VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERSPRISONER RATES: GLOBAL TRENDS AND LOCAL EXCEPTIONS
Tapio Lappi-Seppälä*
I. THE GROWTH OF PRISON POPULATIONS
A. World Prison Populations Today
1. The Highest Prisoner Rates
The third edition (2001) of the World Prison Population List, published by the British Home Office1
shows that over 8.75 million people are held in penal institutions throughout the world, either as pretrial detainees (remand prisoners) or as having been convicted and sentenced. Half of these are in the
United States, Russia and China, and the first two countries also exhibit the highest prison population
rates.

800

Prisoner
RatesininEu
EuropePrisoner ratesrope (and(an dUSA)USA)inin2000
2000
(/100
000
inhabitants)(/100 000 inh abitants)

700(Source : W orld Prison Popula tion list, third e dition)

600
500
400
300
200

USA

Belarus

Russian Fed.

LatviaUkraineEstonia

Moldova

Romania

Lithuania

PolandCzech RepublicHungary

Portugal

Slovakia

England/Wales

Spain

Scotland

Italy

Bulgaria

Germany

Switzerland

Austria

Belgium

Netherlands

MaltaFranceSwedenFYR Macedonia

Denmark

Croatia

NorwayCyprusFinland
Slovenia

0

Iceland100

Figure I.1. Europe and USA 2000
At the beginning of the year 2000, USA had the highest prison population rate in the world, some
700 per 100,000 of the national population, followed by Russia (665). After these two countries come
Belarus and Kazakhstan, and four small territories in the central America/Caribbean region whosehigh rates owe much to the imprisonment of drug smugglers who are not nationals of the countries inquestion (see Walmsley 2002). All these countries have rates of at least 460 per 100,000. On the other
hand, 63% of all countries have rates of 150 per 1000 000 or below.
2. Local Variations
Prison population rates vary considerably between different regions of the world, and between
different parts of the same continent. In Africa the median rate for Southern African countries is 260* Director
National Research Institute of Legal Policy – Finland
1

Walmsley, Roy: World Prison Population List (third edition), Home Office, Research Findings 166/2002. See also Walmsley Roy,
World Prison Populations: Facts, Trends and Solutions. United Nations Programme Network Institutes Technical AssistanceWorkshop. Vienna Austria - May 10, 2001. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/unworld.doc

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 61
whereas in Central and West Africa the rate is 50/55; in the Americas the median rate for the
Caribbean countries is 295 but in South America 115.
In Europe, the median rate for Central and Eastern European countries is more than three times
that for Southern European countries. In northern Europe the most striking difference is to be foundbetween the Scandinavian countries and the neighbouring Baltic countries. In Scandinavia (Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland) the rate is 55, in the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania
and Latvia) it is six times higher (310).

Prisoner Rates
rates inPrisonerin different
Different
European
2000
European Regions
regions 2000
700
600

Baltic500

Centraland East

400
300

South

Western
200

Scandinavia

Belarus

Russian Fed.

PolandCzech RepublicHungary

Bulgaria

Slovakia

Portugal

Italy

Spain

Croatia

GreeceSlovenia

England & Wales

Germany

Switzerland

Netherlands

Austria

FranceLatviaEstonia

Lithuania

NorwaySwedenDenmark

0

Finland100

Figure I.2. Europe, Different Regions 2000
Similar differences are to be found in the Asian region. In Asia the median rate for the South
Central Asian countries is 55 whereas for (ex-Soviet) Central Asian it is nine times higher (425).22

See in more detail Kitada, Mikinao, Prison Population in Asian Countries. United Nations Programme Network Institutes
Technical Assistance Workshop. Vienna Austria - May 10, 2001. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/ridraft.doc. Prisoner
rates in Latin America and the Caribbean are described in Carranza Elias, Prison Overcrowding in Latin America and the
Caribbean: Situation and Possible Responses. United Nations Programme Network Institutes Technical Assistance Workshop.
Vienna Austria - May 10, 2001. http:// www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/ international/caribbean.doc

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Prisonerin inEasternandSouthPrisonerRates
rates(/100(/100000000inhab.)
inhab.)
EasternandSouthEasternAsia(1998/2000)
EasternAsia(1998/2000)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

385
335
245

Singapore

160

Mongolia

135 150

Hong
Kong

Malaysia

70

Philippines

50

Cambodia

45

Indonesia

25

115 12095 110Korea(Republic

205

Figure I.3. Eastern and South Eastern Asia
B. Growth and Trends in Prison Population Rates
Prison population rates are not only high - they are constantly growing in most parts of the world.
In many of the developed countries, there has been a rise in prisoner rates, often with a 40% growthover the decade.
1. Growth in Europe
Prisoner
Prisoner Growth
growth During
during thethe 1990s:
1990s: Western
WesternEurope
Europe
-40 %

-20 %

0%

20 %

40 %

60 %

80 %

100 %

N e t he r l a n ds
It alyGr e e c e
P o r t u ga l
Ge r m a n y
Tur ke yUK
Ir el andS pai nBe lgium
S wi t z e r l a n d
N o r wa y
F r a nc e
A u st r i a
D e n ma r k
S we de n

Source: Roy Walm sley 2001

F i nl a n dFigure I.4. Western Europe in the 1990s (%)
In Europe the growth has been over 20% almost everywhere during the last decade, and at least
40% in half of the countries. Out of the 33 European countries (leaving aside the very small states)

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 61
there has been growth in 28. During the last three years, there has been growth in 24 of the European
countries, and growth of over 10% in more than half of these.
Only in two of the 43 countries observed in the 3rd World Prison Population survey (Home Office166/2002) – Sweden and Finland – has there been a consistent downward trend in the last three years.
Finland is the only country that has had a downward trend throughout the decade.
In the Eastern parts of the Europe, the growth has been especially rapid.

-50 %

0%

50 %

100 % 150 % 200 % 250 % 300 % 350 % 400 %Belarus
Czech Republic
Romania
UkraineBulgaria
Lithuania
RussiaSlovakia
Croatia

Prisoner
GrowthDuring1990s:
Prisoner
growthduringthethe1990s:
CentralEasternEuropeCentralandandEasternEuropeHungary
PolandLatviaEstonia
M oldova
M acedonia

Source: Roy Walm sley 2001

Slovenia

Figure I.5. Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (%)
2. Growth in Asia
Figure I.5. shows the changes in the imprisonment rate per 100,000 residents in some Asian
countries from 1996 to 2000.

