2008-E-13
South Korea’s FTAs:
Moving from an Emulative to a Competitive Strategy
Min Gyo Koo
Assistant Professor, the Department of Public Administration
Yonsei University

June, 2008

Paper presented at the International Symposium “Competitive Regionalism,” Ibuka
International Conference Hall, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. May 30 to 31, 2008.

I. Introduction
East Asian countries’ interest in free trade agreements (FTAs) has surged at the turn ofthe new millennium.1 In particular, the rise of South Korea’s FTA initiative has beenremarkable in its speed and scope. Over the past decade, South Korea has successfully
concluded FTAs with Chile (2003), Singapore (2004), the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA, 2005), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 2006),
and the U.S. (2007). South Korea has also been negotiating FTAs with Japan, Canada,
Mexico, India, and the European Union (EU). In addition, feasibility studies are under
way with Australia, China, South Africa, Australia, Russia, the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC), and MERCOSUR.
The rise of South Korea’s FTA initiative marks a significant departure from its
traditional focus on global multilateralism. Within South Korea’s policy circles, a newconsensus has emerged that a preferential approach to trade liberalization is not only
complementary to the country’s multilateral strategy, but also crucial to its economic
survival in a world of competitive export market. The Kim Dae-jung’s rise to thepresidency in 1998 turned the new policy idea into action, as manifested by the South
Korea’s first FTA with Chile in 2003. With the inauguration of President Roh Moo-hyunin 2003, the proactive role of the Office of the Minister for Trade (OMT) further
expanded the FTA policy to include both small and large economies ranging fromSingapore to the U.S.
From an institutional point of view, South Korea’s embrace of FTAs has been
shaped by a top-down political initiative rather than a bottom-up demand from various

1

See Pempel 2005, Aggarwal and Urata 2006, and Solís and Katada 2007.

1

interest groups and the general public. In the immediate aftermath of Asian financial
crisis, South Korea’s protectionist veto players such as labor unions and farmers’organizations were temporarily disorganized due to President Kim’s neoliberal reform
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity program.2 Amidst sweeping socioeconomic restructuring, Kim’s decision to pursue preferential trade liberalization throughFTAs went unchallenged, if not unnoticed, by traditional protectionist interests, as
illustrated by the fact that it was not until 2003 that a heated debate started over theratification of South Korea-Chile FTA.3
The recent dispute over the South Korea-U.S. FTA (KORUS FTA) indicates thatsocial cleavages in South Korea may be much wider and deeper than previously
conceived. Shifting interest group demands notwithstanding, South Korea’s FTA
strategy has evolved primarily through a top-down policy mechanism that can becharacterized as “embedded autonomy.”4 Under President Kim, strong executive power
and public support for neoliberal restructuring allowed the introduction of new FTA
2A veto player is a person or group who can effectively block the passage of a piece of legislation.
For a more detailed discussion about the effect of veto players on policymaking in general, see
Tsebelis 1995 and Cox and McCubbins 2001.

3

Park and Koo 2007.

4

Peter Evans originally used the term “embedded autonomy” to demonstrate that successful
developmental states in East Asia tend to be immersed in a dense network of ties that bind themto groups or classes that can become allies in the pursuit of societal goals. According to him,
embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and channels of implementation that enhance thecompetence of the state. In his logic, therefore, the idea of the state as midwife comes to thefore: States foster industry by changing social structures, by assisting in the emergence of newsocial groups and interests. Evans points out the impressive institutional constructions that went
with embedded autonomy in Korea in contrast to the often inconsistent state efforts by Brazil
and India to generate local entrepreneurial groups in the 1960s and 1970s (Evans 1995).

2

initiative. Under President Roh, the OMT steadily institutionalized the idea and practiceof promoting economic reform and strategic partnership through FTAs, while othergovernment agencies providing generous side-payments to those who lose out due tomore economic openness.
This paper investigates the following questions: (1) Have the prior decisions ofother countries to negotiate FTAs affected South Korea’s decision to pursue FTAs?; (2)how has South Korea’s FTA policymaking process evolved over the decade in terms of
its partner selection, timing, and scope of agreements?; and (3) to what extent do FTA
outcomes conform to the expectations of the emulation and competition hypotheses, asdeveloped by Solís and Katada?
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews existing
explanations that pertain to South Korea’s dramatic turn to FTA initiative. Section III
shows how and to what extent President Kim’s leadership shaped the launch of South
Korea’s FTA policy, as South Korea felt lagging behind as its peer countries in East Asia
were negotiating FTAs and the WTO was deadlocked. Section IV unravels the role
played by the presidential leadership and the OMT in moving South Korea’s FTA
initiative from an emulative and passive to a competitive and proactive strategy. Section
V summarizes the main findings and draws policy implications.

II. South Korea’s trade policy and conventional explanations
Since its dramatic economic take-off in the 1970s, South Korea has benefited fromexport-oriented industrialization under the auspices of the multilateral trading regime of
the GATT/WTO. Since its accession to the GATT in 1967, South Korea’s active

3

promotion of the export sector has allowed the once reclusive country in Northeast Asia
to aggressively participate in the global market. As a trade-dependent country, South
Korea’s full integration into the world trading system was not a matter of choice, but ofsurvival. Until recently, together with Japan and China, South Korea remained one of thevery few WTO member countries which did not enter into any regional trading
agreements as defined under Article 24 of the GATT/WTO.5
However, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the illusion of its
unstoppable economic growth was severely shattered.6 Furthermore, as the 1999 WTO
Ministerial Meeting in Seattle failed to launch a new round of trade talks, South Korea
came to recognize that the mediocre performance of the WTO and increasing competition
in its traditional export markets could hurt export-dependent South Korea. The financial
crisis and the debacle in Seattle thus served as a wake-up call to South Korea, making it
realize the importance of supplementary mechanisms at the sub-multilateral level tosafeguard its economic security.7
As shown in Table 1, South Korea’s FTA track record has been remarkable.
Since the signing of the South Korea-Chile FTA in 2003, South Korea has concluded
bilateral and minilateral FTAs with Singapore, the EFTA, ASEAN, and the U.S.. These
five FTAs together would likely cover about 27 percent of South Korea’s total trade, if
fully implemented. South Korea has also been negotiating FTAs with Japan, Canada,
5

Koo 2006, pp. 142-143.

