Informational and Cultural Changes in
Present-Day Russia and Their Influenceon the Political System
Victor Kouznetsov
One of the first and program-type documents of President V.
Putin was the Informational Security Doctrine approved by him
on September 9, 2000, less than half a year after he was elected.
The need for its adoption was justified by the following reasons:
1. The society was caught in a deep and lingering moral andpsychological crisis, it was disoriented in the face of global anddomestic challenges. Constant expectation of a catastrophe was
the factor provoking social cataclysms.
2. Russia turned out to be unprepared for informational andpsychological warfare. As a result, its strategic interests in various regions of the world and social life realms were infringed.
3. The world got an image of Russia as a corrupt state, constantly feeding bad news which resulted in serious international
investors avoiding it and Russian companies’ stocks remained
significantly undervalued in worldwide stock markets.
4. The integrated information zone of the country got split
into separate and weakly-linked segments. As a result the social
threads binding society into a single whole were broken.
The Doctrine ascertained “low efficiency of the public policy
information support in the Russian Federation.” This in particular
could be seen in the government facing an objective necessity totake tough and unpopular decisions (housing and communal services reforms; reduction of the social liabilities of the state; withdrawal of the system of internal tariffs on energy resources which
was required for Russia to be able to enter the World Trade Organization). However, none of the seven Yeltsin governments
ever brought themselves to implement these measures, keeping- 391 -

VICTOR KoUZNETSOV

off strong negative public reaction and restoration of the old totalitarian system. The mechanisms to correct public perception of
the policy of the state were simply unavailable for those governments.
Though the state held the control stocks in the biggest TV
companies of the country, in reality their informational policy
substance was determined not based on public interests but on thecorporative interests of individual shadow structures. A vivid example of this is the situation which existed in 1999 when a teamof newsmen, who often were called “political killers,” led by S.
Dorenko executing an order of B. Berezovskii, started a campaign
on the 1st (governmental) TV channel to discredit the PrimeMinister Y. Primakov who declared it necessary to counteract
corruption at the highest level.
Putin’s statements on the need to carry out active public informational policy were interpreted by many observers both inRussia and abroad as striving to avoid recurrence of a similar
situation by way of imposing strict control over the media. The
same conclusions were also suggested by the actions of the representatives of power structures relating to property redistribution at
the NTV and TV-6 channels. Certainly the strive to implement
the project “of the introduction of like-mindedness in Russia” hasalways been one of the longed-for targets of Russian bureaucracy.
However, it would be wrong to reduce the entire governmental information policy only to the aspiration to control the mass
media. The problem is more complex. Implementation of the
majority of public development programs in Russia is impossible
without the active participation of the population and civil society
institutions. Therefore the formation of a favorable social andpsychological climate for the implementation of programs of reformation and development, ensuring competent participation of
the citizens in this process and a dialog between the state and civilsociety, have been one of the fundamental conditions for the realization of reforms in Russia. Those reforms will allow Russia
to modernize itself and be integrated into the world economy.
The purpose of this report is to try to render an analysis ofwhat changes occurred over the last three years in the system of- 392 -

INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES

mass communications in Russia and what effect they had on thesolution of the above strategic task.

1. Sociocultural Changes
As the results of sociological surveys show, the social awareness of Russians has been fatigued from the negative information
coming to them every day from TV, newspapers and magazines
over the last two decades. The scale of such “black” propaganda
can be seen from the following figures:
Fig. 1. Tonality of Subjects of News Broadcasts of TV Channels (January-April 2003)

TVTs

49

TVS

51

NTV

49

42

43

0%

10%

20%
Negative

7

46

45

ORT

6

44

42

RTR

9

12

46

30%

40%

50%
Neutral

60%

70%

9

80%

90%

100%

Positive(Based on mass media monitoring performed by the Information Policy Department under the Samara Oblast Administration)

The mass media outlets are still intimidating people, but they
are significantly less scared than three, five and, a fortiori, ten
years ago. This can be proved in particular by the following public poll data:- 393 -

VICTOR KoUZNETSOVFig. 2. How, in Your Opinion, Will the Situation in the Country Change in the Near Future?1
3

