Science and Global Security, 13:1–42, 2005
C Taylor & Francis Inc.
Copyright 
ISSN: 0892-9882 print
DOI: 10.1080/08929880590961862

A Review of Nuclear Testingby the Soviet Union at Novaya
Zemlya, 1955--1990
Vitaly I. Khalturin,1 Tatyana G. Rautian,1 Paul G. Richards,1,2
and William S. Leith3
1Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Columbia University, Palisades, NY, USA
Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Columbia University, New York,NY, USA
3
U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA, USA
2

The Novaya Zemlya Test Site was used by the Soviet Union for many different types ofnuclear weapons tests and nuclear effects tests. Taking our information principally fromnumerous books and papers in Russian published from 1988 to 2003, we describe the testsite history and facilities, the early underwater tests, the many atmospheric tests from1957 to 1962, and the underground tests in adits and shafts from 1964 to 1990. Each test
often entailed several nuclear explosions fired simultaneously. We describe the largest
group underground test (about 4.2 mt on 12 September 1973), which was conductedin a unique combination of horizontal adit and vertical shaft; and comment briefly on
radioactive releases, which were substantial for some tests. In many but not all cases,
the Soviet Union’s nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya followed similar tests conducted by
the United States.

INTRODUCTION
With the end of the Cold War, extensive new information has become available in the Russian Federation on the conduct of nuclear weapons testing by
the Soviet Union over more than three decades. At Novaya Zemlya (Russianfor “New Land”), a total of 130 tests were carried out high in the atmosphere,
at low levels above water, at the water/air interface, below water, and underground. These 130 tests entailed 224 separate explosive devices, including by
far the largest atmospheric and underground tests of the Soviet Union, and thatcountry’s only tests above and below water. About 265 megatons of nuclear explosive energy was released at Novaya Zemlya from 1955 to 1990, in some of theReceived 10 April 2004; accepted 2 December 2004.
Address correspondence to Paul G. Richards, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory,
Columbia University, Palisades, NY, USA. E-mail: richards@LDEO.columbia.edu

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most extreme environments to be found anywhere on Earth. Contamination byradionuclides is apparent at some locations there today.
Here we review the available information on nuclear testing at Novaya
Zemlya, paying particular attention to new information on the largest tests(atmospheric and underground), and the Soviet Union’s only tests above andbelow water. Separate papers are in preparation on details of the 39 underground nuclear tests, giving best estimates of locations and yields.1
Following World War II, the Soviet Union’s major programs of nuclear
weapon development resulted in that county’s first nuclear device, named RDS1 (standing for Rossia Delaet Sama, meaning “Russia does it itself ”). It was firsttested in Kazakhstan on 29 August 1949, at what became known as the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS). Until the mid-1950s, all Soviet nuclear tests wereconducted above ground at STS. But in 1954 the first Soviet nuclear torpedo(the antiship weapon T-5) was under development and shortly became readyfor testing. The Soviet military was eager to test it in a more realistic situation, requiring a site near a seacoast, and Novaya Zemlya was selected at thattime for what became the first test in that region, an underwater test on 21
September 1955.
Extensive nuclear testing continued in Kazakhstan, including an atmospheric test with yield around 1.6 megatons on 22 November 1955, which
resulted in significant radioactive fallout in Eastern Kazakhstan and West
Siberia, and detection of significant radioactive debris as far east as Japan.
Many physicians and biologists, now able to observe the long-term medical
effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, charged that atmospherictests would carry radioactive material worldwide, causing a genetic hazard
that would be particularly damaging if cumulative doses occurred from fallout.
In 1954, fallout from the US 15 megaton test “BRAVO” had contaminated aJapanese fishing boat, causing the death of one man and the serious illness ofseveral others. It thus became clear to Soviet leaders that the Semipalatinsk
Test Site was unsuited to large-scale atmospheric testing. After evaluating alternative locations in summer 1957, Novaya Zemlya was selected as the site formultimegaton atmospheric tests as well as for tests underwater—despite theharsh environment far above the Arctic Circle, and proximity to the Russian
mainland and Europe. Eighty-five atmospheric nuclear tests (ANTs) are officially listed as having taken place at Novaya Zemlya from the first on 24
September 1957 to the last on 25 December 1962. Eventually this site was also
used, following the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, for the Soviet Union’slargest underground nuclear tests (UNTs), which peaked in the early 1970s
prior to limitations imposed in March 1976 by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
Nuclear testing on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago has been conducted in
two separate areas, as indicated in Figure 1. The northern test site (NZNTS) is
much larger, as can be seen from Table 1, and includes the location of the largest
atmospheric tests, conducted in 1961 and 1962, although testing since 1963

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

Figure 1: Boundaries of the testing subareas of the Novaya Zemlya Test Site (NZTS). A, B,
and C denote three main areas (zones) of military activity: A = Guba (Bay) Chernaya. Six
nuclear explosions (underwater, above water, and at the ground surface) wereconducted in this area during 1955–1962. Six underground nuclear tests were carried out inshafts during 1972–1975. Further details are shown in Figure 2. B = Guba Mityushikha, southbank of Matochkin Shar. This was the area for underground nuclear tests conducted inadits (tunnels). A total of 33 UNTs were exploded in this area in 36 tunnels. Further details
are shown in Figure 4. C = Sukhoy Nos Cape and its vicinity. A special zone, chosen forvery large atmospheric nuclear explosions, including the most powerful test (58 mt, 30
October 1961). Military settlements: Belushya (open circle)—administrative and scientificcenter and NZTS headquarters. Rogachevo (open triangle)—settlement and airport,
equipped with a long runway for any type of military or civilian planes.

has taken place only underground in a relatively small region (approximately
22 km by 18 km) just to the south of the strait called Matochkin Shar between
the main northern and southern Novaya Zemlya islands. The southern testsite (NZSTS) includes the locations of underwater and above water tests, some
Table 1: Areas of the Northern and Southern parts of NZTS (km2 ).
Subareas

Land

Water

Total

Northern
Southern
Total

40400
14800
55200

29800
6200
36000

70200
21000
91200

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relatively small yield atmospheric tests (in the range 1 to 100 kilotons), and six
underground tests (the last, in 1975) in deep shafts.
In sections below, we describe: our principal sources of information; thephysical environment of nuclear testing at Novaya Zemlya; some basic properties of seismic wave propagation in this region; the test site history and its
basic infrastructure; the underwater, above water, and surface nuclear testsof the period 1955 to 1962; the atmospheric tests from 1957 to 1962; underground nuclear testing from 1964 to 1990, with some details on the largest
underground test (approximately 4.2 megatons on 12 September 1973); andbrief commentary on accidents, radioactive contamination, and hydronuclear
and hydrodynamic experiments.
The history of nuclear testing is a remarkable component of power struggles
between East and West in the 20th century. Today in Russia, Novaya Zemlya
plays a role similar to that played for the United States by the Nevada Test Site.
Thus, parts of Novaya Zemlya are currently in active use for nuclear experiments conducted by the Russian Federation since signing the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. The current continuation of nuclear experiments on the archipelago increases the relevance of documenting and understanding its nuclear testing history.

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Almost all technical information about Soviet nuclear tests was classified during the Soviet era until 1987. In that year, when testing resumed following a
unilateral testing moratorium declared by President Gorbachev in 1985 andin effect from late 1985 through all of 1986, announcements about underground nuclear tests (UNTs) began to be published in newspapers (the day
after the test was done). Information derived from seismograms such as coordinates of the explosion source, origin time, and magnitude, began to be
published in seismological bulletins, and eventually seismograms themselves
became available.2 The great relaxation of censorship started in 1988–1989.
During 1988–1992, extensive information and technical analysis concerning
the Soviet nuclear test program and its consequences were published. This
process began at a time of intense interest in Soviet compliance with theThreshold Test Ban Treaty (which, beginning on 31 March 1976, banned theSoviet Union and the United States from conducting underground nuclear
explosions larger than 150 kilotons). Papers by Bocharov and his colleagues
from the Special Monitoring Service of the Soviet Ministry of Defense gave detailed information on the location, origin time, and yields of 96 Soviet UNTs
at the Semipalatinsk Test Site conducted up to the end of 1972.3 Several
publications devoted to the Novaya Zemlya Test Site date from this period.4
Hundreds of articles about UNTs at Novaya Zemlya appeared in newspapers
and journals. For example, a book by Dubasov et al., published in 1999,

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

references 182 articles written for the general public and 29 technical reports.5
Almost all of them were published during 1989–1992. Censorial restrictions
were reestablished little by little during 1996–1998.
Academician M. A. Sadovsky and his colleagues, starting from 1947 in what
was known as the Special Sector of the Institute of Chemical Physics, studied
all seismological aspects of chemical and nuclear explosions, as well as thephysical effects of explosions upon their immediate environment. Their work
was based on observations in the near-field zone, starting from the explosion
cavity itself, out to a few km. Sadovsky became Director of the Institute of the
Physics of the Earth (IPE) in 1960, and the Special Sector (a large organization of about 500 people) came to IPE with him. The seismic effect of nuclear
explosions was a principal topic of their studies from the very beginning of thenuclear program of the USSR. The Special Sector activity was classified: thisgroup did not publish results of their nuclear explosion studies and did nottake part in any international scientific communication or meetings. In 1990
the Special Sector was formally restructured as the Institute of Dynamics ofGeospheres (IDG) under the directorship of V. V. Adushkin, and almost immediately began to participate in joint programs of research with scientists (manyof them seismologists) from western countries.
IDG scientists began intensive publication of studies of various geophysicaland ecological consequences of high-yield chemical and nuclear explosions. During 1994–2002 they issued 10 volumes of collected papers.6 More than two hundred papers covering some aspect of nuclear testing were published in Russianjournals.
Several important and informative papers devoted to the NZTS and parameters of underground nuclear tests were published in western journals
during this period. W. Leith and his colleagues analyzed the geology using
aerial photos and satellite images of the northern testing area (NZNTS).7 J.
Matzko summarized data scattered in Russian publications in geography, geology, meteorology, and reported on yields, scaled depth and radioactive contamination of Novaya Zemlya underground nuclear tests.8 Skorve and Skogan
analyzed satellite images of Novaya Zemlya.9 Comparing them with German
photos taken from the air in 1942, they identified rockfalls caused by megatonlevel underground nuclear explosions. Marshall et al. used the “joint determination of epicenters” method to estimate relative locations of undergroundtests using seismic data.10 They obtained absolute locations by fixing the location of the underground tests of 2 November 1974 (NZSTS) and 29 September 1976 (NZNTS). Their paper is currently the most widely cited source oforigin time, locations, and magnitude information for almost all undergroundtests at Novaya Zemlya. A slight revision of the locations given by Marshallet al. was reported by Richards,11 who used the constraint that the seismic epicenters be close to peaks, ridges, or other high terrain of the rugged NZNTS
topography, as documented in a stereo image of topography, registered to a5

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SPOT photograph and published by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency.12
A general description of the Soviet nuclear weapons program is given in theofficial 1997 publication “USSR Nuclear Tests” edited by a team of people led
by V. N. Mikhailov,13 which incorporates much of the information available inseveral Russian publications mentioned above. For each underground nuclear
test, the following data are provided: (1) official number of the test; (2) test date;(3) code of the borehole or adit; (4) number of subexplosions in each test; and(5) the yield or yield range (whether 0.001–20, 20–150, 150–1,500 or 1,500–
10,000 kt). The Table of Contents of this book is reproduced in translation in
Appendix 1 of this article.
Mikhailov’s book also contains summaries of the history of Soviet atomic
and nuclear weapon development programs and the history of the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya Test Sites. Three separate chapters are devoted
to tests of the first Soviet atomic bomb (29 August 1949, 22 kt; tower, height =30 m), the first thermonuclear bomb (12 August 1953, 400 kt; tower, height =30 m), and to evaluations of nuclear weapons effects, as they were observed
during military maneuvers in the Orenburg region (South Urals, 14 September
1954, 40 kt, height of burst = 350 m). This book is the first volume of a sixvolume series, which contains a full description of many aspects of the Soviet
Nuclear Program. It was published by the Russian Federal Nuclear Center(VNIIEF) in Sarov during 1997–2001. All six volumes were translated into
English and published by Begall-Atom in 1999–2001 with the title “USSR Nuclear Tests.”
The individual titles are:Vol. 1. The goals, general characteristics, and organization of nuclear tests.
First nuclear tests
Vol. 2. Technology of nuclear tests
Vol. 3. Nuclear weapons. Military-political aspects
Vol. 4. Technology of peaceful nuclear explosions
Vol. 5. Nuclear tests and ecological problems
Vol. 6. The people of the atomic era.
Another key source of information is the 500–page book, “Novaya Zemlya
Test Site. Ensuring the general and radiological safety of nuclear tests (facts,
testimonies, memories),” published in Moscow in 2000 with Prof. V. Logachev
as head of the editorial group.14 More than 50 nuclear testing experts participated in the compilation. The Table of Contents of this book is reproducedin translation in Appendix 2 of this article. Some technical parameters of theNovaya Zemlya nuclear tests were published in this book for the first time. For

