Radiation Protection

CHERNOBYL
Assessment of Radiologicaland Health Impacts

2002 Update ofChernobyl: Ten Years On

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENTORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on 14th December 1960, and which cameinto force on 30th September 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)shall promote policies designed:−to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard ofliving in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to thedevelopment of the world economy;− to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in theprocess of economic development; and− to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis inaccordance with international obligations.
The original Member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The following countries became Members
subsequently through accession at the dates indicated hereafter: Japan (28th April 1964), Finland (28thJanuary 1969), Australia (7th June 1971), New Zealand (29th May 1973), Mexico (18th May 1994), theCzech Republic (21st December 1995), Hungary (7th May 1996), Poland (22nd November 1996); Korea(12th December 1996) and the Slovak Republic (14th December 2000). The Commission of the European
Communities takes part in the work of the OECD (Article 13 of the OECD Convention).

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYThe OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established on 1st February 1958 under the nameof the OEEC European Nuclear Energy Agency. It received its present designation on 20th April 1972, when
Japan became its first non-European full Member. NEA membership today consists of 28 OECD Member
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
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Republic of Korea, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and theUnited States. The Commission of the European Communities also takes part in the work of the Agency.
The mission of the NEA is:−

to assist its Member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international cooperation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentallyfriendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as− to provide authoritative assessments and to forge common understandings on key issues, as
input to government decisions on nuclear energy policy and to broader OECD policy analyses
in areas such as energy and sustainable development.
Specific areas of competence of the NEA include safety and regulation of nuclear activities,
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data and computer program services for participating countries.
In these and related tasks, the NEA works in close collaboration with the International Atomic
Energy Agency in Vienna, with which it has a Co-operation Agreement, as well as with other internationalorganisations in the nuclear field.

© OECD 2002
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FOREWORD

Several years after the Three Mile Island accident in the United States,
the Chernobyl accident in 1986 completely changed the public’s perception of
nuclear risk. While the first accident provided the impetus to develop new
research programmes on nuclear safety, the second, with its human death toll
and the dispersion of a large part of the reactor core into the environment, raised
a large number of “management” problems, not only for the treatment ofseverely exposed persons, but also for the decisions that had to be taken in
respect of the population. Clearly, not only the national authorities of the Soviet
Union, but more broadly, authorities from many other affected countries were
not ready to manage an accident whose consequences were not confined to theirterritory.
The way the accident was managed and the lack of information provokeda feeling of distrust in the minds of the public that was reinforced by the factthat radiation cannot be perceived by humans, although it can be easily
identified with electronic detectors, even at a very low level. The prospect ofcontaminated food, aggravated by ambiguous, even contradictory recommendations by national authorities, gave rise to a variety of reactions, andsometimes overreactions, in the management of the accident consequences inseveral European countries. In the accident country itself, where political, socialand economic conditions were worsening, the association of the Soviet regime
with nuclear activities contributed to raise feelings of mistrust towards the
public authorities.
More than sixteen years after the Chernobyl accident, public concern
remains high in spite of the considerable amount of information disseminatedby national authorities and large international organisations, the multitude ofscientific papers in the specialised press, and the numerous symposia devoted tothis accident. The same questions are still being asked and the general public,
the media and sometimes the politicians concerned, still find it difficult tounderstand the information provided by the scientific community.
Public opinion in the former Soviet Union and in many other countries
affected by the accident remains convinced that certain cancers, such as those of3the thyroid, can only have resulted from the Chernobyl accident. This view ispartly driven by statistics showing that in European countries the incidence ofsuch cancers has increased. Although this cannot be attributed to the accident,
because this increase has been ongoing and was recorded long before theaccident occurred, it remains difficult for doctors to reassure patients in thisregard. As the increase in childhood thyroid cancer, which occurred primarily in
Belarus, emerged in the early 1990s, many experts were surprised by this“early” appearance of thyroid cancer and by its geographic distribution within
the affected territories. This further aggravated public scepticism of thescientific community.
The media have at times published pictures of human and animal
deformities without investigating their veritable connection with the accident,
and the public, struck by such images, has been allowed, unchallenged, to lay
the blame on Chernobyl. Here again, the accident has given rise to numerous
studies showing that such deformities and diseases are not linked to radiation
exposure. These conclusions, however, have not been effectively transmitted todecision makers or the public. On the other hand, many feared a catastrophic
contamination of the River Dnieper, extending to the Mediterranean, which
never materialised. Radionuclide retention in the soil has been high, and any
remaining contamination is well below initial projections. So much the better.
In this context of public concern, the NEA has found that by far the mostconsulted document on its website is the one drafted in 1996 on the impact of
the Chernobyl accident. That is why, with more recent information now
available, in particular the new United Nations Scientific Committee on the
Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) report published in 2000, it was
timely to update the Chernobyl: Ten Years On report. Several figures havechanged as a result of the numerous and increasingly detailed studies carried out
over the last years. The list of bibliographical references has also been updated,with one quarter more bibliographical references than in the previous edition.
Furthermore, the NEA wished to address the questions raised by numerous
other reports that have been issued, either on the tenth anniversary of theaccident or immediately afterwards. Among these reports were those preparedby UNSCEAR, and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on thestate of the environment, which had, to a large extent, served as a model for thepresent report.
This report presents the knowledge gained since the accident, which has
evolved gradually. Environmental contamination, which seemed to be
decreasing fairly quickly, has reached an ecological equilibrium and, in certain
limited sectors, has even increased due to a reconcentration of 137Cs, the only
radionuclide remaining in the different soil compartments involved in food4

chain transfers. This process has gone as far as it can, and now, in places wherecontamination persists, only the radioactive decay of caesium will reduce theimpact of the accident.
The huge effort by the international community to gain a better understanding of the real impact of Chernobyl continues, and should, in the next ten
years, clarify the main consequences of the accident. The main trends describedin 1996 continue to be valid in 2002: thyroid cancer in children remains the
only striking manifestation of the accident as far as the public is concerned. The
significant increase in cases of leukaemia, which had been so greatly feared, has
not, on the other hand, materialised.
Many improvements in radiation protection and emergency preparedness
have been made possible by the Chernobyl experience and we are also able todevelop a more accurate assessment of the impact of this accident. Under the
auspices of the NEA Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health(CRPPH), supported by other international bodies, the most outstanding
progress since the Chernobyl accident has been in learning about intergovernmental communications and co-operation in the case of nuclear
emergencies. The International Nuclear Emergency Exercises (INEX) bear
witness to this. Governments, initially reluctant to publicly discuss nuclear
accident preparedness and management issues, now ask for such exercises to be
carried out, operators are no longer reluctant to offer their sites for this purpose,and local authorities are pleased to invite the participants involved to appear
before the media. This shows the progress achieved in terms of communicationand involvement of all social partners. More impressive still is the progress
made concerning the distribution of stable iodine near nuclear power plants, asubject that was more or less taboo before the accident. The NEA organised aninternational colloquium on this topic, and this issue is today openly debated.
Here again, the CRPPH played an experimental and innovative role,
stressing how very important it is to involve all social partners. This idea, which
originated in the context of accident management, has been taken up by manyother disciplines, including the management of nuclear waste. This fundamental
point is also one of the positive lessons learned from the accident.
The accident was followed by numerous assistance and research
programmes supported by international organisations and bilateral agreements.
All these organisations are or will be publishing their results. This report differsfrom the others in that it is a synthetic consensus view aimed at those persons
who wish to know the salient points, without having to go into the technicaldetails that can be found elsewhere.

5

We thank all those organisations (IAEA, UNSCEAR, FAO, WHO, EC
and others) that have provided information so that this report could be as up todate as possible. The original report Chernobyl: Ten Years On was drafted by
Dr. Peter Waight (Canada) under the direction of an editing committee chaired
by Dr. Henri Métivier (France).
This edition was prepared by Dr. Henri Métivier on request of the
CRPPH.

6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword...................................................................................................................

3

Executive summary..................................................................................................

9

Chapter I.

The site and accident sequence ...................................................
The site...........................................................................................
The RBMK-1000 reactor ..............................................................
Events leading to the accident........................................................
The accident...................................................................................
The graphite fire.............................................................................

23
23
26
27
28
29

Chapter II.

The release, dispersion, deposition andbehaviour of radionuclides..........................................................
The source term..............................................................................
Atmospheric releases................................................................
Chemical and physical forms ...................................................
Dispersion and deposition..............................................................
Within the former Soviet Union................................................
Outside the former Soviet Union ..............................................
Behaviour of deposited radionuclides ......................................

33
33
33
37
38
38
44
46

Chapter III.

Reactions of national authorities ................................................
Within the former Soviet Union.....................................................
Outside the former Soviet Union ...................................................
More recent decisions ....................................................................

53
53
55
58

Chapter IV.

Dose estimates ..............................................................................
The liquidators ...............................................................................
The evacuees from the 30-km zone ...............................................
Doses to the thyroid gland .......................................................
Whole-body doses.....................................................................
People living in the contaminated areas.........................................
Doses to the thyroid gland .......................................................
Whole-body doses.....................................................................
Populations outside the former Soviet Union ................................

61
63
65
66
66
67
69
71
74

7

Chapter V.

Health impact ...............................................................................
Radiation induced health effects ....................................................
Acute health effects...................................................................
Late health effects ..........................................................................
Thyroid cancer .........................................................................
Other late health effects ...........................................................
Other studies ..................................................................................
Psychological and social health effects..........................................
Within the former Soviet Union................................................
Outside the former Soviet Union ..............................................

77
78
78
81
83
89
90
91
93
95

Chapter VI.

Agricultural and environmental impacts................................... 99
Agricultural impact ........................................................................ 99
Within the former Soviet Union................................................ 100
Within Europe .......................................................................... 102
Environmental impact.................................................................... 103
Forests...................................................................................... 103
Water bodies............................................................................. 104
Sixteen years later .......................................................................... 105

Chapter VII.

Potential residual risks ................................................................ 109
The Sarcophagus............................................................................ 109
Radioactive waste storage sites...................................................... 112

Chapter VIII.

Shutdown of the Chernobyl plant............................................... 115
Preparation of the definitive dismantling of
the Chernobyl power plant............................................................. 116
Storage of used fuel .................................................................. 116
Treatment of liquids effluents ................................................... 117
Treatment of solid wastes ......................................................... 117
The Sarcophagus............................................................................ 118
Sarcophagus database .................................................................... 119
The social consequences ................................................................ 120

Chapter IX.

Lessons learned ............................................................................ 121
Operational aspects ........................................................................ 121
Scientific and technical aspects...................................................... 124
The INEX programme ................................................................... 126
Psycho-sociological programmes................................................... 128
ETHOS project ......................................................................... 128
Other studies ............................................................................ 129

Explanation of terms................................................................................................ 131
List of acronyms ....................................................................................................... 135
References............................................................................................................. 137

8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction
On 26 April, 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear power station, located in
Ukraine about 20 km south of the border of Belarus, suffered a major accident
which was followed by a prolonged release to the atmosphere of large quantities
of radioactive substances. The specific features of the release favoured awidespread distribution of radioactivity throughout the northern hemisphere,
mainly across Europe. A contributing factor was the variation of meteorologicalconditions and wind regimes during the period of release. Activity transportedby the multiple plumes from Chernobyl was measured not only in Northern andin Southern Europe, but also in Canada, Japan and the United States. Only theSouthern hemisphere remained free of contamination.
This had serious radiological, health and socio-economic consequences
for the populations of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, which still suffer from these
consequences. Although the radiological impact of the accident in othercountries was generally very low, and even insignificant outside Europe, thisevent had, however, the effect of enhancing public apprehension all over theworld on the risks associated with the use of nuclear energy.
This is one of the reasons explaining the renewed attention and effort
devoted during the last sixteen years to the reactor safety studies and to
emergency preparedness by public authorities and the nuclear industry. This
also highlights the continuing public attention to the situation at Chernobyl,
which was already significant 10 years after the accident and has not declined
6 years later. Parts of the population in some countries discuss aspects of theaccident, such as the increase in thyroid cancer, even more than before.
It now appears, therefore, the right moment to review our knowledge ofthe serious aspects of the accident’s impact, to take stock of the information
accumulated and the scientific studies underway e.g. the UNSCEAR
2000 document, IAEA documents, etc; as well as to assess the degree to which

9national authorities and experts have implemented the numerous lessons that the
Chernobyl accident taught us.
Moreover, since the last report, all units of the Chernobyl reactor havebeen shut down.
This new report, prepared for the Committee on Radiation Protection andPublic Health (CRPPH) of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, does not differ
from the former description of the accident, but brings new data on the healthstatus of the population and a new view on environmental contamination.
The accident
The Unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was to be shutdown forroutine maintenance on 25 April 1986. On that occasion, it was decided to carryout a test of the capability of the plant equipment to provide enough electrical
power to operate the reactor core cooling system and emergency equipment
during the transition period between a loss of main station electrical power
supply and the start up of the emergency power supply provided by diesel
engines.
Unfortunately, this test, which was considered to concern essentially the
non-nuclear part of the power plant, was carried out without a proper exchange
of information and co-ordination between the team in charge of the test and thepersonnel in charge of the operation and safety of the nuclear reactor. Therefore,
inadequate safety precautions were included in the test programme and theoperating personnel were not alerted to the nuclear safety implications andpotential danger of the electrical test.
This lack of co-ordination and awareness, resulting from an insufficientlevel of “safety culture” within the plant staff, led the operators to take anumber of actions which deviated from established safety procedures and led toa potentially dangerous situation. This course of actions was compounded by
the existence of significant drawbacks in the reactor design which made theplant potentially unstable and easily susceptible to loss of control in case ofoperational errors.
The combination of these factors provoked a sudden and uncontrollable
power surge which resulted in violent explosions and almost total destruction of
the reactor. The consequences of this catastrophic event were further worsenedby the graphite moderator and other material fires that broke out in the building

10and contributed to a widespread and prolonged release of radioactive materials
to the environment.
Dispersion and deposition of radionuclides
The release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere consisted of gases,
aerosols and finely fragmented nuclear fuel particles. This release wasextremely high in quantity, involving a large fraction of the radioactive productinventory existing in the reactor, and its duration was unexpectedly long, over a
10-day period, with varying release rates. The duration and high altitude (about
1 km) reached by the release were largely due to the graphite fire which wasdifficult to extinguish until day 10, when the releases dropped abruptly, thus
ending the period of intense release.
For these reasons and the concomitant frequent changes of wind direction
during the release period, the area affected by the radioactive plume and theconsequent deposition of radioactive substances on the ground was extremely
large, encompassing the whole Northern hemisphere, although significant
contamination outside the former Soviet Union was only experienced in part ofEurope.
The pattern of contamination on the ground and in foodchains was,however, very uneven in some areas due to the influence of rainfall during thepassage of the plume. This irregularity in the pattern of deposition wasparticularly pronounced at larger distances from the reactor site.
Since the last report we have a better view of the behaviour ofradionuclides in the contaminated areas, and we know now that the natural
decontamination processes have reached an environmental equilibrium state.
The decrease of contamination levels from now on will be mainly due toradioactive decay indicating that radioactive cesium will be present for
approximately 300 years.
Reactions of national authorities
The scale and severity of the Chernobyl accident had not been foreseen
and took most national authorities responsible for public health and emergency
preparedness by surprise. The intervention criteria and procedures existing inmost countries were not adequate for dealing with an accident of such scale andprovided little help in decision making concerning the choice and adoption ofprotective measures. In addition, early in the course of the accident there was

11little information available and considerable political pressure, partially basedon the public perception of the radiation danger, was being exerted on thedecision makers.
In these circumstances, cautious immediate actions were felt necessary
and in many cases measures were introduced that tended to err, sometimes
excessively so, on the side of prudence rather than being driven by informed
scientific and expert judgement.
Within the territory of the former Soviet Union, short-term countermeasures were massive and, in general, reasonably timely and effective.
However, difficulties emerged when the authorities tried to establish criteria forthe management of the contaminated areas on the long term and the associatedrelocation of large groups of population. Various approaches were proposed andcriteria were applied over the years. Eventually, criteria for population resettlement or relocation from contaminated areas were adopted in which radiation
protection requirements and economic compensation considerations wereintermingled. This was and continues to be a source of confusion and possible
abuse.
The progressive spread of contamination at large distances from theaccident site caused considerable concern in many countries outside the former
Soviet Union and the reactions of the national authorities to this situation were
extremely varied, ranging from a simple intensification of the normal
environmental monitoring programmes, without adoption of specific countermeasures, to compulsory restrictions concerning the marketing andconsumption of foodstuffs.
Apart from the objective differences of contamination levels andregulatory and public health systems between countries, one of the principal
reasons for the variety of situations observed in the different countries stems
from the different criteria adopted for the choice and application of intervention
levels for the implementation of protective actions. These discrepancies were insome cases due to misinterpretation and misuse of international radiation
protection guidelines, especially in the case of food contamination, and were
further enhanced by the overwhelming role played in many cases by nonradiological factors, such as socio-economic, political and psychological, in
determining the countermeasures.
This situation caused concern and confusion among the public,
perplexities among the experts and difficulties to national authorities, including
problems of public credibility, as well as a waste of efforts and unnecessary
economic losses. These problems were particularly felt in areas close to12international borders due to different reactions of the authorities and media inbordering countries. However, all these issues were soon identified as an area
where several lessons should be learned and international efforts were undertaken to harmonise criteria and approaches to emergency management.
Radiation dose estimates
Most of the population of the Northern hemisphere was exposed, tovarious degrees, to radiation from the Chernobyl accident. After several years ofaccumulation of dosimetric data from all available sources and dosereconstruction calculations based on environmental contamination data andmathematical models, it is now possible to arrive at a reasonable, although nothighly accurate, assessment of the ranges of doses received by the various
groups of population affected by the accident.
The main doses of concern are those to the thyroid in the population ofchildren and infants at the time of the accident, due to external irradiation andinhalation and ingestion of radioactive iodine isotopes (131I and short-lived
radionuclides), and those to the whole body due to external irradiation from andingestion of radioactive caesium isotopes (134Cs and 137Cs). According to themost wildly accepted estimates, the situation for the different exposed groups isthe following:•

Evacuees – More than 100 000 persons were evacuated, mostly fromthe 30-km radius area around the accident site, during the first few
weeks following the accident. These people received significant
doses both to the whole body and the thyroid, although the
distribution of those doses was very variable among them dependingon their positions around the accident site and the delays of theirevacuation.
Doses to the thyroid ranging from 70 millisieverts to adults up to
about 1 000 millisieverts (i.e., 1 sievert) to young children and an
average individual dose of 15 millisieverts [mSv] to the whole body
were estimated to have been absorbed by this population prior totheir evacuation. Many of these people continued to be exposed,
although to a lesser extent depending on the sites of their relocation,
after their evacuation from the 30-km zone.

•“Liquidators” – Hundreds of thousands of workers, estimated toamount up to 600 000 and including a large number of military
personnel, were involved in the emergency actions on the site during
13

the accident and the subsequent clean-up operations which lasted fora few years. These workers were called “liquidators”.
A restricted number, of the order of 400 people, including plantstaff, firemen and medical aid personnel, were on the site during theaccident and its immediate aftermath, and received very high doses
from a variety of sources and exposure pathways. Among them were
all those who developed acute radiation syndrome and required
emergency medical treatment. The doses to these people ranged
from a few grays to well above 10 grays to the whole body fromexternal irradiation and comparable or even higher internal doses, inparticular to the thyroid, from incorporation of radionuclides. A
number of scientists, who periodically performed technical actions
inside the destroyed reactor area during several years, accumulated
over time doses of similar magnitude.
The largest group of liquidators participated in clean-up operations
for variable durations over a number of years after the accident.
Although they were no longer working in emergency conditions, andwere subject to controls and dose limitations, they received
significant doses ranging from tens to hundreds of millisieverts.
•

People living in contaminated areas of the former Soviet Union –About 270 000 people continue to live in contaminated areas withradiocaesium deposition levels in excess of 555 kilobecquerels per
square metre [kBq/m2], where protection measures still continue tobe required. Thyroid doses, due mainly to the consumption of cow’s
milk contaminated with radioiodine, were delivered during the firstfew weeks after the accident; children in the Gomel region ofBelarus appear to have received the highest thyroid doses with arange from negligible levels up to 40 sieverts, and an average ofabout 1 sievert for children aged 0 to 7. Thanks to of the control offoodstuffs in those areas, most of the radiation exposure since thesummer of 1986 is due to external irradiation from the radiocaesium
activity deposited on the ground; the whole-body doses for the
1986-89 time period are estimated to range from 5 to 250 mSv withan average of 40 mSv.

•

Populations outside the former Soviet Union – The radioactive
materials of a volatile nature (such as iodine and caesium) that werereleased during the accident spread throughout the entire Northernhemisphere. The doses received by populations outside the former
Soviet Union are relatively low, and show large differences from one
14

country to another depending mainly upon whether rainfall occurred
during the passage of the radioactive cloud. These doses range froma lower extreme of a few microsieverts or tens of microsieverts
outside Europe, to an upper extreme of 1 or 2 mSv in some specificareas of some European countries.
Health impact
The health impact of the Chernobyl accident can be described in terms ofacute health effects (death, severe health impairment), late health effects(cancers) and social/accident effects that may affect health.
The acute health effects occurred among the plant personnel and thepersons who intervened in the emergency phase to fight fires, provide medical
aid and immediate clean-up operations. A total of 31 people died as aconsequence of the accident, and about 140 people suffered various degrees ofradiation sickness and radiation-related acute health impairment. No membersof the general public suffered these kinds of effects.
As far as the late health effects are concerned, namely the possible
increase of cancer incidence, since the accident there has been a real andsignificant increase of carcinomas of the thyroid among the population of
infants and children exposed at the time of the accident in the contaminatedregions of the former Soviet Union. This should be attributed to the accident
until proved otherwise. There might also be some increase of thyroid cancers
among the adults living in those regions. From the observed trend of thisincrease of thyroid cancers it is expected that the peak has not yet been reachedand that this kind of cancer will still continue for some time to show an excess
above its natural rate in the area.
On the other hand, the scientific and medical observation of the affected
population has not to date revealed any significant increase in other cancers,
leukaemia, congenital abnormalities, adverse pregnancy outcomes or any otherradiation induced disease that could be attributed to the Chernobyl accident.
This observation applies to the whole general population, both within andoutside the former Soviet Union. Large scientific and epidemiological research
programmes, some of them sponsored by international organisations such as the
WHO and the EC, are being conducted to provide further insight into possible
future health effects. However, the population dose estimates generally accepted
tend to predict that, with the exception of thyroid disease, it is unlikely that the
exposure would lead to discernible radiation effects in the general population
above the background of natural incidence of the same diseases. In the case of15

the liquidators, increases in cancer have not been observed to date, but a
specific and detailed follow-up of this particular group might better reveal
increasing trends should they exist.
An important effect of the accident, which has a bearing on health, is theappearance of a widespread status of psychological stress in the populations
affected. The severity of this phenomenon, which is mostly observed in thecontaminated regions of the former Soviet Union, appears to reflect the public
fears about the unknowns of radiation and its effects, as well as its mistrust
towards public authorities and official experts, and is certainly made worse by
the disruption of the social networks and traditional ways of life provoked by
the accident and its long-term consequences.
These accident related effects have resulted in a general degradation of
the health of the population living in the contaminated territories. Illnesses thathave been observed are not typically related to radiation exposure. Further studyof those effects should continue.
Agricultural and environmental impacts
The impact of the accident on agricultural practices, food production anduse and other aspects of the environment has been and continue to be much
more widespread than the direct health impact on humans.
Several techniques of soil treatment and decontamination to reduce theaccumulation of radioactivity in agricultural produce and cow’s milk and meat
have been tested with positive results in some cases. Nevertheless, within theformer Soviet Union, large areas of agricultural land are still excluded from use
and are expected to continue to be so for a long time. In a much larger area,
although agricultural and dairy production activities are carried out, the foodproduced is subjected to strict controls and restrictions of distribution and use.
Although contamination levels showed a decreasing trend for some time
following the accident, it increasingly appears that an ecological stability has
been reached. This is particularly true in forest areas. The decrease now seems
to be following the decay period for 137Cs, which has a 30-year half-life. Should
this trend continue, measurable contamination would be present in these areas
for approximately 10 half-lives, or 300 years.
Similar problems of control and limitation of use, although of a much
lower severity, were experienced in some countries of Europe outside theformer Soviet Union, where agricultural and farm animal production were16

subjected to restrictions for variable durations after the accident. Most of theserestrictions were lifted some time ago. However, there are still today some areasin Europe where restrictions on slaughter and distribution of animals are inforce. This concerns, for example, several hundreds of thousands of sheep in the
United Kingdom and large numbers of sheep and reindeer in some Nordic
countries.
The forest is a special environment where problems persist. Because of
the high filtering characteristics of trees, deposition was often higher in forests
than in other areas. An extreme case was the so-called “red forest” near to theChernobyl site where the irradiation was so high as to kill the trees which had to
be destroyed as radioactive waste. In more general terms, forests, being a sourceof timber, wild game, berries and mushrooms as well as a place for work andrecreation, continue to be of concern in some areas and are expected toconstitute a radiological problem for a long time.
Water bodies, such as rivers, lakes and reservoirs can be, if contaminated,
an important source of human radiation exposure because of their uses forrecreation, drinking and fishing. In the case of the Chernobyl accident thissegment of the environment has not contributed significantly to the total
radiation exposure of the population. It was estimated that the component of theindividual and collective doses that can be attributed to the water bodies andtheir products does not exceed 1 or 2% of the total exposure resulting from theaccident. Since the accident, it has been noted that the contamination of thewater system has not posed a public health problem during the last decade;nevertheless, in view of the large quantities of radioactivity deposited in thecatchment area of the system of water bodies in the contaminated regions
around Chernobyl, there will continue to be for a long time a need for carefulmonitoring to ensure that washout from the catchment area will not contaminate
drinking-water supplies.
Outside the former Soviet Union, no concerns were ever warranted forthe levels of radioactivity in drinking water. On the other hand, there are lakes,
particularly in Switzerland and the Nordic countries, where restrictions werenecessary for the consumption of fish. These restrictions still exist in Sweden,
for example, where thousands of lakes contain fish with a radioactivity content
which is still higher than the limits established by the authorities for sale on themarket.

17

Potential residual risks
Within seven months of the accident, the destroyed reactor was encasedin a massive concrete structure, known as the “sarcophagus”, to provide someform of confinement of the damaged nuclear fuel and destroyed equipment andreduce the likelihood of further releases of radioactivity to the environment.
This structure was, however, not conceived as a permanent containment but
rather as a provisional barrier pending the definition of a more radical solution
for the elimination of the destroyed reactor and the safe disposal of the highly
radioactive materials.
Years after its erection, the sarcophagus structure, although still generallysound, raises concerns for its long-term resistance and represents a standing
potential risk. In particular, the roof of the structure presented for a long time
numerous cracks with consequent impairment of leaktightness and penetrationof large quantities of rain water which is now highly radioactive. This also
creates conditions of high humidity producing corrosion of metallic structures
which contribute to the support of the sarcophagus. Moreover, some massive
concrete structures, damaged or dislodged by the reactor explosion, are unstable
and their failure, due to further degradation or to external events, could provoke
a collapse of the roof and part of the building.
According to various analyses, a number of potential accidental scenarios
could be envisaged. They include a criticality excursion due to change ofconfiguration of the melted nuclear fuel masses in the presence of water leaked
from the roof, a resuspension of radioactive dusts provoked by the collapse of
the enclosure and the long-term migration of radionuclides from the enclosure
into the groundwater. The first two accident scenarios would result in therelease of radionuclides into the atmosphere which would produce a newcontamination of the surrounding area within a radius of several tens ofkilometres. It is not expected, however, that such accidents could have serious
radiological consequences at longer distances.
As far as the leaching of radionuclides from the fuel masses by the waterin the enclosure and their migration into the groundwater are concerned, thisphenomenon is expected to be very slow and it has been estimated that, forexample, it will take 45 to 90 years for certain radionuclides such as 90Sr tomigrate underground up to the Pripyat River catchment area. The expectedradiological significance of this phenomenon is not known with certainty and acareful monitoring of the evolving situation of the groundwater will need to be
carried out for a long time.

