Show of Force: The PLA and the
1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis
Andrew Scobell

January 19991

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About the Author
Andrew Scobell is assistant professor of political science at the University of Louisville andresearch associate of the East Asian Studies Center at Indiana University. His work has appeared in a variety of journals, including Armed Forces and Society, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, and Problems of Post-Communism. A visiting scholar at A/PARC fromFebruary to July 1998, he is presently completing a book about China’s use of force.

Acknowledgments
The author gratefully acknowledges comments and insights of Cheng Hsiao-shih, Hsu Szechien, John Lewis, Lin Cheng-yi, Lin Chong-Pin, Ramon Myers, Daniel Okimoto, Michel
Oksenberg, Henry Rowen, Patrick Tyler, Richard Williams, Andrew Yang, Milton Yeh, Yu
Bin, I Yuan, and Karl Eikenberry.

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Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait
Crisis*Andrew Scobell
China conducted a series of military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of the Taiwan
Strait between July 1995 and March 1996. On July 18, 1995, Beijing announced that missile
tests would be conducted targeting an area some 90 miles off the coast of northern Taiwan.
Then, on three consecutive days, July 21, 22, and 23, a total of six DF-15 missiles werelaunched from sites in Fujian province—two per day. The following month, after a five-day
advance warning, PLA naval vessels and aircraft conducted ten days of live-fire tests off thecoast of Fujian. Further military exercises were conducted in mid-November to the south of
the Strait, including joint operations involving air, land, and naval arms of the PLA. On
March 5, 1996, Beijing announced it would soon begin another round of missile tests. This
time they were to be targeted at seas less than fifty miles from Taiwan’s busiest ports. On
March 8, three DF-15 missiles were fired from bases in Fujian. Five days later, another DF-15
missile was launched. Finally, also after advanced warning, live-fire tests and war games wereconducted off the coast of Fujian to the north of the Strait and to the south of the Strait
between March 12 and March 25. The maneuvers included amphibious landing exercises
and aerial bombing. Some forty naval vessels, two hundred and sixty aircraft, and an estimated 150,000 troops participated.
The military exercises of the summer of 1995 were meant to signal China’s displeasure atthe visit of Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui to the United States that June. The maneuvers
and tests of March 1996 were meant to intimidate Taiwan in the lead-up to a presidential
election and to chasten the incumbent, President Lee, who seemed certain to be reelected(which he was). The more general aim of these shows of force was to deter Taiwan frompursuing independence from China. And in both instances, China was also addressing an-* This paper is part of a larger study of China’s use of force since 1949.

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other important audience: the United States. The message for Washington was that Beijing
was deadly serious about Taipei and was prepared to use force if necessary to unite Taiwan
with China, American intervention notwithstanding. This message was intended to deter theUnited States from promoting Taiwan’s independence.

Why the Case Is Worth Studying
This case is worth studying for at least two reasons. First, the crisis was the most recent showof force by China in an ongoing conflict that began in the 1940s—a holdover from the stillunresolved Chinese Civil War. The military exercises marked a serious escalation of tensions
in the Strait that, until mid-1995, had seemed at a fifty-year low. One respected American
scholar asserted that these actions amounted to a “China on the warpath.”1 A prominent
PLA analyst in Hong Kong, in a study issued in mid-1996, concluded that the threat ofmilitary conflict in the Taiwan Strait would remain serious at least until 2001.2 Perhaps moresignificantly, a number of studies by Chinese civilian and military researchers contend that
the Taiwan issue is the one dispute most likely to drag China to the brink of war in theforeseeable future.3 Beijing also views Taiwan as the most important issue in its bilateralrelationship with Washington.4 The issue of Taiwan will not disappear. The island is theultimate prize in Beijing’s quest for political control over Greater China (i.e., China plus
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao). Taiwan is likely to reemerge as a serious issue in 2000
because of two scheduled events: in December 1999 the Portuguese colony of Macao is due
to return to Chinese sovereignty, and this will highlight the topic of unification as China
enters the millennium; and then, early in 2000, Taiwan is to hold its next presidential election. One of the leading contenders for the office is a prominent opposition politician fromthe Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—a party openly committed to Taiwanese independence.
Second, and equally important, the 1995–1996 Strait confrontation is significant because
it was the first crisis of the post–Deng Xiaoping era. While Deng was among the living during
the events described, he was barely alive and hardly kicking. Deng was too sick to play adominant role in the proceedings or, for that matter, to be even moderately involved in thedecision making. His incapacitation and subsequent death in February 1997 marked thepassing of the old guard of Chinese Communist Party leaders. It marked the last gasp of thedual-role elite of the Long March generation and the emergence of a civil–military dichotomy
within China’s leadership. One can now speak of a clear distinction between those individuals who are soldiers and those who are civilians. Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and Li Peng, unlike
Mao or Deng, have no claim to extensive military experience or expertise. This is not to say
Deng became totally irrelevant or that the Long March–era leadership was completely out ofthe picture. Deng’s name was invoked, and his commitment to unification was trumpeted. A
high-level party document circulated in early 1996, prior to the March missile tests, was fullof quotes from Deng on the question of Taiwan. Most of these remarks were clearly quite
dated, but the sternest one appeared to be of more recent vintage: “China is capable ofblockading Taiwan if we consider it as necessary to solve the long-term issues [in order] toserve the national interest.”5 This is tame language for someone like Deng, who was not one
to mince his words when the occasion called for tough talk. Thus it is extremely unlikely
these remarks were made during 1995 or 1996. A handful of Long March–era leaders did

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play a significant role in the crisis—notably military figures. Particularly important were
elderly generals Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen. Both were vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu was concurrently a member of the Chinese Communist
Party’s Politburo Standing Committee. But this appears to have been their last hurrah, asboth Liu and Zhang have now been retired from their posts on the CMC and Liu has been
dropped from the Politburo.

