OCTOBER TERM, 1992
Syllabus

SMITH v. UNITED STATESCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-8674. Argued March 23, 1993-Decided June 1, 1993
After petitioner Smith offered to trade an automatic weapon to an undercover officer for cocaine, he was charged with numerous firearm anddrug trafficking offenses. Title 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1) requires the imposition of specified penalties if the defendant, "during and in relation to...[a] drug trafficking crime[,] uses... a firearm." In affirming Smith's
conviction and sentence, the Court of Appeals held that §924(c)(1)'s plain
language imposes no requirement that a firearm be "use[d]" as aweapon, but applies to any use of a gun that facilitates in any manner
the commission of a drug offense.
Held; A criminal who trades his firearm for drugs "uses" it "during andin relation to . . .[a] drug trafficking crime" within the meaning of§ 924(c)(1). Pp. 227-241.
(a) Section 924's language and structure establish that exchanging
a firearm for drugs may constitute "use" within § 924(c)(1)'s meaning.
Smith's handling of his gun falls squarely within the everyday meaningand dictionary definitions of "use." Had Congress intended §924(c)(1)
to require proof that the defendant not only used his firearm but used
it in a specific manner-as a weapon-it could have so indicated in
the statute. However, Congress did not. The fact that the most familiar example of "us[ing] ... a firearm" is "use" as a weapon does notmean that the phrase excludes all other ways in which a firearm might
be used. The United States Sentencing Guidelines, even if the Court
were to assume their relevance in the present context, do not support
the dissent's narrow interpretation that "to use" a firearm can mean
only to use it for its intended purposes, such as firing and brandishing,since Guidelines Manual §2B3.1(b)(2) explicitly contemplates "othe[r]use[s]" that are not limited to the intended purposes identified by the
dissent. The dissents approach, moreover, would exclude the use of
a gun to pistol-whip a victim as the intended purpose of a gun is thatit be fired or brandished, not that it be used as a bludgeon. In addition,
Congress affirmatively demonstrated that it meant to include transactions like Smith's as "us[ing] a firearm" within the meaning of§924(c)(1) by employing similar language in §924(d)(1), which subjects
to forfeiture any "firearm ... intended to be used" in various listed
offenses. Many of the listed offenses involve "using" the firearm not as

SMITH v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
a weapon but as an item of barter or commerce. Thus, even if§924(c)(1), as originally enacted, applied only to use of a firearm during
crimes of violence, it is clear from the face of the statute that "use" isnot presently limited to use as a weapon, but is broad enough to coveruse for trade. Pp. 227-237.
(b) Smith's use of his firearm was "during and in relation to" adrug trafficking crime. Smith does not, and cannot, deny that thealleged use occurred "during" such a crime. And there can be little
doubt that his use was "in relation to" the offense. That phrase has a
dictionary meaning of "with reference to" or "as regards" and, at a minimum, clarifies that the firearm must have some purpose or effect withrespect to the drug crime. Thus, its presence or involvement cannot
be the result of accident or coincidence, and it at least must facilitate or
have the purpose of facilitating the drug offense. Here, the firearm
was an integral part of the drug transaction, which would not have beenpossible without it. There is no reason why Congress would not havewanted its language to cover this situation, since the introduction ofguns into drug transactions dramatically heightens the danger to society, whether the guns are used as a medium of exchange or as protection
for the transactions or dealers. Pp. 237-239.
(c)Smith's invocation of the rule of lenity is rejected. Imposing apostnarrower construction of §924(c)(1) than the one herein adopted
would do violence not only to the statute's plain language and structure,
but also to its purpose of addressing the heightened risk of violence anddeath that accompanies the introduction of firearms to drug trafficking
offenses. Pp. 239-241.
957 F. 2d 835, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQuST,
C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.
BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 241. SCALIA, J., fieda dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS and SouTElR, JJ., joined, post,
p. 241.

Gary Kollin, by appointment of the Court, 506 U. S. 938,
argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Thomas G. Hungar argued the cause for the UnitedStates. With him on the brief were SolicitorGeneral Starr,
Assistant Attorney General Mueller,Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and John F. DePue.

Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)

Opinion of the Court
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide today whether the exchange of a gun for narcotics constitutes "use" of a firearm "during and in relation
to ...

[a] drug trafficking crime" within the meaning of 18

U. S. C. § 924(c)(1).

We hold that it does.

I
Petitioner John Angus Smith and his companion went from
Tennessee to Florida to buy cocaine; they hoped to resell
it at a profit. While in Florida, they met petitioner's acquaintance, Deborah Hoag. Hoag agreed to, and in fact did,purchase cocaine for petitioner. She then accompanied petitioner and his friend to her motel room, where they werejoined by a drug dealer. While Hoag listened, petitioner
and the dealer discussed petitioner's MAC-10 firearm, which
had been modified to operate as an automatic. The MAC-10
apparently is a favorite among criminals. It is small andcompact, lightweight, and can be equipped with a silencer.
Most important of all, it can be devastating: A fully automatic MAC-10 can fire more than 1,000 rounds per minute.
The dealer expressed his interest in becoming the owner of
a MAC-10, and petitioner promised that he would discuss
selling the gun if his arrangement with another potential
buyer fell through.
Unfortunately for petitioner, Hoag had contacts not onlywith narcotics traffickers but also with law enforcement officials. In fact, she was a confidential informant. Consistent
with her post, she informed the Broward County Sheriff's
Office of petitioner's activities. The Sheriff's Office responded quickly, sending an undercover officer to Hoag's
motel room. Several others were assigned to keep the
motel under surveillance. Upon arriving at Hoag's motelroom, the undercover officer presented himself to petitioner
as a pawnshop dealer. Petitioner, in turn, presented the officer with a proposition: He had an automatic MAC-10 andsilencer with which he might be willing to part. Petitioner

