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論文

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance:
Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia
Wilfredo B. Carada and Eiji Oyamada Ph.D.

Abstract
Released from dictatorial governments, the Philippines andIndonesia encountered a strong clamor from the international
community and local leaders, for distribution and sharing of politicaland administrative powers. Towards this end, local autonomy was
installed in the Philippines through the enactment of the Local
Government Code in 1991. A decade later, Indonesia, in a ‘Big Bang’,mandated by Law 22 and Law 25 launched decentralization. The
transfer of powers from the central to local authorities was designed
to ensure effective, efficient and equitable delivery of public goods
and services. It was also intended to encourage transparent andaccountable local authorities and promote inclusive governance.
A frequent inquiry raised is how successful is decentralization in
the two countries. Has it nourished inclusive governance? The paper
joins the chorus of studies concluding that the results are mixed.
There are gains in local government administrative modernization;
selective engagement of civil society and business sector in governancebut overall, deficient in areas of inclusive governance.
Inclusive governance is enshrined in a decentralized polity. It
guarantees the rights of electorates to vote and be voted. It involves
the citizenry in different sphere of decision-making. In an inclusive
governance regime, local politicians respond to the needs of citizenry
with policies and judicious allocation of resources. Then, they aretranslated by local bureaucrats in terms of public goods and services,delivered in a transparent, professional, non-partisan and accountablemanner.
Inclusive governance remains a deficit in the decentralization
process. Local councils that are venues for citizen participation in24

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governance are mostly not functional. Political dynasties that havecaptured electoral exercises and have narrowed the participation ofcompetent people to gain political leadership have grown, both innumbers and strength. Several elements of decentralization havealso been used by opportunistic political leaders for their own gain:
more revenues led to more opportunities for misuse of funds andmore discretionary powers encouraged accommodation of favoredindividuals and groups.
Amidst the externalities of decentralization, the way forward
in both countries is authentic local autonomy. Towards this end, thechallenge is fine-tuning decentralization by making a reasonable
and clear sharing of power between and among different levels ofgovernment, business sector and civil society. Decentralization should
also be viewed from a systems perspective and to be successful,parallel reforms should be undertaken in the electoral process,political parties, civil service system, social power structure andintegrity and accountability mechanism. In doing so, the potential ofdecentralization to promote inclusive governance is higher.

I. Background
After the downfall of the dictator regimes, the Philippines and Indonesia
adopted decentralization policy, aimed to build self-reliant and self-governing
communities. The Local Government Code of 1991 and the 1999 Regional
Autonomy Laws (22 and 25) provided the framework for the decentralizationin the Philippines and Indonesia, respectively. Decentralization included not
only the transfer of political and fiscal powers but also national personnel andfacilities. Local government units (LGUs) became also accountable for thedelivery of services. The “Big Bang” decentralization reform in Indonesia wasdone immediately after the fall of the new order and promoted the transfer
of more functions and services and fiscal resources. Another feature of thedecentralization scheme in Indonesia is the inclusion of system of regular anddirect competitive local election, which has been placed in the Philippines
since early 1900s. In both countries, decentralization was also recognized as a
strategy to grant certain degree of autonomy to special regions so that special

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

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problems, like metropolitan service delivery, secession or internal conflict orregional disparity, could be addressed.
Unlike the decentralization laws in Indonesia, the Local Government
Code of the Philippines remains intact, in spite of the clamors for amendments(specifically in the sharing of internal revenue allotments). In Indonesia, both1

laws were amended in 2004. Law 22 was amended by Law 32 which conferred
new administrative and political powers to district and city administrationsand Law 25 was amended by Law 33 which promotes fiscal balance between
Jakarta and the regions. This was undertaken by giving sub-provincial
government additional revenue raising powers, specifically retention of after
tax revenues generated in their territorial jurisdiction. Presently, 30% of thenational budget has been transferred to LGUs and 35% directly come from thecentral government, making 65% of the total national expenditure spent by
2

LGUs.

II. Objectives and Organization of the Paper
The results of the decentralization have been mixed: there are goodpractices and island of excellence as well as failures and shortcomings. In
joining this continuing discourse on the results of decentralization, this article
discusses the gains and deficit of decentralization, particularly its impact innourishing inclusive governance. In the discussion, the paper is guided by thefollowing assumptions: first, gains in decentralization are mostly innovations
and best practices in local government management. The best practices areusually innovations in public sector management (usually focus of ‘lakbay aral’or ‘studi banding’) whose sustainability is threatened when there is a change
in the local chief executive.
Secondly, the paper claims that decentralization in both countries failed
to institutionalize inclusive governance, as local development councils, where
citizen (s) can participate in governance, do exist but are not functional.
Third, because elective positions and political parties have been captured
and/or hijacked by political elites, local strongmen and/or political dynasty,
this article believed that the intention to create inclusive governance (where
political power is widely shared, in a pluralistic manner) was aborted. What3

emerged is extractive local governance where power and resources are

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concentrated in the hands of a few who utilized them to create institutions andprocesses to sustain their political power.
Lastly, this paper recognizes the inspirations provided by thedecentralization to the flourishing civil society organizations and movements.
They are manned by responsible citizens who have taken the initiative toorganize and confront issues affecting themselves or their communities. In alimited way, they have provided the avenues to enable citizens to express their
voice and provided the countervailing forces to elite captured local governance.
They are building blocks to inclusive governance.
The paper is organized into four parts. After the background, the next
part discusses gains in decentralization, particularly in the innovative andbest practices in local government management. The third part focuses
on decentralization and inclusive governance (or extractive governance);
including a discussion of the status of local development committees or special
bodies; local strongmen and political dynasty; countervailing civil society
initiatives and features of decentralization that became conducive to politicalelite captures. A concluding note is presented in the last part.

