HOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED STATES.

457

Opinion of the Court.

say that this court could not amend the record, but if amended
by the court below, the question would. still remain whether
the objection referred to could be considered by this court.
Equally without merit is the suggestion that the action of
the court below in disposing of the writ of error to the Criminal Court of Cook County, in the absenc6 of the accused, was
not in conformity to "due process of law." This question
was determined in Sckwab v. Berggren, just decided, and we
do not deem it necessary to add anything to what is there
said.
Judgment affrmed.

CHURCHOF THE HOLY TRINITY 'v. UNITEDSTATES.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
No. 143.

Argued and submitted January 7,1892.-Decided Februaiy 29, 1892.

The act of February 26, 1885, "to prohibit the importation and migrationof foreigners and aliens under contract .or agreement to perform laborin the United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia," 23
Stat. 332, c. 164, does not apply to a contract between ap alien, residing
out of the United States, and a religious society incorporated under thelaws of a State, whereby he engages to remove to the United States andto enter into the service of the society as its rector or minister.

THE case is stated in the opinionl.Ar. Seaman .Miller for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General .Maury for defendant inerror submitted on.his brief.

IMR. JusmF BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff in error is a corporation, duly organized and incorporated as a religious society under the laws of the State of
New York. E. Walpole Warren was, prior to September,OCTOBER TERM, 1891.
Opinion of the Court.

1S87, an alien residing in England. In that month the plaintiff in error made a contract with him,.by which he was toremove to the city of New York and enter into its service as
rector and pastor; and in pursuance of such contract, Warren
did so remove and enter upon such service. It is claimed by
the United States that this contract on the part of the plaintiff in error was forbidden by the act of February 26, 1885,
23 Stat. 332, c. 164, and an action was commenced to recover
the penalty prescribed by that act. The Circuit Court heldthat the contract was within the prohibition of the statute,and rendered judgment accordingly, (36' Fed. Rep. 303;) andthe single question presented for our determination is whether
it erred in that conclusion.
The first section describes the act forbidden, and is in thesewords :
: " Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representativesof the United States of America in. Congress assembled, Thatfrom and after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful forany person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any
manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any
way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any
alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the UnitedStates, its Territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made,previous to the inportation or migration of such alien or
aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service ofany kind in the United States, its Territories, or the Districtof Columbia."
It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is withinthe' letter of this- section, for the relation of rector to, his
church is one of service, and iniplies labor on the one side
with. compensation on the other. Not only are the generalwords labor -and service both used, but also, as it were to
guard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize abreadth of meaning, to them is added "of any kind;" and,further, as noticed by the Circuit Judge in his opinion, thefifth section, which makes specific exceptions, among them'professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers and domestic

HOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED STATES.

459

Opinion of the Court.

servants, strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor andservice was intended to be reached by the first section. While
there is great force to this reasoning, we cannot think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction likethat in the present case. It is a familiar rule, that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within thestatute, ,because not within its spirit, nor within the intentionof its makers. This has been often asserted, and the reports
are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not thesubstitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator,
for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, andyet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results
which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words,
makes.it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended
to include the particular act. As said in Plowden, 205:
"From which cases, it appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter insome appearance, and those statutes which comprehend allthings in the letter they have expounded to extend to but
some things, and those which generally prohibit all people
from doing such an act they have interpreted to permit somepeople to do it, and those which include every person in theletter, they have adjudged to reach to some persons only,
which expositions have always been founded upon the intent
of the legislature; which they have collected sometimes byconsidering the cause and necessity.of making the act, sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, andsometimes by foreign circumstances.'!
In 3fargate Pier Co. v..Hannam, 3 B. & Ald. 266, 270,
Abbott, C. J. quotes from Lord Coke as follows: "Acts of Parliament are to be so construed as no man that is innocent or
free from injury or wrong'be, by a literal construction, punished or endamaged." In the case of the State v. Clark, 5Dutcher, (29 N. J. Law) 96, 98, 99, it appeared that an act had
been passed making it a misdemeanor to wilfully break down
a fence in the possession of anotlier person. Clark was indicted

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.
Opinion of the Court.