6

Under the IMF-mandated austerity program, the real GDP growth rate plummeted from 5.0
percent in 1997 to minus 5.8 percent in 1998, while real consumption and investment fell by 8.2
percent and 21.1 percent, respectively, during the same period. After the exchange rate
readjustment, South Korea’s per-capita income fell from $10,037 to $6,823 (Pyo 1999, p. 12).

7

Cheong 1999; Sohn 2001.

4

Mexico, India, and the EU. In addition, a number of feasibility studies are currently
under way with China, Australia, Russia, South Africa, the GCC, and MERCOSUR. If
these prospective FTAs were concluded successfully, they would likely cover up to 67
percent of South Korea’s total trade.

Table 1. South Korea’s current and prospective FTAs

Partners

Year
Signed*Bilateral
trade**

FDI
VolumeIssue Scope
Investment

Services

Environment

Labor

Economic
Cooperation
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Chile
2003
0.63%
TBC
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Singapore
2004
2.33%
TBC
Yes
Yes
No
No
EFTA
2005
0.78%
TBC
Yes
Yes
No
No
ASEAN
2006
9.7%
TBC
Yes
No
No
No
U.S.
2007
13.2%
TBC
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Japan
negotiation
13.3%
TBC
Canadanegotiation
1.11%
TBC
EU
negotiation
12.8%
TBC
Mexiconegotiation
0.78%
TBC
India
negotiation
1.23%
TBC
China
study
18.40%TBC
South Africa
study
0.42%
TBC
Russia
study
1.54%
TBC
Australia
study
2.52%
TBC
MERCOSUR
study
1.4%
TBC
* Updated as of May 2008.
** % scores indicate the value of bilateral trade as a portion of South Korea’s total trade (export +import) as of 2005 and 2006 (Source: IMF, The Direction of Trade Statistics).

The existing literature on South Korea’s FTA strategy—and East Asian FTAs
more broadly—has largely focused on one of the following questions: (1) What has
motivated South Korea’s rush toward FTAs, departing from its traditional focus on
multilateralism?; (2) What are the characteristics of South Korea’s FTA strategy in termsof its partner selection, timing, and scope of agreements?; (3) How has South Korea’s
FTA policymaking process evolved within the domestic political dynamics?

5

As noted by many economists, South Koreahas made the policy shift toward
FTAs primarily because FTAs are likely to generate substantial economic gains.8 The socalled gravity model offers a popular economic explanation that links geographic
distance and economic size to the choice of FTA partners. In order to reduce the costs
related to geographic distance and to maximize the benefits from economic size, thegravity model suggests that neighboring countries form FTAs with each other, thus
creating a natural trading bloc.9 From this perspective, the formation of natural trading
blocs will improve economic welfare, whereas the formation of unnatural trade blocs
between distant and/or small economies will have marginal welfare effects, if any.
Despite its explanatory utility, the gravity model explanation runs into a problem
in accounting for South Korea’s selection of FTA partners. For instance, the South
Korea-Chile FTA is a typical case of an unnatural trading bloc, not only because theocean separates the two countries, but also because Chile’s economy is relatively small,and thus the bilateral trade volume between South Korea and Chile will remain
insignificant, if not negligible.10 Instead, South Korea would most likely benefit
handsomely if it removed existing trade and investment barriers by establishing FTAs
with Japan and China.11 Nevertheless, South Korea’s FTA negotiation with Japan has
been stalemated since November 2004, while a prospective FTA with China is still low
priority for South Korea owing to its concern about China’s cheap agricultural and

8

Cheong 1999, 2001, 2005; Cheong and Lee 2000; Choi and Schott 2001; Sohn 2001; Sohn andYoon 2001; Chung 2003; SERI 2003; Nam 2004.

9Frankel, Stein, and Wei 1997; Krugman 1991.

10

Koo 2006, p. 144.

11

Sohn and Yoon 2001.

6

industrial products. In sharp contrast, South Korea has been more active in pursuingcross-regional FTAs with distant economies, both small and large.12
From a non-economic perspective, the structural changes in the post-Cold War
and post-Asian financial crisis period contributed to cognitive changes and the diffusionof new policy ideas.13 More specifically, the proliferation of East Asian FTAs is closely
associated with the decline of U.S. economic hegemony in the region. During the Cold
War period, trade liberalization was provided for most East Asian countries mainly
through the GATT under the auspices of American hegemony. To the extent that the
GATT required membership, the provision of trade liberalization was a multilateral club
good. But it contained a strong public good characteristic, since East Asian countries
were allowed to pay less to get more out of the system. Yet in the aftermath of regional
financial turmoil, East Asian countries’ new appetite for FTAs reflects a convergence ofinterests in securing bilateral and minilateral club goods. The “trade triangle” that had
linked Japanese and overseas Chinese capital, developing East Asian manufacturing
capacities, and U.S. market was in trouble. With traditional mechanisms within the
GATT/WTO and America’s global economic leadership offering no salient solutions,these countries quickly turned toward FTAs to secure preferential access and create amore diversified export market.14
Against these backgrounds, many have characterized South Korea’s turn toward
FTAs as being neoliberal in its policy orientation. As will be discussed below, someradicals in South Korea have even dubbed the economic liberalization result from FTAs
12

Park and Koo 2007.

13

Acharya 2007; Higgott 2007; Ye 2007.

14

Aggarwal and Koo 2008.

7

“the second IMF-imposed liberalization,” allegedly at the expense of economicallydisadvantaged groups and people such as farmers and blue-collar workers.
Despite their theoretical and empirical merits, few existing studies have focusedon the emulative and competitive aspects of South Korea’s policy shift toward FTAs.
Having that in mind, the following sections attempt to unravel South Korea’s emulativeand competitive motives in FTA policymaking process. In a competitive world, thesuccess of early movers is likely to accelerate the spread of new policy ideas.15 The rapid
diffusion of FTAs in East Asia—particularly the 2001 Japan-Singapore FTA and the2003 ASEAN-China framework FTA—has affected South Korea’s embrace of FTAs invarious ways.
In a similar vein, the voluntary nature of countries’ decision to enter FTAs can be
attributed to their fear of exclusion. According to this logic, a country’s fear of exclusionfrom an FTA—especially with a country that has “go-it-alone-power”—motivates theformer to voluntarily choose to form an FTA with the latter, even if the former prefers thestatus quo.16 The KORUS FTA illustrates that the fear of exclusion in the U.S. market
played a significant catalyst role in launching KORUS FTA negotiations. South Korea
decided to start negotiations with the U.S. despite serious concerns about potentiallylopsided negotiations due to the dominant position of the U.S. in the global economy.
Furthermore, South Korea’s decision to pursue a KORUS FTA goes beyond the logic ofpolicy diffusion and fear of exclusion. South Korea has not made it a secret that it wishes

15

Baldwin 1997; Ikenberry 1990.

