OIL SPILL RESPONSE –EXPERIENCE, TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWINGMAJOR INCIDENTS
by
Dr Ian C. WhiteManaging Director
The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF)
INTRODUCTION
Major tanker spills are now exceptionally rare events as a result of the successful prevention
programmes initiated by industry and governments, particularly through the International
Maritime Organization (IMO). However, world-wide statistics are no consolation to those
whose coastlines and livelihoods are affected by the consequences of accidents such as the
NAKHODKA off the north coast of Japan in January 1997 and the ERIKA off the west coastof France in December 1999. Smaller spills, including those involving heavy bunker fuelfrom non-tankers, can also have serious consequences, especially if they affect sensitive
resources such as mariculture facilities.
It is an unfortunate fact that once oil has been spilled on to the surface of the open sea it isvirtually impossible in a major incident to prevent a significant proportion of it from foulingshorelines and damaging wildlife and coastal resources. It is this inability to control spilled oil,coupled with the highly visible and photogenic nature of the consequences, that causes
politicians, the public and media to pay a disproportionate amount of attention to ship-source
oil spills, in comparison with other more serious forms of environmental disturbance and evenloss of human life. Following a major incident this attention frequently results in calls forincreased control of shipping, improved ship building standards, better enforcement ofexisting regulations and higher levels of compensation for those affected by spills. In thecontext of spill response there will also often be a detailed review within the affected countryof the arrangements for dealing with major oil spills and the appropriateness of the type andquantity of cleanup resources available at the national level. On occasion such reviews will
also result in positive developments at the regional or even international level. One example
would be the rapid agreement within the IMO of the International Convention on Oil
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990 (OPRC Convention), following the
EXXON VALDEZ incident in Alaska, USA in March 1989.
Post-spill reviews aimed at improving the response to future incidents can obviously behighly beneficial, so long as they are based on a truly objective and transparent assessment of
the performance of all the parties involved in the spill, the effectiveness of the techniques
employed and the identification of those elements that need to be improved. Unfortunately,such objectivity and transparency is not always evident, with some post-spill reviews andsubsequent developments being driven more by political expediency and public perception
than by a genuine desire to tackle difficult issues that would result in sustainable technical andorganisational improvements. For this reason there remain serious questions about theadequacy of contingency plans in some parts of the world.
This paper seeks to review some of the experiences, trends and developments in the incidenceof and response to marine ship-source oil spills over the past 30 or so years, drawing on

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ITOPF’s first-hand experience of over 400 incidents world-wide. This includes recent major
spills such as the ERIKA in France, NAKHODKA in Japan and SEA EMPRESS in the UK.

INCIDENCE OF OIL SPILLS
35

1970-79
24.2 spills per year
on average

Spills per Year

10 Year average

30

25

20

1980-89
8.9 spills per year
on average

15

1990-99
7.3 spills per year
on average

10

5

0
1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

Tanker Spills over 5000 barrels (700 tonnes), 1970-2000

Tankers
As the above graph illustrates, much has been achieved in the field of oil spill prevention overthe past two decades. Whilst the relatively small number of spills over 700 tonnes precludes
detailed statistical analysis and there are considerable annual variations, the overall trend isclear. Thus, the average number of spills of this size each year in the 1980s and 1990s was
about one-third of that experienced in the 1970s. The average annual amount of oil lost as aresult of tanker accidents has also been reduced since the beginning of the 1980s and now
represents less than 0.005% of the total quantity transported by sea each year. Whilst this canjustifiably be regarded as a good loss prevention record, the problem is that the majority ofthis 0.005% each year is often lost in only one or two incidents which cause extensive
contamination of coastlines.
Other Types of Ship
Whilst most attention is usually focused on tanker spills, it should be recognised that certain
other types of ship, such as container liners and bulk carriers, can carry more bunker fuel thanmany small tankers carry as cargo. While bunker spills tend, on average, to be relatively small
in volume they can give rise to greater problems (including higher claims for compensation)
than many equivalent sized crude oil spills from tankers. This is indicated by the fact thatabout 28% of the oil spills attended on site by ITOPF staff over the past fifteen years have
involved bunker fuel spilled from non-tankers. In the last two years this percentage has risen
to about 50%.