under that statute. The defence was that the act of breaking
down the fence, though wilful, was iif the exercise of a legal
right to go upon his own lands. The trial court rejected thetestimony offered to sustain the defence, and the Supreme
Court held that this ruling was error. In its opinion the
court used this language: "The act of 1855, in terms, makes
the wilful'opening, breaking down or injuring of any fences
belonging to or in the possession of any other person a misdemeanor. In what sense is the term wilful used . In common
parlance, wilful is used in the sense of intentional, as distinguish-ed from accidental or involuntary. Whatever one does
intentionally he does wilfully. Is it used in that sense in thisact? Did the legislature intend to make the intentional opening of a fence for the purpose of going upon the land ofanother indictable, if done by permission or for a lawful purpose?
. . .We cannot suppose such to have been theactual intent. To adopt such a construction would put astop to the ordinary business of life. The language of the act,
if construed literally, evidently leads to an absurd result. If
a literal construction of the words of a statut be absurd, theact must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity. The court
must restrain the words. The object designed to be reachedby the act must limit and control the literal import of theterms and phrases employed." In United States v. Eirby, 7
Wall. 482, 486, the defendants were indicted for the violationof an act of Congress, providing "that if any person shallknowingly and wilfully obstruct or retard the passage ofthe mail, or 6f any driver or carrier, or of any horseor carriage carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction,for every such offence pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars." The specific charge was that the defendants knowingly and wilfully retarded the passage of one
Farris, a carrier of the mail, while engaged in the performanceof his duty, and also in like manner retarded the steamboat
General Buell,'at that tinie engaged in carrying the mail. To
this indictment the defendants pleaded specially that Farris
had been indicted for murder by a court:oT competent authority in Kentucky; that a bench warrant had been issuedI andHOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED STATES.

461

Opinion of the Court.

placed in the hands of the defendant Kirby, the sheriff of thecounty, commanding him to arrest Farris and bring him
before the court to answer to the indictment; and that in obedience to this warrant, he and the other defendants, as his posse,
entered upon the steamboat General Buell and arrested Farris,and used only such force as was necessary to accomplish thatarrest. The question as to the sufficiency of this plea wascertified to this court, and it was held that the arrest of Farris
upon the warrant from the state court was not an obstructionof the mail, or the retarding of the passage of a carrier of themail, within the meaning of the act. In its opinion the courtsays: "All laws should receive a sensible c6nstruction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not tolead to injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It
will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislatureintended exceptions to its language which would avoid resultsof this character. The reason of the law in such cases should
prevail over its letter. The common sense of man approves
the judgment mentioned- by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian
law which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streetsshould be punished with the utmost severity,' did not extend
to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell downin the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts theruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II.,
which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty
of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when
the prison is on fire, 'for he is not to be hanged because hewould not stay to be burnt.' And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make, that ihe act ofCongress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of thepassage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a caseof temporary detention of the mail caused, by the arrest of thecarrier upon an indictment for murder." The following cases
may also be cited. Hen'y v. Tilso&, 17 Vermont, 479; Byegate v. Wa,5dsboro, 30 Vermont, 746; Exparte Ellis, 11 California, 222; Iizgraham v. Speed, 30 Mississippi, 410; 7aekson v.
Collins, 3 Cowen, 89; People v. JinuranceCom any, 15 Johns.
.
358; .Butck v. .Yewbury, 10 N. Y. 374; People v. -.

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.
Opinion of the Court.

Commissioners of Taxes, 95 N. Y. 554, 558; People v.
Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43, 49; Canal Co. v. Railroad 0o., 4 G. &J., 1,152; Osgood v. Breed,12 Mass. 525, 530; Wilbur v. Crale,
13 Pick. 284; Oates v. NationaZ Bank, 100 U. S. 239.
Among other things which may be considered in determining the intent of the legislature is the title of the act. We do
not mean that it may be used to add to or take from the bodyof the statute, Hadden, v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 107, but it
may help to interpret its meaning. In the case of UnitedStates v. Fisher, 2 Granch, 358, 386, Chief Justice Marshallsaid:' "On the influence which the title ought to have in construing the enacting clailses much has been said; and yet it is
not easy to discern the point of difference between the opposing counsel in this respect. Neither party contends that thetitle of an act can control plain words in the body of thestatute; and neither denies that, taken with other parts, it
may assist in removing ambiguities. Where the intent isplain, nothing is left to construction. Where the mind labors
to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everythingfrom which aid can be derived; and in such case the title
claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of consideration." And in the case of United States v. Palmer,3Wheat. 610, 631, the same judge applied the doctrine inthis way: "The words of the section are in terms of unlimited
extent. The words - any person or persons' are-broad enoughto comprehend every human being. But general words must
not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the State,
but also to those objects to which the legislature intended toapply them. Did the legislature intend to apply these words
to the subjects of a foreign power, who in a foreign ship may
commit murder or robbery on the high seas ? The title of anact cannot control its words, but may furnish some aid inshowing what was in the mind of the, legislature. The titleof this act is, 'An act for the punishment of certain crimes
against the United States.'
It would seem that offences
against the United States, not offences against the humanrace, were the crimes which the legislat-re intended by thislaw to punish."HOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED STATES. 463
Opinion of the Court.

