an inquiry into the original of ourideas of beauty and virtue

natural law andenlightenment classics
Knud Haakonssen
General Editor

Francis Hutcheson

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revised edition
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Francis Hutcheson
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Edited and with an Introduction byiiii
Wolfgang Leidholdiiii
The Collected Works and Correspondenceiiof Francis Hutcheson
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An Inquiry
into the Originalof Our Ideas ofBeauty and Virtue
in Two Treatises

This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established toencourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.

The cuneiform inscription that serves as our logo and as the design motif
for our endpapers is the earliest-known written appearance of the word
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䉷 2004, 2008 by Liberty Fund, Inc.
All rights reserved
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p 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Frontispiece: Detail of a portrait of Francis Hutcheson by Allan Ramsay(ca. 1740–45), oil on canvas, reproduced courtesy of the Hunterian Art
Gallery, University of Glasgow.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hutcheson, Francis, 1694–1746.
An inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue:
in two treatises/Francis Hutcheson;edited and with an introduction by Wolfgang Leidhold. Rev. ed.
p. cm.—(Natural law and enlightenment classics)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
i s b n 978-0-86597-773-0 (hb: alk. paper)—i s b n 978-0-86597-774-7 (pbk.: alk. paper)
1. Ethics, Modern—18th century. 2. Aesthetics—Early works to 1800.
I. Leidhold, Wolfgang, 1950– II. Title.
b j 1005.h 88 2008171⬘.2—dc22
2008015089

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contents
Introductionix

References and Further Reading

xix

Note on the Text

xxiii

Acknowledgmentsxxxi

an inquiry into the original of ourideas of beauty and virtue

1

Treatise I
An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.

17Treatise II
An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of
Virtue or Moral Good83

Textual Notes

199

Index

261

introduction

Liberty and Happiness
The political dimension of liberty is at least twofold: civil liberties andindependence. The former is a matter of the political order of a country;
the latter, of freedom from foreign domination. Liberty and happinesscan be related to each other as they were in the third section of the “Virginia Bill of Rights,” from 6 June 1776:
That government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit,
protection and security of the people, nation or community; of all thevarious modes and forms of government, that is best which is capableof producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety and is mosteffectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and thatwhen any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these
purposes, a majority of the community has an indubitable, inalienable
and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as
shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.

The preceding section puts forward a short argument: The right toreform, alter, or abolish government is founded on the judgment of
whether such government is adequate or contrary to its main purpose,
namely the greatest degree of happiness and safety of the community.
The argument has a philosophical background. The criterion of “producing the greatest degree of happiness” is part of the principal maxim
of utilitarian ethics. The right of resistance against inadequate government, on the other hand, is part of the liberal creed. In the eighteenth
century the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), in his
Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (London,ix

x

introduction

1725), linked the two sides of the argument for the first time.1 There heeven coined the phrase, “That action is best, which procures the greatest
happiness for the greatest numbers.”2
Hutcheson’s philosophy became part of the ideas that formed theAmerican polity. In the eighteenth century his books were imported toAmerica and his philosophy was well known through his students andlearned visitors to Scotland—among them was Benjamin Franklin in
1759. Hutcheson’s ideas even became part of the colonial curriculum.3
The Inquiry, which is published here in a new edition, was the book that
established Hutcheson’s reputation as a philosopher.

The Argument of the Inquiry
Already in this early work, Hutcheson detailed some of his politicalideas.4 However, his main task was examining the foundations of his
aesthetic, moral, and political philosophy. This was done in two treatises,
one dealing with the principles of aesthetics,5 the other with those of
ethics and, to some extent, their political consequences.6 In both treatises
1. For Hutcheson’s biography, see W. R. Scott, Francis Hutcheson, His Life, Teaching and Position in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1900; reprint, New York: A. M. Kelley, 1966). Also see the brief overview of Hutcheson’s early life and writings in the editor’s introduction to Hutcheson, An Essay on
the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral
Sense (1728), ed. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003).
2. The formula was first used by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in a critical remark
on Samuel Cocceji’s thesis De Principio Juris Naturalis Unico, Vero, et Adaequato(Frankfurt: Schrey/Hartmann, 1699); see Joachim Hruschka, pp. 166–69.
3. For the impact of Hutcheson’s philosophy in Europe and America, see the introduction to Hutcheson, Über den Ursprung unserer Ideen von Schönheit und Tugend,
ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), pp. xi–xiv.
4. Especially in the second and the third editions of the Inquiry, 1726 and 1729,
respectively.
5. On Hutcheson’s aesthetic philosophy, see the works and articles of Peter Kivy,
Caroline Korsmeyer, E. Michael, and M. Strasser, listed in “References and Further
Reading” (p. xix of this volume).
6. For discussion of Hutcheson’s central ideas, see “References and Further Reading” (p. xix of this volume), especially the works and articles of Giovanni de Crescenzo, William K. Frankena, Knud Haakonssen, Peter Kivy, Wolfgang Leidhold,David Fate Norton, D. D. Raphael, Jane Rendall, and William Robert Scott; stillintroductionxi

the structure of the argument is similar: (1) Our ideas have their origin
in our perceptions and are received by senses. (2) For different perceptions we have different senses. (3) Perceptions are founded in certain
qualities of the objects perceived. (4) These qualities we can describe ina maxim or formula. Hutcheson’s theory in both treatises therefore is acomplex of three related components: a subjective sense, an objective
foundation, and an analytical formula. Hutcheson presents the outlineof his theory of perception in the first treatise.

The First Treatise
Hutcheson’s theory of perception starts with the ideas of John Locke.7
For Locke all materials of reason and knowledge come “from experience” and our senses are “the first step and degree towards knowledge,
and the inlet of all the materials of it.”8 Hutcheson accordingly defines
different senses as the powers “of receiving . . . different Perceptions” (I.
I. §§ I, II) and maintains that we also acquire the material for our aesthetic and ethical knowledge by some sort of perception. However, whatis the specific quality we perceive in aesthetic perceptions? Here Hutcheson relies on Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury’s analysis of aesthetic perception
is based on the Platonic concept of form (forma is the Latin version of
the Greek Platonic term idea ). Beauty then is the “outward form” ofthings, reflecting the “inward form” of some “forming power.”9 Accordingly Hutcheson defines beauty as a “form” or as “Figures . . . inwhich there is Uniformity amidst Variety” (I. II. § III).
Hutcheson implies that form and uniformity cannot be perceived by
the normal senses but by a special sense only. Therefore he expands thevaluable as a basic bibliography is T. E. Jessop. For a wider British context, see Isabel
Rivers.
7. Locke is mentioned in the Inquiry, I. I. § VII. Here and in the following theInquiry is quoted by treatise, section, and article; for example, “I. I. § VII” means
first treatise, first section, article seven.
8. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II. I. § 2; see II. IX. § 15.
9. See J. V. Arregni and P. Arnau, “Shaftesbury: Father and Critic of Modern
Aesthetics,” British Journal of Aesthetics 34 (1994): 350–62.

xii

introduction

notion of experience beyond the confines of the ordinary five senses.
Form or uniformity then is the particular quality in objects that is the“Foundation or Occasion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men” (I. II.
§§ I, II). Beauty is our perception or knowledge of this objective quality,
and in accord with his definition of “sense” as the power of perceiving
these objective qualities, he assumes a special sense of beauty. This sense
is but one of a group of “internal senses,” which include among others
the “good Ear” or “sense of harmony” (I. VI. § IX). The formula bywhich the objective form in things themselves can be described is, as
already noted, “uniformity amidst variety.” With these words Hutcheson paraphrases Shaftesbury’s concept of beauty. As in his analysis ofmoral actions, Hutcheson thinks that aesthetic phenomena are capableof a mathematical analysis, which he sketches in his study of “originalor absolute beauty” (title of I. II.).
After delineating his theory of aesthetic knowledge, Hutcheson in theremaining chapters of the first treatise develops a general aesthetic theory. This theory of beauty is not limited to a theory of art but extends
to a general, almost cosmological theory. This becomes clear when we
look at his basic distinction of original or absolute beauty from comparative or relative beauty at the end of the first section. Absolute beauty
we “perceive in Objects without comparison to any thing external, of
which the Object is suppos’d an Imitation, or Picture” (I. I. § XVI).
Examples of such beauty are the works of nature (such as heaven andearth, plants and animals); the harmony of music; some works of art,
when their beauty, as in architecture or gardening, is not an imitationof something else. Even theorems, such as those in mathematics, can in
the absolute sense be beautiful. Relative beauty is “founded on a Conformity, or a kind of Unity between the Original and the Copy” (I. IV.
§ I). Instances here are poetry and painting and the creation as a whole—since in the beauty of the effects it reflects the design and wisdom of its
cause, which is God the Father as the Creator (I. V.).
It is the general theory of perception as developed in the first treatisethat forms the basis of the similar argument in the second. We may
assume that Hutcheson wanted first to establish the idea of additional
senses in a field that was not as controversial as that of moral philosophy.

introduction

xiii

The Second Treatise
The moral controversy is found right in the title of the book. In the firstedition we read that Hutcheson wants to defend Shaftesbury’s ideas
against the author of the Fable of the Bees, that is, Mandeville. The two
names reflect the clash between the “benevolent” and the “selfish” system. The first position argues that men have by nature moral principles,the second that these principles are but a political invention that is socially useful and based only on self-love or self-interest. Shaftesbury
taught that social affections were the foundation of morals and that amoral sense was the origin of our moral ideas.10 Where Shaftesbury
speaks of “social affections” as the foundation of morals, Hutcheson
prefers the Christian concept of “love” as “benevolence.” The logicalstructure of the second treatise is similar to the first. Again we can discern
three major components: an objective foundation, which here is benevolence; a particular sense, which is the moral sense; and the analyticalformula of “the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.”
love or benevolence as the foundationof the moral good
In the second treatise, Hutcheson wants to establish the notion of amoral sense as the “Original of our Ideas of . . . Virtue” and love or
benevolence as the particular quality we perceive in virtue:
The Affections which are of most Importance in Morals, are Love andHatred: All the rest seem but different Modifications of these two original affections. (II. II. § II)

Since Hutcheson wanted to follow Locke’s theory of knowledge (asin the first treatise), he had to analyze love or benevolence in accordance
10. See Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics ofMen, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Philip Ayres, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999),
I, pp. 55–57, 62ff., 93–101, 196–274. Also see Stanley Grean. The term moral sense was
first used by Thomas Burnet, a student of Ralph Cudworth, in his discussion of John
Locke, cf. Ernest Tuveson.

xiv

introduction

with Locke’s ideas. According to Locke, all materials of experience consist either of simple ideas or of complex ideas, which are composed ofsimple ideas. Complex ideas can be real or they can be fictitious (being
put together by the imagination or by reason). However, neither imagination nor reason can invent simple ideas. Therefore, only simple ideas
necessarily represent something real. If Hutcheson thinks benevolenceis the objective foundation of morals, he must show what simple ideas
constitute it.
Locke had defined love by the simple ideas of pleasure and pain.11
Love for him is the subjective pleasure of something and is identical with
self-love. This definition of love is compatible only with the selfish system. Hutcheson wants to avoid just that. Therefore he distinguishes two
versions of “good” and “evil,” that is, natural and moral good or evil. A
natural good is perceived only in inanimate beings. This perception is
one of advantage or disadvantage, of pleasure or pain. A moral good isperceived in rational agents since “they study the interest, and desire theHappiness of other Beings.” Our moral relationship with rational agents
then is twofold: (1) a moral perception and (2) a moral affection or desire.
The moral perception is generally called “approbation” or “disapprobation”; the desire is generally named “love” and “benevolence” or “dislike” and “hate” (II. Introduction; II. I. § I; II).
Hutcheson defines love by the “simple idea of desire.” In the firstedition of the Inquiry the terminology is not yet quite consistent; refinements are added later.12 In the Essay he defines love as the “desire”
for the happiness of others and addresses desire as a simple idea (Essay,p. 64).13 In contrast to Locke,14 Hutcheson considers desire to be an actof the will. This is consistent with the Christian idea of love. Love in

11. See Locke, Essay, II. XX. § 4.
12. Here the reader is confronted with an irritating number of terms used to describe love: affection, intention, sentiment, design, disposition, inclination, motive,
determination, instinct, even passion, see Inquiry (first edition 1725), 104, 107, 112,
119, 131, 137, 143; “passion”: 132, 134, 141, 175ff.
13. The same argument is added to the third and the fourth editions of the Inquiry(II. II. § IV and § V).
14. Locke, Essay, II. XXI. §§ 28ff.

introduction

xv

the Christian sense of benevolence is not an emotion or a feeling, but an
act of the will.15 Otherwise, the words of the Sermon on the Mount—“Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself ” (Matthew 19:19)—would become a very strange commandment: a feeling cannot be commanded.
A contemporary Christian author, Richard Cumberland (1631–1718),
knew this very well.16
the moral sense as theorigin of moral ideas
While benevolence is the foundation of the moral good, the moral senseis the source of moral ideas, of approbation and disapprobation. Hutcheson concedes that the moral sense is a “secret sense” (II. Introduction;
II. I. § III). That means the existence of such a sense is not immediately
known and calls for an indirect proof. On the basis of his theory ofperception he demonstrates that there are distinct moral perceptions andconcludes that there must be a distinct sense:
since the Definition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, toreceive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us,
independent on our Will. (II. I. § I)

15. On the Christian idea of love see M. C. D’Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love
(London: Faber and Faber, 1944); J. Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of
St. Augustine (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947); V. Warnach, “Agápe, Not
Eros—or Caritas,” Anglican Theological Review, 37 (1955): 67–73; most comprehensive: Ceslaus Spicq, Agapè dans le Nouveau Testament: Analyse de textes, 3 vols. (Paris:
Gabalda, 1958–59). A good introduction is C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves, 21st ed. (Glasgow: Collins, 1981).
16. See R. Cumberland, A Treatise of the Law of Nature (London: Phillips, Knapton, 1727; first edition in Latin, London, 1672), 42. For Hutcheson the conceptual
situation was rather complicated, and it took him a while to clarify it. Finally, in the
fourth edition of the Inquiry the definition of love is given the most precise wording.
Here Hutcheson identifies the “Desire of the Good of Others” with the Aristotelian“o⁄reqic bouleutikh́,” translating it as a “settled Disposition of the Will, or a constant
Determination, or desire to act . . . , or a fixed Affection toward a certain Manner ofConduct.” Since the foundation of morals sometimes had been called an “instinct,”
he at the same time defines “instinct” as an “Essential or Natural Disposition of theWill, an Affectionate Determination” (p. 195).

xvi

introduction

For Hutcheson, the particular moral perception is approbation. We
perceive a “moral good” when a person acts from benevolence, and this“(excites) . . . Approbation or Perception of moral Excellence.” The “natural good,” on the other hand, raises the “Desire of Possession toward
the good Object.” Hutcheson emphasizes that approbation should not
be mixed up with the “Opinion of Advantage,” and later on throughout
the first and the following chapters he strengthens his position with anumber of instances. That the perception of approbation or moral excellence is different from other perceptions is for Hutcheson a matter of
evidence.17 Evidence for him seems to be a proof from experience, whichcannot be supported by other sufficient reasons (II. I. § I).
the greatest happiness forthe greatest numbers
To be sure, the moral quality of actions is not the same in all cases. Sometimes we approve one act more than another, or we may have to choose
between different options. To clarify the difference, we have to analyze
the object of perception, that is, the moral quality itself. In this case wewould make a judgment about moral quality. This is what Hutcheson
does with his maxim of the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.
In the third section Hutcheson introduces the formula:that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery.
(II. III. § VIII)

The formula is based on the moral sense, the objective moral quality,
and a rational procedure, namely a comparison of the varying moral
qualities of actions. The subsequent judgment is based on the moral
sense that still performs a leading role. In the earlier editions, the presentation of the maxim was followed by a number of mathematical algorithms that, however, are omitted in the fourth edition. Hutchesonstates in the preface to the latter that he had left out the mathematicalexpressions since they “appear’d useless, and were disagreeable to some
17. Hutcheson uses the word evidence, for example, in Inquiry II. I. § I.

introduction

xvii

Readers” (4th ed., Preface, p. xxi; see Preface, note 38, in the TextualNotes of the present edition). The term “happiness” is defined as a “natural good.” To be sure, the greatest good turns out to be benevolence
itself (II. III. § XV) or the “Possession of good moral Qualities” (II. VI.
§ I). The greatest happiness for Hutcheson cannot be found in wealthand external pleasures, but virtue is “the chief Happiness in the Judgment of all Mankind” (II. VI. § II).
political perspectives:happiness and liberty
Hutcheson’s moral philosophy has a political perspective.18 This becomes clear in phrases like the “common good” or “public interest” that
he uses throughout the Inquiry. Especially in its final chapter he treats
the basic questions of political order. His main subjects are the corruption of human nature, prudence, rights, and the form of government.
The political problem emerges right from the center of Hutcheson’s
moral philosophy. Since virtue is the highest form of happiness, andvirtue is based on benevolence and benevolence in turn on the will, then
only people who can exert their will autonomously (in other words, who
are free in a political sense) can be happy.19 Liberty therefore becomes acentral political idea. At the same time, liberty can provide difficulties:
it may happen that people do not follow the path of virtue.
What shall we do if the moral foundation is weak and if the moral
ideas are insufficient? The argument is based on the insight that not all
citizens may be virtuous all the time. Although the moral sense and all
good reasons may point toward a virtuous life, human nature is open tocorruption because men are free. Man is moved by two opposing principles, love and self-love, and is free to follow either. Therefore liberty
18. See Wolfgang Leidhold, Ethik und Politik bei Francis Hutcheson (Freiburg,
Munich: Alber, 1985), especially chaps. 6–10.
19. See Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, 2 vols. (London, 1755), vol. 1,102, and his Synopsis metaphysicae (1744), II. 2. 3, translated in Logic, Metaphysics, andthe Natural Sociability of Mankind, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006), 129–30. On love and free will, see Ethik und Politik,
72–125.

xviiiintroduction

and happiness sometimes counteract each other. It is difficult to determine the prevailing motive, benevolence or self-love, particularly in public life (II. III. § XII). The polity therefore can be based not on goodintentions but on good results. Government can rest only on prudence,
not on moral perceptions. The importance of prudence as opposed tomoral reflections is typical for both the republican tradition of James
Harrington and the Whig tradition, and Hutcheson was close to both.20
Accordingly, the moral sense must be supplemented by an external motive to “beneficent Actions . . . for the publick Good . . . to counterballance those apparent Motives of Interest.” This external motive is “aLaw with Sanctions” (II. VII. § I). For Hutcheson the transfer and restriction of liberty therefore is the central question of political order andof the limits of government:
Men have [the Right] to constitute Civil Government, and to subject
their alienable Rights to the Disposal of their Governours, under such
Limitations as their Prudence suggests. And as far as the People havesubjected their Rights, so far their Governours have an external Rightat least, to dispose of them, as their Prudence shall direct, for attaining
the Ends of their Institution; and no further. (II. VII. § VIII)

To be acceptable, liberty and its restriction must be in balance withhappiness. If a government assumes all rights from its people and neglects the “publick Good of the State” altogether, it is called despotism.
For Hutcheson a “Despotick Government” is directly inconsistent with
his idea of a civil government (II. VII. § X). With despotism, liberty andhappiness are at stake. In such cases, Hutcheson advocates a right ofresistance (II. VII. § X). And later on he argued that this is “When it isthat colonies may turn independent.” 21
Wolfgang Leidhold

20. See Caroline Robbins and Charles Blitzer, An Immortal Commonwealth (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1960), and J. G. A. Pocock, ed., The Political Works ofJames Harrington (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
21. Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, 2 vols. (Glasgow: Foulis, 1755),
vol. 2, 308.

referencesa n d f u rt h e r r e a d i n g

Arregni, J. V., and P. Arnau. “Shaftesbury: Father and Critic of Modern Aesthetics.” British Journal of Aesthetics 34 (1994): 350–62.
Blackstone, William T. Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory.
Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1965.
Bredvold, Louis J. “The Invention of the Ethical Calculus.” In The Seventeenth Century: Studies in the History of English Thought and Literature from
Bacon to Pope, by Richard Foster Jones and Others, Writing in His Honour, 165–80. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951.
Campbell, Roy H., and Andrew S. Skinner, eds. The Origins and Nature of
the Scottish Enlightenment. Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1982.
Carey, Daniel. Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the
Enlightenment and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Crescenzo, Giovanni de. Francis Hutcheson e il suo tempo. Turin: Taylor, 1968.
Cumberland, Richard. A Treatise of the Law of Nature. Ed. Jon Parkin. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005.
Frankena, William K. “Hutcheson’s Moral Sense Theory.” Journal of the History of Ideas 16 (1955): 356–75.
Grean, Stanley. Shaftesbury’s Philosophy of Religion and Ethics: A Study of Enthusiasm. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1967.
Haakonssen, Knud. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the
Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Hruschka, Joachim. “The Greatest Happiness Principle and Other Early
German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory.” Utilitas 3 (1991): 165–77.
Jensen, Henning. Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson’s Ethical Theory. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971.
Jessop, T. E. Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy. London:
A. Brown and Sons, 1938.
xix

xx

references and further reading

Kail, P. J. E. “Hutcheson’s Moral Sense: Realism, Scepticism and Secondary
Qualities.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (2001): 57–77.
Kivy, Peter. The Seventh Sense: A Study of Francis Hutcheson’s Aesthetics and
Its Influence in Eighteenth-Century Britain. 2nd rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Korsmeyer, Carolyn Wilker. “The Two Beauties: A Perspective on Hutcheson’s Aesthetics.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 38 (1979/80):
145–51.
Leidhold, Wolfgang. Ethik und Politik bei Francis Hutcheson. Freiburg, Munich: Alber, 1985.
McCosh, James. The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical,
from Hutcheson to Hamilton. London: Macmillan, 1875. Reprint, Hildesheim: Olm, 1966.
Michael, E. “Francis Hutcheson on Aesthetic Perception and Aesthetic Pleasure.” British Journal of Aesthetics 24 (1984): 241–55.
Moore, James. “The Two Systems of Francis Hutcheson: On the Origins of
the Scottish Enlightenment.” In Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish
Enlightenment, edited by M. A. Stewart, 39–59. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
———. “Utility and Humanity: The Quest for the Honestum in Cicero,
Hutcheson and Hume.” Utilitas 14 (2002): 365–86.
Norton, David Fate. “Francis Hutcheson in America.” Studies on Voltaire andthe Eighteenth Century 154 (1976): 1547–68.
———. “Hutcheson on Perception and Moral Perception.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 59, no. 2 (1977): 181–97.
Raphael, David Daiches. The Moral Sense. London: Oxford University Press,
1947.
Rendall, Jane, ed. The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment 1706–76. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978.
Rivers, Isabel. Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England 1660–1780. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991, 2000.
Robbins, Caroline. The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 2004.
———. “ ‘When It Is That Colonies May Turn Independent’: An Analysisof the Environment and Politics of Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746).”William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 11 (1954): 214–51.

references and further readingxxi

Roberts, T. A. The Concept of Benevolence. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1973.
Scott, William Robert. Francis Hutcheson, His Life, Teaching and Position in
the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900.
Reprint, New York: A. M. Kelley, 1966.
Sloan, Douglas. The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College Ideal.
New York: Teachers College Press, 1971.
Stephen, Leslie. History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. 3rd ed.
2 vols. London: Murray, 1927.
Strasser, M. “Hutcheson on Aesthetic Perception.” Philosophia 21 (1991/
1992): 107–18.
Turco, Luigi. “Sympathy and Moral Sense: 1725–1740.” British Journal for theHistory of Philosophy 7 (1999): 79–101.
Tuveson, Ernest. “The Origins of the ‘Moral Sense.’ ” Huntington Library
Quarterly 11 (1947–48): 241–59.
White, Morton. The Philosophy of the American Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

note on the text

This volume is the revised edition of Hutcheson’s Inquiry into the Original of Beauty and Virtue prepared for the series Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics. The first edition was sold out by mid-2006. Since
then, more variants among the four different editions from the author’s
lifetime have been discovered, misprints and errata of the first edition
have been compiled, and the entire text has been revised and edited anew.
In the paragraphs following, an asterisk (*) indicates the additional versions that have now been taken into account.

The Editions
During Hutcheson’s lifetime, four different editions of the Inquiry into
the Original of Beauty and Virtue were published. These editions arechronologically referred to as A, B, C, and D. The texts of B, C, and D
not only contain corrections but also introduce alterations and additions
by the author. A separate booklet titled Alterations and Additions was
published in 1726 “by the Author” (i.e., Hutcheson); it is listed below(after A3) by this title. The present edition is based on the second edition(B) from 1726; it presents the variants of the other editions and of theaforementioned Alterations and Additions in a critical apparatus. The
second edition was chosen for its philosophical relevance. Although
the later editions display further additions and corrections, these aremostly of philological importance.
Several versions of the first edition (A) and fourth edition (D) exist.
In the eighteenth century it was common practice to intervene in theprocess of printing to correct misprints and to introduce changes. In
many cases some copies containing uncorrected sheets or leaves were sold
xxiii

xxiv

note on the text

nevertheless. That practice produced at least three versions of the firstedition and four versions of the fourth. Arabic numerals are used to markthe variants (A1, A2, A3; D1, D2, D3, D4); whenever all four versions of
the fourth edition are identical, they are referred to as D (without an
Arabic numeral). So far no additional versions of editions B and C havebeen discovered.
A1: The first edition was published in London in 1725: “Printed by
J. Darby in Bartholomew Close, for Will. and John Smith on the Blind
Key in Dublin; and sold by W. and J. Innys at the West End of St. Paul’sChurchyard, J. Osborn and T. Longman in Pater-Noster-Row, and
S. Chandler in the Poultry.”
Copies used for editing A1: (a) University of Aberdeen, Queen
Mother Library, shelf mark pi 1929 Hut i; (b) British Library, shelf mark526.k.22 (reprinted in facsimile as volume 1 of Collected Works of Francis
Hutcheson, edited by Bernard Fabian, 7 vols., Hildesheim, 1969, 1971;
also available as a digital facsimile from Eighteenth Century Collections
Online, http://www.gale.com/EighteenthCentury/); (c) University of
Oxford, Bodleian Library, shelf mark 80 Z 80 Jur.; (d) Cambridge University Library, Rare Books Department, shelf mark Hh.15.63. Other
copies (not seen except for the photocopied title page): (e) University ofBirmingham, Main Library, Special Collections, shelf mark Wigan B
1501.I7; (f ) University of Glasgow, Special Collection, shelf mark Sp.
Coll. 986.1*A2: This version of the first edition was published in London in 1725.
It differs from A1 in three instances and from A3 in two: (a) The title
page does not display the paragraph referring to Shaftesbury, Mande-

1. Referring to the copy of A1 from the British Library as reprinted in the Collected
Works, ed. B. Fabian (Hildesheim: Olms, 1969, 1971), vol. 1, Thomas Mautner (inFrancis Hutcheson, On Human Nature, ed. T. Mautner, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993, p. 170) lists three misprints in the quotation from Cicero on
the title page (factisve for factisque; conservandum for conservandam; cernerentur forcerneretur ). Only the second one of these could be verified. Referring to the copy of
A1 from the Bodleian Libary at Oxford he lists a missing word (tanquam ) in the same
quotation, which allegedly is displayed in the British Library copy; in fact it is missing
in all versions of the first edition. It is introduced with the second edition (B) only.

note on the text

xxv

ville, and the “attempt to introduce a mathematical calculation in subjects of morality” and instead displays the subtitles of the two treatises:“I. Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.” and “II. Concerning
Moral Good and Evil.” (b) In the last paragraph of the title page thefirst names of the printer and the booksellers are printed in full except
for the last one, and one name (T. Longman) is omitted: “Printed byJohn Darby in Bartholomew Close, for William and John Smith on theBlind Key in Dublin; and sold by William and John Innys at the WestEnd of St. Paul’s Churchyard, John Osborn in Pater-Noster-Row, andSam. Chandler in the Poultry.” (c) Finally, on page 216, line 31 it displays,
as does A3, “appears” instead of the plural “appear”: “Our Misery andDistress appears immediately in our Countenance. . . .”Copies used for editing *A2: (a) National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, shelf mark RB.s.916; other copies (not seen except for the photocopied title page and page 216): (b) Warwick University, Special Collections, shelf mark B 1501.I6; (c) McGill University Library, Montreal,
Rare Book Division, McLennan Building, shelf mark BJ604 H8 1725.
*A3: This version of the first edition was published in London in 1725.
It differs from A1 in two instances: (a) In the last section of the title page,
containing the names of the printer and the booksellers, the first bookseller (William and John Smith on the Blind Key in Dublin) is printed
as “Wil.” (one “L” instead of two): “Printed by J. Darby in Bartholomew
Close, for Wil. and John Smith on the Blind Key in Dublin; and soldby W. and J. Innys at the West End of St. Paul’s Churchyard, J. Osborn
and T. Longman in Pater-Noster-Row, and S. Chandler in the Poultry.”(b) On page 216, line 31 an “appears” is displayed as in A2: “Our Miseryand Distress appears immediately in our Countenance. . . .”Copies used for editing *A3: (a) University of Aberdeen, Special Libraries and Archives, shelf mark GY 1571 Hut; (b) Yale University, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, shelf mark K8 H97 b725;(c) Harvard University, Houghton Library, Special Collections (facsimile printed by microfilm/xerocopy in 1985 by University Microfilm International, Ann Arbor, Michigan), shelf mark EC7 H9706 725i, facsimile obtained from Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin,
registration number 701276.

xxvi

note on the text

*Alterations and Additions, Made in the Second Edition of the Inquiry
into Beauty and Virtue, by the Author [i.e., Francis Hutcheson], [noplace, no printer] 1726 [reprinted in: Francis Hutcheson, Collected
Works, ed. B. Fabian, pp. 277–308]. Copy used for editing: British Museum, shelf mark 116.i.18.
B: The second edition “corrected and enlarg’d” was published in London in 1726: “Printed for J. Darby, A. Bettesworth, F. Fayram, J. Pemberton, C. Rivington, J. Hooke, F. Clay, J. Batley, and E. Symon.”Copies used for editing B: (a) British Library, shelf mark 8413.b.6 (alsoavailable as a digital facsimile from Eighteenth Century Collections Online); (b) Yale University, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript
Library, shelf mark BJ1005 H88 (reprinted by Garland Publishers, New
York, 1971).2
C: The third edition “corrected” was published in London in 1729:“Printed for J. and J. Knapton, J. Darby, A. Bettesworth, F. Fayram, J.
Pemberton, J. Osborne and T. Longman, C. Rivington, F. Clay, J. Batley,
and A. Ward.”
Copies used for editing C: (a) British Library, shelf mark 526.k.23(also available as a digital facsimile from Eighteenth Century Collections Online); (b) Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschafts wissenschaften, Kiel (Germany), shelf mark I 14829.
*D1: The first version of the fourth edition was published in London
in 1738: “Printed for D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth, and C. Hitch, J. and
J. Pemberton, R. Ware, C. Rivington, F. Clay, A. Ward, J. and P. Knapton, T. Longman, R. Hett, and J. Wood.”
Copies used for editing *D1: (a) University of Edinburgh, Main Library, Special Collections, shelf mark D.S.g.1.33; (b) University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, shelf mark Godw. Octavo. 534; (c) DartmouthCollege, Hanover, New Hampshire, Baker-Berry Library, shelf markB1604.H8 1738.

2. The Garland reprint (New York, 1971) of this work reports a wrong shelf mark(K8.H97 b726) of Yale University Library as its original source; K8.H97 b726 refers
to a copy of the third edition (C) of 1729 (both books are located in the Beinecke
Rare Book and Manuscript Library).

note on the text

xxvii

D2: The second version of the fourth edition was also published in
London in 1738: “Printed for D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth, and
C. Hitch, J. and J. Pemberton, R. Ware, C. Rivington, F. Clay, A. Ward,
J. and P. Knapton, T. Longman, R. Hett, and J. Wood.” While D1 islargely a reset version of C, D2 differs considerably from both. Thesechanges are not exhausted by the “Additions and Corrections &c.” and“Small Alterations designed for this Edition” added at the end, after
p. 304. At the beginning of this appendix Hutcheson remarks:
This edition having been inadvertently cast off, before the Author’s
corrections were obtained, a few sheets have been cancelled where it
was necessary, and some few additional paragraphs or notes are here
subjoined, with some few corrections of the Expressions referred totheir proper pages and lines, where the reader may make a mark.

Since the appendix is not paginated, the pages here are counted consecutively, starting from the last numbered page of the text itself. Textual
notes refer to this appendix as Corrigenda and indicate the page number:for example, D2 [Corrigenda, p. 310 ].
Copies used for editing D2: (a) Princeton University, Rare Books andSpecial Collections: shelf number (F) 6102.349.11 (the only original copyof D2 identified until now); (b) an unidentified copy of the D2 edition
reprinted in 1969 by Gregg International Publishers Limited, Westmead,
Farnborough, Hants., in England. The reprint gives no information on
the original source; the publisher no longer exists.
D3: The third version of the fourth edition was also published in
London in 1738 and “Printed for D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth, and
C. Hitch, J. and J. Pemberton, R. Ware, C. Rivington, F. Clay, A. Ward,
J. and P. Knapton, T. Longman, R. Hett, and J. Wood.”
Version D3 differs from D2 in several instances: (a) A new sixth article
in Treatise II, section 3 was added. (b) After the identical “Additions andCorrections &c.,” a paragraph with “Directions to the Bookbinder” wasadded, stating: “In the Preface, Cancel from p. 15 to the End. In theWork, Cancel from p. 9 to 17. From 29 to 39. From 57 to 59. From 173
to 179. From 185 to 203. From 217 to 223. From 253 to 255. From 287 to293.” (c) In the D3 version the page numbers 179 and 180 are used twice.

xxviii

note on the text

Copies used for editing D3: (a) Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, shelf mark 50MA15122; (b) Universität Bonn, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, shelf mark B 743.
*D4: The fourth version of the fourth edition was also published in
London in 1738 and “Printed for D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth, and
C. Hitch, J. and J. Pemberton, R. Ware, C. Rivington, F. Clay, A. Ward,
J. and P. Knapton, T. Longman, R. Hett, and J. Wood.”
Version D4 differs from all other versions of the fourth edition: (a)From the title page to p. 28 it is identical with D3, (b) from p. 29 to p. 38
with D1, and (c) from p. 39 to the end again with D3. (d) A misprint
displayed in D3 on p. 220 (last line: Maultiplicity ) is corrected (Multiplicity ). Because D4 differs from other versions in only these respects, it
is not documented separately in the textual notes.
Copy used for editing D4: British Library, shelf mark 8411.m.57 (theonly original copy of D4 identified so far; also available as a digital facsimile from Eighteenth Century Collections Online).
A fifth edition was published posthumously in London in 1753:“Printed for R. Ware, J. and P. Knapton, T. and T. Longman, C. Hitchand L. Hawes, J. Hodges, J. and J. Rivington, and J. Ward.” This edition
has been found to be a close version of D3. There is no evidence that
Hutcheson had any hand in preparing this edition, which appeared six
years after his death. Accordingly it has not been documented in the
textual notes.

Editorial Intervention in the Main Text
In spelling and punctuation the present edition is based on the text ofthe second edition, except in cases of obvious misprints, which weresilently corrected. Differences in spelling and punctuation displayed inother editions have been annotated on those occasions where, in the
judgment of the editor, such variants may be of intellectual relevance.
The typography has been standardized and ignores Hutcheson’s, or his
printer’s, liberal use of italics and small capitals. There are no other silent
editorial deletions or additions. The page breaks of the second edition
are indicated by square brackets [ ]: for example, the text of page 215
begins after [215].

note on the text

xxix

The editor’s explanatory notes are marked by lowercase Roman numerals (i, ii, iii, etc.). Textual notes are marked by Arabic numerals. The
textual notes state the differences between the text of B and the othereditions. In all cases, the editions are cited in the alphanumeric order
given above (A1, A2, A3, C, D1, D2, D3), followed by the page and thetext. For example, C (p. 2 ), D (p. 2 ): great means that in edition C, on
page 2, and in edition D, on page 2, a word (or phrase) was changed into
great. When a new passage was inserted, a single superscript number
refers to the note giving the new passage.
When alterations of the text occur, in addition to the Arabic superscript, pairs of double vertical bars indicate the beginning and the endof a passage that was changed. For example, 㛳 4 we enjoy the Delights ofVirtue 㛳 means that beginning with 㛳 4 and ending with 㛳 the words “weenjoy the Delights of Virtue” were altered as shown in note 4. In somecases there are changes within changes. Here the Arabic numerals forfootnotes are supplemented with lowercase letters to indicate the beginning and the end of the respective variants. For example, 㛳 3a amiable ordisagreeable Ideas of Actions, when they 㛳 4b shall b 㛳 occur to our Observation a 㛳 means that one changed passage starts after 㛳 3a and ends at a 㛳and that another variant affecting only the word “shall” was inserted
between 㛳 4b and b 㛳.

acknowledgments

First of all I would like to thank Elisabeth Schreiber and Andreas Kamp,
who—together with Christine Unrau, Fotios Amanatides, Johannes
Clessienne, Hermann Halbeisen, Felix Krafft, Dirk Neumann, and Alexander Scheufens—revised the text and contributed to the task withmany hours of research. I am much indebted to Christoph Fehige forhis critical remarks and to Thomas Mautner and Luigi Turco (again!),
who helped with a lot of information to fill many gaps and to locate
additional copies of rare books.
The scientists and staff of the libraries with whom we have worked
were extraordinarily helpful. Without their nonbureaucratic help, a
timely completion of the revised edition would have been a futile attempt. I would like to express thanks especially to Peter X. Accardo(Harvard University), Polly Armstrong (Stanford University), Anne
Bertling (English Seminar, Universität Münster), Patricia Boyd (Edinburgh University), Irene Danks and Eoin Shalloo (National Libraryof Scotland), June Ellner (University of Aberdeen), Lydia Ferguson(Trinity College Dublin), Helen Ford and Peter Larkin (University of
Warwick), Ivana Frian (University of Birmingham), Michelle Gait
(University of Aberdeen), Ruth Greenwood (British Library), HelenJ. Hills (Cambridge University), Kathryn James (Yale University),
Josie Lister and Dunja Sharif (Bodleian Library, Oxford), Robert
MacLean (Glasgow University), Raymond L. Marcotte (DartmouthCollege), Margaret Sherry Rich (Princeton University), Richard Virr
(McGill University, Montreal), Christine Weidlich (Universitätsbibliothek, Bonn), and Christiane Wiese (Staatsbibliothek Preußischer
Kulturbesitz, Berlin).
xxxi

xxxiiacknowledgments

Last but not least, I am very much indebted to Laura Goetz and Knud
Haakonssen, who supported our work with great patience and professional advice.
W. L.

a n i n q u i ry i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l o f o u r
i d e a s o f b e a u t y a n d v i rt u eAn Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas
of Beauty and Virtue;
In Two Treatises.
㛳 1 I. Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.
II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil.㛳
The Second Edition, Corrected and Enlarg’d.

Itaque eorum ipsorum quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum
aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam
partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque aboculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis
pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis,
factisque conservandum putat. Quibus ex rebus conflatur &efficitur id quod quaerimus honestum: Quod etiamsi
nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit: quodque etiamsi ànullo laudetur, naturâ est laudabile. Formam quidem ipsam& 㛳 2 tanquam㛳 faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis
cerneretur, mirabiles amores excitaret sapientiae.
—Cic. de Off. lib. I. c. 4.i
London: 1726.

i. Translation: “And so no other animal has a sense of beauty, loveliness, harmonyin the visible world; and Nature and Reason, extending the analogy of this from theworld of sense to the world of spirit, find that beauty, consistency, order are far more
to be maintained in thought and deed. It is from these elements that is forged andfashioned that moral goodness which is the subject of this inquiry—something that,even though it be not generally ennobled, is still worthy of all honour; and by its own
nature, it merits praise, even though it is praised by none. You see here the very form

3

To His Excellency, John, Lord Carteret,ii
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

May it please your Excellency,
When I publish’d these Papers, I had so little Confidence of their Success, that I was unwilling to own them; and [iv] what I was unwillingmyself to own, I durst not presume to inscribe to any great Name.
Your Excellency’s favourable Reception of them, soon put me out of
all Fears about their Success with the wiser and better Part of the World;and since this has given me Assurance to own them, I humbly presume
to inscribe them in this second Edition to your Excellency, that I may
have at once an Opportunity of expressing the sincerest Gratitude for
the Notice you were pleas’d to take of me, and have the Pleasure also of
letting the [v] World know that this small Work has your Excellency’s
Approbation.
The Praise bestow’d by Persons of real Merit and Discernment, isallow’d by all to give a noble and rational Pleasure. Your Excellency firstmade me feel this in the most lively manner; and it will be a Pleasure as
lasting as it is great: ’twill ever be matter of the highest Joy and Satisfaction to me, that I am Author of a Book my Lord Carteret approves.
I know, my Lord, that much of your Commendation [vi] is to be
attributed to your own Humanity: you can entirely approve the Worksof those alone, who can think and speak on these Subjects as justly as
and as it were the face of Moral Goodness; and if it could be seen with the physicaleye, it would awaken a marvellous love of wisdom.” Cicero, De officiis, trans. Walter
Miller, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975),
14–17.
ii. John Carteret, First Earl Granville (1690–1763), English orator, diplomat, andstatesman, member of the House of Lords since 1711, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland
1724–30.

4

dedication

5

your self; and that is what few, if any, even of those who spend theirLives in such Contemplations, are able to do. In the Conversation, withwhich your Excellency has been pleas’d to honour me, I could not, I
own, without the utmost surprize, observe so intimate an Acquaintancewith the most valuable Writings of contemplative Men, Antient, andModern; so just a Taste of what is excellent in the ingenious Arts, [vii]in so young a man, amidst the Hurry of an active Life. Forgive me, myLord, that 㛳 4 I㛳 mention this part of your Character: ’tis so uncommon
that it deserves the highest Admiration; and ’tis the only one which an
obscure Philosopher, who has receiv’d the greatest Obligations fromyour Excellency, can with any Propriety take notice of.
Those other great Endowments which have enabled you, even in
Youth, to discharge the most difficult Employments, with the highest
Honour to your self, and Advantage to your Country, I dare not presume
to de-[viii]scribe. He who attempts to do Justice to so great and good a
Character, ought himself to be one of uncommon Merit and Distinction: and yet the ablest Panegyrist would find it difficult to add any thing
to your Excellency’s Fame. The Voices of Nations proclaim your Worth.
I am,
May it please your Excellency,
Your most obliged,
Most obedient, andMost devoted humble Servant,Dublin,June 19.
1725.

Francis Hutcheson. [ix]the preface

There is no part of Philosophy of more importance, than a just Knowledge of Human Nature, and its various Powers and Dispositions. Ourlate Inquirys have been very much employ’d about our Understanding,and the several Methods of obtaining Truth. We generally acknowledge,that the Importance of any Truth is nothing else than its Moment, or
Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greatest and most lasting Pleasure; and Wisdom denotes only a Capacity of pursuing this End
by the best Means. It must surely then be of the greatest importance,[x] to have distinct Conceptions of this End it self, as well as of theMeans necessary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greatest
and most lasting Pleasures, and not employ our Reason, after all ourlaborious Improvements of it, in trifling Pursuits. It is to be fear’d indeed, that most of our Studys, without this Inquiry, will be of very little
use to us; for they seem to have scarce any other tendency than to lead
us into speculative Knowledge it self. Nor are we distinctly told how itis that Knowledge, or Truth is pleasant to us.
This Consideration 㛳 5 put㛳 the Author of the following Papers
㛳 6 upon㛳 inquiring into the various Pleasures which Human nature iscapable of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophick
Writings, nothing 㛳 7 further㛳 on this Head, than some bare Division ofthem into Sensible, and Rational, and some trite [xi] Common-place
Arguments to prove the 㛳 8 latter more㛳 valuable than the former. Our
sensible Pleasures are slightly pass’d over, and explain’d only by some
Instances in Tastes, Smells, Sounds, or such like, which Men of any
tolerable Reflection generally look upon as very trifling Satisfactions.
Our rational Pleasures have had much the same kind of treatment. We
are seldom taught any other Notion of rational Pleasure than that which7

8

original preface

we have upon reflecting on our Possession, or Claim to those Objects,
which may be Occasions of Pleasure. Such Objects we call advantageous; but Advantage, or Interest, cannot be distinctly conceiv’d, till weknow what 㛳 9 those㛳 Pleasures are which advantageous Objects are apt
to excite; and what Senses or Powers of Perception we have 㛳 10 with respect to㛳 such Objects. We may perhaps 㛳 11 find㛳 such an Inquiry of
more importance in Morals, to prove what we call the Reality of Virtue,or [xii] that it is the surest Happiness of the Agent, than one would atfirst imagine.
In reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Perceptions of Pleasure, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should. The presenceof some Objects necessarily pleases us, and the presence of others asnecessarily displeases us. Nor can we by our Will, any otherwise procure
Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects,
and avoiding the latter. By the very Frame of our Nature the one is madethe occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction.
The same Observation will hold in all our other Pleasures and Pains.
For there are many other sorts of Objects, which please, or displease us
as necessarily, as material Objects [xiii] do when they operate upon our
Organs of Sense. There 㛳 12 is scarcely any Object which our Minds are
employ’d about, which is㛳 not thus constituted the necessary occasionof some Pleasure or Pain. Thus we 㛳 13 find㛳 our selves pleas’d with aregular Form, a piece of Architecture or Painting, a Composition ofNotes, a Theorem, an Action, an Affection, a Character. And we areconscious that this Pleasure necessarily arises from the Contemplationof the Idea, which is then present to our Minds, with all its Circumstances, although some of these Ideas have nothing of what we 㛳 14 call㛳
sensible Perception in them; and in those which have, the Pleasure arises
from some Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; and not fromthe simple Ideas of Colour, or Sound, or mode of Extension separately
consider’d.
These Determinations to be pleas’d with 㛳 15 any Forms, or Ideas [xiv]which occur to our Observation,㛳 the Author chuses to call Senses; distinguishing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name,original preface

9

by calling our Power of perceiving the Beauty of Regularity, Order, Harmony, an Internal Sense; and that Determination to 㛳 16 be pleas’d with
the Contemplation of those㛳 Affections, Actions, or Characters of rational Agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the name of a Moral
Sense.
His principal Design is to shew, “That Human Nature was not left
quite indifferent in the affair of Virtue, to form to it self Observations
concerning the Advantage, or Disadvantage of Actions, and accordingly
to regulate its Conduct.” The weakness of our Reason, and the avocations arising from the 㛳 17 Infirmity㛳 and Necessitys of our Nature, areso great, that very few 㛳 18 Men could ever have㛳 form’d those [xv] long
Deductions of Reason, which 㛳 19 shew㛳 some Actions to be in the wholeadvantageous to the Agent, and their Contrarys pernicious. The Authorof Nature has much better furnish’d us for a virtuous Conduct, than㛳 20 our㛳 Moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful Instructions, as we have for the preservation of our Bodys. 㛳 21 He has madeVirtue a lovely Form, to excite our pursuit of it; and has given us strong
Affections to be the Springs of each virtuous Action.㛳
This moral Sense of Beauty in Actions and Affections, may appear
strange at first View. Some of our Moralists themselves are offended at
it in my Lord Shaftesbury,iii so much 㛳 22 are they㛳 accustom’d to deduce
every Approbation, or Aversion, from rational Views of 㛳 23 Interest㛳,(except it be merely in the simple Ideas of the external Senses) and havesuch a Horror at innate Ideas, [xvi] which they imagine this borders
upon. But this moral Sense has no relation to innate Ideas, as will appear
in the second Treatise. 24 Our Gentlemen of good Taste can tell us of agreat many Senses, Tastes, and Relishes for Beauty, Harmony, Imitationin Painting and Poetry; and may not we find too in Mankind a Relishfor a Beauty in Characters, in Manners? 㛳 25a I doubt we have made Phiiii. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), was educatedunder the supervision of John Locke but was not a follower of his philosophy. Hutcheson used the collection of Shaftesbury’s works in Characteristicks of Men, Manners,
Opinions, Times, 3 vols. (London, 1711). According to the subtitle of the first editionof the Inquiry (see note 1 on the title page), Hutcheson’s intention was to defend
Shaftesbury’s views against Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees.

10

original preface

losophy, as well as Religion, by our foolish management of it, so austereand ungainly a Form, that a Gentleman cannot easily bring himself tolike it; and those who are Strangers to it, can scarcely bear to hear our
Description of it. So much 㛳 26b it is b 㛳 changed from what was once thedelight of the finest Gentlemen among the Antients, and their Recreation after the Hurry of publick Affairs! a 㛳In the first Treatise, the Author perhaps in some Instances has gone
too far, in supposing a greater Agree-[xvii]ment of Mankind in their
Sense of Beauty, than Experience 㛳 27 will㛳 confirm; but all he is solicitousabout is to shew, “That there is some Sense of Beauty natural to Men;㛳 28 that we find㛳 as great an Agreement of Men in their Relishes ofForms, as in their external Senses which all agree to be natural; and that
Pleasure or Pain, Delight or Aversion, are naturally join’d to their Perceptions.” If the Reader be convinc’d of 㛳 29 such Determinations of theMind to be pleas’d with Forms, Proportions, Resemblances,Theorems,㛳
it will be no difficult matter to apprehend another superior Sense, natural㛳 30 also㛳 to Men, determining them to be pleas’d with Actions, Characters, Affections. This is the moral Sense, which makes the Subject of
the second Treatise.
The proper Occasions of Perception by the external Senses, occur to
us as soon as we come into the [xviii] World; 㛳 31 whence㛳 perhaps weeasily look upon these Senses to be natural: but the Objects of the superior Senses of Beauty and Virtue generally do not. It is probably somelittle time before Children 㛳 32 reflect㛳, or at least let us know that theyreflect upon Proportion and Similitude; upon Affections, Characters,
Tempers; or come to know the external Actions which are Evidences ofthem. 㛳 33 Hence㛳 we imagine that their Sense of Beauty, and their moral
Sentiments of Actions, must be entirely owing to Instruction, and Education; whereas it 㛳 34 is as㛳 easy to conceive, how a Character, a Temper,
as soon as they are observ’d, may be constituted by Nature the necessary
occasion of Pleasure, or an Object of Approbation, as a Taste or a Sound;㛳 35 tho it be sometime before these Objects present themselves to ourObservation.㛳 [xix]㛳 36 The first Impression of these Papers was so well receiv’d, that the
Author hopes it will be no offence to any who are concern’d in the Mem-

original preface11

ory of the late Lord Viscount Molesworth,iv if he lets his Readers knowthat he was the Noble Person mention’d in the Preface to the first Edition, and that their being published was owing to his Approbation ofthem. It was from him he had that shreud Objection, which the Reader
may find in the first Treatise;* besides many other Remarks in the frequent Conversations with which he honour’d the Author; by which that
Treatise was very much improved beyond what it was in the Draught
presented to him. The Author retains the most grateful Sense of his singular Civilitys, and of the Pleasure and Improvement he received in his
Conver-[xx]sation; and is still fond of expressing his grateful Remembrance of him: but,
Id cinerem, & Manes credas curare sepultos.v

To be concern’d in this Book can be no honour to a Person so justly
celebrated for the most generous Sentiments of Virtue and Religion,deliver’d with the most manly Eloquence: yet it would not be just toward
the World, should the Author conceal his Obligations to the Reverend
Mr. Edward Syng; vi not only for revising these Papers, when they stoodin great need of an accurate Review, but for suggesting several justAmendments in the general Scheme of Morality. The Author was much

iv. Robert Molesworth, a wealthy Irish merchant, politician, diplomat, and author(1656–1725), with short interruptions a member of both the English and Irish Parliaments for about thirty years. He was one of the most prominent radical Whigs of
his time. At the end of 1722 Molesworth retired to Dublin, where he founded a philosophical and literary circle. Hutcheson was a member of the group.
* Sect. v. Art. 2. the last Paragraph.
v. Translation: “Thinkest thou that dust or buried shades give heed to that?” Virgil,
Aeneid, bk. 4, l. 34, in Eclogues, Georgics, Aeneid I–VI, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough,revised ed., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1935).
vi. Edward Synge (1692/94?–1762) was successively bishop of Clonfert, Cloyne,
Firns, and Elphin. He was a friend of Berkeley and probably a member of Molesworth’s circle in Dublin, where a lasting friendship with Hutcheson developed.
Hutcheson’s son dedicated his father’s posthumous System of Moral Philosophy (London, 1755) to Bishop Synge. As Synge demonstrated in a sermon from 25 October
1725 (the anniversary of the Irish rebellion), later published as The Case of Toleration,
he was a liberal and tolerant Anglican.

12

original preface

confirm’d in his Opinion of the Justness of these Thoughts, upon finding, that this Gentleman had fallen into the same way of thinking before
him; and will ever look upon his Friendship [xxi] as one of the greatest
Advantages and Pleasures of his Life.
To recommend the Lord Shaftesbury’s Writings to the World, is avery needless Attempt. They will be esteemed while any Reflection remains among Men. It is indeed to be wished, that he had abstained frommixing with such Noble Performances, some Prejudices he had receiv’dagainst Christianity; a Religion which gives us the truest Idea of Virtue,
and recommends the Love of God, and of Mankind, as the Sum of alltrue Religion. How would it have moved the Indignation of that ingenious Nobleman, to have found a dissolute set of Men, who relishnothing in Life but the lowest and most sordid Pleasures, searching into
his Writings for those Insinuations against Christianity, that they might
be the less restrained from their Debaucherys; when at the same time
their low Minds are [xxii] incapable of relishing those noble Sentimentsof Virtue and Honour, which he has placed in so lovely a Light!㛳
Whatever Faults the Ingenious may find with 㛳 37 this Performance,
the Author㛳 hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to Religion
or good Manners: and he shall be well pleased if he gives the learned
World an occasion of examining more thorowly these Subjects, whichare, he presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief Groundof his Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is this, That as
he took the first Hints of them from some of the greatest Writers of
Antiquity,vii so the more he has convers’d with them, he finds his Illustrations the more conformable to their Sentiments.
㛳 38 In the former Edition of this Book there were some Mistakes in
one or two of the Instances borrowed [xxiii] from other Sciences, to avii. Hutcheson was familiar with Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and probably with
Plotinus. See the quotation from Cicero on the title page (from De officiis, book 1,§§ 14, 15). Also see Plato on the perception of beauty in Phaedrus (250d) and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, II, 9 (1109b, 20–26) and III, 6 (1113a, 23–35) as well as
Politics, I, 11 (1253a, 16–19). On this topic, see E. H. Olmsted, “The ‘Moral Sense’
Aspects of Aristotle’s Ethical Theory,” American Journal of Philology 69 (1948): 42–
61. See Plotinus, On Beauty (Ennead I. 6).

original preface

13

perfect Knowledge of which the Author does not pretend; nor would
he now undertake that this Edition is every way faultless. He hopes thatthose who are studious of the true measures of Life, may find his Ideas
of Virtue and Happiness tolerably just; and that the profound Connoisseurs will pardon a few Faults, in the Illustrations borrow’d fromtheir Arts, upon which his Arguments do not depend.㛳 [xxiv]

the contentsitreatise i
section i. Concerning some Powers ofPerception distinct from what is generally
understood by Sensation.

19

section ii. Of original or absolute Beauty.

28

section iii. Of the Beauty of Theorems.

36

section iv. Of 㛳 39 comparative or relative㛳 Beauty.

42

section v. Concerning our Reasonings about
Design and Wisdom in the Cause, from the Beauty
or Regularity of Effects.

46

section vi. Concerning the Universality of ourSense of Beauty.

61

section vii. Concerning the Power of Custom,
Education and Example, as to our internal Senses.

70

section viii. Of the Importance of the internal
Senses in Life, and the final Causes of them. [xxv]76

i. The page numbers used in the Contents are those of the present Liberty Fund
edition.

15

16

original contents

treatise ii
introduction.

85

section i. Of the moral Sense by which weperceive Virtue and Vice, and approve, ordisapprove them in others.

89

section ii. Concerning the immediate Motive to
virtuous Actions.

101

section iii. The Sense of Virtue, and the various
Opinions about it, reducible to one general
Foundation. The manner of computing theMorality of Actions.

116

section iv. All Mankind agree in this general
Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions.
The Grounds of different Opinions about Morals.

136

section v. A further Confirmation that we havepractical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our
Nature; with a further Explication of our Instinct to
Benevolence in its various Degrees; with theadditional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame,
Pity.

148

section vi. Concerning the Importance of thismoral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind,and its Influence on human Affairs. [xxvi]

163

section vii. A Deduction of some complex
moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect,
Imperfect, and External; Alienable and Unalienablefrom this moral Sense.

177u 㛳1treatise i uviz.

An Inquiry Concerning Beauty,
Order, &c.[1]㛳

An Inquiry 㛳 2 Concerning Beauty, Order, &c. 㛳
u section i u
Concerning some Powers of Perception, distinct
from what is generally understood by Sensation.

To make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary topremise some Definitions, and Observations, either universally acknowledg’d, or sufficiently prov’d by many Writers both ancient and modern,concerning our Perceptions called Sensations, and the Actions of theMind consequent upon them.
Art. 㛳 3 I㛳. Those Ideas 㛳 4 which㛳 are rais’d in the Mind upon the presence 㥋 5 Sensation. 㥋of external Ob-[2]jects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call’d Sensations. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not
Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to be acted uponby the external Object.
II. When two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree Different
in nothing but the general Idea of Sensation, we call the Powers of re- Senses.
ceiving those different Perceptions, different Senses. Thus Seeing andHearing denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours
and Sounds. And altho Colours have 㛳 6 vast㛳 Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among themost opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence19

20

treatise i

we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses
seem to have their distinct Organs, except Feeling, which is in somedegree diffus’d over the whole Body.
The Mind
how active.

Substances.

III. The Mind has a Power of compounding Ideas, 㛳 7 which㛳 were receiv’d separately; of comparing 㛳 8 their㛳 Objects by means of the Ideas,
and of observing their Relations and Proportions; of enlarging and diminishing its Ideas at pleasure, or in any certain Ratio, or Degree; andof considering separately [3] each of the simple Ideas, which might perhaps have been impress’d jointly in the Sensation. This last Operation
we commonly call Abstraction.
IV. The Ideas of 㛳 9 Substances㛳 are compounded of the various simple
Ideas jointly impress’d, when they presented themselves to our Senses.
We define Substances only by enumerating these sensible Ideas: Andsuch Definitions may 㛳 10 raise an Idea clear enough㛳 of the Substance in
the Mind of one who never immediately perceiv’d the Substance; provided he has separately receiv’d by his Senses all the simple Ideas㛳 11 which㛳 are in the Composition of the complex one of the Substancedefin’d: But if 㛳 12 there be any simple Ideas which he has not receiv’d,or if he wants any of the Senses necessary for the Perception of them,no Definition can raise any simple Idea which has not been before perceived by the Senses.㛳

Education.
Instruction.

V. 13 Hence it follows, “That when Instruction, Education, or Prejudiceof any kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward an Object, this Desireor Aversion must be founded upon an Opinion of some Perfection, orof some Deficiency in those Qualitys, for Perception of which we havethe proper Senses.” Thus if Beauty be desir’d by one who has not the
Sense of Sight, the Desire must be rais’d by some [4] apprehended Regularity of Figure, Sweetness of Voice, Smoothness, or Softness, or someother Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the
Ideas of Colour.

Pleasure. Pain.

VI. Many of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant, and many painful,
immediately, and that without any knowledge of the Cause of this Plea-section i

21sure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; orwithout seeing to what further Advantage or Detriment the Use of such
Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of thesethings vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it
might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raisea distinct Joy, from 㛳 14 a㛳 prospect of further Advantage in the Object,
or Aversion, from 㛳 15 an㛳 apprehension of Evil.
VII. The 㛳 16 simple㛳 Ideas rais’d in different Persons by the same Object, Different
are probably 㛳 17 some way㛳 different, when they disagree in their Ap- Ideas.
probation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his Fancy at one
time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting
on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho they wereformerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there is some accidental Conjunction of a disagreeable Idea, [5] which always recurs with
the Object; as in those Wines 㛳 18 to㛳 which Men acquire an 㛳 19 Aversion㛳,after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation: 㛳 20 In this case㛳
we are conscious that the Idea is alter’d from what it was when that Wine
was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sicknessof Stomach. The like Change of Idea may be insensibly made by the
Change of our Bodys, as we advance in Years, 㛳 21 or when we are accustomed to any Object,㛳 which may occasion an Indifference 㛳 22 toward㛳
Meats we were fond of in our Childhood㛳 23a ; and may make some Objects cease to raise the disagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our
first use of them. 㛳 24b Many of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable
only thro the too great Intenseness of the Quality: thus moderate Lightis agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may bepleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A Change in our Organs will
necessarily occasion a Change in the Intenseness of the Perception atleast; nay sometimes will occasion a quite contrary Perception: Thus awarm Hand shall feel that Water cold, which a cold hand 㛳 25c shall c 㛳 feelwarm ab 㛳.
We shall not find it perhaps so easy to account for the Diversity of
Fancy 㛳 26a about more complex Ideas of Objects, 㛳 27b in which we regard b 㛳 many Ideas of different Senses at [6] once; as 㛳 28c in c 㛳 some Perceptions of those call’d primary Qualitys, and some secondary, as ex-22treatise iplain’d by Mr. Locke: i for instance, in the different Fancys about
Architecture, Gardening, Dress. Of the two former we shall offer something in Sect. VI. As to Dress, we may generally account for the Diversityof Fancys from a like Conjunction of Ideas: Thus a 㛳, if either from any
thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance,
the fancying of glaring Colours be look’d upon as an evidence of Levity,
or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any Colour or Fashion becommonly us’d by Rusticks, or by Men of any disagreeable Profession,
Employment, or Temper; these additional Ideas may recur constantlywith that of the Colour or Fashion, and cause a constant Dislike to themin those who join the additional Ideas, altho the Colour or Form be noway disagreeable of themselves, and actually do please others who joinno such Ideas to them. But there 㛳 29 does not seem to be any㛳 Groundto believe such a Diversity in human Minds, as that the same 㛳 30 simple㛳
Idea or Perception should give pleasure to one and pain to another, orto the same Person at different times; not to say that it seems a Contradiction, that the same 㛳 31 simple㛳 Idea should do so. [7]Complex
Ideas.

VIII. The only Pleasure of Sense, 㛳 32 which㛳 㛳 33 our㛳 Philosophers seemto consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But
there are 㛳 34 vastly㛳 greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects,
which obtain the Names of Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious. Thus every
one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture,than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as
possible; and more pleas’d with a Prospect of the Sun 㛳 35 arising㛳 among
settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, afine Landskip, a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a smoothSea, or a large open Plain, not diversify’d by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite simple. So in
Musick, the Pleasure of fine Composition is incomparably greater thanthat of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever.
i. John Locke (1632–1704) developed the theory of simple and complex ideas, andof primary and secondary qualities in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding(London, 1690), bk. 2, “Of Ideas,” and bk. 4, “Of Knowledge and Opinion.”section i

23

IX. Let it be observ’d, that in the following Papers, the Word Beauty is Beauty.
taken for the Idea rais’d in us, and a Sense of Beauty for our Power ofreceiving this Idea. Harmony also denotes our pleasant Ideas arising Harmony.
from Composition of Sounds, and a good Ear (as it is generally taken)
a Power of perceiving this Pleasure. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made [8] to discover “what is the immediate Occasion of thesepleasant Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites
them.”
X. It is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of Beauty and Internal Sense.
Harmony, Perceptions of the External Senses of Seeing and Hearing,or not. I should rather chuse to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas,an Internal Sense, were it only for the Convenience of distinguishingthem from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which men may
have without Perception of Beauty and Harmony. It is plain from Experience, that many Men have in the common meaning, the Senses of
Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the simple Ideas
separately, and have their Pleasures; they distinguish them from eachother, such as one Colour from another, either quite different, or thestronger or fainter of the same Colour, 㛳 36 when they are plac’d besideeach other, altho they may often confound their Names, when they occur
a-part from each other; as some do the Names of Green and Blue:㛳 they
can tell in separate Notes, the higher, lower, sharper or flatter, when separately sounded; in Figures they discern the Length, Breadth, Widenessof each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing andseeing at great distances as any men [9] whatsoever: And yet perhaps
they shall 㛳 37 find㛳 no Pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Painting,Architecture, natural Landskip; or but a very weak one in comparisonof what others enjoy from the same Objects. This greater Capacity ofreceiving such pleasant Ideas we commonly call a fine Genius or Taste:
In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a good Ear;and the like distinction we 㛳 38 should㛳 probably acknowledge in other㛳 39 Objects㛳, had we also got distinct Names to denote these Powersof Perception by.

24
Different from
External.

treatise i

XI. 40 There will appear another Reason perhaps 㛳 41 afterwards㛳, for calling this Power of perceiving the Ideas of Beauty, an Internal Sense, from
this, that in some other Affairs, where our External Senses are not muchconcern’d, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many respects, tothat observ’d in sensible Objects, and accompany’d with like Pleasure:
Such is that Beauty perceiv’d in Theorems, or universal Truths, in general Causes, and in some extensive Principles of Action.
XII. Let 㛳 42a every one here consider, how different we must suppose thePerception to be, with which a Poet is transported upon the Prospect of
any of those Objects [10] of natural Beauty, which ravish us even in his
Description; from that cold lifeless Conception which we 㛳 43b imagine
in b 㛳 a dull Critick, or one of the Virtuosi, without what we call a fine
Taste. This latter Class of Men may have greater Perfection in that
Knowledge, which is deriv’d from external Sensation; they can tell all
the specifick Differences of Trees, Herbs, Minerals, Metals; they know
the Form of every Leaf, Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the Species,
about which the Poet is often very ignorant: And yet the Poet shall havea 㛳 44c vastly c 㛳 more delightful Perception of the Whole; and not only the
Poet but any man of a fine Taste. Our External 㛳 45d Senses d 㛳 may bymeasuring teach us all the Proportions of Architecture to the Tenth of
an Inch, and the Situation of every Muscle in the human Body; and agood Memory may retain these: and yet there is still something further
necessary, not only to make 㛳 46e a man e 㛳 a compleat Master in Architecture, Painting or Statuary, but even a tolerable Judge in these Works; or㛳 47f capable of receiving f 㛳 the highest Pleasure in contemplating them. a 㛳
Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what
are commonly called the External Senses are the same; since the mostaccurate Knowledge of what the External Senses discover, 㛳 48 often does㛳
not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a good
Taste will en-[11]joy at once without much Knowledge; we may justly
use another Name for these higher, and more delightful Perceptions ofBeauty and Harmony, and call the Power of receiving such Impressions,an Internal Sense. The Difference of the Perceptions seems sufficient tovindicate the Use of a different Name, 㛳 49 especially when we are told inwhat meaning the Word is applied.㛳

section i

25

XIII. 50 This superior Power of Perception is justly called a Sense, be- Its Pleasuresandcause of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure 㛳 51 does necessary
immediate.
not arise㛳 from any Knowledge of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of
the Usefulness of the Object; 㛳 52 but strikes us at first with the Ideaof 㛳 Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge increase this Pleasureof Beauty, however it 53 may super-add a distinct rational Pleasure fromprospects of Advantage, or 㛳 54 from㛳 the Increase of Knowledge.*
XIV. 55 And further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage orDisadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in theexternal Sensations, no View of Interest will [12] make an Object grateful, nor 㛳 56 View of 㛳 Detriment, distinct from immediate Pain in thePerception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole
World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a
deform’d Object, or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be
procur’d by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct
abstain from any pursuit of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform’d; but
our Sentiments of the Forms, and our Perceptions, would continue invariably the same.
XV. 57 Hence it plainly appears, “that some Objects are immediately the This Sense
to
Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for antecedentand distinct
perceiving it; and that it is distinct from that Joy which arises 㛳 58 from from prospects
Self-love㛳 upon Prospect of Advantage.” Nay, do not we often see Con- of interest.
venience and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other prospectof Advantage in the Beautiful Form, than the suggesting the pleasantIdeas of Beauty? Now this shews us, that however we may pursue beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a view to obtain the Pleasures ofBeauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs; yet there
must be a Sense of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects 㛳 59 even of 㛳 this Advantage, without which Sense, these Objects would not be thus [13]Advantageous, nor excite in us this Pleasure which constitutes them ad* See above, Art. 6.

