Strategic Annual Report 2019
First published November 2019 by JIIA
Printed in Japan©2019 Japan Institute of International Affairs

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Message from the President���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 01
Strategic Overview����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 03
The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy – Impacts of Changes in the United States����������������� 11
China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies���������������������������������������������������������� 17
What is the “Axis” for a New Order on the Korean Peninsula?������������������������������������������������������ 24
The Changing International Order in the Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Choice������������������������������������ 29
Putin’s Russia and its Foreign Policy��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 35
Europe in Turmoil and the Future of Japan-EU Cooperation��������������������������������������������������������� 41
The Middle East: Intensifying Competition for Hegemony over a New Regional Order ���������������� 46
Building a Sustainable Socioeconomic System and Restructuring Economic Global Governance�� 52
A New Security Strategy for Addressing Challenges in the Turbulent International Order������������� 57
Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferation����������������������������������������������������� 64
Battles over Techno-hegemony: Japan’s Course����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 69
JIIA Executive Officers, Experts, Directors and Councilors ��������������������������������������������������������� 77
Research Projects ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 80

Message from the President

President, JIIA

Kenichiro Sasae

My name is Kenichiro Sasae, and I have held the post of President of the Japan
Institute of International Affairs since June 2018.
In the political realm, nationalism and populism are currently on the rise, domestic
division and authoritarian governing methods run rampant, and the values ofliberal democracy face increasing challenges. In the field of diplomacy, the “rulesbased international order,” that until recently had been functioning despite its
incompleteness, is under unprecedented strain. This is due, inter alia, to the spreadof unilateralism and certain levels of inadequacy in key international organizations
in dealing with these challenges.
Since taking office, I have pursued several new initiatives while keeping in mind thequestions “what role should think tanks play in Japan?” and “what are think tanks
capable of?”. The first of these has been to provide timely forums for multilateral
discussions involving relevant international organizations and government agencies,
former executives from these organizations/agencies, practitioners and experts, inlight of the fact that the international order is undergoing major changes and countries
are confronting extraordinary diplomatic, political and economic circumstances.
The second has been to effectively convey the gist of said discussions and the findingsof our expert-based research groups in an accessible manner. The third has been tostrengthen the financial basis of our organization in order to carry out the abovemeasures.

01

JIIA conducts a wide range of research activities with the cooperation of experts
from various fields. These activities include workshops covering the United States,
China, Europe, Russia, the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacificregion, as well as the world economy, security, arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation, advanced technology, and territory and history issues.
As part of our efforts to disseminate our research findings, we have decided to publish“The Strategic Annual Report 2019” as the first release of a yearly report that will
briefly describe how JIIA perceives the current regional situation, future prospects,
and the actions Japan should take.
This report also reflects our research activities and evaluations in each of the above
areas. Interested readers may refer to the series of study group reports (the URLs canbe found at the end of this report).
I hope this report will help you better understand the international situation.

02

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Strategic Overview

Strategic Overview

An Overview of the International Situation
The following have surfaced as noteworthy developments that have had an impact
on the international order during the period of October 2018 to October 2019.
US-China relations

negotiations, its provocative actions in

In terms of impact on the international

the South and East China Seas, its debt

order, the most noteworthy development

diplomacy, and its repression of humanhas been the flare-up of the US-Chinarights and democracy in Hong Kong

rivalry (or strategic competition as it has

and Xinjiang Province. There is now

been framed by key US documents).

bipartisan consensus among Congress,
the administration and experts alike,

The change in the US perception on

albeit in varying degrees, that China

China had been evident before on theposes a serious challenge to the existing

policy level; the National Security

rules-based international order.

Strategy published in December 2017

03

classified China along with Russia as

China has shown a willingness to make“revisionist powers” that challenged

certain concessions to the United States

American power. The January 2018

in resolving the trade imbalance, but

National Defense Strategy recognized

has not displayed such amenability

the reemergence of long-term, strategicon issues linked to the survival of thecompetition by revisionist powers as

Communist Party’s dictatorial regime,

the central challenge to the US. Vicesuch as subsidies for state-owned

President Mike Pence’s October 2018

enterprises. As a consequence of US

Hudson speech affirmed this change

backlash, the “Made in China 2025”

on the political level. In October 2019,

slogan is rarely mentioned nowadays,

Vice President Pence stated that China

but the development goal of “socialism

was a strategic and economic rivalwith Chinese characteristics” has held

and reiterated his criticism of China,

strong. Not only has China made use

disapproving of its behavior in tradeof advanced technologies to furtherenhance its repressive system of internal

resort to a national purchase of three ofgovernance, but it has also rapidly

the Senkaku islands in order to thwart

strengthened its military capabilities

a purchase attempt by the governor ofand persisted in its efforts to expand its

Tokyo. China’s strong opposition to thisinfluence in the Indo-Pacific region.

move and its subsequent refusal to holdany dialogue with Japan for over two

Some argue the current state of the US-

years are still fresh in Japan’s memory.

China relationship is a revival of the Cold

In the United States, the hope that China

War structure between the US and thewould become a responsible stakeholder

Soviet Union that led to the polarizationin the international community throughof the international order and callengagement policies gradually faded.

for the containment of China, while

The Trump administration has taken aothers suggest selective engagement

stance of facing the Chinese challenges(or selective competition), given thathead-on, rather than waiting for politicalcontainment is inappropriate as welland economic reforms.

as physically impossible because of USChina economic interdependence.

With its relationship with the US
worsening, China is now drawing closer

For Japan, the course it takes in its

to Japan. A visit by President Xi Jinping

relations with China is a strategic issue

is scheduled next spring, and there arethat will greatly influence the country’s

calls in Japan to take this opportunity

future. Alarmism regarding China has

to further strengthen bilateral relations.

seen a rapid rise in Japan; this stems

Needless to say, maintaining a healthy

from Chinese actions, such as therelationshipemphasizing of historical issues sinceregional power, is important for Japan;

the late 1990s in order to gain politicalhowever, with the drastic shift in US-

advantage over Japan, and its unilateral

China relations that could even lead toefforts to attempt to change the statusa realignment of the international order,

quo around Japan’s Senkaku islands

Japan’s future actions require strategicin the East China Sea from the 2000s

consideration.

onwards.

the Japan-US alliance, Japan mustwith

China,

While

a

major

strengthening

pursue a case-by-case approach thatIn 2012, the Japanese government led

combines competition, coexistence andby the Democratic Party was forced to04

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Strategic Overview

cooperation in order to attain strategic

concerns that systems for influencing

stability among Japan, US, and China.

public opinion using AI technology andmonitoring citizens using biometric

Advanced technologies

technology are not only operating inIn the past year, what has been relevant
to and equally important as the shift
in US-China relations is the directionof the international community inregard to advanced technologies suchas artificial intelligence (AI), quantum
technology, and advanced monitoring
technology, which are products of
disruptiveSuchtechnologicaladvancedinnovation.

technologies

areexpected not only to be militarygame-changers but also to be used as
diplomatic tools. For example, as value
chains become more international inline with the globalization of markets
and technological development, a single
country can press its competitors tomake concessions by restricting accessto key technologies that are choke points
for their products. The United States
has halted some of its semiconductor
exports to China; China may follow
suit in the future. The US argument
for a decoupling with China is basedon the assumption of such a situation.
There is also the problem that advanced
technologies have already begun to be
used by authoritarian states to maintaintheir regimes. Specifically, there are05

China, but are also being exported toother authoritarian countries.
International relations over cutting-edge
technologies created by these disruptive
technological innovations have gone
beyond mere economic competitionand led to a struggle for hegemony thatwill shake the international order itself.
In other words, with the advance of
globalization and the digitalization ofsociety, the US-China power struggle in
the field of advanced technologies cannot
be confined to competition in the field ofpure economics, and may lead to deeper
conflicts based on security concernsand differences in fundamental values
between liberal democratic systems andauthoritarian governance systems.
Under these circumstances, it is highly
likely that countries will follow the
trajectory of restricting exports andinvestment, as can already be seenin the concrete steps taken by the US.
Japanese companies that have a divisionof labor system set in place and thus
have stronger ties with China thantheir US counterparts must seriouslyconsider both the opportunities and

US posture vis-a-vis North Korea,

risks of continuing their relationshipincluding the unconventional wisdomof interdependence with China. Theof holding summit meetings withJapanese government will also be forced

North Korea without sufficient prior

to opt into selective decoupling.

coordination and the acquiescence toNorth Korea’s repeated test-firing of

Challenges to the non-proliferation

short- and medium-range missiles. In

regime by North Korea and Iranparticular, Japan, which is the US’

A third important development isthe environment regarding nuclear
nonproliferation, including the growthof North Korea’s WMD and missile
programs and the possible collapse of
the Iranian nuclear agreement.
Withregarddenuclearization,

to

North
after

the

most important ally in the region andwhich will be directly affected by North
Korea’s nuclear armament and missile
development, had to be concerned about
the prospect.
The United States’ withdrawal from

Korea’s
North-South Summit in April 2018, the UnitedStates and North Korea held a summit
meeting in Singapore in June 2018 inwhich they reaffirmed the principle of“denuclearization”. However, at the
Hanoi Summit in February 2019, thetalks broke down due to differences overthe concrete shape of denuclearization.
In June of that year, the leaders of theUnited States and North Korea met again,
but the conflict over denuclearizationand corresponding measures was not
resolved at the October working-leveltalks. Even after taking the US domestic
political situation into consideration,
many experts are concerned with thethe Iranian nuclear agreement and thesubsequent strengthening of sanctions
against Iran have not yet resulted in
a complete Iranian withdrawal fromthe agreement. However, they haveencouraged the hard-liners in Iran andheightened tensions in the Persian Gulf
region. At the same time, the US has
not been able to stop Iranian activities
it

deems

problematic,

including

supporting pro-Iranian organizations
in neighboring countries and pursuing
missile development. Some have argued
that the framework of the nuclear
agreement itself should be maintained
after certain revisions, but there is noprospect of seeking a solution throughnegotiations, as Iran has refused to hold06

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Strategic Overview

talks with the Trump administration.

a relative decline, as China emerges

From

nuclearand Russia begins to reestablish its

nonproliferation and regional stability,

presence in the international arena,

US allies such as Europe and Japan,

and competition among major powers

which have supported the Iranianis becoming apparent. Under these

nuclear agreement as a provisional

circumstances, nuclear weapons, once

although incomplete measure, cannot

considered unusable, are regaining somehelp but be concerned.

relevance. Expectations for nuclear

theviewpointofdisarmament, which began to growEnd of the INF Treaty and instability

under the Obama administration, arein the nuclear arms control system

rapidly dwindling despite the adoption

Fourth, the nuclear arms control system
has been shaken by the end of the INF
Treaty between the United States andRussia. The United States withdrew
from the INF Treaty, citing of Russia’s
treaty violations and China’s stockpileof hundreds of medium-range missiles.
Although the United States has yet toclarify its stance on the New START
treaty, which will expire in 2021, it has
insisted that China join the nuclear arms
control framework as well. However,China, which possesses far fewer
nuclear weapons than the United States
and Russia, maintains that it will notparticipate in such a framework unless
the United States and Russia drasticallyreduce their nuclear arsenals.
What lies behind this flailing nuclear
arms control situation is a “powertransition” in which US power shows
07of the Nuclear Weapons Convention
that was spearheaded by civil society.
On the other hand, the invalidation of
the INF Treaty has serious implications
for Japan’s security under US extended
deterrence. At the time of the conclusionof the INF Treaty in the 1980s, Japan
insisted on, and managed to realize,
the “double-zero option” eliminating
Soviet and US medium-range missiles
from Europe and Asia. Today, however,both China and North Korea havemedium-range missiles in Northeast
Asia. Meanwhile, Japan and the UnitedStates do not possess such capabilities,
leaving them at a strategic disadvantage.
The alliance will have to take newmeasures to restore strategic balancein the region from the perspective of
stabilizing deterrence, such as holding
consultations with relevant countriesand considering the deployment of new

In addition, the withdrawal of US

missiles.

forces from Syria and Turkey’s crossborder attacks in Syria have confused

Situation in the Middle East

the countries concerned in the region

In the Middle East, countries such as
Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya havefallen into a state of civil war due totheir vulnerability as nation-states andloss of the ability to govern, and thesecountries have allowed intervention
by

other

countries,

enabling

theleapfrogging of armed non-state actors
and bringing about a crisis. In addition,
the Middle East policy of the Trumpadministration,which

prioritizes

strengthening its domestic support base,complicates the situation.
The core of the Trump administration’s
Middle East policy is to improve
relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel,
which had deteriorated during theprevious administration, and to stabilize
the Middle East by forming a coalition
to contain Iran. Unfortunately, this US
policy cannot be said to be successful.

and

the

international

community.

Meanwhile, the regime of Syrian leader
Bashar al-Assad has benefitted, as havehis supporters Russia and Iran. On thePalestinian issue, the economic portion
only of “the deal of the century” wasannounced in June 2019, but it putemphasis on promoting of relations
between Israel and pro-American Arabcountries, and shelved any politicalsolution to the Palestinian issue.
While there is growing concern about
the

Trump

administration’s

futurepolicy toward the Middle East, eventraditionally pro-US governments are
moving to build relations with Russia,
which is increasing its influence in theregion. However, Russia’s involvement
is opportunistic and cannot be expected
to lead to stability and form a new orderin the Middle East.

What Will Happen to the International Order?
How should we assess the impact ofThe current world order is often

international developments over thedescribed as a “liberal international

past year on the international order?

order”. The United States advocatesliberaldemocracy

as

one

of

its

08

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Strategic Overview

09

fundamental principles. After it gained

These recent developments globallyoverwhelming

have been accelerated by the relative

dominanceintheinternational community after Worlddecline

War II, the international order, basicallyinternational leadership. Some fear thatan arena for power politics between

the “liberal international order” that wenations, came to reflect the ideals of

have become accustomed to in the post-

liberalism.

WWII era is coming to an end.

With the collapse of the Cold War

However, from a broader perspective,

structure in the early 1990s, someit should be recalled that, as theadvanced the theory of “the end ofinternational community rose from

history” on the premise that liberal

the ruins of the First World War indemocracy

the early 20th century, political leaders

would

be

universalizedinAmericanpower

as the ultimate form of government.

presented

Since then, however, the internationalsuch as the League of Nations and thecommunity has moved in a completely

Kellogg-Briand Pact to restrain overt

different

Economic

power politics. After World War II,

globalization has, while narrowing

however, the US’s hegemony led to theeconomic disparities between developed

development of various internationalcountries and certain developing states,organizations and international norms,

aggravated income inequality in bothincluding the United Nations and thedeveloped

nations.

Bretton Woods Institutions, collective

The “squeezing” of the middle classsecurity arrangements such as NATO,incountries

regional organizations such as ASEAN,

has exacerbated distrust for politicalthe World Trade Organization that

establishments and worn down societal

forms the basis of the free trade system,

solidarity, leading to the rise of populism

and multilateral treaties on various

and unilateralism. In the Islamic world

issues such as the Treaty on the Non-and developed countries with Islamic

Proliferation

communities, there has been a rise in

the 1951 Refugee Convention, and theIslamic fundamentalism and a spread

United Nations Convention on thein terrorism, particularly touching those

Law of the Sea. In the post-Cold War

who feel left behind economically.

era of globalization, the international

direction.

anddeveloped

developing
democratic

ideological

and

of

Nuclearframeworks

Weapons,

community has placed greater emphasis
on multilateral frameworks in addressinga variety of global issues, including
human rights, health and hygiene,
humanitarian activities, climate change
and sustainable development.
This indicates that the “rules-based
international order” is appreciated by
the current international community toa considerable extent.
On the other hand, in the current situationin which various global governancemethods such as multilateralism areunder siege as described above, it istime for political leaders and citizensof all nations to recall that this worldorder was established over the past
century with countless sacrifices and thelaborious efforts of their predecessors,
and to unite for its reconstruction.■

10Strategic Annual Report 2019
The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy – Impacts of Changes in the United States

The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy– Impacts of Changes in the United States

President Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally, Oct. 2019, Minneapolis. (Photo AP/AFLO)

Since its inauguration in January 2017,

fundamentally change America’s role in

the Trump administration’s America

the international arena, what domestic

First policy, which seems unhesitantchanges have brought the Trump

about confronting other parts of theadministration to power in the United

world while paying little attention to theStates, and how these changes have been

free and open international order it had

and will be manifested in the Trump

been leading, has had significant impacts

administration’s foreign policy.

on the international community. The

11

policies of the United States, Japan’sFirstly, the foreign and security policies

sole ally, have played a central role inof the Trump administration that arebuilding and maintaining the free andof such vital importance to Japan wereopen international order in the Indo-devised at the initiative of Secretary ofPacific region, which has a direct impact

State Pompeo, former National Security

on the security environment and stable

Advisor Bolton, and former Secretary

economic development of Japan. It isof Defense Mattis, with the National

hence critical to understand whether

Security Strategy (NSS2017) released

or not the Trump administration willin December 2017 formulated with

significant involvement from former

administration’s ad hoc interpretation

National Security Advisor McMaster.

of what could benefit its national

The direction set by all these foreigninterests. The Trump administration’s

and security policy experts was not thebasic stance on foreign policy, in other“populist nationalism” led mainly bywords, is to restructure its foreign

former Chief Strategist Bannon, who

relations to put American interests at

supported President Trump in the last

the very center at all times. Competitionpresidential campaign, but rather thehere is not based on ideology but rather

traditional hardline conservatism of

on means involving power and pressure

the Republican Party, which is now

to secure the stronger position needed

widelyfor the United States to realize its own

understoodas“principled

realism” or realism based on principles.

national interests.

