Hyogo Framework for Action
2005-2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations
and Communities to Disasters

HFA IRIDeS Review
ReportFocusing on
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
May 2014

International Research Institute of Disaster Science
Tohoku University
Japan

Hyogo Framework for Action
2005-2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations
and Communities to Disasters

HFA IRIDeS Review
ReportFocusing on
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
May 2014

International Research Institute of Disaster Science
Tohoku University
JapanPreface

Having experienced the catastrophic disaster in 2011, Tohoku University has founded the International
Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS). Together with collaborating organizations from many
countries and staff with a broad array of specializations, the IRIDeS conducts world-leading research on
natural disaster science and disaster mitigation. Based on the lessons from the 2011 Great East Japan(Tohoku) Earthquake and Tsunami disaster, the IRIDeS aims to become a world center for the research/study of disasters and disaster mitigation, learning from and building upon past lessons in disastermanagement from Japan and others around the world. Throughout, the IRIDeS should contribute to ongoing recovery/reconstruction efforts in areas affected by the 2011 tsunami, conducting action-oriented
research and pursuing effective disaster management to build a sustainable and resilient society.
The 3rd United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 will be held on 14-18 March
2015 in Sendai City, one of the areas seriously damaged due to the 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami. The
IRIDeS shall play an important role at the conference as an academic organization located in the hostingcity. Drafting of this report, focusing on the 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami in terms of the core indicatorsof the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, is one of the contributory activities to the forthcoming
event.
This publication is the final issue after the preliminary published in October 2013, for encouraging thediscussion, making agreement, and achieving consensus. We hope that the Japanese experience of pastdisasters including the 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami will be shared among national/local governments,
the private sector, NGO, NPO and citizens all over the world.

Fumihiko Imamura
Director
International Research Institute of Disaster Science
Tohoku University

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

1

2. World's 21st Century Natural Disasters

2

3. History of Natural Disasters in Japan (1888 - 2010)4

4. Damage due to 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

6

5. Various Post-tsunami Recovery Plans for the Coastal Areas
affected by 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

8

6. 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Review
HFA Priority for Action 1

Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.

1
2
3
4
5
6

16

National Policy and Legal Frameworks for Disaster Risk Reduction
Evacuation System for “Persons with Special Needs” in Nuclear Disasters
Dedicated and Adequate Resources for Disaster Management in Japan
University Faculty as a Non-Governmental Resource to Support Disaster Risk Reduction
in Recovery Planning with Local Government
Community Participation in Japan
Japan’s Multi-sectoral Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction

HFA Priority for Action 2

Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.

23

7

Improvement in Risk Assessment and Early Warning Systems with Real-time Monitoring:
Lessons from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami
8 Importance of Quantitative Assessment of Uncertainties and their Visualization in Tsunami Hazard Assessment
9 Tsunami Fragility Curves for Supporting Reconstruction and Future Risk Assessment
10 Small-area Population Estimates and Landscape Planning for Hazard Assessment and Reconstruction Planning
11 Earthquake Early Warning System in Schools and at a University during the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake
12 Monitoring of Land Slides and Status of Buildings and Construction Areas by Radar Technology

HFA Priority for Action 3

Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels.

13 Information Sharing, Cooperation, and Expert Training Provided by Academic Research Institutes
for Natural Disasters
14 Education to Build a Culture of Safety and Resilience at All Levels around Academic Research Institutes
15 Education Practice Program for Improving Response Capability to Survive from a Tsunami
16 Development of the Reconstruction Mapping Program at the Tsunami-affected Elementary School
17 International Post-graduate Education Program for Disaster Medicine;Collaboration with Tohoku University Human Security Program
18 Recent Advances in Numerical Simulation for Disaster Prevention in the View ofthe 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

31

HFA Priority for Action 4
Reduce the underlying risk factors.

39

19 Post-tsunami Recovery Strategies in Sanriku Coastal Areas after the 1933 Tsunami
20 Integrated Perspective of Civil Engineering, Architecture and Urban Planning
21 Measures for People Requiring Assistance during a Disaster
22 Enhancement of Business Continuity Plans and Business Continuity Management
23 Disruption of Supply and Supply Chain Management
24 Promotion of the Earthquake-proof Retrofit of Buildings after the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake
25 Public Housing for the Mitigation on the Negative Impact of Environmental Transition on the Victims
26 Post-tsunami Recovery for Risk Reduction after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
27 Destruction of Coastal Levees by the 2011 Tsunami and their Reconstruction
28 Comprehensive Post-tsunami Recovery after the 201 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

HFA Priority for Action 5

Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

50

29 Measures and Agenda for Large-scale Disasters in Japan: from the Perspective of Personal Information
and Disaster Prevention Education
30 National Preparedness of Disaster Medicine as Tertiary Risk Reduction
31 Enhancement of Plans for Operational Continuity of Government
32 Three Coastal Districts in Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture: Differences Resulting
from the Local Residents Organization Disaster Response Activities
33 Pre-Disaster Activities to Preserve Historical Materials and the Great East Japan Earthquake
34 DMAT as the First and Long-lasting Responder
35 Legal and Financial Frameworks for Recovery and Reconstruction
36 Preparedness for Low-frequency and High-impact Disasters from a Medical Perspective
37 Prospect of Future Information Exchange Methods in the Event of a Disaster by Taking Advantage of SNS

Future Recommendations for Post Hyogo Framework for Action621. Introduction

Japan has one of the highest levels of urban risk of natural disaster in the world because all the three values
determining the risk—hazard, vulnerability, and exposed value—are very high. Thus, Japanese society has
struggled against natural disasters throughout history.
In this context, the UN World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction was held in Yokohama in May 1994 asa part of a mid-term review of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). However, themost tragically disastrous event in Japanese history since World War II, the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, occurred
the next year.
The earthquake led the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) to select Kobe City,
Hyogo Prefecture, as its location for demonstrating the city’s remarkable recovery from the earthquake.
The Hyogo Declaration was adopted at the conference, and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015(HFA) was built as a 10-year plan to safeguard the world from natural hazards. The HFA consists of thefollowing five priorities for action, which would serve as guidelines to reduce future disaster damage forevery country or region.
Priorities for action 2005–2015:
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong
institutional basis for implementation;
2. Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning;
3. Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilienceat all levels;
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors;
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
During that decade, the Great East Japan Earthquake with Mw 9.0 occurred on March 11, 2011. We
must learn from such devastating experiences for the sake of future societies. To this end, International
Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS), Tohoku University issued “HFA IRIDeS Review
Preliminary Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake” in October 2013 in terms of HFA
guidelines from the academic viewpoints of professors at IRIDeS to disseminate the event’s lessons
learned. IRIDeS faculties had enriched the report with more cases learnt from the disaster since then.
This revised report adds more topics to the previous one with additional information of post-disaster urban
recovery plan announced by municipalities affected by the 2011 Tsunami.
As well as the preliminary report, each topic deals with a specific case, contains context, the situation
before and after the event, good practices, and problems, followed by future recommendations
summarized at the end of the 6th chapter: 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Review.

1

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

2. World's 21st Century Natural Disasters

50

38

30
12

29

22

26

47

32

15

31

14
40

33

24

21
28

1 23 39

35

49

46

48

42
34

43

No.

Month/Year

DisasterType

222,570

3,700,000

8,000

14 August 2003

Heat wave

Spain

15,090880

2 December 2004 Earthquake Indonesia 165,708

532,898

4,452

15 August 2003

Heat wave

Germany

9,355

1,650

2,420,000

4,000

16 December 2004

Earthquake Thailand

8,345

67,0071,000

Month/Year

1 January 2010

2

Estimated
Killed Total Affected Damage(US$ Million)

Estimated
Killed Total Affected Damage(US$ Million)

No.

Disaster
Type

Country

Earthquake Haiti

Myanmar 138,366

Country

3 May 2008

Storm

4 May 2008

Earthquake China

87,47645,976,596

85,00017 November 2013

Storm

Philippines

7,986

16,106,807

10,0005 October 2005

Earthquake Pakistan

73,338

5,128,309

5,200

18 June 2013

Flood

India

6,054

504,473

1,100

6 June-August
2010

Heat wave

55,736400

19 May 2006

Earthquake Indonesia

5,778

3,177,923

3,100

1,317

20 April 2010

Earthquake China

2,968

112,000500

315,59450

Russia7 December 2004 Earthquake Sri Lanka

35,3991,019,306

8 December 2003 Earthquake Iran

26,796

267,628

9 July-August
2003

Heat wave

Italy

20,08910 January 2001

Earthquake India

20,00511 March 2011

Earthquake Japan

19,846

12 August 2003

Heat wave

19,490France13 December 2004 Earthquake India

16,38921 September 2004

Storm

Haiti

2,754

4,400

22 August 2003

Heat wave

Portugal

2,696

6,321,812

2,623

23 May-June 2004

Flood

Haiti

2,665

31,283368,820

210,000

24 May 2003

Earthquake Algeria

2,266

210,261

5,000

4,400

25 December 2012

Storm

Philippines

1,901

6,246,664

1,693

1,023

Storm
26 August-September
2005

United States

1,833

500,000

125,000

654,512500

9

Earthquake

Windstorm, Flood

Drought
Heat wave
Extreme winter conditions

This map indicates the ﬁfty worst disasters
between 2001 and April 2014. These
disasters are categorized into ﬁve types.

6
36
37 46
41

11

8

5
49

20

18
10

4

27

44
3

47

13

50

17

16

7

25

2

19
45

48

(Source: NOAA)

No.

Month/Year

Disaster
Type

Country

Estimated
Killed Total Affected Damage(US$ Million)

Estimated
Killed Total Affected Damage(US$ Million)No.

18,00039 May-June 2004

Flood

Dominica

688

10,002988

40 February 2004

Earthquake Morocco628

13,465400Month/Year

Disaster
Type

Country

27 May-August 2010 Flood

China

1,691 134,000,000

28 October 2005

Storm

Guatemala1,513

29 July 2006

Heat wave

France1,388

41 October 2011

Earthquake Turkey

604

32,9381,500

30 August 2003

Heat wave

Belgium

1,175

42 August 2007

Earthquake Peru

593

658,331600

31 July 2003

Heat wave

Switzerland 1,039

43 February 2010

Earthquake Chile

562

2,671,556

30,00032 July 2006

Heat wave

Netherlands 1,000

44 April-June 2013

Heat Wave India

557

33 November 2001

Flood

Algeria921

45 February 2002

Drought

Malawi500

34 January 2011

Flood

Brazil35 January 2001

Earthquake El Salvador

475,314280

45,423300

900

45,0001,000

46 July 2007

Heat wave Hungary

500

844

1,334,529

1,500

47 August 2006

Flood

Ethiopia

498

10,0963

2010-March
48 April
2011

Flood

Colombia

418

2,791,999

1,000

Earthquake Pakistan

399

185,749

100

364

8,000

Extreme winter36 January-February
UkraineConditions
2006

801

37 July 2003

788

49 September 2013

760

Flood
50 August-September
2006

38 July 2013

Heat wave

Croatia

Heat Wave

UnitedKingdom

59,600Ethiopia

2,829,435

Data Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)

3

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

3. History of Natural Disasters in Japan (1888 - 2010)
Japan is located in one of the most disasterprone areas in the world, and we Japanese
have experienced many disastrous events
throughout history. Thus Japanese society
and cities are skilled at disaster management.
Each disaster has helped develop andstrengthen our disaster management system.
Although we occasionally experiencecatastrophic disasters, the number ofdeaths and missing persons due to disasters
has been declining as a result of gradualimprovement of the various aspects of ourdisaster management system.

2000
1977
1993

Hokkaido-nansei-oki Earthquake (M7.8) : 230

1977

1963

Heavy Snowfall : 101

Heavy Snowfall : 231

2007 Niigata-ken-Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (M6.8) :15
1983

Storm damage : 670

2005

Torrential Rains in the Tokai Region : 10

→ 2003 • Speciﬁed Urban River Inundation
Countermeasures Act

Heavy Snowfall : 131

Heavy Snowfall : 152

1947 Mt. Asama Eruption : 11
1984

Fukui Earthquake (M7.1) : 3,769→ 1950 • Building Standard Law

Nagano-ken-seibu Earthquake (M6.8) : 291891 Nobi Earthquake (M7.9) : 7,273
1980

2010

Heavy Snowfall : 131

1938

1983

Torrential Rains : 117

1927
1943

1999

Typhoons 23, 24, 25 : 181

1983 Nihon-kai-chubu Earthquake (M7.7) : 104

1954

1948

Mt. Usu Eruption : 3

1965This map displays the distribution of majordisasters in Japan from 1888 to 2010. About
sixty disasters are classified into four types:
earthquake or tsunami, volcanic disaster,windstorm or flood, and heavy snowfall.

2000

Mt. Usu Eruption : —Heavy Snowfall : 152

Torrential Rains : 925
Kita-Tango Earthquake (M7.5) : 2,925

Tottori Earthquake (M7.2) : 1,083

Torrential Rains in Hiroshima→ 2000 • Act on Promotion of Sediment Disaster
Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Prone Areas

1946

1972

Torrential Rains : 447

1967

Torrential Rains : 256

1990

Mt. Unzen Eruption : 44

Nankai Earthquake (M8.0) : 1,443→ 1947 • Disaster Relief Act

1976

Typhoon 17 and Torrential Rains : 171

1914
1973

Mt. Sakurajima Eruption : 58

2004

Mt. Sakurajima Eruption : —→ 1973 • Act on Specia Measures for Active Volcanoes

1953
1957

Torrential Rains : 1,013
Torrential Rains : 722

1951
1945
4

1993

Typhoon Ruth : 943

Typhoon Makurazaki : 3,756

Torrential Rains : 79
Typhoon 23 : 98

1966 Typhoons 24,26 : 317
1958
1954

Mt. Aso Eruption : 12

1979

Typhoon 20 : 115

1950

Typhoon Jane : 539

1934

Typhoon Muroto : 3,036

Typhoon Toyamaru : 1,761

Deaths and Missing Persons by Disasters (1945 - 2010)

Year
1926
1952

Mt. Tokachi Eruption : 144

Number ofDisaster (Magnitude) : Deaths and Missing

Earthquake (epicenters marked), Tsunami
Volcanic disaster
Windstorm (landed places marked), Flood
Heavy snowfall

Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M8.2) : 33

(places with highest seasonal total marked)

1968

Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M7.9) : 52

1964
2008

Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake (M7.2) : 23

1933

Showa Sanriku Earthquake Tsunami (M8.3) : 3,064

Niigata Earthquake (M7.5) : 26

→ 1966 • Act on Earthquake Insurance Insurance

1978

Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake (M7.4) : 28

→ 1981 • Amendment of Building Standard LawInsurance

1960
1896

Meiji Sanriku Earthquake Tsunami (M7.1) : 21,959

1978
1948
1888

Izu-Oshima-kinkai Earthquake (M7.0) : 25

1947

Typhoon Kanogawa : 1,269

1982

Typhoon Kathleen : 1,930• Amendment of Act on Promotion of Sediment Disaster

Tonankai Earthquake (M7.9) : 1,223• Act on Promotion of the Earthwuake-proof
Retroﬁt of Buildings• Amendment of Act on Special Measures
for Large-scale Earthquakes→ 1997 • Act on Promotion of Disaster Resilience Improvementin Densely Inhabited Areas→ 1998 • Act on Support for Livelihood Recovery ofDisaster Victims

Torrential Rains and Typhoon 10 : 439

1944(M7.3) : 6,437→ 1995 • Act on Special Measures for
Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures→ 1996 • Act on Special Measures for Preservation of
Rights and Proﬁts of the Victims of Speciﬁed Disasters

Izu-hanto-oki Earthquake (M6.9) : 30

Mikawa Earthquake (M6.8) : 2,306

Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake

1995• Amendment of Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act

Izu-Oshima Is. Eruption : —

1945

1953

approx.
Great Kanto Earthquake (M7.9) : 105,000

Miyake Is. Eruption : —1974• Amendment of Flood Control Act
Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Prone Areas

Miyake Is. Eruption and Niijima and Kozushima Is. Earthquake : 1

1983(M6.8) : 67

→ 2005 • Amendment of Act on Promotion of the
Earthquake-proof Retroﬁt of Buildings

Typhoon Ion : 838

1923

2000

Niigata-ken-Chuetsu
Earthquake

2004

Mt. Bandai Eruption : 461

1958

1986

Chile Earthquake Tsunami (M9.5) : 142

1959

Typhoon Ise-wan : 5,098→ 1960 • Soil Conservation and Flood Control
Urgent Measures Act

Torrential Rains : 1,124→ 1961 • Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act(Image from Wikimedia Commons)→ 1962 • Act on Special Financial Support
to Deal with Extremely Severe Disasters

Data Source: “Disaster Management in Japan” (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2011)5

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

4. Damage due to2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

Tochigi
Prefecture

Yamagata
Prefecture

Gunma
Prefecture
SaitamaPrefecture
Tokyo
Metropolis

Kanagawa
Prefecture
Ibaraki Prefecture
Chiba Prefecture

6

Data Source: Fire and Disaster Management Agency, (as of March 26, 2013)

Hokkaido

Sanami Town

Hakodate City

1

Misawa City

0

Erimo Town

0City, Town, Village

Oirase Town

Hachinohe City

41
0

Hashikami Town

69
2

0

878

Number ofCompletely and Partially
Damaged Houses

30

1

Aomori Prefecture2

Number of
Deaths and Missing

Iwate
Prefecture21

MiyagiPrefecture

Ofunato16.7m
15m

Fukushima
Prefecture

Sendai
7.2m
Kamisu6.6m

Susaki
3.2m

JMA
Seismic
Intensity
7
6+
65+
54
3
2
1

Hachinohe
6.2m

10m
Erimo
4.1m

2011-03-11 14:46(2011-03-11 05:46 UTC)

Epicenter
38° 6'12'' N, 142°51'36'' E
Magnitude 9.0
Depth of hypocenter: 24km

5m

1
201

ted
ima eytst E Survigh
He JMA
i
by
nam
Tsu

Data Source: Japan Meteorological Agency

7

HFA
HFA
IRIDeS
IRIDeS
Review
Review
ReportReportFocusing
Focusing
onon
2011
2011
Great
Great
East
East
Japan
Japan
Earthquake
Earthquake

5. Various Post-tsunami Recovery Plans for the Coastal Areasaﬀected by 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

8野田村土地利用構想図

第１堤防
第２堤防
体育館

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

14

Data Source:▪Fire and Disaster Management Agency (as of March 26, 2013)▪Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT,)
Housing Bureau (as of April 1, 2013)▪Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT,)City Bureau, “Archive of Recovery Support Survey”Data▪Reconstruction Agency (as of August 12, 2013)▪Municipalities’ Websites

15

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

6. 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Review
that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority
HFA Priority for Action 1: Ensurewith a strong institutional basis for implementation.

1

National Policy and Legal
Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction

HFA Core Indicator 1.1:
National policy and legal frameworks for disasterrisk reduction exist and include decentralized
responsibilities and capacities at all levels.
Keywords:
institutional structure, disaster management acts, disastermanagement plans
Context:
Japan’s national institutional and legislative frameworks
for disaster management, originating in the 1880s, are welldeveloped and have been refined after each large-scaledisaster, in order to function at all national, regional, andlocal levels. The current disaster management frameworkis specified by the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Actof 1961, enacted after Typhoon Isewan in 1951, whichcaused severe damage. In the wake of the Great East
Japan Earthquake (hereinafter GEJE) in 2011, new laws
and amend laws have been enacted to introduce a new
countermeasure framework against major earthquakes andother serious incidents to ensure the resiliency of Japan.
Institutional structure 1: Key national players for disastermanagement: Central Disaster Management Council,
Cabinet Ofﬁce and national ministries
Before:A basic disaster management system was introduced at thenational level in 1961, and several national key players
have taken central roles since then. The Central Disaster
Management Council (established in 1962) discusses,
evaluates and decides upon crucial disaster management
policy. The Prime Minister chairs the council, and its
members include all cabinet ministers (representing all
ministries and agencies), four heads of important publicorganizations and four disaster management experts.
This council has Committees for Technical Investigation,
which investigate topics that require further research andassessment for scientific and administrative inputs (Table
1.1)
The Disaster Management Section of the Cabinet Officecentrally manages coordination and collaboration among
ministries and other relevant national organizations, andis in charge of the secretariat of the Central Disaster
Management Council. A cabinet minister, deputy ministers
1

16

and vice ministers are responsible for the section, and the
Director-General and the staff of this section draw up basic
disaster management policies in response to large-scaledisasters by coordinating with ministries relevant to disastermanagement.1
National ministries in charge of disaster management have
prepared countermeasures for disasters based on various
acts that they hold jurisdiction over.
Table 1.1 Organization of the Central Disaster Management Council

Central Disaster management Council
Chair
Prime Minister
Member
Minister ofHeads of
Experts(upper 25) State for
Designatedof
Disaster
PublicdisasterManagement, Corporations
manageand all other(Appointed by ment (4)ministers
the PM) (4)Secretariat Disaster Management Section of Cabinet
OfficeCommittees for Technical Investigation
After:The devastation wrought by the GEJE in the Tohoku
region on March 11, 2011, led to the creation of a newreconstruction agency (See Figure 1.1). The Reconstruction
Agency officially debuted on February 10, 2012, following
the previous Headquarters of Reconstruction, which was set
up in June 2011. The Reconstruction Agency was createdunder the Act Establishing the Reconstruction Agency andis planned to operate for 10 years. This agency is primarily
responsible for coordinating various ministries’ budgetaryand reconstruction procedures so that reconstruction efforts
in all localities can proceed in a timely manner.

Source: recreated from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, available at:
http://www.kantei.go.jp/fukkou/organization/reconstructiongrant.html

Fig. 1.1 Role of the National Reconstruction Agency

Ministries of Internal Affairs and Communications; Justice; Foreign Affairs; Finance; Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Health, labor and Welfare;
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Economy, Trade and Industry; Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; Environment; and Defense.

The Central Disaster Management Council created somecommittees for technical investigation following the
GEJE. In April 2011, a committee on earthquake andtsunami countermeasures was set up to scientificallyassess and integrate the lessons learned from the GEJE.
Later in October of the same year, the Committee for
Policy Planning on Disaster Management was established,followed by two new working groups for detailed analysis
of countermeasures for the Nankai Trough Earthquake andTokyo Inland Earthquakes. After the final reports by thesecommittees were published, the Committee for Executionof Disaster Management Policy was established in March2013.
Institutional structure 2: Managing disasters with plans
Before:Disaster management plans are basic tools for disaster
preparedness in Japan. There are three types of such plans
based on the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act: 1) Basic
Disaster Management Plan of the central government,
2) Disaster Management Operation Plans of ministries
and quasi-governmental agencies, and 3) Local Disaster
Management Plans of prefectures and municipalities. Plan
1) was first adopted in 1963 and has since been guiding thecountry’s disaster management. Plans 2) and 3) are drawn
up based on the content of plan 1). These plans cover threedisaster phases: i) mitigation and preparation, ii) response
and iii) recovery and reconstruction, and are organized bydisaster type, for example, earthquake, winds and floods,
volcanoes, and snowstorms in the natural disaster category.
Their content is revised as needed, and revisions have been
more frequent in recent years.

After:
After the GEJE, the Japanese government actively
established the new acts and amended existing acts.
- Two new acts for tsunami disaster management (June andDecember 2011)- A revision of the Act on Special Measures concerning
Urban Regeneration (April 2012)- A revision of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (June2012 and June 2013)- A new act concerning the reconstruction from majordisasters (June 2013)- A new act of countermeasures for the Tokyo Inland
Earthquake (November 2013)-A fundamental revision of an act for promotion ofcountermeasures for the Nankai Trough Earthquake(November 2013)- A new basic act of national resilience for disastermanagement and mitigation (December 2013)
All of these acts were drafted by utilizing the precious
lessons learned from the GEJE, and enacted to prepare formajor disasters predicted to affect Japan in the near future.

After:
The first revision after the GEJE in the Basic Disaster
Management Plan was the response to a large-scaletsunami. Previously, the response to tsunamis had not beenemphasized enough and was included in the chapter on
earthquakes in this plan. Furthermore, several fundamental
revisions of the plan have been executed to reflect additionalcountermeasures, prescribe new acts and amend acts. Plans
2) and 3) have also been revised accordingly.
Legislative structure: Disaster Management Acts
Before:Since the Disaster Relief Act of 1947, one of the oldest
disaster-related acts in modern legislation, Japan has passed
various laws and acts on the management of and response
to disasters. The content of these laws varies depending on
the targets. The Flood Control Act (1949) and the BuildingStandards Act (1950) were drawn up to reduce damage
from floods and earthquakes and/or fires, respectively. The
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (1961) establishedthe present framework of Japanese disaster management. It
was drastically revised based on the lessons learned fromthe 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. More recently,
the Act on Support for Reconstructing the Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims (1998) was established to secure the basic
livelihoods of families affected by disasters.

