Response to the Evoikos Incident and Shared Responsibility
Petroleum A68ociation of Japan Symposium - October 7-6 1998
Tokyo, JapanSeow Hood Jin
Chief Executive Officer
East Asia Response Pte Ltd.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
In my presentation I will first review EARL’s involvement and response to the Evoikos
incident and the lessons learnt from EARL’s perspective. I will next discuss the roleand relationship of the International Tier Three Response Centres in a response.
Finally I will review the need to recognise shared responsibility and its importance inthe effectiveness of a response.
The response arrangements in Singapore are similar to that in most parts of the world
where the government, through its designated national authority typically thetransport agency, is in charge and in command of a response. In Singapore thedesignated national authority is the Maritime and Port Authority (MPA). All otherresources including that of the spiller and, if he is a shipowner, his Protection andIndemnity club (P&I club), industry, response centres, contractors and other interested
parties are in support of the government. This is consistent with Article 6 of theInternational Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation(OPRC) which identifies the national authority or authorities as being responsible foroil pollution preparedness and response. The Treaty on the International OPRC
Convention was adopted in November 1990 by a Conference convened by theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) and became part of International Law onMay 13, 1995.
The Evoikos and Orapin Global collision occurred at 8.54 p.m. October 15, 1997. EARL
was informed of the collision and oil spill at 10.00 p.m. October 15, 1997 by MPA. EARL
promptly put its response team on alert and requested MPA for details of the owner ofthe stricken ship as a signed third party contract was required before EARL could beactivated. At 2.10 a.m. October 16, MPA requested EARL to attend a meeting withSpica Services Ltd, the representative of the shipowner’s P&l Club. At 3.00 a.m.
October 16 Spica Services Ltd signed the contract on behalf of the U.K. P&l Club.
EARL deployed two fast response vessels which arrived at the Evoikos spill site at 5.30a.m.

For the duration of the response EARL took instructions from Spica and ITOPF and theMPA who were in command and control of the response. For the first three days theresponse was mainly dispersant application from vessels and a total of 31 ,600 litres(158 drums) of dispersants were used. Aerial dispersant application using a helicopter
and Simplex helibucket was deployed on the afternoon of the third day (October 1 8).
Corexit 9500 was used on this run and the dispersant was reported to be effective aftera few hours to allow the dispersant to work on the heavy oil. EARL also deployedprotective booms around the Evoikos.
EARL was involved in containment and recovery operations from the third to theseventh day (October 1 8 to 22). EARL procured additional vessels and barges frommarine contractors to supplement EARL’s vessels for these operations. Under thecontract, these additional vessels would not be provided by EARL but by the spiller.
Approximately 130 tons of oil and oily water were recovered.
Seven hundred and fifty metres of protective booms were deployed to protect Raffles
Marina on the western side of mainland Singapore on October 21.
From the eighth to eleventh day (October 23 to 26) the response was mainly to use
absorbents for thin oil layers and sheen removal. Absorbent snares and booms wereused on the beaches, jetties and near shore waters of the Southern Islands which wereimpacted by oil. EARL was stood down at the end of the eleventh day, October 26.
EARL’s own staff of 20 responders was insufficient to perform the response activities
requested notwithstanding the extended working hours of up to 16 hours a day. EARL
contracted additional specialist manpower from the United Kingdom (5 from OSRL),
Australia (6 from AMSA) and Malaysia (5 from Sri Mukali). The Singapore Civil
Defense Force (SCDF) provided 15 men to assist daily.
The oil companies and the Singapore Polytechnic also assisted with manpower for
vessel operations and logistics support.
A total of 1,950 metres of both offshore and nearshore booms were deployed and usedwith 5 skimmers for containment and recovery operations Three EARL fast response
vessels with three support vessels were deployed for dispersant and containment andrecovery operations. In addition, twelve contract vessels and storage barges weredeployed. Nine boat dispersant spraying sets and two helicopter spray buckets weredeployed for dispersant application and a total of 31,600 litres (158 drums) ofdispersants were used. One hundred and forty three bales of absorbents - in pads,booms, snares and blanket form were used.
The use of the ADDS pack for aerial dispersant application was proposed but rejectedby the MPA.
The impact of oil on shorelines was significant but could have been worse were it not forfavourable winds and currents. While all incidents are unfortunate we must learn fromthem to be better prepared in the future. My comments will focus on the lessons learnt
from EARL’s perspective.
A key lesson for EARL is in managing expectations. This is particularly important in amajor spill incident when resources become insufficient. The authorities had
expectations of EARL as one of the many response contractors. The P&l Club who hadcontracted EARL had expectations as a client and ‘payer’ of the cleanup costs.
Unfortunately these expectations were not what EARL could provide or was contractedto provide. Furthermore, the authorities’expectations and the P&l Club’s expectations
were often different and EARL experienced difficulties in performing cleanup
operations from instructions which were sometimes in conflict. Managing expectations
and clarifying them before an incident is therefore essential.
