Review of the 114 Days spent responding to the Nakhodka Incident
Shigeo Nakayama
Director of the Fire & Disaster Prevention Division, Fukui Prefecture
When the bow of the Nakhodka-the symbol of this oil spill disaster--reached the bottomof the sea off Fukui prefecture, the Fukui prefectural government set up theContingency Countermeasure Headquarters for the first time in 16 years, where itpracticed an office-wide thoroughgoing emergency action for disaster prevention,centering around the supervisory division. I will herein attempt to review ourstruggling efforts that lasted as long as 114 days. I sincerely hope that you will find thishelpful as reference material for oil pollution disasters hereafter, as well as other kindsof accidents and calamities.

1. Initial Response
On the evening of January 3, the 8th Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters phoned
me at home to inform me of the Nakhodka incident for the first time. In response to this,I immediately instructed the person in charge to forward the warning fax that hadcome to the Prefectural Office, to each of the concerned divisions and sections in the
Office, municipalities, fishery guilds, and relevant fire stations. On the next day (4th),
all the section staff were urgently called up, and our 120-day struggle to respond to theoil spill disaster began.
We had had another experience in an oil spill incident with the Liberia cargo boat,"Maritime Gardenia," which was stranded off Kyogamisaki in Kyoto prefecture in
January 1990. This hastened us to access the recorded data on that incident andacquire all of the know-how we could from the last oil spill.
The record revealed these findings: ① They responded to the incident primarily
through human-wave tactics under the supervision of the Maritime Disaster
Prevention Center. Because the same center was set up in Maizurn, Kyoto, it failed tosupply enough guidance and instructions. ②The contingency response was prolonged,
until it lasted beyond summer that year.
③Due to a lack of materials/equipments such as booms, dippers and drum cans,sufficient care and treatment could not be provided. ④ The Prefectural Officeconfronted complex difficulties in responding to the incident, as the oil skimmers weredifficult to prepare.

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In the last incident, approx. 6,240 kiloliters of oil spilled out, while 900 kiloliters of oil
flowed out of the Maritime Gardenia. Accordingly, the scale of the last disaster could bepresumed to be further enlarged. Around noon on January 4, we launched a nationwide order for material and equipment such as booms, dippers, drum cans, oil mats,and hip boots.
On the same day, the staff of 14 relevant divisions in the Office were urgently called up,
and the "In-Office Coordinating Conference for Tanker Oil Spill Incidents" was set up
to discuss possible measures against the oil spill incident that had been caused by the
sunk tanker and the drifting bow.
Moreover, since we at the Prefectural Office had some difficulty in getting informationof our own due to the incident occurring on the open sea, two staff members of thesupervisory section were dispatched to the Disaster Control Division of the 8th
Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters in order that they might serve as a pipeline fordata collection and disaster response consultation.
On the evening of the 4th, we contacted the Japan Maritime Disaster Prevention
Center and commenced the consultation over the basics of the oil-spill cleanup
operation. They instructed us to "resort to human-wave tactics, as there was no
appropriate mechanical force available." "Due to the scale of the disaster, once the oil
has begun washing up on the shore, a patient and laborious response will be needed forquite a long time," they said.
2. Role Allotment among this Prefecture, Municipalities, and Concerned
Organizations for Disaster Prevention
The 2nd Coordinating Conference for Tanker Oil Spills was held on January 5, to
discuss how to share the roles of contingency operations among this prefecture,municipalities (cities, towns and villages), and fishery guilds. (The coastland was
divided into a construction area, transportation area, farmland, and quasi-national
parkland, etc.)
In the prefectural conference, it was pointed out that the shipowner was naturally
responsible for removal of oil expected to wash up on the shore.
At the same time, serious concern was shown that the secondary disaster could possibly
be enlarged, should the administrative authority take a step backward in coping withthe disaster simply because of the shipowner's responsibility. As a result, the major
concern in the conference focused upon how the prefecture, municipalities, andrelevant organizations for the disaster prevention should share their roles in advancing
emergency actions. The conference determined a rough scheme of the duty allotment as2