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Imprisonment
in SomeIm priso nm e nt raRatest e s ins o m eAsianA s iaCountries
n c o untinrie s in
1996
and
2001
(/100
000
inhab.)
19 9 6 a nd 2 0 0 1 ( / 10 0 0 0 0 inha b.)

400
300
200
100
0

Indone
sia

Japan

Cambo
dia

China

Malays.

Korea

Hong Mongo
KonglThail.

Singap.

Mid 1996

23

38

28

107

108

139

201

252

173

304

Mid 2001

31

48

52

113

124

132

173

277

352

366

Figure I.6. Asia 1996-2000
The figures account for both convicted and not convicted prisoners. Japan had a relatively low
imprisonment rate among the listed countries, showing around 45 per 100,000 in mid 2000. Other
countries like China, Korea and Malaysia maintained stable figures at around 100 to 200 per 100,000.
Singapore and Thailand recorded relatively large increments in their imprisonment rates, exceeding
300 per 100,000 in mid 2000. In particular, a very rapid increase in the imprisonment rate in Thailand
has been quite remarkable.
C. Reasons for Prison Population Growth: General Overview
Possible explanations for these changes may be found in several sources:
1. Increase in Crime?
One obvious explanation would be the growth of crime. However, it is evident that crime rates alone
cannot explain the changes in prison population rates. In many countries crime rates, including rates
for the more serious crimes, have been stable or even decreasing while prison population has grownsteadily. In the US prisoner rates are now five to six times higher than in the mid 1970s, but only 12%of this change can be explained with reference to the growth of crime (Tonry 1999).
One type of crime, however, seems to be closely connected to the raising number of prisoners. In
many countries the increase in prison population goes together with the number of detected drug
offenders. Or, at least, the most rapidly growing category of prisoners are those convicted of drug
offences (or drug related crimes). But this is not only a question of criminality. Rather, it is a question of
the deliberate changes in governments’ drug policies and sentencing practices.
2. Technical Explanation: Increased Use of Prison
An even more obvious explanation is simply the increased use of prison: More people have beensentenced to prisons and they have received longer sentences than before and, moreover, the use ofparole or conditional release has become more restricted. Examples of changed penal practices can befound almost everywhere.
Most notorious example of this is the US – a country that started the movement towards higher
prisoner rates simply by using more and longer custodial sentences from the mid-1970s onwards.

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Examples can also be found in Western Europe. The Netherlands had long been renowned for its low
prison population rate. In the 1990s, it has had sharper rise than any other West European country, andits prison population has almost doubled. The increase is attributable to a rise in the use of custody andin the length of the sentences imposed. The same development can be seen in Portugal which now has
the highest prisoner rate in Western Europe as a result of increased length of sentences. England andWales holds the second place, partly due to the fact that the use of custodial sentences rose 40% during
the 1990s.
3. Ideological Explanation: Changes in Sentencing Theory
The next question is why the practices have been changed. One answer could be found in the
explicit policy orientations and changes in penal theory and crime policy. Since the mid 1970s – when
prison population rates first started to rise in the US – the sentencing ideologies have undergone
drastic changes. Treatment ideology and criminological correctionalism have been replaced byretributionist notions of just deserts and “common sense” policies based on incapacitation anddeterrence. These retributionist philosophies can readily be translated into popular demands for longer,
tougher sentences. Such factors do appear to have led to a change in attitudes especially in some partsof Europe and North America.
4. Political Explanation: Changes in Political Rhetoric and the Growth of “Punitive Populism”
1. Together with the new sentencing policies incurred other, more profound, policy changes, whichmarked the overall politicisation of crime policy. Criminal policy has more and more become a tool ofgeneral politics, a way to transmit “symbolic messages”, a way to “take a stand”, a way to “makestrategic choices”. At the same time the language of criminal policy has changed into moral tones andmoved towards expressive gestures. Instead of balanced reasoning and the weighting of different
strategies, their pros and cons, criminal justice interventions are often determined by a simple politicalneed to “do something”. Too often the rule of thumb seems to be that the higher the level of politicalauthority is, the more simplistic the approaches advocated are.
The results can be seen in programmes and slogans that are compressed into two or three words,
along the lines of “three strikes”, “prison works”, “truth in sentencing”, “war on drugs”, “zero tolerance” and so on. This, in turn, leads to the tendency to offer simple solutions to complex problems
and to pander to punitive (or presumably punitive) public opinion with harsh tough-on-crime
campaigns. In concrete terms: The crime problem and the fears of the public have more and more beenused for political purposes.
According to Tonry (1999), “The anomaly that public receptivity to proposals for harsh crime anddrug policies remained high in the late 1990s even in the face of substantial and long-term drops incrime rates and in drug use” is explained in the US by, first: “conservative politicians found it intheir interest to keep voters’ attention focused on an issue about which liberals are reluctant todisagree”; second: “the mass media has learned that crime pays in terms of public fascination withthe darker sides of life and that fears vicariously enjoyed in front of the television or the movie
screen are generalised to life outside the home”; and third, “in the 1990s people don’t really careabout the effectiveness of crime and drug abuse policies” but instead support harsh policies for‘expressive’ reasons, because at this time they “value the denunciatory qualities of harsh laws”.
2. In many countries this development is reinforced and supported by the crime drama created in
the mass media and the increasingly growing punitive demands of the public. These two factors areinterconnected, as the attitudes of the public are heavily (mis)guided by the sensational and selective
way in which the mass media deals with crime and criminals. In fact, all of the three elements, that is
populist politicians, mass media and punitive public opinion form a vicious, self-supporting circle where
each component reinforces the other.
3. Attitudes can also be influenced in the short-term by isolated highly publicized dramatic events
such as the 1993 Bulger incident in England (the killing of a young child by two other children). Since
this dramatic event the use of custodial sentences rose by 40%, sentence lengths rose by more than
10%, and now seven or eight years later the prison population remains at the level that it reached after
this event.

