(De)ethnicizing Buddhism for a Globalized World Order

Suren Råghavan
Abstract
Some years ago, Buddhism was growing and attracting many people
across the world for the philosophy it had to offer. But such interest
has been tarnished by the protracted ethnonational violence seen in
many prominent Buddhist states. This short paper argues that
Buddhist societies have fallen victim of the global trend of
consumption and ownership. Such attachments are primarily expressed in Buddhist nationalism and ethnic protectionism. Paperurges for a transethnic identity amongst Buddhists that would enable
Buddhism as an alternative worldview and working model for someof the urgent global issues beyond a given national or ethnic
boundary.

IntroductionT

HE Social and Political dimension of modern Buddhism has comeunder renewed attention and serious discussion (Brekke 2013,
Harris 2007, Hershock 2006, Juergensmeyer and Jerryson 2010,
Jerryson 2010, Wijeyeratne 2013). Such discussions are a common
concern among both Buddhists and non-Buddhists who are either living
close to Buddhists or have an interest in Buddhism and its communities.
There are at least two key themes surfacing from this new literature.
Firstly, it questions the reasons for the paradoxical violent conflicts
generated or supported by Buddhist activists and how they can beaddressed. Secondly, it asks if Buddhism is interested in and able toanswer some of the urgent global questions such as religious violence,democratic stability and economic and human rights for all? In short,
can Buddhism be the answer, at least in part, to the many fundamental
challenges faced by modern humanity?
While theoretically and textually—irrespective of Nikåya differences—scholars agree that the Buddha and his teachings are universal, andprovide answers for present and future lives, however, on a closer look
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(de)ethnicizing buddhism for a globalized world orderat the present majority Buddhist societies, that belief is challenged by
the empirical evidence. The above—mostly Western—scholars raisequestions about the simple reason for direct violence, corruption, lack of
democracy and breakdown of moral/ethical structure seen in some
Buddhist societies. This is not to say that Buddhism as a belief andpractice has not produced any positive impact on individual societies oron humanity in general. In contrast, they inquire how it is possible thateven Buddhism, a philosophy founded on the idea of Ahiµså, has
become the reason for some of the most violent conflicts we havewitnessed in Asia? Is Buddhism failing be a universal force for nonviolence, justice and fairness?
Indian scholar Uma Chakravarti asked a similar question in 2005. She
argued that Gautama Siddhartha was born at a time and in a context ofmuch anxiety and hopelessness, with more questions than answers. We
are told that ontological insecurity that prevailed in the Indian world in
the 5th century BC produced a similar transformation in life with rapid
speed. Proponents of the ‘Axial Age’ thesis have argued that at times ofsuch deep anxieties, society produce their own meaning out of the
intrinsically interwoven complexities (Voegelin 2001). It is then possiblethat Buddhism was preached by Buddha during a similar time to provide
hope and answers. If Buddhism is to be relevant as a hopeful philosophy, the practitioner of such faith needs be able to first struggle to findanswers and then apply those solutions to the society at large.
I will take a few global themes to expand on this.

Economic Disparity
World Bank reports suggest that 70% of the world population shares
only 3% of the gross global wealth and an estimated 10% of the world
owns some 83% of the wealth. Agriculturalists and economists haverepeatedly shown that the problem of the world is not having enough but
simple not sharing enough. According to the Food and Agriculture
Organization, nearly 20 million people die annually due to hungerrelated diseases; of these 11 million are children below 12 years of age.
Even in the 21st century, when we have the knowledge to land on Mars,
our sense of common humanity does not burden us enough to prevent
this. Current global and Asian economic philosophy seems to be anchored on maximizing profit through efficient productivity with minimum
cost. This is to satisfy a section of the world which demands maximum
consumption of everything from crude oil to fresh water at the cost of
the basic needs of a majority. In this process maximum consumption is(de)ethnicizing buddhism for a globalized world order 171
promoted as a way of life, human labour is bargained for at minimal
cost, and a global completion across borders is promoted as free trade,market adjustment or economic liberation. By contrast Buddha’s teaching on work and labour is not focused on consumption, but is, as
Schumacher argued:
First, to provide necessary and useful goods and services. Second, toenable every one of us to use and thereby perfect our gifts like goodstewards. Third, to do so in service to, and in cooperation with, others,
so as to liberate ourselves from our inborn egocentricity. (1979:3)

