RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58

EFFECTIVE METHODS TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONALORGANIZED CRIME IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESSES
Bruce G. Ohr *I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most serious unintended
consequences of the globalization that wehave been experiencing for the last few
years has been the rapid rise oftransnational organized crime groups.
There are several reasons for this,including the following.
First, the increasing ease ofinternational communications brings theworld to each individual more directly andpotentially more dangerously than everbefore. The internet allows the individual
to access information, do business with andcommunicate instantly with persons inevery nation, but at the same time it allows
criminals to perpetrate confidence schemes
and stock market manipulations, run
illegal gambling operations and peddle
child pornography across the globe.
Second, the growth of internationalcommerce and the staggering number ofinternational banking transactions
performed every day by major banks
provide vital benefits to the world’s
economies, but they also present ample
opportunity for fraud and theft and allow
international money launderers to easily
hide their ill-gotten gains.
Third, the fall of Communism in theSoviet Union and Eastern Europe hasbrought freedom and democracy tomillions, but has also resulted in massive* Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section,
Criminal Division, United States Department ofJustice, United States of America

40

economic upheavals in those countries andan often-violent free-for-all among
businessmen for the rich natural resourcesof those regions. These changes have not
only spawned new criminal enterprises
within the area of former Soviet
domination, but have led directly to money
laundering and other crimes in the rest of
the world as well.
Finally, the international traffic in illegal
commodities, chiefly narcotics and wouldbe immigrants to wealthy nations, showsno signs of abating. Organized criminals
have already shown themselves to bemasters of these illegal markets. Given
these developments, it is easy to see whythese are boom times for transnationalorganized crime.
The growing threat of transnationalorganized crime is forcing radical changes
in traditional methods of law enforcement.
Law enforcement has historically been amatter primarily of domestic concern. In
the United States, for example, we havetraditionally focused our anti-organizedcrime efforts solely on the American Mafia,
or La Cosa Nostra. We, and our colleagues
in other countries, have therefore beencaught unprepared by the sudden rise intransnational organized crime activities.
We are not used to criminals who might
reside in country A and travel to country B
in order to commit a crime that takes placein countries C, D and E. Our organizedcrime investigators and prosecutors are notused to obtaining evidence from othercountries and conducting joint
investigations with law enforcement
officials of other countries. Indeed, in many

116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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instances our laws and procedures slow us
down instead of aiding us in theseendeavors. And we have not spent enoughtime studying the new organized crimegroups, learning their faces, theirorganizations, their ways of doing business.
We are now working energetically toclose the gaps in our knowledge and to
expand cooperation with other countries onlaw enforcement matters. This work is
being done on several fronts. First, ourprosecutors and investigators are working
hard to improve their understanding oftransnational organized crime groups.
With the help of the Justice Department’s
Office of International Affairs, they are
investigating new cases in which they arelearning to work more closely with theirforeign counterparts. Second, the US.
Government is stationing more law
enforcement personnel in other countries.
The FBI has legal attaches in over 20
countries and is planning to open more
offices as well. The Justice Department’s
Office of International Affairs has judicial
attaches in London, Rome and Mexico City,and is trying to arrange for a person to be
assigned to Moscow as well. Other U.S.
law enforcement agencies such as the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Customs
Service, and the Immigration andNaturalization Service are also expanding
their overseas presence. Finally, weapplaud the efforts of forums such as
UNAFEI which provide us with thevaluable opportunity to meet directly withour colleagues for other countries. These
forums are extremely important forstrengthening mutual understanding ofeach others’ legal systems and for giving
us the chance to improve cooperation on
specific matters.
I will first briefly discuss the current
situation with respect to transnationalorganized crime in the United States. I willthen cover in somewhat more detail someof the most important methods that we use
for fighting transnational organized crime- electronic surveillance, undercover
operations, accomplice testimony and the
RICO statute. Finally, I will discuss ingeneral terms some of the challenges that
we face in improving law enforcement
cooperation between countries ontransnational organized crime cases.
II. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZEDCRIME IN THE UNITED STATESThe Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section is responsible for overseeing theJustice Department’s programme for thefight against organized crime in the UnitedStates. As I mentioned, the Section’s workand the work of its 24 Organized Crime
Strike Forces across the country hashistorically focused on the activities of La
Cosa Nostra, the American Mafia. In
recent years, the Attorney General has also
directed the Section and its Strike Forces
to attack the growing presence of Russianand Asian organized crime groups in the
United States. As a result, the Section now
supervises investigations into all threemajor areas of organized crime activity in
our country - LCN, Asian and Russian. I
should mention that, for operational
reasons, the South American narcotics
trafficking groups are generally
investigated and prosecuted by other partsof the Department of Justice, and theOrganized Crime and Racketeering Section
does not supervise these prosecutions
unless they also involve one of our groups.
In addition, while we also see some signsof organized criminal activity from Africanand South Asian groups, they have not yet
reached a serious enough level to demand
the attention of our Strike Forces. I will
therefore limit my comments to the two
major kinds of international organizedcrime groups within the Section’s area ofactivity - first the Asian, then Russian andEast European.

41

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58
A. Asian Criminal Enterprises
As you are all aware, criminal
enterprises have existed in Asian countries
for centuries. However, we have so far
found little evidence that the traditional
Asian criminal groups have been able toset up extensive networks in the UnitedStates. Asian immigrant communities in
the United States have suffered from thepredations of gangs and organized crimegroups, but in most instances these arehome-grown groups, without formal ties toorganized criminal groups in Asian
countries. Furthermore, in contrast to La
Cosa Nostra, the Asian Criminal
Enterprises found in the United States
tend to be loosely structured and often lacka formal organization.
Nevertheless, Asian Criminal
Enterprises pose a significant crime
problem in the United States. These
groups commit traditional organizedcrimes within various Asian communities,
such as extortion, murder, kidnaping,illegal gambling, prostitution, and loansharking. Additionally, Asian Criminal
Enterprises have engaged in internationalc r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y, i n c l u d i n g a l i e nsmuggling, drug trafficking, financial
fraud, theft of automobiles and computer
chips, counterfeiting and money
laundering.
1. Chinese Criminal Enterprises
Chinese criminal enterprises operatingin the United States often bear names
familiar to students of the traditional Hong
Kong or Taiwan triads, such as 14 K, Sun
Yee On, Wo Hop To, or Hung Mun.
However, while these groups may indeed
have some links to the traditional Hong
Kong or Taiwan triads, the U.S.-based
groups usually operate independently of
the parent organizations. For example, theTung On Gang was a major criminalorganization operating in New York andother cities on the east coast of the United

