Chapters 9

The Making of Foreign Policy
under Stalin
Jonathan HASLAM
1. The Inherent Flaw in Biography
The issue as to how Soviet foreign policy was made during
the period of Stalin's dictatorship will seem a trifle redundant.
Surely the dictator decided upon foreign policy and that was
that? This has certainly been the view conventionally adopted
by the dictator's biographers. But those biographers have notgenerally specialised in any one area of Soviet policy and havetherefore not actually seen policy-making in any detail.
Theirs is all too often the view from on high rather than that at
eye level. This approach makes certain assumptions about
Stalin's position within the structure and about Stalin himself:
for example, that the Stalin of 1929 to 1939 was exactly thesame man as the supremely self-confident and apparently very
well informed "generalissimo" who sat with Churchill andRoosevelt to carve up the world; that Stalin was always
interested in international relations; that from the outset healways had his own ideas about the conduct of foreign policy;
that he would not allow others to influence the course of
events. This mythical Stalin is unchanging, by all accounts a
most exceptional man who escaped the impact of experience
unlike almost everyone else in history; a man never given to
doubt, a man who never acted on advice, a man who nevergained confidence in spheres that originally lay far beyond his
own limited realm. But perhaps we should not be too

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Jonathan Haslamsurprised. This is the Stalin recreated by political scientists
rather than historians; and if there is one obvious weakness inwestern social science, it is that it is static and insensible tothe changing impact of events. But why not pause toreconsider the nature of Stalin's dictatorship and themechanisms other than pure terror by which Stalin assured
his predominance?
Because of the somewhat sensational claims made byProfessor Getty1 from the United States about Stalin's place
within the structure of power, which in my view falsely
eliminate Stalin from full responsibility for the terror
unleashed from 1936, it is best to state from the outset that
although the case to be made with respect to foreign policy
decision-making calls for a more open-minded and enquiring
view onto the functioning of the entire dictatorship, this writeris unalterably convinced that Stalin was directly andpersonally responsible for the terror campaign in those years;
as all the evidence so far released from the newly opened
Russian archives testifies. He was plainly an evil man.
Having established that much, however, is it really necessary
to insist that all policies carried out by the Soviet regime from
1929 to 1953 were products of his thinking, were his personalinspiration; that there was no significant contribution ofothers? To read his biographers, one would indeed assume so.
And it seems to me that this line of reasoning — unsupported
by evidence and taken for granted — is fundamentally flawedwith respect to the way Stalin operated; and betrays afundamental misunderstanding about the manner in which
any political system makes policy, whether totalitarian ordemocratic.

2. The Inadequacy of Political Science
Perhaps the most baffling characterisation of foreign policy
making by a prominent sovietologist can be found in a piece by
Leonard Schapiro, who emerged in 1980 with a new discovery:"Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy."2 Whatever the merits ofThe Making of Foreign Policy169

his treatment of the Brezhnev era — and what we now know isthat it certainly was not Brezhnev alone who made foreign
policy — his discussion pays no attention whatever to how
foreign policy is normally made in the West; had he done so,certainly with respect to Britain, and France under the fifth
republic, he may have found at least as much in common
between the processes of totalitarian states and theirdemocratic counterparts as their differences, not least because
public opinion has traditionally been excluded or manipulated(as over Irangate and British arms sales to Iraq), Ministers lie
to Parliament, and decisions have been concentrated into thehands of very few: this makes any notion of effective
democracy in foreign policy somewhat tenuous, in Europe atleast, and therefore the notion of totalitarianism in foreign
policy making a matter of degree, not absolutes. What is also
worrying about this characterisaiton of the processes in
Moscow is the naive assumption that in day-to-day matters
one can simply conduct policy without delegating power; yetthis is definitely not like working a machine, for even the mostlowly official has to interpret the policy laid down in what isoften a rapidly changing context.
Schapiro gave us a general conception of Soviet foreign
policy making. Robert C. Tucker gives us an eloquent but
flawed portrait of Stalin and Stalin's methods both in his early
essays and more recently in his full length biography, mostimportantly in volume two: Stalin in Power: The Revolution
from Above, 1928-1941.3 His approach to Stalin is clearlymarked out from that adopted by E.H. Carr and Isaac
Deutscher who, borrowing from Trotsky, see Stalin largely inimpersonal terms: not a man of ideas but a man almost devoidof original thought, and a politician who was the product of histimes rather than the deus ex machina that others haveusually presented.4 Under Trotsky's persuasive influence,these historians undoubtedly underrated the impact of Stalin's
personality. But — and this is where Tucker marches rather
too far out ahead of the evidence — having established that
Stalin was less the product of, than the maker of, the system,

