Eubios Journal of Asian andInternational Bioethics
EJAIB Vol 19 (1) January 2009 ISSN 1173-2571
Copyright ©2009 Eubios Ethics Institute (All rights reserved, for commercial reproductions).
Eubios Ethics Institute World Wide Web: www.eubios.info/index.htm
Official Journal of the Asian Bioethics Association (ABA)

Contents

page

Editorial: Nature of Bioethics
1
Is there an African Bioethics?
2- Karori Mbũgua
Social Construction of Value and the need for evolution to
universal policy of harmonized social system
5- Kayo Uejima
The Relation between Normative and Descriptive Ethics– A Consideration of Empirical Bioethics
21- Jon Vegar Hugaas
Life-Threatening Illness, Hope, and Spiritual MeaningMaking: Buddhist and Christian Perspectives
27- Neil Pembroke
Other information and conferences
31
Order form
32

Editorial: Nature of Bioethics
This issue of EJAIB starts the new year with only 4
papers, but ones that look at the nature of bioethics
itself, and the directions that bioethics has and shouldtake in the future. The journal is a place for expressionof different ideas to challenge the way that we interpretbioethics as a tool for guiding research and policy
making. Each takes up a different emphasis, which arenatural extensions of the way that each community caninterpret the Universal Declaration on Bioethics andHuman Rights, and earlier more limited visions of whatbioethics includes.
The first paper by Karori explores the topic of whether
there is an African bioethics, in a similar way to many
papers that have been published in EJAIB have
explored whether there is an Asian bioethics? While theconclusions of these reflections reveal there is diversityof approaches to bioethics, and that these have someregional commonalities, there may not be one common
ethic even within a country. Universal diversity, that was
the conclusion of the International Bioethics Survey
conducted in 1993 (published in Macer, DRJ, Bioethics
for the People by the People, 1994), reflects theobservation that when it comes to resolving moral
dilemmas we see a variety of different ideas processed
together to shape the choices and actions we make.
The paper by Neil examines the role of compassion,
which is one of the key principles that has been

described as being important in Asian bioethics. The
paper by Jon summarises the discussions in Europe on
descriptive and prescriptive (normative) ethics. Without
the scholarship extended by many on descriptive
approaches to bioethics we would not have developed
our scholarship of bioethics as far as we have seen.
One of the purposes of EJAIB was to be an open forum
for reflection on just what Asian bioethics is, and to also
stimulate a more international reflection on bioethics.
More than one thousand papers have been published in
EJAIB, and there is a growing wealth of knowledge ofboth types about the ways that bioethics can beconstructed.
The paper of Kayo examines how we construct value,and calls for a shift in the underlying values used forconstruction of what is an ethical social system. As shesays, these processes are in evolution, and change, but
the roles of ethicists may be to try to direct society as aconscience. Her paper includes a mix of descriptive
data, such as lifestyle trends in Japan, along withanalysis and development of ideas to describe themany layers that combine and relate to each other toconstruct life and the world, and the systems underwhich we operate.
In November, 2008, at the Ninth Asian Bioethics
Conference in Jogyakarta, Indonesia, several hundred
scholars shared the results of their research, andreflection, on many topics of Asian bioethics. The next
(Tenth) Asian Bioethics Conference, in April 2009, will
be at the other side of Asia, in Tehran, Iran. It is
testament to the aspirations of many scholars tounderstand ourselves that the ABCs are moving aroundmany countries as well as drawing together a solid
foundation of regional scholarship. I urge readers to
submit papers to that conference, so that we might beable to engage in deeper reflection of the nature ofbioethics, and lessons of real experiences to theframeworks that will shape policy to better outcomes.
-Darryl Macer
Editorial address:
Prof. Darryl Macer, RUSHSAP, UNESCO Bangkok,
920 Sukhumvit Rd, Prakanong, Bangkok 10110, THAILAND
Fax: Int+66-2-664-3772
Email: d.macer@unesco.org

The deadline for the March 2009 issue is 1 March, 2009.

2

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

Is there an African
Bioethics?
- Karori Mbũgua Ph.D.,
Department of Philosophy, University of Nairobi, P. O.
Box 30197 Nairobi, Kenya
Email: Karori.mbugua@uonbi.ac.ke
Abstract
Is there an African bioethics? This paper addresses
this question by first exploring the ongoing debate on
the nature and status of African philosophy. It is argued
that if African philosophy exists, then by extension an
African bioethics must exist since bioethics is a subbranch of philosophy. Further, a distinction is madebetween bioethics as a set of moral principles rooted ina people’s culture which should guide clinical care andscientific research and bioethics as a discipline in theuniversity, with a set of codes, standards, recognizedpractitioners and customs. It is argued that bioethics inthe former sense has always existed in Africa but
bioethics in the latter sense is a relatively new
development in the continent.
Key words: Bioethics, Bioethical colonialism, African
philosophy, Ethno-philosophy, Professional philosophy.
Introduction
This paper is an attempt to answer the question ofwhether there is such thing as an African bioethics. In
answering this question it is important to focus on adifferent, though related question, namely, is there suchthing as African philosophy? If bioethics is taken to be a
subfield of philosophy, then a positive answer to thisquestion would mean that African bioethics exists. But if
African bioethics exists then what distinguishes it from,say, Asian bioethics or Western bioethics and why isthis distinction important? These are some of thequestions that this paper will attempt to answer.
Bioethical Colonialism
In recent years a debate has been ranging
concerning whether the principles and methods AngloAmerican bioethics are the same as those of othercultures. Various people have argued that the bioethicalprinciples promoted in U.S. bioethics, of respect forautonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice,
are non-existent or unacceptable in other cultures.
Some bioethicists, especially from the developingworld, have been concerned about what they perceive
as the negative consequences of the globalization ofbioethics. They see the globalization of bioethics as aform of moral imperialism and an attempt by developed
world agencies to advance their biomedical research
agenda at the expense of the developing countries.
Indeed, many scholars have argued that a truly global
bioethics must highlight ethical pluralism byacknowledging the existence of alternative andcompeting ethical frameworks.
One such scholar is Tamidayo Ogundiran wholaments that bioethics in its present form is rooted inand largely dominated by Western culture. Bioethics, heargues, is still foreign to most African countries. He
therefore calls for the inclusion of bioethics in the

medical education in Africa. In his own words ‘It is now
time for Africa to join the rest of the world by introducing
ethics education into the curricula in all medical schools
where it is not presently taught (Ogundrian 1994: 4).
Similar sentiments have been echoed by Munyaradzi
Murove when he says that the current discourse on
bioethics in Africa is trapped in Western categories ofthought and relies heavily on Western analyticalphilosophy. He maintains that an authentic discourseon bioethics in Africa must take cognizance of the factthat most Africans rely on traditional medicine for theirhealth care needs (Murove 2005).
It is interesting to note that just as with African
bioethics, the question of what constitutes the essenceof Asian bioethics has been a topic of intense scholarlyinterest, as seen in the many papers in EJAIB since1995. In a provocative paper entitled, ‘The Bogus
Debates on Bioethics’, Suman Sahai argued thatbioethics is a wasteful intellectual luxury which India
cannot afford. She maintains that developing countries
should not just follow the ethical dilemmas of the Northbut balance ethics of biotechnology against ethics ofpoverty. As she graphically puts it: ‘If there is an outcry
in the West against the recombinant bovine growth
hormone rBBST, which increases milk production incows, it is understandable for a society that is afloat in
an ocean of milk. However, is it logical in India, acountry with severe milk shortages and many children
who do not get minimal nutrition? Should India with its
acute fodder shortage and an average milk productionof 2 litres per cow per day, spurn on ethical grounds atechnology that has the potential to improve thisproduction using the same amount of fodder? (Sahai
1997: 24). Thus, according to Sahai, only wealthy
countries can afford the luxury of debating ethicalissues arising from latest advances in both medicine
and biotechnology.
Hyakudai Sakamoto called for a new global bioethics
which he insists must be holistic in contrast to theWestern individualistic bioethics. He argues that among
the Asian people, the happiness of the community
supersedes that of the individual (Sakamoto 2002: 32).
But Leonardo Castro was more cautious in his call foran authentic Asian bioethics. He says that in an attempt
to assert Asian identity in bioethics, one must be careful
not to lump all Asians together. The point is that even
within Asia different bioethical perspectives exist. In
addition, one must realize that there are certain ethicalprinciples that transcend both culture and geographicalboundaries (Castro 1999: 227).
It is however important to note that it is not only
Africans and Asians who have voiced concern over theimportation of bioethical concepts into their cultures.
Diego Gracia in a paper entitled, ‘The Intellectual Basisof Bioethics in Southern European Countries’ argues
that bioethics is perceived by Southern Europeans as
something foreign. He asserts that because bioethics
made its first appearance in the Anglo-American
culture, ‘Europeans are trying to ‘remake’ or to‘recreate’ the discipline according to their cultural andethical traditions’ (Gracia 1993: 98).
In the light of the foregoing observations, it isimportant that we reflect on the question of whether
there can be an authentically African bioethics.

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)
Two Conceptions of Philosophy
As already indicated, the question whether or not
African bioethics exists cannot be addressed without
due cognizance of the answer to the question whether
or not an African philosophy exists. A negative answer
to this question would imply a negative answer to theformer. Similarly, since bioethics is one branch of ethics
to assert the existence of an African philosophy is toassert the existence of an African bioethics, which inturn is one of the traditional branches of philosophy.
The question of the existence and nature of African
philosophy remains the subject of vigorous debate. Infact a great deal of the literature on African philosophy
is nothing but a metaphilosophical debate as to whether
such a philosophy exists. The question of the existenceof African philosophy was first raised by early European
missionaries and anthropologists who claimed that theAfrican mind was pre-logical, pre-rational andantiscientific and therefore incapable of philosophicaldiscourse. It is useful to note that while this question is
asked of African philosophy, it is not asked about
Western or Oriental philosophy. It is taken for granted
that these philosophies exist without question.
Some people think that to speak of African
philosophy is to make a huge generalization. The
problem is that Africa is not a homogeneous continent.
It is a vast region made of over fifty countries andnumerous ethnic groups each with a unique identity.
Yet other scholars contend that the debate over thenature and existence of African philosophy is no longer
interesting. According to these critics, Africans must
start doing African philosophy instead of endlessly
talking about African philosophy.
In attempting to answer the question whether African
bioethics exists or not, we must first examine theanswers that have been given to this fundamental
question. Four main orientations in African philosophy
can be distinguished: professional philosophy, ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity and nationalistideological philosophy. For the purpose of this paper, I
will only describe the first two trends, namely, ethnophilosophy and professional philosophy.
Ethnophilosophy conceives of African philosophy as
the attitude of mind, logic and perception behind themanner in which African peoples think or act. The key
proponents of this trend include Placide Tempels,
Alexis Kagame and John Mbiti. An ethnophilosopher iscommitted to the task of describing a world outlook or athoughtsystemofaparticularcommunity.
Ethnophilosophy advocates that an African philosophy
shouldbeconcerned
witharticulating
andreconstructing the implicit philosophy behind the habits,
customs and beliefs of a society. It treats African
philosophy as consisting in a set of shared beliefs,
values, categories, and assumptions that are implicit in
the languages, practices and beliefs of African cultures;in short the uniquely African worldview. For this reason,
African philosophy is seen as an item of communal
property rather than an activity for an individual.
Some critics of this orientation such as Odera Oruka
have argued that this approach is too culturally specificand descriptive to be described as philosophy (Oruka
1975). Others think the ethno approach to philosophy

3

represents a form of acceptance of the inferiority of theAfricans since it claims that African thinking is
intrinsically emotional and occurs in the collective
instead of the individual. But Gbenga Fasiku thinks that
submitting ethnophilosophy to systematic and criticalanalysis would make it worthy of the name philosophy(2008: 103)
The other major orientation in African philosophy isprofessional philosophy which consists in analysis andinterpretation of reality in general. The main advocatesof this orientation in philosophy include Odera Oruka,
Kwasi Wiredu and Paulin Hountondji. According to thisview, African philosophy consists of criticism andargument, which are the essential characteristics andconditions for any form of knowledge to be judged asphilosophy. In fact professional philosophers explicitly
reject ethno-philosophy which is largely descriptive
arguing that analysis and clarification of conceptualissues are the hallmarks of philosophy. However, somehave objected that philosophy as practiced in African
Universities today is strictly speaking not African as it isbased on the Western model. Indeed, many of the socalled African philosophers are Western-trained.
Besides, philosophical teaching in African universities isstill limited to teaching ideas and arguments of past orcontemporary Western philosophers. Another criticism
leveled against the professional approach to African
philosophy is that it assumes that Western philosophy
is the benchmark by which all other cultures’
philosophies are to be understood and measured.
Two Approaches to Bioethics
Following from the two orientations in African
philosophy described above, African bioethics can bethought of in two distinct ways, namely, bioethics as a
set
of
moral
principles
rootedinculture(ethnophilosophy approach) and bioethics as an
academicdiscipline(professional
philosophy
approach). I will discuss these approaches in turn.
The Ethnophilosophy Approach
An ethnophilosopher will look for African bioethics inAfrican people’s culture or world view. This is whatmight be referred to as ethnoethics. And as Patricia
Marshall and Barbara Koening have noted ‘…denying
the importance of cultural background and beliefs, andtheir significant power to shape and transform themeanings attached to the experience of health andillness, sustains a rendering of bioethics deprived ofrichness of cultural context’ (Marshall and Koening(2004). The sources of such bioethical principles,
especially in Africa where the introduction of writing isrelatively recent, will include popular sayings, proverbs,
songs, mythology, folklore and other cultural practices.
One important characteristic that should distinguishAfrican bioethics from Western bioethics is that African
culture places considerable value on conformity of theindividual to the social group. And as theologian John
Mbiti, paraphrasing Rene Descartes, aptly puts it, in
African culture ‘I am because we are, and since we are
therefore I am (Mbiti 1969: 108-109). In other words,
African ethics is communalistic in nature and is to becontrasted with the Western ethical tradition with its