42

States. Its former leader was a Red Poleof the Sun Yee On Triad, but the Tung On
Gang’s only connection to the Sun Yee On
was for the purpose of importing Southeast
Asian heroin into the United States.
Otherwise, the Tung On Gang engaged inlocal criminal activities in the UnitedStates such as extortion, murder, illegal
gambling and money laundering without
taking direction from Hong Kong.
The range of Chinese criminal groups in
the U.S. runs from simple street gangs,
such as the Flying Dragons and Ghost
Shadows of New York’s Chinatown, toquasi-legitimate businessmen, sometimes
associated with criminally-influenced
Tongs, engaged in complex frauds.
Currently, the principal criminal Tongs in
the United States are the Hip Shing Tong,
located in New York and on the West coast,principally in San Francisco, and the On
Leong Tong, located predominately in New
York, Chicago, Houston, Detroit, andAtlanta. These Tongs mainly operateillegal gambling, prostitution, aliensmuggling and stolen property activities
along with narcotics trafficking.
Chinese criminal groups in the UnitedStates traditionally preyed almost
exclusively on residents of Chinese
communities in American cities. Morerecently, however, these groups have
expanded the scope of their activities toattacks on other U.S. companies andinstitutions and to international crimes
such as alien smuggling, drug trafficking,credit card fraud, theft of automobiles andcomputer equipment, counterfeiting,money laundering, and piracy ofintellectual property.
Chinese criminal enterprises have
proven themselves to be flexible andsophisticated, capable of engaging incomplex crimes requiring a considerable
amount of planning and/or coordination

116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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with individuals overseas. Different
groups may pool their resources whennecessary to complete an ambitious
criminal scheme. Furthermore, the loose
structures of their organizations makes it
difficult for law enforcement to identify andtarget key individuals.
One of the most dramatic cases ofChinese organized crime in the last coupleof years was the so-called “Bites Dust”
operation, centered in San Francisco, in
which a Chinese criminal group engaged
in robberies of computer chips fromwarehouses and sold them on the black
market. Carefully planning theiroperations, the robbers had arranged inadvance with buyers exactly what kind ofcomputer chips to steal. As with manyother Chinese criminal enterprises in the
U.S., the gang committing the robberies
was loosely organized and not affiliatedwith a specific triad or tong.
2. Vietnamese Criminal Enterprises
Vietnamese criminal enterprises are themajor Asian organized crime problem insome parts of the United States such as
Texas, Louisiana and the Washington, D.C.
area. Currently, more than 750,000
Vietnamese have settled in various partsof the United States, with California
housing a large majority.
Compared to other Asian groups,
Vietnamese criminal groups are the mostflexible groups in terms of cooperating withcriminals of other ethnic and racial
backgrounds. U.S. law enforcement
agencies face not only traditional organizedcrime problems within various Vietnamese
communities such as extortion, murder,
kidnaping, illegal gambling, prostitution,home invasion robbery, illegal weaponstrafficking, and loan-sharking, but also
national and international organized crime
problems including alien smuggling, drugtrafficking, credit card, check and foodstamp fraud, white collar crime, theft ofautomobiles and computer chips/
equipment, counterfeiting of monetary
instruments, money laundering and piracy
of intellectual property.
Although the crime problem generated
from Vietnamese criminal enterprises in
the United States has been in existence fora little more than a decade, their violence
and their proliferated criminal activities
have generated grave concerns to law
enforcement agencies and the public.
Vietnamese criminal enterprises are thefastest growing Asian crime group in the
United States. Not only have they
established a foothold in various newer
Asian communities, they are challenging
the established crime groups in older Asian
communities. For the moment, they are
not as sophisticated as other moreestablished Asian crime groups, such as
Chinese, Japanese and Korean, and do nothave the same level of financial backing,but this is changing.
Recently our Houston Strike Forceprosecuted a Vietnamese group engaged inhealth care fraud. The defendants, who
ran four health clinics, would stage auto
accidents and then submit false medical
bills for reimbursement by theGovernment. Enlist an attorney to assist
them in the scheme, the defendants
mastered complicated paperwork to obtain$ 4 million dollars within a three year
period.
3. Korean Criminal Enterprises
As with the Chinese criminal groups,
Korean criminal enterprises in the UnitedStates have ties to Korean criminal groups
in Korea and Japan, but they are
independent entities. While Koreancriminal enterprises are generally lesssophisticated and less organized thanChinese criminal enterprises and Japanese
Boryokudan, they are best known for and43

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58
are extremely proficient in criminal
activities related to the trafficking of
crystal methamphetamine and Southeast
Asian heroin, extortion, illegal gambling,alien smuggling, prostitution, public
corruption, and money laundering.
Many of the criminal activities of the
Korean groups require an extensive
national and/or international network of
criminal contacts. Adapting to the
expanding international economy, Korean
traditional criminal organizations arelinking up with organized crime groups
abroad, including Japanese and Russiangroups, to form business joint ventures andto learn new methods of committing crimes.
Since Korean immigrants in the UnitedStates are often reluctant to report crimes
to law enforcement agencies, the activityof Korean criminal enterprises often
remains undetected by law enforcement
organizations in the United States. As aresult, these groups have flourished in thepast decade. They have gained a strong
foothold in various prosperous Korean
communities, have controlled a large shareof methamphetamine trade in Hawaii andthe U.S. West Coast, and have had a
network of prostitution/alien smuggling
operations that span the nation. Koreancriminal enterprises have the potential to
become “entrenched organized crimegroups” within the United States, similar
to their counterpart criminal groups in
Korea.
4. Japanese Criminal Enterprises
Japanese criminal enterprises, theBoryokudan, also known as Yakuza, can be
categorized as traditional criminal
enterprises. Japanese criminals based inother countries with Asian communities,
such as the United States, Australia, andBrazil, are either associates of theJapanese Boryokudan, Boryokudan
members, or Japanese delinquents

44(chimpira) who are would-be Boryokudan.
The primary activities of the
Boryokudan in the U.S. are money
laundering, drug trafficking, handgun
trafficking, monopoly of the Japanese
tourist trade, and manipulation of the realestate market. The most aggressive
Boryokudan groups in the U.S. include
Yamaguchi-gumi, Sumiyoshi-rengo-kai,
Inagawa-kai, and Toa Yuai Jigyo Kumiai.
The Boryokudan’s main activity ismoney laundering, a very difficult
operation for law enforcement to detect.
Japanese victims are usually reluctant toreport crimes to law enforcement for fearof retaliation. Boryokudan members andtheir associates have also invested in highvolume cash businesses, such as
restaurants, bars, gift shops, and hotels,
and in other legitimate businesses, such as
construction companies, oil companies,
banks, casinos, golf courses, and U.S.
securities.
Nevertheless, recent investigations haveindicated a decline of the Boryokudan’s
activities in the United States. It has been
speculated that this could be related toJapan experiencing a long period of
economic downturn, providing anabundance of opportunities in Japan for the
Boryokudan to take over ailing businesses
and profit from them.1 Still, theBoryokudan pose a significant threat to theUnited States through their financial
resources, their ability to launder large
amounts of money, their ability to infiltratelegitimate businesses in the United States,
and their international connections withhigh-level political, financial and criminal
figures.

1

See Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, A New Mob
Mentality in Japan, WASH. POST, April 11, 1999,
at A1.