The Key Question
Was China being dangerously bellicose in 1995–1996, and was the PLA leading the charge?
There are a number of different, very straightforward explanations posited regarding thecrisis, articulated in a special section of The China Journal (July 1996), but none of these
seems fully satisfactory. None adequately explains the complex whole. 6 Among the morenuanced and sophisticated analyses of the crisis, there are two dominant interpretations:
1. China’s response reflected a more belligerent, dangerous turn of policy toward Taipei. It
represented a serious escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait and raised the specter of
war—one that could conceivably draw in the United States. This turn of events is either the
result of:a. Pressure by hawkish, hard-line soldiers on moderate, mild-mannered statesmen for a
tougher, more aggressive response to Taiwan, orb. A strong consensus among both civilian and military leaders in the Politburo. One of thebest articulations of this interpretation is by Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang.7
They argue that both points are relevant, i.e., the military became outraged and took the
initiative in pressing for a harsh response, and then a consensus among all top leadersemerged that a tough military response was required.
2. The second interpretation is that the response was an elaborately orchestrated and scripted
Chinese opera—again, the result of a consensus decision by civilian and military leaders. The
entire production was carefully planned, and each move was clearly telegraphed well in advance to the other actors. In the minds of China’s civilian and military leaders, there was little
danger of actual military conflict breaking out. Leaders on both sides of the Strait recognized
this was a major theatrical event, with each person playing a clearly defined role. When theopera was over, matters went back to normal. You Ji, an academic based in Australia, andseveral other perceptive analysts posit such an interpretation.8
What are the main assumptions underlying each interpretation? The first variant of theformer interpretation, that the military was the driving force behind China’s belligerent behavior, feeds into the stereotype of soldier-as-warmonger. The second variant of the firstinterpretation is that the belligerent behavior was the result of civil-military consensus forgedby powerful nationalist appeal of the Taiwan issue. The second interpretation—crisis as opera—is a cultural explanation that fits with the orthodox view of China’s strategic tradition.
The assumption here is that the Chinese cultural preference is to avoid actual combat and touse dramatic theatrical displays to overawe the enemy. Perhaps best typified by the title of a
recent book, Symbolic War,9 this interpretation is consistent with many studies that empha-

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size that Chinese strategy and tactics since ancient times have consisted largely of seeking towin without fighting, of outwitting the opponent by ruse and stratagem—consistent with thethemes of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.
Which interpretation is accurate? Each contains a significant element of truth. The crisis
does reflect a more belligerent approach, but it also represents a considerable amount of
posturing by individual officials and different bureaucratic actors. The missile tests and war
games were undertaken in deadly earnest, but from the beginning the exercises were meant
to be strictly limited to a “show of force” with absolutely no plans to escalate to actual war.
In 1995–1996, China was actually more bellicose toward Taiwan than it had been in the
1980s and early 1990s, but it was no more bellicose than it had been in the 1950s and 1960s.
A major puzzle is how to explain the extreme bellicosity of the PLA in this instance. It
seems inconsistent with the disposition of Chinese military figures in other cases, in whichsoldiers possessed a conservative, pessimistic outlook and exhibited a clear reluctance to use
force.10 Analyses of other Chinese cases suggest that Richard Betts’ findings from U.S. casestudies—that soldiers tend to be no more eager, and often much less eager, than statesmen toresort to military action—hold true for China.11
How accurate are the accounts of bellicose Chinese military figures in the Taiwan crisis?
Some experts, notably Michael Swaine and June Dreyer,12 question the reliability of thesereports, but most scholars find them credible and consistent. And civilian researchers in China
agree that the PLA was more aggressive on Taiwan than were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MFA) and other non-military actors. Significantly, it was military researchers who consistently denied this was the case.13 Of course, the military is not a monolith, with every soldier
holding the same point of view. There seem to be definite differences between branches ofservice, for example. Nevertheless, reports of soldiers expressing bellicose views on Taiwan
are numerous and verifiable.
Why did soldiers act so belligerently? There are three main factors, which will be expanded
upon in the following sections:
1. Coercive diplomacy tends to be problematic for soldiers;
2. Chinese civilian and military leaders had a clear understanding that the military exercises
were strictly limited, and in their minds there was little chance of escalation to actual combat;
and3. The Taiwan issue had a powerful emotional and nationalist influence on soldiers.

Civil–Military Relations and Coercive Diplomacy
Coercive diplomacy is difficult enough for statesmen to practice, even without factoring incivil–military relations. In coercive diplomacy, “force is used in an exemplary, demonstrative
manner, in discrete and controlled increments to induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict.”14 To optimize its chancesof success, coercive diplomacy requires attention to both “carrot” and “stick”: that is, demonstrating a credible threat but at the same time offering some incentive for the other party
to comply. Moreover, great care must be taken to make the signals as clear as possible—toensure that the threat of force is recognized as such and is not taken as preparation for
imminent attack that might escalate to open conflict. But diplomats and soldiers see coercive

8

diplomacy from very different perspectives.15 While both prefer a solution short of war, statesmen favor subtle signals and gradual increases in the pressure applied to an opponent inorder to deter or to compel. Soldiers, in contrast, prefer to send a strong, direct, and unambiguous message—a rapid, massive show of force to bring the opponent swiftly to his senses.
“The strategy of coercive diplomacy,” according to Alexander George, “calls for just enoughforce to demonstrate [one’s resolve] to protect well-defined interests and also to demonstrate
the credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.” He continues:
In contrast to traditional military strategy, coercive strategy focuses on affecting the enemy’s
will rather than upon negating his capabilities. It does not rely on ample or quick use offorce to achieve political objectives. Rather, if threats alone do not suffice and force isactually used, it is employed in a more limited, selective way.16
From the perspective of the PLA, the responses of MFA to Taiwanese actions and to what
was perceived as direct American interference were weak and indecisive. The escalation of
sanctions by the MFA in the summer of 1995 seemed pathetic and ineffective: the cancellation of ministry-level visits between China and the United States, the recall of Beijing’s ambassador from Washington, each got no response. The White House had suddenly reversed
itself in late May 1995 and granted Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui a visa after Secretaryof State Warren Christopher had assured his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, a monthearlier that this would not happen. Lee went to a reunion at his alma mater, Cornell University, and gave an ebullient and bombastic speech trumpeting the virtues of “the Republic ofChina on Taiwan.” In short, his visit was hardly low-key. Along with recent changes by the
Clinton administration easing up on the strict rules governing contact between American
officials and their Taiwanese counterparts, Lee’s visit marked, in Beijing’s view, a significant
change in U.S. policy. And, from Taipei, Lee’s government seemed to launch bolder and moreaggressive diplomatic initiatives aimed at giving Taiwan a higher profile on the global stage(e.g., so-called “vacation diplomacy”: offering a billion-dollar donation to the UN in exchange for a seat). Lee’s speech at Cornell seemed to justify the concern raised by someanalysts in Beijing a year earlier over signs that the Taiwanese leader was moving further andfurther down the road toward independence.17 Within Taiwan, avowed proponents of independence, the DPP in particular, grew more vocal and seemed to garner increased popular
backing.
Furthermore, when viewed by the Chinese military in the light of the events of 1994–1995,
the conciliatory fifteen-year-old policy of “peaceful unification” with Taiwan seemed to be
bringing the prospect of union between the mainland and Taiwan no closer. From the PLA’s
perspective, it was time to show a lot more “stick” and a lot less “carrot.”
In mid-June 1995, after Lee Teng-hui’s triumphal return from the United States, an emergency session of Beijing’s top policy-making body on Taiwan, the Taiwan Affairs Leading
Small Group (TALSG), was called. The two civilian leaders of the TALSG, Chairman Jiang
Zemin and Vice Chair (and Foreign Minister) Qian Qichen, were confronted by three irate
military men insisting it was time for harsher action. Normally the body has only one military representative, Deputy Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai (who sits alongside half adozen civilians, including Jiang, Qian, Wang Daohan [head of Beijing’s quasi-official Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait], and Wang Zhaoguo [director of the CCP
United Front Work Department]). Also present this time were the two most senior figures in
the PLA: generals Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, both vice chairs of the Central MilitaryCommission. Liu at the time was also the only PLA leader on the Standing Committee of the9Politburo. These military men definitely charged the atmosphere and ensured a change ofpolicy.18
The PLA leaders were particularly dissatisfied with the existing criteria for using force
against Taiwan: a formal declaration of independence by Taipei and/or direct support orintervention by an outside power. Senior soldiers were instrumental in adding a third justification for resorting to war: “covert independence,” or “purposeful perpetuation of a state ofdivision” of China, including “deliberate procrastination” by Taipei in talks with Beijing.
According to “an informed source”: “Until the revision of the criteria for using force, thegenerals were frustrated that they could never legitimately start a military action, since neither Lee nor other Taiwan politicians would openly declare independence.” 19 If an actual
military operation were to be launched, the PLA high command would prefer a swift attack
against Taiwan using massive force over a gradual escalation of military pressure. Such an
attack would begin with precision strikes against military targets on Taiwan.20

