論文

A new immigration regime for low- andmedium-skilled labor in Japan?
Assessing the 2019 amendment to the
Immigration Control Act at the two-year
mark
Maximilien Xavier REHM

Introduction
April of 2021 marks two years since what some journalists and academics
have argued to be the most divergent and significant overhaul in Japan’s
immigration regime, which was implemented in form of the 2019 amendment to
the Immigration Control a nd Refugee Recog nition Act (herea fter 2 019
amendment, or amendment). This is ostensibly a policy reversion from years of
relying on side door policies to admit lower skilled foreign workers, which has
led to the institutionalization of a regime that has prioritized rotational andsometimes exploitative labor programs. This begs the question: at the two-year
mark, does the 2019 amendment signify a policy diversion and a first step
towards establishing a new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilledlabor that includes policy outcomes that recognize long-term settlement andmakes efforts towards workers’ integration? In its current form, the author
argues that the 2019 amendment does not, as it fails to address fundamental
issues such as the continued existence and reliance on side door policies thathave been institutionalized over decades - especially the Technical Intern
Training Program (TITP). This points towards the continuation of the statusquo and not a transformation of Japan’s immigration regime in the short term.
The 2019 amendment was initially passed by the 197th National Diet in
December of 2018 before going into effect on April 1st of 2019. Most significantly,
the amendment created two new visa categories (Specified Skilled Worker, or
SSW, i and ii) for a total of 14 economic sectors identified as having a labor
shortage. Other major aspects of the amendment include the implementation of143

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the “Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign
Nationals” (hereafter Comprehensive Measures) at a cost of ¥21.1 billion. Theseare various integration measures for foreigners, including improving access topublic services as well as enhancing Japanese language education and jobmatching services. Finally, on the institutional level, the Immigration Services
Agency (ISA) was established to run the immigration regime. While still part ofthe bureaucratic apparatus of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), it is now an
external bureau with more autonomy and a larger budget. Considering that theJapanese government has long maintained that the only legally admitted
economic migrants must be (highly) skilled, the 2019 amendment can be said tobe significant for two reasons:(1) The establishment of the SSW visa category created a regulated pathway(front door) for the admission of a large number of low- and medium-skilledworkers for the first time, with its cap being set at 345,150 over five years(Immigration Services Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2020a).
(2) T he SSW (ii) visa, which provides a pathway towards permanent residency
and a route for family migration, and the Comprehensive Measures
protruding policies that recognize long-term settlement and the need forsocial integration.
Former Prime Minister Abe, whose government passed the amendment, has
maintained that “this is not an immigration policy” (Sugiyama 2018). Despite
this proclamation, the above does read as if Japan has taken the first step
towards officially recognizing low- and medium-skilled workers as part of their“gaikokujin rōdōsha ukeire”1, or “foreign worker acceptance” policies, while also
promoting long-term immigration and taking steps towards integrating theseworkers into its society. Any discussion with regards to Japanese immigration
policy must include the fact that the country is confronted with shōshi kōreika the coupling of a low birth rate with an ageing society. This has led to a chroniclabor shortage, specifically in the 14 sectors outlined in the amendment.
Therefore, these demographic issues and resulting demand for foreign labor
have led to structuralist arguments birthing what the author calls “immigration
optimism” with regards to Japan. Such a line of debate, advanced both byjournalists and academics, suggests that Japan is on a trajectory towards a
1

In this paper, Japanese words are romanized using the modified Hepburn style. Japanesenames are written using the first name, last name convention.

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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year marknational immigration policy featuring front door policies for low- and mediumskilled labor. Indeed, these arguments have been made even before the 2019
amendment was passed into law. For instance, Green (2 017 ) wrote that
“demographic realities are forcing policymakers to court immigrants aspotential solutions”, while Menju (2017) argued that “the time has come forJapan to make decisions on immigration”. Hollifield and Sharpe (2017) proposedthat Japan is an “emerging migration state” and predicted the country to have a“Meiji moment” with regards to immigration policy. Is the 2019 amendment this“Meiji moment”?
The high volume and tone of writing in the immediate aftermath of theamendment’s passing suggests that many observers of Japanese immigration
policy believe this to be the case. Akashi (2020) found a total of 16 separate
monthly or weekly Japanese-language magazines with an optimistic strand.
These oftentimes featured cover stories with bombastic titles, such as “A New
Era for Immigrants” from Gendai Shisō or “Lifting the Ban on Immigrants” by
the Shūkan Tōyō Keizai. In English-language publications, Gelin (2020) called
the amendment “historic immigration reform”, with Oishi (2020) declaring a“new era for immigration and integration”.
On the other hand, specifically with regards to the acceptance of workers, the
new regime has seen a slow rollout. As of March 2021, the total number offoreigners holding a SSW visa status numbered just 22,567 (Immigration
Services Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2021a), significantly below thegovernment’s own projections. There have also been investigations into how the
new laws have been implemented by government agencies in Japan andauxiliary organizations in sending countries in the construction (Era 2020) andnursing (Ogawa and Sadamatsu 2020) sectors. These studies have shown that,at least for those professions, both employers and migrant facilitators (brokers)
have not preferred the new SSW visa over the more established TITP. Overall,there has been little follow-up in the scholarship that looks at how theamendment has been implemented on the macro level. Therefore, and especiallygiven the initial optimism towards the new laws described above, the author
believes it necessary to investigate how the SSW visa category specifically has
been implemented by governmental and bureaucratic actors in Japan. After
placing the 2019 amendment within the context of Japan’s migrant control
policies from the late 1980s onwards, this study will use primary government
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documents from relevant institutions2 , including the MOJ and by extension ISA,
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) and other agencies, tooutline tangible outcomes (=results), i.e., the change in how lower skilled foreignlabor is accepted into Japan. The time period to be covered is April 2019 toMarch 2021. Finally, the conclusion will attempt to reconsider the importance of
the amendment based on this outline and offer clues on the trajectory ofJapanese immigration policy going forward. Therefore, this article aims tocontribute to the English-language scholarship on Japanese immigration in two
primary ways: (1) by mapping out the current Japanese low- and medium-skilledlabor migration regime a nd (2) understa nding the function of the 2 019
amendment within this regime.