It will be seen that words as general as those used in thefirst section of this act were by that decision limited, and'theintent of Congress with respect to the act was gathered partially, at least, from its title. ""Now, the title of this act is,"An act to prohibit the importation and migration offoreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform
labor in the United States, its Territories and the District ofColumbi'b." 'Obviously the thought expressed in this reaches
only to the work of the manual laborer, as distinguished fromthat of the professional man. No one r ading such a title
would suppose that Congress had in its mind any purpose ofstaying the coming into this country of ministers of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is that of the brain.
The common understanding of the terms labor and laborers
does not include preaching and preachers; and it is to be
assumed that words and phrases are used in their ordinary
meaning. So whatever of light is thrown upon the statuteby the language of the title indicates an exclusion from its
penal provisions of all contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors and pastors.
Again, anothei guide to the meaning of a statute is found in
the evil which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court
properly looks at couternporaneous events, the situation as itexisted, and as it Was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body. United States v. Uiom Pacific Railroad, 91
U. S. 72, 79. The situatioil 4hiclr called for this statute wasbriefly but fully stated by Mr. Justice Brown when, as District
Judge, he decided the case of United States v. COraig, 28 Fed.
Rep. 95, 79: "The motives and history of the act are matters of common knowledge. It had become the practice forlarge capitalists in this country to contract with their -agentsabroad for the shipment of- great nurribers ol an ignorant andservile class of foreign laborers, under contracts, by which theemployer agreed; upon the one hand, to prepay their passage,
while, upon the other hand, the laborers agreed to work after
their arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages. The
effect of this was to break down the labor-marlnet, and to
reduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to the level

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.
Opinion of the Court.

of the assisted immigrant. The evil finally became so flagrantthat an appeal was made to Congress for relief by the passageof the act in question, the design of which was to raise thestandard of foreign immigrants, and to discountenance themigration of those who had not sufficient means in their own
hands, or those of their friends, to pay their passage."
It appears, also, flom the petitions, and in the testimony
presented before the committees of Congress, that it was thischeap unskilled labor which was making the trouble, and the influx of which Congress sought to prevent. It was never suggested that we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers,and, least of all, that the market for the services of Christianministers was depressed by foreign competition. Those werematters to which the attention of Congress, or of the people,
was not directed. So far, then, as the evil which was sought
to be remedied interprets the statute, it also guides to an
exclusion of this contract from the penalties of the act.
A singular circumstance, thr6wing light upon the intent ofCongress, is found in this extract from the report of the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor, recommending the passage of the bill: "The general facts and considerations which
induce the committee to recommend the passage of this bill
are set forth in the Report of the Committee of the House.
The committee report the bill back without amendment,
although there are certain features thereof which might well
be changed or modified, in the hope that the bill may not failof passage during the present session. Especially would thecommittee have otherwise recommended amendments, substituting, for the expression 'labor and service,' whenever it
occurs in the body of the bill, the words ' manual labor' or'manual service,' as sufficiently broad to accomplish the purposes of the bill, and that such amendments would remove
objections which a sharp and perhaps unfriendly criticism
may urge to the proposed legislation. The committee, however, believing that the bill in its present form will be construed as including only those who3e labor or service is manualin character, and being very desirous that the bill become alaw. before the adjournment, have reported the bill without

HOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED STATES.

