論文

The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural
Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period:
Special Reference to Animation
Hisae Nakanishi & Saeedeh Mousavi

Ⅰ. Introduction
This study attempts to examine the changing approaches to art and cultural
policies since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Followed by the analysis of generaltrends in the last 39 years, this article delineates characteristics of the policies
over the past ten years when changes have become evident. A special focus ismade on dramatic arts, and animation which the government of Iran has
particularly drawn its attention and recognized its significance. In response to
the government-led production of animation, negotiation strategies between theartists and the producers in this field and the government will be discussed in
the final section of this article. A trend of gradual expansion of the producers’
autonomous space will also be noted as an emerging phenomenon in today’s
Iran.
Despite the fact that Iran’s government was predicted to fall within a few
years since the Revolution, Iran has recently been one of the most politicallystable countries in the region. The solidarity of the state has often generated anargument, particularly among American and European scholars, that solidnessof the government indicates Iran’s rigid framework of Islamic theocracy foundedon militant Islam. For example, Mehdi Khalaj at the Washington Instituteconsidered that Iran’s militarization of cultural areas was seen through its “softpower” approach but insisted that such a policy was failing as the Iran’s regime
may not be able to cope with the emerging social trends (2012, 1).
It is generally conceived that Islamic ideology has shaped the government
policy in post-revolutionary Iran. Cultural policies are not the exception. The
state has monopolized not only the production of art and culture but that ofartists. However, the review of Iran’s art and cultural policymaking in the post1

論

文

revolutionary period shows that Iran went through different phases in its art
and cultural policies. Despite such visible changes, few studies have been
conducted to shed light on how the government has coopted with the changing
reality of the growing youth population. What policies has Iran employed in art
and culture? How has the government adjusted its art and cultural policies tomaintain Islamic ideology? How has the government negotiated with the people,
particularly the artists? The following sections will answer these questions.

Ⅱ. T he Post-Revolutionary State Policies in Art and Culture:
General Trends
1. Islamic Revolution and State as Guardian of Culture
The Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 was fundamentally a cultural andideological revolution. The Islamic government which took over the state power
after the revolution primarily defined its role in a religious and cultural
framework. The cultural goals of the government originated from two
directions. One was rooted in the belief of modernist theoreticians such as Jalal
Al-e-Ahmad and Ali Shariati. Al-e- Ahmad, an Iranian secular intellectual,
initially emphasized the necessity of removing effects of West-toxication (Gharb
Zadegi) in Iran to regain Iranian political and cultural identity. Ali Shariati, a
key ideologue of the Revolution, adopted this concept and identified it as theresult of the Shah's modernization policies.
The other direction was the call for the regeneration of authentic Islamic
culture which was considered to have declined during the past Pahlavi regime.
Religious thinkers such as Ayatollah Beheshti, Ayatollah Motahari and Ayatollah
Khomeini emphasized the need to strengthen Islamic religious values.
On this basis, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran officiallyemployed the concept of Velayat-e Faqih (the Rule of Ulama) as the centerpieceof the Iran's government and political system to allow multilateral interference
and presence of the government in all cultural developments of the state inorder to establish a type of religious society. As Bayat and Janbaz argued, “thegovernment interfered in all aspects of social life with the hope of creating acultural utopia and considered cultural affairs as political affairs and undertook
its responsibilities” (Bayat & Janbaz, 2011, 35). In 1985, according to the order

2

The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

issued by Khomeini, the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council (SCRC)1 wasestablished to act as a center for cultural policy making.
2. State Monopolization of MediaIn the above-mentioned context, the media, through radio and television
broadcasts, has played the task of preserving and promoting national andcultural values, namely Islamic-Shia ideals. The concept of “fight against Westtoxication or Westernization”, being one of the ideals of Iran’s revolution,
originally meant Iran’s fight against western technologies which had entered
Iran during the 1960’s and the 70’s.
It was assumed that they made the body of the Iranian society sick. 2
However the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini did not reject media
technologies altogether; instead, he believed such “features of modernity” werein need of a thorough “cleansing”: the elimination of Western cultural values
such as individualism, the pursuit of liberty without fulfilling one’s social
responsibility (Mottahedeh, 2008, 2).
As a result, the broadcasting was “no longer an instrument of the Great
Satan, 3 but became a powerful tool for spreading the message of the Revolution
and Islam” (Khiabany, 2009, 165). Television broadcasting is the most popularand available mass media in Iran which has enjoyed a remarkable expansion
and development after the revolution.
Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic (VVIR) which later changed its nameto IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), was founded as a public service
based on a profound reform of the previous Shahi TV4 in order to Islamicize themedium. IRIB was under the direct control of the Supreme Leader.
In this process of Islamizing broadcasting, various reforms have taken placein the organization. Despite state effort to incorporate the voice of the people in
the program, the content of radio and TV broadcasting was, in reality, the merereflection of what the government considered the voice of the people and thus
became weapons of the government’s propaganda (Sreberny and Mohammadi
1994, 196).
Thus, IRIB was the propaganda tool of the Khomeini-led government topreach Iran’s Islam, the so-called revolutionary values and spirits such as
independence, resistance and Islamic values. The Revolutionary government in
the formative period of the Islamic Republic called for national mobilization in
3