116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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Although the Boryokudan groups haveformed alliances with various internationalorganized crime groups, such as Chinese,
Korean, Taiwanese, Russian, and Italian,
they remain the most closed ethnic crimegroup. Only Japanese or Japanese-related
individuals are included in theirorganizations. They have establishedthemselves to some extent in Hawaii andSouthern California. United States law
enforcement organizations are focusing
more attention to the Boryokudan because
they fear that the Boryokudan will becomea truly entrenched criminal organization
similar to the La Cosa Nostra crime family.
However, evidence thus far does notindicate that they possess a substantial
threat in the U.S.
B. Russian and Other Eurasian
Organized Crime
The U.S. Justice Department uses theterms “Russian Organized Crime” and“Eurasian Organized Crime”
interchangeably to refer not only toorganized crime groups operating in
Russia, but also those groups operating inor headquartered in countries in Eastern
Europe and Asia that were formerly partof the Soviet bloc, such as Poland, Hungary,Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine
and others. Eurasian Organized Crime has
become prominent in the West only in thepast ten years, since the collapse of theSoviet bloc.
As I mentioned earlier, the dissolutionof the Soviet Union in 1991 led towidespread economic upheaval across theformer Soviet bloc countries. The economy
of Russia and other former Soviet countries
shrunk drastically as unprofitable state
enterprises lost their state funding andshut down. The considerable natural
resources of these countries became theprizes in a fierce struggle between
competing businessmen who often allied
themselves with organized crime elements,

resulting in dozens of murders and othercrimes as the contestants vied for control.
Criminals who managed to gain access tothese resources sought to cash in on theirsuccess, selling oil and other resources
overseas in violation of Russian laws andconcealing the profits in a series of offshorebank accounts. Finally, the criminals
sought to use the proceeds of their crimes
to purchase real estate and other assets in
the United States and others westerncountries.
At the same time the loosening of travel
restrictions from the former Soviet Union
allowed many individuals to emigrate to
the United States and other westerncountries. Among these immigrants werea few criminals who took advantage of the
new environment to set up new criminalorganizations which preyed on their fellow
immigrants. Thus, in the United States,
we have seen the growth of organizedcriminal groups in places such as theBrighton Beach neighborhood of New York,
where their members practice extortion on
local businesses and commit excise tax andhealth care frauds, drug trafficking andvisa and immigration fraud. The Brighton
Beach groups show particular flexibility inworking with other established criminalgroups such as La Cosa Nostra. In one
particularly egregious example, Russian
mobsters in New Jersey combined with La
Cosa Nostra members in a scheme to cheatstate authorities of millions of dollars inexcise taxes on the sale of gasoline.
So far we have identified roughly twenty
large Russian Organized Crime groups
operating worldwide. Over the last decade,these groups have expanded theiroperations into more than 55 countries,
including the former Soviet Union, Europe
and North America. The most prominentof these groups are:(i) the Ivankov group, also known as
the “Organizatsiya,” based in

45

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58
Vladivostok and Moscow, with
influence in New York, Miami,
Boston, and Los Angeles;(ii) t h e S e m i o n M o g i l e v i c hOrganization, based in Budapest
and Moscow and located in
Philadelphia, Miami, Los Angeles,
New York and Boston;(iii) the Izmailovskaya Organization,
which operates in Moscow, Tel Aviv,
Paris, Toronto, Miami and New
York City; and(iv) the Solntsevskaya Organization,
which is based in Moscow andBudapest, and has moved into
Florida, Southern California, andChicago. These groups are
involved in a variety of crimes
including business frauds,
especially excise tax frauds ongasoline, money laundering,
health care fraud, drug trafficking,extortion and visa andimmigration fraud.
The transnational aspects of Eurasian
Organized Crime, as practiced by the larger
criminal groups, pose a particularly acutethreat to the societies of the West. Our law
enforcement bodies face great difficulties
in attempting to investigate large scalefinancial fraud and money laundering
schemes emanating from the former Soviet
Union. Often the only part of the crime
taking place within western jurisdictions
is the movement of millions, or evenbillions, of dollars through western bankaccounts. Obtaining a clear picture of thepossibly criminal activities linked to thismoney requires the close cooperation of
authorities from Russia, other members of
the Commonwealth of Independent Statesand many other countries. Suchcooperation is extremely difficult to obtainin a timely manner, particularly whenmany different countries are involved. As
a result, it is often impossible to investigate
these cases as thoroughly as they deserve,

46

and the criminals gain the ability to hideand make use of their ill-gotten assets inthe west.
I don’t have to tell you that it is a very
dangerous situation when organizedcriminals have access to large amounts ofmoney in your country. In the UnitedStates, La Cosa Nostra historically used its
control of the pension funds of certain large
labor unions to fund its criminal activities
and further the power of the Mafia,
including in the political arena. If we failto check the ability of these criminals to
make use of the billions of dollars they have
moved out of Russia, you will find theinfluence of Eurasian Organized Crime
spreading to other sectors of the economy
and the political life of western countries.
III. METHODS OF COMBATING
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZEDCRIME - DOMESTIC RESPONSES
United States international law
enforcement has increased its ability tocombat transnational criminals.
Prosecutors have worked out thetechniques for acquiring evidence fromabroad, while extradition and mutual legal
assistance treaties have proliferated andbecome more inclusive.2 Many domestic
legal obstacles to effective internationallaw enforcement have largely been reduced
or eliminated by the actions of Congress
and the federal courts. Additionally,
foreign governments and law enforcement
agencies have worked with U.S. officials
towards reducing the frictions created bytheir own criminal justice systems.3 While
much work remains to be done, we feel that
our law enforcement bodies are graduallyacquiring the necessary tools to do the job.
2

Ethan A. Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The
Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law
Enforcement 467-468 (1993)
3 Id. at 468.

116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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Our fight against transnationalorganized crime will, however, rely firstand foremost on the investigativetechniques and prosecutive tools developedin our long struggles against the American
Mafia. I would therefore like to begin by
discussing with you some of the mostimportant law enforcement tools in ourarsenal. I will begin with three techniques
used by our investigative agencies with theassistance and under the oversight ofprosecutors: electronic surveillance,
undercover operations and the use ofconfidential informants.
A. Electronic SurveillanceElectronic Surveillance represents the
single most important law enforcement
weapon against organized crime. There isnothing as effective as proving a crime
through the defendant’s own words.
Electronic Surveillance evidence provides
reliable, objective evidence of crimes
through the statements of the participants
themselves. Additionally, electronic
surveillance enables law enforcement tolearn of conspirators’ plans to commit
crimes before they are carried out. This
allows them to survey the criminal
activities, such as delivery of contraband
and conspiratorial meetings, or to disrupt
and abort the criminal activities whereappropriate, making electronic
surveillance particularly helpful inpreventing the occurrence of violent crimes.
Additionally, electronic surveillance isparticularly helpful in transnational
crimes because it enables law enforcement
to intercept conspirators in the UnitedStates discussing crimes with theircriminal associates in countries outside theUnited States. Electronic surveillance
gives United States law enforcement
evidence of conspiratorial planning against
co-conspirators operating outside of theUnited States that would otherwise be very
difficult to obtain.

