73

An Outline of Disaster Waste Management
for the Great East Japan Earthquake
from a Technological and Administrative Point of View
Masahiro OSAKO* and Ryo TAJIMA
National Institute for Environmental Studies
16-2 Onogawa Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8506 Japan*e-mail: mosako@nies.go.jp

Abstract
This paper provides an outline of disaster waste management from a technological and administrative
point of view based on recording and compiling many relevant facts with regard to disaster waste management for the Great East Japan Earthquake, and then proposes a basic framework for designing future disaster
waste management systems. The information and proposals provided are expected to be helpful in preparation
for future mega disasters.
Key words: disaster waste, treatment and disposal flow, management system,
roles and functions of each actor

1. Introduction
The Great East Japan Earthquake took place on
March 11, 2011 in Japan. It had an unexpectedly huge,terrible impact on our society. In addition to the damage
caused by the tremor itself (magnitude 9.0), tsunami
waves, some reaching over 10 m high, destroyed a wide

area of human settlements near the Pacific coastline. The
total area flooded came to 561 km2. More than twenty
thousand people were killed or went missing. The
disaster destroyed about 129,000 buildings, partiallydestroyed 20,000 others and partially damaged 760,000
more, leaving behind 20 million tons of disaster waste
and 10 million tons of tsunami sediment (Fig. 1).

Ofunato, Iwate（April 18, 2011）

Kamaishi, Iwate（April 18, 2011）

Otsuchi, Iwate（April 18, 2011）

Miyagino District, Sendai（April 6, 2011）

Fig. 1 Scenes of tsunami-disaster-stricken places (photographed by Masahiro Osako).

Global Environmental Research
18/2014: 73-80
printed in Japan©2014 AIRIES

74

M. OSAKO and R. TAJIMA

After this earthquake, a big disaster waste management project was implemented under the strong initiativeof the national government (the Ministry of the Environment). As of the end of March in 2014, it has been completed for the whole affected area, except Fukushima
Prefecture, which has been impacted by the nuclear
power plant accident. The reason this disaster waste
management project could finish in a period as short as
three years was that it relied on the devoted work by the
many people concerned.
This earthquake was such an unprecedented disasterwith a massive tsunami that knowledge based on pastexperience was of little help in the management of thewaste from the disaster. Therefore the first stage of ourstudy involved recording and compiling relevant facts
with regard to waste management in this disaster, whichhave considerable value in designing an appropriate
disaster waste management system in preparation for
future mega earthquakes.
This paper provides an outline of disaster waste management from a technological and administrative point ofview, based on records and compilations of many relevant facts with regard to the disaster waste management
for the Great East Japan Earthquake, and then proposes aframework for designing future disaster waste management systems.

2. Theory of Disaster Waste Management
2.1 Time-course scheme for disaster waste
management
According to the Japan Society of Material Cycles
and Waste Management (JSMCWM) (2012), postdisaster management of disaster waste can be divided
into four phases. (The first three phases are the same as
the disaster phases described in UN OCHA (2011). The
fourth phase, “contingency planning,” emphasizes theimportance of in advance planning, which is not includedin the scope of this paper.) In the first emergency phase,life-saving efforts are urgently required, to alleviate
suffering as well as to facilitate rescue operations.
Identifying waste issues, assessing quantities, characterizing waste types and mapping areas of waste generation
are also taken as prioritized actions. Second, in the earlyrecovery phase, the recovery of lifelines (i.e., systems

and facilities that provide services vital to the functioningof an industrialized society, including electricity, gas,
water, transportation, etc.) is an important task. As fordisaster waste, preparations must be made for the mainstage of the disaster waste management program. At thesame time, wastes should be transferred to temporarystorage sites. As social stock starts to recover and disaster
waste management progresses according to the programin the recovery phase, full-scale treatment or recycling ofdisaster wastes can be accomplished. The reconstruction
phase starts after the main stage of disaster waste
management is completed.
2.2 Disaster waste management flow chart
Figure 2 shows the flow plan for the separation andtreatment of disaster wastes suggested by the JSMCWM(2012). First, wastes generated in the disaster area aretransported to temporary storage sites, or directly to a
primary storage site designed for mid-term storage andintermediate treatment of wastes. Thereafter they areseparated and undergo intermediate treatment prior toappropriate final disposal or recycling. Separation atsource and at the temporary storage sites is crucial to safe,
quick and cost-effective disaster waste management.
2.3 Key elements of an effective disaster waste
management system
In Japan, each municipal government is responsible
for the management of disaster waste generated in its area,
because disaster waste is categorized as “municipal solid
waste” under the Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing
Law. (Under this law, only two types of waste aredefined: industrial waste (ashes, sludge, waste oil, waste
acid, waste alkali, waste plastics and others specified bycabinet order among all the wastes left as a result of
business activity, and imported wastes, with some exclusions), and municipal solid waste, which is any waste
other than industrial waste.) In order to manage disaster
waste effectively and efficiently by implementing thetreatment flow plan shown in Fig. 2, key elements composing the municipality’s management system must be
administered appropriately. These are human resources(organization), finances (subsidies), and facilities/ technology (Fig. 3).

