3

論文

From the Assurance of Fundamental Rights to
the Main Goal behind a Strategy of Good Governance:
the Shift in Meaning of“Human Security”
Anne Gonon
Emmanuel Gonon

Introduction:
While the European Commission did not invent the concept ofapproximation, it did considerably broaden its scope of application. The
concept is generally applied in a legal context and characterises the technicalprocess for harmonising the legal frameworks of third countries (laws, codes,
regulations) in order to facilitate their relations with the countries of theEU. However, in looking at the “philosophy” behind the EU’s relations with
developing countries, one sees that the concept of approximation as a tool forheightened inter-understanding (even if imbalanced) extends beyond the legal
sphere. Indeed, in this case, it is given a different register, more informal,
which has to do with developing the societies of countries which receive EU
assistance through its development aid programmes and projects. One of thethemes on which the approximation initiative appears to be focused is that ofhuman security.
The notion of human security emerged in the post-Cold War period, as
the world was being recomposed under the guardianship of large financialorganisations – major players in the process of economic globalisation. The
term “human security” first appeared in the UN Human Development Report11994 . It emerged as the result of gradual change within the internationalorganisation, which had come to realise that the development policies
implemented thus far had failed, and decided to focus on individuals more
2than States . The notion was debated and redefined to signify:…protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from criticaland pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths
and aspirations. It means creating [political, social, environmental,

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economic, military and cultural] systems that give people the building
blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood (Commission on Human
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Security Report) .
As expressed by Kofi Annan in 2001, “Human security, in its broadest
sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses
human rights, good governance, access to education and health care andensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or
her potential. Every step in this direction is also a steep towards reducing
poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom fromwant, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a
healthy natural environment -- these are the interrelated building blocks of4human -- and therefore national – security” . It is a direction. The Millennium
Development Goals (MDG) are clearly expressed, but a shift in meaning canalready be seen: concern for individuals has been replaced by governance, anotion put forward by the World Bank beginning in the mid-1990s. As statedby the UN, “the MDGs cannot be attained without good governance.”
Development aid, the ineffectiveness of which had been illustrated time
and time again, needed to be reconceptualised. One might say, as expressedby Wethes and Debiel, that “Human Security provides a powerful ‘politicalleitmotif’ for particular states and multilateral actors by fulfilling selectedfunctions in the process of agenda-setting, decision-making and implication.”

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Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, the European Union,seeking to affirm its role as a powerful political entity, also latched onto
the notion. The European Commission went on to develop a security policy
with the drafting of a number of texts containing the term. Henceforth,
the territorial security of Europe would necessarily be linked to the policy
on development aid for neighbouring countries, and the notion of “humansecurity” would make this connection, becoming a “social norm”.
In this essay, we will look at the EU’s ties with the states of West Africa(ECOWAS) in regard to this notion of human security. We will also examine
the standard-setting which occurs in the exchange between an aid donor andan aid recipient, both acting in the name of a shared notion of human security.
The EU and ECOWAS provide an interesting framework for studying themeaning of this notion. They are connected by a very strong aid policy; indeed,
30% of European aid goes to the ECOWAS countries, but above all, ECOWAS,From the Assurance of Fundamental Rights to the Main Goal behind a Strategy of Good Governance: the Shift in Meaning of “Human Security”

5

like the EU, employs the notion of human security as a public policy tool.
We will try to determine whether this notion creates a common framework
between the two political/economic zones and to understand the nature of theensuing ties between them.

1. Human security within the institutionsa) Breakdown of EU institutions
In the process of establishing itself as a supranational entity, the EU, at
the start of the 21st century, implemented a common European Security and
Defence Policy, managed by the European Defence Agency. The policy’s aim
was three-pronged – conflict prevention, crisis resolution and response tofragile situations – and it was set out in a series of long texts organising the6principles of European security policy . With the European Security Strategy,
aimed at creating “a safe Europe in a better world”, the EU’s main goal isto establish the security of its territory. Aside from terrorism, the strategy
lists the main threat factors – the proliferation of arms of mass destruction,
regional conflicts, the decline of the State, and organised crime – and proposes
strategic goals. The EU defines a variety of tools for dealing with thesesituations. Appropriating the notion of human security without actually using
the term itself, it also considers that this security can only be ensured if thecountries with which it has ties are also secure, both territorially speaking andin terms of human development. “It is in the Union’s interest that countries
7

on our borders are well governed.” Thus, in aid strategies, the security ofStates and the security of people are intertwined, and in order to manage
these aspects, highly technical tools will need to be devised – tools whichmeet certain management criteria in terms of effectiveness, consistency andimpact. Indeed, while aid is a priority in today’s world – a globalised world,
destabilised by terrorism – it must also comply with the budget restrictions
imposed by the member countries, and satisfy public opinion as NGO work insevere poverty situations continues to raise the stakes by increasing publicawareness.
The African, Carribean and Pacific Countries (ACP) region holds a key
position in this aid policy, for historical as well as economic reasons; the EU
is seen as a favoured destination for intercontinental migratory movement.

