an essay on the nature and conductof the passions and affections, with
illustrations on the moral sensenatural law andenlightenment classics
Knud Haakonssen
General Editor

Francis Hutcheson

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An Essay on the Natureiiiiand Conduct of theiiii
Passions and Affections,
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the Moral Sense
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Francis Hutcheson
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Edited and with an Introductioniiby Aaron Garrett
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The Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson
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This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established toencourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.

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䉷 2002 Liberty Fund, Inc.
All rights reserved
Frontispiece: Detail of portrait of Francis Hutcheson by Allan Ramsay(c . 1740–45), oil on canvas, reproduced courtesy of the Hunterian Art
Gallery, University of Glasgow.
Printed in the United States of America
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hutcheson, Francis, 1694–1746
An essay on the nature and conduct of the passions and affections:with illustrations on the moral sense / Francis Hutcheson; introduction
by Aaron Garrett.
p.
cm.
(The collected works of Francis Hutcheson)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
i s b n 0-86597-386-5 (hbk.)—i s b n 0-86597-387-3 (pbk.)
1. Emotions—Early works to 1850. 2. Ethics. I. Title.
b 1501.e 6 2003
171⬘.2—dc21
2002029652
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contents

Introductionix

Acknowledgmentsxxv

an essay on the nature and conductof the passions and affections, with
illustrations on the moral sense1

Textual Notes

205

Index

221

introduction

An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with
Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), jointly with Francis Hutcheson’s
earlier work Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue(1725),1 presents one of the most original and wide-ranging moral philosophies of the eighteenth century. These two works, each comprising
two semiautonomous treatises,2 were widely translated and vastly influential throughout the eighteenth century in England, continental Europe, and America.
The two works had their greatest impact in Scotland and influenced
many well-known Scottish philosophers, particularly those writing after the last Jacobite upheaval, in 1745. This can be seen in the concernof the post-1745 generation with analyzing human nature as the foundation of moral theory, with the “moral sense” and moral epistemology
more generally, with the impartial spectator and the calm passions, andwith the independence of benevolence from self-interest. In addition to
the influence of his writings, Hutcheson was also a famed teacher whose
Glasgow students, notably Adam Smith, held sway over generations of
Scottish moral philosophers.
Despite their impact on Scottish letters, the four treatises were in fact
written in Dublin, and the philosophers to whom Hutcheson re-

1. I refer to these as, respectively, Essay with Illustrations and the Inquiry.
2. Hutcheson seems to have thought of the works as four independent but
interconnected treatises, and he generally cites by treatise and section number (i.e.,
Inquiry on Beauty as Treatise 1, Inquiry on Virtue as Treatise 2, Essay on the Passions
as Treatise 3, and the Illustrations as Treatise 4) as opposed to by book and page
number. This is further reflected in the titles of the two works.

ix

x

introduction

sponded and with whom he debated were in the main not Scottish but
English, Irish, French, Roman, and Greek. Consequently, part of
Hutcheson’s legacy was a cosmopolitan outlook among enlightened
Scots, who learned to turn their eyes far from home.

Early Life
Hutcheson was born in 16943 in County Down, near Saintfield. His
father and grandfather were respected Presbyterian ministers in the
Scots emigrant community of Ulster. Unlike their brethren in Scotland,
where the Presbyterian Kirk was the established church, the Irish Presbyterians were Dissenters. Like the English Dissenters, they were discriminated against by the Anglican state church, which consideredthem marginally less unsavory than Catholics.4 They were excluded
from Trinity College, Dublin, as well as from Oxford and Cambridge,
and, after 1704, they could not take public office.5 The major difference
between Irish Presbyterians and English Dissenters was that the former
had strong ties to Scotland, including the Scottish universities, especially Glasgow.
Irish Presbyterians were divided between traditionalists and morerationally inclined “New Light” ministers. John Hutcheson, Francis’s
father, was a traditionalist who wrote the church’s response to theclaims of “liberal” nonsubscribers. Francis associated with the nonsub3. My chronology of Hutcheson’s early life is based on William Robert Scott,Francis Hutcheson: His Life, Teaching and Position in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. A. Stewart, “Abating Bigotry and
Hot Zeal,” in Damian Smyth (ed.), Francis Hutcheson: A Supplement to Fortnight,
308 (1992), 4–6; M. A. Stewart, “Rational Dissent in Early Eighteenth-Century
Ireland,” in Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Enlightenment and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 42–63; James Moore, “The Two Systems of Francis
Hutcheson: On the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment,” in M. A. Stewart, Studies
in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 37–59.
4. See Robert Eccleshall, “Anglican Political Thought in the Century After the
Revolution of 1688,” in D. George Boyce, Robert Eccleshall, and Vincent Geoghegan (eds.), Political Thought in Ireland Since the Seventeenth Century (London:
Routledge, 1993), 41.
5. Ian McBride, “The School of Virtue: Francis Hutcheson, Irish Presbyterians
and the Scottish Enlightenment,” in Political Thought in Ireland, 80.

introductionxi

scribing clergymen in Belfast and leaned toward the tolerationist theology of love that was associated with the New Light.6
Hutcheson was schooled in classics in Ireland and moved to Glasgow in 1711 when the university was just recovering from a period of
decline, thanks to the influence of some charismatic and theologicallymoderate teachers and of politically active Irish students who challenged the arbitrariness of university authority.7 Upon graduating,
Hutcheson returned to Ireland to head a Dissenting Academy in Dublin, a major undertaking of the Ulster Kirk in which he appears to haveprospered. Hutcheson associated with Robert Molesworth, a closefriend of Shaftesbury and of radical intellectuals such as John Toland
and Anthony Collins. In Ireland, Molesworth cultivated a circle of talented intellectuals who wrote in the Dublin Journal, notably Hutcheson’s friend James Arbuckle. Hutcheson was also in contact with openminded Anglican intellectuals such as William King, the archbishop of
Dublin. At the same time, Hutcheson no doubt felt the impact of themore bigoted world about him.
In intellectual circles, clubs, and, particularly, publications such as
the Dublin Journal and the London Journal, provincial intellectuals
flourished, fought, and exchanged ideas. Like Bayle’s Rotterdam, with
its Huguenot diaspora, Hutcheson’s Dublin felt the weight of sectarian
controversy and the tug of another country. In this context Hutcheson
wrote his early masterpieces.

The Inquiry
Treatise 1, the Inquiry on Beauty, is relatively independent of the Essay
with Illustrations except that it presents the sense of the “beautiful” as amodel for Hutcheson’s subsequent considerations of the “internal”
senses. Treatise 2, however, is presupposed in the Essay with Illustrations(see the Preface). The first section of Treatise 2 considers the moral

6. See Wolfgang Leidhold, Ethik und Politik bei Francis Hutchison (Freiburg:
Alber, 1985), chaps. III and IV.
7. See M. A. Stewart, “John Smith and the Molesworth Circle,” EighteenthCentury Ireland 2 (1987): 89–102.

xii

introduction

sense, and the validity and the importance of the arguments for it inTreatise 2 are assumed in Treatises 3 and 4.
Hutcheson’s basic premise—in both the Inquiry and the Essay—isthat our immediate perceptions of the moral qualities of an action or acharacter are derived from a “sense,” like the external senses, that perceives external, adventitious qualities. To this end, Hutcheson argued
that the content of a moral perception, the quality perceived, cannot beforced upon us. Moral perceptions are, like the perceptions of othersenses, independent of the will.
As we cannot will the perception of something, for example, stimulated by a reward or punishment, our volitions either result from or are
independent of our experience of moral qualities; they do not prompt
them. This is the basis for Hutcheson’s argument against the view that
morality arises from sanctions associated with Locke’s Essay and Pufendorf ’s Law of Nature and Nations (although Hutcheson is at pains not
to deny all influence of sanctions). On the same basis, Hutcheson argued that benevolence toward mankind is “disinterested”; we are capable of having benevolent sentiments toward those in whom we haveno interest and whose “lovely disposition” our moral sense tells us toapprove (T2 148).
Hutcheson’s best explanation of this moral sense was that nature determines us to apprehend moral qualities and that our apprehension isissued with a moral sense that approves of good moral qualities (T2180). Our judgments are sometimes incorrect, but there is neverthelessa perceived quality of which we judge. When we perceive as benevolent
someone who is in fact malicious, what we approve of is still the perceived benevolence. Thus, Hutcheson attempted to rest the approvalof benevolence on our perceptions and, ultimately, on our natures.

Gilbert Burnet and John Clarke of Hull
The Essay with Illustrations followed the Inquiry by almost three years,
during which time a number of acute thinkers criticized the Inquiry,
and Hutcheson became widely known. The Essay with Illustrations isdistinctive, therefore, both for its content and for the altered intellectual
context. In 1725, Hutcheson entered into a debate in the London Jour-introductionxiii

nal with Gilbert Burnet concerning the newly published Inquiry—and
this bore fruit in Treatise 4, the Illustrations. In the same year, John
Clarke published an attack on the then-anonymous author of the Inquiry (along with criticisms of Samuel Clarke) and then communicatedfurther comments to Hutcheson directly. The first section of Treatise 3,
the Essay, is a response to John Clarke that sets the agenda for much that
follows.
Gilbert Burnet (1690–1726) was the son of Bishop Gilbert Burnet of
Salisbury (1643–1715), one of the best-known latitudinarian divines ofthe era, admired by Shaftesbury8 and many others. His son, Hutcheson’s correspondent, was chaplain to George I and a promising young
churchman. John Clarke was master of the Hull grammar school when
he entered into argument with Hutcheson. He was referred to as John
Clarke of Hull to distinguish him from Samuel Clarke’s better-known
nephew. Clarke of Hull was known in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries primarily for his popular Latin manuals, but he wasalso an able philosopher who produced two undervalued but significant
works: An Examination of the Notion of Moral Good and Evil (1725) and
The Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice Considered (1726).
In an enterprising piece of self-advertisement, Hutcheson publishedan anonymous letter, “To Britannicus,” in the London Journal, praising
the Inquiry. Shortly afterward, Burnet responded skeptically: How do
we know the moral sense is not erroneous or deceitful? Pleasure does
not make it true; rather, reason does, and that is the proper internal or
moral sense by which we judge. Once we know that a given act or quality is really good, then we take pleasure in its intrinsic moral qualities.
Hutcheson thus confronted moral rationalism of the sort presented
by Samuel Clarke, who had argued that morality was found in the “fitnesses” of things. Obligations and duties flowed from eternal relations,ends, and offices forming a system as certain as mathematics and, likemathematics, discerned through reason.9

8. Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion
and Ethics in England: 1600–1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
24, 89.
9. See particularly A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Nat-xiv

introduction

Hutcheson provided a bevy of arguments against Burnet and criticized the clarity and coherence of his terminology. One argument isparticularly notable. Hutcheson took over Grotius’s distinction between exciting and justifying reasons, arguing that “Desires, Affections,
Instincts, must be previous to all Exciting Reasons; and a Moral Sense antecedent to all Justifying Reasons.”10 Neither justifying reason nor exciting reason is adequate to the purposes to which Samuel Clarke and Burnet would put reason. For moral reasoning, “reasonableness,” ispractical and has numerous ends. Some ends may be more “fit” and “rational” than others, but we recognize ends through our practical interests, and we distinguish among competing ends.
John Clarke’s The Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice wasa criticism of Samuel Clarke and Hutcheson. Clarke of Hull was a hedonistic theist in the mold of the elder Locke and Pierre Bayle, whoviewed sanction as the basic support of morality, in contrast with both
Hutcheson and the moral rationalists. His central challenge to Hutcheson concerned self-love. Clarke claimed that Hutcheson’s arguments
for the independence of benevolence from self-love were inadequate because they failed to recognize that “the Love of Benevolence is . . . a
Desire or Inclination to do Good to others,” and “the Object and Causeof Desire is Pleasure alone, or the supposed Means of procuring it.”11 Although there is a profound natural connection between the happiness ofa parent and the happiness of a child, and this connection is as “disinterested” as smelling a rose or tasting a peach, it is still pleasure that reinforces and spurs action in both cases. We may have different sorts ofpleasures, some brutish and bad, such as the desire for esteem, andural Religion and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Religion (London, 1706),
5–11, 45–67. In 1717, the young Hutcheson wrote a letter (now lost) to Clarke
criticizing his proof of God in A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God(1705) (Scott, Francis Hutcheson, 15–16).
10. Gilbert Burnet (ed.), Letters Between the Late Mr. Gilbert Burnet, and Mr.
Hutcheson, Concerning the True Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness. Formerly
Published in the London Journal (London: W. Wilkins, 1735), 49.
11. John Clarke, The Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice, in L. A.
Selby-Bigge, British Moralists (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897), v. 2, 224.

introduction

xv

some delightful, such as eating a peach or seeking the good of a child,
but this does not make them less pleasing. Their virtue must instead be
related to the pain and pleasure of divine sanction.

The Essay
In the Essay, Hutcheson attempted to untangle these difficulties whilefurnishing a consistent and convincing theory of the passions. The latter was formulated with reference to two of his predecessors, Bernard
Mandeville and Shaftesbury.12 Mandeville had been publishing fortwenty years, but only with the publication in 1723 of a much expanded
edition of the Fable of the Bees did he become famous and controversial.
It was on Hutcheson’s generation, therefore, that he had his greatest impact. Mandeville presented an infamous Epicurean theory of the passions based on a skeptical analysis of human nature: “I believe Man (besides Skin, Flesh, Bones, &c. that are obvious to the Eye) to be acompound of various Passions, that all of them, as they are provoked,
and come uppermost, govern him by turns, whether he will or no.”13
The theory was directed against Shaftesbury, as a naively optimistic
aristocrat with little understanding of the realities of human nature.
Shaftesbury also championed the diversity of human nature but diminished the importance of self-interest by promoting the social affections “and a thousand other springs, which are counter to self-interest,[and] have as considerable a part.”14 Following Cicero and Marcus Aurelius, Shaftesbury saw virtue, not as a Mandevillian artifice, but as a
stoic harmony with man’s intrinsically passionate nature.
Mandeville emphasized the complexity of self-interest, the interconnectedness of vice and virtue, and the diversity and ubiquity of plea12. The subtitle of the first edition of Inquiry reads “IN WHICH The Principlesof the late Earl of Shaftesbury are Explain’d and Defended, against the Authorof the Fable of the Bees.” Hutcheson also wrote three letters to the Dublin Weekly
Journal in 1726, in which he criticized Mandeville.
13. Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: Or Private Vices, Publick Benefits,
F. B. Kaye (ed.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988), vol. 1, 39.
14. Shaftesbury, “Sensus Communis” (1709), III.3.

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sure. Hutcheson’s reply to this, as to John Clarke’s hedonism, was a reprise of the argument that we cannot force a sentiment, even if theresult is pleasing. If feeling a certain passion makes us happy, we mightwish to feel it in order to be happy, but we cannot force ourselves to feelsomething in order to get a reward. Instead, we sense and desire, andthen we may feel pleasure as a consequence of the desire. The idea that
action implies pleasure is false moral psychology.
For Hutcheson, as for many early modern philosophers, the passions
were central to ethics. The most unsavory passions and sentiments—
bigotry, anger, and the desire to harm—are consequences of limited and“partial Views,” and they arise from emphasis on selfish interest andmistaken understandings of the public good (pp. 72, 75). Consequently,
they are less present in the broader view and disappear in the universal
view of the moral system. Limited views of human interest derive such
validity as they have from their approximation to the most general view,
the providential design of creation, and the prospect of the future state(p. 123). The general view reinforces the calm passions.
The progress of the sentiments accordingly leads us to reflection not
only on the human system but also on its place in the universal system.
Such reflection shows how many apparently negative features of humannature have their place—in moderation. By reflection on the universal“oeconomy,” we learn to regulate passions so as to be happy and to
make others happy.

Illustrations
Hutcheson’s theory of the passions responded to John Clarke’s claimthat his moral philosophy was based on poor psychology. Clarke forced
Hutcheson to draw his account of desire and sentiment more precisely
than he had in the Inquiry, and to show how it was linked with themoral sense. But, as noted previously, other issues were afoot. Burnet’s
criticisms of Treatise 2 had brought out Hutcheson’s conflict withmoral realism and the view that moral judgments are like other judgments insofar as they are only valid if true.

introductionxvii

As noted, Hutcheson emphasized in Treatise 4.1 that this was a skirmish among those who accepted the moral sense, even if some parties
were not aware of it! But Burnet was not the only writer of that stripe.
In the opening chapters of the Illustrations, Hutcheson successively
criticized Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston (1659–1724), employing two related strategies. First, he used Grotius’s distinction between
exciting and justifying reasons to show the confusion in many rationalists’ invocation of reason. Hutcheson argued that there is “no exciting
Reason previous to Affection” (pp. 139–40); what we take as exciting reasons to action and to active attitudes, such as desire and affection, either
presupposes affections and desires or serves as mere justifying reasons.
Furthermore, moral reasoning is practical and particular and varies
from agent to agent. Consequently, supposedly fixed and eternal reasons differ drastically according to how they are viewed by individuals,
and judging what is reasonable in a given situation is difficult. Rather,
moral ends and actions are fixed through a moral sense; they may bejustified by reason but cannot be called forth by it.
Similar arguments were deployed against Samuel Clarke’s eternal
moral relations and Wollaston’s “significancy of truth in actions.”
Hutcheson attacked Samuel Clarke’s “fitnesses”—real, normative predispositions among beings—and argued that the theory was incoherent
and failed to support the eternal moral relations that Clarke required.
Clarke’s heart was in the right place, but that was because the “eternal
relations” were perceived by his own moral sense.
William Wollaston argued in the Religion of Nature Delineated (1724;
first printed privately in 1722) that actions have “significancy”; that is,they could be true or false. Any act that interferes with truth is morally
wrong, and, conversely, any act in accordance with the truth is morally
right. Therefore, there is a correspondence of the truth signified by actions and the morally right, and conversely the denial of truth and themorally wrong.
Hutcheson distinguished between logical and moral truths. Many
logical truths and falsehoods are not moral truths and falsehoods. Notably, actions that unintentionally hinder truth are rarely consideredxviiiintroduction

evil; they may be logically but not morally false.15 False ideas often may
result in moral evil, but they are evil not because of falsity but because
we recognize them as evil through our moral sense.
The moral sense in parallel with the senses of beauty, honor, andimagination does not mean that Hutcheson saw morals as nothing but
spontaneous reactions. Although we do not divine eternal moral relations in the fitnesses of things, we are capable of exact knowledge ofnatural law and civil laws, which constitute “the most useful Subject of
Reasoning . . . as certain, invariable, or eternal Truths, as in any Geometry” (pp. 174/10, 216). But these “relations” arise from the nature ofpeople in social interaction, not from eternal logical relations in abstraction from human nature. The absolute principles of the universal moral
system are inaccessible to humanity, but we can gain more extensive
views by exploring our nature and its place in a wider world.
In the final chapter of Illustrations, Hutcheson is concerned with balancing the importance of toleration with the need for belief in and loveof God. Our love of God amplifies the social affections and reinforces
benevolence. Consequently, the best signs of piety are social affections
and public virtue, and we should not attempt further divination of thebeliefs of others. Instead, we should broaden our views through reflection on the general moral system and thereby cultivate the calm passions. The Illustrations thus concludes with a “moderate” vision of humanity that connects the theory of the passions with Hutcheson’s later
discussions in the System.16

Remarks Concerning the Editions
Three editions of the Essay with Illustrations were printed during Hutcheson’s lifetime, with two variants of the first edition:

15. This argument is perhaps derived from John Clarke, An Examination of the
Notion of Moral Good and Evil, 12.
16. On Hutcheson as model for Moderatism, see Richard Sher, Church andUniversity in the Scottish Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985), 69.

introductionxix

1a An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations On the Moral Sense. By the Author of
the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. London: Printed by J. Darby and T. Browne, for John Smith andWilliam Bruce, Booksellers in Dublin; and sold by J. Osborn and
T. Longman in Pater-Noster-Row, and S. Chandler in the Poultrey.
M.DCC.XXVIII.
1b An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations On the Moral Sense. London: Printed andDublin re-printed by S. Powell for P. Crampton, at Addison’s Head,
Opposite the Horse Guard in Dame’s-Street, and T. Benson, at
Shakespear’s Head in Castle-Street, MDCCXXVIII.
2 An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations on the Moral Sense. By Francis Hutcheson,
Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow; and Author of the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. London: Printed for James and John Knapton, and John Crownfield in St. Paul’s Church-Yard; John Darby in Bartholomew-Close;
Thomas Osborne Jun. At Greys Inn; and Lauton Gilliver in Fleetstreet. M.DCC.XXX.
3 An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations On the Moral Sense. The third edition, withAdditions. London: Printed for A. Ward, J. and P. Knapton, T. Longman, S. Birt, C. Hitch, L. Gilliver, T. Astley, S. Austen, and J. Rivington. MDCCXLII.

There is some question about the order of appearance of 1a and 1b.
Scott notes that 1b was advertised as having “the errors of the London
Edition emended.”17 But 1a has fewer errors than 1b, which might seemaccording to Scott’s comment to make it the “emended” edition. Fur-

17. Scott is quoting an advertisement in the March 23, 1728 edition of the DublinIntelligencer. See Scott, Francis Hutcheson, 53.

xxintroduction

thermore, 1a and not 1b was repackaged as the “second edition.” But
1b clearly reads, “London: printed and Dublin re-printed,” and according to Mautner, 1a is advertised in the London Journal as having been
printed on January 13, 1728.18 Thus, unless 1b was printed in the firsttwo weeks of January, which seems unlikely, 1b was an inferior edition
that appeared after 1a.
1a and 1b appeared anonymously as penned by “the Author of theInquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue” (which did
carry Hutcheson’s name). The second edition of 1730, which introduced Hutcheson’s name on the title page, is not an independent edition but rather 1a reprinted with Francis Hutcheson’s name on the title
page. This was, it seems, the only revision. The authorship read in full,“Francis Hutcheson, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the Universityof Glasgow; and Author of the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas ofBeauty and Virtue.” The point of this reissue was probably to boost
sales of both of Hutcheson’s works by means of his newly acquired academic distinction. He became a professor in Glasgow in 1730, and thethird edition of the Inquiry (1729) had been published too early to makenote of Hutcheson’s new standing.
The third edition of 1742 is a distinct and revised edition with many
additions and emendations, mainly to the Illustrations. There were anumber of posthumous editions of Essay with Illustrations. Jessop mentions a 1751 Dublin edition, a 1756 London fourth edition, and a 1772
Glasgow “3rd edition.”

18. See Thomas Mautner, Francis Hutcheson: On Human Nature (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 173–4. Mautner provides the most extended andup-to-date discussion of the lifetime editions of Hutcheson’s texts. Other bibliographical discussions are to be found in Bernard Peach (ed.), Francis Hutcheson:
Illustrations on the Moral Sense (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1971), 97–100; T. E.
Jessop, A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), 143–7; and the “Bibliographical Note” that introduces each volume of Bernard Fabian (ed.), Collected
Works of Francis Hutcheson (Hildesheim: Olms, 1969/1971), 7 v.

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xxi

Editorial Principles
Of the two extant variorum editions,19 Peach used a posthumous 1769
reprint of 3 as the copy text for his edition of the Illustrations.20 This isthe best approach to the Illustrations when presented independently of
the Essays. I have adopted 1a as the copy text for this edition of the entire Essay with Illustrations for a simple reason. It allows the reader toview the actual chronological alteration of the text: that is, how Hutcheson himself initially presented it and then altered it fourteen years
later.
Turco’s excellent Italian edition uses internal citation to make thebody of the text neutral to the specific edition.21 Unfortunately, that approach becomes far too unwieldy when noting punctuation changes. As
Turco’s edition is a translation into Italian with textual apparatus, minute changes of punctuation go for the most part unremarked.
Why 1a and not 1b? Because 1a has fewer mistakes than 1b, is morecommon, and is the basis for 2 (more accurately, it is identical to 2,
aside from a new title page). I have not noted any variations among 1a,
1b, and the “second edition,” as they have only bibliographic interest(and limited bibliographic interest at that), since Hutcheson appears tohave had little or no hand in them. For the same reason, I have notnoted variations found in posthumous editions.
Hutcheson made numerous alterations in the third edition, although the differences between the two editions are not as dramatic

19. There are a number of reprints without variorum. Volume II of Fabian (op.
cit.) reprints 1a, as does the Garland (New York: 1971). Andrew Ward (ed.), Essay
with Illustrations (Manchester: Clinamen, 1999) is a modernized version of 1a; and3 has been reprinted in Paul McReynolds (ed.), Four Early Works on Motivation(Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints, 1969).
20. Peach (ed.), op. cit., 97.
21. Luigi Turco (ed.), Giovanni Grandi and Monica Saccani (trans.), Francis
Hutcheson: Saggio sulla natura e condotta delle passioni (Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 1997).

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as one might expect, given the fourteen years between them. The significant varia are at the end of this text and are indicated by page andline number of the present volume. Hutcheson’s notes and my editorial notes are attached to the main body of the text, as is the pagination for 1a and 3 (1a appears in italic typeface; 3 appears in regular
typeface).
The lengthiest emendations are found in the preface to the work andin the Illustrations; generally, these are subtractions from the preface andadditions to the Illustrations. Many of the specific references to his contemporaries Joseph Butler, Jean Le Clerc, and John Clarke are trimmed
from the preface in 3.
There are numerous other changes to the text, additions and subtractions of words, lines, and paragraphs, as well as countless modifications and alterations to punctuation, capitalization procedures, italics, and typeface. A number of footnotes were added to the later edition
as well, including a diatribe against Hutcheson’s critic John Balguy. A
sole reference to the New Testament is also added. There are even alterations in the marginal titles.
I have restricted my variorum to changes that could alter the senseof the text, although what could affect sense is a point of debate. I havenoted all changes of wording and all changes of relevant punctuation.
These are clearly the two most important types of textual varia. There
are many varia, though, that have not been noted.
I have not noted most changes in capitalization, as there is little or
no rhyme or reason to Hutcheson’s use of them. Although capitals areoften used for emphasis in twentieth-century prose, they are not usedwith great consistency in earlier eighteenth-century English-language
philosophical texts. Furthermore, capitalization was often a printer’s decision. The same holds for italics. I have noted very few changes in capitals and italics—only those that could possibly be construed as providing a change in emphasis. Readers are strongly cautioned, however,against reading too much into even those changes.
Among other variorum that have not been noted are the following:
1. Differences in spelling, broadly conceived, among the editions.

introduction

xxiii

a. The first edition prefers the idiomatic contraction of -ed: “join’d”/“joined,” “gratify’d”/“gratified,” “alter’d”/“altered.” There are othervariations in contraction, such as “though”/“tho’”/“tho,” “it is”/“’tis.”b. There are numerous differences in spelling more narrowly construed.
A few representative examples are: “alledge”/“alledg,” “threatned”/“threatened,” “inadvertencies”/“inadvertences,” “suspence”/“suspense,”“shews”/“shows.”
c. There are also differences in the hyphenation and separation ofwords. A few representative examples are “nobody”/“no body,” “presuppose”/“pre suppose,” “fellow-creatures”/“fellow creatures,” “ourselves”/ “our selves.”

2. The placement of Hutcheson’s footnote markers—inside or outside
punctuation marks. I have noted variations in the marks used, and ofcourse the absence of notes.
3. Changes in the use of roman and arabic numerals in the footnotes, aswell as changes in the footnote markers themselves.
Finally, I have corrected obvious printer’s errors (e.g., “deipise” for“despise”) and missing punctuation (e.g., a period missing at the end of
a sentence), without remark. I have also substituted regular capitalization for the small caps used in the first word of every paragraph.
Aaron Garrett

acknowledgments

A number of people and institutions have helped in producing this edition of Hutcheson’s Essay with Illustrations. As to institutions, special
thanks are due Boston University, the Humanities Research Centre of
the Australian National University, the Houghton Library at Harvard
University, Liberty Fund and its unfailingly helpful staff, and the Australian National Cricket Team, which kept me awake through longnights of collation. As to people, James Moore has shown great generosity in helping me with my many queries about Hutcheson. He suggested Gershom Carmichael as the possible identity of the man of “realmerit” in Glasgow (cf. p. 10, note x) and has aided in numerous othernotes. Stephen Scully and Morgan Meis have suggested and correctedtranslations. I am also grateful to Bob Brown, Alfredo Ferrarin, Ian
Hunter, Thomas Mautner, and Åsa Söderman.
Three people deserve very special thanks. First, Shelly Kroll laboredwith me over the proofs and caught many errors with her eagle eye. Second, I have benefited beyond measure from Luigi Turco’s masterly Italian edition of the Essay with Illustrations. Through his scholarship I
have avoided many pitfalls, and most of the notes in my edition are indebted in one way or another to his far more copious and erudite discussions. In particular, he has identified all of Hutcheson’s classicalsources. I refer to Turco in a few of my notes, when I am deriving aparticular point from him, but his mark is on virtually everything inthis volume. All readers who can read Italian and want to know more
about the Essay with Illustrations are referred to his work. Finally, thanks
to Knud Haakonssen, the editor of this series, who has helped withmany notes, edited my prose, and been a constant support and resource. Without him this edition would not exist.
xxv

an essay on the nature and conductof the passions and affections, with
illustrations on the moral sensean
E S S AYon theNature and Conductof thePassions and Affections.
with
I L L U S T R AT I O N S
On the Moral Sense.
By the Author of the Inquiry into the Originalof our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.

Hoc opus, hoc studium, parvi properemus, & ampli,
Si Patriae volumus, si Nobis vivere chari. Hor.1
LONDON:
Printed by J. Darby and T. Browne, for John Smith and William Bruce,
Booksellers in Dublin; and sold by J. Osborn and T. Longman inPater-Noster-Row, and S. Chandler in the Poultrey.
M.DCC.XXVIII.

1. Horace, Sermones, I.3.28–29. “This work, this study, let us hasten it far andwide, if we would wish to live in our country and to live happily with ourselves.”
Horace is the most quoted of the classical authors in the Essay with Illustrations,although Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Plato, and Aristotle are also frequently cited.

the preface

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[iii ] Altho the main practical Principles, which are inculcated in thisTreatise, have this Prejudice in their Favour, that they have been taught
and propagated by the best of Men in all Ages, yet there is reason to fearthat renewed Treatises upon Subjects so often well manag’d, may be
look’d upon as superfluous; especially since little is offer’d upon themwhich has not often been well said before. But [iv ] beside that general
Consideration, that old Arguments may sometimes be set in such aLight by one, as will convince those who were not [iv] moved by them,even when better express’d by another; since, for every Class of Writers,
there are Classes of Readers adapted, who cannot relish any thinghigher: Besides this, I say, the very Novelty of a Book may procure alittle Attention, from those who over-look the Writings which theWorld has long enjoy’d. And if by Curiosity, or any other means, somefew can be engag’d to turn their Thoughts to these important Subjects,
about which a little Reflection will discover the Truth, and a thorow
Consideration of it may occasion a great Increase of real Happiness; no
Person need be asham’d of his Labours as useless, which do such Service
to any of his Fellow-Creatures.
[v ] If any should look upon some Things in this Inquiry into the Passions, as too subtile for common Apprehension, and consequently not[v] necessary for the Instruction of Men in Morals, which are the common business of Mankind: Let them consider, that the Difficulty onthese Subjects arises chiefly from some previous Notions, equally difficult at least, which have been already receiv’d, to the great Detrimentof many a Natural Temper; since many have been discourag’d from all
Attempts of cultivating kind generous Affections in themselves, by a pre-3

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prefacevious Notion that there are no such Affections in Nature, and that all
Pretence to them was only Dissimulation, Affectation, or at best some
unnatural Enthusiasm. And farther, that to discover Truth on these
Subjects, nothing more is necessary than a little Attention to what passes
in our own Hearts, [vi ] and consequently every Man may come to Certainty in these Points, without much Art or Knowledge of other Matters.
[vi] Whatever Confusion the Schoolmen introduced into Philosophy,
some of their keenest Adversaries 2 seem to threaten it with a worse kindof Confusion, by attempting to take away some of the most immediate
simple Perceptions, and to explain all Approbation, Condemnation, Pleasure and Pain, by some intricate Relations to the Perceptions of the External Senses. In like manner they have treated our Desires or Affections,making the most generous, kind and disinterested of them, to proceedfrom Self-Love, by some subtle Trains of Reasoning, to which honest
Hearts are often wholly Strangers.
[vii ] Let this also still be remembred that the natural Dispositions ofMankind will operate regularly in those who never reflected upon them,nor form’d just Notions about them. [vii] Many are really virtuous who
cannot explain what Virtue is. Some act a most generous disinterested
Part in Life, who have been taught to account for all their Actions by
Self-Love, as their sole Spring. There have been very different and opposite Opinions in Opticks, contrary Accounts have been given of Hearing,
voluntary Motion, Digestion, and other natural Actions. But the Powers
themselves in reality perform their several Operations with sufficient
Constancy and Uniformity, in Persons of good Health, whatever theirOpinions be about them. In the same manner our moral Actions and Affections may be in good order, when our Opinions [viii ] are quite wrong
about them. True Opinions however, about both, may enable us to improve our natural Powers, and to rectify accidental Disorders incident unto
them. And true Speculations on these Subjects must certainly [viii] beattended with as much Pleasure as any other Parts of Human Knowledge.
2. Hutcheson likely had in mind modern Epicureans: Mandeville, Hobbes, La
Rochefoucault, and others.

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It may perhaps seem strange, that when in this Treatise Virtue is suppos’d disinterested; yet so much Pains is taken, by a Comparison of our
several Pleasures, to prove the Pleasures of Virtue to be the greatest weare capable of, and that consequently it is our truest Interest to be virtuous. But let it be remember’d here, that tho there can be no Motives
or Arguments suggested which can directly raise any ultimate Desire,such as that of our own Happiness, or publick Affections (as we attempt
to prove in Treatise IV;) [ix ] yet if both are natural Dispositions of ourMinds, and nothing can stop the Operation of publick Affections but
some selfish Interest, the only way to give publick Affections their fullForce, and to make them prevalent [ix] in our Lives, must be to remove
these Opinions of opposite Interests, and to shew a superior Interest on
their side. If these Considerations be just and sufficiently attended to, anatural Disposition can scarce fail to exert it self to the full.
In this Essay on the Passions, the Proofs and Illustrations of a moral
Sense, and Sense of Honour are not mention’d; because they are so, in
the Inquiry into Moral Good and Evil, in the first and fifth Sections.
Would Men reflect upon what they feel in themselves, all Proofs in such
Matters would be needless.
[x ] Some strange Love of Simplicity in the Structure of human Nature, [x] or Attachment to some favourite Hypothesis, has engag’d many
Writers to pass over a great many Simple Perceptions, which we may findin our selves. We have got the Number Five fixed for our external Senses,
tho Seven or Ten might as easily be defended. We have Multitudes ofPerceptions which have no relation to any external Sensation; if by it wemean Perceptions, occasion’d by Motions or Impressions made on our Bodies, such as the Ideas of Number, Duration, Proportion, Virtue, Vice,
Pleasures of Honour, of Congratulation; the Pains of Remorse, Shame,
Sympathy, and many others. It were to be wish’d, that those who are atsuch Pains to prove a beloved Maxim, that “all Ideas arise from Sensation and Reflection,” had so explain’d [xi ] themselves, that none shouldtake their Meaning to be, that all our Ideas are either external Sensations,[xi] or reflex Acts upon external Sensations: Or if by Reflection theymean an inward Power of Perception, as I fancy they do, they had as
carefully examin’d into the several kinds of internal Perceptions, as they

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prefacehave done into the external Sensations: that we might have seen whether
the former be not as natural and necessary as the latter. Had they in likemanner consider’d our Affections without a previous Notion, that they
were all from Self-Love, they might have felt an ultimate Desire of theHappiness of others as easily conceivable, and as certainly implanted in
the human Breast, tho perhaps not so strong as Self-Love.
The Author hopes this imperfect Essay will be favourably re[xii ]ceiv’d, till some Person of greater Abilities [xii] and Leisure apply himself to a more strict Philosophical Inquiry into the various natural Principles or natural Dispositions of Mankind; from which perhaps a moreexact Theory of Morals may be formed, than any which has yet appear’d: and hopes that this Attempt, to shew the fair side of the humanTemper, may be of some little use towards this great End.
The principal Objections offer’d by Mr. Clarke of Hull, against thesecond Section of the second Treatise, occurr’d to the Author in Conversation, and had appriz’d him of the necessity of a farther illustrationof disinterested Affections, in answer to his Scheme of deducing themfrom Self-Love, which seem’d more ingenious than any which the Author of the Inquiry ever yet saw in print. He takes better from Mr.
Clarke, all [xiii ] other Parts of his Treatment, than the raising such an
Outcry against him as injurious to Christianity,3 for Principles whichsome of the most zealous Christians have publickly maintain’d: Hehopes Mr. Clarke will be satisfy’d upon this Point, as well as about the
Scheme of disinterested Affections, by what is offer’d in the Treatise on
the Passions, Sect. I. and designedly placed here, rather than in any distinct Reply, both to avoid the disagreeable Work of Answering or Re-

3. John Clarke repeatedly criticized Hutcheson for impiety. The Foundation of
Morality closes: “I have naturally a peculiar Benevolence and Veneration for Persons
of Good Parts and Learning, untainted with Pride, Pedantry, or ill Nature, such as
our Author from his manner of Writing appears to me to be, and therefore I amheartily grieved upon his account, to find his Doctrine bear so hard upon theChristian Religion. Had it not clash’d so visibly with that, notwithstanding it being
false, his Character would have appeared much fairer in the Eye of the World than
it now does, or at least will do, when his Notion comes to be more generally andthoroughly scanned.” (p. 112).

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marking upon Books, wherein it is hard to keep off too keen and offensive Expressions; and also, that those who have had any of the former
Editions of the Inquiry, might not be at a loss about any Illustrations oradditional Proofs necessary to complete the Scheme.
The last Treatise had never seen the Light, had not some worthy[xiv ] Gentlemen mistaken some things about the moral Sense alledg’d
to be in Mankind:4 Their Objections gave Opportunity of farther Inquiry into the several Schemes of accounting for our moral Ideas, whichsome apprehend to be wholly different from, and independent on, that
Sense which the Author attempts to establish. The following Papers attempt to shew, that all these Schemes must necessarily presuppose thismoral Sense, and be resolv’d into it: Nor does the Author endeavour toover-turn them, or represent them as unnecessary Superstructures upon
the Foundation of a moral Sense; tho what he has suggested will probably shew a considerable Confusion in some of the Terms [xiv] muchused on these Subjects. One may easily see from the great variety ofTerms, and diversity of Schemes invented, that all Men feel something intheir own Hearts recommending Virtue, which [xv ] yet it is difficult to
explain. This Difficulty probably arises from our previous Notions of asmall Number of Senses, so that we are unwilling to have recourse in ourTheories to any more; and rather strain out some Explication of moral
Ideas, with relation to some other natural Powers of Perception universally acknowledg’d. The like difficulty attends several other Perceptions,to the Reception of which Philosophers have not generally assigned
their distinct Senses ; such as natural Beauty, Harmony, the Perfection ofPoetry, Architecture, Designing, and such like Affairs of Genius, Taste, orFancy: The Explications or Theories on these Subjects [xv] are in likemanner full of Confusion and Metaphor.
To define Virtue by agreeableness to this moral Sense, or describing it
to be kind Affection, may [xvi ] appear perhaps too uncertain; considering that the Sense of particular Persons is often depraved by Custom,
Habits, false Opinions, Company: and that some particular kind Pas4. This is a reference to Hutcheson’s correspondence with Burnet (who equatedthe moral sense with Reason). See the Introduction.

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prefacesions toward some Persons are really pernicious, and attended with very
unkind Affections toward others, or at least with a Neglect of their Interests. We must therefore only assert in general, that “every one callsthat Temper, or those Actions virtuous, which are approv’d by his own
Sense;” and withal, that “abstracting from particular Habits or Prejudices, every one is so constituted as to approve every particular kind Affection toward any one, which argues no want of Affection toward others.
And constantly to approve that Temper which desires, and those Actions which tend to procure the greatest Moment of Good in the Powerof the Agent toward [xvii ] the [xvi] most extensive System to which it
can reach;” and consequently, that the Perfection of Virtue consists in“having the universal calm Benevolence, the prevalent Affection of theMind, so as to limit and counteract not only the selfish Passions, buteven the particular kind Affections.”
Our moral Sense shews this to be the highest Perfection of our Nature; what we may see to be the End or Design of such a Structure, andconsequently what is requir’d of us by the Author of our Nature: andtherefore if any one like these Descriptions better, he [xvii] may call Virtue, with many of the Antients, “Vita secundum naturam;”5 or “acting
according to what we may see from the Constitution of our Nature, wewere intended for by our Creator.”[xviii ] If this Moral Sense were once set in a convincing Light, thosevain Shadows of Objections against a virtuous Life, in which some are
wonderfully delighted, would soon vanish: alledging, that whatever weadmire or honour in a moral Species, is the effect of Art, Education, Custom, Policy, or subtle Views of Interest; we should then acknowledge

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Quid sumus, & quidnam victuri gignimur.6—Pers.

5. “Vita secundum naturam”—“a life according to nature”—is a central Stoicalethical doctrine as well as the name of a lost treatise by Zeno of Citium (seeDiogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, VII.4), with whom Cicero identifies thephrase in De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, IV.vi [14].
6. Persius, Satire, III.66. “[Learn] what we are, and for what we have come tobe.” It is quoted by Shaftesbury and discussed in the “Miscellaneous Reflections,”
III.1 (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III:97–8).

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’Tis true, a Power of Reasoning is natural to us; and we must own, thatall Arts and Sciences which are well founded, and tend to direct our[xviii] Actions, are, if not to be called Natural, an Improvement upon our
Nature: yet if Virtue be look’d upon as wholly Artificial, there are I know
not what Suspicions against it; as if indeed [xix ] it might tend to thegreater Interest of large Bodies or Societies of Men, or to that of their Governors; whereas a private Person may better find his Interest, or enjoy
greater Pleasures in the Practices counted vicious, especially if he has any
Probability of Secrecy in them. These Suspicions must be entirely remov’d, if we have a moral Sense and publick Affections, whose Gratifications are constituted by Nature, our most intense and durable Pleasures.
I hope it is a good Omen of something still better on this Subject tobe expected in the learned World, that Mr. Butler, in his Sermons at theRolls Chapel, has done so much Justice to the wise and good Order of
our Nature; that the Gentlemen, who have oppos’d some other Sentiments of the Author of the Inquiry, seem convinc’d of a moral [xx ]Sense.7 Some of them have by a Mistake made a Compliment to the
Author, which does not [xix] belong to him; as if the World were any
way indebted to him for this Discovery. He has too often met with theSensus Decori & Honesti,8 and with the Dúnamic agajoeidh’ c, to assume any such thing to himself.

7. This refers to John Clarke’s remark, “The Doctrine of a Moral Sense, and a
Natural Benevolence founded thereon, is a very pretty ingenious Speculation, which
the World is obliged to our Author for; and has, in my Opinion, a good deal of
Truth in it, tho’ perhaps it may not be of that Universal Extent he pleads for,”(Foundation of Morality, 97).
8. Hutcheson likely has De Officiis I [94] in mind, but the identification of what
is appropriate and what is honorable is a common Ciceronian sentiment. Shaftesbury
clearly had this passage in mind when he further identified it with the venusta (thelovely or beautiful)—“The Venustum, the Honestum, the Decorum of Things, will
force its way. They who refuse to give it scope in the nobler Subjects of a rationaland moral kind, will find its Prevelancy elsewhere, in an inferior Order of Things,”
Shaftesbury, “Sensus Communis,” IV.2 (Characteristicks, I.92) further elucidated in“Miscellaneous Reflections” III.2 (Characteristicks, III.109–114). The phrase recurs in
Hutcheson’s Reflection on Laughter in the Dublin Journal (Saturday, June, 5, 1725),
no. 10, 38) collected in A Collection of Letters and Essays on Several Subjects Lately
Publish’d in the Dublin Journal (London: J. Darby and T. Longman, 1729), 2 v.

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preface

Some Letters in the London Journals, subscribed Philaretus,9 gave thefirst Occasion to the Fourth Treatise; the Answers given to them bore
too visible Marks of the Hurry in which they were wrote, and therefore
the Author declined to continue the Debate that way; chusing to senda private Letter to Philaretus, to desire a more private Correspondence
on the Subject of our Debate. I have been since informed, that his
Death disappointed my great Expectations from [xxi ] so ingenious a
Correspondent. The Objections proposed in the first Section of Treatise[xx] IV, are not always those of Philaretus, tho I have endeavour’d toleave no Objections of his unanswer’d; but I also interspersed whatever
Objections occurr’d to me in Conversation on these Subjects. I hope I
have not used any Expressions inconsistent with the high Regard I havefor the Memory of so ingenious a Gentleman, and of such Distinctionin the World.
The last Section of the Fourth Treatise, was occasion’d by a private
Letter from a Person of the most real Merit, in Glasgow; representing tome some Sentiments not uncommon among good Men, which might
prejudice them against any Scheme of Morals, not wholly founded
upon Piety.10 This Point is, I hope, so treated, as to remove the Difficulty.
[xxii ] The Deference due to a Person, who has appear’d so much in
the learned World, as M. Le Clerc, would seem to require, that I shouldmake some Defense against, or Submission to, the Remarks he makes
in his Bibliotheque Ancienne & Moderne. But I cannot but conclude
from his Abstract, especially from that of the last Section of the Inquiry,
The Greek phrase, meaning the sense of the good or right, is replaced in the third
edition with “loving mankind and having the form of the good.”
9. This refers to the exchange with Gilbert Burnet in 1725, and Hutcheson has
either confused the date of the exchange with the publication date of the first editionof the Essay with Illustrations, or with four letters in the London Journal (nos. 447,
450, 463, 468) written in response to and in defense of the Essay with Illustrations.
See Bernard Fabian, “Bibliographical Note,” in Bernard Fabian (ed.), Collected
Works of Francis Hutcheson (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990), v. II vii–viii.
10. It is not clear to whom this remark refers, but a possible candidate is Gershom
Carmichael, whom Hutcheson replaced as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University and who did not approve of Hutcheson’s “new light” philosophy.

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either that I don’t understand his French, or he my English, or that hehas never read more than the Titles of some of the Sections: and if any
one of the three be the Case, we are not fit for a Controversy.11
In the References, at bottom of Pages, the Inquiry into Beauty iscalled Treatise I. That into the Ideas of moral Good and Evil, is Treatise
II. The Essay on the Passions, Treatise III. And the Illustrations on the
moral Sense, Treatise IV.

11. Hutcheson received two unpleasant reviews of the Inquiry in Francophone
journals, first an anonymous notice in the Bibliothètheque angloise accusing him ofhaving plagiarized Crousaz’s Traité du beau, and then a review by Jean Le Clerc in
the Bibliothèque ancienne et moderne that repeated the charge. The Traité du beau
bears only a surface similarity (at best) to Treatise 1, so these reviews quite justly
irked Hutcheson, who wrote a letter to the editor responding to the comments in
the Bibliothètheque angloise.

the contents

treatise 1
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions.
section i
A General Account of our several Senses and Desires.
Selfish or Publick.
Page 15
section ii
Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws ofpure Affection: The confused Sensations of the
Passions, with their final Causes,

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section iii
Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions,48

section iv
How far our several Affections and Passions areunder our Power, either to govern them when raised,or to prevent their arising: with some general
Observations about their Objects,

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section v
A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of theseveral Senses, as to Intenseness and Duration,87

section vi
Some general Conclusions concerning the best
Management of our Desires. With some Principles
necessary to Happiness,

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contents

treatise ii
Illustrations upon the Moral Sense,

133

section iConcerning the Character of Virtue, agreeable toTruth or Reason,

137

section ii
Concerning that Character of Virtue and Vice; theFitness or Unfitness of Actions,155

section iii
Mr. Woolaston’s Significancy of Truth, as the Idea
of Virtue, considered,161

section iv
Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue andVice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by
a Moral Sense,

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section v
Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by
Merit; and be rewardable upon the Supposition that
it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection
or Instinct,

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section vi
How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an
Action virtuous,

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treatise iu

An Essay on the Nature
and Conduct of the Passions

section i
A general Account of our several Senses
and Desires, Selfish or Publick

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[1/1] The Nature of human Actions cannot be sufficiently understood
without considering the Affections and Passions; or those Modifications,or Actions of the Mind consequent upon the Apprehension of certain Objects
or Events, in which the Mind generally conceives Good or Evil. [2] In thisInquiry we need little Reasoning, or Argument, since Certainty is only
[2] attainable by distinct Attention to what we are conscious happens in
our Minds.
Art. I. “Objects, Actions, or Events obtain the Name of Good, orEvil, according as they are the Causes, or Occasions, mediately, or immediately, of a grateful, or ungrateful Perception to some sensitive Nature.” To understand therefore the several Kinds of Good, or Evil, we
must apprehend the several Senses natural to us.
There seems to be some Sense or other suited to every sort of Objects
which occurs to us, by which we receive either Pleasure, or Pain from agreat part of them, as well as some Image, or Apprehension of them: Nay,sometimes our only Idea is a Perception of Pleasure, or Pain. The Pleasures or Pains perceived, are sometimes simple, without any other previous Idea, or any Image, or other concomitant Ideas, save those of Ex15

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the nature and conduct of the passions

tension, or of Duration; one of which accompanies every Perception,
whether of Sense, or inward Consciousness. Other Pleasures arise only
upon some previous Idea, or Assemblage, or Comparison of Ideas. These
Pleasures, presupposing previous Ideas, were called Perceptions of an internal [3] Sense, in a former [3] Treatise.* Thus Regularity and Uniformity in Figures, are no less grateful than Tastes, or Smells; the Harmonyof Notes, is more grateful than simple Sounds.† In [4] like manner, Affections, Tempers, [4] Sentiments, or Actions, reflected upon in our selves,
or observed in others, are the constant Occasions of agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, which we call Approbation, or Dislike. These Moral* In q u i r y into Be a u t y .
†It is not easy to divide definitely our several Sensations into Classes. The Divisionof our External Senses into the five common Classes, is ridiculously imperfect. Some
Sensations, received without any previous Idea, can either be reduced to none of them,such as the Sensations of Hunger, Thirst, Weariness, Sickness; or if we reduce them to
the Sense of Feeling, they are Perceptions as different from the other Ideas of Touch,
such as Cold, Heat, Hardness, Softness, as the Ideas of Taste or Smell. Others havehinted at an External Sense different from all of these. The following general Account
may possibly be useful. (1.) That certain Motions raised in our Bodies are by a general
Law constituted the Occasion of Perceptions in the Mind. (2.) These Perceptions
never come entirely alone, but have some other Perception joined with them. Thus
every Sensation is accompanied with the Idea of Duration, and yet Duration is not asensible Idea, since it also accompanies Ideas of Internal Consciousness or Reflection:
So the Idea of Number may accompany any sensible Ideas, and yet may also accompany any other Ideas, as well as external Sensations. (3.) Some Ideas are found accompanying the most different Sensations, which yet are not to be perceived separatelyfrom some sensible Quality; such are Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest, which accompany the Ideas of Sight, or Colours, and yet may be perceived without them, as
in the Ideas of Touch, at least if we move our Organs along the Parts of the Body
touched. Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest seem therefore to be more properly called
Ideas accompanying the Sensations of Sight and Touch, than the Sensations of eitherof these Senses. The Perceptions which are purely sensible, received each by its proper
Sense, are Tastes, Smells, colours, Sound, Cold, Heat, &c. The universal ConcomitantIdeas which may attend any Idea whatsoever, are Duration, and Number. The Ideas
which accompany the most different Sensations, are Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest.
These all arise without any previous Ideas assembled, or compared: the ConcomitantIdeas are reputed Images of something External.
From all these we may justly distinguish “the Pleasures perceived upon theprevious Reception and Comparison of various sensible Perceptions, with theirconcomitant Ideas, or intellectual Ideas, when we find Uniformity, or Resemblanceamong them.” These are meant by the Perceptions of the internal Sense.

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Perceptions arise in us as necessarily as any other Sensations; nor can wealter, or stop them, while our previous Opinion or Apprehension of theAffection, Temper, or Intention of the Agent continues the same; anymore than we can make the Taste of Wormwood sweet, or that of
Honey bitter.
If we may call every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain, aSense, we shall find many other Senses beside those commonly explained. Tho it is not easy to assign accurate Divisions on such Subjects,
yet we may reduce them to the following Classes, leaving it to others toarrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will [5] shewthat there are such Natural [5] Powers in the human Mind, in whatever
Order we place them. In the 1st Class are the External Senses, universallyknown. In the 2d, the Pleasant Perceptions arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects; as also from Grandeur and Novelty. These we
may call, after Mr. Addison, the Pleasures of the Imagination; 12or we may call the Power of receiving them, an Internal Sense. Whoever dislikes this Name may substitute another. 3. The next Class ofPerceptions we may call a Publick Sense, viz. “our Determination to bepleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their Misery.”This is found in some degree in all Men, and was sometimes calledḰoinonohmosúnh or Sensus Communis 13 by some of the Antients. 4. The
fourth Class we may call the Moral [6] Sense, by which “we perceive Virtue, or Vice in our selves, or others.” This is plainly distinct from the former Class of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon Virtue, or Vice in themselves,or others, as an Object: as we may find in Natural Affection, Compassion,
Friendship, or even general Benevolence to Mankind, which connect our
12. See Joseph Addison’s (1672–1719) “Essay on the Pleasures of the Imagination”
in Spectator 411–21. Addison’s “Essay” is a discussion of aesthetics that includes
extended comparisons between the external senses and the imagination. A “Tableof the principal Contents” is given in Spectator 421.
13. Hutcheson is deriving this from Shaftesbury’s extended discussion of theclassical origins of sensus communis at “Sensus Communis,” III.1 n (Characteristicks,
I.65–6 n).

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Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own
Virtue. 5. The fifth [6] Class is a Sense of Honour, “which makes the Approbation, or Gratitude of others, for any good Actions we have done, thenecessary occasion of Pleasure; and their Dislike, Condemnation, or Resentment of Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation
called Shame, even when we fear no further evil from them.”
There are perhaps other Perceptions distinct from all these Classes,
such as some Ideas “of Decency, Dignity, Suitableness to human Naturein certain Actions and Circumstances; and of an Indecency, Meanness,
and Unworthiness, in the contrary Actions or Circumstances, even
without any conception of Moral Good, or Evil.” Thus the Pleasures ofSight, and Hearing, are more esteemed than those of Taste or [7] Touch:
The Pursuits of the Pleasures of the Imagination, are more approved
than those of simple external Sensations. Plato* accounts for this difference from a constant Opinion of Innocence in this sort of Pleasures,
which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Sense. Others may
imagine that the difference is not owing to any such Reflection upon
their Innocence, but that there is a different sort of Perceptions in thesecases, to be reckoned another Class of Sensations.
A like Divisionof our Desires.

[7] II. Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon
Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtainfor our selves or others the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Eventis good; or to prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil. Our original
Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses. 1. The Desire of sensual Pleasure,(by which we mean that of the external Senses); and Aversion to the
opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the Pleasures of Imagination or Internal Sense,† and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the* Hippias Major. See also Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 7.
[[See Plato, Hippias Major, 300a1–b5. In this passage and those surrounding it,
Socrates discusses what is common to, and presupposed in, various pleasures.]]†
See Treat. I.
[[Notably, Hutcheson rarely identifies internal sense with imagination in TreatiseI, but rather with the sense of beauty and harmony (see T1 1.10). He normally uses

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Pleasures arising from Publick Happiness, and Aversion to the Pains arising [8] from the Misery of others. 4. Desires of Virtue, and Aversion toVice, according to the Notions we have of the Tendency of Actions to
the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of Honour, and Aversion to Shame.*
The third Class of Publick Desires contains many very different sortsof Affections, all those which tend toward the Happiness of others, or theremoval of Misery; such as those of Gratitude, Compassion, [8] Natural
Affection, Friendship, or the more extensive calm Desire of the universal
Good of all sensitive Natures, which our moral Sense approves as the
Perfection of Virtue, even when it limits, and counteracts the narrower
Attachments of Love.
Now since we are capable of Reflection, Memory, Observation, and Rea- Secondary Deof Wealthsoning about the distant Tendencies of Objects and Actions, and not sires
and Power.
confined to things present, there must arise, in consequence of ouroriginal Desires, “secondary Desires of every thing imagined useful togratify any of the primary Desires, with strength proportioned to theseveral original Desires, and the imagined Usefulness, or Necessity, ofthe advantageous Object.” Hence it is that as soon as we come to apprehend the Use of Wealth or Power to gratify any of our original Desires, we must also desire them. Hence arises the Universality of these
Desires of Wealth and Power, since they are the Means of gratifying allother Desires. “How foolish then is the Inference, some would make,from the universal Prevalence of these Desires, that human Nature iswholly selfish, or that each one is only studious of his own Advantage;
since Wealth or Power are as naturally fit to [9] gratify our Publick Desires, or to serve virtuous Purposes, as the selfish ones?”[9] “How weak also are the Reasonings of some recluse Moralists,“imagination” pejoratively (T1 VIII.1) The identification of internal sense withimagination is primarily associated with Addison, and with the articles publishedin his Spectator (411–21), one article of which (Spectator 412) Hutcheson cites withapprobation at T1 VI.13. The identification of internal sense with beauty and harmony can be found in Addison but is particularly associated with Shaftesbury. See,for example, “The Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit,” II.3.]]* See Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 3–8.