18

The accident recovery and clean-up operations have resulted in the
production of very large quantities of radioactive wastes and contaminatedequipment which are currently stored in about 800 sites within and outside the
30-km exclusion zone around the reactor. These wastes and equipment are
partly buried in trenches and partly conserved in containers isolated fromgroundwater by clay or concrete screens. A large number of contaminatedequipment, engines and vehicles are also stored in the open air.
All these wastes are a potential source of contamination of thegroundwater which will require close monitoring until a safe disposal into an
appropriate repository is implemented.
In general, it can be concluded that the sarcophagus and the proliferationof waste storage sites in the area constitute a series of potential sources of
release of radioactivity that threatens the surrounding area. However, any suchreleases are expected to be very small in comparison with those from the
Chernobyl accident in 1986 and their consequences would be limited to a
relatively small area around the site.
In any event, initiatives have been taken internationally, and are currently
underway, to study a technical solution leading to the elimination of thesesources of residual risk on the site.
Lessons learned
The Chernobyl accident was very specific in nature and it should not beseen as a reference accident for future emergency planning purposes. However,it was very clear from the reactions of the public authorities in the various
countries that they were not prepared to deal with an accident of this magnitude
and that technical and/or organisational deficiencies existed in emergency
planning and preparedness in almost all countries.
The lessons that could be learned from the Chernobyl accident were,
therefore, numerous and encompassed all areas, including reactor safety andsevere accident management, intervention criteria, emergency procedures, communication, medical treatment of irradiated persons, monitoring methods, radioecological processes, land and agricultural management, public information, etc.
However, the most important lesson learned was probably the understanding that a major nuclear accident has inevitable transboundary implications
and its consequences could affect, directly or indirectly, many countries even atlarge distances from the accident site. This led to an extraordinary effort to19

expand and reinforce international co-operation in areas such as communication, harmonisation of emergency management criteria and co-ordinationof protective actions. Major improvements have been achieved since theaccident, and important international mechanisms of co-operation andinformation were established, such as the international conventions on early
notification and assistance in case of a radiological accident, by the IAEA andthe EC, the international nuclear emergency exercises (INEX) programme, by
the NEA, the international accident severity scale (INES), by the IAEA andNEA and the international agreement on food contamination, by the FAO andWHO.
At the national level, the Chernobyl accident also stimulated authorities
and experts to a radical review of their understanding of and attitude to radiation
protection and nuclear emergency issues. This prompted many countries to establish nationwide emergency plans in addition to the existing structure of local
emergency plans for individual nuclear facilities. In the scientific and technicalarea, besides providing new impetus to nuclear safety research, especially on
the management of severe nuclear accidents, this new climate led to renewed
efforts to expand knowledge on the harmful effects of radiation and their
medical treatment and to revitalise radioecological research and environmental
monitoring programmes. Substantial improvements were also achieved in thedefinition of criteria and methods for the information of the public, an aspect
whose importance was particularly evident during the accident and its
aftermath.
Another lesson of policy significance concerns the reclamation ofcontaminated land. As has been seen, contamination, particularly in forest
environments, has tended to reach ecological stability. While it was previously
thought that contamination levels would decline due to natural removal
processes, this has not proven to be the case generally, such that policy makers
will be forced to deal with such problems for longer periods than first thought.
Because of this persistence of contamination, the importance of
stakeholder involvement in the development of approaches to living in thecontaminated territories has been highlighted. The policy lesson has been thatstakeholders, local, regional, national and international, must be involved, at theappropriate level, in decision making processes in order to arrive at accepted
approaches to living with contamination. Such approaches need will to be longlasting and to evolve with changing local conditions.

20

Conclusion
The history of the modern industrial world has been affected on manyoccasions by catastrophes comparable or even more severe than the Chernobyl
accident. Nevertheless, this accident, due not only to its severity but especiallyto the presence of ionising radiation, had a significant impact on human society.
Not only did it produce severe health consequences and physical,
industrial and economic damage in the short term, but also its long-term
consequences, in terms of socio-economic disruption, psychological stress anddamage to the image of the nuclear energy, are expected to persist forsometime.
However, the international community has demonstrated a remarkableability to apprehend and treasure the lessons drawn from this event, so that it
will be better prepared to cope with future challenges of this or another nature ina more flexible fashion.

21

Chapter I
THE SITE AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCE

The siteAt the time of the Chernobyl accident, on 26 April 1986, the Soviet
Nuclear Power Programme was based mainly upon two types of reactors, theWWER, a pressurised light-water reactor, and the RBMK, a graphite moderated
light-water reactor. While the WWER type of reactor was exported to othercountries, the RBMK design was restricted to republics within the Soviet
Union.
The Chernobyl Power Complex, lying about 130 km north of Kiev,
Ukraine, and about 20 km south of the border with Belarus (Figure 1), consistedof four nuclear reactors of the RBMK-1000 design, Units 1 and 2 being
constructed between 1970 and 1977, while Units 3 and 4 of the same design
were completed in 1983 (IA86). Two more RBMK reactors were underconstruction at the site at the time of the accident.
To the South-east of the plant, an artificial lake of some 22 km2, situatedbeside the river Pripyat, a tributary of the Dniepr, was constructed to provide
cooling water for the reactors.
This area of Ukraine is described as Belarussian-type woodland with alow population density. About 3 km away from the reactor, in the new city,
Pripyat, there were 49 000 inhabitants. The old town of Chernobyl, which had apopulation of 12 500, is about 15 km to the South-east of the complex. Within a
30-km radius of the power plant, the total population was between 115 000 and
135 000.

23

Figure 1. The site of the Chernobyl nuclear power complex(modif. from IA91)

Credit: Figure IV.1 Distribution, in December 1989, of Deposited Strontium-90 Released in the
Chernobyl Accident. From: “Atlas of Caesium Deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl
Accident”. M. De Cort, G. Dubois, Sh.D. Fridman, M.G. Germenchuk, Yu.A. Izrael,
A. Janssens, A.R. Jones, G.N. Kelly, E.V. Kvasnikova, I.I. Matveenko, I.M. Nazarov,Yu.M. Pokumeiko, V.A. Sitak,
E.D. Stukin,
L.Ya. Tabachny,
Yu.S. Tsaturov
andS.I. Avdyushin. EUR report nr. 16733, EC, Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, Luxembourg (1998).

24

25

*

(Diagrammatic)

RBMK 1000**

BIOLOGICAL SHIELD* PRESSURE TUBES

PUMP

STEAM
SEPARATOR

Figure 2. The RBMK reactor

WATER

STEAM

PUMP

CONDENSER

Graphite moderator

Fuel bundles

Control rods

TURBINE

The RBMK-1000 reactor
The RBMK-1000 (Figure 2) is a Soviet designed and built graphite
moderated pressure tube type reactor, using slightly enriched (2% 235U) uranium
dioxide fuel. It is a boiling light water reactor, with direct steam feed to theturbines, without an intervening heat-exchanger. Water pumped to the bottom of
the fuel channels boils as it progresses up the pressure tubes, producing steamwhich feeds two 500 MWe [megawatt electrical] turbines. The water acts as acoolant and also provides the steam used to drive the turbines. The verticalpressure tubes contain the zirconium-alloy clad uranium-dioxide fuel aroundwhich the cooling water flows. A specially designed refuelling machine allows
fuel bundles to be changed without shutting down the reactor.
The moderator, whose function is to slow down neutrons to make themmore efficient in producing fission in the fuel, is constructed of graphite. A
mixture of nitrogen and helium is circulated between the graphite blocks largely
to prevent oxidation of the graphite and to improve the transmission of the heatproduced by neutron interactions in the graphite, from the moderator to the fuelchannel. The core itself is about 7 m high and about 12 m in diameter. There are
four main coolant circulating pumps, one of which is always on standby. The
reactivity or power of the reactor is controlled by raising or lowering
211 control rods, which, when lowered, absorb neutrons and reduce the fission
rate. The power output of this reactor is 3 200 MWt (megawatt thermal) or
1 000 MWe, although there is a larger version producing 1 500 MWe. Various
safety systems, such as an emergency core cooling system and the requirement
for an absolute minimal insertion of 30 control rods, were incorporated into thereactor design and operation.
The most important characteristic of the RBMK reactor is that it
possesses a “positive void coefficient”. This means that if the power increases
or the flow of water decreases, there is increased steam production in the fuelchannels, so that the neutrons that would have been absorbed by the denser
water will now produce increased fission in the fuel. However, as the powerincreases, so does the temperature of the fuel, and this has the effect of reducing
the neutron flux (negative fuel coefficient). The net effect of these two opposing
characteristics varies with the power level. At the high power level of normal
operation, the temperature effect predominates, so that power excursions
leading to excessive overheating of the fuel do not occur. However, at a lower
power output of less than 20% the maximum, the positive void coefficient effectis dominant and the reactor becomes unstable and prone to sudden power
surges. This was a major factor in the development of the accident.

26

Events leading to the accident (IA86, IA86a)
The Unit 4 reactor was to be shutdown for routine maintenance on
25 April 1986. It was decided to take advantage of this shutdown to determine
whether, in the event of a loss of station power, the slowing turbine could
provide enough electrical power to operate the emergency equipment and thecore cooling water circulating pumps, until the diesel emergency power supply
became operative. The aim of this test was to determine whether cooling of thecore could continue to be ensured in the event of a loss of power.
This type of test had been run during a previous shut-down period, but
the results had been inconclusive, so it was decided to repeat it. Unfortunately,
this test, which was considered essentially to concern the non-nuclear part of thepower plant, was carried out without a proper exchange of information and coordination between the team in charge of the test and the personnel in charge ofthe operation and safety of the nuclear reactor. Therefore, inadequate safety
precautions were included in the test programme and the operating personnel
were not alerted to the nuclear safety implications of the electrical test and its
potential danger.
The planned programme called for shutting off the reactor’s emergency
core cooling system (ECCS), which provides water for cooling the core in an
emergency. Although subsequent events were not greatly affected by this, theexclusion of this system for the whole duration of the test reflected a lax attitude
towards the implementation of safety procedures.
As the shutdown proceeded, the reactor was operating at about half
power when the electrical load dispatcher refused to allow further shutdown, as
the power was needed for the grid. In accordance with the planned test
programme, about an hour later the ECCS was switched off while the reactor
continued to operate at half power. It was not until about 23:00 hr on 25 April
that the grid controller agreed to a further reduction in power.
For this test, the reactor should have been stabilised at about 1 000 MWt
prior to shut down, but due to operational error the power fell to about 30 MWt,
where the positive void coefficient became dominant. The operators then tried
to raise the power to 700-1 000 MWt by switching off the automatic regulatorsand freeing all the control rods manually. It was only at about 01:00 hr on
26 April that the reactor was stabilised at about 200 MWt.
Although there was a standard operating order that a minimum of
30 control rods was necessary to retain reactor control, in the test only
6-8 control rods were actually used. Many of the control rods were withdrawn

27to compensate for the build up of xenon which acted as an absorber of neutrons
and reduced power. This meant that if there were a power surge, about
20 seconds would be required to lower the control rods and shut the reactor
down. In spite of this, it was decided to continue the test programme.
There was an increase in coolant flow and a resulting drop in steampressure. The automatic trip which would have shut down the reactor when thesteam pressure was low, had been circumvented. In order to maintain power theoperators had to withdraw nearly all the remaining control rods. The reactor
became very unstable and the operators had to make adjustments every few
seconds trying to maintain constant power.
At about this time, the operators reduced the flow of feedwater,presumably to maintain the steam pressure. Simultaneously, the pumps thatwere powered by the slowing turbine were providing less cooling water to thereactor. The loss of cooling water exaggerated the unstable condition of thereactor by increasing steam production in the cooling channels (positive void
coefficient), and the operators could not prevent an overwhelming power surge,
estimated to be 100 times the nominal power output.
The sudden increase in heat production ruptured part of the fuel and small
hot fuel particles, reacting with water, caused a steam explosion, which
destroyed the reactor core. A second explosion added to the destruction two to
three seconds later. While it is not known for certain what caused the
explosions, it is postulated that the first was a steam/hot fuel explosion, and thathydrogen may have played a role in the second.
Some medias had reported a sismic origin of the accident, however thescientific credibility of the paper at the origin of this rumour (St98) has been
discarded.
The accident
The accident occurred at 01:23 hr on Saturday, 26 April 1986, when thetwo explosions destroyed the core of Unit 4 and the roof of the reactor building.
In the IAEA Post-Accident Assessment Meeting in August 1986 (IA86),
much was made of the operators’ responsibility for the accident, and not muchemphasis was placed on the design faults of the reactor. Later assessments(IA86a, UN00) suggest that the event was due to a combination of the two, witha little more emphasis on the design deficiencies and a little less on the operator
actions.

28

The two explosions sent fuel, core components and structural items andproduced a shower of hot and highly radioactive debris, including fuel, corecomponents, structural items and graphite into the air and exposed the destroyedcore to the atmosphere. The plume of smoke, radioactive fission products anddebris from the core and the building rose up to about 1 km into the air. The
heavier debris in the plume was deposited close to the site, but lighter
components, including fission products and virtually all of the noble gas
inventory were blown by the prevailing wind to the North-west of the plant.
Fires started in what remained of the Unit 4 building, giving rise to
clouds of steam and dust, and fires also broke out on the adjacent turbine hallroof and in various stores of diesel fuel and inflammable materials. Over
100 fire-fighters from the site and called in from Pripyat were needed, and it
was this group that received the highest radiation exposures and suffered thegreatest losses in personnel. A first group of 14 firemen arrived on the scene of
the accident at 1.28 a.m. Reinforcements were brought in until about 4 a.m.,when 250 firemen were available and 69 firemen participated in fire control
activities. By 2.10 a.m., the largest fires on the roof of the machine hall had
been put out, while by 2.30 a.m., the largest fires on the roof of the reactor hall
were under control. These fires were put out by 05:00 hr of the same day, but by
then the graphite fire had started. Many firemen added to their considerable
doses by staying on call on site. The intense graphite fire was responsible forthe dispersion of radionuclides and fission fragments high into the atmosphere.
The emissions continued for about twenty days, but were much lower after thetenth day when the graphite fire was finally extinguished.
The graphite fire
While the conventional fires at the site posed no special firefighting
problems, very high radiation doses were incurred by the firemen, resulting in
31 deaths. However, the graphite moderator fire was a special problem. Verylittle national or international expertise on fighting graphite fires existed, andthere was a very real fear that any attempt to put it out might well result infurther dispersion of radionuclides, perhaps by steam production, or it mighteven provoke a criticality excursion in the nuclear fuel.
A decision was made to layer the graphite fire with large amounts ofdifferent materials, each one designed to combat a different feature of the fire
and the radioactive release. The first measures taken to control fire and theradionuclides releases consisted of dumping neutron-absorbing compounds andfire-control material into the crater that resulted from the destruction of thereactor. The total amount of materials dumped on the reactor was about 5 000 t

29

including about 40 t of borons compounds, 2 400 t of lead, 1 800 t of sand andclay, and 600 t of dolomite, as well as sodium phosphate and polymer liquids(Bu93). About 150 t of material were dumped on 27 April, followed by 300 t on
28 April, 750 t on 29 April, 1 500 t on 30 April, 1 900 t on 1 May and 400 t on
2 May. About 1 800 helicopter flights were carried out to dump materials onto
the reactor; During the first flights, the helicopter remained stationary over thereactor while dumping materials. As the dose rates received by the helicopter
pilots during this procedure were too high, it was decide that the materials
should be dumped while the helicopters travelled over the reactor. This
procedure caused additional destruction of the standing structures and spreadthe contamination. Boron carbide was dumped in large quantities fromhelicopters to act as a neutron absorber and prevent any renewed chain reaction.
Dolomite was also added to act as heat sink and a source of carbon dioxide tosmother the fire. Lead was included as a radiation absorber, as well as sand andclay which it was hoped would prevent the release of particulates. While it waslater discovered that many of these compounds were not actually dropped on thetarget, they may have acted as thermal insulators and precipitated an increase in
the temperature of the damaged core leading to a further release ofradionuclides a week later.
The further sequence of events is still speculative, although elucidatedwith the observation of residual damage to the reactor (Si94, Si04a, Si94b). It issuggested that the melted core materials settled to the bottom of the core shaft,with the fuel forming a metallic layer below the graphite. The graphite layer had
a filtering effect on the release of volatile compounds. But after burning without
the filtering effect of an upper graphite layer, the release of volatile fissions
products from the fuel may have increased, except for non-volatile fission
products and actinides, because of reduced particulate emission. On day 8 after
the accident, the corium melted through the lower biological shield and flowed
onto the floor. This redistribution of corium would have enhanced theradionuclide releases, and on contact with water corium produced steam,causing an increase of radionuclieds at the last stage of the active period.
By May 9, the graphite fire had been extinguished, and work began on a
massive reinforced concrete slab with a built-in cooling system beneath thereactor. This involved digging a tunnel from underneath Unit 3. About four
hundred people worked on this tunnel which was completed in 15 days,allowing
the installation of the concrete slab. This slab would not only be of use to cool
the core if necessary, it would also act as a barrier to prevent penetration ofmelted radioactive material into the groundwater.

30

In summary
The Chernobyl accident was the product of a lack of “safety culture”. The
reactor design was poor from the point of view of safety and unforgiving for theoperators, both of which provoked a dangerous operating state. The operators
were not informed of this and were not aware that the test performed could havebrought the reactor into an explosive condition. In addition, they did not comply
with established operational procedures. The combination of these factors
provoked a nuclear accident of maximum severity in which the reactor was
totally destroyed within a few seconds.

31Chapter II
THE RELEASE, DISPERSION, DEPOSITION AND
BEHAVIOUR OF RADIONUCLIDESThe source term
The “source term” is a technical expression used to describe theaccidental release of radioactive material from a nuclear facility to theenvironment. Not only are the levels of radioactivity released important, butalso their distribution in time as well as their chemical and physical forms. The
initial estimation of the Source Term was based on air sampling and theintegration of the assessed ground deposition within the then Soviet Union. Thiswas clear at the IAEA Post-Accident Review Meeting in August 1986 (IA86),
when the Soviet scientists made their presentation, but during the discussions it
was suggested that the total release estimate would be significantly higher if thedeposition outside the Soviet Union territory were included. Subsequentassessments support this view, certainly for the caesium radionuclides (Wa87,
Ca87, Gu89). The initial estimates were presented as a fraction of the core
inventory for the important radionuclides and also as total activity released.
Atmospheric releases
In the initial assessment of releases made by the Soviet scientists andpresented at the IAEA Post-Accident Assessment Meeting in Vienna (IA86), it
was estimated that 100% of the core inventory of the noble gases (xenon andkrypton) was released, and between 10 and 20% of the more volatile elementsof iodine, tellurium and caesium. The early estimate for fuel material released tothe environment was 3 ± 1.5% (IA86). This estimate was later revised to
3.5 ± 0.5% (Be91). This corresponds to the emission of 6 t of fragmented fuel.
The IAEA International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) issued
in 1986 its summary report (IA86a) based on the information presented by theSoviet scientists to the Post-Accident Review Meeting. At that time, it was33estimated that 1 to 2 exabecquerels (EBq) were released. This did not include
the noble gases, and had an estimated error of ±50%. These estimates of thesource term were based solely on the estimated deposition of radionuclides on
the territory of the Soviet Union, and could not take into account deposition in
Europe and elsewhere, as the data were not then available.
However, more deposition data (Be90) were available when, in their1988 Report (UN88), the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects ofAtomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) gave release figures based not only on theSoviet data, but also on worldwide deposition. The total 137Cs release wasestimated to be 70 petabecquerels (PBq) of which 31 PBq were deposited in theSoviet Union.
Later analyses carried out on the core debris and the deposited material
within the reactor building have provided an independent assessment of theenvironmental release. These studies estimate that the release fraction of 137Cs
was 20 to 40% (85 ± 26 PBq) based on an average release fraction from fuel of
47% with subsequent retention of the remainder within the reactor building(Be91). After an extensive review of the many reports (IA86, Bu93), this was
confirmed. For 131I, the most accurate estimate was felt to be 50 to 60% of thecore inventory of 3 200 PBq. The current estimate of the source term (De95) issummarised in Table 1.
From the radiological point of view, 131I and 137Cs are the most importantradionuclides to consider, because they are responsible for most the radiation
exposure received by the general population.
The release pattern over time is well illustrated in Figure 3 (Bu93). The
initial large release was principally due to the mechanical fragmentation of thefuel during the explosion. It contained mainly the more volatile radionuclides
such as noble gases, iodines and some caesium. The second large releasebetween day 7 and day 10 was associated with the high temperatures reached in
the core melt. The sharp drop in releases after ten days may have been due to a
rapid cooling of the fuel as the core debris melted through the lower shield andinteracted with other material in the reactor. Although further releases probably
occurred after 6 May, these are not thought to have been large.

34

Table 1. Current estimate of radionuclide releases
during the Chernobyl accident (modif. from 95De)Core inventory
on 26 April 1986
Nuclide
133

Xe
I
134
Cs
137
Cs
132
Te
89
Sr
90
Sr
140
Ba
95
Zr
99
Mo
103
Ru
106
Ru
141
Ce
144
Ce
239
Np
238
Pu
239
Pu
240
Pu
241
Pu
242
Cm
131

Total release during
the accident

Half-life

Activity(PBq)

Percent of
inventory

Activity
(PBq)

5.3 d
8.0 d
2.0 y
30.0 y78.0 h
52.0 d
28.0 y12.8 d65.0 d67.0 h39.6 d1.0 y33.0 d285.0 d2.4 d86.0 y24 400.0 y
6 580.0 y
13.2 y163.0 d

6 500
3 200
180
280
2 700
2 300
200
4 800
5 600
4 800
4 800
2 100
5 600
3 300
27 000
1
0.85
1.2
170
26

100
50-60
20-40
20-40
25-60
4-6
4-6
4-6
3.5
>3.5
>3.5
>3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5

6500
~1760
~54
~85
~1150
~115
~10
~240
196
>168
>168
>73
196
~116
~95
0.035
0.03
0.042
~6
~0.9

Fifteen years on, the estimation made in 1996 is still valid. However the
results presented in Table 1 are incomplete with respect to the release of theshort-lived radionuclides (132I and 135I). In the UNSCEAR 2000 report (UN00),
the overall releases of short-lived radioiodines are presented on the basis ofearly and re-estimated informations (Ab86, Iz90); they are found to be
substantially lower than those of 131I (1760 PBq), 1040 PBq, 910, 25 and 250
respectively for 132I, 133I, 134I and 135I, 132I is assumed to be in radioactive
equilibrium with 132Te.

35

Figure 3. Daily release rate of radioactive substances
into the atmosphere (modif. from IA86a)

0.75
0.70
0.65

+
_ 50% error bars

0.60
0.55

Release rate (EBq/day)

0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Days after initiation of the accident on 26 April

36

9

10

11

The estimated daily releases of 131I during the accident is given in
Table 2.
Table 2. Daily releases of 131I
Day of release Daily releases (PBq)
26 April704

27 April204

28 April150

29 April102

30 April

69

1 May

62

2 May

102

3 May

107

4 May

130

5 May

130

Total

1760

Although the releases were considerably reduced on 5 and 6 May (days 9
and 10) after the accident), continuing low-level releases occurred in thefollowing week and for up to 40 days after the accident, particularly on 15 and16 may, attributable to continuing outbreaks of fires or to hot areas in thereactor. These later releases can be correlated with increased concentrations ofradionuclides in air measured at Kiev and Vilnius.
Chemical and physical forms
The release of radioactive material to the atmosphere consisted of gases,
aerosols and finely fragmented fuel. Gaseous elements, such as krypton andxenon escaped more or less completely from the fuel material. In addition to its
gaseous and particulate form, organically bound iodine was also detected. The
ratios between the various iodine compounds varied with time. As mentioned
above, 50 to 60% of the core inventory of iodine was thought to have beenreleased in one form or another. Other volatile elements and compounds, suchas those of caesium and tellurium, attached to aerosols, were transported in the
air separate from fuel particles. There were only a few measurements of the37

aero-dynamic size of the radioactive particle releases during the first days of theaccident. The activity distribution of the particle size was found to be well
represented as the superposition of two log-normal functions, one with anactivity median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) ranging from 0.3 to 1.5 P andanother with an AMAD of 10 P. The larger particles contained about 80-90%
of the activity of non-volatile radionuclides such as 95Zr, 95Nb, 140La, 144Ce andtransuranium elements embedded in the uranium matrix of the fuel.
Unexpected features of the source term, due largely to the graphite fire,
were the extensive releases of fuel material and the long duration of the release.
Elements of low volatility, such as cerium, zirconium, the actinides and to alarge extent barium, lanthanum and strontium also, were embedded in fuelparticles. Larger fuel particles were deposited close to the accident site, whereas
smaller particles were more widely dispersed. Other condensates from thevaporised fuel, such as radioactive ruthenium, formed metallic particles. These,
as well as the small fuel particles, were often referred to as “hot particles”, andwere found at large distances from the accident site (De95). Typical activities
per hot-particles are 0.1-1 kBq for fuel fragments and 0.5-10 kBq for ruthenium
particles, the diameters being about 10 P WR EH FRPSDUHG ZLWK VL]HV RI
0.4-0.7 P IRU WKH SDUWLFOHV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH DFWLYLWLHV RI 131I and 137Cs(De88, De91).
Dispersion and deposition
Radioactive contamination of the ground was found to some extend inpractically every country of the northern hemisphere. European commission
published on the basis of local measurements an atlas of contamination in
Europe (De98).
Within the former Soviet Union
During the first 10 days of the accident when important releases ofradioactivity occurred, meteorological conditions changed frequently, causing
significant variations in release direction and dispersion parameters. Deposition
patterns of radioactive particles depended highly on the dispersion parameters,
the particle sizes, and the occurrence of rainfall. The largest particles, whichwere primarily fuel particles, were deposited essentially by sedimentation
within 100 km of the reactor. Small particles were carried by the wind to large
distances and were deposited primarily with rainfall. The radionuclide
composition of the release and of the subsequent deposition on the ground also
varied considerably during the accident due to variations in temperature andother parameters during the release. 137Cs was selected to characterise the38magnitude of the ground deposition because (1) it is easily measurable, and (2)it was the main contributor to the radiation doses received by the population
once the short-lived 131I had decayed. However, during the first weeks after theaccident, most of the activity deposited on the ground consisted of short-lived
radionuclides, of which 131I was the most important radiologically. All the maps
established in the former Soviet Union were mainly based on the limited
number of measurement of 131I, and they use 137Cs measurements as a guide.
These maps must be regarded with caution, as the ratio of 131I to 137Cs
deposition densities was found to vary over a large range in Belarus, 5 to 10,
this ratio has been not seriously studied in many countries.
The three main spots of contamination resulting from the Chernobyl
accident have been called the Central, Bryansk-Belarus, and Kaluga-Tula-Orelspots (Figure 4, pages 49-50). The Central spot was formed during the initial,
active stage of the release predominantly to the West and North-west (Figure 5,
pages 51-52). Ground depositions of 137Cs of over 40 kilobecquerels per square
metre [kBq/m2] covered large areas of the Northern part of Ukraine and of theSouthern part of Belarus. The most highly contaminated area was the 30-km
zone surrounding the reactor, where 137Cs ground depositions generally
exceeded 1 500 kBq/m2 (Ba93).
Areas of high contamination of 137Cs occurred thoughout the far zone,
depending primarly on rainfall at the time the plume passed over. The BryanskBelarus spot, centered 200 km to the North-northeast of the reactor, was formedon 28-29 April as a result of rainfall on the interface of the Bryansk region of
Russia and the Gomel and Mogilev regions of Belarus. The ground depositionsof 137Cs in the most highly contaminated areas in this spot were comparable tothe levels in the Central spot and reached 5 000 kBq/m2 in some villages(Ba93).
The Kaluga-Tula-Orel spot in Russia, centered approximately 500 km
North-east of the reactor, was formed from the same radioactive cloud that
produced the Bryansk-Belarus spot, as a result of rainfall on 28-29 April.
However, the levels of deposition of 137Cs were lower, usually less than
600 kBq/m2 (Ba93).
In addition, outside the three main hot spots in the greater part of theEuropean territory of the former Soviet Union, there were many areas ofradioactive contamination with 137Cs levels in the range 40 to 200 kBq/m2.
Overall, the territory of the former Soviet Union initially contained
approximately 3 100 km2 contaminated by 137Cs with deposition levels
exceeding 1 500 kBq/m2; 7 200 km2 with levels of 600 to 1 500 kBq/m2; and103 000 km2 with levels of 40 to 200 kBq/m2 (US91).
39

Figure 4. Deposition of Caesium-137 in Belarus** From:ATLAS of Caesium Deposition on Europe after
the Chernobyl Accident
M. De Cort, G. Dubois, Sh. D. Fridman,
M.G. Germenchuk, Yu A. Izrael, A. Janssens,
A.R. Jones, G.N. Kelly, E.V. Kvasnikova,
I.I. Matveenko, I.M. Nazarov, Yu M. Pokumeiko,
V.A. Sitak, E.D. Stukin, L. Ya. Tabachny,
Yu. S. Tsaturov and S.I. Avdyushin
EUR report nr. 16733, EC, Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities,
Luxembourg (1998).

