Working paperon strategic risk
reduction
January 2022

The European Leadership Network (ELN) is an independent, non-partisan, panEuropean network of nearly 300 past, present and future European leaders
working to provide practical real-world solutions to political and security
challenges.
Principal investigator: Maximilian Hoell (European Leadership Network)
Contributors: Ahmet Üzümcü (European Leadership Network), Goran Svilanović (EuropeanLeadershipNetwork),

AndreasPersbo(EuropeanLeadershipNetwork),

BenjaminHautecouverture (Fondation pour la recherche stratégique), Emmanuelle Maitre (Fondation
pour la recherche stratégique)
Consultants: Marion Messmer (British American Security Information Council), Sebastian
Brixey-Williams (British American Security Information Counci), Pavel Kanevskiy (LomonosovMoscow State University), Elisabeth Braw (American Enterprise Institute), Tom McKane(European Leadership Network), Hua Han (Peking University), François Heisbourg (Fondation
pour la recherche stratégique), Andrey Baklitskiy (MGIMO University)

Published by the European Leadership Network, January 2022
European Leadership Network (ELN)
8 St James’s Square
London, UK, SW1Y 4JU@theELN
europeanleadershipnetwork.org
Published under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0© The ELN 2021
The opinions articulated in this report represent the views of the author, and do not necessarilyreflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN’s aim
is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address pressing foreign,defence, and security challenges.

Introduction
During the tenth NPT review cycle, many States parties have signalled their renewedinterest in risk reduction.1 In light of deteriorating geopolitical relations among the P5,
the risk of a conventional conflict, which could unintentionally escalate into a nuclear
one, has increased. During France’s tenure as the coordinator of the P5 process in
2020-2021, and possibly 2022, conversations on reducing the risks of involuntary
escalation have taken place.2
While the risk issue must be dealt with as comprehensively as possible, thedeteriorating security environment, fuelled by major power competition, makes asustained risk reduction conversation, especially among the P5, a promising firstmeasure. Such a P5 risk reduction dialogue would help to avert one of the biggest
nuclear risks today; that is, the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation leading toan inadvertent escalation of conflict.
The presidents of the P5 states have all recognised this intensifying geopoliticalcompetition, and the risks that ensue from it, in recent speeches. In February 2020,
French President Macron stated that “A new hierarchy of powers is being outlined,
bringing with it a global uninhibited strategic competition that could generate risks
of incidents and uncontrolled military escalation in the future.”3 In March 2021,
British Prime Minister Johnson warned of “A more competitive world,”4 while the UK’sintegrated review refers to a “deteriorating security environment”5 in the world. In
April 2021, US President Biden stated that “We must prepare together for a long-term
strategic competition.”6 In the same month, Russian president Putin noted that,At the same time, unfortunately, it seems that everyone in the world isalready used to it, accustomed to the practice of politically motivated,
illegal sanctions in the economy, to the crude attempts of some to impose
their will on others by force… We really want to have good relations with allparticipants in international society, including, by the way, with those withwhom our relations have not been developing lately, to put it mildly. We really
don’t want to burn bridges. But if someone perceives our good intentions asindifference or weakness and himself intends to finally burn or even blow up
these bridges, he should know that Russia’s response will be asymmetrical,
swift and harsh.7
In July 2021, Chinese President Xi stated that,
We Chinese are a people who uphold justice and are not intimidated bythreats of force. As a nation, we have a strong sense of pride and confidence.
We have never bullied, oppressed, or subjugated the people of any other1 Working paper on strategic risk reduction

country, and we never will. By the same token, we will never allow any foreign
force to bully, oppress, or subjugate us. Anyone who would attempt to do sowill find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forgedby over 1.4 billion Chinese people. We must carry out a great struggle withmany contemporary features.8
While work has taken place on risk reduction during this review cycle, dealing
with both “nuclear” and “strategic” risks, there is still no common understandingof the concept. Similarly, the “nuclear-strategic” dichotomy has been unhelpful
in cultivating a conversation around devising practical, feasible risk reduction
measures that could be implemented immediately. Instead of focusing on producing
implementable measures, the “nuclear-strategic” dichotomy has emphasised two
opposed approaches to risk reduction. In some regional theatres, the reduction ofconventional escalation risks would make a significant net contribution to nuclear
risk reduction as well, highlighting that it is not always easy to isolate nuclear risks
from other escalation factors.
This working paper calls for a sustained, open-ended and senior dialogue process
among the P5 on strategic risk reduction in the form of a working group. The aimof this dialogue process is not only to arrive at a common P5 understanding of“strategic” risks but also to adopt a programme of work to mitigate those risks
through substantive measures during the eleventh NPT review cycle.
P5 work on risk reduction would build on previous interest in the issue in the NPTcontext, including the 13 steps (agreed at the 2000 NPT review conference) as wellas the 64-point action plan (agreed at the 2010 NPT review conference).9 Amongothers, these steps encompass reducing the operational status of nuclear weaponssystems, increasing transparency of nuclear-weapon states with regard to their
nuclear weapons capabilities, and extending security assurances to more nonnuclear-weapon states.