follows:<<Fishery Associations & Members of the Fukui Harbor Oil Spill Countermeasure
Conference>>
Oil recovery on the sea near the coastland was to be done by the fishery associations
that possess fishing boats or oil skimmers as well as by the members of the Fukui
Harbor Oil Spill Countermeasure Conference.
<<Municipalities & Local Residents>>
Human-wave tactics had to be employed for recovery of the oil that evaded theskimming work on the sea and reached the shore, so the oil ashore was to be recoveredby the municipalities (cities, towns and villages) which were convenient formobilization of the residents.
<<Fukui Prefecture>>
The prefectural authority was to provide all information on the drifting oil on the sea,etc., and distribute--at its expense--all material and equipment such as booms, drumcans, dippers, and hip boots that each city, town, or village would need for theircontingency activities, since difficulty or competition was presumed to come about inprocuring/ordering them.
At first, such role allotment was ascertained among the relevant divisions in the
Prefectural Office. The personnel of 12 municipalities and the relevant fire stations
that cover the coastland were summoned on the afternoon of the 5th, and were briefed
about the respective role allotment in the clean-up operation. Plus, the order of thecoast patrols was completely enforced in readiness for the oil to be stranded.
On the same day, the Fishery Supervisory Division held the "Fishery Environment
Countermeasure Conference" (composed of the fishery associations and the relatedorganizations) and the "Fishery Coordinating Conference for Tanker Oil Spills", where
the best possible control system was mapped out in preparation for the oil to be driftedashore.
[What We Learned from Initial Response]a. Significance of risk management in normal times.... Ensured an alert system and apersonnel call-up system in case of the emergency and data gathering equipment which
was started up etc., two staff members were put on the alert due to the high seas
warning that had lasted from January. 2.
b. Strategies against crises (decision-making when uncertainty remains)3

c. Initial response to a disaster completely depends upon contingency information that
may occasionally change, gathering data for countermeasures, and their analysis.
d. Explicit role allotment and information sharing among those concerned
e. Effective assistance by the prefectural authority for the municipalities that sufferfrom being short-staffed.

3. Wide-Area Supporting System
Following lessons learnt from the Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake which fit thebroadening of a disaster and its scale, we made cooperative agreements with nine
prefectures in the Kinki district and nine prefectures and one city in the Chubu district.
Based on these engagements, we were supplied with a string of booms approx. 15,000
meters long and approx. 7,000 drum cans. It is presumable that we could not receive
truly effective assistance unless we concluded these wide-area cooperative agreements.
Likewise. since Fukui prefecture was scheduled to prepare its own contingency
helicopter only in April, 1997, we were provided with the dispatched helicopters by
Aichi, Gifu, Shiga, Wakayama, and Nagoya prefectures. Sure enough, they showed us
all of their power and potential in scouting the drifting oil from the sky above, making
us realize the significance of the wide-area cooperative agreements.

4. Setting up the Contingency Countermeasure Headquarters
On January 7 when the bow reached the seabed off Anto, Mikuni-cho, Fukui, theContingency Countermeasure Headquarters were set up with the governor as a central
figure, and also the local office was established in Mikuni-cho.
Generally, natural disasters are the main assumption when a local public organization(including Fukui) organizes a central office for disaster prevention in its local
contingency. As such, some special ideas and considerations are to be exerted inorganizing a home office that is intended to work on a contingency plan. Some of them
may include:①Self-contained organization type that can swiftly suit any incident and disaster.

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②Judging from the disaster type, each action or treatment must be left in charge of themost appropriate division. For example, the procurement of drum cans, etc. should bearranged via the commerce/industry division that is closely connected to the industrial
circle; oil treatment ought to be arranged via the health/sanitation division that
handles industrial waste; and the drum cans, etc., collected by municipalities ought tobe arranged via the civil engineering division which manages many of the prefectural
vehicles.
③In each of these significant divisions, the staff of the Fire & Disaster Prevention
Division should be designated as the responsible person until the respective operation
works smoothly; after that, all responsibility is to be left in charge of the director of therespective division.
Based on these ideas, we organized the following divisions in the Contingency
Countermeasure Headquarters, where up to 160 staff were constantly stationed andengaged in the contingency activities.
<<Configuration of the Fukui Contingency Countermeasures Headquarters>>(1) Supervisory Division, (2) General Affairs/Facilities Division, (3) General
Countermeasures Division, (4) Personnel & Employees Service Division, (5) Public
Relations/Document

Control

Division.

(6)

Coordinating

DivisionforRelatedOrganizations, (7) Data Gathering Division, (8) Material/Equipment Procurement
Division(heavymachinery),(9)

Materials/Equipments

Procurement

Division(consumable supplies), (10) Oil Spill Aftertreatment Division. (11) Fisheries
Countermeasure Division, (12) Liaison Division, (13) Rescue/Relief Division, (14) Relief
Parties Acceptance Division, (15) Volunteer Division. (16) Coordinating Division for the
Police, (17) Coordinating Division for the Maritime Safety Office, (18) Coordinating
Division for the Self-Defense Force, (19) Liaison Division for Bow-Related Works, (20)Contingency Helicopter Division. (21) Local Office, (22) In-Site Office, (23) Liaison
Office for Volunteers, (24) Staff Dispatch (to the 8th Regional Maritime Safety Office
Division. the Mikuni Maritime Safety Station. and the Japan Maritime Disaster
Prevention Center), and (25) Mobile Picture Division.
These subdivisions were set up in the 1st sublevel of the Prefectural Office, except for(20) through (25) which were set up outside.