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Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

emphasis on an individual’s sense of self and autonomy
of being. In that respect, African bioethics has more incommon with Asian bioethics than with Western
bioethics.
From this point of view it is becomes quite apparent
that some principles of “Western” bioethics will be inconflict with African communalism. One such principle
is the principle of voluntary informed consent which isbased on the idea of self-determination, autonomy andindividual choice. Obtaining informed consent frompatients and research participants in an African setting
without some modification of the principle will provedifficult as this will require not just the consent of theindividual concerned, but also of the entire community.
Of course this will be the case in all societies where theinfluence of the community on individual decisionmaking is very high and this includes most Asiansocieties.
Failure to recognize cultural differences andvariations in the understanding of human dignity, healthand disease can lead to ethical conflicts. Quoting RonyBrauman, past president of Mèdecins Sans Frontières,Sikku Hellsten has reported on the ethical dilemmas
that foreign medical doctors face while working in
Africa. In war ravaged Somalia, for example, many
Somali youths refused life saving amputations
preferring to die with their gangrenous limbs intact. In
neighboring Uganda, the moral value that the Western
medical professionals and aid agencies give to children
and pregnant women was challenged by the local
cultural values and belief systems. Food aid allocatedto malnourished children and pregnant women wasgiven to the elders instead. The explanation given by
the locals was that ‘children are a renewable natural
resource, while the elderly cannot be replaced’(Hellsten 2008: 72). These two examples demonstrate
the need for a culturally sensitive bioethics.
The Professional Philosophy Approach:As an approach to bioethical discourse in Africa, theprofessional approach to African bioethics is not likely
to be methodologically different from Western bioethics.
It will be a collection of logically argued ideas ofindividuals about bioethical issues rather than a body ofcommunal thought. This is because professional
philosophers adopt a universalistic definition ofphilosophy. According to this view philosophy (and in
this case bioethics) must have the same meaning in all
cultures although the questions prioritized in thesecultures will be different.
Unfortunately academic bioethics, like professional
philosophy, is still largely foreign in most Africancountries. Indeed, despite the rapid growth of bioethics
research centers especially in Europe and North
America, there are still relatively few places in Africa
where one can obtain formal bioethics education evenat the certificate level.
This is hardly surprisingconsidering that even in the West bioethics as an
academic discipline did not become established until a
few decades ago.
The strengthening of bioethics education andresearch and the raising of public awareness ofbioethical issues in Africa must be given priority.
Appropriate structures for deliberation and action on
bioethical issues must also be put in place. In thisregard, the launching of the UNESCO Regional Center
for Documentation and Research on Bioethics at
Egerton University in Kenya and the hosting of aninternational bioethics conference at the same
institution in August 2008 are steps in the right direction
but more needs to be done. African bioethicists must
consider the possibility of starting a professional society
and a bioethics journal which will serve as platforms forthe exchange of ideas and research findings.
But it is not enough to adopt a definition of bioethics
that stresses the speculative and personal dimensionsof the discipline. For bioethics to be practically relevant
the individual reflections of African bioethicists must
primarily be geared towards resolving bioethicaldilemmas that medical practitioners and researches
working in Africa encounter daily. This is what will
distinguish African bioethics from other regional
bioethics.
Traditionally, bioethics has always been associatedwith cutting edge biotechnologies such as in vitro
fertilization, organ transplant, and gene therapy. These
technologies are virtually non-existent in most parts ofAfrica. The principles of U.S. bioethics which were
formulated to address ethical issues arising from theseadvances in medicine cannot therefore be expected toadequately equip African researchers and medical
students with the necessary ethical skills to face thebioethical dilemmas that they encounter daily.
Africa is also the poorest continent and arguably theorigin of some of the world’s deadliest diseases such as
AIDS and tropical diseases such as malaria andsleeping sickness. These diseases pose serious moral
challenges which African bioethicists must focus on.
Controversies over AIDS research and access toaffordable AIDS treatment in particular must be given
top priority. It is also useful to point out that majority of
research participants in clinical trials in Africa are likely
to be highly vulnerable due to low levels of educationand poverty. African bioethicists must pay special
attention to bioethical issues and dilemmas arising fromsuch trials.
They must also bear in mind that traditional medicine
remains the most accessible and affordable system of
health for the majority of Africans especially in the rural
areas. For this reason African bioethics will need to
expand its purview beyond Western biomedical
systems. There are numerous legal and ethical issues
surrounding the practice of traditional medicine thatneed to be addressed. The most prominent ones
pertain to patient safety, the quality of health care,confidentiality and the question of biopiracy. And as
Aceme Nyika recently proposed, traditional medicine,
like orthodox medicine, should become a regulated
profession (Nyika 2007). Indeed, there is an urgent
need to develop an ethical code of practice, conductand confidentiality for traditional medical practitioners in
Africa.
Conclusion
We have seen that there are different conceptions ofbioethics: bioethics in the sense of set of moral
principles rooted in culture and bioethics as an
academic discipline. What is not in dispute is the factthat Africa is lagging behind in academic bioethics. As
we have already seen Africa has very few well trainedEubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)
bioethicists and there is no vibrant culture of bioethicaldiscourse among philosophers, scientists and medical
practitioners. However, if we think of bioethics in thesense of a set moral codes embodied in a peoples’
culture then such a bioethics exists in Africa because
no society can survive for long without some grounding
in morality. But whatever definition of African bioethics
one prefers, for it to be authentically African, Africans
must endeavor to fashion it according to their cultural
norms as well as practical realities. In any case there isbound to be an overlap between the two approaches tobioethics.
As I have argued in this paper, some of themainstream concerns, approaches and values of socalled Western bioethics may not be directly relevant tomedical practitioners and researchers in Africa. African
bioethicists must pay special attention to thosebioethical problems that are peculiar to the continent ofAfrica and third world in general while at the same time
not ignoring bioethical problems in the developed world
emanating from cutting edge biotechnologies. In any
case, as a number of scholars have argued, there exist
certain fundamental ethical principles that ought to be
applied across national and cultural boundaries.
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was read at an
International Bioethics Conference which was held at
Egerton University, Kenya in August 2008. I thank theparticipants for constructive comments and criticisms.
References
De Castro, Leonardo (1999) Is there an Asian Bioethics?
Bioethics, 13: 227-235.
Fasiku, G (2008) African Philosophy and the Method of
Ordinary Language Philosophy, The Journal of Pan African
Studies 2(3): 100-116.
Gracia, Diego (1993) ‘The Intellectual Basis of Bioethics inSouthern European Countries’, Bioethics, 7(2/3): 97-107.
Hellsten, S K (2008) Global Bioethics: Utopia or Reality?
Developing World Bioethics, 8(2): 70-81.
Marshall, P and Koening, B (2004) ‘Accounting for Culture ina Globalized Bioethics, Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics
32, 252-266.
Mbiti, J. African Religions and Philosophy. Nairobi:
Henemann, 1969.
Murove, F. M (2005) African Bioethics: An Exploratory
Discourse, Journal for the Study of Religion, 18(1): 16-36)
Nyika, A (2007) Ethical and Regulatory Issues Surrounding
African Traditional Medicine in the Context of HIV-AIDS,
Developing World Bioethics (1): 25-34.
Oruka, H. O (1975) Fundamental Principles in African
Philosophy, Second Order: An African Journal of
Philosophy, 4(1): 44-45.
Potter, V. R (1971) Bioethics: Bridge to the Future.
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971.
Ogundiran, T. O (2004) ‘Enhancing the African Bioethics
Initiative’, BMC Medical Education, 4:21.
Sakamoto, H (2002) ‘Towards a New Global Bioethics’, The
Abstracts of Seventh Tsukuba International Bioethics
Roundtable, 15-18 February, 2002.

5

Social Construction of Valueand the need for evolution to
universal policy of
harmonized social system- Kayo Uejima,
Lablink, Kumamoto, Japan
Email: kayo@lablink.jp
Abstract
The paper will consider the process of how behaviour
shiftsfrom
idealsofmindthroughthephenomenological process of perception that creates
the implicit value and the manifest value. Which is more
important, selection of value with the manifest value or
selection of worthlessness with the implicit value as
gestalt? As the social systems change, our values
continue to change. The dilemma concerning ethicalvalue arises in the boundary zone between social holon
concerning society as a social organization and organic
holon concerning life as a being. It is difficult thathuman beings transcend the boundary zone as a
species. There are many bioethical issues in theboundary zone between the developmental processwith self as social humans and the developmental
process with microcosm as organism.
The paper draws upon integrative science andintegrative strategy with the cosmological outlooks of
Ervin Laszlo (2007) and Konstantin S. Khroutiski (2007)
as transcendent and transcendental perspective. The
research presented examines how the mechanism of
our values may be developed by a universal approachwith a holistic, humanistic and cosmological outlook andmind-set, and used to then create harmonized social
systems for construction of sustainable society for thisand future generations.
1. Introduction
Fundamental to the determining the value of life isdetermining how we ascribe value. Is value something
related to the activity of our daily life? Is there adifference
betweendaily
behaviours
andconsciousness? Value is an incorporative process thatis created by interactions between self, social systemand society with social holon. Self-determination isimportant since each person must make value
judgments between real behaviour and ideals. Social
systems create norms of values concerning what isvalued, and thus as our social system changes, wechange our perception of what we think is worthless.
Darryl Macer(1998), wrote that “the imperatives oflove includes respect for the ethical principle of self love
which argues for empowerment of people so they canmake choices according to their values.” At the sametime, life with universal love can be considered as a
metaphysical transcendental actual entity.
I have already written how integrative policy andintegrative science are foundations for universal policythat can lead to the creation of a harmonized society by
the holistic approach in the September 2008 issue of6Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)EJAIB. It described how a Free Think Tank on a website for integrative science is the first step of Lab Link
design as integrative policy (Uejima, 2008).
In this paper the term “integrative science” means
integration of science rather than integral science or
unified science. Because, of the necessity of universal
policy for construction of sustainable society is an editof science that can contribute to a solution of the
problems of modern issues rather than the discovery
and development of new science and technology.
In this paper, I show a direction for solution of ethicalissues by integrative science as one of theaccomplishments that has emerged from daily dialogue
and mutual education in Free Think Tank. In the Free
Think Tank, I try to create integrative science that cancontribute for construction of sustainable society. Suchintegrative science can show a direction for solution of
ethical issues like environmental ethics and bioethics.
2. Extensions of BioCosmology and Evolution
First I would like to review a related philosophicaltheory. During the Second Joint UNESCO-Kumamoto
University Bioethics Roundtable (13-14 December2008), Dr. Konstantin Khroutski, from Novgorod State
University after Yaroslav-the-Wise (Novgorod Velikiy,
Russia) had advanced and substantiated his thesis of
the three autonomous exploratory realms within the one
whole sphere of modern culture. These realms (due to
Dr. Khroutski’s appellation) are:1) Transcendent Holistics – which is characterized bya monistic (realistic, but irrational) world outlook.
Holistics, in its philosophical (ethical) or scientific form,– ultimately is reduced to the transcendent –supersensible – essence that organizes and rules theworld (like God, or Matter, or a mystical force (Hegelian
Spirit, for instance), or the notion of Information inmodern complex sciences, etc). In rational expression,
Holistics ultimately can be reduced to the philosophy of
Plato, first of all, – to the existence of a transcendent(supersensible) essence that universally directs anddevelops the actual world.
2) Transcendental
Humanistics
–
which
is
1)
characterized by an idealistic (rational, but unrealistic
world outlook. Humanistics ultimately is reduced, in its
any philosophical (ethical) or scientific form, to thetranscendental – anthropocentric – conscious essences
which are rooted in the basic ontological principle ofdualism. This principle signifies the fundamental
separation of a human’s reason (i.e., her/his idealistic
psychological properties) from the constituting (humanbody) physiological components and the surrounding
tangible world (nature, cosmos). In rational relation,
Humanistics ultimately can be reduced to thephilosophy of Kant, first of all, – to the transcendental (apriori, universal) properties of a human reason which
are able of rational cognition and construction of thesurrounding material world. As well, however, any other
Western philosophical or scientific conception (thatsupport the priority and the separation of a humanreason from the surrounding world) might be used as
the basis for Humanistic philosophical or scientific1

Inasmuch as Humanistics rejects the evidence of the unityof a human being with the world of her/his existence, which isa real (a posteriori, proved by natural sciences) truth.

explorations.
3) Biocosmological or anthropocosmist Realistics –which is characterized by both realistic and rational
world outlook. Realistics ultimately is reduced, in its
philosophical or scientific form, – to the fundamental
principle of immanent essentialism (or fundamental
functionalism), i.e. intrinsic (inherent universal) driving
forces of a subject of the life on Earth, which (thesedriving forces, like Aristotelian causa finalis) are opened
up before the subject due to (and in the course of)its/her/his self-dependent purposeful active-evolutionary
life activity. Ultimately, the functionalist effects of thisactivity (and, hence, a person her/himself) areintegrated in the way of attraction (absorption,
assimilation, but not through a management or
guidance) by a Transcendent Cosmic center (Absolute).
In other words, we have the selection of a subject’s(person’s) self-dependently (“from within”) realized –functionalist – effects for their utilization on the higherorganic evolutionary level, but not the guiding directionof a subject's development “from without”, as it is in a
Transcendent holism. Herein, the most typical example(and the metaphor) is the entire life (ontogenesis) of acell (any organ) in the human (biological) organism. In
rational
relation,
Realistics(Biocosmology,
RealCosmism) carries on and develops further thebasic principles of Aristotelian original philosophy – itsrealization in contemporary and future forms.
Substantially, Biocosmological conception is actively
developed (and represented in the EJAIB, 2002–2008)by the author – Dr. Khroutski. Due to his conclusions,biocosmology is currently constructed as strategic
guidelines for future universal (safe and prosperous)
development of the global world. In its turn, thedominating form of modern philosophy and science iscertainly the Western Humanistics that seeks theresolution of universal issues in the reasonable activityof a human being and democratic societies. In thedomain of bioethics, Humanistic universalism relies
substantially on the reasonable prescriptive activities ofbioethical committees and associations. Likewise,transcendent Holistics is capable enough of making aclaim of a true organizational activity that universalizes
the world – herein on the basis of intuitive proposals of
wise, morally perfect persons who have succeeded inpursuance of their natural (special) aptitude ofrealization states of mystical experience (the advanced
states of self-transcendence and deep interconnection
with the Absolute essence that govern the world – God,
Matter, Information, etc.).
Therefore, basically all the three main macrospheres of the world cognitive activity – Transcendent(Holistics),
Transcendental(Humanistics)
andBiocosmological (Realistics) – are universal in theirstrategic aims of self-realization. However, their
universality is related to the position on a macroevolutionary spiral of the world cultural development(Khroutski, 2008). Khroutski’s spiral evolutionary model
includes the poles of Cosmism or Realistics (of theunity of Man with Cosmos) and the opposite
AntiCosmism or Humanistics (of the separate existenceof Human’s reason and material Cosmos).
Substantially, the transition from one pole to another(within the one sphere of Earth’s life evolution and theone spiral ascendance of the world culture) is realizedEubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)
every time through the transitional (intermediate,‘interhemispheric’) cultural era. Thus, due to Khroutski’sview, the transition from AC (Ancient Cosmism) tomodern AntiCosmism was realized through thetheocosmism (Cosmobiology 2 ) of Aristotle – the basis(in the world cultural development) for the emergenceof mediaeval scholastic ontotheology (philosophy of
the Middle Ages), which, in its turn, has carried out thefacilities (built the foundation) – for the further selfformation of the levels and epochs of Renaissanceontoanthropology and the deism and mechanicism of
Enlightenment, of all – for the eventual emergence ofmodern anthropocentrism (humanism) and scientism,i.e. of current Humanistics – AntiCosmist fundamental
rejection both of God and Cosmos, and, thus, – of thetotal rejection of a holistic world outlook.
In Figure 1 is represented the “the global spiralmacro-evolution of the world culture”, now in themodified form the EJAIB 2008 paper (due to theconsultations with Dr. Khroutski):Fig 1: The global spiral evolution of the world
cultureDesignations:
AC(FF)R – Ancient Cosmist
Realistics, with its climax in theachievements of ancient Greek
rational philosophy, especially in thephilosophy of Aristotelian immanent
essentialism(Fundamental
Functionalism).
TM(OT)H – Transcendent Monistic
Holistics,
mainlyrealizedin
OntoTheology of the Middle Ages
culture.
AntiC(ID)Hum–
AntiCosmist(Idealistic, Dualistic) Humanistics –of the priority of an individual humanreason in the world organization.
TI(CS)H–
Transcendent
Integrativist Holistics, realized atpresent chiefly on the basis of asystem approach in the domain ofmodern Complex Sciences
RC(BC)R–
RealCosmist(BioCosmological) Realistics

Naturally, in the course of real evolutionary eventsand in the support of Khroutski’s conceptual
evolutionary model – we might claim that next stages
and levels of the world cultural development(contemporary and future) will realize spontaneously
the return of holistic (theocosmic, rational, integrative)
world-viewing and the derivative construction of
personalist and social development (policy making).
Substantially, this is not only a substantial conclusion of
the theorizing by Dr. Khroutski, but likewise is the actual
challenge of our contemporary global life – to the urgent
development of modern Integrativist (Holistic)
approaches, which are basically founded nowadays on

2

Khroutski orthographically distinguishes Aristotelian
Cosmobiology and Russian organic Biocosmology (and his
own conception of BioCosmology) from the entire (nonorganic) contemporary (dominating) biocosmology that ischiefly occupied with the search of extraterrestrial
civilizations.