Reducing strategic risks
President Macron’s 2020 speech, the 2021 UK integrated review, and President Putin’s
2021 State of the Union speech all single out “systemic competition” as the root causeof the deteriorating security environment. This systemic competition could result in
misperceptions about each other’s actions, which in turn could lead to inadvertent
escalation. The P5 should address a number of the following strategic risk areas.
Amid this strategic competition, the nature of confrontation and competition ischanging, resulting in fluid lines between systemic competition and confrontation.

2 Working paper on strategic risk reduction

Grey zones, characterised by asymmetrical actions to increase leverage, provoke a
disturbance or intimidate a stakeholder, ensue.
The application of new technologies - such as artificial intelligence, cyber technology,
or quantum physics - to defence and security scenarios raises new questions. The
lack of a common framework, in particular regarding the interaction between newtechnologies and nuclear command and control systems, contributes to instability.
The P5 should ensure that the application of new technology contributes toimproved strategic stability (for instance, by providing a more complete and accurate
assessment of what is actually happening in a situation).
To reduce the risks from doctrinal and escalatory pathways to nuclear use, statesneed a better understanding of each other’s concerns to ensure that they act in waysthat are predictable to the extent their military doctrine allows and that their behaviour
does not create incentives for nuclear use.
A P5 strategic risk reduction dialogue could help address the underlying concerns.
It could foster a greater understanding of each other’s policies and a common
conception of strategic risk reduction.
A P5 strategic risk reduction working group would:•Help formulate a common understanding of “strategic risks” and measures
to address them. This could help enhance mutual understanding of strategic
concerns and reduce the risk of miscalculation.

•According to President Putin’s 2021 State of the Union speech,•

Precisely as a leader in the creation of new generation combat systems,in the development of modern nuclear forces, Russia once again urges its
partners to discuss issues related to strategic weapons and ensuring globalstability. The subject, the goal of such negotiations may be to create anenvironment of conflict-free coexistence based on a security equation thatwould encompass not only traditional strategic weapons: intercontinental
ballistic missiles, heavy bombers and submarines, but also, I emphasize,
all offensive and defensive systems capable of solving strategic tasks,
regardless of their equipment. The countries of the nuclear five have aspecial responsibility here. I hope that the initiative for a personal meeting of
the heads of state - permanent members of the UN Security Council, which
we put forward last year, will be implemented, and it will take place as soon
as epidemiological conditions permit.10

3 Working paper on strategic risk reduction•

Assess possible risks in connection with policies, doctrines, postures and discusseach other’s strategic logic and the contents of military doctrines. Qualified
ambiguities in nuclear doctrines and the entanglement of nuclear and non-nuclear
command-and-control systems are examples that can induce escalation in suchgrey zone conflicts.

•

Assess the possible escalation risks in grey zone conflicts, whether direct
escalation from grey zone to nuclear conflict or the slow escalation of aconventional conflict to nuclear, to ensure that no incentives are inadvertently
created for the use of nuclear weapons.

•Assess the risks related to existing and new capabilities, with a particularemphasis on emerging technologies. These could include developing a common
vocabulary on emerging technologies, formulating the “rules of the road”, anddiscussing the role of human control in nuclear launch decisions.

•Assess possible risks in connection with global and regional security crises.
Particularly useful in this regard would be to have a South China Sea dialogue andto raise the issue of fear of escalation or brinkmanship along the NATO-Russiaborder.

•Assess differences of opinion about the capabilities and intentions behind missile
defence systems, differences of opinion about the reality of Russian doctrine
regarding the use of nuclear weapons as warfighting weapons, and the scopefor interference with space-based surveillance systems. These issues should be
discussed individually to achieve an honest and frank dialogue on each of them.

Enhancing strategic stability
A P5 dialogue process enhances strategic stability (that is, the absence of incentives
to launch a nuclear strike) by discussing and adopting a programme of work to
mitigate strategic risks through substantive measures during the eleventh NPT
review cycle.11 These measures should address strategic risks as comprehensively
as possible along the doctrinal and escalatory pathways to nuclear use.
To demonstrate the willingness to deal with the risk issue as comprehensively
as possible, the P5 states should commit to carefully considering the plethora ofmeasures set forth by NPT States parties and civil society to enhance strategic
stability. These include:

4 Working paper on strategic risk reduction•Practical measures to reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons bymiscalculation through technical measures to foster confidence and throughtools to increase communication (e.g., hotlines, risk reduction centres) as outlinedby the Stockholm Initiative in working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.9 (paragraph 8,d, ii).12 In a developing crisis, these measures will help avoid misunderstandings
by ensuring transparency over actions.