The 2019 amendment in context
Nikkeijin, technical interns and foreign students: Japan’s major modern lowand medium-skilled migrant worker policies
For most of the 20th century, Japan has been identified as a negative case oflabor migration (Bartram 2000), featuring an exclusive society and policies
protecting the country’s myth of ethno-homogeneity. While there was asignificant population of oldcomer colonial era migrants primarily from the
Korean Peninsula (known as zainichi korian), the country did not accept a
notable number of foreign workers in the post-war period. However, thedemographic factors mentioned above, as well as the multi-layer subcontracting
structure present in many major industries of the Japanese economy, did result
in demand for lower skilled labor, leading to the acceptance of foreign workers.
The most significant developments in Japanese policy toward these workers are
outlined below. The author will use the terms front door, signifying official
policy and recognized status; side door, referring to legal status but outside of aformal immigration policy; and back door, meaning non-legal status, to classify
the country’s immigration schemes for lower skilled workers.
The first increase in foreign workers can be seen from the mid- to late 1980s,
when the Japanese economy showed strong economic growth (known as the“bubble” period). In the absence of corresponding laws, the first newcomers,
2

The official English-language translation will be used whenever one is available. Alltranslations from Japanese-language texts are done by the author.

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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year markforeign workers from Southeast and East Asia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Iran,entered the country as visitors and proceeded to overstay and work in
traditionally blue-collar jobs (Yamanaka 1993). By the late 1980s, the stark
increase in migrants, many of which without legal status, had become a majorsocietal issue in Japan. Fearing the long-term settlement of foreign workers that
had been observed in post-war Western Europe, the demand for policy change
was high among elites in the bureaucracy and ruling Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) (Yamanaka 1993; Komine 2014). At the same time, the influential businesslobby was still in need of cheap labor and demanded a more institutionalized
immigration control policy (Sekine 1990). The result of the compromise between
the LDP-bureaucracy-big business triad have been numerous reforms since 1990
leading to a marked increase in migrant workers primarily through side door
policies, with the simultaneous outcome of putting these workers into precarious
status.
These began with the 1990 amendment to the Immigration Control andRefugee Recognition Act (passed in 1989), which enabled the migration ofJapanese descendants (nikkeijin), primarily from Brazil and Peru and somefrom the Philippines and other South American countries. Due to their ethnicity,nikkeijin were allowed long-term (“teijūsha”) visa status and to bring theirfamilies, making them Japan’s first major modern immigration initiative.
However, it must be noted that the acceptance of nikkeijin came in response tolabor shortages and the public/political discussion regarding illegal immigrationin the late 1980s, and enabled the Japanese government to procure low- andmedium-skilled laborers through an official pathway while maintaining a façadeof ethnic homogeneity (Kondo 2009). Writing in the LDP’s weekly magazine, amember of the “LDP Special Committee on the Foreign Worker Problem” putforth the argument of the time: nikkeijin were an effective way to alleviatelabor shortages while reducing social friction, as “even though they might havea different nationality, their ethnicity allows us to accept them as compatriots”(Nojima 1989). Therefore, their acceptance, while technically a front door
immigration policy based on ethnic considerations, can arguably be classified aslabor migration policy. Nikkeijin admittance has thus been described as a side
door policy as well, although I maintain the front door moniker due to the legal
privileges the teijūsha status grants. Nikkeijin workers have almost exclusively
worked as lower sk illed laborers , i ncludi ng subcont ract factories a nd
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construction.
In 1993, the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) was established.
Finding its origins in the 1960s as a scheme for Japanese multinational
corporations to train their foreign subsidiaries’ employees back home (Iguchi2002), 1993 marked the onset of the TITP gradually expanding to become ahighly institutionalized program that accounts for more than 400,000 foreign
residents as of October 2020 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2021a).
Ostensibly, the TITP is a human resource development program aimed at thetransfer of skills from Japan to developing countries primarily in Asia, thus
contributing to their economic advancement. However, in the immediate years
since its establishment up to the present, many scholars have identified thesystem as a de facto temporary labor program (Iguchi 2002; Komine 2018;
Yamanaka 1993), with the status of ginō jisshūsei (technical intern) allowing for
employment below the minimum wage, limited access to entitlements, no labormobility and the curtailing of workers’ rights (Roberts 2018). Especially with its
expansion in recent years, this has led to an increase in the number of
runaways from the program, as well as several deaths attributed to suicide or
overwork. One case that gained attention in the news concerned a 27-year-old