Figure 5. Deposition of Caesium-137 in Ukraine** From:ATLAS of Caesium Deposition on Europe after
the Chernobyl Accident
De Cort, G. Dubois, SH. D. Fridman,
M.G. Germenchuk, Yu A. Izrael, A. Janssens,
A.R. Jones, G.N. Kelly, E.V. Kvasnikova,
I.I. Matveenko, I.M. Nazarov, Yu. S. Tsaturov andS.I. Avdyushin
EUR report nr. 16733, EC, Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities,
Luxembourg (1998).

The principal physico-chemical form of the deposited radionuclides are:dispersed fuel particles, condensation-generated particles, and mixed-typeparticles. The distribution in the nearby contaminated zone (<100km) reflected
the radionuclide composition of the fuel and differs from that in the far zone(>100km to 2 000 km). Large particles, deposited in the near zone, contained
fuel (U, Pu) refractory elements (Zr, Mo, Ce and Np) and intermediate elements(Ru, Ba, Sr). The volatile elements (I, Te and Cs) in the form of condensationgenerated particles, were more widely disperded in the far zone.
Deposition of 90Sr was mostly in the near zone of the accident as for
Pu; the only area with plutonium exceeding 4 kBq m-2 was located within the
30-km zone, in the Gomel-Mogilev-Briansk area. (De98)

239

Outside the former Soviet Union
Radioactivity was first detected outside the Soviet Union at a Nuclear
Power station in Sweden, where monitored workers were noted to becontaminated. It was at first believed that the contamination was from a
Swedish reactor. When it became apparent that the Chernobyl reactor was thesource, monitoring stations all over the world began intensive sampling
programmes.
The radioactive plume was tracked as it moved over the European part of
the Soviet Union and Europe (Figure 6). Initially the wind was blowing in a
Northwesterly direction and was responsible for much of the deposition in
Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Belgium and Great Britain. Later the plume
shifted to the South and much of Central Europe, as well as the Northern Mediterranean and the Balkans, received some deposition, the actual severity ofwhich depended on the height of the plume, wind speed and direction, terrain
features and the amount of rainfall that occurred during the passage of theplume.
Most countries in Europe experienced some deposition of radionuclides,
mainly 137Cs and 134Cs, as the plume passed over the country. In Austria,
Eastern and Southern Switzerland, parts of Southern Germany and Scandinavia,
where the passage of the plume coincided with rainfall, the total deposition
from the Chernobyl release was greater (exceeding 37 kBq m-2, with anextensive deposition in a 2-4 km2 area in Sweden within the commune of Gävle(exceeding 185 kBq m-2) (Ed91) than that experienced by most other countries,
whereas Spain, France and Portugal experienced the least deposition. For
example, the estimated average depositions of 137Cs in the provinces of Upper
Austria, Salzburg and Carinthia in Austria were 59, 46 and 33 kBq/m2

44

30 April 1986

06 May 1986

28 April 1986

04 May 1986

26 April 1986

02 May 1986

Figure 6. Areas covered by the main body of the radioactive cloud on
various days during the release

Credit: ARAC

45

respectively, whereas the average 137Cs deposition in Portugal was 0.02 kBq/m2(Un88). It was reported that considerable secondary contamination occurred due
to resuspension of material from contaminated forest. This was not confirmedby later studies.
While the plume was detectable in the Northern hemisphere as far away
as Japan and North America, countries outside Europe received very little
deposition of radionuclides from the accident. No deposition was detected in theSouthern hemisphere by the surveillance networks of environmental radiation(Un88).
Behaviour of deposited radionuclides
The environmental behaviour of deposited radionuclides depends on thephysical and chemical characteristics of the radionuclides and on the type of
fallout, dry or wet, the size and shape of particles and the environment. For
example, particles produced by gas-to-particle conversion through chemical
reactions, nucleation and condensation as well as coagulation have a large
specific surface and are generally more soluble than explosion generated
particles, such as large fuel particles particles generated by mechanicalprocesses like explosion of fuel.
For short-lived radionuclides, such as iodine isotopes, the main pathway
of exposure of humans is the transfer of the amount deposited on leafy
vegetables that are consumed within a few days, or on pasture grass that isgrazed on by cows or goats, giving rise to the contamination of milk. Long term
behaviour is not relevant, because 131I has a physical half-life of only 8 days.
Radionuclides deposited on soil migrate downwards and reach the part ofsoil containing roots, and the time of residence in this area would partly
determinate migration to vegetation. Observations strongly suggest that the
migration profiles are established very early after contamination under the
influence of the early conditions prevailing immediately after contamination,such as soil moisture and first rain events, which may be the paramount indetermining the extent to which radionuclides will penetrate in depth (Br00).
The vertical migration of 137Cs and 90Sr in soil of different type of meadows has
been rather slow, and the greater fraction of radionuclides is still contained in
the upper soil layers (0-10 cm). The effective half-time of clearance from root
layer has been estimated to range from 10 to 25 years for 137Cs. Early after theaccident the transfer coefficients of 137Cs to plant decreased by 1.5 to 7 times
but later from the observed persisting mobility of radiocaesium, and particularly
the increase in effective ecological half lives tending towards the physical decay

46

rate of 137Cs, it now seems that the sorption-desorption process of radiocaesiumin soils and sediments is tending towards a reversible steady-state and thepractical consequences for plant contamination in the environment is thatfoodstuffs will remain contaminated for much longer than initially expected(Sm00).
The contribution of aquatic pathways to the dietary intake of 137Cs and
Sr is usually quite small, However the relative importance, in comparison toterrestrial pathways, may be high in some lakes of Scandinavia and in Russia. In
mountains we can observe by run-off some reconcentrations of the radioactivity
in lower areas and for example in the South part of the French alps the 137Cs
contamination was in 1992 about 20 000 Bq.m-3, corresponding to an activity of
1 760 Bq.kg-1 in soil samples. In some specific, small areas, (only a fraction of asquare meter) hot spots have been measured at 55 800 Bq.kg-1 in 1992,
314 000 Bq.kg-1 in 1995, and500 000 Bq.m-2 in 2000. These hot spots are theconsequences of the runoff of melting water coming from snow which fell after
the 1986 contamination of the upper part of the mountain. These hot spots havebeen found in small basins lower in the forest or under larchs where snow
accumulates. However these hot spots being of small surface (cm2 to m2) are
offwalking tracks, pose little risk of irradiation for hikers. For example, it has
been estimated that a hiker would receive about 0.001 mSv during a 4 hour restin the vicinity of such a hot-spot. (Ma 97). These hot-spots will remain active
for several decades, their decay following the physical half-life of 137Cs.
90

Drinking water in the affected areas is weakly contaminated, less than
1Bq of 137Cs or 90Sr per litre. The mean annual activity of 137Cs in the water of
Pripiat river and in the Kiev reservoirs has now stabilised within a range offrom 1 to 0.2 Bq.l-1 (Bq per litre), ten time higher than the values obtained
before the 1986 accident. The 90Sr activity of the Pripiat river is sometimes
higher than authorised levels for drinking water (2 Bq.l-1) due to meteorologicalconditions, rains and floods.
From 26 April to 6 March 1986, during the period of releases, the highest
levels of radioactivity measured in water of the Pripiat river was of the order of
100 000 Bq/l, principally from 131I. The activity in the Pripiat declined to arounda few thousand Bq/l by mid-May 1986, and to 200 Bq/l in June 1986. From theend of November 1986 to the beginning of 1987, the activity in the Pripiat was
rarely measured above 40 Bq/l. From 1987 on, 137Cs and 90Sr were the only
radionuclides measured in significant quantities. Since 1988, 90Sr is theradioelement of highest concentration in the waters of the Pripiat.
The chemical form of the 137Cs that was deposited is fairly insoluable,
and is not quickly extracted from soil by surface runoff water. Most of the 137Cs
47

transferred to the Pripiat river by runoff water came from the 30 km exclusionzone. As a result of this low solubility, only 1 to 5% of the initial 137Cs activity
reached the Black Sea, the rest accumulating in various reservoirs of the Dniepr,of which more than half stayed in the Kiev reservoir.
The activity of 90Sr in Pripiat river water is a few times higher than thelevel authorised for human consumption, 2 Bq/l. During flooding in the fall of
1988, 90Sr activity reached 9.6 Bq/l. As a result of significant blockage of water
during particularly high flooding, 90Sr concentrations reached 12.2 Bq/l in
January 1991, and 5.9 Bq/l in February 1994.
In 1986, during the accident and the following months, the 137Cs activity
released into the Dniepr was estimated to be 66 TBq. Subsequently, leachingfrom soils by surface water and floods resulted in a measurable increase ofradionuclide concentrations in the Pripiat river. The following Table 3 indicatesthe respective influxes of 137Cs and 90Sr in the Pripiat between 1986 and 1998,
as well as the resulting water concentrations.
The cities of Kiev, Kremenchug et Kahovsk are partly fed by Dniepr
reservoirs (see Figure 7). The table shows the annual average levels of 137Cs and90
Sr in the Pripiat river from 1986 to 1998 (Po01), but it could be observed
peaks of activity ten time higher during floods.
Graphs in the Figure 7 show the evolution ofconcentrations in these reservoirs from 1986 to 1998.

137

Cs and90

Sr

It has been shown that forests can deliver large radiation doses throughthe consumption of berries, mushrooms and game, but also through theindustrial use of forest products. Radiological consequences result from energy
production using radioactively contaminated biofuels from forests in the northof Europe and use of waste products or ashes and their recycling back to theforest as fertilizer.
On the forest podzolic soils, migration of 137Cs is pronounced, withincreased amounts in the mineral layers ten years after aerial distribution. Morethan a decade after Chernobyl accident, the total inventory is still rising in pinetrees of boreal forests. There is almost no 137Cs loss via runoff water fromboreal forest ecosystems except from the wetter portions of bogs.

48

Figure 7. Possible groundwater flow directions in the Dniepr basin
Cs and 90Sr concentrations in Bq/L-1, in the reservoirs of Kiev, Kremenchug
and Kahkovka. Black area reresent activities entering in the reservoirs, whiteareas activities leaving reservoirs (From Po01)

137

BELARUSCHERNIGOV
SUMY

a

Dn
ie

pr

at
ipy
Pr

De

sn

Liz

CHERNOBYLv
Tetere

en

KIEV

Ir
p

Zo
wy

th

res. of KIEVZHITOMIR

res. of KANEVCHERKASSY

Dnie

pr

res. of KREMENCHUG

KREMENCHUG
res.of DNEPROZERZHINSK
res. of DNEPROPETROVSKUKRAINEDNEPRODZERZHINSKDNEPROPETROVSKZAPOROZHE
Possible directions ofunderground water flows

NIKOPOL
res. of KACHOVKA

100 kmNIKOLAYEVKHERSON
KACHOVKAODESSA

BLACK SEACRIMEA

Credit: “Catastrophes et accidents nucléaires dans l’ex-union soviétique”, D. Robeau.

49

Table 3. Evolution of average radioactivity in the Pripiat river since theaccident in 1986 (From Poïkarpov and Robeau, 2001)

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Influx of137
Cs(TBq/a)Average spectrum
activity of 137Cs in the
Pripiat river (Bq/l)

Influx of90
Sr(TBq/a)Average spectrum
activity of 90Sr in the
Pripiat river (Bq/l)

66,2
12,8
9,48
6,44
4,63
2,9
1,92
3,48
2,96
1,15
1,3
1,7
2,95

6,95
1,65
0,73
0,521
0,359
0,208
0,206
0,208
0,197
0,11
0,129
0,158
0,137

27,6
10,4
18,7
8,97
10,1
14,4
4,14
14,2
14,2
3,4
3,42
2,68
6,37

2,9
1,34
1,44
0,725
0.783
1,033
0,445
0,838
0,946
0,326
0,340
0,25
0,296

More than 16 years after the accident, only 2 to 3% of the depositedradioactivity still remains in the aerial part of the vegetation.
Since the accident, wood marketing has become regulated. Depending
upon the intended use of harvested wood regulatory levels vary from 740 to
11 000 Bq 137Cs kg-1, which result in 30% of the Pine trees in the exclusion zone
not being harvestable.
At this stage in time, the transfer of material by resuspension from moreto less contaminated areas is not significant. The classical farming practices,mechanical treatment such as ploughing and mulching and the use of fertilisers
are efficient countermeasures.
However, one year after the accident a storm resuspended depositedradioactivity in the exclusion zone, and the radioactivity of air in the Pripiat city
increased by a factor of 1 000 and reached 300 Bq.m-3. Fires in forests have also
led to increases of radioactivity. In 1992, in the vicinity of exclusion zone,
radioactivity due to forest fires reached 20 Bq.m-3 for beta emitters and
70 mBq.m-3 from plutonium isotopes. Monitoring stations far from these zones
registered some peaks of radioactivity.

50

In summary
It can be stated that there is now a fairly accurate estimate of the total
radioactivity release, and the last years have strengthened previous evaluations.
The duration of the release was unexpectedly long, lasting more than a weekwith two periods of intense release. Another peculiar feature was the significant
emission (about 4%) of fuel material which also contained embedded
radionuclides of low volatility such as cerium, zirconium and the actinides. The
composition and characteristics of the radioactive material in the plume changed
during its passage due to wet and dry deposition, decay, chemical transformations and alterations in particle size. The area affected was particularly
large due to the high altitude and long duration of the release as well as changes
in wind direction. However, the pattern of deposition was very irregular, andsignificant deposition of radionuclides occurred where the passage of the plumecoincided with rainfall. Although all the Northern hemisphere was affected,
only territories of the former Soviet Union and part of Europe experienced
contamination to a significant degree. The environmental behaviour ofdeposited radionuclides is increasingly well known. More than sixteen years
after the accident, radionuclides are still in the first layers of soils, maintaining atransfer to plants, particularly mushrooms, berries and forest products.
Moreover the change of speciation of 137Cs in some soils has led to the fact thatfoodstuffs will remain contaminated for much longer than initially expected(Sm00). With the exception of some water tables, the contamination ofenvironment is very well known. Contamination levels in soils decrease only
slowly, mostly by transfer to plants. Most of the decrease in the coming years
will be at only the rate of the physical half-life of 137Cs.

51

Chapter III
REACTIONS OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIESThe scale and severity of the Chernobyl accident with its widespreadradioactive contamination had not been foreseen and took by surprise mostnational authorities responsible for emergency preparedness. No provisions had
been made for an accident of such scale and, though some radiation protection
authorities had made criteria available for intervention in an accident, thesewere often incomplete and provided little practical help in the circumstances, sothat very few workable national guidelines or principles were actually in place.
Those responsible for making national decisions were suddenly faced with anaccident for which there were no precedents upon which to base their decisions.
In addition, early in the course of the accident there was little information
available, and considerable political pressure, partially based on the public
perception of the radiation danger, was being exerted on the decision makers. In
these circumstances, cautious immediate action was felt necessary, andmeasures were introduced that tended to err, sometimes excessively so, on theside of prudence rather than being driven by informed scientific and expert
judgement.
Within the former Soviet Union
The town of Pripyat was not severely contaminated by the initial releaseof radionuclides, but, once the graphite fire started, it soon became obvious that
contamination would make the town uninhabitable. Late on 26 April it was
decided to evacuate the town, and arrangements for transport andaccommodation of the evacuees were made. The announcement of evacuation
was made at 11:00 hr the following day. Evacuation began at 14:00 hr, andPripyat was evacuated in about two and one half hours. As measurements
disclosed the extensive pattern of deposition of radionuclides, and it waspossible to make dose assessments, the remainder of the people in a 30-km zone
around the reactor complex were gradually evacuated, bringing the total
evacuees to about 135 000.

53

Other countermeasures to reduce dose were widely adopted (Ko90).
Decontamination procedures performed by military personnel included thewashing of buildings, cleaning residential areas, removing contaminated soil,
cleaning roads and decontaminating water supplies. Special attention was paid
to schools, hospitals and other buildings used by large numbers of people.
Streets were watered in towns to suppress dust. However, the effectiveness ofthese countermeasures outside the 30-km zone was small. An attempt to reduce
thyroid doses by the administration of stable iodine to block radioactive uptake
by the thyroid was made (Me92), but its success was doubtful.
The Soviet National Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP)
proposed a 350-mSv lifetime dose intervention level for the relocation of
population groups (Il87). This value was lower by a factor of 2 to 3 than thatrecommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection(ICRP) for the same countermeasure. Nevertheless, this value proposed by the
NCRP was strongly criticised as being a very high level. The situation was
further complicated by the political and social tension in the Soviet Union atthat time. As a result, the NCRP proposal was not adopted by the Supreme
Soviet. Later, a special Commission was established which developed newrecommendations for intervention levels. These recommendations were basedon the levels of ground contamination by the radionuclides 137Cs, 90Sr and 239Pu.
As has been mentioned above, large areas were contaminated mainly by 137Cs
and a ground contamination level by this radionuclide of 1 480 kBq/m2 wasused as the intervention criterion for permanent resettlement of population, andof 555 to 1 480 kBq/m2 for temporary relocation.
People who continued to live in the heavily contaminated areas were
given compensation and offered annual medical examinations by thegovernment. Residents of less contaminated areas are provided with medical
monitoring. Current decisions on medical actions are based on annual doses.
Compensation is provided for residents whose annual dose is greater than
1mSv. The use of locally produced milk and mushrooms is restricted in some ofthese areas. Relocation is considered in Russia for annual doses above 5 mSv.
As is mentioned in the section on health impacts effects, in Chapter V,
the Soviet authorities did not foresee that their attempts to compensate thoseaffected by the accident would be misinterpreted by the recipients and increase
their stress, and that the label of “radiophobia” attributed to these phenomena
was not only incorrect, but was one that alienated the public even more. Someof these initial approaches have been recognised as being inappropriate and theauthorities are endeavouring to rectify their attitude to the exposed population.

54

Outside the former Soviet Union
The progressive spread of contamination at large distances from theaccident site has caused considerable concern in Member countries, and thereactions of national authorities to this situation have been extremely varied,
ranging from a simple intensification of the normal environmental monitoring
programmes, without adoption of any specific countermeasures, to compulsory
restrictions concerning the marketing and consumption of foodstuffs. Thisvariety of responses has been accompanied by significant differences in thetiming and duration of the countermeasures.
In general, the most widespread countermeasures were those which were
not expected to impose, in the short time for which they were in effect, asignificant burden on lifestyles or the economy. These included advice to wash
fresh vegetables and fruit before consumption, advice not to use rainwater for
drinking or cooking, and programmes of monitoring citizens returning frompotentially contaminated areas. In reality, experience has shown that even thesetypes of measures had, in some cases, a negative impact which was not
insignificant.
Protective actions having a more significant impact on dietary habits andimposing a relatively important economic and regulatory burden included
restrictions or prohibitions on the marketing and consumption of milk, dairy
products, fresh leafy vegetables and some types of meat, as well as the controlof the outdoor grazing of dairy cattle. In some areas, prohibitions were placedon travel to areas affected by the accident and on the import of foodstuffs fromthe Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. In most Member countries,
restrictions were imposed on the import of foodstuffs from Member as well as
non-member countries.
The range of these reactions can be explained primarily by the diversityof local situations both in terms of uneven levels of contamination and in termsof national differences in administrative, regulatory and public health systems.
However, one of the principal reasons for the variety of situations observed in
Member countries stems from the criteria adopted for the choice and applicationof intervention levels for the implementation of protective actions. In thisrespect, while the general radiation protection principles underlying the actions
taken in most Member countries following the accident have been very similar,
discrepancies arose in the assessment of the situation and the adoption andapplication of operational protection criteria. These discrepancies were further
enhanced by the overwhelming role played in many cases by non-radiologicalfactors, such as socio-economic, political and psychological, in determining thecountermeasures.
55

This situation caused concern and confusion among the public,
perplexities among the experts and difficulties to national authorities, especiallyin maintaining their public credibility. This was, therefore, identified as an area
where several lessons should be learned from the accident and efforts directed
towards better international harmonisation of the scientific bases and coordination of concepts and measures for the protection of the public in case of
emergency.
Nowhere was this problem better illustrated than by the way that
contaminated food was handled. In some countries outside the Soviet Union themain source of exposure to the general population was the consumption ofcontaminated food. Mechanisms to handle locally produced as well as imported
contaminated food had to be put in place within a few weeks of the accident.
National authorities were in an unenviable position. They had to act quickly andcautiously to introduce measures to protect the “purity” of the public foodsupply and, what is more, they had to be seen to be effective in so doing. This
inevitably led to some decisions which even at the time appeared to be overreactions and not scientifically justified. In addition, dissenting opinions amongexperts added to the difficulties of the decision makers.
Some countries without nuclear power programmes and whose own food
was not contaminated, argued that they did not need to import any “tainted”
food and refused any food containing any radionuclides whatsoever. This
extreme and impracticable measure might well have been regarded as an
example of how well the authorities of those countries were protecting thehealth of their population. Sometimes this attitude appeared to promote aneighbourly rivalry between countries to see which could set the more stringent
standards for food contamination, as though, by so doing, their own citizens
were more protected. The result was that often slightly contaminated food wasdestroyed or refused importation to avoid only trivial doses.
In 1986, the EC imposed a ban on the importation of food containing
more than 370 Bq/kg of radiocaesium for milk products and 600 Bq/kg for any
other food, regardless of the quantity consumed in the average European diet.
Thus, food items with a trivial consumption (and dose), such as spices, weretreated the same as items of high consumption such as vegetables. However,these values were later relaxed for some food items in order to remove
inconsistent treatment of food groups.
In some special circumstances, decisions had to be made based on thelocal situation. For example, in some Northern European communities, reindeer
meat is a major component of the diet; due to the ecological circumstances,these animals tend to concentrate radiocaesium, which will then expose the56populations which depend on them. Special countermeasures, such as pasturingreindeer in areas of lower contamination, were introduced in some countries toavoid this exposure.
The variety of solutions led to confusion and made any international
consensus on Derived Intervention Levels for food extremely difficult toachieve, and it was only with the WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Meeting in
Geneva in 1989 that any agreement was reached on guideline values for theradioactivity of food moving in international trade (Table 4).
Table 4. Codex Alimentarius Guideline values for food moving
in international trade (FA91)
Foods for general consumption
Radionuclide

Level (Bq/kg)

241

Am, 239Pu
90
Sr
131 134
I, Cs, 137Cs

10
100
1 000

Infant foods and milk241

Am, 239Pu
I, 90Sr134
Cs, 137Cs

1
100
1 000

131

It should be remembered that these guideline values were developed tofacilitate international trade in food, and should be regarded as levels “below
which no restrictions to trade need be implemented for radiological reasons”.
Levels above these do not necessarily constitute a health hazard, and if found,the competent national authority should review what action should be taken.
Often the national authorities were not able accurately to predict the
public response to some of their advice and pronouncements. For example, insome European countries, soon after the accident the public were advised towash leafy vegetables. The national authority felt that this was innocuous advice
as most people washed their vegetables anyway, and they were unprepared forthe public response which was to stop buying these vegetables. This resulted insignificant economic loss to local producers which far outweighed any potential
benefit in terms of radiological health.