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

example, Logachev’s book includes data on the height of burst for atmospheric
explosions, and the scaled depth of burst of underground nuclear tests at the Novaya Zemlya Test Site (NZTS). It gives details of three “accidents” (containment
failures) that occurred during the Novaya Zemlya underground nuclear testing
program. Maps of the locations of underwater, above water, and undergroundnuclear tests at the Northern and Southern NZ Test Sites are provided, as wellas the precise yields of some tests, the history and structure of NZTS, the system used for the observation and remote control of tests, and other information
not previously published. Principal items in this book are reviewed below.
A third important Russian publication is “Northern Test Site. Reference
Information” published in St. Petersburg.5 The book is mostly concerned withradioactive contamination (from seepage or venting of underground nuclear
tests), the resulting environmental problems and meteorological issues, andother consequences of nuclear testing activities at NZTS. A detailed descriptionof radiological effects after each test was provided for each of the 39 UNTs
conducted at NZTS. This listing also contains important information about thescaled depths of burial (SDOB) of each test, making it possible in some cases
to estimate the actual depths of underground tests, based on estimated yields.
A translation of the Table of Contents of this book is provided in Appendix 3 ofthis article.
Memoirs of participants of the Soviet Nuclear Weapon Program are also
important sources of “informal information.” Such memoirs were published in
the 1990s during the time of relaxed censorship. Four of these are of particularinterest in providing information reported in the present article. The first is
a volume of memoirs of participants of nuclear tests on the Novaya Zemlya“Nuclear Archipelago,”15 the second is a series of memoirs included in a setof 17 volumes published by the Kurchatov Institute from 1994 to 1997,16 thethird is a lengthy description of the Special Monitoring System of the Soviet
Ministry of Defense,17 and finally we note the book “I Am a Hawk” by V. N.
Mikhailov and published in Russian and English in 1996.18 He writes of his
experiences as a nuclear weapons designer in Arzamas, as a participant in
the underground nuclear test program for several years at Novaya Zemlya, as
Russian Ambassador to the 1980s negotiations on a new verification protocol
for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and as the First Minister in 1992 of the
newly formed Ministry of Atomic Energy.
Accurate values for the yields of Soviet nuclear tests are of particular interest. There were 496 underground nuclear tests (UNTs) conducted on USSR territory from 1949 to 1990. Among them were 340 tests at the Semipalatinsk Test
Site (STS) in Kazakhstan, 117 so called Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) atmany different places on USSR territory other than at test sites, and 39 tests
at the Novaya Zemlya Test Site. Soviet yields have been officially published forall 124 PNEs (including seven conducted at STS), and for 22 UNTs at STS.19
They have also been published for 81 atmospheric nuclear tests, and for six

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underwater, above water and surface nuclear tests.13 But specific informationon the origin times, coordinates, Soviet seismic network magnitudes, and yields
of most nuclear tests are still classified today in Russia. Such data could be used
to calibrate monitoring systems and thus to improve nuclear explosion monitoring. In a separate article we obtain estimates of NZ yields for each UNT, andcoordinates, using information derived from seismograms and other sources.20

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENTThe Novaya Zemlya Islands (archipelago) are located between the Barents andKara polar seas (Figure 1). They consist principally of two large islands, northern and southern, separated by a narrow strait, Matochkin Shar. The northern
island comprises an area of about 49,000 sq. km, and the southern island about
33,200 sq. km. The total extent of the archipelago is about 750 km from north tosouth, and its width ranges from 100 to 140 km. The Novaya Zemlya Test Siteboundaries were specified in an exchange of documents when the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty (signed in 1974) was formally ratified and entered into force,
which did not happen until 1990. Details of the test site areas and location of
the test site boundaries are given in Table 1 and Figure 1.
The northern (“Matochkin Shar”) and southern (“Krasino”) subareas provide significantly different environments. In the northern subarea there
are higher mountains, thicker permafrost, and harder rocks with higher
strength.5,14 Most underground tests at Novaya Zemlya were conducted infrozen rock, unlike any other tests worldwide.
The Novaya Zemlya Northern Test Site (NZNTS) is mountainous, with average elevations ranging from 600 to 800 m. Tests there were conducted in adits.
(Adits are commonly called tunnels, though a tunnel is technically different inhaving two ends that allow passage through the tunnel from one entrance toan exit at a different place. An adit has just one opening.) The area of testing
activity is concentrated within a region about 22 km × 18 km, along the southbank of Matochkin Shar (see Figure 1). The settlement Severny is included inthis region. The rocks consist generally of Devonian age metasediments (e.g.,
shales, sandstones), probably greenschist facies, with an average density of2700 kg/m3 and compressional wave velocities (Vp) of 5.0–5.3 km/s.5,8 Glacierscover more than a half of the Northern Island, their thickness reaching morethan 300 m.21
The southern area of underground nuclear testing activity was chosen in
1970. It is located in the southern part of the southern island, about 280 kmfrom the northern test site, in an area ∼20 km × 25 km of low relief (about
150 m elevation) near the Barents Sea coast, between the bays called Guba
Chernaya and Guba Bashmachnaya. Its center of human activities was thesettlement of Bashmachkino. Tests in this area were conducted in boreholes

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

with depth up to about 1600 m. The rocks throughout NZSTS are sedimentary,of Permian age (argillite, sandstone, siltstone and carbonates), with a thickness
from 2 to 5 km, and a density of 2500 to 2700 kg/m3 . The compressional wave
velocity, Vp, is 4.5–6.0 km/s for the sandstones and 2.2–5.6 km/s in siltstones.
In NZNTS the thickness of the permafrost reaches about 400–500 m in themountainous regions and about 250–350 m in the flat-lying regions.22 Wells
extending beneath the bottom of permafrost in NZSTS find little water.5 Water
content of the rocks is low, only 1–1.5%. A water table in the usual sense does notexist over much of the archipelago. Several wells were drilled in NZNTS in the
Shumilikha River Valley, 500 m deep, penetrating the base of the permafrost
and showing an absence of subsoil waters. (If present, such waters would beof concern in that they might spread radioactivity from underground testing.)
All the adits, built but not used for explosions, are still dry. The gas content ofrocks in Novaya Zemlya is <4% for sandstone but lies in the range from 8–15%
for shale.23
A significant number of UNTs at NZTS were conducted within the permafrost layer. The coupling from explosive energy into seismic signal is strongly
dependent on rock strength, which is different for frozen and unfrozen rock. Thisdifference is high for soft soil and for porous rocks with high water content, andis low for hard rocks that are less fractured and have low water content. The
rocks at NZTS at several hundred meters depth have extremely low ice (water)
content and are in a less fractured state than near-surface rocks. So it appears
that the influence of permafrost on seismic coupling is not very significant.
There is even less effect for the megaton-level UNTs which were conducted
below the permafrost layer.
The climate on the islands is extreme. The average temperature from December to March is –15◦ C; from April to May is –5◦ C; and from September toNovember is –7◦ C. Ice-cover at sea and snow cover on land are both stable from
October until mid-June. Average ice thickness from January to May is about
1.0–1.2 m. Blizzards are very common in wintertime, occurring on an averageof 50 to 60 days each year. The wind velocities reach 40–55 m/s.14,21

VELOCITY AND ATTENUATION OF SEISMIC WAVES AT NOVAYAZEMLYA AND VICINITY
Many seismic stations were installed by military personnel at epicentral distances less than 100 km in order to record UNTs throughout almost the whole
period of Novaya Zemlya nuclear testing. Fifteen UNTs were recorded by a
300 km-long profile, running along the west coast from NZNTS to NZSTS. Limited information on the seismic observations at local and regional distances has
been published.24 It is known only that P waves with velocity 5.3–5.8 km/s andperiods 0.2–0.4 sec were observed in the near-field zone out to 10 km. At greater910

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distances out to 300 km all five types of regional waves were observed—the Pg
wave, Pn, low amplitude Sn, and strong Lg and Rg waves.
Detailed seismic observations of six UNTs at NZNTS were conducted on thecontinental mainland, at distances from 300 to 1300 km. These six explosions
were recorded by six temporary stations: Belushya Guba, Amderma (whichchanged to permanent operation in 1983), Naryan-Mar, Vorkuta, Murmansk,
and Arkhangelsk. The closest station, Belushya Guba, is located about 190 km
from the epicenters of these UNTs. Observations were also obtained at permanent stations of the Soviet Seismographic Network. During seismic observations of UNTs at Novaya Zemlya it was found that Lg waves were not seen on
paths crossing the South Barents depression, where the granitic layer is thin oreven absent.24,25 So Lg waves were not recorded by continental stations locatedsouthwest of this test site.
The following travel-time equations and implied seismic wave velocities
were obtained by Sultanov24 from the observations of UNTs at these stations:t(Pg) = R/6.2 + 0.25

for distances R= 10–450 km;

t(Pn) = R/8.2 + 8.9

R= 220–1000 km;

t(Sn) = R/4.4 + 17.5

R= 250–700 km;

t(Lg) = R/3.5 + 1.0

R= 120–450 km;

t(Rg) = R/3.0–3.0

R = 50–500 km.

Sultanov also studied the attenuation of seismic waves from UNTs at Novaya
Zemlya. Data were obtained for distances from 3–200 km for P waves and from
0.5–200 km for surface waves. The amplitudes of ground displacement were
measured. Scaling to a 1 kt UNT, these amplitudes were found to decrease
with distance likeAP ∼ 3R−1.8
Asurface ∼ 3R−1.4 ,where the amplitude A is measured in mm, and distance R is measured in km.

TEST SITE HISTORYIn July 1954, most of the territory of the Novaya Zemlya Islands was declared
as the Novaya Zemlya Test Site of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. The
indigenous population, 536 people, was resettled on the mainland during 1955–
1957.14 The initial code name of the Novaya Zemlya nuclear testing project was“Object-700” (the postal address for correspondence was “Moscow-300,” andthe Red Army’s code name for the NZ garrison was Unit 77510). After 1958,
the official name of NZTS became the Sixth State Test Site of the Ministry ofNuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

Defense.14 From the beginning NZTS was under the authority of the Soviet
Navy, and today it is run by the Russian Navy.
The first stage of test site construction began in October 1954, when several battalions of military construction workers arrived with their equipment.
Different Russian sources mention from 10 to 13 battalions. As many as six
or seven thousand soldiers are reported to have endured the winter season of
1954–1955 in tents. Their main goal was to build the support facilities necessary
to carry out the first Soviet underwater test. The main site for this first stage of
construction was Guba Chernaya (Figure 2). It is located on the southwest coastof the southern island. In some years, the thickness of the sea ice-cover reaches
4–5 feet in this region by the end of winter. For this reason the icebreaker Baikal

Figure 2: A map of the Novaya Zemlya southern test site (NZSTS) with positions of nuclear
tests and related features. The first subzone of NZSTS was the Guba Chernaya area, where
three underwater tests (1, 3, 4), one surface test (2), and one above water test (5) wereconducted (open circles). Numbers correspond to Table 3. Several atmospheric nuclear
explosions also took place in this region. The center of this subzone was the settlement
Krasino. The command and remote control center was located on the ship Emba at
location N during 1955–1959, and later was moved on land at location M. A second
subzone was located 10–20 km to the west. Six UNTs were conducted there in six shafts(indicated by filled circles). Numbers shown are those used in Appendix 5. One above
water nuclear test (6) was exploded in Guba Bashmachnaya. The center of this subzone
was the settlement Bashmachkino. Locations of these tests and other features are takenfrom a map in reference 14. This map was published without information on
latitude/longitude. We have reconstructed the coordinate net based on the shape of thecoastline shown on the detailed topographic map of Novaya Zemlya (scale 1:250,000)
issued by the Soviet General Staff.