5. Setting up Project Teams
In our contingency plan. different project teams were characteristically established togive close and careful consideration to the relevant disaster and take full advantage ofthe features and prompt response that are only possible with an organization. Each5

project team shown below was put under the supervision of the Contingency
Countermeasures Headquarters, and the existing organizations were utilized fully andcross-sectionally.
(1) Project team for environmental preservation(2) Project team for casualty allowances(3) Liaison conference for technical control of heavy oil recovery(4) Liaison conference for urgent measures for image improvement(5) Working group for usage of disaster contributions(6) Engineering group for temporary roads[What We Learned from Organizing Process]a. For a disaster response, a close and careful consideration is requested whenorganizing the divisions.
b. Each division must be self-contained and the respective authority should bedelegated as such.
c. A project team shall be set up to cope with such problems that involve more than one
division or that the existing prefectural administrative should handle in a crosssectional manner.
d. The most crucial missions of the Contingency Countermeasure Headquarters in caseof emergency are clarifying how to organize an office-wide control system both in nameand in reality, and how to swiftly switch the minds of the staff from the normal toemergency mode.
This is typically reflected in the excavation work of a pit (45 m x 30 m x 3 m) in
Mikuni-cho.
e. Shift work & smooth take-over of operations/a 24-hour system and health control.
f. Among the operations by the Contingency Countermeasure Headquarters,
responding to the press took much time (three regular press interviews a day/document
preparation), proving to be fairly bothersome.

6. Collection & Transmission of Contingency Information
The following is a summary of the tools we used to gather information on the oil
drifting on the Sea of Japan. and the means and forms in which we conveyed suchinformation to the relevant organization of the municipalities:6(1) Major information from the 8th Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters①A hart showing the current status of the drifting oil, and a chart showing its
predicted float.
②A chart showing the condition of the oil spilled from the bow③Vessels, aircraft, etc., mobilized on that given day and the next
④Construction status of temporary roads⑤Bow condition⑥Oil recovery condition on that given day⑦Data released by the press(2) Information from the relevant 12 municipalities①Condition of the oil drifted ashore②Operation status on that given day and plans for the next day③Oil recovery condition on that given day④Condition of volunteer activities, etc.
⑤Condition of supplies, materials and equipment via the in-site office(3) Information from the nuclear power station, etc.
①Condition of the stranded oil②Operation status on that given day and plans for the next day③Oil recovery conditions on that given day(4) Information from the Japan Maritime Disaster Prevention Center①Operation status on that given day and plans for the next day②Oil recovery conditions on that given day(5) Information from those concerned in the construction of temporary roads①Operation status on that given days and plans for the next day②Actual results on that given day(6) Information from those concerned in oil removal from the bow①Operation status on that given day and plans for the next day②Actual results on that given day(7) Oil removal from the bow and construction of temporary roads
The remote-controlled telephoto lens installed in the local office in Yasushima,
Mikiuni-cho were used to monitor their progress at the Contingency Countermeasure
Headquarters on a 24-hour basis. The Internet was used to transmit still pictures.

7(8) The satellite image transmission system of the Fire Defense Agency, the Ministry ofHome Affairs, was employed for still pictures of the above (7); and except at nighttime,
the animated pictures were used to grasp the in-site conditions at the Contingency
Countermeasure Headquarters.
(9) The helicopter TV system of the prefectural main police office was used to project
the status from a bird's eye view, during the Contingency Countermeasure Conference
so that the current conditions could be grasped on a constant basis.
(10) The current condition and estimation of the wave height and swelling were caught
by the marine weather observation system (Namiheikun).
(11) Condition of the drifting oil①Information from the helicopter rented from the Maritime Disaster Prevention
Center②Video image data from the aircraft of the Air Self-Defense Force (Komatsu base)③Aerial photos from the aircraft "Phantom" of the Air Self-Defense Force (Hyakuri
Base)④Information from 5 contingency helicopters of other prefecturers, etc.
⑤Information from S prefectural vessels⑥Information from the fishing boats owned by the prefectural fishery guilds⑦Information from the escort vessel of the Maritime Self-Defense Force⑧Information from the vessels of the Maritime Safety Headquarters⑨Information from the vessels rented from the Maritime Disaster Prevention Center[What We Learned from Data Collection & Transmission]a. Volume of the oil clots drifting on the sea was unclear.
b. Although the drift prediction was provided, its probability and accuracy was no
better than those provided by a weather forecast.
c. Integral data control for the drifting oil was essential, as major drifts continued till
the end of May (8th and 9th Regions).
d. Because the same copies had to be faxed repeatedly, the characters/symbols were
deformed so that complaints about illegible copies came one after another.