26treatise ivantageous. Our Sense of Beauty from Objects, by which they are constituted good to us, is very distinct from our Desire of them when they
are thus constituted: Our Desire of Beauty may be counter-ballanc’dby Rewards or Threatnings, but never our Sense of it; even as Fear of
Death, 㛳 60 or Love of Life,㛳 may make us 㛳 61 chuse and㛳 desire a bitter
Potion, or neglect those Meats which the Sense of Taste would recommend as pleasant; 㛳 62 and yet no prospect of Advantage, or Fear of
Evil, can㛳 make that Potion agreeable to the Sense, or 㛳 63 Meat㛳 disagreeable to it, 㛳 64 which was㛳 not so antecedently to this Prospect.
㛳 65 Just in the same manner as to㛳 the Sense of Beauty and Harmony;that the Pursuit of such Objects is frequently neglected, from prospectsof Advantage, Aversion to Labour, or any other Motive of 㛳 66 Self-love㛳,
does not prove that we have no Sense of Beauty, but only that our Desireof it may be counter-ballanc’d by a stronger Desire㛳 67 : So Gold outweighing Silver, is never adduc’d as a proof that the latter is void of
Gravity㛳.
XVI. 68 Had we no such Sense of Beauty and Harmony; Houses, Gardens, Dress, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as beautiful: 㛳 69a And in Faces I see
no-[14]thing 㛳 70b which b 㛳 could please us, but Liveliness of Colour, andSmoothness of Surface: a 㛳 And yet nothing is more certain, than that allthese Objects are recommended under quite different Views on many
Occasions: 㛳 71 And no Custom, Education, or Example could ever㛳 give
us Perceptions distinct from those of the Senses which we had the useof before, or recommend Objects under another Conception than grateful to* them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example,
upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below.†
Beauty,Original orComparative.

㛳 73 XVII.㛳 㛳 74 Beauty㛳 is either Original or Comparative; or, if any likethe Terms better, Absolute, or Relative: Only let it be 㛳 75 observ’d㛳, thatby Absolute or Original Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos’d* See Art. 㛳 72 5㛳.
† Sect. 7.

section i27

to be in the Object, 㛳 76 which㛳 should of itself be beautiful, without
relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Namesof sensible Ideas, properly denotes the Perception of some Mind; so
Cold, 㛳 77 Hot㛳, Sweet, Bitter, denote the Sensations in our Minds, towhich perhaps there is no resemblance in the Objects, 㛳 78 which㛳 excite
these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine 㛳 79 that there is something in the Object just like our Perception㛳. The Ideas of Beauty and[15] Harmony being excited upon our Perception of some primary Quality, and having relation to Figure and Time, may indeed have a nearer
resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations, 㛳 80 which㛳 seem not somuch any Pictures of Objects, as Modifications of the perceiving Mind;and yet were there no Mind with a Sense of Beauty to contemplate Objects, I see not how they could be call’d beautiful. We therefore by* Absolute Beauty understand only that Beauty, which we perceive in Objects
without comparison to any thing external, of which the Object is suppos’d an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceiv’d from theWorks of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures㛳 82, Theorems㛳. Comparative
or Relative Beauty is that which we perceive in Objects, commonly considered as Imitations or Resemblances of something else. These two
Kinds of Beauty employ the three following Sections. [16]* This division of Beauty is taken from the different Foundations of 㛳 81 Pleasure㛳
to our Sense of it, rather than from the Objects themselves: for most of the following
Instances of relative Beauty have also absolute Beauty; and many of the Instances ofabsolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some respect or other. But we may distinctly consider these two Fountains of Pleasure, Uniformity in the Object it self,
and Resemblance to some Original.

u section ii u
Of Original or Absolute Beauty.

Sense of Men.

I. Since it is certain that we have Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, let us
examine what Quality in Objects excites these Ideas, or is the occasionof them. And let it be here observ’d, that our Inquiry is only about the
Qualitys 㛳 1 which㛳 are beautiful to Men; or about the Foundation of
their Sense of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the Sense of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how
generally the Objects 㛳 2 which㛳 occur to us, are beautiful, we mean 㛳 3 thatsuch Objects are㛳 agreeable to the Sense of Men: 㛳 4 for as there are nota few㛳 Objects, which seem no way beautiful to Men, 㛳 5 so we see a variety of 㛳 other Animals 㛳 6 who㛳 seem delighted with them; they may haveSenses otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the Ideas
of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We see Animals
fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and shapeless, or
loathsom, may be to them a Paradise.
II. That we may more distinctly discover the general Foundation or Occasion of [17] the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be necessary toconsider it first in its simpler Kinds, such as occurs to us in regular Figures; and we may perhaps find that the same Foundation extends to all
the more complex Species of it.

Uniformity
with Variety.

III. The Figures 㛳 7 which㛳 excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be
those in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety. There are many Conceptions of Objects 㛳 8 which㛳 are agreeable upon other accounts, such28

section ii

29

as Grandeur, Novelty, Sanctity, and some others, 㛳 9 which shall be mention’d hereafter.*㛳 But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the
Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity
and Variety: so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty
is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the
Uniformity. This 㛳 10 will be plain from Examples.㛳
First, the Variety increases the Beauty in equal Uniformity. The Variety.
Beauty of an equilateral Triangle is less than that of the Square; whichis less than that of a Pentagon; and this again is surpass’d by the Hexagon. When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas’d, the Proportion of them to the Radius, or Diameter of the [18] Figure, 㛳 11 or of theCircle to which regular Polygons have an obvious Relation,㛳 is so much
lost to our Observation, that the Beauty does not always increase with
the Number of Sides; and the want of Parallelism in the Sides of Heptagons, and other Figures of odd Numbers, may also diminish their
Beauty. So in Solids, the Eicosiedron surpasses the Dodecaedron, andthis the Octaedron, which is still more beautiful than the Cube; and thisagain surpasses the regular Pyramid: The obvious Ground of this, isgreater Variety with equal Uniformity.
The greater Uniformity increases the Beauty amidst equal Variety, in Uniformity.
these Instances: An Equilateral Triangle, or even an Isosceles, surpasses
the Scalenum: A Square surpasses the Rhombus or Lozenge, and thisagain the Rhomboides, 㛳 12 which is㛳 still more beautiful than the Trapezium, or any Figure with irregular curve Sides. So the regular Solids
㛳 13 vastly㛳 surpass all other Solids of equal number of plain Surfaces: And
the same is observable not only in the Five perfectly regular Solids, but
in all those which have any considerable Uniformity, as Cylinders,
Prisms, Pyramids, Obelisks; which please every Eye more than any rude
Figures, where there is no Unity or Resemblance among the Parts. [19]Instances of the compound Ratio we have in comparing Circles or Compound
Spheres, with Ellipses or Spheroids not very eccentric; and in comparing Ratio.
the compound Solids, the Exoctaedron, and Eicosidodecaedron, withthe perfectly regular ones of which they are compounded: and we shall* See Sect. vi. Art. 11, 12, 13.

30

treatise ifind, that the Want of that most perfect Uniformity observable in thelatter, is compensated by the greater Variety in the 㛳 14 others㛳, so that theBeauty is nearly equal.
IV. These Observations would probably hold true for the most part, andmight be confirm’d by the Judgment of Children in the simpler Figures,
where the Variety is not too great for their Comprehension. And however
uncertain some of the particular aforesaid Instances may seem, yet thisis perpetually to be observ’d, that Children are fond of all regular Figuresin their little Diversions, altho they be no more convenient, or useful forthem, than the Figures of our common Pebbles: We see how early they
discover a Taste or Sense of Beauty, in desiring to see Buildings, regular
Gardens, or even Representations of them in Pictures of any kind.
Beauty of
Nature.

V. 㛳 15 It is㛳 the same foundation 㛳 16 which㛳 we have for our Sense of
Beauty in the Works of Nature. In every Part of the World [20] which
we call Beautiful, there is a 㛳 17 vast㛳 Uniformity amidst 㛳 18 an㛳 almost
infinite Variety. Many Parts of the Universe seem not at all design’d forthe use of Man; nay, it is but a very small Spot with which we have any
acquaintance. The Figures and Motions of the great Bodys are not obvious to our Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon
many long Observations: and yet as far as we can by Sense discover, or
by Reasoning enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we
generally find 㛳 19 their Structure, Order㛳, and Motion, agreeable to ourSense of Beauty. Every particular Object in Nature does not indeed appear beautiful to us; but there is a 㛳 20 vast㛳 Profusion of Beauty over mostof the Objects which occur either to our Senses, or Reasonings uponObservation: For not to mention the apparent Situation of the heavenly
Bodys in the Circumference of a great Sphere, which is wholly occasion’d by the Imperfection of our Sight in discerning distances; theForms of all the great Bodys in the Universe are nearly Spherical; theOrbits of their Revolutions generally Elliptick, and without great Eccentricity, in those which continually occur to our Observation: 㛳 21 now㛳these are Figures of great Uniformity, and therefore pleasing to us. [21]22Further, to pass by the less obvious Uniformity in the Proportionsection ii

31of their Quantitys of Matter, Distances, Times of revolving, to eachother; what can exhibit a greater Instance of Uniformity amidst Variety,than the constant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal Times, in each
Planet, around its Axis, and the central Fire or Sun, thro all the Ages ofwhich we have any Records, and in nearly the same Orbit? 㛳 23 by which㛳,
after certain Periods, all the same Appearances are again renew’d; thealternate Successions of Light and Shade, or Day and Night, constantly
pursuing each other around each Planet, with an agreeable and regular
Diversity in the Times they possess the 㛳 24 several㛳 Hemispheres, in theSummer, Harvest, Winter and Spring; and the various Phases, Aspects,
and Situations, of the Planets to each other, their Conjunctions and Oppositions, in which they suddenly darken each other with their Conick
Shades in Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods with invariable
Constancy: These are the Beautys which charm the Astronomer, andmake his tedious Calculations pleasant.
Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem.* i [22]VI. Again, as to the dry Part of the Surface of our Globe, a great Part Earth.
of which is cover’d with a very pleasant inoffensive Colour, how beautifully is it diversify’d with various Degrees of Light and Shade, according to the different Situations of the Parts of its Surface, in Mountains,
Valleys, Hills, and open Plains, which are variously inclin’d toward thegreat Luminary!
VII. If we descend to the minuter Works of Nature, what 㛳 25 vast㛳 Uni- Plants.
formity among all the Species of Plants and Vegetables in the mannerof their Growth and Propagation! 㛳 26 what exact㛳 Resemblance among
all the Plants of the same Species, whose Numbers surpass our Imagination! And this Uniformity is not only observable in the Form in gross;* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2 v. 12.
i. Translation: “Where the excitement pleasantly beguiles the hard toil.” Horace,
Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 136.

32

treatise i㛳 27 nay, in this it is not so very exact in all Instances㛳, but in the Structureof their 㛳 28 minutest Parts,㛳 which no Eye unassisted with Glasses candiscern. In the almost infinite Multitude of Leaves, Fruit, Seed, Flowersof any one Species, we 㛳 29 often㛳 see 㛳 30 an exact㛳 Uniformity in the
Structure and Situation of the smallest Fibres. This is the Beauty whichcharms an ingenious Botanist. Nay, what 㛳 31 vast㛳 Uniformity and Regularity of Figure is found in each particular Plant, 㛳 32 Leaf 㛳, or Flower!
In all Trees and 㛳 33 most of the㛳 smaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks areeither Cylinders nearly, or regular [23] Prisms; the Branches similar totheir several Trunks, arising at nearly regular Distances, when no Accidents retard their natural Growth: In one Species the Branches arise inPairs on the opposite Sides; the perpendicular Plain of Direction of
the immediately superior Pair, intersecting the Plain of Direction of
the inferior, nearly at right Angles: In another species, the Branches㛳 34 spring㛳 singly, and alternately, all around in nearly equal Distances:
And the Branches in other Species 㛳 35 sprout㛳 all in Knots around the
Trunk, one for each Year. And in 㛳 36 every㛳 Species, all the Branches in
the first Shoots preserve the same Angles with their Trunk; and they again
sprout out into smaller Branches exactly after the Manner of their
Trunks. Nor ought we to pass over that great Unity of Colours 㛳 37 which
we often see㛳 in all the Flowers of the same Plant or Tree, and often of
a whole Species; and their exact Agreement in many shaded Transitions
into opposite Colours, in which all the Flowers of the same Plant generally agree, nay often all the Flowers of a Species.
Animals.

VIII. Again, as to the Beauty of Animals, either in their inward Structure, which we come to the Knowledge of by Experiment and long Observation, or their outward Form, we shall find 㛳 38 vast㛳 Uniformity
among all the Species which are known to [24] us, in the Structure ofthose Parts, upon which Life depends more immediately. And how
amazing is the Unity of Mechanism, when we shall find 㛳 39 an㛳 almost
infinite diversity of Motions, all their Actions in walking, running, flying, swimming; all their serious Efforts for Self-preservation, all theirfreakish Contortions when they are gay and sportful, in all their various
Limbs, perform’d by one simple Contrivance of a contracting Muscle,section ii

33

apply’d with inconceivable Diversitys to answer all these Ends! Various
Engines might have obtain’d the same Ends; but then there had beenless Uniformity, and the Beauty of our Animal Systems, and of particular Animals, had been much less, when this surprizing Unity of Mechanism had been remov’d from them.
IX. Among Animals of the same Species, the Unity is very obvious, andthis Resemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in such Classes
or Species, notwithstanding the great Diversitys in Bulk, Colour, Shape,
which are observ’d even in those call’d of the same Species. And thenin each Individual, 㛳 40 what vast Beauty㛳 arises from the exact Resemblance of all the external double Members to each other, which seems
the universal Intention of Nature, when no Accident prevents it! We see
the Want of this Resemblance never fails to pass for an [25] Imperfection,and Want of Beauty, tho no other Inconvenience ensues; as when theEyes are not exactly like, or one Arm or Leg is a little shorter or smaller
than its fellow.
㛳 41a As to that most powerful Beauty in Countenances, Airs, Gestures,
Motion, we shall shew in the second Treatise,* that it arises from someimagin’d Indication of morally good Dispositions of 㛳 42b Mind. ab 㛳
X. There is a further Beauty in Animals, arising from a certain Propor- Proportion.
tion of the various Parts to each other, which still pleases the Sense ofSpectators, tho they cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a Statuary.
The Statuary knows what Proportion of each Part of the Face to thewhole Face is most agreeable, and can tell us the same of the Proportionof the Face to the Body, or any Parts of it; and between the Diametersand Lengths of each Limb: When this Proportion of the Head to the
Body is remarkably alter’d, we shall have a Giant or a Dwarf. And hence
it is, that either the one or the other may be represented to us even in
Miniature, without Relation to any external Object, by observing how
the Body surpasses the Proportion it should have to the Head in Giants,
and falls [26] below it in Dwarfs. There is a further Beauty arising from* Sect. vi. Art. 3.

34treatise ithat Figure, which is a natural Indication of Strength; but this may be
pass’d over, because probably it may be alleg’d, that our Approbation ofthis Shape flows from 㛳 43 an㛳 opinion of Advantage, and not from theForm it self.
The Beauty arising from Mechanism, apparently adapted to the Necessitys and Advantages of any Animal; which pleases us, even tho there
be no Advantage to our selves ensuing from it; will be consider’d underthe Head of Relative Beauty, or Design.*
Fowls.

XI. The peculiar Beauty of Fowls can scarce be omitted, which arises
from the 㛳 44 vast㛳 Variety of Feathers, a curious Sort of Machines
adapted to many admirable Uses, which retain a 㛳 45 vast㛳 Resemblancein their Structure among all the Species, 㛳 46 and㛳 a perfect Uniformity
in those of the same Species in the corresponding Parts, and in the two
Sides of each Individual; besides all the Beauty of lively Colours andgradual Shades, not only in the external Appearance of the Fowl, resulting from an artful Combination of shaded Feathers, but often visible
even in one Feather separately. [27]Fluids.

XII. If our Reasonings about the Nature of Fluids be just, the vast Storesof Water will give us an Instance of Uniformity in Nature above Imagination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite Multitude of small,polish’d, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos’d form’d in all the partsof this Globe. The same Uniformity there is probably among the Partsof other Fluids as well as Water: and the like must be observ’d in several
other natural Bodys, as Salts, Sulphurs, and such like; whose uniform
Propertys do probably depend upon an Uniformity in the Figures of
their Parts.

Harmony.

XIII. Under Original Beauty we may include Harmony, or Beauty ofSound, if that Expression can be allow’d, because Harmony is not usually conceiv’d as an Imitation of any thing else. Harmony often raises
Pleasure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it: And yet the* See Sect. iv. Art. 7.

section ii

35

Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of Uniformity. Whenthe several Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrationsof another, they make an agreeable Composition; and such Notes arecall’d 㛳 47 Concords㛳. Thus the Vibrations of any one Note coincide inTime with 㛳 48 two Vibrations㛳 of its Octave; and two Vibrations of any
Note coincide with three of its Fifth; and so on in the rest of the 㛳 49a Con[28]cords. 㛳 50b Now no Composition can be harmonious, in which theNotes are not, for the most part, dispos’d according to these natural
Proportions. Besides which, a due Regard must be had to the Key, whichgoverns the whole, and to the Time and Humour, in which the Composition is begun: 㛳 51c a frequent and inartificial c 㛳 Change of any ofwhich will produce the greatest, and most unnatural Discord. b 㛳 This willappear, by observing the Dissonance which would arise from tacking
Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho both were separately agreeable. A like a 㛳 Uniformity is also observable among the Bases, Tenors,
Trebles of the same Tune.
㛳 52a There is indeed 㛳 53b observable b 㛳, in the best Compositions, a mysterious Effect of Discords: They often give as great Pleasure as continu’dHarmony; whether by refreshing the Ear with Variety, or by awakening
the Attention, and enlivening the Relish for the succeeding Harmonyof Concords, as Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by some othermeans not yet known: Certain it is however that they have their place,and some good Effect in our best Compositions. a 㛳 Some other Powersof Musick may be consider’d 㛳 54 hereafter㛳.* [29]
XIV. But in all these Instances of 55 Beauty let it be observ’d, That the
Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general
Foundation; and that all here alledg’d is this, “That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is Uniformity amidst
Variety:” We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man’s Taste may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters,
tho he be ignorant of the Forms of the small Bodys, or their Motions,which excite 㛳 56 these㛳 Perceptions in him. [30]* See Sect. vi. Art. 12.

u section iii u
Of the Beauty of Theorems.

Theorems.

I. The Beauty of Theorems, or universal Truths demonstrated, deservesa distinct Consideration, 㛳 1 being㛳 of a Nature pretty different from theformer kinds of Beauty; and yet there is none in which we shall see such
an amazing Variety with Uniformity: and hence arises a very great Pleasure distinct from Prospects of any further Advantage.
II. For in one Theorem we may find included, with the most exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often 㛳 2 an Infinity㛳 of Infinites: so that altho the Necessity of forming abstract Ideas,
and universal Theorems, arises perhaps from the Limitation of ourMinds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or
Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largenessof the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus for instance, the47th Proposition of the first Book of Euclid’s Elements contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite possible Sizes ofright-angled Triangles, as you make the Area greater [31] or less; and ineach of these Sizes you may find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar Triangles, as you vary the Proportion of the Base to the Perpendicular; allwhich 㛳 3 Infinitys of 㛳 Infinites agree in the general Theorem. 㛳 4a In Algebraick, and Fluxional Calculations, we shall 㛳 5b still find a greater b 㛳
Variety of particular Truths included in general Theorems; not only ingeneral Equations applicable to all Kinds of Quantity, but in more particular Investigations of Areas and Tangents: In which one Manner ofOperation shall discover Theorems applicable to 㛳 6c infinite c 㛳 Orders or36

section iii

37

Species of Curves, to the infinite Sizes of each Species, and to the infinite
Points of the 㛳 7d infinite d 㛳 Individuals of each Size. a 㛳
III. That we may the better discern this Agreement, or Unity of an In- Foundation offinity of Objects, in the general Theorem, to be the Foundation of the their Beauty.
Beauty or Pleasure attending their Discovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in such Discoverys, with the uneasy state of Mind 㛳 8 in which
we are㛳, when we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are
making Experiments which we can reduce to no general Canon, but㛳 9 only㛳 heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Observations.
Now each of these Trials discovers a new Truth, but with no Pleasure or
Beauty, notwithstand-[32]ing the Variety, till we can discover some sortof Unity, or reduce them to some general Canon.
IV. Again, let us 㛳 10 take㛳 a Metaphysical Axiom, such as this, Every Whole Little Beauty
is greater than its Part; and we shall find no Beauty in the Contemplation. in Axioms.
㛳 11 For tho㛳 this Proposition 㛳 12 contains㛳 many Infinitys of particular
Truths; yet the Unity is inconsiderable, since they all agree only in avague, undetermin’d Conception of Whole and Part, and in an indefinite Excess of the former above the latter, which is sometimes great andsometimes small. So, should we hear that the Cylinder is greater than
the inscrib’d Sphere, and this again greater than the Cone of the same
Altitude and Diameter 㛳 13 with㛳 the Base, we shall find no pleasure inthis Knowledge of a general Relation of greater 㛳 14 and㛳 less, without
any precise Difference or Proportion. But when we see the universal exact Agreement of all possible Sizes of such Systems of Solids, that theypreserve to each other the constant Ratio of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the
Theorem, and how are we ravish’d with its first Discovery!
㛳 15a We may likewise observe, that easy or obvious Propositions, even Easy
where the Unity is sufficiently distinct, and determinate, do not please Theorems.
us so much as those, which [33] being less obvious, give us some Surprizein the Discovery: Thus we find little Pleasure in discovering that a Linebisecting the vertical Angle of an Isosceles 㛳 16b Triangle, bisects b 㛳 the Base,or the Reverse; or, that Equilateral Triangles are Equiangular. These
Truths we 㛳 17c almost c 㛳 know Intuitively, without Demonstration: They38

treatise iare like common Goods, or those which Men have long possessed, which
do not give such sensible 㛳 18d Joys d 㛳 as much smaller new Additions may
give us. But let none hence imagine, that the sole Pleasure of Theorems
is from Surprize; for the same Novelty of a single Experiment does not
please us much: nor ought we to conclude from the greater Pleasure accompanying a new, or unexpected Advantage, that Surprize, or Novelty
is the only Pleasure of Life, or the only ground of Delight in 㛳 19e Truth. ae 㛳
Corollarys.

V. There is another Beauty in Propositions, 㛳 20 which cannot be omitted;
which is㛳, When one Theorem 㛳 21 contains㛳 a 㛳 22 vast㛳 Multitude ofCorollarys easily deducible from it. Thus 㛳 23 that Theorem which gives
us the Equation of a Curve, whence perhaps most of its Propertys may
be deduc’d, does some way please and satisfy our Mind above any other
Proposition㛳: Such a Theorem 㛳 24 also㛳 is the 35th of the 1st Book of
Euclid, from which the whole Art of measuring right-lin’d Areas is deduc’d, by [34] Resolution into Triangles, which are the halfs of so many
Parallelograms; and these are each respectively equal to so many Rectangles of the Base into the perpendicular Altitude: The 47th of the 1st㛳 25 Book㛳 is another of like Beauty, and so are many 㛳 26 others㛳.
27
In the search of Nature there is the like Beauty in the Knowledgeof some great Principles, or universal Forces, from which innumerable
Effects do flow. Such is Gravitation, in Sir Isaac Newton’s Scheme;
㛳 28 such also is the Knowledge of the Original of Rights, perfect andimperfect, and external; alienable and unalienable, with their manner ofTranslations; from whence the greatest Part of moral Dutys may be deduc’d in the various Relations of human Life.㛳
It is easy to see how Men are charm’d with the Beauty of such Knowledge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing thePropertys of each Figure from one Genesis, and demonstrating the mechanick Forces from one Theorem of the Composition of Motion; evenafter they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths
from distinct independent Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy
even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other 㛳 29 Advantage㛳
from such [35] Manner of Deduction, 㛳 30 than㛳 the immediate Pleasureof contemplating the Beauty: nor could Love of Fame excite us to such

section iii

39regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind
are pleas’d with them immediately, by this internal Sense of their Beauty.
It is no less easy to see into what absurd 㛳 31 Attempts㛳 Men have been Fantastick
led by this Sense of Beauty, and 㛳 32 a silly Affectation㛳 of obtaining it in Beauty.
the other Sciences as well as the Mathematicks. ’Twas this probably
which set Descartes i on that hopeful Project of deducing all human
Knowledge from one Proposition, viz. Cogito, ergo sum; while others
㛳 33 with as little Sense contended㛳, that Impossibile est idem simul esse &non esse, had much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of Principium
humanae Cognitionis absolutè primum. Mr. Leibnitz ii had an equal Affection for his favourite Principle of a sufficient Reason for every thing
in Nature, and 㛳 34 brags to Dr. Clarke iii 㛳 of the Wonders he had wroughtin the intellectual World by its Assistance; 㛳 35 but his learned Antagonist
seems to think he had not sufficient Reason for his Boasting.*㛳 If welook into particular Sciences, we 㛳 36 may see in the Systems learned Men
have given us of them,㛳 [36] the Inconveniences of this Love of Uniformity. 㛳 37 How㛳 aukardly 㛳 38 is Puffendorf iv forc’d to㛳 deduce the several Dutys of Men to God, themselves, and their Neighbours, from his
single fundamental Principle of Sociableness to the whole Race of Mani. René Descartes (1596–1650), French philosopher and mathematician, publishedthe cogito-ergo-sum principle first in his Discours de la méthode (1637) and in his
Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), meditations 2 and 3.
ii. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716), German philosopher, mathematician, historian, and jurist, discovered differential and integral calculus, and developed the first binary arithmetic. Of his numerous writings and extensive correspondence, little was published during his lifetime. The principle of sufficient reason iscentral to his metaphysics and logic; see his Monadologie (1720). In an exchange ofletters with Samuel Clarke (see note iii below), he discussed the philosophical principles of Newton’s physics, especially space and time. See The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H. G. Alexander (New York: Manchester University Press, 1998).
iii. Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), English theologian and philosopher, was a friendof Newton whose philosophical doctrine he defended against Leibniz (see note ii
above).
* See the Letters which pass’d between Dr. Clarke and Mr. Leibnitz, Pag. 23.
iv. Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94) was the leading author on natural law in the Enlightenment. See De Jure Naturae et Gentium (Lund, 1672; translation: The Law of
Nature and Nations, London, 1703) and De officio hominis et civis (Lund, 1673; translation: The Whole Duty of Man, London, 1691).

40

treatise ikind? 39 This Observation 㛳 40 might easily be extended farther, were it
necessary; and㛳 is a strong Proof that Men 㛳 41 have a Sense of Beautyin㛳 Uniformity in the Sciences, 㛳 42 even from the Contortions of common Sense they are led into by pursuing it㛳.
VI. This Delight which accompanys Sciences, or universal Theorems,
may really be call’d a kind of Sensation; since it necessarily accompanys
the Discovery of any Proposition, and is distinct from bare Knowledge
it self 43, being most violent at first, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly
the same. And however Knowledge enlarges the Mind, and makes us
more capable of comprehensive Views and Projects in some kinds ofBusiness, whence Advantage may also arise to us; yet we may leave it in
the Breast of every Student to determine, whether he has not often felt
this Pleasure without any such prospect of Advantage from the Discovery of his Theorem. All 㛳 44 which㛳 can thence be infer’d is only this, thatas in our external Senses, so in our internal ones, the pleasant Sensations
generally arise from those Objects which calm Reason [37] would haverecommended, had we understood their Use, and which might have engag’d our pursuits from Self-interest.
VII. 45 If any alledge, “that this Pleasure in Theorems arises only at first,
upon the Novelty of the Discovery, which occasions Surprize:” It must
be own’d indeed that* Novelty is generally very agreeable, and heightens
the Pleasure in the Contemplation of Beauty; but then the Novelty ofa particular Truth, found out by measuring, as above mention’d, gives
no considerable Pleasure, nor Surprize. That then which is pleasant andsurprizing, is the first Observation of this Unity amidst such a great
Variety. There is indeed another kind of Surprize, which adds to theBeauty of some Propositions less universal, and may make them equallypleasant with more universal ones; as when we discover a general Truth
which seem’d before, upon some confus’d Opinion, to be a Falshood:as that Assymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve. Thisis like that Joy, which may be very strong and violent, upon the unex* See Sect. vi. Art. 13. and the Spectator there referr’d to.

section iii

41pected Arrival of a small Advantage, from that Occasion from which weapprehended great Evil; but still this Unity of many Particulars in thegeneral Theo-[38]rem, is necessary to make it pleasant, in any case.
VIII. 46 As to the Works of Art, were we to run thro the various artificial Works of Art.
Contrivances or Structures, we should 㛳 47 constantly㛳 find the Foundation of the Beauty which appears in them, 㛳 48 to be㛳 some kind of
Uniformity, or Unity of Proportion among the Parts, and of each Partto the Whole. As there is a 㛳 49 vast㛳 Diversity of Proportions possible,and different Kinds of Uniformity, so there is room enough for that
Diversity of Fancys observable in Architecture, Gardening, and such like
Arts in different Nations; they all may have Uniformity, tho the Parts
in one may differ from those in another. The Chinese or Persian Buildings are not like the Grecian and Roman, and yet the former has its
Uniformity of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as wellas the latter. In that kind of Architecture which the Europeans call Regular, the Uniformity of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are regular
Figures, and either equal or similar at least in the same Range; the Pedestals are Parallelopipedons or square Prisms; the Pillars, Cylinders
nearly; the Arches Circular, and all those in the same Row equal; thereis the same Proportion every where observ’d in the same Range between
the Diameters of Pillars and their Heights, their Capitals, the Dia[39]meters of Arches, the Heights of the Pedestals, the Projections of
the Cornice, and all 㛳 50 the㛳 Ornaments in each of our five Orders. And
tho other Countrys do not follow the Grecian or Roman Proportions;
yet there is even among them a Proportion retain’d, a Uniformity, andResemblance of corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one partfrom 㛳 51 that㛳 Proportion which is observ’d in the rest of the Building,
is displeasing to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the Beautyof the Whole.
IX. The same might be observ’d thro all other Works of Art, even to
the meanest Utensil; the Beauty of every one of which we shall always
find to have the same Foundation of Uniformity amidst Variety, without
which they 㛳 53 appear㛳 mean, irregular and deform’d. [40]52u section iv u
Of Relative or Comparative Beauty.

Comparative
Beauty.

I. If the preceding Thoughts concerning the Foundation of absolute
Beauty be just, we may easily understand wherein relative Beauty consists. All Beauty is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it; butwhat we call relative is that which is apprehended in any Object, commonly consider’d as an Imitation of some Original: And this Beauty isfounded on a Conformity, or a kind of Unity between the Original andthe Copy. The Original may be either some Object in Nature, or someestablish’d Idea; for if there be any known Idea as a Standard, and Rules
to fix this Image or Idea by, we may make a beautiful Imitation. Thus a
Statuary, Painter, or Poet, may please us with an Hercules, if his Piece
retains that Grandeur, and those marks of Strength, and Courage, which
we imagine in that Hero.
1
And farther, to obtain comparative Beauty alone, it is not necessarythat there be any Beauty in the Original; the Imitation of absolute
Beauty may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet [41]an exact Imitation shall still be beautiful, tho the Original were intirely
void of it: Thus the Deformitys of old Age in a Picture, the rudest Rocksor Mountains in a Landskip, if well represented, shall have abundant
Beauty, tho perhaps not so great as if the Original were absolutely beautiful, and as well 㛳 2 represented.㛳

Description
in Poetry.

II. The same Observation holds true in the Descriptions of the Poets
either of natural Objects or Persons; and this relative Beauty is what theyshould principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar Beauty of their42

section iv

43

Works. By the Moratae Fabulae, or the h⁄jh of Aristotle, we are not tounderstand virtuous Manners 㛳 3 in a moral Sense㛳, but a just Representation of Manners or Characters as they are in Nature; and that the Actions and Sentiments be suited to the Characters of the Persons to whomthey are ascrib’d in Epick and Dramatick Poetry. Perhaps very good Reasons may be suggested from the Nature of our Passions, to prove that a
Poet should 㛳 4 not㛳 draw 㛳 5 his Characters perfectly Virtuous㛳; these
Characters indeed abstractly consider’d might give more Pleasure, andhave more Beauty than the imperfect ones which occur in Life with amixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to suggest against
this Choice, that we have more lively Ideas of imperfect Men with all
their Passions, [42] than of morally perfect Heroes, such as really neveroccur to our Observation; and of 㛳 6 which㛳 consequently we cannot
judge exactly as to their Agreement with the Copy. And further, thro
Consciousness of our own State, we are more nearly touch’d and affectedby the imperfect Characters; since in them we see represented, in the
Persons of others, the Contrasts of Inclinations, and the Struggles between the Passions of Self-Love and those of Honour and Virtue, which
we often feel in our own Breasts. This is the Perfection of Beauty for which
Homer is justly admir’d, as well as for the Variety of his Characters.
III. Many other Beautys of Poetry may be reduc’d under this Class of Probability,
7
Simily 㥋 ,relative Beauty: The Probability is absolutely necessary to make us imag- 㥋Metaphor.
ine Resemblance; it is by Resemblance that the Similitudes, Metaphorsand Allegorys are made beautiful, whether either the Subject or theThing compar’d to it have Beauty or not; the Beauty indeed is greater,when both have some original Beauty or Dignity as well as Resemblance:
and this is the foundation of the Rule of studying Decency in Metaphorsand 㛳 8 Similys㛳 as well as Likeness. The Measures and Cadence are instances of Harmony, and come under the head of absolute Beauty. [43]
IV. We may here observe a strange Proneness in our Minds to make Proneness toperpetual Comparisons of all things which occur to our Observation, compare.
even 㛳 9 those which would seem very remote㛳. There are certain Resemblances in the Motions of all Animals upon like Passions, which easily

44treatise ifound a Comparison; but this does not serve to entertain our Fancy:
Inanimate Objects have often such Positions as resemble those of thehuman Body in various Circumstances; these Airs or Gestures of the
Body are Indications of 㛳 10 certain㛳 Dispositions in the Mind, so thatour very Passions and Affections as well as other Circumstances obtaina Resemblance to natural inanimate Objects. Thus a Tempest at Sea isoften an Emblem of Wrath; a Plant or Tree drooping under the Rain,of a Person in Sorrow; a Poppy bending its Stalk, or a Flower withering
when cut by the Plow, resembles the Death of a blooming Hero; an aged
Oak in the Mountains shall represent an old Empire, a Flame seizing a
Wood shall represent a War. In short, every thing in Nature, by ourstrange inclination to Resemblance, shall be brought to represent otherthings, even the most remote, especially the Passions and Circumstancesof human Nature in which we are more nearly concern’d; and to confirm
this, and furnish Instances of it, one [44] need only look into Homer or
Virgil. A fruitful Fancy would find in a Grove, or a Wood, an Emblem
㛳 11 for㛳 every Character in a Commonwealth, and every turn of Temper,or Station in Life.
Intention.

V. Concerning that kind of comparative Beauty which has a necessary
relation to some establish’d Idea, we may observe, that some Works of
Art acquire a distinct Beauty by their Correspondence to some universally suppos’d Intention in the 㛳 12 Artificer㛳, or the Persons who employ’d 㛳 13 him㛳: And to obtain this Beauty, sometimes they do not form
their Works so as to attain the highest Perfection of original Beauty separately consider’d; because a Composition of this relative Beauty, alongwith some degree of the original Kind, may give more Pleasure, than amore perfect original Beauty separately. Thus we see, that strict Regularity in laying out of Gardens in Parterres, Vista’s, parallel Walks, isoften neglected, to obtain an Imitation of Nature even in some of its
Wildnesses. And we are more pleas’d with this Imitation, especiallywhen
the Scene is large and spacious, than with the more confin’d Exactnessof regular 㛳 14 Works㛳. So likewise in the Monuments erected in honourof deceased Heroes, although a Cylinder, or Prism, or regular Solid, may
have more original Beauty than a very acute Pyramid or Obelisk, [45]yet the latter pleases more, by answering better the suppos’d Intentionssection iv

45

of Stability, and being conspicuous. For the same reason Cubes, or
square Prisms, are generally chosen for the Pedestals of Statues, and not
any of the more beautiful Solids, which do not seem so secure fromrolling. This may be the reason too, why Columns or Pillars look bestwhen made a little taper from the middle, or a third from the bottom,
that they may not seem top-heavy and in danger of falling.
VI. The like reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, todepart from the Rules of original Beauty, as above laid down. And yet
this is no Argument against our Sense of Beauty being founded, as wasabove explain’d, on Uniformity amidst Variety, but only an Evidence
that our Sense of Beauty of the Original Kind may be vary’d and overballanc’d by another kind of Beauty.
VII. This Beauty arising from Correspondence to Intention, would open
to curious Observers a new Scene of Beauty in the Works of Nature, byconsidering how the Mechanism of the various Parts known to us, seems
adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to theGood of some System or Whole. We generally suppose the Good of[46] the greatest Whole, or of all Beings, to have been the Intention of
the Author of Nature; and cannot avoid being pleas’d when we see any
part of this Design executed in the Systems we are acquainted with. The
Observations already made on this Subject are in every one’s hand, in
the Treatises of our late Improvers of mechanical Philosophy. 㛳 15 We
shall only observe here, that every one has a certain Pleasure in㛳 seeing
any Design well executed by curious Mechanism, even when his own
Advantage is no way concern’d; 㛳 16 and also㛳 in discovering the Design
to which any complex Machine is adapted, when he has perhaps had ageneral Knowledge of the Machine before, without seeing its Correspondence or Aptness to execute any Design. 17
The Arguments by which we prove Reason and Design in any Cause
from the Beauty of the Effects, are so frequently us’d in some of thehighest Subjects, that it may be necessary to enquire a little more particularly into them, to see how far they will hold, and with what degreeof Evidence. [47]u section v u
Concerning our Reasonings about Design
and Wisdom in the Cause, from the Beauty
or Regularity of Effects.

Sense,
Arbitrary in
its Author.

I. There seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas ofBeauty with the Uniformity or Regularity of the Objects, from the Nature of things, 㛳 1 antecedent㛳 to some Constitution of the Author of our
Nature, which has made such Forms pleasant to us. Other Minds 㛳 2 may㛳
be so fram’d as to receive no Pleasure from Uniformity; and we actuallyfind that the same regular Forms 㛳 3 seem not㛳 equally to please all the
Animals known to us, as shall probably appear 㛳 4 afterwards㛳. Therefore
let us make what is the most unfavourable Supposition to the present
Argument㛳 5, viz.㛳 That the Constitution of our Sense so as to approve
Uniformity, is merely arbitrary in the Author of our Nature; and that
there are an infinity of Tastes or Relishes of Beauty possible; so that it
would be impossible to throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles, whichshould not make an agreeable Habitation for some Animal or other, andappear beautiful to it. And then it is [48] plain, that from the Perceptionof Beauty in any one Effect, we should have no reason to conclude Design in the Cause: for a Sense might be so constituted as to be pleas’dwith such Irregularity as may be the effect of an undirected Force.* But* 㛳 6a By undirected Force, or undesigning Force, is to be understood, That Forcewith which an Agent may put Matter into Motion, without having any Design orIntention to produce any particular Form. 㛳 7bThis b 㛳 Conatus ad motum, without anactual Line of Direction, seems such a gross absurdity in the Cartesian Scheme, that
it is 㛳 8c below the Dignity of common Sense to vouchsafe to confute it c 㛳. But Men

46

section v

47then, as there are an Infinity of Forms 㛳 9 possible㛳 into which any System
may be reduc’d, an Infinity of Places in which Animals may be situated,
and an Infinity of Relishes or Senses 㛳 10 in these Animals㛳 is suppos’dpossible; that in the immense Spaces any one Animal should by Chance
be plac’d in a System agreeable to its Taste, must be improbable as infinite to one at least: And much more unreasonable is it to expect from
Chance, that a multitude of Animals agreeing in their Sense of Beauty
should obtain agreeable Places. [49]II. 㛳 11 There is also㛳 the same Probability, that in any one System of Undirected
Matter an Undirected Force 㛳 12 will㛳 produce a regular Form, as any one Force.
given irregular one, of the same degree of Complication: But still theirregular Forms into which any System may be rang’d, surpass in multitude the Regular, as Infinite does Unity; for what holds in one small
System will hold in a Thousand, a Million, a Universe, with more Advantage, viz. that the irregular Forms possible infinitely surpass the Regular. For Instance, the Area of an Inch Square is capable of an Infinityof regular Forms, the Equilateral Triangle, the Square, the Pentagon,
Hexagon, Heptagon, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an
Infinity of Irregular, as an Infinity of Scalena for the one equilateral
Triangle, an Infinity of Trapezia for the one Square, of irregular Pentagons for the one Regular, and so on: and therefore supposing any one
System agitated by undesigning Force, it 㛳 13 is㛳 infinitely more probablethat it 㛳 14 will㛳 resolve itself into an irregular Form, than a regular. Thus,
that a System of six Parts upon Agitation shall not obtain the Form ofa regular Hexagon, is at least infinite to Unity; and the more complex

have so many confus’d Notions of some Nature, or Chance impressing Motions
without any Design or Intention of producing any particular Effect, that it may be
useful to shew, that even this very absurd Postulatum, tho it were granted them, isinsufficient to answer the appearances in the Regularity of the World; and this is what
is attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section. These Arguments would
really be useless, if all Men were persuaded of what to a Man of just Thought willappear pretty Obvious, that there can be no Thought-less Agent; and that Chanceand Nature are mere empty Names, as they are us’d on this Occasion, relative only
to our Ignorance. a 㛳

48

treatise i

we make the System, the greater is the hazard, from a very obvious Reason. [50]15
We see this confirm’d by our constant Experience, that Regularity
never arises from any undesign’d Force of ours; and from this we conclude, that wherever there is any Regularity in the disposition of a System capable of many other 㛳 16 Dispositions㛳, there must have been Design in the Cause; and the Force of this Evidence increases, according
to the Multiplicity of Parts imploy’d.
But this Conclusion is too rash, unless some further Proof be introduc’d; and what leads us into it is this. Men, who have a Sense of
Beauty in Regularity, are led generally in all their Arrangements of Bodys
to study some kind of Regularity, and seldom ever design Irregularity;㛳 17 hence㛳 we judge the same of other Beings too, 㛳 18 viz.㛳 that they study
Regularity, and presume upon Intention in the Cause wherever we see
it, making Irregularity always a Presumption of Want of Design:㛳 19 Whereas if other Agents have different Senses of Beauty,㛳 or if they
have no Sense of it at all, Irregularity may as well be design’d as Regularity. And then let it be observ’d, that in this Case there is just the same
reason to conclude Design in the Cause from any one irregular Effect,
as from a regular one; for since there are an Infinity of other Forms possible as well as this irre-[51]gular one produc’d, and since to such a Being*
void of a Sense of Beauty, all Forms are as to its own Relish indifferent,
and all agitated Matter meeting must make some Form or other, and all* There is a great Difference between such a Being as is here mention’d, and a
Being which has no Intention for any reason whatsoever to produce one Form morethan another. This latter sort of Being, as to the present Argument, would be thesame with Chance, but not the former. For tho a Being has no sense of Beauty, he
may notwithstanding be capable of Design, and of Intention to produce regular
Forms; and the observation of greater Regularity in any number of Effects, than
could be expected from undirected Force, is a presumption of Design and Intention
in the Cause, even where the Cause is suppos’d to have no sense of Beauty in such
Forms, since perhaps he may have other Reasons moving him to chuse such Forms.
Thus supposing the Deity 㛳 20 no way necessarily㛳 pleas’d with Regularity, Uniformity,or Similarity in Bodys, yet there may be Reasons moving him to produce such Objects, such as the pleasing his Creatures, having given them a sense of Beauty foundedon these Qualitys. See the two last Paragraphs of the last Section.

section v

49

Forms, upon Supposition that the Force is apply’d by an Agent void ofa Sense of Beauty, would equally prove Design; it is plain that no one
Form proves it more than another, or can prove it at all; except from ageneral metaphysical Consideration, 㛳 21 too subtile to be certain,㛳 that
there is no proper Agent without Design and Intention, and that every
Effect flows from the Intention of some Cause.
III. This however follows from the above 㛳 22 mention’d㛳 Considerations, Similar Forms
Chance,that supposing a Mass of Matter surpassing a cubick Inch, as [52] infinite byimpossible.
of the first Power does Unity, and that this whole Mass were some way
determin’d from its own Nature without any Design in a Cause (whichperhaps is scarce possible) to resolve itself into 㛳 23 the solid Content ofa cubick Inch㛳, and into a prismatick Form whose Base should always1
be –2 of a square Inch; suppose these Conditions determin’d, and all others left to undirected Force; all 㛳 24 which㛳 we could expect from undirected Force in this Case would be one equilateral Prism, or two perhaps;
because there are an Infinity of irregular Prisms possible of the sameBase, and solid Content: and when we 㛳 25 met㛳 with many such Prisms,
we must probably conclude 㛳 26 them produc’d by Design,㛳 since they are
more than could have been expected by the Laws of Hazard.
IV. But if 㛳 27 this㛳 infinite Mass was 㛳 28 no way㛳 determin’d to a prismatick Form, we could only expect from its casual Concourse one Prismof any Kind, since there 㛳 29 is an Infinity of other Solids㛳 into which theMass might be resolv’d; and if we found any great number of Prisms,
we should have 㛳 30 reason to presume㛳 Design: so that in a Mass of Matter as infinite of the first Power, we could not from any Concourse orAgitation expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions
or Size, and of any given [53] Form; since of any Dimension there areinfinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Dimensions; and if we found several Bodys of the same Dimension andForm, we should have so much Presumption for Design.
V. There is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from thecrystallizing of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in which

50

treatise ithey were swimming; for in this we frequently see regular Forms arising,
tho there is nothing 㛳 31 suppos’d in this Affair but an undirected Forceof Attraction㛳. But to remove this Objection, we need only consider,that we have good Reason to believe, that the smallest Particles of crystalliz’d Bodys have fix’d regular Forms 㛳 32 given㛳 them in the Constitution of Nature; and then it is easy to conceive how their Attractions
may produce regular Forms: but unless we suppose some preceding Regularity in the Figures of attracting Bodys, they 㛳 33 can㛳 never form any
regular Body at all. And hence we see how improbable it is, that thewhole Mass of Matter, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars
known to us by our Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger
than our Astronomers suppose, could in any Concourse have produc’dany Number of similar Bodys Regular or Irregular. [54]Combinations
by Chance,
impossible.

VI. And let it be here observ’d, that there are many Compositions ofBodys which the smallest Degree of Design could easily effect, which
yet we would in vain expect from all the Powers of Chance or undesign’d
Force, 㛳 34 after㛳 an Infinity of Rencounters; even supposing a Dissolution of every Form except the regular one, that the Parts might beprepar’d for a new Agitation. Thus, supposing we could expect one equilateral Prism of any given Dimensions should be form’d from undirected
Force, in an Infinity of Matter some way determin’d to resolve 㛳 35 itself 㛳into Bodys of a given solid Content, (which is all we could expect, since
it is infinite to one after the solid Content is obtain’d, that the Body shallnot be Prismatical; and allowing it Prismatical, it is infinite to one thatit shall not be Equilateral:) And again, supposing another Infinity ofMatter determin’d to resolve itself into Tubes, of Orifices exactly equal
to the Bases of the former Prisms, it is again at least as the second Powerof Infinite to Unity, that not one of these Tubes shall be both Prismatickand Equiangular; and then if the Tube were thus form’d, so as to be
exactly capable of receiving one of the Prisms and no more, it is infinite
to one that they shall never meet in infinite Space; and should [55] they
meet, it is infinite to one that the Axes of the Prism and Tube shall never
happen in the same strait Line; and supposing they did, it is again as
infinite to three, that Angle shall not meet Angle, so as to enter. We seesection v

51

then how infinitely improbable it is, “that all the Powers of Chance ininfinite Matter, agitated thro infinite Ages, could ever effect this small
Composition of a Prism entering a Prismatick Bore; and, that all ourhazard for it would at most be but as three is to the third Power of Infinite.” And yet the smallest Design could easily effect it.
VII. May we not then justly count it altogether absurd, and next to an
absolute strict Impossibility, “That all the Powers of undirected Forceshould ever effect such a complex Machine 㛳 36 as㛳 the most imperfect
Plant, or the meanest Animal, even in one Instance?” for the Improbability just increases, as the Complication of Mechanism in these natural
Bodys surpasses that simple Combination above mention’d.
VIII. Let it be here observ’d, “That the preceding Reasoning from theFrequency of regular Bodys of one Form in the Universe, and from the
Combinations of various Bodys, is intirely inde-[56]pendent on any Perception of Beauty; and would equally prove Design in the Cause, altho
there were no Being which perceiv’d Beauty in any Form whatsoever:”for it is in short this, “That the recurring of any Effect oftner than theLaws of Hazard 㛳 37 determine㛳, gives Presumption of Design; and, That
Combinations which no undesign’d Force could give us reason to expect, must necessarily prove the same; and that with superior probability,
as the multitude of Cases in which the contrary 㛳 38 might㛳 happen, surpass all the Cases in which this could happen:” which appears to be in
the simplest Cases at least as Infinite 㛳 39 does㛳 Unity. And the frequencyof similar irregular Forms, or exact Combinations of them, is an equal
Argument of Design in the Cause, since the Similarity, or exact Combinations of irregular Forms, are as little to be expected from all thePowers of undirected Force, as any sort whatsoever.
IX. To bring this nearer to something like a Theorem, altho the Idea ofInfinite be troublesome enough to manage in Reasoning. The Powersof Chance, with infinite Matter in infinite Ages, may answer Hazards
as the fifth Power of Infinite and no more: thus the Quantity of Matter
may be conceiv’d as the third Power of [57] Infinite and no more, the52treatise ivarious Degrees of Force may make another Power of Infinite, and the
Number of Rencounters may make the fifth. But this last only holds on
Supposition, that after every Rencounter there is no Cohesion, but allis dissolv’d again for a new Concourse, except in similar Forms or exact
Combinations; which Supposition is entirely groundless, since we see
dissimilar Bodys cohering as strongly as any, and rude Masses more thanany Combinations. Now to produce any given Body, in a given Place or
Situation, and of given Dimensions, or Shape, the Hazards of the contrary are, one Power of Infinite at least to obtain the Place or Situation;
when the Situation is obtain’d, the solid Content requires another Powerof Infinite to obtain it; the Situation and Solidity obtain’d require, foraccomplishing the simplest given Shape, at least the other three Powersof Infinite. For instance, let the Shape be a four-sided Prism or Parallelopiped; that the Surfaces should be Planes requires one Power; thatthey should be Parallel in this Case, or inclin’d in any given Angle inany other Case, requires another Power of Infinite; and that they should
be in any given Ratio to each other, requires at least the third Power: forin each of these Heads there 㛳 40 is still an Infinity at least㛳 of other Cases
possible beside the one given. So that all [58] the Powers of Chance could
only produce perhaps one Body of every simpler Shape or Size at most,and this is all we could expect: we might expect one Pyramid, or Cube,or Prism perhaps; but when we increase the Conditions requir’d, theProspect must grow more improbable, as in more complex Figures, andin all Combinations of Bodys, and in similar Species, which we never
could reasonably hope from Chance; and therefore where we see them,
we must certainly ascribe them to Design.
Combinationsof irregular
Forms, equally
impossible.

X. The Combinations of regular Forms, or of irregular ones exactly
adapted to each other, require such vast Powers of Infinite to effect them,and the Hazards of the contrary Forms are so infinitely numerous, that
all Probability or Possibility of their being accomplish’d by Chance
seems quite to vanish. Let us apply the Cases in Art. vi. 㛳 41 of 㛳 this Section
about the Prism and Tube, to our simplest Machines, such as a pair ofWheels of our ordinary Carriages; each Circular, Spokes equal in length,
thickness, shape; the Wheels set Parallel, the Axle-tree fix’d in the Navesection v

53of both, and secur’d from coming out at either End: 㛳 42 Now㛳 the Cases
in which the contrary might have happen’d from undirected Concourses, were there no more requir’d than what is just now mention’d,must amount in Multitude to a Power of 㛳 43 Infinite㛳 [59] equal to every
Circumstance requir’d. What shall we say then of a Plant, a Tree, anAnimal, a Man, with such multitudes of adapted Vessels, such Articulations, Insertions of Muscles, Diffusion of Veins, Arterys, Nerves? The
Improbability that such Machines 㛳 44 should be the Effect of Chance,
must be near the infinitesimal Power of Infinite to Unity.㛳
XI. Further, were all the former Reasoning from Similarity of Forms
and Combinations groundless, and could Chance give us ground to expect such Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promise㛳 45 ourselves㛳 one of these Forms among an Infinity of others. When we
see then such a multitude of Individuals of a Species, similar to eachother in a 㛳 46 vast㛳 number of Parts; and when we see in each Individual,
the corresponding Members so exactly 㛳 47 like㛳 each other, what possible
room is there left for questioning Design in the Universe? None but thebarest Possibility against an inconceivably great Probability, surpassing
every thing which is not strict Demonstration.
XII. This Argument, 㛳 48 as㛳 has been already observ’d,* is quite abstracted from any Sense of Beauty in any particular Form; for the exact
Similarity of a hundred or a [60] thousand Trapezia, proves Design aswell as the Similarity of Squares, since both are equally above all thePowers of undirected Force or Chance㛳 49, as the hundredth or thousandth Power of Infinite surpasses Unity;㛳 and what is above the Powersof Chance, must give us proportionable Presumption for Design.
Thus, allowing that a Leg, or Arm, or Eye, might have been the Effectof Chance, (which was shewn to be most absurd, and next to absolutely
impossible) that it 㛳 50 would㛳 not have a corresponding Leg, Arm, Eye,exactly similar, must be a hazard of a Power of Infinite proportion’d to
the Complication of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the multitude of* See above, Art. viii.

54

treatise i

Cases increas’d, in which it would not have a corresponding Member
similar: so that allowing twenty or thirty Parts in such a Structure, itwould be as the twentieth or thirtieth Power of Infinite to Unity, thatthe corresponding Part should not be similar. What shall we say then of
the similar Forms of a whole Species?
Gross
Similarity
by Chance,
impossible.

XIII. If it be objected, “That natural Bodys are not exactly similar, but
only grosly so to our Senses; as that a Vein, an Artery, a Bone is not
perhaps exactly similar to its Correspondent in the same Animal, tho itappears so to [61] our Senses, which 㛳 52 judge only㛳 of the Bulk, and do
not discern the small constituent Parts; and that in the several Individuals of a Species the Dissimilarity is always sensible, often in the internal
Structure, and 㛳 53 often, nay㛳 always in the external Appearance.” To
remove this Objection it will be sufficient to shew, “That the multitudeof Cases wherein sensible Dissimilitude cou’d have happen’d, are still
infinitely more than all the Cases in which sensible Similitude 㛳 54 might㛳;”so that the same Reasoning holds from sensible Similarity, as from themathematically exact: And again, “That the Cases of gross Dissimilarity
do in the same manner surpass the Cases of gross Similarity possible, as
infinite does one.”
51

XIV. To prove both these Assertions, let us consider a simple Instance.
㛳 Suppose㛳 a Trapezium of a foot Square in Area 㛳 57 should㛳 appear–1 of an Inch; orgrosly similar to another, while no one side differs, by 10
no Angle in one surpasses the corresponding one in the other above ten
㛳 58 Minutes㛳: now this tenth of an Inch is infinitely divisible, as 㛳 59 arealso㛳 the ten Minutes, so that the Cases of insensible Dissimilarity underapparent Similarity are really Infinite. But then it is also plain that there
are an Infinity of different sensibly dissimilar Trapezia, even of the same
Area, ac-[62]cording as we vary a Side by one Tenth, two Tenths, three
Tenths, and so on, and 㛳 60 vary㛳 the Angles and another Side so as tokeep the Area equal. Now in each of these infinite Degrees of sensible
Dissimilitude the several Tenths are infinitely divisible as well as in thefirst Case; so that the multitude of sensible Dissimilaritys are to the multitude of insensible Dissimilaritys under apparent Resemblance, still as
55

56

section v

55

the second Power of Infinite to the first, or as Infinite to Unity. And thenhow vastly greater must the Multitude be, of all possible sensible Dissimilaritys in such complex Bodys as Legs, Arms, Eyes, Arterys, Veins,
Skeletons?
XV. As to the Dissimilaritys of Animals of the same Species, it is in
the same manner plain, that the possible Cases of gross Dissimilarity are
Infinite; and then every Case of gross Dissimilarity contains also all theCases of insensible Dissimilarity. Thus, if we would count all Animals
of a Species grosly similar, while there was no Limb which in Length or
Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a third of the Head;
it is plain that there are an Infinity of 㛳 62 gross㛳 Dissimilaritys possible,
and then in each of these Cases of gross Dissimilarity, there are an In1
finity of Cases of nicer Dissimilarity, since –3 of the Head may be infinitely divided. To take a low [63] but easy Instance; two Cockle-Shells
which fitted each other naturally, may have an Infinity of insensible Differences, but still there are an Infinity of possible sensible Differences;and then in any one of the sensibly different Forms, there may be thesame Infinity of insensible Differences beside the sensible one: So thatstill the hazard for even gross Similarity from Chance is Infinite to one,and this always increases by a Power of Infinite for every distinct Member of the Animal, in which even gross Similarity is retain’d; since theAddition of every Member or Part to a complex Machine, makes a new
Infinity of Cases, in which sensible Dissimilarity may happen; and thisInfinity combin’d with the infinite Cases of the former Parts, raises theHazard by a Power of Infinite.
Now this may sufficiently shew us the Absurdity of the Cartesian or
Epicurean Hypothesis, even granting their Postulatum of undirected
Force impress’d on infinite Matter; and seems almost a Demonstrationof Design in the Universe.
61

XVI. One Objection 㛳 64 more㛳 remains to be remov’d, viz. “That someimagine, this Argument may hold better à Priori than à Posteriori; thatis, we have better Reason to believe, when we see a Cause about to act,
without Knowledge, [64] that he will not attain any given, or desir’d

63

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treatise iEnd; than we have on the other hand to believe, when we see 㛳 65 the㛳End actually attain’d, that he acted with Knowledge: Thus, say they,
when a 㛳 66 particular Person㛳 is about to draw a Ticket in a Lottery, where
there is but one Prize to a thousand Blanks, it is highly probable that heshall draw a Blank; but suppose we have seen him actually draw for himself the Prize, we have no ground to conclude that he had Knowledge
or Art to accomplish this End.” But the Answer is obvious: In such Contrivances we generally have, from the very Circumstances of the Lottery,very strong moral Arguments, which almost demonstrate that Art canhave no place; so that a Probability of a 㛳 67 thousand to one㛳, 㛳 68 does㛳
not surmount those Arguments: But let the Probability be increas’d, andit will soon surmount 㛳 69 all㛳 Arguments to the contrary. For instance,
If we saw a Man ten times successively draw Prizes, in a Lottery where
there were but ten Prizes to ten thousand Blanks, I fancy few would
question whether he us’d Art or not: much less would we imagine it were
Chance, if we saw a Man draw for his own Gain successively a hundred,or a thousand Prizes, from among a proportionably greater number ofBlanks. Now in the Works of Nature the Case is entirely different: wehave not the least [65] Argument against Art or Design. An intelligent
Cause is surely at least as probable a Notion as Chance, general Force,
Conatus ad Motum, or the Clinamen Principiorum, to account for any
Effect whatsoever: And then all the Regularity, Combinations, Similaritys of Species, are so many Demonstrations, that there was Design andIntelligence in the Cause of this Universe: Whereas in fair Lotterys, all㛳 70 Art㛳 in drawing is made, if not actually impossible, at least highly
improbable.
Irregularity
does not prove
want of
Design.

XVII. Let it be here observ’d also, “That a rational Agent may be capable of impressing Force 㛳 72 without㛳 intending to produce any particular Form, and of designedly producing irregular or dissimilar Forms,
as well as regular and similar:” And hence it follows, “That altho all the
Regularity, Combination and Similarity in the Universe, are Presumptions of Design, yet Irregularity is no Presumption of the contrary; unless we suppose that the Agent is determin’d from a Sense of Beauty
always to act regularly, and delight in Similarity; and that he can have71

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57

no other inconsistent Motive of Action:” Which last is plainly absurd.
We do not want in the Universe many Effects which seem to have beenleft to the general Laws of Motion upon some great Impulse, and [66]have many Instances where Similarity has been 㛳 73 plainly design’d㛳 insome respects, and probably neglected in others; or even Dissimilarity
design’d. Thus we see the general exact Resemblance between the two
Eyes of most persons; and yet perhaps no other third Eye in the World
㛳 74 is㛳 exactly like them. We see a gross Conformity of shape in all Persons
in innumerable Parts, and yet no two Individuals of any Species are undistinguishable; which perhaps is intended for valuable Purposes to thewhole Species.
XVIII. Hitherto the Proof amounts only to Design or Intentionbarely, Wisdom,
in opposition to blind Force or Chance; and we see the Proof of this is Prudence.
independent on the arbitrary Constitution of our internal Sense of
Beauty. Beauty is often suppos’d an Argument of more than Design, towit, Wisdom and Prudence in the Cause. Let us enquire also into this.
Wisdom denotes the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means;
and therefore before we can from any Effect prove the Cause to be wise,
we must know what is best to the Cause or Agent. Among men who havepleasure in contemplating Uniformity, the Beauty of Effects is an Argument of Wisdom, because this is Good to [67] them; but the same
Argument would not hold as to a Being void of this Sense of Beauty.
And therefore the Beauty apparent to us in Nature, will not of itself
prove Wisdom in the Cause, unless this Cause, or Author of Nature besuppos’d Benevolent; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind isdesirable or Good to the Supreme Cause; and that Form which pleases
us, is an Argument of his Wisdom. And the Strength of this Argument
is increased always in proportion to the Degree of Beauty produc’d in
Nature, and expos’d to the View of any rational 㛳 76 Agent㛳; since upon
supposition of a benevolent Deity, all the apparent Beauty produc’d isan Evidence of the Execution of a Benevolent Design, to give 㛳 77 him㛳
the Pleasures of Beauty.
78
But what more immediately proves Wisdom is this; when we see
any Machine with a 㛳 79 vast㛳 Complication of Parts actually obtaining75

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treatise ian End, we justly conclude, “That since this could not have been the
Effect of Chance, it must have been intended for that End, which is
obtain’d by it;” and then the Ends or Intentions, being in part known,
the Complication of Organs, and their nice Disposition adapted to thisEnd, is an Evidence “of a comprehensive large Understanding in the
Cause, according to the Multi-[68]plicity of Parts, and the Appositenessof their Structure, even when we do not know the Intention of theWhole.”
General
Causes.

General Laws.

XIX. There is another kind of Beauty 㛳 81 also which is still pleasing to
our Sense, and㛳 from which we conclude Wisdom in the Cause as well
as Design, 㛳 82 and that is,㛳 when we see many useful or beautiful Effects
flowing from one general Cause. There is a very good Reason for thisConclusion among Men. Interest must lead Beings of limited Powers,
who are uncapable of a great diversity of Operations, and distracted bythem, to chuse this frugal Oeconomy of their Forces, and to look uponsuch Management as an Evidence of Wisdom in other Beings like themselves. Nor is this speculative Reason all which influences them, for evenbeside this Consideration of Interest, they are determin’d by a Sense of
Beauty where that Reason does not hold; as when we are judging of the
Productions of other Agents about whose Oeconomy we are not sollicitous. Thus, who does not approve of it as a Perfection in Clock-work,that three or four Motions of the Hour, Minute, and second Hands, andmonthly Plate, should arise from one Spring or Weight, rather than fromthree, or four Springs, or Weights, in a very Compound Machine, whichshould perform the same Effects, and answer all [69] the same Purposeswith equal exactness? Now the Foundation of this Beauty plainly appears to be 㛳 83 Uniformity㛳 or Unity of Cause amidst Diversity of
Effects.
80

XX. We 㛳 85 shall* hereafter㛳 offer some Reasons, why the Author of
Nature 㛳 86 may㛳 chuse to operate in this manner by General Laws andUniversal extensive Causes, altho the Reason just now mention’d does
84

* See the last Section.