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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

2

Evacuation System for “Persons with
Special Needs*” in Nuclear Disasters*Elderly, Infants, Expectant and Nursing Mothers,
Injured or Sick Persons, Persons (Children) with
Disabilities, and Foreign Nationals, etc.

HFA Core Indicator 1.1:
National policy and legal frameworks for disasterrisk reduction exist and include decentralized
responsibilities and capacities at all levels.
Keywords:
nuclear disasters, person requiring support under disastersituation, evacuation, hospitalized patients, Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disasterContext:
The current Emergency Preparedness Guide was establishedin 1980 after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in
the US. Revisions were made after the Tokaimura nuclear
accident. However, a drastic review of the Emergency
Preparedness Guide was not carried out after the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster because of the belief that a Chernobyltype nuclear accident could not occur in Japan. After theoccurrence of the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
in 2007, many local governments hosting nuclear power
plants requested that the national government prepare forcomplex disasters (including situations where a nuclear
power plant could be affected by a large-scale natural
disaster). However, the Guide was not revised drasticallyafter the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake on theassumption that severe nuclear accidents could never occur
in principle since extremely stringent safety examinations
were conducted during the design phase of nuclear power
plant construction, and because local residents should not
be misled or confused 2.
Before:The Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan stipulates
that the evacuation of hospitalized patients shall basicallybe implemented by the hospitals on their own. Evacuationsof entire hospitals were not expected before the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster.

After:
After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, hospitalized
patients who could not be evacuated easily were left
behind in an area within a 20 km radius of the nuclear
plant. On March 13, 2011, the Cabinet Office ordered
the local government to assist with the evacuation of thehospitals inside the Restricted Area. In a situation where
communication was limited and sufficient information could
not be obtained, the evacuation of hospitalized patients was
extremely difficult, resulting in at least 60 deaths by the endof March 2011 2.
Good practices:
There are seven hospitals within the 20 km radius aroundthe Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. At the time of
the accident, approximately 850 patients were hospitalized
at these seven hospitals. Among these patients, about
400 were seriously ill. Futaba Hospital was one of these
hospitals, and is located within a 5 km radius of the nuclear
plant. In the case of Futaba Hospital, slightly ill hospitalized
patients were transported out of the hospital on March 12,
2011. Seriously ill patients were left in the hospital, andthere was no assistance for the seriously ill patients from thetown office. Japan Self-Defense Forces and the local police
arrived at the Futaba Hospital on March 14 and 15, and theytransported the patients to the Sousou Healthcare Center,
which was where surface contamination measurements ofthe evacuees were conducted at that time 2 (Fig. 1.2).
Problems:
Before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, it was
assumed that the possibility of a severe accident was
extremely low and that complex disasters were highly
unlikely. The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) wasestablished in 2012 to learn lessons from the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster. The NRA postulates tremendous
natural disasters, intentional airplane crashes and terrorist
attacks. In order for regulations to reflect the lessons learned
from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and otherinternational nuclear accidents, organizational independenceof the NRA is important.

Fig. 1.2 Surface contamination measurements at the Sousou
Healthcare Center on March 14, 2011

18

2

Main report. The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. 2012.

3

Dedicated and Adequate Resources
for Disaster Management in Japan

resulting from disasters beyond their own control. This
coalition also strives to secure sufficient human and otherresources for potential disasters.

HFA Core Indicator 1.2:
Dedicated and adequate resources are available
to implement disaster risk reduction activities at
all administrative levels.

Keywords:
budgetary resources, human resources, informational
resources
Context:
Japan is a unique country in that it invests ample
resources in disaster management. The budget fordisaster management is annually secured, and abundant
supplemental budgets have been provided for rebuildingin the aftermath of the GEJE disaster. Additionally, giventhat Japan is aging and losing population, new forms ofcollaboration have been emerging to secure adequate
human resources from the decreasing pool to fill the gap.
Such collaboration efforts have accelerated further after
the GEJE. Disaster white papers since 1963 are anotherform of useful resource for the national, regional, and local
administrations, as well as private citizens.
Budgetary resources
Before:Although the proportion of the budget allocated for disastermanagement in the general account budget was decreasingprior to the GEJE, from 8% in 1997 to 3.5% in 2010, 1.24
trillion yen were appropriated for disaster management in20103. In addition, abundant supplemental budgets haveoften been provided for rebuilding public infrastructures
after significant disasters.
After:The GEJE’s direct economic damage is calculated as 16.9
trillion yen. As of July 2013, budgets for rebuilding postGEJE are calculated to cover around 23.5 trillion yen for
total direct losses4.
Human resources
Before:Inter-prefecture and -locality partnerships for mutual
help, including objectives to share human resources, havebeen encouraged since 1995. Such partnerships havelargely involved exchanging agreements. More recently,
as a goal of decentralized governance, the Kansai LargeArea Coalition (Kansai Koiki Rengo) was formed on
October 27, 2010, the first such organization in modern
government administrations. This coalition comprises sevenparticipating prefectures of the Kansai region. One of theseven administrative goals of this coalition is to establish alarge-area disaster management system so that participating
prefectures can provide or receive support for emergencies
3
4
5

Source: http://blog.kahoku.co.jp/saisei/2012/03/post-33.html

Fig. 1.3: Counterpart Support by the Kansai Large-area Coalition

After:For the first time in disaster management history, the largearea administrative coalition is supporting the affected largearea regions. As part of the “counterpart system approach,”
Osaka and Wakayama Prefectures partner with Iwate;
Hyogo, Tottori, and Tokushima partner with Miyagi; andShiga and Kyoto partner with Fukushima, each partnership
including the dispatching of volunteers and specialists for
short-term response and long-term rebuilding (Fig. 1.3). As
of August 30, 2013, 136,000 man days in total have been
dispatched. Additionally, the prefectures temporarily hostevacuees from other prefectures5.
Informational resources
Since 1963, the Cabinet has published an annual disaster
white paper structured to report significant disaster datafor damages, responses, and changes affecting disastermanagement. This paper is a useful resource for national,
regional, and local administrations as it reports the relevant
statistics on disasters and their management, budget, andrelated laws and institutions. Administrations refer thispaper for updating disaster management plans that they needto review annually. Since the GEJE, statistics and revised
laws and regulations have been updated annually.

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2011. “Disaster Management in Japan.”
Reconstruction Agency, 2013. “Reconstruction progress and issues.”
Kansai Large-Area Coalition. “Response of Kansai Large-Area Coalition on the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. Retrieved September 3, 2013, fromhttp://www.kouiki-kansai.jp/contents.php?id=219.

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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

4

University Faculty as a NonGovernmental Resource toSupport Disaster Risk Reduction
in Recovery Planning with Local
Government

HFA Core Indicator 1.2:
Dedicated and adequate resources are available
to implement disaster risk reduction activities at
all administrative levels.
Keywords:
planning aid, recovery planning, university teacher,community, local government
Context:
One of the characteristics of the Great East Japan
Earthquake is that the damage caused by it and thefollowing tsunami was overwhelmingly beyond the
response capabilities of the affected local governments,
which should be in charge of recovery planning, bothquantitatively and qualitatively. Moreover, most of the local
communities in the affected areas did not have sufficientexperience in community planning for both hard and soft
aspects. It was, therefore, expected that experts should
support these planning activities.
Before:Local governments were to formulate their own recovery
plan by themselves because of the decentralization of power.
However, it was very hard for them to do so by themselvesbecause of a lack of experience. Local communities also
faced a similar problem.

Fig. 1.4 Role of university teachers in the public and private sectors

20

After:
National government supported the formulation of recovery
plans for the affected municipalities in the first year after
the disaster by organizing planning committees comprisingprefectural and national government bureaucrats,
consultants and individuals from the academic community.
The Ishinomaki City government uniquely organized arecovery planning conference regularly from the second
year; the chairman of which was a university professor.
Four working groups, which were reorganized into three
one year later, were organized under this council to change
information, adjust each project and to share a common
recognition of problems (Fig.1.4). Faculty members of theuniversities also support the reconstruction activities at thecommunity level.
Good practices:- Experts in architecture, civil engineering and urban
planning working together as a team exceed theframework of their specialized field.
- Local governments and experts forge a long-term
relationship with each other, which makes it possible toengage in a frank exchange of views.
- The experts contribute to consensus building in the local
community through technical support.
- The experts function as an intermediary between the cityadministration and the local community.
Problems:- Some of the advice was not accepted by the local
government because it was impractical or because oflimited administrative capacity.
- Similar cooperation between the local governments andfaculty members is not widely observed in other regions.

5

Community Participation in Japan

HFA Core Indicator 1.3:
Community participation and decentralization
are ensured by delegating authority andresources to local levels.
Keywords:
voluntary community organization, business communities
Context:
Japan has a long history of community participation indisaster reduction activities. The notions of “self-help,”“mutual-help,” and “public-help” have been widely shared,
especially after the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake. The
voluntary community organization for disaster management,
represented by firefighting activities, is consideredespecially important for self-help and mutual help actions.
Business communities have also begun preparing business
continuity plans since 2005, when the Central Disaster
Management Council prepared a guideline on this topic.
Voluntary community organization for disastermanagement

Business communities preparing for disaster
Before:The Special Committee of the Central Disaster Management
Council in 2005 developed and began promoting BusinessContinuity Plans (BCPs), which enable private corporations
to prepare for disasters to mitigate damages and to continue
operations during the response and recovery stage.
Targeting large and medium enterprises in particular, thiseffort was expected to enable sustained business operations
even in emergencies.
After:The business community has researched the effectiveness of
BCPs during and immediately after the GEJE. According to
web-based research led by NTT data (the national telecom
company) 8, 44.7% of corporations either had or weredeveloping a BCP when the GEJE struck, among which
45% of large corporations already had BCPs. Regarding
BCP operation, 65.7% of 263 corporations reported thatthe BCP either had problems in functioning, partially orcompletely, with the GEJE’s impact to the global supply
chain, which extended beyond the size of “expected”
disasters. A complete review is currently on-going inbusiness communities to revise the contents of BCPs tooperate more efficiently in future disasters.

Before:Voluntary community organizations for disaster management
are regulated in the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act of
1961, number 5, article 2. According to the statistics of theFire and Disaster Management Agency, 139,000 voluntarycommunity organizations existed in 1,658 localities in 2009,
and their activities covered 73.5% of all households acrossthe nation6.
After:
Various communities that were significantly affected by the
GEJE and had practiced their volunteer activities during
normal periods in preparation for emergency response foundtheir preparedness functional and effective. For example,
creating a list of the population needing help (handicappedand elderly) was useful when evacuating them. Rules
adopted prior to the GEJE to inform the community about
individuals’ safety during significant disasters have also
helped community members to identify those who were
missing. Nevertheless, various issues emerged: for example,
in the relationship between local governments and voluntarycommunity organizations, some were unofficial and inhibited
direct work, such as when goods and supplies for temporary
evacuees were available only to those in designatedevacuation shelters, whereas, in reality, evacuation shelters
existed in many other places as demand was high after the
GEJE’s unexpected size7. Currently, many activities led byvoluntary community organizations are being reviewed andassessed for better operations in the future.

6

Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2009. “Chapter 4 Disaster management activities by self-help and regional resilience creation to disasters.” Firefighting White Paper,
retrieved September 29, 2013, from http://www.fdma.go.jp/html/hakusho/h21/h21/index2.html#dai4.
Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2009. “Chapter 4 Disaster management activities by self-help and regional resilience to disasters.” Firefighting White Paper.
Retrieved September 29, 2013, from http://www.fdma.go.jp/html/hakusho/h21/h21/index2.html#dai4.
8
Ohashi, K., 2011. “How do we reflect lessons learned from the earthquake? Findings from the survey results of business continuity by corporations affected by the GEJE.”
Retrieved September 29, 2013, from http://www.keieiken.co.jp/monthly/2011/1109-04/index.html.
721

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

6

Japan’s Multi-sectoral Platformfor Disaster Risk Reduction

HFA Core Indicator 1.4:
A national multi-sectoral platform for disasterrisk reduction is functioning.
Keywords:
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, volunteer activities,
wide-area response and mutual support between
municipalities
Context:
Japan’s multi-sector platform for disaster risk reduction isfunctioning under the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures BasicAct. However, the GEJE and Tsunami have proven that
there is no perfect system resilient to all types and sizes ofdisaster, regardless of how well the platform is establishedand operated. The national government response was limited,
incapable of quickly responding to the needs of the affected
local government as it was difficult for them to investigate theoverall damage. Meanwhile, having a multi-sector platform
has also proven that support from non-structured segments,
such as volunteer efforts, could be quite useful. The platformthen incorporates these lessons via modification of theDisaster Countermeasures Basic Act, in order to improve
response capacity against future mega-disasters.
Before:Under the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act,the national government, local governments, Japan Red
Cross, other key semi-governmental and humanitarianorganizations and communities were prepared to function
under emergency conditions throughout the response stage.
The Act was significantly revised to further strengthenfunctions of emergency response headquarters and traffic
regulations for better emergency management after the
1995 earthquake. At this time, the word “volunteer” wasfirst included in the Act and in national law. Since 2005,
the Cabinet office has established the Committee forDisaster-related Volunteer Activities to encourage citizens’
greater participation in disaster reduction activities.
Various committees were established and meetings held inseveral cities nationwide, including topics related to widearea response and networking on disaster management.
Encouragement to reach agreements on mutual support
during emergencies between neighboring local governments
has increased during this period, and in 2010, 90% of local
governments across Japan had reached such agreements9.
Problems:
Although local governments are technically mandated to act
centrally for disaster response and management, prefecturaland national governments are also required to step in andtake the lead in responding to mega-disasters like the GEJE
by creating emergency headquarters in their administrations.

9Good practices:
Despite the initial difficulties in reaching the affected areas
because of an insufficient volume of damage information
and avoiding secondary disasters, numerous volunteers andorganizations, including international and domestic NGOs,
NPOs, and student groups, joined in to provide support in
the affected areas (see Fig. 1.5 for volunteer participation
six months later in Ishinomaki City). So far, 936,900 people
in total have volunteered to support the affected region
within the two years after the GEJE10. Furthermore, various
inter-governmental agreements have effectively supported
the affected region by, for example, hosting disasteraffected populations who lost their houses in disasters.
After:
I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e G E J E d i s a s t e r, t h e D i s a s t e r
Countermeasures Basic Act was amended, effective April
12, 2013. Major revisions include i) strengthening response
capacity for large-scale disasters; ii) providing residents
with smooth and safe evacuation routes; iii) improving
response capacity, and iv) enhancing learning of disastermanagement procedures in normal periods— all of whichemphasize improvement in response to large-scale disasters.
Another major focus for change has been public volunteer
coalitions for better response capacity for mega-disasters.
A unit called the “Coalition Group of Volunteers andCorporations for the Public Interest” was established in the
Reconstruction Agency on February 10, 2012, replacing
an existing volunteer management unit in the Cabinet
office. In addition, the proportion of local governments’mutual support extending beyond prefectural boundaries isincreasing. For instance, there were 46.9% extra-prefecturalagreements but in 2012, it has increased to 55.1%11.

Fig. 1.5 Volunteers Camping in a School Field, Six Months after the GEJE

Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2007. “Enhancing mutual-supporting system between municipalities.” Retrieved August 28, 2013,from
http://www.fdma.go.jp/neuter/about/shingi_kento/h24/tikoutai/01/shiryo_02.pdf.
National Institute for Educational Policy Research, 2012. Activities by NPOs and volunteers following the Great East Japan Earthquake. Retrieved on September 28, 2013, fromhttp://www.nier.go.jp/jissen/chosa/rejime/2011/02_npo_vol/05_chapter3.pdf.
11
Fukumoto, H., 2013. Supporting affected areas by municipalities during emergency – assessing effectiveness of inter-governmental mutual-support agreements –.
10

22

Nevertheless, because of the size and complexity of the GEJE
and Tsunami, national and prefectural government provisionof the necessary support to local governments was delayed
because local governments’ help requests encounteredcomplications resulting from the devastating damage to theusual means of reaching the national government.

HFA Priority for Action 2: Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.

7

Improvement in Risk Assessment and
Early Warning Systems with Real-time
Monitoring: Lessons from the 2011
Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami

HFA Core Indicator 2.1:
National policy and local risk assessments basedon hazard data and vulnerability information areavailable and include risk assessments for key
sectors.
HFA Core Indicator 2.2:
Systems are in place to monitor, archiveand disseminate data on key hazards andvulnerabilities.
HFA Core Indicator 2.3:
Early warning systems are in place for all major
hazards, with outreach to communities.
Keywords:
hazard map, tsunami early warning, real-time monitoring,
earthquake early warning, long-term earthquake forecast
Before:Tsunami inundation maps produced from the risk evaluation
based on historical events over 400 years have been
distributed among the residents in coastal communities
for utilization in developing their evacuation plansand preparedness procedures. Nevertheless, previous
inundations were much smaller than the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake and Tsunami, which caused more casualties
without evacuation. Earthquakes followed by tsunamis
recurred throughout history in each coastal area. Japan’s
Cabinet Office Central Disaster Mitigation Council
evaluated the earthquakes and tsunamis for the target
regions’ safety levels, and the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)
Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion (HERP)
evaluated seismic activities, which are updated every
year. Those results are available for creating hazard
maps, conducting disaster response drills, and increasingawareness through the mitigation plan. However, the gap
between the estimated and observed inundations was solarge that it allowed people to take insufficient action.
Although the tsunami warning was issued roughly 3
min after the earthquake, about 19,000 people (90% of
casualties) were killed by the 2011 Tohoku Tsunami within
20–30 min of its arrival at Sanriku and roughly 1 h of its
arrival at Sendai bay; only two people were killed by thetsunami on the Pacific Ocean. The warning from the PTWC
and Japanese media should have led to immediate Pacificcoastal evacuation. Japan’s tsunami warning system began
in 1952, providing information on the estimated tsunami
arrival time and height, which is divided into two categories,
depending on the arrival time lesser or greater than 1 h, thatis, near or far field, respectively. The first tsunami warningin the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake was underestimated becauseof the lower earthquake magnitude estimation, and thesecond was updated using the tsunami data observed bya GPS buoy in real time offshore from Sanriku, Tohoku.
Reasons for the large number of casualties due to thetsunami remain under investigation and discussion. Not
only the warning’s accuracy but also its dissemination,
traffic jams on the roads, and wrong directions to safe
places have been reported by eyewitnesses.
HERP, a special governmental organization attached to thePrime Minister’s office (now part of MEXT) and establishedin 1995, has been releasing probable seismic hazard maps
annually since 2005, compiling thousands of instrumental,
historical, and paleoseismological data and numerical modelsof plausible future earthquake sources. The map released in2005 was the first publically available probabilistic seismic
hazard map of major shaking for various purposes such ascity planning and emergency local government response. In
the map, the HERP expressed concern about frequent M7-8
earthquakes along the Japan trench (the Sanriku coast to the
Boso Peninsula) and announced a 98% chance of an M7.48.0 earthquake offshore of Miyagi (Sendai) for the next 30
years, based on 37-year average inter-event time of large
subduction earthquakes during the past 200–300 years. Suchhigh probability has effectively stimulated seismic retrofits,better city planning, and disaster drills. However, the extent of
the M9.0 2011 Tohoku Earthquake’s large shaking areas wasmuch wider than the map estimates, especially in Fukushima
and Ibaraki, the southern region of the 2011 source.
Despite the size of the main Tohoku shock and areas oflarge seismic intensity, numerous buildings collapsed(~400,000), mostly from the tsunami; the number collapsingfrom shaking was rather limited. Less damage was observedin the newer buildings and houses. The ratio of the death
toll associated with the collapses was less than several
percent of the total, demonstrating that Japan’s building
code, regulated since 1981 and reflecting the 1978 Miyagioki earthquake, worked effectively.
After the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, the Japanese government
funded an enormous budget to deploy thousands ofseismometers and GPS stations to monitor seismic andcrustal activity. The National Research Institute for Earth
Science and Disaster Prevention (NIED) has built three
seismic networks (Hi-net, F-net, and K-net) for various
purposes, and the Geospatial Information Authority ofJapan (GSI) has operated 1,240 permanent GPS stations tomonitor near-real-time ground movement. Furthermore, theALOS satellite launched in 2006 by the Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency (JAXA) has been providing synthetic
aperture radar data associated with several devastating
earthquakes, including the Tohoku Earthquake, which
expanded understanding of the earthquake rupture process.
Data circulation and data sharing have improved annuallyand now allow even foreign scientists and engineers to
help us provide better models and warnings. Such dense
networks and real-time monitoring systems enable the Japan
Meteorological Agency (JMA) to publically announce
seismic intensity distribution within 1.5 min and theactivity’s detailed hypocenter and magnitude information
23

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

within several minutes, supporting urgent rescue responses
and operations. However, the Tohoku Earthquake’s size
was so great that immediate estimate of magnitude was
7.9 because of magnitude saturation in the high-frequency
domains, causing underestimates of the tsunami height.

taking pre-historic and paleoseismic data into account. The
magnitude of the anticipated large earthquakes along the
Nankai trough for southwest Japan has now increased to
M9.0, based on the tsunami sediment and paleo-geodesy
along the coastal regions.

Since 2007, the JMA has been operating the earthquake
early warning system, which provides immediate estimatesof strong shaking within seconds to people before theactual seismic wave arrives. People can be informed of thewarning via TV, radio, and mobile phone, as well as special
devices, when the estimated JMA intensity reaches 5 or
higher. Seventeen cases of the early warning through 2010
have proven its validity and efficacy for disaster mitigation,for example, by suggesting that students hide themselves
under their desks in school. In the Tohoku Earthquake,the system provided a warning eight seconds before theprimary wave arrived at the city of Sendai, and successively
stopped bullet trains in the Tohoku area. However,it underestimated ground acceleration in the Tokyo
metropolitan area. Furthermore, the Tohoku Earthquake’s
numerous aftershocks revealed the weakness of the early
warning system in that it released a number of false alarms
resulting from unexpected remote simultaneous aftershocks
and interruptions of data transmission.

To overcome the magnitude saturation issue that emerged
from the Tohoku Earthquake, the Geospatial Information
Authority of Japan (GSI) and Tohoku University have beendeveloping a real-time magnitude determination system using
continuous GPS data and a data assimilation technique.

The JMA has been announcing advisories about theprobabilities of subsequent large shaking (intensities 5
or higher) due to aftershocks since the 2004 Niigata-kenChuetsu Earthquake (M6.8). Statistics of well-recorded
early aftershocks enable us to extrapolate the subsequent
three- or seven-day probability of large aftershocks. It
is useful to promote public awareness of the continuing
danger. The advisory worked after the Tohoku Earthquake.
However, the widespread aftershocks and remotely triggered
earthquakes were unprecedented because of its extent ofcrustal deformation. Several M6 class inland earthquakes
have occurred and caused local damage in Akita, Fukushima,
Nagano, and Shizuoka Prefectures, located 100 km to 300
km from the locus of high seismic slip.
After:
To overcome the problem of inadequate evacuation due
to the map’s underestimated inundation, the guideline forcreating a tsunami hazard map is undergoing modification
and revision. For example, the scenario should include theprobable maximum as well as the previous maximum, andshould be expanded to several scenarios to avoid a sense ofcertainty, especially of unjustified safety.
A new offshore network system in the Pacific Ocean, eastof Japan, is going to be installed with more than 50 seismic
and tsunami monitoring sensors, covering the trough in the
deep sea where earthquakes and tsunamis have repeatedly
originated. The system enables monitoring them in real timeand providing more accurate estimations, even for a largescale event.
The HERP confirmed the validity of the methodology
for creating the probabilistic seismic hazard map
by retrospective tests beginning in 1890. The map
underestimated the strong ground motion in Tohoku becauseof the ~200–300-year relatively short period of reliable
historical and instrumental data.
We may have to consider hypothetical M9 super-cycles by24

Problems:
Limitation in the deterministic evaluation for a lowfrequency event such as the 2011 Tohoku disaster suggests
a new approach, combining the statistical method withan inter-disciplinary approach including history, geology,
sedimentrology, and physiography. A multi-scenario
prediction would reduce the risk of governments andcitizens having a false sense of certainty or safety.
Although the tsunami warning for a far field event iseffective, the issues in a near field event remain because of
having a short evacuation window. An early warning systemshould trigger the people to evacuate or take mitigating
action. This system should be connected or cooperate withthe planning of evacuations and systems/facilities in eacharea, which would require understanding people’s reasonsfor not taking action to move to safe areas despite receiving
the warning in the 2011 Tohoku disaster. At the beginningof the earthquake and tsunami generation, errors orindefinite remains can be reduced by monitoring data in realtime, indicating a speed–accuracy trade-off. It is importantto receive the updated information timely after the event.
Then the dissemination system, by combining mass media,
ICT, and public information, can ensure people’s access to
information at any time.
The recent destructive earthquakes including the Tohoku
Earthquake raised several critical issues in the probabilistic
seismic hazard map. However, the map, averaging
probabilities of strong ground motion from various sources ina given place, remains useful for seismic damage mitigation.
The larger issue is to avoid people’s misunderstanding: themap does not indicate “earthquake probability.”In the Tohoku Earthquake, Japan’s recent building codedemonstrated its protection against strong seismic motion.
However, the domain of seismic acceleration and local
intensity at a subduction earthquake is frequently different
from that caused by large, shallow, inland earthquakes.
Reconstructions and seismic retrofits of the old buildings
are strongly recommended.
The earthquake early warning system has been steadily
improving since its 2007 initiation. Frequent drills in theimmediate action necessary within seconds before a seismic
wave arrives have become far more important for protecting
human life. Thus, we need to educate people on thewarning system’s limitations, particularly for large inland
earthquakes, and further promote seismic retrofits to preventthe collapse of old buildings.