57

In some countries, the public was told that the risks were very small but,at the same time, were given advice on how to reduce these low risks. It wasvery difficult to explain this apparently contradictory advice, and the national
authority came under criticism from the media (Sj87). Outside the Soviet
Union, the initial confusion led to inconsistent and precipitate actions which,although understandable, were sometimes ill-advised and unjustified.
However, it should be emphasised that great progress has been madesince this early confusion. As a result of the actions of the internationalorganisations to harmonise intervention criteria and the willingness of countries
to cooperate in this endeavour, a firm groundwork for uniform criteria based on
accepted radiation protection principles has been established, so that relative
consistency can hopefully be expected in their implementation in the event of a
possible future nuclear accident.
More recent decisions
Today, territories where populations receive a dose lower than 1 mSv per
year are declared as zones permitting normal life. For areas higher than
1 mSv/year authorities continue to give social compensations, depending on thedose. Areas where annual dose is higher than 20 mSv per year are exclusion
zones. With the new estimation of doses, some settlements in Russia have losttheir status as contaminated area by a decree (N° 5924, 18 December 1997)
which came into operation the 1 February 1998. This decision was badly
received by local populations and local authorities.
The opposite is also true, as of the 1st of January 1999, 8 397 people werestill living in areas where evacuation is an obligation (contamination higher than
30 Ci.km-2).
The relocation of evacuees has not been completely resolved, as of 2000,
more than 11 000 evacuees are still living in temporary provisory settlements.
Limits on trade exchange of agricultural productions were the same forthe three republics up to 1997. They were lowered a first time in 1987, a second
time in 1991 in the three republics, but in Ukraine these limits were lowered afourth time on 25 June 1997 and now apply to four main products: 100 Bq per
litre for milk (instead of 370 Bq/l in 1991); 200 Bq/kg for meat (instead 740 in1991); 20 Bq/kg for bread and potatoes (instead of, respectively, 370 and 600
since 1991). In Russia, with the exception of Briansk, and Kalouga areas (jizdra,
Khvastovitchi and Oulianovskii), a new regulation was adopted the first of58

March 1998 (SanPiN 2.3.2.560-96) for agricultural products and for milk thelimit is now 50 Bq.kg-1 of 137Cs (Bo99) (Table 5).
Table 5. Evolution of limits for trade exchange since 1986 in Russia,
Bielorussia and Ukraine, the italics values for 1997 are only for Ukraine

87

88

91

93

97
(Ukraine)

98(Russia)

370

370

370

370

370

100

50

Meat

3 700

1 850

1 850

740

740

200

Bread

370

370

370

370

370

20

Potatoes

3 700

740

740

600

600

20

06 May 86 30 may 86
Milk

3700

In Russia, more than ten years after the accident, several programmes
have been agreed upon to compensate for the delays in the implemantation ofprevious plans. A national centre of ecological medicine has been created in
St.-Petersburg for health assistance to the liquidators. It can provide up to
1 500 sick people per year with high quality medical treatment. This centres was
expanded to other national hospitals in the Russian federation. Ten expert
councils have been created to establish a potential links between diseases andthe Chernobyl accident. Four socio-psychological readaptation centres havebeen created in the Bryansk, Orel and Toula areas in Russia. These centers havebeen charged with delivering justice, social and psychological assistance to all
those affected by the accident. Lastly a dosimetry register has been created, in
1999, in which more than 500 000 people have been registered (including
170 000 liquidators).
Several significant programmes were launched during 1998-2000, to takein account the huge delay of all national programmes, Including a National
programme for the protection of the public, a Programme for Chernobyl
children, and a Programme for settlements for liquidators (Bo99).
Lastly the Russian authorities are aware that some aspects of current
federal law must be changed to eliminate significant obstacles to ending certain
programmes that no longer contribute to the elimination of the consequences of
the accident.

59

In summary
The Chernobyl accident took authorities by surprise as regards to its
extent, duration and far reaching contamination. As there were no guidelines forsuch an accident, little information was available and great political and publicpressure to do something were experienced, overprecautious decisions were
often taken in and outside the Soviet Union. The social and psychologicalimpact of some official decisions on the public were not expacted, and variableinterpretations or even misinterpretations of ICRP recommendations, especiallyfor intervention levels for food, led to inconsistent decisions and advice. These
added to public confusion and provoked mistrust and unnecessary economic
losses. However, there were exceptions, and very soon international efforts
began to harmonise criteria and approaches to emergency management.
More than 16 years later the confusion still exist in spite of significant
international efforts of harmonization. For example, in 1997 the Ukrain
unilaterally lowered its radiological restrictions on trade, below the levels
previously harmonised for Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine, reinforces thisconfusion. Lastly, the Russian federation has realised the need to change some
apects of its former law, which has become an obstacle to appropriately
addressing accident consequences.

60

Chapter IV
DOSE ESTIMATES*The exposure of the population as a result of the accident resulted in two
main pathways of exposure. The first is the radiation dose to the thyroid as aresult of the concentration of radioiodine and similar radionuclides in the gland.
The second is the whole-body dose caused largely by external irradiation
mainly from radiocesium.
The absorbed dose to the whole body is thought to be about 20 times
more deleterious, in terms of late health effects incidence, than the same dose to
the thyroid (IC90).
The population exposed to radiation following the Chernobyl accident
can be divided into four categories: (1) the staff of the nuclear power plant andworkers who participated in clean-up operations (referred to as “liquidators”);(2) the nearby residents who were evacuated from the 30-km zone during thefirst two weeks after the accident; (3) the population of the former Soviet
Union, including especially the residents of contaminated areas; and (4) the
population in countries outside the former Soviet Union.
A number of liquidators, estimated at up to 600 000 (civilian and militaryaccording to laws promulgated in Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine)
took part in mitigation activities at the reactor and within the 30-km zone
surrounding the reactor. The most exposed workers were the firemen and thepower plant personnel during the first days of the accident. Most of the dose
received by the workers resulted from external irradiation from the fuelfragments and radioactive particles deposited on various surfaces. Of particularinterest are the 226 000 recovery operation workers who were employed in the
30-km zone in 1986-1987, as it is in this period that the highest doses were*Special thanks to Dr. André Bouville, of the US National Cancer Institute, for his
verification of the facts in this Chapter.

61

received. The remainder of the recovery operation workers, who generally
received lower doses, amounted to about 400 000 (UN00).
About 116 000 people were evacuated during the first days following theaccident, mainly from the 30-km zone surrounding the reactor. Prior toevacuation, those individuals were exposed to external irradiation fromradioactive materials transported by the cloud and deposited on the ground, as
well as to internal irradiation essentially due to the inhalation of radioactive
materials in the cloud.
The relative contributions to the external whole-body dose from the mainradionuclides of concern for that pathway of exposure and during the first few
months after the accident are shown in Figure 8. It is clear that 132Te played amajor role in the first week after the accident, and that, after one month, theradiocaesiums (134Cs and 137Cs) became predominant. Subsequently, however,134
Cs decayed to levels much lower than those of 137Cs, which became after a
few years the only radionuclide of importance for practical purposes. It is usual
to refer to 137Cs only, even when the mix of 134Cs and 137Cs is meant, because
the values for the constituents can be easily derived from those for 137Cs.
With regard to internal doses from inhalation and ingestion ofradionuclides, the situation is similar: radioiodine (131I) was important during
the first few weeks after the accident and gave rise to thyroid doses via
inhalation of contaminated air, and, more importantly, via consumption ofcontaminated foodstuffs, mainly cow’s milk. After about one month, theradiocaesiums (134Cs and 137Cs) again became predominant, and, after a few
years, 137Cs became the only radionuclide of importance for practical purposes,
even though 90Sr may in the future play a significant role at short distances fromthe reactor.
Among the population of the former Soviet Union, it is usual to single out
the residents of the contaminated areas, defined as those with 137Cs depositionlevels greater than 37 kBq/m2. About 5 million people live in such areas. Of
special interest are the inhabitants of the spots with 137Cs deposition levels
greater than 555 kBq/m2. In those areas, called “strict control zones”, protection
measures are applied, especially as far as control of consumption ofcontaminated food is concerned. In 1998, 42 554 measurements were performedin the Federal Republic of Russia, and the national authorities are planning tomaintain such controls beyond 2000 (Bo99). In 1986, shortly after the accident,
the All-Union Dose Registry (AUDR) was set up by the Soviet Government torecord medical and dosimetric data on the population groups expected to be themost exposed: (1) the liquidators, (2) the evacuees from the 30-km zone, (3) the
inhabitants of the contaminated areas, and (4) the children of those people. In
62

1991, the AUDR contained data on 659 292 persons. Starting from 1992,
national registries in Belarus, Russian Federation, and Ukraine replaced the
AUDR.
Outside the former Soviet Union, the radionuclides of importance are,again, the radioiodines and radiocaesiums, which, once deposited on the ground,give rise to doses from ingestion through the consumption of foodstuffs.
Deposited radiocaesium is also a source of long-term exposure from external
irradiation from the contaminated ground and other surfaces. Most of the
population of the Northern hemisphere was exposed, in varying degrees, toradiation from the Chernobyl accident. The 137Cs deposition outside the former
Soviet Union ranged from negligible levels to about 50 kBq/m2.
The liquidators
Most of the liquidators can be divided into two groups: (1) the people
who were working at the Chernobyl power station at the time of the accident
viz. the staff of the station and the firemen and people who went to the aid of
the victims. They number a few hundred persons; and (2) the workers, estimatedto amount up to 600 000, who were active in 1986-1990 at the power station orin the zone surrounding it for the decontamination, sarcophagus construction
and other recovery operations.
On the night of 26 April 1986, about 400 workers were on the site of theChernobyl power plant. As a consequence of the accident, they were subjectedto the combined effect of radiation from several sources: (1) external
gamma/beta radiation from the radioactive cloud, the fragments of the damaged
reactor core scattered over the site and the radioactive particles deposited on theskin, and (2) inhalation of radioactive particles (UN88).
All of the dosimeters worn by the workers were over-exposed and did notallow an estimate of the doses received. However, information is available on
the doses received by the 237 persons who were placed in hospitals anddiagnosed as suffering from acute radiation syndrome. Using biologicaldosimetry, it was estimated that 41 of these patients received whole-body doses
from external irradiation in the range 1-2 Sv, that 50 received doses between
2 and 4 Sv, that 22 received between 4 and 6 Sv, and that the remaining
21 received doses between 6 and 16 Sv. In addition, it was estimated fromthyroid measurements that the thyroid dose from inhalation would range up to
about 20 Gy, with 173 individuals in the 0-1.2 Gy range and seven workers withthyroid doses greater than 11 Gy (UN88). Internal exposure of those workers
was mainly due to 131I and shorter-lived radioiodines, the median value of the63

ratio of the internal thyroid dose to the external effective dose was estimated tobe 0.3 Gy per Sv. The doses resulting from intakes of other radionuclides wasestimated to about 30 mSv for the early months following the accident and
85 mSv for committed dose (UN00).
The second category of liquidators consists of the large number of adults
who were recruited to assist in the clean-up operations. They worked at the site,
in towns, forests and agricultural areas to make them fit to work and live in.
About 600 000 of individuals participated in this work. Initially, about 240 000of those workers came from the Soviet armed forces, the other half including
personnel of civil organisations, the security service, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, and other organisations. The total number of liquidators has yet to be
determined accurately, since only some of the data from some of thoseorganisations have been collected so far in the national registries of Belarus,
Russia, Ukraine and other republics of the former Soviet Union (So95). Also, it
has been suggested that, because of the social and economic advantages
associated with being designated a liquidator, many persons have contrived
latterly to have their names added to the list. To day the total number ofrecovery operation workers recorded in the registries appears to be about
400 000 well below the figure of 600 000, which corresponds to the number ofpeople who have received special certificates confirming their status asliquidators. The workers were all adults, mostly males aged 20-45 years.
There are only fragmented data on the doses received by theseliquidators. Attempts to establish a dosimetric service were inadequate until the
middle of June of 1986, until then, doses were estimated from area radiation
measurements. The doses to the recovery operation workers who participated in
mitigation activities within two months after the accident are not known withmuch certainty. The liquidators were initially subjected to a radiation dose limit
for one year of 250 mSv. In 1987 this limit was reduced to 100 mSv and in1988 to 50 mSv (Ba93). The registry data show that the average recorded dosesin the three national registries decreased from year to year, being about
170 mSv in 1986, 130 mSv in 1987, 30 mSv in 1988 and 15 mSv in 1989
(Se95a). It is, however, difficult to assess the validity of the results as they havebeen reported since these statistics indicates that the dose is known for only
52% of workers for the period 1986-1989, with a lower percentage, 45% for the
first year. Moreover uncertainties associated with dose estimations are assessed
to be up to 50% for individual dosimetry, (if the dosimeter was correctly used),
up to a factor 3 to 5 for group and time-and-motion dosimetry However, thedoses do not seem to have been systematically overestimated, because
biological dosimetry performed on limited number of workers produced resultscompatible with physical dose estimates.

64

It is interesting to note that a small special group of 672 scientists fromthe Kurchatov Institute who have worked periodically inside the sarcophagus
for a number of years have initially estimated accumulated whole-body doses in
the range 0.5 to 13 Gy (Se95a). These dose estimates had been reestimated.
Recorded and calculated doses available for 501 workers show that more than
20% of them received doses between 0.05 and 0.25 Sv and about 5% of themreceived doses between 0.25 and 1.5 Sv (Sh97) Additional analysis by mean of
FISH technique for three of them resulted in doses 0.9, 2.0 and 2.7 Sv (Sh00)
While no deterministic effects have been noted to date, this group may wellshow radiation health effects in the future.
More than sixteen years after the accident, comparisons between the
different techniques of dosimetry confirm the effectiveness of the chromosome
aberration technique, but indicate that some new methods recommended bysome scientists, such as fluorescent in situ hybridisation (FISH), do not appear
to be a sufficiently sensitive or specific to allow the estimation of doses for the
majority of recovery operation workers (Li98).
The evacuees from the 30-km zone
Immediately after the accident monitoring of the environment was started
by gamma dose rate measurements. About 20 hours after the accident the wind
turned in the direction of Pripyat, gamma dose rates increased significantly inthe town, and it was decided to evacuate the inhabitants. About 20 hours laterthe 49 000 inhabitants of Pripyat had left the town in nearly 1 200 buses. Abouta further 67 000 people were evacuated in the following days and weeks (infact, until September) from the contaminated areas (a number of 86 000 people
given in the NEA’s 1996 report (NE95b) was not substantiated).
Information relevant for the assessment of the doses received by thesepeople have been obtained by 30 000 responses of the evacuees toquestionnaires about the location where they stayed, the types of houses inwhich they lived, the consumption of stable iodine, and other activities (Li94).
The average effective dose from external irradiation was estimated to be
17 mSv, with individual values varying from 0.1 to 380 mSv (Li94). This value
is concordant with the absorbed dose of 20 mGy estimated by Electron Spinresonance (ESR) measurements of sugar and exposure rate calculations (Na94).
The main source of uncertainty in the estimation of the average effective
doses from external irradiation is the assessment of the activity ratios of 132Te
and 131I to 137Cs in the deposition.

65

Doses to the thyroid gland
The iodine activity in thyroid glands of evacuees was measured. Morethan about 5 000 measurements of former inhabitants of Pripyat had sufficientquality to be useful for dose reconstruction (Go95a). A comparative analysis
with the questionnaire responses of 10 000 evacuees showed that thyroid doses
were mainly due to inhalation of 131I. Average individual doses and collective
doses to the thyroid are shown in Table 6 for three age groups. Individual dosesin the age classes were distributed over two orders of magnitude. The main
factor influencing the individual doses was found to be the distance of theresidence from the reactor.
Table 6. Average doses to the thyroid gland and collective thyroid doses tothe evacuees from Pripyat (Go95a)
Year of birth

Number ofpeopleAverage individual
dose (Gy)

Collective dose
(person-Gy)

1983-1986
1971-1982
≤1970

2 400
8 100
38 900

1.4
0.3
0.07

3 300
2 400
2 600

Assessments of the doses to the thyroid gland of the evacuees from the
30-km zone (Li93a) showed similar doses for young children as those for the
Pripyat evacuees. Exposures to adults were higher. These high doses were due
to a greater consumption of food contaminated with 131I among those evacuatedlater from the 30-km zone.
Whole-body doses
The whole-body doses to the evacuees were mainly due to external
exposure from deposited 132Te/132I, 134Cs and 137Cs and short lived radionuclides
in the air. Measurements of the gamma dose rate in air were performed every
hour at about thirty sites in Pripyat and daily at about eighty sites in the 30-km
zone. Based on these measurements and using the responses to thequestionnaires, whole-body doses were reconstructed for the 90 000 persons
evacuated from the Ukrainian part of the 30-km zone (Li94). There was a wide
range of estimated doses with an average value of 15 mSv. The collective dose
was assessed to be 1 300 person-Sv. The 24 000 persons evacuated in Belarus
might have received slightly higher doses, since the prevailing wind was
initially towards the north.

66

The estimates of collective doses for the populations that were evacuatedin 1986 from the contaminated areas of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine was about
3 800 man Sv for effective dose and 25 000 man Gy for thyroid doses (UN00).
Most of the collective doses were received by the populations of Belarus andUkraine.
Because the distributions of iodine tablets was done with a one-week
delay and because only part of the population was covered, the averted
collective thyroid dose from ingestion of contaminated milk was about 30% of
the expected collective thyroid dose from that pathway while the thyroid doses
from inhalation remained unchanged.
People living in the contaminated areas
Areas contaminated by the Chernobyl accident have been defined withreference to the background level of 137Cs deposition caused by the atmosphericweapons tests, which when corrected for radioactive decay to 1986, is about
2-4 kBq m-2. considering variations about this level, it is usual to specify thelevel of 37 kBq m-2 as the area affected by the Chernobyl accident.
Approximately 3% of the European part of the former USSR was
contaminated with 137Cs deposition density greater than 37 kBq.m-2. Many
people continue to live in these contaminated territories, although efforts havebeen made to limit their doses, 4 400 000 inhabitants were living in areas with a137
Cs contamination ranging from 37 to 185 kBq.m-2, 580 000 in areas
185-555 kBq.m-2. Areas of 137Cs deposition density greater than 555 kBq km-2
were designated as areas of strict control. In these areas, preventive measures
have been successfully maintained annual effective dose below 5 mSv. Becauseof extensive migration, the number of people living in these areas under strict
control was about 193 000 people in 1995, down from 273 000 in 1986-1987.
In the first few months, because of the significant release of the shortterm 131I, the thyroid was the most exposed organ, the main route of exposure
was cow-milk pathway. During the first year after the accident, doses fromexternal irradiation arose from ground deposition of radionuclides with halflives of one year or less only in areas close to the reactor, but the radiocesiums
deposition was the greater contributors in more distant areas only one monthafter the accident. Over the following years, the doses received by the
populations living in contaminated areas have come essentially from external
exposure due to 134Cs and 137Cs deposited on the soil and internal exposure due
to contamination of foodstuffs by these two isotopes.

67

A very large number of measurements have been done in the three
republics. The publications prepared for regulatory purposes, tend to overestimate the average doses that were received during the years 1986-1990.
Figure 8. Contributions of radionuclides to the absorbed dose rate in air ina contaminated area of the Russian Federation during the first
several months after the Chernobyl accident

80
70
132 Te + 132I

Percentage

6050

134 Cs40

137 Cs

30
20

131 I

106 Ru10

Other
140 Ba + 140La

0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90 100 110 120 130 140 150

Time after accident (days)

Credit: Sources and Effects of Ionising Radiation – United Nations Scientific Committee on
the Effects of Atomic Radiation – UNSCEAR 2000 report to the General Assembly with
Scientific Annexes – Volume II: Effects, United Nations.

68Doses to the thyroid gland
The main information source for the dose reconstruction is the vast
number of iodine activity measurements of thyroid glands. In Ukraine
150 000 measurements, in Belarus several hundreds of thousands of measurements and in the Russian Federation more than 60 000 measurements were
performed in May/June 1986. Some of the measurements were performed withinadequate instrumentation and measurement conditions and are not useful fordose assessment purposes. Using these measurements, the thyroid dose forpeople who lived in areas where direct thyroid measurements were done withina few weeks after the accident are being reconstructed using available data on
131
I and 137Cs deposition.
The influence of having taken stable iodine for prophylactic purposes has
usually not been taken into account in the determination of thyroid doses(except for the evacuees from Pripyat, iodine prophylaxis was not effective in
reducing the doses substantially as it was done too late).
The large variability of individual doses makes estimates of dose
distributions difficult and current dose estimates are still subject to considerable
uncertainties, especially in areas where only a few activity measurements in the
thyroid were performed. Children in the Gomel oblast (region) in Belarus
received the highest doses. The distribution of estimated individual doses in the
thyroid of 0-7 years children is shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Distribution of estimated individual doses in the thyroid of
0-7 years old children in Gomel and Mogilev contaminated districts
Gomel

Mogilev

Total

<0.05

784

256

1040

0.05-0.1

527

339

866

0.1-0.3

1762

586

2348

0.3-1

3573

476

4049

1-2

1983

119

2102

>2

5727

44

5771

69

For the total population of Belarus, the average dose to the thyroid is
0.9 to 1 Gy for 0-7-year-old children and 0.3 Gy for the total population giving
collective doses of 34 000 and 134 000 man Gy respectively. (Il91) For the
populations of the three republics, the collective thyroid doses are roughly
estimated to 550 000, 200-300 000, 390 000 man Gy for Belarus, RussianFederation and Ukraine respectively (UN00). The average thyroid dose received
by the populations of the three republics is estimated to be 7 mGy andexceeding 1 Gy for the most exposed children (UN00). In the eight mostcontaminated districts of Ukraine where thyroid measurements were performed,
the collective dose to this age group was about 60 000 person-Sv and for thewhole population about 200 000 person-Sv (Li93). In the Russian Federation
the collective dose to the whole population was about 100 000 person-Sv(Zv93).
The thyroid doses are about two times greater in rural areas than in urban
aeras.
An estimate of the dose distribution among children from Gomel oblast is
shown in Table 8. For the whole Belarus the collective thyroid dose to children(0 to 14 years) at the time of the accident was assessed to be about
170 000 person-Gy (Ri94). To day the UNSCEAR report give an estimation of
34 000 man Gy to 0-7 year old children (UN00).
Table 8. Distribution of thyroid doses to children (0-15 years)
in the Gomel oblast of Belarus (from UN00)<1 year

1-7 years

8-15 years

<0.05

134

650

1 058

0.05-0.1

58

469

884

0.1-0.3

224

1 538

2 998

0.3-1

587

2 986

4 729

1-2

318

1 665

1 563

>2

3 667

2 060

1 107

In some Russian villages average doses exceeded 1 Gy, and individual
doses exceeded 10 Gy.
Limited information is available on in utero thyroid doses. In a study in
250 children, born between may 1986 and February 1987 in Belarus, thyroid70

doses were estimated to range up to 4.3 Gy, with 135 children exposed to lessthan 0.3 Gy, 95 children between 0.3 and 1 Gy, and 20 children with doses
greater than 1.Gy (Ig99).
Evaluations of questionnaires on food consumption rates in the period
May/June 1986 and measurements of food contamination showed 131I in milk as
the major source for the thyroid exposure of the population living in thecontaminated areas. However, in individual cases the consumption of fresh
vegetables contributed significantly to the exposure.
Whole-body doses
Two major pathways contributed to the whole-body doses of the
population in contaminated areas, the exposure to external irradiation from
deposited radionuclides (Iv95) and the incorporation into the body of radiocaesium in food.
The external exposure is directly related to the radionuclide activity perunit area and it is influenced by the gamma dose rates in air at the locations ofoccupancy. Forestry workers and other workers living in woodframe houses
received the highest doses.
Most of the higher contaminated areas are rural and a large part of thediet is locally produced. Therefore, the uptake of caesium by the plants from thesoil is a deciding factor in the internal exposure. These are regions withextraordinarily high transfer factors, as the Rovno region in Ukraine, where
even moderate soil contamination led to high doses. In order of decreasing
magnitude of transfer factors these regions are followed by regions with peatysoil, sandy podzol (acidic infertile forest soil), loamy podzol, and chernozem
which is rich black soil.
In the first years after the accident the caesium uptake was dominatedpractically everywhere by the consumption of locally produced milk (Ho94).
However, later mushrooms began to contribute significantly in many
settlements to the caesium incorporation for two reasons. First, the milk
contamination decreased with time, whereas the mushroom contamination
remained relatively constant. Second, due to changes in the economic
conditions in the three republics, people are collecting more mushrooms thanthey were in the first years after the accident.
The normalised lifetime doses for urban and rural populations of the three
republics is now estimated to range from 42 to 88 6YSHUN%TP-2 of 137Cs, 60%
being received during the first 10 years. These values are lower than the first71

estimates, because they are more realistic and take account of, for example, thevertical migration of cesium in soils. During the first 10 years after the accident,
average effective doses in theses areas ranged from 5mSv in Russian urban
areas to 11 mSv in the rural areas of Ukraine. The variability of dose
distribution could be represented by a log-normal distribution with a geometricstandard deviation of 1.54. The decontamination measures had a limited impact
on members of population. It was expected that less than 15% of the dose could
be averted for the general population, and only 35% for school children. The
total averted collective dose attributable to decontamination procedures wasestimated to 1 500 mSv for the first four years.
The distribution of the collective dose from external irradiation by region
and dose interval are presented in Table 9 and 10.
Table 9. Estimated collective effective dose to the populations ofcontaminated areas (1986-1995) excluding thyroid dose
RegionPopulation

Collective effective dose (man Gy)
External

Internal

Total

Belarus1 880 612

9 636

5 504

15 140RussianFederation

1 983 000

8 450

4 990

13 440

Ukraine

1 296 000

6 100

7 860

13 960Total

5 159 600

24 18618 35442 540

Table 10. Distribution of estimated total effective doses received by the
populations of contaminated areas (1986-1995) excluding thyroid dose
Number of persons
Dose interval (mGy)

Belarus

RussianFederation

Ukraine<1

133 053

155 301–

1-51163 490

1 253 130330 900

5-20

439 620474 176807 900

20-50

113 789

82 876148 700

50-10025 065

14 5807 700

100-200

5 105

2 979

400

>200

790

333

–

72

Table 11 summarises an estimate of whole-body doses to people living in
the higher contaminated areas. On average, external irradiation was by far thehighest contributor to the total population exposure (Er94). However, thehighest doses to individuals were produced by the consumption of food fromareas with high transfers of radionuclides.
Table 11. Distribution of external and total whole-body doses
during 1986-89, to inhabitants of contaminated areas(137Cs activity per unit area >555 kBq/m2) (Ba94)
Whole-bodydose (mSv)

External exposure

Total exposure

No. ofpersons

Collective dose(man.Sv)

No. ofpersons

Collective dose(man.Sv)

5-20
20-50
50-100100-150150-200>200

132 000
111 000
24 000
2 800
530
120

1 700
3 500
1 600
330
88
26

88 000132 000
44 000
6 900
1 500
670

1 200
4 200
3 000
820
250
160

Total

270 000

7 300

273 000

9 700

The total collective effective dose received during the first 10 years after
the accident by the approximately 5.2 million people living in the contaminatedareas of Belarus, the Russian federation and Ukraine is estimated to be
24 200 man.Sv. This means, as ten years represents 60%, that the lifetime
collective dose from external irradiation would be 40 300 man.Sv (UN00).
Internal doses were 5 500 man Sv for Belarus, 5 000 man.Sv for theRussian Federation an 7 900 man.Sv for Ukraine. As 10 years represents 90%,
the lifetime total for the three republics would be 20 400 man.Sv, corresponding
to an average individual lifetime effective dose of 3.9 mSv [UN00].
Total collective thyroid doses in Belarus, the Russian Federation,and the Ukrain, respectivly, were estimated to be 550 000 250 000 and
740 000 man Gy.
The total of about 60 700 man Sv for external and internal doses
corresponds to an average individual lifetime effective dose of 12 mSv,73

excluding thyroid collective dose delivered during the first year. This isestimated to be 1 500 000 man Gy in total for the three countries.
Populations outside the former Soviet Union
Even though the releases of radioactive materials during the Chernobyl
accident mainly affected the populations of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, thereleased materials became further dispersed throughout the atmosphere and thevolatile radionuclides of primary importance (131I and 137Cs) were detected inmost countries of the Northern hemisphere. However, population doses were, inmost places, much lower than in the contaminated areas of the former Soviet
Union; they reflected the deposition levels of 137Cs and were higher in areas
where the passage of the radioactive cloud coincided with rainfall. Generally
speaking, however, and with a few notable exceptions, the doses decreased as afunction of distance from the reactor (Ne87).
During the first few weeks after the accident, 131I was the main
contributor to the dose, via ingestion of milk (Ma91). Infant thyroid doses
generally ranged from 1 to 20 mGy in Europe, from 0.1 to 5 mGy in Asia, andwere about 0.1 mGy in North America. Adult thyroid doses were lower by afactor of about 5 (UN88).
Later on, 134Cs and 137Cs were responsible for most of the dose, throughexternal and internal irradiation (Ma89). The whole-body doses received during
the first year following the accident generally ranged from 0.05 to 0.5 mGy in
Europe, from 0.005 to 0.1 mGy in Asia, and of the order of 0.001 mGy in North
America. The total whole-body doses expected to be accumulated during the
lifetimes of the individuals are estimated to be a factor of 3 greater than thedoses received during the first year (UN88).

