G-SEC WORKING PAPER No.13
Strategic Motivations of a Rising China:
Security Environment and Foreign Policy
Shigemitsu KONNO ＊January 2007

Abstract

How should we explain the recent rise of China and its active foreign policy? In thispaper, this question shall be answered by focusing on the relation between China’s
assessments of the security environment and its security practice. After briefly revelingin the unrealistic hope of a rapid transition to a multipolar world in the early 1990’s,
China has been cautiously modifying its security strategy in response to revised strategic
assessments and changing international situations, while maintaining an official viewthat the transition period was underway and that China would participate in the creationof a more favorable multipolar international order. Although some scholars exaggerate
the present danger of a rising China with dramatically expanded influence in East Asia, I
will argue that China has no reason to rush to challenge the existing status-quo. This isbecause a rising power has strong incentives to avoid major conflicts with a dominant
power and simply wait, since given time it can achieve an increasingly advantageous
position from which to challenge the status quo.

* Research Fellow, Global Security Research Institute, Keio University. Mita 2-15-45 Minato-ku,
Tokyo, 108-8345, JAPAN. E-mail: konno@irtheory.jp

Introduction
It is commonly believed that the national goals of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
are to become a real great power, to expand its wealth and influence, and to restore its
prestige in Asia. However, the long term consequences of China’s rise are still uncertain
and subject to varying interpretations.
Since the start of its economic reforms in 1978, China’s economy has been
growing rapidly, with average annual growth rate of more than 8 percent 1 . In 1993, theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced new method of calculating national
wealth based on purchasing power parity (PPP) instead of based on currency exchange
rates, which was used to estimate China’s GDP. In this recalculation, China’s GDP was
judged four times larger than previously considered, placing China third largest among
the world’s economies 2 . This immediately heightened concerns among some Western
analysts about the potential danger of a rising China. They argued that China may be
tempted to use military force to advance its vital interests, despite risks of military
conflicts with neighbor countries and the United States 3 .
In fact, China had demonstrated some remarkably assertive behavior in theearly 1990s. In 1992, China declared its “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone” that unilaterally asserted Chinese sovereignty over large areas of the East China
Sea and the South China Sea such as Taiwan and the various offshore islands including
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, Spratly Islands, Xisha Islands, Dongsha Islands. Following
the declaration, China had pursued its claims by assertive means such as building a1

Lardy (2002) pp. 11-12.
Steven Greenhouse, “New Tally of World’s Economies Catapults China into Third Place,” NewYork Times, May 20, 1993.
3
For various China threat theory, see, Broomfield (2003); Yee and Storey (2002); Bernstein andMunro (1997); Roy (1994). See also Deng (2006); Menges (2005); Mosher (2000); Segal (1996);
Friedberg (1993); Betts (1993).
2

1

fortification on Mischief Reef in 1995. This caused disputes with Vietnam, thePhilippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
Despite tremendous opposition from countries in the region, China conducted aseries of nuclear weapons tests from 1992 to 1996. Moreover, China fired missiles into
the Taiwan Strait from 1995 to 1996 in an attempt to scare the people of Taiwan during
the first presidential election to be held there. These assertive actions were taken as
evidence of China’s ambition in the region by some Western analysts who believe that
China’s economic strength will eventually be translated into the sort of military powerthat could further threaten Asian Security.
However, China changed its course and adopted a more prudent strategy fromthe mid 1990s. In fact, China began to seek to reassure its neighbors and enhance its
reputation as a benign and cooperative power. China made significant progress inresolving border disputes with its neighbors, most notably Russia, the former Soviet
Republics, and even Vietnam.
The principal demonstrations of this new emphasis were China’s active
involvement in multilateral cooperation, including its efforts in seeking to resolve thecrisis surrounding North Korea and its attempts to obtain nuclear weapons, and inseeking to establish cooperative relationships with ASEAN countries 4 . To articulate thisnew approach, President Jiang Zemin introduced the “New Security Concept (xinanquan guan)” that was based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, and cooperation, whileemphasizing that the Cold War mentality of competing antagonistic blocks was
outdated 5 .

