Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 54（2020）9-18

ArticleDescartes’s Problem

Naoki ARAKI ＊（Received Oct. 31, 2019）

Abstract
René Descartes insists that there are two distinct things in the world: mind and body. He
attempts to explain how these two things interact with each other but in vain. Why is that?
According to Buddhism, the reason is that the world is not divided as language segments theworld. Phenomena are one and whole thing but not divisible into several parts. But we divide theworld into parts using language and try to explain phenomena by combining words. So we fail tounderstand phenomena by language even though we continue to explain them in more and moredetails using words. In a sense, things words refer to are illusions that do not exist in advanceof language. We deceive ourselves that things exist independently of language. Descartes is no
exception. He deceives himself that mind and body exist independently of each other. But these twothings cannot be divided but are one and whole thing. So Descartes fails to explain how mind andbody interact with each other.
Key Words: body, mind, dualism, interaction, words, things, Buddhism

In the way we describe ourselves and the world

Introduction

we usually make a distinction between the mental

We usually think that there are already thingsand physical aspects. Mental aspects are such things

that words refer to from the outset. Descartes

as thinking, feeling, deciding, dreaming, imagining,further thinks that there are mind and body in thewishing, and so on. Physical ones include feet, limbs,

world and that these two are distinct from eachour brains, cups of tea, the Empire State building,other. Furthermore, he tries to solve the problem

and so on.(Warburton 1999: 130)of how these two interact with each other but invain. Why is that? In this paper, we shall examine

If there are mind and body in this world, thenDescartes’s problem of how mind and body interact

how can we explain the relationship between mind

with each other from a point of view of words andand body? This is called the Mind/Body Problem:

things.
When we do something, such as play tennis,

1. An Outline of the Mind/Body Problem

we use both our mental and our physical aspects:

We usually distinguish mental aspects fromphysical ones without doubting that:

we think about the rules of the game, where our
opponent is likely to play the next shot, and so on,
and we move our bodies. But is there a real division＊ epartment of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of Technology,
D
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp― 9 ―Naoki ARAKI

between mind and body, or is this just a convenient

accepting the soul, which is related to religion. As

way of talking about ourselves? The problem ofis well known, it is written in Genesis in the Old

explaining the true relationship between mind andTestament that God inspired “soul” into the first

body is known as the Mind/Body Problem.

human being, Adam, who was created from the dust(Warburton 1999: 130)of the ground (body, that is, substance) by God’s hand:To explain the relationship between mind andMind/body dualism is a view held by many

body, we have two ways. One is to accept both mind

people, particularly by those who believe that it

and body, the other to acknowledge only body but

is possible to survive our bodily death, either by

not mind:living in some kind of spirit world or by being
reincarnated in a new body. Both these views

Those who believe that mind and body arepresuppose that human beings are not just physicalseparate things, that each of us has both a mind andbeings, but rather that our most important part isa body, are called mind/body dualists. Those who

the non-physical mind or, as it is more often called

believe that the mental is in some sense the samein religious contexts, the soul. René Descartes isthing as the physical, that we are nothing moreprobably the most famous mind/body dualist: suchthan flesh and blood and have no separate mind

dualism is often called Cartesian dualism […].


substance, are known as physicalists.
(Warburton 1999: 131)

(Warburton 1999: 130-131)
Then, what does Descartes say about the

The difference between mind/body dualists andphysicalists is whether they believe in the existenceof mind independently of body. Those who believe in
it are mind/body dualists, and those who do not are

relationship between mind and body? Next, we shall
examine his dualism.

2. Descartes’s Dualism

physicalists. So they both believe in the existence of
not only body but also mind:

First of all, Descartes insists that he does exist
after denying that all things except him exist in theworld:

Dualism, as we have seen, involves a belief in theexistence of a non-physical substance: the mental.