This direction of principled realism
should be welcomed as it is conducive

Attention should be paid to its China

to maintaining an international orderpolicy in this regard. The Trump

based on the rule of law, as shown inadministration has drastically changed

the concerted policies of Japan and the

US

United States, for example, regarding

NSS2017 clearly defined China as a

the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)

revisionist

initiatives.

American power, influence and interests,

foreignpolicycountry

towardthat

China.

challenges

and undermines American security andAt the same time, however, this principledprosperity. A speech by Vice President

realism shows a strong emphasis on a

Pence in October 2018 at a think tank incompetitive and dualistic worldview

Washington, DC symbolized the Trumpputting America’s interests first in

administration’s hardline policy toward

all cases, which has led some to point

China,

out that power politics have now been

behavior in the international arena. In

revived. Where the current approach

addition, the US Congress passed thedecisively differs from the great power

Taiwan Travel Act in March 2018 torivalry between the United States andfacilitate mutual visits by high-ranking

the USSR in the Cold War era, however,officials of the United States and Taiwan,

is that foreign policy is determined notthereby strengthening its involvement inby ideological values but by the Trump

Taiwan. Congress has also intensified

harshly

criticizing

Chinese12Strategic Annual Report 2019
The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy – Impacts of Changes in the United States

its criticism of China over the Tibet andpolicies of the Trump administration

Uighur issues. Furthermore, as seen in

toward China do not give any answers to

the passage of the August 2018 National

major post-Cold War questions of how

Defense Authorization Act, which bansthe United States will incorporate China

US government purchases of products

into the international community, andfrom five Chinese companies, including

what form the international community

Huawei Technologies (Huawei) andshould take. It makes prediction of future

Zhongxun (ZTE), and the December 2018

trends in the international situation

Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, whicheven more difficult.

promotes the sale of defense equipment
to Taiwan, Congress is going alongwith the administration in a bipartisan
manner, taking a whole-of-government
approach to impose stern measures on
China on various fronts. While passageof the bill requires the approval of the
Senate and the signature of President
Trump, the House in October 2019

The trade negotiations at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse,
Feb. 2019, Beijing. (Photo Reuters/AFLO)

passed the Hong Kong Human Rights
and Democracy Act, which requires
the United States to verify every year
whether China is observing the “onecountry, two systems” formula thatguarantees a high degree of autonomy
to Hong Kong. Again, however, theTrumpadministration’s

hardline

policies toward China that are not basedon ideology or values are susceptible
to pressure from President Trump’s
insistence in reducing the bilateral trade
deficit and could be used as a bargaining
chip in trade negotiations with China at
any time. In other words, the hardline

13

Secondly, the unpredictability of the
Trump administration’s foreign policy
persists. The administration has, forinstance, abruptly accepted summit
meetings with North Korea whileabandoning its nuclear agreement with
Iran. In addition to its policy toward
China, the basic principles of its foreignand security policies are elusive and theirpredictability remains low. In particular,
America’s policy toward North Korea’s
denuclearization is not yet clear, evenafter the US-North Korea summit talks
held in Hanoi in June 2018 and Singapore

in February 2019. Even worse, President

Stated another way, President Trump,

Trump’s de facto acceptance of North

who is seeking reelection in the 2020

Korea’s launches of short-range ballisticpresidential

missiles after the two summit meetingsback to a populist position, and Japanraises serious concerns for its regional

needs to carefully watch whether theally Japan. Behind this elusivenessadministration’s foreign policy might fall

and unpredictability of the Trump

victim to populism. In particular withadministration’s foreign policy, there

regard to economic and trade policies

lies the conflict between populism andthat directly affect the interests of theelitism in the administration. President

American voters, extra attention should

Trump won the 2016 presidential election

be paid not only to the tariffs on steel andfrom a populist stance that differedaluminum already imposed on imports

from so-called foreign policy experts,

from Japan but also to the possible

even denying the value of NATO in

imposition of tariffs on automobile

America’s foreign policy. After taking

imports despite the agreement reachedoffice at the White House, however,in September 2019 between the two

he was viewed to have compromised

countries, as President Trump has been

with, or been incorporated into, “themore persistent in materializing his

establishment” to some extent by

populist election pledges than anyone

appointing James Mattis, a foreign andhad expected. Japan must therefore

security policy expert, as Secretary ofcontinue to appropriately remind the

Defense. As mentioned earlier, although

Trump administration of the value

his position regarding the Japan-USof the alliance and the importancealliance, including the policy on a Freeof maintaining a free and fair trade/and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), is close

economic system.

election,

could

swing

to that of the conventional diplomaticand security establishments, he still

It is also important to note that

undeniably has populist tendencies, as

the dismissal of Bolton from theevidenced by his dismissal of Mattis as

post of National Security Advisor

Secretary of Defense and his sudden

has given growing impetus to theannouncement of the withdrawal of US

noninterventionists

forces from Syria, although the latterand security policy circles who claim

was subsequently revised partially.

that

the

in

diplomaticUSandforeignsecurity

14

Strategic Annual Report 2019
The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy – Impacts of Changes in the United States

establishments’ support for the use of

given President Trump a solid support

military power has been forcing thebase. While the results of the 2018

United States to fight endless wars.

midterm elections followed a historicalThistendency

pattern, the come-from-behind victory

was already evident in the Obamain the House of Representatives thatadministration, and it is reasonable togave the Democratic Party a majority

assume that noninterventionism is now

was a major blow to the scandal-ridden

an idea widely shared by the American

Trumpelectorate left or right. Even think tanks

tempered, however, by the fact that thewith policy experts are beginning to see

Republicans did not suffer a crushinga movement to unite both left and rightdefeat in the Senate and maintained

noninterventionist

Thetheir majority. Although numerous

Quincy Institute, a noninterventionist

clashes with Democrats are expected

think tank, was founded after thein Congress, especially in the House,

Trump administration’s inauguration

it may be said that the conclusions ofand funded both by left-leaning andSpecial Counsel Mueller’s March 2019

right-leaning

includingreport on “Russia-Gate” concerning

the liberal George Soros and theRussian intervention in the 2016 US

conservative Koch brothers. With thesepresidential election were not the worst

facts in mind, close attention should

outcome for the president. In the run-be paid to how the conflict between

up to the 2020 presidential election,

America First and US internationalism

there have also been allegations raised

plays out in forming the United States’

since the summer of 2019 that he madeforeign policy.

requests to Ukraine for intervention in

noninterventionist

movements.

billionaires,

administration.

This

was

the coming presidential election, and15

On the domestic policy front, the Trump

the possibility of his dismissal based on

administration succeeded in appointing

a conviction at an impeachment trial,conservative judges not only to thewhich has dogged President Trump since

Supreme Court but also in the federal

his inauguration, has not disappeared.

judiciary, including appellate and district

If crucial evidence emerges during

courts. It also enacted a tax cut that itthedeems its greatest achievement. These,

president could expect to lose a number

along with a strong economy, haveof his supporters although, considering

impeachment

proceedings,

thethe balance of Congress, the possibility

complete retraction of remarks he madeof impeachment is not yet that great

during the 2016 presidential campaign.

at this point. To the contrary, theThere have since been repeated summit

Democratic Party could face difficulties,

meetings and telephone conversations

in battleground states critical for the

between the two leaders that have2020 elections if the party leans too

maintained good relations, as seen, forprogressive in its political agenda in theexample, in President Trump’s May

midst of serious political polarization.

2019 visit to Japan as its first state guest

In all, the nomination of the Democratic

in the Reiwa era. Prime Minister Abe

candidate and the outcome of the 2020

has built a particularly close personalpresidential election are still very much

relationship with President Trump thatup in the air.

has itself become a valuable asset forJapan. While there are some instances

Finally, the relationship between Japanin which Japanese and American

and the United States has developed

policies part ways, as seen in the US’fairly smoothly despite initial concerns

withdrawal from TPP negotiations andfollowing the inauguration of President

its imposition of tariffs on steel andTrump. At the summit meeting held inaluminum, Japan must continue its

February 2017, for example, the leadersefforts to maintain a strong relationshipof the two countries confirmed that thewith the United States, supporting a

Japan-US alliance is the cornerstone

win-win policy for both countries andof peace, prosperity and freedom in

the free and open international order,

the region. At the same time, they also

by taking into account the overall trends

confirmed that the United States wouldin the United States in both the publicdefend Japan with its nuclear andand private sectors, while leveraging theconventional forces, and that Article 5

close relationship established by Primeof the Japan-US Security Treaty, which

Minister Abe with President Trump.■

stipulates the United States’ obligation
to defend Japan, applies to the Senkaku
Islands. In addition, at a joint press
conference, President Trump expressed
his gratitude to Japan for hosting US
forces. These statements represent a

16Strategic Annual Report 2019
China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies

China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies

The 40th anniversary of China's reform at the Great Hall of the People, Dec. 2018, Beijing. (Photo Xinhua/AFLO)

On October 1, 2019, China marked 70

drive changes in the power structure ofyears since Mao Zedong declared thethe international community.

establishment of the Central People’s

17

Government of the People’s Republic

However, it is also true that, especiallyof China (PRC). At the ceremony,over the past few years, various problems

Xi Jinping, President of China andthat could hinder China’s progress

General Secretary of the Communist

toward “the great rejuvenation” have

Party of China, reiterated that the

become apparent. The first is relations

Chinese people are on the brink ofwith the United States; friction between

achievingrejuvenation”

the two countries in areas such as tradearound the centenary anniversary ofand science and technology is developing

the founding of the PRC. It is true that

into a full-scale, long-term confrontation

China’s economic and military powerover hegemony in the international

continues to grow at a faster pace thancommunity. In addition, many Asian“developed countries”. Although theand European countries have criticizedpace of its economic growth has slowed

the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI),

in recent years, China will continue towhich is the linchpin of Xi’s foreign

“the

great

policy. Domestically, there are said

after the 19th Party Congress in 2017,

to be many voices of dissatisfaction

and his power base can be evaluatedand doubt within the party over Xi’s

as stable for the time being. On thetendency toward dictatorship and theother hand, it is true that the aggressive

deterioration of relations with the United

behavior that the Xi administration has

States. Some observers say the economy

consistently adopted has created friction

has already lost a lot of its momentum

with many countries, and this may be

and the growth rate is slowing down

one of the factors that will potentiallywell below official statistics (6%-6.5%).

destabilize his power base.

Recently, large-scale demonstrations
by Hong Kong residents, triggered byRelations with society are, of course,

a proposed bill amending the Fugitive

an important factor in ensuring the

Offenders Ordinance, have begun tostability of power. Under the Xi

show rejection of the Communist Party’s

administration, there has been a strong

rule in Hong Kong itself. Failure by thepush to strengthen ideological control

Communist Party to take appropriate

and control over the media. As a result,measures may lead to a situation whereanti-establishment

the stability of the mainland’s system

in domestic politics has been tightly

would be negatively impacted.

contained and, in diplomacy, control bypublicopinionthe government over the nationalistic
With these lofty goals and destabilizing
factors,

where

is

China

public discourse has increased.

heading

now? How does this trend affect the

Anotherfactorthat

cannotbeexisting international order?

overlooked in assessing Xi’s poweris his relationship with the military.

One of the most important factors inSince taking office as Chairman of the

China’s domestic politics and foreign

Central Military Commission, Xi has

policy is the stability of the current

clearly strengthened his grip on theadministration, especially the power ofmilitary through a large-scale reformthe General Secretary of the Communistof the military structure carried out

Party. General Secretary Xi Jinping

before the 19th Party Congress. The

succeeded in promoting a large number

reform primarily seems to be aimedof his followers to the leadership groupat strengthening the military’s ability

18

Strategic Annual Report 2019
China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies

to wage war, while further analysis isof the Xi administration’s power base,needed before it can be fully evaluated.

the slowdown of the Chinese economy,
the deterioration of US-China relations,

How is China’s foreign policy actuallyand the improvement of the Chinese

expressed? Relations with the United

public’s perception of Japan. On theStates have reached a major turning

other hand, most of the security andpoint. During the “Beidaihe Conference”

confidence-buildingin the summer of 2018, Xi and his aides

Japan and China remain unresolved.

issuesbetweenwere reportedly criticized for worsening
relations with the United States. The
Xi administration is trying hard to
manage relations with the United Statesby refraining from mentioning “Madein China 2025”. On the other hand,some complained about Xi making too
many concessions to the United Statesin trade negotiations and, around May
this year, the administration turned toa hardline stance in the negotiations.
In October, due in part to the domestic
political considerations of the Trumpadministration, the first deal wasconcluded, but it is not certain thatfurther progress will be made. In thisway, China’s foreign policy toward theUnited States is based on a delicate
domestic balance and is expected tofluctuate within a certain range.
Under these circumstances, relations
with Japan have clearly improved,
particularly since the mutual visitsby their leaders in 2018. Contributing
factors behind this are the strengthening
19

The Belt and Road Forum, April 2019, Yanqi Lake venue.
(Photo AP/AFLO)The Xi administration’s foreign policy
is symbolized by the BRI. A notable
trend is the diversification of businessin recent years away from traditional
infrastructure investments. The current
situation surrounding China is quite
different from the time the concept
was formulated. Domestically, foreignexchange reserves and excess production
capacity have both declined, while,
externally, the conflict with the Trumpadministration has surfaced. Under
these circumstances, some adjustments
have been made since the initial plan. A
case in point is the fact that the China hasstarted to refer to a “high-quality BRI”

countries is a “central challenge” to thesince the 2019 Belt and Road Forum forsecurity and prosperity of the UnitedInternational Cooperation, where loans

States. In recent years, this attitude has

to emerging countries were criticized as

led the United States to exclude Huawei

being “debt traps”. It can be seen that theTechnologies in connection with thehigh-quality infrastructure investment“5G” next-generation communications

and the four conditions for cooperation

standard and label China a “currency

for BRI that Japan advocates – openness,

manipulator”, while the “trade war”

transparency, economic profitability,with China has begun to show signs ofand fiscal soundness of the host country

developing into a full-fledged “economic– have had a certain influence on thewar”.

direction of China’s policy. In addition
to its domestic policy banks, China

In contrast to the US-China relationship,

co-finances various projects throughthemultiple funding sources, including

seen improvement. President Xi and

the Asian Infrastructure Investment

President Putin have met nearly 30

Bank (AIIB) and the New Development

times, and the relationship between

Bank (NDB). However, China tends tothe two countries was upgraded to a

independently finance the construction“comprehensive strategic partnershipof strategically important infrastructureof coordination” in June 2019. Thisin developing countries.

partnership is not limited to the

China-Russia

relationshiphasdomains of politics and economy;
How have foreign countries reacted toit aims to also further cooperation

China’s domestic situation and foreign

security-wise,

policy in recent years?

technology and cybertechnology. It

includingmilitaryis said that discussions are being held
Since the beginning of the second year

about deepening cooperation in missileof the Trump administration, the US

defense. It goes without saying thatgovernment has been exhibiting abehind these developments are the twostrong wariness about China’s foreigncountries’ relationships with the Unitedpolicy as a whole. China was definedStates.

as a “revisionist power” and it wasasserted that “the reemergence of long-

Yet beneath the surface, Russia remains

term, strategic competition” with suchwary of China; this is due to security
20

Strategic Annual Report 2019
China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies

concerns caused by China’s rise and thedevelopment of China-DPRK relations

shift in the power balance. For example,

is still a dependent variable for US-

Russia’s strategy to have intermediate-

DPRK relations. The DPRK does notrange nuclear forces even if it violates

want China to intervene excessively

the INF Treaty may have been related toin the process of establishing a peaceits intention to eliminate its asymmetry

regime on the Korean Peninsula, andwith China in this field. Although

the current China-DPRK “honeymoon”

China recognizes this Russian wariness,

is not guaranteed to hold.

it has put on display a harmonious
relationship between the two countries

Among the countries involved in the

because of strategic necessity. Regarding

disputes over sovereignty in the Southeconomic relations, numerous initiatives

China Sea, the Philippines under thehave been launched; however, as theDuterte administration has adopted

economic benefits for China are nota conciliatory policy toward China.

necessarily large, the projects have notContributing factors behind this areseen concrete progress.

the Philippines’ policy of placing thestabilization of domestic security andChina-DPRK

relations

are

also

economic development at the top of theseeing close cooperation, at least on“security” agenda, China’s stance ofa superficial level. Relations between

responding positively to such a posture,

China and the DPRK had deteriorated

andfrom the first half of 2017 but, in early

perception that US involvement in

2018, when Kim Jong-un, Chairman

South China Sea issues is passive. Onof the Workers’ Party of Korea,

the other hand, Vietnam tends to show

mentioned

andmore clearly its wariness of China

when preparations were underway

on the South China Sea issue. On thefor the US-DPRK summit meetings,

economic front, although China’s direct

Kim visited Xi in Beijing in March ofinvestment in Vietnam has increased

that same year. Since then, Chairman

sharply due to the US-China trade war

Kim has visited China four times as

since the beginning of 2019, there is aof October 2019, and in June 2019,strong inclination to avoid excessive

President

dependence on China.