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who condemn in general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power, as below a
perfectly virtuous Character: since Wealth and Power are the most effectual Means, and the most powerful Instruments, even of the greatest
Virtues, and most generous Actions?” The Pursuit of them is laudable,
when the Intention is virtuous; and the neglect of them, when honourable Opportunities offer, is really a Weakness. This justifies the Poet’s
Sentiments:—————— Hic onus horret,
Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpore majus:
Hic subit & perfert: aut virtus nomen inane est,
Aut Decus & Pretium recte petit experiens Vir.—Hor. Epist. 17.14“Further, the Laws or Customs of a Country, the Humour of ourCompany may have made strange Associations of Ideas, so that some
Objects, which of themselves are indifferent to any Sense, by reason ofsome additional grateful Idea, may become very desirable; or by like
Addition of an ungrateful Idea may raise the strongest Aversion.” Thus
many a Trifle, when once it is made a Badge of Honour, an Evidence ofsome generous Disposition, a Monument of [9] some great Action, may
be impatiently pursued, [10] from our Desire of Honour. When any
Circumstance, Dress, State, Posture is constituted as a Mark of Infamy, it
may become in like manner the Object of Aversion, tho in itself mostinoffensive to our Senses. If a certain way of Living, of receiving Company, of shewing Courtesy, is once received among those who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of this may be made uneasy
at their Condition, tho much freer from Trouble than that of higher
Stations. Thus Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour, and Diversions are made Matters of considerable Importance by additional
Ideas.* Nor is it in vain that the wisest and greatest Men regard these
14. Horace, Epistles, I.17.39. “This man dreads his burden as too much for asmall soul and a small body: that man submits and bears it to the end: either virtue
is a word without meaning, or the venturesome deservedly gain honor and reward.”* See Treat. I. Sect. 1. Art. 7. and Treat. II. Sect. 6. Art. 6.
[[Hutcheson changes the reference from T2 VI.2 in the first edition to T2 VI.6
in the third. T2 VI.2 is an appropriate reference, since Hutcheson argues in this

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things; for however it may concern them to break such Associations intheir own Minds, yet, since the bulk of Mankind will retain them, theymust comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent,as they expect the publick Esteem, which is generally necessary to enable
Men to serve the Publick.
Should any one be surprized at this Disposition in our Nature to asso- The Uses of
Associaciate any Ideas together for the future, which once presented themselves thesetions.
jointly, considering what [11] great Evils, and how much Corruption [11]of Affections is owing to it, it may help to account for this Part of ourConstitution, to consider “that all our Language and much of our Memory depends upon it:” So that were there no such Associations made, wemust lose the use of Words, and a great part of our Power of recollecting
past Events; beside many other valuable Powers and Arts which depend
upon them. Let it also be considered that it is much in our power by avigorous Attention either to prevent these Associations, or by Abstraction
to separate Ideas when it may be useful for us to do so.
Concerning our Pursuit of Honour, ’tis to be observ’d, that “since ourMinds are incapable of retaining a great Diversity of Objects, the Novelty, or Singularity of any Object is enough to raise a particular Attention to it among many of equal Merit:” And therefore were Virtue universal among Men, yet, ’tis probable, the Attention of Observers would
be turned chiefly toward those who distinguished themselves by somesingular Ability, or by some Circumstance, which, however trifling in
its own Nature, yet had some honourable Ideas commonly joined toit, such as Magnificence, Generosity, or the like. We should perhaps,when we considered sedately the [12] common Virtues of others, [12]equally love and esteem them:* And yet probably our Attention would
be generally fixed to those who thus were distinguished from the Multitude. Hence our natural Love of Honour, raises in us a Desire ofpassage that “We a l t h and e x t e r n a l Pl e a s u r e s bear no small bulk in our
Imaginations.” T2 VI.6 concerns the power of rhetoric and has at best a tangential
relation to Hutcheson’s discussion in T3 to which it is referenced.]]* See Treat. II. Sect. 3. last Parag.

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Distinction, either by higher Degrees of Virtue; or, if we cannot easily
or probably obtain it this way, we attempt it in an easier manner, by any
Circumstance, which, thro’ a Confusion of Ideas, is reputed honourable.
This Desire of Distinction has great Influence on the Pleasures andPains of Mankind, and makes them chuse things for their very Rarity,
Difficulty, or Expence; by a confused Imagination that they evidence
Generosity, Ability, or a finer Taste than ordinary; nay, often the merest
Trifles are by these means ardently pursued. A Form of Dress, a foreign
Dish, a Title, a Place, a Jewel; an useless Problem, a Criticism on an obsolete Word, the Origin of a Poetic Fable, the Situation of a razed Town,
may employ many an Hour in tedious Labour:510

Sic leve, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum
Subruit aut reficit.—Hor. 15
Desires, selfish
and publick.

[13/13] Art. III. There is another Division of our Desires taken from the
Persons for whose Advantage we pursue or shun any Object. “The Desires in which one intends or pursues what he apprehends advantageous
to himself, we may call Selfish; and those in which we pursue what
we apprehend advantageous to others, and do not apprehend advantageous to our selves, or do not pursue with this view, we may call Publickor Benevolent Desires.” If there be a just Foundation for this Division, it is more extensive than the former Division, since each of theformer Classes may come under either Member of this Division, according as we are desiring any of the five sorts of Pleasures for our selves,or desiring them for others. The former Division may therefore be conceived as a Subdivision of the latter.
This Division has been disputed since Epicurus; who with his old
Followers, and some of late, who detest other parts of his Scheme,16
maintain, “that all our Desires are selfish: or, that what every one intends
15. Horace, Epistles, II.1. 179–80, “So light, so little is what is needed to teardown or build up a soul hungry for praise.”
16. This seems to be a reference to Locke’s hedonistic theory of motivation, as
developed in the later editions of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. See
particularly Essay, II.xxi §§41–43.

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or designs ultimately, in each Action, is the obtaining Pleasure to himself, or the avoiding his own private Pain.”*[14/14] It requires a good deal of Subtilty to defend this Scheme, so
seemingly opposite to Natural Affection, Friendship, Love of a Country,or Community, which many find very strong in their Breasts. The Defences and Schemes commonly offered, can scarce free the Sustainers of
this Cause from manifest Absurdity and Affectation. But some do† acknowledge a publick Sense in many Instances; especially in natural Affection, and Compassion; by which “the Observation of the Happinessof others is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, and their Misery
the Occasion of Pain to the Observer.” That this Sympathy with othersis the Effect of the Constitution of our Nature, and not brought upon
our selves by any Choice, with view to any selfish Advantage, they must
own: whatever Advantage there may be in Sympathy with the Fortunate, none can be alledged in Sympathy with the Distressed: And every
one feels that this publick Sense will not leave his Heart, upon a changeof the Fortunes of his Child or Friend; nor does it depend upon a Man’s
Choice, whether he will be affected with their Fortunes or not. But supposing this publick Sense, they insist, “That by means [15] of it there isa Conjunction of Interest: the [15] Happiness of others becomes theMeans of private Pleasure to the Observer; and for this Reason, or witha View to this private Pleasure, he desires the Happiness of another.”
Others deduce our Desire of the Happiness of others from Self-love, ina less specious manner.
If a publick Sense be acknowledged in Men, by which the Happinessof one is made to depend upon that of others, independently of his
Choice, this is indeed a strong Evidence of the Goodness of the Authorof our Nature. But whether this Scheme does truly account for our Loveof others, or for generous Offices, may be determined from the following* See Cicero de finib. lib. 1.
[[This is discussed throughout Book I of Cicero’s De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum and succinctly stated at I.vii [23].]]†
See Mr. Clark of Hull, his Remarks on Treat. II.
[[On John Clarke of Hull, see the Introduction to this volume.]]24

the nature and conduct of the passions

Considerations; which being matters of internal Consciousness, every
one can best satisfy himself by Attention, concerning their Truth andCertainty.
Let it be premised, that Desire is generally uneasy, or attended with anuneasy Sensation, which is something distinct from that uneasy Sensation arising from some Event or Object, the Prevention or Removal ofwhich Sensation we are intending when the Object is apprehended as
Evil; as this uneasy Sensation of Desire is obviously different from thepleasant Sensation, expected from the Object or Event [16 ] which weapprehend as Good. Then it is plain,
1. “That no Desire of any Event is excited by any view of removing
the uneasy Sensation attending this Desire itself. ” Sensations which areprevious to a Desire, or not connected with it, may excite Desire of any
Event, apprehended necessary to procure or continue the Sensation if
it be pleasant, or to remove it if it be uneasy: But the uneasy Sensation,accompanying and connected with the Desire itself, cannot be a Motive tothat Desire which it presupposes. The Sensation accompanying Desire
is generally uneasy, and consequently our Desire is never raised with aview to obtain or continue it; nor is the Desire raised with a view toremove this uneasy Sensation, for the Desire is raised previously to it.
This holds concerning all Desire publick or private.
There is also a pleasant Sensation of Joy, attending the Gratification of
any Desire, beside the Sensation received from the Object itself, which
we directly intended. “But Desire does never arise from a View of obtaining that Sensation of Joy, connected with the Success or Gratificationof Desire; [17] otherwise the strongest Desires might arise toward any
Trifle, or an Event in all respects indifferent: [17] Since, if Desire arosefrom this View, the stronger the Desire were, the higher would be thePleasure of Gratification; and therefore we might desire the turning of aStraw as violently as we do Wealth or Power.” This Expectation of the
Pleasure of gratified Desire, would equally excite us to desire the Miseryof others as their Happiness; since the Pleasure of Gratification might beobtained from both Events alike.
2. It is certain that, “that Desire of the Happiness of others which we
account virtuous, is not directly excited by prospects of any secular Ad-

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vantage, Wealth, Power, Pleasure of the external Senses, Reward from theDeity, or future Pleasures of Self-Approbation.” To prove this let us consider, “That no Desire of any Event can arise immediately or directlyfrom an Opinion in the Agent, that his having such a Desire will be theMeans of private Good.” This Opinion would make us wish or desire tohave that advantageous Desire or Affection; and would incline us to use
any means in our power to raise that Affection: but no Affection or Desire is raised in us, directly by our volition or desiring it. That alone
which raises in us from Self-Love [18] the Desire of any Event, is an
Opinion that that Event is the Means [18] of private Good. As soon as
we form this Opinion, a Desire of the Event immediately arises: But if
having the Desire or Affection be imagined the Means of private Good,and not the Existence of the Event desired, then from Self-Love we should
only desire or wish to have the Desire of that Event, and should notdesire the Event itself, since the Event is not conceived as the Means of
Good.
For instance, suppose God revealed to us that he would confer Happiness on us, if our Country were happy; then from Self-Love we shouldhave immediately the subordinate Desire of our Country’s Happiness, as
the Means of our own. But were we assured that, whether our Country
were happy or not, it should not affect our future Happiness; but that
we should be rewarded, provided we desired the Happiness of our Country; our Self-Love could never make us now desire the Happiness of ourCountry, since it is not now conceived as the Means of our Happiness,but is perfectly indifferent to it. The Means of our Happiness is the having a Desire of our Country’s Happiness; we should therefore from
Self-Love only wish to have this Desire.
[19] ’Tis true indeed in fact, that, because Benevolence is natural tous, a little Attention [19] to other Natures will raise in us good-will towards them, whenever by any Opinions we are persuaded that there is
no real Opposition of Interest. But had we no Affection distinct from
Self-Love, nothing could raise our Desire of the Happiness of others, butconceiving their Happiness as the Means of ours. An Opinion that ourhaving kind Affections would be the Means of our private Happiness,would only make us desire to have those Affections. Now that Affec-

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tions do not arise upon our wishing to have them, or our volition ofraising them; as conceiving the Affections themselves to be the Means ofprivate Good; is plain from this, that if they did thus arise, then a Bribemight raise any Desire toward any Event, or any Affection toward themost improper Object. We might be hired to love or hate any sort of
Persons, to be angry, jealous, or compassionate, as we can be engaged into
external Actions; which we all see to be absurd. Now those who alledg,
that our Benevolence may arise from prospect of secular Advantage,
Honour, Self-Approbation, or future Rewards, must own, that these are
either Motives only to external Actions, or Considerations, shewing, thathaving the Desire of the Happiness of others, would be the Means ofprivate Good; [20] while the Event supposed to be desired, viz. theHappiness of others, is not [20] supposed the Means of any private
Good. But the best Defenders of this part of the Scheme of Epicurus,
acknowledge that “Desires are not raised by Volition.”
This Distinction Defended

3. “There are in Men Desires of the Happiness of others, when they do notconceive this Happiness as the Means of obtaining any sort of Happinessto themselves.” Self-Approbation, or Rewards from the Deity, might be
the Ends, for obtaining which we might possibly desire or will from
Self-Love, to raise in our selves kind Affections; but we could not from
Self-Love desire the Happiness of others, but as conceiving it the Meansof our own. Now ’tis certain that sometimes we may have this subordinate Desire of the Happiness of others, conceived as the Means of ourown; as suppose one had laid a Wager upon the Happiness of a Personof such Veracity, that he would own sincerely whether he were happy
or not; when Men are Partners in Stock, and share in Profit or Loss;when one hopes to succeed to, or some way to share in the Prosperity of
another; or if the Deity had given such Threatnings, as they tell us
Telamon gave his Sons when they went to War,17 that he would reward
or punish one according as others were [21] happy or miserable: In suchcases one might have this subordinate Desire [21] of another’s Happiness

17. Telamon was the father of Ajax, the Iliadic hero.

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from Self-Love. But as we are sure the Deity has not given such Comminations, so we often are conscious of the Desire of the Happiness ofothers, without any such Conception of it as the Means of our own; andare sensible that this subordinate Desire is not that virtuous Affection
which we approve. The virtuous Benevolence must be an ultimate Desire, which would subsist without view to private Good. Such ultimate
publick Desires we often feel, without any subordinate Desire of the same
Event, as the Means of private Good. The subordinate may sometimes,
nay often does concur with the ultimate; and then indeed the whole Moment of these conspiring Desires may be greater than that of either
alone: But the subordinate alone is not that Affection which we approveas virtuous.
Art. IV. This will clear our way to answer the chief Difficulty: “May not Benevolence isthe Desire
our Benevolence be at least a Desire of the Happiness of others, as the notof the PleaMeans of obtaining the Pleasures of the publick Sense, from the Contem- sures of theplation of their Happiness? ” If it were so, it is very unaccountable that publick Sense.
we should approve this subordinate Desire as virtuous, and yet not approve the like Desire upon a Wager, or other Considerations of Interest.
[22] Both Desires proceed from Self-Love in the same [22] manner: In
the latter case the Desires might be extended to multitudes, if any one
would wager so capriciously; and, by increasing the Sum wagered, theMotive of Interest might, with many Tempers, be made stronger thanthat from the Pleasures of the publick Sense.
Don’t we find that we often desire the Happiness of others without
any such selfish Intention? How few have thought upon this part of ourConstitution which we call a Publick Sense? Were it our only View, in
Compassion to free our selves from the Pain of the publick Sense; should
the Deity propose it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the
Person in Distress, but to continue him in Misery, or on the other handto relieve him from it; should we not upon this Scheme be perfectly
indifferent, and chuse the former as soon as the latter? Should the Deity assure us that we should be immediately annihilated, so that weshould be incapable of either Pleasure or Pain, but that it should depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our28

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Friends, or our Country should be happy or miserable; should we notupon this Scheme be intirely indifferent? Or, if we should even desirethe [23] pleasant Thought of their Happiness, in our last Moment,
would not this Desire be the faintest imaginable?
[23] ’Tis true, our Publick Sense might be as acute at our Exit as ever;as a Man’s Taste of Meat or Drink might be as lively the instant before
his Dissolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as
strong Desires of the Means of obtaining these Pleasures, only with aView to himself, when he was to perish the next Moment? Is it supposable that any Desire of the Means of private Pleasure can be as strong
when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, ’tis certain, any good Man
would as strongly desire at his Exit the Happiness of others, as in any partof his Life. We do not therefore desire it as the Means of private Pleasure.
Should any alledge, that this Desire of the Happiness of others, after
our Exit, is from some confused Association of Ideas; as a Miser, who loves
no body, might desire an Increase of Wealth at his Death; or as any one
may have an Aversion to have his Body dissected, or made a Prey toDogs after Death: [24] let any honest Heart try if the deepest Reflection
will break this Association (if there be any) which is supposed to raise
the Desire. The closest Reflection would be found rather to strengthenit. [24] How would any Spectator like the Temper of one thus rendered
indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open
his Mouth to procure Happiness to Posterity? Would we esteem it refined Wisdom, or a Perfection of Mind, and not rather the vilest Perverseness? ’Tis plain then we feel this ultimate Desire of the Happinessof others to be a most natural Instinct, which we also expect in others,
and not the Effect of any confused Ideas.
The Occasion of the imagined Difficulty in conceiving distinterested
Desires, has probably been attempting to define this simple Idea, Desire.
It is called an uneasy Sensation in the absence of Good.* Whereas Desire* See Mr. Lock’s Essay on Human Understanding in the Chap. on the Passions.
[[This footnote was added in the third edition. See Locke, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, II.20.]]

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is as distinct from any Sensation, as the Will is from the Understandingor Senses. This every one must acknowledge, who speaks of desiring to
remove Uneasiness or Pain.
We may perhaps find, that our Desires are so far from tending always
toward private Good, that they are oftner employ’d about the State ofothers. Nay further, we may have a Propensity toward an Event, which
we neither apprehend as the Means of private Good, or publick. Thus an
Epicurean who denies a future State; or, one to [25] whom God revealed
that he should be annihilated, might at his very Exit desire a future
Fame, from which he expected no Pleasure to himself, nor intended any
to others. Such Desires indeed no selfish Being, who had the modellingof his own Nature, would chuse to implant in itself. But since we havenot this power, we must be content to be thus “befooled into a publick
Interest against our Will;” as an ingenious Author expresses it.18
The Prospect of any Interest may be a Motive to us, to desire whatever we apprehend as the Means of obtaining it. Particularly, “if Rewardsof any kind are proposed to those who have virtuous Affections, thiswould raise in us the Desire of having these Affections, and would incline us to use all means to raise them in our selves; particularly to turn
our Attention to all those Qualities in the Deity, or our Fellows, which
are naturally apt to raise the virtuous Affections.” Thus it is, that Interest of any kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue, and Rewards particularly may over-ballance all Motives to Vice.
[26] This may let us see, that “the Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments, as proposed in the Gospel, are not rendered [26] useless or unnecessary, by supposing the virtuous Affection to be disinterested;” sincesuch Motives of Interest, proposed and attended to, must incline every
Person to desire to have virtuous Affections, and to turn his Attention to
every thing which is naturally apt to raise them; and must overballance
every other Motive of Interest, opposite to these Affections, which could
incline Men to suppress or counteract them.
18. This is one of the Mandeville’s main contentions throughout the Fable of theBees and the central theme of his attack on Shaftesbury, “An Enquiry into the Originof Moral Virtue” (Fable of the Bees, I:43–50).

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section ii
Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Lawsof pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the
Passions, with their final Causes[27/27] I. After the general account of Sensations, we may consider other
Modifications of our Minds, consequent upon these Perceptions,
whether grateful, or uneasy. The first which occur to any one are Desireof the grateful Perceptions, and Aversion to the uneasy, either for ourselves or others. If we would confine the word Affection to these two,
which are entirely distinct from all Sensation, and directly incline theMind to Action or Volition of Motion, we should have no Debate about
the Number or Division of Affections. But since, by universal Custom,
this Name is applied to other Modifications of the Mind, such as Joy,
Sorrow, Despair, we may consider what universal Distinction can be assigned between these Modifications, and the several Sensations abovementioned; and we shall scarce find any other than this, that we call
Other Affec- “the direct immediate Perception of Pleasure or Pain from [28] the prestions, whereinent [28] Object or Event, the Sensation:” But we denote by the Affection
different from
Sensation. or Passion some other “Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain, not directly
raised by the Presence or Operation of the Event or Object, but by our
Reflection upon, or Apprehension of their present or certainly future Existence; so that we are sure that the Object or Event will raise the direct
Sensations in us.” In beholding a regular Building we have the Sensationof Beauty; but upon our apprehending our selves possessed of it, or that
we can procure this pleasant Sensation when we please, we feel the Affection of Joy. When a Man has a Fit of the Gout, he has the painful
Sensation; when he is not at present pained, yet apprehends a sudden
return of it, he has the Affection of Sorrow, which might in some sense
also be called a Sensation.
Proper Affections are
Desire andAversion.

Affection
distinct from
Passion.

When the word Passion is imagined to denote any thing different from the
Affections, it includes, beside the Desire or Aversion, beside the calm Joy
upon apprehended Possession of Good, or Sorrow from the Loss of it, or

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from impending Evil, “a* confused Sensation either of Pleasure [29/29] orPain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily Motions, whichkeeps the Mind much employed upon the present Affair, to the exclusionof every thing else, and prolongs or strengthens the Affection sometimes
to such a degree, as to prevent all deliberate Reasoning about our Conduct.”
II. We have little reason to imagine, that all other Agents have such con- General Deand parfused Sensations accompanying their Desires as we often have. Let us ab- sires,
ticular Affecstract from them, and consider in what manner we should act upon the tions orseveral Occasions which now excite our Passions, if we had none of Passions.
these Sensations whence our Desires become passionate.
There is a Distinction to be observed on this Subject, between “thecalm Desire of Good, and Aversion to Evil, either selfish or publick, as
it appears to our Reason or Reflection; and the particular Passions towards
Objects immediately presented to some Sense.” Thus nothing can be
more distinct than the general calm Desire of private Good of any kind,which alone would incline us to pursue whatever Objects were apprehended as the Means of Good, and the particular selfish Passions, suchas Ambition, Covetousness, Hunger, Lust, Revenge, Anger, [30] as theyarise upon particular Occasions. [30] In like manner, our publick Desires may be distinguished into the general calm Desire of the Happiness* Whoever would see subtile Divisions of those Sensations, let him read Malebranche’s Recherche de la Verite, B. v. c. 3. Together with these Sensations there arealso some strong Propensities distinct from any rational Desire: About which see
Sect. 3. Art. 2. of this Treatise.
[[Recherche de la Vérité III.5 presents a variety of distinctions in Malebranche’s
neo-Augustinean theory of the passions that—roughly—correspond to the position
Hutcheson ascribes to him. Hutcheson seems to be drawing more on Elucidation
14 (a clarification of III.5), in using Malebranche to explain the distinction between
passions and affections. In the Elucidation, Malebranche distinguishes between two
kinds of pleasures: pleasures of the body and pleasures of the soul. Examples of thelatter would be “the joy excited in us as a consequence of the clear knowledge or
the confused sensation we have that some good has happened or will happen tous.” Malebranche particularly emphasizes that they are perceptions. All such perceptions are distinguished from love.]]32

the nature and conduct of the passionsof others, or Aversion to their Misery upon Reflection; and the particular
Affections or Passions of Love, Congratulation, Compassion, natural Affection. These particular Affections are found in many Tempers, where,
thro’ want of Reflection, the general calm Desires are not found: Nay,
the former may be opposite to the latter, where they are found in thesame Temper. We obtain Command over the particular Passions, principally by strengthning the general Desires thro frequent Reflection, andmaking them habitual, so as to obtain Strength superior to the particular Passions.*[31] Again, the calm public Desires may be considered as “they either
regard the Good of particular Persons or Societies presented to ourSenses; or that of some more abstracted or general Community, such asa Species or System.” This latter sort we may call universal calm Benevolence. Now ’tis plain, that not only particular kind Passions, but evencalm particular Benevolence do not always arise from, or necessarily presuppose, the universal Benevolence; both the former may be found in
Persons of little Reflection, where the latter is wanting: And the former
two may [31] be opposite to the other, where they meet together in one* The Schoolmen express this Distinction by the Appetitus rationalis and theAppetitus Sensitivus. All Animals have in common the External Senses suggesting
notions of things as pleasant or painful; and have also the Appetitus Sensitivus, orsome instinctive Desires and Aversions. Rational Agents have, superadded to these,
two higher analogous Powers; viz. the Understanding, or Reason, presenting farther
notion, and attended with an higher sort of Sensations; and the Appetitus rationalis.
This latter is a “constant natural Disposition of Soul to desire what the Understanding, or these sublimer Sensations, represent as Good, and to shun what they represent as Evil, and this either when it respects ourselves or others.” This many callthe Will as distinct from the Passions. Some later Writers seem to have forgot it, by
ascribing to the Understanding not only Ideas, Notions, Knowledge; but Action, Inclinations, Desires, Prosecution, and their Contraries.
[[By the “Schoolmen” Hutcheson likely means the seventeenth-century Scholastic textbooks taught at Glasgow—Eustachius de Sancto Paulo, Ethica, sive
Summa Moralis Disciplinae, Adrian Heereboord, Collegium Ethicum, and Franciscus
Burgersdijk, Idea Philosophiae tum Moralis tum Naturalis. The texts differ widely—
Eustachius was a Catholic, Heereboord and Burgersdijk Protestants—and were very
eclectic and synoptic. The distinction Hutcheson draws on, though, is not particular
to these authors but stems from Aristotle.]]

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Temper. So the universal Benevolence might be where there was neitherof the former; as in any superior Nature or Angel, who had no particular Intercourse with any part of Mankind.
[32] Our moral Sense, tho it approves all particular kind Affection or
Passion, as well as calm particular Benevolence abstractedly considered;
yet it also approves the Restraint or Limitation of all particular Affections or Passions, by the calm universal Benevolence. To make this Desire
prevalent above all particular Affections, is the only sure way to obtain
constant Self-Approbation.
The calm selfish Desires would determine any Agent to pursue every
Object or Event, known either by Reason or prior Experience to begood to itself. We need not imagine any innate Idea of Good in general,of infinite Good, or of the greatest Aggregate: Much less need we suppose
any actual Inclination toward any of these, as the Cause or Spring of allparticular Desires. ’Tis enough to allow, “that we are capable by enlarging, or by Abstraction, of coming to these Ideas: That we must, by theConstitution of our Nature, desire any apprehended Good which occurs a-part from any Evil: [32] That of two Objects inconsistent witheach other, we shall desire that which seems to contain the greatest Moment of Good.” So that it cannot be pronounced concerning any finite
Good, that it shall necessarily engage our Pursuit; since the Agent may
possibly [33] have the Idea of a Greater, or see this to be inconsistent
with some more valuable Object, or that it may bring upon him some
prepollent Evil. The certain Knowledge of any of these Things, or probable Presumption of them, may stop the Pursuit of any finite Good. If
this be any sort of Liberty, it must be allowed to be in Men, even by
those who maintain “the Desire or Will to be necessarily determined by
the prepollent Motive;” since this very Presumption may be a prepollent
Motive, especially to those, who by frequent Attention make the Idea of
the greatest Good always present to themselves on all important Occasions.
The same may easily be applied to our Aversion to finite Evils.
There seems to be this Degree of Liberty about the Understanding,that tho the highest Certainty or Demonstration does necessarily engage

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the nature and conduct of the passions

our Assent, yet we can suspend any absolute Conclusion from probable
Arguments, until we examine whether this [33] apparent Probability be
not opposite to Demonstration, or superior Probability on the other side.
This may let us see, that tho it were acknowledged that “Men arenecessarily determined to pursue their own Happiness, and to be influenced by whatever Motive [34] appears to be prepollent;” yet they might
be proper Subjects of a Law; since the very Sanctions of the Law, if theyattend to them, may suggest a Motive prepollent to all others. In likemanner, “Errors may be criminal,* where there are sufficient Data or
Objective Evidence for the Truth;” since no Demonstration can lead toError, and we can suspend our Assent to probable Arguments, till wehave examined both Sides. Yet human Penalties concerning Opinions
must be of little consequence, since no Penalty can supply the place of
Argument, or Probability to engage our Assent, however they may as Motives determine our Election.
In the calm publick Desires, in like manner, where there are no opposite Desires, the greater Good of another is always preferred to theless: And in the calm [34] universal Benevolence, the Choice is determined by the Moment of the Good, and the Number of those who shallenjoy it.
When the publick Desires are opposite to the private, or seem to beso, that kind prevails which is stronger or more intense.
Definitions.

Natural Goodand Evil.

[35] III. The following Definitions of certain Words used on this Subject, may shorten our Expressions; and the Axioms subjoined may shew
the manner of acting from calm Desire, with Analogy to the Laws of Motion.
1. Natural Good is Pleasure: Natural Evil is Pain.
2. Natural good Objects are those which are apt, either mediately
or immediately to give Pleasure; the former are called Advantageous.
Natural Evil Objects are such as, in like manner, give Pain.
* See Treat. 4 Sect 6. Art. 6, last Paragraph.

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3. Absolute Good is that which, considered with all its Concomi- Absolute.
tants and Consequences, contains more Good than what compensates
all its Evils.
4. Absolute Evil, on the contrary, contains Evil which outweighs
all its Good.
[35] 5. Relative Good or Evil, is any particular Good or Evil, which Relative.
does not thus compensate its contrary Concomitants or Consequences.
This Distinction would have been more exactly expressed by the
Bonum simpliciter, and secundum quid of the Schoolmen.
Cor. Relative Good may be Absolute Evil; thus often sensual Pleasures are in the whole pernicious: And Absolute Good may be Relative
Evil; thus an unpleasant Potion may recover Health.
Good and Evil, according to the Persons whom they affect, may be
divided into Universal, Particular and Private.
6. Universal Good, is what tends to the Happiness of the whole Universal.
System of sensitive Beings; and Universal Evil is the contrary.

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7. Particular Good is what tends to the Happiness of a Part ofthis System: Particular Evil is the contrary.

Particular.

8. Private Good or Evil is that of the Person acting. Each of these Private.
three Members may be either Absolute or Relative.
[36] Cor. I. Particular or private Good may possibly be universal
Evil: And universal Good may be particular or private Evil. The Punishment of a Criminal is an Instance of the latter. Of the former, perhaps,
there are no real Instances in the whole Administration of Nature: butthere [37] are some apparent Instances; such as the Success of an unjust
War; or the Escape of an unrelenting Criminal.
Cor. 2. When particular or private Goods are entirely innocent toward others, they are universal Good.

36
Compound.

Mixed.

Greatest
Good.

Moral Good.

Moral Evil.

the nature and conduct of the passions

9. Compound good Objects or Events, are such as contain the Powers of several Goods at once. Thus, Meat may be both pleasant andhealthful; an Action may give its Author at once the Pleasures of theMoral Sense and of Honour. The same is easily applicable to compound
Evil.
10. A mixed Object is what contains at once the Powers of Goodand Evil: Thus a virtuous Action may give the Agent the Pleasures ofthe Moral Sense, and Pains of the external Senses. Execution of Justice
may give the Pleasures of the publick Sense, and the Pains of Compassion
toward the Sufferer.
[37] 11. The greatest or most perfect Good is that whole Series, or Schemeof Events, which contains a greater Aggregate of Happiness in thewhole, or more absolute universal Good, than any other possible
Scheme, after subtracting all the Evils connected with each of them.
[38] 12. An Action is good, in a moral Sense, when it flows from benevolent Affection, or Intention of absolute Good to others. Men of much
Reflection may actually intend universal absolute Good; but with thecommon rate of Men their Virtue consists in intending and pursuingparticular absolute Good, not inconsistent with universal Good.
13. An Action is morally evil, either from Intention of absolute Evil,universal, or particular, (*which is seldom the case with Men, except insudden Passions;) or from pursuit of private or particular relative Good,
which they might have known did tend to universal absolute Evil. For
even the want of a† just Degree of Benevolence renders an Action evil.

* See Treatise II. Sect. 2. Art. 4. p. 143.
[[The page reference is not to the first edition of the Inquiry but to the second
through the fourth editions.]]†
Treatise IV. Sect. 6. Art. 4.

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[38] 14. Compound moral Goodness is that to which different moral
Species concur: Thus the same Action may evidence Love to our Fellows, and Gratitude to God. We may in like manner understand compound moral Evil. We cannot suppose mixed moral Actions.*[39] 15. Agents are denominated morally good or evil, from their Affections and Actions, or Attempts of Action.

Compound.

IV. Axioms, or natural Laws of calm Desire.
Axioms, or
1. Selfish Desires pursue ultimately only the private Good of the general Laws.
Agent.
2. Benevolent or publick Desires pursue the Good of others, according to the several Systems to which we extend our Attention, butwith different Degrees of Strength.
3. The Strength either of the private or publick Desire of any Event,is proportioned to the imagined Quantity of Good, which will arise fromit to the Agent, or the Person beloved.
[39] 4. Mixed Objects are pursued or shunned with Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the apprehended Excess of Good or Evil.
5. Equal Mixtures of Good and Evil stop all Desire or Aversion.
6. A compound good or evil Object, is prosecuted or shunned witha Degree of [40] Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the Sum of Good,or of Evil.
7. In computing the Quantities of Good or Evil, which we pursue orshun, either for our selves or others, when the Durations are equal, theMoment is as the Intenseness: and when the Intenseness of Pleasure is thesame, or equal, the Moment is as the Duration.
8. Hence the Moment of Good in any Object, is in a compound
Proportion of the Duration and Intenseness.
9. The Trouble, Pain, or Danger, incurred by the Agent, in acquiring* See Treatise II. Sect. 7. Art. 9, last Parag.
[[As T2 VII.9 seems to have little relevance to the passage, Hutcheson is likely
citing the far more relevant discussion at II.7.7 Cor. 15 added in the second throughthe fourth editions. See the similar mistake in n. 23.]]

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the nature and conduct of the passions

or retaining any Good, is to be subtracted from the Sum of the Good.
So the Pleasures which attend or flow from the means of prepollent Evil,are to be subtracted, to find the absolute Quantity.
[40] 10. The Ratio of the Hazard of acquiring or retaining any
Good must be multiplied into the Moment of the Good; so also theHazard of avoiding any Evil is to be multiplied into the Moment of it,
to find its comparative value.
Cor. Hence it is, that the smallest certain Good may raise stronger
Desire than the [41] greatest Good, if the Uncertainty of the latter surpass that of the former, in a greater Ratio than that of the greater to theless. Thus Men content themselves in all Affairs with smaller, but moreprobably successful Pursuits, quitting those of greater Moment but less
Probability.
11. To an immortal Nature it is indifferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys a Good limited in Duration, if its Sense be equally acutein all parts of its Existence; and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes
not the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one time more than another. The
same may be applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited in Duration.
12. But if the Duration of the Good be infinite, the Earliness ofCommencement increases the Moment, as finite added to infinite, surpasses infinite alone.
[41] 13. To Beings of limited certain Duration, Axiom 12. may be applied, when the Duration of the Good would not surpass the Existenceof the Possessor, after the Time of its Commencement.
14. To Beings of limited uncertain Duration, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment of any Good, according [42] to theHazard of the Possessor’s Duration. This may, perhaps, account for whatsome alledg to be a natural Disposition of our Minds, even previous to
any Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, viz. that we are so constituted, as to desire more ardently the nearer Enjoyments than the moredistant, tho of equal Moment in themselves, and as certainly to be obtained by us.
15. The Removal of Pain has always the Notion of Good, and sollicits us more importunately: Its Moment is the same way computed by

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Intenseness and Duration, and affected by the Hazard and by the Uncertainty of our Existence.
These are the general Ways of computing the Quantities of Good in
any Object or Event, whether we are pursuing our own private Good
from selfish Desires, or [42] the Good of others from publick Affections. Concerning these latter we may observe,
16. That our Desires toward publick Good are, when other Circumstances are equal, proportioned to the Moment of the Goods themselves.
17. Our publick Desires of any Events, are proportioned to the
Number of Persons to whom the good Event shall extend, when [43]the Moments and other Circumstances are equal.
18. When the Moments themselves, and Numbers of Enjoyers areequal, our Desire is proportioned to the Strength or Nearness of the Ties
or Attachments to the Persons.
19. When all other Circumstances are equal, our Desires are proportional to the apprehended Moral Excellence of the Persons.
20. In general, the Strength of publick Desire is in a Compound Ratio of the Quantity of the Good itself, and the Number, Attachment, andDignity of the Persons.
These seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires
arise. Our [43] Senses constitute Objects, Events or Actions good; and“we have Power to reason, reflect and compare the several Goods, andto find out the proper and effectual Means of obtaining the greatest forour selves or others, so as not to be led aside by every Appearance ofrelative or particular Good.”
V. If it be granted, that we have implanted in our Nature the several Action from
Desire or
Desires above-mentioned, let us next inquire “into [44] what State we pureAffection.
would incline to bring our selves, upon the several Accidents which
now raise our Passions; supposing that we had the Choice of our own
State entirely, and were not, by the Frame of our Nature, subjected tocertain Sensations, independently of our Volition.”
If it seems too rash to assert a Distinction between Affections and Pas-

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the nature and conduct of the passions

sions, or that Desire may subsist without any uneasiness, since perhaps
we are never conscious of any Desire absolutely free from all uneasiness;“let it be considered, that the simple Idea of Desire is different from thatof Pain of any kind, or from any Sensation whatsoever: Nor is there anyother Argument for their Identity than this, that they occur to us at
once: But this Argument is inconclusive, otherwise [44] it would prove
Colour and Figure to be the same, or Incision and Pain.”
There is a middle State of our Minds, when we are not in the pursuitof any important Good, nor know of any great Indigence of those welove. In this State, when any smaller positive Good to our selves or our
Friend is apprehended to be in our power, we may resolutely desire andpursue it, without any considerable Sensation of Pain or Uneasiness.
Some Tempers seem [45] to have as strong Desires as any, by the Constancy and Vigor of their Pursuits, either of publick or private Good;and yet give small Evidence of any uneasy Sensation. This is observablein some sedate Men, who seem no way inferior in Strength of Desire toothers: Nay, if we consult our selves, and not the common Systems, weshall perhaps find, that “the noblest Desire in our Nature, that of universal Happiness, is generally calm, and wholly free from any confused
uneasy Sensation:” except in some warm Tempers, who, by a lively
Imagination, and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raise somethingof Passion even toward universal Nature.* Yea, further, Desire may be
as strong as possible toward a certainly future [45] Event, the fixed Timeof its Existence being also known, and yet we are not conscious of any
Pain attending such Desires. But tho this should not be granted to be
Fact with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas of Desire and Pain, may
give sufficient ground for abstracting them; and for our making the
Supposition of their being separated.
Upon this Supposition then, when any Object was desired, if wefound it difficult or uncertain to be obtained, but worthy of all the La-* See Marcus Aurelius, in many places.
[[Marcus Aurelius was Hutcheson’s preferred ancient Stoic philosopher. He
translated Aurelius with James Moor as The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus
Aurelius Antoninus (Glasgow: Robert Foulis, 1742).]]

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bour it would cost; we would set [46] about it with Diligence, butwould never chuse to bring upon our selves any painful Sensation accompanying our Desire, nor to increase our Toil by Anxiety. Whatever
Satisfaction we had in our State before the Prospect of this additional
Good, we should continue to enjoy it while this Good was in suspense;
and if we found it unattainable, we should be just as we were before:
And we should never [46 ] chuse to bring upon our selves those Frettings
which now commonly arise from Disappointments. Upon Opinion of
any impending Evil, we should desire and use all means to prevent it,
but should never voluntarily bring upon our selves the uneasy Sensation of Fear, which now naturally anticipates our Misery, and gives us a
Foretaste of it, more ungrateful sometimes than the Suffering itself. If
the Evil did befal us, we should never chuse to increase it, by the Sensations of Sorrow or Despair; we should consider what was the Sum ofGood remaining in our State, after subtracting this Evil; and should enjoy our selves as well as a Being, who had never known greater Good,nor enjoyed greater Pleasure, than the absolute Good yet remaining withus; or perhaps we should pursue some other attainable Good. In the likemanner, did our State and the Modifications of our Mind depend upon
our Choice, should we be affected upon the apprehended Approach ofGood or [47] Evil, to those whom we love; we should have desires ofobtaining the one for them, and of defending them from the other, accompanied with no uneasy Sensations. We do indeed find in fact, that
our stronger Desires, whether private or publick, are accompanied withuneasy Sensations; but these Sensations do not seem the necessary Resultof the Desire itself: They depend upon the present Constitution of our
Nature, which might possibly have been otherwise ordered. And in fact
we find a considerable Diversity of Tempers in this matter; some sedate
Tempers equally desiring either publick or private Good with the morepassionate Tempers; but without that Degree of Ferment, Confusion,and Pain, which attend the same Desires in the Passionate.
[47] According to the present Constitution of our Nature, we findthat the Modifications or Passions of our Mind, are very different fromthose which we would chuse to bring upon our selves, upon their several Occasions. The Prospect of any considerable Good for our selves,

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the nature and conduct of the passions

or those we love, raises Desire; and this Desire is accompanied with uneasy confused Sensations, which often occasion Fretfulness, Anxiety, andImpatience. We find violent Motions in our Bodies; and are often madeunfit for serious Deliberation about the Means of obtaining [48] theGood desired. When it is first obtained, we find violent confused Sensations of Joy, beyond the Proportion of the Good itself, or its Momentto our Happiness. If we are disappointed, we feel a Sensation of Sorrowand Dejection, which is often entirely useless to our present State. Foreseen Evils are antedated by painful Sensations of Fear; and Reflection,
attended with Sensations of Sorrow, gives a tedious Existence to transitory Misfortunes. Our publick Desires are in the same manner accompanied with painful Sensations. The Presence or Suspence of Good orEvil to others, is made the Occasion of the like confused Sensations. A
little Reflection will shew, that none of these Sensations depend upon
our Choice, but arise from the very Frame [48 ] of our Nature, however
we may regulate or moderate them.
The Necessity
for these
Sensations.

VI. Let us then examine “for what Purpose our Nature was so constituted, that Sensations do thus necessarily arise in us.” Would not those
first sorts of Sensations, by which we apprehend Good and Evil in the
Objects themselves, have been sufficient, along with our Reason andpure Desires, without those Sensations attending the very Desires themselves, for which they are called Passions, or those Sensations which [49]attend our Reflection upon the Presence, Absence, or Approach ofGood or Evil?
The common Answer, that “they are given to us as useful Incitementsor Spurs to Action, by which we are roused more effectually to promote
our private Good, or that of the Publick,” is too general and undetermined. What need is there for rousing us to Action, more than a calm
pure Desire of Good, and Aversion to Evil would do, without these confused Sensations? Say they, “we are averse to Labour; we are apt to be
hurried away by Avocations of Curiosity or Mirth; we are often so indolent and averse to the vigorous Use of our Powers, that we should neglect our true Interest without these solliciting [49] Sensations.” But
may it not be answered, that if Labour and vigorous Use of our Powers

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be attended with Uneasiness or Pain, why should not this be brought
into the Account? The Pursuit of a small Good by great Toil is reallyfoolish; violent Labour may be as pernicious as any thing else: Whyshould we be excited to any uneasy Labour, except for prepollent Good?
And, when the Good is prepollent, what need of any further Incitement
than the calm Desire of it? The same may be said of the Avocations ofCuriosity or Mirth; if their absolute Pleasures be greater than [50] that of
the good from which they divert us, why should we not be diverted
from it? If not, then the real Moment of the Good proposed is sufficient
to engage our Pursuit of it, in Opposition to our Curiosity or Mirth.
If indeed our Aversion to Labour, or our Propensity to Mirth be accompanied with these Sensations, then it was necessary that other Desires should be attended with like Sensations, that so a Ballance might
be preserved. So if we have confused Sensation strengthning and fixing
our private Desires, the like Sensation joined to publick Affections is necessary, lest the former Desires should wholly engross our Minds: If
weight be cast into one Scale, as much must be put into the other topreserve [50] an Equilibrium. But the first Question is, “whence arose
the Necessity of such additional Incitements on either side?”
It must be very difficult for Beings of such imperfect Knowledge as
we are, to answer such Questions: we know very little of the Constitution of Nature, or what may be necessary for the Perfection of thewhole. The Author of Nature has probably formed many active Beings,
whose Desires are not attended with confused Sensations, raising theminto Passions like to ours. There is probably an infinite Variety of Beings, of all possible Degrees, in which the Sum of Happiness exceedsthat of Misery. We know that our State is absolutely Good, notwithstanding a considerable Mixture of Evil. The Goodness of the great Author of Nature appears even in producing the inferior Natures, provided
their State in the whole be absolutely Good: Since we may probably
conclude,* that there are in the Universe as many Species of superior* See Simplicius on Epictetus, Cap. 34. And the Archbishop of Dublin, De Origine
Mali, above all others on this Subject.
[[Simplicius was one of the major Hellenistic commentators on Aristotle and44

the nature and conduct of the passions

Natures, as was consistent with the most perfect State of the whole. Thisis the Thought so much insisted upon by Simplicius, that the universal[51] Cause must produce ta mésa, as well as ta pr w÷ta, kai ta
e⁄sxata. We know not if this Globe be a fit Place for the Habitation of
Natures superior to ours: If not, it must certainly be in the whole betterthat it should have its imperfect [52] Inhabitants, whose State is absolutely Good, than that it should be desolate.
All then which we can expect to do in this Matter, is only to shew,that “these confused Sensations are necessary to such Natures as we arein other respects: Particularly that Beings of such Degrees of Understanding, and such Avenues to Knowledge as we have, must need these additional Forces, which we call Passions, beside the first Sensations by which
Objects are constituted Good or Evil, and the pure Desire or Aversion
arising from Opinion or Apprehension of Good or Evil.”also produced a number of commentaries on other philosophical works, including
a major exposition of the Stoic Epictetus’s Enchiridion, or Manual. Chapter 34
considers Epictetus’s maxim “As no Man sets up a Mark, with a Design to shootbeside it, so neither hath the Maker of the World formed any such real Being, as
Evil, in it” (George Stanhope [trans.], Epictetus his Morals With Simplicius His
Comment [London Richard Sare, 1704], third ed., 207). Simplicius emphasized thatevil is not anything real, but a deviation from the order of nature by imperfect
beings imparted with the power of choice but confused as to what course would
be best for them. The specific passage Hutcheson alludes to reads: “God, who is
the Source and Original Cause of all Goodness, did not only produce the highest
and most Excellent Things, such as are good in themselves; nor only those that areof a Rank something inferior to those, and of a middle Nature; but the Extremes
too, such as are capable of falling and apt to be perverted from that which isagreeable to Nature, to that which we call Evil” (221).
William King’s (1650–1729) theodicy, De Origine Mali (1702), was, like Leibniz’s
Theodicy, a response to the fideist challenge posed by Pierre Bayle. King attempted
to reconcile the existence of evil and God’s goodness through the freedom of thedivine and human will, and the fact that God made an imperfect world in orderto preserve human freedom of choice with the consequence of natural and moral
evil. De Origine Mali was translated from Latin by Edmund Law (1703–87) in 1731
and edited with copious notes and commentary. Hutcheson sent a copy of theInquiry to King.

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Now our Reason, or Knowledge of the Relations of external Things to our From theBodies, is so inconsiderable, that it is generally some pleasant Sensation Imperfectionof our Underwhich teaches us what tends to their Preservation; and some painful standing,Sensation which shews what is pernicious. Nor is this Instruction suffi- which required
Sensations ofcient; we need also to be directed when our Bodies want supplies of Appetite.
Nourishment; to this our Reason could not extend: Here then [52] appears the first Necessity of uneasy Sensation, preceding Desire, and continuing to accompany it when it is raised.
[53] Again, our Bodies could not be preserved without a Sense ofPain, connected with Incisions, Bruises, or violent Labour, or whateverelse tends to destroy any part of their Mechanism; since our Knowledge
does not extend so far, as to judge in time what would be pernicious to
it: And yet, without a great deal of human Labour, and many Dangers,
this Earth could not support the tenth Part of its Inhabitants. Our Nature therefore required a Sensation, accompanying its Desires of theMeans of Preservation, capable to surmount the Uneasiness of Labour:
this we have in the Pains or Uneasiness accompanying the Desires ofFood.
In like manner, the Propagation of Animals is a Mystery to their Reason, but easy to their Instinct. An Offspring of such Creatures as Men
are, could not be preserved without perpetual Labour and Care; which
we find could not be expected from the more general Ties of Benevolence. Here then again appears the Necessity of strengthning the
Storgh’ , or natural Affection, with strong Sensations, or Pains of Desire, sufficient to counter-ballance the Pains of Labour, and the Sensations of the [53] selfish Appetites; since Parents must often check and [54]disappoint their own Appetites, to gratify those of their Children.
“When a Necessity of joining strong Sensations to one Class of Desires appears, there must appear a like Necessity of strengthning the restby like Sensations, to keep a just Ballance.” We know, for instance, that
the Pleasures of the Imagination tend much to the Happiness of Mankind: the Desires of them therefore must have the like Sensations assisting them, to prevent our indulging a nasty solitary Luxury. The Happiness of human Life cannot be promoted without Society and mutual
Aid, even beyond a Family; our publick Affections must therefore be

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strengthned as well as the private, to keep a Ballance; so must also our
Desires of Virtue and Honour. Anger, which some have thought an useless Passion, is really as necessary as the rest; since Men’s Interests often
seem to interfere with each other; and they are thereby led from
Self-Love to do the worst Injuries to their Fellows. There could nottherefore be a wiser Contrivance to restrain Injuries, than to make every
mortal some way formidable to an unjust Invader, by such a violent Passion. We need not have recourse to a Prometheus in this matter, with theold Poets: [54] they might have ascribed it to their Optimus Maximus.19[52]—Insani Leonis,
Vim Stomacho apposuisse nostro.20
A Ballance
may be stillpreserved.

VII. With this Ballance of publick Passions against the private, with our
Passions toward Honour and Virtue, we find that human Nature may
be as really amiable in its low Sphere, as superior Natures endowed withhigher Reason, and influenced only by pure Desires; provided we vigorously exercise the Powers we have in keeping this Ballance of Affections, and checking any Passion which grows so violent, as to be inconsistent with the publick Good. If we have selfish Passions for our own
Preservation, we have also publick Passions, which may engage us into
vigorous and laborious Services to Offspring, Friends, Communities,
Countries. Compassion will engage us to succour the distressed, evenwith our private Loss or Danger. An Abhorrence of the injurious, andLove toward the injured, with a Sense of Virtue, and Honour, can makeus despise Labour, Expence, Wounds and Death.
The Sensations of Joy or Sorrow, upon the Success or Disappointment of any Pursuit, either publick or private, have directly the Effectof Rewards or Punishments, [55] to excite us to act with the utmost
Vigor, either for our own Advantage, or that of [56] others, for the fu19. Optimus Maximus was a Roman name for Jupiter or the ruling Deity.
20. Horace Odes, 1.16, 15–16. The passage quoted by Hutcheson is preceded by,“They say Prometheus had to add to the primeval slime/a particle cut from eachof the animals”; Hutcheson quotes, “and grafted the violence of rabid lions/on to
our stomachs.” Trans. David West, Horace: The Complete Odes and Epodes (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997).

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ture, and to punish past Negligence. The Moment of every Event isthereby increased: as much as the Sensations of Sorrow add to our Misery, so much those of Joy add to our Happiness. Nay, since we have someconsiderable Power over our Desires, as shall be explained hereafter, we
may probably, by good Conduct, obtain more frequent Pleasures of Joy
upon our Success, than Pains of Sorrow upon Disappointment.
’Tis true indeed, that there are few Tempers to be found, wherein these A just Ballance
Sensations of the several Passions are in such a Ballance, as in all cases very rare.
to leave the Mind in a proper State, for considering the Importance ofevery Action or Event. The Sensations of Anger in some Tempers are
violent above their proportion; those of Ambition, Avarice, desire of sensual Pleasure, and even of natural Affection, in several Dispositions, possess the Mind too much, and make it incapable of attending to any
thing else. Scarce any one Temper is always constant and uniform in its
Passions. The best State of human Nature possible might require a Diversity of Passions and Inclinations, for the different Occupations necessary for the whole: But the Disorder seems to be much greater than is[56] requisite for this End. Custom, Education, Habits, and Company,
may [57] often contribute much to this Disorder, however its Original
may be ascribed to some more universal Cause. But it is not so great,
but that human Life is still a desireable State, having a superiority ofGoodness and Happiness. Nor, if we apply our selves to it, does it
hinder us from discerning that just Ballance and Oeconomy, which
would constitute the most happy State of each Person, and promote thegreatest Good in the whole.
Let Physicians or Anatomists explain the several Motions in the Fluids Dispositions
someor Solids of the Body, which accompany any Passion; or the Tempera- toparticularments of Body which either make Men prone to any Passion, or are Passions.
brought upon us by the long Continuance, or frequent Returns of it.
’Tis only to our Purpose in general to observe, “that probably certain
Motions in the Body do accompany every Passion by a fixed Law of Nature; and alternately, that Temperament which is apt to receive or prolong these Motions in the Body, does influence our Passions to heighten

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or prolong them.” Thus a certain Temperament may be brought upon
the Body, by its being frequently put into Motion by the Passions ofAnger, Joy, Love, or Sorrow; and the Continuance of this Temperamentshall make Men prone to the several [57] Passions for the future. We
find [58] our selves after a long Fit of Anger or Sorrow, in an uneasy
State, even when we are not reflecting on the particular Occasion of our
Passion. During this State, every trifle shall be apt to provoke or dejectus. On the contrary, after good Success, after strong friendly Passions, ora State of Mirth, some considerable Injuries or Losses, which at othertimes would have affected us very much, shall be overlooked, or meekly
received, or at most but slightly resented; perhaps because our Bodies
are not fit easily to receive these Motions which are constituted the Occasion of the uneasy Sensations of Anger. This Diversity of Temper
every one has felt, who reflects on himself at different Times. In some
Tempers it will appear like Madness. Whether the only Seat of these
Habits, or the Occasion rather of these Dispositions, be in the Body; orwhether the Soul itself does not, by frequent Returns of any Passion
acquire some greater Disposition to receive and retain it again, let thosedetermine, who sufficiently understand the Nature of either the one or
the other.

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section iii
Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions.
[58/59] I. The Nature of any Language has considerable Influence upon
Men’s Reasonings on all Subjects, making them often take all those
Ideas which are denoted by the same Word to be the same; and on theother hand, to look upon different Words as denoting different Ideas.
We shall find that this Identity of Names has occasioned much confusion in Treatises of the Passions; while some have made larger, and somesmaller Collections of Names, and have given the Explications of themas an Account of the Passions.

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Cicero, in the Fourth Book of Tusculan Questions,21 gives from the The Division
Stoicks, this general Division of the Passions: First, into Love and Ha- of the Stoicks.
tred, according as the Object is good or evil; and then subdivides each,according as the Object is present or expected. About Good we havethese two, Libido & Latitia, Desire and Joy: About Evil we have likewise
two, Metus & Ægritudo, Fear and Sorrow. To this general Division he[60] subjoins many [59] Subdivisions of each of these four Passions; according as in the Latin Tongue they had different Names for the several
Degrees of these Passions, or for the same Passion employed upon different Objects. A Writer of Lexicons would probably get the most precise Meanings of the Latin Names in that Book; nor would it be uselessin considering the Nature of them.
The Schoolmen, as their Fund of Language was much smaller, havenot so full Enumerations of them, going no further than their admired
Aristotle.
II. ’Tis strange that the thoughtful Malebranche did not consider, that “Desire and Aversion are obviously different from the other
Modifications called Passions; that these two directly lead to Action, or
the Volition of Motion, and are wholly distinct from all sort of Sensation.” Whereas Joy and Sorrow are only a sort of Sensations; and otherAffections differ from Sensations only, by including Desire or Aversion,or their correspondent Propensities: So that Desire and Aversion are theonly pure Affections in the strictest Sense.
If, indeed, we confine the Word Sensation to the “immediate Percep- Sensation anddistions of [61] Pleasure and Pain, upon the very Presence [60] or Opera- Affection
tinct.
tion of any Object or Event, which are occasioned by some Impression
on our Bodies;” then we may denote by the Word Affection, those Pleasures or Pains not thus excited, but “resulting from some Reflection
upon, or Opinion of our Possession of any Advantage, or from a certain
Prospect of future pleasant Sensations on the one hand, or from a like

21. See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, IV.6–12.

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Reflection or Prospect of evil or painful Sensations on the other, either toour selves or others.”*
Passion.

Division by
Malebranche.

Desire andAversion.
Joy and
Sorrow.