論

文

the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). While the Ministry of Islamic Guidance andCulture (MIGC) has generally played an important role in shaping media andpress policies, the power of IRIB was much stronger. IRIB channels were theonly TV channels until 1995. The government also established the Islamic
Propagation Organization which has closely worked with the MIGC.
The above-mentioned state monopolization of the media continued until the endof the Iran-Iraq War. The reconstruction period (1989-1996) of the war-tornstate of Iran witnessed a change in the government management fromrevolutionary and ideological to more pragmatic policies. This change wasreflected in the government approaches to culture and art described in thefollowing section.

Ⅲ. Changing Policies and Emerging Dilemmas
1. Toward the More Audience Receptive Programming
The post-war period of Iran has faced various political, economic and social
challenges. The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 brought about a new needof state legitimacy. The new Supreme Leader Khamenei came to power in 1989.
Economic reconstruction called for changes in policies for women’s participationin the labor market, which constituted a social and cultural debate. Due topolitical and economic changes which took place in the reconstruction andsubsequent periods of the reformist government led by Muhammad Khatami(1997-2005), art and cultural policymaking has also faced some challenges.
One of the biggest challenges was how to adjust to the new realities of Iran’ssociety in which the new and young generation and the emerging middle classpeople had different tastes and expectations on the broadcasts.
There was an increase in people using illegal satellite dishes. It goes without
saying that the popular use of internet also increased since the middle of the
1990’s. People started to receive international TV programs among which havebeen produced in the Iranian diaspora communities in the world. Under thesecircumstances, IRIB faced the need to reconsider measures on safeguarding its
broadcasting as well as the national interest which was presumed to have been
secured by a rather repressive broadcasting management.
With a growing number of the younger generation who are very indifferent to
the religiously oriented IRIB channels, the government undertook different
4The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

measures: increasing the number of IRIB TV channels and broadcasting foreign
movies and programs which are not fully consistent with Islamic rules andguidelines, 5 consequently tackling and visualizing controversial social issues
which have been regarded as taboo in Iranian traditional society. 6 The
government has also increased the production of commercial and entertaining
films and serials, expanding the provincial networks to broadcast local
programs. Furthermore, measures were taken in increasing the official or statesponsored, and pro-governmental private satellite channels while also jamming
foreign satellites, and increasing internet filtering.
The above-mentioned changes in the direction of the state policy can betraced through the emergence of a comprehensive policy framework, “Five-Year
Plans for National Economy and Social and Cultural Development (FYDP).” A
series of FYDP have been issued by the government in the last two and half
decades and have projected the art and culture policies of the state on a macrolevel.7
The review of defined cultural goals and policies in these plans shows aremarkable change from the 1990’s to the period after 2000. For example, int he f i r st F Y DP ( 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 ) , t he fo c u s of c u lt u r a l p o l ic y w a s o n t henationalization of cultural activities and the avoidance of “governmentalization”8
for cultural affairs. On the other hand, the main aim of the second FYDP (19951999) was to fight against “cultural invasion.” The conservative faction of thegovernment considered the massive proliferation of the foreign-sponsoredsatellites, Persian news and TV channels which IRIB itself recognized as
attractive, as a sign of cultural invasion.
Both plans for govermentalization of cultural affairs and the fight against
cultural invasion were partially implemented. The above-mentioned partial
implementation of the two FYDPs led to a new policy. The third FYDP (20012 0 0 5) was pla nned to improve the ma nagement system a nd implement
necessary structural reforms such as the promotion of the private sector.
The government decided to allocate US16 million to IRIB to produce originalfilms and programs. IRIB thereafter started to mobilize two other affiliatedorganizations, Sima Film and Saba Cultural Artistic Center. While Sima Filmprovided facilities needed for producing films and programs, Saba facilitated“services and facilities for animated, computer generated audio-visual programs”( K h iaba r y, 2 0 0 9, 174 -17 5 ). Thus , t hese two I R I B a f f iliated product ion
5

