INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING IN ENGLAND
PART II:SOM E TACTICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONSTimothy E. Curtis

This paper has been written so that it can be read as a stand-alone document in its own right but
its primary purpose is to complement “Part I “Models for Interviewing Witnesses and Suspects”and it
is recommended that it is read in conjunction with that essay.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Greek philosopher Aristotle spoke of Ethos, Pathos and Logos as “ingredients of persuasion”
or tools to encourage another to take a particular point of view.Whilst investigations should never be
conducted in such a way as to distort the truth (so as to fit an investigatorʼ
s preconceived ideas)it ispossible to draw parallels between Aristotleʼ
s teachings and modern-day models of investigativeinterviewing.In the sister-paper to this essay(“Part I: Models for Interviewing Witnesses and Suspects”)
we saw how the four-phased interview for vulnerable and intimidated victims and witnesses (asadvocated in the M inistry of Justice publication “Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings”)
was comparable with the PEACE model of interviewing (employable in both suspect and victim/
witness contexts). In this paper we will look at various strategies and tactics that can be employedduring interviews as well as some additional factors that influence practice and procedures. In doing
so we may see at least two of Aristotleʼsʻ
ingredientsʼat work ― if not all three.
Without looking too hard it is possible to see aspects of ʻ
Ethosʼ― the attempt to establish theinterviewerʼs authority ― present in the “Engage”phase of a PEACE model interview and quitepossibly again in the“Challenge”element;ʻ
Pathosʼ― the art ofappealing to the intervieweeʼ
s emotions― without doubt features in the “Clarification / first-phase-challenge”steps; and ʻ
Logosʼ― thepresentation of an argument in logical terms ― in the “Final-challenge”delivery, across a PEACE
interview.This sort of psychology has long been recognised as playing a role in police interviews andmany eminent professionals in that science have informed the research into techniques that the police
now use. But where psychology (and/or acts of persuasion) meets the Criminal Justice system aboundary exists which cannot be crossed:everything that is done must fall the right side of the law.
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (protection from torture, inhuman anddegrading treatment or punishment) and Article 6 (the right to a fair trial) are both significant
indicators of where that boundary is drawn (and both of those clauses are also reflected in the moreglobal Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its Articles 5 and 10 respectively).Interviewers needto recognise this when considering their tactics.
The Association of Chief Police Officers recognised these challenges when,in 2005,it published its
guidance on this matter. It stated that for an official body such as the police to stay within thestandards set by Humans Rights legislation it needed to be able to show that its activities met thatbenchmark. To that end they created a mnemonic that became the mantra for investigative decision
making.The acronym they used was (coincidentally given that this paper is being delivered in Tokyo)“JAPAN”!
J ustification (legality) ― that there were reasonable grounds to suspect some knowledge or
involvement relevant to the criminal offending or disturbance of the peace;

Director and Training Consultant,Wessex Training Consultancy Ltd.;former Detective Sergeant,Hampshire Constabulary, United Kingdom.

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A uthorisation ― that the proper procedures have been followed,recorded and all actions wereauthorised;
P roportionality ― that the nature of the interference is proportional to the matter being
investigated in its seriousness;
A ccountability ― all the options considered and all the relevant factors must be recorded;
N ecessity ― that the methods used are necessary for the purpose of the enquiry.
(ACPO 2005 pg 34)
An interview, be it with a suspect or a witness, has to be ʻ
investigativeʼotherwise it is unlikely toachieve its objective ― indeed interviewers are actively encouraged to employ an “investigativemindset”in the Seven Principles of Investigative Interviewing. So there is little dispute that aninterviewer is not merely somebody who asks questions,they are an investigator.Thus,if they apply
the five-point ʻJAPANʼguidance to their decision making they will be in a stronger position to defend
their strategy in court.
The National Police Improvement Agency makes an additional point on the topic of decision
making:In order to be effective the investigator must develop the ability to make reliable and accountable
decisions. This may often be under pressure or difficult circumstances(NPIA 2013)
In an investigative-interviewer context that pressure can be because they are making tacticaldecisions dynamically, in the heat of the interview. They may have planned and prepared for theexchange diligently but something happens in front of them that causes them to change direction anduse a different strategy altogether. If, as they should have done, their original plan was recorded(“Writing an interview plan in all cases will ensure that the most appropriate elements of PEACE arebeing used”― Clarke and Milne 2001)the interviewers will need to justify their departure from that
plan.That justification will itself need to be recorded ― albeit,in these circumstances almost certainly
retrospectively. This point is reflected in the performance criteria of an interviewer (as set out in theagreed National Occupational Standards)“Ensure all decisions, actions, options and rationale are fully
documented in accordance with current policy and legislation”(Skills for Justice 2008). Applying the“Justified,Authorised,Proportionate,Accountable,Necessary”rationale to the recording process has
been found to be a useful template.

