The Nakhodka Incident: Response and Lessons

1.

Chikara Sudo
G.S.D.F. 302 Engineering Commander andCommander of Camp Sabae
as well Lieutenant Colonel
Opening remarks2.

On-site activities of the Self-Defense Forces(1)

Dispatch of Self-Defense Forces for disaster-relief activities
Self-Defense Forces were ordered to five prefectures to respond to a disaster
caused by a spill of heavy oil. The Maritime Self-Defense Forces engaged in shipbased heavy oil recovery on the ocean, recovering about 600 kiloliters. The Air
Self- Defense Forces were ordered to Ishikawa Prefecture where they recovered
heavy oil by hand and also used aircraft to transport the recovered oil. The GroundSelf- Defense Forces were ordered to the prefectures of Niigata, Ishikawa, andFukui, where they recovered heavy oil by hand and by machine, and transported
the recovered oil.
The Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces recovered a combined total of 1,100
kiloliters and 24 1 ,000 sandbags-frill of oil. A total of 144,000 Self-Defense Forcepersonnel were involved in these activities, along with 11 ,900 vehicles, 600
aircraft, and 920 ships.

(2)

On-site activities of the Self-Defense Forces{ Video ( 12 minutes): "Activities of the Self-Defense Forces in Fukui and Ishikawa
Prefectures. }( 3)

Assessment of operations by the on-site commanding officer
The heavy oil that was spilled in this incident was unable to be recovered at sea
and washed ashore over a large area. The oil hardened from day to day andultimately solidified, which hampered the recovery process.
On the first day of disaster-relief by the Self-Defense Forces, we began with a"bucket relay" to recover the oil, but this was dauntingly slow going and inefficient.
From the second day onwards we were able to use machinery to full advantage,
including skimmers provided by the Petroleum Association of Japan, compressors
brought in on an experimental basis by a private company, "vacuum cars" todirectly suck up the oil, and storage pumps to remove the heavy oil. This greatly
improved efficiency.
The coastline involved was very cliffy. While industrial lifts and conveyor belts
were used to carry some of the oil recovered in sandbags, and helicopters provided
some of the transportation, there were many places where transport had to beaccomplished by hand.
As the on-site commanding officer, my days were spent searching for work
methods that would be both safe and efficient. My troops performed aggressively
and positively in spite of the fact that they were doing thankless work, covered inoil during cold, inclement weather. Their morale was bolstered by a strong
awareness that this was a local disaster affecting the community in which they1

resided and by a strong desire to take the lead in responding to it as the only troops
garrisoned in Fukui Prefecture.
3.

Self-Defense Force expertise in disaster response
The Ground Self-Defense Forces have been involved in relief activities for many different
kinds of disasters, including earthquake, heavy wind, flood, snow, and forest fires. We
therefore have response plans drawn up, and our experience has allowed ourorganizations to build up considerable expertise. We were not, however, prepared to deal
with disasters like this heavy oil spill.
I would draw your attention, however, to the fact that the Self-Defense Forces haveplayed highly visible roles in peace-keeping operations, in the response to the Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and in the response to the Sarin attack on the Tokyo
subway. This quite often leads people to ask if the Self-Defense Forces receive special
training for these activities. I personally do not believe special training for these kinds ofsituations to be necessary.
The Ground Self-Defense Forces trains its personnel in three distinct categories:
commissioned officers, sergeants, and enlisted men. Commissioned officers are trained tocommand battalions and companies; sergeants, platoons. Their training gives them theskills to direct their forces in whatever situation they may encounter. Therefore, if wegive our people at the sergeant level and above the people, equipment, and time theyneed to accomplish their orders, they are able to analyze what they need to do, decide on
a procedure for doing it, and lead their troops in its accomplishment.
Our troops are aware of their duty to fulfill the mission of the Self-Defense Forces. They
have the sense of responsibility, the discipline, and the solidarity needed to function as aunit. These are all mental qualities that are instilled in them on a day-to-day basis.
It is these factors that I think were instrumental in our disaster-relief activities.

