51

論文

Intra-Regional Border Conflicts
and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s
Conflict Management
Novri Susan

An intra-regional conflict followed by the violent behaviour of conflicting
states in Southeast Asia is one of some political issues in the ASEAN regionalorganizations. Notable cases of intra-regional conflicts are sourced, among
others, by border disputes between two or more countries such as Thailand vsCambodia on Preah Vihear Temple, and Indonesia vs Malaysia on Ambalat
Block. However, in the case of Ambalat Block between Indonesia and Malaysia,
the escalation has brought military as an instrument of conflict strategy. The
last case of the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia has risen toa violent armed conflict. ASEAN as a regional organization of Southeast Asia
countries is often questioned about its strategic role and capacity to manage
intra-regional conflicts. Basically, this paper offers a discourse on institutional
design and implementation of ASEAN conflict management by looking at thecase of border conflicts between its members. This paper is written based ona qualitative method using secondary data from the mass media, research
reports, and documentation review.

Introduction:
Regional Organization and Country Members Border Dispute
Several regional organizations like the Arab League, the African Union,
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and UNASUR(Union of South American Nations) may have different specific organization
goals. However, regional organizations are basically formed to establish betterinternational relations among the neighbouring countries. An understandable
reason for establishing a regional organization is that neighbours are betterin good relations than infraction or wars. The member countries can develop

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more opportunities to enhance strategic cooperation in the economic, social,
cultural, and political aspects. Regional organizations play an important role
in realizing the opportunities in which the member states have a constructive
relationship and ability to resolve intraregional conflicts peacefully. Therefore,
regional organizations are required to manage intraregional conflicts that may
occur among their member states by institutionalizing conflict management
systems. This demand is also directed to ASEAN as a regional organization forSoutheast Asian countries where intraregional conflicts still frequently occur
by different issues. ASEAN was established in August 1967 in Bangkok, thecapital city of Thailand. ASEAN basically aims to accelerate economic growth,social progress, cultural development among the members, and establish
1

a peaceful regional community. Recently ASEAN has ten countries as therespective members including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam,
Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei. However since
its establishment, ASEAN has to deal with the issue of perpetuated borderconflicts among the members.
The European Union (EU), by some scholars, is appointed a good model ofregional organizations in dealing with intra-regional conflicts. The EU is more
integrated and has more formal regional community while ASEAN is more
open, equal, and loose. The EU member states have an obligation to comply
with all of mechanisms such as in international economic cooperation with
non-European countries; each member of the EU must make its obligations
under the EU system. Instantly, the European Union must comply with themechanism (a binding principle). Therefore, the EU’s rotating presidency
system can essentially create effective political leadership in dealing withconflicts such as the borders among the European Union member states. In
ASEAN way, its member states have more opportunities to choose and makepolitical and economic decision even when the decision is out of the ASEAN
amity or charter. ASEAN has a similar system of ’presidency’ rotation with
EU’s in terms of political leadership that deals with the more difficult natureof regional politics. In the case of the EU, as mentioned in the report ofMichele Pace in “European Union Policy-Making towards Border Conflicts”(2005), the EU prefers its own mechanism which is followed consistently by its
2members to handle border conflicts among its members.

ASEAN leaders have rejected the idea of using the EU model since itIntra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management

53

is fundamentally different from the ASEAN’s non-interference policy amongits members for their internal affairs. Thus, since its establishment in 1967,
ASEAN has seemed unwilling or unable to manage intra-regional conflictsin Southeast Asia area such as the border conflict cases. Sridharan mentions
that the factors of inter-governmental arrangements, rather supranationalism
or regionalism, weaken ASEAN’s ability to handle and manage intra-regional
3

conflicts. However, some other scholars argue that ASEAN has different ways
and a unique approach to managing intra-regional conflicts. These scholars
see the non-interference policy and loose organizational structure as partof the ASEAN approach to conflict management. They say, this is the way
the organization prevents or avoids intraregional conflicts among member
states. “ASEAN Way” to avoid conflict is part of the regional norms. ASEAN
is contextually different from the EU system. The very typical characteristicof ASEAN conflict management model is the ability to incorporate theirprinciples enacted in ASEAN charter with a more implicit and passive
approach to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, reduce, or delay to deal withthem for an uncertain period. This distinctive characteristic indicates that
ASEAN takes a different form of conflict management from the other regional
4organizations. However, while avoiding conflict is the ASEAN’s shared norm
both theoretically and empirically, the ASEAN Way becomes weak withkeeping a lot of conflicts in the region behind the situation of harmony.
The purpose of conflict management for regional organizations is toprevent violent armed conflict in order to establish regional security. Several
cases of intra-regional conflict in Southeast Asia such as the border conflicts
between Thailand and Cambodia in disputing ownership of an ancient temple,
Preah Vihear Temple, and the surrounding land has created a series of armed
conflicts in which several civilians and soldiers were killed. Although thecase of Malaysia and Indonesia on the Ambalat island dispute in 2010 did not
go further to the escalation of violent conflict, the mobilization of the armed
forces of the two countries around the disputed island has also threatened
the ASEAN regional security. While the border conflicts encourage every
country to mobilize violent means, including naval and air forces, ASEAN isquestioned its role in regulating the conflict in order to keep regional securityin Southeast Asia. There is a strong expectation for ASEAN to play a more
important, proactive and strategic role in regulating intra-regional conflicts

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among the members so that it can maintain its regional organization’s values
and norms.
In March 2009, ASEAN adopted the APSC (ASEAN Political Security
Community) as a political attempt of ASEAN leaders in building regional
peace and security in their respective areas. In the APSC document subchapter B.2, it is clearly stated that the Conflict Resolution and PacificSettlement of Disputes have three main actions: (1) a mechanism for dispute
resolution, (2) research activities on peace, conflict management and conflict
resolution, and (3) regional cooperation with relevant regional organizations
and the United Nations (UN). The Conflict Resolution and Pacific Settlement
as the APSC blueprint is essentially the basis of the institutional design of
ASEAN conflict management systems. Especially in the first act, it clearly5explains the need to:a. Study and analyze existing dispute settlement modes and/or additional
mechanisms with a view to enhancing regional mechanisms for thepacific settlement of disputes;
b. Develop ASEAN modalities for good offices, conciliation and mediation;
andc. Establish appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms, including
arbitration as provided for by the ASEAN Charter.
The APSC blue print may still need to be applied and practiced as a policyof the ASEAN for regional conflict management systems. Scholars argue that
ASEAN’s conflict management system is much better than SAARC’s system(the neighbouring regional organization) because ASEAN has establisheddiplomatic norms and rules and has achieved the common interests and6values. However, the real facts of the unresolved border conflicts and violence
among ASEAN members proved different. ASEAN still faces serious problems
in institutionalizing conflict management system in order to manage intraregional conflicts peacefully. This paper mainly describes the way ASEAN
establishes its institutional design of conflict management systems forhandling intra-regional conflicts, and the political barriers during the creationand implementation of the systems. Through the case of the border conflict
between Thailand and Cambodia on Preah Vihear Temple, this paper aims todiscuss how ASEAN’s conflict management systems are working on it.

