COVER STORY • 5I

ndia’s Diplomacy Today& Current Japan-IndiaRelations

By Toru Ito

Retreat from Nonalignment
In Indian diplomacy, the age of nonalignment is now a thing of thepast. During the Cold War, under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, India established a position as a leader of the Third World,
leading the Non-Aligned Movement while maintaining its sovereignty
by keeping a distance from both the Eastern and Western blocs.
After the signing of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty (Treaty of Peace,Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of India and theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics) by the administration of Nehru’s
daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India leaned more strongly
toward the Soviet Union, but nevertheless did not abandon its
nonaligned stance.
After the end of the Cold War, however, as India’s hard powerincreased, it put aside the concept of nonalignment and worked tobuild and strengthen strategic partnerships with the world’s major
powers, including Japan and the United States, from which it had
previously been estranged. In 2012, in fact, under the Indian National
Congress administration led by Manmohan Singh, a strategic
proposal titled “Nonalignment 2.0”1 was drawn up by experts close
to the administration, which effectively replaced nonalignment withthe concept of strategic autonomy.

Multi-alignment & Solidarity with the Global South
under the Modi Administration
Since then, under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) administration
led by Narendra Modi, which took power in 2014, the concept ofnonalignment has not been heard of at all and has been consigned tothe past. The new generation’s non-Congress administration does
not have the slightest sense of nostalgia for nonalignment. Inaddition, it appears to have cooled on the Non-Aligned Movement,with the prime minister not even attending the Conference of Headsof State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. On the other hand,India has entered a new stage with the further upgrading of its
strategic relationship with Western countries. Looking at the UnitedStates in particular, it concluded the Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, the Communications
Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, and theBasic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020, and inaddition to the military area, the two countries began holding
meetings of Cabinet-level foreign and defense officials (“2+2”) from32 Japan SPOTLIGHT • March / April 2024

Author Toru Ito

2018. The US also plans to manufacture fighter aircraft engines andbuild semiconductor manufacturing plants in India. The Quadpartnership, a minilateral framework comprising Japan, the US,
Australia, and India, also began holding regular summit meetingsfrom 2021, and the four countries have conducted the Malabar joint
naval exercises since 2020.
Nevertheless, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2022
has clearly shown that in fact India, and even the Modi
administration, is not necessarily part of the Western bloc. Despite
repeated calls from the US, Japan, and others, India has avoided
criticism of Russia. As the geopolitical situation on India’s borders
becomes increasingly tense, including ongoing territorial disputes
with China since 2020, the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, thereturn of a Taliban government in Afghanistan, and the sanctions on
Iran that have not been lifted by the administration of US President
Joe Biden, the severing of ties with traditional ally Russia is not achoice for India.
In addition, India has purchased large quantities of crude oil andfertilizer, which were discounted because they could not be soldelsewhere, from Russia despite the West’s economic sanctions. As
the West’s frustration and distrust of India was increasing, India
assumed the G20 presidency from the end of 2022, and during its
presidency emphasized the concept of the “Global South”. Developed
Western countries were concerned only with Russia’s aggression,
but India objected, saying that developing countries were the hardest
hit by sharply higher prices for energy and food resulting from theprotracted conflict, and that developed Western countries failed tounderstand this. Taking this opportunity to avoid criticism from theWest and have a successful G20 presidency, India positioned itself
as the “voice of the Global South”. This was demonstrated by theG20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration, which India negotiated withassistance from developing countries Indonesia, Brazil, and South
Africa in September 2023. Instead of criticizing Russia, thedeclaration did not mention Russia at all, focusing on developing
countries and gaining recognition that they are indispensable
partners of developed Western countries. Using its position in thisway, India succeeded in getting all of the G7 countries to accept thedeclaration in its entirety.
This shows that in fact not even under the Modi administration is
India entirely dependent on its strategic relationship with the West.
India also places importance on its strategic relationships withregional powers like Russia and Iran, which the West views as hostile,
https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

and with developing countries. India today is not part of an alliancewith any particular country or bloc, and has not accepted the values
and order of developed Western countries. In other words, India has
replaced its past solidarity with nonalignment and the Third World
with multi-alignment and solidarity with the Global South today.

