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Sino-Japanese Relations in the Year 1958:
Steps Toward Reconciliation
Casper WITSIntroduction
The period from the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to
the Sino-Japanese rapprochement in 1972 was an era in which Japan and
China did not maintain diplomatic relations. There was plenty of contact
however, but always in a nominally nongovernmental framework. Already inthe early 1950s the newly formed government of the People’s Republic of China
decided on prioritizing the achievement of diplomatic normalization in its
relations with Japan. However, while Japan was ruled by the government of
Yoshida Shigeru (吉田茂), both under U.S. occupation and after, there was little
chance of rapprochement with the PRC. Under U.S. pressure, the Japanese
government officially recognized the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan as thelegitimate government of China when it signed the Treaty of Taipei on April 28,
1952 that served as a formal end to the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).
During the successive governments of Hatoyama Ichiro (鳩山一郎In office:December 1954-December 1956) and Ishibashi Tanzan (石橋湛山In office:December 1956-January 1957) there was much more chance of a Sino-Japaneserapprochement, especially after the Hatoyama government normalized relations
with the USSR in 1956. Policy in Beijing was crafted accordingly, andstrengthened ties with Japan featured prominently in Premier Zhou Enlai’s
East Asia strategy. Seemingly, the situation changed when Ishibashi resigned
due to ill health and he was succeeded by former “Class A” war crimes suspect
Kishi Nobusuke (岸信介In office: January 1957-July 1960), who was a pro-ROC
conservative and therefore less inclined to pursue policies favourable to the
PRC. Interestingly, this would not alter the importance Zhou Enlai placed onties with Japan, and throughout the latter half of the 1950s Japan would
maintain its central place in his strategic vision. With direct government ties adistant prospect, in practise this meant cultivating ties with Japanese people
from all walks of life, both inside and outside politics. This became known as the120

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第5号“Promoting government relations via people- to- people exchange” (以民促官)
policy. Taking a closer look at how relations with Japan were managed by the
Chinese in the year 1958 will help us gain a deeper understanding of Zhou
Enlai’s strategic craftsmanship. This was an eventful year with not only thestart of the Great Leap Forward in China but also with a complete breakdownof Sino-Japanese relations after the Nagasaki Flag Incident on May 2nd, and theyear in which Zhou established the groundwork for his Japan policy in years tocome. Central in his dealings with Japan was the cultivation of a “pipe” (as theJapanese like to call it) or backchannel; a direct personal connection between
two people of importance from both sides. This practise, established in the
1950s, was to prove highly effective in the era before the 1972 rapprochement
as well as after. A recent International Crisis Group report has linked thecurrent troubles in Sino-Japanese relations to the disappearance of the lastpersonal “pipe” between two influential politicians on both sides in 2008.1
The year 1958 saw the creation of a “pipe” with two Japanese who were to playa pivotal role in Sino-Japanese relations in the years before 1972. One was theconservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politician Matsumura Kenzo (松村謙三, 1883-1971) and the other was the aristocrat Saionji Kinkazu (西園寺公一, 1906- 1993), who was invited to live in Beijing and would stay there with hisfamily until 1970 and was often referred to as the “People’s Ambassador” (民間大使) . On the Chinese side of the “pipe” the most important person was Liao
Chengzhi (廖承志, 1908-1983), who had grown up in Japan and was fluent inJapanese. By the latter half of the 1950s he had become one of Zhou Enlai’s
most trusted aides and was charged with carrying out Zhou’s Japan policy. In
addition to the establishment of the “pipe” between Liao and the two Japanese,
Liao had set out on the orders of Zhou to establish the Japan Group (日本組); a
group of talented Japan Hands affiliated with different government organs who
were to give shape to Zhou’s vision for a pro-active Japan policy. While there
were some earlier incarnations, under different names, of the Japan Group
before 1958, the group found its final form and central position in Japan affairs
in 1958. So while generally the year 1958 is viewed as a bleak one for SinoJapanese relations, with China’s furious reaction to the Nagasaki Flag Incident
taking the two parties back to square one, in fact Zhou Enlai’s long-term
strategy of strong engagement with Japan crystallized in exactly this year.