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Intra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management

I. Conflicts and Border Conflicts
Conflicts are generally defined as a situation in which two or moreinterest groups are fought the limited resources to meet basic needs. Somescholars like Abraham Maslow, Max Neef, Marshal Rosenberg, and John
Burton insist that the basic needs become the root cause of any type of conflict.
A conflict occurs when there is a mismatch between the goals and actions of
the actors to the limited resources for basic needs. Therefore, Wallensteen
7mentions three components of conflict: incompatibility, action, and actor. The
conflict components will occur in different forms of conflict, such as ethnic,
religious, or industrial conflicts. Each form of conflict can create different
conflict dynamics where actors act to determine whether or not the conflict
will escalate. In some cases, this can create a violent situation, followed byhatred, armed mobilization, and social unrest.
Similar to Wallensteen, Bartos and Wehr argue that conflict is defined asa situation “in which the actors use conflict behaviour against each other to8achieve incompatible goals and/or to express hostility.” From the definition,
the core of conflict is the goal incompatibility, hostility, and conflict behaviour
that is rational or irrational. Incompatible goal is a condition of limited
resource being contested by two or more actors of importance (individuals,
groups, and states). When warring factions fight limited resources, manycases indicate that the emotional aspect comes in many forms of hostility
such as hatred and vengeance. In essence, a conflict is not only caused by the
incompatibility of goals but also due to the hostile feelings of social groups.
In addition, the behaviour of the conflict is “any behaviour that helps theparty to achieve its goals that do not match with that of the opponent or that9expressing its hostility towards the opponent.”

The border conflict can then be defined as an incompatible goal from two
or more parties (individuals, communities, or states) on lands, rivers or seas
which are claimed as part of each party’s territory or possession. Wallensteenrefers it to the term “the incompatibility over territory.”10

In the case ofinter-state border conflicts, borders may have rich resources in addition to
cultural or social bonds for the conflicting actors. One case of border conflictsin Southeast Asia issued by the ownership of natural resources is between
Indonesia and Malaysia on the Ambalat island. In the case of the border

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conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, social and cultural ties seem sopowerful in influencing the conflict. Both natural resources and socio-cultural
ties also in some way are related to each other. In conflict management, tounderstand the main context and reason behind the border conflict is an
11

important part of the analysis of the conflict.

After understanding the definition of conflict, to answer the question ofwhether the conflict is resolvable or not is also important. Wallensteen argues
that as a realistic proposition conflicts are resolvable. Many conflict cases in
the world history took place in the form of war and violence; however, the12conflicting parties could learn the best way to resolve the conflict. Whenthe conflicting parties use zero-sum game, they learn that the strategy canbe devastating to both parties without any positive benefits. The conflicting
parties can learn and try to find other ways to resolve their conflicts withmutual benefits.

II. Conflict Management Perspectives
As a theoretical perspective, conflict management is not a new comerin peace and conflict studies. But, there has been a long debate about theultimate goal or achievement of conflict management. Some scholars insist
that conflict management is to contain and prevent violence in the dynamics
of the conflict while others refuse it by mentioning that conflict management
aims to resolve the root causes of conflict. In the first place, some scholars
have argued that conflict management is primarily a mechanism to contain13

and prevent violence from a conflict situation. Rubenstein states that conflict
management aims to moderate or civilize conflict consequences without
14

addressing its root causes. Conflict management theory also explains that
not all conflicts need to be resolved, but there should be a process to reduce
the escalation of violence. Carpenter and Kennedy suggest that the challenge
for managers is not to remove the conflicts but to deal with discrepancies as
15

creative as possible. Therefore, conflicts become more productive by creating
16

problem-solving and sustainable peace.

Conflict management mechanisms based on non-violence perspective
can be undertaken by the conflicting parties when they have the awarenessof peace in resolving their conflicts through peaceful negotiations, a processIntra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management57

of dialogue and negotiation table. However, the conflicting parties often find
it difficult to bring themselves into the peace talks when they get on a cycleof violent conflict trap. In this situation, a third party may come into conflict
dynamics when the conflicting parties are not able to go into a process ofnegotiation or dialogue by several reasons like a trap in a spiral of violence,
retaliatory circle, and hatred.
A third party with the specific authority can intervene in criticalsituations where the conflicting parties are trapped in a vicious cycle ofviolence, especially when violence has destroyed, killed and suffered the
population. A third party is mandated to stop and eliminate violence through17

a mission called “peace-making and peace-keeping.” Basically, other than tostop violence, the other main task of the third party is to bring the conflicting
parties to the peace talks with the use of capital or power resources such aslegal authority, political power, and strong military forces. Therefore, there
are two main missions of the third-party in conflict management which are
to reduce or eliminate violence from the conflict dynamics and to bring two or
more conflicting parties to peace talks. Furthermore, based on the two main
missions of conflict management, according to Rioux in his article, “Third
Party Intervention as Conflict Management: The Case of Africa” (2003), third
parties play a highly strategic function in a variety of methods and dimensions
including fact-finding, good offices, condemnation, mediation or conciliation,
18

arbitration, and peace keeping.