Such an understanding of the world and struggle to provide an answer
concordant with the Buddhist worldview have seen movements such as
the International Network of Engaged Buddhists led by Thai Buddhist
activist Sulak Sivaraksa. David R Loy, teaching at Bunkyo University,
for a long time argued for such an alternative vision and showed how
Buddhism waits to be deployed in that way. Western scholars haveagreed that the success of Japan immediately after WW II was largely
contributed by companies whose practices were based on Buddhist
traditions. Researchers such as Shunji Hosaka and Yukimasa Nagayasu
have shown that Japanese companies that produce over 100 world
brands were successful because they practised principles based on
Buddhist ethics on customer satisfaction, waste management and employee relationships.
But it is evident that instead of providing alternatives, Buddhist
societies and popular Buddhist practices within them have embraced theconsumerist lifestyle without question. Today Japan and China, twogreat civilizations, are not known for any Buddhist virtues but for consumption and extreme productivity.

Conflict Resolution
Experts in conflict resolution and peace building show that the world has
moved from inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts. From 1950 to2010 more people were killed by internal conflicts between states andnon-state actors within them on the basis of ideology, ethnicity,
language or religion. These intra-state conflicts, which often destroy
centuries old bonds between cultures and communities are seen in every
continent. Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Syria and Sri Lanka are sad examples. Such negative trends havenot spared the states where Buddhism is the majority religion.

172(de)ethnicizing buddhism for a globalized world order

Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the region of
Tibet have been drawn into protracted conflicts of varying degrees.
These ‘forgotten wars’ and the suffering of those caught up in them do
not figure in the world headlines as there is no super power directly
involved. The challenging question to ask is how it is possible that
Buddhist societies with centuries old Buddhist philosophy and practices
embedded in their cultural consciousness can pursue wars and, evenworse, justify the idea that they do this to protect ‘Buddhism’? If so,
what are the key differences that Buddhism offers to the world incomparison with the ‘Just war’, ‘Holy war’ or Dharma Yuddha? In the
direct teaching of the Buddha one cannot find any justification for war.
His reponses to war situations are recorded in at least three incidents. 1)
His Sakyan ethnic community declared war against the Koliyans over
the waters of the river Rohini (Jayatilleke 1983). At this point the
Buddha explained the importance of human life and dignity and theneed to negotiate and avoid this war. 2) King VidË∂abha’s attempt torevenge the Sakyans for an alleged cheat of his mother’s caste. At threetimes the Buddha stood in the way of the king to prevent his marching
to fight his Sakya clan. But at the fourth time Buddha let the outcome be
decided by the Karmic merits of the Sakyans (Deegalle 2009). 3) The
Buddha’s advice was sought by king Ajåtasattu in his plan to defeat theneighboring Vajjis’ rule. The Buddha points out the nature of the Vajjis’rule, which cannot be defeated (D¥ghanikåya , vol. 2, pp. 73–75).
On each of these occasions it is clear that Buddha was not engaging
with the ‘ethics of war’. Instead he challenges the motivation, the innercondition of the mind and the forces that are urging to compete, own
and consume, and to declare war if frustrated in these aims. So his concern was not with a Dharma Yuddha or a Jihåd, but with a war one must
undertake against the forces of Mårasenå (Måra’s army) within us. How
far have the leading Buddhist societies managed to offer such analternative based on moral vision? History records that almost all Buddhist countries have failed this test.