Filipino who worked at a casting company, logging up to 122.5 hours of overtime
per month before dying of heart failure in his employer’s dormitory (Otake
2016). Today, the TITP system is a massive entity, featuring the ISA as anadministrative and control agency, the Organization for Technical Intern
Training (OTIT) as a monitoring body, and thousands of auxiliary nongovernmental organizations. These include foreign brokers recruiting workers,
supporting organizations within Japan ostensibly responsible for their basic
integration and protection, as well as the employers themselves. The MHLW
tacitly acknowledges the interns as workers, listing them as part of theirstatistics on foreign workers (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2021a).
Overall, the TITP is a classic example of a side door labor immigration policy.
Finally, possibly one of the least explored aspects of labor migration to Japanin English-language scholarship is the rapid increase in the number of foreign
workers under the “shikakugai” category. This status refers to a permission to
engage in activities other than those permitted under the official status ofresidence. 82.7% of shikakugai status holders have the official status of student,
accounting for more than 306,000 workers (Ministry of Health, Labour and
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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year markWelfare 2021b). 3 The number of foreign students has risen since the adoption of
the governments “300,000 International Students Plan” in 2008, though theincrease of de facto foreign laborers utilizing the status of student is particularly
noteworthy. While foreign students whose primary purpose is education
definitely contribute to the labor force through part-time work, the latter
represents another side door policy to fill the demand for lower skilled workers
in lieu of front door channels (Menju 2017). This has led to a third-party support
infrastructure of brokers in origin countries and Japanese language institutions
and other sham vocational schools in Japan for these workers, who findthemselves in a legal grey area (as they oftentimes work more hours than theirlegal allowance) and thus face similar exploitation to technical interns (Liu‐
Farrer and Tran 2019). Overall, this suggests an infrastructure resembling the
TITP. However, due to its positioning in grey legality, it is less institutionalized
and thus close to no information is available from government sources. Inoue(2019) and Liu‐Farrer and Tran (2019) provide an in-depth overview of thespecifics of this system. Similar to the TITP, the MHLW tacitly admits to thestudents’ status as workers in counting shikakugai as part of the foreign
workforce (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2021a).
As an endnote, it must be highlighted that the latter two side door policies
inherently do not allow for the long-term resettlement of foreign workers unlessa visa status change is achieved. They are thus similar to traditional guest
worker regimes which operate based on a temporary rotation of workers,
allowing for “labor inclusion but human exclusion”, as Endoh (2019) puts it.
Mapping lower skilled foreign labor in Japan today
The previous section gave an outline of the three major ways Japan’s
policymakers have created pathways for lower skilled foreign workers into
Japan, namely the admittance of nikkeijin, the TITP and the rise in the numberof students holding shikakugai status. In 2020, there were a total of 2,885,904
foreign residents living in Japan (Immigration Services Agency of Japan,
Ministry of Justice 2020d), with the MHLW showing 1,724,328 foreign workers
as of October 2020 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2021a). Table 1
shows a breakdown of the three major categories described thus far and how
3Students are legally allowed to work for up to 28 hours a week in the school period andare allowed to engage in full-time employment outside the school period.

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worker intake has changed in the 2010s. Together, the three categories accountfor 50% of the total foreign workforce in 2020. This shows that government
rhetoric painting Japan as a country that exclusively accepts highly skilledworkers is in direct contradiction to its own data, a dynamic frequently outlined
by local activists such as Ippei Torii from the Solidarity Network with Migrants
Japan (Torii 2020) or international labor rights organizations such as Verité(Verité 2018).
The increase of technical interns and foreign students has driven the steadyincrease in the number of low- and medium-skilled foreign migrants in the last
decade. From 2010 to 2020, the number of interns in the TITP has increased by
252% and the number of shikakugai student visa holders has increased by
338%. This contrasts with the nikkeijin: while the number of workers from themain nikkeijin origin countries has seen a slight increase, their proportion in
the foreign workforce has decreased significantly, from 21% in 2010 to 9% in
2020. TITP and shikakugai students now account for 23% and 18% of the total
foreign workforce, respectively. Interestingly, in the last two years (and thus aperiod of large overlap with the 2019 amendment coming into law), the amountof shikakugai student visa holders only increased by 8,096 (a 2.7% increase),
while technical interns increased by 93,867 (a 30.4% increase), suggesting thatthe latter has become the primary method for Japanese employers to procure
lower skilled labor (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2019a; 2021b).
Table 1. Change in Number of Foreign Workers, by 3 major low-/medium-skilledlabor statuses
No. of Foreign
Workers, 2010