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The Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (EuropAid)
manages aid under the European Development Fund (EDF). More than 30%of the aid goes to the countries of Africa, which, according to the terms of theEuropean Commission Responsible for Development and Humanitarian Aid,
Louis Michel (10th EDF Launch Conference, November 2007), are recognised
as essential partners. The policy is guided by a liberal principle which places
the focus on three main goals: promoting the development of trade with theEU, promoting the country’s internal economic development, and limiting
migration among the workforce.
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed for twenty years in 2000 (andrevised in 2005), defines the framework for how relations between the APC,
on one hand, and the European Community and its member states, on theother, will be conducted at different levels, such as the Council of Ministers,
the Committee of Ambassadors, and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly.
Adopted by the European Council of 14-15 December 2005, the Africa-EU
Strategy was designed to promote interaction between Europe and Africa
at all levels: i.e. with Pan-African institutions such as the African Union(AU), regional organisations such as ECOWAS or SADC (Southern African
Development Community), and national authorities. It is a political platform
which plays a substantial role in the implementation of public development
aid for Africa; indeed, the EU views regional integration as a sustainable
development mechanism which both serves as a proxy to development aid
and uses regional mechanisms to help offset the effects of stability problems
within a country. In concrete terms, it is implemented through thematic EUAfrica partnership agreements and takes the form of annual EU programmes
aimed at helping achieve the MDGs through mainly political means (dialogue,
peacebuilding policy, promoting human rights), but also by calling on the roleof non-state actors, i.e. means which could be classified under the genericterm “governance”. Governance has become a priority in many aid providers’development policies and cooperation programmes, as illustrated in the 2006
European Commission text, “governance in the consensus on development”.
The shift in meaning of “human security” toward governance reflects a new
approach in human development aid, which hinges on the security of States:
this portmanteau has become something of a paradigm in international
political science, signifying “the processes for steering public action”, and inFrom the Assurance of Fundamental Rights to the Main Goal behind a Strategy of Good Governance: the Shift in Meaning of “Human Security”

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more general terms, the mechanisms of “government without government”,
to borrow Rosenau's expression. It is interesting to note how the EU seizedon the term, considering the role of experts (or the scholarly world) in theconstruction of the EU’s institutional policies. It refers to “good governancepractices”, but to critics who consider the term to be “imprecise, of poor
descriptive power and of a true ideology”, Didier Georgakakis insists on thefact that “the use of the term governance is not always related to ideology,
and in its various uses, it refers to practices which are usually far from being
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guided by anything approaching an ‘idea’”.

b) Human security and governance in African institutions: a consistent project
For the EU’s closest African partners, such as ECOWAS, the African
Union, NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), or the NonState Actors, the notion of human security is closely linked to the processof emergence and consolidation of States after decolonisation, in which the9security of the territories was yet to be constructed . Thus, as much thephysical security of people as the security of the States is at the core of the10

notion where the two dimensions were seen as complementary . According
to Thomas Kwasi Tieku, the notion of human security emerged very early
on in Africa, on the initiative of two public figures seeking to establish aneffective Pan-Africa movement with a view to creating the conditions for peace11

in the region . One of these figures was Nelson Mandela, and the other was
Ahmed Salim Ahmed, a Tanzanian diplomat who had already expressed theseideas in the early 1990s during the Kampala Movement. After attempting toincorporate this notion into the aim of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
the supporters of human security scored a success when the OAU became the
AU in 2001. By including the definition of human security in article 4, entitled“Principles” of the Constitutive Act, the African Union (AU) played a key rolein promoting the ideas linked to the notion of human security, and showedthat while its guiding priority was protecting the integrity of the territories

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and maintaining peace, it was also concerned with the rights and well-being
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of individuals . Subsequently, the notion regularly came under attack, andin article 1.f of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact,signed in 2005, human security was redefined as:
The security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic

