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PAJ OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 2001
1-2 March 2001

The

BRAER and SEA EMPRESS Incidents
andDevelopments in Oil Spill Response
Programmes after the Incidents

The TORREY CANYON
Public attention in the United Kingdom became focused on the impact of major oil pollution in
March 1967 when the tanker TORREY CANYON hit the Seven Stones rocks, between the
Isles of Scilly and Lands End. She was carrying 117,000 tonnes of Kuwait crude oil. Some
30,000 tonnes escaped straight away and a further 20,000 tonnes over the next 7 days.
After the failure of an attempt by salvors to drag her off the rocks another 50,000 tonnes was
lost. Finally she was bombed to burn off the 20,000 tonnes or so still on board.
The UK was effectively unprepared for a disaster on this scale and the spraying of industrial
detergent on shore to minimise pollution of the coasts created more problems than it solved.
However the incident soon faded in the public conscience – after all there was human error
involved and little chance of the same situation reoccurring.
For the next 6 years all was peace. There were casualties – but nothing on a scale that
could generate serious public alarm.

The BRAERThen on 5 th January 1993 one of the Shetland Island’s worst nightmares became a reality.
The tanker BRAER went aground onto rocks at Garths Ness. She was fully laden with
84,700 tonnes of Norwegian Gullfaks oil and a further 1600 tonnes of heavy fuel oil in her
bunkers. The weather was atrocious – storm force winds and mountainous seas and all ofPage 2 of 13
the cargo was lost. Here were all the makings of a major economic and ecological disasterfor the whole island community.
In the event the consequences were serious – but miraculously less catastrophic than
expected. The reason was that Gullfaks is a relatively volatile crude, which the high winds,and exceptional seas were largely able to disperse.
However these circumstances were clearly “one -off”.
Nobody could imagine thereoccurrence of such a combination – yet the Shetland Isles economy depended upon thepresence of large tankers in her waters and at the Sullom Voe terminal. The islander’s fears
for the future were reinforced.
The Government acted swiftly in appointing Lord Donaldson of Lymington to Chair anenquiry:“To advise on whether any further measures are appropriate and feasible to protect
the United Kingdom coastline from pollution from merchant shipping.”
This led to the first Donaldson report, published in May 1994, “Safer Ships Cleaner Seas”.
But even as the Government’s response was being implemented the UK suffered a yet
greater disaster.

SEA EMPRESSIn 1996 the grounding and subsequent salvage of the SEA EMPRESS in Milford Haven
unfolded before the eyes of a startled nation. Here, on their television screens everyone wasable to see monstrous forces at work brushing aside the seemingly puny human attempts at
control at all levels. Then came the aftermath of this inability to tackle the incident as hugequantities of oil fouled mile after mile of shoreline and pictures of the effects on wildlife werebroadcast night after night to a horrified nation.
The media occupied their time by investigating and exploiting every perceived failure incontrol and operational systems. The Government reacted and the seeds of the present
national response plan were sown.
What was needed was a new and effective response plan. A documented system, which
would take on board all lessons learned to date, and be flexible enough to cope with every
level of nationally co-ordinated response from the relatively small to the largest imaginable.
A plan that is backed by clear and comprehensive responses and which is tailored to meet
every aspect of an incident. In which all participants know exactly where they stand, what
their role is and, most important of all, what the command structure is.
This is the Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations(NCP).

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Work on preparing for a new Plan began with reviewing and resetting the rock on which it
would be built. The organisation that would produce it, own it, maintain it and operate it.
Thus during 1998 the then Maritime Safety Agency and The Coastguard Agency weretransformed into the all-embracing Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) which wasestablished and ready to apply itself fully to the task after its full commissioning in April of lastyear.
But even as the MCA was being created work was progressing elsewhere, which would set
parameters of the final Plan.

