COCOBOD’s

Unrealised Potential
Promoting Human Rights, Welfare, and the Environment in
Ghana’s Cocoa-Growing Communities

Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Center for International Human Rights
University of Ghana School of Law
Corporate Accountability Lab
SEND Ghana
Barima Akwasi Amankwaah
Glen Asomaning

COCOBOD’s Unrealised Potential:

Promoting Human Rights, Welfare, and the Environment in Ghana’s
Cocoa-Growing Communities
ISBN: 978-1-7352336-2-8© Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Center for International Human Rights,
University of Ghana School of Law, Corporate Accountability Lab & SEND Ghana
All rights reserved.
June 2021
Suggested Citation:
Barima Akwasi Amankwaah, Glen Asomaning, Raymond A. Atuguba, EmmanuelAyifah, Allie Brudney, Brian Citro, Charity Ryerson, Sandra Kwabea Sarkwah &Alexandra Tarzikhan, COCOBOD’s Unrealised Potential: Promoting Human Rights,
Welfare, and the Environment in Ghana’s Cocoa-Growing Communities, Northwestern
Pritzker School of Law Center for International Human Rights, University of Ghana
School of Law, Corporate Accountability Lab & SEND Ghana (June 2021).
Design by Tree Havener.

Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSi

GLOSSARYiii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1RECOMMENDATIONS

7METHODOLOGY

10

I.

13

INTRODUCTION

II. HUMAN RIGHTS, WELFARE & THE ENVIRONMENT IN GHANA’SCOCOA INDUSTRY15

A. Farmer and Worker Poverty

15

B. Children Working in Cocoa

18

C. Cocoa’s Impact on the Environment

20

III. COCOBOD: THE GHANA COCOA BOARD

22

A. COCOBOD’s Operations & Objectives

22

B. COCOBOD’s Financing

26

C. COCOBOD’s Political Power & Lack of Transparency

27

IV. COCOBOD’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM& GRIEVANCE AND REDRESS MECHANISM

V.

30

A. African Development Bank USD 600 Million Syndicated Loan

30

B. Environmental and Social Management System

33

C. Grievance and Redress Mechanism

35

THE PEER PRINCIPLES: AN EVALUATION OF COCOBOD’S GRIEVANCE AND
REDRESS MECHANISM

39

A. Principles for Effective and Efficient Redress: The PEER Principles

39

B. PEER Principles Evaluation of COCOBOD’s Grievance and Redress Mechanism

42

C. The PEER Principles Overall Evaluation and Score

52

VI. CONCLUSION53

APPENDIX

54

The PEER Principles—Principles for Effective and Efficient Redress

54

Grievance and Redress Mechanism Complaint Form

57

In-Depth Interviews Questionnaires

58

Acknowledgements
This report is the product of a collaboration between the Northwestern Pritzker Schoolof Law’s Center for International Human Rights, the University of Ghana School of Law,
Corporate Accountability Lab, SEND Ghana, Barima Akwasi Amankwaah of the Ghana
NGO Coalition on the Rights of the Child (GNCRC), and Glen Asomaning of Nature andDevelopment Foundation (NDF).

Project Director
Brian Citro, Human Rights Lawyer & Independent Researcher, (former) Assistant Clinical
Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law

Faculty and Senior Researchers and Authors:
Barima Akwasi Amankwaah, National Coordinator, Ghana NGO Coalition on the Rights of theChild (GNCRC)
Glen Asomaning, Operations Director, Nature and Development Foundation (NDF)
Raymond A. Atuguba, Dean, University of Ghana School of Law
Dr. Emmanuel Ayifah, Deputy Country Director, SEND Ghana
Allie Brudney, Staff Attorney, Corporate Accountability Lab
Brian Citro, Human Rights Lawyer & Independent Researcher, (former) Assistant Clinical
Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law
Charity Ryerson, Executive Director, Corporate Accountability Lab
Sandra Kwabea Sarkwah, Project Officer, SEND Ghana.
Alexandra Tarzikhan, Schuette Clinical Fellow in Health and Human Rights, Northwestern
Pritzker School of LawiNorthwestern Pritzker School of Law Student Researchers and Authors:
Brianna Campbell (2021)
Chloe (Jaehee) Kim (2020)
Meredith Heim (2021)

Additional Corporate Accountability Lab Contributors:
Daniel Kiefus, Office Coordinator, Corporate Accountability Lab
Special Thanks to Katherine McDonnell (formerly at Corporate Accountability Lab) for her
initiative and guidance in the early stages of this project and to all the interviewees who weregracious enough to speak with us and answer our many questions—we cannot thank you
enough for taking time out of your busy schedules to share your experiences and expertise.
We also thank Sena Dei-Tutu and Mawuse Oliver Vormawor at the University of Ghana
School of Law for their invaluable support in coordinating the project partnership and thereport publication and launch.

iiGlossary
African Development

A multilateral development finance institution founded inBank1964 whose beneficiaries consist of nationals of, and entities
or organizations incorporated within, the continent of Africa.

Environmental and Social

A framework for implementing COCOBOD’s Environmental

Management Planand Social Management System and Productivity
Enhancement Programs developed in accordance with
African Development Bank requirements for a syndicatedloan agreement.

Environmental and Social

A set of policies and procedures created by COCOBOD in

Management System

2018 in anticipation of a syndicated loan agreement to
mitigate social and environmental risks associated with
COCOBOD’s operations.

Farm Gate Price

The price for a tonne of cocoa set by governments in countries
that produce cocoa, such as Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

Floor Price

The minimum price paid for cocoa in Ghana set by
COCOBOD.

Grievance and Redress

A key component of COCOBOD’s Stakeholder Engagement

Mechanism

Plan aimed at providing redress for environmental andsocial harms caused by COCOBOD’s operations.

Integrated Safeguards

A set of policies established by the African Development

SystemBank aimed at minimising the risk of environmental orsocial harms caused by projects funded by the Bank.

iii

Licensed Buying
Companies (LBCs)

Companies licensed by COCOBOD charged withmanaging the internal marketing of cocoa in Ghana.
LBCs hire purchasing clerks to purchase cocoa fromsmallholder farms, provide storage facilities, and perform
other tasks related to the internal marketing of cocoa.

Non-Judicial GrievanceAny non-judicial process through which individuals or

Mechanism

organizations can raise grievances and obtain remedies.
COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism is an example
of a non-judicial grievance mechanism.

Productivity Enhancement

Programs funded by a 2019 syndicated loan agreement

Programbetween COCOBOD, the African Development Bank, andother private lenders aimed at increasing cocoa productionin Ghana.

Stakeholder Engagement

A component of COCOBOD’s Environmental and Social

PlanManagement System in which the grievance and redress
mechanism is located aimed at increasing transparency andcommunication between stakeholders throughout Ghana’s
cocoa supply chain.

Executive Summary
In 2019, Ghana received a USD 600 million syndicated loan from the African Development
Bank and other private lenders to maximize cocoa production and improve farmers’
livelihoods. As a prerequisite for obtaining the loan, the government agency that runs
Ghana’s cocoa industry, COCOBOD, established an Environmental and Social Management
System (ESMS) with a grievance and redress mechanism. The ESMS aims to identify andmanage environmental and social risks and opportunities to protect the environment andimprove the livelihoods of cocoa farmers and others in Ghana’s cocoa sector.
This report examines COCOBOD’s ESMS and its component grievance and redress
mechanism. The report finds that the grievance and redress mechanism could be a powerfultool for cocoa farmers, workers, and their communities. However, to date, the ESMS and its
grievance and redress mechanism remain unfulfilled promises. To fulfil its commitments
and begin realising its potential, COCOBOD must fully implement the ESMS and its grievanceand redress mechanism to promote human rights, welfare, and the environment in Ghana’s
cocoa-growing communities.

Human Rights, Welfare & the Environment in Ghana’s
Cocoa Industry
Ghana is the second-largest producer of cocoa in the world. Together with Cote d’Ivoire,
Ghana produces about 60 per cent of the cocoa that sustains the USD 130 billion global
chocolate industry. Ghana is home to about 800,000 small cocoa farmers, comprising
approximately 60 per cent of its agricultural workers.
Despite the vast wealth created by the global chocolate industry and cocoa’s essential role in
the Ghanaian economy, poverty is pervasive among people living and working in Ghana’s
cocoa-growing communities. According to the 2020 Cocoa Barometer—a global industry
overview published by a consortium of civil society organisations—only about 9 per cent ofcocoa farming households in Ghana earn a living income. Another recent survey of cocoa
farmer households in Ghana found that the average annual income for an individual sellingcocoa beans was USD 983.
Cocoa farming is labour intensive work. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a family living
on USD 1 to 3 a day to hire the necessary labour to work on their farms. Consequently, somefamilies in Ghana engage their children in work on cocoa farms. The involvement of children
in the production of cocoa in Ghana is a complicated phenomenon. A broad spectrum ofexperiences exists, from the culturally enriching exposure of children to longstanding
farming traditions to the harmful forced labour of young children who do not otherwise
1

attend school. In October 2020, the United States Department of Labor released a study thatfound that 770,000 children were engaged in cocoa production in Ghana, 92 per cent of whomwere exposed to at least one form of hazardous child labour. The elimination of harmful
forms of child labour is critical to ensuring the human rights and welfare of people living andworking in Ghana’s cocoa-growing communities.
Cocoa production in Ghana also contributes to environmental degradation and harms frompesticide use. Ghana has lost 80 to 95 per cent of its forest since 1955. Between 2001 and 2014,
cocoa production caused one-quarter of the deforestation in Ghana. Cocoa farming also
causes the loss of forest plant species and strips the land of its nutrients. The use of pesticides
in cocoa farming can harm waterways, lead to pest resistance, and harm individuals who
spray the chemicals if they are not adequately protected.

2

COCOBOD: The Ghana Cocoa Board
The Ghana Cocoa Board, known as COCOBOD, has existed in various forms since 1940 whenthe British government established the West African Cocoa Control Board. COCOBOD now
exerts almost absolute control over the cocoa industry in Ghana. It acts as the sole regulator,
purchaser, and seller of Ghanaian cocoa. COCOBOD sets the floor price paid to farmers fortheir cocoa and regulates who can buy cocoa, solely on its behalf. Through its subsidiaries,
the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana, the Seed Production Division, and the Cocoa Healthand Extension Division, COCOBOD is the primary provider of inputs, such as seedlings andpesticides, and technical training for cocoa farmers.
Considering its dominant position—and the entrenched poverty, child labour, andenvironmental harm in the cocoa sector—COCOBOD has a unique and unrealised potential
to protect the environment and promote the human rights and welfare of cocoa-growing
communities. Despite this immense promise, COCOBOD has a reputation as a secretive
political institution with contradictory objectives. Its role as an export monopoly marketingboard for cocoa provides it with vast political power and wealth. During in-depth interviews
conducted by the authors, stakeholders described COCOBOD as “untouchable” and “oneof the country’s most powerful institutions.” One interviewee alleged that COCOBOD uses
cocoa profits to “reward political support, mobilize political power, and fund politicalparties.” Members of non-governmental organizations explained how difficult it is to obtain
information from COCOBOD about its operations or programs. They pointed out that
COCOBOD’s roles as the sole buyer, seller, and regulator of cocoa are directly at odds. These
interviewees further questioned the institution’s ability to maximise profits from buying andselling cocoa while at the same time raising the wages and enhancing the overall welfare ofcocoa farmers and workers.

COCOBOD’s Environmental and Social Management System &Grievance and Redress Mechanism
In anticipation of a USD 600 million syndicated loan agreement with the African
Development Bank and private lenders, COCOBOD created the Environmental and Social
Management System (ESMS) in 2018. The ESMS is a collection of aspirational policies
and procedures designed to “identify and manage environmental and social risks andopportunities” in COCOBOD’s operations. Through the ESMS, COCOBOD’s Chairman andChief Executive have declared that COCOBOD’s ultimate mission is to promote a sustainablecocoa economy—an economy that promotes the welfare of cocoa farmers and theircommunities. To this end, among other things, the ESMS aims to improve the livelihoodsof cocoa farmers and other stakeholders and address child labour, cocoa price volatility, andthreats from unresolved grievances among cocoa-growing communities.
3

As noted above, COCOBOD has established a grievance and redress mechanism as part of theESMS. The grievance and redress mechanism is a non-judicial grievance mechanism that isthe product of policies and procedures for sustainable project management required underthe African Development Bank’s Integrated Safeguards System. The mechanism is a partof the Stakeholder Engagement Plan under the ESMS, which aims to increase COCOBOD’stransparency by promoting engagement among all stakeholders in the cocoa sector.
Any stakeholder in Ghana’s cocoa sector may file a complaint by telephone, post, or email
using the grievance and redress mechanism to trigger a formal review and response. There
are four levels to the grievance and redress mechanism complaint process: (1) society, (2)district, (3) regional, and (4) national. COCOBOD is to convene a grievance redress teamconsisting of diverse stakeholders at each level, including Chief Farmers and representatives
from government agencies and non-governmental organizations. A complainant begins
the process by filing a grievance at the society level to the COCOBOD receiving officer. If thecomplaint is eligible, the grievance redress team investigates it. If the grievance remains
unresolved, the grievance redress team should forward the complaint to the district level
where the review process repeats, and so forth on to the regional and then the national level.
Although COCOBOD created the ESMS and grievance and redress mechanism and theirimplementation framework—the Environmental and Social Management Plan—in 2018,the authors’ research for this report indicates that COCOBOD has not yet fully implemented
these programs. During interviews with farmers, farmer cooperatives, non-governmentalorganizations, environmental advocates, legal and human rights experts, the African
Development Bank, and others, very few stakeholders were aware of the ESMS or thegrievance and redress mechanism. Those who were aware of the programs asserted that
COCOBOD had not yet implemented them on the ground.

4

The PEER Principles—Principles for Effective and Efficient Redress
To evaluate COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism, the authors synthesized
the essential components of global standards and best practices to create the PEER
Principles—Principles for Effective and Efficient Redress. The PEER Principles include
three levels of evaluation: Good, Moderate, or Poor. These evaluators represent the extent
to which COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism meets each of 10 PEER Principles’
component criteria, and they provide the overall evaluation of the mechanism. The authors
scored the grievance and redress mechanism on a 100-point scale, with each principle
providing up to 10 points for a “Good” evaluation. The authors present the results ofthis evaluation in the PEER Principles Report Card (the details and justifications for thisevaluation are provided below in Section V):

PEER PRINCIPLES REPORT CARD:COCOBOD’s Grievance and Redress Mechanism
Principle

Evaluation / Score (100% / 100 points)

1

Human Rights Compatibility

Moderate 50% / 5 points

2

Accessibility & Awareness

Poor 33% / 3.3 points

3

Transparency & Predictability

Poor 33% / 3.3 points

4

Legitimacy & Accountability

Moderate 50% / 5 points

5

Monitoring & Evaluation

6

Inclusivity & Equitable Participation

Moderate 50% / 5 points

7

Comprehensibility & Manageability

Poor 33% / 3.3 points

8

Scope & Flexibility

Poor 20% / 2 points

9

Sustainability & Self-Improvement

Poor 25% / 2.5 points

10

Procedural Efficiency

Poor 0% / 0 points

Poor 33% / 3.3 points

OVERALL EVALUATION & SCORE

Poor 33% / 33 points

The PEER Principles’ overall evaluation and score of COCOBOD’s grievance and redress
mechanism are “Poor” with 33 points. Among other things, this demonstrates again that
COCOBOD has not yet effectively implemented the mechanism.

5Conclusion
COCOBOD’s central and commanding role in Ghana’s cocoa sector comes with an equally
demanding responsibility for cocoa-growing communities and the environment. Yet, despite
its immense financial and political power, COCOBOD’s potential remains unrealised. Poverty,
harmful forms of child labour, and environmental degradation pervade Ghana’s cocoa sector.
The ESMS and its component grievance and redress mechanism, established as conditions
for a 2019 loan from the African Development Bank and private lenders, present a unique
opportunity for COCOBOD to begin fulfilling its promise. However, as this report shows,
COCOBOD has yet to do so. COCOBOD must seize this opportunity to strengthen, enhance,
and fully implement the ESMS and grievance and redress mechanism according to thisreport's recommendations. COCOBOD must act to fulfil its unrealised potential to protect
the environment and promote the human rights and welfare of people living and working in
Ghana’s cocoa-growing communities.