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needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political,
environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival anddignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for humanrights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual ofopportunities and choices for his/her full development.
Furthermore, eager to control its aid, the AU launched the NEPAD
initiative, which directly included the aims of human security in its
organisation within the five domains: agriculture and food security, climatechange, regional integration and infrastructure, human development andeconomic and corporate governance. Thus, the notion of governance now
included the principle of human security.
As in Europe, it seems that the aim of associating the implementation oftrue governance with the notion of human security was mainly adopted by
the institutions, as a guide for the AU policies, as well as at the regional levelwith ECOWAS, and was mainly known and supported by the elites and NGOs.
However, one cannot make the generalisation that the notion was introduced
into the national legislative instruments, given that certain countries, such as
Libya, Kenya and Sudan, rejected it on the grounds that they saw it as means
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adopted by western countries “to pursue their cultural colonialism project” .
This mistrust raises a valid question: what influence does the Westernworld have over the circulation of ideas such as human security? However,in the view of Thomas Tieku and Deng and Zartman, there are specific
African (indigenous) characteristics in the both the comprehension andimplementation of the notion.
c) The international circulation of the ideas and people promoting the notion
Thomas Tieku laments that the notion of human security is confined tothe elite, political or intellectual spheres. In the case of human security (asfor governance), the fact is that these notions are mainly tools proposed byintellectuals and politicians. The idea’s history is marked by the names ofpublic figures of international renown, such as Nelson Mandela, the Nigerian
Obasanjo, and Kofi Annan, who wanted Africa to take charge of its destiny andreconcile States and individuals. Kofi Annan’s position allowed him to propel
this new concept into the international or regional arenas, but this appears
to have only succeeded in sparking an academic discourse. It is in this sphereFrom the Assurance of Fundamental Rights to the Main Goal behind a Strategy of Good Governance: the Shift in Meaning of “Human Security”

9

that the idea has generated the most initiatives, in terms of both field researchand the creation of NGOs. The most renowned work being done in Europe
in the area of human security is by the team working under Mary Kaldor,
a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance within the
London School of Economics and Political Science. Since the early 2000s, theteam has diligently worked to bring structure to the notion, to conceptualise
it and make it into a true political tool. Reviews, field reports and proposals
submitted to the EC illustrate the lobbying work being done to disseminate
the notion, which has had a hard time gaining ground in Europe, or even in
the United States; efforts are also underway to promote this school of thought
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in Africa .
Some of the team’s African researchers have been involved in the creationof British NGOs such as International Alert, founded in 1987, or the Centre
for Democracy and Development (CDD), founded in 1997, one goal of whichis “to promote peace and human security in West Africa”. For our purposes
here, what interests us about these two NGOs is their role in co-founding,with ECOWAS, an NGO platform called WACSOF (West Africa Civil Society
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Forum), created in 2003 . The stated goals of this platform are like thoseof a conventional platform: developing civil society to ensure the vitality ofthe public space and let the voices of ordinary people be heard. It receives
63% of its funding from the George Soros Foundation, otherwise known as
OSIWA (Open Initiative Society for West Africa); the second-ranked donor
is ECOWAS, which provides only 19% of its funding. The platform’s goals
are directly related to the notion of human security: verifying whether thenational legislations under the ECOWAS treaties properly integrate thisnotion, and setting up national and regional inspections and guidelines on thestatus of human security in West Africa.
There is also the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI), a networkof seven non-governmental African research organisations which have joined
forces in the aim of “benchmarking the performance of key governments in
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respect of human security issues” .
The African NGOs or platforms have adopted this notion of humansecurity. Working hand in hand with governments in some cases, and in
opposition or even in the absence of government in others, they strive torestore the voice of individuals in the decision-making or development

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processes. It is true that the NGOs are still often either international, witha preponderance of Anglo-Saxon NGOs, or African but based on the model ofWestern NGOs. This leads one to think that these are places in which Westernideas are firmly entrenched, not only due to the long-standing practices ofthese NGOs, but also because these practices are taught through seminars
and manuals, allowing members to quickly become operational by learning
time-tested techniques. This suits the urgency of the needs in an area of theworld in which, with some countries shaken by repeated crises, only nongovernmental organisations can provide aid and fill the role of protecting
society which traditionally belongs to the State, even though this can beperceived as a threat to security.
The fact is that although the idea of connecting the security of States withthe security of individuals supports both the EU policy on aid for Africa andthe policy of the various African institutions, the term “human security” hasnot been readily adopted in Europe, where “governance” is the preferred term,
revealing an inclination towards conventional views of the power of State. The
term has a more promising outlook in Africa, notably thanks to the growing
influence of the NGOs which promote its wider use. It is as if, in Africa,
alongside the conventional definition of good governance, there also needs tobe a perspective on fairness and social justice, as Emile Gnimba, ambassadorof the African Union, expressed at the closing ceremony for a focus groupon the Support Study of the European Commission Governance Facility andrelated Incentive Tranche (2006-2011).
It can be seen that it is not because words are in circulation that they
have a uniform meaning. In fact, there appears to be a process of mutual
appropriation and translation which is dictated by respective needs, or evenpower dynamics.