SMITH v. UNITED STATESOpinion of the Court

then pulled the MAC-10 out of a black canvas bag andshowed it to the officer. The officer examined the gun andasked petitioner what he wanted for it. Rather than asking
for money, however, petitioner asked for drugs. He waswilling to trade his MAC-10, he said, for two ounces of cocaine. The officer told petitioner that he was just a pawnshop dealer and did not distribute narcotics. Nonetheless,he indicated that he wanted the MAC-10 and would try to
get the cocaine. The officer then left, promising to return
within an hour.
Rather than seeking out cocaine as he had promised, theofficer returned to the Sheriff's Office to arrange for petitioner's arrest. But petitioner was not content to wait. The
officers who were conducting surveillance saw him leave themotel room carrying a gun bag; he then climbed into his van
and drove away. The officers reported petitioner's departure and began following him. When law enforcement authorities tried to stop petitioner, he led them on a high-speed
chase. Petitioner eventually was apprehended.
Petitioner, it turns out, was well armed. A search of
his van revealed the MAC-10 weapon, a silencer, ammunition, and a "fast-feed" mechanism. In addition, the police
found a MAC-11 machine gun, a loaded .45 caliber pistol,and a .22 caliber pistol with a scope and homemade silencer.
Petitioner also had a loaded 9 millimeter handgun in his
waistband.
A grand jury sitting in the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida returned an indictment charging petitioner with, among other offenses, two drug trafficking
crimes-conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and attempt to possess cocaine with intent to distributein violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 18 U. S. C. § 2.
App. 3-9. Most important here, the indictment alleged that
petitioner knowingly used the MAC-10 and its silencer during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Id., at 4-5.
Under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1), a defendant who so uses a fire-Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)
Opinion of the Courtarm must be sentenced to five years' incarceration. And
where, as here, the firearm is a "machinegun" or is fittedwith a silencer, the sentence is 30 years. See §924(c)(1)("[I]f the firearm is a machinegun, or is equipped with a firearm silencer," the sentence is "thirty years"); § 921(a)(23),
26 U. S. C. § 5845(b) (term "machinegun" includes automatic
weapons). The jury convicted petitioner on all counts.
On appeal, petitioner argued that § 924(c)(1)'s penalty forusing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
offense covers only situations in which the firearm is used asa weapon. According to petitioner, the provision does notextend to defendants who use a firearm solely as a medium
of exchange or for barter. The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed. 957 F. 2d 835 (1992). The
plain language of the statute, the court explained, imposesno requirement that the firearm be used as a weapon. Instead, any use of "the weapon to facilitate in any manner
the commission of the offense" suffices. Id., at 837 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Shortly before the Eleventh Circuit decided this case, theCourt of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit arrived
at the same conclusion. United States v. Harris,294 U. S.
App. D. C. 300, 315-316, 959 F. 2d 246, 261-262 (percuriam),cert. denied, 506 U. S. 932 (1992). In United States v.
Phelps, 877 F. 2d 28 (1989), however, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that trading a gun in a drugrelated transaction could not constitute use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense within themeaning of § 924(c)(1). We granted certiorari to resolve theconflict among the Circuits. 506 U. S. 814 (1992). We now
affirm.
II
Section 924(c)(1) requires the imposition of specified penalties if the defendant, "during and in relation to any crime ofviolence or drug trafficking crime[,] uses or carries a firearm." By its terms, the statute requires the prosecution toSMITH v. UNITED STATESOpinion of the Court

make two showings. First, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant "use[d] or carrie[d] a firearm." Second, it must prove that the use or carrying was "during andin relation to" a "crime of violence or drug trafficking crime."
A
Petitioner argues that exchanging a firearm for drugs does
not constitute "use" of the firearm within the meaning of thestatute. He points out that nothing in the record indicatesthat he fired the MAC-10, threatened anyone with it, or employed it for self-protection. In essence, petitioner argues
that he cannot be said to have "use[d]" a firearm unless heused it as a weapon, since that is how firearms most often
are used. See 957 F. 2d, at 837 (firearm often facilitates
drug offenses by protecting drugs or protecting or emboldening the defendant). Of course, § 924(c)(1) is not limited tothose cases in which a gun is used; it applies with equal force
whenever a gun is "carrie[d]." In this case, however, theindictment alleged only that petitioner "use[d]" the MAC-10.
App. 4. Accordingly, we do not consider whether the evidence might support the conclusion that petitioner carried
the MAC-10 within the meaning of § 924(c)(1). Instead we
confine our discussion to what the parties view as the dispositive issue in this case: whether trading a firearm for drugs
can constitute "use" of the firearm within the meaning of§924(c)(1).
When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning. See
Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S.37, 42 (1979) (words notdefined in statute should be given ordinary or common meaning). Accord, post, at 242 ("In the search for statutory meaning, we give nontechnical words and phrases their ordinary
meaning"). Surely petitioner's treatment of his MAC-10
can be described as "use" within the everyday meaning ofthat term. Petitioner "used" his MAC-10 in an attempt toobtain drugs by offering to trade it for cocaine. Webster'sCite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)
Opinion of the Court