16

Gruber 2000.

8

to use a successful accord with the U.S. as diplomatic and economic leverage in regional
affairs, particularly in its relations with China and Japan.17

III. Emulating Peers under Kim
In November 1998, the South Korean government’s Inter-Ministerial Trade Policy
Coordination Committee formally announced that the country would start an FTA
negotiation with Chile, while conducting feasibility studies with other prospective FTA
partners such as the U.S., Japan, New Zealand, and Thailand. Shortly after theannouncement, the Kim government formed a special task force on a South Korea-Chile
FTA, which consisted of five working groups, covering market access, trade rules,
services, intellectual property, and legal procedures.18
As many observers have noted, the economic crisis shocked South Korea out of
traditional policy patterns and practices. The economic shock temporarily disorganizedinterest groups that used to veto policy reform, while generating pressure for politicians
to change the failed policies.19 Although some farmers’ groups and labor unions
remained militant, their political influence eroded significantly, as both their absolute andrelative shares in the economy continued to decline.20 In sharp contrast, competitive

17

Aggarwal and Koo 2005b.

18

Chung 2003, p. 74; Sohn 2001, p. 7.

19

Mo 1999, p. 53.

20

The share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in South Korea’s total employment decreased

continuously from 17.9 percent in 1990 to 8.1 percent in 2004. The three sectors’ share in South
Korea’s GDP was less than 4 percent in 2003 (The Ministry of Finance and Economy of Korea
2005).

9manufacturing sectors began to show their support for the government’s FTA policy.21
In the advent of South Korea’s near economic collapse, the abundant political
capital given to President Kim allowed him to implement sweeping economic reforms,
including recapitalizing banks, setting up a public asset-management company to buy up
bad loans, overseeing banking reforms, and forcing chaebols to purge the debt from theirbalance sheets by selling entire divisions or going out of business altogether. He also
actively promoted several promising industries, such as information technology andbiotechnology, through various forms of incentives including grants, bank loans on
preferential terms, and the like. Reform efforts thus strengthened the mechanisms forresource allocation through market mechanism and significantly altered the legal andinstitutional settings to improve governance.22
The resultant higher factor mobility generated unintended conditions in favor of
trade liberalization through FTAs. The IMF conditionalities and President Kim’s
corporate restructuring program did create more efficient capital and labor markets,
namely more flexible resource allocation based on market signals rather than government
directives. Such a development significantly weakened the voice of non-competitive
sectors and factors.23
21

A survey conducted by the Federation of Korean Industries (2001) on member entrepreneurs’attitudes toward FTA showed that 87 percent of the 53 respondents recognized the positive
economic effects of FTAs. 94.3 percent of the respondents had concerns about the case where
South Korea is left alone while other Asia-Pacific countries are busy negotiating FTA deals witha number of South Korea’s trading partners.
22

OECD 2003.

23

An OECD survey (2003) notes that flexible factor markets were an important aspect ofrecovering high growth in South Korea with rapid structural change in the aftermath of thefinancial crisis. Indeed the financial crisis produced dramatic socio-economic changes. The

10

One the one hand, FTAs held strong appeal because it was possible to exclude
some politically sensitive sectors from preferential arrangements or to minimize market
concessions, thus leaving domestic veto players contained. On the other hand, the Kim
government’s FTA policy reflected its sense of urgency in the advent of risingcompetition with its advanced trading partners such as Japan as well as developing ones
such as China and ASEAN in the regional and global export market.24 With the WTO’s
new trade round stalemated, South Korea desperately needed to expand its trade to newmarkets by bilateral and minilateral means.25
Most notably, President Kim was also drawn to bilateral and minilateral FTAs in
pursuit of his ambitious initiative to make South Korea a regional transportation hub andinternational business center.26 He undertook a dramatic policy shift as part of his
ambitious vision and strategic goals for regional cooperation. At the first ASEAN Plus
Three (APT) summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, he made public South
Korea’s aspiration to become a hub country of East Asia by playing a balancer role

South Korean economy experienced huge layoffs as well as wild fluctuations in capital flows
until the economy rebounded in 1999. The once-rigid South Korean labor market became more
flexible, as indicated by the growing proportion of temporary and daily workers and theemergence of a dualistic labor market. The proportion of non-regular workers increased from
42.5 percent of total employees in 2000 to 52 percent in 2002.
24

Bank of Korea 2001.

25

Koo 2006, p. 148.

26

Aside from his vision for regional institutions such as EAVG and APT, President Kim

announced in his 2002 New Year’s message to the nation that his government would shortly
launch the Northeast Asian Business Hub State Initiative, while permanently pursuing financial
and corporate reforms in a market friendly manner (The Chosun Ilbo, January 14, 2002).

11

between regional powers.27 During the 1999 APT summit, he also proposed theestablishment of an expert panel, the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), as the first step toforge a regional cooperation mechanism and to develop the APT into a more permanentregional institution.28
As long as China and Japan both were eager for regionalism, President Kim could
play the role of visionary for an East Asian community by serving as a bridge between
the two enduring rivals.29 Aside from relatively warm Sino-Japanese relations at the turnof the new millennium, Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy that culminated in the June
2000 inter-Korean summit created a great deal of diplomatic and moral capital for South
Korea to actively address the delicate issues of peace and stability in the region.30
27

The APT proposal was first discussed in the mid-1990s in preparation of the inaugural ASEAN-

Europe Meeting (ASEM). European countries could coordinate their participation relatively
easily through the European Union (EU), but East Asian counterparts lacked such an
institutional arrangement. ASEAN thus asked Japan, South Korea, and China to participate in apreliminary ministerial meeting, which took place in 1995. The ministerial meeting was later
supplemented by a summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur on the occasion of the annual ASEAN
leaders’ meeting in December 1997. After a second leaders’ meeting a year later, the groupagreed to make the dialogue an annual affair. Since 1999, the scope of the dialogue has
expanded to include separate ministerial meetings under the rubric of APT rather than simply as
preparation sessions for the ASEM meeting. For more details, see Stubbs 2002.
28

The EAVG also studied a joint surveillance mechanism for short-term capital movements andan early financial warning system. The group later proposed the establishment of an East AsianMonetary Fund and a regional exchange rate coordination mechanism, with the long-term goalof creating a common currency area. Other recommendations included upgrading the annual
APT meetings to an East Asian Summit (EAS) and establishment of the East Asian Free Trade
Area (Moon 2005).
29

Rozman 2006.