Fig. 2.1 a) Earthquake Probabilities of Subduction Earthquakes for the Next 30 Years (HERP, 2010).
b) A Comparison between the Expected Seismic Intensities Calculated from the Long-term Forecast and Observed Intensities Recorded
for the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake.

Fig. 2.2 Observed Seismic Intensities of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake (left) and Intensities Estimated from the JMA Earthquake Early Warning
System (right). (Yamada, 2011)25

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

8

Importance of Quantitative
Assessment of Uncertainties andtheir Visualization in Tsunami
Hazard Assessment

HFA Core Indicator 2.1:
National policy and local risk assessments basedon hazard data and vulnerability information areavailable and include risk assessments for key
sectors.
Keywords:
tsunami hazard assessment, quantitative uncertainty
assessment, visualization of uncertainty
Context:
A tsunami hazard map is an indispensable map that shows thepossible tsunami inundation area in order to consider tsunami
disaster prevention measures. The Japanese government andmost of the local governments along coastal areas in Japan
have published many tsunami hazard maps.
Before:Before the GEJE, the Miyagi-oki earthquake and theSanriku-oki earthquake were assumed in the tsunami hazard
maps published by the Miyagi prefectural government.
The tsunami hazard maps published by most of the local
governments along coastal area have also adopted anearthquake scenario.
After:
In many coastal areas of the Tohoku region, the area
inundated by the GEJE tsunami exceeded the area specified
in the tsunami hazard maps. As a result, some residents did
not evacuate because they believed the inundation hazard
maps. Against this background, there is a recent proposal
to categorize a tsunami hazard as one of two types: L1

Fig. 2.3 Coefficient of variation of tsunami height
along Tohoku coastal area1
1

26

tsunamis, which occur frequently and cause extensive
damage even though they are not very high, and L2
tsunamis, which occur at an extremely low frequency but
cause massive amounts of damage.
Good practices:
It is certain that tsunami hazard maps have facilitatedtsunami evacuation for the residents to some degree
following the GEJE and other past earthquakes.
Problems:
Many uncertainties in tsunami wave height are present ineach phase of the tsunami hazard assessment: earthquake
generation, tsunami propagation and tsunami inundation. A
problem is that the uncertainties are not explicitly describedin the tsunami hazard maps. Tsunami hazard maps that
do not concretely show the uncertainties could generate asituation beyond the assumption again such as the GEJE
and mislead residents about potential tsunami hazards.
In the future, we need to quantify the uncertainties andclarify how much we can assure the tsunami hazard
assessments. Hazard maps based on the two types oftsunamis (L1 and L2) are still insufficient for understanding
the potential tsunami hazard. Some examples of visualizing
uncertainties are as follows. Fig. 2.3 shows an uncertainty
in the coastal tsunami wave height. Here, we defined theuncertainty as a coefficient of variation of the possible
tsunami wave height. The uncertainty increases as the points
pinken. We can also see regional characteristics of theuncertainty. Fig. 2.4 shows the uncertainty of the tsunami
inundation around Soma port. The green area is the tsunami
inundation area for a 500-years return period. The red andblue areas are inundation areas when the uncertainties are
considered. Although the return period for each of the threecases is 500 years, the inundation areas factoring in theuncertainties differ. If the tsunami hazard map explicitly
indicates the uncertainties of the tsunami hazard assessment
as indicated above, residents who use the map can properly
understand the uncertainties of the tsunami inundation area.

Fig. 2.4 Example of a stochastic tsunami hazard map

Fukutani, Yo., Suppasri, A., Abe, Y. and Imamura, F. (2014). Stochastic analysis and uncertainty assessment of tsunami wave height using a random slip source parameter model,
Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment. (submitted)

9

Tsunami Fragility Curves for
Supporting Reconstruction and
Future Risk Assessment

HFA Core Indicator 2.1:
National policy and local risk assessments basedon hazard data and vulnerability information areavailable and include risk assessments for key
sectors.

After:
Japanese government put large effort on field survey ofdamaged buildings from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami.
The database has more than 200,000 buildings with detailed
information such as tsunami flow depth, building materials,
number of stories, building functions and construction year4.
This allowed us to apply more advance statistical methods
that suit high quality of the disaggregate data. Fig. 2.6
shows fragility functions for damage probability of building
to be washed away.

Keywords:
tsunami fragility curve, risk assessment, statistical analysis,
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake Tsunami
Context:
Tsunami fragility curves (or tsunami fragility function) aredefined as empirical relationships between vulnerability andtsunami hazard2. Tsunami fragility curves have been developedin performing tsunami risk analysis of structural or social
systems to identify vulnerability against tsunami hazards
using damage data associated with past events and observedor simulated tsunami hazard information such as flow depth,
current velocity and hydrodynamic force on a structure.
Tsunami fragility curves can be implemented forassessments of structural damage and fatalities within the
exposed area against potential tsunami hazard scenarios.
Multiplying the number of exposed structures andpopulations by the damage probability from the fragility
curves equivalent to the estimated tsunami hazards provides
the quantitative estimation of tsunami impact.
Before:The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was the major eventthat earthquake fragility functions were widely applied
to tsunami damage data in severely hit countries such as
Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. While there was alimitation due to number of surveyed damaged buildings(some hundreds or thousands), advantage of remote sensing
technology was utilized to interpret building damage.
Fragility curves (Fig. 2.5) were then plotted using detailed
tsunami features (flow depth and flow velocity) at eachdamaged building obtained from numerical simulation oftsunami inundation3.

Fig. 2.6 Tsunami fragility functions in case of the 2011 Great
East Japan Tsunami based on field survey data(a) Different building material, (b) Number of stories4

Good practices:
Many fragility functions have been developed according tovarious types of building and coastal conditions in different
countries. These functions were used as supporting data
for land use planning during reconstruction period andrisk assessment for future tsunami at the same time. For
instance, in developing the post-disaster reconstruction
plan of Sendai city, the tsunami fragility curve was usedas supporting information in determination of building
restriction area (the area subject to relocation)5.
The tsunami fragility curves were also applied tounderstanding risks and vulnerabilities of other properties
such as marine vessels, and offshore evacuation or risk map
can be created using this data6.
Problems:
The tsunami damage should be characterized by numerous
uncertain factors. In this sense, tsunami fragility curves
include some of uncertainties, and they may not beapplicable in considering tsunami vulnerability whenchanging the areas of interest or considering othertsunami scenarios. Thus, we suggest that careful use andinterpretations are required in using proposed tsunami
fragility when applying.

Fig. 2.5 Tsunami fragility functions for Banda Aceh, Indonesia
in case of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami3
2

Koshimura, S., Y. Namegaya, and H. Yanagisawa, Tsunami Fragility – A New Measure to Identify Tsunami Damage –, Journal of Disaster Research Vol.4 No.6, pp.479-488, 2009.
Koshimura, S., Oie, T., Yanagisawa, H., & Imamura, F. (2009) Developing Fragility Functions for Tsunami Damage Estimation using numerical model and post-tsunami datafrom Banda Aceh, Indonesia. Coastal Engineering Journal, Vol. 51, No. 3, 243–273.
4
Suppasri, A., Mas, E., Charvet, I., Gunasekera, R., Imai, K., Fukutani, Y., Abe, Y. and Imamura, F. (2013), Building damage characteristics based on surveyed data and fragility
curves of the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami, Natural Hazards, 66 (2), 319-341.
5
Koshimura, S., S. Hayashi and H. Gokon, Lessons from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Disaster, Journal of Disaster Research Vol.8 No.4, pp.549-560, 2013.
6
Suppasri, A., Muhari, A., Futami, T., Imamura, F. and Shuto, N. (2013) Loss functions of small marine vessels based on surveyed data and numerical simulation of the 2011 Great
East Japan Tsunami, Journal of Waterway, Port, Coastal and Ocean Engineering-ASCE (published online)
327

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

10

Small-area Population Estimatesand Landscape Planningfor Hazard Assessment andReconstruction Planning

HFA Core Indicator 2.2:
Systems are in place to monitor, archiveand disseminate data on key hazards andvulnerabilities.
Keywords:
small-area, population census, iterative proportional ﬁtting,geodesign, geographic information system
Context:
Spatial datasets and a Geographic Information System(GIS) are keys for accurately measuring natural hazards andvulnerability that varies according to area. For example, thesocio-demographic characteristics of victims affected bynatural disasters are not evenly distributed, and therefore
effective measures for disaster prevention and reconstruction
should differ according to the population characteristics ofparticular areas. Thus, detailed population datasets about thetenure of dwelling, family type, age of the head of household,etc. allow us to create “tailored” measures against disasters
and toward reconstruction. In addition to spatial datasets,
geodesign, a new planning tool using spatial datasets, hasalso gained attention. This framework combines different
evaluation maps representing values of local residents andstakeholders in the GIS environment.
Before:However, a lack of detailed population datasets for small
areas is problematic. National statistical datasets such as
the Population Census of Japan and the Housing and Land
Survey of Japan are tabulated only up to the municipality
level. Therefore, it is difficult to grasp detailed informationof affected areas from published statistical data. On theFig. 2.7 Change models (land use layout) created at the geodesign workshop
28

other hand, there are only a few examples of geodesign
applications for reconstruction planning. There is a gap
between analytical needs and available data and methods.
After:
Using statistical tables derived from the Population Census
of Japan, we developed a method to create an 8-dimensional
table, which represents people’s living conditions by eachbasic unit of the census (the minimum statistical survey
unit comprised approximately 50 households and has
geographical coordinates of latitude and longitude).
Items of the 8-dimensional table about living conditions are
as follows: household members by area (ward/municipality/
district/basic unit) × sex × age group × family type × tenure ofdwelling × building type and stories of house × area of floor
space × head/non-head of household. “Iterative Proportional
Fitting” was applied to make estimated population counts
converge to marginal totals of the census tables.
A geodesign workshop was held as an intensive courseat Tohoku University to design a new land use layout ofSoma City, Fukushima Prefecture. The evaluation maps andchange models (new land use layout) were created by theparticipants (Fig. 2.7) after extensive discussion.
Good practices:
The feature of this work is to conduct data estimation at thesmallest statistical unit that is geographically recorded as apoint. We can count the total population by any eight items
at each point of the basic unit, and it is possible to analyze
people’s conditions within areas stricken by a tsunami or
earthquake.
We confirmed the effectiveness of geodesign for regional
reconstruction planning because it can effectively consider
local variations of risks and vulnerabilities to natural
hazards as well as the value and needs of residents andstakeholders. Using both spatially detailed population
datasets and a geodesign framework will contribute to
making more effective reconstruction plans.

11

Earthquake Early Warning
System in Schools and at a
University during the 2011
Tohoku Earthquake

HFA Core Indicator 2.3:
Early warning systems are in place for all major
hazards, with outreach to communities.

Based on this success, MEXT (Ministry of Education,
Science and Culture) funded the installation of EEWS at
1,000 schools in 2012 and 500 in 2013.
At the Aobayama campus of Tohoku University, EEW wasissued at buildings with EEWS 13 s before severe shaking
helped students and staff evacuate to safe areas even though
the building sustained severe damage.

Keywords:
earthquake early warning system, application in schools,2011 Tohoku Earthquake, evacuation drill
Context:
Earthquake early warning systems (EEWS) can provide
precious seconds for taking action before strong groundshaking occurs. EEWS save lives by stopping trains before
they pass over damaged tracks, facilitating the evacuationof elevators, etc. Systems that detect earthquakes near theirsource and issue warnings before strong ground shaking
occurs have been used in Japan, Mexico, and Taiwan,
and similar systems are being studied for earthquakes inSouthern California, US, and other seismically active areas.
The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) has provided
warning information for public users via television andradio since October 1, 2007.
EEWS in schools have been developed and applied toschools in Miyagi Prefecture 7 in order to enhance the social
basis of understanding EEWS and to ensure the safety ofstudents and staffs by providing warning information.
First successful example of EEW in schools7:
Fig. 2.8 illustrates an EEW evacuation drill in a school that
actually adopted the EEW guidelines of JMA. In Miyagi
Prefecture, EEW applications have been performed at eightschools as government projects. During the Iwate-Miyagi
Inland Earthquake (M7.2) on June 14, 2008, the school EEWS
worked successfully. At a junior high school in Shiroishi City,
with an epicentral distance of 110 km, 102 students were
evacuated thanks to an EEW 21 s before the S waves arrived.
EEW application at a University
Fig. 2.9 shows the EEW application system at Tohoku
University where the university LAN has been used totransmit EEW since 2009. The EEW information is transferredto the broadcasting system of each bureau when the expected
seismic intensity exceeds a preset threshold intensity.
Good practices during the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake:
During the Tohoku Earthquake, at all most all of the schools
with EEW installed, pupils were able to evacuate because
the warning alarm sounded before severe shaking; 1415
s before shaking in Sendai, 17 s in Furukawa, Osaki City,and 21 s in Shiroishi City 8. At one elementary school in
Sendai, students avoided being crushed by toppled shoebox
thanks to EEW, and staff were able to avoid being injured
by large-sized safes in the staff room, even if the safes box
were fixed 8. A teacher in charge of EEW reported that, after
the experience of the Tohoku Earthquake (main shock),
students were able to evacuate by themselves when the
EEW sounded for the many aftershocks.
7
8

EEW

Fig. 2.8 Response to EEW in school

'!
EEWnd2)#
distribution dealer

JMA
Earthquake
'


Tohoku University

Server#/43(Aobayama)
5( 6

( 5

"6
AobayamaC.

201
Univ.LAN
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"6
AmamiyaFig. 2.9 EEWS at Tohoku University

Problems learnt from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake:● Determining source parameters is difficult for a huge
earthquake and leads to underestimation of the magnitude.
Consequently, the EEW may fail to connect to thebroadcasting system depending on the threshold value.
● Evacuation drills using the drill function of EEWS anddaily maintenance of EEWS are needed for evacuation
during a real earthquake. The degree of maintenancedivided black and white for the EEW utilization.
● Problems with false alarms are serious, especially when
two aftershocks occur simultaneously behind a main
shock. Countermeasures to prevent this are needed.
● Successive change of source information is needed for a huge
earthquake, and EEWS would be available for this change.
● On-site earthquake observation data can be used toenhance the accuracy of ground motion prediction but are
not always useful for a huge earthquake.

Masato Motosaka and Makoto Homma, Earthquake Early Warning System Application for School Disaster Prevention, Journal of Disaster Research Vol.4 No.4, 229-236, 2009
Masato Motosaka, Tohoku Earthquake Disaster and Earthquake Early Warning, UC-Berkeley Seismo Laboratory Seminar, April 3, 201229

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

12

Monitoring of Land Slides
and Status of Buildings andConstruction Areas by Radar
Technology

HFA Core Indicator 2.3:
Early warning systems are in place for all major
hazards, with outreach to communities.
Keywords:
GB-SAR, landslide, monitoring, radar, Arato-zawa, MiyagiIwate Nairiku earthquake
Context:
Radar technology is now available to monitor large-scalelandslides. A demonstration in Arato-zawa shows promising
results, and pertinent information should be delivered to the
local inhabitants.
Before:Landslides can be caused by earthquakes, volcanic
activity, strong rain and storms. While landslides canoccur sometimes very abruptly, in many cases they movevery slowly. Available technologies are now being used
to monitor areas prone to landslides. For example, strain
meters and tiltmeters can be placed on the slope, and cancontinuously monitor the deformation of the land surface.
Recently, high-precision GPS has also been used to monitor
the movement of the ground surface. These techniques are
effective when the location of the movement is obvious
and these discrete sensors can be placed in the appropriate
positions. However, if the position of the movement isunclear or distributed across a large area, deploying these
discrete sensors is costly and largely ineffective.

Fig. 2.11 GB-SAR system installed at the Arato-zawa site

The GB-SAR system acquires radar data every 5 min, andthe data are transferred to Remote PC over the Internet foranalysis. Fig. 2.12 shows one of the SAR interferometry
images. The color indicates the deformation of the groundsurface, where the green area is stable and red and blue
areas indicate small displacements. This specific SARinterferometry image was created using data before andafter a small-scale earthquake, and we think that soil androcks have fallen down as a result of the earthquake. This isindicated by the red area, which can be seen in the middleof the cliff.

After:
We propose the use of ground-based synthetic aperture radar(GB-SAR) to monitor the ground surface displacement. One
GB-SAR unit can observe a wide area of the landslide, andcan detect sub-millimeter displacements. Moreover, GBSAR can monitor the ground surface condition continuously,
and could be used to provide an automatic early warning
if the GB-SAR detects any anomalous movement of theground surface.
Good practices:
We have continuously monitored the ground surface
condition by GB-SAR at the Arato-zawa site in Kurihara
City, Japan shown in Fig.2.10 since 2011. Very large-scalelandslides occurred at Arato-zawa as a result of the IwateMiyagi Nairiku earthquake in 2008. Fig. 2.11 shows the
GB-SAR system installed at the Arato-zawa site.

Fig. 2.10 Arato-zawa landslide area. The GB-SAR system can be seen at
the bottom left
30

Fig. 2.12 SAR Interferometry image that shows the location of groundsurface deformation

Problems:
Because the system transmits electromagnetic waves,permission to use it must be obtained from the government.
If the process of obtaining permission is simplified, GBSAR systems can be installed more easily. More experience
using the system is required to increase its accuracy. The
method in which the early warning information is provided
to the local inhabitants must also be carefully studied.

knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety
HFA Priority for Action 3: Useand resilience at all levels.

13

Table 3.1 List of Great Natural Disasters and Academic Research Institutes
for Natural Disasters

Information Sharing, Cooperation,
and Expert Training Provided byAcademic Research Institutes for
Natural Disasters

HFA Core Indicator 3.1:
Relevant information on disasters is available
and accessible at all levels, to all stakeholders(through networks, development of information
sharing systems, etc.)
Keywords:
academic research institute for natural disasters,
background, mission
Context:
Various countermeasures have been implemented on thebasis of the experiences of many great natural disasters,
including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, tsunamis,
typhoons, landslides, etc. This section focuses on the roleof academics suggested by any previous great disaster. HFACore Indicators in this section are altered from the originalindicators, maintaining the original priority.
Before:First, we summarize the century-long history of theestablishment of academic disaster research institutes. The
Tokyo University Earthquake Research Institute (ERI)
was established in 1925, two years after the great Kanto
earthquake. The principles and goals of scientific research are
to promote research of the solid earth, and to pioneer a way
to better understand earthquakes and volcanic activities.
The Kyoto University Disaster Prevention ResearchInstitute (DPRI) was founded in 1951 in response to severe
damage caused by a huge typhoon that struck Japan thatyear. Since its establishment, the DPRI has responded toa variety of natural disasters and has promoted research in
the disaster sciences, with the goal of mitigating damage.
Many researchers and graduate students work in the DPRI,
with specialties ranging from natural science, engineering,
informatics, to social sciences. It also maintains 15
experimental and observatory facilities outside the campus
for unique field investigations, on-site observations, andlarge experiments.
The National Research Institute for Earth Science andDisaster Prevention (NIED) was established in 1963,
motivated by the disastrous 1959 Typhoon Isewan.
Originally, an independent administrative institution isdefined as one that efficiently and effectively promotes
programs that should be securely administered from thepublic perspective, but always need not be executed by thegovernment itself and cannot be expected to be supported
by private enterprises. Research on disaster prevention is
one such work.
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Memorial Disaster
Reduction and Human Renovation Institute (DRI) offers

programs in which visitors can learn the effects of thatearthquake and lessons learned from the experience thatshould be shared with younger generations. The DRI began
in 1959 as an archive project and after 2002 has also worked
to convey expertise and knowledge to the public in an easyto-understand manner so as to help our cities, communities,
and the populace becomes better prepared against disasters.
Such efforts are based on the concept that disaster risk
management and mitigation requires the involvement of
not only the national and local governments but also local
communities and individuals.
After:For a hundred years, fundamental science and technology
related to disasters has been developed in Japan basedon fundamental scientific knowledge, and many experts
have emerged. However, our knowledge has proven to be
insufficient to save lives, to provide correct information, andto make well-informed decisions, because the damage by
the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake was extraordinarily
massive and the damaged area so vast, as never before
31

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

experienced. Experts in each division are less experienced
in connection to that in other divisions. The highest priority
is thus an integrated system of knowledge.
Such a system demands consideration of social engineering,social sciences, and humanities in implementing
countermeasures. It also requires reinforcing efforts for
effective risk communication about a very low frequency
great disaster, including its uncertainty, limitation ofpredicting natural phenomena, and the promotion of
integrated research among different fields such as
seismology, geology, archeology, history, and practicalexpert training.
Having experienced the catastrophic disaster in 2011,
Tohoku University founded the International ResearchInstitute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS). Along withcollaborating organizations from many countries and withbroad areas of specialization, the IRIDeS conducts worldleading research on natural disaster science and disastermitigation. Based on the lessons from the 2011 Great East
Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster, theIRIDeS strives to become a global center for the studyof disasters and disaster mitigation, learning from andbuilding on past lessons in disaster management fromJapan and around the world. Throughout, the IRIDeS willcontribute to ongoing recovery/reconstruction efforts inaffected areas by conducting action-oriented research andpursuing effective disaster management to build sustainable
and resilient societies. The IRIDeS innovates the previous
paradigm of Japan’s and the rest of the world’s management
for catastrophic natural disasters to become a foundationof disaster mitigation management and sciences. Disastermitigation management seeks to avoid or reduce potential
losses from natural hazards, to ensure prompt assistanceto victims, to achieve rapid and effective recovery, and tobuild disaster-resilient and sustainable societies through thefive stages of the disaster management cycle: mitigation,
preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction. The
action-oriented research of the IRIDeS addresses each stage
in the cycle and integrates and universalizes the scientificdiscoveries for implementation worldwide.
The Inter-Graduate School Doctoral Degree Programon Science for Global Safety, the Ministry of Education(MEXT) program for Leading Graduate Schools,
commenced in 2012, and the IRIDeS contributes to thisprogram. Participating students have an integrated practicalprogram, an all-round resource, called the “Kopeito”(cultivate) model.
Good practices:
Having experienced many catastrophic disasters throughhistory, we have established academic/research institutes
and education systems from various aspects.
Problems:
Promotion of integrated research of different fields such as
seismology, geology, and archeology was insufficient. The
failure to anticipate massive earthquakes and tsunamis bytaking every possibility into account was noted.

