AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPSRIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security(Secretariat)

Editor:No.158. 21 September 2012

Akio Watanabe
Editorial Board:
Hideki Asari
Masashi Nishihara
Taizo Yakushiji

Online Publisher:
Yoshiji Nogami
President, JIIAA CLOSER LOOK AT THE “ASEAN RIFT”
ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Susumu Yamakage
In July 2012, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting(AMM) and a number of ASEAN-related ministerial
conferences were held back-to-back in Phnom
Penh, Cambodia. What was unusual is AMM’s
failure in issuing a joint communiqué despite aneffort to achieve consensus. Because of this, noprogress was made on ASEAN’s long-desired
agreement with China on the Code of Conduct for
the South China Sea (COC) in spite of a prioragreement on consultation at the senior official
level between ASEAN and China.

The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

As widely reported, such an embarrassment was due to thedisagreement between member States, rather than between ASEAN and China,
on how to express ASEAN’s stance on recent developments in the South China
Sea. In the face of China’s unilateral actions to press its territorial claims on
disputed reefs and waters, delegates of the Philippines and Vietnam insisted on
more clear-cut criticism of China while Cambodian Foreign Minister HorNamhong, a veteran diplomat trusted by Prime Minister Hun Sen, refused tomodify the original draft that the Cambodian foreign office had prepared.
China has been pursuing amicable relations with those countries thathave strong economic ties and no territorial disputes with China. Cambodia is
one such nation. Many observers pointed out that ASEAN’s inability to criticize
China represents China’s success in using tactful measures to “divide and rule”
Southeast Asian nations. In my personal view, the reality is more complicated,and developments during and after the AMM this year were accidental rather
than structural.
With respect to the outlook towards China, there are significant
differences among ASEAN member States. Although ASEAN has been divided
on various issues since its inception, the vulnerable organization hasdemonstrated its solidarity in the international arena because hanging together
is the only means for small countries in Southeast Asia to survive the powergames. In responding to China’s recent acts it was not so difficult for ASEAN toachieve consensus compared with other serious issues the organization has
faced before. The unprecedented result of AMM may be attributable to thechairmanship, or the lack of chairmanship.
Cambodia, ASEAN’s newest member State, by rotation served theChair of the organization in 2012, and the Cambodian government is supposed
to play important roles such as setting agendas and drafting statements forsummit meetings and various ministerial conferences, including AMM. While it istrue that Cambodia has improved its relations with China considerably, to thedegree that it has become one of China’s closest partners, this does not explain
the stubbornness of the Cambodian Foreign Minister that astounded hiscounterparts.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

A more plausible explanation is Cambodia’s inexperience withconsensus building within ASEAN. Foreign ministers spoke with each other inEnglish, the official language of the organization. At the most critical stage offinalizing the draft, Cambodian officials may have faced difficulties in dealing withnuanced wording in order to reach consensus. It is even conceivable that thedraft communiqué was “blessed” by the Chinese officials in advance. If that was
the case, the Cambodians must have had few ideas on the degree ofcompromised wording that would not anger the Chinese.
Whatever the truth was concerning AMM in Phnom Penh, ASEAN
expressed its consensus on the COC only a few weeks later. The differences
over labeling China’s acts were substantially overcome by the reconfirmation of
the consensus on ASEAN policy towards China. Reportedly, Indonesian Foreign
Minister Marty, an experienced diplomat with a doctorate from Australian
National University, played an important role in this new development. In otherwords, China’s “divide and rule” strategy was not as successful as it had seemed.
ASEAN unity on a peaceful change in the South China Sea is a necessary
condition for a peaceful settlement, and every effort should be taken to get China
to understand and accept this basic principle.
Many observers were worried about the influence of the recent rift on
the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). It is natural to pay keen
attention to the progress of the AEC because of its multifaceted impacts onregional economies, but these apprehensions will hopefully not come true. Theadverse effects will probably be few, if any. Under the umbrella of the ASEAN
Community, the AEC will be practically independent of the ASEAN Political andSecurity Community (APSC). The AEC is being pursued by more pragmatic
economic ministers and technocrats. There are genuine differences on issues
concerning AEC over which member States may confront each other, but suchinternal disputes are not presumably fueled by those between foreign ministers.
Furthermore, an ASEAN-based regional comprehensive economic partnership
including China and Japan is now considered more realistic than ever, andneither ASEAN nor China has brought in the South China Sea issues.

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China seems determined to continue its unilateral actions, a recent
example of which was the establishment of “Sansha City.” Needless to say, thedomestic legislation has nothing to do with international law, and these actstaken by China do not affect its international legal relationships at all.
Nevertheless, ASEAN has to confront China’s attempt to challenge the statusquo and accumulate faits accomplis in the South China Sea.
ASEAN has attempted to provide regional mechanisms in order toameliorate, if not resolve, international disputes. Starting from the peacefulsettlement of mutual conflict, ASEAN countries developed the hub-and-spoke
system of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) withpowers such as Japan, China and the United States. Unfortunately, TAC remains
a moral commitment rather than an effective tool for conflict resolution. The
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has aimed at enhancing security in theAsia-Pacific, from confidence building through preventive diplomacy, as anapproach to the conflict, but little progress has been witnessed. Recently, theARF sifted its main focus to non-traditional security cooperation. In short, neither
TAC nor ARF has been useful in dealing with the South China Sea problems.
Increasingly promising is the “ASEAN Plus Eight” concept, anunofficial designation for ASEAN, Japan, China and Korea (“Plus Three”),
Australia, New Zealand and India (“Plus Six”), Russia and the United States. The“ASEAN Plus Eight” constitutes the East Asia Summit (EAS). It is also identicalwith the membership of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMMPlus). Compared with the TAC regime, merely a collection of countries that haveacceded to the treaty, it is more institutionalized, with an annual summit meetingand other ministerial meetings. Compared with the ARF consisting of sometwenty countries, the “ASEAN Plus Eight” is a more substantive forum of alimited number of more influential countries. It seems now most suited to discuss
strategic issues such as the South China Sea.
Southeast Asia, both continental and insular, has been an arena for
major powers to compete and fight against each other at the expense of theinterests of people in the region. However fragile and vulnerable it is, ASEAN
has been seeking regional resilience in order not to become a hayfield for

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

powers outside the region. Trying to overcome fragility and vulnerability, ASEAN
is paving the way towards the ASEAN Community. In reality, as shown at AMM
this past July, ASEAN is far from consolidated. It still needs a variety of support
from its partners. Being ASEAN’s longest and closest partner, Japan has assets
to help the organization and its member States enhance regional solidarity.
Greater support from Japan would enhance not only ASEAN solidarity but also
regional security.

Dr. Susumu Yamakage is Professor of International Relations, Aoyama Gakuin
University.

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