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59

not hold with an Almighty Being. This is certain, That we have someof the most delightful Instances of Universal Causes in the Works of
Nature, and that the most studious men in these Subjects are so delighted
with the Observation of them, that they always look upon them as Evidences of Wisdom in the Administration of Nature, from a Sense of
Beauty.
XXI. The wonderfully simple Mechanism which performs all Animal
Motions, was mention’d* already; nor is that of the inanimate Parts of
Nature less admirable. How innumerable are the Effects of that one
Principle of Heat, deriv’d to us from the Sun, which is not only delightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of discerning Objects, but
is the Cause of Rains, Springs, Rivers, Winds, [70] and the universal
Cause of Vegetation! The uniform Principle of Gravity preserves at once
the Planets in their Orbits, gives Cohesion to the Parts of each Globe,
and Stability to Mountains, Hills, and artificial Structures; it raises the
Sea in Tides, and sinks them again, and restrains them in their Channels;
it drains the Earth of its superfluous Moisture, by Rivers; it raises the
Vapours by its Influence on the Air, and brings them down again in
Rains; it gives an uniform Pressure to our Atmosphere, necessary to ourBodys in general, and more especially to Inspiration in Breathing; andfurnishes us with an universal Movement, capable of being apply’d ininnumerable Engines. How incomparably more beautiful is this Structure, than if we suppos’d so many distinct Volitions in the Deity, producing every particular Effect, and preventing some of the accidental
Evils which casually flow from the general Law! 㛳 88 We may rashly imagine that㛳 this latter manner of Operation might have been more usefulto us; and 㛳 89 it㛳 would have been no distraction to Omnipotence: But
then the great Beauty had been lost, and there had been no more Pleasurein the Contemplation of this Scene, which is now so delightful. One
would rather chuse to run the hazard of its casual Evils, than part withthat harmonious Form which has been 㛳 90 an㛳 [71] unexhausted Sourceof Delight to the successive Spectators in all Ages.
87* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 8.

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Miracles.

treatise i

XXII. Hence we see, “That however Miracles may prove the Superintendency of a voluntary Agent, and that the Universe is not guided
by Necessity or Fate, yet that Mind must be weak and inadvertent, whichneeds them to confirm the Belief of a Wise and Good Deity; since thedeviation from general Laws, unless upon very extraordinary Occasions,must be a presumption of Inconstancy and Weakness, rather than of
steddy Wisdom and Power, and must weaken the best Arguments we
can have for the Sagacity and Power of the universal Mind.” [72]91

u section vi u
Of the Universality of the Sense of
Beauty among Men.

I. We before* insinuated, “That all Beauty has a relation to some per- Internal Sense
anceiving Power;” and consequently since we know not 㛳 1 how great a㛳 notimmediate
Variety of Senses 㛳 2 there㛳 may be among Animals, there is no Form in Source of Pain.
Nature concerning which we can pronounce, “That it has no Beauty;”
for it may still please some perceiving Power. But our Inquiry is confin’dto Men; and before we examine the Universality of this Sense of Beauty,or their agreement in approving Uniformity, it may be proper to consider, “㛳 3 whether㛳, as the other Senses which give us Pleasure do also
give us Pain, so this Sense of Beauty does make some Objects disagreeable to us, and the occasion of Pain.”
4
That many Objects give no pleasure to our Sense is obvious, manyare certainly void of Beauty: But then there is no Form which seems
necessarily disagreeable of itself, when we dread no other Evil [73] fromit, and compare it with nothing better of the Kind. Many Objects arenaturally displeasing, and distasteful to our external Senses, as well asothers pleasing and agreeable; as Smells, Tastes, and some separate
Sounds: 㛳 5 but as㛳 to our Sense of Beauty, no Composition of Objects
which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively unpleasant or
painful of it self, had we never observ’d any thing better of the Kind.
Deformity is only the absence of Beauty, or deficiency in the Beauty* See above Sect. i. Art. 17. Sect. iv. Art. 1.

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expected in any Species: Thus bad Musick pleases Rusticks who neverheard any better, and the finest Ear is not offended with tuning of Instruments if it be not too tedious, where no Harmony is expected; andyet much smaller Dissonancy shall offend amidst the Performance,
where Harmony is expected. A rude Heap of Stones is no way offensive
to one who shall be displeas’d with Irregularity in Architecture, where
Beauty was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form whichwe 㛳 6 call now㛳 ugly or deform’d, and had we never seen or expected
greater Beauty, we should have receiv’d no disgust from it, altho the Pleasure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now admire. Our Sense of Beauty seems design’d to give us positive Pleasure,but not 㛳 7 positive㛳 Pain or Disgust, any further than what arises fromdisappointment. [74]Approbation
and Dislikefrom Association of Ideas.

II. There are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise
Dislike; but this is generally not from any 㛳 8 positive㛳 Deformity whichof it self is positively displeasing, but either from want of expected
Beauty, or much more from their carrying some natural indications ofmorally bad Dispositions, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerningin Countenances, Airs, and Gestures. That this is not occasion’d by
any Form positively disgusting, will appear from this, That if uponlong acquaintance we are sure of finding sweetness of Temper, Humanity and Cheerfulness, altho the bodily Form continues, it shall give
us no Disgust or Displeasure; whereas 㛳 9 if any thing was㛳 naturally
disagreeable, or the occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, 㛳 10 it㛳 would
always continue so, even although the Aversion we might have toward
it were counterballanc’d by other Considerations. There are Horrors
rais’d by some Objects, which are only the Effect of Fear for our selves,or Compassion 㛳 11 toward㛳 others, when either Reason, or some foolish
Association of Ideas, makes us apprehend Danger, and not the Effectof any thing in the Form it self: for we find that most of 㛳 12 those㛳Objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience or Reason has
remov’d the Fear, may become the occasions of Pleasure; as 㛳 13 ravenous㛳 [75] Beasts, a tempestuous Sea, a craggy Precipice, a dark shadyValley.

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63

III. We shall see* 㛳 14 hereafter㛳, “That Associations of Ideas make Objects pleasant, and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give any such
Pleasures; and the same way, the casual Conjunctions of Ideas may givea Disgust, where there is nothing disagreeable in the Form it self.” And
this is the occasion of many fantastick Aversions to Figures of some Animals, and to some other Forms: Thus 㛳 15 Swines㛳, Serpents of all Kinds,and some Insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with Aversion by
many People, who have got some accidental Ideas associated to them.
And for Distastes of this Kind, 㛳 16 no㛳 other Account can be given.

Associations.

IV. But as to the universal Agreement of Mankind in their Sense of Universality ofBeauty from Uniformity amidst Variety, we must consult Experience: this Sense.
and as we allow all Men Reason, since all Men are capable of understanding simple Arguments, tho few are capable of complex Demonstrations; so in this Case it must be sufficient to prove this Sense of
Beauty universal, “if all Men are better pleas’d with Uniformity in the[76] simpler Instances than the contrary, even when there is no Advantage observ’d attending it; and likewise if all Men, according as their
Capacity enlarges, so as to receive and compare more complex Ideas,㛳 17 have a greater㛳 Delight in Uniformity, and are pleas’d with its more
complex Kinds, both Original and Relative.”
Now let us consider if ever any Person was void of this Sense in18
㛳 the㛳 simpler Instances. Few Trials have been made in the simplest
Instances of Harmony, because as soon as we find an Ear 㛳 19 incapable㛳
of relishing complex Compositions, such as our Tunes are, no further
Pains are employ’d about such. But in Figures, did ever any Man makechoice of a Trapezium, or any irregular Curve, for the Ichnography 㛳 20 orPlan㛳 of his House, without Necessity, or some great Motive of 㛳 21 Convenience㛳? or to make the opposite Walls not parallel, or unequal in
Height? Were ever Trapeziums, irregular Polygons or Curves chosen for
the Forms of Doors or Windows, tho these Figures might have answer’dthe Uses as well, and would have often sav’d a great part of the 㛳 22 Time,
Labour㛳 and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ’d in suiting* See below Art. 11, 12. of this Section.

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the Stones and Timber to the regular Forms? Among all the fantastick
Modes of Dress, [77] none was ever quite void of Uniformity, if it were
only in the resemblance of the two Sides of the same Robe, and in some
general Aptitude to the human Form. The Pictish Painting had always
relative Beauty by resemblance to other Objects, and often those Objects
were originally beautiful: however justly we 㛳 23 might㛳 apply Horace’s
Censure of impertinent Descriptions in Poetry.
Sed non erat his locus ———* i

But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are madeby the casual spilling of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas’d with an
inequality of Heights in Windows of the same Range, or dissimilarShapesof them? with unequal Legs or Arms, 㛳 24 Eyes㛳 or Cheeks in a Mistress?
It must 㛳 25 however be㛳 acknowledg’d, “That Interest 㛳 26 may often㛳 counterballance our Sense of Beauty in this Affair as well as in others, andsuperior good Qualitys may make us overlook such Imperfections.”
Real Beauty
alone pleases.

V. Nay further, it may perhaps appear, “That Regularity and Uniformity
are so copiously diffus’d thro the Universe, and we are so readily determin’d to [78] pursue this as the Foundation of Beauty in Works of Art,
that there is scarcely any thing ever fancy’d as Beautiful, where there is
not really something of this Uniformity and Regularity.” We are indeed
often mistaken in imagining that there is the greatest possible Beauty,
where it is but very imperfect; but still it is some degree of Beauty which
pleases, altho there may be higher Degrees which we do not observe; andour Sense acts with full Regularity when we are pleas’d, altho we are kept
by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would please us more.
27
A Goth, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imagines the Architecture of his country to be the most perfect: and a Conjunction of 㛳 28 some㛳 hostile Ideas, may make him have an Aversion to
Roman Buildings, and study to demolish them, as some of our Reformers did the Popish Buildings, not being able to separate the Ideas of the* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.
i. Translation: “But for such things there was no place.” Horace, Satires, Epistles,
and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 450.

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65

superstitious Worship, from the Forms of the Buildings where it waspractised: and yet it is still real Beauty which pleases the Goth, founded
upon Uniformity amidst Variety. For the Gothick Pillars are uniform toeach other, not only in their Sections, which are Lozenge-form’d; but
also in their Heights and Ornaments: Their Arches are not one uniform
Curve, but yet [79] they are Segments of similar Curves, and generally
equal in the same Ranges. The very Indian Buildings have some kind of
Uniformity, and many of the Eastern nations, tho they differ much fromus, yet have great 㛳 29 Regularity㛳 in their Manner, as well as the Romans
in theirs. Our Indian Screens, which wonderfully supply 㛳 30 the regular
Imaginations of our Ladys㛳 with Ideas of Deformity, in which Nature
is very churlish and sparing, do want indeed all the Beauty arising from
Proportion of Parts, and Conformity to Nature; and yet they cannot
divest themselves of all Beauty and Uniformity in the separate Parts:
And this diversifying the human Body into various Contortions, may
give some wild Pleasure from Variety, since some Uniformity to the human Shape is still retain’d.
VI. There is one sort of Beauty which might perhaps have been better History pleases
mention’d before, but will not be impertinent here, because the Taste in like manner.
or Relish of it is universal in all Nations, and with the Young as well as
the Old, and that is the Beauty of History. Every one knows how dulla Study it is to read over a Collection of Gazettes, which shall perhaps
relate all the same Events with the Historian: The superior Pleasure thenof History must arise, like that of Poetry, from the [80] Manners; 㛳 31 as㛳
when we see a Character well drawn, wherein we find the secret Causesof a great Diversity of seemingly inconsistent Actions; or an Interest ofState laid open, or an artful View nicely unfolded, the Execution ofwhich influences very different and opposite Actions, as the Circumstances may alter. Now this reduces the whole to an Unity of Design atleast: And this may be observ’d in the very Fables which entertain Children, otherwise we cannot make them relish them.
VII. What has been said will probably be assented to, if we always remember in our Inquirys into the Universality of the Sense of Beauty,“That there may be real Beauty, where there is not the greatest; and that

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treatise ithere are an Infinity of different Forms which 㛳 32 may㛳 all have some
Unity, and yet differ from each other.” So that Men may have different
Fancys of Beauty, and yet Uniformity be the universal Foundation of
our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as Beautiful. And we shall findthat it is so in the Architecture, Gardening, Dress, Equipage, and Furniture of Houses, even among the most uncultivated Nations; where
Uniformity still pleases, without any other Advantage than the Pleasureof the Contemplation of it. [81]Diversity of
Judgments
concerning
our Senses.

VIII. It will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like
Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the internal andexternal Senses. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr.
Locke have 㛳 33 shaken off the groundless Opinions about㛳 innate Ideas,
than to alledge, “That all our Relish for Beauty, and Order, is either from㛳 34 prospect of Advantage,㛳 Custom, or Education,” for no other Reason
but the Variety of Fancys in the World: and from this they conclude,“That our Fancys do not arise from any natural Power of Perception,
or Sense.” And yet all allow our external Senses to be Natural, and that
the Pleasures or Pains of their Sensations, however they may be increas’d,or diminish’d, by Custom, or Education, and counterballanc’d by Interest, yet are really antecedent to Custom, Habit, Education, or Prospect of Interest. Now it is certain, “That there is at least as great a variety
of Fancys about their Objects, as the Objects of Beauty:” Nay it is much
more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to bring the Fancys or Relishesof the external Senses to any general Foundation at all, or to find any
Rule for the agreeable or disagreeable: and yet we all allow “that these
are natural Powers of Perception.” [82]

The Reasonof it.

IX. The Reason of this different Judgment can be no other than this,That we have got distinct Names for the external Senses, and none, orvery few, for the Internal; and by this are led, as in many other Cases, tolook upon the former as some way more fix’d, and real and natural, thanthe latter. The Sense of Harmony has got its Name, 㛳 35 viz.㛳 a good Ear;and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a natural Power ofPerception, or a Sense some way distinct from Hearing: now it is certain,section vi

67“That there is as necessary a Perception of Beauty upon the presence ofregular Objects, as of Harmony upon hearing certain Sounds.”
X. But let it be observ’d here once for all, “That an internal Sense no An internal
does notmore presupposes an innate Idea, or Principle of Knowledge, than the Sense
presuppose
external.” Both are natural Powers of Perception, or Determinations of innate Ideas.
the Mind to receive necessarily certain Ideas from the presence of Objects. The internal Sense is, a passive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty
from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety. Nor does
there seem any thing more difficult in this matter, than that the Mindshould be always determin’d to receive the Idea of Sweet, when Particles
of such a Form enter the Pores of [83] the Tongue; or to have the Idea
of Sound upon any quick Undulation of the Air. The one seems to haveas little Connection with its Idea, as the other: And the same Power could
with equal ease constitute the former the occasion of Ideas as the latter.
XI. The Association of Ideas* above hinted at, is one great Cause of the Associationsofapparent Diversity of Fancys in the Sense of Beauty, as well as in the Cause
Disagreement.
external Senses; and often makes Men have an aversion to Objects ofBeauty, and a liking to others void of it, but under different Conceptions
than those of Beauty or Deformity. And here it may not be improper togive some Instances of some of these Associations. The Beauty of Trees,
their cool Shades, and their Aptness to conceal from Observation, havemade Groves and Woods the usual Retreat to those who love Solitude,especially to the Religious, the Pensive, the Melancholy, and the Amorous. And do not we find that we have so join’d the Ideas of these Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur
to us along with them? The Cunning of the Heathen Priests might makesuch obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their Deitys; and hence we join Ideas of something Divine [84] to them. We
know the like Effect in the Ideas of our Churches, from the perpetualuse of them only in religious Exercises. The faint Light in Gothick Build-* See above Art. 3. of this Section.

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ings has had the same Association of a very foreign Idea, which our Poetshews in his Epithet,——— A Dim religious Light.* ii

In like manner it is known, That often all the Circumstances of Actions, or Places, or Dresses of Persons, or Voice, or Song, which haveoccur’d at any time together, when we were strongly affected by any
Passion, will be so connected that any one of these will make all the rest
recur. And this is often the occasion both of great Pleasure and Pain,
Delight and Aversion to many Objects, which of themselves might havebeen perfectly indifferent to us: but these Approbations, or Distastes, areremote from the Ideas of Beauty, being plainly different Ideas.
Musick, how
it pleases
differently.

XII. There is also another Charm in Musick to various Persons, which
is distinct from the Harmony, and is occasion’d by its raising agreeable
Passions. The human Voice is obviously vary’d by all the stronger Passions; now when our Ear discerns [85] any resemblance between the Airof a Tune, whether sung or play’d upon an Instrument, either in its
Time, or 㛳 36 Modulation,㛳 or any other Circumstance, to the sound of
the human Voice in any Passion, we shall be touch’d by it in a very sensible manner, and have Melancholy, Joy, Gravity, Thoughtfulness excited in us by a sort of Sympathy or Contagion. The same Connexion
is observable between the very Air of a Tune, and the Words expressing
any Passion which we have heard it fitted to, so that they shall both recur
to us together, tho but one of them affects our Senses.
37
Now in such a diversity of pleasing or displeasing Ideas which may
38be 㛳 join’d㛳 with Forms of Bodys, or Tunes, when Men are of suchdifferent Dispositions, and prone to such a variety of Passions, it is no* Milt. Il Penseroso.
ii. John Milton (1608–74), English poet and author. His major poems are On theMorning of Christ’s Nativity, L’Allegro, and Il Penseroso (early works), Paradise Lost
and Paradise Regained (later works). He wrote extensively on theological and politicalissues as well (for example, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, 1643; The Tenureof Kings and Magistrates, 1649; The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, 1660).

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wonder “that they should often disagree in their Fancys of Objects, evenaltho their Sense of Beauty and Harmony were perfectly uniform;” because many other Ideas may either please or displease, according to Persons Tempers, and past Circumstances. We know how agreeable a very
wild Country may be to any Person who has spent the chearful Days of
his Youth in it, and how disagreeable very beautiful Places may be, ifthey were the Scenes of his [86] Misery. And this may help us in many
Cases to account for the Diversitys of Fancy, without denying the Uniformity of our internal Sense of Beauty.
XIII. Grandeur and Novelty are two Ideas different from Beauty, which
often recommend Objects to us. The Reason of this is foreign to thepresent Subject. See Spectator No. 412. [87]

u section vii u
Of the Power of Custom, Education, andExample, as to our internal Senses.

I. Custom, Education, and Example are so often alledg’d in this Affair,as the occasion of our Relish for beautiful Objects, and for our Approbation of, or Delight in a certain Conduct in Life, in a moral 㛳 1 Sense㛳,that it is necessary to examine these three particularly, to make it appear“that there is a natural Power of Perception, or Sense of Beauty in Objects, antecedent to all Custom, Education, or Example.”
Custom gives
no new Sense.

II. Custom, as distinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As
to Actions, it only gives a disposition to the Mind or Body more easily
to perform those Actions which have been frequently repeated, but neverleads us to apprehend them under any other View than what we werecapable of apprehending them under at first; nor gives us any new Powerof Perception about them. We are naturally capable of Sentiments of
Fear, and Dread of any powerful Presence; and [88] so Custom mayconnect the Ideas of religious Horror to certain Buildings: but 㛳 2 Custom
could never㛳 have made a Being naturally incapable of Fear, receive such
Ideas. So had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of
Actions, but as they were advantageous or disadvantageous, Custom
could only have made us more ready at perceiving the Advantage or Disadvantage of Actions. But this is not to our present Purpose.
As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects. When the
Blood or Spirits of which Anatomists talk are rouz’d, quicken’d, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner by Medicine or Nutri70

section vii

71ment; or any Glands frequently stimulated to Secretion; it is certain thatto preserve the Body easy, we 㛳 3 shall㛳 delight in Objects of Taste whichof themselves are not immediately pleasant to 㛳 4 it㛳, if they promote thatagreeable State which the Body had been accustom’d to. Further, Custom will so alter the State of the Body, that what at first rais’d uneasy
Sensations will cease to do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea ofthe same Sense; but Custom can never give us any Idea of 㛳 5 a Sense
different from those㛳 we had antecedent to it: It will never make theBlind approve Objects as coloured, or those who have no Taste approve
Meats as delicious, however they [89] might 㛳 6 approve them as㛳
Strengthning or Exhilarating. Were our Glands and the Parts about
them void of Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker
Motions in the Blood, 㛳 7 Custom could never㛳 make stimulating or intoxicating Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the
Taste: So by like Reasoning, had we no natural Sense of Beauty from
Uniformity, Custom could never have made us imagine any Beauty in
Objects; if we had had no Ear, Custom could never have given us the
Pleasures of Harmony. When we have these natural Senses antecedently,
Custom may make us capable of extending our Views further, and ofreceiving more complex Ideas of Beauty in Bodys, or Harmony inSounds, by increasing our Attention and quickness of Perception. But
however Custom may increase our Power of receiving or comparing
complex Ideas, yet it seems rather to weaken than strengthen the Ideas
of Beauty, or the Impressions of Pleasure from regular Objects; else how㛳 8 is㛳 it possible that any Person could go into the open Air on a sunny
Day, or clear Evening, without the most extravagant Raptures, such as
Milton* represents our Ancestor in upon his first Creation? For such any
Person would certainly fall into, upon the first Representation of sucha Scene. [90]
Custom in like manner 㛳 9 may㛳 make it easier for any Person to discern the Use of a complex Machine, and approve it as advantageous;
but he would never have imagin’d it Beautiful, had he no natural Sense
of Beauty. Custom may make us quicker in apprehending the Truth of* See Paradise Lost, Book 8.

72treatise icomplex Theorems, but we all find the Pleasure or Beauty of Theorems
as strong at first as ever. Custom makes us more capable of retaining andcomparing complex Ideas, so as to discern more complicated Uniformity, which escapes the Observation of Novices in any Art; but all thispresupposes a natural Sense of Beauty in Uniformity: for had there been
nothing in Forms, which was constituted 㛳 10 the necessary㛳 occasion ofPleasure to our Senses, no Repetition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure
or Pain, Beauty or Deformity, could ever have made them grow pleasingor displeasing.
Nor
Education.

III. The Effect of Education is this, that thereby we receive many speculative Opinions, 㛳 11 which are㛳 sometimes true and sometimes false;
and are often led to believe that Objects may be naturally apt to give
Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses, 㛳 12 which in reality have㛳 no such
Qualitys. And further, by Education there are some strong Associationsof Ideas without any Reason, by mere Accident sometimes, as well as[91] by Design, which it is very hard for us ever after to break asunder.
Thus Aversions are rais’d to Darkness, and to many kinds of 㛳 13 Meat㛳,and to certain innocent Actions: Approbations without Ground arerais’d in like manner. But in all these Instances, Education never makes
us apprehend any Qualitys in Objects, which we have not naturally
Senses capable of perceiving. We know what Sickness of the Stomach
is, and may without Ground believe that very healthful Meats will raise
this; we by our Sight and Smell receive disagreeable Ideas of the Foodof Swine, and their Styes, and perhaps cannot prevent the recurring ofthese Ideas at Table: but never were Men naturally Blind prejudic’dagainst Objects as of a disagreeable Colour, or in favour of others as ofa beautiful Colour; they 㛳 14 perhaps hear㛳 Men dispraise one Colour,㛳 15 and may㛳 imagine this Colour to be some quite different sensible
Quality of the other Senses㛳 16, but that is all㛳: And the same way, a Man
naturally void of Taste could by no Education receive the Ideas of Taste,or be prejudic’d in favour of Meats as delicious: So, had we no natural
Sense of Beauty and Harmony, we 㛳 17 could never㛳 be prejudic’d in favour of Objects or Sounds as Beautiful or Harmonious. Education may
make an unattentive Goth imagine that his Countrymen have attain’dsection vii

73

the Perfection of Archi-[92]tecture; and an Aversion to their Enemys the
Romans, may have join’d some disagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited them to their Demolition; but he had never form’dthese Prejudices, had he been void of a Sense of Beauty. Did ever blind
Men debate whether Purple or Scarlet were the finer Colour? or could
any Education prejudice them in favour of either as Colours?
Thus Education and Custom may influence our internal Senses,
where they are antecedently, by enlarging the Capacity of our Minds toretain and compare the Parts of complex Compositions: And 㛳 18 then㛳
if the finest Objects are presented to us, we grow conscious of a Pleasure
far superior to what common Performances excite. But all this presupposes our Sense of Beauty to be natural. Instruction in Anatomy, Observation of Nature, and of those Airs of the Countenance and Attitudesof Body, which accompany any Sentiment, Action, or Passion, may enable us to know where there is a just Imitation: but why should an exact
Imitation please upon Observation, if we had not naturally a Sense of
Beauty in it, more than the observing the Situation of fifty or a hundred
Pebbles thrown at random? and should we 㛳 19 observe㛳 them ever so often, we 㛳 20 should㛳 never dream of their growing Beautiful. [93]
IV. There is something worth our Observation as to the manner of root- Prejudices how
ing out the Prejudices of Education, not quite foreign to the present removed.
purpose. When the Prejudice arises from Associations of Ideas without
any natural Connection, we must frequently force our selves to bear Representations of those Objects, or the Use of them when separated fromthe disagreeable Idea; and this may at last disjoin the unreasonable Association, especially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus
Opinions of Superstition are best remov’d by pleasant Conversation of
Persons we esteem for their Virtue, or 㛳 21 by observing that they㛳 despisesuch Opinions. But when the Prejudice arises from an Apprehension or
Opinion of natural Evil, as the Attendant, or Consequent of any Object
or Action; if the Evil be apprehended to be the constant and immediate
Attendant, a few Trials without receiving any Damage will remove thePrejudice, as in that against Meats: But where the Evil is not represented
as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may possibly or probably at

74treatise isome time or other accompany the use of the Object, there must be
frequent Reasoning with our selves, or a long Series of Trials without
any Detriment, to remove the Prejudice; such is the Case of our Fear of
Spirits in the dark, and in Church-yards. And [94] when the Evil is represented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a futureState, it is then hardest of all to remove the Prejudice; and this is only
to be effected by slow Processes of Reason, because in this Case there
can be no Trials made: and this is the Case of superstitious Prejudicesagainst Actions apprehended as offensive to the Deity; and hence it isthat they are so hard to be rooted out.
Example not
the Cause ofinternal Sense.

V. Example seems to operate in this manner. We are conscious that we
act very much for Pleasure, or private Good; and 㛳 22 are thereby㛳 led toimagine that others do so too: hence we conclude there must be some
Perfection in the Objects which we see others pursue, and Evil in thosewhich we observe them constantly shunning. Or, the Example of others
may serve to us as so many Trials to remove the Apprehension of Evilin Objects 㛳 23 to which we had an Aversion㛳. But all this is done uponan Apprehension of Qualitys perceivable by the Senses which we have;for no Example will induce the Blind or Deaf to pursue Objects as Colour’d or Sonorous; nor could Example any more engage us to pursue
Objects as Beautiful or Harmonious, had we no 㛳 24 natural Sense of
Beauty or Harmony㛳. [95]
Example may make us 㛳 25 conclude without Examination,㛳 that ourCountrymen have obtain’d the Perfection of Beauty in their Works,
or that there is less Beauty in the Orders of Architecture or Painting
us’d in other Nations, and so content our selves with very imperfectForms. 㛳 26 And㛳 Fear of Contempt as void of Taste or Genius, 㛳 27 often㛳 makes us join in approving the Performances of the reputed Masters in our Country, and restrains those who have naturally a fine Genius, or the internal Senses very acute, from studying to obtain thegreatest Perfection; it makes also those of a bad Taste pretend 㛳 28 to㛳㛳 29 a㛳 Perception of 㛳 30 Beauty㛳 㛳 31 which in reality they have not㛳: But
all this presupposes some natural Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty

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75

and Harmony. Nor can Example effect any thing further, unless it beto lead Men to pursue Objects by implicit Faith, for some Perfection
which the Pursuer is conscious he does not know, or which perhaps issome very different Quality from the Idea perceiv’d by those of a good
Taste in such Affairs. [96]

u section viii u
Of the Importance of the internal Senses in
Life, and the final Causes of them.

Importance of
the internal
Senses.

I. The busy part of Mankind may look upon these things as airy Dreamsof an inflam’d Imagination, which a wise Man should despise, who rationally pursues more solid Possessions independent on Fancy: but alittle Reflection will convince us, “That the Gratifications of our internal
Senses are as natural, real, and satisfying Enjoyments as any sensible Pleasure whatsoever; and that they are the chief Ends for which we commonly pursue Wealth and Power.” For how is Wealth or Power advantageous? How do they make us happy, or prove good to us? No otherwise
than as they supply Gratifications to our Senses or Facultys of perceiving
Pleasure. Now, are these Senses or Facultys only the External ones? No:
Every body sees, that a small portion of Wealth or Power will supply
more Pleasures of the external Senses than we can enjoy; we know that
Scarcity often heightens these Perceptions more than A-[97]bundance,
which cloys that Appetite which is necessary to all Pleasure in Enjoyment: and hence the Poet’s Advice is perfectly just;——— Tu pulmentaria quaere Sudando ———* i* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.
i. Translation: “So earn your sauce with hard exercise.” Horace, Satires, Epistles,
and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 138.

76

section viii

77

In short, the only use of a great Fortune, above a very small one (except
in good Offices and moral Pleasures) must be to supply us with the Pleasures of Beauty, Order, and Harmony.
㛳 1a It is true indeed, that 㛳 2b the Enjoyment of b 㛳 the 㛳 3c noblest c 㛳 Pleasures of the internal Senses, in the Contemplation of the Works of Nature, 㛳 4d is d 㛳 expos’d to every one without Expence; the Poor and the Low,
may have as free 㛳 5e a e 㛳 use of these Objects, in this way, as the Wealthy
or Powerful. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the Property is of little Consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty, which isoften enjoy’d by others beside the Proprietor. But then there are otherObjects of these internal Senses, which require Wealth, or Power to procure the use of them as frequently as we desire; as appears in Architecture,
Musick, Gardening, Painting, Dress, Equipage, Furniture; of which wecannot [98] have the full Enjoyment without Property. And there are some
confus’d Imaginations, which often lead us to pursue Property, even in
Objects where it is not necessary to the true Enjoyment of them. These
are the ultimate Motives of our pursuing the greater Degrees of Wealth,where there are no generous Intentions of virtuous Actions. a 㛳This is confirm’d by the constant Practice of the very Enemys to these
Senses. As soon as they think they are got above the World, or extricatedfrom the Hurrys of Avarice and Ambition; banish’d Nature will return
upon them, and set them upon Pursuits of Beauty and Order in their
Houses, Gardens, Dress, Table, Equipage. They are never easy withoutsome degree of this; and were their Hearts open to our View, we should
see Regularity, Decency, Beauty, as what their Wishes terminate upon,either to themselves or their Posterity; and what their Imagination isalways presenting to them as the possible 㛳 6 Effects㛳 of their Labours.
Nor without this, could they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves.
There may perhaps be some Instances of human Nature perverted
into a thorow Miser, who loves nothing but Money, and whose Fancy
arises no higher than the cold [99] dull Thought of Possession; but suchan Instance in an Age, must not be made the Standard of Mankind
against the whole Body.
If we examine the Pursuits of the Luxurious, who 㛳 7 in the opinionof the World is㛳 wholly devoted to his Belly; we shall generally find that

78

treatise ithe far greater part of his Expence is employ’d to procure other Sensations than those of Taste; such as fine Attendants, regular Apartments,
Services of Plate, and the like. 㛳 8 Besides㛳, a large share of the Preparation must be suppos’d design’d for some sort of generous friendly Purposes, 㛳 9 as㛳 to please Acquaintance, Strangers, Parasites. How few would
be contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or outof earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however these internal Sensations may be overlook’d in our Philosophical Inquirys about the human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, “That they employ us more, and are
more efficacious in Life, either to our Pleasure, or Uneasiness, than all
our external Senses taken together.”
Final Cause of
the internal
Senses.

II. As to the final Causes of this internal Sense, we need not enquire,“whether, to an almighty and all-knowing Being, there be any real Excellence in regular Forms, in acting by general Laws, in [100] knowing
by Theorems?” We seem scarce capable of answering such Questions
any way; nor need we enquire, “whether other Animals may not discern
Uniformity and Regularity in Objects which escape our Observation,and may not perhaps have their Senses constituted so as to perceive
Beauty, from the same Foundation which we do, in Objects which ourSenses are not 㛳 10 fit㛳 to examine or compare?” We shall confine our selves
to a Subject where we have some certain 㛳 11 Foundation㛳 to go upon,and only enquire, “if we can find any Reasons worthy of the great Author of Nature, for making such a Connection between regular Objects,
and the Pleasure which accompanys our Perceptions of them; or, what
Reasons might possibly influence him to create the World, as it at present
is, as far as we can observe, every where full of Regularity and Uniformity?”12
Let it be here observ’d, that as far as we know 㛳 13 concerning㛳 anyof the great Bodys of the Universe, we see Forms and Motions really
Beautiful to our Senses; and if we were plac’d in any Planet, the apparent
Courses would still be Regular and Uniform, and consequentlyBeautiful
to 㛳 14 our Sense㛳. Now this gives us no small Ground to imagine, that
if the Senses of their Inhabitants are in the same manner [101] adapted
to their Habitations, and the Objects occurring to their View, as ours

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79

are here, their Senses must be upon the same general Foundation withours.
But to return to the Questions: What occurs to resolve them, may becontain’d in the following Propositions.
1. The manner of Knowledge by universal Theorems, and of Operation by universal Causes, as far as we can attain 㛳 15 it,㛳 must be mostconvenient for Beings of limited Understanding and Power; since thisprevents Distraction in their Understandings thro the Multiplicity of
Propositions, and Toil and Weariness to their Powers of Action: andconsequently their Reason, without any Sense of Beauty, must approveof such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent Advantage.
2. Those Objects of Contemplation in which there is Uniformity
amidst Variety, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain’d, than irregular Objects; because the accurate Observation of one
or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole: Thus we canfrom a Pillar or two, with an intermediate Arch, and Cornice, form a
distinct Idea of a whole regular Building, if we know of what Species
it is, and have its Length and [102] Breadth: From a Side and solid Angle,
we have the whole regular Solid; the measuring one Side, gives the whole
Square; one Radius, the whole 㛳 16 Circle㛳; two Diameters, an Oval; one
Ordinate and Abscissa, the Parabola; 㛳 17 and so on in more complex Figures which have any Regularity, which can be entirely determin’d andknown in every Part㛳 from a few Data: Whereas it must be a long Attention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which can ascertain or fix the Idea
of any irregular Form, or give any distinct Idea of it, or make us capableof retaining it; as appears in the Forms of rude Rocks, and Pebbles, andconfus’d Heaps, even when the Multitude of sensible Parts is not so great
as in the regular Forms: for such irregular Objects distract the Mind with
Variety, since for every sensible Part we must have a quite different Idea.
3. From 㛳 18 these㛳 two Propositions it follows, “That Beings of limited
Understanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own Interest,
must chuse to operate by the simplest Means, to invent general Theorems, and to study regular Objects, if they be 㛳 19 as useful as㛳 irregular
ones; that they may avoid the endless Toil of producing each Effect by
a separate Operation, of searching 㛳 20 out㛳 each different Truth by a dif-80

treatise iferent [103] Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless Variety of dissimilar
Ideas in irregular Objects.”
4. But then, beside this Consideration of Interest, there does not appear to be any necessary Connection, 㛳 21 antecedent㛳 to the Constitution of the Author of Nature, 㛳 22 between㛳 regular Forms, Actions,
Theorems, and that sudden sensible Pleasure excited in us upon observation of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage mention’d in the former Proposition. And possibly, the Deity could haveform’d us so as to have receiv’d 㛳 23 no㛳 Pleasure from such 㛳 24 Objects㛳,or connected Pleasure to those of a quite contrary Nature. We have atolerable Presumption of this in the Beautys of various Animals; theygive some small Pleasure indeed to every one who views them, but thenevery 㛳 25 one㛳 seems 㛳 26 vastly㛳 more delighted with 㛳 27 the peculiar
Beautys of its own Species, than with those of a different one,㛳 which
seldom raise any desire 㛳 28 but among Animals of the same Species withthe one admir’d㛳. This makes it probable, that the Pleasure is not thenecessary Result of the Form it self, otherwise it would equally affect all
Apprehensions in what Species soever㛳 29 ; but depends upon a voluntary
Constitution,㛳 adapted to preserve the Regularity of the Universe, andis probably not the Effect of Necessity [104] but Choice in the Supreme
Agent, who constituted our Senses.
5. Now from the whole we may conclude, “That supposing the Deity
From thedivineso kind as to connect sensible Pleasure with certain Actions or ContemGoodness.
plations, beside the rational Advantage perceivable in them; there is agreat moral Necessity, from his Goodness, that the internal Sense of Men
should be constituted as it is at present, so as to make Uniformity amidst
Variety the Occasion of Pleasure.” For were it not so, but on the contrary,
if irregular Objects, particular Truths, and Operations pleased us, besidethe endless Toil this would involve us in, there must arise a perpetual
Dissatisfaction in all rational Agents with themselves; since Reason andInterest would lead us to simple general Causes, while a contrary Sense
of Beauty would make us disapprove them: Universal Theorems would
appear to our Understanding the best Means of increasing our Knowledge of what might be useful; while a contrary Sense would set us on
the search after 㛳 30 particular㛳 Truths: Thought and Reflection would

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81

recommend Objects with Uniformity amidst Variety, and yet this perverse Instinct would involve us in Labyrinths of Confusion and Dissimilitude. And hence we see “how suitable it is to the sagacious [105]
Bounty which we suppose in the Deity, to constitute our internal Senses
in the manner in which they are; by which Pleasure is join’d to the Contemplation of those Objects which a finite Mind can best imprint andretain the Ideas of with the least Distraction; to those Actions which aremost efficacious, and fruitful in useful Effects; and to those Theorems
which most enlarge our Minds.”
III. As to the other Question, “What Reason might influence the De- Reason ofity, whom no 㛳 32 Diversity㛳 of Operation could distract or weary, to general Laws.
chuse to operate by simplest Means and general Laws, and to diffuse
Uniformity, Proportion and Similitude thro all the Parts of Nature
which we can observe?” Perhaps there may be some real Excellence inthis Manner of Operation, and in these Forms, which we know not: but
this we may probably say, that since the divine Goodness, for the Reasons
above mention’d, has constituted our Sense of Beauty as it is at present,
the same Goodness might 㛳 33 determine㛳 the Great Architect to adorn
this 㛳 34 vast㛳 Theatre in 㛳 35 a manner㛳 agreeable to the Spectators, andthat part which is expos’d to the Observation of Men, so as to be pleasantto them; especially if we suppose that he design’d to discover himself tothem as Wise and Good, [106] as well as Powerful: for thus he has given
them greater Evidences, thro the whole Earth, of his Art, Wisdom, Design, and Bounty, than they can possibly have for the Reason, Counsel,
and Good-will of their fellow-Creatures, with whom they converse, withfull Persuasion of 㛳 36 these qualities in them, about㛳 their common
Affairs.
As to the Operations of the Deity by general Laws, there is 㛳 37 still afurther Reason from a Sense㛳 superior to these already consider’d, eventhat of Virtue, or the Beauty of Action, which is the Foundation of ourgreatest Happiness. For were there no general Laws fix’d in the Courseof Nature, there could be no Prudence or Design in Men, no rational
Expectation of Effects from Causes, no Schemes of Action projected,
㛳 38 or㛳 any regular Execution. If then, according to the Frame of our31

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treatise i

Nature, our greatest happiness must depend upon our Actions, as it may
perhaps be made appear it does, “The Universe must be govern’d, notby particular Wills, but by general Laws, upon which we can found our
Expectations, and project our Schemes of Action.” 㛳 39a Nay further, tho
general Laws did ordinarily obtain, yet if the Deity usually stopp’d their
㛳 40b Ef-[107]fects b 㛳 whenever it was necessary to prevent any particular
Evils; this would effectually, 㛳 41c and justly c 㛳 supersede all human Prudence and Care about Actions; since a superior Mind did thus relieve
Men from their Charge. a 㛳㛳 42 The End of the First Treatise.㛳u 㛳1treatise ii uviz.

An Inquiry Concerning the Original of
our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good.
——— Quod magis ad nos
Pertinet, & nescire malum est, agitamus: utrumne
Divitiis homines, an sint Virtute beati:
Quidve ad Amicitias, Usus, Rectumne, trahat nos
Et quae sit natura Boni, summumque quid ejus. i—Hor. Sat. 6. Lib. 2. v. 72.㛳 [111]i. Translation: “We discuss matters which concern us more, and of which it isharmful to be in ignorance—whether wealth or virtue makes men happy, whether
self-interest or uprightness leads us to friendship, what is the nature of the good andwhat is its highest form.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton
Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1970), Satires, II.vi.72–76, p. 216.

An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil.
Introduction.

The Word Moral Goodness, 㛳 2 in this Treatise,㛳 denotes our Idea of some Moral Good
Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, 㛳 3 and and Evil.
Love toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the
Action.㛳 Moral Evil, denotes our Idea of a contrary Quality, which excites 㛳 4 Aversion, and Dislike toward the Actor, even from Persons unconcern’d in its natural Tendency.㛳 We must be contented with theseimperfect Descriptions, until we discover 㛳 5 whether we really have such
Ideas, and what general Foundation there is in Nature for㛳 this Dif[112]ference of Actions, as morally Good or Evil.
These Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg’d Difference of Moral Good and Evil, from Natural. All Men who speak ofmoral Good, acknowledge that it procures 㛳 6 Love㛳 toward those we apprehend possess’d of it; whereas natural Good does not. In this matter
Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected
toward 㛳 7 those㛳 they suppose possess’d of Honesty, Faith, Generosity,
Kindness㛳 8, even when they expect no Benefit from these admir’d Qualitys㛳; and those who are possess’d of the natural Goods, such as Houses,
Lands, Gardens, Vineyards, Health, Strength, Sagacity? We shall findthat we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former; but
the Possession of the latter procures no 㛳 9 Love㛳 at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of Envy and Hatred. In the samemanner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be morally Evil, raises our㛳 10 Hatred㛳 toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as Treachery,
Cruelty, Ingratitude㛳 11, even when they are no way hurtful to our selves㛳;
whereas we heartily love, esteem and pity many who are expos’d to nat85

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treatise ii

ural Evils, such as Pain, Poverty, Hunger, Sickness, Death㛳 12, even when[113] we our selves suffer Inconveniencies, by these natural Evils ofothers㛳.
Now the first Question on this Subject is, “Whence arise these different Ideas of Actions.”
Because we shall afterwards frequently use the Words Interest, AdInterest.
Advantage.
vantage, natural Good, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasurein our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of natural
Good, or Happiness; and then all Objects which are apt to excite thisPleasure are call’d immediately Good. Those Objects which may procure
others immediately pleasant, are call’d Advantageous: and we pursue
both Kinds from a View of Interest, or from Self-Love.
Our Sense of Pleasure is antecedent to Advantage or Interest, and is
the Foundation of 㛳 13 it㛳. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our Interest to do so; but Objects or Actions are Advantageous,and are pursu’d or undertaken from Interest, because we receive Pleasurefrom them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is Advantageous or naturally Good to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure
mediately, or 㛳 14 immediately. Such㛳 Objects as we know, either from
Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be immediately, [114] or mediately
Advantageous, or apt to minister Pleasure, we 㛳 15 are said to㛳 pursue from
Self-Interest, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which
they have the Power of exciting. Thus Meats, Drink, Harmony, fine
Prospects, Painting, Statues, are perceiv’d by our Senses to be immediately Good; and our Reason shews Riches and Power to be mediately
so, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: andboth Kinds of these natural Goods are pursu’d from Interest, or SelfLove.
Now the greatest part of our latter Moralists ii establish it as undeOpinions
about ourniable, “That all moral Qualitys have necessarily some Relation to theSense of moral
Good and Evil. Law of a Superior, of sufficient Power to make us Happy or Miserable;”and since all Laws operate only by Sanctions of Rewards, or Punishii. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London, 1651, pt. 1, chaps. 14, 15; John Locke,
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London, 1690, bk. 4, chap. 28; similarintroduction

87

ments, which determine us to Obedience by Motives of Self-Interest,
they suppose, “that it is thus that Laws do constitute some Actions mediately Good, or Advantageous, and others the same way Disadvantageous.” They say indeed, “That a benevolent Legislator constitutes no
Actions Advantageous to the Agent by Law, but such as in their own
Nature tend to the natural Good of the Whole, or, at least, are not inconsistent with it; and that therefore we approve [115] the Virtue of others, because it has some small Tendency to our Happiness, either fromits own Nature, or from this general Consideration, That Obedience toa benevolent Legislator, is in general Advantageous to the Whole, andto us in particular; and that for the contrary Reasons alone, we disapprove the Vice of others, that is, the prohibited Action, as tending toour particular Detriment in some degree.” 㛳 16 But㛳 then they maintain,“That we are determin’d to Obedience to Laws, or deterr’d from Disobedience, merely by Motives of Self-Interest, to obtain either the natural Good arising from the commanded Action, or the Rewards promised by the Sanction; or to avoid the natural evil Consequences ofDisobedience, or at least the Penaltys of the Law.”
Some other Moralists iii suppose “an immediate natural Good in the
Actions call’d Virtuous; that is, That we are determin’d to perceive someBeauty in the Actions of others, and to love the Agent, even without
reflecting upon any Advantage which can any way redound to us fromthe Action; that we have also a secret Sense of Pleasure 㛳 17 accompanying㛳 such of our own Actions as we call Virtuous, even when we expect
no other Advantage from them.” But they [116] alledge at the same time,“That we are excited to perform these Actions, even as we pursue, orpurchase Pictures, Statues, Landskips, from Self-Interest, to obtain thisPleasure which 㛳 18 accompanys the very Action, and which we necessarily
enjoy in doing it.㛳” The Design of the following Sections is to enquire
into this matter; and perhaps the Reasons to be offer’d may prove,views are in Calvin and Calvinist theology, see John Calvin, Commentaries on the
Bible, vol. 13, pt. 2.
iii. Here Hutcheson probably thinks of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue,bk. 1, pt. 2, sect. 1).

88treatise ii

I. “That some Actions have to Men an immediate Goodness; or, thatby a superior Sense, which I call a Moral one, we 㛳 19 perceive Pleasure in
the Contemplation of such Actions in others, and are determin’d to love
the Agent, (and much more do we perceive Pleasure in being consciousof having done such Actions our selves)㛳 without any View of further
natural Advantage from them.”
II. It may perhaps also appear, “㛳 20 That what excites us to these Actions which we call Virtuous, is not an Intention to obtain even thissensible Pleasure㛳; much less the future Rewards from Sanctions ofLaws, or any other natural Good, which may be the Consequence of thevirtuous Action; but an entirely different Principle of Action 㛳 21 fromInterest or Self-Love.㛳” [117]u section i u
Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive
Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprovethem in others.

I. That the Perceptions of moral Good and Evil, are perfectly different Different Ideas
Moral andfrom those of natural Good, or Advantage, every one must convince of
Natural Good.
himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himself affected when these Objects occur to him. Had we no Sense of Gooddistinct from the Advantage or Interest arising from the external Senses,
and the Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony; 㛳 1 our Admiration andLove㛳 toward a fruitful Field, or commodious Habitation, would bemuch the same with what we have toward a generous Friend, or any
noble Character; for both are, or may be advantageous to us: And weshould no more admire any Action, or love any Person in a distant Country, or Age, whose Influence could not extend to us, than we love theMountains of Peru, while we are unconcern’d in the Spanish Trade. We
should have the same Sentiments and Affections [118] toward inanimate
Beings, which we have toward rational Agents; which yet every one
knows to be false. Upon Comparison, we say, “Why should we 㛳 2 admire
or love with Esteem㛳 inanimate Beings? They have no Intention ofGood to 㛳 3 us㛳; their Nature makes them fit for our Uses, which theyneither know nor study to serve. But it is not so with rational Agents:
㛳 4 they study our Interest, and delight in our Happiness, and are Benevolent toward us.㛳”
We are all then conscious of the Difference between that 㛳 5 Love andEsteem㛳, or Perception of moral Excellence, which Benevolence excites
89

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toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of natural
Goodness, which only raises Desire of Possession toward the good Object. Now “what should make this Difference, if all Approbation, orSense of Good be from Prospect of Advantage? Do not inanimate Objects promote our Advantage, as well as Benevolent Persons who do 㛳 6 us㛳
Offices of Kindness, and Friendship? Should we not then have the sameendearing 㛳 7 Sentiments㛳 of both? or only the same cold Opinion ofAdvantage in both?” The Reason why it is not so, must be this, “Thatwe have a distinct Perception of Beauty, or Excellence in the kind Affec[119]tions of rational Agents; whence we are determin’d to admire andlove such Characters and Persons.”
Suppose we reap the same Advantage from two Men, one of 㛳 8 whom㛳
In Actions
done toserves us 㛳 9 from Delight in our Happiness, and Love toward us;㛳 theour selves.
other from Views of Self-Interest, or by Constraint: both are in this Case
equally beneficial or advantageous to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of moral Actions than those of Advantage: And that Power ofreceiving these Perceptions may be call’d a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea
from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, 㛳 10 independent㛳 on
our Will.㛳 11 *㛳
This perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of Evil, done to
Of Evil, Moraland Natural.
us designedly by a rational Agent. Our Senses of natural Good and Evilwould make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an Assault,
a Buffet, an Affront from a Neighbour, a Cheat from a Partner, orTrustee, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a Beam, 㛳 12 a㛳
Tile, or a Tempest; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments 㛳 13 of both㛳. Villany, Treachery, [120] Cruelty, would be as meekly
resented as a Blast, or Mildew, or an overflowing Stream. But I fancy
every one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho there may
be equal natural Evil in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental, may
occasion the strongest Anger, and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred, or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention* See the Preface, Page 6.

section i91

of moral Ideas may prevent our 㛳 14 Hatred㛳 of the Agent, or bad moral
Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest natural
Evil. Thus the Opinion of Justice in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideasof moral Evil in the Execution, or Hatred toward the Magistrate, whois the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.
II. In our Sentiments of Actions 㛳 15 which affect㛳 our selves, there is In Actionsindeed a Mixture of the Ideas of natural 㛳 16 and moral㛳 Good, which toward others.
㛳 17 require㛳 some Attention to separate 㛳 18 them㛳. But when we reflect
upon the Actions 㛳 19 which affect other Persons only,㛳 we may observe
the moral Ideas unmix’d with those of natural Good, or Evil. For let it
be here observ’d, that those Senses by which we perceive Pleasure innatural Objects, whence they are constituted Advantageous, could neverraise in us any Desire of publick Good, but only of what was good to
our selves [121] in particular. Nor could they ever make us 㛳 20 approvean㛳 Action 㛳 21 because㛳 of its promoting the Happiness of others. And
yet as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, a Study of the good of others, and 㛳 22 a
Delight in㛳 their Happiness, altho it were in the most distant Part of
the World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely
Action, and praise its Author. And on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing 㛳 23 from Hatred, Delight in the Misery of others㛳,or Ingratitude, raises Abhorrence and Aversion.
It is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally
imagin’d to tend to the natural Good of Mankind, or 㛳 24 of 㛳 some Partsof it. But whence this secret Chain between each Person and Mankind?
How is my Interest connected with the most distant Parts of it? And
yet I must admire 㛳 25 Actions which are beneficial to them㛳, and love
the Author. Whence this Love, Compassion, Indignation and Hatredtoward even feign’d Characters, in the most distant Ages, and Nations,according as they appear Kind, Faithful, Compassionate, or of the opposite Dispositions, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there
is no moral Sense, 㛳 26 which makes rational Actions appear Beautiful,[122] or Deform’d㛳; if all Approbation be from the Interest of theApprover,92

treatise ii
What’s Hecuba to us, or we to Hecuba?* iMoral Ideas
not from
Interest.

III. Some refin’d Explainers of Self-Love may tell us, “That we 㛳 27 hate,or love㛳 Characters, according as we apprehend we should have been
supported, or injur’d by them, had we liv’d in their Days.” But how
obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no Sense of moral
Good in Humanity, Mercy, Faithfulness, why should not Self-Love,㛳 28 and our Sense of natural Good㛳 engage us always to the victorious
Side, and make us admire and love the successful Tyrant, or Traitor? Why
do not we love Sinon, or Pyrrhus, in the Aeneid ? for had we been Greeks,
these two would have been very advantageous Characters. Why are we
affected with the Fortunes of Priamus, Polites, Choroebus or Aeneas? ii
29
It is plain we have some secret Sense which determines our Approbation without regard to Self-Interest; otherwise we should always favour
the fortunate Side without regard to Virtue 㛳 30, and suppose our selves
engaged with that Party㛳. 31 [123]Suppose any great Destruction occasion’d by mere Accident, without
any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Authorof it: This Action might have been as disadvantageous to us as design’dCruelty, or Malice; but who will say he has the same Idea of both Actions, or Sentiments of the 㛳 32 Agents?㛳 “Whence then this Difference?”
And further, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from
Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even disadvantageous Actions, and perceive moral Good in them. A few ingenious Artisans, per* Tragedy of Hamlet.
i. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, act 2, scene 2, verse 562: “What’s Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba . . . ?”ii. According to Virgil (Aeneid 2, 57) Sinon used deceit to make the Trojans takethe wooden horse into the city. Pyrrhos I, king of Epirus, 306–302 and 297–277 b.c.,defeated the Romans in 280/279 but lost most of his own troops, hence the phrase
Pyrrhic victory. Priam, king of Troy and grieving father of Hector, who was slain by
Achilles in the Trojan War. Choroebos (Greek: Korroibos) liberated Argos from adisaster sent by Apollo; as punishment Choroebos had to carry a holy tripod and to
found a city where he dropped it (see Pausanias, Description of Greece, 4.17.4). According to legend, Aeneas escaped the conquered Troy and, after a long odyssey,
founded Rome.

section i93

secuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they instruct
us in Manufactures which support Millions of Poor, 㛳 33 increase㛳 the
Wealth of almost every Person in the State, and make us formidable to
our Neighbours. In a Nation not far distant from us, some resolute Burgomasters, full of Love to their Country, and Compassion toward their
Fellow-Citizens, opprest in Body and Soul by a Tyrant, and Inquisition,with indefatigable Diligence, public Spirit, and Courage, support a tedious perilous War against the Tyrant and form an industrious Republick, which rivals us in Trade, and almost in Power. iii All the World sees
whether the former or the latter have been more ad-[124]vantageous to
us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of ? whether of the useful Refugee,or the public-spirited Burgomaster, by whose Love to his own Country,
we have often suffer’d in our Interests? And I am confident he will findsome other Foundation of Esteem than Advantage, and will see a justReason, why the Memory of our Artisans is so obscure among us, andyet that of our Rivals is immortal.
IV. Some Moralists, iv who will rather twist Self-Love into a thousand Self-Love not
Ground ofShapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than Interest, theApprobation.
may tell us, “That whatever profits one Part without detriment to another, profits the Whole, and then some small Share will redound to each
Individual; that those Actions which tend to the Good of the Whole, if
universally perform’d, would most effectually secure to each Individual
his own Happiness; and that consequently, we may approve such Actions, from the Opinion of their tending ultimately to our own Advantage.”34
We need not trouble these Gentlemen to shew by their nice Trainof Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent inparticular Instances, that [125] we in this Age reap any Advantage fromiii. Hutcheson refers to the Dutch struggle for freedom from Spain.
iv. For example, Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, chap. 1, and Bernard Mandeville, Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue (in the second edition of The Fable of the Bees,
1723).

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Orestes’s killing the treacherous Aegysthus, or from the Actions of Codrus or Decius. v Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only
prove, that after long Reflection, and Reasoning, we may find out someground, 㛳 35 even from Views of Interest, to approve the same Actions㛳
which every Man admires as soon as he hears of them; and that too undera quite different Conception.
36
Should any of our Travellers find some old Grecian Treasure, theMiser who hid it, 㛳 37 certainly perform’d㛳 an Action more to the Traveller’s Advantage than Codrus or Orestes; for he must have but a small
Share of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so dispers’d, andlost in various Ages, and Nations: Surely then this Miser must appear to
the Traveller a prodigious Hero in Virtue! For Self-Interest will 㛳 38 makeus only esteem Men㛳 according to the Good they do to our Selves, andnot give us high Ideas of public Good, but in proportion to our Shareof it. But must a Man have the Reflection of Cumberland, vi or Puffendorf, to admire Generosity, Faith, Humanity, Gratitude? Or reason so
nicely to apprehend the Evil in Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude? Do not
the former excite our Admiration, and Love, [126] and Study of Imitation, wherever we see them, almost at first View, without any such
Reflection; and the latter, our 㛳 39 Hatred,㛳 Contempt and Abhorrence?
Unhappy would it be for Mankind, if a Sense of Virtue was of as narrow
an Extent, as a Capacity for such Metaphysicks.
Our Moral
Sense cannot
be brib’d.

V. This moral Sense, either of our own Actions, or of those of others,
has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire ofVirtue may be counterballanc’d by Interest, our Sentiment or Perception
v. Orestes, according to legend, son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, killed his
mother and her lover Aegisthus to avenge their assassination of Agamemnon (Aeschylus, Oresteia, especially The Libation Bearers; Euripides, Electra; Sophocles, Electra ). Codrus, the last king of Athens, gave his life fighting against Sparta in order tofree Athens (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, V, 62). Publius Decius Mus(Roman consul, 340 b.c.) supposedly was killed in the war against the Latins (340–338 b.c.) near Capua (see Cicero, De Finibus, II, 61; see note viii below).
vi. Richard Cumberland (1632–1718) criticized Hobbes in the work De legibus
naturae disquisitio philosophica (London, 1672); translation: A Treatise of the Law of
Nature, London, 1727.

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95

of its Beauty cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of ourApprobation were Views of Advantage. Let us consider this both as toour own Actions and those of others.
A Covetous Man shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever In judging
our own
it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here is an of
Actions.
Aversion from Interest. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he shall be
the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct.
Now is it the same way with our Sense of moral Actions? Should any
one advise us to wrong a Minor, or Orphan, or to do an ungrateful Action toward a Benefactor; we at first View abhor it: Assure us that it will
be very advantageous to us, propose even a Reward; [127] our Sense of
the Action is not alter’d. It is true, these Motives may make us undertakeit; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, thana Physician’s Advice has to make a nauseous Potion pleasant to the Taste,when we perhaps force our selves to take it for the Recovery of Health.
40
Had we no Notion of Actions, beside our Opinion of their Advantage, or Disadvantage, could we ever chuse an Action as Advantageous, which we are conscious is still Evil? as it too often happens inhuman Affairs. Where would be the need of such high Bribes to prevailwith Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin’d Party, or of Tortures toforce out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens
Understandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that itis 㛳 41 probably more㛳 advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid
present Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the
remote Possibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and sometimes unexpected? And when Men are overpersuaded
by Advantage, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, howoften is their remaining Life odious, and shameful, in their own Senseof it, as well as in that of others, to whom the base Action was profitable? [128]If any one becomes satisfy’d with his own Conduct in such a Case,
upon what Ground is it? How does he please himself, or vindicate his
Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his private Advantage, or
alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into
the moral Principles of his new Party; for no Party is without them. And

96treatise ii

thus Men become pleas’d with their Actions under some Appearance ofmoral Good, distinct from Advantage.
It may perhaps be alledg’d, “That in those Actions of our own which
Our Moral
Sense notwe call Good, there is this constant Advantage, superior to all others,
founded on
Religion. which is the Ground of our Approbation, and the Motive to them from
Self-love, viz. That we suppose the Deity will reward them.” This will
be more fully consider’d* 㛳 42 afterwards㛳: At present it is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of Honour, Faith, Generosity,
Justice, who have scarce 㛳 43 any Opinions about the Deity, or any
Thoughts of future Rewards㛳; and abhor any thing which is Treacherous, Cruel, or Unjust, without any regard to future Punishments. [129]44
But further, tho these Rewards, and Punishments, may make my
own Actions appear advantageous to me, 㛳 45 and make me approve themfrom Self-Love,㛳 yet they would never make me approve, and love another Person for the like Actions, whose Merit would not be imputed
to me. Those Actions are advantageous indeed to the Agent; but his Advantage is not my Advantage: and Self-Love could never 㛳 46 influence me
to approve㛳 Actions as advantageous to others, or 㛳 47 to love㛳 the Authorsof them on that account.
㛳 48 This is㛳 the second thing to be consider’d, 㛳 49 “Whether㛳 our Sense
Our Moral
Sense of theof the moral Good or Evil, in the Actions of others, can be overActions of50
others, not to ballanc’d, or brib’d by Views of Interest.” 㛳 Now I may indeed㛳 easily
be brib’d. be capable of wishing, that another would do an Action I abhor as morally Evil, if it were very Advantageous to me: Interest in that Case may
overballance my Desire of Virtue in another. But no Interest 㛳 51 to myself 㛳 will make me approve an Action as 㛳 52 morally㛳 Good, which, without that Interest to my self, would have appear’d morally Evil㛳 53 ; if, upon
computing its whole Effects, it appears to produce as great a Momentof Good in the Whole, when it is not beneficial to me, as it did before
when it was. In our Sense of moral Good or [130] Evil, our own private
Advantage or Loss is of no more moment, than the Advantage or Lossof a third Person, to make an Action appear Good or Evil. This Sense
therefore cannot be over-ballanc’d by Interest.㛳 How ridiculous an At* See Sect. ii. Art. 7.

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97

tempt wou’d it be, to engage a Man by Rewards, or 㛳 54 to threaten him㛳
into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his moral
Notions? We may procure Dissimulation by such means, and that is all.
VI. A late witty Author* says, “That the Leaders of Mankind do not Not occasion’dreally admire 㛳 55 such Actions㛳 as those of Regulus, or Decius, but only by Praise.
observe, that Men of such Dispositions are very useful for the Defenceof any State; and therefore by Panegyricks, and Statues, they encouragesuch Tempers in others, as the most tractable, and useful.” vii Here firstlet us consider, If a Traitor, who would sell his own Country to us, may
not often be as advantageous to us, as 㛳 56 a㛳 Hero who defends us: And
yet we can love the Treason, and hate the Traitor. We can at the sametime praise a gallant Enemy, who is very pernicious to us. Is there nothingin all this but an Opinion of Advantage? [131]57
Again, upon this Scheme what could a Statue or Panegyrick effect?—Men love Praise—They will do the Actions which they observe
to be praised—Praise, with Men who have no other Idea of Good but
Self-Interest, is the Opinion which a Nation or Party have of a Man as
useful to them—Regulus, or Cato, or Decius, viii had no Advantage by
the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore they themselves
could not admire them, however the Persons who reap’d the Advantage
might praise such Actions.—Regulus or Cato could not possibly praiseor love another Hero for a virtuous Action; for this would not gain them
the Advantage of Honour; and their own Actions they must have look’d* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d Edition.
vii. Hutcheson used the third edition of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, London,
1724 (ed. F. B. Kaye, 2 vols., Oxford, 1924, vol. 2, p. 393); the text is not a quotation
but a paraphrase of Mandeville.
viii. Marcus Atilius Regulus (consul 267 and 256 b.c.) was a prisoner of the Carthagenians during the First Punic War and was later (?249 b.c.) sent back to Romein order to negotiate an exchange of prisoners; he advised against it, went back to
Carthage, and was murdered cruelly. M. Porcius Cato Uticensis (95–46 b.c.) was an
educated Stoic and politician. As a republican he was a firm adversary of Caesar;
he committed suicide after the battle near Thapsus in Utica (see Cicero’s Cato ).
According to Livy (8, 6–11) P. Decius Mus sacrificed himself in the war against theLatins in 340 b.c. near Capua; see note v above.

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upon as the hard Terms on which Honour was to be purchas’d, without
any thing amiable in them, 㛳 58a which they could contemplate or reflect
upon with 㛳 59b Pleasure. ab 㛳—Now how unlike is this to what the least
Observation would teach a Man concerning such Characters?
But says* he, “These wondrous cunning Governours made Men believe, by their Statues and Panegyricks, that there was publick Spirit, andthat this was in [132] it self Excellent; and hence Men are led to admire
it in others, and to imitate it in themselves, forgetting the Pursuit of
their own Advantage.” So easy a matter it seems to him, to quit judging
of others by what we feel in our selves!—for a Person who is wholly
selfish, to imagine others to be publick-spirited!—for one who has no
Ideas of Good but in his own Advantage, to be led, by the Persuasionsof others, into a Conception of Goodness in what is avowedly detrimental to himself, and profitable to others; nay so entirely, as not toapprove the Action thorowly, 㛳 60 but so㛳 far as he was conscious that itproceeded from a disinterested Study of the Good of others!—Yet thisit seems Statues and Panegyricks can accomplish!
Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nuce duri!† ix

It is an easy matter for Men to assert any thing in Words; but our own
Hearts must decide the Matter, “Whether some moral Actions do not
at first View appear amiable, even to those who are unconcern’d in their
Influence? 㛳 61a Whether we do not 㛳 62b sincerely b 㛳 love a generous kind
Friend, or Patriot, whose [133] Actions procure Honour to him only
without any Advantage to our selves? a 㛳” It is true, that the Actions which
we approve, are useful to Mankind; but not always to the Approver. It
would perhaps be useful to the Whole, that all Men agreed in performing
such Actions; and then every one would have his Share of the Advantage:
But this only proves, that Reason and calm Reflection may recommend* See the same Author in the Same Place.
† Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.
ix. Translation: “The olive has no hardness within, the nut has none without.”
Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb ClassicalLibrary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 398. The correct location of the text is not Ep. 1. Lib. 2, but Ep. 2. Lib. 1. v. 31.

section i99

to us, from Self-Interest, those Actions, which at first View our moral
Sense determines us to admire, without considering this Interest. Nay,our Sense shall operate even where the Advantage to our selves does nothold. We can approve the Justice of a Sentence against our selves: A
condemn’d Traitor may approve the Vigilance of a Cicero in discovering
conspiracies, tho it had been for the Traitor’s Advantage, that there neverhad been in the World any Men of such Sagacity. To say that he may
still approve such Conduct as tending to the publick Good, is a Jest fromone whose only Idea of Good is Self-Interest. Such a Person has no㛳 63 Desire㛳 of publick Good further than it tends to his own Advantage,
which it does not at all in the present Case.
VII. If what is said makes it appear, that we have some other amiable Nor Custom,
Idea of Actions than that of Advantageous to our selves, we may con- Education,&c.
clude, “That this [134] Perception of moral Good is not deriv’d from
Custom, Education, Example, or Study.” These give us no new Ideas:
They might make us see 㛳 64 Advantage to our selves㛳 in Actions whose
Usefulness did not at first appear; or give us Opinions of some Tendencyof Actions to our Detriment, by some nice Deductions of Reason, orby a rash Prejudice, when upon the first View of the Action we shouldhave observ’d no such thing: but they never could have made us apprehend Actions as amiable or odious, 㛳 65 without㛳 any Consideration of
our own Advantage.
VIII. It remains then, “That as the Author of Nature has determin’d us
to receive, by our external Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to receivefrom uniform Objects the Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, to excite
us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it; or to be an
Argument to us of his Goodness, as the Uniformity it self proves his
Existence, whether we had a Sense of Beauty in Uniformity or not: 㛳 66 in
the same manner㛳 he has given us a Moral Sense, to direct our Actions,and to give us still nobler Pleasures; so that while we are only intending
the Good of others, we [135] undesignedly promote our own greatest
private Good.”100This Moral
Sense does notinfer innate
Ideas or
Propositions.

treatise ii

We are not to imagine, that this moral Sense, more than the other
Senses, supposes any innate 㛳 67 Ideas,㛳 Knowledge, or practical Proposition: We mean by it only a Determination of our Minds to receive
㛳 68a amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when 㛳 69b they b 㛳 occur to
our Observation a 㛳, 㛳 70 antecedent㛳 to any Opinions of Advantage or
Loss to redound to our selves from them; even as we are pleas’d with aregular Form, or an harmonious Composition, without having any
Knowledge of Mathematicks, or seeing any Advantage in that Form, orComposition, different from the immediate 㛳 71 Pleasure.㛳 [136]u section ii u
Concerning the immediate
Motive to virtuous Actions.