Table 1 Time-course scheme for waste management.
PhasesActions

Emergency
Phase

Required to save lives,
alleviate suffering, andfacilitate human rescue

102 hrs.
(ca. 3 days＝72 hrs.)

Take initial actions (identify waste issues),characterize, map, and assess wastes.
Prioritize actions.

Early Recovery(Relief) Phase

Recovery of lifelines

103 hr(ca. 1 month)

Implement groundwork for a disaster waste
management program.
Transfer wastes to temporary sites.

Recovery Phase

Recovery of social stock(infrastructure)

104 hr(ca. 1 year)

Full-scale treatment or recycling of wastes.

Reconstruction
Phase

Recovery of industries

105 hr(ca. 10 years)

Partial recycling of wastes as construction
materials.

Source: JSMCWM, 2012, p.30.

An Outline of Disaster Waste Management for the Great East Japan Earthquake

75

Fig. 2 Flow of separation and treatment of disaster wastes.
(source: Japan Society of Material Cycles and Waste Management, 2012, p.52)

Table 2 Amounts of disaster wastes generated.

Fig. 3 Key elements of a municipality’s disaster waste
management system.

Total(million ton)(c=a+b)Disaster waste(million ton)(a)

Iwate Pref.

5.74

4.14

Tsunamisediment(million ton)
(b)
1.60

Miyagi Pref.

18.77

11.21

7.56

Fukushima Pref.

3.49

1.74

1.75

Total

28.00

17.08

10.91

c.f. Annual amount of municipal waste was around 45 million tons in 2010.

3. Disaster Waste Management for the Great
East Japan Earthquake
3.1 Amount and nature of the disaster wastes
As shown in Table 2, in the most heavily damaged
three prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima), around20 million tons of disaster waste as well as 10 million
tons of tsunami sediment were generated. The total wasaround 30 million tons. Considering the total amount ofmunicipal waste generated annually by the whole country,
which was around 45 million ton in 2010, this mass isreally huge.
Figure 4 shows the initial state of the disaster waste.
As seen in this photo, the tsunami’s power resulted in a
mixture of different kinds of wastes, including building
materials, home appliances, shrubs, sediment, and so on.
This mixture of waste is called “minced waste.” Minced
wastes are hard to separate and contain highly concentrated salt and adhering sediment. Other characteristics ofminced waste that make it difficult to manage include:rotting material (from fisheries, etc.) and dangerous
object (gas cylinders, etc.) content, a risk of fire, and apotential to emit odors. In addition to the above, someof the wastes were somewhat contaminated with radioactive substances discharged from the accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Fig. 4 “Minced wastes” at a temporary storage site in Noda, Iwate,
photographed on May 6, 2011 (by Masahiro Osako).

3.2 Technical and administrative restrictions on
appropriate disaster waste management
The Great East Japan Earthquake was such an unprecedented disaster with such a massive tsunami thatknowledge based on past experience and the existing
technologies available were of little help in the management of the waste from the disaster. Table 3 gives
an overview of the characteristics and restrictions inmanaging the disaster waste generated by the 2011
earthquake and tsunami disaster. The amount of waste
was almost the same as that generated by the Great

76

M. OSAKO and R. TAJIMA

Table 3 Characteristics and restrictions of managing disaster waste generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake.