6Recommendations
These recommendations provide COCOBOD concrete guidance to strengthen its grievanceand redress mechanism as part of the Environmental and Social Management System basedon the PEER Principles—Principles for Effective and Efficient Redress:
1.

Human Rights Compatibility: COCOBOD should explicitly link the grievance andredress mechanism to the human rights of people living and working in cocoa-growing
communities, including their economic and social rights, procedural rights, and right toan effective remedy.

2.

Accessibility and Awareness: COCOBOD should (i) publicise the grievance and redress
mechanism in all necessary language, targeting cocoa-growing regions across thecountry; (ii) make the mechanism’s procedures and guidelines publicly accessible online
and in cocoa-growing communities; (iii) provide assistance for stakeholders who require
help to access the mechanism; and (iv) ensure all relevant government officials and units
in COCOBOD, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and other relevant ministries areaware of the mechanism and trained to effectively facilitate its use by stakeholders.

3.

Transparency and Predictability: COCOBOD should (i) make public accurate andconsistent information about the grievance and redress mechanism’s performance,
including financial reporting and qualitative and quantitative information about redress
procedures and outcomes; (ii) ensure predictability through clear guidelines, time frames,
and general types of available redress; and (iii) keep parties informed of all decisions andprogress throughout the grievance process.

4.

Legitimacy and Accountability: COCOBOD should (i) ensure officials implementing thegrievance and redress mechanism have sufficient authority and leverage to ensure allparties comply with the decisions of the grievance redress teams; (ii) hold the grievance
redress teams accountable for fair conduct during the process; (iii) ensure confidentiality
and allow anonymity to protect complainants from retaliation; and (iv) allow all decisions
to be subject to review by a credible, independent, external authority, such as a judge.

5.

Monitoring and Evaluation: COCOBOD should document and store all grievances andtheir outcomes, ensure consistency in processes and results, and establish and implement
procedures to evaluate the outcomes produced by the grievance and redress mechanism.

7

6.

Inclusivity and Equitable Participation: COCOBOD should (i) consult with stakeholders,
including cocoa farmers, workers, and non-governmental organizations while reviewing
and improving the grievance and redress mechanism; (ii) facilitate the participation ofdiverse and vulnerable groups in finding collaborative solutions for their complaints
through inclusive good-faith negotiations in an atmosphere of mutual confidence; and(iii) ensure all parties have access to sources of information, advice, and expertise to
fully engage in the grievance process, respecting the role of complainants’ advisors andrepresentatives.

7.

Comprehensibility and Manageability: COCOBOD should (i) review the grievance andredress mechanism in coordination with farmers and other stakeholders to ensure it issimple and easy to understand and use and responsive to the needs of all stakeholders;(ii) provide guidance and support to stakeholders who require it to effectively use themechanism, especially for grievances that involve international stakeholders; and (iii)
minimise costs or burdens that could discourage use of the mechanism and that are
unnecessary to ensure that the mechanism is fair, easy to use, and timely.

8.

Scope and Flexibility: COCOBOD should ensure the grievance and redress mechanism (i)accepts as eligible a wide range of grievances and multi-issue and multi-party complaints;(ii) is capable of processing and addressing recurring grievances related to structural orsystemic problems and providing special processes to understand internal and external
contributing factors; and (ii) maintains flexibility in both process and outcomes to offer
complainants options and alternatives.

9.

Sustainability and Self-Improvement: COCOBOD should (i) consider redesigning
the grievance and mechanism to more meaningfully reflect local culture, traditions,and customary methods for dispute resolution; (ii) establish standards, protocols andprocedures to continually identify lessons for improving the mechanism, ensuring its
sustainability, and preventing future harms; and (iii) hire and train staff on grievanceprocedures and regularly ensure their competency.

10. Procedural Efficiency: COCOBOD should (i) create and comply with reporting
requirements for all grievances received and responses provided, and (ii) ensure its
officials follow all procedures in a timely manner at each level of the process.

89Methodology
This report is based on information gathered through desk research and in-depth interviews.
The authors conducted extensive research into the human rights and welfare of Ghana’s cocoagrowing communities, cocoa’s impact on Ghana’s environment, the Ghana Cocoa Board’s
operations, financing, and political aspects, the African Development Bank’s lending policies andprocedures, and global standards and best practices for non-judicial grievance mechanisms.
The authors also conducted a series of semi-structured in-depth interviews with more than 20
stakeholders in Ghana’s cocoa sector. The stakeholders included farmers, farmer cooperatives,
non-governmental organizations, environmental advocates, legal and human rights experts,
the African Development Bank, and others. Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions during 2020
and 2021, the authors based in the United States could not travel to Ghana to conduct in-person
interviews and focus group discussions. Instead, they conducted interviews remotely via videoconferencing and the telephone. The questionnaires the authors used to conduct the interviews
are available in the Appendix. The authors verbally obtained informed consent from eachinterviewee prior to each in-depth interview. Throughout this report, the authors anonymously
attribute direct quotations and other information obtained from stakeholders during in-depth
interviews to protect the stakeholders’ identities.

The authors conducted in-depth interviews with the following stakeholders:1.

Nelson Adubofour, cocoa farmer and Executive Secretary of the Kuapa Kokoo
Cooperative Cocoa Farmers and Marketing Union Limited (Ghana) (04/09/20).

2.

Clement Akapame, founding partner of TaylorCrabbe Initiative and In-Country Associateof ClientEarth (Ghana) (06/01/20).

3.

Barima Akwasi Amankwaah, National Coordinator of Ghana NGO Coalition on the
Rights of the Child (GNCRC) (Ghana) (05/22/20).

4.

Mercy Owusu Ansah, Doreen Asumang-Yeboah, Director and Networking & Advocacy
Expert, respectively, at Tropenbos Ghana (Ghana) (04/10/20).

5.

Stephen Ashia, cocoa farmer and Managing Director of Aponoapono Biakoye Organic
Cocoa Farmers Association (ABOCFA) (Ghana) (04/29/20).

6.

Glen Asomaning, Director of Operations at the Nature and Development Foundation(NDF) (Ghana) (03/12/20).

10

7.

Prof. Raymond A. Atuguba, Dean and Faculty at the University of Ghana School of Law(Ghana) (03/20/20).

8.

Frank Dwase, cocoa farmer and member of Kuapa Kokoo Cooperative Cocoa Farmers andMarketing Union Limited (KKFU) (Ghana) (04/17/20).

9.

Antonie Fountain, Managing Director at the VOICE Network (Voice of Organizations in
Cocoa) (Netherlands) (04/03/20).

10. Etelle Higonnet, former Senior Campaign Director at Mighty Earth (USA) (03/05/20).
11. Kwetey Nartey, Senior Broadcast Journalist at JoyNews in Accra (Ghana) (08/18/20).
12. Sebastian Okeke, Bumi Camara, Theo Braimah Awanzam, Acting Country Program
Manager, Country Economist, and Senior Macroeconomist, respectively, at the African
Development Bank (AfDB) (Ghana) (06/09/20).
13. Obed Owusu-Addai, Co-Founder and Managing Campaigner at EcoCare Ghana (Ghana)(05/05/20).
14. Barnett Quaicoo, Resident Manager and UK/Europe Head of the Cocoa Marketing
Company, a COCOBOD subsidiary (United Kingdom) (05/04/20).
15. Sandra Kwabea Sarkwah, George Amankwah, Emmanuel Ayifah, Project Officer, FinanceManager, and Deputy Country Director, respectively, at SEND Ghana (Ghana) (05/19/20).
16. Prof. Christopher Udry, Co-Director of the Global Poverty Research Lab at Northwestern
University (USA) (05/08/20).

11

The authors were unable to interview COCOBOD officials in Ghana. The authors attempted
to contact COCOBOD over the course of a year to schedule an interview through multiple
communication channels, including post, telephone, email, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, and Skype.
The authors sent numerous emails with signed letters of request for an interview to the
COCOBOD spokesperson, the public affairs office, the National Coordinator, the COCOBOD
focal person on the Ghana Cocoa Platform, the Environmental and Social Management
System Coordinator, and the Cocoa Marketing Company in Ghana. Finally, the authors sent
hard copies of the letter requesting an interview and this report’s Executive Summary bypost to the COCOBOD office in Accra. The authors received confirmation that COCOBOD had
received the letter and summary, but they did not receive any other response.
The authors acknowledge that some of the stakeholders interviewed for this report arealso co-authors. This occurred as a result of the dynamic process by which this project
evolved over the course of approximately two years. Some stakeholders who were initiallyinterviewed later joined the project and co-authored this report. The authors decided tocontinue to rely on the information obtained during in-depth interviews with theseco-authors because the interviews were conducted prior to their joining the project.

12

I. Introduction
The cocoa sector in Ghana is a multi-billion-dollar industry. Yet, the human rights andwelfare of people living and working in Ghana’s cocoa-growing communities remain
unrealised. Most of the approximately 800,000 cocoa farmers in the country live in poverty,
and the use of children in cocoa production is widespread. Unsustainable farming practices
have also devastated the environment, contributing to deforestation, rainfall loss, andwildlife and plant species’ decimation.
In 2019, Ghana received a USD 600 million syndicated loan from the African Development
Bank and private lenders to maximize cocoa production and improve farmers’ livelihoods.1
This loan is part of the African Development Bank’s Feed Africa Strategy that aims to tackle
hunger and malnutrition across the continent. As a prerequisite for obtaining the loan,
the government agency that runs the cocoa industry, the Ghana Cocoa Board, known as
COCOBOD, established an Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) with agrievance and redress mechanism. The ESMS aims to identify and manage environmental
and social risks and opportunities to improve the livelihoods of cocoa farmers and otherstakeholders in the cocoa sector.

“Cocoa is the lifeblood of the economy in Ghana.”— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in March 2020.

This report examines COCOBOD, the ESMS, and the grievance and redress mechanism inlight of the human rights and welfare concerns of people living and working in Ghana’s cocoagrowing communities and cocoa’s impact on the environment. From the under weighing
and underpaying for cocoa beans by Licensed Buying Companies, to the unsafe disposalof pesticides, to instances of forced child labour, the grievance and redress mechanism
could provide cocoa farmers, workers, and their communities a concrete tool to promotetransparency and seek redress for a variety of harms. To date, however, the ESMS remains anunfulfilled promise. For the grievance and redress mechanism to truly support people living
and working in cocoa-growing communities, COCOBOD must fully implement and enhance
the mechanism to make it widely accessible, easy to use, and capable of providing effective
and efficient redress.

African Development Bank. Project Summary Note: Ghana Cocoa Board. Sept. 2019, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/ghana-ghana-cocoa-board-project-summary-note [hereinafter Project Summary Note]; Ghana Cocoa Board. Environmental and Social Management Plan. 25
Oct. 2018, p. 3, https://esa.afdb.org/sites/default/files/GHANA%20COCOA%20BOARD%20ESMP-102018.pdf [hereinafter Environmental andSocial Management Plan]; “Ghana Cocoa Board to Raise $1.3 Billion in Syndicated Loans.” GhanaWeb, 30 July 2019, https://www.ghanaweb.
com/GhanaHomePage/business/Ghana-Cocoa-Board-to-raise-1-3-billion-in-syndicated-loans-767840# [hereinafter Ghana Cocoa Board to
Raise USD 1.3 Billion].
1

13

This report has four main sections. After this introduction, the second section highlights
poverty among cocoa farmers and workers, child labour in cocoa, and cocoa’s impact on
Ghana’s environment. The third section examines COCOBOD’s operations, financing,
political power, and lack of transparency. The fourth section explores COCOBOD’s 2019syndicated loan from the African Development Bank and the ESMS and grievance and redress
mechanism established as conditions for the loan. The final section introduces the PEER
Principles—Principles for Effective and Efficient Redress—synthesized from global standards
for non-judicial grievance mechanisms and uses them to evaluate COCOBOD’s grievance andredress mechanism.

14II. Human Rights, Welfare &the Environment in
Ghana’s Cocoa Industry
Ghana is the second-largest producer of cocoa in the world, just behind its neighbour Coted’Ivoire. Together, the two countries produce about 60 per cent of the cocoa that sustains
the USD 130 billion global chocolate industry.2 Cocoa is a crucial sector in Ghana’s economy.
Ghana is home to about 800,000 small cocoa farmers, comprising approximately 60 per centof Ghanaian agricultural workers.3 In 2019, Ghana exported about USD 2.29 billion in cocoa
products, which accounted for more than 14 per cent of its overall exports.4“Poverty is the most important factor in the cocoa sector. It is amultifaceted issue, but at the center is the pricing of cocoa beans.
Cocoa beans are priced at a rate that does not allow farmers to riseout of poverty.”­— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in May 2020.

Despite cocoa’s essential role in Ghana’s economy, most cocoa farmers live in poverty, childlabour is common, and deforestation and other environmental harms stemming from cocoa
farming are grave threats. This section highlights these concerns for the environment and thehuman rights and welfare of people living and working in Ghana’s cocoa-growing communities.

A. Farmer and Worker Poverty
Poverty is pervasive among cocoa farmers and cocoa workers in Ghana. Cocoa farmers often
do not earn enough to support their families. According to the 2020 Cocoa Barometer—a
global industry overview published by a consortium of civil society organisations—only about
9 per cent of cocoa farming households in Ghana earn a living income.5 Another recent surveyof cocoa farmer households in Ghana found that the average annual income for an individual
selling cocoa beans was USD 983.6 The same study found the average annual income for
Fountain, Antonie C., and Friedel Huetz-Adams. Cocoa Barometer 2020. 2020, p. 22, https://www.voicenetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2020-Cocoa-Barometer.pdf [hereinafter Cocoa Barometer]; Bhutada, Govind. “Cocoa’s Bittersweet Supply Chain in One Visualization.” World Economic Forum, 4 Nov. 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/11/cocoa-chocolate-supply-chain-business-bar-africa-exports/.
3“Cocoa Farmers in Ghana Experience Poverty and Economic Vulnerability.” International Cocoa Initiative, 1 Dec. 2017, https://cocoainitiative.org/news-media-post/cocoa-farmers-in-ghana-experience-poverty-and-economic-vulnerability.
4
Bank of Ghana. Annual Report 2019. Bank of Ghana, 2019, p. 17, https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/AnnRep-2019.pdf.
5
Cocoa Barometer, supra note 2, p. 40.
6
De Buhr, Elke, and Elise Gordon. Bitter Sweets: Prevalence of Forced Labour and Child Labour in the Cocoa Sectors of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.
Tulane University and Walk Free Foundation, 2018, p. 21, https://cocoainitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Cocoa-Report_181004_
V15-FNL_digital.pdf [hereinafter Bitter Sweets].
215

individuals working on cocoa farms was only USD 206.7 A recent estimate found that forfarmers to earn a living wage, the farm gate price for cocoa would have to almost double, fromthe 2020-21 price of USD 1,837 to USD 3,116 per metric tonne.8 A further challenge lies in therelatively low global cocoa prices and their decline during the COVID-19 pandemic during2020 and 2021. For example, during the first part of March 2021, global cocoa contract prices
fell by 8 per cent from USD 2,736 to 2,512 per tonne in New York City.9

Abunu and Abusa Cocoa Farming
Cocoa farmers comprise a diverse group, including
families who own and farm their own cocoa farms, aswell as farmers and migrant workers who tend lands

lord. In contrast, in abusa contracts the landownerestablishes the farm and the sharecropper, often
called a caretaker, farms and maintains the land.

that are subject to a higher authority, such as tribal
leaders, the government, other families, and otherowners. Abunu and abusa sharecropping contracts
play an increasing role in Ghana’s cocoa sector,
especially for migrant workers. In abunu contracts,
the tenant farmer brings the entire farm to maturity
within a specified period and the product is divided in
two between the tenant and the landlord. Traditionally, once the land has been shared like this under an
abunu contract, half of the land and the trees become
the property of the tenant farmer who has the rightto bequeath it while the other half reverts to the land-

The product is split in half or thirds under an abusa
contract, the landowner receiving half or two-thirds
and the caretaker farmer receiving the remaining
amount. The caretaker has no property rights in theland under an abusa contract and his contract can beterminated at will with little notice by the landowner. While it is unknown how many farmers work insuch tenant relationships, it appears that in parts of
Ghana it is close to a quarter or even one-third of all
cocoa farmers. The prevalence of these relationships
demonstrates that a significant portion of cocoa farmers earn less than the value of the cocoa they produce.