When more violent confused Sensations arise with the Affection, and areattended with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we call the whole by
the Name of Passion, especially when accompanied with some natural
Propensities, to be hereafter explained.
If this use of these Words be allowed, the Division of Malebranche
is very natural. Good Objects excite Love; evil Objects Hatred: each ofthese is subdivided, as the Object is present and certain, or doubtfully
expected, or certainly removed. To these three Circumstances correspond
three Modifications of the original Affections; viz. Joy, Desire and Sorrow. Good present, raises Joy of Love, or Love of Joy: Good in suspense,[62] the Love of Desire; Good lost, Love of Sorrow. Evil [61] present,
raises Aversion of Sorrow; Evil expected, Aversion or Hatred of Desire; andEvil removed, Aversion of Joy. The Joy of Love, and the Joy of Hatred,
will possibly be found nearly the same sort of Sensations, tho upon different Occasions; the same may be said of the Sorrow of Aversion: andthus this Division will amount to the same with that of the Stoicks.22
Perhaps it may be more easy to conceive our Affections and Passions
in this manner. The Apprehension of Good, either to our selves or others, as attainable, raises Desire: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the
Loss of Good, raises Aversion, or Desire of removing or preventing it.
These two are the proper Affections, distinct from all Sensation: We may* See above, Sect. 2. Art. 1.
[[This footnote was added in the third edition.]]
22. At De la Recherche de la Vérité, V.9 Malebranche presents his account of love
and aversion which roughly corresponds to Hutcheson’s description. But Hutcheson misinterprets Malebranche’s theory of the passions, perhaps intentionally, in
two important ways. First, Malebranche’s main point in V.9 is to emphasize thatlove is primary and that even aversion assumes love as it is a privation of the good.
In accord with his Augustinianism and Cartesianism, Malebranche’s opposition is
not as sharply binary as Hutcheson presents it. Second, Malebranche distinguishes
between desire as a general passion (V.7) and love as a particular passion (V.9).

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call both Desires if we please. The Reflection upon the Presence or certain Futurity of any Good, raises the Sensation of Joy, which is distinct
from those immediate Sensations which arise from the Object itself.* A
like Sensation is raised, when we reflect upon the Removal or Prevention of Evil which once threatned our selves or others. The Reflection
upon the Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect [63] of it, or of the
Loss of Good, is the Occasion of the Sensation of Sorrow, distinct from[62] those immediate Sensations arising from the Objects or Events
themselves.

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These Affections, viz. Desire, Aversion, Joy and Sorrow, we may, after Affections may
distinMalebranche, call spiritual or pure Affections; because the purest be
guished from
Spirit, were it subject to any Evil, might be capable of them. But beside Passions.
these Affections, which seem to arise necessarily from a rational Apprehension of Good or Evil, there are in our Nature violent confused Sensations, connected with bodily Motions, from which our Affections aredenominated Passions.
We may further observe something in our Nature, determining us very Affections
withfrequently to Action, distinct both from Sensation and Desire; if by De- attended
undesigning
sire we mean a distinct Inclination to something apprehended as Good Propensities.
either publick or private, or as the Means of avoiding Evil: viz. a certain Anger.
Propensity of Instinct to Objects and Actions, without any Conceptionof them as Good, or as the Means of preventing Evil. These Objects or
Actions are generally, tho not always, in effect the Means of some Good;but we are determined to them even without this Conception of them.
Thus, as we [64] observed above,† the Propensity to Fame [63] may continue after one has lost all notion of Good, either publick or private,
which could be the Object of a distinct Desire. Our particular Affections
have generally some of these Propensities accompanying them; but these
Propensities are sometimes without the Affections or distinct Desires,* See Sect. 2. Art. 1.
[[This footnote was added in the third edition.]]†Sect. 1. near the End.

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and have a stronger Influence upon the Generality of Men, than the
Affections could have alone. Thus in Anger, beside the Intention of removing the uneasy Sensation from the Injury received; beside the Desire of obtaining a Reparation of it, and Security for the future, which
are some sort of Goods intended by Men when they are calm, as well as
during the Passion, there is in the passionate Person a Propensity to occasion Misery to the Offender, a Determination to Violence, even where
there is no Intention of any Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided bythis Violence. And ’tis principally this Propensity which we denote by
the Name Anger, tho other Desires often accompany it.
So also our Presence with the distressed is generally necessary to theirrelief; and yet when we have no Hopes nor Intention of relieving them,
we shall find a Propensity to [65] run to such Spectacles of Pity. Thusalso, beside the calm Desire of the Happiness of a Person beloved, we
have a strong Propensity to their Company, to the very [64] Sight ofthem, without any Consideration of it as a Happiness either to ourselves or to the Person beloved. The sudden Appearance of great
Danger, determines us to shriek out or fly, before we can have any distinct Desires, or any Consideration that a Shriek or Flight are propermeans of Relief. These Propensities, along with the Sensations abovementioned, when they occur without rational Desire, we may call Passions, and when they happen along with Desires, denominate them passionate. This part of our Constitution is as intelligible as many others
universally observed and acknowledged; such as these, that Danger offalling makes us stretch out our Arms; noise makes us wink; that aChild is determined to suck; many other Animals to rise up and walk;some to run into Water, before they can have any Notion of Good tobe obtained, or Evil avoided by these means.
Love and
Hatred.
Envy.

It may perhaps be convenient to confine Love and Hatred to our Sentiments toward Moral Agents; Love denoting “Desire of the Happinessof another, generally attended with some Approbation of him as innocent at least, or being of a mixed [66] Character, where Good is generally prevalent:” And Hatred “denoting Disapprobation by our Sense,with the Absence of Desire of their [65] Happiness.” Benevolence may

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denote only “the Desire of another’s Happiness;” and Malice, “the Desire of their Misery,” abstractly from any Approbation or Condemnation by our Moral Sense. This sort of Malice is never found in our Nature, when we are not transported with Passion. The Propensities ofAnger and Envy have some Resemblance of it; yet Envy is not an ultimate Desire of another’s Misery, but only a subordinate Desire of it, as
the Means of advancing our selves, or some Person more beloved than
the Person envied.
Fear, as far as it is an Affection, and not an undesigning Propensity, is “a Fear.
Mixture of Sorrow and Aversion, when we apprehend the Probability of Hope.
Evil, or the Loss of Good befalling our selves, or those we love:” Thereis more or less of Sorrow, according to the apprehended Degrees ofProbability. Hope, if it be any way an Affection, and not an Opinion,
is “a Mixture of Desire and Joy, upon the probability of obtaining Good,and avoiding Evil.” Both these Passions may have some Propensities andSensations attending them, distinct from those of the other Affections.
[67] The confused Use of the Names, Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, Delight, Confused Use
has made [66 ] some of the most important Distinctions of our Affec- of Names,
tions and Passions, to be overlooked. No Modifications of Mind can be
more different from each other, than a private Desire, and a publick; yetboth are called Love. The Love of Money, for Instance, the Love of a generous Character, or a Friend: The Love of a fine Seat, and the Love of aChild. In like manner, what can be more different than the Sorrow fora Loss befallen our selves, and Sorrow for the Death of a Friend? Of thisMen must convince themselves by Reflection.
There is also a considerable Difference even among the selfish Passions, which bear the same general Name, according to the different
Senses which constitute the Objects good or evil. Thus the Desire of
Honour, and the Desire of Wealth, are certainly very different sorts ofAffections, and accompanied with different Sensations: The Sorrow inlike manner for our Loss by a Shipwreck, and our Sorrow for having
done a base Action, or Remorse: Sorrow for our being subject to the Goutor Stone, and Sorrow for our being despised and condemned, or Shame:

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Sorrow for the Damage done by a Fire, and that Sorrow which arises
upon an [68] apprehended Injury from a Partner, or any other of ourFellows, which we call Anger. Where we [67] get some special distinct
Names, we more easily acknowledge a Difference, as it may appear in
Shame and Anger; but had we other Names, appropriated in the samemanner, we should imagine, with good ground, as many distinct Passions. The like Confusion is observable about our Senses.*
To say that the Sensation accompanying all sorts of Joy is pleasant,and that accompanying Sorrow uneasy, will not argue that there is nofarther Diversity. Pains have many differences among themselves, andso have Pleasures, according to the different Senses by which they areperceived. To enumerate all these Diversities, would be difficult and tedious. But some Men have piqued themselves so much upon representing “all our Affections as selfish; as if each Person were in his whole
Frame only a seperate System from his Fellows, so that there was nothingin his Constitution leading him to a publick Interest, further than heapprehended it subservient to his own private Interest; and this Interest
made nothing else, than the gratifying our external Senses and Imagination, or obtaining the Means of it:” that thereby the Wisdom [69]and Goodness of [68] the Author of our Nature is traduced, as if hehad given us the strongest Dispositions toward what he had in his Laws
prohibited; and directed us, by the Frame of our Nature, to the meanest
and most contemptible Pursuits; as if what all good Men have represented as the Excellence of our Nature, were a Force or Constraint put
upon it by Art or Authority. It may be useful to consider our Affections
and Passions more particularly, as “they are excited by something in our
Frame different from Self-Love, and tend to something else than the private Pleasures of the external Senses or Imagination.” This we may dounder the following Heads, by shewing
1. How our Passions arise from the Moral Sense, and Sense of Honour.
2. How our Passions tend toward the State of others, abstractly fromany Consideration of their Moral Qualities.

* Treat. I. Sect. 1. Art. 10.

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3. How the publick Passions are diversified by the Moral Qualities of
the Agents, when they appear to our Moral Sense as virtuous or vicious.
4. How the publick Passions are diversified by the Relations of several Agents to each other, when we consider at once their State, as toHappiness or Misery, and [69] their past as well as present Actions towards each other.
5. How all these Passions may be complicated with the selfish. Undereach of these Heads we may find the six Passions of Malebranche, or[70] the four of Zeno; with many other Combinations of them.

False Representations of
our Nature
rectified.

III. 1. The Passions about our own Actions occasioned by the Moral 1. Passions
our own
Sense. When we form the Idea of a morally good Action, or see it repre- about
Actions.
sented in the Drama, or read it in Epicks or Romance, we feel a Desire The Passion ofarising of doing the like. This leads most Tempers into an imagined Se- Heroism inCastle building.
ries of Adventures, in which they are still acting the generous and vir- Moral Joy or
tuous Part, like to the Idea they have received. If we have executed any SelfApprobation.
good Design, we feel inward Triumph of Joy: If we are disappointed thro Remorse.
our own Negligence, or have been diverted from it by some selfish View,
we shall feel a Sorrow called Remorse.
When the Idea is in like manner formed of any morally evil Action, Reluctance.
which we might possibly accomplish, if we reflect upon the Cruelty or
pernicious Tendency of it, there arises Reluctance, or Aversion: If wehave committed such a Crime, upon like Reflection we feel the Sorrow
called Remorse: If we have resisted the Temptation, [70] we feel a secretJoy and Self-Approbation, for which there is no special Name.
We might enumerate six other Passions from the Sense of Honour, ac- Modesty.
Shame.
cording as we [71] apprehend our Actions, or any other Circumstances,
shall affect the Opinions which others form concerning us. When any
Action or Circumstance occurs, from which we imagine Honour would
arise, we feel Desire; when we attain it, Joy; when we are disappointed,
Sorrow. When we first apprehend any Action or Circumstance as dishonourable, we feel Aversion arising; if we apprehend our selves involved

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in it, or in danger of being tempted to it, we feel a Passion we may callModesty or Shame; when we escape or resist such Temptations, or avoid
what is dishonourable, we feel a Joy, for which there is no special Name.
Ambition.
Pride.

Shame forothers.

2. Publick
Passions
abstractly.
Goodwill.
Compassion.
Pity.
Congratulation.

We give the Name Ambition to a violent Desire of Honour, but generally in a bad Sense, when it would lead the Agent into immoral Meansto gratify it. The same Word often denotes the Desire of Power. Pridedenotes sometimes the same Desires of Honour and Power, with Aversion to their contraries; sometimes Pride denotes Joy upon any apprehended Right or Claim to Honour; generally it is taken in a bad Sense,
when one claims that to which he has no Right.
[71] Men may feel the Passion of Shame for the dishonourable Actionsof others, when any part of the Dishonour falls upon themselves; [72] aswhen the Person dishonoured is one of their Club, or Party, or Family.
The general Relation of human Nature may produce some uneasinessupon the Dishonour of another, tho this is more owing to our publick
Sense.
IV. 2. The second Class are the publick Passions about the State of others,
as to Happiness or Misery, abstractly from their Moral Qualities. These
Affections or Passions extend to all perceptive Natures, when there is noreal or imagined Opposition of Interest. We naturally desire the absent
Happiness of others; rejoice in it when obtained, and sorrow for it whenlost. We have Aversion to any impending Misery; we are sorrowful when it
befals any Person, and rejoice when it is removed. This Aversion and Sorrow we often call Pity or Compassion; the Joy we may call Congratulation.
Since our Moral Sense represents Virtue as the greatest Happiness to
the Person possessed of it, our publick Affections will naturally make us
desire the Virtue of others. When the Opportunity of a great Action occurs to any Person against whom we are [72] no way prejudiced, wewish he would attempt it, and desire his good Success. If he succeeds,
we feel Joy; if he is disappointed, [73] or quits the Attempt, we feel Sorrow. Upon like Opportunity of, or Temptation to a base Action, we

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have Aversion to the Event: If he resists the Temptation, we feel Joy; if
he yields to it, Sorrow. Our Affections toward the Person arise jointlywith our Passions about this Event, according as he acquits himself virtuously or basely.
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V. 3. The Passions of the third Class are our publick Affections, jointly 3. Publick Paswith
with moral Perceptions of the Virtue or Vice of the Agents. When Good sions
moral Percepappears attainable by a Person of Moral Dignity, our Desire of his Hap- tions.
piness, founded upon Esteem or Approbation, is much stronger than that Regret.
supposed in the former Class. The Misfortune of such a Person raises
stronger Sorrow, Pity, or Regret, and Dissatisfaction with the Administration of the World, upon a light View of it, with a Suspicion of the real
Advantage of Virtue. The Success of such a Character raises all the contrary Affections of Joy and Satisfaction with Providence, and Security in
Virtue. When Evil threatens such a Character, we have strong Aversion
to it, with Love toward the Person: His escaping the Evil raises Joy, Confidence in [73] Providence, with Security in Virtue. If the Evil befals him,
we feel the contrary Passions, Sorrow, Dissatisfaction with Providence,[74] and Suspicion of the Reality of Virtue.

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Hence we see how unfit such Representations are in Tragedy, as make Which offit forthe perfectly Virtuous miserable in the highest degree. They can only themthe Drama.
lead the Spectators into Distrust of Providence, Diffidence of Virtue;and into such Sentiments, as some Authors, who probably mistake his
meaning, tell us Brutus express’d at his Death, “That the Virtue hehad pursued as a solid Good, proved but an empty Name.” But wemust here remember, that, notwithstanding all the frightful Ideas wehave inculcated upon us of the King of Terrors, yet an honourable Deathis far from appearing to a generous Mind, as the greatest of Evils. The
Ruin of a Free State, the Slavery of a generous Spirit, a Life upon shameful Terms, still appear vastly greater Evils; beside many other exquisite
Distresses of a more private nature, in comparison of which, an honourable Death befalling a favourite Character, is looked upon as a Deliverance.

58
Passions
toward moral
evil Agents.
No disinterested or
ultimate Malicein Men.
Anger.

Its Effects.

the nature and conduct of the passions

Under this Class are also included the Passions employed about theFortunes of Characters, apprehended as morally Evil. Such Characters
do raise Dislike in any [74] Observer, who has a moral Sense: But Malice, or the ultimate Desire of their Misery, does [75] not necessarily arise
toward them. Perhaps our Nature is not capable of desiring the Miseryof any Being calmly, farther than it may be necessary to the Safety of
the innocent: We may find, perhaps, that there is no Quality in any
Object which would excite in us pure disinterested Malice, or calm Desire of Misery for its own sake.* When we apprehend any Person as injurious to our selves, or to any innocent Person, especially to a Person
beloved, the Passion of Anger arises toward the Agent. By Anger is generally meant “a Propensity to occasion Evil to another, arising upon apprehension of an Injury done by him:” This violent Propensity is attended generally, when the Injury is not very sudden, with Sorrow for
the Injury sustained, or threatned, and Desire of repelling it, and making the Author of it repent of his Attempt, or repair the Damage.
This Passion is attended with the most violent uneasy Sensations, andproduces as great Changes in our Bodies as any whatsoever. We are precipitantly led by this Passion, to apprehend the injurious as [75] directly
malicious, and designing the Misery of others without farther Intention.
While the Heat of this Passion continues, we seem naturally to pursue
the Misery [76] of the injurious, until they relent, and convince us of
their better Intentions, by expressing their Sense of the Injury, and offering Reparation of Damage, with Security against future Offences.
Now as it is plainly necessary, in a System of Agents capable of injuring each other, that every one should be made formidable to an Invader,
by such a violent Passion, till the Invader shews his Reformation of
Temper, as above, and no longer; so we find it is thus ordered in our
Constitution. Upon these Evidences of Reformation in the Invader, ourPassion naturally abates; or if in any perverse Temper it does not, theSense of Mankind turns against him, and he is looked upon as cruel andinhumane.
* See Sect. 5. Art. 5. of this Treatise.

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In considering more fully the Passions about the Fortunes of evil
Characters, distinct from Anger, which arises upon a fresh Injury, we
may first consider the evil Agents, such as a sudden View sometimes
represents them, directly evil and malicious; and then make proper
Abatements, for what the worst of Men come short of this compleatly
evil Temper. As Mathematicians [76] suppose perfect Hardness in someBodies, and Elasticity in others, and then make Allowances for the imperfect Degrees in natural Bodies.
[77] The Prospect of Good to a Person apprehended as entirely mali- Joy of Hatred.
of Hacious, raises Aversion in the Observer, or Desire of his Disappointment; Sorrowtred.
at least, when his Success would confirm him in any evil Intention. His
Disappointment raises Joy in the Event, with Trust in Providence, andSecurity in Virtue. His Success raises the contrary Passions of Sorrow,
Distrust, and Suspicion. The Prospect of Evil, befalling an evil Character,at first, perhaps, seems grateful to the Observer, if he has conceived thePassion of Anger; but to a sedate Temper, no Misery is farther the Occasion of Joy, than as it is necessary to some prepollent Happiness in thewhole. The escaping of Evil impending over such a Character, by which
he is confirmed in Vice, is the Occasion of Sorrow, and Distrust of Providence and Virtue; and the Evil befalling him raises Joy, and Satisfaction
with Providence, and Security in Virtue. We see therefore, that the Success of evil Characters, by obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, is an unfit
Representation in Tragedy.
[77] Let any one reflect on this Class of Passions, especially as theyarise upon Occasions which do not affect himself, and he will see howlittle of Self-Love there is in them; and yet they are frequently as violent
as any Passions [78] whatsoever. We seem conscious of some Dignity inthese Passions above the selfish ones, and therefore never conceal them,nor are we ashamed of them. These complicated Passions the Philosophers have confusedly mentioned, under some general Names, alongwith the simple selfish Passions. The Poets and Criticks have sufficiently
shown, that they felt these Differences, however it did not concern
them to explain them. We may find Instances of them in all Dramatick
Performances, both Antient and Modern.

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Passions about
mixed Characters.
Envy, Sorrow,
Joy.
Pity.

The best Plotsin Tragedy.

the nature and conduct of the passions

The Abatements to be made for what human Nature comes short of thehighest Degrees either of Virtue or Vice, may be thus conceived: When
the Good in any mixed Character surpasses the Evil, the Passions arise
as toward the Good; where the Evil surpasses the Good, the Passions
arise as toward the Evil, only in both Cases with less Violence. And further, the Passions in both Cases are either stopped, or turned the contrary way, by want of due Proportion between the State and Character.
Thus an imperfect good Character, [78 ] in pursuit of a Good too greatfor his Virtue, or to the exclusion of more worthy Characters, insteadof raising Desire of his Success, raises Aversion; his Success raises Envy,
or a Species of Sorrow, and his Disappointment Joy. [79] An imperfectly
evil Character, threatned by an Evil greater than is necessary to makehim relent and reform, or by a great Calamity, which has no direct tendency to reform him, instead of raising Desire toward the Event, raises
Aversion; his escaping it raises Joy, and his falling under it raises Pity, aSpecies of Sorrow.
There is another Circumstance which exceedingly varies our Passionsof this Class, when the Agents themselves, by their own Conduct, procure their Misery. When an imperfect good Character, by an evil
Action, procures the highest Misery to himself; this raises these complicated Passions, Pity toward the Sufferer, Sorrow for the State, Abhorrence of Vice, Awe and Admiration of Providence, as keeping strict
Measures of Sanctity and Justice. These Passions we may all feel, in
reading the Oedipus of Sophocles, when we see the Distress of that
Prince, occasioned by his superstitious Curiosity about his future Fortunes; his rash Violence of Temper, in Duelling without Provocation,and in pronouncing Execrations on Persons unknown. [79] We feel thelike Passions from the Fortunes of Creon in the Antigone; or from theFates of Pyrrhus and Orestes, in the Andromache of Racine; or our Distressed Mother. We heartily [80] pity these Characters, but without repining at Providence; their Misery is the Fruit of their own Actions. It* Aristotle Poetic, Chap. 13.
[[Aristotle, Poetics, 1453a1–12.]]

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is with the justest Reason, that Aristotle* prefers such Plots to all others
for Tragedy, since these Characters come nearest to those of the Spectators, and consequently will have the strongest Influence on them. We
are generally conscious of some good Dispositions, mixed with many
Weaknesses: few imagine themselves capable of attaining the height ofperfectly good Characters, or arriving to their high Degrees of Felicity;and fewer imagine themselves capable of sinking into the Baseness ofperfectly evil Tempers, and therefore few dread the Calamities which befal them.

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There is one farther Circumstance which strengthens this Class of Pas- How thesearesions exceedingly, that is, the greatness of the Change of Fortune in the Passions
raised highPerson, or the Surprize with which it comes. As this gives the Person a and complimore acute Perception either of Happiness or Misery, so it [80] strength- cated.
ens our Passions, arising from Observation of his State. Of this the Poets
are very sensible, who so often represent to us the former Prosperity of
the Person, for whom they [81] would move our pity; his Projects, his
Hopes, his half-executed Designs. One left his Palace unfinished, anotherhis betrothed Mistress, or young Wife; one promised himself Glory, and a
fortunate old Age; another was heaping up Wealth, boasted of his
Knowledge, was honoured for his fine Armour, his Activity, his Augury.

All' ou◊k oi◊wno i÷sin e◊rússata kh÷ra mélainan.
—oude tí oiÿ tóg◊ e◊ph́rkese lugron o⁄lejron.—Homer.23
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Sed non Augurio potuit depellere pestem; Sed non Dardanice
medicari cuspidis ictum Invaluit.—Virg.24

23. The passages from Homer are Iliad II.859, “but he did not ward off black
death with bird omens,” and II.873, “fool, and this did not protect him fromgrievous destruction.” Along with the passages from Virgil directly following them,
they are common examples used to illustrate the human failure to ward off fate.
24. Here Hutcheson quotes two distinct passages from Virgil’s Aeneid: “But theaugury was unable to drive away ruin” (IX.328) and “But he was not able to heal
the cut of the Dardan blade” (VII.756–57).

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The Joy is in like manner increased upon the Misfortunes of evil
Characters, by representing their former Prosperity, Pride and Insolence.
This Sorrow or Joy is strangely diversified or complicated, when the
Sufferers are multiplied, by representing the Persons attached to theprincipal Sufferer, and setting before us their Affections, Friendships,
tender Solicitudes, care in Education, succour in former Distresses; thisevery [81] one will find in reading the Stories of Pallas, Camilla, Nisus,
and Euryalus; 25 or in general, any Battle of Homer or Virgil. What there[82] is in Self-Love to account for these Effects, let all Mankind judge.

510

VI. The Passions of the fourth Class arise from the same moral Sense
and publick Affections, upon observing the Actions of Agents some way
attached to each other, by prior Ties of Nature or good Offices, or disengaged by prior Injuries; when these Relations are known, the moral
Qualities of the Actions appear considerably different, and our Passions
Contrastes and are much diversified by them: there is also a great Complication of difComplications
ferent Passions, and a sort of Contraste, or assemblage of opposite Pasof Passions.
sions toward the several Persons concerned. The most moving Peripeties, and Remembrances, in Epick and Dramatick Poetry, are calculated
to raise these complicated Passions; and in Oratory we study to do thesame.
Thus strong Sentiments of Gratitude, and vigorous Returns of good
Offices observed, raise in the Spectator the highest Love and Esteem toward both the Benefactor, and even the Person obliged, with Security andDelight in Virtue.—Ingratitude, or returning bad Offices designedly,
raises the greatest Detestation against [82] the Ungrateful; and Love with
Compassion toward the [83] Benefactor, with Dejection and Diffidence ina virtuous Course of Life.—Forgiving of Injuries, and much more returning Good for Evil, appears wonderfully great and beautiful to our
4. Publick
Passions andRelations ofAgents.

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25. Pallas, Camilla, Nisus, and Euryalus were all heroes of the Trojan War celebrated in Virgil’s Aeneid. In describing them, Virgil emphasized the approbationthat spectators had for them as well as their sympathetic ties to friends and family
in order to amplify the pathos of their deaths (cf. IX.423–37, X.491–5, XI.532–96).

the nature and conduct of the passions

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moral Sense: it raises the strongest Love toward the Forgiver, Compassion for the Injury received; toward the Injurious, if relenting, some degree of Good-will, with Compassion; if not relenting, the most violent
Abhorrence and Hatred.—Mutual good Offices done designedly between
morally good Agents, raise Joy and Love in the Observer toward both,with delight in Virtue.—Mutual Injuries done by evil Agents designedly, raise Joy in the Events, along with Hatred to the Agents, with Detestation of Vice.—Good Offices done designedly by good Agents toward
Evil, but not so as to encourage, or enable them to further Mischief,
raise Love toward the good Agent; Displicence, with some Good-will toward the evil Agent.—Good Offices designedly done mutually among
evil Agents, if these Offices do not promote their evil Intentions, diminish our Dislike and Hatred, and introduce some Compassion and Benevolence.—Good Offices from good Agents, to Benefactors unknown to theAgent, or to their unknown Friends or Posterity, increase Love toward
both; and raise great Satisfaction and Trust in [83] Providence, with [84]Security in Virtue, and Joy in the Event.—Undesigned evil Returns inlike Case with the former, raise Sorrow in the Observer upon accountof the Event, Pity toward both, with Suspicion of Providence and Virtue.—An undesigned Return of Evil to an evil Agent from a good one,whom he had injured, raises Joy upon account of the Event, and Trustin Providence.—Undesigned evil Offices mutually done to each other by
evil Agents, raise Joy in the Event, Abhorrence of Vice, and Satisfaction
with Providence.—Undesigned good Offices done by good Agents toward the evil, by which they are further excited or impowered to doevil, raise Pity toward the good Agent, Indignation and Envy toward theEvil, with Distrust in Providence.—Undesigned good Offices done bygood to evil Agents, by which they are not excited or enabled to do further mischief, raise Envy or Indignation toward the evil Agent, if the
Benefit be great; if not, they scarce raise any new Passion distinct fromthat we had before, of Love toward the one, and Hatred or Dislike toward the other.
These Passions might have been diversified, according to Malebranche’s Division, as the Object or Event was present, or in suspense, or
certainly removed: And would appear in different Degrees of [84]64

the nature and conduct of the passions

Strength, according [85] as the Persons concerned were more nearly attached to the Observer, by Nature, Friendship, or Acquaintance.26
5. Publick Passions join’dwith theselfish.

VII. The Passions of the last Class, are those in which any of the former
Kinds are complicated with selfish Passions, when our own Interest isconcerned. It is needless here to repeat them over again: Only this may
be noted in general, that, as the Conjunction of selfish Passions willvery much increase the Commotion of Mind, so the Opposition of any
selfish Interests, which appear of great Importance, will often conquer
the publick Desires or Aversions, or those founded upon the Sense ofVirtue or Honour; and this is the Case in vicious Actions done against
Conscience.
These Complications of Passions are often not reflected on by the
Person who is acted by them, during their Rage: But a judicious Observer may find them by Reflection upon himself, or by Observation ofothers; and the Representation of them never fails to affect us in themost lively manner.
—Aestuat ingens
Imo in Corde Pudor, mixtoque Insania Luctu,
Et Furiis agitatus Amor, & conscia Virtus.—Virg.27[85/86] In all this tedious Enumeration, let any one consider, “Howfew of our Passions can be any way deduced from Self-Love, or desire ofprivate Advantage: And how improbable it is, that Persons in the Heatof Action, have any of those subtle Reflections, and selfish Intentions,which some Philosophers invent for them: How great a part of theCommotions of our Minds arise upon the moral Sense, and from publick Affections toward the good of others. We should find, that without
these Principles in our Nature, we should not feel the one half at least

26. See Malebranche, De la Recherche, V. 7–9.
27. Virgil, Aeneid, X.870–72. Dryden renders it “Love, anguish, wrath, and grief,
to madness wrought//Despair, and secret shame, and conscious thought//Of inborn
worth, his lab’ring soul oppress’d.” The third line is thought now to be spurious,
but was common to eighteenth-century editions.

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65of our present Pleasures or Pains; and that our Nature would be almost
reduced to Indolence.”

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An accurate Observation of the several distinct Characters and Tempersof Men, which are constituted by the various Degrees of their natural
Sagacity, their Knowledge, their Interests, their Opinions, or Associationsof Ideas, with the Passions which are prevalent in them, is a most usefuland pleasant Entertainment for those, who have Opportunities of large
Acquaintance and Observation. But our present Purpose leads only toconsider the first general [87] Elements, from the various Combinations[86] of which, the several Tempers and Characters are formed.

How Characters andTempers of
Men areformed.

This account of our Affections will, however, prepare the way for discerning considerable Evidences for the Goodness of the Deity, from theConstitution of our Nature; and for removing the Objections of voluptuous luxurious Men, against the Rules of Virtue laid down by Men of
Reflection. While no other Ideas of Pleasure or Advantage are given us,
than those which relate to the external Senses; nor any other Affections
represented as natural, save those toward private Good: it may be difficult to persuade many, even of those who are not Enemies to Virtue
from Inclination, of the Wisdom of the Deity, in making the Biass of
our Nature opposite to the Laws he would give us; and making all Pleasure, the most natural Character of Good, attend the prohibited Actions,or the indifferent ones; while Obedience to the Law must be a constrained
Course of Action, inforced only by Penalties contrary to our natural Affections and Senses. Nature and Grace are by this Scheme made very opposite: Some would question whether they could have the same Author.
Whereas, if the preceding Account be just, we see no [88] such Inconsistency: “Every Passion [87] or Affection in its moderate Degree is innocent, many are directly amiable, and morally good: we have Senses andAffections leading us to publick Good, as well as to private; to Virtue, as
well as to external Pleasure.”

The Order of
Nature partly
vindicated.

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section iv
How far our several Affections and Passions areunder our Power, either to govern them when raised, or toprevent their arising: with some general Observations
about their Objects.

Affections andPassions
dependmuch upon
Opinions.

[88/89] I. From what was said above it appears, that our Passions are
not so much in our Power, as some seem to imagine, from the Topicks
used either to raise or allay them. We are so constituted by Nature, that,as soon as we form the Idea of certain Objects or Events, our Desire or
Aversion will arise toward them; and consequently our Affections mustvery much depend upon the Opinions we form, concerning any thingwhich occurs to our Mind, its Qualities, Tendencies, or Effects. Thus theHappiness of every sensitive Nature is desired, as soon as we remove all
Opinion or Apprehension of Opposition of Interest between this Beingand others. The Apprehension of morally good Qualities, is the necessary Cause of Approbation, by our moral Sense, and of stronger [90]Love. The Cause of Hatred, is the Apprehension [89] of the opposite
Qualities. Fear, in like manner, must arise from Opinion of Power, andInclination to hurt us: Pity from the Opinion of another’s undeserved
Misery: Shame only arises from Apprehension of Contempt from others:
Joy, in any Event, must arise from an Opinion of its Goodness. Our
selfish Passions in this, do not differ from our publick ones.
This may shew us some Inconsistency in Topicks of Argument, often
used to inculcate Piety and Virtue. Whatever Motives of Interest we
suggest, either from a present or future Reward, must be ineffectual, until we have first laboured to form amiable Conceptions of the Deity, andof our Fellow Creatures. And yet in many Writers, even in this Cause,“Mankind are represented as absolutely evil, or at best as entirely selfish;nor are there any nobler Ideas of the Deity suggested. It is grown afashionable Topick, to put some sly selfish Construction upon the mostgenerous human Actions; and he passes for the shreudest Writer, or Orator, who is most artful in these Insinuations.”

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II. The Government of our Passions must then depend much upon our Appetites andOpinions: [91] But we must here observe an obvious Difference among Affections
distinguished.
our Desires, viz. that [90] “some of them have a previous, painful, or
uneasy Sensation, antecedently to any Opinion of Good in the Object;
nay, the Object is often chiefly esteemed good, only for its allaying thisPain or Uneasiness; or if the Object gives also positive Pleasure, yet theuneasy Sensation is previous to, and independent of this Opinion ofGood in the Object.” These Desires we may call Appetites. “Other Desires and Aversions necessarily presuppose an Opinion of Good and Evilin their Objects; and the Desires or Aversions, with their concomitantuneasy Sensations, are produced or occasioned by this Opinion or Apprehension.” Of the former kind are Hunger and Thirst, and the Desires
between the Sexes; to which Desires there is an uneasy Sensation previous, even in those who have little other Notion of Good in the Objects,
than allaying this Pain or Uneasiness. There is something like to this in
the Desire of Society, or the Company of our fellow Creatures. Our Nature is so much formed for this, that altho the Absence of Company is
not immediately painful, yet if it be long, and the Person be not employed in something which tends to Society at last, or which is designed
to fit him for Society, an uneasy Fretfulness, Sullenness, and Discontent,[92] will grow upon him by degrees, which Company alone [91] canremove. He shall not perhaps be sensible always, that it is the Absenceof Company which occasions his Uneasiness: A painful Sensation dictates nothing of it self; it must be therefore some Reflection or Instinct,
distinct from the Pain, which suggests the Remedy. Our Benevolenceand Compassion pre suppose indeed some Knowledge of other sensitive
Beings, and of what is good or evil to them: But they do not arise fromany previous Opinion, that “the Good of others tends to the Good of
the Agent.” They are Determinations of our Nature, previous to our
Choice from Interest, which excite us to Action, as soon as we know
other sensitive or rational Beings, and have any Apprehension of their
Happiness or Misery.
In other Desires the Case is different. No Man is distressed for wantof fine Smells, harmonious Sounds, beautiful Objects, Wealth, Power, orGrandeur, previously to some Opinion formed of these things as good,

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or some prior Sensation of their Pleasures. In like manner, Virtue andHonour as necessarily give us Pleasure, when they occur to us, as Viceand Contempt give us Pain; but, antecedently to some Experience or
Opinion of this Pleasure, there is no previous uneasy Sensation in their
Absence, as there [93] is in the Absence of the Objects of Appetite. The
Necessity [92] of these Sensations previous to our Appetites, has been
considered already.* The Sensations accompanying or subsequent toour other Desires, by which they are denominated Passions, keep themin a just Balance with our Appetites, as was before observed.
But this holds in general, concerning all our Desires or Aversions,that according to the Opinion or Apprehension of Good or Evil, the Desire or Aversion is increased or diminished: Every Gratification of any
Desire gives at first Pleasure; and Disappointment Pain, proportioned
to the Violence of the Desire. In like manner, the escaping any Objectof Aversion, tho it makes no permanent Addition to our Happiness,gives at first a pleasant Sensation, and relieves us from Misery, proportioned to the Degree of Aversion or Fear. So when any Event, to which
we had an Aversion, befals us, we have at first Misery proportioned to
the Degree of Aversion. So that some Pain is subsequent upon all Frustration of Desire or Aversion, but it is previous to those Desires only,
which are called Appetites.
[93/94] III. Hence we see how impossible it is for one to judge of theDegrees of Happiness or Misery in others, unless he knows their Opinions, their Associations of Ideas, and the Degrees of their Desires andAversions. We see also of how much Consequence our Associations of
Ideas and Opinions are to our Happiness or Misery, and to the Command of our Passions.

* Sect. 2. Art. 6.

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For tho in our Appetites there are uneasy Sensations, previous to any Associations ofandOpinion, yet our very Appetites may be strengthened or weakened, and Ideas
Opinions
variously alter’d by Opinion, or Associations of Ideas. Before their Inter- increase orvention, the bodily Appetites are easily satisfied: Nature has put it in diminish thestrength of ouralmost every one’s power, so far to gratify them, as to support the Body, Desires.
and remove Pain. But when Opinion, and confused Ideas, or Fancy
comes in, and represents some particular kinds of Gratifications, orgreat Variety of them, as of great Importance; when Ideas of Dignity,
Grandure, Magnificence, Generosity, or any other moral Species, arejoined to the Objects of Appetites, they may furnish us with endlessLabour, Vexation, and Misery of every kind.
As to the other Desires which pre suppose some Opinion or Apprehension of [94] Good, [95] previous to any Sensation of uneasiness; theymust still be more directly influenced by Opinion, and Associations of
Ideas. The higher the Opinion or Apprehension of Good or Evil is, thestronger must the Desire or Aversion be; the greater is the Pleasure of
Success at first, and the greater the Pain of Disappointment. Our publick
Desires are influenced in the same manner with the private: what weconceive as Good, we shall desire for those we love, as well as for ourselves; and that in proportion to the Degree of Good apprehended in it:
whatever we apprehend as Evil in any degree to those we love, to that
we shall have proportionable Aversion.
The common Effect of these Associations of Ideas is this, “that theyraise the Passions into an extravagant Degree, beyond the proportionof real Good in the Object: And commonly beget some secret Opinions to justify the Passions. But then the Confutation of these false
Opinions is not sufficient to break the Association, so that the Desire
or Passion shall continue, even when our Understanding has suggested
to us, that the Object is not good, or not proportioned to the Strengthof the Desire.” Thus we often may observe, that Persons, who by reasoning have laid aside all Opinion of [95] Spirits being in the [96] dark
more than in the light, are still uneasy to be alone in the dark.* Thus
* Ac veluti pueri trepidant, atque omnia caecis
In tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus

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the luxurious, the extravagant Lover, the Miser, can scarce be supposed
to have Opinions of the several Objects of their Pursuit, proportioned
to the Vehemence of their Desires; but the constant Indulgence of any
Desire, the frequent Repetition of it, the diverting our Minds from allother Pursuits, the Strain of Conversation among Men of the same
Temper, who often haunt together, the Contagion in the very Air andCountenance of the passionate, beget such wild Associations of Ideas,that a sudden Conviction of Reason will not stop the Desire or Aversion, any more than an Argument will surmount the Loathings or
Aversions, acquired against certain Meats or Drinks, by Surfeits oremetick Preparations.
The Luxurious are often convinced, when any Accident has revived
a natural Appetite, of the superior Pleasures in a plain Dinner, with asharp Stomach:† but [96/97] this does not reform them; they have got
all the Ideas of Dignity, Grandure, Excellence, and Enjoyment of Life
joined to their Table. Explain to a Miser the Folly of his Conduct, sothat he can alledg nothing in his Defence; yet he will go on,

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Ut locuples moriatur egenti vivere fato.—Juv.28

Interdum nihilo quae sunt metuenda magis.—Lu c[[“Just as children are agitated, and fear all things lurking in the dark, so sometimes in the daylight we fear things no more [deserving] of fear,” Lucretius, De
Rerum Natura, II.55–58.]]†—Leporem sectatus, equove
Lassus ab in domito, vel si Romana fatigat
Militia assuetum Graecari—
Cum labor extuderit fastidia—Cum sale panis
Latrantem stomachum bene leniet—Ho r .
[[Horace, Satire 2.2, 8–11, 15, 17–18. “After chasing a rabbit, or coming away
tired from a horse that is hard to control, or if the Roman and Greek military drills
exhaust you . . . when work has hammered away your pickiness then bread and salt
will calm your grumbling stomach quite well.”]]28. Juvenal, Satire, 14, 137: “to live in need in order that you may die wealthy.”

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He has likewise all Ideas of Good, of Worth, and Importance in Life
confounded with his Coffers.
A romantick Lover has in like manner no Notion of Life without
his Mistress, all Virtue and Merit are summed up in his inviolable Fidelity. The Connoisseur has all Ideas of valuable Knowledge, Gentlemanlike Worth and Ability associated with his beloved Arts. The Idea
of Property comes along with the Taste, and makes his Happiness impossible, without Possession of what he admires. A plain Question
might confute the Opinion, but will not break the Association: “What
Pleasure has the Possessor more than others, to whose Eyes they are
exposed as well as his?”
Our publick Desires are affected by confused Ideas, in the same manner with our private Desires. What is apprehended [97] as [98] Good,thro’ an Association of foreign Ideas, shall be pursued for those we love,
as well as what is really good for them. Our benevolent Passions in thenearer Ties, are as apt to be too violent as any whatsoever: this we may
often experience in the Love of Offspring, Relations, Parties, Cabals. The
Violence of our Passion makes us sometimes incapable of pursuing effectually their Good, and sinks us into an useless State of Sorrow upon
their Misfortunes. Compassion often makes the Evil greater to theSpectator than to the Sufferer; and sometimes subjects the Happinessof a Person of great Worth, to every Accident befalling one entirely voidof it.
The Desire of Virtue, upon extensive impartial Schemes of publick
Happiness, can scarce be too strong; but, upon mistaken or partial Views
of publick Good, this Desire of Virtue may often lead Men into very
pernicious Actions. One may conceive a sort of Extravagancy, and effeminate Weakness even of this Desire; as when Men are dissatisfied withthemselves for Disappointments in good Attempts, which it was not intheir Power to accomplish; when some heroick Tempers shew no Regard
to private Good; when the Pursuit of the lovely Form is so passionate,that the Agent [99] does not relish his past Conduct [98] by agreeable
Reflection, but like the Ambitious,

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the nature and conduct of the passions
Nil actum reputat si quid superesset agendum.—Lucan.29

But the most pernicious Perversions of this Desire are “some partial
Admirations of certain moral Species, such as Fortitude, Propagation oftrue Religion, Zeal for a Party; while other Virtues are overlooked, andthe very End to which the admired Qualities are subservient is forgotten. Thus some Phantoms of Virtue are raised, wholly opposite to itstrue Nature, and to the sole End of it, the publick Good.”
Honour, in like manner, has had its foolish Associations, and thetrue Nature of it has been overlooked, so that the Desire of it has run
into Enthusiasm, and pernicious Madness. Thus, “however our Desires,
when our Opinions are true, and the Desire is proportioned to the true
Opinion, are all calculated for good, either publick or private; yet false
Opinions, and confused Ideas, or too great a Violence in any of them,
above a due Proportion to the rest, may turn the best of them into destructive Follies.”
Malicious or
cruel Tempers,
how they arise.

[99/100] This is probably the Case in those Affections which some suppose natural, or at least incident to our Natures, and yet absolutely evil:
Such as Rancour, or disinterested Malice, Revenge, Misanthropy. We indeed find our Nature determined to disapprove an Agent apprehended
as evil, or malicious, thro’ direct Intention; we must desire the Destruction of such a Being, not only from Self-Love, but from our Benevolence to others. Now when we rashly form Opinions of Sects, or Nations, as absolutely evil; or get associated Ideas of Impiety, Cruelty,
Profaneness, recurring upon every mention of them: when, by repeatedReflection upon Injuries received, we strengthen our Dislike into an obdurate Aversion, and conceive that the Injurious are directly malicious;
we may be led to act in such a manner, that Spectators, who are unacquainted with our secret Opinions, or confused Apprehensions of others,
29. Lucan, De Bello Civili, II.657, is the closest line. The quote describes Caesar’s
ceaseless ambition. It is skillfuly captured in Nicholas Rowe’s translation of 1718:“[but he, with empire fired and vast desires,]/ to all and nothing less than all aspires,”in Sarah Annes Brown and Charles Martindale (eds.), Lucan, The Civil War: Translated as Lucan’s Pharsalia by Nicholas Rowe (London: Everyman, 1998).

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may think we have pure disinterested Malice in our Nature; a very Instinct toward the Misery of others, when it is really only the overgrowthof a just natural Affection, upon false Opinions, or confused Ideas; evenas our Appetites, upon which our natural Life depends, may acquire accidental Loathings at the most wholesom Food. Our Ideas and Opinions of Mankind are often very rashly formed, [101] but our Affections[100] are generally suited to our Opinions. When our Ideas and Opinions of the moral Qualities of others are just, our Affections are generally regular and good: But when we give loose Reins to our Imagination
and Opinion, our Affections must follow them into all Extravaganceand Folly; and inadvertent Spectators will imagine some Dispositions in
us wholly useless, and absolutely and directly evil.
Now the Gratification of these destructive Desires, like those of all
the rest, gives at first some Pleasure, proportioned to their Violence; andthe Disappointment gives proportioned Pain. But as to the Continuanceof these Pleasures or Pains, we shall find hereafter great Diversity.
From this view of our Desires, we may see “the great Variety of Objects, Circumstances, Events, which must be of Importance to the Happiness of a Creature, furnished with such a Variety of Senses of Good andEvil, with equally various Desires corresponding to them: especiallyconsidering the strange Combinations of Ideas, giving Importance tomany Objects, in their own Nature indifferent.”
IV. We must in the next Place enquire “how far these several Desires How far the
Desiresmust [101] necessarily [102] arise, or may be prevented by our Con- several
must necessarduct.”
ily arise in us.
The Pleasures and Pains of the external Senses must certainly be per- 1. That ofceived by every one who comes into the World; the one raising some external
pleasures.
Degree of Desire, and the other Aversion: the Pains of Appetites arise yet
more certainly than others, and are previous to any Opinion. But thenit is very much in our power to keep these Sensations pure and unmixed
with any foreign Ideas: so that the plainest Food and Raiment, if sufficiently nourishing and healthful, may keep us easy, as well as the rarest
or most expensive. Nay the Body, when accustomed to the simpler

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Sorts, is easiest in the Use of them: And we are raised to an higher Degree of Chearfulness, by a small Improvement in our Table, than it ispossible to bring a pampered Body into, by any of the Productions of
Nature. Whatever the Body is once accustomed to, produces no considerable Change in it.
2. The Desiresof the Pleasures of the
Imagination.

The Pleasures of the Imagination, or of the internal Sense of Beauty, andDecency, and Harmony, must also be perceived by us. The Regularity,
Proportion and Order in external Forms, will as necessarily strike theMind, as any Perceptions of the external Senses. But then, as we haveno uneasiness [103] of Appetite, previous to the [102] Reception of those
grateful Ideas, we are not necessarily made miserable in their Absence;unless by some fantastick Habit we have raised very violent Desires, orby a long Pursuit of them, have made our selves incapable of other Enjoyments.
Again, the Sense and Desire of Beauty of several kinds is entirely abstracted from Possession or Property; so that the finest Relish of this kind,and the strongest subsequent Desires, if we admit no foolish Conjunctions of Ideas, may almost every where be gratified with the Prospectsof Nature, and with the Contemplation of the more curious Works ofArt, which the Proprietors generally allow to others without Restraint.
But if this Sense or Desire of Beauty itself be accompanied with the Desire of Possession or Property; if we let it be guided by Custom, and receive
Associations of foreign Ideas in our Fancy of Dress, Equipage, Furniture,
Retinue; if we relish only the Modes of the Great, or the Marks of Distinction as beautiful; if we let such Desires grow strong, we must be very
great indeed, before we can have any Pleasure by this Sense: and every
Disappointment or Change of Fortune must make us miserable. The
like Fate may attend the Pursuit of speculative Sciences, Poetry, Musick,or [104] Painting; to excel in these things is granted but to few. [103] A
violent Desire of Distinction and Eminence may bring on Vexation andSorrow for the longest Life.

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The Pleasures and Pains of the publick Sense will also necessarily arise in 3. The publickus. Men cannot live without the Society of others, and their good Offices; Desires.
they must observe both the Happiness and Misery, the Pleasures andPains of their Fellows: Desire and Aversion must arise in the Observer.
Nay farther, as we cannot avoid more near Attachments of Love, either
from the Instinct between the Sexes, or that toward Offspring, or from
Observation of the benevolent Tempers of others, or their particular Virtues and good Offices, we must feel the Sensations of Joy and Sorrow,from the State of others even in the stronger Degrees, and have the publick Desires in a greater Height. All we can do to prevent the Pains ofgeneral Benevolence, will equally lessen the Pleasures of it. If we restrain
our publick Affection from growing strong, we abate our Pleasures fromthe good Success of others, as much as we lessen our Compassion for
their Misfortunes: If we confine our Desires to a small Circle of Acquaintance, or to a Cabal or Faction, we contract our Pleasures as muchas we do our Pains. The Distinction of Pleasures and Pains into real[105] and imaginary, or rather into necessary and voluntary, [104] would
be of some use, if we could correct the Imaginations of others, as well as
our own; but if we cannot, we are sure, whoever thinks himself miserable, is really so; however he might possibly, by a better Conduct of his
Imagination, have prevented this Misery. All we can do in this affair, isto enjoy a great Share of the Pleasures of the stronger Ties, with fewer
Pains of them, by confining the stronger Degrees of Love, or our
Friendships, to Persons of corrected Imaginations, to whom as few of theuncertain Objects of Desire are necessary to Happiness as is possible.
Our Friendship with such Persons may probably be to us a muchgreater Source of Happiness than of Misery, since the Happiness ofsuch Persons is more probable than the contrary.
Since there is nothing in our Nature determining us to disinterested
Hatred toward any Person; we may be secure against all the Pains of
Malice, by preventing false Opinions of our Fellows as absolutely evil,
or by guarding against habitual Anger, and rash Aversions.
The moral Ideas do arise also necessarily in our Minds. We cannot
avoid observing the Affections of those we converse with; [106] their Actions, their Words, their Looks betray them. We are conscious of [105] our76

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own Affections, and cannot avoid Reflection upon them sometimes:
the kind and generous Affections will appear amiable, and all Appearance of Cruelty, Malice, or even very selfish Affections, will be disapproved, and appear odious. Our own Temper, as well as that of others,
will appear to our moral Sense either lovely or deformed, and will be
the Occasion either of Pleasure or Uneasiness. We have not any proper
Appetite toward Virtue, so as to be uneasy, even antecedently to the Appearance of the lovely Form; but as soon as it appears to any Person, as
it certainly must very early in Life, it never fails to raise Desire, as Vice
does raise Aversion. This is so rooted in our Nature, that no Education,false Principles, depraved Habits, or even Affectation itself can entirely
root it out. Lucretius and Hobbes shew themselves in innumerable
Instances struck with some moral Species; they are full of Expressions ofAdmiration, Gratitude, Praise, Desire of doing Good; and of Censure, Disapprobation, Aversion to some Forms of Vice.
Since then there is no avoiding these Desires and Perceptions of Morality, all we can do to secure our selves in the possession of Pleasures ofthis kind, without Pain, consists in “a vigorous Use of our Reason, to[107] discern what Actions really [106 ] tend to the publick Good in thewhole, that we may not do that upon a partial View of Good, which
afterwards, upon a fuller Examination, we shall condemn and abhor
our selves for; and withal, to fix our Friendships with Persons of like
Dispositions, and just Discernment.” Men of partial Views of publick
Good, if they never obtain any better, may be easy in a very pernicious
Conduct, since the moral Evil or Deformity does not appear to them.
But this is seldom to be hop’d for in any partial Conduct. Those whoare injured by us fail not to complain; the Spectators, who are disengaged from our partial Attachments, will often take the Freedom to express their Sentiments, and set our Conduct in a full Light: This mustvery probably occasion to us Shame and Remorse. “It cannot therefore
be an indifferent Matter, to an Agent with a moral Sense, what Opinions
he forms of the Tendency of Actions; what partial Attachments of Lovehe has toward Parties or Factions. If he has true Opinions of the Tendencies of Actions; if he carefully examines the real Dignity of Persons

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and Causes, he may be sure that the Conduct which he now approves
he shall always approve, and have delight in Reflection upon it, however it be censured by others. But if he takes up at hazard Opinions of
Actions; [108] if [107] he has a foolish Admiration of particular Sects,
and as foolish Aversions and Dislike to others, not according to any real
Importance or Dignity, he shall often find occasion for Inconstancy andChange of his Affections, with Shame and Remorse for his past Conduct,
and an inward Dislike and Self-Condemnation.”
What most deeply affects our Happiness or Misery, are the Dispositions of those Persons with whom we voluntarily contract some nearer
Intimacies of Friendship: If we act wisely in this Point, we may secure
to our selves the greatest Pleasures with the fewest Pains, by attaching
our selves to Persons of real Goodness, good Offices toward whom areuseful to the World. The Ties of Blood are generally very strong, especially toward Offspring; they need rather the Bridle than the Spur, in all
Cases wherein the Object is not recommended to a singular Love by his
good Qualities. We may, in a considerable measure, restrain our natural
Affection toward a worthless Offspring, by setting our publick Affections
and our moral Sense against it, in frequent Contemplation of theirVices, and of the Mischief which may arise to Persons of more worthfrom them, if we give them any Countenance in their Vices.
[108/109] The regulating our Apprehensions of the Actions of others,
is of very great Importance, that we may not imagine Mankind worse
than they really are, and thereby bring upon our selves a Temper full of
Suspicion, Hatred, Anger and Contempt toward others; which is a constant State of Misery, much worse than all the Evils to be feared from
Credulity. If we examine the true Springs of human Action, we shall seldom find their Motives worse than Self-Love. Men are often subject toAnger, and upon sudden Provocations do Injuries to each other, and that
only from Self-Love, without Malice; but the greatest part of their Livesis employed in Offices of natural Affection, Friendship, innocent SelfLove, or Love of a Country. The little Party-Prejudices are generally
founded upon Ignorance, or false Opinions, rather apt to move Pity
than Hatred. Such Considerations are the best Preservative against An-

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ger, Malice, and Discontent of Mind with the Order of Nature. “Whenyou would make yourself chearful and easy (says the Emperor*) consider the Virtues of your several Acquaintances, the Industry and Diligence of one, the Modesty of another, the Generosity or [109] Liberality ofa [110] third; and in some Persons some other Virtue. There is nothing
so delightful, as the Resemblances of the Virtues appearing in the Conduct of your Contemporaries as frequently as possible. Such Thoughts
we should still retain with us.”
When the moral Sense is thus assisted by a sound Understanding andApplication, our own Actions may be a constant Source of solid Pleasure, along with the Pleasures of Benevolence, in the highest Degree
which our Nature will admit, and with as few of its Pains as possible.
How far ourSense of
Honour is in
our power.

As to the Desires of Honour, since we cannot avoid observing or hearingof the Sentiments of others concerning our Conduct, we must feel the
Desire of the good Opinions of others, and Aversion to their Censures orCondemnation: since the one necessarily gives us Pleasure, and the other
Pain. Now it is impossible to bring all Men into the same Opinions ofparticular Actions, because of their different Opinions of publick Good,and of the Means of promoting it; and because of opposite Interests; sothat it is often impossible to be secure against all Censure or Dishonour
from some of our Fellows. No one is so much Master of external Things,
as to make his honourable Intentions successful; and yet [110] Success[111] is a Mark by which many judge of the Goodness of Attempts.
Whoever therefore suffers his Desire of Honour or Applause to grow violent, without Distinction of the Persons to whose Judgment he submits, runs a great hazard of Misery. But our natural Desire of Praise, tospeak in the Mathematical Style, is in a compounded Proportion of the
Numbers of Applauders, and their Dignity. “He therefore who makes
Distinction of Persons justly, and acts wisely for the publick Good, may
secure himself from much uneasiness upon injudicious Censure, andmay obtain the Approbation of those whose Esteem alone is valuable,
or at least far over-ballances the Censure of others.”* Marcus Antoninus, Lib. vi. C. 48.