In this incident, EARL deployed only a part of its equipment stockpile. The limitation todeploying additional equipment was manpower and suitable marine craft. However
EARL provided all the equipment and manpower requested by the P&l Club under thecontract and, in fact, provided more by providing logistical support and contracting
additional resources when requested.
In our view EARL fully met its role and design as a regional response centre. In fact, it
did more than its obligations under the contract to provide response services. Yet there
were murmurs of dissatisfaction of EARL’s contributions! This may be due tounrealistic expectations and misconceptions of the role of the International Tier Three
Response Centres.

Let me therefore talk about the International Tier Three Response Centres and theirrole and relationship with the authorities and others in a response. The oil industry in
the I 980’s decided that they needed to position oil spill response resources at strategic
locations in the world to cover their risks to oil spills from their operations or in thetransportation of oil. They established three International Tier 3 Response Centres
namely Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL) in Southampton, Clean Caribbean
Cooperative (CCC) in Florida and East Asia Response Limited (EARL) in Singapore.
These Tier 3 Response Centres have deployment arrangements for rapid response to oil
spill incidents in their respective regions and globally. As such, the industry believes
that the need to replicate similar high cost equipment stockpiles around the world canbe avoided. Experience has shown that it is more cost effective and far easier tomaintain expertise and equipment maintenance standards at a few selected locations
than at many scattered sites. The establishment of these three International Tier 3
Response Centres is a demonstration of the support of the oil industry to the OPRO
Convention. The industry has worked through IPIECA with IMO and governments todevelop and enhance contingency plans and oil spill response resources in the world.
Access to the resources of the centres is through membership. Members pay annual fees
and have a service agreement with the centres. In the event of a member spill, a Tier 3centre would respond and work with the member and the government and otherresponders in combatting the spill. In the event of a non-member or third party spill, aTier 3 centre does not guarantee a response, but if it does respond on an ad-hoc contract,
it would endeavour to work with the spiller, government and other responders.
Whilst the International Tier 3 Centres are established and now well-known to theindustry, oil spill community and government authorities, there is often a
misconception or misunderstanding of these centres in terms of their role andcapability. Perhaps we have “oversold” the Centres by telling what they are and what
they can do but not telling what they are not and what they cannot do. I would like toclarify this misconception and misunderstanding which can detract from an optimalresponse.
The centres have a stockpile of varied equipment and a small core group of specialists
that were designed to supplement a national resource and capability but not to replace
it. We are one of many resources that can cooperate in a response. The centres are not“ one-stop” shops with unlimited resources waiting, like the cavalry, to save the callerwhen he summons. We are also not designed to take command and control as that roleshould stay with the national authorities.
In addition to the stockpile of varied equipment each of the three centres has thespecially designed Airborne Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS Pack). There are only a
few of such units in the world. The ADDS Pack is a roll-on-roll-off aluminium tank witha capacity of 5,500 US gallons to be used from a Hercules L-382 aircraft for aerialdispersant spraying offshore. EARL and OSRL each has a dedicated Hercules L-382 oncharter and on standby 24 hours a day while CCC obtains one from the commercial
market when required. The ADDS Pack is increasingly recognized by industry andgovernments as the only effective means of significantly reducing the threat of massive
shoreline impact from a major offshore spill.
Dispersants are a powerful option in a response provided the conditions are suitable fordispersant application. EARL had successfully used the ADDS pack in the “Once” spillin Thailand in 1996. Two thousand five hundred barrels of Massilla crude wasdispersed in two days with no significant shoreline impact. In a response all options or
a combination of options including dispersants, containment and recovery andshoreline clean up should be considered.
The centres are designed as part of the oil industry’s tiered response concept. They
provide an international tier 3 response and are a source of expertise and equipment tosupplement the resources available under tier 2 should the latter be insufficient tomeet the demands of the response effort.
The centres had used capacity labels to describe their equipment stockpiles, forexample, “a 3OKT stockpile”. However these capacity labels led to a misunderstanding
and expectation that a centre had equipment and manpower to clean up a 3OKT spill.
In the “Evoikos” spill, EARL was criticized for not having the resources, both
equipment and manpower, to clean up the spill of 28KT.
One method of describing the size of an equipment stockpile is to calculate the totalskimming capacity of all offshore skimmers. An efficiency factor is applied to thenameplate capacity (manufacturer’s rated capacity) and it is assumed that the skimmer
is in use for a fixed number of hours a day and for seven days. This calculation includes
all types of skimmers and for both light and heavy oils and that all skimmers aredeployed simultaneously. The US Coast Guard standard is based on the nameplate
capacity of all types of skimmers multiplied by a 20% efficiency factor and by 24 (for a24-hour operation) and by 7 (for a 7-day operation). The assumption is that all theskimmers are deployed simultaneously and are in use continuously. However neither
method is meant to describe the oil recovery capacity but rather to indicate, very
approximately, the relative size of equipment stockpiles. We all know that the amountof oil a skimming unit can recover depends on many factors including the type of oil, its
viscosity and spreading characteristics, the location of the spill, the thickness of the oillayer encountered, and the wind and currents. Typically, only about 10% to 15% of anoil spill can be recovered by mechanical means.
