PAJ OIL SPILL SYMPOSIUM '96
INTEGRATED OIL SPILL RESPONSE MEASURES DURING THE SEA PRINCE
INCIDENT, YOSU, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, JULY, 1995
by
J.A. Nichols
Technical Manager
The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited
Introduction
Effective response to a major marine oil spill occasionally calls for specialised
equipment, personnel and expertise that is beyond the capability of the country orcompany concerned. The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness
Response and Co-operation (OPRC Convention) , which entered into force in May, 1995,
provides an international framework for co-operation in combating major oil pollution
incidents by requiring Parties to develop national and regional contingency plans. The
Convention also promotes the idea of collaboration between Parties and the oil andshipping industries in these processes.
In July, 1995, a major pollution incident occurred off the southern coast of the Republicof Korea when the M/T SEA PRINCE, a part-laden VLCC, grounded near Yosu during
a typhoon. In order to respond to the oil spilled from the tanker and the threat of afurther major release, the tanker owner and his P&I insurers mobilised clean-up
resources from Singapore and Japan to supplement local and national resources inSouth Korea.
This paper describes the clean-up measures undertaken in response to this incident,with particular emphasis on the use of the international resources which were
mobilised, and highlights the benefits and some of the practical problems that need to
be overcome when national resources are supplemented with those from abroad.

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Circumstances of the Incident
On 23rd July, 1995, the Cypriot tanker .92A PR.INCE (275,782 DWT), part-laden with
between 80-86,000 tonnes of mixed Arabian crude oils and carrying some 1,400 tonnesof bunker fuel, grounded on the southern tip of Sori do, a small island to the south of
Yosu, Republic of Korea (see Fig 1) , during attempts to avoid damage from Typhoon"Faye". Shortly after the grounding there were a number of explosions in the engine
room and a fire broke out which spread to the accommodation area but did not extend tothe cargo tanks. Although attempts to fight the fire were hampered by dense fog and aheavy swell, it was finally extinguished some 24 hours after the grounding.
A Japanese salvage company was engaged by the tanker owners under Lloyds Open
Form 95, and during the period 6th - 22nd August, the bulk of the oil was transferred toanother tanker via barges, leaving some 630 tonnes onboard. The residual quantity ofcrude and fuel oil was dosed with dispersant to ensure rapid dispersion should the oil belost during subsequent salvage operations or bad weather. A Dutch salvage company
subsequently removed the remaining oil without further spillage prior to refloating thetanker on 26th November, 1995 and towing it out of Korean waters.
It is believed that some 700 tonnes of bunker fuel and an unknown quantity of crude oil
cargo was spilled shortly after the grounding. During the following weeks, whilst themain oil transfer operation was in progress, further quantities of crude and fuel oil
spilled from the half-submerged section of tanker. Most of the oil spread to the shores ofSon do and other nearby islands to the north, but some was carried eastwards bycurrents and eventually affected shorelines along the south and east coasts of the
Korean peninsular. Small quantities also reached the Japanese island of Tsushima andthe vicinity of island of Okinishima.
Characteristics of the Area and Resources Threatened by the Spill
The south coast of Korea is heavily indented with an archipelago of islands, islets androcks. Son do, the island on which the tanker grounded, lies at the southern end of Yosu
Haeman, an extensive inlet between Tolsan do and Yosu pando on the west, and4Namhae do on the east (see Fig 1). There are numerous small islands between Tolsan
do and Son do, many of which are inhabited by small communities which are primarily
engaged in farming and fishing. The islands are generally rocky with steep cliffs but
there are also coves and inlets which serve as natural harbours for fishing boats. The
shorelines are predominantly composed of shingle, pebbles and large boulders, most ofwhich were affected to some degree by the spill.
The shorelines and near-shore waters are fully exploited for a variety of marine
products such as shellfish and algae which inhabit the inter-tidal and sub-tidal zones todepth of about 12 metres. Species found in the sub-littoral zone are usually collected by
women divers. The more sheltered coves and inlets and channels between adjacentislands are used extensively for the artificial cultivation of marine products such asoysters, mussels, clams, abalone and a variety of seaweed. However, the greatest threat
posed by the spilled oil was to floating cages used for rearing a variety of fish such as
halibut, sea bream, sea bass, yellow tail, and rockfish. Some 10,000 individual cages arelocated amongst the island chain between Son do and Tolsan do.
On the east side of Yosu Haeman is Namhae do, one of the largest islands on the south
coast of Korea. The south and west coasts of the island, which were threatened by theoil, are also used extensively for mariculture and there are a number of major fish
hatcheries which, although shore based, use seawater for there activities. There arealso a number of large sandy bays along the south coast which support a major tourist
industry during the months of July and August.
Local and National Response Measures
The lead agency for dealing with spills of oil and hazardous substances affecting
Korean waters is the Korean Maritime Police. It normally confines its own activities tocombating oil on water using dispersants and oil recovery systems, using its own
resources supplemented by equipment and materials provided by a network ofcommercial contractors. However, it is normal practice in Korea for the spiller to takeover responsibility for the management of the response operation under the direction

