PAJ OIL SPILL SYMPOSIUM '98
7 and 8 OCT 98
TOKYO, JAPANPREVENTION AND COMBAT OF OIL POLLUTION IN SINGAPOREAND
THE "EVOIKOS" OIL SPILL INCIDENT ON 15 OCTOBER 1998
By
CAPT MARK HEAH ENG SlANG
AG 2 DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PORT)IPORT MASTERMARITIME AND PORT AUTHORITY OF SINGAPOREPREVENTION AND COMBAT OF OIL POLLUTION IN SINGAPOREINTRODUCTION
1Singapore is situated at the crossroads of major shipping lanes linking east
and west. Hundreds of ships pass its doorstep every day. As the world's busiest
port, we had more than 130,000 shipping arrivals totalling 808 million gross tons
using our port last year. As the world's top bunkering port, we sold 16.94 million
tonnes of bunkers last year. As one of the major oil refining centres, we had morethan 14,000 tankers that accounted for about 35% of the total tonnage calling at ourport every year. We therefore have greater exposure to oil pollution than manyothers.
2
The protection of Singapore's marine environment has always been high up
on our list of functions and responsibilities. Since its formation in Feb 96, theMaritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) continues to work closely with local
and foreign governmental and private organizations and the shipping community toprotect Singapore's marine environment from pollution of any form. In doing that, we
adopt a comprehensive approach that begins with (a) prevention that encompasses implementing internationally adopted
regulations and strictly enforcing them; and(b) maintaining the highest standard of preparedness at all times which
includes putting in place and in constant readiness emergency plans thatcomprise effective structures/organizations for quick and effective
response, regular exercises and reviews.

PREVENTION
Enhance navigational safety
3"Prevention is better than cure" and the best measure is prevention throughenhancing navigational safety. For this reason, we have introduced many measures toenhance navigational safety for ships using the Malacca and Singapore Straits and our port.
We work actively with the littoral states and the shipping community to ensure safe
navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and in our port waters. These include:(a)

The Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG), represented by officials fromthe three littoral states, was established more than 2 decades ago to maintainand enhance maritime safety in the two Straits;(b)

From I Dec this year, the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore will be extended from One Fathom Bank to Horsburgh;(c)

At the same time, the "STRAITREP", a mandatory ship reporting system put
together with Indonesia and Malaysia, will be implemented for ships using the
TSS in both Straits;(d)

In April this year, we launched the Singapore Electronic Navigational Chart tobenefit ships using our port and the Singapore Strait. We are also studying
other measures to improve navigational safety, such as the use oftransponders; and(e)

Since 1990, we employ state-of-the-art technology such as a radar- based
Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS) and in 1997, a Differential Global
Positioning System (DGPS) station to help ships navigate safely.

4

On I Apr 98, we gave effect to the Convention on Standards of Training, Certificationand Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in Jul 95 (STCW95) for Singapore as
the Merchant Shipping (Training, Certification and Manning) Regulations. On 19 Jul 96, our
National Maritime Academy was awarded the ISO 9002-1994 certificate for Maritime
Education and Training. All these reinforced our commitments to higher standards ofseafaring, better maritime education and training that could all go to enhancing navigationalsafety.

Legislation
5

Whilst improved navigational safety helps to reduce pollution of the sea by ships,

legislation ensures that ships are designed, equipped, operated and managed to prevent
pollution of the sea. This also adds to protect our marine environment. MPA enforces theprovisions of the following Act and Regulations:(a)Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Act 1990
Under the Act, any party causing the oil pollution in Singapore waters or any
Singapore ship causing oil pollution elsewhere can be prosecuted. The penalty
is a fine not exceeding $500,000 or to imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or toboth. The guilty party is also liable for the cost of any reasonable measurestaken to reduce, remove and prevent oil pollution. Payments of cost incurred if
not paid after a reasonable period of notice may cause the vessel to be detained
and sold(b)Prevention of Pollution of the Sea (Oil) Regulations
These regulations give effect to Annex 1 of Marpol 73178 which regulates theprevention of pollution of the sea by oil. Penalty for contravention of any of theseregulations is a fine of up to S$10,000 or up to 2 years imprisonment or to both.

(c)

Prevention of Pollution of the Sea (Reporting of Pollution Incidents)
Regulations
These Regulations give effect to Article 8 and protocol of MARPOL 73/78 which
requires a report to be submitted without delay to the affected coastal states of
any incidents involving oil or other harmful substances.