45Foot (1998); Whiting (1997).
For the “New Security Concept,” see, Finkelstein (1999).
2

After the September 11 attacks in 2001, these tendencies became still more
apparent. China has dramatically improved its bilateral relationship with the UnitedStates, in order to concentrate on economic growth and domestic reform. As Avery
Goldstein points out, China’s current grand strategy, that aims for a peaceful transition
as it rises to become a real great power during an era of unipolarity, seems to belogically coherent and a realistic response to the international circumstances 6 .
Yet questions still remain as to whether Beijing’s current strategy, emphasizing
a “peaceful rise” or “peace and development”, is tactical or strategic. And, is it likely tolast? When China obtains primacy in the world, will it continue to seek reciprocal
relationships with other major powers and maintain a benign posture in Asia?
These questions resolve themselves into the following two positions.
Advocates of a revisionist China or China threat theory argue that China will go on tochange the existing international order, norms, and institutions, to change the rules ininternational affairs to their own advantage, as great powers had done in the past.
Moreover, concerns over China are not about what China wants today but about what it
may want in the future. Even though China’s current strategy seems benign and calm, it
remains unclear the course that China will follow if its current “peace and development”
strategy succeed. They argue that the history of international relations provides us witha more pessimistic scenario of a rising China. John Mearsheimer asserts in no uncertain
terms, that China cannot rise peacefully 7 .
On the other hand, status quo advocates argue that China is being socialized
into the existing international institutions and norms so that China can benefit from the

6
7Goldstein (2005) p. 177.
Mearsheimer (2006).
3

fruits of globalization. This means that globalization is leading China in the direction ofgreater interdependence with its neighbors and encouraging status quo behavior 8 . They
believe that China’s international behavior will not change even when it becomes more
powerful and unipolarity ends.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify strategic motivations behind China’s
foreign policy by focusing on the relation between China's assessments of the future
security environment and its security practice after the Cold War. After a brief
theoretical introduction about the motivations of a rising power and the way Chinese
leaders tend to perceive the international security environment, this paper examines how
these are expressed in the practice of Chinese foreign policy. This paper concludes thatwhile the current trends indicate the prudence of Chinese leaders and suggest that it will
be stable in foreseeable future, we can not be optimistic about long term consequencesof a rising China.

Motivations of a Rising PowerIn the general sense, a rising power refers to a country that has the sufficient potential toplay a more prominent role in international relations than it has played before. The
impact of a rising power is very important in the literature of international relations
theory, as a rising power often changes the distribution of power between major powers
in the international system.
For scholars familiar with rise and fall of great powers over the centuries,
emergence of a great power in the international system can be understood within thecontext of a clash between a dominant power and a rising power. When a second ranked
8

For this line of argument, see, Moore (2005); Johnston (2003).
4

great power rises to near equality with a dominant power, this rising power is inclined toinitiate war to obtain the status and rewards denied by the traditional international
order 9 . It is because a rising power is usually dissatisfied with the existing international
order; it naturally desires to change international system through belligerent means.
However, this need not be the case. Contrary to the conventional wisdom,
rising powers have no reason to rush to challenge the existing status quo. This isbecause rising powers have strong incentives to avoid major conflicts with a dominant
power and simply wait, since given time they can achieve even more advantageous
position from which to challenge the status quo.
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that a rising power will always go to
war with the dominant power, as, for example, the United States did not go to war with
the British Empire at the turn of the twentieth century, even when it surpassed theBritish Empire to become as the dominant power. From theoretical perspective, rational
rising powers prefer costless choice and tend to avoid unnecessary war. Some irrational
rising powers like Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, on the other hand, often fail toreach stable great power status because they wage unreasonable major war in theprocess of rising.
However, this does not necessarily imply that the strategic motivations of rising
powers will be benign and calm. Even though rising powers often claim benign
intentions to reassure other countries, these are often disregarded, not only because
other powers know that rising powers have incentives to conceal their intentions, butalso because their intentions may change when their relative status and circumstances

9

Organski and Kugler (1980) pp. 27-28; Gilpin (1981) pp. 94-95, 186-87.
5change 10 . Once a rising power achieves a dominant position in the international system,
it may change its policy and strategy to reflect its new capabilities and the newinternational environment. As a matter of course, domestic causes such as the nature ofpolitical regime, the briefs and perceptions of political leaders, and government-society
relations will affect the new course taken by the brand-new dominant power.