OutlineAmount of waste
generated

Great East Japan Earthquake(March 11, 2011)y Magnitude 9.0, maximum intensity of 7 on the Japaneseseismic scale (Kurihara City, Miyagi Prefecture)y Massive tsunami on the Pacific coast in the Tohoku regionyyyProperties

y
y
y
y
y
y

Area

y

Restrictions on the yestablishment of ywaste treatment
systemsyy
OthercharacteristicsyyyGreat Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake(January 17, 1995)
y Magnitude 7, maximum intensity of 7 on theJapanese seismic scaley Disaster-hit areas: Kobe City, Nishinomiya City,
Awaji Island
Disaster waste: 17.08 million tons (three Tohoku prefectures) y Disaster waste: 20 million tons
Tsunami sediment: 10.91 million tons (three Tohoku
prefectures)
Only a small amount of waste was generated by the quake.
Most of the waste was generated by the tsunami. Some of thewaste was washed from the land into the sea.
y There were more incombustible materials,
A wide variety of objects were mixed up by the tsunami,
including waste concrete from concrete
becoming mixed waste.
buildings and structures.
A lot of waste wood came from destroyed wood-framedy Fires broke out in some areas.
houses.
Covered with mud containing salt, such as tsunami sediment.
Contained salt that came from seawater.
Fires broke out in some areas.
Some waste was contaminated with radioactive cesium
caused by the nuclear reactor crisis.
Many areas from Aomori Prefecture to Chiba Prefecturey Some areas along the active fault, mainly Kobe
were flooded by the tsunami.
Cityy Many municipalities were medium-sized or
Most municipalities, except for Sendai City, were small.
Municipal employees were affected by the disaster, causinglarge.
the disruption of administrative functions.
y Supported by the less-affected neighboring
All neighboring municipalities were hit by the disaster.
municipalities
Radiation contamination issues contributed to delays in
y Large quantities of waste were accepted at
improving systems for cross-jurisdictional waste
disposal sites for the Osaka Bay Phoenix project.
management.
Radioactive contamination complicated the problems.
Land subsidence destroyed wharfs, damaging port functions.
Debris was deposited within bays.

Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Shimaoka et.al, 2009), but
the following obstacles made disaster waste management
difficult.
1) A wide range of objects destroyed or damaged by thepowerful tsunami were mixed up together.
2) Mud and sand from the seabed carried by the tsunami
were mixed with or covered the waste. Wastes thatabsorbed seawater contained a lot of salt.
3) Mutual support between neighboring municipalities
was difficult because the disaster caused widespread
damage. Radiation issues contributed to delays in
improving systems for cross-jurisdictional waste
management.
4) Many municipal employees involved in waste management were affected by the disaster, causing heavy
damage to administrative functions. There weremany small municipalities with vulnerable administrative systems. Municipal employees, who usually
manage municipal waste, had little knowledge of the
management of disaster waste, including how tohandle collapsed buildings.
5) As there is not much flat land in the Sanriku region in
Iwate Prefecture, it was difficult to secure land for
temporary waste storage sites or waste treatment
facilities. There were no large final disposal sites forthe enormous amount of disaster waste that was
generated.

3.3 Roles and functions of each actor with regard to
management aspects
The devastated municipalities faced a lot of challenges in their disaster waste management. One obvious
challenge was the volume of waste generated by thedisaster. For example, Ishinomaki City, one of the mostheavily damaged cities, would need 108 years to manage
all the generated waste if they were to do it on their own
using their peacetime capacity. Therefore, a cooperative
management scheme joined by various relevant actors
was required for disaster waste management to progress.
Figure 5 indicates roles and functions of each actor withregard to the management aspects of disaster waste
management for the Great East Japan Earthquake.
(1) National Government (Ministry of the Environment)
The Ministry of Environment established an overall
policy/framework for disaster waste management in amaster plan published in May 2011, and also eased someof its regulations which had been recognized as barriers
to smooth progress of disaster waste management. They
also provided fiscal and technical assistance to thedevastated municipalities.
The ministry issued “Guidelines for the Removal of
Damaged Houses and Structures” shortly after the disaster to clarify the handling of private property from a legal
viewpoint. The guidelines say that damaged buildings
reduced to debris can be removed without the consent of

An Outline of Disaster Waste Management for the Great East Japan Earthquake

77

Fig. 5 Roles and functions of each actor in the cooperative management scheme.