The second perspective of conflict management is emphasizing broader
and more complex concepts. Hamad mentions that the definition of theterm should be explored to better understand the overall discipline, which
includes the emergence of conflict, its escalation, subsequent complications,19

containment, resolution and transformation as sub-topics. Hamad pulls
in conflict resolution and transformation into his theory where conflict
management does not only attempt to contain and prevent violence, but also
to address the root causes of conflict. In conflict analysis, the root causes ofconflict refer to incompatibility such as poverty and social injustice. Hamad’s
thought essentially extends the concept of conflict management as an “umbrella
20

name.”

Conflict management as an umbrella concept basically interprets themeaning of management. Hamad urges that “management” has a wider

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meaning than the narrow sense of “to manage” or “to cope with.” This
includes the meaning of “to administer.” He states that the use of the terms
is already common in other disciplines. Many disciplines of social andeconomic sciences are all familiar with the terms management business andbusiness administration. However, in a conflict, management is not justunderstood in terms of administration, in which the conflicting actors may, in21

some cases, even look for conflicts and deter solutions. In this perspective,
Hamad furthermore argues that conflict settlement, conflict resolution,
conflict prevention and conflict transformation are still part of the conflict
management theory. He asserts that conflict management is a discipline that22

covers the concepts in conflict studies.

As an umbrella concept, according to Hamad conflict management as a23

discipline should be analyzed by the method of positivism of social sciences.

The fact is that any approach of conflict studies has its own philosophy, theory,and methodology. Habermas argues that every theory and tradition has its
own importance and rationality such as positivism with its technical interest,
humanism or social construction with its inter-subjective communication,24

and critical theory with its emancipation. Wallensteen also mentions that25

a lot of scholars’ methodological approach is comparative. There are many
approaches to conflict management by following the context of its theory andpractice.
This paper prefers to use the first perspective of conflict managementon conflict resolution that focuses in transforming violence into a peaceful
dialogue and negotiation. As its primary mission to reduce, prevent,and transform violence into peaceful dialogue and negotiation, conflict
management as a concept has three major steps to make it happen. The
first or basic step sees the dimensions of the conflict, the current situation of
conflict whether it increases in violent conflicts or not, who the actor are, andsurrounding issues.
The second step is to understand the actors’ conflict management
strategies being involved. Some scholars like Miall Ramsbotham andWoodhouse use the term conflict strategy. They mention that there are
four conflict strategies commonly used by the conflicting parties, which arecontending, yielding, withdrawing, and problem-solving model. Contendingconflict strategy plays a zero-sum game in which each party mobilizes every

Intra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management

59

way to win the conflict, including violent ways. Yielding-conflict conflictstrategy is usually done by the lower and weaker party that surrenders any
decision to the opponent. Withdrawing-conflict strategy is the behaviour ofeach actor that avoids conflicts with others in order to avoid trouble. Problemsolving strategy is signed by both good commitment and political will to finda better alternative way out of the conflict through the mechanism of peacetalks. In reality, however, the problem-solving strategy is not easily done by26

two conflicting parties until the presence of a third party.

The third is to identify and evaluate conflict management as an
institutionalized system within society, including the regional andinternational community, whether built legally or normatively. Several
scholars stress that conflict management for community in a state, at somedegrees, is different from regional or international community. The main
problem here is that the main actors in the regional conflicts are more than27

one state. Conflict management for the international community is more
complex in case it is related to issues on sovereignty and independence.
According to Ghebremeskel, conflict management at the regional level requiresa strong international organization like the UN to carry out mechanisms andprocedures. However, a strong state role in settling bilateral conflicts is often
28

strategically important.

The main steps in analyzing conflict management help the conflictactors, both conflicting and third parties, to undertake peacemaking andpeacekeeping, good office, arbitration, mediation and negotiation.

29

The

measures can be used by the conflicting and third parties. However, someconflict management mechanism is only done by a third party such as
mediation, good offices, and arbitration. As a system, conflict management
provides a mechanism when and how mediation, good offices, and arbitration
should take place. In the intra-regional conflict, regional organizations such as
ASEAN, the EU, and SAARC with a certain degree of authority, legitimacy,and political power should ideally have such mechanism.

III. Border Conflicts in ASEAN
Most ASEAN member states were once colonized by Western countries,
except Thailand. After they gained independence, the Southeast Asia countries

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are still making efforts to maintain national unity and territorial identity.
However, countries with boundaries established by colonial maps have a lot
territorial issues to resolve. The countries found that demarcation drawn
unilaterally by the colonists was mostly obscure and disputable. The colonists
planted improper territorial lines, which are never demarcated by the survey
30

or physical markings for the actual area.

Ramses Amer summarizes both settled and unsettled territorial disputes
from 1960-1990s. Some settled border conflicts in Southeast Asia countries by
31

using a bilateral diplomacy can be seen in table 1 as follow :Table 1: Settled Border Conflicts in Southeast Asia
No

Year

1

1967 Indonesia and Malaysia Ownership of Simpadan and Ligitan(2002)
islands

2

1971

3

Conflicting Countries

IssuesIndonesia and Malaysia Agreement on the borders of thecontinental shelf in the northern partof the Malacca Strait
Indonesia, Thailand,and Malaysia

The formation of Tri-junction point(common point) on the continental shelf

4

1973

Indonesia andSingapore

Agreement to restrictions on the
Singapore Strait

5

1990

Vietnam and Laos

Agreement on the status of the borderline with agreed land boundary

6

1990

Malaysia and Thailand Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority tosettle disputes in the territorial sea in
the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf ofThailand7

1992

Malaysia and Vietnam

Joint development in the areas ofoverlapping claims to the continental
shelf to the south-west of Vietnam andeast-north-east of Peninsular Malaysia

8

1994

Myanmar and Laos

“Convention” to resolve the boundariesof their lands along the Mekong River

9

1997

Thailand and Vietnam

Agreement on continental shelf and theEEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).

10

1977

Brunei Darussalam and Maritime boundaries in the South
Malaysia
China Sea and EEZ areas

11

1998

TerritorialVietnam and Land border and maritime
CambodiaIntra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management

61

However there are still many unsettled border conflicts in the region ofSoutheast Asia. The unsettled border conflicts in Southeast Asia can be seen
32

at table 2 as follow :Table 2: Unsettled Border Conflicts in Southeast Asia
No

Year

Conflicting Countries

Issues1

1979

Indonesian and
Malaysia

2

1958

Brunei Darussalam and Maritime boundaries in the South
Malaysia
China Sea and EEZ areas

3

1995

The Philippines andIndonesia

Maritime boundary in the Celebes Sea

4

1995

Malaysia and thePhilippines

The maritime boundaries of Sulu Sea,
Celebes Sea, and South China Sea

5

1979

Malaysia and Singapore The ownership of Pedra Branca/ Pulau
Batu Puteh and maritime boundaries.