Nonetheless I convinced myself that there is

A dualist typically believes that body and mind

nothing at all in the world, no sky, no earth, noare distinct substances which interact with eachminds, no bodies; it is not therefore also true that

other but remain separate. Mental processes, such

I do not exist? However, I certainly did exist, if

as thinking, are not the same as physical ones, such

I convinced myself of something. There is someas brain cells firing; mental processes occur in theunidentified deceiver, however, all power ful

mind, not in the body. The mind is not the living

and cunning, who is dedicated to deceiving me

brain. constantly. Therefore, it is indubitable that I also

(Warburton 1999: 131)

exist, if he deceives me. And let him deceive me as
Generally speaking, it is very difficult to understandmuch as he wishes, he will still never bring it about

how body can produce mind or consciousness. Thisthat I am nothing as long as I think I am something.

is one of the reasons why dualism is thought to beThus, having weighed up everything adequately, itplausible. Incidentally, in this respect John Searle (1980)

must finally be stated that this proposition ‘I am, I

may be a mind/body dualist because he denies thatthink’ is necessarily true whenever it is stated bymachines (body, that is, substance) can think like ame or conceived in my mind.(Descartes 1998: 23-24)

human being although he does not seem to confessthat he is.

According to Descartes, he does exist every time

As is easily guessed, belief in mind leads tohe thinks that he is something.

― 10 ―

Descartes’s Problem

body is injured I (who am nothing but a thinking

Next, Descartes confirms the existence of bodies:thing) would not feel pain as a result; instead I
As regards the body, however, I had no doubts. I

would perceive such an injury as a pilot perceives

thought I knew its nature clearly and, if I ever triedby sight if some part of the ship is damaged.

to describe how I conceived it in my mind, I would

Likewise, when my body needs food or drink, I

have explained it as follows: by a body I understandwould understand this more clearly and would notanything that can be limited by some shape, canhave confused sensations of hunger and thirst. For

be circumscribed in a place, and can so fill a spacethese sensations of thirst, hunger, pain, etc., arethat every other body is excluded from it. It can be

undoubtedly mere confused ways of thinking thatperceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste or smell

result from the union and, as it were, the thoroughand can be moved in various ways—however, not by

mixing together of mind and body.
itself but by whatever else touches it. For I thought(Descartes 1998: 63-64)

that it did not belong in any way to the nature of
Next Descartes argues that the mind is completely

body to have a power to move itself, any more thanit has the power of sensing or thinking. In fact, I

different from the body:was surprised to find such powers in certain bodies.
First of all, I perceive that there is a big(Descartes 1998: 24-25)

difference between the mind and the body insofar as
Here Descartes defines what bodies are andthe body, by its nature, is always divisible whereas
the mind is evidently indivisible. When I reflect on

distinguishes body from mind.
Then, he is sure that he is a thinking thing (resthe mind (or on myself insofar as I am simply athinking thing), I certainly cannot distinguish any

cogitans), which is a mind:

parts in myself; instead I understand myself to be
To think? That’s it. It is thought. This alone

a completely unified and integral thing. And evencannot be detached from me. I am, I exist; that isthough the whole mind seems to be united with thecertain. But for how long? As long as I think, forwhole body, if however a foot, an arm, or any otherit might possibly happen if I ceased completely topart of the body is cut off, I know that nothing is

think that I would thereby cease to exist at all. I do

thereby taken away from the mind. Nor can the

not accept anything at present that is not necessarily

faculties of willing, sensing, understanding, etc., betrue. I am, therefore, precisely only a thinking thing,said to be parts of the mind, because it is one andthat is, a mind, soul, intellect or reason—words thethe same mind that wills, senses and understands.

meaning of which was formerly unknown to me.

In contrast, I cannot think of any physical or

But I am a genuine thing and I truly exist. But what

extended body that I cannot divide easily in mykind of thing? I just said: a thinking thing.

thought; for that reason alone, I understand that

(Descartes 1998: 25)

it is divisible. That would be enough to teach methat the mind is completely different from the body

Moreover, Descartes insists that he, a thinking
thing (res cogitans), is very closely joined to his body

if I did not already know it adequately from otherconsiderations.