III. Innovations in Local Government Administrationand Service Delivery in a Devolved Regime
In both countries, several local authorities have improved local governanceand public service delivery system. Local legislation in the Philippines
promoted innovations in revenue generation, local investment, environmental
management and social services and also localized national legislations as
Solid Waste Management Act, Anti-Violence against Women and Children
Act, Environmental Code, and the Senior Citizens Act. Information technology
for legislative tracking, cataloguing, and computerization of records has been
gaining popular in the local legislation.
Harmonization of the planning function was undertaken by making
Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP), Comprehensive Land Use Plan
(CLUP), Local Development Investment Plan (LDIP) and Annual Investment
Plan (AIP) as the required local plans. However, only fully staffed local
authorities can comply with this mandate; other LGUs either outsource
services or simply do not undertake planning. Poor data base is also anotherDecentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

27

reason why other LGUs are having a hard time undertaking planning.
Furthermore, monitoring and evaluation of development plans are usuallyneglected.
The internal revenue allotment remains a major source of revenue.
Revenues generated from local sources remain to be 11% for provinces, 29%
for cities and 14% for municipalities. So far only four cities have generated
4

38 to 50% from local sources. Non-tax revenues contribute only a little andrevenue collection efficiency is low. In Indonesia, less progress was also
found in revenue generation but tremendous increased in local expenditures
were noted. Innovations in financial management have been undertaken inaccounting and auditing system; budget process and procurement system.
For human resource development a number of local authorities have created
Human Resource Management Office and conducted capacity development
programs.
Health care services in the Philippines is provided by LGUs. National
health programs implemented by LGUs are supported by the central
government with equipment, supplies and allowance for local staff. Healthinsurance is provided to constituents. Some LGUs charge minimal user’s
fees for health services, to sustain its delivery. Some cities operate tertiary
hospitals, but find it hard to maintain. Local health workers are entitled toallowance as part of the Magna Carta for Health Workers. Some LGUs cannot
afford to provide 100% of the incentive pay, thus their health workers are not
motivated and health services are compromised.
Although education is a national government concern, rich LGUs havecreated local colleges/universities. They are governed by board of directors
appointed by the mayor. Central government provides oversight functions andlesser supervision, thus the quality of services depend on the standard set by
the local authorities. Other LGUs provide technical and vocational schools or
programs to enhance the skills of the youth for gainful employment.
The regional autonomy in Indonesia transferred 26 functions to local
authorities. They include public works, health, education and culture,
agriculture, transportation, industry and trade, investment, environment,
land, cooperatives, labor, and general affairs. Improvements in service delivery
5

were noted in maternal and child health care service delivery. The healthservices are now available in all regions and are relatively cheaper than the

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private providers. Mobile health units are made available to service remoteareas. But private doctors are preferred as they offer quality and specialized
services. Public health services would need more health specialists and reorientation towards more participatory approach.
In the area of education, local authorities are implementing the basic
nine-year compulsory education. Specialized teachers are lacking and inremote areas both teachers and school buildings are not adequate. School
fees increased since decentralization was implemented. To upgrade education
services, mobile libraries, dormitories and school buses were made available.
Participation of civil society in school management was also introduced. Civil
registry service was also devolved and to improve the processing of documents,
local authorities established facilities at the sub-district and village levels andsenior citizen, were issued lifetime identification card to enjoy their benefits.
Streamlining of business licensing is common in both countries. In Indonesia,
the adoption is not yet nationwide as in the Philippines. Lack of facilities andequipment hinder nationwide adoption of business one-stop shop (BOSS) or
6

integrated licensing agencies.

While decentralization enhanced the provision of services, elite capturesof the delivery system generally exists. Political elites decide service provisions
for their advantage and not for common good. The practice illustrating elite
captures include: the choice of the conditional cash transfer beneficiaries;
selection of the members of the board of directors; eligibility of students incolleges/universities operated by local authorities; granting of health insurance
during the re-election time of the incumbent local officials; and exemption
from hospital fees and amnesty from real property taxes when local election
7

is approaching, among others. There are, however, good examples : road andelectricity projects at the village level (desa) are reflective of the preferences ofthe majority of the inhabitants. Priority projects listed in Badab Perwakilan
Desa are fitted between the needs of the villagers. Usually, there are no
conflicts in the types of projects identified, but elite captures usually come indeciding where to locate the road project (usually favoring political elites).
In the Philippines and in Indonesia, innovations and improvements
in local government administration and service delivery were introduced
relatively in the early stage of the decentralization process (compared toaccountability and corruption control). This is partly due to development

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

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assistance for decentralization that was concentrated on: (1) tools forbudgeting, accounting, and expenditure control; (2) information flows throughcomputers, (3) rational methods of program/project scheduling, monitoring,and implementation; (4) rationalizing organization and procedures; and(5) mobilizing paraprofessionals to implement projects and programs anddeliver services. Later, other approaches included: (1) strengthening local
bureaucracies as social institutions, and (2) strengthening accountability andcorruption control.
Generally, the provision of decentralized service delivery in both countries
is hampered by several barriers. Confusion about the sharing and division of
power, resources and accountability between the national and subnational
levels exist. In both countries, some ministries have continued to deliver
services and implement programs and projects that compete directly or runparallel with devolved functions. Moreover, they imposed added functions
without additional funds (unfunded mandates). In Indonesia, the concerned
service delivery ministries are the Ministry of National Education, Ministryof Religious Affairs, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Environment. Threeministries have oversight responsibilities for decentralization. The Ministryof Finance is concerned with transfer of funds and National Planning
Development Agency (Bappenas) is promoting involvement of the citizenry
and local initiatives in centralized planning. In the Philippines, the Local
Government Code, specifically provided in section 17, that “the national
government or the next higher level of local government unit may provide
or augment the basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local
government unit when such services or facilities are not made available or, if
8made available, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants.”
Misinterpretation of this provision leads to the duplication of services.

The promotion of civic engagement, participatory mechanisms,
transparency and accountability are relatively new to local authorities.
Elective officials are usually selective in promoting civic engagement. Citizens(as rights bearer) are not exerting efforts to demand for more and better
services. In Indonesia, majority of the adult still maintain the authoritarian(Orde Baru) mindset and citizens have low expectations of government
services. In the Philippines, generally, the citizenry are contended with thequantity and quality of available services, usually delivered by politicians

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to create patronage. The demanding for services is done the ‘Asian way’
(preference for social harmony rather than confrontational and dissent and9obedience, loyalty and respect towards authority, like government authority).