While electronic surveillance isextremely valuable, it is also a very
sensitive technique because of legitimate
concerns for a person’s privacy interests.
These concerns impose significant
restrictions on electronic surveillance. For
example, electronic surveillance can only
be used to obtain evidence of some specificserious offenses listed in the governing
statute.4 If an agent or governing attorney
wishes to secure electronic surveillance, heor she must submit an affidavit to a UnitedStates district court judge containing
specific facts establishing probable cause
to believe that the subjects of the electronic
surveillance are committing certain
specified offenses and that it is likely that
relevant evidence of such crimes will beobtained by the electronic surveillance.5
Thus, the government must receive theapproval of a neutral independent judge to
be authorized to conduct electronic
surveillance. Additionally, before electronic
surveillance is permissible, the government
must establish probable cause to believethat other investigative techniques havebeen tried and failed to obtain the sought
evidence, or establish why otherinvestigative techniques appear to beunlikely to succeed if tried, or establish why
other techniques would be too dangerous
to try.
In executing the electronic surveillance,
the government must minimize theinterception of innocent conversations,taking reasonable steps to assure that only
conversations relevant to the crime underinvestigation are intercepted.6 In practice,the monitors are required to turn off
recording machines when conversations
are not discussing matters relevant to thecrimes under investigation.

4

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (West Supp. 2000).
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (West Supp. 2000).
6 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511, 2518 (West Supp. 2000).
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58
Once the electronic surveillance begins,
the government must submit regular
reports to inform the court of theinformation obtained through thesurveillance. In these so-called “10-day
reports” the prosecutor lists the number ofintercepted calls, the number of calls
containing criminal conversations,summarizes of those conversations, anddescribes any unusual events thattranspired in connection with thesurveillance. This constant report writing
is part of what makes electronic
surveillance so labor-intensive for theprosecutor.
Electronic surveillance is also restricted
in terms of its duration. Court-authorized
electronic surveillance is limited to thirty
days.7 This may be extended for additional
thirty-day intervals, provided that all therequirements are met every thirty days andapproved by the judge.8 Althoughsubstantially useful in law enforcement, it
is evident that there are considerable
restrictions on electronic surveillance
designed to protect individuals’ privacy
interests.
B. Undercover Operations
As far as organized crime control goes,
undercover operations are second only toelectronic surveillance, often working
hand-in-hand with each other. An
undercover investigation may be of very
short duration, lasting only a few hours,
or may be quite lengthy, lasting a few years.
It may be directed at only a single criminal
incident, or a long term criminal enterprise.
In some instances, the undercover
operation may involve merely the purchaseof contraband, such as illegal drugs, stolen
property, or illegal firearms, or it may
involve the operation of an undercoverbusiness, such as a tavern or other7
8

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (West Supp. 2000).
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2519 (West Supp. 2000).

48

operation, where criminals meet anddiscuss their activities with undercover
officers or informers. Through such
undercover operations, law enforcement
agents are able to infiltrate the highest
levels of organized crime groups by posing
as criminals when real criminals discuss
their plans and seek assistance incommitting crimes.
Agents often are able to gain theconfidence of criminals, inducing them toreveal their past criminal activities as well
as plotting with the agents to engage in
additional, ongoing criminal activities. In
conjunction with electronic surveillance,
the undercover approach provides
comprehensive coverage of the targets’
daily activities. However, undercover
operations are extremely sensitive andpose the danger of luring otherwise
innocent people into criminal activity.
Because this technique carries thepotential for problems, it requires
exceptional preparation.
For example, the physical safety of theundercover agent must always be
considered. To prevent the premature
disclosure of his or her identity, the agent
must be provided with a fully substantiatedpast history, referred to as “backstopping,”
and careful briefings of the targets’ modus
operandi. Every conceivable scenario that
may induce suspicion of, or hostility
towards the agent must be considered inadvance. Additionally, the undercoveragent must undergo careful testing, often
including psychological profiling, to ensurethat he or she possesses the intangible
qualities to ensure that he will “fit”
comfortably into the new identity.
In the United States, before anundercover investigation may occur, theconsent of agency supervisors andprosecutors is required. The level at which
the activity is reviewed increases as more

116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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sensitive circumstances are involved in theinvestigation. To balance the concerns andavoid harm to the public, the Departmentof Justice has set up Undercover Review
Committees, comprising senior prosecutors
and investigators. These Undercover
Review Committees are responsible forreviewing, approving, and controlling allsensitive undercover operations. To beapproved, an undercover proposal must be
in writing, contain a full factual descriptionof the suspected criminal activity and theparticipants therein, set out, in detail, theproposed undercover scenario, theexpertise of the undercover team, theduration of the project, the anticipatedlegal issues, and it must evaluate the risk
to the agents and the public.
If the undercover activity is of relatively
short duration, such as a one time purchaseof narcotics or other contraband, a first line
investigative agency supervisor and firstline prosecutor must approve the activity
after having been advised of all the factsof the matter. If the undercover activity isof a longer duration, with an undercoveragent and informant engaging in what
would otherwise be ordinary violations of
the law on a repeated basis, then theapproval of a higher level supervisor, suchas a local lead investigative agent, and asupervisory prosecutor must be informedof all the facts and give his or her approvalto the activity. These long-term undercover
operations are essential to assist ininfiltrating organized crime groups that
continue their illegal activities over many
years. Finally, if there are sensitive
circumstances involved, such as a risk that
innocent third parties might be affected by
the activity, or there is extensive andongoing criminal activity of a serious
nature, then the activity must be reviewed
and approved at the headquarters of theinvestigative agencies and by Washingtonbased Department of Justice prosecutors.

Whenever an undercover operation
reveals that a crime of violence is about totake place, law enforcement authorities are
required to take necessary steps to preventthe violence from occurring. This may
include warning the potential victim,
arresting the subjects who pose a threat,or ending the undercover operation
altogether.
C. Informants
Another critical law enforcement
technique involves the use of confidential
informants. When United States law
enforcement uses the term confidential
informant, we refer to an individual who
is not willing to testify but who provides
information or assistance to the authorities
in return for a promise that we will try tokeep his identity confidential. We cannot
absolutely guarantee such confidentiality
because in relatively rare circumstances
courts may conclude that due process, orconcerns of fundamental fairness, requirethat a confidential informant’s identity bedisclosed to a defendant charged with acrime where the informant can provide
evidence that could exculpate thedefendant. Absent such a rare case, we areable in most cases to keep an informant’s
identity confidential.
Confidential informants are typicallymotivated to provide information to theauthorities in exchange for money orlenient treatment regarding charges
pending against them or likely to bebrought against them. In many cases
confidential informants are themselves
engaged in criminal activities whichenables them to provide valuable direct
evidence of criminal activities by theircriminal associates. Confidential
informants frequently provide theinformation that enables law enforcement
officials to obtain judicial warrants
authorizing electronic surveillance. Many
successful prosecutions of the LCN