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1. The Historical Background
1.1 Growing Trade in the 1950s and the Nagasaki Flag Incident
Though there were no official diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC,
throughout the 1950s there were efforts by both sides to improve trade relations,culminating in several “private” agreements on trade, the first of which (theSino-Japanese Nongovernmental Trade Agreement) was signed in 1952. These
agreements were signed by trade groups formed especially for this purpose, andwere independent from the government. Only nominally independent in thecase of the Chinese, but on the Japanese side the government could have no
direct influence, despite the relevant trade group consisting mostly of Diet
members.2 From 1955 a regular trade fair was held in both countries, promoting
mutual trade. However, a stumbling block was whether or not the PRC flag
could be flown at such fairs in Japan, since the Japanese government did notrecognize the PRC’s legitimacy. A major breakthrough appeared to have been
made with the signing of the 4th Sino-Japanese Nongovernmental Trade
Agreement on March 3, 1958. It was agreed trade liaison offices would beestablished in both countries, that trade representatives would have certain
diplomatic rights, and that the PRC flag could be flown at China’s office inJapan. However, though the Japanese government stated that most of theagreement was acceptable to them, soon Prime Minister Kishi made a criticalcomment on the agreement in the Diet, saying the government could not agree
to the flag clause.3 After threats coming from Taipei of economic repercussions 4
the Japanese government on April 9 again stated unequivocally that it did notsupport the PRC’s right to hoist its flag.5 Distrust of Kishi’s government was
already running high in Beijing after Kishi had become the first JapanesePrime Minister to visit Taiwan in 1957, where he voiced his support for ChiangKai-shek’s recovery of the mainland.6 As Soeya Yoshihide has argued, theChinese were very frustrated at this time because of their inability to influence
Japanese government policy via these “private” trade agreements.7 Things wereabout to get worse at the trade fair that had been going on since early April in
Nagasaki. According to Tanaka Akihiko, Kishi at this point still thought someof the agreement could be salvaged and the growing economic relationshipprotected, but the flag issue would prove too big a hurdle.8 Possibly many had

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hoped that the PRC flag could quietly continue to be present at the fair, as it
had been at previous fairs, but forces beyond the control of the government wereto prevent this. On May 2nd, the flag was taken down by force by a right-wing
youth, who was then only briefly held in custody before being released.9 This
mild reaction by the authorities could only be interpreted by the Chinese asthat their flag was not seen as one representing a sovereign nation. Prominent
Japan Group member Sun Pinghua (孫平化) notes in his memoirs that the ROC
consulate in Nagasaki had already voiced its objection to the flag to no avail,and that the incident was probably no coincidence.10 While it is unclear whether
Taipei was actually involved in the incident, the conclusion in Beijing seems tohave been that it was. But the furious reaction that followed was more likely
due to the careless reaction of the Japanese government. In short, Beijing
decided to cut off all contact and halt all trade. This became known as the“Nagasaki Flag Incident,” a historic event and low-point in Sino-Japaneserelations. Despite the outward anger of the Chinese leadership however, Zhou
Enlai and his underlings remained busy as ever carving out the frameworkwith which they wanted to improve relations and eventually achieve diplomatic
normalization.
1.2 China’s Evolving Japan Policy in the 1950s
As Ishii Akira has pointed out, in the first years after the establishment of thePeople’s Republic of China, most of the focus of the Chinese leadership’s Japan
policy was concentrated on cultivating ties with Japanese left-wing civic groups
and parties such as the Japanese Communist Party and Socialist Party.11
Possibly this was done in the hope that there would be a future government led
by the Socialist Party, or at least a more progressive government. According tohigh-ranking Japan Hand Zhang Xiangshan, this lasted until 1955, when the
Chinese leadership became more open to meeting with other Japanese groups.12
By the mid-1950s, Zhou Enlai decided to cast a wider net, and place equal if not
greater importance on the cultivation of ties with those from other sectors ofJapanese society. In a way he was ahead of the curve with this, and after Kishi
became Prime Minister in 1957 and diplomatic normalization was shelved, the
new tactics of building ties with a wide variety of people seemed an appropriate
framework for the long-term, as the Chinese could use friends in a variety ofplaces willing to advance their cause. Throughout this process, Liao Chengzhi