Detachment from Belonging
Nationalism
How did then we arrive here from an Ahiµså civilization to a civilization that is clashing within? One can give any number of reasons fromany number of perspectives. I will provide two strong reasons why
modern Buddhism has lost its global influence. Both these primordial
historical, memorized and memorialized to the present day. They are 1)

(de)ethnicizing buddhism for a globalized world order 173
Nationalism and 2) Ethnicity
Benedict Anderson proposed that nationalism is a modern constructof Imagined Communities fueled by print capitalism. To him, communities living under colonial oppression found solace in imagining thatthey belonged to a great ‘nation’ that belonged together and lived in one
geographical locale which in imagination they transformed into a ‘state’.
Late 18th and 19th century print media transported such ‘belonging’ tootherwise unconnected communities, who in return searched for morebonding under such identities as a way of uniting against the oppressors.
The Asian history of identity mobilization challenges Benedict
Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ thesis, which presents a ‘big bang’genesis of ethno-nationalism that depended on the rise of print capitalism. Anderson’s account does not provide a valid framework for understanding the historic realities of ethnoreligious nationalism as it emergedin many parts of Asia. Texts such as the Mahabharata and Mahåvaµsa
were composed and venerated as focuses of ethnoreligious nationalism
in their audiences. Sinhala ethnoreligious nationalism was constructedin the pages of the Mahåvaµsa written in 6th century CE; it thus
predates the modern concepts of nation and nationalism. Distinguishedsociologist Eiko Ikegami has described Japanese state formation to
analyze how samurai culture contended with the challenge and model ofWestern political structure not by attempting to superimpose them onJapanese society but by questioning the Western paradigm andproviding an extraordinary new definition of disciplined citizenship. She
demonstrates that collective benefit rather than individual satisfaction isat the heart of such differentiation in Japanese social-culture, which we
can safely assume to come from the Buddhist influence.
The Buddha’s mission—while a strong individual commitment andpersonal sacrifice are essential—was to find answers to perennial
questions of human suffering. Such burdens come only when one is able
to imagine beyond one’s immediate surroundings. In the life story of
Siddhartha we read that he deliberately went out of his comfort zone in
the palace, and once he had seen the real world, started to engage andfind answers. Buddhism begins with the idea of voluntary detachment,
renouncing what belongs to us to seek greater benefit. But modern
Buddhism today is tied to the two strong pillars of belonging, nationalism and ethnicity, from which it struggles, ineffectively, to liberate itself.
Nationalism has coloured the Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese,
Burmese, Cambodian and now Thai civilizations in blood red. History
records how these otherwise predominantly Buddhist societies struggled
to detach themselves but remained tied to a territory. Nationalism per-174(de)ethnicizing buddhism for a globalized world order

