Semco's Response to the "Evoikos" Incident
and PAJ Equipment Usage
Chris Richard
Oil Service Manager
Sembawang Maritime

On the evening of October 15k" 1997 one of the worst oil spills in the history ofSingapore occurred when the loaded tanker "Evoikos" suffered a collision with theballasted VLCC "Orapin Global".

The collision resulted in an almost immediate spillage of more than 28000 tonnes of fueloil only about 2 miles from Singapore's southern shore, very close to the holiday islandof Sentosa and to the heavily industrialised southern islands.

Of course Singapore is an extremely busy port with hundreds of ship movements every
day and many more passing vessels transiting the Strait. Given the numbers of vessels
it is perhaps not surprising that accidents can and often do occur, despite the efforts
taken and measures in place to maintain a high level of safety. As a result, Singapore
has become well used to efficiently handling maritime incidents, not only in swiftly
taking control of the situation but in being well prepared in having the skills andresources to deal with the sort of situation that arose on October 15th 1997.

This paper will look at the response to the "Evoikos" spill from the point of view ofSemco Salvage and Marine Pte. Ltd., the largest marine salvage organisation east ofSuez, and its subsidiary Singapore Oil Spill Response Centre. Both Semco and SOSRO
are in themselves subsidiaries of Sembawang Marine and Logistics Ltd.

Very shortly after the collision occurred, Semco's permanently manned operations room
was advised of what had happened, and response vessels were immediately dispatchedto the scene. The first to arrive was Semco's large salvage tug SALVIGOLTR, which
had been in the near vicinity and was fully equipped with salvage and oil spillequipment. After having agreed the terms under which the response would take place,booms were laid around the stem of the "Evoikos" and in way of the enormous hole inher port side, in an effort to contain any oil remaining in her damaged tanks andprevent any further leakage. As soon as this boom was deployed, SALVJGOUIR thenmoved away from the casualty to deploy her remaining booms in an effort to protectsensitive shorelines in the near vicinity.

Meanwhile, SOSRC had also been mobilised and by now it was obvious that every
available response resource was going to be needed to deal with the spillage. Oil wasspreading rapidly westwards and was already polluting the shores of Singapore's
southern islands. The decision was taken by the Port Authority that the initial strategy
should be to use dispersants on the oil that was still in open water and to make every
effort to protect the nearby sensitive shorelines. For its part, SOSRC was mobilising its
entire stockpile of equipment, by loading it on to the L 88, one of Semco's heavy lift
crane barges, and positioning her at Raffles Reserved Anchorage. This anchorage ismore or less at the centre of the operational response area, and putting the L88 and her
response equipment at this location would considerably reduce the time taken to deploy
equipment. By this time Agreement had also been reached to mobilise the PM stockpilethat is stored and maintained in Singapore by SOSRC. The four booms, four skimmers,
vacuum and temporary storage equipment from this stockpile were also loaded alongwith the rest of SOSRC's equipment and mobilised to the operational area.
Throughout this time, dispersant spraying operations had been continuously taking
place, with many of the spraying vessels in use belonging to Semco and other SML
subsidiary companies.

SML' S capabilities were very much to the fore with its substantial marine logistics
being heavily utilised to provide and support an ever growing demand for resources.
This included arranging for the speedy delivery to Singapore of the entire PM stockpile
from Port Klang,
Malaysia and even arranging for the air transportation of the similar stockpile fromJakarta, Indonesia ; no mean feat considering each of the PM stockpiles consists of ninestandard containers. Finding suitably large aircraft at short notice was never going tobe easy but with just this eventuality in mind SOSRC and its freight forwarding sistercompany Sembawang Kimtrans had long since had in place pre-prepared plans toovercome this problem. In the event, however, the Jakarta PM stockpile was notactually brought in to Singapore but kept in reserve. SOSRC is in fact well familiar
with all three of these PM stockpiles as it has been maintaining them on a regularmonthly basis since long before the "Evoikos" spill occurred.

By the end of the second full day of the response operation, SOSRC had booms deployedat numerous locations on the Singapore mainland and the southern islands. Theselocations included two deflector booms at Sentosa, a boom at Marina Bay to prevent
possible contamination of the Bay area and the Singapore River in the heart of theisland, three separate booms at Kusu island just off the southern tip of Sentosa toprotect that very sensitive and beautiful island and another at East Coast Lagoon toprotect the well known recreational areas at that location. This last boom was the firstof the PM booms to be deployed and the only one to be in a fixed location.