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This applies to the areas out of service for cellular phones.
e. The latest information transfer means, such as the Internet, proved to be a powerfultool for contingency responses.

7. Recovery of Drifting Oil on the Sea and Assistance from the Petroleum
Association of Japan.
The above-stated information of the drifting oil was obtained and projected on the map.
Based on that, the plan of operations was elaborated, and the vessels owned by theprefecture, the gut boats arranged by the prefecture, and the fishing boats wereorganized into a large fleet in an attempt to recover the waste oil clots moving
shoreward.
The Sea of Japan in the wintertime raged wilder than we had expected, so there were
few opportunities to set out toward the open sea with ease. Weather permitting,however, we were more successful in recovering oil than we had anticipated.
In particular, the gut boats with cranes brought about outstandingly successful resultsin oil recovery work on the sea.
Here, permit us to express our sincere thanks to the Petroleum Association of Japan for
their special attention and cooperation.
A string of booms for Kansai Electric Power Co., Nihon Atomic Co. Hokuriku ElectricPower Co., Ltd., etc. (all located in Fukui prefecture), the oil skimmers used by the
Self-Defense Force in Mikuni-cho, the oil skimming devices used for oil removal fromthe bow, etc.-We deeply appreciate their kindness and courtesy for renting us all of thematerial/equipment.
We were also indebted for exceptional care and courtesy of the Japan National Oil
Corporation "Shirashima Oil Storage Company" for letting us use the recovery pump of
the "Hakuryu" from January 23 to February 23.
Not only "Shirashima Oil Storage Company," the Japan's real top oil skimmer"Daisantakahoko-Maru" of the "Mutsu-Ogawara Oil Storage Company" showed us a
devoted contribution from January 11 to February 10.

98. Effective Oil Recovery on the Sea, Using Heavy Oil Recovery
Technology
The attached sheet of paper includes the report "About Technical Countermeasure &Information for Heavy Oil Recovery" that the above-mentioned project team "Liaison
Conference for Heavy Oil Recovery Technology" presented to the Fukui Contingency
Countermeasure Headquarters in March.
We are distributing the same report to you, as we believe there would be no such closeand minute data on the test results and consequently that this would aid every
individual in the petroleum industry.
Besides data preparation, this liaison conference has made various attempts, such as
fabrication of countermeasures against the oil that secreted into the sand. We arethinking of introducing some of their trials in the Fukui home page on the Internet-both in Japanese and in English.
Likewise, in the Maizuru Regional District Headquarters of the Maritime Self-Defense
Force, another report was presented on the results of the trial that used the recovery
utensils obtained by processing the tableware cases or waste cans within the vessel.
We are also planning to detail them in our report that will integrally deal with such oil
recovery trials or attempts in Fukui Prefecture.

9. Post-Collection Separation and Countermeasures
In early January when recovery of the drifting oil commenced, the Oil Spill
Aftertreatment Division and some other divisions pointed out that there was concernthat trouble might be caused in later incineration, because in the sites the polluted
mackintosh or gloves were discarded in the drum cans for oil recovery.
In response to this, we promptly instructed the sites to strictly follow the separate
collection of oil and refuse in which the oil drum cans were to be distinguished from therefuse cans in order to prevent the post-collection trouble beforehand.
As of late June, all of the oil drum cans were carried outside the prefecture; only thosefor refuse are presently waiting to be delivered.
Also, in the Municipalities Personnel Meeting of January 5, an explanation was maderegarding the adverse effects that could be occasioned by oil recovery work on the beachthat used heavy machinery, which helps sneak the oil content into the sand.

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We believe that the post-collected treatment was greatly facilitated by resorting to the
all-out human-waste tactics.

10. Future Responses and Potential Problems
The following list of the oil recovered in our contingency plan, suggests which aspect of
the response each authority or agency should improve in the future.
Oil Recovery Condition (as of May 25, 1997)(Measured by kiloliter)

1. Times of aggregation may differ with respective recovery agencies.
2. Data on prefectural agencies are based on information exchange, and data on
national agencies come from the respective public relations material.
3. Presumably, an oil spill of 6,240 kl was caused by the hull breakage, when theamount of 2,800 kl had remained in the bow.