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The Desire of Wealth must be as necessary as any other Desires of our The Desire ofandNature, as soon as we apprehend the usefulness of Wealth to gratify all WealthPower.
other Desires. While it is desired as the Means of something farther, theDesire tends to our Happiness, proportionably to the good Oeconomyof the principal Desires to which it is made subservient. It is in every
man’s power, by a little Reflection, to prevent the Madness and Enthusiasm with which Wealth is insatiably pursued, even for itself, without
any direct Intention of using it. The Consideration of the small Addition often [111] made by Wealth to the Happiness of the Possessor, may
check [112] this Desire, and prevent that Insatiability which sometimes
attends it.
Power in like manner is desired as the Means of gratifying otheroriginal Desires; nor can the Desire be avoided by those who apprehend
its usefulness. It is easy to prevent the Extravagance of this Desire, andmany of its consequent Pains, by considering “the Danger of affecting
it by injurious Means, supporting it by Force, without consent of the
Subject, and employing it to private Interest, in opposition to publick
Good.” No Mortal is easy under such Subjection; every Slave to such aPower is an Enemy: The Possessor must be in a continual State of Fear,
Suspicion and Hatred.
There is nothing in our Nature leading us necessarily into the fantastick The Occasion
fantastick
Desires; they wholly arise thro’ our Ignorance and Negligence; when, of
Desires.
thro’ want of Thought, we suffer foolish Associations of Ideas to be
made, and imagine certain trifling Circumstances to contain something
honourable and excellent in them, from their being used by Persons ofDistinction. We know how the Inadvertencies, Negligences, Infirmities,
and even Vices, either of great or ingenious Men, have been affected,[112] and imitated by those who were incapable of [113] imitating theirExcellencies. This happens often to young Gentlemen of plentiful Fortunes, which set them above the Employments necessary to others,
when they have not cultivated any relish for the Pleasures of the Imagination, such as Architecture, Musick, Painting, Poetry, Natural Philosophy, History: When they have no farther Knowledge of these things,
than stupidly to praise what they hear others praise: When they have

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the nature and conduct of the passions

neglected to cultivate their publick Affections, are bantered a long timefrom Marriage and Offspring; and have neither themselves Minds fit for
Friendships, nor any intimate Acquaintance with such as are fit to make
Friends of: When their moral Sense is weakened, or, if it be strong inany points, these are fixed at random, without any regular Scheme:
When thro’ Ignorance of publick Affairs, or want of Eloquence to speak
what they know, they despair of the Esteem or Honour of the Wise:
When their Hearts are too gay to be entertained with the dull Thoughtsof increasing their Wealth, and they have not Ability enough to hopefor Power; such poor empty Minds have nothing but Trifles to pursue;
any thing becomes agreeable, which can supply the Void of Thought,
or prevent the sullen Discontent which must grow upon a Mind conscious of no Merit, and expecting [113] the Contempt of its Fellows; as a
Pack of Dogs, [114] an Horse, a Jewel, an Equipage, a Pack of Cards, aTavern; any thing which has got any confused Ideas of Honour, Dignity,
Liberality, or genteel Enjoyment of Life joined to it. These fantastick Desires any Man might have banished at first, or entirely prevented. But if
we have lost the Time of substituting better in their stead, we shall onlychange from one sort to another, with a perpetual Succession of Inconstancy and Dissatisfaction.

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—Cui si vitiosa Libido
Fecerit Auspicium—
Iidem eadem possunt horam durare probantes.—Hor. Ep. 1.30

V. The End of all these Considerations, is to find out the most effectual way of advancing the Happiness of Mankind; in order to which,they may perhaps appear of considerable Consequence, since Happiness consists in “the highest and most durable Gratifications of, either
all our Desires, or, if all cannot be gratify’d at once, of those which tend
to the greatest and most durable Pleasures, with exemption either from30. Horace, Epistles, I.1. This is an inversion of Horace’s text, 85–86, “but if amorbid whim has given him the omen,” followed by 82, “can the same person
persist for one hour in liking the same things?”

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all Pains and Objects of Aversion, or at least from those which are themost grievous.” The following general Observations may be premised
concerning their Objects.
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[114/115] 1. “It is plainly impossible that any Man should pursue the The fullof allGratifications of all these Desires at once, with Prudence, Diligence, and Pursuit
kinds of PleaVigor, sufficient to obtain the highest Pleasures of each kind, and to sure is imposavoid their opposite Pains.” For, not to mention the Narrowness of the sible.
Powers of our Minds, which makes them incapable of a Multiplicity of
Pursuits at once; the very Methods of obtaining the highest Gratificationof the several Senses and Desires, are directly inconsistent with eachother. For example, the violent Pursuit of the Pleasures of the external
Senses, or Sensuality, is opposite to the Pleasures of the Imagination, andto the Study of the ingenious Arts, which tend to the Ornament of Life:
These require Labour and Application, inconsistent with the Voluptuousness of the external Senses, which by itself would engross the whole
Application of our Minds, thro’ vain Associations of Ideas.
Again: The violent Pursuits of either of the former kinds of Pleasures, is often directly inconsistent with publick Affections, and with ourmoral Sense, and Sense of Honour. These Pleasures require a quite different Temper, a Mind little set upon selfish Pleasures, strongly possessedwith Love for [116] others, and Concern for their [115] Interests capableof Labour and Pain. However our desire of Honour be really selfish, yet
we know it is never acquired by Actions appearing selfish; but by suchas appear publick-spirited, with neglect of the Pleasures of the external
Senses and Wealth. Selfishness is generally attended with Shame;* andhence we conceal even our Desire of Honour itself, and are ashamed of
Praise in our own Presence, even when we are doing beneficent Actions,with design to obtain it. The Pursuits of Wealth and Power are often
directly opposite to the Pleasures of all the other kinds, at least for thepresent, however they may be intended for the future Enjoyment ofthem.
* Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 7.

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No Certainty
of Success in
any Pursuit,
save that of
Virtue.

the nature and conduct of the passions

2. “There is no such Certainty in human Affairs, that a Man can assure
himself of the perpetual Possession of these Objects which gratify any
one Desire,” except that of Virtue itself: which, since it does not depend
upon external Objects and Events,* but upon our own Affections andConduct, we may promise to our selves that we shall always enjoy. But
then Virtue consists in Benevolence, or Desire of the publick Good:
The Happiness of others is [117] very uncertain, so [116 ] that our publick
Desires may often be disappointed; and every Disappointment is uneasy, in proportion to the Degree of Desire. And therefore, however theAdmiration and fixed Pursuit of Virtue may always secure one stable andconstant Pleasure of Self-Approbation, yet this Enjoyment presupposesa Desire of publick Good, subject to frequent Disappointments, which
will be attended with Uneasiness proportioned to the Degree of publick
Desire, or the Virtue upon which we reflect. There seems therefore no
possibility of securing to our selves, in our present State, an unmixed
Happiness independently of all other Beings. Every Apprehension ofGood raises desire, every Disappointment of Desire is uneasy; every
Object of Desire is uncertain except Virtue, but the Enjoyment of Virtue
supposes the Desire of an uncertain Object, viz. the publick Happiness.
To secure therefore independently of all other Beings invariable andpure Happiness, it would be necessary either to have the Power of directing all Events in the Universe, or to root out all Sense of Evil, or
Aversion to it, while we retained our Sense of Good, but without previous Desire, the Dissappointment of which could give Pain. The rooting
out of all Senses and Desires, were it practicable, would cut off all Happiness as well as Misery: The removing [118] or stopping a part of them,might indeed be [117] of consequence to the Happiness of the Individual on some occasions, however pernicious it might be to the Whole.
But ’tis plain, we have not in our power the modelling of our Senses orDesires, to form them for a private Interest: They are fixed for us by the
Author of our Nature, subservient to the Interest of the System; sothat each Individual is made, previously to his own Choice, a Member* Treat. II. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.

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of a great Body, and affected with the Fortunes of the Whole, or at leastof many Parts of it; nor can he break himself off at pleasure.

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This may shew the Vanity of some of the lower rate of Philosophers of The Mistakes
the Stoicks
the Stoick Sect, in boasting of an undisturbed Happiness and Serenity, of
about
independently even of the Deity, as well as of their Fellow-Creatures, compleat Hapwholly inconsistent with the Order of Nature, as well as with the Prin- piness.
ciples of some of their great Leaders: for which, Men of Wit in theirown Age did not fail to ridicule them.
That must be a very fantastick Scheme of Virtue, which represents it
as a private sublimely selfish Discipline, to preserve our selves wholly unconcerned, not only in the [119] Changes of Fortune as to our Wealthor Poverty, Liberty or Slavery, Ease or Pain, but even in all external Events[118] whatsoever, in the Fortunes of our dearest Friends or Country, solacing ourselves that we are easy and undisturbed. If there be any thing
amiable in human Nature, the Reflection upon which can give us pleasure, it must be kind disinterested Affections towards our Fellows, or towards the whole, and its Author and Cause. These Affections, whenreflected upon, must be one constant Source of Pleasure in SelfApprobation. But some of these very Affections, being toward an uncertain Object, must occasion Pain, and directly produce one sort of Misery to the virtuous in this Life. ’Tis true indeed, it would be a muchgreater Misery to want such an amiable Temper, which alone secures us
from the basest and most detestable State of Self-Condemnation and Abhorrence. But, allowing such a Temper to be the necessary Occasion of
one sort of Happiness, even the greatest we are capable of, yet it may
also be the Occasion of no inconsiderable Pains in this Life.
That this affectionate Temper is true Virtue, and not that undisturbed
Selfishness, were it attainable, every one would readily own who saw
them both in Practice. Would any honest Heart relish such a Speech[120] as this from a Cato or an Aemilius Paulus? “I foresee the Effects ofthis Defeat, my Fellow-Creatures, my Countrymen, my [119] honourable
Acquaintances; many a generous gallant Patriot and Friend, Fathers,
Sons, and Brothers, Husbands and Wives, shall be inslaved, tortured, tornfrom each other, or in each other’s sight made subject to the Pride, Av-

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arice, Petulancy, or Lust of the Conqueror. I have, for my own Pleasure,
to secure agreeable Reflections, laboured in their Defence. I am unconcerned in their Misfortunes; their bodily Tortures, or more exquisite Distresses of Mind for each other, are to me indifferent. I am entirely absolute, compleat in myself; and can behold their Agonies with as much
Ease or Pleasure, as I did their Prosperity.” This is the plain Languageof some boasting Refiners upon Virtue; Sentiments as disagreeable as
those of Catiline.
The Desire of Virtue is toward an Object e◊k t w÷n éf' h’ min, or in our
power, since all Men have naturally kind Affections, which they may increase and strengthen; but these kind Affections tend toward an uncertain Object, which is not in our power. Suppose the Stoick should alledg, “Vice is the only Evil, and Virtue the only Good.” If we have
Benevolence to others, we must [121] wish them to be virtuous, and musthave compassion toward the vicious: thus still we may be subjected toPain or Uneasiness, [120] by our very Virtue; unless we suppose, what
no Experience can confirm, that Men may have strong Desires, the Disappointment of which will give no Uneasiness, or that Uneasiness is noEvil. Let the Philosopher regulate his own Notions as he pleases about
Happiness or Misery; whoever imagines himself unhappy, is so in reality; and whoever has kind Affections or Virtue, must be uneasy to see
others really unhappy.
But tho a pure unmixed Happiness is not attainable in this Life, yet
all their Precepts are not rendered useless.
Est quoddam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.—Hor. Ep. 131
3. The full
Sense of Good
may be preserved, without the Painsof Desire, inmany Cases.

3. For we may observe, thirdly, that “the Sense of Good can continue inits full Strength, when yet we shall have but weak Desires.” In this case
we are capable of enjoying all the Good in any Object, when we obtainit, and yet exposed to no great Pain upon Disappointment. This may begenerally observed, that “the Violence of Desire does not proportionably
enliven the Sensation of Good, when it is obtained; nor does diminish31. Horace, Epistles, I.32, “It is worthwhile to take a few steps forward, even if
we may not go still further.”

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ing the Desire weaken the Sensation, tho it will diminish the [122] Uneasiness of Disappointment, or the Misery of contrary Evils.” Our high Expectations of Happiness from [121] any Object, either thro’ theAcuteness of our Senses, or from our Opinions or Associations of Ideas,
never fail to increase Desire: But then the Violence of Desire does notproportionably enliven our Sensation in the Enjoyment. During thefirst confused Hurry of our Success, our Joy may perhaps be increasedby the Violence of our previous Desire, were it only by allaying the great
Uneasiness accompanying the Desire itself. But this Joy soon vanishes,
and is often succeeded by Disgust and Uneasiness, when our Sense of theGood, which is more fixed in Nature than our Fancy or Opinions, represents the Object far below our Expectation. Now he who examines all
Opinions of Good in Objects, who prevents or corrects vain Associationsof Ideas, and thereby prevents extravagant Admirations, or enthusiastick
Desires, above the real Moment of Good in the Object, if he loses thetransient Raptures of the first Success, yet he enjoys all the permanent
Good or Happiness which any Object can afford; and escapes, in a greatmeasure, both the uneasy Sensations of the more violent Desires, and theTorments of Disappointment, to which Persons of irregular Imaginations
are exposed.
[123] This is the Case of the Temperate and the Chaste, with relation
to the Appetites; of the Men of Moderation and Frugality, [122] and corrected Fancy, with regard to the Pleasures of Imagination; of the Humble
and the Content, as to Honour, Wealth or Power. Such Persons upon
good Success, want only the first transitory Ecstacies; but have a full andlively Sense of all the lasting Good in the Objects of their Pursuit; andyet are in a great measure secure against both the Uneasiness of violent
Desire, and the Dejection of Mind, and abject Sorrow upon Disappointment, or upon their being exposed to the contrary Evils.
Further, Persons of irregular Imaginations are not soon reformed, nor
their Associations of Ideas broke by every Experience of the Smallnessof the Good in the admired Object. They are often rather set upon new
Pursuits of the same kind, or of greater Variety of like Objects. So theirexperience of Disappointment, or of contrary Evils, does not soon correct their Imaginations about the Degrees of Good or Evil. The Loss of

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Good, or the Pressure of any Calamity, will continue to torment them,thro’ their vain Notions of these Events, and make them insensible of
the real Good which they might still enjoy in their present [124] State.
Thus the Covetous have smaller Pleasure in any given Degree of Wealth;the Luxurious from a splendid Table; the Ambitious from any given [123]Degree of Honour or Power, than Men of more moderate Desires: Andon the other hand, the Miseries of Poverty, mean Fare, Subjection, orContempt, appear much greater to them, than to the moderate. Experience, while these confused Ideas remain, rather increases the Disorder:
But if just Reflection comes in, and tho late, applies the proper Cure, bycorrecting the Opinions and the Imagination, every Experience will tend
to our Advantage.
The same way may our publick Desires be regulated. If we prevent
confused Notions of Good, we diminish or remove many Anxieties for
our Friends as well as our selves. Only this must be remembered, thatweakening our publick Affections, necessarily weakens our Sense of publick Good founded upon them, and will deprive us of the Pleasures ofthe moral Sense, in reflecting on our Virtue.
4. Laying our
account tomeet with
Evil, often
lessens ourMisery.

4. We may lastly remark, “That the Expectation of any Pain, or the frequent Consideration of the Evils which may befal us, or the Loss ofGood we now enjoy, before these Events actually threaten [125] us, orraise any Consternation in our Minds by their Approach, does not diminish our Joy upon escaping Evil, or our Pleasure upon the arrival ofany [124] Good beyond Expectation: But this previous Expectation
generally diminishes our Fear, while the Event is in suspence, and our
Sorrow upon its arrival;” Since thereby the Mind examines the Natureof the Event, sees how far it is necessarily Evil, and what Supports under
it are in its power: This Consideration may break vain Conjunctions offoreign Ideas, which occasion our greatest Fears in Life, and even in
Death itself. If, indeed, a weak Mind does not study to correct the
Imagination, but still dwells upon its possible Calamities, under all theirborrowed Forms of Terror; or if it industriously aggravates them to itself,
this previous Consideration may embitter its whole Life, without arming it against the smallest Evil.

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This Folly is often occasioned by that Delight which most Men findin the Pity of others under Misfortunes; those especially, who are continually indulged as the Favourites of Families or Company, being long enured to the Pleasure arising from the perpetual Marks of Love toward
them from all their Company, and from their tender Sympathy in Distress: this often leads them even to feign Misery to obtain Pity, [126] andto raise in themselves the most dejected Thoughts, either to procure
Consolation, or the Pleasure of observing the Sympathy of others. Thispeevish or pettish [125] Temper, tho it arises from something sociable in
our Frame, yet is often the Fore-runner of the greatest Corruption of
Mind. It disarms the Heart of its natural Integrity; it induces us tothrow away our true Armour, our natural Courage, and cowardly tocommit our selves to the vain Protection of others, while we neglect ourown Defence.

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section v

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A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of theseveral Senses, as to Intenseness and Duration.
[126/127] I. Having considered how far these Desires must necessarily
affect us, and when they are the Occasions of Pleasure or Pain; since by
the first general Observation, the Pursuits of their several Pleasures, andthe avoiding their several Pains, may often be inconsistent with eachother; let us next examine, which of these several Pleasures are the mostvaluable, so as to deserve our Pursuit, even with neglect of the others;
and which of these Pains are most grievous, so as to be shunned even by
the enduring of other Pains if necessary.
“The Value of any Pleasure, and the Quantity or Moment of any Pain,
is in a compounded Proportion of the Intenseness and Duration.” In examining the Duration of Pleasure, we must include not only the Constancy of the Object, but even of our Fancy; for a Change in either ofthese will put an end to it.

88
The difficultyin comparing
the several
Pleasures, as
to Intenseness.

the nature and conduct of the passions[127/128] To compare these several Pleasures and Pains as to their Intenseness, seems difficult, because of the Diversity of Tastes, or Turns ofTemper given by Custom and Education, which make strange Associations of Ideas, and form Habits; from whence it happens, that, tho all
the several kinds of original Senses and Desires seem equally natural,
yet some are led into a constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of one kind,as the only Enjoyment of Life, and are indifferent about others. Somepursue, or seem to pursue only the Pleasures of the external Senses, andall other Pursuits are made subservient to them: Others are chiefly set
upon the Pleasures of Imagination or internal Senses; social and kindAffections employ another sort, who seem indifferent to all private
Pleasure: This last Temper has generally joined with it an high moral
Sense, and Love of Honour. We may sometimes find an high Sense of
Honour and desire of Applause, where there is indeed a moral Sense,
but a very weak one, very much perverted, so as to be influenced bypopular Opinion, and made subservient to it: In this Character the
Pleasures of the external Senses, or even of the Imagination, have little
room, except so far as they may produce Distinction. Now upon comparing the several Pleasures, perhaps the Sentence of the Luxurious[129] would be quite opposite [128] to that of the Virtuous. The Ambitious would differ from both. Those who are devoted to the internal
Senses or Imagination, would differ from all the three. The Miser
would applaud himself in his Wealth above them all. Is there therefore
no disputing about Tastes? Are all Persons alike happy, who obtain theseveral Enjoyments for which they have a Relish? If they are, the Dispute is at an end: A Fly or Maggot in its proper haunts, is as happy asa Hero, or Patriot, or Friend, who has newly delivered his Country or
Friend, and is surrounded with their grateful Praises. The Fly or Maggot may think so of itself; but who will stand to its Judgment, when
we are sure that it has experienced only one sort of Pleasure, and is a
stranger to the others? May we not in like manner find some Reasonsof appealing from the Judgment of certain Men? Or may not some
Characters be found among Men, who alone are capable of judging inthis matter?

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II. It is obvious that “those alone are capable of judging, who have ex- The Pleasuresa moralperienced all the several kinds of Pleasure, and have their Senses acute ofKind proved
and fully exercised in them all.” Now a high Relish for Virtue, or a superior, bystrong moral Sense, with [130] its concomitant publick Sense and Affec- the Testimonyof the Virtutions, and a Sense of Honour, was never alledged to impair our external ous.
Senses, or [129] to make us incapable of any pleasure of the Imagination;
Temperance never spoiled a good Palate, whatever Luxury may havedone; a generous affectionate publick Spirit, reflecting on itself with delight, never vitiated any Organ of external Pleasure, nor weakened their
Perceptions. Now all virtuous Men have given Virtue this Testimony,that its Pleasures are superior to any other, nay to all others jointly; thata friendly generous Action gives a Delight superior to any other; that
other Enjoyments, when compared with the Delights of Integrity, Faith,
Kindness, Generosity, and publick Spirit, are but trifles scarce worth any
regard.*Nay, we need not confine our Evidence to the Testimony of the perfectly By the Testiof the
Virtuous. The vicious Man, tho no fit judge, were he entirely aban- mony
Vicious.
doned, since he loses his Sense of the Pleasures of the moral Kind, or atleast has not experienced them fully, yet he generally retains so much ofhuman Nature, and of the Senses and Affections of our [131] Kind, as
sometimes to experience even moral Pleasures. There is scarce any Mortal, who is wholly insensible to all Species of Morality.
[130] A Luxurious Debauchee has never perhaps felt the Pleasures of awise publick-spirited Conduct, of an entirely upright, generous, social,* See this Argument in Plato de Repub. Lib. IX. And Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry
concerning Virtue.
[[Plato, Republic 586d–e. Plato’s argument in this passage concerns the superiority of the pleasures of the highest part of the soul. “How much the social pleasures
are superior to any other may be known by visible tokens and effects. . . . But moreparticularly still may this superiority be known from the actual prevalence andascendancy of this sort of affection over all besides. . . . No joy, merely of sense,
can be a match for it,” Shaftesbury, “Inquiry Concerning Virtue,” II.2.1. (Characteristicks, II.59)]]

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and affectionate Life, with the Sense of his own moral Worth, and merited Esteem and Love; this course of Life, because unknown to him, he
may despise in comparison of his Pleasures. But if in any particular Affair, a moral Species, or Point of Honour has affected him, he will soon
despise his sensual Pleasures in comparison of the Moral. Has he a Person whom he calls his Friend, whom he loves upon whatever fantastick
Reasons, he can quit his Debauch to serve him, nay can run the Hazardof Wounds and Death to rescue him from Danger? If his Honour be concerned to resent an Affront, will he not quit his Pleasures, and run thehazard of the greatest bodily Pain, to shun the Imputation of Cowardice
or Falshood? He will scorn one who tells him, that “a Lyar, or a Coward,
may be happy enough, while he has all things necessary to Luxury.” ’Tis
in vain to alledge, “that there is no disputing about Tastes:” To every
Nature there are certain Tastes assigned by the great Author [132] ofall. To the human Race there are assigned a publick Taste, a moral one,and a Taste for Honour. These Senses they cannot extirpate, more thantheir external Senses: [131] They may pervert them, and weaken them byfalse Opinions, and foolish Associations of Ideas; but they cannot be
happy but by keeping them in their natural State, and gratifying them.
The Happiness of an Insect or Brute, will only make an Insect or Brutehappy. But a Nature with further Powers, must have further Enjoyments.
Nay, let us consider the different Ages in our own Species. We once
knew the time when an Hobby-Horse, a Top, a Rattle, was sufficient
Pleasure to us. We grow up, we now relish Friendships, Honour, good
Offices, Marriage, Offspring, serving a Community or Country. Is there nodifference in these Tastes? We were happy before, are we no happier
now? If not, we have made a foolish Change of Fancy. An HobbyHorse is more easily procured than an Employment; a Rattle kept in order with less trouble than a Friend; a Top than a Son. But this Change
of Fancy does not depend upon our Will. “Our Nature determines us
to certain Pursuits in our several Stages; and following her Dictates, isthe only way to our Happiness. Two States may both be [133] happy,
and yet the one infinitely preferable to the other: Two Species may bothbe content, and yet the Pleasures of the one, greater beyond all comparison, than those of the other.” The virtuous Man, who has [132] as true

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a Sense of all external Pleasure as any, gives the preference to moral Pleasures. The Judgment of the Vicious is either not to be regarded, becauseof his Ignorance on one side; or, if he has experience of moral Sentiments
in any particular Cases, he agrees with the Virtuous.
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III. Again, we see in fact, that in the virtuous Man, publick Affections, a Experiencethemoral Sense, and Sense of Honour, actually overcome all other Desires or proves
same.
Senses, even in their full Strength. Here there is the fairest Combate,
and the Success is on the side of Virtue.
There is indeed an obvious Exception against this Argument. “Do
not we see, in many Instances, the external Senses overcome the moral?”But the Reply is easy. A constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of the external
Senses can never become agreeable, without an Opinion of Innocence,or the Absence of moral Evil; so that here the moral Sense is not engaged
in the Combat. [134] Do not our* luxurious Debauchees, among their
Intimates, continually defend their Practices as innocent? Transient Actsof Injustice may be done, contrary to the moral Sentiments of the [133]Agent, to obtain relief from some pressing Evil, or upon some violent
Motion of Appetite: and yet even in these cases, Men often argue themselves into some moral Notions of their Innocence. But for a continued
Course of Life disapproved by the Agent, how few are the Instances?
How avowedly miserable is that State, wherein all Self-Approbation, allconsciousness of Merit or Goodness is gone? We might here also alledge,
what universal Experience confirms, “that not only an Opinion of Innocence is a necessary Ingredient in a Course of selfish Pleasures, so that
there should be no Opposition from the moral Sense of the Agent; butthat some publick Affections, some Species of moral Good, is the mostpowerful Charm in all sensual Enjoyments.” And yet, on the other
hand, “Publick Affections, Virtue, Honour, need no Species of sensual
Pleasure to recommend them; nor even an Opinion or Hope of Exemption from external Pain. These powerful Forms can appear amiable, and engage our Pursuit thro’ the rugged [135] Paths of Hunger,
Thirst, Cold, Labour, Expences, Wounds and Death.”* Treat. II. Sect. 4. Art. 4. last Paragraph.

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Thus, when a Prospect of external Pleasure, or of avoiding bodily
Pain, engages Men into Actions really evil, the moral Sense of the Agentis not really overcome [134] by the external Senses. The Action or Omission does not appear morally evil to the Agent. The Temptation seems
to extenuate, or wholly excuse the Action. Whereas when a Point of
Honour, or a moral Species, makes any one despise the Pleasures or Painsof the external Senses, there can be no question made of a real Victory.
The external Senses represent these Objects in the same manner, when
they are conquered. None denies to the Virtuous their Sense of Pain,
Toil or Wounds. They are allowed as lively a Sense as others, of all external Pleasure of every kind. The Expences of Generosity, Humanity, Charity and Compassion are allowed, even when yielded to Virtue, to be
known to the full. But the moral Sense, weak as it often is, does notyield even to known external Pleasure, Ease or Advantage: but, where
there is a depraved Taste, and a weak Understanding, private Advantage,or the avoiding of some external Evil, may make Actions appear innocent, which are not; and then the moral Sense gives no Opposition. All
the Conquest [136] on such Occasions is only this, that private external
Advantage surmounts our Aversion to Dishonour, by making us do Actions which others will censure, but we esteem innocent. In these Cases
we generally fear only the Reproach of a Party, [135] of whom we haveconceived an unfavourable Opinion.*
Nay farther: It was before observed, that “fantastick Associations of
Ideas do not really increase the Pleasure of Enjoyment, however they increase the previous Desire. The want of such Associations does not abate
the external Pain, tho it diminishes the previous Fear, or takes awaysome farther Fears which may attend the Pain.” So that a Man of themost correct Imagination does feel and know all the Good in external
Pleasure, and all the Evil in Pain. “When therefore the moral Sense, andpublick Affections, overcome all sensual Pleasure, or bodily Pain, they doit by their own Strength, without foreign Aids. Virtue is never blended
with bodily Pleasure, nor Vice with bodily Pain in our Imaginations. But* Sect. 4. Art. 3.

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when the external Senses seem to prevail against the moral Sense, or
publick Affections, it is continually by Aid borrowed from the moral[137] Sense, and publick Affections themselves, or from our Sense of
Honour.” The Conquest is over a weakned moral Sense, upon partial
views of Good, not by external Pleasure alone, but [136] by some moral
Species, raised by a false Imagination.
Set before Men in the clearest Light all external Pleasures, but strip
them of their borrowed Notions of Dignity, Hospitality, Friendship,
Generosity, Liberality, Communication of Pleasure; let no regard be hadto the Opinions of others, to Credit, to avoiding Reproach, to Company:
Separate from the Pursuit of Wealth all Thoughts of a Family, Friends,
Relations, Acquaintance; let Wealth be only regarded as the Means ofprivate Pleasure of the external Senses, or of the Imagination, to the Possessor alone; let us divide our confused Ideas,* and consider things
barely and apart from each other: and in opposition to these Desires,set but the weakest moral Species, and see if they can prevail over it. On
the other hand, let us examine as much as we please, a friendly, generous,
grateful, or publick-spirited Action; divest it of all external Pleasure, still* See Marcus Antoninus, Lib. III. c. II. and often elsewhere.
[[This footnote was added in the third edition. In his edition of Aurelius, Hutcheson renders the passage: “This also should be observed, that such things as ensue
upon what is well constituted by nature, have also something graceful and attractive.
Thus, some parts of a well baked loaf will crack and become rugged. What is thus
cleft beyond the design of the baker, looks well, and invites the appetite. So whenfigs are at the ripest, they begin to crack. Thus in full ripe olives, their approach toputrefication gives the proper beauty to the fruit. Thus, the laden’d ear of corn
hanging down, the stern brow of the lyon, and the foam flowing from the mouthof the wild boar, and many other things, considered apart, have nothing comely;
yet because of their connexion with things natural, they adorn them, and delightthe spectator. Thus, to one who has a deep affection of soul, and penetration into
the constitution of the whole, scarce any thing connected with nature will fail torecommend itself agreeably to him. Thus, the real vast jaws of savage beasts willplease him, no less than the imitations of them by painters or statuaries. With likepleasure will his chaste eyes behold the maturity and grace of old age in man or
woman, and the inviting charms of youth. Many such things will he experience,not credible to all, but only those who have the genuine affection of soul toward
nature and its works,” James Moor and Francis Hutcheson (trans.), The Meditationsof the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, 76–77.]]

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it will appear the more lovely; the longer we fix our Attention [138] toit, the more we admire it. What is it which we feel in our own Hearts,
determining as it were our Fate as to Happiness or Misery? What sortof Sensations are the most lively and delightful? In what sort of Possessions does the highest Joy and Self-Satisfaction consist? Who has everfelt the Pleasure of a generous [137] friendly Temper, of mutual Love, ofcompassionate Relief and Succour to the distressed; of having served a
Community, and render’d Multitudes happy; of a strict Integrity, andthorow Honesty, even under external Disadvantages, and amidst Dangers; of Congratulation and publick Rejoycing, in the Wisdom andProsperity of Persons beloved, such as Friends, Children, or intimate
Neighbours? Who would not, upon Reflection, prefer that State ofMind, these Sensations of Pleasure, to all the Enjoyments of the external
Senses, and of the Imagination without them?*

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Our Judgments in theCase of others
proves thesame.

IV. The truth, in a Question of this nature, one might expect would be
best known by the Judgment of Spectators, concerning the Pursuits ofothers. Let them see one entirely employed in Solitude, with the mostexquisite Tastes, Odors, [139] Prospects, Painting, Musick; but without
any Society, Love or Friendship, or any Opportunity of doing a kind or
generous Action; and see also a† Man employed in protecting the Poorand Fatherless, receiving the Blessings of those who were ready to perish, and making the Widow to sing for [138] Joy; a Father to the Needy,
an Avenger of Oppression; who never despised the Cause of his very
Slave, but considered him as his Fellow-Creature, formed by the same
Hand; who never eat his Morsel alone, without the Orphan at his Ta-* See this Subject fully treated, in the second Part of Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry
concerning Virtue.
†
See the Character of Job, Ch. xxxi. See also Treat. II. Sect. 6.
[[The general tenor of the passage from Job emphasizes the blameworthiness of
those who act wickedly towards their communities. It concludes: “ ‘If my land has
cried out against me, and its furrows have wept together; if I have eaten its yield
without payment, and caused the death of its owners; let thorns grow instead ofwheat, and foul weeds instead of barley’ ” (The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard
Version (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 527).]]

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ble, nor caused the Eyes of the Poor to fail; who never suffered the Naked to perish, but warmed them with the Fleece of his Sheep; whonever took advantage of the Indigent in Judgment, thro’ Confidence in
his own Power or Interest; Let this Character be compared with the former; nay, add to this latter some considerable Pains of the external
Senses, with Labour and kind Anxiety: which of the two would a Spectator chuse? Which would he admire, or count the happier, and mostsuitable to human Nature? Were he given to Castle-building, or were headvising a Son, or a Friend, which of these States would he chuse orrecommend? Such a Trial would [140] soon discover the Prevalence ofthe moral Species above all Enjoyments of Life.
V. There are a sort of Pleasures opposite to those of the publick Sense, Little Happiin maliarising from the Gratification of Anger or Hatred. To compare these ness
cious PleaPleasures with those of Benevolence, we must observe what holds uni- sures.
versally of all Mankind. The Joy, and Gaiety, and Happiness of any Nature, of which we have formed no previous Opinion, [139] either favourable or unfavourable, nor obtained any other Ideas than merelythat it is sensitive, fills us with Joy and Delight: The apprehending theTorments of any such sensitive Nature, gives us Pain. The Poets know
how to raise delight in us by such pastoral Scenes, they feel the Power ofsuch pleasing Images: they know that the human Heart can dwell uponsuch Contemplations with delight; that we can continue long with Pleasure, in the View of Happiness of any Nature whatsoever. When we havereceived unfavourable Apprehensions of any Nature, as cruel and savage, we begin indeed from our very publick Affections, to desire their
Misery as far as it may be necessary to the Protection of others.
But that the Misery of another, for its own sake, is never grateful, we
may all find by making this Supposition: “That had we the [141] mostsavage Tyger, or Crocodile, or some greater Monster of our own Kind,a Nero, or Domitian, chained in some Dungeon; that we were perfectly
assured they should never have power of doing farther Injuries; that noMortal should ever know their Fate or Fortunes, nor be influenced bythem; that the Punishments inflicted on them would never restrain others by way of example, nor any Indulgence shown be discovered; [140]96

the nature and conduct of the passions

that the first Heat of our Resentment were allayed by Time”—No Mortal, in such a Case, would incline to torture such wretched Natures, or
keep them in continual Agonies, without some prospect of Good arisingfrom their Sufferings. What farther would the fiercest Rage extend to,
if once the Tyrant, thus eternally confined from Mischief, began himself to feel Remorse and Anguish for his Crimes? Nay, did he continue
without Reflection on his past Life, so as neither to betray Remorse nor
Approbation, were Mankind well secured against his Temper, who
would delight to load him with useless Misery?
If the Misery of others then be not grateful for itself, whence arises
the Pleasure of Cruelty and Revenge? The Reason is plainly this: Upon
apprehending Injury to our selves or others, Nature wisely determines [142] us to study Defense, not only for the present, but for the
future. Anger arises with its most uneasy Sensations, as every one acknowledges. The Misery of the Injurious allays this furious Pain. Our
Nature scarce leads to any farther Resentment, when once the Injurious
seems to us fully seized with Remorse, so that we fear no farther Evils
from him, or when all his Power is gone. Those who continue their Revenge further, are prepossessed with [141] some false Opinion of Mankind, as worse than they really are; and are not easily inclined to believe
their hearty Remorse for Injuries, or to think themselves secure. Some
Point of Honour, or Fear of Reproach, engages Men in cruel Acts of Revenge: But this farther confirms, that the Misery of another is only grateful as it allays, or secures us against a furious Pain; and cannot be theOccasion, by itself, of any Satisfaction. Who would not prefer Absenceof Injury to Injury revenged? Who would not chuse an untainted Reputation, for Courage gained in a just War, in which, without Hatred orAnger, we acted from Love of our Country, rather than the Fame acquired by asserting our questioned Courage with furious Anger in aDuel, and with continued Hatred toward the Person conquered? Who
can dwell upon a Scene of Tortures, tho practis’d upon the vilest Wretch;or can delight either [143] in the Sight or Description of Vengeance, prolonged beyond all necessity of Self-Defense, or publick Interest? “The
Pleasure of Revenge then is to the Pleasures of Humanity and Virtue,

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as the flaking the burning, and constantly recurring Thirst of a Fever,to the natural Enjoyments of grateful Food in Health.”

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VI. Were we to compare, in like manner, the Pains of the publick and Moral Evilwithmoral Sense, and of the Sense of Honour, with [142] other Pains of the comparedother Evils,
external Senses, or with the greatest external Losses, we should find the appears
former by far superior. And yet nothing is more ordinary, than to find greater.
Causes of MisMen, who will allow “the Pleasures of the former Classes superior to any take.
other, and yet look upon external Pain as more intollerable than any.”
There are two Reasons for this Mistake. 1. “They compare the mostacute Pains of the external Senses with some smaller Pains of the other
Senses.” Whereas, would they compare the strongest of both Kinds,
they would find the Ballance on the other side. How often have Parents, Husbands, Friends, Patriots, endured the greatest bodily Pains, toavoid the Pains of their publick and moral Sense, and Sense of Honour?
How do they every day suffer Hunger, Thirst, and Toil, to prevent like
Evils to those they love? [144] How often do Men endure, for their
Party or Faction, the greatest external Evils, not only when they are unavoidable, but, when by counter-acting their publick or moral Sense, orSense of Honour, they could extricate themselves? Some Crimes appear
so horrid, some Actions so cruel and detestable, that there is hardly any
Man but would rather suffer Death, than be conscious of having donethem.
[143] The second Cause of Mistake in this Matter, is this, “Theavoiding moral Evil by the Sufferance of external Pain, does not diminish the Sense of the Pain; but on the other hand, the Motive of avoiding
grievous Pain, really diminishes the moral Evil in the Action done withthat design.” So that in such Instances we compare external Pain in its
full strength, with a moral Pain of the lighter sort, thus alleviated by theGreatness of the Temptation.* To make a just Comparison, it should be
thus: “Whether would a Man chuse to be tortured to Death, or to have,* Treat. II. Sect. 7, 9. Cor. 3.
[[The reference is incorrect. The proper reference is to T2 VII.7 Cor. 3. See n 11.]]

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without any Temptation or Necessity, tortured another, or a dear Friend,or Child to Death?” Not whether a Man will betray his Friend orCountry, for fear of Tortures, but “whether it be better voluntarily, andunder no fear, to betray a Friend, or our Country, than to suffer [145]Tortures, or the Pain of the Gout or Stone equal to Tortures?” Uponsuch Comparisons as these, we should find some other Pains and Misery superior to any external Pain. When we judge of the State of others,
we would not be long in suspense which of these Evils to [144] chuse as
the lightest for those whom we* most regarded.

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Publick Affections compared with our
Desire of
Virtue.

VII. We have hitherto only compared on the one side the publick andmoral Sense, and the Sense of Honour jointly, with the external Senses, thePleasures of Imagination, and external Advantage or Disadvantage jointly.
The reason of joining them thus must be obvious, since, to a Mind notprepossessed with any false Apprehensions of things, the former three
Senses and Desires really concur, in exciting to the same Course of Action; for promoting the publick Good, can never be opposite to private
Virtue; nor can the Desire of Virtue ever lead to any thing pernicious to
the Publick: Had Men also true Opinions, Honour could only be obtained by Virtue, or serving the Publick.
But since there may be some corrupt partial Notions of Virtue, as
when Men have inadvertently engaged themselves into [146] someParty or Faction pernicious to the Publick, or when we mistake the Tendencies of Actions, or have some Notions of the Deity, † as requiring* Treat. II. Sect. 6. Art. 1.
†
Such mistaken Notions of Religion, and of some particular moral Species, haveproduced these monstrous Decisions or Apothegms; viz. “Some Actions are not lawful, tho they were necessary not only to universal temporal Happiness, but to the eternal
Salvation of the whole World, or to avoid universal eternal Misery.”

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“Fiat Justitia & ruat Caelum.”
Whereas the only Reason why some Actions are looked upon as universally andnecessarily Evil, is only this, “that in our present Constitution of Nature, theycannot possibly produce any good, prepollent to their evil Consequences.” Whatever35

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some Actions [145] apprehended pernicious to the publick, as Duties tohimself; in such cases there is room to compare our publick Sense or Desires with our moral, to see which is prevalent. The Pleasures of these
Senses, in such cases, need not be compared; the following either theone or the other will give little Pleasure: The Pain of the counteractedSense will prevent all Satisfaction. This State is truly deplorable, when a
Person is thus distracted between two noble Principles, his publick Affections, and Sense of Virtue. But it may be inquired, which of these
Senses, when counteracted, would occasion the greater Pain? Perhaps
nothing [147] can be answered universally on either side. With Men ofrecluse contemplative Lives, who have dwelt much upon some moral
Ideas, but without large extensive View of publick Good, or without engaging themselves to the full in the publick [146] Affections, and common Affairs of Life: The Sense of Virtue, in some partial confined View
of it, would probably prevail; especially since these partial Species ofVirtue have always some sort of kind Affection to assist them. With active Men, who have fully exercised their publick Affections, and have acquired as it were an Habit this way, ’tis probable the publick Affections
would be prevalent. Thus we find that active Men, upon any publick
Necessity, do always break thro’ the limited narrow Rules of Virtue or
Justice, which are publickly received, even when they have scarce any
Scheme of Principles to justify their Conduct: Perhaps, indeed, in suchcases, their moral Sense is brought over to the Side of their Affections,tho their speculative Opinions are opposite to both.

Action would do so, in the whole of its Effects must necessarily be good. This Proposition is Identick.
[[The phrase means, “Do what is right even if it brings down the heavens.” Itapparently has no classical sources but was a common legal expression. Martin
Luther had a well-known variant in his Second Sermon on Psalm 110 (37, 138, 7):“Fiat justitia et pereat mundus.” Although Hutcheson is condemning the quotation
as fanatical and inhumane, and associating it with an extremist Augustineanism,
the quotation has become synonymous with doing what is right whatever the cost
as opposed to what is politic.]]

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The Moral
Sense
compared with
the Sense of
Honour.

the nature and conduct of the passions

VIII. It is of more consequence to compare the publick and moral
Senses, in opposition to the Sense of Honour. Here there may be direct
Opposition, since Honour is conferred according to the moral Notions [148] of those who confer it, which may be contrary to those of
the Agent, and contrary to what he thinks conducive to the publickGood.
To allow the Prevalence of Honour, cannot with any Person of justReflection, [147] weaken the Cause of Virtue, since Honour presupposes* a moral Sense, both in those who desire it, and those who confer
it. But it is enough for some Writers, who affect to be wondrous shrewd
in their Observations on human Nature, and fond of making all theWorld, as well as themselves, a selfish Generation, incapable of any real
Excellence or Virtue, without any natural Disposition toward a publick
Interest, or toward any moral Species; to get but a “Set of different Words
from those commonly used, yet including the same natural Dispositions,† or presupposing them,” however an inadvertent Reader may notobserve it; and they are sufficiently furnished to shew, that there is noreal Virtue, that all is but Hyppocrisy, Disguise, Art, or Interest. “To behonoured, highly esteemed, valued, praised, or on the contrary, to be despised, undervalued, censured or condemned; to be proud or ashamed, areWords without any meaning, if we take away a moral [149] Sense.” Let
this Sense be as capricious, inconstant, different in different Persons as
they please to alledge, “a Sense of Morality there must be, and natural it
must be, if the Desire of Esteem, Pride or Shame be natural.”[148] To make this comparison between the publick and moral
Senses on the one hand, and that of Honour on the other, ’tis to be observed, that all Aversion to Evil is stronger than Desire of positive Good.
There are many sorts of positive Good, without which any one may beeasy, and enjoy others of a different kind: But Evil of almost any kind,in a high Degree, may make Life intolerable. The avoiding of Evil is* See Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 4.
†
Ibid.

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always allowed a more extenuating Circumstance in a Crime, than the
Prospect of positive Good: to make therefore just Comparisons of thePrevalence of several Desires or Senses, their several Goods should be
opposed to each other, and their Evils to each other, and not the Pleasures of one compared with the Pains of another.
Publick Affections, in their nearer Ties, frequently overcome not only
the Pleasures of Honour, but even the Pains of Shame. This is the mostcommon Event in Life, [150] that for some apprehended Interest of Offspring, Families, Friends, Men should neglect Opportunities of gaining
Honour, and even incur Shame and Contempt. In Actions done for theService of a Party, there can be no comparison, for Honour is often a
Motive on both sides.
[149] ’Tis also certain, that the Fear of Shame, in some Instances, will
overcome all other Desires whatsoever, even natural Affection, Love ofPleasure, Virtue, Wealth, and even of Life itself. This Fear has excited
Parents to the Murder of their Offspring; has persuaded Men to themost dangerous Enterprizes; to squander away their Fortunes, to counteract their Duty, and even to throw away their Lives. The Distraction
and Convulsion of Mind observable in these Conflicts of Honour, with
Virtue and publick Affection, shews how unnatural that State is,wherein the strongest Principles of Action, naturally designed to co-operate and assist each other, are thus set in Opposition.
’Tis perhaps impossible to pronounce any thing universally concerning the Superiority of the Desire of Honour on the one hand, or that of
the Desire of Virtue and publick Good on the other. Habits or [151] Custom may perhaps determine the Victory on either side. Men in highStations, who have long indulged the Desire of Honour, and haveformed the most frightful Apprehensions of Contempt as the worst ofEvils; or even those in lower Stations, who have been long enured tovalue Reputation in any particular, and dread Dishonour in that point,
may have Fear of Shame superior [150] to all Aversions. Men, on thecontrary, who have much indulged good Nature, or reflected muchupon the Excellency of Virtue itself, abstracted from Honour, may findAffections of this kind prevalent above the Fear of Shame.

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To compare the moral Sense with the Sense of Honour, we must findcases where the Agent condemns an Action with all its present Circumstances as evil, and yet fears Infamy by omitting it, without any unequal
Motives of other kinds on either side: Or when one may obtain Praiseby an Action, when yet the Omission of it would appear to himself asconsiderable a Virtue, as the Praise to be expected from the Action
would represent the Action to be. The common Instances, in whichsome, who pretend deep Knowledge of human Nature, triumph much,
Duels no have not these necessary Circumstances. When a Man condems Duelproperling in his private Sentiments, and yet practices it, we have indeed aInstances.
considerable [152] Evidence of the Strength of this Desire of Honour, orAversion to Shame, since it surpasses the Fear of Death. But here on one
hand, besides the Fear of Shame, there is the Fear of constant Insults, of
losing all the Advantages depending upon the Character of Courage,
and sometimes even some Species of Virtue and publick Good, in restraining an insolent [151] Villain: On the other hand is the Fear of
Death. The moral Sense is seldom much concerned: for however Men
may condemn voluntary Duelling; however they may blame the Age for
the Custom, or censure the Laws as defective, yet generally, in theirpresent Case, Duelling appears a necessary Piece of Self-Defence against
opprobrious Injuries and Affronts, for which the Law has provided no
Redress, and consequently leaves Men to the natural Rights of SelfDefence and Prosecution of Injuries. The Case seems to them the samewith that of Thieves and Night-Robbers, who may be put to Death byprivate Persons, when there is no hope of overtaking them by Law.
These are certainly the Notions of those who condemn Duelling, andyet practise it.
It is foreign to our present Purpose, to detect the Fallacy of these Arguments, in defence of Duels, as they are commonly practiced amongus; when Men from a [153] sudden Anger, upon some trifling or imaginary Affronts the despising of which would appear honourable in every
wise Man’s Eyes, expose themselves, and often their dearest Friends to
Death, and hazard the Ruin of their own Families, as well as that of
their Adversary; tho the Success in such Attempts can have no tendency

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to justify them [152] against the dishonourable Charge, or to procure
any Honour from Men of worth.

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The magnified Instance of Lucretia* is yet less to our purpose. Some Nor the Casetalk, as if “she indeed would rather have died than consented to the of Lucretia.
Crime; but the Crime did not appear so great an Evil as the Dishonour;
to the Guilt she submitted to avoid the Shame.” Let us consider thisrenowned Argument. Was there then no Motive on either side, but Fearof Shame, and a Sense of Duty? If we look into the Story, we shall find,that to persuade her to consent, there conspired, beside the Fear of
Shame, and of Death, which she little regarded, the Hope of noble Revenge, or rather of Justice on the Ravisher, and the whole Tyrant’s Family; nay, the Hopes of a [154] nobler Fame by her future Conduct; theFear of suffering that contumely by force, which she was tempted toconsent to, and that in such a manner as she could have had no Redress.
All these Considerations concurred to make her consent. On the otherside, there was only the moral Sense of a Crime thus extenuated by themost grievous Necessity, and by hopes of doing Justice to her Husband’s
Honour, and rescuing her Country: Nay, [153] could she not have at once
saved her Character and her Life by consenting; when in that virtuous
Age she might have expected Secrecy in the Prince, since boasting ofsuch Attempts would have been dangerous to the greatest Man in
Rome?
It is not easy to find just Room for a Comparison even in fictitious
Cases, between these two Principles. Were there a Person who had no
Belief of any Deity, or of any reality in Religion, in a Country where
his secular Interest would not suffer by a Character of Atheism; and yet* Livy, Lib. I. c. 57.
[[Hutcheson is citing Livy’s famous account of the rape of Lucretia, her suicide,the consequent overthrow of the Tarquins by Brutus, and the establishment of the
Roman Republic. He is likely also opposing Lucretia as causa proxima of the establishment of the Roman republic to St. Augustine’s well-known condemnation of
Lucretia’s suicide (and opposition between the behavior of pagan and Christian
women) in the City of God, I.19.]]

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he knew that the Profession of zealous Devotion would tend to his
Honour: If such a Person could have any Sense of Morality, particularly
an Aversion to Dissimulation, then his Profession of Religion would evidence the Superiority of the Sense of Honour; [155] and his Discovery of
his Sentiments, or Neglect of Religion, would evidence the Ballance to
be on the other side. I presume in England and Holland, we have more
Instances of the latter than the former. ’Tis true, our Gentlemen who
affect the Name of Freedom, may have now their Hopes of Honour fromtheir own Party, as well as others.
The Adherence to any particular Religion by one in a strange Country, where it was dishonourable, would not be allowed a [154] good Instance of the Prevalence of a moral Species; it is a very common thing
indeed, but here are Interests of another Life, and Regard to a future Return to a Country where this Religion is in repute.

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The Pleasuresof Imagination
greater thanthose of external Senses.

IX. The Pleasures of the internal Senses, or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, who have any tolerable Taste of them, as a much superior
Happiness to those of the external Senses, tho they were enjoyed to the
full.
Other Comparisons might be made but with less use, or certainty inany general Conclusions, which might be drawn from them.
[156] The Pleasures of Wealth or Power, are proportioned to the Gratifications of the Desires or Senses, which the Agent intends to gratify by
them: So that, for the Reasons above offered, Wealth and Power give
greater Happiness to the Virtuous, than to those who consult only Luxury or external Splendor. If these Desires are grown enthusiastick and habitual, without regard to any other end than Possession, they are an endless Source of Vexation, without any real Enjoyment; a perpetual
Craving, without Nourishment or Digestion; and they may surmount allother Affections, [155] by Aids borrowed from other Affections themselves.
The fantastick Desires are violent, in proportion to the Senses fromwhich the associated Ideas are borrowed. Only it is to be observed, that
however the Desires may be violent, yet the obtaining the Object desired
gives little Satisfaction; the Possession discovers the Vanity and Deceit,

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and the Fancy is turned toward different Objects, in a perpetual Succession of inconstant Pursuits.

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X. These several kinds of Pleasure or Pain are next to be compared as to A Comparison
the several
their Duration. Here we are not only to consider [157] the Certainty of of
Pleasures as to
the Objects occasioning these Sensations, but the Constancy of our Rel- Duration.
ish or Fancy.
1. The Objects necessary to remove the Pains of Appetite, and to giveas grateful external Sensations as any others, to a Person of a correct Imagination, may be universally secured by common Prudence and Industry.
But then the Sensations themselves are short and transitory; the Pleasurecontinues no longer than the Appetite, nor does it leave any thing behind it, to supply the Intervals of Enjoyment. When the Sensation ispast, we are no happier for it, there is no pleasure in [156] Reflection; norare past Sensations any security against, or support under either external
Pain, or any other sort of evil incident to us. If we keep these Senses
pure, and unmixed with foreign Ideas, they cannot furnish Employment
for Life: If foreign Ideas come in, the Objects grow difficult and uncertain, and our Relish or Fancy full of Inconstancy and Caprice.
[158] 2. In like manner, the Pleasures of the Imagination may be enjoyed by all, and be a sure Foundation of Pleasure, if we abstract from
Property, and keep our Imagination pure. Such are the Pleasures in the
Observation of Nature, and even the Works of Art; which are ordinarily
exposed to view. But as these give less Pleasure the more familiar theygrow, they cannot sufficiently employ or entertain Mankind, much lesscan they secure us against, or support us under the Calamities of Life,
such as Anger, Sorrow, Dishonour, Remorse, or external Pain. If the monstrous or trifling Taste take place, or the Ideas of Property, they may indeed give sufficient Employment, but they bring along with them little
Pleasure, frequent Disgusts, Anxieties, and Disappointments, in the acquiring and retaining their Objects.
[157] 3. The publick Happiness is indeed, as to external Appearance, avery uncertain Object; nor is it often in our power to remedy it, bychanging the Course of Events. There are perpetual Changes in Mankind from Pleasures to Pains, and often from Virtue to Vice. Our pub-106

the nature and conduct of the passions

lick Desires must therefore frequently subject us to Sorrow; and the Pleasures of the publick Sense must [159] be very inconstant. ’Tis true
indeed, that a general Good-will to our kind, is the most constant Inclination of the Mind, which grows upon us by Indulgence; nor are weever dissatisfied with the Fancy: the Incertainty therefore is wholly owing to the Objects. If there can be any Considerations found out to makeit probable, that in the Whole all Events tend to Happiness, this implicit Hope indeed may make our publick Affections the greatest andmost constant Source of Pleasure. Frequent Reflection on this, is the best
Support under the Sorrow arising from particular evils, befalling ourFellow-Creatures. In our nearer Attachments brought upon our selves,
we may procure to our selves the greatest Enjoyments of this kind, withconsiderable Security and Constancy, by chusing for our Friends, or dearest Favourites, Persons of just Apprehensions of Things, who are subjected only to the necessary Evils of Life, and can enjoy all [158] the certain and constant Good. And in like manner, our Attachment to a
Country may be fixed by something else than the Chance of our Nativity.
The Enjoyments of the publick Sense cannot indeed secure us against
bodily Pains or Loss; but they are often a considerable Support underthem. Nothing can more allay Sorrow and Dejection of Mind for private
Misfortunes, than good [160] Nature, and Reflection upon the Happiness of those we love.
4. The moral Sense, if we form true Opinions of the Tendencies of
Actions, and of the Affections whence they spring, as it is the Fountainof the most intense Pleasure, so “it is in itself constant, not subject toCaprice or Change. If we resolutely incourage this Sense, it grows moreacute by frequent Gratification, never cloys, nor ever is surfeited. We
not only are sure never to want Opportunities of doing good, which arein every one’s power in the highest Degree;* but each good Action is
Matter of pleasant Reflection as long as we live. These Pleasures cannot
indeed wholly secure us against all kinds of Uneasiness, yet they nevertend naturally to increase them. On the contrary, their general [159]* Treat. 2. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.

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Tendency is to lead the virtuous Agent into all Pleasures, in the highestDegree in which they are consistent with each other. Our external Senses
are not weakned by Virtue, our Imaginations are not impaired; the temperate Enjoyment of all external Pleasures is the highest. A virtuous Conduct is generally the most prudent, even as to outward Prosperity.
Where Virtue costs us much, its own [161] Pleasures are the more sublime. It directly advances the Pleasures of the publick Sense, by leading
us to promote the publick Happiness as far as we can; and Honour is its
natural and ordinary Attendant. If it cannot remove the necessary Painsof Life, yet it is the best Support under them. These moral Pleasures dosome way more nearly affect us than any other: They make us delightin our selves, and relish our very Nature. By these we perceive an internal
Dignity and Worth; and seem to have a Pleasure like to that ascribed
often to the Deity, by which we enjoy our own Perfection, and that ofevery other Being.”
It may perhaps seem too metaphysical to alledge on this Subject, that
other Sensations are all dependent upon, or related by the Constitutionof our Nature, to something different from our selves; to a [160] Body
which we do not call Self, but something belonging to this Self. Thatother Perceptions of Joy or Pleasure carry with them Relations to Objects,
and Spaces distinct from this Self; whereas “the Pleasures of Virtue are
the very Perfection of this Self, and are immediately perceived as such,
independent of external Objects.”
Our Sense of Honour may afford very constant Pleasures by good
Oeconomy: If [162] our moral Sense be not perverted; if we form justApprehensions of the Worth of others, Honour shall be pleasant to us in
a compound Proportion of the Numbers and Worth of those who confer
it. If therefore we cannot approve our selves to all, so as to obtain universal Honour among all to whom we are known, yet there are still Menof just Thought and Reflection, whose Esteem a virtuous Man may procure. Their Dignity will compensate the Want of Numbers, and support
us against the Pains of Censure from the Injudicious.
The Inconstancy of the Pleasures of Wealth and Power is well known,
and is occasioned, not perhaps by Change of Fancy, for these Desires
are found to continue long enough, since they tend toward the universal

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Means of gratifying all other Desires; but by the Uncertainty of Objects[161] or Events necessary to gratify such continually increasing Desiresas these are, where there is not some fixed View different from the
Wealth or Power itself. When indeed they are desired only as the Meansof gratifying some other well-regulated Desires, we may soon obtainsuch a Portion as will satisfy us. But if once the End be forgotten, andWealth or Power become grateful for themselves, no farther Limits areto be expected: the Desires are insatiable, nor is there any [163] considerable Happiness in any given Degree of either.

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The Durationsof the several
Painsconsidered.