Willingness to take action outside the box is just emerging. Technicalcapacities to perform functions formerly undertaken by national agencies, arelimited. Some functions need special skills and facilities, not commonly foundin local government units.

IV. Stumbling Blocks to Inclusive Governanceand Perpetuation of Extractive GovernanceInclusive governance seeks to engage the widest possible variety and mix
of stakeholders in managing public affairs. It is a hallmark of decentralization.
In both countries, inclusive governance was not achieved. Firstly, local
councils designed as avenues for citizen participation in decision-making
are not functional. Secondly, extractive governance flourished where old andnew dynastic politicians captured local election and elective positions, at theexpense of the others. Lastly, the prevalence of corruption shifted to the local
level.
1. Non-functionality of Local Councils
In both countries, the decentralization framework provided for theorganization of local councils. The councils are designed to engage civilsociety and the private sector in development planning, procurement, health,education, nutrition, agriculture, environmental sanitation, peace and order,
infrastructure, disaster management and information disclosure. In thePhilippines, there are 26 local special bodies and the Local Development
Council is tasked to prepare, monitor and evaluate development plans,
programs and projects. At least 25% of the membership of the Council should10

be representative of civil society organization. But they should be accreditedby the local legislative body, to be a member. Accreditation takes time andgenerally, civil society organizations (CSOs) allied with local officials in power
are easily accredited. When ‘friendly’ Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) do
not exist, political elites organize CSOs; designate their relatives as head
and accredit them to be members of the local development council. CivicDecentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

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engagement is limited to CSOs who are not ‘hostile’ but are ‘team players’.
In so doing, authentic participation is hindered and the council is captured
by political elites. Consequently, the results of the work of the council, i.e.,
local development plans, are not reflective of the needs and aspirations of thecommunities.
Generally, local councils are not functional due to several factors. Usually,
the local chief executive (LCE) who chairs the council does not call regularmeetings. The secretariat of the council at times does not take the initiative
to call meetings and depend mostly from the instruction of the LCEs. The
member of some council are too many that calling meetings demand resources
which low income LGUs cannot afford. But, there are times when they areconvened due to urgency as when minutes of the meeting and signature ofmembers are necessary to comply with requirements for fund release.
Another window for inclusive governance is local sectoral representationin the local legislative council. This is mandated in the Philippine Constitution
and in the Local Government Code. One sectoral representative from women
sector, another from workers and one from any sector (i.e., urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, disabled persons) should be part of thelocal legislative council. But its implementation has been postponed by theenactment of Republic Act No. 7878 that demands for the enactment of an
enabling law to operationalize sectoral representation. CSO membership in
local special bodies and sectoral representation in local legislative council areintended to enhance inclusive governance, although current practices have
limited their potentials.
In Indonesia, local councils were also organized to engage citizens in
responding to regional needs. An Education Council and Local Health Council
are organized in cities and municipalities. City Council for Environment
and Council for Labor Minimum Wage are created in East Java to answer
the needs of the region. Following the enactment of the Public Information
Disclosure Law in 2008, Public Information Council was created in someprovinces in Indonesia. As in the Philippines, the functionality of the local
council as a forum for the articulation of citizen’s needs and demands is weak.
Consequently, the promotion of inclusive governance was not fulfilled throughthe local councils.

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2. Growth and Fortification of Local Strongmen and Political
Dynasty
Another barrier to inclusive governance is the growth of political dynasties
or strong men in both countries. Political dynasty is a family or alliance offamilies that control political authorities in and/or from the subnational
to national level. They maintain inter-generational political power thatenables husbands, wives, sons, daughters, fathers, mothers, granddaughters,
grandsons, grandfathers, grandmothers, nieces, nephews and in-laws toremain in political power. They create a scenario where they have practically
positioned members of the clan to different elective offices which should not
happen in a representative democratic regime.” Dynastic politicians explain
their existence from different perspectives. One is from the political legacy
perspective which claims that the family members are qualified and haveexcellent record in public service. Another is from a family destiny perspectivethat asserts that there was a calling for their family to undertake public
service. An added dimension is the family profession perspective that declaresthat the members of the clan are better prepared to take over. Another isthe sustainability perspective that argues that political dynasty ensure thesustainability of governance as against short term engagement. Still, somewould allege the political legitimacy/support view that declares that thewinning candidates are voted by the electorates. Finally, others advance thelegal perspective and argue that they are not violating any law, as there is no
anti-political dynasty.
Political dynasties dominate politics in the Philippines and Indonesia.

12

It builds a scenario where the husband is the governor of the province while
the wife seats as a member of the House of Representatives (representing
one district); a son or daughter is a mayor and another is a member of
the Provincial Board (Sangguniang Panlalawigan) and a grandson or
granddaughter is a member of a Municipal Legislative Council (Sangguniang
Pambayan) and another is the chair of the federation of youth sector (Kabataan
Barangay). The same reality could be seen in Indonesia, particularly in theProvinces of Bantem, South Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan and Lumpung.
They are also present in the districts of Kutai Kartanegara District, East
Kalimantan Province; Bantul District, Yogyakarta Province; Kediri District,
East Java Province; Kendal District, Central Java Province; Indramayu

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

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District, West Java Province; Bandung District, West Java Province;
Central Lombok District, West Nusa Tenggara Province; Bontang City, East
13

Kalimantan Provinci and Sragen, Central Java Province.