7a system methodology and are using the cutting-edge
achievements of modern science and philosophy.
In the issue, aiming at the development of theoriginal conception of “Universal scientific policymaking” which is realized with reference to Khroutski’s
BioCosmological conception, – I am going to realize inthis paper, firstly, – an overview of the modern area ofIntegrativist (Holistic) explorations in philosophy andscience; next, – to present the characteristics of myown conception of “Universal scientific policy-making”;
and, in the outcome, to ascertain the correlation of
BioCosmological and “Universal scientific policymaking” perspectives that might be applicable to the
future well-being and development of a person and thesociety.
For solution of the primordial task concerning thestructure of human being, evolution of society including
individual human beings is necessary. In this case,evolution does not mean only natural selection or
mutation evolution. Evolution of society including
individual human-beings means intentionally creativetransformation concerning the process of the present
while
includingdevelopmentforindividual
psychophysical transformation of the past. The
evolutionary process as society including human beingsmeans the dynamic process that is an integrated
individual
diversified
process.
Therefore,
thisevolutionary process links to the dynamics of systemof
Ervin
Laszlo(2007)
withtransformation
Transcendent Holistics. He indicated about process intoday’s world as follows:“Because of the unsustainability of many processes intoday's world, the dynamic of development that will
apply to our future is not the linear dynamic of classicalextrapolation but the nonlinear chaos dynamic ofcomplex-system evolution.”
Thus because of uncertainty with complex system,
whole process as world with unsustainability meansthat individual daily self-determination at the present
affects whole decisions at the bifurcation point. In otherwords, behaviour by daily self-determination of eachindividual decides collapse or development, andsustainance of the whole world at present. Therefore
the elucidation about the mechanism of value
concerning emergence of self that underlies selfdetermination and value judgment is important.
This is connected to universal policymaking for
Global Shift University that Ervin Laszlo (2008)
indicated for creation of global sustainability. Thus for
Global Shift University, phased universal policy with aperspective that can show tangible direction of strategy
as business in industry is necessary for construction ofsustainable society. I have already discussed this at theSecond UNESCO-Kumamoto University Bioethics
Roundtable.
3. Background of value
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “value” with as
the following:1) The regard that something is held to deserve,
importance or worth.
2) Material or monetary worth.
3) (Values) principles or standards of behaviour.

8

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

4) The numerical amount denoted by an algebraic
term; a magnitude, quantity, or number.
5) Music the relative duration of the sound signified
by a note.
Thus, the meaning of value connects to deserving,material, money, behaviour, magnitude, quantity andnumber…etc. In short, when we use value as a word,
we internalize the meaning as a word like above in our
sub consciousness. The word with high frequency ofsocial use becomes a symbol.
“Value” is one of the words that can represent the
attributes of humans in modern society with material
civilization. We create value by close connection withcognition.
4. The linkage of self and value system as systemtheory1) Consciousness as fundamental system of value
The fundamental system of value can link toconsciousness. Because all events concerning humans
are implicated in consciousness. As a holistic
perspective approach as an organism, Ludwig vonBertalanff (1968), who was founder of general systemtheory, defined that system as complexes of elements
standing in interaction. I add the following fundamental
concept about system based on the definition of
Bertalanff (1968). A “system” is a non-reducible wholethat is intricately organized by interactive constituent asa thing and occasions that is actual entities of flowing
process. The whole system of an upper level canbecome a function or part system in whole system.
Gerald M. Edelman (2004) who is a Nobel-prizewinning cerebral neurologist mentioned about
consciousness and information as follows:“The consciousness is the flowing process, integrity andoneness as the neuron group that operates withdecentration in the various domains of brainsaccomplishes dynamic process.”
Information is decrease of uncertainty that is affectedby some message. Arnold Mindell (2000) founded theProcess Oriented Psychology for psychophysical selfawarenessandbody-awarenessconcerning
metaphysics by integration of quantum theory,
information theory, psychology and the Oriental
philosophy. He mentioned about consciousness asfollows:“Consciousness is ability for observing each part of
dreaming some aspects of consensus reality. And
about above, consciousness is ability that can realize
as part of oneself. In short, consciousness is a word
concerning interactive relationships between part andother part.”
2) Value system as bio psychological system
Thus the cognition system concerning explicatedconsciousness is linked to an Open System Theory ofValues value system that Clare W. Graves (1970) had
expounded. Graves (1970) showed level of existence inan open system theory with process of individual
cognition including neural system as designation ofexistential states and existential problems of human.
Before the foundation of the theory, Clare W. Graves(1959) researched the model or theory of ethicalbehaviour as the following viewpoint:“The theory will be derived from the organismic point ofview of Rousseau, Smuts, Schweitzer, Lecky,
Goldstein, Maslow, et. al. These will be reinterpreted
within Krech's concept of Dynamic Neurological
Systems and the General Systems point of view ofBertalanffy. Also, it is assumed that as a growthphenomenon. ethical behaviour develops naturally
through definable but overlapping stages. This being anorderly progression from a less complex to a more
complex stage. The intellectual system, the motivation
system, the feeling system, the perceptual system andthe ethical system are all in contact. Psychologists
study behaviour and one form of behaviour is ethicalbehaviour.”He analyzed conceptions of the mature adultpersonality in an operation that he gathered over a longterm with psychological measures from above viewpoint
for a long periods. Graves (1970) designed the eightlevels as existential states and their existential
problems. They are experientialistic, cognitive,
sociocentric, materialistic, saintly, egocentric, tribalistic
and automatic. With these eight levels, he suggested
eight major value systems as follow. They are thereactive, the traditionalistic, the exploitive, thesacrificial, the materialistic, the sociocratic, theexistential and the experiential value systems. After
Don Edward Beck (1999) verified the The Emergent
Cyclical Levels of Existence Theory of Graves, hefounded Spiral Dynamics Integral as a multidimensionalmodel for describing about evolution of society,transformation of human values, culture andemergence of human nature with values-based modelof Graves. The existence theory of Graves affected
Integral theory of Ken Wilber (2001) also.
Don Edward Beck (1999) designed eight vMEMEs(value MEME) with each colours as worldview codes in
psycho-cultural archeology with Emergent Cyclic Levels
of Existence Theory of Graves as a basis for value test.
He mentioned about Spiral Dynamics Integral withvMEME as follows:“Spiral Dynamics was an extension and elaboration of
the biopsychosocial systems concept of the original
Gravesian research. We must discover the complex,
evolutionary models that can provide the meshworks forour contemporary state of fragmentation, find a way tomonitor and measure our progress, and then create
new and innovative ways to address the difficult
problems that continue to hinder our full emergence on
the planet.”
I show the below about vMEME of his model in thefollowing order based on colours and thinking, one from
cultural manifestations and personal display.
Level 8; Turquoise, Holistic, earth changes
Level 7; Yellow, Ecological, natural systems
Level 6; Green, Consensus, community
Level 5; Orange, Strategic, growth
Level 4; Blue, Authority, rules
Level 3; Red, Egocentric, gratification
Level 2; Purple, Animistic, rituals
Level 1; Beige, Instinctive, protection
This is integrative developmental theory for
emergence of self as evolution and development by
vMEME with psycho-cultural archeology. In short, spiraldynamics integrative is a dynamic biopsycholsocial
systemtheoryintegrated
betweenindividualEubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)
developmental psychobiology and evolution of social
culture.
3) Mechanism of Value that links emergence of selfand self-destination
I have observed and promoted social relationships
and the process between individual self-determinationand society by information disclosure in public activity.
By dialogue and research with many people in diverse
organizations concerning public activity, I consider themechanism concerning emergence of self as one ofintegrative science that can solve environmental ethics
issue with the following fundamental questions: “How isself created at present?”, and “What creates self atpresent?”
For solution of this question, we can link thevMEMEs of Beck to my nesting hierarchy (Uejima,2008) as a matrix that can integrate multidimensional allmaps (Figure 2). Because I think that all events andoccasions concerning humans link to consciousness, I
apply vMEME in these diagrams that describeinteractions between process and system for
emergence of individual self while linking relationships
between social system and society at the present.
Because I considered that all vMEMEs are implicated inall humans with microcosm as the being at the present
by my research to public activity. I already had
published the nesting hierarchy of self as matrix (Figure2) in Uejima (2008).
However, since I don’t adopt vMEME as adevelopmental theory, Level 1 cannot be located in thebottom. I apply vMEME in holon structure that can showinteraction theory between process and system that
focuses on the present rather than developmental
theory. Therefore, I adopt Level 1 of instinctive thinking
as the boundary zone between organic holon and social
holons. Since the organic holon becomes implicit as alower holon, it is difficult to generally recognize organic
holon concerning transpersonal relations. Whether anysocial holon affects individual self more strongly is
decided by interactive relationships between society
and self through social systems of the present.
Meanwhile, since animism found in ethnic tribes likethe Aborigines and Native American links to holistic
cosmology together with taboos and rites, someanimism cannot be easily segmented under a holistic or
cosmological framework. Hayao Kawai (2002) who was
the most famous psychologists in Japan indicatedabout the former. Arnold Mindell (2000) indicated about
the later. Takao Takahashi (2008) showed thatJapanese traditional animism had spirituality andecological thinking together with taboos and rites.
Hyakudai Sakamoto (2002) indicated that Asian people
as tribes with a traditional long history is affected by
implicit animism and traditional religions like Buddhism,
Tao and Tantla in society and they have holistic trends.
Therefore, I deleted Level 2 from my earlier diagram as
the nesting hierarchy.
4) Summary
While I utilize vMEME by Beck as a base for thevalue system concerning emergence of self, I designed
a nesting hierarchy of self as matrix of all occasion and9events (Figure 2). The value system of humans asorganisms links to biosocial psychological systems andcerebral systems based on consciousness. Self is theintegration of various social holon including the process
as the part in whole with a nesting hierarchy. Self has
subordinate and integrative function to the upper holonas social humans. While I utilize nesting hierarchy as
the implicated structure concerning ethical issue, I
elucidate about mechanism of value as below.
5. Individual value
We live in society with value judgments in dailyoccasions. We have continual process between
behaviour and mind with value as the measure. Most
people think only of process of value that we act after
self-determination from value judgments with themeasure of value thinking in mind. I hope that readers
have insight about not only value as the measure but
also the implicit process of value as itself.
Though we argue about the dilemma between valueof mind and behaviour at special self-determination
concerning the crisis of identity, most people do notargue about the difference of value between value ofmind and value of behaviour in daily lifestyle. Because
most of humans recognize only value thinking in mind
as a value of oneself rather than value of behaviour.
The characteristics of human-being and the social
task may exist in our individual daily lifestyle. I canshow by the following examples gaps between mind
and behaviour about health in daily lifestyle in Japan as
follows.
1) The public consciousness for health care
The Hyogo prefectural government announced theresults of the “12th public consciousness of health caresurvey“ in Japan in 2006. Hyogo prefecture has wide
countryside areas and the city of Kobe located in themetropolitan area. The data includes opinions of both
citizens in metropolitan area and citizens in the
countryside. Therefore, I utilize this data as the typical
data of Japanese sense of value concerning healthcare. Even if citizens answered about behaviour, theactions are based on consciousness without detailed
investigation about the actual time of behaviour. Thisdata shows behaviour that citizens think in mind.
Therefore, each answers concern behaviour, value andinformation
sourcesthatcandescribe
subconsciousness in mind rather than actual behaviour.
This questionnaire allowed multiple answers, and someexamples are shown in Table 1.
By these results, most citizens answered that they
had good behaviour for dietary life, rest, sleeping andcleanliness. Most of people gain information concerning
health care from mass media like TV and newspaper.
Many people often read the newspaper in daily lifestyle.
Hence, for health care, most of citizens think that they
have reasonable behaviour for their dietary life.

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)10

Table 1: Public consciousness over health care (Hyogo prefectural survey, 2006; People were asked whether theygave a positive response to the questions and behaviours listed below, results recorded as %)(1) Behaviour in daily
lifestyle (what do you do toenhance your health?)
Attention to dietary life 66.3
Rest and sleeping
Cleanliness of body

57.1
50.7

(2) Value about daily dietary(what important measure do
you take?)
Consumption of
49.1
vegetable
Three meals a day
42.6
Balance diet
35.3(3) Information source for healthcare (Where do you receive
information?)
Television
80.5
Newspaper and magazine
Family and friend

64.1
56.2

Table 2: Transition of beverage consumption in Japan (based on the 1990 level as 100%)
Potable Coffee Regular Coffee Instant Coffee Green Tea

1980
1990
1995
2000
2004

26
100
109
115
120

56
100
122
129
147

82
100
98
100
105

114
100
99
112
128

Tea
54
100
127
127
116

Carbonated Coke Fruit
Beverage
95
100
99
94
92

96
100
111
114
110

69
100
76
89
68

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)11

Table 3: Transition concerning numbers of shops of major chain store in Japan
Convenience Store Chains Department stores Big Supermarkets
1991

9,699

478

1,683

1994

13,431

463

1,804

2002

32,431

362

1,668

2006

34,453308

1,675

Table 4: Transition concerning the proportion of the population and hours in contact with media in Japan

Rate of total population (%)
Audience of Listener
Reader ofTVof radionewspaper
92
15
50
1995
91
14
48
2000
90
13
46
2005

Hours for media (hours)
Watching TV Listening to Readingradio
newspaper
3:40
0:22
0:22
3:45
0:20
0:22
3:54
0:19
0:21

(Kg)

2) Transition of annual per capita consumption ofvegetables in Japan
People often think that consumption of vegetables is
the most valuable aspect of their dietary life. The
transition concerning annual consumption of vegetables
in kg per capita can be seen from the food balance
sheet by Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
between 1988 and 2003 as shown in the inserted figure
below. The consumption of vegetable progressively
decreases in Japan. The center of Japanese traditional
homemade food was vegetables.