5and control of the Maritime Police. For shoreline cleaning, reliance is placed on local
labour, usually drawn from the affected communities, with equipment, materials andsupervision being provided by commercial contractors.
In view of the seriousness of the incident and the potential for a major release of oil, aCounter Measures Committee was established to co-ordinate the response. Chaired by
the Director of the Yosu Maritime Police Headquarters, the Committee comprised theGovernor of Yeochon County and senior representatives from the Maritime and Port
Authority, Fishery Department of Jeon la nam-do Province, Yosu Fishery Co-operative
Union and the tanker owner. Following the initial meeting of the Committee on 25th
July, the tanker owner assumed responsibility for the management of the spill,including the funding of the clean-up operations.
Upon notification of the spill from the SEA PRINCE by the vessel's owners, theMaritime Police mobilised oil recovery units from its bases in Yosu, Taean, Mokpo,
Togryong, Pusan and Ulsan. Some 80 fishing boats and other craft were also engaged toapply dispersants and sorbent pads. Defensive booms were deployed at a number oflocations to protect floating fish cages and tourist beaches.
Shoreline impact by oil, although widespread, was mainly light to moderate, withpredominantly small stretches on rocky coasts, sea wall defences and isolated pebble
beaches being affected. Four local clean-up contractors were engaged to provide
equipment and materials to the local communities on the affected islands who
undertook the cleaning of beaches using mainly manual methods. Some 2,000 people
were involved in this work which, with the exception of one or two heavily oiled
shorelines, was completed by the end of August, 1995. A local waste disposal contractor
arranged for the transportation and storage of all wastes generated from the incident toa licensed incineration and landfill facility near Yosu.
International Response Measures
The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd. (ITOPF) was engaged
jointly by the tanker owner's third party insurers and the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund) to give technical advice to those undertaking these
operations and monitor the clean-up operations.

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In view of the potential for a major release of oil, several response options wereconsidered, including the aerial application of dispersant, in-situ burning and offshore
recovery.
Aerial application of dispersant
Since the primary offshore response technique required by law within the Republic ofKorea is the application of dispersant, the tanker owner decided to mobilise a C-130
Hercules aircraft and ADDSPACK dispersant spraying system from East Asia
Response Limited (EARL) in Singapore. EARL is an oil industry-owned stockpile ofequipment which provides a response capability, principally for its members, within the
Asia-Pacific region.
The ADDSPACK comprises a portable tank of 5,500 US gallons (20,818 litres) , sprayarms which are extended during flight via the rear door of the aircraft, and a pump andcontrol package. When flying over oil slicks at a speed of between 150 and 170 mph, thesystem has the potential to treat up to 300 tonnes of oil per dispersant load. The aircraft,
together with a payload of dispersant and a team of eight ground support staff arrived
in Pusan on 26th July. Entry formalities for the aircraft and equipment were verystraightforward, although import duty and value added tax had to be paid on thedispersant. The decision was made to base the aircraft in Pusan, some 150 km east of
the wreck position, since its international airport had better facilities, including aplentiful supply of fuel, and a runway long enough to allow the aircraft to take off witha full payload of dispersant. These advantages outweighed the benefit of using Yosu
airport which was much closer to the spill location.
On 27th July, the aircraft made two spray sorties on offshore slicks of oil to the east ofSon do. A further two sorties were conducted on 29th July in the same general area.
The spraying operations were undertaken under the instructions of the Maritime
Police and were deemed to have been successful by observers onboard Maritime Police
vessels on-site. However, it is very difficult to control aerial spraying operations fromsurface vessels and ideally, the Maritime Police should have used either a fixed-wing
aircraft or helicopter to guide the spraying aircraft on to the heaviest concentrations of
the oil.