defines "to use" as "[t]o convert to one's service" or "to employ." Webster's New International Dictionary 2806 (2d ed.
1950). Black's Law Dictionary contains a similar definition:"[t]o make use of; to convert to one's service; to employ; toavail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a purpose or action
by means of." Black's Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990).
Indeed, over 100 years ago we gave the word "use" the same
gloss, indicating that it means "'to employ"' or "'to derive
service from."' Astor v. Merritt, 111 U. S. 202, 213 (1884).
Petitioner's handling of the MAC-10 in this case falls
squarely within those definitions. By attempting to trade
his MAC-10 for the drugs, he "used" or "employed" it as an
item of barter to obtain cocaine; he "derived service" from it
because it was going to bring him the very drugs he sought.
In petitioner's view, § 924(c)(1) should require proof not
only that the defendant used the firearm, but also that heused it as a weapon. But the words "as a weapon" appear
nowhere in the statute. Rather, § 924(c)(1)'s language
sweeps broadly, punishing any "us[e]" of a firearm, so longas the use is "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking
offense. See United States v. Long, 284 U. S. App. D. C. 405,
409-410, 905 F. 2d 1572, 1576-1577 (Thomas, J.) (although notwithout limits, the word "use" is "expansive" and extends
even to situations where the gun is not actively employed),cert. denied, 498 U. S. 948 (1990). Had Congress intended
the narrow construction petitioner urges, it could have so
indicated. It did not, and we decline to introduce that additional requirement on our own.
Language, of course, cannot be interpreted apart from context. The meaning of a word that appears ambiguous ifviewed in isolation may become clear when the word is analyzed in light of the terms that surround it. Recognizing
this, petitioner and the dissent argue that the word "uses"
has a somewhat reduced scope in § 924(c)(1) because it appears alongside the word "firearm." Specifically, they contend that the average person on the street would not thinkSMITH v. UNITED STATESOpinion of the Court

immediately of a guns-for-drugs trade as an example of"us[ing] a firearm." Rather, that phrase normally evokes animage of the most familiar use to which a firearm is putuse as a weapon. Petitioner and the dissent therefore argue
that the statute excludes uses where the weapon is not firedor otherwise employed for its destructive capacity. Seepost, at 242-244. Indeed, relying on that argument-andwithout citation to authority-the dissent announces its own,
restrictive definition of "use." "To use an instrumentality,"
the dissent argues, "ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose." Post, at 242.
There is a significant flaw to this argument. It is one
thing to say that the ordinary meaning of "uses a firearm"includes using a firearm as a weapon, since that is the intended purpose of a firearm and the example of "use" thatmost immediately comes to mind. But it is quite another toconclude that, as a result, the phrase also excludes any otheruse. Certainly that conclusion does not follow from thephrase "uses ...a firearm" itself. As the dictionary definitions and experience make clear, one can use a firearm in a
number of ways. That one example of "use" is the first tocome to mind when the phrase "uses... a firearm" is uttereddoes not preclude us from recognizing that there are other"uses" that qualify as well. In this case, it is both reasonable and normal to say that petitioner "used" his MAC-10 in
his drug trafficking offense by trading it for cocaine; the dissent does not contend otherwise. Ibid.
The dissents example of how one might "use" a cane,
ibid., suffers from a similar flaw. To be sure, "use" as anadornment in a hallway is not the first "use" of a cane thatcomes to mind. But certainly it does not follow that the
only "use" to which a cane might be put is assisting one's
grandfather in walking. Quite the opposite: The most infamous use of a cane in American history had nothing to dowith walking at all, see J. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom
150 (1988) (describing the caning of Senator Sumner in theCite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

United States Senate in 1856); and the use of a cane as an
instrument of punishment was once so common that "tocane" has become a verb meaning "[t]o beat with a cane."
Webster's New International Dictionary, supra, at 390. In
any event, the only question in this case is whether thephrase "uses ... a firearm" in § 924(c)(1) is most reasonably

read as excluding the use of a firearm in a gun-for-drugs
trade. The fact that the phrase clearly includes using afirearm to shoot someone, as the dissent contends, does not
answer it.
The dissent relies on one authority, the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1992), as "reflect[ing]" its interpretation of the phrase "uses ...

a fire-arm." See post, at 243. But the Guidelines do not define"using a firearm" as using it for its intended purposes, which
the dissent apparently assumes are limited to firing, brandishing, displaying, and possessing. In fact, if we entertain
for the moment the dubious assumption that the Sentencing
Guidelines are relevant in the present context, they support
the opposite view. Section 2B3.1(b)(2), upon which the dissent relies, ibid., provides for increases in a defendant's
offense level, and therefore his sentence, if the offense involved a firearm. The extent of the adjustment varies according to the nature of the gun's involvement. There is aseven-point upward adjustment if the firearm "was discharged," §2B3.1(b)(2)(A); a six-point enhancement if a gun
was "otherwise used," §2B3.1(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added); anda five-point adjustment if the firearm was brandished, displayed, or possessed, §2B3.1(b)(2)(C). Unless the six-point
enhancement for "othe[r] use[s]" is mere surplusage, there
must be "uses" for a firearm other than its "intended purposes" of firing, brandishing, displaying, or possessing. The
dissent points out that there may be some uses that are
not firing or brandishing but constitute use as a weapon
nonetheless. See post, at 243-244, n. 2. But nothing in§2B3.1(b)(2)(B) suggests that the phrase "othe[r] use[s]"SMITH v. UNITED STATESOpinion of the Court

must be so limited. On the contrary, it is perfectly reasonable to construe §2B3.1(b)(2)(B) as including uses, such as
trading and bludgeoning, that do not constitute use for thefirearm's "intended purpose."
It is true that the Guidelines commentary defines "' [o]therwise used"' as conduct that falls short of "'discharg[ing]a firearm but [is] more than brandishing, displaying, or
possessing [it]."' Post, at 243 (quoting USSG § 1B1.1, comment., n. 1(g)). That definition, however, simply reflects
the peculiar hierarchy of culpability established in USSG
§2B3.1(b)(2). It clarifies that between the most culpableconduct of discharging the firearm and less culpable actions
such as "brandishing, displaying, or possessing" lies a category of "othe[r] use[s]" for which the Guidelines impose intermediate punishment. It does not by its terms exclude fromits scope trading, bludgeoning, or any other use beyond thefirearm's "intended purpose."
We are not persuaded that our construction of the phrase"uses . . .a firearm" will produce anomalous applications.

