2008-E-9
China’s Competitive FTA Strategy:
Realism in a Liberal Slide
Jian Yang
Senior Lecturer in International Relations
the University of Auckland, New ZealandJune 2008

Paper presented at the International Symposium “Competitive Regionalism,” Ibuka
International Conference Hall, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. May 30 to 31, 2008.

Compared with Europe and North America, East Asia is a late comer in regional
economic cooperation and China is one of the latest in the region. In May 2001, China
became a member of the Bangkok Agreement, the first free trade area analogue thecountry joined. China has moved fast since then. It has (partially) completed free trade
agreement (FTA) talks with the 10-member South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), Chile,
Pakistan, and New Zealand and has signed a Closer Economic Partnership Agreement(CEPA) with Hong Kong and Macau. Beijing is also in FTA talks with Australia, Iceland,
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),1 Singapore and lately Peru. It has completed or started
joint feasibility research for FTAs with a number of countries, including the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU),2 India, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland (see Table
1 on page 26).
This paper investigates the driving forces for China’s FTA offensive. It first
briefly discusses the role of Chinese think tanks in China’s foreign policymaking,followed by an investigation of China’s interest in FTAs, focusing on Beijing’s genuineinterest in liberal free trade and its pursuit for realist relative gains. The paper thenexamines China’s four FTA partners, namely Pakistan, ASEAN, Chile and New Zealand.

Chinese Think Tanks
This paper is largely based on Chinese publications. It is therefore necessary tobriefly discuss the actors in China’s foreign policymaking. Bin Yu noted in 1994 that

1

The member states of the GCC include Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar andBahrain.
2
South Africa announced in June 2004 that the SACU would start FTA negotiations with China. No
progress has been reported however. The SACU consists of five Member States, Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.

1although more think-tank and civil society actors had become involved in China’s foreign
policymaking since the 1980s, the role of the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairsremained central. He suggested that China’s official foreign policy makers tended to
distrust scholarly writing on foreign policy (Yu, Bin 1994: 254). However, thatobservation is out of date. While a gap does exist between specialists and policy makers,
it is narrowing as a more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy and a more bureaucratic
policymaking process evolves. Glaser and Saunders (2002: 597) argue that “a morepluralistic and competitive policy environment has given analysts at think tanks more
influence.” Lampton also notes that the complexity of foreign policy issues has resulted
in the professionalization of China’s foreign policymaking, which has given Chinese
analysts the opportunity to make significant inputs. Lampton (2001: 8-10) emphasizes
that “in the economic arena … the need for specialized research has become increasingly
pronounced,” and there is a “growing reliance on internal and external research.”
According to Shambaugh (2002: 575-576, 581), “undoubtedly the decisionmaking system has become more consultative over time, with an increased role played by
the think tank specialists”, so much so that “today they must be considered important
actors in the foreign policy making process in the PRC.” To Shambaugh (2002: 581), thepublished journals of Chinese foreign policy think tanks “provide very important insights
into policy debates that are percolating inside bureaucracies, thus offering important‘early warning indicators’ of policies to come.” Tanner (2002: 559) also emphasizes that
Chinese think tanks are now “some of the most important windows through which
foreign analysts can observe China’s usually opaque policy-making system.”2

While it is widely accepted that Chinese think tanks and analysts can influence
China’s foreign policymaking, it is difficult to assess the actual influence which varies
dramatically and depends on a number of factors. Glaser and Saunders (2002: 608-613)
have classified four types of influence: expertise influence based on where an analyst
works in the bureaucracy, expertise influence based on the analyst’s expert knowledge,
personal influence based on the analyst’s personal connections with policy makers andexperiential influence based on the analyst’s career history and personal experience.
Along with the growing influence of Chinese think tanks and analysts, public
opinion is emerging as a factor which cannot be ignored. Lampton (2001: 12) regards theincreased influence of public opinion in Chinese foreign policymaking as a good example
of “corporate pluralization”, which refers to “the proliferation of organizations, groups
and sometimes individuals in the policy-making process.”
It has long been a challenge to assess the role of public opinion in foreign
policymaking. Rosenau (1961: 4) noted in 1961 that “we have little reliable knowledge
about the role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy.” Understandably, it is far moredifficult to specify the role of public opinion in an undemocratic country like China.
Nevertheless, Fewsmith and Rosen (2001: 186) concluded in 2001 that “public opinion
seems destined to play a more important . . . role in Chinese foreign policy in the future.”
Lampton (2001: 12) is more specific, saying that “some issues and some domestic
circumstances allow the leadership less room to operate than others. Leaders understandwhich issues are so sensitive that to mishandle them could lead to social instability or
could provide political competitors an avenue by which to undermine them.” Although
the issue of FTA can have strong domestic implications, it is not a sensitive issue to the3Chinese public. The Chinese public is not well informed and therefore can offer little
input to China’s FTA negotiations. The Chinese business, however, does play a role byparticipating in the feasibility studies and the subsequent negotiations.

A slide towards liberalism
Since 1978 when China opened up, Beijing has made a consistent effort to integrate with
the international society. One indication is its support for the United Nations and various
international regimes. In the 29 years from 1949 when the People’s Republic China(PRC) was established to 1977, China was a party to a total of 31 international treaties. In
contrast, in the 27 years from 1978 when Chin opened up to the end of 2004, China
signed 236 international treaties (Rao 2005: 51).
China’s effort to integrate with the international society is a process of learningand accepting liberal norms which were foreign to the Chinese whose world views had
been dominated by Marxism-Leninism and a sense of insecurity derived from China’s“Century of Humiliation” (1840-1945) when China suffered at the hands of foreign
invaders. Since 1978, China has been exposed to Western liberal norms. The end of theCold War accelerated China’s slide towards liberalism. Medeiros and Fravel (2003: 23)
noted in 2003 that “in the last ten years, Chinese foreign policy has become far more
nimble and engaging than at any other time in the history of the People’s Republic.”
Evidence of these changes include the expanded number and depth of China’s bilateralrelationships, new trade and security accords, deepened participation in key multilateralorganisations, widening acceptance of many prevailing international rules and institutions
and efforts to help address global security issues.

4China’s slide towards liberalism is most noticeable in the economic area,
highlighted by its 15-year request to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) from1986 to 2001. And China’s trade liberalization has been rewarding. Since it started
economic reforms in 1978, China has pursued a development strategy of export-led
growth. After three decades of economic reforms, the Chinese economy has beentransformed from a closed socialist command economy into an open, trade-oriented
capitalist economy. From 1978 to 2006, China’s trade volume grew more than 85 times
from U.S.$20.6 billion to U.S.$1760.4 billion (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation, China; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007: 730). China is now oneof the countries most dependent on foreign trade. According to Chinese statistics, 70
percent of China’s GDP was generated by merchandise trade in 2004 (Zhang, Huang et.
al. 2006: 42; Chen, Taifeng 2005: 62).3 In the same year, the figures for the United States
and Japan were 25 percent and 26 percent respectively (Xiao and Du, 2007: 2).
Having benefited from free trade, most Chinese economists have been supportiveof global trade liberalization and believe that China should not stop its liberalization
process. They often point to the successful examples of free trade and the unsuccessful
cases of either protectionism or economic nationalism. One unsuccessful case is Latin
America. It is noted that during the 1960s and 1970s, under the influence of economic
nationalism, many Latina American countries changed their free trade policy and became
more protectionist, which resulted in the unsatisfactory economic performance of thesecountries since the 1980s (Jiang 2007: 20).