“denuclearization”

XivisitedPyongyangfor the first time. Nevertheless, the

21

the

Philippines

government’s

India’s

relations

with

China

had

the current administration has taken

worsened from the middle of 2016, duea tough stance on “interference” fromin part to the military confrontation on

China with its August 2018 decision to

the Doklam plateau. Since April 18,

virtually exclude Chinese companies

however, India, which like China hassuch as Huawei and ZTE from its 5G

a huge trade surplus with the United

networks.

States, has been inclined to ease its
confrontation with China as the US-

The trend of worsening relations with

China trade war rages in the background.

China is also seen in Europe. The “EU-After

removedChina – A strategic outlook” released

India from the Generalized System ofby the European Commission in March

Preferences (GSP) in June 2019, Indian

2019 strongly reflected the EU’s mistrust

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whoof China and positioned China not only

attended the Shanghai Cooperation

as a partner but also as a “systemic

Organization (SCO) summit in thatrival”. There is concern that the “16 + 1”

same month, criticized the move as

framework established in 2012 between

unilateralism and protectionism while

China and 16 Central and Eastern

avoiding mentioning the US by name,European countries may be a Chinese

and

with

ploy to divide Europe, and there is

China. However, strategic mistrust still

growing concern about the penetration

underlies India’s view of China.

of China’s political influence throughthe

Unitedconfirmed

Statescooperation

economic means. On the other hand, inSince 2018, Australia’s relations withresponse to Xi’s visit to Europe in March

China have been deteriorating to the2019, some countries, including Italy

point where they are said to be the worst

and Luxembourg, have announced theirsince the normalization of diplomatic

intention to deepen their cooperation

relations between the two countries.

with China on BRI.

Behind this is the growing awarenessresearch

Given these circumstances, it is expected

institutes that China is using its financial

that the risk of destabilization of thepower to spread its influence, whichinternational order will increase over a

has heightened the threat of its “sharp

relatively long period of time. The rise

power”. Under these circumstances,of China and the confrontation between

among

universities

and

22

the United States and China are now

or seek any sphere of influence, but

long-term trends. Even if trade friction,

its explanations and actions are notwhich has captured the attention of theconvincing.

Trump administration, is alleviated,
there will still be a wide gap between

The confrontation between the United

the two countries in terms of governing

States and China is making the lattermodels and values, as evidenced bydraw closer to Japan, which at thisVice President Mike Pence’s Octobermoment has a positive effect on Japan-

2018 speech. As China continues toChina relations. However, if the United

declare its goal of increasing its wealthStates starts to seek Japan’s cooperationand military strength, there is a risk

in various ways in its policy of pressuringthat it will intensify its confrontation

China, Japan could be placed in awith the United States in the future.

dilemma between the United States andFurthermore, this could develop into a

China. Needless to say, the Japan-US

wider struggle for hegemony between

alliance remains the linchpin of Japan’s

the United States and China.

diplomacy. On the other hand, there
might be some room to deepen Japan-

Other

23

countries

areincreasingly

China cooperation on issues common

wary of China because of politicalto Japan’s vision of a “Free and Openand security concerns, even thoughIndo-Pacific (FOIP)” and China’s BRI

they need the economic benefits that(for example, strengthening regional

relations with China bring. Many

connectivity), with the condition that

democracies,

China ensures the recipient countries’

includingJapan,

areconcerned that China will export

financialsoundness,

openness,

its governing model, which relies ontransparency, and economic efficiency.

surveillance and coercion, and seek to

At the same time, it is important for Japanestablish its own sphere of influence by

to monitor the perceptions and policies

strengthening its ties with authoritarianof other countries toward China and tostates. Other neighboring countries are

pursue coordinated policies with these

also apprehensive about the excessive

countries if they match Japan’s national

expansion of China’s influence, whileinterests. In doing so, it is necessary

maintaining good relations with China

to urge China, as a key member of theon the surface. China has stressed thatinternational community, to act in line

no matter how it might develop, itwith the principle of maintaining thewill never threaten any other country

liberal international order.■Strategic Annual Report 2019
What is the “Axis” for a New Order on the Korean Peninsula?

What is the “Axis” for a New Order on the Korean Peninsula?

President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Summit Meeting, Feb. 2019, Hanoi. (Photo AP/AFLO)

In

November

2017,

North

Korea

the wake of North Korea’s participation

declared the completion of its nuclear

in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics

force and took a substantial stepin February 2018 and resulted in the

toward “dialogue mode.” In April

first North-South summit in 11 years atof the following year, it announced

Panmunjom in April of the same year.

a voluntary moratorium of nuclear

In addition, seeking to simultaneously

and intercontinental ballistic missileadvance denuclearization and establish(ICBM) tests and the abandonment of its

a peace regime, the South Korean

nuclear test site. With this as a turning

government

point, the situation on the Korean

between the United States and North

Peninsula began to transform rapidly

Korea and, in March, it obtained aas other countries with various motives

promise from both the United States

became involved. The South Korean

and North Korea via a special envoy

government under President Moon Jae-

to attend the first-ever summit between

in, which was inaugurated in 2017 under

the two countries.

focusedonmediationa banner of peaceful coexistence andco-prosperity with North Korea, broke

Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un, Chairman

the ice. North-South contact resumed inof the State Affairs Commission of24

Strategic Annual Report 2019
What is the “Axis” for a New Order on the Korean Peninsula?

North Korea, turned to active summit

South Korea stepped in for the third

diplomacy and made a surprise visit

time and attempted to expand its role

to Beijing as his first overseas trip atfrom “mediator” to “arbitrator”. By

the end of March, immediately after

makingthe agreement on a US-North Korea

with North Korea at the North-Southsummit. At that time, Chairman Kim

summit in September that included

Jong-un secured China’s support foreasing military tensions, deepening

the US-DPRK summit while seeking

cooperation and reaffirming the DPRK’s

understanding of North Korea’s position

denuclearization, South Korea aimed

that the denuclearization process beto advance North-South relations andphased in.

use it as a springboard for US-DPRK

anoverarching

agreement

dialogue. However, the establishment of

25

The US-DPRK summit meeting wasa peace regime on the Korean Peninsula

held in Singapore in June, and the twoand the denuclearization of North Korea

leaders confirmed the direction of awere essentially issues to be discussed

new US-DPRK relationship, a peace

between the United States and Northregime, and denuclearization. In the

Korea and, since the United States,

run-up to the US-DPRK summit, there

Japan and other countries concerned

were further mediation efforts by the

maintained a cautious stance within the

ROK government through anotherframework of international economic

North-South summit in Panmunjom

sanctions on North Korea, South Korea

and support by China through a China-

faced limitations in using economic

DPRK summit in Dalian, both held incooperation as leverage in advancing

May 2018.

inter-Korean relations.

However, the broad and vague agreement

The second US-DPRK summit meeting

between the leaders of the United States(Hanoi) was held in February 2019,

and North Korea did not bridge thebut the meeting ended in failure due togap between the two countries on the

differences of opinion between Northdetails of the denuclearization process

Korea, which insisted on a drastic

and, in the course of the high-level

relaxation of economic sanctions intalks held afterward, differences overexchange for the abandonment of thespecific measures for denuclearization

Nyongbyon nuclear site alone, andsurfaced. Under such circumstances,

the United States, which insisted onthe abandonment of all weapons of

reducing the scale of its regular US-

mass destruction (WMD) – including

ROK joint military exercises, and has

chemical and biological weapons – andcontinued to express its intention to

missile-related facilities.

carry on with dialogue by taking theposition that it does not regard North

Since then, North Korea has continued

Korea’s launch of short-range ballistic

to employ its two-pronged tactic of

missiles as a problem. It is thoughtlauding President Trump personallythat President Trump’s calculations

and criticizing the US government inon establishing diplomatic legacy andan attempt to win concessions from theusing this to influence domestic politics

United States. Moreover, while carefully

are behind this.

calculating the tolerance of the UnitedStates, it has repeatedly conducted test
launches of short-range ballistic missiles,
new multiple rocket launchers, andSLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic
missiles) (a total of 12 launches between
May and October 2019), and is trying
to apply both hard and soft pressure
toward its own self-imposed deadlineof year’s end. On the other hand, China
and Russia are moving closer to North
Korea, out of concern that tensions
might return and with the intention ofusing their influence over North Korea
as a diplomatic card (a Russia-North
Korea summit meeting was held in
April 2019, and China-DPRK summit
meetings were held in January and June2019).
Since the Singapore summit, the UnitedStates has maintained its policy ofNorth Korea test-fired a “super-large multiple rocket launcher”
at an undisclosed location, Oct. 2019.
(Photo KNS/KCNA/AFP/AFLO)

President Trump and Chairman Kim
again met on the northern side of
Panmunjom at the end of June 2019, andthe resumption of talks was announced.
However, at the Stockholm workinglevel talks held in October, the dispute
over denuclearization measures andincentives did not seem to be settled.
Needless

to

say,

the

processofdenuclearizing a country requires morethan 10 years even if it proceeds smoothly.
26

Strategic Annual Report 2019
What is the “Axis” for a New Order on the Korean Peninsula?

It is inevitable that negotiations between(FFVD)”, and this has to be shared

the United States and North Korea,

among the countries concerned. In

which harbor deep mutual distrust,

addition, to attain FFVD, North Korea’s

will take a long time. It is all the more

nuclear inventory of existing nuclear

true because there seems to be a wide

weapons and related facilities must be

gap in perceptions of denuclearization

declared and identified. Only under

between the US and DPRK. What issuch conditions should what is widely

genuinely needed today, therefore, isknown as phased denuclearization andfor the countries concerned to reconcile

compensation measures be discussed.

their respective visions of the regional
order with the denuclearization of

In addition to the denuclearization

North Korea as the first step.

issue, it is necessary to solve not only the
ICBM issue, which the United States isFurthermore, when considering concrete

particularly concerned about, but alsomeasures for denuclearization, we should

the issue of short-range and medium-not forget the fact that comprehensive

range missiles, which pose a greater

multilateralincludingthreat to neighboring countries, as aconcrete denuclearization measures,

package. Only when these perceptions

such as Joint Statement 9.19 (2005) andare shared by the countries concerned

Joint Statement 2.13 (2007) at the six-

will North Korea realize the need toparty talks, have already been reached.

shift from the tactic it has employed

Despite such agreements, the disputes

since the Agreed Framework (1994) toover procedures and interpretations ofbuy time and to make its possession ofdeclaration, verification, and reward

nuclear weapons a fait accompli.

agreements

eventually allowed North Korea to buytime to improve its nuclear and missile

Furthermore,theeffectivenessofcapabilities.

existing economic sanctions against
North Korea must be ensured in order to27

Based on this lesson, it should beelicit a sincere response from the North.

reaffirmed that the most important

The recent revelation of North Korea’s

precondition for a permanent peace

illicit import and export “network”

on the Korean Peninsula is North

indicates that sanctions will not be

Korea’s denuclearization, namely “final

fully effective until import and export

and fully verified denuclearization

control systems are shared among thecountries

concerned.

Strengthening

with the United States. The Japan-

export and import controls on strategic

ROK General Security of Military

and

will

Information Agreement (GSOMIA) iscontribute not only to resolving North

a symbol of such linkage and must be

Korea issues but also to maintaining

maintained regardless of Japan-ROK

the regional and international orders

bilateral relations.

nuclear-relatedmaterials

as international public goods. We urge
all countries concerned to agree on this

Only

when

the

processofpoint and work together to improve theirdenuclearization proceeds and tensions

capabilities.

are eased under this premise can Japan
become involved in the “bright future

The Japan-US-ROK trilateral frame-

after denuclearization” that President

work is particularly important for

Trump has dangled before North

Japan in considering the formation of

Korea. Negotiations on the pending

an order on the Korean Peninsula withbilateral issues between Japan andthe denuclearization of North Korea

North Korea may then be incorporated

as a starting point. The greater the gap

into the process. At the same time,

between neighboring countries, the freer

however, it may be necessary to quietly

the hand North Korea will have and, if

start discussing the risks in the event of

the independent action of one country to

failed negotiations on denuclearizing

secure leverage on North Korea hinders

North Korea and restricting its missiles,

a coordinated response among theincluding a deterrent regime led by thecountries concerned, denuclearization

United States and Japan.

will be further delayed. Japan for its partopposes any easing of sanctions before

While there are some outstanding issues

North Korea takes concrete action to

between Japan and South Korea at

denuclearize and Japan must makepresent, it is necessary to calmly resolve

efforts so that the US and ROK shareeach issue, bearing in mind the major

this posture. In order to respond to thedevelopments on the Korean Peninsula

missile threat posed by North Korea, it

and the importance of cooperation

is essential for Japan and South Korea

among Japan, the United States, andto cooperate in supporting the actions

South Korea.■of the US military, and to maintain thelink between their respective alliances
28

Strategic Annual Report 2019
The Changing International Order in the Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Choice

The Changing International Order in the Indo-Pacificand Japan’s Choice

Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyers participate in a drill off the coast of Brunei, June 2019. (Photo AP/AFLO)

In 2019, Japan faces a challenging

international order, and acting toward

security environment. In Northeast

its realization will be crucial for theAsia, a mountain of issues remain to

future of Japan.

be tackled, including North Korea’s
development,

As part of its proactive effort to establish

China’s attempts to unilaterally change

an international order, Japan has been

the status quo in the East China Sea, thepromoting the “Free and Open Indo-management of the Japan-US alliance,

Pacific (FOIP)” concept since 2016. At

tensions between Japan and South Korea,

the 6th Tokyo International Conference

and diplomatic negotiations with Russia

on African Development (TICAD VI)

over the Northern Territories. With aheld in Kenya in August 2016, Prime

wider perspective that extends beyond

Minister Shinzo Abe clearly declared

Northeast Asia, we observe tectonic

thatshifts taking place in the international

strengthen the rules-based international

order.

understandingorder, stating that Japan would shoulder

the changes surrounding the existing“responsibility to nurture and enrichinternational order, envisioning an ideal

the interactions between the Pacific andnuclear29

andmissileAppropriately

Japan

would

maintainandIndian Oceans, and between Asia andof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),

Africa, as a place where freedom, thewhich had been reluctant to use therule of law and the market economy are

Indo-Pacific concept, announced its

respected, without force or coercion”.

“Indo-Pacific Outlook” in May 2019.

During the past three years, Japan has

The concept of the Indo-Pacific region,

actively promoted capacity building,which had been used only in discussions

joint

infrastructure

among intellectuals, has now become adevelopment in wide-ranging areas ofregional concept with policy significanceSoutheast Asia, South Asia, Oceania,

comparable to that of East Asia and thethe Pacific island countries, and Africa,

Asia-Pacific region more broadly in theand strategically disseminated these

foreign policy of each country.

training,

andideas. In parallel with Japan’s efforts,
the concept of the Indo-Pacific has been

So why has the concept of the

adopted in the diplomatic documents

Indo-Pacific spread so quickly andof many countries, including Australia,

prevalently? The reason for this is

India, Indonesia and France. The United

twofold: (1) the emergence of challenges

States has also embraced this concept andposed by revisionist forces to therenamed the US Pacific Command “theexisting international order and (2)US Indo-Pacific Command” in May ofthe heightened wariness of those who

2018. Washington has taken additional

prefer maintaining the status quo andsteps in pursuit of the concept, andupholding the rules-based order. This

the Department of Defense published

dynamism can be seen in three key

the “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” inareas: maritime security, connectivity,

June 2019. The quadrilateral dialogue

and fundamental values.

framework among Japan, the UnitedStates, Australia and India, which had

First, in the area of maritime security,

dissipated in 2007 shortly after it wastraditional

created, has been resumed, and the first

reemerged in the South and East China

foreign ministers’ meeting of the fourseas as well as the Indian Ocean region

countries was held on the occasion of(IOR). In the South China Sea (SCS) in

the United Nations General Assembly

particular, China’s expansionist moves

in September 2019. In response tohave been apparent since 2012. As ofthese developments, the Association

2019, China is transforming reclaimed

security

issueshave

30Strategic Annual Report 2019
The Changing International Order in the Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Choiceartificial features into military bases.

challenges to existing infrastructure

While an arbitral award based on Annex

investment standards and loan terms.