See post, at 242 (example of using a gun to scratch one'shead). As we already have noted, see supra, at 227-228,
and will explain in greater detail later, infra, at 237-239,§924(c)(1) requires not only that the defendant "use" thefirearm, but also that he use it "during and in relation to"
the drug trafficking crime. As a result, the defendant who"uses" a firearm to scratch his head, see post, at 242, or forsome other innocuous purpose, would avoid punishment forthat conduct altogether: Although scratching one's head witha gun might constitute "use," that action cannot support punishment under § 924(c)(1) unless it facilitates or furthers the
drug crime; that the firearm served to relieve an itch is notenough. See infra, at 238 (phrase "in relation to" requires,at a minimum, that the use facilitate the crime). Such adefendant would escape the six-point enhancement provided
in USSG §2B3.1(b)(2)(B) as well. As the Guidelines definition of "[o]therwise use[d]" makes clear, see USSG § 1B1.1,

Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

comment., n. 1(g), the six-point enhancement does not apply
unless the use is "more than" brandishing. While pistolwhipping a victim with a firearm might be "more than" brandishing, scratching one's head is not.
In any event, the "intended purpose" of a firearm is notthat it be used in any offensive manner whatever, but rather
that it be used in a particular fashion-by firing it. The
dissents contention therefore cannot be that the defendantmust use the firearm "as a weapon," but rather that he must
fire it or threaten to fire it, "as a gun." Under the dissents
approach, then, even the criminal who pistol-whips his victim
has not used a firearm within the meaning of § 924(c)(1), forfirearms are intended to be fired or brandished, not used as
bludgeons. It appears that the dissent similarly would limit
the scope of the "othe[r] use[s]" covered by USSG §2B3.1(b)(2)(B). The universal view of the courts of appeals, however, is directly to the contrary. No court of appeals everhas held that using a gun to pistol-whip a victim is anything
but the "use" of a firearm; nor has any court ever held thattrading a firearm for drugs falls short of being the "use"thereof. But cf. Phelps, 877 F. 2d, at 80 (holding that trading a gun for drugs is not use "in relation to" a drug trafficking offense).
To the extent there is uncertainty about the scope of thephrase "uses ...a firearm" in § 924(c)(1), we believe the re-mainder of §924 appropriately sets it to rest. Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute. As we have recognized:"Statutory construction ...

is a holistic endeavor.

A

provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory schemebecause the same terminology is used elsewhere in acontext that makes its meaning clear, or because only
one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive
effect that is compatible with the rest of the law."
United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood

SMITH v. UNITED STATESOpinion of the Court

Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988) (cita-

tions omitted).
Here, Congress employed the words "use" and "firearm" together not only in §924(c)(1), but also in § 924(d)(1), which
deals with forfeiture of firearms. See United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms,465 U. S. 354 (1984) (discussing
earlier version of the statute). Under §924(d)(1), any "firearm or ammunition intended to be used" in the various offenses listed in § 924(d)(3) is subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Consistent with petitioner's interpretation, § 924(d)(3) lists
offenses in which guns might be used as offensive weapons.
See §§ 924(d)(3)(A), (B) (weapons used in a crime of violenceor drug trafficking offense). But it also lists offenses inwhich the firearm is not used as a weapon but instead as an
item of barter or commerce. For example, any gun intended
to be "used" in an interstate "transfer, s[ale], trade, gi[ft],transport, or deliver[y]" of a firearm prohibited under§ 922(a)(5) where there is a pattern of such activity, see§ 924(d)(3)(C), or in a federal offense involving "the exportation of firearms," §924(d)(3)(F), is subject to forfeiture. In
fact, none of the offenses listed in four of the six subsectionsof § 924(d)(3) involves the bellicose use of a firearm; each offense involves use as an item in commerce.* Thus, it is clear*Section 924(d)(3)(C) lists four offenses: unlicensed manufacture of orcommerce in firearms, in violation of §922(a)(1); unlicensed receipt of aweapon from outside the State, in violation of § 922(a)(3); unlicensed transfer of a firearm to a resident of a different State, in violation of § 922(a)(5);and delivery of a gun by a licensed entity to a resident of a State that is
not the licensee's, in violation of §922(b)(3). Section 924(d)(3)(D) mentions
only one offense, the transfer or sale of a weapon to disqualified persons,such as fugitives from justice and felons, in violation of §922(d). Under§924(d)(3)(E), firearms are subject to forfeiture if they are intended to be
used in any of five listed offenses: shipping stolen firearms, in violation of§922(i); receipt of stolen firearms, in violation of § 922(j); importation of
firearms, in violation of § 922(l); shipment of a firearm by a felon, in violation of § 922(n); and shipment or receipt of a firearm with intent to commit
a felony, in violation of §924(b). Finally, §924(d)(3)(F) subjects to forfeit-

Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

from § 924(d)(3) that one who transports, exports, sells, ortrades a firearm "uses" it within the meaning of §924(d)(1)even though those actions do not involve using the firearm
as a weapon. Unless we are to hold that using a firearm has
a different meaning in § 924(c)(1) than it does in § 924(d)and clearly we should not, United Savings Assn., supra, at
371-we must reject petitioner's narrow interpretation.
The evident care with which Congress chose the languageof §924(d)(1) reinforces our conclusion in this regard. Although § 924(d)(1) lists numerous firearm-related offenses
that render guns subject to forfeiture, Congress did not lump
all of those offenses together and require forfeiture solely ofguns "used" in a prohibited activity. Instead, it carefully
varied the statutory language in accordance with the guns'
relation to the offense. For example, with respect to somecrimes, the firearm is subject to forfeiture not only if it is"used," but also if it is "involved in" the offense. §924(d)(1).
Examination of the offenses to which the "involved in" language applies reveals why Congress believed it necessary toinclude such an expansive term. One of the listed offenses,
violation of § 922(a)(6), is the making of a false statement
material to the lawfulness of a gun's transfer. Because making a material misstatement in order to acquire or sell a gun
is not "use" of the gun even under the broadest definition of
the word "use," Congress carefully expanded the statutory
language. As a result, a gun with respect to which a material misstatement is made is subject to forfeiture because,even though the gun is not "used" in the offense, it is "involved in" it. Congress, however, did not so expand the language for offenses in which firearms were "intended to be
used," even though the firearms in many of those offenses
function as items of commerce rather than as weapons. Instead, Congress apparently was of the view that one could
use a gun by trading it. In light of the common meaning of
ure any firearm intended to be used in any offense that may be prosecutedin federal court if it involves the exportation of firearms.

SMITH v. UNITED STATESOpinion of the Court

the word "use" and the structure and language of the statute,
we are not in any position to disagree.
The dissent suggests that our interpretation produces a"strange dichotomy" between "using" a firearm and "carrying" one. Post, at 246. We do not see why that is so. Just
as a defendant may "use" a firearm within the meaning of§ 924(c)(1) by trading it for drugs or using it to shoot someone, so too would a defendant "carry" the firearm by keeping
it on his person whether he intends to exchange it for cocaine
or fire it in self-defense. The dichotomy arises, if at all, only
when one tries to extend the phrase "'uses ... a firearm"'to any use "'for any purpose whatever."' Ibid. For our
purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that, because § 924(d)(1)includes both using a firearm for trade and using a firearm
as a weapon as "us[ing] a firearm," it is most reasonable toconstrue § 924(c)(1) as encompassing both of those "uses" aswell.
Finally, it is argued that § 924(c)(1) originally dealt withuse of a firearm during crimes of violence; the provision concerning use of a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking offenses was added later. Ibid. From this, the dissent infers that "use" originallywas limited to use of a gun"as a weapon." That the statute in its current form employs
the term "use" more broadly is unimportant, the dissent
contends, because the addition of the words "'drug trafficking crime' would have been a peculiar way to expand its
meaning." Ibid. Even if we assume that Congress had
intended the term "use" to have a more limited scope when
it passed the original version of §924(c) in 1968, but see
supra, at 229-231, we believe it clear from the face of thestatute that the Congress that amended § 924(c) in 1986 did
not. Rather, the 1986 Congress employed the term "use"expansively, covering both use as a weapon, as the dissent
admits, and use as an item of trade or barter, as an examination of § 924(d) demonstrates. Because the phrase "uses ... afirearm" is broad enough in ordinary usage to cover use of a

Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)
Opinion of the Court

firearm as an item of barter or commerce, Congress was freein 1986 so to employ it. The language and structure of § 924
indicate that Congress did just that. Accordingly, we conclude that using a firearm in a guns-for-drugs trade may constitute "us[ing] a firearm" within the meaning of §924(c)(1).
B
Using a firearm, however, is not enough to subject the defendant to the punishment required by § 924(c)(1). Instead,the firearm must be used "during and in relation to" a "crimeof violence or drug trafficking crime." 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1).
Petitioner does not deny that the alleged use occurred "during" a drug trafficking crime. Nor could he. The indictment charged that petitioner and his companion conspired topossess cocaine with intent to distribute. App. 3-4. Therecan be no doubt that the gun-for-drugs trade was proposed
during and in furtherance of that interstate drug conspiracy.
Nor can it be contended that the alleged use did not occur
during the "attempt" to possess cocaine with which petitioner also was charged, id., at 4; the MAC-10 served as an
inducement to convince the undercover officer to provide
petitioner with the drugs that petitioner sought.
Petitioner, however, does dispute whether his use of thefirearm was "in relation to" the drug trafficking offense.
The phrase "in relation to" is expansive, cf. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506 U. S. 125,
129 (1992) (the phrase "relate to" is "deliberately expansive"(internal quotation marks omitted)), as the Courts of Appeals construing § 924(c)(1) have recognized, United States v.
Phelps, 877 F. 2d, at 30 ("[t]he phrase 'in relation to' isbroad"); United States v. Harris,294 U. S. App. D. C., at 315,
959 F. 2d, at 261 (per curiam) (firearm is used "in relation
to" the crime if it "facilitate[s] the predicate offense in someway"). Nonetheless, the phrase does illuminate § 924(c)(1)'sboundaries. According to Webster's, "in relation to" means"with reference to" or "as regards." Webster's New Inter-