XI. Were we to consider the Duration of the several Pains, we may findit generally as the Duration of their Pleasures. As to the external Senses,
the old Epicurean Consolation is generally just: “Where the Pain is violent, it shortens our Duration; when it does not shorten our Duration,
it is generally either tolerable, or admits of frequent Intermissions;” andthen, when the external Pain is once past, no Mortal is the worse forhaving endured it. There is nothing uneasy in the Reflection, when we
have no present Pain, or fear no Return of it.
The internal Senses are not properly Avenues of Pain. No Form is necessarily the Occasion of positive Uneasiness.
[162] The Pains of the moral Sense and Sense of Honour, are almost
perpetual. Time, the Refuge of other Sorrows, gives us no Relief fromthese. All other Pleasures are made insipid by these Pains, and Life itself
an uneasy Burden. Our very Self, our Nature is disagreeable to us. ’Tis
true, we do not always observe the Vicious to be uneasy. The Deformityof Vice often does not appear to those who continue in a Course of [164]it. Their Actions are under some Disguise of Innocence, or even of Virtue
itself. When this Mask is pulled off, as it often happens, nor can any vicious Man prevent its happening, Vice will appear as a Fury, whose Aspect no Mortal can bear. This we may see in one Vice, which perhaps has
had fewer false or fantastick Associations of favourable Ideas than any,
viz. Cowardice, or such a selfish Love of Life, and Aversion to Death, orto the very Hazard of it, as hinders a Man from serving his Country or
his Friend, or supporting his own Reputation. How few of our gay Gen-

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tlemen can bear to be reputed Cowards, or even secretly to imagine themselves void of Courage? This is not tolerable to any, how negligent soever
they may be about other Points in Morality. Other Vices would appear
equally odious and despicable, and bear as horrid an Aspect, were theyequally stript of the Disguises of [163] Virtue. A vicious Man has no other
Security against the Appearances of this terrifying Form, than Ignorance
or Inadvertence. If Truth break in upon him, as it often must, when any
Adversity stops his intoxicating Pleasures, or Spectators use Freedom with
his Conduct, he is render’d perpetually miserable, or must fly to the only
Remedy which Reason would suggest, all possible Reparation of Injuries,
and a new Course of Life, the Necessity of which [165] is not supersededby any Remedy suggested by the Christian Revelation.
The Pains of the publick Sense are very lasting. The Misery of others,
either in past or present Ages, is matter of very uneasy Reflection, andmust continue so, if their State appears in the whole absolutely Evil.
Against this there is no Relief but the Consideration of a “good governing Mind, ordering all for good in the whole, with the Belief of a futureState, where the particular seeming Disorders are rectified.” A firm Persuasion of these Things, with strong publick Affections interesting us
strongly in this Whole, and considering this Whole as one great System,
in which all is wisely ordered for good, may secure us against these
Pains, by removing the Opinion of any absolute Evil.
[164] The Pains arising from foolish Associations of moral Ideas, with
the Gratifications of external Senses, or with the Enjoyment of Objects
of Beauty or Grandeur, or from the Desires of Property, the Humour ofDistinction, may be as constant as the Pains of the Senses from whichthese Ideas are borrowed. Thus what we gain by these Associations isvery little. “The Desires of Trifles are often made very strong and uneasy;
the Pleasures of Possession very [166] small and of short Continuance,
only till the Object be familiar, or the Fancy change: But the Pains ofDisappointment are often very lasting and violent. Would we guard
against these Associations, every real Pleasure in Life remains, and we
may be easy without these things, which to others occasion the greatest
Pains.”

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Gemmas, Marmor, Ebur, Tyrrhena Sigilla, Tabellas,
Argentum, vestes Getulo Murice tinctas,
Est qui non habet, est qui nec curat habere.—Hor.32
5section vi
Some general Conclusions concerning the best
Management of our Desires. With some Principles
necessary to Happiness.
[165/167] We see therefore, upon comparing the several kinds of Pleasures and Pains, both as to Intention and Duration, that “the whole Sum
of Interest lies upon the Side of Virtue, Publick-spirit, and Honour. Thatto forfeit these Pleasures in whole, or in part, for any other Enjoyment,is the most foolish Bargain; and on the contrary, to secure them with
the Sacrifice of all others, is the truest Gain.”Constant
Discipline
necessary.

There is one general Observation to be premised, which appears of thegreatest Necessity for the just Management of all our Desires; viz. that
we should, as much as possible, in all Affairs of Importance to our selves
or others, prevent the Violence of their confused Sensation, and stop their
Propensities from breaking out into Action, till we have fully examined
the real Moment of the Object, either of our Desires [166] or Aversions.[168] The only way to affect this is, “a constant Attention of Mind,
an habitual Discipline over our selves, and a fixed Resolution to stop all
Action, before a calm Examination of every Circumstance attending it;
more particularly, the real Values of external Objects, and the moral
Qualities or Tempers of rational Agents, about whom our Affections
may be employed.” This Power we may obtain over our selves, by a frequent Consideration of the great Calamities, and pernicious Actions, to
32. Horace, Epistles, II.2, 180–182, “Gems, marble, ivory, Tyrrhenium images,
tablets, silver, clothes colored Gaetulian purple, there are some who do not havethese things: there are some who do not care to have them.”

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which even the best of our Passions may lead us, when we are rashly hurried into Action by their Violence, and by the confused Sensations, andfantastick Associations of Ideas which attend them: Thus we may raisean habitual Suspicion and Dread of every violent Passion, which, recurring along with them continually, may in some measure counter-ballance their Propensities and confused Sensations. This Discipline of our
Passions is in general necessary. The unkind or destructive Affections, ourAnger, Hatred, or Aversion to rational Agents, seem to need it most; but
there is also a great Necessity for it, even about the tender and benign
Affections, lest we should be hurried into universal and absolute Evil, by
the Appearance of particular Good: And consequently it must be of thehighest Importance to all, to strengthen as much [167] as possible, by
frequent Meditation and Reflection, the calm [169] Desires either private or publick, rather than the particular Passions, and to make thecalm universal Benevolence superior to them.
That the necessary Resignation of other Pleasures may be the more easy, Resignation
sensualwe must frequently suggest to our selves these Considerations above- of
Pleasures.
mentioned. “External Pleasures are short and transitory, leave no agreeable Reflection, and are no manner of Advantage to us when they are
past; we are no better than if we had wanted them altogether.”In like manner, “past Pains give us no unpleasant Reflection, nor are
we the worse for having endured them. If they are violent, our Existence
will probably be short; if not, they are tolerable, or allow long Intervalsof Ease.” Let us join to these a stoical Consideration; “that external Painsgive us a noble Opportunity of moral Pleasures in Fortitude, and Submission to the Order of the whole, if we bear them resolutely; but if wefret under them, we do not alleviate the Suffering, but rather increase it
by Discontent or Sullenness.” When external Pains must be endured voluntarily to avoid moral Evil, we must, as much as possible, present toour selves [168] “the moral Species itself, [170] with the publick Good toensue, the Honour and Approbation to be expected from all good Men,the Deity, and our own Hearts, if we continue firm; and on the contrary, the Remorse, Shame and Apprehension of future Punishments, if
we yield to this Temptation.”

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How necessary it is to break off the vain Associations of moral Ideas,
from the Objects of external Senses, will also easily appear. This may bedone, by considering how trifling the Services are which are done to our
Friends or Acquaintances, by splendid Entertainments, at an Expense,
which, otherways employed, might have been to them of considerable
Importance. Men who are at ease, and of as irregular Imaginations as ourselves, may admire and praise our Magnificence; but those who needmore durable Services, will never think themselves much obliged. We
cannot expect any Gratitude for what was done only to please our own
Vanity: The Indigent easily see this, and justly consider upon the whole
how much they have profited.
If the Wealth of the Luxurious fails, he is the Object of Contempt: No
body pities him nor honours him: his personal Dignity was placed byhimself in his Table, [169] Equipage and Furniture; his Admirers placed[171] it also in the same: When these are gone all is lost.
—Non est melius quo insumere possis?
Cur eget indignus quisquam te Divite? quare
Templa ruunt antiqua Deûm? cur improbe carae
Non aliquid Patriae ex tanto emetiris acervo?
Uni nimirum tibi recte semper erunt res:
O magnus posthac inimicis Risus.—Hor.33

There is no Enjoyment of external Pleasure, which has more imposed upon Men of late, by some confused Species of Morality, than
Gallantry. The sensible Pleasure alone must, by all Men who have theleast Reflection, be esteemed at a very low rate: But the Desires of thiskind, as they were by Nature intended to found the most constant un-

33. Horace, Satires, II.2, 102–7. “Is there nothing better to spend your surplus
on? Why are any undeserving men in want while you are rich? Why are the ancient
temples of the Gods ruined? Why, wicked man, don’t you dole out something fromthat great heap for the fatherland? Surely things will only go right for you. Oh whata great laugh your enemies will have someday.” This is the satire from which Shaftesbury takes the epigram for Sensus Communis, “hac urget Lupus, hac Canis” [“Onthe one side a wolf attacks, on the other a dog”] (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I:37).

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interrupted Friendship, and to introduce the most venerable and lovely
Relations, by Marriages and Families, arise in our Hearts, attended withsome of the sweetest Affections, with a disinterested Love and Tenderness,with a most gentle and obliging Deportment, with something great andheroick in our Temper. The Wretch who rises no higher in this Passion
than the mean sensual Gratification, is abhorred by every one: But thesesublimer Sensations and Passions do often so fill the Imaginations of
the Amorous, that they are unawares led into [172] the [170] most contemptible and cruel Conduct which can be imagined. When for sometrifling transitory Sensations, which they might have innocently enjoyedalong with the highest moral Pleasures in Marriage, they expose the very
Person they love and admire to the deepest Infamy and Sorrow, to theContempt of the World, to perpetual Confusion, Remorse, and Anguish;
or, to what is worse, an Insensibility of all Honour or Shame, Virtue orVice, Good or Evil, to be the Scorn and Aversion of the World; and all
this coloured over with the gay Notions of Pleasantry, Genteelness, Politeness, Courage, high Enjoyment of Life.
Would Men allow themselves a little Time to reflect on the whole
Effect of such capricious Pursuits, the Anguish and Distraction of Mind
which these Sallies of Pleasure give to Husbands, Fathers, Brothers;
would they consider how they themselves would resent such Treatmentof a Wife, a Child, a Sister; how much deeper such Distresses are, thanthose trifling Losses or Damages, for which we think it just to bring the
Authors of them to the Gallows; sure none but a thorow Villain could
either practice or approve the one more than the other.
[171/173] A wise Man in his Oeconomy, must do much even in Complaisance to the Follies of others, as well as his own Conveniency, to support that general good Opinion which must be maintained by those who
would be publickly useful. His Expences must be some way suited to his
Fortune, to avoid the Imputation of Avarice. If indeed what is saved in
private Expences, be employed in generous Offices, there is little dangerof this Charge. Such a Medium may be kept as to be above Censure, andyet below any Affectation of Honour or Distinction in these matters. If
one corrects his own Imagination in these things, he will be in no danger of doing any thing pernicious to please others. He is still in a State114

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fit to judge of the real Importance of every thing which occurs to him,
and will gratify the false Relish of others, no farther than it is consistent
with, and subservient to some nobler Views.
Conduct
necessary
about thePleasures of
Imagination.

II. To make the Pleasures of Imagination a constant Source of Delight,
as they seem intended in the Frame of our Nature, with no hazard ofPain, it is necessary to keep the Sense free from foreign Ideas of Property,
and the Desire of Distinction, as much as possible. If this can be done,
we may receive Pleasure from every Work of [174] Nature or Art aroundus. We enjoy [172] not only the whole of Nature, but the united Laboursof all about us. To prevent the Idea of Property, let us consider “howlittle the Proprietor enjoys more than the Spectator: Wherein is he thebetter or the happier?” The Poet, or the Connoisseur, who judges nicelyof the Perfection of the Works of Art, or the Beauties of Nature, has
generally a higher Taste than the Possessor. The magnificent Palace, thegrand Apartments, the Vistas, the Fountains, the Urns, the Statues, theGrottos and Arbours, are exposed either in their own Nature, or by the
Inclination of the Proprietor, to the Enjoyment of others. The Pleasureof the Proprietor depends upon the Admiration of others, he robs himself
of his chief Enjoyment if he excludes Spectators: Nay, may not a Taste for
Nature be acquired, giving greater Delight than the Observation of Art?
Deterius Lybicis olet, aut nitet, Herba lapillis?
Purior in vicis aqua tendit rumpere Plumbum,
Quam que per pronum trepidat cum murmure rivum?
Nempe inter varias nutritur Sylva Columnas,
Laudaturque Domus, longos qua prospicit Agros.
Naturam expellas surca licet, usque recurret.—Hor.34

34. Horace, Epistles, I.10.19–24. “Is the grass poorer in fragrance or beauty than
Libyan mosaics? Is the water purer which in city-streets struggles to burst its leaden
pipes than that which dances and purls adown the sloping brooks? Why amid yourvaried columns you are nursing trees, and you praise the mansion which looks out
on distant fields. You may drive out Nature with a pitchfork, yet she will ever hurryback.” H. R. Fairclough, trans., Horace: Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica (Cambridge,

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Must an artful Grove, an Imitation of a Wilderness, or the more confined Forms or [175] Ever-greens, please more than the real Forest, [173]with the Trees of God? Shall a Statue give more Pleasure than the human
Face Divine?
Where the Humour of Distinction is not corrected, our Equals become our Adversaries: The Grandeur of another is our Misery, andmakes our Enjoyments insipid. There is only one way of making thisHumour tolerable, but this way is almost inconsistent with the Inclination itself, viz. “continually to haunt with our Inferiors, and compare
our selves with them.” But if inconstant Fortune, or their own Merit doraise any of them to equal us, our Pleasure is lost, or we must sink ourselves to those who are still Inferior, and abandon the Society of every
Person whose Art or Merit raises him. How poor a Thought is this!
The Pursuits of the Learned have often as much Folly in them as anyothers, when Studies are not valued according to their Use in Life, or
the real Pleasures they contain, but for the Difficulty and Obscurity, andconsequently the Rarity and Distinction. Nay, an abuse may be made of
the most noble and manly Studies, even of Morals, Politicks, and Religion itself, if our Admiration and Desire terminate upon the Knowledge
itself, and not upon [174] the Possession of [176] the Dispositions andAffections inculcated in these Studies. If these Studies be only matter ofAmusement and Speculation, instead of leading us into a constant Discipline over our selves, to correct our Hearts, and to guide our Actions,
we are not much better employed, than if we had been studying someuseless Relations of Numbers, or Calculations of Chances.
There is not indeed any part of Knowledge which can be called entirely useless. The most abstracted Parts of Mathematicks, and the Knowledge of mythological History, or antient Allegories, have their own Pleasures not inferior to the more gay Entertainments of Painting, Musick,or Architecture; and it is for the Advantage of Mankind that some arefound, who have a Taste for these Studies. The only Fault lies, in letting
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978). Shaftesbury quotes line 24 in “Miscellaneous Reflections,” IV.2 (Characteristicks, III:132).

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any of those inferior Tastes engross the whole Man to the Exclusion of
the nobler Pursuits of Virtue and Humanity.
Concerning all these Pleasures of the Imagination, let us consider
also “how little support they can give Men under any of the Calamitiesof Life,” such as the Treachery or Baseness of a Friend, a Wife, a Child,or the perplexing Intricacies [175] of our common Affairs, or the Apprehension of Death.
[177]
Re veraque Metus hominum, Curaeque sequaces
Nec metuunt sonitus Armorum, nec fera Tela;
Audacterque inter Reges, rerumque Potentes
Versantur, nec fulgorem reverentur ab auro,
Nec clarum vestis splendorem purpureaı̈
Quid dubitas quin omne sit hoc rationis egestas?—Luc. 35
Ideas of
Divinity arise
from the internal Senses.

III. Under this Head of our Internal Sense, we must observe one natural Effect of it, that it leads us into Apprehensions of a Deity. Grandeur,Beauty, Order, Harmony, wherever they occur, raise an Opinion of a
Mind, of Design, and Wisdom. Every thing great, regular, or proportioned, excites Veneration, either toward itself, if we imagine it animated, if not animated, toward some apprehended Cause. No Determination of our Mind is more natural than this, no Effect more
universal. One has better Reason to deny the Inclination between the
Sexes to be natural, than a Disposition in Mankind to Religion.
We cannot open our Eyes, without discerning Grandeur and Beauty
every where. Whoever receives these Ideas, feels an inward Venerationarise. We may fall into a Thousand vain Reasonings: foolish limited

35. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, II.48–53. This passage is part of the famous“Proem” to Book II, the locus classicus of the sort of Epicureanism that Hutchesonsought to undermine: “If truly the fears of men, and the cares which follow them,neither shrink at the sound of arms, nor fierce weapons; and boldly hover among
kings and rulers of the world, neither revere the glitter of gold, nor the brilliant
splendor of a purple robe, why then do we doubt that all this is reason alone?”

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Notions of Divinity may be formed, as attached to the particular
Places or [176] Objects, which strike us in the most lively [178] manner.
Custom, Prejudice of Sense or Education, may confirm some foolish
Opinion about the Nature or Cause of these Appearances: But wherevera superior Mind, a governing Intention or Design is imagined,
there Religion begins in its most simple Form, and an inward Devotion
arises. Our Nature is as much determined to this, as to any other Perception or Affection. How we manage these Ideas and Affections, is indeed of the greatest Importance to our Happiness or Misery.
The Apprehension of an universal Mind with Power and Knowledge, is indeed an agreeable Object of Contemplation. But we must
form our Ideas of all intelligent Natures, with some Resemblance orAnalogy to our selves: We must also conceive something correspondent
to our Affections in the Divinity, with some moral Apprehensions of
the Actions and Tempers of his Creatures. The Order of Nature will suggest many Confirmations of this. We must conclude some Worship acceptable, and some Expressions of Gratitude as our Duty. The Conceptions of the Deity must be various, according to the different Degrees
of Attention and Reasoning in the Observers, and their own Tempers
and Affections. Imagining the divine Mind, as cruel, [177] wrathful, or
capricious, must be a perpetual Source of Dread and Horror; and will
be apt to raise a Resemblance of Temper in the Worshipper, with its attendant Misery. A contrary [179] Idea of the Divinty, as good, andkind, delighting in universal Happiness, and ordering all Events of the
Universe to this End, as it is the most delightful Contemplation, so it
fills the good Mind with a constant Security and Hope, amidst either
publick Disorders, or private Calamities.
To find out which of these two Representations of the Deity is thetrue one, we must consult the Universe, the Effect of his Power, and theScene of his Actions. After what has been observed by so many ingenious Authors, both Ancient and Modern, one cannot be at a loss which
Opinion to chuse. We may only on this occasion consider the Evidences of divine Goodness appearing in the Structure of our own Nature,and in the Order of our Passions and Senses.

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Evidences of
the Goodnessof God in the
Frame of ourSenses andAffections.

the nature and conduct of the passions

It was observed above, how admirably our Affections are contrived forgood in the whole. Many of them indeed do not pursue the private Goodof the Agent; nay, many of them, in various Cases, seem to tend to his
detriment, by concerning him violently in the Fortunes of others, intheir [178] Adversity, as well as their Prosperity. But they all aim at good,
either private or publick: and by them each particular Agent is [180]made, in a great measure, subservient to the good of the whole. Mankind
are thus insensibly link’d together, and make one great System, by aninvisible Union. He who voluntarily continues in this Union, and delights in employing his Power for his Kind, makes himself happy: He
who does not continue this Union freely, but affects to break it, makes
himself wretched; nor yet can he break the Bonds of Nature. His publick
Sense, his Love of Honour, and the very Necessities of his Nature, willcontinue to make him depend upon his System, and engage him to serve
it, whether he inclines to it or not. Thus we are formed with a View toa general good End; and may in our own Nature discern a universal
Mind watchful for the whole.
The same is observable in the Order of our external Senses. The simple Productions of Nature, which are useful to any Species of Animals,
are also grateful to them; and the pernicious or useless Objects are madedisagreeable. Our external Sensations are no doubt often painful, when
our Bodies are in a dangerous State; when they want supplies of Nourishment; when any thing external would be injurious to them. But if itappears, “that the general Laws [179] are wisely constituted, and that itis necessary to the Good of a System of [181] such Agents, to be underthe Influence of general Laws, upon which there is occasion for Prudence and Activity;” the particular Pains occasioned by a necessary Law
of Sensation, can be no Objection against the Goodness of the Author.
Now that there is no room for complaint, that “our external Sense ofPain is made too acute,” must appear from the Multitudes we daily see
so careless of preserving the Blessing of Health, of which many are so
prodigal as to lavish it away, and expose themselves to external Pains forvery trifling Reasons. Can we then repine at the friendly Admonitions of
Nature, joined with some Austerity, when we see that they are scarce sufficient to restrain us from Ruin? The same may be said of the Pains of

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other kinds. Shame and Remorse are never to be called too severe, while
so many are not sufficiently restrained by them. Our Compassion andfriendly Sense of Sorrow, what are they else but the Alarms and Exhortations of a kind impartial Father, to engage his Children to relieve a distressed Brother? Our Anger itself is a necessary Piece of Management, bywhich every pernicious Attempt is made dangerous to its Author.
[180/182] Would we allow room to our Invention, to conceive whatsort of Mechanism, what Constitutions of Senses or Affections a malicious powerful Being might have formed, we should soon see how few
Evidences there are for any such Apprehension concerning the Author of this World. Our Mechanism, as far as we have ever yet discovered, is wholly contrived for good. No cruel Device, no Art or Contrivance to produce evil: No such Mark or Scope seems ever to be aimed
at. How easy had it been to have contrived some necessary Engines ofMisery without any use; some Member of no other service but to bematter of Torment; Senses incapable of bearing the surrounding Objects
without Pain; Eyes pained with the Light; a Palate offended with theFruits of the Earth; a Skin as tender as the Coats of the Eye, and yetsome more furious Pain forcing us to bear these Torments? Human Society might have been made as uneasy as the Company of Enemies, andyet a perpetual more violent Motive of Fear might have forc’d us to bearit. Malice, Rancour, Distrust, might have been our natural Temper. Our
Honour and Self-Approbation might have depended upon Injuries; andthe Torments of others been made our Delight, which yet we could nothave enjoyed thro’ [183] perpetual Fear. Many such Contrivances we[181] may easily conceive, whereby an evil Mind could have gratified his
Malice by our Misery. But how unlike are they all to the Intention or
Design of the Mechanism of this World?
Our Passions no doubt are often matter of Uneasiness to our selves,and sometimes occasion Misery to others, when any one is indulged
into a Degree of Strength beyond its Proportion. But which of them
could we have wanted, without greater Misery in the whole? They are
by Nature ballanced against each other, like the Antagonist Muscles of
the Body; either of which separately would have occasioned Distortionand irregular Motion, yet jointly they form a Machine, most accurately

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subservient to the Necessities, Convenience, and Happiness of a rational
System. We have a Power of Reason and Reflection, by which we may see
what Course of Action will naturally tend to procure us the most valuable Gratifications of all our Desires, and prevent any intolerable or unnecessary Pains, or provide some support under them. We have Wisdom sufficient to form Ideas of Rights, Laws, Constitutions; so as topreserve large Societies in Peace and Prosperity, and promote a general
Good amidst all the private Interests.
[182/184] If from the present Order of Nature, in which Good appears far superior to Evil, we have just Presumptions to conclude theDeity to be benevolent, it is not conceivable “that any Being, who desires the Happiness of others, should not desire a greater Degree of Happiness to them rather than a less; and that consequently the whole Seriesof Events is the best possible, and contains in the whole the greatest possible absolute Good:” especially since we have no Presumption of any
private Interest, which an universal Mind can have in view, in opposition to the greatest Good of the whole. Nor are the particular Evils occurring to our Observation, any just Objection against the perfect
Goodness of the universal Providence to us, who cannot know how
far these Evils may be necessarily connected with the Means of thegreatest possible absolute Good.
The Conductof our publick
Sense andAffections.

IV. In managing our publick Sense of the State of others, we must beware of one common Mistake, viz. “apprehending every Person to bemiserable in those Circumstances, which we imagine would make ourselves miserable.” We may easily find, that the lower Rank of Mankind,whose only Revenue is their bodily Labour, enjoy as much Chearfulness,
Contentment, [183/185] Health, Gaiety, in their own way, as any in thehighest Station of Life. Both their Minds and Bodies are soon fitted totheir State. The Farmer and Labourer, when they enjoy the bare Necessaries of Life, are easy. They have often more correct Imaginations,thro’ Necessity and Experience, than others can acquire by Philosophy.
This Thought is indeed a poor Excuse for a base selfish Oppressor, who,
imagining Poverty a great Misery, bears hard upon those in a low Station of Life, and deprives them of their natural Conveniences, or even of

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bare Necessaries. But this Consideration may support a compassionate
Heart, too deeply touched with apprehended Miseries, of which the
Sufferers are themselves insensible.
The Pains of this Sense are not easily removed. They are not allayedby the Distinction of Pains into real and imaginary. Much less will it
remove them, to consider how much of human Misery is owing to theirown Folly and Vice. Folly and Vice are themselves the most pityable
Evils. It is of more consequence to consider, what Evidences there are“that the Vice and Misery in the World are smaller than we sometimes
in our melancholy Hours imagine.” There are no doubt many furious[186] Starts of Passion, in which [184] Malice may seem to have placein our Constitution; but how seldom, and how short, in comparison ofYears spent in fixed kind Pursuits of the Good of a Family, a Party, aCountry? How great a Part of human Actions flow directly from Humanity and kind Affection? How many censurable Actions are owing to
the same Spring, only chargeable on Inadvertence, or an Attachment totoo narrow a System? How few owing to any thing worse than selfish
Passions above their Proportion?
Here Men are apt to let their Imaginations run out upon all the Robberies, Piracies, Murders, Perjuries, Frauds, Massacres, Assassinations, they
have ever either heard of, or read in History; thence concluding all
Mankind to be very wicked: as if a Court of Justice were the proper Placeof making an Estimate of the Morals of Mankind, or an Hospital of the
Healthfulness of a Climate. Ought they not to consider, that the Number of honest Citizens and Farmers far surpasses that of all sorts of Criminals in any State; and that the innocent or kind Actions of even Criminals themselves, surpass their Crimes in Numbers? That ’tis the Rarity
of Crimes, in comparison of innocent or good Actions, [187] which engages our Attention to them, and makes them be recorded in History;
while incomparably more honest, generous, [185] domestick Actions areoverlooked, only because they are so common; as one great Danger, or
one Month’s Sickness, shall become a frequently repeated Story, during
a long Life of Health and Safety.
The Pains of the external Senses are pretty frequent, but how short incomparison of the long Tracts of Health, Ease and Pleasure? How rare

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is the Instance of a Life, with one tenth spent in violent Pain? How few
want absolute Necessaries; nay, have not something to spend on Gaiety
and Ornament? The Pleasures of Beauty are exposed to all in some measure. These kinds of Beauty which require Property to the full Enjoyment of them, are not ardently desired by many. The Good of every
kind in the Universe, is plainly superior to the Evil. How few would
accept of Annihilation, rather than Continuance in Life in the middle
State of Age, Health and Fortune? Or what separated Spirit, who had
considered human Life, would not, rather than perish, take the hazardof it again, by returning into a Body in the State of Infancy?
[188]—Who would lose,
For fear of Pain, this intellectual Being,
These Thoughts which wander thro’ Eternity,
To perish rather, swallowed up and lostIn the wide Womb of uncreated Night,
Devoid of Sense and Motion—Milton’s Par. lost, Book 2.36

[186 ] These Thoughts plainly shew a Prevalence of Good in theWorld. But still our publick Sense finds much matter of compassionate
Sorrow among Men. The Many are in a tolerable good State; but who
can be unconcerned for the distressed Few? They are few in comparisonof the whole, and yet a great Multitude.
What Parent would be much concerned at the Pains of breeding of
Teeth, were they sure they would be short, and end well? Or at the Painof a Medicine, or an Incision, which was necessary for the Cure, andwould certainly accomplish it? Is there then no Parent in Nature, no
Physician who sees what is necessary for the Whole, and for the good ofeach Individual in the whole of his Existence, as far as is consistent withthe general Good? Can we expect, in this our Childhood of Existence,
to understand all the Contrivance and Art of this Parent and Physician

36. John Milton, Paradise Lost, 146–51. This is from Belial’s speech, as Satan andthe fallen angels debate a plan to recover heaven. Belial uses this as a pretext not
to attack heaven, lest by angering God the fallen angels would cease to exist.

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of Nature? May not [189] some harsh Discipline be necessary to Good?
May not many natural Evils be necessary to prevent future moral Evils,
and to correct the Tempers of the Agents, nay to introduce moral
Good? Is not Suffering and Distress requisite, before there can be roomfor generous Compassion, Succour, and Liberality? Can there be Forgiveness, Returns of good for evil, [187] unless there be some moral Evil?
Must the Whole want the eternally delightful Consciousness of such Actions and Dispositions, to prevent a few transient Sensations of Pain, or
natural Evil? May there not be some unseen Necessity for the greatest
universal Good, that* there should be an Order of Beings no more perfect than we are, subject to Error and wrong Affections sometimes? May
not all the present Disorders which attend this State of prevalent Order,
be rectified by the directing Providence in a future Part of our Existence?
This Belief of a Deity, a Providence, and a future State, are theonly sure Supports to a good Mind. Let us then acquire and strengthen
our Love and Concern for this Whole, and acquiesce in what the governing Mind, who presides in it, is ordering in the wisest Manner, tho
not yet fully known to us, for its most universal Good.
[190] A future State, firmly believed, makes the greatest Difficulties on The Necessity
believing athis Subject to vanish. No particular finite Evils can be looked upon as of
future State.
intolerable, which lead to Good, infinite in Duration. Nor can we complain of the Conditions of Birth, if the present Evils of Life have [188]even a probable hazard of everlasting Happiness to compensate them;much more if it be placed in our power certainly to obtain it. Never
could the boldest Epicurean bring the lightest Appearance of Argument
against the Possibility of such a State, nor was there ever any thing tolerable advanced against its Probability. We have no Records of any Nation
which did not entertain this Opinion. Men of Reflection in all Ages,
have found at least probable Arguments for it; and the Vulgar have beenprone to believe it, without any other Argument than their natural Notions of Justice in the Administration of the World. Present Hope is present* See the Archbishop of Dublin, de Origine Mali.

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Good: and this very Hope has enlivened human Life, and given ease to
generous Minds, under Anxieties about the publick Good.
This Opinion was interwoven with all Religions; and as it in many
instances overballanced the Motives to Vice, so it removed Objections
against Providence. The [191] good Influence of this Opinion, however
it might not justify any Frauds, yet probably did more good than whatmight overballance many Evils flowing from even very corrupt Religions.
How agreeable then must it be to every good Man, that this Opinion,
were there even no more to be done, should be confirmed beyond question or doubt, by a well attested divine [189] Revelation, for the perpetual Security of the virtuous, and for the constant Support of the kindand compassionate? How gladly must every honest Heart receive it; andrejoice that even those who have neither Leisure nor Capacity for deep
Reflection, should be thus convinced of it?

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The Conductof the unkind
Affections.

As to the Management of those Passions which seem opposite to theHappiness of others, such as Anger, Jealousy, Envy, Hatred; it is very necessary to represent to our selves continually, the most favourable Conceptions of others, and to force our Minds to examine the real Springs ofthe resented Actions. We may almost universally find, that “no Man
acts from pure Malice; that the Injurious only intended some Interest of
his own, without any ultimate Desire of our Misery; that he is more to
be pitied for his own mean selfish Temper, for the want of true Goodness,and its attendant Happiness, than to be hated for his Conduct, which isreally more pernicious to himself [192] than to others.* Our Lenity, Forgiveness, and Indulgence to the Weakness of others, will be constant
Matter of delightful Consciousness, and Self-Approbation; [190] and will
be as probably effectual in most cases, to obtain Reparation of Wrongs,
from an hearty Remorse, and thorow Amendment of the Temper of the
Injurious, as any Methods of Violence.” Could we raise our Goodness
even to an higher Pitch, and consider “the Injurious as our FellowMembers in this great intellectual Body, whose Interest and Happinessit becomes us to promote, as much as we can consistently with that of* See this Point handled with great Judgment, in Plato’s Gorgias.
[[Plato, Gorgias, see particularly 477a–d.]]

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others, and not to despise, scorn, or cut them off, because of every Weakness, Deformity, or lighter Disorder;” we might bring our selves to thatdivine Conduct, of even returning good for evil.
In like manner, our Emulation, Jealousy, or Envy, might be restrained ina great measure, by a constant Resolution of bearing always in our Minds
the* lovely Side of every Character:† “The compleatly Evil are as rare as
the perfectly Virtuous: There is something amiable almost in every
one.” Could we enure our selves [193] constantly to dwell on thesethings, we might often bear patiently the Success of a Rival, nay, sometimes even rejoice in it, be more happy our [191] selves, and turn him
into a real Friend. We should often find those Phantoms of Vice andCorruption which torment the Jealous, vanishing before the bright
Warmth of a thorow good Temper, resolved to search for every thing
lovely and good, and averse to think any evil.

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V. In governing our moral Sense, and Desires of Virtue, nothing is more Conduct of
moral
necessary than to study the Nature and Tendency of human Actions; and theSense, andto extend our views to the whole Species, or to all sensitive Natures, as far Sense ofas they can be affected by our Conduct. Our moral Sense thus regulated, Honour.
and constantly followed in our Actions, may be the most constant Source* Epictet. Enchir.Cap. 65.
[[Turco (Saggio, 255) notes that Hutcheson is citing Simplicius’s commentary on
Enchiridion, §65, which explicates Epictetus’s, Enchiridion, §43. This must havebeen Hutcheson’s primary edition of Epictetus, which is notable, as Simplicius often
softens Epictetus’s rather harsh Stoicism through his own Neoplatonic lens. “Everything hath two handles, the one soft and manageable, the other such as will not
endure to be touched. If then your Brother do you an Injury, do not take it by the
hot and hard handle, by representing to your self all the aggravating Circumstancesof the Fact; but look rather on the soft side, and extenuate it as much as possible,
by considering the nearness of the Relation, and the long Friendship and Familiarity
between you. Obligations to Kindness, which a single Provocation ought not todissolve. And thus you will take the accident by its manageable handle.” Epictetus
his Morals With Simplicius His Comment, 379–80.]]†
Plato Phaedon.
[[“[T]here are not many very good or very bad people, but the great majority
are something between the two” Phaedo, 90a. (Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant [trans. & intro.] Plato: The Last Days of Socrates [London: Penguin, 1969], rev.
ed.).]]

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the nature and conduct of the passionsof the most stable Pleasure. The same Conduct is always the most probable Means of obtaining the Pleasures of Honour. If there be a Distinction
between Truth and Falshood, Truth must be stronger than Falshood: It
must be more probable that Truth will generally prevail; that the real good
Tendency of our Actions, and the Wisdom of our Intentions will beknown; and Misrepresentations or partial Views will vanish. Our Desire of
Honour is not confined to our present State. The Prospect of future Glory
is a strong Motive [194] of Action. And thus the Time, in which ourCharacter may have the hazard of obtaining Justice, has no other Limits[192] than those of the Existence of rational Natures. Whereas, partial Notions of Virtue, and partial Conduct, have no other Foundation for
Self-Approbation, than our Ignorance, Error, or Inadvertence; nor for Honour, than the like Ignorance, Error, or Inadvertence of others.
That we may not be engaged into any thing contrary to the publick
Good, or to the true Schemes of Virtue, by the Desire of false Honour,or Fear of false Shame, it is of great use to examine the real Dignity of
those we converse with, and to confine our Intimacies to the truly virtuous and wise. From such we can expect no Honour, but according toour sincere Pursuit of the publick Good; nor need we ever fear any
Shame in such a Course. But above all, did we frequently, and in themost lively manner, present to ourselves that great, and wise, and good
Mind, which presides over the Universe, sees every Action, and knows
the true Character and Disposition of every Heart, approving nothing
but sincere Goodness and Integrity; did we consider that the time willcome, when we shall be as conscious of his Presence, as we are of ourown Existence; as sensible of his Approbation or [195] Condemnation, as
we are of the Testimony of our own Hearts; when we shall be engaged
in a Society of Spirits, stripped of these Prejudices [193] and false Notions
which so often attend us in Flesh and Blood, how should we despisethat Honour which is from Men, when opposite to the truest Honour
from God himself?

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VI. Concerning the Desires of Wealth and Power, besides what was sug- The Desires ofandgested above to allay their Violence, from considering the small Addi- WealthPower.
tion commonly made to the Happiness of the Possessor, by the greatest
Degrees of them, and the Uncertainty of their Continuance; if we haveobtained any share of them, let us examine their true Use, and what isthe best Enjoyment of them.
—Quid asper
Utile Nummus habet? Patriae carisque propinquis
Quantum elargiri decet?—Persius.37

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What moral Pleasures, what Delights of Humanity, what Gratitude
from Persons obliged, what Honour, may a wise Man of a generous
Temper purchase with them? How foolish is the Conduct of heaping
up Wealth for Posterity, when smaller Degrees might make them equally
happy! when great Prospects of this kind are the strongest Temptations tothem, to indulge Sloth, Luxury, [196] Debauchery, Insolence, Pride, andContempt of their Fellow-Creatures; [194] and to banish some noble
Dispositions, Humility, Compassion, Industry, Hardiness of Temper and
Courage, the Offspring of the sober rigid Dame Poverty. How often
does the Example, and almost direct Instruction of Parents, lead Posterity into the basest Views of Life!
—Qui nulla exempla beati
Pauperis esse putat—
Cum dicis Juveni stultum qui donat amico,
Qui paupertatem levat attollitque propinqui,
Et spoliare doces & circumscribere—
Ergo Ignem, cujus scintillas ipse dedisti,
Flagrantem late, & rapientem cuncta videbis.—Juv. Sat. 14.38
37. Persius, Satires, III. 69–71, “Are shiny new coins more useful? How muchshould be spent on our country and our near and dear?”
38. Juvenal, Satires, 14, “It is believed that there are no happy paupers” (120–121);“When you tell a youth that it is stupid to give a present to a friend, or to help apoor relative, you teach him to rob and cheat” (235–37); “Therefore the fire, whose
sparks you tended, you will now see blaze far and wide and seize everything itmeets” (244–45).

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How powerfully might the Example of a wisely generous Father, atonce teach his Offspring the true Value of Wealth or Power, and prevent their Neglect of them, or foolish throwing them away, and yet inspire them with a generous Temper, capable of the just Use of them!
5
Supportagainst Death.

Death is one Object of our Aversion, which yet we cannot avoid. It can
scarcely be said, that “the Desire of Life is as strong as the Sum of all
selfish Desires.” It may be so with those who enure themselves to no
Pleasures but those of the external Senses. [197] But how often do we see[195] Death endured, not only from Love of Virtue, or publick Affections, in Heroes and Martyrs, but even from Love of Honour in lower
Characters! Many Aversions are stronger than that to Death. Fear of
bodily Pain, fear of Dishonour, which are selfish Aversions, do often surpass our Aversion to Death, as well as publick Affections to Countries orFriends. It is of the greatest Consequence to the Enjoyment of Life, toknow its true Value; to strip Death of its borrowed Ideas of Terror; toconsider it barely as the Cessation of both the Pains and Pleasures we now
feel, coming frequently upon us with no more Pain than that of Swooning, with a noble Hazard, or rather a certain Prospect of superior Happiness to every good Mind. Death in this view must appear an inconsiderable Evil, in comparison of Vice, Self-Abhorrence, real Dishonour, theSlavery of one’s Country, the Misery of a Friend.
The tender Regards to a Family and Offspring, are often the strongest
Bands to restrain a generous Mind from submitting to Death. Whatshall be the Fate of a Wife, a Child, a Friend, or a Brother, when we aregone, are the frequent Subjects of grievous Anxiety. The Fortunes ofsuch Persons often depend much upon us; and when [198] they do not,yet we are more anxious [196 ] about their State when we shall be absent.
Ut assidens implumibus pullis avis,
Serpentium allapsus timet
Magis relictis, non ut adsit Auxilı̂
Latura plus praesentibus.—Hor.39

39. Horace, Epodes, I.19–22, “just as the mother bird while guarding unfledged

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Next to the Belief of a good Providence, nothing can support
Men more under such Anxieties, than considering how often the Orphan acquires a Vigor of Mind, Sagacity and Industry, superior to those
who are enfeebled by the constant Care and Services of others. A wise
Man would desire to be provided with Friends against such an Exigency; Persons of such Goodness, as would joyfully accept the Legacy ofa Child, or indigent Friend committed to their Protection.
If Death were an entire End of the Person, so that no Thought orSense should remain, all Good must cease at Death, but no Evil commence. The Loss of Good is Evil to us now, but will be no Evil to a Beingwhich has lost all Sense of Evil. Were this the Case, the Consolation
against Death would only be this, frequently to look upon Life and allits Enjoyments as granted to us only for a short Term; to employ thisuncertain Time as much as we can in the Enjoyment [199] of the noblest
Pleasures; [197] and to prevent Surprize at our Removal, by laying our
Account for it.
But if we exist, and think after Death, and retain our Senses of Goodand Evil, no Consolation against Death can be suggested to a wicked
Man; but for the virtuous, there are the best Grounds of Hope and Joy.
If the Administration of the whole be good, we may be sure “that Orderand Happiness will in the whole prevail: Nor will Misery be inflicted any
farther than is necessary for some prepollent Good.” Now there is no
Presumption, that the absolute Misery of any virtuous Person can be necessary to any good End: Such Persons therefore are the most likely to
enjoy a State of perfect Happiness.
VII. To conclude: Let us consider that common Character, which when What is theStateascribed to any State, Quality, Disposition, or Action, engages our Favour naturalof Men.
and Approbation of it, viz. its being natural. We have many Suspicions
about Tempers or Dispositions formed by Art, but are some way prepossessed in favour of what is natural: We imagine it must be advantageous and delightful to be in a natural State, and to live according toNature. “This very Presumption in favour of what is natural, is a plain
chicks/fears most the serpent’s glide/when she has left the nest, although her presence/could not be any help to them,” West, trans., Horace.

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Indication that [200] the Order of Nature is good, and that Men aresome [198 ] way convinced of it. Let us enquire then what is meant by
it.”
If by natural we mean “that which we enjoy or do, when we first
begin to exist, or to think,” it is impossible to know what State, Temper,or Actions, are natural. Our natural State in this Sense differs little fromthat of a Plant, except in some accidental Sensations of Hunger, or of
Ease, when we are well nourished.
Some elaborate Treatises of great Philosophers about innate Ideas, orPrinciples practical or speculative, amount to no more than this, “Thatin the Beginning of our Existence we have no Ideas or Judgments;” theymight have added too, no Sight, Taste, Smell, Hearing, Desire, Volition.
Such Dissertations are just as useful for understanding human Nature,
as it would be in explaining the animal Oeconomy, to prove that the Faetus is animated before it has Teeth, Nails, Hair, or before it can eat,drink, digest, or breathe: Or in a natural History of Vegetables, to provethat Trees begin to grow before they have Branches, Leaves, Flower,
Fruit, or Seed: And consequently that all these things were adventitious,or the Effect of Art.
[201] But if we call “that State, those Dispositions and Actions, natural, to [199] which we are inclined by some part of our Constitution,
antecedently to any Volition of our own; or which flow from some Principles in our Nature, not brought upon us by our own Art, or that ofothers;” then it may appear, from what was said above, that “a State ofGood-will, Humanity, Compassion, mutual Aid, propagating and supporting Offspring, Love of a Community or Country, Devotion, or Love
and Gratitude to some governing Mind, is our natural State,” to which
we are naturally inclined, and do actually arrive, as universally, and withas much uniformity, as we do to a certain Stature and Shape.
If by natural we understand “the highest Perfection of the Kind, towhich any Nature may be improved by cultivating its natural Dispositions or Powers;” as few arrive at this in the Growth of their Bodies, so
few obtain it in their Minds. But we may see what this Perfection is, towhich our natural Dispositions tend, when we improve them to the utmost, as far as they are consistent with each other, making the weakeror meaner yield to the more excellent and stronger. Our several Senses and

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Affections, publick and private, with our Powers [202] of Reason and Reflection, shew this to be the Perfection of our Kind, viz. “to know, [200]love, and reverence the great Author of all things; to form the mostextensive Ideas of our own true Interests, and those of all other Natures,
rational or sensitive; to abstain from all Injury; to pursue regularly andimpartially the most universal absolute Good, as far as we can; to enjoy
constant Self-Approbation, and Honour from wise Men; with Trust in
divine Providence, Hope of everlasting Happiness, and a full Satisfaction and Assurance of Mind, that the whole Series of Events is directedby an unerring Wisdom, for the greatest universal Happiness of thewhole.”To assert that “Men have generally arrived to the Perfection of their
Kind in this Life,” is contrary to Experience. But on the other hand, tosuppose “no Order at all in the Constitution of our Nature, or no prevalent Evidences of good Order,” is yet more contrary to Experience, andwould lead to a Denial of Providence in the most important Affair
which can occur to our Observation. We actually see such Degrees ofgood Order, of social Affection, of Virtue and Honour, as make the Generality of Mankind continue in a tolerable, nay, an agreeable State.
However, in some [203] Tempers we see the selfish Passions by Habitsgrown too strong; [201] in others we may observe Humanity, Compassion, and Good-nature sometimes raised by Habits, as we say, to an Excess.
Were we to strike a Medium of the several Passions and Affections,as they appear in the whole Species of Mankind, to conclude thence
what has been the natural Ballance previously to any Change made by
Custom or Habit, which we see casts the Ballance to either side, weshould perhaps find the Medium of the publick Affections not very far
from a sufficient Counter-ballance to the Medium of the Selfish; andconsequently the Overballance on either side in particular Characters, is
not to be looked upon as the original Constitution, but as the accidental
Effect of Custom, Habits, or Associations of Ideas, or other preternatural Causes: So that an universal increasing of the Strength of either,might in the whole be of little advantage. The raising universally the
publick Affections, the Desires of Virtue and Honour, would make theHero of Cervantes, pining with Hunger and Poverty, no rare Character.

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The universal increasing of Selfishness, unless we had more accurate Understandings to discern our nicest Interests, would fill the World with
universal Rapine and War. The Consequences of [204] either universallyabating, or increasing the Desires between the Sexes, the Love of Offspring, or the several [202] Tastes and Fancies in other Pleasures, would
perhaps be found more pernicious to the whole, than the present Constitution. What seems most truly wanting in our Nature, is greater
Knowledge, Attention and Consideration: had we a greater Perfection thisway, and were evil Habits, and foolish Associations of Ideas prevented,
our Passions would appear in better order.
But while we feel in ourselves so much publick Affection in the various Relations of Life, and observe the like in others; while we find every
one desiring indeed his own Happiness, but capable of discerning, by alittle Attention, that not only his external Conveniency, or worldly Interest, but even the most immediate and lively Sensations of Delight, ofwhich his Nature is susceptible, immediately flow from a Publick Spirit,a generous, human, compassionate Temper, and a suitable Deportment;
while we observe so many Thousands enjoying a tolerable State of Easeand Safety, for each one whose Condition is made intolerable, even during our present Corruption: How can any one look upon this World asunder the Direction of an evil Nature, or even question a perfectly good
Providence? How clearly does the [205] Order of our Nature pointout to us our true Happiness and Perfection, and lead us to it as naturally
as the several Powers of [203] the Earth, the Sun, and Air, bring Plants
to their Growth, and the Perfection of their Kinds? We indeed are directed to it by our Understanding and Affections, as it becomes rational
and active Natures; and they by mechanick Laws. We may see, that “Attention to the most universal Interest of all sensitive Natures, is the Perfection of each individual of Mankind:” That they should thus be likewell-tuned Instruments, affected with every Stroke or Touch upon any
one. Nay, how much of this do we actually see in the World? What generous Sympathy, Compassion, and Congratulation with each other? Does
not even the flourishing State of the inanimate Parts of Nature, fill us
with joy? Is not thus our Nature admonished, exhorted and commanded to cultivate universal Goodness and Love, by a Voice heard thro’
all the Earth, and Words sounding to the Ends of the World?

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treatise iiuIllustrations upon
the Moral Sense

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[205/207] The Differences of Actions from which some are constituted
morally Good, and others morally Evil, have always been accounted avery important Subject of Inquiry: And therefore, every Attempt to free
this Subject from the usual Causes of Error and Dispute, the Confusionof ambiguous Words, must be excusable.
In the following Discourse, Happiness denotes pleasant Sensation of any Definitions.
kind, or a continued State of such Sensations; and Misery denotes thecontrary Sensations.
Such Actions as tend to procure Happiness to the Agent, are called
privately useful: and such Actions as procure Misery to the Agent, privately hurtful.
[206] Actions procuring Happiness to others may be called publickly
useful, and the contrary Actions publickly hurtful. Some Actions may beboth publickly and privately useful, and others both publickly and privately hurtful.
These different natural Tendencies of Actions are universally acknowledged; and in proportion to our Reflection upon human Affairs,
we shall enlarge our Knowledge of these Differences.

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When these natural Differences are known, it remains to be inquired Two Quesabout
into: 1st, “What Quality in any Action determines our Election of it tions
Morality.
rather than the contrary?” Or, if the Mind determines itself, “What Motives or Desires excite to an Action, rather than the contrary, or rather
than to the Omission?” 2dly, “What Quality determines our Approbationof one Action, rather than of the contrary Action?”
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The Words Election and Approbation seem to denote simple Ideas
known by Consciousness; which can only be explained by synonimousWords, or by concomitant or con[209]sequent Circumstances. Election
is purposing to do an Action rather than its contrary, or than being inactive. Appro[207]bation of our own Action denotes, or is attended witha Pleasure in the Contemplation of it, and in Reflection upon the Affections which inclined us to it. Approbation of the Action of another ispleasant, and is attended with Love toward the Agent.*
The Qualities moving to Election, or exciting to Action, are different
from those moving to Approbation: We often do Actions which we do
not approve, and approve Actions which we omit: We often desire thatan Agent had omitted an Action which we approve; and wish he would
do an Action which we condemn. Approbation is employed about the
Actions of others, where there is no room for our Election.
Now in our Search into the Qualities exciting either our Election or Approbation, let us consider the several Notions advanced of moral Good andEvil in both these Respects; and what Senses, Instincts, or Affections, [210]must be necessarily supposed to account for our Approbation or Election.
The Epicurean
Opinion.

There are two Opinions on this Subject entirely opposite: The one thatof the old Epicureans, as it is beautifully explained in the first Book of
Cicero, De [208 ] finibus; which is revived by Mr. Hobbes, and followedby many better Writers: “That all the Desires of the human Mind, nayof all thinking Natures, are reducible to Self-Love, or Desire of private
Happiness: That from this Desire all Actions of any Agent do flow.”40
Our Christian Moralists introduce other sorts of Happiness to be desired, but still “ ’tis the Prospect of private Happiness, which, with someof them, is the sole Motive of Election.41 And that, in like manner, what
* See Treat. II. Sect. 2. Parag. ult.
[[This note was added in the third edition. Much of T2 II, but not the final
paragraph, concerns approbation toward an agent.]]
40. See, particularly, Cicero, De Finibus, 23b.
41. This is perhaps a reference to John Clarke, as Hutcheson would stop shortof calling Pufendorf or Locke Epicureans, even though they share a similar theoryof motivation.

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determines any Agent to approve his own Action, is its Tendency to his
private Happiness in the whole, tho it may bring present Pain along with
it: That the Approbation of the Action of another, is from an Opinionof its Tendency to the Happiness of the Approver, either immediately or
more remotely: That each Agent may discover it to be the surest way topromote his private Happiness, to do publickly useful Actions, and to abstain from those which are publickly hurtful: [211] That the neglecting
to observe this, and doing publickly hurtful Actions, does mischief to thewhole of Mankind, by hurting any one part; that every one has somelittle damage by this Action: Such an inadvertent Person might possibly
be pernicious to any one, were he in his Neighbourhood; and the very
Example [209] of such Actions may extend over the whole World, andproduce some pernicious Effects upon any Observer. That therefore
every one may look upon such Actions as hurtful to himself, and in thisview does disapprove them, and hates the Agent. In the like manner, apublickly useful Action may diffuse some small Advantage to every Observer, whence he may approve it, and love the Agent.”
This Scheme can never account for the principal Actions of human Does notthe
Life:* Such as the Offices of Friendship, Gratitude, natural Affection, answer
Appearances.
Generosity, publick Spirit, Compassion. Men are conscious of no such Intentions or acute Reflections in these Actions. Ingenious speculative
Men, in their straining to support an Hypothesis, may contrive a thousand subtle selfish Motives, which a kind generous Heart never dreamedof. In like manner, this Scheme can never account for [212] the sudden
Approbation, and violent Sense of something amiable in Actions done indistant Ages and Nations, while the Approver has perhaps neverthought of these distant Tendencies to his Happiness. Nor will it betteraccount for our want of Approbation [210] toward publickly useful Actions done casually, or only with Intention of private Happiness to theAgent. And then, in these Actions reputed generous, if the Agent’s Motive was only a view to his own Pleasure, how come we to approve them

* See Treat. III. Sect. 1.

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more than his enriching himself, or his gratifying his own Taste with good
Food? The whole Species may receive a like Advantage from both, andthe Observer an equal Share.
Were our Approbation of Actions done in distant Ages and Nations,occasioned by this Thought, that such an Action done toward ourselves would be useful to us, why don’t we approve and love in likemanner any Man who finds a Treasure, or indulges himself in any exquisite Sensation, since these Advantages or Pleasures might be conferred on our selves; and tend more to our Happiness than any Actions
in distant Ages?
The Sanctions of Laws may make any Agent chuse the Action required, under the Conception of useful to himself, and lead [213] him
into an Opinion of private Advantage in it, and of detriment in the contrary Actions; but what should determine any Person to approve theActions of others, because of a Conformity to a [211] Law, if Approbationin any Person were only an Opinion of private Advantage?
The opposite
Opinion does
plainly.

Schemes seemingly different
from both.

The other Opinion is this, “That we have not only Self-Love, but benevolent Affections also toward others, in various Degrees, making us desire their Happiness as an ultimate End, without any view to private
Happiness: That we have a moral Sense or Determination of our Mind,
to approve every kind Affection either in our selves or others, and all
publickly useful Actions which we imagined do flow from such Affection, without our having a view to our private Happiness, in our Approbation of these Actions.”
These two Opinions seem both intelligible, each consistent with itself. The former seems not to represent human Nature as it is; the otherseems to do it.
There have been many ways of speaking introduced, which seem to signify something different from both the former Opinions. Such as these,that “Morality of Actions consists in Conformity to Reason, or Difformity[214] from it:” That “Virtue is acting according to the absolute Fitness
and Unfitness of Things, or agreeably to the [212] Natures or Relations ofThings,” and many others in different Authors. To examine these is the

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Design of the following Sections; and to explain more fully how theMoral Sense alledged to be in Mankind, must be presupposed even inthese Schemes.
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section iConcerning the Character of Virtue,
agreeable to Truth or Reason.
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[213/215] Since Reason is understood to denote our Power of finding out
true Propositions, Reasonableness must denote the same thing, with
Conformity to true Propositions, or to Truth.
Reasonableness in an Action is a very common Expression, but yet
upon inquiry, it will appear very confused, whether we suppose it the
Motive to Election, or the Quality determining Approbation.
There is one sort of Conformity to Truth which neither determines to Conformity to
examthe one or the other; viz. that Conformity which is between every true Truth
ined.
Proposition and its Object. This sort of Conformity can never make us
chuse or approve one Action more than its contrary, for it is found in all
Actions alike: Whatever attribute can be ascribed to a generous kind Action, the contrary Attribute may as truly be ascribed to a selfish cruel Action: Both Propositions are equally true, [216 ] and the two contrary Actions, the Objects of the two [214] Truths are equally conformable totheir several Truths, with that sort of Conformity which is between a
Truth and its Object. This Conformity then cannot make a Difference
among Actions, or recommend one more than another either to Election or Approbation, since any Man may make as many Truths about
Villany, as about Heroism, by ascribing to it contrary Attributes.
For Instance, these are Truths concerning the Preservation of Property.
“It tends to the Happiness of human Society: It incourages Industry: Itshall be rewarded by God.” These are also Truths concerning Robbery.
“It disturbs Society: It discourages Industry: It shall be punished byGod.” The former three Truths have the Preservation of Property for their

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Object; the latter three have Robbery. And each Class of Truths hath thatsort of Conformity to its Object, which is common to all Truths with
their Objects. The moral Difference cannot therefore depend upon thisConformity, which is common to both.
The Number of Truths in both cases may be plainly the same; so thata good Action cannot be supposed to agree to more Truths than an evil
one, nor can an evil Action be disagreeable to any Truth or [215] Compages [217] of Truths made about it; for whatever Propositions do notagree with their Objects are not Truths.
If Reasonableness, the Character of Virtue, denote some other sort ofConformity to Truth, it were to be wished that these Gentlemen, whomake it the original Idea of moral Good, antecedent to any Sense or
Affections, would explain it, and shew how it determines us antecedently to a Sense, either to Election or Approbation.
They tell us, “we must have some Standard antecedently to all Sense
or Affections, since we judge even of our Senses and Affections themselves, and approve or disapprove them: This Standard must be our
Reason, Conformity to which must be the original Idea of moral
Good.”

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Reasons either
justifying or
exciting.