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

May
July
September
NovemberJanuary
March
May
July
September
NovemberJanuary
March
May
July
September
NovemberJanuary
March
May
July
September
NovemberJanuary
March
May
July
September
NovemberJanuary
March
May
July
September
NovemberJanuary
March
May
July
September
NovemberJanuary
March
May
July
September
NovemberJanuary
March
May
July
September
NovemberJanuary
March

0

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Political optimism (positive/ negative expecations)
Economic optimism (positie/ negative expectations)

In the endless exaggerating of bad news, admiration of selfabasement is now perceived by society somewhat differently
from what it was ten years ago. Not only does this demoralize thesociety and undermine trust in governmental and public institutions, but it also affects the credibility of the mass media outlets
themselves, which in terms of degree of trust are now generally
inferior to such public and non-governmental institutions as the
President, the government, the army, the church, and the national
security agencies, while only five years ago in the degree of trust
only the church could compete with them. This is clearly seenfrom the following diagram.

1 “Public Opinion Monitoring. Economic and Social Changes,” VTsIOM, 2,
64:4, 2003.

- 394 -

INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES

Fig. 3. Trust in Political and Public Institutions (May 2003)
60

50

40

30

20

10

Deserve not fully

Don't know

Parties

ChurchNational Security

Do not deserve totally

Army

Mass Media

Deserve fully

Parliament

Government

President0(Based on VTsIOM data)

According to the regional sociological surveys conducted by
the Samara State University, only 44.7% of the oblast residents
are inclined to give credit to national periodicals, 52.4% to local
press stories, and 65.3% to local publications.
Under these conditions even objective and constructive criticism of the authorities from public structures and newsmen will
not hit the target since a significant part of society is still in a stateof social anemia. For instance, if ten years ago to accuse a political figure of corruption would mean to kill his career, now neither
politicians themselves nor the electorate pay any attention to theseaccusations.
In short, from a mass communication instrument the mass
media turned into a people-alienating instrument of social structure atomization.
More and more people perceive the mass media not as an instrument for the purpose of getting information about the eventsof socio-political life but as a means of entertainment. This canbe proved by the TV viewers’ interest comparison data of 1996
and 2002:- 395 -

VICTOR KoUZNETSOVFig. 4. What Telecasts Do You Prefer to Watch?2
33.4

News

56.4

6.9

Publicistic

16.1
26.7

Quiz programs, games, shows

19.6
17.5

Sports

33.3
7.4

Music

12.3
29.2
26.6

Serials

32.8
31.4

Feature films
12.9

Comic

23.2
11.8

Educational

5.7
0

10

20

year 1996

30

40

50

60

year 2002

In this respect the tendency of falling ratings of the main social and political TV channels and, vice versa, the growing ratingsof TV channels positioning themselves as entertainment television does not appear unrelated:
Fig. 5. Shares of TV Channels in Russia3
2002, I 2002, II 2002, III 2002, IV 2003, I
Russiaquarter quarter quarter quarter quarter
%

%

%

%

%

The First Channel

42.3

41.7

38.5

40.7

38.1

Russia

22.5

21.8

21.5

21.0

19.6

NTV

12.8

13.7

13.8

12.0

12.8

STS

6.6

7.0

7.5

7.6

8.7

TNT

3.4

3.2

3.7

3.7

4.8

REN-TV

4.3

3.8

4.0

3.9

3.7

2 The data is presented by the Samara Social Technologies Fund. The surveys were conducted in the Samara Oblast (N=1200).
3 Based on TV viewer monitoring conducted by the sociological center
KOMKON-2.

- 396 -

INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES
TVS

-

-

2.4

3.2

3.6

TVTs

2.1

2.1

1.9

2.1

2.4

Culture

1.4

1.4

1.6

1.5

1.8

MUZ-TV

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.7

1.9

MTV

1.5

1.6

1.6

1.8

2.1

TV 3

0.9

0.9

1.1

1.1

1.2

7 TV

0.2

0.6

0.6

0.7

1.1

DTV

0.1

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.4

Rambler

0.5

0.3

0.1

0.1

0.3

ART

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

In this situation, the still quite high ratings of TV channels
can be explained by the underdeveloped entertainment infrastructure in Russia.
The thesis about the decreasing influence of the mass media
on social and public orientation becomes even more obvious
when comparing circulation of periodicals in the pre-reform period and today. Thus, as compared to 1990, circulation of themain social and political periodicals in the Samara Oblast, which
in many respects is typical for Russia, dropped in the following
proportions:
Table 1: Circulation of Main Periodicals in the Samara Oblast
Publication title
1
2
3
4
5
7

