The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

in cooperation with the Vienna Circle Society,with the support of the Federal Government of Lower Austria, section Science and Research,and the municipalities of Kirchberg, Otterthal, and Trattenbach,are pleased to present the44th International Wittgenstein Symposium
August 6 –12, 2023

100 YEARSTRACTATUS
Organised by
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter (Vienna), Alois Pichler (Bergen)and Friedrich Stadler (Vienna)

44. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium
Kirchberg am Wechsel 2023

BEITRÄGE
CONTRIBUTIONS

44

100 JAHRE TRACTATUS
		100 YEARS TRACTATUS

Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft
			Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein SocietyBand XXIX
Volume XXIX

2

100 JAHRE TRACTATUS
Beiträge des 44. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums
6. – 12. August 2023
Kirchberg am WechselBand XXIX

Herausgeber
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter
Alois Pichler
Friedrich Stadler
in Zusammenarbeit mit Joseph Wang-Kathrein
Hinweis: Alle Beiträge in diesem Band wurden ausgewählt und begutachtet, aber nicht redigiert.
Etwaige formale Fehler liegen daher in der alleinigen Verantwortung der Autorinnen und Autoren.

Produziert mit Unterstützung der Abteilung
Wissenschaft und Forschung (K3)
des Amtes der NÖ Landesregierung

Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2023Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft

3100 YEARS TRACTATUS
Contributions of the 44th International Wittgenstein Symposium
August 6 – 12, 2023
Kirchberg am Wechsel

Volume XXIX

Editors
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter
Alois Pichler
Friedrich Stadlerin cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein
Disclaimer: All contributions in this volume have been selected and peer-reviewed, but not copy-edited.
Any formal errors are therefore the sole responsibility of their authors.

Produced with the support of the
Department for Science and Research (K3)of the Province of Lower Austria

Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2023
Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

4Verleger | PublisherÖsterreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft
Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am WechselÖsterreich/Austria
www.alws.at
Vorstand der ÖLWG | Executive Committee of the ALWS
Christian Kanzian (Präsident der ÖLWG)Elisabeth Nemeth (Vizepräsidentin der ÖLWG)Peter Kampits (Vizepräsident der ÖLWG)David Wagner (Geschäftsführer der ÖLWG)Marian David
Elisabeth Ehrenhöfer
Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau
Josef Mitterer
Volker Munz
Alois Pichler
Klaus Puhl
Friedrich Stadler
Paul Weingartner

ISSN 1022-3398 | ISBN 978-3-9505512-1-1Refereed Periodical
All Rights Reserved
Copyright 2023 by the Authors
Copyright will remain with the author, rights to use with the society. No par t of the material may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronically or mechanically, including photocopying,recording, informational storage, and retrieval systems without permission from the society.
Die Redaktion dankt allen Gutachtern für ihre äußerst hilfreichen Rezensionen.
The editors are grateful to all referees for their most helpful reviews.
Die Beiträge und das Abstracts-Heft wurden mit Unterstützung einer von Joseph Wang-Kathrein,
Universität Innsbruck, erarbeiteten Datenbank erstellt. Kontakt: joseph.wang@uibk.ac.at
The Contributions and the booklet of Abstracts were compiled with the support of a database developed
by Joseph Wang-Kathrein, University of Innsbruck. Contact: joseph.wang@uibk.ac.at

5Inhalt / Contents
Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einerBergsonisierung
Pavel Arazim

10

Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable
Dissonance in Interpretations within Wittgensteinian Scholarship
Ulrich Arnswald
On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions
Sorin Bangu
On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Lorenzo Barba

20
29
37

Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial andAustere Readings
Marian Baukrowitz

45

The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on
Wittgenstein
Beatrice Beccari

52

The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—
Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel
Alexander Berg
Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess
Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez
Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity
Edgar C. Boedeker

61
70
82

Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the“Fabulating Function”
René J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez
A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751
David Chandler
Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance?
Yi-Ping Chiu
A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus
Wouter Adriaan Cohen

93
104
111
119

The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in
Wittgenstein's Blue Book
Enzo De Pellegrin

129

5

Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus
Paolo Degiorgi

136

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als
angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus
Hanno Depner
The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus
Dušan Dožudić

145
155

Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New
Interpretation
Joshua Eisenthal

165

Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner
Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus
Cornelia Eșianu
Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität
August Fenk
Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik
Lilli Förster
The Quest for Simple Objects
Ralf Funke
Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality
Francesco Gandellini
Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus
Daniele Garancini
Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein
Manuel Gerether
The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus
Jakub Gomułka
Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach
Isabel Grábalos Palomino

173
182
192
201
209
217
226
235
243

Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus
Aesthetics
Eran Guter

252“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s
Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein
Thomas Hainscho
Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen UntersuchungenAndreas Hämmerle

6

260
269

Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics
David Hommen

279

Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition ofPhilosophy
Reza Hosseini
Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity
Christopher Hoyt
Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive
Urszula Idziak
Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox
Andrej Jandrić
Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein
Kristina Jaspers
Nonsense and Human History
Oscar Joffe“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein
Amadeusz Just

288
295
303
315
322
331
339

Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s
Theory of Analysis and Synthesis
Janusz Kaczmarek
Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein
Ulrike Kadi

348
360

Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern
und der aktuellen Ontologie
Christian Kanzian
Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“Peter Keicher
Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman
André Kfouri
Wittgenstein in the Public DomainMichele Lavazza
Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax
Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau
Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus
Montgomery Link

369
379
390
398
408
416

7

World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation(2.04-2.063)
Filippo Mosca

423

Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus
zeigenAloisia Moser
Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees
Martin Ohmacht
Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein
Luca Oliva
The Tractatus in Buchenwald
David Palme
The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein
Ratikanta Panda

432
441
451
461
468

„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus
Moritz René Pretzsch

476

Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite
Number of Atomic Propositions
Adam Roman & Jakub Gomułka

485

Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus.
Pascale Roure
Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s PsychologismInês Salgueiro

491
502

Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark
ChamberPriyambada Sarkar
The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362
Edoardo Sartore

511
519

Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About Kierkegaard's or(Wittgenstein's) Writings
Franz Schörkhuber
Deep Jokes
Mira Magdalena Sickinger
Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations
Kim Solin

8

528
536
545

Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und
UntersuchungenLine Soryano
Wittgenstein’s Picture
Ioannis Spiliopoulos
Of Pictures and Trivialities
Tue Trinh

553
565
572

The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not theCase
Jasmin Trächtler
The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein
Timur Uçan
The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Miroslav Vacura

581
589
598

“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Elena Valeri
Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus
Maria Venieri

606
613

Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the
Lecture on Ethics
Vincent Vincke
Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62
Christian Helmut Wenzel
A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion
Peter K. Westergaard
Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering
Wei Zeng

622
631
639
647

9

Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung | Pavel Arazim

Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einerBergsonisierung
Pavel Arazim (Prague, Czech Republic)
Abstract
Henri Bergson mag auf den ersten Blick als eine ideale Zielscheibe der Kritik Wittgensteinserscheinen. Seine poetischmystische Ausdrucksweise scheint eher Nebel und künstliche
Probleme zu erzeugen, als die Klarheit und übersichtliche Darstellung, welche Wittgensteinanstrebt. Jedoch beruht diese Einschätzung eher auf Vorurteilen, welche vor allem Russellüber Bergson verbreitet hat und welche ihre unheilvolle Kraft bisher nicht eingebüßt haben.
Tatsächlich aber strebt Bergson eine spezifische Art der Klarheit an. Indem er die Zeit undBewegung philosophisch zu klären versucht, bemüht er sich genau wie Wittgenstein um die
Auflösung der Fragen, welche von einer sprachlichen Verwirrung stammen. Und obwohl er
mit seiner Betonung der dynamischen Aspekte der Realität für Wittgenstein etwas zu radikaloder thesenhaft sein mag, lässt sich auch diese Betonung sehr wohl mit einigen der zentralen
Anliegen Wittgensteins vereinigen. Es ist also durchaus von Interesse, die zwei Autoren in
Dialog treten zu lassen, weil dadurch beide besser verstanden werden können.

Obwohl Wittgenstein bereits mit vielen Philosophen, auch weit außerhalb der
analytischen Tradition, verglichen wurde, scheint Bergson nicht sehr viel
Aufmerksamkeit der Wittgenstein Forscher auf sich zu ziehen. Auf den ersten
Blick mag das kein Wunder sein. Bergson scheint ja viel davon zu
repräsentieren, wogegen Wittgenstein in der Philosophie leidenschaftlichkämpfte. Bergson wird als Philosoph der vagen Unklarheit gesehen, welcheder von Wittgenstein beschworenen übersichtlichen Darstellung
engegengesetzt ist. Auch scheint Bergson oft auf der Suche nach verborgenen
Tiefen zu sein, welche Wittgenstein wiederholt als unsinnig zu demaskieren
trachtet. So redet Bergson gerne bereits im Essai aus dem Jahre 1889 (Bergson
1994, S. 97) vom Le moi profond, also vom tiefen Ich, welches er mit dem
oberflächlichen, gesellschaftlich funktionierenden Ich kontrastiert. Auch will
Bergson sehr oft durch genauere phänomenologische Beobachtung das
erfassen, was uns üblicherweise entgeht. Man könnte weitere Gründe
anhäufen, warum Wittgenstein und Bergson wenig mit einander zu tun haben(sollten). Trotzdem bemühe ich mich zu zeigen, dass die zwei Autoren inwichtigen Hinsichten viel gemeinsam haben. Und vor allem, dass es für die
Lektüre und Interpretation von beiden durchaus lehrreich sein könnte, siemiteinander in Dialog treten zu lassen. Die Ansicht von Bergson als einem
allzu mystischen Autor beruht letztendlich vor allem auf einer ablehnenden
Interpretation von Bertrand Russell in (Russell 1912). Ein Vergleich mit

10

Pavel Arazim, "Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung | Pavel Arazim

Wittgenstein öffnet hingegen den Pfad zu einer fruchtbareren Bewertungdieses nach wie vor faszinierenden französischen Philosophen.

1. Wie der Kerngedanke Bergsons in Wittgenstein sein Echo findet

In erster Annäherung kann man Bergson als einen Philosophen der Dynamik
und Bewegung bezeichnen. Und das in doppeltem Sinne. Zum einen ist für ihn
die Bewegung viel wichtiger und präsenter als man üblicherweise annimmt.
Zum anderen wird das Phänomen der Bewegung normalerweise laut Bergson
schlecht verstanden und deswegen muss ihm besondere Aufmerksamkeit
gewidmet werden.
Fangen wir mit dem zweiten Punkt an. Bergsons Hauptthese besagt, dass man
die Zeit nicht auf den Raum reduzieren kann. Bereits im Vorwort zum Essai
spricht Bergson von der Notwendigkeit, die „Vermengung der Dauer mit derAusdehnung“ zu überwinden, (Bergson 1994, S. 7). Die Zeit ist also ein
selbstständiges Phänomen. Und die Bewegung lässt sich ohne Zeit nicht
denken. Wenn wir nun die Bewegung unter der nach Bergson unechten
Perspektive betrachten, welche in der Zeit nur eine weitere Dimension desRaumes sieht, so scheint sie uns auf ihre Phasen reduzierbar, wie er in seiner
Analyse darlegt (vlg. Bergson 1994, S. 84-91). Wenn sich ein Gegenstand vom
Punkte A zum Punkte B bewegt, so kommt man schnell zu dem Schluss, dass ersich durch den Punkt C, welcher genau in der Mitte der Strecke liegt, bewegenmuss. Oder besser gesagt, es gibt einen Augenblick, wo der Gegenstand genau
auf diesem Punkt steht. Jedoch ist eine solche Betrachtung, nach Bergson,
wesentlich falsch. Vor allem wird dadurch die Bewegung weggedacht, indem
sie auf ihre Phasen reduziert wird. Wenn man also die Zeit auf den Raumreduziert, so reduziert man auch die Bewegung auf die räumlichen Orte,welche sie durchläuft. Die unechte, reduktionistische Perspektive sieht dann inder Bewegung eigentlich nur die Folge der durchgegangenen Punkte, welche
durch vier Zeit-Raum Koordinaten charakterisiert sind. Dabei vergisst man,dass wir es „mit keiner Sache, sondern mit einem Fortschritt“ (Bergson 1889, S.
84-5) zu tun haben.
Eine überraschend analoge Betrachtung kann man in der Philosophischen
Grammatik finden (vlg.Wittgenstein 1969, S. 253). Dort redet Wittgensteindarüber, wie eine Tangente t1 eines Kreises allmählich in eine andere

Pavel Arazim, "Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

11

Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung | Pavel Arazim

Tangente t2 übergeht. Es ist nun natürlich zu erwarten, dass die Tangente
irgendwann mit der genau in der Mitte zwischen t1 und t2 liegenden Tangentet zusammenfallen muss. Jedoch, bemerkt Wittgenstein, dieser Schluss entbehrt
jeder Rechtfertigung. Es ist nur ein philosophisches Vorurteil, welches uns zu
der Behauptung verleitet, dass irgendwann so ein Moment kommen muss.
Vielmehr entstehen durch diese Vorurteile über Zeit und Bewegung lautBergson Zenos Paradoxien. Hier würde Wittgenstein wohl zustimmen und in
Bergson einen Verbündeten sehen, der gegen das Aufkommen artifizieller
philosophischer Fragen spricht.
Und tatsächlich redet Bergson über die artifiziellen philosophischen Probleme.
Zwar behauptet Bergson nicht im Einklang mit Wittgenstein, dass allephilosophischen Fragen auf Missverständnissen beruhen, dennoch glaubt er,
sehr im Geiste Wittgensteins und der logischen Positivisten, dass viele
philosophischen Fragen falsch gestellt und demnach questions mal posées sind.
So soll etwa das Problem der Möglichkeit der menschlichen Freiheit nacheiner eingehenden philosophischen Klärung „selbst verschwinden“ (Bergson
1994, S.7). In Bezug auf viele prominenten philosophischen Fragen, wie die der
Freiheit oder der Paradoxien Zenons, glaubt Bergson im Einklang mit
Wittgenstein, dass eine gute Philosophie dann nicht nach den bestmöglichen
Antworten suchen soll. Vielmehr zeigt solche Philosophie, warum solche
Fragen eigentlich Scheinfragen sind und durch welche Verwirrung sie
entstehen konnten. (Deleuze 1966) sieht die Aufdeckung der falsch gestellten
Fragen als eines der Hauptanliegen Bergsons.

2. Bewegung fast omnipräsent

Bergson ist außerdem überzeugt, dass die Bewegung viel häufiger anzutreffen
ist, als man üblicherweise glauben würde. Besonders prägnant drückt er das
in einer Passage über den Fluss des Bewusstseins aus, in welcher er auch das
Bleiben in demselben Zustande als eine verkappte Bewegung sieht (vgl.
Bergson 1907, S. 7). Diese Sicht mag für Wittgenstein bereits allzu theoretischund verallgemeinernd sein, aber trotzdem, wie ich noch zu zeigen versuche,
könnte er ihr viel abgewinnen.
Es lässt sich eine Analyse Wittgensteins vorstellen, nach welcher Bergson
letzten Endes die Bedeutung des Wortes Bewegung verdreht. Vielleicht ließe

12Pavel Arazim, "Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung | Pavel Arazimsich dadurch ein analytisches Korrektiv zu Bergson erarbeiten, der seinem
Werke mehr als Russells rasche Abwertung gerecht werden könnte. Das heißt,
eine sprachkritische Bewertung im Sinne Wittgensteins könnte zeigen, dassBergson das Wort Bewegung und andere mit ihm zusammenhängende allzu
frei verwendet und dadurch seiner, beziehungsweise ihrer Bedeutung
beraubt. Wenn wir das jetzt aber dahingestellt lassen, können wir doch auchin dieser Hinsicht wichtige Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Wittgenstein undBergson finden.
Bergson bietet im Allgemeinen eine Perspektive an, welche die Dinge eher als
kontinuierlich und einander durchdringend sieht, denn als getrennt undpräzise konstruiert. Obwohl er damit wieder für Wittgensteins Geschmack
etwas zu weit gehen mag, sieht man eben solche Motive auch bei Wittgenstein.
Diese lassen sich klarer sehen, wenn wir die Begriffe Spiel, Sprachspiel und
Familienähnlichkeit mehr in Fokus rücken.
In einem Aufsatz über den Begriff des Spiels bei Wittgenstein (Lauer 2014, S.
230) wird das Spiel in den Zusammenhang mit einer Bewegung, und zwar mit
einer unvorhersehbaren und schillernder Bewegung der Wellen gebracht.
Diese Auffassung vom Spiel geht bereits auf Gadamer zurück (vgl. Gadamer
1990, S. 109). Wenn Wittgenstein viele philosophische Fragen als
grammatische Konfusionen zu enttarnen versucht, so lässt er uns die
besprochene Thematik aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln betrachten, um
uns von der Kraft irreführender Analogien zu befreien. Damit führt
Wittgenstein seine Leser zu einem mehr spielerischen Blick auf die eigene
Erfahrung. Dieser Blick ist, wenn wir der Auffassung Lauers folgen, hiermit
auch dynamisch oder zumindest dynamischer als üblich. Das besprochene
Phänomen, und hier zeigt sich eine Verwandtschaft mit Bergson, wird dannselbst als eher dynamisch und lebendig statt als stabil und starr gezeigt.
So bespricht Wittgenstein im Blauen Buch (vgl. Wittgenstein 1984, S.42) worin
es besteht, dass ich einen Freund zwischen 16:00 und 16:30 zu Besuch erwarte.
Wittgenstein lässt uns unterschiedliche Charakteristika erwägen, diemanchmal als das Wichtigste, ja als das Wesen des Erwartens selbst,
erscheinen, die aber in anderen Kontexten ganz an Bedeutung verlieren.
Manchmal scheint das Erwarten darin zu bestehen, dass ich aufgeregt bin,vielleicht schaue ich auf die Uhr, vielleicht koche ich einen Kaffee. Alle diesePavel Arazim, "Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

13

Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung | Pavel Arazim

Merkmale können aber in anderen Kontexten für die Erwartung ganz
irrelevant sein. Genauso ist es mit Wittgensteins Analyse des lauten Lesens,
welcher wir im Blauen Buch (Wittgenstein 1984), sowie in den Philosophischen
Untersuchungen (Wittgenstein 1984a) begegnen. Man versucht wieder einen
wesentlichen Zug zu finden, jedoch bleiben nur die unterschiedlichen
Familienähnlichkeiten zwischen den Fällen der Anwendung.
Es ist jetzt ein kleiner Schritt über Wittgenstein hinaus, wenn man die
Bedeutung als eine Bewegung auffasst. Und zwar als eine Bewegung zwischen
den Anwendungskontexten, welche eine Familie bilden. Und obwohl
Wittgenstein Wert darauf legt, die Modellbeispiele oder Anwendungskontexte
klar zu unterscheiden, kann man dennoch sagen, dass sie sich durchdringen,genau im Sinne Bergsons. Die Bedeutung scheint in der Bewegung zwischen
ihnen zu liegen. Und diese Bewegung kann jeder nachvollziehen, der eine
Sprache spricht. Obwohl sie theoretisch kaum zu beschreiben ist, beinhaltet
sie für jeden, der eine Sprache beherrscht, recht wenig Erstaunliches.

3. Bergsons Verhältnis zur Sprache

Bergson scheint über die Sprache nicht sehr positiv zu denken. Sprache undLogik scheinen für ihn die größte Last der Schuld dafür zu tragen, dass wir die
Zeit und Bewegung übersehen, bzw. falsch verstehen. Überhaupt redet er vonLogik und Sprache meistens mit dieser negativen Betonung, zum Beispiel,wenn er zeigt, wie eine logische Folgerung zusammen mit einer „mechanistischen Auffassung der Freiheit“ zum Determinismus führt (Bergson
1994, S. 133). Damit scheint er sehr auf der Spur derer zu sein, über die
Wittgenstein kritisch festhält, dass sie etwas ungemeinen Subtiles zu fangenversuchen, wofür unsere Sprache allzu grob ist, wie in der Bemerkung 122 derPhilosophischen Untersuchungen, (Wittgenstein 1984a). Dennoch ist auch
Wittgenstein eine gewisse Art von Sprachkritik nicht nur nicht fremd, sondern
er befürwortet sie, indem er die Philosophie vor allem als Sprachkritik ansieht.
Besonders prägnant drückt er diese Auffassung aus, wenn er in der
Bemerkung 109 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen (Wittgenstein 1984a) die
Philosophie als einen „Kampf gegen die Verhexung unseres Verstandes durch
die Mittel unserer Sprache“ bezeichnet.

14

Pavel Arazim, "Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung | Pavel Arazim

Obwohl Wittgenstein das Dynamische auf Kosten des Stabilen nicht so stark
bevorzugt wie Bergson, muss man ihn dennoch als fast bergsonischer als
Bergson selbst bezeichnen, denn er sieht das Dynamische eben auch in der
Sprache, welche Bergson eher stellvertretend für das Stabile, ja Starre sieht. In
diesem Sinne öffnet der Vergleich zwischen den beiden Autoren die
Möglichkeit, Bergsons Gedanken sogar auf das Gebiet anzuwenden, welches er
selbst für ihnen entgegengesetzt betrachtete.

4. Trotzdem eine Gemeinsamkeit – das Zeigen

Bergson behauptet , dass er im Grunde etwas sehr Einfaches und eigentlichschon immer Bekanntes zeigen will, wenn er über die Zeit und Bewegung
spricht. Er schlägt in diesem Sinne keine neue und feinere Sprache vor, wie es
die Logik spätestens seit Russels Analyse der definite description versucht. Was
er zeigen will, ist für ihn der Sprache unzugänglich.
Man kann darin einen Mystizismus Bergsons erblicken, welcher sehr nahe denabschließenden Passagen von des Tractatus steht, etwa der Passage 6.522(Wittgenstein 1984a). Auch über Bergson ließe sich vielleicht sagen, dass derwichtigere Teil seiner Werke der ungeschriebene ist. Mystizismus mag da abereine zu karikierende Betitelung sein. Bergson behauptet nämlich, dass er seine
Leser nur daran erinnern will, was sie bereits sehr gut aus dem normalen
Leben kennen. Eigentlich sei es nur ein voreingenommenes Philosophieren,welches uns das alles vergessen macht.
Der Zug der Wohlbekanntheit, ja Alltäglichkeit, steht im Gegensatz zu dem
angeblichen nebligen Mystizismus. Somit steht Bergson auch dem späteren
Wittgenstein viel näher, als man vermuten könnte. Und vielleicht zeigt dieseInterpretation des angeblichen Mystizismus bei Bergson, wie man auch das im
Tractatus beschworene Mystische verstehen kann. Nämlich viel harmloser als
es klingen mag und somit auch gar nicht so fremd der späteren Philosophie
Wittgensteins.
Die berühmte Devise Wittgensteins „denk nicht, sondern schau!“ aus derBemerkung 66 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen (Wittgenstein 1984a) kannman sehr wohl auch als für Bergson charakteristisch betrachten. Etwa bei den
beiden gemeinsamen Aufmunterungen zur Betrachtung dessen, welche

Pavel Arazim, "Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung | Pavel Arazim

psychischen Phänomene ein gewisses Ereignis begleiten, ist es für Bergson wie
für Wittgenstein zentral, sich vor den Tendenzen zu hüten, etwas
hineinzuinterpretieren, was uns einseitige Analogien vorauszusetzen
verleiten. So geht es bei Wittgenstein um angebliche bestimmte Gefühle, diedas echte Lesen, echte Erwarten oder echte Verstehen eines Wortes begleiten
sollten. Im typischen Fall finden wir da gar nichts, oder nur vage
zusammenhängende Familienähnlichkeiten zwischen unterschiedlichen
Erlebnissen.
Bergson bezweifelt das Verständnis von Geisteszuständen als spezifischen
Entitäten, die man als Gedanken, Gefühlen und dergleichen zu katalogisieren
geneigt ist. Seine Gründe dafür sind vielleicht nicht direkt im Sinne
Wittgensteins. Nach Bergson sind die Geisteszustände eher in der Zeit als im
Raum zuhause und dementsprechend ist ihre Multiplizität von einem anderen
Charakter, indem sie nicht klar von einander zu unterscheiden sind, sondern
einander durchdringen, was den räumlichen Gegenständen unmöglich ist.
Bergson positioniert sich unter anderem mit dieser ablehnend-rhetorischen
Frage: „Und dennoch zählt man Gefühle, Empfindungen und Vorstellungen,lauter Dinge, die einander durchdringen und die, jedes seinerseits, die ganze
Seele einnehmen?“ (Bergson 1994, S.70) In diesem Sinne kann er, ganz wie
Wittgenstein, viele philosophische Fragen, die mit psychischen Entitäten
verbunden sind, als Scheinfragen abtun.

5. Ideale der Exaktheit

Nicht nur Bergson, sondern nicht selten auch Wittgenstein (vgl. Materna 2015)
wird gerne vorgeworfen, sie seien allzu unklar und nebelig. Dabei gehört zum
Kern ihrer Philosophie, dass sie beide das übliche Ideal der Exaktheithinterfragen. Wittgenstein analysiert wiederholt, wie es zur Entstehung vonphilosophischen Fragen kommt, zum Beispiel, ob der Name Nothung eine
Bedeutung hat, obwohl das benannte Schwert längst zertrümmert ist, wie es
bereits im Braunen Buch auf S. 158 thematisiert wird (Wittgenstein 1984) . Dort
wirft Wittgenstein solcher Philosophie unter anderem einen falschen Begriff
der philosophischen oder logischen Analyse, sowie eine falsche Auffassung der
Exaktheit, die auf der Unkenntnis des Begriffs der Familie beruht, vor. Hier
meint Wittgestein wohl vor allem die Familienähnlichkeit.

16

Pavel Arazim, "Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung | Pavel Arazim

Genauso findet man etwa in der Bemerkung 71 in den Philosophischen
Untersuchungen (Wittgenstein 1984a) die Kritik des Ideals der Exaktheit, etwa
wenn unterstellt wird, dass der Befehl „Halte dich ungefähr hier auf!“ nicht
genau genug ist. Wittgenstein scheint viel mehr zu meinen, als normalerweisein der analytischen Tradition gerne zugegeben wird. Bereits seit Russell, wohl
sogar seit Frege, ist klar, dass die Alltagssprache und Praxis nicht den
Forderungen der logischen Exaktheit genügt. Sie glauben aber, dass es die
einzige Exaktheit ist, die es gibt. Hinsichtlich der alltäglichen Sprache meinensie dann etwas herablassend, dass sie doch funktionieren könne, auch wennsie so chaotisch sei. Wittgenstein scheint aber sagen zu wollen, dass hier die
Anwendung der Ideale der logischen Exaktheit nicht unrichtig, sondern
unsinnig ist. Wenn man über genügende oder ungenügende Klarheit eines
Befehls im Alltagsleben überhaupt sprechen soll, dann geht es um eine ganz
andere Exaktheit. Und das Befehl „Halte dich ungefähr hier auf!“ kann im je
relevanten Sinne ganz exakt sein. Natürlich kann er in vielen anderen inexakt
sein, aber nicht zwangsläufig deswegen, weil keine genauen geometrischen
Koordinaten des Ortes, wo man zu stehen hat, angegeben wurden.
Das bringt uns zu Wittgesteins These, dass der Sichtraum nicht dergeometrische, etwa euklidische Raum ist, die er in den Philosophischen
Bemerkungen (Wittgenstein 1964) und in der Philosophischen Grammatik(Wittgenstein 1969) vertritt. Bergsons Ablehnung der Reduzierung der Zeit auf
den Raum kann dann sehr ähnlich interpretiert werden, nämlich als die
Verteidigung der Autonomie des Sprachspiels, welches sich auf die Zeit in derForm beruft, welche Bergson als durée bezeichnete. Obwohl Bergson der
Sprache nicht so viel Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet hat wie Wittgestein, gab es
bereits Versuche ihn dahingehend zu interpretieren (vlg. Pariente 1969). In
dieser Interpretation wollte Bergson den Diskurs über die gelebte Zeitebenfalls als einem anderen Ideal der Exaktheit verpflichtet verstanden
wissen. Insofern könnte er seine Aussagen als in relevantem Sinne sehrpräzise und genau ansehen. Und gar nicht nebelig. Hier zeigen sich die zwei
Philosophen wieder
als Verbündete. Und schon der Begriff der
Familienähnlichkeit, um welchen sich Wittgensteins Analysen so wesentlichdrehen, enthält viel von dem dynamischen Element, welches Bergson sowichtig war.

Pavel Arazim, "Wittgenstein als Philosoph der dynamischen Sprache? Versuch einer Bergsonisierung". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

17

References

Bergson, Henri, (1889), Essai sur les données immédiates de la coscience, Paris:
Felix Alcan, Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine. Zitiert nach derÜbersetzung: Zeit und Freiheit, 1994, Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.
Bergson, Henri, (1907), L'Évolution créatrice, Paris: Felix Alcan, Bibliothèque dephilosophie contemporaine.
Gadamer, Hans Georg, (1990), Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer
philosophischen Hermeneutik, Gesammelte Werke, Band. 1, Tübingen: MohrSiebeck.
Lauer, David (2014)“Sprache als Spiel: ergon und energeia”, in: Hartmut vonSass and Stefan Berg (eds.) Spielzüge: Zur Dialektik des Spiels und seinem
metaphorischen Mehrwert, München: Karl Alber, 224-263.
Materna, Pavel (2015)“Two Approaches to Philosophically Analysing
Language”, in: Pavel Arazim and Michal Dančák (eds.) The Logica Yearbook
2014, London: College publications, 203-215.
Pariente, J.C. (1969) “Bergson et Wittgenstein”, Revue internationale dephilosophie, 22(88), 321-347.
Russell, Bertrand (1912) “The Philosophy of Bergson”, The Monist, 23, 183-200.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1964), Philosophische Bemerkungen, Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1969), Philosophische Grammatik, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1984), Werkausgabe Band 5. Das blaue Buch / Eine
philosophische Betrachtung(Das braune Buch), Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1984a), Werkausgabe Band 1. Tractatus logicophilosophicus / Tagebücher 1914–1916 / Philosophische Untersuchungen,Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Acknowledgement
Diese Arbeit wurde von dem Grant der The Czech Science Foundation (GAČR), Nummer 23-07119S
mit dem Namen Meaning as an object - principles of semantic theories unterstützt. Dieses Projekt
wird von Jaroslav Peregrin, meinem Kollegen am Institut der Philosophie der Tschechischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften (FLÚ AV ČR), geleitet.

Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship | Ulrich Arnswald

Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and theConsiderable Dissonance in Interpretations within Wittgensteinian
Scholarship
Ulrich Arnswald (Innsbruck, Austria)
Abstract
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) developed a concept of selection that attempted to
explain how the genetic characteristics of species can change over time to produce new
species. Wittgenstein refers to Darwin’s theory of evolution in only one sentence of theTractatus without giving the reader a sufficient explanation for his claim that “Darwin’s
theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis of the naturalsciences.” (TLP 4.1122) Wittgenstein’s statement in the Tractatus is actually a by-product of his
discussion of the question of what the nature of philosophy is. Wittgenstein’s Tractarian
remark mentioning Darwin aims at the fact that Darwin discovered a fruitful new aspect andnot a true, scientific theory. These are not mere assertions; Darwin confirms this himself inthree letters quoted here. In the end, Wittgenstein only reproduced in the Tractatus what
Darwin himself had already freely admitted.

1. Wittgenstein's Remark Mentioning Darwin in the Tractatus

Darwin's On the Origin of Species (1859) famously developed a concept of
selection that attempted to explain how the genetic characteristics of species
can change over time to produce new species. Wittgenstein refers to Darwin's
theory of evolution in only one sentence of the Tractatus without giving thereader a sufficient explanation for his claim that "Darwin's theory has no more
to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis of the natural sciences." (TLP
4.1122)
In his concept of evolution, Darwin assumed that the genetic characteristics ofa species can change over time and lead to speciation, that new species
consequently evolve from existing species and ultimately form new species,
and that all species have a common ancestor. In this respect, Darwin usednatural selection to pursue an explanatory hypothesis for the adaptations oforganisms. For this, he wanted to develop observational experiments to test
the validity of his hypothesis.
In Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the apodictic sentence comes at the end of asequence of sentences dealing with the distinction between science andphilosophy, and is found towards the end of the treatise, as evidenced by theorder of the tract's sentence numbers. Wittgenstein's statement was already20

Ulrich Arnswald, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship | Ulrich Arnswald

controversial during his lifetime. The discussion of Darwinism, however, was
not a Wittgenstein-specific feature, but was in the air during this period,
especially at Cambridge, where Wittgenstein studied. Already George Edward
Moore believed he had to defend Wittgenstein's infamous statement about
Darwin's theory as follows:[E]veryone would agree with Wittgenstein that Darwin's Theory of theOrigin of Species, including man, has nothing more to do with philosophy
than any other hypothesis of Natural Science: and that whatever it may
have to do with it, it’s not the business of philosophy to discuss whether
it’s true or not. (Moore 1966, 10).
Even if Moore were to follow in part, that it is not the business of philosophy tofigure out if Darwin’s theory is true or not, this would not explain why
Wittgenstein generalizes his statement to all of philosophy. What is clear isthat Wittgenstein's interest was not in the influence that scientific discoveries
might have on philosophy. He was more concerned with drawing a clear
distinction between the work of a scientist and the work of a philosopher. For
Wittgenstein, however, it was clear that the task of philosophy is not toquestion the hypotheses of the natural sciences.
It is actually astonishing that in the Wittgenstein research it has not even been
established until today how many partially or completely contradictoryinterpretations of the movement TLP 4.1122 there are in the meantim

2. A Summary of the Different Positions of Wittgenstein's Remark in the Tractatus

J. J. C. Smart (1966) in a commemorative publication for Herbert Feigl called"Philosophy and Scientific Plausibility" and Ernest Gellner in his article "The
Ascent of Life" (1974) consider that science and especially Darwin's theory of
evolution are important for philosophy. While Smart argues that it would be
important to develop new theories even if it is not certain that they would be
advantageous over the prevailing idea, Gellner points out that philosophy
would create philosophies based on concepts.
For Smart, any scientific theory is nothing more than an illustration ofscientific plausibility, so he does not comment as to the character of Darwin's

Ulrich Arnswald, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

21

Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship | Ulrich Arnswald

writing, whether it is descriptive method or theory. To this extent, he is notbothered by metaphysical speculations that may anticipate the science of the
future. Gellner takes a similar line here by arguing that, according to Russell, aphilosophy should be based precisely on a broad foundation of knowledge,
which need not necessarily be philosophical. Therefore, Darwin's approach
would have been correct to present the features of the concept of evolution ina non-formal way, from which philosophy would also benefit, since only thiswould enable it to examine philosophical questions about evolution on thebasis of these explanations.
P. M. S. Hacker (1986) in his book Insight and Illusion and John Preston (2017)
in his article „Wittgenstein, Hertz, and Boltzmann“ take a special role insofar
as they always identify Wittgenstein's utterance as a critique in reaction toanother position(s). For Hacker, Wittgenstein's utterance is a critique ofRussell's views. This criticism, he argues, arises from Wittgenstein's statements
about the nature of philosophy, which in the Tractatus is no longer based on
the description of logical form, since this cannot be accomplished, but only
exclusively on the distinction of philosophy from the natural sciences. While
Russell adheres to logical atomism, Wittgenstein rejects it, since in his view it
leads to a wrong understanding of the essence of philosophy. For Wittgenstein,philosophy cannot be expressed in philosophical propositions and is therefore
no longer the proposition or the logical conclusion, but the activity as such.
For Preston, on the other hand, Wittgenstein's utterance is rather a criticism of
Boltzmann and Mach, since both were evolutionary epistemologists, while
Wittgenstein propagated the philosophical irrelevance of natural science in
the Tractatus. Preston is convinced that if philosophy is the description of thelogical forms of our thoughts and so of all possible facts (which, as we know, itcannot do) and logic only represents the results of natural science, thenWittgenstein's conception is consistent with Boltzmann's philosophy of science.
This would mean that the natural sciences are a genuinely scientific object ofinvestigation, whereas philosophy can never be. From this it could be deduced
according to Preston that there are only supposed philosophical problems or
puzzles that are unsolvable for science, but no real ones. This would also havebeen Boltzmann's attitude toward traditional philosophical questions, which is
why he emphasized the importance of overviews and clear scientificrepresentations. This view would later have been adopted by Wittgenstein.

22

Ulrich Arnswald, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship | Ulrich Arnswald

Newton Garver (1994) in his book This Complicated Form of Life takes anentirely different position, accusing Wittgenstein of discrediting epistemology.
Evolution, he argues, implies for philosophy that since philosophy and science
are simply evolutionary aspects of an evolved species, they should simply bedescribed in their biological setting. This connection between evolution andphilosophy, he argued, came about only after the publication of Darwin's
work. However, Wittgenstein rejected this particular connection between
philosophy and science as superficial and insisted that philosophy and science
were fundamentally different and that philosophy consisted only of activities
to clarify propositions. Since there can be no dichotomy between propositions
and activities, Garver argues, science for Wittgenstein includes activity just as
philosophy does. A distinction is therefore not possible.
For Christopher Hookway in his contribution "Wittgenstein andNaturalism" (2017), Wittgenstein's Tractatus denies that philosophicalknowledge is possible. Rather, Wittgenstein would have advocated epistemic
naturalism, according to which all knowledge is always scientific in nature.
Since the totality of true propositions constitute the natural sciences, inductive
inferences would have to be ruled out. For Wittgenstein it is decisive thatphilosophy is an activity that aims at the logical clarification of thoughts, sothat no metaphysical statements are made. This, he argues, therefore
precludes philosophical theory. Consequently, philosophy can neither provide
explanations nor justify theories. It can only use the sentences which are also
used by those who establish scientific theories in the natural sciences.
Last but not least, Marco Brusotti in his book on Wittgenstein, Frazer and the"ethnological approach" (2014) also takes on Wittgenstein's interpretation of
Darwin's theory of evolution. While Darwin first saw his natural selection as akind of empirical hypothesis or an object of causal explanation, Wittgenstein
saw his work more as a kind of synopsis of possibilities. According to Brusotti,
Wittgenstein stated that Darwin's On the Origin of Species was equivalent to aparable that attempts to circumscribe ordered relations. This synopsis in termsof descriptions of possibilities, he said, was also a discovery, but it did notreveal the actual facts, only hypothetically describing one possibility among
many of how things might be. The concept of evolution thus guides our

Ulrich Arnswald, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship | Ulrich Arnswald

research focus, but it does not represent a scientific theory. Rather, it is a
descriptive method or clear representation that many readers intuitively agree
with.
Hookway's – even if he fails to recognize the descriptive method or clear
presentation that many readers intuitively agree with – and Brusotti's reading
are thus, in this polyphony presented here, the only two that I understand to
be in agreement with the point Ludwig Wittgenstein wanted to make with hisstatement in the Tractatus about Darwin's theory of evolution.

3. What Was the Point of Wittgenstein's Statement in Tracatus about Darwin's
Theory of Evolution?

Wittgenstein's statement in the Tractatus about Darwin is actually a byproduct of his discussion of the question of what the nature of philosophy is.
This can already be seen in the fact that the name Darwin is mentioned only
once in the whole Tractatus. On the other hand, the clarification of the natureof philosophy is in the foreground when, for example, TLP 4.111 states:"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences."
In the late philosophy, Wittgenstein's position on Darwin's theory of evolution
becomes much clearer when he manifests, for example, in Culture and Value:"The real achievement of a Copernicus or a Darwin was not the discovery of atrue theory but of a fertile new point of view." (CV 1998, 26). Undoubtedly, by
equating Copernicus and Darwin, Wittgenstein aims at the representation of
known facts and not at their new discovery.
For Copernicus, as is well known, in his work De revolutionibus orbium
coelestium, which established the heliocentric understanding of the universe,
did not distinguish himself by new discoveries, but rather by a newarrangement of old known facts. These were so skillfully arranged that theybrought a new picture on the old known planetary system. Although earlier
philosophers had also considered heliocentric theories, it was Copernicus who
first developed a comprehensive heliocentric account that rivaled thegeocentric system of the Ptolemies in its scope and predictive ability.

24

Ulrich Arnswald, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship | Ulrich Arnswald

This kind of rearrangement of known facts, i.e. the new representation ofthem, explains the beginning feeling in the viewer that a new dynamic has
been triggered, which corresponds to a new development. Wittgenstein was
well aware of this, because he states "that is why one often thinks one has
discovered the real state of affairs, if one has only found a new possibility, how
it could have behaved. (Darwin's theory.)" (BNE: MS 116: 220; transl by theauthor).
Here at the latest it should be clear why Wittgenstein draws a parallel between
Copernicus and Darwin, when he makes a similar claim about the theory of
evolution: "[Y]ou might say what is satisfactory in Darwin is not such
'hypothesis', but his 'putting the facts in a system' – helping us to make a'synopsis' of them." (MWL 1993: 107).
For Darwin as well as for Copernicus it is therefore true that they created a
new conceptual framework, which let well-known facts appear in a new lightand allowed them speculative new insights, which, however, they were notable to prove scientifically. Strictly speaking, they did not create theories, butrather impactful working hypotheses that fundamentally transformed theirfields. This was the fruitful thing about their representations. They opened up
a new perspective on old things.
Darwin, with his description of the concept of evolution, is still considered theinventor of the theory of evolution, and this despite the fact that his own work,
while attempting to provide some evidence, does not sufficiently prove histhesis either empirically or causally, and thus, strictly speaking, does not
qualify as a theory. Darwin, by the way, never claimed this for himself.

4. Conclusion

Wittgenstein's Tractarian remark mentioning Darwin aims at the fact thatDarwin discovered a fruitful new aspect and not a true, scientific theory. Thisis exactly what Darwin himself was aware of and he did not deny. In a letter to
Asa Gray of June 18, 1857, he himself states that his "theory of evolution" wasrather "speculation" than true science: "It is extremely kind of you to say that

Ulrich Arnswald, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship | Ulrich Arnswald

my letters have not bored you very much, & it is almost incredible to me, for I
am quite conscious that my speculations run quite beyond the bounds of true
science." (Darwin 1857a).
A little later, in the same year to the same correspondent, Asa Gray, heconcedes even more clearly on November 29, 1857, that his work was
primarily hypothetical and could hardly be called inductive, which would be acharacteristic of a scientific theory: "What you hint at generally is very very
true, that my work will be grievously hypothetical & large parts by no means
worthy of being called inductive; my commonest error being probably
induction from too few facts." (Darwin 1857b).
Consequently, there is no doubt that Wittgenstein's statement "Darwin's theory
has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in naturalscience" (TLP 4.1122) is even in perfect agreement with Darwin's own view ofhis "theory of evolution". He did not see even in his work the requirements fora scientific theory fulfilled. Nevertheless, he held on to this view, because it
was plausible for him and from his point of view was able to explain what
could not be explained otherwise. It was not by chance that he wanted todevelop observational experiments even after the completion of the writing inorder to check the validity of his hypothesis.
How unvarnishedly and soberly he was aware of these deficiencies of his
skillful, if scientifically not sufficiently well-founded, description of theevolution he assumed, a letter of Darwin to Cuthbert Collingwood of March 14,
1861, makes clear: "But I believe in Nat. Selection, not because, I can prove inany single case that it has changed one species into another, but because itgroups & explains well (as it seems to me) a host of facts in classification,embryology, morphology, rudimentary organs, geological succession &Distribution." (Darwin 1861).
In the end, Wittgenstein only restated and criticized in the Tractatus what
Darwin himself had already freely admitted, namely that the Darwins' theory
is not a theory but a hypothesis, however one that is "putting the facts in asystem" in order to make a synopsis of them. It is a little irritating when

26

Ulrich Arnswald, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship | Ulrich Arnswald

philosophers, a good 100 years after Darwin's admissions in his letters, begin
and continue to this day to want to defend foundations that Darwin selfcritically believed were not there.
References
Brusotti, Marco (2014) Wittgenstein, Frazer und die „ethnologische Betrachtungsweise“. Berlin;
Houston: Walter de Gruyter.
Darwin, C. R. (1857a) Letter by Charles Robert Darwin to Asa Gray, 18th June 1857, Darwin
Correspondence Project, University of Cambridge, last accessed 06.04.2023: https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/?docId=letters/DCPLETT-2109.xml&query=Asa%20Gray%20on%20the%2018%20June%201857#hit.rank1
Darwin, C. R. (1857b) Letter by Charles Robert Darwin to Asa Gray, 29th November 1857,
Darwin Correspondence Project, University of Cambridge, last accessed 06.04.2023: https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/?docId=letters/DCPLETT-2176.xml&query=asa%20gray%2029%20November%201857#hit.rank1
Darwin, C. R. (1859) On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservationof Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. London: John Murray.
Darwin, C. R. (1861) Letter by Charles Robert Darwin to Cuthbert Collingwood, 14th March
1861, Darwin Correspondence Project, University of Cambridge, last accessed 06.04.2023:
https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/?docId=letters/DCPLETT-3088.xml&query=Cuthbert%20Collingwood#hit.rank2)
Garver, Newton (1994) This Complicated Form of Life. Essays on Wittgenstein: Chicago; La
Salle, Illinois: Open Court 1994.
Gellner, Ernest (1974) "The Ascent of Life". In: Ernest Gellner: The Devil in Modern Philosophy.
Edited with a Preface by I. C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi. London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 201-205.
Hacker, P. M. S. (1986) Insight and Illusion. Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Revised
Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986.
Hookway, Christopher (2017) "Wittgenstein and Naturalism". In: Hans-Johann Glock / John
Hyman (eds.): A Companion to Wittgenstein. Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 746-756.
Moore, George Edward (1966) Lectures on Philosophy. Edited by Casimir Lewy. London: Allen& Unwin.
Preston, John M. (2017) "Wittgenstein, Hertz, and Boltzmann". In: Hans-Johann Glock / John
Hyman (eds.): A Companion to Wittgenstein. Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 110-123.

Ulrich Arnswald, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

27

Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship | Ulrich Arnswald

Smart, John Jamieson Carswell (1966) "Philosophy and Scientific Plausibility". In: Paul K.
Feyerabend / Grover Maxwell (eds.): Mind, Matter, And Method. Essays in Philosophy and
Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 377-390.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness. With an Introduction by Bertrand Russell. London; New York: Routledge & KeganPaul. [= TLP No.]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2015-) Bergen Nachlass Edition. Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at
the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source. Curated
by Alois Pichler (2009-) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020-) [wittgensteinsource.org]. Bergen:
WAB. [= BNE: Manuscript No.]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) Culture and Value. A Selection from the Posthumous Remains.
Edited by Georg Henrik von Wright in Collaboration with Heikki Nyman. Revised Edition of
the Text by Alois Pichler. Translated by Peter Winch. Oxford; Malden: Blackwell. [= CV 1998,
Page]
Acknowledgement
I thank Dr. Jareño Alarcón (Murcia), Dr. Jens Kertscher (Darmstadt) and Dr. Peter Keicher(Karlsruhe) for their comments.

28

Ulrich Arnswald, "Wittgenstein's Critique of Darwin's Theory in the Tractatus and the Considerable Dissonance in Interpretations within
Wittgensteinian Scholarship". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions | Sorin Bangu

On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions
Sorin Bangu (Bergen, Norway)
Abstract
In this paper, I shall heed Wittgenstein’s advice in RFM VII-16, that “mathematical
propositions stand in need of […] a clarification of their grammar.” That mathematical
propositions have primarily the function to formulate rules is, I submit, the most importantidea that Wittgenstein introduced in reflecting on mathematics. It is appropriate to call it
revolutionary. Yet, although it is a breakthrough, it is a difficult proposal to work with; thecomplications one encounters when trying to spell it out make me suspect that Wittgensteinhimself may not have felt that he fully tamed it.

In this paper, I shall heed Wittgenstein’s advice, that “mathematical
propositions stand in need of (…) a clarification of their grammar.” (RFM 1978:
VII-16) Since this clarification is supposed to avert misunderstandings andconfusions, let me first ask: what do grammatical misunderstandings look likewhen it comes to mathematics? They take a variety of forms, but the mostimportant one arises from the kind of assimilation indicated in RFM 1978: I,
Appendix III-4. I shall come back to this key-remark often and hence I shallassign it a label (S):S: We are used to saying “2 times 2 is 4”, and the verb “is” makes this into a
proposition [Satz], and apparently establishes a close kinship witheverything that we call a ‘proposition’ [Satz]. Whereas it is a matter
only of a very superficial relationship.
It is obvious that ‘2 times 2 is 4’, a well-formed declarative sentence, can beused to express a proposition. What is the worry, then? The concern, I suggest,is that the verb ‘is’ here may induce us to believe that when we say this, we
make an assertion; also, that we make a description. Hence, we are warned
that the “kinship” of ‘2 times 2 is 4’ and the sentences that are typically used toexpress these types of propositions is only “superficial”. As we shall see soon,
what he says here is preparation for a deeper point, that a sentence like ‘2times 2 is 4’ – or, more precisely: the proposition expressed by it – has, in fact,
another use.
To elaborate: I take it that in S Wittgenstein accepts that ‘2 times 2 is 4’ can beused to make a truth-apt assertion. (In a commentary on this remark, Sunday
Greve and Kienzler (2016) seem to disagree with this point.) However, his

Sorin Bangu, "On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions | Sorin Bangu

intention is to signal that the proposition expressed by this sentence can havea different function, or use. This use – which is not mentioned in S, but in manyother remarks, some of which will be discussed below – is a normative one: toformulate a rule, which, most significantly, lacks a truth-value. Moreover, hewill insist that it is the fulfillment of this prescriptive-regulative function thatis not “superficial”, and which turns this proposition into a proper
mathematical one. In saying this, it is extremely important to stress that for
him, the appearance of some mathematical symbols in a sentence does not
automatically turn it (and the proposition it expresses) into a mathematicalone. He does not regard the mere appearance of a sentence – which may
include numerals or names of operations (e.g.,’+’, ‘×’) – as an indication that thesentence expresses a mathematical proposition (see, e.g., LFM 1976: 33: “Somepropositions belong to mathematics but other propositions containing
mathematical symbols are not mathematical propositions.”). What matters isthe use we make of the sentence, and, implicitly, of the proposition expressedby it; that is, the function we assign to it. One can confidently say that for
Wittgenstein a necessary condition for a proposition to be called‘mathematical’ is to be assigned a normative function.
Now, when it comes to what Wittgenstein takes to be the “superficial” functionof propositions like ‘2×2 is 4’ and ‘7 is prime’ – namely, to make truth-apt
assertions – there is one additional point to note: in virtue of the assertoricappearance of ‘two times two is four’, it is tempting to think of this proposition
in representational-descriptive terms as well. This is due, again, to its similarity
with other descriptive propositions, expressed by sentences having a parallel
grammatical structure, such as ‘An oxygen atom bonded to another oxygen
atom make up an O2 molecule’. On this model, as a descriptive proposition,‘two times two is four’ would also represent a composite fact: one object,denoted by the numeral ‘four’, is represented as somehow composed of, or
arising from combining, two other objects, denoted by the numeral ‘two’.
So, the warning of S is that our fixation on the “close kinship” between ‘2 times
2 is 4’ and an assertoric-descriptive proposition also fixates us on only one of
its roles (to describe, to make truth-apt assertions), and the effect of thisfixation is that we overlook its other (normative) role. What is worse, thisfixation almost immediately brings in the platonist imagery; hence

30

Sorin Bangu, "On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions | Sorin Bangu

Wittgenstein will also warn against taking such propositions to have thedescriptive-representational role that the platonists insist upon. However, it
would be wrong to think that we are necessarily led to platonism, since othertraditional -isms are available. For instance, we could very well be led toward
conventionalism instead, provided that we drop our commitment torepresentationalism-descriptivism (while continuing to regard the mainfunction of the proposition as being the assertoric one). Yet platonism is thenatural choice here, as it were, as it seems very natural to look at the
proposition ‘2 times 2 is 4’ as corresponding to a compositional super-fact(which, once obtained, makes this descriptive proposition true).
Sentences like the one above can also be accounted for along conventionalist
lines. To see how, recall first that for a conventionalist the declarative sentence‘2 times 2 is 4’ also has a unique function, to make a truth-apt assertion;
basically, to be a true statement – and note that this assumption, about thisfunction, is something that both conventionalism and platonism share, despite
the fact that they are otherwise very different doctrines. Recall also that theconventionalists, unlike the platonists, do not explain the necessity of the
proposition 2×2=4 in representational-descriptive terms, i.e., as getting its
meaning from a correspondence with a super-fact. They do not think of this
proposition in compositional terms either; for them, this proposition does not
represent (describe) some kind of composition of two objects. And, left without
this corresponding ontological ‘support’ offered by the super-reality of superfacts and super-objects, the conventionalists explain this proposition’s status asa necessary truth in a different way. As we also saw, they say, in essence, thatwhat gives it this special standing is us. Or, more explicitly, that what makes it
a necessary truth is a convention. That is, a convention we made to adopt
certain definitions, or an agreement to treat it as irrefutable, as immune torevision.
So, with both doctrines on the table, it looks like we have to choose between
these two alternative explanations. First, the platonist one is that 2×2=4 isnecessarily true because it correctly describes a corresponding super-reality.
Second, the conventionalist explains that 2×2=4 is necessarily true because
what it asserts follows from a convention we have made; namely, to define its
constituent terms in a certain way, and thus to treat this proposition as
irrefutable. And, if these two doctrines (platonism and conventionalism) still

Sorin Bangu, "On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions | Sorin Bangu

do not content us, is it not obvious that we should concoct yet other (‘better’)doctrines?
This dilemma marks a crucial moment in our discussion. We should begin tosuspect that we face a false dilemma. That is, that such a choice is illusory; thatmaybe neither of these explanatory doctrines is in fact needed.
As we recall, the first step in the right direction is to accept that propositions
like ‘2 times 2 is 4’ need “a clarification of their grammar”. That is, we should
check what their functions are since, perhaps, some kind of confusion (i.e.,
assimilation) of functions takes place. Wittgenstein voices this suspicion as
follows:[A] proposition [Satz] that is supposed to be impossible to imagine as otherthan true has a different function from one for which this does not hold.
(RFM 1978: IV-4)
This is the moment of lucidity when one asks the key-question that launches
the grammatical investigation: what are the functions of the proposition
expressed by, e.g., the sentence ‘2 times 2 is 4’? The result of this investigationis, as we recall, a perspicuous presentation of its functions (uses, roles). To findthem, one has to carefully “look and see” (PI 2009: §66), to observe the use ofsuch propositions. (One obviously cannot guess this, as PI 2009: §340 notes.)
So, if one looks, what does one see? First of all, the obvious linguistic fact
mentioned above, that we often and customarily formulate rules, norms andprescriptions by using propositions expressed by declarative sentences – andnot only by normative-imperative ones. Take for instance these two
propositions:
A match is played by two teams, each with a maximum of eleven players.
There are two different ways of moving the king: by moving to an
adjoining square, and by castling.
Both these propositions formulate rules – of the games of football and chess,respectively. (These are exact, official formulations, found here https://www.thefa.com/football-rules-governance/lawsandrules/laws/football-11-11/
law-3---the-players and here https://handbook.fide.com/chapter/E012018.

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Sorin Bangu, "On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions | Sorin Bangu

Accessed 4 Sept. 2022. Importantly, when giving the rules, the chess and thefootball official handbooks systematically mix the declarative and thenormative formulations.) Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that the same may be thecase for other propositions (again, expressed as declarative sentences); here,
the ones belonging to mathematics, e.g., ‘2 times 2 is 4’ or ‘7 is prime’. Despite
their descriptive form, they are used in a normative-prescriptive capacity.
(And yet note that this similarity does not mean that mathematics is ‘just agame’.) To formulate rules by such descriptive propositions, and thus todisguise rules in the form of descriptive propositions and assertions, is one of
the means by which language “bewitch[es] our understanding” (PI 2009: §109).
We are reminded here of something that Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammatical’
phenomenon: that formally descriptive propositions, looking like assertions,also serve to formulate rules and prescriptions.
Let us take stock. The grammatical survey of mathematical propositions yields
the following list of their possible roles. Thus, ‘2×2 is 4’ can express a
proposition used(i)to make an assertion, a truth-apt statement(ii)

to represent, describe (truly or falsely) some ‘fact’

and also can(iii)formulate a non-truth-apt rule.

On these three options, Wittgenstein takes the following stances. First andforemost, he warns against conflating functions (i), (ii) and (iii). Second, heregards function (i) as “superficial”. Third, he urges that (iii) is the primaryfunction of such a sentence. Moreover, he rejects (ii). (This is essentially therejection of platonism, but note that I have not explicated what he thinks iswrong with it. Doing this is unfortunately impossible in this paper.)At this point it is crucial to observe that by failing to be clear about thesedifferent functions, both the platonists and the conventionalists share theassumption that the primary and unique function of a mathematical
proposition is the assertoric function (i). (The platonist would also accept thedescriptive function (ii) as well, while the conventionalist would not.) Yet, as
we just saw, Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that such a proposition has yet

Sorin Bangu, "On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions | Sorin Bangu

another function; namely (iii) above, to formulate a rule, or a norm. (Note alsothat suggesting this additional normative function is not to discover a novel
fact about language, as we saw; recall the second sentence from PI 1953: II, xiv.
Obviously, it is not a mathematical discovery either.)Curiously, this normative function of the mathematical propositions is, as far
as I can tell, not mentioned in PI at all – and I would not venture any exegetical
hypothesis as to why. But there are plenty of places in RFM and LFM where
this normativism is put forward explicitly. Let me list six such instances,although many more are available:
Mathematics forms a network of norms. (RFM 1978: VII-67)
What I am saying comes to this, that mathematics is normative. (RFM
1978: V-40; the next sentence in this remark is “But ‘norm’ does not mean
the same thing as ‘ideal’.” This is, again, an anti-platonist point. )One can say of the sentences [Sätzen] of mathematics that they arenormative sentences. And this characterizes their use. (IDP 2016-: Ms 123,
49v)
I proceed from certain rules, and I get a new rule: that 136×51=6936. (LFM
1976: 101)
And if the child now shews how 3 and 2 make 5, then he shews aprocedure that can be regarded as a ground for the rule ‘2 + 3 = 5’ (RFM 1978:
VII-9)
Finally, and suggestively:
The mathematical proposition says to me: Proceed like this! (RFM 1978:
VII-72)The idea that mathematics may not be in the business of making statements
can be traced back to Weyl (1921 [1998]) and Ramsey (1929 [1990]), two
thinkers whom Wittgenstein engaged with – or, according to Misak (2016),
even earlier, to C. S. Peirce. Going into the details of their conceptions, and of
how they relate to each other, would take us too far afield, especially since for
Wittgenstein we have to consider two philosophers, the middle Wittgenstein,
and the later one. Comprehensive discussions of these matters can be found in

34

Sorin Bangu, "On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions | Sorin Bangu

Marion (1995; 2003), Hacker (1996), Rumfit (2014), Misak (2016) and Methven(2020).
That mathematical propositions have primarily the function to formulate rules
is, I submit, the most important idea that Wittgenstein introduced in reflecting
on mathematics. It is appropriate to call it revolutionary. Yet, although it is abreakthrough, it is a difficult proposal to work with; the complications one
encounters when trying to spell it out make me suspect that Wittgensteinhimself may not have felt that he fully tamed it. But sorting out these
difficulties is definitely worth trying, since it is a pivotal insight indeed:virtually everything else in his thinking – his take on necessity and the
traditional philosophies of mathematics, his conception of proof (including
Cantor’s proof), and so on – revolves around it.
References
Hacker, Peter M. S., 1996, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Marion, Mathieu, 1995, ‘Wittgenstein and Finitism’. Synthese 105 (2): 141–176.
Marion, Mathieu, 2003, ‘Wittgenstein and Brouwer’. Synthese 137 (1): 103–127.
Methven, Steven J., 2020, ‘Ramsey’s record: Wittgenstein on infinity and generalization’. British
Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (6): 1116–1133.
Misak, Cheryl, 2016, Cambridge Pragmatism. From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein. Oxford Univ. Press.
Ramsey, Frank P. 1929 [1990]. ‘General Propositions and Causality’. Reprinted in F. P. Ramsey:
Philosophical Papers. 1990. Ed. D. H. Mellor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 145–
63.
Rumfitt, Ian, 2014, ‘Brouwer versus Wittgenstein on the Infinite and the Law of Excluded
Middle’. Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1): 93–108.
Sunday Greve, S. and W. Kienzler, 2016, 'Wittgenstein on Goedelian Incompleteness, Proofs
and Mathematical Practice: Reading Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Part I,
Appendix III, Carefully'. In: Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language. S. Greve and J. Macha,eds., Houndmills, Basingstroke. Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 76-116.
Weyl, Hermann, 1921 [1998]. ‘On the New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics’, In Mancosu,
Paolo (ed.), 1998, From Brouwer to Hilbert. The Debate on the Foundations of Mathematics in the
1920s, Oxford University Press, Pp. 86–118.

Sorin Bangu, "On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions | Sorin Bangu

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Ed. and trans. P. M. S. Hacker and
Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 4th edition 2009. [PI]Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1976, Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939,
edited by C. Diamond. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. [LFM]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1978 [1956 1st ed.]. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Revised
Edition by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe. Trans. G. E. M Anscombe. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell. [RFM]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 2016-. Interactive Dynamic Presentation (IDP) of Ludwig Wittgenstein's
philosophical Nachlass [http://wittgensteinonline.no/]. Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at
the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. Bergen: WAB. [IDP]
Acknowledgement
I thank Kevin Cahill, Jeffrey Schatz and Alois Pichler for insightful comments on previous versionsof this paper, as well as an annonymous referee. I am the only one responsible for the final version.

36

Sorin Bangu, "On the Grammar of Mathematical Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Lorenzo Barba

On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Lorenzo Barba (Chieri, Italy)
Abstract
In this paper I deal with the question of ’names’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus (henceforth TLP). This is a complex and widely debated question, but I hope tobe able to shed light on it thanks to a comparison with a particular method that it is possible
to see at work in Boltzmann’s writing on thermodynamics; it is an analogy which isparticularly evident in the proposition 6.341 where Wittgenstein describes the role of sciencein bringing “the description of the universe to a unified form” (TLP: 6.341). I hope that thiscomparison will help to clarify the difference between Wittgenstein’s way of dealing with thequestion and any attempt to build up a philosophical theory of proper names from either aphysicalistic or a phenomenological point of view. This attempt may be found in Russell’s
writings, but it is typical of neo-positivism as well; hence, I’ll try to show that Wittgenstein’s
approach to the question radically differs from these ones.

1. The Relationship between Names and Objects

Alan Watt once affirmed that Western philosophy has always paid more
attention to nouns-objects, whereas Eastern thought has conceived from its
origins the whole reality as a network of interrelated entities; so he described
the grammatical nature of the distinction between objects and events bymeans of an example:“What happens to my fist [noun-object] when I open my hand?” The object
miraculously vanishes because an action was disguised by a part of speechusually assigned to a thing! (Watt 1957: 25)
In tractarian terms, this is the description of the distinction between an eventor a ‘state of affairs’ (here is the action of clenching a fist), corresponding to a
proposition (“I'm clenching my fist”) and the object (that is a fist)
corresponding to the noun (“fist"). Wittgenstein, indeed, writes:
Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states ofaffairs” (TLP 4.1)
The name means the object. The object is its meaning. (TLP 3.203)
The idea of a linguistic origin of philosophical problems is crucial in Russell’sanalysis of language as well. Indeed Russell’s aim is to reduce metaphysics to
its linguistic origin, as it is clear from his interpretation of Parmenides:

Lorenzo Barba, "On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Lorenzo Barba

When you think, you think of something; when you use a name, it must be
the name of something. Therefore both thought and language require
objects outside themselves. And since you can think of a thing or speak of
it at one time as well as another, whatever can be thought of or spoken ofmust exist at all times. Consequently there can be no change, since change
consists in things coming into being or ceasing to be. (Russell 1945: 49)
We can observe here that, in his opinion, the philosophical question of Being isrooted in the linguistic question concerning proper names; hence this questionis relevant because of its metaphysical implications: the problem here is that ofdeciding if there is a stable reality beneath a surface of ever changing
appearances.
In addition, according to Russell, the question of 'proper names' is also related
to the logical problem of defining the meaning of a sentence where there is aworld which does not refer to anything; so, for example, we might ask
ourselves what the following sentence means: “The actual king of France isbald". As Diamond pointed out, Frege and Russel took different directions in
answering this question. Indeed, according to Russell when I utter that
sentence, what I really mean is that there is a king in France and he is bald, sothat the sentence is false. According to Frege, on the contrary, the meaning of
the components (i.e. the names) depends on the meaning of the wholesentence (Diamond 1996: 73-93; see also TLP 3.3): we can imagine that thesentence means that a certain ‘king of France' is bald; and therefore thesentence is meaningful, but we do not know whether it is true or false.
In the following paragraph I'd like to describe Russell’s solution to thequestion, in the next one I’ll try to show how much Wittgenstein’s approach isdifferent from Russell’s.

2.Russell and the Foundation of Physics

Russell’s analysis of language may be considered paradigmatic of the kind of
approach characterising empiricism and neo-positivism. In short he started
considering names as an abbreviation for descriptions (as in the previous
example):38

Lorenzo Barba, "On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Lorenzo Barba

Suppose some statement made about Bismarck. [...] What this person was
acquainted with were certain sense-data which he connected (rightly, we
will suppose) with Bismarck's body. His body as a physical object, and still
more his mind, were only known as the body and the mind connectedwith these sense-data. (Russell 1918: 125)
Then he distinguished between knowledge by description (which means being
able to analyse an object in its parts) and knowledge by acquaintance (that isthe direct knowledge of sense-data). Russell compared the ultimate
constituents of matter, say sense-data, to notes which are the ultimate
constituents of a symphony: a ‘thing', from this point of view, is not more
“real” nor “substantial” than the role of a trombone in the symphony, a “thing"is only a collections of sense-data or “sensibilia" (i.e. possible sense data). Thus,
as Hadot pointed out, for him the role of philosophy was to analyse language
and show that knowledge is grounded on experience (Hadot, 2004, p.64): his
aim was namely to establish “physics upon solipsistic basis" (Russell 1918: 92),
by building up all physical concepts from sense-data, or ‘sensibilia’.
The paradox, from Wittgenstein’s perspective, is that this theory requires
language to be formulated and Russell’s strategy implies therefore firstly that
it is thanks to a mental act consisting in being “acquainted with” sense-data
that we can make sense of our concepts and secondly that we should be able toset ourselves outside language to describe it (as Russell admitted in the Preface
to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus). In the next paragraph I'll try to show that
Wittgenstein’s aim was to prove the intrinsic limitations of this attempt.

3. Wittgenstein and the Insurmountability of Language

Wittgenstein, as opposed to empiricist and neo-positivism philosophers, ruledout the possibility of a philosophical foundation of physics. In the Tractatus,
indeed, there is no clear indication about the nature of objects names refers to;
besides Wittgenstein explicitly rules out the possibility of being able to say
what kind of elementary proportions there are (TLP 5.55 and 5.5571): names
for him can only be ‘named’ it is impossible to build meaningful sentences
about what names are (TLP 3.221). This means that, even if “empirical reality
is limited by the totality of objects” (TLP 5.5561), it is impossible to work out atheory about the ultimate constituents of the world (TLP 1.1) and to provide in

Lorenzo Barba, "On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Lorenzo Barba

this way a philosophical foundation of empirical knowledge (i.e. aphilosophical foundation of physics). I hope that the comparison with
Boltzmann method might help explain this crucial point.
Boltzmann faced up to the problem of determining the position of a moleculeof gas in space: it was very difficult because space is continuous and thenumber of possible positions is infinite. So he adopted a particular trick which
can be more easily explained when we consider two dimensions instead ofthree (adding the third dimension later does not change the kind of solution):
he imagined to cover the surface with a grid, which could be made of squares;
given an arbitrary dimension of the grid, we can assume that each particle
which occupies the same cell in the grid has the same position. In this way it ispossible to enumerate all the possible positions of a particle on the surface: thefiner the grid, the more accurate the description of the position of the particle
on the surface is (fig.1). Thus, if we have a function describing the behaviour ofthe particle, we can consider the ‘limit' of this function when the dimension of
the grid tends to zero: this is the ‘real' position of the particle in the continuum.
(Boltzmann 1995: 31 and 317, see also Laserna 2016: 38-39).

Wittgenstein described exactly this method in the proposition 6.341, where he
explained that in this way it is possible to find the “bricks for building theedifice of science” (TLP, 6.341). Similarly, Russell in his Mysticism and Logic
tried to determine the “ultimate constituents of matter", the “notes" the“symphony” is made of (Russell 1918: 76). Reductionism is namely the method
to solve philosophical problems though an analysis of language. Boltzmann, in

40

Lorenzo Barba, "On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Lorenzo Barba

a similar manner, described during a conference on Schopenhauer, what thegoal of the “philosophy of the future” was for him. It was to put an end to thepainful feeling that there is a mystery, this feeling is the spiritual migraine
which is ordinary named metaphysic (Boltzmann 1974: 198, see also Gargani
2008: 65-67 and Gargani 1992: 126-127). In the Tractatus this goal is to bereached by developing a sign-language, that prevents us from philosophicalconfusion (TLP 3.324) which generates when one word has two a moredifferent meanings (TLP3.323 and 3.325).
Wittgenstein, however, as opposed to Russell, does not specify what kind of‘bricks’ we need to build ‘the edifice of science’. On the contrary, he states thatit does not matter the kind of ‘bricks’ we have to use:
Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots. We now say:Whatever kind of picture these make I can always get as near as I like toits description, if I cover the surface with a sufficiently fine square
network and now say of every square that it is white or black. In this way I
shall have brought the description of the surface to a unified form. This
form is arbitrary, because I could have applied with equal success a net
with a triangular or hexagonal mesh. (TLP 6.341, see Fig.2).

Wittgenstein, here, adopts Boltzmann’s strategy: we can arbitrarily choose oursign-language and we will remove confusions by means of a process of logicalanalysis. Diamond (1996: 94-114) effectively described the basic features of thisanalysis by considering a sentence such as “Cesar is a prime number": theLorenzo Barba, "On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Lorenzo Barba

sentence might be analysed as Frege did, and in this case it will be regarded asa meaningful sentence (say “A certain Cesar is a prime number”) without areference (say a sentence we are not able to say if it true or false); similarly
Wittgenstein’s method consists in showing that the origin philosophicalproblems is that some parts of our sentences do not have a proper meaning(TLP, 6.53).
The problem is that we don’t know what the application of a sentence is; inCavell’s terms we don’t know its ‘projection’ (Cavell 1979: 172-189), we are notable to figure out in which context we would use that sentence, andaccordingly we don’t know what fact the sentence represents and what is thesentence about. We can imagine that in everyday life it is possible to reply byexplaining what we ‘meant’: in the example above, the element without adefinite meaning might be “Cesar" or “prime number", and we might therefore
imagine that we mean that “Cesar" is the name of a number even if it is not;the sentence would be meaningful and false in accordance to Russell's
analysis, and it wouldn’t be an elementary proposition, but a molecular one(“Cesar is a number and it is prime"). Conversely we could also imagine that“prime number” could be a metaphor for not having anything in common withother people, so that the sentence might be considered to be true. It is
accordingly the context that enables us to solve this kind of problems and tobuild up a sign-language where meanings are clearly shown (e.g. numbers are
represented by numerals):
Expressions like ‘1 is a number’, ‘there is only one number nought’, and all
like them are senseless. (TLP 4.1272) .
In a proper sign-language each sentence shows its meaning and what it isabout, as Wittgenstein remarked is his notebook on the 5th November 1914,
where he wrote that "the proposition represents the situation" "as it were off
its own bat" (“So stellt der Stz den Sachverhalt gleichsam auf eigene Faust dar")(Wittgenstein 1961: 26 and 26e, see also Gargani 1992: 152-157). In
the Tractatus, he gives therefore a model to follow while analysing language:
the meaning of the sentence must depend on the meaning of its components
which are nouns (TLP 3.318), the meaning of molecular proportions must
depend on the meaning of the elementary ones (TLP 4.4), and every kind of
implication must be expressed by means of logical connectors. In this way a42

Lorenzo Barba, "On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Lorenzo Barba

sign-language can make it explicit what we mean, and the criterion to be usedin building it up consists in paying attention to the application of logic(TLP3.262), as in the aforementioned example, and accordingly it is in this waythat it is possible to decide “what elementary propositions there are.” (TLP
5.557). Thanks to this analysis it is possible to reduce all the different
applications of language (different language games according to his later
terminology) to a single system and this is the aim of reductionism (TLP 6.341).
To conclude, an ‘ideal sign-language’ should be regarded only as the limit atwhich the analysis tends: it is the sign-language we obtain when every
problem has been clarified and where signs clearly show what they refer to, sothat we don’t have to look at the application of language to understand themeaning of the sentence (TLP 2.0211 and 2.0212). Accordingly we are not able
to describe our experience apart from our language, so that, as Wittgenstein
states, the “limits of language (of that language which alone I understand)mean the limits of my world.” (TLP 5.62). Thus, Wittgenstein’s approach to thequestion is completely different from Russell’s one: for him, it’s only within theinsurmountable dimension of language that it is possible to define ourexperience of the world (Hadot 2004: 72). It is therefore at the same time
impossible and pointless trying to define the nature of the constituents of theworld on which basis Russell aimed to ground the entire building of science.
In short, when Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus, he probably had in mind
Russell’s attempt to give a philosophical foundation of physics by defining theconstituents of knowledge we refer to by means of a special mental act (theseare sense-data or ‘possibilia’ we know by acquaintance). However,
Wittgenstein’s aim was to show the failure and the pointlessness of thisattempt which would have implicated to be able to describe language fromoutside.
References
Boltzmann, Ludwig E. (1974), On a Thesis of Schopenhauer’s. In: McGuinness, B. (eds)
Theoretical Physics and Philosophical Problems, Vienna Circle Collection, vol 5. Dordrecht:
Springer, pp.185-198
Boltzmann, Ludwig E. (1995), Lectures on the Theory of Gasses, New York: Dover Publication.
Cavell, Stanley (1979), The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lorenzo Barba, "On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Lorenzo Barba

Diamond, Cora (1991), The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, Cambridge,
MA, USA: MIT Press.
Gargani, Aldo G. (1992), Il Coraggio di Essere, Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Gargani, Aldo G. (2008), Wittgenstein. Musica, Parola Gesto, Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore.
Hadot, Pierre (2004), Wittgenstein Et les Limites du Langage, Paris: Libr. Philosophique J. Vrin.
Laserna, David B. (2016), “I paradossi quantistici” in Speciale Storica 5 (April), Bergamo:
National Geographic.
Russell, Bertrand A.W. (1918), Mysticism and Logic and other Essays. London: Allen and Unwin.
Russell, Bertrand A.W. (1945), A History of Western Philosophy, New York: Simon and Schuster.
Watts, Alan W. (1957), The Way of Zen, New York: Pantheon, 1957.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961). Notebooks, Hoboken (New Jersey): Wiley-Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1963), TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Übersetzt von D. F. Pears
und B. F. McGuinness. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. Second
impression, with a few corrections. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

44

Lorenzo Barba, "On the Nature of ‘Names' in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings | Marian Baukrowitz

Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond
Substantial and Austere Readings
Marian Baukrowitz (Berlin, Germany)
Abstract
The paradoxical claim in the Tractatus—that its propositions are nonsensical and serve as
elucidations—has given rise to two interpretations which are often contrasted. According tosubstantial readings the relevant propositions are technically nonsensical but have acommunicative function since they can somehow gesture at truths. According to Diamond’s
austere reading they are sheer nonsense but the speaker who wants to utter them can beunderstood due to imaginative activity. Both readings share a similar structure and weakness:
They absolutely deny sense on some level and then introduce a new rather obscure source ofsense to compensate for it. Both readings treat the prefix “non-“ in “nonsensical” as an
absolute denial of sense. An alternative reading is possible if the prefix “non-“ is treated as arelative denial of sense and if sense is understood as “direction” or “use”. Propositions withsense are those which direct all competent speakers by providing them with information
about facts in logical space. Someone who outright denies the relevance of informative
propositions would simply not be a competent speaker. Nonsensical propositions are thosewhich advertise different modes of being in logical space as such. If one accepts them one’s
life gains a new basic direction. Depending on how one relates to logical space as such theexperience of the world is transformed. Speakers can freely engage with and reject the
propositions without thereby altering their status as competent speakers: Nonsensicalpropositions thus only have a relative directing or guiding function.