14

Education to Build a Cultureof Safety and Resilience at
All Levels around Academic
Research Institutes

HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material andrelevant training include disaster risk reduction
and recovery concepts and practices.
Keywords:
outreach, social decisions, personal action, daily training,
local media, IT-network, SNS
Before:For longer than the past decade, there were two main
backgrounds for countermeasures for disaster prevention in
Japan: science communication and administrative policy.
The White Paper on Science and Technology, 2004 noted
the importance of scientists and engineers, as members ofsociety, engaging in exchanges with the people, so as tostrengthen mutual trust and to encourage the people to treat
science and technology as issues of personal importance.
In 2005, on the basis of those backgrounds, programs forscience communication had begun at Hokkaido University,
Waseda University, and Tokyo University by the Scienceand Technology Promotion Fund. Science communication
programs had then spread across other universities, andmany outreach programs were held at universities, large
academic research projects, and academic societies.
Research institutes contributed to public programs basedon the political concept. During these 10 years, the NIED
has performed public services through basic research anddevelopment on disaster reduction as well as disseminationof research results for the benefit of society. Regarding
the seismic hazard, two major projects proceeded utilizing
the nationwide seismic network and the 3D Full-scale
Earthquake Testing Facility (E-defense), both of which wereconstructed after the disastrous Kobe earthquake in 1995.
The DPRI serves as a national research center on natural
disasters and their prevention and mitigation, authorized
by the MEXT. Researchers working on natural disasters
from various Japanese universities gather at DPRI, use its
experimental and observatory facilities, and jointly work withDPRI researchers. Another role of the DPRI is to promptly
provide diverse support at disaster sites in and outside Japanby offering advice regarding what to do, what aid is needed,
how to secure and organize volunteers, and other relevant
issues while working on pragmatic tasks with local personnel.
In preparation for such tasks, our team is developing skills
and expertise for managing potential challenges at disastersites. Furthermore, several institutions and UN organizations
related to disaster management are located in this area. This
proximity enables the DPRI to serve as one of world’s key
centers for information on disaster risk management, in
collaboration with these organizations.
The good qualities of human beings such as flexibility,
kindness, generosity, strength, and joviality are the basis forbuilding an attractive life, home, community, and society.

32

To promote a prosperous society of the 21st century basedon harmonious coexistence with nature, the DPRI will strive
to disseminate useful disaster management information andexpertise, which we believe are closely linked with the mindsetof appreciating the importance and preciousness of life.
After:The ERI speedily provided scientific information on theearthquake. The ERI succeeded in making the mechanismof the earthquake and tsunami easy to understand on thebasis of precise analysis.
In addition to its domestic activities, the DPRI has
established formal Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)
with 40 foreign research institutions (as of August, 2012)and organizes numerous joint projects and seminars toserve as an international center for research and education
on natural disasters and their mitigation. The past decade
has witnessed a notable increase in the intensity of natural
disasters, such as the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake andTsunami. To respond to the serious needs for the protectionof the lives and assets of our people and society, the DPRI
promises to continue to enhance its research efforts, using
the knowledge and experience accumulated over the last
several decades.
On the basis of NIDE’s practical outputs in the past 10 years,
they entered “The Third Five-year Plan” period in April, 2011
through negotiation with the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science, and Technology as well as the Ministries
of Finance and of Internal Affairs and Communications.
Synchronized with this turning point, we have changed theorganization of our institute to create a more efficient system.
The research sector was reorganized into three departments:
Monitoring and Forecast, Experimental Research, andSocial Systems; the management sector was simplified byspinning off the planning section. Further, the Outreachand International Research Promotion Center was newly
established to strengthen public services and international
activities, archive projects including a rental camera systemfor victims, etc.
In April, 2011, “The 4th Science and Technology Basic Plan”
was also launched by the Council for Science and Technology
Policy, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. In this plan,
the role of science and technology is highlighted to challenge
important policy goals, one of which is “Realization of Rich
and High-quality Life.” Lessons from the Great East Japan
Earthquake are summarized in the White Paper on Scienceand Technology, 2012. The public’s trust in scientists declined
because of the gap between expectation and reality. We thus
urgently need promotion of integrated research of different
fields such as seismology, geology, archeology, and history
to sufficiently understand earthquakes and tsunamis. There
was overconfidence in embankments and technology; somepeople did not evacuate because they lacked knowledge ofthe limitations of existing countermeasures and technologies.
Scientific and technological risks and uncertainty involved
have not been seriously considered with regard to thegovernment’s and experts’ provision of information to the
public. Therefore, most of the people lacked an adequate
understanding of the situation.
Social engineering, social sciences, and humanities must be
considered in implementing countermeasures. Anticipating

massive earthquakes and tsunamis must take every
possibility into account.
The IRIDeS has created a new academia of disastermitigation that subsumes the lessons from the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake and Tsunami and the findings of world-leading
research into our societies with the purpose of establishingsocial systems that respond promptly, sensibly, andeffectively to natural disasters, withstanding adversities
with resiliency, and passing and exploiting the lessons tothe subsequent disaster management cycles. Enhancing
cooperation with the local municipalities and governmentsin the affected areas and contributing to their recovery andreconstruction efforts, the IRIDeS conducts action-oriented
research. They strive to create disaster-resilient societiesthat can overcome the complex and diverse processes ofnatural disasters, not only by mitigation strategies but also
by preparing for and responding to them, and achieving
recovery and renovation, thus engendering the culture ofdisaster-resiliency incorporated into our social systems.
The action-oriented research of the IRIDeS focuses on thefollowing points:
1) Investigating the physics of global scale natural disasters
such as mega-earthquakes, tsunamis, and extreme weather,
2) Reconstructing disaster response and mitigation
technologies based on the lessons of the 2011 Tohoku
earthquake and tsunami disaster,3) Inventing “Affected Area Supportology” in the aftermathof natural disasters,
4) Enhancing disaster-resiliency and performance ofmultiple-fail-safe systems in regional and urban areas,5) Establishing disaster medicine and medical service
systems towards catastrophic natural disasters,6) Designing disaster-resilient societies and developing thedigital archive system to pass the lessons from thedisasters.
The Inter-Graduate School Doctoral Degree Program on
Science for Global Safety develops human resources throughintegrated education in the five-year doctoral program acrossuniversity departments for students in humanities, sciences,and technologies. It develops leaders in the area of global
safety who have a substantial knowledge of liberal arts,
international adaptability, a high sense of ethics, and a clear
vision, and are able to think and act appropriately on suchbases. They are expected to contribute to the protection ofhuman lives, societies, and industries from global disasters
such as the Great East Japan Earthquake.
In this program, interdisciplinary cutting-edge education
and research are conducted on the basis of practical disasterprevention studies in the (IRIDeS), with participation by the
Graduate Schools of Science, Engineering, Environmental
Studies, Arts and Letters, and others, so that this integrated
program can combine knowledge from the natural sciences,
social sciences, and liberal arts. This program strives todevelop excellent human resources with core specialties,
the ability to apply them in various areas, and other required
abilities for leaders, through activities at recovery sites fromthe Great East Japan Earthquake and conducting worldclass research.
Finally, we focus on the action of non-experts. For roughly
the past decade, many technologies have enabled people
33

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

to transmit information rapidly and simultaneously.
Government offices transmit disaster information and action
indicator messages through mass media and people expect
unified information from responsible organizations. During
the past several years, Internet technology has developed.
The specific information path has diverged with interactive
communication. Personal interactive information excluding
mass media now enables direct personal interaction.

15

Education Practice Program for
Improving Response Capability
to Survive a Tsunami

HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material andrelevant training include disaster risk reduction
and recovery concepts and practices.
Keywords:
1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 2011 Great East
Japan Tsunami, disaster reduction education, education tools
Context:
Issues for disaster reduction education in school havebecome more important since the substantial loss ofchildren due to the 2011 disaster. Education in school is one
method that helps to maintain or increase disaster awarenessof children to survive such catastrophic disasters.

Fig. 3.1 Evacuation Drill for Tsunamis at an Elementary School

Good practices:
1) Scientific experts have increased in Japan. The speedy
supply of scientific information about the mechanismof earthquakes and tsunamis has occurred. That
information is open for access and quickly archived.
2) Disaster prevention education by Dr. Katada of the
University of Gunma, which underpinned the “Kamaishi
Miracle,” became famous after the Great East Japan
Disaster. Dr. Katada said that it was skills for life, not amiracle. Kamaishi is in the Sanriku Coastal Area, where
disaster prevention education and countermeasures wererelatively active. He emphasized the reality of tsunamis
and the existence of preconditions in the hazard map
to overcome the gap between well-informed action
and carelessness regarding hazards. That orderly andrepeated education caused success.
Problems:
The public’s trust in scientists has declined because of
the gap between expectations and reality. We urgently
need integrated research in different fields to sufficiently
understand earthquakes and tsunamis. Communities lack asufficient number of interpreters and coordinators between
experts and non-experts.

Before:Before the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami disaster, the1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was the most recent
large-scale disaster in Japan. More than six thousand lives
were lost, including almost 600 people younger than 20
years old (Fig. 3.2). However, because it was an inland
earthquake that occurred in the early morning, most of thechildren that died were at home. The fact shows importanceof disaster reduction education to improve children’s risk
awareness.

Fig. 3.2 Number of deaths by age for the 1995 Earthquake and2011 Tsunami disasters1

After:The situation surrounding the 2011 Great East Japan
Tsunami differed from that of the earthquake in 1995. The
tsunami hit the east coast of Japan 30–60 min after themassive earthquake struck in the afternoon. Even though thedisaster occurred during the daytime when most children
were supposed to be safe in school, and they had at least
30 min to evacuate, the tsunami killed nearly 700 people
younger than 19 years old in the Tohoku area (Fig. 3.2).
Even though the number of deaths from the 2011 disaster1
2

34

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2011) Disaster prevention white paper, http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/index.htm.
Yasuda, M., Imamura, F. and Suppasri, A. (2014) Practical education program for improving response capability to survive from tsunami, in: Proceeding of the Tohoku researchgroup for natural disaster science, Akita University, 7-8 January 2013 (in Japanese).

for those older than 30 is quite large, the number of children
is almost the same as the number for the 1995 disaster.
Some successful stories emerged from this disaster, such as
the “Miracle of Kamaishi”, in which all the elementary andjunior high school children survived. While their schools
were designated evacuation shelters, they realized that thetsunami might be bigger than that predicted by the hazard
map. They finally decided to evacuate to higher ground, andall of them survived because of disaster education and drills.
Good practices:
The “Miracle of Kamaishi” is an example of a goodpractice, as disaster reduction education was continuously
and well taught in the schools. The children had highawareness, and they were able to think of the catastrophe
beyond what might be expected and find a survival route.
Many ideas for new education courses for disaster reductionin school have been proposed since the 2011 disaster. An
activity in Sendai2 shows that children have higher disasterawareness, know how to survive or protect themselves andtell what they have learned in the class to their parents.
Problems:
Although there are a number of new education courses, they
are mainly paper-based materials, and children might soon
forget about them or infrequently review them. A new toolthat applies disaster reduction information to everyday use
is called “Gensai Pocket YUI”3 and is an example of future
education tools. Information such as disaster phenomena,
things to have prepared and evacuation measures are printed
on the handkerchief. Children can use this handkerchief towrap their lunch boxes and test themselves with the quizzes
every day. More effort needs to be spent on creating new
tools for disaster reduction that are interesting for children
and help maintain disaster awareness during every day life.

16

Development of the Reconstruction
Mapping Program at the Tsunamiaffected Elementary School

HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material andrelevant training include disaster risk reduction
and recovery concepts and practices.
Keywords:
Post-disaster education program, tsunami-affected school,
periods of integrated studies, teaching plan, town-watching
Context:
Disaster education should define in a life cycle of a disasterfrom preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. The
goal of disaster education at school is to build the abilities
not only to survive a disaster but also to be supporters in thereconstruction process.
Before:Experiences of and recovery from the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake shape the foundation of disaster education in
Japan. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Scienceand Technology (MEXT) has been promoting disaster risk
reduction in education by setting school safety guidelinesand developing and distributing training and referencematerials for teachers. Disaster education at school has
been integrated into existing curricula such as science,social studies, and life environment studies. Though many
materials and programs were developed, most of themwere stand alone. Standardization of methodologies for
replication and upscaling has been sought.
After:The Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011,
reaffirmed the importance of disaster education, especiallyin developing the ability to assess a situation and takeproactive measures to protect one’s life. In 2012, MEXT
announced a five-year plan called the Promotion of School
Safety based on the 2009 School Health and Safety
Act. The plan emphasizes promotion of systematic andcomprehensive school safety measures based on scientificand practical knowledge and cooperation among schools,
households, and local communities.

Fig. 3.3 Gensai Pocket YUI3

3
4

The Reconstruction Mapping Program 4 is a disastereducation program at Kazuma Elementary School in
Ishinomaki. The school is located 1 km from the coastline.
Although the school re-opened in the same building on April
21, most of the school district was flooded by the March2011 tsunami. When the Program was started in 2012, there
still remained many vacant lots at the southern end of theschool district due to the water outflow that washed away
houses, requiring many displaced children to commute fromoutside of the school district.

Sendai Television Incorporated (2014) Gensai Pocket YUI: http://www.ox-tv.co.jp/topics/yui_pocket/
Aiko SAKURAI, Takeshi SATO, Yoshiyuki MURAYAMA, Eriko TOKUYAMA, “Development of a School-Based Disaster Education Program: A Case of a “Reconstruction
Map Making” Program in Ishinomaki-City”. Proceedings at the 9th APRU Research Symposium on Multi-Hazards on the Pacific Rim at National Taiwan University, 2013.

35

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

which is structured according to the children’s development
phases and the objectives of the subject and the education
unit. The teaching plan may implement the Program in asustainable manner with the possibility of expansion toother areas.
The Program has given children firsthand experience inthe reconstruction of their community, which has helped
them better know their community and has increased theirmotivation to actively participate in the community’sreconstruction process.

Source: Kazuma Elementary School

Fig. 3.4 Sample of a 2013 Reconstruction Map

The Program is aimed at helping children cope with theirexperiences during the disaster. The entire school district
is divided into 12 groups, and each group walks throughthe tsunami-damaged school district. The children keep
records of the reconstruction process, interview people
in the community, and present this information in a
“Reconstruction Map.”

Fig. 3.5 Organization of the Program (Sample duration: 12 hours)

Good Practices:
The Reconstruction Mapping Program was started throughpartnerships among Ishinomaki City’s Board of Education;
the school’s principal, teachers, and school children; an
NGO; and university researchers. It has been implemented
in the school curriculum during the fourth-grade Period forIntegrated Studies. A teaching plan was also developed,
36

Problems:
Issues identified through the two-year implementation of
the Program include● keeping a close eye on the children’s mental condition,● providing the opportunity for children to feel they arecontributing to the community’s reconstruction throughthe dissemination of artifacts and records,● accumulating records and artifacts collected by thechildren as an asset for the school to further develop
educational materials,● getting more community participation in the Program
implementation, and● examining the effectiveness of the program fordissemination to other areas in Japan and the world.

17International Post-graduate
Education Program for Disaster
Medicine; Collaboration with
Tohoku University Human
Security Program

HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material andrelevant training include disaster risk reduction
and recovery concepts and practices.

Keywords:
human security, education for disaster medicine,international post-graduate program
Context:
Human security is a concept of security and focuseson an individual’s safety rather than state security. Its
goal is “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”.
The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami(hereinafter GEJET) posed a “crisis of human security”.
Tohoku University promoted collaboration between theInternational Post-Graduate Program in Human Security
and the International Research Institute of Disaster Science.

lecture on “Disaster Preparedness for Public Health” as oneof the subjects for the Human Security Program.
The Graduate School of Medicine, Tohoku University
has developed department-level exchange agreements
to operate a linkage program, a double degree course,with the University of Brawijaya and Graduate Schoolof Agricultural Sciences, and Padjadjaran University.
These two department-level exchange agreements will be
developed at the university level. In addition, IRIDeS is
now preparing another two department-level agreementswith the School of Medicine, University of the Philippines
and Public Health School of Angeles University Foundation.
Good practices:
The Human Security Program at Tohoku University
provides resources for international students to learn lessons
from the GEJET. Tohoku University has developed an
exchange agreement at multiple levels with universities invarious Asian Pacific countries.
Problems:
Although the Human Security Program at Tohoku
University is open to both international and domestic
students, a majority of applicants are from outside Japan.
The students have few opportunities to experience directly
the lessons learned from GEJET unless they are able totravel outside the university.

Before:Human security is a concept of security. It focuses on
individuals, not states, which used to be the main concernof the traditional notion of security.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had
already pointed out that a disaster would be a significant
threat to human security in its report published in 1994, andthe importance of climate change in the study of humansecurity has increased. However, disaster medicine is not amainstream part of human security.
Tohoku University established the International PostGraduate Program in Human Security in 2005. Four
graduate schools, the Graduate School of Agricultural
Science, the Graduate School of Medicine, the Graduate
School of International Cultural Studies and the Graduate
School of Environmental Studies participate in thisinterdisciplinary program. Before the GEJET, less attention
has been paid to disaster medicine in human security.
After:The earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, killed
many people and destroyed cities and villages. Evacuation
centers were resource-limited and thought to be at highrisk for outbreaks of infectious diseases. Furthermore, theaccident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
created much anxiety concerning radiation leaks, for which
the health effects remain unclear. The impact of the disaster
was far beyond anyone’s anticipation, and the security ofpeople in affected areas was greatly impaired.
To address these issues, Tohoku University Human Security
Program started a collaboration between disaster medicine
and human security. The Division of Disaster Medicine,International Research Institute of Disaster Science(IRIDeS) and Human Security Program opened a joint
37

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

18

Recent Advances in Numerical
Simulation for Disaster
Prevention in the View of the 2011
Great East Japan Earthquake

HFA Core Indicator 3.3:
Research methods and tools for multi-risk
assessments and cost-beneﬁt analysis aredeveloped and strengthened.
Keywords:
numerical simulations, mathematical modeling,visualization, disaster prevention, mitigation
Context:
The Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster has increased
awareness of the importance of numerical simulations tomuch more than before and, at the same time, highlighted
the immaturity of this field in various aspects. This article
reviews previous and current methodologies and techniques
for numerical simulations and describes the challenges
faced based on the lessons learned from the 3.11 Disaster.
Before:Individual modeling methodologies and simulation
techniques seemed to be mature, both qualitatively andquantitatively, since a variety of general-purpose simulation
software packages were sufficiently reliable for specificsingle-phase phenomena. In particular, structural analysis
methods are effectively utilized for earthquake-resistantdesign in practical computations, and tsunami simulation
programs provide good accuracies for predicting run-up
regions. The main lesson learned from the Great Hanshin
Earthquake Disaster was the necessity of developing robust
numerical simulation schemes that enable us to predict the
failure of structures with specific load bearing capacities
and reproduce post-failure behavior involving large
deformations. In addition, advances in computer hardware
have helped to increase the size of numerical simulations
that can be performed for risk prediction of disasters, as

Fig. 3.6 Changing capabilities and challenges for numerical simulations
38

well as lifetime prediction of infrastructures in urban areas.
After:The Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster featured
complexity and wide-ranging damage. In view of numericalsimulations for advanced risk mitigation, the tsunamistructure and/or tsunami-soil interactions must be noted
aspects of complex disasters in widespread areas. Also, therisks due to the diffusion of contaminants and the generationand expansion of fire are manifested as a result of thecomplexity. Unfortunately, however, highly developed but
individual methodologies and techniques for corresponding
single-phase phenomena are less useful in predicting
such coupled physical and/or chemo-thermomechanicalphenomena. Thus, to make numerical simulations morereliable, specific algorithms for large-scale computations ofcomplex disasters need to be developed.
Good practices:
Researchers have started to combine individual methods
and have tried to solve the real coupled problems involvedin complex disasters with sufficient quantitative accuracy.
In particular, young engineers and scientists, being awareof the implication of developments, have establishedstudy groups to exchange ideas with different disciplines.
Sophistication of the visual representation of analysis
results is also recognized as important for decision-making
by government officials.
Problems:
Actual complex disasters involving interactions between
structures, fluids, and soils/rocks are too complicatedfor all the phenomena to be reproduced with sufficientquantitative accuracy. Not only technical difficulties, butalso uncertainties make such predictions intractable. In fact,
although numerous attempts have been made, most of them
do not have a high enough level of performance for practicaluse in terms of reliability and versatility. Also, methodsof parallel computation for huge-scale complex problems
in widespread areas are still under development. To orient
the research area of computational disaster science, wemust create a new framework of numerical simulations forsolving coupled problems in complex disasters.

HFA Priority for Action 4: Reduce the underlying risk factors.

19

Post-tsunami Recovery Strategies
in Sanriku Coastal Areas after
the 1933 Tsunami

HFA Core Indicator 4.1:
Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective ofenvironment-related policies and plans, including
for land use, natural resource management andadaptation to climate change.
Keywords:
land use regulation, relocation to higher land, 1896 Sanriku
Tsunami, 1933 Sanriku Tsunami, transition of housing
location, urban recovery strategy
Context:
Land use mitigation is one of the most reliable strategies
for avoiding future tsunami disaster. The Sanriku Coastal
Area, one of the most tsunami-prone areas in Japan, locatedin the north part of the main island, was seriously damagedby catastrophic tsunamis in 1896, 1933, and 1960 before
the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. The
Japanese government prepared resettlement space on higher
ground for the victims after the 1933 Great Sanriku Tsunami.

In contrast, the houses on the higher resettlement area
provided by the government after the 1933 Tsunami
survived the destructive 2011 Tsunami.
Good practices:
The fact that the resettlement on higher ground provided bypost-tsunami recovery planning and policy after the 1933
Tsunami was not damaged by the 2011 Tsunami demonstrates
the importance of land use mitigation for tsunami disaster
reduction. This successful experience in the tsunami-prone
coastal area should be referenced in the future.
Problems:
Although the government developed the safer resettlement
area for residents after the 1933 Tsunami, many people
began living in the vulnerable lower lands or returnedto the original tsunami-prone sites until 2011. Previous
research1 describes how several districts in Sanriku Coastal
Area suffered from this hazardous situation because of the
populace’s lack of tsunami risk recognition, convenience,or inherited lands. The recovery planning and policy for theland use regulation was efficient in reducing tsunami risk in
one sense, but it was not a mandatory strategy that required
people to live only in the safe area.

Before:Fig. 4.1 illustrates the transition of housing location after the1933 Tsunami in Hongo District, Iwate Prefecture1. Becauseof the relocation strategy, there is almost no building asof 1948, except in the higher elevations provided by thegovernment. However, many buildings had been constructedin the vulnerable lowlands in the twentieth century.
After:The 2011 Tsunami struck the district, washing away
hundreds of buildings in the lowlands again (Fig. 4.2).

Fig. 4.2 Building Damage in Hongo after the 2011 Tsunami (left) andPre-tsunami (right)2

Fig. 4.1 Change of Housing Location in Hongo, Touni Village (1948–2010)1
1

2

Murao, O., and Isoyama, S. (2012). Transition of Housing Location in Villages in Iwate Prefecture after the Sanriku Tsunamis in 1896 and 1933, Joint Conference Proceedings of
9th International Conference on Urban Earthquake Engineering (9CUEE) and 4th Asia Conference on Earthquake Engineering (4ACEE) (CD-ROM), 1877-1882, Tokyo, Japan.
Geospatial Information Authority of Japan. Retrieved from http://saigai.gsi.go.jp/h23taiheiyo-ok/photo/photo_dj/index.html.

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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

20

Integrated Perspective of Civil
Engineering, Architecture and
Urban Planning

HFA Core Indicator 4.1:
Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective ofenvironment-related policies and plans, including
for land use, natural resource management andadaptation to climate change.
Keywords:
reconstruction plan, Oshika Peninsula, land use, residents’intentions, coastal levee
Context:
The 2011 tsunami damaged vast coastal areas of Japan,
including many fishing villages, which are regarded as asignificant part of a cultural tradition in Japan, a maritime
nation. The fishing industry has supported the revival ofsmall fishing villages step-by-step, although some of thesevillages are faced with the threat of desolation. On theother hand, large villages, which also have functions otherthan being a place of residence and/or a part of the fishingindustry; i.e., the commercial industry, tourism, fisheryprocessing and ship building are facing another difficulty,
such as losing their centrality.
Before:Ayukawa is a largest fishing village of Oshika Peninsula,in Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture. Up until the 1970,the village prospered with the whaling industry. Today,
however, tourism is an important industry for the village
besides fishing. The 7.7-m tsunami heavily devastated thevillage’s industries, commercial and tourism facilities, andhouses at low elevations. The earthquake also caused land
subsistence of up to 1.2 m in this area.
After:
According to the reconstruction plan for Ayukawa madeby a contracted civil engineering consultant, new, higher
residential areas for the relocation will be segmented into

Fig. 4.3 Proposed master plan for Ayukawa

3

Good practices:
Tohoku University IRIDeS 4 and Y-GSA Kojima studioformulated an alternative (Fig. 4.4) by integrating civilengineering, architecture and urban planning.
-Attractive new town center: The new town center islocated on the artillery battery-shaped hill, which smoothly
combines the raised road and the coastal levee. The crosssection is accented with old streets leading to the hillside
temple, where residents can worship their ancestors.
-Compact land use: The new residential area adjoins theexisting residential area in the eastern part of town.
-Multifunctional interface of levee: The gradually widening
stairs and grass slopes are designed to provide access to
the wharf (TP + 1.5 m) from the commercial area.
-Bringing relevant parties 5 into agreement and building
consensus with local residents.
The local government executed another opinion survey after
sharing the information of this alternative with the citizens.
The results showed that 45% of residents want to move tothe west, much lower then the 70% reported previously, and
55% want to move to the east.
Problems:
The prefectural government, the main authority overseeing
the coastal levee development, was unable to decide on aclear direction, and as a result, the project was delayed. It
also led to insufficient communication with residents, whichbiased the results of surveys about their new homes.