Argumenty i fakty
Izvestiia
Komsomol’skaia Pravda
Rossiiskaia gazeta4
Trud
Sel’skaia zhizn’

4 Year 1992.

- 397 -

Circulated editions
2002
1990
(second half-year)
220,000
15,29432,0001,073
137,000
16,657
34,7004,755
51,0003,362
36,400843

VICTOR KoUZNETSOVTable 2: Circulation of Regional Publications in the Samara
OblastCirculated editions
2002
1990
(second half-year)
72,00021,64184,00027,45058,000
14,23846,20012,728Publication title
12
34Volzhskaia kommuna
Samarskie izvestiia
Samarskaia gazeta
Volzhskaia zaria

Additionally, in 2000-2002 two more daily newspapers(“Budni” and “Chisla”), which in the mid-nineties had circulations of more than 50,000 copies, ceased publishing.
To a lesser extent this drop affected district newspapers. The
number of these publications increased from 29 in 1997 to 34 in
2002. In 1990 their cumulative circulation amounted to 327,000
copies, but in the second half of 2002 it equaled 196,000 copies,
an increase of 27,000 copies as compared to 2000.
A significantly lesser drop in the circulation of municipal andregional newspapers at first sight seems paradoxical, the level ofjournalism there being incommensurable with the metropolitan
publications. But it is easy to explain this paradox: during theseyears localization of public awareness took place and interests ofcommon citizens got focused on their city or area. Furthermore,
local publications hardly ever contain negative information ofwhich people are simply tired.
The data shown above indicate that in Russia today there is a
deficit of positive thinking oriented not to the destruction of oldvalues but to the creation of new ones. But this deficit still has
not been realized. The sublimated expression of this demand evidently is the cult of personality of V. Putin, showing itself in the
far-too-high ratings which do not get affected either by the absence of real positive changes in citizen’s lives or individual failures in his policy.
Satisfaction of this demand would allow transformation positive public awareness from the currently primitive form of “Putin
is our everything!” into some constructive ideology. If “Yedinaia- 398 -

INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES

Rossiia” succeeds in the formulation of such an ideology andbringing it home to the electorate then they will have a chance of
converting themselves from a speculative political project into along-term and system-forming factor of the Russian political system. If not, then this party will face the fate of Chernomyrdin’s
NDR.
How great the demand is for positive political awareness canalso be demonstrated by the data of a sociological survey carriedout in June 2003 by the Samara State University with a comparison to the similar parameters of September 1999 (close to theprevious State Duma elections).

2. The Fight for Information SpaceThe main role in building-up public awareness in Russia today, as well as several years ago, is played by television. Understanding its decisive role in election campaigns, governmental
and municipal authorities of all levels in recent years strived toestablish control over existing TV companies or found their own
information resources. Leading national TV channels – ORT,VGTRK, NTV – were placed under dual control. On the one
hand they were far more strictly controlled than in Yeltsyn’s timeby the Ministry of Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting. On
the other hand, the financial flows of these companies from advertising activities were monopolized by the Video International
Company controlled by the Minister M. Lesin. In a number ofregions, TV broadcasting channels joined an open information
war with governors.
In their turn, regional authorities, feeling that they were losing control over the local informational space, started founding
their own TV channels. As of the end of 2002, 30 subjects of theRussian Federation already had their own governmental TV
channels independent of the VGTRK and 12 more had governmental satellite TV broadcasting.
Heads of towns and districts considered it to be their duty toestablish their own municipal TV companies with the purpose ofpolitical promotion within their dependent territories. Thus in the- 399 -