The Motives of human Actions, or their immediate Causes, would be 㥋 1 㥋best understood after considering the Passions and Affections; but here
we shall only consider the Springs of the Actions which we call virtuous,
as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation of the Moral Sense.
I. Every Action, which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is Affections, thetoalways suppos’d to flow from some Affection toward 㛳 2 rational Agents㛳; Motives
Actions.
and whatever we call Virtue or Vice, is either some such Affection, orsome Action consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to makean Action, or Omission, appear vitious, if it argues the Want of such
Affection toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted
morally good. All the Actions counted religious in any Country, are suppos’d, by those who count them 㛳 3 so㛳, to flow from some Affections
toward the Deity; and whatever we call social Virtue, we still suppose toflow from [137] Affections toward our Fellow-Creatures: for in this allseem to agree, “That external Motions, when accompany’d with no Affections toward God or Man, or evidencing no Want of the expected
Affections toward either, can have no moral Good or Evil in them.”
4
Ask㛳 5, for instance,㛳 the most abstemious Hermit, if Temperanceof it self would be morally good, supposing it shew’d no Obedience
toward the Deity, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than Luxury; and he will easily grant,
that it would be no moral Good, tho still it might be naturally good or
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advantageous to Health: And mere Courage, or Contempt of Danger,
if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or
repairing of Wrongs, 㛳 6 or Self-Interest,㛳 wou’d only entitle its Possessor
to Bedlam. When such sort of Courage is sometimes admir’d, it is uponsome secret Apprehension of a good Intention in the use of it㛳 7, or asa natural Ability capable of an useful Application㛳. Prudence, if it 㛳 8 was㛳
only employ’d in promoting private Interest, is never imagin’d to be a
Virtue: and Justice, or observing a strict Equality, if it 㛳 9 has㛳 no regard to
the Good of Mankind, the Preservation of Rights, and securing Peace, isa Quality properer [138] for its ordinary Gestamen, a Beam and Scales,than for a rational Agent. So that these four Qualitys, commonly call’dCardinal Virtues, obtain that Name, because they are Dispositions universally necessary to promote publick Good, and denote Affections toward rational Agents; otherwise there would appear no Virtue in them.
II. Now if it can be made appear, that none of these Affections whichwe 㛳 10 call virtuous, spring from㛳 Self-love, or Desire of private Interest;since all Virtue is either some such Affections, or Actions consequent
upon them; it must necessarily follow, “㛳 11 That Virtue is not pursued
from the Interest or Self-love of the Pursuer, or any Motives of his own
Advantage.㛳”
The Affections which are of most Importance in Morals, 㛳 12 are Love
Love ofComplacence,and Hatred: All the rest seem but different Modifications of these twoand Hatred of
13
Displicence. original Affections㛳. Now in discoursing of Love 㛳 toward rational
Agents㛳, we need not be caution’d not to include that Love between the
Sexes, which, when no other Affections accompany it, is only Desire ofPleasure, and is never counted a Virtue. Love toward rational Agents, is
subdivided into Love of Complacence or Esteem, and Love of Be[139]nevolence: And Hatred is subdivided into Hatred of Displicenceor Contempt, and Hatred of 㛳 14 Malice.㛳 Concerning each of these separately we shall consider, “Whether they can be influenc’d by Motivesof Self-Interest.”
㛳 15 Love of 㛳 Complacence, Esteem, or Good-liking, at first view apAre entirely
disinterested.
pears to be disinterested, and so 㛳 16 the Hatred of 㛳 Displicence or Dislike;and are entirely excited by some moral Qualitys, Good or Evil, appreAffections,disinterested.

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hended to be in the Objects; which Qualitys the very Frame of our Nature determines us 㛳 17 to love or hate,㛳 to approve or disapprove, according to the moral Sense* above explain’d. Propose to a Man all the
Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him
to 㛳 18 love with㛳 Esteem, and Complacence, 㛳 19 a third㛳 Person entirely
unknown, or if known, apprehended to be cruel, treacherous, ungrateful; you may procure external Obsequiousness, or good Offices, or Dissimulation 㛳 20 of Love㛳; but real 㛳 21 Love of 㛳 Esteem no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to 㛳 22 Hatred of 㛳 Contempt, which no
Motive of Advantage can prevent. On the contrary, represent a Character as generous, kind, faithful, humane, tho in the most distant Partsof the World, and we cannot avoid 㛳 23 loving it with㛳 Es-[140]teem, andComplacence. A Bribe may 㛳 24 possibly㛳 make us attempt to ruin sucha Man, or some strong Motive of Advantage may excite us to oppose
his Interest; but it can never make us 㛳 25 hate㛳 him, while we 㛳 26 apprehend him as morally excellent㛳. Nay, when we consult our own Hearts,
we shall find, that we can scarce ever persuade our selves to attempt any
Mischief against such Persons, from any Motive of Advantage, nor execute it, without the strongest Reluctance, and Remorse, until we haveblinded our selves into a 㛳 27 bad Opinion of the Person in a moral Sense㛳.
III. As to the Love of Benevolence, the very Name excludes Self-Interest. Benevolence
Malice,We never call that Man benevolent, who is in fact useful to others, but anddisinterested.
at the same time only intends his own Interest, without any 㛳 28 desire of,or delight in,㛳 the Good of others. If there be any 㛳 29 Benevolence㛳 atall, it must be disinterested; for the most useful Action imaginable, loses
all appearance of Benevolence, as soon as we discern that it only flowedfrom Self-Love or Interest. Thus, never were any human Actions moreadvantageous, than the Inventions of Fire, and Iron; but if these werecasual, or if the Inventor only intended his own Interest in them, there
is nothing which can be call’d Benevolent in them. Wherever then Benevolence is suppos’d, there it is [141] imagin’d disinterested, and design’d for the Good of 㛳 30 others.㛳
* See Sect. i.

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But it must be here observ’d, That as all Men have Self-Love, as well
as Benevolence, these two Principles may jointly excite a Man to thesame Action; and then they are to be consider’d as two Forces impellingthe same Body to Motion; sometimes they conspire, sometimes are indifferent to each other, and sometimes are in some degree opposite.
Thus, if a Man have such strong Benevolence, as would have produc’dan Action without any Views of Self-Interest; that such a Man has alsoin View private Advantage, along with publick Good, as the Effect of
his Action, does no way diminish the Benevolence of the Action. Whenhe would not have produc’d so much publick Good, had it not been for
Prospect of Self-Interest, then the Effect of Self-Love is to be deducted,
and his Benevolence is proportion’d to the remainder of Good, which
pure Benevolence would have produc’d. When a Man’s Benevolence ishurtful to himself, then Self-Love is opposite to Benevolence, and the
Benevolence is proportion’d to the Sum of the Good produc’d, 㛳 31 addedto㛳 the Resistance of Self-Love surmounted by it. In most Cases it is
impossible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc’d by theone or other of these Principles; but yet the [142] general Truth is sufficiently certain, That this is the way in which the Benevolence of Actions is to be computed. 㛳 32 Since then, no Love to rational Agents canproceed from Self-Interest, every Action must be disinterested, as far as
it flows from Love to rational Agents.㛳
㛳 33 If any enquire, “Whence arises this Love of Esteem, or BenevoCause of
Benevolence.
lence, to good Men, or to Mankind in general, if not from some niceViews of Self-Interest? Or, how we can be mov’d to desire the Happinessof others, without any View to our own?” It may be answer’d, “That thesame Cause which determines us to pursue Happiness for our selves,determines us both to Esteem and Benevolence on their proper Occasions; even the very Frame of our Nature, or a generous Instinct, whichshall be afterwards explain’d.”Self-Lovejoin’d with
Benevolence.

Benevolence
presupposes
Esteem.

IV. Here we may observe, That as Love of Esteem and Complacence isalways join’d with Benevolence, where there is no strong Opposition ofInterest; so Benevolence seems to presuppose some small degree of Esteem, not indeed of actual good Qualitys; for there may be strong Be-

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nevolence, where there is the Hatred of Contempt for actual Vices; as a
Parent may have great Benevolence to a most abandon’d [143] Child,
whose Manners he hates with the greatest Displicence: but Benevolence
supposes a Being capable of Virtue. We judge of other rational Agentsby our selves. The human Nature is a lovely Form; we are all consciousof some morally good Qualitys and Inclinations in our selves, how partial and imperfect soever they may be: we presume the same of every
thing in human Form, nay almost of every living Creature: so that bythis suppos’d remote Capacity of Virtue, there may be some small degreeof Esteem along with our Benevolence, even when they incur our greatest Displeasure by their Conduct.㛳㛳 34 As to Malice,㛳 Human Nature seems scarce capable of malicious Human Natureofdisinterested Hatred, or a sedate 㛳 35 Delight in㛳 the Misery of others, incapable
sedate Malice.
when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our㛳 36 Interest㛳: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose those whose
Interests are opposite to ours, it is only the Effect of Self-Love, and notof disinterested Malice. A sudden Passion may give us wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as
absolutely Evil; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give some
Evidences of disinterested Malice: but as soon as we reflect upon human
Nature, and [144] form just Conceptions, this unnatural Passion is allay’d, and only Self-Love remains, which may make us, from SelfInterest, oppose our Adversarys.
Every one at present rejoices in the Destruction of our Pirates; andyet let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast in upon some desolate
Island, and that we were assur’d some Fate would confine them there
perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more. Now let uscalmly reflect that these Persons are capable of Knowledge and Counsel,
may be happy, and joyful, or may be involv’d in Misery, Sorrow, andPain; that they may return to a State of Love, Humanity, Kindness, andbecome Friends, Citizens, Husbands, Parents, with all the sweet Sentiments which accompany these Relations: then let us ask our selves,
when Self-Love 㛳 37 or regard to the Safety of better Men,㛳 no longer
makes us desire their Destruction, and when we cease to look upon them,under the Ideas suggested by fresh Resentment of Injurys done to us or106

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our Friends, as utterly incapable of any good moral Quality; whether
we 㛳 38 would㛳 wish them the Fate of Cadmus’s Army, i by plunging their
Swords in each others Breast, or a worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures; or rather that they should recover the ordinary Affections of Men,[145] become Kind, Compassionate, and Friendly; contrive Laws, Constitutions, Governments, Propertys; and form an honest happy Society,with Marriages, andRelations dear, and all the Charities
Of Father, Son, and Brother ———*

I fancy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding
our present just Abhorrence 㛳 39 of them㛳 from Self-Interest, or publick
Love and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are expos’d to their Fury. Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce ever haveany sedate Malice against any Person, or 㛳 40 delight in㛳 his Misery. Our㛳 41 Hatred㛳 is only from Opposition of Interest; or if we can entertain
sedate Malice, it must be toward a Character apprehended necessarily
and unalterably Evil in a moral Sense; such as a sudden Passion sometimes represents our Enemies to us: 㛳 42 and㛳 perhaps no such Being occurs to us among the Works of a good Deity.
Other
Affections
disinterested.

V. 㛳 43 Having㛳 offer’d what may perhaps prove, That 㛳 44 our Love eitherof Esteem, or Benevolence, is not founded on Self-Love㛳, or views ofInterest; let us see “if some other Affections, in which Virtue may beplac’d, do arise from Self-[146]Love;” such as Fear, or Reverence, arisingfrom an Apprehension of Goodness, Power, and Justice. For no bodyapprehends any Virtue in base Dread and Servitude toward a powerful
Evil Being: This is indeed the meanest Selfishness. Now the same Arguments which prove 㛳 45 Love of 㛳 Esteem to be disinterested, will prove
this honourable Reverence to be so too; for it plainly arises from an Ap-

i. On Athene’s advice Cadmus sowed the teeth of a dragon he had killed. Out ofthese teeth grew an army, most of which killed each other (except for the five Spartoi,
the progenitors of the Thebans).
* Milt. Par. Lost, B. iv. v. 756.

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prehension of amiable Qualitys in the Person, and Love toward him,
which raises an Abhorrence of offending him. Could we reverence a
Being because it 㛳 46 was㛳 our Interest to do so, a third Person might bribe
us into Reverence toward a Being neither Good, nor Powerful, which
every one sees to be a Jest. And this we might shew to be common to allother Passions, which have 㛳 47 rational Agents for their Objects㛳.
VI. There is one Objection against disinterested 㛳 49 Love㛳, which oc- Objections.
curs from considering, “That nothing so effectually 㛳 50 excites㛳 our Love
toward rational Agents, as their Beneficence 㛳 51 to us㛳; whence we are
led to imagine, that our Love of Persons, as well as irrational Objects,
flows intirely from Self-Interest.” But let us here examine our selves morenarrowly. Do we only 㛳 52 love㛳 the Beneficent, because it is our Interestto 㛳 53 love them㛳? Or do we chuse to love them, because our love is the[147] means of procuring their Bounty? If it be so, then we could indifferently love any Character, even to obtain the Bounty of a third Person; or we could be brib’d by a third Person to love the greatest Villain
heartily, as we may be brib’d to external Offices: Now this is plainly
impossible.
㛳 54 But further㛳, is not our 㛳 55 Love always㛳 the Consequent of
Bounty, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequiousness, and Dissimulation may precede an Opinion of Beneficence;but real Love always presupposes it, and 㛳 56 shall㛳 necessarily arise evenwhen we expect no more, from consideration of past Benefits. 57 Or can
any one say he only loves the Beneficent, as he does a Field or Garden,
because of its Advantage? His Love then must cease toward one who has
ruin’d himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as
we cease to love an inanimate Object which ceases to be useful, unlessa Poetical Prosopopoeia animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude,
which is indeed pretty common. 㛳 58 And then again, our Love would be
the same towards the worst Characters that ’tis towards the best, if they
were equally bountiful to us, which is also false. Beneficence then mustraise our Love as it is an amiable moral Quality㛳: and 㛳 59 hence we㛳 loveeven those who are beneficent to others. [148]㛳 60a It may be further alledg’d, “That Bounty toward our selves is 㛳 61b a
48

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stronger Incitement to b 㛳 Love, than equal Bounty toward others.” Thisis true for a Reason to be offer’d below:* but it does not prove, that inthis Case our Love of Persons is from Views of Interest; since this Loveis not prior to the Bounty, as the means to procure it, but subsequent
upon it, even when we expect no more. a 㛳 In the Benefits which we receive our selves, we are more fully sensible of their Value, and of the
Circumstances of the Action, which are Evidences of a generous Temperin the Donor; and 㛳 62 from㛳 the good Opinion we have of our selves,
㛳 63 we are apt to㛳 look upon the Kindness 㛳 64 as㛳 better employ’d, thanwhen it is bestow’d on others, of whom perhaps we have less favourable
Sentiments. It is however sufficient to remove the Objection, that
Bounty from a Donor apprehended as morally Evil, or extorted by Force,or conferr’d with some View of Self-Interest, will not procure real
㛳 65 Love㛳; nay, it may raise Indignation, if we suspect Dissimulation ofLove, or a Design to allure us into any thing Dishonourable: whereas
wisely employ’d Bounty is always approv’d, and gains love to the Author
from all who hear of it. [149]If then no 㛳 66 Love㛳 toward Persons 㛳 67 be influenc’d by㛳 Self-Love,
Virtuedisinterested.
or Views of Interest, and all Virtue flows from 㛳 68 Love㛳 㛳 69 toward Persons㛳, or some other Affection equally disinterested; it remains, “Thatthere must be some other 㛳 70 Motive㛳 than Self-Love, or Interest, which
excites us to the Actions we call Virtuous.”
Objectionfrom Religion.

㛳 71a VII. There may perhaps still remain another Suspicion of SelfInterest in our Prosecution of Virtue, 㛳 72b arising b 㛳 from this, “That thewhole Race of Mankind seems persuaded of the Existence of an Almighty Being, who will certainly secure Happiness either now, or hereafter, to those who are Virtuous, according to their several Notions ofVirtue in various Places: and upon this Persuasion, Virtue may in all
Cases be pursu’d from Views† of Interest.” Here again we might appeal
to all Mankind, whether there be no Benevolence but what flows froma View of Reward from the Deity? Nay, do we not see a great deal of it* See Sect. v. Art. 2.
† See above Sect. i. Art. 5. Par. 㛳 73 4㛳.

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among those who entertain few 㛳 74c if any c 㛳 Thoughts of Devotion atall? Not to say that this Benevolence 㛳 75d scarce deserves d 㛳 the Name,
when we desire not, nor delight in the Good of others, 㛳 76e further e 㛳 thanit serves our own Ends. a 㛳 [150]㛳 77a But if we have no other Idea of Good, 㛳 78b than b 㛳 Advantage to
our selves a 㛳, we must imagine that every rational Being 㛳 79 acts only㛳 for
its own Advantage; and however we may call a beneficent Being, a good
Being, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon this Scheme 㛳 80 weshould not be apt to think㛳 there is any beneficent Being in Nature, ora Being who acts for the Good of others. Particularly, if there is no Senseof Excellence in publick Love, and promoting the Happiness of others,
whence should this Persuasion arise, “That the Deity will make the Virtuous happy?” Can we prove that it is for the Advantage of the Deity to
do so? This I fancy will be look’d upon as very absurd, 㛳 81a unless wesuppose some beneficent Dispositions essential to the Deity, which determine him to consult the publick Good of his Creatures, and reward
such as co-operate with 㛳 82b his b 㛳 kind Intention a 㛳. And if there be such
Dispositions in the Deity, where is the impossibility of some small degreeof this publick Love in 㛳 83 his㛳 Creatures? And why must they be suppos’d incapable of acting but from Self-Love?
84
In short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action inrational Agents than Self-Love, I see no Foundation to expect Beneficence, or Rewards [151] from God, or Man, further than it is the Interestof the Benefactor; and all Expectation of Benefits from a Being whose
Interests are independent on us, must be perfectly ridiculous. Whatshould engage the Deity to reward Virtue? Virtue is commonly suppos’d,upon this Scheme, to be only a consulting our own Happiness in themost artful way, consistently with the Good of the Whole; and in Vicethe same thing is foolishly pursu’d, in a manner which will not so probably succeed, and which is contrary to the Good of the Whole. But how
is the Deity concern’d in this Whole, if every Agent always acts from
Self-Love? And what Ground have we, from the Idea of 㛳 85 a God it self 㛳,
to believe the Deity is good in the Christian Sense, that is, studious of
the Good of his Creatures? Perhaps the Misery of 㛳 86 his㛳 Creatures may㛳 87 give him as much㛳 Pleasure, as their Happiness: And who can find110

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fault, or blame such a Being to study their Misery; for what else should
we expect? A Manichean ii Evil God, is a Notion which Men would asreadily run into, as that of a Good one, if there is no Excellence in disinterested Love, and no Being acts but for its own Advantage; unless weprov’d that the Happiness of Creatures was advantageous to the Deity.
[152]
From
Concomitant
Pleasure.

㛳 88a VIII. The last, and only remaining Objection against what has beensaid, is this, “That 㛳 89b Virtue perhaps b 㛳 is pursu’d because of the concomitant Pleasure.” To which we may answer, first, by observing, that
this plainly supposes a Sense of Virtue antecedent to Ideas of Advantage,
upon which this Advantage is founded; and that from the very Frameof our Nature we are determin’d to perceive Pleasure in the practice ofVirtue, and to approve it when practis’d by our selves, or others.
90c
But further, may we not justly question, whether all Virtue is pleasant? Or, whether we are not determin’d to some amiable Actions inwhich we find no Pleasure? ’Tis true, all the Passions, and Affections
justify themselves; or, we approve our being affected in 㛳 91d a certain d 㛳manner on 㛳 92e certain Occasions e 㛳, and condemn a Person who is otherwise affected. So the Sorrowful, the Angry, the Jealous, the Compassionate, think it reasonable they should be so upon the several Occasions
which move these Passions; but we should not therefore say that Sorrow,
Anger, Jealousy, or Pity are pleasant, and that we chuse to be in these
Passions because of the concomitant Pleasure. The matter is plainly this.
The Frame of our Nature, on such Occasions as move these Passions,determines us to be thus [153] affected, and to approve our being so: Nay,
we dislike any Person who is not thus affected upon such occasions, not-ii. Manicheanism, named after its Persian founder Mani (209–76?), was a religionof later antiquity, whose syncretic system contained Zoroastrian and Gnostic doctrines. Hutcheson refers to the Manichean dualism: evil and the demons of matter(hyle) control the present material world and constantly struggle against the powersof light; the human soul, imprisoned in the body, is part of the good god. Mandevillegives a favorable description of Manicheanism in Free Thoughts on Religion, theChurch and National Happiness, 2nd ed. (London, 1729); 1st ed. 1720, 103ff.

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withstanding the uneasiness of these Passions. 㛳 93f This f 㛳 uneasiness determines us to endeavour an Alteration in the state of the Object; but
not otherwise to remove the painful Affection, while the occasion is unalter’d: which shews that these 㛳 94g Affections are neither chosen for theirconcomitant Pleasure, nor voluntarily brought 㛳 95h upon our selves h 㛳with a view to private Good g 㛳. The Actions which these Passions move
us to, 㛳 96i tend generally i 㛳 to remove the uneasy Passion by altering thestate of the Object; but the 㛳 97j Removal of our Pain is seldom directly
intended in the uneasy Benevolent Passions: nor is the Alteration intended in the State of the Objects by such Passions, imagin’d to be a
private Good to the Agent, as it always is in the selfish Passions. If oursole Intention, in Compassion or Pity, 㛳 98k was k 㛳 the Removal of ourPain, j 㛳 we should run away, shut our Eyes, divert our Thoughts fromthe miserable Object, to avoid the Pain of Compassion, which we seldom do: nay, we croud about such Objects, and voluntarily 㛳 99l expose
our selves to l 㛳 Pain, unless Reason, and Reflection upon our Inability torelieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination; or some selfish Affection, as fear of Danger, overballances it. [154]Now there are several morally amiable Actions, which flow from these
Passions which are so uneasy; such as Attempts of relieving the Distress’d, of defending the Injur’d, of repairing of Wrongs done by ourselves. These Actions are often accompany’d with no Pleasure in themean time, nor have they any subsequent Pleasure, except as they aresuccessful; unless it be that which may arise from calm Reflection, when
the Passion is over, upon our having been in a Disposition, which to ourmoral Sense appears lovely and good: but this Pleasure is never intended
in the Heat of Action, nor is it any Motive exciting to it.
Besides, In the pleasant Passions, we do not love, because it is pleasant
to love; we do not chuse this State, because it is an advantageous, orpleasant State: This Passion necessarily arises from seeing its proper Object, a morally good Character. And if we could love, whenever we see
it would be our Interest to love, Love could be brib’d by a third Person;
and we could never love Persons in Distress, for then our Love gives us
Pain. The same Observation may be extended to all the other Affections
from which Virtue is suppos’d to flow: And from the whole we may

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conclude, “That the virtuous Agent [155] is never apprehended by us asacting only from Views of his own Interest, but as principally influenc’d
by some other Motive.” a 㛳
IX. Having remov’d these 㛳 101 false㛳 Springs of 㛳 102 virtuous Actions㛳,
let us next establish the true one, viz. some Determination of our Nature
to study the Good of others; or some Instinct, antecedent to all Reasonfrom Interest, which influences us to the Love of others; even as themoral Sense,* above 㛳 103 explain’d㛳, determines us to approve the Actions which flow from this Love in our selves or others. This disinterested
Affection, may appear strange to Men impress’d with Notions of SelfLove, as the sole 㛳 104 Motive㛳 of Action, from the Pulpit, the Schools,
the Systems, and Conversations regulated by them: but let us consider
it in its strongest, and simplest Kinds; and when we see the Possibilityof it in these Instances, we may easily discover its universal Extent.
An honest Farmer will tell you, that he studies the Preservation andNaturalAffection.
Happiness of his Children, and loves them without any design of Goodto himself. But say some of our Philosophers, iii “The Happiness of [156]their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and their Misery 㛳 105 gives them㛳Pain; and therefore to obtain the former, and avoid the latter, they study,
from Self-Love, the Good of their Children.” Suppose several Merchants join’d in Partnership of their whole Effects; one of them 㛳 106 is
employ’d㛳 abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain 㛳 107 from㛳
their Share in the Loss: is this then the same Kind of Affection with thatof Parents to their Children? Is there the same tender, personal Regard?
I fancy no Parent will say so. In this Case of Merchants there is a plain
Conjunction of Interest; but whence the Conjunction of Interest between the Parent and Child? Do the Child’s Sensations give Pleasure orPain to the Parent? Is the Parent hungry, thirsty, sick, when 㛳 108 the Childis so㛳? 㛳 109 “No, but his Love to the Child makes him affected with his
Pleasures or Pains.” This Love㛳 then is antecedent to the Conjunction
The true
Spring of
Virtue.

100* See Sect. i.
iii. For example, Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, ed. F. B. Kaye, 2 vols.
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988), vol. 1, p. 75.

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of Interest, and the Cause of it, not the Effect: 㛳 110 this Love㛳 then must
be disinterested. “No, 㛳 111 says another Sophist㛳, Children are Parts ofour selves, and in loving them we but love our selves in them.” A very
good Answer! Let us carry it as far as it will go. How are they Parts ofour selves? Not as a Leg or an Arm: We are not conscious of their Sensations. “But their [157] Bodys were form’d from Parts of ours.” So is aFly, or a Maggot which may breed in any discharg’d Blood or Humour:
Very dear Insects surely! There must be something else then which makes
Children Parts of our selves; and what is this but that Affection which
Nature determines us to have toward them? This Love makes them Partsof our selves, and therefore does not flow from their being so before.
This is indeed a good Metaphor; and wherever we find a Determination
among several rational Agents to mutual Love, let each Individual be
look’d upon as a Part of a great Whole, or System, and concern himself
in the publick Good of 㛳 112 it.㛳113
But a later Author observes,* iv “That natural Affection in Parents
is weak, till the Children begin to give Evidences of Knowledge andAffections.” Mothers say they feel it strong from the very first: and yet
I could wish for the Destruction of his Hypothesis, that what he alledges
㛳 114 was㛳 true; as I fancy it is 㛳 115 in some measure, tho we may find insome Parents an Affection toward Idiots㛳. The observing of Understanding and Affections in Children, which make them 㛳 116 appear
moral㛳 Agents, can increase Love toward them without prospect of Interest; for I hope this [158] Increase of Love, is not from Prospect ofAdvantage from the Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom
Parents are still toiling, and never intend to be refunded their Expences,or recompens’d for their Labour, but in Cases of extreme Necessity. Ifthen the observing a moral Capacity can be the occasion of increasingLove without Self-Interest, even from the Frame of our Nature; pray,
may not this be a Foundation of weaker degrees of Love where there is
no preceding tie of Parentage, and extend it to all Mankind?

* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 68, 3d Ed.
iv. Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 75.

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Publick
Affections,natural.

treatise ii

X. And that this is so in fact, will appear by considering some moredistant Attachments. If we observe any Neighbours, from whom perhaps we have receiv’d no good Offices, form’d into Friendships, Familys,
Partnerships, and with Honesty and Kindness assisting each other; pray
ask any Mortal if he would not 㛳 118 be better pleas’d with㛳 their Prosperity, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own, thanwith their Misery, and Ruin; and you shall find a Bond of Benevolence
further extended than a Family and Children, altho the Ties are not sostrong. Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had left his native Country,
and with all his Kindred had settled his Fortunes abroad, without any
View of returning; and only [159] imagine he had receiv’d no Injurys
from his Country: ask such a Man, 㛳 119 would it give him no Pleasure tohear of the Prosperity of his Country㛳? Or could he, now that his Interests are separated from that of his Nation, as 㛳 120 gladly hear㛳 that it
was laid waste by Tyranny or a foreign Power? I fancy his Answer would
shew us a Benevolence extended beyond Neighbourhoods or Acquaintances. Let a Man of a compos’d Temper, out of the hurry of his private
Affairs, 㛳 121 only㛳 read of the Constitution of a foreign Country, even in
the most distant parts of the Earth, and observe Art, 㛳 122 Design, and a
Study㛳 of publick Good in the Laws of this Association; and he shallfind his Mind mov’d in their favour; he shall be contriving Rectifications
and Amendments in their Constitution, and regret any unlucky part ofit which may be pernicious to their Interest; he shall bewail any Disaster
which befalls them, and accompany all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now this 㛳 123 proves Benevolence to be in㛳 some degree
extended to all Mankind, where there is no interfering Interest, whichfrom Self-Love may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of rational
Agents, capable of moral Affections, in the most distant Planets, v our117

v. Travels to moons and planets were a popular literary subject during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The most famous writer of such travels was Cyranode Bergerac, Histoire comique des états et empires de la lune, Paris, 1657, translated as
Selenarhia, or the Government of the World in the Moon, a Comical History, by Sir
Thomas St. Serfe, London, 1659. Other writers include David Russen, Iter Lunare:or, a Voyage to the Moon, London, 1705, and Daniel Defoe, The Consolidator, or,Memoirs of Sundry Transactions from the World in the Moon, London, 1705. Of

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good Wishes would still attend them, and we should 㛳 124 delight in㛳
their 㛳 125 Happiness.㛳 [160]
XI. Here we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call National Love.
national Love, or Love of one’s native Country. Whatever place we have
liv’d in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark’dthe various Affections of human Nature; we have known many lovely
Characters; we remember the Associations, Friendships, Familys, natural Affections, and other human Sentiments: our moral Sense determines us to approve these lovely Dispositions where we have most distinctly observ’d them; and our Benevolence concerns us in the Interestsof 㛳 127 the㛳 Persons possess’d of them. When we come to observe thelike as distinctly in another Country, we begin to acquire a national Love
toward it also; nor has our own Country any other preference in our
Idea, unless it be by an Association of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth,
with the Buildings, Fields, and Woods where we receiv’d them. This may
let us see, how Tyranny, 㛳 128 Faction㛳, a Neglect of Justice, a Corruptionof Manners, 㛳 129 and㛳 any thing which occasions the Misery of the Subjects, destroys this national Love, and the dear Idea of a Country.
We ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that apparent The Reason
naturalwant of natural Affection among collateral Rela-[161]tions, is, that these why
Affections do
natural Inclinations, in many Cases, are overpower’d by Self-Love, not always
where there happens any Opposition of Interests; but where this does appear.
not happen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence, 㛳 130 tho㛳 withdifferent degrees of Strength, according to the nearer or more remote
Relations they stand in to each other; and according as the natural Affection of Benevolence 㛳 131 is㛳 join’d with and strengthen’d by Esteem,
Gratitude, Compassion, or other kind Affections; or on the contrary,
weaken’d by Displicence, Anger, or Envy. [162]126

major importance for scientific speculation was Bernard de Bouvier de Fontenelle,
Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, Paris, 1686; there were several contemporary
English translations.

u section iii u
The Sense of Virtue, and the various
Opinions about it, reducible to one general
Foundation. The Manner of computing theMorality of Actions.

All Virtue
Benevolent.

I. If we examine all the Actions which are counted amiable any where,
and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are approv’d, we shallfind, that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they 㛳 1 always㛳 appear as Benevolent, or flowing from 㛳 2 Love of others㛳, and 㛳 3 a㛳Study of their Happiness, whether the Approver be one of the Persons
belov’d, or profited, or not; so that all those kind Affections which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos’d to flow fromsuch Affections, appear morally Good, if while they are benevolent toward some Persons, they be not pernicious to others. Nor shall we findany thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where there is no Benevolence imagin’d; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos’d applicable to, and design’d for benevolent Purposes. Nay, as was
before observ’d,* [163] the Actions which in fact are exceedingly useful,shall appear void of moral Beauty, if we 㛳 5 know㛳 they proceeded fromno kind Intentions 㛳 6 toward㛳 others; and yet an unsuccessful Attemptof Kindness, or of promoting publick Good, shall appear as amiable as
the most successful, if it flow’d from as strong Benevolence.

* See Sect. ii. Art. 3. Par. 1. Art. 㛳 4 6. Par. 2㛳.

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II. 㛳 7 Hence those㛳 Affections which would lead us to do good to our Religion.
Benefactor, shall appear amiable, and the contrary Affections odious,
even when our Actions cannot possibly be of any advantage or hurt tohim. Thus a sincere Love and Gratitude toward our Benefactor, a chearful Readiness to do whatever he shall require, how burdensom soever, ahearty Inclination to comply with his Intentions, and Contentmentwith
the State he has plac’d us in, are the strongest Evidences of Benevolence
we can shew to such a Person; and therefore they must appear exceedingly amiable. And under these is included all the rational Devotion, or
Religion toward a Deity apprehended as Good, which we can possibly
perform.
We may here transiently observe one Circumstance in the Frame of 㥋 8 Gratitude. 㥋
our Nature, which is wonderfully adapted to promote Benevolence, viz.
that as a Benefit conferr’d necessarily raises Gratitude in the [164] 㛳 9 Person who receives it㛳, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from themeanest of Mankind, are wonderfully delightful to the Benefactor.
Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful
Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would notrather chuse to be 㛳 10 lov’d㛳, than hated, if their Love no way evidenc’d
us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern’d in their Meanness. And
thus the most abject 㛳 11 Person oblig’d㛳 is capable, and inclin’d to makeno small addition to our Happiness by his Love, and Gratitude, when
he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none
from him: Thus,——— A grateful Mind
By owing owes not, 㛳 12 and㛳 still pays, at once
Indebted and discharg’d ———*As to external Performances of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations, and Ages; and Education may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the Deity: but then wherever any external Rite of Worship is approv’d, there
also it is look’d upon to proceed from Love toward the Deity, or some
* Par. Lost, B. iv. l. 55.

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other Affec-[165]tion necessarily join’d with Love, as Reverence, Repentance, or Sorrow to have offended. So that the general Principle of Love,is the Foundation of all the apparent moral Excellence, even in the mostfantastick Rites of Worship which were ever approv’d. For as to Rites
design’d only to appease a furious Being, no Mortal, I fancy, apprehends
there is any Virtue, or Excellence in them; but that they are chosen only
as the dishonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there arevarious 㛳 13 speculative㛳 Opinions about what is acceptable to the Deity,
it necessarily follows, “That, accordingly, Practices, and Approbation,must be various; tho all the moral Goodness of Actions is still presum’dto flow from Love.”
Social Virtues.

III. Again, that we may see how 㛳 14 Love, or㛳 Benevolence, is the Foundation of all apprehended Excellence in social Virtues, let us only observe, That amidst the diversity of Sentiments on this Head among various Sects, this is still allow’d to be the way of deciding the Controversy
about any disputed Practice, 㛳 15 viz.㛳 to enquire whether this Conduct,or the contrary, will most effectually promote the publick Good. The
Morality is immediately adjusted, when the natural Tendency, or Influence of the Action upon the universal natural Good of Mankind isagreed upon. That which pro-[166]duces more Good than Evil in the
Whole, is acknowledg’d Good; and what does not, is counted Evil. In
this Case, we no other way regard the good of the Actor, or that of those
who are thus enquiring, than as they make a Part of the great System.
In our late Debates about Passive Obedience, and the Right of Resistance in Defence of Privileges, i the Point disputed among Men of
Sense was, “whether universal Submission would probably be attended
with greater natural Evils, than temporary Insurrections, when Privileges
are invaded; and not whether what tended in the Whole to the publicknatural Good, was also morally Good?” And if a divine Command wasalledg’d in favour of the Doctrine of Passive Obedience, this would, noi. George Berkeley’s Passive Obedience (1712) was criticized by the Molesworth
circle. See The Works of George Berkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London,
1953), vol. 4, pp. 17–46, and the editors’ introduction, pp. 3–11.

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doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the ballance of natural Good to its
own side, and determine our Election from Interest; and yet our Senseof the moral Good in Passive Obedience, would still be founded uponsome Species of Benevolence, such as Gratitude toward the Deity, andSubmission to his Will to whom we are so much oblig’d. But I fancy
those, who believe the Deity to be Good, would not rashly alledge sucha Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did
tend more to the universal Good, than the contrary, either by prevent[167]ing the external Evils of Civil War, or by enuring Men to Patience,or some other Quality which they apprehended necessary to their everlasting Happiness. And were it not so, Passive Obedience might be recommended as an inglorious Method of escaping a greater Mischief, but
could never have any thing morally amiable in it.
But let us quit the Disputes of the Learned, on whom, it may bealledg’d, Custom and Education have a powerful Influence; and consider upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are approv’d or condemn’d, vindicated or excus’d. We are universally asham’d to say an Action is Just, because it 㛳 16 tends㛳 to my Advantage, or to the Advantageof the Actor: And we as seldom condemn a beneficent kind Action, because it 㛳 17 is㛳 not advantageous to us, or to the Actor. Blame, and Censure, are founded on a Tendency to publick Evil, or a Principle of private
Malice in the Agent, or Neglect at least of the Good of others; on Inhumanity of Temper, or at least such strong Selfishness as makes theAgent careless of the Sufferings of others: and thus we blame and censure
when the Action no way affects our selves. All the moving and persuasive
Vindications of Actions, which may, from some partial evil Tendency,
appear evil, are taken from this, that they were necessary to some [168]greater Good which counterballanc’d the Evil: “Severity toward a few,
is Compassion toward multitudes.—Transitory Punishments are necessary for avoiding more durable Evils.—Did not some suffer on such
Occasions, there would be no living for honest Men.”—and such like.
And even when an Action cannot be entirely justify’d, yet how greatly
is the Guilt extenuated, if we can alledge; “That it was only the Effectof Inadvertence without Malice, or of partial good Nature, Friendship,Compassion, natural Affection, or Love of a Party?” All these Consid-

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erations shew what is the universal Foundation of our Sense of moral
Good, or Evil, viz. Benevolence toward others on 㛳 18 one㛳 hand, andMalice, or even Indolence, and Unconcernedness about the 㛳 19 apparent㛳 publick Evil on the other. And let it be here observ’d, that we areso far from imagining all Men to 㛳 20 act㛳 only 㛳 21 from㛳 Self-Love, that
we universally expect in others a Regard for the Publick; and do not lookupon the want of this, as barely the absence of moral Good, or Virtue,
but even as positively evil and hateful.
Moral Evil notalways Malice.

IV. Contrarys may illustrate each other; let us therefore observe the general Foundation of our Sense of moral Evil more particularly. Disinterested Malice, or 㛳 22 Delight in㛳 the Misery of others, is the [169] highest
pitch of what we count vitious; and every Action appears evil, which isimagin’d to flow from any degree of this Affection. Perhaps a violent
Passion may hurry Men into it for a few Moments, and our rash angry
Sentiments of our Enemys, may represent them as having such odious
Dispositions; but it is very probable, from the Reasons offer’d above,*that there is no such degree of Wickedness in human Nature, as in cold
blood, to 㛳 23 be pleas’d with㛳 the Misery of others, when it is 㛳 24 conceiv’dno㛳 way useful to our Interests.
㛳 25a The Story of Nero and Paetus ii may be alledg’d against this, but
perhaps unjustly, even allowing the Fact to be true. Nero was 㛳 26b conscious he b 㛳 was hated by those whom the World call’d good Men, andthat they were dangerous to him; he fancy’d his best Security lay in being
terrible, and appearing such on all Occasions, by making others miserable when he pleas’d, to let his Enemys see, that they should have no
Security from that Compassion which a Nero would imagine argu’d
Weakness. This unfortunate Gentleman’s Happiness might by somefoolish Courtier be so related, as to carry a Reproof of the Tyrant’s unnatural Pursuits, whereby his Passion might be excited to cut off the* See Sect. ii. Art. 4.
ii. Thrasea Paetus, a Stoic of republican attitude, who had written a biography ofCato with a clear bias against Caesar, was accused of high treason by Nero and committed suicide after his conviction in a.d. 66.

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Per-[170]son admir’d, and prefer’d before him. Any of these Motives ofapparent Interest seem more probably to have influenc’d him, than that
we should in him, and a few others, suppose a 㛳 a Principle of calm Malicewithout Interest, of which the rest of Mankind seem entirely incapable.
The Temper of a Tyrant seems 㛳 27 probably to be㛳 a continu’d state Temper of aof Anger, Hatred, and Fear. To form our Judgment then of his Motives Tyrant.
of Action, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let usreflect upon the Apprehensions we form of Mankind, when we are under
any of those Passions which to the Tyrant are habitual. When we areunder the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we 㛳 28 plainly㛳 find, that ourMinds are wholly fill’d with Apprehensions of the Person who injur’dus, as if he 㛳 29 was㛳 absolutely Evil, and delighted in doing Mischief: We
overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ’d in him:
we forget 㛳 30 that㛳 perhaps 㛳 31 only Self-Love, and not Malice, was his
Motive; or㛳 it may be some generous or kind Intention toward others.
These, probably, are the Opinions which a Tyrant constantly forms concerning Mankind; and having very much weaken’d all kind Affections
in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempersof others by his own. And were [171] 㛳 32 Men㛳 really such as he apprehends them, his Treatment of them would not be very unreasonable.
We shall generally find our Passions arising suitably to the Apprehensions we form of others: if 㛳 33 these be㛳 rashly form’d upon some suddenslight Views, it is no wonder if we find Dispositions following uponthem, very little suited to the real State of human Nature.
The ordinary 㛳 34 Springs㛳 of Vice 㛳 35 then㛳 among Men, 㛳 36 must be㛳 Ordinaryofa mistaken Self-Love, made 㛳 37 so㛳 violent, 㛳 38 as㛳 to overcome Benevo- Springs
Vice.
lence; 39 or Affections arising from false, and rashly form’d Opinions ofMankind, which we run into thro the weakness of our Benevolence.
When Men, who 㛳 40 had㛳 good Opinions of each other, happen to havecontrary Interests, they are apt to have their good Opinions of each otherabated, by imagining a design’d Opposition from Malice; without this,they can scarcely hate one another. 㛳 41 Thus㛳 two Candidates for thesame Office wish each other dead, because that is an ordinary way by
which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other’s Virtue, as there sometimes may in benevolent Tem-

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pers, then their Opposition may be without Hatred; and if another better Post, where there is no Competition, were [172] bestow’d on one ofthem, the other shall rejoice at it.
Self-Love
indifferent.

Self-Love notexcluded by
Benevolence.

V. 㛳 42 The㛳 Actions which flow solely from Self-Love, and yet evidence
no Want of Benevolence, having no hurtful Effects upon others, 㛳 43 seem
perfectly indifferent in a moral Sense㛳, and neither raise the Love or
Hatred of the Observer. Our Reason can 㛳 44 indeed discover㛳 certain
Bounds, within which we may not only act from Self-Love, consistently
with the Good of the Whole, but every Mortal’s acting thus within these
Bounds for his own Good, is absolutely necessary for the Good of theWhole; and the Want of such Self-Love would be universally pernicious.
㛳 45 Hence㛳, he who pursues his own private Good, with an Intention
also to concur with that Constitution which tends to the Good of theWhole; and much more he who promotes his own Good, with a direct
View of making himself more capable of serving God, or doing goodto Mankind; acts not only innocently, but also honourably, and virtuously: for in both these Cases, 㛳 46 a Motive of 㛳 Benevolence concurs with
Self-Love to excite him to the Action. And thus a Neglect of our own
Good, may be morally evil, and argue a Want of Benevolence toward
the Whole. But when Self-Love breaks over the Bounds above-mention’d,and leads us into Actions detrimen-[173]tal to others, and to the whole;or makes us insensible of the generous kind Affections; then it appears
vitious, and is disapprov’d. So also, when upon any small Injurys, or
sudden Resentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our Benevolence 㛳 47 becomes㛳 so faint, as to let us 㛳 48 entertain㛳 odious Conceptions of 㛳 49 Men㛳, or any Part of them, without just Ground, as if they
were wholly Evil, or Malicious, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings
than they really are; these Conceptions must lead us into malevolent
Affections, or at least weaken our good ones, and make us really Vitious.
VI. 50 Here we must also observe, that every moral Agent justly considers
himself as a Part of this rational System, which may be useful to theWhole; so that he may be, in part, an Object of his own Benevolence.
Nay further, as was hinted above, he may see, that the Preservation of

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the System 㛳 51 requires every one to be㛳 innocently sollicitous about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings greater Evilto the Agent, than Good to others, however it may evidence 㛳 52 strong
Benevolence or㛳 a virtuous Disposition in the Agent, yet it 㛳 53 must be
founded upon a mistaken Opinion of its Tendency to publick Good,
when it has no such Tendency: so that a㛳 Man who reason’d [174] justly,and consider’d the whole, would not be led into it, 㛳 54 were his Benevolence ever so strong㛳; nor would he recommend it to the Practice ofothers; however he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to
the Agent from a kind Action, did evidence a 㛳 55 strong Disposition to
Virtue㛳. Nay 㛳 56 further, if any Good was㛳 propos’d to the Pursuit ofan Agent, and he had a Competitor in every respect only equal to himself;
the highest Benevolence possible would not lead a wise Man to preferanother to himself, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some other external Circumstance to move him to yield to his Competitor. A Man
surely of the strongest Benevolence, may just treat himself as he would
do a third Person, who was a Competitor of equal Merit with the other;and as his preferring one to another, in such a Case, would argue no
Weakness of Benevolence; so, no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only equal Abilitys.
㛳 57a Wherever a Regard to my self, tends as much to the good of theWhole, as Regard to another; or where the Evil to my self, is equal to
the Good obtain’d for another; tho by acting, in such Cases, for the goodof another, I really shew a very amiable Disposition; yet by acting in thecontrary manner, from Regard to [175] my self, I evidence no evil Disposition, nor any want of the most extensive Benevolence; since the Moment of good to the Whole is, in both Cases, exactly equal. And let it
be here observ’d, that this does not supersede the necessity of Liberality,
or gratuitous Gifts, altho in such Actions the Giver loses 㛳 58b as muchas b 㛳 the other receives; since the Moment of Good to any Person, in any
given Case, is in a compound 㛳 59c Ratio c 㛳 of the Quantity of the Goodit self, and the Indigence of the Person. Hence it appears, that a Gift
may make a much greater Addition to the happiness of the Receiver,than the Diminution it occasions in the happiness of the Giver: Andthat the most useful and important Gifts are those from the Wealthy to124treatise ii

the Indigent. 㛳 60d Gifts d 㛳 from Equals are not useless 㛳 61e neither e 㛳, since
they often increase the Happiness of both, as they are strong Evidencesof mutual Love: but Gifts from the Poor to the Wealthy are really foolish,
unless they be only little Expressions of Gratitude, which are also fruitfulof Joy on both Sides: for these Expressions of Gratitude are really delightful and acceptable to the Wealthy, if they have any Humanity; andtheir Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to the poor Giver.
In like manner, when an Action does more Harm to the Agent, thanGood to [176] the Publick; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly
virtuous Disposition in the Agent, tho ’tis plain he acts upon a mistaken
View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the Agent be so great, as tomake him incapable at another time, of promoting a publick Good ofgreater moment than what is attain’d by this Action; the Action may
really be Evil, so far as it evidences a prior Neglect of a greater 㛳 62f attainable f 㛳 publick Good for a smaller one; tho at present this Action also
flows from a virtuous Disposition. a 㛳
Benevolence,
how affectedby theQualitys of
its Object.

VII. The moral Beauty, or Deformity of Actions, is not alter’d by themoral Qualitys of the Objects, any further 㛳 64 than㛳 the Qualitys of the
Objects increase or diminish the Benevolence of the Action, or the publick Good intended by it. Thus Benevolence toward the worst Characters, or the Study of their Good, may be as amiable as any whatsoever;yea often more so than that toward the Good, since it argues such astrong Degree of Benevolence as can surmount the greatest Obstacle,
the moral Evil in the Object. Hence the Love of unjust Enemys, iscounted among the highest Virtues. Yet when our Benevolence to theEvil, encourages them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of Mischief; this diminishes or destroys the Beauty of the Action,or even makes [177] it evil, as it betrays a Neglect of the Good of others
more valuable; Beneficence toward whom, would have tended more to
the publick Good, than that toward our 65 Favourites: But Benevolence
toward evil Characters, which neither encourages 㛳 66 them㛳, nor enables
them to do Mischief, nor diverts our Benevolence from Persons more
useful, has as much moral Beauty as any whatsoever.
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VIII. In comparing the moral Qualitys of Actions, in order to regulate Qualitys
our Election among various Actions propos’d, or to find which of them determining
our Election.
has the greatest moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense of Virtue
㛳 68 to judge thus㛳; that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the Virtue is in proportion to the Number of
Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend; (and here the Dignity, or
moral Importance of Persons, may compensate Numbers) and in equal
Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity of the Happiness, or natural
Good; or that the Virtue is in a compound Ratio of the Quantity ofGood, and Number of Enjoyers. 㛳 69 In㛳 the same manner, the moral
Evil, or Vice, is as the Degree of Misery, and Number of Sufferers; sothat, that Action is best, which 㛳 70 procures㛳 the greatest Happiness forthe greatest Numbers; and that, [178] worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery. iii
67

IX. Again, when the Consequences of Actions are of a mix’d Nature, Consequences,
they
partly Advantageous, 㛳 72 and㛳 partly Pernicious; that Action is good, howaffect thewhose good Effects preponderate the evil, by being useful to many, and Morality ofpernicious to few; and that, evil, which is otherwise. Here also the moral Actions.
Importance of Characters, or Dignity of Persons may compensate
Numbers; as may also the Degrees of Happiness or Misery: for to procure an inconsiderable Good to many, but an immense Evil to few, may
be Evil; and an immense Good to few, may preponderate a small Evil tomany.
㛳 73a But the Consequences which affect the Morality of Actions, are
not only the direct and natural Effects of the Actions themselves; but
also all those Events which otherwise would not have happen’d. 㛳 74b For b 㛳many Actions which have no immediate or natural evil Effects, nay
71iii. This maxim became the central phrase of utilitarianism. Also used by Cesare
Beccaria (1738–94) in the introduction to his work Dei dilitti e delle pene (Livorno,
1764). Jeremy Bentham calls it the “principle of utility”; compare with the title ofchapter 1 of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London, 1789),
ed. H. L. A. Hart (London: Athlone, 1970), p. 11.

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which actually produce good Effects, may be evil; if a man foresees that㛳 75c the evil c 㛳 Consequences, which will probably flow from the Folly ofothers, upon his doing of such Actions, are so great as to overballance
all the 㛳 76d Good produc’d by those Actions d 㛳, or all the Evils which
would flow from the Omission of 㛳 77e them e 㛳: And in such Cases the[179] Probability is to be computed on both sides. Thus if an Action ofmine will probably, thro the 㛳 78f Mistakes f 㛳 or Corruption of others, bemade a Precedent in unlike Cases, to very evil Actions; or when my Action, tho good in it self, will probably provoke Men to very evil Actions,
upon some mistaken Notion of their Right; any of these Considerations
foreseen by me, may make such an Action of mine evil, whenever theEvils 㛳 79g which will probably g 㛳 be occasion’d by the Action, 㛳 80h are
greater h 㛳 than the Evils occasion’d by the Omission.
And this is the Reason that many Laws prohibit Actions in general,
even when some particular Instances of 㛳 81i those i 㛳 Actions would be very
useful; because an universal Allowance of them, considering the Mistakes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than anuniversal Prohibition; nor could there be any more special Boundarys
fix’d between the right and wrong Cases. In such Cases, it is the Dutyof Persons to comply with the generally useful Constitution; or if insome very important Instances, the Violation of the Law would be ofless evil Consequence than Obedience to it, they must patiently resolve
to undergo those Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to theWhole, appointed: and this Disobedience will have nothing criminal in㛳 82j it. aj 㛳 [180]PartialBenevolence,
how virtuous.

㛳 83 X㛳. From 㛳 84 the two last㛳 Observations, we may see what Actions
our moral Sense would most recommend to our Election, as the mostperfectly Virtuous: viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the greatest and most extensive Happiness of all therational Agents, to whom our Influence can 㛳 85 reach㛳. All 㛳 86 Benevolence㛳, even toward a Part, is amiable, 㛳 87 when㛳 not inconsistent with
the Good of the Whole: But this is a smaller Degree of Virtue, unless
our Beneficence be restrain’d by want of Power, and not want of Loveto the Whole. All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have butsection iii

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an imperfect Species of Beauty, 㛳 88 unless㛳 when the Good of the Wholerequires a stricter Attachment to a Part, as in natural Affection, or virtuous Friendships; 㛳 89 or㛳 when some Parts are so eminently useful to
the Whole, that even universal Benevolence 㛳 90 would㛳 determine us
with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. Thus universal
Benevolence would incline us to a more strong Concern for the Interestsof great and generous Characters in a high Station, or make us moreearnestly study the Interests of any generous Society, whose whole Constitution 㛳 91 was㛳 contriv’d to promote universal Good. Thus a good
Fancy in Architecture, would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the
Expence [181] of a compleatly regular Building, to chuse such a Degreeof Ornament as he could keep uniformly thro the Whole, and not move
him to make a vain unfinish’d Attempt in one Part, of what he foresaw
he could not succeed in as to the Whole. And 㛳 92 the most perfect Rulesof Architecture condemn an excessive㛳 Profusion of Ornament on one
Part, above the Proportion of the Whole, unless that Part be some eminent Place of the Edifice, such as the chief Front, or publick Entrance;
the adorning of which, would beautify the Whole more than an equal
Expence of Ornament on any other Part.
㛳 93a This Increase of the moral Beauty of Actions, or Dispositions,according to the Number of Persons to whom the good Effects of themextend, may shew us the Reason why Actions which flow from the nearer
Attachments of Nature, such as that between the Sexes, and the Loveof our Offspring, are not so amiable, nor do they appear so virtuous as
Actions of equal Moment of Good towards Persons less attach’d to us.
The Reason is plainly this. These strong Instincts are by Nature limited
to small Numbers of Mankind, such as our Wives or Children; whereasa Disposition, which would produce a like Moment of Good to others,
upon no special Attachment, 㛳 94b if it was b 㛳 accompany’d with [182] natural Power to accomplish its Intention, would be incredibly more fruitful of great and good Effects to the Whole. a 㛳
95From this primary Idea of moral Good in Actions, 㛳 96 arises the Idea Moralof 㛳 Good in those Dispositions, whether natural or acquir’d, which Dispositions
and Abilitys.
enable us to do good to others; or which are presum’d to be design’d,
and acquir’d or cultivated for that purpose 97. And hence those Abilitys,

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while nothing appears contrary to our Presumption, may increase our㛳 98 Love to㛳 the Possessor of them; but when they are imagin’d to beintended for publick Mischief, they make us hate him the more: Such
are a penetrating Judgment, a tenacious Memory, a quick Invention;
Patience of Labour, Pain, Hunger, Watching; a Contempt of Wealth,
Rumour, Death. These may be rather call’d natural Abilitys, than moral
㛳 99 Qualitys. Now, a Veneration for these Qualitys, any further than they
are employ’d for the publick Good, is foolish, and flows from our moral
Sense, grounded upon a false Opinion; for if 㛳 we plainly see them maliciously employ’d, they make the Agent more detestable.
How wecompute theMorality of
Actions in ourSense of them.

XI. To find a universal 㛳 100 Canon㛳 to compute the Morality of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions doneby our selves, or by others, [183] we must observe the following Propositions, or Axioms.
㛳 101a 1. The moral Importance of any 㛳 102b Agent b 㛳, or the Quantityof publick Good produc’d by him, is in a compound Ratio of his
Benevolence and Abilitys: or (by substituting the initial Letters for
the Words, as M ⳱ Moment of Good, and m ⳱ Moment of Evil)
M ⳱ B ⳯ A.
2. 㛳 103c In like manner, the Moment of private Good, or Interest
produc’d by any Person 㛳 104d to himself d 㛳, is in a compound Ratioof his Self-Love, and Abilitys: or (substituting the initial Letters)
I ⳱ S ⳯ A. c 㛳
3. When in comparing the Virtue of two 㛳 105e Actions, the Abilitys of
the Agents are e 㛳 equal; the 㛳 106f Moment of publick Good produc’d bythem in like Circumstances, is as the Benevolence: or M ⳱ B ⳯ 1 f.㛳
4. When Benevolence in two Agents is equal, and other Circumstances alike; the Moment of publick Good is as the Abilitys: orM ⳱ 㛳 107g A g 㛳 ⳯ 1.
5. The Virtue then of Agents, or their Benevolence, is always directlyas the Moment of Good produc’d in like Circumstances, and inversly asMtheir Abilitys: or B ⳱ –A. [184]6. But as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, somegood to our selves, and evil to the Publick; and others evil to our selves,

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and good to the Publick; or either useful both to our selves and others,or pernicious to both; the entire 㛳 108h Motive to h 㛳 good Actions is notalways Benevolence alone; 㛳 109i or Motive to Evil i 㛳, Malice alone; (nay,㛳 110j this last is seldom any Motive at all j 㛳) but in most Actions we must
look upon Self-Love as another Force, sometimes conspiring with Benevolence, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of private Interest, as well as publick Good; and sometimes opposing Benevolence,
when the good Action is any way difficult or painful in the Performance,or detrimental in its Consequences to the Agent. 㛳 111k In the former Case,M ⳱ (B Ⳮ S) ⳯ A ⳱ BA Ⳮ SA; and therefore BA ⳱ M ⳮ SA ⳱ M ⳮ I,
MⳮI
and B ⳱ —A . In the latter Case, M ⳱ (B ⳮ S) ⳯ A ⳱ BA ⳮ SA;
MⳭI
therefore BA ⳱ M Ⳮ SA ⳱ M Ⳮ I, and B ⳱ —A . ak 㛳
These selfish Motives shall be* 㛳 112 hereafter㛳 more 㛳 113 fully㛳 explain’d; here we may in general denote them by the Word In-[185]terest:
which when it concurs with Benevolence, in any Action capable of Increase, or Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of Good, than
Benevolence alone in the same Abilitys; and therefore when the Moment
㛳 114 of Good, in an㛳 Action partly intended for the Good of the Agent,is but equal to the Moment 㛳 115 of Good㛳 in the Action of another
Agent, influenc’d only by Benevolence, the former is less virtuous; andin this Case the Interest must be deducted to find the true Effect of the
Benevolence, or Virtue. 㛳 116 In㛳 the same manner, when Interest is opposite to Benevolence, and yet is surmounted by it; this Interest must
be added to the Moment, to increase the Virtue of the Action, or theStrength of the Benevolence㛳 117 : Or thus, in advantageous Virtue, B ⳱
MⳮI—
A . And in laborious, painful, dangerous or expensive Virtue, B ⳱MⳭ I—A 㛳. By Interest, in this last Case, is understood all the Advantage
which the Agent might have obtain’d by omitting the Action, which isa negative Motive to it; and this, when subtracted, becomes positive.
But here we must observe, that no Advantage, not intended, altho Intention, andcasually, or naturally redounding to us from the Action, [186] does at all Foresight,
affect Actions.
affect its Morality to make it less amiable; nor does any Difficulty or Evilunforeseen, or not resolved upon, 118 make a kind Action more virtuous;* Vide Sect. v.

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since in such Cases Self-Love neither assists nor opposes Benevolence.
Nay, Self-Interest 㛳 119 then only㛳 diminishes the Benevolence, when
without this View of Interest the Action would not have been undertaken, or so much Good would not have been produc’d by the Agent;and it extenuates the Vice of an evil Action, 㛳 120 only㛳 when without thisInterest the Action would not have been 㛳 121 pleasing to㛳 the Agent,㛳 122 or㛳 so much Evil have been produc’d by him.
The 㛳 123 sixth㛳 Axiom only explains the external Marks by which
Men must judge, who do not see into each others Hearts; for it may
really happen in many Cases, that Men may have Benevolence sufficientto 㛳 124 surmount㛳 any Difficulty, and yet they may meet with none at all:And in that Case, it is certain there is as much Virtue in the Agent, tho
he does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had
surmounted Difficultys in his kind Actions. And this too must be theCase with the Deity, to whom nothing is difficult. [187]MSince then 㛳 125 Benevolence, or Virtue in any Agent, is as –A, or as
Perfect Virtue.
MⳲI—
A , and no Being can act above his natural Ability㛳; that must be the
Perfection of Virtue where 㛳 126 M ⳱ A㛳, or when the Being acts to theutmost of 㛳 127 his㛳 Power for the publick Good; and hence the Perfection
Mof Virtue in this Case, 㛳 128 or –A,㛳 is as Unity. And this may shew us the
only Foundation for the boasting of the Stoicks, “That a Creature suppos’d Innocent, by pursuing Virtue with 㛳 129 his㛳 utmost Power, may in
Virtue equal the Gods.” For in their Case, if 㛳 130 [A] or㛳 the Ability be
Infinite, unless 㛳 131 [M] or㛳 the Good to be produc’d in the whole, be so
too, the Virtue is not absolutely perfect; and the Quotient can neversurmount Unity.
Moral Evil,howcomputed.

㛳 132a XII. The same Axioms may be apply’d to compute the moral Evilin Actions; that is, calling the Disposition which leads us to Evil, Hatred,
tho it is oftner only Self-Love, with Inadvertence to its Consequences:then,1st. The Moment of Evil produc’d by any Agent, is as the Product of
his Hatred into his Ability, or m ⳱ H ⳯ A. And, [188]2dly. In equal Abilitys, 㛳 133b H ⳱ m ⳯ 1 b 㛳.

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3dly. When Hatred is equal; m ⳱ A ⳯ 1: And,
4thly. The Degree of moral Evil, 㛳 134c or Vice c 㛳, which is equal to themHatred or Neglect of publick Good, is thus express’d, H ⳱ –A.
5thly. The Motives of Interest may 㛳 135d co-operate with Hatred, or
oppose d 㛳 it the same way as with Benevolence; and then according as
Self-Interest may partly excite to the Action, and so diminish the Evil;or dissuade from it, and so increase it, the Malice which surmounts it,mⳲI
or H ⳱ —A , in like manner as in the Case of moral Good. a 㛳
But we must observe, that not only Innocence is expected from all Intention,
Mortals, but they are presum’d from their Nature, in some measure in- Foresight.
clin’d to publick Good; 136 so that a bare Absence of this Desire is enoughto make an Agent be reputed Evil: Nor is a direct Intention of publick
Evil necessary to make an Action evil, it is enough that it flows from SelfLove, with a plain Neglect of the Good of others㛳 137a, or an Insensi[189]bility of their Misery, which we either actually foresee, or have aprobable Presumption of.
It is true indeed, that that publick Evil which I neither certainly foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my Action,
does not make my present Action Criminal, or Odious; even altho I
might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my own Actions; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either Malice,
or want of Benevolence. But then it is also certain, that my prior Negligence, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evidence of the want of that Degree of good Affections which is necessary
to a virtuous Character; and consequently the Guilt properly lies in thisNeglect, rather than in an Action which really flows from a good Intention. Human Laws however, which cannot examine the Intentions,㛳 138b or secret b 㛳 Knowledge of the Agent, must judge in gross of the Action itself; presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain’d, which
we are oblig’d to attain.
In like manner, no good Effect which I did not actually foresee andintend, makes my Action morally Good; however Human 㛳 139c Laws orGovernours c 㛳, who cannot search into Mens Intentions, or know their[190] secret Designs, justly reward Actions 㛳 140d which tend d 㛳 to the pub-132

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lick Good, altho the Agent was engag’d to those Actions only by selfish
Views; and consequently had no virtuous Disposition influencing him
to them.
The difference in degree of Guilt between Crimes of Ignorance,whenthe Ignorance is Vincible, and Faulty, as to the natural Tendency of the
Action; and Crimes of Malice, or direct evil Intention, consists in this;that the former, by a prior Neglect, argues 㛳 141e a e 㛳 want of the due degreeof Benevolence, or right Affection; the latter, evidences direct evil Affections, which are vastly more odious a 㛳.
Morality
distinct fromInterest.

Morality of
Characters.

XIII. 㛳 142 From Axiom the 5th㛳, we may form almost a demonstrative
Conclusion, “that we have a Sense of Goodness and moral Beauty in
Actions, distinct from Advantage;” for had we no other Foundation ofApprobation of Actions, but the Advantage which might arise to us fromthem, if they were done toward our selves, we 㛳 143 should㛳 make no Account of the Abilitys of the Agent, but would barely esteem them according to their Moment. The Abilitys come in only to shew the Degreeof Benevolence, which supposes Benevolence necessarily amiable. Whowas ever the better pleas’d with a barren rocky [191] Farm, or an inconvenient House, by being told that the poor Farm gave as great Increase
as it could; or that the House accommodated its Possessor as well as it
could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whose Moment is very
inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the Beauty to alledge, “Thatit was all the poor Agent could do for the Publick, or his Friend.”
XIV. The moral Beauty of Characters arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions of the publick Good, according to their Power. We form
our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their fix’d Disposition, and not according to any particular Sallys of unkind Passions;altho 㛳 144 these㛳 abate the Beauty of good Characters, as the Motions of
the kind 㛳 145 Affections㛳 diminish the Deformity of the bad ones. Whatthen properly constitutes a virtuous Character, is not some few accidental Motions of Compassion, natural Affection, or Gratitude; but sucha fix’d Humanity, or Desire of the publick Good of all, to whom our
Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of 㛳 146 Benefi-

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cence, according to our utmost Prudence and Knowledge of the Interestsof others: and a strong Benevolence will not fail to make us㛳 careful of
informing our selves right, concerning the truest Methods [192] of serving 㛳 147 the Interests of Mankind㛳. Every Motion indeed of the kindAffections appears in some degree amiable; but we denominate the Character from the prevailing Principle.
XV. 㛳 148 I Know not for what Reason some will not allow that to be Vir- Instinct may
the springtue, which flows from Instincts, or Passions; but how do they help them- beof Virtue.
selves? They say, “Virtue arises from Reason.” What is Reason but that
Sagacity we have in prosecuting any End? The ultimate End propos’dby the common Moralists is the Happiness of the Agent himself, andthis certainly he is determin’d to pursue from Instinct.㛳 Now may not
another Instinct toward the Publick, or the Good of others, be as propera Principle of Virtue, as the Instinct toward private Happiness? 㛳 149 And
is there not the same Occasion for the Exercise of our Reason in pursuing
the former, as the latter?㛳 This is certain, that whereas we behold theselfish Actions of others, with Indifference at best, we see something
amiable in every Action which flows from kind Affections or Passions
㛳 150 toward㛳 others; if they be conducted by Prudence, so as any way toattain their 㛳 151a End. 㛳 152b Our passionate Actions, as we shew’d* above,
are not 㛳 153c always c 㛳 Self-interested; since our In-[193]tention is not tofree our selves from the Uneasiness of the Passion, but to alter the Stateof the Object. ab 㛳154
If it be said, “That Actions from Instinct, are 㛳 155 not the㛳 Effectof Prudence and Choice;” this Objection holds full as strongly against㛳 156 the㛳 Actions which flow from 㛳 157 Self-Love; since the use of our Reason is as requisite, to find the proper Means of promoting publick Good,
as private Good. And as it must be an Instinct, or a Determination previous to Reason, which makes us pursue private Good, as well as publick
Good, as our End; there is the same occasion for Prudence and Choice,in the Election of proper Means for promoting of either. I see㛳 no harmin supposing, “that Men are naturally dispos’d to Virtue, and not left
* See Sect. ii. Art. 8.