But what is this Conformity of Actions to Reason? When we ask the Reason of an Action we sometimes mean, “What Truth shews a Quality in
the Action, exciting the Agent to do it?” Thus, why does a Luxurious Man
pursue Wealth? The Reason is given by this Truth, “Wealth is useful topurchase Pleasures.” Sometimes for a Reason of Actions we shew the
Truth expressing a Quality, engaging our Approbation. Thus the Reason of
hazarding [216] Life in just War, is, that “it tends to preserve our [218]honest Countrymen, or evidences publick Spirit:” The Reason for Temperance, and against Luxury is given thus, “Luxury evidences a selfish
base Temper.” The former sort of Reasons we will call exciting, and thelatter justifying.* Now we shall find that all exciting Reasons presuppose
Instincts and Affections; and the justifying presuppose a Moral Sense.
* Thus Grotius distinguishes the Reasons of War, into the Justificae, and Suasoriae.
[[See Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, II.1.1. Grotius makes his distinction with ref-25

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As to exciting Reasons, in every calm rational Action some end is desired Exciting Reasuppose
or intended; no end can be intended or desired previously to some one sonsAffections.
of these Classes of Affections, Self-Love, Self-Hatred, or desire of private
Misery, (if this be possible) Benevolence toward others, or Malice: All
Affections are included under these; no end can be previous to them all;there can therefore be no exciting Reason previous to Affection.
We have indeed many confused Harangues on this Subject, tellingus, “We have two Principles of Action, Reason, and Affection, or Passion(i.e. strong Affection): the former in common with [217] Angels, the latter with Brutes: No Action is wise, or good, or reasonable, to which weare not excited [219] by Reason, as distinct from all Affections; or, if any
such Actions as flow from Affections be good, ’tis only by chance, or materially and not formally.” As if indeed Reason, or the Knowledge of theRelations of things, could excite to Action when we proposed no End,or as if Ends could be intended without Desire or Affection.
But are there not also exciting Reasons, even previous to any end, mov- No excitingforing us to propose one end rather than another? To this Aristotle long ago Reasons
ultimate Ends.
answered, “that there are ultimate Ends desired without a view to any
thing else, and subordinate Ends or Objects desired with a view to something else.”42 To subordinate Ends those Reasons or Truths excite, which
shew them to be conducive to the ultimate End, and shew one Object tobe more effectual than another: thus subordinate Ends may be called reasonable. But as to the ultimate Ends, to suppose exciting Reasons forthem, would infer, that there is no ultimate End, but that we desire one
thing for another in an infinite Series.
Thus ask a Being who desires private Happiness, or has Self-Love?
“what [218] Reason [221] excites him to desire Wealth”? He will give thiserence to Polybius and Livy. Barbeyrac, in the commentary on his edition of Grotius(Jean Barbeyrac, Le Droit de la Guere et de la Paix par Hugo Grotius [Amsterdam:
Pierre de Coup, 1724], 2v.), cites Polybius, History, III.6.]]
42. See Nicomachean Ethics, I.1. See also Gilbert Burnet (ed.), Letters Between
the Late Mr. Gilbert Burnet, and Mr. Hutchinson, Concerning The true Foundationof Virtue or Moral Goodness. Formerly Published in the London Journal (London: W.
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Reason, that “Wealth tends to procure Pleasure and Ease.” Ask his Reason for desiring Pleasure or Happiness: One cannot imagine what
Proposition he could assign as his exciting Reason. This Proposition isindeed true, “There is an Instinct or Desire fixed in his Nature, determining him to pursue his Happiness;” but it is not this Reflection on his
own Nature, or this Proposition which excites or determines him, but
the Instinct itself. This is a Truth, “Rhubarb strengthens the Stomach:”
But ’tis not a Proposition which strengthens the Stomach, but the Quality in that Medicine. The Effect is not produced by Propositions shewing
the Cause, but by the Cause itself.
In like manner, what Reason can a benevolent Being give, as exciting
him to hazard his Life in just War? This perhaps, “such Conduct tends
to the Happiness of his Country.” Ask him, “why he serves his Country?” he will say, “His Country is a very valuable Part of Mankind.”
Why does he study the Happiness of Mankind? If his Affections be really disinterested, he can give no exciting Reasons for it: The Happinessof Mankind in general, or of any valuable Part of it, is an ultimate End
to that Series of Desires.
Men have
many ultimateEnds.

[219/222] We may transiently observe one Mistake which many fallinto, who in their Philosophical Inquiries have learned to form very abstract general Ideas: They suppose, because they have formed some Conception of an infinite Good, or greatest possible Aggregate, or Sum of Happiness, under which all particular Pleasures may be included; that there
is also some one great ultimate End, with a view to which every particular Object is desired; whereas, in truth, each particular Pleasure is desired without farther view, as an ultimate End in the selfish Desires. ’Tis
true, the Prospect of a greater inconsistent Pleasure may surmount or
stop this Desire; so may the Fear of a prepollent Evil. But this does notprove, that “all Men have formed Ideas of infinite Good, or greatest possible Aggregate, or that they have any Instinct or Desire, without an Idea
of its Object.” Just so in the benevolent Affections, the Happiness of any
one Person is an ultimate End, desired with no farther view: And yet theobserving its Inconsistency with the Happiness of another more beloved,or with the Happiness of many, tho each one of them were but equally

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beloved, may overcome the former Desire. Yet this will not prove, thatin each kind Action Men do form the abstract Conception of all Mankind, or the System of Rationals. [210] The forming such large Conceptions is indeed useful, that so we may gratify either our [223] Self-Loveor kind Affections in the fullest manner, as far as our Power extends; andmay not content our selves with smaller Degrees either of private or
publick Good, while greater are in our power: But when we have formed
these Conceptions, we do not serve the Individual only from Love to theSpecies, no more than we desire Grapes with an Intention of the greatest
Aggregate of Happiness, or from an Apprehension that they make a Partof the General sum of our Happiness. These Conceptions only serve tosuggest greater Ends than would occur to us without Reflection; and by
the Prepollency of one Desire toward the greater Good, either private or
publick, to stop the Desire toward the smaller Good, when it appears
inconsistent with the greater.
Let us examine the Truths assigned as exciting to the Pursuit of publick The common
examGood, even by those, who, tho they allow disinterested Affections, and a Reasons
ined.
moral Sense, yet suppose something reasonable in it antecedently. They
assign such as these “publick Good is the End proposed by the Deity.” Then what Reason excites Men to concur with the Deity? Is it
this, “Concurring with the Deity will make the Agent happy?” This isan exciting Reason indeed, [221] but plainly supposes Self-Love: [224]And let any one assign the exciting Reason to the Desire of Happiness.
Is the Reason exciting to concur with the Deity this, “The Deity is
our Benefactor?” Then what Reason excites to concur with Benefactors?
Here we must recur to an Instinct. Is it this Truth, “The divine Ends arereasonable Ends?” Then what means the Word [reasonable?] Does itmean, that “the Deity has Reasons exciting him to promote the publick
Good?” What are these Reasons? Why, perhaps “we do not know them
particularly, but in general are sure that the Deity has Reasons forthem.” Then the Question recurs, What Reason excites us to implicit
Concurrence with the Ends of the Deity? The Reasons which excite
one Nature may not excite another: The Tendency of an Action to theHappiness of one Agent may excite him, but will not excite another Agent142

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to concur, unless there appears a like Tendency to the Happiness of that
other. They may say, “they are sure the divine Ends are good.” Whatmeans Goodness? Is it moral or natural? If the divine Ends be natural
Good, i.e. pleasant, or the Cause of Pleasure, to whom is this Pleasure? If
to the Deity, then why do we study the Happiness or the pleasing of
the Deity? What Reason excites us? All the possible Reasons must
[222] either presuppose some Affection, if they are [225] exciting; orsome moral Sense, if they are justifying.—Is the divine End naturally
good to us? This is an exciting Reason, but supposes Self-Love. If we say
the divine Ends are morally Good, we are just where we began. What is
moral Goodness? Conformity to Reason. What are the Reasons exciting or
justifying?
If any alledg as the Reason exciting us to pursue publick Good, thisTruth, that “the Happiness of a System, a Thousand, or a Million, is agreater Quantity of Happiness than that of one Person: and consequently, if Men desire Happiness, they must have stronger Desires toward the greater Sum, than toward the less.” This Reason still supposesan Instinct toward Happiness as previous to it: And again, To whom isthe Happiness of a System a greater Happiness? To one Individual, orto the System? If to the Individual, then his Reason exciting his Desireof a happy System supposes Self-Love: If to the System, then what Reason
can excite to desire the greater Happiness of a System, or any Happinessto be in the Possession of others? None surely which does not presuppose publick Affections. Without such Affections this Truth, “that an
hundred Felicities is a greater Sum than one Felicity,” will no [223]more excite to study the Happiness of the Hundred, than this Truth,“an hundred [226] Stones are greater than one,” will excite a Man, who
has no desire of Heaps, to cast them together.
The same may be observed concerning that Proposition, assigned bysome as the ultimate Reason both exciting to, and justifying the Pursuitof publick Good, viz. “It is best that all should be happy.” Best is mostgood: Good to whom? To the Whole, or to each Individual? If to theformer, when this Truth excites to Action, it must presuppose kind Affections; if it is good to each Individual, it must suppose Self-Love.

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Let us once suppose Affections, Instincts or Desires previously implanted The trueofin our Nature: and we shall easily understand the exciting Reasons for Meaning
Reasons excitActions, viz. “These Truths which shew them to be conducive toward ing to Actions,some ultimate End, or toward the greatest End of that kind in our and reasonable
Actions.
Power.” He acts reasonably, who considers the various Actions in his
Power, and forms true Opinions of their Tendencies; and then chuses todo that which will obtain the highest Degree of that, to which the Instincts of his Nature incline him, with the smallest Degree of those
things to [224] which the Affections in his Nature make him averse.
[227] More particularly, the exciting Reasons to a Nature which had
only selfish Affections, are those Truths which shewed “what Object orEvent would occasion to it the greatest Quantity of Pleasure:” thesewould excite to the Prosecution of it. The exciting Truths about Means,would be only those which pointed out some Means as more certainly
effectual than any other, or with less Pain or Trouble to the Agent. Publick Usefulness of Ends or Means, or publick Hurtfulness would neither
excite nor dissuade, farther than the publick State might affect that of
the Agent.
If there is any Nature with publick Affections: The Truths exciting to
any End in this Order, are such as shew, “that any Event would promote the Happiness of others.” That End is called most reasonable,
which our Reason discovers to contain a greater Quantity of publick
Good, than any other in our power.
When any Event may affect both the Agent and others, if the Agent
have both Self-Love and publick Affections, he acts according to that Affection which is strongest, when there is any Opposition of Interests; [225]
if there be no Opposition, he follows both. If he discovers this Truth,that “his constant [228] pursuit of publick Good is the most probableway of promoting his own Happiness,” then his Pursuit is truly reasonable and constant; thus both Affections are at once gratify’d, and he isconsistent with himself. Without knowledge of that Truth he does not
act reasonably for his own Happiness, but follows it by Means not tending effectually to this End: and must frequently, from the Power of
Self-Love, neglect or counteract his other End, the publick Good. If there

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illustrations upon the moral sensebe also a moral Sense in such an Agent, while yet he is inadvertent to theConnexion of private Happiness with the Study of the publick; he must be
perpetually yet more uneasy, either thro’ the apprehended Neglect of private Interest when he serves the Publick; or when he pursues only private
Interest, he will have perpetual Remorse and Dissatisfaction with his own
Temper, thro’ his moral Sense. So that the Knowledge of this Connexionof private Interest, with the Study of publick Good, seems absolutely
necessary to preserve a constant Satisfaction of Mind, and to prevent analternate Prevalence of seemingly contrary Desires.
Should any one ask even concerning these two ultimate Ends, private
Good [226] and publick, is not the latter more reasonable than the former?—What means the Word reasonable in this Question? If we [229]
are allowed to presuppose Instincts and Affections, then the Truth justnow supposed to be discoverable concerning our State, is an exciting
Reason to serve the publick Interest, since this Conduct is the most effectual Means to obtain both ends. But I doubt if any Truth can be assigned which excites in us either the Desire of private Happiness or publick. For the former none ever alledged any exciting Reason: and abenevolent Temper finds as little Reason exciting him to the latter; which
he desires without any view to private Good. If the meaning of theQuestion be this, “does not every Spectator approve the Pursuit of publick Good more than private?” The Answer is obvious that he does: but
not for any Reason or Truth, but from a moral Sense.
This leads to consider Approbation of Actions, whether it be for Conformity to any Truth, or Reasonableness, that Actions are ultimately approved, independently of any moral Sense? Or if all justifying Reasons do
not presuppose it?
Justifying Reasons suppose amoral Sense.

If Conformity to Truth, or Reasonable, denote nothing else but that “anAction is the Object of a true Proposition,” ’tis [227] plain, that all Actions should be approved [230] equally, since as many Truths may bemade about the worst, as can be made about the best. See what was said
above about exciting Reasons.
But let the Truths commonly assigned as justifying be examined.

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Here ’tis plain, “A Truth shewing an Action to be fit to attain an End,”does not justify it; nor do we approve a subordinate End for any Truth,
which only shews it to be fit to promote the ultimate End; for the worst
Actions may be conducive to their Ends, and reasonable in that Sense.
The justifying Reasons then must be about the Ends themselves, especially the ultimate Ends. The Question then is, “Does a Conformity to
any Truth make us approve an ultimate End, previously to any moral
Sense?” For example, we approve pursuing the publick Good. For what
Reason? or what is the Truth for Conformity to which we call it a reasonable End? I fancy we can find none in these Cases, more than we
could give for our liking any pleasant Fruit.*
The Reasons assigned are such as these; “’Tis the End proposed by theDeity.” But why do we approve concurring with [231] the divine
Ends? This Reason is given, “He is our Benefactor:” But then, for [228]what Reason do we approve Concurrence with a Benefactor? Here wemust recur to a Sense. Is this the Reason moving to Approbation, “Studyof publick Good tends to the Advantage of the Approver?” Then the Quality moving us to approve an Action, is its being advantageous to us, andnot Conformity to a Truth. This Scheme is intelligible, but not true infact. Men approve without Perception of private Advantage; and often
do not condemn or disapprove what is plainly pernicious; as in the Execution of a just Sentence, which even the Criminal may approve.
If any allege, that this is the justifying Reason of the Pursuit of publick
Good, “that it is best all be happy,” then we approve Actions for their
Tendency to that State which is best, and not for Conformity to Reason.
But here again, what means best? morally best, or naturally best? If theformer, they explain the same Word by itself in a Circle: If they mean
the latter, that “it is the most happy State where all are happy;” then,most happy, for whom? the System, or the Individual? If for the former,
what Reason makes us approve the Happiness of a System? Here we must
* This is what Aristotle so often asserts that the proaireto’ n or boulento’ n is not
the End, but the Means.
[[This note was added in the third edition. See Nicomachean Ethics, 1111b27.]]

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illustrations upon the moral senserecur to a Sense or kind Affections. Is [232] it most happy for the Individual? Then the Quality moving Approbation is [229] again Tendency
to private Happiness, not Reasonableness.
Obligation
supposes either
Affections or amoral Sense.

The meaningof Obligation.

There are some other Reasons assigned in Words differing from the former, but more confused, such as these: “’Tis our Duty to study publick
Good. We are obliged to do it. We owe Obedience to the Deity. The wholeis to be preferred to a Part.” But let these Words Duty, Obligation, Owing,
and the meaning of that Gerund, is to be preferred, be explained; and weshall find our selves still at a Loss for exciting Reasons previously to Affections, or justifying Reasons without recourse to a moral Sense.
When we say one is obliged to an Action, we either mean, 1. That the
Action is necessary to obtain Happiness to the Agent, or to avoid Misery:Or, 2. That every Spectator, or he himself upon Reflection, must approve
his Action, and disapprove his omitting it, if he considers fully all its Circumstances. The former Meaning of the Word Obligation presupposes
selfish Affections, and the Senses of private Happiness: The latter Meaning
includes the moral Sense. Mr. Barbeyrac, in his Annotations upon Grotius,* [230/233] makes Obligation denote an indispensable Necessity to act
in a certain manner. Whoever observes his Explication of this Necessity,(which is not natural, otherwise no Man could act against his Obligation) will find that it denotes only “such a Constitution of a powerful
Superior, as will make it impossible for any Being to obtain Happiness,or avoid Misery, but by such a Course of Action.” This agrees with theformer Meaning, tho sometimes he also includes the latter.
Many other confused Definitions have been given of Obligation, by
no obscure Names in the learned World. But let any one give a distinct
Meaning, different from the two above-mentioned. To pursue them all
would be endless; only let the Definitions be substituted in place of theWord Obligation, in other parts of each Writer, and let it be observed whether it makes good Sense or not.†* Lib J. Chap. 1. Sect. 10.
†
The common Definition, Vinculum Juris que necessitate aastringimur alicujus rei

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Before we quit this Character Reasonableness, let us consider the Argu- Arguments forStandard
ments brought to prove that there must be some Standard of moral someof Morals
Good antecedent to any Sense. Say [234] they, “Perceptions of Sense are prior to adeceitful, we must have some Perception or Idea of Virtue more stable Sense considered.
and certain; this must be Conformity to Reason: Truth discovered by our
Reason [231] is certain and invariable: That then alone is the OriginalIdea of Virtue, Agreement with Reason.” But in like manner our Sight
and Sense of Beauty is deceitful, and does not always represent the true
Forms of Objects. We must not call that beautiful or regular, which
pleases the Sight, or an internal Sense; but Beauty in external Forms too,consists in Conformity to Reason. So our Taste may be vitiated: we must
not say that Savour is perceived by Taste, but must place the originalIdea of grateful Savours in Conformity to Reason, and of ungrateful inContrariety to Reason. We may mistake the real Extent of Bodies, or their
Proportions, by making a Conclusion upon the first sensible Appearance: Therefore Ideas of Extension are not originally acquired by a Sense,
but consist in Conformity to Reason.
If what is intended in this Conformity to Reason be this, “That weshould call no Action virtuous, unless we have some Reason to conclude
it to be virtuous, or some Truth shewing it to be so.” This is very true;
but then in like manner we should count no Action vicious, unless we[235] have some Reason for counting it so, or when ’tis Truth “that it isvicious.” If this be intended by Conformity to Truth, then at the samerate we may make Conformity to Truth the original Idea of Vice [232] aswell as Virtue; nay, of every Attribute whatsoever. That Taste alone ispraestandae, is wholly metaphorical, and can settle no Debate precisely.
[[This note was added in the third edition. This definition of obligation derives
from Justinian, Institutes, III.1—“De Obligationibus.” Cumberland renders it “Thatbond of the Law, by which we are tied with the necessity of paying any thing ” (Richard
Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, V §11). It is commonly cited by the natural
lawyers. For a discussion, see Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, I.vi.4,
and Barbeyrac’s n. 2. It seems likely that Hutcheson is deriving this from Cumberland’s discussion, as Cumberland dismisses Justinian’s definition in favor of Papinianus’s definition (which rests not on the particular laws of a polity—Rome—but on “the bond of equity” and remarks “it breeds obscurity, that he uses
Metaphorical words, which are generally of doubtful meaning,” Ibid.]]

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illustrations upon the moral sensesweet, which there is Reason to count sweet; that Taste alone is bitter,concerning which ’tis true that it is bitter; that Form alone is beautiful,concerning which ’tis true that it is beautiful; and that alone deformed,
which is truly deformed. Thus Virtue, Vice, Sweet, Bitter, Beautiful, orDeformed, originally denote Conformity to Reason, antecedently to Perceptions of any Sense. The Idea of Virtue is particularly that concerningwhich ’tis Truth, that it is Virtue; or Virtue is Virtue; a wonderful Discovery!
So when some tell us, “that Truth is naturally pleasant, and more sothan any sensible Perception; this must therefore engage Men more thanany other Motive, if they attend to it.” Let them observe, that as much
Truth is known about Vice as Virtue. We may demonstrate the publick
Miseries which would ensue upon Perjury, Murder, and Robbery. These
Demonstrations would be attended with that Pleasure which is peculiar
to Truth; as well as the Demonstrations of the publick Happiness to[236] ensue from Faith, Humanity and Justice. There is equal Truth on
both sides.
Whence it isthat Virtue iscalled reasonable and notVice.

[233] We may transiently observe what has occasioned the Use of theWord reasonable, as an Epithet of only virtuous Actions. Tho we have
Instincts determining us to desire Ends, without supposing any previous
Reasoning; yet ’tis by use of our Reason that we find out the Means ofobtaining our Ends. When we do not use our Reason, we often are disappointed of our End. We therefore call those Actions which are effectual to their Ends, reasonable in one Sense of that Word.
Again, in all Men there is probably a moral Sense, making publickly
useful Actions and kind Affections grateful to the Agent, and to every
Observer: Most Men who have thought of human Actions, agree, thatthe publickly useful are in the whole also privately useful to the Agent,either in this Life or the next: We conclude, that all Men have the same
Affections and Senses: We are convinced by our Reason, that ’tis by publickly useful Actions alone that we can promote all our Ends. Whoever
then acts in a contrary manner, we presume is mistaken, ignorant of, or
inadvertent to, these Truths which he might know; and say he acts unreasonably. Hence some have [237] been led to imagine, some Reasons

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either exciting or [234] justifying previously to all Affections or a moral
Sense.

5

Two Arguments are brought in defense of this Epithet, as antecedent to
any Sense, viz. “That we judge even of our Affections and Senses themselves, whether they are morally Good or Evil.”
The second Argument is, that “if all moral Ideas depend upon theConstitution of our Sense, then all Constitutions would have been alikereasonable and good to the Deity, which is absurd.”

Objections
from our judging even of
our Affections
and Senses
themselves.

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As to the first Argument, ’tis plain we judge of our own Affections, or I. That we
ourthose of others by our moral Sense, by which we approve kind Affec- judge
Senses themtions, and disapprove the contrary. But none can apply moral Attributes selves.
to the very Faculty of perceiving moral Qualities; or call his moral Sense
morally Good or Evil, any more than he calls the Power of Tasting, sweet,
or bitter; or of Seeing, strait or crooked, white or black.
Every one judges the Affections of others by his own Sense; so that it Answered.
seems not impossible that in these Senses Men might differ as they doin Taste. A Sense approving Benevolence would disapprove [235] that Temper, [238] which a Sense approving Malice would delight in. The former
would judge of the latter by his own Sense, so would the latter of theformer. Each one would at first view think the Sense of the other perverted. But then, is there no difference? Are both Senses equally good?
No certainly, any Man who observed them would think the Sense of theformer more desirable than of the latter; but this is, because the moral
Sense of every Man is constituted in the former manner. But were there
any Nature with no moral Sense at all observing these two Persons,would he not think the State of the former preferable to that of the latter? Yes, he might: but not from any Perception of moral Goodness inthe one Sense more than in the other. Any rational Nature observing
two Men thus constituted, with opposite Senses, might by reasoning see,not moral Goodness in one Sense more than in the contrary, but a Tendency to the Happiness of the Person himself, who had the former Sense in
the one Constitution, and a contrary Tendency in the opposite Consti-

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tution: nay, the Persons themselves might observe this; since the former
Sense would make these Actions grateful to the Agent which were usefulto others; who, if they had a like Sense, would love him, and return good
Offices; whereas the latter Sense would make all such Actions as are useful[236] to others, and [239] apt to engage their good Offices, ungrateful to
the Agent; and would lead him into publickly hurtful Actions, which
would not only procure the Hatred of others, if they had a contrary
Sense, but engage them out of their Self-Love to study his Destruction,
tho their Senses agreed. Thus any Observer, or the Agent himself withthis latter Sense, might perceive that the Pains to be feared, as the Consequence of malicious Actions, did over-ballance the Pleasures of thisSense; so that it would be to the Agent’s Interest to counteract it. Thus
one Constitution of the moral Sense might appear to be more advantageous to those who had it, than the contrary; as we may call that Sense
of Tasting healthful, which made wholesom Meat pleasant; and wewould call a contrary Taste pernicious. And yet we should no more callthe moral Sense morally good or evil, than we call the Sense of Tastingsavoury or unsavoury, sweet or bitter.
But must we not own, that we judge of all our Senses by our Reason,and often correct their Reports of the Magnitude, Figure, Colour, Tasteof Objects, and pronounce them right or wrong, as they agree or disagree with Reason? This is true. But does it then follow, that Extension,
Figure, Colour, Taste, are not [237] sensible Ideas, but only denote Reasonableness, or Agreement with [240] Reason? Or that these Qualities
are perceivable antecedently to any Sense, by our Power of finding out
Truth? Just so a compassionate Temper may rashly imagine the Correction of a Child, or the Execution of a Criminal, to be cruel and inhuman: but by reasoning may discover the superior Good arising fromthem in the whole; and then the same moral Sense may determine theObserver to approve them. But we must not hence conclude, that it is
any reasoning antecedent to a moral Sense, which determines us to approve the Study of publick Good, any more than we can in the former
Case conclude, that we perceive Extension, Figure, Colour, Taste, antecedently to a Sense. All these Sensations are often corrected by Rea-

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soning, as well as our Approbations of Actions as Good or Evil:* andyet no body ever placed the Original Idea of Extension, Figure, Colour,or Taste, in Conformity to Reason.
Thus tho no Man can immediately either approve or disapprove as
morally good or evil his own moral Sense, by which he approves only Affections and Actions consequent upon them; yet he [238] may see
whether it be advantageous to him in other respects, to have it constituted one way rather than another. One Constitution may make these
Actions grateful to this Sense which tend to procure other Pleasures also.
A contrary Constitution may be known to the very Person himself to bedisadvantageous, as making these Actions immediately grateful, whichshall occasion all other sorts of Misery. His Self-Love may excite him, thowith Dissatisfaction, to counteract this Sense, in order to avoid a greater
Evil. Mr. Hobbes seems to have had no better Notions of the natural
State of Mankind. An Observer, who was benevolent, would desire that
all had the former sort of Sense; a malicious Observer, if he feared no Evilto himself, [243] from the Actions of the Persons observed, would desire
the latter Constitution. If this Observer had a moral Sense, he would
think that Constitution which was contrary to his own, strange and surprizing, or unnatural. If the Observer had no Affections toward others,
and were disjoined from Mankind, so as to have neither Hopes nor Fears
from their Actions, he would be indifferent about their Constitutions,and have no Desire or Preference of one above another; tho he might see
which were advantageous to them, and which pernicious.

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30[239] As to the second Argument, What means [alike reasonable or good The 2d Objecthat all
to the Deity?] Does it mean, “that the Deity could have had no Rea- tion,
Constitutions
sons exciting him to make one Constitution rather than another?” ’Tis would haveplain, if the Deity had nothing essential to his Nature, corresponding been alikereasonable,
to our sweetest and most kind Affections, we can scarce suppose he could answered.
have any Reason exciting him to any thing he has done: but grant such

* See Sect 4. of this Treatise.

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illustrations upon the moral sensea Disposition in the Deity, and then the manifest Tendency of the present Constitution to the Happiness of his Creatures was an exciting Reason
for chusing it before the contrary.* Each sort of Constitution [244]* A late Author on the Foundation of Moral Goodness, &c. p. 9. thus argues: “Ifsuch a Disposition is in the Deity, is it a Perfection, or is it not? is it better than thecontrary, more worthy of his Nature, more agreeable to his other Perfections? If not,let us not ascribe it to him: If it be, then for what Reason, Account, or Ground is it
better? That Reason, Account, or Ground, must be the Foundation of moral Goodness. If there be no Reason why it is better, then God is acted by a blind unaccountable Impulse.” In Answer, one may first ask the precise Meaning of these vague
Words, Perfection, Betterness, Worthiness, Agreement. If these Terms denote “whatever
makes the Being possessed of them happier, than he would be without them;” then,
1. It is plain, kind Dispositions are Perfections to Men in our present Frame; arebetter for us than the contrary, and agree better with our other Powers; i. e. they tend
to preserve them, and procure us many Enjoyments. 2. Our apprehending such Dispositions in God, according to our Frame makes us esteem and love him. 3. Our
Knowledge of God is so imperfect, that it is not easy to prove that such Dispositions
tend to make or preserve him happy, or to procure him other Enjoyments. And yet,
4. We may have good Reason, Ground, or Evidence, from his Works and Administration to believe him Benevolent. 5. If he has real Good-will to his Creatures, their
Perfection or Happiness is to him an ultimate End, intended without farther View
or Reason: And yet, 6. He is not acted by a blind Impulse: the ultimate End is known
to him, and the best Means chosen; which never happen in what we call blind Impulses; unless one calls willing any ultimate End a blind Impulse. For thus each Man
should desire his own Happiness by a blind Impulse: And God’s willing to regard
the Fitness of Things, must be a blind Impulse, unless he have a prior Reason why hewills what his Understanding represents as fit, rather than what is unfit; for his Understanding represents both. And there must be a prior Fitness or Reasonableness thathe should will what is fit, and a yet prior Fitness that he should regard the Fitness ofwilling what is fit, and so on.
If in these Questions is meant, not by what Argument do we prove that the Deity
is benevolent? but, “what is the efficient Cause of that Disposition in God?” Those
Gentlemen must answer for us, who tell us also of the Reason or Ground of the Divine
Existence; and that not as a Proof that he does exist, or the Causa Cognoscendi, as the
Schoolmen speak; but the Causa Essendi of that Being which they acknowledge uncaused and independent. See Dr. Sam. Clarke’s Boyle’s Lectures.
[[This footnote was added in the third edition. John Balguy (1686–1748) was, like
Burnet, a follower of Samuel Clarke. His favored form was polemic, and over thecourse of his career his victims included Shaftesbury, Collins, Tindal, Henry Grove,and Hutcheson. The Foundation of Moral Goodness, or a Further Inquiry into theOriginal of our Idea of Virtue (1728–29) was a critique of Hutcheson’s Treatises froma rationalist perspective. Balguy’s criticisms of Hutcheson continued in the first partof Divine Rectitude: or a Brief Inquiry Concerning the Moral Perfections of the Deity

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might have given Men an equal immediate Pleasure in present SelfApprobation for any sort of Action; but the Actions approved by thepresent Sense, procure all Pleasures of the other Senses; and the Actions
which would have been approved by a contrary [245] moral Sense, would
have been productive of all Torments of the other Senses.
If it be meant, that “upon this Supposition, that all our Approbation
presupposes in us a moral Sense, the Deity could not have approved one
Constitution more than another:” where is the Consequence? Why may
not the Deity have [240] something of a superior Kind, analogous toour moral Sense, essential to him? How does any Constitution of theSenses of Men hinder the Deity to reflect and judge of his own Actions?
How does it affect the divine Apprehension, which way soever moral
Ideas arise with Men?
If it means “that we cannot approve of one Constitution more than another, or approve the Deity for making the present Constitution:” This
Consequence is also false. The present Constitution of our moral Sense
determines us to approve all kind Affections: [246] This Constitution
the Deity must have foreseen as tending to the Happiness of his Creatures; it does therefore evidence kind Affection or Benevolence in the Deity, this therefore we must approve.
We have got some strange Phrases, “that some things are antecedently rea- The meaning
antecedent
sonable in the Nature of the thing,” which some insist upon: “That oth- of
Reasonableerwise, say they, if before Man was created, any Nature without a moral ness.
Sense had existed, this Nature would not have approved as morally goodin the Deity, his constituting our Sense as it is at present.” Very true;
and what next? If there had been no moral Sense in that Nature, there
would have been no Perception [241] of Morality. But “could not such
(1730). For Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) see the Introduction to this volume.
The Boyle Lectures were instituted through a bequest from Robert Boyle’s estate,
to combat “atheism” (Spinoza, Hobbes, and Toland; “free thinkers” such as Anthony Collins; and fellow travelers such as Mandeville). Clarke’s A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion (London, 1705) and A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (London, 1704) were Boyle lectures.
Hutcheson is likely referring here to the proof of God in the latter work.]]

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Natures have seen something reasonable in one Constitution more thanin another?” They might no doubt have reasoned about the various
Constitutions, and foreseen that the present one would tend to the Happiness of Mankind, and would evidence Benevolence in the Deity: So
also they might have reasoned about the contrary Constitution, that it
would make Men miserable, and evidence Malice in the Deity. They
would have reasoned about both, and found out Truths: are both Constitutions alike reasonable to these Observers? No, say they, “the benevolent one is reasonable, and [247] the malicious unreasonable:” And yetthese Observers reasoned and discovered Truths about both: An Action
then is called by us reasonable when ’tis benevolent, and unreasonable
when malicious. This is plainly making the Word reasonable denote
whatever is approved by our moral Sense, without Relation to true Propositions. We often use that Word in such a confused Manner: But theseantecedent Natures, supposed without a moral Sense, would not have approved one Constitution of the Deity as morally better than another.
Had it been left to the Choice of these antecedent Minds, what manner of Sense [242] they would have desired for Mankind; would they
have seen no difference? Yes they would, according to their Affections
which are presupposed in all Election. If they were benevolent, as we suppose the Deity, the Tendency of the present Sense to the Happiness of
Men would have excited their Choice. Had they been malicious, as we
suppose the Devil, the contrary Tendency of the contrary Sense would
have excited their Election of it. But is there nothing preferable, or eligible antecedently to all Affections too? No certainly, unless there can be
Desire without Affections, or superior Desire, i. e. Election antecedently
to all Desire.
Reasons forElection different from those
for Approbation.

[248] Some do farther perplex this Subject, by asserting, that “the same
Reasons determining Approbation, ought also to excite to Election.”
Here, 1. We often see justifying Reasons where we can have no Election;
viz. when we observe the Actions of others, which were even prior to our
Existence. 2. The Quality moving us to Election very often cannot excite
Approbation; viz. private usefulness, not publickly pernicious. This both
does and ought to move Election, and yet I believe few will say, “theyapprove as virtuous the eating a Bunch of Grapes, taking a Glass of Wine,

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or sitting down when [243] one is tired.” Approbation is not what we canvoluntarily bring upon our selves. When we are contemplating Actions,
we do not chuse to approve, because Approbation is pleasant; otherwise
we would always approve, and never condemn any Action; because thisis some way uneasy. Approbation is plainly a Perception arising without
previous Volition, or Choice of it, because of any concomitant Pleasure.
The Occasion of it is the Perception of benevolent Affections in our selves,or the discovering the like in others, even when we are incapable of any
Action or Election. The Reasons determining Approbation are such as shewthat an Action evidenced kind Affections, and that in others, as often as inour [249] selves. Whereas, the Reasons moving to Election are such as
shew the Tendency of an Action to gratify some Affection in the Agent.
The Prospect of the Pleasure of Self-Approbation, is indeed often a
Motive to chuse one Action rather than another; but this supposes themoral Sense, or Determination to approve, prior to the Election. Were
Approbation voluntarily chosen, from the Prospect of its concomitant
Pleasure, then there could [244] be no Condemnation of our own Actions, for that is unpleasant.
As to that confused Word [ought] ’tis needless to apply to it again allthat was said about Obligation.

section ii
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30

Concerning that Character of Virtue and Vice,
The Fitness or Unfitness of Actions.
[245/250] We come next to examine some other Explications of Morality, which have been much insisted on of late.* We are told, “that there
are eternal and immutable Differences of Things, absolutely and antecedently: that there are also eternal and unalterable Relations in the Natures of the Things themselves, from which arise Agreements and Dis-

* See Dr. Samuel Clarke’s Boyle’s Lectures; and many late Authors.
[[This is a synoptic description of Samuel Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the

The Fitness
and Unfitness
in Morals.

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agreements, Congruities and Incongruities, Fitness and Unfitness of the
Application of Circumstances, to the Qualifications of Persons; that Actions agreeable to these Relations are morally Good, and that the contrary
Actions are morally Evil.” These Expressions are sometimes made of thesame Import with those more common ones: “acting agreeably to theeternal Reason and Truth [246] of Things.” ’Tis is asserted, that [251]“God who knows all these Relations, &c. does guide his Actions bythem, since he has no wrong Affection” (the Word [wrong] should havebeen first explained): “And that in like manner these Relations, &c.
ought” (another unlucky Word in Morals) “to determine the Choice of
all Rationals, abstractly from any Views of Interest. If they do not, these
Creatures are insolently counteracting their Creator, and as far as theycan, making things to be what they are not, which is the greatest Impiety.”
That Things are now different is certain. That Ideas, to which there
is no Object yet existing conformable, are also different, is certain. That
upon comparing two Ideas there arises a relative Idea, generally when
the two Ideas compared have in them any Modes of the same simple Idea,is also obvious. Thus every extended Being may be compared to any
other of the same Kinds of Dimensions; and relative Ideas be formed ofgreater, less, equal, double, triple, subduple, &c. with infinite variety. This
may let us see that Relations are not real Qualities inherent in external
Natures, but only Ideas necessarily accompanying our Perception of two
Objects at once, and comparing them. Relative Ideas do continue, whenthe external [247] Objects do not exist, provided [252] we retain the two
Ideas. But what the eternal Relations in the Natures of Things do mean,
is not so easy perhaps to be conceived.

Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of theChristian Revelation and particularly Proposition I. The “many late authors” include
Gilbert Burnet and William Wollaston.]]

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To shew particularly how far Morality can be concerned in Relations, we Three sorts of
may consider them under these Three Classes. 1. The Relations of in- Relations
considered.
animate Objects, as to their Quantity, or active and passive Powers, as explained by Mr. Locke.”43 2. The Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents, as to their active or passive Powers. 3. The Relations ofrational Agents among themselves, founded on their Powers or Actions
past or continued.44 Now let us examine what Fitnesses or Unfitnesses
arise from any of these sorts of Relations, in which the Morality of Actions may consist; and whether we can place Morality in them, without
presupposing a moral Sense. ’Tis plain, that ingenious Author says nothing against the Supposition of a moral Sense: But many do imagine, that
his Account of moral Ideas is independent upon a moral Sense, andtherefore are less willing to allow that we have such an immediate Perception, or Sense of Virtue and Vice.45 What follows is not intended to
oppose his Scheme, but rather to suggest what seems a necessary Explication of it; by shewing that it is no otherwise intelligible, [248/253] but
upon Supposition of a moral Sense.

43. As Locke does not emphasize the relation of quantity in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, it is likely that Hutcheson means only to refer to the doctrine of active and passive powers, which Locke discusses at length in the chapter“Powers” (Essay, II.XXI). Although powers are simple modes and not relations, they
are the basis for countless relations, such as the active power that fire has to meltgold is related to the passive power gold has to be melted by fire; this is the relationof cause and effect (Essay, II.XXI §1). For Locke, though, we only have very obscurenotions of active powers of bodies; active powers are usually referred to the volitionsof thinking beings (Essay, II.XXI §4).
44. This division is derived from Samuel Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the
Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, 46–47.
45. Burnet argues that although “Reason and Pleasure may both of them beproperly enough . . . Moral Senses” (Burnet [ed.], Letters, 11), the sense of pleasure
which we feel upon observing a moral action is a consequence of our rational
judgment that an act is true or right. Thus for Burnet, Hutcheson’s moral sense ismediated by reason which in turn is not immediate but is the “Sense of the Agreement
or Disagreement of our Simple Ideas, or the Combinations of them” (ibid.). Wollaston
would concur (cf. Religion of Nature Delineated, 23, 41–45).

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None of them
explain Morality without a
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illustrations upon the moral sense

1. Relations of inanimate Objects being known, puts it in the Power of arational Agent often to diversify them, to change their Forms, Motions,or Qualities of any kind, at his pleasure: but no body apprehends any
Virtue or Vice in such Actions, where no Relation is apprehended to arational Agent’s Happiness or Misery; otherwise we should have got into
the Class of Virtues all the practical Mathematicks, and the Operationsof Chymistry.
2. As to the Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents; theKnowledge of them equally puts it in one’s Power to destroy Mankind,as to preserve them. Without presupposing Affections, this Knowledge
will not excite to one Action rather than another; nor without a moral
Sense will it make us approve any Action more than its contrary. The
Relation of Corn to human Bodies being known to a Person of kindAffections, was perhaps the exciting Reason of teaching Mankind Husbandry: But the Knowledge of the Relations of Arsenick would excite amalicious Nature, just in the same manner, to the greatest Mischief. A
Sword, an Halter, a Musket, bear the same Relation [249] to the Body ofan Hero, which they [254] do to a Robber. The killing of either is equallyagreeable to these Relations, but not equally good in a moral Sense. The
Knowledge of these Relations neither excites to Actions, nor justifies
them, without presupposing either Affections or a moral Sense. Kind Affections with such Knowledge makes Heroes; malicious Affections, Villains.
3. The last sort of Relations is that among rational Agents, founded on
their Actions or Affections; whence one is called Creator, another Creature; one Benefactor, the other Beneficiary (if that Word may be used inthis general Sense;) the one Parent, the other Child; the one Governor,
the other Subject, &c. Now let us see what Fitnesses or Unfitnesses arise
from these Relations.
There is certainly, independently of Fancy or Custom, a natural Tendency in some Actions to give Pleasure, either to the Agent or to others;
and a contrary Tendency in other Actions to give Pain, either to theAgent or others: This sort of Relation of Actions to the Agents or Objects
is indisputable. If we call these Relations Fitnesses, then the most contrary Actions have equal Fitnesses for contrary Ends; and each one is unfit for the End of [250] the other. Thus Compassion is fit to make others

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happy, and unfit to make others miserable. Violation of [255] Property is
fit to make Men miserable, and unfit to make them happy. Each of theseis both fit and unfit, with respect to different Ends. The bare Fitness thento an End, is not the Idea of moral Goodness.
Perhaps the virtuous Fitness is that of Ends. The Fitness of a subordinate End to the ultimate, cannot constitute the Action good, unless theultimate End be good. To keep a Conspiracy secret is not a good End, tho
it be fit for obtaining a farther End, the Success of the Conspiracy. The
moral Fitness must be that of the ultimate End itself: The publick Good
alone is a fit End, therefore the Means fit for this End alone are good.
What means the Fitness of an ultimate End? For what is it fit? Why,’tis an ultimate End, not fit for any thing farther, but absolutely fit. Whatmeans that Word fit? If it notes a simple Idea it must be the Perceptionof some Sense: thus we must recur, upon this Scheme too, to a moral
Sense.*[256] If Fitness be not a simple Idea, let it be defined. Some tell us, that
it is “an Agreement of an Affection, Desire, [251] Action, or End, to theRelations of Agents.”46 But what means Agreement? Which of these four
Meanings has it? 1. We say one Quantity agrees with another of equal
Dimensions every way. 2. A Corollary agrees with a Theorem; when our* A late Author who pleads that Wisdom is chiefly employed in choosing theultimate Ends themselves, and that Fitness is a proper Attribute of ultimate Ends,
in answer to this short Question, “What are they fit for?” “answers, they are fit tobe approved by all rational Agents.” Now his meaning of the word [Approved] isthis, discerned to be fit. His Answer then is “they are fit to be perceived fit.” When
Words are used at this rate one must lose his Labour in Replies to such Remarkers.
See a Paper called Wisdom the sole Spring of Action in the Deity.
[[This footnote was added in the third edition. Turco (Saggio, 260) identifies
this as a reference to Wisdom the first spring of action in the Deity (London: J. J. and
P. Knapton, 1734) by the Dissenter Henry Grove (1684–1738), tutor first in ethics
and pneumatology, then mathematics and physics, and finally divinity at Taunton.
Grove criticized T 3 in Wisdom the first Spring (n. 18): “Will any one say that there
must be natural inclinations in God, because there can be no exciting reasons toaction without them? . . . But to a Being of the most consummate wisdom, andunbounded power, what more persuasive reason can there be, than the eternal unchangeable reason, or fitness, of things? ’ Tis fit to be done, therefore God does it.”]]46. Hutcheson likely has the pre-1728 writings of Balguy in mind here.

Agreementwith Relations
presupposesalso a moral
Sense.

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knowing the latter to be Truth, leads us to know that the former is alsoa true Proposition. 3. Meat agrees with that Body which it tends to preserve. 4. Meat agrees with the Taste of that Being in whom it raises apleasant Perception. If any one of these are the Meanings of Agreementin the Definition, then one of these is the Idea of Fitness. 1. That an
Action or Affection is of the same Bulk and Figure with the Relation.
Or, 2. When the Relation is a true Proposition, so is the Action or Affection. Or, 3. The Action or Affection tends to preserve the Relation; andcontrary Actions would destroy it: So that, for instance, God would be
no longer related to us as Creator and Benefactor, when we disobeyedhim. Or, 4. The Action raises pleasant Perceptions in the Relation. All
these Expressions seem absurd.*[257] These Gentlemen probably have some other Meanings to theseWords Fitness or Agreement. I hope what is said will shew the need forExplication of them, tho they be so common. There is one Meaning[252] perhaps intended, however it be obscurely expressed, That “certain Affections or Actions of an Agent, standing in a certain Relation toother Agents, is approved by every Observer, or raises in him a grateful
Perception, or moves the Observer to love the Agent.” This Meaning is
the same with the Notion of pleasing a moral Sense.
Whoever explains Virtue or Vice by Justice or Injustice, Right orWrong, uses only more ambiguous Words, which will equally lead to
acknowledge a moral Sense.

* Several Gentlemen who have published Remarks or Answers to this Scheme,
continue to use these words Agreement, Conformity, Congruity, without complying
with this just Request of explaining or fixing precisely the meaning of these words,
which are manifestly ambiguous.
[[This footnote was added in the third edition. Balguy did attempt to define“conformity” in response to Hutcheson’s complaints about the vagueness of themoral rationalist’s terminology (The Foundation of Moral Goodness, I:28), but
Hutcheson found his attempt unsatisfactory. In Part II of the The Foundation of
Moral Goodness, Balguy considers the possible criticism of his theory as providing
too vague a discussion of “conformity,” to which he responds with an even vaguer
definition (II:4–5).]]

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section iii
Mr. Woolaston’s Significancy of Truth,as the Idea of Virtue considered[253/258] Mr. Woolaston* has introduced a new Explication of moral
Virtue, viz. Significancy of Truth in Actions, supposing that in every Action there is some Significancy,47 like to that which Moralists and Civilians speak of in their Tacit Conventions, and Quasi Contractus! 48
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The Word Signification is very common, but a little Reflection will Significationitshew it to be very ambiguous. In Signification of Words these things are whereinconsists.
included: 1. An Association of an Idea with a Sound, so that when any
Idea is formed by the Speaker, the Idea of a Sound accompanies it. 2.
The Sound perceived by the Hearer excites the Idea to which it is connected. 3. In like manner a Judgment in the Speaker’s Mind is accompanyed with the Idea of a Combination of Sounds. 4. This Combinationof [254] Sounds heard raises the Apprehension of that Judgment [259] inthe Mind of the Hearer. Nothing farther than these Circumstances
seems to be denoted by Signification.
Hearing a Proposition does not of itself produce either Assent or Dissent, Conclusions
fromor Opinion in the Hearer, but only presents to his Apprehension the drawn
Speech.
Judgment, or Thema Complexum.49 But the Hearer himself often forms

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* In his Religion of Nature delineated.
[[see particularly I.ix.]]
47. “I lay down this as a fundamental maxim, That whoever acts as if things wereso, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so; as plainly as he could
by words, and with more reality,” Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, 13.
48. Tacit conventions and “quasi contractus” were standard natural law expressions, the latter derived from Justinian, Institutes I.iii.28. Hutcheson defines themas follows: “Some rights arise, not from any contract, but from some other action
either of him who has the right, or of the person obliged. . . . the Civilians . . . callthem * obligationes quasi ex contractu ortae: feigning a contract obliging men in thesecases to whatever could reasonably have been demanded by the one party, andwisely promised by the other, had they been contracting about these matters” (System, II.2.14).
49. “A thema is whatever is able to be offered to the understanding to be known.”

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Judgments or Opinions upon this occasion, either immediately without
Reasoning, or by some short Argument. These Opinions are some one
or more of the following Propositions. 1. That a Sound is perceived, anda Judgment apprehended. 2. Such a Person caused the Sound heard. 3. The
Speaker intended to excite in the Hearer the Idea of the Sound, and theApprehension of the Judgment, or Thema Complexum. This Judgment
is not always formed by the Hearer, nor is it always true, when Men areheard speaking. 4. The Speaker intended to produce Assent in the Hearer:This Judgment is not always true. 5. The Speaker assents to the Proposition spoken: This Judgment in the Hearer is often false, and is formed
upon Opinion of the Speaker’s Veracity, or speaking what expresses his
Opinion usually. 6. The Speaker does not assent to the Proposition spoken:
This Judgment of the Hearer is often false, when [255] what is spoken
is every way [260] true. 7. The Speaker intended that the Hearer should
believe or judge, “that the Proposition spoken was assented to by the
Speaker.” 8. The Speaker had the contrary Intention, to that supposed in
the last Judgment: Both these latter Judgments may be false, when the
Proposition spoken is every way true. 9. The Proposition spoken represents
the Object as it is, or is logically true. 10. The Proposition spoken does not
represent the Object as it is, or it is logically false.
Morality does
not consist in
Significancy.

As to the first four Circumstances which make up the proper Significancy
of Speech, ’tis scarce possible that any one should place moral Good orEvil in them. Whether the Proposition were logically true or false, thehaving a bare Apprehension of it as a Thema Complexum, or raising thisin another, without intending to produce Assent or Dissent, can have no
more moral Good or Evil in it, than the Reception of any other Idea, or
raising it in another. This Significancy of Falshood is found in the very
Propositions given in Schools, as Instances of Falshood, Absurdity, Contradiction to Truth, or Blasphemy. The pronouncing of which, are Actions
signifying more properly than most of our other Actions; and yet nobody condemns them as immoral.
A thema complexum is a “proposition or speech to be confirmed or explicated,”(Hutcheson, Logicae Compendium (Glasgow: Foulis, 1756), “Appendix,” III.ii,
100–101).

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[256 ] As to the Opinions formed by the Hearer, they are all his own Nor in
Action as much as [261] any other Conclusion or Judgment formed from Conclusions
formed byAppearances of any sort whatsoever. They are true or false, according to Hearers.
the Sagacity of the Observer, or his Caution. The Hearer may form perfectly true Opinions or Judgments, when the Speaker is guilty of the basest Fraud; and may form false Judgments, when the Speaker is perfectly
innocent, and spoke nothing false in any Sense.
The Evils which may follow from the false Judgments of the Hearer,
are no otherwise chargeable on the Speaker, than as the evil Consequences of another’s Action of any kind may be chargeable upon any
Person who co-operated; or, by his Action, or Omission, the Consequence of which he might have foreseen, did either actually intend thisEvil, or wanted that Degree of kind Affection, which would have inclined
him to have prevented it.

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The Intention of the Speaker is what all Moralists have hitherto imag- The Morality
Speech in
ined the Virtue or Vice of Words did depend upon, and not the bare of
the Intention.
Significancy of Truth or Falshood. This Intention is either, 1. To lead theHearer into a true or false Opinion about the Sentiments of the Speaker.
[257] 2. To make the Hearer assent to the Proposition spoken. Or, 3. Bothto make the Hearer assent to the Proposition, and judge that the [262]
Speaker also assents to it. Or, 4. To accomplish some End, by means of theHearer’s assent to the Proposition spoken. This End may be known by the
Speaker to be either publickly useful, or publickly hurtful.
Some Moralists* of late have placed all Virtue in Speech in the Intention of the last kind, viz. “Accomplishing some publickly useful End,* Barberack’s Notes on Puffendorf, Lib. iv. c. 1, 7.
[[Barbeyrac’s extremely long note explains how speech is “to be governed bythree great principles of Duty . . . Religion, Self-love, and Sociability.” In the note,
Barbeyrac argued against theories that forbid all lies, on the grounds that sociability
is intertwined with countless white lies and pragmatic lies are often necessitated bycircumstances. Not all or even most lies are to be allowed, but at the very least, “Asoften as they, to whom we speak, have no right to require of us to speak freely what
we think, we do them no injury, if we conceal the Truth from them.” Thus, Barbeyrac, following Pufendorf, emphasized the sociable and functional character oflanguage and separated it from absolute considerations on truth.]]164

illustrations upon the moral senseby speaking either logical Truth or Falshood: and that all Vice in speaking, consists in intending to effect something publickly hurtful by
Speech, whether logically true or false, and known to be such; or by using Speech in a manner which we may foresee would be publickly hurtful, whether we actually intend this evil Consequence or not.” Some
stricter Moralists 50 assert, that “the publick Evils which would ensue
from destroying mutual Confidence, by allowing to speak Propositions
known to be false on any occasion, are so great, that no particular Advantage to be expected from speaking known logical Falshoods, can everover-ballance [258] them; that all use of Speech supposes a tacit Convention of Sincerity, the Violation of which is always evil.” Both sides in thisArgument agree, that the moral Evil in Speech consists either in somedirect malicious Intention, or a Tendency to the publick Detriment of [263]Society; which Tendency the Agent might have foreseen, as connectedwith his Action, had he not wanted that Degree of good Affections whichmakes Men attentive to the Effects of their Actions. Never was bare Significancy of Falshood made the Idea of moral Evil. Speaking logical Falshood was still looked upon as innocent in many cases. Speaking contrary
to Sentiment, or moral Falshood, was always proved evil, from some publickly hurtful Tendency, and not supposed as evil immediately, or thesame Idea with Vice. The Intention to deceive was the Foundation of the
Guilt. This Intention the Speaker studies to conceal, and does not signify it: It is an Act of the Will, neither signified by his Words, nor itself
signifying any thing else.
This Point deserved Consideration, because if any Action be significant, ’tis certainly the Act of Speaking: And yet even in this the Virtue is
not the signifying of Truth, nor the Vice the signifying Falshood.
The Significancy of
Actions.

[259] The Signification of some Actions depends upon a like Associationof Ideas with them, made either by Nature, or arbitrarily, and by Custom, as with Sounds. Letters are by Custom the Signs of Sounds. A Shriek
or Groan is a natural Sign of Fear or Pain: A Motion of the Hand or
Head may signify [264] Assent, Dissent, or Desire. The cutting down tall
50. It is not clear to whom this refers. One possibility is Cumberland.

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Poppies was an answer: The sending Spurs, advice to Flight: Kindlingmany Fires raises the Opinion of an Encampment: Raising a Smoke willraise Opinion of Fire.
The most important Distinction of Signs is this, that* 1. “Some Appearances are the Occasion upon which an Observer, by his own reasoning, forms a Judgment, without supposing, or having reason to believe,that the Agent, who caused these Appearances, did it with design to communicate his Sentiments to others; or when the Actions are such as areusually done by the Agents, without designing to raise Opinions in Observers. 2. Some Actions are never used but with professed Design to convey the Opinions of the Agent to the Observer; or such as the Observer[260] infers nothing from, but upon having reason to believe that the
Causer of the Appearance intended to convey some Sentiment to the Observer.” 3. Other Signs are used, when “the Signifier gives no reason toconclude any other Intention, but only to raise an Apprehension of the
Judgment, or the Thema Complexum, without professing any design tocommunicate [265] his Sentiments, or to produce any Assent in the Observer.”To do Actions from which the Observer will form false Opinions,
without having reason to imagine an Intention in the Agent, is never ofitself imagined evil, let the Signs be natural or instituted; provided there
be no malicious Intention, or neglect of publick Good. ’Tis never called a
Crime in a Teacher, to pronounce an absurd Sentence for an instance; ina Nobleman, to travel without Coronets; or a Clergyman in Lay-Habit,
for private Conveniency, or to avoid troublesome Ceremony; to leave
Lights in a Lodge, to make People conclude there is a Watch kept. This
Significancy may be in any Action which is observed; but as true Conclusions argue no Virtue in the Agent, so false ones argue no Vice.
Raising false Opinions designedly by the second Sort of Signs, which
reasonably [261] lead the Observer to conclude Intention in the Agent tocommunicate his Sentiments, whether the Signs be customary, instituted,* See Grotius de Jure Bell. Lib. 3. c. 1.
[[See Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, III.1.7.2, III.1.XI.3 and on the latter passages
Barbeyrac’s n. 3.]]

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or natural, is generally evil, when the Agent knows the Falshood; since
it tends to diminish mutual Confidence. To send Spurs to a Friend,whom the Sender imagines to be in no danger, to deceive by Hieroglyphicks or Painting, is as criminal [266] as a false Letter. This Significancy
occurs in very few human Actions: Some of the most important Virtues
profess no design of communicating Sentiments, or raising Opinions either true or false: Nor is there any more Intention in some of the mostvicious Actions. Again, who can imagine any Virtue, in all Actions,where there is this Significancy of Truth with Intention? Is it Virtue tosay at Christmas, that “the Mornings are sharp?” to beckon with theHand, in sign of Assent to such an Assertion? And in false Propositions
thus signified by Actions or Words, there is no Evil apprehended where
the Falshood is only logical. When the Falshood is known by the Agent,
the Evil is not imagined in the Significancy, but in doing what one mayforesee tends to breed Distrust in Society. And did all moral Evil consist
in moral Falshood, there could be no Sins of Ignorance. If Mr. Woolaston
alledges, that “Ignorance of some things signifies this Falshood, viz. We
are not [262] obliged to know the Truth:” This Falshood is not signified
with Intention; nor is it moral Falshood, but only logical: since no Man
in an Error knows that “he is obliged to know the contrary Truth,” Mr.
Woolaston’s use of the Words [ought] or [obliged] without a distinct
Meaning, is not peculiar to this Place.51[267] The third sort of Significancy of Falsehood is never apprehended
as morally Evil: if it were, then every Dramatick Writer drawing evil
Characters, every History Painter, every Writer of Allegories, or Epicks,
every Philosopher teaching the Nature of contradictory Propositions,would be thought criminal.