49

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58
leadership have involved information
supplied by confidential informants who
provided information for many years about
the leadership of the LCN; indeed some of
the informants have been “made members”
of the LCN. Incriminating evidence by
informants who deal directly with the LCN
leadership is simply invaluable to breakthrough the layers of insulation that theleadership uses to conceal their activities.
However, there are high risks associatedwith the use of informants. Sometimes,
informants do not fully disclose their own
criminal activities, or they falsely implicate
their enemies in crimes, or they engage inunauthorized criminal activities. In thatlatter respect, under United States law, law
enforcement may authorize informants toparticipate in some forms of non-violent
criminal behavior that would otherwise beillegal, if they were not acting as
informants with authority to engage in theactivities. For example, depending on thecircumstances, in order to protect aninformant’s cover and to enable him to be
in a position to obtain incriminating
evidence against others, informants may
be authorized to participate in illegal
gambling, trafficking in stolen property,
and other non-violent crimes. Therefore,
it is important for law enforcement toclosely monitor the activities of informants
to minimize the danger that the informant
would use his association with law
enforcement to shield his own
unauthorized criminal activities.
On balance, however, experience teaches
us that as a general rule, the benefits fromthe use of informants greatly outweigh therisks. But, we must be ever vigilant of therisks.
These three techniques, electronic
surveillance, undercover operations, anduse of informants are the most important
techniques that have assisted the50

investigative agencies to combat organizedcrime and transnational crimes. Next, I
will discuss the weapons available to thefederal prosecutors in the United States tocombat organized crime and transnational
crimes.
D. Racketeer Influenced andCorrupt Organizations Statute(RICO)
In every organized crime case, the goal
is to convict the highest levels of a crimeorganization. To accomplish this,prosecutors must be equipped with theproper tools. One particularly valuable tool
is a law which singles out the activity ofongoing criminal organizations. In the
United States, the most important law of
this sort is the Racketeer Influenced andCorrupt Organizations Statute (RICO). In
general, RICO provides heavy penalties,
including life imprisonment in certain
circumstances, when a defendant conducts,
or conspires to conduct, the affairs of anenterprise through a pattern of specified
acts, known as predicate crimes. An
enterprise can include anything from a
corporation, to a labor union, to a group ofindividuals working together to commit
crime, such as the Asian and Russianorganized crime groups discussed above.
Interestingly, the RICO statute did notactually create a new crime, as the crimesof murder, arson, and extortion, to name afew of the 46 predicate offenses in RICO,
were all made criminal long before RICO’senaction in 1970. However, RICO was stilla dramatic legislative initiative because it
permitted many of these genericallydifferent crimes to be charged in a single
indictment. After RICO, these different
crimes could even be charged in a single
count against a defendant, so long as thecrimes were part of the defendant’s patternof acts that related to the enterprise. In
essence, RICO made it a crime to be in thebusiness of being a criminal.

116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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RICO is particularly effective inorganized crime cases, as it allows aprosecutor to demonstrate the full rangeof criminal activity of an individual or agroup of criminals. For example, RICO hasa reach-back feature that enables a
prosecutor to show a pattern of
racketeering activity. As long as one of thepredicate crimes alleged against adefendant occurred within the five yearsof when the indictment is brought, the next
previous crime in the pattern of
racketeering need only be within ten yearsof the most recent crime. Similarly, thethird most recent crime need only haveoccurred within ten years of the second act.
This reach-back feature enables thisprocess to continue, possibly extending
twenty years or longer into the past.
Ordinarily, the evidence of past criminal
activity that may be presented under RICO
is outside the period for which a person
could be prosecuted, as indictments in the
United States generally cannot allege
crimes that occurred more than five years
prior to the date of the indictment. This
makes RICO particularly useful inorganized crime cases.

RICO allows the government toprosecute criminal activity on a systematic
basis, enabling them to punish themembers of an organized crime group forthe criminal activities each has engaged inon behalf of that group. In an ordinary
RICO prosecution, often six or more
racketeers are charged with perhaps adozen or more predicate crimes extending
over a decade. In each of the allegedpredicate crimes, usually only some of the
defendants are named. There have beencases where RICO indictments havecharged several defendants withcommitting over fifty offenses as part of apattern of racketeering activity!

Additionally, RICO’s reach is very broad,as the predicate crimes that qualify as
RICO predicates span all forms of criminal
actions. Without RICO, most United Statesjudges would prohibit the prosecution ofsuch diverse crimes in a single case andwould be more likely to break it up into a
series of smaller trials, especially if
numerous defendants were being charged.
Organized crime groups prefer dividing up
a prosecution because no one jury gets tosee the entire picture. Organized crime iscomposed of many crimes, all linked by asingle chain-of-command to the same
enterprise. Thus, any effective prosecutionof a crime family requires proof of many
crimes in a single trial. RICO allows this,enabling the jury to see an entire patternof crimes.

As powerful as RICO is, there were only
a few RICO prosecutions brought againstorganized crime in its first fifteen years.
That was primarily because it took Federal
prosecutors that long to feel comfortableenough with the complicated instrument
to make it the centerpiece of organizedcrime prosecutions. Another reason wasthat the investigative techniques necessary
to build a suitable RICO case, such as
electronic surveillance and undercover
operations, were not routinely used againstorganized crime bosses in the 1970’s.

Furthermore, RICO also allows thepresentation of evidence of criminal
activity that has been the subject of earlier
prosecutions. Ordinarily, this would not
be allowed in the United States because of
constitutional rules against successive
prosecutions for the same conduct.
Nevertheless, this is also permitted under
RICO. RICO has proven to be an extremely
important tool assisting in the preventionof organized crime in the United States.

Currently, it is evident that control oforganized crime in the United States would
be inconceivable without RICO. Beyond
organized crime, RICO cases have also
been brought against hundreds of police

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58
officers, judges, and public officials forofficial misconduct, and against terroristgroups, radical hate groups, street gangs,
stock manipulators, and drug cartels.
However, like any powerful tool, RICO has
the capability of being abused. To protect
against potential abuses, the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section has a
special unit of attorneys who carefully
review all proposed RICO indictments forlegal and factual sufficiency. This unit
ensures that RICO is used only when it isnecessary, disapproving of a RICO charge
when less powerful statutes would be justas effective.
E. Organized Crime Strike ForceUnits
As I previously stated, the LCN is thenumber one organized crime problem in the
United States. The LCN is an extensive
nationwide criminal organization.
Therefore, it was essential to attack the
LCN and other organized crime groups
through a closely coordinated nationwide
effort. However, law enforcement is very
fragmented and decentralized in the
United States. The United States
Department of Justice at the federal levelis divided into 94 different United States
Attorneys offices throughout the country
that operate with considerable
independence of the main JusticeDepartment located in Washington, DC. In
addition, there are literally hundreds,
perhaps over 1,000 state, county and city
prosecutors’ offices and police departmentsthat have criminal jurisdictions that are
totally independent of the federal
Department of Justice. This fragmented
prosecutorial authority makes nationwide
coordination difficult. These difficulties are
made even greater when you factor in thelarge territorial size of the United Statesand its relatively large population of over
260 million people.