3

China’s statistics are questionable in that China’s real GDP can be underestimated as much of the output
generated by the tertiary industry is not included. China’s unusually high dependency on trade is also due
to its high percentage of processing trade (Han et. al. 2006: 16).

5

Chinese analysts (Jiang, 2007: 20-21; Zhang, Zhen 2004: 4-6) have listed anumber of benefits that FTAs could generate, including·

the effect of economy of scale·

improvement of the structure of the market through an intensified competition·

stimulating foreign investment·

protecting the continuation of economic reforms through binding agreements·

attracting potential investors by signaling the government’s trade policy and good
relations with FTA partners·

creating an insurance mechanism by preventing protectionism·

strengthening the bargaining power of FTA partners against a third party·

improvement of the coordination among different economic sectors by mobilizing
free trade agreement supporters·

contributing to the settlement of international disputes in security areas

Having noted the slow progress and its limited influence in multilateral talks, China has
become increasingly interested in the potential for regional trade liberalization, an arenain which it could play a stronger and more effective role (Wang, Qin 2005: 59).
China’s FTA offensive also reflects Beijing’s effort to learn the international
economic game and to emulate other counties. The Chinese started their economic
reforms with little experience and had to, as Deng Xiaoping said famously, “cross theriver by feeling the stones”. Although Beijing soon accepted the concept of free trade, it
still is playing the catch-up game.
China’s FTA policy shift therefore can be a process of learning and emulation.
FTA strategies of the United States and Europe have been particularly influential to
China’s FTA policy (Zheng, Xianwu 2003: 5-6). In Northeast Asia, Chinese observers
have noted a trend of moving away from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

6

and towards FTAs since the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (Zhang, Zhen 2004: 2; Zheng,
Xianwu 2002: 30-31).
China’s emulation process is marked with both caution and ambition. On the one
hand, China started its FTA negotiations with relatively liberal and small economies. On
the other hand, China’s FTA offensive is global, with negotiation partners in Latin
America, Oceania, South and East Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa. Chinese
analysts term these partners as China’s front posts (qianzhan) in China’s global FTA
strategy (Zheng and Yu 2006: 7).
To summarise, we may argue that China is interested in liberal absolute gains
derived from FTAs. After all, China is deeply involved in global trade and has been its
major beneficiary.

Realist Calculations
While China has been on a liberal slide, realism continues to determine Chinese foreign
policy. Deng (1998: 320) observed that despite the growing idealpolitik, the dominant
thinking of international relations among Chinese analysts was still realist. Lampton(2001: 24-25) also noted that “although there is plenty of evidence of increasing Chinese
cooperation and conformity with international norms, there is little evidence thatconsiderations of national interest and realpolitik figure any less prominently in Chinese
thinking than they always have.”
In terms of China’s FTA strategy, while the liberal absolute gain has laid afoundation, the selection of FTA partners and the speed and urgency of FTA negotiations
are often determined by China’s effort to compete for realist relative gains. Zhang

7

Anyuan (2006: 7) warns that compared with the WTO, FTAs cover a broader area andare more discriminative against non-partners. Zhang also notes that even the FTAs that
do not seem related to China could have a strong impact on China. Chinese analysts
advise Beijing to follow the trend and to join the “small group” of FTAs after joining the“big group” of the WTO in order to avoid being marginalized (Zhang, Fan 2004: 75).
“Everyone is talking about FTAs. Everyone is conducting FTA talks. Especially after the
Doha negotiations reached a deadlock, the FTA talks concerning China and nations
worldwide reached their highest peak,” noted a senior researcher at the Institute of AsiaPacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (‘China-Pakistan FTA topromote bilateral trade” 2006). The following paragraphs investigate China’s competitive
FTA strategy, focusing on the economic, political and legal aspects.

Economic competition
It is generally believed that China’s rapid growth of exports is to a great extent due to its
cheap labor, raw material and land. China’s labor cost in 2003 was just one fiftieth of thatin the United States and Japan. However, China’s advantage of cheap labor is offset by its
low productivity which was only one twenty-fifth of that of the United States and one
twenty-sixth of Japan’s (Zhang, Huang et. al.2003: 122). Meanwhile, the costs of labor,
raw material and land all have been increasing. It was observed in 2004 that already someleveling of wages was taking place between Hong Kong and Shanghai (Ariff 2003). It isthus imperative for Chinese producers to continue to reduce the costs so that theirproducts stay competitive in the world market. FTAs are most effective in lowering
tariffs and thus substantially reducing the costs of both exports and imports. FTAs could8also save costs by enhancing the efficiency and productivity of China’s somewhat oldfashioned command enterprises, partly due to the effect of scale and because
rationalization and modernization would be stimulated by the new competition (Bi 2005:
15).
China also attempts to use FTAs to make good use of rules of origin (ROOs) andto deal with possible negative impacts derived from ROOs in various FTAs. FTAs are
effective in addressing China’s ROOs concerns not only because China can negotiate
ROOs to its benefit but also because FTAs will facilitate Beijing’s “go out” (zou chu qu)strategy which pushes its enterprises to go global. This is in line with Beijing’s interest in
the WTO membership. As a member of the WTO, China would have to further open up
to international trade and investment, which “would prod necessary reforms of domestic
enterprises by subjecting them to competition from—and transformative partnerships
with—foreign firms” (deLisle 2006).
Related to its ROOs concerns are Beijing’s efforts to reduce the impact of trade
diversion resulted from competing FTAs. The South Korea-U.S. FTA, which was signedon April 2, 2007, alarmed the Chinese to a considerable extent. In addition to the strategic
implications of U.S. strategic counter balance against China (Caryl 2007; Kim 2007),
competitive U.S. agricultural products could threaten Chinese agricultural exports toSouth Korea. With an annual value of about U.S.$3 billion, South Korea is the second
biggest market for Chinese agricultural exports after Japan (Song 2007: 39). On the other
hand, American businesses have expressed intention to reduce their imports of textiles
and apparel from China and use South Korea as a replacement (“South Korea: US buyers
keen to source more apparel, textiles” 2007).