(d)Prevention of Pollution of the Sea (Reception Facilities) Regulations
These Regulations require preventive measures to be taken by
shipyards and terminals. They are to provide facilities for reception ofoily residues so as not to cause undue delay to ships. A reasonable
fee can be charged and they can specify reasonable conditions forusing facilities. Facilities have been built for receiving, treating anddisposing oily spills, sludge, oily waste, dirty ballast and tank washing.
This is managed by Singapore Cleanseas Pte Ltd, a subsidiarycompany of the PSA in partnership with local shipyards.

(e)Prevention of Pollution of the Sea (Detergents and Equipment) Regulations
These Regulations require:(i)

Oil companies in Singapore (BP, Caltex, Esso, Mobil, Shell and SPO) to assist
the MPA in dealing with oil pollution in Singapore; and(ii)

All steel constructed tugs licensed under the MPA (Harbour Craft) Regulations, 1997, with an engine power of 750 kilowatts or more must have onboard not lessthan 400 litres of an approved dispersant with means of spraying the dispersant.
It must also have a pump capable of delivering 250 litres of water per minute.

(f)Merchant Shipping (Civil Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution) Act
This Act gives effect to the 1 992 Protocol to the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1996. This Protocol, commonly known as CLO 92,
came into force on 18 Sep 98. Under the Act, the owners of ships will be liable for:(i)any damage or contamination caused by discharge or escape of oil into
Singapore waters from a ship;(ii)

the cost of any measures reasonably taken to prevent or reduce any suchdamages caused by the discharge or escape of oil; and(iii)

any damage caused by any measures taken.

The Act also empowers MPA to detain a ship which caused an oil pollution in
Singapore waters and sell the ship if situation warrants. The master, owner or the
person-in-charge of the ship that commits an offence under the Act can be arrested.
Under the Act, ships carrying more than 2,000 tonnes of persistent oil in bulk as cargo
are required to have a certificate evidencing a valid contract of insurance or security tocover the civil liability against oil pollution before they are permitted to enter or leave
Singapore. The penalty for not complying with the requirements is a fine not exceeding
S$1 ,000,000.
Surveillance
6

We watch our port for any sign of oil pollution very closely. This surveillance ismaintained as follows:(a)

24 hours patrol by our Port Inspectors;

(b)vigilant watch for sign of spill by all harbour pilots and crew members of marine
craft;(c)

24 hours patrols by the Singapore Police Coast Guard and the Republic ofSingapore Navy; and(d)with the assistance from passing ships and ships and harbour craft in port.

PREPAREDNESSContingency Plan
7

MPA has the Marine Emergency Action Procedure (MEAP) to handle oil spills andother marine incidents. The MEAP contains detailed procedures on reporting, control,co-ordination and rescue in a marine incident. The Oil Spill Contingency Plan is partof the MEAP. It comprises 2 parts i.e. STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL PLAN, as
follows:(a)Strategy*High spill risk areas and resources at risk from oil spills are
identified and charted*

Oil sensitive areas are identified and prioritised for protection*

Types of resources and equipment available for clean up are
identified by organisation and location*

Manpower for deployment and clean up operations*

Response organisation structure and the parties to the plan*

Responsibilities of oil spill control, the spiller, oil terminal operators& oil spill response companies*

Emergency Operations Committee*

Communication centres, Information Collection and
Dissemination centres*

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Combatting Oil Spill in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore(b)Operational Plan*

Notification Procedures*

Oil Spill Notification Form*

Alerting Procedures*

Guidance for determining response*

Activating List*

Mobilisation procedures in accordance with the Tier Response*

Deployment of manpower and equipment for oil spill*

Clean up operation procedures

8
The objective of any oil spill contingency plan is to respond effectively in the shortest
possible time. The discharge of oil is to be stopped and the spill contained so as to prevent itfrom being washed ashore or extending over a large area.
Resources
9
MPA, as the national maritime authority, co-ordinates the spill clean-up operation,
monitors and enforces measures to prevent oil pollution in Singapore waters.
10
At MPA's request, the PSA Corporation and oil majors will deploy their resources forcontrolling and cleaning-up oil spills. Each organisation is equipped with the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Dedicated anti-pollution craft fitted with spray booms;
Oil skimmers
Storage, fast tanks;
Oil booms;
Portable dispersant sprayers; andSufficient stock of dispersant.