A Strictly Limited, Carefully Controlled Regional Operation
The military exercises were clearly defined, circumscribed in terms of location, duration, andscope. This was explicitly communicated several days in advance to Taipei and Washington.21 The July 1995 exercises, although carefully planned, were so speedily arranged andimplemented that not much advance notice was given to Taiwan or the United States. By
contrast, preparations for the exercises of March 1996 were undertaken many months inadvance, and advanced notice was given, especially to the United States. Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu was dispatched to Washington in March to make certain that the Clinton
administration was aware that China was only planning military exercises and missiles tests—
not a direct attack on Taiwan. Liu is concurrently director of the State Council’s Office ofForeign Affairs and a key member of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, two extremely influential bodies in Chinese foreign policy making. He is a very senior member of
Beijing’s foreign-policy establishment—the position he occupies has been likened to the postof the U.S. National Security Advisor—and his dispatch to Washington was to ensure that
the Clinton administration could be confident he spoke with an authoritative voice. 22
In order to ensure strong central control, in mid-October 1995 a “Headquarters for Operations Targeting Taiwan” (dui Taiwan junshi zhihui bu) was established in Beijing under
the command of the director of the PLA’s General Staff, Zhang Wannian. Zhang reported
directly to the CMC—indeed, he was a vice chair of that organ. The headquarters was responsible for directing the exercises and coordinating among the PLA services, as well as the
Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions and the East China Sea Fleet—all falling within a
specially designated Nanjing “War Theater” (zhanqu) encompassing the entire Taiwan Strait
area.23 Pains were also taken to ensure no direct contact with the enemy, since actual hostilities were not desired. The live-fire exercises and war games, while held in the vicinity of the
Taiwan Strait, were well-removed from Taiwan itself. And the use of missiles was intended tominimize the risk of a direct confrontation between mainland and Taiwanese military. Of
course, the use of missiles was the most provocative element of the PLA’s saber rattling,
especially those missiles launched in March 1996 at the sea lanes some 30 miles off thenorthern port of Keelung and 47 miles from the busy southern port city of Kaohsiung. And at
least one missile passed over the outskirts of Taipei on its way to the splashdown site. Still,10

from the PLA perspective, the missiles were almost the ideal option, because they were a clear
demonstration that Beijing’s threats were credible—China had the will to use force and thecapability to strike Taiwan—and offered little danger of escalation. Having said this, Chinese
leaders were certainly concerned about the U.S. response; otherwise Vice Foreign Minister
Liu Huaqiu would not have been dispatched to Washington in early March. This move wasunprecedented in the history of the PRC and indicated the high level of importance Beijing
attached to making its intentions on Taiwan clear to Washington. It also reflected a degree of
uncertainty in Beijing over the U.S. reaction to the military exercises. Beijing apparently anticipated that the United States might send one naval battle group to the vicinity of Taiwan,
but seemed surprised when two were dispatched.24 The muted U.S. response to the PLA
exercises and missile tests of the summer of 1995 gave Chinese leaders the impression that if
any reaction was forthcoming from Washington it would be simply token.
Therefore, in the PLA’s view, these actions were not very dangerous. In fact, the aim of theexercise was to avoid actual conflict in the future by deterring Taiwan from pursuing independence. Thus the harsher and more bellicose the PLA acted and talked, the more effective
the exercise would be.25 It is noteworthy that the most virulent and threatening rhetoric frommilitary figures came not in the weeks surrounding the initial missile tests and live-fire exercises in the summer of 1995 but, rather, in the months leading up to the operations in thespring of 1996. Since the actions of July and August 1995 were more hastily staged andscripted—prompted by Lee Teng-hui’s speech at Cornell—when PLA leaders were most furious, one might expect to have heard the most bellicose rhetoric at this time. But the mostvenomous barrage of threats and condemnations came in the lead-up to March 1996, when
Beijing and the PLA had months to prepare for the exercises and to coordinate and carefully
script the blasts of rhetoric. This suggests that the barrage of militant military rhetoric wasless an emotional diatribe expressing gut feelings and more a sequence of deliberate and wellrehearsed sound bites. The message to Taiwan was, “This is what you can expect if you
persist in pursuing the road to independence, so stop before it is too late.”
There are reports that some PLA leaders pressed for exercises and missile tests with nowarnings. This seems rather implausible: Why would the military not want to give advancewarning if the purpose was to intimidate Taiwan? Giving notice of the tests would only serve
to heighten the level of intimidation felt by Taiwan. More credible are the reports that soldiers wanted to fire between two and eighteen more missiles during the March 1996 tests.26
This is plausible because in virtually every regard the military show of force that spring
marked a significant escalation from the previous summer’s actions: number of troops, ships,
planes involved, and the proximity of the missile target zones to Taiwan. The glaring exception was in the number of missiles fired: in March 1996 four DF-15 missiles were fired—two
fewer than the previous July.
The tough talk by military figures was tempered by assurances that they did not want war
with Taiwan. General Zhang Wannian, commander of the operation, insisted during the
March exercises that the PLA strongly desired peaceful unification rather than military conquest.27 PLA leaders didn’t want to fight a war they knew they might not win. Therefore thegenerals did not want to attack Taiwan if it could be avoided. No Chinese leader, civil ormilitary, wanted to see a war with Taiwan. This is underlined by new signs of substantial
flexibility on Taiwan policy in 1998.28
What the exercises of 1995–1996 also reflect, however, is the PLA’s interest in focusing its
new doctrine of “Limited War under High Technology Conditions” on a meaningful, plausible, and tangible scenario. Thus military planners were presented with a golden opportu-

11

nity to test the effectiveness of weaponry and combined-service exercises. The seizure of
Taiwan is now a central scenario for the PLA, one on which military planners can concentrate their energies.29