Sino-Japanese Relations in the Year 1958: Steps Toward Reconciliation123

was the person under Zhou who was responsible for giving concrete form toZhou’s evolving vision. Since he was born and partially raised in Tokyo, Liao
was fluent in Japanese and well-versed in matters concerning Japan as well as
Overseas Chinese affairs. Moreover, considering Liao was the son of KMTrevolutionary and Sun Yat-sen confidant Liao Zhongkai (廖仲愷) and an early
member of the CCP, he had an impeccable ideological pedigree. Clearly he was
the ideal person to deal with Japanese affairs under Zhou Enlai, and to serve at
the Chinese end of the desired “pipe” that Zhou was keen to construct withmany influential Japanese. Already in 1952 or 1953 Liao, by then a member of
the Central Committee, was charged by Zhou Enlai to form a task force of Japan
Hands, which was to take different shapes until morphing into the Japan Groupin 1958.13 He began to connect Japan Hands from different departments, for the
execution of Japanese affairs. Concretely the Japan Hands were to be engaged
in researching Japanese politicians as well as economic and cultural figures,
and after 1955 they tried to establish connections with Japanese from all walksof life. Generally they were expected to keep a finger on the Japanese pulse byfollowing the Japanese media, meeting with Japanese visitors and working
with and within Chinese groups visiting Japan. While Liao Chengzhi is a wellknown figure and has been the subject of several academic studies,14 the Japan
Hands that were instrumental in the day-to-day affairs regarding relations
with Japan have received only very limited academic attention. Recently
however, a group of scholars in Japan has published an excellent collection of
essays that illuminate the role played by what would become the Japan Group.15
The first incarnation of the group was informally gathered by Liao in 1953 fromJapanese speakers in the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Trade Office.16 The
first issues they dealt with were negotiations with the Japanese government
about Japanese left behind in China, and preparations for the first SinoJapanese Nongovernmental Trade Agreement.17 Realizing that there was a
shortage of (ideologically suitable) Japanese speakers readily available, it took
Liao until 1958 to recruit people from different backgrounds, the three maingroups being (1) overseas Chinese who had returned from Japan, (2) those who
had studied in Japan before 1949, and (3) from the latter half of the 1950s,
students who had studied Japanese at Chinese universities after 1949.18 Mostof the prominent older members of the Japan Group belonged in the second
category. An example of someone in the first group is Lin Liyun (林麗韞) who

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was to become an interpreter for the Chinese leadership. She recalls how in a
meeting with her father, with whom she had moved to China from Japan after
1949, Liao noticed her fluent Japanese and recruited her on the spot.19 Anotherimportant interpreter for the leadership was Zhou Bin (周斌), who came to
Liao’s attention because of his Japanese proficiency while still a student at
Peking University in the late 1950s, is an example of someone from the thirdgroup.20 So by 1958 a team was in place that was ready to work intensively withpeople on the other side, and work towards rapprochement following Zhou andLiao’s orders.