In summary
A large number of people received substantial doses as a result of theChernobyl accident:•

Liquidators – Hundreds of thousands of workers, estimated toamount up to 600 000, were involved in clean-up operations. The
most exposed, with doses of several grays, were the workers
involved immediately after the beginning of the accident and thescientists who have performed special tasks in the sarcophagus. The

74

average doses to liquidators are reported to have ranged between
170 mSv in 1986 and 15 mSv in 1989.
•

Evacuees – More than 100 000 persons were evacuated during thefirst few weeks following the accident. The evacuees were exposed
to internal irradiation arising from inhalation of radioiodines,
especially 131I, and to external irradiation from radioactivity present
in the cloud and deposited on the ground. Thyroid doses are
estimated to have been, on average, about 1 Gy for small children
under 3 years of age at the time of the accident, and about 70 mGy
for adults. Whole-body doses received from external irradiation prior
to evacuation from the Ukrainian part of the 30-km zone showed alarge range of variation with an average value of 15 mGy.

•

People living in contaminated areas of the former Soviet Union –About 270 000 people live in contaminated areas with 137Cs
deposition levels in excess of 555 kBq/m2. Thyroid doses, due
mainly to the consumption of cow’s milk contaminated with 131I,
were delivered during the first few weeks after the accident; children
in the Gomel region of Belarus appear to have received the highest
thyroid doses with a range from negligible levels up to 40 Gy and an
average close to 1 Gy for children aged 0 to 7. Thanks to the control
of foodstuffs in those areas, most of the radiation exposure has been
due to external irradiation from the 137Cs activity deposited on the
ground; the whole-body doses for the 1986-1989 time period are
estimated to range from 5 to 250 mGy with an average of 40 mGy.
In areas without food control, there are places, such as the Rovno
region of Ukraine, where the transfer of 137Cs from soil to plant isvery high, resulting in doses from internal exposure being greaterthan those from external exposure.

•

Populations outside the former Soviet Union – The radioactive
materials of a volatile nature (such as iodine and caesium) that werereleased during the accident spread throughout the entire northernhemisphere. The doses received by populations outside the former
Soviet Union were relatively low, and showed large differences fromone country to another depending mainly upon whether rainfall
occurred during the passage of the radioactive cloud.

75

Chapter V
HEALTH IMPACT

As ionising radiation passes through the body, it interacts with the tissues
transferring energy to cells and other constituents by ionisation of their atoms.
This phenomenon has been extensively studied in the critical genetic material,
DNA, which controls the functions of the cells. If the damage to DNA is slightand the rate of damage production is not rapid, i.e. at low dose rate, the cell may
be able to repair most of the damage. If the damage is irreparable and severe
enough to interfere with cellular function, the cell may die either immediately orafter several divisions.
At low doses, cell death can be accommodated by the normal
mechanisms that regulate cellular regeneration. However, at high doses anddose rates, repair and regeneration may be inadequate, so that a large number ofcells may be destroyed leading to impaired organ function. This rapid, cell deathat high doses leads to early deleterious radiation effects which become evident
within days or weeks of exposure, and are known as “deterministic effects”.
These deterministic effects can be life-threatening in the short term if the dose ishigh enough, and were responsible for most of the early deaths in the Chernobyl
accident.
Lower doses and dose rates do not produce these acute early effects,
because the available cellular repair mechanisms are able to compensate for thedamage. However, this repair may be incomplete or defective, in which case thecell may be altered so that it may develop into a cancerous cell, perhaps many
years into the future, or its transformation may lead to inheritable defects in thelong term. These late effects, cancer induction and hereditary defects, are
known as “stochastic effects” and are those effects whose frequency, notseverity, is dose dependent. Moreover, they are not radiation-specific and,
therefore, cannot be directly attributed to a given radiation exposure.
For this reason, low dose health effects in humans cannot be measured
and, therefore, risk projections of the future health impact of low-dose ionisingradiation exposure have to be extrapolated from measured high-dose effects.
77

The assumption is made that no dose of ionising radiation is without potential
harm, and that the frequency of stochastic effects at low doses is proportional tothat occurring at high doses. This prudent assumption has been adopted to assist
in the planning of radiation protection provisions when considering the
introduction of practices involving ionising radiations. The ICRP has estimatedthe risk of fatal cancer to the general population from whole-body exposure tobe 5% per sievert (IC90).
The health impact of the Chernobyl accident can be classified in terms ofacute health effects (“deterministic effects”) and of late health effects(“stochastic effects”). Moreover, there are also social and psychological effects
which can influence health.
Radiation induced health effects
Acute health effects
All the acute deterministic health effects occurred among the personnel ofthe plant, or in those persons brought in for fire fighting and immediate cleanup operations.
Two deaths were immediately associated with the accident: one person
killed by the explosion and another who suffered a coronary thrombosis. A third
person died early the morning of the accident from thermal burns. Twenty-eight
other persons died later in the treatment centres, bringing the total to 31 deathsin the first weeks after the accident (UN88).
All symptomatic exposed persons from the site were placed in hospitals.
Of the total of 499 people were admitted for observation, 237 of these were
initially diagnosed as suffering from acute radiation syndrome. The severity andrapidity of onset of their symptoms depended on their dose. The initial earlysigns and symptoms of radiation sickness from high doses included diarrhoea,
vomiting, fever and erythema. Over 200 patients were placed in regional
hospitals and specialised centres in the first 24 hours. Patients were allocated tofour categories of radiation sickness severity according to their symptoms, signs
and dose estimates. The differential white blood cell count showed reduced
circulating lymphocytes (lymphocytopenia) which was the initial indicator of
the severity of the exposure and became evident in the first 24-36 hours for
those most severely irradiated.

78

No members of the general public received such high whole-body doses
as to induce Acute Radiation Syndrome (IA86). This was confirmed in Belarus,
where, between May and June 1986, 11 600 people were investigated without
the discovery of any cases of acute radiation sickness.
In the highest exposure group of those who were acutely exposed(6-16 Gy), the first reaction was usually vomiting, occurring within
15-30 minutes of exposure. These patients were desperately ill; fever andintoxication as well as diarrhoea and vomiting, were prominent features.
Mucous membranes were severely affected, becoming swollen, dry andulcerated, making breathing and swallowing extremely painful and difficult.
Extensive burns both thermal and due to beta radiation often complicated theillness. Within the first two weeks white blood cells and platelets fell
dramatically, indicating a very high dose which had compromised the
production of blood cells in the bone marrow, making it virtually impossible forthe patients to fight infection or to retain the natural clotting activity of theblood. Almost all the patients with such high doses died (20 of 21), in spite of
the intensive specialised medical treatment provided.
At lower exposures, the symptoms, signs and laboratory findings
improved. Vomiting began later, platelet and white cell counts did not drop so
precipitously and the fever and toxaemia were less pronounced. Beta radiation
burns to the skin were a major complicating factor and mucous membrane
damage was difficult to treat, but survival improved markedly at lower doses, sothat no early deaths were noted in the less than 1-2 Gy exposure group(Table 12).
Table 12. Outcome of radiation exposure among persons hospitalised for
acute radiation syndrome
Number of patients
21
21
55
140
Total

Estimated dose (Gy)
6-16
4-6
2-4
less than 2

237

Deaths2071028

There is a large range of medical treatments that can be attempted tomitigate acute radiation syndrome. All these procedures were applied to thepersons hospitalised with varying degrees of success. The hospital treatment
following the accident included replacement therapy with blood constituents,

79

fluids and electrolytes, antibiotics, antifungal agents, barrier nursing and bonemarrow transplantation.
The treatment of the depression of bone-marrow function encounteredafter the accident was largely supportive. Special hygienic measures were taken;
patients’ clothes were changed at least twice a day and aseptic techniques used.
Those patients who received doses above 2 Gy were given anti-fungal agentsafter the second week. Antibiotics and gamma globulin were also administered.
Bone-marrow transplantation was undertaken in 13 patients who were
judged to have irreversible bone marrow damage after doses greater than 4 Gy.
All but two of these patients died, some before the transfused marrow had had achance to “take”, but others had short-term takes. It was concluded that, evenafter very high radiation doses, the bone marrow may well not be completely
destroyed and may recover at least some function at a later stage. It is thisrecovery which may lead to later rejection of the transplanted marrow through a“Host versus Graft” reaction. The physicians responsible for treating the victimsof the accident concluded that bone marrow transplantation should play a very
limited role in treatment.
Burns, both thermal and from beta radiation, were treated with surgicalexcision of tissue that was not viable, and any fluid and electrolyte loss wascompensated for by the parenteral feeding set up to treat the gastro-intestinal
syndrome which is a prominent feature of acute radiation sickness. The oropharyngeal syndrome of mucosal destruction, oedema and the absence of
lubrication caused by radiation damage to the mucosa of the mouth and pharynx
was extremely difficult to treat, and severely impaired swallowing andbreathing.
The organisational aspects of treating large numbers of very ill patients
also presented significant problems. Intensive nursing care and monitoring had
to be provided 24 hours a day in small units. Personnel had to be taught newtechniques of care and patient handling, and a large number of diagnostic
samples had to be examined. The logistic requirements of medical handlingneeded to be well-established before any therapeutic programme could be runefficiently.
There were eleven deaths between 1987 and 1998 among confirmed
acute radiation sickness survivors who received doses of 1.3-5.2 Gy. There were
three cases of coronary heart disease, two cases of myelodysplasic syndrome,two cases of liver cirrhosis, and one death each of lung gangrene, lungtuberculosis and fat embolism. One patient, classified with Grade II, died in1988 from acute myeloid leukaemia.

80Radiation skin burns were observed in 56 patients. Cataracts scarring andulceration are the most important causes of persistent disability in acuteradiation sickness survivors.
Sexual function and fertility was investigated until 1996 in acuteradiation sickness survivors. Functional sexual disturbances predominated,while fourteen normal children were born to acute radiation sickness survivor
families, within the first five years.
Patients with acute radiation sickness, Grades III and IV, were severely
immuno-suppressed. These abnormalities, however, are not necessarily
associated with clinically manifest immuno-deficiency.
Late health effects
There have been many reports of an increase in the incidence of somediseases as a result of the Chernobyl accident. In fact, the accident has,according to present knowledge, given rise to an increase in the incidence of
thyroid cancers. Also, it has had negative social and psychologicalconsequences. As far as other diseases are concerned, as yet the scientificcommunity has not been able to relate those to the effects of ionising radiation.
However, large research projects have been conducted and are under way tofurther study the matter. For example, the WHO (WH95) established theInternational Programme on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident(IPHECA). This programme initially concentrated on pilot projects involving
leukaemia, thyroid diseases, oral health in Belarus, mental health in children
irradiated before birth and the development of epidemiological registries. The
pilot phase came to an end in 1994 and, as a result of the findings, efforts areunderway to develop long-term permanent programmes involving thyroid
diseases, the accident recovery workers, dose reconstruction and guidance to the
public in the event of an accident. It is expected that these new projects will
provide further insight into any future health effects.
An estimate (An88) of the total lifetime cancers which could be expectedin Europe as a result of the accident suggested an increase of about 0.01%
above their natural incidence. Another assessment placed the increase in cancer
incidence at 0.004% in the Northern hemisphere, a lower percentage increase
due probably to including the large population of the whole hemisphere (Pa89).
These predictions are remarkably similar and support the view that the average
doses to the general population of the Northern hemisphere were so low that
only fractions of a percent increases in cancer incidence could be expected inthis population (Pe88, Re87). Large parts of the Northern hemisphere, such as

81North America (Hu88, Br88), Asia and Siberia, were not significantly
contaminated and doses were inconsequential. Therefore, the following sections
focus on the late health effects in the population of the contaminated regions of
the former Soviet Union.
In the International Chernobyl Project organised by the IAEA (IA91),
field studies were undertaken in the latter half of 1990 on the permanent
residents of the rural settlements with a surface caesium contamination ofgreater than 555 kBq/m2, and on control settlements of 2 000 to 50 000 persons,using an age matched study design. Seven contaminated and six control
settlements were chosen by the medical team of the Chernobyl Project. Since all
persons could not be examined, representative samples were taken from various
age groups. In all, 1 356 people were examined, and the aim was to examine
about 250 from each of the larger settlements. Three medical teams each spent
two weeks conducting medical examinations to provide the data for theseassessments.
The medical examinations were quite comprehensive, and the general
conclusions reached were that there were no health abnormalities which could
be attributed to radiation exposure, but that there were significant non-radiation
related health disorders which were similar in both contaminated and control
settlements. The accident had had substantial negative social and psychologicalconsequences which were compounded by the socio-economic and politicalchanges occurring in the former Soviet Union. The official data provided to the
medical teams was incomplete and difficult to evaluate, and were not detailed
enough to exclude or confirm the possibility of an increase in the incidence ofsome tumour types. On this subject, it was suggested in 1991 that the incidenceof cancer in Ukraine showed no large increase even in the most contaminatedareas (Pr91).
The International Chernobyl Project Report (IA91) suggested that thereported high thyroid doses in some children were such that there could be astatistically detectable increase in the incidence of future thyroid tumours. The
Chernobyl Project team finally concluded that, on the basis of the doses
estimated by the team and the currently accepted radiation risk estimates, future
increases over the natural incidence of cancer or hereditary defects would be
difficult if not impossible to discern, even with very large and well-designed
long-term epidemiological studies. However, it should be remembered that thishealth survey took place four years after the accident, before any increase incancer incidence might be expected and reflects the status of the people
examined in a few months of 1990. The sample size was also criticised as being
too small.

82

Nevertheless, the dose estimates generally accepted indicate that, with the
exception of thyroid disease, it is unlikely that the exposure would lead todiscernible radiation effects in the general population. Many predictions of the
future impact of the accident on the health of populations have been made, all ofwhich, apart from thyroid disease, indicate that the overall effect will be small
when compared with the natural incidence and therefore not expected to bediscernible (An88, Be87, Hu87, Mo87, De87, Be87).
Thyroid cancer
Early in the development of the Chernobyl accident, it became obviousthat the radioiodines were contributing significant thyroid doses (Il90),
especially to children, and the then Soviet authorities made every effort not only
to minimise doses, but also to record the thyroid doses as accurately as possible.
The results of these measurements and dose reconstruction assessments
indicated that some groups in the population received high doses to their
thyroids, and that an increase in thyroid abnormalities, including cancer, was avery real possibility in the future. This was particularly true for children in thecontaminated regions in Belarus, northern Ukraine and the Bryansk and Kaluga
regions of the Russian Federation. These were not inconsequential thyroid doses
and, as early as 1986, it was predicted by experts from the Soviet Union that the
thyroid would be the target organ most likely to show evidence of radiation
effects, especially an increased incidence of benign and malignant tumours.
It was known from previous studies of largely external irradiation of the
thyroid that an increase in thyroid tumours tended to appear six to eight years
following irradiation, and continue for more than twenty years after exposure,particularly in children. What was not expected was that thyroid abnormalities
would already become detectable about four years after the accident. At thattime, the conventional wisdom was that internal radioiodine exposure was lesscarcinogenic than external irradiation of the thyroid. Two recent studies found
an elevated risk of thyroid cancer mortality following adult 131I treatment for
hyperthyroidim, which is in contrast to prevuious studies (Ro98, Fr99). It wasestimated that the incidence of thyroid cancers in children, defined as thosediagnosed between the ages of 0 and 14, might increase by about 5%, and in
adults by about 0.9% over the next 30 years. As will be seen, a substantial
increase has been detected in the more contaminated regions. The large numberof cases appearing within five year of the accident was surprising, since it had
been believed that thyroid cancer had a latency period of at least 10 years. A
determined effort was made to estimate doses, record the data, initiate medical
examinations and follow the cohorts already identified as being most at risk.

83

In Ukraine, more than 150 000 examinations were conducted by special
dosimetric teams, and a realistic estimate of the collective thyroid dose of
64 000 person-Sv has been made, leading to a projection of 300 additional
thyroid cancers (Li93a). In the contaminated regions of Russia, namely
Bryansk, Tula and Orel, it was predicted that an excess thyroid cancer total of349 would appear in a population of 4.3 million (Zv93). This represents anincrease of 3 to 6% above the spontaneous rate.
A programme to monitor the thyroid status of exposed children in Belarus
was set up in Minsk in May/June 1986. The highest doses were received by theevacuated inhabitants of the Hoiniki rayon (district) in the Gomel oblast. In thecourse of this study, it was noted that the numbers of thyroid cancers in children
were increasing in some areas. For Belarus as a whole (WH90, Ka92, Wi94),
there has been a significantly increasing trend in childhood thyroid cancer
incidence since 1990 (Pa94). It was also noted that this increase is confined toregions in the Gomel and Brest oblasts, and no significant increase has been
noted in the Mogilev, Minsk or Vitebsk areas where the radioactive iodine
contamination is assessed to have been lower. Over 50% of all the cases arefrom the Gomel oblast.
For the eight years prior to 1986, only five cases of childhood (less than
15 years old on the day of accident) thyroid cancer were seen in Minsk, which is
the main Belarussian centre for thyroid cancer diagnosis and treatment forchildren (De94). From 1986 to 1989, 3 to 6 cases of thyroid cancer in children
were seen annually in Belarus. In 1990, the number jumped to 31, to 62 in 1991,
then to 87 in 1993. By the end of 1998 the total had reached over 600 in
Belarus. Nearly 50% of the early (1992) thyroid cancers appeared in children
who were aged between one and four years at the time of the accident. Atthesame time 382 were diagnosed in the Ukraine.
The histology of the cancers has shown that nearly all were papillarycarcinomata (Ni94) and that they were particularly aggressive, often withprominent local invasion and distant metastases, usually to the lungs. This has
made the treatment of these children less successful than expected, whether
undertaken in Minsk or in specialised centres in Europe. In all, about
150 000 children in Belarus had thyroid uptake measurements following theaccident. Other data from Ukraine and Russia show a similar, but not as
pronounced, increase in the incidence of childhood thyroid cancer since 1987.
The increase in Belarus was confirmed by the final report of an EC
Expert Panel (EC93) convened in 1992 to investigate the reported increase. In
1992 the incidence of childhood thyroid cancer in Belarus as a whole wasestimated to be 2.77 per 100 000, more recent information (Un00) raises the84incidence in 1992 to 3.9 per 100 000, whereas in the Gomel and Brest oblasts it
was 11.2 and 3.7 respectively. In Belarus, it was observed that children
0-4 years old at the time of accident still had an increase in absolute numbers of
thyroid cancers in 1997, while the number of cancers among those who were
5-9 years old seem to decrease after 1995, in those of 10-14 years of age at
exposure, the number of cancers seems to be stable for the period 91-97 (Ko99).
There is some difficulty in comparing the numbers quoted by the healthauthorities of the former Soviet Union with previous incidence statistics, as
previous data collection was not sufficiently rigorous. Moreover, the absolute
numbers can differ from one report to another, and the age scale taken into
consideration can differ between 0-14, 0-17 or 0-18 years of age. However, inBelarus all cases of childhood thyroid cancer have been confirmed since 1986
by international review of the histology and, because of more rigid criteria fordata collection, reliance can be placed on accuracy and completeness. An
attempt to review incidence estimates was made in the above-mentioned EC
Report (EC93). These experts confirmed that the incidence of childhood thyroid
cancer (0-14 y) prior to the accident in Belarus (between 0 and 0.14/100 000/y)
was similar to that reported by other cancer registries. This indicates that thedata collection in Belarus was adequate. They noted that it jumped to
3.9/100 000/y in 1991, and 5.6/100 000 in 1995 and 1997, about a forty-foldincrease.
The most recent published rates of childhood thyroid cancer (St95) showunequivocal increases as seen in Table 13. At the time of this writing, three ofthe 1036 children cited in Table 13 below have died of their disease.
Table 13. Number of cases of thyroid cancers in children under 15 years old
at diagnosis and cancer incidence rates number of cases
per 100 000 children
86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

3

4

6

5

31

62

62

87

77

82

67

73

48

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.3

1.9

3.9

3.9

5.5

5.1

5.6

4.8

5.6

3.9

RussianFederation

–

1

–

–

1

1

3

1

6

7

2

5

–

0.3

0.3

0.9

0.3

2.8

2.5

0.6

2.2

Ukraine

8

7

8

11

26

22

49

44

44

47

56

36

44

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.4

0.5

11

12

14

16

58

85

114 132 127 136 125 114

92

Belarus

Total

0.3

85

When this increase was first reported, it was very quickly pointed out(Be92) that any medical surveillance programme introduced would apparently
increase the incidence by revealing occult disease and rectifying misdiagnoses.
While this may account for some of the increase (Ro92), it cannot possibly be
the sole cause, as the increase is so large and many of the children presented notwith occult disease, but with clinical evidence of thyroid and/or metastatic
disease. In fact, only 12% of the childhood thyroid cancers were discovered byultrasound screening alone in Belarus (WH95). In addition, subsequentexamination by serial section of the thyroids of persons coming to autopsy in
Belarus have confirmed that the number of occult thyroid cancers is similar tothat found in other studies (Fu93) and showed none of the aggressive
characteristics found in the childhood cancers presenting in life (Fu92).
It can be concluded that there is a real, and large, increase in theincidence of childhood thyroid cancer in Belarus and Ukraine which is likely tobe related to the Chernobyl accident. This is suggested by features of thedisease, which differ somewhat from the so-called natural occurrence, as well as
by its temporal and geographic distribution.
As far as other thyroid disorders are concerned, no difference in Russia
was detected by ultrasound examination, in the percentage incidence of cysts,
nodules or autoimmune thyroiditis in the contaminated versus the uncontaminated areas (Ts94). Following the accident, children in the Ukrainian
contaminated regions exhibited a transient dose-dependent increase in serum
thyroxine level, without overt clinical thyrotoxicosis, which returned to normal
within 12 to 18 months (Ni94). This was most marked in the youngest children.
This finding cannot be regarded as an adverse health effect, as no abnormality
was permanent. However, it may be a pointer to future thyroid disease,especially when it may be associated with mild regional dietary iodine
deficiency, and indicates the need for continued monitoring.
This increased incidence was not confined to children, as a larger numberof adult cases was registered in Belarus and in Ukraine (WH94). In a more
recent report (Iv99) 3 082 thyroid cancer cases in persons less than 60 years ofage at diagnosis were recorded in Russian Federation between 1982 and 1996 in
the four most contaminated regions. Among those 0-17 years of age at time of
the accident, 178 cases were found. In the same report we can observe that
before the accident, the incidence of cancer in women in these contaminatedareas was lower than the national incidence in the Russian federation for theperiod 1982-1986, but increased.
For the period of 12 years after the Chernobyl accident, thyroid
carcinoma increased by 4 057 cases in Belarus, as compared to the same period86

of time before. Since 1974 to 1985 thyroid carcinomas developed in
1 392 patients, but from 1986 up to July 1998, 5 449 new cases were diagnosed(De99). The standard index reached 7.9 per 100 000 in population above
18 years old and 3-4 per 100 000 in children. Thyroid carcinomas were mainly
diagnosed in children born before the accident. Once all 131I had disintegrated,spontaneous carcinomas were diagnosed only in six children born in 1987 and1988. Since 1996, the number of child patients has gradually decreased, while
the incidence rates in adults continue to increase. We can expect during thesecond decade after the accident a peek of incidence for young people at age
from 15 to 34 at the time of the accident. Among children and teenagers (age0-18 at the time of the Chernobyl accident) we observe among thyroid cancers amortality of 0.7% (observed time – 1986-2001) (Ke01).
An analysis of thyroid cancers in children and adolescents of the Ukraine(0-18 years of age at the time of surgery) showed that for period 1986 to 1997,
577 cases were registered (Tr99). Among 358 cases in children (0-14 years ofage at time of surgery), the incidence per 100 000 children for the whole of the
Ukraine has increased from 0.05 before the accident to 0.11 in 1986-1990, 0.39
in 1991-1995, and 0.44 in 1996-1997. The increase of incidence takes placemainly in children who were 5-years old or less in 1986.
Jacob et al reported a correlation between collective dose and incidenceof thyroid cancers in 5 821 settlements in the three republics in 1991-1995.
Using the southern half of Ukraine as a reference, the excess thyroid cancers
risk was found to be linear in the dose interval 0.07 Gy to 1.2 Gy. For the
0-18 years of age group, Jacob et al obtain an excess absolute risk of 2.1 per
104 person-year Gy (Je98). In this study the authors did not relate any age (atexposure)-dependence for excess absolute risk for the birth cohort 1968-1985(Je99) in contradiction with the Trosko report (Tr99) and the Japaneseobservations within the framework of the Sasakawa project in Belarus (Sh98).
In another study, Ivanov et al (Iv99) reported excess absolute risk for children
and adolescents comparable to those described by Jacob et al, 2.21 per
104 person-year Gy for girls and 1.62 for boys, described also a dose-risk linear
relationship, but observed a dependence of risk with age at exposure, 14 times
higher than in adults than for 0-4 years, 2.3 for children and adolescents.
The radiogenic nature of these thyroid tumours is supported by theirrelationship with thyroid exposure dose, clinical and morphological changes,
aggressiveness of cancers, geostatistical studies (Bl97). This is in spite of theincrease of ultrasound screening, which can explain a part of the increase inobserved cases. However certain uncertainties remain, such as iodine deficiency
and genetic predisposition, as well as the role of 131I. For example, it has beensuggested that the geographical distribution of thyroid cancers cases correlates
87better to the distribution of short-lived radioisotopes (132I, 133I and 135I) than tothat of 131I (Av95).
Table 14. Thyroid cancers and risk for children 0-18 years old at the timeof the Chernobyl accident for the years 1991-1995 in three cities
and 2 729 settlements in Belarus and the Russian Federation
Thyroid dose

Personyears at risk

Observednumber ofcases

Expected
number ofcases aExsess absoluterisk b
4(10 PY Gy)-1

0-0.1 (0.05)
0.1-0.5 (0.21)
0.5-1.0 (0.68)
1.0-2.0 (1.4)>2.0 (3.0)

1 756 000
1 398 000
386 000
158 000
56 000

38
65
52
50
38

16
13
3.6
1.5
0.5

2.6 (0.5-6.7)
1.9 (0.8-4.1)
2.0 (0.9-4.2)
2.3 (1.1-4.9)
2.4 (1.1-5.1)a) Calculated by multiplying the age-specific incidence observed in Belarus in 1983-1987
by three.
b) 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
Credit: Sources and Effects of Ionising Radiation – United Nations Scientific committee on the
Effects of Atomic Radiation – UNSCEAR 2000 report to the General Assembly with Scientific
Annexes – Volume II: Effects, United Nations.