Sources: Asamoah, Mercy, and Frank Owusu-Ansah. Report on Land Tenure & Cocoa Production in Ghana: A CRIG/WCF
Collaborative Survey. Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana & The World Cocoa Foundation, Feb. 2017, https://www.worldcocoafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/files_mf/1492612620CRIGLandTenureSurveyFinal41217.pdf; Fountain,
Antonie C., and Friedel Huetz-Adams. Cocoa Barometer 2020. 2020, p. 22, https://www.voicenetwork.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2020/12/2020-Cocoa-Barometer.pdf.

The labour-intensive nature of cocoa farming perpetuates this cycle of poverty. It is difficult,if not impossible, for a farming family living on USD 1 to 3 a day to hire the necessary labour
to work a cocoa farm.10 When cocoa farmers do try and hire workers, the wages they offer
are often so low that they are often unable to find help.11 The introduction of high-yielding,

Ibid.
Necessary Farm Gate Prices for a Living Income: Existing Living Income Reference Prices Are Too Low. Consultation Paper for the 2020 Cocoa Barometer, Voice Network, Jan. 2020, p. 2, https://www.voicenetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/200113-Necessary-Farm-Gate-Pricesfor-a-Living-Income-Definitive.pdf; Reuters Staff. “UPDATE 1-Ghana Raises 2020/21 Cocoa Farmgate Price by 28%.” Reuters, 24 Sept. 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/cocoa-ghana/update-1-ghana-raises-2020-21-cocoa-farmgate-price-by-28-idUSL5N2GL5J1.
9
Cocoa Market Report: March 2021. International Cocoa Organization, 2021, p. 2, https://www.icco.org/wp-content/uploads/ICCO-Monthly-Cocoa-Market-Report-March-2021.pdf.
10
Cocoa Barometer, supra note 2, p. 40.
11Ibid, p. 66.
7816

disease-resistant cocoa varieties—often promoted to increase farmer incomes in Ghana12— has further exacerbated the need for labour and contributed to the number of children
working in hazardous cocoa production.13“Even though there is a market for cocoa, price setting
is a major issue. Farmers don’t have a say in the pricedetermination. COCOBOD says it represents farmers,
but it doesn’t do anything.”— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in April 2020.

Notably, poverty among cocoa farmers and workers in Ghana remains deeply entrencheddespite COCOBOD’s receipt, since the 1992-93 crop season, of annual loans to ensure its
payments to cocoa farmers.14 These loans have recently ranged from USD 1.2 to 1.8 billion.15
In 2019, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire agreed to implement a Living Income Differential (LID) of
USD 400 per tonne added to cocoa’s price for the 2020-21 cocoa season.16 Officials introduced
this premium to address the low incomes of cocoa farmers in both countries.17 The two
governments aim to use the LID proceeds to guarantee farmers 70 per cent of the USD 2,600
per metric tonne free-on-board target price for cocoa. If market prices rise above USD 2,900,
the governments will funnel excess income from the LID into a stabilisation fund to ensure that
farmers continue to receive a fair price if cocoa prices fall.18 Based on an anticipated harvest of
3 million metric tonnes in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, observers expected the LID to generate an“Ghana Cocoa Board to Distribute 60 Million Hybrid Seedlings to Farmers Free.” Alternative Africa, 22 July 2019, https://alternativeafrica.com/2019/07/22/ghana-cocoa-board-to-distribute-60-million-hybrid-seedlings-to-farmers-free/ (quoting Kwadwo Danso, a Regional
Manager of the Cocoa Health and Extension Division of COCOBOD, claiming that hybrid, disease-resistant cocoa seedlings will promote
higher cocoa production and increase cocoa farmers’ incomes); Kyei, Kofi. “COCOBOD Takes Steps to Revive Cocoa Production …Kick-Starts
Massive Rehabilitation of Farms in Western North and Eastern.” State Interests and Governance Authority, 13 Aug. 2020, https://siga.gov.
gh/cocobod-takes-steps-to-revive-cocoa-production-kick-starts-massive-rehabilitation-of-farms-in-western-north-and-eastern/ (quoting
Kwame Owusu Ansah, a COCOBOD Regional Manager of the Cocoa Health and Extension Division, asserting that new hybrid cocoa seedlings
will “help alleviate poverty by increasing productivity”).
13
Luckstead, Jeff, et al. “Estimating the Economic Incentives Necessary for Eliminating Child Labor in Ghanaian Cocoa Production.” PLoS
ONE, vol. 14, no. 6, June 2019, p. 2, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0217230; Final Report: 2013/14 Survey Research on Child Labor
in West African Cocoa Growing Areas. Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University School of Public Health, July 2015,
p. 73, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/research_file_attachment/Tulane%20University%20-%20Survey%20Research%20
Cocoa%20Sector%20-%2030%20July%202015.pdf.
14
Obiukwu, Onyedimmakachukwu. “Ghana Secures $1.7bln Capital for Next Cocoa Season.” Ventures, 14 Sept. 2014, https://venturesafrica.com/ghana-secures-1-7bn-capital-for-next-cocoa-season/ [hereinafter Ghana Secures USD 1.7 Billion in Capital]; “COCOBOD Signs
US$1.3 Billion Syndicated Loan Facility for 2020/2021 Crop Season.” Ghana Cocoa Board, 29 Sept. 2020, https://cocobod.gh/news/cocobod-signs-us13-billion-syndicated-loan-facility-for-20202021-crop-season [hereinafter COCOBOD Signs USD 1.3 Billion Loan for 2020-21].
15
Ghana Secures USD 1.7 Billion in Capital, ibid; COCOBOD Signs USD 1.3 Billion Loan for 2020-21, ibid; Kwasi Kpodo, “UPDATE 2-Ghana’s
COCOBOD Signs $1.3bln Syndicated Loan for 2018/19 Cocoa Buying,” Reuters, 20 Sept. 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ghana-cocoa-loan/update-2-ghanas-cocobod-signs-1-3-bln-syndicated-loan-for-2018-19-cocoa-buying-idUKL8N1W62Z2 [hereinafter COCOBOD
Signs USD 1.3 Billion Loan for 2018-19]; “UPDATE 1-Ghana’s COCOBOD Signs $1.3bln Loan for 2017/18 Cocoa Purchases,” Reuters, 20 Sept.
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/ghana-cocoa/update-1-ghanas-cocobod-signs-1-3-bln-loan-for-2017-18-cocoa-purchases-idUSL5N1M13X9 [hereinafter COCOBOD Signs $1.3 Billion Loan for 2017-18].
16
Angel, Maytaal, et al. “Ivory Coast, Ghana Strike First Cocoa Deals with Living Income Premium.” Reuters, 13 Sept. 2019, https://www.
reuters.com/article/cocoa-west-africa-pricepremium/ivory-coast-ghana-strike-first-cocoa-deals-with-living-income-premium-idUSL5N2644FR [hereinafter Ivory Coast, Ghana Strike First Cocoa Deals].
17
Ibid; Voice Network. VOICE Network Welcomes Historic Move to Raise Cocoa Prices, Questions Remain on Implementation, https://www.voicenetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/190905-VOICE-Position-on-West-African-Cocoa-Floor-Price.pdf.
18
Ivory Coast, Ghana Strike First Cocoa Deals, supra note 16.
1217additional USD 1.2 billion.19 However, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a decrease in chocolate
sales in 2020, resulting in an oversupply of cocoa.20 This supply glut caused the price of cocoa todrop substantially. Cocoa companies have also found ways to avoid paying the LID. In the fall of
2020, Hershey’s sourced cocoa on the futures market, in what Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire claimed
was an attempt to avoid paying the LID. Other companies have also refused to pay the LID,21
citing the decreased demand as an excuse.22

B. Children Working in Cocoa
Entrenched poverty in Ghana’s cocoa industry leads some cocoa-growing families to engage
their children in work on farms. The involvement of children in the production of cocoa in
Ghana is a complicated phenomenon.

Wexler, Alexandra. “Cocoa Cartel Stirs Up Global Chocolate Market.” Wall Street Journal, 5 Jan. 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
new-cocoa-cartel-could-overhaul-global-chocolate-industry-11578261601.
20
Almeida, Isis, and Leanne de Bassompierre. “Chocolate War Leaves Top Cocoa Producer Stuck with Beans.” Bloomberg, 20 Jan. 2021,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-20/chocolate-war-leaves-world-s-top-cocoa-producer-stuck-with-beans; Angel, Maytaal, and Ange Aboa. “Exclusive: Pact to Aid Poor Cocoa Farmers in Peril as COVID-19 Hits Demand.” Reuters, July 2020, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-cocoa-poverty-exclusive/exclusive-pact-to-aid-poor-cocoa-farmers-in-peril-as-covid-19-hits-demand-idUSKCN24I19I.
21
Peña, Christina. “The War on Cocoa: Hershey Co. Accused of Not Upholding Sustainability Efforts in West Africa.” NBC News, 12 Dec. 2021,
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/war-cocoa-hershey-co-accused-not-upholding-sustainability-efforts-west-n1250798.
22
Nartey, Kwetey. “Chocolate Companies Evading Payment of Living Income Differential for Ghanaian and Ivorian Cocoa Farmers – CSOs.”
JoyOnline, 19 Mar. 2021.
19

18

“You cannot disassociate child labour from poverty.”— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in April 2020.

Children are exposed to a broad spectrum of experiences in the cocoa industry. These
include the culturally enriching introduction to longstanding farming traditions, but also
harmful, forced labour of young children who do not otherwise attend school. Many otherchildren help on the farm after school or on the weekends to contribute financially, learn
practical farming skills, or remain under the supervision and care of their farming parents.
Notwithstanding this nuanced reality, eliminating harmful forms of child labour is criticalto ensuring the human rights and welfare of people living and working in cocoa-growing
areas of Ghana.

Pesticides Harm Children and Other
Workers in Cocoa Production
Workers in the cocoa industry are commonly
exposed to pesticides in Ghana. People working on
cocoa farms, including women and children, areexposed to hazardous chemicals without training
or proper protective equipment, often causing
long-term health conditions. One study found that
more than 95 per cent of children in rural areasin Ghana did not use protective equipment whileworking with pesticides, even though children
are more susceptible to pesticide poisoning thanadults. Protective clothing worn by adult workers
often consists of material that is not chemical resistant. Birth defects, mental and motor impairment,
hyperirritability, dizziness, headaches, and damage
to internal organs are among the many adverse
health effects related to pesticide exposure.

Sources: Mull, L. Diane, and Steven R. Kirkhorn. “Child Labor in Ghana Cocoa Production: Focus upon Agricultural
Tasks, Ergonomic Exposures, and Associated Injuries and Illnesses.” Public Health Reports, vol. 120, no. 6, Nov. 2005, pp.
649–55; Denkyirah, Elisha Kwaku, et al. “Modeling Ghanaian Cocoa Farmers’ Decision to Use Pesticide and Frequency ofApplication: The Case of Brong Ahafo Region.” SpringerPlus, vol. 5, no. 1, Dec. 2016, p. 1113.

In October 2020, the United States Department of Labor released a study that found that
770,000 children were engaged in cocoa production in Ghana, 710,000 or 92 per cent of whomwere exposed to at least one form of hazardous child labour.23 The study also found that in2018 and 2019, 55 per cent of children living in agricultural households in cocoa-growing
areas in Ghana were engaged in child labour in cocoa production, with more than 50 per
cent of children in agricultural households involved in hazardous work.24 The study defines
hazardous work as work that a child does involving land clearing, carrying heavy loads, using
agrochemicals, using sharp tools, working long hours, or engaging in night work.25
NORC Final Report: Assessing Progress in Reducing Child Labor in Cocoa Production in Cocoa Growing Areas of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.
NORC at the University of Chicago, Oct. 2020, p. 10, https://www.norc.org/PDFs/Cocoa%20Report/NORC%202020%20Cocoa%20Report_
English.pdf.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid, pp. 8-9 (focusing on the “common ground” between the legal definitions in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire within the broader framework of
the International Labour Organization).
23

19

In addition to children working on family farms, there is evidence of trafficking and forcedchild labour in Ghana’s cocoa industry. A 2018 study estimated that between 2013 and 2017
more than 14,000 children were forced to work in cocoa production by someone other thantheir parent in medium and high cocoa producing areas in Ghana.26 The United States
Department of Labor has also found that child trafficking within Ghana and forced childlabour are present in the industry.27“Fraudulent scales showing lower weights for cocoa beans
is a major problem for farmers. As long as there’s fraud, thefarm gate price and LID [Living Income Differential] will notmake a difference.”— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in April 2020.

C. Cocoa’s Impact on the Environment
Cocoa production in Ghana contributes to deforestation. Since 1955, Ghana has lost 80 to 95
per cent of its forest.28 Between 2001 and 2014, 7,000 square kilometres of forests in Ghana
were destroyed.29 Cocoa production caused one-quarter of this deforestation.30 Because cocoa
farming degrades the soil, farmers repeatedly cut further into the forest to obtain new landfor cocoa farms. Deforestation has decimated Ghana’s wildlife population, and the country
is experiencing decreased rainfall and unpredictable weather patterns.31 If the government
does not act, deforestation could destroy all the forests remaining outside of Ghana’s nationalparks within the next decade.32
Cocoa farming can also cause the loss of forest plant species and strips the land of its
nutrients.33 The current pesticides used in cocoa production rely primarily on chemical
methods and result in significant environmental damage. This damage includes the physicaland chemical deterioration of the soil flora and fauna.34 Water that seeps through these
Bitter Sweets, supra note 6, p. 28.
Child Labor and Forced Labor Reports: Ghana. U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2018, https://www.dol.gov/
agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/ghana.
28
Agroforestry in the Cocoa Sector: A Need for Ambitious Collaborative Landscape Approaches. Consultation Paper for the 2020 Cocoa Barometer,
Voice Network, July 2020, p. 4, https://www.voicenetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/200706-Cocoa-Barometer-Agroforestry-Consultation-Paper.pdf [hereinafter Agroforestry in the Cocoa Sector].
29
Higonnet, Etelle, et al. Chocolate’s Dark Secret: How the Cocoa Industry Destroys National Parks. Mighty Earth, 2017, p. 4, https://www.mightyearth.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/chocolates_dark_secret_english_web.pdf [hereinafter Chocolate’s Dark Secret].
30
Ibid.
31
Agroforestry in the Cocoa Sector, supra note 28, p. 4; Chocolate’s Dark Secret, supra note 29, p. 4.
32
Chocolate’s Dark Secret, supra note 29, p. 4.
33
Asase, Alex, et al. “Impact of Cocoa Farming on Vegetation in an Agricultural Landscape in Ghana.” African Journal of Ecology, vol. 48, 2009,
pp. 338–46, on p. 342, http://www.sidalc.net/repdoc/A7633i/A7633i.pdf; Vliet, J. A. van, et al. Mineral Nutrition of Cocoa: A Review. 2015.
Open WorldCat, p. 47, http://edepot.wur.nl/356090; Cocoa Barometer, supra note 2, p. 77.
34
Afrane, George, and Augustine Ntiamoah. “Use of Pesticides in the Cocoa Industry and Their Impact on the Environment and the Food
Chain.” Pesticides in the Modern World - Risks and Benefits, edited by Margarita Stoytcheva, InTech, 2011, pp. 51–68, on p. 64, https://cdn.intechopen.com/pdfs/21173/InTech-Use_of_pesticides_in_the_cocoa_industry_and_their_impact_on_the_environment_and_the_food_chain.pdf.
26
27

20

acidic soils also adversely impacts Ghana’s aquatic ecosystems, including its lakes andrivers.35 Pesticides used in the cocoa industry also decimate pests’ natural enemies, leading
to the development of pest resistance.36 The adverse environmental effects of pesticides are
particularly severe in Ghana because farmers do not always use approved pesticides, and theysometimes use more pesticides than recommended for their crops.37

Ibid, pp. 64-65.
Denkyirah, Elisha Kwaku, et al. “Modeling Ghanaian Cocoa Farmers’ Decision to Use Pesticide and Frequency of Application: The Case of
Brong Ahafo Region.” SpringerPlus, vol. 5, no. 1, Dec. 2016, p. 1113.
37
Ibid.
35
36

21

III. COCOBOD: The Ghana
Cocoa Board
The Ghana Cocoa Board, known as COCOBOD, exerts almost absolute control over Ghana’s
cocoa sector. COCOBOD sets the price of cocoa and is the sole buyer and seller of cocoa. It
controls how cocoa is grown, the inputs farmers receive, and other day-to-day aspects of cocoa
farming. COCOBOD’s central and commanding role in Ghana’s cocoa industry comes withan equally demanding responsibility to cocoa-growing communities. This section highlights
COCOBOD’s operations and objectives, examines its financing, and discusses its politicalpower and lack of transparency.