VII of the United Nations Convention

On the one hand, the BRI could beon the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was

beneficial to the regional economy byissued in July 2016, which completely

activating economic exchanges andrejects China’s excessive claim of

economic connectivity between China

historical rights based on the “Nine-and the central and western parts of theDash Line” and points out legal

Eurasian continent and the countries

problems regarding the construction ofbordering the Indian and Pacific oceans

artificial islands in the Spratly Islands,

through infrastructure. On the other

China claims that the arbitration ishand, there remain concerns overinvalid and a mere piece of paper with“debt traps” in which China assumes

no meaning. From the perspective ofexcessive debts and acquires long-term

maintaining the rules-based maritime

port management rights in return, as

order, China’s current actions arewell as the geopolitical and military use

challenges to the whole of maritime lawof that infrastructure. In addition, newand order, which defines the rights andinvestment banks have emerged, such as

obligations of states. Needless to say,the New Development Bank establishednon-traditional security issues such as

by the BRICS countries and the Asianhumanitarian assistance and disaster

Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

relief for maritime accidents, anti-

It is unclear at this stage whether thesepiracy measures, and non-proliferation

new initiatives will replace the existingof weapons of mass destruction stilldevelopment banks but, at least forremain.

international

the next 10 years, development norms

cooperation at sea and the improvement

and organizations in which emerging

of each country’s ability to monitor

countries have a greater influence will

circumstances

Domaincoexist alongside such institutions as

Awareness: MDA) are important issues

the Bretton Woods regime and thein maintaining the maritime order.

Asian Development Bank, which was

Therefore,(Maritime

led primarily by Japan.
As for connectivity, China’s plan for31

a regional economic bloc – the Belt

Finally, there is the challenge to liberaland Road Initiative (BRI) – posesvalue systems such as democracy, basic

human rights, freedom of expression,

All together, they have become one ofand the rule of law. At the end of the Coldthe forces destabilizing the existing

War, the debate over ideology at one timeinternational

seemed to have come to a conclusioninternational law and organizations.

ordercomposedofas “the end of history” was declared.
Yet there is not necessarily a sufficientsystem of cooperation among countries
to address serious cross-border humanrights issues such as terrorism, religious
oppression and refugees in the IndoPacific region, where there are countries
with diverse political systems, culturesand histories. In addition, technologicaldevelopment has not necessarily led to
improved access to information andmore free speech activities by citizens.
Instead, there have been moves in somecountries that run counter to democracy,such as the strengthening of state control
over information and the imposition ofgreater censorship. Furthermore, thefact that the principle of the rule of law
is being challenged not by great power
politics but by parochial national interest
is one of the most serious problems forJapan, which maintains that all disputes
be resolved according to internationallaw. The challenges have included not
only China’s assertiveness in the SCS,
but decisions by US leaders to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement and the
TPP as well as disparaging remarks
aboutinternationalorganizations.

Subi Reef at the Spratly group of islands in the South China Sea(Photo Reuters/AFLO)

How should Japan deal with theseissues related to the international order?
As mentioned earlier, the FOIP concept
addresses a wide range of issues basedon a sense of urgency about Japan’s
principle of maintaining a rules-based
international order. With regard to
maritime security, Japan is steadilystrengthening cooperation with theUnited States, Australia, India, andother maritime nations in Southeast
Asia to protect the freedom of navigationin key sea lanes of communications.
Specifically,

Japan

has

conducted

multiple bilateral and multilateral joint
exercises and patrols with the aimof improving interoperability. Tokyo
has also provided both hardware andsoftware support to countries around32

Strategic Annual Report 2019
The Changing International Order in the Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Choice

the SCS and the Indian Ocean to build

viability. In order to further reduce the

MDA capabilities, including enhancing

risk that the host country will fall into a

regional coast guard capacities, and“debt trap”, or that these four conditions

supplying patrol vessels and personnel

will not be met by China, Japan should

training. In recent years, security

consider inviting China to participate

cooperation

withparticularly

advanced.

India

has

been

in the Paris Club and assisting the host

The

Japan

countryinformulating

investment

criteria

cooperation

Maritime Self-Defense Force’s regular

acceptanceparticipation in the Malabar Exercise

with other countries. Finally, Japan

since 2016, as well as the bilateralhasjoint exercises held in the Andaman

to gradually accept liberal values

Sea in May 2019, aim to improve thewhile taking into consideration thetactical skills of both navies throughunique history and circumstances ofanti-submarine warfare and tacticaleach country, without imposing so-

exercises.

called universal values unilaterally. In

encouragedinregionalcountries

order to achieve this goal, Japan has
In the area of connectivity, Japan

been pursuing balanced diplomacy

advocates “high-quality infrastructure”

combining

and aims to offer infrastructure that

economic cooperation with countries

is resilient in the long term and leads

having different political systems.

political,

securityandto recipient countries’ autonomous

33

development. In addition to promoting

There is no doubt that the key toits own high-quality infrastructure,

maintaining the existing international

it is also pursuing joint development

order lies in the future course of China,

with the United States, Australia, New

which has achieved rapid economic

Zealand and others, as exemplified by

growth in the first 20 years of the 21st

Papua New Guinea’s electrification

century and is now becoming a colossal

project. In addition, while seeking room

military power, and the actions of theto cooperate with China’s infrastructure

United States as a status quo power.

financing, Japan is urging China

Yet, the two behemoths are already into ensure that the BRI meets suchstrategic competition. For instance,

requirementssoundness,the current Sino-US trade war and theopenness, transparency, and economic

pressure placed on Chinese companies

asfiscalover 5G are not simply economic issues

more resilience from the coercion andbut reflect geopolitical competitionpressure of major powers, thereby

between the two for technologicalputting the principle of the rule of law

hegemony. In this context, Japan, as

into practice. As a maritime nation,an ally of the United States, needs toJapan needs to see the “Free and Open

think about ways to elicit not only

Indo-Pacific” region not only as an

the physical presence of US forces but

ideal but also as a “sine qua non” for thealso a constructive attitude towardstability and prosperity of the country,

maintaining

and to formulate specific diplomatic

order

from

the

US

administration while imposing costs onpolicies to realize this goal. ■China for attempts to change the statusquo and incentivizing rule-abiding
behaviors.
To this end, it is increasingly importantto build a system of cooperation amongsmall and medium-sized states in the
Indo-Pacific that want to avoid choosing
either the United States or China. Thisis because no country can establish
and maintain an international orderon its own and, as US-China relations
becomeincreasingly

antagonistic,other Asian countries (the rest of Asia)
that are expected to achieve economic
development will become increasingly
important. While placing the security
and economic cooperation networksof the US’s allies at the center, Japan
will need to proactively cooperate withcountries in the Indo-Pacific Region
irrespective of their sizes and different
political systems and help them acquire

34

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Putin’s Russia and its Foreign Policy

Putin’s Russia and its Foreign Policy

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the International Economic Forum (SPIEF),
June 2019, Sankt Pertersburg. (Photo Reuters/AFLO)

Thirty years have passed since the end

economic base and a peculiar presenceof the Cold War. Since the collapse ofin the international community, due in

the Soviet Union, the global status ofpart to its “quasi-alliance” relationship

the Russian Federation has remainedwith the emerging superpower China.

one of the major issues in the postCold War world order. On the whole,

Putin has remained in power for 20

however, we must say that the Westyears since first inaugurated in 2000

has

not succeeded in establishing(from 2008 to 2012 he ran a “tandem”

amicable relations with Russia. Leaving

government with President Medvedev),

aside the question of whether we canand it is true that he implemented

describe the 2014 Ukrainian crisis aspolitical and economic liberalization

part of a new Cold War, it goes without

and overcame the chaos that followedsaying that Russia is one of the factors

the collapse of the Soviet Union andthat
liberalhas

destabilizedinternationalthecurrent

managed the economy through stable,order.

While

vertical control and the development ofstrengthening its assertiveness under the
Putin administration, Russia has a weak
35

energy resources.

During the Ukrainian crisis in 2014,

replacement of local government heads

Putin annexed Crimea and Russia wasand the appointment of young people tosubjected to international sanctions,central government posts, and the powerincluding expulsion from the G8. At

balance between the Siloviki and thethe same time, in a world becoming

liberals is changing. It is believed that

increasingly

security

Putin himself is trying to test potential

and other areas, Russia continues tosuccessors by watching the performance

hold an important position as part ofof young people in these positions. With

Eurasia, together with such emerging

Putin’s approval ratings declining andsuperpowers as China and India. Frommass protests against the government

Japan’s point of view, Russia is notappearing at the local level, the Putin

only a neighboring country with whichadministration is nervous about local

Japan has a territorial issue, but is also

governance. The rise of young people

one directly linked to Japan’s security,

entrusted with local governance andas seen in its efforts to gain a newbeing “put to the test” will be the key tofoothold in a region stretching from thethe future of Putin’s regime.

multipolarin

Arctic Ocean to the Indo-Pacific Ocean
through its “Pivot to the East” policy.

It is widely known that the Russian
economy is linked to oil prices. The

How

has

Putin’s

Russiaevolvedchallenge for the Putin administration ispolitically and economically? What is

how to minimize the impact of oil pricePutin’s foreign policy? What impact

fluctuations on the economy and build awill it have on the international order,

robust industrial structure. Accordingly,

the East Asian region and Japan?

the current administration’s economic
policy is based on a contractionary fiscal

The Putin administration today ispolicy and is supported by advisers who

supported by an elite group centeredaspire to “liberal” economic policies.

on the executive branch comprising

At the same time, there is a tendency

the “Siloviki”, made up mainly of

to emphasize the role of the state

officials from the military ministries,

and to promote state intervention in

and a “liberal” faction. The former is

specific strategic industries. Adding

also dominant in the energy sector. In

to these basic policies are others

recent years, the Putin administration

formulated in response to changes

has

in

been

actively

promoting

the

the

international

environment
36

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Putin’s Russia and its Foreign Policy

following the annexation of Crimea.

The

geopoliticalcharacteristicsof

In other words, sanctions imposed by

Eurasia, where Russia is located, vary

the United States and the European

greatly depending on its relations

Union after the annexation of Crimea

with Europe and the United States,

have compelled Russia to implement awith the former Soviet republics and“forced import substitution” policy andthe countries of the Middle East, andto approach “Eastern countries” suchwith Japan, China, and other Asianas China and Turkey to obtain funding

countries. These factors define Putin’s

and export destinations for its natural

basic foreign and security policies.

resources. In the energy sector, which
accounts for an important part of theRussia’s relations with the United States

Russian economy, the “Pivot to theand Europe have not fully recovered

East” is accelerating. However, thesefrom the confrontation that followed

measures have not been sufficient to

the Ukrainian crisis. From the Russian

revive the Russian economy, which has

point of view, the perception of Russia

been in a low-growth mode recently.

within the US establishment, regardlessDissatisfaction among the Russianof party, is a very unfavorable one, andpeople is rising steadily, as shown by theit is unlikely that the United Statessluggishness in real income growth andwill soften its policy toward Russia

increasing consumer debt. The Putinin the future. Even in areas such asadministration’s implicit social contractarms control where the United States

thatpolitical

and Russia were thought to be able tofreedom is beginning to collapse. We

cooperate, disagreements between theshould pay attention to how these cracks

two countries are conspicuous, as seen

will affect domestic politics.

in the invalidation of the INF Treaty.

barterssausagesfor

It would be desirable for Russia toconstruct a new arms control frameworkthat would include emerging China,
India and Iran, but such a proposal
would not be easily accepted by either
the United States or emerging regional
powers and, therefore, it would be
difficult to find a good starting point for
Russian dissenters at a demonstration, Sep. 2019, Moscow.
(Photo AFP/AFLO)
37

a dialogue with the United States. In its

relations with Europe, Russia has been

important

from

the

viewpointoftrying to influence those who oppose

restraining China, which has been

the EU establishment to lessen the

expanding its influence in Central Asia

adverse impact on Russia by disrupting

through its “Belt and Road Initiative”

coordination among EU countries,(BRI).

while some European countries, such
as Italy and France, have been trying to

One of Putin’s most important policies

mend their relations with Russia. Russia

is the “Pivot to the East” policy, which

seems intent on “reintegration into theaims to strengthen relations withinternational

Asian countries that are gaining incommunity”

througheconomic and political weight. In recent

these efforts.

years, Russia has concluded FTAs
It is extremely important for Russia towith Vietnam and Singapore, therebybuild stable relations with the former

steadily building a foothold in Asia. The

Soviet republics in Central Asia and“Pivot to the East” policy itself had beenwith countries in the Middle East. Thisin place before relations with Europe

is because some regions in Central

and the United States deteriorated,

Asia have been shaken by international

but the Ukrainian crisis gave support

terrorism and drug pollution. Politicalto Russia’s eastward orientation. In

and economic stability in Central Asianparticular, its approach to China has

countries is desirable in preventing

become more important for restraining

these problems from spreading totheRussia. Good relations with Middle

2019, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang

Eastern countries are also necessary

visitedin stabilizing

the prices of energy“comprehensive strategic cooperation

resources, which are Russia’s main

partnership” that showed both at home

exports. Russia is seeking regional

and abroad that Sino-Russian relations

stability by reintegrating the former

constitute a “quasi-alliance”. On theSovietandother hand, there is the view that there

economically through such frameworks

are certain limits to the strengthening

as the Eurasian

of

and

bloc

the

both

politically

Economic Union

Shanghai

UnitedStates.

RussiaChina-Russia

and

In

Septemberestablishedrelations.

a

While

Cooperation

China and Russia are stage-managing a

Organization. The reintegration of thehoneymoon through initiatives such as

former Soviet bloc is also extremely“Pivot to the East” and BRI, Russia is
38

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Putin’s Russia and its Foreign Policy

still wary of China’s “Ice Silk Road”

order that existed during the Cold

initiative. It has also been pointed

War. However, Russia’s influence as aout that Russia’s intention to possess

global actor remains significant, andintermediate-range

weapons

its “opportunistic” behavior, coupledeven in violation of the INF Treaty waswith the decline in US influence underto eliminate the asymmetry between

the Trump administration, has a non-

China and Russia. Regardless of thenegligible impact on the international

reality surrounding the Russo-Chineseorder.

nuclear“quasi-alliance”, as Russia’s approaches
to China gain momentum, Japan’s

For Russia, Japan is positioned not only

position vis-à-vis Russia is changing. In

as a negotiation partner for the long-the past, some Russian experts viewed

standing territorial issue, but also as

Japan as a counterbalance to China,

an important piece in its “Pivot to thebut now they think that, with no sign

East” diplomacy, which aims to deepenof improvement in US-Russia relations,relations with neighboring countries

theconfrontationalby leveraging the development of theatmosphere between the United States

Russian Far East, Eastern Siberia, andand

the Arctic region. In the increasingly

increasingly
China

has

put

Japan-Russia

relations on the back-burner.

important Indo-Pacific region, what
weight should Japan give to its relations

39

In addition to these basic policies,

with Russia, a Eurasian power witha priority on national interests andabundant natural resources? As theopportunism are also factors shaping

strategic value of the Arctic region

Putin’s foreign and security policies.

increases in line with climate change,

The annexation of Crimea, triggered by

how does Japan position Russia in its

the Ukrainian crisis, and intervention

foreign policy? Despite good personalin the Middle East (Syria), in which

relationsthe US presence has declined, can be

Japan and Russia, there is no sign ofdescribed as opportunistic responses

a solution to the territorial dispute.

that give priority to their own interests

On the other hand, cooperation withand respond to the situation at hand.