LORD DONALDSON’S REVIEW
Following SEA EMPRESS Lord Donaldson of Lymington had once again beencommissioned – this time to review salvage and state intervention and their command andcontrol.
The findings of the Review were innovative and specific.
The Review made 26 recommendations of which Government accepted 23 and three wereset aside to be considered further.
None were rejected.
The Review also drew four fundamental conclusions:
1. The involvement of Ministers in operational decisions is not a practical option.
2. That in any deteriorating situation there will come a time when the Government interms of its statutory powers and responsibilities is entitled to intervene and give
directions. This is the “Trigger” point. From this point on Government has acontinuing and inescapable responsibility to monitor events closely and, if necessary,
control the whole salvage operation.
3. That officers of the MCA as a whole should take a more proactive role in operations in
response to pollution than had been the case in the past.
•

They should be able to take early steps to make salvage and counter pollution
assistance available.

•

They should be trained to acquire specialist knowledge of salvage and counter
pollution.

4. That similar state power of intervention and control should be available for incidents
involving offshore installations.

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The Review concluded that there are four distinct theatres of activity in a major marine
pollution incident:•

Search and rescue•

Salvage•

Clean-up at sea•

Clean-up of the shoreline

It was predicated on the assumption that there would be separate multi-disciplinary units,
created for each incident, to deal with each of these functions.
It specified that in the case of salvage activities ultimate control over all operations become
the responsibility of a single designated Secretary of State’s Representative for purposes ofmaritime salvage and intervention (SOSREP).
Worryingly, for me at least, SOSREP could not abdicate his, or indeed her, responsibility.
Whether or not he exercised any intervention powers at all he wo uld be in no doubt what soever that he was in charge and would be held responsible for the outcome of all plans anddecisions.
Put simply - to ignore a situation is not an option.
These separate “response units” now form the corner stones of the Nationa l Contingency
Plan.
•

Multi-Incident Liaison Team (MILT)
For purposes of search and rescue there is a Multi-Incident Liaison Team led by the
Coastguards.

•

Salvage Control Unit (SCU)
Salvage Activities are the responsibility of SOSREP who is supported by a Salvage
Control Unit. The SCU comprises a small group of specified persons who alone canrepresent key interests such as the salvor, the casualty owners, or a harbour authority. It
also includes any advisors that are felt necessary e.g. a specialist independent salvage
advisor or a chemical cargoes specialist. The SCU however is not a committee – at all
times the final decisions will be the sole responsibility of SOSREP.

•

Marine Response Centre (MRC)
In a national level response the at-sea clean-up activity is directed and co-ordinated by
the Marine Response Centre. This is likely to be established at the nearest appropriate
Coastguard station. It may be set up in harbour authority buildings if pollution lay within aport jurisdiction. In a national incident the MCA Head Of Operations will control the MRC.

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Shoreline Response Centre
When the threat of pollution to the shoreline exceeds the capability of the most affected
local authorities, or Environment and Heritage Service (EHS) of the DoE (in Northern
Ireland), and the MCA indicates a national response is required, those local authorities, orEHS, will set up a Shoreline Response Centre. The purpose of an SRC is to provide anorganisation through which local authorities can discharge their responsibilities forpreventing and mitigating pollution of the shoreline.

•

Environment GroupIn any maritime incident in the UK requiring a regional or national response there will be
an Environment Group formed. The core membership of the Group comes from therelevant statutory nature conservation agency, fisheries department, environmental
regulator, and (in the case of incidents beyond territorial waters) the Joint Nature
Conservation Committee. The Group will advise on environmental aspects and impactsof all operations and is a common facility providing comprehensive advice to theoperational units through nominated Environmental Liaison Officers.