9

A more immediate effect of FTAs is that they help to address China’s concerns
about the anti-dumping (AD) charges against Chinese exporters. Since its accession into
the WTO in late 2001, China has faced an increasing number of AD investigations, to theextent that it appears to be the number one victim of AD investigations.4 From 1995-2006,
China faced 536 AD investigations, 2.34 times of South Korea’s 229 which was in thesecond place. In terms of final AD measures during this period, 375 were directed at
China, 2.76 times of South Korea’s 136 (World Trade Organization 2007a). One major
reason for the large number of AD charges against China has been that many countries do
not recognize China as a market economy. All WTO members have 15 years to recognize
China’s market economy status after China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. China’s FTA
efforts could have some immediate impact on reducing the number of AD investigations
against China as a number of the countries which have launched AD investigations
against China are China’s FTA partners or negotiation partners, such as Australia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Chile, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia. China has also completed
the China-India FTA feasibility study and is looking into the feasibility of negotiating an
FTA with South Korea. Both India and South Korea are active AD players (World Trade
Organization. 2007a).

Political competition
While economic competition is an apparent factor in China’s interest in FTAs, politicalcompetition is no less important. In analyzing U.S. FTAs, deLisle (2006) notes that
FTAs can serve as an economic instrument in the pursuit of security goals
that loom large in U.S. foreign policy. . . More crassly instrumentally, they4

Although China is subject to more AD initiations and measures than any other countries, it is not thebiggest victim in terms of intensity relative to trade value.

10

can serve as economic goodies that Washington can dole out to serve
political ends of building or reinforcing alliance-like arrangements.
A similar observation can be applied to China. deLisle (2006) actually points out that“compared to the U.S., the political dimension is even larger for Beijing and thecommitment to the relatively radical economic liberalism ideals behind FTAs (or of thebroader international trade regime) less established and robust.”
Chinese analysts emphasize that China’s FTA strategy should help China“enhance its influence in the international political economy and expand its political andsecurity space” (Zhang, Fan 2004: 75). Therefore, China should make FTAs “animportant tool for both economic diplomacy and political diplomacy” (Liu, Changli,
2005: 10). Thus, Chinese analysts are wary of Japan’s effort to negotiate FTAs or EPAs
(Economic Partnership Agreements) with China’s neighbors. They deem it imperative for
China to “break up the encirclement of Japan’s FTA strategy” (Liu, Changli 2005: 10).
The reason seems simple—the countries with closer economic relations with Japan will
inevitably improve their political relations with Tokyo, which may dilute China’s
regional leadership potential.
Another political and strategic consideration in China’s FTA strategy is Beijing’s
effort to establish a long-term, reliable supply of overseas resources and energy.
According to the Development Research Centre of the State Council of China (2005), in
the years before 2020, China is expected to experience rapid industrialization and China’s
demand for resources will peak (see Table 2). In 2003, the percentages of China’s
consumption of petrol, lead, copper, nickel, steel, coal and cement in world total were 7,
19, 20, 21, 25, 30 and 50 percent respectively. China’s steel demand outstripped the11demand in the United States and Japan combined, and the Chinese demand for copper,
nickel, zinc, iron ore and cement also surpassed the United States. On the other hand,
China’s per capita possession of resources is far below world average. Its per capita
mineral occupation is about a half of the world average, per capita arable land area andper capita water resources about one third of the world average, per capita forest area
only one sixth of the world average, and per capita coal, oil and gas about three fifths,
one tenth and one twentieth of the world average respectively.
Table 2. China’s Increasing Dependency on Imports of Key Minerals
MineralDependency on imports (%)
2000
2010
Petroleum31
41
Iron Ore
33
34
Manganese
16
31
Copper
48
72
Lead
0
45
Zinc
0
53
Source: Development Research Centre of the State Council 2005.

2020
58
52
38
82
52
69

Legal competition
Related to economic and political competition is legal competition. The three can hardly
be separated. A Chinese analyst argues that for great powers, to play a leading role inregional economic cooperation is not just for their interests in the region or internalbenefits (neibu shouyi). More importantly, the great powers are aiming at the externalbenefits (waibu shouyi), namely to increase their bargaining chips in multilateralnegotiations and further to play a leading role in the making of international economic
rules (Zhang, Zhen 2004: 5). While having benefited from its active participation in
global trade and investment, Beijing has long believed that the existing international
economic order is a part of the “unfair and irrational” international order. Beijing’s “fairand rational” international order is based on its vision for a “harmonious world”. Chinese

12President Hu Jintao elaborated the concept of harmonious world by raising some specificsuggestions. Economically, Hu urged the international society to actively push forward
the establishment of an open, fair and indiscriminative multilateral trade mechanism,
further improve the international financial system, reinforce global energy dialogue andcooperation and jointly maintain energy security and the stability of the energy market(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China 2005; Wang, Gonglong 2007: 56-62).
China clearly is interested in making changes to the existing international trading
system to ensure a “fair and rational” international economic order. Chinese officials
have repeatedly pointed out that the WTO decision-making process is dominated by a
few states and the views of developing countries are not adequately considered. For
instance, as a developing country, China opposes any linkage between trade and labor
standards and “the use of environmental standards as a new form of protectionism”(Lardy 2002: 156). One of China’s goals in participating in globalization and joining
international economic institutions is to shape the rules of the international trading system(Zhang, Huang et. al. 2004: 12). It is believed that those who set the international rules
have vested interests and they have no intention to let China enjoy the benefits
automatically (Liu and Gong 2007: 18). “An unchangeable rule (tie de faze) is that those
who set rules will benefit from the rules”, Chinese analysts emphasize (Han et. al. 2005:
7).
China’s perceptions of U.S. and EU policies towards China’s market economy
status highlight its dissatisfaction with some of the existing international trading rules.
While acknowledging that China still needs to continue to marketize its economy,
Chinese analysts do not see it a purely economic issue, especially vis-à-vis China’s major

13

trading partners. It was noted that early in 2001 the market economy in China surpassed
world-recognized threshold of 60 percent and made up 69 percent of the Chinese
economy. China thus was well ahead of Russia in terms of economic liberalization (Chen,
Taifeng 2005: 184).5 Yet the United States recognized Russia’s market economy status inJune 2002 and the EU followed in July 2002. Chinese analysts believe that a key reason
why Washington recognized the market economy status of former socialist countries like
Russia, Romania and Bulgaria but not China’s is that these countries had changed
politically and had moved closer to the United States in their foreign polices (Chen,
Taifeng 2005: 188).
It is no surprise that one of China’s goals in multilateral trade talks is to establish
uniform (tongyi) market economy criteria (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2005: 107). Given
China’s limited influence in international economic institutions, Beijing is unlikely toachieve the goal in the near future. A “more feasible” approach is to enlist as many
countries as possible to recognize China’s market economy status, which China hopes
will impose pressure upon other countries to follow the suit (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2005:
107). New Zealand was the first developed country to recognize China’s market economy
status and was rewarded as the first developed country to start FTA negotiations with
China. By October 2007, 76 countries had recognized China’s market economy status(Bhuyan 2007).
China is not actively challenging the existing international trading system
however. This is partly because China is still learning how to play the international
economic game. deLisle (2006) notes that “China has remained largely a ‘regime
taker’—accepting the existing rules . . . and pledging to abide by them.” It is unlikely that5

For a more comprehensive assessment of China’s marketization, see Li, Xiaoxi (2006).