6

1968

Vietnam and Malaysia

The ownership status of the Spratly
islands

7

1980

Thailand and Laos

Dispute boats along the Mekong Riverborder8

1985

Myanmar and Thailand 2400 kilo meters of land borders andmaritime boundaries in the Andaman
Sea

Ambalat Block

In the case of Malaysia-Indonesia border conflicts, during 2005, 2008, and2010, both countries deployed their military forces along the border due tothe escalation of the conflict over Ambalat Island. In 2010 the two countries
sent their warships and this escalated political tensions. Indonesia built alighthouse near Ambalat Island and sent troops to the island. The escalation
was sparked by the arrest of three Indonesian patrol officers from the ministryof marine and fishery affairs by the Malaysian marine police as retaliation
for seven Malaysian fishermen were arrested by Indonesian authority on thesame day. Despite high internal political pressures, Indonesia and Malaysia
chose peace talk and diplomacy to resolve the dispute. War was not an option
with consideration of public safety in ASEAN. Indonesia’s President, Susilo
Bambang Yudoyono, stated through a press release in response to escalationand internal political pressure on Indonesia-Malaysia that considering thestrong friendship and the role of both countries in ASEAN (ASEAN pillars),

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peace talk, negotiation and diplomacy track should be used. He said that “So
let us fight for our national interests and character in the spirit of keeping
33

the peace.” Similar to Indonesian President, the Prime Minister of Malaysia
Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak also urged that the border conflict “needed to34

be resolved in an amicable manner through diplomatic channels.” Basicallyboth Malaysia and Indonesian government have agreed to settle the borderconflict by peaceful means bilaterally. However, ASEAN’s role in this case is
not embraced since the countries have chosen a bilateral diplomacy.

IV. ASEAN’s Conflict Management
ASEAN claims that conflict management system has been
institutionalized in its own unique way. In the case of ASEAN, a conflict
management system that provides a strong and legal mechanism is obviously
not found. Many scholars see conflict management in ASEAN is appeared tobe more a non-formal institution. Before current steps of ASEAN with new
ASEAN Charter and protocol for dispute mechanism, conflict management
system was based on the ASEAN principles and values.
The conflict management system consisted of summit meetings, foreign
ministers meetings (FMMs), economic and environmental ministers meetingsand senior officials meetings (SOMs) that held for averagely 230 meetings
annually. The system also included bilateral joint committees and commissions
to handle the border conflicts and military co-operation. Those meetings wereplanned to let ASEAN Member States interacting at many forums even when
they might be in a conflict situation. Askandar stated that ASEAN principles
explicated that they controlled themselves from being aggressive, and not tochoose violence to resolve conflicts among ASEAN members. In this sense, it
was notable that ASEAN has built “the mutual restraint without resorting to
35

deterrence (the balance of power)”.

However, some critics linked the non-formal mechanism of conflict
management system to some unsettled intraregional conflicts in Southeast
Asia that prove ASEAN’s inability in managing conflict. Acharya mentions
that the incapability of ASEAN in solving intraregional conflicts, particularly
border conflicts, was caused by the failure of establishing tangible institutional
design and mechanism for handling the conflict cases. ASEAN’s tendency

Intra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management63

in hiding its intraregional conflicts, rather than attempting to search a
36sustainable problem solving, could be seen as the weakness of ASEAN Way.

Therefore, some cases of intraregional conflicts, particularly the border conflictcases, could not be resolved using ASEAN method. As in the current caseof Preah Vihear Temple and Ambalat Island, the conflict escalations weremarked by armed-force mobilization and showdowns.
ASEAN Way on conflict management system was normatively named as
ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ASEAN DSM) which was basicallybuilt on the ASEAN values and norms that documented in ASEAN Charter,
Concord, and Treaty. In Bangkok declaration (1967) the spirit of regional
peace was clearly mentioned to promote “the spirit of equality and partnershipand thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region”
and the vision of “regional peace and stability.” Regarding with DSM, there
are five points in ASEAN purposes that emphasize on peace and security and37

related to regional conflict management. The five points are as follow :1. To maintain and improve peace, security and stability and, further on,
to strengthen peace oriented values in the region.
2. To enhance regional resilience by promoting political, security,
economic, and socio-cultural cooperation.
3. To preserve Southeast Asia as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and freefrom all other weapons of mass destruction.
4. To ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live inpeace with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious
environment.
5. (number 8) To respond effectively, in accordance with the principle ofcomprehensive security, on all forms of threats, transnational crimes
and trans-boundary challenges.
ASEAN Members must reaffirm and adhere to the fundamental principles
in the charter:
1. Respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial
integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Members.
2. Shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional
peace, security and prosperity.
3. Renunciation of aggression and of threats or use of forces or otheractions in any manner inconsistent with international law.

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4. Reliance on peaceful settlement of disputes
5. Non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Members.
6. Respect for the rights of every Member to lead its national existence,
free from external inference, subversion, and coercion.
Basically, ASEAN DSM could be traced more specifically through theTreaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) that based on
ASEAN Concord I. The Treaty, Article 2, mentions about the principles for the38

conflicting parties (High Contracting Parties) :1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial
integrity and national identity of all nations;2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free fromexternal interference, subversion or coercion;
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and6. Effective co-operation among themselves.
In Chapter IV on Pacific Settlement of Disputes from articles 13-17, theTreaty of Amity has built the conflict management mechanism. Basically, thechapter rules the State Members not to use violence or to “refrain from threator use of forces.” It designates that the conflicting parties (High Contracting
Parties) constitute a High Council comprising Representatives at ministerial
level, which should take cognizance of the dispute and recommend good offices,mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Contracting Parties should be
encouraged to take initiatives to solve the dispute by friendly negotiations
before resorting to other procedures, for example, stipulated in the Charter of
the United Nations.
Furthermore, the ASEAN DSM, specifically, could be traced to the1996 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the2003 ASEAN Protocol based on Bali Concord II. Based on Bali Concord II,
ASEAN DSM basically was emphasized on the framework of ASEAN Security
Community (ASC) with twelve points of regional security. First article of ASC
basically ruled intraregional conflicts, such as border conflict. It is stated that
“The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN’s political andsecurity cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region
live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic

Intra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management65

and harmonious environment. The ASEAN Security Community members
shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional
differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another39

and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives.”