Taiwan Evokes Intensely Emotional and Nationalistic Feelings among
Soldiers
The fact that national unification is a deeply cherished dream among virtually all Chinese is
widely recognized. Taiwan, of course, is the ultimate prize for Beijing. With the resumptionof sovereignty over Hong Kong a year ago and the scheduled return of Macao in 1999, by thetwenty-first century only Taiwan will remain just beyond Beijing’s reach. In asserting that all
Chinese are strongly nationalistic, what some analysts seem to overlook is that soldiers inany country tend to be extremely patriotic, far more so than civilians. PLA leaders are super
patriots, fiercely supportive of unification and deeply suspicious of meddling by foreign countries in what are regarded as China’s internal affairs. Perceived violations of Chinese territorial integrity and infringements on its sovereignty are viewed with special outrage, and this isparticularly true in the case of Taiwan.
On the subject of territorial disputes, the PLA was very angry at the MFA for downplaying
the most recent squabble over the Diaoyutai or Senkaku islands (claimed by Japan and China).
According to Chinese military researchers, the PLA wanted to send warships to the islands inlate 1996 and early 1997 to protect activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan, but this proposal
was vetoed by the MFA. One retired senior officer expressed a mixture of pride and embarrassment to me that Hong Kong and Taiwanese compatriots displayed far greater patriotic
fervor than their mainland brethren. Beijing was conspicuous by its silence and inaction.
Indeed, some Chinese have criticized their own government for being too cowardly and overly
sensitive to upsetting Japan over the Diaoyutais.30
In order to understand better the aggressive stance of military leaders in the 1995–1996
Taiwan Strait crisis, it is useful to draw a parallel with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In theclassic study of the crisis, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison depicts top American military
figures as exceedingly bellicose, much more so than most of the top civilian officials.31 U.S.
soldiers tend to come off looking like the caricature of the bloodthirsty modern-day warrior
portrayed in some Hollywood movies. Just as one comes away from the Cuban case with adisturbing picture of the Pentagon, so a study of the most recent Taiwan Strait crisis presents
an alarming portrait of the Chinese military high command. However, neither case is particularly representative of the dispositions of senior soldiers. This is because Cuba was a very
special case for U.S. soldiers, much as Taiwan is for Chinese soldiers. Just as Cuba lies rightoff the U.S. mainland in the Caribbean in what has long been considered an American sphereof influence, so Taiwan, located just off the coast of mainland China, has been considered apart of Chinese territory for centuries. In 1962 the Kennedy administration viewed the interference of an outside power in Cuba, specifically the basing of Soviet missiles, as a very
dangerous development—one that posed an unacceptable threat to the United States. In 1995
and 1996 China’s Communist leaders viewed American behavior toward Taiwan as a flagrant interference in China’s internal affairs, one that presented them with a grave strategic
dilemma. Particularly odious in Beijing’s view was the encouragement and support given to
Taipei in its steps down the road to independence. An independent Taiwan backed by the12United States would not only shatter China’s dreams of eventual reunification, but also posea direct security threat to the mainland.
Not only is the PLA’s attitude toward Taiwan colored by intense nationalism, but it is also
affected by the deep-seated belief that the military bears a special responsibility for achieving
unification with Taiwan. In Mao’s time the PLA was on the front line in the Taiwan Strait
with the mission of liberating the last bastion of Chiang Kai-shek. Preparation for an invasion of the island in the early 1950s was sabotaged by U.S. intervention in the Korean War
and the establishment of an American alliance with Taiwan. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s the military kept up a regular barrage of the KMT-held islands of Quemoy andMatsu and grabbed the limelight in the series of crises (1954–1955, 1958, and 1962).
Furthermore, the PLA and its leaders also have been intimately involved in the post-Mao
initiative to achieve a peaceful union between the mainland and Taiwan. The two key events
that signaled this change from emphasizing a military solution to stressing a peaceful one
involved the military. First, it was the PLA that, on January 1, 1979, ceased its shelling of theoffshore islands, marking the end of an era of conflict and confrontation. Second, it was
Marshal Ye Jianying who, in September 1981, fired the first full salvo of the peaceful-unification offensive by making the initial formal appeal to Taiwan—what became know as the“one country, two systems” formula.32
After Lee Teng-hui’s speech at Cornell, PLA figures pressed for a quick and forceful response by Beijing. It seemed to have been the last straw. China had not vehemently protested
when President Bush announced the sale of F-16s to Taiwan in 1992, and China had notstrenuously objected when Lee Teng-hui was given a visa to visit the United States in May
1995. But the generals drew the line at Lee’s inflammatory rhetoric at Cornell.33 In a September 1995 interview with a Hong Kong newspaper, General Liu Huaqing, China’s most seniorsoldier, stated:
In June, Li Denghui [Lee-Teng-hui] went to the United States flaunting his connections
with foreigners, openly forsook national interests, brazenly advocated a split, and resisted reunification. This inevitably has increased tension across the Taiwan Strait.
We resolutely oppose any moves by foreign forces to interfere in China’s internalaffairs and to undermine China’s reunification, and resolutely oppose the conspiracy of
the Taiwan authorities of going against the overall interest of the nation, resisting thegreat cause of peaceful unification of the motherland.
The People’s Liberation Army of China is the powerful defender of state sovereignty
and unity and will never permit any part of the territory of the motherland to be cut
apart. Our army is determined, and has the ability to smash all schemes undermining
the reunification of China and practicing Taiwan independence, and to triumphantly
fulfill the sacred mission of safeguarding the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The irresponsible policy of Li Denghui [Lee Teng-hui] will only bring disaster tothe Taiwan compatriots. If the Taiwan authorities cling obstinately to their course andcontinue to play with fire, they will be acting as if they were lifting rocks only to dropthem on their own feet.34
Moreover, it is the PLA that is most suspicious of the United States. Many soldiers are convinced that the United States is the chief instigator and supporter of the Taiwan independence
movement.35 Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff Xiong Guangkai delivered a veiled threat to
the United States in the course of a heated discussion with former assistant secretary ofdefense Charles Freeman in early January 1996. Freeman said he warned the Chinese offi13