Wittgenstein’s paradoxical claim in the Tractatus that the book’s propositions
are “nonsensical” and yet serve as “elucidations” (TLP 1974: 6.54) has givenrise to two readings which are often presented as polar opposites: Substantial
and austere readings.
The Substantial Reading

According to a “substantial” reading of the Tractatus Wittgenstein puts
forward a philosophical theory: the picture theory of language. Central to thistheory is the idea of an isomorphism between language and the world. The
world consists of combinations of x objects which can stand in y relations toeach other: It is mirrored by language which consists of x names which can be
combined to form y relations. In a well-formed proposition names are
combined in such a way that they picture possible combinations of objects(facts).
It is a side effect of this theory that only the propositions of natural science
which describe contingent facts in the world are meaningful while logicalMarian Baukrowitz, "Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings | Marian Baukrowitz

tautologies and contradictions have to be qualified as “senseless” and ethical,
aesthetic and philosophical propositions which proclaim metaphysical a priori
truths have to be rejected as “nonsensical”. The Tractatus-paradox is “solved”
by treating it as an uncomfortable side-effect of an otherwise valuable theory.
Such an interpretation is offered by Bertrand Russell in his 1922 introduction
to the Tractatus in which he also admits that is leaves him “with a certain
sense of intellectual discomfort” (TLP 1974: xxiv).
The Austere Reading

It is not surprising therefore that this reading was challenged by austereinterpreters who claim that a proper reading of Wittgenstein needs to do
justice to the fact that Wittgenstein calls philosophical propositions “simply […]nonsense” (TLP 1974: xxiv). Substantial readings introduce an unsounddistinction between propositions which are (a) sheer nonsense and (b)substantial nonsense: propositions which are technically nonsensical because
they violate the logical form of the proposition “but do manage to gesture
towards those things that cannot be put into plain words” (Diamond 2000:
150). Such a distinction is criticized because it practically re-introduces sense
through the back door.
The ambitious task of an austere reading is thus clear: It needs to be madeplausible how the nonsensical propositions of the Tractatus can dophilosophical work while being truly sheer nonsense. Cora Diamond (2000:
155) claims that “whenever someone wanted to say something metaphysical,
you show him that, as far as meaning goes, ‘piggly wiggle’ would do as well assome word he used”. If we were to translate all nonsensical metaphysicalpropositions of the Tractatus such as “Objects contain the possibility of all
situations” (TLP 1974: 2.014) simply to the nonsense of “piggly wiggle” it iswholly unclear how they could be used in a philosophically fruitful mannerand be related to problems discussed by Frege and Russell. If that, however, istrue then it seems that there need to be different kinds of nonsense and not
simply sheer nonsense. Diamond acknowledges that and in fact makes a
distinction between philosophically productive nonsense and unproductive
nonsense.
How does Diamond cash out the difference between these types of nonsense?
What all nonsensical propositions have in common is that they have not been

46

Marian Baukrowitz, "Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings | Marian Baukrowitz

given any sense: “A sentence that is meaningless is not any special kind ofsentence; it is a symbol which has the general form of a proposition, andwhich fails to have a sense simply because we have not given it any” (Diamond
2000: 151). Wherein they differ is that certain meaningless but potentially
productive propositions are accompanied by the illusion of sense. Such anillusion of sense could arise in the following way. Someone, for instance,
meaningfully uses the term “way” in the context of asking for the way to thenext bus stop. The word is then uttered in a new context in which it has no
defined use such as “The way that can be trodden is not the enduring andunchanging way.” While the word “way” has no sense in this new context theperson who utters it still carries with it the mental accompaniments ofmeaningful propositions in which it is used. Now mental accompaniments, as
Frege emphasized, are wholly irrelevant to the logical characteristics of asentence. We now have a vision of how the illusion of sense can arise: A word
is used in a context in which it has no defined use, but it still carries with itmental accompaniments which then create the illusion of sense.
How are these nonsensical propositions philosophically productive? According
to Diamond we cannot understand them – they are truly nonsensical – but wecan understand the person drawn to them. “To want to understand the person
who talks nonsense is to want to enter imaginatively the taking of that
nonsense for sense. [The Tractatus demands of its readers] a kind ofimaginative activity, an exercise of the capacity to enter into the taking ofnonsense for sense, of the capacity to share imaginatively the inclination tothink that one is thinking something in it. If I could not as it were see yournonsense as sense, imaginatively let myself feel its attractiveness, I could notunderstand you” (Diamond 2000: 157– 158). Such an imaginative activity
would clarify that metaphysical propositions never satisfy our actual criteria
for sense and thus help us abandon them as nonsensical.
Diamond attempts to save the status of nonsensical propositions as radicallynonsensical by radically disconnecting the speaker whom we can understandfrom his nonsensical sentences which we cannot understand. Such a
disconnect does not easily fit the Tractatus in which meaning is tied to how
speakers use signs: “What signs fail to express, their application shows. Whatsigns slur over, their application says clearly.” (TLP 3.262). The status ofunderstanding a speaker while not understanding his sentences which are

Marian Baukrowitz, "Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings | Marian Baukrowitz

sheer nonsense remains obscure. The austere reading seems to repeat themalaise of the substantial reading. Both readings affirm that nonsensicalpropositions are nonsensical and thus strictly speaking incomprehensible.
Both try to give a philosophical account of how these nonsensical propositions
can do work. Both re-introduce a hidden source of sense: The substantial
reading introduces truths which can be gestured at and comprehended; theaustere reading introduces speakers whom we can understand imaginatively.
The Prefix “Non-”: Absolute vs. Relative Negation

The repetition of the same structure in both readings points to a shared source:
In both readings the prefix “non-“ in “nonsensical propositions” is taken as an
absolute negation of sense. Trying to find some sort of understandability inpropositions whose sense is radically denied might be as futile as trying tosolve the equation “x*0=1”. The explicit and radical denial of sense makes it
necessary for a new variety of “sense” to re-emerge in both readings. An
alternative approach is possible if one interprets the prefix “non-“ as a relative
denial of sense which is inspired by a certain every-day-use of the German
words Sinn (sense) and Unsinn (nonsense).
The key to understanding how the prefix “non-“ could be used as a relative
negation in the Tractatus is to emphasize that the German word Sinn (sense) in
every-day-language can be used with the meaning of direction or use.
Propositions which have sense in the Tractatus are those which are able todirect language-users. They are able to do this because they point at facts in theworld. The paradigmatic case Wittgenstein thinks of in the Tractatus is aspeaker who is stuck because he lacks information about the world and thencan go on because he gets the relevant information. What is called the picture
theory of language is an attempt to clarify how this directing function could
work so smoothly. “The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of thepicture’s elements with things” (TLP 1974: 2.1514). Since picture and pictured
reality share a logical form “[l]ogical pictures can depict the world” (TLP 1974:
2.19) in a determinate manner. Signs such as “Es regnet” or “Дождь идет” canprovide precise information about the world because they share its logicalform. Someone who does not understand informative propositions and is notdirected by them – does not take information into account to guide theiractions – is simply not a competent speaker.

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Marian Baukrowitz, "Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings | Marian Baukrowitz

If propositions with sense are combined to form tautologies or contradictions
they become senseless (sinnlos). “I know nothing about the weather when I
know that it is either raining or not raining” (TLP 1974: 4.461). That tautologies
are necessarily true and contradictions necessarily false, however, “shows theformal – logical – properties of the world” (TLP 1974: 6.12). Logical
propositions display the logical form which a speaker needs to understand sothat informative language can get off the ground. Someone who fails to regard
objects as self-identical could not understand any proposition and there would
be no way to inform him about the logical properties of the world. It issenseless therefore to inform someone about logic because only a person who
already recognizes logical form can detect it in logical propositions.
Propositions with sense and those which lack sense demarcate what allcompetent speakers understand: The necessarily logically structured world ofcontingent facts. While every competent speaker in principle knows how tohandle an informative proposition such as “There are mice in the kitchen” aperson can be a competent speaker and reject as nonsensical orincomprehensible propositions such as “Jesus Christ is our Lord and Savior”,“All problems of philosophy are confusions of everyday-language” or “In thefield of emptiness being and non-being are two superimposed layers of reality”
which do not simply point towards facts in the world. An example of such arejection is reported by C.G. Jung (1995: 74-75) who interpreted the dream of apatient as an unconscious death-wish to which the patient replied with theword “Nonsense!” (“Unsinn!”). Later the patient died due to risky behavior.
Jung thinks if the patient had accepted his interpretation he would havesurvived because he would have gained a new perspective on his whole life.
The point here is the following: Nonsensical propositions would give the life of
those who accept them a specific direction but a speaker can reject them without
thereby losing the status as a competent speaker. For example: If I am at the
airport and reject the information on destination boards, boarding passes andso on as nonsensical I am not a competent speaker. If I meet a group on theway to the airport who propose a specific worldview which does not proclaim
specific facts but expresses a general way of relating to the world of facts as awhole – whatever contingent facts may be the case – it is a fair move to either
accept their attitude or to reject it. The prefix “non-“ denies the absolute
directing function of propositions with sense which every competent speaker

Marian Baukrowitz, "Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings | Marian Baukrowitz

needs to take into account but affirms a relative directing function which
depends on the person who engages with them.
How does the relative directing function work? The nonsensical propositionsof ethics, aesthetics and philosophy express different ways of inhabiting logicalspace. While logical propositions such as “Either it does rain or it does notrain”, “Either P is killed or P is not killed” showcase the logical structure of theworld ethical propositions express different ways of relating to logical space. A
relation to logical space can be grasped as a specific pattern which is affirmed
in relation to it. A specific ethical mode of being would, for instance, recognizethat both propositions “P is killed” or “P is not killed” are logically possible but
exclude one possibility as absolutely shameful. Due to excluding certain logicalpossibilities as shameful and affirming others as absolutely good logical spaceis in some sense modified. The world one inhabits is not merely logical space
but logical space transformed by the ethical relation one has to it. The person
who adopts a certain ethical attitude which affirms the absolute value of otherhuman beings might gain happiness since he is convinced that his life has ageneral, meaningful direction whatever facts may occur. “If the good or bad
exercise of the will does alter the world, it can only alter the limits of theworld, not the facts – not what can be expressed by means of language” (TLP
1974: 6.423). Similar to how someone who does not already think logicallycannot be made to understand and accept as valid logical space by informing
him about it, someone cannot be made to understand and accept an ethicalattitude towards logical space by giving him information. Understanding
logical space means being in it, understanding an ethical attitude means living
it and no one else can undertake that for you. Nonsensical ethical propositions
support and advertise modes of being and thus aim to direct other speakers
who however remain free to reject them: A mode of being advertised as
salvific by one speaker can be rejected as sick and misguided by anotherspeaker while both according to the Tractatus remain fully competent users of
informative language. Furthermore speakers only truly understandnonsensical propositions when they adopt the advertised mode of being whichmight be impossible for them. Likewise the strict philosophical distinction
between propositions with sense, senseless propositions and nonsensicalpropositions the Tractatus advertises as a solution to all philosophicalproblems, expresses a philosophical attitude towards the world which a reader

50

Marian Baukrowitz, "Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings | Marian Baukrowitz

can adopt if the reader himself manages to adopt it but which could also be
rejected without denying any facts about the world.
Conclusion

An alternative interpretation or solution of the Tractatus-paradox is now
possible: The propositions of the Tractatus are neither called nonsensicalbecause they are absolutely nonsensical and incomprehensible nor because
they merely technically violate the logical form of the proposition but because
they only manage to be of use to speakers if they freely engage with them in a
specific way. The relevant potentially productive nonsensical propositions
direct people by inviting them to a new form of life. The invitation can berejected and may not even be understood. The suggested, intimidated, hinted
at form of life is only adequately understood once it is actually lived. Once theform of life is actually lived the relative directing function of nonsensicalpropositions is superfluous and they can be discarded.
References
Diamond, Cora (2000) “Ethics, imagination and the method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, in
Crary & Read (eds.) The New Wittgenstein, New York: Routledge, 149-173
Jung, Carl Gustav (1995) Über die Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit. Ostfildern: Patmos
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. With an Introduction by Bertrand
Russell, London: Routledge

Marian Baukrowitz, "Wittgenstein’s Use of the Prefix “Non-” in the Tractatus: Beyond Substantial and Austere Readings". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein | Beatrice Beccari

The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s
Influence on Wittgenstein
Beatrice Beccari (Ferrara, Italia)
Abstract
In this paper I will argue that Wittgenstein’s metaphysical subject is a reformulation of
Schopenhauer’s pure subject of cognition, which is compared to the “eternal eye of the world”.
The overall aim of this paper is to show that a careful consideration of the role of intuition in
Schopenhauer’s philosophy can offer new insights into the influence he had on Wittgenstein.
In particular, this work starts from the conception of the sub specie aeterni, which is a
Spinozian expression that Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein use to address the aesthetic
experience. This notion is strictly related with contemplation, the detached andcomprehensive experience of a totality, a whole, that configures the subject-world
relationship in a peculiar way. In this eternal present, subject and world merge and thisresults in a change in the way of seeing and living things. I will first outline Schopenhauer’s
account of sub specie aeterni to highlight the pivotal notions related to this conception inaesthetics and ethics. I will then turn to Wittgenstein to examine how he elaborates on
Schopenhauer’s thought especially in the Notebooks.

1. In this paper I claim that by accessing the Tractatus through the notion of
the sub specie aeterni, Schopenhauer’s influence on Wittgenstein will gain in
depth. In particular I argue that Wittgenstein’s metaphysical subject is areformulation of Schopenhauer’s pure subject of cognition. The sub specie
aeterni is the expression that both philosophers use to account for thecomprehensive experience of the world that is temporally defined as eternalpresent and spatially characterized as a totality, a whole. The result of thiscontemplation is an alteration of perspective, in the way of seeing and livinglife.
In the following section I will present Schopenhauer’s account on aesthetics
and ethics from The World as Will and Representation. In the last section, I willturn to Wittgenstein to examine how he elaborates on the Schopenhauerianconceptions.
2. Sub specie aeterni or sub aeternitatis specie appears in §34 of The World as
Will and Representation [=WWR] in a quotation of Spinoza’s Ethica: «The mind
is eternal to the extent that it conceives things under the form of eternity (subaeternitatis specie)». With this temporal expression Schopenhauer deepens the52

Beatrice Beccari, "The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein | Beatrice Beccari

explanation of aesthetic contemplation, when «The particular thing instantly
becomes the Idea of its species and the intuiting individual becomes the puresubject of cognition» (WWR 202).
Contemplation is a peculiar cognizant moment that all of a sudden disrupts theordinary way of knowing, i.e. representation.
Representation is the distiction and reciprocal relation between subject andobject: this is the transcendental condition of knowledge. «No object without
subject; no subject without object» repeats Schopenhauer. The subject knows
only appearances through the transcendental forms of time, space andcausality. Accordingly, we only know things-for-us. Representations arise froma pre-theoretical activity, that human beings and animals share, as a result of
the processing of sensory stimuli that affect the body. The object is recognizedas such because it is the cause of the sensitive perception felt by the body, i.e.
the subject. The highly developed human brain can further process every
representation and abstract from the instantaneous and countless sensitive
origin through concepts and judgements. Thanks to rationality we build
systems of knowledge (sciences) and operate with representations ofrepresentations.
Nonetheless, while we are aware of ourselves as knowing subjects, we also
stand in an immediate identity with our body. There is no conceptual
mediation, hence representation, although this is how the subject canrepresent itself as an object. The willing subject is what we know of ourself inrepresentation, yet we are both simultaneously and immediately. It is fromhere that what we call will, the intimate, immediate and individual essence ofthe subject is extended by Schopenhauer with an analogical deduction to theworld (the totality of objects).
When contemplation has the upper hand, representation is suspended andrarefied. The subject loses itself in the object, it obliterates its individuality, theconnection with its body. Consequently, the subject does no longer apply theform of representation, hence it exits the flow of time to enter the dimensionof the nunc stans, the endless present, eternity. The subject becomes the«eternal eye of the world» (WWR 308). Equally, the object is isolated from any
connection with other objects, including the individual and its body. The

Beatrice Beccari, "The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein | Beatrice Beccari

subject-object relation is balanced, the two merge and collapse into each other:
the subjective self-consciousness vanishes into the pervasive existence of theobject, that becomes a totality, and at the same time this "pure" subject
acknowledges to be the actual bearer of the object as a totality.
Schopenhauer describes this knowledge as a consideration according to the«what» and not to the «where, when, why, wherefore, and how» (WWR 201).
This «what» is the content of contemplation, the platonic Ideas, the intuitive
eternal and universal archetypes (genus). They are the highest level ofappearances we can represent, since they are not touched by individuationand plurality (species). The intuitive elevation is basically a view that is
irreducible to concepts. It evokes the meta-physical, the world – if any –beyond physics, i.e. representation, which shall be an unlimited whole, a realmof indistinction and timelessness, which is completely opposite to our limited
standpoint of representation.
Consequently, the «World as Will» is the world known as an Idea, grasped as atimeless totality, where the Will is the Urphänomen. It is the best concept we
can use to represent something that goes beyond representation by staying
within its limits (WWR 135; Barbera 1989). Schopenhauer proposes an original
Platonic reading of the Kantian dualism of appearance-Thing-in-itself, whichcorresponds to the doxa-épisteme distinction and to the existential dualism offinitude-eternity.
Philosophy – states Schopenhauer – aims to answer the question: «What is life
about?» and to solve the riddle of existence, that is the meaning of death. The
riddle arises from the opposition of finitude and eternity. Contemplation is thesource of the feeling of eternity and this is what art and authentic philosophy
address. From the sub specie aeterni dimension we can philosophically grasp
the transcendental and metaphysical truth that «The indivisible point thattouches the tangent [of the spinning circle of time] would be the extensionlesspresent: as the tangent does not roll with the circle, the present, the object’s
point of contact (whose form is time) does not roll with the subject (which has
no form) because it does not itself belong to what can be cognized but is rather
the condition for everything that is» (WWR 306). The subject and the Will stayin the extensionless present, since they are transcendental-metaphysicalcondition of the representation. Since the latter is in fact appearance, it is an54

Beatrice Beccari, "The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein | Beatrice Beccari

illusion. Life, normally intended as limited, appears in its truthful notempirical endlessness. Thanks to philosophy one can overcome the fear ofdeath (that for Schopenhauer is the source of the metaphysical puzzlementthat inspires religion and philosophy) for it is only the apparent end of one’s
own life when considered empirically, within representation.
As a result, contemplation feels good: «Everyone is well in the state [ofcontemplation] where he is all things; but is poorly where he is only one
thing» (WWRs 388). Schopenhauer explains that we move to «A state in which
our personality, our willing with its constant agony, disappears for as long as
the pure, aesthetic delight continues» (WWR 246). This intuitive well-being
consists in a dis-interested attitude, since it is a will-less consciousness
detached from affection and intentionality. Since our essence is the Will to live,
which manifests itself in our body and in our cognitive capacity, hence
knowledge is at the service of the Will to live, the suspension of the ordinary
Will-affirming representation frees the individual from any implication withthe world and body. We acquire a sort of gaze from above, a standpoint fromthe outside, which is not a physical dislocation, but rather a change inperspective, and ultimately a relief.
Similarly, Schopenhauer explains that ethics depends on a similar dynamic.
The subject «Lifts his gaze from the particular to the universal, when he views
his own suffering as a mere example of the whole and, becoming a genius in
the ethical sense, treats it as one case in a thousand, so that the whole of life,
seen essentially as suffering, brings him to the point of resignation» (WWR
423).
Compassion is the feeling that entails a suspension of the subject-object
distinction on a practical level. It enables one to exceed one’s own
individuality in its egoistic interests. We feel the same with the others and thewhole world since we all share the same essence. This is the Urphänomen of
ethics. This ethical intuition sometimes occurs as a detached perspective of thewhole path of one’s life and suffering. It provides a «conversion» or a«transcendental alteration» in the subject. In very rare cases this alteration is
so fully embraced that it becomes an ascetic ethos. Hermits and saints turndown any act of «affirmation of the Will» by silencing the immediate home of
the Will: the body. Consequently, they are also able to enter the a-cognizant

Beatrice Beccari, "The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein | Beatrice Beccaridimension of the Nothingness, the complete absence of representation (subjectobject distinction), the absolute, since they totally unite with God. This mysticalunion is the most excellent example of the «negation of the Will».
According to Schopenhauer, ethics and aesthetics depends on intuition and a
specific disposition towards life and world, felt or seen as a relative whole.
Philosophy has to make clear that even if they are its tool «Concepts are barren
when it comes to the true and inner nature of virtue, just as they are forart» (WWR 395). The philosopher puts into words the intuitions to point out
the truth and authenticity of the contemplative experiences, in order tosafeguard the possibility of virtue and beauty.
3. In the first part of Tractatus [=TLP] 6.45 Wittgenstein states: «Die
Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre Anschauung als – begrenztes –Ganzes». The Odgen edition translates Anschauung (intuition) with «view»,
Pears/McGuinness edition with «contemplation». This oscillation of terms
works well and can be explained if Schopenhauer is taken into account. As theprevious section shows, the role of intuition is crucial for Schopenhauer’s
philosophy and it is strictly linked to the sub specie aeterni account. For, it isexactly through intuition that we experience the world in its aesthetical andethical aspects, which is ultimately an experience of a «relative totality», what
Wittgenstein calls a «limited whole».
Wittgenstein seems to follow Schopenhauer and he presents exactly thisdouble path of intuition: the aesthetical one of the sub specie aeterni and theethical one of the intuition as a feeling, which is the Mystical (6.45 TLP). In TLP
6.421 Wittgenstein writes that ethics and aesthetics are one since they aretranscendental condition (as logic) and cannot be expressed. As the Mystical,
they can only show themselves (TLP 6.522). Wittgenstein dwells also on theconcepts of time and eternity related to death which is seen as an apparent
end, similarly to Schopenhauer (TLP 6.4311).
I suggest taking the sub specie aeterni as a preferential point of access to
explore the influence of Schopenhauer on Wittgenstein. I refer in particular to
the Notebooks [=NB] where the expression seems to play an important rolefrom a genetic standpoint. It appears that this expression helps Wittgenstein toreach the conclusion of a long consideration began in June 1916 about God and56

Beatrice Beccari, "The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein | Beatrice Beccari

the meaning of life. With sub specie aeterni (NB 83) Wittgenstein is finally able
to detect the nature of the connection between aesthetics (the work of art) andethics (the good life) which he previously found because of the coincidence of«world» and «Life». Ethics and aesthetics are conditions of the world/life (NB
77).
These remarks bring about the Schopenhauerian dualism of perspectives, theinherent one of the representation and the exceptional distant one of intuition(from the outside), which opens onto metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics. In
Wittgenstein’s case metaphysics is substituted by logic, but the result isanyway a vision of a whole, which arises from a different relation with theworld of a cognizant kind, since it is philosophy that allows us to acknowledge
this change in perspective.
«The object is seen together with space and time instead of in space and time.
The thing seen sub specie aeternitatis is the thing seen together with the whole
logical space» (NB 83). In fact, we are always within the limits of thought when
we trace its limits by depicting the condition of language and thought. This
whole is limited, relative and not absolute. It is undeniable that althoughimmanently, the philosopher (which is a subject) has to reach a different
standpoint to draw this conclusion and Wittgenstein seems to find the rightone in Schopenhauer’s account of contemplation.
While addressing the «what» (as Schopenhauer says and does), which is the
Mystical (TLP 6.44) – to which the «how» of the world is indifferent (TLP 6.432)– Wittgenstein writes: «The solution to the problem of life is to be seen in thedisappearance of this problem. But is it possible for one so to live that life stops
being problematic? That one is living in eternity and not in time?» (NB 74; TLP
6.521). The answer is to get to the endless present standpoint from which
philosophically speaking the problems dissolve. «Only a man who lives not intime but in the present is happy. For life in the present there is no death. Deathis not an event in life. It is not a fact of the world. If by eternity is understood
not infinite temporal duration but non-temporality, then it can be said that aman lives eternally if he lives in the present» (NB 74-75; TLP 6.4311).
The dissolution of the problem of life is then about a qualitative alteration
which has nothing to do with contingent and factual changes (and solutions).

Beatrice Beccari, "The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein | Beatrice Beccari«The world of the happy is a different world from the world of theunhappy» (NB 77) since «If good or evil willing affects the world it can only
affect the boundaries of the world, not the facts, what cannot be portrayed bylanguage but can only be shewn in language. In short, it must make the world
a wholly different one. The world must, so to speak, wax or wane as a whole.
As if by accession or loss of meaning» (NB 73; TLP 6.43). The change comesfrom the experience of the world – life – as a «whole» that is altered in terms ofwaxing and waning its limits or outlines.
This recalls the loss of individuation that occurs in contemplation as
Schopenhauer explains it, especially in ethics. By overcoming the subjective
egoistical boundaries, we extend the world which conversely would beparticularly restricted. It is in ethics that the intuition is less cognizant andmore disruptive, it may result in a spiritual conversion.
In the NB Wittgenstein dwells also on the Schopenhauerian distinction
between willing and knowing subject, which is ultimately solved with themetaphysical subject.
It is interesting that Wittgenstein uses the same image of Schopenhauer «theextensionless point», the point in which the subject touches the circle of time,
but he places stress upon the spatial aspect to underline the issue of subject inphilosophy. Moreover, Wittgenstein keeps the metaphor of the eye and adds
the spatial image of visual field to detect the raw nerve of this kind of
philosophical discussions.
We can meet the «I» on the limit of the world, as it shows itself silently as an«extensionless point» and it shrinks to disappear. Philosophically, hence
logically, we can only grasp a manifestation of the subject as it is a conditionand not an element of the whole, the eye-field, what we call «my world» (TLP
5.62-5.641). What is shown is the relation of coordination, where the nonindividual subject disappears into the correspondent world (NB 82). Thus, theknowing subject treated as part of the world is a mere «superstition», an«illusion» (NB 80). Any discourse that assigns to the subject a metaphysical or
epistemological importance – even transcendentally – says what cannot be
said, being anything necessary outside the possibilities of the saying. Equally,
the willing subject is affected – despite this metaphysical treatment of the58

Beatrice Beccari, "The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein | Beatrice Beccari

subject is for Wittgenstein tempting and puzzling, as the NB entries attest. In
fact, if the subject belongs to the showing, the scaffold of the world, which issuch as pictured in the language, it may suggest that the world is more thanjust a picture.
While Schopenhauer’s philosophy is completely exceeded as an attempt to say
what cannot be said, it is its intuitive core which is inspirational for
Wittgenstein. The showing in TLP elaborates Schopenhauer’s contemplationand in fact it maintains the relation with the visual and intuitive experience
which Schopenhauer assigns to arts and ethics. Since Wittgenstein adopts alsoa transcendental framework twisting it from epistemology to logic, he canfollow Schopenhauer’s dualistic movement of thought.
Wittgenstein reformulates Schopenhauer’s pure eye of the world conception,
since as the metaphysical subject of TLP: (a) it is not an individual subject and it
has to do with a whole, the life-world perceived in its totality (theSchopenhauerian Idea); (b) world and subject collapse in a theoretical andpractical sense; (c) this takes place on the limits of language/representation interms of exposition; (d) it does not alter the world, but provides a qualitativechange in terms of view and attitude towards the world; (e) it helps to dissolve
the metaphysical and existential riddles.
With the sub specie aeterni and following Schopenhauer Wittgenstein finds theway to introduce and also exclude the subject, the ethics and aesthetics fromthe TLP, since it is logic as an activity that safeguards the authenticity of theseintuitions together with the metaphysical puzzlement of existence.
References
Barbera, Sandro (1989) Schopenhauer e Goethe: dall’attimo al fenomeno originario, Iride 2,
41-63.
Schopenhauer, Arthur (2010) The World as Will and Representation. Vol. 1. Transl. and edit. by
J. Norman et al. Introd. by C. Janaway. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. = WWR
Schopenhauer, Arthur (2018) The World as Will and Representation. Vol. 2. Transl. and edit. by
J. Norman et al. Introd. by C. Janaway. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. = WWRs
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979) Notebooks 1914–1916. Hg. von G. H. von Wright und G. E. M.
Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. = NB

Beatrice Beccari, "The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein | Beatrice Beccari

Wittgenstein,

Ludwig(1989)

Logisch-philosophische

Abhandlung/

Tractatus

logico-philosophicus. Hg. von B. F. McGuinness und Joachim Schulte. Kritische Edition. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp. [„Synoptische“ Ausgabe] = TLP

60

Beatrice Beccari, "The World as Limited Whole : A Few Remarks on Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel |Alexander Berg

The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel
Alexander Berg (Zurich, Switzerland)
Abstract
Why does the Tractatus end in such a peculiar, paradoxical, self-negating way? This paper
traces Wittgenstein’s philosophical development in Cambridge through the prism of his
psychological studies and research. One major influence was Charles Samuel Myers, underwhose guidance Wittgenstein developed his own psychological experiments and methods inCambridge. Myers’s explicitly empirical, scientific approach also paved the way for the evendeeper impression that William James and his work The Varieties of Religious Experience latermade on the young Wittgenstein. Through the Varieties, Wittgenstein found inspiration in therich tradition of Christian mysticism, which prompted him not only to make certain
momentous decisions in his own personal life, but also to consider how the insights of themystics might be translatable into a philosophical method. James’s references to Hegel’s
philosophy and his project of a ‘method of absolute negativity’ are particularly notable in thisregard. The paper charts the course of this intellectual development, in which Wittgenstein
attempted to unite his logical and philosophical insights with certain ethical demands rooted
in our form of life. This ultimately culminated in the literary form of his early masterwork,
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

I.

In 1912, just as Wittgenstein was beginning his study of philosophy at
Cambridge, a new psychological laboratory was being built to house thepsychological research projects that until then had been dispersed across theuniversity. The laboratory was an initiative of Charles Samuel Myers, who had
been teaching experimental psychology in Cambridge since 1909. Wittgensteinmust have met Myers at one of the numerous concerts and musical events at
which the small university city’s intellectual elite relaxed after a hard day’swork.
He probably even attended the meeting of the Moral Science Club in earlyFebruary 1912, at which Myers presented the findings of his expeditions to theIndonesian natives and described (and even performed) their ‘primitive
music’, because shortly thereafter Wittgenstein began to conduct his own
psychological experiments.
In his diary, David Pinsent documented regular experimental sessions inwhich he was examined as a test subject using an apparatus designed by
Wittgenstein himself. It is not known what exactly this apparatus looked like

Alexander Berg, "The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel |Alexander Bergor how it functioned. Presumably, however, a kind of metronome wasinvolved, whose sound could be altered in order that the subject’s subjective
perception could be compared with the objectively played sound. By May,
Wittgenstein had completed the apparatus and begun the experimental phase.
In an entry dated 15 May, Pinsent comments:
At 2.30 I went chez Wittgenstein and we went on to the Psychological
Laboratory, where I had arranged to act as a ‘subject’ in some experiments
he is trying: to ascertain the extent and importance of rhythm in music.
Not bad fun. (PPW 1990: 3)
When designing this apparatus, Wittgenstein undoubtedly benefited from his
earlier studies of mechanical engineering in Berlin and Manchester. Later,
during the Second World War, Wittgenstein must have undertaken anothervery similar project: his friend Maurice O’Connor Drury remembers that
Wittgenstein worked on an apparatus that was intended to compare heart
rhythm and breathing rate:
I travelled up to Newcastle to spend a few days with Wittgenstein […]. He
took me to his room in the Research Department and showed me theapparatus which he himself had designed for his investigation. Dr Grant
had asked him to investigate the relationship between breathing (depth
and rate) and pulse (volume and rate).
Wittgenstein […] had made several improvements in the original
apparatus, so much so that Dr Grant had said he wished Wittgenstein had
been a physiologist and not a philosopher. (MDC 1981: 147)
This second apparatus was still somewhat related to Myers’s research in
Cambridge. It was to be used to study ‘shell shock’, a concept which Myers had
introduced into the psychological literature during the First World War (Myers
1940) and which, under the influence of Wittgenstein’s research in Newcastle,
then got abandoned and broken down into individual descriptions ofsymptoms (Monk 1991: 444–445).

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Alexander Berg, "The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel |Alexander Berg

A lively discussion that Wittgenstein mentioned to Russell in June suggests that
this intensive contact with Myers and his own experimental psychologicalresearch stimulated Wittgenstein’s philosophical thoughts on the relationshipbetween logic and psychology:
I had a discussion with Myers about the relations between Logic andPsychology. I was very candid and I am sure he thinks that I am the mostarrogant devil who ever lived. Poor Mrs Myers who was also present got—
I think—quite wild about me. (22 June 1912, WC 2008: 30)
However, this dispute does not seem to have caused any deep rift, because
shortly afterwards Myers asked Wittgenstein to explain and publicly
demonstrate his apparatus at the ceremonial opening of the new research
centre on 13 July 1912 (McGuinness 1988: 128). In the British Journal of
Psychology, this event is documented as an ‘Experiment on Rhythm(Demonstration), L. Wittgenstein and B. Muscio (Introduced by C.S.
Myers)’ (cited in McGuinness 1988: 128, fn. 95).

II.

Besides Myers, another important influence on Wittgenstein’s psychologicalstudies was William James. James’s psychological research was very popular,
and his Principles of Psychology (1890) was considered a standard textbook of
the still-young discipline. G. E. Moore, whose psychology lectures Wittgenstein
attended at that time, had also studied James’s Principles in detail in
preparation for those lectures.
However, it was another book by James—The Varieties of Religious Experience:
A Study in Human Nature (1902)—that would have a lasting impression on
Wittgenstein. In Wittgenstein’s letter to Russell of 22 June, where he mentions
the disagreement with Myers about his views on the relation between logic
and psychology, he reveals what was actually on his mind:
Whenever I have time I now read James’s ‘Varieties of religious
exp[erience]’. This book does me a lot of good. I don’t mean to say that I
will be a saint soon, but I am not sure that it does not improve me a little
in a way in which I would like to improve very much: namely I think that

Alexander Berg, "The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel |Alexander Bergit helps me to get rid of the Sorge (in the sense in which Goethe used theword in the 2nd part of Faust). (WC 2008: 30)
This is notable for several reasons. First, of course, it is interesting that
Wittgenstein read the Varieties at all. Alongside Russell’s Principles ofMathematics and Frege’s Begriffsschrift, it was one of the few philosophicalbooks that Wittgenstein had engaged with in any sort of depth by that point.
Then there is the book’s content. James spends over 400 pages discussing
topics such as conversion, holiness, religious ecstasy and the mystical,
adopting a descriptive, psychological approach in which these things aretreated as mental phenomena. Much of the book is devoted to detailed
documentation of reported experiences with them; this part reads more like acaptivating novel than a scientific textbook. The individual reports areembedded in James’s wide-ranging, deeply philosophical observations.
From the book, Wittgenstein learned not only about James’s philosophicalpragmatism but also Kant’s transcendental philosophy, Hegel and British
idealism. But most importantly, James’s Varieties shares detailed, criticalobservations on the state of the new scientifically and empirically oriented
psychology. With regard to Wittgenstein’s later ideas in the Tractatus, it issurprising to see that James was already pointing out in the Varieties that therationalistic investigations undertaken by the natural sciences andexperimental psychology appeared to have an inadequate grasp of, or even toignore, the deep significance of certain aspects of the mind for human life:
If we look on man’s whole mental life as it exists, on the life of men thatlies in them apart from their learning and science, and that they inwardly
and privately follow, we have to confess that the part of it of whichrationalism can give an account is relatively superficial. (James 1902: 72)
It might have been after close reading of these very passages that Wittgenstein
took against his teacher Myers, who favoured the rationalist and empiricist
approach to science. And they may have also critically shaped the Tractatus,
which at the end turns away from a logical-empiricist approach towards one ofparadoxical self-negation. This turning point in the Tractatus mirrors James’s
argument that some of our unconscious insights are able to grasp a deeper andmore profound truth than the logical-empirical sciences can attain:

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Alexander Berg, "The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel |Alexander Berg

It [i.e. science] is the part that has the prestige undoubtedly, for it has theloquacity, it can challenge you for proofs, and chop logic, and put you
down with words. But it will fail to convince or convert you all the same, if
your dumb intuitions are opposed to its conclusions. If you have intuitions
at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious
level which rationalism inhabits.
Your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs, yourdivinations, have prepared the premises, of which your consciousness
now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely knowsthat that result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk,however clever, that may contradict it. (ibid.)
When Wittgenstein later explicitly emphasised the ethical point of his
Tractatus in a letter to the publisher Ludwig von Ficker—a point that,
however, is not directly expressed in the work, but is to be found outside it,delimited, as it were, by that which can be said (in the propositions of naturalscience)—and identified precisely this unsayable as the important part, he may
have been inspired to do so by his reading of James’s Varieties of Religious
Experience:
The point of the book is ethical. [It] consists of two parts: of the one which
is here, and of everything which I have not written. And precisely thissecond part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within,
as it were, by my book; and I’m convinced that, strictly speaking, it can
ONLY be delimited in this way. (November 1919, Monk 1991: 178)
James may have given Wittgenstein the initial impetus towards a new view ofthe mind and mental life, shifting him away from the scientific, analytical viewthat yields externally observable and ‘sayable’ results and towards a view ofthe mind as possessing an subconscious, mystically experienceable dimensionthat only ‘shows itself’ in certain human situations.
It is striking that James characterises the awareness of this mystical,
subconscious dimension of mental life as the essential motivation of Hegelianphilosophy, and derives from it ‘the Aufgabe’ (task, demand) of ‘making it
articulate’:Alexander Berg, "The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel |Alexander Berg

What reader of Hegel can doubt that that sense of a perfected Being withall its otherness soaked up into itself, which dominates his whole
philosophy, must have come from the prominence in his consciousness ofmystical moods like this, in most persons kept subliminal? The notion isthoroughly characteristic of the mystical level, and the Aufgabe of making
it articulate was surely set to Hegel’s intellect by mystical feeling. (James1902: 379, fn. 1)
It is likely that Wittgenstein read this passage carefully, since in the same
chapter James gave him his first introduction to Angelus Silesius as aninspiring example of a negative mystic. This appears to have had a deep andlasting impact on Wittgenstein; years later, when trying to explain theTractatus to Russell, he attributed the work’s ‘flavour of mysticism’ to his
familiarity with Angelus Silesius (see below).
And for the same reason, Wittgenstein may very well also have come acrossJames’s further explanation of the ‘method of absolute negativity’ that Hegel
used to connect the scientific and the mystical:
The fountainhead of Christian mysticism is Dionysius the Areopagite. He
describes the absolute truth by negatives exclusively. […] Like Hegel in his
logic, mystics journey towards the positive pole of truth only by the‘Methode der Absoluten Negativität’. (James 1902: 407–408)
Even in Wittgenstein’s later remarks to von Ficker, the relation between thescientifically analysable and sayable on the one hand, and the transcendent,
ethical life that only shows itself on the other, remains absolutely negative.
The mystical, as Wittgenstein identified it in the Tractatus, can thus be traced
back, at least in certain respects, to the early inspiration he took from Jamesand his remark about Hegelian philosophy’s ‘Aufgabe’ of articulating themystical. Complementing this point, it is precisely the remarks on the mysticalwhich set the stage for the Tractatus’s conclusion and the transition from thesayable—the ‘propositions of natural science’—to that which is philosophicallyunsayable and ‘inexpressible’ (6.54) and hence to ‘silence’ (7):6.522 There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.

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Alexander Berg, "The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel |Alexander Berg

6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. somethingthat has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone
else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that hehad given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method
would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feeling that wewere teaching him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct
method. (TLP 1922)
When Russell later read the Tractatus, he immediately noticed its ‘flavour of
mysticism’, and after his first subsequent meeting with Wittgenstein himself
he wrote to Ottoline Morrell with great astonishment about the change he had
witnessed in his friend:
I had felt in his book a flavour of mysticism, but was astonished when I
found that he has become a complete mystic. He reads people like
Kierkegaard and Angelus Silesius, and he seriously contemplates
becoming a monk. (20 December 1919, WC 2008: 112)
Russell ascribed Wittgenstein’s conversion to his early encounter with James’s
Varieties and to his reading of Leo Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief:
It all started from William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience, andgrew (not unnaturally) during the winter he spent alone in Norway before
the war, when he was nearly mad. Then during the war a curious thing
happened. He went on duty to the town of Tarnov in Galicia, andhappened to come upon a bookshop which however seemed to containnothing but picture postcards. However, he went inside and found that it
contained just one book: Tolstoy on The Gospels. He bought it merely
because there was no other. He read it and re-read it, and thenceforth had
it always with him, under fire and at all times. (WC 2008: 112)
In the earlier-quoted letter to Russell from June 1912, Wittgenstein had alreadyexpressed the hope of being able to improve his own state of mind by reading
the Varieties, and in this context mentioned Goethe’s Faust and the concept ofSorge. It is almost certain that he was referring not to reading Faust itself, but

Alexander Berg, "The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel |Alexander Bergrather the biographical notes by Goethe that James quotes and discusses indetail in the Varieties, where he argues that Goethe himself was also drawing
on his own, very personal experience:‘I will say nothing,’ writes Goethe in 1824, ‘against the course of myexistence. But at bottom it has been nothing but pain and burden, and I
can affirm that during the whole of my 75 years, I have not had fourweeks of genuine well-being. It is but the perpetual rolling of a rock thatmust be raised up again forever.’ (James 1902: 135)
This passage comes from the chapter of the Varieties on ‘the sick soul’, inwhich James analyses Goethe’s and Tolstoy’s existential suffering from thisFaustian condition. But in the subsequent chapters on ‘conversion’, James only
singles out Tolstoy (and not Goethe) as a successful example of mental healing,in which an element of spiritual transformation is combined with a conversion
in the way of life.

III.

Through its literary form, the Tractatus came to embody this larger
development of Wittgenstein’s thinking. On the one hand, it expresses theideas of the empiricist-logicist project, which are reminiscent of C. S. Myer’s
scientific approach to psychology and to some degree anticipate the Vienna
Circle’s ‘scientific worldview’.
But at another level, which resulted above all from Wittgenstein’s earlyacquaintance with William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience, this first
conception is complemented by the imperatives of mysticism, with anemphasis on the Hegelian ‘Aufgabe of making it articulate’ as a deeper
aspiration of philosophical truth. By introducing him to the mystics Dionysius
the Areopagite and Angelus Silesius, James paved the way for Wittgenstein’sview that certain fundamental truths can only be spoken about negatively, inthe context of the philosophical method of absolute negativity.
For the figures discussed in the Varieties, such as Goethe and Tolstoy, thismysticism not only inaugurated a new way of thinking, but also demanded afundamental change in the way of living and a conversion to the ethical life.

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Alexander Berg, "The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel |Alexander BergWith the Tractatus, Wittgenstein made this demand his own: literarily,
philosophically and practically.
References
Frege, Gottlob (1879) Begriffsschrift. Eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache desreinen Denkens, Halle.
James, William (1890) The Principles of Psychology, New York.
James, William (1902) Varieties of religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature, New York1902.
McGuinness, Brian (1988): Wittgenstein. A Life. Young Ludwig, 1889–1921.
MDC (1981) Drury, Maurice O’Connor “Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in: Rush Rhees (ed.)
Recollections of Wittgenstein. Oxford.
Monk, Ray (1991) The Duty of Genius, London.
Myers, Charles Samuel (1940) Shell shock in France 1914–1918, based on a war diary ,Cambridge.
PPW (1990) von Wright, Georg Henrik (ed.) A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man: From
the Diary of David Hume Pinsent, 1912-14, Oxford.
Russell, Bertrand (1903) The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge.
TLP (1922) Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, London.
WC (2008) McGuinness, Brian (ed.) Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Letters and Documents, 1911–
1951, Malden.
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my profound gratitude to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, whose
generous financial support has been indispensable to this project. I am also immensely thankful for
the University of Zurich, which has graciously provided the essential institutional framework for myresearch.

Alexander Berg, "The Method of Absolute Negativity and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus—Wittgenstein, William James and Hegel". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess
Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera, René J. Campis C., Osvaldo Orozco Méndez
(Barranquilla, Colombia)
Abstract
The concept of logical multiplicity that is already present in TLP becomes central tounderstand the continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought up until PI. In the last few years, theauthors and other fellow colleagues have worked together towards the goal of constructing acommon framework to interpret Wittgenstein’s philosophy. A key point in our research
perspective is the study of the role of chess in the development of his thought. Following the
track of the role of chess in Wittgenstein’s evolution provides us with what we consider are
fresh insights that are very difficult to attain otherwise. This paper relates the concept oflogical multiplicity to both chess and Chess960.

How strange if logic were concerned with an ‘ideal’ language and not withours. For what would this ideal language express? Presumably, what we
now express in our ordinary language (PB, §3: 52)
All propositions of our colloquial language are actually, just as they are,logically completely in order. That simple thing which we ought to give
here is not a model of the truth but the complete truth itself.
(Our problems are not abstract but perhaps the most concrete that thereare.) (TLP §5.5563)

1. Introduction
Examining the role of chess in Wittgenstein’s evolution provides fresh insightsthat are difficult to attain otherwise. This contribution continues our previous
work that relates the concept of logical multiplicity of rules (from chess theory)
and Wittgenstein’s logical (mathematical) multiplicity. This partially explains
the reasons why we see more continuity than disruptions in his thought, which
diverges from the popular ideas of the “several Wittgensteins”.

2. On logical (mathematical) multiplicity in TLP and before PI
A great proportion of Wittgenstein’s works are devoted to mathematics. The
period of the publication of TLP is sealed by the influence of Frege’s

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Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

Grundgesätze. For both, the comparison of the rules of arithmetic (and math ingeneral) with the rules of chess was of great importance. Most likely, thatcomparison played a role in their conversations during the summer of 1911
and winter of 1912.
Wittgnestein introduces logical multiplicity in TLP §4.04: a proposition needs tohave “exactly as many things distinguishable as in the state of affairs that it
represents” so that both a proposition and a corresponding state of affairs
must “possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity”. Should we attend
to mathematical multiplicity, we interpret this as if each term that appears on agiven proposition corresponds to one (and only one) element in the referredstate of affairs. In this view, this is valid regardless if there are multiple
instances in which a term comes up in said proposition or its corresponding
element in the related state of affairs. Once this is clear, the idea of logicalmultiplicity is still due for further explanation, since Wittgenstein did not
define it explicitly in TLP or elsewhere –according to his philosophicalconvictions–. However, it comes up repeatedly not just in the Nachlass, but inother instances: In RLF (1929) he states that we can ascribe it to phenomena:“Now we can only substitute a clear symbolism for the unprecise one byinspecting the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying tounderstand their logical multiplicity” (p. 163). It is the “logical investigation” ofphenomena what enables us to identify their logical multiplicity, and we canonly recognize it a posteriori (after such investigation). According to
Wittgenstein, we can also ascribe logical multiplicity to a description (p. 165), a
proposition (p. 170), and an explanation (PB §230: 287). This implies that some
propositional constructs (or its constituents) do also have logical multiplicity.
Logical multiplicity is also a matter of degrees: one propositional description ofa given phenomenon can have a greater one than another. Wittgenstein statesthat regarding a particular case, a given specific description can have “theright multiplicity” –RLF, p. 165–.
Although an analytic philosopher would demand a satisfactory definition,
having reviewed references to logical multiplicity in primary literature, ourprovisional conclusion is that it is something we can recognize, but notexhaustively and precisely define; something that is closer to the realm ofwhat can be shown, but not said.

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

3. Logical multiplicity of ordinary language: multivocity against theunivocity of an “ideal language”
The concept was difficult to grasp at the beginning of 20th century: the tools of“modern [contemporary] logic” were still under development. It seems quite
natural that eventually someone would have to turn his attention to therelationship between logical (artificial) and natural languages. TLP represents
one of the earliest instances of such an endeavor –be it correct or misguided–.
The Zeitgeist was pregnant with antipsychologism. The mental was clearlyseen as metaphysical and as such, not liable of empirical treatment. Logicalempiricists were eager to take Mach’s program to its full completion, and saw
TLP as the means to achieve the ideal of purging formalized scientific theories
by logical analysis and elimination of the metaphysical remains from theircontents, thus achieving a language of science that was also free of theimperfections of natural languages. It is not a coincidence that Wittgenstein
did not like Russell’s prologue, or the interpretation of logical empiricists of his
first work. It is not either a coincidence that the title of the second thing heever published in life was RLF. It was already evident that Wittgenstein feltthat TLP was not clearly understood or that he had not expressed his ideas
appropriately enough. The so-called “picture theory” and logical multiplicity
are two of the factors that we identify as a source for this misunderstanding.
We claim that the concept is central to a closer understanding of what
Wittgenstein had in mind while developing his theory of meaning. To us,
under “logical (mathematical) multiplicity”, he understood something that goesbeyond logic as formal, mathematical logic, either if it relates itself to formal
logic. A central aspect of this concept is the faculty of a term (or expression, oreven a proposition) containing not only the actual possibilities of facts but also
those that cannot be actually realized. Also, the property of being able tocapture the potential instances in which something could and could not reachthe stage of being a matter of facts. Otherwise, language could not express
anything about the world or our own thoughts. Logical multiplicity manifests
itself precisely in the polysemy of natural languages, something a classic

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Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

logician (or a logical empiricist) would consider an imperfection of language,
but not Wittgenstein, who thought that logic was concerned with our language,
and not an ideal (“perfect”) one.
Wittgenstein’s conception of language as expressed in PI refers to the humanneed for logical order, “the a priori order of the world” that has to beabsolutely simple (PI §97 and §103, among others). Let us remind that
according to Wittgenstein, logical multiplicity can be recognized after logicalanalysis –not known a priori–. The prestige of logical ideal keeps us fromseeing that ordinary language is at least as important as formal logic.
Furthermore, the multiplicity of language games is not static. As Patiño(1963:123-124) states: ‘In contrast to the traditional picture of language
presented by Logic, unitary and schematic, the variety of means and uses ofspeech is infinite. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, something
determined forever’. To us, the multiplicity and variability of language games
are also due to logical multiplicity and the fact that some concepts do possess agreater logical multiplicity than others do. This will be addressed through someexamples from chess in the following section. By adopting such a strategy andnot a fully developed argument, we hope to contribute to the realization ofRussell’s misunderstanding of TLP and the lack of understanding of logicalmultiplicity in Moore (1959). Also, Wittgenstein never intended to help develop
an univocal language in the likes of logical empiricists. The idea of logicalmultiplicity is rather in the realm of “what can be shown but not said”. Seen inthis light, ever since TLP, Wittgenstein’s concerns were more related to theproperties of our actual, ordinary language and its powers to express
something about the world and ourselves.

4. Wittgenstein’s chess metaphor revisited: logical multiplicity vs. thefetish of formal logic“What is characteristic of chess is the logical multiplicity of its rules” is an ideathat Wittgenstein expressed many times. Moore (1959:292, ff.) manifests his
incomprehension of this thesis while referring to the Lectures of 1930-1933:
But if by 'the rules of chess' he meant, as I think he probably did, the rules
which govern the moves which may be made by pieces of different sorts,

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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e.g. by pawns and bishops, and was suggesting that the 'logical multiplicity'of the rules which govern the possible moves of a pawn and a bishop is
sufficient to distinguish a pawn from a bishop, I think he was wrong. The
rule that a pawn can only make certain moves certainly, I think, does notmean that any piece the rules for the moves of which have a certain'logical multiplicity' (whatever that may mean) may only make the moves
in question, even if he was right in holding that the rules for the moves ofpawns have a different 'logical multiplicity' from those for the moves ofbishops; and similarly in the case of all the other different kinds of pieces.
Moore had only a superficial understanding of chess and its rules and thenature of the pieces, whereas Wittgenstein evidences a more profoundcomprehension of the game and its implications for the theory of meaning. A
pawn has a multiplicity of movements that cannot occur with the bishop. The
latter, has clearly differentiated (univocal) movements, whereas the pawn has
at least half a dozen distinctive (multivocal) features, namely: (i) never goes
backwards; (ii) advances forward and captures in diagonals; (iii) captures en
passant; (iv) when it reaches the end of the board, it can be transformed into aqueen, rook, bishop or knight; (v) forms structures as a set or subassemblies;(vi) at the beginning of a game, in the first move, it has the option of moving
one or two squares (at the player’s will). It is then fair to say that a pawn has agreater logical multiplicity than a bishop.
Getting back to Moore, he seems to not have grasped that Wittgenstein’s
comparison between a bishop and a pawn implies a contraposition between apiece that moves in a clear and univocal way (exclusively in diagonals) withanother one, the pawn, that has a multiplicity of options of movements andtransformations, which make of it a very special piece. Another importantomission by Moore lies in that he does not comprehend that it is not evennecessary to replace a missing pawn on the board with a button or anotherobject, for any experienced player can correctly conduct his chess strategy
having information only by hearsay of each move made by his opponent. In
Wittgenstein’s own words in WWK (1979, p. 104):74

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

It does not matter what a pawn looks like. It is rather the totality of rulesof a game that yields the logical position of a pawn. A pawn is a variable,
just like ‘x’ in logic. It is clear that in chess it is not the actual movementsthat matter. The moves on a chess-board are not the movements of physics.
Another side of the same issue consists in considering not only the rules oflegal movements of the pieces but also the rules of general strategy. Onceagain, we come to a discussion on the logical multiplicity of the rules ofstrategy. An example is the game Bent Larsen vs. Quinteros 1975 (Figure 1).
Larsen goes against the rules for the openings recommended in chess manuals.
The rule is that one is not to make many moves of pawns in the opening. Yet hemakes 12 pawn moves in his first 15 turns. His strategy is correct, as the gameproved at the end. This example illustrates the extent to which Wittgenstein
was right in appealing to chess in his attempts to clarify the notion of logicalmultiplicity of language and how little attention has been paid to it for hiscorrect understanding.

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

Figure 1: Bent Larsen vs. Quinteros 1975. 15.a5.
Another example of logical multiplicity of general strategic rules for the
middle game comes from Larsen. In Leningrad (1973) against Uhlman andSmejkal, he played the Dutch defense in both games. According to the cannon,
the bishop of the black pieces that runs in the light squares is “bad”. Larsen
shows that the restriction of mobility attributed to that bishop in such
positions is not permanent and that there are means to turn that “bad bishop”
into a “good” one. Once asked if he was seeking to play a game of “correct”
chess, Larsen prompted: “Not that fast, pal! The key of that matter is that chessdoes not respond to a strict criterion of correctness: Chess is a multiform

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Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

game!”. We interpret this reference to chess as a “multiform game” as an
expression of its logical multiplicity.

5. Logical multiplicity, chess and final remarks

G. H. von Wright (1955:527) stated that Wittgenstein “once said that he felt as
though he were writing for people who would think in a quite different way,
breathe a different air of life, from that of present-day men. For people of adifferent culture, as it were.” In that vein, we think that we, from a different
cultural and temporal context, can now expand the chess metaphor in
Wittgenstein to Chess960 and thus, the comprehension of logical multiplicity.
Chess960 is an enhanced variant of the game that precisely exhibits a greater
logical multiplicity than classic chess. We will try to illustrate this by appealing
to some examples related to the expansion of the rules. Gligoric (2003:74)
points out the complexity of orthodox chess. For him, the numerous attempts
to modify it did not manage to grasp its complexity and richness. The
introduction of Chess960 by Robert Fischer has succeeded where otherproposals failed, since the greater logical multiplicity of this variant allows forbounded randomness at the opening –which sums for novelties– while
preserving the flavor of classic, orthodox chess.
Chess960 constitutes a revolutionary change –in a Kuhnian sense–, where there
is an expansion of the rules for the initial position of the pieces, and orthodox
chess is just one of the 960 possibilities for the start. This initial setting allows
for keeping the basic, deep strategy of orthodox chess while allowing
randomness at the beginning of games. The logical possibilities and the logicalmultiplicity of the game are richer and at the same time, it keeps not so skilledplayers to use preconceived recipes. The game acquires a new dimension
compared to traditional chess. It has the effect of altering the opening to thepoint of defying traditional theory. After a number of 12 to 20 moves, the gamelooks just like one of classic chess, and the rules of strategy for middle- andendgame remain valid. Chess960 leaves room for creativity while largely
preserving traditional rules. Chess960 vastly illustrates the notion of logicalmultiplicity. The rules for the extraordinary movement of Castle (Figure 2)
constitute a central example. An examination of the new rules illustrates thegreater logical multiplicity of rules with respect to classic chess. It is important

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

to emphasize that even with these new rules, deep general strategy does notchange for the middlegame and endgame. Adapting the rules of castle ofchess960 to the rules of classic chess is what preserves the deep general
strategy.

Figure 2: Rules for Castle in Chess960.
The chess960 game of Nakamura vs. Carlsen 2018 (Figure 3) is a great exampleof how castle is possible in the first move –only possible after four moves inclassic chess–, one of the many cases that illustrate the enhancement of thelogical multiplicity of the rules. We affirm that there is an enhanced logical78

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

multiplicity in that novel game situations are instantiated for the developmentof the opening of the game in comparison with classic chess. It is only after therevision (analysis) that the implications of the opening situation of the pieces
that its complexity can be noticed, just as it is the case with the logicalmultiplicity of the phenomena that can only be identified after logical research(cfr. the previous quote of RLF in section 2). This is also indirectly evidenced by
the fact that, in tournaments, players and their teams are allowed to analyze
the initial position for 10 minutes before starting to play in a classic chess960
game.

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

Figure 3: Nakamura vs. Carlsen 2018. Position 324 of chess960. Castle at thefirst move.
The previous examples illustrate the feature of logical multiplicity by relating
current chess developments to what Wittgenstein actually said about logicalmultiplicity. Of course, being it a feature that can be shown, but not said (as we
believe), it is simply not possible to exhaust the subject. Further development
is still required, as our research is still a work in progress. Fischer’s objective
was to keep the fundamental essence of classic chess while promoting
innovation. Following Bermúdez (2013), we point out that orthodox chess is to
Chess960 what classic particle mechanics are to the physics of relativity. The
mutual implications and relations between chess, chess960, cognitive science,and Wittgenstein’s philosophy are currently a subject under investigation.
References
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921; 1922; 1961)
Wiener Ausgabe Band 2: Philosophische Betrachtungen, Philosophische Bemerkungen (1994)[MSS 107–108]
Philosophical Investigations (1953)
Some Remarks on Logical Form (1929)
Bermúdez, E (2013). Long-Term Working Memory for Complex Tasks: The Case of Blindfold
Chess960. Doctoral Thesis. Barranquilla: Universidad del Norte.
Gligoric, S. (2003) Shall We Play Fischerandom Chess? London: B.T. Batsford Ltd.
Hertz, H. (1894). Gesammelte werke. JA Barth.
------------ (1899) The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form. London: MacMillan andCo.
Knabenschuch, S. (2003). Multiplicidad y conocimiento: Alcances y trasfondos de un concepto
wittgensteineano. Ideas y Valores, 52(121), 3-39.
Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Moore. G. E. (1959). Philosophical Papers.
Patiño, C. (1963:123-124) Los “juegos del lenguaje” de L. Wittgenstein. Revista Eco 43, (8)1, pp.
39-56.

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Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess | Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo
Orozco Méndez

Preston, J. M. (2016). Wittgenstein, Hertz, and Boltzmann. In: Glock, H. J., & Hyman, J. (Eds.). A
companion to Wittgenstein, 110-123.
von Wright, G. H. (1955). Ludwig Wittgenstein, a biographical sketch. The Philosophical Review,
64(4), 526-545.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referee for the useful suggestions for the correctionof this paper.

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & René J. Campis C. & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Once Again on Wittgenstein & Logical Multiplicity in Chess". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity
Edgar C. Boedeker (Cedar Falls, USA)
Abstract
For Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, the limits of language would appear to be roughly the limitsof first-order logic. Statements of equinumerosity, however, can’t be expressed in standard
first-order logic (FOL). It thus might appear that a Tractarian notation can’t express suchclearly meaningful ordinary-language sentences. If this proved correct, it would pose asignificant problem, for one of Wittgenstein’s criteria for a satisfactory logical notation issurely that it can express any meaningful sentence. Here I introduce, to the best of myknowledge for the first time, something Wittgenstein suggests but doesn’t show how toconstruct: a bracket-expression representing a formal series (Formenreihe) of propositions.
This involves a novel way of indicating the form of an arbitrary proposition in the series andthe form of the next proposition in the series. The first-order notation in which this isaccomplished satisfies Wittgenstein’s logico-philosophical demands by employing just one
logical operator, Nα(ξ̅), based on his operator N(ξ̅); and expressing identity and difference of
meanings without an identity-sign, but via identity and difference of signs. I employ theseconventions to express two propositions that play crucial roles in Frege’s logicist derivation of
the basic laws of arithmetic and that he analyzes as second-order: a statement ofequinumerosity and the statement “b is a successor of a”. This demonstrates that theexpressive capacity of the notation I propose is greater than that of FOL.

For Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, the limits of my language mean the limits of
my world (5.62), and the limits of language, it would appear, mean roughly thelimits of first-order logic. (I qualify this suggestion with “roughly” in the lightof the simple second-order proposition Wittgenstein gives at 5.5261.) This
coheres with his rejection of talk of classes (4.1272, 6.031), Russell’s theory oftypes (3.331-3.332), and Frege’s and Russell’s treatments of arithmetic(6.2-6.24), issues we can’t explore here (cf. Marion and Okada 2014). Certain
statements, however, such as “There’s at least one fork and at least one knife
and there are exactly as many forks as there are knives” (#F=#K), can’t be
expressed in standard first-order predicate logic with identity (FOL). For sucha statement of equinumerosity is typically analyzed as a second-orderstatement that there’s a relation establishing a one-to-one correspondence
between the F’s and the K’s. It thus might appear that a Tractarian notation
can’t express such obviously meaningful ordinary-language sentences. If thisproved correct, it would pose a significant problem, for one of Wittgenstein’s
criteria for a “correct Begriffsschrift” (5.534; cf. 3.325) is surely that it can
express any meaningful sentence.

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Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

Here I show how a first-order notation conforming to Wittgenstein’s logicophilosophical demands can express statements of equinumerosity, thus
demonstrating that its expressive capacity is greater than that of FOL. To
accomplish this, I introduce a convention for employing a Tractatus-stylebracket-expression (Klammerausdruck) to represent a formal series (Formenreihe) of propositions. This involves a novel technique for indicating
the form of an arbitrary proposition in the formal series and the form of thenext proposition in the series.
Not only do statements of equinumerosity occur in ordinary language, but theyplay key roles in Frege’s logicist derivation of the basic laws of arithmetic. I
also employ bracket-expressions to provide a first-order analysis of anothersuch proposition: “b is a successor of a” (4.1273), the classical second-order
expression of which is formula 76 in Frege (1879: 62); and of “Something is a
successor of something else”.
I’ll employ a notation, 𝓛Nαξ (pronounced “elnax”), introduced in my (2019),
expanded to include bracket-expressions representing formal series of
propositions. 𝓛Nαξ possesses two key properties Wittgenstein demands of asatisfactory notation. First, it expresses identity and difference of meaning
without an identity-sign, but via identity and difference of signs (5.53). 𝓛Nαξsatisfies this demand by employing what’s known as “weakly-exclusive”
semantics, embodied in semantic rules (Sem2) and (Sem4) below, and which
Rogers and Wehmeier (2012: 540-543) convincingly argue should be attributed
to the Tractatus. Second, 𝓛Nαξ employs just one logical operator, Nα(ξ̅), basedon Wittgenstein's N(ξ̅), which does “double-duty” of sentential andquantificational joint negation.
For Wittgenstein, “every proposition is a result of successive applications toelementary propositions of the operation N(ξ̅)” (6.001; cf. 5.5). ξ̅ is a variable
whose values are propositions, and N(ξ̅) is an iterable operation resulting in a
proposition that’s true if and only if these propositions are false (5.5-5.502,
5.51-5.52). He writes: “We can distinguish 3 kinds of description” (5.501)
determining the propositions represented by ξ̅. First, there’s “direct
enumeration, in which case we can simply substitute for the variable theconstants that are its values” (5.501). “N(p, q, r)”, for example, is logically

Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

equivalent to FOL sentence “(~p ∧ ~q ∧ ~r)” (cf. 5.51). Second, there’s “giving afunction fx whose values for all values of x are the propositions to be
described” (5.501). For example, “[i]f ξ has as its values all the values of afunction fx for all values of x, then N(ξ̅) = ~(∃x).fx” (5.52).
Neither the first nor the second kind of description permits the expression ofsentences not expressible in FOL, so they can’t help with our cutlery problem.
The third, however, can: “giving a formal rule that governs the construction of
the propositions, in which case the terms of the bracket-expression are all theterms of a formal series” (5.501). A series is formal if it’s constructed by
beginning with an initial term and generating each subsequent term by
iteratively applying an operation (5.232, 5.252-5.253).
Wittgenstein gives an example of a proposition involving a formal series:
If we want to express in conceptual notation the general proposition “b is a
successor of a”, then we require an expression for the general term of theformal seriesaRb,(∃x)(aRx ∧ xRb),(∃x)(∃y)(aRx ∧ xRy ∧ yRb), . . . . (4.1273, notation modernized)
He provides a convention for such expressions:
I write the general term of the formal series a, O'a, O'O'a, . . . as “[a, x, O'x]”.
This bracket-expression is a variable. The first term of the bracketexpression is the beginning of the formal series, the second is the form ofan arbitrary term x in the series, and the third is the form of the term that
immediately follows x in the series. (5.2522, translation modified)
If a is a proposition, this symbol indicates “the general form of the operationthat generates the next term from the proposition that precedes it” (4.1273). I’ll
write the bracket-expression representing the formal series of propositions φ1,
φ2, . . . as[φ1; φa; φa+1],

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Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

for perspicuity replacing Wittgenstein’s commas with semicolons. He employs
bracket-expressions in giving the general form of propositions (6-6.001) anddefining cardinal numbers (6.02, 6.03), but doesn’t show how to construct abracket-expression representing a formal series of propositions involved in theanalysis of any actual proposition, such as “b is a successor of a”.
Floyd (2001) employs a version of Wittgenstein’s bracket-notation, weaklyexclusive semantics, and an N-notation. Her technique can generate the seriesof first-order statements #F=#K=1, #F=#K=2, . . . (cf. Floyd 2001: 169), using#Φ=#Ψ=n to mean that there are exactly n Φ’s and exactly n Ψ’s. It can’t,
however, generate the “general proposition” (4.1273) #F=#K of which they’re
instances. Ricketts (2012, 2014) views second-order statements as “generalized
disjunctions” or “generalized conjunctions” of such instances, but expresses
skepticism that a bracket-notation is workable (2012: 136). Weiss (2017)
employs a modified bracket-notation in a non-Tractarian notation to constructformal series of propositions by substituting signs for signs, but permitting
only a finite number of variables (2017: 21f). Although this works in the case of
the ancestral, it can’t express ascriptions of number, such as statements ofequinumerosity, since in an infinite domain an infinite number of variables isrequired (Säbel 2018: 213). And for Wittgenstein a satisfactory logical notation
mustn’t preclude such a domain (4.2211), even though the number of objects inany universe can’t be stated (4.1272).
Thus, to the best of my knowledge, no proposals have been made to datedemonstrating how to express a proposition by means of a bracket-expression
representing a formal series of propositions.
I’ll now propose a way to do this. [φ1; φa; φa+1] represents formal series of
propositions φ1, φ2, . . . iff the following conditions are met:
FS1: φ1 is a wff.
FS2: φa results from φ1 by inserting finitely many (strings of) signs σ1, σ2, . . ., each immediately followed by “...”. The numerical values of all
newly-introduced subscripts in φa must be greater than those of any
subscripts occurring in φ1, and those of any newly-introduced binding
or bound variables must be greater than those of any constant names.
FS3: Removing all occurrences of “...” in φa results in a wff.

Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

FS4: φa+1 results from φa by replacing σ1... with σ1σ1'..., σ2... with σ2σ2'..., . . .,where σ1' looks just like σ1, σ2' just like σ2, . . ., except that in σ1', σ2', . . .
1 is added to some or no subscripts in σ1, σ2, . . ., respectively.
FS5: Removing all occurrences of “...” in φa+1 results in a wff.
We employ bracket-expressions to generate “interior” formal series of signs
that we then use to generate formal series of propositions. Using σσ'... to standfor any of σ1σ1'..., σ2σ2'..., . . ., this sign represents formal series σ, σσ', σσ'σ'', . . .;these terms occur, respectively, in φ2, φ3, φ4, . . . . This series is generated by
the following operation: σ'' results from σ' by adding 1 to any subscripts
formed by adding 1 to a subscript in σ in generating σ' from σ; σ''' results fromσ'' by adding 1 to any subscripts formed by adding 1 to a subscript in σ' ingenerating σ'' from σ', . . . . In the formal series of propositions represented by[φ1; φa; φa+1], after φ1, φn+1 results from φa+1 by replacing each σ1σ1'..., σ2σ2'..., . . .
with the nth term in its respective formal series of signs. [ φ1; φa; φa+1]
represents all terms in this formal series of propositions. No circularity (cf.
4.1273) is involved in employing these formal series to express ascriptions of
number, since numerals are used just to generate signs, not to express
cardinals.
To see how this works, let’s take Wittgenstein’s example “b is a successor of a”.
Bracket-expression“[aRb; (∃x1)(…aRx1 ∧ x1R…b)…;(∃x1)((∃x2)(…aRx1 ∧ x1Rx2 ∧ x2R…b))…]”
represents the formal series of propositions Wittgenstein gives at 4.1273. For
perspicuity, σ1, σ2, . . . are underlined and σ1', σ2', . . . are bold underlined. Here,
σ1 is “(∃x1)(”,σ1' is “(∃x2)(”,σ2 is “x1 ∧ x1R”,
σ2' is “x2 ∧ x2R”,
σ3 is “)”, and σ3' is “)”.

86Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

The fourth term in this formal series of propositions is thus“(∃x1)((∃x2)((∃x3)(aRx1 ∧ x1Rx2 ∧ x2Rx3 ∧ x3Rb)))”.
We’ve thus accomplished something that’s to the best of my knowledge novel:
showing how to construct a bracket-expression representing a formal series of
propositions in a manner conforming to the convention Wittgenstein suggests
but doesn’t lay out in detail.
We now need to understand 𝓛Nαξ, the Tractarian notation I’ll be employing. Its
syntax is this:Syn1: A predicate A, . . ., Z, A1, . . ., Zn followed by finitely many variables a, . . ., z, a1, . . ., zn is a wff.
Syn2: If φ1, . . ., φn are finitely many wff’s and α is a variable, thenNα(φ1, . . ., φn)is a wff.
Syn3: If [φ1; φa; φa+1] fulfills conditions (FS1)-(FS5) and α is a variable, thenNα([φ1; φa; φa+1])
is a wff.
𝓛Nαξ contains just one logical operator, Nα(ξ̅), which is a jointly-negating
quantifier binding occurrences of α in the formulas represented by ξ̅ much asa quantifier in FOL binds variables occurring in its scope. All free variables areconstant names. The reader may find helpful the elucidation of 𝓛Nαξ in my(2019), which also provides a translation-procedure from this notation into one
all of whose sentences conform to the syntax of FOL.
Here are the semantics of 𝓛Nαξ:
Sem1: Each constant name refers to exactly one object.
Sem2: Occurrences of constant names refer to different objects iff theseoccurrences are tokens of different types of signs.
Sem3: Elementary proposition Φα1…αn is true iff ordered n-tuple ofconstant names α1. . .αn satisfies n-place predicate Φ.
Sem4: If in Nα1(φ1, . . ., φn) α1 occurs free in any formulas φ1, . . ., φn or in N
α1([φ1; φa; φa+1]) α1 occurs free in any formulas φ1, φ2, . . . represented

Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

87Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

by [φ1; φa; φa+1], then α1 is a bound variable whose range doesn’tintersect with the range or reference of bound variable or constantname α2 iff there’s a formula in which both α1 and α2 occur free.
Sem5: Each bound variable has a non-empty range: all objects in theuniverse except as precluded by (Sem2) and (Sem4).
Sem6: Given (Sem1)-(Sem5), Nα(φ1, . . ., φn) is true iff each result of
uniformly substituting a constant name for all free occurrences of α informulas φ1, . . ., φn is false.
Sem7: Given (Sem1)-(Sem6), Nα([φ1; φa; φa+1]) is true iff each result of
uniformly substituting a constant name for all free occurrences of α inthe formulas φ1, φ2, . . . represented by [φ1; φa; φa+1] is false.
If in Nα(φ1, . . ., φn) α doesn’t occur free in any formulas φ1, . . ., φn, then the α,
but not the N, in Nα is vacuous, so here N α(ξ̅) works as sentential, notquantificational, joint negation.
We’ll now employ bracket-expressions representing formal series of
propositions to express “general proposition[s]” (4.1273). For example, toexpress “b is a successor of a” in 𝓛Nαξ, we apply Nc(ξ̅) to the terms in theformal series of propositions that are logically equivalent to the negations of
the terms in the bracket-expression given above, interpreted weakly
exclusively. In the 𝓛Nαξ expressions below, “c” doesn’t occur free, so Nc(ξ̅)
works as sentential joint negation. “b is a successor of a” thus reads“Nc([Nc(Rab);
Na1(Nc(…Nc(Raa1), Nc(Ra1…b)))…;
Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(…Nc(Raa1),
Nc(Ra1a2), Nc(Ra2…b)))))…])”.
The operations applied to a formal series of propositions represented by abracket-expression may also include Nα(ξ̅) in its quantificational role. For
example, we can express “Something is a successor of something else” as“Nc(Na(Nc(Nb(Nc([Nc(Rab);
Na1(Nc(…Nc(Raa1), Nc(Ra1…b)))…;

88

Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(…Nc(Raa1), Nc(Ra1a2),
Nc(Ra2…b)))))…])))))”.
Here, Na(ξ̅) and Nb(ξ̅) are jointly-negating quantifiers binding the (free)occurrences of “a” and “b” in the bracket-expression.
Turning now to #F=#K, I’ll begin with an informal explanation of how to
express this proposition in 𝓛Nαξ. An initial schema for its expression is
Nc(Nc([#F=#K=1; #F=#K=a; #F=#K=a+1])).
This represents the negation of the joint negation, hence the disjunction, of theterms in the formal series of propositions #F=#K=1, #F=#K=2, . . . . Next, using #Φ≥k to mean that there are at least k Φ’s, a schema for expressing #F=#K=n is(#F≥n ∧ ~#F≥n+1 ∧ #K≥n ∧ ~#K≥n+1)
in FOL, andNc(Nc(#F≥n), #F≥n+1, Nc(#K≥n), #K≥n+1)
in 𝓛Nαξ. Combining these schemata gives us the following schema forexpressing #F=#K:
Nc(Nc([Nc(Nc(#F≥1), #F≥2, Nc(#K≥1), #K≥2);
Nc(Nc(#F≥a), #F≥a+1, Nc(#K≥a), #K≥a+1);
Nc(Nc(#F≥a+1), #F≥a+2, Nc(#K≥a+1), #K≥a+2)])).
Finally, I represent the formal series of propositions # F≥1, #F≥2, . . .,expressed in FOL as(∃x1)Fx1,(∃x1)(∃x2)(Fx1 ∧ Fx2 ∧ ~x1 = x2),(∃x1)(∃x2)(∃x3)(Fx1 ∧ Fx2 ∧ Fx3 ∧ ~x1 = x2 ∧ ~x1 = x3 ∧ ~x2 = x3), . . .,with bracket-expression“[Nc(Na1(Nc(Nc(Fa1))));
Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(…Nc(Nc(Fa1), Nc(Fa2)…)))…));

Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

89Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(Na3(…Nc(Nc(Fa1), Nc(Fa2),
Nc(Fa3)…)))))…))]”.
Replacing “F” with “K” yields the bracket-expression representing #K≥1, #K≥2,....
We thus express #F=#K in 𝓛Nαξ as follows:“Nc(Nc([Nc(Nc(Nc(Na1(Nc(Nc(Fa1))))),
Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(Nc(Fa1), Nc(Fa2)))))),
Nc(Nc(Na1(Nc(Nc(Ka1))))),
Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(Nc(Ka1), Nc(Ka2)))))));
Nc(Nc(Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(…Nc(Nc(Fa1),
Nc(Fa2)…)))…))), Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(Na3(…Nc(Nc(Fa1),
Nc(Fa2), Nc(Fa3)…)))…)))),
Nc(Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(…Nc(Nc(Ka1), Nc(Ka2)…)))…))),Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(Na3(…Nc(Nc(Ka1),
Nc(Ka2), Nc(Ka3)…)))…)))));(Nc(Nc(Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(Na3(…Nc(Nc(Fa1),
Nc(Fa2), Nc(Fa3)…)))))…))),Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(Na3(Nc(Na4(…Nc(Nc(Fa1),
Nc(Fa2), Nc(Fa3), Nc(Fa4)…)))))…)))),
Nc(Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(Na3(…(Nc(Ka1), Nc(Ka2),
Nc(Ka3)…)))))…))),Nc(Na1(Nc(Na2(Nc(Na3(Nc(Na4(…Nc(Nc(Ka1),
Nc(Ka2), Nc(Ka3), Nc(Ka4)…)))))…)))))]))”.
The number of terms in formal series expressed in 𝓛Nαξ often depends on thenumber of objects in the universe. The nth terms in the formal series of
propositions used in our three examples are meaningful only if there are atleast n + 1 objects.

90

Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

Our “variable” (5.2522) bracket-expressions representing formal series of
propositions are analogous to bound variables in FOL, for they permit the firstorder expression of propositions whose truth-conditions may be infinitely
complex. Whereas bound variables are used to attribute predicates tocountably many ordered n-tuples of objects, bracket-expressions permit theexpression of truth-functions of countably many propositions.
The three propositions as analyzed above are first-order. Each is expressed not
in its standard second-order way, but as a truth-function of the first-orderpropositions in the formal series represented by its bracket-expression. That
several ordinary-language statements standardly analyzed as second-ordercan be expressed in this manner therefore circumvents a potential objection to
the stringency of Wittgenstein’s logico-philosophical demands.
References
Boedeker, Edgar (2019) “Satisfying Wittgenstein’s Demands of a ‘Correct Logical Notation’”,Contributions of the 42nd International Wittgenstein Symposium 27, 21-24.
Floyd, Juliet (2001) “Number and Ascription of Number in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, in: Juliet
Floyd (ed.) Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 145-191.
Frege, Gottlob (1879) Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache desreinen Denkens, Halle: Nebert.
Marion, Mathieu; Okada, Mitsuhiro (2014) “Wittgenstein on Equinumerosity and
Surveyability”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 89, 61-78.
Ricketts, Thomas (2012) “Logical Segmentation and Generality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus” in:Peter Sullivan and Michael Potter (eds.) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: History and Interpretation,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 125-142.
Ricketts, Thomas (2014) “Analysis, Independence, Simplicity, and the General Sentence-Form”,
Philosophical Topics 42, 263-288.
Rogers, Brian; Wehmeier, Kai (2012) “Tractarian First-Order Logic: Identity and the NOperator”, The Review of Symbolic Logic 5, 538-573.
Säbel, Markus (2018) “The Applicability of Arithmetical Concepts”, Philosophy of Logic andMathematics: Contributions of the 41st International Wittgenstein Symposium 26, 212-214.
Weiss, Max (2017) “Logic in the Tractatus”, The Review of Symbolic Logic 10, 1-50.

Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity | Edgar C. Boedeker

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, David Pears and Brian
McGuinness (trs.) London: Routledge.
Acknowledgement
Thanks to Gregory Landini, Timm Lampert, Yannis Arazam, and Jonathan Gombin.

92

Edgar C. Boedeker, "Tractarian Cutlery: Formal Series and Equinumerosity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco MéndezNeither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture
Theory” as the “Fabulating Function”
René J. Campis C. (Buenos Aires, Argentina)
Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera, Osvaldo Orozco Méndez (Barranquilla, Colombia)
Abstract
We present some arguments to reject the so called “picture theory of language” in TLP as acontinuation of our previous work (2022). We claim that the “picture theory” can beconsidered as a fable originated in a significant portion of AngloSaxon tradition. A revision of
the literature (not only limited to German and English) strongly suggest that it as a fabulationthat developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s under the effects of Anscombe (1959).
Bergson (1932) sees the “fabulatory function” as one of the causes of the development ofreligions. To us, there is a “family resemblance” between some Wittgensteinian
interpretations and religious cults: After the formulation of an original fable (the “picture
theory”), the original idea is uncritically assumed.

[I]l ne peut agir directement, mais puisque l'intelligence travaille sur desreprésentations, il en suscitera d' «imaginaires» qui tiendront tête à lareprésentation du réel et qui réussiront, par l'intermédiaire del'intelligence même, à contrecarrer le travail intellectuel. Ainsis'expliquerait la fonction fabulatrice. (Bergson 1932:64).
11. THE SECOND COMING. WELL, GOD HAS arrived. I met him on the 5.15
train.’ Thus was Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge announced by Keynes
in a letter to Lydia Lopokova [...]. (Monk 1990:255)

Introduction

We present some arguments to reject the positing of a “picture theory” in TLP.
This contribution supplies further arguments against that well-establishedthesis after our previous work (2022). Now we claim that adhering to the thesisof a “picture theory” equals to follow a fable proposed by part of the AngloSaxon tradition. The epigraph aims towards considering the so called “picture
theory” as a fabulation developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s under the
influence of Anscombe (1959). For Bergson, the “fabulatory function” is one
cause of the development of religions. There is a “family resemblance”
between some Wittgensteinian interpretations and religious cults: After theformulation of an original fable (the “picture theory”), the original idea isuncritically assumed.

René J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as
the “Fabulating Function”". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez

1. Theory or fabulation? What a theory is and why there is no such thing as a“picture theory” in TLP

Although there are two instances where Wittgenstein used the term Bildtheorie– MS 102 and MS 108 –, there are reasons to reject this as a smoking gun: Oneshould first revise what is both (i) a philosophical and (ii) a scientific theory: (i)is a position that we adopt regarding a philosophical problem rather than atheory, for which it is ill advised to take it literally as such. As for (ii), we candefine it very loosely as a set of propositions that are internally consistent andprovide the means to predict the behavior of an object of study. Thus, the“picture theory” would be at best a “theory” in the first sense. However, theuse of the term “theory” in that sense does not correspond to what a theory
actually is.

2. How & when started the talk about a “picture theory”

Revising the literature (a Google Scholar search query via Harzing’s Publish or
Perish Software 8.8), there is a fistful of references to “picture theory” between
1921 and 1954 –7 references–. De Laguna (1924:108) is the first known mention
thereof. Edna Daitz (1953:184) –reprinted as O’Shaughnessy (1966)– refers to“the Picture Theory” drawing “examples from three sources: Russell,
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and Wisdom's articles on 'Logical Construction” [(1953:184);(1966: 115)]. Between 1954 and 1958, there are 18 mentions of“picture theory” in the literature. Chart 1 and Table 1 illustrate the mentions
to “Bildtheorie” and “picture theory” in the literature from 1921 to 2000.

94

René J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as
the “Fabulating Function”". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez

Chart 1: References to “picture theory” and “Bildtheorie” (1921-2000). Source:
made by the authors.

Table 1: References to “picture theory” and “Bildtheorie” (1921-2000).
Source: made by the authors.
It is only in the 1960s that the references to “Wittgenstein’s picture theory”
start to proliferate, most likely after Anscombe (1959), who explicitly stated:“My first six chapters aim at giving the reader some idea of the 'picture theory'of the proposition” (p. 19). We consider this last work as the inflection point for
the use of “picture theory” rather than previous instances that did not catch on

René J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as
the “Fabulating Function”". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez

within the community of Wittgensteinian scholars. The first two references toa Bildtheorie –associated with Wittgenstein– in German date from 1964, and it
took up until 1986 to reach a two-digit number (12 references). Although wecannot claim to have covered all possible mentions, at least the case for
identifying the cause of the trigger for the use of the term “picture theory”
with Anscombe (1959) is very compelling. To us, this also affects the treatmentof the Nachlass.
In our work of 2022 we claimed that there is an “underlying impulse to claim
Wittgenstein as a distinctive product of a given national philosophicaltradition”. In our view, this has played a prominent role in the persistence ofthe thesis of the “picture theory”. At best, there are actually some “Bildideen”“that affected his original starting point” (p. 61), –the conceptions of Bild in
Hertz (1894) and Boltzmann (1897; 1905). This does not rules out the influenceof the discussion on Bilder and Darstellungen in Vienna as registered by Janik& Toulmin (1973: 31).
The particularities of different languages constitute another factor that led us
to question the “picture theory” (that is, our analysis of the etymology of Bild
and Bildung and different translations of TLP to English and Spanish while also
considering other elements in the literature). Next, we will refer to the Finnish
Georg von Wright (whose mother tongue was Swedish). As we shall see, hiscase –related to languages different from German and English– is very tellingand compelling regarding the translations and their role in crystallizing thenotion of “picture theory”.

3. Georg von Wright's Biographical Sketch in Swedish (1954) and the debate on
Spanish translations

Malcolm (1958) includes it as a first hand testimony of someone that closely
knew Wittgenstein. As such, von Wright was an authorized voice given his
knowledge of Wittgenstein’s works and life. However, that is not the first
English version of the biographical sketch: it was first published in 1955. In
this version, von Wright (p. 538) states that
Wittgenstein's "new" philosophy entails the rejection of some of thefundamental thoughts of the Tractatus. He abandoned the picture-theory of

96

René J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as
the “Fabulating Function”". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez

language, the doctrine that all significant propositions are truth-functionsof elementary propositions, and the doctrine of the unspeakable.
(Emphasis is ours).
In subsequent editions, the expression “picture theory of language” ispreserved. However, the original appeared in 1954 in Finland. The original text
in Swedish states “Han överger sin teori om språket som bild” (“He abandons his
theory of language as image”). Either if we granted that it could also betranslated as “He abandoned the picture-theory of language”, von Wright,
Finnish by birth and a Swedish-speaker, was not a native speaker of German
or English. Yet he did not refer to the “picture theory” directly one single time in
his works, leaving aside the instance that is to us a mere product of translation.
Again, this is not either a smoking gun but still yields the fact that the “picture
theory” is a fabulation of the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition.
The above serves to highlight the problems introduced by the subtleties related
to the translations. Our two works of 2022 contain other considerations withrespect to the continuing use of the concept of Bild by Wittgenstein from TLP
to the PI. There is also a debate on the translation to other languages: to thisday, there are six (!) Spanish translations of TLP, which diverge in key
concepts, thus affecting the ongoing discussion and understanding ofWittgenstein’s philosophy. The debate between the Spaniard Padilla Gálvez
and the Mexican Tomasini, two of the translators, is a clear example of thissituation. Others have joined since the publication of Padilla Gálvez (2016).
Unsurprisingly, one of the main differences between their translations
precisely relates to Bild. Where Padilla Gálvez translates it as “imagen” (image), Tomasini opts for “retrato” (portrait). It is clear to us that “portrait” falls
short to capture the whole dimension of what a Bild is and its logicalmultiplicity.

4. More on why “ein Bild” is not “a picture”

Admittedly, picture is one possible English translation of the German word Bild
. However, Bild has a greater logical multiplicity than picture within ourcontext. Why then, advocating for a different English translation?

René J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as
the “Fabulating Function”". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez

It is clear that the young Wittgenstein was well acquainted with the works of
Hertz and Boltzmann by 1906 and Frege’s Grundgesetze by 1911; Studying with
Boltzmann was not possible anymore. Kreiser (2001) reports “about themeeting of the 63-year-old Frege with the 22-year-old Wittgenstein from(presumably) 1911” when he was looking for advice after his first British
experience (1908-1911). The earliest mention of a picture theory by
Wittgenstein himself is in MS 102 (1914-1915), before the publication of TLP(1921; 1922) –of which we insist to take it as a figurative use of “theory”–.
Based upon this context, we claim that Wittgenstein’s conception of Bild isalmost certainly, a strict derivate from the original developments of the notion
in Hertz (1894) and Boltzmann (1897; 1905).
Regarding those works, more than 50% of the references to Bild areconcentrated in Hertz’s Introduction (62%) and Boltzmann’s First Lecture(55.76%). Both parts are the key texts where Boltzmann and Hertz offer theirrespective conceptions of what a Bild and Gedankenbilder are. Although there
are differences, one common point is that the task of theorizing starts not justwith plain experience, but with mental images (again, not pictures). As Hertz(1897:1; 1899:1) puts it, the theorization begins with mental images:
In endeavouring thus to draw inferences as to the future from the past, wealways adopt the following process. We form for ourselves images [Bilder]or symbols of external objects; and the form which we give them is such thatthe necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of
the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured. (Emphasis is
ours)
Boltzmann also agrees:
It has never been doubted and is especially emphasized by Hertz in thementioned book that our thoughts are mere images [“blosse Bilder”] of theobjects (better signs for them), which have at most a certain relationshipwith them, but can never coincide with them, but relate to them like theletters to the sounds or the notes to the tones.
Here is the root of the Wittgensteinian concept of Bild in TLP. For us, there isno need to look elsewhere. The fact that mental images are isomorphic with theobjects in nature and the discussions of Hertz and Boltzmann (on how the98

René J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as
the “Fabulating Function”". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez

process leads to the formulation of propositions in the sense of general laws [Sätze] and theories) leads directly to the idea of attempting to hypothesize an
isomorphic relationship between language and the world. (Mental) Image, notpicture, is the concept that better encapsulates the origins of many of the young
Wittgenstein´s thoughts and developments. The fear of psychologism and thelack of the means to treat mental images as physical phenomena back thencould explain why this has been almost overlooked.

5. What else is there in TLP, if not a "picture theory"?

[T]he Anglo-Saxon tradition of translating Bild as picture has done more
harm than good. The term “picture” is related more to figuration than tosymbolic representation, more to the visual than to the conceptual. Hence,
when one hears or reads the expression “picture theory of Wittgenstein”,
one immediately thinks of Wittgenstein's conception of language as a kindof “linguistic visual image” of the world. In this interpretation, words form
statements and the statements form a kind of “picture” or “portrait” ofthings, the only difference being that instead of shapes and colors, words
and statements are used. (Zamora 2007: 374)
What was lacking in 1921 is already available to us since the last three decades
thanks to contemporary cognitive neuroscience. As Kosslyn (2005, p. 334) puts
it, “[a]ll of the mental functions that we label with a single word, such as
perception, memory, reasoning, and imagery, are accomplished by systems ofprocesses in the brain”. Kosslyn refers to the relation between thought andmental images:
I don't believe that our thinking is composed solely of images. Images are
just one tool of thought. The images that come to mind are produced byunconscious processes that themselves are not images. Regarding theblind: They still have "spatial images" (specifying where things are),kinesthetic images (specifying how things feel), auditory images, and soforth. Imagery is not "one thing" – it is a collection of abilities, each being
related to a particular sensory modality. (Kosslyn, 2008)
The progress in areas such as mental imagery allows us today to affirm thatmental images are physical processes that take place in the brain, in the form ofRené J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as
the “Fabulating Function”". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez

patterns of neural activity that do not constitute any kind of metaphysical entities. This statement reflects part of our theoretical commitments. We also draw
here to Bermúdez (2013) –experimental research on expert memory inblindfold Chess960–, among others. Surely, our assumption is not free ofobjections, but due to constraints in the format of the contributions to thisevent, we cannot provide here a thorough development of these ideas. We
shall get back to the issue in future works.
Mental images, as we claimed in 2022, are of multiple modalities of sensory
perception, not just visual. As Damasio (1999: 318) states it:
By the term images I mean mental patterns with a structure built with thetokens of each of the sensory modalities—visual, auditory, olfactory,
gustatory, and somatosensory… [It] includes varied forms of sense: touch,muscular, temperature, pain, visceral, and vestibular. The word image
does not refer to "visual" image alone, and there is nothing static about
images either. […] Images in all modalities "depict" processes and entitiesof all kinds, concrete as well as abstract. Images also "depict" the physicalproperties of entities and, sometimes sketchily, sometimes not, the spatial
and temporal relationships among entities, as well as their actions. In
short, the process we come to know as mind […] is a continuous flow ofimages many of which turn out to be logically interrelated.
Damasio’s quote is not an argument of authority, but rather an instance thatsynthetically expresses part of our theoretical assumptions derived from theexperimental work of Bermúdez on blindfold Chess, expert memory, andcognitive science. It is interesting to note that Pylyshyn deals with the ideas ofWittgenstein in many of his works on mental imagery (2002, 2003a, 2003b).
Most of the academic research on Wittgenstein does not the contrary: to take
into account what neuroscientific work might imply for a better
understanding of his thought. We aim towards this direction. For us, there isno picture theory in TLP, but something more in the vein of what Boltzmannand Hertz meant.

100

René J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as
the “Fabulating Function”". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez

5. Final remarks

We hope we have provided arguments to consider that “Wittgenstein’s picture
theory” might be seen as some sort of fabulating function, a product of an
Anglo-Saxon interpretation. Wittgenstein’s ideas of Bilder are actually adevelopment that stems from the ideas of Hertz and Boltzmann. The
consideration of different alternatives for the translation of their works
supports this interpretation. One last word on the nature of images: if images
were just visual, there would not be chess players that are blind from birth.
Blind players do have mental (tactile) images, different from visual modality –cfr. Bermúdez (2013)–, thus enabling them to play skillfully. It is our hope that
this contribution suggests new perspectives for Wittgenstein scholars.

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Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as the “Fabulating Function” | René J. Campis C. &Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez

TLP 1973
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Note on Table 1 and Chart 1: the source is a Google Scholar search query of »“picture theory”+ Wittgenstein”« and »“Bildtheorie’ + Wittgenstein« using Harzing’s Publish or Perish Software
8.8.4275.8412 (https://harzing.com/resources/publish-or-perish). Redundant items and/or witha non-verifiable publication date were removed). The dataset is available by request to theauthors.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewer of this contribution, whose comments
and suggestions were of great aid.

René J. Campis C. & Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera & Osvaldo Orozco Méndez, "Neither Picture, nor Theory, nor of Wittgenstein: The “Picture Theory” as
the “Fabulating Function”". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge derÖsterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by
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A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751 | David Chandler

A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751
David Chandler (London, United Kingdom)
Abstract
I intend to offer a solution to the problem at Tractatus 6.3751 predicated upon Canfield’ssuggestions and Wittgenstein’s thoughts in his 1929 paper, “Some Remarks on Logical Form”.
With this in mind, I will give a brief overview of what is going on here and what the concern
is believed to be. From which, I will attempt to offer a tentative answer to these difficulties.

1. Wittgenstein's Elementary Propositions

One of the more underappreciated topics that appears later in the Tractatus is
the issue regarding the citation of the colour-exclusion problem: “thesimultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field is
impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logicalstructure of colour” (TLP 1961: 6.3751). Tractarian objects derive theirphilosophical significance from their ontological importance and the essential
relation of the nature of language to the world. Wittgenstein tells us that
objects make up the world’s substance (TLP 1961: 2.021). Because a namemeans an object, and the simple signs employed in propositions are merely
names, they represent the unanalysable integrands within our language (TLP
1961: 3.202, 3.203). This fact, in particular, distinguishes objects from theirsister term, ‘things’. In the pre-Tractatus notebooks, dated between 1914 and
1916, things when named function as objects but when described they turn out
to be existing combinations of simples that form complex, composite objects(NB 1979: 49, 2.05.15). In contrast to this, objects, as they are in themselves,must remain simple since they do not have nameable parts susceptible todissolution (TLP 1961: 2.02).
Some have taken this to be definitive proof of the fact that simple objects
cannot be reasonably thought of as sense-data. Others, such as Ramsey reason
that our inability to sustain the claim that it is impossible for a point in a visual
field to be both red and blue is ultimately responsible for the downfall of theTractatus due to the requirement that elementary propositions are logicallyindependent of one another (Ramsey 1923: 473). That said, a proposition is
independent from another when they have no truth arguments in common
with each other (TLP 1961: 5.152).

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David Chandler, "A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751 | David Chandler

According to Wittgenstein, the elementary propositions of the Tractatus
remain independent from one another in so far as that if “a” and “b” are bothelementary propositions, then one cannot ascertain the falsity of “b” from thetruth or falsity of “a” (TLP 1961: 2.0211, 4.211, 5.134). As an immediate
consequence of this, a molecular proposition, i.e. those that are connected by alogical connective, is neither a tautology nor a contradiction. This extends toall connectives. Anscombe believes that since the simultaneous presence of
two colours at the same place in a visual field is ruled out by the logicalstructure of colour, elementary propositions are not to be thought of as simple
observation statements—that is, they describe the arrangement of phenomena(Anscombe 1959: 25-27). Therefore, she argues that Tractarian objects cannot
be understood as sense-data. Canfield puts this objection as follows. If theTractatus is phenomenalistic, then a natural interpretation of elementary
propositions is that they describe distinguishable portions of that which is
phenomenally given (Canfield 1976: 82). Thusly, under Anscombe’s view, suchstatements would not be independent of one another.
However, in opposition, Wittgenstein tells us that every statement aboutcomplexes can be resolved into an expression about their constituents (TLP
1961: 2.0201). As such, Canfield argues that a contradiction only arises because
our ordinary colour words—say, red, blue, and green—are not yet fully
analysed terms; the grammar of these propositions has not been made clear(Canfield 1994: 37). As I understand it, the thought here is that further analysis
of such terms would yield elementary propositions that maintain their
independence from each other. An observation statement such as ‘there is ablue spec in a specific place at a certain time’ is not a true elementary
proposition but rather a more complex expression capable of dissolution.

2. The Colour-Exclusion Problem

To develop the foundations of this solution, we must first come to terms with
Wittgenstein’s view on the precise nature of contradiction. Accordingly, it must
be possible to show a contradiction by implementation of a truth table orthrough the employment of a series (TLP 1961: 5.1, 5.101). That is to say that acontradiction must be shown through a schema such as the following:(TTTT) (p, q)

Tautology(If p then p; and if q then q.)

David Chandler, "A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
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A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751 | David Chandler(FFFF) (p, q)

Contradiction(p and not p, and q and not q.)

The question remains as to whether we can demonstrate that a statement—for
example, ‘this point is currently both pink and yellow’—is contradictorythrough the use of the schema detailed above. If such a statement is acontradiction, Wittgenstein could not have reasonably thought that an
expression of the form ‘this spec is green’ represents a completely analysed
proposition. For suppose that we take a proposition that asserts the existenceof a colour R, at a certain time, T, in a particular place P, within our visual
field. The proposition “BPT” says that the colour B is in such-and-such a place P
at so-and-so time T. From this, it is immediately clear that a molecular
proposition which asserts the existence of a colour R in a place P at a time T,
and that also states the existence of a colour B at that same place and time,
would appear to be a contradiction as opposed to being merely false.
To explain, Wittgenstein reasoned that if statements were analysable, then “wecould explain this contradiction by saying that the colour R contains all
degrees of R and none of B and that the colour B contains all degrees of B andnone of R” (RLF 1929: 168-69). One possible interpretation of this thought isthat colours are believed to admit degrees. In other words, a visually given
colour will possess some degree of brightness in the same sense that a musicalnote will have a particular volume or pitch. Along such lines, Canfield tells usthat we can rewrite “RPT”, a proposition that asserts the existence of a certain
colour at a particular time in a specific place within our visual field as:

Equally, “BPT”, a proposition which asserts the existence of a different colour
can be rewritten as:

Therefore, the statement that a point in a visual field is red, or some othercolour, is not yet a complete description; rather, we would have to say exactly
how bright it is in order to describe it completely. This is such that we attain acontradiction from the product of these two propositions:106

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Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
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A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751 | David Chandler

A further concern can be raised as to whether Wittgenstein would haveunderstood the conjunction of the propositions “r1PT" and "b1PT” to be acontradiction. Two possible answers seem up for consideration. On the one
hand, there is the possibility that the simultaneous coexistence of two colours
within the same space represents an incompatibility. On the other, some thinkthat a combination of colours—say, the synchronous appearance of cyan andmagenta—simply forms another, i.e. blue (PR 1975: 105). Evidently, preferenceis given to the latter remark in so far as Wittgenstein states that what herequires is a phenomenological theory of colour as opposed to a physicalunderstanding (PR 1975: 273). This way, it would be possible to immediately
recognise a mixture of these phenomena within physical colours. Similarly, anindividual would be capable of discriminating between the shades of red andblue within the colour purple in the same sense depicted in the analysis shown
above (WL47 1989: 77). We can find further evidence of this in the statementthat when we talk of the impression of a particular colour on a certain surface,
our intention is not to speak of the colour itself, but rather the complex object
created by the various shades through which they produce the colourimpression that we observe (ROC II 1977: §1). From this, we can say that a
proposition such as the conjunction of "r1PT" and "b1PT” would describe a
specific colour formed by the combination of various shades in our visual field
at a particular place and time. Importantly, as an immediate consequence of
this, “r1PT” and “b1PT” remain independent of one another in that the truth of
one does not entail the truth or falsity of the other.
Furthermore, this becomes clearer when we consider the disparity between
our colour words used in everyday language such as ‘orange’ and a formal
proper name—say, “b1”. As a way into this, it is vital to ask: why is the
conjunction of “RPT" and "BPT” a contradiction whereas the conjunction of “r1PT" and "b1PT” is not so? Most likely, Wittgenstein would have answered that if
we attempt an actual analysis, then “we find logical forms which have very
little similarity with the norms of ordinary language” (RLF 1929: 165). As such,in asking why the statement is a contradiction rather than one of our ways ofsaying the colour purple, we can respond that this is not how our colour words

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Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
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are used in everyday life. Looking at it another way, that is to say that one has
to agree on the set of grammatical rules we use in determining the meaning ofa word. But this is not to say that what we are asserting is nothing more than ameaningless combination, i.e. ‘this point is both red and green’ is a senselessproposition. Rather, the point here is that an expression such as ‘the colours
pink and white can’t be in the same place simultaneously’ is, for Wittgenstein,“a grammatical rule and states a logical impossibility” (BB 1958: 56 [myemphasis]).
We can readily extend our conclusions regarding colour to all other sensible
qualities—for example, the quality of hardness will admit a level of degrees inthe sense that an edge is so-and-so resistant. On this, there is the matter ofwhether or not Wittgenstein sought to develop a purely combinatory theory ofobjects. After all, he held that all objects are alike in being able to fit into
combination with any other object. However, it appears as though he intended
to present a theory where objects are sorted into various categories andcombined according to their internal properties (TLP 1961: 2.01231). Fogelin
agrees with this description in so far as this would be out of focus if the world
really did not contain different kinds of objects. Otherwise, all objects would
have the same internal properties as each other (Fogelin 1987: 7). We canconstruct a simple counterexample in that if objects did possess identicalinternal properties, then we would be able to refer to that which is red as
being sharp, and vice versa, without them actually having exhibited suchqualities. Therefore, the colour-exclusion problem does not show that wecannot allow Tractarian objects to be sensible qualities such as colour.

3. Examples

A natural question remains as to whether or not we are now in a place where
we can isolate or extract various genuine examples of objects that are simple.
Because of this, one may ask: are these examples of ‘simple’ colours? The
immediate answer is no, or Wittgenstein at least did not think so. In a
conversation with Malcolm, he told him that it was not his business to decide
whether or not something was a simple object or a complex one, ruling thatsuch a decision was an empirical matter and not an endeavour that should beengaged with by the philosopher or the logician (Malcolm 1958: 86). The

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David Chandler, "A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751 | David Chandler

thought here is that Wittgenstein’s purpose in the Tractatus, and by theextension the earlier period as a whole, was merely to assert that there mustbe such things as simple objects; that our world is, in fact, comprised of them,and that they necessarily exist in some capacity.
Although most philosophers reading the Tractatus naturally consider whether
Tractarian objects could be something like material objects or sense-data,
Pears suggests that because Wittgenstein appears to be non-committal to either
categorisation, the matter of how he thought of these object is not important toour understanding of the text (Pears 1987: 89-90). The idea being expressed
here is that because he can prove the existence of objects of some kind, thequestion of what exactly these things are said to be could be postponed in so
far as it is not philosophically significant. Given Wittgenstein’s approach inboth the Tractatus and the Notebooks, it is certainly a tempting suggestion inthat the lack of sustained argumentation no doubt reflects this conclusion.
Furthermore, Pears writes that what we should takeaway is that it did not
matter what precise grouping Tractarian objects belonged to so long as they
were thought of as phenomenal entities. That is, they did not imply a contrast
with any reality beyond their own (Pears 1987: 277).
Many take Wittgenstein’s remark regarding the division of the body intomaterial parts to indicate that he allowed for material things, as opposed tophenomenal entities, to function as simple objects at least when named.
However, this argument fails for several reasons. Foremost amongst these
considerations, as McGuiness records, Wittgenstein once expressed to Russellthat the natural sciences do not require matter in so far as chemistry, biology,
and physics could still be considered to contain truthful statements even
without it (McGuiness 1988: 106). That is to say that it is possible to give thesciences a phenomenalistic interpretation that would preserve their truth. As
an immediate consequence of this, even if simple objects were allowed to besomething like material points, there is nothing to say that these would have to
be different in kind from phenomenal entities. In the case of physics, things
such as imaginary mass points are used in various theoretical calculations, yet
one could not find any actual instance such that a name could be reasonably
applied to them. In any event, neither the colour-exclusion problem nor theapparent lack of examples gives us a sufficient reason to reject theinterpretation under consideration.

David Chandler, "A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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References
Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (1959) An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,
London: St Augustine Press.
Canfield, John (1976) “Tractatus Objects”, Philosophia 6, 81-99.
Fogelin, Robert (1987) Wittgenstein: The Arguments of the Philosophers, Routledge.
Malcolm, Norman (1958) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McGuiness, Brian (1988) Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig (1889-1921), London: Duckworth.
Pears, David (1987) The False Prison, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ramsey, Frank (1923) “Critical Notice of L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”, Mind32, 465-78.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1929) “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, Supplementary Volumes 9, 162-71.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958) The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by David Pears and Brian
McGuiness, New York: Humanities Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1975) Philosophical Remarks, edited by Rush Rhees, translated byRaymond Hargreaves and Roger White, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1977) Remarks on Colour, ed. by G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. by Linda
McAlister and Margarette Schattle, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979) Notebooks, 1914-1916, 2nd ed., ed. by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M.
Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1989) Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology: 1946-1947,
ed. by P.T. Geach, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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David Chandler, "A Review of the Colour-Exclusion Problem at Tractatus 6.3751". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance? | Yi-Ping Chiu

Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of FamilyResemblance?
Yi-Ping Chiu (Huanggang, China)
Abstract
David Wong has argued that Mencius’ concept of righteousness (yi, 義) is a Wittgensteinianfamily concept, i. e., that there are what Wong calls “sprout cases” that we intuitively andinnately know and based on which we recognize similarities in new cases and act accordingly.
According to Wong, there are in Mencius no general rules for righteousness and moral
behavior. But I will show that there are many cases in the Mencius, where contrary to Wong’s
claim, righteousness is determined by external rules, namely rites (li, 禮). Inner attitudes
sometimes even do not matter. I will discuss five such cases. The rites explicitly spell out social
conditions that determine who may or should do what, such as (1) whether a Commoner may
visit a feudal lord, (2) that a Commoner should follow a certain kind of summons but not
another kind, (3) that a game-keeper should not follow a summons that is wrong in a certain
way, and (4) that what is right or wrong regarding certain matters of protection, charity, andpayment clearly depends on social positions and certain circumstances. Thus, righteousness(義) in Mencius is often governed by explicit rules (禮) and thus not a family concept.

1. David Wong on Mencius on morality: In favor of basic cases, intuition, andanalogical reasoning. There are no general principles and rules. There is only
family-resemblance.

Ethics is not mathematics. Neither is ordinary life. Wittgenstein was very
reserved regarding ethics, famously already in the Tractatus. Regarding
ordinary life, in the Philosophical Investigations he introduced the idea of“family resemblance”:
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members ofa family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, ect. ect. overlap
and criss-cross in the same way. (Wittgenstein 1953: section 67).
There is no general criterion, feature, or mark, by means of which we could
see whether someone is a member of a certain family or not. An uncle might
have a similar mouth but not a similar nose compared with his nephew.
Compared with his sister, it might be the nose and not the mouth that looks
similar. Again differently, compared with his father the most strikingly featureof similarity might be his eyes and not his mouth or nose. Compared with hisson, it might be a gesture, etc. Similarities vary from person to person within
the family, and they will change over time. No clear and fixed set of shared

Yi-Ping Chiu, "Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance?". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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marks can be found that would determine in general who is a member of afamily and who is not. Instead, we always have to look closely in each case andsituation to see whether we can discover similarities. We might findsimilarities that we have not thought of before.
David Wong argues that in Mencius we find arguments regarding ethics andmoral education that can be better understood in terms of family
resemblances.
A discussion with Christian Wenzel helped me to see how a case could bemade for the normativity of Mengzian arguments by analogy, even if
principles or rules are not primarily involved. He also suggested the ideathat Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblance’ could be relevant as towhy general principles could not function in the top-down way andproduce the kind of moral judgements we typically make. (Wong 2002:
218-9)
There are no general rules that would determine what is right and wrong,
Wong says. Instead, there are basic cases that should be our guides. Wong calls
them sprouts. These we intuitively recognize and based on them we see othercases as being similar, and then we act accordingly. The sprout cases will ofcourse have certain features. But there is no way that we could make thesefeatures explicit and formulate them as general rules, so that when
encountering a new situation, we could reflect on these rules and then act
according to the good case and thus appropriately. Rather, it is more directlythat we see similarities between the new case and a previous case. Dependingon the situation, the similarities might always be new ones that have not yet
been formulated. Thus, there is never a complete list of features that could
serve to establish general rules. There simply are no general rule, and in fact
we do not go by general rules. This is how David Wong thinks it works andhow he reads Mencius.
Regarding ethics in general, Wong writes:
For all their differences, the Kantian and the utilitarian both conceive
ethical reasoning to be governed from the top down by the most generaland abstract principles. (Wong 2002: 187).

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Yi-Ping Chiu, "Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance?". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance? | Yi-Ping Chiu

Finding support in Mencius, Wong argues against this top-down model:
I want to argue that in Mengzi there is a conception of ethical reflectionthat gives justificatory priority to the particular and that this conception isabout a form of ethical reasoning that involves careful comparison
between particulars. (Wong 2002: 188)
Wong cites the famous example of a king who saw an ox being led to ritualslaughter. The king spared the ox, because seeing the eyes of the ox reminded
him of an innocent man being led to execution. Being asked by Mencius why
he spared the ox, the king admits that he felt compassion for the ox. Mencius
knows that the people under the rule of the king are suffering. He then argues
with the king that he should extend the feeling of compassion to all his subjects(Wong 2002: 189). Based on such examples from Mencius, Wong argues thatwhat we need to cultivate moral feelings is not general principles and rules
but emotion and analogical reasoning. He also thinks that this is Mencius’ view.
Wong argues that one does not reason from a general principle such as “Onehas reason to feel compassion for all sentient and suffering creatures” (Wong2002: 200). One does not reflect on general features such as sentience andsuffering. The king saw the eye of the ox and was able to recall the image of an
innocent man. Mencius tells him that if he can do that, he can similarly
imagine his people who are suffering. Wong says:
One does not rehearse a syllogism with the general principle as major
premise in order to recognize that if one has a reason to save an ox one
has reason (and even more) to save people from suffering. (Wong 2000:
200)
All one needs are paradigmatic cases and analogical reasoning. One “needs nogeneral principle specifying relevance-constituting characteristics” (Wong2002: 2002). Thus, Wong sees an application of Wittgenstein’s idea of family
resemblance.
Mengzian analogical reasoning would be a careful way of navigating fromone case of right to another without supposing ahead of time what might
be the relevant similarities. (Wong 2002: 2005)

Yi-Ping Chiu, "Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance?". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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Wong thus argues against the relevance of general rules and principles. He
argues against the relevance of top-down reasoning, and in favor of bottom-up
reasoning. He also thinks this is Mencius’ view.

2. An alternative reading of Mencius: There are general principles and rules.

There is much to be said for this bottom-up way of reasoning that Wong argues
to find in Mencius. But I think there is another feature in Mencius that works
top down and that it seems to me David Wong neglects. I will give fiveexamples from Mencius, where he explains that “righteousness” (yi, 義)
consists in following certain explicit rules and “rituals” (li, 禮).
1. Wan Chang, a disciple of Mencius, asked Mencius what righteousness is.
Mencius replied that according to the social etiquette at that time, Commoners
had to bring gifts before they could visit feudal lords. Here is the text from
Mencius 5B7:
Wan Chang said, ‘May I ask on what grounds [he yi, 何義] does one refuse
to meet feudal lords?’ [Mencius replies:] ‘Those who live in the capital […]are known as subjects of the market-place, while those who live in theoutskirts are known as subjects in the wilds. In both cases the reference is
to Commoners. According to the rites, a Commoner does not dare present
himself to a feudal lord unless he has handed in his token of
allegiance’” (Mencius 2004: 119). Bloom translates “what rightness [he yi, 何
義 ] is involved”. (Mencius 2009: 117).
Judging from this story, righteousness here is determined by external norms ofsocial etiquette. The point I want to make is that righteousness is determinedby rites that functions as a general rule that applies to all Commoners.
Contrary to Wong, there is no talk of Wittgensteinian “similarity” comparable
to “various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colourof eyes, gait, temperament, ect. ect. overlap and criss-cross in the sameway” (Wittgenstein 1953: section 67).
2. The text continues: “‘When a Commoner,’ said Wan Chang, ‘is summoned tocorvée [a service and form of unpaid forced labor] he goes to serve. Why thenshould he refuse to go when he is summoned to an audience?’ [Mencius

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Yi-Ping Chiu, "Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance?". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance? | Yi-Ping Chiu

replies:] ‘It is right [義] for him to go and serve, but it is not right [不義] for him
to present himself” (Mencius 2004: 119).
Continuing from the previous story, it can be seen what righteousness is.
According to Mencius’ reply to his student Wan Chang, Mencius believed thatobedience to the laws of the country at that time, i.e., that ordinary people
must serve as soldiers, is in line with “righteousness” (義). However, it is not inline with righteousness to go to see the lord without bringing gifts. Thus, we
can see that Mencius explained what righteousness is based on the laws andregulations of the country at that time and the social etiquette ofcommunication. The regulations are general rules that apply to all Commoners
and say what one should and not should do in certain situations. Again, this is
not a case of family resemblance.
3. In a passage about a gamekeeper, the rules for right behavior are more
complicated, but still explicit. Mencius said: “Duke Ching of Ch’i went hunting
and summoned his gamekeeper with a pennon. The gamekeeper did not come.
[... Wan Chang asked:] ‘May I ask with what should a gamekeeper besummoned?’ [Mencius replies:] ‘With a leather cap. A Commoner should besummoned with a bent flag, a Gentleman with a flag with bells, and aCounsellor with a pennon. When the gamekeeper was summoned with what
was appropriate only to a Counsellor, he would rather die than answer thesummons.’” (Mencius 2004: 120).
The point I want to make is that there are explicit rules about how to summon
someone, depending on what kind of person is summoned. The rules are rites(禮) that make righteousness (義) possible. Saying that “a Commoner should besummoned with a bent flag, a Gentleman with a flag with bells, and aCounsellor with a pennon,” is expressing a general rule. This does not work via
family resemblance as Wong suggests. The “proper way” of behavior is tofollow explicit rules. “To wish to meet a good and wise man while notfollowing the proper way is like wishing him to enter while shutting the door
against him. Rightness is the road, and the rites are the door [夫義，路也；禮，門也]” (ibid.).
In the feudal society of ancient China, there were strict divisions of social
classes. And according to different social classes, there were different ritualYi-Ping Chiu, "Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance?". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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requirements. Duke Ching of Ch’i (齊景公) summoned a gamekeeper withincorrect summoning rituals (using a pennon instead of a leather cap). As aresult, the gamekeeper would rather die than dare to come. It can be seenfrom this story that Mencius believes that a righteous behavior must follow
strict etiquette regulations of the social class at that time. Mencius used themetaphors “road (lu, 路)” and “door (men, 門)” to explain “righteousness (義)”and “rituals (禮)”. Thus, righteousness here consists in following an external
objective “road” that is determined by external social norms, i.e., the “door”.
4. The following is a story from Mencius about what is right and wrong
regarding protection, charity, and payment. It turns out that there are rulesthat determine who can grant protection to whom, and who can give charity
or payment to whom and under what conditions. Who one is in this context, isdetermined by one’s social position, i.e., whether one is a Gentleman, a lords, aruler, or a prince. The conditions in question are whether one comes fromabroad to settle or whether one has regular duties. The question of what isright or wrong in this context is a question of righteousness (義) that isdetermined by ritual (禮). The story is a dialogue between Wan Chang and
Mencius:
Wan Chang said, ‘Why is it [that] a Gentleman does not place himself
under the protection of a feudal lord?’ [Mencius replies:] ‘He does notpresume to do so […]. According to the rites [禮], only a feudal lord who
has lost his state places himself under the protection of another. It would
be contrary to the rites [禮] for a Gentleman to place himself under theprotection of a feudal lord.’ [Wan Chang further asks:] ‘But if the ruler
gives him rice […], would he accept it?’ [Mencius:] ‘Yes.’ [Wan Changfurther asks:] ‘On what principle [of righteousness 義] does he accept it? [shou zhi he yi ye, 受之何義也]’ [Mencius explains:] ‘A prince naturally gives
charity to those who have come from abroad to settle.’ [Wan Chang asks
again:] ‘Why is it that one accepts charity but refuses what is bestowed toone?’ [… Mencius explains:] ‘A gate-keeper or a watchman accepts his
wages from authorities because he has regular duties. For one who has no
regular duties to accept what is bestowed on him is for him to show a lackof gravity’. (Mencius 2004: 118).

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Yi-Ping Chiu, "Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance?". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance? | Yi-Ping Chiu

Thus, what is right is stipulated by ritual, i.e., by the external and objective
social etiquette and the legal system. The etiquettes say what one has to do,depending on whether one is a Gentleman, a lord, a ruler, or a prince. Social
classes are not “characterized” by Wittgensteinian “similarities.”
5. In a further passage, Mencius explains that according to the social etiquette,
any gift given by a “superior” must be accepted, even if it was obtained
through immoral means. As long as the circumstances conform to the etiquetteof communication, even Confucius would have accepted such a gift, Mencius
says.
Wan Chang asked, ‘In social intercourse, what, may I ask, is the correct
attitude of mind?’ [Mencius replies:] ‘A respectful attitude of mind’ [… Wan
Chang further asks:] ‘Why is it said, Too insistent a refusal constitutes alack of respect?’ [Mencius replies:] ‘When a superior honours one with agift, to accept it only after one has asked the question Did he or did he notcome by it through moral means? is to show a lack of respect. This is why
one does not refuse.’ [Wan Chang asks:] ‘Cannot one refuse, not in so many
words, but in one’s heart? Thus, while saying to oneself, He has taken thisfrom the people by immoral means, one offers some other excuse for one’s
refusal.’ [Mencius replies:] ‘When the superior makes friends with one in
the correct way and treats one with due ceremony, under suchcircumstances even Confucius would have accepted a gift’. (Mencius 2004,
116).
Thus, there are clear rules according to which one should accept a gift. Rites
and rules determine righteousness. David Wong emphasizes the importance ofan inner and potentially shameful mind that he calls an “inner sprout.” But
here we see that a state of mind caused by accepting gifts from improper
sources is not the most important thing to Mencius. Instead, righteousness
according to Mencius is closely related to rules of external propriety.

Conclusion

I would argue that in Mencius, righteousness (yi, 義) is not understood in termsof family resemblance and inner intuitive “sprout cases,” but according torituals, i.e., in terms of explicit rules. Extending basic intuitions by analogical

Yi-Ping Chiu, "Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance?". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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reasoning, as David Wong explains it, is indeed something that can be found in
Mencius, and it indeed plays a role in matters of morality. But this is not the
only aspect regarding morality in Mencius. This aspect should not make us
believe that in Mencius no top-down principles and rules are supposed todetermine moral behavior. In fact, I believe that in Mencius it is mainly
explicit top-down rituals that are supposed to determine righteousness andmoral behavior. Understanding the rituals is not based recognizing“similarities” as Wittgenstein had them in mind when introducing the idea of“family resemblance.” Thus, I believe there is less room for family
resemblance and analogical reasoning than David Wong suggests. It is mainly
explicit top-down rituals that are supposed to determine righteousness, moral
behavior, and how to rule a country.
References
Mencius (2004) Mencius, translated by D.C. Lau. Second edition (first edition 1970). Penguin
Books.
Mencius (2009) Mencius, translated by Irene Bloom. New York: Columbia University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953) Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Blackwell.
Wong, David (2002) “Reasons and analogical reasoning in Mengzi,” in Essays on the Moral
Philosophy of Mengzi, Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.). Hackett Publishing.
Acknowledgement
I thank Christian Helmut Wenzel for his help in writing this essay.

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Yi-Ping Chiu, "Is Mencius’ Concept of “Righteousness” (Yi, or: 義) a Concept of Family-Resemblance?". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus | Wouter Adriaan Cohen

A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's
Tractatus
Wouter Adriaan Cohen (Cambridge, United Kingdom)
Abstract
Wittgenstein’s argument for substance is typically taken to be an attempt to show that somethings must exist necessarily, making existence itself a formal concept. After briefly reflecting
on the self-undermining character of this argument within the Tractarian framework, I notethat readers of the Ogden-Ramsey and Pears-McGuinness translations may sense an ambiguityin Wittgenstein’s use of “existence” that does not arise in the German original. Thesetranslations mistakenly translate both “existieren” and “bestehen” to “to exist”, even thoughbestehen is not a formal concept. I then discuss the status of negative existentials in theTractatus, pointing out that 3.24 seems to suggest that they can never be true. I compare 3.24
with a similar remark in Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica about definite
descriptions, which seems to suggest that there cannot be true negative existentials withdefinite descriptions. Upon reflection, it is clear that both scope distinctions and separate
treatment of the verb “to exist” mean that there can be true negative existentials with definite
descriptions for Whitehead and Russell. I show that more or less the same holds for
Wittgenstein, contrary to what 3.24 seems to suggest. Finally, I emphasise an importantdifference between Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s analysis, namely that Russell’s is external,
whereas Wittgenstein’s is internal. This makes Wittgenstein’s analysis truly reductive, but, as I
argue in the last part of the paper, also entails that he struggles to accommodate generalexistential propositions and their negations, such as “unicorns do not exist”, whereas Russell
can accommodate these straightforwardly.

1. Existence and “To Exist” in the Tractatus

What was Wittgenstein’s theory of existence in the Tractatus? A non-specialist
might, from the depths of their memory, produce something along these lines:
according to the Tractatus, existence is a formal concept because Tractarian
objects exist necessarily. Although interpretationally sound, there is something
odd about this statement. Famously, many of the propositions in the Tractatusare, by their own light, nonsense. Here we have a smaller, local version of sucha self-undermining construction, concerning existence. The Tractatusargument for substance, at least according to the standard interpretation, ismeant to show that some things exist necessarily. But the moment it isaccepted that these things, whatever they are, exist necessarily, we cannot
even say that they exist, let alone that they exist necessarily, at least given
Wittgenstein’s requirement of a true/false polarity for sense (Proops 2011: 221–
222). What, then, has Wittgenstein even tried to establish with his difficult
argument for substance?

Wouter Adriaan Cohen, "A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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It is worth noting that Wittgenstein himself doesn’t put the argument for
substance in terms of existence in the Tractatus. Neither does he say thatexistence is a formal concept. So the familiar way of understanding theconclusion of the argument for substance that I have just described is a
departure from Wittgenstein’s own words in the Tractatus. (Although both
before (TB 1979: 60) and after (PB 1975: 72) the Tractatus he does mention
existence in this context.) Whether this departure leads to unnecessary
confusions will depend, of course, on how he does in fact use the verb “toexist” and its cognates.
So in what context does Wittgenstein mention existence in the Tractatus?
Readers of the Ogden-Ramsey and McGuinness-Pears translations may beforgiven for mistakenly believing that Wittgenstein uses existence todistinguish between the Sachverhalte that obtain and those that don’t. For inboth translations, “to exist” is not only used as a translation for the Germanverb “existieren”, which is to be expected, but also for the German verb “bestehen” and its cognates. So we find 2, “Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das
Bestehen von Sachverhalten”, translated as:
Ogden-Ramsey
What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. (TLP 1955: 2)
Pears-McGuinness
What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs. (TLP 1972: 2)
The same mistake is made again and again throughout the translations of 2.04–
2.11 and also in 4.1, 4.2–3, 5.131, 5.135. In these propositions, “bestehen” isattached to “Sachverhalte” and is consistenly translated with the verb “to exist”.
That this is a mistake is especially clear when we do indeed take the argument
for substance to show that existence is a formal concept. For then a keen
reader of the English translations cited might sense an important ambiguity inthe verb “to exist” that does not correspond to any ambiguity in the originalGerman text. Although it is impossible, according to the familiar
understanding of the argument for substance, that an object doesn’t exist, any
Sachverhalt that exists might not have existed. (The awkwardness ofcomparing the existence of objects to the existence of Sachverhalte in this way
shows the need for different verbs.) Bestehen is a material concept at the level

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with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus | Wouter Adriaan Cohen

of Sachverhalte and existieren is a formal concept at the level of objects. It
would be better, then, to translate “bestehen” as “to subsist”, as Pears andMcGuinness do in 2.024, 2.027 and 2.0271 only (here the Ogden-Ramsey alsouses “to exist”). Or perhaps “to obtain” is more natural, which I used in thecontext of Sachverhalte in the previous paragraph (and Michael Beaney uses in
his forthcoming translation of the Tractatus). The best choice will of course
depend on how we decide to translate “Sachverhalt”, but I won’t discuss thatdifficulty here.
(Incidentally, translations of the Tractatus into Dutch introduce the same
ambiguity, but in this case because the only natural translation of the verb “existieren” is “bestaan”. This Dutch verb is so obviously the etymologicalsibling of “bestehen” that this also gets translated as “bestaan”.)

2. Complexes and Definite Descriptions

When does Wittgenstein use the verb “existieren” in the Tractatus, if not in thecontext of the argument for substance? In its most important use in theTractatus, it doesn’t operate at the level of objects, but at the level ofcomplexes:
Der Satz, in welchem von einem Komplex die Rede ist, wird, wenn dieser
nicht existiert, nicht unsinnig, sondern einfach falsch sein. (TLP 1921: 3.24)
Taken at face value, this seems to entail that there cannot be true negative
existentials in which a complex is mentioned. If “c” stands for a complex, then “c does not exist” simply couldn’t be true: if it were true, then it would be a
proposition in which a complex that doesn’t exist is mentioned and so by 3.24
it must in fact be false. So if we accept 3.24 at face value, existence would be aformal concept even at the level of complexes: “c exists” must always be trueand “c does not exist” always false. That would of course entail that these are
actually nonsense, leaving us with a similar self-sabotaging conclusion
concerning existence as we got from the argument for substance.

Wouter Adriaan Cohen, "A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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What if we don’t want to accept 3.24 at face value? After all, we do seem tohave the true/false polarity for existence at the level of complexes, as
illustrated by true negative existentials. How can these be accommodated in
the Tractarian picture?
I suggest we compare Wittgenstein with Whitehead and Russell on this point.
The contraposition of the part of 3.24 that I cited is this: given a proposition inwhich there is mention of a complex, if it is true, then the mentioned complex
exists. We find an analogous statement about definite descriptions in the first
volume of Principia Mathematica:
the existence of the (grammatical) subject can be analytically inferredfrom any true proposition having this grammatical subject (℩x)(ϕx).
(Whitehead and Russell 1927: 175)
If we take this at face value, then “(℩x)(ϕx) does not exist” must always be false.
After all, if it were true, then we would seem to have a true proposition with (℩x)(ϕx) as its grammatical subject, and so “(℩x)(ϕx) exists” would, according toWhitehead and Russell, also be true. That can’t be right, so we conclude that “(℩
x)(ϕx) does not exist” was false to begin with.
We must not take Whitehead and Russell’s remark at face value. As they write
a few pages later, there can be true propositions with (℩x)(ϕx) as grammaticalsubject even when (℩x)(ϕx) does not exist, as long as the definite description
has secondary occurrence (1927: 182). When the definite description has
secondary occurrence in “the present king of France is not bald”, it clearly
doesn’t entail “the present king of France exists”. But more importantly for our
purposes, they treat existentials separately: “(℩x)(ϕx) exists” is “there is exactly
one x such that ϕx”. If we introduce a negation to get “(℩x)(ϕx) does not exist,”
no question of scope arises. The sentence will simply express that it is not thecase that there is exactly one x such that ϕx, and this is obviously true formany choices of ϕ. So negative existentials also fall outside the purview of theremark just cited and can be true.

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with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus | Wouter Adriaan Cohen

3. Existence of Complexes

The question now is whether a similar story can be told for Wittgenstein’s 3.24.
I think it can. In the “Notes on Logic”, we have a statement closely related to3.24 (and 2.0201).
Every proposition which seems to be about a complex can be analysed into
a proposition about its constituents and about the proposition which
describes the complex perfectly; i.e., that proposition which is equivalent
to saying the complex exists. (NL 1979: 93)
Later, in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein gives an example ofsuch an analysis. He there asks whether “the broom is in the corner” reallymeans that “the broomsick is there [in the corner], and so is the brush, and thebroomstick is fixed in the brush” (PI 2009: §60). The proposition “which
describes the complex perfectly” corresponds to the last conjunct.
Symbolically, if aRb symbolises “the broomstick is fixed in the brush” and wewrite [aRb] for the complex corresponding to the broom, then ϕ([aRb]) is
analysed as (ϕ’a AND ϕ’b) AND aRb. (Here ϕ’ is a propositional function
appropriately related to ϕ. In the case of “the brush is in the corner” this is
likely to be just ϕ, since it makes sense to say of the parts of the brush that they
are in the corner. But in other cases, it doesn’t make sense to say of the parts ofa complex what the original proposition says of the complex itself (Potter 2009:44).)
It follows that ϕ([aRb]) may be false in two ways: because ¬aRb or because¬ϕ’a OR ¬ϕ’b. This is the indefiniteness inherent in propositions aboutcomplexes as also mentioned in 3.24 (Anscombe 1971: 34). And when we
introduce a negation into ϕ([aRb]), the issue of scope arises again (Proops 2011:
220). Is ¬ϕ([aRb]) to be understood as (¬ϕ’a AND ¬ϕ’b) AND aRb (“thebroomstick is fixed in the brush, but neither is in the corner”) or as ¬((ϕ’a ANDϕ’b) AND aRb) (“it is not the case that: the broomstick is fixed in the brush andboth are in the corner”)? On the second reading, “the broom is not in thecorner” might be false simply because the broomstick isn’t fixed in the brush.
As long as this is an acceptable reading, then, contrary to 3.24, ¬ϕ([aRb]) may
be true even when it is a proposition which mentions a complex that doesn’t
exist (namely when ¬aRb).

Wouter Adriaan Cohen, "A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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What now about “the broom exists”? This seems to say that the parts of thebroom—the broomstick and the brush—are connected in the right way. That is
to say, the proposition that the complex [aRb] exists is equivalent to the
proposition aRb, the difference between them being that only the first
proposition mentions the complex. So “the broom does not exist” says that theparts of the broom are not connected in the right way, that is, ¬aRb. (Note,though, that there is not a complex [ ¬aRb]: negative complexes areincomprehensible. So we cannot somehow say “[¬aRb] exists” as an alternative
to “[aRb] does not exist”.)
As for Whitehead and Russell, so for Wittgenstein: “the broom does notexist”can be true in only one way, there is no scope distinction to beconsidered. And “the broom does not exist” certainly can be true: one need
only dismantle the broom to make aRb false. So at the level of complexes,
existence is not a formal concept, contrary to what 3.24 seemed to suggest. Thisconclusion is also contrary to another part of 3.24, which I haven’t yet cited,
namely “that a propositional element signifies a complex can be seen from anindeterminateness in the proposition in which it occurs”. For in “the broom
does not exist”, there is no indefiniteness: it can be true in only one way (when¬aRb) and false in only one way (when aRb).

4. Internal and External Analysis

There is an important disanalogy between Russell’s analysis of “the broom isin the corner” and Wittgenstein’s. Russell thinks that this sentence expresses
that there is exactly one entity such that it is a broom, and it is in the corner.
For this to be true, there must be complexes in the domain of quantification.
The definite description describes the broom, the complex, according to its
properties, and something is then predicated of it. This makes the analysis
external: it is the properties of the (supposed) complex that occur in theanalysed proposition. Wittgenstein’s analysis is internal (Potter 2020: 278). In
the analysed proposition, neither the complex itself, nor its properties, play arole. Instead, the complex is described in terms of its constituents andsomething is predicated of them. So in the analysed proposition, the intial
complex disappears and there is no quantification over complexes. All thatremains are the constituents of the complex. Wittgenstein’s analysis is thus, as

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A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus | Wouter Adriaan Cohen

Michael Potter writes, “genuinely reductive in a sense in which Russell’s wasnot” (2009: 44).
That Wittgenstein’s internal analysis is reductive has consequences. For
Russell, “the golden mountain does not exist” is perfectly meaningful and infact true: it states that there is not exactly one golden mountain. For
Wittgenstein, however, “the golden mountain does not exist” must, at least in
most actual context, be nonsense. There is no internal structure to appeal to,there are no parts of the supposed complex of which we can say: these are notconnected so as to form a golden mountain. On the Tractarian theory, “toexist” can only be used together with some definite possible complex. Thispossible complex might not actually exist, but it has to be definite in the senseof having a specified internal structure, it must consist in a definite way ofdefinite constituents. In other words, “the broom does not exist” only makes
sense when it can be followed with: “because that broomstick and that brush
are not fitted together”. Perhaps a follow-up of this kind can be given for “thegolden mountain does not exist” if there actually had been a golden mountain,
but its top half was somehow removed. But until someone actually has aconcrete plan to create a golden mountain so that we can talk about its parts,
even if they haven’t been assembled yet, we can’t make sense of “the golden
mountain does not exist”.
Unlike Russell, Wittgenstein also does not seem to have room for “unicorns do
not exist”. Here it is even more obvious that there is no definite complex whichanalysis can decompose. Sentences of this form rather express that there areno complexes of a particular kind. In other words, “unicorns do not exist”
expresses something about all Tractarian objects, namely that none of them
are arranged such as to form a unicorn. Whereas, in accordance with
Wittgenstein’s rejection of such propositions, “the golden mountain does notexist” arguably does not picture anything when no definite constitution is
given, “unicorns exist” does seem to picture something, and, arguably, so does
“unicorns do not exist”. But what they picture is somehow not definite, but
general: they are really quantificational propositions.
Can these general pictures be accommodated in the Tractatus without
betraying the reductive internal analysis it espouses, without quantifying overcomplexes? I take it that a natural attempt would go as follows. Let Ux1...xn say

Wouter Adriaan Cohen, "A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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that x1 through xn form a unicorn, so that any complex of the form [Ux1...xn] isa unicorn. Then “unicorns exist” expresses, upon analysis, that there areobjects x1 through xn such that Ux1...xn, and “unicorns do not exist” expresses,
upon analysis, that there are no objects x1 through xn such that Ux1...xn. Here
we have quantified only over objects, and with Wittgenstein’s substitutional
account of quantification such a proposition will reduce to a long disjunction
involving only names. Similarly, “brooms exist” may be rendered, in light of
our earlier symbolisation key, as: ∃x∃y xRy.
So far, so good, it seems. But there is an awkward complication. In the case of“the broom exists”, Wittgenstein assumed there to be a definite constitution
and, in particular, two constituents. But clearly a broom may also consist of
three parts, for instance if it has a separable handle. Since “brooms exist” isabout brooms as complexes generally, its analysis cannot be ∃x∃y xRy: this
supposed analysis may be false even though “brooms exist” is true, namely
when there is a broom consisting of three parts. That is to say, any analysis of“brooms exist” must recognise that brooms may also consist of three parts. Andof course also of four parts, and so on. We are still working with Wittgenstein’s
initial simplifying assumptions, treating the broomstick and brush as simple,
but the point is fully general. Even if for any given broom, there is only one
complete decomposition into Tractarian objects, for another broom thedecomposition is unlikely to be the same structurally. In particular, thenumber of Tractarian objects that constitute the second broom is unlikely to be
the same as the number of Tractarian objects that constitute the first broom.
We certainly have no reason to think that all brooms ultimately consist of thesame number of Tractarian objects. Now, who is to say how many constituentsa unicorn, or a golden mountain, may have? If Wittgenstein is to accommodate“unicorns do not exist” and similar sentences, then it seems he is committed tothere being answers to such questions. The analysed proposition for “brooms
exist” must incorporate all the possible internal structures of a broom, and theanalysed proposition for “unicorns do not exist” must incorporate all thepossible internal structures of a unicorn.
This is not a problem for Russell, who quantifies over complexes instead ofsimples. There will be many brooms and Russell does not have to identify asingle internal structure for all of them. Here is a broom, a complex with a126

Wouter Adriaan Cohen, "A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus | Wouter Adriaan Cohencertain internal structure, and there is another broom, a complex with adifferent internal structure. What connects them is that they are both brooms,
that is, what connects them are their external properties, not their internal
constitutions.
References
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1971) An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 4thedn., London:

Hutchinson & Co.
Potter, Michael (2009) Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Potter, Michael (2020) The Rise of Analytic Philosophy, 1879–1930: From Frege to Ramsey, New
York: Routledge.
Proops, Ian (2011) “Logical Atomism in Russell and Wittgenstein”, in: Oskari Kuusela andMarie McGinn (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, Bertrand (2010 [1918]) The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, London and New York:
Routledge.
Whitehead, A.N.; Russell, Bertrand (1927) Principia Mathematica: Volume I, 2nd edn.,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979): “Notes on Logic”. In: Notebooks 1914–1916, S. 93–107. Hg. von G.
H. von Wright und G. E. M. Anscombe, übersetzt von G. E. M. Anscombe. Second edition.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1975): Philosophical Remarks. Hg. von Rush Rhees, übersetzt vonRaymond Hargreaves und Roger White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009): Philosophical Investigations / Philosophische Untersuchungen. Hg.
von P. M. S. Hacker und Joachim Schulte, übersetzt von G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker undJoachim Schulte. New York: Wiley.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979): “Notebooks 1914–1916”. In: Notebooks 1914–1916, S. 2–91. Hg. von
G. H. von Wright und G. E. M. Anscombe, übersetzt von G. E. M. Anscombe. Second edition.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1921): „Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung“. In: Annalen der Natur- undKulturphilosophie 14, S. 185–262 (Leipzig 1921). Hg. von W. Ostwald.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1955): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Hg. von C. K. Ogden, übersetzt
von C. K. Ogden und F. P. Ramsey. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and
Scientific Method. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Wouter Adriaan Cohen, "A Note on Existence and Negative Existentials in Wittgenstein's Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1972): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Übersetzt von D. F. Pears und B.
F. McGuinness. Reprinted with corrections in the light of the publication of Wittgenstein’s
correspondence with C. K. Ogden about the first translation. London: Routledge and KeganPaul.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Benjamin Marschal, Patrick Pan and Michael Potter for their feedback on an
earlier draft of this paper. The research for this paper was funded by a Bauer Scholarship from
Gonville and Caius College, University of Cambridge.

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with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book | Enzo De Pellegrin

The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian
Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book
Enzo De Pellegrin (Vienna, Austria)
Abstract
The last third of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book is devoted to the topic of personal experience and acritical discussion of some of the philosophical difficulties it raises. At the beginning of this
discussion Wittgenstein remarks that he deliberately delayed treatment of the topic becauseof the revisions it may appear to require of the approach that Wittgenstein had taken earlier
in the Book in considering the linguistic origins of philosophical problems surrounding mental
phenomena. In my talk I identify what Wittgenstein believes to be the main source of thisapparent threat to his approach and examine the principal way in which his response to thethreat is intended to defuse it. Wittgenstein’s primary concern in this response is, I suggest,
not to reject a particular strain of empiricism but to resist a certain dogmatic framing of it. To
unpack the relevant remarks in the Blue Book I draw on unpublished notes of lectures given
by Wittgenstein immediately before he began to dictate the Book and on writings by Bertrand
Russell that give expression to some of the ideas that Wittgenstein had in mind when lecturing
on mental phenomena in the academic year of 1933-34.

Nearly two-thirds into his Blue Book (henceforth BLB), after an extended
discussion of mental phenomena, Wittgenstein stops to take stock. Summingup the gist of the preceding investigation, he states its goal inuncharacteristically general terms: his examination of various examples ofuses of words such as "thinking", "meaning", and "wishing" was intended toremove certain preconceptions that are rooted in the "established forms ofexpression" (BBB 1958: 43) and that typically impede the investigation ofmental phenomena. After some further remarks on lexical meaning,
Wittgenstein abruptly turns to the topic of personal experience. This topic had
been broached much earlier in the book, but Wittgenstein only now discloses
the reason for deferring its discussion:
The reason I postponed talking about personal experience was thatthinking about this topic raises a host of philosophical difficulties which
threaten to break up all our commonsense notions about what we shouldcommonly call the objects of our experience. And if we were struck bythese problems it might seem to us that all we have said about signs andabout the various objects we mentioned in our examples may have to go
into the melting-pot. (BBB 1958: 44)

Enzo De Pellegrin, "The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The postponement and the reason that Wittgenstein cites to explain it raise thefollowing questions: What are these problems and what does Wittgensteinmean when he speaks of being struck by them? What precisely is the risk theypose, or appear to pose, for the approach he had taken before? And finally:
How does Wittgenstein respond to this apparent threat?
None of these questions is addressed directly in the remarks following
Wittgenstein's explanation of the postponement. As is so often the case, a little
unpacking and some assembly are required. My attempt today to unpack therelevant passages and outline partial answers comes in two parts: First, I'll
identify what I take to be the chief concern motivating Wittgenstein's deferralof the topic of personal experience until the last third of the book. I thenconsider Wittgenstein's response to the concern as he presents it in acompressed reminder about some previous remarks of his on the notion ofethereal objects and the role they play in philosophy. To accomplish the task of
the first part, I propose to read several passages in BLB against the backdrop of
Wittgenstein's long-standing engagement with the writings of Bertrand Russell.
To unpack the reminder about ethereal objects I draw on records of remarksthat Wittgenstein made in class before he began to dictate the lectures fromwhich BLB emerged and that he would later fail to include in the revised
compilation of the dictated lecture notes.
Before I begin, let me mention only a few basic points regarding the origins of
BLB to which I will refer later. The book derives from a series of lectures that
Wittgenstein dictated to some of his students in the academic year of 1933-34
at Cambridge University. Originally, Wittgenstein had intended to teach two
lecture courses that year, a biweekly course entitled "Philosophy" and a weekly
course, cross-listed with the Faculty of Mathematics, entitled "Philosophy forMathematicians". A few weeks into the first term, however, Wittgensteincancelled classes for the weekly course, reportedly because of the large
number of those attending the lectures. Shortly thereafter, on November 8, hebegan to dictate lecture notes to a small group of students selected for this very
purpose and he continued to do so with only a few breaks until June 1934.
Relevant for our purposes, when Wittgenstein began with the dictations in
November 1933, he rehashed some, but not all, of the themes and ideas that hehad presented in his "Philosophy" class in the weeks before November 8. After
numerous revisions, the final text was eventually duplicated in two

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Enzo De Pellegrin, "The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book | Enzo De Pellegrin

installments under his supervision, bound in blue covers and disseminatedamong students, friends and family. Apart from the odd heading or cover sheet
later added, neither the original BLB copies nor the copies of later generations,which were produced without Wittgenstein's involvement, readily betray theirdescent from a compilation of lecture notes. Wittgenstein's own working copyof BLB, however, which was recently rediscovered and is described in detail by
Jonathan Smith (Smith 2013), bears not only the marks of revision but also
retains numerical references to the original lectures. In what follows I use thenumbering of the dictated lectures as it appears in Wittgenstein's working
copy.
Let us now turn to the topic of personal experience, as it was first mentioned
briefly under the rubric of "private experience" in the ninth lecture of BLB(henceforth L9), dictated on December 8. In the first month of dictations,
Wittgenstein had spent a considerable amount of time discussing a common
but, by his lights, misleading characterization of the activity of thinking. At one
point during this discussion, he had proposed to his students that they think of
thinking not as some obscure activity of the mind but, if they wished to thinkof thinking as an activity at all, to think of it as an activity of operating withsigns. By way of illustration, he had offered the example of the activity
performed by our hands when we think with a pencil on a piece of paper.
Now, in L9, Wittgenstein notes the following challenge facing his proposal:
There is an objection to saying that thinking is some such thing as anactivity of the hand. Thinking, one wants to say, is part of our 'private
experience'. It is not material, but an event in private consciousness. […] Ishall talk about this at a later point, [...] (BBB 1958: 16)
Wittgenstein does not work out the objection in any detail here but swiftly
moves on to a different topic. Yet even in its inchoate state, the thrust of theobjection is clear: as an explication, Wittgenstein's proposal fails to capture
what might be considered a key trait of thinking, namely that thinking,conceived as something that a person experiences, is removed from common
observation; that it is, in a certain sense of the word, "private".
I will not develop the sense of "private" at issue here but only note that the
failure of Wittgenstein’s proposal to accommodate a certain notion of privacy

Enzo De Pellegrin, "The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book | Enzo De Pellegrinshould not come as a surprise. The explication is, after all, an application ofwhat in BLB Wittgenstein had earlier called a "method", the use of which herepeatedly recommends to his students. (BBB 1958: 5) In making models of themind they should, he urges, replace references to mental images withreferences to actual painted or sculpted images, i.e., with references to"outward object[s]" that are "seen". Similarly, any allusion to some obscure"working of the imagination" should be replaced by references to specific "actsof looking at real objects". (BBB 1958: 4f.)
Time constraints do not allow me to address the various applications made ofthis method in BLB and the utility attributed to it for the resolution ofphilosophical problems. For our purposes, it suffices to single out one feature
integral to the method: its application yields descriptions of scenarios in whichsigns are ordinary signs, like inscriptions on a piece of paper, and in which
objects are actual objects, such as apples and people.
It is this feature of the method that lies at the core of the concern that
Wittgenstein articulates when he returns to the topic of personal experience inL28. Recall, from the passage quoted in the beginning, that in explaining his
reason for postponing addressing the topic Wittgenstein speaks of the dangerof everything that he had said earlier about signs and objects in his examples
having to "go into the melting-pot". For Wittgenstein, this danger holds no realrisk. It is but an apparent danger, assumed to exist by those who are "struck"by the problems posed by the topic of personal experience.
What is meant by being "struck" here becomes apparent in the opening
remarks of L29, where Wittgenstein singles out one of these problems andthen briefly discusses the path one might be tempted to take towards its
solution. The problem is the question of how best to characterize therelationship between the ordinary objects surrounding us and the personal
experiences we have of them. Making no attempt to challenge the assumptionthat the question is, as it stands, meaningful, Wittgenstein at once moves on toan apparent answer, which is based on the idea that personal experiences are
the material of which reality consists. The idea of personal experiences as thebuilding material of reality is then traced along some route, which I will not
discuss today, to yet another tempting idea, namely the idea that, forphilosophical purposes, the language we ordinarily use is "too coarse" and that132

Enzo De Pellegrin, "The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book | Enzo De Pellegrin"a more subtle one" is needed to "clear up [...] matters philosophically". (BBB
1958: 45)
So this is what Wittgenstein means by being "struck" by a problem posed by
the topic of personal experience: to endorse the idea that, for philosophicalpurposes, ordinary language is inadequate and a certain other kind of
language is needed. Wittgenstein's discussion of this idea in BLB reflects, I takeit, his critical engagement with ideas on mental phenomena and their scientificexplanation that Bertrand Russell had set out in his The Analysis of Mind(henceforth AM) and other writings. For Russell, in AM, objects, commonly socalled, are not really objects but "logical constructions" built up from ultimate
constituents of the world, among which Russell counts what he calls"sensations" and "images", sensation-like entities subject to special kinds oflaws. Signs, too, are not really signs but certain groupings of these ultimate
constituents, with their meaningful use ultimately hinging on some sort ofassociation of sensations and images. In AM, Russell neither identifies such
constructions in terms of their ultimate constituents nor does he contend thatthey are ever made fully explicit in ordinary or scientific discourse:
In language there is no direct way of designating one of the ultimate brief
existents that go to make up the collections we call things or persons. If wewant to speak of such existents-which hardly happens except inphilosophy-we have to do it by means of some elaborate phrase, such as"the visual sensation which occupied the centre of my field of vision atnoon on January 1, 1919." (Russell 1921: 193)
Only in a language logically perfected for philosophical purposes would theconstructions be articulated, and every constituent bear its own name.
Nevertheless, the schematic scenarios of language use that Russell considers in
his analyses of mental phenomena are intimately bound up with references tosensations and images. And this is no coincidence: as Russell sees it, sensations
and images must play the pivotal role in any present theory of the mind, andno ultimate scientific account of the world can regard ordinary objects asanything but logical constructions. For Russell, these points are fixed; that is,
Russell views them as starting points for all present and future theorizing
about mind and matter.