In article 2 of the DSM Protocol 2003, SEOM (Senior Economic Official
Meeting) was the competent institution of the Protocol administration.
The ASEAN DSM was derived from the Protocol implemented on disputes
brought under the ASEAN economic agreement and consisted of a set of nonadjudicatory mechanisms, such as, consultation, good office, conciliation anda set of procedures at adjudicatory steps which comprised of proceedings
before the panel, the Appellate Body’s review, and procedures for compliancemonitoring. The ASEAN DSM was adopted from WTO DSU by some40

differences based on regional framework of ASEAN. Based on the Protocol,
the mechanism could be seen at the table 3 of ASEAN Dispute Resolution
41

Mechanism as follow :Table 3: Unsettled Border Conflicts in Southeast Asia
Duration

Process and Action

60 daysPre-adjudication consultations and mediations

45 days

SEOM establishes DSM panels and appoints panelists

60-70 days

Panel reports, containing legally binding findings andrecommendations, to be submitted to SEOM

30 days

SEOM to decide on report adoption (if no appeal)

60-90 days

Appeal proceedings to be reviewed by DSM Appellate Body
whose report is to be submitted to SEOM

30 days

SEOM to decide on adoption of appeal report

60 daysCompliance by AMS concerned to report findings andrecommendations (unless parties in dispute agree on a longer
timeframe for compliance)

In April 2010, the Foreign Ministers meeting was held in Hanoi andagreed to sign the Protocol of Dispute Mechanism Resolution that would
transform ASEAN DSM as a legal entity. This agreement was the effort of
ASEAN Member States to follow up the ASEAN Charter 2007. As reported
by Bangkok Post, ASEAN Members’ foreign ministers had common visionand commitment on ASEAN DSM. Foreign Minister from Singapore, George
Yeo, testifies that the protocol encouraged the ASEAN Members to have

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more political commitment by establishing a dispute settlement mechanism
which would realize the agreements more concretely. ASEAN Secretary
General Surin Pitsuwan also pointed out that the protocol was a “rather
comprehensive” document that would realize stability and security in the42

region.

The new part of Protocol is about the arbitrary mechanism. Before thearbitration, the request was from a complaining party for new consultations.
Good offices, mediation or conciliation, might be resorted by the parties if they
were able to improve the disputes into a conflict resolution. The Chairman of
ASEAN or the Secretary-General of ASEAN, acting in an ex officio capacity,
could also undertake good offices, mediation or conciliation if requested by the
conflicting parties. When the dispute could not be resolved by consultations
or good offices and mediation and conciliation processes, an arbitration
mechanism could be conducted under certain circumstances.
According to Tiwari, the mechanism to conduct arbitration needs tofollow the Rules of Arbitration annexed to the Protocol, but subjects to suchmodifications as the conflicting actors to the conflict might concur upon.
The number of arbitrators and the methods in which they are to be chosenor replaced is to be prescribed in the Rules of Arbitration annexed to theProtocol. Furthermore, Tiwari urges that the award of the arbitral tribunal
is ultimate and obligatory on all parties to the conflict and has to be obeyedby them fully. Likewise, the conflicting parties have to comply, too, withresolution agreements resulting from the conflict management means, such as
good offices, mediation and conciliation. Progress in fulfillment with arbitralawards and resolution agreements is to be observed and monitored through43

status reports applied to the Secretary-General of ASEAN.

V. The Implementation of ASEAN DSM:
Case of Thailand and Cambodia Border Dispute
The recent cases of border conflicts in the countries of Southeast Asia witharmed clashes occurred in the case of Thailand and Cambodia on the Preah
Vihear Temple. In the case of border land conflict on Preah Vihear Temple,
Thailand and Cambodia have mobilized their troops in a series of armed
clashes. Since July 2008, the Thai-Cambodian military has been involved inIntra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management

67

five low intensity fire fights, in October 2008, April 2009, January and April
2010, and currently in February 2011. The clashes have killed lives on bothsides, the hottest issue being the Bangkok and Phnom Penh’s decision to44

deploy military forces in the border conflict dynamics.

The conflict over Preah Vihear basically started a century ago. Basedon the completion of the border between the French colonial governmentof Cambodia and the Kingdom of Siam, the temple of Preah Vihear andsurrounding areas belonged to Cambodia. However, in 1938 the Thaigovernment reiterated that it was part of their territory. Therefore, the Thaigovernment occupied it until 1958 when the two warring parties held a seriesof negotiations to find a solution. There was no agreement reached. Bothwarring parties agreed to take the case to the International Court of Justice in
45

July 1959.

In 1962 International Court of Justice ruled that the temple belonged to
Cambodia by the request of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The Prince commanded
the Thai force to leave the temple after long occupation. And in July 2008
UNESCO listed Preah Vihear Temple as a world heritage that belongs to
Cambodia. The UNESCO’s decision on Preah Vihear Temple has triggered
protest of Thailand people such Thai’s People Alliance for Democracy. This
organization gives a strong political pressure to current Thai administrationon the issue of Preah Vihear Temple. Recently, in the beginning of February
2011 military forces from both countries fired each other across the disputed
border. BBC News reported that the fighting claimed five lives and thousandsof villagers around the temple were displaced. The part of Preah Vihear
Temple collapsed because of the fighting. The armed clash was triggered by
the arresting of seven Thai people by Cambodian authority as espionage.

46

VOA News reports that seven Cambodians, including two civilians, were killed
47

during the clash.