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Bunker spills from non-tankers have increasingly become the focus of attention of politicians,
regulators and environmental groups in a number of countries, partly due to high profile
events such as the NEW CARISSA. This wood-chip carrier grounded on the coast of Oregon,
USA in February 1999 during a period of severe weather. The consequences of the spill ofsome 250 tonnes of bunker fuel were relatively minor. However, the world’s media (whoinvariably cannot tell the difference between a bulk carrier and a tanker) was enthralled by the
pyrotechnics surrounding the attempts to burn the bunker oil remaining in the ship's fuel tanks
and, later, by the fact that it ultimately took a torpedo fired from a nuclear-powered submarine
to sink the bow section beyond the 200- mile limit, previous attempts to sink it by gun firefrom a naval vessel having failed!
CLEANUP OPERATIONS
Although most countries of the world are much better prepared and equipped to deal withmajor marine oil spills than they were 30 years ago, major incidents continue to pose
fundamental problems to which there are still no technological solutions. This is somethingthat those who are responsible for spill response within governments and industry frequently
find difficult to admit publicly. More disappointingly, it is also the case that major spills areoften not dealt with as effectively as current technology should allow. This is frequently
because those in charge of the response operations take insufficient account of the extensive
technical knowledge and experience that is available, especially in terms of the lessons
learned from previous spills around the world. It is also a regrettable fact that decisions on
response strategies are sometimes driven more by political expediency and public perception
than by technical requirements.
To understand the fundamental problems that continue to defy a simple technological solution
to oil spill combat it is necessary to examine some of the main factors tha t determine theseriousness of a spill, before examining the limitations of the cleanup techniques that are
currently available.
Movement and Fate of Spilled Oil
When oil is spilled onto the surface of the sea it spreads very rapidly, and after a few ho urs
the slick will usually also begin to break up and form narrow bands or "windrows" parallel tothe wind direction. Within a very short time, therefore, the oil will often be scattered within
an area of many square miles with large variations in oil thickness being evident. This is oneof the fundamental factors that limits the effectiveness of all at-sea response techniques.
Whilst computer models can be used to calculate the probable movement and spreading of
spilled oil, experience shows that it is unwise to place total reliance on such predictions.
Inadequate knowledge of surface currents in the area of the spill, local wind variations and theunpredictable behaviour of some oils (e.g. submergence of heavy oils in rough seas or low
salinity waters due to neutral buoyancy) are among the factors that can cause spilled oil tomove in surprising directions. This is why aerial surveillance by experienced observers,
possibly supplemented by remote sensing equipment if available, is an essential element of aneffective response. Surveillance flights should be undertaken at the outset of an incident andthen on a regular basis thereafter to confirm the location and extent of the pollution and toverify and update predictions on the oil’s probable movement and the threat it poses tosensitive resources. It is important to co-ordinate flights and flight plans to avoid duplication,and to prevent unnecessary disturbance of colonies of seabirds and marine mammals, whichmight otherwise be frightened into diving into nearby floating oil.

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Regrettably, experience shows that aerial surveillance following spills is often inadequate,
with common problems including the use of inappropriate aircraft (e.g. jet fighters) andinexperienced observers who are unable to distinguish between thin sheens, thick oil,“mousse” and a variety of other phenomena that can look like oil from the air (e.g. underwatersea grass beds). A further very common problem is a failure to transmit clear reports on oil
location and reliable estimates of amount to the control centre in a timely manner.
Weathering
At the same time as the oil spreads, moves and fragments it also undergoes a number ofphysical and chemical changes, collectively termed weathering. Most of these weathering
processes, such as evaporation, dispersion, dissolution and sedimentation, lead to thedisappearance of oil from the sea surface. On the other hand, the formation of water- in-oil
emulsion (“mousse”) and the accompanying increase in viscosity as the oil absorbs up to fourtimes its own volume of water, promote the oil’s persistence. Ultimately, the marine
environment assimilates spilt oil through the long-term process of biodegradation.
The speed and relative importance of the processes depends on factors such as the quantity
and type of oil, the prevailing weather and sea conditions, and whether or not the oil remains
at sea or is washed ashore. Of these factors one of the most significant in any spill is the typeof oil, especially its probable persistence in the marine environment.
Type of Oil
In general, non-persistent oils include light refined products (e.g. gasoline) and even somelight crude oils which are highly volatile materials with low viscosities. As they do notnormally persist on the sea surface for any significant time due to rapid evaporation and theease with which they disperse and dissipate naturally, there is usually only a limited
requirement for cleanup. Such oils may, however, pose a significant fire and explosion hazard
as well as cause public health concerns if they occur close to centres of population. They may
also cause significant environmental impacts due to their high concentration of toxic
components but, as these same components evaporate rapidly, any such effects will usually behighly localised.
At the other end of the spectrum of oil types are heavy crudes and heavy fuel oils. These oils
are highly persistent when spilled due to their greater proportion of non- volatile components
and high viscosity. Such oils have the potential, therefore, to travel great distances from theoriginal spill location, causing widespread contamination of coastlines and damage to amenity
areas, fishing gear and wildlife, mainly through physical smothering. As a consequence, thecleanup of heavy oil spills can be extremely difficult, extend over large areas and be costly.
This is illustrated by the recent ERIKA and NAKHODKA spills in France and Japan,
respectively. The problem of dealing with heavy oils is also the reason why bunker spills from
non-tankers can often cause problems that are far greater than might be suggested by theamount of oil spilled.
Between the two extremes of gasoline and heavy fuel oil there are many intermediate crude
oils and refined products that are transported by tankers and used in a variety of marine
engines. It is therefore important when a spill occurs to know the exact type of oil involved
and its characteristics. This can sometimes be difficult to determine with certainty during theearly stages of a spill, leading to confusion and unreliable predictions.