2. The nature of the standard: analysis of the assessment criteria– an area complementary to standards.
The notion of human security was put forward in UN discussions at
the end of the 20th century, and gradually inserted into the discourse on
governance in order to establish guidelines for EU aid projects. The idea wasthat the only way poverty could be reduced was by implementing financial

From the Assurance of Fundamental Rights to the Main Goal behind a Strategy of Good Governance: the Shift in Meaning of “Human Security”

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targets, requiring the deployment of management and process follow-up
operations, which in turn inculcated new behaviours, new working habits,
and new ways of thinking based on specific standards. Moreover, promoting
this notion de governance offered a clear advantage in that, since “measuring
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progress in democratic governance has recently proved to be feasible” , itfacilitated the planning, follow-up and conclusion of aid programmes, and the
involvement of numerous partners in the project, including the private sector.
a) Governance is assessable
Given its polysemous nature, the word governance lent itself to a multi19

dimensional approach (political, social, cultural and technical) . The technicalaspect is covered through the development of a number of indicators. The
Paris Declaration of 2005 established the aid field much like a field ofengineering, subject to explicit guidelines based on budgetary efficiency andresults. The Paris Declaration on Development Aid Effectiveness (2005) is
the text of reference for the management of aid, and thus for understanding
the philosophy behind it: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and20

mutual accountability . In light of its defined missions, the text defines therole of the partner countries and donor countries, and sets out twelve progress
indicators. On the basis of this Declaration, the EU-Africa Strategy defines thepolitical framework for developing and funding the target projects.
The question of assessability is central to EU aid policy, and over the past
decade, a wide range of engineering tools have been developed to measure theresults of aid and determine the lessons learned through the implementationof aid programmes. The complexity of the assessment procedures, which canbe consulted on the EuropAid website, seems inconsistent with the statedgoal of transparency: an invitation to tender system with European research
centres, application of different criteria at each stage of the project concerned(planning, identification, formulation, involvement and assessment), andthe production of training manuals for those in charge of in-progress andprogramme-end assessments make the overall system difficult to comprehend.
The highly technical nature of the system’s design and assessment tools
reflects a tendency specific to Europe: i.e. the central role in the European
construction project which experts have played, and continue to play, a role
they increasingly share with research institutes and even NGOs, which, due to12

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this technical aspect, have acquired valuable know-how in carrying out their
missions.
Accustomed to the notion de governance as signatories of numerous
texts from various international organisations, the countries of Africa havedeveloped their own assessment tools in this area, such as the African
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This mechanism was established at thesame time as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and21

recognised in a UN resolution in November 2002 (resolution 57/2) . Thisinitiative was launched by South Africa, and the countries of Africa insist on
the truly African nature of the project in its entirety. The documents on the
APRM were discussed and adopted at the 6th Summit of the NEPAD Heads
of State and Government Implementation Committee held on 9 March 2003,
in Abuja (Nigeria). In one of these documents, the Declaration on Democracy,
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, in which the heads of African
governments committed to “eradicate poverty” by working together to attaina series of four goals, article 28 mentions the APRM as a tool for promoting“adherence to and fulfilment of the commitments” in that it “spells out theinstitutions and processes that will guide future peer reviews, based on
mutually agreed codes and standards of democracy, political, economic and22

corporate governance” . At present, 29 of the 52 UA member countries aretaking part in the mechanism, and of these, only 12 (mostly English-speaking,but also a few countries of the French-speaking tradition such as Tunisia andMali) have already been assessed.
b) The convergence of assessment tools
We will now look at how the scope of governance is assessed, and whichcriteria are promoted in the European monitoring system and in the NEPAD/APRM monitoring system, which claims to be an expression of a distinctly23

African tradition of political discussion .
EU aid falls within the scope of policies set up by African institutions suchas the AU, ECOWAS and UEMOA (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouestafricaine), which also receive support from other institutions (UN agencies,etc.) and consequently also use these institutions’ assessment tools. Thus,
many different, sometimes contradictory, assessment tools can potentially be
involved.