14

we will see a dramatic change in the near future. While suggesting that China should not
accept the unfair requirements forced upon China (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2003: 221),
Chinese analysts have observed that
China’s strategy of actively participating in economic globalization
demonstrates that in the process of turning China into a world-classeconomic power, China accepts the existing international economic orderinstead of challenging it. Not only does China not challenge this order, itutilizes the order. China will first accept the existing international economicorder and then work with other countries, especially the developing
countries, to gradually improve it (Zhang, Huang et. al. 2004: 12).
China’s UN experience shows that it prefers integration first and gradual changes second.
When the PRC was admitted to the United Nations in late 1971, there were concerns that
Beijing would disrupt the status quo and would use its veto power to paralyze the UN
Security Council. But as Samuel Kim has noted, within the UN, China is “a satisfied
conservative system maintainer, not a liberal system reformer nor a revolutionary systemtransformer” (as cited in Lardy 2002: 155).
Legal competition is thus not a major factor driving China’s FTA negotiations.
However, with a rapidly growing economy, it may not be long before China starts toleave its mark on the rules of the international trading system. International order evolves
with the rise and fall of great powers. As Drezner (2007: 39-42) points out, global
institutions cease to be appropriate when the allocation of decision-making authority
within them no longer corresponds to the distribution of power. A good example is the G7. The G-7 was moderately successful in managing global macroeconomic imbalances
during the 1980s. Today, these economic giants cannot be effective without including intheir deliberations economic heavyweight China. Drezner argues that despite the widely
shared perception of U.S. unilateralism, the George W. Bush administration has actually15

made a consistent effort to incorporate emerging powers while placating status quo states.
For instance, the United States has encouraged China to participate periodically in the G7 meetings of finance ministers and central-bank governors. Also, with a view to giving
greater influence to China, the Bush administration has pushed hard to change the voting
quotas within the International Monetary Fund.

Understanding China’s FTA outcomes
Chinese analysts have had a rather thorough discussion about selecting China’s
FTA partners. They take into consideration economic, political and strategic factors. The
realist relative gain is what China is really concerned about and the liberal absolute gain
takes a back seat in China’s selection of FTA partners. “What we can get from the FTA
should be the key issue in selecting partners,” said a Chinese analyst (“China-Pakistan
FTA to promote bilateral trade” 2006). It is generally agreed that priority should be given
to China’s neighbouring countries, then to the countries that either have an economy
complementary to China’s or rich recourses or are emerging markets. Thus Beijing wasright in initiating FTA negotiations with ASEAN. Other FTA negotiation partners in Asia
should be South Korea and Japan in Northeast Asia and then Pakistan and India in South
Asia. Beyond Asia, China’s ideal FTA partners are United Arab Emirates in the Middle
East, Chile in Latin America, Australia in Oceania and South Africa in Africa. However,FTA negotiations are two-way communications and China has to be flexible inprioritising its FTA partners. For instance, in Oceania, it is New Zealand, instead ofAustralia, that has signed an FTA with China.

16

This section investigates China’s current FTA partners. China’s CEPAs with
Hong Kong and Macao are different from China FTAs in that both Hong Kong and
Macao are China’s special administrative regions instead of sovereign states.

Inside Asia: Pakistan and ASEAN
Pakistan
Pakistan’s economic value to China is limited. Its trade with China accounted for just 0.3
percent of China’s total trade in 2006. Unlike countries such as Chile, Pakistan can hardly
be used as a springboard to other economies. This does not mean Pakistan has no
economic potential for China. Chinese investment in Pakistan is believed to increase
substantially in the coming years (“Pakistan: China displays growing interest in Pakistan”
2007). Nevertheless, Pakistan’s value to China is largely political and strategic.
It is well known that Pakistan has been China’s strong ally for decades. It has
consistently supported China in the United Nations on issues like China’s human rights
record and Taiwan. It has also played a crucial role in Sino-US rapprochement in theearly 1970s. Although China has substantially improved its relations with India, a giant inSouth Asia who has regarded China as a major enemy ever since the 1962 Sino-Indianwar, Pakistan’s strategic importance to China has by no means declined. After all, Beijing
is wary of U.S. and Japanese attempts to deepen their strategic cooperation with India.
Pakistan’s strategic value to China lies not only in its support for China on various
political and security issues but also in its vital strategic location. It not only neighbors
China, India and Arabian Sea, but also is close to the Middle East and Central Asia, twooil-rich regions. The Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province is only 72

17

kilometers away from Iran, and about 400 kilometers away from the Strait of Hormuz,
the only sea passage to the open ocean for large areas of the petroleum-exporting Persian
Gulf states. The Chinese hope that they will one day ship Persian Gulf oil from Gwadar
overland through Pakistan to China. That will cut transport by 12,000 miles, shaving amonth off the journey’s time and 25 percent off the fees (Montero 2007). Perhaps more
importantly, it would give China an alternative to the Malacca Strait, an increasingly busy
and dangerous Strait which is plagued by pirates and vulnerable in times of great power
conflicts.
While Sino-Pakistan political and security relations are deep-rooted, their economic
relations have been shallow. Chinese analysts conclude that the Sino-Pakistan “allweather, all dimensional” strategic relationship is seriously unbalanced. It is therefore ofstrategic importance to strengthen the bilateral economic relationship (Huang, Zhao andBi 2008: 64-65). In Pakistan, in spite of some economic concerns, the strategic value ofan FTA with China is also well recognized. A Pakistani commentary notes that
Spanning over five and a half decades, the historic bonds between China andPakistan are the living example of a relationship based on trust, equity andrespect. . . . The FTA is acknowledgement of the realization that to sustain
cooperation and . . . nurture the wholistic and strategic relationship, majoradvances had to be made in the economic fields (“Pak-China FTA” 2006).
ASEAN
Political competition is also prominent in China’s FTA with ASEAN. To be sure, theeconomic necessities for the China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) were not difficult to identify.
Bilateral trade grew rather rapidly, from US$7 billion in 1990 to US$39.52 billion in
2000. The average growth rate was 18.8 percent. In 2000, the growth rate was as high as
45.3 percent. In 1991, ASEAN’s share of China’s foreign trade was 5.8 percent. By 2000,18