120
110
100
90
80
1988

1993

1998

2003

Figure 3: Annual consumption of vegetables (kg perperson )3) Transition of beverage consumption in JapanThe consumption of beverages as actual behaviourof citizens, can be seen from the annual consumption ofbeverage per capita from beverage consumption survey
between 1980 and 2004 by Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries as seen in Table 2. This data is
statistical with a score of 100 representing 1990. The
growth of potable coffee and regular coffee between
1980 and 2004 is not positive.
Coffee is not a Japanese traditional beverage.
However, most people think that oneself has good daily
diet. Even if they perceive that vegetable is valuable,
when we analyze consumption of vegetable andbeverage, we can realize difference between value inmind and value of behaviour of citizens in Japan.
The behaviour of citizens selects coffee as valuable
regardless of their minds. If they recognize the value of
their behaviour as a daily custom in lifestyle, they

always have conflict. Awareness of the differences
between value of behaviour and value of mind raises
conflicts rather than dilemma in oneself. Humans associal human cannot always select the actions basedon the deeper values in mind. The value of mind
creates reality inside oneself with memory as thinking
for oneself.
Human beings recognizes thinking time as time ofreality. Because our brain creates a time scale bymemory in each individual self. Linkage among
perception, thinking and memory creates individual
time-scale. Gerald M. Edelman (2004) mentioned abouttime as follows:“Time is the product in the brain. The creatures withconsciousness of higher-order produce the past byremembering and the future by image.”
The value of mind that we think for long periods
creates reality for ourselves regardless of realization insociety by behaviour. Therefore, I call value of mind as
individual value.
Edelman (2004) mentioned about categorization ofperception and memory in individual cerebral value
system with neuron network as follows:“The interaction between motor system and sensory
system creates global mapping for both generalizationof various signal and extraction of common
characteristics. The complex global map creates
perception categorization and concept. The memory
has attribute as follows. The interaction between
degeneracy and association produces memory inmultidimensional network that the manifold circuit
merges. The consciousness arises by the dynamic
interaction between the memory and the perception of
the present progressive. Human-being has structure
concerning sustention of consciousness and learningby the ascending neuron system. Since the spreadingwith neuraxon in nucleus of brain-stem andhypothalamus
creates
widespreadprojection,transmitter can affect much neurons at the same time.”
In the other words, he argues about value systemthat regulates the response of neuron systems
concerning motion control, learning and memory forEubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)12

survival by function of neuron and structure of brain.
The value system in the brain has the effect to bias
synapse transmission. Thus, he showed theory ofneuronal group selection concerning Neural Darwinism
as comprehensive theory with both division andintegration in the brain.
6. Social value
Though citizens think that vegetables with dietary life
for health care is valuable, they select coffee. Why do
citizens buy coffee rather than vegetables? We canobserve the reality of lifestyle of citizens with tangible
data of major chain stores in Japan. Major chain store
in Japan like convenience store chains utilizes the
Point-of-Sale system that a sale item, amount, genderand the age of the customer are instantly transmitted tothe center for management of information. In short,since major chain stores in Japan analyzes behaviourof consumer by marketing, activity of major chain store
is reflected by value as behaviour of consumer.
1) Transition concerning numbers of shop of major
chain store
The data from the survey of commerce between 1991
and 2006 by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is
in Table 3. The convenience store chain increases inspite of decreasing of other major chain store. The
numbers of big supermarkets where many citizens buy
various fresh food including fresh vegetable decreased.
2) Rates concerning contents of commercial
products in convenience shop in major chain store
The rates concerning contents of commercial
products in convenience store in 2000 and 2005 in
Japan were surveyed by the Japanese Franchise
Association. Most commercial products in convenience
store are foods. Especially, fresh foods like lunch box
and beverage have the highest rate.
Figure 4 : Contents of commercial products
(%)
40
30

2000

20

2005

10
0

freshness foods fabricated foods

goods

service*freshfoods like lunch box and beverage..etc* fabricated foods like cookies and gum…etc* goods except foods

This increase is because marketing of theconvenience store could apply to the needs ofconsumers that wish for convenience, efficiency as well
as sales of much kind of foods and daily goods. The
major convenience store chain in Japan is located onroad with parking in residential districts and open 24
hours a day. Though most of commercial products inthe convenience store are foods, most of the food ispackaged food for convenience of consumer.
Therefore, most of Japanese people daily buy potable
beverage with fabricated food or fresh food like lunchbox. Actually, we can also look on rapidly increasing of
potable coffee in Table 2.
3) Transition concerning rate of doers and hours
contacting to media giant
There is also a transition concerning the proportionof persons and hours in contact to a media giant with
National time-budget survey between 1995 and 2005
by Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK). The data in Table 4 isfrom weekdays. This data is created by a questionnaire
in order to investigate precise time-series actual
behaviour. Therefore, this data can be utilized as datathat can observe actual behaviour rather thanconsciousness in mind. In short, this data of timebudget by NHK as actual behaviour can be comparedwith data of public consciousness of health by Hyogo
prefecture as sub consciousness
More than 90% of Japanese people watched TV fornearly 4 hours every weekday. The hours for watchingon TV increased more than 10minutes between 1995
and 2005. Half of Japanese people read the newspaperfor 22 minutes a weekday. In short, Japanese people
gain social information from major mass media.
Especially, TV affects Japanese people very much.
4) Construction of social value
In short, the major mass media keeps on creating
value with public consensus of humans as an audience.
For example, since commercial message of coffee
enters the mind of the consumers, they may
automatically buy it in a convenience store. Our body
including brain may automatically have become
addicted to caffeine by daily customs and visual
stimulus of commercial message. Commercial
messages are advertisements for sale and propaganda
for ideology.
The authority of society as a social organization uses
vision as a visual symbol and sound as an auditory
signal with various social systems for transformation to
information from stimulation in perception system.
Since humans can usually recognize loneliness, stressand annoyance by various relationships through intersubjectivity between objective and subjective, humans
always keep on requiring pleasure for escape fromloneliness by any comfortable and immediate stimulus.
Since we are vaguely aware that daily disjunction
between behaviour and mind connects to awareness ofdaily conflict, we try to forget it. This may be because
we feel fear about the conflict between reality of oneself
and the reality world of society. There is just anotherfact on the other side of our fear as gestalt of value.
Various social systems including economic systemwith mass media and convenience chain store…etc
affects the value of behaviour. The value of behaviour
creates the world of reality in society through behaviourof humans rather than value of mind.
In the other words, social cognition in yourself affects
to value of your behaviour. Social cognition becomesthe implicit order for individual cognition process that iscreated in relationship with objects or others. Humanbeings have higher social cognition than individual
cognition system through evolution.
Ralph Adolphs (2003) mentioned about social
cognition that is an attribute of humans as follows:Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)“We understand ourselves in part by observing otherpeople and their reactions to us. Our ability to think
about other people might be an aspect of our ability to
re-describe events from several points of view. Just as
we can think about other people, we can step outsideourselves and think about ourselves, have
conversations with ourselves, and imagine things
happening to ourselves in the future.”
In addition, he explained about the brains that are
specialized for social cognition concerning evolution of
species as follows:“Under one hypothesis, the competition for social skills
led to the evolution of cognitive mechanisms foroutsmarting others, and fuelled the expansion of thehuman brain and perhaps the elaboration of certain
neural systems. In support of this idea, there is acorrelation across primate species between the size of
their social group and the relative volume of neocortex.”Thus, since we have higher social cognition as acerebral attribute of species, we are affected by thesocial system. I call the value of daily behaviour that
individual selects by social cognition as the social
value. Social value is not separated between society
and oneself. There is social value in interactive
relationships between the individual self and society.
And social value creates our social “reality” through thesocial system. In short, the power-wielder in authority
with society as social organization can affect and create
value and duty with process of obedience of individuals
as element in same boundary of social organization.
Some power-wielders and the enterprise keep on
creating social value by value system assystematization. They can directly create social value inindividual behaviour through perception system withvisual sign like commercial message and symbols suchas branding, social moral and faith.
After Ralph Adolphs (2003) have introduced various
scientific experimental studies concerning social
cognition, he mentioned about social signal and thebrain process of social information as follows:“There are parallel processing routes. For instance,
pathways involving the amygdala and sub corticalstructures can trigger rapid emotional responses,
whereas slower emotional behaviour relies on
prefrontal and parietal cortical processing that involves
self-regulatory components. Second, there is extensive
feedback between different processing levels, such thatit becomes difficult to assign levels to any particularhierarchy. Third, stimuli are processed in the context ofa background, baseline mode of brain operation thatmight already introduce substantial biases. The brain’s
baseline activity might reflect a mode of operation thatis already tuned to interpreting and categorizing theworld as social. About social cognition and emotion,
emotions can be thought of as states that coordinate
homeostasis in a complex, dynamic environment; in so
far as one aspect of the environment is social, emotions
will participate in regulating social behaviours. Most
studies on social cognition have used visual stimuli, but
it is clear that real-life social interactions draw on
additional modalities. Whereas touch is an importantsocial communication channel in other mammals, inmodern humans it is relatively restricted to those with13

whom we have the most intimate relationships. Aboutsocial signal, audition provides important social signals
in addition to language. The intonation of speech —prosody — can signal various emotions, and isrecognized using some of the same structures that we
use for recognizing facial expressions.”
As identified above, I propose that symbols and signs
as social signal can be transformed to information by
perception categorization in neuron network of cerebral
system.
7. The different between moral value and ethicalvalue
Though we can create moral value by various social
systems for sustentation of society, we cannot create
ethical value by various social systems. The former
connects to self as social humans in society as a socialorganization. The latter connects to life as an organism.
We usually create moral value through each social
position in society as social organization.
Conversely, authority as the top of social organization
creates and teaches moral value for sustentation or
improvement of society. Then they may design social
systems that can spread and hand moral value fromone of social value to individual value by construction ofvalue system with systematization.
We can ask who or what creates our value? If wehave children, we are the authority to children of
oneself in a social organization as a family. We cancreate and hand on various moral values including
moral value of children through a common system insocial organization as family. At same time, as webelong to some social system as servient person withelements through social organization like nation,company or school, an authority in social organization
can create or affect our moral value.
In short, we can become both an authority andservient person by our social position. While we always
affect value as a process of each other by interactive
social relationships, we keep on creating social systemand society. Thus transformation of moral value as well
as social value with social system by society as socialorganization derives from characteristics of humanbeings.
Stanley Milgram (1974) who was a famous
psychologist proved about obedience of individual
human to authority. He indicated about obedience toauthority as follows:“The humans as social animals have the implicit
condition. That is creation of mentality for transforming
action of obedience by authority, dependence of selfimage to authority, tuning of value and cognition foraccommodation to authority by autonomic forfeit ofanswerability. With channel of symbol, reward andpunishment, ideology as framework, humans recognize
authority.”
If authority changes value systems of moral value aswell as social value by improved systematization forsustentation of society, most humans immediately may
transform norms of value judgment or moral value aswell as social value.

14

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

8. The manifest value or implicit value as gestalt
If we spend maximum hours for sleeping, sleeping is
the most valuable occasion for our health. If we spend
with family for long time in the day, the family is themost valuable for us. Citizens answered rest andsleeping as actions for healthcare in daily lifestyle(Table 1). If we spend maximum hours for working,working is the most valuable occasion for us. At the
below, I analyze the value concerning sleeping.
1) Transition concerning rate and hours forsleeping or working at weekday in JapanThe data concerning sleeping is based on answers of
all people to Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) surveys (Table5). The data concerning working is based on answers
from only those working. The workers who work morethan 10 hours a day increased in Japan. Hours forsleeping gradually decreased. Bedtime for most people
is later than 22:00.
About sleeping, most people of advanced nations
have only short sleeping hours. For example, 44% ofbabies of Japanese on their second birthday went to
bed after 22:00 in 2004 (Data from findings of theJapanese Society of Child Health). Children of between
8 and 9 ages have 9.2 hours of sleeping time. Juniorhigh school students have 7.5 hours of sleeping time.
Junior high school students have 6.6 hours of sleeping
time. The value of sleeping is decreasing in Japan.
2) Transition concerning rate and hours for daily
activity of women and men at weekday in Japan
Table 6 shows that women perform most of thechores and child-rearing for families in Japan. Shopping
gradually increases in both women and men. The
comparative value that parents take care of health forchildren also is decreasing in Japan with a bad
condition of sleeping of young children.
3) Summary
Many citizens think that they have rest and sleeping
as behaviour for health care, as shown in Table 1.
However, hours of sleeping decreased as shown in
Table 5. And shopping hours of both women and men
increase.
About working, we work with workfellows inorganization for long hours while deleting sleeping time.
Sleeping and working is necessary for living in society.
The work is the most valuable for us. Most people
mention working in order to get money for living.
Earning more money and high social position becomesthe rich lifestyle rather than sustentation of life forupper-middle class of the advanced nations. The
money or imposition by social system is the mostvaluable item for many of us.
When citizens select work with reduction of sleeping
time as value of behaviour, they select sleeping that is
worthlessness or ignorance to value as gestalts.
There are both manifest value as behaviour andimplicit value as gestalt in our selection. The former iswork for profit or imposition by social system. The latteris sleep for health by individual psychophysical system.
Which is more important, the manifest value or
implicit value as gestalt? By the changing social
system, our value continues on changing. Because
social system creates a norm of the value concerning
profit or control for sustentation or improvement of eachsociety as organization.
For instance, we can observe value in macro
economics in Japan as case study about above. The
economic activity concerning supply and demand withmoney directly expresses manifest value with data as
integration of our individual value as data.
When Japan was in a rapid economic growth period,
consumer-electronics products were the most valuable.
When Japan was in bubble economy period, both land
and financial asset were the most valuable.
When Japan is in information-communication
technology innovation, numbers and quality ofcommunication and information is the most valuable. If
our social system changes, worthlessness changes
value. In short, the changing of social system links tochanging of value. Because we have self as social
animals.
One of the frontiers of neuroscience at the present isSocial Neuroscience that John T. Cacioppo and Gray
G. Berntson (2002) had founded in 1992. They definedsocial neuroscience as follows:“Social Neuroscience studies the relationship between
neural and social processes, including the intervening
information-processing components and operations at
both the neural and the computational levels ofanalysis. As such, work in social neuroscience builds
on work in the neuroscience, cognitive science, andsocial science. In addition, since they think that humans
are social animals, they mentioned both new definitionand process concerning relationship of society andindividual about memory as follows. Memory makes
possible not only the formation of stimulus associations
and learning but of social connections, alliances,
norms, traditions, culture, and histories that link us tominds of others present and past. This makes possible
actions, thoughts, and feelings exceeding anything that
could be accomplished by any individual alone. Social
relationships subtly embrace us in the warmth of selfaffirmation, the whispers of encouragement, and themeaning of belonging. Disruptions or the absence ofstable social relationships, in contrast, disturb ourminds and biology as few other events can. Elective
brain injuries and imaging studies also reveal important
links between the brain and social context.”
As identified above, I propose that we have social
neural-network for boundary with species as higher
primates. We establish self as social humans by the
relationship between neural network and social
processes, including the intervening informationprocessing components and operations.