465

Opinion of the Court.

change." 6059, Congressional Record, 48th Congress. And,referring back to the report of the Committee of the House,
there appears this, language: "It seeks to restrain and prohibit the immigration or importation of laborers who would
have never seen our shores but for the inducements and allurements of men whose only object is to obtain labor at the lowest
possible rate, regardless of the social and material well-beingof our own citizens and regardless of the evil consequences
which result to American laborers from such immigratiq!.
This class of immigrants care nothing about our institutions,and in many instances never even heard of them; they aremen whose passage is paid by the importers; they come here
under contract to labor for a certain number of years; they
are ignorant of our social condition, and that they may remainso they are isolated and prevented from coming into contact
with Americans. They are generally from the lowest social
stratum, and live upon the coarsest food and. in hovels of acharacter before unknown to American workmeff. They, asa rule, do not become citizens, and are certainly not a desirable acquisition to the body politic. The inevitable tendencyof their presence among us is to degrade American labor, and,to reduce it to the level of the imported pauper labor." Page
5359, CongressionalIRecord, 48th Congress.
We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which-was intended to be'-remedied, the, circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the reports of the committee of
each house, all concur in affirming that the intent of Congress was simply to stay the .influx of this cheap unskilledlabor.
But beyond all these matters no purpose of action against.
religion, can be imputed to any lgislation, state or national,
because this is a religious people. This is historically true.
From the discovery of this continent to the present hour, there
is a single voice making this affirmation. The commission to
Christopher Columbus, prior to his sail westward, is from"Ferdinand and Isabella, by the grace of God, King andQueen of Castile," etc., and recites that "it is hoped that by
God's assistance some of the continents and islands in theVOL. CXLMU-30

466,

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.
Opinion of the Court.

ocean will be discovered," etc. The first colonial grant, thatmade to Sir Walter Raleigh in 1584, was from "Elizabeth, by-the grace of God, of England, Fraunce and Ireland, queene,
defender of the faith," etc. ; and the grant authorizing him toenact statutes for the government of the proposed colony provided that "they be not against the true Christian faith nowe
professed in the Church of England." The first charter ofVirginia, granted by King James I in 1606, after reciting theApplication of certain parties for a charter, commenced the.
grant in these words" "We, greatly commending, and graciously accepting of, their Desires for the Furtherance of so•noble a Work, which may, -by the Providence of Almighty
God, hereafter tend to the Glory of his Divine Majesty,' inpropagating'of Christian Religion to such People, as yet livein Darkness and miserable Ignorance of, the true Knowledge
and Worship of God, and may in time bring the Infidels andSavages, living in those parts, to human Civility, and to asettled and' quiet Government; DO, by these our LettersPatents, graciously accept of, and agree to, their humble andwell-intended Desires."
Language of similar, import may be found in the subsequent
charters of that colony, from the same king, in 1609 and
1611; and the same is true of the various charters granted tothe other colonies. In language more or less emphati6 is theestablishment of the Christian religion declared to be one ofthe purposes of the grant. The celebrated compact made by
the Pilgrims in the Mayflower, 1620, recites: "Having undertaken for the Glory of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and C6untry, a Voyage to plant the first Colony in the northern Parts of Virginia;
Do by these Presents, solemnly .andmutually, in the Presenceof God and one another, covenant and conibine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick-, for our better Ordering and
Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid."lThe fundame'tdl orders of Connecticut, under which a provisional government" was instituted in 1638-1639, commencewith this declaration: "Forasmuch as it hath pleased the Allmighty God by the wise disposition of his diuyne pruidenceHOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED STATES.

467

Opinion of the Court.

so to Order and dispose of things that we the Inhabitants andResidents of Windsor, Hartford and Wethersfield are now cohabiting and dwelling in and vppon the River of Conectecotteand the Lands thereunto adioyneing; And well knowing
where a people are gathered togather the word of God requires that to mayntayne the peace and vnion of such apeople there should be an orderly and decent Gouermenk
established according to God, to order and dispose of thpa
affayres of the people at all seasons as occation shall require;
doe therefore assotiate and conioyne our selues to be as one
Publike State or Comonwelth; and doe, for our/selues andour Successors and such as shall be adioyned to vs att any
tyme hereafter, enter into Combination and Confederation togather, to mayntayne and presearue the liberty and purity of
the gospell of our Lord Jesus weh we now prfess6 as also thedisciplyne of the Churches, wch according to the truth of thesaid gospell is now practised amongst vs."In the charter of privileges granted by William Penn to theprovince of Pennsylvania, in 1701, it is recited: "Because no
People can be truly happy, though under the greatest Enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of their
Consciences, as to their Religious Profession and Worship;
And Almighty God being the only Lord of Conscience, Fatherof Lights and Spirits; and the Author as well as Object ofall divine Knowledge, Faith andWorship, who only doth enlighten the Minds, and persuade and convince the Understandings of People, I do hereby grant and d66fare, ' r etc.
Coming nearer to the present time, the Declaration of Independence recognizes 'the presence of the Divine in humanaffairs in these words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed bytheir Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." "We,therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America,in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme
Judge of the world for the rectitude of, our intentions, do, in.
the Name and by Authority ofthe good Peo le-of these Colonies, solemnly publish and- declare, etc,; "And for the sup-