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was turned over to NZTS in March 1958, to establish an all-season connection
between the various parts of the test site and the mainland. The main port for
supplying the testing operations was Arkhangelsk, near the Kola Peninsula,
900 km away.
The steamship Emba was also assigned to the test site and reequipped
into a command center for the remote control of the nuclear devices. Data on
the results of tests were collected on the Emba. The ship was anchored at theposition marked by the letter “N” on Figure 2, eight kilometers SW of the spotin Guba Chernaya where the underwater explosion was to be conducted. From
October 1954 to September 1955 the following facilities were constructed:
1. Administrative and command center (Belushya);2. Settlement and airport (Rogachevo);
3. Command center on board the ship Emba; and4. All the facilities needed for conducting and monitoring an underwater nuclear explosion in Chernaya Bay.
As a result of this intensive activity involving several thousand soldiers andofficers, the USSR’s first underwater nuclear test was exploded on 21 September
1955 (see Figure 2).
During the period from 1956 to 1961, several different areas were developedand equipped for nuclear testing experiments. The first of them was in Zone A,
on NZSTS. During the nuclear testing moratorium from November 1958 toAugust 1961 an extensive experimental area was created especially for verylarge yield (100 mt-level) atmospheric tests in Zone C, Sykhoy Nos (meaning“Dry Cape”).

INFRASTRUCTURE OF NZTS
Test site operations involved a large organization with thousands of employees,
mostly soldiers and officers and their families, a large seaport, and an airport.
It is documented that three aviation regiments were billeted on the NZTS.14 A
modern airport was constructed near Rogachevo with a 2400 m runway, where
almost any type of civilian or military aircraft could land. The local administrative and scientific center with its military headquarters (Figure 3) was called
Belushya, where many five-story houses were built. During its heyday, morethan one thousand officers children lived there. Several other settlements werealso established on the Island, including Severny, Rogachevo, Bashmachkino,
and Krasino. The total number of inhabitants on the island may have been as
high as 12,000 or more during the navigable season. A large ocean steamshiparrived during the summer-fall season, serving as a floating hotel for businesstravelers and as a restaurant for generals and other officers.

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

Figure 3: A view of the Officers’ Club at Belushya.

Several testing fields were located within each of the three main areas(zones A, B, C), where different types of nuclear tests were carried out. The
main testing fields, settlements and command posts at NZTS, along with theircode names, are shown in Table 2. Additional summary information is asfollows:

Zone AAt Guba Chernaya (Figure 2) between 1955 and 1962, the Soviets conducted
the first and only surface nuclear explosion (# 2 in Figure 2), three underwater(#1, 3, 4) and two above-water nuclear tests (# 5, 6). Later, boreholes for conducting underground nuclear tests (UNTs) were drilled some 20–25 km westof the original testing area. Between 1972 and 1975, six UNTs were conductedin six boreholes (# 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, and 19).

Zone BA settlement named Severny (meaning “Northern”) was founded on thesouth bank of the Matochkin Shar strait near the mouth of the Shumilikha
River. A mountainous area also on the south bank of the strait was chosen for
conducting UNTs. Numerous adits were constructed between 1960 and 1990,
and 33 UNTs were carried out in 36 of them.26 Two main experimental fields
are located in this area: field D-9 is an area where UNTs were conducted in

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Table 2: The names and purpose of the main testing areas, settlements, andcommand posts at NZTS.
Code name

The purpose and type of activity

Belushya
Rogachevo

A-6

A-7
A-8
Yu

D-9

D-11

D-1
D-2

D-3

D-4

D-8

The administrative and scientific center of NZTS.
A large airport, equipped for almost any type of militaryand civil airplane landing. Runway length, 2400 m.
Zone A
Guba Chernaya (Black Bay) area
Experimental field for studying the influence of
gamma-radiation on naval equipment and animals
and other physical experiments. The small settlement
Krasino, is located near this field.
Test field for conducting kiloton-level atmosphericnuclear explosions.
Experimental field for testing of tactical nuclear
weapons (rockets with nuclear charges).
Field for conducting underground nuclear tests in shafts.
The small settlement Bashmachkino was constructed
for builders and miners.
Zone B
Severny settlement and the location of UNTs conducted in adits
in mountains on the south side of the Matochkin Shar
The area of UNTs conducting in adits in the Moiseev andLazarev Massifs. The settlement Severny (a former
geophysical station) was built on the northern bank of
Matochkin Shar in the western part of the zone.
A new area prepared for conducting UNTs. Not used.
Zone C (former D)
Large test area on the northern island for conducting megaton-levelatmospheric and high altitude nuclear explosions
A port on the shore of Mityushikha Bay. The location of aharbor, depots, and electric power station.
A large field (several tens of km across) for testing
nuclear charges dropped from airplanes. Almost all
multi-megaton devices tested by the USSR were
exploded above this field.
Test field for explosions of the nuclear warheads ofintercontinental ballistic missiles, launched at distancesof a few thousand kilometers from a rocket base insouth-east Siberia.
Ostrov Mityushkov, the location of a relay station for
re-transmitting the signals for operation of all
instruments installed for recording the nuclear weapon
effects.
Central command post in Gribovaya Bay, located
90 km from the center of the D-2 field.

adits, and includes the settlement at Severny. Another area, the field D-11,
contains new adits, which were not used.

Zone C
North of Matochkin Shar is an area along the Barents Sea coast that is the
only part of the North Island of Novaya Zemlya used for nuclear testing. It wasNuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

used especially for the highest yield atmospheric and high-altitude explosions.
In these tests, nuclear bombs were either dropped from airplanes or delivered byrockets. The largest Soviet nuclear test (30 October 1961, 58 mt) was detonatedabove this area at a height of about 4 km.
Within Zone C was a test field (without a code name), used as a target for
payloads from heavy strategic rockets. Many smaller test fields were also builtin Zone C, intended for testing atomic artillery shells, atomic torpedoes, andother atomic weapons. The tests in this case consisted of studying the effects of
conventional explosives, not nuclear ones, on military hardware. Some of thesefields were intended for scientific experiments. The main command center forZone C was located too far from the testing areas (90–100 km) to ensure goodtransmission of all information from the hundreds of instruments installed to
document the results of each test. An important factor here was that just after
an atmospheric explosion the radio wave propagation became very poor for
about 30 to 60 minutes (sometimes longer).
Starting in 1957, the Soviet Navy conducted annual maneuvers in the autumn at NZTS. During these maneuvers, rocket-propelled missiles (both flying
and ballistic), torpedos, and shells were launched from submarines, warships,
and airplanes.27 The targets were located on the testing fields A-8, D-3 andother smaller fields. These warheads mostly carried conventional (chemical explosive) charges, but some had nuclear charges. All the nuclear explosions inthese maneuvers (mostly atmospheric, and only four under or above water)
were included in the official Soviet list of nuclear tests.13

UNDERWATER, ABOVE-WATER, AND SURFACE NUCLEAR TESTSAT NZTS, 1955--1962
Six nuclear explosions of these three types were carried out at NZTS from
September 1955 to October 1962. Their locations are indicated on the map(Figure 2) by numbers from 1 to 6 in chronological order. Their parameters areshown in Table 3.14
The first nuclear explosion at NZTS was a test of the nuclear warhead of thetorpedo “T-5.” This warhead was the nuclear device “RDS–9,” and it was tested
Table 3: The approximate coordinates of underwater, above water, and surface
nuclear tests conducted at NZTS from 1955 to 1962.
N

Date

Time, GMT

Type

Yield kt

H, mLat. ◦ N

Long. ◦ E

1
2
3
4
5
6

21 Sept 1955
07 Sept 1957
10 Oct 1957
23 Oct 1961
27 Oct 1961
22 Aug 1962

05:00:54
08:00:01
06:54:32
10:30:47
08:30:27
09:00:00

Underwater
Surface
Underwater
Underwater
Above water
Above water

3.5
32
10
4.8
16
6

−12
+15
−30
−20
+1.1
0

70.70370.71570.70370.703
70.73
71.00

54.60
54.68
54.60
54.60
54.59
53.50

15

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for the first time in Kazakhstan at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in nonwaterconditions in 1954, but failed.28 At Novaya Zemlya this first test was detonatedunderwater on 21 September 1955 (Y = 3.5 kt; location N1, Figure 2), at a
depth of 12 m. More than 30 ships were deployed around the nuclear charge
at distances ranging from 300 to 1600 m. Among them were four destroyers,
three submarines, several minesweepers and seaplanes. Many of these ships
were new. More than 500 goats and sheep, about 100 dogs, and other animals,
were on board the vessels. The closest destroyer (at 300 m) sunk immediately;other ships were heavily damaged.14
Two years later, after the end of the first stage of test site construction, thesecond NZTS explosion was conducted on 7 September 1957. The only surface
explosion at NZTS, this test consisted of a nuclear charge (Y = 32 kt) installed
on a tower 15 m in height, located 100 meters inland from the coast at Guba
Chernaya Bay (at #2 in Figure 2). Many “targets” (e.g., animals, warships, andother military objects) were deployed both in the water and on land. The resulting crater was 80 m in diameter and 15 m deep. The test resulted in significant
radioactive contamination; an hour after the explosion the intensity of gamma
radiation near the epicenter was 40,000 roentgen per hour (a contemporary
permissible dose is 2 R per year, according to one of our main sources of information on Soviet nuclear testing practices at Novaya Zemlya14 ). A second
contaminated area, resulting from fallout of the above-water explosion of 27
October 1961, is also located in Guba Chernaya Bay, about 6 km to the east.
Both areas are still considered to be contaminated (totaling about 100 sq. km)
and access is prohibited.
A month later, on 10 October 1957, a full-yield test (Y = 10 kt) of the T-5
nuclear torpedo was conducted at the same location as the first underwater
test (#3 in Figure 2) at a depth of 30 m. A standard submarine at a distance ofseveral kilometers launched the torpedo. Three destroyers, three submarines,
two minesweepers, and many smaller target ships, were sunk by the blast.14
The last Soviet underwater test (#4 in Figure 2) was detonated on 23 October 1961, at the same place as two previous underwater tests. This time, only
rafts were deployed, along with remote control instruments (apparently, too
many ships were lost in the previous tests). A new, B-130 submarine locatedat some distance from Guba Chernaya launched the torpedo, which had a nuclear charge of 4.8 kt. The torpedo exploded precisely under the target, at a
depth of 20 m. Radioactivity from the underwater explosions was remarkably
low.14
The first Soviet above-water explosion was conducted four days later, on 27
October 1961, also in Guba Chernaya (#5 in Figure 2). In this experiment, thesame B-130 submarine, at a distance of 11 km, launched a torpedo. The torpedo
traveled 11 km underwater at a depth of 12 m, rose into the air and exploded
exactly above the target.14 It was the final test of the new torpedo, which later
took its place among Soviet naval weapons.

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya
Table 4: The number of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted at NZTS from 1957
to 1962, and their annual total yield.

Year
Number of tests
Annual yield, mt

Sep--Oct

Feb--Oct

Sep--Nov

Aug--Dec

Total

1957
2
4.5

1958
24
16.2

1961
24
86.2

1962
35
132.7

85
239.6

The last test in this series, conducted on 22 August 1962, was the abovewater test of a new antiship weapon with a nuclear warhead. The rocket, witha nuclear charge of 6 kt, was launched from a Tu-16 aircraft about 200 km
from the target.29 The warhead traveled ballistically and exploded at the water
surface. The target was located in Guba Bashmachnaya (#6 in Figure 2), 45 km
northwest of the sites of the previous tests in Guba Chernaya Bay. It hit thefloating target with accuracy of about 5 meters.

ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS, 1955--1962
Eighty-five atmospheric nuclear tests (ANTs) were carried out at NZTS between
24 September 1957 and 25 December 1962. Their distribution by year is shownin Table 4, and by yield in Table 5. The list of all 85 ANTs, with yield and heightof burst when available, are given in Appendix 4. Yields for 77 of these tests
have been published,13 and heights-of-burst (HoB) for 73.14 HoB has not been
published for 12 ANTs and yields are still not published for 8 ANTs.
Two atmospheric explosions failed: 19 October 1958 (HoB = 900 m, Y < 1 t)
and 25 October 1958 (HoB = 300 m, Y < 100 t). Both these events are includedin the official list of 85 nuclear tests at NZTS although there was no nuclear
yield.
Four ANTs that exploded “somewhere above the Barents Sea” at the NZTS
were carried on intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from southeast
Siberia.30
The majority of warheads used in ANTs at NZTS were dropped by parachutefrom bombers. Most of these nuclear devices, covering a wide range of yields,
Table 5: The distribution of atmospheric nuclear tests at NZTS, by yield.
Yield range, in kt

Number of tests

Y < 1010 ≤ Y < 100
100 ≤ Y < 1,000
1,000 ≤ Y < 3,000
3,000 ≤ Y < 5,000
5,000 ≤ Y < 10,000
10,000 ≤ Y

12
12
21
24
5
5
6

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came from a large storage facility located about 1000 km from the test site in
the military airbase called “Olenye” on the Kola Peninsula, where Tu-95 heavy
bombers were also based.15 The decisions of what type and yield of nuclear
device were to be exploded in the next test were made by the State Commission
in Moscow. The Head of this Commission was usually present for the test at
Novaya Zemlya, and he made the final decision about the zero time dependingon the meteorological conditions (including the expected wind direction). Oncethe decision was made, a heavy bomber (usually a Tu-95) with the nuclear
device would take off from “Olenye” for the test at Novaya Zemlya.
The coordinates of ANTs were not published by the Soviet Union. The
largest-yield tests were conducted on the Barents Sea coast in Zone C (testfield D-2 and offshore). In cases where the interval between two ANTs was lessthan 48 hours the second ANT was conducted at the Kara Sea coast of Novaya
Zemlya and not in any of the specified “zones” (this is confirmed by a map of
ANT locations given in a Norwegian study9 ). Small and intermediate range
ANTs were conducted in Zone A, of NZSTS.
Analysis of published data on yield and height-of-burst for NZTS ANTs
indicates scaled heights-of-burst exceeded 100 m/kt1/3 . Variations of the scaledheight were high, ranging from 105 m/kt1/3 (BIG IVAN, see below) to about1000 m/kt1/3 . The lowest ANT was detonated at HoB = 250 m (Y = 6 kt), with ascaled height of 140 m/kt1/3 . The highest ANT was detonated at HoB = 4090 m(Y = 19,100 kt), with a scaled height of 145 m/kt1/3 .
On 30 October 1961, the most powerful atmospheric bomb, code name “BIGIVAN,” was exploded. This “super bomb,” weighing 26 tons, was too large tobe placed inside an aircraft, so it was fastened beneath a Tu-95 (“Bear”) heavy
bomber with only about 30–40% of its diameter within the fuselage, and dropped
with a giant parachute from a height of 10.5 km.31 It exploded 188 seconds
after it was dropped, at a height of about 4000 m above test field D-2, near
Cape Sukhoy Nos. The origin time of this explosion was 08:33 and approximate
coordinates were 73.85◦ N, 54.50◦ E.32 This is about 55 km north of the Severny
settlement and 250 km north of the headquarters at Belushya, from where
it was observed by the State Commission.5,14 Although it was exploded in theatmosphere, it generated several types of seismic signal. According to a bulletinof the U.S. Geological Survey it had seismic magnitude mb = 5.0–5.25.
The zone of lethality and destruction of dwellings was out to 120 km; thezone of eye damage was out to 220 km; a shock wave in air was observed at
Dickson settlement, at 700 km; windowpanes were partially broken to distancesof 900 km. People felt a seismic wave exactly at the moment of the flash of lightfrom the explosion (personal communication of a test participant). All buildings
in Severny (both wooden and brick), at a distance of 55 km, were completely
destroyed. The air wave that went around the world entailed a change in air
density, resulting in signals on long-period vertical-component seismometers
because of the change in buoyancy of the inertial mass.

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

The yield of 58 mt and height of 3.5 km were reported in early Russian
publications33 and in scientific papers.34 In official publications the yield was
reduced to 50 mt. We assume that the scientific data provided by people who
worked on this nuclear test are the most reliable. It was claimed officially that
only half of the maximum potential energy for this bomb design was released in
the “BIG IVAN” test. As noted by Yu. N. Smirnov, scientific director of Arzamas16, this design allowed “a yield of up to 100 megatons when fully loaded with
nuclear fuel.” Thus the test “was in effect the test of the design for a 100-megaton
weapon . . . ”35
The radioactivity released by atmospheric nuclear testing at Novaya
Zemlya was recorded worldwide, and specifically within the Soviet Union by the
network of more than 500 stations of the State Meteorological Survey, which,
together with stations operated by other government agencies, were equippedwith standard instruments for monitoring of radionuclides. From observations
made in 1958–1962 and reported daily to Moscow, two main trajectories of significant radioactive fallout were observed: (1) directly to the South as far as the
Caspian Sea, and (2) towards the Sea of Okhotsk stretching several thousand
km to the southeast from Novaya Zemlya.

UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS
Two different Nuclear Weapon Scientific Institutes (Centers) were organized in
the U.S.S.R. (just as the United States had National Laboratories at Los Alamosand Lawrence Livermore). Both Institutes were responsible for all stages ofnuclear weapons development, including construction and testing.
The first Institute was organized in April 1946. Its current name is theInstitute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF). It is located in the small town ofSarov (called Arzamas during the Soviet era) about 700 km east of Moscow, andits code name was Arzamas-16. The second Institute was organized in 1955 andis now called the Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF). It is located in thesmall closed city of Snezhinsk, near Chelyabinsk in the South Urals and its
code name was Chelyabinsk-70.13 The two Institutes fielded a total of 39 UNTs
at NZTS during 1964–1990. Eighteen UNTs at NZTS were developed, coordinated, and conducted by Arzamas-16; thirteen UNTs were the responsibility of
Chelyabinsk-70; eight UNTs involved both Institutes,5 which competed vigorously with each other.
Information about each of the 39 UNTs at NZTS has been provided in
the widely cited official Russian publication edited by Mikhailov.13 Specifically,
this source gives the date, a code for the adit or shaft, the number of nuclear
devices exploded in each test, the scaled depth, and the total yield of all tests
conducted during each year of the test program. According to the Protocol of theThreshold Test Ban Treaty a single UNT can consist of any number of nuclear

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devices provided they are exploded within a time interval less than 0.1 secondand are located within a circle of radius less than 1 km. A total of 133 nuclear
devices were exploded in the 39 UNTs at NZTS. The full list of these tests isgiven in Appendix 5.
The bilateral Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed in 1974 specifies a limit of
150 kilotons for UNTs beginning on 31 March 1976. For the 20 UNTs at NZTS
prior to this date, the total yield was 23.77 megatons with average yield about
1.19 megatons. The total yield of the 19 UNTs at NZTS after March 1976 was
1.94 megatons with average yield about 100 kilotons.
Three tests (21 October 1967, 14 October 1969, and 11 October 1980) eachentailed nuclear devices located in two different adits, and until 1997 many
Russian and Western authors assumed these consisted in each case of two
separate tests. Thus prior to 1997, many publications refer to 42 UNTs at NZTS.
In the Russian Federation’s official summary13 each of these pairs is listed asa single test, so the total number of UNTs conducted at NZTS is now taken
as 39. Of these, 33 were carried out at the northern site near Matochkin Shar
during 1964 to 1990. The remaining six UNTs were carried out at the southernsite between July 1972 and October 1975. The first of these tests (27 July 1972)
was not detected seismically, and it is widely assumed that the nuclear device
failed to explode.
Early preparations for underground nuclear testing began in 1959 withconstruction of the settlement called Severny on the south bank of Matochkin
Shar. A rock massif (Mount Lazarev) near the western end of the strait waschosen as the main area for drifting adits and conducting the UNTs. Adits
were excavated with entrances about 50–80 meters above sea level along thesouth bank of Matochkin Shar, into the northeast slope of Mount Lazarev (map,
Figure 4). The drifting of five adits (G, B, A-1, A-2, A-3) started in May 1960.
Adits G (200 m long) and B were ready by May 1961, but A-1, A-2 and A-3
were not completed until later, because trilateral negotiations were underway
between the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom which resulted
in 1963 in the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, space, and underwater. The Soviets therefore devoted almost all the
resources at Novaya Zemlya to completing the program of atmospheric explosions, and underground construction was temporarily halted. Adit construction
resumed in August, 1963, just before the signing of the LTBT.14
The first UNT at NZTS was conducted at 08:00 on 18 September 1964, inadit G. The intent was to conduct an exact repeat of the first UNT at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (11 October 1961). It had the same yield (1 kt), depth (100 m),
length of adit (200 m), was also in hard rock, and the same type of stemming
was used.5 Nevertheless, the radiological consequence was completely different.
Whereas radioactive gases from the STS test were not detected in the atmosphere near the adit for 3–4 hours, they appeared in the epicentral area of the
NZ adit within only a few minutes.14

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

Figure 4: A map of zone B, the area of UNTs conducted in the Moiseev and Lazarev
massifs. Bold circles are locations of UNTs from reference 10. Severny—a settlement for
military staff and miners.

The second UNT at NZTS was conducted at 08:00 on 25 October 1964, inadit B, near the first NZ UNT. The yield of this explosion was about 20 kt, andthe scaled depth was 180 m/kt1/3 . Again, whereas a nuclear test at STS withthe same yield and depth was fully contained, radioactive debris was detected
at the surface near the NZ UNT just 38 minutes after this second test.14
Later analysis showed that the difference in gas venting between STS
and NZTS was a result of different gas and water content of rock at the twotest sites. The rocks at the Kazakhstan test site consist mostly of granite.
They have low water content (0.5–1.0% weight) and no components that under high temperature experience thermal decomposition producing significant
amounts of gas. Therefore, in Kazakhstan the gas pressure in the cavity of a
UNT rapidly decreased due to cooling. In the final stage it became even lower
than atmospheric pressure,5 and outer air moved into the chamber throughnatural rock joints and fractures. The situation at NZTS was found to be completely different. Local rocks are mostly shales and other carbonate rocks. They
have high water content (1.5–2.5%) and high gas output (5–15%) under hightemperature, especially for nuclear tests conducted in carbonate rocks.23 The
pressure in the cavity after cooling remained significantly higher than atmospheric pressure. This led either to seepage or rapid venting of the radioactive
gases.14

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The strategy of tunnel selection was therefore changed after the first two
tests, and rock environments in which the gas content could exceed 15% (including the vicinity of shales and other carbonate or carbonaceous rocks) wereruled out.5 As a result of a number of tests at Novaya Zemlya, it was concluded
that, in rocks with gas content of 8–15%, nuclear tests must be emplaced atscaled depths of at least 150–180 m/kt1/3 . Nevertheless, a few serious accidents(containment failures) occurred. They are described below.
Beginning in 1966, underground nuclear tests were conducted systematically at Novaya Zemlya, with one or two tests per year in most years (but three
in 1973). Most tests were conducted in the August–November period, before
navigation routes had closed due to ice. A total of 39 underground nuclear tests
were conducted, the last on 24 October 1990.
Most underground nuclear tests were of multiple devices (“salvo” tests)
detonated nearly simultaneously: 133 separate nuclear devices were detonatedin the 39 tests. The largest number of subexplosions—eight—was for UNT #17
on 23 August 1975 and also for UNT #39 on 24 October 1990.
In two experiments, two tests were conducted simultaneously. Thus, underground tests #3 and #4 were conducted at the same time in two different adits,
separated by more than 2 km. Tests #18 and #19 were conducted simultaneously in two different shafts, separated by 22 km.
From 1966 to 1975, eleven megaton-size underground nuclear tests wereconducted—eight of them in the northern area (Matochkin Shar) and three inthe southern area (Krasino). The most powerful Soviet UNT (yield ∼4.2 mt,
seismic magnitude mb = 6.97) was conducted in the northern test area on 12
September 1973. The most powerful test in the southern area (Y = 3.5 mt, mb =6.98) was detonated on 27 October 1973. Since March 1976, and the imposition
by treaty of a 150 kt threshold, seismic magnitudes of UNTs have not exceeded
mb = 6.00. Table 6 gives the distribution of teleseismic magnitudes for the
UNTs at Novaya Zemlya.36
A surface chemical explosion (Y = 974 t) was detonated at 14:00:00 GMT
on 25 August 1987 south of Matochkin Shar, about 100 meters from the coast.
Its coordinates were 73.38◦ N and 54.78◦ E.37 Its seismic signal at NORSAR(an array in Southern Norway) was reported with magnitude 3.2,38 along witha similar magnitude (3.6) for a seismic signal on 15 November 1978. Its origin
time (1400 hours) and epicenter (73.4◦ N, 55.0◦ E) are typical for UNTs, and weare sure, it, too was a chemical explosion, though we know of no Russian sourcesthat describe this event.
Table 6: Distribution of seismic magnitudes (reference 10), for UNTs at NZTS.
mb
1964–1975
1976–1990<4.0

4.0--4.99

5.0--5.49

5.50--5.99

6.0--6.45

>6.45

1
2

3
1

0
0

3
15

2
1

11
0

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

THE MOST POWERFUL UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST ON NOVAYAZEMLYA, Y = 4.2 MT
The two most powerful Soviet UNTs were carried out at NZTS during the fall of
1973. On 12 September 1973, four nuclear devices, with a total yield of 4.2 mt39
were exploded in the northern area.5,14 The scaled depth was announced as
95 m/kt1/3 , and its seismic magnitude was reported as 6.97.10 On 27 October
1973 a single 3.5 mt charge was exploded in the southern area just one monthafter the first successful UNT in this new area.14,40 It was carried out in astandard borehole. Its seismic magnitude was 6.98,41 and the announced scaled
depth was 120 m/kt1/3 .
Although the yields of these two tests were nearly the same, the surface
effects were very different. After the southern explosion, changes in the groundsurface were noted southwest of the top of the shaft. Four small ridges werecreated, a region 120 m in width was uplifted 2 to 3 m, and on the uplifted
portion large cracks were observed 0.5–1.5 m wide and 5 m deep.14
In contrast, the largest UNT at the northern area produced a tremendous
spall effect, a huge rockslide was triggered, and significant changes in surface
relief occurred. More than 80 million cubic meters of material cascaded down
in a massive rock avalanche. The rockslide blocked the entrance of a valley
and the flow of two glacial streams. A lake, 2 km long, formed behind the slidedebris. The extent of the rockslide is shown schematically in Figure 5 (in verticalsection) and in Figure 6 (a map view of the slope collapse and the area covered

Figure 5: A vertical schematic cross-section (based on ref. 14) of the adit–shaft
combination of the UNT of 12 September 1973, indicating the position of chambers KB-1
and KB-4. The mountainside is shown before and after the landslide caused by the
explosion.