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For our purposes here, we will limit our analysis to the governanceassessment tool promoted by the EU, GAP, and the NEPAD tool, the APRM.
This comparison is all the more relevant following focus group of 7 and 8
June 2011 organised by the African Institute of Governance on the themeof the Support Study of the European Commission Governance Facility andrelated Incentive Tranche (2006-2011), during which it was reaffirmed that
the EU Council had called for “improving the ties between the APRM and thegovernance action plan”.
In the 10th EDF (2007-2011), the European Commission budgeted agovernance programme (2006-2011) called the Governance Action Plan
(GAP). The structure of this programme reflects the importance placed on
the connection between human development and democratic governance,
and also shows the EU’s commitment to not allowing the World Bank alone
to lay down the standards of governance. According to the Plan, there are
six components of “good governance” – democratisation, human rights, ruleof law and administration of justice, civil society, public administration anddecentralisation – which are to be promoted in the name of the principles ofparticipation and ownership, equity, organisational adequacy, transparency
and accountability, conflict prevention and anti-corruption, through theimplementation of various programmes. The original idea is “positive
conditionality”: countries receive payment of an additional incentive tranche
according to their results, which are determined using a Governance Profile.
Within this framework, the Governance Profile is a document drawn up
for each aid recipient country, which identifies the country’s main weak points
and therefore the priority areas for improvement. The Profile document assessnine points which differ slightly from those used by the World Bank andmainly focus on the political aspects: Political governance/democracy, Political
governance/rule of law, Government effectiveness, Economic governance,
Internal and external security, Social governance, International and regional
context and Quality of the partnership. Each point is analysed from different
angles, which, as is to be expected, reflect the values considered fundamental
by the European Commission: the death penalty and freedom of thought.
More surprisingly, however, the question on the country’s judicial system
also covers the possible existence of a religious or traditional system which
may operate alongside the modern system. The questions are designed to14

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determine the real nature of the existing governance. However, the approach
relating to Europe’s interests is sensitive on points relating to economic
governance; for example, it raises the question of how natural resources ofstrategic importance for the country’s economy (mineral resources, wood,
diamonds, etc.) are managed, and it places considerable importance on the
country’s compliance with international agreements. In short, it would appear
that the EU has taken care not to orient its questions towards a “European”
conception of governance; it appears to want to encourage the appropriationof conditionality. However, by seeking to determine the extent of the country’s
integration in the international community, particularly with regard to assets
which are considered “global commons”, it reveals an interest in the security of
its own territory and economy. The document is completed with the country inquestion and serves as the basis for devising a Governance Action Plan which
in turn is used to negotiate the financial support. The GAP and Strategy
Country Paper are viewed as commitments serving as the basis for awarding
a financial incentive. This document has been fairly well-received by thecountries of the AU as a basis for undertaking reforms. It appears, in fact, thatmost GAPs refer to documents created for the implementation of the APRM.
The APRM is a mechanism which has been in operation for several
years, and in 2011, certain points, including the questionnaire, were revised
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according to critical feedback that had been received . It is also a tool forassessing the overall status of the country participating in the operation,
since the four assessment areas cover governance in the broad sense of theword, larger than that expressed in the OECD reviews. In the view of Kofi
Annan, “Good governance means creating well-functioning and accountable
institutions – political, judicial and administrative – which citizens regard
as legitimate, in which they participate in decisions that affect their daily
lives and by which they are empowered.”25

Participation in the mechanism

is voluntary, which means that not only have some countries of the AU notsigned the APRM text, but that the decision to implement it or not is left up to
the governments. If a country chooses to implement this assessment, it has tocomply with five steps in the process which can be briefly outlined as follows:– A preliminary step during which the country assesses and identifies
the organisations within its civil society, and sets up what is called
the Focal Point (APRM structures within the country);From the Assurance of Fundamental Rights to the Main Goal behind a Strategy of Good Governance: the Shift in Meaning of “Human Security”

15– Step 1, the self-assessment which is carried out using aquestionnaire sent by the APRM secretariat; the country drafts
three documents (diagnosis, preliminary action programme aimed
at correcting the weak points identified, and an in-depth study ofthe country) which help create a list of the major issues;– Step 2, a verification tour of the country by a team directed bya member of the Steering Panel, with consultations to check thevalidity of the updated information;– Step 3, the team prepares a report based on the commitments madein the preliminary action programme, proposing amendments,
through discussion with the government concerned;– Step 4, the final assessment report is drawn up, along with the
National Action Plan which will be presented to the Forum of Heads
of State and Government (i.e. the peer review);– And lastly, Step 5, the assessment report is published and officiallypresented to the regional and sub-regional structures such as
ECOWAS, the Pan-African Parliament, etc. This assessment must
be completed within a period of six months; the assessment cycle
is intended to be repeated every two or four years. The assessedcountry must then implement the NAP (National Action Plan)
aimed at improving the weak points identified.
The Questionnaire, drafted in accordance with the Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism issued by the
NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (2003),
was established to serve as a common self-assessment basis for all countries.
It was initially intended as a document to be distributed to a limited numberof specialists, but as the rules encourage a high level of public participation, it
was distributed on a much larger scale. Composed by the APRM secretariat,
this questionnaire is submitted to the country’s Focal Point, which handles
the distribution. This is only one component of the file that the country
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must compile, a sort of guide , but due to the highly technical nature of thequestions, a number of specialised research groups had to be solicited to assist
27

with the survey work .
The Questionnaire is an 88 page document broken down into four thematic
sections, each of which has been defined by goals, questions and criteria. In all,16