論

文

organizations started to play a significant role in making TV films andanimated and computer generated programs more appealing to the audience.
The Fourt h FY DP (2 0 0 6 -2 011) being associated wit h I ra n’s 2 0 -Yea r
Perspective Document stated the position of Iran in 2024. Here, much weight
was placed on the issue of national identity. Moreover, the role of the media,
particularly animation was highlighted as a key policy agenda in protecting,developing, and promoting national and cultural identity. This emphasis on theconstruction of national and cultural identity through the media has manifested
a new approach under the name of “soft power”, which will be discussed later.
2. T he Construction of the Civil Society and“Beautifying (Ziba Sazi) Public
Space”The emergence of the reformist administration (1997-2005), led by President
Muhammad Khatami marked a turning point in Iran’s art and cultural policy.
His initiative in promoting the “Civil Society” (Jame’ye-madani, literally meaning
Medina’s Society) became a driving force for liberalizing public space bymoderating press regulations and codes and by establishing art and culture
centers. The Bahman Cultural Center (Farhangsara-ye Bahman) was alreadyestablished during the Rafsanjani’s period (1989-1997) symbolizing the state-led
promotion of art and cultural events, and continued to be active during the
Khatami’s reign.
Yet, the more obvious support of the government in cultural and art activities
was shown in this period, represented by the House of Artists (Khaneye
Honarmandan) established in 2000, and the Saba Cultural Artistic Center( M o a s s e s s - e Fa rh a ng i v a H o n a r i -ye S a b a ) i n 2 0 01 ( G l ig or, 2 014 ,kindle,2252/6576). It was also in the Khatami’s administration that several
dozens of state-owned museums were established and hundreds of private
galleries received permission to open (Ibid, 330/6376).
The increasing number of art galleries and museums symbolized not only thepromotion of the civil society but the attempt to “beautifying” (Ziba Sazi) public
space. Moreover, it was an effort of making public space more entertaining (Ibid,
1520/6376).
This opening of the art and cultural areas was led by Ataollah Mohajerani,then Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, who was appointed by thenPresident Khatami in 1997. Mohajerani was one of the strongholds of the
6The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

Khatami’s administration promoting the freedom of expression as well as
supporting social and cultural activities. A reform oriented and moderate
thinker, Alireza Samiazar, was also appointed by Mohajerani to take on thepost as Director of The Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art (TMOCA) as
well as that of Director General of the Visual Arts Office that was affiliated to
the MCIG (Ibid. 3123/6376).
On the contrary to the above-mentioned state-led promotion of cultural andart activities, the freedom of expression and publication generally curtailed
from Khatami’s second term to the Ahmadinejad’s period. A growing numberof secularist and reformist journalists and writers began to be suppressed after
the Student Revolt of Tehran University’s Dormitory in July 1999. Dozens ofpublishing houses lost their permission to continue. However, this general trend
backlashing publications was not directed to the art and culture policies. This ispartially because of a paradoxical relationship between the state’s desire tosafeguard national and cultural identity and the state’s deepening policy toaccommodate the youth. The more the state endeavors to secure national andcultural identity through arts and cultural works, the more it needs to relax ormoderate regulations in broadcasting and public space so as to attract theaudience including the youth.
Ⅳ. The Emergence of Soft Power Approach Toward Opening a DiscursiveSpace
1. The Discourses of Soft War and Soft PowerAs analyzed earlier, the government developed much concerns about “cultural
invasion.” Yet, it was ironical that the phenomenon of cultural invasion waspartially the sub-product of the government’s employing a more accommodative
approach to the audience.
The idea of cultural invasion was closely linked with that of “soft war.”
According to statements made by the Islamic Development Organization in
Iran, a post-revolutionary institute that has promoted “Islamic Revolutionary”(meaning, Iran’s Shi’i revolutionary) values, soft war is “any kind of psychological
warfare action and media propaganda which targets the society and induces
the opposite side to accept the failure without making any military conflict”(Price, 2012 ,2400).

7

論

文

Though there is no clear definition given by the government, the term “softwar” started to be employed by Supreme Leader Khamenei around 2012 when
nuclear negotiations appeared to be at a deadlock. His reference to soft war was
generally in the context of his criticism against the US policy toward Iran.
Given the fact that Ira n had been under economic sa nctions a nd has aconfrontational relationship with Israel and the US, Khomenei insisted that the
US and Israel (referred to as Zionist regime) imposed economic sanctions andlaunched incessant political criticisms against Iran’s policies toward Iraq and
Syria as well as Ira n’s nuclear energ y policy. Khamenei regarded suchcharacteristic of the policy as soft war implying that there was no real military
war aga inst Ira n but emphasizing that a series of the US a ntagonistic
statements and policies attempted to weaken Iran’s revolutionary values andharm the establishment from the inside.
Thus, soft war as interpreted by Khamenei meant whatever rhetoric andtactic the US uses to attack Iran verbally, not militarily. It is soft as opposed tomilitary. It is sort of war which is psychological in the sense that media wasutilized as a propaganda tool as noted above (Price, 2012, 2400).
As a rhetorical counterattack to the soft war that Khomenei considers Iranwas placed in, Iranian academic and media circles have developed the idea of“soft power.” It is to be noted that Supreme Leader Khamenei has not used thephrase “soft power” in his speeches. The idea of “soft power” has been first usedamong Iranian intellectuals as a key element of Iran’s defense and security
strategies.
As is well known, the concept of soft power originated in the works of Joseph
Nye in the post-Cold War era. Nye argued that an alternative way of exercising
power by using culture and communications replaced military power and thatthe real power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get thedesired outcomes in the age of information (2009, 160-163).9
One of the central points of Nye’s thoughts on soft power is the use of culture
as an important part of public diplomacy (Nye, 2004, 102-103). By referring to
the idea of cultural or “public diplomacy,” Iranian media and academicians
adopted the term soft power as a representative approach of the state toexercise a countermeasure to the West’s launching soft war against Iran (Price,
2012, 2397).

