PAJ OIL SPILL SYMPOSIUM 2006
The role of the IMO in developing national and regional systems
for preparation and response
byJean-Claude Sainlos
Director, Marine Environment DivisionInternational Maritime Organization

Mr. Kazuo Suzuki, Chairman of the Transportation Committee of PAJ;
Mr. Keichi Hakozaki, Director, Petroleum Refining and Reserve Division
Ladies and gentlemen,
Good morning!
Let me begin by thanking the Petroleum Association of Japan, the Organizer of the 2006
Oil Spill Symposium, for its kind hospitality and for inviting me here to speak about the work ofthe International Maritime Organization regarding the protection of the marine environment fromshipping activities.

I would also like to convey to you the best wishes of Mr. Efthimios

Mitropoulos, Secretary-General of IMO.

The theme of the Symposium is “changing strategies in regional oil spill responses”.

The International Maritime Organization is the UN system’s regulatory agency for themaritime sector and its global mandate is to promote safer shipping and cleaner oceans. It
follows that mandate by adopting international conventions and regulations, which are thenimplemented and enforced by governments in the exercise of flag, port and coastal Statejurisdiction.

Shipping is the most efficient and economical mode of transport, especially for bulk cargo,
and it moves over 90% of international trade. Over the next 20 years, shipping is expected totriple. Shipping, therefore, is an important and inseparable component in the pursuit of economicdevelopment.

Alongside the growth of shipping, marine pollution from ships is also a growing concern.
Most of the pollution of the world’s oceans comes from land-based sources and tanker accidents
contribute a comparatively small percentage of the total amount of oil entering the sea in a year,
but the consequences of a major accident can be disastrous to the immediate area. An accident\\Ae-server\ 油 濁 対 策 部 \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム
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-2-involving an oil tanker in narrow and confined channels could affect the marine an coastal
ecosystem and also interrupt the flow of trade, thereby having a devastating impact on theeconomy of the area, especially in the case of a small island developing State.

The accidents

involving the Torrey Canyon (1969), the Amoco Cadiz (1978), the Exxon Valdez (1989), theErika (1999) and, more recently, the Prestige (2002) are prime examples. Constant efforts are
therefore needed to prevent such pollution and to prepare to respond to it should it occur.

According to Lloyd’s Register World Casualty Statistics, the loss of ships continues todecline and major studies on oil spills from ships show a similar decline. IMO’s contributions tothese obvious improvements has been central to our efforts in promoting safe shipping and theprotection of the marine environment. It is through vigorous promotional activities, including
technical co-operation projects, that most of the 40 international conventions and protocols
adopted by IMO are in force. The most important ones have more than 120 States Parties,
representing over 93% of the total tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet. In addition, more than800 codes, guidelines and recommendations have been produced through IMO.

IMO, in particular through its Marine Environment Protection Committee, is engaged in aconstant effort to establish and refine the international regulatory regime that is designed toprevent maritime casualties from happening in the first place, and to mitigate the negative effectsof those that do occur. There is no doubt that Erika and Prestige placed certain aspects of that
regime under an intense spotlight and, as a result, IMO had to act swiftly and decisively to makethe adjustments that its members felt were necessary.

But it is important to recognise also that the comprehensive array of existing and planned
IMO measures which have been adopted by IMO over the years, including amendments
formulated in direct response to these two incidents, has nevertheless created a climate in which
the overall incidence of shipping casualties, of lives lost at sea and of maritime pollution fromships, continues to fall.

Those IMO measures and responses in which the influence of the major accidents can bemost clearly seen fall broadly into four categories. First, there are those preventive measures
which relate directly to the design, construction, equipment and operation of the ships themselves.
Then there are those that address the need to protect specific sensitive sea areas. A third group\\Ae-server\ 油 濁 対 策 部 \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム
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-3-deals with matters of response and compensation and a fourth with the implementation of theseand indeed all IMO measures.

Prevention of pollution from ships
Those which have attracted most attention are the first group, and in particular the moves
to accelerate the timetable for the phasing out of single-hull tankers like Erika and Prestige.
The concept of a phase-out for single-hull tankers was already long established. In 1992,
MARPOL was amended to make it mandatory for tankers of 5,000 dwt and more delivered on orafter 6 July 1993 to be fitted with double hulls, or an alternative design approved by IMO.

The requirement for new tankers to have double hulls was then extended to existing ships
under a programme that began in 1995. A regulation in MARPOL required all tankers to beconverted or taken out of service when they reached a certain age. This measure was being
phased in over a number of years because of shipyard capacity and to limit disruption to world
trade and industry.

Following the Erika incident, in December 1999, IMO Member States discussed
proposals for accelerating the phase-out of single-hull tankers. As a result, in April 2001, IMO
adopted a revised phase-out schedule for single-hull tankers, which entered into force on
1 September 2003. The new, revised, MARPOL regulation set out a much stricter timetable forthe phasing-out of single-hull tankers.