A. COCOBOD’S Operations & Objectives
COCOBOD has existed in various forms since 1940 when the British government established
the West African Cocoa Control Board.38 In 1984, the Ghana Cocoa Board Act establishedthe Ghana Cocoa Board, today’s COCOBOD.39 Although it is a government institution, theAct established COCOBOD as a “corporate body,” meaning it may own property, enter into
contracts, conduct transactions, sue and be sued in its corporate name, and be taxed.40
In the early 1990s, COCOBOD underwent a series of reforms. Under pressure from the World
Bank, COCOBOD downsized and further liberalized the cocoa industry.41 The Ghana Cocoa
Board (Amendment) Act, 1991 restructured and partially privatized COCOBOD, making it theslimmer, public-private hybrid institution it is today.42 COCOBOD’s structure has remained
essentially unchanged since these reforms of the 1990s. However, in October 2020, theParliament of Ghana passed the Ghana Cocoa Board (Amendment) Act, 2017 that amends andupdates the law governing COCOBOD.43 Among other changes, the law grants the Ministry ofFood and Agriculture ministerial responsibility for COCOBOD, removing COCOBOD from the
Minister of Trade and Industry.44

Meredith, David. “The Colonial Office, British Business Interests and the Reform of Cocoa Marketing in West Africa, 1937-1945.”
The Journal of African History, vol. 29, no. 2, 1988, pp. 285–300, on p. 293.
39
Ghana Cocoa Board Act, 1984 (PNDCL 81).
40
Ibid.
41
Williams, Tracy. An African Success Story: Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing System. IDS, 2009, pp. 10-11, 15-16, 18-19. Open WorldCat, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2009.00318_2.x [hereinafter An African Success Story].
42
Ghana Cocoa Board (Amendment) Act, 1991 (PNDCL 265); An African Success Story, supra note 41, pp. 13-14, 18-19.
43
PNDCL 265, ibid; Report of the Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on the Ghana Cocoa Board (Amendment) Bill, 2017.
Dec. 2019, http://ir.parliament.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/1540/2019_12_23_13_38_31.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
44“COCOBOD Placement under Agric Ministry Almost Complete.” GhanaWeb, 25 May 2020, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/
business/COCOBOD-placement-under-Agric-Ministry-almost-complete-961366.
38

22

COCOBOD Board of Directors
1.

Chairman of the Board and two additional “Government nominees”

2. Chief Executive of the Board
3. Two farmers’ representatives who have an “interest in cocoa farming”
4. A member of the “working staff”
5. Governor of the Bank of Ghana
6. A member responsible for Finance and Economic Planning
7. A member responsible for Trade and Tourism
Source: Ghana Cocoa Board (Amendment) Act, 1991, (PNDCL 265).

Today, COCOBOD is the sole purchaser and seller of Ghanaian cocoa. COCOBOD purchases
cocoa through its subsidiary buying company, the Cocoa Marketing Company, or through aperson or organization it has authorized to buy cocoa, but only for sale back to COCOBOD.45
COCOBOD also sets the price paid to farmers for their cocoa.46 This floor price reflects the
expected export price, COCOBOD’s operating expenses, and taxes.47 COCOBOD has a longstanding policy of paying less than 100 per cent to cocoa producers to hold reserves for“the fulfilment of objectives other than those related to producers’ income.”48 COCOBOD
authorizes Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) to coordinate the purchase of cocoa fromfarmers. LBCs must purchase cocoa at the floor price set by COCOBOD. LBCs utilize
Purchasing Clerks, also known as Commission Marketing Clerks, to buy cocoa from farmers
at smaller quantities on the LBCs’ behalf. Purchasing Clerks also perform other tasks asneeded, such as re-drying and weighing cocoa beans they purchase from farmers.49

PNDCL 265, supra note 42, § 4.
Ibid, § 3.
47
Kolavalli, Shashi, and Marcella Vigneri. “Cocoa in Ghana: Shaping the Success of an Economy.” Yes Africa Can: Success Stories from a
Dynamic Continent, edited by Punam Chuhan-Pole and Manka Angwafo, World Bank, 2011, pp. 201–17, on p. 208, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/304221468001788072/930107812_201408252033945/additional/634310PUB0Yes0061512B09780821387450.pdf.
48
Guri, Sanni. The Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board: Conflicts of Interest. Aug. 1975, pp. 87, 96, https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/
bitstream/1885/130324/2/b12581677_Guri_S.pdf; Reuben Quainoo, “GCCP Commends Ghana Cocoa Board on Producer Price Increment
For 2020/2021 Cocoa Season,” Modern Ghana, 6 Oct. 2020, https://www.modernghana.com/news/1033733/gccp-commends-ghana-cocoaboard-on-producer-price.html.
49
Owusu Ansah, Goodlet, et al. “The Stake of Licence Buying Companies (LBCs) in the Promotion of Quality Cocoa in Ghana.” Cogent Business& Management, edited by Shaofeng Liu, vol. 5, no. 1, Jan. 2018, 1560857, p. 10; Baah, Francis, et al. “Examining the Cocoa Farmer- Purchasing Clerk Relationship in Ghana.” Global Journal of Science Frontier Research Agriculture and Veterinary Sciences, vol. 12, no. 11, 2012, pp.
45–52, on p. 46.
45
46

23

COCOBOD’s Quality Control Company inspects and certifies cocoa beans purchased by the
LBCs. Once the cocoa passes inspection, it comes under the control of the Cocoa Marketing
Company. The Cocoa Marketing Company is a subsidiary of COCOBOD that functions as a
private company. It is responsible for marketing cocoa to domestic and international buyers.
The Cocoa Marketing Company bargains with other companies to secure profitable foreignexchange revenue, maintains sales records, and settles disputes through direct arbitration.50

COCOBOD’s Subsidiaries and Divisions
1.

The Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana conducts research anddevelops cocoa processing techniques.

2. The Seed Production Division assists farmers to ensure the production
and delivery of high-quality cocoa products.
3. The Cocoa Health and Extension Division inspects and treats diseased
cocoa farms.
4. The Quality Control Company is responsible for grading and sealing
and fumigating and disinfecting cocoa.
5. The Cocoa Marketing Company coordinates the purchasing,transportation, storage, and internal and external marketing of cocoa.
Source: Ghana Cocoa Board (Amendment) Act, 1991, (PNDCL 265).

COCOBOD also serves as the primary provider of cocoa farming inputs through three of
its subsidiaries and divisions, the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana, the Seed Production
Division, and the Cocoa Health and Extension Division.51 They provide pre-harvest services
and inputs for cocoa farmers to improve the quality and yield of their crops.52 These inputs
include training for cocoa farmers and farming materials like seedlings and pesticides.

World Bank. Supply Chain Risk Assessment: Cocoa in Ghana. 2011, p. 11, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16516/775890WP0Ghana0Box0342041B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [hereinafter Supply Chain Risk Assessment].
51
Ghana Cocoa Board. “Subsidiaries and Divisions.” Ghana Cocoa Board, https://cocobod.gh/subsidiaries-and-divisions. Accessed 17 Apr.
2021.
52
Ghana Cocoa Board. “Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana.” Ghana Cocoa Board, https://cocobod.gh/subsidiaries-and-divisions/cocoa-research-institute-of-ghana. Accessed 1 May 2021; Ghana Cocoa Board. “Seed Production Division.” Ghana Cocoa Board, https://cocobod.gh/
subsidiaries-and-divisions/seed-production-division. Accessed 1 May 2021; Ghana Cocoa Board. “Cocoa Health and Extension Division.”
Ghana Cocoa Board, https://cocobod.gh/subsidiaries-and-divisions/cocoa-health-and-extension-division. Accessed 1 May 2021; Supply Chain
Risk Assessment, supra note 50, p. 10.
5024Key Terms
Floor Price: The price of cocoa paid to farmers set by COCOBOD reflecting
expected export price, operating expenses, taxes, and farmers’
production costs.
Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs): Private companies licensed by
COCOBOD to manage the internal marketing of cocoa. LBCs purchase cocoafrom farmers on behalf of COCOBOD.
Purchasing Clerk: Purchasing clerks are employed by LBCs to purchasecocoa directly from farmers on the LBCs’ behalf.

COCOBOD has numerous statutory objectives for all aspects of the cocoa industry in Ghana.
Its first general objectives are to encourage the production and undertake the cultivation of
cocoa.53 COCOBOD is also statutorily committed to regulating the marketing and export ofcocoa and securing the “most favourable arrangements for the purchase, inspection, grading,sealing and certification, export and sale of cocoa.”54 COCOBOD is further bound to promote“the general welfare” of cocoa farmers.55
Some of COCOBOD’s objectives are in direct tension with each other. As one stakeholder
explained during an interview, a buyer in a market cannot effectively regulate themself. This
concern is particularly salient because COCOBOD is the sole buyer of Ghanaian cocoa andthe only seller and exporter of that cocoa. The critical challenge lies in COCOBOD’s ability
to prioritize and promote farmer welfare while also securing the most favourable financial
arrangements for the purchase, sale, and export of cocoa. Holding COCOBOD accountablefor its obligations to people living and working in cocoa-growing communities is essential
given its power over the industry and the welfare, human rights, and environmental concerns
highlighted above.

PNDCL 265, supra note 42, § 2(a)-(b).
Ibid, § 2(g).
55
Ibid, §2(l).
53
54

25

Contacting COCOBOD
While researching this report, the authors tried
unsuccessfully for more than one year to speakwith COCOBOD. In total, the authors attempted
to contact more than 20 different officials in various positions at COCOBOD by telephone, email,WhatsApp, Skype, and post. The authors emailed
and sent by post a summary of this report and formal letters requesting interviews to COCOBOD’s
spokesperson, the public affairs office, the National Coordinator, the COCOBOD focal person on the
Ghana Cocoa Platform, the ESMS Coordinator,
and the Cocoa Marketing Company in Ghana.
After numerous emails, COCOBOD’s focal personon the Ghana Cocoa Platform agreed to speakwith the authors over Zoom, but later cancelled

the interview due to COVID-19 restrictions. The
authors attempted to reschedule the interview
after the restrictions had been lifted but did notreceive a response. The authors also reached the
COCOBOD Deputy Chief Executive for Agronomy
and Quality Control by telephone. The Deputy
Chief Executive refused to speak with the authors
without obtaining approval directly from COCOBOD’s Chief Executive. The authors followed-up
multiple times to determine whether the Deputy
Chief Executive had received the Chief Executive’s
permission, but he did not respond. The authors
also contacted two members of COCOBOD’s staff
through WhatsApp, but the staff members were
ultimately unwilling to speak to them.

B. COCOBOD’s Financing
COCOBOD receives large loans each year to fund Ghana’s cocoa industry. COCOBOD uses
these loans to buy and sell cocoa during the growing season, provide inputs to farmers, andcarry out other tasks. Since the 1992-93 crop season, COCOBOD has received annual loans
ranging from about USD 1.2 to 1.8 billion to ensure its payments to cocoa farmers.56 In thepast few years, four to six banks have generally underwritten these loans before bringing in
more institutions to syndicate the loans.57 For instance, in 2020 COCOBOD signed a USD 1.3
billion syndicated loan for the 2020-21 crop season.58 This loan’s purpose is “to finance cocoapurchases and related operational activities in the crop season.”59 This includes COCOBOD
buying approximately 900,000 metric tonnes of cocoa beans through its LBCs.60 Twenty-eightbanks—24 international and four domestic institutions—underwrote the loan.61
COCOBOD’s receipt each year of billions of dollars in loans to buy cocoa from farmers
further underscores the need to hold the institution accountable to protect the environment
and promote the welfare and human rights of people living and working in cocoa-growing
communities. Moreover, while Ghana has a good track record of paying back its loans on

Ghana Secures USD 1.7 Billion in Capital, supra note 14; COCOBOD Signs USD 1.3 Billion Loan for 2020-21, supra note 14; COCOBOD Signs
USD 1.3 Billion Loan for 2018-19, supra note 15; COCOBOD Signs $1.3 Billion Loan for 2017-18, supra note 15.
57“Banks Refuse Syndicated Loan for COCOBOD.” GhanaWeb, 19 June 2020, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/
Banks-refuse-syndicated-loan-for-COCOBOD-984691.
58
COCOBOD Signs USD 1.3 Billion Loan for 2020-21, supra note 14.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
56

26

time, COCOBOD uses 70 per cent of its profits to repay these annual loans and only 30 per centto reinvest in its operations.62 These figures suggest that COCOBOD is not investing enoughto support farmers with inputs and to improve their farming practices and technologies.
Instead, COCOBOD forces cocoa farmers themselves to absorb the costs of new farming
techniques and technologies, cutting into their profits and exacerbating poverty in cocoagrowing communities.63 Farmers interviewed for this report confirmed this concern, noting
the high cost of farming inputs and its impact on their income and livelihoods.

C. COCOBOD’S Political Power & Lack of Transparency
COCOBOD’s role as an export monopoly marketing board for cocoa provides it immense
political power and wealth. During an in-depth interview, an environmental advocate
asserted that this power and wealth makes COCOBOD “untouchable.” Another stakeholder
described COCOBOD during an interview as “one of the most powerful institutions in the
country,” noting that the Chief Executive has “direct access” to the President of Ghana.
The interviewee stated that, as the country’s “cash cow,” COCOBOD is “subject to political
capture” and corruption. This stakeholder explained that the government uses cocoa revenue
to “reward political support, mobilize political power, and fund political parties.” Theinterviewee further claimed that COCOBOD’s maintenance of cocoa “price stability” comes atthe cost of farmers’ welfare so that politicians can “buy big fancy cars.”“Cocoa is political.”— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in March 2020.

COCOBOD also has a reputation as a secretive institution, lacking in transparency anddifficult to engage. Most of the stakeholders the authors interviewed for this report—farmers,
professors, lawyers, and members of non-governmental organizations—expressed concern
about COCOBOD’s lack of transparency and accessibility. As one interviewee explained,
COCOBOD officials “will not listen to civil society voices or other stakeholders” because
their crop is a “huge source of revenue for the government.” Other stakeholders explained
during interviews that it was challenging to obtain policies, documents, or other kinds ofinformation from COCOBOD, especially for non-governmental organizations. Interviewees
in non-governmental organizations further asserted that when COCOBOD does makeinformation available, it is often fragmented, incomplete, and difficult to understand.
Exploring Revenue Management & Producer Pricing Mechanism Within Ghana’s Cocoa Sector. IMANI Center for Policy and Education, 2019, p.
80, https://imaniafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Cocoa-Project-Final-Web_Print-Final_compressed.pdf.
63
Cocoa Barometer, supra note 2, p. 44; “COCOBOD Doesn’t Have Enough Funds to Supply Free Fertiliser,” Ghanaweb, 5 Nov. 2020, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/COCOBOD-doesn-t-have-enough-funds-to-supply-free-fertiliser-Hackman-1101130;
Odijie, Michael E. “West Africa’s Cocoa Farmers Are Trapped by the Global Chocolate Industry.” Quartz Africa, 10 Oct. 2019, https://qz.com/
africa/1725709/ghana-ivory-coasts-cocoa-farmers-trapped-by-chocolate-industry/.
62

27

“Working with COCOBOD is a major challenge. COCOBOD
is an autonomous body. You cannot do anything in the cocoa
sector without going through COCOBOD. But reaching themis quite difficult.”— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in March 2020.