the owners, which is a controversial decision but hascontributed to the quick removal of the disaster waste.
Soon after the disaster, the government also established a policy of bearing all the costs of disaster waste
management itself. In early May, it announced it would
raise its share of the national subsidy, bear an average of
95 percent of the costs through the Green New Deal fundand finance the remaining costs of local governments
through a special local allocation tax for recovery fromthe earthquake disaster. A total of 1.1792 trillion yen isreported to have been provided between FY2011 and2013 (Yamamoto, 2014).
On May 16, 2011, the ministry prepared and issued
Guidelines (Master Plan) for Disaster Waste Management, which presented a treatment flow plan andcomplete schedule (Ministry of the Environment, 2011).
Regarding the treatment of the huge quantities of disaster
waste left by the tsunami, a basic treatment flow plan andschedule with a target period of three years were alsopresented.
The ministry gave notice of technical methods fortreating a wide range of tsunami disaster waste. It prepared special measures for re-entrustment and unified
guidelines for waste handling contracts to ensure smooth
progress in the management of the waste. It also provided
physical support to prefectural governments to ensure thesmooth implementation of waste management within theprefectural and municipal governments. A beat team ofgovernment officials, engineers and researchers was sent
to the disaster-hit areas to assess the reality and needs,
and to provide support.
To achieve early treatment of a large amount ofdisaster waste required cross-jurisdictional disposal, so
the ministry served as coordinator by providing theinformation needed to match affected local governmentswith local governments accepting waste. As radioactive
contamination issues hampered cross-jurisdictional
disposal, the ministry prepared guidelines for crossjurisdictional treatment that included aspects of safety
and ways of checking for radioactive substances andradiation dosage. The promotion of cross-jurisdictional

disposal caused considerable friction in society, but
Tokyo’s acceptance of disaster waste from the city of
Miyako in November 2011 led to gradual progress incross-jurisdictional treatment.
In August 2011, the Act on Special Measures for theTreatment of Disaster Waste Generated by the Great East
Japan Earthquake was enacted. The government madeexceptions for managing disaster waste for the affectedmunicipalities, but these exceptions were limited to certain municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture.
(2) Affected Prefectural Governments
The prefectural governments have the role of overall
coordination, and have set up inter-governmental committees and prepared a prefectural disaster waste
management plan. Additionally, in this case, they took
over the duty of managing disaster waste from some of
the municipalities (upon request), considering theiroverwhelming burden.
The affected prefectural governments assessed thesituation of the affected municipalities and provided
technical support to them as upper tier governments.
They helped municipalities prepare their management
plans and integrated them before preparing their own
management plan. They also worked with the Ministry of
the Environment to establish a Council on Disaster Waste
Management with the participation of the affectedmunicipalities, serving as the coordinating body for
managing the waste.
The 2011 disaster caused disruption to the administrative functions of the affected municipalities, thus theprefectural governments were entrusted by the municipalities to deal with most of the secondary treatment of
the disaster waste accumulated at the temporary storagesites. They usually operated some public waste treatment
facilities and did not directly treat the waste other thanthat. Permits, licenses and other regulations made up themain part of their waste management. They played a
responsible role in treating the disaster waste, promoting
waste treatment by entrusting it to joint ventures (JV)
consisting of general contractors and other businesses