% Foreign
Workforce, 2010

No. of Foreign
Workers, 2020

% Foreign% Change, No. ofWorkforce, 2020 Foreign Workers

TITP*

159,43125%

402,356

23%

252%

Students w.
shikakugai

90,67514%

306,557

18%

338%

Brazilian +Peruvians**

139,723

21%

158,359

9%

113%

Table created by author based on data from the MHLW (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
2011; 2021b). The total number of foreign workers stood at 649,982 in 2010 and 1,724,328 in 2020.
* refers to the total number of foreigners holding the ginō jisshū (technical training) status.
**	For nikkeijin, as many have switched from their original teijūsha status to other status-based
categories, the total number was calculated by ethnicity, not status.

A not her a sp e c t of not e i s t he u s e of E PA s ( E c o nom ic Pa r t ner s h ip
Agreements) to accept nurses and care workers from the Philippines, Indonesia
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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year markand Vietnam. The use of trade deals rather than immigration control policy wasanother way for the Japanese government to side-step a debate on foreign labor
import (Ford and Kawashima 2013). Workers receive training in their field andJapanese language lessons both prior and following arrival in Japan. Then, theyobtain a labor contract and provided they pass corresponding national exams
within a designated time frame (3 or 4 years), are permitted to work in theirfield indefinitely. However, the total number of workers entering through thissystem since its inception in the late 2000s totaled just over 6,400 in 2019
(Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2019b). Therefore, the author did notconsider it a major policy for foreign labor admittance.
Finally, when attempting to quantify the number of lower skilled foreign
workers, it is also important to mention the number of fuhō zanryūsha,commonly translated as (illegal) overstayers. While the majority of overstayers
still enter the country through short-term tourist visas, the number for (former)
technical interns and foreign students stood at 12,457 and 5,170, respectively(Immigration Services Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2020c). The
exploitative nature of side door policies, including the ban on technical internschanging their employer, contributes to the shissō (or disappearance) of theseworkers, who most likely attempt to find more favorable working conditions
despite the loss of status. This creates a regression of status, as workers movefrom the side door (limited legal protection) to the back door (highly limited tono legal protection). The total number of fuhō zanryūsha was 82,616 in 2020
and the high probability that a majority of them have remained in the workforce
suggests an even higher number of lower skilled workers than reported in theofficial data (Immigration Services Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2020e).
A labor migration regime based on side door policies
As outlined above, before the 2019 amendment, Japan had shown a trend
away from their only major front door immigration policy (though it was basedon ethno-nationalist conceptions of Japanese society) towards their two primaryside door policies to accept lower skilled foreign workers - with workers
accepted under the TITP specifically being of note due to their marked recent
increase. Indeed, with regards to nikkeijin, the 2008 recession leading to highunemployment and the difficulty of integrating them into Japanese society
prompted the government to provide a monetary incentive for repatriation (Tian
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論文2019). On the other hand, the flexibility and inexpensiveness of the TITP andshikakugai students has led to those systems becoming the primary source forlower skilled foreign labor in industries where nikkeijin traditionally worked.
Today, the TITP has a broader occupational and geographic distribution ofworkers than was seen even at the peak of nikkeijin employment (Tian 2019).
Interestingly, the 2019 amendment did include a stipulation for 4th generation
nikkeijin to be able to immigrate to Japan. However, this allowance now comes
attached with a language requirement (minimum JLPT level N4) for the firstt ime, converg i ng it towa rds t he ot her two major pol icies a nd f u r t her
underscoring Japan’s hesitancy to commit to long-term settlement and theaccompanying integration costs.
Overall, the immigration policy of the 2010s, and especially of the 2nd Abe
Administration from 2012 to 2020, reflect a desire to keep the status quo: theappearance that Japan does not permit lower skilled labor, while accepting an
increasing amount of such labor through side door policies. This is a balancing
act on the part of the governing LDP-Kōmeitō coalition due to politicalconsiderations. Indeed, the coalition is susceptible to pressures from businessinterests that are struggling with a shortage of labor while also requiring thepolitical support of hardliners on the right ( Endoh 2 019; Roberts 2 018).
Therefore, Abe framed the 2019 amendment as an economic measure to help
calm potential political backlash from both core constituents (such as theinfluential right-wing lobby nippon kaigi) as well as the general public, which
has generally been hesitant to increasing immigration (Song 2020).
However, even before the 2019 amendment, Abe’s government had pursued
incremental attempts at reform aimed primarily at the TITP. Here too, thegovernment opted for language suggesting that the acceptance of foreign
workers is a “key to (economic) revitalization”, although the growing pressure
by labor activists, scholars as well as foreign governments and internationalorganizations may have forced the ruling bloc’s hand (Tian 2019). The TITP
was overhauled twice, first in 2014 and again in 2016. The latter reforms
lengthened maximum length of stay from 3 to 5 years, added nursing as an
acceptable category for employment and, crucially, included new oversightmeasures for employers. The OTIT was implemented to monitor and carry out
inspections for the “implementing organizations” (employers) and “supervisingorganizations” (responsible for accepting, placing, and supporting interns), which
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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year marknow must register with the MHLW. Despite this, the reliance on extragovernmental actors for the implementation of humane working conditions andlabor rights remains a bottleneck (Tian 2019). Indeed, the OTIT found a total of
4,922 (32.9% violation rate) violations for implementing and 1,331 (43.1%) for
supervising organizations in its latest monitoring report (Organization forTechnical Intern Training 2020). A significant number of these violations are ofa serious nature, including insufficient support (e.g., lack of adequate housing)and inappropriate payment of wages. The presence of an impressive number ofa u x i l i a r y org a n i z at i o n s t h at a r e r e s p o n s i b l e for key a s p e c t s of t h eimplementation of the TITP, including the protection of workers, is emblematicof what the author calls delegationism in the Japanese immigration regime. Thisphenomenon will also be analyzed in context of the 2019 amendment below.
The 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act: policies regarding lowand medium-skilled labor
It is with this background that the 2019 amendment was passed into law.
Considering Japan’s recent trajectory towards a strong reliance on their two
major side door lower skilled labor policies, and specifically the TITP, theamendment reads as a major policy divergence. As mentioned in the outset, theestablishment of the SSW (i) and (ii) visa categories provide front door accessfor lower skilled workers based on the completion of language and technicalexams, while the Comprehensive Measures are an attempt to integrate theseworkers (and are not limited to only S SW visa holders). Table 2 gives asummary of the two new visa categories. I n contrast to the TITP a nd
shikakugai student workers, the amendment provides a legal framework for thefollowing:
Status: a legal pathway for lower skilled workers, featuring protection underlabor laws and access to social and labor insurance, in industries previously
accessible through side door policies (with nikk eijin workers a nd EPA
healthcare workers as exceptions). 12 of the 14 industries selected for the SSW(i) visa overlap with the TITP, accounting for most foreign workers currently
employed by that system (see figure 1).
Set tlement : Through the S SW (ii) visa, a pathway towards permanent
residence and family migration. Furthermore, a pathway for status progression(from side door to front door) both for students and technical interns to the153