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Similar incidents have also occurred elsewhere, as the 1996 Dutroux case in Belgium (involving
kidnapping, paedophilia and murder). The United States has seen an increase in random shootings ofyoung people by strangers. Such events can generate public demands for a more punitive response tocertain crimes and offenders, demands which may be accepted by policy makers and courts alike. Even
after the focus in the media has moved on to other matters, more punitive policy responses tend toremain in place.
5. Social and Structural Reasons
But the roots of these political changes may be even deeper. Behind these changes are also more
profound economic and social uncertainties, first brought to the western world by the 1970s oil crisis,
and then again by the economic crises of the 1990s. Rising unemployment figures, together withincreasing crime rates fuel these feelings of insecurity (portrayed also in the growing fear of crime).
This leaves less and less room for the feelings of tolerance and solidarity for socially marginalised
groups. Punitive policies also reflect deeper changes in our social values. In the western world, thegrowth of penal populism goes together with the decline of the values of welfare state, replaced bymarket economy and neo-liberal social policies. If the world of the 1960s was the world of “economic
control and social freedom”, the world of the 1990s became the world of “economic freedom and social
control”.
This change is well characterized by David Garland (2001 p.199): “In the middle decades of the lastcentury, the criminal justice system formed part of a broader solidarity project. Its programmatic
response to crime was part of the welfare state's programmatic response to poverty and destitution.
Criminal justice was shaped by the politics of social democracy, and its ideals were the reintegrative ideals of an inclusive welfare state society. ... But that solidarity project no longer
dominates the rhetoric of policy or the logic of decision-making. The high ideals of solidarity havebeen eclipsed by the more basic imperatives of security, economy, and control. Crime control andcriminal justice have come to be disconnected from the broader themes of social justice and social
reconstruction. Their social function is now the more reactionary, less ambitious one of re-imposing
control on those who fall outside the world of consumerist freedom.”
Of course these social and structural background reasons vary in different parts of the world, – asalso vary the respective social and economic conditions. In Eastern Europe a part of the prison
population growth is explainable by the collapse of the communist and socialist regime, followed by amarked rise in criminality at least until 1992/3, as the barriers of the previous repressive regimes were
removed. This seems to have been reflected in the increasing use of imprisonment. But the question is
why, then, the rise continued for the following four or five years when crime rates were generally fairly
stable?
Also in Eastern Europe, although the overall crime rates were not rising, the public, the media andthe politicians were all alarmed by the changes in the nature of crime, with the emergence of new andpreviously unheard of forms of criminality, such as transnational organised crime, economic crime and,in some countries, contract killings. This climate of fear led to the increased use of pre-trial detention,subsequent imprisonment, longer terms of imprisonment as well as conditional release being more
sparingly allowed (Walmsley 2001).
6. In Conclusion
The growth of prisoner rates has explanations at many levels. In technical terms this has been the
result of more and longer sentences. Ideologically the change is connected with new sentencing theories
and policies. The adoption of these policies was influenced by the increased fear of crime and the impact
of mass media. Both of these factors also contribute to the changes in the general political discourse:
Crime policy became more and more politicized, and cool and rational arguments were replaced byexpressive and symbolic gestures, directed to calm down the anxieties of the public (and the voters).
But, when we look deep enough, these policies did not come “out of nowhere”. They were reflections of
the social, economical and cultural transformations of the era of “late modernity”, as well as answers tosocial needs and political pressures (which does not mean that there could not have been other – better– answers).

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Basically this all means that the growth in prison population rates in the European and North
American countries is mainly policy-driven – not an inevitable result of an increase in crime (see also
Walmsley 2001). The issue, then, is whether things could have been different, and whether the present
state of affairs could be changed? To answer these questions, we should look at those countries that did
not follow this general trend. These include, among others, Japan and Finland.
II. REDUCING THE PRISON POPULATION IN FINLAND
A. The Change
1. At the beginning of the 1950s, the prisoner rate in Finland was four times higher than in theother Nordic countries. Finland had some 200 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, while the figures in
Sweden, Denmark and Norway were around 50. Even during the 1970s, Finland's prisoner ratecontinued to be among the highest in Western Europe. However, the steady decrease that started soonafter the Second World War continued. Even during the 1970s and 1980s, when most European
countries experienced rising prison population rates, the Finnish one kept going down and by the
beginning of the 1990s Finland had reached the Nordic level (figure II.1.).

Prison Rate
rate 1950-1997
Prison1950-1997(/100 000000 population)
population)
200
DEN

180

FIN

160

NOR

140

SWE

120
100
80
60
40
20
1995

1992

1989

1986

1983

1980

1977

1974

1971

1968

1965

1962

1959

1956

1953

1950

0

Figure II.1. Prisoner Rates in Four Scandinavian Countries 1950-1997(Source: Lappi-Seppälä 2001)
2. This long-term change - covering almost a half of a century - cannot be explained with reference
to one or two simple factors. The change has been affected both by macro level structural factors andideological changes in penal theory, as well as legal reforms and changing practices of sentencing and of
prison enforcement. Also the role of these different background reasons varies over time. This paper
discusses some these key factors.3
B. The Ideology
1. In the 1960’s, the Nordic countries experienced heated social debate on the results andjustifications of involuntary treatment in institutions, both penal and otherwise (such as in health careand in the treatment of alcoholics). In Finland the criticism of the treatment ideology was in a sense
merged with another liberal social movement which was directed against our outdated and overly
severe Criminal Code and the excessive use of custodial sentences. Not only was there a decline of therehabilitative ideal, but also a reaction against old repressive policies. The outcome of all this was a
3

The subject has been dealt with in more detail by the author in Lappi-Seppälä 1998 and 2001, see also Törnudd 1993.