Enzo De Pellegrin, "The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book | Enzo De Pellegrin

It is this aspect of Russell's conception of a logically perfected language whichmatters to him in AM, and to which Wittgenstein responds in his remarks on
the subterfuge of the idea of aethereal objects at the beginning of L30. There,
Wittgenstein envisages a subject describing her visual experiences in anexperimental setting. When contrasted with a regular description of, say, agarden of tulips, her description may appear, Wittgenstein notes, to treat of aworld that is distinct from the physical world, a mental or "aethereal" world.
By way of explaining how this appearance arises Wittgenstein reminds his
students of an earlier discussion, saying "[...] we already know the idea of'aethereal objects' as a subterfuge" (BBB 1958: 47). The reminder alludes to
Wittgenstein's first lecture of the academic year, which he had given before
the dictation sessions for BLB began, and to his discussion then of a particularmisconception about language according to which the meaning of a sign issomething somehow corresponding to it, a correlate of the word. According to
Wittgenstein, this widely held misconception first arises as a confusion, when,after having explained the meaning of a name by pointing to its bearer, we
reflect on our semantic achievement and in doing so mistake the bearer of thename for its meaning. Extending the scope of the confusion to cases where no
name-bearing objects are readily available to serve as correlates of the words,
we simply posit objects existing elsewhere. Thus we arrive at the misguided
notion that for a sign to have any meaning at all there must be something
somewhere somehow corresponding to it, an ethereal object.
In reminding his students of this misconception about language and applying
it to the case of descriptions of visual experiences in L30, Wittgenstein does notdeny that there may exist images or sensations somehow corresponding tosuch descriptions or parts thereof. The subterfuge that he associates with theidea of ethereal objects in the context of his criticism of the idea of a more
subtle language that is distinct from our ordinary language is the supposition
that entities like sensations or images must exist for the descriptions of visualexperiences to be meaningful. But without assurance of the existence of such
entities, the call to heed them loses its force.
From Wittgenstein's point of view, the matter is settled, and in the remaining
lectures of BLB he devotes his full attention to issues relating to various
notions of privacy, freely making use again of what he had earlier called a"method". Whether the remarks that Wittgenstein made in defense of this134

Enzo De Pellegrin, "The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book | Enzo De Pellegrin

method during the dictation of BLB were intended to form part of a broader
criticism of the conception of language that Russell laid out in AM and in otherwritings is still, I think, an undecided question. To answer it, more needs to besaid about some of the preconceived ideas concerning language and theanalysis of mental phenomena that Wittgenstein subjects to scrutiny in otherlectures in BLB and about their possible sources in Russell's writings. But thisis a topic for another day.
References
Russell, Bertrand (1921) The Analysis of Mind, London: George Allen and Unwin.
Smith, Jonathan (2013) "Wittgenstein's Blue Book: Reading between the Lines", in: Nuno
Venturinha (ed.) The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, New York:
Routledge, 37-51.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958): Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”.
Generally Known as The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Enzo De Pellegrin, "The Subterfuge of Ethereal Objects: Some Remarks on Russellian Fixed Points in Wittgenstein's Blue Book". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus | Paolo Degiorgi

Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus
Paolo Degiorgi (Boston, Mass., USA)
Abstract
I connect Wittgenstein’s later reflections on the different roles of the surprising inmathematics to some of his comments on logic and philosophy in the Tractatus. My point of
departure is the second appendix to book I of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,
where Wittgenstein distinguishes between two roles that the surprising might play inmathematics. Surprise of the first kind is essential to a fruitful engagement with mathematics;
it vanishes once the solution to the problem is thoroughly understood. The second form stems
from erroneously thinking that mathematicians investigate “depths” which we have “noinkling of,” as well as from confusing calculations and proofs with experiments. I argue thatseveral passages from the Tractatus discussing logic, such as 6.1251 and 6.1261, are best
understood as referring to the second sense of surprise from RFM. I thereby employ
Wittgenstein’s later remarks on the surprising in mathematics to elucidate the Tractarian
distinction between the sinnvolle Sätze of natural science and the sinnlose Sätze of logic. Then
I argue that we can utilize the discussion of the first role of surprise in RFM to shed light on
the Tractarian distinction between significant propositions and Wittgenstein’s own
elucidatory propositions (discussed in the 6.5s).

I. RFM: Two Roles of the Surprising

Appendix II from Part I of the revised edition of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on theFoundations of Mathematics (henceforth RFM) begins with the following
passages:
The surprising may play two completely different parts in mathematics.
One may see the value of a mathematical train of thought in its bringing tolight something that surprises us: - because it is of great interest, great
importance, to see how such and such a kind of representation of it makes
a situation surprising, or astonishing, even paradoxical.
But different from this is a conception, dominant at the present day, which
values the surprising, the astonishing, because it shews the depths towhich mathematical investigation penetrates; - as we might measure thevalue of a telescope by its shewing us things we’d have had no inkling of
without this instrument. The mathematician says as it were: ‘Do you see,this is surely important, this you would have never known without me.’ Asif, by means of these considerations, as by means of a kind of higher
experiment, astonishing, nay the most astonishing facts were brought tolight.

136

Paolo Degiorgi, "Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus | Paolo Degiorgi[…] If you are surprised, then you have not understood it yet. For surpriseis not legitimate here, as it is with the issue of an experiment. There […] itis permissible to yield to its charm; but not when the surprise comes toyou at the end of a chain of inference. For here it is only a sign thatunclarity or some misunderstanding still reigns (RFM 1978: 111)
When we engage with mathematics, we are often surprised by some elements
we thus acknowledge as surprising. As noted by Peter Simons, Wittgenstein’s
use of the latter term suggests that his interest was not limited to the merely
psychological state of surprise (Simons 2015: 160). Yet, the text seems to be
crucially concerned with some of the ways in which we experiencemathematics (Floyd 2012: 231). I shall refer to these as forms of surprise.
Because the distinction at stake has been amply elucidated by the literature,e.g. in (Mühlhölzer 2002), I will limit myself to a short overview of it.
We can illustrate the first form by considering, following Wittgenstein’s
invitation (RFM 1978: 112), the case of a mathematical puzzle, such as the one
in which we are asked to connect nine dots, arranged in a 3 x 3 lattice, using
only four consecutive straight lines.

When faced with this request, we may try to draw a spiral, or attempt othersimilar educated strategies that maximize the number of dots covered while
minimizing overlapping lines. None of these attempts will work. After being
shown the solution (Figure 2), it might strike us as surprising, and we mightprotest not having been given a crucial bit of information: namely, that lines
can reach outside the grid. The puzzle is not a difficult one after one
understands what counts as a line. It is as if after seeing the solution one cando something with a line that one could not do before.

Paolo Degiorgi, "Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus | Paolo Degiorgi

While this elementary puzzle might seem distant from “grown up”
mathematics, I believe that it highlights an important, if not essential, role ofthe surprising in the practice of mathematics. The experience of working
through surprising elements not only is an important component of whatmakes problems interesting or worth pursuing; it also is a mark of genuine
mathematical progress through insight. Puzzles, as Wittgenstein suggests, “areframed because they surprise: this is their whole sense” (RFM 1978: 112).
While any given bit of mathematics is surprising only to some people, being
surprised by a new insight has the potential to contribute to everyone’s
mathematical development. What is crucial, however, is that surprise
eventually disappear: that what used to puzzle us does not do so anymore.
More is true: we are now incapable of “unseeing” the solution, thus coming tofeel a form of compulsion that the theorem has to be true, or that the puzzle
must be framed in this way. When we ask ourselves what we were previously
surprised at, we find ourselves incapable of pointing to anything specific (RFM
1978: 59-60, 63); we realize that there is no determinate thing in the problem
that is surprising in itself. What happened is that we have come to a newunderstanding of the statement of the problem itself. This leads Wittgenstein tosuggest that “the sense of the result is not to be read off from [the result] byitself, but from the proof” (RFM 1978: 162), similarly to how the sense of “line”
can only be read off the solution to the previous puzzle. I read this as aninvitation to appreciate how understanding a mathematical statement and its
proof are more closely related processes than one might think.
The second form of surprise is manifest in our tendency to marvel at amathematical result as if it introduced us to a hidden truth that was previously
unforeseeable. Wittgenstein had in mind, for instance, some of the reactions torecent developments in mathematical logic, such as Gödel’s incompleteness

138

Paolo Degiorgi, "Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus | Paolo Degiorgi

theorem. One is tempted to read these results as “introduc[ing] us to themysteries of the mathematical world” (RFM 1978: 137). This leads one to thinkof mathematics as a tool reaching beyond human knowledge. Unlike the firstkind of surprise, this one fosters its own persistence and dissuades us fromachieving full clarity on the topic. Filled with a “special feeling ofdizziness” (RFM 1978: 286), we are seduced by the idea that the proposition weare dealing with has a “deep content” (RFM 1978: 286), which we will notunderstand unless we come to see something that we previously had no inklingof. This form of surprise, contrary to the previous one, signals that we have not
yet understood the mathematical problem. I read Wittgenstein as suggestingthat overcoming this form of surprise involves a proper appreciation of thekind of questions that mathematics poses. In particular, it requires
distinguishing between mathematical problems and problems posed in naturalscience, whose solutions might require discovering new facts which might takeus by surprise. Mathematical proofs and calculations, on the other hand, differ
from scientific experiments in their being (in principle) foreseeable. Thus,
overlooking the difference between the grammatical structures ofmathematical and empirical statements is one of the ways we might be led into
the second form of surprise.

II. Logic and Surprise in the Tractatus

In what follows, I want to suggest some ways in which we may trace bothforms of surprise we found in RFM back to some of Wittgenstein’s comments
on logic in the Tractatus. I believe that much of the following could be applied
to his early views of mathematics as well, perhaps following an account of therelation between mathematics and logic in the TLP as in (Kremer 2002);
however, space limitations prohibit me from discussing Tractarianmathematics. Because the Tractatus distinguished logic from mathematics, thepassages I am quoting concern a different subject matter from that of RFM. I
nevertheless read in the TLP an incipient concern with questions regarding thenotion of surprise similar to those that shaped the mature views found in RFM.
My hope is that, by recognizing these strands within Wittgenstein’s thought,
we might come to a better understanding of both his earlier and his later
works.

Paolo Degiorgi, "Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus | Paolo Degiorgi

I suggest that the second form of surprise we encountered in RFM has much incommon with the one mentioned in TLP 6.1251, which asserts that “there cannever be surprises in logic.” To see this, recall how, in the Tractatus, thepropositions of logic (tautologies and contradictions) lack sense (Sinn), which is
why Wittgenstein calls them sinnlose Sätze. Unlike significant propositions (sinvolle Sätze), they do not depict possible states of affairs. Rather, tautologies
demonstrate the logical properties of significant propositions by combining
them into propositions that say nothing (6.12, 6.121). The ‘experience’ needed
to understand tautologies is not that of a determinate state of affairs, but
merely the experience “that something is; that, however, is not anexperience” (5.552). Logic is thus prior to any (significant) experience, such asthat of surprise. Unlike the significant propositions commonly employed in thenatural sciences, tautologies cannot depict or predict (possibly unforeseeable)
objects or events. No future experience can possibly lead us to conclude that agiven tautology turned out to be false. By choosing the appropriate logicalnotation, we could in fact dispense with logical propositions (6.122). In these
remarks, Wittgenstein is criticizing the very notion of a “logical experience” of“logical objects,” proposed by Russell in his 1913 manuscript Theory ofKnowledge (Russell 1984: 97). More generally, Wittgenstein denies any
conception of logic that makes it appear “substantial” (6.111), similarly to how
in RFM he criticizes conceptions of mathematics that make it appear
irretrievably mysterious. Hence, as in RFM with mathematics, the discussion of
surprise in the TLP is meant to stress the foreseeability of logical andmathematical results, thereby distinguishing them from the propositions of thenatural sciences.
Thus, when the Tractatus talks of the absence of surprise in logic, we shouldhear the second sense of surprise from RFM. The activities that involve
senseless propositions, such as applying operations and mechanicallyrecognizing tautologies (6.1262) are substantially different from the “real life”
scenarios which we might characterize through significant propositions, suchas seeing or experiencing something for the first time (6.211). In focusing on
this aspect, both early and late Wittgenstein are concerned with elucidating
what sort of activities logic and mathematics are; in particular, in how they
bear a markedly distinct form from that of engaging with the empiricalsciences (6.111). A persistent attitude of astonishment in the face of a140

Paolo Degiorgi, "Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus | Paolo Degiorgi

mathematical result is more likely a sign that we are not clear about its nature,or that we have unwarranted expectations about its purpose. This is unlikely
to help us with the practice of mathematics. The Tractatus makes a more
fundamental point: as long as we are engaging with this form of surprise, wehave failed to so much as enter the domain of the logical as such. This is thesense in which there can never be surprises in logic.
I now want to consider Wittgenstein’s brief discussion of the process by which
one recognizes a tautology as such (6.126-6.1265) and use it to suggest a way inwhich we can read the first form of surprise as entering, albeit tangentially,
the Tractarian discussions of logic. The recognition of a tautology is referred toas a “calculation” of the logical properties of the symbol, yielding a “proof” of alogical proposition. It amounts to “successively applying certain operations” toan initial tautology generating further ones that are said to follow from thepremise (6.126). Hence, the steps of a logical proof all lack sense. Thus, unlikein the case of significant propositions, “in logic every proposition is the form ofa proof” (6.1264), and it is “possible to construe logic in such a way that every
proposition is its own proof” (6.1265). Wittgenstein stresses how the process bywhich we recognize a tautology is not essential to logic (6.126): it is a “meremechanical expedient” we use to deal with complicated cases (6.1262).
Nevertheless, the equivalence of process and result in logic should be
reminiscent of our earlier discussion of the internal connection between
understanding a mathematical result and understanding its proof. In theTractatus, Wittgenstein is concerned with the specific character of therelationship between logical propositions and their proofs, and how thisrelationship is markedly different from that between a hypothesis about astate of affairs and the experiment needed to verify it (6.2331, 6.1263). In doingso, he is brought to reflect on the (inessential) process by which tautologies arederived or used to infer a significant proposition from another, i.e. theiroperational character. Determining whether a string of signs is a tautology, oran equation, requires going through a sequence of steps. This process mighthold some surprises for us, in the way that the first form of surprise did in
RFM. While the TLP does not dwell on the details of the possibility of surprisein the procedure, precisely because Wittgenstein did not (yet) deem it
pertinent to logic as such, it is significant that the work does single out the“complicated cases” in which we cannot determine at a glance whether a

Paolo Degiorgi, "Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus | Paolo Degiorgi

propositional sign belongs to logic. I conjecture that Wittgenstein’s early
concern with distinguishing logic and mathematics from the empiricalsciences played a role in his later thinking of the two under the aspect of“doing” rather than that of “finding” (RFM 1978: 362), and hence in his
increasing interest in the experiential elements that characterize
mathematical practice, such as surprise. In other words, I read in the TLP thebud of an incipient concern with the relationship between the experience ofsymbolic manipulation and more traditionally “fundamental” concerns about
the nature of logic and mathematics. This is one way in which we might trace
Wittgenstein’s interest in “vanishing” surprise back to his early works.

III. Surprise in Philosophy

There is another and less obvious locus in the text that I would like to connect
to the first form of surprise from RFM. One aspect I attempted to emphasize insection I is how the vanishing of the feeling of surprise is, for Wittgenstein, acharacteristic mark of having understood a mathematical proposition in virtueof having recognized that it belongs to mathematics. In other words, assigninga sentence to its proper logical place is an essential component of the processof understanding the sentence itself. This is similar to why the Tractatusstresses that tautologies are not significant propositions: their job is not that of“getting to the facts.” Hence, recognizing the senselessness of tautologies isitself a mark of success in the practice of logic, similarly to how, in RFM, thevanishing of surprise is a mark of successful engagement with mathematics. I
believe that a similar idea holds of the Tractatus’ conception of what it means
for a reader to understand its own (philosophical) propositions. The work
famously states that “Philosophy aims at the clarification of thoughts” (4.112), a
sentence that Wittgenstein attempted to explain in a letter to Ogden by writingthat “the result [of philosophy] must be that the prop[osition]s now havebecome clear that they ARE clear” (CCO 1973: 49). Since the work (6.53, 6.54)
characterizes the propositions of philosophy as “nonsensical” (unsinnig), the“thoughts” of 4.112 as well as the “propositions” of the letter to Ogden are most
likely those that have sense (those that are significant). Hence, part of the taskof understanding the philosophical propositions of the Tractatus is torecognize them in their nonsensicality, similarly to how understanding atautology requires recognizing its senselessness. In both cases, it is crucial to142

Paolo Degiorgi, "Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus | Paolo Degiorgi

appreciate that the proposition one is working with is not significant, because
it does not perform the job of, for instance, the propositions of natural science.
As in the case of working out whether a sentence is a tautology, the process bywhich one comes to recognize a proposition as nonsensical needs not be asimple one. It might involve “a long period of doubt” (6.521), a convoluted
transition away from the initial puzzlement and surprise. My concern here is
not to dwell on the multifarious forms this process might bear, nor to attempta phenomenological analysis of it; rather, my intent is to suggest that we mayread this transition as structurally akin to the one through which we come tounderstand the solution to a mathematical puzzle. Working ourselves out of
this feeling of puzzlement and surprise requires realizing that there was no
determinate element of the mathematical problem that was surprising in
itself; similarly, “letting go” of Wittgenstein’s nonsensical remarks requires
realizing that there was nothing determinate we wanted to say in the firstplace. In other words, we may draw a parallel between the way the Tractatus
calls for the problems of philosophy to “vanish” (6.521) and the vanishing of
surprise in our practice of mathematics as described in RFM. What is at stake,in both works, is a proper appreciation of the specific natures of necessity thatmathematics and philosophy, respectively, deal with. By drawing thisconnection, I hope not only to indicate how RFM and TLP might mutually
illuminate each other, but also to suggest that Wittgenstein’s discussion ofmathematical practice might help us better understand the development of his
own conception of philosophy throughout his works.
References
Floyd, Juliet (2012), “Das Überraschende: Wittgenstein on the Surprising in Mathematics”, inJonathan Ellis and Daniel Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, New York:OUP, 225-258.
Kremer, Michael (2002), “Mathematics and Meaning in the Tractatus,” in PhilosophicalInvestigations 25, 272–303.
Mühlhölzer, Felix (2002), “Wittgenstein and Surprises in Mathematics”, in: Klaus Puhl and
Rudolf Haller (eds.), Wittgenstein und die Zukunft der Philosophie: Eine Neubewertung nach 50
Jahren, Proceedings of the 24th International Wittgenstein Symposium 2001, Vienna: Öbv&Hpt
Verlagsgesellschaft, 306-315.
Russell, Bertrand (1984), Theory of Knowledge, the 1913 Manuscript, edited by E. R. Eames,
London: George Allen & Unwin.

Paolo Degiorgi, "Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

143

Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus | Paolo Degiorgi

Simons, Peter (2015), “Wittgenstein and surprise in mathematics,” in Argumentos, ano 7 n. 13,
Fortaleza, jan./jun. 2015, 157-164.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1973), Letters to C. K. Ogden, edited with an introduction by G. H. vonWright and an Appendix of Letters by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Oxford: Basil Blackwell and
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, revised edition, translated by B.
McGuiness and D. F. Pears, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, third revised
edition, edited by G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (eds), Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Acknowledgement
I thank Michael Kremer and Juliet Floyd for their helpful comments on earlier versions of thispaper. I am also thankful to an anonymous reviewer for their extensive feedback and suggestions.

144

Paolo Degiorgi, "Varieties of Surprise in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ desTractatus | Hanno DepnerBasteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt –selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus
Hanno Depner (Rostock, Germany)
Abstract
Als der Tractatus erschien, richtete er sich nicht zuletzt gegen die übertriebenen Hoffnungender Zeit an Logik und Wissenschaft, als deren Erbe sich der Computer entwickelte. 100 Jahre
später leben wir in einer digitalisierten Welt, ohne die übertriebenen Hoffnungenlosgeworden zu sein, die sich nun an die Informationstechnologie richten. Weil Möglichkeiten
und Herausforderungen der Digitalisierung auch heute nur ansatzweise ausgelotet sind, hat
Wittgensteins frühe Schrift als Kritik des Informationszeitalters nichts an Aktualität verloren.
Um diesen Anspruch zu belegen, stelle ich meinen Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst
hergestellt medientheoretisch und kulturwissenschaftlich als analoge Antwort auf Probleme
der digitalisierten Welt vor. Die sperrig und hybrid gestaltete Analogizität des Bastelns ist
geeignet, zu einem verantwortungsvolleren Umgang mit Information beizutragen. Vor diesem
Hintergrund lässt sich erstens der Tractatus als frühe Kritik des Informationszeitalters und
Kultivierung der Anwendungsdimension von Kommunikation aktualisieren. Zweitens erhält
auch Wittgensteins Spätwerk eine neue Beleuchtung, wenn dessen Aspekte des Bastelns ins
Licht der Digitalisierungskritik, neuer Formate der Kommunikation und damit derEtablierung neuer Verantwortungsstrukturen gesetzt werden.

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt
als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus

Vor zwei Jahren aber hatte ich Veranlassung, mein erstes Buch (die„Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung“) wieder zu lesen und seine
Gedanken zu erklären. Da schien es mir plötzlich, dass ich jene alten
Gedanken und die neuen zusammen veröffentlichen sollte: dass diese nur
durch den Gegensatz und auf dem Hintergrund meiner älteren Denkweise
ihre rechte Beleuchtung erhalten könnten. (PU 1993, 232)
Als der Tractatus erschien, richtete er sich nicht zuletzt gegen dieübertriebenen Hoffnungen der Zeit an Logik und Wissenschaft, als deren Erbesich der Computer entwickelte. 100 Jahre später leben wir in einer
digitalisierten Welt, ohne die übertriebenen Hoffnungen losgeworden zu sein,die sich nun an die Informationstechnologie richten. Weil Möglichkeiten undHerausforderungen der Digitalisierung auch heute nur ansatzweise ausgelotet
sind, hat Wittgensteins frühe Schrift als Kritik des Informationszeitalters
nichts an Aktualität verloren. Um diesen Anspruch zu belegen, soll hier
Wittgensteins „ältere Denkweise“ eine angemessene „Beleuchtung“ erhalten –in Abwandlung von dessen Idee einer gemeinsamen Veröffentlichung vonHanno Depner, "Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

145

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ desTractatus | Hanno Depner

Früh- und Spätwerk zur „rechten“ Erhellung des letzteren. Das geschieht,
indem ich meinen Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt
medientheoretisch und kulturwissenschaftlich als analoge Antwort auf
Probleme der digitalisierten Welt vorstelle. Dabei zeigt sich der Bausatz auch
als eine Art der gleichzeitigen Veröffentlichung von Wittgensteins Früh- und
Spätwerks – was schließlich auch das von ihm beabsichtigte Licht auf letztereswirft.
Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt ermöglicht die Umsetzung des Tractatuslogico-philosophicus in ein dreidimensionales Modell – „zum Basteln und
Begreifen“, wie der Untertitel erläutert. Der als Buch gebundene Bausatz
enthält 19 Bastelbögen, die anhand einer illustrierten Anleitungzusammengebaut werden können, ergänzt von einführenden Texten und
Begriffserläuterungen. Schritt für Schritt lässt sich auf diese Weise nicht nur
der Aufbau des Tractatus nachbilden, sondern auch die ontologischen Ebenen
schematisieren, die er durchschreitet: Ausgehend von der „Welt“, wie sie
Wittgenstein fasst, in ihrer atomistisch gegliederten logischen Struktur (alsrote Kuben); darauf aufbauend die „Gedanken“ als logisch ebenso gegliederte
Bilder der Welt (als blauer Kubus); anschließend die „Sprache“ mit ihren
logisch wieder ebenso gegliederten Bildern der Gedanken (als gelbe Kuben);sowie abschließend das „Unsagbare“ als logisch nicht zu gliedernde
Verwirrung von Sprache und Denken (als graue Kuben). Mit dem
Zusammenbauen aller Kuben verbindet man die Hauptsätze 1 bis 7 und hält
schließlich den „Tractatus-Turm“ in den Händen, aus dessen ausziehbaren
Schubladen sich alle Nebensätze als darin versenkte Türmchen entfalten
lassen und dann die klare Grundstruktur gleichsam entkernen und wolkenhaftumhüllen (vgl. Depner 2019).

Digitalisierung als Verengung von Kommunikation

Unter den zahlreichen medialen Formaten von Kommunikation zeichnet sichdas Format der Information dadurch aus, dass es die Kontingenz derAnwendungsdimension auf diskrete, unterschwellige Weise ausschließt (vgl.
Derrida 1988). Es wird ein Sender-Empfänger-Modell etabliert, in welchem
Wissen als Information verbindlich, der Verfasser als Autor verantwortlich
und der Leser als Rezipient auf ein eher passivisches als aktivisches Verstehen

146

Hanno Depner, "Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ desTractatus | Hanno Depner

verpflichtet ist. Erreicht wird dadurch eine Entlastung des Rezipienten sowie
die Verbindlichkeit von Wissen. Durch die Festlegung der Rollen von Autorund Rezipient etablieren sich normativ belegte Verantwortungsstrukturen(vgl. Depner 2022).

Dieses ausgezeichnete Format der Kommunikation zeigt sich spätestens in derdigitalisierten Welt dadurch stark herausgefordert, dass die diskrete
EntlastungdesLesersVerantwortungslosigkeit
begünstigt.
Medienwissenschaftler wie Bernhard Pörksen beschreiben (in ihrer eigenen

Hanno Depner, "Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

147

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ desTractatus | Hanno Depner

Begrifflichkeit, die ich hier zu meinen Zwecken umschreibe, wobei ich inmehreren längeren Passagen auf meine Artikel zur Gestaltung meiner
Bausätze zurückgreife, vor allem Depner 2022), wie der Anstieg vonInformation durch digitale Produktion und global ungebremste Distribution
das etablierte Sender-Empfänger-Modell implodieren lässt (vgl. Pörksen 2021,
50). Während Information eine ubiquitäre Dominanz erlangt, einen Zustandder „situationsunabhängigen Sichtbarkeit, permanenter ortloser Präsenz undunabweisbarer Evidenz“ (ebd. 16), nivelliert das Übermaß an Informationen
deren Verbindlichkeit, indem beinahe beliebige widersprüchliche
Informationen verfügbar sind (vgl. ebd. 41). Entstehungskontexte werden
zunehmend als inszeniert empfunden (vgl. ebd. 31f), Rezeptionskontexte
vervielfältigen sich und prallen als „Clash der Codes“ global ungehemmt
aufeinander (ebd. 16).
Die Kontingenz der Anwendungsdimension, gegen die das Format„Information“ eigentlich immunisieren will, wandert auf diese Weise
gleichsam in die quantitativ aufgeblähte Information ein und höhlt sie
qualitativ aus. Unvermutet überfordert und mit bislang ungekannten
Möglichkeiten der globalen Verteilung von Information ausgestattet, wird deran Entlastung gewöhnte Rezipient selbst zum Autor – allerdings ohnebesondere Kompetenz und Verantwortlichkeit (vgl. ebd. 68 und 87f). Der
medial bedingte Wandel im Umgang mit Information in der Öffentlichkeit
führt zur Irritation über ihren Status. Das postfaktische Zeitalter hat
begonnen, oder genauer gesagt: Die Angst davor nimmt zu, und zwar
berechtigterweise: „Die Idee letzter Gewissheit oder auch nur die Idee eines
einigermaßen stabilen Realitätskonsens zerfällt und zerbröselt öffentlich, füralle sichtbar und in unabweisbarer Deutlichkeit.“ (Ebd. 49)
Verbindlichkeit und Verantwortung als Fixpunkte von individueller undgesellschaftlicher Orientierung werden nun immer dringender benötigt. Unter
den gegebenen medialen Umständen hilft es jedoch gerade nicht, auf mehr
Verbindlichkeit durch Information zu setzen, denn mehr vom Gleichen
verschärft nur das Problem, wie gegenwärtig sichtbar ist: Es werden immer
mehr Expertenmeinungen (bessere Informationen) nachgefragt, die dannnoch routinierter angezweifelt werden. Es werden immer mehr Bücher
gedruckt, die jeweils immer weniger gelesen werden. Es entsteht eine Spirale
zunehmender Gereiztheit. (Vgl. ebd. Titel)

148

Hanno Depner, "Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ desTractatus | Hanno Depner

Statt einseitiger Konzentration auf Information wäre, wie es Pörksen mit
seiner „Utopie der redaktionellen Gesellschaft“ vorschlägt, bei der
Kommunikation von Wissen die Anwendungsdimension nicht weiterauszuschließen, sondern – anders als bisher bzw. auf andere Weise – zu
kultivieren (ebd. 194-210). Dafür reicht es nicht, bildungsoptimistisch allein
auf der Seite des Individuums anzusetzen und Kompetenzen zu fördern,sondern nötig ist auch eine Modifizierung medialer Formate des Wissens unddamit eine Etablierung neuer Verantwortungsstrukturen (vgl. ebd. 196 und
217-221).
Vor diesem medientheoretischen Hintergrund kann der Tractatus als frühe
Kritik des Informationszeitalters und Vorschlag eigener Antworten gelesen
werden. In seiner Schrift bringt Wittgenstein auf Information verengte
Kommunikation mit ihrer diskret in den Hintergrund gerückten
Anwendungsdimension in einen scharfen Kontrast. Zwar geht er von derübertriebenen
Annahme
aus,
dass
nur
propositionale
Tatsachenbeschreibungen Sinn haben – womit echte kommunikative Akte auf
Informationen limitiert würden. Doch kann das informative „Sagen“ nicht
ohne „Zeigen“ auskommen. Gerade die Logik kann die Kontingenz derAnwendungsdimension nicht konsistent ausschließen, weil das Zeigen
begrifflich unverfügbar ist: „Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt
werden.“ (TLP 4.1212)
Jenseits solcher informativer Aussagen über das Zeigen kann sich die
Dimension des Zeigens nur bemerkbar machen. Sie tut das etwa im auffälligen
Gliederungssystem, mit dem sich der Tractatus von gewöhnlichen
philosophischen Formaten abhebt (vgl. Tetens 2009, 7). Die Folge der sieben
Hauptsätze und ihre Entfaltung in Nebensätze erster bis fünfter Ordnung setzt
das Prinzip der Verengung von Kommunikation auf Information auf extreme
Weise um, indem die inhaltlichen Zusammenhänge zwischen den Sätzen auf
Zahlen reduziert sind und die Relevanz der Sätze hierarchisch geordnet wird.
Doch gerade im Format dieser extremen Verengung kommt die
Anwendungsdimension zur Geltung. Das Gliederungssystem, das auf die LinkStruktur des Internets vorausweist, erweist sich nämlich in der Lektüre
weniger als entlastend, sondern vielmehr als herausfordernd, weil es neben
einer gewöhnlichen, inhaltlich ausgerichteten, linearen Lektüre zusätzlicheine formale Lektüre entlang der verschiedenen Ordnungsstufen der

Hanno Depner, "Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

149

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ desTractatus | Hanno DepnerNebensätze ermöglicht und damit ein zirkuläres, suchendes Lesen nahelegt.
Der Tractatus ermutigt den Rezipienten, selbständig zu lesen und so zum
Autor zu werden.
Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt rückt bereits mit seiner
Anschaulichkeit die vielfältigen Formate von Kommunikation und damit die
Anwendungsdimension in den Vordergrund – denn während das Format desAussagesatzes beim Verstehen diskret im Hintergrund steht, erfordert das
Format des Bausatzes Entscheidungen über die Bedeutung seiner spezifischen
Konturen und Formen. Das ungewöhnliche Gliederungssystem des Tractatuswird mittels einer exakten, feingliedrigen Gestaltung umgesetzt, die nach dervollständigen Entfaltung eine fragile Netz-Struktur entstehen lässt. Im
Herausziehen und Schließen der Schubladen, im Aus- und Einklappen derTürmchen wird der Rezipient zu einem Nutzer, und zwar zu einem, der zum
sorgfältigen und verantwortungsbewussten Umgang mit Wissen angehalten
wird. Denn er benötigt buchstäblich Fingerspitzengefühl, Geschick und
Geduld, in einem Ausmaß, das über umstands- und gedankenloses Lesen,
Verlinken oder das schnelles Absetzen eines Posts oder Tweets körperlich
spürbar hinausgeht. In diesem Einsatz von Materialität liegt eine Kultivierung
der Anwendungsdimension: Übungen im nicht-willkürlichen Umgang mit
Kontingenz und das Sammeln von Erfahrungen der Verlässlichkeit jenseits derBegrifflichkeit.

Basteln als analoge Kultivierung der Anwendungsdimension

Als eigentlicher Garant der Verlässlichkeit des (logischen) Schließens zeigt sichschon im Tractatus die Materialität des Papiers: Logik besteht im materialen
Operieren mit Symbolen, und zwar in einem unbegrifflichen, dabei aber nicht
beliebigen, weil regelhaften Umgang mit Wissen. Was im Tractatus graphischvorgeführt wird (vgl. TLP 6.1203 und 6.1262), was die Informationstechnologie
später mithilfe von Relais und Prozessoren ausführt, das wird in Wittgensteins
Welt mit Schiebereglern und einer Drehscheibe aus Papier mechanischsichtbar gemacht. In seinem Spätwerk wird Wittgenstein auf das zumeist
diskret übersehene sorgfältige Operieren mit Materialität bei geistigen

150

Hanno Depner, "Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ desTractatus | Hanno Depner

Vorgängen explizit hinweisen, etwa im Blauen Buch: „Wenn wir über den Ort
sprechen, wo das Denken stattfindet, haben wir ein Recht zu sagen, dass dieser
Ort das Papier ist [...].“ (BBB 23)
Basteln betont den Anwendungs-Aspekt der Herstellung von Wissen, indem
Papier nicht einfach als Hintergrund einer Schreibfläche, sondern als Zentrum
einer haptischen Aktivität verwendet wird: Wittgenstein selbst bastelte inseinem Spätwerk buchstäblich an seinen philosophischen Gedanken, indem erlose gruppierte Notate mittels Schere und Klebstoff immer wieder neu
kombinierte, erweiterte, kürzte. Das Basteln von Philosophie erweitert das
etablierte Repertoire philosophischer Formate der Kommunikation nicht nur,es kann zudem – wie bei Wittgensteins Welt – eine kritische, ironische Geste
sein,
die
über
bloß
intellektuelle
Welterklärung
auf
dieAnwendungsdimension hinausweist. An das erhellende Potential von Witz
und Polemik glaubte auch Wittgenstein, der der Meinung war, es könnte ein
ernsthaftes und gutes philosophisches Werk geschrieben werden, dasausschließlich aus Witzen besteht (vgl. Buchholz 2006, 114), und überzeugt
war: „Nur wenn man noch viel verrückter denkt als die Philosophen, kannman ihre Probleme lösen.“ (VB 557)
Wittgensteins Mentor Bertrand Russell war nicht überzeugt von dessen
Spätphilosophie, die pragmatisch auf den kultivierenden Umgang mit derKontingenz von Sprachgewohnheiten abzielte. Für ihn war das nicht „serious
philosophy“, sondern „an idle tea-table amusement“, als sei darin jeder
Anspruch auf Verlässlichkeit aufgegeben (Russell 1959, 217). Tatsächlich ist die
Kulturleistung einer geistreichen Unterhaltung beim Teetrinken so wenig
eindeutig von unverbindlichem und verantwortungslosem Geplauder zu
unterscheiden wie bastelndes Begreifen von einer gedankenlosen Bastelei.
Eine umstandslose Öffnung der Anwendungsdimension kann tatsächlich – wie
es in der Digitalisierung durch die Fragmentierung von Information geschieht– die Rezipientin mit leicht konsumierbaren Informationen unterfordern undsie als Autorin (die nachdenken sollte, bevor sie spricht) überfordern. Am
schmalen Grad zwischen umstandsloser Öffnung der Anwendungsdimension
und ihrer Kultivierung kann man scheitern. Das spricht nicht gegen Versuche,
ihn auf verschiedene Weise zu beschreiten.

Hanno Depner, "Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

151Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ desTractatus | Hanno DepnerMit seiner Gestaltung betont und steigert Wittgensteins Welt die schon oben
dargestellte Sperrigkeit des Materials, indem der Bastelprozess komplex
gehalten und nicht als freies Spielen angelegt ist, so dass er zum vorgegebenen
und überprüfbaren Ergebnis des „Tractatus-Turms“ führt. Dessen Bedeutung
wird allerdings in der Vielfalt seiner Details, Andeutungen und Bezüge nicht
explizit erklärt. Ebensowenig erlaubt es seine Gestaltung, den Bausatz auf einebestimmte Funktion zu reduzieren. Als Hybrid aus Didaktik, Kunst und
Unterhaltung verbindet er Begriff- und Bildlichkeit auf eineassoziationsreichere Art als eine gewöhnliche didaktische oder funktionale
Infografik, ist dabei aber doch didaktischer, funktionaler und auchunterhaltsamer als es auratische, kanonische Kunstwerke in der Regel sind
(Depner 2016, 223-236). In dieser Offenheit und Interpretationsbedürftigkeit
radikalisiert der Bausatz den Gestus der Spätphilosophie, in der Wittgensteinsich allein auf die Anordnung von „Bildern“ als ein „Album“ (vgl. PU 231f)
verlässt und darüber hinaus ein Sich-Ausschweigen über Grundsätzliches
praktiziert (vgl. WWK 183), das übertriebene Erwartungen an Informationen
nicht bedient.
Gleichzeitig radikalisiert die Gestaltung von Wittgensteins Welt auch das
Schweige-Gebot, auf das das Frühwerk hinausläuft. Im letzten Kubus ist ein
Streichholz verborgen, das an einer Reibefläche entzündet werden kann, die
unter dem Schlusssatz 7 „Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man
schweigen“ angebracht wird. Der bastelnde Rezipient wird im Bausatz zwar
ausreichend darüber informiert, inwiefern der Tractatus seiner eigenen
Konzeption zufolge aus „Unsinn“ besteht (der Informationen „sagt“, wo„gezeigt“ werden müsste), und dass hinter der „Überwindung“ seiner Sätze(wie eine Leiter, die man wegwirft) die ethisch-didaktischen Intention steht,die „richtige Sicht der Welt“ (vgl. TLP 6.54) sichtbar werden zu lassen. Anders
als der Leser des Tractatus wird der Bastler des Bausatzes jedoch nicht zu
einer Tat aufgefordert oder sogar verlockt, deren Ausführung unkonkret
bleibt. Er wird implizit vor eine ganz konkrete Wahl gestellt: Soll er das Modell
anzünden oder nicht?
Durch solche unausweichlichen Entscheidungen wird beim Basteln die Rolle
der Rezipientin im Umgang mit der Anwendungsdimension vonKommunikation weiter kultiviert. Unumgängliche Entscheidungen mit
deutlich erheblichen Konsequenzen unterbrechen die reibungslose Produktion

152

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100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ desTractatus | Hanno Depner

und Distribution von Information in der digitalisierten Welt. In der
Entschleunigung der Wissensübertragung, im Betasten, im Kleben, im Treffenvon Entscheidungen wird die Rezipientin sichtbar aus ihrer diskreten
Verantwortungslosigkeit entlassen und zu einem sorgfältigen Umgang mit
Wissen angehalten: Ihr wird unmissverständlich Verantwortlichkeit
zugestanden, somit latent von ihr gefordert.
Insofern ist das Motto des Bausatzes „Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dasmuss man basteln“ kein bloßes Wort Wortspiel und auch keine reine
Anmaßung. Natürlich lässt sich nicht nur durch Basteln allein die
Anwendungsdimension von Information kultivieren. Und selbstverständlichlässt sich verantwortungsvolles Lesen auch in der digitalen Welt praktizieren:
Nicht alle User von Computer und Internet sitzen der übertriebenen Hoffnung
auf, aktives Handeln und verantwortliches Entscheiden durch vermehrten
Konsum von Informationen als Fixpunkten gesellschaftlicher Orientierung
ersetzen zu können. Und doch ist durch die Implosion des etablierten SenderEmpfänger-Modells und angesichts erodierender Verantwortungsstrukturen
die Kommunikation in der digitalisierten Welt gefährdet. Die sperrig und
hybridgestaltete
Analogizität
desBastelns
kann
zu
einem
verantwortungsvolleren Umgang mit Information beitragen. Vor diesem
Hintergrund lässt sich der Tractatus als frühe Kritik des Informationszeitalters
und Kultivierung der Anwendungsdimension aktualisieren. Auch
Wittgensteins Spätwerk erhält eine neue Beleuchtung, wenn dessen Aspektedes Bastelns ins Licht der Digitalisierungskritik, neuer Formate derKommunikation und damit der Etablierung neuer Verantwortungsstrukturen
gesetzt werden.
References
Buchholz, Kai (2006): Ludwig Wittgenstein. Eine Einführung, Frankfurt, New York: Campus.
Depner, Hanno (2016): Zur Gestaltung von Philosophie, Bielefeld: transcript.
Depner, Hanno (2019): Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt. Der „Tractatus“ als Turm zum
Basteln und Begreifen, München: Penguin.
Depner, Hanno (2022): „Das Papier als Ort des Denkens. Verantwortungsstrukturen derGanzschrift in der digitalisierten Globalisierung“, in: Gerber, Sophia; Heise, Melanie;
Tiedemann, Markus (Hg.): Ganzschriften im Philosophieunterricht, Jahrbuch für Didaktik der
Philosophie und Ethik 22, Dresden und München: Thelem, 60-71.

Hanno Depner, "Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Derrida, Jacques (1988): „Signatur Ereignis Kontext“, in: Randgänge der Philosophie, Wien:
Passagen, 291-314.
Pörksen, Bernhard (2021): Die große Gereiztheit, München: Goldmann.
Russell, Bertrand (1959): My Philosophical Development, London: Allen and Unwin.
Tetens, Holm (2006): Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“. Ein systematischer Kommentar,
Stuttgart: Reclam.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Werkausgabe Band 1. Tractatus logico-philosophicus / Tagebücher
1914-1916 / Philosophische Untersuchungen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1984. [Neuauflage
1993]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Werkausgabe Band 3. Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1984. [Neuauflage 1993]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Werkausgabe Band 5. Das Blaue Buch / Eine Philosophische Betrachtung(Das Braune Buch). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1984. [Neuauflage 1997]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Werkausgabe Band 8. Bemerkungen über die Farben / Über Gewißheit /Zettel / Vermischte Bemerkungen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1984. [Neuauflage 1999]

AbbildungenDepner, Hanno (2019: Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt. Der „Tractatus“ als Turm zum
Basteln und Begreifen, München: Penguin, 23, 33, 44, 46, 47.

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Hanno Depner, "Basteln in der Digitalisierung: Der Bausatz Wittgensteins Welt – selbst hergestellt als angemessene „Beleuchtung“ des Tractatus". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus | Dušan Dožudić

The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus
Dušan Dožudić (Zagreb, Croatia)
Abstract
The paper addresses Frege’s comment about the manuscript of the Tractatus to the effect thatthe way Wittgenstein explained its purpose in their 1919 correspondence (the explanation
which amounts to what he says at the beginning of the preface of the Tractatus), it turns out
the Tractatus is more an artistic than a scientific achievement—in it, as Frege concludes, “thatwhich is said therein steps back behind how it is said” (Frege, September 1919). I consider
how, on the one hand, Frege’s remark relates to his previously established views about
differences between the ‘scientific’ and the ‘artistic’ and, on the other, how it relates to someof Wittgenstein’s views expressed in the book (and elsewhere) in the same period. I suggestthat although Frege and Wittgenstein come to an agreement from evidently different positions
and attach different thoughts to the conclusion to which they arrive, they nevertheless doagree at one level about the character of the Tractatus. This agreement, I further suggest, ispossibly another case of the late Frege’s impact on Wittgenstein’s subsequent thought.

To a mind concerned with the beauties of language, what is trivial to thelogician may seem to be just what is important. (Frege 1977: 10)
1

Frege’s initial reaction to the manuscript of the Tractatus immediately struck
Wittgenstein as disappointing. Unlike Russell’s, it was thoroughly
unfavourable. “I find it difficult to understand.” – Frege wrote to Wittgenstein– “For the most part you put your sentences down one beside the otherwithout justification, or at least without sufficiently detailed justification. I
thus often do not know whether I ought to agree, for their sense is not
sufficiently clear to me” (Frege 2011: 51). Several critical points accompanied
this general dismissal, and all this contrasted with Russell’s initial judgements;
his growing enthusiasm for the manuscript could only reinforce thefrustration.
Wittgenstein must have written Frege something about it since, in his reply,
Frege (2011: 57) expresses hope for reaching their mutual agreement.
Ironically, this marked the beginning of the last stage of a decade-longexchange, building up to Wittgenstein’s tempered criticism of “Der Gedanke”
and then the abrupt termination of their correspondence and personal contact
for good (Frege 2011: 65/67; Dožudić 2022). In this paper, I address Frege’s
earlier complaint that Wittgenstein’s manuscript is not primarily scientific.
The conclusion follows from Frege’s independently established views about

Dušan Dožudić, "The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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the ‘(un)scientific’ combined with how Wittgenstein characterised his
manuscript in its preface and elsewhere. But although at first Frege’s
complaint might seem like nothing but disagreement, there is a sense in whichit comes as an agreement and a point of his influence on Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein replied to Frege’s initial objections with two now-destroyed
letters. All we know about the content of these letters come from Frege, whose
16/9/19 letter reveals not only some of the points Wittgenstein considered mostpressing to explain but also which of the explanations Frege considered moststimulating to address in reply (Dožudić 2021a: 534-536). Concerning thecontent of Wittgenstein’s first letter, Frege says it “set so much in motion in[him] that if [he] followed up on every stimulating point [he] would have towrite a book rather than a letter” (Frege 2011: 57). Yet, of all the allegedly
stimulating points Wittgenstein made in that letter, Frege addressed only thetwo which strictly concern the character of the book, starting with the remark:What you write me about the purpose of your book strikes me as strange.
According to you, that purpose can only be achieved if others have alreadythought the thoughts expressed in it. The pleasure of reading your bookcan therefore no longer arise through the already known content, but,rather, only through the form, in which is revealed something of theindividuality of the author. Thereby the book becomes an artistic rather
than a scientific achievement; that which is said therein steps back behind
how it is said. (Frege 2011: 57)
There is no way of knowing what word-to-word Wittgenstein wrote in his
letter about the point Frege paraphrased. Still, from the paraphrase, it is clear
Wittgenstein repeated or elaborated the opening lines of the Tractatus preface:
Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself
already had the thoughts that are expressed in it – or at least similar
thoughts. – So it is not a textbook. –Its purpose would be achieved if it gave
pleasure to one person who read and understood it. (TLP: p. 3)
After several meetings with Wittgenstein, Ramsey provided a recap of thispoint, too:

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Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus | Dušan Dožudić

His idea of his book is not that anyone by reading it will understand his
ideas, but that some day someone will think them out again for himself,
and will derive real pleasure from finding in this book their exact
expressions. (McGuinness 2012: 139).
I do not think it is a coincidence that Frege and Ramsey picked out the same
point from their exchanges with Wittgenstein. In both cases, Wittgenstein musthave given it a prominent place in his explanations to the extent that Frege
and Ramsey acknowledged it as vital to him. And I suspect Wittgensteininsisted on that point in both cases for the same reason: Frege and Ramsey
were scientifically-minded logicians who approached the Tractatusaccordingly. Thus, Wittgenstein felt the need to train them in the right
direction. That is why we find the point in his first reply to Frege and why
Ramsey gave it special attention in his report after two whole afternoons ofWittgenstein’s explanations. But whereas Ramsey was favourable towards theidea, Frege had more reservations. He disregarded the preface, and even after
Wittgenstein brought his attention to the idea contained there, he referred
only to Wittgenstein’s letter. He probably found the preface too obscure toattend to it serious attention at first and addressed another point directly fromit only later – one with which he could relate (Frege 2011: 61; 2013: XXVI).

2

From the opening lines of the preface of the Tractatus, one can excerpt two
claims: (1) The book’s purpose is to give pleasure to one who reads it with
understanding. (2) One can understand the book only if one has alreadythought the thoughts expressed in it (or similar thoughts). When combined, acorollary of (1) and (2) is that the particular pleasure cannot come from thethoughts one has thought – what Frege calls the “known content.” If thoughts
are already in one’s mind, they by themselves cannot produce a new pleasurein that same mind. But then, what is the source of such pleasure for someone
who reads Wittgenstein’s book with understanding and has already thought
the thoughts expressed in it? Something must be added to them. For Frege, theonly source of pleasure in reading the book, in this case, could be its form,
which provides the needed ingredient.

Dušan Dožudić, "The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
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What form is for Frege is no mystery. It is a verbal expression (a word, phrase,
sentence, or their composition) consisting of visual or auditory signs that affectour senses, enabling us somehow to grasp the expressed sense or thought(Frege 1977: 4-5/10/13; 1979: 129/139). Thoughts being what is said (expressed),
the expression (of thought) is how they are said, thus the epilogue, “that whichis said therein steps back behind how it is said”. But expressions – forms – domore than that. From Begriffsschrift onward, Frege insisted that the finegrained content stemming from how something is said – say, from a particular
choice or arrangement of words – often transcends the thought and varies
with a particular expression, although the expressed thought remains thesame (e.g., Frege 1972: §3; 1977: 8-10; 1979: 139-141). Such content does notaffect the thought or its truth value and is thus irrelevant to logic (or science ingeneral). But if the presentation of thoughts – their expression – matters forfulfilling the book’s purpose, not their truth, then, according to Frege, it does
not differ from a literary work, a novel or a poem. Hence, it is primarily an
artistic achievement. Wittgenstein’s idea about the value of his book
additionally supports this (TLP: pp. 3-4)
There is a different route to the same conclusion: For Frege, a scientific treatisewould be either a novel work (that brings new content/thoughts) or a textbook(that supplies its readers with new knowledge of already discovered content/
thoughts). But from Wittgenstein’s preface, it is clear he does not intend his
manuscript to bring new content (so even if it does, that is of no importance),
and it could be understood provided its reader already thought the thoughts
expressed in it. Thus, it is not intended as a novel work or textbook, so Fregesays it cannot be a scientific treatise.
The conclusion about the artistic/unscientific character of the Tractatus cameso naturally to Frege because Wittgenstein’s explanation fitted so nicely into
the framework of his understanding of literary works (as opposed to scientificones) suggested across his writings way before he encountered Wittgenstein’s
manuscript. In connection to Wittgenstein’s first letter, Frege explicitly brings
his attention to a part of “Der Gedanke” in which he separates levels ofsentential content – a significant segment of his understanding of literaryworks (Frege 2011: 59; 1977: 8-10). And the way he presents the matter in158

Dušan Dožudić, "The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus | Dušan Dožudić

“Logic” (1897) sounds more like something he wrote as a direct reaction to
Wittgenstein’s ideas than something written two decades earlier (Frege 1979:
139-140).
Frege’s conclusion about the character of the manuscript gets supported by
Wittgenstein’s emphasises in the preface, which suggest that in his book, hecares mainly for the expression of thoughts: He attaches particular importanceto reading the book with understanding, expression of thoughts, method of
formulating philosophical problems, the logic of our language, what can be said
clearly, drawing a limit to the expression of thoughts, and drawing the limit inlanguage. Finally, he connects the book’s value with how well the thoughts are
expressed within it and, at the same time, insists that the “unassailable anddefinitive” truth of these thoughts does not contribute to the book’s value. Only
demonstrating “how little has been done when these problems have beensolved” does. All this stands in clear opposition to Frege’s perspective, nicelyreflected in his almost-apology to readers of “Der Gedanke” for being“compelled to occupy [himself] with language although it is not [his] proper
concern here” (Frege 1977: 13 n.4). This is not to say Frege was not concernedwith language; he was (e.g., Frege 1972; 2013). But studying language is apreparatory matter for him. Once settled, the proper subject enters, studying
thoughts and their truth. Wittgenstein did the opposite.
Wittgenstein’s shift from the consideration of thoughts to the consideration of
their expression reflected in his letter alarmed Frege to question the characterof his manuscript. However, Wittgenstein’s tendency to focus on theexpression rather than the content should not have been a novelty to Frege.
Already in 1912, Wittgenstein informs Russell about his discussion with Frege
concerning ‘their’ theory of symbolism (Wittgenstein 2012a: 36). Then, thefollowing year, Frege wrote Wittgenstein a letter accusing him “of ‘attaching
too much value to signs’” (Frege 1976: 265; also Floyd 2011: 95). Thus,
Wittgenstein, earlier on, familiarised Frege with his views, whose tendency
eventually found its way into the Tractatus to provoke Frege’s 1919 conclusion
to the effect that Wittgenstein (still) attaches “too much value to signs” andpreoccupies himself with the “mere auxiliary means” (Frege 2013: 4); now,with an exciting twist. Wittgenstein, Frege must have thought, learned little
from their earlier encounters.

Dušan Dožudić, "The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
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3

If Frege had any doubts as to how to characterise the treatise based on
Wittgenstein’s explanation of its purpose, Wittgenstein’s explanation of thecase/fact distinction that followed could only affirm Frege’s suspicions about
its character, and in his letter, he addresses the two as a single train ofthoughts. Wittgenstein, by this point, “thoroughly exhausted from giving what
are purely and simply explanations” (Wittgenstein 2012c: 193), neveraddressed Frege’s complaint. Perhaps for a good reason. Of all the comments
Frege made concerning the manuscript, Wittgenstein could hardly regard thisone as disclosing a drawback either of his manuscript or the comment itself.
Indeed, the way Frege formulates it, Wittgenstein could no longer say Frege“doesn’t understand a word of it all” (Wittgenstein 2012b: 98). By itself, Frege’s
formulation was something to which Wittgenstein could readily assent eventhough routes they arrived at it and the accompanying evaluations weredisparate.
Disparate thoughts aside, what supports the suggested agreement on
Wittgenstein’s part? Several points come to mind:(a) In a letter to Ficker, Wittgenstein says his “work is strictly philosophicaland, at the same time, literary” (Wittgenstein 1979: 94). This sounds much likean adaptation of Frege’s conclusion that his work is more artistic thanscientific.
(b) In the following letter to Ficker, Wittgenstein presents the manuscript
saying that “the point of the book is ethical”, recommending him to read first“the [preface] and the conclusion since these express the point mostdirectly” (Wittgenstein 1979: 94-95). In the same letter, Wittgenstein says that“[i]n reality, [the book’s content] isn’t strange to [him/Ficker]” (Wittgenstein
1979: 94), thus suggesting Ficker himself already thought the (similar)
thoughts. Combine these two points with his identification of ethics andaesthetics (TLP: 6.421), and Frege’s remark gets supported.
(c) Frege’s conclusion that the manuscript is primarily an artistic achievement
is compatible with Wittgenstein’s account of the impossibility of propositionsof ethics (TLP: 6.4-6.423) combined with his identification of ethics and160

Dušan Dožudić, "The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus | Dušan Dožudić

aesthetics (TLP: 6.421) and insistence on the nonsensicality of propositions of
the Tractatus (TLP: 6.53.-6.54).
(For an additional point, see Bremer (2021: 178).) In the light of (a)/(b)/(c), it
could be suggested that Frege’s remark about the unscientific character of themanuscript made Wittgenstein clearly see it or at least start explicitly
promoting it first as literary as much as philosophical and then as ethical. – He
did it for the first time shortly after Frege’s ‘artistic’ remark. If so, it is yet
another case of the late Frege’s impact on Wittgenstein (Geach 1977: viii; Floyd
2011: 97ff).
In connection with this, two more things are worth noting. Firstly, after Frege’s‘artistic’ remark and his unwillingness to recommend the manuscript for
publication in the Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, it“occurred” to Wittgenstein that, instead of a scientific journal, the publisher ofa Halbmonatsschrift für Kunst u. Kultur – Der Brenner – “might be inclined totake the poor thing into [his] protection” (Wittgenstein 1979: 93). (See also
Monk’s point mentioned in Floyd (2011: 103).).
Secondly, the compatibility of Wittgenstein’s perception of the manuscriptwith Frege’s characterisation might be reflected in Wittgenstein’s
unwillingness to support its publication financially. As he explains it to Ficker,
he considers “it to be indecent to force a work upon the world […] the worldmust accept it in the normal manner” (Wittgenstein 1979: 93). This would
surely be a strange justification if a scientific treatise were in question.
(Indeed, the scientifically-minded Frege could (or would) not afford himself
the luxury, as the publishing history of his Grundgesetze shows.)
The thought behind Wittgenstein’s attitude towards the possibility of thefinancial support would run as follows: The book’s purpose is not pedagogical(“it is not a textbook”). The book’s purpose is not to communicate new truths.
Its purpose is to provide a particular pleasure. Given its purpose, it would beindecent to force it on anybody – as with any other pleasure-providing artistic
achievement (a poem, painting, or piece of music). One has to be willing toattain the pleasure, and the way to do that is to be in a particular cognitive

Dušan Dožudić, "The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus | Dušan Dožudić

state independently of Wittgenstein’s book. Upon reading it, only then will one“derive real pleasure from finding in this book their exact
expressions” (McGuinness 2012: 139).
Finally, if not taken as strictly metaphorical, Wittgenstein’s 1930 remark that
the Tractatus “contains alongside good and genuine also Kitsch” (quoted in
Floyd 2011: 91), as an aesthetical judgement, is also suggestive.

4“I had supposed in my remarks” – Frege continues his ‘artistic’ comment –“that you wanted to communicate a new content”. An ironic excuse, if not an
apology, for mistreating the manuscript as primarily scientific. What started as
an objection was heading towards an agreement, evident a section later when
he complimented Wittgenstein’s (alleged) embracing of his sense/idea
distinction (Frege 2011: 59; Dožudić 2021b: 267-272). Granting the primarily‘artistic’ character of Wittgenstein’s treatise makes objections Frege offered up
to this point idle. If the manuscript is not primarily intended as a scientifictreatise that asserts new or unfamiliar thoughts, there is no problem or
substantial disagreement here. There could be none – Frege’s standards
exclude it in principle (1977: 362-363; 1979: 132-133; 2013: XVIII-XIV), but at thecost of the Tractatus becoming a “logically irrelevant side-show” (Frege 2013:
XXII).
From the perspective of someone who has “come to know [Wittgenstein] as athinker to be taken rather seriously” (Frege 2011: 61) and hopped that
Wittgenstein “will some day advance what [he/Frege believed he has]discovered in the domain of logic” (Frege 2011: 57), coming to such an
agreement must have left Frege with a bitter aftertaste. The feeling of adisappointment thus cuts both ways. Given how he continued to treat
Wittgenstein’s manuscript in the following two letters (2011: 61/65/67), Frege
had a hard time coming to terms with this change of perspective or eventaking it seriously. Wittgenstein’s hope to publish it in a scientific journal and arequest to Frege to help him achieve it backed Frege’s attitude and gave
legitimacy to his final reflection on Satz 1 of the Tractatus (Frege 2011: 65-67;
Dožudić 2021b: 273-277).

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Dušan Dožudić, "The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus | Dušan Dožudić

Frege’s turn from the professed agreement about the character of the treatise
and inability to consider it afterwards in a different light was undoubtedly
part of why Wittgenstein, disappointed, abruptly quit the correspondence. By
March 1920, it should have been clear to Frege Wittgenstein was now far fromhis companion in searching for the truth “partly on different paths” (Frege
2011: 57). After Wittgenstein’s attack on “Der Gedanke” and acknowledgementof “a deep and true core in idealism” (Frege 2011: 67), they were not taking
somewhat distant paths – the distance between them was “as wide as thesky” (Frege 2013: XXV). The same goes the other way around. Frege’s finalquestions dispatched to Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein’s subsequent silenceshow that better than anything.
References
Bremer, Józef (2021) “‘An artistic rather than a scientific achievement’: Frege and the
Poeticality of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, Philosophia 49(1), 175-196.
Dožudić, Dušan (2021a) “Thoughts in Exchange: A Note on Frege’s Tractatus Letters”, Filozofia
76(7), 531-541.
Dožudić, Dušan (2021b) Frege, Wittgenstein, i problem prepoznavanja u Tractatusu” [Frege,
Wittgenstein, and the Recognition Problem in the Tractatus], Prolegomena 20(2), 261-280.
Dožudić, Dušan (2022) “Wittgenstein and Frege’s ‘Der Gedanke’: Figuring the Resentment”, in:Herbert Hrachovec and Jakub Mácha (eds.) Platonism: Contributions of the 43rd International
Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 34-36.
Floyd, Juliet (2011) “The Frege-Wittgenstein Correspondence: Interpretive Themes”, in: Enzo
De Pellegrin (ed.) Interactive Wittgenstein: Essays in Memory of Georg Henrik von Wright,
Dordrecht and New York: Springer, 75-107.
Frege, Gottlob (1972) Conceptual Notation: A Formula Language of Pure Thought Modelled Upon
the Formula Language of Arithmetic, in: Gottlob Frege, Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 101-203.
Frege, Gottlob (1976) Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Frege, Gottlob (1977) “Thoughts”, in: Gottlob Frege, Logical Investigations, Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1-30.
Frege, Gottlob (1979) “Logic”, in: Gottlob Frege, Posthumous Writings, Chicago: The Universityof Chicago Press, 126-151.

Dušan Dožudić, "The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Frege, Gottlob (2011) “Frege-Wittgenstein Correspondence”, in: Enzo De Pellegrin (ed.)
Interactive Wittgenstein: Essays in Memory of Georg Henrik von Wright, Dordrecht and New
York: Springer, 16-67.
Frege, Gottlob (2013) Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Derived using concept-script I/II, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Geach, Peter T. (1977) “Preface”, in: Gottlob Frege, Logical Investigations, Oxford: BasilBlackwell, vii-ix.
McGuinness, Brian (ed.) (2012) Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Document 1911-1951,
Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by David F. Pears and Brian
F. McGuinness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. [TLP]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979) “Letters to Ludwig von Ficker”, in: C. G. Luckhardt (ed.)
Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 82-98.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2012a) “Letter to B. Russell, 26.12.1912”, in: McGuinness (2012), 36.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2012b) “Letter to B. Russell, 19.8.1919”, in: McGuinness (2012), 98-99.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2012c) “Letter to B. Russell, 6.10.1919”, in: McGuinness (2012), 103-104.

164

Dušan Dožudić, "The Purpose, the Pleasure, and the Tractatus Nonscientificus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation | Joshua Eisenthal

Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a
New Interpretation
Joshua Eisenthal (Pasadena, USA)
Abstract
Although there is a great deal concerning the Tractatus that is controversial, the following lineof interpretation is not controversial: Wittgenstein’s picture theory of representation applies
primarily to elementary propositions, and only derivatively to non-elementary propositions.
Despite the broad consensus on this matter, I challenge this interpretation of the picture
theory. I first gather some of the evidence showing that Wittgenstein consistently treated thepicture theory as applying to all propositions, rather than specifically or especially toelementary propositions. I then begin to sketch a proposal for how the picture theory can beunderstood in light of this fact.

1. Introduction

As is well known, Wittgenstein’s inspiration for the picture theory seems tohave been a model of a car accident that was used in a Paris court room. On
29th September 1914, Wittgenstein recorded in his notebook, “In the
proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the
law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls,etc.)” (TB 1998, 7; see Sterrett (2017), p.116, for a reproduction of the image that
Wittgenstein himself might have seen). The standard way to interpret thisremark is to think of the courtroom model as capturing, albeit somewhat
crudely, the pictorial nature of an elementary proposition. According to theTractatus, an elementary proposition is a nexus of names with each namegoing proxy for a simple object. The way in which the names are related to one
another in the elementary proposition represents the way in which the named
objects are related to one another in a state of affairs. In the standard
interpretation of the courtroom model, the elements of the model (the dolls)
function as names, and the ways they are related to one another in the model
represents the actual spatial relationships among their real-world
counterparts. In this way, the courtroom model is taken to demonstrate how
an elementary proposition is a picture (Bild) of a possible situation.
The reason that this can only be a crude approximation of the pictorial natureof an elementary proposition is because of the further features of elementary
propositions that are fleshed out in the Tractatus (TLP 1989). In particular, thenames in elementary propositions stand for objects which “make up the

Joshua Eisenthal, "Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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substance of the world”, entities which “cannot be composite” (2.021).
Furthermore, the elementary propositions themselves are logicallyindependent of each other (2.061, 4.21). Hence the vehicles and pedestrians
represented by the dolls in the courtroom model are not Tractarian objects,
and the claims that the model is used to make about how the accident occurred
are not the kinds of logically independent claims asserted by elementary
propositions. Nevertheless, so the thought goes, the courtroom model manages
to convey some of the central features of the pictorial nature of elementary
propositions.
What about other propositions? According to the Tractatus, non-elementary
propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions (5). Famously,
Wittgenstein described his claim that the logical constants do not go proxy foranything as his “fundamental thought” (4.0312). The question thus arises: if
non-elementary propositions are truth-functionally complex, and the logicalconstants do not go proxy for anything, how, then, do non-elementary
propositions function as pictures?
It is easy enough to see how the pictorial nature of elementary propositions
can be carried over to a conjunction of elementary propositions. The
conjunction simply represents all of the objects named in the conjoined
propositions as related to one another in the ways they are represented as
being in those conjoined propositions. However, it seems that we can only
appeal to a derivative and not particularly illuminating sense of how othertruth-functionally complex propositions are pictures of possible situations. A
disjunction, we might think, represents objects as related to one another in atleast one of the ways that one of the disjoined propositions represents them; anegation represents objects as not related to one another in the way that thenegated proposition represents them; a conditional represents that, if objects
are related to one another as they are represented in the antecedent, thensome further objects are related to one another as they are represented in theconsequent. With regard to more complex truth-functional structure, perhaps
all we can do is gesture in a vague way to the fact that logical analysis bottoms
out in elementary propositions.
Despite its limitations, there is a broad consensus around the idea that the
picture theory applies primarily to elementary propositions, and only in a

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Joshua Eisenthal, "Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation | Joshua Eisenthal

derivative way to non-elementary propositions, in the way just outlined.
Nevertheless there are some straightforward reasons to challenge such an
account. The first is that Wittgenstein’s initial development of the idea of thepicture theory in the Notebooks preceded the account of elementary
propositions that is worked out in the Tractatus. The second is that in many ofWittgenstein’s canonical statements to the effect that propositions are pictures,the claim is put forward in complete generality—there is no prioritization ofelementary propositions. Finally, there is the difficulty, indicated above, ofunderstanding how non-elementary propositions function as pictures.
The goal of this paper is to begin to present some of the textual evidence thatindicates that the picture theory applies in the same way to all propositions,rather than primarily to elementary propositions, and to begin to sketch a
proposal for how the picture theory can be understood with this in mind.
Instead of regarding the courtroom model as a crude approximation of thepictorial nature of an elementary proposition, I suggest that we should rather
see it as illustrating the essentially pictorial nature of any proposition.

2. Some textual evidence

Let us begin with the remarks surrounding the appeal to the courtroom modelin the Notebooks:"The general concept of the proposition carries with it a quite general conceptof the co-ordination of proposition and situation: The solution to all myquestions must be extremely simple.
In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As whenin the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls,
etc.)This must yield the nature of truth straight away (if I were not blind).
Let us think of hieroglyphic writing in which each word represents its
meaning. Let us think also of the fact that actual pictures of situations can beright and wrong." (TB 1998, 7)

Joshua Eisenthal, "Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation | Joshua Eisenthal

The basic idea behind Wittgenstein’s appeal to the courtroom model can be
put as follows. The proposition, like the model, is a proposal that can beassessed as to its correctness, and the elements of the proposition, like the dollsin the model, can be rearranged to represent that things might be otherwise.
For present purposes, the most immediate point to note is that there is nothing
in Wittgenstein’s remarks here that gestures at the particular significance ofan elementary proposition; rather, he is explicitly talking about the “general
concept” of the proposition. The references to hieroglyphic writing and “actual
pictures” reinforce the idea that the relevant notion of picturing applies to all
propositions. Indeed, in the following remarks (on the same day) Wittgensteinsketches a picture of two people fencing and writes, “It must be possible todemonstrate everything essential by considering this case.”
In the ensuing days Wittgenstein repeatedly gives voice to the idea that all
propositions are pictorial in the relevant sense. On 2nd and 3rd October hewrites “We can say straight away: instead of this proposition has such andsuch a sense, this proposition represents such and such a situation” and “Theproposition only says something in so far as it is a picture!” (TB 1998, 8). Given
that versions of these remarks occur in the Tractatus at 4.031 and 4.03
respectively, Wittgenstein appears to have latched onto core elements of thepicture theory before he has worked out the details of Tractarian elementary
propositions. Indeed, there is no indication that anything depends on the ideathat ordinary propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.
Wittgenstein is also linking the conception of a proposition as a picture to thefact that, in contrast with a name, a proposition is logically articulated. Where
the function of a name is to stand for an object, the function of a proposition isto represent that such and such is the case. Hence “a name is not a picture of
the thing named!”; a simple sign “can be neither true nor false” (Wittgenstein
1998, 8). In sum, some of the central ideas that can be extracted fromWittgenstein’s earliest construal of propositions as pictures are the following.
Propositions involve elements that can be rearranged to represent possible
situations; they can be correct or incorrect; and their function of representing
how things are depends on their being logically articulated.
All of these ideas are still present in the Tractatus. Here, the picture theory is
introduced in the 2.1s, beginning with 2.1 itself: “We picture facts to168

Joshua Eisenthal, "Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation | Joshua Eisenthal

ourselves”. At 2.13 and 2.14 we are told that “objects have the elements of thepicture corresponding to them” and that what constitutes a picture is that “itselements are related to one another in a determinate way”. The idea of
pictorial form is then introduced, “the possibility that things are related to one
another in the same way as the elements of the picture” (2.151). Here we havein view the possibility of rearranging the elements of a picture in order torepresent a range of possible situations. Hence, on a first pass at least, we arerecovering the same operative features that are present in the Notebooks.
In the section of the Tractatus where Wittgenstein applies the picture theory to
propositions—the 4.0 sequence—we find again that there is no particularemphasis on elementary propositions. The sequence begins at 4.01 with thedeclaration, “A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model ofreality as we imagine it.” The immediately following remark then leaves little
room to doubt that this is intended to apply to propositions in complete
generality: "At first sight a proposition—one set out on the printed page, forexample—does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it isconcerned. But neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of apiece of music, nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be a picture of ourspeech. And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary
sense, of what they represent." (4.011) Wittgenstein is evidently asserting that
ordinary sentences, such as the ones set out on a printed page, are pictures“even in the ordinary sense”.
Given all this, it may seem surprising that a consensus has formed around theidea that the picture theory applies primarily to elementary propositions. The
explanation for such a consensus stems from features of the Tractatus that are
not present in the Notebooks. In particular, 2.11 asserts that “A picture
presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of statesof affairs.” This is what links the picture theory in the Tractatus to the notionof logically independent states of affairs (2.061-2.062). Indeed, when 2.13 statesthat “objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them,” this isnaturally interpreted with reference to the Tractarian notion of simple objects
presented in the 2.0s; objects which “make up the substance of theworld” (2.021). As noted above, if the elements of a picture are supposed tocorrespond to Tractarian simple objects, then the items used in the model ofthe car accident would not count as pictorial elements. Here, then, we have

Joshua Eisenthal, "Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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textual evidence that seems to speak in favor of the idea that the picture
theory applies especially to elementary propositions.
On the interpretation that I will sketch below, the picture theory does still
apply to elementary propositions. Furthermore, given the central Tractarian
claim that all propositions with sense are truth-functions of elementary
propositions, there will be no problem in accepting the idea that a picture“presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of statesof affairs” (2.11). The novel feature of my interpretation is simply that the
picture theory does not apply primarily to the elementary propositions. The
main obstacle for such a proposal stems from the difficulty in seeing how truthfunctionally complex propositions could count as pictures in Wittgenstein’s
sense, especially bearing in mind the “fundamental thought” that the logicalconstants do not go proxy for anything. Hence in what follows I hope toprovide some indication of how this obstacle can be overcome.