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SSW (i) status, the latter being exempt from both the sector-specific andlanguage examination provided they have completed three years in the TITP.
In addition, upon passing the SSW (ii) sector-specific exam, status change from
SSW (i) to (ii) is also possible, technically allowing for a path to long-term
settlement as well.4
Access: Though determined by sector-specific exams and language ability,
relatively low barriers to entry to the system for workers (though arguably notfor employers, as will be outlined below). However, it must be noted that there
is an overall cap to the number of workers to be admitted under the new
statuses, which ranges by industry (see figure 1). The total cap is 345,150 overthe first five years from implementation. If achieved, this would mean asignificant amount of lower skilled foreign labor would be admitted under afront door policy, especially if one considers the potential of status progression
leading to a lower proportion of workers stuck within side door systems.
Figure 1. 14 industries selected for the SSW visa category, by responsible ministry
MHLW:

Care worker (60,000), building cleaning management (37,000)

METI:

Machine parts & tooling industries (21,500), industrial machinery industries (5250),
electric, electronics and information industries (4,700)

MLIT:

Construction industry (40,000), shipbuilding & machinery industry (40,000), automobile
repair & maintenance (7,000), aviation industry (2,200), accommodation industry(22,000)

MAFF:

Agriculture (36,500), fishery & aquaculture (9,000), manufacture of food and beverage(34,000), food service industry (53,000)

The number in brackets indicates the government identified shortage of workers and signifies the
maximum number of foreign nationals to be accepted over 5 years. Italics indicate sectors
currently accepting workers under TITP. Bold indicates acceptance under both SSW (i) and (ii)
category.

Table created by the author based on MOJ documents (Immigration Services Agency of Japan,
Ministry of Justice 2020a).

4

Additionally, in the case of a foreign worker that completes the TITP program (5 years),changes status to the SSW (i) category and works for the maximum allowed period ofstay (an additional 5 years), they will have stayed in Japan for a total of 10 years. A
successive stay of 10 years allows for the application to permanent residency, though
Japan’s non-formalized, case-by-case PR system would not guarantee it.