Rising Nationalism Along with Increased PowerOne other unique feature of India’s diplomacy today is its
increasingly assertive position in foreign relations as an emerging
power. India’s sense of being a great power has of course not comeabout unexpectedly or all of a sudden. It has existed since
independence, but is becoming increasingly assertive with growing
confidence from the fact that India is on track to have the world’s
third-largest GDP in 2027 and appears certain to become a greatpower in both actual and nominal terms, trailing only the US andChina.
Even more important is the Hindu nationalism ideology of Modi’s
BJP. The BJP gained a majority in the lower house of parliament(Lok Sabha) in the 2014 general election, and increased this majority
in the 2019 general election. In particular, the second Modi
administration from 2019 has been working full-scale to establish aHindu nation (Hindu Rashtra). This has included the revocation ofArticle 370 of the constitution which granted special status to theMuslim-majority states of Jammu and Kashmir, revising theimmigration laws that are the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) togrant citizenship to non-Muslim illegal immigrants, and holding agroundbreaking ceremony for the rebuilding of the Ram Mandir
Hindu temple at Ayodhya on the site where a Muslim mosque wasdestroyed in 1992.
There are concerns that this Hindu majoritarianism poses a risk to
India’s secularism.2 Nevertheless, Hindus, who account for close to80% of the population, and especially right-wing Hindus,
enthusiastically support the Modi administration’s creation of a
Hindu nation, and this gives additional legitimacy to theadministration’s exclusionary policies. Opposition parties, the media,citizens groups, and others who object to this policy have beenthoroughly suppressed, policed, and excluded.
The US, European countries, and others are voicing concerns
regarding India’s backsliding democracy. India has strongly rejected
this criticism, however. At the Summit for Democracy hosted by theBiden administration, Modi asserted that India is the mother ofdemocracy.3 Strongly rejecting criticism, he said that countries withshort histories are in no position to lecture India on what constitutes
democracy.

Assertive Diplomatic Stance
The hanging of the Akhand Bharat mural, depicting the territory ofthe Mauryan Empire that included parts of today’s Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, in the new parliament
House in New Delhi that was completed in 2023, drew protests fromneighboring countries who said that it depicted an expansionist
India, but the Hindu nationalist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) welcomed the move. Similarly, India’s use of the name
Bharat, which means India in Hindi and other local Indian languages,
rather than India, to refer to itself to the outside world at the G20summit can be seen as an outward manifestation of Hindu
nationalism.
At the 2023 G20 summit, issuing a leaders’ declaration wasinitially seen as being hopeless, but one was achieved under Modi’sleadership. While this elated the Indian public and media, suspicion
was being cast on India regarding a major assassination plan.
Immediately after returning from the summit, Canada’s prime
minister made the bombshell announcement in parliament that there
were credible allegations that India’s foreign intelligence agency, theResearch and Analysis Wing (RAW), was involved in the murder ofSikh separatist leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar outside Vancouver inJune 2023. Then, in November, Indian national Nikhil Gupta wasindicted in the US on charges of conspiracy to murder Sikhseparatist leader Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a US citizen, on theinstructions of the Indian government.
While India promised to investigate these suspicions, especially inthe case of Pannun, it has denied involvement, stating that this is not
the government’s policy. At the same time, however, the Indian
government expressed its strong dissatisfaction with the fact that
separatists whom it had designated as terrorists are being allowed tolive freely in Canada and the US. Anonymous Indian diplomatic
sources and Indian social media even said that India has the right todo what the US has done (carry out assassinations in foreigncountries). India also unilaterally set a deadline by which Canada wasforced to reduce the size of its embassy staff in India by half.
Bolstered by the self-confidence of being a major power and theoutpouring of Hindu nationalism, India today is showing an
increasingly assertive diplomatic stance with regard to Westerncountries.
Japan SPOTLIGHT • March / April 202433