(i) Enabling Environment for Political Dynasty Building
There are varying reasons or a combination of reasons that perpetuatedthe existence of political dynasties. One is the social power structure in bothcountries which is a fertile breeding ground for political dynasty. Communities
and society as well as political organizations are organized based on social
status or family or clan endowed with resources. The family system isextended and the members share the pride of being in political power. A seedcapital for elective political position is the resources of the clan which ordinary
people, professionals and middle class do not enjoy. Dynastic politicians trust
their relatives who ensured their loyalty and solidarity in the preservation ofpolitical power. Furthermore, the clan has the tendency to dictate the career
path of their members and usually towards political position/s in government.
The second reason is the failure of state regulation. The Philippines
missed the opportunity to regulate political monopolies by limiting the term ofoffice and barring political dynasty in the 1987 Constitution. Article II Section
26 of the Constitution affirms that “The State shall guarantee equal accessto opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law.” A provision should have added, stating: “no outgoing elected
official shall be succeeded to the same office by any person related to him/her
14

to the third degree of consanguinity or affinity.” This provision should haveprohibited the spouse, brother or sister, or in-laws, children, or first cousins of
the outgoing official to succeed him/her in the same office.
State capture generally refers to political elites (who are themselves
lawmakers and dynastic politicians) shaping laws, policies and regulations
15of the state for their own advantage is a third reason. This explains why
anti-dynasty law has not been enacted in both countries. But even if there
is a law, dynastic politicians can capture electoral exercise by acting as ‘kingmaker’; building and financing candidates, loyal to them, just to break theircontinuous presence in the position and be back as soon as they are eligible
again.
Fourth reason is the capture of the state and this exists when dynastic

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politicians are protected by the government of the day. The head of thestate and his/her party used dynastic politicians to consolidate their power.
This strategy started during the authoritarian regimes in both countries.
More recently in the Philippines, the government of Arroyo allured politicaldynasties loyal to her with benefits and protection in exchange for loyalty andprotection from the threat of people power. This strategy also contributed tothe creation of private armies of dynastic politicians. In Indonesia the processof consolidating the political power during the new order gave birth to local
mafias and bossism. Initially, dynastic politicians are capture of the state, but
as they gain power, they captured the state (elite capture).
The fifth reason is that political parties are generally weak and failed topromote inclusive political participation. They were unsuccessful in recruiting
competent candidates; financing party activities; and organizing and managing
16

the party. They have not undertaken a conscious effort to build professional
political leaders. They remained dominated by political dynasties that canswitch alliance on the basis of convenience and not on ideological commitment
and development perspective.
The sixth reason is the enormous cost in running for elective position thatprovides advantage to dynastic politicians. Generally, it prevents progressive
candidates to try the electoral arena. If ever, they run and win, they remain
in lower level positions. Sometimes they are invited by the dynastic politicians
to make their party appear progressive. Their political growth, however, iscontrolled by the dynastic politician.
The seventh reason is the absence of a vibrant and healthy citizenry,community and civil society that demands for political meritocracy.
Responsible citizenry, voting wisely and able to resist selling their right tosuffrage is just slowly emerging. The last reason is the absence of a strong
professional public service manned by highly qualified and politically neutral
bureaucrats who can influence the thinking of dynastic politicians in providing
non-partisan public service.
(ii) Contributions of Decentralization to Political Dynasty Building
In both countries, decentralization expanded the revenue raising powersof LGUs. Dynastic politicians thus gain access to more resources which could
be used to advance their political agenda. Although budget allocation is done

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

35

through ‘sound’ planning and budgeting, politicians are still able to ensure
funding of their political agenda or preferences. Infrastructure projects
constructed in the localities usually bear a big sign (with the picture of thepolitician), telling the constituencies that this project is initiated by him orher (although funding comes from the people’s taxes). This kind of publicity or
promotion gives the incumbent politicians advantage, as name recall during
election.
Another source of money is the Priority Development Assistance Funds(PDAP). Members of Philippine Legislature (congressman and senators) areentitled to PDAP. For the year 2011, several senators used their PDAP for
infrastructure projects, like construction of water system, farm-to-market
road, school building, among others. Elected to either House of Senate orHouse of Representatives, dynastic politicians have the advantage to access
PDAP and implement priority projects.
Political machinery is important in building dynastic politicians. In a way,
decentralization has strengthened the political machinery of elected dynastic
politicians. In the Philippines, the barangays (urban and rural villages) are thebasic political units of the country. The Local Government Code provided forthe election of barangay officials (chair and council members), appointment ofother officials (treasurer and secretary), and recruitment of volunteer workers(like barangay police, Barangay Health Worker and Barangay Nutrition
Scholars). Political elites have captured this constellation of barangay officials
and volunteers and have integrated them to their political machinery.
Furthermore, in every barangay, Kabataang Barangay (a youth village
council) is created. The intent is to expose and involve the youth in nationbuilding. The officials of the council are also elected. Most political dynasties
have made use of the kabatang barangay leadership election as an entryof their grandchildren to politics. Although limited, both barangay council(village council) and Kabataang Barangay (village youth council) have revenue
generating powers. They can request higher level governments for grants.
The barangays get regular share from the internal revenue allotment of thenational government. They also tap the Priority Development AssistanceFunds (pork barrel funds of the congressmen and senators to finance theirpriority projects). Again, through the barangay youth council, dynastic
politicians elected in the legislative branch can make use of the PDAP, and36

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include the youth as part of the political machinery.
Strengthening or capacity building of the village council is regularly done
to make sure that the members are able to execute their functions. Capacity
development is a requirement of the decentralization process. A popular formof capacity development is benchmarking or visiting best practices (lakbayaral) done by other local government units. They draw lessons from the bestpractices visited. Barangay officials and local bureaucrats are recipients ofthese lakbay aral. In some cases, however, political elites make use of lakbay
aral as a forum for power consolidation. They sponsor or augment the budgetof the LGUs to organize lakbay aral and there are instances when they
allot some time to be with the group and take the opportunity to get theircommitment.
With decentralization, LGUs can also create new offices. In most cases,
an Office of the Public Information Officer is created, tasked to promote theprograms, projects, and services of the LGUs. In doing so, maximum media
coverage for officials is provided. A dynastic politician in power can make useof the Office of the Public Information Office for his/her advantage. Anotherpopular office that is created is a local traffic bureau or public safety office.
This office manned by traffic bureau enforces usually selected from the
supporters of the politicians.
The local chief executives (LCEs) in the Philippines have operational
and administrative control over the police force. Republic Act 6975 empowers
them to select Provincial Director or Chief of Police and to discipline andsuspend erring police officer. Although the Department of Interior and Local
Government, through memorandum circular 2002-002, clarified that thepowers of local government executives are on higher level supervision andcontrol, issuing policies and guidelines to ensure public safety and maintainpeace and order, in reality, the LCEs exercise operational supervision. To
prevent LCEs from using the police force for their advantage during election,
this memorandum further provided that 30 days before and after elections,supervision and control of the police will be under the Commission on Election.
This is to avoid the use of police force for the advantage of incumbent officials
who are running for public office.