(Descartes 1998: 67)

because of the sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc.:
But according to M. S. Gazzaniga (2011), our mind
Nature also teaches by means of the sensations of

is not indivisible. The right and left brains function

pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not present to myindependently of each other. So mind is not the one

body only in the way that a pilot is present to a ship,

and whole thing.
How, then, does Descartes explain that the bodybut that I am very closely joined to it and almost
merged with it to such an extent that, together withinteracts with the mind?

it, I compose a single entity. Otherwise, when my― 11 ―Naoki ARAKI

Secondly, I perceive that the mind is not affected

Or a sensation of thirst is sensed:

immediately by all the parts of the body but onlyby the brain or, perhaps, only by one small part of[…] when we need a drink, that gives rise to

the brain, namely the part in which the common

a certain dryness in the throat, which moves its

sense is said to be. Whenever this part is in thenerves and, as a result, the interior of the brain. Thissame state, it presents the same thing to the mind

motion affects the mind with a sensation of thirst, […]even though the other parts of the body may be in(Descartes 1998: 69)

different states. This is proved by many experiencesthat need not be reviewed here.
Surprisingly, Descartes says that the same

(Descartes 1998: 67-68)

motion in the brain causes the same sensation in themind. This idea reminds us of physicalism, which

According to Descartes, the mind interacts withthe body in some part of the brain:insists that the mind can be explained by physicaland chemical reaction of the matter:[…] when I feel a pain in my foot, physics teaches

Thus the sense is naturally deceived because,me that that sensation occurs by means of thesince the same motion in the brain must always

nerves that are spread through the foot and are

trigger the same sensation in the mind and since it

stretched from the foot to the brain like cords;

results much more frequently from some cause thatwhen they are pulled in the foot, they also pull theharms the foot rather than from anything else, it isinner parts of the brain where they terminate, andreasonable that it would always signal to the mind athey stimulate a certain motion there, which was

pain in the foot rather than in any other part of theestablished by nature to affect the mind with abody.

(Descartes 1998: 69)

feeling of what seems like a pain in the foot. Since
these nerves have to pass through the leg, the thigh,the loins, the back and the neck to reach from theThus, Descartes explains the relationshipbetween mind and body.

foot to the brain, it can happen that, even if that
section of the nerves which is in the foot is notaffected but only some other intermediate section,evidently the very same motion occurs in the

But could Descartes have convinced other people
to accept his dualism?

3. Descartes and Princess Elizabeth

brain as when the foot is hurt, from which it will

Princess Elizabeth, who is a reader of Descartes’snecessarily follow that the mind feels the same pain.

writings, says in her letter dated 16 May 1643 to

The same thing must occur in the case of other

Descartes:

sensations.

(Descartes 1998: 68)… how can the human soul, which is only a

Descartes goes on to explain what happens to themind:thinking substance, determine the movement of
the animal spirits in order to perform a voluntaryaction? It seems as if every determination of[ …] when the nerves in the foot are moved

movement results from the following three factors:

violently and more than usual, their motion, passing

the pushing of the thing that is moved, the manner

through the spinal cord to the inner parts of thein which it is pushed by the body that moves it,

brain, gives a signal to the mind to sense something,

and the quality and shape of the latter’s surface.

namely a pain that seems to be in the foot, by

The first two presuppose that the bodies touch,which it is stimulated to remove its cause, insofar

while the third presupposes extension. You exclude

as that is possible, as something harmful to the foot.

extension completely from your concept of the souland, it seems to me, it is incompatible with being(Descartes 1998: 68-69)

an immaterial thing. That is why I am asking for― 12 ―

Descartes’s Problem

a definition of the soul which is more specific thanI hope I can use that as an excuse for mywhat is provided in your Metaphysics, that is, of

stupidity in not being able to understand the idea

the substance of the soul when it is separated fromby which we are supposed to decide how the mind

its action of thinking. For even though we assume(which is neither extended nor material) can movethat the substance and its thinking are inseparable,

the body, by comparison with the idea you formerly

just like God’s attributes—however, it is difficult to

had of heaviness. Nor can I understand why thisestablish their inseparability in the mother’s womb

power to move a body towards the centre of theor in cases of serious fainting—we can get a better

earth, which you falsely attribute to it in the pastidea of them by considering them separately.

as a quality, should convince us that a body could(Descartes 1998: 148)

be pushed by something immaterial, no morethan a demonstration of the contrary truth (which