30

In February 1998, President Kim announced that he would pursue what he called the “Sunshine

Policy” with North Korea in hopes of encouraging greater discussion and cooperation with

12

The adoption of FTAs under Kim’s presidency as a new policy tool, and theimplementation of sweeping economic reforms, thus supports the emulation hypothesisthat countries will copy the FTA policies of their socio-cultural peers or of leading
nations. To some extent, the embrace of an FTA track under Kim also supports a related
hypothesis that FTA policies that disseminate through emulation should beomnidirectional in that the Kim government became interested in negotiating as many
FTAs as possible with little concern about sequencing.
To summarize, the economic crisis at the end of the 1990s contributed to the riseof reform-minded Kim Dae-jung and the downfall of many domestic veto holders that
had plagued South Korea’s economic policy in general and trade policy in specific.
These included not only formal institutions such as government bureaucracy and politicalparties but also societal groups such as labor unions, farmers’ associations, and NGOs.
Yet, it should be noted that the Kim government’s FTA policy remained inherently
emulative and passive to the extent that it aimed at minimizing potential costs, rather thanmaximizing benefits, of FTAs.

IV. Competing with Peers under Roh
The new policy ideas under Kim greatly inspired his successor, President Roh Moo-hyun.
Upon its inauguration in February 2003, the Roh government launched an ambitious
initiative aimed at creating a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia. He created the
Pyongyang, as inspired by the old Aesop’s fable about the sun getting more results than thefierce wind. In December 2000, the Norwegian Nobel Committee, in recognition of his“extraordinary and lifelong works for democracy and human rights in South Korea and East
Asia in general, and for peace and reconciliation with North Korea in particular,” awarded him
the Nobel Peace Prize.

13

Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Business Hub in order to carry out theinitiative including the creation of financial and logistic hubs and the promotion ofcooperation in the areas of business, energy, and transportation. At the same time,
President Roh launched the “Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative for Peace andProsperity,” designed to carry out his long-term vision for creating a new regional order
based on mutual trust and cooperation.31
From the outset, however, President Roh’s agenda encountered unfriendly
regional geopolitics as a result of the outbreak of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the
U.S. in 2001. In addition, the simultaneous political leadership changes in the U.S.,
China, Japan, and South Korea put unpredictable pressure on East Asian regionalism.32
None of the great powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula thus seemed supportive of
President Roh’s wish, which lacked the same degree of diplomatic and moral attraction as
his predecessor Kim had once enjoyed. Each great power kept alive an interest in
regionalism, but sought to gain advantage over its rival, thereby leaving very little room
for Roh to maneuver.33
As noted previously, South Korea’s FTA strategy emerged initially as a fractionof President Kim’s broader economic and strategic agenda. Under his presidency, theFTA policy was largely designed as an emulative and defensive strategy to cope with the31

Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation 2004.

32

The U.S. President George W. Bush and the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

entered office in 2001. Hu Jintao and Roh Moo-hyun were elected presidents of the People’s
Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, respectively, in 2003. All these leaders werecharacterized as defiant and dogmatic—rather than pragmatic—in their foreign policy
orientation, thus often causing diplomatic spats with one another.
33

Rozman 2006.

14

rise of regionalism in other parts of the world. Not surprisingly, the linkage between
FTAs and domestic reforms was not clearly defined or deliberately minimized. Yet with
its ambitious regionalist vision in trouble, the Roh government realized that bilateral andminilateral FTAs might provide more effective mechanism for realizing its strategic andeconomic goals.
In many respects, the policy shift toward FTAs under President Kim did mark adramatic departure from South Korea’s traditional trade policy. Yet, it was not until
President Roh entered office in 2003 that the roadmap for FTAs and detailed action plansfor its multi-track FTA strategy were completed.34 In contrast to its rather peripheral
status in President Kim’s economic and strategic agenda, the FTA policy now became acore element of President Roh’s economic policy reform and regionalist vision. From an
institutional point of view, the empowerment of the OMT demonstrated the renewed
enthusiasm and commitment under Roh, as the once beleaguered institution took firmroots within the government with its mission and mandate to initiate and negotiate
FTAs.35 OMT’s central position was further highlighted by the appointment of its third
Trade Minister, Kim Hyun-chong, in July 2004 (until August 2007) as well as thepromotion of its first Trade Minister, Han Duk-soo, to the Minister of Finance and34

Lee 2006, p 5; MOFAT 2006.

35

As a result of the 1998 government organization reforms that were intended to consolidate

institutional support for President Kim’s reform agenda, the OMT was formed under the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) with a mission to comprehensively establish
and conduct foreign policies on trade, trade negotiations, and foreign economic affairs.
Although its institutional legitimacy was shaky at first, the OMT slowly but steadily set inmotion the changes in bureaucratic balance of power, and thus began to play a leadership role inforeign trade affairs (Koo 2006).