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there are 25 goals, 58 questions and 183 indicators, which are divided between
the four sections: Democracy and political governance, Economic governance28

and management, Corporate governance and Socio-economic Development .
In examining the content of the Questionnaire, one finds the values andstandards considered as fundamental in accordance with the standards of theconventions, protocols and declarations signed by the countries of the AU.
The nature of the questions on democracy and governance indicate positive
recognition of democratic institutions, rule of law, decentralisation and theseparation of powers. The questionnaire covers the status of the rights ofminorities, women, children and vulnerable groups, including displaced
persons, and consequently, the question of the independence of the Judiciary.
While the term “human security” is not used explicitly in the phrasing of
the questions, it is what encompasses all of these non-civil and non-politicalrights, and is therefore suggested implicitly. The defining characteristics ofthe questionnaire are that it requires a high level of expertise (27 forms ofexpertise are apparently required to complete it) and a strong understandingof the term governance in a limited sense: it does not examine the issue ofthe country’s implementation of the treaties it has signed. Unlike in the EU’s
understanding of governance, the APRM also covers corporate governance andraises questions on the working conditions. It assesses two essential aspects ofthis governance: the governance of development, with questions on economic
and corporate policy, and development policy and efficiency (the socioeconomic
aspect). This interest in corporate governance is clearly seen in the NAP costallocation: the two largest amounts are allocated to two themes – companies
29

and socioeconomic development . The APRM’s “innovativeness” is hailed bymany, but others point out problems considering the soaring expectations
30

regarding its effectiveness . The APRM works as an early warning system
which attempts to read how the country is perceived, which is why it requires
the involvement of as many people as possible. As the information it provides
is used in combination with two other types of documents, it does not need31

to be statistically efficient. In the words of Martin Vielajus , the APRM isintended “much more as a process of narrative and exploratory assessment”
which will be incorporated into the additional statistical documents requiredin Step 1.

From the Assurance of Fundamental Rights to the Main Goal behind a Strategy of Good Governance: the Shift in Meaning of “Human Security”

17c) Technicism and insatiable civil society
These highly complex, continually changing assessment systems present
two characteristics: 1) their technicism and 2) the difficulty of defining thepersons concerned. In addition, they lack transparency and allow the fear thatthey could be manipulated for personal use.
The EU and NEPAD/AU place major importance on expertise. The tools
are designed to define crisis-prevention situations as accurately as possible,
and the experts are constantly trying to improve them based on their selfassessments in the field. Thus, by adopting governance as the focus of theaid policy implemented under the 10th EDF, the EU tried to consider subtler
aspects, such as time, and sought to take duration into account, to consider
the fact that working on practices requires more gradual change and that
acquiring “good” habits takes time. The APRM, on the other hand, wants toincorporate more factors which can be measured more accurately. As we cansee, the field of aid is ever-changing in its constant quest to improve efficiency,
but there is a flip-side to this pursuit of ever-greater expertise. In response to
the EU’s growing complexity, the countries of Africa have raised the issue ofdissemination or “extension”, not only for the lay people called on to take partin the national survey consultations, as in Gabon, but also for the experts who
manage the surveys, as the phrasing of the questions and the use of highly
technical terms can actually hinder the process.
Implementing the APRM not only serves to identify weak points in thegovernance of the countries concerned, but is also a learning experience forthe people who use it. The follow-up process is in fact very educational and an
effective training tool for certain communication skills, as it requires working
in collaboration with partners from all horizons (civil society, entrepreneurs,
civil servants, trade union representatives). The process also trains users
in engineering methods by requiring the use of tools for assessing the work
carried out. But this type of use of the APRM is not the only means of learning
new skills in terms of verifying information, research collaboration, etc. The
questionnaire, which is provided by the APRM secretariat, can be adapted to
specific aspects of the country using it, but one cannot overlook the fact that
distribution of this tool does have the effect of standardising the expertiseto some extent, a phenomenon which is clear to the people involved in themechanism.