In March 1999 Lord Donaldson’s second report Salvage and Intervention and their
Command and Control (the Donaldson Review) was published. Four days later a vessel
carrying an extremely hazardous cargo of explosive chemical suffered an engine room fire
and was abandoned at anchor within a mile of a lee shore. As police began evacuating
nearby houses, John Astbury Director of Maritime operations in the newly formed MCA
became the first single person to wield State powers of intervention on behalf of the UK
Government acting as the SOSREP.
19th March MULTITANK ASCANIA

Pentland Firth

The Master of this chemical tanker reported to Pentland MRSC that the vessel was driftingin the Pentland Firth after suffering an engine room fire.
She was laden with around 1800 tonnes of vinyl acetate, a chemical that is used in paintproduction and is highly explosive. An LOF was eventually signed and the vessel towed to
Scapa flow.
The Government’s Emergency Towing Vessel ANGLIAN PRINCE stood by during thesalvage operation and acted as a passive escort during the final tow.

Things had already changed dramatically in the UK response to maritime disasters.
A new model of response was bornPage 6 of 13
From then on the UK would take up the mantle of state control of salvage and pollution
prevention. Its reactions would be positive not dithering.
And people in the world o utside would watch with interest to see how it all turned out.
They didn’t have long to wait. On 24th August 1999 the NORWEGIAN DREAM, a cruise
ship decided to go poaching for part of the deck cargo of the container ship EVER DECENT
around 20 miles north east of Ramsgate.
24th August EVER DECENT/NORWEGIAN DREAM

Dover Strait

NORWEGIAN DREAM had 1,750 passengers and a further 838 crew aboard at the timeand unbelievably escaped the collision with only three minor casualties. Despite suffering
severe damage to her bow and being holed above the waterline her watertight doors
maintained their integrity and she was able to proceed to port under her own power.
EVER DECENT was not so lucky. A 55,000 tonne Container ship, she had 25 crew onboard and suffered serious damage including a breach of her number three Wing Ballasttank.
She was trimmed down by the head, had lost several containers overboard and had
approximately 18 containers on fire. Consideration was given to beaching her on the Falls
Bank.
An Anglo-Dutch salvage consortium was speedily appointed and seven tugs were tasked tothe scene.
This was the biggest event so far and, for the first time, a fully functional Donaldson-style
Salvage Control Unit was established at Dover Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre(MRCC). This included representation from the salvors Smit Tak and Klyne Tugs.
Units were also established to respond to any marine pollution and to monitor any potential
impact on the shoreline. Powers of Intervention were again exercised and the Salvors wererequired to clear all Salvage and Passage Plans through the MCA.
The fire was eventually extinguished after 5 days and a formal Passage Plan to Zeebrugge,
which was also agreed by the French, and Belgian authorities was approved.

MCA AS SALVOR
Lord Donaldson had also drawn the fundamental conclusion that the MCA should play amuch larger part in operations in response to a threat of significant pollution.
To enable it to fulfil this role the MCA has the ability to mobilise various equipment andresources.

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Emergency Towing Vessels (ETVs)
There are a number of tugs or “Emergency Towing Vessels” stationed at strategic
locations around the United Kingdom. At present there is an all year ETV stationed in the
Dover Straits under a joint Anglo -French partnership. Other ETVs are stationed in theSouth West Approaches, the Minches and in the Pentland / Shetland area during wintermonths only.

•

Coastguard Agreement for Salvage and Towing (CAST)The MCA also has call-off agreements (CAST) with various tug and salvage
organisations around the coast, which can be activated subject to the vessels being
available.
Each of the present ETVs is of the Anchor Handling Towing and Supply (AHTS) design.
This is FAR TURBOT stationed in the Dover Straits. As can be seen she has a large
after deck, which can accommodate survivors, salvage equipment, or as a platform for
deploying counter pollution equipment.
She also has a powerful fire fighting capability and can sustain over 130 tonne bollard pull.

•

Stockpiles
This is part of the MCA’s stockpiled equipment at Milford Haven. The list of salvage
equipment includes:••••

Cargo Transfer Equipment (ship to ship)
Inert gas generator, pumps, fenders, intrinsically safe lighting
Communication systems
Chemical transfer equipment, chemical resistant pumps, hoses and protective
equipment, BA sets etc.