3. A sketch of a new interpretation

Let us examine the apparent difficulty with regarding non-elementary
propositions as pictures more closely. A simple proposition which lacks any
overt truth-functional complexity—such as “the cat sat on the mat” or what
have you—appears to make a specific claim about the world. Although a
conjunction of such propositions makes a number of such claims, the otherlogical constants seem to function in a notably different way. For example,
because a disjunction asserts that at least one situation obtains, this evidently
fails to be a specific claim analogous to the claim made by a simple proposition.
In general, an arbitrary truth-function functions similarly to a disjunction:
ruling out some possibilities but leaving open, to some degree, what in factobtains. It is largely for this reason that it is difficult to see how truthfunctionally complex propositions can be understood as pictures.
However, here we should note that, according to the Tractatus, an apparently
simple proposition such as “the cat sat on the mat” really masks a great deal oftruth-functional complexity. This can be seen from the fact that it has many
logical relationships with other propositions: it implies that there was a mat
and that it was placed somewhere such that the cat could sit on it; it denies
that the cat was standing outside in the garden, and so on. On the Tractarian

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Joshua Eisenthal, "Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation | Joshua Eisenthal

account, this multitude of logical relationships—this “place in logicalspace” (3.4)—is what will be revealed by logical analysis.
With this in mind we can recognize that an apparently innocent proposition
such as “the cat sat on the mat” does not make such a specific claim about theworld after all. Indeed, perhaps it is best understood as a long disjunction of
the various specific ways that the cat could be sitting on the mat such as tomake the proposition true. The point generalizes easily: an ordinary
proposition will typically assert that at least one of a range of more specificsituations obtains.
The crucial implication of this idea for interpreting the picture theory is torecognize that the generic case, including the kind of case Wittgenstein had inmind when referring to the Paris courtroom model, was always a truthfunctionally complex proposition. Furthermore, if an ordinary picture isalready truth-functionally complex in this way, then there is no special
problem of how to interpret the picture theory so that it can accommodate
truth-functional complexity. Recall the central components of the picture
theory that we identified as already present in the Notebooks: propositions
involve elements that can be rearranged to represent possible situations; they
can be correct or incorrect; and their function of representing how things are
depends on their being logically articulated. My proposal is simply that all of
this applies just as immediately to truth-functionally complex propositions as it
does to elementary propositions.
This proposal depends on interpreting the elements of a picture more broadly
than as names in elementary propositions. Indeed, the proposal is that
Wittgenstein’s original courtroom model should be thought of in comparison
with an ordinary sentence: the various ways of arranging the dolls torepresent different situations corresponds to the various ways of arranging
ordinary words to form different sentences. Hence it will be important to notethat such an interpretation is supported by many of the remarks in theTractatus, particularly when Wittgenstein identifies the constituents ofpropositions as words at 4.026, contrasting the meanings of words (which“must be explained to us”) with the meaning of a proposition (with which “wemake ourselves understood”). Indeed, when Wittgenstein writes that a
proposition “must use old expressions to communicate a new sense” (4.03), he

Joshua Eisenthal, "Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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is talking about the construction of unfamiliar sentences from familiar words.
This then leads into a canonical statement of the picture theory: “A proposition
communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected withthe situation. And the connection is precisely that it is its logical picture.”
It will be evident that more needs to be said to fully flesh out this proposal for
how to interpret the picture theory and to defend it from possible objections.
Hence my goal here has simply been to draw attention to some of the textual
evidence in favor of such an interpretation, and to recommend that we pursue
it.
References
Sterrett, Susan (2017) “Pictures, Models, and Measures”, Belgrade Philosophical Annual 30,
99-137.
Wittgenstein,

Ludwig(1989)

Logisch-philosophische

Abhandlung

Tractatus

logico-philosophicus, Kritische Edition. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) Notebooks 1914-1916, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell.
Acknowledgement
An earlier version of this work was presented as part of a symposium on “Representation and Logic
in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus” at the meeting of the Society for the Study of the History of Analytical
Philosophy in July 2021. My thanks to the members of the audience, and my particular thanks to theother symposium participants Sophia Arbeiter, Mahmoud Jalloh and Sanford Shieh, for their input
on this project.

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Joshua Eisenthal, "Propositions as Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Sketch of a New Interpretation". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus |Cornelia Eșianu

Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien
und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus
Cornelia Eșianu (Vienna, Austria)
Abstract„Wittgenstein war in Rumänien vor 1990 fast unbekannt“, sagt Mircea Flonta (geb. 1932) inseinem Buch (Flonta 2008: 7) über den österreichischen Philosophen und dessen Schrift
Tractatus logico-philosophicus, die ihm im frühen 20. Jahrhundert zur Berühmtheit verhalf.
Der rumänische Exeget vergleicht die heutige Annäherung in Rumänien an Wittgenstein – „als
Bezugssystem im Horizont des Denkens“ (Flonta 2008: 8) – etwa mit der Phase vor einem
Jahrhundert, als die Klassiker der Philosophie in Rumänien gepflegt wurden und Büchertitel
wie z. B. Kants Leben und Werk legitim waren. Doch wie wurde Wittgenstein in Rumänien vor
und nach 1989, dem Wendejahr, das den Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus und die
politische Öffnung des Landes hin zu den liberalen, europäischen Werten markiert,
aufgenommen? Der erste und zweite Abschnitt dieser Studie widmen sich dieser allgemeinen
Frage und heben die Begegnung einzelner rumänischer Autoren bis zur heutigen Generation
mit Wittgensteins bedeutender Erstschrift hervor. Eine Antwort auf die im dritten Abschnitt
formulierte allgemeine Frage schlägt eine Erklärung für das vor 1989 kaum existierendeInteresse für den Verfasser des Tractatus vor und formuliert eine Schlussfolgerung mit Bezug
auf dessen mögliche zukünftige Rezeption in dem seit 2007 der Europäischen Union
beigetretenen Rumänien.

1. Wittgenstein gestern

In einem Text, den der rumänische Philosoph Constantin Noica am 26. Oktober1943 auf Radio Bukarest verlesen hat (Noica 2019: 170), äußert sich dieser
folgendermaßen:
Philosophisches Denken ist das Denken eines Verhältnisses: desVerhältnisses zwischen Mensch und Welt. Aber was ist das für ein
Verhältnis? Es ist ein Gleichgewichtsverhältnis. Was für ein
Gleichgewicht? Eines von Wärme und Freundschaft. Und wo führt die
Erfahrung der Freundschaft hin? Sie führt zur Vertrautheit, zum Wissen
aus einer Innenperspektive. (Aus dem Rumänischen übersetzt von der
Verfasserin)
Ausgehend von diesem Gleichgewichtsverhältnis von Wärme und
Freundschaft, welches das philosophische Denken in der Auffassung Noicas
darstellt, wäre zu erwarten gewesen, Ludwig Wittgenstein als Philosophen in
der umfangreichen Geschichte der modernen Philosophie, die die Rumänische
Gesellschaft für Philosophie in der Zwischenkriegszeit in Bukarest in fünf

Cornelia Eșianu, "Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus |Cornelia Eșianu

Bänden in den Jahren 1937-1941 veröffentlicht hat, erwähnt vorzufinden.
Diese Geschichte – die erste ihrer Art in Rumänien – wurde zum größten Teilvon rumänischen Autoren verfasst, wobei viele von ihnen auch später, nachdem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, als Rumänien unter sowjetischem Einfluss(Baciu 1990) zu einem neuen politischen Regime überging, mit einer gewissen
Kontinuität auf dem Gebiet der Philosophie, Logik und Kultur fortwirken
konnten (zum Beispiel Constantin Noica, Anton Dumitriu, Petru Comarnescu
und andere). In dieser voluminösen Geschichte der modernen Philosophie
wurde Wittgenstein jedoch nicht erwähnt. Sein geeigneter Platz wäre hiervermutlichinThomasGreenwoods
Aufsatz„Englische
Philosophen“ (Greenwood 1941: 349–360) gewesen, im Anschluss an die
philosophischen Überlegungen des Autors zu G. Moore, B. Russell und A. N.
Whitehead, umso mehr, da zu dieser Zeit Wittgenstein tatsächlich in
Cambridge als Professor lehrte und zudem seit 1939 britischer Staatsbürger
war. Auch wurde einige Jahre zuvor, 1933, in einer deutsch-englischen
Ausgabe seine Abhandlung Tractatus logico-philosophicus, erstmals 1921
veröffentlicht, erneut aufgelegt. Thomas Greenwood, der anscheinend keinanderer als der Herausgeber der 1923 gegründeten und auch heute noch
existierenden britischen Zeitschrift The Philosopher war, konnte in dieser
seiner Rolle nicht nicht von Wittgenstein gewusst haben. Was vage, durch eine
Art Implikation, an Wittgenstein erinnern dürfte, ist die im Beitrag vonGreenwood einmalige Erwähnung der Wiener Schule, die jedoch in derÖkonomie der in rumänischer Sprache herausgegebenen Geschichte dermodernen Philosophie eigentlich kaum breitere Behandlung fand.
Sollte damals in Osteuropa wirklich so wenig über den Philosophen
Wittgenstein bekannt gewesen sein? Und hatte der englische Autor guteGründe, Wittgenstein in seinem Beitrag nicht zu erwähnen?
Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wurde Wittgenstein in Rumänien zuerst ineinzelnen Artikeln (sogar in russischer Sprache, z.B. von Sorin Vieru) und inRezensionen zur Philosophie der Logik referiert, später dann aber auch in –wenn auch nur wenigen – Büchern zur Sprachphilosophie. Der Tractatus
wurde im Laufe der ersten Jahrzehnte nach dem Krieg von den zentralen
Universitätsbibliotheken des Landes hauptsächlich in deutscher undenglischer Sprache angeschafft. Es scheint, dass sich hauptsächlich Logiker wie
Anton Dumitriu, Sorin Vieru, Alexandru Surdu oder Constantin Noica in den

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Cornelia Eșianu, "Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus |Cornelia Eșianu

60er und 70er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts während des kommunistischen
Regimes auf Wittgenstein in größerem Umfang bezogen hatten.
Zu dieser Zeit äußerte sich vermehrt beispielsweise Constantin Noica zu
Wittgenstein. In seinem Ideenjournal nahm er wiederholt auf Satz 7 desTractatus Bezug und bemerkte Folgendes dazu: „Denn es ist wahr, was ein
Wittgenstein sagt, mit einer durchaus bedeutungsvolleren Tiefe des Geistes als
die Neopositivisten, die sich darauf berufen; es ist wahr, dass ‚worüber wir
nicht sprechen können, darüber müssen wir schweigen‘“. (Noica 1991: 247)
Worauf genau Noica damit hinauswill, erfährt die Leserschaft zwar nicht,
Noica setzt hier aber sein Fragen fort und eröffnet auf diese Weise ein
ausgedehntes Reflexionsfeld, das bis zu Heideggers Seinsphilosophie reicht:„Aber wie kommt es, dass diese Dinge, über die wir schweigen müssen, durch
uns und in uns sprechen? Welcher Logos wäre dieser unsrige, der auf die
Verschlüsselung eines Logos in uns und in den Dingen stieße, aber den
Versuch, ihn zu entschlüsseln, verbieten würde?“ (Noica 1991: 247) (Aus dem
Rumänischen übersetzt von der Verfasserin)Überzeugt von Wittgensteins philosophischer Bedeutung für die Moderne hebt
Noica auf lobende Art und Weise in einem 1981 geführten Dialog mit dem
damals jungen Philosophen Gabriel Liiceanu Folgendes hervor:
Neben allen Hintikkas scheint mir Wittgenstein heute ein Gott zu sein: Er
hat alle großen Probleme angegriffen und es mit einem Gefühl vonVerantwortung getan, welches die heutigen Menschen nicht mehr haben.
Wittgenstein stellt einen Höhepunkt des Vorsokratismus in einer Welt dar,die alexandrinisch und mandarinisch ist. (Liiceanu 1991: 236) (Aus dem
Rumänischen übersetzt von der Verfasserin)
Als Bollwerk geistigen Widerstands wird Wittgenstein angesehen, wenn Noica– Hegels Interpret im rumänischen Kommunismus – mit Bezug auf einegegenwärtige Zeit moralischer Befangenheit im Modus der Kritik
fortfährt: "Die heutige Welt ist eine schreckliche Welt; und vielleicht können
nur diejenigen sie noch retten, die wussten, wie man den Monotheismus im
Zustand der Diaspora bewahrt. Nur sie können der verheerenden Kultur derCornelia Eșianu, "Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus |Cornelia EșianuAngelsachsen entgegenwirken und die Kultur in den guten Monotheismus desGeistes verwandeln.“ (Liiceanu 1991: 236) (Aus dem Rumänischen übersetzt
von der Verfasserin)
Macht
Noica
hier
auf
die
Auseinandersetzungzwischen
Kontinentalphilosophie und analytischer Philosophie aufmerksam? Und ist es
vielleicht diese im Hintergrund laufende Auseinandersetzung, derWittgenstein zum „Opfer“ fiel, als Thomas Greenwood sich nicht zu dessen
Aufnahme in seinen Beitrag über die englischen Philosophen entschied?
1989, dem Jahr der rumänischen Revolution (Cox 2011; Roth 2016), erschienen
die ersten drei Sätze des Tractatus in rumänischer Sprache (Wittgenstein 1989:
530–540). Im gleichen Jahr wird auf Wittgenstein in einer Schrift, die sich mit
der Aktualität der Beziehung zwischen Denken und Sprache befasst, Bezug
genommen (Surdu 1989). Darin schlägt der Autor nicht zuletzt aufgrund seiner
kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit Wittgensteins Tractatus eine Theorie dersogenannten präjudikativen Formen vor.
Nach 1989 begann mit der politischen Öffnung des Landes und der Möglichkeit
der Verleihung von Forschungsstipendien und Studienaufenthalten fürStudierende und Lehrende an renommierten Universitäten auf der ganzen
Welt sowie durch leichteren Zugang zu einer reichen internationalen
Sekundärliteratur in entsprechenden Fachbibliotheken das Interesse an
Wittgenstein allmählich zu wachsen und sich zu intensivieren.

2. Wittgenstein heute

In den 90er Jahren wurde ein Großteil von Wittgensteins Arbeiten übersetzt.
Schon 1991 erschien in der Übersetzung von Alexandru Surdu der Tractatuslogico-philosophicus erstmals komplett in rumänischer Sprache. Im Mai 2001
fand anlässlich des 50. Todestages von Wittgenstein an der Universität
Bukarest ein Symposium mit dem Titel „Wittgensteins Philosophie im 20.
Jahrhundert“ statt, an dem viele junge rumänische Universitätslehrende
teilgenommen hatten. Dieses akademische Treffen führte 2002 zur
Veröffentlichung des gleichnamigen Bandes, der die Bedeutung vonWittgensteins Denken in der philosophischen Forschung und in der heutigen
Ideendebatte hervorhob.

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Cornelia Eșianu, "Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus |Cornelia Eșianu

Ebenfalls 2001 wurde Wittgensteins Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung unter
der Feder von Mircea Flonta und Mircea Dumitru, beide Professoren an derUniversität Bukarest, neu ins Rumänische übersetzt, mit einer zweiten Auflage
2012. In diesem Jahr erschienen auch die Briefe über den Tractatus(Wittgenstein 2012), eine Auswahl von übersetzten Texten Wittgensteins mit
einleitenden Anmerkungen zum Zweck besseren Verständnisses des Tractatus.
Die letzte Übersetzung aus dem Wittgenstein’schen Werk ins Rumänischestammt aus dem Jahr 2018 und befasst sich mit dem sogenannten Braunen
Buch.
Wie wird der Tractatus charakterisiert? Augenscheinlich fasziniert von derPersönlichkeit des österreichischen Philosophen stellt Mircea Flonta in der„Historischen Notiz“, die er der rumänischen Übersetzung des Tractatusvorausgehen lässt, u.a. mit Hilfe von Wittgensteins Briefwechsel (Wittgenstein1980) in wesentlichen Zügen den biografischen und intellektuellen Parcours
des Autors nach. Flonta spricht von Wittgensteins „bestimmter Denkweise“
und betont häufig dessen „frühzeitige moralische Ernsthaftigkeit“ (Flonta
2008: 17). So schreibt er: „Es war nicht der intellektuelle Ehrgeiz, der Wunsch,
ein Werk zurückzulassen, der Wittgenstein zum Schreiben veranlasste,
sondern vor allem die Notwendigkeit, Klarstellungen zu erreichen, die für ihn
von unmittelbarer Bedeutung waren.“ (Flonta 2008: 14) (Aus dem
Rumänischen übersetzt von der Verfasserin)Sich der Schwierigkeit dieser Schrift vollkommen bewusst, richtet sich derÜbersetzer in der Präambel des Buches mit einem zweiten erläuternden Text,
der eine Art Leseschlüssel des Tractatus enthält, an ein breites Publikum und
kommt somit auch einem weniger informierten Lesepublikum entgegen. So
weist Flonta in diesem Text mit dem Titel „Zugunsten des Lesers“ auf die
wichtigen Grundelemente bei der Lektüre und dem Verstehen vonWittgensteins Erstlingsschrift hin. In diesem Zusammenhang geht er
insbesondere auf die Fallstricke ein, die sich aus der neuen Bedeutung
bestimmter vom Autor verwendeter Begriffe ergeben. Begriffe wie Name,
Objekt, Satz, logische Form werden in diesem Sinne erwähnt und erklärt. Der
Autor belässt es aber nicht dabei und bezieht sich auch auf die argumentative
Struktur des Tractatus, wobei er über die Bedeutung nachdenkt, die

Cornelia Eșianu, "Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein mit seinem „künstlerischen Temperament“ (Flonta 2008: 33) der
Dezimalnummerierung seiner Arbeit und der Wechselbeziehung zwischenden einzelnen Sätzen beimisst.
Auch nach der Veröffentlichung der Übersetzung des Tractatus ins
Rumänische bleibt Mircea Flontas Interesse an Wittgenstein lebendig, sodass
er einige Jahre später für das rumänische Publikum ein Buch mit dem Titel
Der einsame Denker: Kritik und Praxis der Philosophie bei Ludwig Wittgenstein(Flonta 2008) veröffentlicht, das auch eine Analyse von Wittgensteins später
Philosophie mit deren Höhepunkt, den posthum publizierten Philosophische(n)Untersuchungen, enthält. Ohne eine endgültige Position in Bezug auf die
Kontinuität oder Diskontinuität von Wittgensteins philosophischem Werk zu
formulieren, gibt sich Flonta damit zufrieden, die wichtigen Ansichten undArgumente der Vertreter beider Lager kurz darzulegen. Die Gegenüberstellung
der beiden philosophischen Etappen in Wittgensteins intellektueller
Biographie, der sogenannten 1. und 2. Philosophie, gibt dem Verfasser die
Möglichkeit einer erneuten und vertieften Auseinandersetzung mit dem
Tractatus.
Was besonders auffällt, ist die sorgfältige und leidenschaftliche Untersuchung,die Flonta, man könnte fast sagen, im Geiste des von Noica beschriebenen
philosophischen Denkens – hier nun der einen ausgewogenen
freundschaftlichen Beziehung zwischen Wittgenstein und Russell – durchführt
und sich dementsprechend viel Platz für seine diesbezüglichen Überlegungeneinräumt. Warum verstand zum Beispiel der Logiker Russell, ein so brillanter
Geist, Wittgenstein letzten Endes nicht und verkannte die wahre Bedeutung
der im Tractatus formulierten zentralen Unterscheidung – der Unterscheidung
zwischen dem, was gesagt werden kann und dem, was gezeigt wird? Eines dervon Flonta in dieser Hinsicht angeführten Argumente ist, dass Russell „eine
gewisse Veranlagung fehlte, die für eine gute Lektüre der WittgensteinʼschenStudie notwendig ist“ (Flonta 2008: 334). So berücksichtigte Russell nicht die
Tatsache, dass Wittgenstein von dem Moment an, als er Cambridge verließ undbis zum Herbst des Jahres 1918, als er das Manuskript des Tractatus fertig
stellte, sich weiterentwickelt hatte.

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Cornelia Eșianu, "Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus |Cornelia Eșianu

3. Eine Erklärung und eine Schlussfolgerung

Flonta ist der Ansicht, dass es gerade Wittgensteins philosophischer Stil war,
der sich einer angemessenen Rezeption im rumänischen Kulturraum
widersetzte. In diesem Zusammenhang können weitere Argumente ins Spiel
gebracht werden: Weder die Veröffentlichung von Wittgensteins Abhandlung
im Jahr 1921, noch deren Neuveröffentlichung im Jahr 1933 in England, nochdie Beziehung zu Bertrand Russell reichten aus, um Wittgensteins Philosophie
in der Zwischenkriegszeit in der allerersten rumänischen Geschichte dermodernen Philosophie gebührend zu berücksichtigen. Dies überrascht umso
mehr, als Greenwood, der Verfasser des ebendort veröffentlichten Aufsatzes
mit dem Titel „Englische Philosophen“, dem angelsächsischen Raum
entstammte und daher sehr gut mit den damaligen philosophischen
Strömungen in England vertraut gewesen sein musste. Man könnte daher
sagen, dass ein Ausgangspunkt für Wittgensteins lang andauernde
Nichtrezeption in Rumänien in dieser fehlenden wissenschaftlichen
Erwähnung des österreichischen Autors und britischen Staatsbürgers zu
finden ist.
Aber hatte Wittgenstein während des kommunistischen Regimes in Rumänien
eine größere Resonanz? Es kann die These avanciert werden, dassWittgenstein erst nach seinem Tod 1951 in Rumänien wahrgenommen zu
werden begann und dabei zunächst auch stärker mit dem Empirismus unddem logischen Positivismus in Verbindung gebracht wurde. Von den
rumänischen Logikern wurde er vorerst als Sprachlogiker wahrgenommen.
Der Klausenburger Professor Andrei Marga erkannte in Wittgenstein 1987 den
Initiator des Programms des logischen Positivismus, „dessen definierende Note
die Abgrenzung der Wissenschaft von anderen Wissensformen war, um einenkognitiven Bereich rigoroser Objektivität für Organisationen im sozialen
Leben zu identifizieren.“ (Marga 1987: 293)
Aus der intellektuellen Begegnung mit Wittgenstein, der sich den Fragen„frontal“ und „völlig unabhängig“ (Flonta 2001: 12) näherte, sowie aus jener
mit dessen Tractatus dürfe, so Flonta, Folgendes behauptet werden:
Als Aussagen über die Logik der Welt und der Sprache und über das ‚washöher ist‘, können die Sätze des Tractatus nur Unsinn sein. Dies zu
behaupten bedeutet natürlich nicht, dass sie nichts mitteilten oder dass sie

Cornelia Eșianu, "Die philosophische Rezeption von Ludwig Wittgenstein in Rumänien und seiner Schrift Tractatus logico-philosophicus". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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falsch und irreführend wären. Es ist keine Kleinigkeit zu wissen, wie mandas, was gesagt werden kann, von dem, was sich zeigt, trennt, um zu
verstehen, warum genau das, was nicht gesagt werden kann, die größte
Bedeutung hat, und dies am Ende eines Ansatzes, der durch seine
nüchterne Strenge beeindruckt. (Flonta 2001: 71) (Aus dem Rumänischenübersetzt von der Verfasserin)Inzwischen gibt es viele Doktorand:innen und Forscher:innen, die
Wittgensteins Schriften lesen und ihn in bestimmten Situationen erwähnen
(Afloroaei 2013). Sie sprechen beispielsweise über Sinn und Bedeutung, überSprachspiel und Lebensform, Referenz und Bezeichnung, Gebrauch oder
Verwendung von Ausdrücken usw., darüber hinaus über einige Themen aus
Wittgensteins Schriften über ästhetische, ethische, soziale oder religiöse
Fragen, oder über Themen aus seinen Notizbüchern.
Vor diesem Hintergrund einer realen Wittgensteinʼschen Renaissance, dienach 1989 in Rumänien durch Übersetzungen, einführende Texte undKommentare des Werkes des Philosophen, aber auch durch Bücher über ihn
entstand, ist es möglich, dass auch in Zukunft Denkerinnen und Denker vondieser Art des Philosophierens angezogen und – warum nicht – Wittgensteinneu entdecken werden.
References
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Cox, Terry (2011) “1989 and the Transformations in Eastern Europe”, Europe-Asia Studies, 63:9, 1529–1534.
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București: Humanitas.
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Marga, Andrei (1987) „Filosofia științei la Lucian Blaga”, in: Ghișe, Dumitru u.a. (Hg.) Lucian
Blaga – cunoaștere și creație. Culegere de studii, București: Cartea Românească, 292–305.
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Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als
Regularität
August Fenk (Klagenfurt, Austria)
Abstract
Wieviel Peirce steckt in Wittgensteins Tractatus? In Studien zu Parallelen zwischen
Wittgenstein und seinem ideengeschichtlichen Vorgänger Peirce wird der Tractatus logicophilosophicus (TLP) eher ausgespart. Sollte Peirces Philosophie erst den späteren Wittgenstein
beeinflusst haben? Eine gezielte Suche ergibt anderes: Laut Tractatus kann im Satz „derGedanke so ausgedrückt sein, dass den Gegenständen des Gedankens Elemente desSatzzeichens entsprechen.“ (3.2; siehe auch 3.21 sowie 2.12 – 2.14 und 2.161 – 2.172). Der Satzist dann „ein Bild“ oder „Modell der Wirklichkeit, so wie wir sie uns denken“ (4.01). Und lautPeirce dient das Arrangement der Wörter im Satz als Icon „in order to show the Forms of thesynthesis of the elements of thought.“ (Peirce 1906: 513) Weitere Übereinstimmungenzwischen dem Tractatus und Peirce betreffen die Idee der grafischen Repräsentation logischer
Wahrheitsbedingungen (vgl. 6.1203 TLP und Peirces Existential Graphs) sowie das
Fortschreiten von Ausdruck zu Ausdruck durch eine Abfolge von Substitutionen (6.24 TLP)
und die enge Beziehung zwischen Übersetzbarkeit, Gesetzmäßigkeit, und Symbol. Man
vergleiche 3.343, 3.344 und 5.514 TLP mit Peirce: „And the regularity is the symbol. Reality,
therefore, can only be regarded as the limit of the endless series of symbols.” (Peirce 1976
[1904]: 261). Diskutiert wird ein entscheidender Unterschied zwischen bildlicher undpropositionaler Repräsentation: Nur letztere kann wahr oder falsch sein.

1. Peirce und Wittgenstein. Anstelle einer EinleitungStudien zu erstaunlichen Parallelen zwischen Peirce und Wittgensteinbeziehen sich vor allem auf post-tractarian Wittgenstein. Nubiola (1996)
erwähnt einige dieser Arbeiten, will aber primär rekonstruieren, wie
Informationen über Peirce bzw. dessen Ideen oder Schriften den Weg zu
Wittgenstein gefunden haben könnten. Wobei insbesondere Frank Ramsey als
Mittler in Betracht gezogen wird (vgl. auch Misak 2016). Könnte da auchCharles Ogden irgendwie eine Rolle gespielt haben? Er hat gemeinsam mit
Ramsey als Tractatus-Übersetzer fungiert und war – wann? – Verfasser eines
Kommentars zu Peirces Philosophie, welcher dann offenbar dem Appendix (D,§6) des kurz nach dem Tractatus erscheinenden Bandes von Ogden und
Richards (1985 [1923]) nur mehr beizufügen war. Dieser ausführliche
Kommentar enthält bereits vieles von dem, was es zur Erklärung vonEntsprechungen zwischen Peirce und dem Tractatus bräuchte; etwa lange
Auszüge aus Schriften von Peirce (insbesondere Peirce 1906), inclusive
Erläuterungen zu den Existential Graphs.

182

August Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

Ich zitiere zwei Details aus dem Appendix in Ogden und Richards (1985): Ein
Diagramm ist für Peirce, trotz Symbol-artiger Merkmale, in der Hauptsacheein „Icon of the forms of relations in the constitution of its Object.“ (p. 281).
Und eine Proposition ist für ihn ausdrücklich “not the German Satz, but ‘thatwhich is related to any assertion, whether mental and self-addressed or
outwardly expressed, just as any possibility is related to its actualization.’” (p.
283).
Diagramm und Proposition sind zusammengesetzte Zeichen. Im Diagramm
werden von dessen Komponenten – bildliche und sprachliche Elemente –unterschiedliche semiotische Funktionen realisiert (vgl. Fenk 2000). Peirce
zufolge können vergleichbare Zusammensetzungen auch eine Proposition
bilden (siehe Abschnitt 4).
In Studien zu Parallelen zwischen Peirce und Wittgenstein spielt der Tractatus,
wie schon erwähnt, keine nennenswerte Rolle. Finden sich Erklärungen dafür
in Publikationen, welche Peirce positiv, den Tractatus hingegen negativ
kommentieren? Mit Ogden und Richards (1923) folgt dem Tractatus (1922) sehrschnell eine Reaktion dieser Art: TLP 3.21 kritisieren sie als „unplausible
Schlussfolgerung“ (Seite 253), und bezugnehmend auf TLP 6.2 und 6.24
kritisieren sie einen von Wittgenstein unnötigerweise eingeführten
Mystizismus (Seite 89; vgl. auch Seite 255). Auf die beiden Paragraphen 6.2 und
6.24 werde ich in Abschnitt 3 zurückkommen.
Aber auch spätere Autoren sollten Peirce positiv und den Tractatus negativ
zitieren: Dass Wittgensteins Bildtheorie schwer mit dem Radikalen
Konstruktivismus vereinbar ist, liegt auf der Hand. Für von Glasersfeld wurde
das klar angesichts von 2.223 TLP, wonach wir ein Bild mit der Wirklichkeit
vergleichen müssten, um zu erkennen, ob es wahr oder falsch ist. Ein solcher
Vergleich sei aber nicht möglich; da sieht er sich einer Meinung mit jenen„mutigen“ Skeptikern, „die seit Bestehen der abendländischen Zivilisation
immer wieder behauptet hatten, dass es unmöglich ist, unser Bild derWirklichkeit mit einer Wirklichkeit ‚draußen‘ zu vergleichen.“ (von Glasersfeld
1987: 139). Zu Peirce hingegen äußert er sich durchwegs positiv – trotz dessen
Realismus-nahem Konzept des Icons: “Each Icon partakes of some more or lessovert character of its object“ (Peirce1906: 496).

August Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

Peirce gilt nicht nur als „father of pragmatism“; er war auch FallibilismusPionier. Im Wissen um massivste Widerstände gegenüber diesem Ansatz
warnt er vor einem Konservativismus, der in der Wissenschaft fehl am Platz
sei. Erfolgreiche Forschung sei radikal darin, Konsequenzen bis ins Extreme
auszuloten und im (gedanklichen) Experiment zu erproben: „Indeed, it isprecisely among men animated by the spirit of science that the doctrine offallibilism will find supporters.“ (CP 1.148). [CP = Collected Papers of Charles S.
Peirce]Karl Popper, als Falsifikationist auch Fallibilist, wird sehr spät auf Peirce
aufmerksam und verweist von da an respektvoll auf diesen frühen
Fallibilisten. Umso bemerkenswerter seine Kritik an Wittgensteins“surprisingly naïve picture theory, or projection theory, of truth”. Im Tractatus
werde die Proposition oder der Satz als Bild bzw. als Projektion eines
Sachverhalts verstanden; so, als könne der Satz dieselbe Struktur oder Formhaben wie der beschriebene Sachverhalt (Popper 2007: 302). In einer Fußnote
zu seiner Kritik verweist er auf diverse TLP-Sätze, u.a. auf 2.223 (wie auch vonGlasersfeld) oder 3.11, und ganz speziell auf 4.0141. Dort erklärt Wittgenstein
die innere Ähnlichkeit scheinbar unterschiedlicher Gebilde durch das Gesetz
der Projektion und illustriert dieses Gesetz am Beispiel der Tonaufzeichnungals „Übersetzung der Notensprache in die Sprache der Grammophonplatte“.
Für Popper ein unzulässiges Beispiel, weil man bei dieser Tonaufzeichnung,anders als bei dem von einem Satz beschriebenen Sachverhalt, tatsächlich voneiner Projektion sprechen könne. Interessanterweise kreiert Wittgenstein hierauchauffällige
Metaphern(„Noten sprache “;„ SprachederGrammophonplatte“), welche einerseits eine Vergleichbarkeit mit Sprache ineinem eher wörtlichen Sinne suggerieren und andererseits den unmittelbar
folgenden Paragraphen 4.015 vorbereiten, welcher die Möglichkeit aller
Gleichnisse – und damit auch die Zulässigkeit seines Gleichnisses in 4.0141? –sowie die ganze „Bildhaftigkeit unserer Ausdrucksweise“ mit der „Logik derAbbildung“ begründet.
Spinks (1991) sieht zwei Pole in Peirces “Scholastic Realism: an epistemologicallogic which recognizes the power of the sign and yet expects that there is some
immediate and dynamic relation between the world of objects and the worldof signs.” Zwei aufeinander bezogene Argumentationsstränge orten auch
Kloesel und Pape (1986: 15): Auf der semiotischen Ebene vertrete Peirce eine

184

August Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit. „Ähnlich wie beim frühen Wittgensteinermöglicht der Abbildcharakter der Proposition ihre Korrespondenz. In derMetaphysik der Kontinuität dagegen ist Wahrheit der Grenzbegriff im Prozess
der Interpretation“. Der erste Satz war der einzige mir bekannte
Literaturhinweis auf inhaltliche Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Peirce undWittgensteins Tractatus. Ich beginne daher (in Abschnitt 2) mit einem
Vergleich zwischen Wittgensteins Bildtheorie und Peirces Konzept derIkonizität und illustriere dann Übereinstimmungen auch in Verästelungendieser Ansätze.

2. Der Satz als Bild der Wirklichkeit und die Bildhaftigkeit unserer Ausdrucksweise

Mit dem Tractatus beschreitet Wittgenstein in der seit eh und je kontrovers
geführten Diskussion um das Verhältnis von „Sprache und Welt“ (4.014) neue
Wege: Formal durch sein Notationssystem mit apodiktischer Argumentationohne Zitationen im üblichen Sinne. Und inhaltlich durch eine eigenwillige BildTheorie, die man als Bedeutungstheorie und/oder Wahrheitstheorie sehen
kann. Aber sie ist nicht radikal neu. Auf der Suche nach verwandten älteren
Ideen wird man bei Peirce rasch fündig:• Nach Peirce (1906: 513) reichen Symbole samt Indices nicht aus zur
Bildung einer Proposition. Darüber hinaus müsse das Arrangement derWörter im Satz als Icon dienen: „The chief need for the Icons is in order toshow the Forms of the synthesis of the elements of thought.”• Entsprechungen in Wittgensteins TLP: „Im Satze kann der Gedanke soausgedrückt sein, dass den Gegenständen des Gedankens Elemente desSatzzeichens entsprechen.“ (3.2). „Der Konfiguration der einfachen
Zeichen im Satzzeichen entspricht die Konfiguration der Gegenstände in
der Sachlage.“ (3.21). Und: „Der Satz ist ein Bild der Wirklichkeit.“
Beziehungsweise „ein Modell der Wirklichkeit, so wie wir sie uns
denken.“ (4.01).
Besonderes Augenmerk in den obigen TLP-Zitaten verdient auch (i) die
Verwendung von „Satzzeichen“ und (ii) der Satz über den Satz als „Bild derWirklichkeit“:

August Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

ad (i): „Satzzeichen“ denotiert gewöhnlich Interpunktion(en). Peirce hatte
ständig neue Ausdrücke für seine triadischen Unterscheidungen auf
verschiedenen taxonomischen Ebenen geprägt. Unter anderem den vom
Lateinischen „dicere“ ausgehenden Neologismus „Dicizeichen“ (dicisign) für
bestimmte Arten von Sätzen (Kloesel und Pape 1990: 431, Fußnote 116).
Wittgenstein könnte auf den Gedanken verfallen sein, den bereits
existierenden Ausdruck „Satzzeichen“ probeweise umzudeuten – in das „SatzZeichen“, den „Satz als Zeichen“, beziehungsweise das „propositional sign“,wie es in den Übersetzungen heißt.
ad (ii): „Bild“ wäre von den Tractatus-Kritikern, sagt Stegmüller, immer ineinem „naturalistischen Sinne“ gedeutet worden. Was diese Kritiker hätte
vermuten lassen, dass Wittgensteins Dictum vom Satz als „Bild derWirklichkeit“ nur metaphorisch gemeint sein könne. Er schlägt vor, dieses
Dictum im Gegenteil „in einem streng wörtlichen Sinne“ zu verstehen, und das„Satzzeichen“ als logische Struktur des Satzes (Stegmüller 1969: 545).
Allerdings könnte man Wittgensteins Dictum von der „Bildhaftigkeit unserer
Ausdrucksweise“ auch sehr direkt als „Metaphorik unserer Ausdrucksweise“
lesen. Für Wittgenstein ist der Gedanke der „sinnvolle Satz“ (Satz 4 im TLP)
und der Satz ein „logisches Bild“ der Sachlage (4.03 TLP). In einer weniger
metaphorischen Sprache meint „logisches Bild“ aber nicht den Satz, sondern
eine Spezies von Diagrammen, welche dafür bekannt ist, räumliche
Metaphern – wie die Pfad-, die Inklusions- und die Subsumptionsmetapher –ins Bild zu setzen (vgl. Fenk 2000). Jedenfalls meint Peirces Icon neben
perzeptueller Ähnlichkeit auch formale Ähnlichkeit: „For Reasoning, nay, Logic
generally, hinges entirely on Forms. You, Reader, will not need to be told that aregularly stated Syllogism is a Diagram; /… / No pure Icons represent anything
but Forms; no pure Forms are represented by anything but Icons.” (Peirce
1906: 513)
Den Terminus des „Hypoicons“ für kulturelle Manifestationen des Icons hatte
Peirce nur für erstaunlich kurze Zeit propagiert (Stjernfelt 2019). Er umfasst
neben den images und diagrams auch die Metaphern; und zwar als jene
Hypoicons, „which represent the representative character of a representamen
by representing a parallelism in something else“ (CP 2.277). “Hence, every
assertion must contain an icon or set of icons, or else must contain signs whose186

August Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

meaning is only explicable by icons.” (CP 2.278). Die Rolle der Metapherbeschäftigte Peirce auch im Zusammenhang mit der Metaphysik und mit derSprache des Logikers (Kloesel und Pape 1986: 136f; 210).
All das könnte mit der „Bildhaftigkeit unserer Ausdrucksweise“ (4.015 TLP)
gemeint sein: Ausdrucksweisen für Relationen, die man als Diagrammeauffassen kann, und daher auch als Bilder. Und weil auch Syllogismen
Diagramme sind, sind auch sie Bilder. Und die Metaphern? Sind auch Bilder;„Sprachbilder“ eben, bildhaft ausgedrückt. Logische Begriffe müssten
metaphorisch „eingekleidet“ werden, heißt es bei Peirce (Kloesel und Pape
1990: 340). Und in 4.002 TLP „verkleidet“ die Sprache den Gedanken.

3. Gesetzmäßigkeit und Übersetzbarkeit als Essenz des Symbols

Peirces Pionierleistungen als Mathematiker (vgl. Kauffman 2001) betreffen
Gebiete, welche auch der TLP behandelt: Erstens die von Bertrand Russell im
TLP-Vorwort erwähnte Konstruktion von Wahrheitsfunktionen durch
simultane Negation. (Wobei Russell aber einen 1913 erschienenen Artikel vonHenry M. Sheffer als Pionierarbeit nennt.) Und zweitens Rekursion als
fortgesetzte „Anwendung einer Operation auf ihr eigenes Resultat“ (5.2521
TLP).
Die unten zusammengestellten Zitate aus Peirce und dem TLP betreffen aber
die Bildung von Serien von Ausdrücken durch Übersetzungen (Peirce 1904:
261) und/oder Ersetzungen (6.24 sowie 3.343 und 3.344 TLP). Von beiden
Autoren wird den Grenzbegriffen solcher Sukzessionen besondere Bedeutung
beigemessen, und beide betonen die enge Beziehung zwischen Symbol und„Regularität“ (Peirce 1904) bzw. „Gesetzmäßigkeit“ (6.3 TLP).
Peirce in einem seiner Manuskripte: “The object of representation can be
nothing but a representation of which the first representation is theinterpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing theone behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit.” (CP1.339) Später erklärt er: “The reality only exists as an element of the regularity.
And the regularity is the symbol. Reality, therefore, can only be regarded as
the limit of the endless series of symbols.” (Peirce 1976 [1904]: 261). Und
schließlich bringt er auch den Terminus “Übersetzung” ins Spiel: “TheAugust Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

187

Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

meaning of a proposition is itself a proposition. Indeed it is no other than the
proposition of which it is the meaning: it is a translation of it.” (Peirce 1905:
173). Definition als Übersetzung?
Einer ungewöhnlichen Verwendung des Terminus „Übersetzung“ sind wir
auch schon in Wittgensteins Gleichnis mit der Grammophonplatte begegnet(4.0141); wiewohl Wittgenstein häufiger von „ersetzen“ spricht. Die folgenden
Formulierungen entsprechen jenen von Peirce, sind aber eher auf die Spracheder Mathematik gemünzt (6.24 TLP), deren Gleichungen er in 6.2 als
Scheinsätze (pseudo-propositions) qualifiziert. Diese „Gleichungen drücken die
Ersetzbarkeit zweier Ausdrücke aus, und wir schreiten von einer Anzahl von
Gleichungen zu neuen Gleichungen vor, indem wir, den Gleichungenentsprechend, Ausdrücke durch andere ersetzen.“ Und:
„3.343 Definitionen sind Regeln der Übersetzung von einer Sprache in eine
andere. Jede richtige Zeichensprache muß sich in jede andere nach solchen
Regeln übersetzen lassen: Dies ist, was sie alle gemeinsam haben.
3.344 Das, was am Symbol bezeichnet, ist das Gemeinsame aller jener Symbole,durch die das erste den Regeln der logischen Syntax zufolge ersetzt werden
kann.“
5.514: „Diese Regeln sind den Symbolen äquivalent und in ihnen spiegelt sich
ihr Sinn wider.“Die Erforschung der Logik bedeute also „die Erforschung aller Gesetzmäßigkeit.“ (6.3)

4. Peirce zum Begriff der Proposition

In Papes (1983: 82f) Übersetzung von Peirces Syllabus entsprechen alle
Propositionen der Definition des Dicizeichens bzw. der Quasi-Proposition. Das
Porträt eines Mannes mit dessen darunter geschriebenem Namen sei, durch
die Kombination eines Hypoicons mit einem „informativen Index“,„strenggenommen eine Proposition, obwohl seine Syntax nicht die der Redeist“. Ein noch besseres Beispiel wäre das Foto. Zwar übermittle der Foto-Abzug
selbst keinerlei Information. Doch „die Tatsache, daß es sich wirklich um einen
Ausschnitt der Strahlen handelt, die von einem anderweitig bekannten Objekt

188

August Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

reflektiert wurden, macht es zu einem Dicizeichen. Jedes Dicizeichen ist – unddies wird im System der Existential Graphs entsprechend berücksichtigt – eine
weitergehende Bestimmung eines bereits bekannten Zeichens desselben
Objekts.“ (Pape 1983: 83). Von hier aus braucht es, angesichts der Funktion
dieser Existential Graphs in der Darstellung logischer Wahrheitsbedingungen,nur mehr einen kleinen Schritt zu einer Bild- oder Projektions-Theorie derWahrheit!
In einer solchen Theorie ist übrigens Peirces Foto ein näher liegendes Beispiel
als Wittgensteins Grammophonplatte. Aber man muss auch Peirce nicht inallem folgen:
Warum soll der Foto-Abzug selbst keinerlei Information enthalten? In Peirces
Trichotomie des Zeichens (Symbol, Index, Icon) wird dem Index eineausschließlich hinweisende Funktion zugeschrieben: „A pure index simply
forces attention to the object with which it reacts [...] but conveys no
information.“ (Peirce 1976 [1904]: 242). Aber der „pure Index“ erweist sich als
ein höchst artifizielles Konstrukt (vgl. Fenk 1997).
Ein anderer Einwand: Sobald die Proposition als kognitive Bedeutungseinheit
sprachliche Form annimmt, entspricht diese einer Prädikat-ArgumentStruktur (vgl. Fenk-Oczlon 1983: 30f). Und sonst, oder vorher? Wenn die an die
Betrachtung des Fotos anknüpfende Interpretation als hinreichend für ein„Dicizeichen“ akzeptiert wird, akzeptiert man unweigerlich auch einen
inflationären
GebrauchdiesesTerminus:Alles
ausunsererWahrnehmungswelt kann irgendwie zum Dicizeichen bzw. zur Proposition
werden!
Anders bei Peirces Beispiel „legend under a portrait“. Da fungiert räumliche
Nähe als künstlicher Index, der eine bestimmte Interpretation nahelegt: „Das
hier ist ein ‚Selbstporträt von X aus dem Jahr Y‘“. Diese Proposition kann eine
explizite Erklärung des Museumsführers sein, eventuell begleitet von einer
Zeigegeste als weiterem Index. Oder aber eine sinngemäß entsprechende,unausgesprochene, sprachnahe Interpretation eines Museumsbesuchers.
Und diese Proposition kann, z.B. wegen vertauschter Etiketten, falsch sein.
Während das Gemälde selbst zwar eine Fälschung, aber weder wahr nochfalsch sein kann.

August Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

5. Schlussfolgerungenaus den obigen Vergleichen:• Eine Proposition, und nur eine Proposition, kann „wahr“ (zutreffend)
oder falsch sein – unabhängig davon, ob sie geäußert oder nur gedacht
wird, und unabhängig davon, ob dem bloßen Gedanken der Status eines
Zeichens zuerkannt wird.
• Wogegen ein Bild für sich allein, ohne Anknüpfung ans sprachliche
System, weder wahr noch falsch sein kann, weil es keine Aussage trifft
und nichts behauptet (vgl. Fenk 1987).
• Was am Bild falsch sein kann, ist die Relation zwischen bildlicher
Darstellung und sprachlichen oder sprachbasierten Komponenten, wie
den Bezeichnungen und Zahlenwerten in geographischen Karten undanderen Diagrammen.
• Von solch anderen Diagrammen – Cartesischen Diagrammen, VennDiagrammen, Graphen – werden hauptsächlich Ergebnisse
symbolmanipulierender Operationen „abgebildet“. Nebst Syllogismen
dürfte Peirce (CP 4.536) vor allem solche Diagramme meinen, wenn er„diagrammatic reasoning“ als einzig fruchtbare Form von Reasoning
bezeichnet.
Apropos Reasoning: Der Symbols and Search-Ansatz von Newell und Simon(1976), ein Klassiker der theoretischen AI-Forschung, beschreibt Problemlösen
als Generieren und fortschreitendes Modifizieren von Symbolstrukturen. Ein
spätes Echo Peircescher Philosophie?
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Fenk-Oczlon, Gertraud (1983) Bedeutungseinheiten und sprachliche Segmentierung, Tübingen:
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August Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität | August Fenk

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Nubiola, Jaime (1996) “Scholarships on the Relations Between Ludwig Wittgenstein andCharles S. Peirce”, Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie 8, 282-294.
Ogden, Charles K.; Richards, Ivor A. (1985 [1923]) The Meaning of Meaning, London: ARK
Paperbacks.
Pape, Helmut (1983) Charles S. Peirce. Phänomen und Logik der Zeichen. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
Peirce, Charles S. (1976 [1904]) “Καινὰστιχεῖα”, in: Eisele, Carolyn (ed.), The New Elements ofMathematics 4, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 236-263.
Peirce, Charles S. (1905) “What Pragmatism Is”, The Monist 15(2), 161-181.
Peirce, Charles S. (1906) “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism”, The Monist 6(4),492-546.
Popper, Karl (2007 [1963]) Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge,
New York: Routledge.
Spinks, C.W. (1991) Peirce and Triadomania: A Walk in the Semiotic Wilderness, Berlin: de
Gruyter.
Stjernfelt, Frederik (2019) “Dimensions of Peircean Diagrammaticality”, Semiotica 228(1-2),
301-331.
Stegmüller, Wolfgang (1969) Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Stuttgart: Kröner.
von Glasersfeld, Ernst (1987) Wissen, Sprache und Wirklichkeit, Braunschweig: Vieweg.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, http://people.umass.edu/klement/
tlp/ Zugriff 20.08.2022

August Fenk, "Peirces Icon, Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, und das Symbol als Regularität". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik | Lilli Förster

Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik
Lilli Förster (Stuttgart, Germany)
Abstract
Leo Tolstois Einfluss auf Ludwig Wittgenstein wird anerkannt, in seinen Ausmaßen jedoch oftverkannt. Wittgenstein selbst verdeutlicht die Bedeutung von Tolstois Kurze Darlegung desEvangeliums für ihn in wiederholten Eintragungen in seinen Tagebüchern während der Zeit
des Ersten Weltkrieges. In diesem Werk stellt Tolstoi heraus, dass das wahre Christentum fürihn keine göttliche Offenbarung ist, sondern „die aller strengste, reinste und ganzeste
metaphysische und ethische Lehre,“ (Tolstoi 2016, 25), die es vermag, die wesentlichen Fragen
im Leben eines Menschen zu beantworten. Nicht in irgendeinem Jenseits (in Transzendenz)
ist das Glück und der Sinn des Lebens zu suchen, sondern im Diesseits, da nur auf Erden die
Menschen unter Menschen existieren und somit Gottes Wille erfüllen können, einander
Brüder und Schwestern zu sein. Diesem antitranszendentalen Denkansatz fühlt sich auch
Wittgenstein in seinen Gedanken zu Ethik (und auch Logik) verbunden. Dem Parallelismus im
Denken von Tolstoi und Wittgenstein in Bezug auf Religion und Ethik soll im Folgenden
nachgegangen werden.

Einleitung

Die Einflüsse auf Ludwig Wittgensteins Denken sind ein interessanter und gut
untersuchter Gegenstand in der aktuellen Forschung. Die Einflüsse vonPersonen wie dem Mathematiker und Logiker Gottlob Frege oder den
Philosophen Bertrand Russell sind unbestreitbar. Der russische Schriftsteller
und Denker Leo Tolstoi trägt in seiner ganz eigenen Weise ebenfalls zu
Wittgensteins Vermächtnis bei. Sein Einfluss wird anerkannt, aber in seinen
Ausmaßen oft verkannt. Im Folgenden wollen wir aufzeigen, wie Tolstois
antitranszendentale Religionsauffassung und die damit einhergehende
antitranszendentale Sicht auf das Leben selbst, den frühen Wittgenstein inseinem eignen Herantreten an das Leben und die Welt beeinflusst hat.

1. Wittgenstein und Tolstoi

Zunächst gilt es kurz die Verbindungen zwischen den beiden Denkern
aufzuzeigen:
In der Ausnahmesituation des 1. Weltkrieges findet Wittgenstein Tolstois
Kurze Darlegung des Evangeliums und beginnt dieses Werk mehrfach zu lesen
und stellenweise auswendig wiederzugeben. Er verdeutlicht die Bedeutungdieses Werkes für ihn in wiederholten Eintragungen in den Tagebüchern, die

192

Lilli Förster, "Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik | Lilli Förster

er zu dieser Zeit verfasste. (Weiberg 2011, 137) Daraus erfahren wir, dass er
das Buch wie einen Glücksbringer immer bei sich trug, sodass er bald vonseinen Mitsoldaten als Der-mit-dem-Evangelium bekannt wurde. Ebenfallsäußert Wittgenstein in einem Brief an Ficker: „Wenn Sie es nicht kennen[Tolstois Kurze Darlegung des Evangeliums], so können Sie sich auch nicht
denken, wie es auf den Menschen wirken kann.“ (Brief an Ficker, 24.7.15)
Jahre später erinnert sich Wittgenstein an diese Zeit zurück und meint, dassdieses Buch ihn wortwörtlich am Leben gehalten hätte. So schreibt er in sein
persönliches Tagebuch während des Krieges: „Immer wieder sage ich mir im
Geiste die Worte Tolstois vor: ‚Der Mensch ist ohnmächtig im Fleische, aber frei
durch den Geist.’ Möge der Geist in mir sein!“ (TB 12.09.1914) Ausführlicher ist
Wittgensteins geistige Verfassung in der Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges in Ilse
Somavillas Aufsatz „Spuren Tolstois in Wittgensteins Tagebüchern von
1914-1916“ dargelegt. Während seines gesamten Lebens liest Wittgenstein
Tolstois Werke. So, neben der Kurzen Darlegung des Evangeliums auch Hadschi
Murat oder Auferstehung. (McGuinness 1988, 184)

2. Tolstoi, Leben und Religion

Bevor wir uns ansehen, wie der frühe Wittgenstein Tolstois Auflassungen vom
Leben, Tod und Religion verinnerlicht und weiterdenkt, sollen eben dieseunter dem Fokus des Antitranszendentalismus untersucht werden.
1886 veröffentlichte Tolstoi die Erzählung Der Tod des Ivan Iljitsch. Der
gleichnamige Hauptcharakter des Buches liegt im Sterben. Er versucht Sinn inseinem Leben und in der Art und Weise, in der er es geführt hat, zu finden. Die
problematische Frage des „Warum?“ bleibt ihm dabei unbeantwortet. Die
Angst, die er vor dem Tod hatte, ist im Anblick des Todes irrelevant. Das, was
ihn wirklich beschäftigt, sind alles Dinge aus seinem Leben, die er mit dem Tod
verliert: Karriere, Familie, … Tolstoi kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Angst vor
dem Tod eine unbegründete sei. Was man erlebt und worauf man seine
Gedanken verwenden sollte, ist das Leben. Den Tod erlebt man nicht – er ist
das Ende des Lebens.
Diese Fokussierung auf das Gegenwärtige, das Leben im Jetzt, schlägt sich auchin Tolstois Religionsauffassung nieder. Seine Zuwendung zum Christentum ist
bei ihm Resultat einer Lebenskrise. Später schreibt er:

Lilli Förster, "Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

193

Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik | Lilli Förster[A]ls ich im Alter von 50 Jahren mich und die Weisen in meinem Kreise
danach gefragt, was es mit mir auf sich und mein Leben zu bedeuten habe,
und die Antwort erhalten [habe]: ‚Du bist eine zufällige Verkettung vonTeilchen, dem Leben wohnt keine Bedeutung inne, das Leben ist an sichein Übel‘ – daß [hat mich …] damals zur Verzweiflung gebracht […] und[ich wollte] mich töten […] (Tolstoi 2016, 13)
Seine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum mündet 1883 in seinem Werk
Zusammenfassung und Übersetzung der vier Evangelien, welches in derKurzform Kurze Darlegung des Evangeliums mehr Menschen zugänglich
gemacht wurde. Sein Ziel dabei ist die Offenlegung des wahren Geistes derchristlichen Lehre und so trennt er zunächst klar den eigentlichen christlichen
Glauben von der Kirche und dem Christentum als Institution. Das wahre
Christentum selbst ist für ihn keine göttliche Offenbarung, sondern
die aller strengste, reinste und ganzeste metaphysische und ethische
Lehre. Über die hinaus der menschliche Verstand sich bis heute nicht
erhoben hat, und in deren Kreise sich, ohne sich dessen bewußt zu sein,alle höchste menschliche Tätigkeit bewegt, sei sie nun eine politische,wissenschaftliche, poetische oder philosophische. (Tolstoi 2016, 25)
Das wahre Christentum ist für Tolstoi eine ethische, unmittelbar verständliche
Lehre, die Antworten zu geben vermag auf die wesentlichen Fragen im Lebeneines Menschen.
Religion ist für ihn keine dogmatische Überlieferung, sondern beschreibt das
Verhältnis des einzelnen Menschen zu sich selbst und in Beziehung zu
anderen, zu Gott und zum Universum. „Tolstoy insists that every person has arelationship to the universe and therefore a religion. Religion concerns thefundamental form of out engagement in, and orientation to, theworld.“ (Thomas 1997, 371) Der religiöse Glaube beschreibt demnach die
Orientierung des Einzelnen zu allem und nimmt Einfluss auf alle
Lebensbereiche des Menschen und auf die Auffassung vom Leben selbst. Zu
diesem Punkt kommen wir am Ende des Aufsatzes erneut zurück.
Tolstoi nach, ist das allen Menschen gemeinsame Leben, das wahre Leben, das,welches in der Gegenwart stattfindet. Gottes Wille, in dieser Art und Weiseverstanden, soll gefolgt werden; die Befriedigung des eigenen Willens führt

194

Lilli Förster, "Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik | Lilli Förster

hingegen nicht zu einem guten Leben. Der Mensch, bestehend aus Fleisch undGeist, soll sich Tolstoi zufolge, für den Geist entscheiden, den dieser ist die
Verbindung mit Gott. Nicht in irgendeinem Jenseits (in Transzendenz) ist das
Glück und der Sinn des Lebens also zu suchen, sondern im Diesseits, da nur
auf Erden die Menschen unter Menschen existieren und somit Gottes Wille
erfüllen können, einander Brüder und Schwestern zu sein. Tolstoi ist demnachüberzeugt, dass das eigentlich Erstrebenswerte, „das Reich Gottes,“ nicht ineinem überirdischen Reich zu suchen sei, sondern auf der Welt, im irdischen
Hier und Jetzt. Alles, was der Mensch für ein gutes Leben zu tun hat, ist dieses
auf den Willen Gottes auszurichten.
Die Bauern und einfachen Menschen leben Tolstois Ansicht nach dieseEinsicht bereits aus und stellen sich deshalb die quälende Frage nach dem„Warum?“ erst gar nicht: „Der einfachste Mensch kennt die moralische
Wahrheit, die eine ist; er kann diese nur nicht artikulieren. Die Aufgaben derIntelligents (der Philosophes) besteht darin, die schon erahnte Wahrheit klar
auszusprechen.“ (Milkov 2004, 312) Wichtig ist es demnach nicht, an
bestimmte transzendentale Wahrheiten zu glauben, sondern so natürlich zu
leben, dass sich die Frage nach Sinn und Bedeutung des Lebens gar nicht erst
stellt. Kurz: „What he [Tolstoi] learns is not that the meaning of life is such andsuch, but how to live in a way that these questions no longer
arise.“ (Thompson 1997, 103) Im wahren Christentum hat Tolstoi demnach die„Antworten auf die Fragen nach der Bedeutung meines Lebens und des Lebens
der Anderen“ (Tolstoi 2016, 14) gefunden.

3. Tolstoi und Wittgenstein zu Religion und Ethik

Gut erforscht ist der Einfluss von Tolstoi auf Wittgenstein in Bezug auf
Lebensfragen. So wird betont: „Tolstoy’s religious writings clearly had anenormous influence on Wittgenstein during the time that he was writing theTractatus.“ (Thompson 1997, 97) Dieser Einfluss bezieht sich jedoch nicht auf
Wittgensteins Logik, sondern auf den Anstoß, die Ermutigung, sich mit Ethik
und Religion in seinem Werk auseinanderzusetzen und diese auch mit seiner
Logik in Verbindung zu bringen.
Um Verbindungen beider Denker aufzuzeigen, soll zunächst das Bild von Gottals das eines Vaters aufgegriffen werden. Für Tolstoi ist „[d]er Mensch […] ein

Lilli Förster, "Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik | Lilli Förster

Sohn des unendlichen Ursprungs, ist der Sohn dieses Vaters nicht durch das
Fleisch, sondern durch den Geist.“ (Tolstoi 2016, 6) Und so schreibt auch
Wittgenstein in seinem Tagebuch von 1916: „Den Sinn des Lebens, d.i. den
Sinn der Welt, können wir Gott nennen. Und das Gleichnis von Gott als einem
Vater daran knüpfen. Das Gebet ist der Gedanke an den Sinn des Lebens.“ (TB
11.6.16) Die Begriffe Gott und Welt verschmelzen miteinander. Die
Personifikation des Gottes als irgendeine Art Entität lehnt Wittgenstein ab undauch das Wort „Herr“ sagt ihm in diesem Sinne nichts: „Wie Du das Wort ‚Gott‘
verwendest, zeigt nicht, wen Du meinst – sondern, was Du meinst.“ (VB 521)
Und eben dieses „Was“ zeigt sich im Leben der gläubigen Person selbst.
Religion wird so als Lebenslehre aufgefasst: „Was Wittgenstein an der Kurzen
Darlegung des Evangeliums faszinierend fand, war, dass sie als ‚Lehre desLebens‘ dienen kann.“ (Milkov 2003, 190)
Auch die Anforderungen, die Tolstoi an seine Lebenslehre undReligionsauffassung setzt, finden bei Wittgenstein Anklang und Zustimmung:„Einheitlichkeit, Klarheit, Einfachheit und Ganzheit der Lehre.“ (Tolstoi 2016,10) Tolstoi und der frühe Wittgenstein waren der gleichen Auffassung, was derIntellektuelle, der Philosoph zu leisten hat: Tolstoi hebt hervor, dass auch die
als weise und schlau betitelten Menschen nicht mehr in Bezug auf
Lebensfragen wissen, als das Volk, die einfachen Menschen. „Die Lehre eines
großen Menschen ist darum nur groß, weil sie verständlich und klar
ausspricht, was die anderen weder verständlich noch klar ausgesprochen
haben.“ (Tolstoi 2016, 19) Kurz gesagt: „Tolstoy sees philosophy as an activityof clarification.“ (Thompson 1997, 106) Hier wird die Verbindung zum frühen
Wittgenstein offensichtlich.
Dazu weitere Erläuterungen: Wittgenstein ist in seiner Methodik
antitranszendental, da er wie Tolstoi, alle überflüssigen Elemente sowohl inder Ethik als auch in der Logik ausklammert. In der Tat ist Logik „keine
Lehre“ (TLP 6.13) – wir können „auch ohne die logischen Sätze
auskommen“ (TLP 6.122). Gleichermaßen „kann es auch keine Sätze der Ethik
geben.“ (TLP 6.42) Logik, wie auch Ethik, ist transzendental (TLP 6.13 und
6.421). Nur in diesem Sinne liegen sie außerhalb der Welt. Logik und Ethik
lassen sich daher nicht aussprechen. (TLP 6.421)

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Lilli Förster, "Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik | Lilli Förster

Wittgenstein ist beim Lesen von Tolstois Ausführungen beeindruckt, da er
feststellt, dass der russische Denker seinen eigenen Ansichten nahesteht.
Tolstoi geht in der Literatur, Religion und Lebensauffassung in die gleicheRichtung wie Wittgenstein beim Schreiben seines Tractatus in Bezug auf Logik
und Ethik. Die antitranszendentale Herangehensweise ist beiden Denkern
gemeinsam.
Der nächste Abschnitt fokussiert sich daher auf diesen Ansatz Tolstois undWittgensteins in Bezug zur Einstellung zur Zeitlichkeit des Lebens. Tolstois
Gedanken dazu: „Das wahre Leben liegt nicht allein außerhalb der Zeit, als ein
Leben im Gegenwärtigen, sondern ist auch ein Leben außerhalb derPersönlichkeit, als ein allen Menschen gemeinsames Leben.“ (Tolstoi 2016, 7)
Dies wird von Wittgenstein aufgegriffen: Sowohl Wittgenstein als auch Tolstoi
gehen davon aus, dass der Tod kein Erlebnis des Lebens ist. (TLP 6.431). Es
muss sich dementsprechend weder davor gefürchtet werden, noch gilt es,
Rätsel um das Ende des Lebens zu lösen. Das wahre Leben liegt für Tolstoi und
Wittgenstein außerhalb der Zeit. Ein unproblematisches Leben ohne Rätsel ist
keines, welches das irdische Leben in irgendeinem Jenseits schlicht fortsetzen
würde, sondern es hat weder einen zeitlichen noch räumlichen Bezug.
Wittgenstein greift genau dies im Tractatus 6.4312 auf:
Die zeitliche Unsterblichkeit der Seele des Menschen, das heißt also ihr
ewiges Fortleben nach dem Tode, ist nicht nur auf keine Weise verbürgt,sondern vor allem leistet diese Annahme gar nicht das, was man immer
mit ihr erreichen wollte. Wird denn dadurch ein Rätsel gelöst, daß ichewig fortlebe Ist denn dieses ewige Leben dann nicht ebenso rätselhaft
wie das gegenwärtige? Die Lösung des Rätsels des Lebens in Raum und
Zeit liegt außerhalb von Raum und Zeit. (TLP 6.4312)
Die Verwandtschaft von Wittgensteins und Tolstois Denken wird hier in derantitranszendentalen Herangehensweise offengelegt. Der Parallelismus im
Denken der beiden hat Wittgenstein dabei von Beginn an fasziniert.

4. Wittgenstein und Tolstoi zur Welt

Für Wittgenstein ist die Welt, beziehungsweise die Tatsachen und
Sachverhalte in ihr, an sich weder gut noch böse. „Die Welt ist unabhängig vonLilli Förster, "Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik | Lilli Förster

meinem Willen“ (TLP 6.373) und es gibt keinen logischen Zusammenhangzwischen meinem Willen und dem, was in der Welt geschieht (TLP 6.374).
Der Glaube an Gott bedeutet für Wittgenstein, eben dies zu bemerken. Meine
Wünsche haben keinen Einfluss auf die Tatsachen der Welt. Das, wasgeschehen soll, wird unabhängig von mir geschehen. Hier sei ebenso an
Tolstois Darstellungen vom Willen Gottes erinnert, wie auch an Wittgensteins
Aufzeichnungen während des Krieges: „Wurden beschossen. Dachte an Gott.
Dein Wille geschehe!“ (TB 11.10.14) Ziel des Lebens kann es demnach nur sein,
mit der Welt in Übereinstimmung zu leben. Der Punkt, indem das „Ich“
relevant ist, ist der Einfluss, den es auf die Grenzen der Welt hat.
Hierzu muss zunächst nachvollzogen werden, was Wittgenstein im Tractatus
unter Subjekt versteht (Milkov 2005, 223-224):
Subjekt (I) – ist das empirische Subjekt, das in der Welt aus Fleisch und Blut
wissend und erfahrend die Welt erlebt und erkennt. Dieses gibt es nach
Wittgenstein nicht. Es ist lediglich ein Schein, von dem es sich zu trennen gilt.
Wir nehmen die Welt zwar als Subjekte, auf eine individuelle Art und Weisewahr. Wir als Subjekte sind jedoch nicht Teil dieser Welt in der Hinsicht, dasswir uns selbst nicht als Subjekt wahrnehmen können.
Subjekt (II) ist für Wittgenstein das metaphysische Subjekt, dieses ist mit dem
Sinn des Lebens verbunden. Dieses Subjekt liegt an der Grenze zur Welt undbringt Sinn und Zwecke in diese.
Das Subjekt (III) ist nach Wittgenstein das wollende Subjekt. In den Gedanken
hierzu werden Wittgensteins Verbindungen zu Schopenhauer offensichtlich.
Auch Tolstoi ist von dem deutschen Philosophen beeinflusst worden. 1869 hielt
der russische Denker ihn für den genialsten aller Menschen. (Brief an Fet,
30.8.1869, Sergejenko 1910) Das wollende Subjekt wird als das handelnde
Subjekt verstanden, welches Entscheidungen trifft und eine Haltung
gegenüber der Welt und ihren Tatsachen einnimmt. Je nachdem, mit welchen
Werten und Normen ich an die Welt und ihre Tatsachen herantrete, so
verändert sich auch meine Welt, das wie ich sie sehe und wie ich mich ihr
gegenüber verhalte. Demzufolge ist ein glückliches Leben eines, bei dem ich
den Sinn des Lebens erkannt habe und meine Welt zu einer ganz anderen
wird – die eines Glücklichen. (Vgl. TLP 6.43) Merkmale für so ein glückliches

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Lilli Förster, "Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik | Lilli Förster

Leben lassen sich nicht aufzählen – am Verschwinden des Problems desLebens merke ich schlichtweg, dass ich es führe. (Vgl. TLP 6.521) Mein eigenes
Leben bekommt einen Sinn, da ich mich mit meinem Willen zu ihm
positionieren kann.
Aus all dem gilt es zu schlussfolgern, dass der Sinn des Lebens außerhalb der
Welt liegt. Gleiches trifft auch für die Ethik zu – die Werte und Normen vonmir oder einer Gesellschaft sind ebenfalls keine Tatsachen dieser Welt undliege außerhalb von ihr. Wie die Ethik, so liegt auch die Ästhetik außerhalb
dieser – die Logik reiht sich hier ebenfalls ein.
Abschließend lässt sich festhalten, dass der antitranszendentale Ansatz sowohl
bei Tolstoi als auch bei Wittgenstein dazu beiträgt, ein lebensnahes und klares
Bild von Religions- und Lebensauffassung zu bilden. Die Verbindung beider
Denker ist eine fruchtbare, die es auch in anderen Bereichen, wie dem derKunst, weiterzuverfolgen gilt.
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Thompson, Caleb (1997) „Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Meaning of Life,“ PhilosophicalInvestigations 20 (2), 97–116.
Tolstoi, Leo (2016) Kurze Darlegung des Evangelium, Norderstedt: Hansebook.

Lilli Förster, "Antitranszendentalismus in Tolstois und Wittgensteins Ethik". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Weiberg, Anja (2011) „Tolstoisches Gedankengut im 'Tractatus' und in den frühen
Tagebüchern,“ in: Esther Ramharter (Hg.): Ungesellige Geselligkeiten. Unsocial Sociabilities.
Wittgensteins Umgang mit anderen Denkern. Wittgenstein’s Sources, Wittgensteiniana Band Nr.
7, Parerga, Berlin, S. 133-150.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1969) Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker, Hg. v. Georg H. v. Wright, Salzburg.
—— (1984) Werkausgabe Band 1. Tractatus logico-philosophicus/ Tagebücher 1914–1916/
Philosophische Untersuchungen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
—— (1984) Werkausgabe Band 8. Bemerkungen über die Farben /Über Gewißheit /Zettel /Vermischte Bemerkungen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
—— (1991) Geheime Tagebücher 1914–1916, Hg. und dokumentiert v. Baum, W., Wien: Turia &Kant.
Acknowledgement
Vielen Dank für die Unterstützung an Nikolay Milkov und Peter Keicher.

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Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Quest for Simple Objects | Ralf Funke

The Quest for Simple Objects
Ralf Funke (Hamburg, Deutschland)
Abstract
Wittgenstein, like Leibniz, thought that, for logical reasons, there must be simple objects
because it follows from the ideas of complexity and analysis. And like Leibniz’s monads theseobjects are the substance of the world. The exact nature of Wittgenstein’s objects, however,and their role in the “states of affairs” has remained unclear since the publication of theTractatus. In an attempt to demystify the objects, Anthony Kenny once offered the game ofchess as a model for the Tractatus world. I will modify this model slightly so that it becomes acellular automaton. In a second part I present a new “Causal Theory of Views” by physicist Lee
Smolin who is heavily influenced by Leibniz. He postulates a new kind of objects that are
actually events. These objects, although inspired by monads, might be candidates for thesimple objects of Wittgenstein.