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

37(iii) What Is Wrong with Political Dynasty?
In mapping the political dynasty in the House of Congress in the 15th
Congress of Philippines, it was noted that (1) 70 percent of the 15th Philippine
Congress is dynastic; meaning they are related to one or more membersof the three previous Congresses and/or to at least one local government
official, elected in the four previous elections; (2) there is no gender and age
bias, as they are spread across different age groups and gender; (3) theytend to dominate major political parties and their shift from one to anothercan weaken the other; (4) in terms of wealth ownership, dynastic legislators
have more possession than non-dynastic politicians; (5) if they win, they win
overwhelmingly or by a greater margin; and (6) they are generally located inareas with higher poverty levels and inequalities (poverty incidence averages
24.15%; poverty gap is 6.18 per cent and poverty severity is 2.31%. Comparedwith the areas with non-dynastic legislators, poverty incidence is lower at
1718.95%, poverty gap is 4.93% and poverty severity is 1.86%). The poverty
scenarios in areas with dynastic politicians are only patterns and no conclusive
attribution has been established.
It is remarkable to note that Japan is another country with dynastic
politicians (others are the United States of America, Mexico, Italy and India).
A study was undertaken in Japan to determine the electoral outcomes anddistributive benefits derived from dynastic politicians (using data from 1997 to2007). The study combined the Citizen Candidate Model with the Legislative
18

Bargaining Model. The findings of the study revealed the following : (1)dynastic politicians enjoy legislative and electoral advantages over nondynastic counterparts; (2) dynastic candidates enjoy a higher probabilityof winning and a higher vote share or greater margin than non-dynastic
candidates and (3) most importantly, the areas represented by dynastic
legislators receive a larger amount of discretionary grants than the areas
represented by non-dynastic legislators, yet the increased transfers do notboost economic performance in the area. Rather, (4) prefectures face worse
economic performance when represented by dynastic legislators. Perhaps,when the models are applied in the Philippines and Indonesia, they will
generate similar results and will establish a direct relationship between
dynastic politicians and prevalence of poverty and inequalities.

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Innovation in government administration and service delivery, brought
about by decentralization, has not eradicated corruption. The results of thesurvey on corruption in the Philippines, conducted by the Social Weather
Station, revealed that from 2009 to 2012, the perception is that corruption
cases shifted from the national government to local government units,
particularly in the cities and municipalities and then provinces. The top offices
where corruption is happening include Budget Office, Mayor’s Office, Officeof the Engineer, Office of the Treasurer and Business Permit and Licensing
19

Office.

This dismal state of corruption is happening in spite of the increasein the number of LGUs awarded with the Seal of Good Housekeeping (thisseal is given to LGUs observing good planning, sound fiscal management,
transparency and accountability and valuing performance information). This
is in line with the Department of Interior and Local Government’s (DILG)
commitment to institutionalize transparency, accountability, participation
and result-orientation in local governance. From July 2011 to Dec 23, 2011,
the number of LGUs that have been given this seal jumped from 319 to 459.
Corruption is also happening amidst the increase in the number of LGUs
using Citizen Charter (illustration of the step-by-step provision of a service,including person responsible and requirements to get the service).
Decentralization and democratization in Indonesia is not free from
corruption either. A popular sentiment is that new patterns of highly diffuse
and decentralized corruption emerged in the form of predatory local officials,
20

money politics and political gangsterism. In both countries the 3Gs (guns,goons and gold) of extractive governance exist. The temptations to resort
to the politics of money (gold) and political violence (goons and guns) tosecure elective position are high. This is shown by the number of election
related killings; the number of private armies existing and the number ofcomplaints against vote buying. In Indonesia the KKN (corruption, collusion
and nepotism) syndrome that used to happen only in Jakarta spread to thesubnational and local levels.

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

39

V. Countervailing The Stumbling Blocks: Civil Society Initiatives
W h i l e v u l n e r a b l e t o p o l i t i c a l e l i t e c a p t u r e s a n d c l i e n t i l i sm,
decentralization has promoted the development of countervailing institutions,like NGOs, voluntary initiatives or organizations and community-basedorganizations. They have slowly taken the risk and improved their capacity
to demand transparency and accountability. One such organization is theConcerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance (CCAGG) in the Provinceof Abra, Philippines (located in northern Philippines). The CCAGG is a nongovernmental organization whose primary task is to monitor government
projects in the Province of Abra. The organizers took the opportunities createdby the people power in 1986 and formed an organization to participate in
the development programs of President Corazon Aquino administration. The
organization got the approval of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) to undertake program/project monitoring. Its members
were likewise receiving training on project monitoring and evaluation.
CCAGG documented the status of the reported completed projects. Throughtestimonies and pictures, the group was able to show that most of them were
just beginning or under mid-way construction. The effort of CCAGG led to theinvestigation and conviction of eleven officials.
Today (26 years later), CCAGG has sustained its efforts in promoting
good governance. Given its track record, the Commission on Audit (COA)
partnered with CCAGG in “Enhancing the Public Accountability Program of
the Philippine COA: Participatory Audit with Civic Society Organizations.”