haps is one deep attachment from which humanity struggles to detachitself, though we know that no state is 100 percent innocent and in the
postmodern sense there is no central ownership to a particular nation in
the globalized order. Buddhism provides the most logical framework forhuman life in the face of eternal realities such Anicca (impermanence)and Du˙kha (suffering).
Thanks to the forces of globalization, states are an invalid point ofreference for our sense of belonging in the post Berlin wall era. Neoliberalism has made it possible to move human and economic capitalacross borders in an unprecedented manner. In the European Union‘nations’ who once fought centuries old wars are now considered as one
zone with very little differentiation. This fragmentation of the nation
state under the heavy demand of economic progress has meant that thenation can no longer serve as a resting place for ‘ourness’ or differentiating ourselves from others. However, just when our sense of attachment has been broken, we have found a triple refuge to guide ourmodern political lives. Even in deeply Buddhist states, unfortunatelythat triple refuge is not the Buddha, Dhamma and Sa∫gha but identification by religion, language and ethnicity.
Ethnicity
The combination of these three emotionally charged attachments has
impinged on our Buddhist experience. There is a strong sense of‘Buddhistness’ in countries like Sri Lanka; it is conveyed by moredecorated temples, more grand ceremonies, more monks using modern
technology. The public square is Buddhicized with symbols such as
huge Buddha statues at key intersections, nonstop chanting of Pirith andelaborate Bodhi PËjas. All these are intended to construct a deeper
attachment to what people consider as their community, society andcountry. Today ethnic identity has become the foremost energy that
seems to mobilize many a Buddhist state. Japan is mostly a mono-ethnic
state, but the rest of Asia is home for hundreds of ethnic groups who liveside by side. The new identity construction and its political accentuation
have generated even more bloody and bitter violence in many Buddhist
states.
Even after decades of research still there is no universally accepted
definition of ethnicity. Most who research in the field of ethnicity emphasize the importance of common mytho-history and some codified texts
such the Mahåvaµsa to support a particular identity. They follow Max
Weber in presenting ethnicity to be a common ancestry, most often
traced back to migration (völkerwanderung) and settlement, but also(de)ethnicizing buddhism for a globalized world order 175
referring to political survival and superiority, often measured against a
nearby ‘other’ using religious criteria. Thus the story of the Buddha
visiting Sri Lanka—the only foreign land he ever visited—using his
divine powers, and consecrating the island as Dhammad¥pa (Island of
the Teaching) for his eternal message, making the Sinhalas and theirkings guardians of this dhamma and ßåsana, has provided the majority
Sinhalas with a cosmic responsibility to protect their Sinhala ethnic race
and, through it, Buddhism at large. Scholars have done detailed studiesof this ethnoreligious Buddhism (Gombrich 1988a, 1988b; Harris 2007,
2005, 1999; Tambiah 1996, 1984, 1973). They suggest that in the
Theravåda states of Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, ethnicity qualifies the kind of Buddhism practised and recognized. Therefore
instead of Buddhism, we have Thai Buddhism, Burmese Buddhism,
Sinhala Buddhism, and other such identities. In Sri Lanka, in reality
one’s Buddhism is qualified by one’s ethnicity. So to be a true Buddhist
one quintessentially has to be a Sinhalese. A ‘Tamil Buddhist’ is a misnomer, even though just a few centuries ago Buddhism was a strong religion in South India, and many Tamil monks contributed to the growth of
Buddhism. Under such conditions Buddhism has in-grown to become an
inclusive identity symbol. Such ontological separation has the propensity to spiral downwards to further narrow the vision of Buddhism. In
Sri Lankan public and political space, to be a true Buddhist one has tobe a Sinhala, then has to be true Sinhala, then hail from the Kandy
district—the last Sinhala kingdom1. Within Kandy district preference isgiven to the Goyigama (farmer caste). So this Sinhala/Kandy/Goyigama
triple identity defines the authenticity of a “real Buddhist”. It isnoteworthy that the powerful Temple of the Tooth is situated in Kandy
and the two custodian branches of the Temple, namely Malwathu andAsgiriya of the Siam chapter, are exclusively Kandy and Goyigama.
Such exclusiveness has virtually cut off the possibility for nonSinhalas to become Buddhist or Buddhists to approach the nonSinhalas. In states where more than one ethnic group lives, when thestate power, resources and opportunities are ethicized, they constructmajoritarian hegemony and minority agitations, resulting in violent
conflicts as witnessed in Sri Lanka for the last 30 years. For this reason,in Sri Lanka the Buddhist presence amongst non-Sinhalas isnonexistence. They may respect Buddhism for its philosophical stand,but since their socio-political experience with Sinhala Buddhists are so
different, there is no opportunity for Buddhism amongst the nonSinhalas.
I take Lanka’s condition as a microcosm of present day Buddhism in176(de)ethnicizing buddhism for a globalized world ordermany Buddhist states. Those who have engaged in detailed fieldwork inmany Asian Buddhist states suggest that the national, regional, and evenglobal potential of Buddhism as an alternative way to consider many of
the world’s burning challenges, such as the rich poor disparity, economic crisis, environmental degradation, abuse of human rights andpromotion of world peace, is undermined, as these states have transformed Buddhism from its unattached middle path to an exclusive ethnonationalist political project. Studying these states, Peter L. Daniels, anenvironmental economist who develops E. F Schumacher’s 1973 Small
is Beautiful thesis, which was based on Buddhist worldviews on economic wealth, argues:
Unfortunately, the historical experience of many of these nations could
be viewed as evidence of the dangers of the tolerant and submissive,
perhaps overly-flexible, nature of Buddhism in dealing positively withmarked internal or external changes and powerful self-interested
motives—for example, the well-known national cases of politicalviolence and strife, and the relentless pursuit of economic growth (atsubstantial social and environmental cost) in many nations with strong
Buddhist backgrounds. There is also little evidence that the inculcationof Buddhism in these nations has produced greater levels of happiness.
(Daniel 2005:253)