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No offshore slicks of sufficient size were observed after the 29th July but the aircraft
remained on stand-by in Pusan until 22nd August, when the bulk of the oil had been
removed from the wreck and there was no further risk of a major spill. All thedispersant which was brought in from Singapore with the EARL aircraft was used up
during the spray runs on the first day and stocks of Korean products were staged at
Pusan airport to support further operations. A total of 176 tonnes of chemical wasavailable, most of which was supplied by the manufacturers in either 16 litre cans or
200 litre drums. The chemical was transferred into 2.0 tank trucks for storage in orderto facilitate the rapid loading and turn around of the aircraft. The amount of chemical
available would have been sufficient to treat about 3,500 tonnes of oil, although it
would have been necessary to undertake a minimum of 6 sorties per day to disperse thisamount of oil before it became too weathered to be amenable to dispersant treatment.

In-situ burning

It was recognised that the large-scale use of dispersants would only be appropriate if amajor slick drifted offshore and away from sensitive resources such as mariculture
facilities. Consideration had therefore to be given to alternative response strategies.
The Federation, in consultation with the tanker owner and its oil pollution insurers,
invited an expert on the in-situ burning of oil to join the Federation's technical staff
on-site to assess the potential for using the technique in the event of a large oil spill.

The expert arrived in Yosu on 27th July and commenced site surveys for the purpose ofidentifying' options for burning. Specifically, he focused on sourcin9 fire-proof boom
and aerial i3nition devices, safety considerations, identifying sea bed resources which
could be at risk from sunken burn residues, and preparing detailed plans for potential
burn sites. Regular meetings were held with the Maritime Police regarding the
progress of the above assessment and although they expressed their approval forstaging the necessary equipment, they could not offer any guarantee that, if thetechnique was assessed to be appropriate, the government would endorse its use.

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The nearest fire-proof boom was located in Shekou, Peoples Republic of China but theowners were unwilling to make it available. The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company in
Alaska agreed to make 800 metres of boom available, the terms of which were that
there would be no charge if the boom was not deployed, but full replacement with newboom would be required if the boom was put into the water, irrespective of whether or
not it was used to contain burning oil. A helicopter-mountable igniter was found to beavailable from a manufacturer in the USA which was offered at the purchase price.

It was agreed that while a significant amount of oil remained onboard the wreck, any
attempt to burn oil on the water would have to take place at a considerable distancefrom the grounding location but soon enough after release to ensure that the oil was not
too weathered and emulsified to prevent ignition. It would also be necessary to isolate
the burning oil from any slicks trailing back to the source to prevent 'flash- back'. The
prevailing heavy swell conditions south of Son do were such that booming operations
were at best only likely to be partially successful. It was also reported that ark shell,
cockle and pen shell farms were located on the sea bed to the south of Son do which
could have been impacted by any burn residues that sunk.

Consideration was also given to burning oil in one or more of the coves and inlets near
the wreck, where it tended to concentrate under the influence of the prevailing winds.
However, in addition to the risk of 'flash-back' to the tanker, most of the identified
coves were close to village communities and farm land under cultivation which could
have been affected by smoke and atmospheric fallout.

In view of the above considerations the Federation decided to recommend not to pursue
the option of burning any further.

Offshore and shoreline clean-up equipment
In view of the fact that dispersant application would not be expected to work in every
situation, it was decided that the local and national mechanical recovery capability
should be supplemented by resources from overseas. The Federation therefore
approached the Petroleum Association of Japan (PAJ) with a view to borrowing some9equipment from one of its stockpiles in Japan. The PAJ was very responsive to therequest and offered to send equipment from their Setouchi Base at the Mizushima
Refinery, Kurashiki City.
The equipment was loaned in accordance with a special agreement drawn up between
the PAJ and signed by the P&I insurer of the SEA PRINCE. Under the terms of theagreement the equipment was loaned free of charge, subject to it being returned after
use in as good a condition as it was when it left the stockpile. The shipowner was
responsible for the costs of transporting the equipment to Yosu and, since the PAJ do
not provide trained operators, reliance had to be placed on local contractors to deploy
the equipment. Unfortunately, none of the Korean clean-up contractors were familiar
with the items of equipment provided from the stockpile. However, EARL in Singapore
maintains the same types of equipment in its stockpile and the Federation therefore
requested EARL to make available some of their team members (who were at the time
based in Pusan to support the ADDSPACK unit) to check the equipment and assist in
training local contractor personnel in its use.
Seven containers of equipment comprising offshore boom, weir skimmers, vacuum
skimmers and portable storage tanks were transported by road from Kurashiki to
Shimonoseki where they were loaded on to a ferry bound for Pusan. On arrival in
Pusan, the containers were taken by road to Yosu, arriving at the port on the morningof 3rd August. Prior to the arrival of the equipment in Yosu, a local contractor was
engaged to provide the necessary logistic support which comprised two flat-top barges
for carrying the equipment, two tugs for barge and boom towing and two coastal
tanker5 to receive any collected oil.
Before the equipment could be taken out of its containers, the customs authorities in
Yosu imposed import duties and value added tax (VAT) on all the items even though
the equipment had been brought in on a temporary basis and was to be returned toJapan at the end of the incident. Furthermore, the authorities indicated that whilst the
VAT would be refundable after the equipment was returned to Japan, the import duty
would not. Despite attempts to persuade a representative of the national governmentthat the equipment constituted international aid and therefore should not attract a levy,
there appeared to be no mechanism in place to facilitate this and the owners of the SEA
PRINCE had no option but to pay the import duty and VAT in full.