Ghanaian lawmakers have also decried COCOBOD’s lack of transparency. COCOBOD has been
the subject of widespread criticism regarding the lack of transparency around its allocationof funds from the USD 600 million loan from the African Development Bank and private
lenders, discussed in detail below. In 2019, Rockson-Nelson E.K. Dafaemkor Esq., Member ofParliament of the South Dayi Constitution, issued a press release to several Ghanaian news
outlets urging COCOBOD to “come clear” on its allocation of funds from the loan.64 His publicstatement at the time highlighted widespread mistrust in COCOBOD as an institution andfrustration with the lack of transparency surrounding COCOBOD’s financial operations.

Dafeamekpor, Rockson-Nelson E. K. “Government Must Come Clear on the $600m COCOBOD Loan.” Ghana News, 18 Nov. 2019, https://ghananewsonline.com.gh/government-must-come-clear-on-the-600m-cocobod-loan/ (Dafeamekpor concluded in his press release that “thismoney is being applied to something markedly different from what Gov’t has stated on paper”). Stakeholders the authors interviewed forthis report echoed this suspicion about the misallocation of the African Development Bank loan funds.
64

28

“Almost everybody is afraid of engaging COCOBOD becauseof how decisions are made within the institution.
— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in May 2020.

COCOBOD has also taken aggressive steps to try and shut down public criticism. In 2018,
an independent media outlet, JoyNews, produced a documentary exposing the fraudulent
adjustment of scales and the under weighing of cocoa bags by LBCs’ purchasing clerks.65
Through multiple interviews with cocoa farmers and workers, the documentary “Missing
Kilos” lays bare the widespread but illegal practice that cheats farmers of significant portionsof their income. LBCs filed an injunction to prevent the documentary from airing,claiming that it contained “unfair and unverified allegations of crime made against thecompanies.”66 In May 2018, the Accra High Court Human Rights Division dismissed the LBCs’
application for an injunction, holding that it would amount to unconstitutional “preemptive
censorship.”67 The LBCs appealed the decision and in February 2020 the Supreme Court ofGhana dismissed their appeal, thereby preserving the High Court ruling.68 The “Missing
Kilos” documentary aired in the summer of 2020.

Missing Kilos Pt.1 - Hotline Documentary on JoyNews (14-8-20). JoyNews, 14 Aug. 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9HtTH9fj-2k[hereinafter Missing Kilos Pt.1]; Missing Kilos Pt.2 - Hotline Documentary on JoyNews (14-8-20). JoyNews, 14 Aug. 2020, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=5ZK8s9_at0Q [hereinafter Missing Kilos Pt.2]; Missing Kilos Pt.3 - Hotline Documentary on JoyNews (14-8-20). JoyNews, 14 Aug.
2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3fBB0ZCUB0E [hereinafter Missing Kilos Pt.3].
66“Court Gives JoyNews Green Light to Air ‘Missing Kilos’ Documentary.” JoyOnline, 21 Jan. 2020, https://www.myjoyonline.com/courtgives-joynews-green-light-to-air-missing-kilos-documentary/; “Cocoa Buyers Association Fights Back Attempts by Joy News to Air Documentary.” JoyOnline, 23 May 2018, https://www.myjoyonline.com/cocoa-buyers-association-fights-back-attempts-by-joy-news-to-air-documentary/#!.
67
Licensed Cocoa Buyers Association & Ors. v. Multimedia Group Ltd. & Ors., p. 4, Suit No. GJ 188/2018, Accra High Court of Justice(Human Rights Div.) (Unreported).
68
The Republic v. High Court (Human Rights Div.), Accra, Suit No. J5/52/2018, Supreme Court (Civil Div.) (Unreported).
65

29

IV. COCOBOD’S
Environmental and Social
Management System &Grievance and Redress
Mechanism
In 2019, COCOBOD received a USD 600 million syndicated loan from the African
Development Bank and several private institutions. The African Development Bank requiredthat COCOBOD create an Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) and agrievance and redress mechanism to obtain these funds. This report aims to understandthese relatively new programs and their potential to protect the environment and promote
the human rights and welfare of people living and working in Ghana’s cocoa-growing
communities. To this end, this section first discusses the USD 600 million syndicatedloan. It then provides an overview of the ESMS, highlighting its objectives, scope,and implementation. Lastly, this section examines COCOBOD’s grievance and redress
mechanism, a component of its Stakeholder Engagement Plan under the ESMS.

A. African Development Bank USD 600 Million Syndicated Loan
On November 12, 2019, following a year of negotiations, COCOBOD, the African
Development Bank, Credit Suisse AG, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
signed a USD 600 million, seven-year syndicated loan agreement.69 In February 2020, several
other development finance institutions joined the loan, including the Japan International
Cooperation Agency, the Development Bank of South Africa, and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti
Spa, the primary Italian development bank.70 The development institutions contributed USD
250 million for the loan, and the private financial institutions provided USD 350 million.71“African Development Bank, Credit Suisse, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Ghana Cocoa Board Ink $600 Million Loan
Agreement to Boost Cocoa Production.” African Development Bank Group, 12 Nov. 2019, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-development-bank-credit-suisse-industrial-and-commercial-bank-china-and-ghana-cocoa-board-ink-600-million-loanagreement-boost-cocoa-production-32628.
70
Signing of Loan Agreement for “Cocoa Value Chain Enhancement Project” in Ghana: Contributing to Enhancement of the Agricultural Value Chain and Related Industries. Japan International Cooperation Agency, 21 Feb. 2020, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/
press/2019/20200221_10_en.html [hereinafter Signing of Loan Agreement]; Ghana COCOBOD Launches US $600m Syndicated Loan Facility
to Boost Sector Operations. 24 June 2020, https://africaincmag.com/tag/cocobod/.
71
Signing of Loan Agreement, ibid.
69

30

African Development Bank Institutional and Policy Framework
for COCOBOD's Grievance and Redress Mechanism

African Development Bank
Integrated Safeguards System

Integrated
Safeguards
PolicyStatement

Operational Safeguards (OS)Involuntary Resettlement

Stakeholder
Engagement
Plan

AfricanDevelopment Bank
Independent
Review
Mechanism

Biodiversity andEcosystem Services
Pollution Prevention
and Control, Hazardous
Materials and Resource
Efficiency

Environmental
and Social
Management
System (ESMS)

Environmental
and Social
Monitoring
SystemIntegrated
Environmental
and Social
ImpactAssessment

OS2-5:

OS1:

Environmental andSocial Assessment

Environmental
and Social
Management
Procedure

Environmental
and Social
Assessment
Procedures

AfricanDevelopment
Bank Grievanceand Redress
Mechanism

Labour Conditions,
Health and Safety

Environmental
and Social
Management
Plan

COCOBOD’SGRIEVANCE AND REDRESSMECHANISM

Source: African Development Bank Group’s Integrated Safeguards System — Policy Statement and Operational Safeguards. African Development
Bank Group, 2013, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/December_2013_-_AfDB%E2%80%99S_Integrated_Safeguards_System__-_Policy_Statement_and_Operational_Safeguards.pdf.

31

According to COCOBOD, the African Development Bank, and the Ghanaian press, the purposeof this loan is to assist COCOBOD in implementing Productivity Enhancement Programs tomaximize Ghanaian cocoa production and increase farmer income.72 COCOBOD has statedthat it intends to use the loan to support the following activities:» Hand pollination of cocoa farms;» Irrigation of cocoa farms;» Rehabilitation of Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease (CSSVD) infested farms;» Rehabilitation of moribund cocoa farms;» Increasing and improving warehousing capacity;» Creation of an integrated farmer database;» Promotion of domestic processing; and» Promotion of local consumption.73
The Productivity Enhancement Programs are a part of the African Development Bank’slarger Feed Africa Strategy, an economic development strategy that aims to tackle hunger andmalnutrition across the continent.74 The programs aim to “sustainably increase plant fertility;
develop irrigation systems; rehabilitate aged and disease-infected farms; increase warehousecapacity; and create an integrated farmer database.”75 The African Development Bank also
intends for the Product Enhancement Programs to provide short-term capital to support cocoaprocessing companies in Ghana and promote domestic consumption of cocoa products.

Environmental and Social Management Plan, supra note 1, p. 3; Project Summary Note, supra note 1; Ghana Cocoa Board to Raise USD 1.3
Billion, supra note 1.
73
Environmental and Social Management Plan, supra note 1, p. 3.
74
Project Summary Note, supra note 1; Feed Africa: Strategy for Agricultural Transformation in Africa 2016-2025. African Development Fund,May 2016, p. v, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Feed_Africa-_Strategy_for_Agricultural_Transformation_in_Africa_2016-2025.pdf.
75
Project Summary Note, supra note 1.
72

32

B. Environmental and Social Management System
COCOBOD created its Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS), including thegrievance and redress mechanism, in 2018 as a requirement to obtain the USD 600 million
syndicated loan from the African Development Bank and private lenders.76 The African
Development Bank required COCOBOD to ensure its operations conformed to the Bank’s
Environmental and Social Safeguards Requirement Standards, called the Operational Safeguards.77
The Operational Safeguards are part of the Bank’s Integrated Safeguards System to promotesocially inclusive and environmentally sustainable development.78 To fulfil these Operational
Safeguards, COCOBOD must follow their guidelines set forth in the Integrated Safeguards System.79“[The grievance and redress mechanism] is not a common
thing that people are talking about in the cocoa sector. It is not
something I see being implemented or being effective at all.
I don’t see its effectiveness, not for now.”­— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in May 2020.

The African Development Bank determined that COCOBOD’s Productivity Enhancement
Programs were “medium risk.”80 Consequently, under the Operational Safeguards, COCOBOD
was required to develop and maintain the ESMS and summarise the program on its website.81
COCOBOD also created an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) to provide aframework to implement the ESMS.82 The Integrated Safeguards System further requires all
African Development Bank loan recipients to develop “a credible, independent and empowered
local grievance and redress mechanism to … facilitate …the resolution of affected people’s
grievances and concerns about the environmental and social performance of the project.”83

76
Environmental and Social Management Plan, supra note 1, pp. 3-4 (“This Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) provides aframework for the implementation of COCOBOD’s ESMS, in satisfaction of the requirements of the Bank.”); Ghana Cocoa Board. Environmental and Social Management System. 25 Oct. 2018, p. 8, https://esa.afdb.org/sites/default/files/ESMS%20GHANA%20COCOA%20BOARD.
pdf [hereinafter Environmental and Social Management System] (stating that the ESMS is “guided by the national laws of Ghana; AfDB Environmental and Social safeguards requirement standards; International Labour Organisation conventions and other relevant policies of the
Global Environment”). As a back-up for project-specific grievance and redress mechanisms, in 2004 the African Development Bank createdan Independent Review Mechanism. The Bank’s mechanism is meant to “address complaints made by any group of two or more people whohave been harmed, or who are likely to be harmed, by a project funded by the AfDB Group.” The Independent Review Mechanism of the African
Development Bank, p. 2, https://rightsindevelopment.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/The-independent-review-mechanism-of-the-african-development-bank.pdf. Accessed 18 Apr. 2021. Accessed 18 Apr. 2021.
77
Environmental and Social Management System, supra note 76, p. 8.
78
African Development Bank Group’s Integrated Safeguards System — Policy Statement and Operational Safeguards. African Development Bank
Group, 2013, p. 1, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/December_2013_-_AfDB%E2%80%99S_Integrated_Safeguards_System__-_Policy_Statement_and_Operational_Safeguards.pdf [hereinafter Policy Statement and Operational Safeguards].
79
Ibid; Environmental and Social Management System, supra note 76, p. 8.
80Environmental and Social Management Plan, supra note 1, p. 4 (“These projects have been categorized as FI-B medium risk by AfDB.”).
81
Ibid (“COCOBOD has developed this Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) to identify the environmental and social management and mitigation measures associated with the implementation of the projects in line with the requirements of AfDB.”); Policy Statement
and Operational Safeguards, supra note 78, p. 25 (stating that according to the African Development Bank’s Integrated Safeguards System, all
Category 4 financial intermediaries are required to “[d]evelop and disclose a summary of the ESMS to the public on its website”).
82
Environmental and Social Management Plan, supra note 1.
83
Policy Statement and Operational Safeguards, supra note 78, p. 29.

33

The ESMS applies to all COCOBOD’s operations, officials, and agents working in Ghana’s cocoa
sector, including its subsidiaries and divisions, outside contractors, service providers, andconsultants.84 The ESMS aims to “identify and manage environmental and social risks andopportunities” and “improve [the] livelihoods of cocoa farmers and other stakeholders.”85 The
ESMS identifies numerous risks associated with COCOBOD’s activities in Ghana’s cocoa industry.
These risks include deforestation, child labour, volatile cocoa prices, the lack or misuse of
personal protective equipment, and unresolved grievances from individuals and communities
living and working in project areas.86 The ESMS provides COCOBOD with a “framework forcontinuous improvement” in managing these risks, including its Stakeholder Engagement Plan
and component grievance and redress mechanism, discussed in detail below.87

Environmental and Social Management System, supra note 76, p. 5 (“COCOBOD, its subsidiaries and divisions, productivity enhancing programmes, projects and activities, contractors, services providers, consultants and parties associated with any of the operations of the Board
must conform to this ESMS.”).
85
Ibid, pp. 5, 12.
86
Ibid, p. 10.
87
Ibid, pp. 6, 27.
84

34

“We could not find the ESMS online or in Ghana. What we seein the ESMS is the business-as-usual approach with language toappeal to donors. We feel it was only written for donors and theAfrican Development Bank loan. For now, the ESMS is just a
document that has been developed to meet donor requirements.”— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in May 2020.

According to COCOBOD’s Chairman, Hon. Hackman Owusu-Agyemang, and Chief Executive,
Hon. Joseph Boahen Aidoo, the successful design and implementation of the ESMS arenecessary to advance COCOBOD’s ultimate mission: “to create a modernized, resilient andcompetitive cocoa environment where all stakeholders strive towards a sustainable cocoa
economy in which cocoa farmers and their communities thrive.”88
However, to date, it appears that COCOBOD has not fully implemented the ESMS. Only five offourteen stakeholders the authors interviewed for this report had heard of the ESMS before
the authors spoke with them. Three of these five interviewees emphasized that, to theirknowledge, the ESMS had not yet been implemented and was instead only established on paper.
Moreover, while the 2018 ESMS and ESMP reports are available on the African Development
Bank’s website,89 at the time the authors wrote this report, they were only able to find minimal
information about ESMS programs and activities on COCOBOD’s website and elsewhere online.90

C. Grievance and Redress Mechanism
COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism is a non-judicial grievance mechanism that
individuals and organizations affected by COCOBOD projects may use to seek redress forenvironmental and social harms. COCOBOD declared that it would establish the grievanceand redress mechanism based on the “principles of accessibility, effectiveness, transparency,
independenc[e] and record maintenance.”91 The mechanism is a part of COCOBOD’s Stakeholder
Engagement Plan under the ESMS.92 The Stakeholder Engagement Plan aims to increasetransparency by promoting engagement among all stakeholders in the cocoa sector.93 COCOBOD’sgrievance and redress mechanism is the product of policies and procedures for sustainable project
management required under the African Development Bank’s Integrated Safeguards System.94
Ibid, p. 7.
“Environmental and Social Assessment: ESA Full Disclosure Site.” African Development Bank Group, https://esa.afdb.org/document/environmental-and-social-impact-assessment-14. Accessed 1 April 2021 [hereinafter Environmental and Social Assessment].
90
For example, only recently in April 2021—two and a half years after the ESMS was established on paper—has information
about an ESMS program become available on COCOBOD’s website. “A Survey to Assess the Environmental and Social Impacts of
COCOBOD’S PEPs Takes Off.” Ghana Cocoa Board, 27 Apr. 2021, https://cocobod.gh/news/a-survey-to-assess-the-environmentaland-social-impacts-of-cocobods-peps-takes-off.
91
Environmental and Social Management System, supra note 76, p. 30.
92
Ibid, p. 27.
93
Ibid.
94
Policy Statement and Operational Safeguards, supra note 78, pp. 18, 29.
88
89

35

“There should be a COCOBOD unit responsible for hearing
complaints. Currently, the chain is too long; it can get lost.
They should give a solution in a short period of time.”— A stakeholder during an in-depth interview in May 2020.