Counter pollution equipment is also dispersed around the country:•••

At-sea stockpiles of equipment are held at Milford Haven and Dundee
On-shore pollution stockpiles of equipment are based at Southampton andInverness
Stockpiles of dispersants are held in 14 locations around the UK

Lord Donaldson’s recommendation that the MCA should play a larger part than hitherto bore
fruit in September 1999 when the MV SONIA, carrying 5,300 tones of grain, limped into
Sandown Bay off the Isle of Wight and announced to the world that she was sinking.

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1st September

SONIA

Isle of Wight

SONIA was the ship that no one wanted. She was a general cargo ship carrying a cargo of
5,300 tonnes of grain and 447 tonnes of bunker fuel oil.
Whilst on passage through the Solent she suffered a fractured inlet pipe which led to floodingof her engine room and complete loss of power.
Her salvation was enabled by the use of a naval tug from Portsmouth, salvage equipmentfrom the MCA’s stockpiles, and the MCA’s ability to activate tug and towage support throughthe CAST agreement.

SONIA had suffered from the fracture of a salt-water inlet pipe leading to flooding of her
engine room and eventually complete loss of power. She was sinking slowly, but surely, andshe contained 447 tonnes of bunker fuel. The impact of this on the shore would have been
dramatic to say the least.
Yet there was no salvage interest in the vessel. Eventually she was recovered by the use ofa naval harbour tug from Portsmouth, salvage equipment from the MCA’s own stockpiles in
Milford Haven and the use of a pre-contracted tug operating, initially, under the Coastguard
Agreement for Salvage and Towage (CAST).
On this occasion powers of state intervention were also used and SOSREP introduced a
Total Exclusion Zone around the casualty. SOSREP also ordered that oily water from theengine room be pumped overboard. Illegal perhaps – but this whole operation cost wellunder half a million pounds - the cost of clean-up of the spilled bunkers would have madethis amount seem trifling.

PROGRESS WITH THE NCP AND OPRC PLANS
By May of 1999 the revised NCP was considered at a consultative forum attended b y 55 key
representatives prior to a formal consultation process through the summer.
And indeed this was to be a very busy summer.
As part of its’ commitment to the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness andCo-operation the UK had to ensure that all port and harbour authorities covered by theRegulations made under the convention produced contingency plans of their own which
would be compatible with the proposed NCP. Principal Counter Pollution and Salvage
Officers had been appointed to ensure that this task was completed in their respective areasof responsibility by August. That was an estimated 250 plans (now around 200). Their rolealso includes acting as duty counter pollution and salvage response officers in order toprovide a round the clock contact point and assistance for SOSREP.

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At the same time scientists from the MCA were travelling the country gathering together localgroups with environmental interests and working with the Environment Agency to establish“sleeping” Environmental Groups and nominated Environmental Liaison Officers to work with
the NCP Response Units in an incident.
An initial trial of the proposed NCP and the Clyde OPRC plan was held on Clydeside in early
October through Exercise DALRIADA, the first of a series of four national exercises
recommended by Lord Donaldson.
On 8th November the final draft of the NCP was resubmitted to the consultative forum andagreed.
Paradoxically the previous day, the reefer DOLE AMERICA was in collision with the Nab
Tower in the Solent approaches and part of the NCP response had been activated.
7th November

DOLE AMERICA

Solent approaches

The reefer DOLE AMERICA collided with the Nab Tower in the Solent approaches.
Prompt action by the pilot saved the day when the vessel was driven aground outside themain channel to prevent her from capsizing.
The vessel proved to be extensively damaged with gashes above water level and one below
which was over twenty metres in length. Holds 2 and 3 were open to the sea and 5,100 litresof lube oil was spilled. A further 535 tonnes of HFO was known to be aboard.
A Salvage Control Unit was established at Solent MRSC, Intervention powers were
exercised and an exclusion zone was established around the vessel.
She was later refloated with the aid of sheerlegs under a LOF agreement and towed into
Southampton for repair.