8

The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

On the other hand, the notion of soft power and that of soft war changed over
the years. Its real meaning in actual practice depended on the political andinternational environment Iran was placed in. When Iran faced a series ofverbal attack from Israel on possible military attack, soft war was identified as“Zionist” intrigue by the Supreme Leader. The government also started to
employ the strategy of soft power as Iran’s non-military, security policies
toward Iraq and Syria (Akbarzadeh & Conduit, 2016, 158-162). As a matter offact, political and logistical involvements of the Islamic Republic Revolutionary
Guards Corp (IRGC) in Iraq and Syria are today referred to as soft approach(Ibid).
In the context of Iran’s contemporary art and cultural policies, the debate on
soft power between the government and stakeholders in art production ismainly on the government’s involvement or interference in art and culturalactivities. The recent development of this debate will be briefly covered in thenext section.
2. E
 merging Discursive Space: Dialogs between the Government and“Artists
and Scholars”
The debate on soft power in the arts and cultural activities started to become
more visible in the last five years. A series of state-led conferences andseminars commenced since May 2014, such as the Conference of “National
Power in the Mirror of Dramatic Arts” held at the University of Arts in Tehran
on June 2, 2014. The objective of the Conference was to initiate “a potential
dialogue between the representatives of state and those in the field of art inacademia.”10 The University of Arts in Tehran has been one of the leading
universities in Iran that has historically produced many prominent artists:
painters, sculptors, animation producers and so on. It was in this context thatthe above-mentioned conference was held in this university.
According to the symposium’s discussants and latterly published proceedings,
the Conference of National Power was primarily designed to analyze thepotentiality of dramatic arts in theater, cinema and animation as the means of
exercising soft power (Hosnaee, 2014, 7 & 11). The conference covered elevenacademic seminars and three round tables with the participation of researchersand scholars from academic circles. Representatives from IRIB, the Ministry of

9

論

文

Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL) were major participants from the government.
Since the objective of the conference was to provide an opportunity for
opening up “a discursive space” between artistic research centers and strategicand defense research centers (Ibid, 5), in addition to plenary sessions, several
separate panels with specific themes on the relationship between dramatic artsand national power were conducted.
According to Saeedeh Mousavi, the conference speaker and observer, the ideaof soft power dominated the heated discussions both in the plenary and panel
discussions. A group of lecturers representing the government put muchemphasis on the role of soft power. For example, Mostafa Moslehzadeh andKazem Gharib -Abadi, diplomats from the Ministry of Foreig n Affa irs,
articulated that the government expected dramatic arts to play the role ofendorsing both the government’s domestic and foreign policies. The use of thestate’s dramatic arts is, as they argued, an aspect of cultural and public
diplomacy. They also insisted that the artists and scholars in this field shouldplay a vital role for this purpose.
Thus, by interpreting soft power as manifested in cultural and public
diplomacy which is presumably in the hand of the government, the government
ultimately reduces the role of the artists to an instrument for the state tolegitimize its policies. This dominant view was apparent from the government
speakers.
An alternative view was expressed by many academicians and artists,
pa rticula rly sociolog ists a nd semioticia ns . They a rg ued that state -led
productions of films and television programs still remained a “propaganda”
approach, implicitly meaning the state’s dominant discourse emphasizing Islamicvalues and revolutionary spirits. As a result, the programs were, as they stated,
not reflecting political and social conditions and did not meet the needs of Iran’ssociety.
By criticizing the current policies of the government, they argued that artists
should be responsive to the demands of the society and thus stay independent
from the control of the government in order to fulfill this task. Achieving such
responsibility by the artists will be, they say, the basis for strengthening
national power and solidarity (Moradi, 2014, 63).