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merely indifferent, 㛳 158 to be ingag’d in Actions only as they appear totend to their own private Good.㛳” Surely, the Supposition of a benevolent universal Instinct, would recommend human Nature, and its Author, more to the Love of a good Man, and leave room enough for the
Exercise of our Reason, in contriving and settling Rights, Laws, Constitutions; in inventing Arts, and practising them so as to gratify, in themost effectual manner, that generous Inclination. And if we must bringin Self-Love to make Virtue Rational, a [194] little Reflection will discover, as 㛳 159 shall appear hereafter㛳, that this Benevolence is our greatest
Happiness; and thence we may 㛳 160 resolve to cultivate, as much as possible,㛳 this sweet Disposition, and to despise every opposite Interest. Not
that we can be truly Virtuous, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure
which 㛳 161 accompanies㛳 Beneficence, without the Love of others: Nay,this very Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of disinterested
Love to others, as the Spring of our Actions. But Self-Interest may be
our Motive, 㛳 162 in chusing to㛳 continue in this agreeable State, tho itcannot be the sole, or principal Motive of any Action, which to ourmoral Sense appears Virtuous. 163
Heroism, in㛳 164a The applying a mathematical Calculation to moral Subjects,
all stations.
㛳 165b will b 㛳 appear perhaps at first extravagant and wild; but some Corollarys, which are easily and certainly deduc’d below,* may shew theConveniency of this Attempt, if it could be further pursu’d. At present,
we 㛳 167c shall only draw c 㛳 this one a 㛳, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest rank of Mankind, viz. “That no external Circumstances of Fortune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any
Mortal from the most heroick Virtue.” For how small soever the Moment of publick Good be, [195] which any one can accomplish, yet if
his Abilitys 㛳 168 are㛳 proportionably small, the 㛳 169 Quotient, which expresses the Degree of 㛳 Virtue, may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus,
not only the Prince, the Statesman, the General, are capable of true Heroism, tho these are the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus’d throvarious Nations and Ages; but when we find in an honest Trader, thekind Friend, the faithful prudent Adviser, the charitable and hospitable* See Sect. vii. Art. 㛳 166 8, 9㛳.

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Neighbour, the tender Husband and affectionate Parent, the sedate yet
chearful Companion, the generous Assistant of Merit, the cautious Allayer of Contention and Debate, the Promoter of Love and good Understanding among Acquaintances; if we consider, that these were all thegood Offices which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunityof performing to Mankind, we must judge this Character really as amiable, as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into
an Opinion, “that they are the only Heroes in Virtue.” [196]u section iv u
All Mankind agree in this general
Foundation of their Approbation of moral
Actions. The Grounds of the different
Opinions about Morals.

This Moral
Sense
universal.

I. To 㛳 1 shew㛳 how far Mankind agree in that which we have made theuniversal Foundation of this moral Sense, viz. Benevolence, we haveobserv’d already,㛳 2 *㛳 that when we are ask’d the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we 㛳 3 perpetually㛳 alledge its Usefulness to the
Publick, and not to the Actor himself. If we are vindicating a censur’dAction, and maintaining it lawful, we 㛳 4 always㛳 make this one Articleof our Defence, “That it injur’d no body, or did more Good thanHarm.” On the other hand, when we blame any piece of Conduct, we
shew it to be prejudicial to others, besides the Actor; or to evidence atleast a Neglect of their Interest, when it was in our power to serve them;or when Gratitude, natural Affection, or some other disinterested Tye[197] should have rais’d in us a Study of their Interest. 㛳 5a If we sometimes blame foolish Conduct in others, without any reflection upon its
Tendency to publick Evil, it is 㛳 6b still occasion’d b 㛳 by our Benevolence,
which makes us concern’d for the Evils befalling 㛳 7c the Agent, whom wemust always look upon as a part of the System. ac 㛳 We all know how greatan Extenuation of Crimes 㛳 8 it㛳 is, to alledge, “That the poor Man does
harm to no body but himself;” and how often this turns Hatred into
Pity. And yet 㛳 9 if we examine the Matter well,㛳 we shall find, that the* See above, Sect. iii, Art. 3. Par. 3.

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greatest part of the Actions which are immediately prejudicial to ourselves, and are often look’d upon as innocent toward others, do reallytend to the publick Detriment, by making us incapable of performing
the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have
㛳 10 been㛳 inclin’d to do. This is the Case of Intemperance and extravagant Luxury.
II. And further, we may observe, that no Action of any other Person was Benevolencesoleever approv’d by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or ill grounded, theground ofof some really good moral Quality. If we observe the Sentiments of Men Approbation.
concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is 㛳 11 always㛳 some really amiable and benevolent Appearance which engages their Approbation. We
may perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging 㛳 12 that Actions tend㛳 [198]to the publick Good, which do not; or be so 㛳 13 stupidly㛳 inadvertent,
that while our Attention is fix’d on some partial good Effects, we may
quite over-look many evil Consequences which counter-ballance theGood. Our Reason may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial
Representations of the tendency of Actions; but it is still some apparent
Species of Benevolence which commands our Approbation. And thisSense, like our other Senses, tho counter-acted 㛳 14 from Motives of external Advantage, which are stronger than it㛳, 㛳 15 ceases not㛳 to operate,but 㛳 16 has Strength enough to make㛳 us uneasy and dissatisfy’d with ourselves; even as the Sense of Tasting 㛳 17 makes㛳 us loath, and dislike thenauseous Potion which we may 㛳 18 force㛳 our selves, from Interest, toswallow.
It is therefore to no purpose to alledge here, “That many Actions are False
really done, and approv’d, which tend to the universal Detriment.” For Approbations.
the same way, Actions are often perform’d, and in the mean time approv’d, 㛳 19 which tend㛳 to the Hurt of the Actor. But as we do not fromthe latter, infer the Actor to be void of Self-Love, or a Sense of Interest;
no more should we infer from the former, that such Men are void of a
Sense of Morals, or a desire of publick [199] Good. The matter is plainly
this. Men are often mistaken in the Tendency of Actions either to publick, or private Good: Nay, sometimes violent Passions, while they last,
will make 㛳 20 them㛳 approve very bad Actions 㛳 21 in a moral㛳 Sense,

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㛳 22 or㛳 very pernicious ones to the Agent, 㛳 23 as㛳 advantageous: But thisproves only, “That sometimes there may be some more violent Motive
to Action, than a Sense of moral Good; or that 㛳 24 Men, by Passion, may
become blind㛳 even to their own Interest.”
㛳 25 But to prove that Men㛳 are void of a moral Sense, we should findsome Instances of cruel, malicious Actions, done, 㛳 26 and approv’d inothers, when there is no Motive of Interest, real or apparent, save gratifying that very Desire of Mischief to others㛳: We must find a Country
where Murder in cold blood, Tortures, and every thing malicious, without any Advantage, is, if not approv’d, at least look’d upon with indifference, and raises no Aversion toward the Actors, in the unconcern’dSpectators: We must find Men with whom the Treacherous, Ungrateful,
Cruel, are in the same account with the Generous, Friendly, Faithful,and Humane; and who approve the latter, no more than the former, in
all Cases where they are not affected by the Influence of these Dispositions, or when the natural Good or Evil befals other [200] Persons.
And it may be question’d, whether the Universe, tho large enough, andstor’d with no inconsiderable variety of Characters, will yield us any
Instance, not only of a Nation, but even of a Club, or a single 㛳 27 Person,who㛳 will think all Actions indifferent, but those which 㛳 28 regard㛳 his
own Concerns.
III. From what has been said, we may easily account for the vast Diversityof moral Principles, in various Nations, and Ages; 㛳 29a which is indeed agood Argument against innate Ideas, or Principles, but will not evidence
Mankind to be void of a moral Sense to perceive Virtue or Vice 㛳 30b in
Actions, when they b 㛳 occur to their Observation.
The a 㛳 Grounds of this Diversity are principally these:
1st. Different Opinions of Happiness, or natural Good, and of the
From various
Notions ofmost effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there
Happiness.
prevails a courageous Disposition, where Liberty is counted a greatGood, and War an inconsiderable Evil, all Insurrections in Defence ofPrivileges, will have the Appearance of moral Good to our Sense, becauseof their appearing benevolent; and yet the same Sense of moral Good

Diversity ofManners
accounted for.

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in Benevolence, shall [201] in another Country, where the Spirits of Men
are more abject and timorous, where Civil War appears the greatest natural Evil, and Liberty no great Purchase, make the same Actions appear
odious. So in Sparta, where, thro Contempt of Wealth, the Security ofPossessions was not much regarded, but the thing chiefly desir’d, as naturally good to the State, was to abound in a hardy shifting Youth; Theft,
if dexterously perform’d, was so little odious, that it receiv’d the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity.
31
But in these, and all other Instances of the like nature, the Approbation is founded on Benevolence, because of some real, or apparent
Tendency to the publick Good. For we are not to imagine, that this Sense
should give us, 㛳 32 without㛳 Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, orof their natural Tendencys to Good or Evil: It only determines us toapprove Benevolence, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hatethe contrary. So our Sense of Beauty does not, without Reflection, Instruction, or Observation, give us Ideas of the regular Solids, Temples,
Cirques, and Theatres; but determines us to approve and delight in Uniformity amidst Variety, wherever we observe it. Let us read the Preamblesof any Laws we count unjust, or the Vindications of any dispu-[202]ted
Practice by the Moralists, and we shall find no doubt, that Men are often
mistaken in computing the Excess of the natural Good, or evil Consequences of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv’d, is still some Tendency to the greater natural Good of others,
apprehended by those who approve it.
The same Reason may 㛳 33 remove㛳 also the Objections against the TravellersofUniversality of this Sense, from some Storys of Travellers, concerning accounts
barbarous
strange Crueltys practis’d toward the Aged, or Children, in certain Customs.
Countrys. If such Actions be done in 㛳 34 sudden㛳 angry Passions, they
only prove, that other Motives, or Springs of Action, may overpower
Benevolence in its strongest Ties; and if they really be universally allow’d, look’d upon as innocent, and vindicated; it 㛳 35 is certainly㛳 undersome Appearance of Benevolence; such as to secure them from Insultsof Enemys, to avoid the Infirmitys of Age, which perhaps appear greater
Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous and useful Citizens from the140treatise ii

Charge of maintaining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them.
A love of Pleasure and Ease, may, in the immediate Agents, be stronger
in some Instances, than Gratitude toward Parents, or natural Affection
to Children. But that such Nations are continu’d, notwithstanding all
the [203] Toil in educating their Young, is still a sufficient Proof of natural Affection: For I fancy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in suchPlaces, compelling Parents to a proper Education of some certain number of their Offspring. We know very well that an Appearance of publick
Good, was the Ground of Laws, equally barbarous, enacted by Lycurgus
and Solon, of killing the deform’d, or weak, to prevent a burdensome
Croud of useless Citizens. i
㛳 36a A late ingenious Author* has justly observ’d the Absurdity of themonstrous Taste, which has possess’d both the Readers and Writers ofTravels. 㛳 37b They scarce give us any Account b 㛳 of the natural Affections,
the Familys, Associations, Friendships, Clans, of the Indians; and as㛳 38c rarely c 㛳 do they mention their Abhorrence of Treachery among
themselves; their Proneness to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of theirseveral States; their Contempt of Death in defence of their Country, or
upon points of Honour. “These are but common Storys.—No need totravel to the Indies for what we see in Europe every Day.” The Entertainment therefore in these ingenious Studys consists chiefly in exciting
Horror, and making Men Stare. The ordinary Employment of [204] theBulk of the Indians in support of their Wives and Offspring, or Relations, has nothing of the Prodigious. But a Human Sacrifice, a Feast
upon Enemys Carcases, can raise an Horror and Admiration of the wondrous Barbarity of Indians, in Nations no strangers to the Massacre at
Paris, the Irish Rebellion, or the Journals of the Inquisition. These theyi. Concerning Solon, Hutcheson refers to a passage in Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoneion Hypotypóseon, Book III, 211, in Sextus Empiricus, ed. R. G. Bury, Loeb ClassicalLibrary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), vol. 1, p. 267, reportingthat the father had been allowed to kill his son. Lycurgus’s law on killing of the weak
and malformed is mentioned in Plutarch’s Lives, ed. B. Perrin, Loeb Classical Library(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), vol. 1, p. 255.
* Ld. Shaftesbury, Vol. i. p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.

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behold with religious Veneration; but the Indian Sacrifices, flowing froma like Perversion of Humanity by Superstition, raise the highest Abhorrence and Amazement. What is most surprizing in these Studys, isthe wondrous Credulity of some Gentlemen, of great Pretensions 㛳 39d inother matters to Caution of Assent d 㛳, for these marvellous Memoirs ofMonks, Fryars, Sea-Captains, Pyrates; and for the Historys, Annals,
Chronologys, receiv’d by Oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks. a 㛳
Men have Reason given them, to 㛳 40 judge of the Tendencys of their㛳 Use of Reason
Actions, that they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of pub- in Morals.
lick Good; but it is still some Appearance of Good which they pursue.
And it is strange, that Reason is universally allow’d to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid, ridiculous Opinions receiv’d in many Places, andyet absurd Practices, founded upon those very Opinions, shall seem an
Argument against any moral Sense; [205] altho the bad Conduct is not㛳 41 owing to㛳 any Irregularity in the moral Sense, but 㛳 42 to a wrong㛳
Judgment or Opinion. If putting the Aged to death, with all 㛳 43 its㛳 Consequences, really tends to the publick Good, and 㛳 44 to㛳 the lesser Miseryof the Aged, it is no doubt justifiable; nay, perhaps the Aged chuse it, inhopes of a future State. If a deform’d, or weak Race, could never, by
Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should growan absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in
Misery, it is just to put them to death. This all allow to be just, in theCase of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for killing of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock’d, it is perhaps practis’d, andallow’d from Self-love; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action
any where. If Wood, or Stone, or Metal be 㛳 45 a Deity㛳, have Government, and Power, and have been the Authors of Benefits to us; it is morally 㛳 46 amiable㛳 to praise and worship them. Or if the true Deity bepleas’d with Worship before Statues, or any other Symbol of some more
immediate Presence, or Influence; Image-Worship is virtuous. If he delights in Sacrifices, Penances, Ceremonys, Cringings; they are all laudable. Our Sense of Virtue, generally leads us exactly enough according
to our Opinions; and therefore the absurd [206] Practices which prevailin the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no Reason,
than that they have no moral Sense of Beauty in Actions.

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IV. The next Ground of Diversity in Sentiments, is the Diversity of
Systems, to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their Benevolence. We 㛳 47 insinuated㛳 above,* that it is regular and beautiful to havestronger Benevolence, toward the morally good Parts of Mankind, who
are useful to the Whole, than toward the useless or pernicious. Now if
Men receive a low, or base Opinion of any Body, or Sect of Men; if they
imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or
but useless Burdens of the Earth; Benevolence itself will lead 㛳 48 them㛳to neglect the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason,
why, among Nations who have high Notions of Virtue, every Action
toward an Enemy may pass for just; why Romans, and Greeks, could
approve of making those they call’d Barbarians, Slaves.
㛳 49a A late ingenious Author㛳 50b † b 㛳 justly observes, “That the various
Sectspernicious
Sects, Partys, 㛳 51c Factions, Cabals c 㛳 of Mankind in larger [207] Societys,
to Virtue.
are all influenc’d by a publick Spirit: That some generous Notions ofpublick Good, some strong friendly Dispositions, raise them at first, andexcite Men of the same Faction or Cabal to the most disinterested mutual Succour and Aid: That all the Contentions of the different Factions,and even the fiercest Wars against each other, are influenc’d by a sociablepublick Spirit in a limited 㛳 52d System.” d 㛳 But certain it is, that Men arelittle oblig’d to those, who often artfully raise and foment this Party
Spirit; or cantonize them into several Sects for the Defence of very trifling Causes. Associations for innocent Commerce, or Manufactures;
Cabals for Defence of Liberty against a Tyrant; or even lower Clubs for
Pleasantry, or Improvement by Conversation, are very amiable andgood. But when Mens heads are filled with some trifling Opinions; when
designing Men raise in their Minds some unaccountable 㛳 53e notion e 㛳 ofSanctity, and Religion, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increase ourLove to God, or our own Species; when the several Factions are taught
to look upon each other as Odious, Contemptible, Profane, because of
their different Tenets, or Opinions; even when these Tenets, whether
true or false, are perhaps perfectly useless to the publick Good; when the

Narrow
Systems
pervert the
moral Sense.

* See Sect. iii. Art. 10. Par. 1.
† Ld. Shaftesbury’s Essay on Wit and Humour, Part iii. Sect. ii. Vol. 1. p. 110.

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keenest Passions are rais’d about such Trifles, and [208] Men begin tohate each other for what, of it self, has no Evil in it; and to love the
Zealots of their own Sect for what is no way valuable; nay, even for theirFury, Rage, and Malice against opposite Sects; (which is what all Partys
commonly call Zeal) ’tis then no wonder if our moral Sense 㛳 54f be
much f 㛳 impair’d, and our natural Notions of Good and Evil almost lost;when our Admiration, and Love, or Contempt, and Hatred, are thus
perverted from their natural Objects.
If any Mortals are so happy as never to have heard of the Party-Tenetsof most of our Sects; or if they have heard of them, have either neverespous’d any Sect, or all equally; they bid fairest for a truly natural andgood Disposition, because their Tempers have never been soured aboutvain Trifles; nor have they contracted any Sullenness, or Rancour against
any Part of their own Kind. If any Opinions deserve to be contended
for, they are those which give us lovely Ideas of the Deity, and of ourFellow-Creatures: If any Opinions deserve Opposition, they are such as
raise Scruples in our Minds about the Goodness of Providence, or represent our Fellow-Creatures as base and selfish, by instilling into us some
ill-natur’d, cunning, shreud Insinuations, “that our most generous Actions proceed wholly from [209] selfish Views.” This wise Philosophyof some Moderns, after Epicurus, must be fruitful of nothing but Discontent, Suspicion, and Jealousy; a State infinitely worse than any little
transitory Injurys to which we might be expos’d by a good-natur’d Credulity. But thanks be to the kind Author of our Nature, that, in spite ofsuch Opinions, our Nature it self leads us into Friendship, Trust, andmutual Confidence. a 㛳
Were we freely conversant with Robbers, who shew a moral Sense in
the equal or proportionable Division of their Prey, and in Faith to eachother, we should find they have their own sublime moral Ideas of their
Party, as Generous, Courageous, Trusty, nay Honest too; and that those
we call Honest and Industrious, are imagin’d by them 㛳 55 to be㛳 Meanspirited, Selfish, Churlish, or Luxurious; on whom that Wealth is ill bestow’d, which therefore they would apply to better Uses, to maintaingallanter Men, who have a Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours,
who are their profess’d Enemys. Nay, if we observe the Discourse of our144

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profess’d Debauchees, our most dissolute Rakes, we shall find their Vices
cloth’d, in their Imaginations, with some amiable Dress of Liberty, Generosity, just Resentment against the Contrivers of artful Rules to [210]enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures.
56
Perhaps never any Men pursu’d 㛳 57 Vice long with Peace of Mind㛳,
without some such deluding Imagination of moral Good,* while they
may be still inadvertent to the barbarous and inhuman Consequencesof their Actions. The Idea of an ill-natur’d Villain, is too frightful everto become familiar to any Mortal. 㛳 59 Hence㛳 we shall find, that the basest Actions are dress’d in some tolerable Mask. What others call Avarice,appears to the Agent a prudent Care of a Family, or Friends; Fraud, artful
Conduct; Malice and Revenge, a just Sense of Honour, and a Vindication of our Right in Possessions, or Fame; Fire and Sword, and Desolation among Enemys, a just thorow Defence of our Country; Persecution, a Zeal for the Truth, and for the eternal Happiness of Men,
which Hereticks oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act froma Sense of Virtue upon false Opinions, and mistaken Benevolence; uponwrong or partial Views of publick Good, and the means to promote it;or upon very narrow Systems form’d by like foolish Opinions. It is not
a Delight in the Misery of others, or Malice, which occasions the horrid
Crimes which fill our [211] Historys; but generally an injudicious unreasonable Enthusiasm for some kind of limited Virtue.
Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui,
Ultra, quam satis est, Virtutem si petat ipsam.† ii

False Opinionsof the divine
Laws.

V. The last Ground of Diversity which occurs, are the false Opinionsof the Will or Laws of the Deity. To obey these we are determin’d from
Gratitude, and a Sense of Right imagin’d in the Deity, to dispose at* See below, Sect. vi. Art. 2. Par. 㛳 58 2㛳.
† Hor. Ep. 6. Lib. 1. v. 15.
ii. Translation: “Let the wise bear the name of madman, the just of unjust, should
he pursue Virtue herself beyond due bounds.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 286–87.

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pleasure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is so abundantly known tohave produc’d Follys, Superstitions, Murders, Devastations of Kingdoms, from a Sense of Virtue and Duty, that it is needless to mention
particular Instances. Only we may observe, “That all those Follys, orBarbaritys, rather confirm than destroy the Opinion of a moral Sense;”
since the Deity is believ’d to have a Right to dispose of his Creatures;and Gratitude to him, if he be conceiv’d good, must move us to Obedience to his Will: if he be not 㛳 60 conceiv’d good㛳, Self-love may overcome our moral Sense of the Action which we undertake to avoid hisFury. [212]
As for the Vices which 㛳 61 commonly㛳 proceed from Love of Pleasure,or any violent Passion, since generally the Agent is soon sensible of theirEvil, and 㛳 62 that sometimes㛳 amidst the heat of the Action, they only
prove, “That this moral Sense, and Benevolence, may be overcome by
the more importunate Sollicitations of other Desires.”
VI. Before we leave this Subject, it is necessary to remove one of the Objection
strongest Objections against what has been said so often, viz. “That this from Incest.
Sense is natural, and independent on Custom and Education.” The Objection is this, “That we shall find some Actions always attended withthe strongest Abhorrence, even at first View, in some whole Nations,㛳 63 in which there appears nothing contrary to Benevolence㛳; and thatthe same Actions shall in another Nation be counted innocent, or honourable. 64 Thus Incest, among Christians, is abhorr’d at first appearance
as much as Murder; 㛳 65 even by those who do not know or reflect upon
any necessary tendency of it to the detriment of Mankind. Now wegenerally allow, that what is from Nature in one Nation, would be so inall. This㛳 Abhorrence 㛳 66 therefore㛳 cannot be from Nature, since in
Greece, the [213] marrying half Sisters was counted honourable; andamong the Persian Magi, iii the marrying of Mothers. Say they then, may
not all our Approbation or Dislike of Actions arise the same way from
Custom and Education?”
iii. The Magi were the priestly caste of the ancient Persian Zoroastrian or Mazdean religion.

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The Answer to this may be easily found from what is already said.
Had we no moral Sense natural to us, we should only look upon Incest
as hurtful to our selves, and shun it, and never 㛳 67 hate㛳 other incestuous
Persons, more than we do a broken Merchant; so that still this Abhorrence supposes a Sense of moral Good. And further, it is true, that㛳 68 many who abhor Incest do not know, or reflect upon the㛳 naturaltendency of some sorts of Incest to the publick Detriment; but wherever
it is hated, it is apprehended as offensive to the Deity, and that it exposesthe 㛳 69 Person㛳 concern’d to his just Vengeance. Now it is universallyacknowledg’d to be the grossest Ingratitude and Baseness, in any Creature, to counteract the Will of the Deity, to whom it is under such㛳 70 Obligations. This then㛳 is plainly a moral evil Quality apprehended
in Incest, and reducible to the general Foundation of 㛳 71 Malice, or rather
Want of Benevolence㛳. Nay further, where this Opinion, “that Incest isoffensive to the Deity,” prevails, Incest must have another direct Contrariety to Benevolence; since [214] we must apprehend the Incestuous,
as exposing an Associate, who should be dear to him by the Ties of Nature, to the lowest State of Misery, and Baseness, Infamy and Punishment. But in those Countrys where no such Opinion prevails of theDeity’s abhorring 㛳 72 or prohibiting Incest; if no obvious natural Evils
attend it㛳, it may be look’d upon as innocent. And further, as Men who
have the Sense of Tasting, may, by Company and Education, have Prejudices against Meats they never tasted, as unsavoury; so may Men, whohave a moral Sense, acquire an Opinion by implicit Faith, of the moral
Evil of Actions, altho they do not themselves discern in them any tendency to natural Evil; imagining that others 㛳 73 do: or, by Education, they
may have some Ideas associated, which raise an abhorrence without Reason. But㛳 without a moral Sense, we could receive no Prejudice against
Actions, under any other View than as naturally disadvantageous to ourselves.
Moral Sense
not from
Education.

VII. The Universality of this moral Sense, and that it is antecedent toInstruction, may appear from observing the Sentiments of Children,
upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain’d assoon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest

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themselves on that side where Kindness and Humanity are found; anddetest the Cruel, the Covetous, [215] the Selfish, or the Treacherous.How
strongly do we see their Passions of Joy, Sorrow, Love, and Indignation,
mov’d by these moral Representations, even tho there has been no pains
taken to give them Ideas of a Deity, of Laws, of a future State, or of themore intricate Tendency of the universal Good to that of each Individual! [216]u section v u
A further Confirmation that we have practical
Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature; witha further Explication 㛳 1 of our Instinct to
Benevolence in its various Degrees㛳; with theadditional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shameand Pity.

I. We have already endeavour’d to prove, “That there is 㛳 2 a㛳 universal
Determination to Benevolence in Mankind, even toward the most distant parts of the Species:” But we are not to imagine that 㛳 3 this Benevolence is equal, or in the same degree toward all.㛳 There are 㛳 4 some㛳nearer and stronger 㛳 5 Degrees㛳 of Benevolence, when the Objects standin some nearer relations to our selves, which have obtain’d distinct
Names; such as natural Affection, 㛳 6 and㛳 Gratitude, 㛳 7a or when Benevolence is increas’d by greater 㛳 8b Love of ab 㛳 Esteem.
One Species of natural Affection, viz. That in Parents towards
NaturalAffection.
㛳 9 their㛳 Children, has [217] been consider’d already;* we 㛳 11 shall only
observe further㛳, That there is the same kind of Affection among collateral Relations, tho in a weaker degree; which is universally observable
where no Opposition of Interest produces contrary Actions, or counterballances the Power of this natural Affection.
12
Not founded
We may also observe, that as to the Affection of Parents, it cannot
on Merit, orbeentirelyfounded on Merit 㛳 13 or㛳 Acquaintance; not only because it
Acquaintance.
is antecedent to all Acquaintance, which might occasion the 㛳 14 Love of 㛳
Degrees ofBenevolence.

* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 9. Par. 2㛳 10, 3㛳.

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Esteem; but because it operates where Acquaintance would produce
Hatred, even toward Children apprehended to be vitious. And this Affection is further confirm’d to be from Nature, because it is always observ’d to descend㛳 15, and not ascend㛳 from Children to Parents mutually. Nature, who seems sometimes frugal in her Operations, has strongly
determin’d Parents to the Care of their Children, because they universally stand in absolute need of Support from them; but has left it㛳 16 㛳 to
Reflection, and a Sense of Gratitude, to produce Returns of Love inChildren, toward such tender kind Benefactors, who very seldom standin such absolute need of Support from their Posterity, as their Chil[218]dren did from them. Now did Acquaintance, or Merit produce natural Affection, we surely should find it strongest in Children, on whom
all the Obligations are laid by a thousand good Offices; which yet is quite
contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin’d to Mankind, but extends to other Animals, where yet we scarcely ever suppose
any Ideas of Merit; and is observ’d to continue in them no longer thanthe Necessitys of their Young require. Nor could it be of any service tothe Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive
little Benefit from the Love of their Dams. But as it is otherwise withrational Agents, so their Affections are of longer continuance, even during their whole lives.
II. 㛳 17 But㛳 nothing will give us a juster Idea of the wise Order in which Gratitude.
human Nature is form’d for universal Love, and mutual good Offices,
than considering that strong attraction of Benevolence, which we call
Gratitude. Every one knows that Beneficence toward our selves makesa much deeper Impression upon us, and raises Gratitude, or a stronger
Love toward the Benefactor, than equal Beneficence toward a third Person.* Now because of the 㛳 19 vast㛳 Numbers of Mankind, their distantHabi-[219]tations, and the Incapacity of any one to be remarkably usefulto 㛳 20 vast㛳 Multitudes; that our Benevolence might not be quite distracted with 㛳 21 a multiplicity㛳 of Objects, whose equal Virtues would
equally recommend them to our regard; or 㛳 22a become useless, by being* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6. 㛳 18 Par. 3㛳.

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equally extended to Multitudes 㛳 23b at vast distances b 㛳, whose Interest
we could not understand a 㛳, nor be capable of promoting, having no
Intercourse of Offices with them; Nature has 㛳 24a more powerfully determin’d us to admire, and love the moral Qualitys of others which affectour selves, and has given us more powerful Impressions of Good-will㛳 25b toward b 㛳 those who are beneficent to our 㛳 26c selves a 㛳. This we call
Gratitude. And thus a Foundation is laid c 㛳 for joyful Associations in all
kinds of Business, and virtuous Friendships.
By this Constitution also the Benefactor is more encourag’d in his
Beneficence, and better secur’d of an increase of Happiness by grateful
Returns,* than if his Virtue were only to be honour’d by the colder general Sentiments of Persons unconcern’d, who could not know his Necessitys, nor how to be profitable to him; especially, when they would
all be equally determin’d to love innumerable Multitudes, whose equal
Virtues would have the same Pretensions to their Love㛳 28a, were there
not [220] an increase of Love, according as the Object is more nearlyattach’d to us, or our Friends, by 㛳 29b good b 㛳 Offices which affect ourselves, or them a 㛳.
㛳 30 This㛳 universal Benevolence toward all Men, we may compare tothat Principle of Gravitation, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the
Universe; but㛳 31, like the Love of Benevolence,㛳 increases as the Distance is diminish’d, and is strongest when Bodys come to touch eachother. Now this increase 㛳 32 of Attraction㛳 upon nearer Approach, is asnecessary 㛳 33 to the Frame of the Universe,㛳 as that there should be any
Attraction at all. For a general Attraction, equal in all Distances, wouldby the Contrariety of such multitudes of equal Forces, put an end to all
Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it 㛳 34 altogether.㛳㛳 35 This increase of Love toward the Benevolent,㛳 according to theirnearer Approaches to our selves by their Benefits, is observable in thehigh degree of Love, which Heroes and Law-givers universally obtain in
their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among those
who are not insensible of their Virtues; and in all the strong Ties ofFriendship, Acquaintance, Neighbourhood, Partnership; which are ex* See above, Sect. iii. Art. 2. 㛳 27 Par.㛳 2.

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ceedingly necessary to the Order 㛳 36 and Happiness㛳 of human Society.
[221]
III. From considering that 㛳 37 strong Determination in our Nature to㛳 Love of
Gratitude, and Love toward our Benefactors, which was already shewn Honour.
to be disinterested;* we are easily led to consider another Determinationof our Minds, equally natural with the former, which is to 㛳 38 delight㛳
in the good Opinion and Love of others, even when we expect no other
Advantage from them, except what flows from this Constitution,whereby
Honour is made an immediate Good. This Desire of Honour I would
call Ambition, had not Custom join’d some evil Ideas to that Word,
making it denote such a violent desire of Honour, and of Power also,
as will make us stop at no base Means to obtain them. On the other
hand, we are by Nature subjected to a grievous Sensation of Misery, fromthe unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dreadno other Evil from them. This we call Shame; which in the same manner㛳 39 is constituted an immediate Evil, as we said Honour was an immediate Good.㛳
Now were there no moral Sense, or had we no other Idea of Actions
but as advantageous or hurtful, I see no reason why we should be delighted with Honour, or sub-[222]jected to the uneasiness of Shame; or
how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from Punishment
for any Action, should ever be uneasy at its being known to all the World.
The World may have 㛳 40 the worse Opinion of him for it; but what subjects my Ease to the Opinion of the World? Why, perhaps, we㛳 shall not
be so much trusted henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If thisbe the only reason of Shame, and it has no immediate Evil, or Pain init, distinct from Fear of Loss; then wherever we expose our selves to Loss,
we should be asham’d, and endeavour to conceal the Action: and yet itis quite otherwise.
A Merchant, for instance, 㛳 41 lest it should impair his Credit㛳, conceals a Shipwrack, or a very bad Market, which he has sent his Goods
to. But is this the same with the Passion of Shame? Has he that Anguish,* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6.

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that Dejection of Mind, and Self-condemnation, which one shall have
whose Treachery is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory in their
Losses, when in a Cause imagin’d morally good, tho they really weaken
their Credit in the Merchant’s Sense; that is, the Opinion of their
Wealth, or fitness for Business? Was any Man ever asham’d of impoverishing himself to serve his Country, or his Friend? [223]
The Foundation of Morals
not the Opinions of ourCountry.

IV. The Opinions of our Country are by some made the first Standardof Virtue. They alledge, “That by comparing Actions to them, we first
distinguish between moral Good, and Evil: And then, say they, Ambition, or the Love of Honour, is our chief Motive.” But what is Honour?
It is not 㛳 42 the being㛳 universally known, no matter how. A covetous
Man is not honour’d by being universally known as covetous; nor aweak, selfish, or luxurious Man, when he is known to be so: Much lesscan a treacherous, cruel, or ungrateful Man, be said to be honour’d forhis being known as such. A Posture-master, a Fire-eater, or Practiser ofLeger-de-main, is not honour’d for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of Admiration and
Surprize to Multitudes. Honour then is the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum’d to be apply’d thatway; for Abilitys constantly apply’d to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now, it is certain, that Ambition㛳 43, or Love of Honour isreally selfish㛳; but then 㛳 44 this㛳 Determination to love Honour, presupposes a Sense of moral Virtue, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it. [224]45
And let it be observ’d, that if we knew an Agent had no other Motiveof Action 㛳 46 than㛳 Ambition, we should apprehend no Virtue even in
his most useful Actions, since they flow’d not from any Love to others,
or Desire 㛳 47 of 㛳 their Happiness. When Honour is thus constituted by
Nature pleasant to us, it may be an additional Motive to Virtue, as we
said above,㛳 48 *㛳 the Pleasure arising from Reflection on our Benevolence
was: but the Person whom we imagine perfectly virtuous, acts immediately from the Love of others; however these refin’d Interests may be* See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 2.

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joint Motives to him to set about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate every kind Inclination, and to despise every contrary Interest, as
giving a smaller Happiness than Reflection on his own Virtue, and Consciousness of the Esteem of others.
Shame is in the same manner constituted an immediate Evil, and influences us the same way to abstain from moral Evil; not that any Action
or Omission would appear virtuous, where the sole Motive was Fear of
Shame.
V. But to enquire further, how far the Opinions of our Company can Opinions flowtheraise a Sense of moral Good or Evil. If any Opinion [225] be universal from
Moral Sense.
in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an
Action be believ’d to be advantageous to the Agent, we may be led tobelieve so too, and then Self-Love may make us undertake it; or may,the same way, make us shun an Action reputed pernicious to the Agent.
If an Action pass for advantageous to the Publick, we may believe sotoo; and what next? If we have no disinterested Benevolence, what shallmove us to undertake it? “Why, we love Honour; and to obtain thisPleasure, we will undertake the Action from Self-Interest.” Now, is Honour only the Opinion of our Country that an Action is advantageous to
the Publick? No: we see no Honour paid to the useful Treachery of an
Enemy whom we have brib’d to our Side, to casual undesign’d Services,or to the most useful Effects of Compulsion on Cowards; and yet we
see Honour paid to unsuccessful Attempts to serve the Publick fromsincere Love to it. Honour then presupposes a Sense of something amiable besides Advantage, 㛳 49 viz.㛳 a Sense of Excellence in a publick Spirit;and therefore the first Sense of moral Good must be antecedent to Honour, for Honour is founded upon it. 50 The Company we keep may leadus, without examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the publick
Good; but that our Company honours such Actions, and loves theAgent, must flow from a Sense of some [226] Excellence in this Love of
the Publick, and serving its Interests.
“We therefore, say they again, pretend to love the Publick, altho weonly desire the Pleasure of Honour; and we will applaud all who seemto act in that manner, either that we may reap Advantage from their

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Actions, or that others may believe we really love the Publick.” But shallany Man ever 㛳 51 really love the Publick, or study the Good of others in
his heart, if Self-love be㛳 the only spring of his Actions? No: that is
impossible. Or, shall we ever really 㛳 52 love㛳 Men who appear to love the
Publick, without a moral Sense? 㛳 53 No: we could form no Idea of sucha Temper; and as for these Pretenders to publick Love, we should hate㛳them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Fame. Now this is all which could
be effected by the Opinions of our Country, even supposing they had amoral Sense, provided we had none our selves: They never could makeus admire Virtue, or virtuous Characters in others; but could only give
us Opinions of Advantage, or Disadvantage in Actions, according as
they tended 㛳 54 procure to㛳 us the Pleasures of Honour, or the Pain of
Shame.
But if we suppose that Men have, by Nature, a moral Sense of Goodness in [227] Actions, and that they are capable of disinterested Love;
all is easy. The Opinions of our Company may make us rashly conclude,that certain Actions tend to the universal Detriment, and are morally
Evil, when perhaps they are not so; and then our Sense may determine
us to have an Aversion to them, and their Authors; or we may, the sameway, be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Actions as good; andthen our desire of Honour may co-operate with Benevolence, to move
us to such Actions: but had we no Sense of moral Qualitys in Actions,㛳 55 nor any㛳 Conceptions of them, 㛳 56 except㛳 as advantageous or hurtful,
we never could have honour’d or lov’d Agents for publick Love, or had
any regard to their Actions, further than they affected our selves in particular. We might have form’d the metaphysical Idea of publick Good,but we had never desir’d it, 57 further than it tended to our own private
Interest, without a Principle of Benevolence; nor admir’d and lov’dthose who 㛳 58 were㛳 studious of it, without a moral Sense. So far is Virtue
from being (in the Language of a late* i Author) the Offspring of Flattery,
begot upon Pride; that Pride, in the bad meaning of that Word, is the
spurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense, and Flattery only an* Author of the Fable of the Bees, Pag. 37. 3d Ed.
i. Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 51.

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Engine, which the [228] Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense inothers, to the Purposes of Self-love in the Flatterer.
VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of Honour. Suppose a Moral Sense,from Love
State or Prince, observing the Money which is drawn out of England notof Honour.
by Italian Musicians, 㛳 59 should㛳 decree Honours, Statues, Titles, forgreat Musicians: This would certainly excite all who had hopes of Success, to the Study of Musick; and 㛳 60 Men of a good Ear would approveof 㛳 the good Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining.
But would this give all Men a good Ear, or make them delight in Harmony? Or could it ever make us really love a Musician, who study’dnothing but his own Gain, in the same manner we do a Patriot, or a
generous Friend? I doubt not. And yet Friendship, without the Assistance of Statues, or Honours, can make Persons appear exceedingly
amiable.
Let us take another Instance. Suppose Statues, and triumphal Arches
were decreed, as well as a large Sum of Money, to the Discoverer ofthe Longitude, or any other useful Invention in Mathematicks: This
would raise a universal Desire of such Knowledge from Self-Love;but would Men therefore love a Mathematician as they do a virtuous
Man? Would a Mathema-[229]tician love every Person who had attain’dPerfection in that Knowledge, wherever he observ’d it, altho he knewthat it was not accompany’d with any Love to Mankind, or Study of
their Good, but with Ill-nature, Pride, Covetousness? In short, let us
honour other Qualitys by external Shew as much as we please, if we do
not discern a benevolent Intention in the Application, or presume uponit; we may look upon these Qualitys as useful, enriching, or otherwise
advantageous to any one who is possess’d of them; but they shall nevermeet with those endearing Sentiments of Esteem and Love, which our
nature determines us to appropriate to Benevolence, or Virtue.
Love of Honour, and Aversion to Shame, may often move us to do
Actions for which others profess to honour us, even tho we see no Goodin them our selves: And Compliance with the Inclinations of others, as
it evidences Humanity, may procure some Love to the Agent, from Spectators who see no moral Good in the Action it self. But without some

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Sense of Good in the Actions, Men shall never be fond of such Actions
in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practisingthem in Solitude; and much less shall they be dissatisfy’d with themselves
when they act otherwise in Solitude. Now this is the case with us, as to
Virtue; and therefore we must [230] have, by Nature, a moral Sense of
it antecedent to Honour.
This will shew us with what Judgment a late* ii Author compares theOriginal of our Ideas of Virtue, and Approbation of it, to the mannerof regulating the Behaviour of aukard Children by Commendation. It
shall appear 㛳 61 afterward㛳,† that our Approbation of some Gestures, andwhat we call Decency in Motion, depends upon some moral Ideas in
People of advanc’d Years. But before Children come to observe this Relation, it is only good Nature, an Inclination to please, and Love of
Praise, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are desir’d; andnot any Perception of Excellence in this Behaviour. 㛳 62 Hence㛳 they are
not sollicitous about Gestures when alone, unless with a View to please
when they return to Company; 㛳 63 nor do they ever㛳 love or approveothers for 㛳 64 any㛳 Perfection of this kind, but rather envy or hate them;till they either discern the Connexion between Gestures, and moral
Qualitys; or reflect on the good Nature, which is evidenc’d by such aCompliance with the desire of the Company. [231]
False Honour.

VII. The considering Honour in the manner above explain’d, may shew
us the reason, why Men are often asham’d for things which are not vitious, and honour’d for what is not virtuous. For, if any Action only
appears vitious to any Persons or Company, altho it be not so, they will
have a bad Idea of the Agent; and then he may be asham’d, or suffer
Uneasiness in being thought morally Evil. 㛳 65 The㛳 same way, those wholook upon an Action as morally good, will honour the Agent, and hemay be pleas’d with the Honour, altho he does not himself perceive any
moral Good in what has procur’d it.
* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 38. 3d. Ed.
ii. Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 52.
† See Sect. vi. Art. 4.

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Again, we shall be asham’d of every Evidence of moral Incapacity, or Moral
Want of Ability; and with good ground, when this Want is occasion’d Incapacity,
matter of
by our own Negligence. Nay further, if any Circumstance be look’d Shame.
upon as indecent in any Country, offensive to others, 㛳 66 or㛳 deform’d;
we shall, out of our 㛳 67 Love to㛳 the good Opinions of others, be asham’dto be found in such Circumstances, even when we are sensible that thisIndecency or Offence is not founded on Nature, but is merely the Effectof Custom. Thus being observ’d in 㛳 68 those㛳 Functions of Nature
which are counted indecent and offensive, will make us uneasy, altho weare sensible that they really do [232] not argue any Vice or Weakness.
But on the contrary, since moral Abilitys of any kind, upon the general
Presumption of a good Application, 69 procure the Esteem of others, weshall value our selves upon them, or grow proud of them, and be asham’dof any Discovery of our want of such Abilitys. This is the reason that
Wealth and Power, the great Engines of Virtue, when presum’d to beintended for benevolent Purposes, either toward our Friends or ourCountry, procure Honour from others, and are apt to beget Pride in the
Possessor; which, as it is a general Passion which may be either good orevil, according as it is grounded, we may describe to be the Joy whicharises from the real or imagin’d Possession of Honour, or Claim to it.
㛳 70 The㛳 same are the Effects of Knowledge, Sagacity, Strength; andhence it is that Men are apt to boast of them.
But whenever it appears that Men have only their private Advantage
in view, in the application of these Abilitys, or natural Advantages, theHonour ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fondof displaying them; and much more when there is any Suspicion of an
ill-natur’d Application. Thus some Misers are asham’d of their Wealth,and study to conceal it; as the malicious or selfish do their Power: Nay,this is very often done where there is [233] no positive evil Intention;
because the diminishing their Abilitys, increases the moral Good of any
little kind 㛳 71 Action㛳, which they can find in their hearts to perform.
In short, we always see Actions which flow from publick Love, ac- Selfishness
company’d with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only mali- shameful.
cious, but even selfish ones, the matter of Shame and Confusion; andthat Men study to conceal them. The Love of private Pleasure is the158treatise ii

ordinary occasion of Vice; and when Men have got any lively Notionsof Virtue, they generally begin to be asham’d of every thing which betrays Selfishness, even in Instances where it is innocent. We are apt toimagine, that others observing us in such Pursuits, form mean Opinionsof us, as too much set on private Pleasure; and hence we shall find such
Enjoyments, in most polite Nations, conceal’d from those who do notpartake with us. Such are venereal Pleasures between Persons marry’d,and even eating and drinking alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks;
whereas a hospitable Table is rather matter of boasting; and so are allother kind, generous Offices between marry’d Persons, where there isno Suspicion of Self-love in the Agent; but he is imagin’d as acting fromLove to his Associate. This, 㛳 72 I fancy, first introduc’d Ideas of Modesty
in polite Nations, and Custom has strengthen’d [234] them wonderfully㛳; so that we are now asham’d of many things, upon some confus’d
implicit Opinions of moral Evil, tho we know not upon what account.
Here too we may see the reason, why we are not asham’d of any of
Honour andShame, often
the Methods of Grandeur, or high-Living. There is such a Mixture of
from some
Associations moral Ideas, of Benevolence, of Abilitys kindly employ’d; so many Deof Ideas. pendants supported, so many Friends entertain’d, assisted, protected;
such a Capacity imagin’d for great and amiable Actions, that we are neverasham’d, but rather boast of such things: We never affect Obscurity or
Concealment, but rather desire that our State and Magnificence should
be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of moral Ideas, no Mortal
could bear the Drudgery of State, or abstain from laughing at those who
did. Could any Man be pleas’d with a Company of Statues surrounding
his Table, so artfully contriv’d as to consume his various Courses, andinspir’d by some Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the usual trifling
Returns in praise of their Fare? Or with so many Machines to performthe Cringes and Whispers of a Levee?
The Shame we suffer from the Meanness of Dress, Table, Equipage,is entirely owing to the same reason. This Meanness is often imagin’dto argue Avarice, Meanness [235] of Spirit, want of Capacity, or Conduct
in Life, of Industry, or moral Abilitys of one kind or other. To confirm
this, let us observe that Men will glory in the Meanness of their Fare,when it was occasion’d by a good Action. How 㛳 73 many㛳 would besection v

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asham’d to be surpriz’d at a Dinner of cold Meat, who will boast of theirhaving fed upon Dogs and Horses at the Siege of Derry? iii And they will
all tell you that they were not, nor are asham’d of it.
This ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between external
Grandeur, Regularity in Dress, Equipage, Retinue, Badges of Honour,and some moral Abilitys greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more consequence in the World than some recluse Philosophers apprehend, whopique themselves upon despising these external Shews. This may possibly be a great, if not the only Cause of what some count miraculous,
viz. That Civil Governors of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours,by some inexpressible Awe, and Authority, quell 㛳 74 the㛳 Spirits of the
Vulgar, and keep them in subjection by such small Guards, as might
easily be conquer’d by those Associations 㛳 75 which might be rais’damong㛳 the Disaffected, or Factious of any State; who are daring enoughamong their Equals, and shew a sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such an Enterprize. [236]㛳 76 Hence also we may㛳 discover the reason, why the gratifying our
superior Senses of Beauty and Harmony, or the Enjoyment of the㛳 77 Pleasures㛳 of Knowledge, never occasions any Shame or Confusion,
tho our Enjoyment were known to all the World. The Objects which
furnish this Pleasure, are of such a nature, as to afford the same Delights
to multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one,which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that altho wepursue these Enjoyments from Self-love, yet㛳 78, since㛳 our Enjoyment
cannot be prejudicial to 㛳 79 others, no㛳 Man is imagin’d any way inhumanly selfish, from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is possible.
The same Regularity or Harmony which delights me, may at the sametime delight multitudes; the same Theorem shall be equally fruitful of
Pleasure, when it has entertain’d thousands. 㛳 80 Men therefore are not㛳
asham’d of such Pursuits, since they 㛳 81 never, of themselves,㛳 seduce us
into any thing malicious, envious, or ill-natur’d; nor does any one ap-

iii. Overcrowded with some thirty thousand Protestant refugees, Londonderry (orDerry) withstood a siege by the dethroned King James II from April to July 1689.

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prehend another too selfish, from 㛳 82 his㛳 pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure. 83
This View of Honour and Shame may also let us see the reason, whymost Men are uneasy at being prais’d, when they themselves are present.
Every one is delighted [237] with the Esteem of others, and must enjoy
great Pleasure when he hears himself commended; but we are unwillingothers should observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure, which is reallyselfish; or that they should imagine us fond of it, or influenc’d by hopesof it in our good Actions: and therefore we chuse Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with respect to other Pleasures, in which others
do not share with us.
Compassion
a motiveto Virtue.

VIII. Let us next consider another Determination of our Mind, whichstrongly proves Benevolence to be natural to us, and that is Compassion;by which we are dispos’d to study the Interest of others, without any
Views of private Advantage. This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal
is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv’d in, unlessthe Person be imagin’d 㛳 84 evil㛳, in a moral Sense: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov’d, even in that Case. Advantage may makeus do a cruel Action, or may overcome Pity; but it scarce ever extinguishes it. A sudden Passion of Hatred or Anger may represent a Person
as absolutely evil, and so extinguish Pity; but when the Passion is over,
it often returns. Another disinterested View may even in cold blood overcome Pity; such as Love to our Country, or Zeal for Religion. Persecution
is generally occasion’d by Love of Virtue, and [238] 㛳 85 a㛳 Desire of theeternal Happiness of Mankind, altho our Folly makes us chuse absurd
Means 㛳 86 to promote it㛳; and is often accompany’d with Pity enoughto make the Persecutor uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, hechuses; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the Heretick as absolutely and entirely evil.
We may here observe how wonderfully the Constitution of human
Nature is adapted to move Compassion. Our 㛳 87 Misery or Distress immediately appears㛳 in our Countenance, if we do not study to prevent
it, and propagates some Pain to all Spectators; who from Observation,
universally understand the meaning of those dismal Airs. We mechan-section v

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ically send forth Shrieks and Groans upon any surprizing Apprehension
of Evil; so that no regard to Decency can sometimes restrain them㛳 88.
This is the Voice of Nature, understood by all Nations, by which㛳 all
who are present are rous’d to our Assistance, and sometimes our injurious Enemy is made to relent.
We observ’d above,* that we are not immediately excited by Compassion to desire the Removal of our own Pain: we think it just to be so
affected upon the Occasion, and dislike those who are not so. But we[239] are excited directly to desire the Relief of the Miserable; 㛳 90 without
any imagination that this Relief is a private Good to our selves: And㛳 if
we see this impossible, we may by Reflection discern it to be vain for us
to indulge our Compassion any further; and then 㛳 91 Self-love prompts
us to㛳 retire from the Object which occasions our Pain, and 㛳 92 to endeavour㛳 to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no such Reflection,
People are hurry’d by a natural, kind Instinct, to see Objects of Compassion, and expose themselves to this Pain when they can give no reason
for it; as in the Instance of publick Executions.
This same Principle leads men to Tragedys; only we are to observe,that another strong reason of this, is the moral Beauty of the Characters
and Actions which we love to behold. For I doubt, whether any Audiencewould be 㛳 93 pleas’d to㛳 see fictitious Scenes of Misery, if they were kept
strangers to the moral Qualitys of the Sufferers, or their Characters andActions. As in such a case, there would be no Beauty to raise Desire ofseeing such Representations, I fancy we would not expose our selves toPain alone, from Misery which we knew to be fictitious.
It was the same Cause which crouded the Roman Theatres to see
Gladiators. There [240] the People had frequent Instances of great
Courage, and Contempt of Death, two great moral Abilitys, if not Virtues. Hence Cicero looks upon them as great Instructions in Fortitude.
The Antagonist Gladiator bore all the blame of the Cruelty committed,
among People of little Reflection; and the courageous and artful one,really obtain’d a Reputation of Virtue, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Necessity of Self-defence. In the mean
* See Sect. ii. Art. 8. 㛳 89 Par. 2.㛳

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time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding to such Sights,
and favouring the Persons who presented them with such Spectacles of
Courage, and with Opportunitys of following their natural Instinct toCompassion, was the true occasion of all the real Distress, or Assaults
which they were sorry for.
What Sentiments can we imagine a Candidate would have rais’d ofhimself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of Misery;
had he drain’d Hospitals and Infirmarys of all their pityable Inhabitants, or had he bound so many Slaves, and without 94 any Resistance,butcher’d them with his own Hands? I should very much question the
Success of his Election, (however Compassion 95 might cause his Shews
still to be frequented) if his Antagonist chose a Diversion apparently[241] more virtuous, or with a Mixture of Scenes of Virtue.
How independent this Disposition to Compassion is 㛳 96 on㛳 Custom,Compassion
natural.
Education, 㛳 97 or㛳 Instruction, will appear from the Prevalence of it in
Women and Children, who are less influenc’d by these. That Children
㛳 98 delight in some Actions which㛳 are cruel and tormenting to Animals
which they have in their Power, flows not from Malice, or want of Compassion, but from their Ignorance of those signs of Pain which many
Creatures make; together with a Curiosity to see the various Contortionsof their Bodys. For when they are more acquainted with these Creatures,or come by any means to know their Sufferings, their Compassion often
becomes too strong for their Reason; as it generally does in beholding
Executions, where as soon as they observe the evidences of Distress, orPain in the Malefactor, they are apt to condemn this necessary Methodof Self-defence in the 㛳 99 State.㛳 [242]u section vi u
Concerning the Importance of this moral
Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind,and its Influence on human Affairs.

I. It may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruption of Importance
the Moral
Manners so justly complain’d of every where, this moral Sense has a ofSense.
greater Influence on Mankind than is generally imagin’d, altho it is often
directed by very partial imperfect Views of publick Good, and often
overcome by Self-love. But we shall offer some further Considerations,to prove, “That it gives us more Pleasure and Pain than all our other
Facultys.” And to prevent Repetitions, let us observe, “That 㛳 1 whereever㛳 any morally good Quality gives Pleasure from Reflection, or from
Honour, the contrary evil one will give proportionable Pain, from Remorse and Shame.” Now we shall consider the moral Pleasures, not only
separately, but as they are the most delightful Ingredient in the ordinary
Pleasures of Life. [243]All 㛳 2 Men㛳 seem persuaded of some Excellency in the Possession ofgood moral Qualitys, which is superior to all other Enjoyments; and on
the contrary, look upon a State of moral Evil, as worse and morewretched than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgmentin this matter from the Actions of Men; for however they may be influenc’d by moral Sentiments, yet it is certain, that Self-interested Passions
frequently overcome them, and partial Views of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really morally evil, apprehending it to be good.
But let us examine the Sentiments which Men universally form of theState of others, when they are no way immediately concern’d; for in
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these Sentiments human Nature is calm and undisturb’d, and shews itstrue Face.
Now 㛳 3 should㛳 we imagine a rational Creature in a sufficiently happy
State, 㛳 4 tho his㛳 Mind was, without Interruption, wholly occupy’d withpleasant Sensations of Smell, Taste, Touch, &c. if at the same time allother Ideas were excluded? 㛳 5 Should㛳 we not think the State low, meanand sordid, if there were no Society, no Love or Friendship, no good
Offices? What then must that State be wherein there are no Pleasures
but those of the external Senses, with such long Intervals as human Nature at present [244] must have? Do these short Fits of Pleasure makethe Luxurious happy? How insipid and joyless are the Reflections onpast Pleasure? And how poor a Recompence is the Return of the transient Sensation, for the nauseous Satietys, and Languors in the Intervals?
This Frame of our Nature, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the external Senses, points out to us, “That there must be some other more
durable Pleasure, without such tedious Interruptions, and nauseous
Reflections.”
Let us even join with the Pleasures of the external Senses, the Perceptions of Beauty, Order, Harmony. These are no doubt more noble
Pleasures, and seem to inlarge the Mind; and yet how cold and joyless
are they, if there be no moral Pleasures of Friendship, Love and Beneficence? Now if the bare Absence of moral Good, makes, in our Judgment, the State of a rational Agent contemptible; the Presence of contrary Dispositions is always imagin’d by us to sink him into a degree ofMisery, from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we everwish to be in the same Condition with a wrathful, malicious, revengeful,or envious Being, tho we were at the same time to enjoy all 㛳 6 the Pleasures of the external and internal Senses? The internal Pleasures ofBeauty and Harmony, contribute greatly indeed toward soothing㛳 the[245] Mind into a forgetfulness of Wrath, Malice or Revenge; and theymust do so, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: forwhile these Affections possess the Mind, there is nothing but Torment
and Misery.
What Castle-builder, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life,
Castle-builders
prove it.
in which he thinks he 㛳 7 should㛳 be happy, ever made acknowledg’dsection vi

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Treachery, Cruelty, or Ingratitude, the Steps by which he mounted to
his wish’d for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain’dit? We always conduct our selves in such Resveries, according to the Dictates of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Courage; and the lowest we can sink,is hoping we may be enrich’d by some innocent Accident.
O si urnam Argenti Fors quà mihi monstret! ———* i

But Labour, Hunger, Thirst, Poverty, Pain, Danger, have nothing so detestable in them, that our Self-love cannot allow us to be often expos’dto them. 㛳 8 On the contrary㛳, the Virtues which these give us occasionsof displaying, are so amiable and excellent, that scarce ever is any imaginary Hero in Romance, or Epic, brought to his high-[246]est Pitch ofHappiness, without going thro them all. Where there is no Virtue, there
is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation; the Romance, or Epos mustend. Nay, the Difficulty,† or natural Evil, does so much increase the Virtue of the good Action which it accompanys, that we cannot easily sustain these Works after the Distress is over; and if we continue the Work,it must be by presenting a new Scene of Benevolence in a prosperous
Fortune. A Scene of external Prosperity or natural Good, without any
thing moral or virtuous, cannot entertain a Person of the dullest Imagination, had he ever so much interested himself in the Fortunes of his
Hero; for where Virtue ceases, there remains nothing worth wishing to
our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his Possession of,when we are most studious of his Happiness.
Let us take a particular Instance, to try how much we prefer the Pos- Virtue own’dto allsession of Virtue to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon Vice superior
Pleasure.
as worse than any other Misery. Who could ever read the History ofRegulus, ii 10 without concerning himself in the Fortunes of that gallant
Man, sorrowing at his Sufferings, and wishing him a better Fate? But* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 6. v. 10.
i. Translation: “O, that some lucky strike would disclose to me a pot ofmoney. . . .” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough,Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 210.
† Sect. iii. Art. xi. 㛳 9 Axiom 6.㛳
ii. See editor’s note viii to Treatise II, Sect. I.

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how 㛳 11 a better㛳 Fate? Should [247] he have comply’d with the Termsof the Carthaginians, and preserv’d himself from the intended Tortures,
tho to the detriment of his Country? Or should he have violated hisplighted Faith and Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that eitherof these is the better Fate he wishes his Favourite? Had he acted thus,that Virtue would have been gone, which interests every one in his Fortunes.—“Let him take his Fate like other common Mortals.”—Whatelse do we wish then, but that the Carthaginians had relented of their
Cruelty, or that Providence, by some unexpected Event, had rescued him
out of their hands.
12
Now may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin’d to judge
Virtue with Peace and Safety, preferable to Virtue with Distress; but thatat the same time we look upon the State of the Virtuous, the Publickspirited, even in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all affluenceof other Enjoyments? For this is what we chuse to have our Favourite
Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains and natural Evils. We 㛳 13 should㛳
never have imagin’d him happier, had he acted otherwise; or thought
him in a more eligible State, with Liberty and Safety, at the expence of
his Virtue. We secretly judge the Purchase too dear; and therefore wenever imagine he acted foolishly in secu-[248]ring his Virtue, his Honour, at the expence of his Ease, his Pleasure, his Life. Nor can we thinkthese latter Enjoyments worth the keeping, when the former are entirely
lost.
Necessaryin other
Pleasures.

II. Let us in the same manner examine our Sentiments of the Happinessof others in common Life. Wealth and External Pleasures bear no smallbulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany thisOpinion of Happiness in Wealth, some suppos’d beneficent Intentionof doing good Offices to Persons dear to us, at least to our Familys, orKinsmen? And in our imagin’d Happiness 㛳 14 from㛳 external Pleasure,㛳 15 are not some Ideas㛳 always included of some moral Enjoyments ofSociety, some Communication of Pleasure, something of Love, of
Friendship, of Esteem, of Gratitude? Who ever pretended to a Tasteof 㛳 16 these㛳 Pleasures without Society? Or if any seem violent in pursuitof 㛳 17 them㛳, how base and contemptible do they appear to all Persons,section vi

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even to those who could have no expectation of Advantage from theirhaving a more generous Notion of Pleasure?
18
Now were there no moral Sense, no Happiness in Benevolence, anddid we act from no other Principle than Self-love; sure there is no Pleasure of the external Sen-[249]ses, which we could not 㛳 19 enjoy alone㛳,with less trouble and expence than in Society. But a Mixture of the moral
Pleasures is what gives the alluring Relish; ’tis some Appearance of
Friendship, of Love, of communicating Pleasure to others, which preserves the Pleasures of the Luxurious from being nauseous and insipid.
And this partial Imagination of some good moral Qualitys, some Benevolence, in Actions which have many cruel, inhuman, and destructive
Consequences toward others, is what has kept Vice more in countenancethan any other Consideration.*
But to convince us further wherein the Happiness of Wealth, andexternal Pleasure lies; let us but suppose Malice, Wrath, Revenge; or only
Solitude, Absence of Friendship, of Love, of Society, of Esteem, join’dwith the Possession of them; and all the Happiness vanishes like a
Dream. And yet Love, Friendship, Society, Humanity, tho accompany’dwith Poverty and Toil, nay even with smaller degrees of Pain, such as
do not wholly occupy the Mind, are not only the Object of Love fromothers, but even of a sort of Emulation: which plainly shews, “ThatVirtue is the chief Happiness in the 㛳 21 Judgment of all㛳 Mankind.”[250]
III. There is a further Consideration which must not be pass’d over, con- The Charmcerning the External Beauty of Persons, which all allow to have 㛳 22 a㛳 in Beauty.
great Power over human Minds. Now it is some apprehended Morality,
some natural or imagin’d Indication of concomitant Virtue, which gives
it this powerful Charm above all other kinds of Beauty. Let us consider
the Characters of Beauty, which are commonly admir’d in Countenances, and we shall find them to be Sweetness, Mildness, Majesty, Dignity, Vivacity, Humility, Tenderness, Good-nature; that is, that certain
Airs, Proportions, je ne scai quoy’s, are natural Indications of such Vir* See above, Sect. iv. Art. 4. Par. 㛳 20 4, 5㛳.

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treatise iitues, or of Abilitys or Dispositions toward them. As we observ’d above*of Misery, or Distress appearing in Countenances; so it is certain, almost
all habitual Dispositions of Mind, form the countenance in such a manner, as to give some Indications of them to the Spectator. Our violent
Passions are obvious at first view in the Countenance; so that sometimes
no Art can conceal them: and smaller degrees of them give some lessobvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will observe. Now
when the natural Air of 㛳 24 a㛳 Face approaches to that which any Passion
would form it unto, we make a [251] conjecture from this concerning
the leading Disposition of the Person’s Mind.
As to those Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward large
Lips, little Noses, narrow Eyes; unless we knew from themselves underwhat Idea 㛳 25 such Features㛳 are admir’d, whether as naturally beautiful
in Form, or Proportion to the rest of the Face; or as presum’d Indicationsof some moral Qualitys; we may more probably conclude that it is thelatter; since this is so much the Ground of Approbation, or Aversion
㛳 26 towards㛳 Faces among our selves. And 㛳 27 as to those㛳 Features which
we count naturally disagreeable as to Form, we know the Aversion on
this account is so weak, that moral Qualitys shall procure a liking, evento the Face, in Persons who are sensible of the Irregularity, or want ofthat Regularity which is common in others. With us certain Features are
imagin’d to denote Dulness; as hollow Eyes, large Lips; a Colour of Hair,
Wantonness: and may we not conclude the like Association of Ideas,㛳 28 perhaps in both Cases without Foundation in Nature,㛳 to be theGround of those Approbations which appear unaccountable to us?
In the same manner, when there is nothing grosly disproportion’d in
any Face, what is it we dispraise? 㛳 29 It is㛳 Pride, Haugh-[252]tiness,Sourness, Ill-nature, Discontent, Folly, Levity, Wantonness; which someCountenances discover in the manner above hinted at? And 㛳 30 these㛳Airs, when brought by Custom upon the most regular Set of Features,
have often made them very disagreeable; as the contrary Airs have given
the strongest Charms to Countenances, which 㛳 31 were㛳 far from Perfection in external Beauty.
* See Sect. 㛳 23 V㛳. Art. 8. Par. 2.

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169㛳 32 One cannot but observe the Judgment of Homer, in his Characterof Helen. Had he ever so much rais’d our Idea of her external Beauty,㛳
it would have been ridiculous to have engag’d his Countrymen in a War
for such a Helen as Virgil has drawn her. He therefore still retains something 㛳 33 amiable in a moral Sense,㛳 amidst all her Weakness, and often
suggests to his Reader,——— ÿElénhc oÿrmh́matá te sonaxác te* iii

as the Spring of his Countrymens Indignation and Revenge.
This Consideration may shew us one Reason, among many others, The Causedifferentfor Mens different Fancys, or Relishes of Beauty. The Mind of Man, ofFancys of
however generally dispos’d to esteem Benevolence and Virtue, yet by Beauty.
more particular Attention to some [253] kinds of it than others, may
gain a stronger Admiration of some moral Dispositions than others.
Military Men, may admire Courage more than other Virtues; Personsof smaller Courage, may admire Sweetness of Temper; Men of Thought
and Reflection, who have more extensive Views, will admire the like
Qualitys in others; Men of keen Passions, expect equal Returns of all
the kind Affections, and are wonderfully charm’d by Compliance: theProud, may like those of higher Spirit, as more suitable to their Dignity;
tho Pride, join’d with Reflection and good Sense, will recommend tothem Humility in the Person belov’d. Now as the various Tempers of
Men make various Tempers of others agreeable to them, so they must
differ in their Relishes of Beauty, according as it denotes the several
Qualitys most agreeable to themselves.
This may also shew us, how in virtuous Love there may be the greatest
Beauty, without the least Charm to engage a Rival. Love it self gives a
Beauty to the Lover, in the Eyes of the Person belov’d, which no other
Mortal is much affected with. And this perhaps is the strongest Charm
possible, and that which will have the greatest Power, where there is not
some very great Counter-ballance from worldly Interest, Vice, or grossDeformity. [254]* See Homer, Iliad 2. v. 356, 590.
iii. Translation: “Helen’s fear and lonesome sighs.”