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Selecting the Appropriate Response
Knowledge of the type of oil and predictions of its probable movement, behaviour and fateare vital in order to evaluate the risk to coastlines and the likely impact of the spill on
environmental and economic resources. It is essential to carry out such an evaluation before
deciding on the response strategy and the required type and amount of cleanup resources.
Failure to do so prior to mobilising resources can result in considerable embarrassment at alater stage for those in charge if it should transpire that the equipment and materials areinappropriate in the circumstances. This can render the response ineffective and lead toproblems in recovering the costs from other parties.
Monitoring
If the evaluation indicates that the oil will remain offshore where it will dissipate andeventually degrade naturally, monitoring the movement and fate of the floating slicks to
confirm the predictions may be sufficient, or indeed all that is feasible. On this basis, many ofthe largest tanker spills over the last 20 or so years, including the ATLANTIC EMPRESS,ABT SUMMER, CASTILLO DE BELLVER and ODYSSEY, did not require a majorcleanup response. In other cases, like the BRAER in Shetland in 1993, a combination of lightcrude oil and severe weather conditions can also dramatically reduce the need for andfeasibility of a cleanup response, even when very large quantities of oil (about 85,000 tonnesof crude in the case of the BRAER) are spilled close to the coastline.
Response Operations at Sea
If the evaluation of the spill suggests that the oil does pose a serious threat to coastal
resources, the next stage is to consider the most appropriate cleanup techniques and the bestsources of the required equipment, trained operators and all the other components of a major
response operation. Two main options are available for combating oil on the surface of thesea: containment and recovery, and chemical dispersion.
Containment and Recovery - The use of floating booms to contain and concentrate floating oil
prior to its recovery by specialised skimmers is often seen as the ideal solution since, if
effective, it would remove the pollutant from the marine environment. Unfortunately, thisapproach suffers from a number of fundamental problems, not least of which is the fact that it
is in direct opposition to the natural tendency of the oil to spread, fragment and disperse. Thus,
even if ship-borne containment and recovery systems are operating within a few hours of an
initial release (which is rare) they will tend to encounter floating oil at an extremely low rate.
Wind, waves and currents, even quite moderate ones, also limit the effectiveness of recovery
systems on the open sea by making correct deployme nt difficult and causing oil to splash over
the top of booms or be swept underneath. Even when oil has been concentrated within a boom
the problems are not over since many skimmers are only effective with a limited range of oil
types, with severe limitatio ns on the pumping of viscous oils and "mousse”.
Because of all these limiting factors it is rare, even in ideal conditions and with the greatly
improved equipment available today, for more than a relatively small proportion (10-15%) of
spilled oil to be recovered from open water situations. In the case of the EXXON VALDEZ,
for example, where enormous resources were dedicated to offshore oil recovery, thepercentage was at most 9%.

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While at-sea recovery rates may be low when viewed as a percentage of the total volume
spilled, the benefit of such operations can be maximised by targeting the heaviest oilconcentrations and areas where collection will reduce the likelihood of oil impacting sensitive
resources or contaminating shorelines that will be particularly difficult to clean. This requiresa strategic approach to oil spill combat, as well as close control of the containment andrecovery operations, usually through the use of aircraft. Unfortunately, such an approach israre with the result that any oil collected is unlikely to reduce significantly the extent of thespill’s overall impact on coastal resources or the problems faced by those responsible forshoreline cleanup.
Whilst containment and recovery of oil on the open sea is frequently of marginal benefit, ahigher degree of success can be achieved in sheltered coastal areas and where floating slicks
are concentrated within port areas or by natural features. Equally, improved rates of recovery
may be achieved in the event of an on- going release from a tanker, offshore platform or otherstatic source since more time will be available to mount an effective response operation close
to the spill source where the oil is fresh and more concentrated. However, even in suchcircumstances, adverse weather and sea conditions, logistical problems, equipment
malfunction, the difficulty of conducting cleanup operations during the hours of darkness anda variety of other factors will usually result in a significant quantity of oil escaping.
Dispersants - The main alternative to containment and recovery of floating oil is to try toenhance natural dispersion through the use of chemical dispersants. This is one technique
where there have been major advances over the past 30 years, especially in terms of improved,
low-toxicity products and more effective application systems.
As with containment and collection, the rapid spreading and fragmentation of oil spilt on the
open sea tends to work counter to the effective application of dispersants. However, thelikelihood of success can be increased by using aircraft which are able to deliver the chemical
more rapidly than ships and with greater precision on to the thickest concentrations of oil or
those slicks posing the most significant threat to sensitive resources. The success of such a
strategy was illustrated in the SEA EMPRESS incident when the use of about 450 tonnes ofdispersant was judged to have removed at least 18,000 tonnes of crude oil from the sea
surface, thereby greatly reducing the quantity of oil available to impact sea birds and thecoastline.
While the aerial application of dispersant can be highly effective, it does require aircraft of theappropriate type equipped with specialised spraying equipment, as well as large stocks ofsuitable dispersant chemical. These are unlikely to be immediately available unless the use ofdispersant is an integral part of the relevant contingency plan. Without such pre-planning
delays are inevitable in a major spill while the required equipment and materials are sourced.
This may render the strategy inoperable since, in the event of a large instantaneous release,
the natural weathering of the oil and the formation of "mousse" will rapidly render slicks
increasingly resistant to dispersant treatment.
In considering a dispersant strategy it also has to be recognised that some types of oil such as
heavy fuel oil and viscous crude are less amenable to dispersant treatment from the outset.
This does not always stop those in charge from continuing with spraying operations long after
there is any technical justification for doing so, usually on the mistaken assumption that it
must be having some effect and that, whatever the technical arguments, it satisfies a politicaland public relations need to be “seen to be doing something”.