II. ADVERSE INFERENCES
Before we look at specific tactics that can be considered in investigative interviews it is right tolook at another legislative issue that must be considered during interviews with some suspects.This issections 35 to 37 of the Criminal Justice and Public order Act 1994 which allows potentially adverse(onthe part of the suspect) inferences to be drawn by the court. Section 35 deals specifically with aninference being made if the accused remains silent during the trial. There are caveats that apply but,given that section 35 can only apply after the interview has taken place it has less relevance to thisessay than sections 36 and 37; so we will concentrate on them. As we do so we will also remindourselves of the wording of the ʻ
cautionʼthat applies to all interviews of people for whom there are
grounds to suspect them of having committed an offence:“
You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention now
something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.”
Here,it is clear that there is no obligation on the suspect to answer any questions ― so long as heor she understands the implications of such a refusal at a later date.Section 36 though shifts the onus
of commenting back to the suspect. It states:

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Where―(a)a person is arrested by a constable, and there is―(i) on his person; or(ii) in or on his clothing or footwear; or(iii) otherwise in his possession; or(iv) in any place in which he is at the time of his arrest,
any object, substance or mark, or there is any mark on any such object; and(b)that or another constable investigating the case reasonably believes that the presence of the object,substance or mark may be attributable to the participation of the person arrested in the commissionof an offence specified by the constable; and(c) the constable informs the person arrested that he so believes, and requests him to account for thepresence of the object, substance or mark; and(d)the person fails or refuses to do so,then if, in any proceedings against the person for the offence so specified, evidence of those matters
is given［］the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged,
may draw such inferences from the failure or refusal as appear proper.
Section 37 has a similar impact:
Where―(a)a person arrested by a constable was found by him at a place at or about the time the offence forwhich he was arrested is alleged to have been committed; and(b)that or another constable investigating the offence reasonably believes that the presence of theperson at that place and at that time may be attributable to his participation in the commission of theoffence; and(c) the constable informs the person that he so believes, and requests him to account for that presence;
and(d)the person fails or refuses to do so,then if, in any proceedings against the person for the offence, evidence of those matters is given,［］the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may
draw such inferences from the failure or refusal as appear proper.
In both Sections there are areas that have been,and will continue to be,areas for debate:in section
36,what constitutes “otherwise than in his possession”?;and in section 37,how flexible can “
at orabout the time
”be?These have been ultimately matters for the Court to decide but the responsibility lies firmly with an interviewer to ensure that, at the time of questioning, the suspect understands
what is being asked of them. In circumstances where Sections 36 or 37 apply the original caution
advising them that they ʻ
do not have to say anythingʼis no longer relevant and the suspectneeds to understand that the obligation on them has changed.To achieve this understanding they are
given, what is referred to in relevant guidance as, a “Special Warning”. Significantly, whilst theoriginal caution is published and agreed (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Codes of Practice:
Code C Paragraph 10.5) a ʻ
Special Warningʼisnʼ
t: “Legislation does not provide a specific form of
wording”(Centrex 2006 Pg 11)for it.The reference point then has to be the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act Codes of Practice (Code C, Paragraph 10.11)which states:
For an inference to be drawn when a suspect refuses to answer a question about one of thesematters, or to answer it satisfactorily, the suspect must first be told in ordinary language:a) what offence is being investigated;b) what fact they are being asked to account for;c) this fact may be due to them taking part in the commission of the offence;d) a court may draw proper inference if the fail or refuse to account for this fact;e) a record is being made of the interview and it may be given in evidence if they arebrought to trial.