Russia is indispensable for the stability

Today, Russia is neither able nor willingof the Northeast Asian region, and it

to establish the kind of international

is important to come up with effective

betweentheleadersofcooperation

measureswith

Russiafor global issues such as international
terrorism, drug pollution, and climatechange. Based on this recognition, and inlight of the fact that today’s good JapanRussia relations have become a valuableasset for Japanese diplomacy, it will benecessary once again to reconsider froma strategic perspective what Russia is toJapan and what role Russia can play.■40

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Europe in Turmoil and the Future of Japan-EU Cooperation

Europe in Turmoil and the Future of Japan-EU Cooperation(Photo Reuters/AFLO)

In the 21st century, Europe has

to understand the problems of Europe,

continuously experienced serious crises­

which has maintained the liberal– the European economic crisis after

international order together with Japan,

the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothersin considering how both can cooperate

in 2008, the annexation of Crimea

to uphold it.

by Russia in 2014, a spate of terrorist

41

attacks by extremists, a massive influx

One of the first things to emphasize isof refugees and the rise of far-rightthat the EU, despite its many problems,

populist forces, and Brexit – and theseis gaining solid support. In a 2018 poll

problems are interrelated and complex.

that asked whether their country’s

Meanwhile, the liberal international

accession to the EU was beneficial, anorder has been threatened by theaverage of nearly 70% of people in 28 EU

inclination of the United States toward

member states answered that it was ina unilateralist foreign policy, the new

their interests. This is the highest figure

rise of a dictatorial China, and thesince 1983. The support for the single

ambition of authoritarian Russia tocurrency, the euro, is also growing. In aregain power. It is of vital importance2018 survey, 64% of respondents gave apositive assessment of the euro’s impact

problems include: the failure of theon their country’s economy. This is themember states to cooperate on thehighest figure since the introduction

admission of refugees and intra-regionalof the euro in 2002. In addition,

free movement; economic stagnation inEurosceptics and far-right populist

CEE and Southern European countries

parties, who have advocated anti-EUandpolicies, have become less vocal about

member states; dissatisfaction with EU

withdrawal from the EU and the euro.

elites and establishments and the rise of

Instead, they have switched their stance

populist forces. Hungary and Poland,

to one of pursuing internal reforms

whose

while staying in the EU. In the European

increasingly authoritarian, have moved

Parliament elections held in June 2019,

toward manipulating the courts, thevoter turnout was up for the first time

media and even their constitutions inin a quarter-century, surpassing 50%.

the government’s favor. These moves

Behind this were active campaigns bycast doubt on the core values of theyoung people, urban dwellers, ecologists

EU, such as freedom and the rule ofand other EU supporters who felt

law. Externally, since the inauguration

worried about the future of the EU.

of the Trump administration, theeconomic

disparities

governments

have

among

becometension between the United States
Thus,

the

once-whispered

collapseandEurope,particularly

betweenof the EU, its “existential crisis,” isthe US and Germany, has been at the

now a thing of the past. What now

forefront. Since the end of World War

characterizes Europe is not a choice

II, European countries have maintained

between the EU and sovereignty but

their order on the basis of a multilaterala tug-of-war between integration andeconomic, political and security network

disintegration, in which those who seek

centered on the EU and NATO, backed“more Europe” and those who seek “lessup by the United States. However,Europe” struggle with each other.

with its “America First” policy, theTrump administration has taken a

Although the EU has avoided its

skeptical stance on multilateralism.

“existential crisis,” it is not without

The differences in attitudes toward

problems. Internally, several serious

the US among member states have led

problems remain unresolved. Those

to internal confrontations within the42Strategic Annual Report 2019
Europe in Turmoil and the Future of Japan-EU Cooperation

EU and have obstructed the EU fromcoordinating among member states on
its security and foreign policy.
Brexit has recently received the mostattention in the EU. Over many years,
there was a gap in perceptions of the
EU between the UK and continental
Europe. The 2016 EU referendum
led the UK to exit the EU, albeit by a

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson at the Manchester Central
convention complex, Sep. 2019, Manchester.
(Photo AFP/AFLO)

narrow margin, against the backdrop

For Japan, Europe and the EU may

of a national craving for sovereignty

seem a little distant. However, Europe isagainst EU intervention, opposition toa rare partner for Japan that maintains

large-scale immigration and refugee

the same principles and values, suchflows, and the decline of the middle

as liberal democracy and open market

class and widening economic gaps. As

economies. The EU-Japan Economicof the end of October 2019, the UK’sPartnership Agreement (EPA) and therequest for a three-month extension

Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA),

to the Brexit process was approved,

which entered into force in February

making it unpredictable to the very end

2019,

how it will unfold. It is a certainty thatlink between the two actors in thisthe cleavage between and within publicdimension. The EPA is an agreement

opinion and Parliament, which has so farthat creates a free trade area accounting

deeply muddied Brexit, cannot be cured

for about 30% of world GDP and 40%

by the three-month extension. Even ifof world trade. It is a clear message senta formal agreement is reached, social

by Japan and the EU that they oppose

and political turmoil will continue. Yet,

protectionism and unilateral action

it should be noted that the Brexit deal

and support free and open economies

could be a vital issue for the UK, but

and multilateralism. The SPA provides

not necessarily for the EU. Brexit is aa legal basis for strengthening strategic

blow to the EU. However, this crisis forcooperation between Japan and thethe UK will not necessarily turn into aEU, which share values and principles

crisis for the EU.

such as democracy, the rule of law,

showedastrongnormative

and human rights. The SPA calls for43

comprehensive cooperation in fifty

Meanwhile, at the EU level, Japan-

fields, including politics and security.

EU

Through these agreements, we cansubstantially progressed. At the time of

expect Japan-EU relations to become

the SPA negotiations with Japan, theever closer. Japan-EU relations are

EU proposed to conclude a Framework

good, and their potential is significant.

Participation Agreement (FPA) that

security

cooperation

has

not

would enable the SDF to further
In recent years, there has been progresscooperate under the EU’s Common

in security cooperation between Japan

Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

and Europe, mainly at the bilateral levelmission.

with the UK and France, which are

was not realized, as the Japanese

deepening their engagement with theside believed that a track record of

Indo-Pacific region. The UK, whichconcrete cooperative missions, such

regards Japan as its closest partner in

as patrol missions in the Indo-PacificAsia, concluded the Acquisition andregion, should be built first before the

Cross-Servicing

conclusion of the framework.

Agreement(ACSA)

However,

this

proposalin 2017, following the United Statesand Australia. The ACSA enabled the

Although

Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

deepened its engagement with theand the British Army to share supplies

Indo-Pacific region, the linchpin of its

and transportation services, including

security is still NATO, and its allianceammunition and equipment, and Japanwithand the UK have held joint exercises

relationship with the US is under strain

every year since then. The ACSA

due to the Trump administration. In

with France also came into effect in

response to the Trump administration’sJune 2019. When President Macron

demands for more burden-sharing byvisited Japan that month, the Roadmap

European allies and its insistence that

on

was

NATO is outdated and obsolete, France

unveiled, in which the emphasis was

and Germany often take the lead input on the strengthening of Indo-Pacifichighlighting the need for Europe tocooperation, including the establishment

pursue its own defense cooperation andofComprehensive

integration. The need for “European

Maritime Dialogue, and the deepening

strategic autonomy” (ESA) has beenof security and defense cooperation.

stressed, alongside moves such as

Japan-FranceaCooperation

Japan-FrancetheEuropeUS.

has

However,

gradually

Europe’s

44

the establishment of the “European

theIntervention Initiative” in June 2018

infrastructure development, intended

and a call for creating a European army.

as a joint effort to restrain China, which

However, there has been a divergencehas deepened its strategic engagementof views among the EU member states,in CEE countries through the Belt andfearing that such a move might invite

Road Initiative. The EU and Japan area backlash or withdrawal from the US,

expected to further cooperate towardand the EU has yet to take concerted

the common goal of building sustainableaction. Delicate wheeling and dealing

and high-quality connectivity throughwill continue between member statesvarious cooperative ventures, such as

and the US over the extent of Europe’s

infrastructure capacity building andstrategicNATOsecurity cooperation, maritime resource

will steer relations with the Trump

and waste management, and third-

administration will be an important

country market cooperation.

autonomy.

Howsustainability

andqualityofreference point not only for European
countries but also for Japan, whose

At a time when the US-China rivalry issecurity heavily relies on its allianceincreasingly taking on the appearancewith the US.

of a power struggle for hegemony, it
is difficult for Japan and Europe to

In addition to security cooperation,

assume global leadership alone. Rather,further cooperation between Japan

it is precisely at such a time that Japanand the EU is expected in the area

and the EU, which seek cooperationof connectivity strategies, including

through

infrastructure development. Japan has

must act to strengthen their strategic

been promoting the “Free and Open

partnershipIndo-Pacific” (FOIP) initiative sinceconducive to the common economic

2016. In 2018, the EU came out withand security interests of many countries

the European Connectivity Strategy

and encourages their cooperation to

for Asia, whose values and principles

resolve global issues. Otherwise, theare similar to those proclaimed in theprinciples of a rules-based international

FOIP. In September 2019, Japan andorder and high-quality infrastructure

the EU signed an ambitious deal on

would be hollowed out in a power-

infrastructure development between

game between major powers.■

Asia and Europe. The deal repeatedly
45

stressed the importance of ensuring

rules

ratherthat

thancreatesanpower,
order

Strategic Annual Report 2019
The Middle East: Intensifying Competition for Hegemony over a New Regional Order

The Middle East: Intensifying Competition for Hegemony
over a New Regional Order

The Wailing Wall, Sep. 2017, the Old City of Jerusalem (Photo by Mari Nukii)

Since the “Arab Spring” there has been afulfill their responsibility to establish

continuing power vacuum in the Middle

an order for the entire region. What

East at three levels: national, regional

makes these crises even more serious is

and international. At the national level,

the Middle East policy of US President

countries such as Syria, Yemen, Libya,

Donald Trump, who places top priority

and Iraq have fallen into a state of civil

on strengthening his domestic support

war due to their weak cohesivenessbase.

as nation-states and their inability to
govern, allowing other countries to

The Trump administration’s policy

intervene and armed non-state actors totoward the Middle East is characterized

run rampant. On the other hand, certain

by its efforts to improve relations withstates exempt from civil war havepro-US partners such as Saudi Arabia

become more authoritarian, neglecting

and Israel, which had deteriorated

to solve the fundamental problems

during the Obama administration, andraised by the “Arab Spring.” A power

to form a “coalition to contain Iran”

vacuum has also occurred at the regionalwith these two countries as its pillars.

level as countries in the Middle East

The US administration believes thatprioritize their own interests rather thanits policy can stabilize the region.
46

Strategic Annual Report 2019
The Middle East: Intensifying Competition for Hegemony over a New Regional Order

President Trump apparently wants tothe safety of navigation in the Persian

withdraw US troops from the Middle

Gulf, but only a few countries officially

East in the near future so that the

supported the idea. On the other hand,security of the region can be shoulderedIran, judging the possibility of a military

by pro-US countries. Having chosen

attack by the United States to be low,

the Middle East as his first overseas

has refused to hold talks with President

destination after taking office in May

Trump, and is showing signs of reducing

2017, he agreed to sell $110 billion

its obligations under the Iranian nuclear

in weapons to Saudi Arabia, andagreement

stopped by the Jewish holy site of thedevelopment on the grounds that it has

Wailing Wall in Jerusalem as the firstnot received any economic rewards.

andresuming

nuclearincumbent US president to visit Israel.
In December, the Trump administration

The prevailing view is that the Trump

formally recognized Jerusalem as theadministration’s policy of maximum

capital of Israel, pleasing its support

pressurebase of Christian evangelicals in theunsuccessful, not only because it has

United States and the Netanyahu

been unable to change Iran’s behavior

government in Israel.

(support for pro-Iran organizations,

toward

Iran

has

been

mainly Shiites in neighboring countries,

47

In May 2018, the Trump administrationand missile development), but also

withdrew from the Iranian nuclear

because it encourages hardliners in Iranagreement and, in May 2019, it imposed

who insist on nuclear development.

a total embargo on Iranian oil imports

Hence, it has not received sufficientand dispatched aircraft carriers andinternationalbombers to the Middle East. On June

Obama and Trump administrations

20, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards

share in common the perception of a

Corps shot down US drones over the

threat from Iran’s growing influence

Persian Gulf. A sequence of events,

and an inclination toward withdrawal

including attacks on oil tankers andfrom the Middle East, they differ infacilities, pushed the United States andtactics (the Obama administration’s

Iran to the brink of war. The Unitedengagement policy and the Trump

States has called on other countries toadministration’s containment policy).

join a “Maritime Security Initiative”

Even if a US administration seeks to(a coalition of the willing) to ensure

withdraw from the Middle East, it

support.

While

the

will be unable to renounce its anti-Iranon information from Kurdish groups

policy in consideration of the strategic

and the Iraqi government, had theimportance of the Middle East, including

cooperation of Russia (which opened

energy supply and terrorism issues, as

its airspace to US forces), the Syrian

well as the “special relationship” withregime of President Bashar al-Assad,

Israel. This contradiction has forced theand Turkey. The killing of Baghdadi

US administration to engage in conflictis thought to have a certain effect inin the Middle East.

containing domestic and international
criticism of the withdrawal of US troops

President

Trump’soffrom Syria, as well as in impressing thewithdrawing US troops from Syria andpublic with the “end of the fight against

tolerating Turkey’s cross-border attacks

the Islamic State”. However, there hason Kurds in Syria have confused the

been no change in the US government’s

countries concerned in the region anddecision to abandon its involvement in

the

and

war-ravaged Syria, around 6 million of

benefited the Assad regime and its allies

whose citizens are refugees, and to leave

Russia and Iran. Many in the United

its fate in the hands of Iran as well asStates oppose Trump’s decision, saying

Russia and Turkey.

international

policycommunity,

it would betray the Kurdish militia(YPG) that has cooperated with the US

On the other hand, Israel, wary of

military in the war against the Islamic

Iran’s military consolidation and theState (IS) and allow IS to resurge.

expansion of logistical support routes

However, President Trump does notinto the Mediterranean, has repeatedly

seem interested in Syria, which does

launched attacks on suspected Iranian

not have much oil and which offers few

military bases in Syria. Should a major

opportunities for arms sales.

military conflict break out between
the two countries, the international

On October 27, President Trumpcommunity may have to face the worst

announced that US special operations

possible scenario of Israel remotely

forcesattacking the Iranian mainland andhadkilledIslamic

State

leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in theIrannorthwesternexchanges of ballistic missiles between

Syrianprovinceof

Idlib. It has been reported that thisfightingback,

resultinginthe two.

operation, which was carried out based48Strategic Annual Report 2019
The Middle East: Intensifying Competition for Hegemony over a New Regional Order

Agricultural Industrial Park (JAIP),
tourism development projects, andimprovements to Palestinian refugee
camps. The Japanese government has
made efforts to enhance the Palestinian
Authority’s

governancefunctionsthrough grassroots assistance, such as
improving residents’ self-governance
Tehran’s Former U.S. Embassy, Feb. 2014.
(Photo by Mari Nukii)

capacity

andmedium-sized
In

June

2019,

President

small

enterprises.

and
These

Trump

projects aim to cultivate regional

announced his “deal of the century”

cooperation, economic independence

aimed at resolving the Palestinianand mutual trust with neighboring

problem, but only in the economic

countries such as Israel and Jordan,

arena. Although the ostensible intention

and with international donor bodies

was to promote relations between

and countries in Asia. This Japanese-

Israel and pro-US Arab countries,

style assistance system, which places

the political resolution of the Israeli-

importance on the participation of local

Palestinian conflict was shelved and theresidents, has not been as flashy or high-fundamental principles of international

profile as the “deal of the century” but it

law as well as the opinions of thehas been highly praised for empowering

Palestiniancompletely

the weak. It would be advisable for theignored. As a result, many Palestinians

Japanese government to continue its

aredisappointed,

thinking

that

steady support by involving privatetheinternational

communityhas

companies and individuals interested

abandoned a two-state solution. Since

in contributing to society alongside the1993, Japan has provided $1.9 billion incountries and organizations concerned

assistance to the Palestinian Authority

in order to prevent the radicalization

to support a two-state solution forof Palestinian youth who are desperatethedue to their political and economicside

coexistence

were

and

co-prosperityof Israel and the future independent
Palestinianstate.

These

projects

include the development of the Jericho

49

fosteringstagnation.

While the United States is attempting

an active and responsible role in theto scale back its involvement in thestabilization and establishment of a new

Middle East, Russian influence isorder in the region.

increasing. Not only anti-Americancountries such as Iran and Syria but also

Aside from tensions between pro-US

traditionally pro-American countries

forces and anti-US (pro-Iran) forces, thesuch as Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, andpower game of Turkey and Qatar versus

Turkey are willing to build amicable

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates

relations with Russia, fearing the Trump

and Egypt is defining intraregional

administration’s

policies

relations. From around 2010, a struggle

and retreat from the Middle East. A

for supremacy between the Red Sea andmember of NATO, Turkey decided to

the Horn of Africa began to surface.

purchase and deploy the S-400 surface-

Behind this is the fact that in recent

to-air missile system from Russia inyears, as the conflict between Iran2019, despite objections from the United

and the United States and their allies

States. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have(especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE)

also begun procuring new weapons fromin the Persian Gulf has escalated, theMoscow, as well as purchasing large“Red Sea Shift” has been accelerating

amounts of weapons from Washington.

as both oil suppliers and shippers seek

unreliable

out a safe energy transport route.
Israel, which is concerned about Iran’s
move to construct bases in Syria,

In

including the Golan Heights near theUAEborder with Israel, has asked Russianin Yemen by setting up bases in

President Vladimir Putin to check Iran.