Here Princess Elizabeth is asking how two

you promise in your Physics) could confirm us indistinct things—mind and body—interact with eachbelieving that it is impossible. The main reason isother. Descartes answers her question in his letterthat this idea (which cannot equal the perfection

dated 21 May 1643 to Princess Elizabeth, taking

or intentional reality of the idea of God) may be

the relation between weight and an object for an

false, because of ignorance of whatever reallyexample:moves these bodies towards the earth’s centre. And
since there is no observable material cause, thisFor example, by assuming that weight is a real

motion would have been attributed to its opposite,quality of which we know nothing apart from thean immaterial cause—something that I have neverfact that it is the power to move a body in which it

been able to conceive except by the negation ofis present towards the centre of the earth, we havewhat is material—even though there can be nono difficulty in conceiving how it moves the bodycommunication between an immaterial cause andnor how it is joined to it. And we never think thatthe motion.

this occurs by a real contact between two surfaces,

I confess that it would be easier for me tofor we experience in ourselves that we have aattribute matter and extension to the soul thanspecific notion with which to conceive it. I think

to attribute the ability to move a body, and to bethat we use this notion badly when we apply it to

moved by a body, to an immaterial being [the soul].

weight, which is something that is not really distinct

For if the former were accomplished by information,from the body—something which I hope to show

it would have to be the case that the minds thatin my Physics—and that it was given us instead tocause the movement are intelligent—something you

conceive of the way in which the soul moves the

do not attribute to anything which is physical. And

body.

although you show the possibility of the second(Descartes 1998: 150)

option in your Metaphysical Meditations, it is still
In short, Descartes is trying to explain how

very difficult to understand how a soul such as you

the mind affects the body by saying that weight

described it, which had the faculty and habit ofhas power and it does not exert its power throughreasoning correctly, could lose all that as a result ofcontact between two objects:

a few vapours and how, despite being able to subsist
without the body and having nothing in common

body
↑
↓

←→

object←→with it, it would be ruled by it in such a way.

mind
↑
↓



(Descartes 1998: 150-151)

weightHere Princess Elizabeth criticizes Descartes’s

However, Princess Elizabeth is not convinced byidea that the mind and the body interact by an

Descartes’s answer above and asks him a question

analogy of heaviness, proposing that we should

again in her letter dated 20 June 1643 to Descartes:

attribute matter and extension to the soul, which― 13 ―Naoki ARAKI

means that the mind becomes the body and theitself and that the extension of this matter has amind does not exist!

different nature from the extension of thought, in

Descartes answers Princess Elizabeth’s criticism

this sense: the former is determined to a certain

above in his letter dated 28 June 1643 to Princess

place from which it excludes every other bodily

Elizabeth:

extension, whereas this does not apply in the lattercase. In this way Your Highness will easily recover

But I thought that, more than thoughts thatyour knowledge of the distinction between the soulrequire less attention, these meditations were

and the body, despite the fact that you conceive of

responsible for making you find obscure the notion

their union.

(Descartes 1998: 153-154)

we have of the union of mind and body, because it
seemed to me that the human mind is incapable

Here Descartes seems to behave like an agnosticof conceiving very distinctly, and simultaneously,

saying that we cannot understand the distinction

both the distinction and union of body and soul.

and union of mind and body. He explains the reason

The reason is that, in order to do so, it would be

why this is so. It’s because it is contradictory tonecessary to conceive of them as one single thing

understand two things at the same time: one isand, at the same time, to conceive them as twothat mind and body are one and the same thing,

things—which is self-contradictory. Assuming thatthe other is that mind and body are distinct. Then,Your Highness still retains a vivid memory of the

Descartes says that Princess Elizabeth’s proposition

reason that prove the distinction of the soul andis a good idea because it is what unites ‘mind andbody, and not wishing to ask you to get rid of them

body’ as one and the same thing. Furthermore,in order to conceive of the union that everyone

Descartes says that after understanding the union

constantly experiences in themselves withoutof mind and body, we can understand that ‘body

philosophizing—viz. of being a single person who

after the union’ is not thinking itself and ‘extension

has a body and thought together, and being of such

attributed to mind’ is different from ‘extension ofa nature that thought can move the body and canbody’. In short, Descartes insists again that bodysense the changes that occur in it—I therefore

and mind are two distinct things.