VICTOR KoUZNETSOVSamara Oblast, for example, within the period from 1997 (rightafter the first direct elections of local administration heads)
through 2002, municipal TV companies were founded in 19
towns and communities.
Taking into account the above-mentioned tendency to localization of public awareness, these local TV companies could seriously compete with nation-wide TV companies occupying thepro-Kremlin position. In particular, in rural areas of Samara
Oblast municipal TV companies broadcast ratings exceed similarparameters of informational broadcasts of federal TV channels bya factor of 1.2-1.5 and regional TV broadcasts by 3-3.5 times. All
this happens in spite of the fact that many of these TV companies
do not have either professional equipment or qualified TV
newspeople.
In its turn, the federal government continues to struggle forcontrol over informational space using financial and legislative
mechanisms.
The point is that regional and local authorities, by means oflaunching their own public-opinion-forming-channels, usuallycompletely ignored issues of cost efficiency of these media outlets, giving them funds from their budget. For example, in the
Samara Oblast the total amount of support provided by the local
authorities to municipal mass media in 2002 equaled RUB 48.6
million, including:- printed mass media – RUB 26.4 million- local radio broadcasting stations – RUB 3.7 million- local TV channels – RUB 18.5 million
In addition to that, local newspapers received annual subsidies from the Ministry of Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting in accordance with the federal law “On economic support tonewspapers in areas (cities)” to the amount of RUB 4.066 million(data for the year 2002). These subsidies equal approximately
70% of their budget.
Naturally such dependence of local newspapers and TV
companies on subsidies from the authorities does not allow us toconsider them as civil society elements. Therefore the Administration of the President worrying about vertical power strength- 400 -INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES

ening and preventing manifestations of independence in the provinces today disputes the very existence of the municipal mass
media. The new revision draft of the federal laws “On generalprinciples of organization of local governments in the RF” and“On general principles of organization of the governmental authorities in the RF entities” comprehensively lists the issues referring to the competence of regional and local authorities. Budgetary funds as per these laws may be spent only to resolve these issues and support to local and regional mass media is not on thislist. Along with this, the Ministry of Press, Television and Radio
Broadcasting announced that the financial support to municipal(area) newspapers will be stopped from 2005. Taking into account the fact that out of 89 subjects of the Russian Federation, 76
depend on subsidies, governmental, area and municipal mass media there may lose their means of subsistence.
In 2002 the All-Russia Governmental TV Company(VGTRK) assumed an offensive attitude against local radio stations, forcing them into changing their broadcasting time from theevening high rating hours to the middle-day hours.
At the same time, governmental and semi-governmental TV
channels occupying dominant positions in the market of electronic mass media in the near future will face very tough competition with satellite and cable TV belonging as a rule to privatecompanies, both Russian and foreign (mostly American). The
pioneer of this broadcasting trend in Russia, the NTV+ company
belonging to V. Gusinskii now has about one million subscribers.
Its further promotion in the information market is impeded only
by a quite high subscription fee (US$9-27 with the average salaryamounting to US$160). Cable broadcasting networks provide access to 20-25 channels with a subscription fee two to four times
less than that of NTV+. As of today cable broadcasting networks
have been built in 23 Russian cities. The dominating positions inthem are occupied not by Russian but by foreign channels (CNN,
Hallmark, Discovery, Euronews, Fashion, etc.). The software
product of these channels is of far higher diversity and quality,
and it is not overloaded with commercials in contrast to the on-air
TV broadcasting.
- 401 -

VICTOR KoUZNETSOVCorrespondingly, federal and regional TV companies havelost a significant part of their viewers and political institutions –traditional mechanisms of “brainwashing.” Along with this, theconstantly-growing portion of the population constituting the target audience of these channels gets the possibility to integrate into
world informational space. But this process is far from being an
automatic one. It is impeded on the one hand by the defensive
position of local and regional authorities and, on the other, bylack of interest of the world news agencies and TV companies in
Russia. Russia comes into their field of vision only in the case ofsome cataclysms. The Russian people, as noted already, are tiredof negative information about themselves and for this reason incase of reports on the next catastrophe or scandal they often simply switch to another channel.
One more property of the fight for informational space is therise in the costs of informational services, especially in the periodof the coming electoral cycle of 2003-2005. By expert assessments, the costs of services of all mass media in this period willrise by two to three times as compared to 2002 for a number ofreasons:A) Election campaigns themselves to a great extent stimulate
agiotage-like rises in rates since candidates often pay for not only
their presence on the screen but outbid the on-air time from theircompetitors.
B) Continuing economic growth gives an impetus to development of the advertisement market and given unchanged scopeof supply this results in leaping prices. Thus with the economic
growth of 8-10% per year, the advertisement market grows by 2530%.
C) Active penetration of Moscow companies into regional
markets in recent years contributes to the increase of the numberof advertisers possessing significant financial resources. Since
primary saturation of the market with goods is over, the struggle
has started to promote company brands, which forces them to increase advertising expenses.
D) On the threshold of elections, TV channel management
will be placed under such conditions where they are able to accept- 402 -

INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES

political advertisements merely from a certain group of candidates. This will have the consequence of the political publicity
market in the period of the coming elections shrinking instead ofgrowing.