Djibouti and subsequently Eritrea andRussia seems to be taking advantage ofSomaliland. As a consequence of thesethe decline of US power in the Middle

developments, some African countries

Eastinternational

are wary of the incursion of outsidepresence and use “the Middle East

forces, while others are actively seekingcard” as a means to counter the United

to build relationships in order to extract

States. However, its involvement is stillassistance by taking advantage of theopportunistic in nature and Russia

competition among countries. There

does not necessarily intend to take on

are also examples that have contributedtoincrease

its

2015,

Saudi

began

Arabiaintervening

and

the

militarily50

to peace to a certain extent. Ethiopia
dramatically restored its relations with
Eritrea in 2018, as a result of a consensus
on concerns and interests among
China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, andEthiopia. The Red Sea and the Horn ofAfrica are transportation and logistics
nodes that connect Asia, the Middle
East, Europe, and Africa. They are also
important chokepoints for maritime
trade and energy transportation in
the world economy. Despite theirgeopolitical importance, the absenceof a multilateral framework to manage
security in the region has in some ways
escalated the competition for hegemony.
In future, the Japanese government
will need to formulate a strategy
and an international framework forcooperation to protect energy supply
routes and freedom of navigation witha comprehensive perspective that links
the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea
under the concept of a “Free and Open
Indo-Pacific”.■

51Strategic Annual Report 2019
Building a Sustainable Socioeconomic System and Restructuring Economic Global Governance

Building a Sustainable Socioeconomic System
and Restructuring Economic Global Governance

The T20 summit meeting, May 2019, Tokyo. (Photo T20 Japan 2019)

Globalization has brought enormous

Today, due in part to the negative

wealth to the world as a whole, andaspects of globalization, we witness

the economic gap between developed

unprecedented distrust in politics andand emerging countries has narrowed

increasingly eroding social cohesion,

rapidly. On the other hand, the shift

leading to the rise of populism,of the center of economic gravity toprotectionism and unilateralism as

emerging economies has become moreglobal trends. In particular, the United

apparent since the global financial crisis,

States is changing its long-establishedand dissatisfaction over intensifying

role in supporting the post-World War

competition with emerging economies,

II liberal international order, and thisincluding the relocation of production

has disrupted global governance and

bases

In

multilateralism. Furthermore, the rise

addition, the income gap has beenof China and other emerging countries

widening in many countries due to theas well as the development of the digitalshock caused by the financial crisis in

economy require reforms to existing

2008 and the disparity of wage levels

frameworks

between skilled and unskilled workers

governance such as the WTO to address

driven by technological progress.

new issues.

overseas,has

increased.

for

economic

global52

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Building a Sustainable Socioeconomic System and Restructuring Economic Global Governance

Despiteslowing

globaleconomic

growth, globalization and technologicalinnovationareexpectedtoas well as strengthening institutional
capacity.

makeirreversible progress, and the structural

There is mounting awareness aroundrisks posed by anti-globalism will

the world that balancing growth with

continue to exist globally to a certain

economic

extent.

isandsocialdevelopment

necessary.

The“Sustainable

Development Goals (SDGs)” adopted

53

Widening disparities are inextricably

by the United Nations emphasize anlinkedbyapproach that addresses issues in an

immigration, race, and culture, to nameintegrated manner, bearing in mind

but a few factors. Growing demands

the relevance of social, economic, andfor protection by the state from thoseenvironmental issues. In recent years,

alarmed at their loss of social status andsustainable and inclusive growth has

for the right to self-determination by thosebeen an important issue for the G20,

left out of the rapid economic and social

and there has been active discussion

changes caused by globalization offer

on the virtuous cycle of growth andfertile ground for anti-global populism.

distribution,

There are at least two important

responses to climate change, andconditions to be met at the domestic

pursuit of the SDGs. At the Osaka G20

level in supporting globalization. The

Summit, leaders confirmed efforts tofirst is to mitigate the negative economic

address the problem of ocean plastic

and social impacts of globalization by

waste and promote universal healthcare

strengthening redistribution functions

coverage (UHC). In recent years,

and expanding investment in humanenvironment, society and governanceresources for education. Second, in(ESG) investment and SDGs haveorder for domestic politics to function in

been attracting increasing attention

a sound manner, it is necessary to ensurein the private sector. ESG investment

sound policy planning and execution

is based on the practical reasoning

through the participation of diversethatstakeholders in policy formation, public

responsibility initiatives involving the

diplomacy and other means of forming

environment

a consensus among the general public,

have positive effects on corporate andtodivisionscausedhuman

corporations
andinvestment,

upholdingemployment

socialcan

shareholder value over the medium to

Nations system, economic fora suchlong term. While there are reservations

as the G7/G20, international financial

about the accuracy and correlation of

institutions,data, high ESG scores tend to lead toand voluntary groups of countries),

high stock prices.

(2) a transnational network of privateorganizations,privateexperts

corporations,

and

local

How to maintain multilateralism andgovernments, and (3) the framing ofpromote international cooperation issecuritization (recognition as a security

another important issue. As mentioned

issue leads to domestic political support)

above, without the resolution of issues

are important factors to enhance thesuch as widening income disparities

resilience of multilateralism.

and immigration, domestic politics
tends to lean toward populism and

The US-China trade war between

protectionism, making it difficult to

the world’s two largest economies

support multilateralism. It is essential

is intensifying. The United States

thatadministrativeis increasing its pressure on China

institutions function soundly to addressby raising tariffs and by negotiating

domestic challenges. Multilateralism

over China’s unfair trade practices

works to empower domestic institutions

and industrial subsidies for high-tech(e.g., capacity building for developing

industries under “Made in China 2025”.

countries), and thus it is important

Addressing the US-China trade war,to strengthen core capacity throughwhich overshadows the global economy,

international

Even

is an urgent task. It is a matter of great

under the prevailing unilateralism,

concern for the multilateral trade

there are areas where multilateralsystem, which has the WTO at its core,

cooperation is essential, among themthat the United States disregards WTO

such urgent global issues as climate

procedures by unilaterally imposingchange and global health. In the areas

tariffs or trade sanctions under Sectionof climate change and global health,232 of the Trade Expansion Act of

there is a degree of resilience despite

1962 (security clause) and Section 301

the influence of unilateralism. Inof the US Trade Act of 1974 (sanction

summary,

withclause for unfair trade) and refusing tomultiple layers (support from the United

reappoint a member of the Appellate

political

(1)

and

cooperation.

multilateralism

54

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Building a Sustainable Socioeconomic System and Restructuring Economic Global Governance

Body for dispute settlement procedures.

growing friction with recipient countries

At the same time, China’s economic

over geopolitical and military concerns,

activity cannot be fully addressed by

the behavior of Chinese companies on

existing WTO rules, and WTO reform

environmental, safety, and employment

is desperately needed. Therefore, it

issues, and debt sustainability. In his

is essential that China undertake its

speech at the 2nd BRI Summit Forum inown domestic structural reforms toApril 2019, President Xi Jinping statedbreak through this phase, especiallythat BRI projects need to be operated

by reviewing state-directed industrial

in line with international standards andsubsidies and high-tech managementwith respect for the laws and regulations

policies and by further liberalizing tradeof each country, and he also stressed

and investment, creating a level playing

the need to ensure debt sustainability.

field for foreign companies to expand

While

their business in China, in order toapproach is noteworthy and welcome,hastenstate

implementation should be verified.

economy.

China should enhance transparency byHowever, due to the need to maintain its

disclosing data on debt by joining thecurrent domestic system, it is unrealistic

Paris Club and also by making sure theto expect China to voluntarily implement

projects are carried out in accordancesuch reforms. It is important for Japan

with international standards, such as

to work closely with the United States,

those set by the Development Assistance

Europe, and other interested countries

Committee (DAC) of the Organization

to encourage WTO reform and rule-formaking that will effectively convince

Development (OECD). To maintain

China to implement market reforms.

positive relations with Japan, Chinathecapitalism

transition
to

a

from

marketthe

Economic

BRI’s

recalibrated

Cooperationandneeds to undertake BRI initiatives based

55

From a constructive perspective, China’s

on the values and principles set forth

Belt and Road initiative (BRI) supports

in the “Free and Open Indo-Pacificthe development of infrastructure and(FOIP)” initiative. Such efforts would

the strengthening of connectivity ininclude the promotion of “high-quality

emerging economies, and accelerates theinfrastructure”. “The G20 Principles

growth of the regional economy throughfortrade and investment. However, there is

Investment” was adopted at a meeting

High-Quality

Infrastructure

of the G20 finance ministers and central

environmental policies that contributebank governors, and efforts to expand theto sustainable and inclusive growth at

high-quality infrastructure standards

international economic fora such as

are being pursued in such contexts as

the G7/G20. Japan should also support

the partnership between Japan and theefforts to enhance corporate social

European Union (EU). In addition,

roles by promoting discussions andcooperation

multilateralpolicies on global corporate governance.

financial institutions such as the Asian

Second, with a view to strengthen

Development Bank (ADB) and the Asian

rules-based, free and open economic

Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),

and global governance, Japan should

and private-sector cooperation between

step up its participation in the Trans-

Japan and China in third countries,

Pacific

should also be promoted. It is essential

conclude negotiations for the Regionalthat these joint projects with China be

Comprehensive Partnership Agreement

guided by principles such as openness,(RCEP) at an early date, maintain thetransparency, economic viability, and

WTO dispute settlement function andfiscal sustainability.

advance WTO reform, and promote rule-among

Partnership(CPTPP)

andmaking such as digital trade governanceand artificial intelligence principles
through the G7/G20. Furthermore,
Japan should advocate the setting ofinternational standards by expanding
partnerships

indeveloping“high-

quality infrastructure” and cooperatingwith China’s BRI within the framework
The headquarters building of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB), Beijing. (Photo Imaginechina/AFLO)

Based on the above discussions, thefollowing policy recommendations arepresented. First, Japan should continueof international standards. If China
supports FOIP in this process, FOIP
and BRI can be compatible to someextent, and a mutually beneficial JapanChina relationship will move forward.■

to endorse discussions on redistribution,
humancapitalinvestment,

and

56

Strategic Annual Report 2019
A New Security Strategy for Addressing Challenges in the Turbulent International Order

A New Security Strategy for Addressing Challenges
in the Turbulent International Order

President Trump boards JMSDF helicopter carrier Kaga along with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, May 2019.
(Photo Yomiuri Shimbun/AFLO)

The post-World War II international

The Trump administration, under theorder, which was formed under thebanner of “America First,” has chosen

leadership of the United States, wasto strategically compete with China andbased on the premise that all nations,

Russia, viewing them as “revisionist

large and small, should abide bystates” that challenge the existing

international law and spread liberalinternational order. At the same time,values such as individual freedom,

the Trump administration has placeddemocracy, human rights, the rule ofgreater priority on protecting its own

law, the peaceful resolution of disputes,

interests rather than on maintaining

and free trade. In recent years, however,

the existing order, and has called

countries discontented with the existingfor correcting trade imbalances andinternational order, such as China andincreasing burdens on its allies. In

Russia, have been trying to create an

particular, the Trump administration’senvironment favorable to authoritarianpolicy of valuing the contributions of its

regimes by unilaterally changing or

allies from a financial perspective is adenying

serious issue that could undermine theinternationallynorms and systems.
57

establishedcredibility of the Japan-US alliance.

China has declared that it will aim toand special operations capabilities, tobecome a strong nation by the middle

become a serious threat in Northeastof this century. Based on its “Belt andAsia. Dialogue between North Korea

Road Initiative,” China has focusedand the United States has not led toon the development of ports in coastal

the denuclearization of North Korea,

countries in the Indian Ocean and Pacificand it continues to develop new short-island countries, while at the same timeand intermediate-range missiles whileproviding huge amounts of unrepayable

continuing to evade sanctions throughaid to developing countries, creating

ship-to-ship transfer of prohibited goods.

unequal diplomatic relations between

Thus, the future of denuclearization isthe debtor countries and China. China

unpredictable.

is also developing infrastructure suchas 5G, submarine cables, and satellite

Russia has been strengthening its

positioning

extendingnuclear and conventional forces in theits influence by expanding its own

Far East, and is working to militarize

e-commerce network, and exporting

the Northern Territories by deploying

a digital surveillance social modelanti-ship missiles. In addition to military

using facial recognition technology tocooperation and joint exercises, Russia

other authoritarian countries, creating

and China have begun to cooperate inan order that is incompatible with theoperational areas, such as joint patrols

concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

ofWhile China’s anti-access/area-denial

negotiations on a peace treaty between(A2/AD) capabilities in the East andJapan and Russia have made little

South China seas have already become

progress, and Russia opposes thea real threat, China has been using

deployment of Japan’s Aegis Ashore

government ships, fishing boats, andsystems.

technology,

strategic

bombers.

Meanwhile,marine militias to create a gray-zone
situation without leading up to war andChina and the United States areto continue trying to change borders.

investing in the development of cuttingedge technologies, such as artificial
its

intelligence (AI), unmanned aerial

nuclear missile capabilities, combined

vehicles (UAVs), and automation, aswith its traditional heavy weapons

well as in efforts to use them for military

North

Korea

has

leapfrogged

58

Strategic Annual Report 2019
A New Security Strategy for Addressing Challenges in the Turbulent International Orderpurposes. Military competition between

priority to its own interests, Japanthe two countries over cyberwarfare,shouldanti-satellite

electronic

with the United Nations, ASEAN,

warfare capabilities, and hypersonicIndia, the EU, and others in order toweapons is accelerating. These “game-

maintain a rules-based internationalchanger technologies” will alter theorder and promote the rule of law andfuture of warfare and affect the military

the peaceful resolution of disputes inbalance in East Asia.

the international community in orderweapons,

strengthenitscooperation

to counter changes in the status quo
by authoritarian regimes. It is also
necessary to oppose protectionism andaddress the challenges brought about
by globalization through the G7, theGroup of 20 and APEC. With regard
to the suppression of individual rights
by authoritarian states, the government
A Russian TU-95 bomber flies over East China Sea,July 23,
2019. (Photo the Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministryof Japan /Reuters/AFLO)

Despitethedeteriorationofenvironment,

theshouldinternational

governmentofJapan continues to view the current
2013 National Security Strategy as“appropriate.” However, the alliancepolicy of the Trump administrationand the expansion of China’s influence
have greatly changed since the initialassessment, and a review of this strategy
is essential. In doing so, the following
points should be emphasized.
With China disrupting the international
order and the United States giving top
59

to

seek

furtheractions together with the international

above-mentioned
thecontinuecommunity. In addition, it is necessary
to deepen Japan’s contributions tointernational

peace

cooperation

activities from Self-Defense Forces(SDF) dispatches, as done heretofore,
to support for capacity building such as
the provision of equipment and training
to developing countries and for thebuilding of a security framework so thatthese capabilities can be used efficiently.
In order to strengthen its own defense
capabilities, Japan should steadily builda “multidimensional integrated defense
force” that effectively fuses capabilities

in all areas, including space, cyberspace,

Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,

and the electromagnetic spectrum.

Japan and the United States should

At the same time, a Joint Operations

undertake bilateral consultations on

Command should be established tothe joint development and deployment

further strengthen SDF integration.

of new intermediate-range missiles.

Given the possibility that the SDF’s
missile defense system could be nullified

Stable relations between Japan andby further upgrading of the DPRK’s

China are indispensable to the peace andmissile capabilities, it is necessary toprosperity of the Indo-Pacific region,

consider new countermeasures, suchand Japan should build a “mutuallyas directed energy weapons, boost

beneficial

phase interception, and preemptive

in every field, including security,

attacks with hypersonic weapons. In

from a broad medium- to long-term

addition, Japan and the United States

perspective. Meanwhile, as the United

should constantly update their flexible

Statesdeterrence options and joint plans in

China, Japan needs to take a pragmaticorder to strengthen command andapproach to China’s growing power

control and operational coordination

and revisionist activities. As China’s

between the SDF and the US Indo-economic growth slows, Japan should

Pacific Command, and to appropriately

also consider adopting a cost-imposing

respond to the expansion of conflicts

strategy in which China pursues morefrom peacetime to gray-zone situations

open economic policies and gains

and armed attack situations. Alongbroader benefits by diverting resources

with the steady realignment of US

from military expansion to social andforces, Japan should promote the joint

civilian uses. Furthermore, in additionuse of bases and facilities, expand US

tomilitary access to Japanese civilianof the Japan Coast Guard, Japan

facilities,

operational

should establish a system to respondcooperation based on the “Guidelines

appropriately to hybrid warfare in

for Japan-US Defense Cooperation”

gray-zone situations and armed attackand strive to rectify the asymmetry ofsituations. With tensions mounting

the alliance. In addition, in the wakein the Taiwan Strait, the strategicof the expiration of the Intermediate-

importance of a democratic Taiwan

maximizestrategic

competesstrengthening

relationship”

strategically

the

with

capabilities

60

Strategic Annual Report 2019
A New Security Strategy for Addressing Challenges in the Turbulent International Ordershould be reassessed, and security

with China, while at the same timecooperation with Taiwan corresponding

urging China, as a creditor nation, totoimplement relief measures in line with

developments

relationsandinChina-Taiwan

US-Taiwan

relationsthe standards of developed countries,

should be pursued in addition to theincluding China’s participation in the

promotion of pragmatic economic andParis Club.

human resources exchanges.
Japan should strengthen international61

To achieve a “free and open Indo-cooperation to transform North Korea’s

Pacific”, Japan should strengthen its

strategic ability to favorably negotiatepresence in the South China Sea andon nuclear weapons into a strategic

the Indian Ocean region, maintain theliability that leads the country tocooperative framework among Japan,

bankruptcy by maintaining maximum

the United States, Australia, and I

pressure and preventing loopholes inndia (QUAD), and strengthen its

sanctions, including through tighter

partnerships with the United Kingdom,

enforcement of ship-to-ship transfers –the core of the Five Power Defence

in collaboration with its international

Arrangements (FPDA) and the UK-

partners – and the deportation of

USA Agreement (Five Eyes), and with

North Korean workers overseas until

France, which has territory in the

North Korea responds with genuine

Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Japandenuclearization. In addition, Japan, theshould promote the development of