10

The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

Based on this alternative view of the state-artist relationship, a group ofscholars and artists who hold this view suggested that IRIB as a national
broadcasting medium should be more neutral and provide a foundation on whichstate and civil society can interact and mutually produce discourses (Azimifard,
2014, 60).
Discussions at this conference also touched on how much the art and cultural
products should be designed to answer the audience. For example, Farzan
S ojoodi , professor i n t he f ield of semiot ics advocated t he necessity ofincorporating a “targeting audience” approach in the state-led broadcastingprog ra ms a nd f i l ms . I n pa r t icu la r, he emphasized t he sig n i f ica nce ofunderstanding the needs of the youth in Iran. Along this line, the filmmaker
Majid Sheikh Ansari emphasized the role of animation as an effective source formaking collective memories which can construct the identity of children andthe youth, ultimately leading to social cohesion.
Those who emphasized the role of animation brought up the Japanese
animation industry as an exemplified case of a state achieving soft power. A
special reference was made to the animation series Captain Tsubasa (1983-1986)
as a successful case which well utilized the popularly accepted baseball togenerate a collective memory among the Japanese.
To explain the reason for putting much emphasis on animation, a few reasonsshould be addressed. First, much was shared through animation programs
broadcasted on TV immediately after the Revolution. With the post-revolutionary
elimination of dramas and films produced in the West, Japanese animation
programs dominated TV programs as non-Western products and were mainly
designed to target children for both educational and entertainment purposes.
However, not only the children but adults also watched animation.
Second, owing to the state’s reliance on the animation programs being the
major TV channels, the government considered animation as an important tool
to transmit political and religious ideology. Third, the global expansion ofJa pa ne s e a n i m at io n pro duc t s a s a p op c u lt u re re a c he d t he yout h i ncontemporary Iran. Though Iranian people have been attracted to Japanese
animation and manga, viewing of TV programs declined. In order to increase
the viewing rate, the government promoted the production of animation bystate owned broadcasting companies, and started to outsource parts ofanimation production to Iranian artists and producers.
11

論

文

Due to the constitutional constraint which limits privatization of industries,
the promotion and construction of the animation industry still remains aquestion. However, a sign of the progress in opening further opportunities forprivatization of animation production was visible at this conference.
A newly appointed director of Saba (Animation Center), Rahim Livani, statedin his introductory speech that Saba today considers economic orientation in
animation production. This direction is in contrast with the official declarationof the center11 giving Saba the mandate to produce “pure and religious
animations” (Zarei, 2013). As is well known in Iran, IRIB has lost much audience
partially because of the dominant features of religious animations.
As previously addressed, a quasi-privatization started in IRIB affiliatedorganizations. With the closing of its internal production studios in early 2016,
decentralization of production in Saba began by subcontracting to private
animation production companies on a contract-based framework. The separationof the Saba administration from IRIB’s Pooya channel, an animation andchildren’s TV channel considered to be the main medium for screening
domestically produced animated films, has significantly expanded the domain of
activities of the independent animation producers.12
The above-mentioned development has had a visible impact on the quality andto some degree the popularity of the programs. In addition, the launching of
new children and youth channels like Nahal and Omid shows a policy shiftheading for the production of more target oriented TV programs in terms ofage. This trend has generally led to the development of an audience conscious
approach: TV program producers started to pay more attention to the taste andpreferences of their audience.13
Thus, the above-mentioned statement by Livani can be considered a sign of adeveloping tendency inside Saba to shift from its conventional educational andreligious approach in animation production to something more entertaining. In
order to achieve this, Saba is obviously required to expand autonomy of theartists in production in the long run. Though it is likely to take time until IRIB
and Saba adopt this degree of expansion, the emerging audience oriented
consciousness of IRIB’s and Saba’s is significantly manifested in the conference.
The above analysis of the conference discussions shows a newly emerging
relationship between the state and artists. It is true that the speakers
representing the government largely remained in the framework of the
12

The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

propaganda approach. Yet, the fact that the conference was held in an attempt
to create a space of dialog between policymakers and artists and scholars is, initself, a new phenomenon. Moreover, it is to be noted that such an attempt
actually led to a heated and continuous debate.
3. Increasing Interactions between Policymakers and Artists
In general, the state has maintained its control over broadcasting and national
cinema by setting up a licensing system which closely supervises privately
produced programs to verify their consistencies with Islamic rules and laws.
Through this system, producers must follow specific and sometimes ‘unwritten’
codes in order to obtain the authorization for their programs. These codes areplaced within the Islamic framework which determines the content, dialogue
and language, sexuality, and violence of the programs produced.
However, there is much ambiguity in the government censorship andmonitoring of production outsourced to the private sector. There is a generalperception among outsourced producers that no specific guideline is provided by
the government yet they should always follow some unwritten codes.14 So-called
self-censorship always exist in a society like Iran not only for artists but also forwriters, as backlash often takes place after some moderation of press codes andliberalization of expression, during the political fluctuation period between
reformism and conservatism.
As is often pointed out, less progress was made in economic privatization
during the past administrations. Yet, the above-mentioned phenomenon of actual
films and TV program outsourcing is an exceptional case in which theprivatization policy of the Iran media functioned, and a paradox emerged in thefield of the artists’ expanding their involvement in the state-led enterprises, ie,
TV a nd a n imat ion prog ra mmi ng a nd product ion . W het her or not t h isengagement of the artists can be considered as an expansion of autonomous
space requires further studies. Given the observation of the fact that theparticipation of artists in film and animation production is growing, theoutsourcing effect is likely to widen the space for artists to negotiate with thegovernment through their activities.
W hat is notable here is that the above -mentioned trends prog ressed
regardless of whether the administration was reformist (Khatami’s in 19972005) or conservative (Ahmadinejad in 2005-2012). Despite the fact that the
13

論

文

state monopolizes the ultimate decisions in art and cultural policies including
media policy on the surface, an actual battle has started between the state andscholars, intellectuals, and artists.