China’s Perception of its Security Environment
Two important concepts in understanding how Chinese elites assess their security
environment are liliang duibi (balance of forces or polarity) and comprehensive national
power. This is because, regardless of whether or not Chinese leaders have ever read any
neorealist literatures, they tend to perceive changes in the international system with aneorealist-style sense of power politics 11 . Power calculation occupies a central place in
China’s approach to perceiving its security environment.
Chinese scholars and policy makers tend to start their analysis of international
security from the perspective of the status of liliang duibi in the world. As Wang Jisi
notes, “Without a study of liliang duibi, policy makers in Beijing presumably would not
be able to adjust foreign policy accordingly 12 ”.
To assess the liliang duibi (hereafter as polarity) of the international system,
Chinese leaders usually refer to the concept of comprehensive national power (CNP).
CNP is the concept by which Chinese scholars and policy makers evaluate and measure
China's relative power status in relation to other states. Although exact components used
to calculate CNP vary among scholars or institutions, it may include qualitative and10

Copeland (2000) pp. 22-23, 37.
Zhao (2004) p. 141.
12
Wang (1995) p. 489.
116

quantitative measures of territory, natural resources, economic power, diplomatic
influence, governability, military capability, and cultural influence.
Even though China’s strategic motivations should not be inferred from power
politics alone, Beijing’s perception of polarity and national power is very important inorder to clarify the strategic motivations behind Chinese foreign policy.

China and the End of the Cold War
At the beginning of the post Cold War era, most IR scholars in the world believed thatthe post Cold War world would quickly move through a brief “unipolar moment” andthat a new multipolar system would emerge 13 .
Like western scholars, most Chinese analysts took the view that American
power was gradually declining and that the emergence of a multipolar world was
imminent 14 . After the transition period to a multipolar world was over, they believed,
there would no longer be any “super powers” but instead a “multipolar world” in which
five nations (China, the United States, Japan, Europe, and Russia) would each have aroughly equal CNP 15 .
In actual fact, there seemed already to be signs of a multipolar system emerging
in Asia. First of all, with the end of the cold war, U.S. military presence in Asia was
reduced. In its East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) of April 1990, the United States
outlined a blueprint for phased reduction of U.S. forces deployed in Asia Pacific. By theend of 1992, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from bases in the Philippines had been
completed.
13

Waltz (1993); Layne (1993); Lynn-Jones and Miller (1993).
Zhang (2005) p. 678; Pillsbury (2000) pp. 3-4; Wang (1997) pp. 4, 9.
15
Pillsbury (2000) pp. 3-4.
14

7

A second factor was the heightened economic frictions between the UnitedStates and Japan. In particular, from the start of the Clinton administration, theU.S.-Japan relation had deteriorated to such an extent that scholars in both countries had
begun to have serious concerns about the future of the relationship. Experts in China
viewed this deterioration of the relationship between the United States and Japan as asign of the approach of a multipolar world order 16 .
A third factor was the sudden economic growth experienced by several East
Asian nations, known as the “Asian Miracle 17 ”. Economic growth had been advancing
in China too, but in particular from the time of Deng Xiaoping's inspection tour ofsouthern China onward, when he delivered a series of speeches aimed at bolsteringreform and open-door policies, China’s economic growth speeded up still further, to theextent of recording double-digit growth rates.
Based on such perceptions of the approaching emergence of a multipolar world,
and the perceptions of Chinese leaders regarding their security environment, China
pursued an aggressive foreign policy for the first half of the 1990s, and in particular
took hawkish stances over matters relating to sovereignty. China established its “Law on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone” in February 1992, which unilaterally
claimed territorial rights to islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea and, inFebruary 1995, launched a military occupation of Mischief Reef. Moreover, otheractions by China such as a series of nuclear tests, the rapid increase in military spending
and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, weapons exports to Pakistan, etc.,
only served to trigger further concerns among neighboring Asian countries. Then, over a16
17

Drifte (2003) p. 34.
World Bank (1993).
8

period from 1995 to 1996, the People’s Liberation Army launched missiles into the
Taiwan Strait with the aim of intimidating Taiwan, marking the peak of China’s
aggressive behavior.