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The question of expertise is closely linked to the role of civil society,the development of which is a key aspect of the EU governance project. But
where do these experts come from, and what role do they play? Whether inthe preparation of programmes and tools or in carrying out the surveys, theEU calls on experts (researchers, members of specialised NGOs, academics,
lawyers, doctors, etc.). The surveys are also tied to this realm of international
experts: the African states and their organisations, NEPAD/African
Parliament, Think Tank, the European institutions and member countries,
the civil society organisations, and the UN institutions. The experts haveusually worked in one or more of these institutions and know each other.
The same is true of the APRM, and training experts is an essential part of its
implementation. But in choosing the terms “peers” or “eminent persons” for themembers of the Panel, NEPAD has tried to place the emphasis on the qualityof the expertise and expert, stressing the integrity of the people called upon to
fulfil these functions, their “moral probity and their commitment to the ideals
32

of Pan-Africanism” . In addition, the private sector needs to be involved in
the process, both to establish the tool’s legitimacy with the authorities and touse its financial influence to apply pressure in ways that can help achieve thecommitments.
It is with this factor in mind that, instead of “civil society”, the EU prefers
to use the term “Non-State Actors”. However, the latter term is vague enoughto incite dangerous combinations, as N. Flamel has pointed out in a harshly
critical article entitled “EU programmes for African civil societies: the ideology
33

of transparency and hyperprocedurality”” . The underlying demand for actors
from civil society in order to meet the participation goals set out by the EU
or NEPAD aid programmes brings all of the problems relating to civil society
to the surface. The first problem is the omnipresence of major internationalNGOs, either in the field or in the financing of African NGOs. Thisomnipresence translates into a sort of monopoly, which jeopardises the ability
to ensure a balanced representation of input from the different populations.
Second, in the case of Africa, there is the problem of certain governments’
mistrust of these sometimes hostile partners who alter the political dynamics.
Another problem is the use of consulting firms which put their own interests
first. And the list goes on. If the aim behind the use of experts was to eliminate
the risk of overlap, the role granted to civil society would require newFrom the Assurance of Fundamental Rights to the Main Goal behind a Strategy of Good Governance: the Shift in Meaning of “Human Security”

19

monitoring tools.

Conclusion
In examining the several years in which the joint assessment systemsof the GAP and APRM have been in operation, one sees a convergence inthe assessment practices, marking a victory for the world of measurable
results. If we consider that the notion of governance can be understood, inthe categories of standards defined by Zaki Laïdi as social preferences, those
not imposed by constraint, those that Europeans can only defend if others
share them… one could say that the emphasis on comprehensivist principles
such as transparency, autonomy, the participation of all, and the system’s
efficiency has succeeded in winning the support of most actors in the field
34

of aid . However, by producing a tool specific to its scope, NEPAD has thus
far been able to maintain relative autonomy in defining its guidelines inthis area, promoting a broad notion of governance enhanced by its notionof Human Security. One has to look beyond the terminology to consider thevarious ways in which the meanings of the words are interpreted, in order tobring to light the differences fostered by different realms of thought and waysof life. However, if in the dialogue between partner countries, efforts are notmade to identify the variations in meaning among the terms used, we canfear that, in the end, the new aid policies will continue producing the same
results we have seen since 1945: failed development for the poorest countries
and succeeding only in rallying the world around a minimal liberal creed thathas largely demonstrated its flaws in the past. Moreover, by promoting thevalues of governance, the emphasis is placed on global concerns regarding
global commons (environment, health, etc.). In shifting the focus from humansecurity to governance, there is a risk of losing sight of the concerns of theAfrican peoples – equity and social justice.

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References
1 UN Report published in 1994, with the sub-title New Dimensions of Human Security.
2 The discussion on the term at the UN presented in: N. MacFarlane, and Y.F Khong, Human
Security and the UN – A Critical History (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2006).
3 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now – Protecting and Empowering People
Final Report, 2003.
4 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in
Mongolia, Press Release SG/SM/7382 (Ulaanbaatar, 8-10 May 2000).
5 T. Debiel, and S. Werthes, eds, Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: changes, concepts,
cases, INEF Report 80/2006 (Duisburg: University of Duisburg-Essen, 2006).
6 2003 European Strategy; EU Strategy for Africa [COM(2005) 489 final]; The European
Consensus on Development [Official Journal C46 of 24.2.2006]; Code of Conduct onComplementarity and the Division of Labour in Development policy [COM(2007) 72 final ] andEU Response to Fragile Situations [COM(2007) 643 final]; Security and Development 2007 (EUCouncil).
7 2003 European Strategy, 7.
8 Didier Georgakakis, “Introduction”, D. Georgakakis and Marine de Lassalle, La «nouvelle»
gouvernance européenne – Genèses et usages politiques d’un livre blanc (Strasbourg: Strasbourg
University Presses, 2008), 23.
9 Jackie Cilliers, Human Security in Africa – A conceptual framework for review (a monography
for the African Human Security Initiative, 2004), 51.
10 Ibid., 12.
11 Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “African Union promotion of human security in Africa,” African Security
Review 16 (2, 2007), 26-37.
12 See the Cairo Declaration, 1962, on the preservation of borders created through colonisation.
13 The innovative dimension of the process is analysed in the work by F.M. Deng, and I.W
Zartman, A Strategic Vision for Africa – The Kampala Movement (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2002).
14 Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “African Union Promotion of Human Security in Africa” Ibid., 33.
15 See the text entitled A European Way of Security – The Madrid Report of the Human Security
Group Comprising a Proposal and Background Report, 2007, prepared by Mary Kaldor’s team.
16 Among the sub-regions of Africa, the region of West Africa, following the example of otherunions between countries, promptly formed an economic union. The Economic Communityof West Africa States (ECOWAS), overseen first by a Secretariat following its creation in
1975, and since June 2006 by a Commission, set up instruments to promote the economic
development of its member countries. One such instrument is the economic and social council,
which fulfils the role of providing analyses and input for the three executive bodies, i.e. theCommunity Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Conference of Heads of State.
Paradoxically, although the ECOWAS developed instruments designed to promote economic
vitality in the sub-region, such as the free movement of persons between member States (asfrom 1978), it just as quickly adopted other instruments, aimed at conflict prevention andprotecting the populations, for example.
17 The members include major research centres such as the South African Institute forInternational Affairs (SAIIA), the WANEP (West-Africa Network for Peacebuilding), the
APFO (African Peace Forum) and the ISS (Institute for Security Studies).