United States and South Korea should

high-quality infrastructure aimed atdeepen cooperation on missile defense,

expanding connectivity that generates

antisubmarine warfare, proliferation

active flows of people and goods, andprevention and noncombatant rescue

should propose alternative measures

operations. Furthermore, Japan, thefor the “debt traps” in the region andUnited States and the ROK should

provide financial support to countries

strengthen their cooperation towardalready suffering from debt to China.

the establishment of a peace regime on

In this regard, it is important to

the Korean Peninsula in the event ofsteer China’s aid to the international

progresslevel through practical third-country

which

economicshared recognition of the role andcooperation

in

talks

in
they

denuclearization,
shouldreaffirm

intheirimportance of US Forces Korea. On

is clear that a slight increase will not

the other hand, in order to build Japan-

be sufficient for Japan to maintain its

North Korea relations based on thetrue independence and ensure its own

Pyongyang Declaration, Japan-North

security and prosperity. In light of

Korea dialogue should be promoted

this situation, it is necessary to makealongside progress in US-North Korea

serious efforts to strengthen Japan’s

negotiations.

technological and financial bases andto work out necessary technological

While the peace treaty and territorial

innovation and defense expenditures

negotiations between Japan and Russia

from the perspective of investment inneed to be continued tenaciously,

the future.

it should be recognized that thestrengthening of Japan-Russia relations,

In order to strengthen the defensein the context of the major strategic

industry infrastructure that supports

relationships among the United States,

Japan’s

China, and Russia, has a limited impact

defense industry should concentrate itson Sino-Russian relations, and Japan

resources on the technical fields andshould make it clear that economic

infrastructure that must be maintainedcooperation cannot be pursued if Russia

in order to enhance the capabilities

continues its militarization of theofNorthern Territories and provocativeequipment. At the same time, theactions in areas surrounding Japan.

defense industry should be reorganizedJapan also strongly urges Russia toto establish stronger companies andplay a constructive role in dealing withbusiness entities, and the infrastructure

North Korea, Syria, Iran and Ukraine.

for the development and manufacture ofdefensecapabilities,

domestically-produced

thedefensehigher-performance defense equipment
The foundations that support Japan’s

and the fostering of international

defense capabilities have become socompetitiveness should be developed. It

fragile that they cannot be ignored any

is also necessary to promote the transfer

longer. For example, given that China’sof defense equipment by utilizing thedefense spending has increased neary

framework of the Three Principles on

15-fold over the past 30 years and is now

the Transfer of Defense Equipment andmore than three times that of Japan, it

Materials to expand markets and reduce62equipment prices.
Based on the trends in the defense
technology environment, Japan should
develop a system to ascertain, protect,andfosteradvanced

technologies

developed in Japan, and draw up aroadmap to introduce them to the
Ministry of Defense and the SDF. In linewith Japan’s demographic trends, thegovernment should also utilize cuttingedge technologies to cope with thelabor shortages caused by the declining
birthrate.

Furthermore,

from

the

perspective of realizing more efficientdefensespending,

thegovernment

should review investment in large
vessels, short-range aircraft, and fixed
platforms that are vulnerable in modern
warfare, and also utilize unmannedsystemsthat

conduct

autonomous

operations using artificial intelligence
under human control.■63

Strategic Annual Report 2019Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferation

Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferation

The Defense Department conducted a flight test of a conventionally configured ground-launched cruise missile,
Aug. 2019, San Nicolas Island, Calif. (Photo Scott Howe/Department of Defense/UPI/AFLO)

Ten years have passed since US President

Reagan and Soviet General Secretary

Barack Obama called for a “world

Mikhail Gorbachev, who shared thewithout nuclear weapons” in April 2009.

ideal of eliminating nuclear weapons

However, after short-term progress andand the recognition that there is noa surge in momentum, nuclear arms

winner in a nuclear war and such a war

control and non-proliferation graduallymust thus never be fought, and it obliged

turned sour.

the US and the USSR to reduce their
nuclear arsenals under strict verification

Among the negative trends for nuclear

measures, including on-site inspections,arms control in 2019 was the US

for the first time in history. The United

withdrawal from the Intermediate-

States argues that its withdrawal from

Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,

this historic treaty was in response towhich had a significant impact on the

Russia’s noncompliance with the treaty

international community. The INF

through the clandestine testing andTreaty has been regarded as one of the

deployment of 9M729 ground-launchedsymbols of nuclear arms control; it wascruise missiles (GLCM) as well as

signed in 1987 by US President Ronald

China’s possession of hundreds of64Strategic Annual Report 2019Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferationintermediate-range ballistic and cruise

since July 2019. The situation withmissiles.

respect to the North Korean nuclear
issue has also deteriorated from theIn addition, the United States has yet topositive atmosphere at the North-Southclarify its policy on the New Strategic

Korean/US-North

Arms Reduction Treaty (New START),

meetings in 2018. The second US-North

which will expire in February 2021. If

Korean summit meeting in Hanoi

the treaty expires without any extension

in February 2019 ended without any

or successor treaty, US-Russian bilateral

results, and the working-level talks innuclear arms control, which has been

October were reported to have broken

in place since the Cold War era fordown. Pyongyang has not yet mademaintaining strategic stability, will end

a strategic decision to dismantle its

after nearly half a century. Washington

nuclear weapons program.

Koreansummitproposes that not only the United States
and Russia but also China join theframework of nuclear arms control.
Beijing, however, has not changed its
stance that it will not participate ina nuclear weapons reduction processunless the United States and Russia,
which together hold 90% of the world’s
nuclear weapons, drastically reduce
their nuclear arsenals first.
Regarding nuclear non-proliferation,
tensions over the Iranian nuclear issue
have increased since the United States
pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 andre-imposedandsteadily

expanded

economic sanctions on Iran. In response,
Iran has gradually extended its partial
suspension of JCPOA implementation

65

A meeting of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
Jul. 2019, Vienna. (Photo Xinhua/AFLO)

The worsening of the nuclear situation
also cast a dark shadow on the third
Preparatory

Committee(PrepCom)for the 2020 Nuclear non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.
The US-Russian, US-Chinese and USIranian confrontations were brought
to the PrepCom, where the respective
parties criticized each other. The
widening rift over nuclear disarmament

has become more pronounced between

on military power and the manner in

the non-nuclear-weapon states that had

which it is used. Where there is a highled the way in formulating the Treaty

degree of uncertainty and instabilityon the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons

regarding the prospects for the future(TPNW) and the nuclear-armed statesbalance of power among the major

and their allies that had opposed it.

powers, and where intense competition
is taking place over its maintenance and

The situation surrounding nuclear arms

revision, there will be little incentive forcontrol and non-proliferation is unlikely

the major powers to accept institutional

to improve, at least in the near future,

restrictions on their nuclear weapons

because the ongoing challenges arise

and policies.

from the faltering international system.
In the power transition stemming from

In addition, changes in the balance

the re-emergence of China and theof power have shaken the existing

resurgence of Russia, rivalry over the

institutional foundations for nuclear

international/regional order surfaces asarms control and non-proliferation,

great power/geopolitical competition.

which were established under the

The nuclear-armed states, their allies

bipolar structure of the Cold War era

and countries of proliferation concern

and maintained under US leadershipthat are involved in this competition

during the unipolar moment after the

have

and

end of the Cold War. The current US

military value of nuclear weapons for

retreat from US-Russian nuclear arms

their national security, and become

control is partly due to the great power

extremely cautious about accepting

competition with China, which has

and strengthening nuclear arms control

rapidly modernized its military forces,and non-proliferation that would oblige

including nuclear weapons. In thethem to reduce their nuclear arsenals or

meantime, Russia has not concealed its

to regulate their activities. Arms control

reluctance to further reduce its nuclear

andorientedarsenal, looking ahead to competition

toward maintaining the status quo,with the United States over spheres ofin which the balance of power at the

influence and seeking to maintain its

time they are enacted is fixed throughstatus as a nuclear superpower.

reaffirmed

thenon-proliferation

political

arequantitative and qualitative restrictions

66

Strategic Annual Report 2019Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferation

The passive attitudes of nuclear-weapon

collapse of the NPT be expected forstates toward nuclear arms control havethe time being. Once an international

also negatively affected the NPT regime.

regime has been established, it has been

Despitediscriminativeargued that, even if the distribution ofnature of the NPT regime, whichpower and the structure of interests

divides the international community

among

into five nuclear-weapon states andwere to change, it would not be easily

other non-nuclear-weapon states andterminated because significant changes

which prohibits the acquisition ofor termination impose a heavy burden

nuclear weapons by only the latter, iton the participating countries; thehas achieved near-universality. This

legitimacy of regimes and the practiceis partly because the “three pillars ofof adherence have been establishedthe NPT” – nuclear non-proliferation,

through the acceptance of principles,

peaceful uses of nuclear energy, andnorms and rules by the participating

nuclear disarmament – are incorporated

countries, and constraints such as theinto the NPT regime to alleviate thiscost and criticism of deviant behavior

discriminative nature. In particular,

would increase. However, it cannot

non-nuclear-weapon states emphasize

be ruled out that the collapse of one

the importance of nuclear disarmament.

of the “three pillars of the NPT” may

Their

the

weaken the cohesiveness and legitimacy

impasse on this issue made many non-of the NPT regime, and that actions

nuclear-weapon states and civil societythat violate the principles, norms anddecide to establish the TPNW in order torules of the NPT regime will increase

create a norm for the legal prohibition of

in future using this as a pretext or as anuclear weapons, even though nuclear-result of a deterioration in the security

armed states and their allies were highly

environment.

thestronghighlyfrustration

with

the

participating

countries

unlikely to participate.
Northeast Asia is the region with

67

Given their absence, the TPNW would

the greatest degree of instability andnot be an alternative to the NPT as a

uncertainty surrounding nuclear issues,

framework for nuclear disarmament

placing Japan at a critical strategic

and non-proliferation, at least in the

crossroads. The touchstone will be

short and medium term. Nor can theJapan’s policy planning on deterrence

as well as disarmament and non-launched intermediate-range missiles,

proliferation in the “post-INF Treaty

is inextricably involved, Japan should

period.” While Japan and the Unitedcontemplate how to develop arms control

Statesand non-proliferation measures in order

do

not

possess

intermediate-range

land-based

missiles,North

to control and mitigate the negativehaveacquired

impacts that nuclear weapons andhundreds of such missiles respectively

missiles and their counter-measures may

and enhanced them both quantitatively

have on regional stability and security,and qualitatively, posing potential andwith the same priority as policies ontangible threats to Japan’s security.

deterrenceIn

anti-access/Constructing a multilateral frameworkarea-denial (A2/AD) capability – infor countries with asymmetric andwhich

missilesdiverse capabilities and interests acrossplay an important role – has also beena wide range of issues presents astrengthened, eroding the superiority

conundrum that will take a considerableof the Japan-US alliance at the regionalamount of time to resolve. However,level. The Japan-US alliance needs toarms control and non-proliferation

strengthen its deterrence capabilities,of intermediate-range missiles in theand careful and urgent consideration

post-INF Treaty period could indicate

must be given to whether ground-

the way forward for a new/renewed

launched intermediate-range missiles

paradigm of nuclear disarmament andcould be an option, what their advan-

non-proliferation regime. It is therefore

tages and challenges are, and whether

an important policy issue that Japan

there are alternatives, taking into accountmust actively address.■

Korea

and

China

addition,

China’sintermediate-range

andcounter-measures.

the situation after the demise of the INF
Treaty.
At the same time, since Northeast
Asia is the region where the world’s
most intense great power/geopolitical
rivalry is foreseen and the developmentofnuclearmissileweapons

forces,andvarious

includingground-68

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Battles over Techno-hegemony: Japan’s Course

Battles over Techno-hegemony: Japan’s Course(Photo AFLO)

69

With attention focused on advanced

Second, the technological capabilities

technologies

ofof a nation do not determine only theinternational relations and international

superiority or inferiority of its military

security, battles over techno-hegemony

power. Technology is also used as ahave surfaced. The most prominent form

diplomatic tool. Some countries canof technological competition is the race

impose constraints on access to criticalfor simple technological advantage. First,

technology, a choke point for products,

each country considers its technologicaland force other countries to makecapabilities to be directly linked to its

concessions. The internationalization

own security interests and, in a moreof the value chain and the deepening

straightforward manner, views themof interdependence make this kind of

as sources of hard power and pursues

statecraft possible. This phenomenon

relative

can

in

the

technologicalcontext

superiority.

becalled“weaponized

Each country expects and/or worriesinterdependence.” China’s pursuit ofabout the disruptive innovations thatdomestic production of semiconductors

introduce cutting-edge technologies as

is aimed at reducing its dependence on

game changers in the military domain.

the United States, which has establishedadominant

position

globalAgainst this backdrop, in the midst of

semiconductor production. Third, it

competition for technological superiority,

has been pointed out that advanced

governments are scrambling to engage

technology combined with artificial

in research and development (R&D) tointelligence (AI) may be used to support

produce technological innovation. For

the regimes of authoritarian states. It

example, the essence of AI innovation,

has been pointed out that voice

as typified by deep learning, lies inrecognition technology and automatic

foundational technologies, advanced

translationequipped

human resources, and good-quality

with deep learning technology are

data. Key foundational technologies

used to manipulate public opinion,

includeand biometric technologies such as

semiconductors

facial recognition technology is usedperformance information processing,

to monitor and suppress people. In

and advanced information technologies.

addition, it has been noted that theseCountries are competing for thesetechnologies are exported and usedtechnologies, talent, and quality data.

abroad, often by authoritarian regimes,

Moreover, from basic research to

to shape public opinion and monitor thesocial implementation, the boundaries

public. Advanced technologies backed

between the military and civilian sectors

by the current information technology

have become increasingly blurred. In

enables large-scale and rapid circulation

the past, technology development andof information, while strengthening theapplication were focused on spin-off,

control of governments over peoples.

the diversion of military technology

It may be said that information andto civilian industries, and spin-on,

communication technology has played

the diversion of civilian technology toa role in spreading the norm of liberal

military use. At present, however, “spin-

democracy while proliferating andaround” and “civil-military fusion”

strengthening authoritarian politicalare being pursued, transcending themodels. In the midst of this, competition

boundaries between the military andhas begun for technology as a source of

civilian sectors. It is well known thatsoft power and/or sharp power.

many advanced technologies have dual-

technology

incomputing,that

algorithms,
enablehigh-use purposes.

70

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Battles over Techno-hegemony: Japan’s Course

US President Donald Trump signed

In addition, in order to promote

Executive Order 13859 announcing

open innovation, as exemplified by“the American AI Initiative” – the US

international

national strategy on AI – on February

competition is taking place in the hiring11, 2019. Priority was given to R&D

of world-class human resources. In

in AI for the purpose of maintaining

China, high-tech workers from Silicon

US leadership in the AI field. In

Valley called hai-gui have made great

addition,

Innovation

contributions to upgrading China’s

Unit (DIUx) of the US Department ofadvanced technologies. As described

Defense (DOD) is making efforts toabove, the flexibility of technology

strengthen cooperation with private

R&D frameworks, the globalization ofhigh-tech

Siliconvalue chains, and the mobility of highlyValley, and the Defense Advanced

skilled human resources are advancing,Research Projects Agency (DARPA) isand international interdependence overcontinuing its efforts to support R&D bytechnology is deepening.

the

Defensecompanies

in

joint

R&D

projects,

civilian institutions, including foreignOn

universities.

the

other

hand,

there

is

a

movement to promote decoupling at

71

China focuses its attention on fostering

the technological level. This entails

high-tech industries, as seen in its “Madesevering technological interconnectionsin China 2025” plan announced in

to maintain technological superiority.

2015. Moreover, China’s military R&D

In the US, there is growing concern

appears to be moving from “military-that China is acquiring advanced US

civilian“military-technology through legal and illegal

civilian fusion,” deepening cooperationmeans, such as forced technology

with the civilian sector. Althoughtransfer, industrial espionage, cyber

the prospects for the Shanghai Stockespionage,

Exchange’s STAR Market, opened in

exchanges, academic exchanges, andJuly 2019, are unclear, the new market

corporate mergers and acquisitions

does show Beijing’s intention to support(M&A). The FY2019 National Defense

high-tech unicorns in the semiconductor

Authorization Act (NDAA), signed

material and AI sectors in which itby President Trump in August 2018,has encouraged domestic production.

included a ban on government agency

integration”

to

joint

R&D,

personnel

procurement of products from fivegovernment

ChineseChinesetelecom companies and their affiliatescompanies targeted by the NDAA werein May and August of this year, as welltelecommunications equipment giants,

as Chinese AI-related companies insurveillance

October, to the list of entities subject

andcompanies.

cameraThe

manufacturers,

telecommunications

added

major

Chineseequipment

to its export controls. As a result of

manufacturers, all of which are high-these measures, it has become clear

tech companies. Overwhelming support

that the scope of US export controls

for the NDAA in both the Senate andtoward China has expanded beyond

the House indicated that decoupling

the conventional aerospace and defense

from China in terms of advanced

sector to include AI and information

technology was widely supported inand communication technologies.