cials that any PLA action against Taiwan would prompt a stern response from the UnitedStates. The Chinese military leaders at the meeting retorted that the United States didn’t“have the will” to put its forces in harm’s way. Xiong reportedly stated, “In the 1950s, you
three times threatened nuclear strikes on China, and you could do that because we couldn’t
hit back. Now we can. So you are not going to threaten us again because, in the end, you carea lot more about Los Angeles than Taipei.”36 President Yang Shangkun, a career soldier,
speaking in October 1991, condemned “foreign forces instigating Taiwan independence”
and threatened that “whoever plays with fire will perish with fire.”37 Similar warnings were
given by top Chinese leaders prior to the PLA’s intervention in Korea in 1950 and before the
PLA attack on India in 1962.38 The depth of the PLA’s suspicion about U.S. motives can begauged from a more recent example. In the aftermath of the surprise detonation by India ofa nuclear device in May 1998, some military researchers in Beijing reached the conclusionthat the United States had detected signs of India’s preparation for nuclear tests but remaineddeliberately silent in order to surprise and scare China. They were highly skeptical of the U.S.
claim that there had been an “intelligence failure.”39
And there were other factors motivating harsh rhetoric from soldiers. Military men wereplaying the role of hawks in part because it was expected of them and in part because it wasmuch to their advantage to do so. The PLA as an institution is eager to put the memory of
Tiananmen firmly behind it, and Taiwan provided a heaven-sent opportunity to show themilitary as the staunch defender of the motherland. The virulent and aggressive public statements by PLA figures are plays to public opinion. The cause of reunification with Taiwan isstrongly supported by ordinary Chinese people, and most would back a military attack on
Taiwan if it were rationalized as preventing Taiwan from separating from China. The massive public support for Beijing’s handling of the crisis is evident from the strong approval
rating the Chinese government got for “ensuring a strong national defense”—a higher approval rating than for any other issue except family-planning implementation. In a poll of
Beijing residents taken in December 1995, in the midst of the strait crisis, 64.3 percent of the
respondents gave the government a “good” or “very good” rating in providing for national
defense. This favorable assessment rose to 95.1 percent when the category of “fair” wasincluded.40 While one must be cautious of generalizing from this Beijing sample, it seems very
likely that a similar approval rating existed in China’s population as a whole.
The crisis also gave the PLA a chance to show that it has a central role to play as the“stick” element in Beijing’s “carrot and stick” approach to Taiwan. By vocally touting theirintense patriotism, soldiers reminded China’s civilian leaders of the PLA’s indispensability inthe serious and ongoing game of coercive diplomacy with Taiwan. This should help the PLA
win a bigger defense budget or at least avoid large spending cuts. It is probably not justcoincidence that the public announcement of the March missile tests was made early on themorning of March 5, 1996, the same day the National People’s Congress opened its new
session.41
Individual interests also motivated bellicose and ultranationalist barrages. The saber rattling provided officers from the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions an opportunity togain the attention of superiors. They hoped that if they demonstrated great enthusiasm andpatriotism this would enhance their chances for a promotion. Moreover, if, by chance, there
was some military conflict and their units saw action, their long-term career prospects would
be enhanced. The shocking words of a two-star PLA general during the crisis, “Women dapo
Taiwan!” (We will crush Taiwan!), vividly recalled by several Taiwanese scholars, should beviewed in this context.42

14

Conclusion
The case of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis stands as a largely successful instance of
coercive diplomacy by Beijing. This conclusion seems justified because China achieved mostof its goals without resorting to actual warfare: getting Taipei and Washington to take China’s
warnings seriously and resulting in a more chastened and less boisterous Taiwanese independence movement. Coercive diplomacy fails when one of two things occurs: (1) war breaks
out, or (2) the opponent fails to modify/change its behavior. In this case war was quite clearly
averted, and Taiwan did moderate its words and deeds. It is admittedly more difficult tomake a definitive assessment on the second point: to establish, in a straightforward fashion,
the precise goals of China’s coercive diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is greater recognition andawareness among Taiwan officials and politicians of the need to avoid antagonizing Beijingwith bravado and public-relations exercises aimed at trying to trump China at every turn on
the world stage.43 Also, now that Beijing has acted belligerently, it feels it can afford to beflexible, allowing for the possibility of some kind of agreement between Taiwan and China.
But the effort cannot be ruled a total success: Only a month after the crisis, in April 1996,
President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto signed a joint declarationcommitting Japan to providing logistical support and assistance to U.S. military forces in
East Asia, including in the Taiwan vicinity (not specifically mentioned by name but clearly
implicit). Drawing Japan more directly into any future Strait tensions is definitely not what
Beijing could view as a success.
Significantly, China’s general success in the 1995–1996 crisis contrasts with a rather dismal record of failure in other cases of coercive diplomacy. The cases of Korea (1950), India(1962), and Vietnam (1979) are some obvious examples of failure because in each instance,
war broke out.44 Prior crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954–1955 and 1958 also count as
failures, not because they resulted in wars but because they were not successful in modifying
Taiwanese or American behavior.45 Perhaps the success in the most recent Taiwan crisis canbe credited to a process of learning by Beijing on how best to manage coercive diplomacy orto the fact that dealing with fellow Chinese minimized the potential for misreading Beijing’s
signals.46 The story with Washington is radically different, as I explain below.
In short, then, PLA figures were not really as hawkish as they tried to appear at the time oras others have made them out to be. Their belligerency is explained partly by soldiers’ response to coercive diplomacy, partly by the military’s eagerness to apply its new doctrine, andpartly by the intense nationalist feelings aroused by Taiwan. But although the 1995–1996
crisis amounted to a “show of force” with no intention by China to initiate actual hostilities
against Taiwan, it nevertheless gives cause for concern for at least four reasons:
1. First of all, the crisis underlines the fact that the PLA is actively preparing to take Taiwan
by military means if need be. This does not mean that an attack is imminent or that China iscapable of launching a successful invasion of Taiwan or even an effective blockade. What it
does mean, however, is that the PLA is likely in time to surmount the challenge of tackling
Taiwan because these scenarios are consistent with current military doctrine—“Limited War
under High Technology Conditions”—and because it is concentrating its efforts in terms offorce structure, training, and weapons-systems development and acquisition. When an organization focuses all its efforts toward achieving one task, it can get very good at it quite
quickly, no matter how challenging. While armies, like all bureaucracies, can, as James Q.
Wilson observes, be highly resistant to change and innovation, once a new strategy has been15