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The TORREY CANYON incident in 1967 resulted in dispersants achieving a world-wide
reputation for being environmentally damaging. Despite the greatly improved products thatare available today and repeated demonstrations that, in open sea conditions, small dispersed
oil droplets are rapidly diluted to below concentrations likely to cause biological damage, theuse of dispersants is still severely restricted in many countries. In reality, the issue is one ofpolicy and priorities rather than just science. Thus, the decision on dispersant usage should bebased on a comparison of the probabilities of significant damage being caused by floating oil
slicks (e.g. to birds and amenity beaches) as against dispersed oil droplets (e.g. to plankton
and fisheries), in order to establish whether the use of chemical dispersants will result in a
"Net Environmental Benefit".
Regrettably, such considerations are frequently not addressed adequately at the contingency
planning stage. In the highly-charged atmosphere following a major oil spill it is virtually
impossible to resolve any major differences of opinion, thereby reducing the possibility ofmounting an effective operation within the limited time-scale available. The result can be a
response that falls far short of the best that existing technology would allow.
Other Techniques - Whilst containment and collection, and chemical dispersion haveremained the two main techniques for dealing with oil at sea for three decades, alternative
approaches have been invented and re- invented over the same time period.
One such alternative approach is in-situ burning, which has recently received renewed
attention, particularly in the USA. The theoretical attraction of in-situ burning is that it could
overcome the difficulties of pumping oil from the surface of the sea, as well as the problems
associated with storing it and the associated water. However, the technique requires thefloating oil to be contained and concentrated in fire-resistant booms before setting it alight.
This remains a fundamental problem and so in practice it will be very difficult in most major
spills to collect and maintain sufficient thickness of oil to burn. As the most flammablecomponents of the spilled oil evaporate quickly, ignition can also be difficult. Residues fromburning may sink, with potential long-term effects on sea bed ecology and fisheries. Closer toshore or the source of the spill, there may be health and safety concerns as a result of the riskof the fire spreading out of control or atmospheric fall-out from the smoke plume.
Whilst in-situ burning has serious limitations, it may well have application in particular
circumstances (e.g. oil trapped in ice). The same general comment can be made about othertechniques that regularly attract attention, such as sinking agents, chemicals that solidify oil,and bacteria and nutrients to enhance natural biodegradation. Whilst each can be shown to beeffective in the laboratory and under highly controlled test conditions (and even on occasions
in limited circumstances in actual spills), in reality they all have severe limitations in a major
marine oil spill on the open sea, usually due to the fundamental problems associated with therapid spreading, fragmentation and movement of slicks.
Protecting Sensitive Resources
The protective booming of sensitive coastal resources, such as mariculture facilities, power
stations and ecological and wildlife sites of particular importance, is a response option which
can be highly successful. Similarly, simple measures such as surrounding fish cages withweighted plastic sheeting can afford a high degree of protection from floating oil. In the
recent TREASURE spill in South Africa, a novel protective technique involved the

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installation of temporary fencing on an offshore island in order to stop adult penguins in a
major breeding colony from reaching the nearby sea which was contaminated by floating oil.
It is rare that protective strategies are employed to full advantage during an actual spill,usually due to inadequate planning. Thus, if such a defensive strategy is to be employed withsuccess, there must be agreement at the contingency planning stage as to which resources areto be given priority for protection. It must also be ascertained in advance that their protection
is feasible since otherwise it may be discovered during an actual incident that, for example,
the currents are too strong for booms to be anchored in the desired configuration.
These simple and obvious lessons, as well as the importance of regularly maintaining booms
after deployment to check their configuration and to remove accumulated oil, have been
demonstrated repeatedly at numerous past spills around the world. However, they are rarely
addressed adequately during contingency planning. It is also regrettable that priorities andprotective strategies that have been agreed during the planning process are frequently
forgotten during an actual incident or, worse, are overturned due to political interference orpressure brought to bear on the On-Scene Commander by special interest groups or the media.
Shoreline Cleanup
It is impossible to protect an entire coastline and every sensitive resource with equal successand so in a major oil spill some contamination of coastal areas is virtually inevitable, unlesswinds and currents carry the oil offshore where it breaks down naturally.
Shoreline cleanup needs to be carried out in accordance with a clear strategy that takes
account of the characteristics of the particular oil, the level of contamination, the types ofshoreline that have been impacted and their relative environmental, economic and amenity
sensitivities. Effort should first be directed to areas which have the heaviest concentrations ofmobile oil, which could otherwise lead to further pollution of surrounding areas.
The removal of floating oil from harbours and elsewhere where it becomes concentrated isrelatively straightforward, using a combination of specialised booms and skimmers andlocally-available resources such as vacuum trucks and similar suction devices, so long as
there is good access. Mobile oil trapped along inaccessible parts of a coastline poses moredifficult problems. If it is highly persistent and therefore resistant to natural breakdown anddissipation it will act as a reservoir for contaminating additional stretches of the coast or for
re-oiling previously cleaned areas, either with bulk oil or with tar balls, as winds and currentschange. Some persistent heavy oils also have the potential to sink in shallow water after
picking up sediment in inshore waters, in the surf zone or after temporarily stranding onbeaches. Such sunken oil can be re- mobilised by storms, thereby re-contaminating previously
cleaned areas.
Once the oil is no longer mobile and has stranded on shorelines a combination of cleanup
techniques is normally used. Such operations once again usually rely on locally-available
equipment and manpower, rather than specialised equipment. Shoreline cleanup is usuallyhighly labour intensive and not a 'high-tech' business. Thus, bulk oil can usually be removed
without difficulty from hard-packed sand beaches using a combination of well-organised
cleanup teams assisted by front-end loaders and road- graders, so long as care is taken not toremove excessive qua ntities of uncontaminated sand or to mix the oil deeply into the beach
substrate. Secondary and final cleaning options can include sieving (to remove tar balls), as