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Figure 6: A topographical map (from ref. 13, English edition) of the region above the UNTof 12 September 1973. The contour interval is 50 m. The beginning (source) and ending
areas of the rockslide are outlined. Filled circle—chambers KB-1 and KB-4; open
circle—end of the line of least resistance (LLR), emergent at the surface from KB-4.

by rockslide debris). The size of the collapse area is 800 m × 1700 m, and thearea covered by debris is 1600 m × 2200 m with thickness 20–50 m.14,42
The contrasting outcome of the two multimegaton underground nuclear
tests is due to the differences in relief and yield distribution. The test geometry
in the south was relatively simple: a single charge was exploded in a deep

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

shaft. The northern test entailed four separate nuclear devices exploded almost
simultaneously, but in a complicated configuration beneath Mount Chernaya.
At safe scaled depths of 100 m/kt1/3 or greater, a yield of 4.2 mt needs at least
1600 m for the line of least resistance to the free surface (LLR). But the height ofMount Chernaya is only 900 meters, and its relief cannot provide a value of LLR
more than 650 m using only a horizontal adit. The Soviets therefore designed
a unique adit-plus-shaft hybrid excavation inside the mountain (Figure 5). An
adit 1223 m long was first excavated.42 The big KB-1 chamber was made at theend of the adit B-1. A vertical shaft (3 m diameter) was then excavated to an
additional 500 m depth, and a chamber KB-4 was constructed at the bottom of
this shaft. Additional chambers, KB-2 and KB-3, are listed for this nuclear test.
The positions of KB-2 and KB-3 are unknown. They were located somewhere
along the adit, not far from KB-1 (and possibly collocated there).
The aggregate yield of approximately 4.2 mt for this UNT thus resulted fromfour separate explosions located in different chambers. One way to carry out thetest would be to place all the devices in the deepest chamber, KB-4. The LLR for
this chamber, estimated from the cross-section in Figure 5, was about 1200 m.
The scaled depth of burial (SDOB) for 4.2 mt at 1200 m is 74 m/kt1/3 , only
marginally greater than the estimated minimum needed to prevent crateringin hard rock,43 70 m/kt1/3 . How then might the total yield be distributed in a
way that reduced the SDOB?
Reference 13 gives the yield range for each of the four devices in this test
as 1.5–10 mt for the largest, presumably in KB-4; and 150–1500 kt for each of
the others, presumably in KB-1, -2, -3. The LLR values for KB-4 and KB-1 wereabout 1200 m and 600 m, respectively, from the cross-section shown in Figure 5,
and approximately 600 m for KB-2 and KB-3 also. A distribution of the aggregate 4.2 mt yield, which significantly raises the overall SDOB from 74 m/kt1/3 ,would be to have 380 kt in each of KB-1, -2, -3 and the remainder (about 3 mt)
in KB-4. The SDOB for each chamber would then be about 83 m/kt1/3 . If thechambers KB-1, -2, -3 were not far apart, it would be more appropriate to groupthe three smaller devices into one, for purposes of finding a value for the SDOB.
In this case the value is 77 m/kt1/3 with 3.7 mt in KB-4 and about 500 kt at theupper level.
Whatever the distribution of yields in this test, the safety rule LLR ≥100 m/kt1/3 appears not to have been followed, and the reported value LLR =95 m/kt1/3 is inconsistent with the aggregate yield of 4.2 mt and the LLR values we have discussed. Naturally, the superposition of shock waves from themain charge at KB-4 together with those of other charges in KB-1, KB-2, KB-3
exceeded the seismic effect associated with that from each chamber taken separately. The rockslide was a result of this superposition. It may also be notedthat any distribution of yield which placed significant seismic sources at theupper level of the main adit would lead unavoidably to larger seismic signals
compared to a total of 4.2 mt at the KB-4 level, since underground explosions

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of fixed charge size generate larger seismic signals when fired at shallower
depths.44
As well as the difference in surface effects for these two largest undergroundtests, there was a difference in that the largest UNT in a shaft (27 October1973) led to a significant swarm of aftershocks.38,45 Thus Logachev14 wrotethat 19 earthquakes were recorded during the 14 hours after this explosion.
Nine events among them, with teleseismic magnitudes mb ranging from 4.0 to
4.6, were located by the International Seismological Centre. But no significant
aftershock activity was reported following the UNT of 12 September 1973.

ACCIDENTS AND RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION
Three accidental releases of significant radioactivity occurred at NZTS during
the underground nuclear testing program, though only two of these resulted inwhat official Russian sources5,14,46 describe as “emergency situations.”
The first accident occurred on 14 October 1969, when two nuclear charges
totaling 540 kt (the announced yield13 ) were detonated in separate adits at
Matochkin Shar (A-7 and A-9). This was the most serious accident of the UNT
program at NZTS. A gas-stream jet burst to the surface one hour after the testfrom a tectonic fault on a mountain slope at some distance from adit A-9. The
level of gamma radiation jumped to several hundred roentgens per hour. For
some 40–50 minutes, many test personnel were exposed to the resulting radiation hazard. Most were subjected to a radiation dose of about 40–80 roentgens.
An action plan for emergency situations was absent, and apparently the leadership was panic-stricken and immediately left the test field, abandoning a few
hundred remaining people.14 Only 40–60 min later were personnel evacuated toa safety area. Ten days later, people who had suffered radiation exposure weretransported to a hospital in Moscow, by ship and train, to have their first medical examination about three weeks after the accident.14 More than 80 people
were subjected to a radiation dose of about 40 roentgens, and 344 participantsof the test suffered from the high level of radiation.14 Radiation in this area is
now described as near the background level.
No official explanation for this radioactive release has yet been published.
The informal opinion of experts is that there was a thermal decompositionof a dolomite cement that was used for tamping the charge chamber, and forstemming along the length of the adit. The pressure in the chamber may havereached 45 atmospheres due to high levels of carbon dioxide, following a reaction
with CO2 content in the rocks and stemming exposed to the nuclear explosive
charge.14
Here we may note that Mikhailov, in his personal description of nuclear
testing at Novaya Zemlya,18 explained why the spreading of radioactive gas
was associated with the smell of hydrogen sulfide: “it meant that pyrite crystals

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya[which were present in abundance near the shot point underground] . . . were
decomposing.”
The second acknowledged accident occurred on 2 August 1987, following
the detonation of a 150 kt test in adit A-37A at Matochkin Shar (yield from
Mikhailov13 ). A powerful burst of a radioactive “gas-jet-stream” occurred justabove the mouth of the adit, just 1.5 minutes after the explosion. It was later
established that gas penetrated along a geologic fault that extended along theadit axis and hot gases melted the surface ice. In this case, an emergency program was immediately instituted. Fourteen helicopters, waiting two miles away,
evacuated all staff within a period of several minutes. It is reported that not
one case of radiation sickness occurred among the test site personnel.
Another accident, which occurred on 27 September 1973, is described only
in Logachev’s book.14 In this case, 20 minutes after an explosion was conductedin the borehole Yu-4 at Krasino, a radioactive gas-stream-jet suddenly burst to
the surface some 1500 m away from the epicenter. The yield of this explosion,
based on its seismic magnitude of 5.89,10 was about 120 kt. It was found laterthat gas from the cavity left by the explosion penetrated along a tectonic fault.
A small area (about 0.2 sq. km) around this fault is still a restricted zone.
Even recently, the radiation level there is 40–50 times higher than near themouth of the borehole. Other published Russian summaries of the radioactive
aftermaths of UNEs at NZTS do not mention this case, only that “low gas
seepage was observed near the mouth of the shaft.” It is seen clearly from thiscase, that postexplosion radiation effects were commonly ignored by authors ofofficial Russian publications. Note that in all three accidents described here,radioactive gas rapidly migrated to the surface through a geologic fault.
A description of the radiological consequences of each UNT at the NZTS issummarized in Appendix 6 of this article. The record of containment failureslisted in this Appendix translates into a series of significant technical challenges
for a nation that would attempt to execute and confidently conceal a militarily
significant nuclear test program. A review of Soviet nuclear test containment
practice was published in 2001.47

HYDRONUCLEAR AND EXPOSURE-TO-RADIATION EXPERIMENTS
Besides the nuclear explosions, NZTS was used for so called hydronuclear48
and hydrodynamic experiments to study the behavior of nuclear materials andthe physical processes taking place in a developing nuclear explosion of a nuclear charge. Several test areas were equipped especially for studying models
of nuclear devices and nuclear weapons components.
A hydronuclear explosion has been defined as “a physical experiment withmodels of nuclear devices without significant nuclear energy release (not higher
than the energy of the chemical explosives). HNEs are the unique way to study

27

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Khalturin et al.

physical processes in the nuclear charge during the explosion.”14 A total of 89
hydronuclear experiments were conducted in the USSR before 1990, two ofthem in the atmosphere, 72 on the surface, and 15 underground. Four of theseexperiments were done in NZTS.14
Concerning a relevant Russian characterization of “hydronuclear” and“hydrodynamic” experiments (see the Introduction to Chapter 3 of reference13), we note that “Experiments with nuclear energy release less than one
ton of chemical explosive are not included into the list of nuclear tests (bothmilitary and PNEs). Such experiments are laboratory explosion experimentswith radioactive fissionable materials and they are not classified as atomic
weapon tests. Following the American classification such experiments are called
HYDRONUCLEAR experiments. More than 90 such experiments were conducted in the USSR. The nuclear energy release during most of these experiments was less than 100 kg of chemical explosive equivalent.”
The same reference also remarks that: “Into the list of nuclear tests, experiments with nuclear and fissionable materials were naturally not included.
Such experiments were conducted at nuclear test sites. They are not connectedwith nuclear explosive charge or the realization of the explosive chain reaction or any type of chain reactions. Following the American classification such
experiments are called HYDRODYNAMICAL TESTS or experiments. Theseexperiments entail laboratory study of the materials and parameters of nonnuclear processes.”49
Since 1994, numerous additional hydrodynamic and hydronuclear experiments have been successfully carried out at NZTS. Their main goal was simulating nuclear accidents and developing methods to prevent unintended nuclear explosive energy release.14 A series of hydrodynamic experiments was
carried out in 1995–1996. Mikhailov writes in his preface to reference 14 thatthe results of these experiments were “super positive” and allowed Russia subsequently to sign the CTBT. Successful experiments were also carried out in
1997.50
As in the U.S., experiments were also done to evaluate the ability of different items of military equipment, including rockets, to function properly whensubjected to high levels of radiation. Logachev14 mentions two tests that wereused for this purpose (9 October 1977 and 26 August 1984), and indicates thatsuch experiments accompanied most UNTs. A sophisticated system was constructed to transport the intensive radiation along the tunnel to a speciallyconstructed closed chamber, in which the equipment to be subjected to radiation
was emplaced.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The main official Russian publication13 describing nuclear testing of the USSR
notes that

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya
Nuclear tests set standards and in an important way were a unique technological activity which was based on the efforts of enormous groups involving tensof thousands of specialists. The results of this activity gave a foundation for the
military effectiveness, reliability, and safety, of the nuclear arsenal and national
security of Russia. . . . The program of nuclear tests in the USSR from 1949 to 1962
was a decisive step in the creation of a system of nuclear weapons for the USSR
and transformed the USSR into a nuclear superpower.

