AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPS

RIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security

Editorial Advisory Board:

No. 213

Akio Watanabe (Chair)
Masashi Nishihara
Yoshiji Nogami
Taizo Yakushiji

23 June 2015

Editorial Committee:
Taizo Yakushiji
Hisayoshi Ina
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Shujiro Urata andToshiro Iijima
Editor & Online Publisher:
Yoshji Nogami
President, JIIANUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AFTER THE NPTREVIEW CONFERENCE: THE NEED FOR A
REALISTIC APPROACH IN THE FACE OF
GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION

Hirofumi Tosaki・ The most contentious as well as spotlighted issues
discussed at the 2015 NPT Review Conference
were whether and how to engage in normative/legal
approaches to nuclear disarmament. However, suchapproaches could hardly play an effective role intackling the root cause of the current deadlock innuclear disarmament: deepening geopoliticalcompetition.
・ There is no doubt that efforts for reinforcing norms
andlegalframeworks
regardingnucleardisarmament are crucial. However, the most urgent
task in these difficult times is to pursue realistic andpractical arms control tailored to the security
environment in the key (sub-) regions, including
Northeast Asia.
・ Japan must not underrate how serious a security
environment it is facing, nor can it afford to rely
solely on normative/legal approaches. To ensure its
peace
andsecurity
andadvancetheaforementioned regional arms control, realistic
thinking and approaches are essential for Japan.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

The quinquennial Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference (RevCon) in April-May 2015 concluded without adopting aconsensus final document due to disagreement over convening a conference on
a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-Free Zone. Nevertheless,the subject that prompted the most heated debates among participating
countries over the four-week session was nuclear disarmament, as was the casein past RevCons.
Among the issues discussed, the most contentious as well as spotlighted
issues were whether and how to engage in normative/legal approaches fornuclear disarmament, such as by addressing “the humanitarian consequencesof nuclear weapons” and establishing “a framework for the prohibition andelimination of nuclear weapons.” At the Conference, 107 non-nuclear-weaponstates (NNWSs) — mainly members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) andthe New Agenda Coalition (NAC) that have grown increasingly frustrated overthe insubstantial progress made on nuclear disarmament, particularly after theentry into force of the US-Russian New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NewSTART) in February 2011, and, more fundamentally, over the discriminatory
nature of the NPT regime — joined the “Humanitarian Pledge” proposed byAustria, in which they “call on…to identify and pursue effective measures to fill
the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.”
Furthermore, some of them even called for commencing negotiations on a
nuclear weapons convention with or without the participation of thenuclear-weapon states (NWSs).
It is obvious that normative/legal approaches are essential for reframing
the nuclear disarmament debate and achieving a “world without nuclearweapons,” especially from a medium- to long-term perspective. However, it isalso clear that such approaches could hardly play an effective role in tackling theroot cause of the current deadlock in nuclear disarmament: deteriorating
relationships among the major powers involved in deepening geopoliticalcompetition in key (sub-) regions, particularly Asia and Europe, during theongoing power transition.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

In those (sub-) regions, both revisionist and status quo countries haveattempted to maintain and/or strengthen their nuclear (extended) deterrence,and to reaffirm the value of nuclear weapons as “structural power.” Forrevisionist states seeking to reconfigure the existing international/regional order
or expand their spheres of influence, nuclear weapons serve as one of the mostsignificant assets for demonstrating their power explicitly or implicitly. For status
quo states facing the challenges posed by such revisionist states, there are few
alternatives but to react to such a movement and seek to maintain the reliabilityof nuclear deterrence while engaging in the power struggle over theinternational/regional order.
In the security circumstances mentioned above, one would hardly expect
the NWSs to be willing to accept radical nuclear disarmament in accordance withnormative/legal approaches. NWSs — and, to a lesser extent, the so-called“nuclear umbrella states” — are cautious about the possibility of decreasing theirpower by accepting nuclear disarmament, which has been oft-regarded as a partof the power struggle. Therefore, NWSs repeatedly demanded significant
amendments to paragraphs on issues and measures in line with normative/legal
approaches during the drafting of a final document for the 2015 RevCon.
There is no doubt that efforts for reinforcing norms and legal frameworks
regarding nuclear disarmament are crucial. However, pursuing them prematurely
without taking into consideration the dimensions of power struggle ininternational politics may preclude any meaningful accomplishments. Instead,the most urgent task in these difficult times is to pursue realistic and practicalarms control tailored to the security environment in key (sub-) regions bylaunching close dialogues with the countries concerned on developing sharedperceptions of the functions and risks of nuclear weapons in geostrategiccompetition; contemplating the roles of nuclear arms control in managing crises,
mitigating tensions, improving relationships among the countries concerned, andmaintaining order in the key (sub-) regions; and establishing and implementing
regional arms control measures.
Northeast Asia is one of the regions where such arms control should beexplored with the utmost priority. In the past, because of the relatively stable

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

regional security situation under US dominance, few regional arms control efforts
had been undertaken by the countries involved in security affairs in Northeast
Asia, except the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
However, the regional security landscape has been dramatically changing. Arising China has aggressively pursued modernization of its military, including its
nuclear and missile forces, and become more assertive, particularly in the South
China and East China seas. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which clearly
constitutes a violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, undermined thecredibility of the NWSs’ commitments on security assurance.
The first steps that should be taken by the countries concerned are tocommence dialogues on nuclear weapons, missiles and other strategic issues,and to promote multiple confidence-building measures (CBMs). In addition, they
could also implement regionally some practical and realistic measures proposedby the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiatives (NPDI: a coalition
comprising 12 NNWSs, initiated by Japan and Australia) at the 2015 NPT
RevCon, including: transparency of information relating to nuclear weapons (andpreferably other weapons that have strategic implications, such as missiles,missile defense, and hypersonic strike capabilities); reductions of — or at leastsuspensions of enhancements to — nuclear and missile forces; revisions to thedeployment postures of non-strategic nuclear weapons; reductions in the rolesof nuclear forces; and visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the people andleaders of those countries. Implementing regional nuclear arms control
measures in this region certainly has significant implications for global arms
control since three NWSs are involved in security affairs not just in Northeast
Asia but also in other regions deemed key in terms of the current powertransition.
Since the RevCon, Japan has been criticized for neither joining the“Humanitarian Pledges” nor concurring on a prompt commencement of efforts
for a nuclear weapons convention while relying on extended nuclear deterrence
despite having suffered atomic bombings. Needless to say, the experiences ofHiroshima and Nagasaki make Japan and the Japanese people understand theinhumanity of nuclear weapons better than any other country. At the same time,

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

however, Japan must not underrate how serious a security environment it isfacing, nor can it afford to rely solely on normative/legal approaches. For
ensuring its peace and security and advancing the aforementioned regionalarms control, realistic thinking and approaches are essential for Japan. For thesake of a world without nuclear weapons, Japan cannot bypass this difficult andbumpy path.

Hirofumi Tosaki is a Senior Research Fellow of the Center for the Promotion ofDisarmament and Non-Proliferation, The Japan Institute of International Affairs.

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