it had increased to 8.3 percent and ASEAN had become China’s fifth largest trading
partner. Meanwhile, the share of China in ASEAN’s trade expanded from 2.1 percent in1994 to 3.9 percent in 2000, making China ASEAN’s sixth largest trading partner. In
2002, with China’s entry into the WTO, China-ASEAN trade increased by 31.6 percent(ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation 2001: 1). According to the
ASEAN-China joint expert group, the CAFTA would increase ASEAN’s exports to
China by US$13 billion or by 48 percent while China’s exports to ASEAN would expand
by U.S.$10.6 billion or by 55.1 percent. At the same time, ASEAN’s GDP would
increase by 0.9 percent or by U.S.$5.4 billion while China’s GDP would rise by 0.3
percent or by U.S.$2.2 billion in absolute terms (ASEAN-China Expert Group on
Economic Cooperation 2001: 31, 150).
Arguably, both China and ASEA would benefit from CAFTA in the long term as
the competition resulted from CAFTA would help ASEAN and China to increase theeconomic efficiency and competitiveness of their business sector and attract more foreign
direct investment (FDI) inflows (Cai 2003: 401). Some also argued that the pact would in
the longer term be in China’s favor as Chinese manufacturers would break into Southeast
Asian export markets and the Chinese economy would also benefit from a stable supply
of commodities and raw materials (Vatikiotis and Hieber. 2003: 28.). However, the shortterm economic impacts of the CAFTA on both China and ASEAN were less certain. The
impacts could be negative. A key principle for establishing FTAs is the complementarityof the two economies and ASEAN and China were more competitive than supplementaryin trade structure. This was reflected in the fact that China and ASEAN were not eachother’s major export markets. Wong and Chan (2003: 518) noted that from 1980 to 2000,

19

the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) received only
an average of 6.4 percent of China’s total exports while ASEAN-5’s exports to China
constituted only 5.5 percent of China’s total imports. From the perspective of ASEAN-5,
exports to China in this period accounted for only 2.4 percent of its total exports and its
imports from China were just 2.6 percent of its total imports. In terms of investment, the
FDI share of the ASEAN-5 in China accounted for only six percent in 2001 (Wong andChan 2003: 523). Wong and Chan (2003: 526) hence concluded that “there are more
possibilities that China and ASEAN would compete, rather than complement one other.”
China’s strong interest in CAFTA thus cannot be fully explained by economic
interests. More incentives can be found in Chinese political and strategic calculations.
Lee Kuan Yew (2007: 25) observed that China’s decision-making on CAFTA was “basedon strategic considerations that override such competing domestic interests as importers
versus exporters and agriculturists versus industrialists.” Chinese analysts agree that
China’s decision was, to a great extent, a politically driven move (Qiu 2005: 8-13; Li, Xia
2005: 62).6
First of all, to promote China’s peaceful rise is particularly important in East Asia.
While China contributed a great deal to the trade within East Asia, its export competition
with the newly industrialized economies in the region has increased from eight percent in1990 to 20 percent in 2002. It is therefore important to coordinate economic interests with
ASEAN states, which has strategic implications.
Southeast Asia is geo-politically significant to China, not only because much of
China’s trade and oil from the Middle East passes through the region but also because of

6This author’s interviews in Beijing and Shanghai in October and November 2005 also confirmed thispoint.

20

conflicting maritime claims. China, as a rising power, has been a strong supporter for
multipolarity in world politics and ASEAN is crucial in that respect. Southeast Asia isalso important in China’s effort to counter a perceived US containment-of-China strategy
and to marginalize Taiwan politically.
To cement closer economic relations with ASEAN would increase China’s
regional influence at the expense of the United States, Japan and other major economic
powers. The FTA deal was just part of Beijing’s concerted effort to embrace ASEAN
from all directions. In November 2002, when China and ASEAN signed the CAFTA,
they also signed off on three other agreements, including agreements on cooperation in
new areas like drug trafficking, agricultural cooperation and a landmark declaration on
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It was thus observed that “China moved aheadof rival Japan in setting the stage for economic and political ties with the region” (deCastro 2002).
Chinese analysts have noted a number of Chinese interests in establishing the CAFTA,
as summarized by Wang Shuguang ((2005: 24-25):·

To demonstrate to the world that China is determined to open up further and torecognize, accept and integrate into the existing international system;·

To further improve relations with China’s peripheral states in order to create an
external environment which is conducive to China’s economic development;·

To use it as a base for China to participate in international competition.
Economically, CAFTA will help reduce China’s reliance on North American andEuropean markets. Politically, ASEAN is an important springboard for China to
go to the world and could be an important supportive political force;·

To explore regionalism that serves China’s interests;·

To help address ASEAN’s concerns about “China threat”;·

To help resolve the issues about ethnic Chinese in ASEAN member states.

21Outside Asia: New Zealand and Chile
New Zealand and Chile have some similarities. First, both are relatively small and open
economies, reflecting Beijing’s attempt to learn about and try FTA negotiations. Second,
both economies are more or less complementary to the Chinese economy. Third, the twocountries have had a strong political relationship with China. Finally, both have beenleading the support for China’s economic integration with the world economy.

New Zealand
New Zealand from the very beginning was determined to become the first developed
country to sign an FTA with China. Australia, China’s priority FTA negotiation partner in
Oceania, tried to compete with New Zealand. However, due to their differences onmarket access, especially for agricultural products, no significant progress has beenachieved in the negotiations since the eighth round in April 2007 (Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Australian Government 2008). On the other hand, China has been
grateful to New Zealand for its consistent support in the past. New Zealand was the firstdeveloped country to sign a WTO agreement with China, the first developed country torecognize China as a “market economy”, which was a huge boost to China’s effort to be
accepted as a “market economy”.
There are a number of other factors for New Zealand becoming the firstdeveloped country to sign an FTA with China. As mentioned earlier, the New Zealandeconomy is relatively small, open and complementary to the Chinese economy and New
Zealand has a good political relationship with China. It was an ideal country for China to22

learn about and practice FTA negotiations. Commenting on China’s FTA negotiations inMarch 2003, Long Yongtu, who was chief trade negotiator for China's entry into the
WTO in 2001, said that “China has just entered into the WTO. We are really not familiar
with all these very sophisticated negotiations and also our negotiating capacities are notvery strong; so we have to focus on a few things rather than try to do many things at thesame time” (Lee, Rebecca 2003).

Chile
Similarly, Chile is a relatively small trading partner to China but has a few firsts in its
relations with China. It was the first Latin American country to diplomatically recognize
the PRC, the first Latin American country to recognize China’s “market economy” status
and the first Latin American country to conclude WTO membership accession
negotiations with China.
Compared with New Zealand, Chile is more important to the Chinese economy.
What attracts China perhaps as much as trade opportunities is the fact that Chile is aliberal, cosmopolitan state that has already negotiated full or partial FTAs with over 30
partners in four continents, and that it has a special relationship with the United States. In
that respect, Chile is a Latin American counterpart of Singapore; both have become FTA“hubs” in their respective regions. A good example is Chinese exports of toys to Latin
America. Latin America was believed a most difficult market for Chinese toy exporters.
It was the only region where Chinese toy exporters faced dumping charges. After thesigning of China-Chile FTA in 2005, Chinese toy exports to Chile, Mexico, Argentina
and Brazil increased by 50 percent, 33 percent, 23 percent and 58 percent respectively.