Japan Distances Itself from the US & Europe
Against the backdrop of this surge of Hindu nationalism in India
and the country’s increasing authoritarianism, the US and Europe
have expressed concern regarding its assertive foreign policy
pronouncements and actions, and this has created repeated conflict.
In contrast, this does not appear at all in Japan-India relations. Thereis, of course, the major difference that Japan has extremely few
immigrants and there are no anti-Indian separatists living in Japanthat India would want to assassinate, but more important than this is
the fact that Japan tends not to be as concerned as the US andEurope with regard to India’s domestic political issues related tofreedom, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.
It is a fact that in the past, the administration of late Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe engaged in value-oriented diplomacy, and Japanfrequently reasserted the fact that Japan and India shared the valuesof freedom and democracy. Nevertheless, unlike the US and Europe,
the Abe administration never made demands on the Modi
administration with regard to India’s suppression and exclusion ofminorities through heavy-handed measures like revoking Article 370
and revising immigration laws. Under the current administration ofPrime Minister Fumio Kishida there has been no mention whatsoeverof value-oriented diplomacy, but instead the administration has put
forth pragmatic policies that acknowledge the existence of diverse
values around the world and refrain from intervening in that area. Ona visit to India in March 2023, Kishida said in a policy speech to theIndian Council of World Affairs (ICWA):[B]oth Japan and India have unique historical backgrounds. The
people of the two countries humbly acknowledge that there arediverse values, cultures and histories on this planet, and thatfully understanding them is not an easy task. We are the kind ofpeople who understand intuitively that the best way forward isto respect the other party and cooperate through dialogue.
It follows that Japan and India have a great responsibility for
maintaining and strengthening “a free and open international
order based on the rule of law.” 4
In other words, Japan accepts the fact that India has different
values, and is clearly focusing on the joint creation of aninternational order rather than on India’s domestic situation. This canbe seen in the Kishida administration’s frequent use of the Global
South concept since the beginning of 2023, as if in concert with34 Japan SPOTLIGHT • March / April 2024

India. All of the G7 countries except for Japan have been cool to theconcept of the Global South, which is unrelated to the values offreedom and democracy, but Kishida has taken the lead in Japan incalling for solidarity with the Global South and with India as its
leader. The LDP even established an internal headquarters for JapanGlobal South Cooperation in October 2023. There is no question thatfrom India’s perspective, compared with the US and Europe, which
are frequently looking down on India and calling for it to change itsways regarding things like human rights and media restrictions,Japan does not do this, making it an easier partner to work with.

Political Heat & Economic Cold in Japan-India
Relations
Nevertheless, it is difficult to say that the current status of theJapan-India relationship is a special strategic global partnership. In
terms of politics and diplomacy, it is true that the leaders of the twocountries appear to be actively engaging and exchanging opinions,
including at Quad summit meetings. The two countries have signedand put into effect the India-Japan Agreement for Cooperation in thePeaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, despite domestic resistance inJapan as the only country to have been attacked with nuclear
weapons. Japan is especially limited, including by its constitution,with regard to transactions for defense equipment, but is active inmilitary exercises on land, sea, and air, and in exchanges of senior
military officials.
On the economic side, however, the development of an economic
relationship has lagged, and given the potential represented by twoof Asia’s major economies – the world’s No. 3 economy in terms ofGDP (Japan) and No. 5 (India) – it must be said that the economic
relationship is not as robust as the political relationship. Even though
the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)
between Japan and India took effect in 2011, based on public datafrom India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India’s trade withJapan during 2022-2023 had grown by only 60% compared with2010-2011. This is far behind the 185% increase with the US, 97%
increase with China, and 96% increase with South Korea during thesame period. And even though Japanese investment in India has
increased, the number of Japanese companies expanding into India
appears to have peaked around 2018. While the number of Japanesecitizens living in India has finally begun to approach 10,000, this is
only one-10th the number living in China and one-eighth the number
living in Thailand, and less than half the number living in Vietnam