21

Participatory audit was conducted in 23 road projects of the Departmentof Public Works and Highways and 10 soil conservation and watershedmanagement programs of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). Given its success, participatory audit was replicated in
two other provinces, where two NGOs (the National Urban Poor Assemblyin Camarines Norte and the Social Action Development Center in Mountain
Province) were mobilized as partners. Participatory auditing was perceived tobe more focused and efficient at the same time adhering to the principles ofgood governance.
In Indonesia, an NGO supported a community organization and the40

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Lembaga Adat (the traditional village council), in protecting their village
near the National Park in Central Sulawesi from illegal logging by foreign
capitalists. The NGO was engaged in park protection and was promoting
income-generating agricultural activities and creating environmental
awareness among the villagers. In the process, it organized the villagers
who later on protested against illegal logging through demonstration in
front of the People’s Representative Assembly at the Regency level. In spiteof heavy objections from their village headman, the group mobilized othervillage organizations and NGOs to join. In the same area, years later, anotherattempt was made to convert 300 hectares of forest land into agricultural land.
Again, the NGO together with the village organization organized a workshop
to discuss the issue. Through this undertaking, the group was able to impress
upon the Director of the National Park that the conversion of the forest land
is not practical, as it will affect the watershed, the park and religious belief of22

the villagers.

Another example in Indonesia is the local economy watch undertaken
by an NGO, the KPPOD. Since 2001, this NGO was conducting surveys andranking districts in terms of economic governance and business climates orinvestment competitiveness. At first, 90 districts were covered and by 2007,
the coverage has reached 243 districts, in 15 provinces. Through survey andratings, some LGUs have become more transparent and have made businessregulations and processes simple and more competitive. Regions that wereranked high in terms of lessening the cost of doing business attracted moreinvestment. Eventually, other local authorities were streamlining theirbusiness processes to attract investors.
Another organization providing countervailing force in the Philippines is
the City Coalitions for Transparent and Accountable Governance (CCTAGs).
This organization is composed of representatives from the three pillars ofgovernance: business, local government, and civil society. Through partnershipwith local business council (like the Mindanao Business Council), thisorganization has facilitated 13 city-level coalitions that became a forum forthe articulation and monitoring of local government reforms in response to the23needs of the business sector . More pro-people policies and judicious allocationof resources were advocated. CCTAG was also instrumental in establishing
localized counter-corruption score card and business one stop shop (BOSS).

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

41

Finally, by working and learning together, the different sectors develop theculture of sharing of expertise.
Decentralization in both countries inspired and encouraged thedevelopment of a vibrant local civil society network (although relatively
slow and sometimes risky) but it should not end there, as civil society is justone pillar of inclusive governance. The space for inclusive governance in adecentralized regime should be further opened. Decentralization should makeinclusive governance both a process and a goal.

VI. Concluding Note: Transforming Decentralization FromAn Instrument Of Extractive Governance To Inclusive Governance
While decentralization provided incentives for the rise and fortificationof political dynasties and opened more avenues for corruption, it inspired
grassroots initiatives. These organizations and/or community initiatives
came in varying forms, like advocacy; involvement in project planning,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation; corruption control; resource
conservation and protection; rescue operation; rehabilitation and development
and even peace building. More and more critical engagement from thegrassroots and/or community organizations are happening inspired by thegeneral intent of decentralization, that is, to build self-governing and selfreliant communities.
Amidst the corruption and perpetuation of elite captures (externalitiesof decentralization), local autonomy remains popular in the Philippines. The
Social Weather Station survey further revealed that respondents expected
cities, municipalities and barangays (rather than national and provincial
governments) to solve problems concerning the economy, social services,
crime, infrastructure, government and governance. A similar survey in 2009
identified the national government as directly responsible to provide solutions
24

to these concerns. Interest to participate in local governance is high.

The direction in both countries is that there is no turning back to
centralization. The way forward is a completion of the decentralization
process. Towards this end, the challenges ahead include the need to redefine
or fine-tune decentralization to make the sharing of power between higher
and lower levels of authorities/competencies of government, business sector

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and civil society a reality. Decentralization has been narrowly misinterpreted
as the transfer of power from the central to local government, to ensure that
services are effectively and efficiently delivered to the intended customers.
But decentralization is much more than as it should promote also a free flowof lines of collaboration, integration and accountability, both vertical andhorizontal. Further, this narrow view of decentralization deemphasizes theequity and empowerment (or promotion of inclusive governance) as a desired
outcome of the process. Moreover, decentralization takes place in public
governance and administration system (even in a broader socio-politicalsystem) and the reform in the whole system should simultaneously be done toeffect a genuine decentralization. The completion of decentralization process
should also incorporate reforms in the other socio-political sub-systems. These
sub-systems cover election (including political party organizations), the civil
service system; social power structure; and public integrity and accountability
sub-system.
Electoral reforms need to focus on strengthening political parties,
upholding strict compliance to the election code, and enactment andenforcement of anti-political dynasty law. There is a need to strengthen
political parties to make them catalyst of inclusive governance and to prevent
them from becoming a political party of dynastic politicians. This could bedone through advocacy from media, civil society and academe. Development ofpolitical parties would entail the promotion of distinct party ideology, platform
and culture; observance of political meritocracy and professionalization ofmembers; enforcement of party discipline and regulation (including antipolitical dynasty regulations). An incentive mechanism should be provided
for political parties to be able to observe these elements. The incentive could
be in a form of financial incentives from the national government. Major
political parties should be encouraged to organize political foundations which
will be professionally managed and will administer the priority development
assistance fund given to the members of the house of congress and senate.
The creation of regional political parties which are usually home of politicaldynasties should be discouraged or regulated.
Complementing decentralization is to uphold strict compliance with theelection code. One relevant area is the policies governing election campaign
finance. Penalties for the violation of election offenses (like penalties againstDecentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