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)15

Table 5: Transition concerning proportion of the population and hours for sleeping or working
Proportion (%)
Person working
BedtimeBedtimemore than 10(22:00 - 23:00)(22:00 hours
23:00)
17
21
22

1995
2000
2005

34
33
34

69
67
68

Hours for daily activity (hours)
Bedtime Working Sleeping of Sleeping
after 00:00
workingofpersonallpeople
85
7:22
7:15
7:27
83
7:34
7:07
7:23
84
7:31
7:05
7:22

Table 6: Transition concerning proportion of the population and hours for daily activity of women and men
Hours for daily activity by women (%)
Hours for daily activity by men (hours)
Chores
Shopping
Child-rearing
Chores
Shopping
Child-rearing
1995
2000
2005

2:23
2:21
2:24

0:33
0:35
0:35

0:52
0:41
0:44

0:08
0:09
0:11

0:08
0:09
0:12

0:06
0:05
0:06

16

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)
9. Value system as systematization by policy
Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1967) thought of value as asymbol with process of perception including
phenomenology. Humans use words as symbols whileconnecting signs like face and repeating action. Whensymbols connect to memory with signs in the cerebral
network by repeating, symbol and sign implicates in sub
consciousness. The symbol that we call value
automatically links to selection of a boundary. The wordthat we call value has already become a symbol by highfrequency of social use. When humans use words withhigh frequency of use as symbols, humans transformthe symbol into a signal within the cerebral network by
repeated action. While we use value, our sub
consciousness always grasps deserving, material,
money, behaviour, magnitude, quantity and number etc,
as the meaning of value.
On the one hand, when we suggest a value system
by policy, we consider value system as systematization.
In the case of this, the most risk is intention to control
individual value by social systems like totalitarianism
and communism. In short, argument about value
system by policy can link to policy-making or desire inorder to control sub-consciousness of citizens.
Value links both a process and policy. This isbecause value as universal policy connects to theprocess in self of human being. When we argue about
value systems or principles and standard of value forsustaining structure in policymaking, we subliminallyconsider about improvement of social systems forstabilization and maintaining the structure of societythat we belong to.
Even if we involuntarily use value systems as
systematization in policy, we subliminally may control
sub consciousness of citizens to sustain and improveeach society as various policies or strategies.
Authority as each social organization that can designsocial systems can intentionally or involuntarily create
all value from social value to individual value by
construction of value systems with systematization.
Value systems as systematization are created by only
thinking of a method as systematization of knowledge.
Only thinking method has a risk. About this risk, I
quote an important message of Jiddu Krishnamurti(2001) who was a famous modern Indian philosopher
as follows:“The brain is the source of thought. The brain is matterand thought is matter. Can the brain - with all its
reactions and its immediate responses to every
challenge and demand - can the brain be very still? It is
not a question of ending thought, but of whether thebrain can be completely still? This stillness is not
physical death. See what happens when the brain iscompletely still.”
10. Can we solve ethical tasks with value of life?
David Bohm (1980) suggested that cosmology isimportant as the being with wholeness. He indicatedabout life as follows:“The life is integral including all as macrocosm. The
space and time become implicate and enfolded the life.
The life is enfolded by holo movement. Even if life does
not manifest as actual entities, life is implicit in situation

17of inanimate being. When inanimate being is given
information, life manifests as the unfolding process andis implicit as the enfolding process after death.”
I suggest that Life is movements that transcendspace and time as itself. Life is a macrocosm as an
actual entity that transcends all boundaries. Life is amacrocosm with holo movement of wholeness as itself.
We keep creating a lot of the deaths and the lives ofcell or DNA in oneself as being with extensive
continuum of all moments including this moment asorganisms. While we also have a lot of the death andthe lives in oneself, we keep on living in transcendenceof the death and the lives with continuation of thismoment.
Is there a difference between the death and life as
the being with actual entities? There is onlytransformation with information, force and energy as
movement repeating of the death and life in us. When
we argue about the value of life, we involuntarily selecta boundary with a symbol that we call value. Therefore
we cannot grasp life as macrocosm by concept ofvalue.
11. Value as a process with social holon
Arthur Koestler(1978) created holrachy as organic
hierarchy by self-organization of biotic organ as follows:“The living matter is the integral constructed by subwhole like digestive system and circulating system that
continuously can diverge to organelle from individual
cell, to individual cell from organization and toorganization from organ. Organism has multilevel
hierarchy that sub wholes create layers. This multilevel
hierarchy is holarchy. The sub whole means holon thathave both part and whole. The holon as part in whole
has subordinate and integrative function to the upper
holon. The holon as whole in part has quasiautomatic
assertive function to the lower holon. Holon has codeand canon that controls structure and function. Holon
also has flexible strategy in order to accommodate
environment.”
While he uses holon structure to characteristics ofhuman-being in both organisms and society, heespecially pay attention about both destructibility bygroup mind and defect of cerebral nerve system as
species. He explained about the above as follows:“The group mind derives from desire for belonging bydependent experience of nurturing for long period ofearly childhood. The potential trend creates group mind
as social holon in society. This characteristic of groupmind is belief that means communion of common faithsystem. Therefore organization of belonging, various
authorities and various social systems including politicalsystem influence individual humans in society byintegrative function of social holon. Individual humantransforms to assimilation between authority or massand self by moral, faith, cord and tradition with symbol
system and emotional response. The holarchy ofsociety is constructed by social holon like above.”
We have self as social animals. We have social
neural-networks for boundaries with species as higher
primates. We establish self as social humans by the
relationship between neural network and social

18

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

processes, including the intervening informationprocessing components and operations.
Self is the integration of various social holons
including process as part in whole has subordinate andintegrative function to the upper holon as social
humans. Each social holon has a self as social animals
as shown in Figure 5.
1) Economic holon: economic material value that links
to reward and benefit.
2) Political holon: belief that links to control of someone
by acquirement of power.
3) Educational holon: educational morals that links torelativity.
4) Diversity holon: there is relief by belonging that links
to stabilization and dependence of mind.
Value has incorporative processes that are createdby interactions between self, the social system andsociety in the nesting hierarchy as holachy with various
social holon (Figure 6).
I suggest value as a process from the perspective
approach of holon structure concerning self. We
recognize value that is created by not only interaction
between social system and social culture but alsointeractive relationships between individual persons andbureaucratism of top-down hierarchy in all society. Ifsocial system or social culture changes newly, ourvalues also change soon. Since symbols and signs inperception systems are attributes of humans with
implicit value, value closely connects to the process ofself as social humans. Therefore, I propose a shift tothe value as a process from the value system.
12. Primordial cause of ethical issues
How does difference occur between behaviour andmind? We can notice that there is self-determination
concerning value judgment between real behaviour andmind. What links to self-determination?
In short, the process of shift concerning behaviour
from mind connects to the process of perception
concerning phenomenology that creates implicit value
and manifest value. This also links to the boundary associal holons that social systems create.
Organic holon as life that links wholeness as
macrocosm forms the bottom as structure of self. The
life as the bottom of a structure can enfold self that iscreated by process of all social holons. The self thatorganic holon enfolds becomes a microcosm. However,
we as self cannot perceive in our usual social condition
that we are microcosm and macrocosm. Because, there
is boundary zone that links to instinct of species. It isdifficult that we transcend developmental processes
and systems with organs as instinct with species.
However, life as the being of organism is atranscendental actual entity including individualorganization with material from the field of metaphysics.
In short, life is a macrocosm with holo-movement ofwholeness as itself.
The dilemma concerning ethical value arises at theboundary zone between each holachy. In short, theprimordial cause of the ethical issues is the primordial
task as structure of human-being rather than task ofsocial system and society.
Especially, the dilemma concerning bioethics andenvironmental ethics arises in the boundary zone ofprocess between social holon and organic holon. In

sum, the difference between value of life and life ofmacrocosm links to the difference between social holonand organic holon.
Therefore, if we keep on using only self-concept andvalue with social holon, we cannot search for primordial
solution of various ethical tasks about especiallybioethics and environmental ethics.
13. Shift to Universal Love with Life from value as
symbolI think the following key concept is the background ofuniversal policy that can create a sustainable society by
the 23rd century. I propose that we use Universal Love
with Life as the bottom of the structure, as well as value
as a process, instead of a value system. About the
ethical basis of corporate social responsibility, Macer(1998) mentioned as follows:“The imperatives of love respect for the ethical principleof self love supports empowerment of people so they
can make choices according to their values. But even if
we make the goal as serving love or happiness, it isvery difficult to assign values to different people's
interests and preferences.”
Our psychophysical body is organized by many cells
and networks of cell. Each cell has their own love andlife. We are multicellular organisms. Our body has
many parasites also in itself. We call that we have life of
only one to each other. We are the integral of
innumerable lives rather than only one.
Many lives in our body always contribute to keeping
on living as oneself without hoping to receive thanks
and return. Nobody can love for us without complaining
and hoping except innumerable lives in us. We with self
are Love with microcosm as a being that emerges frommacrocosm. This is formation of implicit Universal Lovein oneself. Naturally, the final achievement of value as
process is Universal Love with Life that is implicatedinto the bottom of holon structure as the nestinghierarchy (Figures 5 and 6).
I express that Universal Love as Brahman byphilosophy implicates in all thing, events, matters, andtime-space, as information field (Figure 6). The field has
a lot of information. Field is a medium for transformationand metamorphosis with information. As the field of
information by philosophy, I propose the field that
Universal Love as Brahman that implicates into thebottom of holon structure as the nesting hierarchy canenfold all events, occasions, substances, and timespace.
The above concept is similar to Akasic fields by Ervin
Laszlo (2004). Ervin Laszlo is a pioneer of modern
cosmology and founder of system philosophy proposed
the Akashic Field for an integral theory of everything.
He defined Akashic Field about cosmic field as an
information field. He described the universe, Akashic
field and information as follows:“The concept of a universe is constituted in theembrace of continuous fields and forces that carryinformation as well as energy. Information is a real andeffective feature of the universe. Information is
produced by the real world and is conveyed by afundamental field that is present throughout nature.
Universe becomes the informed universe that is full withinformation and energy.”

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)
I show as holon between yellow and pink coloured
holons [see pdf version of EJAIB for colour] from
Brahman that is outer boundary in this diagram. The
upper holons above instinct of species show social
holons concerning self as social humans. The lower
holons below instinct of species show organic holons
concerning life as the being. Instinct of species
becomes the boundary between metamorphosis andtransformation as information concerning life or social
humans.
The reality with all creatures as actual entities has life
in body as the being. The reality with life transcends
value as process or value system compared to self associal humans creates.
14. Conclusion
First let us conclude about the mechanism of value by
integrative science. Figure 6 perspective map sums up
the mechanism of value with perspective integrative
science as a conclusion. The mechanism concerns
homeostasis that emerges from circulation withfeedback of various functions. The mechanism withhomeostasis contributes to the invisibility of theboundary with the system. In sum, when we grasp our
self by systematic and systemic perspective, we cangrasp value from the mechanism with self.
As the summary with mechanism of value, sincevalue becomes an integrative mode of thedevelopmental process in humans, value has aspects
as a mode that can transform dynamic information
depending on the linear transition of time-scale.
Therefore, about this aspect with value, developmental
theory can explain the concept of the value system witha dynamic spiral.
Meanwhile, as a comprehensive perspective that can
include value system, we can utilize system philosophy
by Ervin Laszlo with process philosophy as follows. In
case of systematic and systemic perspective, the self
implicates a dynamic non-linear system with dynamic
complex system as well as the diversified bifurcation
with Macro Shift by Ervin Laszlo (2008). In this case,value means a module that becomes interchangeablewith other components. The value has the aspect ofmodule as function in system with self.
In other explanation about mechanism of value by
integrative science that includes dynamic spirals,
dynamic system theory, Macro Shift and holacky by
Arthur Koestler (1978), the value with module inprocess of self becomes an interchangeable part in theupper level from a whole system of lower level as
holacky.
Self is the integration of various social holons
including process as part in whole. Self has subordinate
and integrative function to the upper holon as social
humans. Value emerges through social system byinteractive relationships between human and societythat is the process of self. Though value emerges as
the upper holon of process with self, the value can be
not be lower than the holon of human beings andorganic holons.
In short, while value is an integrative mode of
developmental process in social humans, value is also
an integrative module in the process of self. The value

19

becomes an interchangeable part in the upper level thatemerges as integration from a whole system of lower
level as holacky.
Meanwhile, social holons as self with social humans
includes biosystems with organisms and social systems
with self. While we have implicit memory anddevelopment of the past in the process of the present,
the value emerges with the process of self that iscreated through social systems by relationships
between social cognition, society as social organization
including individual person and external environment
including nature at the present.
Secondly, the evolutionary process is important as aprocess for transformation for construction of asustainable society. Human beings have a microcosm
as well as self. This will link to the transformation of thebasic function of cerebral cognition system andpsychosomatic perception system with human beingsas species. If the form of brain as matter follows
function in a new cerebral cognition system and new
psychosomatic perception system, we can gain
evolution as human-being that lives in both society andnature.
In other words, realistic evolution that we need forconstruction of a sustainable society is intentionallycreation of our psychophysical transformation by
oneself. Evolution that we wish as a species among
long history of human-being is not development orvariation of genes, cells and organization for advanceas adaptation. Evolution that we wish as a species iscreation of harmony not only between oneself andmicrocosms but also between oneself and otherorganism as macrocosm.
Therefore, the first achievement target for individualtransformation for the evolution process of the wholeworld is daily self-awareness to process andrelationship between social system and oneself
concering social cognition. The first individual
achievement target is awareness by daily insight toUniversal Love with Life. The first achievement target
as society is construction of a democratic network thatcan link diversified organization by information
disclosure and express of individual self-determination.
If you are interested in the Free Think Tank pleasecontact me and Lab Link.
Acknowledgments
I extend gratitude to Dr. Darryl R. J. Macer whoteaches and assists about subject of ethics and policy
to me. I extend gratitude to Dr. Konstantin S.Khroutski
who teaches and assists about subject of philosophy
and sociology to me at everyday by website. I extend
gratitude to a lot of people including Dr,Jasdev Rai, Dr.
Yasuhiko Lee, Dr. Masakazu Kitano, Dr. Takao
Takahashi, Dr. Keiji Sakaguchi, Dr.Seiji Komori, Dr.
Yoshimasa Kato, Dr. Takashi Yano, Dr. Kiyoshi Ikeda,
Dr. Kihachiro Nakajima, Dr. Tamotsu Suzuki, Dr. Kouya
Ogino, Dr. Kazushige Kaba, Dr. Kanji Yoshida, Mr. Eiji
Tsutsui, Mr. Naomi Nomoto, Mr. Hajime Nonaka, Ms.
Sakiko Onaka, Mr. Toshiaki Murakami, Mr. Kensei
Tomita, Mr. Seiichiro Matsuoka, Mr. Yoshiaki
Sakaguchi, Ms. Yoshiko Soejima, Mr. Hidehiko Kamiya.

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Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

I extend special gratitude that guides to me, forest andnatural creatures with GAIA. You always guide me. I
don’t forget your guide and support to me. Finally I
thank my universal love and life as my microcosm andmy parents very much.
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Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

The Relation between
Normative and Descriptive
Ethics – A Consideration of
Empirical Bioethics- Jon Vegar Hugaas, Cand.theol., Dr.art.
Associate professor, Department of Social Studies
Faculty of Social Science, University of Stavanger,
Norwaywww.uis.no/frontpage
Email: jon.v.hugaas@uis.no
Abstract
This article offers a discussion of the relevance of
empirical studies to normative ethics focusing on the
new trend in bioethics called empirical bioethics. The
author sees this trend as an answer to a call made byanthropologists decades ago that ethicists should be
more aware of the situatedness of the moral institutionof life. Through a discussion of two opposing views
expressed in the final publications of the EU-funded
EMPIRE-project, the middle way is sought between the
misconception of bioethics as pure philosophy on one
side and the misconception of bioethics as sociology on
the other. The author argues that empirical studies may
be of relevance to the normative enterprise in at least
three ways as illustrated in the EMPIRE-material. First,
there is the relevance of empirical facts as descriptive
premises in ethical arguments. Second, there is therelevance of empirical studies as means of mapping
moral opinion and moral experience which ought toserve as one of two poles between which one oscillates
in moral decision making – the other being thenormative ethical theories. Third, there is the relevanceof empirical studies of the capacity and function of thehuman mind, which may tell us something about therange of normative principles and rules.
Keywords: Ethics, normative ethics, descriptive ethics,
empirical bioethics.
Introduction
The topic of this article may be approached indifferent ways. I will take as starting point somereflections on the way the subject of ethics is presented
in the introduction to many textbooks. I account briefly
for a general presumption when it comes to therelevance of descriptive ethics to normative ethics.
Then, I narrow the scope of the discussion in the
direction of bioethics as one of the most debated areasof applied ethics in contemporary society, and focus on
the relation between normative and descriptive ethics
within this area by looking closer at that which one may
call a new trend in academic bioethics and public
policy, viz. the tendency to engage in and rely on more
systematic
empiricallyorientedstudieswhenapproaching and attempting to solve normative issues. I
will address methodological questions which may beraised in this connection and at the end attempt tosummarize some ways in which empirical studies may

21

be of relevance to normative ethics in general andbioethics in particular.
On definitions of descriptive and normative ethics
Ethics is commonly considered to be the study ofmorality. According to Tom L. Beauchamp and LeRoy
Walters (1999: 2), four approaches to the study ofmorality appear prominently in the literature of ethics.
Of these four approaches two are normative and two
non-normative. The non-normative approaches arelabeled descriptive and analytical ethics or meta-ethics,
whereas the normative are divided into general andpractical normative ethics. Other ethicists, like William
K. Frankena (1973: 4), settle with a first hand division of
the study of ethics into three parts – dividing ethics into
normative ethics, descriptive ethics and analytical
ethics or meta-ethics. This is perhaps the mostcommon division in textbooks and it depends on therecognition of different methodological perspectives
applied in the study of morality. In this sense it ignores
the distinction which the other two scholars draw
between general and applied or practical normative3
ethics.
For the purpose of this article, I find it sufficient tooperate with the latter division of ethics into three
disciplines – i.e. with only one category of normative
ethics, since the problem which I address is related totheunderlying
distinction
betweendifferent
methodological perspectives applied in ethics. This has
to do with epistemological questions such as “What isthere to know in ethics?” and “How can we know in
ethics?” In themselves these questions belongs to thethird discipline of ethics called meta-ethics, which is theother non-normative approach aside from descriptive
ethics. Meta-ethics addresses logical, semantical andepistemological questions of relevance to the study ofmorality (Frankena 1973: 5). Thus, it is also concernedwith the question on the relation between descriptive
and normative ethics.
In order to talk clearly about this relation between
descriptive and normative ethics, one ought to start at
the outset by defining the two categories in speech.
Frankena (1973: 4) describes the work done within
descriptive ethics as an “empirical inquiry, historical orscientific, […] done by anthropologists, historians,
psychologists
andsociologists.”
He
explains,
furthermore, that the goal of this inquiry is to “describe
or explain the phenomena of morality or to work out atheory of human nature which bears on ethicalquestions” (Frankena 1973: 5). In other words,
descriptive ethics is the factual investigation of moral
behaviour and beliefs (cf. Beauchamp & Childress
1994: 4-5). This means that the category of descriptive
ethics indeed covers a large field of investigations
which among themselves are quite different in design
and focus, merely having in common that they apply
3

In another work by Beauchamp, normative ethics is divided
into general and applied normative ethics (cf. Beauchamp &Childress 1989: 10). However, in the 4th edition of this volume
they have replaced “applied” with “practical” arguing that thelabel formerly used was misleading (cf. Beauchamp &Childress 1994: 4).