and Taiwan. This is clearly an insufficient level considering the sizeof India’s population and economy and expectations for future
growth. Even with territorial issues, historical issues, and security
concerns, many Japanese companies are active in China, which isJapan’s largest trading partner. For many years, the Japan-China
relationship has been viewed as political cold and economic heat, but
Japan-India ties should be viewed conversely as political heat andeconomic cold.
The Japanese business world’s deep-rooted risk aversion
combined with a decisive lack of knowledge and information
regarding India are possible factors behind this situation. Major risks
include insufficient infrastructure in terms of electricity, water androads, concerns regarding the securing of skilled workers, and acomplex legal framework that differs by state. This means that it will
not be easy to earn profits in India, and as a destination for Chinarisk mitigation, Vietnam and other ASEAN countries tend to beviewed as safer. In terms of the lack of knowledge and information,
this is not the case for the entire country of India and is tied to a lackof recognition that things are changing with time and there are areas
where it is easy to do business. The lack of research on India
conducted in Japan, and the small number of reporters posted toIndia and the small amount of news being reported from India, haveencouraged this tendency of the business world to maintain adistance from India.

Win-Win Japan-India Relationship Needed
Nevertheless, it would be foolish to continue staying out of theIndian market, with its young population and expected “populationbonus”, out of risk aversion stemming partly from ignorance. For
Japan in particular, which will be unable to avoid a loss of nationalpower as its population declines going forward, it is indispensable to
make inroads in the Indian market while its advanced technologicalcapabilities are highly regarded.
A border dispute with China during the coronavirus pandemic
created a sense of crisis within India regarding supply chains withChina, and triggered a move to rebuild those supply chains and makethem more resilient. The US, which has promised to build fighter
aircraft engines and semiconductors in India, is ahead of Japan inthis regard. Even if not in all sectors, it is extremely important thatJapan establishes an indispensable position in India in sectors thatare seeking Japanese technology.
Even with the US raising objections about human rights in India

and India’s dismissal of those objections, the fact that this has not
led to a breakdown in India-US relations undeniably shows that India
views the US as a country that is indispensable for its own growth.
For the US as well, in a sense it needs to say these things as an
advocate for freedom and democracy, but unlike when China
ascended 30 years ago, in today’s world where business and humanrights are intertwined, no company can ignore the politics and social
issues of countries they wish to enter.
In this sense, Japan still lags. Japan needs to enter the Indian
market taking a medium- to long-term perspective and become
indispensable to India, while at the same time developing a strategy
to encourage India not to deviate from an ideal type of liberal
democracy in its internal affairs.

References
1. Khilnani, Sunil, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt. Gen.
(Retd.) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan,
Shyam Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan, Nonalignment 2.0: A
Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century(2012). (https://cprindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/NonAlignment-2.pdf)
2. Chatterji, Angana P, Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe
Jaffrelot (eds.), Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism Is
Changing India (HarperCollins, 2019).
3. Prime Minister of India [2023], “Remarks by PM at the Leaderlevel plenary of the second Summit for Democracy,” March 29.
(https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/remarks-by-pmat-the-leader-level-plenary-of-the-second-summit-fordemocracy/)
4. Prime Minister’s Office of Japan [2023], “Policy Speech by
Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio at the Indian Council of World
Affairs (ICWA),” March 20. (https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202303/_00013.html)
Article translated from the original Japanese by David Spengler.
Dr. Toru Ito has been teaching at the National Defense Academy (NDA) since2009 after serving as a researcher at the Embassy of Japan in New Delhi and as
associate professor at Shimane University. He is an expert on security andinternational relations in South Asia, with a focus on Indian foreign policy.

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