The Taiwan Strait Crisis as a Turning Point
The crisis over the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96 was a symbolic and crucial event in termsof Chinese leaders realizing their misperceptions regarding power trends in theinternational system. In the spring of 1996, Chinese leaders were taken aback by theunexpectedly strong countermeasures with the United States responded to China’s
attempts to menace Taiwan by firing missiles into the Taiwan Strait. The United States
responded by ordering two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, demonstrating bothits capabilities and intention to check China’s coercive actions over Taiwan. This crisis
prompted major efforts by Chinese leaders to reduce tensions with the United States.
There are no secret documents available in which Chinese leaders spell out
their revision on future security environment, however, it is clear that the Taiwan Strait
Crisis had a strong impact on perceptions of Chinese leaders 18 .
From a theoretical perspective, the intentions and capabilities that the UnitedStates displayed during the Taiwan Strait crisis have indicated that the unipolar system
was likely to continue longer than Chinese leaders had anticipated. Therefore, if theunipolar system was to continue, the policy choices that China had been making basedon the premise that the dawn of a multipolar world was imminent, were now highly
likely to prove risky to China. If the unipolar system were to continue, the most rational
18

Another factor affecting Chinese perception at that time was the U.S.-Japan Joint Security
Declaration in April 1996. As Wang Jisi noted the newly enhanced U.S.-Japan alliance reinforced
Chinese anxiety about two powers’ joint endeavors to counterweight Chinese power. Wang (1997) p.
12.
9choice for China would to be to take a more moderate posture regarding foreign policy,
while devoting itself to increasing its national power.
Some circumstantial evidence indicates this remarkable change in Chinese
strategy. First of all, no further examples of major military adventurism occurred after
the Taiwan Strait crisis. This is strong evidence that modifications to security strategy
were embarked upon from this time. In fact, China began to refrain from any serious
attempts to menace the United States, in the way that the Taiwan Strait Crisis had, thatmight cause serious military confrontation. Instead, Chinese leaders began to embrace amore benign grand strategy designed to concentrate on economic development while
also coping with the potential dangers, such as counterblow from the United States, that
China might face during a protracted period of unipolar moment.
Second, Chinese diplomacy changed significantly from mid 1996. Beijing
made pragmatic accommodations to the U.S. led unipolar world through, (1) improving
the relations with the United States especially after Jiang Zemin visited Washington,
D.C. to meet President Bill Clinton in 1997, (2) playing an active role in regional
multilateral institutions, such as ARF and the Shanghai Five, (3) participating thenuclear non-proliferation regime by announcing its intentions to sign theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and engaging the nuclear weapons program ofNorth Korea to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula.
China began to adjust its regional strategies to the “unipolar reality” from mid
1996 onward and attempted to reduce widespread concerns about its rise and ambitions.
Chinese leaders emphasized not only words but also actions, in order to reassureneighboring countries and to enhance its reputation as a reliable and cooperative powerin the region.

10

In fact, China also took a softer stance regarding territorial disputes with
ASEAN countries and instead prioritized joint-development endeavors. Moreover, at thetime of the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997, China decided not to devalue the yuan,
thereby helping to minimize the damages of neighboring Asian countries. As a result ofChina’s efforts to reassure neighboring countries, perceptions of China in Southeast
Asia have shifted dramatically, so that elites and public opinion in many ASEAN
countries have come to see China as a constructive partner.
Third, there had been very important change in Chinese debate on the future
security environment. As Michael Pillsbury has noted, formerly Chinese authors rarelyreferred to each other and never criticized other authors directly, but in 1997, twoarticles broke this taboo. One of two articles criticized the orthodox assessment of thecoming multipolar world and the other article made a counterargument 19 . What is
important is that serious argument has begun to occur in China about the timing of thearrival of a multipolar world. Whereas in the past, in the view of many western scholars,
there was a strong tendency in China toward wishful thinking rather than objective
analysis, since the mid 1990s, there has been a gradual but steady increase in realistic
debate 20 .
In sum, Chinese leaders began to recognize the likely implications of the rise of
China under a protracted unipolar world. They realized that the United States would
remain as the only superpower for decades rather than years 21 . They also understoodthat it had neither the option of the external balancing (an option of allying with othermajor power), nor the option of internal balancing (an option of military buildup) to
19

Pillsbury (2000) p. 13.
For the details of this debate, see, Zhang (2005) pp. 680-81; Pillsbury (2000) pp. 13-25.
21
Zhang (2005) p. 683.
20

11

check the United States directly. They calculated their interests would be better servedby cooperation than confrontation with the United States.
Thus Chinese leaders have cautiously been modifying China’s security strategy
in response to a revised strategic assessment and a changing international situation.
They have relocated their perspective include the prospect of a very long period oftransition. By the late 1990s, they were concluding that the transition process would
take at least several decades, while maintaining an official view that the transition wasunderway and that China would participate in the creation of a favorable multipolarinternational order.