used an analogy above with heaviness and with

After all, Descartes’s argument returns to his

the other qualities that we commonly imagine are

first statement that body and mind are two different

united with certain bodies, for the way in whichthings. Could his line of reasoning have convincedthought is united with our body. I was not worried

Princess Elizabeth? Probably not! Descartes doesthat this analogy might be defective on account of

not prove anything at all!

the fact that these qualities are not real, as they are

So Descartes could not explain to Princess

imagined to be, because Your Highness was alreadyElizabeth the interaction between body and mind.

completely convinced that the soul is a substanceScience cannot deal with mind:

which is distinct from the body.
However, since Your Highness suggested that[…] it is alleged by physicalists, a non-physicalit is easier to attribute matter and extension tomind couldn’t be investigated directly: in particular,

the soul than to attribute to the soul the ability to

it couldn’t be investigated scientifically because

move, and to be moved by, a body without having

science only deals with the physical world.

any matter itself, I beseech you to take the liberty(Warburton 1999: 131-132)

to attribute this matter and extension to the soul,for that is nothing more than conceiving of its union

We cannot explain mind using science:with the body. Having conceived with that union
properly and having experienced it in yourself, you

Most scientists, particularly those who arewill find it easy to think that the matter that you

physicalists, assume that every change in an object

have attributed to this thought is not the thought

can be explained by a priori physical event: the― 14 ―

Descartes’s Problem

causes of all physical events are themselves physical.

surprisingly similar to Saussure’s criticism ofSo, for instance, if a nerve cell in someone’s brain

nomenclaturism (Saussure 2006: 162). Saussure

fires, a neuropsychologist will look for a physicalinsists that words are not labels attached to thingscause of this. But if pure thought, which is anin the world. That is why Maruyama alreadyactivity of the mind, can lead to action, then somepoints out how closely Saussure’s idea is related tomerely mental events must directly lead to physicalNāgārjuna’s (Maruyama 1984: 215). So there do not

ones.

exist things referred to by words:(Warburton 1999: 133)

While we are using words, we misunderstandFurthermore, there are other questions about thethat there are unchangeable and well-defined

mind/brain dualism we need to answer:

entities, which are separate from and correspond to
Where could this mind substance have suddenly

words. […] For example, while we use the word “I,”

come from? And why does the evolution of mind so

we deceive ourselves that there is an unchangeable

closely parallel the evolution of the brain? […] events

entity “I” (soul). (My translation)in the brain are very closely linked with mental

(Sadakata 1990: 78-79)

events. Why do we need to introduce the idea of themind as distinct from the body when it is obvious

If Sadakata is right, “ego” does not exist anywhere,

that, for example, severe damage to the brain leads

which is an element of “cogito” and “sum” in “Cogito

to mental deficiency? If mind and body are reallyergo sum” propounded by Descartes. So both “cogito

distinct, why is this so? (Warburton 1999: 132-133)(I think)” and “sum (I am)” are a kind of fiction:

After all, can mind exist independently of bodyas Descartes insists?

Every phenomenon is one and whole thing thatcannot be divided. But if we express a phenomenon,

Next, we shall examine Sadakata’s views on the

we need to split it into [for example] an agent andMind/Body Problem. He develops his insistence

its movement and further to connect the two. This

based on Nāgārjuna’s teachings.

leads to an expression [a sentence] like a subject plus

4. Sadakata’s Views on the Mind/Body Problem
First of all, Sadakata discusses the relationshipa verb.
Communication may always follow the sameprocedure as this. (My translation)

between things and words:

(Sadakata 1990: 105)

Words have unchangeable, well-defined, andFor example, we express a phenomenon, which isdistinct meaning. This is a matter of fact. That isoriginally one and whole, by using words that divide

why we can achieve our goals by using words. Also,

the phenomenon:

that is the reason why we invented words. […]Taro goes.