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he goes on to assert that the system created was nothing but ablind creature of Stalin's.
This position has its roots far back into the past, in Tucker's
personal experience of Stalin's dictatorship while serving at
the US embassy in Moscow during the early Cold War.
Haunted by this bitter experience, he formulated thisconception of the dictatorship not many years later. It is in an
essay on "The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinisation" published in
World Politics in October 1959 that he makes the classic
formulation of the Soviet regime as a totalitarian structure:
Every true totalitarianism is a one-man system and comesto power through the subversion of a pre-existing politicalregime...after Stalin's blood purges of the middle 1930s,
there was no longer in any real sense a ruling party, just as
there was no real ruling class; there was at most a
privileged stratum of bureaucratic serving-men who lived
well and wore medals but who were instrumentalities
rather than real holders or sharers of power.5
Tucker thus insists that from 1936 no one shared power with
Stalin. How, then, did Stalin rule? Through the so-called
Special Sector, Tucker tells us:
All directives for trials and purges were funneled throughit. All information was channelled into it. It had a foreign
section through which Stalin conducted foreign policy, andso on... It was, as it were, a little gear box through which
the massive machinery of Soviet rule of over nearly 900
million human beings on about one-third of the earth's
surface was operated. By manipulating the levers in thecontrol panel, Stalin could cause all kinds of things tohappen. He could play politics as though playing a piano,
touching a key here and striking a chord there, with results
as diverse as a blast in Pravda against Churchill, a purge inthe Ukraine, a plan for a new power station on the Volga, a
propaganda campaign about germ warfare, a re-evaluationof Einstein, or a government change in Bulgaria.6

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It would be idle to deny that this portrayal does, of course,
provide an explanation for much that happened. But one has
to ask how complete it is as an explanation. The image issurely too simplistic. Stalin alone seems to do everything in
relation to policy; others merely execute it. This claim is notnew. It is the Stalin that was presented to us daily through theadulatory organs of the Soviet press from 1929 to 1953. It isalso the Stalin that Khrushchev describes as the sole villain of
the piece in his secret speech of 1956. As the leader of the
Italian Communist Party Palmiro Togliatti put it: "At first, allthat was good was put down to the superhumanpositive
qualities of one man; now, all that was bad comes to be
attributed to the as many exceptional and even astonishing of
his defects."7 The adulation and the condemnation both served
useful political purposes, both suspect, though perhaps notequally so; but was this approach ever adequate as an
explanation as to how the system really worked?
It is striking to note that the view of the Stalinist systempresented by Merle Fainsod was a more nuanced andsophisticated one:
The formula of totalitarian rule as it took shape under
Stalin's ministrations was a complex one. It represented, in
one aspect, a drive to safeguard his own security by
obliterating all actual or competing centers of power... In
this system of institutionalized mutual suspicion, thecompeting hierarchies of Party, police, army, andadministration were kept in purposeful conflict andprovided with no point of final resolution short of Stalin andhis trusted henchmen in the Politburo. The concentrationof power in Stalin's hands rested on the dispersal of power
among his subordinates.8
This general comment with respect to "Stalin's Totalitarian
Formula" seems much closer to reality than that presented byTucker. For in Tucker there is no "dispersal of power"; there
are not really any henchmen, either — at least, after 1929-30.
Stalin's closest associates are mentioned without being
discussed: Litvinov and Molotov, Dimitrov and Radek, all172