Ⅴ. Conclusion
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the state has been a central actor in
shaping art and cultural productions. Radio and TV programs as well as films
that were publicly broadcasted contained religious and ideological values. Art
and culture reflected in these programs as well as films were in the hand of thegovernment, namely under management of the state authorities.
With the changing needs of the audience, particularly that of the growing
you ng popu lat ion , t he gover n ment has exper ienced a dilemma . W h ile
continuously seeking for preservation of religious and ideological values in theart and cultural production, the government has faced the necessity to reform
policies in order to maintain the role of art and cultural productions as a tool forstate’s political and religious propaganda.
The artists have generally responded to governmental directions in diverseand unexpected ways, often uncovering subtle critical views on the way
authorities handle art and cultural productions. It can be observed that inrecent years, the nonconformist approach by artists to policies and regulationsof the establishment has led to the formation of a new discursive space which
strives to push the government to reconsider its instrumental and cultural
policies by participating in interactive dialogue with the artists.
While safeguarding of the national interests and social and cultural identity has
been a priority to the state, the last decade in particular has witnessed a newphase of Iran’s political development where Iran has internationally confronted
cultural invasion or soft war. Government authorities and scholars and the artists
together have developed the debate on soft power. Regardless of the obvious gap
in the interpretation of “soft” or soft power between the state and society, thegovernment has today accommodated more space for the artists than any otherperiod since the Revolution. In this process, the government has mobilized theartists and scholars for their own benefit. However, the active engagement of theartists and scholars through dialog with the government as well as through theirartistic production has accelerated the formation of a discursive space.
14

The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

The state’s concern for the growing young generation was a factor inpromoting this emerging new wave, yet the blurred border between what is
official and what is private also played a part in the opening of this discursive
space.
Endnotes
1

The Supreme Cultural Revolution Council was in fact a continuation of the Cultural
Revolution Headquarters established in 1980.
2 Al- e -Ahmad refers to a sense of intoxication caused by the West a nd western
technologies which have sickened Iran in a way that the country, instead of being a
producer and controller of technologies and machines, turned into a mere consumer,
resulting in the decline of the country’s producing abilities along with weakening of the
Iranian traditional industries.
3 Great Satan has become a disdainful title for United States in the Iranian political andreligious discourse, originally used by Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini to describe theImperialistic nature of the United States.
4 Related to the Shah (King)
5 As Gholam Khiabani (2010, 176) has mentioned, IRIB still devotes time and effort tocensor undesired elements of many foreign series and films. This approach leads to akind of “free dubbing” that involves censoring of programs and changing the dialogues
deemed inappropriate for the Iranian audience.
6 This tackling taboos and controversial social issues are especially visible in IranianCinema.
7 FYDPs are national plans, devised and directed by the government in order to decideand practice nationwide programs and direct the overall cultural development of thestate. FYDPs have been revised every five years with various steps in planning,
policymaking and designing cultural programs through legislative, executive, andjudicial measures.
8 The process of de-governmentalization of the cultural sectors began from the first
FYDP in 90s, and based on this policy the government of Iran is in charge for providing
the required means and support for ceding the cultural organizations and associatedcenters to the general public. Privatization efforts were seriously followed by reformistsof the Iranian government and society, resulting in the design of a more feasible andconcrete plan to speed up the implementation of privatization in Iran in the 4th FYDP.
Based on the 4th Five-Year Development Plan, privatization in the cultural sectors
should lead to cultural development and economic promotion of cultural sectors byenhancing the quality of cultural goods and services, encouraging a competitive
ambient, and creating new cultural resources with fair distribution.
9 Hans J. Morgenthau, Klaus Knorr, and Ray Cline were among the earliest intellectuals
who studied possibilities of using cultural power and attractions in international
relations.
10 [https://papers. iafor. org/sub mission04956/accessed September 20, 2017]11 Doctoral Dissertation of Nasser Golmohammadi, An analysis of the circumstances andfactors that have influenced the development of Animation Industry in Iran in the
1960-2002 period, 2003, pp. 205-230.

15

論

文

12 This is based on the observation of Saeedeh Mousavi who lived in Iran during thisperiod.
13 Ibid.
14 The authors’ interviews with outsourced producers conducted in June 2014 and August
2015 in Tehran showed this trend. All fifteen interviewees responded that they followed
what they thought would be acceptable to the government as they otherwise may notreceive a license for broadcasting their products on TV, and in this case should findother sources such as Home Video circulations (Resneye Pakhshe Khanegi) or online
streaming service to sell their films.