3. Old and New Technologies ofMass Communications
In recent years significant improvements took place in the informational space of Russia. If you compare present-day channels informing the population about events of social and politicallife, you will see that they underwent major changes in comparison to the corresponding parameters of five years ago and evenmore so of ten years ago. This can be seen from a comparison ofsociological surveys data of different years:
Fig. 6. What Are Your Main Sources of Information on
Events of Social and Political Life?5
80
70
68.4

64.5

62.8

60
54.2
50

45.2
39.8

44.6
40
30

39.7
25.8

37.3
39.2

38.4

34.9
23.8

20

23.9
17.5

16.7

16.2
12.3

15.3
10
0

0

0

0.9

year 1991

year 1996

year 2000

2.5
year 2002-10
Do not have any interest in these events
Radio

TV
Newspapers, magazines

Internet

Friends

5 Polls were conducted by the Sociological Center of the Samara State University using representative sampling (N=1200). Total responses exceed
100% as respondents could choose several options of responses at thesame time.

- 403 -

VICTOR KoUZNETSOVFor the entire last decade, the influence of newspapers andmagazines of social and political orientation has been declining.
In particular this manifests itself in a reduction of circulation of
periodicals distributed by subscription and through the retail network as stated above.
At the same time, there is an obvious trend towards growth in
the number of Internet users. By the expert assessments of SpyLOG Runet, the number of users is growing very fast. Their
number doubles every 1.5 years and today equals § 25 million users, including not only Russians but also foreigners. Out of thisnumber § 10 million are permanent users, the core of the audience.
Only five or six years ago the Internet was an exotic thing in
Russia and was found mainly in Moscow, but now the Internet isregularly used by about 150,000 individuals in the typically provincial Samara Region. As specialists predict, by the year 2005
this figure will reach § 300-350,000 given a total population of
3.2 million.
At the same time, one cannot neglect the fact that masscommunication is not only the receiving of information on eventsof social and political life but also the formation of public opinion
on those events. And in this respect the process of mass communication appears as a complex model of information perception
and its value interpretation. Without going deep into the theoryof this problem let us consider only some aspects of practical importance. Conventionally three groups of public opinion carriers
can be singled out: society in total, public opinion psychologicalleaders, and status leaders.
I – society in total which is a carrier of a certain circle ofideas, knowledge, notions, stereotypes, etc.;
II – public opinion psychological leaders; they are the ones
who form a specific attitude towards any event, institution, or individual politician at the level of microgroups. Psychologicaltests show that the people possessing such leadership properties
constitute between 25 to 35%. But the final opinion of all the rest
depends on their viewpoint;
III – public opinion status leaders are those people who by
virtue of their public status have control over the formation of- 404 -

INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES

public attitudes to certain life phenomena (managers, teachers,
journalists, etc.). They account for about 5% of the total population.
The channels through which representatives of these threegroups obtain information significantly differ from each other:
Fig. 7. What Are Your Main Sources of Information on
6
Events of Social and Political Life?
17.6

Do not have any interest inthese events

27
37.3
12.4
20.8

Friends

39.2
9.1
3.8
2.6

Internet

36.9
15.1
12.3

Newspapers, magazines
5.1

9.8

Radio

16.2
46.2
62.4
64.5

TV

0
Society in total

10

20

30

Psychological leaders

40

50

60

70

Status leaders

Based on the above data one can draw several conclusions.
TV is the main source of information for all three groups but its
significance is lower for psychological leaders and even less for
public opinion status leaders. Instead, the significance of printed
mass media and the Internet grows in proportion. To a greater extent the significance of radio goes down for these social groups.
In other words, if for the society in total only TV is of special
significance, then for psychological leaders and especially forstatus leaders of public opinion, the printed media and high quality press is of the same importance. The Internet is reaching thethird position here.
6 Total responses exceed 100% as respondents could choose several options of responses at the same time.