Fig. 4.4 Proposed plan for the east side of Ayukawa6

TP : Tokyo Peil. The height of coastal levee is indicated by T.P.
IRIDeS: International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Project officer : Onoda, Y.(Architecture), Hirano, K.(Civil Engineering), et al.
5
Local government means Ishinomaki City and Miyagi Prefecture. We coordinated some reconstruction project; river embankment, coastal levee, road, housing project.
6
Model made by Kazuhiro Kojima studio of Yokohama Graduate School of Architecture
440four areas with 30 to 40 households each. An opinion
survey shows that 70% of the victims want to move to thewestern area, which is separate from the existing eastern
residential area. This indicates that they did not find thereconstruction of the village center appealing. This breaking
up of the community and separation between old and new
residential areas casts a shadow over the future of thevillage. The isolation of the new residential area from theexisting village functions, including the commercial andtourism industries, as well as the current residential areas,
will decrease the sustainability of the town. Moreover, theTP3 + 6.0 m high coastal levee separates the harbor areafrom the residential area (Fig. 4.3).

21

Measures for People
Requiring Assistance during
a Disaster

HFA Core Indicator 4.2:
Social development policies and plans are being
implemented to reduce the vulnerability of
populations most at risk.
Keywords:
elderly people, Guidelines for Evacuation Support ofPeople Requiring Assistance During a Disaster, evacuation,
emergency network
Context:
It is vital for the elderly and disabled to be supported andassisted by neighbors in immediately evacuating fromdisastrous situations. The government and neighboring
communities must strive to establish a framework for
managing the various aspects of this issue.

After:
Fig. 4.5 indicates the number of casualties, by age, due tothe 2011Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami andthe 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake. Both exhibit a similartendency of the death toll by age in that the ratio of theolder populace is higher than that of the younger. However,
the ratio in the 2011 event is remarkably higher than that in
the 1995 Earthquake. The deaths from the 1995 Earthquake
were caused largely by building collapse, so a dwelling’s
structural type and age were significant. In contrast,
the 2011 deaths were caused largely by the tsunami, so
evacuation methods from the vulnerable area to safer places
were critical. Thus, residents’ age or health condition was
an important factor affecting their fate. Following theguidelines, many districts had striven for strong community
assistance for such people, but not all community plans
worked well because of the size of affected areas andgeographical conditions.

Before:To support such community activities, the Cabinet Officereleased the Guidelines for Evacuation Support of People
Requiring Assistance During a Disaster in 2005 and thePreparation of Measures for Supporting Persons Requiring
Assistance During a Disaster, which contains case studies
from recent disasters, in 2007. They were also supposed tosupport municipal governments in producing overall plans.
The 2005 Guidelines document consists of the following
five activities.
1. Improving the information communications system• Announcement of evacuation preparation information• Establishment of a support unit for people requiring
assistance• Secure communications through various means such as
the Internet and emergency call message service
2. Sharing of information concerning people requiring
assistance during a disaster• Collection and sharing of information on people
requiring assistance in various ways
• Promotion of exceptional use of social-welfare-related
personal information to prepare evacuation support systems
3. Creating a tangible evacuation support plan forpeople requiring assistance during a disaster• Creation of an evacuation support plan for eachindividual requiring assistance• Recognition of the importance of making communities
resilient to disasters
4. Assistance at evacuation centers• Establishment of an information desk for people
requiring assistance at evacuation centers• Establishment of welfare evacuation centers
5. Collaboration among related organizations• Continuity of welfare services in disaster situations• Wide-area support of health nurses• Establishment of a committee on evacuation support forpeople requiring assistance at the municipal level
78Fig. 4.5 Casualties, by Age, due to the 2011Great East Japan Earthquake andTsunami and the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake7

Good practices:
There were many elderly people needing assistance inshelters after the tsunami. Homehelpers in Japan dispatchedsupporters for them, and because of keeping accurate
records of the elders’ information, that plan worked well4.
Problems:
The Cabinet Office8 noted problems in each response phaseclarified by the event, as follows:
Before: lack of supporting systems, including acceptanceof people and organizations, lack of dissemination of theprocedures, shortage of helpers, shortage of previous drills.
Emergency response: no list of the elderly, not knowing
how to use the lists, no guidelines, no information on
evacuation for the elderly.
At the shelters after the emergency response: difficultyin continuing to live with other people, lack of shelters,
limitation of response systems to the elderly, unsatisfactory
health care, lack of information and materials, insufficient
support by local governments because of damage,difficulties faced by infants and expectant mothers.

The Cabinet Office (2011). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/bousai2011/html/honbun/2b_sanko_siryo_06.htm.
The Cabinet Office (2012). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hisaisyagyousei/youengosya/h24_kentoukai.

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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

22

Enhancement of BusinessContinuity Plans and BusinessContinuity Management

HFA Core Indicator 4.3:
Economic and productive sectoral policies andplans have been implemented to reduce thevulnerability of economic activities.
Keywords:
business continuity plans, business continuity management,
resiliency
Context:
A business continuity plan (BCP), is defined as “a plan
describing the policy, systems, procedures, etc. by which
enterprises can avoid suspension of their critical businessor resume business quickly if their business is interrupted,
even when unexpected situations arise, including natural
disasters such as major earthquakes, communicable disease
pandemics, terrorist acts, serious accidents, disruptionof supply chains and abrupt changes in the businessenvironment9.” The importance of an organization having
a BCP had been particularly discussed in Japan since theterrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2011. The
main concept of a BCP is shown in Fig. 4.6.

After:The GEJE severely influenced companies located in thedamaged areas, but also affected companies throughout
Japan. The above-mentioned survey by the Cabinet Officein November 2011 revealed the status of 5,409 companies
throughout Japan, and is summarized as follows:(1) The ratio of companies whose important business was
disrupted by the GEJE was 34.5% (43.8% as for largescale company).
(2) Reasons for disruption (multiple answers permitted)
were: electric power supply: 54.8%, traffic systems
and roads: 37.8%, telephone and internet: 29.9%,
employees: 28.0%, machinery, facilities: 26.6%,
suppliers: 25.6%, water: 25.4%
As of November 2011, eight months after the GEJE, 45.8%
of large-scale companies had completed their BCPs (Fig.
4.6); a 19.8 percent-point increase from 2009. The rate
for mid-sized companies was 20.8%; an 8.2 percent-point
increase.

Fig. 4.7 Diffusion of BCPs (Large-scale Companies)9

Fig. 4.6 Concept of a BCP10

Before:The Cabinet Office released the first version of the “BusinessContinuity Guidelines” in 2005. The guidelines strongly
recommended that organizations develop their BCPs, andthe diffusion rate of BCPs has been steadily increasing.
The guidelines were updated in 2009 to include responses
to pandemic influenza and so on. The Cabinet Officecontinuously conducted “Surveys on Companies’ Status
on Business Continuity” in 2007, 2009 and 2011. In 2009,
before the Great East Japan Earthquake (hereinafter GEJE),
27.6% of large-scale companies and 12.6% of mid-sizedcompanies had completed their BCPs (Fig. 4.6).

9

42

10

Cabinet Office “Business Continuity Guidelines 3rd version”, 2014
Source: same as note 9Good practices:
Oil Plant Natori Co. Ltd., a waste oil treatment company
in Miyagi Prefecture, released its BCP in January 2011.
Instead of self-refining, they partly outsourced the process
to a different company in another prefecture, assuming thedamage on refining plants by tsunami. It reopened after aone-week interruption following the disaster by outsourcing.
A similar case was Suzuki Kogyo Co. Ltd. in Miyagi
Prefecture, which operates waste treatment business. By
outsourcing to another company in an adjacent prefecture,they recovered their main business within a week after the
GEJE and started accepting tsunami debris. Their rapid
recovery was very supportive to the damaged area because
they devoted themselves to cleaning up the debris and waste
around the damaged coastal area.
Problems:
First, only a small number of companies in the area affectedby the GEJE had BCPs. Second, not all BCPs functioned
well after the event because the BCPs were not preparedfor severe incidents that require “alternative strategies”,
including a substitute business site. Finally, BCPs did not
efficiently function because they had not accounted forsupply chain continuity (See Topic 23).

23

Disruption of Supply andSupply Chain Management

HFA Core Indicator 4.3:
Economic and productive sectoral policies andplans have been implemented to reduce thevulnerability of economic activities.
Keywords:
disruption of supply, supply chain management, business
continuity management
Context:
In the production process in Japan, external dependency
and outsourcing have grown as part of efforts toward
rationalization and efficiency. Much of the productionof parts and raw materials is outsourced, and the supplyof essential utilities such as electricity, gas, water, andtelecommunications depends on external providers. As
a result of this dependency, even if a company sustained
limited damage, the company would unavoidably haveto halt its own activities almost simultaneously with
their suppliers who suffered serious damage. Moreover,since these suppliers are increasingly dependent on othercompanies’ activities, the supply chain becomes longer andmore complex.
Damage:After the Great East Japan Earthquake (hereinafter
GEJE), disruptions of this long, complex supply chain had
considerable influence on the production capabilities ofmany companies that suffered no direct damage from the
GEJE. About one month after the GEJE, from April 8 to
15, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)
conducted its “Emergency survey on the actual status ofindustries after the GEJE”, which was directed at 80 major
companies (55 in manufacturing and 25 in retail/service).
Of the manufacturing businesses located in the damaged
areas, 64% had already restored their production bases; 26%
estimated that they would be restored by the middle of July;and 3% estimated that restoration would require from six
months to less than one year.

Regarding the reasons for difficulty in obtaining raw
materials and parts/components (multiple answers), 88%of companies in the raw materials-producing industries
cited “damage to the suppliers we procure from” and 42%
cited “damage to the suppliers supplying the companies weprocure from,” while 82% and 91%, respectively, of thecompanies of the processing industries cited these reasons.
These responses indicate that the processing industries werestrongly impacted by events two levels up the supply chain.
METI also conducted a second survey from June 14 to July
1, surveying 123 major enterprises (65 in manufacturing and
58 in retail/service). This represents a period around three
and a half months after the GEJE. According to this survey,
out of 91 production bases of manufacturing companies thatwere directly damaged by the earthquake, tsunami or both,
93% had already been restored by this time. Regarding
production levels, 80% had regained or surpassed preearthquake levels. Of the remaining 20% who replied that
their production levels were still lower than before theearthquake, some 70% said they expected to return to preearthquake production levels before the end of 2011. The
second survey found that, compared to the April survey, theproportion of materials industries responding that there were
no alternate suppliers fell from 12% to zero, while thesefigures fell from 48% to 18% for processing industries11.
The processing industries, which have a longer supply chain
above them, were indeed more strongly affected by indirect
damage from the earthquake, but their recovery progressed
during the intervening three months.
After:
Many enterprises were not struck directly but faced adisruption in the supply of essential parts or components.
Their response fell under three general approaches: (A)assisting in the recovery of their damaged suppliers; (B)acquiring alternate sources of procurement for unobtainable
parts and components; and (C) redrawing specifications
so that the unobtainable parts and components need not
be used. From these, the companies would choose one orseveral options that would solve their problems the quickest.
In June 2011, METI’s Industrial Competitiveness Subcommitteeof the Industrial Structure Council released a report12 that put
forth the following five directions as measures for strengthening
its position:1) Use of multiple production bases for critical parts andmaterials, decentralization of these production bases andalternate production on other production lines.
2) Restructuring and forming joint businesses todecentralize the production bases on a nationwide level.
3) Alternate supply with multiple suppliers.
4) Organize and commonalize specifications and parts;
integrate upstream and downstream industries.
5) Reorganize BCPs to address the entire supply chain,including clients.

Fig. 4.8 Reasons for Difficulty in Obtaining Raw Materials and Parts/
Components (one month after the earthquake)
11
12

Multiple answers were permitted if a company used multiple materials or parts/components.
“Problems and Responses Regarding Japan’s Industrial Competitiveness after the GEJE – Moving beyond a Crisis of Unprecedented Hollowing Out”

43

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

24

Before:The Act on Promotion of Earthquake-proof Retrofit of
Buildings was passed in 1995 after the Kobe Earthquake.
It was amended in 2006 after the 2004 Niigata-ken
Chuetsu Earthquake. The act serves to increase the ratioof earthquake-resistant buildings from 75% in 2005 to
90% by 2015. Fig. 4.10 shows the change in the number ofearthquake-resistant buildings in a 2010 report released by
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism14.
Each local government had supported to strengthenbuildings in the jurisdiction.

Promotion of the Earthquakeproof Retroﬁt of Buildings
after the 1995 Great Kobe
Earthquake

HFA Core Indicator 4.4:
Planning and management of human settlements
incorporate disaster risk reduction elements,
including enforcement of building codes.
Keywords:
1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, building damage,earthquake-proof retroﬁt, seismic reinforcement
Context:
More than 100,000 buildings were severely damaged
and roughly 150,000 were moderately damaged by the
Hyogoken-Nanbu (Kobe) Earthquake on January 17, 1995.
Most human casualties were caused by building collapse,
and the building damage conditions depended on structural
type and construction period (Fig. 4.9) 13. Specifically,buildings constructed after the 1971 and 1981 amendmentsof the 1950 Building Standard Law were less damaged.
Consequently, that event indicated the importance ofstrengthening buildings to reduce future building collapse risk.

After:The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake’s building damage
was not as great as that by the Tsunami or by the 1995
Great Kobe Earthquake because of the relationship between
the structural natural period and seismic characteristics.
However, slightly damaged buildings, including destructionof non-structural elements, were widely distributed.
Having strong misgivings about building damage dueto the estimated destructive earthquake occurring in the
Nankai Trough, the government amended the act again in
2013. The amended act requires the evaluation of seismic
capacity of lrge-scale public facilities and publication ofthat information, among other actions.
Good practices:
Learning from previous disasters, the government passed
and repeatedly amended the act. This cycle is vital for
future disaster management. Setting a quantitative goal forthe proportion of earthquake-resistant buildings in near
future would also be effective.
Problems:
Some residents are not willing to strengthen vulnerable
houses because of (1) uncertainty of the cost, (2) doubt
about the building strength after the retrofit, and (3) the ideathat it is inefficient to spend much money for reinforcing
old buildings.

Fig. 4.9 Damage Ratio of Wood-frame Buildings by the 1995 Kobe
Earthquake Classified by the Construction Period13

Progress on Earthquake-Proof House
2003

2003 → 2008
Rebuilding: 0,9 million houses
Retrofit: 0,3 million houses

about
10,5 million
housesabout
11,5 million
housesabout
7 million
houses

Before1981

2015 (goal)

2008

After
1982
about
28,5 million
housesabout
6,5
millionhouses

Before
1981

about
6,5
millionhousesAfter
1982

Non-earthquake-proof
housesEarthquake-proof
housesEarthquake-proof houses
after 1982

about
5 million
houses

Before
1981
After
1982

about
32,5 million
housesabout
38 million
housesTotal Number of Houses : about 47,0 million
Earthquake-proof: about 35,5 million
Non-earthquake-proof : about 11,5 million

Total Number of Houses : about 49,5 million
Earthquake-proof: about 39,0 million
Non-earthquake-proof : about 10,5 million

Total Number of Houses : about 49,5 million
Earthquake-proof: about 44,5 million
Non-earthquake-proof : about 5,0 million

The ratio of earthquake-resistanthouses: about 75%

The ratio of earthquake-resistanthouses: about 79%

The ratio of earthquake-resistanthouses (goal) : about 90%*Estimated record in 2003

*Estimated record in 2008

*The goal was set in 2005

10

Fig. 4.10 Change in the Number of Earthquake-resistant Buildings (2003-2015)
13

44

14

Yamazaki, F., and Murao, O. (2000). “Vulnerability Functions for Japanese Buildings Based on Damage Data due to the 1995 Kobe Earthquake,” Implications of Recent
Earthquakes on Seismic Risk, Series of Innovation in Structures and Construction, Vol. 2, pp. 91-102, Imperial College Press.
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2010). Retrieved on [date] from http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000188412.pdf.

25

Public Housing for the
Mitigation on the Negative
Impact of Environmental
Transition on the Victims

HFA Core Indicator 4.4:
Planning and management of human settlements
incorporate disaster risk reduction elements,
including enforcement of building codes.
Keywords:
public housing for victims, actual housing needs, quality ofliving condition, community
Context:
Municipalities affected by the 2011 tsunami are responsible
for providing land and public housing for the victims
based on the national reconstruction policy (Fig. 4.11). A
vast number of projects must be implemented in a shortperiod of time with a limited budget; thus, there is little
room to consider quality. Referring to previous disaster
experiences, including the Great Hanshin Earthquake, theenvironmental transition of the victims is a critical phaseof the reconstruction. Victims face an unstable situation
after moving from temporary housing to new settlements;
therefore, they require appropriate support. In the case of
the Great Hanshin Earthquake, numerous solitary deaths
were reported after victims moved to public housing.
The situation after
the earthquake.

Victims

Eldery and low income

Self-reconstruction
It raises the risk of“Isolated Death.”
Damage level/
land possession/
Public housingsaving+insurance
・System：Comunity
・Faciliries：AwarenessLand aquisition by victims
・On original location
・On another location
Habitable area ・Relocation
・Land raising
・Defenses

surveys are sometimes unreliable. For instance, the numberof people who wish to live in public housing was foundto be exaggerated. Thus, both the amount and quality of
public housing should be controlled carefully. In the caseof Shichigahama Town, which had good collaboration withadvisers16, the municipality established a good strategy forthe planning, as follows:
1) Adequate information sharing with the victims in theearly phase to reduce the number of public housing units
that they need to build (Fig. 4.12); 2) establishing good
relationships between the existing community and relocatedvictims; 3) community-oriented planning of the public
housing to encourage communication between residents(Fig. 4.13); 4) a participatory process of planning andorganizing the residents’ association; and 5) conducting arational management process supported by the prefecture.
Problems:
The construction boom in the area affected by the 2011
tsunami is leading to skyrocketing construction costs.
These escalating costs make elaborate designs, for whichconstruction costs are difficult to estimate, a high risk forconstructors.
4.0

1st opinion survey（2011.7）

2.0
1.0

-2.0

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

Damage large

Fig. 4.11 Accommodation situation after the 2011 tsunami15

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Damage small-2.0

Original location

Age high-3.0
Another location(corresponds to) Group relocation(corresponds to) Public housing
4.0

2nd opinion survey（2012.2）

Undecided

Age low

Original location

In the group that people
reconstruct on original
location, the damage onland ahd house is small.

3.0
2.0
1.0

-2.0

-1.5

-1.0

Damage large

Land use of ﬂooded are by local government
Tsunami by The Great East Japan Earthquake

0.0
0.0
-1.0

Public land preperation
・Land reajustment project・Relocation for group housing
Non-habitable area

Age low

3.0

-0.5

0.0
0.0

0.5

1.5

2.0

-3.0

2.5

3.0

Damage small

Public housing-2.0

Original location

1.0

-1.0

Age high

Another location

The people who choose to live inpublic housing is older and the sizeof their family is also small.

Group relocation

Public housing

Fig. 4.12 Change in victims’ demand for accomodation15

Before:
The area affected by the 2011 tsunami had problems
associated with an aging and decreasing population even
before the disaster. On the other hand, these communities
have sufficient social resources to support older people.
After:The damage not only exacerbates these difficulties but alsochanges the community itself. Spending more than 3 years
in temporary housing is sufficient time for a community todeteriorate. On the other hand, victims are able to receive
social support while living in temporary housing; however,this support will be cut off after they move to permanent
housing.
Good practices:
The amount of public housing was estimated based on an
opinion survey of the victims; however, the results of theseFig. 4.13 Diagram of community-oriented housing17

Fig. 4.14 Image of new public housing building18

15

Tsukuda. H, Onoda, Y., The situation of housing reconstruction from the disaster, Conference of UN. Habitat and IRIDeS,March 14th 2014, Sendai, Japan.
Onoda,Y.(Architecture and Urban Planning, Tohoku Univ.), Miyagi, T.(Natural Disaster Science, Tohoku Gakuni Univ.) Miyagi, S.(Landscape, Nara Women’s Univ.)
Onoda, Y., Kanno, M.,(2005), New Alternatives for Public Housing in Japan, EDRA, 36, The Environmental Design Research Association, Vancouver, pp.61-67
18
Atlier Hitoshi Abe (2014).
16
17

45

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

26

Post-tsunami Recovery for Risk
Reduction after the 2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

HFA Core Indicator 4.5:
Disaster risk reduction measures are integrated
with post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation
processes.
Keywords:
urban recovery strategy, land use regulation, relocation,
concentration, avoiding, slowing, steering, blocking,compacted terraces and berms, reinforcement
Context:
Post-disaster recovery is a significant process for rebuilding
a society with new, improved disaster reduction systems forthe future. The Tohoku Region coastal areas had previously
experienced several huge tsunamis and took measures tomitigate tsunamis’ damage through the twentieth century.
However the March 11, 2011, Tsunami struck them again
and washed away the residential areas. Every district
examined and designed its recovery plan according to its
circumstances, and they are exploring strategies to build
their new towns in the context of certain problems.
Before:As described in Topic 19, the government developed inland
resettlements for the 1933 Sanriku Tsunami victims, buthouses again increased in the lower elevations by the ocean,
only to be washed away. The death toll including missing
people was 21,000 as of March 26, 2013.
After:The number of damaged municipalities by the Tsunami was 62,
and 43 municipalities had released their post-tsunami recovery

plans for future tsunami damage mitigation as of May 2012.
According to a survey for 208 damaged districts conductedby the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, andTourism19, the post-tsunami recovery plans can be classified
into five types and comprise four mitigation systems: (1)relocation as a land use mitigation system; (2) levee toblock tsunamis; (3) compacted terraces and berms to avoid,slow, or steer tsunamis; and (4) tsunami mitigation designfor facilities. The five classifications are as follows (Fig
4.15):
A. Relocation (127)
B. Concentration (6)C. Compacted terraces and berms (19)
D. Relocation and compacted terraces and berms (18)
E. Reconstruction on the original site with facility
reinforcement (38)Good practices:
Every damaged district in Japan devised its recovery
plan that reduces future tsunami risk based on previous
experience. Public involvement has been recognized as anespecially significant factor in devising recovery plans sincethe 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake.
Problems:
Now that the damaged municipalities have announced theirrecovery plans, each local government must implement
it. However, they encounter several challenges in
implementing actual projects, depending upon the regionalsituation, such as the following examples:• Disagreements between governments and residents
about the destruction of a beautiful piece of scenery by
levee construction, or levees’ adequate assurance of safety• Shortage of available land for relocation• Shortage of construction materials and workers for the
extraordinarily large damaged area
• Construction costs

Fig. 4.15 Regional Urban Recovery Types Proposed after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 3

46

19Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2012). Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000209868.pdf (revised for this material by the author).