Washington.
The control of highly skilled personnel
One notable tool for decoupling at theistechnology level is export controls. On

security issue. This is because highly

November 2018, the US Department

skilled personnel are a key element forof Commerce (DOC) welcomed publictechnological innovation that createscomments on the introduction of export

advanced technologies. Against thecontrols for emerging technologies.

backdrop of concerns over the outflow

The emerging technologies discussedof advanced technologies and highly

includedbiotechnologies,

such

as

skilled human resources through foreign

synthetic

biologygenomic

direct investment (FDI) and M&A,

engineering; AI and machine learning,

countries are undertaking to strengthensuch as deep learning and speech

regulations on inward direct investment

processing; quantum technologies, suchfor security reasons. The reform of theas quantum encryption and quantum

Committee on Foreign Investment incomputing; and advanced surveillance

the United States (CFIUS), authorized

technologies, such as faceprint andunder the US Foreign Investment

voiceprint technologies. All are cutting-

Risk Assessment Modernization Actedge technologies based on advanced(FIRRMA), is a typical example.

information

Behind these efforts is the reality thattechnology.

and

and

communication

Furthermore,

the

US

also

attracting

attentionasa

R&D on advanced technologies is

72Strategic Annual Report 2019
Battles over Techno-hegemony: Japan’s Course

currently being led by the private sector.

governing technology in line with their

While there is a need for enormous

own national interests. The Chinese

funds to be obtained from outside forgovernment, for example, has launched

today’s R&D, there is also a security

the concept of the Digital Silk Road andrequirement

will focus on developing and expanding

outflowtothroughpreventtechnology

participationinthe standardization process for the fifth-

corporate management. These efforts

generation

also aim to prevent high-tech startups

system (5G). The leadership of Chinese

from being acquired by foreign entities.

companies, which are promoting the

Furthermore,prevent

standardization of 5G on a global scale,technology transfers through highlyis expected to complement the formation

skilled human resources have becomeof the Digital Silk Road. In the US, inevident even as restrictions on entry

particular, there is growing concern

visas have been tightened. It has recently

that China will set the international

become clear that Chinese engineers andstandard

researchers are severely restricted from

Chinese companies will also play active

entering the US. In this way, policies forroles in the international market for 5G

technological superiority are intricately

base stations. Not only emerging Asianintertwined with the opposing vectors

and African countries but also advancedof open innovation (interdependence)

European countries may accept 5G baseand decoupling (cutoff).

stations from Chinese companies. Theremeasurestomobilefor

5G.

communications

Cost-competitive

is no international consensus on the73

Another dimension of the battles overtechnological and security implications

techno-hegemony is related to theof China’s 5G. Thus, China is focusing

international order and institutions

on the formation of the Digital Silk

relevant to technology. The international

Road through the expansion of theordergoverning

5G standard process and the overseas

technology shape how international

installation of 5G base stations. The

technology

formation of the Digital Silk Road,and

institutionsisdeveloped,

used,

transferred and managed, and affectbackedthe power and interests of individual

andcountries.

arewill complement China’s “Belt andstriving to mold the international orderRoad” initiative and contribute to the

Therefore,

countriesbyadvanced

information

communication

technology,

promotion of China’s national interests

to individual privacy as a fundamental

at the global level.

value of society, while the latter positions
it as a secondary consideration to social
stability. In addition, there is a conflict
between those who reject government
control and those who place importanceon the principle of national sovereignty
in the governance of the Internet.

China Unicom, one of the three major Chinese telecom
operators, announces the launch of a 5G service for the public in
50 cities, October 2019. (Photo Imaginechina/AFLO)

The international order and institutions
governing technology reflect not only
the economic and security interests
but also the values and norms of eachcountry.

Internationalarrangements

areinstitutional

currently

being

explored in various areas such as
cybersecurity, data protection, antitrust,and taxes. For example, the flow ofdigital data is understood to be directly
linked to the economic and security
interests of individual countries, andefforts are underway to create aninternational institution to govern theflow of digital data. The EU establishedthe“General

Data

Protection

Regulation (GDPR)” to protect datafrom a privacy perspective, while in
China a domestic law (Cybersecurity
Law) was enacted to allow government
access to data that could affect national
security, the economy, and the lives ofthe people. The former treats the right

The former is advocated by Westerncountries, while the latter is supported by
China and developing countries (G77).
In this way, attempts are being made toestablish an international order for the
management of data flow and Internet
governance that have led to conflictsof norms and values concerning digital
governance.
Thus, when it comes to international
relationsconcerningtechnology,

there are two different dimensionsof competition for techno-hegemony.
One is the dimension of technologicalsupremacy, and the other is thedimension of the international order
governingtechnology.

However,these dimensions are not mutually
exclusive. The powers, interests, andnorms

surrounding

technology

inthe international community definetheinternationalorder

governingtechnology. At the same time, theinternational order and institutions

74

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Battles over Techno-hegemony: Japan’s Course

governing technology influence theUnder these circumstances, attention

power, interests, and norms surrounding

has been focused on Japan’s stance.

technology in each country. Under these

Industry now has a growing interest

circumstances, countries are competingin digital transformation (DX). The

fiercely for techno-hegemony.

digital society enabled by advanced
information

andcommunication

Japan now faces a difficult challenge.

technology is a world where everything

While Japan has its eyes on China, a

is connected online. Japan has strength

large market, it values its alliance within sensors, machine tools and robotics,

the US as the core of its security policy.

which are indispensable for the Internet

At present, however, China’s political,of Things (IOT). Japan needs to show

economic, and ideological presence

its presence in the digital society throughin the international community istechnological innovation. Meanwhile,increasing, while the influence of thein 2018 the Japanese government

United States is declining in relativechangedterms. In addition, some European

regarding government procurement ofcountries have not determined how

telecommunications equipment, andto distance themselves from China

in 2019 it requested private companies

over issues such as 5G. Countries inand organizations in charge of 14

Asia and Oceania are also increasing

critical infrastructure fields to refrain

their presence in the international

fromcommunity,

alwaysequipment that might cause infor-

maintain solidarity on these issues.

mation leakage. It is reported that

While Australia and New Zealand,

Japan’s review of the Foreign Exchange

which are eyeing the 5G era, vowed

and Foreign Trade Law is intended toto block Chinese participation in 2018,

strengthen regulations on inward FDI

Papua New Guinea authorized Chinese

for security reasons. Although thesecompanies to build domestic Internet

measures did not directly refer to any

cables. Many countries in Asia andparticular country or company, it isAfrica have adopted China’s low-cost,

generally understood that they are de facto

high-performance telecommunications

measures to exclude Chinese companies.

system.

Japan’s moves appear to align with those

and

do

not

its

procuring

operational

policytelecommunicationsof the US, which has been decoupling75

from China in terms of technology.
However, Japan’s increasing inclination
toward technological decoupling from
China could also mean a weakeningof its technological cooperation with
China. There is also a risk that Japan’s
technologicalinnovation

will

slow

down.
The international order reflects not
only the power and interests of eachcountry but also its values and norms.
International competition for technohegemony is both a race for technologicalsuperiority and a race to establish
theinternationalorder

governingtechnology. Japan will have to decide
whether to build a value chain system
exclusively with members of the liberalinternational order (LIO) or continue
to cooperate and compromise withcountries that aspire to other models
of international order. In the world ofadvanced technology, Japan’s positionin the LIO is being watched.■76Strategic Annual Report 2019
JIIA Executive Officers, Experts, Directors and Councilors

Executive Officers

President and Director General: Kenichiro SASAE
Director General (Acting): Yasunori NAKAYAMA
Executive Director and Secretary General: Tetsuo TAKAGI
Senior Research Adviser: Seiichiro TAKAGI
Director of Research Coordination: Daisuke NAKANOPolicy Director of the Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology: Akemi SUTO
Special Research Fellow: Kohei SAITO
Director of Communications: Koichi IWASAWA

Experts

Senior Fellows
Chushiro YONEZAWA / Toyomi SAKAMOTO /Hirofumi TOSAKI / Tetsuo KOTANIFellows
Shohei AKAGAWA / Naoko FUNATSU / Hironori FUSHITA / Ryosuke HANADA /Kazumasa HAYAMARU / Tomoki IIMURA / Ryuta ITO / Shinya KADOZAKI /Kyoko KUWAHARA / Hao LI / Takeshi MIYAI / Mari NUKII / Miho OKADA /Kiyomi OKUBO / Shigeru OSUGI / Chihiro SHIKATA / Yoshiaki TAKAYAMA /Kensuke YANAGIDA

Senior Adjunct Fellows
Naoya OKUWAKI Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo
Tsutomu KIKUCHI Professor of International Political Economy, Aoyama Gakuin
University
Fumiaki KUBO Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo
Akihiko TANAKA President of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
Akio TAKAHARA Professor, University of Tokyo
Toshihiro NAKAYAMA Professor, Faculty of Policy Management Graduate School ofMedia and Governance, Keio University
Yuichi HOSOYA Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University

Adjunct Fellows
Nobumasa AKIYAMA Dean of School of International and Public Policy, Hitotsubashi
University
Kiyoshi ARAKI Former Ambassador of Japan to the Republic of Turkey
Masahiko ASADA Adjunct Fellow of the Center for Disarmament, Science andTechnology / Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University
Hideaki ASAHI Former Professor of International Security, Graduate School of Arts andSciences, University of Tokyo / Former Ambassador to East TimorKen ENDO Professor, Hokkaido University
Yoshihisa ENDO Former Ambassador of Japan to Panama
Takahiro IKAWA Head of Global Relations Department, Fujitsu Ltd.
Kazuhide ISHIKAWA Former Ambassador of Japan to the Republic of the Philippines
Matake KAMIYA Professor, National Defense Academy
Hideaki KANEDA Director, The Okazaki Institute77Experts

Adjunct Fellows
Nobukatsu KANEHARA Former Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary, Former Deputy
Secretary-General of National Security Secretariat
Kenichi KAWASAKI Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Hideya KURATA Professor, National Defense Academy
Mitsuru KUROSAWA Adjunct Fellow of the Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology/ Professor, Osaka Jogakuin College
Sumio KUSAKA Former Ambassador of Japan to Australia
Toru NAKAKITA Professor, Toyo University
Mutsuyoshi NISHIMURA Special Advisor to the Cabinet
Yoichi OTABE Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent
Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Geneva
Yoichi SUZUKI Former Ambassador of Japan to the French Republic
Shigenobu TAMURA Policy Research Council, LDP
Toshiya TSUGAMI Representative, Tsugami Workshop
Kyoichi WAKAYAMA Director, Japanese Secretariat of Japan-China Joint Study
Masaru WATANABE Former Ambassador of Japan to Cuba
Katsuyuki YAKUSHIJI Professor, Toyo University

Leaders of the Research Projects
Fumiaki KUBO: The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy and Japan-US Relations-Professor, University of Tokyo / Senior Adjunct Fellow, JIIA
Seiichiro TAKAGI: China's Foreign Policy and Other Countries' China Policies--SeniorResearch Adviser, JIIA
Akio TAKAHARA: China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies--Professor
and Dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo / Senior Adjunct
Fellow, JIIA
Masao OKONOGI: The Korean Peninsula in an ‘Age of Uncertainty’ and Japan’s Foreign /Security Policy--Professor Emeritus of Keio University
Tsutomu KIKUCHI: Rule of Law in the Indo-Pacific: Japan’s Foreign Policy for Enhancing
Global Public Goods--Professor of International Political Economy, Aoyama Gakuin University
Nobuo SHIMOTOMAI: Post-Putin Russia--Professor Emeritus, Hosei University /Distinguished Professor, Kanagawa University
Ken ENDO: Europe in Turbulence--Professor, International Politics, School of Law & Dean of
the Graduate School of Public Policy, Hokkaido University
Ryoji TATEYAMA: Global Risk - Subgroup (1) Analysis of Current Situation in the Middle
East and Energy Issues--Professor Emeritus, National Defense Academy
Hideshi TOKUCHI: Bottom-up Review (Security Research)--Senior Fellow, National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies / Director, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Nobuo INABA: World Economy--Director and Chairman of the Board of Ricoh Co., Ltd.
Kazuto SUZUKI: Security and Emerging Technology--Vice Dean and Professor of International
Politics at Public Policy School of Hokkaido University

78Strategic Annual Report 2019
JIIA Executive Officers, Experts, Directors and Councilors

Councilors

Yasuhiko ENDOH Appointed Chancellor, Japan Foundation for Regional Art-Activities
Hiroaki FUKAMI Professor Emeritus, Keio University
Joji HARANO President, Japan Echo Inc.
Ryokichi HIRONO Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
Yoshinori IMAI Professor, Ritsumeikan University
Takeo INOKUCHI Honorary Advisor, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.
Rikio NAGAHAMA Chairperson, NPO Triton Arts Network
Eiko Ohya-Edahiro President, Oya Soichi Library, Inc.
Teiichi SATO Eminent Scholar Professor, J.F. Oberlin University
Yukio SATOH Former President of JIIA
Hiroshi SHIGETA President, The Okazaki InstituteTakashi TSUKIOKA Representative Director Chairman, Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd.
Akio WATANABE Vice Chairman, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Taizo YAKUSHIJI Research Counsellor, Nakasone Yasuhiro Peace InstituteYoshinobu YAMAMOTO Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo, Aoyama Gakuin
University
Aiko Jane YAMANO Principal, Yamano Beauty College, Yamano Gakuen

Directors

Chairman
Motoyuki OKA Honorary Adviser, Sumitomo Corporation
Vice Chairs
Yoshiji NOGAMI Former President of JIIA, Former Ambassador to the U.K.
Takashi OYAMADA Senior Advisor, MUFG Bank, Ltd.
Teisuke KITAYAMA Advisor, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation

President and Director General
Kenichiro SASAE
Executive Director and General Secretary
Tetsuo TAKAGI

79

Directors

Directors
Naoki ATSUMI Representative Director, Executive Vice President, Kajima Corporation
Sadayuki HAYASHI Former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to the United
Kingdom
Koichi KAWANA Vice Chairman, JGC Holdings Corporation
Eizo KOBAYASHI Senior Representative for Business Community Relations, ITOCHU
Corporation
Tadaaki MAEDA Advisor, Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd.
Takao NAKAI Chairman, Toyo Seikan Group Holdings, Ltd.
Yoshinobu NAKAMURA President, Seiko Holdings Corporation
Katsunori NAKANISHI Chairman and Chief Executive Office, The Shizuoka Bank, Ltd.
Masashi NISHIHARA President, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Shoichi OIKAWA Executive adviser, Senior Deputy Editor-in-Chief, International Operationsof The Yomiuri Shimbun
Ken SATO Adviser, Nakasone Yasuhiro Peace Institute
Osamu SHINOBE Vice Chairman ANA Holdings Inc.
Yukio TADA Senior Advisor, Sojitz Research Institute, Ltd
Masayasu TOYOHARA Corporate Executive Vice President, Toshiba Corp.
Yoshitaka TSUDA Representative Executive Officer, Senior Vice President and Executive
Officer, CMO, General Manager, Corporate Sales & Marketing Group, General Manager of
Innovation Business Division, Hitachi Ltd.
Kanji WAKUNAGA President, Wakunaga Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.

Auditors
Makoto SHIRAI Trustee, Toshiba International Foundation
Yasuhiro YOSHIDA Corporate Officer, General Manager, General Accounting Dept.,
Sumitomo Corporation

Adviser

Hisashi OWADA Former President of the Japan Institute of International Affaris

General Counsels

Yohsaku FUJI Advisor, The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Sumitaka FUJITA Advisor, Itochu Corporation
Rei MASUNAGA Former Director, Institute of World Economy
Kazuo TSUKUDA Senior Executive Advisor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
Hiroshi WATANABE President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
Shunji YANAI Judge, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

80

Strategic Annual Report 2019
Research Projects         

     ● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_A-subproj_I_summary.pdf● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/H30_US/index.php       ● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_A-subproj_II_summary.pdf

           
● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_B-subproj_II_summary.pdf● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/H30_Korean_Peninsula/        ­       ● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_D_summary.pdf

 ● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_B-subproj_III_summary.pdf● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/H30_Russia/­  
● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_A-subproj_III_summary.pdf● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/H30_Europe/    ­ ● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_C-subproj_II_summary.pdf● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/H30_Global_Risk/index.php ­ ● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_C-subproj_I_summary.pdf● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/H30_World_Economy/    ● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_B-subproj_I_summary.pdf● http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/policy_recommendations/2018/181010jpn-security_policy_recommendations.pdf

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● http://www.cpdnp.jp/81 