- 405 -

VICTOR KoUZNETSOVThus in the coming electoral cycle, of principal importancewill be control over TV, the possibility to influence Internet users,and control over the promoted “intellectual monthlies” as a channel of the formation of the elite’s opinion. The role of daily mass
newspapers in the period of future election campaigns may beleveled by ordinary leaflets and agitation papers or by one-day
newspapers.

4. Legislative Changes and Limitations
The character of the coming election campaigns will also begreatly influenced by the legislative innovations introduced by thefederal law “On securing electoral rights of citizens” passed in thesummer of 2002. Following this law, possibilities of the mass
media to influence the electoral process on their own will be significantly limited.
Previously the mass media could independently occupy a certain position in relation to candidates and could issue assessmentsof their promises and activities. Such assessments of the press
were not considered as electoral campaigning but the new law introduces many procedures limiting the possibilities of the mass
media to express such viewpoints.
This especially concerns governmental and municipal mass
media that will be obliged to provide broadcasting time and printing space equally for all candidates and election associations.
The editors will not have the right to accompany these data withany comments, headings or illustrations without the approval of
the corresponding candidate. This refers to all mass media having
a governmental share in their charter capital as well as the mass
media that received subsidies for the last two years from the federal or municipal budget.
Actually, in the period of the election campaign itself thegovernmental and municipal mass media will be taken out of theprocess of pre-election agitation. The procedure of disseminationof information on candidates and parties which is included in thelaw will significantly limit the possibilities of governmental andmunicipal officials to interfere with the election process.
- 406 -

INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGESFor instance, according to the law all TV channels with agovernmental and municipal property share will be obliged toprovide on-air broadcasting time free of charge (?) on an equal
footing to all candidates. The law even specifies the duration ofpre-election broadcasts – 30 minutes daily at prime-time. Notless than 50% of the pre-election broadcasting time shall be given
to candidates for direct debates.
The law also introduces limitations on journalists’ criticismsof candidates. The mass media “shall refrain from publishingdata (including those containing true information) that could
damage a candidate’s honor, dignity or business reputation, if
they cannot give the candidate the possibility to publish a refutation free of charge... before the end of the agitation period.”
However, in the law itself there are many “blank spots” thatprejudice the very possibility of the realization of the procedures
included in it. In particular, it is not clear who will pay for theon-air time in cases where candidates have different financial potentials. For the editors, of no small importance is the question ofwhat the unavoidable losses of ratings and advertisement profits
will be compensated with. Neither is the mechanism of control
over adherence to the legislation developed, as shown by regional
elections held in some subjects of the RF last year.
Participants of the political process reacted to these changes
in electoral legislation by starting their State Duma election campaign 3-4 months earlier than usual while new limitations could
not be used against them.
In general, one should note that the electoral legislation
changes, if strictly followed by election committees and law machinery, will become a spiteful joke for many candidates representing the “party of power.” But for the communist opposition
with a steadfast electorate they are advantageous. This is provedby the analysis of survey data conducted by FOM and ARPI
showing that the formation of electorates of the biggest election
associations during election campaigns proceeds not quite uniformly.
For example, prior to the elections of 1999, more than half of“Yedinstvo” supporters decided to vote for this movement less
- 407 -

VICTOR KoUZNETSOV

than three weeks before the elections. At the same time, the electorate of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation shaped
itself at 80% as early as the summer of 1999:
Fig. 8. Subjective Assessments of When the Political Decision
Was Taken7
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

"Yedinstvo"
OVR
CPRF

0
Summer 1999orearlier

Autumn1999

Two-three
weeks before
electionsAt
Several days
the polling
beforestationelections

Out of the legislative innovations, one more thing is worthwhile pointing out: in the forthcoming election campaigns certain
preferences are given to oligarchs who stand for governmental authority offices and are founders of various periodicals. All theselimitations do not apply to them (Article 56/6).

5. Expectations of the Electorate
These improvements will surely affect the nature and resultsof coming elections in the new election cycle of 2003-2005. On
the other hand, the coming elections will be significantly affectedby the changed expectations and mass stereotypes of the population.
Among the many leadership theories in present-day politicalscience, one of the main ones is the disciple determinism concept
7 See Independent Media-Changes. Nos. 4-5, April-May 2000. Authors: I.
Zadorin, D. Strebkov, A. Siutkina, Y. Khalkina.