Although initially the dispersants worked well, by the third day of the response it wasbecoming apparent that the dispersants were becoming less effective on the spilled oil,which by now was becoming much more viscous as it weathered. In response to thesechanging circumstances SOSRC then prepared for an extensive containment andrecovery operation in and around the southern islands and West Jurong Anchorage
area by setting up no less than five separate booming and skimming systems on day
three of the response operation. Each of these systems consisted of a 'mother' vessel as aworking platform, three of which were fiat top barges, a fourth being the SALVIGOUR
and the fifth being the large tug SEA MASTIFF, also an SML vessel belonging to thetugs and ferries division. Each system was equipped with at least one 250 metre boom,
two skimmers and temporary storage tanks as well as the barges being fitted with otherequipment such as temporary cranes and forklift trucks to facilitate equipment
handling. Most of the oil spill equipment used on this part of the response operation
belonged to PAJ, as by now almost all of the rest of SOSRC's own equipment wasalready deployed elsewhere. Each system also had several other vessels in attendance,with the barges being controlled by a tug with at least one more tug for controllingbooms. By this time over thirty SML vessels were involved with more chartered in toassist with the various operations.
From early on day four, all of these booming and skimming systems were ready for
operation and were deployed to various locations as directed by the Maritime and PortAuthority. Early on each morning, when daylight and the persistent haze form otherparts of S. E. Asia permitted, a survey of the whole area would be carried out by theMIPA to ascertain where the heaviest concentrations of spilled oil were located. As soon
as possible, this information was then passed on to SOSRC and the vessels were moved
to their new locations as required. For the first few days of this phase of the clean up
operation, the heaviest patches of oil seemed to be in the area between Singapore's
southern islands and the Jurong islands off Singapore's south western coast. The booms
were deployed in a "F' formation, with one end attached to the stern of the barge andthe other being held in position by another tug. Another formation was initially tried,with two booms being held in a 'funnel' formation ahead of a 'J' formation boom, but
although this was effective it soon proved difficult to maintain in the limited sea room
available. Another problem was that of the strong currents in the area, making it very
difficult to hold oil once it had been collected in the boom. However, with careful vessel
and boom handling, containing the oil could be achieved, making it possible to set about
the task of recovering the oil. The skimmers available for recovery were the weirskimmers from the PM stockpile, plus disc skimmers and vacuum units. Other than
one of the vacuum units that is fitted with a very large diameter suction hose, all theskimmers experienced some difficulty in recovering the oil, notably in being able topump out the oil that the skimmers were collecting. This was due to the oil now having
weathered considerably and consequently becoming very viscous as well as having acertain amount of debris entrained in it as well. Nevertheless, some oil was recovered
which was then temporarily stored prior to ultimate disposal at a local facility.

For the next few days each of these booming and skimming systems were kept
continuously busy, working at different locations almost every day as directed by theMPA and in an effort to deal with the thickest concentrations of oil. Up until then themain effort was concentrated around an area between the Jurong and Southern Islands,
but it was becoming apparent that the worst patches of oil were moving more towards
the West, with reports of oil in the West Jurong Anchorage area. This anchorage is very
crowded but nevertheless operations were soon relocated, including by now a volunteer
team from the Japanese International Co-operation Agency, who were working theirown boom and skimmer system from yet another tug and barge combination suppliedby SMIL.
Also located in this anchorage was SMIL's heavy deck cargo vessel SEAHORSE 1, witha clear working deck of 127 metres by 38 metres, a total of 4826 M2 ideal as anequipment storage vessel for the ongoing clean up operations. It seemed sensible torelocate to this vessel as a centre of operations, so on the 22nd October L 88 was moved
from her original location to alongside the SEAHORSE 1 at West Jurong Anchorage,
where the combination of the L88's crane and SEAHORSE 1 's substantial deck spaceproved ideal for the task in hand.

Eventually by the 24th November, it was becoming apparent that there were few
significant patches of oil remaining, as by now most of the oil had either been recovered,
had naturally dispersed or had been carried away by the still strong current. In
addition, the overall operation was about to take a significant change of direction withthe battered EVOJIKOS, still anchored in her original position very close to the main
Strait, preparing to commence offloading her remaining cargo into another vessel. It
must be remembered that although more than 28000 tonnes had been spilt, around 100,000 tonnes still remained on board the heavily damaged ship. She was also being
held in this position by only one of her anchors very close to the busiest shipping lane in
the world, so the threat of a further accident and even more extensive pollution wasvery real. Her owners had arranged for another of their vessels, the 94000 tonne tanker
FRIXOS, to go alongside the EVOII(OS and take on board most of the remaining cargo.
By the 24w" October, the time had come to put in place the resources needed to ensure
the ship-to-ship transfer operation could be carried out as safely as possible, so once
again Semco Salvage was called upon for assistance. Large fenders were positioned toensure the two ships could safely moor alongside one another and suitable flexible
hoses were provided for the actual transfer. Not least of the requirements was for theprovision of two more booms in addition to those still in place since the day after thecollision, so again the PM booms were deployed, this time from yet another barge
moored alongside the EVOIKOS, just ahead of the hole in her port side. A total of 800
metres of PM boom in two separate formations was used for this purpose, one of 350
metres and the other of 450 metres, both being positioned around the stern of thetanker. Considerable difficulty was experienced in deploying these booms, mainly due
to the very strong currents and the problem of drawing the end of the boom up andsecurely mooring it to the side of a tanker as large as the EVOIKOS, but eventually
they were successfully positioned while the smaller tanker FRIXOS was being readied
to come alongside. Of course, during the actual berthing operation these booms had tobe moved again, until eventually they not only encircled the stem of the EVOIKOS but
the FRIXOS as well. Eventually all was secure ready for the transfer operation tocommence, and the response team could at last settle down to a period of maintaining
all the booms in place.