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9well as techniques such as flushing with sea water and harrowing to remove residual staining
and other light contamination.
Greater problems are caused where oil penetrates deeply into shorelines consisting ofboulders, cobbles or gravel since it is rarely practical to do more than remove surface
accumulations. If amenity or wildlife concerns dictate a more thorough cleanup, the mosteffective technique is likely to be sea water flushing, with the containment and collection of
any oil that is released using booms and skimmers. However, if the residual oil is very
persistent or if a higher degree of cleanliness is required then it may be necessary to resort tomore ‘aggressive’ techniques such as high pressure (hot or cold) water washing or even sandblasting. On cobble beaches it may be appropriate to bulldoze the contaminated beachmaterial into the surf zone to benefit from natural cleanup processes, such as clay-oil
flocculation. In circumstances where residual oil on shorelines might pose a threat to breedingcolonies of marine mammals or birds such as penguins, and where other techniques mightcause damage through greater disturbance, it may be appropriate to cloak oily haul-out areas
and access routes with some form of natural sorbent, such as peat.
In many cases with rocky shores it will be most appropriate and least damaging to the floraand fauna to leave natural processes such as wave action and scouring to deal with any
residual oil over a longer period of time, despite the fact that the weathered oil on the rocks
may create a visual but incorrect impression of continuing environmental impact. A similar
approach of leaving residual oil to weather and degrade naturally is usually recommended forsensitive shoreline types such as salt marshes and mangroves which have been shown to be
more easily damaged by the physical disturbance caused by cleanup teams and vehicles thanby the oil itself.
The concept of balancing environmental sensitivities against socio-economic factors (e.g.
fisheries, tourism) in order to determine the most appropriate techniques and level ofcleanliness (sometimes referred to as “Net Environmental Benefit Analysis”) is well known
and widely accepted. It is frustrating, therefore, that such issues are frequently not adequately
addressed in contingency plans or are ignored by those in charge of actual operations. As aresult, shoreline cleanup is often not carried out with the degree of care and control that is
warranted. This can mean that operations are unnecessarily prolonged, that excessive amountsof material are generated for disposal (a major problem now in most spills), that additional
environmental and economic damage is caused, and that the cost of cleanup and third party
damages is higher than it should be.
Termination of Cleanup
All cleanup activities should be constantly evaluated to ensure that they remain appropriate as
circumstances change. As soon as any operation has been shown to be ineffective, likely tocause unacceptable additional damage to environmental or economic resources, or the costs
begin to greatly exceed diminishing benefits it should be stopped.
Regrettably, there are frequently strong pressures on those in charge of response operations to
adopt other non-technical criteria to decide when to terminate a response measure. Thus, on
many occasions the ineffectiveness of offshore oil combating techniques and theinappropriateness of cleaning certain types of shorelines will be ignored and as many
resources as possible deployed in an attempt to persuade politicians, the media and public thateverything possible is being done to deal with the problem. The fact that the operations may
be ineffective or more damaging to the environment than the oil is often not a persuasive

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10argument. Equally, the requirement that every trace of oil must be removed to assuage publicanger and to meet the demand s of politicians is neither possible nor environmentally sound.
The fact that it is also likely to result in exorbitant cleanup costs is unlikely to be a major
concern for those making the demands unless, of course, they will have to directly bear thecosts, in which case a greater degree of realism may prevail. In this regard it is important tonote in passing that the technical justification of response measures ("reasonableness") isfundamental to the effective operation of the international compensation Conventions, notably
the 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions.
Wildlife Rescue and Rehabilitation
The collection, cleaning and rehabilitation of oiled birds, marine mammals and other animals
is a now a common and high profile feature of many oil spills. Whilst individual animals may
be saved, the rationale for such operations is usually based more on animal welfare
considerations than on any expectation of promoting the recovery of populations. Thisdepends, of course, on the species in question and the long-term survival potential of
rehabilitated and released individuals.
The collection, transport, handling and care of injured and ill animals requires trained
personnel if further distress is to be avoided. The cleaning and feeding of animals is also verylabour intensive. However, well- meaning volunteers can sometimes be more of a hindrance
than a help, especially if they try to operate independently of ‘professional’ animal welfare
groups and veterinary surgeons, or if they are unwilling to undertake training, follow orders or
carry out menial tasks. Wildlife rehabilitation can also be expensive and consideration needs
to be given to its funding at an early stage.
In many countries wildlife rehabilitation remains an ad hoc business, with groups often acting
in a competitive manner. It is also a topic that is frequently not addressed adequately innational, regional and local contingency plans, leading to poor co-ordination and managementof operations. There would seem to be considerable merit in addressing this issue in a morestructured manner, thereby ensuring that best practices from around the world are followed inorder to optimise prognosis and cleaning arrangements.
Health and Safety
Shoreline cleanup is highly labour intensive and most authorities and other agencies will needto supplement their own staff in order to find the necessary workforce and to ensure its
adequate supervision. In some cases it will be possible to employ contract labour,
unemployed personnel, members of the armed forces or persons who are unable to pursue
their normal employment because of the spill (e.g. fishermen). The publicity given to a major
spill can also result in volunteers travelling considerable distances to the spill site to offer
their assistance with the cleanup. In most cases their involvement is unhelpful, especially ifthey decline to do or are deemed unsuitable for certain tasks.
The health and safety of clean-up workers (including those engaged in wildlife rehabilitation)
should always be a primary consideration. Whilst it can sometimes be taken to extreme levels,for example by dressing workers in protective clothing that makes it difficult for them to work
or exposes them to the likelihood of heat exhaustion, appropriate personal protective clo thing
and equipment should always be supplied. This will normally include boots, lightweightoveralls, gloves and other simple precautions to avoid contact with the oil. Lifejackets will beneeded if operating on water and hard hats if there is a risk of falling objects. In some cases