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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year mark

Table 2. Outline of the SSW (i) & (ii) visa category specifics
Specified Skilled Worker (i)Specified Skilled Worker (ii)Period of Stay

Up to 5 years total

Unlimited

Occupational Sector

14*

2*

Skill Level

Determined by sector-specific exam
Determined by sector-specificexams, exempt if Applicant hascompleted Technical Intern Training(TITP) (ii) (equal to 3 years)

Level of Japanese
Language Proficiency

Japanese language skills necessary
for day-to-day activities and work,
as determined by an exam or thecompletion of TITP (ii)

Exempt from examination on
Japanese proficiency

Accompaniment of
Family MembersNo

Yes (Spouse and Children)

Path to Permanent
Residency

No, though status change to SSW (ii) Yes
is possible

Table created by the author based on MOJ documents (Immigration Services Agency of Japan,
Ministry of Justice 2020a)*see figure 1 for details on occupational sectors

Finally, it must be mentioned that the government language with regards to
the SSW visa category continues the trend of Japan creating visa status basedon its definitions of “skills”. Indeed, the “Specified Skills” moniker attached to
the new visa categories suggests that the government is simply redefining who
it considers a skilled worker to fit industry demand for labor. While some havecalled the amendment a “medium-skilled” worker program (Milly 2020), theoverlap with many TITP industries, low language requirement (JFT Basic or
JLPT N4, the second lowest level offered) and lack of cultural training suggeststhat it is simply reorganizing and institutionalizing many of the lower skilledlabor categories previously served by the side door policies (Oishi 2020).
Looking at some of the sector-specific exams underscores this: the “building
cleaning management” exam is only 32 minutes long and primarily consists ofbeing able to reproduce the basic flow of cleaning floors, glass surfaces andtoilets (Japan Building Maintenance Association 2020). On the other hand of thespectrum are fields such as “care worker” (corresponding to nursing), whichhave higher requirements that include a specific Japanese examination for thefield (Immigration Services Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2020b).
However, with regards to nursing, its addition to the TITP also included
stipulations stricter than is the norm for the system, including the samelanguage requirement now present in the SSW system. In that sense, the 2019
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a mend ment do es not present a major pol icy d ivergence . O vera l l , t heclassification of the amendment in terms of low- and medium-skilled labor, as
has been done in this paper, seems accurate.

A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor?
A slow rollout
At first glance, the above points to a significant policy reform, addressing
critical issues facing foreign workers that have been forced to rely on side door
policies, such as labor protection and access to social entitlements. Furthermore,
there are now pathways for status progression and even potentially long-term
settlement. This suggest a trajectory for Japan to become an “immigration
country”, which is traditionally defined as a country where immigration is notpart of the founding ideal but that does implement an immigration regime that
relies mostly on front door policies, allowing for formal employment andsettlement (J. Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014). Such a trajectory would
validate the arguments of the “immigration optimists”. However, when analyzing
immigration policy, it is important to differentiate between policy output andoutcome. As Komine (2018) points out, “even if an admission policy wasobjectively open, this does not automatically produce a large number of
migrants”. There is oftentimes a gap between how policy is formulated/put into
law and how it is implemented, called an “implementation gap” (de Haas et al.
2 019). Apr i l 2 0 21 ma rks exact ly two yea rs si nce t he a mend ment was
implemented. Therefore, it is crucial to begin to analyze not only the policy andrelated laws, but also the tangible outcomes of this policy. With the legal
framework of the amendment established, the results of its implementation forlower skilled foreign workers in Japan will be investigated below.
At almost exactly the two-year mark, as of March 2020, the MOJ reported a
total of 22,567 SSW visa status holders (Immigration Services Agency of Japan,
Ministry of Justice 2021b). At the time of writing, there are currently zero SSW(ii) status holders and no exams scheduled for the acceptance of workers under
this category. This is significantly below the maximum allowance that the SSW
stipulates, which is 3 45,15 0 over five years or roughly 69,0 0 0 per year.
Furthermore, given that it was widely reported that the government expected
a total of 47,550 workers to secure the new visa for fiscal year 2019 alone, the156

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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year markcurrent numbers appear to be missing the government’s own projections by
wide margins (The Japan Times 2020). Figures 2-a and 2-b show the current
distribution of SSW visa holders by industry and acquisition route. What aresome of the factors that have contributed to the low acceptance numbers under
the new visa categories?
Firstly, the extreme haste with which the amendment went from being
passed into law in the diet (December 2018) to implementation (April 2019)
allowed for little time to prepare the necessary infrastructure such a grandprogram requires (Endoh 2019). This is underscored by the timeline for thebilateral agreements between Japan and the sending countries (known as
Memorandum of Cooperation, or MOC). As of April 2019, only four MOCs weresigned. Since then, an additional nine have been signed after the program wasalready officially implemented, bringing the total number of sending countries to
13 (Immigration Services Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice n.d.). The sending
countries are exclusively from South and Southeast Asia and generally overlap
with those of the TITP, with one notable exception. China accounts for morethan 65,000 technical interns, but an MOC with the country has not beensigned as of June 2021. However, an MOC is not a requirement for acceptanceof foreign workers from a country if those workers are already in Japan. Hence,
there are currently 2,050 Chinese SSW status holders (Immigration Services
Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2021b).
Furthermore, a contributing factor that cannot be ignored is the effects of the
COVID-19 induced global pandemic, which has resulted in unprecedented limits
to human movement, slowing migration in the short-term. Indeed, Japan madeheadlines as it restricted foreign entry even for foreign residents, i.e., those witha valid residence status or a Certificate of Eligibility (essentially an entry permit
for a work visa), in the period between April to September of 2020 (Dooley2020). This effectively brought new arrivals in all visa categories, including the
SSW1&2, to a standstill.