Jonathan Haslamappear and disappear from the pages of the text without any
serious attention to their personalities, their power and theirtrue influence. Since Stalin knows what he is going to do fromthe outset in every sphere of Soviet life and politics, what isthe point of discussing the role of mere subordinates whose job
it was just to execute policy, not think about it and guideStalin's judgements?
For the characterisation given in World Politics in 1959, a
good six years after Fainsod's portrayal of the system but withno reference to the alternative view he presents, is fully
consonant with the Stalin presented in volume two of thebiography. We are soon informed that Stalin "had his own
distinctive orientation and... during the 1920s he worked out apolicy program that gave concrete expression to it."9 In respectof foreign policy, Tucker claims Stalin had a peculiarly"German orientation."10 To make clear what his orientation
was, whether in foreign or domestic policy, Tucker lack any
direct evidence. What we "can" do, he suggests, is to "piece it
together from various statements that he made during that
decade." 11 This, it has to be said, is rather dubious
methodologically. For he assumes that Stalin knew from theoutset what he would do; he does not prove it. He thenattempts to illustrate this assumption by means of very
selective quotation. With respect to foreign policy this has anodd, but not altogether unexpected, result. Since the generalline laid down by Lenin in foreign policy was that of anorientation towards Weimar Germany — the so-called Rapallo
relationship — based on a common hostility to the Versailles
peace settlement, it is as easy to find pro-German statements
by Stalin as it is by everyone else; and extremely difficult tofind anything said in public which contradicts it. The
quotations from Stalin's public statements of the 1920s are
therefore worthless as evidence of a personal orientation.
The Rapallo relationship underpinned the Soviet priority ofkeeping the capitalist camp divided; there is nothing odd in
the fact that Stalin continued that line after he achieved
personal supremacy in 1929. There is, however, no evidence toThe Making of Foreign Policy

173

suggest any particular personal attachment to that line or any
other orientation in foreign policy. Indeed, what is mostnoticeable throughout the period of Stalin's supremacy is amarked reluctance to say anything coherent about foreign
policy in public and an equally marked reluctance to meetforeign ambassadors, leaders or journalists, for discussions on
the subject, with the notable exception of the period 1941-45.
It is that image of the generalissimo taken from World War II
projected back into the past which is so misleading.

3. Stalin's Immediate Entourage
The evidence of Stalin's own predetermined orientation
lacking, what of those around him? It is, in my view, here that
we find the sources of Stalin's position on any given question.
First there is the issue of the strategy of collective security
which Litvinov originated. Tucker informs us that "in the new
atmosphere following January 1933, Litvinov and others werebound to be attracted to the idea of a new diplomacy ofcooperation with those European states that had cause to fear
Hitler's Germany. Stalin, however, had other ideas..."12 But if
Stalin had supreme power, how was it that the policy was
adopted in December 1933? And statements Stalin made insupport of the policy — most notably to Kollontai, the Soviet
ambassador to Sweden — are ignored.13 There is also theadoption of the Popular Front policy by the Comintern.
Tucker passes by the evidence concerning major disputes overthe direction Comintern should take and the fact that Stalin
had favoured a continuation of the old line of class against
class without comment.14 Then there is the role of Vyacheslav
Molotov. Born on 9 March 1890 Molotov joined the Bolsheviks
at only sixteen years of age. Like Stalin he formed part of theinternal emigration and therefore lost the opportunity to knowwhat the outside world was really like. He became closely
associated with Stalin in 1921 and Politburo member inJanuary 1926. Stalin felt he could count on Molotov's politicalloyalty and it was for this reason and certainly no other that