4.
(1)

Assessment of the oil spill response equipment provided by the Petroleum
Association of Japan and/or others
Skimmers
The skimmers are designed to float on the water and be operated by remote control
as they automatically recover oil. However, they were not as useful as they could
have been under different circumstances because the heavy oil involved washighly viscous and it washed ashore in shallow, rocky areas.
Even still, the skimmers were the single most extensively used pieces ofmachinery in cleaning up this spill. We set the skimmers in areas in which heavy
oil was concentrated and used buckets to scoop up the oil and deposit it in
Fastanks and drum cans. In Oshima, which is an area of steep cliffs, the skimmers
were transported in by helicopter.
I would, however, like to suggest a couple of modifications in the hoses that I thinkwould make the skimmers easier to use. First, the hoses are long and hard, whichmakes them heavy and therefore hard to carry. There were cases in which kinks in
the hose prevented the oil from getting through. I think it would be better if thehoses were shorter and if they were made of an easily bended material like thatused in the vacuum car hoses.

2Second, we floated the skimmers on the surface of the water, but were unable tooperate them by remote control. The cause appears to be in the hardness andweight of the hoses. The hoses themselves, it would appear, need to be given somebuoyancy.
(2)

Vacuum cars
Vacuum cars were used to suck up the heavy oil deposited in drum cans by our"bucket relays" and transport it to temporary storage sites. We actually had excess
capacity and several of the vacuum cars were sitting idle, so we asked if wecouldn't use them to directly vacuum up stranded heavy oil. The answer was that
we could not because they would lose their suction if the hoses were extended. We
went ahead and tried anyway. What we did was to experimentally attach a
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe in the mid-section of the hose, and we found that bydoing so we could extend the hoses with little decrease in suction. This enabled us
to use all of our vacuum cars to full capacity.
By the third week, however, the heavy oil had become so viscous that the vacuum
cars were no longer able to recover it.

(3)

Storage pumps
The press reported that the Self-Defense Forces even cleaned off the rocks along
the coast. This was not quite accurate. We were having trouble recovering theheavy oil that had seeped into the spaces between rocks, so what we did was to use
storage pumps to push the oil back out to sea where we could then clean it up. This
did not, however, clean the rocks themselves.

(4)

Oil absorbnts
Oil absorbnts were quite suited to the recovery of comparatively low-viscosity oil
floating on the surface. We also tried using them in the final stages of oil recovery
and found them to be effective there as well.

(5)

Oil absorbing mats
As you saw from the video, our people literally were covered in oil during theclean-up, and one of the biggest tasks we faced was getting the oil off their rain
gear and boots. We first used kerosene to remove most of the heavy oil and thensprayed them with hot water. When doing this, we laid oil-absorbing mats under
the gear to prevent the oil from scattering.

5.

Lessons for future clean-up operations(1)

Manuals and equipment stockpiles
We think it is very important that we create manuals from our experiences withthis clean-up. We also think that equipment should be kept in readiness.
I have two specific proposals that I would like to add to this.
First, I would note that the heavy oil recovery efforts of local citizens andvolunteers ultimately involves direct recovery with buckets and scoops. If we are3

going to have recovery equipment and materials on-hand, we also need a system
whereby they can be provided to local citizens and volunteers through their civic
governments.
Second, the Ground Self-Defense Forces had primary responsibility for places that
local citizens and volunteers could not easily get to rocky areas and coastline
without road access. We used helicopters and rough-terrain vehicles to transport
the oil recovered from these areas, but there were limits to what these vehicles
could do and many cases in which oil had to be transported over long distances byhand. I would therefore like to suggest that research be done on a means oftransporting recovered oil directly from the ocean. For example, barges that pull inclose to the shallows to load the oil, or buoyant containers for the recovered oil that
could be pulled by fishing ships, for instance, to somewhere easier to off-load.
(2)

Local support
In the town of Mikuni, which was where the bow of the tanker drifted ashore andthe focal point in oil recovery operations, the mayor took the lead in clean-up
efforts, visiting the work sties every day to give direction and encouragement.
Town employees also pulled together to work on disaster-relief. We wereparticularly impressed by their willingness to accept Self-Defense Forces andvolunteers, to divide up work areas according to abilities, and to hold coordination
meetings. The town did everything it should have, and we in the Self-Defense
Forces hope that the next time we are called in to deal with a disaster that we areable to enjoy the kind of support and responsiveness provided by Mikuni.

6.

Closing remarks4