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Air, Motion,
Gestures.

IV. This same Consideration may be extended to the whole Air and Motion of any Person. Every thing we count agreeable, some way denotes
Chearfulness, Ease, a Condescension, and Readiness to oblige, a Loveof Company, with a Freedom and Boldness which always accompanys
an honest, undesigning Heart. On the contrary, what is shocking in Air,or Motion, is Roughness, Ill-nature, a Disregard to others, or a foolish
Shame-facedness, which evidences a Person to be unexperienc’d in Society, or Offices of Humanity.
With relation to these Airs, Motions, Gestures, we may observe, thatconsidering the different Ceremonys, and Modes of shewing respect,which are practis’d in different Nations, we may indeed probably conclude that there is no natural Connexion between any of these Gestures,or Motions, and the Affections of Mind which they are by Custom madeto express. But when Custom has made any of them pass for Expressionsof such Affections, by a constant Association of Ideas, some shall become agreeable and lovely, and others extremely offensive, altho they
were both, in their own Nature, perfectly indifferent. [255]

The Spring ofLove between
the Sexes.

V. Here we may remark the manner in which Nature leads Mankind to
the Continuance of their Race, and by its strongest Power engages themto what occasions the greatest Toil and Anxiety of Life; and yet supports
them under it with an inexpressible delight. We might have been excited
to the Propagation of our Species, by such an uneasy Sensation as would
have effectually determin’d us to it, without any great prospect of Happiness; as we see Hunger and Thirst determine us to preserve our Bodys,
tho few look upon eating and drinking as any considerable Happiness.
The Sexes might have been engag’d to Concurrence, 㛳 34 as㛳 we imagine
the Brutes are, by Desire only, or by a Love of sensual Pleasure. But how
dull and insipid had Life been, were there no more in Marriage? Whowould have had Resolution enough to bear all the Cares of a Family,
and Education of Children? Or who, from the general Motive of Benevolence 㛳 35 alone㛳, would have chosen to subject himself to natural
Affection toward an Offspring, when he could 㛳 36 so easily foresee what㛳
Troubles it might occasion?

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171

This Inclination therefore of the Sexes, is founded on somethingstronger, and more efficacious and joyful, than the Sollicitations of Uneasiness, or the bare desire of [256] sensible Pleasure. 38 Beauty gives afavourable Presumption of good moral Dispositions, and Acquaintanceconfirms this into a real Love of Esteem, or begets it, where there is little
Beauty. This raises an expectation of the greatest moral Pleasures alongwith the sensible, and a thousand tender Sentiments of Humanity andGenerosity; and makes us impatient for a Society which we imagine bigwith unspeakable moral Pleasures: where nothing is indifferent, andevery trifling Service, being an Evidence of this strong Love 㛳 39 of 㛳 Esteem, is mutually receiv’d with the Rapture and Gratitude of the greatest
Benefit, and of the most substantial Obligation. And where Prudence
and Good-nature influence both sides, this Society may answer all their
Expectations.
Nay, let us examine those of looser Conduct with relation to the fairSex, and we shall find, 㛳 40 that Love of sensible Pleasure is not㛳 the chief
Motive of Debauchery, or false Gallantry. Were it so, the meanest Prostitutes would please as much as any. But we know sufficiently, that㛳 41 Men㛳 are fond of Good-nature, Faith, Pleasantry of Temper, Wit,
and many other moral Qualitys, even in a Mistress. And this may furnish
us with a Reason for what appears pretty unaccountable, viz. “ThatChastity it self has a powerful Charm in [257] the Eyes of the Dissolute,even when they are attempting to destroy it.”This powerful Determination even to a limited Benevolence, andother moral Sentiments, is observ’d to give a 㛳 42 strong㛳 biass to our
Minds 㛳 43 toward㛳 a universal Goodness, Tenderness, Humanity, Generosity, and contempt of private Good in our whole Conduct; besides
the obvious Improvement it occasions in our external Deportment, andin our relish of Beauty, Order, and Harmony. As soon as a Heart, before
hard and obdurate, is soften’d in this Flame, we shall observe㛳 44, arisingalong with it,㛳 a Love of Poetry, Musick, the Beauty of Nature in rural
Scenes, a Contempt of other selfish Pleasures of the external Senses, aneat Dress, a humane Deportment, a Delight in and Emulation of every
thing which is gallant, generous and friendly.
37

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Society,
Friendships,
from ourMoral Sense.

In the same manner we are determin’d to common Friendships andAcquaintances, not by the sullen Apprehensions of our Necessitys, orProspects of Interest; but by an incredible variety of little agreeable, engaging Evidences of Love, Good-nature, and other morally amiable
Qualitys in those we converse with. 㛳 45 And㛳 among the rest, none of
the least considerable is an Inclination to Chearfulness, a Delight to raise
Mirth in others, which procures a secret [258] Approbation and Gratitude toward the Person who puts us in such an agreeable, innocent,good-natur’d, and easy state of Mind, as we are conscious of while weenjoy pleasant Conversation, enliven’d by moderate Laughter.

The Powerof Oratory
founded on it.

VI. Upon this moral Sense is founded all the Power of the Orator. The
various Figures of Speech, are the several Manners which a lively Genius,
warm’d with Passions suitable to the Occasion, naturally runs into, only
a little diversify’d by Custom: and they only move the Hearers, by giving
a lively Representation of the Passions of the Speaker; which are communicated to the Hearers, as we* observ’d above of one Passion, viz.
Pity.
Now the Passions which the Orator attempts to raise, are all foundedon moral Qualitys. All the bold Metaphors, or Descriptions, all the artificial Manners of Expostulation, Arguing, and addressing the Audience, all the Appeals to Mankind, are but more lively Methods of giving
the Audience a stronger impression of the moral Qualitys of the Person
accus’d, or defended; of the Action advis’d, or dissuaded: And all the
Antitheses, or Witticisms; all the Cadences of sonorous Periods, whatever [259] inferior kind of Beauty they may have separately, are of noconsequence to persuade, if we neglect moving the Passions by someSpecies of Morality. They may perhaps raise a little Admiration of the
Speaker, among those who already favour his Party, but they oftner raise
Contempt in his Adversarys. But when you display the Beneficence of
any Action, the good Effect it shall have on the Publick in promoting
the Welfare of the Innocent, and relieving the unjustly distressed; if you
prove your Allegations, you make every Mortal approve the undertaking* See Sect. v. Art. 8. Par. 2.

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it. When any Person is to be recommended, display his Humanity, Generosity, Study of the publick Good, and Capacity to promote it, his Contempt of Dangers, and private Pleasures; and you are sure to procure
him Love and Esteem. If at the same time you shew his Distress, or the
Injurys he has suffer’d, you raise Pity, and every tender Affection.
On the contrary, represent the Barbarity, or Cruelty of any Action,
the Misery it shall procure to the Kind, the Faithful, the Generous, oronly to the Innocent; and you raise an Abhorrence of it in the Breastsof the Audience, tho they were not the Persons who would have suffer’dby it. The same way, would you make a Person infamous, and despis’dand [260] hated, represent him as cruel, inhuman, or treacherous toward
the most distant rational Agents; or shew him only to be selfish, 㛳 46 and㛳
given to solitary Luxury, without regard to any Friend, or the Interestof others; and you have gain’d your Point as soon as you prove what you
alledge. Nay, 㛳 47 how does it㛳 stop our Admiration of any celebrated Action, to suggest, “That the Author of it was no Fool; he knew it would
turn to his own Advantage?”
Now, are the Learned and Polite the only Persons who are mov’d bysuch Speeches? Must Men know the Schemes of the Moralists and Politicians, or the Art of Rhetorick, to be capable of being persuaded? Must
they be nicely conversant in all the Methods of promoting Self-Interest?
Nay, do we not see on the contrary, the rude undisciplin’d Multitude
most affected? Where had Oratory so much Power as in popular States,
and that too before the Perfection of the Sciences? Reflection, and Study,
may raise in Men a Suspicion of Design, and Caution of Assent, when
they have some knowledge of the various Topicks of Argument, andfind them employ’d upon themselves: but rude Nature is still open to
every moral Impression, and carry’d furiously along without Caution,or Suspense. It was not the [261] Groves of the Academy, or the polish’d
Stones of the Portico, or the manag’d Horses of Greece, which listen’dto the Harp of an Amphion, or an Orpheus; iv but the Trees, and Rocks,
iv. “The Groves of the Academy” refers to the Academy in Athens, the school ofphilosophers founded by Plato; Zeno of Citium founded the school that derived its
name from the stoa (“portico” or colonnade), the Stoic school, also in Athens. Ac-

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and Tygers of the Forest: which may shew us, “That there is some Senseof Morality antecedent to Instruction, or metaphysical Arguments proving the private Interest of the Person who is persuaded, to be connectedwith the publick Good.”
Poetry pleases
from thisMoral Sense.

VII. We shall find 㛳 48 this㛳 Sense to be the Foundation 㛳 49 also㛳 of thechief Pleasures of Poetry. We hinted, in the former Treatise, at the Foundation of Delight in the Numbers, Measures, Metaphors, Similitudes.*But as the Contemplation of moral Objects, either of Vice or Virtue,
affects us more strongly, and moves our Passions in a quite different and㛳 50 more㛳 powerful manner, than natural Beauty, or (what we commonlycall) Deformity; so the most moving Beautys bear a Relation to ourmoral Sense, and affect us more vehemently, than the 㛳 51 Representation㛳
of natural Objects in the liveliest Descriptions. Dramatic, and Epic Poetry, are entirely address’d to this Sense, and raise our Passions by the
Fortunes of Characters, distinctly represented as morally good, or [262]evil; as might be seen more fully, were we to consider the Passions
separately.
Where we are studying to raise any Desire, or Admiration of an Object really beautiful, we are not content with a bare Narration, but endeavour, if we can, to present the Object it self, or the most lively Imageof it. And 㛳 52 hence㛳 the Epic Poem, or Tragedy, 㛳 53 gives㛳 a 㛳 54 vastly㛳
greater Pleasure than the Writings of Philosophers, tho both aim at recommending Virtue. The representing the Actions themselves, if theRepresentation be judicious, natural, and lively, will make us admire theGood, and detest the Vitious, the Inhuman, the Treacherous and Cruel,by means of our moral Sense, without any Reflections of the Poet toguide our Sentiments. It is for this Reason that Horace has justly madeKnowledge in Morals so necessary to a good Poet:cording to legend, Amphion’s lyre moved the stones into place for the city wall ofThebes; Orpheus could charm wild beasts, plants, and stones with his lyre-playing.
* See Treatise I. Sect. ii. Art. 13. Sect. iv. Art. 3.

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175

Scribendi recte Sapere est & principium & fons.* v

And again:
Qui didicit Patriae quid debeat, & quid Amicis, [263]Quo sit amore Parens, quo Frater amandus, & Hospes,
Quod sit Conscripti, quod Judicis officium, quae
Partes in bellum missi Ducis; ille profecto
Reddere Personae scit convenientia cuique.† vi

Upon this same Sense is founded the Power of that great Beauty in Imagery
PoetryPoetry, the Prosopopoeia, by which every Affection is made a Person; infounded on
every natural Event, Cause, Object, is animated by moral Epithets. For the Moral
we join the Contemplation of moral Circumstances and Qualitys, along Sense.
with natural Objects, to increase 㛳 58 their㛳 Beauty or Deformity; and㛳 59 we㛳 affect the Hearer in a more lively manner with the Affections
describ’d, by representing them as Persons. Thus a shady Wood musthave its solemn venerable Genius, and proper rural Gods; every clear
Fountain, its sacred chaste Nymph; and River, its bountiful God, withhis Urn, and perhaps a Cornu-copia diffusing Plenty and Fruitfulness
along 㛳 60 its㛳 Banks. The Day-light is holy, benign, and powerful to banish the pernicious Spirits of the Night. The Morning is a kind, officious
Goddess, tripping over the dewy Mountains, and ushering [264] in Light
to Gods and Men. War is an impetuous, cruel, undistinguishing Monster, whom no Virtue, no Circumstance of Compassion, can move fromhis bloody Purposes. The Steel is unrelenting; the Arrow and Spear are
impatient to destroy, and carry Death on their Points. Our modern Engines of War are also frightful Personages, 㛳 61 counterfeiting with theirrude Throats㛳 the Thunder of Jove. The moral Imagery of Death is* Hor. de Arte Poet. 㛳 55 v.㛳 309.
v. Translation: “Of good writing the source and fount is wisdom.” Horace, Satires,
Epistles, and Ars Poetica, p. 476.
† Hor. de Arte Poet. 㛳 56 v.㛳 312 㛳 57 &c㛳.
vi. Translation: “He who has learned what he owes his country and his friends,
what love is due a parent, a brother, and a guest, what is imposed on senator andjudge, what is the function of a general sent to war, he surely knows to give eachcharacter his fitting part.” Horace, ibid., p. 476.

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every where known, viz. his Insensibility to Pity, his Inflexibility, anduniversal impartial Empire. Fortune is inimitably drawn by Horace,*with all her Retinue and Votaries, and with her rigid severe Minister,
Necessity. The Qualitys of Mind too become Persons. Love becomes a
Venus, or a Cupid; Courage, or Conduct, a Mars, or a Pallas protecting
and assisting the Hero; before them march Terror and Dread, Flight andPursuit, Shouts and Amazement. Nay, the most sacred Poets are often
led into this Imagery, and represent Justice and Judgment as supporting
the Almighty’s Throne, and Mercy and Truth going before his Face:
They shew us Peace as springing up from the Earth, and Mercy looking
down from Heaven. [265]Every one perceives a greater Beauty in this manner of Representation, this Imagery, this Conjunction of moral Ideas, than in the fullest
Narration, or the most lively natural Description. When one reads the
fourth Book of Homer, and is prepar’d, from the Council of the Gods,
to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidst the most beautiful Description
which ever was imagin’d of shooting an Arrow, meets with its moral
Epithet,——— melaináwn e¤rm◊ o◊duna‡wn,†——— The Source of blackest Woes; vii

he will find himself more mov’d by this Circumstance, than by all the
Profusion of natural Description which Man could imagine.
History.

VIII. History derives its chief Excellence from the representing theManners and Characters; the Contemplation of which in Nature being
very affecting, they must necessarily give Pleasure when well related.

Painting.

IX. It is well known too, that a Collection of the best Pieces of Facepainting is but a poor Entertainment, when compar’d with those Pieces
which represent moral Actions, Passions, and Characters. 65 [266]6364* See Lib. 1. Od. 35.
† See Homer, Iliad 4. 㛳 62 v.㛳 117.
vii. That is, Pandaros’ arrow shot at Menelaos.

u section vii u
A Deduction of some Complex moral Ideas,
viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect,
and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, fromthis moral Sense.

I. To conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see thetrue Original of moral Ideas, viz. This moral Sense of Excellence in every
Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence㛳 1. It remains to be explain’d,
how we acquire more particular Ideas of Virtue and Vice, abstracting㛳from any Law, Human, or Divine.
If any one ask, Can we have any Sense of Obligation, 㛳 2 abstracting㛳 Obligation.
from the Laws of a Superior? We must answer according to the various
Senses of the word Obligation. If by Obligation we understand a Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to approve Actions,and to perform them; which Determination shall also make us displeas’dwith our selves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to 㛳 3 it㛳; in thismeaning of the word Obligation, [267] there is naturally an Obligation
upon all Men to Benevolence; and they are still under its Influence, evenwhen by false, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of 㛳 4 their㛳
Actions, this moral Sense leads them to Evil; unless by long inveterate
Habits it be exceedingly weaken’d. For it scarce seems possible wholly
to extinguish it. Or, which is to the same purpose, this internal Sense,and Instinct 㛳 5 toward㛳 Benevolence, will either influence our Actions,or 㛳 6 else㛳 make us very uneasy and dissatisfy’d; and we shall be consciousthat we are in a base unhappy State, even without considering any Law
whatsoever, or any external Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impend177

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ing from its Sanctions. And further, there are still such Indications given
us of what is in the whole 㛳 7 benevolent㛳, and what not; as may probably
discover to us the true Tendency of every Action, and let us see, sometime or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear’d㛳 8 benevolent㛳: 㛳 9 or if we have no Friends so faithful as to admonish us,
the Persons injur’d will not fail to upbraid us.㛳 So that no Mortal cansecure to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation,
but by a serious Inquiry into the Tendency of his Actions, and a perpetual Study of universal Good㛳 10, according to the justest Notions ofit㛳. [268]
But if by Obligation, we understand a Motive from Self-interest, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own
Advantage wisely, to a certain Course of Actions; we may have a Senseof such 㛳 11 an㛳 Obligation, by reflecting on this Determination of our
Nature to approve Virtue, to be pleas’d and happy when we reflect upon
our having done virtuous Actions, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by considering how muchsuperior we esteem the Happiness of Virtue to any other Enjoyment.*
We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of Obligation, by considering
those Reasons which prove a constant Course of benevolent and social
Actions, to be the most probable means of promoting the natural Goodof every Individual; as Cumberland and Puffendorf have prov’d: And
all this without Relation to a Law.
But further, if our moral Sense be suppos’d exceedingly weaken’d,and the selfish Passions grown strong, either thro some general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our Understanding be weak, andwe be often in danger of being hurry’d by our Passions into precipitate
and rash [269] Judgments, that malicious Actions shall 㛳 12 promote ourAdvantage more㛳 than Beneficence; in such a Case, if it be inquir’d whatis necessary to engage Men to beneficent Actions, or induce a steadySense of an Obligation to act for the publick Good; then, no doubt, “A
Law with Sanctions, given by a superior Being, of sufficient Power tomake us happy or miserable, must be necessary to counter-ballance those* See above, Sect. vi. Art. 1, 2.

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apparent Motives of Interest, to calm our Passions, and give room for therecovery of our moral Sense, or at least for a just View of our Interest.”
II. Now the principal Business of the moral Philosopher is to shew, from How far
cansolid Reasons, “That universal Benevolence tends to the Happiness of Virtue
be taught.
the Benevolent, either from the Pleasures of Reflection, Honour, natural
Tendency to engage the good Offices of Men, upon whose Aid we must
depend for our Happiness in this World; or from the Sanctions of divine
Laws discover’d to us by the Constitution of the Universe;” that so noapparent Views of Interest may counteract this natural Inclination: but
not to attempt proving, “That Prospects of our own Advantage of any
kind, can raise in us 㛳 13 real Love to㛳 others.” Let the Obstacles from
Self-love be only remov’d, and Nature it self will incline us to Be[270]nevolence. Let the Misery of excessive Selfishness, and all its Passions, be but once explain’d, that so Self-love may cease to counteract
our natural Propensity to Benevolence, and when this noble Disposition
gets loose from these Bonds of Ignorance, and false Views of Interest,
it shall be assisted even by Self-love, and grow strong enough to make anoble virtuous Character. Then he is to enquire, by Reflection upon
human Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote
the universal Good, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ’d,
and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters, so as to admit
Exceptions; that so our good Inclinations may be directed by Reason,
and a just Knowledge of the Interests of Mankind. But Virtue it self, orgood Dispositions of Mind, are not directly taught, or produc’d by Instruction; 㛳 14 they must be originally implanted in our Nature, by its
great Author; and afterwards strengthen’d and confirm’d by our own
Cultivation.㛳㛳 15a III. We are often told, “That there is no need of supposing such a Objection.
Sense of Morality given to Men, since Reflection, and Instruction would
recommend the same Actions from Arguments of Self-Interest, and engage us, from the acknowledg’d Principle of Self-love, [271] to the Practice of them, without this unintelligible Determination to Benevolence,or the occult Quality of a moral Sense.”180
Moral Sense,
not from
Reflection.

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It is perhaps true, that Reflection and Reason might lead us to approve
the same Actions as advantageous. But would not the same Reflection
and Reason likewise, generally recommend the same Meats to us which
our Taste represents as pleasant? And shall we thence conclude that wehave no Sense of Tasting? Or that such a Sense is useless? No: The use
is plain in both Cases. Notwithstanding the mighty Reason we boast ofabove other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of doubt andhesitation, to serve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preservation,
without the external Senses, or to 㛳 16b direct b 㛳 our Actions for the Goodof the Whole, without this moral Sense. Nor could we be so strongly
determin’d at all times to what 㛳 17c is c 㛳 most conducive to either of theseEnds, without these expeditious Monitors, and importunate Sollicitors;
nor so nobly rewarded, when we act vigorously in pursuit of these Ends,by the calm dull Reflections of Self-Interest, as by those delightful
Sensations.
This natural Determination to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is no doubt an occult Quality. But [272] is it any way moremysterious that the Idea of an Action should raise Esteem, or Contempt,
than that the motion, or tearing of Flesh should give Pleasure, or Pain;or the Act of Volition should move Flesh and Bones? In the latter Case,
we have got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic
Fluids, like the Indian’s Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden of
the Difficulty: but go one step further, and you find the whole as difficult
as at first, and equally a Mystery with this Determination to love andapprove, or 㛳 18d hate d 㛳 and despise Actions and Agents, without any
Views of Interest, as they appear benevolent, or the 㛳 19e contrary. e 㛳When they offer it as a Presumption that there can be no such Sense,
antecedent to all Prospect of Interest, “That these Actions for the mostpart are really advantageous, one way or other, to the Actor, the Approver, or Mankind in general, by whose Happiness our own State may
be some way made better;” may we not ask, supposing the Deity intended to impress such a Sense of something amiable in Actions, (which
is no impossible Supposition) what sort of Actions would a good God
determine 㛳 20f us f 㛳 to approve? Must we deny the possibility of such a
Determination, if it did not lead us to admire Actions of no Advantage

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to Man-[273]kind, or to love Agents for their being eminent Triflers? Ifthen the Actions which a wise and good God must determine us to approve, if he give us any such Sense at all, must be Actions useful to the
Publick, this Advantage can never be a Reason against the Sense it self.
After the same manner, we should deny all Revelation which taught usgood Sense, Humanity, Justice, and a rational Worship, because Reasonand 㛳 21g Interest g 㛳 confirm and recommend such Principles, and Services; and should greedily embrace every Contradiction, Foppery, andPageantry, as a truly divine Institution, without any thing humane, or
useful to Mankind.
IV. The Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of Goodand Evil from the private Advantage of the Actor, or from Relation toa Law and its Sanctions, either known from Reason, or Revelation, areperpetually recurring to this moral Sense which they deny; not only incalling the Laws of the Deity just and good, and alledging Justice andRight in the Deity to govern us; but by using a set of Words which
import something different from what they will allow to be their only
meaning. Obligation, with them, is 㛳 22h only h 㛳 such a Constitution, either of Nature, or some governing Power, as makes it advantageous for
the Agent to [274] act in a certain manner. Let this Definition be substituted, wherever we meet with the words, ought, should, must, in amoral Sense, and many of their Sentences would seem very strange; asthat the Deity must act rationally, must not, or ought not to punish the
Innocent, must make the state of the Virtuous better than that of the
Wicked, must observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words,
must, ought, should, would make these Sentences either ridiculous, orvery disputable. a 㛳
V. But that our first Ideas of moral Good depend not on Laws, may
plainly appear from our constant Inquirys into the Justice of Laws themselves; and that not only of human Laws, but of the divine. What else
can be the meaning of that universal Opinion, “That the Laws of God
are just, and holy, and good?” Human Laws may be call’d good, becauseof their Conformity to the Divine. But to call the Laws of the supreme

23

Moral Sense
judges of
Laws.

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Deity good, or holy, or just, if all 㛳 24 Goodness, Holiness㛳, and Justice
be constituted by Laws, or the Will of a Superior any way reveal’d, must
be an insignificant Tautology, amounting to no more than this, “ThatGod wills what he wills.” 25
26
It must then first be suppos’d, that there is something in Actions
which is apprehend-[275]ed absolutely good; and this is Benevolence,or 㛳 27 a Tendency to㛳 the publick natural happiness of rational Agents;
and that our moral Sense perceives this Excellence. And then we callthe Laws of the Deity good, when we imagine that they are contriv’dto promote the publick Good in the most effectual and impartial manner. And the Deity is call’d 㛳 28 good㛳, in a moral Sense, when we apprehend that his whole Providence tends to the universal Happiness of
his Creatures; whence we conclude his Benevolence, and 㛳 29 Delight㛳
in their Happiness.
Some tell us, “That the Goodness of the divine Laws, consists in their
Conformity to some essential Rectitude of his Nature.” i But they must
excuse us from assenting to this, till they make us understand the meaning of this Metaphor, essential Rectitude, and till we discern whether
any thing more is meant by it than a perfectly wise, uniform, impartial
Benevolence.
Hence we may see the Difference between Constraint, and ObligaDifference
betweention. There is indeed no Difference between Constraint, and the second
Constraint,
and Sense of the word Obligation, viz. a Constitution which makes an AcObligation. tion eligible from Self-Interest, if we only mean external Interest,distinct
from [276] the delightful Consciousness which arises from the moral
Sense. The Reader need scarcely be told, that by Constraint, we do notunderstand 㛳 30 an㛳 external Force moving our Limbs without our Consent, for in that Case we are not Agents at all; but that Constraint whicharises from the threatening and presenting some Evil, in order to makeus act in a certain manner. And yet there seems a universally acknowledg’d Difference between even this sort of Constraint, and Obligation.
i. See Samuel Clarke, Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion (1706), chap. 1, sects. 3, 4, 6, in D. D. Raphael, British Moralists 1650–
1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 199–214.

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We never say we are oblig’d to do an Action which we count base, but
we may be constrain’d to it; we never say that the divine Laws, by their
Sanctions, constrain us, but oblige us; nor do we call Obedience to theDeity Constraint, unless by a Metaphor, 㛳 31 tho㛳 many own they are
influenc’d by fear of Punishments. And yet supposing an almighty evil
Being should require, under grievous Penaltys, Treachery, Cruelty, Ingratitude, we would call this Constraint. The difference is plainly this.
When any 㛳 32 Sanctions co-operate㛳 with our moral Sense, in exciting
us to Actions which we count morally good, we say we are oblig’d; butwhen Sanctions of Rewards or 㛳 33 Punishments㛳 oppose our moral
Sense, then we say we are brib’d or constrain’d. In the former Case wecall the Lawgiver good, as designing the publick Happiness; in the latter
we call him evil, or unjust, for the suppos’d contrary [277] Intention.
But were all our Ideas of moral Good or Evil, deriv’d solely from opinions of private Advantage or Loss in Actions, I see no possible difference
which could be made in the meaning of these words.
VI. From this Sense too we derive our Ideas of Rights. Whenever it Rights.
appears to us, that a Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any
thing, universally allow’d in certain Circumstances, would in the wholetend to the general Good, we say that 㛳 35 any Person㛳 in such Circumstances, has a Right to do, possess, or demand that Thing. And according
as this Tendency to the publick Good is greater or less, the Right is greateror less.
The Rights call’d perfect, are of such necessity to the publick Good, Perfect Rights.
that the universal Violation of them would make human Life intolerable; and it actually makes those miserable, whose Rights are thus 㛳 36 violated. On㛳 the contrary, to fulfil these Rights in every Instance, tends
to the publick Good, either directly, or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a Part. Hence it plainly follows, “That 㛳 37 to allow㛳 a violent
Defence, or Prosecution of such Rights, before Civil Government beconstituted, cannot in any particular Case be more detrimental to the
Publick, than the Violation of them with Impunity.” [278] And as to
the general Consequences, the universal use of Force in a 㛳 38 State of
Nature㛳, in pursuance of perfect Rights, seems exceedingly advanta34

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geous to the Whole, by making every one dread any Attempts against
the perfect Rights of others.
39
Right ofThis is the moral Effect which attends proper Injury, or a Violation
War, andof the perfect Rights of others, viz. A Right to War, and all Violence
Punishment.
which is necessary to oblige the Injurious to repair the Damage, and give
Security against such Offences for the future. 㛳 40a This is the sole Foundation of the Rights of punishing Criminals, and of violent Prosecutions of our Rights, in a 㛳 41b State of Nature b 㛳. And these Rights,
㛳 42c belonging originally to the Persons injur’d, or their voluntary, or invited Assistants, c 㛳 according to the Judgment of indifferent Arbitrators,
㛳 43d in a State of Nature, d 㛳 being by 㛳 44e the e 㛳 Consent of the 㛳 45f Persons
injur’d f 㛳, transferr’d to the Magistrate in a Civil State, are the true Foundation of his Right of Punishment. a 㛳 Instances of perfect Rights arethose to our Lives; to the Fruits of our Labours; to demand Performanceof Contracts upon valuable Considerations, from Men capable of performing them; to direct our own Actions either for publick, or innocent
private Good, before we have submitted them to the Direction of others
in any measure: and many others of like nature. [279]Imperfect Rights are such as, when universally violated, would not
Imperfect
Rights.
necessarily make Men miserable. These Rights tend to the improvement
and increase of positive Good in any Society, but are not absolutely
necessary to prevent universal Misery. The Violation of them, only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any Good which they had
before. From this Description it appears, “That a violent Prosecution ofsuch Rights, would generally occasion greater Evil than the Violation ofthem.” Besides, the allowing of Force in such Cases, would deprive Menof the greatest Pleasure in Actions of Kindness, Humanity, Gratitude;
which would cease to appear amiable, when Men could be constrain’dto perform them. Instances of imperfect Rights are those which the poor
have to the Charity of the Wealthy; which all Men have to Offices ofno trouble or expence to the Performer; which Benefactors have to returns of Gratitude, and such like.
46
The Violation of imperfect Rights, only argues a Man to have such
weak Benevolence, as not to study advancing the positive Good of oth-

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185ers, when in the least opposite to his own: but the Violation of per[280]fect Rights, argues the injurious Person to be positively evil or cruel;or at least so immoderately selfish, as to be indifferent about the positive
Misery and Ruin of others, when he imagines he can find his Interest
in it. In violating the former, we shew a weak Desire of publick Happiness, which every small View of private Interest over-ballances; but inviolating the latter, we shew our selves so entirely negligent of the Miseryof others, that Views of increasing our own Good, overcome all our
Compassion toward their Sufferings. Now as the absence of Good, ismore easily born than the presence of Misery; 㛳 47 so㛳 our good Wishes
toward the positive Good of others, 㛳 48 are㛳 weaker than our Compassion toward their Misery. He then who violates imperfect Rights, shews
that his Self-love overcomes only the Desire of positive good to others;
but he who violates perfect Rights, betrays such a selfish Desire of advancing his own positive Good, as overcomes all 㛳 49 Compassion㛳toward
the Misery of others.
Beside these two sorts of Rights, there is a third call’d External; as External
when the doing, possessing, or demanding of any thing is really detri- Rights.
mental to the Publick in any particular Instance, as being contrary to
the imperfect Right of another; but yet the 㛳 50 universally㛳 denying Men
this Faculty [281] of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or ofusing Force in pursuance of it, would do more mischief than all the Evils
to be fear’d from the Use of this Faculty. And hence it appears, “Thatthere can be no Right to use Force in opposition even to external Rights,
since it tends to the universal Good to allow Force in pursuance ofthem.”
Civil Societys substitute Actions in Law, instead of the Force allow’din the State of Nature.
Instances of external Rights are these; that of a wealthy Miser to recal
his Loan from the most industrious poor Tradesman at any time; thatof demanding the Performance of a Covenant too burdensome on one
side; the Right of a wealthy Heir to refuse Payment of any Debts whichwere contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender; theRight of taking advantage of a positive Law, contrary to what was Equity
antecedent to that Law; as when a register’d Deed takes place of one not186treatise ii

register’d, altho prior to it, and known to be so before the second
Contract.
Now whereas no action, Demand, or Possession, can at once be either
What Rights,
can benecessary to the publick Good, or conducive to it, and [282] at the same
opposite.
time its contrary be either necessary or conducive to the same end; itfollows, “That there can be no Opposition of perfect Rights among
themselves, of imperfect among themselves, or between perfect and imperfect Rights.” But it may often tend to the publick Good, to allow a
Right of doing, possessing, or demanding, and of using Force in pursuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more humane and kindin any Person to have acted otherwise, and not have claim’d his Right.
But yet a violent Opposition to these Rights, would have been vastly
more pernicious than all the Inhumanity in the use of them. And therefore, 㛳 51 tho㛳 external Rights cannot be opposite among themselves; yetthey may be opposite to imperfect Rights, but imperfect Rights, tho violated, give no Right to 㛳 52 Force. Hence㛳 it appears, “That there cannever be a Right to Force on both Sides, or a 㛳 53 just War on both Sides㛳
at the same time.”
Rightsalienable, andunalienable.

VII. There is another important Difference of Rights, according as
they are Alienable, or Unalienable. To determine what Rights are alienable, and what not, we must take these two Marks:
1st. If the Alienation be within our natural Power, so that it be possible
for us in [283] Fact to transfer our Right; and if it be so, then,
2dly. It must appear, that 㛳 55 to transfer㛳 such Rights may serve somevaluable Purpose.
By the first Mark it appears, “That the Right of private Judgment,
or of our inward Sentiments, is unalienable;” since we cannot command ourselves to think what either we our selves, or any other Person㛳 56 pleases. So㛳 are also our internal Affections, which necessarily arise
according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the second Mark it
appears, “That our Right of serving God, in the manner which we
think acceptable, is not alienable;” because it can never serve any valuable purpose, to make Men 㛳 57 worship㛳 him in a way which seems tothem displeasing to him. The same way, a direct Right over our Lives
54

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or Limbs, is not alienable to any Person; so that he might at Pleasureput us to death, or maim us. We have indeed a Right to hazard ourLives in any good Action which is of importance to the Publick; andit may often serve a most valuable end, to subject the direction of suchperilous Actions to the Prudence of others in pursuing a publick Good;as Soldiers do to their General, or to a Council of War: and so far thisRight is alienable. These may serve as [284] Instances to shew the useof the two Marks of alienable Rights, which must both concur tomake them so, and will explain the manner of applying them in otherCases.
VIII. That we may see the Foundation of some of the more important The
Rights of Mankind, let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at least, Foundationof Property.
of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their Labourand Industry; and consequently, 㛳 59 when once Men become so numerous, that the natural Product of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; a necessity arises, for the support ofthe increasing System, that such a Tenour of Conduct be observ’d, as
shall most effectually promote Industry; and that Men㛳 abstain from all
Actions which would have the contrary effect. It is well known, thatgeneral Benevolence alone, is not a Motive strong enough to Industry,
to bear Labour and Toil, and many other Difficultys which we are averse
to from Self-love. For the strengthning therefore our Motives to Industry, we have the strongest Attractions of Blood, of Friendship, of
Gratitude, and the additional Motives of Honour, and even of externalInterest. Self-love is really as necessary to the Good of the Whole, as
Benevolence; as that Attraction which causes the Cohesion of the Parts,
is as necessary to the regular [285] State of the Whole, as Gravitation.
Without these additional Motives, Self-love would generally oppose the
Motions of Benevolence, and concur with Malice, or influence us to thesame Actions which Malice would. “㛳 60 That㛳 Tenour of Action then,㛳 61 which㛳 would take away the stronger Ties of Benevolence, or the additional Motives of Honour and Advantage, from our Minds, and sohinder us from pursuing industriously that Course which really increases
the Good of the Whole, is evil; and we are oblig’d to shun it.”
58

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First then, the depriving any Person of the Fruits of his own innocent
Labour, takes away all Motives 㛳 62 to Industry from Self-love, or thenearer Ties; and leaves us no other Motive than general Benevolence:㛳
nay, it exposes the Industrious as a constant Prey to the Slothful, andsets Self-love against Industry. This is the Ground of our Right of Dominion and Property in the Fruits of our Labours; without which Right,
we could scarce hope for any Industry, or any thing beyond the Productof uncultivated Nature. Industry will be confin’d to our present Necessitys, and cease when they are provided for; at least it will only continue from the weak Motive of general Benevolence, if we are not allow’d to store up beyond present Necessity, and to dispose of what is
above our Necessitys, [286] either in Barter for other kinds of Necessarys, or for the Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears
the Right which Men have to lay up for the future, the Goods which
will not be spoil’d by it; of alienating them in Trade; of Donation to
Friends, Children, Relations: otherwise we deprive Industry of all the
Motives of Self-love, Friendship, Gratitude, 㛳 63 and㛳 natural Affection.
The same Foundation there is for the Right of Disposition by Testament. The Presumption of 㛳 64 this㛳 Disposition, is the Ground of theRight of Succession to the Intestate.
The external Right of the Miser to his useless Hoards, is founded also
on this, that allowing Persons by Violence, or without Consent of theAcquirer, to take the Use of his Acquisitions, would discourage Industry,
and take away all the Pleasures of Generosity, Honour, Charity, whichcease when Men can be forc’d 㛳 65 to㛳 these Actions. Besides, there is no
determining in many Cases, who is a Miser, and who is not.
Marriage must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring; otherRight ofMarriage.
wise we take away from the Males one of the strongest Motives to publick Good, viz. natural Affection; and discourage Industry, as has been
shewn above. [287]
The Labour of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessarys, thoCommerce.
it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one sort: Hence the Rightof Commerce, and alienating our Goods; and also the Rights from Contracts and Promises, either to the Goods acquir’d by others, or to theirLabours.

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189㛳 66a The great Advantages which accrue to Mankind from unprej- Right of Civil
udic’d Arbitrators, impower’d to decide the Controversys which ordi- Government.
narily arise, thro the partiality of Self-love, among Neighbours; as also
from prudent Directors, who should not only instruct the Multitude in
the best Methods of promoting the publick Good, and of defending
themselves against mutual or foreign Injurys; but also be arm’d with
Force sufficient to make their Decrees or Orders effectual at home, andthe Society formidable abroad: these Advantages, I say, sufficiently shew
the Right Men have to constitute Civil Government, and to subject theiralienable Rights to the Disposal of their Governours, under such Limitations as their Prudence suggests. And as far as the People have subjected their Rights, so far their Governours have an external Right atleast, to dispose of them, 㛳 67b as their Prudence shall direct b 㛳, for attaining the Ends of their Institution; and no further. a 㛳 [288]IX. These Instances may shew how our moral Sense, by a little Re- Corollarys fortheflection upon the tendencys of actions, may adjust the Rights of Man- comparing
degrees ofkind. Let us now apply the general 㛳 69 Canon㛳 laid down above,* for Virtue andcomparing the Degrees of Virtue and Vice in Actions, in a few Corol- Vice in
Actions.
larys besides that one already deduc’d.†
1. The Disappointment, in whole or in part, of any Attempt, Good From Ability.
or Evil, if it be occasion’d only by external Force, or any unforeseen
Accident, does not vary the moral Good, or Evil; for as in good Attempts,
the Moment of Good, 㛳 72 or [M]㛳 is diminish’d, or vanishes in such acase, so does the Ability, 㛳 73 or [A]㛳 likewise: The Quotient then may stillbe the same. 㛳 74 This holds equally㛳 in evil Attempts. So that Actions are
not to be judg’d good or evil by the Events, any 㛳 75 further㛳 than theymight have been foreseen by the Agent in evil Attempts; or were actuallyintended, if they were good, in good Actions; for then only they argue
either Love or Hatred in the Agent.
2. Secular rewards annex’d to Virtue, and actually influencing the Interest.
Agent fur-[289]ther than his Benevolence would, diminish the moral
68* See Sect. iii. Art. 11㛳 70, 12㛳.
† See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 㛳 71 3㛳.

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Good 㛳 76 as far㛳 as they were necessary to move the Agent to the action,or to make him do more Good than otherwise he would have done; forby increasing the Interest, 㛳 77 or [I] positive,㛳 to be subtracted, they diminish the Benevolence. But additional Interests which were not necessary to have mov’d the Agent, such as the Rewards of a good Being
for Actions which he would have undertaken without a Reward, do notdiminish the Virtue. In this however no Mortal is capable of judging
another. Nor do the Prospects of grateful Returns for Benefits which wewould have conferr’d gratuitously, diminish the Generosity. This Corollary may be apply’d to the Rewards of a future State, if any Person
conceives them distinct from the Pleasures of virtue itself: If they be notconceiv’d as something distinct from those Pleasures, then the very Desire of them is a strong Evidence of a virtuous Disposition.
3. External Advantage exciting us to Actions of evil tendency to others, if without this Prospect of Advantage we would not have undertaken
them, diminishes the Evil of the Action; such as the Prospects of great
Rewards, of avoiding Tortures, or even the uneasy Sollicitations of violent selfish 㛳 78 Passions. This㛳 is com-[290]monly call’d the greatnessof Temptation. The reason of this is the same with that in the formermⳮI
Case㛳 79, since H ⳱ —A 㛳. We may here also remember again, that weare more uneasy upon the presence of Pain, than upon the absence ofGood; and hence Torture is a more extenuating Circumstance thanBribes, engaging us to Evil, because 㛳 80 [I] is greater.㛳
4. The surmounting the uneasy Sollicitations of the selfish Passions,
Detriment.
increases the Virtue of a benevolent Action, and much more worldly
Losses, Toil, &c. for now the Interest becomes negative; the Subtractionof which increases the Quantity.
5. A malicious Action is made the more odious by all its foreseen Disadvantages to the Agent, for the same reason: particularly,
6. The Knowledge of a Law prohibiting an evil Action, increases theKnowledge ofLaws, how it
Evil by increasing the negative Interest to be subtracted; for then the illaffects Actions.
natur’d Inclination must be so strong as to surmount all the 㛳 81 Motivesof Self-love, to avoid㛳 the Penaltys, and all the Motives of Gratitude
toward the Law-giver. This is commonly call’d sinning against Conscience. [291]section vii

191

7. Offices of no Toil or Expence, have little Virtue generally, because
the ability is very great, and there is no contrary Interest surmounted.
8. But the refusing of them may be very vitious, as it argues an absenceof good Affection, and 㛳 82 often produces㛳 a great enough Moment of
natural Evil. And,
9. In general, the fulfilling the perfect Rights of others has little Virtue Degree ofin it; for thereby 㛳 83 no㛳 Moment of Good is produc’d 㛳 84 more than Right.
there was before㛳; and the Interest engaging to the Action is very great,even the avoiding all the Evils of War in a State of 㛳 85 Nature.㛳
10. But the violating 㛳 86 perfect, or even external Rights,㛳 is always
exceedingly evil, either in the immediate, or more remote Consequencesof the Action; and the selfish Motives surmounted by this vitious Inclination, are the same with those in the former Case.
11. The truest Matter of Praise are those Actions or Offices which
others claim from us by an imperfect Right; and generally, the stronger
their Right is, there is the less Virtue in fulfilling it, but the greater Vicein violating it. [292]㛳 87 Lemma. The stronger Ties of Benevolence, in equal Abilitys, must Strength
produce a greater Moment of Good, in equally good Characters, than of Ties.
the weaker Ties. Thus, natural Affection, Gratitude, Friendship, havegreater Effects than general Benevolence. Hence,㛳
12. In equal Moments of Good produc’d by two Agents, when one
acts from general 㛳 88 Benevolence㛳, and the other from a nearer Tie; there
is greater Virtue in the Agent, who produces equal Good from the㛳 89 weaker㛳 Attachment, and less Virtue, where there is the 㛳 90 stronger㛳
Attachment, which yet produces no 㛳 91 more㛳.
13. But the Omission of the good Offices of the stronger Ties, orActions contrary to them, have greater Vice in them, than the like
Omissions or Actions contrary to the weaker Ties; since our Selfishness or Malice must appear the greater, by the strength of the contrary
Attachment which it surmounts. Thus, in co-operating with Gratitude, natural Affection, or Friendship, we evidence less Virtue in any
given Moment of Good produc’d, than in equally important Actionsof general Benevolence: But Ingratitude to a Benefactor, Negligence of
the Interests of a Friend, or Relation; or Returns of evil Offices, are192

treatise ii

vastly more [293] odious, than equal negligence, or evil Offices toward
Strangers.
14. When we cannot at once follow two different Inclinations of BeWhat Offices
to be prefer’d,nevolence, we are to prefer gratifying the stronger Inclination; according
when there
92
appears any to the wise Order of Nature, 㛳 who㛳 has constituted these Attachments.
Opposition. Thus, we are rather to be Grateful than Liberal, rather serve a Friend, orKinsman, than a Stranger of only equal Virtue, when we cannot do both.
㛳 93a 15. Or more generally, since there can be no Right, Claim, or Obligation to Impossibilitys; when two Actions to be done by any Agent,would both tend to the good of Mankind, but they cannot be perform’dboth at once; that which occasions most Good is to be done, if the Omission of the other occasions no prepollent Evil. If the omission of either,will occasion some new natural Evil, that is to be omitted, whose Omission will occasion the least Evil. Thus, if two Persons of unequal Dignity
be in Danger, we are to relieve the more valuable, when we cannot relieveboth. Ingratitude, as it evidences a worse Temper than neglect of Beneficence; so it raises worse Sentiments in the Benefactor, and greater
Diffidence, and Suspicion of his [294] Fellow-Creatures, than an Omission of an act of Beneficence: we ought therefore to be Grateful, rather
than Beneficent, when we cannot (in any particular Case) evidence both
Dispositions. If omitting of one Action will occasion new positive Evil,or continuance in a State of Pain, whereas the Omission of anotherwould only prevent some new positive Good; since a State of Pain is agreater Evil, than the absence of Good, we 㛳 94b are b 㛳 to follow Compassion, rather than Kindness; and relieve the Distressed, rather than increase the Pleasures of the Easy; when we cannot do both at once, andother Circumstances of the Objects are equal. In such Cases, we should
not suppose contrary Obligations, or Dutys; the more important Office
is our present Duty, and the Omission of the less important inconsistent
Office at present, is no moral Evil. a 㛳TheOriginal of
Government.

㛳 95a X. From Art. vii. 96b it follows, “That all human Power, or Authority,
must consist in a Right transferr’d to any Person or Council, to disposeof the alienable Rights of others; and that consequently, there can be no
Government so absolute, as to have even an external Right to do or com-section vii

193

mand every thing.” For wherever any Invasion is made upon unalienable
Rights, there must arise either a perfect, or external Right to Resistance.
[295] The only Restraints of a moral Kind upon Subjects in such cases,
are, when they foresee that, thro their want of Force, they shall probably
by Resistance occasion greater Evils to the Publick, than those they attempt to remove; or when they find that Governours, in the main very
useful to the Publick, have 㛳 97c by c 㛳 some unadvised Passion, done an
Injury too small to overbalance the Advantages of their Administration,or the Evils which Resistance would in all likelihood occasion; especiallywhen the Injury is of a private Nature, and not likely to be made a Precedent to the ruin of others. Unalienable Rights are essential Limitations
in all Governments.
But by absolute Government, either in Prince, or Council, or in both Absolutejointly, we understand a Right to dispose of the natural Force, and Government.
Goods of a whole People, as far as they are naturally alienable, according
to the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of both jointly, for the publick
Good of the State㛳 98d, or whole People d 㛳; without any Reservation as
to the Quantity of 㛳 99e the e 㛳 Goods, manner of Levying, or the proportion of the Labours of the Subject, which they shall demand. But in all
States this tacit Trust is presuppos’d, “that the Power 㛳 100f conferr’d f 㛳shall be employ’d according to the best Judgment of the Rulers for the
publick Good.” So that [296] whenever the Governours openly professa Design of 㛳 101g distroying g 㛳 the State, or act in such a manner as will
necessarily do it; the essential Trust suppos’d in all 㛳 102h conveyance ofCivil Power h 㛳, is violated, and the Grant thereby made void.
A Prince, or Council, or both jointly, may be variously Limited; either Limited
when the consent of the one may be necessary to the validity of the Acts Government.
of the other; or when, in the very Constitution of this supreme Power,
certain Affairs are expresly exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Prince,or Council, 㛳 103i or both i 㛳 jointly: as when several independent States
uniting, form a general Council, from whose Cognizance they expresly
reserve certain Privileges, in the very Formation of this Council; or whenin the very Constitution of any State, a certain Method of Election of
the Person of the Prince, or of the Members of the supreme Council isdetermin’d, and the Intention of their Assembling declar’d. In all such

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cases, it is not in the Power of such Prince, Council, or both jointly, toalter the very Form of Government, or to take away that Right which
the People have to be govern’d in such a manner, by a Prince, or Council
thus elected, without the universal Consent of the very People who havesubjected themselves to this Form of [297] Government. So that there
may be a very regular State, where there is no universal absolute Power,
lodg’d either in one Person, or Council, or in any other Assembly besidethat of the whole People associated into that State. To say, that upon a
Change attempted in the very Form of 㛳 104j the j 㛳 Government, by thesupreme Power, the People have no Remedy according to the Constitution itself, will not prove that the supreme Power has such a Right;
unless we confound all Ideas of Right with those of external Force. The
only Remedy indeed in that Case, is an universal Insurrection against
such perfidious Trustees.
Despotick Power, is that which Persons injur’d may acquire overThe natureof despotick
those
Criminals, whose Lives, consistently with the publick Safety, theyPower.
may prolong, that by their Labours they may repair the Damages they
have done; or over those who stand oblig’d to a greater Value, than all
their Goods and Labours can possibly amount to. This Power itself, islimited to the Goods and Labours only of the Criminals or Debtors; andincludes no Right to Tortures, Prostitution, or any Rights of the Governed which are naturally Unalienable; or to any thing which is not ofsome Moment 㛳 105k toward Repair k 㛳 of Damage, Payment of Debt, orSecurity against future Offences. The Characteristick of de-[298]spotick
Power, is this, “that it is solely intended for the good of the Governours,
without any tacit Trust of consulting the good of the Governed.” Despotick Government, in this Sense, is 㛳 106l directly l 㛳 inconsistent with the
Notion of Civil Government.
From the Idea of Right, as above explain’d, we must necessarily conclude, “that there can be no Right, or Limitation of Right, inconsistent
with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good.” And therefore in Casesof extreme Necessity, when the State cannot otherwise be preserv’d from
Ruin, it must certainly be Just and Good in limited Governours, or in
any other Persons who can do it, to use the Force of the State for its own
preservation, beyond the Limits fix’d by the Constitution, in some tran-

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195

sitory acts, which are not to be made Precedents. And on the other hand,when an equal Necessity to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may
justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg’d in their Governours, or may
counteract them. This Privilege of flagrant Necessity, we all allow in
defence of the most perfect private Rights: And if publick Rights are ofmore extensive Importance, so are also publick Necessitys. These Necessitys must be very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they can neverover-ballance the Evils of vio-[299]lating a tolerable Constitution, by anarbitrary act of Power, on the one hand; or by an Insurrection, or Civil
War, on the other. No Person, or State can be happy, where they do notthink their important Rights are 㛳 107m secur’d m 㛳 from the Cruelty, Avarice, Ambition, or Caprice of their Governours. Nor can any Magistracy
be safe, or effectual for the ends of its Institution, where there are frequent Terrors of Insurrections. Whatever temporary acts therefore may
be allow’d in extraordinary Cases; whatever may be lawful in the transitory act of a bold Legislator, who without previous Consent should
rescue a slavish Nation, and place their Affairs so in the Hands of a
Person, or Council, elected, or limited by themselves, that they should
soon have confidence in their own Safety, and in the Wisdom of the
Administration; yet, as to the fixed State which should ordinarily obtainin all Communitys, since no 㛳 108n Assumer n 㛳 of Government, can sodemonstrate his superior Wisdom or Goodness to the satisfaction andsecurity of the Governed, as is necessary to their Happiness; this must
follow, a 㛳 “That except when Men, for their own Interest, or out of㛳 109 publick Love㛳, have by Consent subjected their Actions, or theirGoods within certain Limits to the 㛳 110 Disposal㛳 of others; no Mortal
can have a Right from his superior Wisdom, or [300] Goodness, or any
other Quality, to give Laws to others without their Consent, express ortacit; or to dispose of the Fruits of their Labours, or of any other Rightwhatsoever.” 㛳 111 And therefore superior Wisdom, or Goodness, gives noRight to Men to govern others. b 㛳
But then with relation to the Deity, suppos’d omniscient and benev- Divine
olent, and secure from Indigence, the ordinary Cause of Injurys toward Government
founded onothers; it must be amiable in such a Being, to assume the Government Wisdom andof weak, inconstant Creatures, often misled by Selfishness; and to give Goodness.

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treatise ii

them Laws. To these Laws every Mortal should submit from publick
Love, as being contriv’d for the Good of the Whole, and for the greatest
private Good consistent with it; and 㛳 112 every one may be sure, that heshall be better directed how to attain these Ends by the Divine Laws,
than by his own greatest Prudence and㛳 Circumspection. Hence we
imagine, “That a good and wise God must have a perfect Right to govern
the Universe; and that all Mortals are oblig’d to universal Obedience.”
The Justice of the Deity is only a Conception of his universal imDivine Justicewhat.
partial Benevolence, as it shall influence him, if he gives any Laws, toattemper them to the universal Good, and inforce them with the [301]most effectual Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments.
Creation not
the Groundof God’s
Dominion.

XI. Some imagine that the Property the Creator has in all his Works,
must be the true Foundation of his Right to govern. ii Among Men indeed, we find it necessary for the publick Good, that none should arbitrarily dispose of the Goods, acquir’d by the Labour of another, which
we call his Property; and hence we imagine that Creation is the only
Foundation of God’s Dominion. But if the Reason㛳 114 *㛳 of establishing
the Rights of Property does not hold against a perfectly wise and benevolent Being, I see no Reason why Property should be necessary to
his Dominion. 㛳 115 Now㛳 the Reason does not hold: For an infinitely
wise and good Being, could never 㛳 116 employ his assumed Authority to㛳
counteract the universal Good. The tie of Gratitude is stronger indeed
than bare Benevolence; and therefore supposing two equally wise andgood Beings, the one our Creator, and the other not, we 㛳 117 should㛳
think our selves more oblig’d to obey our Creator. But supposing ourCreator malicious, 118 and a good Being condescending to rescue us, orgovern us better, with sufficient Power to accomplish his kind Intentions; his Right to govern would be perfectly good. But [302] this is rather
matter of curious Speculation than Use; since both Titles of Benevo113

ii. Compare John Locke’s criticism of Robert Filmer in Two Treatises of Government, Treatise 1, vol. 5, chap. 3, pp. 222ff., from The Works of John Locke, 10 vols.
(London, 1823).
* See Art. 10. Par. 6. of this Section.

section vii

197

lence and Property concur in the one only true Deity, as far as we canknow, join’d with infinite Wisdom and Power.
XII. If it be here enquir’d, “Could not the Deity have given us a dif- Our Moraltheferent or contrary determination of Mind, viz. to approve Actions upon Sense
Effect ofanother Foundation than Benevolence?” 㛳 120 It is certain, there is㛳 noth- the Divine
ing in this surpassing the natural Power of the Deity. But as in the first Goodness.
Treatise,* we resolv’d the Constitution of our present Sense of Beauty
into the divine Goodness, so with much more obvious Reason may weascribe the present Constitution of our moral Sense to his Goodness.
For if the Deity be really benevolent, 㛳 122 or delights in㛳 the Happinessof others, he could not rationally act otherwise, or give us a moral Sense
upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own benevolent
Intentions. For, 㛳 123 even㛳 upon the Supposition of a contrary Sense,
every rational Being must 㛳 124 still㛳 have been solicitous in some degree
about his own external Happiness: Reflection on the Circumstances ofMankind in this World would have suggested, 㛳 125 that㛳 universal Benevolence and a social Temper, 㛳 126 or a certain Course of external㛳 Actions,[303] would most effectually promote the external Good of every one,
according to the Reasonings of Cumberland and Puffendorf; while at thesame time this perverted Sense of Morality would have made us uneasy
in such a Course, and inclin’d us to the quite contrary, viz. Barbarity,
Cruelty, and Fraud; and universal War, according to Mr. 㛳 127 Hobbs㛳, iii
would really have been our natural State; so that in every Action we musthave been distracted by two contrary Principles, and perpetually miserable, and dissatisfy’d when we follow’d the Directions of either.
119

XIII. It has 㛳 129 often been㛳 taken for granted in these Papers, “That Whence thisthe Deity is morally good;” tho the Reasoning is not at all built upon universal
Opinion ofthis Supposition. If we 㛳 130 enquire into㛳 the Reason of the great Agree- the Divine
ment of Mankind in this Opinion, we shall perhaps find no demon- Goodness.
128* Sect. viii. Art. 2. 㛳 121 Prop.㛳 5.
iii. Hobbes, Leviathan, pt. 1, chaps. 13, 14, 15; pt. 2, chap. 17; in The English Worksof Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury; now first collected and edited by Sir William Molesworth, vol. 3 (London, 1839; Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1966).

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treatise ii

strative Arguments à priori, from the Idea of an Independent Being, toprove his Goodness. But there is abundant Probability, deduc’d fromthe whole Frame of Nature, which seems, as far as we know, plainly
contriv’d for the Good of the Whole; and the casual Evils seem the necessary Concomitants of some Mechanism design’d for 㛳 131 vastly㛳 prepollent Good. 㛳 132 Nay㛳, this very moral Sense, implanted in rational
Agents, to 㛳 133 delight in㛳, and admire whatever Actions flow from a[304] Study of the Good of others, is one of the strongest Evidences ofGoodness in the Author of Nature.
134
But these Reflections are 㛳 135 no way㛳 so universal as the Opinion,
nor are they often inculcated 㛳 136 by any one㛳. What then more probably
leads Mankind into that Opinion, is this. The obvious Frame of theWorld gives us Ideas of boundless Wisdom and Power in its Author.
Such a Being we cannot conceive indigent, and must conclude happy,
and in the best State possible, since he can still gratify himself. The best
State of rational Agents, and their greatest and most worthy Happiness,
we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in universal efficacious
Benevolence: and hence we conclude the Deity benevolent in the most
universal impartial manner. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves
the Name of Perfection 㛳 137 but㛳 Benevolence, and those Capacitys or
Abilitys which are necessary to make it effectual; such as Wisdom, andPower: at least we can have no 㛳 138 other valuable㛳 Conception of it.
FINIS.

textual notes

Title Page
1. A1, A3: In which the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are
Explain’d and Defended, against the Author of the Fable of the Bees: and theIdeas of Moral Good and Evil are establish’d, according to the Sentimentsof the Antient Moralists. With an Attempt to introduce a Mathematical Calculation in Subjects of Morality.
2. Not in A.

Dedication
3. Dedication not in A.
4. Omitted in D (p. vi).

Preface
5. A (p. iv): set
6. A (p. iv): about
7. In C and D always farther instead of further. Exception: further at the
beginning of a paragraph (C and D, p. 20 and p. 57).
8. A (p. iv): latter to be more
9. A (p. iv): these
10. A (p. iv): about
11. A (p. iv): see Reason to imagine
12. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 309]: are few Objects which are
13. A (p. v): shall find
14. C (p. xiii), D (p. xiii): commonly call
15. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 309]: certain complex Forms
16. C (p. xiii), D (p. xiii): approve
199

200

textual notes

17. C (p. xiv), D (p. xiv): Infirmities
18. A (p. vii): of Mankind could have
19. A (p. vii): may shew
20. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 309]: some
21. C (p. xiv), D (p. xiv): He has given us strong Affections to be theSprings of each virtuous Action; and made Virtue a lovely Form, that wemight easily distinguish it from its Contrary, and be made happy by the Pursuit of it.
22. A (p. vii): they are
23. D2, D3 (p. xv): private Interest
24. New paragraph in D2, D3 (p. xv).
25. D2, D3 (p. xv): It will perhaps be found, that the greater Part of theIngenious Arts are calculated to please some Natural Powers, pretty different
either from what we commonly call Reason, or the External Senses.
26. A (p. viii): is it
27. A (p. viii): perhaps will
28. A (p. viii): And we find to the full
29. D2, D3 (p. xvi): this
30. Not in A (p. viii).
31. A (p. ix): and thence
32. A (p. ix): do reflect
33. A (p. ix): And hence
34. A (p. ix): is full as
35. C (p. xvii), D (p. xvii): tho’ these Objects present themselves to ourObservation sooner than the other.
36. A (pp. ix–xi): Were not the Author diffident of his own Performance,
as too inconsiderable to have any great Names mention’d in it, he would havepublickly acknowledg’d his Obligations to a certain Lord (whose Namewould have had no small Authority [x] with the learned World) for admitting
him into his Acquaintance, and giving him some Remarks in Conversation,
which have very much improv’d these Papers beyond what they were at first.
The Author might have found good Materials for a modern Dedication fromthe active parts of his Life, as well as from his Learning and Reflection; but
he knows him to be one of that sort,
Cui male si palpere, recalcitrat undique tutus.*
And therefore, when they come to his Hands again, he only repeats to him
the old Dedication with which he first presented them ———contents

201——— Si quid ego adjuvero, curamve levasso,
Si quae te coquat, aut verset in pectore fixa,
Jam pretium tulerim.†———The same Consideration hinders the Author from Mentioning a Clergyman, to whom he was much oblig’d for revising these Papers, and for somevaluable Remarks. That Gentleman’s Character is further known for every
Quality becoming [xi] his Office, than the Author can well presume his Papers ever shall be; and therefore he thinks he can do him no honour by mentioning him.
*Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. I. v. 20. [Translation: “Who, being flattered clumsily, kicks back,protected from all sides.”]†Cicero de Senectute, in initio. [Editor’s note: The exact quotation does not exist
in any known Cicero text. The original lines read as follows: “si quid ego adiuero
curamve levasso quae nunc te coquit et versat in pectore fixa, ecquid erit praemi.”
Translation: “should some aid of mine dispel / The cares that now within thy bosom
dwell / And wring thy heart and torture thee with pain, / What then would be themeasure of thy gain.” (Cicero, De senectute, De amicitia, De divinatione, with an
English translation by William Armistad Falconer, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 8.)]

37. A (p. xi): the Author’s Performance, he
38. Not in A (p. xi). C (pp. xxi–xxii), D1 (p. xxi–xxii), D2, D3 (p. xxi): In[C (p. xxi): this third Edition] [D1 (p. xxi): this Edition] [D2, D3 (p. xxi):
the later Editions], what Alterations are made, are partly owing to the Objections of some Gentlemen, who wrote very keenly against several Principles
in this Book. The Author was convinc’d of some inaccurate Expressions,which are now alter’d; and some Arguments, he hopes, are now made clearer:
but he has not yet seen Cause to renounce any of the Principles maintain’din it. Nor is there any thing of Consequence added, except in Sect. II. of
Treatise 2d; and the same Reasoning is found in Sect. I. of the Essay on the
Passions.
D1 (p. xxi): In this [C (p. xxi): Third] [D2, D3 (p. xxi): 4th] Edition there
are Additions interspersed, to prevent Objections which have been publishedagainst this Scheme by several Authors; and some Mathematical Expressions
are left out, which upon second Thoughts, appear’d useless, and were disagreeable to some Readers.

Contents
39. C and D: relative or comparative

202

textual notes

Treatise I, Section I
1. Divisional title page not in C and D.
2. D (p. 1): An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and
Virtue. Treatise I. Of Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.
3. In A: Arabic numerals in Treatise I.
4. A (p. 1): that
5. In A: No marginal headings in Treatise I and Treatise II.
6. C (p. 2), D (p. 2): great
7. A (p. 2): that
8. Omitted in C (p. 2), D (p. 2).
9. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 309]: Corporeal Substances
10. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 309]: raise a clear enough Idea
11. A (p. 3): that
12. A (p. 3): he has not received any of these Ideas, or wants the Senses
necessary for the Perception of them, no Definition can ever raise in him any
Idea of that Sense in which he is deficient.
13. A (pp. 3–4): articles V and VI are interchanged. Instructions for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 3).
14. Not in A (p. 4).
15. Not in A (p. 4).
16. Not in A (p. 4). Instructions for alteration already in Alterations andAdditions (p. 3).
17. Not in A (p. 4).
18. Not in A (p. 5), C (p. 5).
19. A (p. 5): Aversion to
20. Omitted in C (p. 5), D (p. 5).
21. Not in A (p. 5).
22. A (p. 5): towards
23. Not in A (p. 5).
24. Addition already in Alterations and Additions (p. 3).
25. Alterations and Additions (p. 3): will
26. A (p. 5): in our Dress, and some other Affairs; and yet this may arise
from a like accidental Conjunction of Ideas: as for instance,
27. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 309]: including
28. Deleted in B [Errata, p. xxvi], C (p. 5), D (p. 6).
29. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: appears no
30. Not in A (p. 6).

treatise i, section i

203

31. Not in A (p. 6).
32. A (p. 6): that
33. C (p. 6), D (p. 6): many
34. C (p. 6), D (p. 6): far
35. A (p. 6): rising
36. Not in A (p. 7).
37. A (p. 8): relish
38. A (p. 8): wou’d
39. A (p. 8): Affairs
40. New paragraph added in D2, D3 (p. 9): We generally imagine thebrute Animals endowed with the same sort of Powers of Perception as ourExternal Senses, and having sometimes greater Acuteness in them: but weconceive few or none of them with any of these sublimer Powers of Perception here call’d Internal Senses; or at least if some of them have them, it isin a Degree much inferior to ours.
41. C (p. 9), D (p. 9): hereafter
42. D2, D3 (p. 10): Let one consider, first, That ’tis probable a Being may
have the full Power of External Sensation, which we enjoy, so as to perceive
each Colour, Line, Surface, as we do; yet, without the Power of comparing,or of discerning the Similitudes or Proportions: Again, It might discernthese
also, and yet have no Pleasure or Delight Accompanying these Perceptions.
The bare Idea of the Form is something separable from Pleasure, as may
appear from the different Tastes of men about the Beauty of Forms, where
we don’t imagine that they differ in any Ideas, either of the Primary or Secundary Qualities. Similitude, Proportion, Analogy, or Equality of Proportion, are Objects of the Understanding, and must be actually known before
we know the natural Causes of our Pleasure. But Pleasure perhaps is notnecessarily connected with the Perception of them: and may be felt where
the Proportion is not known or attended to: and may not be felt where the
Proportion is observed.
43. A (p. 9): imagine to be in
44. C (p. 10): much
45. A (p. 9): Sense
46. Not in A (p. 9).
47. A (p. 9): to receive
48. D2, D3 (p. 10): may often
49. Not in A (p. 10).
50. D2, D3 (p. 11): not numbered.