Once again a Salvage Control Unit involving salvors was established. There was also an
Environment Group formed, which proved the worth of the MCA scientists’ endeavours. But
this incident was to be our first real chance to exercise the interaction between Harbour
Masters and SOSREP.
It worked well, and, with the active input of QHM Portsmouth and the Southampton Port
Authority, the casualty was eventually refloated and taken to Southampton.
On the casualty’s arrival at Southampton access to dry dock facilities was refused by private
owners, which served to hinder the final process of the salvage. This underlines the need for
powers to issue directions to riparian owners and managers of facilities such as berths,
wharfs and jetties. That such powers be available was the first of Lord Donaldson’s
recommendations and they will be included in forthcoming legislation.

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The NCP was eventually published in its present form in January of this year. But even
before the printed copies were off the press we were again testing it to the full at Exercise
HUMEX on Humberside – this time alongside the Humber response plan. The exercise wasagain a success and information on its progress and learning points has been published.

USING THE NCP
As luck would have it we have enjoyed a millennium free of major incidents to date. But thishas by no means meant that the state powers of intervention have not been tested. There
are minor incidents occuring all the time – for instance the weekend during which I wrote thispresentation saw two vessels drifting without power off lee shores in the English Channel.
One had to receive a formal direction to take a line from the ETV before she would accept
any help – as the tow was secured she was drifting at an estimated 3.5 knots towards
Dungeness Point!
The flexibility of the NCP to address relatively minor incidents was tested during the
COASTAL BAY incident at Anglesey in July.
21st July 2000

COASTAL BAY

Church Bay, Anglesey

At 0034 Holyhead MRSC received a report that the container ship COASTAL BAY was hardaground in Church Bay on the west coast of Anglesey and in sight of Holyhead Coastguard
Station. Coastal Bay grounded on an amenity beach, just outside Holyhead port limits, but inan environmentally sensitive area.
The Antilles registered vessel of 2,463 gt and 88 metres in length, with a crew of 7 onboard,
had been on passage from Dublin to Liverpool. Her cargo was mixed containers, many ofwhich were empty and she also carried 71 tonnes of gas oil. There were no casualties, but
the Holyhead lifeboat stood by for much of the incident. Grounding caused a crack between
the forepeak bulkhead and number 3 fuel tank, resulting in the leakage of approximately 250
litres of gas oil. Further investigation revealed plate damage extending over approximately
25 feet to the underwater section of the bow, as well as damage to the propeller.
MV Coastal Bay was refloated by the Liverpool tug Trafalgar (60 tonne bollard pull) at 0248
on 22 July, after an earlier attempt over the high water period on the afternoon of 21 July
failed. After an underwater dive survey and a passage plan approved by SOSREP, she
departed under tow during the evening of 22 July, arriving in Liverpool the next morning todock down in Gladstone dock for repairs.

On this occasion a Salvage Control Unit and an Environmental Group were established tooversee and monitor progress of the salvage.

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At the beginning of October attention was focused on the Falmouth area where the full NCP
and Search and Rescue and counter pollution was tested during the third major national
exercise – Exercise KERNOW.
KERNOW certainly served to test the whole national response in action in the most difficult of
circumstances. For my part in the Salvage Control Unit the interests of the environmentalists,salvors and insurers, harbour authorities and national considerations were set directlyagainst each other. In the end SOSREP had to make overriding decisions which werecertainly not to everyone’s liking. But despite this, and most importantly, there was an
acceptance that these decisions were necessary. This, I believe, was because the closeworking within the Salvage Control Unit ensured that all participants had a full awareness ofeach others problems and of how hard they had worked towards addressing those of theother interests. There was no right answer and little room for compromise. In this lightdecisions were accepted and all attention immediately refocused on addressing the newproblems of the next stage.
Recently we have explored new grounds in salvaging the MV LAGIK, which was stranded
and blocking the River Nene and the approaches to Wisbech Harbour in Lincoln England.
LAGIK was abandoned by her owners and the task of removing the wreck and pollutants was
taken up by the Government, through the MCA, and the local Harbour Authority inpartnership. The cost of the project is around £1.25 million and the partners have joined inlegal action for recovery.