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respirators may be necessary if the oil is fresh and there is a high level of vapours but in suchcircumstances measures to avoid the risks of fire and explosion would be of greater concern.
Among the other issues requiring attention might be protection from hazardous material (e.g.
sewage, discarded hypodermic syringes) at cleanup sites where both oil and other floating
waste naturally collects. It will also be necessary to make arrangements to decontaminate,feed and accommodate the workers, and to ensure appropriate rest and relief periods for all
those involved in the response operations, including those in charge.
Sensible guidelines on these and other matters relating to health and safety should be readily
available and drawn to the attention of all involved. Where they are not available, as is thecase in many parts of the world, they should be developed as part of contingency planning,with advice from suitably qualified medical and safety specialists from industry.
Minimisation of Waste, Temporary Storage and Ultimate Disposal
A major oil spill will generate a considerable quantity of oily waste that needs to be
temporarily stored, transported and ultimately disposed of in an environmentally- acceptablemanner. In the case of the ERIKA, for example, some 200,000 tonnes of mixed wastes weregenerated, some ten times more than the original spill volume.
Effective organisation and control of cleanup operations is vital to minimise the generation ofwaste. Considerable attention should therefore be devoted to avoiding the unnecessary
removal of uncontaminated water, sand, stones and other beach material. Similarly, thetechnical feasibility and cost-effectiveness of treating lightly contaminated beach material onsite should always be explored. This has the benefit of reducing the amount of material fortransportation and disposal, as well as potential erosion problems that could subsequently leadto the need for beach replenishment programmes.
Immediately oil begins coming ashore, cleanup begins and there is then an urgent need for
temporary storage to be established to receive waste. To meet public expectations of rapid
action, temporary storage may be improvised rather than organised. There are numerous
options for setting up temporary storage at the beach head (in car parks or on public or
agricultural land) but proper measures need to be taken to ensure there is no short-termleakage, overspill or subsoil contamination. To optimise later disposal, those in charge alsoneed to give attention to trying to ensure the segregation during temporary storage of different
types of waste, which might include bulk liquid oil, oily beach material, debris, seaweed andother vegetation, dead wildlife, protective clothing, plastic sheeting, damaged booms andsorbents.
The disposal of oily waste often continues long after the cleanup phase is over, especially if
the material falls under regulations designed to deal with toxic or hazardous waste. In suchcircumstances it is even more regrettable when the relevant government agencies have beenreluctant to address the issue at the contingency planning stage, with the result that when aspill occurs cleanup operations have to be suspended until at least a temporary storage
solution is worked out. This is an issue that still needs to be addressed urgently in many
countries.

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MANAGEMENT OF SPILL RESPONSE
Whilst the technical aspects of dealing with an oil spill are clearly important, the effectivenessof the response to a major spill will ultimately depend upon the quality of the contingency
plan, and of the organisation and control of the various aspects of the cleanup operation.
Numerous difficult decisions as well as compromises will be required throughout the response
operation, and the widely differing requirements of a multitude of governmental and privateorganisations, as well as public and political pressures, will need to be reconciled. In doing so
it is vital that due account is taken of the extensive experience and technical knowledge that isavailable so that past mistakes are not repeated. Regrettably this is often not the case.
Government authorities generally assume responsibility for organising and controlling thecleanup of a major ship-source spill, either using their own resources or those available fromprivate organisations. There are many good reasons why government authorities are bestplaced to take the lead in responding to spills from ships, not the least being that such spills
often involve vessels in innocent passage whose owners do not have an operational capability
in the affected country. The responsibility for protecting a country's interests also ultimately
must rest with government authorities since they alone have that mandate and are in a position
to determine priorities for protection and cleanup in the particular circumstances. Theinternational compensation Conventions (i.e. 1992 Civil Liability Convention and 1992 Fund
Convention) were largely created to encourage such authorities to assume the responsibility
for responding to spills of persistent oil from tankers by providing a straightforward system
whereby the costs of ‘reasonable’ measures would be promptly reimbursed.
Oil spill response is not a core activity for most government authorities due to the fact that
serious events are an infrequent occurrence. The organisational structure for responding to oil
spills therefore tends to follow administrative structures created for other purposes. This isparticularly evident when it comes to shoreline cleanup, where the responsibility usually falls
on a multitude of local and regional government authorities. In harbour areas some
responsibility may also fall on the port authority and on the operators of terminals and otherfacilities. This is frequently a recipe for confusion in a major spill, especially if insufficient
effort has been devoted prior to such an incident to developing an integrated and consistent
approach. This is critical bearing in mind that it is highly probable that otherwise some groups
will devote considerable effort to contingency planning, training and the maintenance of an
appropriate level of resources, whereas others will argue that the level of risk does not justify
the effort and cost, especially in comparison with other priorities. In the event of a major spillthese differences will translate into an uncertain and variable response, unclear command andcontrol, and a lack of co-ordination.
Such co-ordination and management problems are never overcome by inviting all interested
parties to serve on one or more committees during an incident so that they can participate in
the decision- making process (whether or not they are technically qualified to do so). Whilst
this may be democratic, it usually leads to large, unwieldy spill management teams, delayed
decision making and, frequently, the adoption of inappropriate or conflicting response
strategies. The time for the legitimate concerns of all interested parties to be addressed iswhen contingency plans are being prepared. This allows for information on planned oil spill
response techniques, strategies and priorities to be shared in a calm atmosphere and for any
concerns to be addressed and agreed adjustments made.
When the oil is on the water or on the shore informed and decisive leadership is required, withauthority vested in an appropriate individual or in a small command team, so that an effective