In the six most contaminated regions of the Russian Federation, thethyroid cancer incidence increased over time in adults. The incidence was
11 per 100 000 for women compared to 4 for the Russian Federation as a wholeand 1.7 and 1.1 respectively for men.
In a study of Lithuanian recovery operation workers, three thyroid
cancers were detected. There was no significant difference compared with the
Lithuanian male population and no association with level of radiation dose or
duration of stay in the area of Chernobyl. In Europe, where several studies werecarried out, no increase of thyroid cancer among children was observed.
The majority of the estimates indicate that the overall health impact fromthese thyroid disorders will be extremely small and not detectable when
averaged over the population potentially at risk. This viewpoint is widely heldby the competent risk assessors who have examined the potential effects of theaccident.

88Other late health effects
From data in the Russian National Medical Dosimetric Registry(RNMDR), the reported incidence of all types of disease has risen between
1989 and 1992 (Iv94). There has also been a reported increase in malignant
disease which might be due to better surveillance and/or radiation exposure. The
crude mortality rate of the liquidators from all causes in the Russian Federation
has increased from 5 per 1 000 in 1991 to 7 per 1 000 in 1992. The crude death
rate from respiratory cancer is reported to have increased significantly between
1990 and 1991, and for all malignant neoplasms between 1991 and 1992. It is
not clear what influence smoking has had on these data, and the overallsignificance of these findings will need to be established by further surveillance,
especially when there are distinct regional variations in the crude death rate andthe mortality rates from lung, breast and intestinal cancer are rising in thegeneral population of the Russian Federation.
From the dosimetric data in the RNMDR (Iv94), a predicted excess
670 cancer deaths may occur in the exposed groups covered by the Registry,
peaking in about 25 years. This is about 3.4% of the expected cancer deaths
from other causes. Data from the other national dose registries is not readily
available in the published literature.
In view of the difficulties associated with these Registry data, such as thedose estimates, the influence of such confounding factors as smoking, thedifficulty in follow-up, the possible increase in some diseases in the general
population and also the short time since the accident, it is not possible to draw
any firm conclusions from these data at this time. The only inference that can bemade is that these groups are the most exposed and that, if any radiation effects
are to be seen, they will occur in selected cohorts within these registries, which
will require long-term future surveillance.
A predicted increase of genetic effects in the next two generations was
0.015% of the spontaneous rate, and the estimated lifetime excess percentage of
all cancers as a result of living in the strict control zones was 0.5%, provided
that a lifetime dose limit of 350 mSv was not exceeded (Il90).
Childhood leukemia incidence has not changed in the decade since theaccident. There is no significant change in the level of leukemia and relateddiseases in the contaminated (more than 555 kBq/m2) and noncontaminatedterritories of the three states (WH95). Other attempts through epidemiologicalstudies have failed to establish a link between radiation exposure from the
Chernobyl accident and the incidence of leukemia and other abnormalities. No
epidemiological evidence of an increase in childhood leukemia around89

Chernobyl (Iv93, Iv 97), in Sweden (Hj94, To96), Germany (Mi97) or the restof Europe (Pa92, Wi94) has been established. However, if the last OECD/NEA
report recommended to be prudent, to withold final judgement, 6years later, noincreased risk of leukemia related to ionising radiation has as yet been foundamong recovery operation workers. The probability of observing a significant
increase of leukemias decreases with time, and the next five years will beconclusive.
Other studies
Various reports (Pa93, Sc93, Se95, St93, Ve93) have been published on
the incidence of chromosome aberrations among people exposed both in thecontaminated regions and in Europe. Some of these have shown little or no
increase, while others have. This may reflect the wide variation in dose.
However, there is a trend for the incidence of chromosome aberrations to return
to normal with the passage of time. Other studies have not shown evidence oflymphocytic chromosome damage (Br92).
In East Germany one study found no rise in foetal chromosome
aberrations between May and December 1986. Chromosome aberrations are to
be expected in any exposed population, and should be regarded as biologicalevidence of that exposure, rather than an adverse health effect.
Another study in Germany suggesting a link between Down’s syndrome(Trisomy 21) and the Chernobyl accident has been severely criticised andcannot be accepted at face value because of the absence of control for
confounding factors (Sp91), and it was not confirmed by more extensive studies(Li93). Another study in Finland (Ha92) showed no association of the incidenceof Trisomy 21 with radiation exposure from Chernobyl.
In a group of Belarussian children born to exposed mothers with in utero
doses ranging from 8 to 21 mSv, no relationship between birth defects andresidency in contaminated areas was seen (La90). At this time, no clear trends
in data for birth anomalies in Belarus or Ukraine be established (Li93, Bo94).
Later study of Lazuk et al. has shown increase of birth defects andmalformations in contaminated areas (1997), but no changes could be related to
exposure to ionising radiation since the same increase was observed in the cityof Minsk used as control.
Two epidemiological studies in Norway concluded that no serious grosschanges as to pregnancy outcome were observed (Ir91), and that no birthdefects known to be associated with radiation exposure were detected (Li92). In

90

Austria, no significant changes in the incidence of birth defects or spontaneousabortion rates which could be attributed to the Chernobyl accident weredetected (Ha92a).
A review by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
showed no consistent evidence of a detrimental physical effect of the Chernobyl
accident on congenital abnormalities or pregnancy outcomes (Li93, EG88). No
reliable data have shown any significant association between adverse pregnancy
outcome or birth anomalies even in the most contaminated regions and thedoses indicate that none would be expected.
On the basis of many studies, UNSCEAR in its last report (UN00)
conclude that “no increase in birth defects, congenital malformations, stillbirths,
or premature births could be linked to radiation exposures caused by theaccident”.
No association between thyroid abnormalities and 137Cs activity in the
body or soil contamination was seen in 115 000 children in the Sasakawa
framework health and Medical cooperation project (Ya97).
There have been reports that have suggested that radiation exposure as aresult of the accident resulted in altered immune reactions. While immune
suppression at high whole-body doses is known to be inevitable and severe, atthe low doses experienced by the general population it is expected that any
detected alterations will be minor and corrected naturally without any medical
consequences. These minor changes may be indicative of radiation exposure,but their mild transitory nature is unlikely to lead to permanent damage to theimmune system. All immunological tests of radiation exposure are in theirinfancy, but tests such as stimulated immunoglobulin production bylymphocytes hold promise for the future as a means of assessing doses below
one Gy (De90).
Psychological and social health effects
One of the most significant effects of the Chernobyl accident has been the
degridation of the social fabric in the affected territories. This has, it is felt
(UN02), contributed to a general decline in well being through an increase inhealth effects that are related to the accident, but which are not necessarily
radiation related. That is, the non-cancer health effects that are currently being
studied seem not to result directly from irradiation, but from the stresses(physical and psychological) that have persisted since the accident.

91In addition, the severity of the psychological effects of the Chernobyl
accident appears also to be related to the public’s growing mistrust of
officialdom, politicians and government, especially in the field of nuclear
power. Public scepticism towards authority is reinforced by its difficulty inunderstanding radiation and its effects, as well as the inability of the experts topresent the issues in a way that is comprehensible. The impression that an
unseen, unknowable, polluting hazard has been imposed upon them by theauthorities against their will, fosters a feeling of outrage.
Public outrage is magnified by the concept that their existing or future
descendants are also at risk from this radiation pollution. This widespread
public attitude was not confined to one country, and largely determined theinitial public response outside the Soviet Union. The public distrust wasincreased by the fact that the accident that they had been told could not happen,
did happen, and it induced anxiety and stress in people not only in thecontaminated areas but, to a lesser extent, all over the world.
While stress and anxiety cannot be regarded as direct physical adverse
health effects of irradiation, their influence on the well-being of people who
were exposed or thought that they might have been, may well have a significant
impact on the exposed population. Several surveys have shown that theintensity of the anxiety and stress are directly related to the presence ofcontamination. It should also be remembered that the stress induced by theradiological contamination caused by the accident was in addition to that
produced in the general population by the upheaval in local social structures due
to massive evacuation and relocations, and the severe economic and social
hardship caused by the break-up of the Soviet Union.
These non-radiological effects related to the Chernobyl accident havebeen studied extensively. Symptoms such as headaches, depression, sleep
disturbance, inability to concentrate, and emotional imbalance have beenreported and seen to be related to the difficult conditions ands stressful events
that followed the accident (Le96, Le96a). The psychological development of
138 belarussian children who were exposed in utero was compared with122 children from non contaminated areas. A correlation was found between
anxiety among parents and emotional stress in children; No differences could be
related to ionising radiation (Ko99).
It was concluded that the Chernobyl accident has had a significant longterm impact on psychological well-being, health-related quality of life, andillness in the affected populations. However, none of these findings could bedirectly associated with ionising radiation (Ha97, UN00).

92Within the former Soviet Union
Within the Soviet Union additional factors came into play to influence thepublic reaction. It should be remembered that this accident occurred during theinitial period of “glasnost” and “perestroika”. After nearly seventy years ofrepression, the ordinary people in the Soviet Union were beginning openly to
express all the dissatisfaction and frustration that they had been harbouring.
Distrust and hatred of the central government and the Communist system could
be expressed for the first time without too much fear of reprisal. In addition,nationalism was not repressed. The Chernobyl accident appeared to epitomise
everything that was wrong with the old system, such as secrecy, witholding
information and a heavy-handed authoritarian approach. Opposition to
Chernobyl came to symbolise not only anti-nuclear and anti-communist
sentiment but also was associated with an upsurge in nationalism.
The distrust of officialdom was so great that even scientists from thecentral government were not believed, and more reliance was placed on local“experts” who often had very little expertise in radiation and its effects. The
then Soviet Government recognised this problem quickly, and tried tocounteract the trend by inviting foreign experts to visit the contaminated areas,
assess the problems, meet with local specialists and publicise their views inopen meetings and on television. These visits appeared to have a positive effect,
at least initially, in allaying the fears of the public. In the contaminatedRepublics, anxiety and stress were much more prevalent and were not justconfined to the more heavily contaminated regions (WH90a). Several surveys
conducted by Soviet (Al89) and other researchers (Du94) have shown that theanxiety induced by the accident has spread far beyond the more heavily
contaminated regions.
During this period there was severe economic hardship which added tothe social unrest and reinforced opposition to the official system of government.
Anti-nuclear demonstrations were commonplace in the larger cities in Belarus(Gomel and Minsk), and Ukraine (Kiev and Lvov) in the years following theaccident (Co92). The dismissive attitude of some Soviet scientists andgovernment officials in describing the public reaction as “radiophobic” tended
to alienate the public even further by implying some sort of mental illness orreaction which was irrational and abnormal. It also served as a convenient
catch-all diagnosis which suggested that the public was somehow at fault, andthe authorities were unable to do anything about its manifestations.
The concern of people for their own health is only overshadowed by theirconcern for the health of their children and grandchildren. Major and minor
health problems are attributed to radiation exposure no matter what their origin,
93

and the impact that the accident has had on their daily lives has added to thestress. Whole communities are facing or have faced evacuation or relocation.
There are still widespread restrictions on daily life affecting schooling, work,
diet and recreation.
The accident has caused disruption of social networks and traditional
ways of life. As most inhabitants of the contaminated settlements are native tothe area and often have lived there all their lives, relocation has in many cases,
destroyed the existing family and community social networks, transferringgroups to new areas where they may well be resented or even ostracised. In
spite of these drawbacks, about 70% of the people living in contaminated areas
wished to be relocated (IA91). This may well be influenced by the economic
incentives and improved living standards that result from relocation by thegovernment.
There are two additional circumstances and events which have tended toincrease the psychological impact of the accident, the first of which was an
initiative specifically designed to alleviate these effects in Ukraine. This was theintroduction of the compensation law in Ukraine in 1991. Some three million
Ukrainians were affected in some way by the post-accident management
introduced, upon which approximately one sixth of the total national budget
was spent (Du94). Different surveys have shown a general feeling of anxiety inall sectors of the population, but it was particularly acute among those who had
been relocated. People were fearful of what the future might bring forthemselves and their offspring, and were concerned about their lack of control
over their own destiny.
The problem is that the system of compensation may well haveexaggerated these fears by placing the recipients into the category of victims.
This tended to segregate them socially and increased the resentment of thenative population into whose social system these “victims” had been injectedwithout consultation. This had the effect on the evacuees of increasing stress,
often leading to withdrawal, apathy and despair. Locally, this compensation wasoften referred as a “coffin subsidy”! It is interesting to note that the 800 or somostly elderly people who have returned to their contaminated homes in theevacuated zones, and hence receive no compensation, appear to be less stressed
and anxious, in spite of worse living conditions, than those who were relocated.
It should be pointed out that compensation and assistance are not harmful inthemselves, provided that care is taken not to induce an attitude of dependence
and resignation in the recipients.
The second factor which served to augment the psychological impact of
the accident was the acceptance by physicians and the public of the disease94

entity known as “vegetative dystonia”. This diagnosis is characterised by vague
symptoms and no definitive diagnostic tests. At any one time, up to
1 000 children were hospitalised in Kiev, often for weeks, for treatment of this
“disease” (St92). The diagnosis of vegetative dystonia appears to be tailor-madefor the post-accident situation, assigned by parents and doctors to account forchildhood complaints and accepted by adults as an explanation for vague
symptoms.
There is great pressure on the physicians to respond to their patients’needs in terms of arriving at an acceptable diagnosis, and “Vegetative Dystonia”
is very convenient as it will fit any array of symptoms. Such a diagnosis not
only justifies the patients’ complaints by placing the blame for this “disease” onradiation exposure, it also exonerates the patient from any responsibility, whichis placed squarely on the shoulders of those responsible for the exposure – theGovernment. When the need for extended hospitalisation is added, thejustification to accept this as a real disease is enhanced. It can be understood
why there is an epidemic of this diagnosis in the contaminated areas.
Outside the former Soviet Union
Social and psychological effects in other countries were minimalcompared with those within the former Soviet Union, and were generally
exhibited more as concerned social reactions rather than health symptoms. In
the contaminated regions of the former Soviet Union, many people wereconvinced that they were suffering from radiation induced disease, whereas in
the rest of the world, where contamination was much less, news of the accident
appeared to reinforce anti-nuclear perceptions in the general population. Thiswas evidenced, for example, by the demonstrations on 7 June 1986 demanding
the decommissioning of all nuclear power plants in the Federal Republic of
Germany (Ze86). While in France public support for nuclear power expansion
dropped since the accident, 63% of the population felt that French nuclear
power reactors operated efficiently (Ch90). The minimal impact of theChernobyl accident on French public opinion was probably due to the fact thatabout 75% of their electrical power is derived from nuclear stations, and in
addition, France was one of the least contaminated European countries.
The Swedish public response has been well-documented (Dr93, Sj87). In
the survey, the question was asked: “With the experience that we now have, do
you think it was good or bad for the country to invest in Nuclear Energy?”
Those that responded “bad” jumped from 25% before, to 47% after Chernobyl.
The accident probably doubled the number of people who admitted negative
attitudes towards nuclear power (Sj87). This change was most marked among95

women, who, it was felt, regarded nuclear power as an environmental problem,
whereas men regarded it as a technical problem which could be solved. Media
criticism of the radiation protection authorities in that country became morecommon, with the charge that the official pronouncements on the one hand said
that the risk in Sweden was negligible, and yet on the other, gave instructions
on how it could be reduced. The concept that a dose, however small, should be
avoided if it could be done easily and cheaply, was not understood.
This sort of reaction was common outside the former Soviet Union, andwhile it did not give rise to significant health effects, it tended to enhance public
apprehension about the dangers of nuclear power and foster the public’s
growing mistrust of official bodies.
In addition, public opinion in Europe was very sceptical of theinformation released by the Soviet Union. This mistrust was reinforced further
by the fact that the traditional sources of information to which the public tended
to turn in a crisis, the physicians and teachers, were no better informed andoften only repeated and reinforced the fears that had been expressed to them.
Added to this were the media, who tended to respond to the need to print“newsworthy” items by publishing some of the more outlandish claims of socalled radiation effects.
The general public was confused and cynical and responded in
predictable but extreme ways such as seeking induced abortions, postponing
travel and not buying food that might conceivably be contaminated. Anotherglobal concern that was manifested, was the apprehension over travel to theSoviet Union. Potential travellers sought advice from national authorities onwhether to travel, what precautions to take and how they could check on their
exposure. Many people, in spite of being reassured that it was safe to travel,
cancelled their trip, just to be on the safe side, exhibiting their lack ofconfidence in the advice they received.
As has been seen, governments themselves were not immune from theinfluence of these fears and some responded by introducing measures such as
unnecessarily stringent intervention levels for the control of radionuclides inimported food. Thus, in the world as a whole, while the effects on individuals,
due to anxiety and stress, were probably minimal, the collective perception andresponse had a significant economic and social impact. It became clear that
there was a need to inform the public on radiation effects, to provide clear
instructions on the precautions to be taken so that the public regains some levelof personal control, and for the authorities to recognise the public’s need to be
involved in the decisions that affect them.

96

In summary
It can be stated that:
•

•

•

•

Thirty-one people died in the course of the accident or soon after andanother 134 were treated for the acute radiation syndrome. Forty-oneof these patients received whole-body doses from external
irradiation of less than 2.1 Gy, 2& between 6.5 and 16 Gy.
Extensive accident-related health effects are apparent in the affected
regions of the former Soviet Union, manifested as anxiety and stress,
as well as diverse health effects not directly related to radiation
exposure. Severe forms induce a feeling of apathy and despair often
leading to withdrawal. In the rest of the world these individual
effects were minimal.
In the last decade, there has been a real and significant increase inchildhood and, to a certain extent, adult carcinoma of the thyroid incontaminated regions of the former Soviet Union (Wi940) whichshould be attributed to the Chernobyl accident until provenotherwise.
In children, the thyroid cancers are:−−−−largely papillary and particularly aggressive in nature often self
presenting with local invasion and/or distant metastases;
more prevalent in children aged 0 to 5 years at the time of theaccident, and in areas assessed to be the more heavily
contaminated with 131I;
apparently characterised by a shorter latent period than
expected; andstill increasing for children younger than 5 years in 1986.

Iodine deficiency and screening, have almost certainly had an influenceon observed risk factors can be said that the increase of thyroid cancers inchildren is clearly established to be linked to exposure of radioactive iodine
isotopes releases. The number of these cancers is still increasing in adults.
Conversely, no increase in leukaemia has been observed to date.
No increase of congenital abnormalities, adverse pregnancy outcomes or
any other radiation induced disease in the general population, either in thecontaminated regions or in Western Europe, could be attributed to this exposure
sixteen years after the accident. It is unlikely that surveillance of the general
population will reveal any significant increase in the incidence of cancer but

97continued follow-up is necessary to allow planning of public health actions andto gain a better understanding of influencing factors.
The present knowledge of the effects of protracted exposure to ionisingradiations is limited, since the dose-assessments rely heavily on high-dose
exposure. An increase in cancer rates was already observed before theChernobyl accident in the affected areas and, moreover, a general increase inmortality has been reported in recent years in most areas of the former USSR.
Among recovery operation workers, no increase of leukaemia has been
identified more than sixteen years after the accident.
Among the health consequences resulting from the Chernobyl accident,
are radiological consequences, and other, non-radiological health problems.
The radiological aspects have been studied in great detail since the accident, andhave been well characterised, within the limits of scientific uncertainty ofradiological sciences. However, increasingly, medical specialists are studying
other health effects that are not associated with radiation exposure, but morewith the effects of significant and prolonged stress, physical and psychological.
These effects, which have been classified as “Vegetative Dystonia”, areincreasingly recognised as real, but are felt to result from the social, cultural andpsychological stress caused by the accident and the general social degradationthat followed the accident and the end of the Soviet Union. To obtain a moreexact understanding of these “accident-related effects”, it is important to expand
current studies to include specialists from studies of the health and social effects
of other natural and technological disasters.

98Chapter VI
AGRICULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

Agricultural impact
All soil used anywhere in the world for agriculture contains radionuclides
to a greater or lesser extent. Typical soils (IA89a) contain approximately
300 kBq/m3 of 40K to a depth of 20 cm. This radionuclide and others are thentaken up by crops and transferred to food, leading to a concentration in food andfeed of between 50 and 150 Bq/kg. The ingestion of radionuclides in food is oneof the pathways leading to internal retention and contributes to human exposure
from natural and man-made sources. Excessive contamination of agriculturalland, such as may occur in a severe accident, can lead to unacceptable levels ofradionuclides in food.
The radionuclide contaminants of most significance in agriculture arethose which are relatively highly taken up by crops, have high rates of transfer
to animal products such as milk and meat, and have relatively long radiologicalhalf-lives. However, the ecological pathways leading to crop contamination andthe radioecological behaviour of the radionuclides are complex and are affected
not only by the physical and chemical properties of the radionuclides but also
by factors which include soil type, cropping system (including tillage), climate,season and, where relevant, biological half-life within animals. The major
radionuclides of concern in agriculture following a large reactor accident are
131
I, 137Cs, 134Cs and 90Sr (IA89a). Direct deposition on plants is the major
source of contamination of agricultural produce in temperate regions.
While the caesium isotopes and 90Sr are relatively immobile in soil,
uptake of roots is of less importance compared with plant deposition. However,soil type (particularly with regard to clay mineral composition and organic
matter content), tillage practice and climate all affect propensity to move togroundwater. The same factors affect availability to plants insofar as they
control concentrations in soil solution. In addition, because caesium andstrontium are taken up by plants by the same mechanism as potassium and99

calcium respectively, the extent of their uptake depends on the availability ofthese elements. Thus, high levels of potassium fertilisation can reduce caesium
uptake and liming can reduce strontium uptake.
Within the former Soviet Union
The releases during the Chernobyl accident contaminated about
125 000 km2 of land in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia with radiocaesium levels
greater than 37 kBq/m2, and about 30 000 km2 with radiostrontium greater than
10 kBq/m2. About 52 000 km2 of this total were in agricultural use; theremainder was forest, water bodies and urban centres (Ri95). While themigration downwards of caesium in the soil is generally slow (Bo93), especiallyin forests and peaty soil, it is extremely variable depending on many factors
such as the soil type, pH, rainfall and agricultural tilling. The radionuclides are
generally confined to particles with a matrix of uranium dioxide, graphite, ironceramic alloys, silicate-rare earth, and silicate combinations of these materials.
The movement of these radionuclides in the soil not only depends on the soil
characteristics but also on the chemical breakdown of these complexes byoxidation to release more mobile forms. The bulk of the fission products is
distributed between organomineral and mineral parts of the soil largely in humic
complexes. The 30-km exclusion zone has improved significantly partly due tonatural processes and partly due to decontamination measures introduced.
There were also large variations in the deposition levels. During 1991 theCs activity concentrations in the 0-5 cm soil layer ranged from 25 to
1 000 kBq/m3 and were higher in natural than ploughed pastures. For all soils,
between 60 and 95% of all 137Cs was found to be strongly bound to soil
components (Sa94). Ordinary ploughing disperses the radionuclides more
evenly through the soil profile, reducing the activity concentration in the 0-5 cm
layer and crop root uptake. However, it does spread the contamination
throughout the soil, and the removal and disposal of the uppermost topsoil may
well be a viable decontamination strategy.
137

The problem in the early phase of an accident is that the countermeasuresdesigned to avoid human exposure are of a restrictive nature and often have tobe imposed immediately, even before the levels of contamination are actually
measured and known. These measures include the cessation of field work, of theconsumption of fresh vegetables, of the pasturing of animals and poultry, andalso the introduction of uncontaminated forage. Unfortunately, these measures
were not introduced immediately and enhanced the doses to humans in
Ukraine (Pr95).

100Furthermore, some initial extreme measures were introduced in the firstfew days of the accident when 15 000 cows were slaughtered in Ukraine
irrespective of their level of contamination, when the introduction of clean
fodder could have minimised the incorporation of radiocaesium. Other countermeasures, such as the use of potassium fertilisers, decreased the uptake ofradiocaesium by a factor of 2 to 14, as well as increased crop yield.
In some podzolic soils, lime in combination with manure and mineral
fertilisers can reduce the accumulation of radiocaesium in some cereals andlegumes by a factor of thirty. In peaty soils, sand and clay application can
reduce the transfer of radiocaesium to plants by fixing it more firmly in the soil.
The radiocaesium content of cattle for human consumption can be minimised bya staged introduction of clean feed during about ten weeks prior to slaughter. A
policy of allocating critical food production to the least contaminated areas may
be an effective common sense measure.
In 1993, the concentration of 137Cs in the meat of cows from the Kolkhoz
in the Sarny region, where countermeasures could be implemented effectively,tended to be much lower than that in the meat from private farms in theDubritsva region (Pr95). The meat of wild animals which could not be subjectedto the same countermeasures had a generally high concentration of radiocaesium. Decontamination of animals by the use of Prussian Blue boli wasfound to be very effective where radiocaesium content of feed is high and where
it may be difficult to introduce clean fodder (Al93). Depending on the local
circumstances, many of the above mentioned agricultural countermeasures wereintroduced to reduce human exposure.
Since July 1986, the dose rate from external irradiation in some areas has
decreased by a factor of forty, and in some places, it is less than 1% of its
original value. Nevertheless, soil contamination with 137Cs, 90Sr and 239Pu is stillhigh and in Belarus, the most widely contaminated Republic, eight years after
the accident 2 640 km2 of agricultural land had been excluded from use (Be94).
Within a 40-km radius of the power plant, 2 100 km2 of land in the Poles’e state
nature reserve have been excluded from use for an indefinite duration.
The uptake of plutonium from soil to plant parts lying above groundgenerally constitutes a small health hazard to the population from the ingestionof vegetables. It only becomes a problem in areas of high contamination whereroot vegetables are consumed, especially if they are not washed and peeled. The
total content of the major radioactive contaminants in the 30-km zone has been
estimated at 4.4 PBq for 137Cs, 4 PBq for 90Sr and 32 TBq for 239Pu and 240Pu.

101

However, it is not possible to predict the rate of reduction as this isdependent on so many variable factors, so that restrictions on the use of land arestill necessary in the more contaminated regions in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.
In these areas, no lifting of restrictions is likely in the foreseeable future. It is
not clear whether return to the 30 km exclusion zone will ever be possible, nor
whether it would be feasible to utilise this land in other ways such as grazing forstud animals or hydroponic farming (Al93). It is however, to be recognised thata small number of generally elderly residents have returned to that area with theunofficial tolerance of the authorities.
Within Europe
In Europe, a similar variation in the downward migration of 137Cs has
been seen, from tightly bound for years in the near-surface layer in meadows(Bo93), to a relatively rapid downward migration in sandy or marshy areas(EC94). For example, Caslano (TI) experienced the greatest deposition in
Switzerland and the soil there has fallen to 42% of the initial 137Cs content in thesix years after the accident, demonstrating the slow downward movement of
caesium in soil (OF93). There, the 137Cs from the accident has not penetrated toa depth of more than 10 cm, whereas the contribution from atmospheric nuclear
weapon tests has reached 30 cm of depth.
In the United Kingdom, restrictions were placed on the movement andslaughter of 4.25 million sheep in areas in southwest Scotland, northeast
England, north Wales and northern Ireland. This was due largely to root uptakeof relatively mobile caesium from peaty soil, but the area affected and thenumber of sheep rejected are reducing, so that, by January 1994, some
438 000 sheep were still restricted. In northeast Scotland (Ma89), where lambsgrazed on contaminated pasture, their activity decreased to about 13% of theinitial values after 115 days; where animals consumed uncontaminated feed, it
fell to about 3.5%. Restrictions on slaughter and distribution of sheep andreindeer, also, are still in force in some Nordic countries.
The regional average levels of 137Cs in the diet of European Union
citizens, which was the main source of exposure after the early phase of theaccident, have been falling so that, by the end of 1990, they were approaching
pre-accident levels (EC94). In Belgium, the average body burden of 137Cs
measured in adult males increased after May 1986 and reached a peak in late1987, more than a year after the accident. This reflected the ingestion ofcontaminated food. The measured ecological half-life was about 13 months. A
similar trend was reported in Austria (Ha91).