SMITH v. UNITED STATESOpinion of the Court
national Dictionary, at 2102. The phrase "in relation to"thus, at a minimum, clarifies that the firearm must have some
purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime;
its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident
or coincidence. As one court has observed, the "in relation
to" language "allay[s] explicitly the concern that a person
could be" punished under § 924(c)(1) for committing a drugtrafficking offense "while in possession of a firearm" eventhough the firearm's presence is coincidental or entirely "unrelated" to the crime. United States v. Stewart, 779 F. 2d538, 539 (CA9 1985) (Kennedy, J.). Instead, the gun at least
must "facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating," thedrug trafficking offense. Id., at 540. Accord, United Statesv. Ocampo, 890 F. 2d 1363, 1371-1372 (CA7 1989); 957 F. 2d,
at 837.
We need not determine the precise contours of the "in relation to" requirement here, however, as petitioner's use of
his MAC-10 meets any reasonable construction of it. The
MAC-10's presence in this case was not the product ofhappenstance. On the contrary, "[flar more than [in] theordinary case" under § 924(c)(1), in which the gun merely
facilitates the offense by providing a means of protection or
intimidation, here "the gun.., was an integral part of thetransaction." United States v. Phelps, 895 F. 2d 1281, 1283
(CA9 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc). Without it, the deal would not have been possible.
The undercover officer posing as a pawnshop dealer expressly told petitioner that he was not in the narcotics business and that he did not get involved with drugs. For a
MAC-10, however, he was willing to see if he could trackdown some cocaine.
Relying on the decision of the Court of Appeals for theNinth Circuit in Phelps and on the legislative record, petitioner insists that the relationship between the gun and thedrug offense in this case is not the type of connection Congress contemplated when it drafted §924(c)(1). With re-Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)
Opinion of the Court

spect to that argument, we agree with the District of Columbia Circuit's observation:"It may well be that Congress, when it drafted thelanguage of [§ ]924(c), had in mind a more obvious use ofguns in connection with a drug crime, but the language[of the statute] is not so limited[;] nor can we imagine
any reason why Congress would not have wished its language to cover this situation. Whether guns are usedas the medium of exchange for drugs sold illegally or
as a means to protect the transaction or dealers, theirintroduction into the scene of drug transactions dramatically heightens the danger to society." Harris,supra,
at 316, 959 F. 2d, at 262.
One need look no further than the pages of the Federal Reporter to verify the truth of that observation. In Phelps,
supra, the defendant arranged to trade his MAC-10 forchemicals necessary to make methamphetamine. The Ninth
Circuit held that the gun was not used or carried "in relation
to" the drug trafficking offense because it was used as an
item of barter and not as a weapon. The defendant, however, did not believe his MAC-10's capabilities were so limited. When he was stopped for a traffic violation, "[t]he
MAC 10, suddenly transmogrified [from an item of commerce] into an offensive weapon, was still in [the defendant's]
possession[.] [He] opened fire and shot a deputy sheriff."
Id., at 1288, n. 4 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
C
Finally, the dissent and petitioner invoke the rule of lenity.
Post, at 246-247. The mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction, however, does not by itself make the ruleof lenity applicable. Instead, that venerable rule is reserved
for cases where, "[a]fter 'seiz[ing] every thing from which aid
can be derived,"' the Court is "left with an ambiguous statute." United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971) (quot-

SMITH v. UNITED STATESOpinion of the Court

ing United States v. Fisher,2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805)). Accord, Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990).
This is not such a case. Not only does petitioner's use of his
MAC-10 fall squarely within the common usage and dictionary definitions of the terms "uses ... a firearm," but Con-

gress affirmatively demonstrated that it meant to include
transactions like petitioner's as "us[ing] a firearm" by so employing those terms in § 924(d).
Imposing a more restrictive reading of the phrase "uses...

a firearm" does violence not only to the structure andlanguage of the statute, but to its purpose as well. When
Congress enacted the current version of § 924(c)(1), it was no
doubt aware that drugs and guns are a dangerous combination. In 1989, 56 percent of all murders in New York City
were drug related; during the same period, the figure for the
Nation's Capital was as high as 80 percent. The American
Enterprise 100 (Jan.-Feb. 1991). The fact that a gun istreated momentarily as an item of commerce does not render
it inert or deprive it of destructive capacity. Rather, as experience demonstrates, it can be converted instantaneously
from currency to cannon. See supra, at 239. We therefore
see no reason why Congress would have intended courts andjuries applying § 924(c)(1) to draw a fine metaphysical distinction between a gun's role in a drug offense as a weapon
and its role as an item of barter; it creates a grave possibilityof violence and death in either capacity.
We have observed that the rule of lenity "cannot dictate
an implausible interpretation of a statute, nor one at odds
with the generally accepted contemporary meaning of aterm." Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 596 (1990).
That observation controls this case. Both a firearm's use asa weapon and its use as an item of barter fall within the plain
language of § 924(c)(1), so long as the use occurs during andin relation to a drug trafficking offense; both must constitute"uses" of a firearm for § 924(d)(1) to make any sense at all;and both create the very dangers and risks that CongressCite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)
SCALu, J., dissenting

meant § 924(c)(1) to address. We therefore hold that a criminal who trades his firearm for drugs "uses" it during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense within the meaning of§924(c)(1). Because the evidence in this case showed that
petitioner "used" his MAC-10 machine gun and silencer inprecisely such a manner, proposing to trade them for cocaine,
petitioner properly was subjected to § 924(c)(1)'s 30-year
mandatory minimum sentence. The judgment of the Courtof Appeals, accordingly, is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion in full because I understand thediscussion in Part II-B not to foreclose the possibility thatthe "in relation to" language of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) requires
more than mere furtherance or facilitation of a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime. I agree with the Court that
because petitioner's use of his MAC-10 meets any reasonable
construction of the phrase, it is unnecessary to determine inthis case the precise contours of "in relation to" as it appearsin § 924(c)(1). See ante, at 238.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE STEVENSJUSTICE SOUTER join, dissenting.