China’s Strategy in the Era of a Unipolar WorldOver the past few years, China has put on track its strategy for responding and adapting
to the situation of a unipolar world, in other words, its strategy of cooperating with theUnited States. However, this positive trend could have been stopped in its tracks orreversed as the result of three difficult tests it has faced in recent years, althoughfortunately this has not, as yet, happened.
The NATO strikes on the former Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 represented
the first of such tests. The NATO accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade, killing three Chinese people, raised the levels of anti-American sentiment in
China 22 . Chinese analysts were highly critical of the United States and even critical of
the effort by the Jiang administration to cooperate with the United States. Moreover,some called for an anti hegemonic coalition 23 . Chinese analysts were also concerned

22
23

Pillsbury (2000) p. 44.
Goldstein (2005) p. 153.
12

that the United States and NATO bypassing of the UN Security Council in order toattack Serbia, might create a precedent for a new way to interfering in the domestic
politics of China 24 . The Chinese debate continued with fury until late summer, when aconsensus had formed that the wisest option for China’s future would be to continue
with the current policy.
The presidential election in March 2000 provided the second test for the
China’s modified strategy. When Taiwan elected a hard-core, pro-independence
president Chen Shui-bian, in March 2000, China reacted fiercely but did not takemilitary action. The Clinton administration also quickly warned Chen against any
provocative actions. Chen moderated his stance and stated in his inaugural address thathe promised not to declare independence and or change the national symbols of the
Republic of China as long as the PRC has no intention to use the PLA against Taiwan 25 .
As a result, a new Taiwan Strait crisis did not occur.
The launch of the George W. Bush administration in January 2001 was the third
test. The Bush administration initially took a tough stance regarding China andcontended that China was strategic competitor rather than strategic partner. Since theBush administration was cautious of China’s ambitions, they were eager to contain
China’s rise and to demonstrate that they would not tolerate any challenge to American
influence in East Asia.
In the context of this hard-line stance by the Bush administration, the collisionof a U.S. EP-3 spy plane and a Chinese fighter over the sea near Hainan Island in April

24

Finkelstein (2000), pp. 14, 29-30.
“President Chen Shui-bian's Inauguration Speech,” May 20, 2000.
http://th.gio.gov.tw/pi2000/dow_2.htm (accessed 4 September 2006).

25

13

2001 provoked widespread antipathy among Chinese scholars 26 . However, since by theend of 1990s, Chinese leaders had already concluded that the prospect of a multipolarworld was more distant than had been thought previously, ultimately Jiang Zemin wasable to restrain domestic criticism and stay the course.
Within a few months, the Bush administration backed away from its toughstance as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. After 9/11, China
supported the U.S. led campaign against international terrorism, even moderating its
expression of concern about American military developments in Central Asia during the
war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban state in Afghanistan. While some Chinese leaders
remained skeptical about U.S. strategic intentions toward China, Chinese leaders
uniformly recognized that since the U.S.-led unipolar system is likely to continue for
decades, it is not in China’s interests to confront the United States directly.
After Hu Jintao took power in November 2002, China became much more
confident in its strategy. Chinese leaders clearly realized that China needs a stableinternational environment to drive economic growth and to increase its relative powervis-à-vis the United States. In charting a course for the rise of China during the unipolarera, Zheng Bijian and his colleagues began to implement the ideas of China’s strategy of“peaceful rise (heping jueqi) 27 ”.
Actually, Hu’s China emphasizes that a cooperative relationship with theUnited States should be a central feature of a prudent strategy for China, while at thesame time embracing multilateral over bilateral coordination, and also seeking toenhance regional cooperation to realize mutual benefits with neighbor countries.