•A declaratory commitment against nuclear war as a confidence-building measure.
Alternatively, a declaratory commitment to reduce the role and significance ofnuclear weapons (in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies).

•Regular exchanges between the P5 and non-nuclear-weapon states on risk
reduction.

A dialogue process on strategic risk should also address (longer-term) measures
to enhance strategic stability and to relaunch non-proliferation and disarmament
dynamics, including a new arms control framework in Europe following the collapseof the INF Treaty as well as efforts to achieve a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Outcomes if the suggestions in the paper are
adopted:1. If adopted, these recommendations would increase the predictability ofinternational politics and the strengthening of strategic stability;
2. Give more weight to the often advocated step-by-step approach towards nuclear
disarmament as favoured by the P5 and some non-nuclear-weapon states. The
Stockholm Initiative has suggested opportunities for the P5 to make progress inthis direction;13
3. Feed into the narrative of a broader reflection on the future of arms control;
4. Promote a common perspective on strategic risk reduction;
5. Adopt specific deliverables in the next NPT review cycle, and a clear outline ofthis work will continue throughout the next NPT review cycle.

5 Working paper on strategic risk reductionEndnotes
1.

This working paper is the result of the ELN’s and the FRS’s work to support risk reduction in theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The ideas presented herein have been explored withofficials and experts from all P5 states and some non-nuclear-weapon states in consultationsin the period June 2020 to December 2021. In December 2021, the P5 formally announced theinclusion of “strategic risk reduction” into their working group on nuclear doctrines and policies
as “separate but related topics” with the publication of working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.33. We
note with satisfaction that some of the ideas explored in this paper, such as the recommendations
to establish a strategic risk reduction working group and to make a joint declaratory commitmentagainst nuclear war, have been adopted by the P5. We hope that the P5 will explore some of theother recommendations set forth in this working paper to agree on a substantive programme ofwork in the run-up to the postponed 2020 NPT review conference and beyond.

2.

France was due to hand the role of coordinator to the United States at the tenth NPT review
conference in January 2022. At the time of publication, the tenth NPT review conference hadjust been postponed again, from January 2022 to August 2022, due to the ongoing Covid19 pandemic, and there had been no clarification yet on whether France would continue as
coordinator until the review conference convenes or whether the United States would take over ascoordinator from January 2022.

3.

E. Macron (2020) “Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence
Strategy”, Paris, 7 February, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/
speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy.

4.

(2021) “Johnson’s foreign policy review warns of ‘deteriorating security environment”,NewsChain (online), 16 March, https://www.newschainonline.com/news/
johnsons-foreign-policy-review-warns-of-deteriorating-security-environment-127086.

5.

HM Government (2021) “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security,Defence, Development and Security Policy”, London: Cabinet Office, 16 March, https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-securitydefence-development-and-foreign-policy, p. 29.

6.

E. Ashford (2021) “Great-Power Competition is a recipe for disaster”,
Foreign Policy (online), 1 April, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/01/
china-usa-great-power-competition-recipe-for-disaster/.

7.

V. Putin (2021) “State of the nation address”, Moscow, 21 April, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/65418.

8.

J. Xi (2021) “Address on the 100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party”, Beijing, 1 July,
https://qz.com/2028306/xi-jinping-speech-transcript-for-the-ccps-100th-anniversary/.

9.

NPT Review Conference (2000) Final Document: Volume 1, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I andII), New York: United Nations; NPT Review Conference (2010) Final Document: Volume 1, NPT/CONF.2010/50, New York: United Nations.

10. V. Putin (2021) “State of the nation address”, Moscow, 21 April, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/65418.
11. While alternative definitions of strategic stability exist, this more traditional definition remains
useful in this context.

6 Working paper on strategic risk reduction

12. (2021) “A Nuclear Risk Reduction Package”, working paper by the Stockholm Initiative, supported
by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Indonesia,Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic ofKorea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, NPT/CONF.2020/ WP.9, New York: United Nations.
13. (2020) “Stepping Stones for Advancing Nuclear Disarmament”, joint working paper submitted
by Argentina, Canada, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, NPT/CONF.2020/
WP.6, New York: United Nations; (2021) “A Nuclear Risk Reduction Package”, working paper by
the Stockholm Initiative, supported by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia,Finland, Germany, Iceland, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, NPT/CONF.2020/
WP.9, New York: United Nations.

7 Working paper on strategic risk reduction

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