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criminal political ideology — “humane neo-classicism” — which stressed both legal safeguards against
coercive care as well as the objective of less repressive measures in general.
2. During this ideological turn, the theoretical aim and the justification of punishment was
subjected to re-evaluation. The shift was once again towards general prevention. However, it isimportant to stress that in Scandinavian criminological theory, the mechanism of general prevention
has been given a broad interpretation. Instead of direct or simple deterrence, the theory speaks ofindirect general prevention or more often the moral-creating and value-shaping effect of punishment.
And this is something different than obeying the law because of the simple fear of punishment.
According to this idea, the disapproval expressed in punishment is assumed to influence the values andmoral views of individuals. As a result of this process, the norms of criminal law and the values theyreflect are internalized; people refrain from illegal behaviour not because such behaviour would be
followed by an unpleasant punishment, but because the behaviour itself is regarded as morally
blameworthy.4
This mechanism of indirect general prevention poses some central demands on the penal system.
The aim of indirect prevention is best served by sanctions that maintain their moral character.
Punishments must be regarded as expressions of the society's disapproval, and they must be directed
towards the act (in other words to demonstrate the blameworthiness of the act). Furthermore, it isrequired that the citizens perceive the system to be reasonably efficient and legitimate. Principles of
proportionality and perceived procedural fairness are key factors that influence the willingness of thepeople to conform to the law (see in more detail Lappi-Seppälä 2001 with references).
3. Also the more general aims of criminal policy underwent a process of re-definition (see especially
Törnudd 1969/1996, 14(15). Cost-benefit analysis was introduced into criminal political thinking
requiring that in making choices between different strategies and means, the probable policy effects
and costs should be carefully assessed. One of the practical consequences was that the arsenal of
possible means of criminal policy became larger in comparison with the traditional (repression or
rehabilitation orientated) penal system. Strategies such as environmental planning and situational
crime prevention in controlling crime were discussed in Finland as early as in the late 1960s. Anotherslogan was: “Good social development policy is the best criminal policy”. One result of this new line ofthought was that the role of punishment came to be seen as relative. Once the primary means of criminal
policy, it came to be regarded as only one option among many.
4. The policy conclusions drawn from these ideological changes can be briefly summarized. In crime
prevention, criminal law is only one means among many. These other means are often far more
important. This does not mean that we could do without criminal law. It still is of vital importance, but
its mechanisms are more subtle and indirect than one usually thinks. All in all, we should notoverestimate its potential. We should be realistic with regard to the possibilities of achieving short-term
effects in crime control by tinkering with our penal system. And what is most important, we should
always weigh the costs and benefits of applied or suggested strategies of criminal policy. And this,indeed, was the test that our earlier prison politics failed to pass. It was difficult to answer convincingly
the question of why we should have three to four times more prisoners than our neighbours do.
C. Law Reforms and Sentencing Policies
Since the early 1970s the main parts of the Finnish criminal legislation have been reformed fromthese neo-classical “anti-treatment and anti-repressive” starting points. There has been a purposeful
movement towards a more lenient system of sanctions, and especially towards a reduction in the use ofcustodial sentences.5 Together with legislative reforms one has to stress also the independent role of the
4

In a closer analysis, this concept contains several distinct hypothesis which are based on different assumptions on why, how
and through what kind of mechanisms various features of the legal system influence social values and compliance with the law.
Andenaes (1974 p. 113 ff) classifies the influence of criminal law on morality as follows. Direct influence: (1) respect for theformal authority (no change in the individual’s view of morality), (2) criminal law as a moral eye-opener (a change in moral
attitude as a result of personal thinking) and (3) punishment as an authoritative statement (a change in moral attitude as aresult of the suggestive influence of laws). Indirect influence: (4) punishment’s effect in reducing and neutralizing bad examples(the working mechanism is supposed to be simple deterrence) and (5) criminal law as a framework of moral education.

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judiciary. In several cases the courts had taken the initiative towards more lenient sentencing levels
even before the legislator had reached its decision. The major reforms and sentencing changes can besummarized as follows.
1. General Trends in Sentencing
The Finnish judge has traditionally had quite a limited number of options in sentencing. The threebasic alternatives have been unconditional imprisonment, conditional imprisonment and a fine. The
fine has been the principal punishment throughout the present century. Still, the most effective
alternative to imprisonment has been conditional sentence. The popularity of this sentencing option has
increased steadily. From 1950 to 1990 the number of conditional sentences has increased from some
3,000 to 18,000 sentences per year. The growth was especially rapid between 1970 and 1980. A closer
look at the sentencing patterns of the courts would reveal two consecutive changes between 1950 and
1990. Both are illustrated in figure II.2.

The
prisonsentences
The length
Lengthofofallall
PrisonSentences
1950-1990
1950-1990
14

useconditional (suspended)
andandTheTheUse
ofof
Conditional(suspended)unconditional
prisonsentence
1950-1990
Unconditional Prison Sentence 1950-1990

12

100 %

10

Unconditional

Conditional

80 %

8
60 %
40 %

2

Unconditional

Conditional

0%
1950

0

20 %

1990

4

1970

6

Figure II.2. The Length of Sentences of Imprisonment Imposed by the Courts and the
Choice Between Conditional and Unconditional Sentences, 1950 to 1990
Between 1950 and 1965 the average length of unconditional imprisonment fell from 13 months to 7
months (left part). The right part reveals another change. Up to the mid-1960s, two out of threesentences of imprisonment were imposed unconditionally. From the late 1960s onwards the proportionof unconditional sentences fell from 70% (1966) to 42% (1980). These two changes can be explained
primarily by changes in sentencing in two distinct crime categories: theft and drunk driving.
2. Penalties for Theft Offences
Long custodial sentences imposed for traditional property crimes kept the prison population at its
peak level during the early 1950s. During the 1950s the courts had started to mitigate the sentences,
but high minimum penalties and rigid offence definitions for aggravated forms imposed strict limits tothese efforts. However, in 1972 new definitions and new punishment latitudes for larceny wereintroduced. Again, in 1991 the latitude for the basic form of theft was reduced. As a result, there was aclear change in sentencing practice. In 1971, 38% of offenders sentenced for larceny received a custodial
sentence. Twenty years later, in 1991, this proportion had decreased to 11% (for more detail see LappiSeppälä 1998 and Törnudd 1993). Figure II.3. below illustrates the length of prison sentences in 19501990 in the case of theft.

5

A more complete list of the legislative reforms that have been carried out in Finland since 1967 can be found in Törnudd 1993
and Lappi-Seppälä 1998.

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The average
Average length
Lengthof
ofprisonPrisonsentences
Sentencesimposed
Imposedfor theft
Theftinin1950-1990
1950-1990
for

14,0
12,0
10,0
8,0
6,0
4,0
2,0
0,0

All
Conditional

1990

1985

1980

1975

1970

1965

1960

1955

1950

Unconditional

Figure II.3. The Average Length of Sentences of Imprisonment for Theft, 1950 to 1991
The changes are rather dramatic. For example in 1950 the average length of all sentences ofimprisonment imposed for theft was 12 months. In 1971 the sentence was still 7.4 months, but in 1991
it was only 2.6 months.6 Similar type of changes can be detected also in other crime categories (seefigure II.4).

The
The Length
length ofof All
all Prison
prison Sentences
sentences forfor FourfourDifferent
different Offences
offdeses 1950-1990
1950-1990
Theft
Aggravated assault
Robbery
DrunkenDriving
Drunk
Driving

25

Months (average)

20

15

10

5

1980

1965

1950

0

Figure II.4. The Average Length of Sentences of Imprisonment for Four Different Offences
1950 to 1990

6

Of course, one has to take into account that in the long run the typical forms of theft have changed. Crimes against individual
victims and households have been replaced in part by, for example, petty shoplifting.