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response consistent with the contingency plan is initiated promptly. In the case of shoreline
cleanup the lead individual should usually be a senior representative of the regional or local
government authority whose area is effected. The issue of seniority is important since there
will be a need to deal at a high level with central government and to be able to authorise theallocatio n of resources (including finances) that may have been earmarked for other projects.
The individual or small command team cannot be expected to manage the response to asignificant spill alone. It will be necessary for them to be supported by experienced technicaland scientific advisors that are part of a larger management team that looks after the various
components of the overall operation, as well as logistic support, record keeping and financial
control. These last two aspects are vital in connection with cost recovery from other parties.
Whilst central government agencies, international organisations and various sectors of theshipping and oil industries have endeavoured to fill these gaps by making both specialist
equipment and expert advice available, the challenge is to have it accepted by the relevant
authorities. All to often offers of technical advice are ignored, with those in charge preferring
to learn their own lessons and thereby repeat the mistakes of past spills.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
A major oil spill will inevitably present those in charge with numerous, complex problems,
some of which will be non-technical in nature. There is a greater likelihood that prompt andeffective response decisions will be made if considerable effort has been devoted in advanceof any spill to the preparation of comprehensive, realistic and integrated contingency plans fordifferent levels of risk. Issues which are difficult to resolve in 'peace time' are likely to
become major conflicts in the highly charged atmosphere following a major spill when
everyone should be working together with the common purpose of cleaning up the oil as
effectively as possible with the minimum of damage to the environment and economic
resources.
Unfortunately, as this paper has attempted to illustrate, contingency plans frequently fail toadequately address a wide range of key issues such as the identification of sensitiveenvironmental and economic resources, priorities for protection and clean-up, agreed response
strategies for different sea and shoreline areas at different times of the year, temporary storagesites and final disposal options, and command and control. Increasingly there is also a need to
manage the legitimate interests of the media in a way that ensures that they receive regular
factual updates, without interfering with the control and conduct of the actual cleanup
response.
All too often contingency plans are little more than a list of contact points (often with out-ofdate names, organisational structures and telephone numbers) and generic information. Theyfrequently adorn someone’s bookshelves (especially if they are suitably glossy inappearance!) and are only ‘dusted off’ in an actual incident when their inadequacy rapidly
becomes apparent.
In reality, the final product is less important than the actual process of contingency planning.
Thus the main benefit comes from gathering all the necessary data, consulting and getting toknow all potentially interested parties, and resolving potential disputes in a calm atmosphere.
For this reason it is important that those who will be required to implement the plan should
also be closely involved in its preparation, with outside consultants only being used to give
advice on structure, content, technical issues and alternative approaches.

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The preparation of contingency plans and enhanced co-operation between various interested
parties (including between governments and the oil and shipping industries) is a key elementof the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation,
1990 (OPRC). One facet of this Convention is the enhanced availability of cleanup resourcesfrom neighbouring governments, including through bi- lateral, multi- lateral, regional or otheragreements, and from internatio nal co-operatives or oil industry Tier 3 stockpiles.
Whilst ‘outside’ specialised resources and trained operators may be required in order tosupplement local capability in the event of a major spill, total reliance should never be placedon their availability. This is especially so if arrangements have not been put in place to ensure
the rapid mobilisation and transport of ‘outside’ resources, to facilitate their entry into a
country and to agree the financial basis on which they are provided. It also needs to berecognised that the effective deployment of cleanup equipment mobilised from other locations,
including neighbouring countries and oil industry Tier 3 stockpiles, is dependent upon theexistence of an effective local, regional or national contingency plan. Without the foundationof an organisational structure, adequate logistic support (e.g. transport, suitable boats, oilstorage facilities) and clearly-defined response policies and strategies in the area requiring
assistance, Tier 3 resources will, at best, be of limited value and may, at worst, be unusable.
Contingency plans should be regularly tested and updated. The ultimate test is a major spill
and problems of an organisational and technical will inevitably occur. These problems need tobe identified in an objective manner before memories fade and interest wanes so that they canbe addressed before the next spill. Unfortunately, objective and transparent spill reports are
rare. Too often they are written by those intimately involved with the response with the resultthat there is an understandable reluctance to admit to mistakes and problems. This is clearly
unhelpful and hinders a sustainable improvement in response arrangements, not only in the
country concerned but internationally where many of the lessons that have been learned may
also be applicable. Examples of exceptions to this statement include the reports of the
response to the SEA EMPRESS and LAURA D’AMATO incidents (see foot of page forreferences). Other governments might be advised to follow the lead given by the UK andAustralia.
Because actual spills are rare, regular training of personnel at all levels and the testing ofequipment is essential. Spill drills and exercises can be valuable in this regard, so long as they
are not too ambitious and include a large element of surprise and realism, with all ‘players’
once again being willing to admit their mistakes in the final ‘wash-up’. All too often this is
not the case, with exercises seemingly being more designed to serve a public relations
requirement (even to the extent of virtually being scripted), with everyone being assured ofglowing reports for their performance.
__________________________________________________________________________________________The Coastguard Agency (1996). The Sea Empress incident. A report by the Marine Pollution Control Unit. The
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Southampton, UK
SEEEC (1998), The Environmental Impact of the Sea Empress Oil Spill. Final report of the Sea Empress
Environmental Evaluation Committee. The Stationery Office, London, UK
AMSA (2000). The Response to the Laura D'Amato Oil Spill. Report of the incident analysis team. Australian
Maritime Safety Authority, Canberra, Australia