In this article we have presented activities at the Novaya Zemlya Test Sitewith few comparisons against nuclear testing elsewhere, but of course these
activities at NZTS did not occur in isolation. The same publication just quoted
notes that, in carrying out the nuclear test program of the USSR, it was almost
always necessary to catch up with the United States. The first U.S. nuclear test
and two nuclear bombs used against Japan in 1945 were followed only four years
later by the USSR’s first nuclear test, in August 1949. The first fully-contained
U.S. underground nuclear test in 1957 was followed about four years later by
the first USSR UNT. Other “firsts” in the U.S. nuclear test program usually took
less than four years for the USSR to emulate. This applies to the first test of a
nuclear explosion at the 100 kt level, the first test of a thermonuclear device,and the first high-altitude nuclear explosion. On the other hand, the Soviet
Union led the U.S. with the first test of a thermonuclear weapon dropped froma plane, and the yield of BIG IVAN has never been exceeded. Both superpowers blew up many ships with underwater nuclear tests, and tested the effectsof nuclear explosions on soldiers. Thus it seems more appropriate to note howsimilar the U.S. and Soviet nuclear test programs were, rather than to emphasize where one was ahead of the other. The driving imperative of each side was
the success of the other, and the perceived need to compete in nuclear testing
became one of the most direct expressions of the nuclear arms race between thetwo countries. In part it was perhaps “saber-rattling” on a grand scale, rather
than a dispassionate series of technical evaluations of new nuclear devices.
Of course the decades of Soviet nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya were
the subject of intense monitoring efforts by western nations. We have not described these efforts here, but note that over time it has become possible tomonitor even the underground environment on Novaya Zemlya for the possibility of nuclear testing down to very small yields. A practical example of a small
earthquake, detected and identified in August 1997 but initially misinterpreted(according to news stories) within the U.S. government as a small nuclear test,
was a celebrated cause51 that resulted in several open papers demonstrating
the earthquake origin of the recorded signals. Earthquakes of magnitude 3.0
and 2.5 near the Novaya Zemlya test site were detected in February 2002 andOctober 2003, respectively, with high signal-to-noise ratios, by sensors of theInternational Monitoring System operated for the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty Organization.52 Such magnitudes, if due to well-coupled underground

29

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Khalturin et al.

nuclear tests, would be associated with yields down at the level of a few tens oftons of TNT equivalent.
Given the remote setting of Novaya Zemlya, with its high winds, rugged
topography, and permafrost conditions, and given the execution there of nuclear
tests having a total yield of about 265 mt, it is appropriate to conclude by usinga phrase taken from the sentences quoted above: nuclear testing at Novaya
Zemlya was indeed a “unique technological activity,” albeit one in which bothsuperpowers engaged.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank the library staff of the Russian Academy of Sciences working in the Institute of the Physics of the Earth and the Institute of Dynamics of Geospheresfor considerable assistance. This work was partly supported by the U.S. Department of State. It is Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory contribution no. 6778.

NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. V. I. Khalturin, T. G. Rautian, and P. G. Richards, “Absolute locations for underground nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya,” ms. in preparation for the Bulletin of the
Seismological Society of America, 2005; and V. I. Khalturin, T. G. Rautian, and P. G.
Richards, “Yields for underground nuclear explosions at the Novaya Zemlya Test Site,”
ms. in preparation for the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 2005. The
magnitude-yield relation for the northern area of underground testing at Novaya Zemlya
differs slightly from this relation for the southern area.
2. F. von Hippel, “Arms Control Physics: the New Soviet Connection,” Physics Today
42:39–46 (1989).
3. V. S. Bocharov, L. P. Vladimirsky, and A. M. Novikov, “Estimation of the Accuracy of
Explosion Yield by the Seismic Method for UNTs Conducted Under Known Conditions”(in Russian), Atomic Energy 65:114–119 (1988); and V. S. Bocharov, M.N. Georgievsky,
V. V. Kirichenko, and A. V. Peshkov, “Estimation of the Yield of UNEs Taking Accountof their Actual Seismic Efficiency” (in Russian), Atomic Energy 65:653–659 (1988); andV. S. Bocharov, S. A. Zelentsov, and V. I. Mikhailov, “Characteristics of 96 Underground
Nuclear Explosions at the Semipalatinsk Test Site” (in Russian), Atomic Energy 67:210–
214 (1989).
4. Y. E. Shipko and N. P. Filonov, “Northern Test Site” (in Russian), Information Bulletin of the Center of Public Information of Atomic Energy (Moscow, 4 June 1990), 22
pp.; V. N. Mikhailov, G. A. Tsirkov, V. M. Ivanov, Y. E. Shipko, and 19 co-authors, “Novaya Zemlya, Report of Soviet Experts Given at Soviet-Finland Meeting” (Moscow 28
February, 1991); V. N. Mikhailov, G. A. Tsirkov, V. M. Ivanov, Y. E. Shipko, and 19 coauthors, “Novaya Zemlya, Report of Soviet Experts given at International Symposium”(Ottawa, 21–26 April 1991); V. N. Mikhailov, G. E. Zolotukhin, A. M. Matushchenko,
and Yu V. Dubasov (eds.), “USSR Nuclear Explosions,” Issue 1. Northern Test Site: Nuclear Explosions, Radiology and Radiation Safety. Reference Information (in Russian),(St. Petersburg: Khlopin Institute, 1992), 195 pp.; K. N. Andrianov, V. N. Bazhenov, and29 co-authors, “Nuclear Explosions in the USSR,” V.1, Northern Test Site, Information
Handbook (in Russian), (Moscow, 1992); and V. N. Mikhailov, G. E. Zolutukhin, andA. M. Matushchenko (eds.), “Northern Test Site: the Reports and Presentations of theNuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya
Russian Experts at the International Conferences,” Meetings and Symposiums during
1990–1992 (in Russian) (St. Petersburg: Khlopin Institute, 1993), 406 pp.
5. Y. V. Dubasov, A. M. Matushchenko, and V. N. Mikhailov (eds.), “Nuclear Explosions
in the USSR. Northern Test Site,” Reference Publication (in Russian), (St. Petersburg:
Khlopin Radium Institute Publishing House, 1999), 163 pp.
6. These 10 collections are as follows:
IDG (1990), V.V. Adushkin and A.A. Spivak (eds.), Explosions in heterogeneous media(in Russian), (Moscow: Nedra), 287 pp.
IDG (1994a), Mechanical Effects of Underground Explosions (in Russian), (Moscow:
IDG), 390 pp. 28 papers published by IDG authors during last 25 years.
IDG (1994b), Dynamic Process in Geospheres (in Russian), (Moscow: IDG), 333 pp. 35
papers.
IDG (1995), Dynamic Processes in the Internal and External Geospheres (in Russian),(Moscow: IDG), 285 pp. 33 papers.
IDG (1996a), Physical Processes in Geospheres under the High Energy Signals (in Russian), (Moscow: IDG), 327 pp. 35 papers.
IDG (1996b), Seismic Monitoring of UNEs. Federal System of Seismic Observations andEarthquakes Prediction Bulletin, special issue v.3 (in Russian), (Moscow: IDG), 104
pp. 12 papers.
IDG (1998), Dynamic Processes in the Geospheres (in Russian), (Moscow: IDG), 320 pp.
37 papers.
IDG (1999), Physical Processes in the Geospheres (in Russian), (Moscow: IDG), 390 pp.
39 papers.
IDG (2001), Main results of Scientific Projects Conducted and Finished in the Instituteduring 1996–2001 (in Russian), (Moscow: IDG), 119 pp. (Short review of 64 projects),andIDG (2002). Non-stationary Processes in the Upper and Lower Geospheres (in Russian),(Moscow: IDG), 627 pp. 58 papers.
7. W. Leith, J. R. Matzko, J. Unger, and D. W. Simpson, “Geology and Image Analysisof the Soviet Nuclear Test Site at Matochkin Shar Novaya Zemlya, USSR,” Proceedingsof the 12th Annual DARPA/PL Seismic Research Symposium, DARPA, Arlington, VA(1990).
8. J. R. Matzko, “Underground Nuclear Testing on Novaya Zemlya: The Physical Background,” Post-Soviet Geography 35(3):123–141 (1994); J. R. Matzko, “Physical environment of the Underground Nuclear Test Site on Novaya Zemlya, Russia.” Open File Report
93–501, U.S. Geological Survey (Reston, VA, 1993), 28 pp.
9. J. Skorve and J. K. Skogan, “The NUPI Satellite Study of the Northern Underground Nuclear Test Area on Novaya Zemlya,” Report N 164, Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs (NUPI), (1992), 51 pp.
10. P. D. Marshall, D. Porter, J. B. Young, and P. A. Peachell, “Analysis of short-period
seismograms from explosions at the Novaya Zemlya test site in Russia,” Atomic Weapons
Establishment Report O 2/94, available from Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (London,
U.K., 1994).
11. P. G. Richards, “Accurate Estimates of the Absolute Location of UNTs at the Northern NZTS,” Proceedings of Second Workshop on IMS Location Calibration, 10–24 March
2000 (Oslo, Norway, 2000).

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Khalturin et al.
12. “Revolution in Map Making facilitates Verification Research,” in The MONITOR,
newsletter of the Nuclear Monitoring Research Office, DARPA, vol.3/No.1, Fall 1992.
13. There are two Russian editions and one English edition of this book: V. N. Mikhailov,
et al., USSR Nuclear Tests, vol. 1. The goals, general characteristics, and organization of nuclear tests. First nuclear tests (in Russian), (Sarov: VNIIEF, 1997). 287 pp.
V. N. Mikhailov, et al., USSR Nuclear Tests (in Russian), (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1997).
303 pp. V. N. Mikhailov, et al., USSR Nuclear Tests, vol. 1 (in English), (Begell-Atom,
1999).
14. V. A. Logachev, et al., Novaya Zemlya Test Site. Ensuring the General and Radiological Safety of the Nuclear tests. Facts, Testimonies, Memories (in Russian), (Moscow:
IzdAT, 2000), 485 pp.
15. B. I. Ogorodnikov, compiler, Nuclear Archipelago (in Russian), (Moscow: IzdAT
Pub. House, 1995), 255 pp. A collection of the memoirs of participants in the nuclear test
program at NZTS.
16. History of Atomic Project (in Russian), 17 volumes (Moscow: Russian ScientificCenter Kurchatov Institute, 1994–1998). Memories of several hundred participants of
the Soviet Nuclear Weapon project.
17. A. P. Vasiliev, et al., The Service born in the Atomic Century: The History of
the Soviet Special Monitoring Service (SSK) (in Russian), first edition in two volumes (Moscow: SSK, 1998), 840 pp. Also a second edition in three volumes (Moscow:
SSK 2002), 1112 pp. that includes hundreds of pictures and declassified early
documents.
18. V. N. Mikhailov, I am a Hawk. Memoirs of Atomic Energy Minister Mikhailov, (ThePentland Press: Durham), 195 pp.
19. V. S. Bocharov, S. A. Zelentsov, V. N. Mikhailov, “Characteristics of 96 Underground
Nuclear Explosions at the Semipalatinsk Test Site” (in Russian), Atomic Energy 67: 210–
214 (1989): See also reference 13.
20. Principally, we use announced yield information to calibrate seismic magnitudes.
See reference 1. The magnitude—yield relation is slightly different for northern andsouthern testing subareas.
21. K. A. Kondratieva, “Glacial Thicknesses and Cryolithozones of Novaya Zemlya:
Mapping on a Scale of 1:2,500,000” (translation from Russian), Moscow University Geology Bulletin 33(6):57–69 (1978); and K. A. Kondratieva, “Frozen-Temperature Map
of Novaya Zemlya, Scale 1:2,500,000” (in Russian), Problems of Cryology 18:80–101(Moscow, 1979).
22. K. A. Kondratieva, S. Y. Parmuzin and I. I. Petrozhitsky, “Cryological Mapping inStudy the Novaya Zemlya as a Place for Burial the Radioactive Waste” (in Russian),
Geoecology 6:83–92 (1996).
23. With reference to UNTs, the gas content is usually defined in the Soviet literatureas the weight % of the gas, mostly carbon dioxide, which emanated under thermal decomposition of the rock at 1000◦ C. The presence of pyrite crystals in rocks in the adits
led to hydrogen sulfide gas being released by several UNTs.
24. D. D. Sultanov, “Seismic Observations of UNTs on the NZTS” (in Russian),
The Problems of Seismic Monitoring of Underground Nuclear Explosions. Federal System of Seismological Observations 3:23–26 (Moscow, 1996). See also
reference 14.
25. L. A. Daragan-Sushcheva, A. D. Pavlenko, and Yu. I. Daragan-Sushcheva, “Crustal
Structure of the South Barents Depression,” Russian Academy of Sciences, Proceedings