In the event of a large spill, many parties are involved in the response and they allshare in the responsibility for an effective and successful cleanup.
The national authority is in overall charge and its contingency plan should address how
resources will be mobilized, who will mobilize them, how these resources will interface
with each other and how they will be controlled and used. For a national plan, theresponsibility for its development and exercising resides with the national authority.
During a spill, the national authority will mobilize its own resources and call uponother resources that it will need for the response. These other resources will come frommany local sources such as other national agencies, the oil industry, contractors andothers.
The International Tier 3 Response Centres are one of these resources that may also becalled.
The Tier 3 centres are, therefore, one of many resources that can be mobilized in aresponse. They were not designed nor resourced to clean up a spill on their own. To
describe some other aspects of this shared responsibility let me use the example of achain of activities when a centre is activated. To mount a response at the spill site,equipment and manpower needs to be deployed from the centre to the site. When thecentre is activated the centre, in this case EARL, will mobilize and arrange for theequipment and manpower to be transported to the airport, loaded on the plane andflown to the designated airport. EARL is responsible for these activities. On arrival, theclient (spiller) is responsible for clearing customs and immigration and transportation

to the spill site. The client is also responsible for storage, procurement of labor, boats,barges and waste disposal. The client will also be responsible for liaison with thenational authority in the response. EARL will support the client and government
authority with advice as necessary.
If the spiller is an oil company and if the company is an EARL member, EARL will be
activated by the company. The company is responsible for receiving EARL’s equipment
and providing support and other equipment such as boats for the response. Thecompany would normally have their company contingency plan and response team toperform these tasks. The national authority may provide equipment if it has access tothem within the country. The government can exert considerable power and influenceduring an emergency. However in the case of a third party spill from a ship, theshipowner and his P&l club may not have staff or resources at the spill site to provide
the support to EARL. In this case the national authority or its designated agency orcontractor has to provide the support. These different scenarios should be considered in
the national plan and the resources and interfaces that need to be mobilized andintegrated should be identified.
The national authority is responsible for control of the cleanup. The spiller isresponsible for the cost and the provision of whatever resources he can muster tosupport the cleanup effort led by the government. EARL provides equipment andmanpower to support the national authority and spiller in the response. For theresponse to be successful, all parties must share in the responsibility for the cleanup.
I have described the role and relationship of the national authority, the spiller andresponse resources like EARL. But how prepared are we?
Having a well-written contingency plan is not in itself “being prepared”. But having one
that has been regularly tested to prove it will work in the event of a spill, is. The
contingency plan needs to be tested for robustness and the cooperative arrangements,
in particular, the relationships, roles and responsibilities of all involved need to beexercised.
Tests and exercises should be as realistic as possible as it is tempting to make themeasy so that everybody feels good when they are over. “Easy” drills lead to overconfidence and complacency. An oil spill is a stressful situation and, in such a crisis,interfaces and relationships of all involved are severely tested and human behaviors
change. Friends may become foes and prior agreements and understanding can become
disagreements and misunderstanding that result in confrontation rather thancooperation. Realistic testing leads to lessons learnt and the subsequent changes andimprovements lead to enhanced preparedness. Even though every eventuality cannot
be anticipated, confidence and preparedness will grow. A rigorous exercise program
needs the support of all parties and the commitment of resources to really test thecontingency plan and the roles and relationships between the different interest groups.
Oil spills create an arena of potential conflict of objectives: a government to “punish”
the spiller and cleanup the spill to return the environment to its pre-spill condition; aspiller/shipowner and his P&l club to minimise the cost and impact of the spill on hiscompany’s reputation and business; a person who has suffered injury or property
damage to seek maximum compensation; environmental and other special interest
groups to publicise their cause. Cooperation of all these interest groups can be achieved
with strong leadership or it can quickly degenerate into conflict and confrontation.
Conflict saps energy, is demoralising and diverts resources from what should be thecommon foe, the oil spill. Although there are many diverse interest groups thegovernment needs to mobilise them to work collectively to effectively fight the spill.
In conclusion, I have reviewed EARL’s involvement and response to the Evoikos
incident and the lessons learnt from EARL’s perspective. The International Tier Three
Response Centres are one of many resources that support a response effort and I hope I
have clarified the role and capability of these centres and that of EARL in our region.
For spill response to be effective, the recognition and commitment to shared
responsibility and cooperation by all parties is essential. To be well-prepared, national
contingency plans and arrangements need to be exercised and I urge the responsible
authorities to give this the priority it deserves.
Thank you.