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Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

empirical methods and focus on issues of morality in
one sense or another.
Normative ethics, on the other hand, is determinedrather loosely as asking what really is right, good or
obligatory. Frankena explains, moreover, that it may
take the form of asserting normative judgments andgiving or being ready to give reasons for thesejudgments, or it may take the form of debating about
what is good or right, with oneself or with others, andreach to normative conclusions on this (Frankena 1973:4). I like to add, however, that perhaps the mostimportant part of normative ethics is the normative
ethical theories on procedures to follow in order toreach to such justified conclusions, and this part of thediscipline is quite formal. In my opinion, the task toestablish a procedure to follow in order to reach toknowledge about right and wrong, good and evil,
desirable and undesirable, etc. as well as theapplication of such a procedure are the most importantparts of normative ethics.
Normative ethics, like descriptive ethics, is aknowledge enterprise – it seeks the truth about rightand wrong in ethical question. But there is also apractical aspect to normative ethics which need not be
a part of descriptive ethics. The reason why we want toknow about right and wrong, good and evil, desirable
and undesirable, is that we want to be able to choose
and promote the right, good or desirable in life. That
normative ethics has to do with practical knowledge
does not only mean that it is knowledge about the
ethical status of different human practices, it alsomeans that it is a kind of knowledge that has a practicalaim (cf. Finnis 1983). We do not want to know merely
for the sake of knowing, but also so that we may beable to act or live in accordance with this knowledge.
Finally, there is also a third element in the practicalaspect of normative ethical knowledge: Knowledge
about moral affairs is practical knowledge also meansthat it is knowledge which cannot be acquired without
real life experience.
Whereas the choice of adequate methods within
descriptive ethics most often is rather uncontroversial,participants in the normative ethics enterprise advocate
several more or less different and even contradicting
solutions as to how this task should be pursued andwhich answers should be considered valid. Some haveargued that knowledge about purely normative affairs inethics is a product of reason alone acquired through aparticular moral intuition. Others have proposed
theories which imply that such knowledge will be basedon psychological investigations and what is commonly
considered to be empirical studies. Others again reject
the whole idea of knowledge being implied in the
traditional sense of the word when talking aboutnormative ethics.
Without going any deeper into the question
concerning the foundation of normative knowledge, I
just like to point out that disagreement of this kindmakes up part of the reason why it would be a mistaketo regard the categories of normative and descriptive
ethics as expressing rigid, sharply differentiatedapproaches, since different approaches often are
undertaken at the same time and overlap in goal andcontent. Rather, the categories in speech should betaken as broad polar contrasts which exemplify models
of inquiry (Beauchamp & Walters (eds.) 1999: 2).
A basic presumption on the relevance ofdescriptive ethics
In what follows I will reflect on whether and to what
extent one may be justified in believing that descriptive
ethics also plays and should play an important role in
the process of establishing knowledge about what is tobe considered normative in ethics. The theories ofnormative ethics are normally considered to bephilosophically and not empirically acquired knowledge.
It is, therefore, interesting to notice that the last criterion
for a normative ethical theory proposed by the two
philosophers Beauchamp and Childress is that such atheory must “be able to account for the whole range ofmoral experience, including the principles, rules, andjudgments affirmed in common morality” (1989: 15). In
effect, this means that a normative ethical theory whichleads to conclusions which runs clearly counter to themoral experience or intuition of common people should
be considered with certain skepticism. According to thetwo authors, moral theory and moral experience areengaged in a dialectic relationship:
We develop theories to illuminate experience and to
determine what we ought to do, but we also use
experience to test, corroborate, and revise theories. If atheory yields conclusions at odds with our ordinary
judgments – for example, if it allows human subjects to
be used merely as means to the ends of scientificresearch – we have reason to be suspicious of thetheory and to modify it or seek an alternative theory(Beauchamp & Childress 1989: 16).
The basic method suggested here is a dialectic one
in which one oscillates between moral experience – theknowledge of which is available through ordinary life ormore properly through empirical descriptive studies –and normative ethical theories developed through thereasoning of normative moral philosophy. It is a wellknown method described as coherentism. A similar
approach is advocated as method of reflective
equilibrium developed by John Rawls (1971). I find thisto be a very good description of what really happens in
ethical decision making. It also provides a good clue tohow descriptive ethics may be relevant to the normative
enterprise. If common morality should serve as a pointof reference for normative ethics, which indeed most
moral philosophers believe, then a good way to arrange
for this to happen, is by the means of empirical studies.
On the use of empirical knowledge in ethics andbioethics
From what has been written above, it follows that therelevance of descriptive ethics to normative ethics goesbeyond the fact that both are concerned with the moral
institution of life. However, if one turns to the field ofbioethics one finds that is it only recently that the resultsof more systematically elaborated descriptive studies
have been published in bioethical journals. In fact, arecent quantitative analysis of the empirical research
published in nine peer reviewed bioethical journals
during the period from 1990 to 2003, concluded that the
proportion of empirical research in these journals
increased steadily from 5.4% of the total number ofarticles in 1990 to 15.4% in 2003. The authors alsoEubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)
found it likely that the importance of empirical methods
in medical ethics would increase (Borry et al. 2006:
240-45). A recent dissertation on bioethical end-of-life
issues in Japan, points to several such studies, both
qualitative and quantitative, of which most are of anewer date (Hugaas 2006). This material corresponds
well with the findings of the quantitative analysis justmentioned which indeed points out that not only dosuch studies represent a new research trend inbioethics but also that euthanasia and prolongation oflife were the main topic of research in the majority of
the articles surveyed.
In a way, one might say that this new trend comes as
an answer to a long standing call for a more empiricallyoriented type of ethics, initially made by anthropologist
and others several decades ago. Speaking to moral
philosophers, Abraham Edel wrote as follows in the
introduction to a book on the subject of anthropology
and ethics in the early 60s:
You have dealt with morality as an isolated and selfcontained domain, cut off from relations to
psychological and cultural processes. Its vocabulary
has been explored as though the field were separate
and meaningful in total isolation, as though its
processes of justification were utterly unique andunrelated to processes in knowledge generally, and aconceptual chasm has been created between fact andvalue to preserve the distinct character of moral
judgment. And what has resulted is often described bycontemporary philosophers as a deadlock or impasse in
ethical theory (Edel & Edel 2000: vi-vii).
The Edels were concerned about the conceptualchasm which had been created between fact and value,and considered this a major reason why ethics or moral
philosophy had moved into isolation. Three decades
later, the same point was made by another and perhaps
more influential anthropologist, Clifford Geertz:
An approach to a theory of value which looks toward
the behaviour of actual people in actual societies living
in terms of actual cultures for both its stimulus and its
validation will turn us away from abstract and rather
scholastic arguments in which a limited number ofclassical positions are stated again and again with little
that is new to recommend them, to a process of everincreasing insight into both what values are and how
they work. Once this enterprise in the scientific analysis
of values is well launched, the philosophicaldiscussions are likely to take on more point (Geertz
1993: 141).
It is one thing to call for more empirical orientatedstudies in ethics and another to explain exactly how
such material fit in with the normative enterprise of
ethics. Unpleasant as it may be, severe philosophicaland epistemological problems need to be solved in
ethics, but they should not be easily dismissed asirrelevant, even if they are not easily solved. To ignore
the existence of these problems because we are notcapable of solving them is not wise. Eventually they arebound to turn up again, depending on how deep the
ethicists choose to go into the questions of justificationand truth. However, this is not to say that theanthropologists quoted did not have a case when it

23

comes to recognizing the relevance of empirical studies
to ethics and, in our case, bioethics.
thMoral philosophy in most of the 20 century werepredominantly occupied with issues of meta-ethics,
such as the distinction between values and facts andthe so-called natural fallacy, leaving the empiricalapproach to human morality aside for theanthropologists, psychologists and others to deal with.
A problem was, however, that the latter group was notparticularly eager to engage in such studies, partly
because they did not consider the moral institution oflife to be an independent area of life. When someoccasionally did, they also tended to ignore thepractical aim which is so central to ethics in the firstplace (cf. Cook 1999). Hence, descriptive ethics wastreated as if it was without relevance to the normative
enterprise. Only recently have more systematicallyelaborated empirical studies been designed andconducted in order to assist the ethicist in the normative
enterprise, and there still seems to be some confusion
concerning how these studies should be treated and inwhat way they are relevant to normative ethics.
The EMPIRE project – empirical methods inbioethics
In Europe, there was during the years from 2001 until
2003, an EU funded a research project focusing on theuse of empirical methods in bioethics. The so-called
EMPIRE project had as one of its main tasks toinvestigate the ways in which data generated byempirical research can be relevant to bioethical thinking
and regulation of health care and human use of
biotechnology. Results from this project have been
published in the book Engaging the World – the Use of
Empirical Research in Bioethics and the Regulation of
Biotechnology (Holm & Jonas (eds.) 2004). There wasalso issued a final report submitted to the European
4
Commission. The report is more or less identical withthe final chapter of the book.
The book contains independent contributions fromscholars engaged in the project, reflecting a variety ofviews and approaches to the topic in question. The
report on the other hand, is an attempt to present theconclusions and bring together the different insights
reached through this project in a coherent
recommendation. The report harmonizes different
points of view expressed in the book, among whichsome reflect clearly contradicting opinions on therelevance of empirical research to bioethics. In what
follows, I will concentrate on a couple of the
independent contributions in order to illuminate different
principal views on the question in what way empiricalstudies are relevant to bioethics, and thereby also bringan answer to the question concerning the relation
between descriptive and normative ethics.
In particular there are two contributions which standout in this respect, both located in the first section of thebook addressing the question: “What role can empiricalresearch play in bioethics?” The first is an article by the
British philosopher John Harris (2004) with the telling4The
reportisavailable
Internet: www.empire.hum.auc.dk

on

the

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Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