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3. Drunk Driving
Drunk driving plays a special role in Nordic criminal policy. The combination of hard drinking
habits and a very restrictive and intolerant attitude towards drinking-and-driving has kept drunk
driving among the key issues in debates on criminal policy. A substantial part of the Finnish prison
problem during the 1960s resulted from fairly long unconditional sentences of imprisonment imposedfor drunk driving. During the 1970s this practice was changed in favour of non-custodial alternatives.
The movement was started by the courts themselves, but the development was reinforced by separate
legislative acts. The definition of drunk driving was modernized by an amendment of the law in 1977.
In this connection, the legislator took a definite stand in favour of conditional sentence and fines.
On the same occasion, three other bills were passed in order to increase the use of conditional
sentences and fines in general (and particularly in the case of drunk driving). The reform of theconditional sentence act created the opportunity for combining a fine with a conditional sentence. The
reform of the day-fine system raised the amount of day-fines, thus encouraging the court to use fines
also in more serious cases. The most important 1977 reform from the point of view of the principle was,however, the enactment of general sentencing rules. These provisions in Chapter 6 of the Criminal Codegave the courts general guidance in meting out punishments for all offences. They also provided aframework for a further debate concerning the proper sentencing level. The first target of such a debate
was drunk driving. These discussions were, in fact, run by the judges, with only organisational help
from the Ministry of Justice. These efforts to change sentencing practice regarding drunk driving
proved to be a success, as figure II.5. below verifies.

Penalties
driving1950-1990
1950-1990(Percentages)(percentages)
Penalties forfor drunken
Drunk Driving
100 %
80 %
60 %
40 %
20 %
0%
50

60
Prison-%70
Conditiona l-%

80

90

Fine -%

Figure II.5. Sanctions for Drunk Driving, 1950 to 1990 (Percentages)
In 1971, 70% of drunk drivers received an unconditional sentence. Ten years later, in 1981, this
proportion had dropped to 12%. Since the reform in 1977, the normal punishment for aggravated drunk
driving has been conditional imprisonment together with an unconditional supplementary fine, while“ordinary” drunk driving cases (BAC under 0.12%) are dealt with by fines.
The sentencing reforms of the 1970s have turned out to be a success in terms of criminal policy. One
reason is that these reforms constituted a coherent and consistent entity with clear aims andsystematic strategy. The case of drunk driving serves as a good example. The legislator first created theopportunity for combining a fine with a conditional sentence, then raised the amount of day-fines. After
passing a bill on drunk driving, new provisions on sentencing were also enacted, and these provided the48

121ST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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framework for discussions on the sentencing levels and normal punishment. In a way, all these reforms
were a part of one well planned “big package”.
4. New Sentencing Alternatives: Community Service
The basic structure of the sentencing system has remained relatively stable during the last decades.
The only major amendment in this structure has been the introduction of community service. This took
place first on an experimental basis in 1991. In 1994 the system was extended to cover the entire
country and community service became a permanent part of the Finnish system of sanctions.
Community service is imposed instead of unconditional imprisonment for up to 8 months. In orderto ensure that community service will really be used in lieu of unconditional sentences of imprisonment,a two-step procedure was adopted. First the court is supposed to make its sentencing decision inaccordance with the normal principles and criteria of sentencing, without even considering thepossibility of community service. If the result is unconditional imprisonment, then the court may
commute the sentence into community service under the following conditions. First, the convictedperson must consent to the sanction. Second, the offender must also be capable of carrying out thecommunity service order. Third, recidivism and prior convictions may prevent the use of this sanction.
The duration of community service varies between 20 and 200 hours. In commuting imprisonment into
community service, one day in prison equals one hour of community service. Thus, two months ofcustodial sentence should be commuted into roughly 60 hours of community service. If the conditions of
the community service order are violated, the court normally imposes a new unconditional sentence ofimprisonment. Community service does not contain any extra supervision aimed, for example, at
controlling the offender's behaviour in general. The supervision is strictly confined to his or her working
obligations.
The legislator’s idea was, thus, that community service should be used only in those cases where theoffender would otherwise have received an unconditional sentence of imprisonment. As figure II.6.
shows, this aim was well achieved.

UnconditionalImprisonment
imprisonment andand Community
community
Unconditional
Serviceservice 1992-2000
1992-2000
Imprisonment

14000

Community service

12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

0

Figure II.6. Imprisonment and Community Service in the Finnish Court PracticeAlong with the increase in the number of community service orders, the number of unconditional
sentences of imprisonment has decreased. In 1998, the average daily number of offenders serving acommunity service order was about 1200 and the corresponding prison rate was 2800. It is therefore
reasonable to argue that, within a short period of time, community service has proved to be an

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 61
important alternative to imprisonment. As the figure shows, the use of community service seems tohave reached its peak in 1998-1999.
5. Specific Prisoners Groups
In the course of time, different prisoner groups have received different degrees of attention. During
the 1960s and 1970s the focus was on fine defaulters and recidivists in preventive detention. In the
1970s and 1980s the use of imprisonment for young offenders has been restricted.
(i) Fine defaulters
In the 1950s and 1960s fine defaulters constituted a substantial part of the Finnish prison
population (sometimes exceeding 25% of the total prison population). In the late 1960s the number ofdefault prisoners was reduced through two consecutive law reforms: By decriminalising public
drunkenness (which led to fewer default sentences since public drunkenness was one of the major
offences leading to a default fine) and by raising the amount of day-fines and decreasing the number ofday-fines (which led to shorter default sentences, on the day-fine system, see below part II chapter
II.A.2).

2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

30,0

Fine def. %

20,0
15,0
10,0

% of all prisoners

25,0Fine defaulters

5,0
1.1.1998

1.1.1995

1.1.1992

1.1.1989

1.1.1986

1.1.1983

1.1.1980

1.1.1977

1.1.1974

1.1.1971

1.1.1968

1.1.1965

1.1.1962

1.1.1959

1.1.1956

1.1.1953

0,0
1.1.1950

Number of F.def.

Fine defaulters
Defaultersin
inprisonPrison1950-2000
1950-2000

Figure II.7. The Number of Fine Defaulters in Prison 1950-2000(ii) Preventive detention
The Finnish criminal justice system includes a provision for holding chronic recidivists inpreventive detention after the completion of the sentence, if both the sentencing court and a special
court so decide. During the 1960s, the large majority of detainees had been found guilty of repeat
property crimes. On the basis of an amendment passed in 1971, the option of preventive detention wasrestricted only to dangerous violent offenders. The number of persons held in detention as recidivists
dropped by 90% in one year, from 206 to 24. Since then, the annual average has been between 10 and 20
prisoners.