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya
343, 2:217–219 (1995); B. M. Shipilov and B. V. Senin, “Deep Structure of the Floor of the
Barents Sea” (in Russian), Geotectonics 3 (1988); T. Zhang and T. Lay, “Effect of crustal
structure under the Barents and Kara Seas on short-period regional wave propagation
for Novaya Zemlya explosions: Empirical relations,” Bull. Seism. Soc. Amer. 84(4):1132–
1147 (Aug. 1994).
26. According to Volume 2, page 13 of Nuclear Tests of the USSR (Sarov, 1997, seereference 13) the typical adit for UNTs (at the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya testsites) had cross-sectional area of about 10 to 12 sq. m and a gradient of about 0.25 to0.30 degree toward the exit. The standard rate of adit construction was about 100 m permonth.
27. E. A. Shitikov, “In interests of the Navy,” Nuclear Archipelago (in Russian),(Moscow: IzdAT, 1995), pp. 60–75.
28. V. D. Khristoforov, “Underwater explosions on Guba Chernaya” (in Russian), History of Atomic Project 6:110–117 (Moscow, Kurchatov Institute, 1997).
29.

See p. 73 of reference 15.

30.

See pp. 144–148 of reference 14.

31. The BIG IVAN bomb was 8 m long and had a diameter of 2.1 m, according to pp.
82–84 of reference 42.
32. K-L. Grönhaug, “The Nuclear Atmospheric Explosions on Novaya Zemlya. Estimates of Positions, Energy and Radiation Release,” Conference on Radiological Problems
in the Nordic Regions. (Tromse, Norway, November 21–22, 1991).
33.

See for example the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, 31 October 1991.

34. V. V. Adushkin and K. I. Goreliy, “Reaction of the ionosphere to atmospheric nuclear
explosions” (in Russian), in Dynamic Processes in Geospheres, (Moscow: IDG, 1994),
pp. 239–248; V. V. Adushkin and K. I. Goreliy, “Global Variation of layers fo-F2 after
Atmospheric Nuclear Explosion 58 mt at NZTS” (in Russian), in Dynamic Processes in
the Internal and External Geospheres (Moscow: IDG, 1995), pp. 82–87.
35. Yu. N. Smirnov, “Three interesting episodes in the Soviet nuclear program”, in E. S.
Husebye and A. M. Dainty (eds.), Monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1996), pp. 11–24.
36.

Magnitudes, from reference 10.

37. V. D. Garnov, “Twelve nuclear explosions in the atmosphere in the Guba Suleymenova region” (in Russian), History of Atomic Project 11:215–219 (Moscow: Kurchatov
Institute, 1997); M. Enerva, J. L. Stevens, and J. Murphy, “Analysis of Russian hydroacoustic data,” Technical Report DTRA-TR-01-19 to the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, 193 pp., November 2004.
38. F. Ringdal, “Study of Low-Magnitude Seismic Events near the Novaya Zemlya
Nuclear Test Site”, Bull. Seism. Soc. Am. 87(6):1563–1575 (1997).
39. Our value of 4.2 mt for the total yield of the 12 September 1973 UNT is derived
as follows: the annual total of all tests at NZ for 1973 is given by Mikhailov et al.
(1997) as 7820 kt; and there were just three UNTs that year with magnitudes 6.97 (12Sept., Matochkin Shar), 5.89 (27 Sept. Krasino), and 6.98 (27 Oct, Krasino). The yieldof the last test, Y = 3500 kt has been given by Adushkin et al. (1996) and Logachev(2000, p. 241). The relatively small event at Krasino with mb 5.89 corresponds to a yield
about 120 kt with error not more than about 50 kt. Hence the 12 Sept. UNT yield wasabout 4200 kt. The accuracy of this number depends principally on 3500 kt and 7820 kt
being accurate values for the yield of the 27 Oct UNT, and the total yield at NZ in
1973.

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Khalturin et al.
40. V. V. Adushkin, Yu. V. Dubasov, A. M. Matushchenko, et al., Description and Estimation of the Environmental Conditions at Novaya Zemlya Test Site (in Russian), (Sarov:
Russian Federal Nuclear Center, 1996), 114 pp.
41. In terms of yield and depth of burial, this single-fired 3.5 mt shot in a deep shaft
was quite similar to the U.S. underground nuclear test “CANNIKIN” conducted in the
Aleutians in 1971.
42. V. N. Mikhailov, et al., USSR Nuclear Tests, vol. 2, Technology of Nuclear Tests (inEnglish), (Begell-Atom, 1999), 302 pp.
43. F. A. McKeown, “Buried pressurized cavity model of venting from nuclear explosion
cavities,” U.S. Geological Survey report 474–146 to the Nevada Operations Office, U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission (NTS 236), (1972), 44 pp.
44. See, for example, P. G. Richards, and W. Y. Kim, “Equivalent Volume Sources for Explosions at Depth: Theory and Observations”, ms. accepted for publication, Bull. Seism.
Soc. Am.
45. H. Israelsson, R. Shunga, and O. Dahlman, “Aftershocks caused by the Novaya
Zemlya explosion on October 27, 1973,” Nature 247:450–452 (1974).
46. V. P. Bazhenov, V. P. Dumik, et al., “Northern Test Site: Chronology and Radiation
Phenomenology of UNTs.” (Moscow, 1992. English translation in Science & Technology,1993). Also V. N. Mikhailov, V. P. Dumik, A. M. Matushchenko, and V. G. Safronov,“Ecology Safety of the Underground Nuclear Explosions at Novaya Zemlya,” Proceedingsof Conference: The Radiological Problems in Nordic Region, (Norway, 21–22 November
1991), 50 pp.
47. V. V. Adushkin and W. Leith, “The containment of Soviet underground nuclear
explosions,” U.S. Geological Survey Open File Report 01–0312, (2002), 52 pp.
48. V. N. Mikhailov, et al., “Nuclear Tests of the USSR. Hydronuclear Experiments” (inRussian), (Sarov: Russian Federal Nuclear Center, 1998), 22 pp.
49. From these definitions it may be inferred that the term hydronuclear applies toexperiments that reach criticality and entail some nuclear energy release, whereas theterm hydrodynamic applies to experiments that remain below criticality. For an experiment to be considered hydronuclear its nuclear energy release is required to be limited,for example (in one definition) to not be more than about four pounds of TNT equivalent.
During the mid-1990s and prior to deciding that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty would be a zero-yield treaty, various upper limits larger than four pounds wereconsidered.
50. These experiments are described in Mikhailov’s introduction to Logachev’s book(see reference 14).
51. See news stories in the Washington Post, Oct 20 and Nov 4, 1997; also P. G. Richards
and W. Y. Kim, “Testing the nuclear test-ban treaty,” Nature 389:781–782 (1997).
52. NORSAR Scientific Report No. 2-2004, Semiannual Technical Summary, 1
January–30 June 2004, Frode Ringdal (ed.), pp. 36–37.

APPENDIX 1
Content of the V.N. Mikhailov et al., 1997 book‘‘USSR NUCLEAR TESTS”
Page numbers here refer to the Sarov edition of reference 13

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 1. Nuclear tests and development of USSR nuclear weapons
Chapter 2. The state system for conducting nuclear tests . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 3. Nuclear weapon tests and peaceful nuclear explosions . . .
Appendix 1. Nuclear explosions conducted in the USSR during
1949–1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix 2. USSR Peaceful Nuclear Explosions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix 3. Summary of nuclear tests conducted by five nuclear
powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 4. The first (1949) nuclear test in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 5. The first (1953) thermonuclear tests RDS-6 and RDS-37 .
Chapter 6. Military maneuvers with a real atomic bomb (Y = 40 kt)
in the Totsk region (Sept 1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pages
1
9
45
91
125
165
175
179
212
239

The full official list of Soviet nuclear tests is included in Chapter 3/Appendix 1.
The following information about each test is presented in the list:
1. Number of explosions. The total was 715 nuclear tests, including 496 UNTs.
2. Date (based on Moscow time = GMT + 3 hours).
3. Place (for Peaceful Nuclear Explosions) or weapons test site (for UNTs).
4. Before 1963: medium and indication of position—e.g., atmospheric, surface.
Since 1963: the tunnel or shaft number, for each component explosion in thetest.
5. The main purpose of the nuclear explosion, for each component explosion.
6. One of four yield ranges for each single nuclear device in the test: less than
0,001 ton, 0.001–20 kt, 20–150 kt, 150–1500 kt. The yield range 1,500–
10,000 kt is indicated only for the two most powerful explosions at NZTS: 12
Sept 1973 and 27 Oct 1973. A specific yield was indicated for all 124 PNEs,
including 7 PNEs conducted at the Semilapatinsk Test Site (STS) and 20
UNTs at STS. Yield intervals are shown for each of other UNTs.

APPENDIX 2
Content of the V. Logachev et al., 2000 bookPage numbers here are for reference 14
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pages
Preface of Acad. V.N. Mikhailov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15

35

36

Khalturin et al.

Part 1. Geographical and historical aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Chapter 1. Novaya Zemlya. History and geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chapter 2. History of the NZTS, underwater and atmospheric tests . . . 59
Part 2. Ensuring of the general and radiological safety ofunderwater and atmospheric nuclear tests conducted at the NZTS . 92
Chapter 3. General safety principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
References (36 titles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Chapter 4. Ensuring the safety of the participants of the tests . . . . . . . . 138
References (19 titles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Chapter 5. Ensuring the safety of the NZ population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
5.1. Radiological monitoring system on USSR territory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.2. Radiological situation off Novaya Zemlya after
atmospheric explosions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
5.3. Radiological situation on Novaya Zemlya territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
References (37 titles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Part 3. Safety of participants and population during UNEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Chapter 6. Main goals, parameters and peculiarities of the UNEs . . . . . 232
6.1. Main goals, stages, and documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
6.2. Dangerous situations that occurred during UNEs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
6.3. Main characteristics of the UNEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
6.4. Safety measures in conducting the UNEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
References (15 titles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Chapter 7. Ensuring the radiological safety of the personnel
and population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
References (22 titles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Chapter 8. Ensuring seismic safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
References (8 titles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
Part 4. Medical-biological studies. Radioecological situationof the NZTS area and surrounding territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
Chapter 9. Medical-biological investigations on the NZTS territory
during the conduct of nuclear explosions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
References (29 titles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Chapter 10. Recent radiological situation on the NZTS and the whole
Novaya Zemlya Archipelago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
References (19 titles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
Chapter 11. Radioactive pollution of nuclear explosions at NZTS
and at other world nuclear test sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
References (27 titles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
Post Scriptum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
Supplements (including the chronology of all Soviet nuclear tests during
1949–1962 and heights of 193 atmospheric nuclear explosions at STS
and NZTS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

APPENDIX 3
Content of the Dubasov et al., 1999 book ‘‘Nuclear Explosions in
the USSR, Northern Test Site’’Editorial Board: Yu. V. Dubasov, A. M. Matushchenko, and V. N. Mikhailov,
Radium Institute Publishing House, St. Petersburg, 1999, 163 pp.
Page numbers here are for reference 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1. Basic information about Nuclear Tests at NZTS . . . . . . . . . . .
Number and main parameters of explosions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meteorological conditions and climate factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parameters and level of recent radiological situation in the Russian
Far North. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Criteria of radiological and seismic safety of underground nuclear
explosions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recent radiological investigations at the NZTS area and connection
with mass media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 2. Northern Test Site. Chronology and Radiation
Phenomenology of the Underground Nuclear Explosions . . . . . . . . .
Radiological consequences of UNTs at STS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Detailed description of radiation phenomenology of each UNT
conducted at NZTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 3. Experts’ reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 4. Bibliography and other sources of information. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pages
13
13
15
23
26
31
42
46
48
68
155