1. Facts and Monads

The world consists of birds and bees and trees and clouds. The world consistsof elements. Of atoms. Of sub-atoms. The world consists of sense data. The
world consists of bits and bytes (because it is a simulation). The world consistsof facts. The world consists of Monads.
The last two claims are, of course, by Wittgenstein and Leibniz, respectively.
And since a fact is the existence of atomic affairs and an atomic affair is aconcatenation of objects it seems that at least in some sense both Leibniz andWittgenstein are concerned with the ultimate constituents of being, theElements of Things, as Leibniz calls them (Leibniz 1714: 3). And there are othersimilarities between the Monadology and the Tractatus.
“Both texts are composed as a sequence of numbered sentences; both lay out apicture of the world with[out] little or no argument; both advance a pictorialconception of meaning; and both advance from a description of the structureof the world to reflections on ethics” (Sluga 2018).
And both admit the possibility of alternative worlds, and both deny that there
is absolute space and time.
But there are important differences.
For Leibniz (and this is one of the criticisms of Russell) every proposition is
ultimately reducible to one which attributes a predicate to a subject. That is,

Ralf Funke, "The Quest for Simple Objects". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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relations are not real. (“I hold that paternity in David is one thing, and filiation
in Solomon another, but the relation common to both is a merely mental
thing” (quoted in Russell 1900: 206).) For Wittgenstein, it might be argued, only
relations are real. The only properties of an object are the internal, i.e. thepossible relations to other objects, and the external – the actual relations.
The monads are simple only in respect to the compounds they enter. The
monads must have qualities, Leibniz says, “otherwise they would not even be
existing things” (Leibniz 1714: 8). This follows from his Principle of the Identityof Indiscernibles. The qualities of a monad, it turns out, is its ability to mirror
the qualities of all other monads (Leibniz 1714: 56).
As a consequence, this means that one cannot take away one monad without
affecting all others. Wittgenstein completely disagrees. Not only are objects
independent of one another, but even the states of affairs are independent
from one another (TLP 2.061). This is the difference between a monistic andpluralistic view of the world. And Wittgenstein’s view is in direct opposition to
the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles: “Two objects of the same logicalform are – apart from their external properties – only differentiated from one
another in that they are different.” (TLP 2.0233)
Another major difference between a monad and an object is that the
Wittgensteinian object is not really a constituent of the world. A state of affairs
is the smallest ontological entity. Since all combinations of states of affairs can
exist and the number of possible combinations of n states of affairs is 2n (TLP
4.27) it follows that a world with no states of affairs is possible. And even thisworld would have all objects in common with any other possible world (TLP
2.022 and 2.023).
I will use the chess game to illustrate the crucial difference between thephilosophies of Wittgenstein and Leibniz concerning the nature of being. And
from an exegetical point of view, in the case of Wittgenstein, I think that chessmight illuminate his concept of logical form. For, as he says, “in order to beable to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselveswith propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the202

Ralf Funke, "The Quest for Simple Objects". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Quest for Simple Objects | Ralf Funkeworld” (TLP 4.12). This is obviously impossible. But since we invented thegame of chess we are in a sense outside the world of this game, and we know
its logical form perfectly well.

2. Chess as a Model of the Tractatus World

When Wittgenstein returned to the problems he tackled with in the Tractatus
in 1929 with “Some Remarks on Logical Form” he still believed that
propositions of ordinary life could be analyzed “to the point where it reaches
propositional forms which are not themselves composed of simpler
propositional forms” (RLF 1929: 162). They, the elementary propositions,represent the “ultimate connexion of terms” and it is to them, he says, we haveto look for the subject matter. What is the form of these propositions? It is
tempting, he says, to think of them as having the subject-predicate form or
relational form, but this, he thinks, “is a mere playing with words.” Because:”An atomic form cannot be foreseen” (RLF 1929: 163).
This is why he is careful in the Tractatus to talk of logical form and of logicalspace and logical co-ordinates (e.g. TLP 3.41).
On the other hand it seems that it is not only tempting but inevitable to talk in
a subject-predicate form or relational form when we try to investigate thenature of elementary propositions. Wittgenstein himself follows his own
warning with examples where he uses spatial relations to analyze theproposition “P is red” and subjects-predicate expressions when he tries todemonstrate that, contrary to his opinion in the Tractatus, there areunanalyzable statements of degree that are mutually exclusive (RLF 1929:
165ff.).
So let us now look at the subject matter of chess.
Anthony Kenny once suggested a (modified) game of chess that would serve asa model “as near as we can get to [...] for the way the world is conceived in theTractatus” (Kenny 1975: 74). In this model pieces and squares are the objects of
the world and a state of affairs would be the relation between a piece and asquare. This model would indeed honour some of the key concepts of theTractatus. The world would be the totality of facts, not the pieces but its

Ralf Funke, "The Quest for Simple Objects". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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positions on the squares would be relevant. The rules for the positioning of thepieces give their logical form. The internal properties of for example a bishop
would be its ability to move diagonally, its external property the actual
position on the board. The bishops would share the same logical form. In
Kenny’s modified chess pieces are not allowed to be taken, since objects are“indestructible”. But even with this modification, the analogy limps because, as
he acknowledges, “the atomic facts of chess are not independent on each otherin the way that Tractatus states of affairs are” (Kenny 1975: 75).
Space and time (and colour) are forms of objects (TLP 2.0251), so it seems
wrong to regard the squares of the board as objects themselves. Somehow theposition of a piece must be established in a way that avoids a reference tosome (absolute) points in space.
One way of simplifying the game from a logical point of view without
removing any essential features is to regard chess a cellular automaton.
Instead of having pieces and squares as inhabitants of the Tractarian chessworld we will allow only one kind of object, the cells.
Most cellular automata (like John Conway’s ‘Life’, for example) have cells with
two states, black and white or on and off. But we can have a multi-state
cellular automaton. A cell, (or square), could be, for example, in a “bishop” or“pawn” state. Normally one would say there is a bishop on a particular square
and it can be moved diagonally in every direction. But one can get rid of theactual pieces and say that the cell possesses the ability to transpose its internal
properties to any cell in a diagonal direction.
The external properties limit this ability to all diagonal cells with an empty
state or a non-empty cell with a different parity (meaning it is of the opposite
colour). So instead of describing a chess piece with either an absolute positionon the board or relative to other pieces, we just describe the current state of acell by the sum of its possible moves. Only that there is nothing that actually
moves. A “move” means that the source cell switches to an empty state and thetarget cell switches to the state of the source cell. The advantage of this modelis that it allows ‘pieces to be taken’. There are no actual pieces, a piece is just a(human readable) marker for the state of the cell, no more essential than thecolour of a field or the material of the board. What happens with a move is just204

Ralf Funke, "The Quest for Simple Objects". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Quest for Simple Objects | Ralf Funkethat two cells change its state. (Notice that in contrast to other cellular
automata where many cells can change their state, we have here multiple
possible states but only two state changes.)
This chess game without pieces would still be chess because it shares thelogical form with standard chess. It has the same multiplicity. A single red ball,
Kenny says, cannot represent a game of chess, but if we allow to bounce theball, we could create a system where every possible chess situation isrepresented by us bouncing the ball a specified number of times (Kenny 1975:
75).
The bouncing system would not be very useful, but one very interesting way totransfer the game of chess to a different medium is to represent a game ofchess by a piece of music.
The note defines the chess piece (or a cell state), e.g., pawn = 1/16th note,knight = 1/8th note. The eight columns of a chess board correspond to the eight
audible octaves. So the field c4 gets mapped to the middle C on the piano. With
some clever musical transformations, one could actually make the musicalgame quite pleasing. (Stokes 2011)
And the advantage of this chess incarnation is that we not only got rid of thepieces but also of the space frame. You can consider the musical rendition of agame of chess as a kind of alternative notation. In standard notation like “1. e4
e5 ...” we get a one-dimensional representation of a game with the minimum
necessary information. Only the changes of the position are recorded. You
must know the starting position. But the important thing is that there is a oneto-one correspondence between standard notation, the Stokes notation and an
actual game. It is the logical form of chess what they all have in common.
One of the games Stokes transformed is the famous one played by Adolf
Anderssen and Lionel Kieseritzky on 21 June 1851, the so-called Immortal
Game. This is a good example of the difference between the monistic system ofLeibniz and the pluralistic system of Wittgenstein.
With the seventh move White puts a pawn on d3. This move has been
criticised by German grandmaster Robert Hübner who suggested Nc3 instead.
This would have been a legal alternative. And in one sense it would be natural

Ralf Funke, "The Quest for Simple Objects". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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to say that the alternative move changed the position of a pawn and a knight,
but “everything else remains the same” (TLP 2.21). On the other hand, Leibniz
would say, that everything has changed, since every chess piece is defined by
its relation to all other pieces (more precisely by its perceptions of the otherpieces). Nc3 would not be compossible with the other pieces that make up the
Immortal Game world. It belongs to a different world. And of course, with the
Hübner move we would not be in the Immortal Game anymore. Wittgensteinwould say that chess is modular. At every position any legal move branches
into a different game. There is no mythical connection between one chesspiece and all the others. Any legal move leads to a perfectly normal new
position and the game can non-deterministically continue to the end. The factthat in this particular position at one time the pawn was moved to d3 is just
that: a historical, contingent fact. I think both views are equally plausible andintuitive. So, I do not judge.

3. A Causal Theory of Views

Are there Wittgensteinian objects? Wittgenstein was not sure. “It always looks
as if there were complex objects functioning as simples, and then also reallysimple ones like the material points of physics...” (NB June 21, 1915). He
doubted that questions like the one about the nature of the object could beanswered. “It looks as if I could say definitively that these questions could
never be settled at all” (NB September 3, 1914).
And it is probably safe to assume that there is no group of scientists at CERN in
Geneva searching for Wittgensteinian objects – or monads.
But the idea is not as ludicrous as one might think. Because theoreticalphysicist Lee Smolin recently advanced a new theory that explicitly refers to
Leibniz. He lets himself be guided by five principles all of them being aspectsof a single principle: Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (Smolin 2020:
233). From quantum theoretical assumptions Smolin holds that “space andtime cannot both be fundamental. Only one can be present at the deepest levelof understanding: the other must be emergent and contingent” (Smolin 2020:
235).

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von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Quest for Simple Objects | Ralf Funke

Smolin was inspired by the Monadology. He even calls the elements of his
relational model of the universe “nads”. Nads, of course, are not reallymonads. For one thing, they do not have a soul. “Nads have two kinds ofproperties: intrinsic properties, which belong to each individual nad, andrelational properties, which depend on several of the nads” (Smolin 2020: 242).
This actually sounds more like a description of a Wittgensteinian object than amonad. Especially as monads do not really have relations. (Remember,
relations are only a mental thing.) On the other hand, Wittgensteinian objects
certainly do not obey the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (TLP
2.0233).
Next, Smolin adopts the Leibnizian idea that nads have a “view of theuniverse” and he even thinks that the actual universe differs from otherpossible ones in that it has as much perfection as possible. Only the “quantitythat is maximized, which Leibniz called ‘perfection’, we call an action” (Smolin
2020: 243).
A nad, Smolin goes on, is an event and the relation between events is causation(Smolin 2020: 254).
“I then would propose that each event has a certain quantity of energy, andthat energy is transmitted from past events to future events along the causal
relations” (Smolin 2020: 261).
In our musical chess world, a note would cause the next note. Or the state of acell would cause the change of state of a different cell. A state of affairs then,that often is thought of as a spatial relation of objects, would really be a causal
relation of two (in chess) objects in time.
In his summary Smolin says that “the universe consists of nothing but views ofitself, each from an event in its history, and the laws act to make the views asdiverse as possible” (Smolin 2020: 271).
Taken out of context, this sounds as mysterious and esoteric as a philosopher's
speculations. It is a new theory, and “as is the case with any new theory”,
Smolin says, “it is most likely wrong”. But, and here there is a difference to thesystems of Wittgenstein and Leibniz, “one good thing about it is that it will bemost likely be possible to test it against experiment” (Smolin 2020: 248). And I

Ralf Funke, "The Quest for Simple Objects". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
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think that both Leibniz and Wittgenstein would agree that this in itself is an
improvement on their own ideas.

References
Kenny, Anthony (1975) Wittgenstein, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1714) Monadologie, https://www.plato-philosophy.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/The-Monadology-1714-by-Gottfried-Wilhelm-LEIBNIZ-1646-1716.pdf.
Russell, Bertrand (1900), A Critical Exposition Of The Philosophy Of Leibniz, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Sluga, Hans (2018), “Simple Objects, Complex Questions”, https://www.truthandpower.com/?
p=32.
Smolin, Lee (2020), Einstein’s Unfinished Revolution, London: Penguin Books.
Stokes, Jonathan (2011), “Chess Music”, https://www.jonathanwstokes.com/blog/2011/02/14/
chess-music/.

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Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality | Francesco Gandellini

Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance andOriginality
Francesco Gandellini (Southampton, United Kingdom)
Abstract
An interesting and compelling way of engaging with Wittgenstein’s philosophy in general andhis Tractatus Logico-philosophicus in particular is through a dialectic of continuity anddiscontinuity with Kant’s thought. Kantian (and anti-Kantian) receptions of TLP havecopiously proliferated since the early days of its publication. In a sense, no comprehensive
interpretation of TLP has been (and, plausibly, can be) supplied without comparing andcontrasting Wittgenstein’s work with Kant’s philosophical project. My paper focuses on one
theme of Kant’s philosophy through which interpreters have read TLP: the doctrine ofTranscendental Idealism. In Section 1, I briefly outline Kant’s original doctrine, as it appears
in the Critique of Pure Reason. In Section 2, I consider one of the first commentaries on TLP’s
inheritance of this Kantian doctrine, by looking at Erik Stenius’ Critical Exposition. In Section
3, I present two contemporary readings, respectively elaborated by Peter Sullivan and Adrian
Moore, which have recently stirred the debate on TLP’s Transcendental Idealism. In Section 4,
I set up the general terms of my own, original proposal, inspired by the work of Stanley Cavell.
Finally, in Section 5, I sketch some promising ways to develop the proposal in detail.

1. Introduction

The panoply of aspects of convergence and divergence between thephilosophical thinking of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and of
Kant’s critical project includes, among many others, the reflection on thenature of philosophy, the role of metaphysics, the limits of sense-making andthe scope of ethics. In what follows, I will focus my attention on a theme that
could be seen to cut through all these aspects. This fil rouge is represented by
the doctrine of Transcendental Idealism (“TI” hereinafter).
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines the “[TI] of all appearances [as] thedoctrine that they are together to be regarded as mere representations and notas things in themselves, and accordingly space and time are sensible forms of
our intuition, not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects
as things in themselves” (Kant 1998: A 369). In brief, Kant’s TI is a specificposition about space and time, where these are taken to be necessary
conditions for the appearance of objects in our experience. What we can cometo know are appearances whose essential features (starting from their spatiotemporal location) depend on the forms of our human cognitive apparatus.
Indeed, Kant extends these features of objects to what is covered by the “Table

Francesco Gandellini, "Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality | Francesco Gandellini

of Categories” (Kant 1998: A 80/B 106): objects appear not only to be here andnow, but also as such-and-such through the a priori forms of our conceptual
repertoire. It follows that we cannot know things independently of these
forms, but we are limited to the knowledge of what appears in our experienceand is individuated by the a priori of space and time, together with thecategories. Hence, we cannot know things in themselves, which “ground” (Kant
1998: A 49) the appearances we only can know.
Considering the rough overview of Kant’s TI here outlined, the doctrine hasapparently nothing to do with Wittgenstein’s TLP, which, at first sight,
provides an abstract theory of language and logical symbolism. Nevertheless,interpreters have wondered whether a suitably modified version of TI is infact present in TLP and redirected their attention to which role such a doctrine
might play in the work. Sections 2 and 3’s task is to trace this suggestion in the
Wittgensteinian scholarship and briefly illustrate it.

2. Transcendental Idealism in TLP. Past…

One of the inaugural associations of TI with TLP in the English-speaking world
is Stenius’ Critical Exposition. In the last chapter, Stenius argues that
“Wittgenstein was in essential respects a Kantian philosopher” and that “hisanti-Kantianism meant only that he […] transformed the system of Kant andthus created a Kantianism of a peculiar kind” (Stenius 1960: 214).[1]
According to Stenius, the “essential modification of the Kantian view which
gives rise to all the differences between Wittgenstein and Kant” (218) is that,while for Kant what we can know is what can experience through the forms ofour conceptual apparatus, for Wittgenstein what we can say is what we candescribe in meaningful language thanks to the general form of the proposition.
They both attempt to indicate the limits of theoretical discourse. Wittgenstein,on his part, takes this task to entail the investigation of what can be said at all
in language: he thus moves from the limits of knowledge to the limits oflanguage. The logical analysis of language that Wittgenstein’s TLP undertakes
is supposed to parallel Kant’s transcendental investigation of the a priori of
empirical knowledge. The identification of a general form of the proposition
thus allows Wittgenstein to draw a limit between what is meaningfully said inlanguage and what is not, which is simply nonsense.

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with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality | Francesco Gandellini

Stenius concludes that “Wittgenstein’s philosophical system could be called‘Critical Lingualism’ or ‘Transcendental Lingualism’ or even ‘Lingualistic
Idealism’” (220). Following TLP 5.6, we are said that what we canpropositionally make sense of the world depends upon the form of ourlanguage. We cannot propositionally make sense of anything independently of
it. And this is a peculiar form of TI: “the limits of language are thetranscendental limits of the world” (Stenius 1960: 221). What about what lies
beyond such limits? For Stenius, Wittgenstein leaves that region for the“unreachable transcendent” (223), inexpressible (cf. TLP 6.522) but showing
itself in the mystical feeling (cf. 6.45). His TI carves out room for what
transcends the limits of our meaningful language (similarly to Kant, who had“to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith” (Kant 1998: Bxxx)[2]).
Stenius’ judgment on Wittgenstein’s endeavours, however, is mixed: “[w]hat isof lasting value in [TLP] is not the philosophical system […], but the views
proposed in the different steps of the argument” (Stenius 1960: 224). He
regards TI as part of the “inconsistencies” (ibid.) of TLP, which should bethrown away after we have followed the nonetheless philosophically valuable
steps that have led us to it (cf. TLP 6.54).[3]A coda on Stenius. He believes that the apparent “positive ring” of
Wittgenstein’s appeal to the inexpressible is “not a reverence for the
ineffable” (Stenius 1960: 225). In invoking silence at the end of the book (cf.
TLP 7), Wittgenstein would not aim at setting us free from the linguistic cagethat debars us from contemplating the ineffable, but rather at giving us (andhimself) a way out from philosophy as a whole. The outcome of TLP, for
Stenius, is not the mystical turning of philosophy, but the abandonment ofphilosophy tout court because of its aimlessness. The interpreters who haverecently revived the debate on TI in TLP do not think that this abandonment ispossible. On the contrary, they read Wittgenstein’s work as precisely
reminding us of the urgency of doing philosophy.

3. …And Present

The letter of Stenius’ groundwork might be lost, but it is not the case for its
spirit. The Wittgensteinian scholarship has been witnessing a rich variety ofpositions about the place of TI in TLP over the years. A recent exchange

Francesco Gandellini, "Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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between Peter Sullivan (“PS”) and Adrian Moore (“AM”) has stirred the debate
anew, given their argumentative sophistication and the relevance of theircontribution to other mainstream and wide-ranging debates in philosophy.[4]In raising the issue about the place of TI in TLP, we actually search answers to
three questions:(a) what is TI?
(b) is TI there in TLP?
(c) if yes, what is TI doing there?
PS and AM substantially agree about (a) and (b). Their answers are notdissimilar, in principle, by that of Stenius. Broadly speaking, TI is the theory
according to which what we can make sense of depends on the kind of sensemaking with which we are endowed. Moreover, TI involves the (suitably
qualified) impossibility of making sense of what transcends that sense-making,and, a fortiori, of the very dependence of what we can make sense of on thatsense-making.[5] Another way to put this is to say that in TI the limits (i.e.,essential features) of our sense-making are limitations (i.e., features that atsome level exclude certain possibilities). Both interpreters agree that in TLP,
and notably in the 5.6s, we find remarks that bespeak Wittgenstein’s TI. This
amount to a doctrine according to which the (metaphysical) subject sets thelimits of language (and, therefore, of the world) as limitations, fencing us offfrom certain possibilities (starting from that of answering the question about
why these limitations are as they are). By going through these remarks, it iseasy to see how TI rests on very fragile grounds, for it deprives itself of thevery possibility of being stated. Hence, TI is self-refuting. These claims are
obviously up for debate and may not find total agreement, but in what follows
I will reason in line with this significant interpretation.
The final self-renunciation of TLP and the progressive affirmation of the“resolute” reading (the interpretation of the work famously popularised by
Conant and Diamond) make (c) the real point of contention. PS believes that
Wittgenstein ends up “repudiating, not just the truth of [TI], nor yet just its
meaningfulness, but also its appropriateness, even qua self-consciously
nonsensical and knowingly futile attempt to express the understanding one
has of its sources” (Sullivan 2003: 218). According to Sullivan, the212Francesco Gandellini, "Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality | Francesco Gandellini

understanding of how we go on with language that Wittgenstein wants to
impart comes (in part) from the nonsense he deliberately produces in TLP,[6]but not from that of TI, which is present as a luring doctrine that needs,
ultimately, to be “diagnosed and dispelled” (Sullivan and Potter 2013: 11). In asense, then, PS shares much of Stenius’ conviction about TI. AM, on thecontrary, is more inclined to believe that some understanding is conveyed by
the spectacular self-sabotage of TI in TLP. In particular, TI rises and falls
because of our attempts to give voice to the ineffable understanding we canachieve of our propositional relation with things in the world. AM claims that
TI “is there as a result of an unsuccessful attempt to express certain
inexpressible insights into the limits of language and into the incoherence ofattempts to violate those limits, insights which, on the one hand, are supposed
to be fostered by seeing that such nonsense is the result of an attempt to
express them and, on the other hand, are supposed to foster seeing that such
nonsense is nonsense” (Moore 2013: 248). In other terms, AM allows for aseemingly positive role played by the nonsense engendered by TI, which has to
do with the ineffable understanding – in particular, of what it is to makepropositional sense of things – that accrues from manipulating the nonsensethat Wittgenstein accurately crafts (cf. TLP 6.54).
Apart from this central disagreement, it is hard to tell where the two scholars
really differ. For what matters here, the rough reconstruction just presented
has fulfilled its purpose if it has shown some ideas that have been injected in
the recent debate about TI in TLP. Rather than ending such a debate, theseideas can contribute to fostering new ways of thinking about it.

4. The “Truth in TI”

In the wake of the previous remarks, I intend to sketch now the terms of an
original proposal about the issue of TI in TLP. In doing so, I endorse theanswers that AM and PS have provided to (a) and (b): given a suitably qualified
understanding of the doctrine, TI can be said to be there in TLP. In order toprovide an answer to (c), I will draw on Stanley Cavell’s treatment of
scepticism, which seems to me to offer invaluable insights for the issue here atstake.

Francesco Gandellini, "Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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TI, like scepticism in Cavell’s view, takes our relation to the world as a whole tobe a problem of knowledge (cf. Cavell 1979: 46), or, in the terms of TLP, ofpropositional sense-making. In particular, TI holds that we cannot
propositionally make sense of what lies beyond the limitations of ourlanguage. In the attempt to counter the very source of TI (cf. TLP 5.6s),
Wittgenstein ends up yielding to it (cf. 1s, 6.44-6.45), hence accepting TI.[7] For
the reasons given above, TI produces its self-undercutting: by advancing it,
Wittgenstein cannot but fail to give meaning to the words he uses. This
represents the “failure” of TI, which is astonishingly made manifest in the
conclusive self-repudiation of the book (cf. 6.54).
Yet, such a “failure” is not insignificant. On the contrary, it points to the “truth
in TI”, or its moral (cf. Cavell 1979: 45, 241). This truth must not be taken tomean that Wittgenstein’s TI is true but inexpressibly so. It instead means thatin failing to express what he attempts to articulate, Wittgenstein acknowledges
that “the limitations of [our language] are not failures of it” (241). Instead of an
essential inadequacy of our language to articulate the world, the “failure” of TI
reveals a trait of our human, “metaphysical finitude”, which we mask behindsome kind of “intellectual lack” (493). We conceive of ourselves as ineradicably
constrained sense-makers, condemned to fail to make propositional sense of
the general relation of our language to the world, and so much the worse if wefail to make sense even of this last feat (whence the “failure” of TI). In fact, therelation of our words to the world as a whole does not get stored and receive
expression in our words, but there is nothing we irremediably fail to do. The“truth in TI” is meant to capture the idea that nothing in the nature oflanguage makes it such that it can or cannot express the relation. Instead, therelation with the world we inhabit ultimately resides and can be identified in
our ordinary uses of langauge, once they are made clear. This explains
Wittgenstein’s repeated invocation of “clarity” (cf. TLP Preface, 3.251,
4.112-4.116) and the sense in which, once we are done with the questions
formulable in language,[8] nothing is achieved for us, human beings (cf.
Preface, 6.52). Our metaphysical finitude lies in the fact that the relation of ourwords to the world is not something we can achieve or fail to make sense inwords, but something which may wax or wane (cf. TLP 6.43), depending on
how we use them.

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Francesco Gandellini, "Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality | Francesco Gandellini

5. Conclusion

The kernel of the proposal that the previous section sets up is surely in need ofboth exegetical and theoretical expansion. Apart from better tailoring Cavell’s
insight to the issue of TI’s presence in TLP, there are further ways to hone theproposal that I envisage. Here I want to suggest three.
First of all, given that Cavell is generally acknowledged as the patron saint of“resolute” readers, one interesting prospect to delve into is whether myreading can be assimilated to the resolute interpretation of TLP. The idea of a“truth in TI”, if on the right track, might indeed reveal important limitations inthat interpretation. Secondly, there are aspects of my proposal that make itsimilar to that of AM. In this sense, both his reading and mine would improvefrom a comparison that aims at highlighting points of convergence anddivergence (in particular, on the theme of ineffability). Thirdly, it may be
worth investigating how my proposal fares with Wittgenstein’s convictions
about ethics and religion, in order to assess whether it can profitably
illuminate what the philosopher thinks about these domains. But about what I
cannot say (here), I must be silent.

[1] The anti-Kantianism Stenius writes about refers to Wittgenstein’s rejectionof the synthetic a priori truths, the possibility of which is at the heart of Kant’s
TI. This is generally accepted by scholars also in present days. Cf. Moore 2012:234.
[2] A similar point is also made by authors considered in Section 3, but I will
not return to it in the continuation.
[3] Stenius does not specify why, but the issue of TI’s coherence will return
later.
[4] I have in mind, for instance, debates about those aspects common to both
Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s thinking, mentioned at the beginning of Section 1. In
this section, I consider the last word of the protracted and subtle exchange
between AM and PS, pronounced respectively in Moore 2013 and Sullivan andPotter 2013, with small integrations.

Francesco Gandellini, "Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus. Between Inheritance and Originality | Francesco Gandellini[5] Such a formulation is along the lines of Moore 2012: 142.
[6] For instance, in his treatment of logical category distinctions.
[7] Such a dialectic is painstakingly described by AM, for instance in Moore
2013: § II.
[8] A reminder. The question about the relation of our language to the world asa whole, to which TI aims to answer and on which scepticism levers in order tobe threatening, is no question at all (cf. TLP 6.51).
References
Cavell, Stanley (1979) The Claim of Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Immanuel, Kant (1998 [1787]) Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moore, Adrian W. (2012) The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics. Making Sense of Things,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moore, Adrian W. (2013) “Was the author of the Tractatus a transcendental idealist?”, in: Peter
Sullivan and Michael Potter (eds.) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. History and Interpretation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 239-255.
Stenius, Erik (1960) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Sullivan, Peter (2003) “Ineffability and Nonsense”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77,
195–223.
Sullivan, Peter; Potter, Michael (eds.) (2013) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. History and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961 [1921]) Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, London: Routledge.
Acknowledgement
This paper constitutes a very early engagement with the topic under investigation, which dates backto the beginning of my now close-to-end PhD. For their help and encouragement, I would like tothank Denis McManus, Adrian Moore, Ed Witherspoon, Graham Priest, David Cerbone, Stephen
Mulhall, and Ed Minar. I owe an unbridgeable debt of gratitude to Filippo Casati: his friendship andpassion for the discipline helped me re-discover the beauty of philosophy, in particular when done
among friends and with great care. This paper has also benefited from audience feedback frompostgraduate seminars at the University of Southampton. It was also made possible by generous
funding from the Presidential Scholarship.

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with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus | Daniele Garancini

Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus
Daniele Garancini (Lingnan, China / Oxford, United Kingdom)
Abstract
Conant argued that the epistemology of logic developed in the Tractatus is “a structure ofthought which is designed to undermine itself” (1992, 97). I argue that this is not correct andput forward an alternative interpretation. Wittgenstein’s view might seem self-defeating
because he says that tautologies are senseless. This might seem to suggest that Wittgenstein’s
tautologies correspond to Frege’s non-well-formed sentences. But, in fact, Wittgensteinpostulates that his notion of senseless tautology corresponds to Frege’s theorems, effectively
taking for granted soundness and completeness results. There is nothing in the body of theTractatus suggesting that Wittgenstein’s epistemology of logic entails that contradictions arenonsense. Therefore, the only support for the resolute interpretation remains ‘the frame.’

1. Preliminary Remarks

There are two issues that I need to set aside, to keep my discussion
manageable. First, I disregard questions as to whether Wittgenstein changed
his views, and how many times (see Stern (2006), among others). Whenever I
mention Wittgenstein in the present article, I intend to refer to the early
Wittgenstein in a purely chronological sense. Given this focus, unlessotherwise noted, all references are to TLP 2021, Pears and McGuinness
translation, quoting the proposition number.
Second, I disregard the parts of TLP that resolute readers call 'the frame.'
According to the resolute reading, the main body of the book is nonsense. Onlysome remarks, the frame, should be taken at face value; namely, the remarks
telling us that the theory presented in the main body is "plain
nonsense" (Diamond 1991, 23) or a "mock theory" (Conant 1992, 98). This paper
focuses on the allegedly nonsensical theory. Regardless of whether the frame isevidence that Wittgenstein regarded the main body of TLP as nonsense, here I
discuss whether Wittgenstein's theory itself, specifically his views on thejustification of logic, supports the resolute interpretation. My evaluation is thatit does not. But let us not get ahead of ourselves.

2. Wittgenstein's and Frege's Terminologies

I suggest that Wittgenstein's notion of pseudo-proposition [scheinsatz] maps
onto Frege's notion of grammatically ill-formed expression (Frege 1892, 28).

Daniele Garancini, "Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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These are sentences, Frege would say, that cannot be grasped. On the other
hand, Wittgenstein's notion of senseless tautologies maps onto Frege's notionof theorems. These are sentences, Frege would say, that must be asserted.
The notions of grasping and asserting in Frege's concept script are marked by
the horizontal and judgement strokes. Wittgenstein held that "Frege's
judgement stroke '⊢' is logically quite meaningless" (4.442). At this juncture,
Hacker maintains that Wittgenstein is pointing out that a valid argument canhave false premises (1986, 31). What Wittgenstein does not seem to appreciateis that Frege was aware of this:The task of logic is to set up laws according to which a judgement isjustified by others, irrespective of whether these are themselves true
(Frege 1906, 175).
Wittgenstein's reason to discard the judgement stroke was that, in his
understanding, this symbol represents a psychological state of the authors (NB
1961, 96). This might be a correct assessment of Whitehead and Russell's
assertion-sign (Russell and Whitehead 1910, 8). Possibly, Wittgenstein had
Russell's view in mind in his early notes for TLP since there he talks about the"assertion-sign" (NB 1961, 96). But then in 4.442, the main critical target isFrege, since there Wittgenstein talks about the "judgement-stroke." Thus, thepsychologist criticism misses its mark, given Frege's systematic rejection of
psychologism. Frege does not mark every step in his proofs with the judgement
stroke because he thought that "one can draw inferences only from true
assertions" (Hacker 1986, 31). Rather, premises in Frege's proof must be
marked by the judgement stroke because, while giving a foundation ofarithmetic, he is concerned solely with sound arguments.
Wittgenstein also distinguishes between sound and unsound arguments. He
calls 'tautologies' unconditionally true combinations of signs (4.46) and heoutlines a method to recognize a given combination of signs as tautological(6.1203). This method, in effect, is a semantic truth-table proof system (5.101).
But Wittgenstein also allows the use of other proof systems in cases where
drawing a truth table would be cumbersome. This is a syntactic proof of thesort that Frege and Russell use since it applies rules that deal only with signs(6.126). Now, according to Wittgenstein, syntactic proofs are "merely a

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Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus | Daniele Garancini

mechanical expedient to facilitate the recognition of tautologies in complicatedcases" (6.1262). This effectively takes for granted soundness and completenessresults. Therefore, Wittgenstein postulates that his notion of tautology
corresponds to Frege's notion of theorems.
There is some evidence to indicate that tautologies in TLP are neither true nor
false, which would make them rather different from Frege’s theorems.
Wittgenstein says that a proposition can be true or false only in virtue of beinga picture of reality (4.06) and continues “if a proposition has no sense, nothingcorresponds to it, since it does not designate a thing (a truth value)” (4.063).
Tautologies lack sense (4.461). Thus, tautologies have no truth value. See also
NB 108, where Wittgenstein says that the propositions of logic are neither true
nor false, and 6.125 where tautologies are said to be ‘true’ with invertedcommas. My suggestion here is that these remarks, with the possible exceptionof 4.063, which might refer to unsinn, rather than sinnlos, indicate that
Wittgenstein’s notion of a true proposition corresponds to Frege’s notion ofcontingent truth. Only empirical propositions that could have been false aretrue in Wittgenstein’s sense. When Wittgenstein remarks that tautologies areneither true nor false, he means that lacking a sense, tautologies cannot agree
or disagree with the existence of state of affairs (4.2), they are not bipolar.
Tautologies are ‘true’ in the distinctive sense of being unconditionally true
(4.461). This, Wittgenstein remarks, is a somewhat improper kind of truth,
because tautologies are uninformative, they say nothing. Nevertheless,tautologies are true by Frege’s standards. Frege does not distinguish between
true and unconditionally true propositions, as Wittgenstein does, by sayingthat only the former is strictly true. Wittgenstein develops a truth-table proof
system that can show that a given proposition is tautological in the familiar
way, and he takes for granted soundness and completeness results. Therefore,
his notion of tautologies maps onto Frege’s notion of theorems, which is also
the contemporary default notion, regardless of Wittgenstein’s terminology inconnection to truth values.
Another Fregean notion that maps nicely onto Frege's terminology is that of an
ill-formed sentence, which corresponds to Wittgenstein's pseudo-propositions,scheinsätze. For Frege, if a string of symbols is ill-formed, then it is nonsense.
Otherwise, it has a sense, which is the way it displays its truth value.
Wittgenstein agrees with Frege that a string of symbols can violate the rules ofDaniele Garancini, "Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus | Daniele Garancini

logical syntax, resulting in pseudo-propositions. No string of signs in and byitself is a pseudo-proposition. But once a proposition is assigned to a string ofsigns, rules of formations follow (3.342). Therefore, when we assign a
proposition to a sign, other signs on that convention necessarily turn out to be
pseudo-propositions. The convention can be changed giving sense to signs thatformerly were pseudo-propositions, but there will again be other pseudopropositions, and the underlying logical facts are unaffected by the choice ofnotation. Wittgenstein, unlike Frege, emphasizes that what is nonsensical in anotational convention may not be nonsensical in another. But this is hardly apoint of departure from Frege. Frege was aware that a well-formed sentence in
his concept script need not be a well-formed sentence in, say, the language ofPrincipia Mathematica.
The mapping between Frege's and Wittgenstein's terminologies is imperfectbecause they have different views about sense. Crucially, the bearers of sense
differ. Although they use the same word, sätze, Wittgenstein's propositions, do
not correspond to Frege's well-formed sentences. According to Frege, strings ofsymbols themselves are the bearers of sense, Wittgenstein has an intermediary
notion: strings of symbols (propositional signs) correspond to propositions,and propositions are the bearer of sense. Moreover, for Frege, the sense of awell-formed sentence is the distinctive way it displays its reference. For
Wittgenstein, a proposition's sense is the distinctive way it partitions the spaceof possibilities if it does.
There is some evidence suggesting that in TLP all propositions have a sense,
which would make 'sense' a somewhat redundant notion. Wittgenstein saysthat a picture is a model of reality (2.12). A proposition is a model of reality(4.01). Thus, a proposition is a picture. A logical picture is a thought (3). Thus, aproposition is a thought, since "every picture is also a logical picture" (2.182).
But a thought is a proposition with a sense (4). Therefore, a proposition is a
proposition with a sense: it is part of the nature of propositions that they havesense.
Now if this were correct, then every time Wittgenstein talks in terms of'propositions of logic' he would be making a category mistake, because
tautologies lack a sense. There is some evidence to support this; in his notes,
Wittgenstein occasionally seems to imply that tautologies are pseudo-

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Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus | Daniele Garancini

propositions (NB, 12) or that they are not propositions, given that “there are nosuch things as analytic propositions” (NB, 21). I suggest that these few
preparatory remarks, which have not been written in TLP, are not part of thetheory that Wittgenstein intended to present. If they were, then the theory
would be self-defeating in a much more mundane sense than resolute readers
have it. Wittgenstein talks in terms of “propositions of logic” throughout thebook. If all these occurrences were category mistakes, then TLP would be selfdefeating in the uninteresting sense of using contradictory terminology.
Furthermore, if all propositions had a sense, proposition 4, which was one of
the first focuses of Wittgenstein's attention in the writing of PT, would state aneedless redundancy. This seems highly unlikely. Accordingly, I suggest that
Wittgenstein did not realize that the definitions above seem to jointly entailthat all propositions have a sense. In the intended TPL account of sense,
propositions may or may not have a sense. Propositions with a sense arethoughts, and they are logical pictures. Propositions without a sense aretautologies or contradictions, they picture nothing, they say nothing, but theyshow the logical structure of the world.
In an early note for TLP, Wittgenstein suggests that propositions correspond toFrege's well-formed sentences (NB 1961, 2), possibly because, as Anscombe
suggests (NB 1961, 15 translator's footnote), at that time he had still in mind
Frege's theory of sense. But in TLP a proposition is not a combination of signs.
A string of symbols in TLP is called a "propositional sign" (3.5). For
Wittgenstein, a proposition is an abstract entity corresponding to a string ofsigns, "a model of reality as we imagine it" (4.01). Commentators seem to agree
on this (Conant 1992, 64 and Hacker 2021, 18, among others).
For Frege, on the other hand, abstract entities corresponding to well-formed
strings of signs are thoughts. This extensionally corresponds to Wittgenstein's
propositions because, according to both, there is only one sort of entity thatcan be expressed by well-formed sentences (propositions for Wittgenstein andsenses for Frege). Frege holds that well-formed sentences refer to truth values
through their senses. No well-formed sentence can have a truth value but nosense, or a sense but no truth value. Thus, truth values are not a Fregean
notion whose extension could overlap Wittgenstein's notion of proposition.

Daniele Garancini, "Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus | Daniele Garancini

This sums up the above discussion, with Frege's terms in parenthesis. I am notsuggesting that the disagreement between Frege and Wittgenstein concerning
the nature of sense was verbal. Although their taxonomies are extensionallyequivalent, they differ intensionally. But extensional equivalence is sufficientfor my purposes.

3. The Justification of Logic

Conant (1992) attributes to Wittgenstein the self-defeating view that
contradictions are nonsense because he superimposes Frege's view about
sense on TLP: there is only one way that a sentence may lack a sense, whichmakes it neither true nor false. But Wittgenstein distinguishes pseudopropositions, which are neither true nor false, from senseless tautologies
which are most emphatically true. The graph above illustrates this. In
Wittgenstein's terminology, a senseless proposition must be asserted. Indeed,
Wittgenstein asserts tautologies by saying that they are "unconditionallytrue" (4.461). This brings us to the key proposition on the impossibility ofillogical thought.
What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought (5.4731)
Wittgenstein acknowledges that, in complicated cases, one might not realizethat a given sign corresponds to a tautology (6.1262). But once a tautology has
been grasped, it is impossible to reject it. To think out a proposition amounts tovisualizing its truth table. Even fallible humans, having thought out atautology, cannot reject it. We cannot think illogically, although we can fail tovisualize the truth table of a sentence. It is possible to think illogically in thesense that one can mistakenly associate a false proposition with a tautological
propositional sign. However, it is impossible to think illogically in the sense

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Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus | Daniele Garancini

that one cannot reject a tautological propositional sign that one has applied
and thought out (i.e. having visualized its truth table). This is factually false,
contemporary non-classical logicians reject classical tautologies and it isabsurd to say that they fail to visualize their truth tables. But obviously,
Wittgenstein had never encountered logicians seriously defending nonclassical logics at the time.
It is often remarked that, unlike Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein thought that
ordinary language is in perfect logical order (Anscombe 1959, 91-2). Frege's
concept script is a technical tool developed to replace ordinary language for
specific scientific purposes, analogous to a microscope (Frege 1879, 105).
Wittgenstein's notation, by contrast, is meant to display the underlying logicalstructure of ordinary language.
Again, one must not confuse Frege's and Wittgenstein's terminologies.
Wittgenstein says that language is the totality of propositions (4.001). That is,language is the totality of what propositional signs express. Frege, by contrast,
regards languages as collections of symbols and rules to manipulate them.
Frege's formal language is intended as a tool to express more precisely some of
the thoughts that ordinary language expresses. For Wittgenstein, on the other
hand, language is the collection of thoughts expressed by various notations.
Wittgenstein's use of the term 'language' occasionally alternates these twomeanings. In proposition 3.325, for instance, he uses interchangeably 'signlanguage' [zeichensprache], 'concept script' [begriffsschrift], and 'language' [sprache]. This ambiguity is plausibly what misled Russell. Russell thought that
the Tractatus aims to describe a logically perfect language (see Russell's
introduction to TLP). This reading is quite correct if a language is a notational
convention, indeed Wittgenstein develops a notational convention in theTractatus. It is absolutely wrong if language is understood as the totality ofthoughts (see also WC, 98).
Frege could very well agree that language is in perfect logical order if language
is understood as the totality of what he called thoughts. Wittgenstein's
conception is intensionally different because he takes a semantic, rather thana syntactic approach to logic. But as to the impossibility of illogical thought,
they agree. Logical errors, for Frege, result from psychological limitations,

Daniele Garancini, "Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus | Daniele Garancini

which he strives to eliminate by developing his concept script. If we could
ideally see all syntactic consequences of any given sentence, we would nevermake mistakes in logic. Having unintendedly postulated soundness andcompleteness results, Wittgenstein's view coincides with this.
Let us consider now how Wittgenstein intended to bridge the ideal
impossibility of logical mistakes with the justification of logic. Here is one
reasoning that Wittgenstein could have advanced: he could have pointed outthat since logical mistakes are ideally impossible, the world must obey the lawsof logic because otherwise, our epistemic standpoint would lose its ground. We
must believe tautologies. Therefore, if there were any false tautologies, we
could not possibly find them. That is, if tautologies were false, we have no way
of finding it out, not even ideally. This is a skeptical scenario in which theworld has a certain feature that we are bound to believe it lacks. If
Wittgenstein rejects this scenario, his view that logical mistakes are impossible
entails that tautologies are true.
I argue elsewhere that Kant and Frege proposed an argument along this line.
This move is available for Wittgenstein as well. Indeed, he wrote: "scepticism is
not irrefutable but obviously nonsensical" (6.51). However, he does not seem tohave linked this with the justification of logic. The proposition where
Wittgenstein bridges the limits of language with the structure of the world is
this:
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world (5.6)
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits (5.61)
It is a complex exegetical problem, one that I do not tackle here, to evaluate
Wittgenstein's notes about solipsism. It suffices to say that 5.6 and the remarks
about it are the propositions most clearly stating that the gap between
inconceivability and justification can be filled. Thus, whatever view
Wittgenstein was advancing there, that was his main reason to bridge logic
and reality. Hacker (1986) argues that here Wittgenstein was influenced by
Schopenhauer. If this is correct, then although Wittgenstein's view on the
epistemology of logic has much in common with Kant's and Frege's, ultimately,
they appeal to radically different devices. Kant and Frege reject skepticism
because it is a scientific non-starter: if we are to do science, we need to224

Daniele Garancini, "Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus | Daniele Garancini

presuppose that, at least ideally, humans can obtain knowledge. Wittgenstein
appeals to Schopenhauer's notion of a non-psychological "metaphysicalsubject" that constitutes the limits of the world by representing it.

References
Anscombe, Elisabeth G.M. (1959) An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. London: St.
Augustine's Press.
Conant, James (1992) “The Search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and theTractatus.” Philosophical Topics 20(1), 115-180.
Diamond, Cora (1991) The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Frege, Glottlob (1892) “Sense and Reference” In Translations from the Philosophical Writings of
Glottob Frege. London: Blackwell. 1960
Frege, Glottlob (1906) “17 Key Sentences on Logic” In Glottlob Frege, Posthumous Writings.
Oxford: Blackwell. 1979.
Frege, Glottlob (1879) “Conceptual Notation” in Conceptual Notation and Related Articles.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press. 1972
Hacker, Peter. M. S. (1986) Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein .
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hacker, Peter. M. S. (2021) “Introduction to this edition” in TLP 2021.
Russell, Bertrand and Whitehead, Alfred North (1910) Principia Mathematica I. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Stern, David G. (2006) “How Many Wittgensteins?” In Alois Pichler and Simo Säätelä (eds.),
Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. NB (1961) Notebooks 1914-1916. Edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M.
Anscombe. With an English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig WC (2008): Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911-1951.
McGuinness Brian (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell,.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig TLP (2021): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Centenary edition. Bazzocchi(eds.). London: Anthem Press.

Daniele Garancini, "Tautologies and Theorems in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein | Manuel Gerether

Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein
Manuel Gerether (Wiener Neustadt, Austria)
Abstract
Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie bricht mit der traditionellen Vorstellung von Sprache undPhilosophie: Typische philosophische Probleme resultieren aus grammatischen
Missverständnissen. Diese Arbeit zeigt, wie Wittgenstein dabei methodisch vorgeht und wie
philosophische Probleme als Rätsel bei Wittgenstein charakterisiert sind. Ferner stellt sich die
Frage, was es bedeutet, sich innerhalb der Grenze des Denkens zu bewegen und diese alssolche wahrzunehmen. Die zentrale These ist dabei, dass Wittgensteins Einsicht in das
Funktionieren der Sprache und das Auflösen philosophischer Rätsel keineswegs rein
destruktiv ist, sondern eine neue Perspektive auf die Welt bietet. Diese Philosophie zeigt
einerseits einen neuen Weg zur Überwindung philosophischer Probleme und bleibt
andererseits dabei höchst bescheiden: Sind die Probleme überwunden und der Nebel der
Verwirrung gelichtet, wird Raum für andere Perspektiven und Betrachtungsweisengeschaffen. Die Welt bleibt weiterhin greifbar für Kultur, Literatur und Kunst, ganz ohne
sprachlich-philosophische Verwirrungen. Die Philosophie Wittgensteins schafft damit Raumund Möglichkeiten für einen breiteren kulturellen Diskurs.

1. Sprachspiel und Bedeutung

Bereits zu Beginn in Philosophische Untersuchungen kritisiert Wittgenstein das
traditionelle Bild der Sprache und deutet an, dass der Verstehensprozess vonsprachlicher Bedeutung oft von einem Nebel umgeben ist, einer Art
geheimnisvollen abstrakten Entität, die eine vermeintliche Erklärung fürdieses Phänomen liefern soll (vgl. PU §5). In dieser Arbeit soll gezeigt werden,
dass diese Kritik weniger zerstörerisch ist, sondern vielmehr eine neue
Perspektive anbietet.
Wittgenstein führt zunächst den Begriff des 'Sprachspiels' ein, welcher den
gesamten sozialen Handlungsablauf in der Sprache, einschließlich der
Wortverwendung, regelt. Die Wörter der Sprache werden dabei inverschiedenen Situationen im Gebrauch unterschiedlich gelernt und haben
ihre Bedeutung nicht nur deshalb, weil sie etwas bezeichnen. Vielmehr sinddie Wörter unserer Sprache wie Werkzeuge in einem konkreten
Anwendungsfall oder wie eine Schachfigur im Schachspiel zu verstehen. (Vgl.
PU §§7-17.)

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Manuel Gerether, "Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein | Manuel Gerether

Das Sprachspiel kann dabei nicht scharf abgegrenzt werden und umfasst nicht
nur Wörter (und ihren Gebrauch), sondern sämtliche damit verbundenensozialen Handlungsabläufe und Tätigkeiten wie das Befehlen, Bitten,
Hypothesen aufstellen usw. (vgl. PU §23).
Hierbei werden von Wittgenstein auch absolute Definitionen von Begriffen
kritisiert. Definitionen dienen als Hinweis für einen Wortgebrauch, welche nie
frei von Mehrfachdeutungen und nie absolute Erklärungen sind (vgl. PU §29).
Um ein Wort sinnvoll in einem Kontext verwenden zu können, muss bereits
Wissen gegeben sein (vgl. PU §30-31). Die Benennung ist dabei völlig
willkürlich und spielt eine unterstützende Rolle im Sprachspiel. Beim
Zusammenspiel aus Benennen, Zeigen und (konzeptuellen) Erfassen vonDingen, wie z.B. einer Schachfigur, überlappen sich kognitive Prozesse, undwir vermuten eine geistige Entität oder ein Abbild der Dinge (vgl. PU §36). Die
suggerierte Verbindung zwischen Wort und Gegenstand, die über einenkontextuellen Gebrauch der Wörter hinaus geht, führt oft zu einem
philosophischen Problem, wenn der Zusammenhang zwischen Sprache undPraxis übersehen wird: "Denn die philosophischen Probleme entstehen, wenn
die Sprache feiert." (PU §38) Mit Feiern sei gemeint, dass Wörter (und ihre
Bedeutung) sich meist aus ihrem Gebrauch, ihrem geregelten sozialen Kontext(eben dem Sprachspiel), entfernen, denn für viele Fälle gilt: "Die Bedeutungeines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache." (PU §43) Die in der Praxis
funktionierenden Sprachspiele werden durch unterschiedliche erlernbare
Regeln ermöglicht (vgl. PU §53-54).
Nach Wittgenstein haben dabei Sprachspiele keine allgemeine Wesenheit,
sondern sind untereinander verwandt und weisen Ähnlichkeiten auf.
Wittgenstein erläutert hier seinen Begriff der Familienähnlichkeit, da
Sprachspiele untereinander Ähnlichkeiten besitzen wie die Mitglieder einer
Familie. So gibt es auch zwischen verschiedenen Spielen (Brettspiele,
Kartenspiele usw.) Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede. Auch die exakte
Definition eines Spiels ist weder völlig abgeschlossen noch explizit zu nennen –die Grenze des Begriffs wird dabei von uns gezogen. (Vgl. PU §§65-69.)
Unsere Sprache ist dabei von Unschärfe geprägt, so gibt es auch z.B.
unterschiedliche Bedeutungen und Sprachspiele über das Wort 'gut' (vgl. PU§77). Selbst die Logik (d.h. Regelanwendung) sowie unser Denken ist kein

Manuel Gerether, "Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Kalkül, sondern die Regeln der Sprache kommen von uns – sie sind kontingent,veränderbar, willkürlich (vgl. PU §§81-83). Dabei müssen die Regeln nicht
vollständig oder über einen (pragmatischen) Zweifel erhaben sein (vgl. PU§§84-85). Auch bei der Erklärung von Regeln für Sprachspiele stoßen wir an
Grenzen; diese kommen irgendwann an ein Ende, aber dienen dazu,
Missverständnisse zu vermeiden (vgl. PU §87). Eine finale Rechtfertigung desRegelfolgens scheint es nicht zu geben: "Wenn ich der Regel folge, wähle ichnicht. Ich folge der Regel blind." (PU §219) Ähnlich formuliert Wittgenstein inÜber Gewißheit, dass es scheinbar kein Fundament des Wissens gibt und eineallgemeine Rechtfertigung unserer Glaubenssätze nicht möglich ist: "Am
Grunde des begründeten Glaubens liegt der unbegründete Glaube." (ÜG §253)
Wittgenstein zufolge verführen uns die Wörter unserer Sprache dazu, Tiefe zu
vermuten, wo keine ist, wie am Beispiel der Logik (vgl. PU §89). Wittgensteins
Methodik handelt aber nicht von tiefgehenden, exakten Erklärungen, sondern
von der schlichten Untersuchung grammatischer Missverständnisse (vgl. PU§90). Ein Exaktheitsideal, wie in der Logik, ist dabei trügerisch, denn die
Sprache funktioniert ebenso mit Vagheiten (vgl. PU §§100-101). Das Ideal ist
allerdings fest in uns verankert: "Die Idee sitzt gleichsam als Brille auf unsrer
Nase, und was wir ansehen, sehen wir durch sie." (PU §103) Wittgensteinbekämpft somit das Vorurteil der all-erklärenden Logik: Eine ideale Sprache
und ihre (logische) Analyse führt zu einer Scheinanalyse und die Sprache desAlltags muss in das Zentrum der Untersuchung rücken (vgl. PU §§105-107).
Damit wehrt sich Wittgenstein gegen eine allumfassende Erklärung und einer
Hypothesenaufstellung seiner Philosophie: "Alle Erklärung muß fort, und nur
Beschreibung an ihre Stelle treten." (PU §109) Philosophische Probleme
werden dadurch gelöst, indem man sich klar macht, wie diese in der Sprache
entstehen: "Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unsres
Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache." (PU §109) Die philosophischen
Probleme sind dabei tief in unserer Vorstellung von Sprache verankert (vgl. PU
111). Eine Lösung gegen eine idealisierte, metaphysische Vorstellung ist, diemetaphysischen Begriffe auf ihre alltägliche, ursprüngliche Verwendung
zurückzuführen (vgl. PU §116). So werden metaphysische Luftgebäude
eingerissen, die von der Sprache erzeugt werden (vgl. PU §118). Wittgenstein

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Manuel Gerether, "Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein | Manuel Gerether

bezeichnet seine Entdeckung als die eines 'Unsinns', die sich an den Beulen
zeigt, "die sich der Verstand beim Anrennen an die Grenze der Sprache geholt
hat." (PU §119)
Nach dieser Darstellung der sprachphilosophischen Methodik Wittgensteinswerde ich im Folgenden näher darauf eingehen, was ein philosophisches
Problem ist.

2. Was ist ein philosophisches Problem?

Aus dem vorherigen Kapitel geht hervor, dass Wittgenstein keine einheitliche
Definition philosophischer Probleme zulässt. In Philosophische Untersuchungenbezeichnet Wittgenstein ein philosophisches Problem so: "Ein philosophisches
Problem hat die Form: 'Ich kenne mich nicht aus.'" (PU §123) Nach Edmonds
und Eidinow sind philosophische Fragen bei Wittgenstein demnach "keine
Probleme, sondern Rätsel." (Edmonds & Eidinow 2003, 209)
Wittgenstein behandelt in seinen Werken eine ganze Reihe unterschiedlicher
philosophischer Fragestellungen, wie die Frage, ob etwas gleichzeitig ganz rot
und grün sein kann oder ob ich wissen kann, dass ich Schmerzen habe (vgl.
Edmonds & Eidinow 2003, 209). Für Wittgenstein standen diese Rätsel
allerdings im Bann der Sprache und sind nur durch ein grammatisches
Missverständnis hervorgerufen, welches durch das Bewusstwerden ihres
Entstehens wieder aufgelöst werden konnten (vgl. Edmonds & Eidinow 2003,
209).
Ein philosophisches Problem oder Rätsel lässt sich so weder exakt definieren
noch scharf abgrenzen. Man könnte ähnlich wie bei einem Spiel selbst das
Konzept der Familienähnlichkeit auf philosophische Probleme anwenden, um
diese als solche zu begreifen. Jedoch gäbe es hier eine Gemeinsamkeit: FürWittgenstein sind sie sprachliche Verwirrungen. Ob diese mit
Familienähnlichkeiten erklärt werden können, bleibt offen. Wittgensteinvertrat jedenfalls nach Popper in deren berühmten Streitgespräch die
Meinung, dass es keine 'wirklichen' philosophischen Probleme gibt, die nicht
auf einem sprachlichen Missverständnis beruhen (vgl. Edmonds & Eidinow
2003, 212). Wittgensteins Lösung gleicht einer Therapie: Man "behandelt eine
Frage; wie eine Krankheit." (PU §255)

Manuel Gerether, "Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Bereits in The Big Typescript merkt er an, dass die (grammatischen) Probleme
tief in uns sitzen und unsere Art, mit ihnen konzeptuell zu denken, zu einer
festen Gewohnheit geworden sind, weshalb sie schwer zu bekämpfen sind (vgl.
BS 90, 423). Wittgenstein geht es dabei um eine Ordnung in unserem
sprachlichen Geflecht; eine Übersicht zu schaffen über den tatsächlichen
Gebrauch der Sprache, anstatt im 'Nebel' der Sprache, d.h. in künstlicherzeugten Entitäten umherzuwandern und eine (sprachlich-logische) Regel zur
Beantwortung einer philosophischen Frage darzulegen (vgl. BS 89, 416-417).
Damit bricht Wittgenstein mit der analytischen Tradition, welche er selbst
noch im Tractatus logico-philosophicus vertrat und stellt nicht mehr die Logik
als Sinnkriterium für sinnvolle Sätze ins Zentrum (vgl. Edmonds & Eidinow
2003, 205f). Was jedoch fortgeführt wird, ist eine Grenze des Denkens: "DieGrenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt." (TLP 5.6) Diese
Grenze unterscheidet sich zwar von jener seiner Spätphilosophie, jedoch ist
das Bestehen darauf, dass unser Denken Grenzen hat, für seine Sichtweise
essenziell.

3. Die Grenze des Denkens

Wittgensteins Grenze des Denkens kann man sich vorstellen, als wandere manin einem sprachlichen Labyrinth und anstelle sich eine bessere Übersicht überdas Labyrinth zu machen und das Rätsel aufzulösen, rennt man mit dem Kopf
ständig gegen eine vermeintliche Mauer und holt sich so 'Beulen', wie
Wittgenstein es ausdrückt. Weiters kann man sich vorstellen, dass dieses
Labyrinth von einem Nebel durchzogen ist, der von der Sprache erzeugt wird:
Es fehlt jegliche Orientierung. Doch neben dem Nebel, also der sprachlicherzeugten Unübersichtlichkeit, sitzen wir einem weiteren Vorurteil auf: Wir
betrachten unsere Umgebung durch eine Brille aus Vorurteilen, um einen
Ausgang zu finden und mögliche Lösungswege zu konstruieren; um(vermeintlich) klarer sehen zu können. Es muss dort und dort ein Weg sein,
wo nach Wittgenstein keiner ist. Durch diese Metapher soll hervorgehoben
werden, dass sich Wittgenstein nun (i) gegen ein solches Exaktheitsideal der
Logik, welches man mit der analytischen Tradition vergleichen kann, wehrt(die Brille), (ii) die Sprache und unser Denken eine natürliche Grenze haben(die Ränder des Labyrinths) und (iii) wir den Gebrauch unserer Wörter im
Nebel der Sprache übersehen (vgl. PU §122).

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Manuel Gerether, "Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein | Manuel Gerether

Beim Philosophieren ist die Gefahr des Verlaufens dabei generell groß: "Werphilosophiert, verliert den Weg leicht, indem er sich durch die Sprache
irreführen läßt." (Schulte 1989, 134) Wittgensteins Metaphorik umschreibt diesnoch radikaler: Für Wittgenstein lassen wir uns von der Sprache verhexen,
wogegen sich zu wehren ist (vgl. PU §109) Anstatt eines Labyrinths vergleicht
Wittgenstein unser Dasein als Gefangene in einem Fliegenglas: "Was ist dein
Ziel in der Philosophie? – Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas
zeigen." (PU §309) Dies bedeutet vom Bann der philosophischen Probleme
gelöst zu sein. Die Übersicht über das sprachliche Labyrinth stellt hierbei
allerdings keine Semantiktheorie dar.
Nach Wittgenstein sind wir in die Grammatik, menschliche Praxis und insprachliche Konzepte hineingeboren, durch die wir die Welt wahrnehmen; die
Natur selbst ist nicht begrifflich strukturiert, da die Begriffe und Struktur von
uns stammen (vgl. Moyal-Sharrock, 219). Wie ist jedoch der Zusammenhangzwischen unserem Denken und der Welt geklärt? Während Kants
transzendentaler Idealismus erklärt, dass wir die Welt in idealisierter Form in
unserem Denken durch gewisse Kategorien wahrnehmen (und damit die
Beziehung zur äußeren Welt erklärt), geht Wittgenstein Jonathan Lear zufolgeähnlich vor: Die sozialen und kulturellen Bedingungen des Denkens stehen im
Vordergrund (vgl. Lear 1984, 240). Ist unsere Grammatik selbst dabei die
Grenze der Sprache? Ist sie ähnlich einer Kategorie bei Kant? Wittgensteinwürde dies nach Simon Blackburn nicht so streng sehen, da unsere Grammatik
und begriffliche Konzepte (und Regeln) kontingent sind (vgl. Blackburn 2004,
247). Blackburn unterstreicht stattdessen die Vielfalt der aus praktischen
Handlungen entstandenen Konzepte, wobei kein Konzept dem anderen
rational vorzuziehen ist (vgl. Blackburn 2004, 256).
Ist Wittgenstein damit ein Relativist? Ein Therapeut? Oder doch bloßPragmatiker? Und was bedeutet dies für unsere Grenze der Sprache und desDenkens? Denn unsere verschiedenen Sprachspiele schaffen bzw. formen
unsere Welt, die wir vorfinden. Unabhängig davon ist kein Denken möglich,auch nicht darüber hinaus. Gerade wenn wir philosophieren, kommen wir
zwangsläufig mit der Grenze in Berührung. Egal, ob wir nun gegen dieseGrenze rennen oder im Nebel wandern oder uns durch angeschlagene

Manuel Gerether, "Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein | Manuel Gerether

Brillengläser vorwärtsirren – für Wittgenstein ist die Sprache ein gigantisches
Netzwerk unscharfer Begriffe, etwas Lebendiges, sich stets Veränderndes und
wir ein elementarer Teil davon. Raus aus der Sprache können wir nicht.

4. Was bleibt von der Philosophie?

Wittgenstein lehnt eine einzige Methodik der Philosophie klar ab und spricht
sich gegen ein Dogma in der Philosophie aus, eine philosophische Theorie zur
Erklärung der Phänomene formulieren zu müssen. Dabei betrachtet
Wittgenstein scheinbar die gesamte Philosophie als Problem, das überwunden
bzw. therapeutisch behandelt wird. Der neue Zweck seiner Philosophie ist
nicht das Aufstellen von tieferen Erklärungen oder irgendwelchen
Schlussfolgerungen, sondern eine sprachliche Ordnung wiederzuentdecken
und die philosophischen Beulen zu behandeln. (Vgl. PU §§122-133.)
Ist damit Wittgensteins Philosophie so destruktiv wie sein Ruf es beschreibt?
Wittgenstein geht es hier nicht um eine vollständige Zerstörung der
traditionellen Philosophie, sondern um eine Neubetrachtung, eine
Reformation, die auch vieles offen lässt. Wittgenstein möchte vermeiden, dasswir weiter im Nebel wandern, und zerstört bloß konstruierte Scheinprobleme:"Aber es sind nur Luftgebäude, die wir zerstören, und wir legen den Grund derSprache frei, auf dem sie standen." (PU §118). Wittgenstein war überzeugt,
dass die meisten philosophischen Probleme bloß sprachliche Rätsel sind,jedoch war seine Philosophie wie auch er selbst dabei bescheiden: "Es gibt
Probleme, an die ich nie herankomme, die nicht in meiner Linie oder inmeiner Welt liegen. Probleme der abendländischen Gedankenwelt, an die
Beethoven (und vielleicht teilweise Goethe) herangekommen ist" (VB 1984,462). Wittgenstein lässt so Raum für die Kunst und andere Probleme, sobald
der Nebel gelichtet ist: "[S]o habe ich eine amorphe (durchsichtige) Masse
geschaffen, und die Welt mit ihrer ganzen Vielfältigkeit bleibt, wie eine
uninteressante Gerümpelkammer, links liegen." (VB 1984, 462f)
Die Philosophie Wittgensteins ermöglicht den Zugang zu anderen
Betrachtungsweisen. Die amorphe Masse bleibt offen für Literatur, Kunst und
Kultur, die auch den Nebel tatsächlich als Nebel wahrnehmen.

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after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein | Manuel Gerether

Hier zeigen sich Parallelen zu einem Philosophen, mit dem Wittgensteinzunächst keine Berührungspunkte hat: Albert Camus. Dieser unterscheidet in
Der Mythos des Sisyphos zwischen einem erklärenden Thesenroman und dem(absurden) Kunstwerk, welches mannigfaltige Erfahrungen hervorbringt (vgl.
Camus 2014, 136-137). Die Kunst erschafft hierbei Neues und ist an
Beschreibungen der Welt interessiert, anstatt sich in einem festen System zu
bewegen (vgl. Camus 2014, 113-117). Sie kümmert sich um Klarheit, aber
begrenzt auch die Welt, die sie schafft und wird zu einer unausgesprochenen
Philosophie, die sich um die Darstellung der Wirklichkeit bemüht (vgl. Camus
2014, 119-121). Wie Wittgenstein zieht Camus Beschreibungen der Welt
gegenüber Erklärungen vor. Sind die abstrakten Probleme der Philosophieüberwunden, setzt die Kunst ein, die sich in einer gleichgültigen Welt entfaltet.
Kunstschaffende müssen demnach "dem Leeren seine Farben geben." (Camus
2014, 134)
Die Philosophie Wittgensteins bemüht sich ebenso um Klarheit. Damit zeigt
dieser eine neue Perspektive auf die Welt und löst philosophische Rätsel auf,
die ihre Ursachen in grammatischen Missverständnissen haben. Jedoch lässt er
auch Raum für andere Betrachtungsweisen. Dies heißt, alte Gewohnheiten undVorurteile des von der Sprache verhexten Verstandes zu brechen und den
Nebel zu lichten – der Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas.
References
Blackburn, Simon (2004): "Relativism and the Abolition of the Other", in: International Journalof Philosophical Studies 12 (3), 245-258.
Camus, Albert (2014): Der Mythos des Sisyphos. 19. Aufl. Reinbek: Rowohlt.
Edmonds, David J.; Eidinow, John A. (2003): Wie Ludwig Wittgenstein Karl Popper mit dem
Feuerhaken drohte. Eine Ermittlung. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch.
Lear, Jonathan (1984): "The Disappearing 'We'", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,Suppl. Vol 58, 219-242.
Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle (2017): "Fighting Relativism: Wittgenstein and Kuhn", in: Realism –Relativism – Constructivism. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 215-232.
Schulte, Joachim (1989): Wittgenstein. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart: Reclam.

Manuel Gerether, "Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein | Manuel Gerether

Acknowledgement
Ich danke Herrn David Wagner dafür, dass er mich zur Einreichung dieser Arbeit motiviert hat.
Ebenfalls danke ich meinen anderen Lehrpersonen sowie meinen Mitstudierenden am Institut für
Philosophie an der Universität Wien für zahlreiche Einsichten. Auch danke ich Herrn Kurt Wischin
für viele erhellende philosophische Gespräche über Wittgenstein.

234

Manuel Gerether, "Der Nebel der Sprache und die Grenze des Denkens bei Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus | Jakub Gomułka

The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus
Jakub Gomułka (Krakow, Poland)
Abstract
The Wittgenstein Ontology is a project initiated in 2006 by the Wittgenstein Archives inBergen (WAB). It currently organises knowledge about over fifty thousand separate remarksthat appear both in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and his published works, as well as about otherWittgenstein resources such as his correspondence. The up-to-date base contains, for example,
information about the date of a Nachlass remark, whether it refers to a particular person, or
contains a drawing; it also relates a remark with all the volumes which include anotherversion of that remark. However, the aspirations of the contributors to the project have beenmuch more far-reaching and embraced modelling the philosophical content of Wittgenstein’s
writings. I propose to implement theoretical solutions offered by researchers associated with
the WAB, especially the idea of representing different perspectives, by means of thereification mechanism permitted by the RDF syntax. According to my approach, there arethree layers of the representation of philosophical content: textual, propositional, and subpropositional. The textual layer is simply a structured collection of Wittgenstein’s papers andpublications. The propositional —or logical—layer should represent philosophical claims thatshould be related to both the textual and sub-propositional layers via their relations tosentences and STATEMENT instances, respectively. The sub-propositional—or structural—
layer should generally consist of structures of concepts represented via the syntax ofreification. In my paper, I focus on the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and demonstrate how
the representation of its content can be created.

This paper is my second report on my contribution to the development of the
Wittgenstein Ontology, a project initiated in 2006 by the Wittgenstein Archives
in Bergen (WAB). I delivered the first report at the 43rd International
Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg (2022). At that time, I presented an
attempt to solve some of the problems related to representing the section of
the Tractatus devoted to mathematics. The results of the work that has been
continued since then will be presented in my three publications alreadyaccepted for printing (Gomułka forthc. a; forthc. b; forthc. c). I see mycontribution primarily as an implementation and follow-up to the proposals
formulated by researchers associated with the WAB (Zöllner-Weber, Pichler
2007; Mácha et al. 2013; Pichler, Zöllner-Weber 2013; Addis et al. 2015; Pichler
et al. 2021). Here, I present a further development and a certain correction of
my earlier ideas, as well as a set of techniques that can bring about the actual
construction of the knowledge base covering early Wittgenstein’s
philosophical concepts. In other words, I try to demonstrate how to complete
the knowledge base for the full content of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

Jakub Gomułka, "The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Wittgenstein Ontology project

The computational ontology devoted to Wittgenstein being developed by the
WAB currently organises knowledge about over fifty thousand separate
remarks that appear both in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and his published works,
as well as about other Wittgenstein resources such as his correspondence. The
working part of the knowledge base is available via a comprehensive interface
under the web address https://wab.uib.no/sfb/. The up-to-date base can be
downloaded as a large 64MB file in OWL format from the address: http://
wab.uib.no/cost-a32_philospace/wittgenstein.owl.
The knowledge base contains, for example, information about the date of aNachlass remark, whether it refers to a particular person, or contains adrawing; it also relates a remark with all the volumes which include anotherversion of that remark. However, the aspirations of the project’s authors havebeen much more far-reaching, as revealed in their publications. For example,
in their 2007 text Pichler and Zöllner-Weber write that their goal is "toinvestigate to what extent it is possible to model the content of a philosophicaltext such as Wittgenstein’s Tractatus using a formal ontology language, as wellas to test subsequent computational applications" (Zöllner-Weber, Pichler
2007: 249). The authors notice that although this task may seem simple at firstglance due to the fact that Wittgenstein’s early philosophy concerns a domainthat can be relatively easily categorised into classes, subclasses, and properties,
and the Tractatus itself appears to have a clear hierarchical structure, theattempt to create an ontology for the content of this work has revealed that thetask is not so simple after all. In their subsequent article (Pichler, ZöllnerWeber 2013), both scholars argue that their ontology must be based onelements related to fragments of documents from the Nachlass that are madeavailable by the WAB. It must therefore be object-oriented, not event-oriented.
The article describes a fragment of the ontology for the emerging knowledge
base of Wittgenstein’s philosophy by enumerating the family of the SUBJECT
class. It is to comprise the subclasses: ISSUE, PERSPECTIVE, POINT, and FIELD,
where FIELD gathers sub-disciplines and areas of interest like "philosophy oflanguage"; ISSUE groups such notions as "logical independence", "atomic
proposition", "state of affairs", etc.; POINT encompasses simple philosophicaltheses; and PERSPECTIVE is introduced to deal with the fact that Wittgenstein’s

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Jakub Gomułka, "The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus | Jakub Gomułka

views are inconsistent and underwent changes (Pichler, Zöllner-Weber 2013:
702–704).
Another 2013 paper by authors associated with the WAB discusses in detail,although only theoretically, the problem of incompatibility between different
possible representations of knowledge in the humanities. Thus, the authors
justify the need for a mechanism that can take into account various
perspectives in a representation of knowledge, and so they broaden thepossible employment of the PERSPECTIVE class (Mácha et al. 2013).
At the time of writing, the latest publication by researchers associated with the
WAB (Pichler et al. 2021) is a summary of the current state of the project andits goals. The authors indicate that modelling a representation of knowledge inthe humanities encounters serious difficulties. They suggest that in order todevelop such a representation, we need to take into account "dynamic
concepts, non-shared conceptualisation, knowledge about knowledge,
competing claims, contested arguments and ongoing debate" (Pichler et al.
2021: 65). Therefore, they propose a revision of the idea of computational
ontology and call for new approaches to ontology design (ibid.). However, thepaper concludes with an ascertainment that the authors do not yet have adetailed outline of the proposed new ideas for a formalised computational
ontology (ibid.: 71).
It should also be mentioned that in their recent reports the WAB scholars tend
to use different names for the two SUBJECT subclasses: instead of ISSUE andPOINT, they discuss CONCEPT and CLAIM, respectively. From now on, I will
use the latter names because I believe they are more accurate.