WHAT HAS CHANGEDThe NCP in itself is no more than a paper document. It is as only as good as the last time it
was used and then only as good as the people, agencies and organisations, which input into
making it work. In short our response to incidents requires:•

Positive commitment by all parties and respect for each other’s role.

•

Seamless working between different faculties e.g. environmental interests with salvors,
salvage operations with legal, investigative and enforcement agencies.

•

The presence of resources to avert, or delay, disaster and to provide assistance topersons involved.

The new NCP reflects this philosophy. It is a living document, which is there to provide
guidance rather than a prescriptive approach to incidents. Already we have shown that themodel can just as easily be used in its entirety as broken into constituent units tailored tomeet particular circumstances.
Already we are working towards updating it to include the fruits of lessons learned.
The state response through the MCA has also changed. In all theatres there is now strong
leadership and guidance. Changes to our approach have enabled swift, positive andPage 12 of 13
decisive responses to be made in all areas. The option to delay, not take a decision or torefer issues to a committee have been removed.
This positive and structured approach has, I believe, led to vastly increased credibility andthat translates into confidant willing working partnerships with other organisations.
SOSREP with all his powers is now being seen more as a pragmatic working partner rather
than a source of interference. SOSREP is there to keep the state’s hand on the tiller and toenable the best response, in terms of environmental protection, to be formulated andenacted with the minimum of delay or external complication.
Fears that such a role would lead to unwarranted involvement in the affairs of Harbour
Masters and salvors are now being dispelled as we work and learn together.
Feedback from external parties is becoming ever more positive too. Indeed the former
President of the International Salvage Union himself, Mr Hans Walenkamp felt able tocommend developments in the UK to the last International Tug and Salvage Convention in
Jersey and more recently to the 3rd International Conference on Salvage and Wreck in
London.
We are also developing closer partnerships with our international partners and this will lead
to better response coverage through strategic resource deployment. By this I mean
combined strategies for aspects of response such as helicopters, ETV deployment and radar
coverage.

HOW CAN WE IMPROVE FURTHER?
Progress is a moving concept and we still have issues to address.
The MCA is currently publishing its review of Emergency Towing Vessel (ETV) provision
around the United Kingdom.
This document :•Includes an up-to-date accident and spillage risk assessment within UK waters.

•

Makes recommendations for future coverage.

•

Is supported by a comprehensive cost benefits analysis.

By the end of this year there will be draft regulations for extending state powers ofintervention to offshore installations.
There will also be draft legislation designed to address the present anomaly, which prevents
British fire-fighting services from operating at sea.

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And there will be powers for SOSREP to issue Directions to Riparian wharf owners.
Importantly, for salvors and myself, there is likely to be legislation drafted to address
responder immunity for spillages during salvage operations. In this context let me assure
you that the need to preserve and support our remaining professional salvage companies byremoving bureaucratic burdens is dear to our hearts.
Safety in our harbours will be improved by the introduction of a Port Marine Code and the
MCA will be busy with the task of implementation of the Convention on Highly Noxious
Substances.

AND FINALLY
Finally let me quote to you from The UK Coastguard handbook of 1920.
“If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from theletter of his orders, when such departure is clearly demanded bycircumstances, and failure is caused, he will be held responsible for such
failure.
A man who has thoroughly grasped the above knows exactly where hestands and has no excuse for hesitation.
The excuse that “I had no orders” is far too frequent.
One may go as far as saying that prompt action, even if it does not happen to
be quite the right action, is preferable to masterly inactivity.”- Maybe things haven’t changed that much after all !