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he charged him with responsibility for the Comintern after
Bukharin's removal in 1928-29. Then in 1930 he took overfrom Rykov as chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars. Traditionary Molotov has always been assumed
to have been a mere mouthpiece of Stalin's. New evidence hascome to light that this was not so. We have Molotov's own
testimony, for example. In conversation with Felix Chuyev inJune 1977, he said the following with reference to his
relationship with Stalin which had broken down after 1949:
I criticised certain views of Stalin's even before, and I told
him in person. I consider that a Communist, a member of
the Politburo, thirty years there but with no opinions of hisown, is a chatterbox. Thus I consider that Stalin valued me,
the fact that I had some kind of opinion, someunderstanding of the issues. Well, he did not always agreewith me, but I have to say that he largely agreed with me.
Otherwise we could not have worked together for 30 years.15
Yet when he considers a statement by Molotov on policy
towards Germany that contradicts the basic line of Soviet
foreign policy — notably when in 1936 Molotov tells a Frenchjournalist that "the chief tendency, and the one determining
the Soviet Government's policy, thinks an improvements inSoviet-German relations possible" — Tucker immediately
leaps to the conclusion that "Stalin made his position public
via Molotov."16 But this is an assumption, not a statement offact. Why is it not equally possible that Molotov held to astrongly pro-German line, and that he had managed toconvince an agnostic Stalin that now was the time to make it
more public? This would, of course, flatly contradict Tucker's
assumption that from the outset Stalin had a strategy ofdragging the West into a war with Germany.17 This is exactly
what Stalin feared the West might be contemplating withrespect to Russia and Germany. Nonetheless Litvinov had
persuaded him to take a forward position in favour of thecontainment of Germany even at the risk of provoking
Berlin.18 And in this writer's view it was only in August 1939

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that Stalin finally gave up that option and switched decisively
to the other side.19
There is other testimony that Molotov had open
disagreements with Stalin over policy. "I would say," recalls
Khrushchev, "that he [Molotov] was the only person in the
Politburo who opposed Stalin on this or that question for thesecond time."20 In the opinion of Marshal Zhukov, who
observed Molotov and Stalin at close quarters for the first timein 1940-41, Molotov "exerted serious influence over Stalin,
particularly in questions of foreign policy, in which Stalinthen, until the war, considered him [Molotov] competent."
When attacked by Stalin, "Molotov by no means always
remained silent." Indeed, "at times it reached the point where
Stalin raised his voice and even lost all self-control, andMolotov, smiling, rose from behind the table and held firm to
his point of view."21
There is evidence that Stalin was indecisive on matters of
foreign policy. This emerges most clearly in respect ofrelations with Japan. The Japanese assault on manchuria
from September 1931 threatened to evolve into a campaign
against the Soviet Far East. In Moscow this jeopardisedcompletion of the first five-year plan and forced the
speeding-up of preparations for war. The thorny question
was: should the Russians appease the Japanese until they
were ready for war or should they make a show of standing
firm and risk war even though defence preparations were far
from adequate? There is no evidence that Stalin took adecisive position either way. And there is abundant evidence
that his subordinates were bickering with one another over
the right path to take; in itself an unambiguous sign that
Stalin found it difficult to make up his mind. The issue wasfurther complicated when Hitler took power in January 1933.
Those who argued that Germany now presented a threat toSoviet security — as Litvinov predicted it would when Hitler
took power — pressed for continued appeasement of Japan;
those who were more rabidly anti-Japanese found a further
reason for continuing to sustain close relations with Germany.
The Soviet Union did1 76

Jonathan Haslam

not have the power to contemplate a war on two fronts; so adecision was required between the two orientations. Early in1932 the French ambassador to Moscow reported a clash of
opinion between those advocating a forward policy in the East,
including the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lev
Karakhan, and those advocating a more passive line, first andforemost Litvinov. Thereafter foreign embassies picked up
frequent signs of discord among leading officials.22
4. The Postwar Period
We have spoken entirely about pre-war Stalin andemphasised here and elsewhere that he may well have beenrather a different figure in relation to foreign policy than the
Stalin of the war and after, in that it took time for him to takea direct grip on all aspects of foreign policy; and that partly
from lack of interest and partly also from lack of direct
knowledge, he diffused control among his immediate
entourage, adopted policies proposed by others on a trial anderror basis, and ultimately only took more operational control
after the dismissal of Litvinov in May 1939. On this view thedifference between pre-war and postwar Stalin was one ofdegree. He appears never to have handed over a degree of
operational control to Molotov and Vyshinsky to the same
extent that he did to Litvinov. On the other hand, the signs
are that debates over policy continued — indeed intensified —into the early Cold War; and that the great battles of the 1950s
over whether to pursue detente with the West and, if so, how
far to go, fought out between Malenkov and Molotov, and then
Khrushchev and Molotov, were to some extent prefigured inthese earlier debates.
Much of this will, of course, remain speculative until the
Politburo papers on the foreign policy issues of the period areopened.23 But then Stalin's biographers have not shunned
speculation, even if it is presented as hard fact. The evidence
in US diplomatic archives is that there were, indeed, someintense debates in Moscow over the line to take from 1945.