78

M. OSAKO and R. TAJIMA

and utilizing the private-sector’s technologies and business operational know-how.
(3) Affected Municipal Governments
Under the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures
and Article 22 of the Waste Management and Public
Cleansing Act, the affected municipalities bear the primary responsibility for disaster waste treatment. Therefore, disaster waste is treated as general waste. They must
prepare an implementation plan for waste management topromote waste treatment, based on the directions andguidelines presented by the Ministry of the Environment
and their prefectural government. As stated above, however, when it is difficult for them to manage the waste,
the national and prefectural governments will be
entrusted with waste treatment or treat the waste forthem.
Waste generated by tsunami disasters, including
damaged houses, constitutes industrial waste fromproperty, which is very different from general waste.
The municipalities concerned had little experience,
knowledge or know-how regarding the treatment ofdisaster waste. The procedures for concluding business
contracts also required technical expertise. It was evenmore difficult to proceed with waste treatment when themunicipal officials themselves were affected by thedisaster. However, the affected municipal governments
worked hard to treat waste by entrusting the operations tobusinesses, backed by the national and prefectural
governments, and the supporting municipalities withwhich they had concluded disaster waste managementagreements, as well as consultant firms that helped them
prepare waste management plans and monitor the
progress of the treatment.
(4) Supporting Municipal Governments
Supporting municipalities have provided humanresource and machinery/materials necessary for thedevastated municipality, and accepted some of the disaster waste generated outside of their administrative
boundaries to promote cross-jurisdictional management.
For example, a total of 58 people from eight groups,
including Kobe City and Okazaki City, had been sent to
Sendai City by the end of March 2012. For garbage
collection, 7,510 people from ten groups and 88 vehicles
were sent, and human waste collection and supplies suchas portable toilets were provided (JSMCWM, 2012).
(5) Industrial Circles
Private businesses contributed greatly to helping thedevastated municipalities by conducting the actual
removal, collection, transportation, sorting, processing,recycling, reduction, combustion, and landfilling, subcontracted to them.
For early recovery from disasters, disaster debris incities must be collected and damaged buildings must be
demolished and removed before being roughly separated
and transported to the primary temporary storage sites.
These operations were conducted by local building con-tractors, demolition contractors and industrial waste disposal companies. Based on agreements that industrial
waste associations had concluded with prefectural andmunicipal governments, all operations were entrusted tothese associations, or individual businesses were contracted to carry out the work. Industrial waste disposal
companies have experience and expert know-how in theseparation and proper treatment of mixed disaster debris.
At the secondary temporary storage sites, the waste isseparated into combustible waste, noncombustible waste
and recyclables through a combination of rough sorting,rough shredding and a variety of shredding separation
methods. These secondary treatment operations wereconducted by joint ventures (JV) led by general contractors.
Consultant firms were expected to help municipalities
prepare waste management plans and monitor progress,
but only a few of these consulting firms exercised overallmanagement in an integrated manner, from preparing
plans and establishing procedures for contracting
out waste treatment projects to monitoring treatment
progress management.
There were many small municipalities whose administrative functions were left vulnerable after the 2011
disaster. More technical support was required fromprivate businesses than for the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake. At first, the systems of cooperation between
municipalities and the private sector were insufficient,
but later they contributed to progress in waste treatment.
3.4 Flow plan for separation and treatment ofdisaster wastes
Devastated municipalities basically followed thetreatment flow plan shown in Figure 2, with some variations in details. The following will describe the actual
treatment flow plan observed in general. (This does not
apply to disaster waste management in the municipalities
of Fukushima Prefecture, as the disaster wastes inFukushima are managed directly by the national government in order to dispose safely of wastes highly contaminated (relatively) by radioactive substances.)
Firstly, roads were cleared during the emergency
phase for life saving (mainly by the Japan Self-Defense
Forces), followed by collection and transportation to thetemporary sites. At this phase, minimum separation
was conducted on site (e.g., combustibles and noncombustibles) in most of the municipalities. Here, theconstruction industry was actively involved. Temporarystorage sites reached their capacity very quickly, so themunicipalities had to set up primary storage sites quickly.
As primary storage sites became available, disaster
wastes were directly transported to the primary storagesites from the stricken areas, and were roughly separated(ca. 7~10 categories). Dangerous and hazardous objects
were separated wherever possible. The main part of thedisaster waste was removed from residential areas byAugust, 2011. Some of the recyclables (e.g., concrete)
were treated and reused during this phase.
As more and more wastes piled at storage sites, thereAn Outline of Disaster Waste Management for the Great East Japan Earthquake

Delivery entrance gate

Rough sorting by
heavy machinery

Rough shreddingof mixed waste

Shredded waste

Sorting by humanpower

Sorting of recyclables

Fig. 6 A fire that broke out at a temporary storage site
(photographed by Masahiro Osako).