When a person or group files a complaint using the grievance and redress mechanism, it
triggers a formal review and response process. There are four levels to the process: (1) thesociety level, (2) the district level, (3) the regional level, and (4) the national level.95 Eachlevel should include a grievance redress team (or committee) consisting of five to seven
representatives from COCOBOD, other government institutions, cocoa farmers, traditional
leaders, and other stakeholder groups.

COCOBOD’s Grievance Redress Teams’ Composition
Level

Composition

Society• Community Extension Agent (Chairman)• Chief of the community or his representative• Chief Farmer• Leader/Representative, Cocoa Farmers’ Cooperative• Women’s Representative• Leader, Youth in Cocoa Initiative• Assemblyman/Unit Committe Chairperson

District• District Cocoa officer (Chairman)• Traditional Council Rep.
• District Chief Cocoa Farmer• LBC Rep.
• District NADMO Coordinator

Regional• Regional Manager, CHED (Chairman)• Traditional Council Rep.
• Regional Chief Cocoa Farmer• LBC Rep.
• Regional NADMO Coordinator• Regional EPA

National• Chief Executive• ESMS Manager• National Chief Cocoa Farmer• NADMO• EPA

Source: Ghana Cocoa Board. Environmental and Social Management System. 25 Oct. 2018, pp. 30-31,
https://esa.afdb.org/sites/default/files/ESMS%20GHANA%20COCOA%20BOARD.pdf.

95

Environmental and Social Management System, supra note 76, pp. 30-31.

36

An individual or group begins the process by filing a complaint with a receiving officer at thesociety level. The official complaint form is in the Appendix. The receiving officer registers
the complaint and documents it within a logbook or database. Within five working days,
the chairman of the grievance redress team at the societal level should consult with othercommittee members and notify the complainant whether the complaint is “eligible.”96
Unfortunately, COCOBOD has not set forth the factors to be used to determine whether acomplaint is eligible.
If the complaint is deemed eligible, the committee at that level shall investigate the issue andsubmit a detailed report within 14 working days to the ESMS Manager.97 COCOBOD has also
not established how the committee should investigate a complaint or which standards orevidence it should consider. The committee’s report should consist of a “detailed response” tothe issue, confirmation that the complaint is valid, and an “action plan” to address it.98
If the complaint is not resolved at the initial society level, the committee should forward it
to the next level for consideration.99 COCOBOD has not laid out the ways that the grievance
redress teams may resolve complaints. However, it has established that “[f]eedback onreported grievances shall be channeled through face-to-face interactions, leaflets, radio,
durbars/rallies, farmer business schools, emails, phone calls and letters.”100

COCOBOD’s Grievance Redress Process

Individual or group
files a complaint
at the society level

If eligible, theclaim is investigatedand submitted to the
ESMS manager
within 14 days

Ibid, p. 31.
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid, p. 32.
96
97

37

If not resolved,
the complaint shouldbe escalated to
the next level for
consideration

Like the ESMS, it appears that COCOBOD has not yet fully implemented the grievance andredress mechanism. The only publicly available information the authors could find about thegrievance and redress mechanism comprises a few pages in the 2018 ESMS and ESMP reports.101
Moreover, only five of fifteen stakeholders the authors interviewed for this report had heard of
COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism before the authors spoke with them. Three ofthese five interviewees emphasized that, to their knowledge, like the ESMS, the grievance andredress mechanism had not yet been implemented and instead only existed on paper.

Why Use COCOBOD’s Grievance and Redress Mechanism?
Under Weighing Cocoa
In 2020, a documentary entitled “Missing Kilos” produced by JoyNews revealed that purchasingclerks for Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) were under weighing and underpaying for cocoabags, cheating cocoa farmers of their income.102 Individual cocoa farmers who have had theircocoa under weighed and have lost income could file a grievance using the grievance and redress
mechanism to obtain their lost income. A group of cocoa farmers could file a grievance together
to highlight and seek redress for the problem's systemic nature.

Forced Child Labour
In March 2021, the Government of Ghana rescued thirteen children who were victims of trafficking and forced labour.103 These children, ages 9 to 19, had worked on cocoa farms in the Volta
region, some for ten years.104 Although they have since been repatriated to their homes andfamilies, these children and their families could bring a grievance using the grievance and redress
mechanism to seek redress for the harms they suffered.

Deforestation
Deforestation has continued at a fast pace in Ghana, despite commitments by the Government of
Ghana and multinational chocolate and cocoa companies to achieve zero deforestation.105 Under
the Cocoa and Forest Initiative, these and other parties have promised not to convert any moreforest land for cocoa production.106 Non-governmental organizations that work to protect andpreserve the environment could bring a grievance through the grievance and redress mechanism
to address the continued destruction of forests for cocoa farming.

Ibid, pp. 30-32; Environmental and Social Management Plan, supra note 1, pp. 19-20.
Missing Kilos Pt.1, supra note 65; Missing Kilos Pt.2, supra note 65; Missing Kilos Pt.3, supra note 65.
“Child Survivors of Trafficking Rescued in Ghana Return to Côte d’Ivoire.” International Organization for Migration, 19 Mar. 2021, https://www.iom.int/news/child-survivors-trafficking-rescued-ghana-return-cote-divoire.
104
Ibid.
105
“Cocoa & Forests Initiative.” World Cocoa Foundation, https://www.worldcocoafoundation.org/initiative/cocoa-forests-initiative/.
Accessed 18 Apr. 2021.
106
Ibid.
101
102
103

38

V. The PEER Principles:
An Evaluation of COCOBOD’s
Grievance and Redress
Mechanism
This section examines COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism based on global
standards and best practices for non-judicial grievance mechanisms. The authors synthesizedthese standards into the PEER Principles—Principles for Effective and Efficient Redress. This
report employs the PEER Principles to evaluate and score COCOBOD’s grievance and redress
mechanism. The aim is to highlight the mechanism’s strengths and weaknesses and offer
concrete recommendations to ensure it provides effective and efficient redress for people
living and working in Ghana’s cocoa-growing communities.
The first part of this section introduces the ten PEER Principles and their sources and explains
the grading system. The second part evaluates COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism
according to the ten principles and their component criteria. The final part of this section
considers the analysis as a whole, focusing on what COCOBOD must do to improve its scoreand ensure the grievance and redress mechanism is an effective tool for cocoa farmers,
workers, and their communities.

A. Principles for Effective and Efficient Redress: The PEER Principles
A non-judicial grievance mechanism is any non-legal routine process by which parties may
raise complaints and secure redress. COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism is an
example of a non-judicial grievance mechanism.

39

The PEER Principles comprise ten principles and their component criteria synthesizedfrom global standards and best practices for non-judicial grievance mechanisms. The PEER
Principles are:1.

Human Rights Compatibility

2.

Accessibility and Awareness3.

Transparency and Predictability

4.

Legitimacy and Accountability

5.

Monitoring and Evaluation

6.

Inclusivity and Equitable Participation

7.

Comprehensibility and Manageability

8.

Scope and Flexibility

9.

Sustainability and Self-Improvement

10. Procedural Efficiency
To create the PEER Principles, the authors surveyed and incorporated essential components ofthe following sources:» United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework;107» Karen Lukas et al.’s “criteria of excellence” from Corporate Accountability: The Role and Impactof Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms;108» Center for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) Glass Half Full?:
The State of Accountability in Development Finance;109» The Institute for Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Integrity and Harvard’s International Human
Rights Clinic’s MSI Evaluation Tool: For the Evaluation of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives;110 and» Oxfam Australia’s Community-Company Grievance Resolution: A Guide for the Australian
Mining Industry.111
The ten PEER Principles and their component criteria combine for a total of 100 points,
with each principle contributing ten points. Each principle’s ten points are further divided
by the number of component criteria. For example, for a principle with five criteria, eachSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. A/HRC/17/31, 2011,https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/a-hrc-17-31_aev.pdf.
108
Lukas, Karin, et al. Corporate Accountability: The Role and Impact of Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms. Edward Elgar Publishing,
2016.
109
Daniel, Caitlin, et al., editors. Glass Half Full? The State of Accountability in Development Finance. SOMO, 2016.
110
MSI Integrity and Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic. MSI Evaluation Tool: For the Evaluation of Multi-Stakeholder
Initiatives. 2017, https://www.msi-integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/MSI_Evaluation_Tool_2017.pdf.
111
Hill, Christina. Community–Company Grievance Resolution: A Guide for the Australian Mining Industry. Oxfam Australia, 2010,https://www.oxfam.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/OAus-GrievanceMechanisms-0410.pdf.
10740

component criteria is worth two points. A table with all ten PEER Principles and theircomponent criteria is available in the Appendix.
The authors use three evaluative levels to describe the extent to which COCOBOD’s grievanceand redress mechanism fulfils each principle: Good, Moderate, or Poor. A “Good” evaluationmeans the grievance and redress mechanism fulfils 65 per cent or more of a principle’s
component criteria. A “Moderate” evaluation means the grievance and redress mechanism
fulfils more than 35 but less than 65 per cent of a principle’s component criteria. A “Poor”
evaluation means the mechanism fulfils 35 per cent or less of a principle’s component criteria.
Overall, the grievance and redress mechanism receives points for each principle
corresponding to the percentage of criteria it fulfils for each principle. For example, if themechanism fulfils three of five component criteria for a particular principle, it receives a“Moderate” evaluation for that principle and six points for its overall score for meeting 60 per
cent of that principle’s criteria.

Good is ≥ 65% / 65 total points
Moderate is > 35% / 35 total points and < 65% / 65 total points
Poor is ≤ 35% / 35 total points

Given the lack of publicly available information about the implementation of the grievance andredress mechanism, the authors could not determine whether COCOBOD has fulfilled someof the PEER Principles’ component criteria. The authors removed these criteria from the total
number of component criteria when calculating a principle’s score. For example, if a principle
has four component criteria but information is only available to evaluate two components,
the principle is treated as having only two criteria to calculate its score. If the grievance andredress mechanism fulfils one of this principle’s component criteria, it receives an evaluation of“Moderate” with five points for meeting 50 per cent of the component criteria—one out of two
for which information is available.
Finally, the authors assign an overall evaluation and score for COCOBOD’s grievance andredress mechanism using the same formula as for each principle’s evaluation.

COCOBOD published the Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) report and Environmental and Social Management Plan
(ESMP) on the same day in October 2018, and they contain the same information about the grievance and redress mechanism. Environmental
and Social Management System, supra note 76, pp. 30-32; Environmental and Social Management Plan, supra note 1, pp. 19-20.
113“Home.” Ghana Cocoa Board, https://cocobod.gh/. Accessed 18 Apr. 2021.
112

41

B. PEER Principles Evaluation of COCOBOD’s Grievance and Redress Mechanism
As highlighted in the previous section, it appears that COCOBOD has not fully implemented
its grievance and redress mechanism. The authors have not been able to find evidence
that COCOBOD has publicised the mechanism or provided redress for any grievances. The
information on which the authors rely for the PEER Principles evaluation therefore derives
from three sources: (1) COCOBOD’s 2018 documents that introduced the ESMS and ESMPand established the grievance and redress mechanism (collectively referred to as the “ESMS
report” in this section);112 (2) COCOBOD’s website;113 and (3) information collected during indepth interviews with farmers, farmer cooperatives, non-governmental organizations, legal
and human rights experts, the African Development Bank, and others.

1. Human Rights Compatibility: Moderate (50% / 5 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Human Rights Compatibility(i) Comprehensively address human rights issues, especially
issues that prompted the grievance mechanism’s formation;(ii) Ensure processes, outcomes, and remedies accord withinternationally recognized human rights standards.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism fulfils one of two component criteria for Human
Rights Compatibility—component (ii).
The ESMS report acknowledges some of the human rights concerns of cocoa-growing
communities, including child labour and environmental risks. However, the report does notrecognize these concerns in connection with the grievance and redress mechanism, and the
ESMS does not comprehensively address human rights issues.
Although there is a shortage of information about the implementation of the grievance andredress mechanism and its processes, outcomes, and remedies, the ESMS report explicitly
establishes the mechanism based on the principles of accessibility, effectiveness, transparency,
independence, and record maintenance.

422. Accessibility and Awareness: Poor (33% / 3.3 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Accessibility & Awareness(i)

Publicise the grievance mechanism and take appropriate steps
to ensure stakeholders who might be impacted are aware of it;(ii) Make all procedures and guidelines necessary for utilizing themechanism publicly available and accessible to stakeholders;(iii) Assist all stakeholders who may face barriers to accessingor understanding the procedures or guidelines;(iv) Ensure all relevant departments within the governing
institution are aware of the mechanism and are actively
involved in facilitating its use by stakeholders.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism fulfils one of three component criteria for
Accessibility and Awareness for which information is available—component (iv). The authors
did not find sufficient information to evaluate component (iii).
The authors could not find evidence that COCOBOD has publicised the grievance and redress
mechanism or made all its procedures and guidelines publicly available. Instead, as noted
above, during interviews with key stakeholders, including farmers, farmer cooperatives, andnon-governmental organizations, a large majority of people had not heard of either the ESMS
or the grievance and redress mechanism. In addition, as described in the Methodology and theContacting COCOBOD text box above, COCOBOD declined to engage the authors during theirresearch and development of this report to discuss, among other things, whether the institution
has publicized the grievance and redress mechanism or made its procedures and guidelines
publicly available for relevant stakeholders. There is also no information about the grievanceand redress mechanism or the ESMS on the COCOBOD or Ministry of Food and Agriculture
websites.114 The complaint form is not available on the “Download Our Forms” webpage on
COCOBOD’s website or on the Ministry of Food and Agriculture’s website.115 There is also no
mention of the grievance and redress mechanism or the ESMS under the “Programs” menu tab
or on the “Social Responsibility” webpage on COCOBOD’s website.116
Given the lack of publicly available information about COCOBOD’s implementation of thegrievance and redress mechanism, it is unknown whether COCOBOD assists stakeholders whoface barriers to accessing or understanding the mechanism’s procedures or guidelines.

Ibid; “Home.” Ministry of Food & Agriculture, http://mofa.gov.gh/site/. Accessed 29 April 2021 [hereinafter Ministry of Food & Agriculture
Website].
115“Download Our Forms.” Ghana Cocoa Board, https://cocobod.gh/resources/forms. Accessed 18 Apr. 2021; Ministry of Food & Agriculture
Website, ibid.
116“Social Responsibility.” Ghana Cocoa Board, https://cocobod.gh/social-responsibility. Accessed 18 Apr. 2021.
114

43

The authors were also unable to confirm whether COCOBOD has ensured that all relevant
departments within the institution are aware of and involved in facilitating the use of thegrievance and redress mechanism. However, COCOBOD’s Cocoa Health and Extension
Division has conducted at least one training on the ESMS for its Extension Staff in a districtin the Volta Region, during which it appears the participants discussed the grievance andredress mechanism.117

3. Transparency and Predictability: Poor (33% / 3.3 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Transparency & Predictability(i) Publicly provide accurate and consistent information about themechanism’s overall performance, including financial reporting,information about the allocation of resources for implementation
activities, and qualitative and quantitative information on theredress procedure and outcomes;(ii) Ensure predictability of procedure by providing clear
guidelines for procedures with an indicative time frame,
clarity on types of processes and outcomes available, andmeans of monitoring implementation;(iii) Keep all parties to a grievance informed throughout
the process.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism fulfils one of three component criteria forTransparency and Predictability—component (ii).
The authors could not access any information—public or maintained by COCOBOD—about
the grievance and redress mechanism’s performance. They were unable to find any publicly
available records indicating whether a stakeholder has filed a grievance or COCOBOD has
provided redress. The ESMS report states that COCOBOD officers receiving complaints
should document them in a database or logbook, but the authors could not verify whether
this has occurred. Moreover, as noted above, the authors did not obtain any information
about the grievance and redress mechanism during in-depth interviews with farmers, farmer
cooperatives, lawyers, or non-governmental organizations. The interviewees were either
unaware of the mechanism or indicated that COCOBOD had not yet implemented it.
The ESMS report provides guidelines for the mechanism’s procedures with designatedtimeframes. The report indicates that COCOBOD will monitor the progress made in resolving
complaints, and it notes that the grievance redress team shall submit an “action plan” to the
Eshun, Francis Mike. “Cocobod Ched in Volta Region Organises Training for Extension Officers on Environmental and Social Management
Systems.” Modern Ghana, 29 Oct. 2020, https://www.modernghana.com/news/1039325/cocobod-ched-in-volta-region-organisestraining.html.
117

44

ESMS Manager. Finally, the report sets forth a variety of venues by which COCOBOD will
provide “feedback” on grievances submitted by stakeholders, including emails, phone calls,
face-to-face meetings, leaflets, the radio, rallies (durbars), and “farmer business schools.”
The ESMS report states that the Chairman of the ESMS grievance redress team “shall indicate
to the complainant whether the request is eligible” within five working days of receiving acomplaint. However, this is only the first step in the grievance and redress process. The report
does not establish or discuss any further requirements or measures to keep parties informed
during the rest of the process.