15

Economy (March 2005 – July 2006) and later to the Prime Minister (April 2007 –February 2008).36
The KORUS FTA is a good example of South Korea’s proactive FTA strategy
and the role of the OMT. In February 2006, the Roh government made a surprise moveto cut South Korea’s annual screen quota in favor of the U.S.37 In addition, it lifted theban on U.S. beef (the response to an incident of mad cow disease in the U.S.), proposed
modifications to its pharmaceutical pricing system, and revised an automobile remissions
regulation to provide a grace period for imported vehicles, thereby paving the way for
KORUS FTA negotiations.38 After eight formal negotiating rounds since June 2006, thetwo governments successfully concluded a landmark agreement on April 1, 2007.
By any measure, the negotiation process was not an easy one and the two
governments expect an even tougher legislative ratification process. From one
perspective, the current debate in South Korea about the KORUS FTA indicates thatsocial cleavages may be much wider and deeper than previously thought. South Korea’s
protectionist interests, which have slowly been recovering from the upheavals caused by
the financial crisis, have now been galvanized by their coalition of convenience with anti-

36

For the critics of neoliberal economic policy as well as hardcore Korean nationalists, Trade

Minister Kim is a bad choice not only because he advocates neoliberal economic policies, butalso because he grew up in the U.S. and was trained as a U.S. lawyer, which allegedly
undermines his nationalist credential.
37

South Korea’s screen quota system was designed to stem a flood of Hollywood blockbusters.

South Korea cut the quota from the current 146 days or 40 percent reserved for domestic films
to 73 days or 20 percent starting July 1, 2006 (“Screen Quota Cut Clears Way for Trade Dealwith the US,” The Chosun Ilbo, 26 January 2006. [Online, cited May 18, 2008]. Available from<http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200601/200601260013.html>).
38

United States Trade Representative 2006, pp. 393-417.

16

capital labor unions and anti-American NGOs, whereas pro-liberalization businesslobbies are not actively mustering enough political support for the government.39
Indeed, South Korea’s uncompetitive sectors felt more victimized by KORUS
FTA negotiations and, more broadly, by their allegedly neoliberal economic orientation.
For those skeptics, therefore, the government’s effort to restructure the economy byinviting external pressure—i.e. FTAs—would only worsen the issue of economic
polarization in South Korea, rather than providing an opportunity to upgrade its economy
to a more advanced level.40 Some South Korean radicals have dubded the cross-Pacificdeal as “the second IMF-imposed liberalization.” This indicates that the explicit linkage
of FTA policy to neoliberal reforms galvanized once dormant protectionist veto players.
Amid shifting interest group demands, however, South Korea’s FTA strategy
maintains its top-down momentum that is centerd on presidential leadership andgovernment institutions. Under President Kim, strong executive power and public
support for neoliberal restructuring allowed the introduction of new FTA initiative.
Under President Roh, the OMT took over the driver’s seat from the president who

39

In March 2006, for instance, a coalition was formed bringing together some 300 anti-KORUS

FTA groups, thus becoming the largest coalition ever on a single policy issue during the Rohadministration. Its core membership consisted of farmers and film industry people, who would
most likely suffer from a successful KORUS FTA. At the same time, this ad-hoc coalition
included a number of anti-American and leftist organizations such as the Korean Federation ofTrade Unions, the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union, and the Korean Federationof University Student Councils. In May 2006, many of these radical groups also organizedviolent protests against the relocation of the U.S. Forces Headquarters in South Korea fromSeoul to Pyongtaek, a small city south of Seoul, leading to charges that the anti-KORUS FTA
protests turned into an anti-American movement.
40

Lee 2006, p. 6.

17

suffered low popularity even among his once-loyal supporters.41
As a champion of neoliberal economic ideas, the OMT is relatively insulated fromthe pressure from special interest groups, which in turn prevents this government agency
from obtaining sufficient public support for FTAs.42 Nevertheless, the abolition of theForeign Economic Council under the Presidential Committee for National Economy inearly 2006 after its operation as a monitoring body for the previous two years expanded
the OMT’s institutional authority. In addition, a presidential committee to facilitate a
KORUS FTA and to win over its opponents was set up in August 2006 under theleadership of the former OMT minister and the former Minister of Finance and Economy
Han Duk-soo, who successfully shielded the OMT from its critics.43 Above all, President
41

The OMT’s neoliberal policy orientation has been further highlighted by the appointment of its

third trade minister, Kim Hyun-chong, in July 2004 as well as the promotion of its first trademinister Han Duk-soo (1998-2004) to deputy prime minister and minister of finance andeconomy. The OMT’s authority has been expanded as indicated by the abolition of the Foreign
Economic Council under the Presidential Committee for National Economy in early 2006 after
its operation as a monitoring body for the past two years. In addition, a presidential committee tofacilitate a KORUS FTA and to win over its opponents was set up in August 2006 under theleadership of the former OMT minister and the former deputy prime minister Han Duk-soo, who
is most likely to shield the OMT from its critics.
42

Of course, this does not mean that the OMT operates in political vacuum. Aside from its critics

and public opinion, the OMT closely consults various private business councils as well as the
National Economic Advisory Council under the President’s Office as well. Yet in contrast to its
counterpart ministries in the government such as the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE),
the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MOCIE), and the Ministry of Agriculture andForestry (MOAF), the OMT rarely consults small firms and individual farmers directly, while
putting much more emphasis on the feedback from big business and industry associations suchas the Federation of Korean Industries, the Korea International Trade Association, and the Korea
Federation of Small and Medium Business (Lee 2006, p. 7).
43

The Chosun Ilbo, July 24, 2006.

18

Roh’s trust in the OMT and Trade Minister Kim remained firm and steadfast despite
criticism.
Roh’s endorsement of the OMT and KORUS FTA negotiations reflected his own
sense of urgency. More often than not, President Roh stated that “China is surging.
South Korea is trapped between China and Japan, and thus needs to address thisundesirable situation sooner rather than later. One of the most effective ways to realize
this goal is to improve our country’s competitive edge against China and Japan in the U.S.
market through a KORUS FTA.”44 In a press conference on August 9, 2006, hereaffirmed his commitment to FTAs and urged his people to embrace the tide ofglobalization wholeheartedly, instead of trying to dodge what liberals of today’s world
see as an unstoppable and inevitable phenomenon. In addition, he rejected the Japan’s
flying geese model-based economic development strategy as having outlived its utility
for South Korea, and instead proposed that South Korea find its economic future inservice industries, departing from its traditional focus on manufacturing industries.45
For South Korea, the KORUS FTA is the largest FTA ever, as the U.S. is South
Korea’s third-largest trading partner. Many studies predict that the KORUS FTA would
most likely benefit South Korea’s export industries such as automobiles and electronics,
albeit at the expense of its less competitive agricultural and service sectors.46 Indeed, the
KORUS FTA has the potential to alter the dynamics of U.S.-South Korean economic
relations. At the same time, it may greatly contribute to bolstering diplomatic and44

A presidential speech delivered to the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, March 28,

2006 ([Online, cited May 18, 2008]. Available from<http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LOD&office_id=023&article_id=0000178504>).
45

Yonhap News, August 9, 2006.