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It is therefore the interviewerʼs responsibility to construct a ʻ
warningʼthat embraces the five factors
listed above in a form that they can justify was appropriate for their intervieweeʼ
s level of understanding.Clearly the application of this “Special Warning”has the potential to confuse the interviewee ifnot
explained well by the interviewee. Occasionally interviewers find themselves saying things like:“Iʼmnow taking the Special Warning off”when no longer asking questions to which Sections 36 or 37 apply.
It is perhaps not surprising when some practitioners prefer to introduce ʻSpecial Warning materialʼ
only towards the end of the interview (approaching the challenge phase)in case they render the rest of
it as inadmissible due to the interviewee being confused.

III. THE FIVE TIERS OF INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING
There is, without doubt, a need to exercise vigilance when interviewing around evidence to which
sections 36 and 37 of the Criminal Justice and Public order Act 1994 applies but professional interviewers should not be apprehensive and probably should not let it influence their interview plan to that
degree. The more serious the case, the more scrutiny on things like the use of “Special Warnings”islikely to be and in recognition of that probability, the Police in England and Wales have adopted atiered system of interview skills so that, for more serious investigations a higher level of skilledinterviewer can be called upon.
For many years there were five tiers of investigative interviewer:
Tier 1 ― an entry-level introduction for basic recruits;
Tier 2 ― for more experienced officers dealing with more serious offences;
Tier 3 ― identified ʻSpecialist interviewersʼutilising additional techniques in the most serious
crimes;Tier 4 ― for managers and supervisors of interviewers;andTier 5 ― Interview Mangers/Coordinators.
This structure not only gave Senior Investigating Officers in serious crime investigations clarity
over what sort of resources they should be deploying across their interviews but it also gave Workforce
Development departments a focus for any future Training Needs Analysis.
A commonly adopted application of the Tiers was that all uniformed patrol officers would betrained to Tier One, all detectives to Tier Two, all supervisors to Tier Four and then a core nucleus
of staff, from specific policing disciplines, would be trained to Tiers Three and Five as necessary. It
is important to recognise that the Tier Three specialism existed in both the witness and the suspectarenas and so departments such as Major Crime Investigation Teams would have some Tier Three(suspect)specialist interviewers as well as some Tier Three (victim/witness)specialist interviewers.
This Tiered structure existed until the publication of the National Investigative Interviewing
Strategy (National Police Improvement Agency 2009) when it was incorporated within the Professionalising the Investigation Programme (PIP)and aligned with the National Occupational Standardsof the Police. In essence nothing changed: Tier 1 became PIP level 1 ʻVolume and Priority Crimeʼinterviewers and Tier 2 became PIP level 2 ʻ
Serious and Complex crimeʼinterviewers. Tier 3, whilst
still PIP level 2 investigators would be formally identified as having the additional competencies of aʻSpecialist suspectʼor aʻSpecialist victim and witnessʼinterviewer.Tier 4 was absorbed into the generalsupervisory responsibilities and the Tier 5 Interview Mangers/Coordinators continued to exist in theirown right.
M any Police Forces employ a progression strategy demanding that to become an Interview
M anager/Coordinator you have to have been a ʻSpecialistʼinterviewer (in either the suspect or witness
field). The logic of this straight forward: they can advise on a technique or tactic that they arethemselves familiar with and have practiced.