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The containers of equipment were finally loaded on to the barges, one of which was
towed to Son do whilst the other remained in Yosu port. Once the training programme
was completed, most of the equipment was returned to its containers, ready for
deployment in the event of a major spill.

Although shoreline impact of oil was mostly light to moderate, one beach on Sari do,
adjacent to the grounding site, was heavily inundated with up to 1,000 tonnes of
emulsified crude and fuel oil. It was therefore decided to deploy the two vacuum
skimmers and eight portable storage tanks from the PAJ stockpile on this beach.
Operators from EARL assisted with the deployment and maintenance of the equipment
which was used to very good effect in removing bulk oil from this shoreline. The oil was
pumped into the portable storage tanks by means of the vacuum units and thentransferred using a screw pump and a floating hose to a barge anchored just off thebeach. Over a three week period some 700 tonnes of bulk oil was removed from thebeach in this way.

The bulk of cargo from the SEA PRINCE was transferred by 22nd August and theunused PAJ equipment was returned to its base in Japan on 13th September. The
remaining equipment was cleaned and returned to Japan in October. Although someminor damage occurred to the containers, all the equipment was returned in goodworking order and no items needed to be replaced.

Conclusions

1. The SEA PRINCE incident was the first in the Republic of Korea in which clean-up
resources tram abroad were used to supplement those available in the country. Despitesome shortcomings in the national spill response arrangements in Korea and the lack ofa fully integrated contingency plan, the additional resources were effectively
incorporated into the overall clean-up operation.

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2. The arrangements which were put in place in support of a large-scale aerial spraying
operation, although not fully put to the test, appeared to address most of the logistic
problems which occur when undertaking such a large-scale response.

3. Had it proved necessary to mount a full-scale dispersant spraying procedure, thearrangements for controlling and monitoring the operation were inadequate and would
probably have resulted in considerable wastage of chemical.
4. Although the decision was made not to recommend in-situ burning of oil, mainly forpractical and safety reasons, had the circumstances of the incident been more suited toburning, there was no guarantee that the authorities would have permitted thetechnique to be used. A policy on in-situ burning, including criteria for its use, shouldbe agreed as part of the national contingency planning process. The availability of fireproof boom and igniters should also be investigated so that arrangements can be put inhand without delay when the technique is deemed appropriate.
5. The PAJ stockpile proved to be a valuable and effective resource in supplementing
the local and national response capability. The equipment was well maintained andeasily transported and the logistic support necessary to utilise the resources was
rapidly identified and mobilised by local contractors in Korea.
6. The lack of skilled operators from the PAJ facility to maintain the equipment on-site
and to train local manpower in its use could prove a disadvantage in future incidents.
Without the assistance of EARL in providing this essential service on this occasion, theequipment could not have been used to its maximum potential and it may not have beenreturned in good working order. Nevertheless, the response highlighted the benefits ofmajor international stockpiles and the advantages to be gained from good co-operation
between the various industry organisations which own and operate them.
7. The intransigence of the Korean authorities in refusing to waive import duty andvalue added tax on the temporary import of the PAJ equipment could serve as adisincentive to tanker owners and insurers to bring in outside resources in the future.
Experience suggests that similar problems would be encountered in other countries.

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8. Article 7 of the OPRC Convention, which came into force in May, 1995, calls uponeach Party to take necessary legal and or administrative measures to facilitate theexpeditious arrival, use and departure of resources required and required for an
incident. Urgent attention needs to be given to ensuring that these issues are
addressed.
J.A. Nichols
ITOPF, 31st January, 1996

Joseph A Nichols
Biographica1 Summary
Joe Nichols is the Technical Manager of the International Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation, based in London. He holds a degree in Chemistry and prior to joining theFederation in 1978 he worked for a UK government research laboratory where he was
responsible for investigating the fate of spills of oil and hazardous substances in themarine environment and developing materials and techniques for combating such spills.
During his time at the Federation he has attended over 70 oil spills world-wide on
behalf of tanker owners and their insurers, providing technical advice on appropriate
response measures and damage assessment.