46

Schott and Choi 2001; Sohn 2001.

19

security relations between the two traditional allies in a region where the balance ofpower is shifting due to the rise of China and the nuclear adventurism of North Korea.47
Furthemore, the KORUS FTA has the potential to alter the dynamics of East
Asian economic relations. With respect to spillover effects, many in Japan and China
have already expressed concern that the U.S.-South Korean accord could put theircountries at a competitive disadvantage in the U.S. and South Korea market. Such
recognition might motivate both Tokyo and Beijing to seek an FTA with Seoul andWashington.48 South Korea-Japan FTA negotiations have been stalled since November
2004. Meanwhile, the feasibility of a South Korea-China FTA has been studied byprivate/semi-private research institutions in both countries. The opinion about a South
Korea-China FTA is divided in South Korea. From one perspective, a bilateral FTA with
China will enhance South Korea’s economic presence with its largest trading partner.
From other perspective, potential adverse effects on agricultural and some low-end

47

Many policy experts in Seoul share this view. For instance, Yoon Young-kwan, who served as

the first Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Roh administration stresses that an FTA
with the U.S. is a useful mean to promote South Korea’s role as an economic hub country inEast Asia. He argued that a KORUS FTA would be compatible with South Korea’s
globalization strategy that began in the early 1990s under President Kim Young-sam. For Yoon,
it was important for South Korea to improve its competitive edge in high value-added service
industries. He also emphasized that cementing economic ties with the U.S. is strategicallyimportant because South Korea’s future lies in how to coordinate with the U.S. to ensure thepeaceful resolution of the current North Korean nuclear crisis (A speech delivered to aconference organized by the Association of Junior High and High School Teachers, Jeju Island,
July 24, 2006).
48“Chinese Premier Hopes for FTA with Korea ‘Soon’,” Chosun Ilbo, 6 April 2007. [Online,

cited May 18, 2008]. Available from<http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200704/200704060013.html>.

20

manufacturing sectors would be much greater than those of prospective FTAs with the
U.S. and Japan.
These developments under Roh strongly supports the competition hypothesis thatcountries will counteract the FTA policies of their competitors in terms of market sharesand regional leadership and that business and economic bureaucrats concerned with tradeand investment diversion and/or politicians and foreign affairs officials focused on theforeign policy implications of FTAs should be the main agents behind the country’s trade
policy shift.
To summarize, in contrast to the emulative and reactive approach taken by theKim government, the multitrack FTA initiative of Roh government has adopted aproactive and competitive stance, both domestically and internationally. Most notably,
the OMT has institutionalized the idea of pursuing economic reforms and cementing
strategic partnerships through FTAs. Its neoliberal leanings notwithstanding, it should be
noted that Roh’s FTA strategy has in fact built upon South Korea’s longstanding
embedded liberal tradition. As held widely, South Korea’s developmental state has
provided minimum safeguards for uncompetitive sectors and rural areas through multilayered formal and informal trade barriers, although they were largely exploited in favorof competitive, export-oriented sectors and urban areas.49 The Roh administration choseto combine generous side payments with its market opening commitments in order tocushion its citizens from the vagaries of the international economy in return for public

49

For more discussions about South Korea’s developmental state, see Amsden 1989 and Woo-

Cumings 1999.

21

support for openness.50 As summarized in Table 2, the success of its proactive
negotiations has been achieved by embedded liberalism consisting of generous
compensation packages to support those who suffer damages from FTAs.

Table 2. Major side payments under President Roh Moo-hyun

50

For instance, the ratification of the Korea-Chile FTA in February 2004 was followed by thepassage of a special law designed to make up for the potential financial damages of farming andfishing industries due to FTAs. Despite criticism for the government’s excessive financial
commitment to declining sectors, over $80 billion of public and private funds have been
earmarked for farming and fishing rescue programs over a 10-year period (MOFAT 2004).
Other examples include a series of side payment pledges in the form of government subsidies
and grant-in-aid during the KORUS FTA negotiations. In March 2006, the Roh government
pledged to provide the Korean movie industry with a government fund amounting to $400
million instead of cutting South Korea’s annual screen quota in favor of the U.S. (“su-ku-rinquo-ta hu-sok dae-chaek sil-hyo geo-dul-kka (Will the post-screen quota measures be
effective?),” The Chosun Ilbo, January 27, 2006. [Online, cited May 18, 2008]. Available from<http://spn.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2006/01/27/2006012770343.html>). The Rohgovernment also committed itself to provide cash allowances for seven years to compensate forup to 85 percent of income losses of farmers and fishermen once the KORUS FTA goes into
effect. Aside from this, Korean farmers and fishermen will receive government subsidies forfive years if they go out of business due to the KORUS FTA. Furthermore, to boost investment
in agriculture, the Korean government will encourage the creation of private agriculturalinvestment funds, and agriculture-related companies will be allowed to bring in CEOs fromoutside the industry. The government will also offer low-interest loans to businesses that lose
more than 25 percent of their sales due to the KORUS FTA, while they are eligible for receiving
subsidies of up to 75 percent of their payroll for one year if they switch into other industries orrelocate their employees. The government will also provide cash incentives of up to $600 amonth to companies that hire farmers and fishermen who have been dislocated from their work(“Government to Pay Farmers, Fishermen for FTA Losses,” [Online, cited May 18, 2008]. The
Chosun Ilbo, May 18, 2008. Available from<http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200706/200706290022.html>).

22

Ratification stageof the KoreaChile FTA(2004)

Target groups

Size of side payments

In return for

Agricultural andfishery industries

over $80 billion of
public and private
funds over a 10-year
period.

partial opening ofagricultural and fisherymarkets

Movie industry$400 million
government fundcutting of annual screen
quota in favor of the U.S.

cash allowances forseven years

to compensate for up to 85
percent of income losses

government subsidies
for five years

if they go out of businesslow-interest loans

if they lose more than 25
percent of their sales

subsidies of up to 75
percent of their payroll
for one year

if they switch into otherindustries or relocate theiremployees

cash incentives of up
to $600 a month tocompanies

if they hire farmers andfishermen who have been
dislocated from their work.