26
27

Li (2005) p. 29.
For the details of idea of “peaceful rise”, see, Suettinger (2004); Brookings Institution (2005).
14

Nevertheless, China’s current strategy is certainly not based on the assumptionthat China will live forever in a U.S.-led unipolar world. While it accepts that the
unipolar world may continue for at least part of the foreseeable future, in the long-term
it considers that it will be possible to resist U.S. hegemony by means of increasing its
own overall national power. Moreover, with stable economic growth being essential toincreasing its overall national power, at the present time China remains highly
dependent on investment from overseas. Because of this, for the time being, foreign
policy for China will constitute a means of securing the necessary stable international
environment to enable its continued economic growth. Current Chinese cooperative
behavior toward America can be understood in this context.
From a realist perspective, China’s current diplomatic accommodation of its
neighbors and active participation in regional institutions can be seen as parts of astrategy to weaken American influence in Asia 28 . In fact, China has sought to promote a
variety of new institutional arrangement such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) and even the East Asian Community, which exclude the United States in Asia,
where China can exercise its natural leadership role, and China’s growing need forenergy and raw materials has extended its resource diplomacy to Central Asia, Middle
East, Africa, and South America.
With the relative decline in American influence due to the war in Iraq and thelong drawn-out occupation, in fact there has been an increase in Chinese behavior
intended to check the United States. For example, the application of the United States tojoin the SCO as an observer was rejected in 2005. Moreover, member states of the SCO
28

Robert Shutter points out that China’s long term strategy runs counter to U.S. interest, but that thenear- and middle –term reality of predominant U.S. power dictates that China’s tactics accommodate
American interest. See, Shutter (2005) pp. 294-99.
15

called for a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Central Asia that was
initially deployed to wage the war in Afghanistan. More recently, China has had
increasing contact with anti-U.S. Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Cuba.
This can be interpreted as the result of a Chinese view that the decline in American
influence may indicate that the process of the emergence of a multipolar world isaccelerating.

Looking into the Future of China’s Foreign Policy
China is certainly not a clear and present danger in Asia today. In recent years, China
has consistently sought a stable international environment that will allow it to focus on
economic development and domestic concerns. China has even shown flexibility
regarding some territorial issues, agreeing to set aside sovereignty claims in the South
China Sea for the joint development of energy resources in disputed waters. The result
has been a significant expansion of positive influence in the region.
However, the events of the early and mid 1990s demonstrate that China may
act aggressively and resort to military actions if Chinese leaders perceive that it can doso without endangering national interests.
As Michael Swaine points out, “China is in the process of acquiring new
military capabilities and undertaking new force deployments that will fundamentally
alter security perceptions in the region and stimulate a more widespread militaryresponse among the major powers. Although this dynamic is not fated to produce
conflict – even in the case of Taiwan – it will likely increase the chance of regional

16

tension and instability 29 .” Moreover, Chinese leaders still view military power as theprimary component of national policy. China is attempting to take advantage of its
rising influence in Asia, and while maintaining a low-profile, it is also building up its
military capabilities at a faster rate than ever 30 . This does not mean that major war isinevitable in Asia, however, and the course that China will follow if and when its
strategy of “peace and development” succeeds is unclear due to its record of assertive
behavior and a lack of transparency in the decision-making processes of Chinese foreign
and military policy. The China factor remains essential to any discussion of the future of
the East Asian security environment.
What then, are the conditions for Chinese foreign policy to remain on its
current moderate course? The following two conditions can be identified.
The first condition is the endurance of a unipolar world. For Chinese leaders,the creation of a multipolar world is highly desirable. China regularly claims thatpartnerships with other great power centers such as Europe and Russia are both a sign ofthe emergence of a multipolar world and a force for accelerating this transformation of
the structure of the international system 31 . The emergence of other power centers would
mean that the United States would no longer be so dominant that it could contain
China’s rise.
However, multipolarization itself may be a cause of instability. Although
China’s relative power will increase with the emergence of a multipolar world, theconcerns of neighboring countries about China will also be increased. Moreover, the29

Swaine (2005) p. 281.
For the relation between China’s economic growth and military build up, see, Perkins (2005).
Perkins argues that China’s defense expenditure have been rising more rapidly than its growth rate of
GDP since 1996.
31
Goldstein (2005) pp. 132-33.
30