According to Nugroho, from a regional viewpoint, the Thailand-Cambodian
border conflict is only the tip of the iceberg. There are many of other borderconflicts among Southeast Asian countries which mostly are settled down48

by bilateral mechanisms. Border conflicts in Southeast Asian countries are
obviously influencing what ASEAN tries to create, namely a regional peaceand security community. As Singh states that later on, ASEAN has grown,
as de facto, to be a successful security regional community. And, eventually,

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the mobilization of armed forces have fired violence across the ThailandCambodia border with four more incidents, endangering ASEAN’s image as aregional area with peaceful condition. More annoying is the possible threats
as there are many unresolved conflict issues within the region of Asia. While
China’s claim on South China Sea and its minus of inhibition to use force
causes trouble, most of ASEAN member-states have not settled the land and49

maritime border conflict issues.

Is ASEAN DSM able to settle down border conflict in the ThailandCambodia conflict on Preah Vihear Temple? Indonesian Foreign Minister,Marty Natalegawa, states that it would be up to the conflicting parties
themselves, including ASEAN Members, whether they want to use ASEAN
DSAM or not. In the case of Thai-Cambodia border conflict on Preah Vihear
Temple, both parties have a free status whether they would use ASEAN DSM
or not. Natalegawa states, “When all is said and done, the most important
50

thing is the political will to use or not to use such a mechanism.” Using
Natalegawa statement on ASEAN DSM, it could be interpreted quite clearly
that the ASEAN’s conflict management system is basically only an option withno obligation to follow. It is not the main mechanism of conflicting parties
to resolve conflicts in Southeast Asian countries, including the case of ThaiCambodia conflict. Indeed, the ASEAN DSM practically now is challenged
by current border conflicts with armed clash, such as between Thailand andCambodia. If ASEAN is unable to manage the border conflicts by settling themdown, Singh reminds that ASEAN’s security role in the region of ASIA is a
failure which means that the region of Southeast Asia is possibly back to the51

past in using violence to settle any disputes and conflicts.

The armed clash in Thailand and Cambodian’s border conflict is a regional
political symptom that shows the ASEAN security community is still far fromachieving. Both the Thai government and Cambodian’s have been using acontending conflict strategy in which zero-sum game is being played. With thisconflict strategy, by giving up the settlement process to the conflicting parties,
the hope to find a solution to the problem is impossible. Thai and Cambodia
politically disobeyed ASEAN principles and values. Therefore, the conflicting
parties have violated the shared norms, values, and principles of ASEAN.
At the same time, ASEAN, as the regional organization, and its conflict
management system seemed to be very weak; its conflict management system

Intra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management69

cannot be undertaken ideally. When the Members of ASEAN deploy means ofviolence to resolve border disputes, there is no systemic action, such as, giving
sanction to the violator of ASEAN norms. Based on ACT and ASEAN Charter,
it is clear that the Member States must use a peaceful conflict resolution.
However, what can ASEAN do to practice the norms?
In recognition of the armed clash, Indonesia, as the current chairmanof ASEAN, sent its foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, to Cambodia andThailand after the armed violent clash. Indonesia also has sent its observers
to the conflicted area to find out the latest situation in the field. Based on
new ASEAN Charter, the parties were allowed “to request the chairmanof ASEAN” or “the secretary-general of ASEAN” to undertake conflict
management system, such as good offices, conciliation or mediation. Marty,
as well as representatives from Cambodia and Thailand, attended the UN
52

Secretariat briefing requested by the UN Security Council. The chairmanof ASEAN also pushed Thai and Cambodian governments to hold peacetalks to end deadly armed clashes. However, as reported by CNN, Marty M.
Natalegawa states that the issue “can only be addressed bilaterally.” Aftersome dialogues with the conflicting Member States, Phnom Penh and Bangkok
had a commitment to bring the conflict through peaceful mechanism by using
dialogues and negotiation processes. The question here was: did the conflicting
parties want to use ASEAN DSM to help them in solving the problem? Or, wasthere an obligation for conflicting parties to obey ASEAN DSM?
Based on foreign minister meeting held in Jakarta, the chairman of
ASEAN offered good office and mediation by providing a neutral place inIndonesia to hold a peace talk in early April 2011. At the beginning, theconflicting parties agreed it. However, as reported by media, military forceof Thailand preferred a bilateral diplomacy to solve the border conflict onPreah Vihear Temple. The rejection basically was to de-legitimate Indonesia’s
leadership and weaken ASEAN’s strategic role in managing intraregional
conflict within its own region.

53

At the same time, ASEAN, through its

chairman, could not force the Member States to continue using ASEAN DSM.
This case was just evidence that ASEAN DSM had vital weakness. Nugroho
stated that the conflicting parties were not obliged to accept the mediation of54

the other members of the High Council. There was no power and authority of
ASEAN as regional organization of Southeast Asian countries to obligate its

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members to obey its own conflict management system.
Sim, in his article, urges that the border conflict of Thai and Cambodia
was basically fuelled by internal politics in both countries; it has become athreat to ASEAN’s positive record in preventing violent conflicts among themembers. The intervention of Indonesia as the chairman of ASEAN, thus,
55

momentarily strengthened ASEAN institutions at a hard time. The norm of“avoiding violent disputes,” as mentioned previously, was then likely to becomea regional political fallacy system. Ideally, any intraregional conflict should
be handled and solved by certain and legal mechanism of ASEAN. However,
ASEAN DSM had a weak side, namely, inability to force its member states
to follow the system. Even the new ASEAN Charter has mentioned about theconflict management system, namely, good office, mediation, and conciliation;
its realization depended only on political will, as the chairman of ASEAN
stated previously. When conflicting parties, such as in Thai and Cambodia
case, did not accept ASEAN DSM, they could just go for other mechanisms.
That weakness of ASEAN DSM did not provide a good track for building
ASEAN Community Security. Many intraregional conflicts in the region ofSoutheast Asia are settled down mostly outside of the ASEAN DSM. The
Singapore-Malaysia ICJ litigation on Pedra Branca could be the sample ofintra-ASEAN dispute handled by non-ASEAN mechanism. It also happened
recently to non-border conflict, such as when Thailand invited a World
Trade Organization (WTO) to handle Thai customs valuation of cigarettes
that brought by the Philippines. Sigitan and Simpadan dispute was also
resolved without ASEAN DSM. Sim mentions, “A relatively low-profile, lowerstakes economic dispute involving the ASEAN Economic Community would
be brought to the WTO instead of the ASEAN dispute settlement system56

evidences a lack of confidence in the ASEAN system”.