Agricultural andfishery industries
Negotiation stageof the KORUS
FTA (2006-07)
Manufacturing
and service
industries

V. Conclusion
This paper investigated South Korea’s embrace of FTAs that has evolved from anemulative to a competitive strategy in the post-Asian financial crisis period. Within
South Korea’s policy circles, the traditional view that FTAs are a stumbling block forstrengthening global multilateralism has been replaced by a more favorable view thatthey could be a building block. This cognitive shift began to take place during the Kim
Dae-jung administration and took firm roots within the Roh Moo-hyun administration,
particularly within the OMT. With a growing confidence in negotiating andimplementing FTAs, South Korea’s FTA policy has become proactive rather than being
simply reactive in its goal and action.

23

South Korea’s dramatic embrace of FTA policy has largely been shaped by a topdown political momentum rather than a bottom-up societal demand. Most notably, theeconomic crisis at the end of the 1990s contributed to the rise of reform-minded Kim
Dae-jung and the downfall of many domestic veto holders. In pursuit of his diplomaticand economic vision, President Kim was drawn to bilateral and minilateral FTAs, which
held strong appeal because some politically sensitive sectors could be excluded fromtrade liberalization. As a result, South Korea’s trade strategy successfully shifted its
focus from global multilateralism to regional/cross-regional bilateralism andminilateralism. Nevertheless, the Kim government’s approach was basically designed tominimize the potential costs of FTAs rather than to maximize the gains from them. It
also lacked a clear linkage between FTAs and other reform policies, thus leaving the FTA
policy inherently emulative and passive.
President Kim’s grand regionalist vision and neoliberal economic reforms
inspired President Roh Moo-hyun. Yet President Roh did not have the luxury of the
popular support and diplomatic capacity that President Kim had once enjoyed. Morerecently, South Korea’s protectionist interests seem to have become regalvanized by theircoalition with labor unions and leftist NGOs, whereas proliberalization business lobbies
fall short of providing equivalent political support to the government. Nonetheless, theFTA initiative has become a core element of the Roh government’s economic policy
reforms. Among others, the enlarged role of OMT has steadily institutionalized the idea
and practice of promoting economic reform and strategic partnership through FTAs.
The motivations of the political leadership as well as the new bureaucratic balanceof power have played a significant role in South Korea’s rush toward FTAs. Although24

South Korea’s pursuit of FTAs does not necessarily mean that it has completely
abandoned the multilateral trading system, the policy departure is increasingly becoming
obvious and significant. To conclude, the South Korean case strongly supports theemulative and competitive hypotheses.

25References
Acharya, Amitav (2007), “Made in America? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism,”
Journal of East Asian Studies 7(3), pp. 371-378.
Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Min Gyo Koo (2005a), “Beyond Network Power? The
Dynamics of Formal Economic Integration in Northeast Asia,” The Pacific
Review 18(2), pp. 189-216.
(2005b), “The Evolution and Implications of Bilateral Trade Agreements in the
Asia-Pacific,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Shujiro Urata, eds., Bilateral Trade
Agreements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications, London:
Routledge.
(2008), “Economic and Security Institution Building in Northeast Asia: An
Analytical Overview,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal, Min Gyo Koo, Seungjoo Lee, andChung-in Moon, eds., Northeast Asian Regionalism: Ripe for Integration?, New
York: Springer.
Amsden, Alice (1989), Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Baldwin, Richard (1997), “The Causes of Regionalism,” The World Economy 20(7), pp.
865-888.
Bank of Korea (2001), “Comparative Analysis and Prospects of South Korea-ChinaJapan Trade Relationships, Seoul: The Bank of Korea (in Korean).
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1992), “Regionalism versus Multilateralism,” The World Economy
15(5), pp. 535-555.
Bridges, Brian (1993), Japan and Korea in the 1990s: From Antagonism to Adjustment,
Bookfield: Edward Elgar.
Calder, Kent and Min Ye (2004), “Regionalism and Critical Junctures: Explaining the‘Organization Gap’ in Northeast Asia,” Journal of East Asian Studies 4(2), pp.
191-226.
Cheong, Inkyo (1999), “Korea-Chile FTA: Economic Effects and Implications,” Journalof International Economic Studies, 2(4).

26(2001), “The Economic Effects of a Korea-Japan FTA and Policy
Implications,” KIEP Policy Paper 01-04, Seoul: Korea Institute for International
Economic Policy (KIEP).
(2005), “Economic Assessment of Korea-Japan FTA,” in Choong Yong Ahn etal. eds., Korea-Japan FTA: Toward a Model Case for East Asian Economic
Integration, KIEP Policy Analyses 05-01, Seoul: KIEP.
Cheong, Inkyo and Kyunghee Lee (2000), “Korea-Chile FTA: Background, Economic
Effect, and Policy Implications,” KIEP Policy Analysis 00-07, Seoul: KIEP.
Chung, Hae-kwan (2003), “The Korea-Chile FTA: Significance and Implications,” East
Asian Review 15(1).
Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins (2001), “Institutional Dimensions of Economic
Policy Outcomes,” in Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, eds., Presidents,
Parliaments and Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Evans, Peter (1995), Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Frankel, Jeffrey A., Ernesto Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei (1997), Regional Trading Blocs inthe World Economic System, Washington, DC: Institute for International
Economics.
Frieden, Jeffry A. (1991), “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies
in a World of Global Finance,” International Organization 45(4), pp. 425-451.
Frieden, Jeffry A. and Ronald Rogowski (1996), “The Impact of the International
Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview,” in Robert O. Keohane
and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gilpin, Robert (1987), The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Gruber, Lloyd (2000), Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational
Institutions, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman (1995), The Political Economy of
Demographic Transition, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