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IV. TACTICS
Having a range of tactics available to an interviewer is important as every interviewee will bedifferent and so a one-size-fits-all approach will almost certainly fail. Add to this fact that many
repeat-offenders are interviewed time and time again by police officers and the need to be flexible in
the execution of the interview takes on a heightened relevance. Something as common as receiving nosatisfactory response to an interview question can be an area where different approaches can,and inmany case should, be considered.
A. “No comment”
When a suspect exercises his right not to say anything meaningful in reply to the questions put tothem he should, in the first instance be reminded of the implications of the ʻ
cautionʼthat he is being
interviewed under. He should be reminded that that if he intends to rely on an account at Court,that
Court might be less inclined to believe him than had he offered that explanation during the interview.
Whilst that is something for the suspect to consider the interviewers also have a responsibility here:if
they do not ask the question during the interview then no proper inference (following the suspectʼsrefusal to answer)can be expected to be drawn by the Judge or jury. Basically, if the question is not
asked ― it cannot be a failure to answer it.Empirical evidence disappointingly exists of officers who
have failed to plan for such a potential and they end up saying to the suspect (who has responded “Nocomment”to their opening fifteen questions):“Are you going to keep saying ʼno commentʼto all of ourquestions?”When the suspect replied that he was never going to answer any of their questions so theymight as well charge him if they had the evidence ― the interviewers terminated the interview at thatpoint. This episode concluded with a supervisor intervening and, following appropriate planning, theinterview was resumed later in the day.But this demonstrates that “no comment”is a difficult response
to constantly put questions to unless you are ready to do so. Poorly prepared interviewers cansometimes find them falling into a metronomic response where the interview goes something like this:Question:“Where were you last night?”
Reply:“No comment”
Question:“Did you go to the nightclub?”
Reply:“No comment”
Question:“Did you go into the nightclub?”
Reply:“No comment”
Question:“Did you see the barman in the nightclub?”
Reply:“No comment”
Question:“Did you threaten the barman?”
Reply:“No comment”
Question:“Did you punch the barman?”
Reply:“No comment”
Etc, etc etc.
The ʻ
metronome effectʼis where as soon as the interviewer has finished the question the suspect
responds “no comment”
and as soon as the suspect has finished the word “comment”the interviewer is straight back in there with the next question. No pause. Nothing. Just the start of the nextquestion. To which the suspect replies “no comment”and the interviewer, in anticipation that that23