andSection 924(c)(1) mandates a sentence enhancement for any
defendant who "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses ... a firearm." 18
U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). The Court begins its analysis by focusing upon the word "use" in this passage, and explaining thatthe dictionary definitions of that word are very broad. Seeante, at 228-229. It is, however, a "fundamental principle ofstatutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) thatthe meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, butmust be drawn from the context in which it is used." Dealv. United States, ante, at 132. That is particularly true of aword as elastic as "use," whose meanings range all the way

SMITH v. UNITED STATESSCALA, J., dissenting

from "to partake of" (as in "he uses tobacco") to "to be wontor accustomed" (as in "he used to smoke tobacco"). See
Webster's New International Dictionary 2806 (2d ed. 1950).
In the search for statutory meaning, we give nontechnicalwords and phrases their ordinary meaning. See Chapman
v. United States, 500 U. S. 453, 462 (1991); Perrinv. UnitedStates, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979); Minor v. Mechanics Bank ofAlexandria, 1 Pet. 46, 64 (1828). To use an instrumentality
ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose. Whensomeone asks, "Do you use a cane?," he is not inquiring
whether you have your grandfather's silver-handled walking
stick on display in the hall; he wants to know whether you
walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of "using a firearm"is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i. e., as aweapon. To be sure, "one can use a firearm in a number ofways," ante, at 230, including as an article of exchange, justas one can "use" a cane as a hall decoration-but that is not
the ordinary meaning of "using" the one or the other.1 The
Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between how
a word can be used and how it ordinarilyis used. It would,
indeed, be "both reasonable and normal to say that petitioner'used' his MAC-10 in his drug trafficking offense by trading
it for cocaine." Ibid. It would also be reasonable and normal to say that he "used" it to scratch his head. When one
wishes to describe the action of employing the instrument ofa firearm for such unusual purposes, "use" is assuredly aIThe Court asserts that the "significant flaw" in this argument is that"to say that the ordinary meaning of 'uses a firearm' includes using afirearm as a weapon" is quite different from saying that the ordinary
meaning "also excludes any other use." Ante, at 230 (emphases in original). The two are indeed different-but it is precisely the latter that I
assert to be true: The ordinary meaning of "uses a firearm" does not include using it as an article of commerce. I think it perfectly obvious, forexample, that the objective falsity requirement for a perjury conviction
would not be satisfied if a witness answered "no" to a prosecutor's inquiry
whether he had ever "used a firearm," even though he had once sold his
grandfather's Enfield rifle to a collector.

Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)SCALIA, J., dissenting

verb one could select. But that says nothing about whether
the ordinary meaning of the phrase "uses a firearm" embraces such extraordinary employments. It is unquestionably not reasonable and normal, I think, to say simply "donot use firearms" when one means to prohibit selling or
scratching with them.
The normal usage is reflected, for example, in the UnitedStates Sentencing Guidelines, which provide for enhanced
sentences when firearms are "discharged," "brandished,displayed, or possessed," or "otherwise used." See, e. g.,
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual§2B3.1(b)(2) (Nov. 1992). As to the latter term, the Guidelines say: "'Otherwise used' with reference to a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) means that the conduct did notamount to the discharge of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon." USSG § 1B1.1, comment., n. 1(g) (definitions).
"Otherwise used" in this provision obviously means "otherwise used as a weapon."
2

2

The Court says that it is "not persuaded that [its] construction of thephrase 'uses ...a firearm' will produce anomalous applications." Ante,at 232. But as proof it points only to the fact that §924(c)(1) fortuitously
contains other language-therequirement that the use be "during and in
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime"--that happens
to prevent untoward results. Ibid. That language does not, in fact, prevent all untoward results: Though it excludes an enhanced penalty for theburglar who scratches his head with the barrel of a gun, it requires one
for the burglar who happens to use a gun handle, rather than a rock, tobreak the window affording him entrance-hardly a distinction that ought
to make a sentencing difference if the gun has no other connection to thecrime. But in any event, an excuse that turns upon the language of§924(c)(1) is good only for that particular statute. The Court cannot
avoid "anomalous applications" when it applies its anomalous meaning of"use a firearm" in other contexts-for example, the Guidelines provision
just described in text.
In a vain attempt to show the contrary, it asserts that the phrase "otherwise used" in the Guidelines means used for any other purpose at all (theCourt's preferred meaning of "use a firearm"), so long as it is more "culpa-