was an increased risk of fire. Due to accumulated heatgenerated through biological and chemical reactions,fires broke out in many storage sites (see Fig. 6). Thiswas seen as a risk to human health, since these fires had ahigh probability of causing air pollution and soil contamination. However, it was not easy to manage fire
hazards for technical and managerial reasons, including
shortages of land available for storage sites and pressure
to push disaster waste management forward.
As soon as the existing or temporary incineration
facilities were ready, full-scale treatment, i.e., separationand incineration, started at the secondary storage sites.
Various advanced technologies have actually been
applied here (see Fig. 7).
Figure 8 shows how disaster waste management
progressed. The disposal ratio reached almost
100 percent by the end of March 2014. Why was thedisaster waste management completed in a period asshort as three years? It relied on not only the great efforts
of many people concerned but also the application of
appropriate disaster waste management methods with anemphasis on volume reduction by means of separation,
incineration and recycling under limited landfill disposal
capacity. Table 4 shows the amounts disposed by eachdisaster waste management method. Advanced disaster
waste management technologies in Japan have achieveda remarkably high percentage of recycling. The recycled
waste has been used in projects for rebuilding sea andriver levees, for the establishment of seashore protection
forests, for park improvement, and for preparing
temporary waste storage sites.
With a limited amount of 650,000 tons, crossjurisdictional waste management played an importantrole as an alternative means of waste disposal in the earlydays, when temporary incinerators were not wellestablished. Around 20 percent of the combustible waste
was treated in cross-jurisdictional areas. This also helpedwith the disposal of 40 percent of the noncombustible
mixed waste and over 70 percent of the fishing equipment and nets that it was difficult to treat or dispose of.
3.5 Basic framework for designing future disaster
waste management systems
Mega earthquakes, including the forecasted Tonankai
earthquake and a quake predicted to occur directly79

Temporary incinerator(Rotary kiln type)Fig. 7

Temporary incinerator(Stoker type)

Various disaster waste management technologies being
applied at the Ishinomaki block, Miyagi Prefecture(photographed by Masahiro Osako).

Fig. 8 Progress of disaster waste management.
(2014.3.26, Ministry of the Environment)

beneath the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, could happen at
any time. In preparation for future massive disasters, wemust acquire knowledge bases through experiences inthis disaster to design future disaster waste management
systems.

80

M. OSAKO and R. TAJIMA

Table 4 Amounts disposed by method used in disaster waste management.

References

Fig. 9 A basic framework for designing future disaster waste
management systems.

Viewing management systems macroscopically, as
shown in Figure 9, we should establish the lessons
learned from the 2011 disaster as new written rules andmanuals and pass them on as “codified knowledge” to theextent possible. However, as the precedent of the Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was not always helpful in the
response to the 2011 disaster, the next massive disastermay also be completely different. Thus what is importantis “uncodified, unsettled knowledge” based on principles
learned from practical experience. The uncodified/unsettled knowledge relies on the abilities of people
developed on the basis of their actual experience. People
that have real experience responding to disasters in thenational, prefectural and municipal governments andprivate businesses have acquired a considerable amountof knowledge and a high level of capability through thispractical experience. Creation of a new system forsharing their knowledge and cultivation of the ability todevelop the required human resources should beconsidered. During the next disaster, a system that can
respond to the situation in a flexible and agile mannermust be established by combining both forms ofknowledge into a “practical knowledge base for emergency response/recovery.” We should study how to build
a structure that balances the authority to give directions
and orders in a top-down fashion using overall coordination with the discretion of the on-site workers.

Japan Society of Material Cycles and Waste Management(JSMCWM) (2012) Disaster Waste Separation and Management Strategy Manual, Gyosei. (in Japanese)
Ministry of the Environment (2011) Guidelines (Master Plan) for
Disaster Waste Management after the Great East Japan Earthquake (May 16, 2011).
<http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/haiki_masterplan-en.pdf>
Shimaoka, T. and K. Yamamoto, under the supervision of the Japan
Society of Material Cycles and Waste Management (2009)
Disaster Waste, Chuohoki. (in Japanese)
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UN OCHA) (2011) Disaster Waste Management
Guidelines, Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit.
<http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/DWG%20Annex%
20XII.Disaster%20waste%20management%20contingency%20
planning.pdf>
Yamamoto, M. (2014) The Latest Developments of the National
Government Regarding Disaster Waste Management. Lecturematerial for the symposium on disaster environmental
management sponsored by National Institute for Environmental
Studies, January 16, 2014. (in Japanese)

Masahiro OSAKO
Masahiro OSAKO is director of the ResearchCenter on Sustainable Material Cycles and Waste
Management, the National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan. He specializes in solid
waste management. Since the time of the Great
East Japan Earthquake he has made great efforts
that have contributed to prompt recovery andrestoration of the devastated area and society
through his research on tsunamis and radioactively contaminated waste
management.

Ryo TAJIMA
Ryo TAJIMA is a researcher at the National
Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan. His
main research field is policy and planning for
waste management under disaster and normal
circumstances. His current research interest
activity focuses on effective preparedness planning for disaster waste management, based on theexperiences of Japanese municipalities after the Great East Japan
Earthquake.

(Received 8 May 2014, Accepted 7 July 2014)