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would be the response,comes straight in with the next question.It becomes metronomic when question
is followed by answer is followed by question is followed by answer is followed by question is followedby
The reality is neither party is thinking about what is going on. Almost certainly the suspect
is not listening to the questions ― he is just waiting for the interviewer to stop talking to give hisʻreplyʼ
.In these circumstances however it is crucial that the interviewer gives the suspect time to digest
what the question was and to show that he was given time to consider his response.
Another tactic in a similar vein employed by suspects is where they respond with the words “nocomment”but do not give the interviewer time to deliver the question. They actually speak over the
top of the question. The problem for the interviewer here is that the Court may hold that the suspectdidnʼ
t in fact hear the question ― or,indeed,that the question was not successfully asked.In either casethe ability to ask the court to draw a proper inference might prove difficult.
Responding with “
no comment”is one method suspects can adopt when refusing to give adequate
responses in interview.Another is just remaining silent.Much like saying “
no comment”there is morethan one way of remaining silent in an interview.The suspect can stare directly at the interviewers in
an attempt to intimidate them or he can ignore them completely and adopt a body-language reinforcing
this stance.This could be as extreme as standing and facing the wall or,less dramatically,they mightjust lay their head on their arms on the table feigning sleep.The interviewers need to have a response
for these tactics ― not least ensuring that the interviewee is not suffering some sort of mental
break-down making his health and well-being an issue. In short, the interviewers need to ensure that
there is nothing existing at the time that will impact on the reasonable expectation of the suspectanswering.
B. Written Questions
If there is likely to be any doubt that the question has been put to the suspect an option exists forthe interviewers to write them out,much like a questionnaire,and give them to the interviewee.As is
always the case there are additional points that need to be considered with such a tactic but it is an
option.It is also something that is worth considering as giving advanced notice ofwhat will be includedin the next interview.
C. Pre-Interview ʻDisclosureʼʻDisclosureʼis terminology often used when speaking about pre-interview briefings with thesuspectʼ
s legal advisor.This briefing reveals ― or ʻ
disclosesʼwhat material it is intended to discuss inthe next interview.The rationale for such a practice is to give the opportunity for the legal advisor to,in private,advice the suspect and take instructions from him.Whilst this sounds perhaps like the police
being overly helpful there are, in fact a range of investigative benefits in existence here.
If the police ask a question the suspect could make ʻ
no commentʼ
.He could claim that he did so,onthe guidance of his legal advisor. His legal advisor could in turn claim that they had insufficient
information from the police on which to base coherent advice to their client ― thus ʻno commentʼwasthe only advice they could give.If the Court considered this as being circumstances existing at the timeof the interview that would have removed the reasonable expectation for the suspect to answer thequestions put to him in interview it is possible for no proper inference to be drawn from the suspectʼsrefusal to answer it. To be clear:there is no legal obligation to disclose anything in advance of theinterview but it is something that is occasionally done to progress the interview process. There is
obviously the pitfall here of revealing so much of your case that the suspect has an opportunity toconstruct a false explanation to fit the facts of the case ― and this could be argued if ʻ
pre-interview
disclosureʼwas not dealt with professionally and with an investigative mindset.To illustrate this point
let us look at the introduction of scientific evidence,such as a finger-print of the accused at the scene,
into the interview.
Let us consider an investigation where a school has been broken into during the long summer
holiday and a lot of wanton damage and destruction has been caused.This includes heating pipes that
had been suspended from the ceiling in the reception hall having been pulled down,flooding the area.
The fingerprints of three people are discovered on the upper part of one of the pipes ― consistent withpeople swinging on it and it eventually giving way under their weight.These fingerprints are identified

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as belonging to three students of the school.The three youths were all interviewed simultaneously.The
legal advisor of one youth was given the full circumstances of the scientific evidence:the fact that it
was fingerprints,where they were― both where in the building and where on the pipe― and theywere
also given photographic evidence.In interview this youthʼs account was that he and his friends,during
term time (ie when they had legitimate access to the school),had held a competition to see who could
jump the highest ― and make a mark highest on the wall. The youth went on to explain that he wasso good at this game that he climbed onto the banister rail of the stairs in the reception and jumped
from there
and was even able to just about touch the heating pipe.That was why his fingerprints
would have been found on something that was normally twenty feet off of the ground ― certainly notbecause he had swung on the pipe breaking pulling it from the ceiling. Poor ʻ
disclosureʼtactics had
given him the ability to construct a whole story around the potentially damning piece of evidence. A
more thought-through disclosure strategy was used on the second youth.
The second youth was told only that the police had “intelligence”that suggested he (the youth)
might have been responsible for the damage. It was left for the youth and his legal advisor to ponder
what this ʻ
intelligenceʼmight have been.Was it an independent informant or one of the other detainees
in an admission to the police, was it closed-circuit television footage or something else. The legal
advisor argued that he did not enough information on which to advise his client ― hence the youth
made no comment to the questions put to him.In the next ʻ
disclosureʼpackage it was then revealed tohim that the ʻintelligenceʼwas in fact ʻscientific, forensic intelligenceʼ. Still the legal advisor did notknow whether this ʻ
intelligence was likely to be a footwear mark,fingerprint,DNA or fibre evidence― or something else.The interviewing officers pointed out that all they were trying to do was secure
an uncontaminated account from the youth that might explain his probable presence at the scene of thecrime but the youth maintained his position of making no comment. The officers revealed next that
there was fingerprint evidence available to them. The youth obviously pointed out that he was astudent at the school and so his fingerprints were likely to be present. It was only when the locationof the fingerprints was revealed to him did the youth make a reply― this being that he had heard thedamage going on and entered the building in an effort to see what was happening.In doing so,he musthave inadvertently grabbed the pipe (which was now at waist level) ― thus leaving his fingerprints
behind. Any subsequent Judge and jury would be able to see that ample opportunity had been given
to the youth to explain his involvement,and that he only chose to do so when given the whole amountof information linking him to the scene. Pre-interview disclosure therefore does not need to tie thehands of the interviewer. Indeed it is sometimes helpful to consider it alongside one of the National
Police Improvement Agencyʼ
s Principles of Investigative Interviewing.
D. Facilitating the Cooperation of Suspects:Early Admission of Guilt
The fifth Principle states:“Investigators should recognise the positive impact of an early admission
in the context of the criminal justice system”(NPIA 2009). The question that this raises for aninterviewer is:are they obliged to reveal more information in advance of the interview than they would
otherwise have intended ― in order to provoke an early admission (if,indeed the interviewee is guilty)
or is it right to hold back the information in order not to contaminate any early confession ― thus
allowing the offender to demonstrate their true regret?The answer is almost certainly unique to each
investigation and goes back to the ʻJustified, Authorised, Proportionate, Accountable, Necessaryʼapproach to defensible decision making discussed earlier.If there is any doubt about the contributionthat an admission in interview can make to the sentence that an accused can receive in Court some timelater it should be removed by the Sentencing Guidelines Council.When considering mitigating factors
relevant to the offender they state:The issue of remorse should be taken into account at this point［oncethe seriousness of the offence has been considered］along with other mitigating features such asadmissions to the police in interview.(Sentencing Guidelines Council 2006).The interviewer needs to becareful how this guidance is introduced into the interview so as to ensure it does not become interpreted
as an unfair inducement. It is almost certainly for this reason that very few interviews contain thediscussion in such stark terms.
E. The Custody-Time Clock
The incremental approach to ʻ
disclosureʼused in the example above with the youthsʼfingerprints on
the school heating pipe identifies another consideration for the interviewer:“
How much time have I got
left before this suspect needs to be released?”The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C,