468

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.
Opinion of the Court.

port of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Protectionof Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other ourLives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."If we examine the constitutions of the various States wefind in them a constant recognition of religious obligations.
Every constitution of every one of the forty-four States contains language which either directly or by clear implication
recognizes a profound reverence for religion and an assumption that its influence in all human affairs is essential to thewell being of the community This recognition may be in
the preamble, such as is found in the constitution of Illinois,
1870-, "We, the people of the State of Illinois, grateful to
Almighty God for the civ.il, political and religious liberty
which He bath so long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to
Him for, a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit
the same unimpaired to succeeding generations," etc.
It may be only in the familiar requisition that all officers
shall take an oath closing with the declaration "so help meGod." It may be in clauses like that of the constitution ofIndiana, 1816, Article XI, section 4: "The manner of administering an oath or affirmation shall be such as is most consistent with the conscience of the deponent, and shall beesteemed the most solemn appeal to God." Or in provisions
such as are found in Articles 36 and 37 of the Declaration of
Rights of the Constitution of Maryland, 1867: "That as it isthe duty of every man to worship God in 'such manner as hethinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitledto protection in their religious liberty,; wherefore, no person
ought, by any law, to be molested in his person or estate on
account of his religi6us persuasion or .profession, or for his
religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall
disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shallinfringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural,
eivil or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled
to frequent or maintain or cofttribute, unless on contract, tomaintain any place of worship, or any ministry; nor shall any
person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief: Provided, HeHOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED STATES.

469

Opinion of the Court.

believes in the existence of God, and that, under His dispensation, such person will be held morally accountable for his acts,
and be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this world or
the world to come. That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in thisState other than a declaration of belief in the existence ofGod; nor shall the legislature prescribe any other oath cfoffice than the oath prescribed by this constitution." OrAke
that in Articles 2 and 3, of Part 1st, of the Constitution of
Massachusetts, 1780: "It .is the right as well as the duty of
all men in society publicly and at stated seasons, to worshipthe Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of theuniverse.
.
. As the happiness of a people and the goodorder and preservation of civil government essentially depend
upon piety, religion and morality, and as these cannot be generally diffused through a community but by the institution of
the public worship of. God and of public instructions in piety,religion and morality: Therefore, to promote their happinessand to secure the good order and preservation of their government, the people of this commonwealth have a right to invest
their legislature with power to authorize and require, and thelegislature shall, from time to time, authorize and require, theseveral towns, parishes, precincts and other. bodieszpolitic or
religious societies to make suitable provision, at their own
expense, for the institution of the public worship of God andfor the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily." Or as in sections 5 and
14 of Article 7, of the constitution of Mississippi, 1832: "No
person who denies the being of a God, or a future state ofrewards and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil
department of this State. . . . Religion, morality andknowledge being necessary to good government, the preservation of liberty, and the happiness of mankind, schools and themeans of education, shall forever be encouraged in this State."
Or by Article 22 of the constitution of DelaWare, 1776, which
required all officers, besides an oath of allegiance, to makeand subscribe the following declaration: '"I, A. B., do profess470'1OCTOBER TERM, 1891.
Opinion of the Court.

faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son,and in the Holy Ghost, one Goa, blessed for evermore; andI do acknowledge th6 Holy Scriptures of the Old and New
Testament to be given by divine inspiration."
Even the Constitution of the United States, which is supposed
to have little touch upon the private life of the individual, contains in the' First Amendment a declaration c(rnmon to theconstitutions of all the States, as follows: "Congress shallmake no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," etc. And also provides in
Article'1, section 7, (a provision common to many constitutions,)
that the Executive shall 'have ten days (Sundays excepted)
within which to determine 3vhether he will approve or veto abill.
There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language pervading them all, having one meaning; they
affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These ar6
not individual sayings, declarations of private persons: they
are organic utterances; they speak the voice of the entire
people. While because of a general recognition of this trut)
the question has seldom been presented to the courts, yet w('find that in Updegrah"& The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394,
400, it was decided that, "Christianity, general Christianity,
is, and always has been, a part of the common law of Pennsylvania; .
- . not Christianity with an-established church,
and tithes, and spiritual courts; but Christianity with libertyof con-science to all men." And in The People v. Ruggles,
8 Johns. 290, 294, 295,,Chancellor Kent, the great commentator on American law, speaking as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of. New York, said: "The people of this State,in common with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity, as the-rule of theirfaith andpractice; and to scandalize the duthor of these doctrini is
not only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious, but,even in respect-to the obligations due to society, is a gross violation.of decency and -good order. . . . The -free, equal
and undisturbed enjoyntent -of religious opinion, whatever
it may bq, and free and decent discussions on any religious