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121ST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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Recivists
Recidivistsinin
preventive
preventive
detention
detention

400
300

9,0
8,0
7,0
6,0
5,0
4,0
3,0
2,0
1,0
0,0

% of
of allallprisoners
prisoners
serving aasentenceservingsentence

200
100

1.1.1998

1.1.1994

1.1.1990

1.1.1986

1.1.1982

1.1.19781.1.1974

1.1.1970

1.1.1966

1.1.1962

1.1.1958

1.1.19540% of prisoners

500

1.1.1950

Number of recid. in prev.
det.

Restrictingthe
theUseuseofofPreventive
preventiveDetention
detention inin 1971
1971
Restricting

Figure II.8. Restricting the Number of Prisoners in Preventive Detention(iii)Juveniles
There is no special juvenile criminal system in Finland, in the sense that this concept is understoodin the Continental legal systems: there are no juvenile courts and the number of specific penalties only
applicable to juveniles has been quite restricted. However, offenders aged 15 to 17 receive a mitigatedsentence. In addition, the conditions for waiver of sanctions (for example non-prosecution) are muchless restrictive for young offenders. Young offenders under the age of 21 who are sentenced to
imprisonment are usually released on parole after 1/3 of the sentence has been served, instead of thenormal 1/2. Despite the lack of specific measures for juveniles, there has also been a deliberate policy
against the use of imprisonment for the youngest age groups. This has been done mainly by relying on
the traditional alternatives. The willingness of the courts to impose custodial sentences on young
offenders has decreased throughout the 1970s and the 80s. In addition, the Conditional Sentence Act
was amended in 1989 by including a provision which allows the use of unconditional sentences foryoung offenders only if there are extraordinary reasons calling for this. All of this has had a clear
impact on the practice (figure II.9.). At the moment there are about one hundred prisoners between theages of 18 and 20 and less than ten in the 15 to 17 age group, while as recently as the 1960s thenumbers were ten times higher.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 61

The number
Number ofof young
Young prisoners
Prisoners (15-17
The(15-17 years)
years)
to 19971975 to 1997
serving their1975
sentence,
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1995

1985

1975

Figure II.9. The Number of Young Prisoners (15-17 years, Annual Average)
6. Parole
The system of parole (early release) has also proved to be a very powerful tool in controlling prisoner
rates. Any changes in the basic structure of this system will have visible effects on prison figures. In
Finland all prisoners except those few serving their sentence in preventive detention or serving a life
sentence will be released on parole. At the moment, the minimum time to be served before the prisoner
is eligible for parole is 14 days. A series of reforms has brought it down to this. During the mid-1960s
this period was shortened from six to four months, during the mid-1970s from four to three months, andfinally in 1989 from three months to 14 days.

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The
1974-2000
Thenumber
Number of prisoners
Prisoners 1974-2000(by status)
Status)
(by
6000
5000
Prev. det.

4000

Remand.

3000

Fine def.

2000

Prisoners

1000
1998

1995

1992

1989

1986

1983

1980

1977

1974

0

Figure II.10. The Number of Prisoners 1974-2000 (by Status)
7. Sentencing Practice and Prison Rates in the 1990s
During the 1990s, the court practice has been quite stable (leaving aside changes caused by thecommunity service order). The overall level of sanctions and the relative use of basic sentencing
alternatives have remained at the same level. Of all criminal cases brought before the court, a clear
majority result in fines (60%) or a conditional sentence (20%). About 10% are sentenced to
imprisonment (usually between 3-6 months) and some 6-7% to community service. In less than 2% of
the cases the court waives further sanctions. Non-prosecution is not included in these figures. In
Finland non-prosecution has traditionally had a relatively restricted role. However, in the early 1990s
the conditions for non-prosecution were relaxed. As a result, the use of non-prosecution was doubled(this also reduced the use of the waiver of the sentence in the court level, as seen in table 1).
Figure II.11 gives a more detailed picture of the prison rates in 1992-2000 in four Nordic countries(note: /100 000 inhabitants over 15 years of age).

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 61

Prisoner Rates
rates 1992-2000
Prisoner
1992-2000(/100000
inhabitants
over 15
15 years)
years)(/100 000 inhabitants over
100
90
80
70

Finland60

Sweden50

Norway40

Denmark

30
20
10
0
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Figure II.11. Prison Rates in Four Nordic Countries in 1992-2000
In Finland the prison rate was at its lowest in 1999. Since the year 1999 the number of prisoners
has grown over 20% (mainly due to the increase in sentences imposed for drug offences and foreign
remand prisoners).
III. PRISON RATES AND CRIME RATES
A fundamental change in the use of imprisonment naturally leads to the question about the effects
on crime rates. Time and time again, research confirms the fact that the use of imprisonment isrelatively unrelated to the number of crimes committed or reported. There are, of course, several wellknown methodological difficulties in comparing crime rates with prison rates. However, the possibilityof comparing countries which share strong social and structural similarities but have a very different
penal history gives an exceptional perspective to the matter. In fact, the Nordic experiences provide aninteresting opportunity to test how drastic changes in the penal practices in one country have beenreflected in the crime rates, as compared to countries which have kept their penal system more or lessstable. Figure III.1 provides information on prisoner rates and reported crime in Finland, Sweden,
Denmark and Norway from 1950 to 1997.

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121ST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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Offences
againstcriminal
code1950-1997
1950Offences
AginstThetheCriminal
Code(/100 0001997
population)

Prison1950-1997
Prison Rate
rate 1950-1997(/100
000population)
population)(/100 000
200(/100 000 population)