Then, in December 2003, following the Prestige incident, MARPOL was once again
revised, accelerating the phase-out schedule still further. These latest amendments will enter intoforce in just a few days time, on 5 April 2005. At the same time, a new regulation on theprevention of oil pollution from oil tankers when carrying heavy grade oil (HGO) bans thecarriage of HGO in single-hull tankers of 5,000 tons dwt and above after 5 April 2005 and insingle-hull oil tankers of 600 tons dwt and above but less than 5,000 tons dwt, not later than theanniversary of their delivery date in 2008.

Under the revised regulation 13G of MARPOL Annex I, the final phasing-out date forCategory 1 tankers (pre-MARPOL tankers) is brought forward to 2005, from 2007. The final\\Ae-server\ 油 濁 対 策 部 \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム
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-4-phasing-out date for category 2 and 3 tankers (MARPOL tankers and smaller tankers) is brought
forward to 2010, from 2015.

Hand-in-hand with the phase-out programme for single-hull tankers has been thedevelopment of a Condition Assessment Scheme (CAS) for oil tankers. This was adopted in2001 following the Erika sinking and, although it does not specify structural standards in excessof the provisions of other IMO Conventions, Codes and Recommendations, its requirements
stipulate more stringent and transparent verification of the reported structural condition of theship and that documentary and survey procedures have been properly carried out and completed.
Compliance with the CAS is assessed during the Enhanced Survey Programme of Inspections,concurrent with intermediate or renewal surveys, and its application has been further extended in
response to the Prestige incident.

Places of refuge, PSSA
Turning to those matters addressing the protection of sensitive sea areas, the issuessurrounding the need for places of refuge for ships in distress was among the items highlighted in
response to the Erika incident. It led to the adoption, in November 2003, of IMO guidelines on
the subject, intended for use when a ship is in need of assistance but the safety of life is not
involved.

An associated Assembly Resolution recommends that all coastal States should

establish a maritime assistance service (MAS) to provide a central point of contact andorganization in such cases.

The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a common framework to assist coastal
States to determine places of refuge for ships in need of assistance so as to respond effectively torequests for such places of refuge, whilst keeping the balance between the prerogative of a shipin need of assistance to seek a place of refuge and the prerogative of a coastal State to protect its
coastline.

The objective of the guidelines on maritime assistance services is to recommend coastal
States to establish such services for the following purposes:\\Ae-server\ 油 濁 対 策 部 \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム
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-5-1

receiving the reports required by the IMO instrument in the event of incidents
involving ships;

2

monitoring the ship’s situation;

3

serving as the point of contact between the master and the coastal State; and4serving as the point of contact between those involved in a marine salvage
operation and the coastal State, if the coastal State decides that it should monitor
all phases of the operation.

With a view to providing enough protection for those sea areas that are particularly
sensitive and which may be affected by shipping activities, IMO has designated eleven
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, or PSSAs including the Western European Waters for which
IMO has endorsed the establishment of a mandatory ship–reporting system as an associatedprotective measure that entered into force on 1 July 2005.

Pollution Preparedness, response and co-operation
With the adoption in 1990 of the OPRC Convention following the grounding of theExxon Valdez, pollution preparedness and response became a regular agenda item for theMarine Environment Protection Committee. The OPRC Convention was adopted in 1990 andcame into force on 13 May 1995. The primary objectives of the Convention are to facilitate
international co-operation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to a major oil
pollution incident and to encourage States to develop and maintain an adequate capacity to deal
with an oil pollution emergency.

In March 2000, a Diplomatic Conference adopted a Protocol to the OPRC Convention.
The OPRC-HNS Protocol follows the principles of the OPRC Convention and established amechanism that will provide a framework for international co-operation in incidents involving
hazardous and noxious substances.

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-6-

Although the OPRC Convention and the OPRC-HNS Protocol could be described as“declaratory” rather than “regulatory”, the Convention and its Protocol do in fact create
obligations on States that become Parties to take specific actions related, in particular, to therequirements for ships, offshore units and sea ports to have pollution emergency plans andreporting procedures.

Parties are requested to establish a national system for responding promptly andeffectively to pollution incidents. Such a system shall have, as a basic minimum, a national
contingency plan, designated national authorities and operational focal points responsible forpollution preparedness and response, reporting and handling requests for assistance.

Each party, within its capabilities either individually or through bilateral or multilateral
co-operation and in co-operation with the shipping industries and industries dealing with oil orHNS, port authorities and other relevant entities shall establish:-a minimum level of pre-positioned spill response equipment-a programme of training and exercises for relevant personnel and organizations-detailed plans and communication capabilities; and-a mechanism or arrangement for co-ordinating response.

Since the adoption of the OPRC Convention, IMO has been providing a forum where
matters pertaining to the implementation of the OPRC and response to spills of oil and hazardousand noxious substances (HNS) are dealt with.

Recently in 2002 the Marine Environment Protection Committee decided to change theOPRC Working Group into a Technical Group, meeting prior to the Committee as a subsidiary
body of the Committee. Over the last 13 years, that Group has developed guidelines, manuals,guidance documents and model courses. All this material is a tremendous help when it comes tobuilding up a national or regional system and training personnel.