23

This is despite the fact that the China-Chile FTA did not come into effect until October 1,
2006. The increase was so dramatic that Chinese analysts called for self regulations to
avoid repercussions (Zeng 2007: 12-13).
Concerns over the competition of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas(FTAA) contributed to China’s eagerness to conclude its FTA negotiations with Chile.
China was worried that the proposed FTAA would generate more competition from Latin
American economies in the U.S. market. The Chinese still remember the tariffdiscrimination that their country suffered after North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) came into effect in the 1990s. Before NAFTA, China had the largest share of
the U.S. textile products market. During the first three years after NAFTA was signed by
the United States, Canada and Mexico in 1994, Mexico saw its exports of male shirts to
the United States soar by 122.9 percent while those of China declined by 38.1 percent.
For sports wear exports, Mexico gained 769.3 percent while China lost 33.8 percent(“China, India to advance feasibility research on regional trade arrangement” 2007.) By
1998, Mexico had replaced China as the largest exporter of textile products to the UnitedStates. It is predicted that the FTAA will have an even stronger impact on China’s
exports. An FTA with Chile will give China’s traders a beachhead from which to expand
their economic activities into the Latin America region and make the FTAA work for
China rather than against it (Yang, Zhimin 2004:48-50). Pablo Cabrera, the Chilean
Ambassador to China, said that Chile expected to provide Chinese companies with a newentry point to the American market. “South America, even the whole of America, will
become a complete free trade area for China,” Cabrera claimed (Liu and Jiang 2005).

24

An FTA with Chile also serves China’s energy and natural resources security
interest. While China is the world’s largest copper importer with its copper consumption
accounting for about 22 per cent of world total in 2004 (Chen, Hua 2005). Chile is theworld’s largest copper supplier. Chile annually produces 4.9 million tons of copper.
About 850,000 tons are exported to China (Zhang, Jin 2004). The two countries havealready vowed to strengthen co-operation on copper mining. Currently copper accounts
for 62 percent to 68 percent of Chilean exports to China (Zhang, Jin 2004).

Conclusion
Before November 2000 when Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji surprised the world with aproposal to establish a free trade area with all ten ASEAN economies by 2010, China had
been “more of a follower than a leader when it came to be dealing with multilateral
economic arrangement” (Cheng 2006). Since then, China has engaged in an FTA
offensive and is an influential driving force of East Asian regionalism. As a tradeoriented economy, China has a strong interest in promoting trade liberalization. Concrete
benefits include lowering costs, expanding exportation, diverse markets, and helping
address the anti-dumping concerns.
China’s interest in FTA talks should be examined against the background that“the use of FTAs in geopolitical jockeying is reaching new heights in East Asia” (Caryl2007). Political and strategic considerations can play a decisive role in China’s FTA
decisions. It is no coincidence that China began its FTA initiatives in Southeast Asia
where China has had historical influence that it aspires to re-establish, particularly inrivalry with Japan and the United States. At the same time, FTAs can also be useful25

vehicles for China to promote its “peaceful development” vision and the notion that
China’s development is an opportunity rather than a threat to other countries. China’s
FTA negotiation partners include some resource-rich countries, such as GCC andAustralia. In terms of legal competition, China still is in its learning curve. Beijing isrelatively new to the existing international trading system and has been focusing on how
to make good use of it instead of challenging it.
The outcomes of China’s FTA negotiations so far have highlighted thecompetition factor in Chinese selection of FTA partners. In Asia, China’s FTAs withPakistan and ASEAN are mainly driven by strategic and political considerations. Outside
Asia, New Zealand became the first developed country to conclude FTA negotiations
with China largely because as a small, open economy New Zealand was relatively
harmless to the Chinese economy. Also, China intended to reward New Zealand for its
exemplary role in supporting China’s effort to participate in the world economy.
Similarly, Chile is a small and open economy with a strong political relationship with
China. But more importantly, it can be China’s springboard to Latin America. All thesecases point to Chinese realist calculation of relative gains although China’s FTA strategy
is in line with its slide towards liberalism. The cases demonstrate that China has been
competing for economic, political and strategic interests.
Whom has China been competing with then? The target countries can be specific,
but not always. In the case of Pakistan, China is competing with other great powers forstrategic interests and for its energy security. In ASEAN, China was mainly competingwith Japan and the United States for future regional leadership role. China was also
competing with “China threat theory” supporters in that the CAFTA will substantially26

improve China’s image by demonstrating China’s rise as an opportunity. The competition
factor can be applied to the New Zealand case in that New Zealand played an importantrole in Chinese campaign for the recognition of its market economy status. Chile, on theother hand, is important to China’s broadly defined economic competition in that it canbe China’s springboard to Latin America.

27

Table 1. China’s FTA Offensive (As of May 2008)
Partner

StatusTrade Volume*% of 2006 total

FDI Volume*% of 2006 total

Issue Scope

ExportImportOutflow(Non-financial)
39.30
0.82
2.82

Hong Kong
Macao
ASEAN

In force (Jan 2004)
In force (Jan 2004)
In force (Jul 2005)

16.06
0.23
7.36

1.36
0.03
11.31

Inflow(Actually utilized)
32.11
0.96
5.32

Chile
Pakistan
New Zealand
GCC
Australia
Singapore
IcelandPeru
SACU

In force (Oct 2006)
In force (Jul 2007)
Signed (Apr 2008)
Negotiation (Jan 2005)
Negotiation (May 2005
Negotiation (Oct 2006)
Negotiation (Apr 2007)
Negotiation (Jan 2008)
Negotiation Announced(Jun 2004)
Study completed(Oct 2007)
Study
Study
Study
Study

0.32
0.44
0.17
1.81
1.41
2.39
0.00
0.00
0.61

0.72
0.13
0.17
3.11
2.44
2.23
0.00
0.00
0.53

0.00
0.00
0.13
0.24
0.88
3.59
0.00
0.00
0.16

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.75
0.00
0.00
0.23

1.50

1.30

0.00

0.00

14.05
9.46
4.59
0.26

25.95
14.62
11.34
0.54

13.48
7.30
6.18
0.31

0.39
0.22
0.16
0.00

India
Japan-Korea
Japan
South Korea
Switzerland

Investment

Service

Environment

Labor

Economiccooperation

Yes
Yes
Negotiation

Yes
Yes
Yes
(Jul 2007)
Negotiation
Negotiation
Yes

No
No
No

No
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

No
No
Yes

No
No
Yes

Yes
No
Yes

Negotiation
Yes
Yes* National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007.