APPENDIX 4
Chronology, Yield and Height of 85 Atmospheric Nuclear
Explosions Conducted at Novaya Zemlya Test Site from 1957
to 1962
N

Date

Y, kt

H, m

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Sep 24 1957
Oct 06 1957
Feb 23 1958
Feb 27 1958
Feb 27 1958
Mar 14 1958
Mar 21 1958
Sep 30 1958
Sep 30 1958
Oct 02 1958

1600
2900
860
250
1500
40
650
1200
900
290

2000
2120
2500
2500
n/a
n/a
2500
1500
2500
1400
(Continued on next page)

Comment

37

38

Khalturin et al.
Appendix 4: (Continued)
N

Date

Y, kt

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Oct 02 1958
Oct 04 1958
Oct 05 1958
Oct 06 1958
Oct 10 1958
Oct 12 1958
Oct 15 1958
Oct 18 1958
Oct 19 1958
Oct 19 1958
Oct 20 1958
Oct 21 1958
Oct 22 1958
Oct 24 1958
Oct 25 1958
Oct 25 1958
Sep 10 1961
Sep 10 1961
Sep 12 1961
Sep 13 1961
Sep 14 1961
Sep 16 1961
Sep 18 1961
Sep 20 1961
Sep 22 1961
Oct 02 1961
Oct 04 1961
Oct 06 1961
Oct 08 1961
Oct 20 1961
Oct 23 1961
Oct 25 1961
Oct 30 1961
Oct 31 1961
Oct 31 1961
Nov 02 1961
Nov 02 1961
Nov 04 1961
Nov 04 1961
Nov 04 1961
Aug 05 1962
Aug 10 1962
Aug 20 1962
Aug 22 1962
Aug 25 1962
Aug 27 1962
Sep 02 1962
Sep 08 1962
Sep 15 1962
Sep 16 1962
Sep 18 1962
Sep 19 1962
Sep 21 1962
Sep 25 1962
Sep 27 1962

40
9
15
5.5
68
1450
1500
2900
40
0
440
2
2800
1000
190
<0.1
2700
12
1150
6
1200
830
1000
150–1500
260
250
1500–10000
4000
15
1450
12500
300
58, 000
5000
150–1500
120280
15
150–1500
6
21100
150–1500
2800
1600
1500–10000
4200
80
1900
3100
3250
1350
1500–10000
2400
19100
>10000H, m

Comment

n/a
800
1200
1200
n/a
n/a
2150
n/a
n/a
900
Failure
n/a
270
2070
1525
1500
300
Failure
2000
390
1190
250
1700
n/a
ICBM
1500
ICBM
1600
1300
1500
2100
ICBM
2700
1450
n/a
3500
1450
4000
2200
1530
1400
1500
1770
1750
2240
3600
1560
2500
ICBM
1700
2980
3000
1300
1730
n/a
n/a
2000
3280
3000
4090
3900
(Continued on next page)Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya
Appendix 4: (Continued)
N

Date

Y, kt

H, m

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Oct 07 1962
Oct 09 1962
Oct 22 1962
Oct 27 1962
Oct 29 1962
Oct 30 1962
Nov 01 1962
Nov 03 1962
Nov 03 1962
Dec 18 1962
Dec 18 1962
Dec 20 1962
Dec 22 1962
Dec 23 1962
Dec 23 1962
Dec 23 1962
Dec 24 1962
Dec 24 1962
Dec 25 1962
Dec 25 1962

320
15
8200
260
360
280
240
390
45
110
69
8.3
6.3
430
8.3
2.4
1100
24200
3100
8.5

1400
3000
3230
1550
1550
1500
1500
4000
710
1600
1500
1070
1050
1460
1470
1270
1320
3750
2250
990

Comment

Notes: 1—The height was not announced for 12 atmospheric nuclear explosions (ANEs) andthe yield was not announced for eight ANEs. Information is from references 13 and 14.
2—ANEs on 19 October 1958 and 25 October 1958 failed and had near zero yield.
3—For four ANEs the nuclear charges were delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs), launched from a base in South East Siberia at a distance of 3000–4000 km from
NZTS. They were exploded “somewhere above the Barents Sea” and are included as NZTS
tests.

APPENDIX 5
Information on 39 UNTs at NZTS , including their seismic
magnitude and annual yield (kt)
1
Test
NN

2
Year

3
Date

1
2
3
4
5

1964
1964
1966
1966
1967

Sep 18
Oct 25
Oct 27
Oct 27
Oct 27

6
7

1968
1969

Nov 07
Oct 14

8
9
10
11
12

1970
1971
1972
1972
1973

Oct 14
Sep 27
Jul 27
Aug 28
Sep 124Tunnelor shaft5
Numbersubexpl.

tun G
tun B
tun A-1
tun A-2
tun A-4
tun A-5
tun A-3
tun A-7
tun A-9
tun A-6
tun A-8
sh Yu-31
tun A-16
tun B-1

1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
1
3
4
1
4
4

6
mb AWE

7
Annual
yield

4.19
4.82
6.49

20
1,400

5.98

260

6.13
6.18

330
540

6.79
2,200
6.67
2,450
<3.0
6.49
1,130
6.97
7,820
(Continued on next page)

39

40

Khalturin et al.
Appendix 5: (Continued)
1
Test
NN

2
Year

3
Date

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

1973
1973
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1977
1977
1978
1978
1979
1979
1980

Sep 27
Oct 27
Aug 29
Nov 02Aug 23
Oct 18
Oct 18
Oct 21
Sep 29Oct 20
Sep 01
Oct 09Aug 10
Sep 27
Sep 24
Oct 18
Oct 11

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

1981
1982
1983
1983
1984
1984
1987
1988
1988
1990

Oct 01
Oct 11
Aug 18
Sep 25
Aug 26
Oct 25
Aug 02
May 07
Dec 04
Oct 244Tunnelor shaft5
Numbersubexpl.

sh Yu-4
sh Yu-1
tun A-11
sh Yu-5N
tun A-10
sh Yu-6N
sh Yu-7
tun A-12
tun A-14
tun A-15
tun A-17
tun A-7P
tun A-18
tun A-19
tun A-32
tun A-20
tun A-25
tun A-30
tun A-23
tun A-37
tun A-40
tun A-21
tun A-100
tun A-26
tun A-37A
tun A-24
tun A-27
tun A-13N

1
1
5
1
8
2
1
5
2
5
4
1
6
7
3
4
4
3
4
4
5
4
1
4
5
3
5
8

6
mb AWE
5.89
6.98
6.58
6.81
6.55
6.75
6.60
5.83
4.98
5.66
4.36
6.00
5.63
5.77
5.79
5.76
5.97
5.58
5.91
5.77
3.80
5.82
5.82
5.58
5.89
5.61

7
Annual
yield

3,430
4,190

140
130
240
280
130
140
80
250
110
150
220
70

Notes: Comments on specific columns of the Table:
1—number NN of each UNT corresponds the number on the official Russian list (reference 13);
4—tunnel codes (tun) are for UNTs in the northern subarea (Matochkin Shar), shaft codes (sh)are for the southern subarea (Krasino);
5—number of single nuclear devices in each tunnel or shaft;
6—teleseismic magnitude of each test (from reference 10);
7—total yield of all UNTs (in kt), for each year (from reference 13).

APPENDIX 6
Summary of information from Russian sources on radioactive
pollution, including radioactive rare gas seepage, gamma
radiation, and venting episodes, for 39 UNTs at NZTS

1
#

2
Year

3
Date

4
Containment orType of pollution

1
2

1964
1964

Sep 18
Oct 25

SoR
SoR

6
7
Radioactive pollution
5
T min

Gamma
radiation, R/h

1
30

2
1.5

Area

8
Comment

OnsiteOffsite(Continued on next page)Nuclear Testing at Novaya Zemlya

Appendix 6: (Continued)
6
7Radioactive pollution

1
#

2
Year

3
Date

4
Containment or
5
Gamma
Type of pollution T min radiation, R/h

3
4
5

1966
1966
1967
1967
1968
1969
1969

Oct 27
Oct 27
Oct 21
Oct 21
Nov 07
Oct 14
Oct 14SoR
SoR
SoR
G.cont.
SoR
G.cont.
V.R.!

10
10
23
No
60
No
60

8
9
10
11
12
13

1970
1971
1972
1972
1973
1973

Oct 11
Sep 27
Jul 27
Aug 28
Sep 12
Sep 27

SoR
SoR
G.cont.
SoR
SoR
SoR

15
15
No
10
10
12

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

1973
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1977

Oct 27
Aug 29
Nov 02Aug 23
Oct 18
Oct 18
Oct 21
Sep 29Oct 20
Sep 01

24
25
26
27
28
29

1977
1978
1978
1979
1979
1980

30
31
32
33
34
36

1981
1982
1983
1983
1984
1987

Oct 09Aug 10
Sep 27
Sep 24
Oct 18
Oct 11
Oct 11
Oct 01
Oct 11
Aug 18
Sep 25
Aug 26
Aug 02G.cont.
SoR
G.cont.
SoR
SoR
G.cont.
SoR
SoR
G.cont.
SoR
G.cont.
SoR
SoR
G.cont.
SoR
SoR
G.cont.
SoR
G.cont.
SoR
SoR
SoR
G.cont.
V.R.!

No
12
No
50
3
No
10
10
No
15
No
5
7
No
10
10
No
10
No
12
10
15
No
1.5

37

1988 May 07 SoR

6
7

10

7
7
20
No
5
—
1000

Area

8
Comment

OffsiteOffsiteOnsiteContain.
OnsiteContain.
Venting,A
accident
250
Offsite1
OffsiteNo
Contain.
100
Offsite
2.2
Offsite3
Offsite,B
accident
No
Contain.
3
OffsiteNo
Contain.
1.5
Offsite
0.4
OnsiteNo
Contain.
250
Offsite3
OffsiteNo
Contain.
n/aOffsite
C1
No
Contain
C2
1000
OffsiteD
7
OffsiteNo
Contain.
300
Onsite1.5
OnsiteNo
Contain.
8
OffsiteNo
Contain.
0.25
Onsite0.5
Onsite0.5
OnsiteNo
Contain.
>500
Venting,Eradioact.
accident
1
Onsite(Continued on next page)

41

42

Khalturin et al.
Appendix 6: (Continued)
6
7Radioactive pollution

1
#

2
Year

3
Date

4
Containment orType of pollution

5
T min

Gamma
radiation, R/hArea

8Comment

38
39

1988
1990

Dec 04
Oct 24G.cont.
G.cont.

No
No

No
No

Contain.
Contain.

F
F

Columns:
1—Number of UNT in official Russian list (reference 13).
4—Containment or Type of radioactive pollution:
G.cont.—gas containment;
SoR—seepage of radioactive inert gases;
V.R.!—venting of radioactive gases and debris.
5—Time (in minutes) after the explosion when gas seepage appears.
6—Gamma radiation intensity in roentgen per hour near the tunnel or shaft after the UNT.
7—Area, where the radioactive gases were detected. Four levels of radioactive pollution
intensity used in the Table:
contain.—gas and debris containment;
onsite—radioactive gases were detected only in Test Site area;
offsite—radioactive gases were detected outside the Test Site;venting radioact.—venting of radioactivity, outburst of hot gases including steam.
Emergency situation.
8—Comments:
A—The emergency situation described in the text of the article.
B—Accident described in the present article. Both main Russian summaries of radioactive
aftermaths of UNTs leave out this case.
C1—After reference 14.
C2—After reference 5 and different from reference 14. Indicative of several contradictions in
Russian official publications describing levels of radioactive pollution.
D—The intensive seepage of radioactive gases caused a high level of gamma radiation(>1000 R/h!). This was the second UNT in tunnel A-7 (first one was on 14 Oct 1969). Repeatedusage of the same tunnel was the main reason of the intensive gases seepage.
E—The last and most dangerous accident. See description in the text of the article.
F—The two last UNTs were conducted at the scaled depth 120 m/kt1/3 . This was during
Gorbachev’s “perestroika” and “glasnost.” Strong public opinion (and movement) against
nuclear tests started at that time. It was the first occasion when representatives of the public
visited NZTS. Authorities ordered an increase in the depth of these explosions to avoid possible
accidents.