2. Establishing a “pipeFor finding the right kind of “pipe” or channel on the Japanese side outside of
the obvious leftist circles, Zhou Enlai was interested in one person who was
willing to move to Beijing and work from there, as well as in politicians in Tokyoon the right, obviously not be the usual allies for a communist regime to have.
From the late 1950s through the 1960s this strategy was to prove highly
effective, and maintaining these kinds of channels worked well for the Japanese
too. Chalmers Johnson has argued that this was “one of the most skilfully
executed foreign policies pursued by Japan in the postwar era,” because it
provided a separate backchannel to the mainland while the LDP leadership
could continue to “take pro-Taiwan positions in order to placate the Americans.” 21
2.1 Saionji Kinkazu
By 1957 the search was on for someone from Japan with strong connections inboth the business world and among intellectuals who could serve as a bridge, or“pipe,” with his homeland while being based in China. This person was tocontribute to paving the way for diplomatic normalization. As Saionji Kinkazu’sson, Saionji Kazuteru (西園寺一晃) recalled in a personal interview, the person
they were looking for had to: (1) have connections not only on the left but on theright as well, (2) be well versed in international affairs while having a favourable
opinion of China, and (3) be without selfish motives.22 Liao Chengzhi alreadyhad the right candidate in mind. Saionji Kinkazu’s connections with the new
Chinese leadership dated from 1952, when he was a delegate to the World Peace
Conference in Vienna in December. The Chinese delegation was made up ofSino-Japanese Relations in the Year 1958: Steps Toward Reconciliation

125

prominent people such as Song Qingling (宋慶齢) and Guo Moruo (郭沫若), as
well as Liao Chengzhi, who probably used the opportunity to discuss the PRC’s
Japan policy with the Japanese delegates.23 Here, at their first meeting, Saionji
had already expressed a wish to visit China to Liao.24 Saionji Kinkazu, born in
1906, hailed from the prominent aristocratic Saionji family and was the
grandson (by adoption) of the former Prime Minister; Prince Saionji Kinmochi(in office 1906-1908 and 1911-1912). Saionji Kinkazu was educated at Oxford
and before the war he had been a moderate member of Prime Minister Konoe
Fumimaro’s “Breakfast Club” of advisors. After the war he became a Diet
member and peace activist. While his personal beliefs were clearly progressive
and leftist, due to his very upper-class background he had plenty of connections
in more conservative circles. So with his political beliefs quite palatable to theChinese leadership and his background ensuring wide access, he was the perfectcandidate for the role of unofficial ambassador, or “People’s Ambassador,”
between the two countries. According to Saionji Kazuteru, Zhou Enlai hadtaken an interest in Saionji Kinkazu already around the middle of the 1950s,
and thought he could play an important role in facilitating diplomatic
normalization.25 In March 1957, after he had been living in Vienna for 3 years,
Saionji returned home to Japan via China. While in Beijing he met Liao
Chengzhi and was informed that the Chinese were looking for someone who
could live in Beijing and serve as their “pipe,” connecting them with the Japanesebusiness world and intellectuals, and as Saionji recalled it, Liao asked him
directly: “Not just anyone would do. If possible, Mr. Saionji, would you like tocome here?” 26 Upon returning to Japan, Saionji sought advice on the future of
Sino-Japanese relations from his many prominent contacts with an interest in
the PRC, such as those in the Japan-China Friendship Association (日中友好協会), and the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade, or
JAPIT (日本国際貿易促進協会). He described the general reaction as optimistic,
and many thought a Sino-Japanese rapprochement was not far away now that
diplomatic relations with the USSR had already been normalized.27 Saionji
knew that returning to Japan regularly would be hard and that, if he moved toChina, he probably had to stay there until diplomatic normalization wasachieved.28 In 1958 he decided to move to Beijing with his family and would stayfor twelve years, until 1970.