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textual notes

51. D2, D3 (p. 11): is different
52. D2, D3 (p. 11): we are struck at the first with the
53. Footnote in A (p. 10): *See above, Art. 5.
54. D2, D3 (p. 11): may bring along that peculiar kind of Pleasure, which
attends
55. D2, D3 (p. 11): numbered XIII.
56. Not in A (p. 10).
57. D2, D3 (p. 12): numbered XIV.
58. Omitted in C (p. 12), D (p. 12).
59. A (p. 11): of even
60. Omitted in C (p. 13), D (p. 13).
61. Omitted in C (p. 13), D (p. 13).
62. D2, D3 (p. 13): but cannot
63. A (p. 12): Meats
64. A (p. 12): that were
65. C (p. 13), D (p. 13): The same holds true of
66. C (p. 13), D (p. 13): Interest
67. Omitted in C (p. 13), D (p. 13).
68. D2, D3 (p. 13): numbered XV.
69. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 13).
70. A (p. 12): that
71. C (p. 13), D1 (p. 13): And Custom, Education, or Example, could
never
D2, D3 (pp. 13–14): ’Tis true, what chiefly pleases in the Countenance, are the Indications of Moral Dispositions; and yet were we by thelongest Acquaintance fully convinc’d of the best Moral Dispositions in any
Person, with that Countenance we now think deform’d, this would neverhinder our immediate Dislike of the Form, or our liking other Forms more:
And Custom, Education, or Example, [p. 14] could never
72. A (p. 13): 6
73. XVI.
74. D2, D3 (p. 14): Beauty, in Corporeal Forms,
75. A (p. 13): noted
76. A (p. 13): that
77. A (p. 13): Heat
78. A (p. 13): that
79. C (p. 13), D (p. 14): otherwise
80. A (p. 14): that

treatise i, section ii

205

81. A (p. 14): Pleasure as
82. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 15).

Treatise I, Section II
1. A (p. 15): that
2. A (p. 15): that
3. Not in A (p. 15).
4. C (p. 16), D (p. 16): for there are many
5. C (p. 16), D (p. 16): and yet
6. Omitted in C (p. 16), D (p. 16).
7. A (p. 15): that
8. A (p. 16): that
9. A (p. 16): that shall be touched at* afterwards. [Same footnote.]
10. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: may seem probable, and hold pretty
generally.
11. Not in A (p. 18). Instruction for addition already in Alterations andAdditions (p. 4).
12. A (p. 17): which yet is
13. Not in C (p. 18), D (p. 18).
14. C (p. 19), D (p. 19): former
15. Omitted in C (p. 19), D (p. 19).
16. Omitted in C (p. 19), D (p. 19).
17. C (p. 19), D (p. 19): surprizing
18. Not in A (p. 18).
19. A (pp. 18–19): the [19] Structure, and Order
20. C (p. 20), D (p. 20): great
21. A (p. 19): and22. No new paragraph in A (p. 19).
23. C (p. 21), D (p. 21): Thus
24. A (p. 20): various
25. C (p. 22), D (p. 22): great
26. C (p. 22), D (p. 22): how near the
27. C (p. 22), D (p. 22): in brackets.
28. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: minuter Parts, even of those,
29. Not in A (p. 21).
30. C (p. 22), D (p. 22): a very great
31. C (p. 22), D (p. 22): great206

textual notes

32. A (p. 21): or Leaf
33. Not in A (p. 21).
34. A (p. 21): shall spring
35. A (p. 21): shall sprout
36. C (p. 23), D (p. 23): each
37. Not in A (p. 22).
38. C (p. 23), D (p. 23): surprizing
39. A (p. 22): that
40. C (p. 24), D (p. 24): how universal is that Beauty which
41. Not in A (p. 23).
42. C (p. 25), D (p. 25): Mind. In Motion there is also a natural Beauty,
when at fixed Periods like Gestures and Steps are regularly repeated, suiting
the Time and Air of Music, which is observed in regular Dancing.
43. Not in A (p. 24).
44. C (p. 26), D (p. 26): great
45. C (p. 26), D (p. 26): considerable
46. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: and frequently
47. A (p. 25): Chords
48. A (p. 26): every second Vibration [Instruction for alteration alreadyin Alterations and Additions (p. 4).]
49. A (p. 26): Chords. Now good Compositions, beside the Frequencyof these Chords, must retain a general Unity of Key, an Uniformity
among the Parts in Bars, Risings, Fallings, Closes. The Necessity of this willappear, by observing the Dissonance which would arise from tacking Partsof different Tunes together as one, altho both were separately agreeable. A
greater
50. Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (p. 4).
51. Alterations and Additions (p. 4): an artificial
52. Not in A (p. 26), and no new paragraph. Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 4–5).
53. Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 4).
54. A (p. 26): afterwards
55. New footnote in D2, D3 (p. 29): *There is nothing singular in applying the Word Beauty to Sounds. The Antients observe the peculiar Dignityof the Senses of Seeing and Hearing, that in their Objects we discern thekalòn [beauty], which we don’t ascribe to the Objects of the other Senses.
56. D1 (p. 29): theD2, D3 (p. 29): thesetreatise i, section iii

207

Treatise I, Section III
1. A (p. 27): because
2. D2, D3 (p. 30): a Multitude
3. Omitted in D (p. 31).
4. A (p. 28, wrongly numbered p. 21): Thus also one Fluxional Calculation shall determine the Tangents of all Algebraick Curves; of these Curves
there are infinite Orders and Species possible[,] of each Species infinite Sizes,or Magnitudes of Areas, of each Size infinite Individuals, of each Individual
Curve an Infinity of Points, from which Tangents may be drawn. But all these
Infinitys of Infinites are exactly comprehended in the general Theorem,
which fixes the Lengths of the Subtangents, or their Proportion to the Abscissa. [Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 5).]
5. D2, D3 (p. 31): find a like
6. D2, D3 (p. 31): many
7. D2, D3 (p. 31): innumerable
8. A (p. 28, wrongly numbered p. 21): which we are in [Omitted in D2,
D3 (p. 31).]
9. D2, D3 (p. 31): are only
10. D1 (p. 32): makeD2, D3 (p. 32): take
11. A (p. 29): Because however
12. A (p. 29): does contain
13. A (p. 29), C (p. 32), D (p. 32): of
14. D1 (p. 32): or
D2, D3 (p. 32): and15. Paragraph not in A (p. 29). Instruction for addition of this paragraphalready in Alterations and Additions (pp. 5–6).
16. Alterations and Additions (p. 5): does also bisect
17. Alterations and Additions (p. 6): also
18. Alterations and Additions (p. 6): Joy
19. C (p. 33), D (p. 33): Truth. Another kind of Surprize in certain Theorems increases our Pleasure above that we have in Theorems of greater Extent; when we discover a general Truth, which upon some confused Notion
we had reputed false: as that Asymptotes always approaching should never meet
the Curve. This is like the Joy of unexpected Advantage where we dreaded
Evil. But still the Unity of many Particulars in the general Theorem is necessary to give Pleasure in any Theorem.

208

textual notes

20. A (p. 29): which cannot be omitted; which is this [Omitted in C
(p. 34), D1 (p. 34), D2, D3 (p. 33).]
21. A (p. 29): shall contain
22. C (p. 34), D1 (p. 34), D2, D3 (p. 33): great
23. D2, D3 (p. 33): there are some leading, or fundamental Propertys,
upon which a long Series of theorems can be naturally built
24. Not in D2, D3 (p. 34).
25. Not in A (p. 30).
26. D2, D3 (p. 34): others in higher Parts of Geometry
27. No new paragraph in A (p. 30), D2, D3 (p. 34).
28. D2, D3 (p. 34): What is the Aim of our ingenious Geometers? A continual Inlargement of theorems, or making them extensive, shewing how
what was formerly known of one Figure extends to many others, to Figuresvery unlike the former in Appearance.
29. A (p. 31): Advantage in Life
30. A (p. 31): besides
31. A (p. 31): Whimsys
32. C (p. 35), D (p. 35): an Affectation
33. D2, D3 (p. 35): pleaded
34. D2, D3 (p. 35): boasts
35. Without footnote in A (p. 31). Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 35).
36. D2, D3 (p. 35): see
37. A (p. 32): Dr. Cumberland has taken a great deal of needless Pains to
reduce the Laws of Nature to one general practical Proposition; and how
38. D2, D3 (p. 35): does Puffendorf
39. A (p. 32): As if they had not been better drawn, each respectively,fromtheir immediate Sources, viz. Religion, Self-Love, and Sociableness.
40. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 35).
41. C (p. 36), D1 (p. 36), D2, D3 (p. 35): perceive the Beauty of
42. A (p. 32): notwithstanding the Contortions of Common Sense they
may be led into by pursuing it
D2, D3 (p. 36): since they are led into unnatural Deductions by pursuing it too far
43. D2, D3 (p. 36) add note: *Aristotle (Ethic. Nicom. I. ro. c. 3. [NE, X
2, 1174a 4–8]) justly observes, that we have certain natural Propensitys to certain Actions, or to the Exercise of certain natural Powers, without a View to,or Intention of, obtaining those Pleasures which naturally accompany them.
Perì pollà spoudh̀n poihsaímeja a‹n, kaì ei◊ mhdemían e◊piféroi hÿdonh́n, oiﬂontreatise i, section iv

209o◊ra÷n, mnhmoneúein, ei◊dénai, tàc a◊retàc e⁄xein• ei◊ d’ e◊q a◊nágkhc e¤pontai toutoic hÿdonaì, ou◊dèn diaférei• eÿloímeja gàr a‹n tau÷ta, kaì ei◊ mh̀ génoit’ a‹n a◊p’
au◊tw÷n hÿdonh́. [Translation: “Also there are many things which we should be
eager to possess even if they brought us no pleasure, for instance sight, memory, knowledge, virtue. It may be the case that these things are necessarily
attended by pleasure, but that makes no difference; for we should desire themeven if no pleasure resulted from them.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, withan English translation by H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 588.]
44. A (p. 33): that
45. Article not in A (p. 33), C (p. 37), D1 (p. 37), D2, D3 (pp. 36–37). Instruction for addition of the entire paragraph (without numeration and without footnote) already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 6–7).
46. A (p. 33): wrongly numbered VI. In C (p. 37), D (p. 37): numberedVII.
47. Not in A (p. 33).
48. A (p. 33): to be constantly
49. C (p. 37), D (p. 37): great
50. Not in A (p. 34).
51. D2, D3 (p. 38): the52. A (p. 34): numbered VII; C (p. 38), D (p. 38): numbered VIII.
53. A (p. 34): shall appear

Treatise I, Section IV
1. No new paragraph in A (p. 35).
2. C (p. 40), D (p. 40): represented. Nay, perhaps the Novelty may
make us prefer the Representation of Irregularity.
3. Omitted in D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310].
4. A (p. 36): not out of choice
5. A (p. 36): the finest Characters possible for Virtue
6. B [Errata, p. xxvi]: whom
7. D1, D2, D3 (p. 41): Simile
8. D1, D2, D3 (p. 41): Similes
9. B [Errata, p. xxvi]: of those which seem very remote
C (p. 42), D (p. 42): of those which are very different from each other
10. Not in A (p. 38).
11. D (p. 43): of210

textual notes

12. B [Errata, p. xxvi], C (p. 43): Artificers
D (p. 43): Artificer
13. B [Errata, p. xxvi]: themC (p. 43), D (p. 43): him
14. A (p. 39): Work
15. A (p. 41): We may only here observe the Pleasure which any one shallreceive from
16. A (p. 41): as also that pleasant Sensation he shall have
17. New footnote in D2, D3 [Corrigenda, pp. 305–6]: *’Tis surprising to
see the ingenious Author of Alciphron i alledging, that all Beauty observed issolely some Use perceived or imagined; for no other Reason than this, that
the Apprehension of the Use intended, occurs continually, when we are judging of the Forms of Chairs, Doors, Tables, and some other Things of obvious
Use; and that we like those Forms most, which are fittest for the Use. Whereas
we see, that in these very Things Similitude of parts is regarded, where unlike
Parts would be equally useful: thus the Feet of a Chair would be of the sameUse, tho’ unlike, were they equally long; tho’ one were strait, and the otherbended; or one bending outwards, and the other inwards: A Coffin-shape fora Door would bear a more manifest Aptitude to the human Shape, than thatwhich Artists require. And then what is the Use of these Imitations of Nature,
or of its Works, in Architecture? Why should a Pillar please which has someof the Human Proportions? Is the End or Use of a Pillar the same as of a
Man? Why the Imitation of other natural or well-proportioned Things in
the Entablature? Is there then a Sense of Imitation, relishing it where there
is no other Use than this, that it naturally pleases? Again; Is no Man pleased
with the Shapes of any Animals, but those which he expects Use from? The
Shapes of the Horse or the Ox may promise [306] Use to the Owner; but is
he the only Person who relishes the Beauty? And is there no Beauty discernedin Plants, in Flowers, in Animals, whose Use is to us unknown? But what isstill more surprising, is his representing Aristotle as giving the e◊painetón[laudable], for the Notion of the kalòn [beauty]: when he has so often told
us, “that the kalòn is prior to it; that we love Praise from others, as it gives
Testimony to, and confirms our Opinion of, our being possessed of Virtue,or the kalòn; and that the superior Excellency of this, which we antecedently
perceive, is the Reason why we love Praise.” See Ethic. Ad Nicom. Lib. i. c.
5.ii and often elsewhere. ’Tis true that the kalòn is laudable, and, as Plato
asserts, all-wise, hÿdù, kaì w◊félimon [the pleasant and the profitable] at last;and so does every one maintain who asserts a Moral Sense, in that very As-

treatise i, section v

211

sertion. And yet the Doctor has found out the Art of making this an Objection to Moral Sense.
i. George Berkeley, Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher, in The Works of George
Berkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, vol. 3 (London, 1950), Third Dialogue,
sects. 4–12, pp. 118–32.
ii. Hutcheson paraphrases Aristotle and Plato using another paraphrase in Berkeley’s Alciphron, p. 118. The passage indicated reads “men’s motive in pursuing honour
seems to be to assure themselves of their own merit.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,trans. and ed. H. Rackham [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937], p. 15;
NE I 3, 1095b 22ff.); compare Plato, Alcibiades, II, 145c.

Treatise I, Section V
1. A (p. 42): antecedently
2. A (p. 42): may possibly
3. A (p. 42): do not seem
4. C (p. 46), D (p. 46): hereafter
5. A (p. 42): possible,
6. A (p. 43): This Expression is taken from the Cartesian Scheme, inwhich the Author of Nature is supposed to have designedly impress’d a general Force or Conatus ad motum upon the Mass of Matter, without any Direction whatsoever. This nonsensical Notion did so much prevail, and men
have so many confused Conceptions of Nature and Chance, as real Beings
operating without Wisdom or Design, that it may be useful to shew that theirvery absurd Postulatum is wholly insufficient, tho it were granted them, toanswer the Appearances in the Regularity of the World. And this is what is
attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section.
7. B [Errata, p. xxvi], C (p. 47), D (p. 47): The
8. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: below our Notice
9. Deleted in B [Errata, p. xxvi]. Printed again in C (p. 47), D (p.
47): possible
10. Not in A (p. 43).
11. A (p. 43): It is also certain that there is
12. A (p. 43): may
13. A (p. 44): shall be
14. A (p. 44): shall
15. No new paragraph in A (p. 44).
16. A (p. 44): Positions
17. A (p. 45): and hence

212

textual notes

18. Not in A (p. 45).
19. A (p. 45): Whereas if different Senses of Beauty be in other Agents,
20. C (p. 50), D (p. 50): not immediately
21. Omitted in C (p. 50), D (p. 50).
22. A (p. 46): offered
23. A (p. 46): cubick Inches solid Content
C (p. 51), D (p. 51): Parts whose solid Contents were each a cubick
Inch
24. A (p. 47): that
25. A (p. 47): meet
26. A (p. 47): Design as producing them,
27. A (p. 47): the28. C (p. 51), D (p. 51): not
29. A (p. 47): are an infinity of other Forms possible, we could only expect from the casual Concourse of such a Mass as was suppos’d in the lastCase, one Prism of any Kind, since there are an Infinity of other Solids
possible
30. A (p. 47): Presumption for
31. A (p. 48): in this Affair but an undirected Force of Attraction
suppos’d
32. A (p. 48): given to
33. A (p. 48): shall
34. A (p. 49): even after
35. Not in A (p. 49).
36. A (p. 50): as is that of
37. A (p. 50): do determine
38. A (p. 51): might possibly
39. D (p. 55): does to
40. A (p. 52): are at least still an infinity
41. D2, D3 (p. 57): in
42. Not in A (p. 53).
43. D2, D3 (p. 57): infinites
44. D2, D3 (p. 57): arising daily in such Numbers in all Parts of the Earthwith such Similarity of Structure, should be the Effect of Chance, is beyond
all Conception or Expression.
45. Not in A (p. 54).
46. C (p. 58), D (p. 58): great
47. A (p. 54): like totreatise i, section v

213

48. A (p. 54): as it
49. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 58).
50. A (p. 55), C (p. 58), D (p. 58): should
51. A (p. 55): wrongly numbered 12. The following articles of this section
wrongly numbered accordingly.
52. A (p. 55): only judge
53. Omitted in C (p. 59), D (p. 59).
54. C (p. 59), D (p. 59): might be retained
55. A (p. 56): numbered 13.
56. Not in A (p. 56).
57. A (p. 56): shall
58. A (p. 56): Minutes perhaps
59. A (p. 56): also are
60. A (p. 56): varying
61. A (p. 57): numbered 14.
62. C (p. 61), D (p. 61): sensibly different gross
63. Entire article not in A (p. 58). Instruction for addition of the entire
paragraph (without numeration) already in Alterations and Additions(pp. 7–8).
64. Alterations and Additions (p. 7): further
65. Alterations and Additions (p. 7): an
66. Alterations and Additions (p. 7): man
67. Alterations and Additions (p. 8): 1000 to 1
68. C (p. 63), D (p. 63): may
69. Alterations and Additions (p. 8): all moral
70. Alterations and Additions (p. 8): Art, or Wisdom
71. A (p. 58): numbered 15.
72. A (p. 58): when he is not
73. A (p. 59): designed plainly
74. Not in A (p. 59).
75. A (p. 59): numbered 16.
76. C (p. 65), D (p. 65): Agents
77. C (p. 65), D (p. 65): them
78. No new paragraph in A (p. 60).
79. C (p. 65), D (p. 65): great
80. A (p. 61): numbered 17.
81. Omitted in C (p. 66), D (p. 66).
82. Omitted in C (p. 66), D (p. 66).

214

textual notes

83. D (p. 67): an Uniformity,
84. A (p. 62): numbered 18.
85. A (p. 62): may perhaps* afterwards. [Footnote identical.]
86. A (p. 62): may possibly
87. A (p. 62): numbered 19.
88. A (p. 63): And yet
89. Not in A (p. 63).
90. A (p. 64): the91. A (p. 64): numbered 20.

Treatise I, Section VI
1. A (p. 65): the
2. A (p. 65): which
3. A (p. 65): if
4. No new paragraph in A (p. 65).
5. A (p. 66): for
6. C (p. 71), D (p. 71): now call
7. D (p. 71): a positive
8. Omitted in C (p. 72), D (p. 72).
9. A (p. 67): what wereC (p. 72), D (p. 72): if any thing were
10. Not in A (p. 67).
11. A (p. 67): towards
12. A (p. 67): these
13. A (p. 67): in ravenous
14. A (p. 68): afterwards
15. A (p. 68), C (p. 73), D (p. 73): Swine
16. A (p. 68): there is no
17. A (p. 69): do further extend their
18. Not in A (p. 69).
19. A (p. 69): not capable
20. Not in A (p. 69).
21. A (p. 69): Conveniency
22. A (p. 69): Time and Labour
23. C (p. 75), D (p. 75): might here
24. A (p. 70): or Eyes
25. A (p. 70): be howevertreatise i, section vii
26. A (p. 70): often may
27. No new paragraph in A (p. 71).
28. A (p. 71): some of the
29. A (p. 71): Regularity and Beauty
30. C (p. 76), D (p. 76): our Imaginations
31. Omitted in C (p. 77), D (p. 77).
32. A (p. 73): shall
33. C (p. 78), D (p. 78): rejected
34. A (p. 74): Advantage, or
35. Not in A (p. 75).
36. A (p. 77): Key,
37. No new paragraph in A (p. 78).
38. A (p. 78): conjoin’dTreatise I, Section VII
1. C (p. 84), D (p. 84): Species
2. A (p. 80): no Custom could
3. A (p. 80): will
4. A (p. 80): the Taste
5. A (p. 80): different Sense from what
6. A (p. 80): like such as proved
7. A (p. 81): no Custom would
8. A (p. 81): were
9. A (p. 82): could
10. A (p. 82): necessarily the
11. Not in A (p. 82).
12. A (p. 82): when in reality the Object has
13. A (p. 83): Meats
14. A (p. 83): hear perhaps
15. A (p. 83): they
16. Not in A (p. 83).
17. A (p. 83): never could
18. Not in A (p. 84).
19. A (p. 84): repeat our Attention to
20. A (p. 84): shall
21. A (p. 85): seeing them
22. A (p. 86): hence are

215

216

textual notes

23. A (p. 86): which we had an Aversion to
24. A (p. 86): Sense of Beauty or Harmony naturally
25. A (p. 87): without Examination conclude,
26. A (p. 87): And often
27. Not in A (p. 87).
28. Not in A (p. 87).
29. C (p. 92), D (p. 92): a livelier
30. A (p. 87): Ideas of Beauty
31. A (p. 87): when they do not perceive themC (p. 92), D (p. 92): than in reality they have

Treatise I, Section VIII
1. Entire paragraph not in A (p. 89). Instruction for addition of the entire
paragraph already in Alterations and Additions (p. 9).
2. Omitted in C (p. 94), D (p. 94).
3. Alterations and Additions (p. 9): greatest
4. C (p. 94), D (p. 94): are
5. Not in C (p. 94), D (p. 94).
6. A (p. 89): Effect
7. C (p. 96), D (p. 96): is imagined
8. A (p. 90): Beside
9. Omitted in C (p. 96), D (p. 96).
10. A (p. 91): fitted
11. A (p. 91): Foundations
12. No new paragraph in A (p. 91).
13. A (p. 91): of
14. C (p. 97), D (p. 97): us
15. A (p. 92): to this Manner
16. A (p. 93): Circle pretty nearly
17. C (p. 99), D (p. 99): thus also other Figures, if they have any Regularity, are in every Point determined
18. A (p. 93): the last
19. A (p. 93): but equal in Use with
20. Not in A (p. 94).
21. A (p. 94): antecedently
22. A (p. 94): between the
23. C (p. 100), D (p. 100): no immediatetreatise ii, introduction

217

24. D (p. 100): Object
25. A (p. 94): one in its own Species
26. C (p. 100), D (p. 100): far
27. A (p. 94): their peculiar Beautys, than with the Beautys of a different
Species
28. Omitted in C (p. 100), D (p. 100). In D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310] thisfootnote follows: *See Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib. I. c. 27.
29. A (p. 94): . This present Constitution is much more
30. A (p. 95): singular
31. A (p. 96): not numbered.
32. A (p. 96): Diversitys
33. C (p. 102), D (p. 102): have determined
34. C (p. 102), D (p. 102): stupendous
35. A (p. 96): that manner which should be
36. A (p. 97): this in
37. A (p. 97): a further Reason from a Sense still
38. A (p. 97): nor
39. Not in A (p. 97). Instruction for addition already in Alterations andAdditions (pp. 9–10).
40. Alterations and Additions (p. 10): Effect
41. Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 10).
42. Not in A (p. 97), C (p. 103), D (p. 103). Instruction for addition in
Alterations and Additions (p. 10): End of the first Treatise.

Treatise II, Introduction
1. Separate leaf in B with pagination 109. Entire page omitted in C and
D. D (p. 105): The title “Treatise II.” is displayed on the top of the first pageof the text.
2. Not in A (p. 101).
3. C (p. 104), D (p. 105): attended with Desire of the Agent’s Happiness.
4. C (p. 104), D (p. 105): Condemnation or Dislike. Approbation andCondemnation are probably simple Ideas, which cannot be farther explained.
5. A (p. 101): some general Foundation of
6. C (p. 105), D (p. 106): Approbation and Good-will
7. C (p. 105), D (p. 106): these
8. Omitted in C (p. 105), D (p. 106).

218

textual notes

9. C (p. 105), D (p. 106): Approbation or Good-will
10. C (p. 105), D (p. 106): Dislike
11. Omitted in C (p. 105), D (p. 106).
12. Omitted in A (p. 102), C (p. 105), D (p. 106).
13. A (p. 103): them
14. A (p. 103): immediately; and such
15. Not in A (p. 103).
16. C (p. 108), D (p. 109): And
17. C (p. 108), D (p. 109): arising from reflection upon
18. C (p. 108), D (p. 109): arises from Reflection upon the Action, orsome other future advantage.
19. C (p. 109), D (p. 110): approve the Actions of others, and perceive
them to be their Perfection and Dignity, and are determin’d to love the Agent;a like Perception we have in reflecting on such Actions of our own
20. C (p. 109), D (p. 110): That the Affection Desire, or Intention, whichgains Approbation to the Actions flowing from it, is not an Intention to obtain even this sensible Pleasure [D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 310) substitutes“pleasant Self-Approbation” for “sensible Pleasure” and wrongly attributes
the alteration to p. 109].
21. C (p. 109), D (p. 110): from Self-Love, or Desire of private Good.

Treatise II, Section I
1. C (p. 110), D (p. 111): the Sensations and Affections
2. C (p. 111), D (p. 112): approve or love
3. C (p. 111), D (p. 112): us, or to any other Person
4. C (p. 111), D (p. 112): they study the Interest, and desire the Happinessof other Beings with whom they converse. [In A the text following this passage is not an independent paragraph.]
5. A (p. 108): Esteem
C (p. 111), D (p. 112): Approbation
6. Not in A (p. 108).
7. C (p. 111), D (p. 112): Approbation
8. A (p. 109): which
9. C (p. 112), D (p. 113): from an ultimate Desire of our Happiness, orGood-will toward us;
10. A (p. 109): independently
11. Footnote not in A (p. 109).

treatise ii, section i

219

12. A (p. 109): or
13. C (p. 112), D (p. 113): on both Occasions
14. C (p. 113), D (p. 114): Condemnation
15. A (p. 110): done toward
16. Not in A (p. 110).
17. A (p. 110): requires
18. Not in A (p. 110).
19. A (p. 110): which do not affect our selves, but other Persons,
20. A (p. 110): pleas’d with any
21. C (p. 113), D (p. 114): merely because
22. C (p. 114), D (p. 115): an ultimate Desire of
23. C (p. 114), D (p. 115): from Ill-will, Desire of the Misery of others
without view to any prevalent Good to the Publick
24. A (p. 111): that of
25. A (p. 111): beneficent Actions toward themC (p. 114), D (p. 115): Actions which shew Good-will toward them
26. C (p. 114), D (p. 115): which makes benevolent Actions appear Beautiful
27. C (p. 115), D (p. 116): approve or condemn
28. Not in A (p. 112).
29. Inserted here in C (p. 115), D (p. 116): Would not the Parsimony ofa Miser be as advantageous to his Heir, as the Generosity of a worthy Man
is to his Friend? And cannot we as easily imagine ourselves Heirs to Misers,
as the Favourites of Heroes? Why don’t we then approve both alike?
30. Not in A (p. 112).
31. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, pp. 306–7] add: As Mr. Hobbes explains all the
Sensations of Pity by our Fear of the like Evils [Editor’s note: Leviathan,pt. 1, chap. 6], when by Imagination we place ourselves in the Case of the
Sufferers; so others explain all Approbation and Condemnation of Actions
in distant Ages or Nations, by a like Effort of Imagination: We place ourselves in the Case of others, and then discern an imaginary private Advantage
or Disadvantage in these Actions. But as his Account of Pity will never explain
how the Sensation increases, according to the apprehended Worth of the
Sufferer, or according to the Affection we formerly had to him; since theSufferings of any Stranger may suggest the same Possibility of our Suffering
the like: So this Explication will ne[v]er account for our high Approbationof brave unsuccessful Attempts, which we see prove detr[i]mental both to
the Agent, and to those for [307] whose Service they were intended; here there

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textual notes

is no private Advantage to be imagined. Nor will it account for our Abhorrence of such Injuries as we are incapable of suffering. Sure, when a Man
abhors the Attempt of the young Tarquin, he does not imagine that he haschang’d his Sex like Caeneus. And then, when one corrects his Imagination,
by remembring his own Situation, and Circumstances, we find the moral
Approbation and Condemnation continues as lively as it was before, tho’ the
Imagination of Advantage is gone. [Editor’s note: According to legend, Sextus, son of Tarquinius Superbus, raped Lucretia, sparking off the popular
uprising that ended the Roman monarchy and ushered in the Roman republic. Caeneus, a mythical figure, was originally a woman and given achange of sex by Poseidon.]
32. C (p. 116), D (p. 117): Agents? Thus also an easy, indolent Simplicity,which exposes a Man of Wealth as a prey to others, may be as advantageous
a Disposition as the most prudent Generosity, to those he converses with;and yet our Sentiments of this latter Temper are far nobler than of the former.
33. A (p. 113): and increase
34. No new paragraph in A (p. 114).
35. C (p. 118), D (p. 119): to judge certain Actions advantageous to us
36. No new paragraph in A (p. 115).
37. A (p. 115): did certainly perform
38. C (p. 118), D (p. 119): recommend Men to us only
39. Omitted in C (p. 119), D (p. 120).
40. No new paragraph in A (p. 116).
41. A (p. 117): more probably
42. C (p. 121), D (p. 122): hereafter
43. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: any Dispositions of Piety, or Thoughtsof future Rewards
44. No new paragraph in A (p. 118).
45. Omitted in C (p. 122), D (p. 123).
46. C (p. 122), D (p. 123): recommend to me
47. C (p. 122), D (p. 123): make me like
48. Not in A (p. 119).
49. A (p. 119): is, “whether
50. A (p. 119): I may
51. Not in A (p. 119).
52. Not in A (p. 119).
53. A (p. 119): . The Sense of the moral Good, or Evil, cannot be overballanced by Interest.

treatise ii, section i

221

54. C (p. 123), D (p. 124): Threatnings
55. A (p. 119): any Actions, such
56. D (p. 124): an
57. No new paragraph in A (p. 120).
58. A (p. 121): in the Contemplation or Reflection upon which they could
be pleas’d.
59. C (p. 124), D (p. 125): Pleasure. Nay, what should excite a Cato or a
Decius to desire Praise, if it is only the cold Opinion of others that they were
useful to the State, without any Perception of Excellence in such Conduct?
60. A (p. 121): but in so
61. Not in A (p. 122).
62. C (p. 126), D (p. 127): sincerely approve and63. C (p. 126), D (p. 127): Approbation of publick Spirit, nor Desire
64. C (p. 127), D (p. 128): private advantage
65. A (p. 123): abstractly from
66. A (p. 124): so
67. A (p. 124): Ideas, or
68. C (p. 128), D (p. 129): the simple Ideas of Approbation or Condemnation, from Actions observed
69. A (p. 124): they shall
70. A (p. 124): antecedently
71. C (pp. 128–30), D (pp. 129–31): Pleasure. That we may discern more
distinctly the Difference between moral Perceptions and others, let us consider, when we taste a pleasant Fruit, we are conscious of Pleasure; whenanother tastes it, we only conclude or form an Opinion that he enjoys Pleasure; and, abstracting from some previous Good-Will or Anger, his enjoying
this Pleasure is to us a matter wholly indifferent, raising no new Sentimentor Affection. But when we are under the Influence of a virtuous Temper, andthereby engaged in [C: p. 129, D: p. 130] virtuous Actions, we are not always
conscious of any Pleasure, nor are we only pursuing private Pleasures, as willappear hereafter: ’tis only by reflex Acts upon our Temper and Conduct that
we enjoy the Delights of Virtue [D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 310): “that Virtue
never fails to give Pleasure” substitutes for “that we enjoy the Delights ofVirtue”]. When also we judge the Temper of another to be virtuous, we do
not necessarily imagine him then to enjoy Pleasure, tho’ we know Reflection
will give it to him: And farther, our Apprehension of his virtuous Temperraises Sentiments of Approbation, Esteem or Admiration, and the Affectionof Good-will toward him. The Quality approved by our moral Sense is con-

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textual notes

ceived to reside in the Person approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity
in him: Approbation of another’s Virtue is not conceived as making the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, tho’ ’tis attended with some small Pleasure. Virtue is then called Amiable or Lovely, from its raising Good-will orLove in Spectators toward the Agent; and not from the Agent’s perceiving
the virtuous Temper to be advantageous to him, or desiring to obtain it underthat View. A virtuous Temper is called Good or Beatifick, not that it is always
attended with Pleasure in the Agent; much less that some small Pleasure attends the Contemplation of it in the Approver: but from this, that every
Spectator is persuaded that the reflex Acts of the virtuous Agent upon his
own Temper will give him the highest Pleasures. The admired Qua-[C: p. 130,
D: p. 131]lity is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as
is distinct from the Pleasure either in the Agent or the Approver; tho’ ’tis asure source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho’attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from thisPleasure; even as the Perception of external Forms is attended with Pleasure,and yet represents something distinct from this Pleasure. This may prevent
many Cavils upon this Subject.

Treatise II, Section II
1. C (p. 131), D (p. 132) introduce the marginal heading: Nature
2. C (p. 131), D (p. 132): sensitive Natures
3. A (p. 125): religious
4. No new paragraph in A (p. 126).
5. Not in A (p. 126).
6. Not in A (p. 126).
7. Not in A (p. 126).
8. A (p. 126): were
9. A (p. 126): have
10. A (p. 127): call virtuous, do spring fromC (p. 133), D (p. 134): approve as virtuous, are either
11. C (p. 133), D (p. 134): That Virtue springs from some other Affection
than Self-Love, or Desire of private Advantage. And where Self-Interest excites to the same Action, the Approbation is given only to the disinterested
Principle.
12. C (p. 133), D (p. 134): are commonly included under the Names Loveand Hatredtreatise ii, section ii

223

13. Omitted in C (p. 133), D (p. 134).
14. C (p. 134), D (p. 135): Malice. Complacence denotes Approbation of
any Person by our Moral Sense; and is rather a Perception than an Affection;
tho’ the Affection of Good-will is ordinarily subsequent to it. Benevolenceis the Desire of the Happiness of another. Their Opposites are called Dislike
and Malice.
15. Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).
16. Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).
17. Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).
18. Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).
19. C (p. 134), D (p. 135): toward a
20. Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).
21. Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).
22. Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).
23. Omitted in C (p. 135), D (p. 136).
24. Deleted in B [Errata, p. xxvi].
25. C (p. 135), D (p. 136): disapprove
26. C (p. 135), D (p. 136): retain the same Opinion of his Temper andIntentions
27. C (p. 135), D (p. 136): false Opinion about his Temper
28. C (p. 135), D (p. 136): ultimate Desire of
29. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: real Good-will or Kindness
30. C (p. 136), D (p. 137): others. To raise Benevolence, no more is required than calmly to consider any sensitive Nature not pernicious to others.
Gratitude arises from Benefits conferred from Good-will on ourselves, or
those we love; Complacence is a Perception of the moral Sense. Gratitude
includes some Complacence, and Complacence still raises a stronger Goodwill than that we have toward indifferent Characters, where there is no opposition of Interests.
31. A (p. 130): and32. Not in A (p. 130), C (p. 137), D (p. 138). Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (p. 10).
33. The following two paragraphs are not in C (p. 137) and D (p. 138);
instead, fourteen new pages are added: [Margin heading: Benevolence isdisinterested.] IV. There are two ways in which some may deduce Benevolence from Self-Love, the one supposing that “we voluntarily bring this Affection upon ourselves, whenever we have an Opinion that it will be for ourInterest to have this Affection, either as it may be immediately pleasant, or224

textual notes

may afford pleasant Reflection afterwards by our Moral Sense, or as it may
tend to procure some external Reward from God or Man.” The other Scheme
alledges no such Power in us of raising Desire or Affection of any kind by
our Choice or Volition; but “supposes our Minds determined by the Frameof their Nature to desire whatever is apprehended [C: p. 138, D: p. 139] as
the Means of any private Happiness; and that the Observation of the Happiness of other Persons, in many Cases is made the necessary Occasion ofPleasure to the Observer, as their Misery is the Occasion of his Uneasiness:and in Consequence of this Connexion, as soon as we have observed it, we
begin to desire the Happiness of others as the Means of obtaining this Happiness to ourselves, which we expect from the Contemplation of others in a
happy State. They alledge it to be impossible to desire either the Happinessof another, or any Event whatsoever, without conceiving it as the Means ofsome Happiness or Pleasure to ourselves; but own at the same time, that
Desire is not raised in us directly by any Volition, but arises necessarily upon
our apprehending any Object or Event to be conducive to our Happiness.
[Margin heading: The first contrary Opinion confuted.] That the former
Scheme is not just, may appear from this general Consideration, that “neither
Benevolence nor any other Affection or Desire can be directly raised by Volition.” If they could, then we could be bribed into any Affection whatsoever
toward any Object, even the most improper: we might raise Jealousy, Fear,
Anger, Love, toward any sort of Persons indifferently by an Hire, even as weengage Men to external Actions, or to the [C: p. 139, D: p. 140] Dissimulationof Passions; but this every Person will by his own Reflection find to be
impossible. The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us from having any
Affection, may indeed turn our Attention to those Qualitys in the Object,which are naturally constituted the necessary Causes or Occasions of theadvantageous Affection; and if we find such Qualitys in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus indirectly the Prospect of Advantage may
tend to raise any Affection; but if these Qualitys be not found or apprehended
in the Object, no Volition of ours, nor Desire, will ever raise any Affectionin us.
But more particularly, that Desire of the Good of others, which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raised from Prospectof any Pleasure accompanying the Affection itself: for ’tis plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with Pleasure; nay, ’tis often attended
with Pain, when the Object is in Distress. Desire in general is rather uneasy
than pleasant. ’Tis true, indeed, all the Passions and Affections justify them-treatise ii, section ii

225

selves; while they continue, (as Malebranch expresses it) we generally approve
our being thus affected on this Occasion, as an innocent Disposition, or ajust one, and condemn a Person who would be otherwise affected on the like
Occasion. So the Sorrowful, the Angry, the [C: p. 140, D: p. 141] Jealous, theCompassionate, approve their several Passions on the apprehended Occasion;
but we should not therefore conclude, that Sorrow, Anger, Jealousy or Pity
are pleasant, or chosen for their concomitant Pleasure. The Case is plainly
thus: The Frame of our Nature on the Occasions which move these Passions,determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our Affection at least as
innocent. Uneasiness generally attends our Desires of any kind; and this Sensation tends to fix our Attention, and to continue the Desire. But the Desire
does not terminate upon the Removal of the Pain accompanying the Desire,but upon some other Event: the concomitant Pain is what we seldom reflect
upon, unless when it is very violent. Nor does any Desire or Affection terminate upon the Pleasure which may accompany the Affection; much less is
it raised by an Act of our Will, with a View to obtain this Pleasure.
The same Reflection will shew, that we do not by an Act of our Will raisein ourselves that Benevolence which we approve as virtuous, with a View toobtain future Pleasures of Self-Approbation by our Moral Sense. Could weraise Affections in this manner, we should be engaged to any Affection by the
Prospect of an Interest [C: p. 141, D: p. 142] equivalent to this of SelfApprobation, such as Wealth or sensual Pleasure, which with many Tempers
are more powerful; and yet we universally own, that that Disposition to dogood Offices to others, which is raised by these Motives, is not virtuous: how
can we then imagine, that the virtuous Benevolence is brought upon us by a
Motive equally selfish?
But what will most effectually convince us of the Truth on this Point, is
Reflection upon our own Hearts, whether we have not a Desire of the Goodof others, generally without any Consideration or Intention of obtaining
these pleasant Reflections on our own Virtue: nay, often this Desire is strongest where we least imagine Virtue, in natural Affection toward Offspring,and in Gratitude to a great Benefactor; the Absence of which is indeed thegreatest Vice, but the Affections themselves are not esteemed in any considerable degree virtuous. The same Reflection will also convince us, that these
Desires or Affections are not produced by Choice, with a View to obtain thisprivate Good.
In like manner, if no Volition of ours can directly raise Affections fromthe former Prospects of Interest, no more can any Volition raise them from226

textual notes

Prospects of eternal Rewards, or to avoid eternal Punishments. The former
Motives differ from these only [C: p. 142, D: p. 143] as smaller from greater,shorter from more durable. If Affections could be directly raised by Volition,
the same Consideration would make us angry at the most innocent or virtuous Character, and jealous of the most faithful and affectionate, or sorrowful for the Prosperity of a Friend; which we all find to be impossible. The
Prospect of a future State, may, no doubt, have a greater indirect Influence,by turning our Attention to the Qualitys in the Objects naturally apt to raise
the required Affection, than any other Consideration.* [C: p. 143, D: p. 144]
’Tis indeed probably true in Fact, that those who are engaged by Prospectof future Rewards to do good Offices to Mankind, have generally the virtuous
Benevolence jointly exciting them to Action; because, as it may appear hereafter, Benevolence is natural to Mankind, and still operates where there is no
Opposition of apparent Interest, or where any contrary apparent Interest is
overbalanced by a greater Interest. Men, conscious of this, do generally approve good Offices, to which Motives of a future State partly excited theAgent. But that the Approbation is founded upon the Apprehension of adisinterested Desire partly exciting the Agent, is plain from this, that not only
Obedience to an evil Deity in doing Mischief, or even in performing trifling
Ceremonies, only from Hope of Reward, or Prospect of avoiding Punishment, but even Obedience to a good Deity only from the same Motives,
without any Love or Gratitude towards him, and with a perfect Indifference
about the Happiness or Misery of Mankind, abstracting from this private
Interest, would meet with no Approbation. We plainly see that [C: p. 144,
D: p. 145] a Change of external Circumstances of Interest under an evil Deity,
without any Change in the Disposition of the Agent, would lead him into
every Cruelty and Inhumanity.
Gratitude toward the Deity is indeed disinterested, as it will appear hereafter. This Affection therefore may obtain our Approbation, where it excites
to Action, tho’ there were no other Benevolence exciting the Agent. But thisCase scarce occurs among Men. But where the Sanction of the Law is the
only Motive of Action, we could expect no more Benevolence, nor no otherAffection, than those in one forced by the Law to be Curator to a Person forwhom he has not the least Regard. The Agent would so manage as to savehimself harmless if he could, but would be under no Concern about the
Success of his Attempts, or the Happiness of the Person whom he served,
provided he performed the Task required by Law; nor would any Spectator
approve this Conduct.

treatise ii, section ii

227[Margin heading: The second Opinion confuted.] V. The other Scheme
is more plausible: That Benevolence is not raised by any Volition upon Prospect of Advantage; but that we desire the Happiness of others, as conceiving
it necessary to procure some pleasant Sensations which we expect to feel [C:
p. 145, D: p. 146] upon seeing others happy; and that for like Reason we have
Aversion to their Misery. This Connection between the Happiness of others
and our Pleasure, say they, is chiefly felt among Friends, Parents and Children,and eminently virtuous Characters. But this Benevolence flows as directlyfrom Self-Love as any other Desire.
To shew that this Scheme is not true in Fact, let us consider, that if in our
Benevolence we only desired the Happiness of others as the Means of thisPleasure to ourselves, whence is it that no Man approves the Desire of theHappiness of others as a means of procuring Wealth or sensual Pleasure toourselves? If a Person had wagered concerning the future Happiness of a Manof such Veracity, that he would sincerely confess whether he were happy ornot; would this Wagerer’s Desire of the Happiness of another, in order to
win the Wager, be approved as virtuous? If not, wherein does this Desire differ
from the former? except that in one case there is one pleasant Sensation expected, and in the other case other sensations: For by increasing or diminishing the Sum wagered, the Interest in this case may be made either greateror less than that in the other.
Reflecting on our own Minds again will best discover the Truth. Many
have never thought upon this Connection: nor do [C: p. 146, D: p. 147] weordinarily intend the obtaining of any such Pleasure. When we do generous
Offices, we all often feel Delight upon seeing others happy, but during our
Pursuit of their Happiness we have no Intention of obtaining this delight.
We often feel the Pain of Compassion; but were our sole ultimate Intention
or Desire the freeing ourselves from this Pain, would the Deity offer to us
either wholly to blot out all Memory of the Person in Distress, (C, p. 146:“or”; omitted in D, p. 147) to take away this Connection, so that we shouldbe easy during the Misery of our Friend on the one hand, or on the otherwould relieve him from his Misery, we should be as ready to choose the former
way as the latter; since either of them would free us from our Pain, which
upon this Scheme is the sole End proposed by the compassionate Person.—Don’t we find in ourselves that our Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of our own Pain? Were this our sole Intention, we would run away,
shut our Eyes, or divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, as the readiest way of removing our Pain: This we seldom do, nay, we croud about such

228

textual notes

Objects, and voluntarily expose ourselves to this Pain, unless calm Reflection
upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination, orsome selfish Affection, as Fear of Danger, over-power it. [C: p. 147, D: p. 148]
To make this yet clearer, suppose that the Deity should declare to a good
Man that he should be suddenly annihilated, but at the Instant of his Exit itshould be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his Children, or his Country
should be made happy or miserable for the Future, when he himself could
have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain from their State. Pray would he be
any more indifferent about their State now, that he neither hoped or feared
any thing to himself from it, than he was in any prior Period of his Life?**Nay, is it not a pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Decease weknow nothing of what befalls those who survive us? How comes it then that
we do not lose, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families,
Friends, or Country? Can there be any Instance given of our desiring any
Thing only as the Means of private Good, as violently when we know that
we shall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the Possessionof this good for many Years? Is this the way we compute the Value ofAnnuities?
How the disinterested Desire of the Good of others should seem inconceivable, ’tis hard to account: perhaps ’tis owing to the Attempts of somegreat Men to give Definitions of simple Ideas.—Desire, say they, is Uneasiness, or uneasy Sensation upon the Absence [C: p. 148, D: p. 149] of any
Good.—Whereas Desire is as distinct from Uneasiness, as Volition is from
Sensation. Don’t they themselves often speak of our desiring to remove Uneasiness? Desire then is different from Uneasiness, however a Sense of Uneasiness accompanies it, as Extension does the Idea of Colour, which yet is avery distinct Idea. Now wherein lies the Impossibility of desiring the Happiness of another without conceiving it as the Means of obtaining any thing
farther, even as we desire our own Happiness without farther View? If any
alledge, that we desire our own Happiness as the Means of removing theUneasiness we feel in the Absence of Happiness, then at least the Desire of
removing our own Uneasiness is an ultimate Desire: and why may we nothave other ultimate Desires?
“But can any Being be concerned about the Absence of an Event which
gives it no Uneasiness?” Perhaps superior Natures desire without uneasy Sensation. But what if we cannot? We may be uneasy while a desired Event is in
Suspence, and yet not desire this Event only as the Means of removing thisUneasiness: Nay, if we did not desire the Event without View to this Un-

treatise ii, section ii

229

easiness, we should never have brought the Uneasiness upon ourselves bydesiring it. So likewise we may feel Delight upon the Existence of a desired
Event, when yet we did not desire the Event only as the Means of obtaining
this [C: p. 149, D: p. 150] Delight; even as we often receive Delight from
Events which we had an Aversion to.
VI. If any one should ask, since none of these Motives of Self-Interest
excite our Benevolence, but we are in virtuous Actions intending solely theGood of others, to what Purpose serves our moral Sense, our Sense of Pleasure from the Happiness of others? To what Purpose serves the wise Orderof Nature, by which Virtue is even made generally advantageous in this Life?
To what End are eternal Rewards appointed and revealed? The Answer tothese Questions was given partly already: all these Motives may make us desire
to have benevolent Affections, and consequently turn our Attention to those
Qualities in Objects which excite them; they may overbalance all apparent
contrary Motives, and all Temptations to Vice. But farther, I hope it will be
still thought an End worthy of the Deity, to make the Virtuous happy, by awise Constitution of Nature, whether the Virtues [D2, D3 (Corrigenda,
p. 310) substitute “Virtuous” for “Virtues”] were in every Action intending
to obtain this Happiness or not. Beneficent Actions tend to the publick
Good; it is therefore good and kind to give all possible additional Motives tothem; and to excite Men, who have some weak Degrees of good Affection,
to promote the publick Good more vigorously by Motives of Self-Interest;or even to excite those who have no Virtue at all to external Acts [C: p. 150,
D: p. 151] of Beneficence, and to restrain them from Vice.*** [C: p. 151, D:
p. 152]
From the Whole it may appear, that there is in human Nature a disinterested ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others; and that our moral Sense
determines us [C, p. 151, D1, p. 152, D3, p. 152: only] [D2, p. 152: instead of“only” a lacuna of approximately four letters] to approve [D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 310): only such] Actions as virtuous, which are apprehended to proceed partly at least from such Desire.
*These several Motives of Interest, which, some alledge, do excite us to Benevolence, operate upon us in a very different Manner. Prospect of external Advantage
of any kind in this Life from our Fellows, is only a Motive to the Volition of external
Actions immediately, and not to raise Desire of the Happiness of others. Now being
willing to do external Actions which we know do in Fact promote the Happiness ofothers, without any Desire of their Happiness, is not approved as virtuous: Otherwise
it were Virtue to do a beneficent Action for a Bribe of Money.
The Prospect of Rewards from the Deity, of future Pleasures from the Self-

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textual notes

Approbation of our Moral Sense, or of any Pleasure attending an Affection itself, areonly Motives to us to desire or wish to have the Affection of Benevolence in ourHearts; and consequently, if our Volition could raise Affections in us, these Motives
would make us will or choose to raise benevolent Affections: But these Prospects
cannot be Motives to us from Self-Love, to desire the Happiness of others; for, from
Self-Love we only desire what we apprehend to be the Means of private Good. Now
the having those Affections is the Means of obtaining these private Goods, and not
the actual Happiness of others; for the Pleasure of Self-Approbation, and Divine Re[C: p. 143, D: p. 144]wards, are not obtained or lost according as others are happy or
miserable, but according to the Goodness of our Affections. If therefore Affections
are not directly raised by Volition or Choice, Prospects of future Rewards, or of SelfApprobation, cannot directly raise them.
**[Note added in D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 307)]: Cic. de Finib. lib. ii. c. 31. [today:
II, 99] Ista commendatio puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiae, summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu conservatio, indicat innatam esse homini probitatem gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus, nec praemiorum mercedibus evocatam, &c.
[Translation: “That provision for the care of children, that loyalty to friendship andaffection, that observance of these solemn duties with his latest breath, prove that
there was innate in the man a disinterested uprightness, not evoked by pleasure nor
elicited by prizes and rewards.” Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, with an English translation by H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1967), p. 190.]***Let it be also remembered, that every Consideration suggested in the Gospel,as an additional Motive to beneficent Actions, is not immediately to be looked uponas the proper Motive to Virtue, or what would engage our Approbation of Actions
flowing from it alone. We have the Promises of this Life as well as of the next, andyet the former alone was never thought a virtuous Principle. Some Texts are alsobrought to confute this Scheme of disinterested Affections as the only truly virtuous
Principle, such as i Corinth. Ch. XV. ver. 32. which imports no more than this, “Thatif there were no resurrection, and consequently Christ had not risen, and therefore
his Religion only an Imposture, it had been the greatest Folly in the Apostle to have
exposed himself to Persecution:” Not that the Prospect of a future Reward was the
only Motive to Virtue, or that the only Affection of Mind which made the Apostle
bear Persecution was, Hope of Reward.
Another Text insisted on is, Heb. XI. ver. 6. But this only means, either “that noMan can perform religious Acts acceptably to God, who does not believe his Existenceand Goodness,” which is self-evident: Or it is to be understood of “embracing thetrue Religion, and adhering to it under the most severe Persecutions, which we may
allow no Man could do without Hopes of future Reward.” Now this does not prove
either that our sole, or our strongest Incitement to virtuous Actions is a Prospect ofInterest, nor even that any Action is approved, because it springs from Hope of Reward.
Heb. XII. ver. 2. is chiefly urged, but with least Ground: if we have it well translated, it only asserts, “That the Hope of future Joy was one Incitement to our Saviour
in enduring Sufferings,” not that this was the principal Spring of his beneficent Actions, or that they were made amiable by arising from it. Nay, this Joy may be understood metonymically, for its Object, viz. the Salvation of Mankind. Not to men-treatise ii, section ii

231tion another Translation long ago known to Criticks; some of whom insist that a◊ntí
is seldom used for the final Cause; but means instead of, in this Place, as well as in
Texts debated with the Socinians: And then this Verse may be thus translated; [C:
p. 151, D: p. 152] “Who instead of that Joy which was ready at hand, or in his Powerto have enjoyed, as he had from the Beginning, he submitted to the Cross.” Nor isthere any thing to confute this Translation; save that some Antithesis between oursuffering from Faith in a Reward, and his suffering in like manner, is not kept up sowell; as if it were a necessary Perfection in the Scriptures to abound in such Antitheses.
For in this Translation there is good Reasoning, in shewing how our Saviour’s sufferings are enhanced by his exchanging a State of Joy for them, parallel to Philip. II.
ver. 6, 7.
Whoever would appeal to the general Strain of the Christian Exhortations, willfind disinterested Love more inculcated, and Motives of Gratitude more frequently
suggested, than any others.

34. Not in A (p. 132), no new paragraph. In C (p. 151), D (p. 152): numbered VII.
35. C (p. 151), D (p. 152): ultimate Desire of
36. A (p. 132): Interests
37. Not in A (p. 133).
38. A (p. 133): would rather
39. Not in A (p. 133).
40. C (p. 153), D (p. 154): ultimate Desire of
41. C (p. 153), D (p. 154): calm Ill-will
42. C (p. 153), D (p. 154): yet
43. A (p. 134): Now having
C (p. 153), D (p. 154): numbered VIII.
44. C (p. 153), D (p. 154): neither our Esteem nor Benevolence, is founded
on Self-Love
45. Omitted in C (p. 154), D (p. 155).
46. A (p. 134): were
47. C (p. 154), D (p. 155): been reputed virtuous
48. C (p. 154), D (p. 155): numbered IX.
49. C (p. 154), D (p. 155): Good-Will
50. A (p. 135): procures
51. Not in A (135). In C (p. 154), D (p. 155): , and especially towardourselves
52. C (p. 154), D (p. 155): wish well to
53. C (p. 154), D (p. 155): do so
54. A (p. 135): And further
C (p. 155), D (p. 156): Nay, farther

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textual notes

No new paragraph in A (p. 135), C (p. 155), D (p. 156).
55. C (p. 155), D (p. 156): Good-will
56. C (p. 155), D (p. 156): will
57. New paragraph in C (p. 155), D (p. 156).
58. C (p. 155), D (p. 156): Beneficence then must increase our Good-will,
as it raises Complacence, which is still attended with stronger degrees of Benevolence
59. A (p. 136): hence it is that we
60. Omitted in C (pp. 155–56), D (pp. 156–57).
61. A (p. 136): much more powerful to excite
62. A (p. 136): by
63. Not in A (p. 137).
64. Not in A (p. 137).
65. C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Good-will
66. C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Good-will
D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: ultimate Good-will
67. C (p. 156), D (p. 157): arises from
68. C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Good-will
D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: such Good-will
69. Omitted in C (p. 156), D (p. 157).
70. C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Affection
71. Paragraph omitted in C (p. 156), D (p. 157).
72. A (p. 137): taken
73. B [Errata, p. xxvi]: 5
74. Not in A (p. 138).
75. A (p. 138): does scarce deserve
76. A (p. 138): any farther
77. No new paragraph in A (p. 138). In C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Had we noother ultimate Desire but that of private Advantage
78. A (p. 138): but
79. A (p. 138): must only act
80. A (p. 138): we can have no reason to imagine that
81. C (p. 157), D (p. 158): by many who yet expect Mercy and Beneficencein the Deity
82. A (p. 139): this
83. Not in A (p. 139).
84. No new paragraph in A (p. 139).
85. C (p. 158), D (p. 159): infinite Power and Art

treatise ii, section ii

233

86. Not in A (p. 139).
87. A (p. 140): be as capable of giving him
88. Entire article VIII omitted in C (p. 158), D (p. 159).
89. A (p. 140): perhaps Virtue
90. No new paragraph in A (p. 140).
91. A (p. 140): such a
92. A (p. 140): such an Occasion
93. A (p. 141): And then this
94. A (p. 141): Passions are not from Self-Love [Instruction for alteration
already in Alterations and Additions (p. 11).]
95. Alterations and Additions (p. 10): on
96. A (p. 141): do tend generally in fact
97. A (p. 141): removal of our Pain is not directly intended; for then [Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 11).]
98. Alterations and Additions (p. 11): were
99. A (p. 141): run into
100. C (p. 158), D (p. 159): numbered X.
101. A (p. 143): falsely suppos’d102. A (p. 143): those Actions which are counted Virtuous
103. A (p. 143): suppos’d104. C (p. 159), D (p. 160): Spring
105. Not in A (p. 144).
106. A (p. 144): bustles
107. D (p. 160): for108. C (p. 160), D (p. 161): his Children are
109. C (p. 160), D (p. 161): No; but his naturally implanted Desire of theirGood, and Aversion to their misery, makes him affected with Joy or Sorrowfrom their Pleasures or Pains. This Desire
110. C (p. 160), D (p. 161): it
111. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: say others
112. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, pp. 307–8]: it. Another Author thinks all thiseasily deducible from Self-Love. “Children are not only made of our Bodies,but resemble us in Body and Mind; they are rational agents as we are, and
we only love our own Likeness in them.” Very good all this. What is Likeness?
’Tis not individual Sameness; ’tis only being included under one general or
specifical Idea. Thus there is Likeness between us and other Mens Children,
thus any Man is like any other, in some Respects; a Man is also like an Angel,and in some Respects like a Brute. Is there then a natural Disposition in every

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textual notes

Man to love his Like, to wish well not only to his individual Self, but to any
other like rational or sensitive Being? and this Disposition strongest, where
there is the greatest Likeness in the more noble Qualities? If all this is calledby the Name Self-Love; be it so: The highest Mystick needs no moredisinterested Principle; ’tis not confined [308] to the Individual, but terminates ultimately on the Good of others, and may extend to all; since each one
some way resembles each other. Nothing can be better than this Self-Love,nothing more generous.
If any allege, That “Parents always derive Pleasure, often Honour, andsometimes Wealth, from the Wisdom and Prosperity of their Children, andhence all Parental Solicitude arises;” let us recollect what was said above; allthese Motives cease upon Approach of Death, and yet the Affection is asstrong then as ever. Let Parents examine their own Hearts, and see if theseviews are the only Springs of their Affection, and that toward the most infirm,from whom there is least Hope.
113. No new paragraph in A (p. 145).
114. A (p. 145): were115. Not in A (p. 145).
116. A (p. 145): appear to be moral
117. C (p. 161), D (p. 162): numbered XI.
118. C (p. 162), D (p. 163): more desire
119. C (p. 162), D (p. 163): would he not rather desire the Prosperity of
his Country
120. C (p. 162), D (p. 163): readily wish
121. Not in A (p. 147).
122. A (p. 147): and Design, and Study
123. A (p. 147): argues a Benevolence in124. C (p. 163), D (p. 164): desire
125. C (p. 163), D (p. 164): Happiness. And that all these Affections,
whether more or less extensive, are properly disinterested, not even foundedon any Desire of that Happiness we may expect in seeing their prosperous
Condition; may appear from this, that they would continue even at the Instant of our Death, or intire Destruction, as was already observed, Art. IV.
of this Section.
126. C (p. 163), D (p. 164): numbered XII.
127. C (p. 164), D (p. 165): those128. A (p. 148): and Faction
129. B [Errata, p. xxvi]: ortreatise ii, section iii

235

130. A (p. 149): but
131. A (p. 149): may be

Treatise II, Section III
1. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: generally
2. A (p. 150): the Love of others
C (p. 165), D (p. 166): Good-will to others
3. Not in A (p. 150).
4. B [Errata, p. xxvi]: 6. Par. 3
C (p. 166), D (p. 167): 9. Par. 2
5. A (p. 151): know that
6. D (p. 167): towards
7. A (p. 151): Hence it is, that those
8. No marginal heading in D (p. 167).
9. A (pp. 152–53): Beneficiary
10. D (p. 168): belov’d
11. A (p. 152): Beneficiary
12. D (p. 168): but
13. Omitted in D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310].
14. Omitted in C (p. 168), D (p. 169).
15. Not in A (p. 153).
16. A (p. 155): tended
17. A (p. 155): was
18. C (p. 171), D (p. 172): the one
19. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: manifest
20. A (p. 156): be acted
21. A (p. 156): by
22. C (p. 171), D (p. 172): ultimate Desire of
23. C (p. 172), D (p. 173): desire
24. A (p. 157): conceiv’d to be no
25. D3 (pp. 173–74): The frequent, and seemingly unprovoked Crueltiesof the Nero’s and Domitian’s, are often alleged in Opposition to all this; but
perhaps unjustly. Such Tyrants are conscious that they are hated by all thosewhom the World repute virtuous, and they apprehend Danger from them:
A Tyrant looks upon such Men as designing, artful, or ambitious, under afalse Shew of Virtue. He imagines the surest Means of his own Safety is toappear terrible, and to deprive his Enemys of all Hopes of escaping by his

236

textual notes

Compassion. The Fame of Virtue in eminent Subjects is matter of Envy, andis a Reproach upon the Tyrant: it weakens his Power, and makes them dangerous to him. Power becomes the Object of Delight to the Tyrant; and in
Ostentation of it, he may break through all regards to Justice and Humanity.
Habits of Cruelty can be acquired in such a Course. Any of these apparent
interests seem better to account for the Crueltys of Tyrants, than [174] thesupposing in them
26. A (p. 157): conscious that he
27. Omitted in D3 (p. 174).
28. Omitted in D3 (p. 174).
29. A (p. 158), C (p. 173), D (p. 174): were
30. A (p. 158): that it is
31. A (p. 158): only Self-Love, and not Malice, which was his Motive; orC (p. 173), D (p. 174): he acted from Self-Love, and not Malice, or,
32. A (p. 158): Mankind
33. D3 (p. 174): they are
34. C (p. 174), D (p. 175): Spring
35. Not in A (p. 159).
36. A (p. 159): must then be supposed to be
37. A (p. 159): too
38. A (p. 159): so as
39. D3 (p. 175) adds: or such strong Appetites, or Passions either selfish,or toward some narrow Systems, as overcome our Regard to Publick Good;
40. A (p. 159): had mutually
41. Not in A (p. 159).
42. Omitted in D3 (p. 175).
43. D3 (pp. 175–76): seem of a middle Nature, neither virtuous nor
vitious.
44. A (p. 160): discover indeed
45. A (p. 160): And hence
46. Omitted in C (p. 175), D (p. 176).
47. A (p. 161): is
48. A (p. 161): run into any
49. A (p. 161): Mankind
50. D3 (pp. 177–78) inserts a new article with the margin heading “Benevolence of different Kinds” and numbered VI. The remaining articles ofsection III are renumbered accordingly. VI. Benevolence is a Word fit enoughin general, to denote the internal Spring of Virtue, as Bishop Cumberlandtreatise ii, section iii

237

always uses it. But to understand this more distinctly, ’tis highly necessary toobserve, that under this Name are included very different Dispositions of theSoul. Sometimes it denotes a calm, extensive Affection, or Good-will toward
all Beings capable of Happiness or Misery: Sometimes, 2. A calm deliberate
Affection of the Soul toward the Happiness of certain smaller Systems or
Individuals; such as Patriotism, or Love of a Country, Friendship, Parental
Affection, as it is in Persons of Wisdom and Self-Government: Or, 3. The
several kind particular Passions of Love, Pity, Sympathy, Congratulation.
This Distinction between the calm Motions of the Will, Affections, Dispositions, or Instincts of the Soul, and the several turbulent Passions, is elsewhere more fully considered.* [p. 178]
Now tho’ all these different Dispositions come under the general Character of benevolent, yet as they are in Nature different, so they have very
different Degrees of Moral Beauty. The first Sort is above all amiable andexcellent: ’Tis perhaps the sole Moral Perfection of some superior Natures;and the more this prevails and rules in any human Mind, the more amiable
the Person appears, even when it not only checks and limits our lower Appetites, but when it controuls our kind particular Passions, or counteracts
them. The second Sort of Benevolence is more amiable than the third, when
it is sufficiently strong to influence our Conduct: And the third Sort, tho’ ofa lesser Moral Dignity, is also beautiful, when it is no way opposite to thesemore noble Principles. And when it is opposite, tho’ it does not justify such
Actions as are really detrimental to greater Systems, yet it is strong extenuating
Circumstance, and much alleviates the Moral Deformity. We are all sensibleof this, when any Person, from Friendship, Parental-Affection, or Pity, hasdone something hurtful to larger Societys.
*See Treatise III. Sect. ii. Art. 3 and Treatise IV. Sect. vi. Art. 4. [Editor’s note: Hutcheson thought of the Inquiry and the Essay as a coherent whole. Consequently he is here
referring to the two Treatises making up the Essay, namely, An Essay on the Nature andConduct of the Passions and Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, London, 1728.]