52

To improve coordination of federal efforts
to attack organized crime, in the late 1960s
the Department of Justice created 24
specialized prosecutive units called
Organized Crime Strike Forces located in
the cities where the 24 LCN families weremost active. These Strike Force Units werestaffed by career prosecutors who wereexperienced in electronic surveillance,
undercover operations, and long term
proactive investigations. Moreover, these
prosecutors are only allowed to work onorganized crime matters. To assure thatthey work only on organized crime mattersand to assure that the Strike Force cases
are properly coordinated from a national
perspective, supervising prosecutors inWashington, DC must approve every
investigation, every indictment, every
wiretap and every other principal activity
that each Strike Force Unit undertakes.
Through such oversight, the supervising
attorneys in Washington, DC are able tomaintain the focus of efforts againstorganized crime groups and to see to it that
relevant information developed by one
Strike Force office gets to another office inanother part of the country that may needit.
Moreover, because the supervisors inWashington, DC, are aware of all LCN
investigations and prosecutions in the
United States, they are able to reduce
duplication of efforts and coordinate
investigations and prosecutions conductedby more than one office.
The creation of these Strike Force Units
proved to be invaluable. Over the past 25
years, the vast majority of all the major
convictions of LCN bosses and members
were obtained by these Strike Force Units.
Although the LCN remains strong in themetropolitan New York City area whereroughly 80% of the LCN members operate,the LCN has been substantially weakened
in other parts of the United States -116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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particularly in San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Kansas City, Milwaukee, St. Louis, andother cities.
Although the Strike Force Units were
initially created to combat the LCN, their
mission was expanded in 1990 to combat
Asian and Russian organized crime groups.
In 1990, the Attorney General of the UnitedStates adopted a national strategy tocoordinate the federal attack against thennewly emerging organized crime groups
operating in the United States. The Strike
Force approach became the centerpiece ofthat national strategy since it had been so
successful against the LCN. The Strike
Force Units were well equipped to handle
the new challenges because of theirexperience, and also because the Strike
Force Units were already located in thecities where the Russian and Asian
organized crime groups were most active.
Not surprisingly, the Russian and Asian
organized crime groups are active in thesame large cities as the LCN.
To implement this national strategy, theAttorney General created the Attorney
General’s Organized Crime Council, themembers of which are the heads of theFederal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), theDivision of Enforcement of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Secret
Service, the Marshals Service, the Customs
Service, the Postal Inspectors, and theInternal Revenue Service. The Council
meets as necessary to set the official
priorities of the Federal Government’sorganized crime programme, whichcurrently are LCN, Asian, and Russianorganized crime. In order to set thesepriorities, each agency and the country’s
94 top Federal prosecutors (called UnitedStates Attorneys) are required each year
to file written plans assessing the problems
posed by organized crime groups in theirdistricts and for attacking organized crimegroups in their districts. The Departmento f J u s t i c e ’s O r g a n i z e d C r i m e a n d
Racketeering Section then reports its
analyses of these plans to the Council. The
most important feature of this system iscontrol: It obligates the regional
prosecutors and agents to keep constantpressure on La Cosa Nostra and Asian andRussian crime groups, and prevent themfrom succumbing to periodic temptations
to assign prosecutors and agents to nonorganized crime cases.
Implementing this national strategy has
enabled the Federal Government tocoordinate its nationwide efforts againstorganized crime groups and to keep thepressure on them to prevent them fromexpanding their corrupt influences onsociety.
F. Immunity System
Another valuable tool used byprosecutors in organized crime cases is thepower to grant immunity under certain
conditions in return for a witness’s
testimony. Every individual in our country
has a right under Fifth Amendment of ourconstitution to refuse to testify against
himself. The immunity system allows thegovernment to force an individual to testify
in return for a promise that the testimony
may not be used against the witness in any
subsequent criminal case.9
Until 1970, there were numerous federal
immunity statutes providing transactional
immunity, protecting people testifying
under these laws against prosecution or
penalty on account of any transaction,
matter, or thing relating to their testimony
or production of evidence. Therefore, undertransactional immunity, the witness
received immunization from a subsequent9

See 18 U.S.C.A § 6002 (West Supp. 2000); Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58
prosecution as to any matters about which
he or she testified.
Today, however, transactional immunity
no longer exists in the federal system. It
was replaced by what is referred to as “useimmunity.”10 In 1970, the United States
Congress enacted the so-called “useimmunity” statutes that explicitly
proscribe the use in any criminal case of
testimony compelled under the order
granting immunity. In essence, use
immunity only provides that the witness’
testimony itself will not be used against
him or her; he or she may still be
prosecuted using other evidence. Although
use immunity is not considered as broad aprotection to the individual astransactional immunity, it is neverthelessconsistent with the proscriptions of theFifth Amendment because it “prohibits theprosecutorial authorities from using thecompelled testimony in any respect, and it
therefore insures that the testimony cannot
lead to the infliction of criminal penalties
on the witness.”11
The United States attorney, with theapproval of the Attorney General, theDeputy Attorney General, or a designatedassistant attorney general is empowered
to seek a court order granting use
immunity when, in the judgment of thegovernment, the testimony or otherinformation is necessary to the public
interest and the individual has asserted or
is likely to assert his or her privilege
against self-incrimination. In 1999, theDepartment of Justice authorized 2,059
requests for witness immunity, and 1,444of those requests were granted to the
Criminal Division.

In addition to the Immunity system,
there is also the “Crown Witness” system
which, although it is not codified in the
United States Code, is a widespread andapproved practice in obtaining witnesses.
Under the “Crown Witness” system, there
are two types of agreements that theUnited States can enter into withwitnesses, non-prosecution agreements
and cooperation agreements.
Non-prosecution agreements, are mainly
used for situations where a witness’s
involvement in a criminal act is minimal.12
These agreements grant immunity fromprosecution in connection with that casein return for full, truthful cooperation.
Although non-prosecution agreements areavailable, they are rarely used.
Cooperation agreements, on the other
hand, are the most commonly used
instrument to compel testimony. These
agreements require the defendant to incursome type of liability for his or her criminal
conduct. In a cooperation agreement, thedefendant agrees to plead guilty to certain
agreed-upon charges, to fully andtruthfully cooperate with prosecution, andto testify in any court proceeding
concerning all matters asked of him or her.
I n e x c h a n g e f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t ’s
cooperation, the government agrees to filea motion pursuant to Federal Sentencing
Guideline § 5K1.1.13 This motion gives ajudge discretion with respect to thedefendant’s sentence, something he or she
ordinarily would not possess. Upon receipt
of such a motion, the sentencing judge willusually decide to reduce the sentence. This
creates a powerful incentive forcooperation, and is a particularly valuable
tool in the prosecution of organized crime

10 See: 18 U.S.C.A §§ 6001, 6002, 6003 (West Supp.

2000); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441(1972).
11 See: Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.

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12 US Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorney’s

Manual, ch.9, § 27.600(B)(1)(c) (1997).
13 US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 5K1.1 (1998).