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2.2 Matsumura Kenzo
Another target for a “pipe” that could be cultivated by the Chinese was aconservative politician, preferably from the LDP. In fact several connections
were made around the year 1957, and the most obvious candidate for the job
was the previous Prime Minister, Ishibashi Tanzan. These contacts would
eventually lead to Ishibashi’s visit to China in May 1959. In the end though,another LDP politician was to prove an even more influential connection.
Matsumura Kenzo had been a prominent politician since the pre-war period
and he had recently been Education Minister in the Hatoyama government. His
growing involvement from the late 1950s with China was representative of aperhaps surprisingly pro-PRC attitude among many LDP conservatives.
According to Chalmers Johnson, this strain of thinking among Japaneseconservatives can be traced back straight to Yoshida Shigeru, who in 1952 wasin fact opposed to the recognition of the ROC government in Taiwan and tried
to resist it in the face of pressure from the US, to no avail.29 The first meeting
between Liao Chengzhi and Matsumura Kenzo took place in late 1957 or early
1958. From December 5 to January 9 a delegation of the Chinese Red Cross
visited Japan; the delegation was full of members of the Japan Group andheaded by Liao. While there, Liao requested two of his Japanese confidants,
Miyazaki Ryusuke (宮崎龍介, a Socialist Party politician who had been close to
Sun Yat-sen) and businessman Horiike Tomoji (堀池友治) to arrange a meetingwith a conservative politician.30 Miyazaki and Horiike suggested both Ishibashi
Tanzan and Matsumura Kenzo, but since the former was still plagued by thehealth issues that had forced him to resign as Prime Minister a year earlier,they focussed on the latter. A meeting took place in a restaurant in Akasaka,
Tokyo, where they exchanged ideas about the Sino-Japanese relationship andMatsumura’s potential future role.31 But at this stage Beijing was still very
interested in cultivating the ties with Ishibashi as well as with Matsumura, andlogically they would have made quite a good team. Both politicians had long
been interested in reconciliation efforts towards China and Southeast Asia, andduring Ishibashi’s brief tenure as Prime Minister he had envisioned Matsumura
to be dispatched as a kind of Southeast Asia peace envoy.32 So, in all likelihood,
Liao Chengzhi in 1958 also saw them as a duo that could work together as his“pipe.” In the end, both politicians were to make important visits to China, butSino-Japanese Relations in the Year 1958: Steps Toward Reconciliation

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separately. Urged on by China as his health improved slightly in the spring of
1959, Ishibashi invited Matsumura to go together, but the latter declined.
Furukawa Mantaro has argued that since the two were in very different stagesof their career, with Ishibashi a retired Elder Statesman free to say what heliked while Matsumura was still heavily involved in LDP factionalism with aneye on the post-Kishi government, Matsumura felt that they were better off
pursuing ties with Beijing separately.33 Both would make important visits to
China in 1959. At the end of the year, Matsumura took a large group of Japanesepeople to China for 40 days and travelled there extensively, and in this period
he met Chinese leaders such as Zhou and Liao of course, but also Zhu De (朱徳)and Foreign Minister Chen Yi (陳毅). He was accompanied by several Japan
Group members such as Sun Pinghua, Wang Shaoyun (王曉雲) and Wu Xuewen(呉学文).34 His efforts are generally seen as essential for the progress that wasmade in the following years, such as the establishment of mutual Trade Liaison
Offices and the exchange of journalists in 1964.

Conclusion
In a simplistic interpretation of history, the year 1958 can only be seen as a
detrimental one for Sino-Japanese relations. While China was swept up in the
fervour brought on by Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, the little progressthat had been made in the previous decade to bring the two countries closer
together again was seemingly undone when Beijing broke off all contact
following the Nagasaki Flag Incident in May. Japanese Prime Minister Kishi
was the most pro-Taiwan of all Japanese Prime Ministers to date and he won
another election in the same month. Yet around this time a process was set inmotion that would lead to considerable success in the first half of the 1960s,
with the establishment of Trade Liaison Offices and the exchange of journalists.
These successes were not just a result of there being a new Japanese Prime
Minister but were the fruits of hard labour by people on both sides dedicated tobuilding personal bridges in service of advancing mutual relations, regardlessof prevailing political winds. Zhou Enlai’s strategic vision was essential forbringing this about and around the year 1958 he pushed on with the constructionof the backchannels that were to prove so vital later on. Of course this was aprocess that did not start suddenly in 1958, but rather one that took years to128