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Walter Bedell-Smith, who served as US ambassador to theSoviet Union from 1946-1949 before heading the newly formed
Central Intelligence Agency, wrote memoirs which appearedin 1950. There he had some interesting reflections on the
structure of power and decision in the Kremlin. He describes
Stalin thus: "Courageous but cautious; suspicious, revengefuland quick to anger, but coldly ruthless and pitilessly realistic;
decisive and swift in the execution of his plans when theobjective is clear, but patient, deceptive and Fabian in his
tactics when the situation is obscure..."24 Because hecentralised power, and because the officials down below dare
not communicate the unadorned truth, even if theirindoctrination allowed them to see it, "Stalin must be bycharacter, experience and environment, almost completelydependent on a few close friends and advisers within the wallsof the Kremlin." Bedell-Smith continues: "It is not only inauthoritarian states that the continuous struggle for access to
the Chief of State, and for control of his sources of information,
is a major factor in political life. In the Soviet Union, wheresecrecy and suspicion are rife, this must be particularly
intense. Because of Stalin's ignorance of the West, his
suspicious Georgian character and his isolation, the power of
his few political intimates must be very great. It is in thecharacter of these advisers, and in their relationship with
Stalin, that we must seek the answers to many of the
perplexing manifestations of Soviet foreign policy and of theSoviet attitude toward the United States and Western
Europe/'25 "My own impression," wrote Bedell-Smith, "is that
there really was a decided difference of opinion in the
Politburo concerning relations with the West."26 Interestingly
he saw opinions cluster around two distinct group within
Stalin's entourage: the "Moderates," who believed the Soviet
Union needed to buy more time before confronting the Westand should therefore required a "closer understanding" with
the United States and its allies; and the hardliners, whofavoured a more pro-active policy of "constant pressure,aggressive action and intransigence." The more militant group

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he saw clustered around Molotov and included Zhdanov —"one of the most anti-Western and anti-foreign members of theupper Soviet hierarchy"27 — and Beria; the more moderateelement he saw grouped around Malenkov. When set against
what we know of the events that followed Stalin's death andthe struggle over the direction of Soviet foreign policy between
Molotov and Malenkov from 1953-55 (and then between
Molotov and Khrushchev from 1955-56 and later),
Bedell-Smith's conclusions carry an undeniable authority.
And his conclusions were not mere speculation. Someconcrete evidence had come to his notice with respect to the"events which preceded Zhdanov's death [31 August 1948],"
which "reflected some discord in the ranks of the Politburo."28
And the continuation of the debate concerning the thesis by
Eugene Varga that the capitalist world was entering a new
period of stabilisation gives added support to the notion of aclash of views on the future direction of foreign policy. For if
the West was restabilising and unlikely to re-divide infurther internecine warfare, then the Soviet Union would be
wiser to come to terms with it in the spirit of compromise;
if the opposite were true, as Varga's opponents argued,
then the Russians could afford to pursue their goals
entirely unilaterally confident that a Western bloc could notcome into being and confident that capitalism would sooner
rather than later collapse. As Bedell-Smith noted in 1948:
the ultimate fate of the Varga group "may therefore wellserve as a weathercock of party attitudes toward [the] westernworld..."29
Of course, these internal differences were never permitted
except as Stalin's own peculiar means of ensuring that henever received a monolithic set of advice on importantquestions; and by setting his entourage at loggerheads, hecould also ultimately ensure that they would always require
him to reach a neutral decision. The means of making
decisions was thus in a fundamental sense intimately
connected with the means of assuring continued supremacy;
the terror was too blunt a tool to serve all purposes and mightin the end ensure he never had alternative options presented