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18 The Commission Communication, Governance in the European Consensus- Towards a
harmonised approach within the European Union, [COM (2006) (421 final of 30.08.2006,) ]4.
19 Here again, care must be taken with regard to the different traditions that use the term; inFrance, for example, there is greater emphasis on the social dimension than in Anglo-Saxon
countries.
20 2007 OECD text which supplemented the Accra Agenda for Action.
21 The United Nations review Chronicle Online provides an overview of the debates, 2003/1.
22 Article 29, p.10 of the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate
Governance. Documents on the APRM are available online on the NEPAD website as well as
the APRM website,-http://aprm-au.org/.
23 Anne-Cécile Robert, L’Afrique au secours de l’Occident (Ivry sur Seine: Les Editions de l’Atelier,2008).
24 There are many studies in English, and somewhat fewer in French, but the work of referenceis that published by two SAIIA researchers, Steven Gruzd and Ross Herbert, The APRM,
Lessons from the Pioneers, 2008. A complete version can be downloaded from the NEPAD
website.
25 Citation from the NEPAD publication, Country Self-Assessment for the African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2004, 20.
26 Translated into all vernacular languages of the countries concerned; committed to presenting
the specific needs of each country, it was revised in 2011 based on critiques submitted to the
Panel.
27 NEPAD has published a guide for drafting the Questionnaire to be completed by the National
Commissions, Country Self-Assessment for the African Peer Review Mechanism, ibid.
28 A critical analysis of the Questionnaire is set out in chapter 4 of the work of reference: Steven
Gruzd and Ross Herbert, The APRM, Lessons from the Pioneers, ibid.
29 Table from the study by Adotey Bing-Pappoe, APRM – Seven Countries, (Africa Canada
Partnership, March 2010), 8.
30 The original nature of the document is also subject to debate, as some see it as a tool imposedby aid providers.
31 Martin Vielajus, Rapport du groupe aide au développement et gouvernance, 2006
(http://www.institut-gouvernance.org/fr/analyse/fiche-analyse-279.html)
32 Mentioned in the NEPAD text, Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the APRM,
2003.
33 N. Flamel, “Les programmes de l’Union Européenne vers les sociétés civiles africaines –idéologie de la transparence et hyperprocéduralité” from (plateforme-ong.au-senegal.com).
34 Zaki Laïdi, La norme sans la force (Paris, Sciences Po/ Les Presses, 2008).

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要旨ヒューマンセキュリティ（HS）の概念が初めて言及されたのは 1994 年の「国連人間開発報告書」の中であったが、この報告書は開発の基礎を国家に置いていた従来の政策の行き詰まりから人間を重視することへのシフトを表したものである。この概念はある国によって、とりわけ援助に関わる組織によって使用され、強い「ライトモチーフ的政治」となった。欧州委員会は特に近隣国の援助に関わる安全保障政策を作り上げたが、その政策の中で社会的規範として HS の概念がガバナンスの名のもとに反映されている。
アフリカ開発のための新パートナーシップ（NEPAD）という組織は開発政策分野において HS 的要素を含めたガバナンスの価値を強調し、独自の評価システ
ムを作ることによって運営の自律性を今日まで保持することができた。しかし、
EU においては共通の世界財を重視する一方、NEPAD は公平さと社会的正義という HS 的価値を重視するというガバナンスの理解は両者の間で異なる。開発援助の過程において自律性をいかに守るかということは NEPAD が抱える重要な課題である。