102

In short, there is a continuous, if slow, reduction in the level of mainly
Cs activity in agricultural soil.

137

Environmental impact
Forests
Forests are highly diverse ecosystems whose flora and fauna depend on acomplex relationship with each other as well as with climate, soil characteristics
and topography. They may be not only a site of recreational activity, but also aplace of work and a source of food. Wild game, berries and mushrooms are a
supplementary source of food for many inhabitants of the contaminated regions.
Timber and timber products are a viable economic resource.
Because of the high filtering characteristics of trees, deposition was often
higher in forests than in agricultural areas. When contaminated, the specificecological pathways in forests often result in enhanced retention ofcontaminating radionuclides. The high organic content and stability of the forest
floor soil increases the soil-to-plant transfer of radionuclides with the result thatlichens, mosses and mushrooms often exhibit high concentrations of radionuclides. The transfer of radionuclides to wild game in this environment could
pose an unacceptable exposure for some individuals heavily dependent on gameas a food source. This became evident in Scandinavia where reindeer meat had
to be controlled. In other areas, mushrooms became severely contaminated withradiocaesium.
In 1990, forest workers in Russia were estimated to have received a dose
up to three times higher than others living in the same area (IA94). In addition,some forest-based industries, such as pulp production which often recycle
chemicals, have been shown to be a potential radiation protection problem due
to enhancement of radionuclides in liquors, sludges and ashes. However,
harvesting trees for pulp production may be a viable strategy fordecontaminating forests (Ho95).
Different strategies have been developed for combating forest
contamination. Some of the more effective include restriction of access and theprevention of forest fires.
One particularly affected site, known as the “Red Forest” (Dz95), lies to
the South and West close to the site. This was a pine forest in which the trees
received doses up to 100 Gy, killing them all. An area of about 375 ha was103

severely contaminated and in 1987 remedial measures were undertaken to
reduce the land contamination and prevent the dispersion of radionuclides
through forest fires. The top 10-15 cm of soil were removed and dead trees were
cut down. This waste was placed in trenches and covered with a layer of sand.
A total volume of about 100 000 m3 was buried, reducing the soil contamination
by at least a factor of ten.
These measures, combined with other fire prevention strategies, havesignificantly reduced the probability of dispersion of radionuclides by forest
fires (Ko90). The chemical treatment of soil to minimise radionuclide uptake inplants may be a viable option and, as has been seen, the processing ofcontaminated timber into less contaminated products can be effective, provided
that measures are taken to monitor the by-products.
Changes in forest management and use can also be effective in reducing
dose. Prohibition or restriction of food collection and control of hunting canprotect those who habitually consume large quantities. Dust suppression
measures, such as re-forestation and the sowing of grasses, have also been
undertaken on a wide scale to prevent the spread of existing soil contamination.
Water bodies
In an accident, radionuclides contaminate bodies of water not only
directly from deposition from the air and discharge as effluent, but also
indirectly by washout from the catchment basin. Radionuclides contaminatinglarge bodies of water are quickly redistributed and tend to accumulate in bottom
sediments, benthos, aquatic plants and fish. The main pathways of potential
human exposure may be directly through contamination of drinking-water, or
indirectly from the use of water for irrigation and the consumption ofcontaminated fish. As contaminating radionuclides tend to disappear from water
quickly, it is only in the initial fallout phase and in the very late phase, when thecontamination washed out from the catchment area reaches drinking-watersupplies, that human exposure is likely. In the early phase of the Chernobyl
accident, the aquaeous component of the individual and collective doses fromwater bodies was estimated not to exceed 1-2% of the total exposure (Li89).
The Chernobyl Cooling Pond was the most heavily contaminated water body inthe exclusion zone.
Radioactive contamination of the river ecosystems (see Chapter 2) was
noted soon after the accident when the total activity of water during April andearly May 1986 was 10 kBq/L in the river Pripyat, 5 kBq/L in the Uzh river and4 kBq/L in the Dniepr. At this time, shortlived radionuclides such as 131I were104the main contributors. As the river ecosystem drained into the Kiev, then the
Kanev and Kremenchug reservoirs, the contamination of water,sediments,
algae, molluscs and fish fell significantly.
In 1989, the content of 137Cs in the water of the Kiev reservoir was
estimated to be 0.4 Bq/L, in the Kanev reservoir 0.2 Bq/L, and in the
Kremenchug reservoir 0.05 Bq/L. Similarly, the 137Cs content of Bream fish fell
by a factor of 10 between the Kiev and Kanev reservoirs, and by a factor of two
between the Kanev and Kremenchug reservoirs to reach about 10 Bq/kg (Kr95).
In the last decade, contamination of the water system has not posed a publichealth problem. However, monitoring will need to be continued to ensure that
washout from the catchment area which contains a large quantity of stored
radioactive waste will not contaminate drinking-water.
A hydrogeological study of groundwater contamination in the 30-km
exclusion zone (Vo95) has estimated that 90Sr is the most critical radionuclide,which could contaminate drinking-water above acceptable limits in 10 to
100 years from now.
Outside the former Soviet Union, direct and indirect contamination oflakes has caused and is still causing many problems, because the fish in thelakes are contaminated above the levels accepted for sale in the open market. In
Sweden, for instance, about 14 000 lakes (i.e., about 15% of the Swedish total)
had fish with radiocaesium concentrations above 1 500 Bq/kg (the Swedish
guideline for selling lake fish) during 1987. The ecological half-life, which
depends on the kind of fish and types of lakes, ranges from a few years up tosome tens of years (Ha91).
In the countries of the European Union, the content of 137Cs in drinkingwater has been regularly sampled and reveals levels at, or below, 0.1 Bq/L from1987 to 1990 (EC94), which are of no health concern. The activity
concentration in the water decreased substantially in the years following theaccident due largely to the fixation of radiocaesium in the sediments.
Sixteen years later
Over sixteen years after the accident, exposures of populations are mainly
due to the consumption of agricultural food contaminated with 137Cs. Production
is today based on the following criteria:•

The contamination of foodstuffs should be at a level not leading to
an average individual doses higher than 1 mSv per year.

105

•
•

Production of these foodstuffs should not be more expensive ineither economical or social terms.
Some large population groups may receive low doses from thesecontaminated foodstuffs, but collective dose and excess risk shouldbe evaluated.

In the Ukraine, agriculture in most contaminated territories produces
foodstuffs respecting the limits fixed the 25 June 1997: 100 Bq/l for milk
products; 200 Bq/kg for meat; 20 Bq/kg for potatoes and bread. Currently, milk
contamination levels are about 50 Bq/l.
However, there are large disparities in production in Ukraine, and some
private farms continue to produce milk more contaminated than the level fixedby the new limits. This is due to animal grazing in contaminated meadows, andto the large differences of transfer coefficients for caesium (1 to 20) dependingon the chemical composition of soils. Some experts predict that the fixation of
caesium in soils will be enough in the next 4 to 8 years to prevent morecontamination of foodstuffs, but some predictions seem more pessimistic.
(Sm00).
In Ukraine, 8,4 million hectares of agricultural soil are contaminated withCs, and are subject to countermeasures, mostly the use of fertilisers:

137

•
•
•
•

The 54 900 hectares in the exclusion zone and the 35 600 ha
contaminated with more than 555 kBq/m2 are exclude fromagricultural farming.
130 800 ha are contaminated between 185 and 555 KBq/m2,
including 15 000 ha of peat bog where the transfer of caesium toplants is the highest.
1.1 million ha contaminated between 37 and 185 kBq/m2, including
99 500 ha of peat bog.
7 238 millions ha contaminated between 3.7 and 37 kBq/m2.

An exclusion zone of about 4 000 km2 has been defined, including acircular area with a radius of 30 km around the reactor. The areas affected are
2 100 km2 in Belarus, 2 040 km2 in Ukraine and 170 km2 in the RussianFederation. All agricultural activities are forbidden, as is transfer of products.
However, studies are underway as to how the less contaminated portions of thisexcluded land can be used.
Outside this area, 1.4 million of people are living on 30 000 km2 of land
contaminated higher than 185 kBq/m2, and 130 000 people are living in areas106where the contamination is higher than 555 kBq/m2. For the territories where
the annual dose is lower than 1mSv, life is considered as normal. When theannual dose is higher than 1 mSv per year, people receive social compensations.
In Russia, some districts were declassified in January 1998, and thisdecision was accepted badly by the affected populations.
The amount of agriculture products exceeding trade limits fixed by
Ukraine, Russia and Bielorussia are now very low, in spite of new restrictive
limits given by Ukraine in 1997 (100 Bq/kg for milk, 200 Bq/kg for meat,
20 Bq/kg for bread and potatoes). Today, the combination of soil transfers,
physical half-life of 137Cs and efficacy of the countermeasures could lead to an
agricultural production that is lower than the fixed limits within the next 4 to
8 years. This means that, 20 to 25 years after the accident, food production
could be operated without any restriction.
In early 2001, 2 217 cities are still under radiological control in the
Ukraine. In fact, only 1 316 need permanent controls, but the population of the901 remaining cities refuse the declassification of their areas because this could
be associated with the end of financial and social compensation.
In the exclusion zone, the impact on fauna and flora is characterised by
the extremely heterogenous deposition of radioactive particles, which produces
a wide range of doses to which the biota were subjected. In some cases, even invery small geographic areas, the impacts differed by an order of magnitude(IA01).
Somes consequences of the accident for the natural plant and animal
populations are determined by secondary ecological factors resulting fromchanges in human activities. For example, the forbidding of hunting alters thetypes and numbers of birds. In general, animal numbers have greatly increased
compared to adjacent inhabited areas. These favourable conditions for large
numbers of commercially hunted mammal species will be preserved (IA01).
The transfer of radionuclides by water and wind, and by extreme seasonal
weather conditions has not led to long term contamination beyond the exclusionzone. In the exclusion zone, the future radioactive contamination will be
reduced slowly through radioactive decay.
The area in the exclusion zone covered by coniferous and deciduous
forests will increase to 65-70% of the whole zone. The areas of meadowlandand swap land will be correspondingly significantly reduced and graduallyreplaced by forests. These changes create a stable and fire-resistant vegetation107

layer. Associated with destruction of drainage systems, the level of groundwater
will rise (IA01).
Since the accident, trade of wood is regulated. Depending upon its use,commercialisation levels range from 740 to 11 000 Bq of 137Cs.kg-1. With thisnew regulation, 30% of pines trees in the excluding zone are not usable.
In summary
•

•

•

•
•
•

Many countermeasures to control the contamination of agricultural
products were applied with varying levels of efficiency. Nevertheless, within the former Soviet Union large areas of agriculturalland are still excluded from use, and are expected to continue to beso for a long time. In a much larger area, although agricultural andfarm animal activities are carried out, the food produced is subject tostrict controls and restrictions on distribution and use.
Similar problems, although of a much lower severity, wereexperienced in some countries of Europe outside the former Soviet
Union, where agricultural and farm animal production were
subjected to controls and limitations for variable durations after theaccident. Most of these restrictions were lifted several years ago.
However, there are still some areas in Europe where restrictions on
slaughter and distribution of animals are applied. This concerns, forexample, several hundreds of thousands of sheep in the United
Kingdom and large numbers of sheep and reindeer in some Nordic
countries.
Produce from forests, such as mushrooms, berries and game meat,
may continue to be a radiological protection problem for a long time.
The decrease of radioactivity will be now slow through radioactivity
decay.
At present drinking water is not a problem. Contamination ofgroundwater, especially with 90Sr, could be a problem for the futurein the catchment basins downstream of the Chernobyl area.
Contaminated fish from lakes may be a long-term problem in somecountries.
However, the rehabilitation programmes must create conditions
attractive enough for a younger workforce, especially engineers andqualified workers, to return. It is necessary and quite possible tocreate conditions where the environmental contamination will not
result in the exclusion of important dietary components fromconsumption.

108

Chapter VII
POTENTIAL RESIDUAL RISKSThe Sarcophagus
In the aftermath of the accident several designs to encase the damaged
reactor were examined (Ku95). The option which was chosen provided for theconstruction of a massive structure in concrete and steel that used as a support
what remained of the walls of the reactor building (Ku95).
By August 1986 special sensors monitoring gamma radiation and otherparameters were installed in various points by using cranes and helicopters.
These sensors had primarily the function of assessing the radiation exposure in
the areas where the work for the construction was to be carried out.
An outer protective wall was then erected around the perimeter and otherwalls in the turbine building, connected to the reactor Unit 3 building throughan intermediate building, the so-called “V” building, and a steel roof completed
the structure. The destroyed reactor was thus entombed in a 300 000 tonne
concrete and steel structure known as the “Envelope” or “Sarcophagus”. Thismammoth task was completed in only seven months, in November 1986.
Multiple sensors were placed to monitor such parameters as gamma
radiation and neutron flux, temperature, heat flux, as well as the concentrationsof hydrogen, carbon monoxide and water vapour in air. Other sensors monitor
the mechanical stability of the structure and the fuel mass so that any vibrationor shifts of major components can be detected. All these sensors are undercomputer control. Systems designed to mitigate any changing adverse
conditions have also been put into place. These include the injection ofchemicals to prevent nuclear criticality excursions in the fuel and pumping to
remove excess water leaking into the Sarcophagus (To95).
An enormous effort was required to mount the clean-up operation;
decontaminating ground and buildings, enclosing the damaged reactor and109

building the Sarcophagus was a formidable task, and it is impressive that somuch was achieved so quickly. At that time the emphasis was placed on
confinement as rapidly as possible. Consequently, a structure which would
effectively be permanent was not built and the Sarcophagus should rather beseen as a provisional barrier pending the definition of a more radical solution
for the elimination of the destroyed reactor and the safe disposal of highly
radioactive materials. In these conditions, to maintain the existing structure forthe next several decades poses very significant engineering problems.
Consultations and studies by an international consortium are currently taking
place to provide a permanent solution to this problem.
The fuel in the damaged reactor exists in three forms, (a) as pellets of 2%enriched uranium dioxide plus some fission products essentially unchanged
from the original forms in the fuel rods, (b) as hot particles of uranium dioxide a
few tens of microns in diameter or smaller particles of a few microns, made offuel fused with the metal cladding of the fuel rods, and (c) as three extensive
lava-like flows of fuel mixed with sand or concrete. The amount of dispersed
fuel in the form of dust is estimated to amount to several tons (Gl95).
The molten fuel mixture has solidified into a glass-like material
containing former fuel. The estimates of the quantity of this fuel are very
uncertain. It is this vitrified material that is largely responsible for the very highdose rates in some areas (Se95a). Inside the reactor envelope, external exposureis largely from 137Cs, but the inhalation of fuel dust is also a hazard. As wasnoted earlier, a small special group of scientists who have worked periodicallyinside the Sarcophagus for a number of years have accumulated doses in theestimated range of 0.5 to 13 Gy (Se95a). Due to the fact that these doses werefractionated over a long time period, no deterministic effects have been noted inthese scientists. Since the beginning of 1987 the intensity of the gamma
radiation inside the structure fell by a factor 10. The temperature also fellsignificantly. Outside the Sarcophagus, the radiation levels are not high, except
for the roof where dose rates up to 0.5 Gy/h have been measured after theconstruction of the Sarcophagus. These radiation levels on the roof have now
decreased to less than 0.05 Gy/h.
Nine years after its erection, the Sarcophagus structure, although still
generally sound, raises concerns for its stability and long-term resistance andrepresents a standing potential risk. Some supports for the enclosure are theoriginal Unit 4 building structures which may be in poor condition following
the explosions and fire, and their failure could cause the roof to collapse. Thissituation is aggravated by the corrosion of internal metallic structures due to thehigh humidity of the Sarcophagus atmosphere provoked by the penetration oflarge quantities of rain water through the numerous cracks which were present
110

on the roof and were only recently repaired (La95). The existing structure is notdesigned to withstand earthquakes or tornados. The upper concrete biologicalshield of the reactor is lodged between walls, and may fall. There isconsiderable uncertainty on the condition of the lower floor slab, which wasdamaged by the penetration of molten material during the accident. It this slab
failed, it could result in the destruction of most of the building.
A number of potential situations have been considered which could leadto breaches in the Sarcophagus and the release of radionuclides into theenvironment. These include the collapse of the roof and internal structures, apossible criticality event, and the long-term migration of radionuclides into
groundwater.
Currently, the envelope is not leaktight even if its degree of confinement
has been recently improved. Although the current emissions into theenvironment are small, not exceeding 10 Gbq/y for 137Cs and 0.1 GBq/y forplutonium and other transuranic elements, disturbance of the current conditions
within the Sarcophagus, such as the dislodgement of the biological shield could
result in more significant dispersion of radionuclides (To95). The dispersion inthis case would not be severe and would be confined to the site provided thatthe roof did not collapse. However, collapse of the roof, perhaps precipitated byan earthquake, a tornado or a plane crash, combined with collapse of internal
unstable structures could lead to the release of the order of 0.1 PBq of fuel dust,
contaminating part of the 30-km exclusion zone (Be95).
More improbable worst case scenarios would result in higher
contamination of the exclusion zone, but no significant contamination is
expected beyond that area. Currently, criticality excursions are not thought to be
likely (IP95). Nevertheless, it is possible to theorise (Go95, Bv95) on
hypothetical accident scenarios, however remote, which could lead to a
criticality event. One such scenario would involve a plane crash or earthquakewith collapse of the Sarcophagus, combined with flooding. An accident of thistype could release about 0.4 PBq of old fuel dust and new fission products tothe atmosphere to contaminate the ground mainly in the 30-km zone.
Leakage from the Sarcophagus can also be a mechanism by whichradionuclides are released into the environment. There are currently over
3 000 m3 of water in various rooms in the Sarcophagus (To95). Most of this hasentered through defects in the roof. Its activity, mainly 137Cs, ranges from 0.4 to
40 MBq/L. Studies on the fuel containing masses indicate that they are not inert
and are changing in various ways. These changes include the pulverisation offuel particles, the surface breakdown of the lava-like material, the formation of
new uranium compounds, some of which are soluble on the surface, and the111leaching of radionuclides from the fuel containing masses. Studies to dateindicate that this migration may become more significant as time passes.
Another possible mechanism of dispersion of radioactivity into theenvironment may be the transport of contamination by animals, particularly
birds and insects, which penetrate and dwell in the Sarcophagus (Pu92). Finally,
the possibility of leaching of radionuclides from the fuel masses by the water inthe enclosure and their migration into the groundwater has been considered.
This phenomenon, however, is expected to be very slow and it has been
estimated that, for example, it will take 45 to 90 years for certain radionuclides,
such as 90Sr, to migrate undergound up to the Pripyat river catchment area. The
expected radiological significance of this phenomenon is not known withcertainty and a careful monitoring of the evolving situation of the groundwater
will need to be carried out for a long time.
Radioactive waste storage sites
The accident recovery and clean-up operations have resulted in the
production of very large quantities of radioactive wastes and contaminatedequipment. Some of these radioactive wastes are buried in trenches or incontainers isolated from the groundwater by clay or concrete screens within the
30-km zone (Vo95). A review of these engineered sites concluded that,provided the clay layer remained intact, their contribution to groundwatercontamination would be negligible. On the other hand, 600 to 800 waste
trenches were hastily dug in the immediate vicinity of the Unit 4 in theaftermath of the accident. These unlined trenches contain the radioactive falloutthat had accumulated on trees, grass, and in the ground to a depth of 10-15 cm
and which was bulldozed from over an area of roughly 8 km2. The estimatedactivity amount is now of the order of 1 PBq, which is comparable to the total
inventory stored in specially constructed facilities next to Unit 4. Moreover, alarge number of contaminated equipment, engines and vehicles are also stored
in the open air.
The original clean-up activities are poorly documented, and much of theinformation on the present status of the unlined trenches near Unit 4 and the
spread of radioelements has been obtained in a one-time survey. Some of thefindings of the study (Dz95) are that:•

The water table in the vicinity of Unit 4 has risen by 1 to 1.5 m in a
few years to about 4 m from the ground level and may still be rising(apparently this is due mostly to the construction, in 1986, of a wall
3.5 km long and 35 m deep around the reactor to protect the Kiev
112

reservoir from possible spread of contamination through theunderground water, as well as to the ceasing of drainage activities
formerly connected with the construction of new units on the site).
•In the most targeted study area 32 of 43 explored trenches are
periodically or continually flooded.

•

In that area the upper unconfined aquifer is contaminated everywhere with 90Sr to levels exceeding 4 Bq/L. Caesium and plutonium
are less mobile and contamination from these elements is confined tothe immediate vicinity of the disposal trenches.

•

The relative mobility of the 90Sr is especially important in that, fromthe closest trenches, it might reach the Pripyat River in 10 to
20 years.

It is clear that large uncertainties remain which require a correspondingly
large characterisation effort. For instance, at present, most disposal sites are
unexplored, and a few are uncharted; monitoring for groundwater movement isinsufficient and the interpretation of the hydrologic regime is complicated byartificial factors (pumping, mitigative measures, etc.); the mechanisms ofradionuclide leaching from the variety of small buried particles are not wellunderstood, but are being studied.
Although it was previously felt that, radioelements could spread to the
Pripyat river and down stream to the Black see, this has not occurred.
Radionuclides have been effectively held up in soils and river sediments near
the accident site (see Chapter 2).
In summary
The sarcophagus was never intended to be a permanent solution toentomb the stricken reactor. The result is that this temporary solution may wellbe unstable in the long term. This means that there is the potential for collapse
which needs to be corrected by a permanent technical solution.
The accident recovery and clean-up operations have also resulted in the
production of very large quantities of radioactive wastes and contaminatedequipment which are currently stored in about 800 sites within and outside the
30-km exclusion zone around the reactor. These wastes are partly conserved incontainers and partly buried in trenches or stored in the open air.

113

In general, it has been assessed that the Sarcophagus and the proliferationof waste storage sites in the area constitute a series of potential sources of
release of radioactivity that threatens the surrounding area. However, any
accidental releases from the sarcophagus are expected to be very small incomparison with those from the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and their radiological consequences would be limited to a relatively small area around the site.
As far as the radioactive wastes stored in the area around the site are concerned,
they are a potential source of contamination of the groundwater which will
require close monitoring until a safe disposal into an appropriate repository isimplemented. Radionuclides have not, however, migrated as far from the site as
was once expected.
Initiatives have been taken internationally, and are currently underway, tostudy a technical solution leading to the elimination of these sources of residual
risk on the site. This will be developed in the following Chapter.

114

Chapter VIII
SHUTDOWN OF THE CHERNOBYL PLANT1

The agreement to build the Chernobyl power plants dates from 1966,
when the former Soviet Union decided to develop nuclear production ofelectricity. The RBMK reactor design also dates from this period. Six
1 000 MWe reactors were planned at that time.
Unit 1, which begin production in 1977, stopped in November 1996. In
December 1997, it was decided to decommission.
Unit 2, which was first connected to the grid in December 1978, wasstopped in 1991 after damage due to fire. The Ukrainian national authorities
decided to definitely close this plant in March 1999.
Unit 3, which started in 1981 has had many shut downs for maintenance,
inspections and repairs since 1997. In June 2000, the Ukrainian authorities
decided to close it definitely on 15 December 2000.
Units 5 and 6 were under constructions at the site at the time of accident,
but were never finished.
After the accident in reactor 4 and the fire in reactor 2, western countries
attempted to persuade the Ukrainian authorities to definitively close reactor
number 3. This was a priority for many countries in the bilateral exchanges andagreements with Ukraine. This western pressure crystallised when the Ukrainianparliament decided, in October 1993, to cancel a 1990s decision which
recommended to immediate stop of all RBMK reactor construction, and theclosure of the Chernobyl site. Later the European Union and the Ukraine
concluded, on 20 December 1995, a memorandum of understanding for the
closure of Chernobyl plant. In exchange for the definitive closure of all
1. This Chapter was prepared with the assistance of E. Gailliez and J.B. Chérié(IPSN), (IP00, IP01).

115

Chernobyl plants, the European Union (in the framework of TACIS programme)
and western countries agreed to provide financial assistance to the Ukraine forthe provision of electricity, and to solve social problems resulting from theclosure of the site. Financial projects were estimated, in 1995, to be 2.3 billion
dollars. A part of these funds has been committed to modifications of reactor
number 3, creation of building for used fuel, and workshops for liquid and solid
waste treatments.
Later, many other projects relating to the modernisation of VVER
reactors have been discussed with the European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment (EBRD).
Concerning the stabilisation of reactor 4, the safety analyses for all
installations described in the next paragraphs will be jointly performed. From
the European side, the Riskaudit consortium, a common subsidiary of theFrench IPSN (now the IRSN) and the German GRS in collaboration withANPA (Italy) and AVN (Belgium) under contract of the European Union will
perform this work. From the Ukrainian side, the Ukrainian State ScientificTechnical Center for nuclear and radiation safety (SSTC) will perform the work.
The two groups will combine their analyses for the benefit of the Ukrainian
Safety Authority (Nuclear Regulatory Department, NRD).
Preparation of the definitive dismantling of the Chernobyl power plant
It is planned to build different installations on the Chernobyl site toaccomplish the dismantling of the reactors. These facilities will be for the:•storage of used fuel;•treatment of liquids and solids wastes produced by dismantlingoperations;•storage of resulting waste packages.