The lack of regionalism feeling and poor institutionalized conflict
management system of ASEAN will obviously create more cases of unresolved
intraregional conflicts. The member states will easily escape from their‘obligation’ to participate in the governance of ASEAN which is on the way
towards establishing ASEAN Community 2015. The implementation of
ASEAN DSM in managing border conflicts, in general intraregional conflicts,
may have been undertaken optimally as its way. However, this paper foundthat the weakness side of ASEAN conflict management was on the non-Intra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management71

binding mechanism and institutionalized conflict management system which
was not concrete. Therefore, instantly, it can be said that in the future, theregion will face many intraregional conflicts, including border conflicts, withthe mobilization of means of violence. There should be more active efforts toestablish a stronger regionalism feeling, solidarity, unity, and governancesystem of ASEAN.

Conclusion
This paper found the fact of ASEAN’s conflict management system isvery loose and weak. As elaborated earlier, ASEAN DSM was not built as alegal binding system to guide intraregional conflict to find a problem solving.
The ASEAN Charter and ACT may provide some ideal mechanisms of conflict
management. However, the system does not tie the ASEAN Member States inorder for them to utilize and follow its mechanism consistently. At the sametime, ultra-nationalism is much larger than a regionalism feeling of ASEAN
people, or even leaders. When Indonesia and Malaysia disputed Simpadan
and Ligitan, ultra-nationalism protests occurred in a larger scale comparedwith the people who value more regionalism feeling. The protest demanded
the Indonesian government to declare war and close down its embassy in
Malaysia. The protest occurred again during the Ambalat block dispute. The
phenomenon also rose up in Bangkok regarding to the status of border conflictaround the Preah Vihear Temple. ASEAN needs to conduct more peace
campaigns focusing on the regionalism feeling to the ASEAN people. Peace
education program for the ASEAN youth will help the ASEAN people to gain
more regionalism feeling and reduce ultra-nationalism.
Institutionally, ASEAN DSM is dealing with the classic issue of theprinciple of “non-interference” to member sovereignty. As Abad, Jr. mentioned
in his article that the principles hampered ASEAN to conduct more responsive
conflict management. He stated that ASEAN has built a collective agreement
to broadly comprehend and monitor its very important policy of “noninterference in the internal affairs of one another”; it will be hard to assume amore effective and practical role in conflict management, especially when thedispute or conflict is not inter-state in nature. Clearly, ASEAN has to develop
further confidence among respective members. This issue, however, cannot

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57

be separated from ASEAN states’ national political systems. However, as
clearly written in APSC (ASEAN Political Security Community) blue print,
the organization has an opportunity to strengthen its conflict management
system.
As a blueprint, APSC is a new regional capital to handle the two problems
mentioned above. The ASEAN Members have more responsibility to engage
fully by looking at APSC that has been produced by them. The discourse ofsome scholars to build more concrete and well-established conflict management
system with more regional political legitimacy cannot be ignored politically.
As a regional political entity, ASEAN has an obligation to create more formal
regional instrument for managing intraregional conflicts. By creating moreformal settlement mechanisms and legal binding ones, ASEAN can step muchcloser to APSC. At the same time, ASEAN cannot only rely on the political willof its members; it also needs stronger leadership and better governance. In
the case of Preah Vihear Temple case, Marty Natalegawa, then, mentions thatone big purpose of ASEAN’s DSM has been achieved; it was marked by thecease fire and agreement to hold peace talk between Thailand and Cambodia.
However, there should be more confidence in leadership among the ASEAN
Members to handle intraregional conflicts.

Notes
1 “Overview,” ASEAN. Accessed March 6, 2011 http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean.
2 Michele Pace, “EU Policy-Making Towards Border Conflicts,” Working Papers Series in
EU Border Conflicts Studies, No. 15., June 2005. Accessed September 19 2012. http://www.
bhamlive2.bham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/polsis/research/eu-border-conflict/wp15-eu-policy-making-towards-border-conflicts.pdf.
3 Kripa Sridharan. 2009, “Regional Organisations and Conflict Management: Comparing
ASEAN and SAARC.” Accessed March 18 2011. Working Paper 33, Regional and Global Axes ofConflict, National University of Singapore, March 2008. Accessed March 2010 http://www.dfid.
gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/CrisisStates/wp33.2.pdf.
4 Kamarulzaman Askandar, Jacob Bercowtch Bercowtch, and Mikio Oishi, “The ASEAN Way
of Conflict Management: Old Patterns and New Trends,” Asian Journal of Political Science,
Volume 10, Issue 2 (2002): 21-42. Accessed March 29, 2011. http://www.informaworld.com/
smpp/content~db=all~content=a789141200.
5 “Asean Political-Security Community Blueprint,” Jakarta: Asean Secretariat (2010): 10.
Accessed February 8, 2011 http://www.aseansec.org/22337.pdf.
6 Rajshree Jetly, “Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC,” TheIntra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management