Of course, every time the tide changed the whole operation, including both tankers andthe booms, would swing through 180°, causing many problems with the booms foulingthe damaged metal on each occasion despite the effort to prevent this from happening.
During the transfer one of Semco's other salvage tugs, the SALVENUS, was moored tothe bows of the EVOLKOS in an effort to take the strain off the one anchor holding bothtankers in position.
The changes of tide and the strong currents also caused the SALVENUS many
problems, not least with trying to turn around whilst maintaining her pull on the bowsof the EVOIKOS during the changes of tide. The SALVIGOUR was also still involved as
she had been throughout the response, this time acting as guard ship and trying toensure that passing vessels did not come too close to the delicate transfer operation.
Despite her strenuous efforts, some passing vessels still strayed very close, with an
LPG tanker at one time so near that a marker buoy laid by the MIPA very close to thetwo tankers was run down and had to be replaced. Other Semco vessels were also
involved, with the two smaller tugs SALVICTOR 6 and SALVICTOR 7 being equippedwith dispersant spraying equipment to deal with the small quantities of oil stilloccasionally leaking out. Another operation with the booms around the two tankers also
had to be carried out, because when the FRIXOS was fully loaded, there was still somecargo remaining on board the EVOIKOS and another ship, the small tanker JINLI, had
to be brought alongside to take off the remainder. This meant that the booms had to berepositioned yet again but this was successfully achieved without too much problem.

It must also be remembered that the booms at the ship were by no means the only ones
deployed at this time, for although the at sea booming and skimming operations had bythen ceased, all the booms that were deployed to protect sensitive areas were still inplace, and each needed constant attention to ensure their security. To recap, there werestill three booms at Kusu Island, two at Sentosa, one at Marina Bay and another at
East Coast Lagoon to attend to, and some of these were bringing problems of their own.
One of those at Sentosa had been damaged by a bunker vessel and had to be replaced,
this time by one of the MPA's own booms which was drawn from the OSPAR stockpileof quipment. Again, Semco and SOSRC were called upon to assist, by supplying a tugand barge to deploy from and a deployment team. Unfortunately, some days later thisboom suffered a similar fate, this time by being run down by a passing fast ferry despite
navigational warnings.

Eventually in early November, the remaining cargo from the EVOIKOS had all been
offloaded and the task of demobilising everything could commence. All the booms wererecovered from the various different locations and brought back to Semco's base forcleaning and repair. The task of cleaning the skimmers that had been demobilised
earlier was not too difficult despite them being very heavily oiled, and this wascompleted within an week or two. On completion they were returned to their original
bases, those from the Port Klang PM stockpile being delivered by Sembawang
Kimtrans in late November. The task of cleaning the booms proved far more difficult
however, with the large quantity of oil that was adhering to them having become
virtually solidified. Each had to be treated with liberal doses of degreaser and eventhen the oil had to be scraped off using wooden and plastic scrapers, and altogether it
was not until early February 1998 that they were all eventually cleaned. Finally they
were all inspected by in mid February by PM, the original manufacturers of the booms
and a surveyor from the insurers prior to report being prepared and decisions made as
to how the boom repairs should take place.

In conclusion, it can be appreciated that this was a very major response operation to try
and effectively deal with the worst incident of its kind ever to happen in Singapore. Ofcourse there were many problems to overcome and many difficulties experienced, butoverall all the parties involved worked very well together with the ultimate result ofnot one drop of oil from the EVOJIKOS impacting the shorelines of mainland Singapore.
A debt of gratitude is owed to the Petroleum Association of Japan, without who's
equipment many of the operations could not have been carded out, and this was
expressed on Friday 1 4~' November with the presentation of an award to PM for its
invaluable assistance during this response operation.

For its part, Semco Salvage and Marine and its sister company Singapore Oil Spill
Response Centre would also like to thank PM, and we look forward to providing thebest of service to PM for many years to come.