116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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groups.
G. Witness Protection Programs
Another valuable asset that aids theprosecution of organized crime groups isthe federal Witness Security Programme.
Because of the often violent nature oforganized crime, witness intimidation canbe a significant obstacle in the way of a
successful prosecution. To address thatproblem, the Department of Justice createdthe Federal Witness Security Programme
in 1970. Requests for protection of
witnesses must be made as soon as it is
k n o w n t h a t t h e Wi t n e s s S e c u r i t y
Programme candidate will be a significant
and essential witness, and will need
relocation due to proximity to a “danger
area.” Naturally, because of the security
concerns regarding the witness and his or
her family, a witness’s pending and actual
participation in the Programme is notdisclosed unless under the authorizationof the Office of Enforcement Operations(OEO). This allows the United States
Marshals Service (USMS) time to conduct
preliminary interviews, psychologicaltesting, and appropriate review, thereby
minimizing the disruption to both thewitness and the concerned government
agencies.
A witness is admitted into theProgramme when he or she is able tosupply significant evidence in important
cases, and there is a perceived threat tohis or her security. Once in the programme,
the witness and his or her family are given
new identities, relocated to another partof the United States where the danger totheir security is decreased, and are given
financial assistance until the witness isable to secure employment.
The Witness Security Programme is very
costly. Since the beginning of theProgramme, over 6,800 witnesses havebeen admitted, along with an additionalroughly 9,000 family members. The
average cost is $75,000 per witness, peryear, and $125,000 per family, per year.
Despite these numbers, the results derived
from the Programme have made it worth
the cost. Since its inception in 1970, over
10,000 defendants have been convicted
through the testimony of witnesses in the
Programme.
The vast majority of protected witnesses,
about 97 percent, have criminal records.
However, the recidivist rate for witnesses
in the programme is 21 percent, which ishalf the rate of those released from prisonin the United States. Overall, the Witness
Security Programme has proven to be
extremely beneficial and effective in theprosecution against organized crimegroups.
H. Forfeiture
It cannot be overstated that making
money is the primary goal of organizedcrime and transnational criminal activities.
Therefore, it is imperative to take the profit
out of crime. Strong forfeiture laws do justthat. Forfeiture is a criminal penalty formany offenses in the United States.
Generally speaking, upon conviction for an
offense that carries forfeiture as a penalty,
a defendant may be ordered to forfeit all
profits or proceeds derived from thecriminal activity, any property, real or
personnel, involved in the offense, orproperty traceable to the offense such as
property acquired with proceeds of criminal
activity. For example, if a defendant uses
a residence or car to distribute drugs, thatproperty is subject to forfeiture. Thus, aconvicted defendant may be ordered toforfeit all proceeds of his criminal activity
including money and other forms ofproperty.
In addition to criminal forfeiture, civil
forfeiture laws also allow the government
to obtain property used in criminal

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58
activities. The principal difference between
criminal and civil forfeiture is that criminal
forfeiture is limited to a convicted
defendant’s personal interest in property
subject to forfeiture, whereas civil
forfeiture focuses on the property itself.
For example, suppose a defendantrepeatedly used a house to sell drugs, but
he did not have an ownership interest in
the house. If he is convicted of drug
dealing, that house is not subject tocriminal forfeiture because the defendant
did not own the house. However, a civil
forfeiture law suit could be brought against
the house itself as a defendant, even if theowner of the house was not engaged incriminal activity. The house, nonetheless,is subject to civil forfeiture because it was
repeatedly used to facilitate criminal
activities, and the owner did not takeadequate steps to prevent his house frombeing used for criminal activities.
There are various defenses to such civil
forfeiture, such as the “innocent owner
defense”, but I do not want to digress into
the complexity of United States forfeiturelaw. To some extent I have generalized andoversimplified United States forfeiture law
which is complex so as not to detract ourattention from the main point I am trying
to make. That is, that criminal and civil
forfeiture laws are powerful weapons in theprosecutors’ arsenal to take the profit outof crime.
I. Money Laundering
Strong money laundering laws go handin-hand with forfeiture laws as powerfulweapons against criminal activities. Under
United States money laundering laws, it
is a crime to knowingly conduct a financialtransaction with the proceeds of certain
specified unlawful activity set forth in thestatute with either the intent to promote
the specified unlawful activity or with theintent to conceal the specified unlawful

56

activity. The term transaction is broadly
defined to include “a purchase, sale, loan,pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or otherdisposition” and “with respect to a financial
institution includes a deposit, withdrawal,
transfer between accounts, exchange ofcurrency, loan, extension of credit,
purchase or sale of any stock, bond,certificate of deposit, or other monetary
instrument, use of a safe deposit box, or
any other payment, transfer, or delivery by,through, or to a financial institution, bywhatever means effected.”
As you can see, the money laundering
statute covers nearly every imaginable typeof transaction. Moreover, the penalties formoney laundering include forfeiture which
greatly enhances law enforcement’s efforts
to take to profit out of crime.
For example, in one recent case in
Boston, defendants were convicted oflaundering $136 million in drug proceeds
for Colombian drug traffickers. The
defendants received the cash drug
proceeds, and used it to buy money orders,cashiers’ checks, or gold to conceal theillegal source of the cash; this constituted
money laundering. The defendants argued
that they should only be required to forfeit
the 5% laundering fee (or roughly $7
million) that they charged the drugtraffickers since the $136 million belonged
to the drug traffickers. The court rejected
this argument and held that thedefendants were liable for forfeiture of theentire $136 million that they laundered.
Other examples of money laundering
illustrate the breadth of the statute. For
example, proceeds of fraud that are
deposited in bank accounts or otherfinancial institutions which is commingledwith legitimate money in accounts under
the names of nominees constitutes money
laundering subjecting, under somecircumstances, the entire amounts in the

116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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accounts to forfeiture, including the money
obtained legally as well as the crime
proceeds.
In many cases, not just organized crime
cases, money laundering violations coupledwith forfeiture have proven to be powerfulweapons to take the profit out of crime.
J. Sentences
Finally, I would like to briefly discuss
United States sentencing laws. Fairpunishment upon conviction is obviously
the ultimate goal of all prosecutions.
Perhaps most important is the protection
afforded by incapacitating the convictedcriminal through incarceration. To be sure,
imprisonment substantially reduces, butdoes not totally eliminate, opportunities forcriminals to continue their illegal activities.
In 1987, the United States Federal
Government adopted a comprehensivechange in its sentencing laws to makepunishment more definite and more
uniform throughout the federal system.
First, federal parole was abolished.
Therefore, a sentence of 10 years in jailmeans a defendant will not be paroled at ashorter time and the defendant will
actually serve 10 years in jail, with somemodest reduction for good time behavior
while in jail. Other changes involved
substantial restrictions on the discretionof judges in imposing sentences. Pursuant
to the changes, sentences are now
determined by application of a complex
numerical weighing system. Under theformula, specific numbers are assigned to
relevant factors such as the type of offense,
the nature of the underlying
circumstances, the defendant’s role in theoffense and the defendant’s criminal
history. The numbers are added up andthe defendant is generally sentenced to a
guideline range according to the resulting
number. Again, I am oversimplifying
complex legal provisions.