73

Pacific Review, Volume 16, Number 1, March, 2003 (USA: Routledge, 2003) 53-76.
7 Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and The Global System, 2nded. (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2007), 17.
8 J. Otomar Bartos and Paul Wehr, Using Conflict Theory (UK: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 12.
9 Ibid., 22.
10 Wallensteen, 57.
11 Conflict analysis is one step of conflict management which aims to understand the issues,
actors, root cause of conflict, and conflict dynamic. It is used as systematic information upon
what conflict action and intervention should be conducted.
12 Wallensteen, 12.
13 L. Susan Carpenter and W.J.D Kennedy, Managing Public Disputes: A Practical Guide to
Handling Conflict and Reaching Agreements (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989).
14 E. Richard Rubenstein, “Conflict Resolution and Power Politics: Global Conflict after War”,
working paper 10, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (California: George Mason
University, 1996) 1. Accessed December 10, 2010 http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_10_rubenstein.pdf.
15 Carpenter and Kennedy, 6.
16 Carsten De Dreu, K.W. ”Conflict Management and Performance.” in Using Conflict inOrganizations, edited by Carsten De Dreu and Evert van De Vliert (London: Sage Publication,2007).
17 Peace making means a process to stop violence of the conflicting parties through some politicaland legal actions including military intervention while peace keeping is an effort of third
neutral party to maintain a situation from violent action that may occur during the conflict
dynamics.
18 Jean-Sebastian Rioux, “Third Party Intervention as Conflict Management: the Case of Africa”,
16th Nordic and 4th Baltic Peace Research Conference, St. Petersburg, Russian Republic (11-13
September 2003). Accessed September 30, 2012 http://www.institutidrp.org/contributionsidrp/
Rioux_7octobre2003.pdf.
19 Ahmad Azem Hamad, “The Reconceptualisation of Conflict Management,” Peace, Conflict andDevelopment: An Interdisciplinary Journal Vol. 7 (July 2005): 2. Accessed March 20, 2011 http://
www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk.
20 Ibid., 25.
21 Ibid., 11.
22 Ibid., 28.
23 Positivism of social sciences is a tradition of scholars that believe social life and society can betreated in an objective, universal and free value approach as the natural sciences.
24 Juergen Habermas, Communication and The Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).
25 Wallensteen, 5.
26 Hugh Miall, Wood Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The
Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (UK: Polity Press, 1999).
27 Ibid.
28 Adane Ghebremeskel, “Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somali
Experience,” OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 4.2 (2002): 9-29.
Accessed September 30, 2012. www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/4_2gheb.pdf.
29 Ho-Won Jeong, Peace and Conflict Studies (UK: Ashagate, 2000).
30 Agus Trihartono, “The Evolving ASEAN Security Community (ASC): Background, Rationales,

74

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and Challenges” ( MA thesis, Graduate School of International Relations. Ritsumeikan
University: Kyoto, Japan, 2009), 37.
31 Ramses Amer, “Conflict Management and Constructive Engagement in ASEAN’s Expansion,”
Third World Quarterly, Vol 20, No 5 (2000), pp. 1031-48. Accessed March 20, 2010 http://www.
jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3993610.pdf?acceptTC=true.
32 Ibid., 34-36.
33 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyoyo, “Susilo: Resolve Territorial Issues to Maintain Ties,” The Star,
September 2, 2010. Accessed April 3, 2011 http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/9/2/
nation/6966792&sec=nation.
34 Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, “Malaysia and Indonesia Can Play A Bigger Role in Region—
Najib.” Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, September 28, 2009. Accessed December 18,
2012 http://www.pmo.gov.my/?menu=newslist&news_id=645&news_cat=13&page=1731&sort_year=&sort_month=.
35 Askandar, et.al., 24-32.
36 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the
Problem of Regional Order (New York: Routledge, 2009), 6.
37 “The ASEAN Charter” (ASEAN Secretariat 2007), 3-4. Accessed March 18, 2011 http://www.
aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.
38 “The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.” Accessed April 7, 2010 http://www.
aseansec.org/1217.htm.
39 “Declaration of Bali Concord II (Bali Concord II),” ASEAN, Accessed November 25, 2012, http://
www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html.
40 Paulo Vergano R., “The Asean Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Its Role in a Rules-based
Community: Overview and Critical Comparation,” Asian International Economic Law (AIELN),
Inaugural Conference (June 30, 2009). Accessed March 22, 2011 http://aieln1.web.fc2.com/
Vergano_panel4.pdf.
41 “Asean Dispute Settlement System.” Aseansec: Jakarta (2009). Accessed February 8, 2011
http://www.aseansec.org/Fact%20Sheet/AEC/2009-AEC-017.pdf
42 George Yeo and Surin Pitsuwan, “Asean Leaders Ink Dispute Resolution Protocol.” Bangkok
Post (August 8, 2010). Accessed April 3, 2011 http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/174007/
asean-leaders-ink-dispute-resolution-protocol.
43 R. Tiwari, “Slowly but surely- ASEAN’s Progress in Dispute Resolution,” Asean Studies Center
14 April 2010. Accessed April 2, 2011 http://asc.iseas.edu.sg/images/stories/pdf/asco16-10.pdf.
44 Bilver Singh, “ASEAN’s Raison d’etre in Danger,” Today Online, 19 February 2011. Accessed
April 3, 2011 http://www.todayonline.com/World/EDC110219-0000190/ASEANs-raison-detrein-danger.
45 Bambang Hartadi Nugroho, “Temple Dispute and ASEAN Conflict Settlement,” The
Jakarta Post, 12 February 2011. Accessed April 4, 2011 http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2011/02/12/temple-dispute-and-asean-conflict-settlement.html.
46 “Thai-Cambodia Clashes ‘Damage Preah Vihear Temple,” BBC, 6 February, 2011. Accessed
April, 3 2010 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12377626.
47 “In Preah Vihear Temple, 50 Years of Conflict,” VOA News 15 February 2010. Accessed April
4, 2011 http://www.voanews.com/khmer-english/news/In-Preah-Vihear-Temple-50-Years-ofConflict-116230744.html.
48 Nugroho, op.cit.
49 Singh, op.cit.

Intra-Regional Border Conflicts and the Institutional Design of ASEAN’s Conflict Management75

50 Marty Natalegawa, “Asean Leaders Ink Dispute Resolution Protocol”, Bangkok Post, 8 August
2010. Accessed April 3, 2011 http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/174007/asean-leaders-inkdispute-resolution-protocol.
51 Singh, op.cit.
52 “Asean Can Mediate Thai-Cambodia Conflict,” Strait Times, February 16, 2011. Accessed
April 4, 2011 from http://www.bt.com.bn/opinion/2011/02/16/asean-can-mediate-thai-cambodiaconflict.
53 “Thai Politics May Derail RI Leadership,” The Jakarta Post, 25 March 2011. Accessed http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/25/thai-politics-may-derail-ri-leadership.html
54 Nugroho, op.cit.
55 Edmund Sim, “ASEAN Chair Indonesia Needs to Work Fast on Preah Vihear”, Opinionasia,
February 2011. Accessed April 4, 2011 from http://opinionasia.com/node/871.
56 Sim, ibid.
57 M.C. Abad. Jr., “Prospects for UN-ASEAN Cooperation in Conflict Management?”, Third UNASEAN Conference on Conflict Prevention sponsored by the UNDPA, UNDP, Singapore MFA,
IDSS, ASEAN-ISIS and the ASEAN Secretariat, Singapore, 17-19 February 2003. Accessed
April 4, 2011 http://www.aseansec.org/14202.htm.

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