HOLY TRLNITY CHUR (H v. UNITED STATES.

471

Opinio. of the Court.

subject, is granted andie ii-td;but to revile, with malicious
and blasphemous cont~inptp the religion professed by almost
the wh6le community; is -i abase of that- right. Nor are webound, by a-ay expressions in the Oonstitution as some havestrangely supposed, eith? riot to punish at all, or to punish
indiscriminately, the like tacks upon the religion of -Mahomet
or of the Grand Lzma; and for this plain reasen; that thecase assumes that we are a Christian people, and the moralityof the country is deeply ingrafted u'pon Christianity, and notupon the docirifies or worship of those impostors." And in
the famous case of Vidol v. -Girard'sExecutors, 2 How. 127,
198, this court, whil sustaining the will of Wr. Girard, with
its provision for the-dcreation of a college into which no minister should be p~rmitted to -enter, observed: "It is also said,
and truly, that the Christian religion is a part of 'the common
law of Pennsylvania."
If we pass beyond tIse reatters to a view of American life
as expressed by its lais, its business, its customs and its soci-ty,
we find everywhere a clear recognition of the same truti.
Among ofher matters note the following: The form of"oa .
universally prevailing, concluding with an appeal to the
Almighty; the custom of .opeining sessions of all deliberative
bodies and most conventions with prayer; the prefatory wordsof all wills, "In the name of God, amen;" the laws respecting
the observarice.of the Sabbath, with the general cessation of
all secular buginess, and the closing of- aourts, legislatures, andother similar public-assenblies on that day; the churches andchurch organizations .which abound in every city, town
and hamlet; the multitude of chiritable organizations existing everywhere under Christian auspices; the gigantic missionary associations, with general-suppgrt, and-aiming to establish
Christian .missions in every quarter of -the globe. These, andmany other-matters which might be n-oticed, add a volume of
unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances that
this is a Christian nation. In the face of all these, shall it bebelieved that a Congress of the United States intended to make4. a misdemeanor for a church of this -ountry to contract forthe services of a Christian minister residing in another nation?

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.
Syllabus.

Suppose in the Congress that passed this act some member
had offered a bill which in terms declared that, if any Roman
Catholic church in this country should contract with Cardinal
Manning to come to this country and enter into its service as
pastor and priest; or any Episcopal church should enter intoa like contract with Canon Farrar; or any Baptist church
should make similar arrangements with Rev. Mr. Spurgeon;or any Jewish synagogue with some eminent Rabbi, such contract should be adjudged unlawful and void, and the church
making it be subject to prosecution and punishment, can it bebelieved that it would have received a minute of approving
thought or a single vote? Yet it is contended that such wasin effect the meaning of this statute. The construction invoked cannot be accepted as correct. It is a case where there
was presented a definite evil, in view of which the legislatureused general terms with the purpose of reaching all phases ofthat evil, and thereafter, unexpectedly, it is developed thatthe general language thus employed is broad enough to reachcases and acts which the whole history and life of the country
affirm could not have been intentionally legislated against.
It is the duty of the courts, under those circumstances, to say
that, however broad the language of the statute may be, theact, although within the letter, is not within the intention of
the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.
The judgment will be reversed, and the case remandedfor
further proceedings in accordance,with, this opinion.

In re COOPER, Petitioner.
ORIGINAL.
Nfo. 6. Original. Argued November 9, 10, 1891.-Decided February 29,1892.

The District Court for the District of Alaska has jurisdiction in admiralty
to forfeit vessels for violating the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 1956 on
any of the navigable waters of the United States which were acquiredby the treaty with Russia, concluded March 30, 1857, 15 Stat. 539.