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take shape and only crystallized around this time. The formation of the Japan
Group had already started in the early 1950s and contacts with Japanesewilling to work with the Chinese like Saionji, Ishibashi and Matsumura were
gradually enhanced. The importance of the cultivation of a “pipe” like this in
Zhou’s strategic vision can be surmised by the fact that these efforts continued
unabated during the turbulence of the year 1958. It should also be noted that
this strategy would prove a perfect fit for the Japanese leadership who could
remain in good standing with the US by being pro-Taiwan while condoning
expanding contacts with Beijing. These ongoing contacts meant that both sides
were well prepared when rapprochement was finally realized in 1972. The“pipe” would continue to be of use until well into the 2000s, by now maintainedby different people of course, and the apparent lapse in maintaining suchconnections among leadership figures in recent years might actually havecontributed to the current tensions.

Endnotes:
1 International Crisis Group (ICG), Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks, 8 April
2013, Asia Report N°245, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/51b830571.html [accessed
30 September 2014]
2 Yoshihide Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998), 32.
3 “ “Seifu kakunin ha konnan” Kokki joko de shushou toben [“Government recognition is difficult”
Premier’s reply to the flag clause],” Asahi Shimbun, March 6, 1958.
4 “Sho Soutou kara messe-ji “Kokki mondai” de [Message from President Jiang on the “FlagIssue”],” Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 1958.
5 Akihiko Tanaka, Nicchu kankei 1945-1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 1991), 50.
6 “Asia ha rendai seyo,” Asahi Shimbun, June 4, 1957.
7 Yoshihide Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998), 39.
8 Ibid, 49.
9 “Chukyouki hizuriorosu, Nagasaki no kiteten de koufun shita seinen, [CCP flag downed at
Nagasaki stamp stall by agitated youth],” Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 1958.
10 Pinghua Sun, Zhongri youhao suixianglu (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1986), 82.
11 Akira Ishii, “Chugoku no tainichi seisaku kettei- Soshiki to jinmyaku,” Toa No.255 (September
1988): 14, 15.
12 Xiangshan Zhang, Nicchu kankei no kanken to kensho- Kokkoseijoka 30nen no ayumi, trans. Eiji
Suzuki (Tokyo: Sanwa Shoseki, 2002), 3.
13 Xueping Wang, “Ryo Shoshi to ryoben no tainichi gyomu tantosha,” in Sengo Nicchu Kankei toSino-Japanese Relations in the Year 1958: Steps Toward Reconciliation

129

Ryo Shoshi, ed. Xueping Wang et al. (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2013), 22.
14 See for example: Radtke, Kurt W., and Chengzhi Liao. China's Relations with Japan, 1945-83:
The Role of Liao Chengzhi. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.
15 Xueping Wang et al. Sengo Nicchu Kankei to Ryo Shoshi. Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2013.
16 Xueping Wang, “Ryo Shoshi to ryoben no tainichi gyomu tantosha,” in Sengo Nicchu Kankei to
Ryo Shoshi, ed. Xueping Wang et al. (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2013), 31.
17 Ibid, 35.
18 Ibid, 39.
19 Interview by author, Beijing, August 2014.
20 Interview by author, Shanghai, August 2014.
21 Chalmers Johnson, “The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982,” Pacific Affairs,
Vol.59, No.3 (Autumn 1986): 405.
22 Interview by author, Tokyo, January 2014.
23 Radtke, Kurt W., and Chengzhi Liao, China's Relations with Japan, 1945-83: The Role of Liao
Chengzhi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 101.
24 Kinkazu Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku “Sugisari shi, Showa” (Tokyo: IPEC Press, 1991),
305.
25 Interview by author, Tokyo, January 2014.
26 Ibid, 319. Translation by the author.
27 Ibid, 319, 320.
28 Ibid, 320.
29 Chalmers Johnson, “The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982,” Pacific Affairs,
Vol.59, No.3 (Autumn 1986): 404.
30 Seiichi Tagawa, Matsumura Kenzo to Chugoku (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1972), 80.
31 Ibid, 81.
32 Mantaro Furukawa, Nicchu Sengo Kankei Shi (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1981), 173.
33 Ibid, 174.
34 Ibid, 179, 180.