43

vote-buying and vote-selling; coercion; unlawful electioneering; appointment
or promotion of employees during the election period; use of policemen,public funds and government properties during the election campaign period,
among others) should be enforced. Weak enforcement of laws favors dynastic
politicians and discourages potential and more competent people to enter theelectoral arena.
In the Philippines, the enactment of an anti-political dynasty law should
be facilitated. Although it will take time to enact one, as it is unconceivableto see dynastic politicians ratifying a law that will end the power of theirclan, still advocating for one is important. Sectoral party representatives
are championing it in the House of Congress and a couple of senators are
doing it in the Senate, but again, the possibility to pass a law is slim in thenear future. But the legal framework is not sufficient to control the power ofdynastic politicians and thus, the socio-political structure in general should bealso overhauled.
The present social and political power structure is conducive to thefurtherance of political dynasties. Inclusive growth and inclusive governanceshould blend together to transform the social and political power structure
more balance (promotion of social equality, equal access and ownership ofeconomic resources). This implies that poverty reduction, asset reform andsocial protection initiatives (like conditional cash transfer, etc.) and earlychildhood development, among others, should be used as a transformation
mechanism for a socio-political order conducive to decentralization andinclusive governance.
Decentralization was not accompanied by the creation of public integrity
and accountability values, safeguards to deter misuse of decentralized powers
and resources. A range of tools have been introduced, like governance reportcard, citizen charter, e-procurement and seal of good housekeeping, but local
authorities were undertaking them more as compliance with administrative
processes rather than as building blocks towards accountable governance. A
more determined effort to push integrity, accountability and anti-corruption
strategies should be initiated together with any decentralization process.
Aside from education, developing agency-wide public integrity promotion plan,
formulating public integrity pact and introducing anti-corruption strategies,
support should be provided to whistle blowers and improvement should be44

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done in the apprehension and conviction of corrupt local officials. In the sameway, best (or good enough) practices on the promotion of local public integrity
and accountability should be scaled up and popularized (one example is Naga
City and the practices of the late Jessie Robredo, as a Mayor of Naga City
and as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government). The
leagues of local government units (like the Leagues of Provinces; Leagues ofCities and Leagues of Municipalities) should also be mobilized as a mechanism
in promoting public integrity and accountability (policing and rewarding
their own ranks). Localizing the corruption perception index (undertaken
by Transparency International) will also help promote integrity andaccountability in a decentralized regime.
Local councils and sectoral representatives in the legislative body remain
a potent strategy to expand and/or equalize political voice in local governance.
The decentralization process should devolve effective power capacity to socialgroups and institutions, where local councils are a part. Councils should not
be organized solely to recommend policies but should also be given power tomake independent decisions and execute policies and programs. Budgetary
support should also be provided to enable them to function effectively. The
chair of the councils should not always be the local chief executives and theaccreditation (to become member) should be transferred to a network of civilsociety organizations. The sectoral representatives (i.e., labor, women, or
urban poor, etc.) in the local councils should not be abandoned, and rules andguides in their selection should be provided. Membership to the sector should
be properly established and their representatives to the local legislative
authorities should be appropriately elected.
Civil society and the third sector initiatives, private sector inventivenessand public private partnership (PPP) in the provision of public goods and interlocal government cooperation to solve common problems requiring common
solutions have not been fully harnessed in the decentralization process. A
strong political will to provide the enabling environment to make them work isneeded.
Politicians come and go and the local bureaucracy (civil servants) provides
continuity in delivering public goods and services and stability of government.
Their security of tenure, political neutrality and professionalization should beensured. In most cases, they become instruments of political elites (including

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

45

dynastic politicians) in promoting their political agenda at the expenseof public service. Some politicians bring with them a management teamundermining the organic staff and personnel. Appointive officials suspectedof being not loyal are given limited or no role in the administration. In most
instances, their decision-making power is limited (they get clearance frompoliticians before making decision). Although they are technically equipped,in some cases, they are not able to influence the decisions of the local chief
executives. And still there are occasions when they cannot suggest innovations
to local politicians. Strengthening their capability is therefore necessary(not through the old style training program). A career executive service for
local bureaucrats is an option as well as strengthening their professional
associations (like the association of local treasurers, association of municipal
assessors, etc.). Making entry difficult (through rigid screening) and making
compensation and package of incentives competitive will bring dignity to local
civil servants. Ensuring that local government departments are organized ina lean and mean manner (to pay only a few but highly qualified personnel)
would ensure judicious allocation of funds and efficient use of resources. A
competitive or highly professionalized local bureaucracy (independent fromextractive political interventions) could promote inclusive governance.
Dynastic politicians frequently claim that they stay in power as they areelected by their constituencies. Generally, they undertake political actions
under the scrutiny of the public. They assert that they are re-elected andsustained their political position as their actions are approved and sanctionedby the people. Therefore the quality of governance is also determined by theworth of citizenship or electorates. Good or responsible citizenship breeds
good governance (and good politicians). Thus, the quality of citizenship needs
to be enhanced for inclusive governance and genuine decentralization. A
new culture of responsible citizenship should be recreated as a pre-conditionor along the process of decentralization. Responsible citizenship means
people have the capacity to decide and act based on conviction or belief,
not on the basis of imposition, intimidation or fear or obligation. Educationand community engagement may enable responsible citizenry to reduce or
minimize electoral captures by dynastic politicians.
In both countries the support for decentralization is still popular. In
similar manner, international recognition for decentralization as a means

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towards democratic good governance is still high. Decentralization has inspired
the emergence of civil society and third sector initiatives; small scale public
private partnership; service delivery through outsourcing; modernization ofadministrative processes and promotion of efficiency in delivery of services.
Excellence in local governance has been exhibited by outstanding local
authorities. At the same time, decentralization created externalities, as more
opportunities for corruption emerged and better chances were opened fordynastic politicians to be fortified and sustained. This phenomenon leads
to extractive or exclusive governance. The sentiments remain that there isno turning back to re-centralization but to move forward and complete thedecentralization process and promote genuine local autonomy.
Decentralization has inspired and encouraged grassroots and/or civilsociety initiatives in both countries. There are numerous cases; some are
documented and presented as case studies or anecdotes and still many arenot. Several initiatives were issue-based while others grew and replicated.
The bottom line, however, is that these types of initiatives have demonstrated
how to counter political elites and clientelism, no matter how risky. Onceappropriate policy framework and incentives have been provided, thesecountervailing efforts provide hope in completing an authentic decentralization
process.
The decentralization process in both countries point to the fact that
pursuing a genuine local autonomy is not merely a rational process oftransferring powers from central to local (or national to sub-national)
governments, but entails a combination of policy reform, renovation of thepolitical party system, socio-political transformation, professionalization of
the bureaucracy, supporting grassroots initiatives and civic engagement andbuilding responsible citizenry. Reforms in all fronts of the system will enable
to unleash decentralization from captures of dynastic politicians and frominformal network of patronage and social domination. Decentralization thenwill be truly an instrument of inclusive governance.