adopted, tactics, organizational formats, and weapons systems can all be tailored remarkably swiftly to fit the required specifications.47
2. Second, the crisis provides a wake-up call that the PLA finds the idea of a preemptive
attack increasingly appealing. Under the new doctrine of limited war, the key battle is thefirst one. Moreover, the principle of active defense (jiji fangyu), which has been at the core ofChinese strategic thinking for decades, does not preclude offense. In fact, if conditions meritit, a preemptive strike may be the optimal form of “active defense.”48
3. Third, the crisis highlights the preferred choice of tactics for a PLA attack on Taiwan:
missiles. Using missiles as its primary weapon against Taiwan plays to China’s strength.49
While on paper China has a vast numerical superiority over Taiwan in terms of manpower,
aircraft, and naval vessels, these statistics are very misleading. It would be extremely difficult
to bring into play the hundreds of thousands of soldiers needed for an invasion, because
China does not have the appropriate ships or landing craft in anywhere near the numbers
required. This raises the spectacle of what has been called, tongue-in-cheek, the “millionman swim.” Moreover, the PLA’s dated air and naval craft are outclassed by Taiwan’s more
modern air wings and fleets. And many of the air and sea craft formally part of the PLA’s
inventory are probably inoperable, while a good portion of those that do function are in poor
condition and likely capable of only limited service. Additionally, when assessing China’s air
capabilities, it is important to note that training for pilots is totally inadequate. 50
Missile technology is one area in which China has clear superiority over Taiwan. The
threat by a senior Chinese general to former assistant secretary of defense Charles Freeman
that China was prepared to launch one missile a day for thirty days at Taiwan should betaken seriously.51 Missiles armed with conventional warheads have the potential to do serious damage to Taiwan’s defense capabilities. They could, for example, destroy the island’s
airports, grounding Taiwan’s air force and thus delivering a devastating blow to the island. If
aimed at civilian targets or at remote, sparsely populated areas, they would terrorize anddemoralize the 21 million inhabitants.52 And, even more alarmingly, there is the possibility of
nuclear escalation.53 While current Chinese nuclear warheads are not of an appropriate size
to fit DF-15 missiles, the warheads and/or missiles could be made compatible.54 If the alleged
statement of an MFA official with responsibility for arms-control issues is true, then China
has not ruled out arming these missiles with nukes. The official reportedly said in August
1996 that China’s “no first use” pledge did “not apply” to Taiwan.55 Certainly Iain Johnston’s
research reveals that Chinese military strategists openly discuss the use of tactical nuclear
weapons.56
4. Fourth, there was a dangerous lack of clear communication between Beijing and Washington during the crisis. The result could have been an undesired escalation to direct military
conflagration between the two nuclear powers. The key issue for the United States was an
uncertainty about just how far China was prepared to go in March 1996. Beijing believed it
had made its intentions crystal clear: The object was to intimidate Taiwan and to warn the
United States not to meddle in Taiwan’s affairs—no actual invasion or attack was planned.
Washington initially seemed asleep at the wheel—ignoring and/or downplaying the crisis andthen scrambling to overcompensate in March 1996. As Warren Christopher later wrote about
the crisis, “The administration was concerned that a simple miscalculation or misstep could[have lead] to unintended war.”57 While Washington–Beijing relations are much better today
in the wake of reciprocal state visits by Jiang to the United States in 1997 and Clinton to16

China in the summer of 1998, the potential for misperception and misunderstanding is still
there.
In sum, this successful case of coercive diplomacy underscores the significance of the civil–
military distinction in post-Deng China, emphasizes that the PLA’s new doctrine of limited
war is now front and center, and reminds one of the potency of nationalist emotions on theissue of Taiwan.

Notes
1

Arthur Waldron, “Deterring China,” Commentary 100, no. 4 (October 1995), p. 21
2
See the summary of the study’s findings cited in Defense News, August 26–September 1,
1996, p. 8.
3
Fan Zhenjiang, “China’s Defense Policy into the Twenty-first Century,” Guofang Daxue
xuebao [National Defense University Journal] no. 1 (March 10, 1997), p. 6. Another militaryresearcher highlights Taiwan as an area of serious conflict potential. See Lt. Gen. Mi Zhenyu,“China’s Strategic Plan of Active Defense,” in Shi Bike, ed., Zhongguo daqushi [Megatrends
China] (Beijing: Hualing Chubanshe, 1996), pp. 58–59. According to an influential civilian
academic, Taiwan is “East Asia’s greatest potential hot spot.” See Zheng Wenmu, “The Main
Points of China’s International Political [situation] in the Twenty-First Century,” in ibid., p.
46. Taiwan is also a central scenario for China’s military forecasters and planners as the next
war. See, for example, Xiao Bing and Qing Bo, Zhongguo jundui neng fou da ying xia yichang zhanzheng [Will China’s Army Win the Next War?] (Chongqing: Xinan Shifan Daxue
Chubanshe, 1993), chap. 3. See also the analysis and excerpts translated in Ross. H. Munro,“Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War—Where It Doesn’t,” Orbis
vol. 38, no. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 355–372.
4
According to one group of military researchers: “After the end of the Cold War Taiwan has
been increasingly used by the United States as an extremely important chess piece to contain
China.” See Zhongmei guanxi de fazhan bianhua ji qi qushi [Changing Developments andTrends in China-U.S. relations] Zhu Chenghu, chief editor (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin
Chubanshe, 1998), p. 194. Taiwan, of course, has always been a central issue in U.S.-China
relations. “The greatest obstacle to the normalization of relations between the two countries
was the Taiwan question.” See Zi Zhongyun, “foreword,” in Mei-Tai guanxi sishi nian,
1949–1989 [Forty years of U.S.-Taiwan relations] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), p. 1.
5“Document Cites Deng Remarks on Taiwan Blockade,” Hong Kong Standard February 13,
1996, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter FBIS)
February 13, 1996, p.11.
6
For a critique of these explanations, see Andrew Scobell, “Taiwan as Macedonia? The Strait
Crisis As a Syndrome,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 21 (1998), pp. 183–184.
7
Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 274–279.
8
You Ji, “Making Sense of War Games in the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Contemporary
China vol. 6 (1997), pp. 287–305; this author’s interviews in Beijing, Shanghai, and Taipei,
May–June 1998.

17

9

Jonathan Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih, Symbolic War, China’s Use of Force, 1840–1980(Taipei: Institute for International Relations, 1993).
10
For the classic articulation of the “military mind,” see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier
and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–military relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press,
1957), chap. 3.
11
Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1991).
12
Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking(Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), pp. 11–14; June Teufel Dreyer, “The Military’s Uncertain
Politics,” Current History vol. 95, no. 602 (September 1996), pp. 258–259.
13Interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, May–June 1998.
14
Alexander George, “The Development of Doctrine and Strategy,” in Alexander George,David K. Hall, and William E.. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, andVietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 18.
15
Thomas A. Fabyanic, “The Grammar and Logic of Conflict: Differing Conceptions of Statesmen and Soldiers,” Air University Review vol. 32, no. 3 (March–April 1981), pp. 23–31.
16
George, “The Development of Doctrine and Strategy,” p. 18.
17See, for example, Li Jiaquan, “Where Are the Chinese People’s Feelings?” Renmin ribao[People’s Daily] June 17, 1994, p. 5. I am grateful to Ramon Myers for bringing this article to
my attention.
18
Ting Chen-wu, “Hawks Dominate China’s Policy Toward Taiwan,” Hsin Pao, March 14,
1996, in FBIS March 21, 1996, pp. 12–13. Also in June Jiang Zemin made a self-criticism ata meeting of the Central Military Commission, taking responsibility for mistakes in Beijing’s
policy toward Taiwan. David Shambaugh, “China’s Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and
the PLA,” in C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu, eds., China’s MilitaryModernization (New York and Washington, D.C.: Kegan Paul International and American
Enterprise Institute Press, 1996), p. 210.
19
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “‘Covert Independence Movement’ Justifies Invasion,” South China
Morning Post, November 28, 1995, in FBIS November 29, 1995, pp. 92–93.
20
John Zeng, “PLA Thinking About an Invasion of Taiwan in the Year 2000,” in Peter Kienhong Yu, ed., The Chinese PLA’s Perception of an Invasion of Taiwan (New York: Contemporary U.S.-Asia Research Institute, 1996), p. 139. This information is based on interviews
Zeng conducted in China in July 1995. See also Zeng Liang-ping, Leap Month of August
1995: T Day—The Warning of War in the Taiwan Strait (Taipei: Business Weekly, 1994).
21
You Ji, “Making Sense of War Games,” p. 301.
22
For an account of Liu’s meetings with U.S. officials in January 1996, see Barton Gellman,“U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows in 1996,” Washington Post June 21, 1998, pp. A1,
A20–A21. On Liu’s power and influence in Beijing’s foreign policy establishment, see Swaine,
The Role of the Military, pp. 25–26.
23
Jen Hui-wen, “CPC Specially Sets Up Headquarters to Plan Military Exercises Targeting
Taiwan,” Hsin Pao December 22, 1995, cited in FBIS January 2, 1996, p. 37; Willy Wo-Lap
Lam, “‘Covert Independence Movement’ Justifies Invasion,” p. 93.