The proposed construction of the knowledge baseIn all three of my forthcoming texts mentioned above, I propose to implement
the ideas of researchers associated with the WAB by means of the reification
mechanism permitted by the RDF syntax. RDF is a key component of the
Semantic Web technology. It is a formal language, a way to describe andrepresent knowledge on the Internet so that computers can make use of it
unsupervised by humans. It does this by breaking down knowledge into small
units – called triples – that define a relationship between a subject, a predicate,

Jakub Gomułka, "The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus | Jakub Gomułka

and an object. These triples can then be combined to form larger information
structures, the so-called named graphs, which can be made available online topeople and machines. I also suggest attributing instances of the CLAIM classwith reified structures created from instances of the CONCEPT class. According
to this approach, there are three layers of the representation of philosophicalcontent: textual, propositional, and sub-propositional. The textual layer issimply a structured collection of Wittgenstein’s papers and publications. It has
itself a three-level order divided into volumes ("Tractatus logicophilosophicus", "Ms-104", etc.), remarks ("Tractatus logico-philosophicus 2.022","Ts-208,37r[3]", etc.), and sentences ("Tractatus logico-philosophicus 2.022[1]","Ts-208,37r[3][1]", etc.). The WAB knowledge base does not yet provide the lastlevel; it only includes the subclass SENTENCE which has no instances(however, they can be easily generated – see below). Notice that the instancesof the textual layer do not belong to the SUBJECT branch but the SOURCE
branch of the project’s class hierarchy. In addition to SENTENCE, the latter also
includes the NACHLASS BEMERKUNG, PART, MS, TS, and WERK subclasses.
The propositional – or logical – layer should consist of instances of the CLAIM
class related to both the textual and sub-propositional layers via their relations
to sentences and structures of concepts, respectively. The claims themselves
can and should be linked with each other by such logical relations as "entails","presupposes", "suggests", etc. Notice that the mapping of claims on sentences
is not one-to-one but many-to-many. On the one hand, there can be a textual
sentence that comprises more than just one claim; for instance, TLP 1.1 "Die
Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge" can be logicallydivided into two claims: the one states that the world is the totality of facts
while the other says that the world is not the totality of things. On the other
hand, there can be a claim that is related to more than just one sentence; forinstance, the clam that mathematics is a kind of a logical method can be
attributed both to the first sentence of TLP 6.2 "Die Mathematik ist eine
logische Methode" and to the first (and only) sentence of TLP 6.234 "DieMathematik ist eine Methode der Logik"; indeed, we can assume that thedifference between the two sentences is only superficial.
The sub-propositional – or structural – layer should generally consist of
instances of the STATEMENT class that is a built-in feature of the RDF syntax
and provides the means for the mechanism of reification. It should be

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Jakub Gomułka, "The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus | Jakub Gomułka

attributed with three standard properties: Subject, Predicate, and Object,
whose values are constitutive elements of a simple propositional structure;that is, an RDF triple. For instance, if we want to build a sub-propositional
representation for the claim that mathematics is a kind of a logical method, we
can create a STATEMENT instance whose Subject property is"Mathematics" (an instance of the CONCEPT class); Predicate property is "is akind of" (a property itself); and Object is "Logical method" (another instance of
the CONCEPT class).
More complicated structures of claims are also possible. For example, the only
sentence of TLP 6.001 says that "Dies sagt nichts anderes, als dass jeder Satz ein
Resultat der successiven Anwendung der Operation N (‾ξ) auf die
Elementarsätze ist". This sentence contains a subordinate clause, so unlike the
TLP 1.1, it cannot be divided into two claims but rather its logical counterpart
is a single claim that has a complex grammatical structure. Its main clause isrepresented by a STATEMENT instance whose Subject property is the formal
expression "[‾p, ‾ξ, N(‾ξ)]" (this is the anaphoric reference of the pronoun"dies" in the sentence); Predicate is the property "says"; and Object is another
STATEMENT instance whose Subject property is the concept "Proposition";
Predicate is the property "is explicated as"; and Object is the concept "Result of
successive application to elementary propositions of the operation N(‾ξ)".
(Actually, the subordinate clause is also directly affirmed by 6.001, so weshould have a second claim that is attached to this sentence: a subpropositional counterpart of the claim should be the latter STATEMENT
instance.) Other, more complex structures, are discussed in Gomułka forthc. c.
Obviously, there should be relations that are obtained between concepts; forinstance, the concept "Result of successive application…" is complex andshould be attributed with the property "contains" with a couple of values as"Operation N(‾ξ)", "Successive application", and so on.
Fully adequate models of claims’ structures require a new kind of subpropositional elements, and so a new class that would be a sibling of CONCEPTand CLAIM. I call it FORMULA. Its instances are all logical or mathematicalexpressions, schemes, and tables that can be built by means of LaTeX syntax.
Formerly, I called the proposed class SYMBOL (cf. Gomułka forthc. a), but thename was both too specific and confusing, particularly in the context of theTractatus. The need of the FORMULA class arises from the fact that equations

Jakub Gomułka, "The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus | Jakub Gomułka(cf. TLP 6.02), expressions of the quantificational logic (cf. TLP 5.531–5.534),
and tables (cf. TLP 4.31) obviously belong to the philosophical content of theTractatus, but they clearly cannot be regarded as concepts (though they canoccur in conceptual structures). The aforementioned TLP 6 formal expression"[‾p, ‾ξ, N(‾ξ)]" should also be an instance of the FORMULA class.
In my papers (Gomułka forthc. a; forthc. c) I propose two additional extensions
to the Wittgenstein Ontology class hierarchy: RULESET and CLAUSE. Currently,
I do not think that the latter that were to represent conceptual parts of claims
that have no assertion, is necessary: we can simply use STATEMENT instancesthat are values of other STATEMENT instances' properties, as has been
demonstrated above. In turn, RULESET can provide a useful mechanism forutilising sub-propositional structures stored in the knowledge base to build
inference rules for generating new information. A simple example could be
the use of the TLP 6.02 definitions (represented as FORMULA): they can beused to create a rule that, for any expression created according to the pattern"Ω’Ω’...Ω’x", will generate its counterpart; that is, "Ω0+1+1...+1’x".
The sub-propositional layer, which already seems very complicated, is actuallymuch more complex as we take into account perspectives. The latter are
unavoidable because modelling conceptual structures of natural-language
sentences is a form of translation and requires countless more or less arbitrary
decisions. In other words, a sub-propositional representation can only be
developed from the particular perspective of a particular scholar (or group ofscholars). Therefore, all the aforementioned relations between instances of
STATEMENT, CLAIM, CONCEPT, and FORMULA should be reified andattributed via further instances of STATEMENT to a particular instance of the
PERSPECTIVE class.

The questions of implementation and use

The complexity of the proposed structure of the knowledge base, especially its
third, sub-propositional layer, may give rise to questions regarding its
feasibility and usability. With regards to the first issue, it is clear that standard
ontology tools like Protégé are of no use here for the simple reason that they
do not support reification. Therefore, we are in need of new ontology editing

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Jakub Gomułka, "The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus | Jakub Gomułka

tools. Moreover, we could also consider using a set of scripts capable of parsing
the text of the Tractatus. Such scripts can utilise natural language processing
libraries like Python’s spaCy package that provides a robust support forGerman. With the aid of this tool, it is possible to readily isolate distinct
sentences. The package also enables automatic recognition of the role ofindividual words in a sentence. This, in turn, enables the extraction ofgrammatical subjects and objects – candidates for concepts – as well as verbs –candidates for properties. Therefore, it is possible, at least partially, toautomate the process of translating sentences from the Tractatus into RDF
triplets.
Regarding the second issue, as has been suggested in one of my upcoming
papers, we should need a kind of an overlay on the standard knowledge baseinterface that would, for instance, produce a "resurfaced" part of the base; that
is, a set of temporarily de-reified structures attributed to a single perspective(this would be an analogue of a view in relational databases). This would also
allow for more user-friendly perspective-oriented queries that would beinternally translated into standard queries given to our base (cf. Gomułka
forthc. a): it would be possible to choose a particular scholar's perspective andformulate a query as if the structures "immersed" in that perspective directly
occurred in the knowledge base.
The Wittgenstein Ontology has the potential to become a very useful tool forboth teaching and researching the ideas of the author of the Tractatus. It may
also become a platform for presenting, conducting, and in some cases perhaps
even resolving interpretative disputes. Completing this project requires
significant effort and the cooperation of many researchers. However,contemporary natural language processing systems allow for a significant
degree of automation of this job.
References
Addis, Mark; Brock, Steen; Pichler, Alois (2015) "Contributions to a Conceptual Ontology for
Wittgenstein", Wittgenstein-Studien, 6 (1), 257-275.
Gomułka, Jakub (forthc. a) "AI applied to philosophy: A contribution to the Wittgenstein
Ontology project", Ethos.
Gomułka, Jakub (forthc. b) "Technologia sieci semantycznej w zastosowaniu do humanistyki:
Przypadek Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego Wittgensteina", in: Adam Jonkisz, Jacek Poznański,Jakub Gomułka, "The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Wittgenstein Ontology: Representing the Tractatus | Jakub Gomułka

Jolanta Koszteyn (eds.) Zrozumieć nasze postrzeganie i pojmowanie człowieka i świata. Prace
dedykowane Profesorowi Józefowi Bremerowi SJ z okazji 70-lecia urodzin, Kraków: WAM.
Gomułka, Jakub (forthc. c) "Towards a Computational Ontology for the Philosophy of
Wittgenstein: Representing the Tractarian Philosophy of Mathematics", Analiza i Egzystencja.
Mácha, Jakub; Falch, Rune Jensen; Pichler, Alois (2013) "Overlapping and competing
ontologies", in: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Collaborative Annotations in
Shared Environment: Metadata, Vocabularies and Techniques in the Digital Humanities, 1-4.
Pichler, Alois; Fielding, James Matthew; Gangopadhyay, Nivedita; Opdahl, Andreas Lothe(2021) "Crisscross ontology: Mapping concept dynamics, competing argument andmultiperspectival knowledge in philosophy", Quaderni Di ‘Filosofia’, 2, 59-73.
Pichler, Alois; Zöllner-Weber, Amélie (2013) "Sharing and debating Wittgenstein by using an
ontology", Literary and Linguistic Computing, 28 (4), 700-707.
Zöllner-Weber, Amélie; Pichler, Alois (2007) "Utilizing OWL for Wittgenstein’s Tractatus", in
Herbert Hrachovec, Alois Pichler, Joseph Wang (eds.), Papers of the 30th International
Wittgenstein Symposium 5-11 August 2007. Philosophie der Informationsgesellschaft—Philosophy of the Information Society, ALWS, 249-254.

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Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach | Isabel Grábalos Palomino

Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach
Isabel Grábalos Palomino (Pamplona, Spain)
Abstract
It’s very contested whether there is one Wittgenstein or several of them based on the different
stages of his philosophical thoughts and publications. Considering both approaches, this paperargues that there was at least true unity in a deeply existential aspect of his thought: the need,precisely, for unity and coherence between philosophy and life. And that the footprint of thatexistential coherence was already set in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. A footprint that
follows seamlessly through and into the latest works of the author, thanks to the concepts of“telling” and “showing”, which Wittgenstein will never drop. More specifically, the text aims
to trace that connexion through an aesthetical enquiry, thanks to its restricted and practicalnature and its well-known relation to ethics. It will approach it both epistemologically andbiographically, by looking at practical instances of artistic endeavours in Wittgenstein’s lifeand how they show the coherence between his thought and his active choices. Aesthetics here
becomes a case study in a topic that is much larger than them, but that can be very
enlightened by an aesthetical approach.

1. Introduction

The coherence between life and philosophy troubled Ludwig Wittgensteinthroughout his life. This concern was directed mostly to his inner self, to his
intimate growth as a human, and only by proxy to the field of ethics. He
undertakes it with the seriousness of a man who knows that he is fighting forhis soul. But he very rarely adapted that personal fight into a comprehensive
reflection on ethics. The reason, as we will see later, is that he is not talking
about ethics per se as a discipline, but of the whole of philosophy which, forhim, is an ethical endeavour in itself.
Building on that, aesthetics might be seen as a particularly difficult field
regarding how little he wrote about it. But in a way, it makes for a privileged
field to convey a lot with very little and to skim to the basics by listening to theauthor himself, silence included.
But silence is the least empty in aesthetics because of its very active nature. In
theory, he usually approaches aesthetic questions in a casuistic way. But if one
takes a step back and looks at the whole picture, his philosophical ideas deeply
permeate his life and actions. They’re in his works of art, his philanthropicalchoices, his architecture or engineering.

Isabel Grábalos Palomino, "Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
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Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach | Isabel Grábalos Palomino

So, we will take the path of aesthetics, not to explain them, (that would be amuch longer work), but to let them be our guide until the actions can speak forthemselves.

2. Aesthetic Approach

When asked about Ludwig Wittgenstein's aesthetic theories, the short answer
is relatively simple: there are no systematic theories. Or at least, not any that
he personally put down in writing. But biographical elements and the projects
he undertook throughout his life, the various comments in his philosophicalworks, his diaries and many enthusiastic oral lessons, of which we only havethe notes of a few, indicate that he had some very specific ideas on the subject(cf. MAM, 1958 p.53 & LA, 1957).
Finding out what these ideas are, however, is in a certain sense anarchaeological task, partly of unearthing these comments and actions scatteredthroughout the various sources, partly of reconstruction, filling in the gaps
with the maximum philosophical and historical coherence possible.
For that, the distinction between the first and second Wittgenstein has great
hermeneutic value, apart from its academic tradition, and I will refer to it
constantly. However, I veer closer to those who defend the unity of
Wittgensteinian ideas.
That connection can be perceived more clearly in the context of non-scientificquestions. Aesthetics is a fundamental part of those because of its
communicative value. There is a central idea made explicit in the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus that will no longer be lost: the distinction between
saying and showing. If we follow that path, whatever comes after that is aprocess of clarification of an intuition present from the very first moment.
In a way, that is the underlying concept on Philosophy that bridges thedifferent stages of Wittgenstein’s work. And aesthetic happenstances are reallife examples of how that approach is not merely an intellectual musing but abounding life choice, even an ethically charged one.
It wouldn’t be a stretch to say that Wittgensteinian philosophy is shaped by thesearch for the conditions of possibility of knowledge. At the time of the244

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Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach | Isabel Grábalos Palomino

Tractatus, these conditions of possibility were the logical framework of what
one "can speak" about with propriety. In the second Wittgenstein, that place istaken by the language-games, which shape our relationship with the world.
But that search for knowledge is not neutral:[T]he point of view of the book is ethical (...) My work has two parts: thefirst is what I have written, and the second is unwritten. It is precisely thesecond part that is the most important. My book draws a limit for ethics
from the perspective treated, and I am convinced that it is the only way
with rigour.
Where, while many others have done nothing but pure charlatanism, I
have succeeded with my book to put things in their place in a firm way byasking for silence about them. (Luckhardt 1979, pp. 94-95)
Besides the reference to the unwritten, the primacy he gives to ethics as theguiding discipline of the content of his book sticks out. All interests of reason
make sense as long as they are, and because they are, ethical. That is, if they
can contribute to our living life more ethically, a life worth living. As he will
expand in his Lecture on Ethics many years later:
Now I am going to use the term Ethics in a slightly wider sense, in a sense
in fact which includes what I believe to be the most essential part of what
is generally called Aesthetics.
(…) the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important, or I
could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into whatmakes life worth living, or into the right way of living. (LE, 1993, p. 36)
Before moving forward, it would be fitting to introduce the well-known adage:
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.) (TLP 1974, p.147)
Of course, it does not mean that both disciplines are "the same" in an absolutesense. But they are similar extensionally, in terms of method and the place
they occupy within his philosophy, in the mystical. Extensionally similar in so

Isabel Grábalos Palomino, "Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach | Isabel Grábalos Palominothat he mentions ethics as a part of aesthetics (and not the other way around)but at the same time ethics is in a way all-encompassing. Yet there issomething more than a philosophical symmetry. The aesthetic aspect is anactive endeavour:
I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy
ought really to be written only as a poetic composition. (VB 1980, p. 24e)Thus lies the privileged situation of art, in this case, poetry, to shed light onvital questions. The key is in its expressive power. As a mirror of ethics, where
ethics seeks the practical answer to the good life, art exposes life itself. Where
philosophy explains partially, or shows “absurd” things, art can “show”,
because in art, form and content are not separated, nor poisoned by the tricksof language. Only there, the game is transparent or aims to be so.
But before going further, I should remind that Wittgenstein's philosophy is
explicitly ethical, and only derivatively, aesthetic. The extension of thestructure of aesthetics within philosophy is extended, but not its significance.
Taken out of context, the special status of aesthetics would lose its meaning.
Only with that nuance can justice be done both to the originality and delicate
anthropological attunement of Wittgenstein's thought.

3. The Epistemological Transition

Although he would later abandon the idea of having marked the philosophicallimits "rigorously" and "firmly" in the Tractatus, he already hinted this in its
paradoxical end:
6.54

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone

who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when hehas used them —as steps— to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the worldaright. (TLP 1974, pp. 150-151)
But this is far from being a simple anecdotal contradiction. On the contrary, itmarks the direction to go further. The most important propositions may be

246

Isabel Grábalos Palomino, "Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach | Isabel Grábalos Palomino

nonsensical, but somehow, they open our eyes so that we can "see the world
correctly". Coherently, a key idea in his second philosophical stage, giving preeminence to the things that are possible to show, but not to say or to explain,fits perfectly as the natural elaboration of that "nonsense" aspect of his
Tractatus propositions. With that method, things are shown, including thelimits of language through the idea of language-games. It is no longer a matterof conjuring those transcendent elements, clashing with the limits he had
imposed on himself. He can finally undertake what he had already postulated.
In that sense, it can be said that in his second stage what he did was to find amethod for finally making the philosophy he wanted to in the Tractatus.
Another idea that is present in his notes from before the Tractatus and also at
the end of his life, and that complements the concepts of “telling” and“showing”, is that philosophy should not explain, but describe.
Tellingly, many of his later comments on aesthetics are within a lecture on"description" (cf. LA, 1967, pp. 37-40). If philosophy describes, art goes one stepfurther: it clarifies. Philosophy, art, and the choice between explaining,
describing, or clarifying, in the end, always go hand in hand and have to beunderstood as an epistemological-transcendental continuum.
In that continuum, the aesthetic choice, by directing the person's attention tothe object for its own sake makes us see it “sub specie aeternitatis”. As he wrote
in his early notebooks:
The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life
is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art
and ethics. (TB 1961, [83e])
Borrowing Spinoza's expression, he delves into this relationship between
ethics and aesthetics, albeit as briefly and cryptically as usual. The Spinozian
expression, “sub specie aeternitatis” implies an objective, transcendent sight.
How to access ethics and aesthetics then?
It is above all a distancing, both from the world, to live an honest life, and fromthe objects, by transforming them into works of art. “A work of art forces us -as
one might say- to see it in the right perspective”. (VB, 1980, p.4e)

Isabel Grábalos Palomino, "Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
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Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach | Isabel Grábalos Palomino

But to say what this distance consists of, or what conclusion must it lead to,would be, once again, absurd. Instead, the answer must be found in each case,in each life, in a personal commitment; an idea that would later be expressedin a very famous Wittgensteinian insight, comparing philosophy to medicine,which must treat each case one by one (PI, p. 91e [133, 254, 255]).
It’s more than just an intellectual effort, it is an existential one. The
commitment may vary: many questions of an aesthetic nature are closer toprosaic everyday problems, such as the proper cut of a suit. Wittgensteinemphasizes that our most usual (although not the most respected, for it
wouldn’t apply to a Symphony of Beethoven) judgments of that kind are not of
taste, but of correctness: that is, with universality. (cf. LA, 1967, pp. 7-8). That
idea of correctness brings us back to that connection to ethics.
Conversely, Wittgenstein only quite managed to express some personal choicesthat would have seemed ethical in nature, like the ascetic austerity of his
rooms in Cambridge, when he translated it into aesthetic choices. Each piece offurniture had to be just in the right place (cf. MAM, 1958 p.25 & Monk, 1990, p.
106). In the same vein, what he considered unsightly architectural works
suffered from a “lack of taste”. But they were also clearly ethically charged:
While sitting in Trafalgar Square and talking about its architecture hedenounced the historicizing classicising forms of Canada House, just being
completed: ‘That’s bombast; that’s Hitler and Mussolini.’ On the other
hand, he admired the Georgian architecture of houses in Dublin: ‘people
who built these houses had the good taste to know that they had nothing
very important to say, and therefore they did not attempt to express
anything’. (Wijdeveld, 2000, p. 176)
As such, looking at his "ways of doing" might be more elucidating than trying
to decipher what he would have meant to say. It could even be the mostparadoxically textual interpretation of his thought.

4. His Artistic Work

Wittgenstein put artistic and scientific issues into practice before, during andafter talking about them. If scientifically he distinguished himself in

248

Isabel Grábalos Palomino, "Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach | Isabel Grábalos Palomino

engineering and mathematics, artistically, although his actions were not many,
they were poignant. It’s suitable then to look at his responses to a type ofquestion that calls for practical resolution. Each of these active responses
should be seen as one more example of a type of communicative field, likelanguage-games, and not as an absolute answer to be taken at face value. But
they can help us elucidate the response to a particular challenge at a particulartime and, crucially, what that entails.
The two pieces that Wittgenstein made with full self-consciousness of his roleas an artist are the sculpture of a bust and the house that he built for his sister
Margarethe. The latter is the most significant in ambition, projection andinfluence. The bust, however, will be more accessible for this brief
dissertation. But the most radical inference we can get about their importanceis the perception held by those who knew him intimately. In that sense, thememory of his sister Hermine is almost completely articulated around those
two pieces and the passion that her brother Ludwig felt for music. (cf. Rhees,
1881, pp. 1-11). True, Hermine was an artist and a painter herself, but her
biographical note on him focuses on these vital milestones as much as on his
travels and changes of residence, and barely on his philosophicalachievements. It shows us the subjective importance it had for Wittgensteinhimself: what occupied his conversations and what made him proud (a rare
feeling in his case).
The bust was created between 1925 and 1928 in the workshop of his friend,
sculptor Michael Drobil, whom he had met as a prisoner in the First World
War. Not surprisingly, the purpose of trying his hand at sculpture was to try to"clarify" a series of Drobil's sculptures, one of which did not quite convincehim, without being able to express exactly what was wrong with it. His thengirlfriend Marguerite Respinger posed for him, although it wasn’t a portrait ofher, nor even an attempt to capture her expression. She was a clutch to help
him find an expression and a gesture that had been in Wittgenstein's mind
since he saw Drobil's original sculpture. It was the same impulse that drove
him in his philosophical project: to clarify little by little and step by step, toshow, rather than to explain. (cf. Monk 1990, pp. 158, 240)
It is a real-life episode that could well have inspired the lesson on aesthetics inwhich he describes how aesthetic experience presents us with something that

Isabel Grábalos Palomino, "Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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simply "clicks" or doesn't, and how that reaction cannot be expressed in words
but is presented in the action taken by the subject. Sometimes, listening to apiece of music several times, re-reading a poem, or wearing a well-cut suit. (cf.
LA, 1967, pp. 1-36) Properly speaking, by continuing the game in the samelanguage in which it began. Wittgenstein mentioned on several occasions in
his notes that artistic language was the only language that aspired to or tended
to perfection (though of course, it did not necessarily always achieve it, if ever).
That is what makes his pieces so relevant, even if they are not perfect
expressions of what we are trying to study. They are pointers. Insofar as
Wittgenstein's clarifying effort was honest and carried to its ultimate
consequences, they are indeed the best possible expression of it. But also, since
Wittgenstein was not a professional sculptor or architect, he lacked the tools of
the game of language that would have allowed him to use that particularlanguage perfectly. And he was well aware of this:I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy
ought really to be written only as a poetic composition.
It must, as it seems to me, be possible to gather from this how far mythinking belongs to the present, future or past. For I was thereby revealing
myself as someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able todo. (VB 1980, p. 24e)This last sentence might very well sum up his life, and in pure honesty, thehuman condition. But, in a way that might be less obvious for a reader, butvery clear for those who treasured memories of him and knew what truly
mattered to him, I’d like to think that his relentless search for honesty brought
him much closer than he realized to embodying a modus vivendi which
template he had set where it all began, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
References
Malcolm, Norman, (2001), Ludwig Wittgenstein: a memoir, With a Biographical Sketch by G. H.
von Wright. London: Oxford University Press
Monk, R., (1990), Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Duty of Genius, London: Penguin Books
Rhees, Rush (ed.) (1981). Wittgenstein, Hermine, "My Brother Ludwig", in Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Personal Recollections. London: Blackwell250

Isabel Grábalos Palomino, "Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach | Isabel Grábalos Palomino

Wijdeveld, Paul, (2000), Ludwig Wittgenstein, Arquitect, Singapore: The Pepin Press
Wittgenstein, L., (1958), Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, translated by G. E. M.
Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations, Third edition with index. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Wittgenstein, L., (1961), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul
Wittgenstein, L., (1961), translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Notebooks 1914-1916, Oxford:
Blackwell
Wittgenstein, L., (1967), Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief,
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles
Wittgenstein, L., (1979), edited by C. G. Luckhardt, “Letters to Ludwig von Ficker”, inWittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, Hassocks: Cornell University Press and Harvester Press
Wittgenstein, L., (1980), Culture and Value, Oxford: Blackwell
Wittgenstein, L., (1993), edited by Klage, J. C., and Nordmann, A., “A Lecture on Ethics” in
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951 , S. 36–44. Indianapolis andCambridge, USA: Hackett
Acknowledgement
To Jaime Nubiola for his guidance, mentorship and patience, and to Raquel Cascales and Philip
Muller, without whose support this text would not have been written.

Isabel Grábalos Palomino, "Wittgenstein’s Unity of Life and Philosophy, an Aesthetic Approach". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics | Eran Guter

Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s
Post-Tractatus Aesthetics
Eran Guter (Yezreel Valley, Israel)
Abstract
Wittgenstein’s experiments on rhythm (1912-13) were based on Charles Myers’s 1911 written
protocols for laboratory exercises. The experiments provided an early onset for Wittgenstein’s
career-long exploration of the philosophically pervasive implications of aspects. Years before
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein already got a glimpse of a philosophical angle, which was bound to
become very important to him not only in aesthetics, but also for his overarching
philosophical development. He became interested in the possibilities of aesthetic
conversation, in what we actually do when we re-phrase, compare, come up with good similes
in order to illuminate something definite within the space of possibility. These initial insights
were bound to recede into the background for a while by the mounting demands of theTractatus framework, only to fully bloom in Wittgenstein’s later work.

One of the least understood and often overlooked episodes in Wittgenstein’s
early thought is his stint during the years 1912-1913 as a researcher at Charles
S. Myer’s laboratory for experimental psychology in Cambridge, where
Wittgenstein eagerly conducted experiments on rhythm designed to “ascertain
the extent and importance of rhythm in music” (Pinsent 1990: 3). This was his
first (and only) attempt to do experimental aesthetics, and scholars usuallyrefer to these experiments in relation to Wittgenstein’s later explicit views (inhis lectures in Cambridge in the 1930s) on the use and abuse of experimental
psychology for aesthetics. In this paper I would like to consider theseexperiments in the context of Wittgenstein’s later recounting of them in a 1933
lecture on aesthetics in Cambridge (Wittgenstein 2016: 9:40-42), thereby
elaborating on my published findings on the subject (Guter 2020).
While neither the original notes and data from the experiments, nor the two
resulting public presentations by Wittgenstein (given in 1912 to the British
Psychological Society, and in 1913 upon the ceremonial opening of Myers’s
new laboratory in Cambridge) are to be found, the existing textual evidence iscomplete enough to allow for a solid understanding of their methodology andsubstance. Moreover, as I shall argue, the evocation of these experiments inthe context of Wittgenstein’s 1933 lecture on aesthetics affords a rare, indeed
surprising glimpse into Wittgenstein’s initial aesthetic dispositions as
manifested in the context of his thinking about music at the time before theTractatus. This rare glimpse, I submit, goes beyond the usual reference to these252

Eran Guter, "Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics | Eran Guter

early experiments as being merely just another example of the ridiculousness(in Wittgenstein’s eyes) of the idea that aesthetics is a science that tells us what
is beautiful.
Wittgenstein’s experiments concerned a phenomenon then called “subjective
rhythm”, aiming to determine the conditions under which subjects heard orread into a sequence of beats a rhythm which, in a sense, was not there. By
1912 this phenomenon had already been well documented and studied. As
early as the 1890s, published research demonstrated that beat trains appear togroup into units of two, three, or four despite being isochronal and equitonal
and hence devoid of cues relating to coherence or pattern. According to
McGuinness (1988: 124), Myers’s laboratory was equipped with the standard
scientific equipment at the time for such experiments, e.g., using a metronome,
which could also be placed in a box, so that raising the lid unobserved by the
subject would produce an objectively stressed beat. According to Monk (1990:
49-50), Wittgenstein’s research was helped by Myers, who took theseexperiments quite seriously.
There is a striking similarity between Wittgenstein’s description of theexperiments (in his 1933 lecture) and Myers’s protocol for laboratory exercise
number 144 from the second volume of Myers’s Text-Book of Experimental
Psychology, with laboratory exercises (Myers 2013. I should note that while thisis a reprint of the third edition from 1925, which is based on the second edition
from 1911, the protocols for the experiments and Myers’s commentary are
identical also to the first 1909 edition.). It stands to reason that Wittgensteinfollowed Myers’s protocol closely under the latter’s supervision.
Exp. 144 is entitled “subjective accentuation in rhythm”. The protocol states asfollows:
The metronome is a convenient instrument for observing the subjective
accentuation of the simplest rhythm. But care must be taken that no
objective accentuation of its beats exists. The experimenter should set themetronome at various rates of oscillation, so that the subject may
appreciate the relation between rate of rhythm and ease of subjective
accentuation. The subject should observe and record the varying affective
values (pleasant, wearisome, etc.) of different rhythms and the associated

Eran Guter, "Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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experiences which they may revive. The experimenter may notice
unconscious movements on the part of the subject. (Myers 2013: 98-99)
Wittgenstein (2016: 9:41-42) reported that in his experiments he used amachine which did not stress any beat. His subjects tended to group the beattrain into groups of three, and to hear an accent on the first beat in eachgroup. They also tended not to hear two consecutive beats as accentuated. Thisis consistent with Myers’s (2013: 301-302) commentary for Exp. 144 in the TextBook. According to Myers, if a metronome is rapidly beating with regularity
and uniformity, the listener who preserves a passive attitude will observe thatthe sounds arrange themselves in groups, usually of two or four sounds,
although groups of three (as was indeed the case in Wittgenstein’s
experiments) and of six may also be realized. In all cases, the first member of
each of which becomes strongly accented in the sense that the intervals
between successive groups appear longer than those between the members ofsuch groups. Wittgenstein commented that “you can find laws which regulate
what stress you hear. e.g. you try to divide into bars.” Again, this is consistent
with Myers’s (2013: 302) comment that “the effect of accentuation, whether
subjective or objective, is always to divide a series of auditory stimuli into feetor bars.”
Interestingly, Wittgenstein (2016: 9:42) also reported that “if you construct arhythm in such a way that 2 tendencies conflict, a curious effect is produced –that of a constant stumbling.” This means that the experiments included
objective accentuation as well. According to Myers’s Text-Book (2013: 302) thiscan be done in two ways: either the auditory stimuli are of like loudness, but of
unlike duration, or else there is a change of loudness in an otherwise uniform
group of stimuli. In the former case, the longest lasting member of each group
appears to be the loudest; it receives the accent and is apprehended as the firstof each group. In the latter case, the objectively accented beat appears not only
to be louder, but to last longer and to be followed by a longer interval of timethan the other members of the group. The latter is essentially the focus of Exp.
145 in Myers’s Text-Book (2013: 99), in which the effects of varying theobjective accentuation are studied by enclosing the metronome in a box, thelid of which may be silently opened and closed at any moment so as to allow
any desired sound to be intensified and so to be accented.

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Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics | Eran Guter

Wittgenstein’s description of this part of his experiments fits the protocol forExp. 145. Myers comments that iambic and anapestic measures are notmaintainable rhythms in this experiment. The iambic tends to pass over into
the trochaic measure, while the anapestic passes over to the dactyl. “There is a
general tendency,” Myers (2013: 302) explains, “for the series to be grouped sothat the accent is received by the first member of every group.” So, in either ofthese two cases one would expect a conflict of tendencies and a resulting effectof constant stumbling. Thus, it is safe to conclude that Wittgenstein followed
Myers’s protocol for Exp. 144 with added elements from Exp. 145.
Furthermore, in line with Myers’s protocol for Exp. 144, Wittgenstein also
reported that he collected the input of the subjects concerning the affective
value of the perceived rhythm and the associated experiences which it evoked.
Wittgenstein (2016: 9:40) was actually quite dismayed by their responses: “To
most people the rhythm meant nothing: one lady said: ‘It makes me feel like abutterfly with a pin through me’”. I shall argue next that, when read in thecontext of Wittgenstein’s 1933 lecture, his frustration at the laboratory
disclosed the philosophical significance of the experiments.
What we first need to observe, if we pull away from the scientific context ofthese experiments, is that Wittgenstein produced in them the onset of what hewould later call “noticing an aspect.” The experiments produced a sonicequivalent of an ambiguous figure, not unlike his famous example of the
Necker Cube in the Tractauts (Wittgenstein 1995: 5.5423), as different‘hearings’ (rhythms) manifest themselves according to different manners ofprojection. Wittgenstein’s test subject could have heard the isochronal andequitonal pulse train either as duple (or, less likely, quadruple) meter or, as
Wittgenstein reported, triple meter. That is, he could have heard the accent
either every other beat or every two beats, and he could have flipped back andforth between the two rhythmic patterns at will. As Myers (2013: 302) noted in
his Text-Book, “subjective accentuation of a simple rhythm may be changed atwill.” Wittgenstein’s manipulation of the pulse train in order to induce
constant stumbling in the ‘hearings’ of his subjects, in their manner ofcharacterizing what they hear, underscored his particular attention to aspects
in these experiments. This is by far the earliest evidence of Wittgenstein's

Eran Guter, "Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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career-long exploration of the philosophically pervasive implications ofnoticing an aspect, predating even his first treatment of aspects in his early
writings on logic and mathematics.
Yet even more strikingly, I maintain, in comparison to Wittgenstein’s formal
treatment in the Tractatus of aspects such as the Necker Cube, in the dynamic
context of the experiments he sought after the ways of characterization inwhich noticing an aspect feeds back into the subjects’ use of language, that is,after the communicability of aspects. Over and above the scientificdesideratum of “find[ing] laws which regulate what stress you hear”, which
was at best “moderately interesting” for Wittgenstein, by his own admission,
the experiments harbored for him an idea that he already then found crucially
important—a philosophical idea:
I was looking forward to talking with my subjects about something whichinterested me. I was looking for utterances inside an aesthetic system. […]When I made those experiments, what would have satisfied me wascomparison, within a system. (Wittgenstein 2016: 9:40-41)
The context of Wittgenstein’s 1933 lecture on aesthetics allows us to fully
understand what he was looking for already in 1912. Wittgenstein conceived
aesthetics as a mode of conversation, which concerns what he variously calls“aesthetic controversy”, “aesthetic enquiry” or “aesthetic investigation”, and“aesthetic puzzle” or “aesthetic puzzlement”. “Aesthetic puzzlement” occurs
always in situ: it concerns something concrete that needs to be resolved,
worked out, corrected or agreed upon for a particular purpose – hence anaesthetic discussion is always particular, addressing a tension arising in thecase at hand. Part of Wittgenstein’s discussion concerns the difference
between experimental psychology and aesthetics. This is where he brings up
the case of his own experience in the laboratory. The uniqueness of aesthetics
lies in the nature of the explanations (giving reasons as opposed to causes) thatare offered and accepted in the attempt to address, and possibly remove, agiven instance of aesthetic puzzlement. Contrasting the modes of explanationin psychology and aesthetics allows Wittgenstein to spell out theconversational, non-hypothetical and therein immanently human character ofaesthetics.

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Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics | Eran Guter

An aesthetic enquiry is un-hypothetical in the sense of affording a mere
picture as a useful device, which “enables [one] to overlook a system at a
glance” (Wittgenstein 2016: 9:38). It inheres in the particular case by means ofparaphrasing, giving good similes, which result in a collective arrangement of(often surprisingly) similar cases. “Criterion of correctness of aesthetic analysis
must be agreement of person to whom I make it”, says Wittgenstein (2016:9:46), “Aesthetics does not lie in finding a mechanism”. While causal
explanations turn a blind eye to the manifold verifying phenomena in humaninteraction, aesthetic explanations preserve them in their fullness: “I say all
Aesthetics is of nature of giving a paraphrase, even if same words also expressa hypothesis. It is giving a good simile” (2016: 9:37).
“A reason,” says Wittgenstein (2016: 9:33), “consists in drawing your attention
to something which removes an uneasiness”. But also, “you want to compare
notes but not any notes; only those which are illuminating” (2016: 9:41). In thissense, a reason addresses what presents itself as a necessity, as an experienceof meaning. Yet to fix the very possibility at stake in a conversation, one needs
a proper characterization, not merely a form of words. One needs to draw a
possibility in, make it alive. According to Wittgenstein, this is what
illuminating comparisons amount to. They illuminate a field of possible
projections of a concept and a potential development of the mode ofcharacterization. Characterization involves presenting phenomena, laid out
side by side, independently of the causally determined sequence of events, in acreative, fitting order, which enables one to see things with understanding. A
comparison is an articulation of possibilities, which invites further
comparisons and re-phrasings, serving and instancing possibilities for thecharacterization of what can be seen and said. The open-endedness of theconversation, its flow, is regulated by manifold, nuanced, patently incalculable“verifying phenomena” of the parties involved, allowing ways to go on
discussing and drawing out from the articulation further aspects of what ischaracterized that are there to be seen in and by means of it.
“I had a natural propensity to think about ideas which arise in music,”
Wittgenstein (2016: 9:40) said about this 1912-13 experiments on rhythm. Yet
at Myers’s laboratory he realized to his dismay that the interrogative setting of
the experiments stultified this sort of aesthetic enquiry. His test subjects
answered what he called the how question, the psychological (hypothetical)

Eran Guter, "Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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one, instead of the why question, the aesthetic. Wittgenstein (2016: 9:27) said:“The question of Aesthetics is not: Do you like it? But, if you do, why do you?”
To answer the why question, the question about significance, to give a reason,requires making comparisons and ordering, as we draw in a field of
possibilities and necessities, eventually offering the gift of a good simile. Suchcharacterization requires a choice and an effort ‘to get it right’ within thespace of possibility (a “synopsis”), to show someone else and enable a proper
response. This was the source of the failure of his 1912-13 experiments onrhythm, but also the source of their significance, because they enabled him totap for the first time, and very early on, a radical thought about thephilosophical importance of paying close attention to the activity ofcharacterizing, and the varieties of techniques for making illuminatingcomparisons in situ.
Such radical ideas which arose for him in music were bound to be suppressed
for a while by the mounting philosophical framework of the Tractatus, which,according to Floyd (2018), powerfully fostered a philosophical disregard ofcharacterizations and the belittling of the specific techniques ofcharacterization involved in symbolizations and representations of all kinds.
These pre-Tractatus seeds germinated in Wittgenstein’s middle-period view ofaesthetics when he brought back the idea of the anthropological form of life
beginning in the early 1930s. As Wittgenstein’s transitioned toward theanthropological view, his newly gained practical holism, to use Stern’s (1991)
notion, allowed for these seeds to grow. He obtained the view that our copingwith things and people in, and through language can only be meaningful in
speciﬁc contexts and against the background of shared practices, and only
then, what he learned in the laboratory, namely, the significance of the ability
to characterize, became of center importance for him in aesthetics, and he wasable to further utilize this sense of characterization to a great philosophicaleffect in the years to come.
References
Floyd, Juliet (2018) “Aspects of Aspects,” in H. Sluga and D. Stern (eds.) The Cambridge
Companion to Wittgenstein, 2nd ed., New York: Cambridge University Press.
Guter, Eran (2020) “The Philosophical Significance of Wittgenstein’s Experiments on Rhythm,
Cambridge 1912–13”, Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1), 28–43.

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Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics | Eran Guter

McGuinness, Brian (1988) Wittgenstein, A Life: Young Ludwig, 1889–1921, Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Monk, Ray (1990) Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, New York: Free Press.
Myers, Charles S. (2013) A Text-Book of Experimental Psychology, with laboratory exercises, 2
volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pinsent, David (1990) A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man: From the Diaryof David Hume Pinsent 1912-1914, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Stern, David (1991) “The ‘Middle Wittgenstein’: From Logical Atomism to Practical Holism,”
Synthese 87, 203-226.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1995) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden, London:
Routledge.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009) Philosophical Investigations, revised 4th edition, Oxford: WileyBlackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2016) Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933: From the Notes of G.
E. Moore, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eran Guter, "Wittgenstein in the Laboratory: Pre-Tractatus Seeds of Wittgenstein’s Post-Tractatus Aesthetics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein| Thomas Hainscho“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George
Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein
Thomas Hainscho (Klagenfurt, Austria)
Abstract
It is well known that Karl Popper read Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Popper’s
interpretation of Wittgenstein served as a blueprint for Popper’s criticism of language
philosophy throughout his work. Apart from the allegation that Popper misunderstood
Wittgenstein, one objection to Popper’s criticisms is that they exclusively refer to the Tractatus, which is assumed to be the only work of Wittgenstein that Popper ever read. This paper
presents evidence that Popper read the notebooks of Wittgenstein. On notes found in his
edition of George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form, Popper addresses a problem of negationthat Wittgenstein was concerned with in 1915, and suggests that Spencer-Brown accomplishedwhat Wittgenstein was aiming for.

1. Popper’s criticism of Wittgenstein

The only known encounter between Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein
took place in October 1946 at the University of Cambridge. Two books were
written about this incident (Edmonds/Eidinow 2001; Munz 2004),
reconstructing the course of the event and commenting on its outcome. The
accounts of Popper meeting Wittgenstein in person differ and it is neither
clear who said what to whom on that night, nor who was present at all.
There is consensus, however, that Popper expected Wittgenstein to hold thesame views in 1946 as he did at the time of the Tractatus. In a 1952 address,
Popper states that he had not seen any of Wittgenstein’s “unpublishedmanuscripts which were privately circulated by some of his pupils” (Popper
1952: 128, footnote 1) and emphasises a continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought,
pointing out that he found the “most fundamental and influential point of his
teaching unchanged” (Popper 1952: 128, footnote 1) during the 1946 meeting.
Whenever Popper addresses Wittgenstein in his work, the criticisms can betraced back to views that Popper’s claims to find in the Tractatus. This
concerns two major points: Firstly, Popper disputes the claim, attributed to
Wittgenstein, that philosophical problems do not exist and argues that there
are genuine philosophical problems (cf. Popper 2002: 89). Secondly, Popper
accuses Wittgenstein of advocating essentialism, i.e., the view that the meaningof a word is what designates its essence (cf. Popper 2002: 26). Popper instead
rejects investigations of language in order to find out the meaning of words,

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Thomas Hainscho, "“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein| Thomas Hainscho

and advocates the examination of theories in order to approximate truth(Popper 2002: 25).
Popper laments in his autobiography that his criticisms of Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus as given in The Open Society and Its Enemies “have been almost
completely neglected by Wittgenstein’s commentators” (Popper 2002a: 133). It
can be argued, however, that many of Popper’s objections are rooted inmisunderstandings: Neither would Wittgenstein attribute Popper’s
essentialism to himself, nor argue that there are no problems in philosophy.
This circumstance had been brought to Popper’s attention, it was addressed inseveral papers (see Klemke (1981) for a critical overview of Popper’s
criticisms), and it was pointed out to him that he should take notice ofWittgenstein’s later philosophy. Popper was not to be convinced. On 8 June
1980, Viennese Klaus Pikal sent a letter to Popper pointing out several aspectsof Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Philosophical Grammar towhich Popper should respond. Pikal asks why Popper treats Wittgenstein as if
he had only written the Tractatus. In his reply of 17 June 1980, Popper writes“You complain that I have taken notice only of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus but notof his later works. But why should I? I simply am not interested. You may saythat I ought to be interested. But life is short, and there are countless
philosophers: one must make a choice” (KPA box 338, folder 21).
This attitude did not change during Popper’s lifetime and his reply to Pikal
seems to be, at least in spirit, Popper’s last word on this matter. This meansthat Popper’s reading of Wittgenstein is limited to the Tractatus. Popper’s final
text that expresses an interest in discussing Wittgenstein’s philosophy is theaforementioned 1952 address “The Nature of Philosophical Problems andTheir Roots in Science”, which was later edited and republished in 1963 as thesecond chapter of Conjectures and Refutations.

2. Popper’s notes on Wittgenstein in his edition of Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form

Originally published in 1969, Laws of Form by George Spencer-Brown is amathematical work that is highly enigmatic and idiosyncratic in its
presentation and content. Spencer-Brown therein develops a calculus, called‘calculus of indications’, which is used to create a ‘primary algebra’ and a

Thomas Hainscho, "“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein| Thomas Hainscho‘primary arithmetic’. He aims to create a logical foundation for mathematics
and a formal framework for the generation of meaning. Popper owned a copyof the 1973 Bantam Books paperback edition. A dedication on the first pagesuggests that it was given to him as a gift by E. Darlene Nisewanger in January
1976, an American student from California, who visited Popper in 1974 (cf.
KPA box 331, folder 42; box 554, folder 4).
Popper left underlinings, highlightings, and comments in the book’s
introduction, the first two chapters, and occasionally on later pages. He was
not fond of the work, as will be shown in the next section. However, a bookwith extensive annotations is rather an exception among the books of Popper’s
library, since he did not leave many annotations while reading. In addition,
three notes with text written on both sides of the paper were found in thebook; two of these notes deal with Wittgenstein. They reveal an engagement of
Popper with Wittgenstein in the 1970s, just four years before his reply to Pikal.
The first note (figure 1) was inserted after page xvi of the introduction. Popper
used two pens, a green fineliner pen and a blue ballpoint pen, to write it.

Figure 1: Popper’s first note.
This note refers to Popper’s main criticism of Wittgenstein regarding thedistinction between problems and puzzles. Popper relates the issues of Laws ofForm with the issues during the 1946 encounter with Wittgenstein. It is
unclear if “were [sic] more subtle than you were aware” is to be understood asa literal quotation of Wittgenstein or a paraphrase of something that he had
said to Popper in 1946. He then suggests a structural analogy of problems andpuzzles with objective and subjective questions. A further discussion of thisnote must take place elsewhere.

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100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein| Thomas Hainscho

The second note (figure 2) was inserted after page 2 at the end of the firstchapter. A part of it, a paper strip approximately 1.8 to 2.5 cm high, appears tohave been cut off with scissors. It is unclear whether something was cut away
at the end of the first page, between “lies in” and “Negation”, or not. Popper
used the ballpoint pen to write this note and traces of the pen can be seenaround the edge of the paper; but these traces do not allow any conclusion
about letters.

Figure 2: Popper’s second note.
This note indicates that Popper was aware of Wittgenstein’s notebooks, at least
to such an extent that he was familiar with the passage about negation that herelates to Spencer-Brown. There is no indication in Popper’s publishedwritings that he read Wittgenstein’s notebooks. No edition of NB is present at
the Popper Archives in Klagenfurt.

Thomas Hainscho, "“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
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3. Does Spencer-Brown offer a solution to problems of Wittgenstein?

Popper refers to the end of the NB entry of 6 June 1915. In this entry,
Wittgenstein deals with tautology, the relation of his picture-theory to thetheory of classes, and the relationship of an affirmative (bejahend) proposition
with its negation. It contains the passage “Every proposition has only one
negative; ... There is only one proposition lying quite outside ‘p’” (NB: 6.6.15)
that was later integrated into the Tractatus as § 5.513. On his note, Popper
omits the first part of the sentence, which begins one page earlier. The wholeparagraph reads: “My mistake must lie in my wanting to use what follows
from the nature of negation, etc. in its definition.——That ‘p’ and ‘~p’ have acommon boundary is no part of the explanation of negation that I am tryingfor” (NB: 6.6.15).
Referring to this passage, Popper writes “I think Brown uses negation as
Wittgenstein wished to.” There is too little textual material to determine what
Popper assumed about Wittgenstein’s wish to use negation. Also, what
Wittgenstein calls ‘my mistake’ must be interpreted. This question is discussed
now, followed by a discussion of the connection to Spencer-Brown. Negation is,
for Wittgenstein, an operation that reverses the sense of a proposition (cf. TLP
5.2341). Bonino (2008: 53) hints at a relation between Wittgenstein’s
understanding of sense in the pre-Tractatus writings and the concept ofbipolarity. Bonino refers to the Notes on Logic, in which it is asserted that“[t]he sense of a proposition is determined by the two poles true and false” (NL
2009: B23, 279). That propositions must be capable of being true and false is an
issue that Wittgenstein thought about in September 1913. In the Notes on Logic, addressing the notion of bipolarity, he remarks: “Every proposition isessentially true–false: to understand it, we must know both what must be thecase if it is true, and what must be the case if it is false. Thus a proposition has
two poles, corresponding to the case of its truth and the case of its falsehood.
We call this the sense of a proposition.” (NL 2009: C13, 285)
The notion of bipolarity is not found in the Tractatus, but it can beplausibly argued that the idea was taken up in the notion of sense: A
proposition can be understood without knowing whether it is true or false, itssense allows us to comprehend a proposition without knowing its meaning.
For an overview about bipolarity in the early writings of Wittgenstein and a
deeper exploration about the concept’s integration into the Tractatus and its

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100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein| Thomas Hainscho

adaption, see Glock (2005: 63–66), Bonino (2008: 53–59, 68–90), and Potter(2008: 151–157, 173–174).
There is not enough space to go into the intellectual development ofWittgenstein's conception of negation from the writings of 1914 to theTractatus. For the purposes here, it shall suffice to state what problem might
be at stake when Wittgenstein writes of his mistake on 6.6.15. As propositions, p
and not-p determine a place in logical space (cf. TLP 3.4). In TLP 3.4
Wittgenstein claims that “the whole logical space must already be given by”
this place, because logical operations, such as negation, do not introduce newelements into the logical space. When Wittgenstein attempted to interpret thisrelation as a relation between sets in June 1915, he encountered a problem,
both in terms of affirmative (bejahend) and negative statements and of
tautology and contradiction: “In the class-theory it is not yet evident why the
proposition needs its counter-proposition. Why it is a part of logical space
which is separated from the remaining part of logical space” (NB: 6.6.15). He
assumes that by “attaching the ‘~’ to ‘p’ the proposition gets into a different
class of propositions” (NB: 6.6.15) and is confronted with the problem that “acommon boundary is no part of the explanation of negation that I am tryingfor” (NB: 6.6.15). A few days earlier, on 2 June 1915, Wittgenstein mentions thenotion of bipolarity and writes that “my theory does not really bring it out thatthe proposition must have two poles” (NB: 2.6.15). It appears that this was still
an issue on 6 June.
Does Spencer-Brown use “negation as Wittgenstein wishes to”, as Popper
writes on his note? There are only a few comparative studies that explore
connections between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Spencer-Brown. Landini(2018), for example, examines similarities between Wittgenstein’s N-operator
and Spencer-Brown’s primary algebra. Landini’s claims are based on acomprehensive and comparative reading of the Tractatus and Laws of Form. It
is unclear if Popper put the same effort in studying the two works. As thehandwritten comments in Popper’s copy of Laws of Form mainly encompass
the first two chapters, I assume that his claims about negation rely on what
can be found in these chapters. In Laws of Form, Spencer-Brown intends to“separate what are known as algebras of logic from the subject of logic, and to
re-align them with mathematics” (Spencer-Brown 2011: xiv). In developing his
calculus, he thus does not resort to common logical operators. Hence, negation

Thomas Hainscho, "“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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is not an element in the calculus of indications, but something that is possible
to be translated into the formal systems derived from his calculus.
Laws of Form opens with taking the idea of distinction and the idea of
indication as given. A distinction “is drawn by arranging a boundary withseparate sides” (Spencer-Brown 2011: 1). Distinction is established as a premiseof indication, because in order to indicate something it must be distinguishedfrom everything that it is not. “Once a distinction is drawn, […] contents oneach side of the boundary, being distinct, can be indicated” (Spencer-Brown
2011: 1). Spencer-Brown then introduces the notion of marked states by thesymbol of the ‘mark’, two right-angled lines, like the upper and righthandedges of a square. There is no genuine meaning of the symbol of the mark; its
meaning is determined by the use of the mark, which Spencer-Brown calls the‘intent’. Spencer-Brown unfolds his calculus using the symbol of the mark, theempty space of the unmarked state, and operators that are introduced inchapter 3. It can be assumed that Popper read Laws of Form beyond chapter 2;
but his notes and most of the annotations are found in the passages
summarised here. It therefore is reasonable to assume that his reference toWittgenstein was stimulated by these ideas.
The two states created by a distinction stand in a certain relation to each other:
They share a common boundary. Spatial metaphors with which the act of
distinction is introduced (‘boundary’, ‘sides’) are frequently used in thefollowing text. But unless the distinction is indicated to be a spatial or logicalnegation by intent, the two states do not have any other properties than being
distinct. From a structural point of view, there is a similarity between SpencerBrown and Wittgenstein. Both the common boundary between p and not-p in
Wittgenstein and the results of a distinction in Spencer-Brown seem to lead tothe problem mentioned by Wittgenstein. In Spencer-Brown, however, theboundary that is created by a distinction, and the two states, share a common
origin. This origin can be restored by the calculus. The distinction is thus notdetermined by the boundary, but by an intentional act.
In the preface to the international edition of Laws of Form, Spencer-Brown
writes: “The whole text of the Laws can be reduced to a principle, which canbe stated as follows: […] What a thing is and what it is not, are, in form,
identically equal” (Spencer-Brown 1997: ix; translation T.H.). It may be a mere

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Thomas Hainscho, "“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein| Thomas Hainscho

analogy, but the passage is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s initial problem asstated in his Notes on Logic: “The chief characteristic of my theory is that, in it,
p has the same meaning as not-p.” (NL 2009: B37, 281).
Popper could not have known this analogy, as the preface was written in 1997.
It is thus even more surprising that Popper’s notes suggest quite the contraryof a superficial understanding of Wittgenstein and point to an analogous
problem in Spencer-Brown. It is less of a surprise that Popper did not enjoy it.
At the end of page 3, after the last sentence of Spencer-Brown’s First canon, “Ingeneral, what is not allowed is forbidden” (Spencer-Brown 2011: 3), Popper
added the comment “These are the fruits of W.’s style”.
References
Bonino, Guido (2008) The Arrow and the Point. Russell and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Frankfurt,
etc.: Ontos.
Edmonds, David; Eidinow, John (2001) Wittgenstein’s Poker, London: Faber and Faber.
Glock, Hans-Johann (2005) A Wittgenstein Dictionary, 7th edition, Malden, etc.: Blackwell
Publishing.
Klemke, E. D. (1981) “Popper’s Criticisms of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus” Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 6, 239–261.
KPA: Sir Karl R. Popper papers, Karl Popper Archives, University of Klagenfurt. Original papers
located at the Hoover Institution Library & Archives.
Landini, Gregory (2018) “On the Curious Calculi of Wittgenstein and Spencer Brown”, Journal
for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6, 2–28.
Munz, Peter (2004) Beyond Wittgenstein’s Poker, Aldershot, etc.: Ashgate.
Popper, Karl (1952) “The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science”, The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3, 124–156.
Popper, Karl (2002) Conjectures and Refutations, London, etc.: Routledge.
Popper, Karl (2002a) Unended Quest, London, etc.: Routledge.
Potter, Michael (2008) Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic, Oxford, etc.: Oxford University Press.
Spencer-Brown, George (1997) Gesetze der Form, Leipzig: Bohmeier.
Spencer-Brown, George (2011) Laws of Form, Leipzig: Bohmeier.

Thomas Hainscho, "“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961): “Notebooks 1914–1916”. In: Notebooks 1914–1916, S. 2–91. Hg. von
G. H. von Wright und G. E. M. Anscombe, übersetzt von G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: BasilBlackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009): “The Notes on Logic”. In: Michael Potter: Wittgenstein's Notes On
Logic, S. 276–295. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Hg. von C. K. Ogden, übersetzt
von C. K. Ogden und F. P. Ramsey. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and
Scientific Method. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
Acknowledgement
The reproduction of archival material is granted by the University of Klagenfurt. For Popper’s
unpublished writings: © 2008 University of Klagenfurt / Karl Popper Archives. All rights reserved.

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Thomas Hainscho, "“These are the fruits of W.’s style” – Karl Popper Reads George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and Thinks about Wittgenstein". In
100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig
Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther
Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen | Andreas Hämmerle

Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen UntersuchungenAndreas Hämmerle (Baden bei Wien, Austria)
Abstract
Die Beispiele, die Ludwig Wittgenstein in seinen Philosophischen Untersuchungen verwendet,sind ein tragendes Element in seinem Text. Sie sind gleichzeit aber auch bemerkenswert
unzugänglich. Anhand der am Beginn der Philosphischen Untersuchungen verwendeten
Beispiele – dem apfelverkaufenden Kaufmann aus § 1 und dem Bauarbeiter und dessen
Gehilfen aus § 2 – wird gezeigt, wie die von Ludwig Wittgenstein gewählten Beispieleaufgebaut sind: sie führen die Leserin in surreale Gefilde. Der Händler, der nur anhand eines
Prüfverfahrens den Inhalt seiner Verkaufsaufgabe erkennt, und anhand von Tafel und Listen
das Problem löst. Der Volksstamm, dessen Sprache lediglich aus vier Worten besteht unddessen Kinder ausschließlich Bauarbeiten lernen, ebenso. Beide Beispiele sind lebensfremd.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird versucht, die Beispiele Wittgensteins zu verwenden und sie ineine persönliche und heutige Sphäre zu transferieren. Diese Methode soll dabei helfen, die
Argumentation Ludwig Wittgensteins und dessen eigene Beispiele besser zu verstehen. Dieses
bessere Verständnis wiederum führt dazu, dass die wittgensteinschen Beispiele in ihrer
spezifischen Qualität besser wahrgenommen werden können.

1 Einleitung

Wir leben in einer anderen Zeit.
Es werden keine Äpfel mehr einzeln über die Budel gereicht (vgl. PU 2019: § 1).
Bauarbeiter rufen sich nicht mehr zu, welcher Werkstoff gerade gebraucht
wird (vgl. PU 2019: § 2). Menschen werfen sich außerhalb von dedizierten
Sportveranstaltungen nicht Bälle zu, und Menschen werfen Bälle auch nicht
planlos in die Luft (vgl. PU 2019: § 83). Sie erkennen die Beispielewahrscheinlich wieder, die Ludwig Wittgenstein am Beginn seiner
Philosophischen Untersuchungen verwandte.
Ludwig Wittgensteins Beispiele sind bemerkenswert unzugänglich, und das
auf verschiedene Art und Weise. Erstens: Die Beispiele sind Kinder ihrer Zeit.
Bauarbeiter können sich gar nichts mehr zurufen, weil die Maschinen zu laut
und die sprachlichen Hürden zu hoch sind. Äpfel werden in der Regel im
Supermarkt aus dem Regal genommen.
Zweitens: Die Beispiele Wittgensteins werden von schrägen Persönlichkeiten
bevölkert: da ist zuerst der Obsthändler, der Tabellen in Schubladen seines
Verkaufstisches lagert (vgl. PU 2019: § 1); dann ist da der passive Gehilfe am
Bau, der auf Zurufe seines einsam arbeitenden Vorarbeiters wartet (vgl. PU

Andreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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2019: § 2); da ist die Gruppe von Menschen, die nach immer wechselnden
Regeln Ball spielt und ab und an den Ball einfach auch nur in die Höhe wirft(vgl. PU 2019: § 83).
Es ist gar nicht so einfach, sich von den Beispielen nicht ablenken zu lassen; es
ist auch nicht einfach, die Beispiele weiterzudenken. Was ist denn nun derrichtige Umgang mit Wittgensteins Beispielen? Soll man die Beispieleanalysieren oder ignorieren, oder ist der richtige Zugang ein großzügiges undungenaues Dazwischen? Tragen die Beispiele selbst Inhalt, sind sie also
wesentlich, oder sind sie ein Beiwerk, das nicht mehr interessiert, wenn der zu
Grunde liegende Gedanke verstanden worden ist? Ist es Absicht, dassWittgenstein das Modellhafte in seinen Beispielen überbetont? Vielleicht um
den dem Beispiel zu Grunde liegenden Gedanken in gleißendem Licht
erscheinen zu lassen? Oder sind die Beispiele einfach das Produkt eines
scharfen Verstandes gepaart mit skurrilem Humor?
Es kommt sehr darauf an, welchem Zweck denn ein Beispiel dienen soll. Im
einfachsten Fall ist ein Beispiel eine Illustration. Ein Beispiel ist dann die
Veranschaulichung von etwas Allgemeinen. Eine solche Illustration hilft derEinsicht in das Allgemeine auf die Sprünge, hat also eine mäeutische Funktion.
Diese Art des Beispiels bildet den Ausgangspunkt für die Überlegungen indiesem Essay.
Das Beispiel kann aber auch eine Beleg- und Beweisfunktion haben: gemäß
dem Sprichwort, wonach eine Regel so weit reicht wie die Beispiele gehen. Das
Gegenbeispiel zeigt dann der Regel die Grenzen auf.
Luiz Antônio Marcuschi hat sich in seinem Buch „Die Methode des Beispiels“
ausführlich mit der methodischen Funktion des Beispiels, insbesondere bei
Ludwig Wittgenstein, beschäfigt. Zu Wittgenstein sagt er: „WITTGENSTEIN
wendet diesen Schreibstil an, um neue Anregungen zu weiteren Fragen zu
gewinnen. Man möchte sagen, daß er Spaß daran findet, alles durcheinanderzu bringen, um dann langsam, durch Beispiele, Bilder, Metaphern zu neuen
Positionen zu gelangen“ (Marcuschi 1976, 179, Großbuchstaben im Original).
Diese Erklärung passt wohl zusammen mit Wittgensteins Denken. Denn wenner im Tractatus sagt: „Die Logik muss für sich selber sorgen“ (TLP 2019, 5.47),
dann spricht er sich ja eigentlich gegen die Verwendung von Beispielen aus.

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Andreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen | Andreas Hämmerle

Das Absurde und Überhöhte in Wittgensteins Beispielen kommentiert Matthias
Kroß in seinem Essay „Philosophieren in Beispielen. Wittgensteins Umdenken
des Allgemeinen“ mit den Worten:
Interessant wird die Beispielverwendung für Wittgenstein vor allem bei
der Lösung philosophischer Probleme. Hier findet man gehäuft Beispiele,
die bis zur Absurdität überspitzt oder von vornherein fiktiv sind. Sie
sollen zur Verunsicherung bzw. Reductio ad absurdum traditioneller
philosophischer Fragehaltungen führen und damit ein Schritt zur Lösung
des „Krampfes“ des philosophischen Reflektierens leisten: „Nur wenn man
noch viel verrückter denkt, als die Philosophen, kann man ihre Probleme
lösen.“ (ÜG 2021, 557)[…]
Ohne diese methodische Zielstellung liefe das Beispiel „leer“ – es bewegte
sich in den traditionellen Bahnen der Exemplifizierung eines bereits
vorausgesetzten Allgemeinen, und es fehlte, wie Wittgenstein formuliert,
seine „Reibung“ (PU, 130), und es erzeugte keinen „Widerstreit“ (PU, 107).
Deshalb wählt Wittgenstein bewußt das abgelegene Beispiel aus“
(Kroß 1999, 182–183, kursive Passagen im Original)
Die methodische Zielsetzung ist es also, die den Beispielen Wittgensteins ihre
Form und ihren Inhalt geben. Durch das Abweichen von gewohnten
Denkwegen möchte Wittgenstein „spasmologisch auf das Philosophenhirn
wirken“, wie Matthias Kroß das griffig benennt (Kroß 1999, 183).
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird versucht, die Beispiele Wittgensteins zu
verwenden und sie in eine persönliche und heutige Sphäre zu transferieren.
Diese Methode soll dabei helfen, die Argumentation Ludwig Wittgensteins unddessen eigene Beispiele besser zu verstehen. Die Beispiele werden imübertragenen Sinn in ihre Einzelteile zerlegt und aus der Nähe betrachtet.
Durch das genaue Hinsehen werden etwaige Unebenheiten sichtbar, man
kann förmlich die Oberfläche des Gedankens abtasten und merkt, ob dieser
rauh und abweisend ist oder zugänglich und einladend. Dieses bessere
Verständnis, diese Auseinandersetzung mit den einzelnen Bestandteilen
wiederum führt dazu, dass die wittgensteinschen Beispiele in ihrer
spezifischen Qualität besser wahrgenommen werden können.

Andreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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2 Ein Beispiel für eine primitive Sprache (vgl. PU 2019: § 2)

Ein Vorarbeiter – Wittgenstein verwendet dafür den Begriff „Bauender“ –verständigt sich mit seinem Gehilfen. Verschieden Elemente – Würfel, Säulen,
Platten, Balken – stehen für den Bau zur Verfügung. Der Gehilfe muss dem
Vorarbeiter solche Elemente reichen, und zwar jene, die der Vorarbeiter
gerade braucht. Zu diesem Zweck „bedienen sie sich einer Sprache, bestehend
aus den Wörtern: ‚Würfel‘, ‚Säule‘, ‚Platte‘, ‚Balken‘“ (PU 2019: § 2). Der
Vorarbeiter sagt den Namen jenes Bauelements, welches er gerade braucht,
der Gehilfe reicht es ihm. „Fasse dies als vollständige primitive Sprache auf“,
mit diesen Worten schließt Wittgenstein diesen Paragraphen.
Wittgenstein baut hier also ein Sprachmodell, und zwar ein extrem
reduziertes. Eines, das nur aus vier Wörtern, genau genommen aus vierBezeichnungen von Dingen, besteht. Auf dieses einfache Sprachmodell kommt
Wittgenstein in weiterer Folge in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen immer
wieder zu sprechen: in den Paragraphen 6, 7, 8, 10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 37,
48 – um nur die unmittelbaren Bezugnahmen zu nennen.
Das Beispiel ist also zentral für die Entwicklung des Gedankens, den
Wittgenstein verfolgt. Gemessen daran, dass das Beispiel von offensichtlicher
Wichtigkeit ist, ist es, trotz seiner Reduziertheit, sperrig.
Da ist zuerst das Narrativ zu nennen: um den Gedanken einer primitiven
Sprache einzuführen, ist die Vorstellung eines entstehenden Bauwerks nicht
notwendig. An einer Baustelle wirkt eine solch reduzierte Sprache arg
abstrakt. In einem chirurgischen Operationssaal hingegen nicht mehr. Keiner
von uns wird je bei einer Operation in einem Saal live dabei gewesen sein;aber wir meinen zu wissen, wie die Ärztin mit dem Operationsassistenten
kommuniziert: „Skalpell“, „Tupfer“, „Schere“, „Defibrillator“. Die Sprache im
Operationssaal ist eine, die von vornherein, in ihrer Grundkonzeption, undabsichtlich einfachst gebaut ist: weil sie schnell und präzise sein muss, weil sie
keinen Platz für Missverständnisse lassen darf.
Eine andere Möglichkeit wäre für Wittgenstein gewesen, das Sprachmodell,das er anhand der Kommunikation von Bauarbeitern entwickelt hat, vonvornherein an den weiteren Anwendungszeck anzupassen. In § 6 nimmt

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Andreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen | Andreas Hämmerle

Wittgenstein erstmals wieder auf sein Modell aus § 2 Bezug und überhöht
diese primitive Sprache der Bauarbeiter zur „ganze[n] Sprache eines
Volksstamm[e]s“ (PU 2019: § 6). Nicht nur das, die Kinder werden in diesem
Volksstamm auch dazu erzogen, nur die Tätigkeiten aus § 2 zu verrichten (also
Häuser zu bauen oder anderen dabei zu helfen, Häuser zu bauen), und dabei
ausschließlich die vier Wörter „Würfel“, „Säule“, „Platte“ und „Balken“ zuverwenden (vgl. PU 2019: § 6). Das Modell wird ins Absurde gesteigert.
Wittgenstein hätte das Modell relativ einfach auch so gestalten können, dassdie in § 6 geplante Weiterführung nachvollziehbarer gewesen wäre. Ein Weg
wäre gewesen, das Modell gleich vom Kindlichen her zu denken. Jedes Kind ist
in seiner frühen Sprachentwicklung in einer Phase, in der nur wenige „Dinge“
namentlich benannt werden – Mama, Papa, Gurkerl, Wasser. Auf diesen recht
natürlichen und allgemein bekannten Benennungen hätte Wittgenstein
aufbauen können, um dann elegant in § 6 das Modell weiterzuentwickeln.
Oder aber Wittgenstein hätte das tribale Element von Anfang an als Basisverwendet: ein fiktiver Volksstamm, vielleicht auf einer Insel, mit einfachster
Syntax ausgestattet. Wenn diese Syntax lediglich aus einer Aneinanderreihung
von Substantiven besteht, dann hätte Ludwig Wittgenstein dieselbe
Versuchsanordnung zustande bekommen, die er in § 2 hergestellt hatte.

3 Das Erlernen einer primitiven Sprache (vgl. PU 2019: § 6)

Das Naheliegende war für Wittgenstein offensichtlich nicht zugänglich. Wirsind nun also in § 6 in der Versuchsanordnung bei einem Volksstamm, dessen
Sprache aus vier Wörtern besteht und wo die Kinder dieses Volksstammes
ausschließlich Bauarbeiten verrichten. Die Frage, die Wittgenstein nun
aufwirft, ist, wie die Kinder dieses Stammes die Sprache lernen.
Er führt dabei sein Beispiel aus § 2 fort, und dies ausgerechnet mit dem Begriff„Platte“. Warum „ausgerechnet“? Weil von den vier Benennungen Würfel,
Säule, Platte und Balken, „Platte“ wohl das unbestimmteste Ding ist. Wenn ich
Sie bitten würde, jeder für sich, einen Würfel zu zeichnen – die Ergebnisse
Ihrer Zeichnungen würden wahrscheinlich alle ungefähr wie ein Würfel
aussehen. Bei einer Säule würden Sie wahrscheinlich meist etwas
Zylindrisches zeichnen, bei einem Balken etwas, was wie ein längliches
Rechteck aussieht. Wie aber würden Sie eine Platte zeichnen? Ja, rechteckig, ja,

Andreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen | Andreas Hämmerle

flach. Aber würde eine Unbeteiligte zweifelsfrei beim Anblick Ihrer Skizze:„Das ist eine Platte“, konstatieren? Bei einem Würfel wäre das doch viel eher
der Fall.
Man mag einwenden: Es verändert das Beispiel nicht inhaltlich, ob nun„Platte“ oder „Würfel“ von Ludwig Wittgenstein verwendet wird. Nein, das tut
es nicht. Aber das Beispiel ist ja überhaupt nur für den Zweck eingeführt,Verständnis zu schaffen. Das Verständnis wiederum ist dann am Besten
gegeben, wenn das Beispiel so nah wie möglich an der Lebenswelt desAdressaten angesiedelt ist. Die „Platte“ ist aus der zur Verfügung stehenden
Auswahl – Würfel, Säule, Platte, Balken – wahrscheinlich jener Begriff, der vor
dem geistigen Auge am wenigsten klar umrissen ist.

4 Der Kaufmann und seine Tafel (vgl. PU 2019: § 1)

In weiterer Folge verbindet Wittgenstein dieses eine Beispiel der BaustellenVolksstamm-Sprache mit einem Beispiel aus dem ersten Paragraphen der
Philosophischen Untersuchungen: dem Kaufmann, der Äpfel verkaufen sollte.
Dieses Beispiel geht so: Ein Kunde ordert in einem Geschäft fünf rote Äpfel,
und dann:[D]er [Kaufmann] öffnet die Lade, auf welcher das Zeichen „Äpfel“ steht; dannsucht er in einer Tabelle das Wort „rot“ auf und findet ihm gegenüber ein
Farbmuster; nun sagt er die Reihe der Grundzahlwörter – ich nehme an, er
weiß sie auswendig – bis zum Worte „fünf“ und bei jedem Zahlwort nimmt er
einen Apfel aus der Lade, der die Farbe des Musters hat. – So, und ähnlich,
operiert man mit Worten. (PU 2019: § 1)
Es wäre das Beispiel leichter verkraftbar, wenn Wittgenstein nicht
nachgeschoben hätte: „So, und ähnlich, operiert man mit Worten“.
Unmittelbar, die Leserin kann den darauffolgenden Gedankengang gar nicht
verhindern, fragt sie sich: „So operiert man mit Worten?“
Wittgenstein setzt in diesem Beispiel Worte und Dinge zueinander in Bezug,
schafft damit ein Bezugssystem. Der Händler verfügt über ein Prüfverfahren,
das ihm ermöglicht, den Begriff – gemäß Wittgenstein: das Wort – mit Inhalt
zu hinterlegen. Mit dem gewählten Beispiel eines Händlers, der nur anhand

274

Andreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen | Andreas Hämmerleeines Prüfverfahrens den Inhalt seiner Verkaufsaufgabe erkennen kann, wird
diese abstraktes Bezugssystem und das damit verbundene Prüfverfahren
veranschaulicht. Die Phantasie des Lesers wird dabei aber arg in Anspruchgenommen.
Ein solches Prüfverfahren wäre eigentlich alltäglich beobachtbar: Eine
Schulklasse aus Baden bei Wien macht mit Ihrer Lehrerin einen Ausflug nach
Wien ins Kunsthistorische Museum. Sie fahren mit dem Zug. Die Lehrerin geht
zum Schalter und sagt der Mitarbeiterin der Badener Bahn, dass sie eine
Fahrkarte für 17 Schüler nach Wien kaufen möchte. Die Mitarbeiterin derBadener Bahn schaut auf, zählt die Klasse durch – eins, zwei, drei, vier ...
siebzehn –, versichert sich, dass die Kinder tatsächlich im schulpflichtigen
Alter sind und sucht aus der Tariftabelle den Preis für eine Fahrkarte Baden –Wien.
Mit diesem adaptierten Beispiel würde für uns tatsächlich sichtbar werden,„wie man mit Worten operiert“, um paraphrasierend bei Wittgenstein zu
bleiben (vgl. PU 2019: § 1). Worte bezeichnen, und was sie bezeichnen, ist
entweder klar oder muss über ein Zuordnungs- oder Prüfverfahren ermittelt
werden. Das Prüfverfahren der Fahrkartenverkäuferin ist ein alltägliches undAlltägliches ist leicht nachvollziehbar.
Es tut sich ein interessanter Zwiespalt auf: ein lebensnahes Beispiel lässt uns
besser verstehen. Das wittgensteinsche Beispiel mit dem listenabhängigen
Apfelverkäufer ist dafür so skurril, dass es im Gedächtnis haften bleibt wie
eine Klette am Steirergewand. Wollte Wittgenstein mit diesem Beispiel seinen
Gedanken erläutern, oder eher einen Wegpunkt im Gehirn der Leserin
markieren? Es könnte sein, dass er beides gewollt hatte, und wenn er es sogewollt hatte, dann hat er es auch geschafft.