27

Destruction of Coastal Leveesby the 2011 Tsunami and their
Reconstruction

HFA Core Indicator 4.6:
Procedures are in place to assess the disaster risk
impacts of major development projects,
especially infrastructure.
Keywords:
Level 1 and 2 tsunamis, return period, design tsunami,
disaster mitigation, robust structures
Context:
The 2011 tsunami overtopped almost all the coastal
defense facilities in Iwate and Miyagi prefectures, such as
breakwaters, inlet gates and coastal levees, destroyed assets
as well as facilities and resulted in an enormous loss of life.
In June 2011, the Central Disaster Management Council(CDMC) established the following tsunami countermeasurepolicies: 1) to classify the tsunamis into two levels, namely
Level 1 tsunamis that occur at a high frequency and havethe potential to cause extensive damage, and Level 2
tsunamis that occur at a very low frequency but with amaximum magnitude, and that have the potential to cause
catastrophic damage; 2) to protect human lives and assets
from Level 1 tsunamis using defense facilities; and 3) toprotect human lives from Level 2 tsunamis with the highest
priority through effective evacuation and to adopt integrated
mitigations using all possible methods. This is an importantparadigm shift from disaster prevention to mitigation basedon the lessons learned from the 2011 tsunami.
Following the policies of the CDMC, in July 2011,
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, andTourism (MLIT) established the following guidelines forreconstruction of the coastal levees: 1) the return period of a
Level 1 tsunami is to be in the range of several tens of years
to one hundred and several tens of years. This corresponds
to the guidelines of another prevailing flood disaster. The
return period is 10 to 50 years depending on the importanceof the hinterland of the rivers, and 200 years for the Tone
River, which has potential to inundate Tokyo. A tsunami
with a specified return period is defined as the design
tsunami. The height of the design tsunami is to be adjustedwith the management and available utilities of rivers,
harbors and fishing ports. It should be noted that the there
is a rather wide range of selectivity for the return period
in the guideline. 2) The height of the coastal levee is to be
determined from the higher elevation of the design tsunami
and design storm surge. 3) The reconstructed levees are to
be robust even for the overtopping of Level 2 tsunamis,
because more frequent disasters including Level 1 tsunamis
and storm surges have to be blocked by the surviving levees,
and because mitigation by the surviving levees for the next
Level 2 tsunami attack is expected. This expectation meansthat the reconstructed levees are required to maintain theirrobustness during the return period for Level 2 tsunamis,
which is estimated to be 1000 years in the Sendai Bay area.
This is discussed later in Problems.
Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures immediately
received the guidelines and started the procedure to

determine the levee height. The prefectures determined thereturn period of the design tsunami to be approximately
150 years uniformly for all of the coasts, and included the1896 Great Sanriku tsunami, which killed at least 20,000
people worst in this area. The determined return period
is at the high end of the range in the guideline. Miyagi
Prefecture divided the 258 km coast into 22 units andselected the design tsunami for each unit. The 1896 tsunami
is selected for most units, while the 1960 Chilean tsunami
is selected for the leeside of the Ojika peninsula and for the
Matsushima bay. The Ishinomaki coast and the Southern
Sendai bay coast also selected the 1896 tsunami which is,
however, lower than the design storm surges because thesetwo coasts are in the shaded area by the peninsula for the1896 tsunami. The design storm surges determined he leveeheight of 7.2 m above the mean sea level. Miyagi Prefecture
determined a levee height of all the units in September
2011, started to discuss with the related municipalities, andreached an agreement for all but a few units.
Following the prefectural plan on coastal leveereconstruction, municipalities in the Sendai bay area
developed an urban plan that specifies a disaster danger
zone behind the levee in which people are prohibitedfrom residing and are moved to inland areas according
to the large-scale movement plan for disaster prevention.
Residential areas are specified as locations where theinundation depth for Level 2 tsunamis is less than 2 m. To
expand the area, the inland road will be raised because thehighway located about 4 km from the coast stopped further
inundation of the 2011 tsunami. Municipalities along theSanriku coast mostly selected higher areas instead of inland
areas to move because plains at the bay head area are
narrow and are the major route of the tsunami run-up. Theseurban plans follow up the CDMC policies on the mitigation
for the Level 2 tsunamis.
Before:
The coasts heavily damaged by the 2011 tsunami areclassified into three coasts: the Sanriku coast, the Sendai
bay coast, and the Joban coast. The Sanriku coast is
characterized by the train of submerged valleys that
amplifies the tsunami height due to the effect of energy
concentration and resonance. Furthermore, large tsunamis
have repeatedly occurred off the Sanriku coast, including
the 1896 and 1933 tsunamis. The Sendai bay coast isbounded by the Ojika peninsula from the Sanriku coast andcharacterized by fluvial plains, big rivers, sandy coasts andshallow water. Large cities, such as Sendai, Ishinomaki,
Shiogama, etc. are located on the plains. Especially,
Ishinomaki was developed as a harbor city along theKitakami River, which concentrates the population near thewaterfront of the river and sea with relatively low levees toavoid disrupting harbor activity. Ishinomaki is vulnerable
to large tsunami attacks. The height of the 1896 and 1933
tsunamis along the Sendai bay coast was much lower thanthat along the Sanriku coast because the tsunami sourceareas off the Sanriku coast and the peninsula functioned
as a natural breakwater. Therefore, people living along the
Sendai bay coast were not accustomed to large tsunami
attacks. Major hazards in this area over the last 150 years
are therefore not tsunamis but storm surges. However, if welook well into the past, the Sendai bay plains experienced
deep inland inundation due to the 869 and 1611 tsunamis.
47

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

After:The 2011 tsunami source has not only large verticaldisplacement but also large horizontal extension from off
the Sanriku coast to off the Chiba coast, and it produced agigantic tsunami. The maximum tsunami trace height reaches
up to 40 m above the mean sea level along the Sanriku coastand 15 m along the Sendai bay coast. The tsunami overtopped
almost all coastal defense facilities, took numerous lives
and destroyed assets as well as facilities. Destruction of thecoastal levees proceeded in two steps: 1) the impact from thefirst wave broke weak structures, such as parapets, joints, thinslabs of concrete, moved strong rigid-frame structures, and/or eroded backside mounts via overtopped jets; 2) the return
flow of a huge amount of inundated water concentrated at
the break points from the first step, rivers, and ditches andresulted in large-scale scouring. Fig.4.16 and Fig.4.17 show
aerial photographs of the Yamamoto coast before and after
the tsunami. T-shaped jetties and steep slope levees with aparapet were installed along the coast because it had been
suffering from serious coastal erosion. The first wave ofthe tsunami initially broke the parapets and thin slab. The
return flow then concentrated at the break points and caused
massive erosion behind breach points, an area referred to as
the tsunami bay. The return flow also caused long erosion
behind levees, which is referred to as a tsunami channel. To
avoid this kind of large-scale scouring, appropriate control of
the return flow is necessary.
Good practices:
1) The paradigm shift from disaster prevention to
mitigation is necessary for catastrophic disasters. Not
everything can be secured against huge hazards by
the facilities. Prioritizing the security for human lives
enables effective mitigation.
2) Robustness of the defense facilities for Level 2 tsunamis
is necessary for important structures but not forevery structure. For example, the Kamaishi tsunami
breakwater was constructed at the bay mouth witha maximum depth of 63 m. The breakwater cost 12
billion USD and should last 30 years. It was designed
based on Level 1 tsunamis, such as the 1896 tsunami,
and was completed in 2009. Although the 2011 tsunami
overtopped the break water and blew off some caissons
at the shallow water and opening, the other was almost
safe. The Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI)
evaluated the mitigation by the breakwater and foundthat the inundation height was decreased by 30% andtransmission of the tsunami was delayed 6 min. The
breakwater was robust. The repair costs are estimatedto be 49 billion USD.
Problems:
1) Setting of the return period of Level 1 tsunamis
uniformly at the high end of the range, 150 years, which
is close to that for Tokyo’s defenses, may be excessive,
especially for ageing communities. Other effective
mitigations should also be considered.
2) Most of the funding for the reconstruction of the defense
facilities and urban areas comes from the national treasury
without considering the costs and benefits. It was an urgent
political decision and necessary to start the recovery
process as soon as possible. However, at this stage,effective use of the budget should be used effectively isnecessary to avoid making unnecessary defenses.
48

Fig. 4.16 The Yamamoto coast before the tsunami, photographed by MLIT
in March 2010

Fig. 4.17 The Yamamoto coast after the tsunami, photographed by Kyodo
News, on March 19, 2011

28

Making Manual (2004)” and “Guideline for Management of
Tsunami Evacuation Buildings (2005).”

Comprehensive Post-tsunami
Recovery after the 2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

HFA Core Indicator 4.6:
Procedures are in place to assess the disaster risk
impacts of major development projects,
especially infrastructure.
Keywords:
post-tsunami recovery projects, tsunami simulation
Context:
To support local governments to arrange proper regional
plans for tsunami disaster reduction, the Japanese
government published the “Tsunami Disaster Estimation
Manual” and “Guideline to Strengthen Tsunami Disaster
Management in Local Disaster Prevention Plans” in 1997,
followed by the “Tsunami and Tidal Wave Hazard Map

Fig. 4.19 Seawall Under Construction in Natori City

Before:Considering these guidelines, local governments in thedamaged areas had developed their disaster management
systems according to regional conditions. However, the2011 Earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku was greaterthan expected, and some management systems failed towork well.
After:
Each municipality performed two types of tsunami
simulations, depending on the occurrence risk to devise
recovery plans for resettlement. The Japanese government20
prepared several projects (Fig. 4.18) to support their plandevelopment and implementation. Figure 4.19 and 4.20
show the examples.
Good practices:
Problems:
HFA Core Indicator 4.6 good practices and problems arethose previously described for Topic 19.

Fig. 4.20 Town Development in Taro Town

Fig. 4.18 Urban Recovery Projects at a Glance after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami20
20

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2013). Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/report/fukkou-index.html.

49

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

HFA Priority for Action 5: Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

29

Measures and Agenda for Largescale Disasters in Japan: from the
Perspective of Personal Information
and Disaster Prevention Education

HFA Core Indicator 5.1:
Strong policy, technical and institutional
capacities and mechanisms for disaster risk
management, with a disaster risk reduction
perspective, are in place.
Keywords:
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, Personal Information
Protection Law, local knowledge
Context:
Because of the several disasters such as typhoons,
earthquakes, tsunamis, and heavy snowfall in Japan, thecountry has suffered a great loss of people’s lives andassets and a massive economic loss. On the basis of theseexperiences and lessons learned, disaster-related acts,
policies, and legal frameworks have been developed andenacted to prepare for and respond to disasters.
Before:The 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was enacted
on the basis of the experiences of the 1959 Typhoon
Isewan. Before that, the national and local government
roles and responsibilities had not been stated clearly.
The Act regulated the roles and authorities of each levelof government for disaster risk reduction, response, andrecovery to secure the victims’ welfare and social orderby protecting citizens’ lives and assets from disasters.
Municipalities have the responsibility of establishinga disaster response office; however, to respond to a
massive disaster (causing damages beyond the capacity ofprefectures and municipalities), the national government isrequired to establish a disaster response office to provide
the necessary assistance.
After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, major revisions to
the Act included 1) easing the conditions of establishingthe disaster response office and strengthening the disaster
response office’s authority; 2) mayors’ issuing a request forthe deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF)
to the governor and reporting the disaster situation to the
Director-General of the Defense Agency; 3) traffic control;and 4) training of the local voluntary organizations fordisaster risk reduction, including measures for the elderly
and persons with disabilities.
After:The experiences from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami revealed that the existing act was insufficient
for response to such an unexpected disaster. The April
2005 Personal Information Protection Law hampered theconfirmation of people’s safety, making it difficult to obtain
the information and pre-determine whether people would
require extra support lives. The leaders of communitybased organizations and the chairpersons of neighborhood
50

associations addressed such issues. As a result of suchproblems, the number of casualties of the elderly and persons
with disabilities reached was double that of ordinary persons.
Another issue was the citizens’ lack of awareness oftsunamis. The areas affected by the 2011 Tsunami included
regions with no previous tsunami experience, and a numberof citizens there had no proper knowledge and believed thata tsunami poses no danger. They held such beliefs fromtheir knowledge of the 1961 Chile Earthquake and wereconvinced that their residential areas were safe as they had
no such earlier incidents.
On the basis of the lessons learned from the 2011 Tsunami,
the Act was again revised, and local governments gained theauthority to develop a list of affected people, specificallythrough information gathered by municipalities, and theinformation on the elderly and persons with disabilities, inparticular, can now be submitted to relevant offices, with
the individuals’ consent. In addition, the dissemination of
the lessons learned and disaster education will strengthen
the capacity for local disaster risk reduction.
Good practices:
Quick response is required after a disaster, whereas enactmentof a law is, by its nature, a post-process. Therefore, now is thetime to revise the fundamental act for disaster measures on
the basis of the experiences of the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake
and Tsunami and the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake.
In an attempt to determine the essential knowledge, forexample, the education committee of Shizuoka Prefecture
has established the Fundamental Education Policy ofDisaster Presentation of Shizuoka Prefecture (2012 revision)
to prepare for a Tokai Earthquake. The policy addresses
several guidelines with two main purposes of education
for disaster prevention. Beginning in preschool, the first
purpose is to develop knowledge and understanding,interest, motivation and attitudes, thinking and judgment,
and skills (social contribution, etc.). At each stage ofmaturation, the second purpose comprises developing theabilities of self-preservation (kindergarten to lower gradesof elementary school), actively applying knowledge (midhigh grade of elementary school), contributing to local
society’s safety, understanding and responding to thesituation (middle school), and rebuilding a safe society(college/university student, working people).
Problems:
Preventing municipal access to private information is thelargest barrier constraining local networks. When the chairmanof the municipality, who is a local community leader, is notconcurrently a member of the public welfare committee, it isdifficult to understand the issues of a community’s vulnerable
people such as senior citizens.
Furthermore, a dilemma exists in that the idea of being ina “safe place,” handed down from olden times, continues
in the community with no validity. This phenomenon isunderstandable for the short-term to mid-term stage of recent
history; people might have difficulty understanding the realityof a once-in-a-thousand-years event. This mindset has become
clear from the precedent that migrants to higher places havereturned to the coast repeatedly in the Sannriku region.

30

National Preparednessof Disaster Medicine as
Tertiary Risk Reduction

HFA Core Indicator 5.1:
Strong policy, technical and institutional
capacities and mechanisms for disaster risk
management, with a disaster risk reduction
perspective, are in place.

Keywords:
disaster medicine, disaster base hospitals, commandcontrol, disaster medical-public health coordinator
Context:
The medical response after the Great Hanshin Awaji
Earthquake was not sufficient to deal with the masscasualties and vast areas of damage that disrupted hospitalfunctions. Preventable deaths were postulated since rapid
search and rescue, on-site confined space medicine andwide-area transportation was not systematically available.
Thus, the Japanese government established the medical
response system including Disaster Base Hospital (DBH),
Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), Staging Care
Unit (SCU) and wide-area transportation, Emergency
Medical Information System (EMIS) and disaster medicalpublic health coordinator.
Before:There were 609 DBHs under the management of the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in Japan before
the GEJE. Most of the tertiary hospitals were assigned as
DBHs that provide intensive care for patients with multiple
injuries, crush syndrome and severe burns following adisaster. DBHs respond to incoming and outgoing widearea patient transportation and provide DMATs. DBHs
also provide medical resources to affected hospitals. The
National Disaster Medical Center is assigned as the General
Headquarters of the Japan DMATs. Fifty-five central DBHs
and more than 200 DBHs were ready to dispatch a DMAT.
A DMAT is specifically trained to deal with confined
space medicine and wide-area transportation as well as toeffectively assist the local headquarters. EMIS provides thephysical and functional capacity information of hospitals
nationwide. In 1996, Hyogo Prefecture assigned the medical
coordinator that coordinates the various medical needs andresources, but only three prefectures followed suit.
After:The system is strengthened by increasing the number of
DBHs and DMATs. The building code of DBHs was revised
to further strengthen seismic control and emergency lifelines.
Hospital BCPs are also improving. Prioritization of EMIS
to all hospitals and its daily use is now promoted. Specifictraining courses have rapidly increased the number of disastermedical-public health coordinators nationwide (Fig. 5.1).

Fig. 5.1 Increase in the number of medical-public healthGood practices:
No DBH was destroyed by the 2011 tsunami. DBHs within
the affected area responded to the surge in medical needs
and acted as the hub of medical-public health aids. Distant
DBHs accepted patients from the affected area to decrease
the medical loads of the affected area. DBHs provided
DMATs rapidly to the affected area under control of thegeneral headquarters. From March 11 to 22, 383 DMATs,
a total of 1,800 members, were dispatched to provide
medical assistance. SCU and wide-area transportation were
performed for the first time since their establishment andsaved more than 90 patients who needed hemodialysis. SCU
worked as a pool of doctors to help nearby hospitals. EMIS
handled the basic hospital information to assist medical
coordination at the DMAT general headquarters.
Problems:● Several hospitals built on the coast were destroyed andmany patients and staff members were lost along with
their function as a safety net.
● Hospitals had to accept the evacuees as a shelter despite
their damage and the surge in medical needs.
● Lifelines of the hospitals were damaged, which impaired
their function.
● Hospital workers also lost family members and property
because of the disaster, but had to deal with the surge inmedical needs.
● Impairment of communication tools made coordinating
activities difficult.
● DBHs within the affected area were paralyzed by theexcess requests from local hospitals and outside medical
assistant teams that lacked trained coordinators.
● Health care at evacuation centers was not well preparedbecause the recovery of local health care providers wasdelayed.
● DBHs that were supposed to deal with the nuclear
disaster were not fully functional.
● SCU at the airport was not well equipped with supporting
devices and vehicles.
● EMIS coverage was limited and failed to dispatch
adequate medical relief.
● There were not enough trained medical coordinators at
the time of the disaster.
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31

Enhancement of Plans forOperational Continuity ofGovernment

HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency
plans are in place at all administrative levels, andregular training drills and rehearsals are held totest and develop disaster response programmes.

municipalities had to relocate their main building andother 15 municipalities had to relocate a portion of
it. Additionally, the main building of the Fukushima
prefectural government was not usable for a while becauseof its poor antiseismic properties.
Table. 5.1 Damage from the GEJE to main buildings of local governments

Keywords:
business continuity plans of governments, operational
continuity
Context:
To avoid suspension of critical operation, plans forcontinuity of important operation or business continuity
plans (BCPs) in the public sector are necessary for publicorganizations as well as private enterprises, even for
unexpected situations, including natural disasters suchas major earthquakes, communicable disease pandemics,
terrorist acts or serious accidents. (For private company
BCPs, see Topic 22 of Indicator 4.3)
“The Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act” prescribes that
ministries (including local branches) and local governments
should keep disaster management plans in accordancewith “the Disaster Management Basic Plan” issued by theCentral Disaster Management Council (supported by the
Cabinet Office). However, if these organizations suffer
serious damage to their critical resources for important
operations, such as personnel, government buildings, ICT
systems, electric power supply, telecommunications, waterand so on, they need governmental organization BCPs.
Before:The Cabinet Office released the first version of the “BusinessContinuity Guidelines” in 2005 1. The guidelines were
designed as applicable to both public organizations andcompanies. Then, in June 2007, “Business Continuity
Guidelines for Ministries” was published, considering
the probability of a Tokyo Inland Earthquake. Based on
the guidelines, all ministries and agencies of the central
government were requested to formulate their BCPs, andhad finished them before the Great East Japan Earthquake(hereinafter GEJE) occurred.
For local governments, “Manual and Guidance on
Business Continuity of Local Governments at the Time ofEarthquake” was published in April 2010 by the Cabinet
Office. However, formulating a BCP does not prevail
easily, and less than half of prefectural governments
had formulated their BCPs at the time of the GEJE. As
for municipalities, only a limited number of the city
governments had BCPs at that time.

Damage to critical resources for important operation of local
governments was not limited to the facilities. The mayor of
Otsuchi Town in Iwate Prefecture was killed by the tsunami,
and many other high-ranking officials were killed in manymunicipalities within the damaged area. The serious damage
to facilities and loss of personnel delayed the rescue action,
refugee support and recovery of the facilities and towns.
The need for plans of operational continuity (i.e. BCPs) of
local governments has been clearly realized, considering thehigh probability that Japan will be struck by major natural
disasters in the future.
After:The Cabinet Office conducted a review of all BCPs ofministries in 2012 that were prepared for a possible Tokyo
Inland Earthquake, and serious weak points were found by
BCP specialists in charge of the review. “BCP of the Central
Government” was issued by the Central Disaster Management
Council in March 2014. This plan was formulated to respondto the demand by the new acts for special countermeasures
for a Tokyo Inland Earthquake (November 2013) and for
National Resilience (December 2013).
The number of prefectures formulating BCPs increased
after the GEJE. Approximately 60% of prefectures haveformulated BCPs2 for earthquakes and other major disasters
and incidents. The Cabinet Office plans to revise both thebusiness continuity guideline for ministries and the manual/
guidance for local government BCPs in fiscal year 2014.

Damage:The GEJE damaged the main buildings of many local
governments. Table 5.1 shows the damage. A total of
273 municipalities suffered damage. Among them, 13
1
2

52

The newest version is “Business Continuity Guidelines, third version”, published in August 2013, available at http://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/kigyou/pdf/guideline03.pdf
Source: News of Jiji.com, Feb.28, 2014, http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201402/2014022800541

32

Table 5.3 reports disaster-related activity evaluations before
and after the earthquake. The next section explains thedetails of this evaluation.

Three Coastal Districts in Iwaki
City, Fukushima Prefecture:
Differences Resulting from the
Local Residents Organization
Disaster Response Activities

Table 5.3 Activity Evaluation before and after the Earthquake
BeforeHFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency
plans are in place at all administrative levels, andregular training drills and rehearsals are held totest and develop disaster response programmes.
Keywords:
neighborhood association, regional activities, disasterprevention
Context:
Overview of three coastal districts in Iwaki City:
Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture, is located approximately
50 km south of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
There are about 33 million people in less than 500 districts.
Coastal areas in this city were also damaged by the tsunami
caused by the 2011 Earthquake, resulting in the deaths offewer than 300 people. The population of the coastal areas
discussed here is roughly 5,000: over 2,000 in districts A
and C, and less than 1,000 in B. Fig. 5.2 and Table 5.2,
respectively, present each district’s location and population.

FutabaNamie

Fukushima No.1
nuclear power plant

20km

Fukushima

10km

KawauchiOkuma

Tomioka

Fukushima No.2
nuclear power plant

NarahaHironoIwaki

Numanouchi
UsuisoToyomaFig. 5.2 Map of Iwaki City Area
Table 5.2 Overview of each district
poplation

households

damage䞉death 310, missing 37
133,270 䞉completely destroyed 7,640
housesIwaki City

343,008

A

2,200

660

䞉death 85
䞉completely destroyed 䠐䠎䠌

B

760

260

䞉death 130
䞉completely destroyed 䠎䠏䠌

C

1,600

District

700 䞉completely destroyed 47

District

Activities

Preparationof disaster

After
call formanagement
evacuationor search

FutureA
B
C

Before:(1) Pre-disaster activities of each district
A: ○ There was an activity at each districtlevel (Gyosei-ku), block associations (Chonai-kai),and neighborhood associations (Tonari-gumi). This
district has many festivals and activities organized byeach block association.
B: △ Activities in the latter were mainly inthe district and neighborhood associations. The only
event was the Children’s Day Festival, which is held
once a year in May.
C：○ The district is divided into small towns (Buraku),
composed of neighborhood associations and a
district with many festivals.
(2) Preparation for disaster in each district
The “Iwaki Regional Disaster Prevention Plan” (Iwaki
Conference on Disaster Reduction, revised 2010) had
been enacted before the earthquake. However, efforts toensure its effectiveness were left to the districts because
this is only a “guideline.” Disaster preparedness in each
district is as follows.
A：○ Although planning occurred in the district, blockassociations had insufficient time to effectively
support it.
B: △ This district was the only well-known refuge
for residents.
C: ◎ District officers have created primarily ahazard map that was well known to residents.
After:(1)Communication of each area of the disaster
immediately afterward: call for tsunami evacuation
A: ○ The mayor personally performed the call for
evacuation. Residents escaped to the shelter while
helping each other.
B: △ There was no particular communication plan as a
district; it had only a refuge by neighborhood
association unit.
C: ○ The mayor personally performed the call for
evacuation and opened the shelter (community
center). Then the officers gathered without a specificcall to them because there was a tacit understandingthat everyone should “Go to the community center,
if there is a disaster.”(2)Communication of each area of the disaster
afterward: shelter management or missing person search.
A: ○ Under the mayor’s direction, district officers kept
in touch with other districts and the system engineer
53

HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake(SE) volunteered to help make a missing persons list.
B: △ It was difficult for the district to support
communications immediately.
C: ◎ After performing their roles (foods,
communication, health, collecting information, etc.),
officers of districts took action to manage sheltersand seek missing persons.
(3) Future response plans: activities for disaster prevention
and mitigation, from the efforts of the emergency drillon August 31, 2013.
Iwaki City has presented for each district the “2013Comprehensive Disaster Training in Iwaki City.” Thedocument provides an outline that includes an overview
of training, time schedule, and publicity materials ineach district. The districts had to revise it according to
the actual situation for shelters and response methods.
A: ○ The emergency drill was supported at theblock association level. The mayor conducted it,with three district conductors and the heads of theneighborhood associations. Under each conductor,
the association head called for evacuation andguided residents to shelter. After the head confirmed
the number of people displaced in the primaryevacuation site, he reported it to each conductor.
B: △ The district asked two neighborhood associations
to collaborate via a circular notice. The others
were difficult to implement for the disaster drill.
C: ○ The district conducted the drill at theneighborhood association level. Thirty association
heads had residents evacuate to the primary placeof refuge, and reported the number of evacuatedpeople to the district officers. After moving evacuees
to the secondary shelter according to the officers’
instructions, officers reported the results to the mayor.
Good practices:
Daily regional activities enhance disaster prevention
awareness and lead to involvement in creating the hazard
map, which enables better post-disaster support byorganizations. Furthermore, autonomous organizations
formed by local residents (A, C) can utilize various
functions to prevent disasters.
Problems:
Even if there is partial solidarity, such as a blood–territorial
relationship, if the community is not active and the selfgovernment organization function is weak, the community’s
disaster response capabilities before and after the earthquake
are also weak (B).