27

Higgott, Richard (2007), “The Theory and Practice of Regionalism in East Asia: Peter
Katzenstein’s Value Added,” Journal of East Asian Studies 7(3), pp. 378-387.
Ikenberry, John (1990), “The International Spread of Privatization Policies: Inducements,
Learning, and Policy Bandwagoning,” in Ezra Suleiman and John Waterburt, eds.,
The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatizations, Boulder:
Westview Press.
Koo, Min Gyo (2006), “From Multilateralism to Bilateralism? A Shift in South Korea’s
Trade Strategy,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Shujiro Urata, eds., Bilateral Trade
Agreements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications, London:
Routledge.
(2005), Scramble for the Rocks: The Disputes over the Dokdo/Takeshima,
Senkaku/Diaoyu, and Paracel and Spratly Islands, Ph.D. dissertation in Political
Science, Berkeley: University of California.
Krasner, Stephen (1976), “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World
Politics 28, pp. 317-347.
Krugman, Paul (1991), “Is Bilateralism Bad?” in Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin, eds.,
International Trade and Trade Policy, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Lee, Seungjoo (2006), “The Political Economy of the Korea-U.S. FTA: The Korean
Government’s FTA Strategy Revisited,” a paper presented at a spring 2006
convention of the Association of Korean Political and Diplomatic History, April
21 (in Korean).
Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse (2004), “Vetoing
Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements,”
unpublished manuscript. http://www.princeton.edu/~pegrad/papers/milner.pdf.
Mattli, Walter (1999), Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ministry of Finance and Economy of Korea (2005), Economic Bulletin 27(11), November
22.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea (2004), “Ja-yoo-moo-yuk-hyup-jeong
che-gyul-eh dda-reun nong-eo-eop-in deung-eui jiwon-eh gwan-han teuk-byulbeop (rules regarding the special law to support farmers and fishermen as a result28

of FTAs),” [Online, cited August 25, 2007]. Available from<http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/data/200407224131655 자유무역협정체결에따른농
어업인등의지원에관한특별법시행규칙.pdf>.
(2006), Key Initiatives of Year 2006, Seoul: The MOFTA.
Mo, Jongryn (1999), “The Politics of Economic Reform,” in Carnegie Economic Reform
Network, ed., The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Asia: Consensus andControversies, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Mo, Jongryn and Chung-in Moon (2003), “Business-Government Relations under Kim
Dae-jung,” in Stephan Haggard, W. Lim, and E. Kim, eds., Economic Crisis andCorporate Restructuring in Korea: Reforming the Chaebol, New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Moon, Chung-in (2005), “Community-Building in Northeast Asia: A South Korean
Perspective,” a paper presented a conference, “Northeast Asia’s New Institutional
Architecture and Community-Building in a Post-9/11 World,” Berkeley APEC
Study Center, University of California at Berkeley, December 11.
Nam, Young-Sook et al. (2004), “Economic Effects of Korea-China FTA and the Main
Issues,” KIEP Policy Analsis 04-03, Seoul: KIEP.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2003), OECD Economy
Survey: Korea, Paris: OECD.
Park, Sung-hoon and Min Gyo Koo (2007), “Forming a Cross-Regional Partnership: The
South Korea-Chile FTA and Its Implications,” Pacific Affairs 80(2), pp. 259-278.
Pempel, T.J. ed. (2005), Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press
Pempel, T.J. and Shujiro Urata (2005), “Japan: A New Move toward Bilateral Trade
Agreement,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Shujiro Urata, eds., Bilateral Trade
Agreements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications, London:
Routledge.
Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation (2004), Toward a Peaceful andProsperous Northeast Asia, Seoul: the Government of Republic of Korea.
Pyo, Hak K. (1999), “The Financial Crisis in Korea and Its Aftermath: A PoliticalEconomic Perspective,” a paper presented to the Center for International Political
29

Economy and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,
Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University.
Ravenhill, John (2005), “The Political Economy of the New Asia-Pacific Bilateralism:
Benign, Banal or Simply bad?” in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Shujiro Urata, eds.,
Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, andImplications, London: Routledge.
Rogowski, Ronald (1989), Commerce and Coalitions, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Rozman, Gilbert (2004), Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the
Shadow of Globalization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(2006), “South Korean-Japanese Relations as a Factor in Stunted Regionalism,”
paper presented a conference entitled “Northeast Asia’s Economic and Security
Regionalism: Old Constraints and New Prospects,” Center for International
Studies, University of Southern California, March 3-4.
Samsung Economic Research Institute (2001), Three Years after IMF Bailout, Seoul:
SERI.
Schott, Jeffrey J. and Inbom Choi (2001), Free Trade between Korea and the UnitedStates?, Policy Analyses in International Economics 62, Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics.
Sohn, Chan-hyun (2001), “Korea’s FTA Developments: Experiences and Perspectives
with Chile, Japan, and the U.S.,” a paper presented at a conference, “Regional
Trading Arrangements: Stocktake and Next Steps,” Trade Policy Forum, Bangkok,
June 12-13.
Sohn, Chan-hyun and Jinna Yoon (2001), “Does the Gravity Model Fit Korea’s Trade
Patterns?” KIEP Working Paper 01-01, Seoul: Korea Institute for International
Economic Policy (KIEP).
Solís, Mireya and Saori Katada (2007), “Understanding East Asian Cross-Regionalism:
An Analytical Framework,” Pacific Affairs 80(2), pp. 229-258.
Stubbs, Richard (2002), “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian
Survey 42(3), pp. 440-455.

30

Tsebelis, George (1995), “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism,” British
Journal of Political Science 25(3), pp. 289-325.
United States Trade Representative (2006), 2006 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers, Washington, D.C.: USTR. Available from<http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file682_9188.pdf>.
Weyland, Kurt (2005), “Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American
Pension Reform,” World Politics 57(2), pp. 262-295.
Woo-Cumings, Meredith (1999), “Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of
Nationalism and Development,” in Meredith Woo-Cumings ed., The
Developmental State, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ye, Min (2007), “Security Institutions in Northeast Asia: Multilateral Responses to
Structural Changes, in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, eds., Asia’s New
Institutional Architecture: Evolving Structures for Managing Trade, Financial,and Security Relations, New York: Springer.

31

GIARI Working Paper Vol. 2008-E-13,
June.30 2008
Published by Waseda University Global COE Program
Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI),
Waseda University, Nishiwaseda Bldg. 5F#507 1-21-1
Nishi-waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051 Japan
E-mail: affairs@waseda-giari.jp
Webpage: http://www.waseda-giari.jp
Printed in Japan by International Academic Printing Co.Ltd