18

24

It is standard procedure for the U.S. Navy to send two battle groups, one to serve as a
backup for the other. Thus, the United States had no “message” for China implicit in thenumber sent. I am indebted to John Lewis for drawing my attention to this point.
25
You Ji, “Making Sense of War Games,” pp. 300–01.
26
Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China’s Missiles over the Taiwan Strait: A Political and Military
Assessment,” in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Ft.
McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), p. 174.
27
Speech to participants in the March 1996 military exercises quoted in Ta Kung Pao March
27, 1996, cited by You Ji, “Making Sense of War Games,” p. 301.
28
Interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, May–June 1998. On the emergence of a more moderate and flexible line on Taiwan, see Bruce Gilley and Julian Baum, “What’s in a Name?: For
China, an offer it thinks Taiwan can’t refuse,” Far Eastern Economic Review May 7, 1998,
pp. 26–27.
29
See, for example, Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics,
1985–1995: A Chinese Perspective,” The China Quarterly no. 146 (June 1996) and sources
cited in footnote 5 of this paper.
30
Interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, May–June 1998.
31
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1971), chap. 6.
32
At that time, of course, Ye was chairman of the National People’s Congress’s Standing
Committee—but chosen because he was a PLA veteran with ties to KMT leaders going backto his days at the Whampoa academy near Canton in the 1920s.
33
Ting, “Hawks Dominate China’s Policy toward Taiwan,” pp. 12–13. See also Willy WoLap Lam, “‘Covert Independence Movement,’” pp. 92–93.
34
Ta Kung Pao September 4, 1995, cited in FBIS September 7, 1995, p. 32.
35
See, for example, John W. Garver, “The PLA As an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign
Policy,” in Lane, Weisenbloom, and Liu, Chinese Military Modernization, pp. 259–272.
36
Gellman, “U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows,” p. A20. While Freeman has refused toreveal his source, the U.S. intelligence community has concluded it was Xiong who made thisincendiary remark. See ibid.
37“Yang Shangkun’s Speech,” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily] October 10, 1991, in FBIS October 15, 1991, p. 33.
38
This point is made by Allen Whiting, “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng,”
The China Quarterly no. 142 (June 1995), p. 303.
39
Interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, May–June 1998.
40
The highest approval rating was for “implementing family planning”: 77.2 percent of the
respondents said the government was doing a “good” or “very good” job of this (this rose to95.5 percent if the category of “fair” was included). In comparison, the percentages of thesample agreeing that the government did a good or very good job of “providing welfare to
the needy” and “maintaining societal order” were 22.8 percent and 21.7 percent, respectively. Yang Zhong, Jie Chen, and John M. Scheb II, “Political Views from Below: A Surveyof Beijing Residents,” PS: Political Science and Politics vol. XXX, no. 3 (September 1997), p.

19

479. There is no way to determine how much the strong approval rating on defense policy
was influenced by Beijing’s handling of the Strait crisis.
41
This point is also made by Richard Fisher. See “China’s Missiles over the Taiwan Strait,” p.
174.
42Interviews in Taipei, May 1998.
43
Interviews in Taipei, May 1998.
44
On Korea, see Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1968); Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The
Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” International Security vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer
1992), pp. 122–154. On India, see Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India
and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975). On Vietnam, see James
Mulvenon, “The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War,”
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies vol XIV, no. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 68–88.
45
Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese and American Confrontations, 1948–1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), chaps. 7 and 8; Thomas J.
Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American
Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), chap. 6.
46
I am grateful to Ramon Myers for suggesting this latter point to me. If this point has
validity—and I believe it does—it raises the question of why earlier instances of coercive
diplomacy by Beijing in the Taiwan Strait were not more successful. Several factors seem
important in explaining the different outcomes of the earlier cases, including the fact that in
the 1950s China’s “ stick” was not big enough and there was no obvious “carrot” for Taiwan. In short, forty years ago Beijing was neither adept at nor capable of practicing the
diplomatic and military dimensions of effective coercive diplomacy.
47
James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It(New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 5–6, 14–18. Wilson’s case in point is the German military and its preparations to attack France at the outset of World War II. I am grateful to Karl
Eikenberry for stressing this important concept and providing the citation.
48
See, for example, Mi Zhenyu, “China’s Strategic Plan for Active Defense,” pp. 53–54. See
also Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine.”
49
Fisher, “China’s Missiles over the Taiwan Strait,” pp. 186–187; Eric McVadon, “PRC
Exercises, Doctrine, and Tactics Toward Taiwan: The Naval Dimension,” in Lilley and Downs,
eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 269–270. See also Bruce Gilley, “Operation Mind Games,”
Far Eastern Economic Review May 28, 1998, pp. 31–32. At least one analyst anticipated thiskind of use of missiles by Beijing. See Chong-Pin Lin, “The Role of the People’s Liberation
Army in the Process of Reunification: Exploring the Possibilities,” in Richard H. Yang, chief
editor, China’s Military: The PLA in 1992/1993 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 170.
50
On these issues, see Harlan W. Jencks, “Wild Speculations on the Military Balance in the
Taiwan Strait,” in Lilley and Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 139–245; Kenneth
W. Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” in ibid., pp. 217–247; McVadon, “PRC
Exercises, Doctrine, and Tactics,” pp. 249–276.
51
Partrick E. Tyler, “As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure the U.S. Listens,” New YorkTimes (national edition) January 24, 1996, p. A3.