33

Pre-Disaster Activities to Preserve
Historical Materials and the Great
East Japan Earthquake

HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency
plans are in place at all administrative levels, andregular training drills and rehearsals are held totest and develop disaster response programmes.
Keywords:
preservation of local historical materials, pre-disaster
networking, 2003 Miyagi Earthquake, 2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake, cooperative activities to preserve andpass on historical and cultural heritage
Context:
Historical documents, old tools and implements, and antique
art objects are to be found in an overwhelming quantity andvariety in local society throughout Japan. These documents areunparalleled throughout the world for their quality and quantity
as a record of human activities in the early modern era.
The majority of these historical materials are held as theprivate property of either old families or local communities.
With the increasing social fluidity of living patterns,
local historical materials are being lost to posterity,3 andlarge-scale natural disasters further accelerate this loss of
irreplaceable historical materials. In this mass disposal of
wreckage and debris after disasters, historical materials
abandoned inside condemned buildings are disposed aswell. With the destruction of these materials, the history of
the region that they contain is also forever lost to posterity.
After Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995, people havebecome conscious of the need to preserve endangered
historical materials, and many salvage operations have been
conducted to preserve historical materials.
Miyagi Prefecture was hit by an epicentral earthquake on
26th July 2003. This led to the formation of the ‘Miyagi
Rekishi Shiryō Hozon Net’ (Miyagi Shiryō Net ‘MSN’) to
provide an organizational structure to coordinate preparation
work for saving historical materials in future disasters.

Fig. 5.3 Old official documents of Ōkago Village, (early 19th century),found in a private warehouse (Ichinoseki City, Iwate Prefefcture,
Aug.8,2009)
54

3

OKUMURA Hiroshi Dai-shinsai to Rekishi Shiryō Hozon (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2011)

Before:When MSN was founded in 2003, we knew that anotherlarge earthquake was certain to occur in the near future.4
In preparation for this impending disaster, the MSN began
to locate and digitally record materials in private hands
throughout Miyagi Prefecture, in what we call ‘historicalpreservation activities.’5 Prior to March 2011, MSN had
succeeded in conducting 415 such preservation operations.
After:
Many original historical materials were lost in the tsunami
and earthquake of March 2011. However, there were several
cases where MSN had recorded the lost originals withdigital cameras beforehand. Moreover, the activities of MSN
before the disaster had provided MSN with an interpersonal
network linking together collection owners, interested
local citizens, and local government officials. This existing
network enabled MSN to quickly and efficiently react. As of
December 2013, MSN has conducted salvage operations for
78 collections of endangered historical materials.

Fig. 5.5 Emergency first aid treatment for damaged materials (Sendai City,
Miyagi Prefecture. July 11, 2013)

Problems:
Three years have passed since the events of 2011, butthere is still no end in sight in the process of salvaging andpreserving endangered and damaged historical materials.
However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtainfunding and manpower for continuing operations.
Another problem we face is how to find a suitable keeping
place for materials we have salvaged and preserved. Thereis a dearth of public storage facilities, and there are cases
where we cannot return collections to their original owners.

Fig. 5.4 Salvage Operations of Honma Family Historical Materials(Ishinomaki city, Miyagi Prefecture, Apr.6,2011)

Good Practices:
In order to protect local historical materials from disasters, it
is important to start preservation activities prior to the actual
event.
It is essential to locating and digitally record materials. This
process also creates interpersonal networks which function assources of information on endangered materials when regularcommunications are sundered. Involving ordinary citizens
in these activities provides a source of skilled and informed
manpower to supplement the limited resources of specialists.

4
5

Miyagi Ken Oki Jishin no Chōki Hyōka’ 27th Nov. 2000 http://www.jishin.go.jp/main/chousa/00nov4_2/miyagi.htm
HIRAKA Arata (2005) ‘Shinsai”Go” no Shiryō Hozen kara Saigai “Mae” no Bōsai Taisaku he’ “Rekishi Hyōron” 666

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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

34

DMAT as the First andLong-lasting Responder

HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency
plans are in place at all administrative levels, andregular training drills and rehearsals are held totest and develop disaster response programmes.
Keywords:
DMAT, disaster base hospitals, training drills, coordinatorprogramContext:
September 1, the day in 1923 when the Great Kanto
Earthquake devastated the Tokyo metropolitan area andkilled 105,000 people, is designated as Disaster Drill
Day. Based on experiences from the Great Hanshin
Awaji Earthquake, a system of medical responder teams,
called Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), wasestablished in 2005 throughout the nation to provide rapid
on-site confined space medicine, “Load-and-Go” and widearea transportation. The founding elements to support theactivities of DMATs, i.e. Disaster Base Hospital (DBH),
Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), Staging Care
Unit (SCU) and wide-area transportation, Emergency
Medical Information System (EMIS) and disaster medicalpublic health coordinator were established as described inCore Indicator 5.1.
Before:Under the management of the Ministry of Health, Labourand Welfare, there are more than 1,000 DMATs, with a
total of 6,000 members throughout Japan. The National
Disaster Medical Center is assigned as the Headquarters(HQ) of the Japan DMATs. There are six fundamental
HQ functions that make the DMAT activities possible: a)Planning and direction, b) Recording, c) Coordination, d)Intelligence and analysis, e) Tactics and command control,
and f) Management of resources. A DMAT comprises
one or two medical doctor(s), one or two nurse(s), one
pharmacist and one logistician (4–5 people in total), andcan access the affected site within 48 h with self-standing
equipment, drugs, food and a vehicle. The concept of
DMAT activities are defined as Command & Control,
Safety, Communication, Assessment, Triage, Treatment
and Transport (CSCATTT). It was strongly recognized that
profound knowledge about disasters and preparedness isnecessary to be a DMAT. There are also traditional medical
relief teams (MRTs) of the Japan Medical Association,
Public Hospitals, Japan Red Cross and others. These teams
are designated to give medical care to the people in shelters,
public health aid until the recovery of local health careproviders.
Table 5.4 Difference between Japanese DMATs and other MRTs

1. Preordered and legislative preparedness and agreementwith prefectures.
2. Only educated and trained individuals are registered sothat the common languages make the coordinated action
possible.
56

3. Collective and collaborative action is possible by thecoordination of HQ
4. Abilities to coordinate with related organizations
especially with police and fire department
5. Self-control of their own safety.
The DMAT Standard Textbook was first published inFeb. 2011 as a product of its 10-year training program.
DMAT members are hospital workers with daily duties,
but they will be dispatched and must take continuing
education courses. DMAT leaders are certified after
taking an advanced course and can assist the local HQ as
coordinators. Every September 1, DMAT HQ organizes asimulation drill.
After:DMATs are increasing to 1,300 as of April 2014. DMAT
guidelines were modified to deal with the emerging
problems associated with large-scale disasters. The conceptof a prepared response is propagated to other MRTs
including pediatric, psychiatric, primary care and otherdisaster-related medical-public health responders. The
number of prefectures assigning medical-public healthcoordinators is increasing.
Good practices:A total of 383 DMATs, 1,800 members, were rapidly
dispatched to the affected area from March 11 to 18. DMATs
provided medical aids, assisted the local HQ with medicalpublic health coordinators, in addition to management of
SCU and wide-area transportation of severely ill patients.
DMATs utilized EMIS and the Medical Air Transport
Tracking System (MATTS) as much as possible for efficient
coordination. SCU became the source of substitute medical
workers to reduce the load in the affected hospitals. DMATs
conducted hospital evacuation of 507 patients from therestricted area near the nuclear power plant without any
mortality.
Problems:● Responses were required for not only injuries and acuteconditions, but also chronic illnesses and public healthconsequences.
● The time gaps until the arrival of other MRTs or
recovery of local health care providers were unexpectedly
long, although the medical needs of those affected wereincreasing.
● Some DMATs did not have the necessary tools
to overcome the damage and congestion of thetelecommunication systems.
● EMIS was not fully utilized by multiple sectors including
the government, fire departments and Self Defense Forces.
● The number of DMAT leaders, medical-public healthcoordinators and supporting staff was insufficient tomaintain effective HQ function.
● Logistics to support DMATs were insufficient especiallyfor food, drugs, medical resources and fuel.
● The lack of prepared facilities for SCU and wide-areatransportation, and the lack of wide-area transportationplans delayed the first flight.
● The lack of general understanding of the function of
DMATs by the health professions in the affected area
made help requests and use of materials and humanresources inefficient.

35

Legal and Financial Frameworks
for Recovery and Reconstruction

HFA Core Indicator 5.3:
Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms
are in place to support effective response andrecovery when required.
Keywords:
disaster recovery and reconstruction acts, Reconstruction
AgencyContext:
As a disaster-prone country, Japan has a long history ofrecovery and reconstruction of major cities including thecapital city Tokyo. Reconstruction has been necessary withrecurrent disasters, including earthquakes, conflagrations,wars as well as other types of natural and manmade
disasters. However, the Japanese modern disastermanagement system based on the Disaster Management
Countermeasures Basic Act (enacted in 1961) has no fixedsystem or framework for reconstruction, regardless of themany provisions for recovery.
Before:The Headquarters for Reconstruction of the Hanshin/
Awaji Area, mandated for orchestrating recovery efforts,
was set up about one month after the Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake (January 1995) occurred, and was basedon a new “Act for the Basic Principle and Organization
for Reconstruction after the Great Hansin/Awaji
Earthquake”, which is not regulated in the existing Disaster
Countermeasure Basic Act.
After:
Organizations for Reconstruction
About three and a half months after the Great East Japan
Earthquake (hereinafter GEJE), the Recovery Headquarters was
set up based on the new act “the Basic Act of Reconstruction
after the GEJE.” This was a similar situation to the post-Great
Hanshin/Awaji Earthquake. Under this headquarters, theReconstruction Design Council was organized to discuss thebasic concept of reconstruction (See Figure 5.6).

The devastation of the Tohoku region further led to thecreation of a new reconstruction agency for the thirdtime in Japanese history, following the 1923 Great Kanto
Earthquake and World War II. The Reconstruction Agency
officially debuted on February 10, 2012, and is a 10-year
operation reporting directly to the Cabinet. Created under“the Act Establishing the Reconstruction Agency”, thisagency is primarily responsible for coordinating various
ministries’ budgetary and reconstruction procedures sothat reconstruction efforts in all localities can proceed in atimely manner.
New System for Reconstruction after the GEJE7The Special Area for Reconstruction: In these areas,advanced medical and welfare services, deregulationof emergent temporary buildings, special taxation
arrangements for capital investment, interest subsidies forloans, etc. has been executed.
The Reconstruction Support Grant System: From March2012 to March 2013, 1,937 billion yen (national funds: 1,570
billion yen) were issued for seven prefectures and 94 cities,
towns and villages. Use of this grant was highly flexible
compared to previous grants.
The Liquidation-type Revival Fund: Introduced to nine
prefectures, the total amount of 196 billion yen is for filling
the gap between existing support systems and establishingflexible arrangements for victims. It was increased by 104.7
billion yen for inhabitants of the tsunami disaster area.
New Legal Framework
In June 2013, the Diet passed “the Act Concerning
Reconstruction after Major Disasters”, and coincided withthe amendment of the Disaster Countermeasures BasicAct. The aim of this new act is to prepare the governmental
framework for quick reconstruction after major disasters.
The main contents are:8-Set up of the Headquarters for Reconstruction: The Prime
Minister can set up a headquarters in the Cabinet Office atthe time of a major disaster. No new act is necessary for
setting this up.
- Formulate the Reconstruction Basic Principle- Draw up the Reconstruction Plan: Prefectural governments
can draw up the Prefecture Reconstruction Principle. The
plans will include restructuring of land use for smooth andquick reconstruction and so on.
- Special Arrangement for the Reconstruction Plans: 1)change of the Land Use Plan in a one-stop manner, 2)
relaxation of the authorization for reconstruction projects,3) city planning for of reconstruction will be applied.
- The central government’s execution of disaster recovery
project instead of local governments: Such as fishery ports,
roads, coastal protection facilities and rivers for which thelocal government are responsible in ordinary times.
- Special finance arrangement: When a major disasteroccurs, the government will execute special financearrangements quickly by enacting other new acts, if it isrecognized as being specifically necessary.

Source: Modified from Iuchi, K., Johnson, A., and Olshansky, R (2013) 6

Fig. 5.6 Evolution of Japan’s Recovery Governance Structure
6

Source: Iuchi, K., Johnson, L. A., & Olshansky, R. B. (2013). Securing Tohoku’s future: Planning for rebuilding in the first year following the Tohoku-oki earthquake andtsunami. Earthquake Spectra,
Source: Cabinet Office “White Paper on Disaster Management, Fiscal Year 2013”8
Source: Materials explaining the Act Concerning Reconstruction after Major Disasters, the Cabinet Office.
7

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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

36

Preparedness for Low-frequency
and High-impact Disasters froma Medical Perspective

HFA Core Indicator 5.3:
Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms
are in place to support effective response andrecovery when required.
Keywords:
disaster response preparedness, medical assistance, publichealth, clinical data
Context:
After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, Japan enhanced its
disaster management mechanism, especially in the medicalassistance field. However, the 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami raised the issue of the need forfurther enhancement in both short- and long-term medical
services provision in a disaster situation, including publichealth issues.
Before:Japan’s disaster response and management have been
regulated by the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act,
which was enacted after Typhoon Isewan in 1959. The Act
specifies that municipalities and/or prefectures are responsiblefor developing a regional disaster risk reduction plan, alongwith the Basic Disaster Prevention Plan, and for responding
to disasters. However, the Act was developed without
the expectation of a largescale disaster such as the 2011
Tsunami, with damages and impacts beyond the management
capacity of prefectures and municipalities. Based on theexperiences of the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, the disasterbase hospitals and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams(DMATs) were established to minimize casualties underdisaster conditions, and a wide-area medical transportation
system and Emergency Medical Information System (EMIS)
were developed to share clinical and logistics information
between the related hospitals and the government. At
the time of the Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake in 2007, whose
damage occurred within a limited area, the disaster medical
response was successfully implemented immediately after
the event and provided effective assistance by transporting
the seriously injured to a disaster base hospital. In addition,
since 2008, EMIS has been established in most prefecturesand municipalities, 603 disaster base hospitals have been
constructed, 1,000 DMATs have been formed and 6,000
DMAT members have been trained.
During:More than 15,000 people were killed by the 2011 tsunami,
and more than 2,600 people are still consider missing. The
cause of more than 90% of the deaths was drowning, which
was completely different from the case of the HanshinAwaji Earthquake, wherein the major cause was crushing bybuilding collapse. A large number of patients suffered fromaggravation of chronic diseases because of the short supply
of medicines and a lack of clinical information. Ishinomaki
City was severely affected by the Tsunami. In the City,
several hospitals located along the coast areas were forced
58

to evacuate. Only the Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital, which
had just moved inland prior to the 2011 Tsunami, could
remain functioning and played a central role in disastermedicine at the frontline as a disaster base hospital.
In most affected areas, wide-area medical transportation
was required for dialysis and other treatments. One
characteristic of such a massive disaster is creating a muchwider variety of medical needs, not only at hospitals but
also at evacuation centers and homes.
After:● Based on the 2011 tsunami, the existing law was
modified to enable prefectures to provide the necessary
support to municipalities for their own initiatives.
● DMATs were empowered to provide short-term, middleterm, and long-term medical assistance.
● The Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act was modified
and specified that municipalities must create a list ofpeople requiring special and additional assistance during
emergencies.
● Creation of a manual for public health in emergency
situations has been discussed and coordinated in aseries of meetings organized by relevant organizations,
agencies, and groups to unify the medical information indisaster situations.
● Efforts to enhance public health, medicine, and social
welfare in emergency situations have been undertaken
at different levels, including the establishment ofspecialized medical teams to respond to radiation
disasters; developing psychosocial care teams, suchas the psychological first aid promoted by WHO;and initiating a lecture series for disaster medical
coordinators to train them to respond effectively to largescale disasters.
● A national project was launched to back up clinicalinformation among national and public university
hospitals. Various local projects were also launched toshare clinical data as a backup.
Good practices:
Practices developed after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake● Several medical teams, including DMATs, hastened
to provide medical services at evacuation centers in
the affected sites and provided assistance for hospital
evacuations.
● Initiatives adapted after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake
were implemented at the time of the 2011 tsunami,
including the operation of disaster base hospitals,
psychosocial support teams, networks for dialysis, EMIS,
and a wide-area medical transportation system.
Disaster medical coordinator● Under the leadership of the prefecture and municipalitylevel coordinators, collaboration and cooperation
between public and private sectors including the Japan
Self-Defense Forces and DMATs were strengthened. The
coordinators played an important role in many efforts,
including autopsying victims, requesting accommodation
for injured people, and disaster medical team deployment
after the sub-acute phase.
University hospital● The university hospitals located in three affected
prefectures played crucial roles as disaster base hospitals
in providing support to the local hospitals, receiving
patients, assisting with wide-area medical transportation

for dialysis, and collaborating with prefecture-leveldisaster medical coordinators.
● They provided and provisioned the required medical
personnel such as doctors, nurses, and pharmacists to thehospitals and medical facilities in the affected areas.
Activities at evacuation centers● Based on the experiences and the lessons learned fromthe 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, there was a concern
about the increasing number of patients suffering frompost-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression
and alcoholism. However, with active intervention by
psychosocial teams, the occurrence of these symptoms
was minimized.
Relocation of hospitals to higher grounds and hills● The Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital, which had justmoved to higher ground prior to the 2011 tsunami,
played a central role as a disaster base hospital.

Preparation of receiving support● The affected hospitals were not sufficiently preparedfor receiving and managing assistance from externalorganizations effectively, although they were familiar
with providing medical assistance. There was no clear
guideline describing the mechanism of receiving
support, such as how the affected hospitals can request
assistance over a wide area.
Relief supply● The stockpile of emergency supplies was insufficientbecause it had been prepared under the assumptionthat the lifeline could be secured from private power
generation and well water use facilities.
● It was impossible to respond to the affected areas’
requests immediately because of insufficient manpowerand equipment.

Problems:
Preparedness and measures against massive tsunamis● Earthquakes had been the main focus of existingmeasures. Following the 2011 tsunami, many needs
emerged that had not been seen during the 1995 Great
Kobe Earthquake and were thus factored into therequired response.
● There were insufficient preparations and countermeasuresfor handling both the interruption of regional publichealth systems and other serious damage.
● It was extremely difficult to obtain information on thesituation and the needs of expectant mothers, infants,
elderly persons, persons with disabilities, and foreigners
who require extra support and assistance.
● The medical records in hospitals around the tsunami area
were lost or completely destroyed. The electronic
medical records were temporally unavailable because of
power outages.
● Hospital damage included not only the buildings andequipment, but also loss of human resources and medical
personnel, requiring hospital evacuation.
Disaster public health● When a large-scale disaster occurs, the functions of themunicipal-level disaster countermeasures offices
and those of the prefecture and municipality publichealth centers cease. The current policies and laws
do not clearly state how the national and prefectural
governments can assist these offices with the medical
response in such situations, nor do they provide planning
tools or guidelines.
● After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, the calculationof “disasters=DMAT=external injuries” was widely
acknowledged, and there was no concept of “disasterpublic health risk management.” Even the Disaster Relief
Act did not target activities related to public health,sanitation, nutrition and welfare. Therefore, the adoptionof public health measures for welfare and nutrition,
relief activities for persons requiring extra support, andinfection control were delayed.
● The absence of a comprehensive/holistic control andcoordination mechanism delayed the establishment of
the relief system. The interruption of communicationand information sharing and the severe damage in theaffected areas hampered medical relief activities at
evacuation centers.
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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

37

Prospect of Future Information
Exchange Methods in the Event of aDisaster by Taking Advantage of SNS

HFA Core Indicator 5.4:
Procedures are in place to exchange relevant
information during hazard events and disasters,
and to undertake post-event reviews.
Keywords:
mass media, social network service (SNS), Twitter, risk
communication
Context:
In the past two decades, there were two greatest
earthquakes, in 1995 and 2011. During this period, themethods of delivering and sharing disaster information to
the public have changed considerably. In 1995, the mostwidely used form of communication was newspapers andTV, whereas in 2011, Internet social network service (SNS)such as Facebook and Twitter were used. SNS have figured
prominently as an instant info-sharing cybertool, despite
the presence of ethical and privacy issues for individual
account holders. As a future goal, methods to respect andprotect SNS account users should be implemented, while
maximizing the instant info-sharing potential of SNS.
Before:When the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake occurred, TV andnewspapers were the main source of sharing information.
Immediately after the disaster, these media conveyed
the damage situation. It remained difficult to obtain
information regarding damage conditions in the earlystages. Over time, the information contents changed to
the victim’s perspective such as sharing information about
shelter locations, their conditions, and confirming people’s
whereabouts. With time, the relevance of information
contents changed for victims’ long-term living environment
in evacuation facility such as life lines, preventing second
disasters, medical services, and school re-opening. The
origin of the information was mainly the government,
and mass media delivered it to the public. However, there
was a lot of incorrect information or rumors around. The
mass media also had ethical issues; for example, the roarof broadcasting company helicopters reporting on damage
conditions, such as destroyed buildings or roads, caused
search-and-rescue crews difficulty in hearing the voices ofvictims who were underground or in collapsed buildings.
Moreover, those mass media concentrated on areas of
massive or shocking events. Thus, it is difficult to saythat they provided sufficient information about rescuing
outcomes and emergency treatments. Community radio andnews programs for people with disabilities and foreigners
have earned positive reviews. At that time, the Internet
had just begun to spread widely, and it was considered thefirst full-scale media attention devoted to a disaster. One ofonline communication network, Nifty Serve, has launched
an earthquake information hub and provided diverse

960

information on administration, shelter, and volunteer
activities. However, much of the information had previously
been announced by the government, and in other cases,
concerns existed about the information’s reliability becauseof its origin.
After:
Using a wide range of mass media, including the Internet(SNS), for exchanging disaster information during the2011 Earthquake and Tsunami was novel. The hugetsunami, with more than 10 m waves, followed a magnitude
9.0 earthquake and reached an elevation of 40.1 m,
catastrophically damaging the Japanese Pacific coastal
area. TV and radio announced warning information such as
aftershocks and the second and third waves of the Tsunami.
After the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, they alsoannounced evacuation information by removal order andthe radiation diffusion of contamination areas. Media also
reported in detail on the rescue activities by the Japan SelfDefense Forces (JSDF) and experts from abroad. It informed
the public about the damage from liquefaction to the coastal
areas in Chiba Prefecture, and train and bus schedules forcommuters in the central Tokyo area. NHK and certain
commercial television stations provided real-time disasterrelated information via their websites to people who could
not watch TV due to power outage9 and so on. According
to the result of a survey of 100 companies in the Kantoarea, the percentage of the purpose of SNS usage including
Facebook and Twitter in April 2011 (immediately following
the disaster) increased: the percentage for communicatingwith family and friends before the disaster and for receiving
early information after the disaster rose from 32% to 49%,for supplying media report but with lack of information by
TV and newspaper rose from 20% to 33%, for informing tolarge numbers of people rose from 22% to 29%. Receiving
domestic and international information from mass media
ranked fourth (22%), and confirming family members’ andfriends’ whereabouts and safety occupied 21% of SNS
usage. Public information could be obtained via SNS10, butthey can also transfer private information. In addition toaffecting a wide area, the Great East Japan Earthquake andlarge-scale Tsunami caused the Fukushima nuclear plant
accident and subsequent secondary disasters. Therefore, it
is increasingly thought that a Nankai Trough Earthquake
has a high probability of occurrence, and discussion has
begun addressing it as a real and practical matter. Regarding
the effects of a large-scale earthquake in a big city, the2011 disaster triggered broad perspective discussions on
TV forums about disaster prevention and relief amongindividual, academic, industrial, and government experts.
In 2011, smartphones also played an important role.
Despite a phone charging problem due to power outage orcommunication towers being broken, many people sent realtime messages/news of affected areas using SNS throughsmartphones.
Good practices:By tying up with NHK, certain commercial television
stations and internet sites provided Nico-Nico movie news
and Ustream for people with disabilities and those unable
to watch TV because of the power outage. Yahoo JapanThe Cabinet Office (2011). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/bousai2011/html/honbun/2b_sanko_siryo_06.htm.
The Cabinet Office (2012). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hisaisyagyousei/youengosya/h24_kentoukai.