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from which he could, in his more Fabian moods, select theright course. Perhaps this is the least misleading way inwhich to view the operations of the Soviet dictatorship under
Stalin; certainly it is a hypothesis that fits the known facts
more adequately than the alternatives presented. But above
all we should not be intimidated into thinking that any
reformulation of our ideas on this subject is somehow
tantamount to Stalin's rehabilitation; for if we are to work infear of this, we might as well be living in a totalitarian systemourselves.
Notes
1 J.A. Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: the Soviet Communist Party
Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge University Press, 1985).
2 K. London (ed.), The soviet Union in World Politics (Westview andCroom Helm, Boulder and London, 1980), pp. 3-24.
3 Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above 19281941 (Norton, New York and London, 1990).
4 For Carr's portrayal: E.H. Carr, Socialism in One Country 19241926, Vol. 1 (Macmillan, London, 1958), pp. 174-1,86.
For
Deutscher's: I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (Oxford
University Press, London, 1949), pp. 273,295,318,322 and 326. And
for Tucker's criticism of this approach: Tucker, The Soviet Political
Mind, pp. 108-112. This criticism is repeated in Tucker's biographyof Stalin: Stalin in Power, p. 145.
5 Reprinted in R.C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism andPost-Stalin Change (revised edition, Norton, London, 1972), pp. 178179.
6 Ibid., p. 182.
7 Intervista a Nuovi argomenti, No. 20, May-June 1956: reprinted in
P.Togliatti, G. Santomassimo (ed.), Opere scelte (Editori Riuniti,
Rome, 1974), p. 716.
8 M. Fainsod, How RUSSIA is Ruled (Revised edition, Oxford
University Press, 1963), p. 109.
9 Tucker, Stalin in Power, p. 40.
10 Ibid., p. 226.
11 Ibid., p. 40.
12 Tucker, Stalin in Power, p. 233.
13 Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security inEurope, 1933-39 (Macmillan, London; St. Martin's Press, New York,1984), p. 41.

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14 For the disputes: Haslam, "The Comintern and the Origins of the
Popular Front 1934-1935," The Historical Journal, 22, 3 (1979), pp.
673-691.
15 Interview, 16 June 1977: Sto sorok besed s Molotvym (Terra, Moscow,1991), p. 370.
16 Tucker, Stalin in Power, p. 350.
17 Ibid., pp. 342 and 345.
18 See Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective
Security in Europe 1933-39 (Macmillan, London and St. Martin's
Press, New York, 1984).
19 The latest evidence on this supports that view: see the documents
recently published from the Narkomindel files and now open toreaders in the archives — V. Komplektov et al. (eds.), Dokumenty
Vneshnei Politiki 1939 god, Vol. 1 (Mezhdunarodnaia otnosheniia,
Moscow, 1992).
20 Quoted in Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East,
1933-41: Moscow, Tokyo and the Prelude to the Pacific War(Macmillan, London, and Pittsburgh University Press, 1992), p. 17.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., pp. 18-19 and 21-22.
23 The decisions on foreign, defence and intelligence policies are notrecorded in the regular minutes, but in another category — osobaia
papka (special file). The category is apparently being released toreaders only for the pre-war period; moreover, it is said that the
supporting position papers that underlay the final decisions are toremain closed. That files of the Foreign Ministry for the early Cold
War are now declassified (1945-49) with the exception — animportant and extremely frustrating exception — of the cipheredcorrespondence, which remains closed. It is said that the cipheredcorrespondence for the years 1917-41 will now be declassified. But
we have no promises with regard to the subsequent period.
24 W. Bedell-Smith, Moscow Mission 1946-1949 (Heinemann, London,1950), p. 51.
25 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
26 Ibid., p. 64.
27 Ibid., p. 65.
28 Ibid., p. 64.
29 Bedell-Smith (Moscow) to Marshall (Washington), 6 December 1948:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. IV: Eastern Europe;
The Soviet Union (USGPO, Washington, 1974), p. 942.