14000

180

DEN

160

FIN

140

NOR

120

SWE

12000

DEN
FIN

10000

NOR

8000

SWE

100
80

6000

60

4000

40

2000

20
0

1994

1990

1986

1982

1978

1974

1970

1966

1962

1958

1954

1950

1994

1990

1986

1982

1978

1974

1970

1966

1962

1958

1954

1950

0

Figure III.1. Prison Rates and Crime Rates 1950-1997 (Source: Lappi-Seppälä 2001)
A simple comparison between the Nordic countries reveals a striking difference in the use of
imprisonment, as well as a striking similarity in the trends in recorded criminality. The fact that
Finland has heavily reduced its prisoner rate has not disturbed the symmetry of Nordic crime rates.
The figures also confirm, once again, the general criminological conclusion that crime rates rise and fallaccording to laws and dynamics of their own, and sentencing policies in turn develop and change
according to dynamics of their own; these two systems are fairly independent of one another.
IV. DISCUSSION
1. The decrease in the Finnish prison population has been the result of a conscious, long term andsystematic criminal policy.7 The legislative reforms turned to this direction already during the mid1960s. Even before that, during the 1950s, the courts had began to reduce their sentences. In manycases the legislator was strongly supported by the judiciary and especially by the courts of first
instance. Quite often the courts had changed their practice even before the legislator had changed thelaw. Still, the critical question remains: What made all this possible, and what made it possible to carryout these law reforms? Describing the techniques used was easy. Explaining why they were adopted
and accepted is harder.8
2. A part of the answer could be found in the structure of our political culture. The Finnish
criminologist Patrik Törnudd has stressed the importance of the political will and consensus to bring
down the prisoner rate. As he summarises, “those experts who were in charge of planning the reforms
and research shared an almost unanimous conviction that Finland’s internationally high prisoner rate
was a disgrace and that it would be possible to significantly reduce the amount and length of prison
sentences without serious repercussions on the crime situation.” (Törnudd 1993 p. 12). This conviction
was shared also by civil servants, the judiciary and prison authorities and, what was equally important,also by politicians.9
Another and closely related way for characterizing the Finnish criminal policy would be to describe
it as exceptionally expert-oriented: Reforms have been prepared and conducted by a relatively small
7

A short presentation cannot capture all the factors that have influenced this development. For example, one should not forget
structural and demographic factors: The aging of the large birth cohorts born after the war (cf. Aho 1997) have also contributed
to the reduction of the prison population.

8

In order to put things in perspective, it should be stressed that instead of a massive move towards decarceration one could also
describe the change merely as a “normalisation” of prison rates: a move from a level that was totally absurd to a level that canbe considered to be a fair Nordic level - albeit ten times lower than the present U.S. level.

9

At least to the extent that they did not oppose the reform proposals prepared by the Ministry of Justice.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 61
group of experts whose opinions on criminal policy, at least on the basic points, has followed similarlines. The impact of these professionals was, furthermore, reinforced by close personal and professional
contacts with senior politicians and with academic researchers.10 Consequently, and unlike in manyother countries, crime control has never been a central political issue in election campaigns in Finland.
At least the “heavyweight” politicians have not relied on populist policies, such as “three strikes” and“truth in sentencing”.
3. This takes us to another element in the Finnish criminal policy composition – the role of themedia. In Finland the media have retained quite a sober and reasonable attitude towards issues ofcriminal policy. The Finns have largely been saved from low-level populism. But things may bechanging. The emergence of a rival in the tabloid paper market over a decade ago, as well as theincrease in TV channels and the resulting intensified competition for viewers have brought crime
reports onto Finnish TV as well.
4. “Attitudinal readiness” among the judiciary can also be identified as one relevant factor over thelast decades. It would, indeed, be a misinterpretation to conclude that what happened in Finland
during the last decades was just a skilful manoeuvre of a small group of experts. Collaboration with andassistance from the judiciary was clearly a necessary prerequisite for the change to happen. As noted
above, in many cases the legislator received the essential support of the judiciary. Of course, the factthat criminology and criminal policy are taught in the university law schools to lawyers – those whowill later implement the laws – is also a part of the larger picture. The majority of the Finnish local
court judges and prosecutors are relatively young, having received their university degrees during the1970s and the 1980s in the spirit of liberal criminal policy. In addition, different training courses andseminars arranged for judges (and prosecutors) on a regular basis by judicial authorities – incooperation with the universities – have also had an impact on sentencing and prosecutorial practices.
5. Also the crime scene matters. The fact that Finland has been - and still is - a peaceful and safe
society with a low level of crime has made it easier to adopt liberal policies in crime control. Even so, it
may be argued that this factor has a rather restricted explanatory force. In fact, over a period of
approximately 20 years, and especially during the 1960’s, Finland experienced severe social andstructural changes while developing from a rural/agricultural economy into an industrial urban welfare
state. This rapid development had its impact on our crime rate. There was a steep increase in recorded
crime from the mid-1960’s to the mid-1970’s, and again during the 1980’s. However, this did not preventthe prisoner numbers from falling (and neither is there any reason to conclude that this fall had any
significant effect on the growth of crime, as discussed above).
***
The Finnish criminal policy may well be characterized as both rational and humane. Whether thiswill be the case also in the future, is open to question. The growing international aspect of crime andcrime control, the increased pressure to harmonise criminal law within the European Union, as well as
the general tendency to politicise criminal policy, all this includes a greater risk of increased repression
also in Finland.
Unfortunately, increasing signs of the populist punitive approach can be seen also in the Finnish
debate. Our prison rates may well have now “hit the bottom”, and we may anticipate an increase in theprisoner numbers in the future. In fact, the number of prison sentences, as well as the number ofprisoners has increased over 20% between 1999-2002 (but still is among the lowest in the EU). Countermeasures – to be discussed in the following two chapters – are needed to resist these tendencies, also in
Finland.

10 Several Finnish Ministers of Justice during the 1970's and 1980’s have had direct contact with research work; indeed, one ofthem, Inkeri Anttila, was a professor of criminal law and the director of the National Research Institute of Legal Policy at thetime of her appointment as Minister.