28

References
Ai, Hua. 2006. “Jingji quanqiuhua diertiao daolu: Zhongguo FTA zhanlue” (The Second
Way of Economic Globalization: China’s FTA strategy), Guangdong Shenji(Guangdong Auditing), 2: 4-9.
Ariff, Mohamed. 2003. “China riding high amid growing risks”, New Straits Times, May
31.
ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation. 2001. Forging Closer ASEANChina Economic Relations in the 21st Century. October.
<http://www.aseansec.org/newdata/asean_chi.pdf>. Accessed October 20, 2007.
Bhuyan, Rituparna. 2007. “India-China FTA talks soon”, The Business Standard (India),
October 30. <http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=10134>. Accessed
May 24, 2008
Bi, Yujiang. 2005. “WTO kuangjia xia shijie FTA de fazhan yu Zhongguo de maoyi
zhanlue tiaozheng” (The Development of FTA within the Framework of WTO andStrategic Adjustments of China’s Trade), Yatai Jingji (Asia-Pacific Economic
Review), 3: 15-17.
Cai, Kevin G. 2003. “The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement and East Asian Regional
Grouping”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 25, 3 (December): 387-404.
Caryl, Christian. 2007. “It’s not about Money”, Newsweek International, June 4.. General
OneFile. Gale. University of Auckland Library.
<http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/itx/start.do?prodId=ITOF>.
Accessed October 17, 2007.
Chen, Hua. 2005. “Chile warm to FTA”, China Daily, May 28.
<http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=1973>. Accessed September 25,
2007.
Chen, Taifeng. 2005, ZhongMei Maoyi Mocha (Sino-American Trade Disputes), Beijing:
Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Social Sciences Academic Press).
Cheng, Harrison. 2006. “Asian Economic Cooperation in the New Millennium: China’s
economic presence (Book review)”, China Review International, vol. 1, 1 (Spring):
284-289.
“China, India to advance feasibility research on regional trade arrangement”. 2007.
People’s Daily Online. May 30.
<http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=8492>. Accessed September 25,
2007.
“China-Pakistan FTA to promote bilateral trade”. 2006. Industry Update, December 18.
Ching, Cheong. 2001. “China gains big in FTA deal with Asean”, Straits Times,
November 30.
de Castro, Isagani. 2002. “Politics: New pacts may give China key role in Southeast
Asia”, Global Information Network. New York, Nov 5.
deLisle, Jacques. 2006. “Free Trade Areas: Legal aspects and the politics of U.S., PRC
and Taiwan participation”, November 10. Foreign Policy Research Institute.
<http://www.fpri.org/pubs/20061110.asia.delisle.freetradeareasusprctaiwan.html>.
Accessed October 3, 2007.
Deng, Yong. 1998. “The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International
Relations,” China Quarterly, vol. 154 (June): 308-329.
29

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government. 2008. “AustraliaChina Free Trade Agreement Negotiations”, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/,
accessed 14 May 2008.
Development Research Centre of the State Council. 2005. “Zhongguo jingji zengzhang
de qianjing yu zhanlue” (China’s Economic Growth Prospects and Strategies),<http://www.gzass.gd.cn/content/skwc/wc20050401_10.htm>. Accessed October 3,
2007.
Drezner, Daniel W. 2007. “The New World Order”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, 2(Mar/Apr): 34-46.
Fewsmith, Joseph and Rosen, Stanley. 2001. “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign
Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making ofChinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000. Stanford,
CA.: Stanford University Press, pp. 151-187.
Glaser, Bonnie S. and Saunders, Phillip C. 2002. “Chinese Civil Foreign Policy ResearchInstitutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly 171(September): 597-616.
Han, Yuan et. al. 2005. Quanqiuhua yu Zhongguo Da Zhanlue (Globalization and
China’s Grand Strategy), Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe (China
Social Sciences Press).
He, Xiang and Hu, Hui. 2006. “Zhongguo zai quyu maoyi hezuo zhong de zuoyong jiqi
zhanlue yitu” (China’s Role and Strategic Motivations in Regional Trade
Cooperation”, Zhujiang Jingji (South China Review), 11: 2-8.
Higashi, Akiko. 2004. “Nitchuukan - higashi ajia boueki kouzou no henka to inpakuto”(Changes and Impact of the Japan-China-South Korea East Asia Trade Framework),
NEXT-ING, Mitsubishi Research Institute, vol. 5, 4: 20-21.
Huang, Junbao, Zhao Heqin and Bi Shihong. 2008. “Cong zhanlue gaodu renshi heshenhua yu Bajisitan de quanmian hezuo” (Understanding and Deepening theComprehensive Cooperation with Pakistan from a Strategic Perspective), Yatai
Jingji (Asia-Pacific Economy), 2: 64-67.
Jiang, Junhua. 2007. “Ziyou maoyiqu de fazhan taishi jiqi duice” (The Development
Trend of FTAs and China’s Policy), Duiwai Jingmao (Practice in Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade), 2: 19-21.
Kim, Yon-se. 2007. “Korea cautious on free trade talks with China”, Korea Times, April
15.
Lampton, David M. 2001. “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making
Process: Is It Changing, and Does It Matter?” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The
Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000.
Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, pp. 1-36.
Lardy, Nicholas R. 2002. Integrating China into the Global Economy. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press.
Lee, Kuan Yew. 2007. “Contests for Influence in Asia-Pacific Region”, Forbes, vol. 179,
13 (June 18): 25.
Lee, Rebecca. 2003. “China views FTA with ASEAN a top priority”, Straits Times,
March 6.

30

Li, Xia. 2005. “Shijie FTA fazhan qushi yu woguo de quyu jingji hezuo zhanlue” (TheTrend of FTA Development in the World and China’s Regional Economic
Cooperation Strategy) Nanfang Jingji (South China Journal of Economics), 8: 62.
Li, Xiaoxi (ed.). 2006. Assessing the Extent of China’s Marketization. Aldershot,
England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Liu, Changli. 2005. “Shijie shuangbian ziyou maoyi fazhan de yuanyin tedian yu woguo
de duice” (The Causes and Characteristics of the Development of Bilateral Trade
Liberalization in the World and China’s Policy), Sijie Jingji Yanjiu (World
Economy Study), 4: 4-10.
Liu, Chenyang and Gong, Zhankui. 2007. “Zhongguo canyu shuangbian FTAs jinchengjiqi yu APEC de zhengce xietiao” (China’s Participation in Bilateral FTAs and its
Policy Co-ordination between FTAs and APEC), Yatai Jingji (Asia-Pacific
Economic Review), 2: 17-20.
Liu, Weiling and Jiang, Wei. 2005. “Free trade deal with Chile in the pipeline”, China
Daily, August 16 <http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=2496>.
Accessed September 25, 2007.
Medeiros, Evan S. and Fravel, M. Taylor. 2003. “China’s New Diplomacy”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 82, 6 (Nov/Dec): 22-35.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China. 2005. “Hu Jintao Delivers an Important Speech at the
UN Summit”, September 16<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t212614.htm>. Accessed 12 August 2007.
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, China, “Trade Volume since1978”, <http://www.cofortune.com.cn/moftec_cn/tjsj/jcktj/lszlb.html>. Accessed
September 19, 2007.
Montero, David . 2007. “China, Pakistan team up on energy”, The Christian Science
Monitor , April 13.
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1998-2007. China Statistical Yearbook. Annual.
“Pak-China FTA”. 2006. Business Recorder, December 29.
“Pakistan: China displays growing interest in Pakistan”. 2007. Asiamoney. . General
OneFile. Gale. University of Auckland Library. 12 June 2008<http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/itx/start.do?prodId=ITOF>.
Qiu, Danyang. 2005., “Zhongguo-Dongmeng ziyou maoyiqu: Zhongguo heping jueqi dediyuan jingjixue sikao” (China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Geo-economic analysis of
China’s peaceful rise), Dangdai Yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific), 1: 8-13.
Rao, Geping. 2005. “Guoji falu zhixu yu Zhongguo de heping fazhan”, Waijiao Pinglun(Foreign Affairs Review), 6: 48-54.
Rosenau, James N. 1961. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. New York: Random House.
Shambaugh, David. 2002. “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving
Structure and Process”, China Quarterly 171: 575-596.
Song, Zhiyong. 2007. “MeiHan FTA yingxiang Zhongguo” (The Impact of U.S.-South
Korea FTA on China), Shijie Zhishi (World Knowledge), 9: 38-39.
“South Korea: US buyers keen to source more apparel, textiles”. 2007. just-style.com,
April 17. General OneFile. Gale. University of Auckland Library.
<http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/itx/start.do?prodId=ITOF>.
Accessed October 17, 2007.