51. No passage in Wollaston matches these two quotes exactly, but Hutcheson
seems to have in mind Religion of Nature Delineated, I §5, 16–18.

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But since only the first sort of Significancy can be in all Actions, and that Significancy
from
too supposing that every Action whatsoever is observed by some Being different
the Morality.
or other: Let us see if this will account for Morality. Perhaps either, 1st,“Every Action is good which leads the Observer into true Opinions concerning the Sentiments of the Agent, whether the Agent’s Opinions be trueor false.” Or, 2dly. “That Action is good which leads the Observer intotrue Opinions concerning the Object, the Tendency of the Action, and theRelation between the Agent and the Object.”[263] Did Virtue consist in this first sort of Significancy of Truth, itwould depend not upon the Agent but the Sagacity of the Observer: The
acute Penetration of one would constitute an Action virtuous, and theRashness or Stupidity of another would make it vicious: And the mostbarbarous Actions [268] would raise no false Opinion of the Sentiments of
the Agent, in a judicious Observer.
The second sort of Significancy would also make Virtue consist in thePower of Observers. An exact Reasoner would receive no false Opinion
from the worst Action concerning the Object or Relation of the Agent
to it: And a false Opinion might be formed by a weak Observer of aperfectly good Action.—An Observer who knew an Agent to have thebasest Temper, would not from his worst Action conclude any thing false
concerning the Object: And all such false Opinions would arise only
upon Supposition that the Agent was virtuous.
But may it not be said, that “whether Men reason well about Actions
or not, there are some Conclusions really deducible from every Action? It
is a Datum from which something may be inferred by just Consequence,
whether any one [264] actually infers it or not. Then may not this Quality in Actions, whether we call it Significancy or not, that only true Propositions can be inferred from them by just Reasoning, be moral Goodness?
And may it not be the very Idea of moral Evil in Actions, that some false
Conclusions [269] can by just Consequence, be deduced from them? ” Or if
we will not allow these to be the very Ideas of moral Good and Evil, “arethey not universal just Characters to distinguish the one from theother?”
One may here observe in general, that since the Existence of the Action is supposed to be a true Premise or Datum, no false Conclusion can

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possibly be inferred from it by just Reasoning. We could perhaps often
justly infer, that the Agent had false Opinions; but then this Conclusionof the Observer, viz. “that the Agent has false Opinions,” is really true.
True Conclusions deducible from Actions, no justCharacter ofVirtue.

But again, it will not make an universal Character of good Actions, thata just Reasoner would infer from them, that “the Opinions of the Agentare true.” For it is thus Men must reason from Actions; viz. Given theConstitution of Nature, the Affections of Agents, and the Action, to conclude concerning the Opinions: Or more generally given any three [265] ofthese to conclude the fourth. Thus suppose the “Constitution of Nature
such, that the private Interest of each Individual is connected with the publick Good:” Suppose an Agent’s Affections selfish only, then from a publickly useful [270] Action we infer, that “the Agent’s Opinions are true:”And from a publickly hurtful Action conclude his Opinions to be false.
The same Constitution supposed with publick Affections as well as selfish. The observing a kind or publickly useful Action, will not immediately
infer, that the Agent’s Opinions are either true or false: With false Opinions he might do publickly useful Actions out of his publick Affections, inthose cases wherein they are not apparently opposite to his Interest. A
publick Action opposite to some present private Interest, would generally
evidence true Opinions; or if the Opinions were false, that his publick Affections were in this Case much stronger than his Self-Love. A cruel Action would indeed evidence false Opinions.
Suppose the same Constitution in all other respects, with malicious
Affections in an Agent. A cruel or ungrateful Action would not always
prove the Opinions of the Agent to be false; but only that his [266] Malicein this instance, was more violent than regard to his Interest. A beneficent
Action would prove only one of these two, either that his Opinions of theConstitution were true; or, that if [271] he was mistaken about the Constitution, he had also a false Opinion of the natural Tendency of the Action. Thus false Opinions may be evidenced by contrary Actions.
Suppose “a Constitution wherein a private Interest could be advancedin Opposition to the publick” (this we may call an evil Constitution:) Suppose only Self-Love in the Agent, then a publickly useful Action, any way

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toilsome or expensive to the Agent, would evidence false Opinions: And
the most cruel selfish Actions would evidence true Opinions.
In an evil Constitution, suppose kind Affections in the Agent; a publickly useful Action would not certainly argue either true or false Opinions. If his Opinions were true, but kind Affections stronger than SelfLove, he might act in the same manner, as if his Opinions were false, andSelf-Love the reigning Affection.
In an evil Constitution, suppose malicious Affections in an Agent, allpublickly useful Actions would argue false Opinions; [267] and publickly
hurtful Actions would argue true ones.
[272] This may shew us that Mens Actions are generally publickly
useful, when they have true Opinions, only on this account; that we neither have malicious Affections naturally, nor is there any probability, in
our present Constitution, of promoting a private Interest separately from,or in Opposition to the Publick. Were there contrary Affections and acontrary Constitution, the most cruel Actions might flow from true
Opinions; and consequently publickly useful Actions might flow fromfalse ones.
In our present Constitution, ’tis probable no Person would ever do any- How far it is aofthing publickly hurtful, but upon some false Opinion. The flowing from Character
Virtue, that ittrue Opinions is indeed a tolerable Character or Property of Virtue, and flows fromflowing from some false Opinion a tolerable Character of Vice; tho neither true Opinions.
be strictly universal. But, 1. This is not proper Signification. A judicious
Observer never imagines any Intention to communicate Opinions insome of the most important Actions, either good or evil. 2. Did an Action signify Falshood, ’tis generally only logical. 3. The false Opinion in
the Agent is not the Quality for which the evil Action is condemned; noris the [268] true Opinion that for which the good Action is approved.
True Opinions in Agents [273] often aggravate Crimes, as they shew
higher Degrees of evil Affection, or total Absence of good. And false Opinions generally extenuate Crimes, unless when the very Ignorance or Error has flowed from evil Affection, or total Absence of good.
’Tis surprizing, for instance, how any should place the Evil of Ingrat-

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itude in denying the Person injured, to have been a Benefactor. The Observer of such an Action, if he supposed the Agent had really that false
Opinion, would think the Crime the less for it: But if he were convincedthat the Agent had a true Opinion, he would think his Ingratitude themore odious. Where we most abhor Actions, we suppose often true
Opinions: And sometimes admire Actions flowing even from false Opinions, when they have evidenced no want of good Affection.
To write a Censure upon a Book so well designed as Mr. Woolaston’s,
and so full of very good Reasoning upon the most useful Subjects,
would not evidence much good Nature. But allowing him his just Praise,to remark any Ambiguities or Inadvertencies which may lead Men into
Confusion in their Reasoning, I am confident would [269] have been
acceptable to a Man of so much Goodness, when he was living.
[274] One may see that he has had some other Idea of moral Good,
previous to this Significancy of Truth, by his introducing, in the very Explication of it, Words presupposing the Ideas of Morality previously
known: Such as [Right,] [Obligation,] [Lye,] [his] denoting [Property.]
Signifying of
Truth equal inunequalVirtue.

Mr. Woolaston acknowledges that there may be very little evil in some
Actions signifying Falshood; such as throwing away that which is of but
little Use or Value. It is objected to him, that there is equal Contrariety
to Truth in such Actions, as in the greatest Villany: He, in answer to it,really unawares gives up his whole Cause. He must own, that there may
be the strictest Truth and Certainty about Trifles; so there may be themost obvious Falshood signified by trifling Actions. If then Significancy ofFalshood be the very same with moral Evil, all Crimes must be equal.
He answers, that Crimes increase according to the Importance of theTruth denied; and so the Virtue increases, as the Importance of theTruths affirmed. Then
[270] Virtue and Vice increase, as the Importance of Propositions affirmed or denied;[275]But Signification of Truth and Falshood does not so increase:
Therefore Virtue and Vice are not the same with Signification of
Truth or Falshood.

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But what is this Importance of Truth? Nothing else but the Moment
or Quantity of good or evil, either private or publick, which should be
produced by Actions, concerning which these true Judgments are made.
But it is plain, the Signification of Truth or Falshood is not varied bythis Importance; therefore Virtue or Vice denote something different
from this Signification.
But farther, The Importance of Actions toward publick Good or Evil,
is not the Idea of Virtue or Vice: Nor does the one prove Virtue in an
Action, any farther than it evidences kind Affections; or the other Vice,farther than it evidences either Malice or Want of kind Affections: Otherwise a casual Invention, an Action wholly from views of private Interest,
might be as virtuous as the most kind and generous Offices: And ChanceMedley, or kindly-intended, but unsuccessful Attempts [271] would be as
vicious as Murder or Treason.

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One of Mr. Woolaston’s Illustrations that Significancy of Falshood is the Some Ambiguin Mr.
Idea of moral [276] Evil, ends in this, “’Tis acting a Lye.”52 What then? ities
Woolaston.
Should he not first have shewn what was moral Evil, and that every Lye
was such?
Another Illustration or Proof is that, “it is acting contrary to that Reason which God has given us as the Guide of our Actions.”53 Does not thisplace the original Idea of moral Evil in counteracting the Deity, andnot in signifying Falshood? But, he may say, “Counteracting the Deity
denies him to be our Benefactor, and signifies Falshood.” Then why issignifying Falshood evil? Why, ’tis counteracting the Deity, who gave us
Reason for our Guide. Why is this evil again? It denies the Truth, that
“he is our Benefactor.”
52. Wollaston argues that someone who violates another’s property rights “actsa lie,” (Religion of Nature Delineated, VI §§15, 138). The exact formulation is foundin John Clarke’s attack on Wollaston: “I suppose this Sort of Language of denying
Truth by Action, or acting a Lie, as the Author somewhere expresses himself, will
be a little surprising to the Reader” (John Clarke, An Examination of the Notion of
Moral Good and Evil [London: A. Bettesworth, 1725], 6).
53. See Religion of Nature Delineated, I.4, 14–15.

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Another Illustration is this, “That signifying Falshood is altering the
Natures of Things, and making them be what they are not, or desiring atleast to make them be what they are not.”54 If by altering the Natures bemeant destroying Beings, then moral Evil consists in desiring the Destruction of other Natures, [272] or in Evil Affections. If what is meant be altering the Laws of Nature, or desiring that they were stopped; this is seldom desired by any but Madmen, nor is this Desire evidenced by someof the [277] worst Actions, nor is such Desire always criminal; otherwise
it were as great a Crime as any, to wish, when a Dam was broken down,that the Water would not overflow the Country.
If making Things be what they are not, means “attempting or desiringthat any Subject should have two opposite Qualities at once, or a Quality
and its Privation;” ’tis certain then, that according to the Stoicks, all vicious Men are thorowly mad. But ’tis to be doubted, that such Madness
never happened to even the worst of Mankind. When a Man murders,
he does not desire his Fellow-Creature to be both dead and living. Whenhe robs, he does not desire that both he and the Proprietor should at thesame time possess. If any says, that he desires to have a Right to that, towhich another has a Right; ’tis probably false. Robbers neither think ofRights at all, nor are solicitous about acquiring them: Or, if they retainsome wild Notions of Rights, they think their Indigence, Conquest or
Courage gives them a Right, and makes the other’s Right to cease. If attempting to make [273] old Qualities or Rights give place to new, be the
Idea of moral Evil, then every Artificer, Purchaser, or Magistrate invested
with an Office is criminal.
[278] Many of Mr. Woolaston’s Propositions contradicted by Actions,are about Rights, Duties, Obligation, Justice, Reasonableness. These arelong Words, principal Names, or Attributes in Sentences. The little Word
[his,] or the Particles [as, according] are much better: they may escapeObservation, and yet may include all the Ambiguities of Right, Property,
Agreement, Reasonableness: “Treating Things as they are, and not as they
are not:” Or, “According to what they are, or are not,” are Expressions he

54. See Religion of Nature Delineated, I.4, 13.

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probably had learned from another truly great Name, who has not explained them sufficiently.

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It may perhaps not seem improper on this occasion to observe, that in In Quasi Conor
the Quasi Contractus, the Civilians do not imagine any Act of the Mind tracts,
Tacit, no Sigof the Person obliged to be really signified, but by a sort of Fictio juris nification of
supposing it, order him to act as if he had contracted, even when they Truth.
know that he had contrary Intentions.
In the Tacit Conventions, ’tis not a Judgment which is signified, but
an Act of the Will transferring Right, in which [274] there is no Relation
to Truth or Falshood of itself. The Non-performance of Covenants ismade [279] penal, not because of their signifying Falshoods, as if thiswere the Crime in them: But it is necessary, in order to preserve Commerce in any Society, to make effectual all Declarations of Consent totransfer Rights by any usual Signs, otherwise there could be no Certainty
in Mens Transactions.

section iv
20

Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue
and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive
these Ideas by a Moral Sense.
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[275/280] Had those who insist so much upon the antecedent Reason- Truths aboutfour
ableness of Virtue, told us distinctly what is reasonable or provable con- Morals,
sorts.
cerning it, many of our Debates had been prevented. Let us consider
what Truths concerning Actions Men could desire to know, or prove by
Reason. I fancy they may be reduced to these Heads. 1. “To knowwhether there are not some Actions or Affections which obtain the Approbation of any Spectator or Observer, and others move his Dislike andCondemnation? ” This Question, as every Man can answer for himself,
so universal Experience and History shew, that in all Nations it is so; andconsequently the moral Sense is universal. 2. “Whether there be any par-

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ticular Quality, which, wherever it is apprehended, gains Approbation,and the contrary raises Disapprobation? ” We shall [276] find this Quality
to be kind Affection, [281] or Study of the Good of others; and thus themoral Senses of Men are generally uniform. About these two Questions
there is little reasoning; we know how to answer them from reflecting
on our own Sentiments, or by consulting others. 3. “What Actions doreally evidence kind Affections, or do really tend to the greatest publick
Good?” About this Question is all the special Reasoning of those whotreat of the particular Laws of Nature, or even of Civil Laws: This is thelargest Field, and the most useful Subject of Reasoning, which remains
upon every Scheme of Morals. 4. “What are the Motives which, evenfrom Self-Love, would excite each Individual to do those Actions which
are publickly useful?” ’Tis probable indeed, no Man would approve as
virtuous an Action publickly useful, to which the Agent was excited only
by Self-Love, without any kind Affection: ’Tis also probable that no viewof Interest can raise that kind Affection, which we approve as virtuous;
nor can any Reasoning do it, except that which shews some moral Goodness, or kind Affections in the Object; for this never fails, where it is observed or supposed in any Person to raise the Love of the Observer; sothat Virtue is not properly taught.
[277/282] Yet since all Men have naturally Self-Love as well as kindAffections, the former may often counteract the latter, or the latter theformer; in each case the Agent is uneasy, and in some degree unhappy.
The first rash Views of human Affairs often represent private Interest as
opposite to the Publick: When this is apprehended, Self-Love may often
engage Men in publickly hurtful Actions, which their moral Sense willcondemn; and this is the ordinary Cause of Vice. To represent these
Motives of Self-Interest, to engage Men to publickly useful Actions, iscertainly the most necessary Point in Morals. This has been so welldone by the antient Moralists, by Dr. Cumberland, Puffendorf, Grotius,
Shaftesbury; ’tis made so certain from the divine Government of theWorld, the State of Mankind, who cannot subsist without Society, fromuniversal Experience and Consent, from inward Consciousness of the
Pleasure of kind Affections, and Self-Approbation, and of the Tormentsof Malice, or Hatred, or Envy, or Anger; that no Man who considers

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these things, can ever imagine he can have any possible Interest in opposing the publick Good; or in checking or restraining his kind Affections; nay, if he had no kind Affections, his very Self-Love and Regard to
his private Good might excite [278] him to publickly [283] useful Actions, and dissuade from the contrary.
What farther should be provable concerning Virtue, whence itshould be called reasonable antecedently to all Affection, or Interest, orSense, or what it should be fit for, one cannot easily imagine.
Perhaps what has brought the Epithet Reasonable, or flowing from
Reason, in opposition to what flows from Instinct, Affection, or Passion,
so much into use, is this, “That it is often observed, that the very bestof our particular Affections or Desires, when they are grown violent andpassionate, thro’ the confused Sensations and Propensities which attend
them, do make us incapable of considering calmly the whole Tendencyof our Actions, and lead us often into what is absolutely pernicious, under some Appearance of relative or particular Good.” This indeed may
give some ground for distinguishing between passionate Actions, andthose from calm Desire or Affection which employs our Reason freely: But
can never set rational Actions in Opposition to those from Instinct, Desire or Affection. And it must be owned, that the most perfect Virtue
consists in the calm, unpassionate Benevolence, [279] rather than in particular Affections.
[284] If one asks “how do we know that our Affections are right when How we judge
our Moral
they are kind?” What does the Word [right] mean? Does it mean what ofSense.
we approve? This we know by Consciousness of our Sense. Again, how do
we know that our Sense is right, or that we approve our Approbation?
This can only be answered by another Question, viz. “How do weknow we are pleased when we are pleased?”—Or does it mean, “howdo we know that we shall always approve what we now approve?” To
answer this, we must first know that the same Constitution of our Sense
shall always remain: And again, that we have applyed our selves carefully to consider the natural Tendency of our Actions. Of the Continuance of the same Constitution of our Sense, we are as sure as of the Continuance of Gravitation, or any other Law of Nature: The Tendency of176

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our own Actions we cannot always know; but we may know certainlythat we heartily and sincerely studied to act according to what, by all the
Evidence now in our Power to obtain, appeared as most probably tending to publick Good. When we are conscious of this sincere Endeavour,
the evil Consequences which we could not have foreseen, [280] never will
make us condemn our Conduct. But without this sincere Endeavour,[285] we may often approve at present what we shall afterwards condemn.
How ourMoral Sense iscorrected by
Reason.

If the Question means, “How are we sure that what we approve, all others shall also approve?” Of this we can be sure upon no Scheme; but ’tishighly probable that the Senses of all Men are pretty uniform: That theDeity also approves kind Affections, otherwise he would not have implanted them in us, nor determined us by a moral Sense to approvethem. Now since the Probability that Men shall judge truly, abstractingfrom any presupposed Prejudice, is greater than that they shall judge
falsly; ’tis more probable, when our Actions are really kind and publickly
useful, that all Observers shall judge truly of our Intentions, and of theTendency of our Actions, and consequently approve what we approve
our selves, than that they shall judge falsly and condemn them.
If the Meaning of the Question be, “Will the doing what our moral
Sense approves tend to our Happiness, and to the avoiding Misery?” ’Tis
thus we call a Taste wrong, when it makes that Food at present grateful,which shall occasion future Pains, or Death. This Question [281] concerning our Self-Interest must be answered by such Reasoning as was
mentioned above, [286] to be well managed by our Moralists both antient and modern.
Thus there seems no part of that Reasoning which was ever used by
Moralists, to be superseded by supposing a moral Sense. And yet withouta moral Sense there is no Explication can be given of our Ideas of Morality; nor of that Reasonableness supposed antecedent to all Instincts, Affections, or Sense.
“But may there not be a right or wrong State of our moral Sense, as
there is in our other Senses, according as they represent their Objects tobe as they really are, or represent them otherwise?” So may not our moral

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Sense approve that which is vicious, and disapprove Virtue, as a sickly Palate may dislike grateful Food, or a vitiated Sight misrepresent Colours or
Dimensions? Must we not know therefore antecedently what is morally
Good or Evil by our Reason, before we can know that our moral Sense
is right?
To answer this, we must remember that of the sensible Ideas, someare allowed to be only Perceptions in our Minds, and not Images of any
like external Quality, as [282] Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure,
Pain. Other Ideas are Images of something external, [287] as Duration,
Number, Extension, Motion, Rest: These latter, for distinction, we may
call concomitant Ideas of Sensation, and the former purely sensible. As tothe purely sensible Ideas, we know they are alter’d by any Disorder in our
Organs, and made different from what arise in us from the same Objects
at other times. We do not denominate Objects from our Perceptions
during the Disorder, but according to our ordinary Perceptions, or thoseof others in good Health: Yet no body imagines that therefore Colours,
Sounds, Tastes, are not sensible Ideas. In like manner many Circumstances
diversify the concomitant Ideas: But we denominate Objects from theAppearances they make to us in an uniform Medium, when our Organs
are in no disorder, and the Object not very distant from them. But none
therefore imagines that it is Reason and not Sense which discovers these
concomitant Ideas, or primary Qualities.
Just so in our Ideas of Actions. These three Things are to be distinguished, 1. The Idea of the external Motion, known first by Sense, andits Tendency to the Happiness or Misery of some sensitive Nature, often
inferr’d by Argument or Reason. 2. Apprehension or Opinion of the Affections [283] in [288] the Agent, concluded by our Reason: So far the Idea
of an Action represents something external to the Observer. 3. The Perception of Approbation or Disapprobation arising in the Observer, according as the Affections of the Agent are apprehended kind in their justDegree, or deficient, or malicious. This Approbation cannot be supposed
an Image of any thing external, more than the Pleasure of Harmony, ofTaste, of Smell. But let none imagine, that calling the Ideas of Virtue andVice Perceptions of a Sense, upon apprehending the Actions and Affections of another does diminish their Reality, more than the like Assertions

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concerning all Pleasure and Pain, Happiness or Misery. Our Reason does
often correct the Report of our Senses, about the natural Tendency of theexternal Action, and corrects rash Conclusions about the Affections of theAgent. But whether our moral Sense be subject to such a Disorder, as tohave different Perceptions, from the same apprehended Affections in an
Agent, at different times, as the Eye may have of the Colours of an unaltered Object, ’tis not easy to determine: Perhaps it will be hard to find
any Instances of such a Change. What Reason could correct, if it fell intosuch a Disorder, I know not; except suggesting to its Remembrance its
former [289] Approbations, and representing the general Sense of Mankind. [284] But this does not prove Ideas of Virtue and Vice to be previous to a Sense, more than a like Correction of the Ideas of Colour in a
Person under the Jaundice, proves that Colours are perceived by Reason,previously to Sense.
If any say, “this moral Sense is not a Rule:” What means that Word?
It is not a strait rigid Body: It is not a general Proposition, shewing what
Means are fit to obtain an end: It is not a Proposition, asserting, that a
Superior will make those happy who act one way, and miserable who act
the contrary way. If these be the Meanings of Rule, it is no Rule; yet byreflecting upon it our Understanding may find out a Rule. But what
Rule of Actions can be formed, without Relation to some End proposed? Or what End can be proposed, without presupposing Instincts,
Desires, Affections, or a moral Sense, it will not be easy to explain.

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Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meantby Merit; and be rewardable upon the Supposition,that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from
Affection or Instinct.
[285/290] Some will not allow any Merit in Actions flowing from kindInstincts: “Merit, say they, attends Actions to which we are excited by
Reason alone, or to which we freely determine ourselves. The Operation

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of Instincts or Affections is necessary, and not voluntary; nor is there more
Merit in them than in the Shining of the Sun, the Fruitfulness of a Tree,or the Overflowing of a Stream, which are all publickly useful.”
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But what does Merit mean? or Praiseworthiness? Do these Words denote Merit, what.
the “Quality in Actions, which gains Approbation from the Observer?”Or, 2dly, Are these Actions called [291] meritorious, “which, when any
Observer does approve all other [286] Observers approve him for his Approbation of it; and would condemn any Observer who did not approvethese Actions?” These are the only Meanings of meritorious, which I canconceive as distinct from rewardable, which is considered hereafter separately.
Now we endeavoured already to shew, that “no Reason can excite to
Action previously to some End, and that no End can be proposed without some Instinct or Affection.” What then can be meant by being excited by Reason, as distinct from all Motion of Instincts or Affections?
Then determining our selves freely, does it mean acting without any
Motive or exciting Reason? If it did not mean this, it cannot be opposedto acting from Instinct or Affections, since all Motives or Reasons presuppose them. If it do mean this, that “Merit is found only in Actions done
without Motive or Affection, by mere Election, without prepollent Desireof one Action or End rather than its opposite, or without Desire of that
Pleasure which* some do suppose follows [287] upon any Election, by anatural Connexion:” Then let any Man [293] consider whether he everacts in this manner by mere Election, without any previous Desire? Andagain, let him consult his own Breast, whether such kind of Action
gains his Approbation? Upon seeing a Person not more disposed by Af-* This is the Notion of Liberty given by the Archbishop of Dublin, in his mostingenious Book, De Origine Mali. This Opinion does not represent Freedom ofElection, as opposite to all Instinct or Desire; but rather as arising from the Desireof that Pleasure supposed to be connected with every Election. Upon his Scheme there
is a Motive and End proposed in every Election, and a natural Instinct toward
Happiness presupposed: Though it is such a Motive and End as leaves us in perfect
Liberty. Since it is a Pleasure or Happiness, not connected with one thing morethan another, but following upon the Determination itself.

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fection, Compassion, or Love or Desire, to make his Country happy thanmiserable, yet choosing the one rather than the other, from no Desire of
publick Happiness, nor Aversion to the Torments of others, but by such an
unaffectionate Determination, as that by which one moves his first Finger
rather than the second, in giving an Instance of a trifling Action; let any
one ask if this Action should be meritorious: and yet that there should
be no Merit in a tender compassionate Heart, which shrinks at every Painof its Fellow-Creatures, and triumphs in their Happiness; with kind Affections and strong Desire labouring for the publick Good. If this be the
Nature of meritorious Actions; I fancy every honest [288] Heart would
disclaim all Merit in Morals, as violently as the old Protestants rejected
it in Justification.
But let us see which of the two Senses of Merit or Praise-worthinessis founded on this (I won’t call it unreasonable or casual ) but unaffectionate Choice. If Merit denotes the Quality moving the Spectator to approve, then there may be unaffectionate Election of the greatest Villany,
as well as of the most [294] useful Actions; but who will say that they
are equally approved?—But perhaps ’tis not the mere Freedom of Choice
which is approved, but the free Choice of publick Good, without any Affection. Then Actions are approved for publick Usefulness, and not forFreedom. Upon this Supposition the Heat of the Sun, the Fruitfulness ofa Tree, would be meritorious: or if one says, “these are not Actions;” they
are at least meritorious Qualities, Motions, Attractions, &c. And a casual
Invention may be meritorious.—Perhaps Free Election is a Conditio sinequa non, and publick Usefulness the immediate Cause of Approbation;neither separately, but both jointly are meritorious: Free Election alone is
not Merit; Publick Usefulness alone is not Merit; but both concurring.
Then should any Person by mere Election, without any Desire to serve
the publick, set about Mines, [289] or any useful Manufacture; or shoulda Person by mere Election stab a Man, without knowing him to be apublick Robber; here both free Election and publick Usefulness may concur: Yet will any one say there is Merit or Virtue in such Actions? Wherethen shall we find Merit, unless in kind Affections, or Desire and Intention of the publick Good? This moves our Approbation wherever we observe it: and the want of this is the true Reason why a Searcher for Mines,

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a free Killer of an unknown [295] Robber, the warming Sun, or the fruitful Tree, are not counted meritorious.
But it may be said, that to make an Action meritorious, it is necessary
not only that the Action be publickly useful, but that it be known or
imagined to be such, before the Agent freely chuses it. But what does
this add to the former Scheme? Only a Judgment or Opinion in the Understanding, concerning the natural Tendency of an Action to the publick Good: Few, it may be presumed, will place Virtue in Assent or Dissent, or Perceptions. And yet this is all that is superadded to the former
Case. The Agent must not desire the publick Good, or have any kindAffections. This would spoil the Freedom of Choice, according to their
Scheme, who insist on a Freedom opposite to Affections [290] or Instincts:
But he must barely know the Tendency to publick Good, and without
any Propensity to, or Desire of, the Happiness of others, by an arbitrary
Election, acquire his Merit. Let every Man judge for himself, whether
these are the Qualities which he approves.
What has probably engaged many into this way of speaking, “thatVirtue is the Effect of rational Choice, and not of Instincts or Affections,”is this; they [296] find, that “some Actions flowing from particular kindAffections, are sometimes condemned as evil,” because of their bad Influence upon the State of larger Societies; and that the Hurry and confused Sensations of any of our Passions, may divert the Mind from considering the whole Effect of its Actions: They require therefore to Virtue
a calm and undisturbed Temper.
There is indeed some ground to recommend this Temper as very necessary in many Cases; and yet some of the most passionate Actions may
be perfectly good. But in the calmest Temper there must remain Affection
or Desire, some implanted Instinct for which we can give no reason; otherwise there could be no Action of any kind. As it was shewn above inthe first Section.
[291] If meritorious Actions are these which whosoever does not approve, is himself condemned by others; the Quality by which they are
constituted meritorious in this Sense, is the same which moves our Approbation. We condemn any Person who does not approve that which we
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our own; and that any other Person, would he attend to the [297] Actions which we approve, would also approve them, and love the Agent;
when we find that another does not approve what we approve, we are
apt to conclude, that he has not had kind Affections toward the Agent,or that some evil Affection makes him overlook his Virtues, and on thisaccount condemn him.
Perhaps by meritorious is meant the same thing with another Word
used in like manner, viz. rewardable. Then indeed the Quality in which
Merit or Rewardableness is founded, is different from that which is denoted by Merit in the former Meanings.
Rewardable, or deserving Reward, denotes either that Quality which
would incline a superior Nature to make an Agent happy: Or, 2dly, That
Quality of Actions which would make a Spectator approve [292] a superior
Nature, when he conferred Happiness on the Agent, and disapprove that
Superior, who inflicted Misery on the Agent, or punished him. Let any one
try to give a Meaning to the Word rewardable distinct from these, andnot satisfy himself with the Words worthy of, or deserving, which are ofvery complex and ambiguous Signification.
[298] Now the Qualities of an Action determining a powerful Nature
to reward it, must be various, according to the Constitution and Affections of that Superior. If he has a moral Sense, or something analogous ofa more excellent sort, by which he is determined to love those who evidence kind Affections, and to desire their Happiness, then kind Affection
is a Quality moving to Reward.
But farther, if this Superior be benevolent, and observes that inferior
Natures can by their mutual Actions promote their mutual Happiness;then he must incline to excite them to publickly useful Actions, by Prospects of private Interest to the Agent, if it be needful: Therefore he will
engage them to publickly useful Actions by Prospects of Rewards, whatever be the internal Principle of their Actions, or whatever their Affections be. These two Qualities in Actions, viz. flowing from kind [293] Affections, and publick Usefulness concurring, undoubtedly incline thebenevolent Superior to confer Happiness: The former alone, where, thro’
want of Power, the Agent is disappointed of his kind Intentions, will

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incline a benevolent Superior to reward; and the want of Power in the
Agent will never incline him to punish. But the want of kind Affections,altho [299] there be publickly useful Actions, may be so offensive to themoral Sense of the superior Nature, as to prevent Reward, or excite topunish; unless this Conduct would occasion greater publick Evil, by
withdrawing from many Agents a necessary Motive to publick Usefulness, viz. the Hope of Reward.
But if the Superior were malicious with a moral Sense contrary to ours,
the contrary Affections and Tendency of Actions would excite to reward,
if any such thing could be expected from such a Temper.
If Actions be called rewardable, when “a Spectator would approve thesuperior Mind for conferring Rewards on such Actions:” Then various
Actions must be rewardable, according to the moral Sense of the Spectator. Men approve rewarding all kind Affections: And if it will promote
publick Good to promise [294] Rewards to publickly useful Actions fromwhatsoever Affections they proceed, it will evidence Benevolence in the
Superior to do so. And this is the Case with human Governors, who cannot dive into the Affections of Men.
Some strongly assert (which is often the only Proof) that “to make an Whether Moor IncliAction rewardable, the Agent should have had Inclinations to evil as tives
nations to Evilwell as to good.” What does this mean, That a good governing Mind be necessary to
is only inclined to make an Agent happy, or to confer a Reward on him make an Agent
rewardable?
when he has some evil Affections, which yet are surmounted by the benevolent Affections? But would not a benevolent Superior incline to makeany benevolent Agent happy, whether he had any weaker evil Inclinations or not? Evil Inclinations in an Agent would certainly rather havesome Tendency to diminish the Love of the superior Mind. Cannot agood Mind love an Agent, and desire his Happiness, unless he observes
some Qualities, which, were they alone, would excite Hatred or Aversion? Must there be a Mixture of Hatred to make Love strong and effectual, as there must be a Mixture of Shade to set off the Lights in a Picture, where there are no Shades? Is there any Love, where there is no
Inclination to [295] make happy? Or is strong Love made up of Love andHatred?

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illustrations upon the moral sense’Tis true indeed, that Men judge of the Strength of kind Affections
generally by the contrary Motives of Self-Love, which they surmount:But must the Deity do so too? Is any Nature the less lovely, for its
having no Motive to make itself odious? If a Being which has no Motive
to evil can be beloved by a Superior, shall he not desire the Happiness ofthat Agent whom he loves? ’Tis true, such a Nature will do good Actions [301] without Prospect of any Self-Interest; but would any benevolent Superior study the less to make it happy on that account?—But
if they apply the Word rewardable to those Actions alone, which an
Agent would not do without Prospect of Reward: then indeed to make an
Action in this Sense rewardable, ’tis necessary that the Agent should either have no kind Affections, or that he should live in such Circumstances, wherein Self-Love should lead to Actions contrary to the publick Good, and over-power any kind Affections; or that he should haveevil Affections, which even in a good Constitution of the World, his
Self-Love could not over-ballance without Reward.
[296 ] This poor Idea of Rewardableness is taken from the Poverty andImpotence of human Governors: Their Funds are soon exhausted; theycannot make happy all those whose Happiness they desire: Their little
Stores must be frugally managed; none must be rewarded for what goodthey will do without Reward, or for abstaining from Evils to which they
are not inclined. Rewards must be kept for the insolent Minister, who
without reward would fly in the Face of his Prince; for the turbulent
Demagogue, who will raise Factions if he is not bribed; for the covetous,
mean-spirited, but artful Citizen, who will serve his Country no farther[302] than it is for his private Interest. But let any kind honest Heartdeclare what sort of Characters it loves? Whose Happiness it most desires?
Whom it would reward if it could? Or what these Dispositions are, which
if it saw rewarded by a superior Nature, it would be most pleased, andmost approve the Conduct of the Superior? When these Questions areanswer’d, we shall know what makes Actions rewardable.
If we call all Actions rewardable, the rewarding of which we approve;
then indeed we shall approve the rewarding of all Actions which we approve, whether the [297] Agent has had any Inclinations or Motives toEvil or not: We shall also approve the promising of Rewards to all pub-

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lickly useful Actions, whatever were the Affections of the Agents. If by
this Prospect of Reward either malicious Natures are restrained from
Mischief, or selfish Natures induced to serve the Publick, or benevolent
Natures not able without reward to surmount real or apparent selfish
Motives: In all these Cases, the proposing Rewards does really advancethe Happiness of the Whole, or diminish its Misery; and evidences Benevolence in the superior Mind, and is consequently approved by ourmoral Sense.
[303] In this last Meaning of the Word rewardable, these Dispositions are rewardable. 1. Pure unmixed Benevolence. 2. Prepollent good Affections. 3. Such weak Benevolence, as will not without Reward overcome
apparently contrary Motives of Self-Love. 4. Unmixed Self-Love, which by
Prospect of Reward may serve the publick. 5. Self-Love, which by Assistanceof Rewards, may overballance some malicious Affections. If in these Cases
proposing Rewards will increase the Happiness of the System, or diminish its Misery, it evidences Goodness in the Governor, when he cannot
so well otherwise accomplish so much good for the whole.
[298] If we suppose a Necessity of making all virtuous Agents equally
happy, then indeed a Mixture of evil Dispositions, tho surmounted by thegood, or of strong contrary Motives overballanced by Motives to Good,
would be a Circumstance of some Importance in the Distribution of
Rewards: Since such a Nature, during the Struggle of contrary Affections
or Motives, must have had less Pleasure than that virtuous Nature
which met with no Opposition: But as this very Opposition did givethis Nature full Evidence of the Strength of its Virtue, this Consciousness
may be a peculiar Recompence to which the unmixed Tempers are Strangers: [304] And there seems no such necessity of an equal Happiness of
all Natures. It is no way inconsistent with perfect Goodness, to makedifferent Orders of Beings; and, provided all the Virtuous be at last fully
content, and as happy as they desire, there is nothing absurd in supposing different Capacities and different Degrees; and during the Time of
Probation, there is no necessity, not the least shew of it, that all be equal.
Those who think “no Person punishable for any Quality or Action, if
he had it not in his Power to have had the opposite Quality, or to haveabstained [299] from the Action if he had willed it;” perhaps are not mis-

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taken: but then let them not assert on the other Hand, that it is unjust
to reward or make happy those, who neither had any Dispositions toEvil, nor could possibly desire any such Dispositions. Now if Mens Affections are naturally good, and if there be in their Fellows no Quality
which would necessarily raise Malice in the Observer; but, on the contrary, all Qualities requisite to excite at least Benevolence or Compassion:
It may be justly said to be in the Power of every one, by due Attention,
to prevent any malicious Affections, and to excite in himself kind Affections toward all. So that the intricate Debates about human Liberty do
not affect what is here alledged, concerning our [305] moral Sense of Affections and Actions, any more than any other Schemes.
Some alledge, that Merit supposes, beside kind Affection, that theAgent has a moral Sense, reflects upon his own Virtue, delights in it, andchuses to adhere to it for the Pleasure which attends it.* We need not
debate the Use of this Word Merit: ’tis plain, we approve a generous
kind Action, tho the Agent had not made this Reflection. [300] This Reflection shews to him a Motive of Self-Love, the joint View to which
does not increase our Approbation: But then it must again be owned,that we cannot form a just Conclusion of a Character from one or two
kind, generous Actions, especially where there has been no very strong
Motives to the contrary. Some apparent Motives of Interest may afterwards overballance the kind Affections, and lead the Agent into vicious
Actions. But the Reflection on Virtue, the being once charmed with thelovely Form, will discover an Interest on its side, which, if well attended
to, no other Motive will overballance. This Reflection is a great Security
to the Character; this must be supposed in such Creatures as Men are,before we can well depend upon a Constancy in Virtue. The same may
be said of many other Motives [306] to Virtue from Interest; which, thothey do not immediately influence the kind Affections of the Agent, yet
do remove these Obstacles to them, from false Appearances of Interest.
Such are these from the Sanctions of divine Laws by future Rewards andPunishments, and even the manifest Advantages of Virtue in this Life:* See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue. Part 1.

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without Reflection on which, a steddy Course of Virtue is scarce to be
expected amidst the present Confusion of human Affairs.

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How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary
to make an Action virtuous
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[301/307] I. Some do imagine, that “to make an Action virtuous, it isnecessary that the Agent should have previously known his Action to be
acceptable to the Deity, and have undertaken it chiefly with design toplease or obey him. We have not, say they, reason to imagine a malicious
Intention in many of the worst Actions: the very want of good Affectionsin their just Degree, must constitute moral Evil. If so, then the moral Evilin the want of Love or Gratitude, must increase in proportion to the
Causes of Love or Gratitude in the Object: by the Causes of Love, theymean those Qualities in the Object upon Observation of which Love or
Gratitude do arise in every good Temper. Now the Causes of Love toward the Deity are infinite; therefore the want of the highest possible
Degree of Love to him, must be infinitely evil.—To be excited more bysmaller [302] Motives or Causes [308] than by greater; to love those whoare less lovely, while we neglect him in whom are infinite Causes of Love,
must argue great Perverseness of Affections. But the Causes of Love in the
Deity, his infinite Goodness toward all, and even toward our selves,from whence springs all the Happiness of our Lives, are infinitely above
any Causes of Love to be found in Creatures: Therefore to act from Loveto them without Intention to please God, must be infinitely evil.”If this Reasoning be just, the best of Men are infinitely evil. The Distinction between habitual and actual Intention will not remove the Difficulty, since these Arguments require actual Intention. An habitual Intention is not a present act of Love to the Deity, influencing our
Actions more than actual Love to Creatures, which this Argument requires; but a prior general Resolution not at present repeated.

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To find what is just on this Subject, we may premise some Propositions of which Men must convince themselves by Reflection.
How we compute theGoodness ofTemper.

II. There is in Mankind such a Disposition naturally, that they desire theHappiness of any known Sensitive Nature, [303] when it is not inconsistent with something more [309] strongly desired; so that were there no
Oppositions of Interest either private or publick, and sufficient Power, we
would confer upon every Being the highest Happiness which it could
receive.
But our Understanding and Power are limited, so that we cannot
know many other Natures, nor is our utmost Power capable of promoting the Happiness of many: our Actions are therefore influenced bysome stronger Affections than this general Benevolence. There are certain
Qualities found in some Beings more than in others, which excite
stronger Degrees of Good-will, and determine our Attention to their Interests, while that of others is neglected. The Ties of Blood, Benefits conferred upon us, and the Observation of Virtue in others, raise much
more vigorus Affections, than that general Benevolence which we may
have toward all. These Qualities or Relations we may call the Causes ofLove.
However these Affections are very different from the general Benevolence toward all, yet it is very probable, that there is a Regularity or Proportion observed in the Constitution of our Nature; so that, abstractingfrom some acquired Habits, or [304] Associations of Ideas, and from themore sudden Emotions of some particular Passions, that Temper [310]which has the most lively Gratitude, or is the most susceptive of Friendship with virtuous Characters, would also have the strongest general Benevolence toward indifferent Persons: And on the contrary, where thereis the weakest general Benevolence, there we could expect the least Gratitude, and the least Friendship, or Love toward the Virtuous. If this Proportion be observed, then, if we express all these Desires of the good ofothers by the Name of Benevolence, we may denote the several Degrees
in which Men possess these several kind Dispositions by the Goodnessof the Temper: And the Degrees of Desire toward the Happiness of any
Person, we may call the Quantity of Love toward him. Then,

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The Quantity of Love toward any Person is in a compound Proportion of the apprehended Causes of Love in him, and of the Goodness ofTemper in the Observer. Or L ⳱ C ⳯ G.55
When the Causes of Love in two Objects are apprehended equal, theLove toward either in different Persons is as the Goodness of Temper; or
L ⳱ G ⳯ I.
[305] When the Goodness of Temper is the same or equal, the Love toward any Objects will be as the Causes; or L ⳱ C ⳯ I.
The Goodness of any Temper is therefore as the Quantity of Love, diL
vided by the apprehended Causes, or G ⳱ . And since we [311] cannotCapprehend any Goodness in having the Degree of Love above the Proportion of its Causes, the most virtuous Temper is that in which theLove equals its Causes, which may therefore be expressed by Unity.*
Hence it follows, that if there were any Nature incomparably more
excellent than any of our Fellow-Creatures, from whom also we ourselves, and all others had received the greatest Benefits; there would beless Virtue in any small Degree of Desire of his Happiness, than in a like
Degree of Love toward our Fellow-Creatures. But not loving such a Being, or having a smaller Degree of Love, must evidence a much greater
Defect in Virtue, than a like want of Love toward our Fellow-Creature.
For the Causes of Love being [306 ] very great, unless the Love be also

55. Hutcheson toned down or removed the mathematical language in the third
edition of the Essay with Illustrations as well as in later editions of the Inquiry. This
included not only the mathematical notation (also purged from T2), but also theword “axioms” which is replaced by “maxims” in the text, although it persists inthe marginal titles. The desire to render morals into mathematically quantifiableratios likely derives from Cumberland, cf. De Legibus Naturae, I §§5–9.
* See Treat. 2. Sect. 3. Art. II. last Paragraph.
In many Questions of this Nature we must have recourse with Aristotle to a
Sense, which is the last Judge in particular Cases.[318][[This footnote was added in the third edition and is not indicated in the text.
Hutcheson likely had in mind Aristotle’s discussion of our ability to judge goodand bad as natural, like the sense of vision, Nicomachean Ethics, III. 5, 1114a30–b12.]

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illustrations upon the moral sensevery great, the Quotient which expresses the Goodness of Temper will bevery much below Unity.
The general
Rules applied
to the Love ofGod.

III. To apply this to the Deity is very obvious. Our Affections toward
him arise in the same manner as toward our Fellows, in [312] proportion
to our Attention to the Causes of Love in him, and the Goodness of ourTemper. The Reflection on his Goodness raises Approbation and Complacence, his Benefits raise Gratitude, and both occasion Good-will or Benevolence. Some imagine, that “his Happiness is wholly detached fromall Events in this World, absolute, and unvaried in himself.” And yet
the same Inclination of Mind might remain in us, tho we had thisOpinion. When the Happiness of a Friend is in Suspense, we desire it;when he has obtained all that which we desired, the same Inclination of
Mind seems to remain toward him, only without that Uneasiness accompanying Desire of an uncertain Object: Thus Gravity may be said
to be the same when a Body is resting on a fixed Base, as when it caused
descent.
Upon this Scheme of the divine Happiness, it is not easy to account
how our Love to him could excite us to promote the Happiness of ourFellows. Our frequent Contemplation of such an amiable excellent [307]Nature, might indeed tend to reform or improve our Temper.
If we imagine that the Deity has such Perceptions of Approbation or
Dislike toward [313] Actions as we have our selves, then indeed our Loveto him would directly excite us to do whatever he approves, and shun
what he condemns. We can scarce avoid imagining, that the frequent
recurring of Events disapproved, must be uneasy to any Nature, and thatthe observing approved Actions must be delightful.
If we imagine that the divine Happiness, or any part of it is connectedwith the Happiness of his Creatures, so that their Happiness is constituted the Occasion of his; then indeed our Love to the Deity will directly excite us to all manner of beneficent Actions. ’Tis true, many good
Men deny these two last Opinions, yet it is probable, when their Minds
are diverted from Speculations, by Opportunities of Action, there recurs
some Imagination of Offence, Uneasiness, and Resentment in the Deity, upon observing evil Actions; of Delight and Joy in beholding good

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Actions; of Sorrow upon observing the Misery of his Creatures, and Joy
upon seeing them happy: So that by their Love to the Deity they are
influenced to beneficent Actions, notwithstanding their [308] speculative Opinions. In our Conceptions of the Deity, we are continually led
to imagine a Resemblance to what we feel in our selves.
[314] Whoever maintains these Opinions of the Deity to be true,must also suppose “a particular Determination of all Events in the Universe;” otherwise this part of the divine Happiness is made precarious
and uncertain, depending upon the undetermined Will of Creatures.
The Diversity of Opinions concerning the divine Happiness, may
lead Men into different ways of accounting for the Influence which theLove of God may have upon our Actions toward our Fellows: But theAffections toward the Deity would be much the same upon both
Schemes. Where there were the same just Apprehensions of the divine
Goodness in two Persons, the Love to the Deity in both would be proportioned to the Goodness of Temper. Tho the highest possible Degree ofLove to a perfectly good Deity, would evidence no more Virtue ofTemper, than a proportioned Love to Creatures; yet the having only
smaller Degrees of Love to the Deity, would evidence a greater Defectof Goodness in the Temper, than any want of Affection toward Creatures.
[309] Here it must be remembred, that in arguing concerning theGoodness of Temper [315] from the Degree of Love directly, and theCauses of Love inversly, actual Attention to the Causes of Love is supposed in the Person. For ’tis plain, that in the best Temper no one Affection or Idea can always continue present, and there can be no Affection present to the Mind, toward any Object, while the Idea of it is notpresent. The bare Absence therefore of Affection, while the Mind is employed upon a different Object, can argue no evil in the Temper, farther
than want of Attention may argue want of Affection. In like manner, inthe best Temper, there can be no Love toward an Object unknown: The
want therefore of Love to an Object unknown, can argue no evil in theTemper, farther than Ignorance may argue want of Affection. It is certain
indeed, that he who knows that there is a good Deity, and actually
thinks of him, and of all his Benefits, yet has not the strongest Love and192

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Gratitude toward him, must have a Temper void of all Goodness; but it
will not follow, that that Mind is void of Goodness which is not always
thinking of the Deity, or actually loving him, or even does not know
him. How far the want of Attention to the Deity, and Ignorance ofhim, may argue an evil Temper, [310] must be shown from different Topicks, to be considered hereafter.
What Degrees
of Affection
necessary to
Innocence.

[316] IV. But previously to these Inquiries we must consider “what Degrees or Kinds of Affection are necessary to obtain the simple Approbation of Innocence.” ’Tis plain, the bare Absence of all Malice is notenough. We may have the general Benevolence toward a mere sensitive
Nature, which had no other desire but Self-Love; but we can apprehend
no moral Goodness in such a Being: Nay, ’tis not every small Degree ofkind Affections which we approve. There must be some proportion ofkind Affections to the other Faculties in any Nature, particularly to its
Understanding and active Powers to obtain Approbation. Some Brutes
evidence small Degrees of Good-will, which make them be approved intheir Kind; but the same Degrees would not be approved in a Man.
There is an higher Degree expected in Mankind, to which, if they do
not come up, we do not account them innocent. It is not easy to fix
precisely that Degree which we approve as innocent by our moral Sense.
Every kind Affection, if it be considered only with relation to its own
Object, is indeed approved; such as natural Affection, Gratitude, Pity,
Friendship: And yet when we take a more extensive View of the Tendency of [311] some Actions proceeding even from these Affections, [317]
we may often condemn these Actions when they are apprehended aspernicious to larger Systems of Mankind. In the same manner we often
condemn Actions done from Love to a particular Country, when they
appear to be pernicious to Mankind in general. In like manner, SelfPreservation and pursuing private Advantage abstractly considered, is innocent: But when it is apprehended as very pernicious in any case to the
Safety of others, it is condemned.
Mankind are capable of large extensive Ideas of great Societies. And it
is expected of them, that their general Benevolence should continually
direct and limit, not only their selfish Affections, but even their nearer

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Attachments to others: that their Desire of publick Good, and Aversion
to publick Misery, should overcome at least their Desire of positive private Advantages, either to themselves or their particular Favourites; so
as to make them abstain from any Action which would be positively
pernicious or hurtful to Mankind, however beneficial it might be tothemselves, or their Favourites. To undergo positive Evil for the sake ofpositive Good to others, seems some degree of Virtue above Innocence,
which we do not universally expect: But to reject positive attainable[312/318] good, either for our selves or our particular Favourites, rather
than occasion any considerable Misery to others, is requisite to obtain
the Approbation of Innocence. The want of this Degree we positively
condemn as evil; and an Agent must rise above it by positive Services toMankind, with some Trouble and Expence to himself, before we approve
him as virtuous. We seem indeed universally to expect from all Men
those good Offices which give the Agent no trouble or expence: Whoever refuses them is below Innocence. But we do not positively condemn
those as evil, who will not sacrifice their private Interest to the Advancement of the positive Good of others, unless the private Interest be verysmall, and the publick Good very great.
But as the Desire of positive private Good is weaker than Aversion to
private Evil, or Pain; so our Desire of the positive Good of others, isweaker than our Aversion to their Misery: It seems at least requisite to[313] Innocence, that the stronger publick Affection, viz. our Aversion to
the Misery of others, should surmount the weaker private Affection, theDesire of positive private Good; so that no prospect of [319] Good to
our selves, should engage us to that which would occasion Misery toothers. It is in like manner requisite to Innocence, that our Aversion
to the Misery of greater or equal Systems, should surmount our Desireof the positive Good of these to which we are more particularly attached.
How far it may be necessary to Innocence to submit to smaller private Pains to prevent the greater Sufferings of others, or to promote somegreat positive Advantages; or how far the Happiness of private Systems
should be neglected for the Happiness of the greater, in order to obtain
the Approbation of Innocence, it is perhaps impossible precisely to determine, or to fix any general Rules; nor indeed is it necessary. Our business

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is not to find out “at how cheap a Rate we can purchase Innocence, but
to know what is most noble, generous and virtuous in Life.” This weknow consists in sacrificing all positive Interests, and bearing all private
Evils for the publick Good: And in submitting also the Interests of all
smaller Systems to the Interests of the whole: Without any other Exception or Reserve than this, that every Man may look upon himself as aPart of this System, and consequently not sacrifice an important private
Interest to a [320] less important Interest of others. We may find the same
sort of Difficulty about all our other Senses, in determining precisely
what Objects are indifferent, [314] or where Pleasure ends, and Disgust
begins, tho the positive Degrees of the grateful and ungrateful are easily
distinguished.
It is also very difficult to fix any precise Degree of Affection toward
the Deity, which should be barely requisite to Innocence. Only ingeneral we must disapprove that Temper, which, upon Apprehensionof the perfect Goodness of the Deity, and of his innumerable Benefits
to Mankind, has not stronger Affections of Love and Gratitude toward
him, than those toward any other Being. Such Affections would necessarily raise frequent Attention and Consideration of our Actions; andwould engage us, if we apprehended any of them to be offensive to him,or contrary to that Scheme of Events in which we apprehended the Deity to delight, to avoid them with a more firm Resolution than what
we had in any other Affairs. Positive Virtue toward the Deity must go
farther than a resolute abstaining from Offence, by engaging us with thegreatest Vigor, to do whatever we apprehend as positively pleasing, orconducive to those Ends in which we apprehend the Deity delights.
It is [321] scarce conceivable that any good Temper can want such Affections toward the Deity, when once he is known, as were above supposed necessary to Innocence. Nor [315] can we imagine positive Degrees
of Goodness of Temper above Innocence, where Affections toward theDeity do not arise proportionably.
What is here said relates only to the Apprehensions of our moral Sense,and not to those Degrees of Virtue which the Deity may require by
Revelation: And every one’s Heart may inform him, whether or no hedoes not approve, at least as innocent, those who omit many good Of-

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fices which they might possibly have done, provided they do a great dealof good; those who carefully abstain from every apprehended Offence toward the Deity, tho they might possibly be more frequent in Acts of
Devotion. ’Tis true indeed, the Omission of what we know to be required
is positively evil: so that by a Revelation we may be obliged to farther
Services than were requisite previously to it, which we could not innocently omit, after this Revelation is known: But we are here only considering our moral Sense.
V. Now let us inquire how far simple Ignorance of a Deity, or unaf- How far Ignoof Deity
fected Atheism does evidence an evil Disposition, or Defect of good Affec- rance
is Evil.
tions below Innocence.
1. Affections arising upon apparent Causes, or present Opinions, thofalse, if [316] they be such as would arise in the best Temper, were these
Opinions true, cannot argue any present want of Goodness in any Temper, of themselves: the Opinions indeed may often argue a want of Goodness at the time they were formed: But to a benevolent Temper there is
no Cause of Malice, or Desire of the Misery or Non-existence of any Being for itself. There may be Causes of Dislike, and Desire of Misery or
Non-existence, as the Means of greater Good, or of lessening Evil.
2. No Object which is entirely unknown, or of which we have no
Idea, can raise Affection in the best Temper; consequently want of Affection to an unknown Object evidences no evil. This would be the Caseof those who never heard even the Report of a Deity, if ever there were
any such: Or who never heard of any Fellow-Creatures, if one may makea Supposition like to that made by Cicero.* And this is perhaps theCase, as to the Deity, of any unfortunate Children, who may havesome [323] little Use of Reason, before they are instructed in any Religion.
* De Nat. Deor. Lib. 2. cap. 37. Ex Aristotele.
[[Hutcheson is citing Cicero’s dicussion of a passage from Aristotle’s lost dialogue
De Philosophia. Aristotle imagines beings who always lived under the earth but
finally surfaced. Seeing the extraordinary beauty and purposiveness (efficientiam) of
the world they must conclude that the gods exist and the world is their work. Thisis a locus classicus for the argument from design and occurs within Cicero’s argumentthat the world exhibits design and providence.]]196

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If there really were an Innate Idea of a Deity so imprinted, that no
Person could [317] be without it; or if we are so disposed, as necessarily
to receive this Idea, as soon as we can be called moral Agents: then no
Ignorance of a Deity can be innocent; all Atheism must be affected, or
an Opinion formed, either thro’ evil Affection, or want of good Affection
below Innocence. But if the Idea of a Deity be neither imprinted, noroffer itself even previously to any Reflection, nor be universally excitedby Tradition, the bare Want of it, where there has been no Tradition or
Reflection, cannot be called criminal upon any Scheme. Those who
make Virtue and Vice relative to a Law, may say, “Men are required toreflect, and thence to know a Deity. “But they must allow Promulgation necessary, before Disobedience to a Law can be criminal. Now previously to Reflection it is supposed impossible for the Agent to know theLegislator, or to know the Law requiring him to reflect, therefore this Law
requiring him to reflect, was not antecedently to his Reflection publishedto him.
The Case of human Laws, the Ignorance of which does not excuse,is not parallel [324] to this. No Person under any Civil Government canbe supposed ignorant that there are Laws made for the whole State. But
in the present Supposition, Men antecedently to Reflection may be ignorant of the Deity, or that there are Laws of Nature. [318] If any Subject could thus be unapprized, that he lived under Civil Government,
he should not be accounted Compos Mentis. The Supposition indeed inboth Cases is perhaps wholly imaginary; at least as to Persons above
Childhood. One can scarce imagine that ever any Person was wholly
unapprized of a governing Mind, and of a Right and Wrong in Morals.
Whether this is to be ascribed to innate Ideas, to universal Tradition, or
to some necessary Determination in our Nature, to imagine a designing
Cause of the beautiful Objects which occur to us, with a moral Sense, let
the curious inquire.
3. Suppose an Idea formed in a benevolent Mind, of other sensitive
Natures, Desire of their Existence and Happiness would arise.
4. A good Temper would incline any one to wish, that other Natures
were benevolent, or morally Good, since this is the chief Happiness.
[325] 5. A good Temper would desire that the Administration of Nature were by a benevolent or good Mind.