11
There are also 2 oil response centres namely; EARL and SOSRC, that are fully
equipped to respond to any oil pollution incident in Singapore and in the region. PAJ
equipment stored in Singapore can also be deployed.
Training
12
MPA personnel are trained in-house as well as by external parties as part of the Oil
Spill Contingency Plan. The training cover the following areas:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(e)

Oil causes, fates & strategies;
Use of Chemical Dispersant;Surveillance Tracking;Contingency Planning;
Boom Deployments Media Management; andClaims and Compensation.

CONCLUSION13
MPA is committed to an effective and prompt response to assist in any maritime
emergencies. It is only through training and continuous exercising of contingency plans that
MPA with the concerted efforts of all other parties, can effectively deal with a real life
incident.
〜〜〜〜〜

"EVOIKOS" OIL SPILL - THE SINGAPORE EXPERIENCEBACKGROUND
1

On 15 Oct 97, at about 2054 hours, a collision between two oil tankers occurred in the

Singapore Strait. This collision resulted in about 28,500 tonnes of heavy marine fuel oil to be
spilled in our waters. The 'ORAPIN GLOBAL' was transiting the Singapore Strait from theeast towards the west. The 'EVOIKOS' was sailing in a eastward-bound direction forSingapore. The vessels collided off Singapore's port limits at approximately latitude 010
10.5'N and longitude 1030 48.5'E, which is about 5 km south of Pulau Sebarok in Singapore
waters. At the time of the collision, visibility was good. Before the collision, MPA's Vessel
Traffic Information Service (VTIS) warned the 'ORAPIN GLOBAL' that she was in the wrong
lane and of the presence of other approaching vessels. The VTIS also warned the'EVOIKOS' of the approaching 'ORAPIN GLOBAL'. Both vessels acknowledged receipt of
the warnings.
2

As a result of the collision, the 'EVOIKOS' suffered severe damage to 3 of its cargotanks, while the bow of the 'ORAPIN GLOBAL' was also damaged. There was no injury to
any of the crew of the two ships. Neither ship was in danger of sinking. 'EVOIKOS' wasanchored inside the port, south of Pulau Bukom, while 'ORAPIN GLOBAL' was anchoredjust off Johor after the collision.
IMMEDIATE ACTION TO MANAGE THE INCIDENT
3

Navigational warnings were broadcast to warn shipping of the collision immediately

after the collision. Both ships were moved clear of the traffic lanes. Subsequently, the'EVOIKOS' anchored north of the traffic lane, away from shipping traffic. The 'ORAPIN
GLOBAL' was able to proceed on its own power with guidance from the Vessel Traffic
Information Service (VTIS) and cleared the Southern Islands to a safe anchorage in the west.
Shipping traffic in the Singapore Strait was not disrupted and the Strait remained open. PSA
Corporation and the oil/petrochemical complexes were able to continue their operations
without interruption. Apart from some of the Southern Islands which are largely uninhabited,such as Pulau Sudong, our coast and beaches along East Coast and Sentosa were
unscathed. In accordance with our Marine Emergency Action Procedure (MEAP), all theparties in the MEAP were immediately activated and took swift action to combat an
impending massive oil spill.
MANAGEMENT OF OIL SPILL
4This incident caused the worst oil spill in our history. The previous serious incident

occurred in 1975, when the super tanker "Showa Maru" ran aground south of Pulau Sebarok
and spilled 3,000 tonnes of light crude oil.
5
The massive "EVOIKOS' oil spillage was well contained within the Southern Islands.

The sensitive areas including the sea water intakes to Sentosa Underwater World Aquarium
were promptly protected and international shipping was unaffected in the busy Singapore
Strait. This was due to the swift response by the MPA in activating and co-ordinating the
MPA's oil spill response plan.
6
A total of 16 ministries/agencies, oil terminals, salvage companies, oil spill responsecompanies and I foreign agency were led by MPA in the clean-up operation. Some 80 craft
and 650 personnel were involved in the operations and at the height of the operations, 57
craft were deployed.
SUCCESS_FACTORS
7
We believe in PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS and RESPONSE in order to tackle
any crisis. Having a contingency plan in place as well as regular annual exercises
contributed positively to the success of the operation. The plan enabled quick response andprompt actions to be taken to minimise economic losses and minimised the ecologicaleffects of this marine disaster. The key factors that contributed to the successful cleaning up
operation were as follows:
Marine Emergency Action Procedure (MEAP)8
All key officers were familiar with the MEAP and adhered closely to the procedures aslaid down for the cleaning up operation. Procedures for the Control and Co-ordination,
Seaward Operations, Shallow Water Operations and Air Reconnaissance in the MEAP havebeen very practical and most useful.
Command and Control
9
Led by the MPA top management, the seaward and landward clean-up operation was
well controlled and co-ordinated e.g. involvement of MINDEF, ENV and SCDF. The chain ofcommand and line of communication between the Emergency Operations Committee(EOC) and On-Scene Commanders were short and effective. The delegation of various
tasks to officers and teamwork ensured the successful execution of various strategies asplanned to combat spill and manage the crisis.
Quick Initial Response
10
The MPA Emergency Operations Committee (EOC) under the Director-General of
the MPA was promptly activated to manage the crisis. Situation "RED" was declared and allparties were activated. All essential agencies, personnel and resources were mobilised i.e.
Police Coast Guard, Republic of Singapore Navy, PSA Corporation and private salvage
companies. As an added contingency, we alerted the U.S., Australia and Japan for
information regarding oil combat resources, if required. The EOC was maintained roundthe-clock. The initial management of marine traffic to clear casualties and navigational
broadcast ensured that the shipping lanes were safe and had no adverse impact on port
operations. The port operated normally without any stoppage.