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4. The heavy oil not only formed into mousse but contained seawater, sand, and algae,
so that the total recovered amount resulted in several times of the net oil collected.
[Future Problems]
a. Because of "No distinction between stranded oil/drifting oil" for Kyoto, etc., therecovered amount of the stranded oil was 39,817 Id and that of the drifting oil was 7,282
kl.
These amounts result in approx. 85% for the former and approx. 15% for the latter.
b. This suggests that should an oil spill incident of this scale occurs again, a vast
amount of oil can be stranded even if several high performance skimmers aredispatched.
c. Consequently, it is essential that the national government appeal the necessity forpreventive measures against the recurrence of a disaster both internally and externally,
including the reinforcement of PSC, etc.
d. The local public organizations need to consider proper countermeasures on a steadybasis. They are specifically advised to reevaluate the ongoing local contingency plans,
hold fast to the organization control, and stock the materials and equipment inreadiness for an emergency.

11. Guideline for Removal of the Stranded Oil
When the contingency response had progressed into the second half of the plan and thefatigue of the coast inhabitants and the number of volunteers had increased, theconcerned municipalities raised a vital question: Which guidepost should be followed indetermining the amount of the stranded oil to be removed? In response to this, theFukui Contingency Countermeasure Headquarters mapped out the "Standard
Guidelines for Removal of the Stranded Oil" on February 20 and reported it to theconcerned organizations accordingly.
This guideline not only served as a standard for the removal operation that every
relevant agency was working on, but it also requested that the removal work be
implemented flexibly while considering the natural condition of each area, the state ofeach coastal area, and the local authority's discretion. Refer to the attached sheet, fordetails of the standard removal operation stipulated in this guideline.

12. Conditions of Major Contingency Activities (Reference)
The following is a summary of the major contingency activities for the period between

12the time when the Contingency Countermeasure Headquarters were set up on January
7, 1996 and the time when the same were abolished on April 30.
(1) Material/equipment deployed
Length of a string of booms:21,720 m

Dram cans:70,152 pcs.

Dipper:11,404 pcs.

Hip boots: 3,442 pcs.

(2) Oil recovery work [as of May 28]
Number of oil recovery workers (including volunteers):162,743

Amount of oil spill recovered1:

18,610.5 kl(Amount recovered on the coast - 16,934.4 Id, that recovered by the prefecture 547 kl, that recovered on the sea - 1,129.1 kl)
Quantity removed:

18,659.4 kl

Removal rate:

100.2%* The removal rate exceeds 100%, due to the fact that the quantity removed included
the drum cans containing oily mackintosh or dippers.
(3) Volunteer activity (application ended on 3/3 1)(4) The Self-Defense Force (withdrew on 3/4)
Fukui/Mikuni region

2,864

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Tsuruga zone

1,018

Mikata/Mihama zone

1,635

Total

5,517

(5) Investigations by helicopters, etc.
:

30 times

Prefectural police helicopters (Fukui and Mie Prefectures):

40 times

The Air Self-Defense Force:

22 times

The Maritime Self-Defense Force: 219 times

The Maritime Safety Agency (within 2nd, 8th and 9th Regions): 619 times

Total: 930 times

Contingency helicopters(Shiga, Gifu, Aichi, and Wakayama Prefectures and Nagoya City)(6) Mobilized skimmers, etc.
The Maritime Safety Agency (within 8th Region)

1,991

The Maritime Self-Defense Force

913

Prefectural vessels

97

Fishing boats

2,114

Other working boats

452

Total

5,567

(7) Disaster contributions [as of May 28]
Number of contributions
Amount8,115
727,778,475 yen(8) Contributed supplies [as of April 30th]
Number of contributions

2,294

13. Conclusions
Each and every one of the Fukui inhabitants is deeply grateful to every individual andorganization for providing us with hearty contributions and supplies from all across thecountry, as well as to every volunteer for working on volunteer activities in the harsh
winter season. We would like to express our deepest thanks to them all.

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Likewise, we would sincerely appreciate all contingency countermeasure agencies andinhabitants of the prefectures in Chubu and Kinki blocks, for supplying material
equipment, and valuable information.
We are planning to prepare a record of the actual conditions of the incident and knowhow for disaster prevention derived therefrom. For all the kindness and thoughtfulness
we received, we at the Fukui Prefectural Office would like to express our deepest
thanks by forwarding our records to relevant agencies all across the country.

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