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6. All Desire of any Event or Circumstance inclines any Mind to
search into the Truth of that Event or Circumstance, [319] by all the
Evidence within its power to obtain.
7. Where there is such Desire, and sufficiently obvious Evidence given
in proportion to the Sagacity of the desiring Mind, it will come to the
Knowledge of the Truth, if its Desire be strong.
Now from these Propositions we may deduce the following Corollaries.
1. Supposing the Idea of a good Deity once apprehended, or excitedeither by Report, or the slightest Reflection; if there be objective Evidence
in Nature proportioned to the Capacity of the Inquirer, for the Existence of a good Deity, Atheism directly argues want of good Affection
below Innocence.
2. If there be only the simple Tradition or Presumption of a governing
Mind once raised; and if there be Evidence as [326] before for his Goodness, to conclude the Deity evil or malicious, must argue want of good
Affection as before.
3. Suppose the Idea of an evil Deity once excited, and some Presumptions for his Malice from Tradition, or slight Reflection upon particular Evils in Nature; to rest in this Opinion without Inquiry, [320]would argue want of good Affection; to desire to reject this Opinion, or
confute it by contrary Evidence, would argue good Affection: Suppose
such contrary Evidences obvious enough in Nature to one who inquired
as diligently about it as about his own Interest; to continue in the false
Opinion cannot be innocent.
VI. In like manner concerning our Fellow-Creatures, who are actually How Ignorance inknown to us.
human Affairs
4. To imagine Fellow-Creatures morally Good, either according to evidences a
Evidence upon Inquiry, or even by a rash Opinion, evidences good Affec- bad Temper.
tion.
5. Imagining them Evil contrary to obvious Evidence, argues want ofgood Affection below Innocence.
6. Retaining and inculcating an Opinion either of the Causes of Lovein [327] others, or of the Causes of Aversion, induces an Habit; andmakes the Temper prone to the Affection often raised. Opinion of Good-

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ness in the Deity and our Fellows, increases good Affection, and improves the Temper: Contrary Opinion of either, by raising frequent Aversions, weakens good Affection, and impairs the Temper.
[321] This may shew how cautious Men ought to be in passing Sentence upon the Impiety of their Fellows, or representing them as wicked
and profane, or hateful to the Deity, and justly given over to eternal
Misery: We may see also what a wise Mark it is to know the true Church
by, that “it pronounces Damnation on all others.” Which is one of the
Characters of the Romish Church, by which it is often recommended as
the safest for Christians to live in.
The same Propositions may be applied to our Opinions concerning
the natural Tendencies of Actions. Where the Evidence is obvious as before, good Affection will produce true Opinions, and false Opinions often argue want of good Affection below Innocence. Thus, tho in Assent
or Dissent of themselves, there can neither be Virtue nor Vice, yet they
may be Evidences[328] of either in the Agent, as well as his external Motions. ’Tis not possible indeed for Men to determine precisely in manycases the Quantity of Evidence, and its proportion to the Sagacity of the
Observer, which will argue Guilt in him, who contrary to it, forms a
false Opinion. But Men are no better judges of the Degrees of Virtue[322] and Vice in external Actions. This therefore will not prove that all
false Opinions or Errors are innocent, more than external Actions: The
Searcher of Hearts can judge exactly of both. Human Punishments are
only Methods of Self-Defence; in which the Degrees of Guilt are not theproper Measure, but the Necessity of restraining Actions for the Safety of
the Publick.
How want ofAttention evidences a bad
Temper.

VII. It is next to be considered, how far want of Attention to the Deity
can argue want of good Affections, in any Agent, to whom he is known.
Every good Temper will have strong Affections to a good Deity, andwhere there is strong Affection there will be frequent Reflection upon the
Object beloved, Desire of pleasing, and Caution of offence. In like manner every Person of good Temper, who has had the Knowledge of a[329] Country, a System, a Species, will consider how far these great Societies may be affected by his Actions, with such Attention as he uses in
his own Affairs; and will abstain from what is injurious to them.

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Attention to a Deity apprehended as good, and governing the Universe, will increase the Moment of Beneficence in any [323] good Agent,various ways, such as by Prospects of Reward, either present or future,by improving his Temper thro’ Observation of so amiable a Pattern, orby raising Sentiments of Gratitude toward the Deity, a part of whose
Happiness the Agent may imagine depends upon the Happiness of the
Universe. In like manner, the considering a Species or System may increase our good Offices, since their Interests are advanced by good Offices to Individuals.
But then from a like Reasoning to that in Art. II. ’tis plain, that inequal Moments of good produced by two Agents, the Goodness of theTemper is inversly as the several additional Helps, or Motives to it. So
that more Virtue is evidenced by any given Moment of Beneficence fromgood Affections only toward our Fellows, or particular Persons, than by
the same Moment produced from the joint Considerations of the Deity, or of a general System or Species.*
But an injurious Action which appeared to the Agent not only pernicious to his Fellows, or to particular Persons, but offensive to the Deity, and pernicious to a System, is much more vicious than when the
Agent did not reflect upon the Deity, or a Community.
[324] VIII. We must not hence imagine, that in order to produce greater Nothing in
SchemeVirtue in our selves, we should regard the Deity no farther, then thissupersedes themerely to abstain from Offences. Were it our sole Intention in beneficent Duty of Love
Actions, only to obtain the private Pleasure of Self-Approbation for the to the Deity,and general
Degree of our Virtue, this might seem the proper Means of having great Benevolence.
Virtue with the least Expence. But if the real Intention, which constitutes an Action virtuous, be the promoting publick Good; then voluntarily to reject the Consideration of any Motive which would increase the* See Luke x. 12, 13, 14.
[[This note, added in the third edition, refers to the following passage from
Luke: “I tell you, on that day it will be more tolerable for Sodom than for that
town. Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the deeds of power
done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago,sitting in sackcloth and ashes,” (Holy Bible, II. 72–73). For the exact passage it is
attached to, see the Textual Note reference for 199/13–16.]]

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Moment of publick Good, or would make us more vigorous and stedfast
in Virtue, must argue want of good Affection. In any given Moment ofBeneficence, the unaffected Want of Regard to the Deity, or to private
Interest, does really argue greater Virtue. But the retaining these Motives
with a View to increase the Moment of publick Good in our Actions, if
they really do so, argues Virtue equal to, or greater than that in the former Case: And the affected Neglect of these Motives, that so we may acquit our selves virtuously with the least Expence to our selves, or withthe least Moment of publick Good, must evidence want of good Affections, and base Trick and Artifice to impose upon [325] Observers, or ourown Hearts. Therefore
Since Gratitude to the Deity, and even Consideration of private
Interest, tend to increase the Moment of our Beneficence, and tostrengthen good Affections, the voluntary Retaining them with thisView evidences Virtue, and affecting to neglect them evidences Vice.*
And yet,[332] If the Moment produced by the Conjunction of these Motives,
be not greater than that produced with unaffected Neglect of these Motives, from particular good [326] Affection, there is less Virtue in theformer than in the latter.
Men may use Names as they please, and may chuse to call nothing* This may sufficiently justify the Writers of Morality in their proving, that “Virtue is the surest Means of Happiness to the Agent.” ’Tis also plain from universal
Experience, that a Regard to the Deity, frequent Reflection on his Goodness, andconsequent Acts of Love, are the strongest and most universally prevailing Means ofobtaining a good Temper. Whatever Institution therefore does most effectually tend
to raise Mens Attention, to recall their Minds from the Hurry of their common
Affairs, to instruct them in the Ways of promoting publick Good farther than thebusy Part of the World without assistance would probably apprehend, must be so
wise and good, that every honest Mind should rejoice in it, even though it had noother Authority than human to recommend it. Every one will understand that bythis is meant a publick Worship on set Days, in which a stop is put to Commerce,
and the busy part of Mankind instructed in the Duties of Piety and Humanity.
[[Hutcheson likely has Shaftesbury in mind: “Every thing which is an Improvement of Virtue, or an Establishment of right Affection and Integrity, is an Advancementof Interest, and leads to the greatest and most solid Happiness and Enjoyment” “AnInquiry Concerning Virtue,” “Conclusion.”]]

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Virtue but “what is intended chiefly to evidence Affection of one kindor other toward the Deity.” Writers on this Scheme are not wellagreed about what this virtuous Intention is; whether only to evidence
Submission, or Submission and Love, or to obtain the divine Benevolence,and private Happiness to the Agent, or to give Pleasure to the Deity. But
let them not assert, against universal Experience, that we approve no Actions which are not thus intended toward the Deity. ’Tis plain, a generous compassionate Heart, which, at first view of the Distress of another,flies impatiently to his Relief, or spares no Expence to accomplish it,meets with strong Approbation from every Observer who has not perverted his Sense of Life by School-Divinity, or Philosophy. ’Tis to be suspected, that some Vanity must be at the Bottom of these Notions,which place Virtue in some Nicety, which active Tempers, have not leisure to apprehend, and only the Recluse Student can attain to.
[327] To be led by a weaker Motive, where a stronger is alike present
to the Mind, to love a Creature more than God, or to have stronger
Desires of doing what is grateful to Creatures than to God, when weequally attend to both, would certainly argue some Perversion of our Affections; or to study the particular Good of one, more than that of a System, when we reflected on both: But as no finite Mind can retain at oncea [334] Multiplicity of Objects, so it cannot always retain any one Object.
When a Person therefore not thinking at present of the Deity, or of a
Community or System, does a beneficent Action from particular Love,he evidences Goodness of Temper. The bare Absence of the Idea of a Deity, or of Affections to him, can evidence no evil; otherways it would
be a Crime to fall asleep, or to think of any thing else: If the bare Absenceof this Idea be no evil, the Presence of kind Affections to FellowCreatures cannot be evil. If indeed our Love to the Deity excited to
any Action, and at the same time Love to a Creature excited to the
Omission of it, or to a contrary Action, we must be very criminal if theformer do not prevail; yet this will not argue all Actions to be evil inwhich pleasing the Deity, [328] is not directly and chiefly intended.
Nay, that Temper must really be very deficient in Goodness, whichneeds to excite it to any good Office, to recal the Thoughts of a Deity,
or a Community, or a System.[335] The frequent recalling theseThoughts, indeed, does strengthen all good Affections, and increases

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the Moment of Beneficence to be expected from any Temper; and withthis View frequently to recal such Thoughts, must be one of the best
Helps to Virtue, and evidence high Degrees of it. Nay, one cannot callthat Temper entire and complete, which has not the strongest Affection
toward the greatest Benefactor, and the most worthy Object.
Beings of such Degrees of Knowledge, and such Extent of Thought,
as Mankind are not only capable of, but generally obtain, when nothinginterrupts their Inquiries, must naturally arise to the Knowledge of theDeity, if their Temper be good. They must form general Conceptionsof the whole, and see the Order, Wisdom, and Goodness in the Administration of Nature in some Degree. The Knowledge and Love of theDeity, the universal Mind, is as natural a Perfection to such a Being
as Man, as any Accomplishment to which we arrive by [329] cultivating
our natural Dispositions; nor is that Mind come to the proper State andVigor of its kind, where Religion is not the main Exercise and Delight.
Whether the
Deity is thesole proper
Object ofLove.

IX. There is one very subtle Argument on this Subject. Some alledge,“That [336] since the Deity is really the Cause of all the Good in the
Universe, even of all the Virtue, or good Affection in Creatures, which
are the seeming Causes of Love toward them, it must argue strange Perversion of Temper to love those in whom there is no Cause of Love, or
who are (as they affect to speak) nothing, or Emptiness of all Goodness.
The Deity alone is amiable, in whom there is infinite Fulness of every
amiable Quality. The Deity, say they, not without some Reason, is the
Cause of every pleasant Sensation, which he immediately excites according to a general Law, upon the Occasion of Motions arising in our Bodies; that likewise he gave us that general Inclination, which we modify
into all our different Affections; God therefore, say they, is alone lovely.
Other Things are not to be beloved, but only the Goodness of God appearing in them; nay some do make the loving of them, without considering God as displaying [330] his Goodness in them, to be infinitely
evil.”In answer to this it must be owned, that “God’s being the Cause of
all the Good in the Universe, will no doubt raise the highest Love to
him in a good Temper, when it reflects upon it.”

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[337] But 1st, had all Men this Apprehension that “there was no goodin any Creature,” they really would not love them at all. But Men generally imagine with very good ground, that there are good Beings distinct
from God, tho produced by him: And whether this Opinion be true or
false, it evidences no evil.
2. As upon this Scheme God is the Cause of all pleasant Sensation,
so is he the Cause of all Pain: He is, according to them, the Cause ofthat Inclination which we modify into evil Affection, as well as into good.
If then we are to love God only, for what we call good Affection in Creatures, and not the Creatures themselves, we must also only love God
upon observing evil Affections in Creatures, and have no Aversion to thebasest Temper, since God gave the general Inclination alike in both
Cases.
[331] 3. If we may suppose real Beings distinct from God, that their
Affections are not God’s Affections, if God is not the only Lover andHater, if our moral Sense is determined to approve kind Affections, andour Love or Benevolence must arise toward what we approve; or if we findan Instinct to desire the Happiness of every sensitive [338] Nature, wecannot avoid loving Creatures, and we must approve any kind Affections
observed in others toward their Fellows. ’Tis true, we must approve thehighest Affections toward the Deity, and condemn, as a Deficiency ofjust Affections toward God any Degree which is not superior to ourother Affections. But still, Affections towards Creatures, if they be distinct Natures from God, must be approved.
4. If to make a Mind virtuous, or even innocent, it be necessary thatit should have such sublime Speculations of God, as the to’ pa÷n in theIntellectual active System (if we call one Agent in many Passive Organs anactive System) then God has placed the Bulk of Mankind in an absolute
Incapacity of Virtue, and inclined them perpetually to infinite Evil, by
their very Instincts and natural Affections. Does the parental Affection direct [332] a Man to love the Deity, or his Children? Is it the Divinity, to which our Pity or Compassion is directed? Is God the Object of
Humanity? Is it a Design to support the Divinity, which we call Generosity or Liberality? Upon Receipt of a Benefit, does our Nature suggest
only Gratitude toward God? Affections toward the Deity may indeed

204

illustrations upon the moral sense

often accompany Affections toward Creatures, and do so in a virtuous
Temper: but [339] these are distinct Affections. This Notion of making
all virtuous Affections to be only directed toward God, is not suggested to Men by any thing in their Nature, but arises from the longsubtle Reasonings of Men at leisure, and unemployed in the natural Affairs of Life.
5. If there be no Virtue or Cause of Love in Creatures, it is vain forthem to debate wherein their Virtue consists, whether in regard toward
the Deity, or in any thing else, since they are supposed to have noneat all.
To conclude this Subject. It seems probable, that however we must
look upon that Temper as exceedingly imperfect, inconstant, and partial,
in which Gratitude toward the universal Benefactor, Admiration and Loveof the supreme [333] original Beauty, Perfection and Goodness, are not thestrongest and most prevalent Affections; yet particular Actions may be innocent, nay virtuous, where there is no actual Intention of pleasing theDeity, influencing the Agent.
FINIS.

510

15

textual notes

Treatise i: An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions
4/17
remembred] remembred,
4/18
will] may
5/15–16 Illustrations of . . . areso,] Illustrations of thisPoint, that we have amoral Sense, and a Sense
of Honour, by which we
discern an immediate
Good in Virtue andHonour, not referred toany further Enjoyment,
are not much insisted onsince they are alreadylaid down
5/24
tho Seven or Ten might]
though a larger Number
might perhaps
5/26
Perceptions,] Perceptions
immediately
5/26–27 Bodies;] Bodies,
5/34
I . . . do,] Mr. Locke declares expressly, calling itinternal Sensation, that
[See John Locke, Essay,
II. 1 §4. Locke is interested in giving an account of how and from
where experience furnishes us with ideas, notwith using the idea of reflection as a basis for
multiplying senses which

6/2

6/14–
7/4

205

is more a characteristicof Shaftesbury.]natural . . . as] naturaland necessary and ultimate, without reference
to any other, as
The principal Objections . . . complete the
Scheme] The Author
takes nothing in badpart from any of his Adversaries, except that
Outcry which one or
two of them madeagainst these Principles
as opposite to Christianity, though it be so wellknown that they havebeen and are espousedby many of the mostzealous Christians.
There are Answers interspersed in the later Editions to these Objections, to avoid thedisagreeable Work of Replying or Remarking, inwhich one is not generally upon his Guard[xiii] sufficiently to avoid
Cavils and offensive Expressions.

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7/10

textual notes

to establish.] to establish
in Treat. IV.
7/22
some other natural]
some of the natural
8/6–8 every one . . . to approve] om.
8/9tend] are intended
8/9–10 in the . . . Agent] om.
8/10–14 it can . . . Affections.” ]our Power can reach, isapproved as the highest
Virtue; and that the universal calm Good-will or
Benevolence, where it is
the leading Affection of
the Soul, so as to limit
or restrain all other Affections, Appetites, orPassions, is the Temper
which we esteem in thehighest Degree, according to the natural Constitution of our Soul:
And withal, that we in alower Degree approve
every particular kind Affection or Passion, which
is not inconsistent withthese higher and nobler
Dispositions.”
8/15
this to be] this calm extensive Affection to be
9/3
Actions, are,] Actions,
9/3
Natural,] Natural, yet are
9/4
yet if] but if
9/5–6 tend to the greater] tend
to the9/7
whereas a . . . find his]while yet one may better
find his private
9/12–15 I hope . . . Gentlemen,]
Gentlemen,

9/20

DúnamiC agajoeidh’ C]
Filánjrwpon kai’agajoeide’C

Journals,] Journals in
1728,
10/2
them bore] them inthose weekly Papers bore
10/6–12 I have . . . I have] He
was soon after informed,that his Death disappointed the Author’s
great Expectations fromso ingenious a Correspondent. The Objections proposed in thefirst Section of Treatise
IV, are not always thoseof Philaretus, though the
Author endeavoured toleave no Objections of
his unanswered; but healso interspersed whatever Objections occurredin Conversation on these
Subjects; and has not
used any Expressions inconsistent with the highRegard he has
15/12 several Senses] several
Powers of Perception or
Senses
15/13 There seems . . . or Pain.]–16
It is by some Power ofPerception, or Sense, that
we first receive the Ideasof these Objects we areconversant with, or bysome Reasoning uponthese perceived Objects
of Sense. By Sensation
we not only receive the
Image or Representation,
10/1

textual notes

but some Feelings ofPleasure or Pain; nay
sometimes the sole Perception is that of Pleasure or Pain, as in Smells,
and the Feelings of Hunger and Thirst.
15/18 Extension . . . one of]–16/1 Duration or Time,
16/3
Idea, or Assemblage] Idea,
or Image, or Assemblage
16/4
Pleasures,] Pleasures
16/13 is ridiculously] seems
very
16/25 Ideas, as] Ideas, and yet
may also accompany anyother Ideas, as
16/25 Sensations.] Sensations.
Brutes, when several
Objects are before them,
have probably all theproper Ideas of Sight
which we have, without
the Idea of Number.
16/32 Senses.] Senses; since
they can be received
sometimes without the
Ideas of Colour, andsometimes without thoseof Touching, thoughnever without the one or
the other.
16/33 Smells, . . . &c.] Smells,
colours, Sound, Cold,
Heat, &c.
16/38 “the] “those
17/6
every]” every
17/8
Sense,] Sense,”
17/14 Perceptions] Perceptions,
17/15 as also] as also,
17/16 Addison,] Addison
17/17 them,] them

17/22

207

Antients. 4. The] Antients. This inward Painof Compassion cannot
be called a Sensation ofSight. It solely arises
from an Opinion of Misery felt by another, andnot immediately from avisible Form. The same
Form presented to theEye by the exactest
Painting, or the Actionof a Player, gives no Pain
to those who rememberthat there is no Misery
felt. When Men by
Imagination conceive
real Pain felt by an Actor, without recollectingthat it is merely feigned,or when they think of
the real Story represented, then, as there is a
confused Opinion of real
Misery, there is also Painin Compassion. 4.
17/23 Virtue, or Vice] Virtue or
–24
Vice,
17/26 Virtue, or Vice] Virtue or
Vice,
18/3
“which] which
18/5
Pleasure;] pleasure;
18/7
them.”] them.
18/15 Plato* accounts] Plato
makes one of his Dialogists* account
18/24 our selves] ourselves
18/28 Senses);] Senses, of Taste
and Touch chiefly);
19/6–12 The third . . . of Love.]om.
19/14 Now] And

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textual notes

19/18

Desires, with] Desires,and that with
19/20 Hence it is that] Thus
19/23 Power,] Power
20/2 Character:] Character:”
20/4 Actions?”] Actions?
20/14 “Further,] Further,
20/16 Sense, by] Sense, yet by
20/18 Aversion.”] Aversion.
20/22 Posture] Posture,
20/26 this] all this,
20/34 Sect. 6.] Sect. 2.
21/7
Uses] Use
21/11 consider] consider,
21/26 such as] such as those of
21/30 a Desire of Distinction,]–22/1 an Emulation or desire ofEminence,
23/33 II.] II. in his Foundationof Morality in Theory andPractice.
24/4–10 Desire is . . . is plain,]
there is a certain Pain or
Uneasiness accompanying most of our violent
Desires. Though the
Object pursued be
Good, or the Means of
Pleasure, yet the Desireof it generally is attended with an uneasy
Sensation. When an Object or Event appears
Evil, we desire to shunor prevent it. This Desire is also attended withuneasy Sensation of Impatience: Now this Sensation [16] immediately
connected with the Desire, is a distinct Sensa-

24/12
–15

24/22
24/31

24/32
24/34
25/12
25/24
26/9
–10

26/11
26/12
26/19
26/22

tion from those which
we dread, and endeavour
to shun. It is plain then,itself. ”. . . be uneasy:] itself.” Uneasy Sensations
previously felt, will raisea Desire of whatever willremove them; and thisDesire may have its concomitant Uneasiness.
Pleasant Sensations expected from any Object
may raise our Desire ofit; this Desire too may
have its concomitant uneasy Sensations:pleasant] peculiar pleasantthe Pleasure of gratified]that Pleasure whichmerely arises from gratifying ofsince the] since this
that,] that
Desire or Affection] Desire, or the mere Affection,
our Happiness,] our future Happinessthese are either . . .
shewing,] the two former are Motives only to
external Actions; and theother two only shewof the Happiness of others,] of the Happiness ofothers,Event . . . desired] Eventdesired
Deity,] Deity,
but as conceiving it] except we imagined their
Happiness to betextual notes

27/16
27/17
27/23
27/30

28/6
28/14

28/30
29/5
29/13
30/7
30/17
30/18
30/24
–25

30/28
–31

Pleasures] Pleasureunaccountable] unaccountable,
might,] might
but to continue him in
Misery,] or to harden
our Hearts against all
feelings of Compassion,on the one hand, while
yet the Object continued
in Misery;
Drink] Drink and his
Sensations of Hunger
and Thirst
Life.] Life, which must
be the Case with those
who voluntarily hazard
their Lives, or resolve on
Death for their Country
or Friends.
attempting] from the attempting
toward] towards“befooled] “outwitted bynatureno] lessor certainly future] orfutureare sure] expect or judge
in some sense also becalled a Sensation.] becalled a Sort of Sensation: as the Physicians
call many of our Passions internal Senses.
includes, beside . . . impending Evil,] includes astrong Brutal Impulse of
the Will, sometimes
without any distinct notions of Good, publickor private, attended with

31/14
31/20
32/6

32/9
33/32

33/33
–34
34/19
34/25
34/30
34/34

209

it appears] they appear
manner,] Manner
Temper. We] Temper.
Sometimes the calm
Motion of the Will conquers the Passion, andsometimes is conqueredby it. Thus Lust or Revenge may conquer thecalm Affection towardprivate Good, and sometimes are conquered by
it. Compassion will prevent the necessary Correction of a Child, or theuse of a severe Cure,
while the calm parental
Affection is exciting to
it. Sometimes the latter
prevails over the former.
All this is beautifully
represented in the 9thbook of Plato’s Republick. We
Passions.] Passions.*
In the third edition The
same . . . finite Evils. isconnected to, and concludes, the previous paragraph.
about . . . that tho] evenin the acts of the Understanding, or in Judging,that thoughby the Moment] by the
Importance or Moment
the Axioms subjoined]
the Maxims subjoinedapt,] apt
Treat. 4] Treat. II. [Asnoted by Turco, Hutcheson incorrectly emended

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textual notes

the third edition. The
reference should be to
the final paragraph of T4
6.6.]
35/11 Cor. Relative] [36]Hence relative
35/15 Particular] Particular,
35/17 Good,] Good
35/29 Instances;] Instances:
35/31 Cor. 2.] 2.
36/1–2 the Powers . . . Goods]
Goods of several sorts
36/7–8 at once . . . Evil:] at once
Good and Evil:
36/18 Action is . . . Sense,] Action is morally good,
36/25 (*which is . . . Pas–26
sions;)] (*universal Evilis scarce ever intended,and particular Evil onlyin violent Passion)
37/8
Axioms,] Maxims,
37/16 beloved.] for whose sakeit is desired.
37/25 Intenseness:] Intenseness,or Dignity of the Enjoyment:
38/8
Cor. Hence] Hence
38/10 Ratio] Proportion
40/17 selves . . . Systems,]
Hearts,
41/7
And we] We
41/23 We do] We
41/25 do not seem] seem not
42/30 of Good,] of Good,
43/8
good] Good
43/25 ours. There] ours. Thereare [51] perhaps Ordersof rational Beings also
without these particular
limited Attachments, towhich our Natures are

44/2
46/24
47/16
47/33
49/31

50/2
50/13
50/14
–19

subjected; who may perhaps have no Parental
Affection, Friendships,
or Love to a Country, orto any special smaller
Systems; but have Universal Good-will to all,and this solely proportioned to the moral Excellencies of the several
Objects, without anyother Bonds of Affection. Thereupon] on
Virtue,] Virtue
possible] possible,
do accompany] accompany
from a like] from a certain Prospect of future
pleasant Sensations on
the one hand, or from alikeothers.”] others.”*
Desire] Desire,
Joy of Love . . . Sorrowof Aversion:] raises joyful
Love: Good in suspense,
the Love of Desire, or desirous Love: Good lost,
sorrowful Love. Evil present, raises sorrowful Aversion: Evil expected, desirous Aversion; and Evilremoved, joyful Aversion.
The joyful Love, andjoyful Hatred, will possibly be found nearly thesame sort of Sensations,though upon different
Occasions; the same may
be said of the sorrowful

textual notes

Love, and the sorrowful
Aversion:
51/3
itself.] itself.*
52/10 tho . . . often [tho’ other
Degrees may often
54/29 shewing] shewing, [In
the third edition the fivenumbered paragraphs following “shewing” areconnected to form one
paragraph. The small caps
used to offset “How” atthe beginning of each paragraph is rendered in regular print as “How”]
55/4
State,] State
56/23 absent . . . others;] Hap–24
piness of others while it
is in suspense;
57/23 Diffidence of] Diffidence
in58/3
do raise] raise
58/20 this Passion,] it,
58/21 malicious, and designing]
malicious, designing
58/22 we . . . pursue] we naturally pursue
59/25 Let . . . especially] Let
one reflect on this Classof Passions,60/11 Disappointment] Disappointment,
60/30 Racine;] Racine,
64/24 Advantage:] Advantage?
64/26 them:] them?
64/28 others.] others?
65/22 would give us;] gives us;
65/32 external] other sorts of
66/2 under] in(in title)
66/15 others:] others, or Consciousness of moral Evil:

67/16

211

fellow Creatures.]
Fellow-creatures.
67/24 it self;] itself:
68/13 proportioned] generally
proportioned
69/4 satisfied:] satisfied;
74/27 have any] secure constant
75/22 enjoy] obtain
76/2–3 all . . . Cruelty,] all Cruelty,
76/30 “It] It
77/8
Self-Condemnation.”]Self-Condemnation.
78/27 Praise . . .Style,] Praise,–28
78/32 Approbation] Approbation,
79/7 pursued,] pursued
79/26 them,] them
79/30 Fortunes,] Fortunes–31
80/7 Wise:] wise:
81/14 Life:] Life;
82/23 but] and that
83/1
Whole,] Whole;
83/4–5 of the lower . . . boasting] Expressions of the
Stoicks, boasting, one
would imagine, who did
not remember otherparts of their Scheme,
84/25 quoddam] quádam
84/32 obtained;] obtained:
87/1–2 find . . . Misfortunes;]
when under Misfortunes
find in being pitied byothers;87/25 their] the87/26 their] the88/28 Fly or Maggot] Brute or–29
Insect

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89/24

textual notes

Luxurious Debauchee]
Debauchee

90/27 An Hobby-Horse . . . a–29Son.] Our former Toys
we more easily procured,
kept in good order, andmanaged, than the present Objects of ourCares, an Employment,a Son, a Friend, a Country, a Party.
91/15 luxurious Debauchees,]
Debauchees
91/24 “that] that
91/28 Enjoyments.”] Enjoyments.
92/12 Compassion] Compassion,
92/23 “fantastick] fantastick
92/27 Pain.”] Pain.
93/14 Ideas,] Ideas,*
95/8
given to Castle-building,]
amusing himself withimaginary Scenes ofLife,
95/24 When we] When indeed
we95/26 begin indeed from] begin from95/29 “That had we] That wehad
96/1–2 Time”—No Mortal,]
Time—No mortal,
96/25 Absence . . . revenged?]–26
Safety from Injury, tothe having revenged an
Injury?
99/14 Life: The] Life, the99/20 Necessity, do] Necessity,
100/11 World, . . . themselves,]
World,
100/12 incapable . . . without]–13
without,

100/14 “Set] Set
100/16 them,”] them,
100/28 any one] one
101/9 Men should neglect]
Men neglect
102/6 Praise . . . represent]–7
World imagines
102/20 Self-Defence] SelfDefence,
102/28 Purpose,] Purpose
102/29 Duels,] our Duels,
105/14 no] little
105/14 Reflection; nor] Reflection; and that almost
solely arises from the return of Appetite; andsome Prospect of repeated Enjoyment, orsome moral Notions ofLove or Friendship or
Communication of Pleasure: without these theRemembrance of pastsensual Enjoyments ismore generally nauseous.
Nor
106/25 “it] it
106/27 nor ever] never106/29 in every] in almost
every
107/12 our selves,] ourselves,107/15 Being.”] Being.
107/18 our selves;] ourselves;108/22 perpetual.] perpetual;
108/22 no . . . these.] least Relief–23
from them.
109/31 violent.] violent.”
109/34 Pains.”] Pains.
110/3 habet,] habeat,
110/12 We see therefore,]Thus,
110/13 that] we see that

textual notes

110/14 Honour . . . to] Honour:–15
To
110/25 affect] effect
111/1–2 us . . . by] us, by
111/7 necessary.] necessary:
111/31 “the] the111/31 itself,] itself
111/35 Temptation.”] Temptation.
113/7 Passions do often] Passions often
113/24 Authors . . . to] Authors
to113/29 publickly useful.] usefulto the Publick.
114/19 others,] others;
114/20 Enjoyment] Enjoyment,
115/10 Merit do] Merit117/10 The] When we havethe
117/11 is indeed . . . We] we–13
117/17 The Conceptions] Con–18
ceptions
118/16 Nature] nature
118/28 Author.] Author. See
Treat. I. Sect. ult.
118/32 external Pains] the most
severe external Pain

213

118/35 Ruin?] Ruin.
118/35 the Pains] Pain
119/1 kinds.] kinds,
120/10 Presumptions] ground120/33 who,] who
120/35 their natural . . . Neces–121/1 saries.] the common
Necessaries, or even of
the natural Conveniences of Life,
122/4 Beauty] Beauty,
122/17 Par. lost,] Par. Lost,
123/7 Whole] whole
124/6 Frauds . . . what] Frauds
in other points, yetprobably
124/20 “no] no
124/30 Violence.”] Violence
127/8 carisque] carisq;
127/12 a generous] generous
129/22 Good.”] Good.
129/24 End:] End;
129/33 “This] This
130/3 it.”] it.
130/4 do,] do
130/31 Nature] Species
132/8 Attention] Attention,

Treatise ii: Illustrations upon the Moral Sense
133/10 called privately] called for–11
shortness, [208] privately
133/22 into:] into;
134/5 with] with,
134/7–8 is pleasant . . . Agent.]
has some little Pleasureattending it in the Observer, and raises Love
toward the Agent, inwhom the Quality ap-

proved is deemed to reside, and not in the Observer, who has a
Satisfaction in the Act ofapproving.*
134/22 Mr. Hobbes,] Hobbes,
Rochefocault, and othersof the last Century,
134/26 Moralists] Moralists ofthis Scheme

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textual notes

134/27 “ ’tis the Prospect] it is the“Prospect
135/22 in] about
136/7 manner] manner,
136/8 be] have been
136/23 imagined do] imagine
138/1 Object;] Object:
138/2 Object,] Objects,
138/22 Action] Action,
138/30 exciting] exciting,138/33 Suasoriae.] Suasoriæ, orthese, sub ratione utilis.
139/5 these;] these:
139/8–9 Affection, . . . Affection):]Affection or Passion:
This paragraph follows in
the third edition: Writers on these Subjects
should remember thecommon Divisions of
the Faculties of the Soul.
That there is 1. Reason
presenting the naturesand relations of things,
antecedently to any Act
of Will or Desire: 2. The
Will, or Appetitus Rationalis, or the disposition of Soul to pursue
what is presented as
good, and to shun Evil.
Were there no otherPower in the Soul, thanthat of mere contemplation, there would be no
Affection, Volition, Desire, Action. Nay withoutsome motion of Will no
Man would voluntarily
persevere in Contemplation. There must be a
Desire of Knowledge,

and of the Pleasure
which attends it: this too
is an Act of Willing.
Both these Powers are by
the Antients included
under the lógoC or
logiko’ n mh́roC. Below
these they place twoother powers dependent
on the Body, the Sensus,
and the Appetitus Sensitivus, in which they place
the particular Passions:the former answers to
the Understanding,[220] and the latter tothe Will. But the Will isforgot of late, and someascribe to the Intellect,
not only Contemplation
or Knowledge, but
Choice, Desire, Prosecuting, Loving. Nay someare grown so ingenious
in uniting the Powers of
the Soul, that contemplating with Pleasure,
Symmetry and Proportion, an Act of the Intellect as they plead, is thesame thing with Goodwill or the virtuous Desire of publick Happiness.
140/20 one . . . Ideas:] a Mistake–22
some fall into;
140/30 prove, that “all] prove“that all140/31 Desire,] Desire, actuallyoperating140/32 Object.”] Object.
141/2 do form] form

textual notes

141/3–4 The . . . is] Such Conceptions are
141/13 either] to either
141/20 these] these,
141/21 Is it] It is142/12 justifying?] justifying.
143/9 to] from
143/33 frequently,] frequently
144/4 serves the] serves in
144/22 obvious] obvious,
144/23 Sense] Sense in the Constitution of the Soul.
145/11 Fruit.] Fruit.*
145/22 Criminal] Sufferer
146/9 Gerund,] Gerund orParticiple,
146/18 Words] Words,
146/32 not] not.†149/11 I. That]That
149/15 sweet,] sweet
This paragraph follows in
the third edition: ’Tis
manifest we have in ourUnderstanding moral
Ideas, or they are Perceptions of the Soul: we reason about them, we
compare, we judge; butthen we do all the same
Acts about Extension,
Figure, Colour, Taste,
Sound, which Perceptions all Men call Sensations. All our Ideas, orthe materials [241] of ourreasoning or judging, arereceived by some immediate Powers of Perception internal or external,
which we may call
Senses; by these too wehave Pleasure and215

Pain. All Perception isby the Soul, not by theBody, tho’ some Impressions on the bodily Organs are the Occasionsof some of them; and inothers the Soul is determined to other sorts of
Feelings or Sensations,where no bodily Impression is the immediate
Occasion. A certain incorporeal Form, if one
may use that Name,a Temper observed, aCharacter, an Affection, aState of a sensitive Being,
known or understood,
may raise Liking, Approbation, Sympathy, as naturally from the very
Constitution of theSoul, as any bodily Impression raises external
Sensations. Reasoning orIntellect seems to raise no
new Species of Ideas, but
to discover or discern
the Relations of those received. Reason shews
what Acts are conformable to a Law, a Will of aSuperior; or what Acts
tend to Private Good, or
to Publick Good: In likemanner, Reason discovers contrary Tendenciesof contrary Actions.
Both Contraries are alike
the Object of the Understanding, and may
give that sort of Pleasure216

151/17151/29152/3
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154/4
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154/18154/29156/8
156/23
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157/6
157/11
158/2
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textual notes

which arises upon Discovery of Truth. A Demonstration that certain
Actions are detrimental
to Society is attended
with the peculiar Pleasure of new Knowledge, asmuch as a like Demonstration of [242] theBenefit of Virtue. But
when we approve a kind
beneficent Action, let us
consider whether thisFeeling, or Action, orModification of the Soul
more resembles an Act
of Contemplation, suchas this [when strait Linesintersect each other, thevertical Angles areequal;] or that Liking wehave to a beautiful
Form, an harmonious
Composition, a gratefulSound.
observed,] observed
corresponding] resembling or analogous
contrary.] contrary.*of one] one
Deity:] Deity;
Manner:] Manner;
Mankind;] Mankind,Some do] Some(the Word] the (Worddo continue,] continue
Relations] Relations,themselves,] themselves
many do] many
Motions,] Motions
Agent’s] or sensitive
Being’s

158/6
158/19158/31
159/33
159/15
159/17–19
160/9
160/12
160/16
–17
161/3
161/6

Mathematicks,] Mathematicks
good in a moral Sense.]
good.
or to] orothers:] others.
Sense.] Sense.*[This marginal title wasomitted from the third
edition]instance,] Instance,
absurd.] absurd.†
That “certain] “Thatcertainlike to] like
Signification] Signification,
Nor] Not
Action] Action,
imagined] imagined,

163/1
163/11
163/16–17
163/24 useful,] useful
163/26 “Accomplishing] accomplishing
164/5 not.”] not.
164/6 assert, that “the] assertthat the164/11 evil.”] evil.
164/19 evil,] Evil,
164/29 of] of some–30
165/4–7 In the third edition thereis the following marginal
title next to this paragraph:] Three Sorts of
Signifying.
165/9 designing] professing a
Design165/20 without . . . Agent,]
while yet the Agent is
not understood to profess
any Intention of commu-

textual notes

nicating to him his Opinions or Designs,
165/30 Intention . . . his] a Pro–31
fession of communicating
166/8 imagine any] imagine
166/20 Truth.”] Truth,”167/30 Consequence] Consequence,
168/3 Opinions,”] Opinions”
168/7 Given] When
168/8 Action,] Action, are given,
168/23 Opinions.] Opinions, or avery violent unkind Passion.
170/33 Therefore Virtue . . . or
–34
Falshood.] Therefore Signification of Truth or
Falshood, are not thesame with Virtue andVice.
171/20 is that,] is, that174/11 Morals.] Morals, andhere we may discover as
certain, invariable, or
eternal Truths, as any inGeometry.
174/19 Observer; . . . taught.]–20 Observer; so that Virtue is not properly
taught.
174/35 Hatred,] Hatred;
175/14 do make] make176/2 studied] study
176/3 appeared] appears
177/26 Reason.] Reason, whichon these Subjects, suggests as invariable eternalor necessary Truths as
any whatsoever.
177/27 concluded] inferred
177/28 Observer.] Observer, really existing whether he217

had perceived it or not,and having a real Tendency to certain Ends.
177/32 Pleasure] Pleasures
178/1–2 does often correct] often
corrects
179/6 Observer?”] Observer,
according to the present
Constitution of the human Mind?”
179/8 approve] approve,
179/11 separately.] separately.
–12
Let those who are notsatisfied with either ofthese Explications ofMerit, endeavour to givea Definition of it reducing it to its simple Ideas:
and not, as a late Author
has done, quarrellingthese Descriptions, tell
us only that it is Deserving or being worthy ofApprobation, which isdefining by giving a synonimous Term.[[In his
polemic against Hutcheson, Balguy uses Cicero’s
De Officiis 1.14 to define“Merit or Praiseworthiness” as “the Quality in
Actions which not only
gains the Approbation of
the Observer, but which
also deserves or is worthyof it,” (Balguy, The
Foundation of Moral
Goodness, I:20).]]179/16 Affections?] Affections?
Some perhaps take theWord [Instinct] solely
for such Motions of218

textual notes

Will, or bodily Powers,
as determine us without
Knowledge or Intentionof any End. Such Instincts cannot be theSpring of Virtue. But theSoul may be as naturally
determined to Approbation of certain Tempers
and Affections, and to
the Desire of certain
Events when it has an
Idea [292] of them, as
Brutes are, by theirlower Instincts, to their
Actions. If any quarrel
the Application of theWord Instinct to any
thing higher than what
we find in Brutes, letthem use another Word.
Though there is noHarm in the Sound of
this Word, more than ina Determination to pursue Fitness, which theymust allow in the Divine
Will, if they ascribe any
Will to him at all.
179/20 do mean] means
179/23 do suppose] suppose
180/10 I fancy every] every
180/14 casual ) but] casual, but)
180/21 Supposition] Supposition,
180/30 Man,] Man
181/14 of,] of
181/22 Sensations] Sensation
181/32 others;] others:
182/12 In the third edition–14
Hutcheson added themarginal head “WhatActions rewardable.”next to this paragraph.
182/21 various,] various
182/29 Interest . . . Agent,] Interest,
182/30 publickly useful] such
183/4 superior] Superior
183/12 superior] Superior
183/22 What . . . mean,] [300]What means this?
183/32 Picture, . . . Shades?] Pic–33
ture?
185/24 did give] gave
186/26 this] and186/29 yet do] do–30
187/11 Some do] Some
187/20 Gratitude do] Gratitude
188/31 then, if . . . C ⳯ G.]–189/3 then we may denote thePropensity of mind, or
the disposition to receiveor to be moved with any
tender or kind Affections
by the Goodness of Temper. Then,
The degree of kindAffection toward any Person is in a compound
Proportion of the apprehended Causes of Love inhim, and of the Goodnessof Temper in the Observer.
189/5–6 Temper . . . I.] Temper.
189/8 as the . . . I.] proportioned to the Causes.
L
189/10 Causes, . . . .] Causes.
C
190/1–2 the Quotient . . . Unity.]
there must be some depravation of the Temper,
some want of the naturaltextual notes

Proportion, or of thatcalm Deliberation andcalm Affections, toward
Objects of the Understanding.
190/8–9 Benevolence . . . Happiness is] Benevolence. “HisHappiness is perhaps
imagined
190/21 Temper.] Temper, bypresenting an Example
engaging our Imitation.
192/2 that] the
193/11 positively . . . as] con–12
demn as positive
193/26 occasion] occasion praepollent
193/30 to Innocence] to theCharacter of Innocence
194/11 positive] higher
194/26 apprehend] apprehended
194/34 him,] him
195/11 does evidence] evidences
195/18 or Desire] or of the ultimate Desire
196/7 itself even] itself
197/7–8 Corollaries] Conclusions.
198/3 Affection,] Affections,
199/2–3 Moment . . . such as]
Disposition to Beneficencein any good Agent various ways;
199/3 future,] future;
199/4 Pattern,] Pattern
199/5–7 a part . . . the Universe.]
to whom we may imagine the publick Happiness to be acceptable.
199/12 inversly] rather inversly
199/13 more Virtue . . . Species.]–16
where no more good is219

done, in equal Abilities,
by one Agent who had
presented to him thejoint Motives of Piety
toward God and Humanity toward Men,
than is done by anotherfrom mere Humanity,
the latter gives a better
Evidence of a [330] good
Temper. And where
higher Motives of Gratitude to God are presented to one than toanother, unless the Good
done from these stronger
Motives is greater, theTemper must be somuch the worse.*
200/2 In any . . . these] [331]–4Good Offices done frommere Humanity, while
the Motives of Piety
were not present to theMind, provided they
were not excluded by direct Design, or blameable Inadvertence, may
in this particular Case bea better Indication of agood Temper, than Offices only of equal Importance done by another of equal Abilities,
from the joint Motivesof Piety and Humanity;
yet the retaining designedly and frequently recalling all these200/22 that “Virtue] “that Virtue–23
201/4–5 obtain . . . Deity.] express

220

textual notes

Gratitude by compliancewith the Divine Will, or
to express a disinterested
Esteem, or to obtain ourown Happiness bymeans of the Divine Favour. This last [333] Intention may influence avery corrupt Mind insome things. And theformer more generous
Intentions must really
increase the Goodness ofevery Action, and are thehighest Virtues of themselves.
201/10 Observer] Observer,
201/11 ’Tis to be . . . attain to.]–14
Joining frequently andhabitually the Acts of Piety with those of Humanity is, no doubt, thePerfection of Goodness
and Virtue. But we must
not deny the Reality ofVirtue in these Actions,which are not of themost perfect Sort.

201/18201/23
201/34–35some] greatCommunity] Community,
needs to excite . . . System.] ever needs to recall
the Thoughts of a Divine Command and its
Sanctions, or even theThoughts of the Interests of greater Societies
or Systems, before it canbe engaged into any particular Acts of Kindness.
Accordingly we find in
Nature that the particular kind Passions generally move the Mind first.
And upon Reflection,
more extensive Motives
begin to occur, and Regards to the great Headof the rational System.
202/30 do make] make203/24 Natures from God,]
Natures.
204/16 nay] nay,

indexNote: Page numbers followed by (n) indicate material in footnotes.
Absolute evil, 35
Absolute good, 35
Actions
drawing conclusions from,
168–69rewardable, 182–83
virtuous, Deity and, 187–88
Actions, significancy of, 164–66
Addison, Joseph, 17, 17 (n ), 19 (n)Affections, 30. See also Public affections
appetites and, 67–68
balance, 46–47
conduct of unkind, 124–25
degrees of, necessary to innocent,
192–95
evidence of good of God in,
118–20
judging, 149–53
opinions and, 66
vs. passions, 30–31, 51
unattended, 51–52
Agents, rewardable, 182–87
Agreement, relations and, 159–60
Ambition, 56
Anger, passion, 58
Antecedent reasonableness, 153–54
Appetites, affections and, 67–68
Approbation, 134, 154–55
Arbuckle, James, xi

Associationsof ideas and opinions, and desires,
69–72
uses of, 21–22
Aversion, 50–51
Axioms, of calm desire, 37–39
Balance of affections, 46–47
rarity of, 47
Balguy, John, xxii, 152 (n ), 159 (n),160 (n)Bayle, Pierre, xiv, 44 (n)Beauty, xi–xii, 74
Benevolent desires, 22, 27–29
Boyce, D. George, x (n)Boyle, Robert, 153 (n)Burnet, Gilbert, xiii, xiii (n ), xiv,
xvi, 9 (n), 156 (n), 157 (n), 157 n.
xlv
Butler, Joseph, xxii
Calm desires
axiom or natural laws of, 37–39
selfish, 33
Calm passions, xvi
Carmichael, Gershom, 10 (n)Character, formation of, 65
Clarke, John, xiii, xiii(n), xiv–xv, xvi,
xviii(n), xxii, 6, 6(n), 6 n. iii, 9(n),134(n), 171(n)

221

222

the nature and conduct of the passions

Clarke, Samuel, xiii, xiv, xvii, 152 n.,
156 (n), 157 (n)Collins, Anthony, xi
Common reasons, 141–42
Compassion, 56
Compound evil, 36
axioms for, 37
Compound good, 36
axioms for, 37
Compound moral evil, 37
Compound moral goodness, 37
Congratulation, 56
Constitutions, 151–53
Cruel tempers, 72–73
Death, 128–29
Decency, 74
Deity. See also God
duty of love to, 199–202
ignorance of, and evil, 195–97
as sole object of love, 202–04
virtuous actions and, 187–88
Delight, 53–55
Desires, 27–29. See also Public desires
benevolent, 22
constant discipline for, 100–101
effects of ideas and opinions on,
69–72
fantastic, 79–81
general, 31–34
preventing, 73–78
secondary, 19–21
selfish and public, 22–23
types of, 18–19
Distinction, desire of, 21–22
Divinity, ideas of, internal senses
and, 116–17
Duels, 102–3
Eccleshall, Robert, x (n)Election, 134, 154–55
Envy, 52–53

Epicureans, 4 n. ii, 134–37
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of
the Passions and Affections, xv–xvi
Essay with Illustrations, xi–xiii, xvi–
xviii
editions of, xix–xxi
editorial principles for, xxi–xxiii
Evil, 15absolute, 35
compound, 36
compound moral, 37
computing quantities of, 37
ignorance of Deity and, 195–97
laying of accounts to meet with,
86–87
moral, 36
moral vs. others, 97–98
natural, 34
particular, 35
private, 35
relative, 35
universal, 35
Exciting reasons, 141–42
External pains, 111
External pleasures, 73–74, 111–13
External senses
evidence of good of God in, 118
overcoming moral senses, 91–92
Fabian, Bernard, 10 (n)Falsehoods, 164, 166
Fantastic desires, 79–81
Fear, 53
Fitnesses, 158–60
Future state, necessity of believing in,
123–24
Geoghegan, Vincent, x (n )God, evidence of good of, in affections, 118–20. See also Deity
Good, 15absolute, 35

indexcompound, 36
compound moral, 37
computing quantities of, 37
greatest, 36
moral, 36
natural, 34
particular, 35
private, 35
relative, 35
universal, 35
Goodwill, 56Greatest good, 36
Grotius, Hugo, xiv, xvii, 138 (n)Grove, Henry, 159 (n)Haakonssen, Knud, x (n)Happiness, 133
malicious pleasures and, 95–97
Harmony, 74
Hatred, 52–53, 53–55
joy and sorrow of, 59
Heroism, passion of, 55
Honor, 78
desire of, 21–22
sense of, moral sense and, 100–101,
125–26
Hope, 53
Hutcheson, Francis, ix (n), x (n),xii–xiii, xiii (n), xiv (n ), 10 (n ),11 (n), 189 (n), 195 (n)debates with Burnet and Clarke,
xii–xvearly life of, x–xi
Hutcheson, John, xIdeas, effects of, on desires, 69–72
Ignoranceof Deity, and evil, 195–97
in human affairs, 197–98
Imagination, pleasures of, 74,
104–5
conduct necessary for, 114–116

223

Inquiry on Beauty, xi–xii
Intention, morality of speech in,
163–64
Internal senses, ideas of divinity and,
116–17. See also Imagination
Irish Presbyterianism, x–xi
Joy, 24, 50–51, 53–55
of hatred, 59
King, William, archbishop of Dublin, xi, 44 (n), 179 (n)Language, 21–22, 48–49
Le Clerc, Jean, xxii, 10–11, 11 (n )Leidhold, Wolfgang, xi (n)Liberty, 179 (n)Locke, John, xii, 22(n), 28(n), 134(n),157 (n)Logical truths, xvii–xviii
Love, 52–53, 53–55
Love of God, rules applied to,
190–92
Lucretia, 103 (n), 103–4
Luther, Martin, 99 (n)McBride, Ian, x (n)Malebranche, Nicholas de, 31 (n ), 49,
50, 50 (n), 51
Malicious pleasures, happiness and,
95–97
Malicious tempers, 72–73
Mandeville, Bernard, xv (n), xv–xvi,
29 (n)
Marcus Aurelius, 40 (n), 93 (n )Mautner, Thomas, xx (n)Mennatural state of, 129–32
vicious, 89–91
virtuous, 89, 91
Merit, 178–82, 186
Milton, John, 122 (n)224

the nature and conduct of the passions

Mixed objects, 36
axioms for, 37
Modesty, 55–56
Molesworth, Robert, xi
Moore, James, x (n )Moral evil, 36
vs. others, 97–98
Moral good, 36
Morality, xiii, 133–34
explaining, with relations, without
sense, 158–59
sensory account of, xviii
significancy and, 162, 167–68
of speech, 163–64
Moral reasoning, xvii
Moralsarguments for standard of, 147–48
fitness and unfitness in, 155–57
truths about, 173–75
Moral senses, 8
conduct of, and sense of honor,
125–26
external senses overcoming, 91–92
judging, 175–76
justifying reasons and, 144–46
reason and, 176–78
sense of honor and, 100–101
Moral truths, xvii–xviii
Natural evil, 34
Natural good, definition of, 34
Nature, order of, 65
Obligations, 146
Opinions
affections and, 66
effects of, on desires, 69–72
passions, 66
true, virtue and, 169–70
Pain, 15–17
duration of, 108–110
external, 111

Particular evil, 35
Particular good, 35
Passions, 30. See also Public passions
vs. affections, 30–31, 51
calm, xvi
dispositions to particular, 47–48
effects of, 58–59
morally evil, 58
opinions and, 66
raising, 61–62
selfish, 64–65
theory of, xvi–xvii
Peach, Bernard, xx (n)Perceptions, 5classes of, 17–18
Pity, 56
Pleasures, 15–17
difficulty in comparing intenseness of, 88
duration of, 105–8
external, 73–74, 111–13
impossibility of full pursuit of,
81–82
malicious, and happiness, 95–97
Plots, in tragedies, 60–61Powerdesire of, 79, 127–28
as secondary desire, 19–21
Presbyterianism, Irish, x–xi
Pride, 56
Private evil, 35
Private good, 35
Public affections. See also Affections
conduct of, 120–23
desire for virtue and, 98–99
pleasures of honor and, 101
Public desires, 22, 27–29, 32, 74–78.
See also Benevolent desires
axioms for, 37
Public passions. See also Passions
abstract, 56–57
with moral perceptions, 57

indexand relations of agents, 62–64
and selfish passions, 64–65
Public senses
benevolence and, 27–29
conduct of, 120–23
Pufendorf, Samuel, xii, 134 (n)Reason, moral sense and, 176–78
Reasonableness, 137
antecedent, 153–54
Reasoning, power of, xxvii
Reasons
common, 141–42
exciting, 141–42
exciting, for ultimate ends, 139–40
justifying, 144–46
true meaning of exciting, 143–44
Relationsexplaining morality without sense
and, 158–59
types of, 157
Relative evil, 35
Relative good, 35
Reluctance, 55
Remorse, 119
Rewards, agents and, 182–87
Rivers, Isabel, xiii (n)Schoolmen, 4, 32 (n)Scott, William Robert, x (n)Secondary desires, 19–21
Selfish desires, 22–23, 33
axioms for, 37
Selfish passions, public passions and,
64–65
Self-love, xiv
Sensations, necessity of, 42–46
Senses, 16 (n )evidence of good of God in,
118–20external, 91–92, 118
judging, 149–53
types of, 15–18

225

Sensual pleasures, resignation of,
111–14
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley
Cooper, third earl of, xi, xv
Shame, 55–56, 101, 119
Sher, Richard, xviii (n )Significancy
of actions, 164–66
vs. morality, 167–68
morality and, 162
Signification, 161
Simplicius, 43 (n), 125 (n)Smith, Adam, ix
Sorrow, 30–31, 50–51, 53–55
of hatred, 59
Speech, morality of, 163–64
Stewart, M. A., x (n), xi (n)Stoics, 49
mistakes of, about happiness,
83–86
Tempers
computing goodness of, 188–90
formation of, 65
ignorance of human affairs andbad, 197–98
rise of cruel or malicious, 72–73
want of attention and bad, 198–99
Thema, 161 (n)Thema complexum, 161, 162 (n)Toland, John, xi
Toleration, xviii
Tragedies, best plots in, 60–61
Truth
conformity to, 137–38
logical, xvii–xviii
moral, xvii–xviii
morals and, 173–75
Turco, Luigi, xxi, xxi(n), 125(n), 159(n)Ultimate ends
exciting reasons for, 139–40
men and, 140–41

226

the nature and conduct of the passions

Universal benevolence, 32–33
Universal evil, 35
Universal good, 35
Unkind affections, conduct of, 124–25

reasonable, 148–49
in speech, 163–64
true opinions and, 169–70
Virtuous men, 89, 91

Vice, in speech, 163–64
Vicious men, 89–91
Virtue, 5, 7–8
certainty of success in pursuit of, 82
desire for, and public affections,
98–99

Wealthdesire of, 79, 127–28
as secondary desire, 19–21
Wollaston, William, xvii, 156 (n ), 161,
161 (n), 170, 171 (n), 171–73
Words, 21–22

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