title “Putting Empirical Studies in their Place.” Theauthor categorically rejects that gathering empirical
data should be a task of ethics. The other contribution
on this question is the article “Can There Be Moral
Experts?” by Louise Irving and Nina Hallowell (2004). It
can be read as an answer to Harris advocating the
opposite view. I do believe that both these articles
contain misconceptions of what bioethics should be.
Harris represents a lopsidedness to the philosophicalside, whereas Irving and Hallowell represents a viewwhich reduces the enterprise of bioethics to some of its
tools.
Misconception of bioethics as pure philosophy
Starting with Harris’ article, I first of all like to say that
there are many good considerations in this article
concerning the distinctive character of ethics as aphilosophical enterprise. Harris also agrees that facts
may be essential in ethical decision making, and offersa good account of how this may be so. When this ispointed out, however, I also like to call attention to acouple of points at which I find him to be lessconvincing.
The first has to do with his opinion on what should be
the task of the bioethicists. According to Harris, there isa fallacy in bioethics much more severe than that
discovered by David Hume some hundred years ago,
namely that which Harris calls the empiricalist fallacy or
the belief that one can dispose with oughts altogether
and only focus on the ises in bioethics. This is of course
a misconception of what ethics is about, and Harris iscorrect when he identifies it as a fallacy, even though I
am not sure if it is as widely committed as he assumes.
Harris admits that facts are relevant and even may beessential to ethics, but he still argues that gathering
them should not be the business of ethics, claiming that“gathering facts and deciding what we ought to think
about them are two different sorts of activities” (2004:19).
In my opinion, this is a point where Harris could beless categorical. I believe that the proposed division oflabor is in want of a more nuanced view on the first kindof activity – the gathering of facts. One may agree thatthe actual gathering of data may not be the primary task
for the bioethicist as moral philosopher. But this does
not necessarily mean that the ethicist should not be
engaged in deciding which data may be of relevance or
how these data should be acquired. Surely, it must be
better for the ethicist to have an influence on thepriorities and designs of empirical studies in order to getas relevant data as possible, than to just sit and wait forsuch information eventually to appear by chance.
In order for Harris’ categorical statement on thedivision of labor to be true, one need to apply asomewhatoutdatedview
concerningtheepistemological status of the sciences, which may still
be widely held within certain circles within the sciences
but nevertheless is abandoned by most philosophers ofscience. As Harris is well aware of the appeal to facts
does not have the same splendor of objectivity as it
used to. It is rather uncontroversial to say that it is notaltogether coincidental what the scientists find to be thefacts. We do not merely discover the world as it is,gathering facts as if we were picking berries on afieldtrip. Philosophers like Kuhn (1970) have showedthat the result of scientific enquiries is partly determinedby important choices in advance which influence on theoutcome. Figuratively speaking, the scientists
determines what counts as a berry, what equipment touse, which field to walk in and finally what berries topick. Even the basic facts or so-called “pure facts” innatural science are products of theory, as pointed out
by Popper (1965: 93-95). The theoretical influence on
the gathering of empirical data does also entail that thisenterprise is value laded. This means that explicit
ethical values may determine or influence on thegathering of facts in empirical sciences, and more
implicit values surely do (cf. Strand 2000).
Instead of just sitting put and waiting for relevant
data to float by on a lucky day to make ethicaljudgments on the basis of, bioethicists in particular andethicists in general should rather engage in partnershipwith sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists andnatural scientist in order to be sure that they among
others also conduct studies which are not relevant toethics merely by chance, but rather because they havebeen designed for such a purpose. Such studies may
be occupied with factual question to which the answers
serve as premises in ethical decision making or they
may be concerned with the moral opinion or experienceof groups of people of relevance to ethical questions.
As shall be seen later on such studies may also
concern the actual validity of widely held believes
among ethicist concerning the function of human mindor their theory of human nature which bears on ethicalquestions.
I like to call attention to an example of the first kind,that is, a call for gathering of morally relevant empiricalfacts which is made by a bioethicist in order to solve an
ethical problem. What I have in mind is the call forfurther basic stem cell research in order to decide on
the ethical status of therapeutic stem cell research,made in an article by the Norwegian ethicist Jan Helge
Solbakk. Solbakk (2004) argues that because of thescientific or empirical uncertainty connected with thetherapeutic arguments put forth both pro et contra
human embryonic stem cell research, it is necessary
with a limited amount of destructive basic research on
human embryos in order to be able to evaluate whether
the therapeutic arguments on both sides are valid. This
serves as a good example of how the ethicist may
collaborate with and call on the scientists to assist in
the ethical decision making by providing further factual
premises to the discussion. It also shows how empiricaluncertainty may be an important factor in the ethicalcontroversy (cf. Strand 2000). Another example of suchcooperation between scientists and ethicists has been
initiated by the Centre for The Study of the Sciences
and the Humanities at the University of Bergen incooperation with scientific units at the university on thesubject of nanoethics. This ELSA-project which is called
Interdisciplinary Studies of Ethical and Societal
Implications of Nanotechnology applies a broad scope
methodology in which the ethicists not only are
informed by scientists but also participates in aproactive way in dialogue with the scientist (cf. NSC
2006).
The second point I like to make in connection withHarris’ article is also related to the disagreement
between this and the other article which I will turn to inEubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)a minute. Although Harris has a legitimate concern forthe distinctive character of ethics and bioethics asphilosophical enterprises, he expresses a classic
philosopher’s arrogance when assessing the relevanceof common morality and public opinion to bioethics
echoing the words of my fellow countryman Ibsen’s Dr.
Stockman: “The majority never has right on its side!”
The fact that this arrogance is sprinkled with a sense ofhumor does not remove the impression of a mere
rejection of public opinion as irrelevant to bioethicaldecision making. Such a general rejection of public
opinion falls on its own unreasonableness, especiallysince it seems to presuppose that public opinion isconsidered relevant due to quantity, counter to which
Harris puts the quality of the philosophical mind.
Misconception of bioethics as sociology
I find it difficult not to read the article by Irving andHallowell as a direct critique of Harris at this point. As in
the case with Harris’ article, there are importantconsiderations reflected also in this article, such as theaccusation that bioethics tends to give supremacy tonatural sciences as provider of factual premises, thatbioethics tends to decontextualize ethical issues, andthat it is confined only to a limited number of problems
which reflects a bias to the interests of the Westernworld or rich parts of the world (Irving & Hallowell 2004:
29). However, none of these accusations need end in
the final claim that bioethics should turn into sociology.
It seems like the two authors argue for a change in thebasic philosophy of knowledge (of bioethics) based on
an analysis conducted almost exclusively from theperspective of sociology of knowledge (of bioethics).
Irving and Hallowell end up attacking the player,
leaving the ball. But disappointments about being
excluded from a (dis)course can never be a reason todismiss the opponents’ viewpoints as wrong. Sociologyof knowledge may tell us much about how (bioethical)
knowledge is used or works as means of power, butsuch explanations will never be sufficient to settle
questions about what is the truth or how the truth is tobe disclosed (in bioethics). It is therefore regrettablethat the case for empirical studies in bioethics made by
Irving and Hallowell boils down to complaints about theexclusiveness of bioethics as a discipline where
professional associations “often have high membershipdues and registration fees – some by invitation only –etc.” (2004:34). The call they make for a change inworld view among bioethicists as depicted is misplaced
and misinformed. At the very end of the text, they write
as follows:“We would argue […] that the real value of adopting amore empirical perspective within bioethics lies not in
the adoption of empirical methods per se, but in the
adoption of a different world view. […] Ultimately, we
would argue that it is time for bioethicists to adopt a
more sociological perspective” (Irving & Hallowell 2004:
34-35).
Should bioethicists change worldview and apply thesociological perspective as their main perspective, thenwhat would be left of bioethics as a normative
discipline? Put differently, what would happen to the25practical aim of bioethics as normative ethics if it was
turned into descriptive social science? As pointed out inthe beginning of this article, the practical aim is a sinequa non for bioethics as normative enterprise. Insteadof doing bioethics as a normative enterprise thebioethicist would end up doing what might be called thesociology of knowledge (of bioethics), and that issomething different.
In my opinion, therefore, Irving and Hallowell take it
too far. There must no doubt be a division of labor
between the sciences, on the one hand, and philosophy
and ethics on the other, although not as rigid as
proposed by Harris. Instead of attaching this distinctive
character of bioethics and ethics in general as
philosophical enterprise, with the methodology implied,suggesting that it should turn into sociology,sociologists and other scientists should rather feedbioethics with factual premises and information oncommon morality and public opinion on moral issues.
The bioethicist, on the other hand, ought to be willing to
be informed by such a kind of sociology of morals, andstill take seriously the practical aim of normative ethics.
Empirical studies in bioethics: kinds of relevance
I have discussed how empirical studies may be of
relevance to bioethics in different ways. I will now
summarize the answers suggested during the course of
my critique of different views on the relation between
descriptive and normative bioethics. As I see it,
empirical studies may be of relevance to bioethics in atleast three different ways, regardless what normative
theory one applies. By this I do not wish to question thatwhich may be called the primacy of philosophy ofmorals in bioethics. However, keeping in mind that
there will not be a primacy if philosophy holds the field
all alone, one should not be afraid to allow for otherperspectives to be applied and other questions to be
asked than those belonging to the classical discourse of
moral philosophy. As long as bioethics is not reduced to“empirical bioethics” altogether and misses the practical
aim of normative ethics of sight, I find it unproblematicand even necessary to rely on empirical input inbioethics.
A. The relevance of empirical facts as premises in
ethical arguments. First there are the studies which areoccupied with factual question which may serve as
premises in ethical decision making. This may inprinciple be any kind of empirical study, but it may also
be studies which are design for such a purpose inparticular. As pointed out earlier, the call for further
basic stem cell research serves as an example ofempirical studies of such relevance. The difference inopinions regarding empirical premises gives rise to aneed for further studies within basic stem cell researchin order to assess the validity of therapeutic arguments.
Another example from the EMPIRE-project is the article
by Anne Gammelgaard (2004) which concerns theinformed consent process of a recent Danish
randomized multi-centre trial called DANAMI-2.
B. The relevance of moral opinion and moral
experience. The second type of relevance is the one ofsocial science studies concerned with the moral opinion
or moral experience of groups of people, concerning26

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

particular ethical questions. This is perhaps the mostcommon kind of empirical studies conducted withinbioethics, as pointed out by Harris. If this kind of studies
are conducted merely in order to determine normative
ethics by majority opinion alone, then the ethicist should
be concerned, and listen carefully to the modified
version of the warning from Ibsen’s Dr. Stockman: Themajority does indeed not always have right on theirside. However, if such studies are conducted in order tobring the normative enterprise closer to real life, andtake the moral experience of ordinary people into
consideration in order to find out, for instance, whichaspects of the situation are considered by the public to
be morally relevant or which norms among the lot
people believes should be given primacy, then this is
one way among others, in which bioethics ought to be5
informed by empirical sciences.
C. The relevance of psychological studies of thefunction of human mind. Finally, there are the kind ofstudies which concern the actual validity of widely held
believes among ethicist on the function of human mindor their theory of human nature which bears on ethicalquestions. Such an example has not been provided in
the above standing account. But also an example ofthis is found in the EMPIRE-material, viz. in the article
by Angus Dawson (2004).
Dawson argues that since (a) ‘ought implies can’,and (b) empirical studies reveal that most researchsubjects in studies applying randomized methodology infact can not understand and process properly the
information provided regarding the trials which they areto participate in, regardless how and how muchinformation they get, then (c) one may conclude that thenormative ought involved in the principle of informed
consent must be rejected when it comes to participationin studies with such a methodology: “The conclusion to
be drawn is that if it is indeed impossible to achieve atrue informed consent in relation to randomization thenwe should not be morally required to attempt to do so”(Dawson 2004: 49).
One of the other participators in the EMPIRE-project
claims that “when bioethics is approached descriptively,
the outcomes of the studies are also purely descriptive”(Takala 2004: 71), but the example from Dawsonshows that empirical studies does not only serve as
providers of factual premises in ethical decision making,or concerning public opinion in particular issues ofmoral relevance, they may also tell us somethingimportant and even decisive about the range of
normative principles. In this particular case, that we can
not demand an informed consent in cases where sucha consent is not possible due to barriers in the normal
psychology of man, at least not of we subscribe to theprinciple that ‘ought implies can’.
Conclusions
Recent publications show that the discipline ofbioethics has expanded beyond the domain of purely
philosophical investigations – empirical methods havebeen adopted in the discipline and bioethicists have5

An example of such a study is presented by Levitt et al.
(2004).

engaged themselves in inter-disciplinary projects. The
discussion in this paper shows that descriptive ethics
indeed is relevant to normative ethics, and that thisrelevance stretches beyond the point of a simple
division of labor between ethicists and empiricalscientists. One may therefore conclude that thisdevelopment in bioethics is both acceptable andrecommendable. A challenge is of course to put
empirical studies in their proper place, without throwing
the baby out with the bathwater. In order to meet thischallenge, it is important to recognize that there arelimits to the relevance of empirical studies. There arepossibilities for both use and abuse of empiricalknowledge in bioethics as in any field of ethics.
Successful application of empirical studies depends
among others on what role one assigns to philosophy inthe greater picture. The conclusion to this discussion isthat philosophical reasoning always will be a sine qua
non to normative ethics, and as such it should hold theprimacy also within bioethics.
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Life-Threatening Illness,
Hope, and Spiritual
Meaning-Making: Buddhist
and Christian Perspectives- Neil Pembroke, Ph.D.
The School of History, Philosophy, Religion, andClassics, Forgan Smith Building, The University of
Queensland, St. Lucia. Q4072, Australia
Email: n.pembroke@uq.edu.au
Abstract
The concept of hope as meaning-making is
discussed in the context of a life-threatening illness.
Significant aspects of Buddhist and Christian
approaches to making sense of this traumatic
experience are presented. Particular attention is given
to the roles that compassion and emptiness play in thisprocess. These two teachings are assigned a central
place in both Buddhism and Christianity, but theirfunction in the context of a life-threatening illness isunderstood differently.
Keywords: Life-threatening illness, dying, hope,
meaning, Buddhism, Christianity, healthcare.
The spirituality of living with a life-threatening illness
can, of course, take either a secular or a religious form.
People who do not have a religious commitment may
still value the spiritual dimension of life. In all forms of a
spirituality of living with the threat of dying, the search
for meaning is a vitally important factor. Commonly,

27

there is a strongly felt desire to experience one’s life in
the midst of the illness as full of worth and purpose. In
the drive to wholeness and integration, persons facing
death ask questions such as: Why is there so muchsuffering? And what is this experience telling me about
myself, about the nature of human existence, and about
who God is and where God is in my illness? (Cf. Corr,
1991-1992).
This process of meaning-making is associated withan experience of hope for persons living with a lifethreatening illness. Shafts of light break into thedarkness of an illness experience when one is able to
make some sense of it. The ways in which Buddhists
and Christians make meaning in their suffering aremany. It is necessary in a short essay to be selective.
With this in mind, I have chosen to concentrate on twovery important notions in our nominated religious
traditions—namely, compassion and emptiness. We
shall see, though, that the way in which these concepts
function in Buddhism and in Christianity is quite
different.
It is becoming more widely accepted that effective
healthcare requires a holistic approach. Increasingly,
healthcare providers are coming to accept theimportance of acknowledging and attending to not only
the physical, psychological, and social needs of theirpatients, but also to the important role that the spiritual
dimension plays (Anandarajah & Hight, 2001; Culliford,
2002; Koenig, 2000; Larrimore, Parker, & Crowther,
2002; Lawrence & Smith, 2004; Levin, Chatters, &Taylor, 2005). The beliefs and practices of Buddhism
and Christianity have helped countless people sufferingfrom serious illness to find peace, hope, and meaning.
These religions have been selected for attention here
because of their prominence in the Asian region. My
intention is to make a contribution to the growing bodyof literature that seeks to enhance the understandingthat healthcare providers have of the way religion aids
patients in coping with their suffering.
In order to set the scene for the essay, a brief
discussion on the psychology of hope is required. This
discussion will indicate that some psychologists seemunable to distinguish clearly between hope andoptimism. It is argued, however, that this distinction is
an important one and that, moreover, it centers on
meaning-making. Optimism refers to a conviction thatsomething will turn out well, whereas hope is theconfident feeling that something is meaningful,regardless of how it turns out. This is clearly a crucial
distinction in the context of a life-threatening illness. It isquite unlikely that things will turn out well—if turning out
well means being cured—but it is very possible toexperience the process as deeply meaningful.
Buddhists and Christians, it goes without saying, aredeeply committed to this view.
The Psychology of Hope
Hope, in general terms, is an expectancy of good in
the future (Herth, 1990). Or to be more specific, it is the
expectation that future positive feelings will outweighfuture negative feelings (Staats & Stassen, 1985).
Hope becomes important to us when we findourselves in a difficult and trying situation. It is a very

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Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

uncomfortable place to be; we feel distressed andworried. We feel trapped by our circumstances. When
this is the case, it is easy to fall into apathy and despair.
Hope pushes against the forces dragging us down into
the depths. What sustains us is the knowledge and the
feeling that there is a way out (Cf. Lynch, 1974).
A review of the psychological literature on hopeindicates that there are at least three central elements
in hoping. First, as has already been notes, hope isassociated with an experience of deprivation. When thesituation that we find ourselves in is disagreeable andtrying, we naturally hope for something better in the
future. What is perhaps most painful in such situations
is the deep sense of alienation—an alienation of theself from itself—that is experienced. This loss of theintegrity of one’s selfhood Marcel (1951) vividly
describes as “tearing me out of myself” (p. 31).
The second essential element that is regularly
identified in a psychology of hope is desire (Capps,
1995; Lazarus, 1999; Lynch, 1974; Staats & Stassen,1985). When we feel trapped in an unpleasant anddistressing situation, our yearning is for a more positiveone.
The final aspect of hope that features in the literatureis the involvement of both affect and cognition. The
affective element is usually associated with desire(Lazarus, 1999; Staats & Stassen, 1985). The person
who hopes is gripped by a deep yearning for positive
outcomes in the future. The cognitive dimension isexpressed through an expectation that the current
unsatisfactory situation will be superseded by a moreagreeable one (Staats & Stassen, 1985). One issustained by the belief that the present distress will
eventually pass.
Many psychologists, after reviewing what has beenpresented so far, would be struck by the failure toinclude what they take to be of the very essence ofhope, namely, the pursuit of goals. At the forefront of
the goal-based approach to the psychology of hope wefind C.R. Snyder and his associates (Snyder et al,
1991; Snyder, Cheavans, & Sympson, 1997; Snyder,2000; Snyder, Cheavans & Michael, 2005). In theirearly work, they defined hope as “a cognitive set that isbased on a reciprocally-derived sense of successful
agency (goal-directed determination) and pathways(planning to meet goals)” (Synder et al, 1991, p. 571).
Here the three essential components in the theory—
goals, pathways, and agency—are identified. High hopepersons are those who find pathways around blockages
to their nominated goals, and who have the mental
strength to keep moving along those paths.
One question that immediately presents itself upon
reviewing the Snyder et al approach is whether or not
the experience they describe is really hope. It seems
more like optimism to me (Cf. Hobfoll, Briggs-Phillips, &Stines, 2005). Optimism is usually construed as afeeling or conviction that one will prevail in one’s quest,
despite the obstacles in one’s path. In his survey of thepsychology of optimism, Pearson (2000) has this tosay:“Optimism enters into self-regulation when people ask
themselves about impediments to achieving the goals
they have adopted. In the face of difficulties, do people
nonetheless believe that goals can be achieved? If so,they are optimistic; if not, they are pessimistic” (p. 47).