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paragraph 1.1 lays the foundation:“All persons in custody must be dealt with expeditiously, and released
as soon as the need for detention no longer applies”. Section 37 of the same Act states that where aperson has been arrested for an offence:
If the custody officer determines that he does not have such evidence before him［to charge thedetainee］, the person arrested shall be released either on bail or without bail, unless the custody
officer has reasonable grounds for believing that his detention without being charged is necessary
to secure or preserve evidence relating to an offence for which he is under arrest or to obtain such
evidence by questioning him.
Here it is clear that a person can be held in custody solely for the purpose of interviewing them.But
does incremental ʻ
disclosureʼconflict with an ʻ
expeditiouslyʼdealt with investigation and unfairly
extend the time a person spends in custody ― particularly if to be interviewed is the sole reason he isso detained?We are back,yet again,to defensible decision making ― and decisions of this nature will
have to be defended on a regular basis to an ever escalating-in-authority independent reviewer.
Section 40 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 states that a detainee who has not been
charged must have his continued detention reviewed and further authorised not later than six hours
after the initial detention was first authorised. The detention must be reviewed again not more thannine hours after the previous one was conducted and subsequent reviews will be at intervals ofnot morethan nine hours ― up to a maximum period of detention not exceeding 24 hours.These reviews will be
conducted by an officer of at least the rank of inspector who has not been directly involved in theinvestigation.
Section 42 of the same Act authorises an officer of the rank of Superintendent or above to extend
this maximum by another 12 hours in certain circumstances, namely:
it is an indictable offence;the detention continues to be necessary to secure or preserve evidence relating to an offence
for which he is under arrest or to obtain such evidence by questioning him;andthe investigation is being conducted “
diligently and expeditiously”.
This has the potential to extend the detention up to 36 hours without charge, by which point, if afurther extension is desired it will be a matter for M agistrate to rule on.
Initially a Magistrate can issue a Warrant of Further Detention to extend the custody period for up
to a maximum of 36 hours (making 72 hours in total).Application can later be made for this warrant
to be itself extended to a maximum of 96 hours detention ― after which the suspect must be charged
or released.
It is right to recognise that a significant amount of legislation,requirements and provisos have beensummarised in these few sentences but,for the purpose of investigative interviewing and the tactic ofincremental disclosure ― the point is made:the investigation (and therefore the interview) must be
dealt with diligently and expeditiously and an independent Inspector, then Superintendent, thenM agistrate must be regularly convinced the need to detain the suspect remains. These review thresholds give the suspectʼs legal advisor the opportunity to put forward their views regarding,not least,theinterviewerʼ
s diligence and expedience.Whilst these views are put to the Review Officer (the Inspector,
the Superintendent or the magistrate)a tenacious legal advisor will have already made their mark in
the interviews ― and interviewers need to be ready for these interventions.
F. Dealing with Legal Advisors in Interviews
Ideally police interviews with suspects will be conducted by two interviewers ― one to lead theprocess and ask the questions and the second to take notes, summarise as appropriate and otherwise
assist his or her colleague as necessary. A rule of thumb tactic for police officers when dealing withlegal advisors is that the lead-interviewer should remain engaged with the interviewee and the26