Bibliography:
Asahi Shimbun
Furukawa, Mantaro. Nicchu Sengo Kankei Shi. Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1981.
International Crisis Group (ICG), Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks, 8 April
2013, Asia Report N°245, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/51b830571.html [accessed
30 September 2014]
Ishii, Akira. “Chugoku no tainichi seisaku kettei- Soshiki to jinmyaku.” Toa No.255 (September
1988): 10-24.
Johnson, Chalmers. “The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982.” Pacific Affairs,
Vol.59, No.3 (Autumn 1986): 402-428.

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Radtke, Kurt W., and Chengzhi Liao. China's Relations with Japan, 1945-83: The Role of Liao
Chengzhi. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.
Saionji, Kinkazu. Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku “Sugisari shi, Showa.” Tokyo: IPEC Press, 1991.
Soeya, Yoshihide. Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978. Oxford: Clarendon Press;,
1998.
Sun, Pinghua. Zhongri youhao suixianglu. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1986.
Tagawa, Seiichi. Matsumura Kenzo to Chugoku. Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1972.
Tanaka, Akihiko. Nicchu kankei 1945-1990. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 1991.
Wang, Xueping et al. Sengo Nicchu Kankei to Ryo Shoshi. Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2013.
Zhang, Xiangshan. Nicchu kankei no kanken to kensho- Kokkoseijoka 30nen no ayumi. Translated by
Eiji Suzuki.Tokyo: Sanwa Shoseki, 2002.

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Abstract

Sino-Japanese Relations in the Year 1958:
Steps Toward Reconciliation
Casper WITSThe purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at the eventful year 1958 in
Sino-Japanese relations.
Generally seen as a bad year due to the break off of all trade in May, it was also
a year in which great progress was made, maybe not recognized at the time,
toward stronger people-to-people ties.
The 1950s, as far as Sino-Japanese relations were concerned, was a period of
cautious rebuilding of ties despite the fact that there were no diplomatic relations
between the two countries.
During the Hatoyama and Ishibashi governments in Japan (1954-1957) there
was a willingness on the Japanese side to re-engage, and this atmosphere
continued during the initial stages of the succeeding Kishi government (19571960). There was a corresponding optimism on the Chinese side, and Japanbegan to occupy a central role in the strategic vision of Zhou Enlai. This led toseveral crucial decisions in 1958 that would create a new framework in which
China’s relations with Japan would be conducted. One decision was the formationof a group of Chinese “Japan Hands” under the direct leadership of Liao Chengzhi(although ordered to do so by Zhou). This informal group would be known as theJapan Group. Zhou then invited the prominent Japanese aristocrat Saionji
Koichi to relocate to Beijing and serve as an unofficial “People’s Ambassador.”
Also of critical importance were the increased Chinese activities of LDP politician
Matsumura Kenzo, who would play a pivotal role in rebuilding trade relations.
What makes the year 1958 so important to focus on, is that it is also the year of
the “Nagasaki Flag Incident” that would cause deterioration in the SinoJapanese relationship. The fact that the efforts on the Chinese side here described
continued regardless is due to Zhou’s grand strategic vision. It was the creationof a “pipe” or backchannel between different high-ranking people on both sides
that was to prove of vital importance for Sino-Japanese relations in the years tocome.