10and Google Japan launched a real-time disaster-related
information site and a people’s whereabouts information
site, respectively.
Moreover, people using SNS exchanged considerable
information. For example, fuel for cars or house heating
systems was not delivered to the affected areas, including
lightly affected areas, because of a malfunction of thelogistics system. Twitter users frequently shared information
via Twitter about the available gas stations. Twitter
messages also shared information on when aid and medical
supplies were not delivered on time, requesting the rescue
supplies, and people’s emotions, such as anxiety for theaftershocks and fears about cold temperatures. Information
on volunteer activities and people’s whereabouts was also
shared via SNS. SNS played an especially important rolefor foreigners who did not understand Japanese, sharing
real-time information in their native language.
Problems:
In virtual online space such as SNS, the first uploader’sopinion on the information occasionally has more
powerful influence, for better or worse. The point is thata vast amount of information is spread to public with noverification, which could cause chaos.

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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

Future Recommendations for Post Hyogo Framework for Action
HFA Priority for Action 1:
Ensure that disaster risk reduction
is a national and a local priority
with a strong institutional basis for
implementation.
HFA Core Indicator 1.1:
National policy and legal frameworks for disaster risk
reduction exist and include decentralized responsibilities
and capacities at all levels.

1

National Policy and Legal Frameworks for Disaster
Risk Reduction● Japan’s history of institutionalizing a disastermanagement system highlights three key points.First,
national level leadership in establishing a disastermanagement system helps to organize horizontal
and vertical structures effectively. Second, creating
a law to implement a disaster management system
will further legitimize the system and thus support
further actions. Third, shaping an institutional basis inwhich all levels of organizations — national, regional,
and local participate. All these actions will takeconsiderable time, but initiating a system and revising
it as necessary through post-disaster assessments is
critical for improving disaster management.
● Various national recovery agencies have been
established after large-scale disasters worldwide.
In many cases, such agencies are only created for aninterim period, usually between five and ten years,
their responsibility and power in recovery are critical.
As these agencies often set the stage for long-term
rebuilding and future resilience, identifying funding
and allocating decision-making power within theexisting relationship of ministries and departments(e.g., public works, building construction, social
welfare, and health) prior to large-scale disasters are
extremely important for effective implementationof recovery. As in the case of post-GEJE in Japan,
starting a new agency outside existing regulatory
framework is not an easy task, as it often causes
confusion and disorder delaying the recovery effort.
HFA Core Indicator 1.2:
Dedicated and adequate resources are available toimplement disaster risk reduction activities at alladministrative levels.

and Adequate Resources for Disaster3 DedicatedManagement in Japan● In-kind support systems are becoming increasingly
important. As we exist in an insecure world, where
vulnerabilities to disasters are increasing and62

single-government financial security and liability
are declining, preparing mutual support networks
between various players in society is crucial. Such
networks include supporting structures among local,
prefectural, regional, and national governments, where
financial obligations are a non-primary concern. The
participation of citizens as well as private sector
entities in this in-kind system is also essential, as
disaster size and degree are unforeseeable.
Faculty as a Non-Governmental Resource to
4 University
Support Disaster Risk Reduction in Recovery Planningwith Local Government● Local governments and experts should build
relationships of trust during non-disaster periods.
● Experts should support the local governments
as a team, which makes it possible to respondcomprehensively and complementarily.
● Experts should connect the local government and the
local community.

HFA Priority for Action 2:
Identify, assess and monitor disasterrisks and enhance early warning.

HFA Core Indicator 2.1:
National policy and local risk assessments based on hazard
data and vulnerability information are available and include
risk assessments for key sectors.

of Quantitative Assessment of
8 Importance
Uncertainties and their Visualization in Tsunami
Hazard Assessment● We need to qualitatively assess the uncertainties
of the tsunami hazard assessment and visualize
comprehensibly the uncertainties in the tsunami
hazard map. By visualizing the uncertainties,
people can clearly perceive that the tsunami hazard
assessment includes large uncertainties. Moreover,clearly showing regional characteristics of theuncertainties could benefit residents who live incoastal areas.
Fragility Curves for Supporting
9 Tsunami
Reconstruction and Future Risk Assessment● Characterizing tsunami fragility curves in different
tsunami hazards, geographic, and social conditions sothat they can be used as universal measure of tsunami
risk assessment.
● Tsunami fragility curves should be updated andimplemented for use in terms of risk assessment ofreconstruction and urban planning in national, local
and community levels.

HFA Core Indicator 2.3:
Early warning systems are in place for all major hazards,
with outreach to communities.

HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material and relevant
training include disaster risk reduction and recovery
concepts and practices.

Early Warning System in Schools and at a
11 Earthquake
Education to Build a Culture of Safety and Resilience
University during the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake14
at All Levels around Academic Research Institutes● EEW reduces the number of causalities by providing
information for both physical and mechanical reactions.
Based on experiences from the Tohoku earthquake,successful utilization in schools is important to enhance
the social understanding for EEW. EEWS will be
installed in all schools in the future.
● To avoid false alarms, EEWS should be reliable, andapplicability to inland earthquakes would be enhanced
by combining on-site earthquake observation data.
● Accurate ground motion estimation is needed.
Successive use of observation data from not only onsite but also from local/regional observation networks
is recommended. Front-site observation data could be
efficiently used to enhance the accuracy.

● Education about disaster prevention for non-experts
is very important. We learned from the Great East
Japan Earthquake that it is effective to teach people
the preconditions of hazard estimation. During the
emergency, people themselves had to decide how to
avoid hazards and protect property because of theinadequate information from outside their community.

Practice Program for Improving Response
15 Education
Capability to Survive a Tsunami● Disaster risk reduction education including lessons
from the 2011 disaster that judgment by themselves on
the situation save the lives should be implemented at
all grade levels to increase the disaster awareness ofchildren.
● New types of practical education tools should be
developed to further interest children, including toolsthat can be used outside the classroom.

of Land Slides and Status of Buildings and
12 Monitoring
Construction Areas by Radar Technology● GB-SAR systems should be tested under various
conditions. At the beginning, experts must support
assist with the analysis of GB-SAR data.
● A protocol for providing the early warning
information through local governments must be
established.

of the Reconstruction Mapping Program
16 Development
at the Tsunami-affected Elementary School
In order for disaster education to further contributeto building a culture of safety and resilience in thecommunity,● disaster education should be developed by fullyreflecting the local context, including the community’s
disaster history, natural environments, and social andeconomic backgrounds; and● the validity of each disaster education program should
be examined for sharing effective approaches.

HFA Priority for Action 3:
Use knowledge, innovation andeducation to build a culture of safety
and resilience at all levels.

HFA Core Indicator 3.1:
Relevant information on disasters is available and accessibleat all levels, to all stakeholders (through networks,
development of information sharing systems, etc.)

Sharing, Cooperation, and Expert Training
13 Information
Provided by Academic Research Institutes for Natural
Disasters● The establishment of a domestic system for local
hazard risk is the highest priority effort, comprisingan observation system, a system for archiving andextracting data, expert training, and other elements.
The establishment of an integrated knowledge systemis the next priority.

17

International Post-graduate Education Programfor Disaster Medicine; Collaboration with Tohoku
University Human Security Program● Disaster medicine is an interdisciplinary subject. An
interdisciplinary course such as Tohoku University’s
Human Security Program is suitable for implementing
subjects related to the study of disasters. Theinternational educational program is suitable forinternational students to learn lessons from the GEJET.
However, students in the international program have
few opportunities to learn from local people, so theorganizer of the course should consider providing
more of these kinds of opportunities.
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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

HFA Priority for Action 4:
Reduce the underlying risk factors.

HFA Core Indicator 4.1:
Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective ofenvironment-related policies and plans, including forland use, natural resource management and adaptation
to climate change.

Recovery Strategies in Sanriku Coastal
19 Post-tsunami
Areas after the 1933 Tsunami● Relocation to higher land from the waterfront area asa post-tsunami recovery strategy should be performed bynational/local government purchase of the lowlands to
avoid future private usage of vulnerable waterfront space.
Perspective of Civil Engineering,
20 Integrated
Architecture and Urban Planning
After the disaster, a number of projects are under
way simultaneously; however, each of them has to becoordinated to comprise entire future vision of a village.
● Multidisciplinary cooperation among various experts;
architect, a civil engineer or an urban planner, withlocals, is important to build up a project.
● Sharing future vision of the village among the people
prior to their opinion survey works well to lead theirintentions to an appropriate direction.
● To build up consensus for the village planning, thecomplementary communication with local stakeholders
is invaluable.
HFA Core Indicator 4.2:
Social development policies and plans are being
implemented to reduce the vulnerability of populations
most at risk.

for People Requiring Assistance
21 Measuresduring a Disaster● More thorough business operation analysis should be
performed to devise BCPs including the network
required for maintaining the supply chain.

HFA Core Indicator 4.3:
Economic and productive sectoral policies and plans
have been implemented to reduce the vulnerability of
economic activities.

22

64

Enhancement of Business Continuity Plans andBusiness Continuity Management● All organizations including companies arerecommended to develop its BCP, and the governments
should make efforts to diffuse BCPs. Furthermore,
BCPs should be prepared in anticipation of severe
incidents that require “alternative strategies”, including
a substitute business site.

of Supply and Supply Chain Management
23 Disruption● Efforts should be made toward knowing about
suppliers that make up the supply chain. Companies
should become aware that centralized purchasing to
reduce cost and sticking to original specifications
make it difficult to resort to alternate procurement.

HFA Core Indicator 4.4:
Planning and management of human settlements
incorporate disaster risk reduction elements, including
enforcement of building codes.

of the Earthquake-proof Retroﬁt of
24 Promotion
Buildings after the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake● Pre-disaster recovery planning worked well in Kobe’s
Mano District after the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake aswell as in Tokyo after the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake.
Pre-disaster recovery planning is an important process
for reaching agreement among the local governmentand residents on a future vision of the district. Sharing
the future vision prior to a disaster may avoid emotional
conflicts at the stages of developing or implementing
the post-disaster recovery plan.
Housing for the Mitigation on the Negative
25 Public
Impact of Environmental Transition on the Victims
To avoid degradation of the community caused bylong-term stays in temporary housing and drasticchanges in living conditions:● The new housing community should beinterconnected with the existing community.
● The new living environment should encourage
residents’ communication, especially to prevent theisolation of older persons, who represent a large
number of the residents.
● Sharing sufficient information concerning thereconstruction plan and allowing the public toparticipate in the planning of the housing are
essential.

HFA Core Indicator 4.5:
Disaster risk reduction measures are integrated with
post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes.

Recovery for Risk Reduction after the
26 Post-tsunami
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami● Prediction of available resources as well as disasterdamage is necessary for implementing
reconstruction activities. Reconstruction activity
estimation should be considered at the national,
local, and community levels corresponding topredicted damage levels.

HFA Priority for Action 5:
Strengthen disaster preparedness for
effective response at all levels.

HFA Core Indicator 5.1:
Strong policy, technical and institutional capacities
and mechanisms for disaster risk management, with adisaster risk reduction perspective, are in place.

from the Perspective of Personal Information
29 Japan:and Disaster Prevention Education
Measures and Agenda for Large-scale Disasters in● It is important to establish legislation for responding
to large-scale disasters and re-establishing the
network among residents in the municipalities andlower levels.
● One goal is to develop an information-sharing
system by reviewing how personal information
may be excessively protected, and by creating a
database with detail, a management strategy, and thesystem’s application under the regulation, throughcooperation among residents, local governments,
and the national government.
●The other goal is to share and hand down local
knowledge, including disaster information. To
accomplish sharing and handing down requires
encouraging citizens to perform daily activities
positively for their local community and embedding
activities that increase safety awareness anddisaster relief (local knowledge), which can reduce
community vulnerability to disaster.
Preparedness of Disaster Medicine as
30 National
Tertiary Risk Reduction● Disaster risk assessment and reinforcement of risk
reduction of all hospitals as “the building last standing
in a disaster” are necessary.
● National standardization of DBHs and hospitals as
evacuation shelters is necessary● Strengthening of emergency lifelines together withhospital resource stocks including drugs, food, medical
gases should be considered as a BCP.
● The medical relief to the affected hospital should
comprise substitute workers rather than assistancefor decreasing the physical and mental load of local
workers who were also victims of the disaster.
● Communication tools including network infrastructuresand satellite phones should be strengthened to makethe hospitals more functional.
● Hospitals should build capacities to receive support
by hiring disaster manager and disaster medical-publichealth coordinator.
● Health care at the evacuation center should becontinuously supported by DMATs and other medical
assistant teams to prevent the outbreak of infectious
disease, mental depression, deep vein thrombosis andother diseases.

● DBHs should build capacities to deal with chemical,
biological, radioactive, nuclear and explosive(CBRNE) hazards.
● Utilization of SCU as the hub of medical resources
should be better prepared.
● Daily usage of EMIS as a medical management systemin the community will increase the coverage of
hospitals and health-related institutions.
● Assignment of medical-public health coordinators
together with education and supporting resources isnecessary.

HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency plans arein place at all administrative levels, and regular training
drills and rehearsals are held to test and develop disaster
response programmes.

of Plans for Operational Continuity of
31 Enhancement
Government● Operational continuity of the ministries and local
authorities (BCPs of public organizations) is essential
for quick rescue action, to support refugees and to
recover facilities and towns, even if these organizations
suffer serious damage to their critical resources forimportant operations. It is strongly recommended
that the plans have an alternative strategy for criticalresources including their main buildings.
Coastal Districts in Iwaki City, Fukushima
32 ThreePrefecture: Differences Resulting from the Local

Residents Organization Disaster Response Activities● As the countermeasures required of local
municipalities (counties and cities) are only to present
an outline, voluntary, autonomous communication (suchas hazard mapping) at the community level is very
important for the plan to be effective. Specifically, adisaster prevention and mitigation system in accordancewith the historical path dependency of each districtis required. Examples include spatial hierarchy suchas district － block association － neighborhood
association (A) and district － neighborhood association(B, C); various forms of governing such as top-down
decision-making (A) and combination of bottom-up
decision-making and roles by officers (B, C).
● Community development and enhancement of
the activities of resident organizations is one key toachieving these goals.

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HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

Activities to Preserve Historical Materials
33 Pre-Disasterand the Great East Japan Earthquake● It is necessary to bring together owners of local
collections, interested local citizens, local government
employees and specialists on a continuing basis tobuild a consensus that there is a real need to protect
historical materials from disasters.
● Disasters are not the only cause of attrition ofhistorical materials. Social isolation and aging isanother major threat, and it is important build social
bonds to provide latent social support within local
society for private owners of collections of historicalmaterials.

● Multilayered information sharing should be prepared,
including EMIS, by every responder.
● Every hospital and medical professional should learn
about the function of DMATs to enhance the supportreceiving capacities. Disaster medicine should bepart of the curriculum for every medical and publichealth school as fundamental knowledge to cope withemergencies and disasters.
● Multi-sectorial collaborative preparedness shouldbe established between DMATs and other responders
through agreements.
● Every prefecture or province should strengthen thefunction of airports or other facilities for SCU to
support DMATs for efficient wide-area transportationand to become a logistics hub for relieving resources
and medical professionals.

HFA Core Indicator 5.3:
Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms are in place
to support effective response and recovery when required.

and Financial Frameworks for Recovery and
35 LegalReconstruction● It is important to develop new and innovative ways ofengaging freely interested citizens in this preservation
process, and developing social structures to implement
this. It is also necessary for national and local
governments to start to study ways of supporting andpromoting these kinds of activities.

34 DMAT as the First and Long-lasting Responder66● The concept of DMATs should be developed by eachcountry considering their geographical, climate,cultural and socioeconomical characteristics.
● DMATs should be endorsed by the central government
as effective medical-public health responders together
with sufficient logistics support.
● The concepts of DBH, EMIS, SCU, wide-areatransportation and medical-public health coordinators
should be propagated as the fundamental structure forthe activities of DMATs.
● DMATs should be trained for primary care of patients
under various conditions, including CBRNE disasters
together with confined space medicine, “Load-and-Go”
and wide-area transportation, as specialists of disastermedicine.
● Continuous dispatch or logistics support should be preplanned to fulfill any gap until the arrival of other
MRTs and recovery of local health care providers.
● Regular training of DMATs should be endorsed andassured by the government and affiliated hospitals tomaintain the preparedness of DMATs.

● Creating financial mechanisms that allow flexible
use is essential for a recovery reflecting local needs.
After the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake andChuetsu Earthquake, foundations to manage andoperate pooled recovery funds were established.
After the GEJE, recovery funds were also pooled
to be managed directly by the affected Prefectural
governments. Pooling these funds and providing
power to foundations and Prefectures to manage thesefunds better accommodates the needs of localities,
which could incorporate multiple stakeholders anduse the funds for various non-structural programs.
Nevertheless, such mechanisms would need to bealtered according to macro socio-economic conditionsof that time.
for Low-frequency and High-impact
36 Preparedness
Disasters from a Medical Perspective● Relocation to higher land from the waterfront area as a
post-tsunami recovery strategy should be performed bynational/local government purchase of the lowlands to
avoid future private usage of vulnerable waterfront space.
● More thorough business operation analysis shouldbe performed to devise BCPs including the network
required for maintaining the supply chain.
● Reinforcement of buildings is essential to reduce therisk of collapse. Setting quantitative goals andeducation figure strongly in promoting this effort.
● Pre-disaster recovery planning worked well inTokyo after the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake as wellas in Kobe’s Mano District after the 1995 Great Kobe

Earthquake. Pre-disaster recovery planning is an
important process for reaching an agreement among the
local government and residents on a future vision of the
district. Sharing the future vision prior to a disaster may
avoid emotional conflicts at the stages of developing or
implementing the post-disaster recovery plan.
● Prediction of available resources as well as disasterdamage is necessary for implementing reconstruction
activities. Reconstruction activities should be
estimated at the national, local, and community levels
and correspond to predicted damage levels.
● Clinical information in hospitals should be backed up,
and comprehension of medical activity typical to the
local area should be required.

Classification of Twitter Accounts by Keyword “Great East Japan
Earthquake”

HFA Core Indicator 5.4:
Procedures are in place to exchange relevant information
during hazard events and disasters, and to undertake
post-event reviews.

of Future Information Exchange Methods in
37 Prospect
the Event of a Disaster by Taking Advantage of SNS● Figures depict Twitter account classificationby the keywords “Great East Japan Earthquake”
for August 30th and “Tsunami” for September 4th,
2013, respectively. The total number of accounts
for “Great East Japan Earthquake” was 1,165 andthat for “Tsunami” was 797. Uploading messages
and providing information regarding the earthquake
by individual occupied 52% of the total accounts,suggesting a project by individuals or communities
occupying 19% by the keyword “Great East Japan
Earthquake.” The keyword “Tsunami” occupied
46% of uploads from individual accounts and 20%
from municipalities managing the account. Thisphenomenon can be interpreted as demonstrating thepower of individuals sharing information via SNS
and proving SNS to be the most effective method forsharing/exchanging information, anytime and anyplace.
● As another point, personal information such as bankaccount, tax, or health information that are stored bymunicipalities must be digitized and backup data kept
in a secure place, safe from natural disasters. In the big
data era, legal restrictions must be created as a filter
ensuring the high quality and quantity of data, analysis
methodology, and method of interpretation. Early
ethical education for sharing information via SNS
is also required. Risk-related communication using
traditional multimedia, SNS, and WebGIS techniques
can figure more importantly as next-generation
communication methods.

Classification of Twitter Accounts by Keyword “Tsunami”*Since the keyword was searched in Japanese, it is possible that
results in English differ.

67

Contributors
HFA IRIDeS Review Panel

Fumihiko Imamura: Deputy Director, Professor of Tsunami Engineering (Chair)
Yuichi Ono: Professor of International Regional Cooperation Office (Chair)
Osamu Murao: Professor of International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation (Chief Editor)
Kanako Iuchi: Associate Professor of Comparative Mitigation Society
Shinji Toda: Professor of Natural Disaster ResearchTakeshi Sato: Professor of Disaster Reconstruction Design and Management
Aiko Sakurai: Associate Professor of Disaster Reconstruction Design and Management
Takako Izumi: Associate Professor of International Regional Cooperation Office

Authors

Hazard and Risk Evaluation Research Division
Masato MOTOSAKA: Professor of Earthquake Engineering (11)Fumihiko IMAMURA: Director, Professor of Tsunami Engineering (7)Akira MANO: Professor of Disaster Potential Study (27)Shunichi KOSHIMURA: Professor of Remote Sensing and Geoinformatics for Disaster Management (9)Motoyuki SATO: Professor of Remote Sensing and Geoinformatics for Disaster Management (12)Human and Social Response Research Division
Daisuke SATO: Associate Professor of Preservation of Historical Materials (33)
Hiroaki MARUYA: Professor of Social Systems for Disaster Mitigation (1, 22, 23, 31, 35)
Kanako IUCHI: Associate Professor of Comparative Mitigation Society (1, 3, 5, 6, 35)
Regional and Urban Reconstruction Research Division
Koichi ISHIZAKA: Professor of Technology for Urban Resuscitation (10)Michio UBAURA: Associate Professor of Technology for Urban Resuscitation (4, 20)
Kazumasa HANAOKA: Assistant Professor of Technology for Urban Resuscitation (10)Kenjiro TERADA: Professor of Regional Safety Engineering (18)
Shuji MORIGUCHI: Associate Professor of Regional Safety Engineering (18)Junji KATO: Assistant Professor of Regional Safety Engineering (18)
Osamu MURAO: Professor of International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation (19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28)
Carine J. YI: Assistant Professor of International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation (29, 37)
Disaster Science Division
Shinji TODA: Professor of Natural Disaster Research (7)Disaster Medical Science Division
Shinichi EGAWA: Professor of International Cooperation for Disaster Medicine (30, 34, 36)
Toshio HATTORI: Professor of Disaster-related Infectious Disease (17)
Yoshio HOSOI: Professor of Radiation Disaster Medicine (2)Masaharu NAKAYAMA: Professor of Disaster Medical Informatics (36)
Disaster Information Management and Public Collaboration Division
Yasuaki ONODA: Professor of Disaster Reconstruction design & Management (20, 25)
Katsuya HIRANO: Associate Professor of Disaster Reconstruction design & Management (20)
Aiko SAKURAI: Associate Professor of Disaster Reconstruction design & Management (16)
Masashige MOTOE: Associate Professor of Disaster Reconstruction design & Management (25)Teppei KOBAYASHI: Research Associate of Disaster Reconstruction design & Management (20)
Takako IZUMI: Associate Professor of International Regional Cooperation Office (29, 36)
Michimasa MATSUMOTO: Associate Professor of International Regional Cooperation Office (29, 32)
Miwa KURI: Associate Professor of International Regional Cooperation Office (13, 14)
Endowed Research Division
Anawat SUPPASRI: Associate Professor of Earthquake induced Tsunami Risk Evaluation (Tokio Marine) (9)Yo FUKUTANI: Research Associate of Earthquake induced Tsunami Risk Evaluation (Tokio Marine) (8)Mari YASUDA: Research Associate of Earthquake induced Tsunami Risk Evaluation (Tokio Marine) (15)*The number in parentheses is a topic the author is in charge of in Chapter 6.

Edited and Designed by International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation Laboratory
Osamu Murao
Hiroko Sakaba
Sonoko Kato

Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters
HFA IRIDeS Review Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
Copyright ©2014 International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Tohoku University
All rights reserved.
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URL: http://irides.tohoku.ac.jp
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Phone: +81-22-795-4893
E-mail: contact@irides.tohoku.ac.jp