51. A (p. 161): requires that every one should be
52. D3 (p. 179a): the Strength of some particular kind Attachment, or of[In D3 the page numbers are used twice subsequently. The first page 179 begins with “in part”; the first page 180 begins with “in such.” The second page
179 begins with “Happiness”; the second page 180 begins with “nevolence”.]
53. A (p. 161): shews it to be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of theTendency of an Action to the publick Good, which does not in Reality tend
to it: so that a wise

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textual notes

54. D3 (p. 179a): by the calm extensive Benevolence, how strong soever
it were55. D3 (p. 179a): strong virtuous Disposition
56. A (p. 162): further were there any Good
57. Not in A (p. 162). Instruction for addition of the following two paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 11–13).
58. C (p. 177), D1, D2 (p. 178), D3 (p. 180a): what
59. D3 (p. 180a): Proportion
60. D3 (p. 180a): Yet Gifts
61. Omitted in D3 (p. 180a).
62. Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 13).
63. Wrongly corrected in D2 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: VIII. In D3 this correction is correct [Corrigenda, p. 310, referring to p. 179b].
64. A (p. 162): than as
65. A (p. 163): injurious
66. Omitted in C (p. 179), D1, D2 (p. 180), D3 (p. 180b).
67. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310] instruct to delete the number.
68. A (p. 163): thus to judge
69. A (p. 164): And in
70. A (p. 164): accomplishes
71. C (p. 180), D (p. 181): not numbered.
72. Not in A (p. 164).
73. A (pp. 164–65): But by the Consequences of Actions, we are not only
to understand the immediate Effects directly produc’d by them, but also all
those Events which otherwise would not have happen’d. Thus many Actions
which have no immediate evil Effects; nay, which actually produce good Effects, may be evil, if their universal Al-[165]lowance would be more detrimental to Mankind than their universal Prohibition; or if there be no fixedStandard, that Men may easily know when such Actions are allow’d, andwhen prohibited; or when such Actions, however useful in particular Instances, might be Precedents to the greatest Mischief. As for Example, theExecution of Justice by private Persons on Offenders, in any State not entirely
perverted from the Ends of Government; the violating the Rights of worthless Persons, in favor of those of great moral Capacitys, and of great Benevolence; the protecting the Innocent by false Testimony in a Court of Justice,and such like, may be very useful in singular Instances: but then the Allowance of such Actions would lead into the greatest Mischief, since every one
would judge for himself what Cases were proper, and what not, and thentreatise ii, section iii

239

there could be no Certainty of Life, Possessions, and Evidences: and hencesuch Practices are universally counted evil. [Instruction for alteration of thefollowing two paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 13–14).]
74. Alterations and Additions (p. 13): Thus
75. Alterations and Additions (p. 13): the accidental evil
76. Alterations and Additions (p. 13): good effects he proposes to attain by
the Action
77. Alterations and Additions (p. 13): it
78. C (p. 181), D (p. 182): Mistake
79. Alterations and Additions (p. 14): to80. Alterations and Additions (p. 14): are probably greater
81. Alterations and Additions (p. 14): these
82. C (pp. 182–83), D (pp. 183–84): it. [new article] (D2, D3 [Corrigenda,
p. 310] instruct to delete the number.) IX. ’Tis here to be observed, that tho’every kind Affection abstractly considered, is approved by our moral Sense,
yet all sorts of Affections or Passions which pursue the Good of others are
not equally approved, or do not seem in the same degree virtuous. Our calm
Affections, either private or publick, are plainly distinct from our particular
Passions; calm Self-Love quite distinct from Hunger, Thirst, Ambition, Lust,
or Anger; so calm Good-will toward others is different from Pity, passionate
Love, the parental Affection, or the Passion of particular Friends. Now every
kind Passion which is not pernicious to others, is indeed approved as virtuousand lovely: And yet a calm Good-will toward the same Persons appears more
lovely. So calm Good-will toward a small System is lovely and preferable tomore passionate Attachments; and yet a more extensive calm Benevolence isstill more beautiful and virtuous; and the highest Perfection of Virtue is anuniversal calm Good-will toward all sensitive Natures. Hence it is, that wecondemn particular Attachments, when inconsistent [C: p. 183, D: p. 184]
with the Interest of great Societies, because they argue some defect in that
more noble Principle, which is the Perfection of Virtue.**See Essay on Passions, Sect. 2. Art. 3. And Illustrations, Sect. 6. Art. 4.

83. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310] instruct to read IX.
84. C (p. 183), D (p. 184): these
85. A (p. 165): extend
86. C (p. 183), D (p. 184): Beneficence
87. A (p. 166): if
88. C (p. 183), D (p. 184): even240

textual notes

89. C (p. 183), D (p. 184): except
90. C (p. 183), D (p. 184): does
91. A (p. 166): is
92. D2, D3 (p. 185): he would condemn a great
93. C (pp. 184–85), D (pp. 185–86): This Constitution of our Sense,
whereby the moral Beauty of Actions, or Dispositions, increases according
to the Number of Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend; whence
also Actions which flow from the nearer Attachments of Nature, such as thatbetween the Sexes, and the Love of our Offspring, do not appear so virtuous
as Actions of equal Moment of Good towards Persons less attach’d to us; hasbeen chosen by the Author of Nature for this good Reason, “That the more
limited Instincts tend to produce a smaller Moment of Good, be-[C: p. 185,
D: p. 186]cause confined to small numbers. Whereas the more extensive calm
Instinct of Good-will, attended with Power, would have no Bounds in its
good Effects, and would never lead into any Evil, as the particular Passions
may: and hence it is made more lovely to our Sense, that we might be induced to cultivate and strengthen it; and make it check even kind Passions,when they are opposite to a greater Good.”
94. A (p. 167): were it
95. D2, D3 (p. 186): numbered X.
96. D2, D3 (p. 186): may arise a Notion of moral
97. D2, D3 (p. 186): or are natural Indications of a good Temper, andusually accompany it
98. C (p. 185), D (p. 186): Approbation of
99. A (p. 168): Qualitys Good or Evil. Now, a Veneration for these Qualitys, any further than as they are employ’d for the publick Good, is foolish,
and flows from our moral Sense, grounded upon a false Opinion; for if
D2, D3 (p. 186): Qualitys: And we seem to have a natural Relish forthem distinct from moral Approbation. But if
100. D2, D3 (p. 187): Rule101. In D2, D3 (pp. 187–88) all formulae are omitted, and the axioms readas follows:
1. The moral Importance of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick
Good he produces, is in a compound Proportion of his Benevolence andAbilitys. For ’tis plain that his good Offices depend upon these two jointly.
In like manner, the Quantity of private Good which any Agent obtains
for himself, is in a like compound Proportion of his selfish Principles, andtreatise ii, section iii

241

his Abilitys. We speak here only of the external Goods of this World,which one pursues from some selfish Principles. For as to internal Goodsof the Mind, these are most effectually obtain’d by the Exercise of otherAffections than those called Selfish, even those which carry the Agent beyond himself toward the Good of others.
2. In comparing the Virtues of different Agents, when the Abilitys areequal, the Moments of publick Good are proportioned to the Goodnessof the Temper, or the Benevolence; and when the Tempers are equal, theQuantitys of Good are as the Abilitys.
3. The Virtue then or Goodness of Temper is directly as the Momentof Good, [188] when other Circumstances are equal, and inversly as theAbilitys. That is to say, where the Abilitys are greatest, there is less Virtue
evidenced in any given Moment of Good produced.
4. But as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, somegood to ourselves, and evil to the Publick; and others evil to ourselves, andgood to the Publick; or either useful both to ourselves and others, or pernicious to both; the intire Spring of good Actions is not always Benevolence alone; or of Evil, Malice alone (nay, sedate Malice is rarely found);but in most Actions we must look upon Self-Love as another Force, sometimes conspiring with Benevolence, and assisting it, when we are excitedby Views of private Interest, as well as publick Good; and sometimes opposing Benevolence, when the good Action is any way difficult or painful
in the Performance, or detrimental in its Consequences to the Agent.
102. A (p. 168): Character
103. Not in A (p. 168). The following axioms are numbered accordingly, 2,
3, 4, 5. Instruction for addition of this paragraph (without numeration) already in Alterations and Additions (p. 14).
104. Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 14).
105. C (p. 186), D1 (p. 187): Agents, the Abilitys are
106. A (p. 169): Benevolence is as the Moment of publick Good, producedby them in like Circumstances: or B ⳱ M ⳯ 1.
107. D1 (p. 187): B
108. C (p. 187), D1 (p. 188): Spring of
109. C (p. 187), D1 (p. 188): or of Evil
110. C (p. 187), D1 (p. 188): sedate Malice is rarely found111. Not in A (p. 169). Instruction for addition already in Alterations andAdditions (p. 15).

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textual notes

112. A (p. 170): afterwards
113. Not in A (p. 170).
114. A (p. 170): in one
115. Not in A (p. 170).
116. A (p. 170): And in
117. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 189).
118. A (p. 171): tend to119. A (p. 171): only then120. Not in A (p. 171).
121. C (p. 189), D (p. 190): done by
122. A (p. 171): nor
123. A (p. 171): fifth124. A (p. 171): have surmounted
125. D2, D3 (p. 190): in judging of the Goodness of Temper in any Agent,
the Abilitys must come into Computation, as is above-mentioned, and none
can act beyond their natural Abilitys
126. D2, D3 (p. 190): the Moment of Good produced equals theAbility127. A (p. 172): its
128. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 190).
129. A (p. 172): its
130. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 190).
131. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 191).
132. D2, D3 (p. 191): XII. In the same Manner we may compute the Degree of Depravity of any Temper, directly as the Moment of Evil effected,
and inversly as the Abilitys. The Springs of vicious Actions however are seldom any real ultimate Intention of Mischief, and never ultimate deliberate
Malice; but only sudden Anger, Self-Love, some selfish Passion or Appetite,some kind Attachments to Parties, or particular kind Passions.
The Motives of Interest may sometimes strongly cooperate with a depraved Temper, or may oppose it, in the same Manner that they cooperatewith or oppose a good Temper. When they cooperate, they diminish theMoral Evil; when they oppose, they may argue the Depravity of Temper tobe greater, which is able to surmount such Motives of Interest.
133. B [Errata, p. xxvi]: m ⳱ H ⳯ 1134. A (p. 173): or the Degree of Vice
135. A (p. 173): be co-operating with Hatred or opposing
136. Footnote in D2, D3 (p. 191): *See Treatise IV. § 6.

treatise ii, section iii

243

137. The following three paragraphs not in A (p. 174). Instruction for addition of the following three paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions(pp. 15–16).
138. Alterations and Additions (p. 16): or the secret139. Alterations and Additions (p. 16): Laws, and Governours
140. Alterations and Additions (p. 16): which in fact tend
141. Alterations and Additions (p. 16): the142. A (p. 174): From Axiom the 4th
D2, D3 (p. 193): From the former Reasonings
143. A (p. 174): would
144. A (p. 175): these do
145. A (p. 175): Affections may
146. D2, D3 (p. 194): Beneficence; and makes us
147. D2, D3 (p. 194): their Interests
148. D2, D3 (pp. 195–96): Some will not allow that Virtue can spring from
Passions, Instincts, or Affections of any Kind. ’Tis true, kind particular Passions are but a lower Kind of Goodness, even when they are not opposite to
the general Good. Those calmer Determinations of the Will, whether ofgreater or less Extent, or sedate strong Affections, or Desires of the Good ofothers, are more amiable. These may be as much rooted in the Frame of theSoul, or there may be as natural a Disposition to them as to particular Passions. They tell us, That “Virtue should wholly spring from Reason;” as if
Reason or Knowledge of any true Proposition could ever move to Action
where there is no End proposed, and no Affection or Desire toward that End.*For this see Treatise IV. Sect. i and ii.
The ultimate End, according to many of our Moralists, is to each one his
own Hap-[196]piness; and yet this he seeks by Instinct.
*These Gentlemen should either remember the common Doctrine of the Schools,
or else confute it better; that the proaíresic [choice] which is necessary in virtuous
Actions is o⁄reqic bouleutikh̀ [intention of will]: And that Virtue needs not only thelogòn a◊lhjh̃ [logical truth], but the o⁄reqic o◊rjh́n [right intention]. These very Authors who deny any Affections or Motions of the Will to be the proper Springs ofsublime Virtue, yet, inconsistently with themselves, must allow in Men of sublime
Virtue, and even in the Deity too, a settled Disposition of Will, or a constant Determination, or Desire to act in Conformity to Reason, or a fixed Affection towarda certain Manner of Conduct. Now an ill-natur’d Adversary would call this an Instinct, an Essential or Natural Disposition of Will, an Affectionate Determination
toward a very sublime Object presented by the Understanding. See Aristotle’s Magn.
Moral. Lib. i. c. 18, 35. and Lib. ii. c. 7 & 8. [MM I 18, 1189b 32ff.; I 35, 1196b 4ff.;
and II 7–8, 1204a 19ff.] and in many other Places.

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textual notes

149. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 196).
150. A (p. 176): towards
151. D2, D3 (p. 196): End consistently with the general Good.
152. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 196).
153. A (p. 176): generally
154. No new paragraph in A (p. 176), D2, D3 (p. 196). Not in Errata.
155. A (p. 176): not so much the156. Not in A (p. 176).
157. A (p. 176): Self-Love: And I see
158. A (p. 176): to be engag’d into Actions only as they shall appear to tend
to their own private Good.
C (p. 196), D1 (p. 197), D2, D3 (p. 196): until some prospect of Interest allures them to it.
159. A (p. 177): it may appear afterwards
160. A (p. 177): resolve, as much as possible, to cultivate
161. C (p. 196), D (p. 197): arises from
162. C (p. 197), D1 (p. 198), D2, D3 (p. 197): in studying to raise these kindAffections, and to163. New footnote in D2, D3 (pp. 197–98): *’Tis thus we must understandmany places of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and others of the Antients, when
they speak of “natural Instinct or Disposition in each Being, toward his own
Preservation and highest Perfection, as the Spring of Virtue.” ’Tis acknowledged by all, that we have such an Instinct, which must operate very indistinctly at first, till we come to consider our Constitution, and our several
Powers. When we do so, we find, according to them, the natural Principles
of Virtue, or the fusikaì a◊retaì [natural virtues], implanted in us: They
appear to us the noblest Parts of our Nature; such are our Desires of Knowledge, our Relish for Beauty, especially of the Moral Kind, our Sociable Affections. These upon Reflection we find to be natural Parts of our Constitution, and we desire to bring them to Perfection from the first-mentioned
general Instinct. We must not thence con-[198]clude, that all our Affections
spring from Self-Love, or are ultimately pursuing private Good. Disinterested
Affections are presupposed as natural Parts of our Constitution, and foundin it upon Reflection, not raised by an Act of Choice for some private Good,nor ultimately pursuing it. (See Cicer. De Finib. Lib. iii. & Lib. v.) This would
be manifestly contrary to the most express Words of these great Men on
Friendship, Patriotism, and other Subjects. See Aristotle in the Magn. Moral.
& Nicom. On Friendship; and Cicero de Finib. Lib. ii. & Lib. v.

treatise ii, section iv

245

164. D2, D3 (p. 198): From the preceding Reasonings we shall only draw
this one Inference
165. A (p. 177): may
166. A (p. 177): 6, 7
167. A (p. 178): may only take168. A (p. 178): be
169. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 198).

Treatise II, Section IV
1. A (p. 179): see
2. Footnote not in A (p. 179).
3. D2, D3 (p. 200): universally
4. D2, D3 (p. 200): generally
5. Not in A (p. 179). Instruction for addition already in Alterations andAdditions (pp. 16–17).
6. Alterations and Additions (pp. 16–17): occasion’d still
D2, D3 (p. 201): generally occasion’d7. D2, D3 (p. 201): others.* [and the following footnote:] *Beside that
moral Approbation or Commendation, we have also an immediate natural
Relish for certain Powers and Abilitys, and the regular Exercise of them; anda Dislike and Contempt of a Person who wants them, or has not cultivatedthem; when we don’t think of any Subserviency to a publick Good. But thisis rather perceiving a vigorous or a mean Character, than a virtuous or vitiousone.
8. A (p. 180): this
9. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 201).
10. Not in A (p. 180).
11. A (p. 180): still
12. A (p. 180): Actions to tend
13. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 202).
14. D2, D3 (p. 202): by stronger Motives of external Advantage
15. A (p. 181): yet does not cease
16. D2, D3 (p. 202): makes
17. A (p. 181): shall make
18. A (p. 181): command
19. A (p. 181): which in fact tend
20. A (p. 181): us246

textual notes

21. D2, D3 (p. 202): by their Moral
22. C (p. 202), D (p. 203): and conceive
23. C (p. 202), D (p. 203): to be
24. A (p. 182): Men may be blinded by Passion,
25. No new paragraph in A (p. 182): But to prove that some Men
26. C (p. 202), D (p. 203): without any Motive of Interest, real or apparent; and approved without any Opinion of Tendency to publick Good,or flowing from Good-will
27. A (p. 182): Person, of such Sentiments who
28. A (p. 182): touch
29. C (p. 203), D (p. 204): and the
30. A (p. 183): when Actions
31. No new paragraph in A (p. 184).
32. A (p. 184): antecedent to
33. A (p. 184): take away
34. D (p. 205): such
35. A (p. 185): shall certainly be
36. Not in A (p. 185). Instruction for addition of this paragraph alreadyin Alterations and Additions (pp. 17–18).
37. C (p. 206), D (p. 206): They are sparing enough in Accounts
38. C (p. 206), D (p. 206): transiently
39. Alterations and Additions (p. 18): to Caution of Assent in other matters
40. A (p. 186): judge, and compare the Tendencys of
41. Not in A (p. 186).
42. A (p. 186): in the
43. A (p. 186): the44. Omitted in C (p. 207), D (p. 208).
45. C (p. 208), D (p. 208): Deities
46. A (p. 187): amiable, gratefully
47. C (p. 208), D (p. 209): intimated
48. A (p. 187): us
49. The following two paragraphs not in A (p. 188). Instruction for addition of the following two paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions(pp. 18–21).
50. Footnote not in Alterations and Additions (p. 18).
51. Alterations and Additions (p. 18): Cabals, Factions
52. Alterations and Additions (p. 19): System.”* [and the following footnote:]*Ld. Shaftesbury’s Essay on Wit and Humour, Part. 3. Sect. 2. p. 110. Vol. 1.

treatise ii, section v

247

53. Alterations and Additions (p. 19): Notions
54. Alterations and Additions (p. 20): be very much
55. A (p. 188): as
56. No new paragraph in A (p. 188).
57. A (p. 188): with Peace a long Tract of Vice
58. B (p. 210): 1
B [Errata, p. xxvi]: 2
C (p. 212), D (p. 213): 1
59. A (p. 189): And hence
60. A (p. 190): conceiv’d as good
61. A (p. 190): are commonly observ’d to
62. A (p. 191): sometimes so,
63. A (p. 191): where yet there is nothing contrary to Benevolence apparent in the Actions
64. A (p. 191): Now we generally allow, that what is from Nature in one
Nation, would be so in all.
65. A (p. 191): and yet we cannot find any necessary tendency of it to thedetriment of Mankind, at least among Collaterals: Now this
66. Not in A (p. 191).
67. C (p. 215), D (p. 216): disapprove
68. A (p. 192): it is very hard to shew any
69. B [Errata, p. xxvi]: Persons
70. A (p. 192): Obligations; and this
71. A (p. 192): want of Benevolence, or Malice
72. A (p. 193): Incest, or prohibiting it; since it does not appear that any
obvious natural Evils follow from it
73. A (p. 193): do so: but

Treatise II, Section V
1. D2, D3 (p. 218): of our Benevolent Instincts of various Kinds
2. D1 (p. 218): an
D2, D3 (p. 218): a
3. D2, D3 (p. 218): all benevolent Affections are of one Kind, or alikestrong.
4. Omitted in C (p. 218), D (p. 218).
5. D2, D3 (p. 218): Kinds
6. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 218).

248

textual notes

7. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 218).
8. Omitted in C (p. 218), D (p. 218).
9. Not in A (p. 195).
10. Not in A (p. 195).
11. A (p. 195): may only further observe
12. No new paragraph in A (p. 196).
13. C (p. 219), D (p. 219): and14. Omitted in C (p. 219), D (p. 219).
15. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: more strongly and constantly than it
ascends
16. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: more
17. A (p. 197): But there is
18. A (p. 197): Part 2
19. C (p. 220), D (p. 220): great
20. C (p. 220), D (p. 220): great
21. D1 (p. 220): Maultiplicity
D2 (p. 220): a Multiplicity
D2 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: a Multiplicity
D3 (p. 220): Maultiplicity
D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: a Multiplicity
22. A (p. 197): be made useless towards multitudes, whose Interests, atvast distances, we could not understandD (p. 221): become useless, by being equally extended to Multitudes,
whose Interest we could not understand23. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 221).
24. C (p. 221), D (p. 221): so well ordered it, that as our Attention is more
raised by those good Offices which are done to our selves or our Friends, sothey cause a stronger Sense of Approbation in us, and produce a stronger
Benevolence toward (D1, p. 221: towards) the Authors of them
25. A (p. 198): towards
26. A (p. 198): selves; which we call Gratitude; and thus has laid aFoundation
27. A (p. 198): Part
28. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 221).
29. Not in A (p. 198).
30. D2, D3 (p. 221): The
31. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 222).
32. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 222).

treatise ii, section v

249

33. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 222).
34. D2, D3 (p. 222): altogether. Beside this general Attraction, the Learnedin these Subjects shew us a great many other Attractions among several Sorts
of Bodys, answering to some particular Sorts of Passions, from some special
Causes. And that Attraction or Force by which the Parts of each Body cohere,
may represent the Self-Love of each Individual.
35. D2, D3 (p. 222): These different Sorts of Love to Persons
36. Not in A (p. 199).
37. D2, D3 (p. 222): natural
38. C (p. 223), D (p. 223): desire and delight
39. A (p. 200): as Honour, is constituted an immediate Evil.
40. C (pp. 223–24), D (pp. 223–24): an Opinion [224] of him as pernicious to his Neighbours; but what subjects his Ease to this Opinion of theWorld? Why, perhaps, he
41. A (p. 201): from Interest
42. A (p. 201): to be
43. A (p. 202): is founded on Self-Love
44. A (p. 202): our
45. No new paragraph in A (p. 202).
46. A (p. 202): but
47. D (p. 225): to
48. Footnote not in A (p. 202).
49. Not in A (p. 204).
50. New footnote in C (p. 227), D (p. 227): *This should be consideredby those who talk much of Praise, high Opinion, or Value, Esteem, Glory,as Things much desired; while yet they allow no moral Sense.
51. C (p. 228), D (p. 228): be heartily approved and admired, when weknow that Self-Love is
52. C (p. 228), D (p. 228): admire
53. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: No; we should distrust all Pretenders tosuch a Temper, and hate
54. B [Errata, p. xxvi]: to procure
A (p. 205), C (p. 228), D (p. 228): to procure to
55. A (p. 205): form’d
56. A (p. 205): but
57. A (p. 206): any
58. D (p. 229): are
59. A (p. 206): did

250

textual notes

60. C (p. 230), D (p. 230): all Men would look upon
61. C (p. 232), D (p. 232): hereafter
62. A (p. 209): And hence
63. A (p. 209): and they never
64. Not in A (p. 209).
65. A (p. 209): And the66. A (p. 210): and67. C (p. 233), D (p. 233): Desire of
68. A (p. 210): some of the
69. C (p. 233), D (p. 233) add: and of having been acquired by Virtue,
70. A (p. 211): And the71. A (p. 211): Actions
72. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: strengthens the natural Modesty in civiliz’d Nations, as Habits and Education improve it
73. A (p. 213): many are there who
74. A (p. 214): the very
75. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: of
76. A (p. 214): We may also hence
77. D (p. 237): Pleasure
78. A (p. 214): as
79. A (p. 215): others, so no
80. A (p. 215): And therefore none are
81. A (p. 215): do not of themselves ever82. Not in A (p. 215).
83. New footnote in C (p. 238), D (p. 238): *See another Reason of this,perhaps more probably true, in the Essay on the Passions, p. 6.
84. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: morally evil [an apparently incomplete
correction]
85. Not in A (p. 216).
86. Not in A (p. 216).
87. A1 (p. 216): Misery and Distress immediately appear
A1 [Errata]: Misery or Distress
A2, A3 (p. 216): Misery and Distress immediately appears
88. A (p. 217): : Thus
89. Not in A (p. 217).
90. A (p. 217): and
91. A (p. 217): from Self-love we
92. A (p. 217): study

treatise ii, section vi

251

93. A (p. 218): pleas’d barely to
94. A (p. 219): meeting with
95. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: or Curiosity
96. A (p. 219): of all
97. Not in A (p. 219).
98. A (p. 219): do delight in some Actions which in fact
99. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 308]: State. Some have alleged, That “however the Sight of another’s Misery some way or other gives us Pain, yet thevery feeling of Compassion is also attended with Pleasure: This Pleasure issuperior to the Pain of Sympathy, and hence we desire to raise Compassionin ourselves, and incline to indulge it.” Were this truly the Case, the Continuation of the Suffering would be the natural Desire of the Compassionate,
in order to continue this State, not of pure Pleasure indeed, but of Pleasuresuperior to all Pains.

Treatise II, Section VI
1. A (p. 221): wherever it appears, that
2. A (p. 222): Mankind
3. A (p. 222): would
4. A (p. 222): when his
C (p. 245), D (p. 245): whose
5. A (p. 222): Would
6. A (pp. 223–24): the external Sensations of Pleasure, or all the Opportunitys of seeing the most beautiful regular Prospects, and hearing themost harmonious Sounds, or [224] obtaining the most extensive Knowledge?
These internal Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, have a great Power to sooth
7. A (p. 224): would
8. A (p. 224): Nay
9. A (p. 225): Par. 5.
10. C (p. 248), D (p. 248) insert: as related by Cicero and some others,
11. C (p. 248), D (p. 248): better a
12. No new paragraph in A (p. 226).
13. A (p. 226): would
14. A (p. 227): of
15. A (p. 227): some Ideas are
16. Not in A (p. 227).
17. A (p. 227): such Pleasures252

textual notes

18. No new paragraph in A (p. 227).
19. A (pp. 227–28): obtain the solitary Perceptions [228] of
20. A (p. 228): 2
21. A (p. 228): universal Judgment of
22. Not in A (p. 229).
23. A (p. 229): 4
24. A (p. 229): any
25. A (p. 230): it is that such Forms
26. A (p. 230): toward
27. A (p. 230): for these Irregularitys of
28. D2, D3 (p. 253): upon some probable Foundation in Nature, andsometimes without any,
29. C (p. 253), D (p. 253): Is it
30. A (p. 231): those
31. A (p. 231): are
32. D2, D3 (p. 253) [no new paragraph]: Had Homer, in his Characterof Helen, rais’d our Idea of her external Beauty to the greatest Height, yet
33. D2, D3 (p. 254): morally amiable
34. A (p. 234): even as
35. Not in A (p. 234).
36. A (p. 234): foresee all the
37. No new paragraph in A (p. 234).
38. New paragraph in A (p. 234).
39. C (p. 257), D (p. 257): and
40. A (p. 235): that it is not Love of sensible Pleasure which is
41. A (p. 235): we
42. A (p. 236): great
43. C (p. 258), D (p. 258): towards
44. Not in A (p. 236).
45. Omitted in D (p. 259).
46. Not in A (p. 239).
47. A (p. 239): how far does it go to
48. A (p. 240): the same moral
49. Not in A (p. 240).
50. D (p. 262): a more
51. D (p. 262): Representations
52. A (p. 241): hence it is that
53. A (p. 241): givetreatise ii, section vii

253

54. C (p. 263), D (p. 263): far
55. C (p. 263), D (p. 263): ver.
56. C (p. 264), D (p. 264): ver.
57. Not in A (p. 242).
58. A (p. 242): the59. Not in A (p. 242).
60. A (p. 242): his
61. A (p. 243): with their rude throats counterfeiting
62. C (p. 266), D (p. 266): ver.
63. Not numbered in A (p. 244).
64. Not numbered, no new article in A (p. 244).
65. In A pages 244–48 follow articles VIII and IX, which in the later editions became articles III and IV of Section 7: B (pp. 270–74), C (pp. 271–74), D (pp. 271–75). Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 21).

Treatise II, Section VII
1. A (p. 249): ; and that we have Ideas of Virtue and Vice, abstractly
2. A (p. 249): abstractly
3. A (p. 249): this Sense
4. Not in A (p. 250).
5. C (p. 268), D (p. 268): of
6. Omitted in D (p. 268).
7. C (p. 268), D (p. 268): beneficent
8. C (p. 268), D (p. 268): good
9. Not in A (p. 250).
10. Not in A (p. 250).
11. Not in A (p. 251).
12. A (p. 251): more promote our Advantage
13. C (p. 270), D (p. 270): virtuous Benevolence toward
14. A (p. 253): but are the Effect of the great Author of all things, whoforms our Nature for them.
15. In A (p. 253) articles III and IV appear instead at the end of Section
6, numbered VIII and IX (pp. 244–48).
16. C (p. 272), D (p. 272): influence
17. A (p. 245): were
18. C (p. 273), D (p. 273): condemn

254

textual notes

19. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, pp. 308–9]: contrary. Some also object, That
according to this Account, Brutes may be capable of Virtue; and this isthought a great Absurdity. But ’tis manifest, that, 1. Brutes are not capableof that, in which this Scheme places the highest Virtue, to wit, the calm
Motions of the Will toward the Good of others; if our common Accountsof Brutes are true, that they are merely led by particular Passions toward
present Objects of Sense. Again, ’tis plain there is something in [309] certain
Tempers of Brutes,* which engages our Liking, and some lower Good-willand Esteem, tho’ we do not usually call it Virtue, nor do we call the sweeter
Dispositions of Children Virtue; and yet they are so very like the lower
Kinds of Virtue, that I see no harm in calling them Virtues. What if there
are low Virtues in Creatures void of Reflection, incapable of knowing Laws,
or of being moved by their Sanctions, or by Example of Rewards or Punishments? Such Creatures cannot be brought to a proper Trial or Judgment: Laws, Rewards, or Punishments won’t have these Effects upon them,which they may have upon rational Agents. Perhaps they are no farther
rewarded or punished than by the immediate Pleasure or Pain of their Actions, or what Men immediately inflict upon them. Where is the Harm of
all this, That there are lower Virtues, and lower Vices, the Rewarding or
Punishing of which, in Creatures void of Reason and Reflection, can answer no wise End of Government?
*Cicero is not ashamed to say of some Brutes, Videmus indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, desideria,—secreta à voluptate humanarum simulacra virtutum.
De Finib. Lib. II. c. 33. [today: II, 110]. [Translation: “In a certain class of birds wesee some traces of affection, and also recognition and recollection; and in many weeven notice regret for a lost friend. If animals therefore possess some semblance of thehuman virtues unconnected with pleasure, . . .” Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, with an English translation by H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 202.]

20. Omitted in C (p. 273), D (p. 273).
21. A (p. 247): Interest do
22. A (p. 248): nothing else but
23. A (p. 253): wrongly numbered II (instead of III).
24. A (p. 253): Goodness, and Holiness
25. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: Or that his Will is conformable to his
Will.
26. No new paragraph in A (p. 254).
27. C (p. 275), D (p. 275): Desire oftreatise ii, section vii

255

28. D2, D3 [Corrigenda p. 311]: morally good [an apparently incomplete
correction]
29. C (p. 276), D (p. 276): Desire [In D1 and D3 pagination error: 267
instead of 276.]
30. Not in A (p. 255).
31. A (p. 255): altho
32. A (p. 255): Sanctions are join’d to co-operate
33. A (p. 255): Threatnings
34. A (p. 256): numbered IV.
35. C (p. 277), D (p. 277): one
36. A (p. 256): violated: And on
37. A (pp. 256–57): allowing
38. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: Natural Liberty
39. No new paragraph in A (p. 257).
40. Not in A (p. 257). Instruction for addition already in Alterations andAdditions (p. 21).
41. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: Natural Liberty
42. C (p. 279), D (p. 279): naturally residing in the Persons injur’d, or
their voluntary, or invited Assistants, to use force
43. Omitted in C (p. 279), D (p. 279).
44. Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 21).
45. Alterations and Additions (p. 21): injured Party
46. No new paragraph in A (p. 258).
47. A (p. 259): so the Power of
48. A (p. 259): is
49. A (p. 259): the Power of Compassion
50. A (p. 259): universal
51. A (p. 261): however
52. A (p. 261): Force: and hence
53. A (p. 261): War on both Sides just
54. A (p. 261): numbered V.
55. A (p. 261): a Power to transfer
D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: the Power of transferring
56. A (p. 262): pleases: and so
57. A (p. 262): serve
58. A (p. 262): numbered VI.
59. A (p. 262–63): all [263] Men are oblig’d to observe such a Tenour of
Action as shall most effectually promote Industry; and to256

textual notes

Alterations and Additions (p. 21): when Men are so numerous, that thenatural Product of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or
innocent Pleasure; all men are oblig’d to observe such a Tenour of Action as
shall most effectually promote Industry; and to
60. A (p. 263): Whatever
61. Not in A (p. 263).
62. A (p. 264): of Self-Love from Industry, and leaves Benevolence alone;[Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 22).]
63. Not in A (p. 264).
64. Omitted in D (p. 286).
65. A (p. 265): into
66. Not in A (p. 265). Instruction for addition of this paragraph alreadyin Alterations and Additions (p. 22).
67. Alterations and Additions (p. 22): according to their Prudence
68. A (p. 265): numbered VII.
69. D2, D3 (p. 288): Rules
70. Not in A (p. 265).
71. A (p. 265): 2
72. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 288).
73. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 288).
74. A (p. 266): And so
75. A (p. 266): farther
76. A (p. 266): in as far
77. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 289).
78. A (p. 267): Passions: And this79. Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 289).
80. D2, D3 (p. 290): the Motives of private Interest are greater.
81. D2, D3 (p. 290): selfish Motives from
82. A (p. 268): has often
83. D2, D3 (p. 291): no new
84. Omitted in D (p. 291).
85. D2, D3 (p. 291): natural Liberty, or the Penalties of Law in Civil
Society.
86. A (p. 269): perfect Rights, or even external ones,
87. D2, D3 (p. 291): A stronger and less extensive Tie of Benevolence, in
equal Abilitys, must produce a greater Moment of Good to the Object of it,
in equally good Characters, than the weaker Ties. Thus, natural Affection,
Gratitude, Friendship, have greater Effects than general Benevolence: Or,treatise ii, section vii

257

we do more Good to Friends, Children, Benefactors, than to Persons underno special Relation.
88. D2, D3 (p. 292): Benevolence alone
89. D2, D3 (p. 292): more extensive, but less passionate
90. D2, D3 (p. 292): more violent, or passionate
91. C (p. 292), D2, D3 (p. 292): more. The general Benevolence (C,p. 292, D1, p. 292: also) appears of itself a more amiable Principle, according
to the Constitution of our moral Sense [C, p. 292, D1, p. 292 add after“Sense” a footnote: *See Sect. 3 Art. IX & Art. X § 2.]
D2, D3 (p. 292) add: , than any particular Passion. [and add a footnote after “Sense”]: *See Sect. 3. Art. ix. The Author all along supposes, thatno Man acts without some Desire, or Instinct, or Affection, or Appetite; thatof these Attachments of the Will, some are calm and unpassionate, others
are passionate; some are extensive, and others confined to one, or to a few.
The former Sort in each of these Divisions, manifestly appears more amiable;
and consequently, caeteris paribus, the Virtue is less, in any given Quantity,of Good done from the violent, passionate, and narrow Attachment. A certain Remarker thence argues, “That then the Virtue is highest, when there is
no Desire, Affection, or Attachment at all; or when we act solely from Reason,
without any Affection to any Thing.” One may retort this Reasoning in alike Case. In any given Momentum of Bodies, there the Velocity is greater,where there is least Matter; consequently, it is there greatest, where there is
no Matter at all.
92. C (p. 293), D (p. 293): which
93. Not in A (p. 270). Instruction for addition of this paragraph alreadyin Alterations and Additions (pp. 23–24).
94. Alterations and Additions (p. 23): ought
95. The following five paragraphs are not in A (pp. 270–71); instead: VIII.
Let us not imagine, that from the above Idea of Right it will follow, [271]that the wise and benevolent have a perfect Right to dispose of the Labours
or Goods of the weak or foolish, because perhaps they would better employ
them for the publick Good than the unskilful Possessors can; for tho in someparticular Cases this might happen to do good, as when a good-natur’d Octavius assum’d the Government of a distracted Commonwealth; yet what
would be the Consequence of allowing this universally, while there is no acknowledg’d Standard, or Judge of superior Wisdom or Benevolence, which
every one would be too apt to claim? And as each Man is more nearly engag’dfor his own Good by Self-love, than another is by mere Benevolence, he will

258

textual notes

scarcely be brought to believe, that another understands his Interest, or pursues it, better than he could himself. And what Happiness can remain to theGovern’d, while there is any Suspicion of either the Benevolence or Wisdomof the Governor? Especially when there are too great Presumptions, that Governors may be sway’d by Self-love against the publick Good. From this Consideration, as well as the natural Love of Liberty, and Inclination both to act
and judge for our selves, we justly conclude, [Instruction for addition of thefive paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 24–30).]
96. Alterations and Additions (p. 24) adds footnote: *See Art. v. of the first
Edition.
97. Alterations and Additions (p. 25): unawares, or in
98. Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 25).
99. Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 25).
100. Alterations and Additions (p. 25): transferr’d101. Alterations and Additions (p. 25): ruining
102. Alterations and Additions (p. 25): Forms of Civil Government
103. Alterations and Additions (p. 26): or of both104. Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 27).
105. Alterations and Additions (p. 27): toward the Repair
106. Alterations and Additions (pp. 27–28): intirely
107. D (p. 298): secure108. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: violent Usurper
109. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: regard to a publick Good
110. A (p. 271): Pleasure111. Not in A (p. 272).
112. A (p. 272): we should be better guided by them than by our own
utmost113. A (p. 273): numbered IX.
114. Footnote not in A (p. 273).
115. A (p. 273): But
116. A (p. 273): (by his assuming Authority)
117. A (p. 273): would
118. D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: as some ancient Hereticks did,119. A (p. 274): numbered X.
120. C (p. 302), D (p. 302): There seems
121. A (p. 274): Par.
122. C (p. 302), D (p. 302): and desires
123. Not in A (p. 274).

treatise ii, section vii
124. Not in A (p. 274).
125. A (p. 274): that a126. A (p. 274): Course of such external
D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: or with a suitable Course of127. C (p. 302), D (p. 302): Hobbes
128. A (p. 275): numbered XI.
129. A (p. 275): been often
130. A (p. 275): would know
131. Omitted in C (p. 303), D (p. 303).
132. A (p. 275): Yea
133. C (p. 303), D (p. 303): approve134. No new paragraph in A (p. 275).
135. C (p. 303), D (p. 303): not136. Omitted in C (p. 303), D (p. 303).
137. C (p. 304), D (p. 304): more than138. C (p. 304), D (p. 304): more lovely259

index

This index uses modern American spelling. When necessary, proper names arelisted both under their common modern spelling and under Hutcheson’s spelling. Published works not listed in the index may be found by checking the entry
for their author.
absolute beauty. See original or absolute beauty
absolute government, 193
abstraction, 20
Achilles, 92n
acquaintance, natural affection notfounded on, 148–49
advantage. See self-interest
Aegysthus (Aegisthus), 94
Aeneas, 92
Aeneid (Virgil), 11n, 92n
Aeschylus, 94n
aesthetics: animals, aesthetic sense of,28, 46–47; animals, as beautiful inthemselves, 32–34; association ofideas and, 62–63, 67–75; comparative or relative, 27–28, 42–45;
custom, effects of, 70–72; definition of beauty, 23; design in cause
reasoned from (see design, argument from); diversity of judgment
regarding, 66–69, 168–69; education and instruction in, 10, 20, 66–
67, 72–74; by example, 74–75;
final cause of, 78–81, 217n28; general/universal laws, operation ofuniverse by, 58–59, 81–82; of grandeur, 40–41, 69; harmony, 23, 34–

35; of history, 65; Hutcheson’s
theory of, xi–xii, 9–10; importanceof, 76–78; as internal sense, 23–24,
66–67, 76–82; moral virtue andexternal beauty of persons, 167–71;
natural origins of, 10, 20, 66–67;
of novelty and surprise, 40–41, 69;
original or absolute (see original orabsolute beauty); perception of,
19–27; pleasure and pain derived
from, 25, 61–63, 159–60; proportionate (see proportion, aestheticsof); self-interest, separateness from,
25–26; single principle, attempts todeduce knowledge from, 39–40; oftheorems, 36–41, 72; uniformity
with variety in, 28–30; universalityof sense of beauty, 63–69; utilitarian theory of, 210–11n17; wisdom
and prudence in cause reasoned
from, 57–58
affections and passions as motive to
virtuous actions, 101–15; concomitant pleasure, pursued from, 110–12; country, affection for, 115;
different types and moral status of,
239n82; disinterestedness of, 102–3,
106–8; happiness of others, plea-

261

262

index

affections and passions as motive to
virtuous actions (continued )sure derived from, 227–29n30;
hatred, 102–3, 105; malice, 102–3,
105–6, 119–20; parents and children, natural affection between,
112–13, 148–49; public affections,
114–15; religion, not grounded in,
108–10; volition, affections notraised by, 224–26n33. See also
benevolence; love
Agamemnon, 94nair, motion, and gestures, 167–70
Alciphron (Berkeley), 210–11n17
alienable rights, 186–87, 192–93
allegory, 43
ambition, 151
Amphion, 173, 174nanimals: aesthetic sense of, 28, 46–47;
association of ideas with, 62–63;
beauty of, 32–34; children tormenting, 162; fowls, 34; perceptionof, 203n40; proportion in, 33–34;
virtue, incapacity for, 254n19
Apollo, 92n
approbation: benevolence as soleground of, 137–38; false, 137–38; asparticular moral sense, xvi; selfinterest not ground of, 93–94
architecture, xii, 8, 22, 23, 24, 25, 41,
62, 64–68, 72–74, 77, 79, 127,210n17
Aristotle, xvn, 12n, 43, 208–9n43,
210n17, 243n148*, 244n163, 210–211n17
art, works of, 41, 42, 44–45, 64, 77, 176
association of ideas, 62–63, 67–75
astronomical beauty, 30–31, 78
Athena, 106n
Athenian Academy, 173
attempts at virtue, failure of, 189
axioms: aesthetics of, 37; degrees ofvirtue and vice, corollaries forcomparing, 189–92; of moral evil,

130–32, 242n132; of moral good,
128–30barbarians, low opinion of, 142
barbarous customs, travelers’
accounts of, 139–41
beauty. See aesthetics
Beccaria, Cesare, 125n
benevolence, 116–35; as act of will,
xiv–xv; approbation, as soleground of, 137–38; axioms forcomputing, 128–30, 240–41n101; inChristianity, xiv–xv, 230n33***;complex moral ideas derived from,
177; consequences of, 125–26; custom or education, not derived
from, 99, 145–47; degrees of, 148;
desire, defined by simple idea of,xiv–xv; different inclinations of,
192; different types of, 236–37n50;
disposition toward, 127–28; esteem
and complacence presupposed by,
104–5; final cause of, 104; God and(see under God); greatest happinessfor greatest numbers as object of,
125; happiness and, xvii, 164–67,
227–29n30; importance of, 164–67; moral good, as foundation of,xiii–xv, 116, 136–37; moral qualitiesof objects of, 124; between parents
and children, 112–13, 148–49; partial, 126–27; perfect, 130; public,
114–15; self-interest and, 103–4,
107–8, 122–24, 132, 223–31n33;
strength of attachment to objectsof, 127, 191–92, 240n93, 256–57n87, 257n91; universal agreement
regarding, 136–37, 146–47; volition, not raised by, 224–26n33
Bentham, Jeremy, 125n
Bergerac, Cyrano de, 114n
Berkeley, George, 11n, 118n, 210–11n17
biblical citations: 1 Corinthians 15:32,
230n33***; Hebrews 11:6,

index230n33***; Hebrews 12:2, 230–
31n33***; Matthew 19:19, xv;
Philippians 2:6–7, 231n33***
Bouvier de Fontenelle, Bernard de,115nbrutes. See animals
Burnet, Thomas, xiiin
cabals pernicious to virtue, 142–44
Cadmus, 106
Caeneus, 220n31
Caesar, 97n, 120n
calculations: algebraic calculations
and beauty, 36, 207n4; evil, 130–32;
fluxional calculations and beauty,
36, 207n4; morality of actions,
128–30, 130–32, 134–35, 240–41n101, 242n132
Calvin, John, 87n
Carteret, John, First Earl Granville,
4–5
Cartesian theory, 39, 46n, 55, 211n6
Carthaginians, 97n, 166
castle-builders, 164–65
Catholic buildings, destruction of,
64
Cato (M. Porcius Cato Uticensis),97, 120n, 221n59
cause: aesthetics, final cause of, 78–81,
217n28; benevolence, final causeof, 104; design in cause reasoned
from beauty or regularity of effects(see design, argument from); one
general cause, useful or beautiful
effects flowing from, 58–59; wisdom and prudence in cause
reasoned from beauty or regularityof effects, 57–58
chance. See design, argument fromcharacters, moral beauty of, 132–33
charm in beauty, 167–71
chastity, 171
children: compassion in, 162; geometric shapes, fondness for, 30;263

honor, sense of, 156; parents and,affection between, 105, 112–13, 127,
135, 140, 141, 148–49, 175, 227n33,
233–34n112, 237n50, 239n82; universality of moral sense detectedin, 146–47
Choroebus (Korroibos), 92
Christianity, benevolence in, xiv–xv,
230n33***. See also biblical citations; God
Cicero: animals, affections of,
254n19*; on Cato, 97n; on Codrus,
94n; conspiracies, vigilance in discovering, 99; on Decius Mus, 94n;
on disinterested benevolence,
230n33**; on final cause of aesthetic sense, 217n28; on gladiatorial
combat, 161; Hutcheson’s familiarity with, 12n; on instinct toward
virtue, 244n163; on natural affection between parents and children,
251n10; opening and dedicatory
quotations from, xxivn, 3, 201n36†
civil government, right of, 189
Clarke, Samuel, 39, 182n
clockwork, 58
Clytemnestra, 94n
Cocceji, Samuel, xn
Codrus (last king of Athens), 94
Cogito, ergo sum, 39
commerce, right of, 188
comparative or relative beauty, 27–28,
42–45
compassion, 160–62, 251n99
complacence or esteem, love of,
102–5complex forms, impossibility ofchance creation of, 50–54
complex moral ideas derived frommoral sense, 177
complex vs. simple ideas, xiii, 21–22
computational axioms. See axioms
concomitant pleasure, virtue pursued
from, 110–12

264

index

consequences: affecting morality ofactions, 125–26; defined, 238–
39n73; unintentional or
unforeseen, 129–30
constraint vs. obligation, 182–83
contempt or displicence, hatred of,
102–3
Cooper, Anthony Ashley, Third Earlof Shaftesbury, xi–xiii, xxiv, 9, 12,87n, 140n, 142n, 199, 246n52
1 Corinthians 15:32, 230n33***
corollaries, 38–39, 189–92
countenances: association of ideas
with, 62; moral virtue and externalbeauty of persons, 167–71; perception of beauty in, 36, 204n71
country: love of, 115; opinions of,
152–53
creation not grounds for God’s
dominion, 196–97
crystallization, 49–50
Cudworth, Ralph, xiiin
cultural issues: diversity of moral
principles, 138–45, 152–53; opinions
of country, 152–55. See also custom;
exampleCumberland, Richard, xv, 94, 178,
197, 208n37, 236–37n50
Cupid, 176
custom: aesthetic sense and, 70–72;
barbarous, travelers’ accounts of,
139–41; compassion not derived
from, 162; moral sense not derived
from, 99, 145–46
dancing, 206n42
Decius (Publius Decius Mus), 94, 97,
221n59Defoe, Daniel, 114n
Deity. See God
Derry, Siege of, 159
Descartes, René, 39, 46n, 55, 211n6
design, argument from, 46–60; arbitrary origins of our pleasure inuniformity, possibility of, 46–47;
complex forms, impossibility ofchance creation of, 50–54; general/
universal laws, useful or beautiful
effects flowing from, 58–59; grosssimilarity of forms by chance,
impossibility of, 54–56; irregularity,
want of design not proved by, 56–
57; miracles, significance of, 60;
regularity of form by chance,
impossibility of, 49–52; undirectedagency, probability of, 46–49; wisdom and prudence in cause also
reasoned from aesthetics, 57–58
desire, benevolence defined by simple
idea of, xiv–xv
despotic power, xviii, 121, 194–95,
235–36n25
disinterestedness. See self-interest
displicence or contempt, hatred of,
102–3
disposition toward moral good, 127–
28
diversity: of aesthetic judgment, 66–
69, 168–69; of moral principles,
138–46
divinity. See God
Domitian (Roman emperor), 235n25
dreams, role of moral sense in, 164–65
dress and equipage, aesthetics in, 22,
26, 65, 66, 68, 76, 77, 159, 171,202n26dualism, Manichean, 110
Dutch struggle for freedom from
Spain, 93n
duty or obligation, 177–79, 182–83
earth, beauty of, 30–31, 31
education and instruction: in aesthetics, 10, 20, 66–67, 72–74;
compassion not derived from, 162;
moral sense not derived from, 99,
145–47; prejudices of, 73–74; virtue
acquired by, 179–81

indexElectra (Euripides), 94n
Electra (Sophocles), 94n
epic poetry, 174–75
Epicurus, 55, 143esteem or complacence, love of,
102–5
Euclid, 36, 38
Euripides, 94nevil, natural vs. moral, xiii, 85–86,
90–91. See also moral evil
example: aesthetic sense and, 74–75;
moral sense not derived from, 99
executions, public, 161
external rights, 185–86
external senses, 23–25
Fable of the Bees (Mandeville), xiii,
9n, 93n, 97n, 110n, 112n, 113n,
154n, 156n, 199n1
faces: association of ideas with, 62;
moral virtue and external beauty of
persons, 167–71; perception of
beauty in, 36, 204n71
factions pernicious to virtue, 142–44
fear or reverence, 106–7
Filmer, Robert, 196n
final cause. See cause
fluids, beauty of, 34
foresight, 129–30, 131–32
form, Platonic concept of, xi–xii
fowls, beauty of, 34
Franklin, Benjamin, x
freedom (liberty), ix–x, xvii–xviii,
138–39, 258n95
friendship, 172
furniture, aesthetics of, 66, 77
gardens and gardening, xii, 8, 22, 25,
26, 30, 41, 44, 66, 77, 85, 107
general/universal laws, 58–59, 81–82
geometric shapes, beauty in, 29–30,
44–45, 79
ghosts or spirits, 74, 175
giants, 33

265

gladiatorial combat, 161–62
Gnosticism, 110n
God: aesthetic sense, as final cause of,
78–81; argument from design forexistence of (see design, argumentfrom); benevolence grounded ingoodness of, 197; benevolence notgrounded in rewards offered by,
108–10; benevolence toward, 117–
18; creation not grounds fordominion of, 196–97; false opinions regarding, 144–45; goodnessof, 197–98; government of, 195–96;
gratitude toward, disinterestednessof, 226n30; justice of, 196; laws of,
181–82, 196; miracles of, 60; moral
sense, God as final cause of, 99;
moral sense not grounded inrewards offered by, 96
good. See moral good
goodness: divine, 197–98; moral (seemoral good); natural, xiii, 85–86,
89–91
Gothic architecture, 64–65, 67–68,
72–73
government, 189, 192–96
grandeur, 40–41, 69, 158–59
gratitude, 117–18, 149–51, 223n30,
226n30gravity, law of, 59
greatest happiness for greatest numbers, xvi–xvii, 125; in aesthetics, 45;
coining of, x; self-interest, notincompatible with, 122–24
Hamlet (Shakespeare), 92
happiness: benevolence and, xvii,
164–67, 227–29n30; differing
notions of, 138–39; importance ofmoral sense to, 164–66; liberty,
relationship to, ix–x, xvii–xviii;
moral good and, xvii; necessity ofmoral virtue to, 166–67; pleasure
derived from others’ happiness,

266

index

happiness (continued )227–29n30. See also greatest happiness for greatest numbers
harmony, aesthetic, 23, 34–35, 43
Harrington, James, xviii
hatred, 102–3, 105heat, principle of, 59
Hebrews: 11:6, 230n33***; 12:2, 230–
31n33***
Hector, 92n
Hecuba, 92
Helen of Troy, 169, 252n32
Hercules, 42heroic monuments, 44–45
heroic virtue, 134–35
history: aesthetics of, 65; moral foundations of, 176
Hobbes, Thomas, 86n, 93n, 94n,
197n, 219n31, 259n126
Homer, 43, 44, 169, 176, 252n32
honor, 151–60
Horace, 31n, 64, 76n, 83, 98n, 144n,
165n, 174–75, 201–2n36
human nature, importance of knowledge of, 7–9
Hutcheson, Francis, writings of:Inquiry (see Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and
Virtue); Synopsis metaphysicae,
xviin; A System of Moral Philosophy, xviin, xviiin, 11n
ideas: association of, 62–63, 67–75; ofbeauty and harmony, 23–24; form,
Platonic concept of, xi–xii; innate
ideas not presupposed by moral
sense, 67, 100; internal sense of,
23–24; mind’s power of compounding, 20; simple vs. complex,xiii, 21–22; of substances, 20. See
also moral ideas
ignorance, crimes of, 132
Iliad (Homer), 169, 176
Il Penseroso (Milton), 68

imagery in poetry, 175–76
imperfect rights, 184–85
inalienable rights, 186–87, 192–93
incest, 145–46
Indian architecture, 65
Indians, customs of, 140–41
individual characters, moral beautyof, 132–33
individual countenances, moral disposition in, 167–69, 204n71
individual dispositions and abilities,
moral effect of, 127–28
infanticide, 140, 141innate ideas not presupposed bymoral sense, 67, 100
innocence, 131
Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas
of Beauty and Virtue (Hutcheson),ix–xviii; Alterations and Additions
to, xxiii, xxvi; argument and theory of, x–xi; dedication to Lord
Carteret, 4–5; editions of, xxiii–
xxviii, 12–13; illustration of
Hutcheson, iii; liberty and happiness, relationship between, ix–x;
original table of contents, 15–16;
original title page, 3; perception,
theory of, xi–xii; political perspective of moral philosophy of, xvii–
xviii; text notes, xxiii–xxix
Inquisition, 140
instincts or passions, virtue arisingfrom, 133–34, 243n148, 244n163
instruction. See education andinstruction
intention: beauty arising from correspondence to, 44–45; moral evil and,
131–32; moral good and, 129–30
interest. See self-interest
internal sense of aesthetics, 23–24,
66–67, 76–82
Irish Rebellion, 140
irregularity, want of design notproved by, 56–57

indexJames II (king of England), 159n
Jove, 175
justice: divine, 196; right of, 189
kindred, affection for, 114–15, 172
knowledge: of human nature, 7–9; oflaws, 190; single principle,
attempts to deduce from, 39–40
labor, right to fruits of (rights ofproperty and commerce), 187–88,
257–58n95
laws: divine, 181–82, 196; knowledgeof, 190; moral sense of, 181–83
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, xn, 39
Leviathan (Hobbes), 86n, 197n,
219n31
The Libation Bearers (Aeschylus),
94n
liberalism, ix
liberality, 123, 192
liberty, ix–x, xvii–xviii, 138–39,
258n95limited government, 193–94
Livy, 97n
Locke, John, xi, xiii–xiv, 9n, 22, 66,
86n, 196n
longitude, discovery of, 155
lotteries, 56
love: of benevolence (see benevolence); of complacence or esteem,
102–5; of country, 115; disinterestedness of, 102–3, 107–8; of self (seeself-interest); sexual, 102, 170–71
Lucretia, rape of, 220n31
luxury, 77–78, 137, 157–59
Lycurgus, 140
machines and mechanical philosophy,
45, 52–53, 57–58
malice, 102–3, 105–6, 119–20
Mandeville, Bernard, xiii, 9n, 93n,
97n, 110n, 112n, 113n, 154n, 156n,
199n1

267

Manicheanism, 110
marriage: parents and children, affection between, 105, 112–13, 127, 135,
140, 141, 148–49, 175, 227n33, 233–
34n112, 237n50, 239n82; right of,
188; sexual love in, 102, 170–71
Mars, 176
mathematical axioms. See axioms
mathematical theorems, beauty of,
36–41, 72
Matthew 19:19, xv
Mazdean religion (Zoroastrianism),
110n, 145nmeanness, 158–59
Menelaos, 176n
mercantile activity, right of, 188
merit, natural affection not foundedon, 148–49
metaphor, 43
Milton, John, 68n, 71, 106, 117
miracles, 60
misers, 77
modesty, 158, 250n72
Molesworth, Robert, 11, 118nmonuments, 44–45
moon, travel to, 114–15n
moral evil: axioms for computing,
130–32, 242n132; degrees of virtue
and vice, corollaries for comparing,
189–92; foundations of, 120–22;
imagination of moral good in, 144;
moral sense perceiving, 89–100;
natural evil vs., xiii, 85–86, 90–91;
no approbation of, 138; public,
119–20; self-interest and, 86–88,
91–100, 190; shame as, 153
moral good, xiii–xv, 85–88; aesthetic
theory of, 9–10; affections as
motive to (see affections and passions as motive to virtuous
actions); axioms for computing,
128–30, 240–41n101; benevolence
as foundation of, xiii–xv, 116, 136–
37 (see also benevolence); of

268

index

moral good (continued )characters, 132–33; concomitant
pleasure, pursued from, 110–12;
degrees of virtue and vice, corollaries for comparing, 189–92;
external beauty of persons and,
167–71; happiness and, xvii; heroic,
134–35; Hutcheson’s theory of,xiii–xviii; imagined in moral evil,
144; from instincts or passions,
133–34, 243n148, 244n163; moral
sense perceiving, 89–100; naturaldisposition to, 133–34; natural
good vs., xiii, 85–86, 89–91; opinions regarding impetus to, 86–88;
perfect, 130; pleasure, superiority
to, 165–66; prudence vs., xviii; reason and, 133–34, 141, 179–81,
243n148; sects pernicious to, 142–
44; self-interest and, xiii, 86–88,
91–100, 132, 189–90; social theoryof, xiii, 39–40; universal agreement
regarding benevolence as foundation of, 136–37, 146–47
moral ideas: complex moral ideas
derived from benevolence, 177;
custom, education, or example,
not derived from, 99; moral sense
as origin of, xv–xvi; self-interest,
not derived from, 92–93
moral incapacity, shamefulness of,
157–59moral principles, reasons for diversityof, 138–46
moral sense: divine goodness,grounded in, 197; God as final
cause of, 99; honor, not arisingfrom love of, 155–56; importanceto happiness of, 164–66; innate
ideas not presupposed by, 67, 100;
opinion flowing from, 153–55; asorigin of moral ideas, xv–xvi; pleasure, relationship to, 165, 221–
22n71; praise not occasioning, 97–

99; religion not basis for, 96;
self-interest, not bribable by, 94–
96; universal agreement regarding,
136–37, 146–47; virtue and vice,
perception of, 89–100. See also
benevolencemusic, xii, 22, 23, 35, 62, 68–69, 77,
155, 171, 206n42
national love, 115
national opinion, 152–53
natural affection, 112–15, 148–49
natural disposition to moral good,
133–34natural evil vs. moral evil, xiii, 85–86,
90–91
natural good vs. moral good, xiii, 85–
86, 89–91
natural origins of aesthetic sense, 10,
20, 66–67
nature: beauty in, 30–34; imitationof, 44neighbors, affection for, 114–15, 172
Nero (Roman emperor), 120, 235n25
Newton, Isaac, 38, 39n
novelty, aesthetics of, 40–41, 69
obligation or duty, 177–79, 182–83
one general cause, useful or beautiful
effects flowing from, 58–59
one principle, attempts to deduceknowledge from, 39–40
opinion: of country, 152–53; moral
sense, flowing from, 153–55
opposition of rights, 186
oratory, moral foundations of, 172–74
Oresteia (Aeschylus), 94n
Orestes, 94
original or absolute beauty, 28–35;
comparative beauty vs., 26–27;
harmony as part of, 34–35; innature, 30–34; uniformity withvariety, 28–30
Orpheus, 173, 174n

indexPaetus (Thrasea Paetus), 120
pain. See pleasure and pain
painting, xii, 8, 9, 23, 24, 42, 64, 74,
77, 86, 176
Pallas, 176
Pandaros, 176nParadise Lost (Milton), 106, 117
parents and children, affection
between, 105, 112–13, 127, 135, 140,
141, 148–49, 175, 227n33, 233–
34n112, 237n50, 239n82
Paris, massacre at, 140parterres, 44
party spirit pernicious to virtue, 142–44
passions and affections. See affections
and passions as motive to virtuous
actionspassions or instincts, virtue arisingfrom, 133–34, 243n148, 244n163
passive obedience, 118–19
patriotism (love of country), 115
Pausanias, 92nperception, xi–xii, 8–9, 19–27
perfect rights, 183–84, 191
perfect virtue, 130
Philippians 2:6–7, 231n33***
Pictish painting, 64
pirates and piracy, 105, 143
planetary bodies, beauty in, 30–31, 78
planets, travel to, 114–15nplants, beauty of, 31–32
Plato, xi, 12n, 173n, 210–11n17,
244n163
pleasure and pain, 7–8, 20–21; advantage or interest, relationship to, 86;
aesthetic, 25, 61–63, 159–60; fromassociation of ideas, 62–63, 67–69;
compassion occasioning, 160–62,
251n99; concomitant pleasure, virtue pursued from, 110–12;
happiness of others, pleasure
derived from, 227–29n30; moral
sense and pleasure, relationship269

between, 165, 221–22n71; moral
virtue superior to, 165–66; natural
good and evil, relationship to, xiii,
86; necessity of moral virtue topleasure, 166–67; perception, connection to, 203n42
Plotinus, 12n
Plutarch, 140n
poetry, xii, 9, 24, 42–43, 64, 65, 171,174–76
Polites, 92
political perspective of Hutcheson’s
moral philosophy, xvii–xviii, 192–
96. See also public good; rights
Popish buildings, destruction of, 64
Poseidon, 220n31
power, honor/shame in, 157
praise, moral sense not occasioned by,
97–99
prejudice, 73–74, 142
Priamus (Priam, king of Troy), 92
prisms, 49–51
private pleasure as occasion of vice,
157–58
private property, 187–88
property rights, 187–88, 196, 257–
58n95
proportion, aesthetics of: in animals,
33–34; in structures, 41
Prosopopoeia, 175
prudence, xviii, 57–58
public affections, 114–15
public evil, 119–20
public good: actions harmful to agent
but advantageous to, 123; approbation of actions based on usefulness
to, 136–37; government, 189, 192–
96; honor and, 153–54;
Hutcheson’s views on, xvii–xviii;
importance of moral sense to,164–66; justice, 189, 196; perfect
rights necessary to, 183–84; sects
arising from, 142; social virtues,
benevolence as foundation of,

270

index

public good (continued )118–20; wealth and power used for,157; wrong or partial views of, 144.
See also rights
public opinion, 152–55
Pufendorf, Samuel, 39, 94, 178, 197,
208n38punishment, right of, 184
Pyrrhus (Pyrrhos I, king of Epirus), 92
reason and moral good, 133–34, 141,
179–81, 243n148
regularity or beauty of effects, designin cause reasoned from. See design,
argument from
Regulus (Marcus Atilius Regulus),
97, 165
relations, affection for, 114–15, 172
relative or comparative beauty, 27–28,
42–45
religion. See God
resistance, right of, ix, xviii, 93, 118–
19, 193
reveries, role of moral sense in, 164–
65
rights: alienable and inalienable, 186–
87, 192–93; of civil government
and justice, 189; of commerce, 188;
derivation of idea of, 183; external,
185–86; fulfilling or violating, 191;
government and, 192–96; imperfect, 184–85; of marriage, 188;
opposition of, 186; perfect, 183–84,
191; of property and labor, 187–88,
196, 257–58n95; of resistance, ix,
xviii, 93, 118–19, 193; Virginia billof, ix; of war and punishment, 184robbers, honor among, 143–44
Roman Catholic buildings, destruction of, 64
Russen, David, 114n
scriptural citations. See biblicalcitationssculpture, 42, 44–45
sects pernicious to virtue, 142–44
self-interest: affections, disinterestedness of, 102–3, 106–8; approbation
not grounded in, 93–94; benevolence and, 103–4, 107–8, 122–24,
132, 223–31n33; greatest happinessfor greatest numbers not incompatible with, 122–24; moral goodand evil, relationship to, xiii, 86–
88, 91–100, 132, 189–90; moral
ideas not derived from, 92–93;
moral indifference of, 122; moral
sense not bribable by, 94–97; natural affection overwhelmed by, 115;
obligation or duty arising from,
178; pleasure antecedent to, 25–26,
86; political ramifications of, xvii–
xviii; surmounting, 190; theory of
moral good based in, xiii
selfishness, 157–58
sensation, 19
sensational literature, 140–41
senses, 19–20, 23–25
Sermon on the Mount, xv
Sextus (son of Tarquinius Superbus),
220n31
Sextus Empiricus, 140n
sexual love, 102, 170–71
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper,
Third Earl of, xi–xiii, xxiv, 9, 12,87n, 140n, 142n, 199, 246n52
Shakespeare, William, 92
shame, 153, 155–60
simile, 43
simple vs. complex ideas, xiii, 21–22
single cause, useful or beautiful
effects flowing from, 58–59
single principle, attempts to deduceknowledge from, 39–40
Sinon, 92
slavery, 142, 162
social theory of moral good, xiii, 39–40

indexsocial virtues, benevolence as foundation of, 118–20
society, moral origins of, 172
society and friendship, 114–15, 172
Solon, 140
Sophocles, 94nspace travel, 114–15n
Sparta, 94n, 106n, 139
spirits, fear of, 74, 175
Stoics, 173n
St. Serfe, Sir Thomas, 114nsun, principle of heat derived from, 59
surprise and novelty, aesthetics of,
40–41, 69
symbolism, 43–44, 175–76
Syng[e], Edward, 11–12
Synopsis metaphysicae (Hutcheson),xviin
A System of Moral Philosophy (Hutcheson), xviin, xviiin, 11n
Tarquin, 220n31
theorems, beauty of, 36–41, 72
thieves, honor among, 143–44
Thrasea Paetus, 120
trade, right of, 188tragedy, 161, 174–75
Trojan War, 92n, 169
truths, universal. See theorems,
beauty oftyrants, xviii, 121, 194–95, 235–36n25
uniformity: aesthetic pleasure derived
from variety with, 28–30; arbitrary
origins of our pleasure in, possibility of, 46–47; general/universal
laws, 58–59, 81–82; one principle,
attempts to deduce knowledge
from, 39–40

271

unintentional or unforeseen consequences, 129–30, 131–32
United States: Hutcheson’s influencein, x; Virginia Bill of Rights, 1776,
ix
universality: of aesthetic sense, 63–
69; of moral sense, 136–37, 146–
47; of opinion of divine goodness,
197–98; useful or beautiful effects
flowing from universal/generallaws, 58–59
use, beauty as, 210–11n17
utilitarianism: aesthetic, 210–11n17;
principal maxim of, ix, 125n. See
also greatest happiness for greatest
numbers
variety, uniformity with, 28–30
Venus, 176
vice. See moral evil
Virgil, 11n, 44, 92n, 169
Virginia Bill of Rights, ix
virtue. See moral goodvolition, affections not raised by,
224–26n33
voluntary generation of love or any
other affection, xiv–xv, 223–31n33
war, right of, 184
wealth, honor/shame in, 157
Whigs, xviii, 11nwill, affections not raised by, 224–
26n33
wisdom in cause reasoned from aesthetics, 57–58
women, compassion in, 162
Zeno of Citium, 173n
Zoroastrianism, 110n, 145n

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