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52

I am indebted in Henry Rowen for making this important point about the threat posed byconventional missiles.
53
For some discussion of this possibility, see Jencks, “Wild Speculations,” pp. 151–154.
54
For a fascinating account and analysis of China’s missile program, see John Wilson Lewis,“China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security
vol. 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 4–40. On the DF-15, see pp. 34–26, and Table 1 on p. 11.
55
Fisher, “China’s Missiles over the Taiwan Strait,” p. 167.
56
Alaistair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995–1996), pp. 5–42.
57
Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998),
p. 427. For a particularly good analysis of the U.S. role in the crisis and the implications
thereof, see John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democractization(Seattle: University of Washington, 1997).

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Selected Publications of the Asia/Pacific Research Center
Occasional Papers currently in print may be ordered at $7.50 per copy (including postage and handling) and Working Papers and Discussion Papers at $5.00 per copy through the Asia/Pacific ResearchCenter. For further information, call (650) 723-9741 or fax (650) 723-6530. A complete publications
list and the complete texts of many of the papers are also available on the A/PARC Web site: http://
www.stanford.edu/group/APARC.
Special Reports
Daniel I. Okimoto, Henry S. Rowen, Michel Oksenberg, James H. Raphael, Thomas P. Rohlen, Donald
K. Emmerson, Michael H. Armacost. A United States Policy for the Changing Realities of East Asia:
Toward a New Consensus. 1996. $10.
Occasional Papers
C.H. Kwan. The Yen, the Yuan, and the Asian Currency Crisis: Changing Fortune between Japan and
China. December 1998.
Michel Oksenberg and Elizabeth Economy. China’s Accession to and Implementation of International
Environmental Accords 1978–95. February 1998.
Daniel I. Okimoto. The Japan-America Security Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century.
January 1998.
Michael May. Energy and Security in East Asia. January 1998.
The Walter H. Shorenstein Distinguished Lecture Series: Korea in the 21st Century. Lawrence B. Krause,
Korea’s Economic Role in East Asia; James Lilley, The “Great Game” on the Korean Peninsula; andBruce Cumings, Japanese Colonialism in Korea: A Comparative Perspective. October 1997.
K.C. Fung and Lawrence J. Lau. China’s Foreign Economic Relations. 1997.
Ronald McKinnon, Kenichi Ohno, and Kazuko Shirono. The Syndrome of the Ever-Higher Yen, 1971–
1995: American Mercantile Pressure on Japanese Monetary Policy. 1996.
K. C. Fung and Lawrence J. Lau. The China–United States Bilateral Trade Balance: How Big Is It
Really? 1996.
Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. Managing U.S. Relations with China. 1996.
Working Papers
Sang-Mok Suh. The Korean Economic Crisis: What Can We Learn From It? May 1998.
Jennifer A. Amyx. Sankin Kotai: Institutionalized Trust As the Foundation for Economic Development in the Tokugawa Era. 1997.
Reprints
Lawrence J. Lau. “Gain Without Pain: Why Economic Reform in China Worked.” Reprint from China’s
Political Economy (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. and Singapore UP Pte. Ltd.,
1998). October 1998.
Michel Oksenberg, Pitman B. Potter, and William B. Abnett. “Advancing Intellectual Property Rights:
Information Technologies and the Course of Economic Development in China.” Reprint from NBR
Analysis 7, no. 4 (March 1998).
Michel Oksenberg. “Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong in Sino-American Relations.” Reprint from Living with China: Relations in the Twenty-first Century, ed. Ezra F. Vogel (New York: W.W. Norton,
1997). February 1998.
Michel Oksenberg. “Will China Democratize? Confronting a Classic Dilemma.” Reprint from Journalof Democracy 9, no. 1 (January 1998).
Henry S. Rowen. “The Political and Social Foundations of the Rise of East Asia: An Overview.”
Reprint from Behind East Asian Growth, edited by Henry S. Rowen (London: Routledge, Inc., 1998).
James H. Raphael and Thomas P. Rohlen. “How Many Models of Japanese Growth Do We Want orNeed?” Reprint from Behind East Asian Growth, edited by Henry S. Rowen (London: Routledge,
Inc., 1998).

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Lawrence J. Lau. “The Role of Government in Economic Development: Some Observations from theExperience of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.” Reprint from The Role of Government in East Asian
Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis, edited by Masahiko Aoki, Hyung-Ki
Kim, and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). October 1997.
Henry S. Rowen. “Off-Center on the Middle Kingdom.” Reprint from The National Interest (Summer1997). 1997.
Lawrence J. Lau. “The Sources of Long-Term Economic Growth: Observations from the Experience ofDeveloped and Developing Countries.” Reprint from Ralph Landau, Timothy Taylor, and Gavin Wright,
eds., The Mosaic of Economic Growth (Stanford University Press 1996). 1996.
America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia Project Discussion Papers
Andrew F. Krepinevich. Future Prospects for the U.S. Defense Budget and Their Implications for Our
Asian Alliance Commitments. 1997.
Ralph Cossa. Korea: The Achilles’ Heel of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. 1997.
Yu Bin. East Asia: Geopolitique into the Twenty-first Century—A Chinese View. 1997.
Paul Giarra. U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines: Toward a New Accommodation of Mutual Responsibility. 1997
Bates Gill. Proliferation and the U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia. 1997.
Bonnie Glaser and Banning Garrett. China and the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a Time of Strategic Change
and Shifts in the Balance of Power. October 1997.
Richard Danzig. Asian Futures, Naval Futures: How Do They Intersect? William J. Perry. AsianPacific Security Issues in the Post-Deng Era. November 1997.
Wu Xinbo. Integration on the Basis of Strength: China’s Impact on East Asian Security. February
1998.
Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li-gang Liu. The Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification.
March 1998.
Charles Wolf, Jr., and Michele Zanini. Benefits and Burdens: The Politically Dominated Economics of
U.S. Alliances with Japan and Korea. April 1998.
Jorn Dösch. The United States and the New Security Architecture of the Asia Pacific—A European
View. April 1998.
Yoshihide Soeya. Japan’s Dual Identity and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. May 1998.
Mike M. Mochizuki. Security and Economic Interdependence in Northeast Asia. May 1998.
Jianwei Wang and Xinbo Wu. Against Us or with Us? The Chinese Perspective of America’s Allianceswith Japan and Korea. May 1998.
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker. The Origins and Evolution of the Korean American Alliance: An American
Perspective. June 1998.
Byung-joon Ahn. The Origins and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance: A Korean Perspective.
July 1998.
Koji Murata. The Origins and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance: A Japanese Perspective.
August 1998.
Michael Swaine. Chinese Military Modernization and Asian Security. August 1998.
Hideo Sato. Japan’s China Perceptions and Its Policies in the Alliance with the United States. September 1998.
Oknim Chung. The Origins and Evolution of the Japanese-American Alliance: A Korean
Perspective.September 1998.
Andrew Scobell. Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. January 1999.
Urban Dynamics of East Asia Project Discussion Papers
Mike Douglass. East Asian Urbanization: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects. July 1998.

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