My argument is not to dismiss the unique beauties and cultural nuancesthat each ethnic community has to provide. That would in fact be
unbuddhist, because even Gautama was born into an ethnically recognized clan and he was not shy to be part of it. Ethnicities contribute to
the variety of human civilization by cross fertilizing our life experiences. However, it will be a historical mistake to cage Buddhism in an
ethnic frame and, worse, declare war on others, especially the non-Buddhist. Many in the West ask me to explain how Buddhism can afford tobe the basis of such violent conflicts often led by monks and supported,
directly or indirectly, by the ruling elites? I don’t have a neatly arranged
answer. We need to face the reality that our ethnic affiliations have takenover the essence of Buddhist teaching. Modern media looking for
sensation have found robed monks clashing with civilians as well as
security forces. Conflicts based on ethnic identities in which Buddhists
and their monks are directly involved in violence are reported fromBurma, Cambodia, and Thailand.
In Sri Lanka, we were optimistically looking forward to a post-war
era in which we would try to understand how to heal our collective and(de)ethnicizing buddhism for a globalized world order 177
reciprocal wounds as a divided nation. But then a range of new Sa∫gha
led organizations2 have come forward with the political agenda toconstruct an even narrower version of Buddhism in which they demand
the surrender of all other religious communities. Muslims and evangelical Christians have repeatedly come under violent physical attack
while the police stand by. You Tube and other social media have enoughvisual evidence of such activism, which continues to erode the possibility of Buddhism ever being treated as a potential alternative solution
to any modern global crisis. However, this dark situation should challenge us to seek more meaningful engagement across our ethnic
identities.
The Jodo Shinshu Pure Land temple in Los Angeles has demonstrated
the power of Buddhist compassion that can turn an entire community toadopt and re-calibrate their life philosophies on Buddhist teaching. The
community did not become followers of Buddhism, but they adopted theBuddhist teaching on simplicity, compassion and generosity. The workof the Dalai Lama and Thich Nhat Hanh is recognized more as Buddhist
activism than as Tibetan or Vietnamese. It is because, while they recognize themselves as members of a particular ethnic community, theirwork and engagement is aimed at a greater humanity than their own
ethnicity. But unfortunately we cannot say the same about Ven.
Galagodaaththe Gñånasåra of Lanka or Ven Wirathu of Burma. Their
activities may gain popularity and regime support for a short time.
However, the deep structural damage they do is too costly to ignore. The
key challenge of the 21st century is not finding the exact birthplace of
Gautama or settling a textual abidhammika dispute. The urgent need ofcontemporary Buddhism is to be able to live above its immediate ethnonational identities and engage with issues concerning the whole ofhumanity. Failing to do so will amount to failing Buddhism and its
unique offering to our world.
NOTES
While Kandy was the last Sinhala kingdom, nevertheless it was ruled by Tamilkings for over two hundred years. These kings often restored fragmented and fading
Buddhism on the island.
2
Bodu Bala S„nå, S¥hala Råvaya, Råvana Balakåya, Hela Bodu Pawra are a few ofthe organizations that have taken to violent street demonstrations on many topics fromthe UN resolution to anti-Halal campaigning; see: Råghavan, Suren, ‘Buddhicizing or
Ethnicizing the State: Do the Sinhala Sa∫gha Fear Muslims in Sri Lanka?’ Journal of the
Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies Volume 4, 2013, pp. 88–104. http://www.ocbs.org/
ojs/index.php/jocbs/article/view/45/73
1178(de)ethnicizing buddhism for a globalized world order
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