17incentives for a declining America to take a tougher stance against China and try tocontain China’s rise through means such as preventive actions will be increased. If theUnited States becomes more hard-line, it will become more difficult for China’s leaders
to contain domestic nationalism and it is likely that it will become difficult to continue
to make the sorts of compromises that are being made at present.
On the other hand, if the unipolar world continues, as long as the Chinese
leadership is rational, it will be able to maintain a basic policy of pursuing anomnidirectional foreign policy without showing off its power any more than isnecessary and thus avoid tensions and confrontation with the United States.
The second condition is the stability of domestic politics. Economic
development is essential to China’s internal stability and greater international power.
However, if economic growth suffers serious setbacks or there is some kind of problem
related to domestic politics, it is possible that China may seek to accomplish its
domestic policies by means of creating and using a controllable threat from abroad 32 . In
such a case, it is likely that China would be prepared to sacrifice its international
reputation for the sake of the legitimacy of the CCP control.
Finally, it is necessary to give some consideration to scenarios in which in the
future, China begins to behave aggressively and the fears of the “China threat” theorists
are realized.
First of all, there is the situation in which the power balance between the
United States and China changes suddenly. Dramatic changes in the distribution of
power in international system would lead Chinese leaders to reconsider their strategy, inorder to make foreign policy based on China’s new capabilities and the new32

For this sort of domestic mobilization logic, see, Christensen (1996) pp. 11-31.
18

international environment.
Once Chinese leaders feel that China has accumulated enough economic andmilitary strength, China will seek to expand its sphere of influence, utilizing force ifnecessary, and insisting that its claims be respected, as other great powers have done in
the past. Once China has ceased to worry so much about the influence of the UnitedStates in Asia, China is likely to make more determined efforts to get Taiwan back. It is
likely that problems related to sovereignty and territory, such as the territorial disputewith Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands, are likely to gain in intensity.
A second scenario would be one in which China’s economic growth sufferedserious setbacks. At present, the CCP is using the realization of economic growth tolegitimize its one-party rule, but if at some point in the future China’s economy ceased
growing economically, due to social disorder or the deterioration of the bad loans issue,
this could potentially become an obstacle to the continued rule by the CCP. If such asituation arises, China’s leaders may have little choice but to redirect domestic
dissatisfaction to outside by creating an external threat, stirring up nationalism against it
and embarking on a belligerent foreign policy, in order to maintain the control andpolitical base of the CCP.
A third scenario would be that of the advance of democratization in China. To
western observers, the fact that China is growing more powerful but is still not
democratic contribute to nervousness about the implications of its rise. However, even if
democratization did advance in China, this too could be a cause for concerns. This isbecause, as Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder show, looking back in history, nations
which are in the midst of the process of democratization are more prone to excessive
nationalism and are more likely to become aggressive and acceptant of the risks of19

going to war 33 .
Up until now, the CCP has been aware that if they do not control popularnationalism appropriately, this kind of domestic dissatisfaction could easily betransformed into anti-government or anti-party feeling, and at the time of the U.S.
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 U.S. EP-3 spy plane incident,
they were able to manage expressions of popular nationalist outrage. However, with theadvance of democratization in China, it would become difficult for the CCP to continue
to limit domestic nationalism in the same way.

Conclusion
Overall, the analysis of this paper indicates that it is difficult to state that China’s
strategic motivations have fundamentally changed to become more moderate. They are
not based on the premise of permanent accommodation with the U.S. led unipolar world,
and it seems that China is behaving in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s famous phrase,“bide our time and conceal our intentions (tao guang yang hui)” in preparation for the
long-term emergence of a multipolar world. The policy of pursuing cooperative
relations with the United States was designed to enable China to cope with potentially
dangerous countermeasures by the United States during China's rise to great power
status 34 .
If, as has been argued in this paper, China’s strategic motivations tend to begreatly influenced by its interpretation of international relations and particularly of thepolarity of the international system, how China’s leaders perceive the polarity of the33
34

Mansfield and Snyder (2005); Mansfield and Snyder (1995).
Goldstein (2005) p. 145.
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international system will be an important issue in terms of thinking about future
developments in China’s foreign policy strategy.
The series of recent phenomenon which seem to suggest a decline in America’s
influence, such as the war in Iraq and the chaos surrounding the occupation of Iraq, arelikely to greatly affect Chinese perceptions regarding the prospects for the realization ofa multipolar world. In fact, since the United States has met with setbacks over Iraq,
China has tended to display a stronger stance of tendency of seeking to check the UnitedStates, than it had previously. It cannot be denied that depending on developments in the
power balance between the United States and China, a very difficult period forsurrounding nations could arrive far sooner than anyone had anticipated. We cannot saythat it is not possible for a great power to rise peacefully, but it is also dangerous to be
overoptimistic. For neighboring countries, China should be observed with cool
objectivity and assessed based upon its current national capabilities and latent power
resources, without harboring any illusions.

21

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