Words are tools to distinguish one thing fromanother. Although there are originally no boundaries

Taro falls down.

in the whole universe, […] we give various names

Taro laughs.

to entities, which do not exist before they are

Taro cries.

named. The whole universe comes to be segmented............

by words into various forms according to our
From these expressions above, we extract “Taro,”

convenience. […] But the universe is not really what

who is an unchangeable entity. We derive “Taro,”

we think it to be. […] (My translation)
(Sadakata 1990: 77-78)

who has nothing to do with any movement, although“Taro” should be always either “Taro who goes,”

Sadakata’s views on words quoted above is“Taro who falls down,” “Taro who laughs,” or “Taro― 15 ―Naoki ARAKI

who cries.” But such “Taro” does not exist, who istheir explanation, you will deceive yourself. Why

abstract. Despite that, we think that such “Taro”

do we get sensation of light when particles of light

exists.

stimulate our retina? Scientists goes on to explain
further: the reason is that if particles stimulate

Next, consider the following expressions:

our retina, electric current will flow on the retina
Taro goes.

and reach the brain through the nerves. But why

Hanako goes.

do we get sensation of light when electric current

A dog goes.

reaches the brain? Probably scientists will go on to

A train goes.

explain even further. But unfortunately, however..........

further scientists may explain, they will not be able
to explain why we get sensation of light. Why is

From these expressions above, we extract “go,”which is a universal action. But the action “go” itself

that? The reason is that from the outset we have adefinition that mind and body are separated.

never exists. Necessarily, someone or something

Probably we forget this definition. We havegoes. Despite that, we implicitly assume that theaccepted since our childhood the definition that was

action “go” itself exists independently of the agent

given by our ancestors long time ago. Our ancestors[like Taro, Hanako, a dog or a train]. (My translation)

thought that mind and body were separated

(Sadakata 1990: 106-107)

although they were not aware of the dignity ofdefinition. Now scientists are desperately trying to

If Sadakata’s views are correct, then it will be

attribute mental phenomena to physical phenomena,a crucial mistake that Descartes propounds hisforgetting the definition that mind and body are

dualism of “Mind and Body.” The reason is that

separated. (My translation) (Sadakata 1990: 118-119)

every phenomenon is continuum and that both
“Mind” and “Body” do not exist independently of

By the way, if so, then are both Yuval Noaheach other. So “the Mind/Body Problem” itself, that

Harari and Michio Kaku also caught in a trap ofis, how “Mind” and “Body” interact, is a pseudo-words? Harari insists that machines have intelligenceproblem and should vanish in the air. Neither “Mind”

but not consciousness (Harari 2015: 114). On thenor “Body” exists. “Mind” and “Body” exist as one

other hand, Kaku maintains that machines can have

and whole phenomenon. So there is no interaction

both intelligence and consciousness (Kaku 2014: 221-

between “Mind” and “Body.” Descartes is caught

223). But as we have seen, there are no such things

in a trap of words and insists on the Mind/Body

as the words “intelligence” and “consciousness” referdualism.

to in this world. For more details, see Araki 2020.

So Sadakata criticizes dualism like Descartes’s:

Conclusion

Laymen regard “persons who see something” andDescartes insists that we have mind and body“things that are seen by persons” as “one thing” andand explains how these two distinct things interact“another.” They think that the following pair is two

with each other. But he fails to convince Princess

distinct things: subjectivity and objectivity; mind

Elizabeth that his explanation is plausible. Whyand body; internal world and external world; the self

is that? According to the world view based on

and the world. This idea distorts our world view.

Buddhism, the whole universe is continuum. This

We assume that the world exists independently

means that the world is not segmented as it isof ourselves. That is the reason why we fail tothought to be before language emerges. In otherexplain how our sensation takes place. Scientists

words, language divides the universe by using words

explain: particles of light or waves fly towards

and expresses phenomena by connecting words.

and stimulate our retina and then our sensation of

So there is nothing that corresponds to words. The

light takes place. If you think that you understandwords “mind” and “body” are no exception. There― 16 ―

Descartes’s Problem

are no corresponding things to “mind” and “body.”

Araki, Naoki. “Harari and Kaku.” Bulletin of

So there is no interaction between mind and body

Hiroshima Institute of Technology 54: pp. 19-28.

either. Mind and body are one and whole thing(2020)

but not separate and distinct things. Descartes are

Chomsky, Noam. Powers and Prospects: Reflections

deceived by a trick of words. Mind and body are

on Human Nature and the Social Order. Pluto

just fictions or illusions. This idea is taken over byPress. 1996.