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second-interviewer, the note-taker, should be the one who responds to any intervention during theinterview by the legal advisor. A simple rationale for this is if the legal advisor ʻ
winsʼthe argument
then the lead-interviewer has not ʻ
lost faceʼin the eyes of the suspect ― thus whatever ʻ
engagementʼ
existed between the lead and the suspect, none of it has been lost. If any professional credibility has
been lost in the room (in the eyes of the suspect)it has been lost by somebody not directly interviewing
them.A second,more reasoned,basis for the second interviewer engaging with the legal advisor is thatit does not mean that the lead-interviewer has to be distracted from their train of thought.Often,when
an interview is going well (in the eyes of the police)a legal advisor will make an intervention merely
to break the momentum. Allowing the lead interviewer to maintain their line of thinking whilst theircolleague deals with the distraction is extremely helpful to the lead.This tactic can even be enhanced
by manufacturing a specific seating arrangement in the interview room. Look at the setting below:

Even if the second interviewer deals with the legal advisorʼs intervention they are talking across the
diagonal of the table― across the line-of-sight that exists between the lead interviewer and the suspect.
This can potentially disrupt the engagement that you want to continue to exist between these two
individuals. Just swapping the interviewers seating positions means that this is less likely to happen.
A variation on this theme ― and one that provokes discussion amongst trainees ― is that shown
below:

Here the rapport between the lead and the suspect is much easier to maintain and any discussion
between the legal advisor and second interviewer can seem almost ancillary to the interview going onover the other side of the table.Another benefit of this seating plan is that there is no barrier between
the interviewer and the suspect.This may be advantageous or it may not be― and there may be otherfactors to consider too ― but the point is, even something that we often do without thinking (such as
walking into an interview room and sitting down)should be planned for in an investigative interview.
G. Tactical Interview Advice:The Interview Manager
Interview Manager/Coordinators have already been referred to earlier in this essay.Their role is,amongst other things,to advise on a range of planning and tactical considerations (some of which havebeen discussed above). This coordination is crucial to the investigation as a whole as so many things
can upset the interview strategy unless it is coordinated. A well meaning press-release to the newshungry media following the discovery of a dead body can ― and will ― influence a pre-interview
disclosure strategy.The press release will,by definition,release information to potential witnesses andthe offender thus contaminating future interviews.A commonly practiced investigative technique is thehouse-to-house enquiry. Unless this is coordinated by or with the Interview M anager an injudicious
release of information into the public domain can occur.Investigative Interviews stretch far beyond theconfines of the interview room; equally factors previously not considered as relevant can have amassive impact on what happens during that maximum of 96 hour detention.
H. Tactical Interview Advice:The Psychological Interview Consultant
Sometimes even more assistance is required and this can come in the form of a Behavioural
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these specialists have been referred to as psychological profilers, forensic psychologists and criminal
profilers amongst other titles. They will almost certainly not be police officers but are an external
service who can be called upon as and when considered necessary. For many years they have been
considered as having a contribution to make to investigations as a whole it has only been in relatively
recent years that their contribution to investigative interviewing has become finely honed.
They can offer interview guidance against specific character disorders:a psychopath,for example
can be superficially charming and intelligent, and yet under the surface they might be unreliable,
dishonest,insincere,manipulative and egocentric.When interviewing such a person they will say that
there is little point in spending too much time on trying to build a rapport with the suspect.Interviewers
should avoid criticism of him or his actions and also avoid conveying or expressing emotions. A PIC
will also say that there is limited value in appealing to a psychopathʼs better nature as he may well nothave one. If he does it is quite possible that this is a hard-to-reach area of his psyche.
A second example would be a suspect with a histrionic personality disorder will quite possibly seelife as mundane and boring and will crave attention and excitement. In interview it might be helpful
to flatter their intelligence and independence and to emphasise the need to resolve the situation.
Equally a paranoid person might well be suspicious, mistrustful and hyper-sensitive. Here, if theinterviewers emphasised the importance of the suspect giving their version of events then this might beappropriate motivation to encourage an account from them.
These are just three examples of the sort of generic advice that a BIA and/or a PIC might be able
to give,but more specific assistance might also be possible,depending on how much information about
the suspect exists on which they can build their guidance. It is quite possible for them to advise on
things like:
Nature and timing of arrest
Who is to make the arrest
Characteristics of interviewers
Duration of interviews
Timings of interviews
Order of questions asked
When and how to make challenges
Topics to include /avoid
What would be the most effective first question
How might questions be most effectively worded
How can rapport be most effectively established and maintained
Just as importantly BIAs and PICs recognise also what they cannot do. They are academics witha background in behavioural sciences;they are not investigators,interviewers or interrogators.They
do not pretend to keep up with relevant legislation surrounding investigation and/or interviewing nor
do they profess to be able to ʻ
get inside the mind of a killerʼor to ʻ
push the right buttons in order to
get them to confessʼ
.The stereotypical portrayal of a criminal psychologist in Hollywood movies andtelevision dramas is often an image they need to dismantle for some more naive investigators!

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155TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼPAPERS

V. CONCLUSION
This paper has aimed to give an overview of some of the strategies,tactics and techniques that canbe considered during an investigative interview.Whilst its focus may appear to have been on suspects
much of what has been discussed is equally applicable to some witnesses. Each tactic needs to beadapted to suit the circumstances that exist at the time,the presentation ofthe interviewee and the skillset (and confidence)of the interviewer.It is hoped that this paper has also shown that ongoing advice
is available to interview teams and Senior Investigators ― both from within their own ranks andbeyond. In conclusion, consider the words of filmmaker Errol M orris:
I think an interview, properly considered, should be an investigation. You shouldnʼ
t know what
the interview will yield. Otherwise, why do it at all?
Follow that mindset, in both witness and suspect interviews and you will not go far wrong.
References
Central Police Training and Development Authority(2004)The Practical Guide to Investigative Interviewing. London:Centrex.
Centrex (2006)Practice Advice on the Right to Silence (Revised Edition) Wyboston:ACPO.
Clarke, C. & Milne, R. (2001) National Evaluation of the PEACE Investigative Interviewing Course.
Portsmouth:Institute of Criminal Justice Studies.
M inistry of Justice (2011)Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings. London:HMSO.
National Police Improvement Agency (2009) Briefing Paper: National Investigative Interview Strategy
Wyboston:NPIA.
Sentencing Guidelines Council (2006) Overarching Principles: Domestic Violence Definitive Guidelines
London:Sentencing Guidelines Council.
Skills for Justice(2008) National Occupational Standards Element CJ203 Carry out specialist interviews
with suspects［online］Available from http://www.college.police.uk/en/10587.htm>accessed 13
Aug. 2013.

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