16

The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

References
Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Dara Conduit (2016), Iran in the World: President Rouhani’s
Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, London and New York.
A lexa nder, V. & Rueschemeyer, M . (2 0 0 5 ), Ar t an d th e St a t e: Th e Vi s u al Ar t s inComparative Perspective, Palgrave, Oxford.
Ashtarian, Kiyoomarth (2004), Public Policy in Iran, Mizan, Tehran
Bayat M. & Janbaz, D. (2011), Pathological Study of the Cultural Policy-Making basis andProcess in Islamic Republic of Iran, Ghoomes Publishing., Tehran
Bell, E. & Haas, L. & Sells, L. (2008), From Mouse to Mermaid: The Politics of Film,
Gender, and Culture, Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Bloom, William (1993), Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Breton, Albert (1982), “Introduction to an economics of culture: a liberal approach,” inCultural Industries: A Challenge for the Future of Culture, Paris, UNESCO, pp 40-50
Center of Model of Progress (2014), Goals and Responsibilities of the Islamic-Iranian Modelof Progress Conference Series, Online at http://www.olgou.org/about-olgou/olgou/
goals-and-task1.html [accessed 9/5/2017]
Chomsky, Noam (1991), Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda,
Seven Stories Press, Canada.
Elliott, Anthony and Turner, Bryan S. (2001), Profiles in Contemporary Social Theory,
SAGE Publications Ltd, London.
Evans, Jessica & Hall, Stuart (2003), Visual Culture: The Reader, Sage, London
Eyvazi, M. R. & Parsa M. (2013), “Analytical Model of Soft Power and International Politics”,
Soft Power Studies, Vol. 3, No. 9, pp 99-112
Freedman, Des (2008), the Politics of Media Policy, Polity, Cambridge
Girard, Augustin (1982), “Cultural Industries: A Handicap or a New Opportunity for Cultural
Development,” in Cultural Industries A Challenge for the Future of Culture, Paris,
UNESCO, pp 24-39
Gotz, M. & Lemish, D. & Aidman, A. (2005), Media and Make-Believe Worlds of Children:
When Harry Potter Meets Pokémon in Disneyland, Routledge, New Jersey
Gray, Clive (2007), Commodification and Instrumentality in Cultural Policy, International
Journal of Cultural Policy, 13: 2, pp. 203- 215
Gligor, Talinn (2014), Contemporary Iranian Art: From the Street to the Studio, Reaktion
Books, London.
Hall, Stuart (1991), “Ethnicity, identity and difference,” Radical America, 23 (4), pp 9–20
Hayden, Craig (2011), the Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts,
Lexington Books, New York.
Hollindale, Peter (1992), “Ideology and the Children’s Book,” in Literature for Children:
Contemporary Criticism, ed. Peter Hunt, Routledge, London, pp 19-40
Hosnaee Mohammadreza (2014), Proceedings of the Conference of National Power in the
Mirror of Dramatic Arts, June, 2014, University of Arts, Tehran
Hutchison, David (1999), Media Policy: An Introduction, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford
Jameson, Fredric (2008), Ideologies of Theory, Verso, London
Majdzadeh, B. & Azadikhah, A. & Dejam, E. (2015), Soft War from the Perspective Ayatollah
Khamenei, Journal of Social Issues & Humanities, Volume 3, Issue1, Tehran
Khalaji, Mehdi (2012), “Clerics vs Modernity: Failure of the Islamic Republic’s Soft Power,”
Washington Institute Improving the US Middle East Policy, June. [http://www.