Saussure, Whorf, and Chomsky. Saussure (2006:

Chomsky, Noam. New Horizons in the Study of162) criticizes the nomenclaturism and insists on

Language and Mind. Cambridge University

the same claim as what is mentioned above. For

Press. 2000.

more details, see Araki (2019: 5-7). Maruyama

Chomsky, Noam. “Some simple evo devo theses:

already points out that Saussure’s idea is similar

how true might they be for language?” In The

to Nāgārjuna’s insistence (Maruyama 1984: 215).

Evolution of Human Language: Biolinguistic

Inspired by his writings, I discussed the relationship

Perspectives, edited by Richard K. Larson,

between Saussure’s and Nāgārjuna’s ideas (Araki

Viviane Déprez and Hiroko Yamakido. pp. 45-62.
Cambridge University Press. 2010.

1997: 195-204). Also, Whorf (2012: 308) insists thatthe world around us is not segmented in advance ofDescartes, René. Meditations and Other Metaphysicallanguage. For more details, see Araki (2019: 9-10).

Writings (translated with an introduction by

Similarly, Chomsky (1996: 22-23; 2000: 36; 2010: 57)

Desmond M. Clarke). Penguin Books. 1998.

says that things are not mind-independent and that

Gazzaniga, M. S. Who’s in Charge?: Free Will and
The Science of the Brain. Ecco. 2011.

they are what is prescribed by a human frameworkof perceiving the environment. For more details,

Harari, Yuval Noah. Homo Deus: A Brief History ofTomorrow. Harvill Secker. 2015.

see Araki (2019: 7-9). His idea is similar to J. von
Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt (1973). In this sense,

Kaku, Michio. The Future of the Mind: The Scientificboth Chomsky and Uexküll may be Kantians. Kant

Quest To Understand, Enhance and Empower

insists that we recognize the world according to

the Mind. Penguin Books. 2014.

our framework of mind (1781). For more details, seeKant, Immanuel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 1781.

Araki (1999: 5-18). Also, for intellectual relations(Critique of Pure Reason. translated by Norman

between Descartes and Chomsky, see Araki (2006:

Kemp Smith. Palgrave Macmillan. 2003)

163-174).

Maruyama, Keizaburo. Fet ishism of Culture.
Keisosyobo. 1984. (in Japanese)

References

Okada, Taketo. A Story of Mind/Body Problem: from
Descartes to Cognitive Science. Kitaohjishobo.

Araki, Naoki. “Nāgārjuna and Saussure.” Bulletin of2012. (in Japanese)

Hiroshima Institute of Technology 31: pp. 195-

S ad a kat a , A k i r a . Em pt i n e s s a n d No n -E g o:204. (1997) (in Japanese)

Buddhism’s View of Language. Kodanshya. 1990.

Araki, Naoki. “Chomsky and Kant.” Hearts to the(in Japanese)

English-American Language and Literature:
Essays Presented to Emeritus Professor Sutezo

Saussure, Ferdinand de. Wr itings in General

Hirose in Honour of his Eighty-eighth Birthday,

Linguistics (translated by Carol Sanders andMatthew Pires). Oxford University Press. 2006.

edited by Hisayuki Sasamoto et al. pp. 5-18.

Searle, John. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” The

Osaka-Kyoiku-Tosho. 1999. (in Japanese)

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: pp. 417-457.

Araki, Naoki. “Descartes and Chomsky.” Neo-(1980)ANGLICA No. 4. pp. 163-174. Osaka-Kyoiku-

Uexküll, J. von & Kriszat, G. Streifzüge durch

Tosho. (2006) (in Japanese)
Araki, Naoki. “Sapiens and Language.” Bulletin of

di e Umwelt e n vo n Ti e re n un d Me n sch e n

Hiroshima Institute of Technology 53: pp. 1-10.

Bedeutungslehre (translated by Toshitaka Hidaka(2019)and Yasuyuki Noda. Shisakusha. 1973). (in― 17 ―Naoki ARAKI

Japanese)

Whorf, B. Lee. Language, Thought and Reality. 2nd

Warburton, Nigel. Philosophy: The Basics. 3rdedition. Routledge. 1999.

― 18 ―

edition. The MIT Press. 2012.