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CONCLUSIONS
Major marine oil spills from both tankers and other types of ship are rare events. However,further effort is still required in terms of prevention, since once oil is spilled on to the surfaceof the sea there is no technological solution and the best that can be done is to try to mitigate
the damage. For this reason no oil spill cleanup operation will ever be viewed as a total
success, especially in the eyes of politicians, the media and the public whose attention isinevitably grabbed by dramatic and distressing images of blackened beaches and oil-soaked
wildlife, and by the impact that such events can have on those whose livelihoods depend on aclean sea and coastline.
Given the fundamental problems of combating oil on the surface of the sea, the best that we
can strive for is that everyone involved will co-operate in mounting the most effective
response that current technology and the circumstances of a particular incident will allow.
However, as this paper has sought to explain, this is rarely the case. Despite great advances
over the past thirty years in response strategies, specialised equipment and materials, and in
our understanding of the fate and effects of oil spills and the limitations of cleanup techniques,
the mistakes of previous spills continue to be regularly repeated. To a large extent, this is due
to problems connected with the organisation and management of spill response and to thetendency of those in charge to be more influenced by political, media and public perceptions
and pressures than by technical realities. It also reflects the continuing inadequacy ofcontingency plans in many areas of the world and the related failure of many government
agencies to publish truly objective reports of spill response and to address ‘difficult’ technicaland organisational issues.
The challenge for the future is therefore clear. Far more effort needs to be put into ensuringthat the lessons of past spills and the accumulated technical knowledge that exists around theworld are taken fully into account in future response operations. This can only be achieved
through developing improved organisational structures, as well as realistic, integrated andwell-rehearsed local, area and national contingency plans. It is time that we recognised that
we can achieve far greater improve ments in oil spill response by applying what we know
already rather than by simply seeking small incremental improvements in techniques,
however valuable these may be.
_________________________________________________ANNEX
The International Tanker Owne rs Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF) was established
as a non-profit making organisation in 1968. ITOPF is funded through subscriptions paid by
the world’s shipowners who thereby have access, along with their third party liability (P&I)
insurers, to a broad range of technical services that fall under the headings of:• Response to Marine Oil Spills - This is ITOPF’s priority technical service and is normally
performed, without charge, at the request of its Members, Associates and their P&I
insurers. The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds also usually call on ITOPF’s
technical services for incidents with which they are involved. Since 1977 ITOPF technicalstaff have attended more than 400 spills in over 80 countries.
• Damage Assessment and Claims Analysis - Assessment of the technical merits of claims
for compensation - both in relation to cleanup and damage to economic resources such as
fisheries and mariculture - is a natural extension of ITOPF’s on-site attendance at the time

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of a spill. It is important to emphasise that ITOPF’s role is one of providing advice on thetechnical merit of claims. It is not for ITOPF but for those who will pay the compensation
to decide whether or not a particular claim should be settled.
• Contingency Planning and Advisory Work - Because of the experience gained throughactive involvement in spills around the world, ITOPF is often asked to advise on the
preparation of contingency plans and to undertake other advisory assignments.
• Training and Education - ITOPF runs and participates in numerous training courses andseminars for government and industry personnel around the world, as well as oil spill drills
and exercises conducted by shipowners and other groups.
• Information - The widespread dissemination of ITOPF publications is designed to keep
Members and others around the world in touch with developments in relation to oil spill
preparedness, response and compensation. Various databases are also maintained,
including on the world-wide incidence of tanker spills and on the availability of stocks ofcleanup resources. Since mid-1996 ITOPF has also maintained an extensive Web site on
the Internet, which can be found at:
http://www.itopf.com
In addition to the above specific areas of technical activity, ITOPF regularly contributes tonational and international discussion on matters related to oil pollution. Since 1980 ITOPF
has had observer status at both the IMO and the IOPC Funds.
PUBLICATIONS:Technical Information Papers 1-12 (1981-1986).
1 "Aerial Observation of Oil at Sea"
3 "Aerial Application of Oil Spill Dispersants"
5 "Use of Skimmers in Combating Oil Pollution"
7 "Shoreline Cleanup"
9 "Contingency Planning for Oil Spills"
11 "Fate of Marine Oil Spills"

2 "Use of Booms in Combating Oil Pollution"
4 "Use of Oil Spill Dispersants"
6 "Recognition of Oil on Shorelines"
8 "Disposal of Oil and Debris"
10 "The Effects of Marine Oil Spills"
12 "Action: Oil Spill"“Response to Marine Oil Spills”, pub. Witherby & Co. Ltd., London (1987), ISBN O 948691 51 4. Available
in English, French and Spanish. (Japanese and Korean language versions also available from other sources.)“The Use of International Oil Industry Spill Response Resources: Tier 3 Centres” – A Joint ITOPF/IPIECA
Briefing Paper (April 1999)“Oil Spill Compensation – A Guide to the International Conventions on Liability and Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage” – A Joint ITOPF/IPIECA Briefing Paper (March 2000).
“Ocean Orbit” - ITOPF’s Annual Newsletter.
“ITOPF Handbook, 2001/2002”“The Real Story - the Environmental Impact of the BRAER”, a video produced by The Marine Laboratory,
Aberdeen, UK and available from ITOPF.
“ERIKA – The Black Tide”, a video produced by Tom McInnes and sponsored by the Steamship Mutual P&I
Club, in co-operation with ITOPF and the IOPC Funds. Information on availability from ITOPF.

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