Storage of used fuelUsed fuel coming from the three reactors is today stored inside reactor
cores, in pools close to the reactors, and in a former storage building. A new dry
storage installation is under construction, using the Nuhoms process, certified
by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Two other building are underconstruction. The first new building will be used for the cutting of fuel rods, and116

the storage of control rods. The second building will consist to modular cells inwhich containers including fuel will be inserted. Each cell will receive one
container. Cooling will be passive. It is planed to build 256 cells in 10 years.
Funding for this operation is provided through the EBRD, Westinghouse(USA), Bouygues and Campenon Bernard (France), the operating westerncompanies for the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant operator.
This project began in June 1999, and buildings are under construction andforecast receiving operating licenses in the beginning of 2003. Transfer of all
fuel assemblies is planned for the following ten years.
Treatment of liquids effluentsLiquid effluents, containing mainly 60Co, 137Cs, 134Cs, are stored on thesite in two groups of tanks. The first group contains 5 outside tanks of 5 000 m3
each, the second contains 9 tanks of 1 000 m3 in individual cells. Today
26 000 m3 are stored, the total capacity of the installation being 34 000 m3.
The treatment of these liquid wastes is a delicate operation, requiring theconstruction of ventilated boxes for pumping operations. For the 5 000 m3
tanks, it will be necessary to construct coverage.
Another building has been under construction since 2000, and will be
used for the transformation of these liquid wastes into solid wastes. Licensing of
this facility is planned for completion by the end of 2002. Transformation
operations will consist of mixing liquid wastes with concrete. The resulting
solid packages will be stored in a surface storage center close to Chernobyl. All
effluents produced by dismantling operations would be treated in these
installations. Liquid effluent processing operations are planned to last for ten
years.
These buildings are funded by the EBRD, Westinghouse (USA),
Belgatom (Belgium), SGN (France) and Ansaldo (Italy).
Treatment of solid wastes
A new installation for solid waste treatment is needed. Low andintermediate-level wastes were generated by reactor operations, and consist of
metal, concrete, plastic, wood and paper. Today, these solid wastes are stored ina decrepit building consisting in three compartments, the two first of which(1 000 m3 each) are quite full. The third compartment (1 800 m3), containing the117most highly contaminated wastes, is 20% filled, bring the total volume of waste
in this facility to approximately 2 350 m3. Currently, these wastes are covered
with concrete which must be removed and itself conditioned for disposal. This
existing storage installation can be used for waste conditioning, but only at a
rate of 3 m3 per day.
The solid wastes produced during dismantling of the reactors will alsoneed to be treated. Wastes will be sorted, and low and intermediate-level wastes
will be stored in the surface storage site, outside the exclusion area ofChernobyl site.
The most highly contaminated wastes will be inserted into waterproof
containers for temporary storage before future treatment. The workshop to
perform this waste conditioning will be built for a daily production of 20 m3.
These operations will be funded by European Union under the frameworkof the TACIS programme. A call for proposals is in progress. The choice of thewestern contractors will be decided for starting of operations at the end of 2003,
beginning of 2004. These operations are planned to last for at least 5 years.
The Sarcophagus
In the aftermath of the accident several designs to encase the damaged
reactor were examined. The Sarcophagus, build in only few weeks after theaccident, is largely described in Chapter VII, along with the potential residual
risks that the sarcophagus currently poses. Today, work is needed to reinforce
the existing sarcophagus to prevent or to limit radioactive dust releases, and to
reduce the risk of collapse either spontaneously of due to natural catastrophe. A
list of about 15 tasks has been established on the basis of estimated risks.
Today, only priority tasks have been performed, including the reinforcement of
a common ventilation chimney for reactors 3 and 4, and the reinforcement of
the roof concrete girders.
A new project, SIP (Shelter Implementation Plan) was launched in 1998,
to last for 8 years, by a working group of nuclear safety experts coming fromthe G72 countries and the Ukraine. This project is funded by the EBRD, and its
cost is estimated to be 760 million dollars, 50 million of which will be paid by
the Ukrainian government.

2. The G7 group consists of the 7 more industrialized countries of the world; Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States.

118

The SIP project has two main objectives; reinforcement of thesarcophagus and enhancement of protection of workers and environment. Fivesubsidiary objectives have been defined:•

reduction of the probability of sarcophagus collapse;•

reduction of consequence of an eventual collapse;•

increase of safety of the installation (criticality, management ofcontaminated water, characterisation of materials containing
remaining fuel);•increase of security of workers and environment;•

definition of a long tem strategy for safety.

This project is performed by a group independent from the Chernobyl
plant operator, and is assisted by a project management team unit including
Betchel and Battelle from USA, and EDF from France. This organization has tomain tasks: to define the elementary tasks for reaching SIP objectives, and torequest approval from competent Nuclear Regulatory Department of Ukraine.
Once more, the Ukrainian NRD will be assisted by the SSTC and westerncompanies (Scientech and Riskaudit).
Reinforcement of roof girders had involved about 300 workers. The
collective dose estimated from Ukrainian information is 3.5 man Sv, 10% forpreparation and 90% for the actual work. Preparative works had involved about
100 people, the highest doses were lower than 15 mSv, and approximately ten
people have received doses ranging from 10 to 15 mSv. The reinforcement
work has involved about 200 people, about 20 of whom have received doses
ranging from 30 to 40 mSv.
Ukrainian authorities claim that no workers have exceeded fixed the limit
for these operations, i.e. 40 mSv. The collective dose objective for the fifteentasks planed in the SIP project is 25 man Sv. Particular attention is being paid tothe monitoring of worker internal contamination.
Sarcophagus databaseIn the framework of “German-French initiative”, the IRSN (France) and
the GRS (Germany) have collaborated with the operator (CHNPP), theInternational Scientific and Technical Center (ISTC) of the Ukrainian Academy119

of Sciences, the Ukrainian National Engineering and Sciences Institute (NIISK),and the Kurchatov Institute (Moscow) to produce a database on the “healthstatus” of the sarcophagus.
This database will facilitate and improve estimation of radiological risks
inside and outside the damaged building, and validate the today’s radiologicalprotection guidelines. This database will be used by SIP projects operators.
When finished this database will allow workers and planners to take a virtual
visit of the sarcophagus and its immediate surroundings. This database is basedon:•construction and equipment of the sarcophagus, and new infrastructure annexes;•

the radiological situation inside the sarcophagus (Kurchatov
Institute);•

the radiological situation in the vicinity of the sarcophagus (ISTC);•

gathering of data concerning amounts, quality, and characteristics ofradioactive materials inside the sarcophagus (Kurtchatov Institute).

The first version of this database was transmitted to the Chernobyl Centerin June 1999.
The social consequences
A large part of the 7 000 Chernobyl workers are living in Slavoutich city,
50 km east of Chernobyl. Ending the operation of the Chernobyl power plants
will reduce manpower needs on the site by about 2 000 people.
The closure of the Chernobyl site will be an additional stress on this region,
which has already suffered extensively as a result of the accident. The social,economic and personal effects that the loss of employment at the site will haveon these individuals, these cities and this region should be studied and taken
into account in any final resolution of this situation.

120

Chapter IX
LESSONS LEARNED*

The accident did not affect each country in the same way and a different
emphasis was placed on various aspects of the accident with particular reference
to the circumstances of that country. Thus, countries remote from the accident,with no domestic nuclear power programmes or neighbouring reactors, tended
to emphasise food control and information exchange as their major thrust for
improvement. Whereas those countries which were contaminated by theaccident, and had their own nuclear power programmes and/or reactors inneighbouring countries, drew extensive lessons from the way the accident
developed and was treated. For these reasons, not all the lessons learned wereapplied universally with the same emphasis.
Operational aspects
The Chernobyl accident was one of a kind, and, although it highlighted
deficiencies in emergency preparedness and radiation protection, it should not
be seen as the reference accident for future emergency planning purposes(Bu91).
It was very clear from the initial reactions of the competent national
authorities that they were unprepared for an accident of such magnitude andthey had to make decisions, as the accident evolved, on criteria that could havebeen established beforehand. This also meant that too many organisations wereinvolved in the decision making, as no clear-cut demarcations had been agreed
and established. Areas of overlapping responsibility and jurisdiction needed to
be clearly established prior to any accident. A permanent infrastructure needed
also to be in place and maintained for any efficient implementation of protective
measures. Such an infrastructure had to include rapid communications systems,
intervention teams and monitoring networks. Mobile ground monitoring teams*

With the contribution of Stefan Mundigl (OECD/NEA).

121

were required, as was aerial monitoring and tracking of the plume. Many
countries responded to this need by establishing such monitoring networks andreorganising their emergency response.
Logistic problems associated with intervention plans, such as stableiodine distribution (Sc94, NE95a) and evacuation obviously needed to be inplace and rehearsed long before the accident, as they are too complex and timeconsuming to be implemented during the short time available during theevolution of the accident. Intervention actions and the levels at which theyshould be introduced needed to be agreed, preferably internationally, andincorporated into the emergency plans so that they could be immediately andefficiently implemented.
The accident also demonstrated the need to include the possibility oftransboundary implications in the emergency plans, as it had been shown thatthe radionuclide release would be elevated and the dispersion of contamination
more widespread. The concern, raised by the experience of Chernobyl, that any
country could be affected not only by nuclear accidents occurring on its territory
but also by the consequences of accidents happening abroad, stimulated theestablishment of national emergency plans in several countries.
The transboundary nature of the contamination prompted the international organisations to promote international cooperation and communication, to harmonise actions (NE88, IA94, IC90, IC92, NE93, NE89,
NE90, NE89b, WH88, WH87, IA89b, IA92, IA91a, IA89c, IA87a, IA94a,
EC89a, EC89b) and to develop international emergency exercises such as thoseorganised by the OECD/NEA in its INEX Programme (NE95). A major
accomplishment of the international community were the agreements reachedon early notification in the event of a radiological accident and on assistance inradiological emergencies through international Conventions in the frame of the
IAEA and the EC (EC87, IA86b, IA86c). In 1987, two Conventions came into
effect, namely the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident(“Early Notification Convention”) and the Convention on Assistance in theCase of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (“Assistance Convention”). At
present, 83 States are Party to the Early Notification Convention, and 79 States
Parties to the Assistance Convention. In addition, the Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the World MeteorologicalOrganisation (WMO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) are parties toboth conventions.
Based on these two conventions, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) established a system for notification and information exchange122

in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency, as well as a network to provide
assistance, on request, to affected countries.
The Council Decision 87/600/EURATOM of 14 December 1987
stipulated the European Community arrangements for the early exchange of
information in the event of a radiological emergency. Based on this council
decision, the European Commission established the European Community
Urgent Radiological Information System (ECURIE) through which the EU
Member States are required to notify the Commission on radiologicalemergencies and to promptly provide available information relevant tominimising the foreseen radiological information. The system focuses oncommunication and information and data exchange in case of a nuclear orradiological emergency.
Furthermore, in order to facilitate communication with the public on theseverity of nuclear accidents, the International Nuclear Event Scale INES wasdeveloped by the IAEA and the NEA and is currently adopted by a large umberof countries.
The accident provided the stimulus for international agreement on foodcontamination moving in trade, promoted by the WHO/FAO, as there is a needto import at least some food in most countries, and governments recognised theneed to assure their citizens that the food that they eat is safe. Monitoring
imported food was one of the first control measures instituted and continues tobe performed (FA91, EC89c, EC93a).
This event also clearly showed that all national governments, even those
without nuclear power programmes, needed to develop emergency plans toaddress the problem of transboundary dispersion of radionuclides. Of necessity
these plans had to be international in nature, involving the free and rapid
exchange of information between countries.
It is essential that emergency plans are flexible. It would be foolish toplan for another accident similar to Chernobyl without any flexibility, as the
only fact that one can be sure of is that the next severe accident will bedifferent. Emergency planners need to distil the general principles applicable tovarious accidents and incorporate these into a generic plan.
The accident emphasised the need for public information and publicpressure at the time clearly demonstrated this need. A large number of persons
who are knowledgeable about techniques in providing information are needed toestablish a credible source of information to the public before an accident, so123

that clear and simple reports can be disseminated continuously in a timely andaccurate form (EC89).
Emergency plans also need to include a process by which large numbersof people could have their exposure assessed, and those with high exposuresdifferentiated. The accident also highlighted the need for the prior identificationof central specialised medical facilities with adequate transportation to treat themore highly exposed individuals.
Refinement and clarification of international advice was needed (Pa88).
The recommendations for intervention in an accident contained in ICRP
Publication 40 were not clearly understood when they came to be applied, andthe Commission reviewed this advice in Publication 63 (IC92). This guideplaced emphasis on the averted dose as the parameter against which anintervention measure should be assessed. It was also made clear that anintervention had to be “justified” in as far as it produced more good than harm,and that where a choice existed between different protection options,“optimisation” was the mechanism to determine the choice. Emphasis was also
placed on the need to integrate all protective actions in an emergency plan, andnot to assess each one in isolation, as one may well influence the efficacy ofanother.
Scientific and technical aspects
Prior to the accident, it was felt that the flora and fauna of theenvironment were relatively radio-resistant and this was supported by the factthat no lethal radioecological injuries were noted after the accident except inpine forests (600 ha) and small areas of birch close to the reactor. A cumulative
dose of less than 5 Gy has no gross effect even in the most sensitive flora of
ecological systems, but there are still ecological lessons to be learned especiallyon the siting of nuclear power reactors (Al93).
Plant foliar and root uptake is being studied, as are resuspension andweathering. The transfer coefficients at all stages of the pathways to human
exposure are being refined. Following the accident, an assessment of the models
used at thirteen sites to predict the movement of 131I and 137Cs from theatmosphere to food chains (Ho91) indicated that models commonly used tended
to overpredict by anything up to a factor of ten. The extensive whole-bodymonitoring of radioactivity in persons undertaken in conjunction with themeasurement of ground and food contamination allowed refinement of theaccuracy of the models for human dose assessment from the exposure through124different pathways. The methods and techniques to handle contamination offood, equipment and soil have been improved.
Meteorological aspects, such as the relationship between deposition andprecipitation and greater deposition over high ground and mountains, have beenshown to be important especially in the development of more realistic models(NE96a). The importance of synoptic scale weather patterns used in predictions
was established, and different models have been developed to predict deposition
patterns under a wide variety of weather conditions. The chemico-physicalchanges in the radioactive gases and aerosols transported through theatmosphere are being studied to improve the accuracy of transport models.
Other impacts of the accident on model refinement include theimprovement in understanding the movement of radionuclides in soil and biota,
pathways and transfer factors; the effect of rainstorms and the influence of
mountains and the alignment of valleys on deposition patterns; particulate resuspension; long range pollution transport mechanisms; and the factors which
influence deposition velocities (NE89a, NE96).
Uniform methods and standards were developed for the measurement ofcontaminating radionuclides in environmental samples.
In the case of high exposures, the importance of symptomatic andprophylactic medical and nursing procedures, such as antibiotics, anti-fungal
and anti-viral agents, parenteral feeding, air sterilisation and barrier nursing wasdemonstrated, as were the disappointing results of bone-marrow transplantation.
In addition, the accident led to an expansion of research in nuclear safety
and the management of severe nuclear accidents.
On the other hand, there is a need to set up sound epidemiological studies
to investigate potential health effects, both acute and chronic. In the Chernobyl
case, the lack of routinely collected data, such as reliable and complete cancer
registry data, led to difficulty in organising appropriate epidemiologicalinvestigations in timely manner. There appears to be a need for developing andmaintaining a routine health surveillance system within and around nuclear
facilities.
In Russia, the government has decided to create a national system for thehandling of information on all aspects of crisis management. This system will
be operational at national level, but also at regional level. The database will be
managed by the IBRAE Russian Institute.

125

The INEX Programme (Nuclear Emergency Preparedness andManagement)
The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), as a result of interest by its
member countries, has been actively involved in emergency planning,
preparedness and management for nuclear accidents, and created, in 1990, theExpert Group on Emergency Exercises, which became later the standing NEA
Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters. This Working Party focuses oninnovative ideas and new approaches to improve existing procedures in place
for response to nuclear emergencies. In order to most efficiently achieve an
improvements, the group creates, as needed, temporary sub-groups with welldefined tasks, time lines and products, employing the most appropriate experts
from NEA Member countries, but also from non-NEA members. In addition,
the Working Party initiates the organisation of workshops and discussion
groups, the launching of questionnaires on specific topics, or the organisation ofinternational exercise series.
To explore, for the first time in an international context, thetransboundary aspects of nuclear accidents, the NEA initiated the preparationand conduct of the first international nuclear emergency exercise INEX 1,
performed in 1993. With this table-top exercise, the international community
could for the first time test procedures and mechanisms in place to manage anuclear or radiological emergency, leading to a wealth of lessons learned and to
an improvement in nuclear emergency management. Three INEX 1 related
workshops allowed the exchange of experience in the implementation of shortterm countermeasures after a nuclear accident, in agricultural aspects of nuclear
and/or radiological emergency situations, and in nuclear emergency data
management.
The INEX 2 exercise series, also initiated by the NEA and performed
between 1996 and 1999, was more ambitious than the INEX 1 exercise, seeking
to improve actual emergency response procedures and existing “hardware”
through a truly international command post exercise. This experienceestablished for the first time an international nuclear emergency “exercise
culture” leading to a clear improvement of the international aspects of nuclear
emergency preparedness and management. The INEX 2 series offered a wealthof lessons learned with respect to emergency planning and management,
particularly in the areas of communication and information exchange, public
and media information, and decision making based on limited and uncertain
information. The identified deficiencies in the area of communication andinformation exchange led to the most prominent outcome of INEX 2 and amajor step forward in nuclear emergency management: the development of a
new communication and information exchange strategy Monitoring and Data
126

Management Strategies for Nuclear Emergencies, which is currently
implemented by various NEA member countries as well as by the international
community.
Regarding the role of international organisations, the INEX 2 series
contributed to better understanding who are the relevant internationalorganisations, what obligations and responsibilities each has, and how to coordinate and harmonise their response in case of a nuclear emergency. The
relevant international organisations used the experience to establish amechanism for co-operation and collaboration through an Inter-Agency
Committee on the Response to Nuclear Accidents (IACRNA), for which the
IAEA serves as Secretariat.
On a national level, many countries participating in INEX 1 and INEX 2
exercises used the experiences and lessons learned to modify and improve
national procedures for nuclear emergency preparedness and management.
Countries also used the outcome of the exercises to update bilateral agreements.
In 2001, the INEX 2000 exercise was organised, similar to the four
INEX 2 exercises, as a command-post real-time notification and communication
exercise, dealing with the first hours of a nuclear emergency. In addition, the
INEX 2000 exercise included for the first time a second major objective, to testcompensation and third party liability issues after a nuclear accident, performed
as a NEA workshop in November 2001 focusing on decision-making
mechanisms in later phases of a nuclear emergency. This exercise, therefore,
served as a bridging exercise between the INEX 2 series and the next generationof international nuclear emergency exercise programmes. On one hand, early
notification and communication exercises will be institutionalised by the IAEA
in collaboration and co-operation with other international organisations, andrepeated periodically. On the other hand, a new innovative INEX 3 programme
was initiated by the NEA to investigate post-accident management ofcontaminated sites and regions.
In summary, the Chernobyl accident triggered the start of many national
and international programmes, which led to a considerable improvement of
national and international procedures for nuclear emergency management andpreparedness, especially in the areas of international communication andinformation exchange, and in harmonisation of response. However, there still
remains room for improvement, for example in the field of co-ordinating andharmonising the response to nuclear accidents, as well as in the area of decision
making in later phases after an accident. The work programmes of various
international organisations are focusing on these aspects.

127Psycho-sociological programmes
ETHOS project
ETHOS is a European project that is looking at new methodologies forsustainable rehabilitation of living conditions for inhabitants of contaminatedareas. It is a new approach to strategic co-expertise, and includes experts fromdifferent fields of activities. The project also vigorously involves the local
population in the evaluation and the management of risk, in collaboration withthe local authorities and experts, (Lo99, He99) thus helping to restore theirconfidence in experts and authorities.
The ETHOS methodology and practical approach were used in the firststage (1996-1999), in the village of Olmany, which is located in the Stolyn
district of Belarus. This village, in the south east portion of Belarus, is located200 km from Chernobyl. Great improvement in living conditions, especially inthe area of radiological protection and private farm production, was achieved
thanks to the strong involvement of the village people. A group of mothers
became involved in activities to improve the radiological protection of theirchildren. New pedagogic modules from this radiological protection culture werelater introduced in the village school.
While it is too early to draw final conclusions about the long term impactof the actions implemented, it is interesting to note that during the project’s
three years, a profound change with regard to radiological protection took placeand several lessons have been learned. The first concerns the negative role
played by regulatory limits when they are interpreted as a boundary between
safe and unsafe. This was seen as a strong blocking factor, discouraging those
confronted by higher levels, and destroying any potential initiative an ALARA
attitude. The process followed by the mothers illustrates how it is possible todevelop a framework for setting protection targets, where limits lose theirprevious status and are considered merely as a point of reference to guideaction.
On a village scale, the ETHOS project also has been successful at
improving the radiological quality of the food produced by the villagers. This
has improved the local economic and radiological situations in a “hand-in-hand”
fashion. The Bielorussian authorities, in agreement with European Union,
launched in 1999 a similar project at a district scale, the Stolyn district(90 500 inhabitants). The aim of this second stage is to demonstrate that the
ETHOS process could be implemented in everyday activity by locals such as
physicians, nurses, head of collective farms, teachers and a radioactivity

128

measurement specialist to improve radiological and economic conditions. All
these activities are based on voluntary service.
Other studies
Murphy and Allen (Mu99) have studied the factors that determine
personal parameters guiding individuals to respect, or not, regulations regarding
forest used and forest product consumption. The gathering of mushrooms andberries is, for these populations, a tradition and also a social and leisure activity.
Behavioural compliance, with forest and forest food restrictions, was largely
predicted by factors relating to behaviour itself: lifestyle factors. Factors
concerning radiation had little or no impact. This suggests that people’s
decisions about whether or not to go to the forest and consume forest produce
are largely based on whether they want or need to, and whether other people
they know are engaging in the behaviour. Concerns over radiation appear toplay little part in these behaviours.
However, more than sixteen years after the accident, these populations
that did not respect the measures of protection are not ignoring the radiation
situation, they are still aware of and concerned about the threat of radiation totheir health. This concern may manifest itself in the increased risk of stressrelated health problems.
In another study, Mays et al. (Ma99) have shown through theconsumption of contaminated milk in rural settlements that it is necessary forthe radiation protection experts to widen consideration of risk and impacts,beyond radioactive dose, to social and psychological costs of both the nuclear
accident and countermeasures programmes.
In conclusion these studies clearly show the necessity to take in accountthe socio-psychological factors for acceptance by the public of the radiologicalprotection measures taken by the national authorities.

In summary
Besides providing new impetus to nuclear safety research, especially on
the management of severe nuclear accidents, the Chernobyl accident stimulated
national authorities and experts to a radical review of their understanding of,and attitude to radiation protection and nuclear emergency issues.

129

This led to an expansion of knowledge of radiation effects and theirtreatment, and to a revitalisation of radioecological research and monitoring
programmes, emergency procedures, and criteria and methods for the
information of the public.
Moreover, a substantial role in these improvements was played bymultiple international co-operation initiatives, including revision and rationalisation of radiation protection criteria for the management of accident
consequences, as well as reinforcement or creation of international
communication and assistance mechanisms to cope with the transboundary
implications of potential nuclear accidents.
More than sixteen years after the accident, we can observe that its
consequences have not been completely addressed. Some pathologies haveappeared, the amplitude of these being not directly correlated with the real
impact of the accident.
But, one of the more spectacular lesson learned after the Chernobyl
accident is probably the change of government attitudes with regard totechnological catastrophes. The change includes the recognition of the need forsome common action at the international level, the admittance that a large
accident is possible, and the necessity to organize national and transboundary
exercises. In this field we can note the major role played by the NEA/CRPPH in
the INEX exercises, and the significant maturing of mentalities. This can bemeasured by the fact that it was necessary to create artificial countries (Acciland
and Neighbourland) in the INEX 1 exercise, whereas subsequent exercises haveused real plants in real countries. These exercises are well appreciated bynational and local authorities, who do not hesitate to invite local media forcelebration of these exercises.
This important effort is now materialized in the form of an international
document, the Joint radiation emergency management plan of the internationalorganizations, jointly sponsored by Food and Agriculture Organization of theUnited Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy Agencyof the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United
Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian affairs, World HealthOrganization and the World Meteorological Organization (IA00).

130

EXPLANATION OF TERMS

Activity
Quantity of a radionuclide. It describes the rate at which spontaneous
nuclear transformations (i.e., radioactive decay) occur in it. It is measured inbecquerels (Bq), where 1 Bq equals one nuclear transformation per second.
Several multiples of the becquerel (Bq) are used throughout the text.
They are the following:
exabecquerel (EBq)petabecquerel (PBq)
terabecquerel (TBq)
gigabecquerel (GBq)megabecquerel (MBq)kilobecquerel (kBq)

=
=
=
=
=
=

1018 Bq
1015 Bq
1012 Bq
109 Bq106 Bq103 BqCollective dose
Total dose over a population group exposed to a given source. It isrepresented by the product of the average dose to the individuals in the group by
the number of persons comprising the group. It is measured in person-sieverts(person-Sv).
Dose
A general term denoting a quantity of radiation. Depending on its
application it can be qualified as “absorbed dose”, “equivalent dose” and“effective dose”.

131

Absorbed dose
Quantity of energy imparted by radiation to a unit mass of matter such as
tissue. Absorbed dose is measured in grays (Gy), where 1 Gy equals 1 joule ofenergy absorbed per kilogramme of matter. One gray produces a different
intensity of biological effects on tissue depending on the type of radiation(alpha, beta, gamma, neutrons). One common submultiple of the gray, themilligray, is often used. One milligray (mGy) is equal to 10-3 Gy.
Effective dose
Weighted sum of the “equivalent doses” to the various organs and tissues
multiplied by weighting factors reflecting the differing sensitivities of organs
and tissues to radiation. The weighting factor for each organ or tissue expresses
the fractional contribution of the risk of death or serious genetic defect from
irradiation of that organ or tissue to the total risk from uniform irradiation of thewhole body. Effective dose is measured in sieverts (Sv). Some submultiples ofthe sievert are used throughout the text. They are the following:
millisievert (mSv) = 10-3 Sv
microsievert (µSv) = 10-6 Sv
Equivalent dose
Quantity obtained by multiplying the “absorbed dose” in an organ (e.g.,
thyroid) or tissue by a factor representing the different effectiveness of thevarious types of radiation in causing harm to the organ or tissue. This factor,
whose value varies between 1 and 20 depending on the type of radiation, hasbeen introduced in order to allow grouping or comparing biological effects due
to different radiations. Equivalent dose is measured in sieverts (Sv). One sievert
produces the same biological effect, irrespective of the type of radiation.
Health effects
Acute radiation syndrome
A clinical scenario characterized by a complex of acute deterministic
effects affecting various organs and body functions in the irradiated person.

132

Deterministic effects (also called acute health effects)
Early deleterious radiation effects on living tissues (e.g., body, organ or
tissue death, cataracts), which generally occur only above a threshold of dose
and whose severity depends on the level of dose absorbed. They become
generally evident within a short time from the irradiation (hours, days or weeks,
depending on the dose received). Throughout the text the doses producing
Deterministic effects are expressed in grays (Gy).
Genetic effects (also called hereditary effects)
Stochastic effect which occur in the progeny of the exposed person.
Stochastic effects (also called late health effects)
Late deleterious radiation effects (e.g., leukaemia, tumours) whose
severity is independent of dose and whose probability of occuring is assumed to
be proportional to the dose received. It is also assumed that there is no thresholddose below which stochastic effects will not occur. The stochastic effects occur,
therefore, at doses lower than those producing deterministic effects and may
manifest themselves after a long time (years, decades) from the irradiation.
Throughout the text the doses producing stochastic effects are expressed insieverts (Sv).
Intervention level
The value of a quantity (dose, activity concentration) which, if exceededor predicted to be exceeded in case of an accident, may require the applicationof a given protective action.

133

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AUDR
CRPPH
DNA
EC
ECCS
FAO
GSF
IAEA
IARC
ICRP
INES
INEX
INSAG
IPHECA
IPSN
JAERI
NAZ
NCRP
NEA
OECD
RNMDR
SKI
UNSCEARWHO

Soviet All-Union Dose Registry
NEA Committee on Radiation Protection and Public HealthDesoxyribonucleic Acid
European Commission
Emergency Core Cooling System
Food and Agriculture Organization
Forschungszentrum für Umwelt und Gesundheit
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Agency for Research on Cancer
International Commission on Radiological Protection
International Nuclear Event Scale
NEA Nuclear Emergency Exercises ProgrammeInternational Nuclear Safety Advisory GroupInternational Programme on the Health Effects of theChernobyl Accident
Institut de Protection et de Sûreté Nucléaire
Japan Atomic Energy Research InstituteNationale Alarmzentrale
Soviet National Committee on Radiation Protection
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Russian National Medical Dosimetry Registry
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation
World Health Organization

135

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