SMITH v. UNITED STATESSCALu, J., dissenting

Given our rule that ordinary meaning governs, and given
the ordinary meaning of "uses a firearm," it seems to me
inconsequential that "the words 'as a weapon' appear nowhere in the statute," ante, at 229; they are reasonably implicit. Petitioner is not, I think, seeking to introduce an"additional requirement" into the text, ibid., but is simply
construing the text according to its normal import.
The Court seeks to avoid this conclusion by referring to
the next subsection of the statute, §924(d), which does not
employ the phrase "uses a firearm," but provides for the confiscation of firearms that are "used in" referenced offenses
which include the crimes of transferring, selling, or transporting firearms in interstate commerce. The Court concludes from this that whenever the term appears in this statute, "use" of a firearm must include nonweapon use. Seeante, at 233-236. I do not agree. We are dealing here notwith a technical word or an "artfully defined" legal term,ble" than brandishing. See ante, at 232. But whence does it derive thatconvenient limitation? It appears nowhere in the text-as well it should
not, since the whole purpose of the Guidelines is to take out of the handsof individual judges determinations as to what is "more culpable" and "lessculpable." The definition of "otherwise used" in the Guidelines merely
says that it means "more than" brandishing and less than firing. The
Court is confident that "scratching one's head" with a firearm is not "morethan" brandishing it. See ante, at 283. I certainly agree-but only because the "more" use referred to is more use as a weapon. Reading the
Guidelines as they are written (rather than importing the Court's deus ex
machina of a culpability scale), and interpreting "use a firearm" in thestrange fashion the Court does, produces, see ante, at 232, a full sevenpoint upward sentence adjustment for firing a gun at a storekeeper duringa robbery; a mere five-point adjustment for pointing the gun at the storekeeper (which falls within the Guidelines' definition of "brandished," see
USSG § 1B1.1, comment., n. 1(c)); but an intermediate six-point adjustment
for using the gun to pry open the cash register or prop open the door.
Quite obviously ridiculous. When the Guidelines speak of "otherwise
us[ing]" a firearm, they mean, in accordance with normal usage, otherwise"using" it as a weapon-for example, placing the gun barrel in the mouthof the storekeeper to intimidate him.

Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)
SCA AL,J., dissenting

cf. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U. S. 410, 423 (1992) (SCALIA, J.,dissenting), but with common words that are, as I have suggested, inordinately sensitive to context. Just as adding thedirect object "a firearm" to the verb "use" narrows themeaning of that verb (it can no longer mean "partake of"),so also adding the modifier "in the offense of transferring,
selling, or transporting firearms" to the phrase "use a firearm" expands the meaning of that phrase (it then includes,
as it previously would not, nonweapon use). But neither the
narrowing nor the expansion should logically be thought toapply to all appearances of the affected word or phrase.
Just as every appearance of the word "use" in the statuteneed not be given the narrow meaning that word acquires in
the phrase "use a firearm," so also every appearance of thephrase "use a firearm" need not be given the expansive connotation that phrase acquires in the broader context "use afirearm in crimes such as unlawful sale of firearms." When,for example, the statute provides that its prohibition on certain transactions in firearms "shall not apply to the loan orrental of a firearm to any person for temporary use for lawful
sporting purposes," 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(a)(5)(B), (b)(3)(B), I
have no doubt that the "use" referred to is only use as asporting weapon, and not the use of pawning the firearm to
pay for a ski trip. Likewise when, in § 924(c)(1), the phrase'ses... a firearm" is not employed in a context that necessarily envisions the unusual "use" of a firearm as a commodity, the normally understood meaning of the phrase should
prevail.
Another consideration leads to the same conclusion:§924(c)(1) provides increased penalties not only for one who"uses" a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, but also for one who "carries"
a firearm in those circumstances. The interpretation I
would give the language produces an eminently reasonabledichotomy between "using a firearm" (as a weapon) and "carrying a firearm" (which in the context "uses or carries a fire-SMITH v. UNITED STATESSCALIA, J., dissentingarm" means carrying it in such manner as to be ready for
use as a weapon). The Court's interpretation, by contrast,
produces a strange dichotomy between "using a firearm forany purpose whatever, including barter," and "carrying a3
firearm."
Finally, although the present prosecution was brought
under the portion of §924(c)(1) pertaining to use of a firearm"during and in relation to any... drug trafficking crime," I
think it significant that that portion is affiliated with the preexisting provision pertaining to use of a firearm "during andin relation to any crime of violence," rather than with thefirearm trafficking offenses defined in §922 and referencedin § 924(d). The word "use" in the "crime of violence" context has the unmistakable import of use as a weapon, andthat import carries over, in my view, to the subsequently
added phrase "or drug trafficking crime." Surely the word"use" means the same thing as to both, and surely the 1986
addition of "drug trafficking crime" would have been a peculiar way to expand its meaning (beyond "use as a weapon")for crimes of violence.
Even if the reader does not consider the issue to be as
clear as I do, he must at least acknowledge, I think, that it
is eminently debatable-and that is enough, under the ruleof lenity, to require finding for the petitioner here. "At thevery least, it may be said that the issue is subject to somedoubt. Under these circumstances, we adhere to the familiar rule that, 'where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute,
doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant."' Adamo'The Court responds to this argument by abandoning all pretense ofgiving the phrase "uses a firearm" even a permissiblemeaning, much lessits ordinary one. There is no problem, the Court says, because it is notcontending that "uses a firearm" means "uses for any purpose," only thatit means "uses as a weapon or for trade." See ante, at 236. Unfortunately, that is not one of the options that our mother tongue makes available. "Uses a firearm" can be given a broad meaning ("uses for any purpose") or its more ordinary narrow meaning ("uses as a weapon"); but it
can not possibly mean "uses as a weapon or for trade."Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)
SCALiA, J., dissenting

Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 284-285 (1978),4quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 836, 348 (1971).

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

4

The Court contends that giving the language its ordinary meaning
would frustrate the purpose of the statute, since a gun "can be converted
instantaneously from currency to cannon," ante, at 240. Stretching lan-

guage in order to write a more effective statute than Congress devised is
not an exercise we should indulge in. But in any case, the ready ability
to use a gun that is at hand as a weapon is perhaps one of the reasons
the statute sanctions not only using a firearm, but carrying one. Here,however, the Government chose not to indict under that provision. Seeante, at 228.