Decentralization and Inclusive Governance: Experiences from the Philippines and Indonesia

47

End Notes
1 Darmawan, Rachmad Erland Danny, “The practices of decentralization in Indonesia and its
implication on local competitiveness,” Public Administration-Public Governance Study, Schoolof Management and Government, University of Twente, Enschede, the Netherlands, 2008, 25.
(http://essay.utwente.nl/59282/1/scriptie_R_Darmawan.pdf) (accessed 12/15/12).
2 Hiroshi Ikawa,“Indoneshia ni okeru chihoubunken to chihouzaisei—Shinpojium Chihoubunken
to chihouzaisei deno houkoku to giron (Local autonomy and local finance in Indonesia:
Symposium on Local Autonomy and Local Finance—presentation and discussion,” Todoufuken
tenbou, Vol. 612 (September 2009), 32-35.
3 Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity andPoverty, New York: Crown Publishers, 2012, 385, 406.
4 The Asia Foundation, “11th Rapid Field Appraisal of Decentralization in the Philippine,” 2010,11-29. (http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/01Synopsis.pdf) (accessed 1/15/13)
5 The Asia Foundation, “Indonesia Rapid Decentralization Appraisal (IRDA),” 2004, 11-38. (http://
asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/IRDA4English.pdf ) (accessed 1/15/13)
6 Rustiani, Frida and Maria Belen Bonoan, “Streamlining Business Licensing and Transparency
Mechanisms in Indonesia and the Philippines,” In Innovations in Strengthening Local Economic
Governance in Asia (The Asia Foundation, 2011), 126-127. (http://asiafoundation.org/resources/
pdfs/InnovationsinStrengtheningLocalGovernanceinAsia.pdf) (accessed 1/15/13)
7 Chowdhury, Shyamal, Futoshi Yamaguchi and Reno Dewina, “Governance Decentralizationand Local Infrastructure Provision in Indonesia,” IFPRI Discussion Paper 00902, International
Food policy Research Institute, 2009, 22. (http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp00902.pdf) (accessed 1/12/13)
8 Republic of the Philippines, Republic Act 7160: Local Government Code of 1991.
9 Cortes, Damcelle, “Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?” (Paper presented in the Doshisha
University International Conference on Humanitarian Intervention, Kyoto, Japan. June 27-29,
2011).
10 Republic of the Philippines, Republic Act 7160: Local Government Code of 1991.
11 Rady, David, “What’s wrong with political dynasties?” Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 3,
2012.
12 Trajano, Julius Cesar I., and Yoes C. Kenawas, “Indonesia and the Philippines: Politicaldynasties in democratic states,” RSIS Commentaries, No. 018/2013, S. Rajaratnam School ofInternational Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2013, 1-2. (http://www.
nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Political-dynasties-dominate-in-Indonesia-and-the--30199391.
html) (accessed 1/12/13)
13 Utomo, Tri Widodo Wahyu, “Building Good Governance through Decentralization in Indonesia(Recognizing Some Inhibiting Factors in the Implementation Stage),” In Kimura, Hirotsune,
Suharko, Aser B. Javier, and Ake Tangsupvattana, eds., Limits of Good Governance inDeveloping Countries, Gadjah Mada University Press, 2011, 254-256.
14 Abueva, Jose V., “Dynasties threat to democracy,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 3,
2012.
15 Hellman, Joel S., Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day:
State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition,” Policy Research Working Paper 2444
(September 2000), World Bank, 2000, 4.
16 Rady, David, “What’s wrong with political dynasties?” Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 3,

48

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2012.
17 Beja, Edsel L. Jr , Mendoza, Ronald U., Victor S. Venida, and David B. Yap, “Inequality indemocracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine
Congress,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper No. 40104 (July 2012), 14-15.
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969605 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1969605
18 Asako, Yasushi, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, and Michiko Ueda, “Dynastic Politicians:
Theory and Evidence from Japan,” Working Paper No. 20101 (April 14, 2012), Waseda
University Organization for Japan-US Studies, 30. (http://www.kikou.waseda.ac.jp/wojuss/achievement/publication/pdf/wp201201.pdf) (accessed 1/15/13)
19 Mahar, Mangahas, “Survey of Enterprises on Corruption: The fight against corruption
has radically progressed from 2009,” (Paper presented in the SGV Hall, Asian Institute ofManagement, Makati, Philippines, 12 September, 2012).
20 Hadiz, Vedi R., “Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutional
Perspectives,” Development and Change, 35 (4), International Institute of Social Studies, The
Hague, 2004, 707-710.
21 Ramkumar, Vivek, and Warren Krafchik, “The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Auditing
and Public Finance Management,” in Auditing for Social Change: A Strategy for Citizen
Engagement in Public Sector Accountability (ST/ESA/PAD/SSER.E/75), United Nations, 2007,
38-40. (http://www.unpan.org/Portals/0/60yrhistory/documents/Publications/Auditing%20
for%20Social%20Change.2007.pdf) (accessed 1/15/13)
22 Birner, Regina, “Can Decentralization and Community-Based Development Reduce Corruptionin Natural Resource management?—Insights from Irrigation in Ghana and Forestry inIndonesia,” Paper presented at the 13th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Athens,
Greece, October 30-November 2, 2008, International Food policy Research Institute, 2008, 1011. (http://netmap.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/decentralization_corruption_birner_2008.pdf)(accessed 1/15/13)
23 Transparent Accountable Governance (TAG), “TAG 3: Local Governance in Mindanao,” Second
Quarter Report FY 2009 (January 1-March 31, 2009) (No. 492-A-00-07-00021-00), May 4, 2009,
6-7.
24 Social Weather Station, “The 2012 Survey on Good Local Governance,” SWS Manila, August20-28, 2012. (http://www.sws.org.ph/pr20121029.htm) (accessed 1/15/13)

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