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-7-

The Technical Group offers the opportunity for sharing experiences among a network ofpartners – Member States, Regional Agreements and industry (the oil industry, chemical industry
and shipping industry).

It also plays an important role in helping countries, in particulardeveloping countries, in understanding and implementing the OPRC Convention and its Protocol.
Currently the Technical Group, according to an agreed timeframe, is following a workplan for
the early implementation of the OPRC-HNS Protocol.

The OPRC Convention and the OPRC-HNS Protocol encourage the holding of regularinternational symposia and research and development fora.

Although the safety standards of ships continue to improve and accident rates are falling,
accidents such as those involving ships like the Nakhodka in Japan, and the Baltic Carrier inthe Baltic Sea, as well as the Erika and Prestige, confirmed the urgent need for furtherdevelopment and dissemination of techniques to enable coastal States to respond rapidly andeffectively to spills of high density oils. In 2002 IMO organized the 3rd R&D Forum on HighDensity Oil Spill Response in Brest, France. In addition to technological development, theForum also focused on the operational aspects of combating pollution by high-density oil, suchas training and the effective use of equipment.

IMO, using the material developed by the OPRC Working Group and the OPRCOPRC/HNS Technical Group, provides assistance to developing countries through its technicalco-operation programme, and in co-operation with the industry, to develop their national capacity.
The Organization is also very much involved in the development of regional systems.

For many years IMO has actively co-operated with other organizations, particularly withUNEP, in encouraging and assisting in the development of regional arrangements for combating
marine pollution in case of emergency. In several regions the regional arrangement is reinforcedby the adoption of regional and sub-regional contingency plans and by the establishment ofregional centres. In October 2002, IMO jointly with UNEP organized a forum on regionalarrangements for co-operation in combating marine pollution incidents.

Another forum isplanned for May this year.

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-8-Thanks mainly to IMO, an internationally agreed mechanism to provide compensation to
the victims of such accidents is well established – indeed, the recently adopted (in May 2003)
Supplementary Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, which will provide
compensation for each future incident in States Party to the supplementary fund in the order ofapproximately £597 million or in excess of $1.1 billion, will celebrate its first Assembly at theIMO Headquarters next week following its entry into force on the 3rd March of last year. As anaside, I think we can all understand the need felt by those who suffer the effects of pollution - notto mention those who represent them politically - to do all they can to secure propercompensation and to take action against those on the wrong side of the law – but with thiscompensation mechanism in place, as well as safety and pollution prevention measures, there cansurely be no need to criminalize those unfortunate enough to find themselves involved inincidents which they had no intention to cause.

It is, of course, always important to stress that none of these measures can be truly
effective unless they are properly implemented and enforced. In this respect, IMO looks to its
Member governments to carry out those things that they have agreed to in the debating forum ofIMO.

In this context, I should mention in particular the Code for the implementation ofmandatory IMO instruments, as well as the voluntary audit scheme for IMO Member States, bothof which are designed to help the IMO members fulfil their obligations properly. As an aside, it
is also worth mentioning in this context the extensive Port State Control regime, which provides
a “second tier “ of enforcement and which has been actively encouraged and assisted by IMO.

Ladies and gentlemen, one final but all-important point: all of the measures taken by IMO
have been developed in the context of an international approach to standard-setting for shipping,
and this is central to their success. The very specific structure of shipping, in which ships
physically move between countries, between different regions of the world and, therefore,
between different legal regimes, makes internationally agreed and universally applied standards
an absolute pre-requisite. That is why all countries of the world with maritime interests haveconsented to be bound by international conventions on maritime safety and protection of themarine environment which they themselves develop, adopt and ratify.

It was for that very reason that IMO was founded, in order to provide a global forum for
Governments to meet, discuss, exchange views and conclude the adoption of international\\Ae-server\ 油 濁 対 策 部 \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム \ シ ン ポ ジ ウ ム
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-9-technical standards, which, once ratified, they must respect and implement through nationallegislation. The alternative would be a “patchwork” of different standards and regulations indifferent parts of the world, which would clearly be unworkable for an international industry inwhich the principal assets – the ships and their cargoes – must be able to move freely around theworld in pursuit of their legitimate business.

Regrettable though it is, every occasion in which a ship becomes involved in a pollution
incident or a major casualty must be set against the literally millions of trouble-free, clean andeconomically efficient ton-miles that shipping achieves every day, and all the consequent
benefits that accrue from this activity.

This Symposium provides a tremendous opportunity to governments and industry
representatives to exchange views and experiences on current issues and future perspectives.
Partnership among governments, industry and international organizations is essential indeveloping and maintaining effective mechanisms for pollution preparedness and in organizing
international co-operation and mutual assistance. I hope that this Symposium will contribute toensuring that the prevention of and the preparedness to respond to pollution incidents remains ahigh priority for the decision makers in government as well as in the industry and that thenecessary resources are dedicated to this goal.

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