Most prosecutors and police in the
United States would argue that the longer
prison sentences under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and similar state
guidelines are in part responsible for thelarge decrease in the rate of serious crimein the United States over the last ten years.
Others may take the contrary view andpoint to some cases in which the
Guidelines, and the mandatory minimum
sentences associated with certain drug
crimes, lead to harsh results in individual
cases. I take no view on this debate, except
to argue that for the most serious criminals,
especially high-ranking members oforganized crime groups, the Guidelines andmandatory minimum sentences haveensured that the most serious criminal
conduct will be matched with a serious
punishment. The certainty of longsentences for criminal convictions also
tends to convince defendants that theywould be better served by cooperating with
the Government and testifying against
their bosses, rather than hope that a judge
will be swayed by their lawyers’ arguments
into giving them a light sentence. In thisway the Guidelines help our cases bymaking it more likely that defendants will
choose to “flip” and testify for our side.
IV. METHODS FOR COMBATING
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZEDCRIME - INTERNATIONALRESPONSES
I would now like to turn my discussion
from the principal aspects of the UnitedStates domestic responses to transnational
crimes and organized crime to what we aredoing together with other countries in theinternational arena to combat suchcriminal activities.
A. Extradition
It is imperative that international
criminals be denied a safe haven.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 58
International extradition treaties remain
the most effective legal mechanism toobtain the return of international fugitives.
In 1990, the United States sought theextradition of 1,672 accused or convictedcriminals. By 1996, that number had
jumped to more than 2,894, including
numerous fugitives wanted for murder,
major drug trafficking offenses, money
laundering, multi-million dollar financial
scams, and other serious crimes committed
against the United States.

countries. These MLATs are invaluable insetting out clear procedures by which
prosecutors can gain evidence from othercountries. However, MLATs do not execute
themselves. In some ways the MLAT isonly the first step. Prosecutors in bothcountries have to work hard to prepare
requests that will be understood by thereceiving country, and have to work equally
hard in preparing responses to incoming
requests that will be useful to therequesting country.

The United States is currently party toover 110 such extradition treaties. The
United States Departments of State andJustice, with appropriate input from otherlaw enforcement agencies, are involved inan active programme to negotiate modern
treaties in order to replace old, outdated
instruments, to create extradition treaties
where none previously existed, and toensure that new crimes are covered byextradition treaties. We encourage theinternational community to work together
to deny safe havens to international
criminals through procedures consistent
with domestic and international law.

In the United States Department ofJustice, the Office of International Affairs
is responsible for coordinating bothincoming and outgoing requests for legal
assistance with other countries. The
Office’s attorneys become experts in the lawof their assigned countries and are able toprovide assistance and advice both to US
prosecutors seeking evidence from abroad
as well as foreign countries seeking
evidence from the United States. They
confront all manner of problems andmisunderstandings that arise between
different legal systems, where even similarterms like “judge” and “indictment” havevery different legal meanings and effects.
In the years to come, the Office ofInternational Affairs and its counterpartsin other countries will be called upon toplay a larger and larger role in ourorganized crime investigations.

B. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties(MLATS)
In light of the international nature oftransnational and organized crime
activities, it is also essential to be able toobtain, in a timely way, the testimony of
witnesses, bank records, other financial
records and other evidence from foreigncountries, and in some cases from several
different countries, and for the UnitedStates to give similar assistance to othercountries. Therefore, Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties have become important
tools to address international criminal
activities.
Barely 20 years ago, the United Statesentered into its first MLAT. Today, there
are the United States has MLATs with 36

58

Even where there is no MLAT in force,
the United States is hopeful that law
enforcement agencies will be able toexchange information and provide mutual
assistance in ways that are fully consistent
with the laws of the countries involved.
Such cooperation is essential to effectively
combat the international criminal
activities of sophisticated criminals whoseek to exploit the difficulties inherent ininternational investigations.

116TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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C. Expanding the Presence ofUnited States Law Enforcement
Agents Abroad
Tough United States laws that protect
United States citizens and interests abroad
will be of little value if the United States
does not establish an investigative and law
enforcement infrastructure to pursue
violations of these laws. United States law
enforcement officials stationed abroad
work shoulder to shoulder with theirforeign counterparts to investigate crimes
against United States nationals committed
overseas. Where offenders are identified,these officials also work to locate,apprehend, and return the perpetrators ofsuch crimes through extradition, expulsion
or other lawful means. They also facilitate
the arrest and extradition of international
fugitives located in the United States andwanted abroad.
The United States would like to expand
its law enforcement presence in othercountries to work with the host countries
to respond to this growing need. For
example, the FBI currently has FBI offices
in 44 other countries and is looking to
expand further. Similar expansions arebeing planned by the Customs Service andDrug Enforcement Administration. These
expansions will bolster United States law
enforcement abilities to arrest and punish
fugitives who have committed crimes
against the United States, to dismantle
international organized crime rings, andto strengthen law enforcement and judicial
systems around the globe. I have been
fortunate enough to work with FBI Legal
Attaches in many foreign countries, and I
have found their advice to be absolutely
essential to our work. I strongly encourageprosecutors and police officials of every
country to make and maintain close contact
with the nearest FBI Legal Attache if you
have any kind of investigation that touches
both your country and the United States,
or if you want any kind of investigative

assistance from the United States.
One particularly bold step taken earlier
this year was the creation of a joint FBIHungarian National Police Unit based in
Budapest that investigates organized crime
cases. This advance was made possible
because the Hungarian government
recognized that transnational organizedcriminals based in Budapest werecommitting crimes that affected manydifferent countries, including the UnitedStates. The Hungarians and theAmericans agreed that a joint police unit
would be better able to pursue
transnational investigations that would
result in prosecutions in Hungarian orAmerican courts. This unit has alreadymade a big difference in the operating
environment for criminals in Budapest,
and we are open to considering similar
initiatives with other countries.
To complement the increasing numberof United States law enforcement
personnel overseas, mutual legal
assistance is greatly enhanced by the
Department of Justice’s cadre of overseas
attorneys. Their role includes facilitating
requests for extradition and mutual legal
assistance, providing substantive legal
guidance on international law enforcement
and treaty matters, and increasing
cooperation between United States andforeign prosecutors. Currently, theDepartment of Justice has prosecutors inBrussels, Mexico City, Paris, London,
Geneva, and Rome. This summer we also
had a prosecutor stationed in our embassyin Moscow, a position that we hope to makepermanent. These attorneys do work
similar to that of their Office ofInternational Affairs colleagues in
Washington, D.C., but are even more
effective because they are on the spot. They
have also proved vital for building the longterm working relationships that we hopeto establish with our overseas colleagues.

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If it were not for budget constraints, I
would gladly see these positions expanded
to a dozen other countries.
V. CONCLUSION
Transnational organized crime is a
rapidly growing problem. The criminals
have showed that they can adapt instantly
to new technologies, to exploiting
opportunities created by the increasing
globalization of the world’s economies.
They know how to use borders to their best
advantage to protect themselves, but do not
let problems of national sovereignty,
ethnicity, or language get in their way when
they see an illegal way to make money. We
members of law enforcement, by contrast,
must obey not only our own rules, with all
their technicalities, but must scrupulously
obey each others’ rules whenever weventure into another country. In the
eternal battle between policeman andcrook, the criminals threaten today as
never before to gain the upper hand on a
global scale.
The measures which I have outlined
above are at most partial solutions. They
will have at best only a limited effect until
we undergo a more fundamental shift in
our attitudes toward the difficult andfrustrating process of international
investigations. We all have heavy demands
on our time, more cases than we know what
to do with, and many leads to follow which
will always seem more promising or moreurgent than a foreign bank accountnumber, or a telephone call by a criminalthat goes overseas. These foreign leads,
we feel, are unlikely to amount to anything,and even if they did lead to a case it would
be a long and difficult one. My argument
to you today is that we have to overcome
this reluctance, we have to be willing totake the plunge and reach out for a foreigncolleague who may be looking at the otherend of the same case that you are puzzling

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over. It is only when we learn to work
effectively across borders that we will beable to mount an effective attack ontransnational organized crime.