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121ST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERSREFERENCES (all three papers)
Aho, Timo 1997: “Land of Decreasing Prison Population”. In Prison Population in Europe and North
America. Problems and Solutions. Ministry of Justice, Department of Prison Administration. Helsinki.
Andenaes, Johs.. 1974: Punishment and Deterrence. Michigan: University of Michigan Press,
Bishop, Norman 1988: Non-Custodial Alternatives in Europe. HEUNI publications, Helsinki 1988.
Bottoms, Anthony 1995: The Philosophy and politics of punishment and sentencing. In The politics ofSentencing Reform (ed. C. Clarkson & R. Morgan). Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995.
Bottoms, Anthony 2001: Compliance and community penalties. In Community Penalties. Change andChallenges (ed. Anthony Bottoms, Loraine Gelsthorpe and Sue Rex). Willan Publishing Cornwall 2001.
Beckett, Katherine 1997: Making Crime Pay. Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics. Oxford
University Press. New York.
Canadian Sentencing Commission: Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach. Minister of Supply andServices Canada 1986.
Carranza Elias 2001: Prison Overcrowding in Latin America and the Caribbean: Situation and Possible
Responses. United Nations Programme Network Institutes Technical Assistance Workshop. Vienna
Austria - May 10, 2001. http:// www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/ international/caribbean.doc
Brå-Rapport 1994:4: Intensiv-övervakning med elektronisk kontroll. Brottsförebyggande rådet,Stockholm 1999
Garland, David 2001: The Culture of Control. Oxford.
Hough Mike & Roberts Julian 1998: Attitudes to Punishment: findings from the British Crime Survey,
Home Office Research Study 179. London: Home Office.
Hough Mike & Roberts Julian 2002: Penal Populism and Public Opinion. Oxford University Press.
Oxford 2002.
Iivari, Juhani 2000: Victim-offender mediation in Finland. In Victim-Offender Mediation in Europe.
Making Restorative Justice Work. Leuven University Press 2000.
Joutsen, Matti 1987: The Role of the Victim of Crime in Criminal Justice Systems, HEUNI publication
no. 11, Helsinki 1987.
Joutsen, Matti 1990: Three lectures given at the 85rd UNAFEI International Training Course on
Alternatives to Imprisonment, 2 April - 2 June 1990 (“Expanding the Use of Non-Custodial Measures”,“The Range and Use of Non-Custodial Measures” and “Are Non-Custodial Measures Effective?)”.
UNAFEI 1990. Tokyo.
Kalmthouth, Anton van 2000: Community sanctions and measures in Europe: a promising challenge ora disappointing Utopia? In Crime and criminal justice in Europe. Council of Europe Publishing.
Strasbourg 2000.
Kitada, Mikinao 2001: Prison Population in Asian Countries. United Nations Programme Network
Institutes Technical Assistance Workshop. Vienna Austria - May 10, 2001. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/ridraft.doc.
Lappi-Seppälä, Tapio 1998: Regulating the Prison Population. Experiences from a Long-Term Policy in
Finland. National Research Institute of Legal Policy. Research Communications 38/1998.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 61
Lappi-Seppälä, Tapio 2001. “Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline of the Repressive
Ideal. In Punishment and Penal Systems in Western Countries, edited by M. Tonry and R. Frase. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Muiluvuori, Marja-Liisa 2001: Recidivism Among People Sentenced to Community Service in Finland.
Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention Vol. 2 No 1, 2001.
Paus, Karen Kristen 2000: Victim-offender mediation in Norway. In Victim-Offender Mediation in
Europe. Making Restorative Justice Work. Leuven University Press 2000.
Penological Information Bulletin 22/2000.
Penological Information Bulletin 23 & 24/2002.
Roberts, Julian 1998: Public Opinion, Crime and Criminal Justice. Crime and Justice. A Review of
Research vol. 16 (toim. Tonry, Michael). Chicago.
Rex, Sue 2001: Beyond cognitive-behaviouralism? Reflections on the effectiveness literature. In
Community Penalties. Change and Challenges (ed. Anthony Bottoms, Loraine Gelsthorpe and Sue
Rex). Willan Publishing Cornwall 2001.
Stern, Vinien (ed) 2002: Alternatives to Prison in developing countries. The International Center for Prison
Studies. Concluding chapter available in: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/
developing_alternatives_to_prison.doc.
Tak, Peter 2002: Essays on Dutch Criminal Policy. Willem-Jan van der Wolf, Nijmegen 2002.
Tonry, Michael 1999: 'Why are US incarceration rates so high?' in: Overcrowded Times. June 1999,
Castine, Maine, USA.
Tonry, Michael 2001: Symbol, substance, and severity in western penal policies. Punishment & Society.
Volume. 3 Nr. 4/2001
Törnudd, Patrik. 1993: Fifteen Years of Decreasing Prisoner Rates in Finland. National ResearchInstitute of Legal Policy. Research Communication 8/1993.
Törnudd, Patrik 1996. Facts, Values and Visions. Essays in Criminology and Crime Policy. National
Research Institute of Legal Policy. Research reports 138/1996.
Walmsley Roy 2001: World Prison Populations: Facts, Trends and Solutions. United Nations
Programme Network Institutes Technical Assistance Workshop. Vienna Austria - May 10, 2001. http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/unworld.doc
Walmsley, Roy 2002: World Prison Population List (third edition), Home Office, Research Findings 166/
2002.

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APPENDIX: Prisoner Trends in the 1990s
Growth during the 1990s
Central and Eastern
EuropeWestern Europe
Netherlands

89%

Belarus

345%

Italy

53%

Czech Republic

282%(since 1991)

Greece47%

Romania100%(since 1991)

Portugal46%

Ukraine81%(since 1991)

Germany

40%

Bulgaria

62%(since 1991)

Turkey40%

Lithuania

61%

UK

40%

Russia44%

Ireland39%

Slovakia

44%

Spain

34%

Croatia

32%

Belgium

27%

Hungary

23%(since 1991)

Switzerland

24%

Poland13%(since 1991)

Norway19%

Latvia9%France13%

Estonia

3%

Austria12%

Moldova-17%

Denmark

8%

Macedonia (FYROM)-20%

Sweden0%

Slovenia-23%

Finland-17%

Americas(since 1991)(since 1991)

Other regions

Argentina

83%(since 1992)

Australia

51%

Brazil70%(since 1992)

New Zealand38%

Colombia

70%(since 1992)

South Africa

33%

U.S.A.

62%

Japan

9%

Mexico60%

Canada13%(since 1992)

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 61
Current trends: recent growth
AfricaAmericas

Asia

EuropeOceania

Ghana

35% rise(1996 to 1999)

Benin

26% rise(1999 to 2000)

Tanzania

20% rise(1998 to 1999)

South Africa

14% rise(1997 to 1999)

Costa Rica

55% rise(1996 to 1999)

Mexico35% rise(1996 to 1999)

Dominican Republic

28% rise(1997 to 1999)

Brazil

16% rise(1997 to 1999)

United States

12% rise(1997 to 2000)

Thailand57% rise(1997 to 2000)

Cambodia

32% rise(1997 to 1999)

Sri Lanka

32% rise(1997 to 1999)

Indonesia

28% rise(1997 to 2000)

Japan

14% rise(1997 to 2000)

Slovenia

51% rise(1997 to 2000)

Greece44% rise(1997 to 2000)

Macedonia (FYROM)

44% rise(1997 to 2000)

Poland25% rise(1999 to 2000)

Croatia

24% rise(1997 to 2000)

Ireland

22% rise(1997 to 2000)

Turkey21% rise(1997 to 2000)

Australia

17% rise(1997 to 2000)

Guam (US)

109%
rise

(1997 to 1999)

Sources Roy Walmsley; World Prison Population List, World Prison Brief, Council of Europe Annual
Penal Statistics, United Nations Latin American Institute (ILANUD), information from various
countries’ prison administrations and statistics departments.

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