Multi-prong Action Plan
11
Implementation of a multi-prong action plan to localise and clean up the oil was very
effective. This included utilising MPA's Oil Spill Model with hourly updated wind direction as
well as, aerial and ground recce inputs to track the movement of oil. Based on suchpredictions, anti-pollution craft and personnel were then deployed effectively round-theclock to expedite clean up operations. The strategy to combine and adopt different methodsof combating oil pollution at correct phases reflected MPA's ability to respond effectively.
The different strategies used were as follows:(a)

Use of dispersant to break up the oil;(b)

Laying of oil booms around casualty vessel and sensitive areas suchas recreational beaches and water in-takes;
Use of skimmers to recover the oil which could not be dispersed bydispersant; andBeach cleaning to remove oil on the shorelines of the Southern
Islands.

(c)(d)

Communication
12
The close communication through regular meetings with external agencies, to coordinate the operation and to keep them updated of the cleaning up progress, was anothersuccess factor. During the 1st phase of the operations (i.e. thick oil during the 1st ~days), 3
meetings were convened daily to discuss the status of operations, review the work carriedout and to formulate strategies and plan to enhance effective clean-up. Subsequently,
meetings were reduced to twice a day after the situation improved. This ensured successful
execution of the operational plan.
13
We also kept our Indonesian and Malaysian counterparts regularly informed about
the situation.
Media Management
14
The promptness in our response to local and foreign media queries and the regular
updates issued to the media minimised media speculation. The smooth and transparent
information flow to the media, the factual status reports and reassurance to the public thatthe situation was under control, demonstrated MPA's effective media management.
LESSONS LEARNT
15
No other oil spill of this magnitude had been brought under control within such ashort span of time. To improve any future response, MPA conducted an internal review.
Also, we had discussions with external government agencies, Singapore International
Chamber of Commerce (SICC), oil majors and other marine facilities. Some of the lessons
learnt as a result of this post-mortem are as follows:Response
16
There was slow response by the shipowners and P&l Club to engage an oil spill
response company to clean up the oil spill. It took some 6 hours before the shipowners
agreed to engage an oil spill response company. Fortunately, MPA had deployed otherresources in the meantime. We understand that some overseas parties were involved in thedecision-making process. We cannot accept such delays in future.
17
Arising from this problem, the oil industry was in agreement that quick response wasa key factor for a successful operation. In general, feedback from the oil majors indicatedthat if they have cargo onboard the tanker, they would turn out oil spill response companies
to combat and minimise damages caused by the oil spill. But more importantly, shipowners
and P&I Clubs must carry out their obligations responsibly. There cannot be any delay inengaging a oil spill response company to combat the pollution.
Techniques and Methods
18
The supporting agencies should have personnel who are trained to deploy
appropriate equipment and to spray dispersants effectively. Also booms at certain strategic
locations ought to have permanent securing arrangements thereby obviating the need touse work boats. These shortcomings are being redressed.
CONCLUSION
19
The oil spill clean up operations was a success in averting what would otherwise bea major economic and ecological disaster. This worst oil spill in the history of Singapore wascleaned up in a record of 3 weeks. Although, we had done well, we cannot sit back and reston our laurels. We must continue to improve on our preparedness and response. Many
important lessons were learnt. We need to work closely with the industry, the shipowners
and shipmasters in their responsibilities to ensure safety of navigation and prevention of oil
pollution. With the implementation of the above recommendations, MPA would be in abetter position to effectively manage and combat any future oil spill incident to avert apotential catastrophe.

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