4. Legitimacy and Accountability: Moderate (50% / 5 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Legitimacy & Accountability(i)Ensure the exercise of sufficient economic and political leverageover non-complying parties;(ii) Hold the redress team accountable for fair conduct during theprocess;(iii) Ensure confidentiality and allow anonymity upon request to
protect complainants from retaliation;(iv) Allow all decisions to be subject to the review of a credible,
independent, external authority.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism fulfils two of four component criteria for
Legitimacy and Accountability — component (i) and (iii).
Given COCOBOD’s commanding position in Ghana’s cocoa sector, it appears that the grievance
redress teams possess sufficient political and economic leverage to ensure compliance among
responsible parties, especially at the higher Regional and National levels (see COCOBOD’s
Grievance Redress Teams’ Composition above). The COCOBOD Chief Executive and ESMSManager are members of the grievance redress team at the National level.
The ESMS report fails to establish procedures or safeguards to ensure fairness andaccountability for the grievance redress team during the complaint process. Notably, thereport provides no information about how the initial eligibility decision is made to determine
whether a complaint may move forward in the process. The report indicates that the
Chairman of the grievance redress team shall consult with the other team members at thatlevel to decide whether a complaint is eligible. However, the report does not provide any
information about the standards or protocols by which the team should make their decision.

45

The ESMS report does not mention confidentiality in direct relationship to the grievance andredress mechanism. However, the report asserts that confidentiality is a guiding principle of
the Stakeholder Engagement Plan that contains the mechanism. The Official Complaint Formalso provides an option to submit the complaint anonymously (see the Appendix).
Notwithstanding the involvement of some external stakeholders, such as Traditional Council
Representatives and the District and National Chief Cocoa Farmers, decisions from the grievance
redress teams are not subject to review by an independent, external authority. Instead, thegrievance redress team at each of the four levels includes one or more COCOBOD officials.

5. Monitoring and Evaluation: Poor (33% / 3.3 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Monitoring & Evaluation(i) Document grievances received and responses and redressprovided;(ii) Ensure coherent and consistent results, and address decisions
and other actions that are out of the ordinary;(iii) Establish follow-up procedures to review and evaluate outcomesproduced.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism fulfils one of three component criteria for
Monitoring and Evaluation—component (i).
The ESMS report indicates that a “receiving officer” shall register and document all complaints
received in a logbook or database so COCOBOD may monitor progress towards their resolution.
The report further establishes that the ESMS Committee shall submit to the ESMS Manager adetailed response and an action plan for all eligible complaints.
However, the grievance and redress mechanism does not contain standards, protocols, orprocedures to monitor and ensure consistency in its processes and decisions or to review andevaluate the outcomes it produces.

46

6. Inclusivity and Equitable Participation: Moderate (50% / 5 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Inclusivity & Equitable
Participation(i) Consult stakeholders while creating the mechanism;(ii) Ensure full participation of diverse and vulnerable groups, andrespect local culture and traditions;(iii) Involve stakeholders in finding collaborative solutions for theircomplaints through inclusive good-faith negotiations in an
atmosphere of mutual confidence;(iv) Ensure that aggrieved parties have adequate access to sourcesof information, advice, and expertise to engage in a grievanceprocess on fair, informed, and respectful terms;(v) Respect the role of complainants’ advisors and representatives.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism fulfils one of two component criteria for Inclusivity
and Equitable Participation for which information is available—component (ii). The authors did not
find sufficient information to evaluate components (iii), (iv), or (v).
The authors could not determine whether COCOBOD involved any stakeholders in creating
the grievance and redress mechanism. However, the ESMS report does not mention theirinvolvement, and none of the farmers or civil society members the authors interviewed forthis report was involved in developing the mechanism. Moreover, as noted above, COCOBOD
declined to engage the authors during the research and development of this report. As a result,the authors could not discuss with COCOBOD the apparent lack of stakeholder involvement in
the grievance and redress mechanism’s creation.
The grievance redress teams include representatives from the community, vulnerable groups,
and local and traditional leaders. For instance, at the Society level, the Chief of the community
or his representative, the Chief Farmer, a women’s representative, a leader from the Youth in
Cocoa Initiative, and an Assemblyman or Unit Committee Chairperson are members of thedecision-making committee.
Given the lack of information about the implementation of the grievance and redress
mechanism, it is unknown whether COCOBOD has involved stakeholders in finding
collaborative solutions for their complaints through inclusive good-faith negotiations in an
atmosphere of mutual confidence. It is also unknown whether aggrieved parties have accessto sources of information, advice, and expertise so they can engage in the grievance process on
fair, informed, and respectful terms. Lastly, it is unknown whether the officials facilitating thegrievance process respect the role of the complainants’ advisors and representatives.

477. Comprehensibility and Manageability: Moderate (33% / 3.3 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Comprehensibility &Manageability(i) Ensure that the mechanism is simple and easy to understandand recognizes the diverse needs of all stakeholders;(ii) Provide guidance and support to stakeholders to assist them inusing the mechanism to address grievances, especiallygrievances that involve international, cross-border stakeholders;(iii) Minimise stakeholders’ costs and burdens that are unnecessary
to ensure the mechanism is fair, easy to use, and timely.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism fulfils one of three component criteria forComprehensibility and Manageability—component (i).
Although there is a lack of information about how (or whether) COCOBOD has implemented
the grievance and redress mechanism, the ESMS report provides a process that is relatively
simple and understandable. The report establishes multiple ways to submit a complaint: inperson, by phone, by mail, and by email. The complaint form is uncomplicated, although it
appears that it is only available in English. The ESMS report also considers some of the needsof diverse stakeholders by requiring a diverse make-up of the grievance redress teams at eachof the four levels.
The ESMS report does not indicate whether COCOBOD will provide guidance or support tostakeholders to use the grievance and redress mechanism. Nor does it address complaints
involving international or cross-border stakeholders or grievances. The failure to consider
global concerns is a significant oversight, as Ghana’s cocoa industry involves foreign workers
and foreign multinationals as the ultimate purchasers of Ghanaian cocoa.
Although the ESMS report establishes a relatively simple, understandable grievance andredress mechanism, there is no indication of whether COCOBOD will minimize unnecessary
costs or burdens for stakeholders to ensure fairness, timeliness, and ease of use.

48

8. Scope and Flexibility: Poor (20% / 2 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Scope & Flexibility(i) Be open to a wide range of concerns and grievances;(ii) Be able to address multi-party and multi-issue complaints while
maintaining a narrow enough scope to address particular issues;(iii) Considers and addresses structural and systemic problems related
to recurring grievances;(iv) When serious complaints or grievances arise, put a process inplace for seeking to understand contributing factors, both internal(how the institution and its actions may have contributed) andexternal (factors beyond the control of the institution);(v) Maintain flexibility in both process and resolution by offering
alternatives in negotiation and providing options for parties tochoose the best alternative to negotiate an agreement.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism fulfils one of five component criteria for Scopeand Flexibility —component (i).
The grievance and redress mechanism appears to be open to a wide range of concerns. The
ESMS report states that the mechanism allows “affected individuals and communities
to raise environmental and social concerns related to the projects to be implemented by
COCOBOD.” While this suggests that the grievance and redress mechanism is also capable ofaddressing multi-party and multi-issue complaints, there is no specific mention of these kindsof complaints in the ESMS report. There is also no publicly available information regarding
multi-party or multi-issue complaints. There is also no clear indication that the mechanism
can address structural or systemic problems when multiple complaints raise the same kindsof issues. The grievance and redress mechanism also does not explicitly allow for separate
processes to understand internal and external contributing factors for serious grievances.
The ESMS report does not offer negotiation alternatives or allow parties to choose the best
option to negotiate an agreement using the grievance and redress mechanism. As noted above,
the report does state that COCOBOD shall provide feedback on grievances through multiple
channels, including face-to-face interactions, leaflets, the radio, and rallies (or durbars).
However, it appears that COCOBOD intends to use these forums to disseminate the decisions of
the grievance redress team—i.e., the outcomes of the process—rather than to provide options
for alternative dispute resolution.

49

9. Sustainability and Self-Improvement: Poor (25% / 2.5 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Sustainability & Self-Improvement(i) Design the mechanism according to local culture, traditions
and customary methods and/or local preferences for dispute
resolution;(ii) Continually identify lessons for improving the mechanism andensuring its sustainability;(iii) Establish standards and processes to ensure continuous learningfrom grievances to prevent future grievances and harms;(iv) Hire and train associates on grievance procedures and regularly
ensure the competencies of staff members in charge of
implementing the mechanism.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism fulfils one of four component criteria for
Sustainability and Self-Improvement—component (iv).
The grievance and redress mechanism does not appear to incorporate local culture, traditions,or customary methods. Nor does it consider local preferences for dispute resolution in its
design. Although COCOBOD includes representatives of the community and traditionaland customary leaders on the grievance redress teams, the design of the mechanism and its
processes do not integrate community customs or traditions.
The ESMS report does not include standards, protocols, or processes to ensure continuous
learning to improve and ensure the grievance and redress mechanism’s sustainability or learn
from and prevent future grievances and harm. COCOBOD has also not provided any publicly
available information on whether it has taken steps or implemented protocols to these ends.
The ESMS report does not address how COCOBOD will hire, train, or otherwise regularly
ensure its officials’ competency in implementing the grievance and redress mechanism.
However, as noted above, COCOBOD’s Cocoa Health and Extension Division has completed atleast one training on the ESMS for its Extension Staff in a district in the Volta Region, during
which it appears the grievance and redress mechanism was covered.118

118 Ibid.

50

10. Procedural Efficiency: Poor (0% / 0 points)
PEER Principle

Component Criteria

Procedural Efficiency(i) Create and comply with reporting requirements for all grievances
received and responses provided;(ii) Incorporate most common key stages of non-judicial grievancemechanisms: (1) receipt and registration of grievance; (2)acknowledgement, assessment, and assignment of grievance;(3) proposal of response; (4) agreement on response; (5)implementation of agreed response; (6) review and evaluation of
implementation; (7) closing out or referral of grievance;(iii) Ensure that officials and parties follow all procedures in a timely
manner.

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism does not fulfil the one component criteria for
Procedural Efficiency for which information is available. The authors did not find sufficient
information to evaluate components (i) or (iii).
Although the ESMS report does create reporting requirements for complaints received andresponses provided, there is no publicly available information about whether COCOBOD has
complied with these requirements. It is therefore unknown whether the grievance and redress
mechanism fulfils this component.
The grievance and redress mechanism only clearly incorporates the first two stages of the sevenmost common key stages of non-judicial grievance mechanisms. The grievance redress team is
not required to propose or ensure agreement with the response between the parties involved.
The ESMS report also fails to provide procedural stages for the review and evaluation of aresolution’s implementation or the closing out or referral of a complaint.
Given the lack of information on the implementation of the grievance and redress mechanism,
it is unknown whether COCOBOD officials and the parties involved follow all the establishedprocedures in a timely manner.

51

C. The PEER Principles Overall Evaluation and Score
PEER PRINCIPLES REPORT CARD:COCOBOD’s Grievance and Redress Mechanism
Principle

Evaluation / Score (100% / 100 points)

1

Human Rights Compatibility

Moderate 50% / 5 points

2

Accessibility & Awareness

Poor 33% / 3.3 points

3

Transparency & Predictability

Poor 33% / 3.3 points

4

Legitimacy & Accountability

Moderate 50% / 5 points

5

Monitoring & Evaluation

6

Inclusivity & Equitable Participation

Moderate 50% / 5 points

7

Comprehensibility & Manageability

Poor 33% / 3.3 points

8

Scope & Flexibility

Poor 20% / 2 points

9

Sustainability & Self-Improvement

Poor 25% / 2.5 points

10

Procedural Efficiency

Poor 0% / 0 points

Poor 33% / 3.3 points

OVERALL EVALUATION & SCORE

Poor 33% / 33 points

COCOBOD’s grievance and redress mechanism earns an overall evaluation and score of“Poor” with 33 points. The mechanism received a score of 0 for procedural efficiency; 2 points
for scope and flexibility; 2.5 points for sustainability and self-improvement; 3.3 points foraccessibility and awareness, transparency and predictability, monitoring and evaluation,and comprehensibility and manageability; and 5 points for human rights compatibility,
legitimacy and accountability, and inclusivity and equitable participation.
The PEER Principles’ overall evaluation of “Poor” highlights the need for COCOBOD to
immediately take steps to strengthen, enhance, and fully implement its grievance and redress
mechanism. Mere words on paper in a report are insufficient to meet the demands of theAfrican Development Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguards Requirement Standards
and provide stakeholders in Ghana an effective tool for redress. To start, COCOBOD must
act to publicise the grievance and redress mechanism so that it is well-known in cocoagrowing communities across Ghana. It must further ensure the mechanism is easy to access,understand, and use. This report’s recommendations (in the Recommendations section
above) set forth in greater detail the steps COCOBOD must take to ensure its grievance andredress mechanism provides effective and efficient redress for cocoa farmers, workers, andtheir communities.
52

VI. Conclusion
Ghana’s cocoa industry is a complex ecosystem with hundreds of thousands of cocoa
farmers, families, workers, and other stakeholders. Like any large industry—especially
one heavily dependent on powerful multinational corporations—individuals andorganizations at the producer end of the supply chain often have legitimate grievances
but few avenues for redress. Moreover, COCOBOD’s commanding role in Ghana’s
cocoa sector comes with an equally demanding duty to protect the environment andpromote the human rights and welfare of people living and working in cocoa-growing
communities. COCOBOD’s Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) andgrievance and redress mechanism, created as conditions to receiving a USD 600 million
loan in 2019, present it with a unique opportunity to address this crucial gap and begin
fulfilling its promise to cocoa-growing communities.
To date, however, these promises remain unrealised. The persistence ofpoverty, child labour, and environmental degradation in Ghana’s cocoa-growing
communities demonstrate this in vivid detail. COCOBOD must seize thisopportunity to strengthen, enhance, and fully implement the ESMS and grievanceand redress mechanism in line with this report’s recommendations to protect
the environment and promote the human rights and welfare of people living andworking in Ghana’s cocoa-growing communities.

53

Appendix
THE PEER PRINCIPLES—PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE AND
EFFICIENT REDRESSPEER Principle

Component Criteria

1. Human Rights Compatibility(i) Comprehensively address human rights issues, especially issues
that prompted the grievance mechanism’s formation;(ii) Ensure processes, outcomes, and remedies accord withinternationally recognized human rights standards.