- 408 -

INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES

that ,to me, also seems to most adequately describe reality. Its essence is that a person becomes a leader not so much owing to his
status or personal qualities but only when he, or to be more precise his image, meets mass expectations and stereotypes. And
these expectations and stereotypes change with time.
Therefore charismatic leaders of some epochs appear as meregraphomaniacs in different times and dim, indistinct, middlingpeople become mouthpieces of public aspirations. This is how
the phenomenon of Putin can be explained when ten years ago it
was not possible to make him just a popular politician to say
nothing of the nation’s leader. But will this situation stand in the
future?
There is no doubt about the social perceptions of Russians
having been significantly changed. If we compare the results ofpsychological tests on the electorate performed by the Samara
Social Technologies Fund in April-May 2003 with corresponding
parameters of 2000 we can draw a number of conclusions.
Having studied such things as the psychological tonus of theelectorate, psychosocial motivation of behavior, people’s perception of their social status and psychological depth of socializationof a personality, the survey authors arrived at the conclusion thatduring the last three modifications the electorate perception system had the following tendencies.
The society has started to overcome the deep psychologicalshock condition from which it suffered in the early 1990s. Publicawareness of this period can be characterized by a pronounced
catastrophic perception of the world. Moreover this catastrophic
perception resided not only in outsiders but also in people in theupper strata of the public pyramid. While the first simply stayed
in a condition of social apathy with rare bursts of undirected aggression, representatives of the social and economic elite werealso thrown out of their social niche and lived with a feeling offeasting in the middle of a plague.
People did not plan their future, lived for the moment, andtook skeptically such values as health, family, and education.
Team social values were also moved to the background. Dominating instead were values related to prosperity and present-day- 409 -

VICTOR KoUZNETSOVsuccess. Contentment with one’s social status was a rare exception just as was the willingness to stand for one’s way of life.
Now the perception of more and more people gradually settles in harmony with reality, but it is a new reality. Along with asevere rationalism and egocentrism typical also of the 1990s, values that are post-material per se are being moved to the forefront.
People are trying to plan their future, think more about theirhealth, education, children, and the value of a stable public order:
Fig. 9. Changes in the Social Perception Values System (20002003)8

1999
2003
Materialism
70
60

Recusancy

50

Contentment

40
30
20
10

Collectivism

0Discontent

Egocentrism

Conformism

Post-materialism

This means that the voter who will come to polling stations
during the new electoral cycle of 2003-2005 is a different voter incomparison to even 2000. Therefore voters will need leaders capable of expressing adequately their demands and expectations.
8 Based on socio-psychological surveys performed by the Social Technologies Fund on request from the Samara Oblast Administration.

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INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES

Before the 2000 elections, survey authors noted that public
expectations of voters had a noticeable tendency towards charismatic authoritarianism.
The highest psychological resonance and correspondingly thehighest electoral support went to political leaders demonstrating a
striving for renewal, rigidity in their style of behavior and categoricity in assessments and judgments. Here the main psychological constituent is the willingness and urge towards assuming
the burden of responsibility.
New socio-psychological conditions call for political leadersof a different type. This would be a person with an image of a reliable, predictable partner inclined more to effective management
proven by experience of previous activities rather than to superficial epatage.
This has been confirmed by the results of other surveys. In
particular, observations performed by Samara University sociologists in 1999 and 2003 show how people’s notion of an ideal candidate deputy has changed:
Table 3. To What Kind of a Candidate Deputy Would You
Give Your Preference?
A professional manager with experience ofpolitical activities
A fighter for justice, an outstanding personality capable of trenchant deeds
A potent business manager capable of running an enterprise successfully
A person capable of getting money required to solve problems of the constituency out of authorities
A person having not only a program but
implemented projects
A businessman rendering charitable support to those in need
A man of labor who understands the problems of common people
A representative of a political party you
sympathize with

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1999

2003

36.2

28.8

51.5

43.3

33.8

44.2

11.8

16.5

35.2

49.1

11.5

9.6

35.4

28.2

3.1

4.2

VICTOR KoUZNETSOVThus the conclusion can be drawn that in Russia the time ofleaders is gradually expiring and an epoch of managers is settingin. Politicians will be less and less assessed by the ideologicalvalues they personify and more by the degree of their efficiency.

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