Given this interpretation of optimism, it is not
surprising that Pearson includes the work of Snyder
and associates in his survey. In reviewing their goalspathways-agency approach, it seems clear that what
they are describing is more an optimistic outlook thanthe experience of hoping. Having said that, it must be
acknowledged that there is a significant area of overlap
between optimism and hope. When we are feelinghopeful, we also notice that our outlook is more
optimistic. It is also true that a sense of hopeaccompanies an optimistic frame of mind. It isnevertheless very important in a discussion on lifethreatening illness to clearly distinguish the two
dynamics. Most people who are facing the possibility ofan imminent death would not immediately think of
optimism as a state of mind to strive for. They morenaturally speak about the hopes that they have
(Bregman & Thiermann, 1995; Buckman, 1990; Harper,1992).
Weingarten (2006) helpfully suggests that optimism
refers to a conviction that something will turn out well,whereas hope is the confident feeling that something ismeaningful, regardless of how it turns out. Persons witha life-threatening illness are not usually brimming withconfidence that things will turn out well for them—especially when the disease has progressed and theprognosis has worsened. It may be that they feel
optimistic about receiving good palliative care, or about
the chances of beating the odds and living longer than
expected, or about the fact that their friends and loved
ones will stand by them and offer them the love andcare that they so desperately need. In this sense, they
may expect that things will turn out well. Alongsidethese positive expectations, sits a strongly felt need tomake meaning out of what is happening. Making senseof the experience leads to a feeling of hopefulness.
Weingarten is particularly sensitive to this in her writingon hope because she is herself suffering from cancer.
In one of her articles, she tells the story of how she
experienced her cancer treatment in a very different
light—in a much more hopeful light—when she decided
to dedicate it to those who are suffering in the world
and to those who commit their lives to helping ease that
suffering. She tells her story this way:
“My work was to lie in the bowels of a hospital getting
zapped by electron particles. However, strapped to thetable, as stripped down as one can get, I still had
something to offer others: those very same particles
that were entering my body and, hopefully, giving me achance for a long and productive life. How different mysituation was from that of the people my South Africancolleagues were helping, who were not being given
state-of-the-art treatment. I saw many connections anda path toward action. After radiation that day, my eighth
session, I sent off e-mails to four of my closest South
African colleagues:“As you know I am undertaking radiation treatment.
While there are discomforts, I am mindful of how
fortunate I am to be able to receive treatment. I am
dedicating my next session to the four of you for all thatyou do for those who suffer with AIDS and for thosefamilies, caretakers and communities that suffer aswell. In deep gratitude for all that you do.”Sending off the e-mail, I felt back in my life for the
first time in months. A few hours later, I devised a plan.

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)
Each day I would dedicate my radiation treatment to aperson or a cause whose work in relation to violence I
wished to honor. I hoped that the knowledge thatsomeone cared enough about the work they were doing
to dedicate their treatment to them would encouragethem in the daily challenges they faced” (Weingarten,
2005, 158-159).
Illness, Hope, and Mean-Making in Buddhism andChristianity
Weingarten’s practice of dedicating her cancer
treatment to those who work with people in deep needhas an affinity with the spiritual guidance given to a
student living with cancer by the Tibetan lama, Thubten
Zopa Rinpoche (Zopa, 1989). The intent in each case isto get outside oneself and the distress one isexperiencing through thinking lovingly of others. Thelama counsels the ill man thus:“With compassion you take all the sufferings fromhuman beings and gods, and also from all beings in thelower realms. Breathing in, take the sufferings throughthe nose like a polluted smoke and this destroys theself-cherishing thought” (Zopa, 1989, p. 1).
In Buddhist thought, self-cherishing is viewed as anarch-enemy. It stems from the illusion that the self is astable, enduring, and independent entity. Those who
are wise, according to the Buddha, know that the self isgroundless or insubstantial. The self, and all otherphenomena, give the appearance of inherent existence,but the truth is that everything that we encounter isultimately empty. According to Abe (1995), emptiness(sunyata) is the Buddhist ultimate. Sunyata is not a“something”; rather, it “completely empties everything,including itself…The pure activity of absolute emptying
is true Sunyata” (Abe, 1995, p. 51). In an oft-quoted
passage from the Heart Sutra we read: “Form is
emptiness, and the very emptiness is form; emptinessdoes not differ from form, form does not differ from
emptiness; whatever is form, that is emptiness,
whatever is emptiness, that is form. The same is true of
feelings, perceptions, impulses, and consciousness” (InConze, 1983, pp. 162-163). In the Buddhist view, allthat exists is simply a combination of constantly
changing and mutually conditioning material and mental
conglomerates called the five aggregates or skandhas:
matter (rupa), sensation (vedana), perception (sanna),
mental formations (sankhara), and consciousness(vinnana).
Not-self is the liberating truth of the Buddha (Cf.
Williams, 2000, p. 57). Attachment to the self and to its
desires ties a person into the cycle of suffering(samsara). “That I experience suffering in cyclic
existence is due to self-cherishing; the root of selfcherishing comes from conceiving that beings andthings inherently exist, whereas they do not” (Dalai
Lama, 2002, p. 109).
According to the Buddhist perspective, we areplagued by the illusion that “I am the body,” and that “I
possess the body.” When we think of the body as ourpossession, we fall into the trap of thinking that we havemore control over it than we actually do. When serious
illness strikes, we are confronted with the painful factthat we actually have quite limited control. Jootla (1993)

29

observes that this perspective leads to dukkha(dissatisfactoriness or suffering): “Sickness demolishes
the illusion that we can make the body feel the way wewant and that disillusionment, rather than the physicalpain itself, causes much of the grief and despair” (p.
206).
Buddhists make a distinction between pain andsuffering (dukkha) (Gordon, Blackhall, Bastis &Thurman, 2002). Physical and mental pain is inevitablein human existence; there is nothing that we can do toescape from it. However, the Buddha teaches thatthrough meditation, moral action, and wisdom it ispossible to transcend suffering. The path advocated by
the Buddha leads to the extinguishing of all craving.
Human craving has three forms. We crave for sense
satisfaction, being, and non-being (Aronson, 2004;
Epstein, 2001; Skorupski, 1999). The notion of desirethat is associated with the five senses is clear enough;the concepts of the desire for being and for non-being
are more difficult to grasp. Craving for being refers towanting more of what we already have. We desire apartner who satisfies our every whim and fancy, anenhancement of our personal status, more money, andmuch more besides. Craving for non-being means, inthe most general terms, a desire for escape from the
problems and pain of life. It indicates a desire fornothingness, a craving for a fall into a peaceful oblivion,
into a state or place far from one’s worries and troubles.
Craving is the seat of the problem. It creates the karmic
formations that fuel the cycle of death and rebirth.
The hope of the Buddhist is that through abandoning
craving—especially the cherishing of self—and theignorance that underpins it, nirvana is attained. Nirvanais the blissful experience of an existence free of craving
and therefore free of dukkha. This teaching is at theforefront as Zopa (1989) offers the counsel ofcompassion to the student suffering with cancer:
When the self-cherishing is destroyed, the real “I,”the independent, unlabelled, existing-from-its-own-side“I,” this “I,” which does not exist in reality is seen to be
empty. The “I” is merely imputed on theaggregates…So, when the self-cherishing thought is
destroyed, the “I” that appears, unlabelled, concrete,
and independent, is also destroyed. This leaves someempty space in the mind that can be filled with true
happiness and can remove all fears and delusions (p.
1).
Compassion for the suffering of others is viewed as a
powerful means of banishing egoism and thereby
keeping one’s own suffering in a proper perspective.
The Dalai Lama tells the story of an experience thatbrought this truth home to him. He was suffering
intense pain as a result of an abdominal infection. On
the trip to the hospital in Bihar State, he observed botha small boy and an old man in great physical distressthat had simply been left to their own devices. He
recalls that
Later, at the hospital, my thoughts kept circling on
what I had seen, reflecting on how sad it was that here I
had people to take care of me but those poor people
had no one. That is where my thoughts went, rather
than to my own suffering. Though sweat was pouring
out of my body, my concern was elsewhere.

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Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)

In this way, though my body underwent a lot of pain(a hole had opened in my intestinal wall) that prevented
sleep, my mind did not suffer any fear or discomfort(Dalai Lama, 2002, p. 54).
Compassion is also, of course, a central Christianvirtue (Nouwen, McNeill & Morrison, 1982; Pembroke,2007). Followers of Christ are exhorted by the writer ofthe Letter to the Colossians to clothe themselves withcompassion and kindness (3:12). Praying for those whoare suffering is an important expression of a loving
concern for one’s neighbor. Nouwen et al (1982),
writing on the spirituality of compassion, view this kindof intercessory prayer as an act of solidarity with thesuffering ones. They indicate that this is so “because
the Spirit who prays in us is the Spirit by whom all
human beings are brought together in unity andcommunity” (p. 108).
It should be noted, though, that Christians do notmake the connection between compassion and thehope of liberation that Buddhists do. For the lattergroup, compassion for all those who suffer aids in thetask of destroying the self-cherishing thought. That is,compassion establishes a person in the liberating truthof no-self. Interestingly, the hope of the Christian is also
founded on emptiness, but it is emptiness of quite adifferent form. It is held that salvation comes throughemptying out the false self in order that one can be
filled with all the fullness of Christ’s grace and mercy(Cf. Meador & Jones, 2000, p. 831; Sheehan, 2000, p.
15). As the Apostle Paul puts it in his letter to theGalatians: “It is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who
lives in me” (2:19).
Thomas Merton avers that the false self needing tobe emptied out is nothing more or nothing less than thesinful drive that afflicts all human persons (Merton,
1949, p. 8). According to Merton, the false self
expresses itself through attachment to things,
experiences, and ideas that promise pleasure andfulfillment but in the end lead only to emptiness andself-alienation. It is this grasping for things that so
damages one’s relationship with Christ. Emptiness, hecontends, is the path to fullness of life:
For I know I will possess all things if I am empty of allthings, and only You can at once empty me of all things
and fill me with Yourself, the Life of all that lives and theBeing in Whom everything exists (Merton, 1995, p. 49).
A life-threatening illness brings this truth into sharp
focus for the Christian (Meadows & Jones, 2000;
Sheehan, 2000). It is often reported that in this situationmaterial objects and personal achievements no longer
seem to carry the importance or have the attraction thatthey once did. These things seem quite empty, devoidof meaning. Meaning is found in embracing Christ as
one’s “superior self” (Merton, 1961, p. 123). Thisrequires emptying the self of its grasping, acquisitive,
proud tendencies in order to become hidden with God
in the grace and mercy of Christ (Meadows & Jones,
2000). In a word, one’s hope in life and in death is
Christ.
Conclusion
Hope is a vitally important need and resource for
persons suffering from a life-threatening illness.
Psychologists and theologians define hope in a numberof different ways. The notion of hope as meaning-making is especially important for those whose lives are
threatened by disease. Buddhism and Christianity havehelped countless people make sense of life at its
extremities. Compassion and emptiness play leadingroles in this task. For the Buddhist, the path to liberationfrom dukkha involves exercising a compassion for all
suffering beings. Such compassion aids in killing off
self-cherishing and associated forms of craving. In
letting go of self one realizes the ultimate truth that all is
emptiness; the tie-rope connecting one to samsara iscut.
Christians express solidarity with those who suffer
through their prayers of intercession. The hope of
personal liberation is not located here, though. It isthrough emptying out the false or sinful self in order tobe filled with the fullness of Christ that Christians hope
to be liberated.
It is commonly reported by people faced with a lifethreatening illness that the central teachings of theirreligion press in on them with a new urgency andrelevance. In endeavoring to find meaning in what ishappening to them, notions such as the ones discussed
above play a vital role.
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Williams, P. (2000). Buddhist Thought. London & New York:
Routledge.
Zopa, T. (1989). Using sickness for the path. Unpublishedrecordedteaching. http://www.fpmt.org/Teachers/Zopa/advice/pdf/Usi
ngSicknessForthePath.pdf. Retrieved Sept. 23, 2008.

31

News in Bioethics & Biotechnology
http://eubios.info/NBB.htm
International Bioethics Education ProjectNews<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Bioethicseducation/>)

UNESCO Asia-Pacific School of Ethics
http://www.unescobkk.org/index.php?id=apse

Conferences
For a list of some ethics meetings in Asia and Pacific:
http://www.unescobkk.org/index.php?id=current_and_future_
eventsAsian Bioethics Association (ABA)<www.eubios.info/ABA.htm>

Send papers to EJAIB Editorial Office
Editorial address:

Prof. Darryl Macer
RUSHSAP, UNESCO Bangkok,
920 Sukhumvit Rd, Prakanong,
Bangkok 10110, THAILAND
Fax: Int+66-2-664-3772
Email: asianbioethics@yahoo.co.nz
d.macer@unescobkk.org
Send papers to the editor in electronic form if
possible. Please use numbered reference style, do not
use automatic footnotes or endnotes. Papers are peer
reviewed.
The journal is independent of UNESCO and thecontents are not endorsed by either Eubios Ethics
Institute or UNESCO, but are published in the spirit ofacademic freedom.
EJAIB Editor: Darryl Macer
Associate Editors
Jayapaul Azariah (All India Bioethics Association, India),
Masahiro Morioka (Osaka Prefectural University, Japan).
Managing Editor: Nobuko Yasuhara Macer
Editorial Board: Akira Akabayashi (Japan), Sahin Aksoy (Turkey),
Angeles Tan Alora (Philippines), Atsushi Asai (Japan), Alireza
Bagheri (Iran), Gerhold Becker (Germany), Hasna Begum(Bangladesh), Minakshi Bhardwaj (UK), Christian Byk (IALES;
France), Ken Daniels (New Zealand), Leonardo de Castro (ThePhilippines), Ole Doering (Germany), Norio Fujiki (MURS Japan),
Tran Han Giang (Vietnam), Thomas Gionis (USA), Dena Hsin
(Taiwan), Rihito Kimura (Japan), Abby Lippman (Canada),
Margaret Lock (Canada), H. Ahmad Ludjito (Indonesia), V.
Manickavel (Nepal), Anwar Nasim (Pakistan), Mary Ann Chen Ng,(Philippines), Jing-Bao Nie (China, New Zealand), Pinit Ratanakul(Thailand), Qiu Ren Zong (China), Hyakudai Sakamoto (Japan),
Sang-yong Song (Korea); Noritoshi Tanida (Japan), A.K. Tharien(India), Yanguang Wang (China), Daniel Wikler (USA), Jeong Ro
Yoon (South Korea).

Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 19 (January 2009)32

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Shaping Genes: Ethics, Law and Science of Using Genetic Technology in Medicine and Agriculture
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Equitable Patent Protection in the Developing World
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Bioethics for the People by the People
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Bioethics in High Schools in Australia, Japan and New Zealand,
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Protection of the Human Genome and Scientific Responsibility (Bilingual)
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Bioethics in India (includes 115 papers from Jan.1997 conference)
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Bioethics is Love of Life: An alternative textbook
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Ethical Challenges as we approach the end of the Human Genome Project
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Bioethics Education in Japanese High Schools (in Japanese only)
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Bioethics and the Impact of Human Genome Research in the 21st Century
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Bioethics in Asia in the 21st Century
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Challenges for Bioethics from Asia
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A Cross Cultural Introduction to Bioethics 2006, 300pp. (A4)
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