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Figure 2-a/2-b Number of SSW status holders by industry and by acquisition route,as of March 2021
Other
2527, 11%

Nursing
1705, 8%

Food Service
Industry
1150, 5%

Other, 122,0%MachineParts &
Tooling
1669, 7%

Examination
Route, 3353,
15%

Industrial
Machinery
1937, 9%

Food andBeverage
Manufacturing8104, 36%

Agriculture
3359, 15%

Construction
2116, 9%Technical
InternRoute,
19092, 85%

Figures created by the author based on (Immigration Services Agency of Japan, Ministry ofJustice 2021b).

To examine the specifics of admittance under the SSW status, it is importantto keep in mind the two routes of acceptance into the program: the examinationroute, referring to entry via passing language and sector-specific examinations;and the technical intern route, meaning entry through visa progression fromthe TITP system. With regards to the former, one of the most important
aspects in implementation is the holding of examinations. The responsibility oforganizing these falls to the ministry responsible for the specific sector (seefigure 1), though their creation/administration is done by industry tradeorganizations. The data shows only 3,353 foreigners currently holding SSW (i)status have come through the examination route. This suggests an extremely
slow rollout of the examination infrastructure, although the ISA reports a totalof 40,268 (out of 63,284) successful examinees for sector-specific tests over allindustries, and 10,412 (out of 25,553) successful examinees for the JFT BasicJapanese language examination as of March 2021 (Immigration Services
Agency of Japa n, Ministry of Justice 2 021a). These numbers show two
noteworthy trends: there is a significantly larger number of successful
examinees than current examination route status holders, meaning that either
COVID-19 related entry restrictions or lack of employment opportunities (orboth) has contributed to the low levels of acceptance. Also, since passing of thelanguage test is required in addition to the sector-specific exam, the low passing
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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year markrate for the JFT Basic suggests that the language requirement is a bottleneckfor many would-be applicants (as sector-specific exams are held also in English
or the applicant’s native language). 5
Furthermore, the frequency of tests is also critical to guarantee access to thesystem. Especially with regards to tests held in foreign countries, it has beenreported that an effort to eliminate malicious brokers, in addition to certain
COVID-19-related restrictions in sending countries, has slowed down the rollout
of examinations (The Japan Times 2020). Most industries have only held exams
in one or two foreign countries in addition to Japan, the notable exceptions
being nursing (7 countries), agriculture (6 countries) and food services (6countries) (Immigration Services Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2021a).
The JF T Basic has been held in 7 countries. Even before the spread of
COVID-19, the Japanese government made a significant change in who waseligible to take SSW examinations, allowing anybody with a valid visa status(including temporary visitors) the chance to take the tests (Immigration
Services Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2020b).
One crucial aspect to note is that the two industries not covered by the TITP,
i.e., accommodation and food services, as well as nursing, have been most
proactive in the administration of examinations. As described above, nursing
represents a late comer to the TITP, suggesting that its usage by employers is
not as entrenched as with other industries. The percentage of total examinees
in those three industries was 70% (44,495 out of 63,284) and the percentage ofsuccessful examinees was 65% (26,331 out of 40,268) (Immigration Services
Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2021a, 20201).
Overlap and continued reliance on the TITP
While the slow procedural and administrative rollout and COVID-19 induced
global pandemic are contributing factors, this leads to what the author considers
to be the fundamental reason for the slow acceptance of foreign workers under
SSW visas: the continued existence of the TITP program and the large overlap
between it and the SSW system. As written above, Japan has accepted close to100,000 technical interns in the period from late 2018 to late 2020, while only
5

It must be noted that as the JLPT N4 is also acceptable and the nursing field conducts
its own sector-specific Japanese language examination, these numbers do not paint thefull picture.

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19,092 interns have made the switch from the TITP to the SSW visa status asof March 2021 (see figure 2-b). As TITP workers are already in Japan, there
are no COVID-19 related entry problems for these workers. There are two
primary reasons for the low turnover from TITP to SSW, both suggesting acontinued reliance on the TITP: (1) On the regulatory side, the requirement forcompletion of TITP (ii), equivalent to three years. This excludes 369,400 of the402,355 technical interns in Japan in 2020, significantly hindering access to visa
progression. (2) With regards to the industries covered both by the TITP and
SSW, a financial disincentive for employers both to hire new workers under the
SSW over the TITP and to allow existing workers to switch their visa status.
The financial disincentive arises from the following reasons:1The requirement of the establishment of a support plan for every SSW
worker (possible to outsource to registered support organizations),
including guidance on administrative procedures, guarantorship for finding
accommodation, daily life support, providing opportunities for Japanese
language education and cultural exchange, among others (Immigration
Services Agency of Japan, Ministry of Justice 2020a).

2

The criteria stipulating that renumeration must be equal or greater toJapanese nationals.