2. Accessibility & Awareness(i) Publicise the grievance mechanism and take appropriate steps toensure stakeholders who might be impacted are aware of it;(ii) Make all procedures and guidelines necessary for utilizing themechanism publicly available and accessible to stakeholders;(iii) Assist all stakeholders who may face barriers to accessing or
understanding the procedures or guidelines;(iv) Ensure all relevant departments within the governing institution
are aware of the mechanism and are actively involved in
facilitating its use by stakeholders.

3. Transparency & Predictability(i) Publicly provide accurate and consistent information about themechanism’s overall performance, including financial reporting,information about the allocation of resources for implementation
activities, and qualitative and quantitative information on theredress procedure and outcomes;(ii) Ensure predictability of procedure by providing clear guidelines
for procedures with an indicative time frame, clarity on typesof processes and outcomes available, and means of monitoring
implementation.
(iii) Keep all parties to a grievance informed throughout the process.

4. Legitimacy & Accountability(i) Ensure the exercise of sufficient economic and political leverageover non-complying parties;(ii) Hold the redress team accountable for fair conduct during theprocess;(iii) Ensure confidentiality and allow anonymity upon request to
protect complainants from retaliation;(iv) Allow all decisions to be subject to the review of a credible,
independent, external authority.

54

5. Monitoring & Evaluation(i) Document grievances received and responses and redressprovided;(ii) Ensure coherent and consistent results, and address decisions
and other actions that are out of the ordinary;(iii) Establish follow-up procedures to review and evaluate outcomesproduced.

6. Inclusivity & Equitable
Participation(i) Consult stakeholders while creating the mechanism;(ii) Ensure full participation of diverse and vulnerable groups, andrespect local culture and traditions;(iii) Involve stakeholders in finding collaborative solutions for theircomplaints through inclusive good-faith negotiations in an
atmosphere of mutual confidence;(iv) Ensure that aggrieved parties have adequate access to sourcesof information, advice, and expertise to engage in a grievanceprocess on fair, informed, and respectful terms;(v) Respect the role of complainants’ advisors and representatives.

7. Comprehensibility &Manageability(i) Ensure that the mechanism is simple and easy to understand andrecognizes the diverse needs of all stakeholders;(ii) Provide guidance and support to stakeholders to assist them inusing the mechanism to address grievances, especially grievancesthat involve international, cross-border stakeholders;(iii) Minimise stakeholders’ costs and burdens that are unnecessary toensure the mechanism is fair, easy to use, and timely.

8. Scope & Flexibility(i) Be open to a wide range of concerns and grievances;(ii) Be able to address multi-party and multi-issue complaints while
maintaining a narrow enough scope to address particular issues;(iii) Considers and addresses structural and systemic problems
related to recurring grievances;(iv) When serious complaints or grievances arise, put a process inplace for seeking to understand contributing factors, both internal(how the institution and its actions may have contributed) andexternal (factors beyond the control of the institution);(v) Maintain flexibility in both process and resolution by offering
alternatives in negotiation and providing
options for parties to choose the best alternative to negotiate anagreement.

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9. Sustainability &Self-Improvement(i) Design the mechanism according to local culture, traditions
and customary methods and/or local preferences for dispute
resolution;(ii) Continually identify lessons for improving themechanism and ensuring its sustainability;(iii) Establish standards and processes to ensure continuous learningfrom grievances to prevent future grievances and harms;(iv) Hire and train associates on grievance procedures and regularly
ensure the competencies of staff members in charge of
implementing the mechanism.

10. Procedural Efficiency(i) Create and comply with reporting requirements for all grievances
received and responses provided;(ii) Incorporate most common key stages of non-judicial grievancemechanisms: (1) receipt and registration of grievance; (2)acknowledgement, assessment, and assignment of grievance;(3) proposal of response; (4) agreement on response; (5)implementation of agreed response; (6) review and evaluation of
implementation; (7) closing out or referral of grievance;(iii) Ensure that officials and parties follow all procedures in a timely
manner.

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GRIEVANCE AND REDRESS MECHANISM COMPLAINT FORM

GHANA COCOA BOARD

OFFICIAL COMPLAINT FORM
Date/Time
Location

Date:

Location:Time:
Detailsof Name:Complainant:Age:Complaint
anonymous

Alternative
contact/shouldVillage/town:
I nominate the under listed to make the complaint on my behalf:Contact
Method:Telephone/ mobile number:
Email Address:
Postal Address:
Personal interaction:

Residential
Location:

Please describe the physical location of your current residence:

Attached
Documents:

Please indicate any attaching documents to your complaint if any:Complaint:

Signature:57

beIN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS QUESTIONNAIRES
Cocoa Farmers
1. Name, title, department, and duties:		a. Please tell us briefly about your background in the industry and describe		the nature of your work.

2. Role in Ghana’s cocoa industry:		a. Please tell us about the kind of work you do as a cocoa farmer.

				b. Who do you work with, what kinds of organizations and people,				

to make a living as a farmer?

c. Could you please tell us about the nature of land ownership among				What do your day-to-day operations look like?

cocoa farmers in Ghana?

d. Overall, what challenges do you face as a farmer within the Ghanaian

		cocoa sector?

3. Poverty, human trafficking, and child/forced labour:		a. As a farmer, do you see problems with poverty, human trafficking,				or dangerous child labour in the Ghanaian cocoa industry?

b. Based on your experience, what do you believe are the primary causes		

of these issues?

4. Relationship with COCOBOD:		a. Do you work with COCOBOD? If so, what kind of relationship do you		have, and which COCOBOD officials do you interact with?

		

b. What is your general impression of COCOBOD as an organization?

		c. Overall, what role does COCOBOD play in promoting farmer welfare		and addressing human rights issues?

5. African Development Bank and Bank Loan:		a. Are you aware of the AfDB $600 million loan initially approved to				

COCOBOD in November 2019? If so, what have you heard about it?

b. Do you feel there has been a lack of transparency around the COCOBOD		

AfDB loan process? What have you observed?

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6. COCOBOD’s ESMS and GRM:
		a. COCOBOD has designed an Environmental and Social Management

		

System as part of the AfDB loan requirements. Are you aware of the		ESMS or its grievance and redress mechanism? If so, what is your		

impression about whether it will be effective?

		b. Have you heard about or been a part of any forums or durbars with		

COCOBOD and other farmers to discuss environmental and social		issues? If so, please tell us about your experience.

7. Complaints and other redress mechanisms:
		a. What do you do if you have a grievance or complaint related to your		

work as a farmer? Where do you take these complaints, and what		happens?
		

b. Are you aware, more generally, of a system in the cocoa industry by		

which farmers can submit complaints or grievances related to things		such as income and earnings? If so, what is it like? If not, how are these		

issues generally dealt with?

		

c. What would an ideal grievance and redress mechanism look like for		farmers in the cocoa sector?

8. Concluding questions:		a. Do you know of any other cocoa farmers that you can put us in touch with?

		

b. Is there anything else you’d like us to know for our research?

COCOBOD Departments and Subsidiaries
1. Name, title, department, and duties:		a. Please tell us your name, title, and department, and briefly describe your				

duties and the nature of the work you performb. How long have you been working there, and how long have you been		working in the cocoa industry, more generally?

2. Poverty, human trafficking, and child/forced labour:		a. How familiar are you with the issues of poverty, human trafficking, and				child/forced labour in the Ghanaian cocoa sector?

b. Based on your experience, what do you believe are the primary causes of		these issues?

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c. What does COCOBOD consider the biggest challenge to stopping child		labour?
3. Relationship with COCOBOD and institutional structure:		

a. Can you please explain the relationship between your subsidiary and		COCOBOD?
		

b. More generally, to what extent does a subsidiary of COCOBOD operate		

independently from the board and from the other subsidiaries?

		[Subsidiaries: the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC), the Seed Production

		Division (SPD), the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG), the Cocoa		

Health and Extension Division (CEHD), and the Quality Control

		Company (QCC)]		

c. How are COCOBOD Board Members nominated and appointed, and are				

they full-time employees?

d. How are the Board Members’ salaries determined, and do they receive		yearly bonuses?

4. COCOBOD’s role in Ghana’s cocoa industry:		a. Does COCOBOD consider its obligations to cocoa farmers as any different				from a business’s obligations to its consumers?

b. What does COCOBOD consider the biggest challenge to increasing		

income for cocoa farmers, and what role, if any, do you believe CMC Ltd		UK plays?

				

i. In particular, COCOBOD considers (1) the world market price				

of cocoa, (2) input from cocoa farmers, and (3) direction from				

the Ministry of Finance to determine the “farmgate” price of				

cocoa to be paid directly to farmers.

		c. How are these considerations weighed and prioritized-does COCOBOD

		

communicate with any other organizations, such as Licensed Buying		Companies or IFIs, when determining the price for cocoa?

5. Relationship with purchasers and IFI’s:		

a. Does COCOBOD ever have disagreements between itself and foreign		purchasers of cocoa, like Cargill, or between itself and international		

financial institutions (IFIs)? If so, how does COCOBOD handle such		disagreements?

60

6. African Development Bank and Bank Loan:		a. Are you aware of the AfDB $600 million loan initially approved to 						

b. Do you feel there has been sufficient transparency around the AfDB loan				

COCOBOD in November 2019? If so, what have you heard about it?
process? What have you observed?

c. Do you know what projects will be supported by this loan?

7. COCOBOD’s ESMS:		

a. COCOBOD has designed an Environmental and Social Management

		

System as part of the AfDB loan requirements. Are you aware of the		ESMS or its grievance and redress mechanism? If so, what is your		

impression as to whether they have been implemented and are effective?

		b. More generally, how does COCOBOD receive and address complaints or		grievances from stakeholders, including farmers?

8. Complaints and remedial measures:		a. Are you aware of a system by which people can submit complaints or		grievances related to the cocoa industry? If so, what is it like? If not, how		are these issues generally dealt with?

		

b. What would an ideal grievance and redress mechanism look like for		farmers, CSOs, and other stakeholders in the cocoa sector?

9. Concluding questions:		a. Moving forward, do you know of any other groups or individuals that we		should speak with to gain insight into Ghana’s cocoa industry and the		effectiveness of COCOBOD’s grievance mechanism?

		b. Is there anything else you would like us to know for our research?

International Finance Institutions
1. Name, title, department, and duties:		a. Please tell us your name, title, and department, and briefly describe your				

duties and the nature of the work you perform.

b. How long have you been working for this particular IFI? How long have		you been working in the cocoa industry, generally?

61

2. Role in Ghana’s cocoa industry:		a. Please tell us about the work you do in the Ghanaian cocoa industry. What				

do your day-to-day operations look like?

b. Aside from COCOBOD, what groups do you primarily work with? What		

stakeholders in the cocoa industry do you represent?

		c. What types of projects have you implemented within the community?

		d. How is your organization funded? What kinds of payments do you accept				and from whom?

e. What kinds of projects does your IFI fund? Do you attach any		requirements to such funding?

		

f. How do you raise capital from investors?

		g. What types of investors typically contribute funds to your IFI?

		

h. Overall, what challenges do you face in addressing the needs of your		

partners within the cocoa industry?

3. African Development Bank and Bank Loan:		a. Are you aware of the application process to receive funding from the		AfDB?
		b. Are you aware of the particular $600 million loan approved to COCOBOD

		in November 2019?

		

c. Do you know what projects will be supported by this loan?

		d. Have you heard of other organizations in Ghana developing an ESMS				e. Do you feel that COCOBOD has been transparent in its allocation of				

guide to receive such loans from the AfDB?
funding from the loan? Why or why not?

f. Have you heard anything regarding COCOBOD’s compliance with the		loan requirements?

4. Relationship with COCOBOD:		a. Does your organization have a connection to COCOBOD? If so, what is the				b. How often do you interact with COCOBOD officials throughout your				

nature of its relationship with COCOBOD?
day-to-day operations?

c. What is your general impression of COCOBOD as an organization?

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5. Evaluation of COCOBOD’s GRM:
		a. Are you aware of the existence of COCOBOD’s grievance mechanism?

		b. Do you believe COCOBOD’s grievance mechanism meets the needs of the				

community you serve? Why or why not?

c. What services do you believe are needed to better meet the community’s		grievances?
		d. Have you noticed a difference in the number of complaints received or the				assessment of such complaints within the past two years?

e. Have you noticed a difference in the cocoa industry overall during this		

two-year timeframe?

6. Poverty, human trafficking, and child/forced labour:		a. How familiar are you with the issues of poverty, human trafficking, and				b. Based on your experience, what do you believe are the primary causes of				these issues?

c. Does your organization work on addressing these issues at all?

				child/forced labour in the Ghanaian cocoa sector?

Please explain.

d. Do you believe COCOBOD is impacting these issues? If so, would you		consider their impact to be positive or negative?

7. Complaints and remedial measures:		a. Is there a system by which individuals can submit complaints or		grievances related to the cocoa industry? If not, how are these issues

		

generally addressed?

		b. What kinds of redress and remedies are available to community				members, specifically cocoa farmers, through this system?

c. Have you received any complaints from cocoa farmers about a lack of		redress from COCOBOD? If so, please explain the content of the		complaint and how it was resolved.

		d. If there is a grievance among those you represent within the cocoa sector,		does your organization have internal or external processes for addressing		

the grievance?

		e. What challenges does your organization face in addressing stakeholders’		grievances?

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8. Concluding questions:		a. Moving forward, do you know of any other groups or individuals that we		should meet with to gain insight into Ghana’s cocoa industry and the		effectiveness of COCOBOD’s grievance mechanism?

		b. Is there anything else you would like us to know for our research?

Non-Governmental Organizations and Other Stakeholders
1. Name, title, department, and duties:		a. Please tell us your title and briefly describe the nature of your work at		your organization.

2. Role in Ghana’s cocoa industry:		a. Please tell us about the work you do in the Ghanaian cocoa sector. What				

do your day-to-day operations look like?

b. Please tell us about the kinds of stakeholders you work within the cocoa

		sector.
		c. Overall, what challenges do you face in addressing the needs of farmers

		and your partners within the cocoa sector?

3. Poverty, human trafficking, and child/forced labour:		a. How familiar are you with the issues of poverty, human trafficking, and				child/forced labour in the Ghanaian cocoa sector?

b. Based on your experience, what do you believe are the primary causes of		these issues?

c. Does your organization work on addressing these issues at all?
		

Please explain.

4. Relationship with COCOBOD:
a. What is the nature of your organization’s relationship with COCOBOD?
b. How often do you interact with COCOBOD officials through your work?
c. What is your general impression of COCOBOD as an organization, and		

where do you receive information about COCOBOD’s work?

d. In particular, what role does COCOBOD play in promoting farmer welfare		and addressing human rights issues?

64

5. African Development Bank and Bank Loan:a. Are you aware of the AfDB $600 million loan initially approved to		

COCOBOD in November 2019? If so, what have you heard about it?

b. Do you feel there has been a lack of transparency around the COCOBOD		

AfDB loan process? What have you observed?

6. COCOBOD’s ESMS and GRM:
a. COCOBOD has designed an Environmental and Social Management
		

System as part of the AfDB loan requirements. Are you aware of the ESMS		or its grievance and redress mechanism? If so, what is your impression as		to whether it has been fully implemented and will be effective?

b. Our research has revealed that other public institutions or non		governmental organizations have implemented similar ESMS programs		to secure development funding. Do you have a sense of whether these		kinds of initiatives have been successful?

7. Complaints and other redress mechanisms:
a. Does your organization receive complaints or concerns from cocoa
		farmers? If so, how are they received and addressed?

b. Are you aware of a system by which people can submit complaints or		grievances related to the cocoa industry? If so, what is it like. If not, how		are these issues generally dealt with?

c. What would an ideal grievance and redress mechanism look like for		farmers, CSOs, and other stakeholders in the cocoa sector?

8. Concluding questions:a. Moving forward, do you know of any other groups or individuals that we		should speak with to gain insight into Ghana’s cocoa industry and the		effectiveness of COCOBOD’s grievance mechanism?

b. Is there anything else you would like us to know for our research?

65

COCOBOD’s Unrealised Potential
Promoting Human Rights, Welfare, and the Environment
in Ghana’s Cocoa-Growing Communities
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Center for International Human Rights
University of Ghana School of Law
Corporate Accountability Lab
SEND Ghana
Barima Akwasi Amankwaah
Glen Asomaning

June 2021