17

論

文

washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-clerics-vs.-modernity-failure-of-theislamic-republics-soft-power, accessed August 31, 2017]
Khiabany, Gholam (2009), Iranian Media: The Paradox of Modernity, Routledge, New York
Khiabany, Gholam (2007), The Politics of Broadcasting in Iran: Continuity and Change,
Expansion, In David Ward, Television and Public Policy: Change and Continuity in
an Era of Global Liberalization, Routledge, New York
Kiefer, Barbara (1992), Visual criticism and children’s literature, in B. Hearne and R. Sutton(eds) Evalu ating Children's Book s: A Critical Look. Urban a-Ch ampaign, I L:
University of Illinois Graduate School of Library and Information Science, USA
Klimkiewicz, Beata (2010), Media Freedom and Pluralism: Media Policy Challenges in the
Enlarged Europe, Central European University Press, Budapest
Mahdavi, Mojtaba (2004), Reflections on the Iranian Revolution: A Quarter Century After,
Paper Presented at the Conference of the University of Toronto, February 13th-14th,
2004
Majdzadeh, B. & Azadikhah, A. & Dejam, E. (2015), Soft War from the Perspective Ayatollah
Khamenei, Journal of Social Issues & Humanities, Volume 3, Issue1, Tehran
Makaryk, Irena (1993), Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory: Approaches,
Scholars, Terms, University of Toronto Press, Canada
McQuail, D. (1994), Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, Sage Publications,London
McQuail, Denis (1997), Audience Analysis, Sage Publications, London
Mirrlees, Tanner (2013), Global Entertainment Media: Between Cultural Imperialism andCultural Globalization, Routledge, New York
Mitchell, W. J. T. (1987), Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology, University Of Chicago Press,
ChicagoMitchell, W. J. T. (1995), Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation,
University Of Chicago Press, Chicago
Mitchell, W. J. T. (20 05), W hat Do Pictures Want?: The Lives and Loves of Images,
University Of Chicago Press, Chicago
Mottahedeh, Negar (2008), Displaced Allegories: Post-Revolutionary Iranian Cinema, Duke
University Press, Durham
Naficy, Hamid (1993), Making of Exile Culture: Iranian Television in Los Angeles,
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis
Nichols, Bill (1981), Ideology and the Image: Social Representation in the Cinema and OtherMedia, Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Nye, J. S. (2004), Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, NewYork
Nye, J. S. (2004), Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization,
Routledge, New York
Nye, J. S. (2009), “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, 88 (4), pp
160-163
Price, Monroe (2012), “Iran and the Soft War,” International Journal of Communication 6,
pp.2397-2415.
Roberts, Adam (2000), Fredric Jameson, Routledge, New YorkSari, Hossein (2014), Iran will become the pole of religious animation making in the world(in Persian), the Meeting of Managers of Saba with Tasnim News Agency, Online at
http://tn.ai/473101, [accessed 9/7/ 2017]
S reb er ny, A n n a b e l le & Moh a m m a d i , A l i ( 1 9 9 4 ) , S m a l l M e d i a , Bi g R e v o l u t i o n :18The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution, University of Minneapolis
Press, Minneapolis
Storey, John (1994), Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: a Reader, Harvester Wheatsheaf,
New York
Stratigoula, Pantouvaki (2009), “The Role of Collective Memory in National Identities
Sh a p in g,” 1st E M U N I Resea rch S ou k 2 0 0 9 ( E M U R I Re S 2 0 0 9 ) , The Eu ro Mediterranean Student Research Multi-conference, Unity and Diversity of EuroMediterranean Identities, 9th of June, 2009
Strinati, Dominic (2004), an Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture, Routledge, London.
Rahnama, Ali (2000), an Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shariati, I. B.
Taurus, London
Waller, J. Michael (2008), Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, andPolitical Warfare, Institute of World Politics Press, Washington
Warnke, Georgia (1987), Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason, Stanford University
Press, Stanford
Warren, John T. & Fassett Deanna L. (2010), Communication: A Critical/Cultural Introduction,
SAGE Publications, Los Angeles
Zarei, Hossein (2013), We are moving toward producing pure and religious animations (inPersian), Interview with ISNA, Online at http://www.isna.ir/news/92073019083/,[accessed 8/11/ 2016]

19

論

文

Abstract

The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural
Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period:
Special Reference to Animation
Hisae Nakanishi & Saeedeh Mousavi
The objective of this study is to examine the changing approaches in art andcultural policies since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, particularly in the last
decade when the changes have been more apparent. A special focus is made in
the last section on dramatic arts, particularly animation where the governmentof Iran has drawn its attention and recognized the significance and where
animation artists negotiate with the government to expand their autonomous
space.
Since the Revolution the, state has been a central actor in shaping the art andcultural productions. Radio and TV programs as well as films that were publicly
broadcasted contained religious and ideological values. Art and culture reflectedin these programs as well as films were in the hand of the government, namely
the management of the state authorities.
However, faced with the changing needs of the audience, particularly that of
the growing population of the youth, the government has experienced adilemma. On the one hand, it has continuously sought the preservation ofreligious and ideological values in the art and cultural production. On the other
hand, it has faced the necessity of reforming the policies in order to maintainthe role of art and cultural production as a tool for state’s political and religious
propaganda.
The artists in these fields have generally responded to these governmental
directions in diverse and unexpected ways which often uncover subtle criticalviews against the way the authorities of the government have handled art andcultural activities. It is observed that in recent years, nonconformist approach oft he a r t i st s’ t owa rd t he p ol ic ie s a nd t he reg u l at io n s i mp o s e d by t heestablishment has led to the formation of a new discursive space that strives topush the government to reconsider its policies.
20

The Analysis of Iran’s Art and Cultural Policies in the Post- Revolutionary Period: Special Reference to Animation

Though how to safeguard the national interests and social and cultural
identity has constituted a priority of the state, the last decade has witnessed a
new phase of Iran’s political development in which Iran has internationallyconfronted cultural invasion or soft war. Both the government authorities andthe scholars and the artists together have developed the debate on soft power.
Regardless of the obvious gap of what state and society interpreted about whatis “soft” or soft power, the government has today accommodated more space forthe artists than any other period since the Revolution. In this process, thegovernment has mobilized the artists and scholars for their own sake. However,t he more act ive eng agement of t he a r t ist s a nd s chol a r s t h roug h t heparticipation of the dialog with the government as well as through their artistic
production has accelerated the discursive space.

21