31

<HTTP://WWW.CSMONITOR.COM/2007/0413/P06S01-WOSC.HTML?PAGE=1>.
Accessed May16, 2008.
Tanner, Murray Scot. 2002. “Changing Windows on a Changing China: The Evolving‘Think Tank’ System and the Case of the Public Security Sector”, China Quarterly
171: 559-574.
Vatikiotis, Michael and Hiebert, Murray. 2003. “China’s Tight Embrace”, Far Eastern
Economic Review, vol. 166, 28 (July 17): 28-30.
Wang, Gonglong. 2007. “ ‘Hexie shijie’: Guoji zhixu de xin gouxiang he xin fanshi”(“Harmonious World”: A new idea and model of the international order), Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), 3: 56-62.
Wang, Qin. 2005. “Yazhou quyu jingji yitihua yu Zhongguo” (Asian Economic
Integration and China), Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Affairs Studies), 4 55-59.
Wang, Shuguang. 2005. “Zhongguo-Dongmeng ziyou maoyiqu jianshe de guoji zhengzhi
jingjixue fenxi” (An International Political Economic Analysis of the Establishmentof the China-ASEAN FTA”, Huanan Ligong Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban)
(Journal of South China University of Technology, Social Sciences Edition), vol 7,
4 (August): 23-27.
Wong, John and Chan, Sarah. 2003. “China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Shaping
future economic relations”, Asian Survey, vol. 43, 3 (May/June): 507-526.
World Trade Organisation. 2006. International Trade Statistics 2006 (Table A6)<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2006_e/its2006_e.pdf>. Accessed
September 15, 2007. World Trade Organisation. 2007c. International Trade
Statistics 2007.
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2007_e/its07_toc_e.htm>. Accessed
May 25, 2008.
--------. 2007a, “Anti-dumping Initiations: Reporting Member vs Exporting Country
From: 01/01/95 To: 31/12/06” <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab3_e.xls>. Accessed
September 15, 2007.
--------. 2007b. “AD Initiations: By Exporting Country From: 01/01/95 To: 12/31/06”<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab1_e.xls>. Accessed
September 15, 2007.
--------. 2007c. “AD Measures: By Exporting Country From: 01/01/95 To: 12/31/06”<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab6_e.xls>. Accessed
September 15, 2007.
Xiao, De and Du Lili. 2007. “Woguo canyu quyu jingji hezuo zhanlue xuanze” (China’s
Strategic Choice in Participating in Regional Economic Cooperation), Hezuo Jingji
yu Keji (Cooperative Economy and Technology), 322 (June): 4-6.
Yang, Zhimin. 2004. “FTAA: Chongji Zhongguo” (FTAA: Impacts on China), Shijie
Zhishi (World Knowledge), 6: 48-50.
Yu, Bin. 1994. “The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospect,” World
Politics, vol. 46, 2 (January): 235-261.
Yu, Xiao. 2006. “DongYa diqu ziyou maoyi xieding jincheng zhong de RiZhong
jingzheng” (China-Japan Competition in the Process of Reaching FTAs in East
Asia), Xiandai Riben Jingji (Contemporary Economy of Japan), 4: 17-22.

32

Zeng, Ruicheng. 2007. “Ta Zhili tiaoban tingjin Lamei dalu” (Chile, a springboard tojump into Latin America), Zhongwai Wanju Zhizhao [Toy Industry], 6: 12-13.
Zhang, Anyuan. 2006. “China’s FTA wenti” (China’s FTA question), Zhongguo Haiguan(China Custom), 9: 7.
Zhang, Fan. 2004. “Lun goujian Zhongguo de FTA zhanlue” (On the Construction ofChina’s FTA Strategy) Kaifang Daobao (China Opening Herald), 116 (October):
74-77.
Zhang, Jin. 2004. “Chile rolls out red carpet for Chinese mining firms”, China Daily,
May 28. <http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=186>. Accessed
September 25, 2007.
Zhang, Youwen, Huang Rengwei, et.al. 2006, 2006 Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Baogao(China’s International Status Report 2006), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe (People’s
Publishing House).
--------. 2005. 2005 Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Baogao (China’s International Status Report2005), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe (People’s Publishing House).
--------. 2004. 2004 Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Baogao (China’s International Status Report2004), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe (People’s Publishing House.
--------. 2003. 2003 Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Baogao (China’s International Status Report2003), Shanghai: Shanghai Yuandong Chubanshe (Shanghai Far East Publishers).
Zhang, Zhen. 2004. “FTA: Dongya huzuo de xin langcao” (FTA: A new wave ofcooperation in Northeast Asia), Dongnanya (Southeast Asia), 3: 1-6.
Zheng, Jizhong and Yu, Qing. 2006. “Zhongguo FTA de zhanlue xuanze” (China’s
Strategic Choice of FTAs), Heilongjiang Duiwai Jingmao (Heilongjiang Foreign
Economic Relations & Trade), 7: 7-9.
Zheng, Xianwu. 2003. “Shuangbi ziyou maoyi: Xin shiji Zhongguo waimao zhengce xin
xuanze” (Bilateral Free Trade: China’s new choice of foreign trade in the new
century” (Jingmao Luntan (Forum of Economy and Trade), 1: 4-8.
-------- 2002. “Quanqiu xin yilun shuangbian ziyou maoyi tanxi” (An analysis of a newround of global bilateral free trade), Duiwai Jingmao Wushi (World Economy &Trade), 11: 30-34.

33

GIARI Working Paper Vol. 2008-E-9,
June.30 2008
Published by Waseda University Global COE Program
Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI),
Waseda University, Nishiwaseda Bldg. 5F#507 1-21-1
Nishi-waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051 Japan
E-mail: affairs@waseda-giari.jp
Webpage: http://www.waseda-giari.jp
Printed in Japan by International Academic Printing Co.Ltd