3

The status of SSW providing worker protection under labor laws as wellas access to entitlements, meaning that exploitative labor practices areless likely to go unpunished.

While there have been reports of employers preferring non-temporary foreign
workers to limit the cost of having to successively train new cohorts of workers(Torii 2020), these financial disincentives in turn incentivize continued relianceon the TITP system, resulting in little progress for workers. The fact that many
employers relying on the TITP run very small operations (Tian 2019) makes
the high cost of entry into the SSW system difficult. This point of criticism was
specifically pointed out in the immediate aftermath of the 2019 amendment’s
passage into law (Endoh 2019; Milly 2020), and its implementation thus far
underlines such argumentation. Another reason is even more simple: thefacilitation of the migratory process under the TITP has been institutionalized,
both in the origin countries and Japan, over almost three decades now, making
it impractical and unrealistic to expect an immediate switch-over to the SSW
system. Early findings from the system’s implementation in the construction
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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year mark(Era 2020) and nursing (Ogawa and Sadamatsu 2020) sectors point to this as
well.
Finally, another issue relates to the oversight of workers under the SSW
system. Based on a comparison of supervising organizations for the TITP andregistered support organizations for the SSW, the author found 1,640 out of
3,276 TITP organizations to be also registered for the SSW as of April 2021
(Organization for Technical Intern Training 2021; Immigration Services Agencyof Japan, Ministry of Justice 2021c). Given the number of significant problems
with TITP supervising organizations outlined above, there is reasonable doubt
as to whether they are fit to implement the stricter SSW criteria. The continued
reliance on these external support organizations also suggests that the Japanese
government has not learned its lesson when it comes to delegationism, i.e., theoverreliance on non-governmental actors for key aspects in the smooth
admittance, caretaking, and support of workers. This suggests that theimplementation of the SSW system might follow a similar institutional model to
the TITP, which would clearly be problematic given the well documented issues
with the latter program for workers.

Conclusion
After looking at the specifics regarding its implementation in the previous
section, does the 2019 amendment represent a significant policy change leading
to more favorable policy outcomes for foreign workers?
In its short history of accepting low- and medium-skilled workers andespecially in the past decade, Japan’s immigration regime has been defined by
two primary characteristics: (1) the creation of systems that are inherently
based on maximizing labor inclusion but minimizing related human costs, and(2), any reforms to this regime being incremental in nature. At the two-year
mark, the 2019 amendment has underlined the latter trend. The early results
for the accepta nce of S SW workers show a slow implementation of theexaminations infrastructure, which can be partly attributed to administrative
issues and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the high percentageof examinations that have been held by those industries not (or, in the case ofnursing, only recently) being served by the TITP suggests another root cause.
That is , t hat due to t he expensive ba r r iers of ent r y a nd i nst it ut iona l
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entrenchment of the TITP, there is little incentive for those employers currently
served by the TITP to accept many S SW workers. Also, the continued
delegation to non-governmental organizations for critical worker support could
present S SW workers wit h simila r issues to t he TITP going forwa rd .
Furthermore, the SSW (ii) visa category, which has been lauded as it allows apath to long-term settlement and family migration, has been completely nonfunctional, with zero status holders at time of writing - although recent reportssuggesting that this category will be expanded to all 14 industries covered
under the amendment suggests bureaucratic awareness of this issue (The Japan
Times 2021).
Given these findings, the question arises what purpose the SSW system
serves. The implementation results indicate it to be an auxiliary immigration
policy serving those industries not currently served by the TITP, as well as
providing a pathway for employers to retain their technical interns once they
have completed that program. Currently, it is not a fundamental change inJapan’s immigration regime for lower skilled workers. It does not result in a
majority of foreign workers that entered the country through side door policies
a pathway to visa progression and the resulting policy outcomes, such as
worker protection, access to entitlements, and long-term settlement. Therefore,
the implementation of the 2019 amendment in its current form has validated askeptical outlook for Japan’s immigration policy for low- and medium-skilledworkers: while it is a country of such migrants, the latest reforms have notresulted in Japan becoming a “country of immigration”.

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A new immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in Japan? Assessing the 2019 amendment to the Immigration Control Act at the two-year mark

Abstract

A new immigration regime for low- andmedium-skilled labor in Japan?
Assessing the 2019 amendment to the
Immigration Control Act at the two-year
mark
Maximilien Xavier REHM

Demographic issues and resulting demand for foreign labor have led certain
journalists and academics to advance structuralist arguments birthing
immigration optimism with regards to Japan. The enactment of a majoramendment to its immigration regime for low- and medium-skilled labor in
April 2019 seemingly underscored such optimism. Through a data-driven
analysis based on collecting tangible implementation results and uncovering theprocesses that have led to them, the author maps Japan’s lower skilled labor
acceptance systems in 2021 and how the recent amendment fits within them,
revea l i ng t hat t he refor m ha s produced on ly a n i ncrement a l a nd not
fundamental change to Japanese immigration control policy.

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