5 Die Sprache wird erweitert, die beiden Sprachmuster aus § 2 und § 1 werden
miteinander verwoben (vgl. PU 2019: §§ 8-10)

Ludwig Wittgenstein fügt in weiterer Folge Elemente der beiden
Sprachmodelle zusammen. Er nimmt das Zahlwort aus dem Beispiel desAndreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Kaufmanns, dazu dessen Farbmuster. Weiters die Bezeichnungen für die
Bauelemente – Würfel, Säule, Platte, Balken – sowie zwei neue Worte:„dorthin“ und „dieses“, ein deiktisches Begriffspaar (vgl. PU 2019: § 8).
Die Beispiele befruchten einander aber leider nicht. Es ist lediglich ein
Vermischen von jenen Wortarten und Mechanismen, die in den beiden
Sprachmodellen zuvor eingeführt worden waren. Dieses Aufeinander-BezugNehmen ist auf Grund der weit auseinanderliegenden Narrative
wahrscheinlich auch gar nicht möglich. Vielleicht wäre es für das Verständnis
der Sprachmodelle hilfreich gewesen, Beispiele zu suchen, die miteinander in
irgendeiner Art und Weise verwandt gewesen wären.
Die beiden besprochenen Sprachbilder – der Kaufmann und die Bauarbeiter finden inhaltlich in den Paragraphen 9 und 10 ihr Ende. In § 9 denkt
Wittgenstein darüber nach, wie Zahlwörter und die deiktischen Worte„dorthin“ und „dieses“ gelehrt werden könnten. Er verwendet in diesem undim darauffolgenden Paragraphen als Beispiel für Zahlwörter tatsächlich
Buchstaben, nämlich ‚,a, b, c, ...“ (PU 2019: § 9). Was zu weiteren Einlassungeneinladen würde, was die Zugänglichkeit von Wittgenstein gewählten
Beispielen anlangt.
Ludwig Wittgenstein nimmt zwar später immer wieder auf diese zwei
Beispiele in den Paragraphen 2 und 8 Bezug, aber er entwickelt sie nicht
weiter. Er reichert die Beispiele nicht mehr mit weiteren Gedanken an, ererhöht nicht mehr deren Komplexität. Es folgen Erklärungen, die die
Modellhaftigkeit seiner Überlegungen mildern sollen: „Daß die Sprachen (2)und (8) nur aus Befehlen bestehen, laß dich nicht stören“ (PU 2019: § 18), oder,an anderer Stelle: „Man kann sich leicht eine Sprache vorstellen, die nur aus
Befehlen und Meldungen in der Schlacht besteht“ (PU 2019: § 19).
Die Beispiele sind in weiterer Folge nur mehr ein Reservoir an Vokabeln. So
wird das Wort „Platte“ von Ludwig Wittgenstein für Überlegungen zum
Aufbau eines Satzes verwendet, z. B. in § 19 und in § 20. Für das Verständnis
des Lesers wäre es aber egal, wenn er in diesen Absätzen statt „Bring mir eine
Platte“, „Pflück mir einen Löwenzahn“ verwenden würde. Erlauben Sie mir,den Beweis dieser Behauptung anhand des § 20 der Philosophischen
Untersuchungen zu führen:

276

Andreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen | Andreas Hämmerle

Aber wenn nun Einer sagt „Pflück mir einen Löwenzahn!“ [imwittgensteinschen Original: „Bring mir eine Platte!“], so scheint es ja jetzt,
als könnte er diesen Ausdruck als ein langes Wort meinen: entsprechend
nämlich dem einen Wort „Löwenzahn!“ [im Original: Platte!]. [...] Ich
glaube wir werden geneigt sein, zu sagen: Wir meinen den Satz als einenvon vier Wörtern, wenn wir ihn im Gegensatz zu andern Sätzen
gebrauchen, wie „Reich mir einen Löwenzahn zu“, „Bring ihm einen
Löwenzahn“, „Bring zwei Löwenzahne“ [im Original jeweils: Platte], etc.;
also im Gegensatz zu Sätzen, welche die Wörter unseres Befehls in
anderen Verbindungen enthalten. (PU 2019: § 20, kursive Hervorhebungen
im Original)
Es ist bemerkenswert. Genau jenen Begriff, der von den Sachbezeichnungen
am wenigsten bildlich fassbar ist, nämlich die Platte, verwendet Wittgenstein
zur Verbildlichung neuer Gedankengänge.

6 Conclusio

Wittgensteins Beispiele sind ein wichtiger Bestandteil seines Werks und trotz
ihrer Sperrigkeit bleiben sie im Gedächtnis haften – vielleicht auch gerade
deswegen. Die Beispiele weichen oft von gewohnten Denkwegen ab, sindmanchmal sogar bis ins Absurde übersteigert. Sie bleiben dadurch
klettengleich im Philosophenhirn haften und verhelfen im besten Fall zu
neuen Gedanken.
Wittgensteins Beispiele zu verwenden und sie in eine persönliche und heutige
Sphäre zu transferieren, hilft für das Verständnis von WittgensteinsArgumenten.
Durch das genaue Hinsehen, durch die Auseinandersetzung mit den einzelnen
Bestandteilen der Beispiele können die wittgensteinschen Beispiele in ihrer
spezifischen Qualität besser wahrgenommen werden.
Wenn dieses Verständnis einmal erarbeitet ist, ist es wohl das Richtige, die
Beispiele wieder an ihren Platz zu rücken, Ludwig Wittgenstein zuzunickenund „Nichts für ungut“ zu sagen.

Andreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen | Andreas Hämmerle

References
Kroß, Matthias (1999): "Philosophieren in Beispielen. Wittgensteins Umdenken desAllgemeinen", in: Hans Julius Schneider und Matthias Kroß (Hg.): Mit Sprache spielen. Die
Ordnungen und das Offene nach Wittgenstein. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 169–187.
Marcuschi, Luiz Antônio (1976): Die Methode des Beispiels. Untersuchungen über die
methodische Funktion des Beispiels in der Philosophie, insbesonder bei Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Erlangen: Palm & Enke (= Erlanger Studien).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2019): Werkausgabe. Band 1. Tractatus logico-philosophicus / Tagebücher
1914-1916 / Philosophische Untersuchungen. Für die vorliegende Ausgabe wurde der Text neu
durchgesehen von Joachim Schulte. 23. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (= Suhrkamp
Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 501) [zitiert mit Siglen: TLP 2019, TB 2019 oder PU 2019].
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2021): Über Gewißheit. Für die vorliegende Ausgabe wurde der Text neu
durchgesehen von Joachim Schulte. 17. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (= SuhrkampTaschenbuch Wissenschaft, 508) [zitiert mit Sigle: ÜG 2021].

278

Andreas Hämmerle, "Von Beispielen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics | David Hommen

Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics
David Hommen (Düsseldorf, Germany)
Abstract
In his famous rule-following considerations, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a word(the technique of its use) can never be learned with the help of interpretations or explanations
alone, but only through a direct exposure to and perception of its external criteria of use.
Wittgenstein’s account of semantic understanding thus presupposes a theory of perceptionthat enables language users to recognize the objective application conditions of words. It isargued that Wittgenstein’s numerous remarks on perceptual recognition are intended toprovide just such a theory. In particular, his discussion of the phenomenon of aspect
perception is meant to avert Cartesian models of the perceptual process and concomitant
skeptical concerns about the cognizability of objective features in the world. It will be shownthat the ability to perceive aspects underlies not only our basic conceptualizations of things
but also more sophisticated efforts at understanding, which Wittgenstein develops under thenotion of surveyable representation. This even suggests a novel approach to metaphysics: onein which surveyable representations of our general world experience can yield objective
world knowledge, even if that knowledge must remain to some extent preconceptual and thus
in some sense ineffable.

1. Semantic Understanding

According to the later Wittgenstein, understanding the meaning of a word
essentially consists in mastering the technique of its use (cf. Z: §418), which is a
specific case of what Wittgenstein calls “following a rule” (PI 2009: §199).
Accordingly, the question of how to acquire such an understanding becomes
the question of how to learn to follow the appropriate rule. In this regard,
Wittgenstein famously argues that the answer cannot be that one learns tofollow a rule correctly by interpreting (defining, explaining) it. For such aninterpretation would be nothing but another rule specifying how to follow the
first one, and that would only raise the question of how one learns to correctly
follow that rule, and so on. The converse argument then says that there must
be “a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, fromcase to case of application, is exhibited in what we call ‘following the rule’ and‘going against it’” (PI 2009: §201). So, “‘following a rule’ is a practice” (PI 2009:§202).
Wittgenstein’s conclusion has led many commentators to impute to him apurely conventionalist theory of meaning and a kind of “linguistic
idealism” (cf. Anscombe 1981: 112) that acknowledges the social reality of alinguistic community but maintains that all features of the natural world areDavid Hommen, "Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics | David Hommen

constructed solely by the linguistic activities of the members of that
community. It has certainly contributed to this reading that Wittgenstein’s
remarks are also directed against privatist views according to which rulefollowers can determine the correct execution of a rule solely on the basis of
their own interpretation of it. Such views would amount to everyone acting
according or contrary to a rule whenever they think they are doing so. In thisway, any action could be brought into accord or conflict with any rule, thus
eliminating any distinction between correct and incorrect following of a rule,
which would make nonsense of the whole idea of rule-following (cf. PI 2009:§201). Hence, “it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’” (PI 2009: §202).
The point of Wittgenstein’s argument, however, is much more general. For if
individual agents cannot learn to follow a rule correctly by forming aninterpretation of that rule, then others will not be able to teach them thecorrect following by giving them an interpretation either. Wittgenstein’s
momentous insight is that no rule, whether articulated privately or publicly,
can of its own determine its proper application. What is additionally required
for mastering the correct use of a rule, according to Wittgenstein, are concrete
examples and paradigmatic applications of the rule: “Not only rules, but also
examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes
open, and the practice has to speak for itself.” (OC: §139)
Wittgenstein’s point can be restated in terms of linguistic understanding. In his
opinion, the meaning of no word can ever be completely stated. For such astatement would have to be articulated in a language. Thus, it would amountto nothing else than the substitution of one sign by another – which in turnwould have to be replaced by further signs in order to express its meaning, ad
infinitum. In all efforts to assert the meaning of a word, therefore, one will hit
upon a residue of inarticulable meaning: “The inexpressible […] provides the
background, against which whatever I was able to express acquires
meaning.” (CV: 23) At the “limits of language” (PI 2009, §119), one is forced toconvey a word’s meaning by exposing the learner head-on to what the wordmeans, namely, the thing or feature it denotes or describes:

280

David Hommen, "Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics | David Hommen[I]f a person has not yet got the concepts, I’ll teach him to use the words bymeans of examples and by exercises […]. In the course of this teaching, I’ll
show him the same colours, the same lengths, the same shapes; I’ll makehim find them and produce them; and so on. (PI 2009: §208)
On the part of the learner, the ability to acquire the meaning of a word
presupposes the ability to detect when the standard conditions of the word’s
correct application are present in a particular situation (cf. PI 2009: §72). Thisability, however, cannot be thought of as involving linguistic representationsof those application conditions (on pain of an infinite regress). Rather, it is tobe regarded as a preconceptual, perceptual responsiveness to them. As
Wittgenstein puts it, “we recognize normal circumstances but cannot precisely
describe them” (OC, §27).

2. Aspect Perception

Now, Wittgenstein’s remarks leave some questions to be answered. To solve
the rule-following paradox, the Wittgensteinian account of semantic
understanding requires a theory of perception that enables language users torecognize the objective application conditions of words with sufficientreliability. Wittgenstein is aware that such a theory cannot perpetuate thetraditional Cartesian model, which interposes epistemic intermediaries (suchas mental images or sense data) between the perceiving subject and the objectsof its perception; for such intermediaries would themselves first have to bechecked for their credibility and thus could not by themselves provide theperceiver with any evidence that what is perceived actually exists in the way it
is perceived (cf. PG: §118; BBB: 85–9; RPP I: §698). Wittgenstein’s conclusion isthat the perception of a word’s objective conditions of application must be
immediate:
If I’m told: “look for a red flower in this meadow and bring it to me” andthen I find one – do I compare it with my memory picture of the colour
red? – And must I consult yet another picture to see whether the first is
still correct? – In that case why should I need the first one? – I see thecolour of the flower and recognize it. (PG: §54)

David Hommen, "Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics | David Hommen

Hence, Wittgenstein conceives perceptual recognition as direct “familiarity [Wohlbekanntheit]” (PG: §37). This familiarity consists in an “intransitive
knowledge” (ibid.) of what something is or how it is (cf. PG: §115). It is not an
occurrent feeling but manifests itself in the perceiving subject’s skillfulinteraction with the object of its perception (cf. BBB: 127–9.; PI 2009: §596; RPP
II: §120–4.). This may include verbal reactions on the part of the subject.
However, these are not to be understood as conscious applications of words tothe perceptual situation according to certain linguistic conventions, but rather
as primitive behavioral expressions of the subject’s familiarity with thissituation (cf. PG, §116).
In this direct familiarity with a word’s standard conditions of application,
then, Wittgenstein finds the necessary objective basis of all semantic
understanding. There is, however, a complication. For Wittgenstein concedesthat sometimes one and the same things can be seen in several different ways
(cf. PI 2009: §74). In this context, Wittgenstein particularly refers to thephenomenon of “noticing an aspect” (PI 2009: 203) or “seeing-as” (PI 2009: 216).
Aspects are what someone notices who, e.g., sees a likeness in two faces (cf. PI
2009: 203), an ambiguous image once as a rabbit, once as a duck (cf. PI 2009:204), or a human figure in a puzzle-picture (cf. PI 2009: 206). What is noticed insuch experiences are not (previously overlooked) parts or properties of theperceived objects, but a particular organization or configuration of their partsand properties – a gestalt that ultimately determines just what kind of thing
one sees in those objects (cf. ibid.).
The peculiar experience of seeing things at once unchanged and yet different(cf. PI 2009: 203) suggests that in aspect perception a “fusion” (PI 2009: 208) ofseeing and thinking takes place – which on the one hand makes the noticing of
aspects phenomenologically akin to a passive-perceptive state (cf. RPP I: §8),but on the other hand also assimilates it to a deliberate act of interpretation:“‘The aspect is subject to the will.’ […] It makes sense to say, ‘See this circle as ahole, not as a disc’ […].” (RPP II: §545) It is this putatively arbitrary
interpretative nature of aspect perception that prompts a reintroduction of the
Cartesian model of perception – and a renewed skepticism about thepossibility of objective world knowledge. Aspects seem to be, not objective
features of the things perceived, but rather subjective ways of perceiving those
things: “It is as if one had brought a concept to what one sees, and one now

282David Hommen, "Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics | David Hommen

sees the concept along with the thing. It is itself hardly visible, and yet it
spreads an ordering veil over the objects.” (RPP I: §961; cf. RPP I: §899) This
result, however, leads straight back into the rule-following paradox. Not only
do perceptions of aspects seem to be conceptually shaped – they also seem tolack the necessary objectivity to provide language users with epistemic accessto the correctness conditions of their word usage.
Wittgenstein, however, manages to avoid this aporia. In fact, his analysis of
aspect perception is much less constructivist than is commonly (cf., e.g., Baz:
2000) assumed. He does say: “If I am describing an aspect, the description
presupposes concepts which do not belong to the description of the figure
itself.” (RPP I: §1030) However, Wittgenstein makes it clear that the concepts
used to describe the aspects of an object are not to be understood in theirordinary sense, but take on a novel meaning in their application to the object
whose aspects are described:
The epithet “sad”, as applied, for example, to the face of a stick-figure,characterizes the grouping of lines in an oval. Applied to a human being, it
has a different (though related) meaning. (PI 2009: 220; cf. LW: §§742, 748)
Thus, the concepts employed in the description of aspects do characterizeobjective features of objects – just not in a literal way. Yet, Wittgenstein also
clarifies that the nonliteral meaning of these concepts cannot be paraphrased
in other terms (as in the case of ordinary ambiguity): “[I]f it amounted to this, I
ought to know it. I ought to be able to refer to the experience directly, and not
only indirectly.” (PI 2009: 204; cf. PI 2009: 211) As Wittgenstein says, the use of
the concepts in an aspect description is “a secondary one” (PI 2009: §282),
which cannot be explained but in terms of their primary meaning (cf. PI 2009:227) – so that only someone who knows the primary meaning of these concepts
can use them in this secondary meaning (cf. ibid.).
In its secondary meaning, a word is used to describe an object in analogy to theobjects to which the word is applied in its primary meaning. However, theanalogy does not take the form of an explicit simile, in which the analogized
objects are first described in their own terms and then their analogies arestated, but rather the form of a metaphorical redescription of the object interms of the other objects, which hints at its analogous features without being

David Hommen, "Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics | David Hommen

able to articulate them directly (cf. PI 2009: 192). The secondary meaning of aword thus turns out to be ineffable in an important sense. What is expressedby it, the aspect of an object, is not something that could be literally said just as
well, or even better, in other terms, but rather something that is poeticallyevoked “only by these words in these positions” (PI 2009: §531). In the end, it isa meaning that is grasped only through a direct acquaintance with the object
to which the word in this secondary meaning applies:
When I look at a genre-picture, it ‘tells’ me something, even though I don’t
believe (imagine) for a moment that the people I see in it really exist, orthat there have really been people in that situation. For suppose I ask, “What does it tell me, then?”“A picture tells me itself” is what I’d like to say. That is, its telling me
something consists in its own structure, in its own forms and colours. (PI2009: §§522–3)
What one becomes acquainted with in the perception of an aspect, inparticular, is “an internal relation” (PI 2009: 223) between the perceived object
and other objects (e.g., pertinent similarities between the painted people in thegenre-picture and real people). Again, “the substratum” of this experience is
not a subjective feeling, but rather “the mastery of a technique” (PI 2009: 219).
For example, someone who sees a certain figure as a face can engage with it insome respects as with a human face: study its expression, react to it as to theexpression of the human face, etc. (cf. PI 2009: 204, 213). The repurposing ofcertain words to describe the perceived aspect can also be considered amanifestation of this capacity. As in the case of perceptual recognition,
however, the application of these words to the given situation is not to beunderstood as a considered judgment, but more like a spontaneous
exclamation (cf. RPP I: §§125–6; RPP II: §574).

3. Metaphysics

Perceptual recognition and aspect perception, in the sense of a directfamiliarity with the features of the objects of application of words, thus form
the objective basis of all linguistic practice, indeed of all conceptual-cognitiveendeavors. As it turns out, aspect perception plays a particularly important

284

David Hommen, "Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics | David Hommenrole in learning the correct use of family terms. As Wittgenstein notes, suchterms are applied to their diverse instances not on the basis of essential
features common to them all, but on the basis of complex similarity relations
between them (cf. PI 2009: §67). The implicit cognition of these “family
resemblances” (PI 2009: §68) is what precedes and justifies the application ofsuch terms to novel cases. Whether these reapplications are ultimately judged
to be metaphorical, or whether the novel cases are incorporated into the literalmeaning of the term, is more of a pragmatic consideration for Wittgenstein (cf.
BBB: 139–40) – both uses are grounded in the same mechanism of aspect
perception.
Wittgenstein even extends the principle of analogical thinking based on theperception of aspects to a philosophical method of understanding, which hecalls “surveyable representation [übersichtliche Darstellung]” (PI 2009: §122).
Wittgenstein originally introduces this method to account for sociocultural (cf.
RF: 133), later linguistic phenomena (which are a species of social phenomena)(cf. PI 2009: §122). But he also likens scientific explanations of natural
phenomena to surveyable representations in his sense (cf. CV: 26). As with theperception of aspects and the cognition of family resemblances, theunderstanding attained through such representations consists in “seeing
connections” (PI 2009: §122) between the phenomena under consideration andother phenomena that are not already evident from the description of thephenomena alone. And like the secondary use of words for the description of
aspects and the application of family concepts to novel cases, surveyable
representations elicit this understanding by invoking objects of comparison, socalled “intermediate links [Zwischenglieder]” (PI 2009: §122), whose sole
purpose is to “direct the attention to the similarity, the relatedness, of the facts” (RF: 133) and thereby “throw light on features” (PI 2009: §130) of thephenomena in question.
Given its anchoring in basal conceptualization processes and, ultimately, theperception of aspects, which in turn consists in a direct (albeit tacit) familiarity
with objective features and relations in the real world, Wittgenstein’s
surveyable representation constitutes a genuinely epistemic method of
understanding. One may even discern in it the outlines of a new methodology
for metaphysics understood as the philosophical inquiry into the fundamental
nature of reality. The metaphysician, according to Wittgenstein, is somebody

David Hommen, "Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics | David Hommen

who feels constrained by the categorial limitations of ordinary language (cf.
BBB: 59). Their interest, then, is to develop new conceptual schemes that will
enable them to adopt more expedient world-coping strategies (cf. ibid.). This
they can achieve, says Wittgenstein, by means of a surveyable representationof their world experience which, through innovative analogies and metaphors,
reveals aspects of reality that have hitherto gone unnoticed due to deadlocked
and one-sided interpretations (cf. BBB: 28): “To resolve these philosophicalproblems one has to compare things which it has never seriously occurred toanyone to compare.” (RFM, VII, §15) Such a surveyable representation would
generate, as it were, unadulterated knowledge of the structures of reality. The
price for this authenticity, of course, would be that ultimately this knowledge
could not be spoken, but only shown. A ‘Wittgensteinian metaphysics’envisaged in this way would thus bring the philosopher into a contact with theworld which is at once particularly direct and particularly elusive.
References
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981) From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Baz, Avner (2000) “What’s the Point of Seeing Aspects?”, Philosophical Investigations 23, 97–121.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1969) Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”.
Generally Known as The Blue and Brown Books, 2nd edition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974a) On Certainty, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright,
translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, reprinted with corrections and indices, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974b) Philosophical Grammar, edited by Rush Rhees, translated by
Anthony Kenny, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1978) Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, edited by G.H. vonWright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd edition, revised
and reset, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1980) Culture and Value, edited by G.H. von Wright with Heikki Nyman,translated by Peter Winch, amended 2nd edition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1993) “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough”, in: James C. Klagge andAlfred Nordmann (eds.)Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951, Indianapolis
and Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 115–155.

286

David Hommen, "Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics | David Hommen

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998a) Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, edited by
G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, translated by C.G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A.E. Aue,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998b) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, edited by G.E.M.
Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998c) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, edited by G.H.
von Wright and Heikki Nyman, translated by C.G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A.E. Aue. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998d) Zettel, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright,
translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009) Philosophical Investigations / Philosophische Untersuchungen,edited by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker
and Joachim Schulte, New York: Wiley.
Acknowledgement
Funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – Project
number 452319975.

David Hommen, "Semantic Understanding, Aspect Perception, and Metaphysics". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy | Reza Hosseini

Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the
Socratic Tradition of Philosophy
Reza Hosseini (Sandton, South Africa)
Abstract
The latest edition of Wittgenstein’s Koder Diaries was published recently under the title of:Movements of Thought (Rowman & Littlefield 2023). The book is a translation of a manuscriptthat was handwritten by Wittgenstein over seven years from 1930 to 1937. Koder Diaries was
first published by Ilse Somavilla in 1997 in German. The English translations of the diaries areboth based on Somavilla’s edition. As indicated by editors, James C. Klagge and Alfred
Nordmann, this notebook is “unusual” in the sense that it contains “both personal andphilosophical remarks.” In encountering such convergence of philosophical and personal
notes one is bound to revisit a contentious point in Wittgenstein philosophy: His style ofwriting. In what follows, I situate Wittgenstein’s remarks in the tradition of philosophy as
spiritual exercises and I argue that contrary to Wittgenstein’s misjudgement about the roleand the impact of the Socratic conception of philosophy, embodied in Socrates’ definitional
dialogues, his own way of doing philosophy shares much in common both in terms oforientation and rhetorical style with the writings of Socratic philosophers from Plato to Henry
Thoreau. Specifically, I argue that the convergence of philosophical and personal remarks in
Wittgenstein’s handwritten manuscripts is on the whole the result of writing in the form ofhypomnemata or private notes or exhortations to the self with the intention of capturing the
movements of thought and, more importantly, practicing askesis, or working on oneself
according to an ideal of wisdom.

Reading the Socratic dialogues, one has the feeling: what a frightful wasteof time! What's the point of these arguments that prove nothing & clarify
nothing. (Culture and Value, p. 21)
Most commentators on the tradition of philosophy as spiritual exercises allude
to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s contribution, usually as they list the names ofphilosophers whose works can be situated within the tradition of philosophy
as spiritual exercises. (Hadot, 1995, 1998; Nehamas 1998; Sharpe & Ure 2021)
But what is the exact nature of such contribution and in what sense does his“work on philosophy” follows the Socratic conception of philosophy as “workon oneself”? With few exceptions, commentators often refer to Wittgenstein’s
conception of philosophy as “working on oneself” without acknowledging thedirect link between such conception of philosophy and the central role ofaskesis or working on oneself based on an ideal of wisdom in the Socratic
tradition (Cf. Conant 2001, 2019; Sunday Grève 2015). As a result of suchdisconnection Wittgenstein scholars often present his approach to philosophy
as a rather idiosyncratic and anachronistic way of doing philosophy, marked

288

Reza Hosseini, "Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy | Reza Hosseiniby the intense commitment to the clarity of vision and moral decency. (Monk
2001: 12) A long generation of Wittgenstein enthusiasts who lionized him as
the revolutionary who wanted to do away with the history of philosophy in his
search for a new method, a new “way of looking” at the problems ofphilosophy were culprits in creating the image of Wittgenstein as a “pureincarnation of the anti-philosopher.” (Conant 2019: 249) One might say,
Wittgenstein himself had his share of entertaining the idea that if we look at
philosophy as an “activity” and not a “body of doctrine” then perhaps we could
move away from such doctrines. But the idea of philosophy as an activity or
exercise did not begin with Wittgenstein and his famous characterization ofphilosophy as “work on oneself” in Culture and Value is a variation of the
Socratic notion of philosophy as “care of the soul” (Laches 186e3). In what
follows, I argue that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy has much incommon with a longstanding tradition in the history of philosophy that can betraced back to Socrates’ elenctic method of enquiry. One might suggest, there isa connecting link between the goal of the same dialogues which allegedly left
Wittgenstein unimpressed, and the manner in which Wittgenstein subjected
himself to self-examination, as recorded in his manuscripts. Consider, forexample, Plato’s characterization of the Socratic method of refutation and its
impact on the interlocutors. As he writes in Sophist of those who:
Cross-examine someone when he thinks he’s saying something though he’s
saying nothing. … They collect his opinions together during the discussion,
put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each other. . . The
people who are being examined see this, get angry at themselves, andbecome calmer toward others. They lose their inflated and rigid beliefs
about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has a more
lasting effect on them. Doctors who work on the body think it can’t benefit
from any food that’s offered to it until what’s interfering with it frominside is removed. The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend,
likewise think the soul, too, won’t get any advantage from any learningthat’s offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it, removes theopinions that interfere with learning, and exhibits it cleansed. (Sophist,230b-d4)
Wittgenstein’s commitment to establish “once and for all” that often
philosophers say nothing though they think they are “saying something” is a

Reza Hosseini, "Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy | Reza Hosseini

notable feature of his early works. Likewise, dismantling one’s “inflated andrigid beliefs” about oneself remains at the core of his private notes, as
exemplified in the alarming exhortation that “The edifice of your pride has tobe dismantled. And that means frightful work.” (1998:30; all italics in theoriginal text)
The recent publication of Movements of Thought with its intertwined
sequencing of personal and philosophical entries is an invite to revisit
Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections and the variety of ways he was
implementing and making use of established genres and rhetorical methods inthe tradition of philosophy as spiritual exercises. Specifically, I argue that
Wittgenstein’s text should be viewed as belonging to the genre of hypomnemata
or notes to the self and that one can identify common themes between hisnotes and the writings of Socratic philosophers. I refer to Socratic tradition
and the tradition of philosophy as spiritual exercises interchangeably. Some ofthese recurring themes include self-knowledge and the cost of acquiring it, theimplications of seeing (and not seeing) the world religiously, the primacy ofpraxis, despair and the role of writing in alleviating it, writing as a form of
inner dialogue with the self, and the joy of writing as the joy of life. Though it
is beyond the limits of this paper to flesh out these commonalities, I try to
allude to them where relevant.
In his Introduction to Movements of Thought, Ray Monk highlights the“formative influence” of Otto Weininger’s conception of genius as “the highest
morality” on Wittgenstein’s thought. (2023: 2) There is no doubt that Monk’sclassic biography of Wittgenstein, The Duty of Genius, offers a revealing
account of Wittgenstein’s works and days but it seems to me that his narrativeof Wittgenstein as a tormented “genius” can only partially explain the affinity
between his conception of philosophy and the works of Socratic philosophers.
Intriguing as it might be, the tendency to categorize Wittgenstein with the tired
narrative of a genius who was consumed by spiritual and philosophicalproblems and yet offered pseudo-religious or poetic solutions to “the problemof life” fail to do justice to the depth of Wittgenstein’s contribution to a longstanding philosophical tradition.
Wittgenstein’s handwritten manuscripts follow the standard norms of thegenre of hypomnemata or “notes written on a daily basis for the author’s

290

Reza Hosseini, "Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy | Reza Hosseini

personal use” (Hadot 1995: 179). As Hadot argues on another occasion,
hypomnemata can be defined as “private writings,” “notes not yet quite revisedfor publication and lacking a title” or “personal notes taken on a day-to-day
basis.” (Hadot 1998: 24; 30-31) Some of these notes could be taken out of their
original context and disseminated for public use. For example, Wittgenstein's
first book, Tractatus is on the whole based on his notebooks from 1914 to 1916.
When we compare the two, paying attention to what he transfers to the bookand what he leaves out says something important about his style. Notably, inthe process of selection Wittgenstein follows a strategy aligned with his
general aesthetic preference to say less, to not “utter” “what is
unutterable.” (Monk 1990: 151)
Hypomnemata, in this view, provides a space for personal utterances, anopportunity to situate oneself in the midst of life and capture what is usually
revealed in the actual process of writing. As such, in the very act of writing
down one’s thoughts one creates a space for an inner dialogue with oneself, inorder to get clarity about one’s motives and intentions, to reflect on the eventsof the day and capture ideas in their most basic form for future references.
Clarity of vision is a process even if it seems to dawn instantly. As he writes in
his diaries,
It takes extraordinarily long until something is clear to me. —This is true invarious spheres. My relation to others, for example, always becomes clear tome only after a long time. It is as if it took colossally long for the large patch offog to recede & the object itself to become visible. But during this time, I am
not even quite clearly aware of my unclarity. And all of a sudden, I then see
how the matter really is or was. (21)
Writing, in this view, is an act of “courage” (16) as it indicates one’s willingness
to record, that is, to encounter one’s innermost conflicts and confusions.
Wittgenstein’s famous moment of realizing “There is no one here,” (86) is such
moment of clarity in his diaries. With regards to his “religious questions” inthe diaries, mainly in the Norwegian winter of 1937, it is beyond the scope of
this paper to discuss the far-reaching implications of Wittgenstein’s
sympathetic approach to a religious solution but one cannot help thinking ofwhat Brian Clack calls a “regrettable” feature of Wittgenstein scholarship: The
tendency to “find in Wittgenstein’s writings” what one expects to find there

Reza Hosseini, "Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy | Reza Hosseini“rather than what is actually there” (Clack 2001:12). What is unfortunate is our
failure to appreciate his remarks in the contexts where his reflections havebeen documented: the intimate space of a friendly conversation or in theprivate space of a notebook meant for “personal use”.
In so far as Movements of Thought is concerned, if we situate and examine hisremarks in their original habitat, as private notes or exhortations to himself
we would be in a much-informed position to assess the connecting links
between what James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann have aptly called
Wittgenstein’s public and private occasions. In these exchanges of different
voices at the moments of vulnerability and “unstable equilibrium,” (76) one
could see a clear example of practicing self-examination and care of the soul.
As such, the most personal notes allude to a universal “tendency in the humanmind” (Wittgenstein 1965:12) to ask: “How do you go through this life?” (94) His
personal exhortations are not there to be used or abused for theologicaldiscussions about fideism or divine hiddenness. The way we receive thesenotes, with a sense of appreciation for their personal tone, and sensitive to thefact that we are in the immediate presence of a person capturing their dailyreflections, is identical to the way we receive meditations of philosophers in
the Socratic tradition of philosophy as spiritual exercises. Hadot’s account ofMarcus Aurelius’ private notes can be extended to Wittgenstein’s too. Upon
encountering Aurelius’ private exhortations:
we feel a highly particular emotion when we enter, as it were, into thespiritual intimacy of a soul's secrets, and are thus directly associated withthe efforts of a man who, fascinated by the only thing necessary – theabsolute value of moral good – is trying to do what, in the last analysis, weare all trying to do: to live in complete consciousness and lucidity; to give
each of our instants its fullest intensity; and to give meaning to our entire
life . Marcus is talking to himself, but we get the impression that he istalking to each one of us. (Hadot 1998: 313)
Likewise, in his personal notes, which is aptly entitled Movements of Thought,
Wittgenstein is indeed addressing himself but we have good reasons to believethat he is at the same time saying something about our lives. In this view, thephilosopher-king and the “beggar who sometimes reluctantly admits that he isno king,” (100) in their moments of receptivity, reflect on questions and292

Reza Hosseini, "Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy | Reza Hosseiniconcerns accessible and applicable to many of us. We as the audience or theinterlocutors of these exhortations find that their nuanced questions andobservations of life are directed at us as well. For example, he writes, “A goodword from someone or a friendly smile has a lasting effect on me.” (22) But thequestion is do I extend the same friendly smile to others? He realizes later onthat his judging attitude towards people “unless their appearance ordemeanour makes a special impression on me,” (73) is devoid of good words
and friendly smile: “A completely unfounded & unjustified judgment.” (73)Now, on the one hand, there is a conflict or tension that needs to be resolved,
and, on the other, there is the unsettling realization that “Hardly any one of
my remarks that reproach me is written entirely without the feeling that atleast it is nice that I see my faults.” (66) That is, the acknowledgment of a
deficiency in the soul could be just an imitation of integrity and as such it is
not “part of one’s new life.” (16)
Likewise, in the diaries one could notice the weight and influence of letters on
Wittgenstein’s reflections: “Offensive” letters, “kind” letters, “confession”
letters, “late” letters, “last” letters, “dear letters,” “touching” letters, farewell
letters, “family” letters and all sorts of innuendos of day-to-day humancommunications that need to be accounted for. Letters, back then, were able tocreate “upheaval,” (30) or defuse tensions: kisses that were dodged in the heatof "another serious conversation," dismissive glances, and the understatedshame of realizing that we are no longer “good & tender as in earlier
days.” (30) He needs his writings to be an exercise in understanding “thehuman heart” (82) and not an exercise in cleverness.
In conclusion, one might say, in line with the norms of hypomnemata,Wittgenstein’s manuscripts were a place to record not only his philosophicalreflections but also to capture fleeting thoughts about life in their relations to
his own moral demeanour. In the absence of Socratic dialogues, or perhaps asan alternative to it, hypomnemata is a form of askesis or working on oneself
according to an ideal of wisdom. As for Wittgenstein, it was a private platform“to discuss virtue every day” (Apology 38) not in the agora but in the quiet
space of “a new page” (26), at the end of “a difficult day,” (86) or after looking
at “Northern Lights” in awe. “For first one must live.” (94)

Reza Hosseini, "Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy | Reza Hosseini

References
Clack, Brian (2001) “Wittgenstein and Magic,” in Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion, ed. R.
L. Arrington & M. Addis, London: Routledge, pp. 12-28.
Conant, James (2001) “Biography and Philosophy”, in Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy,
ed. James C. Klagge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 16-50.
Conant, James (2019) “Some Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy,” in
Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning, ed. James Conant & Sebastian Sunday,
Cambridge University Press. pp. 231-264.
Hadot, Pierre (1995) Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Around Davidson, trans. Michael Chase,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Hadot, Pierre (2001) The Inner Citadel: Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Michael Chase,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Monk, Ray (1990) Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, New York: The Free Press.
Monk, Ray (2001) “Philosophical Biography: The Very Idea,” in Wittgenstein: Philosophy and
Biography, ed. James C. Klagge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-15.
Nehamas, Alexander (1998) The Art of Living: Socratics Reflections from Plato to Foucault, Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
Plato (1997) Complete Works, ed. John Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company.
Sharpe, Matthew & Ure, Michael (2021) Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions,
Directions, London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Sunday Grève, Sebastian (2015) “The Importance of Understanding Each Other in Philosophy,”
Philosophy 90 (2):213-239.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1965) “A Lecture on Ethics” The Philosophical Review 74, 3–12.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1997) Denkbewegungen, ed. Ilse Somavilla, Innsbruck: Haymon.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) Culture and Value, revised ed. Alois Pichler, trans. Peter Winch,
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2023) Movements of Thought: Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Diary, 1930-1932
and 1936-1937, ed. James Klagge, trans. Alfred Nordmann, New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

294

Reza Hosseini, "Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought: Hypomnemata, and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity | Christopher Hoyt

Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity
Christopher Hoyt (Cullowhee, NC, United States)
Abstract
Despite Wittgenstein’s cogent work dissolving the problem of other minds, a lot of philosophy,
psychology, and lay thinking continues to labor under the delusion that minds are private
phenomena hidden inside our bodies. As Peter Hacker discusses in a recent essay, this mistake
has the dismal effect of leading us down many wrong paths in our efforts to understandothers and ourselves more clearly. It is the human condition to find others and ourselves
opaque sometimes, and the progress we can make towards understanding each other better
depends on our properly understanding the nature of our difficulties. Instead, countless
philosophers and psychologists continue to proffer bogus theories of internal mental
mechanisms that falsify the realities of our lived experiences. In this essay, I pursue a line ofthought regarding the origins of language and human forms of life suggested by Wittgensteinin certain of his remarks. By looking at how our psychological language and forms of life
likely evolved from the time of the earliest hominids, we might hope to shift our perspectiveon the nature of mind in such a direction that the folly of the problem of other minds isapparent, and the real nature of human opacity is clarified.

In a recent essay, Peter Hacker argues that the real reasons that other people
can be opaque to us, why their thoughts, feelings, and motivations can be so
hard to know, have been obscured in philosophy and psychology by theirfailure to properly settle the problem of other minds (Hacker 2022). Other
people are so hard to understand, the confused view claims, because theirminds are hidden away within their bodies beyond direct observation.
Furthermore, people are often inscrutable to themselves and all the more
inscrutable to others because certain portions of our private minds areconcealed in the doubly-secret chamber of the unconscious (and, for Freud, thepreconscious as well). Hacker follows Wittgenstein’s lead and lays out an
account that reminds us that something like the reverse is true: it is because
the aspects of life that we engage in when talking about our mental lives are socomplicated and uncertain that we are tempted to posit hidden phenomena.
The facts themselves lie “right before our eyes” (Wittgenstein, Culture andValue 1994, 8), so to say, but they are not the sort of facts that can be neatly
cataloged and summed.
The assumption that other people are so hard to understand because theirinteriors are hidden from view has the damaging effect of blinding us to thereal nature of our interpersonal difficulties. Hacker writes, “When Romeoavows his passionate love for Juliet, it would be risible to assert that she

Christopher Hoyt, "Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity | Christopher Hoyt

conjectures that he has fallen in love with her” (Hacker 2022, 4). A real-life
Juliet might question her Romeo’s love, but such suspicions are fundamentallydifferent from the sort of doubts that a scientist might have about theexistence of hypothetical entities. Consider the sort of thoughts that someone
might have when she wonders if her husband still loves her or if he ever reallydid. Did he push me to excel in my career for my own good or for his? Is his
flattery genuine or is he merely projecting his fantasy of who I am? The
uncertainty one faces in such moments, Hacker argues, is ultimately
insurmountable even if we might hope to claw our way towards some further
clarity than we already have. In moments such as these, we run up against“genuine limitations on our knowledge and understanding of our fellow
human beings,” as Hacker note. “Some of these rest on ignorance, others on
the constitutional indeterminacy of the mental" (Hacker 2022, 1).
Hacker’s focus is on the wrong turn that western thought took around the timethat early modern philosophy was born, when our confused theory of mind
appears to have wended its way into the collective imagination. To get ahold of
the “constitutional indeterminacy of the mental” and to understand thetemptation to flee from it into the false certainties of psychological theories,
however, we would do better to look much further back in time, to ouranthropological pre-history. By reflecting on the origins of our complex forms
of interpersonal life and the psychological language that is integral to them, wemight hope to liberate ourselves from the false picture of the mind as internalmechanism. The point is not to do an empirical science of the origins of mindor language, but to use the exercise as a means of revising our way of thinking
about the mental along the lines that Wittgenstein intends. It is one method of
revealing the grammar of psychological language, in other words, or certain
important and problematic dimensions of that language.
Wittgenstein himself sometimes pursues a similar line of naturalistic
conjecture for the same purpose. He writes, for example:
I really want to say that scruples in thinking begin with (have their rootsin) instinct. Or again: a language-game does not have its origin inconsideration. Consideration is part of a language-game. (Wittgenstein,
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, v. 2 1980, §632)

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Christopher Hoyt, "Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity | Christopher Hoyt

Elsewhere, Wittgenstein says:
I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one
grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any
logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no
apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination. (Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 1994, §475)
One implication of these remarks that I want to develop here is that humanopacity, including our difficulty knowing ourselves, is rooted in the fact that
our language is based on animal capacities, not thought, not ratiocination, ineither a conscious or an unconscious form. We are animals whose bodies
evolved so that we might master the tasks of survival and propagation, andour capacity to master social exchange and the use of psychological language is
one dimension of our evolved animal natures. “Consideration,” “thought,”“intention,” “emotion,” and other psychological concepts are at home within
the context of our social lives and are not suited to do the theoretical work
asked of them in the psychology and philosophy of supposedly hidden minds.
They are not terms that do or that can refer to hidden phenomena.
Wittgenstein’s naturalistic bent in his philosophy of language is further
expressed in certain of his remarks about pain, amongst other. He says, forexample, that it “is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts
when someone else is in pain,” (Wittgenstein, Zettel 1981, §540) a point uponwhich he elaborates as follows:
But what is the word "primitive" meant to say here? Presumably that thissort of behaviour is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, that
it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought ... I
want to say: it is characteristic of our language that the foundation onwhich it grows consists in steady ways of living, regular ways of acting...
The basic form of the game must be one in which we act. What has to be
accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life. (Wittgenstein,
Zettel 1981, §541)
Our language of psychology emerged as a part of these given forms of life that
we evolved to be capable of occupying. “Language - I want to say--is arefinement, 'in the beginning was the deed” (Wittgenstein, Culture and Value

Christopher Hoyt, "Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
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1994, 36). The forms of life that we occupy are remarkably complex andnuanced. Being skeptical of another person’s expressions of pain is as much apart of human life as are empathy and sympathy. This complexity of ourreactions and our forms of life is an essential feature of Wittgenstein’s insights
into the nature of human opacity.
To think more clearly about the complexity of our interactions with otherpeople and our efforts to understand them, let us consider a speculative prehistory of our species. The anthropological record suggests that H. sapiens
descends from one or more groups of small primates who moved down fromthe trees and began to live at the edges of the African savanna several million
years ago. It was then, in response to the demands of life on the ground, that
our evolution towards ever larger and more complex groups and ever larger
and more complex brains really began (Tattersall 2012, 59-61). It was after
taking to the ground that Australopithecus afarensis and other early hominids
began to live something like the hunter-gatherers who soon evolved fromthem. It is not certain, but both anatomy and environment suggest that
Australopithecus lived much like modern day baboons (Tattersall 2012, 58).
A striking and pertinent fact about baboon societies is that they exert suchstrong social pressure from within the troupe that their further evolution
would be shaped more strongly by social demands than by demands of theenvironment. Infanticide is the leading cause of infant deaths, forexample (Cheney 2007, 40), and every individual’s survival and success inmating depends heavily on his or her ability to navigate the complexities ofbaboon social life. Baboon life is highly political in the sense that it isorganized by social power, and the most cognitively demanding tasks for ababoon are social. In baboon society, power is arranged both in genderspecific lines and in factions that form alliances and rivalries. The
primatologists Dorothy Cheney and Richard Seyfarth write:
To succeed in baboon society, a female must, of course, recognize her own
relatives. But to participate in coalitions, she needs more than this. …
Alliances involve not just the support of one individual but also hostility
towards another --- and often, by extension, the other animal’s family.
They require nuanced decisions about when to join, whom to join, whomto threaten, and whom to ignore. (Cheney 2007, 64)

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Christopher Hoyt, "Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
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Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity | Christopher Hoyt

Baboons appear to be incapable of deliberately using vocalizations tomanipulate others’ beliefs, but they are acutely sensitive to what vocalizations
imply regarding social dynamics. According to Cheney and Seyfarth, baboons“cannot hear a vocalization without thinking about the animal who is calling
and the events the call describes” (Cheney 2007, 274). A grunt can calm a
troupe and a call might trigger anxiety or upheaval depending on who “says”
what to whom and how.
Given our assumption that Australopithecus had some similar form of society,it follows that the further evolution of hominids was most likely propelled by
the increasingly complex demands of social life, particularly as communities
grew larger. Social intelligence is the key to success in hominid life, andevolutionary competition favored ever more sophisticated players attuned tosubtleties of gesture and vocalization. Though the matter is hardly settled, it isinteresting to note that Cheney and Seyfarth speculate that both humanlanguage (Cheney 2007, 270) and tool use (Cheney 2007, 282) likely piggybacked on cognitive developments originally evolved to meet increasingly
demanding social problems. They write that "social intelligence shares several
features with language, [and] many of the rules and computations found in
human language may have first appeared as an elaboration of the rules andcomputations underlying social interactions" (Cheney 2007, 282).
To flourish in a society of H. sapiens, individuals must grasp the social
significance of other members’ bodily and vocal gestures, and that means
seeing those gestures for what they mean when stood against the backdrop ofsocial power. Note that I emphasize social power and, by implication, theutility of psychological language as an instrument of social power, only to castlanguage in a certain light. Our forms of life have many further dimensions,but to see our psychological vocabulary as a set of tools evolved to serve us
within the course of hominid life helps illuminate Wittgenstein’s insights
regarding the nature of human opacity and the nature of psychologicallanguage. To speak of what someone else is “thinking” appears in this light not
as a speculative hypothesis about someone’s inner states, but rather as an
instrument used to navigate society and its complex demands. This agrees withboth Wittgenstein’s recommendation that we think of language as a set of tools(Wittgenstein, PI 1957/1999, §23) and with his emphasis on the foundation of
language lying in our animal reactions and capacities.

Christopher Hoyt, "Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
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Psychological concepts such as “thinking” “feeling pain” and “intending”
almost certainly existed in a pre-historic languages where they would havebeen employed in the quotidian tasks of social exchange. To lift them out ofthat context and suppose that they name hypothetical postulates in atheoretical realm is to take language “on holiday” (Wittgenstein, PI 1957/1999,§38) where it has no legitimate role to play. The error is analogous to thesuggestion that “justice” refers to a yet-to-be isolated mechanical force of
nature. The psychological conjecture that what evolved were private minds
speculating about other private minds is a story told in a vocabulary unsuited
to its task. The picture of the private mind is no more than an illustration of
how we use psychological language in the course of hominid life. Concepts
such as “pain,” “think,” “motive,” and even “unconscious desire” have meaning“only in the stream of life” (Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of
Psychology, v. 2 1980, §687), as Wittgenstein says, and are renderedmeaningless when deployed in theories of hidden mental mechanisms.
To return to the matter of human opacity, one thing to say is that evolution
apparently shaped us to be able to play strategic games of spotting, sharing,hiding, and dissimulating significant gestures as a means of retaining or
gaining social advantage. This is an empirical claim, of course, and the detailsof the history sketched above are not essential here. What is essential to see isthat, whatever the facts of our evolutionary past, psychological language
emerged as an element of the forms of life we participate it. This is the pointthat Wittgenstein is driving at when he says that a concept such as“consideration” is at home within a form of life. “Consideration” does not referto a hypothetical process in a theoretical realm. It is a tool employed by certain
H. sapiens in the course of social life.
Psychologists commonly suppose that they can use our vocabulary of themental to describe the hidden causes of our behavior somehow embedded in
our nervous system, as though our brains “consider” and “think” in a private
realm. This is, more often than not, a source of profound confusion. Evolution
molded our hormones, neurotransmitters, cerebral structures, and much else
to lead to the evolutionarily desirable outcome of producing offspring who
pass on our genes yet again. There is no reason to assume that those biologicalprocesses follow a logic reflected in a discourse evolved to give us a strategic
advantage as players in the games of hominid life. In a book arguing that300

Christopher Hoyt, "Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity | Christopher Hoyt

human mating habits follow the logic predicted by Darwin’s theory of
evolution (despite what we might want to believe about ourselves), David Buss
writes:A man whose increased status opens up better mating alternatives does
not think to himself, 'Well, if I leave my current wife, I can increase my
reproductive success by mating with younger, more reproductively
valuable women." He simply finds other women increasingly attractive
and perceives that they are more attainable than before. (Buss 1994, 172)
The man that Buss imagines need not entertain such thoughts either
consciously or in the secret chamber of the unconscious. The body evolved tolay the foundations of our forms of life as it does. My point is not that Buss has
the facts of human mating right (or wrong), and neither is it that his sort of
explanation is more valuable than sensitive poetry, a history of gender
relations or any other insightful study of human mating patterns. My point isthat Buss’s mode of explanation respects the categorical gap between thecausal systems that shape our actions on the one hand and the sorts things wesay about ourselves and others in a psychological vocabulary on the otherhand. The language of psychology that evolved to play a part within the dramaof H. sapiens life is unsuited to describe the biological processes that undergird
those forms life, and theories of mind that violate this principle usually domore to scupper our understanding of ourselves than to clarify it. As
Wittgenstein says, our forms of life are the given, not the products ofratiocination. In this sense, we are often opaque to each other and toourselves, as there are causal forces at work in our lives that evade thelanguage we ordinarily use to understand ourselves and others. This is one
facet of the “constitutional indeterminacy of the mental” of which Hacker
writes.
References
Buss, David M. 1994. The Evolution of Desire. New York: Basic Books.
Cheney, Dorothy and Seyfarth, Robert. 2007. Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of Social Mind.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Hacker, Peter. 2022. "Other minds, other people, and human opacity." Ratio 00: 1–12.
Tattersall, Ian. 2012. Masters of the Planet. St. Martin's Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Christopher Hoyt, "Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1994. Culture and Value. Edited by G.H. and Nyman, Heikki von Wright.
London: Blackwell.
—. 1957/1999. Philosophical Investigations. 2. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
—. 1980. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, v. 2. Edited by G.E.M Anscombe and G.H.
von Wright. Translated by G.E.M Anscombe. Vol. 2. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
—. 1981. Zettel. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

302

Christopher Hoyt, "Wittgenstein and the Evolution of Human Opacity". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive | Urszula Idziak

Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive
Urszula Idziak (Warsaw, Poland)
Abstract
The text draws attention to the year 1917 in Wittgenstein’s biography, probably the less
known although most interesting from many points of view. On the basis of press releases
covering that period, I try to reconstruct Wittgenstein’s warfare during the last year spent on
the Eastern front.

Illustration 1.
This paper is part of a larger project describing the historical and culturalembedment of Wittgenstein’s thoughts during the First World War, with a
special interest in its white spots such as the year 1917.
After the officer school in Olomouc, promoted to the rank of cadet (aspiring)
officer, Ludwig Wittgenstein was posted once again to the Bukovina region, orthe eastern foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, with the capital in
Chernivtsi. He left Vienna after the Christmas break on the 6th of January 1917.
Since diary entries of that time are missing (and also the exchanged
correspondence, mostly with Paul Engelmann and Hermine Wittgenstein, israther laconic), that period is one of the dark spots in his biography(McGuinness 1988: 257-259; Monk 1990: 150-151; Baum 2014: 100-101)
The last entry of MS 103 was written on the 10th of January 1917 on the way tothe frontline. It reads as follows:

Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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If suicide is allowed, then everything is allowed.
If anything is not allowed then suicide is not allowed.
This throws a light on the nature of ethics, for suicide is, so to speak, theelementary sin.
And when one investigates it is like investigating mercury vapor in order
to investigate the nature of vapors.
Or is even suicide in itself neither good nor evil? (Wittgenstein/Perloff
2022: 191, 193)
Places where Wittgenstein stayed for almost a whole year (from the 19th ofJanuary till the end of November, even, possibly, till the beginning of 1918)
with a break in February and a month-long break in June) vanish in obscurity,from which only residual military data is known. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein as
an officer, for the first time, had men under his command and achieved
considerable success on the battlefield, for which he was awarded two medals(Baum 2014: 101). In an attempt to illuminate this darkness of oblivion, onemust start by explaining his position in Northern Bukovina, a land crisscrossedby trade routes with the Black Sea. Its geographic boundaries were defined by
two obstacles, extremely difficult to overcome, the more difficult Carpathian
mountain range and the Dniester River which was reinforced by the old-aged
fortresses (Chocim, Kamieniec Podolski). Wittgenstein was already there in
1916 (Pilch 2018: 133), when Austro-Hungarians had been driven back fromthe Dniester and pushed deep into Galicia, while in 1917, they were trying torecapture cities up to Chernivtsi. To understand his position early that year I
will refer to an account that appeared in the émigré magazine Polonia
published in the summer of 1917. Covering a wide-ranging area of warfare, it
contributes valuable information that facilitates understanding troop
movements:[T]he ranks of the revolutionary army failed to hold on to the captured
positions. The agitation of the "Bolsheviks" did their part. Dissension anddisorganization reigned anew in the ranks of the two attacking armies,
even though Kerensky had chosen only those units in which he placed histrust. Soldiers abused their superiors and refused to obey. Then, on the 23rd of June, at a moment when Russia's political and internal situation was

already critical, the Austro-Germans launched their counter-offensive. The

304

Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive | Urszula Idziak

main effort was directed toward Ternopil, east of Zloczow [Złoczów]. This
offensive was successful – the Russian lines were broken. Then theGermans immediately threw a great mass of troops, preceded by cavalry,
into the created gap. These forces pushed toward the southeast, following
the watershed between the Styrpa and Seret rivers. Thus, the Russianarmy located on the Halich-Brzejany [Halicz-Brzeżany] line suddenly had
its rear threatened.
A general back away began, and at the same time, the Austrians moved
south of the Dniester and advanced rapidly through the Prut andCheremosh valleys. Ternopil, Buczacz, and Husiatyn [Husiatyń] on one
side of the Dniester, and Stanislawow [Stanisławów], Kolomea [Kołomyja],
and Chernivtsi on the other, fell back into Austro-German hands. Today,
all of Bukovina and Galicia, except for Brody, are occupied by Central
Powers troops. (Polonia, 1917: 7)
Wittgenstein was among those Austrians who "moved south of the Dniester".
He belonged to the 42nd Honved’s Infantry Division under the command of
three Croatian generals: Luka Šnjarić from February 1916 followed by Anton
Lipošćak (from March 1917) replaced in June by Mihovil Mihaljević. One mightask why Wittgenstein found himself in the Hungarian part of the army (in adivision that presented the following national composition: 61% Hungarians,
27% Romanians, 97% Croats, and Serbs), the answer is that he was part ofreserves attached to troops depleted during the Brusilov offensive. In thiscompany, Wittgenstein had every right to curse his comrades-in-arms, as thedivision was called “devilish” (in Croatian "Vražja divizija"), due to the cruelty
with which they treated Serbs in 1914 on the southern front (including rapeand torture among the civilian population).
The 42nd Division belonged to the XIII Corps of the Third Army. It was headedby Pflanzer-Baltin, but after losses in Galicia in 1916 he was dismissed from his
post, replaced briefly by Karl von Kirchbach and then, a Hungarian, Herman
Kövess.
Since February Wittgenstein’s position was one of the central targets of theRussians' advance towards Lviv and the petroleum fields of Galicia. All theplaces mentioned by McGuinness are positions next to Bystrzyca Solotvinska[Sołotwińska] opposing the Russians’ occupied - Bohorodczany.

Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive | Urszula Idziak

According to a local Polish newspaper (Płocki Kurier) from the 16th ofFebruary, a Russian attack was repulsed on the southwest side from
Bohorodczany on the Solotvinska Bystrzyca river. These may concern
precisely Wittgenstein’s activity mentioned by McGuinness (McGuinness 1988:
258). Wittgenstein is known to have participated in a patrol action to the townof Dzviniacz [Dźwiniacz] (15.03.1917) (McGuinness 1998: 257) standing on ahill above the Solotvinska Bystrzyca River. Next Wittgenstein's regiment
moved to Lachovtse [Lachowce], almost opposite Bohordczany [illustration 1](end of June 1917), and then was forced back (west) to Rosulna [illustration 2
and 5] (Baum 2014: 100). When the Kerensky's offensive was launched on thefirst of July, the central powers were pushed up north to the next river - theLomnica [Łomnica] (Waugh 2008: 233). At that point, Wittgenstein's regiment
was located in Ldziany [Łdziany] (McGuinness 1988: 258) (50 km northwest).
These battles were decisive for two reasons: first, it was the last Russian
offensive of the war and, secondly, conducted by revolutionary troops.
Henceforth the whole world was observing Bukovina, wondering how Russia
had changed after the February Revolution. Wittgenstein was therefore
involved in the first clashes with the “new Russia”, whose tsar was detained inTsarskoye Selo under guard. The Russian offensive from the Bystrzyca
Solotvinska to the Lomnica river was covered by newspapers around theworld from Bombay, Toronto, Hobard to New York [illustration 6]. New
Zealand’s Grey River Argus wrote: “Russian official: We crossed to the left bankof the Lomnica and captured heights, driving back the enemy north-west of
Chiluo [Kałusz]. We occupied the villages of Studzianka and Podhorki, and are
now engaging the enemy, who is protecting the crossing of the Lomnica
southwest of Kalush in the direction of Rozniatov and Dolina” (July 15).
The New-York Times on the 18th of July reported [illustration 4]: “Pressing,with the aid of heavy German reinforcements, their counterattacks on theupper and middle Lomnica river, in southern Galicia, the enemy has forced
Korniloff’s Russians to retire from Kalusz and retreat back upon the river.
They also retook the village of Novica but were ejected on the arrival ofreserves [Petrograd War Office report:] In the section of Novica-Lodziany[probably misspelled “Łdziany”]-Krasne our troops continued attacks, with theobject of throwing the enemy back across the Lomnica. The enemy madestubborn resistance. With the approach of the evening, he counterattacked in

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Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive | Urszula Idziak

dense waves from the direction of Selohy-Kagnka, and, pressing back our
troops, occupied the village of Novica…” (The New-York Times 18th of July)
The press release describes exactly Wittgenstein’s military activity in Łdziany(McGuinness 1988: 258). The Entente countries press was rather optimistic till
the middle of July, describing a series of successes “taking over 2,000
prisoners and 30 guns during the two days fight we continue to pursue theenemy in the direction of Dolina, (west of Stanislaus)[…] We have taken over
10,000 prisoners in advance towards Dolina, in addition to 80 guns and large
heirs of trench mortars and machine guns." (Grey River Argus July 16, 1917).
When Dolina, Rozniatov, and Kałusz are mentioned, it only shows theimportance of the stand in Łdziany (far more southeast on the southern side ofthe Łomnica). Maintaining this place must have been of high importance for
the Austro-Hungarian counteroffensive.
The Kerensky offensive is described from an insider and literary perspective
by Victor Shklovsky. The memoirs of the famous Russian formalist and writercontradict McGuinness's thesis that the Russian army opposite to
Wittgenstein's position "was not greatly affected by Red [...]
propaganda" (McGuinness 1988: 258). Shklovsky has been sent to agitate andbear revolutionary spirit to soldiers by Kerensky himself and described themood of each military unit. Fortunately for Wittgenstein scholars, he meets
exactly the troops that are facing Wittgenstein and will participate in thecapture of Rosulna and the battles around Łdziany, being the turning point of
the offensive [among which the 47 regiment see illustration 3]. As a result of
his description of the villages left by "Germans" just hours earlier, the wet
forest, Austro-Hungarian highly sophisticated trenches (in comparison to
Russian ones), we get a vivid image of Wittgenstein's battlefield. One mighteven hypothesize with good reason that the machine guns firing without
interruption (Shklovsky 1967: 225) were directed from Wittgenstein's
observation post. Two disciples of Tolstoy, both ardent readers of Hadji Murat,
were passing each other across one field of the frontline. Both would agreewith Tolstoy's thesis that war like any other human activity (trade or science...)is only meant to learn the moral laws by which they live (Tolstoy 1885).
Following Wittgenstein's steps, just hours or at most days after him, and then,after the battle of Ldziany, escaping his army corps Shklovsky concluded: "IUrszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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had to be in the worst units during their worst moments" (Shklovsky 1967:
229). Who would have dared to make such an avowal in Wittgenstein's name,taking under consideration that although on the opposite side, he neverthelesscrossed the same cornfields, and wet forests of Rosulna and Łdziany underheavy fire from both sides.
During the rest of the campaign, Wittgenstein famously took part in thecapture of Starunia on July 24th (McGuinness 1988: 259). He must also haveparticipated in seizing Nadvorna [Nadwórna] and then Kolomea. Voice of
Lublin wrote on the 26th of July 1917:
Austrian-Hungarian troops occupied Stanislawów and Nadvorna, andGerman troops occupied Ternopil. The pursuing enemy corps hit the fierce
resistance from the retreating troops several times […] The Nadvornianska[Nadwórniańska] Bystrzyca could only be crossed after heavy fighting. (Głos Lubelski)
The failure of the last Russian offensive inspired the “July days” in Petersburg
a subsequent partial revolution directed against Kerensky.
In August, allied troops moved south as the Głos Polityczny journal [Political
Voice] reported, on the first of August they occupied Kachurnik north ofChernivtsi and broke into the "forested mountainous area south of the former
state border." This area was already known to Wittgenstein from Brusilov’s
offensive. Next to this area on the east of the forested Kociuba Mountain is
precisely the Savokrynicznyi [Sawokrynicznyi] Kordenpost in which
Wittgenstein served in May-June 1916. (Pilch 2018: 133)
The excellent offensive spirit of our infantry made it possible, after priorartillery preparation, to quickly break the enemy's lines and bring thevictorious forces closer to the main town of Bukovina. This rapid advance
was assisted by Croatian troops advancing toward the city simultaneously
from the north.
That this sentence refers to the 42nd HID is clear from the term "Croatian"troops.

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Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive | Urszula Idziak

Wittgenstein thus participated in the fighting that, despite the capture of
Chernivtsi, moved the frontier farther toward the Dniester. In particular, thisinvolved the village of Boyany [Bojany] and Dolzhok Hill [Dolżok] (McGuinness
1988: 259), which was a wooded elevation that provided important positions.
We have some photos of that place coming from the winter of 1916, because ofheavy fighting in this area.
Dziennik Kujawski from the 30th of August 1917 published a German
communiqué: "On the northeastern bank of the Prut River, the Rhine,
Bavarian, and Austro-Hungarian regiments attacked a strongly fortified
position on Doleot [Dolżok] hill and the village of Bojan. The fierce resistanceof the Russians was broken. We took 1000 prisoners, 6 guns, and numerous
machine guns. At the Rąkitna section, we repulsed the enemy with heavy
losses". (Dziennik Kujawski 30th of August nr 197)
The political daily Głos Polityczny wrote in August 1917 in reports from thewar front "East of Chernivtsi German and Austro-Hungarian divisions
captured the village of Rarańcze and the western part of the town of Bojan on
the Prut". (Głos Polityczny)This contribution to Wittgenstein’s biography is not futile when we realize thatfor many reasons this “missing” year from the point of view of his biography isof great importance. Firstly, from the historical point of view, the eyes of thewhole world were focused exactly on the Bukovina region where Wittgenstein
was in service, as it is evidenced by the worldwide news releases, mainly
because of the consequences of the February revolution. Russia had just been
thrown into the greatest political transformation of its modern history. During
the same war, the Russian army under the command of Tsar Nicholas II moved
into an offensive bearing the name of the minister of war of the Provisional
Government – Alexander Kerensky. As far as I know, no attempt has been
made to consider Wittgenstein’s words addressed to Hermine on the twelve ofApril 1917 “Here [that is with the escalation of war] we are dealing – I believe –with a complete victory of materialism, and the demise of any sense of goodand evil” (Wittgenstein 2019: 123) as a reaction to fighting with therevolutionary Russian army. The morale of that army was low, revolutionary
ideas were spreading, distrust towards officers was growing, and acts offraternizing with the enemy to put an end to military operations were

Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive | Urszula Idziak

increasing, which was the reason for Kerensky’s visit to the frontline. In thesame daily newspaper informing about that matter, an editorial was informing
about the return to Kraków of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the US
Count Tarnowski, accompanied by other noticeable Austrians, as a result of
the American army joining the allied forces (Kurjer Poznański 26th May: 1, 3).
Among them on the same boat, Rudolf Wittgenstein, Ludwig’s older brother,was returning to homeland aiming to enroll into the army. In autumn 1917 forthe first time three Wittgenstein brothers – Ludwig, Rudolf, and Paul (at officework) were engaged in military service.
Another reason for reclaiming this period is that it helps to understandWittgenstein’s continuous suffering from the companionship of fellow
soldiers. The fact of being attached to the Croatian “devil’s division” – the 42nd
HID – shows that war life was for Wittgenstein a continuous challenge to“recognizing the humanity in man”. Finally, the fact that he spent that mostintense year of war in Bukovina and Galicia shouldn’t be neglected. This
mythical land used to be one of the most multicultural, polyethnic, andintensively saturated with religious phenomena (Chasidic, Orthodox, Catholic,Greek-catholic, Lutheran, etc) places in Europe. Wittgenstein was engaged infighting back Chernivtsi, so he must have experienced at least a percentage ofthe cultural richness of that town: “Assimilated Jews and educated Germans,
Ukrainians, Romanians […] - philosophers, political thinkers, writers, artists,
composers or mystics. Karl Kraus had a numerous commune of admirers in
Chernivtsi; you could meet them, with Die Fackel in hand, in the streets andparks, in the surrounding forests and on the banks of the Pruth [...] There were
Schopenhauerians and Nietzsche worshippers, Spinozians, Kantists, Marxists,
Freudians” (Schlögel 2019: 51). Chernivtsi was not an oasis in the province ofthe empire, but a “melting pot of spirituality and languages”. It is therefore
also important to consider that these were times when Wittgenstein asked tosend him works by Goethe, Mörike (31.03.17), and a small edition of the Bible(4.09.1917). He also received from Engelmann Uhland’s poem Count Eberhard's
Hawthorn and perhaps we should consider these geographical and historicalcircumstances as corresponding to these lines:…The while he slowly rode
Along a woodland way;

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Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive | Urszula Idziak

He cut from the hawthorn bush
A little fresh green spray. (Engelmann 1967: 83-84)
Consequently, while the “sprig became a tree”, the memory of these days wasovershadowing the inexpressible that Wittgenstein had resisted expressing.
Indeed, it is on the reverse side of a letter from Hermine, dated April 1917,
that the final clause of the Tractatus can be found, probably written afterward
by Wittgenstein: “Whereof one cannot talk, thereof one must be
silent” (Wittgenstein 2019: 78).
Illustration 2.

Illustration 3

Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive | Urszula Idziak

Illustration 4

Illustration 5

Illustration 6

References
Baum, Wilhelm (2014) Wittgenstein im Ersten Weltkrieg. Die “Geheimen Tagebücher” und die
Erfahrungen an der Front (1914-1918) Klagenfurt: Kitab-Verlag

312

Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive | Urszula Idziak

McGuinness, Brian (1988) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889-1921, Berkeley/Los
Angeles/London: The University of California Press
Monk, Ray (1990) Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Duty of Genius, New-York: Penguin Books
Pilch, Martin (2018) “März – September 1916 Ludwig Wittgenstein während der BrussilowOffensive in der Bukovina” in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Die Tractatus Odyssee, ed. R. Schweitzer,
Vienna: Wittgenstein Initiative
Schlögel, Karl (2019) Odkrywanie nowoczesnej Europy – próba archeologii, Gdańsk: Słowo/Obraz/Terytoria
Shklovsky, Victor (1967) "At the Front - Summer 1917" transl. by R. Sheldon, in: The Russian
Review vol 26/3
Uhland, Ludwig (1967) “Count Eberhard's Hawthorn” transl. by Alexander Platt, in P.
Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein. With a Memoir, transl. L. Furtmüller, Oxford:
Blackwell.
Waugh, Alexander (2008) The House of Wittgenstein. A Family at War, London: Bloomsbury(electronic edition)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2019) Wittgenstein’s Family Letters. Corresponding with Ludwig, transl.
P. Winslow, London: Bloomsbury (electronic edition)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2022) Private Notebooks 1914-1916, ed. & transl. M. Perloff, New-York:
Liveright Publishing
Newspapers [all translations and transliterations are mine U.I.]:“Polish Lands" in: Polonia. Revue hebdomadaire polonaise, no. 33/ 1917 in: https://
crispa.uw.edu.pl/object/files/22445/display/JPEG
https://www.nytimes.com/1917/07/18/archives/russians-forced-out-of-kalusz-driven-backacross-the-lower-lomnica.html
Dziennik Kujawski August 30, 1917 No. 197 year book XXV in: http://dlibra.bmino.pl/Content/
267026483/Dziennik_Kujawski_R25_30_08_1917.pdf
Grey River Argus July 16, 1917 New Zealand in: https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/
GRA19170716.2.34
Głos polityczny no. 196 /1917 in: https://crispa.uw.edu.pl/object/files/17167/display/JPEG
Głos Lubelski July 26, 1917 in: http://bc.wbp.lublin.pl/dlibra/plain-content?id=10413
Kurjer Płocki February 18, 1917, in: http://mbc.cyfrowemazowsze.pl/dlibra/plain-content?
id=49298

Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Kurjer Poznański May 26, 1917 in: http://www.wbc.poznan.pl/Content/138564/124411.pdf
illustration sources:-New-York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/1917/07/18/archives/russians-forced-out-of-kalusz-driven-backacross-the-lower-lomnica.html-Victoria Daily Times 11 July 1917
Victoria_Daily_Times_(1917-07-11)_(IA_victoriadailytimes19170711).pdf-Rosulna Soldatenheim 8 May 1917
www.commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Soldatenhiem_in_Rosulna,_8._Mai_1917._-Field with camouflaged batteries and camouflaged roadhttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

File:Scheinbatterie_und_maskierte_Straße_zwischen_Rosulna_und_Kosmacz,_30.April_1917._(BildID_15590492).j-map of the area Kosmacz - Bohorodczany the valley of Bystrzyca Solotvinska [my photo andannotations U.I.]-Infanteriestellung nördlich Ldziany, 8 May 1917 (Österreichische Nationalbibliothek)
https://www.europeana.eu/pl/item/9200291/BibliographicResource_3000073513893-Attack of the 47 Siberian rifle regiment exactly on the 42 HID July 1917
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Attack_of_the_47_Siberian_rifle_regiment_1917.jpg
Acknowledgement
I want to thank Martin Pilch for his valuable comments and suggestions which helped me toimprove my paper.

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Urszula Idziak, "Wittgenstein's Battlefield. The Kerensky Offensive". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox | Andrej Jandrić

Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox
Andrej Jandrić (Belgrade, Serbia)
Abstract
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein describes elementary sentences as concatenations of names,
and the states of affairs they represent as configurations of objects which these names referto. He does not seem to make room either for predicates in the elementary sentences, or forconcepts, properties or relations as constituents of states of affairs. Although such view is at
odds both with Frege’s and with Russell’s views, I argue that its philosophical sources are to befound in Frege’s concept horse paradox and Russell’s understanding of a proposition’s being
about a certain object. Frege’s notorious claim that the concept horse is not a concept, but anobject, indicates that objects can be used as proxies to represent concepts in sentences.
Russell, on the other hand, understood propositions as structured entities that contain objects
they are about as their constituent parts; in his view, an object cannot feature in the content
that a sentence expresses in a merely accidental way, but characterises it necessarily. It is the
adoption of these two insights (one from Frege and one from Russell) that led Wittgenstein tohis controversial claims about objects and names in the Tractatus.

1

One of the striking features of the elementary propositions (Elementarsätze) in
the Tractatus is that they consist only of names (Namen) (TLP § 5.55). Once
fully analysed, they turn out to be nothing but concatenations of names (TLP §4.22): they contain neither predicates nor expressions of any other semantic
category. Accordingly, (possible) states of affairs (Sachverhalte) represented bythese propositions are built up only of objects (Gegenstände): they are
configurations of objects (TLP § 2.0272) and contain entities of no otherontological category (such as properties or relations) as their constituent parts.
This, apparently, puts Wittgenstein’s views of language, and of the facts it
depicts, in stark contrast to those of Frege or Russell.
Frege (1984b: 193) believed that a meaningful sentence, regardless of how
many saturated parts it contains, must also have at least one unsaturated part,which “glues” the other parts together and makes up the unity of the sentence.
This unsaturated expression is called functional expression by Frege, since it
contains an empty place for an argument (marked by a line or a variable). The
reference (Bedeutung) of such an expression is an unsaturated entity, orfunction (Funktion): predicates (Prädikate) are just a special kind of functional
expressions, namely those that refer to functions which assign truth values toobjects, i.e. concepts (Begriffe) (Frege 1984a: 146).

Andrej Jandrić, "Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox | Andrej Jandrić

In this regard, similar views can also be found in Russell’s analysis of atomic
propositions. Although these propositions contain particulars, each of themmust also have a universal as its constituent part: a property or a relation(Russell 2010: 27). Hence, an atomic sentence cannot be built exclusively out ofnames (Russell 2001: 28), just as the proposition it expresses cannot contain
only particulars.
Wittgenstein’s position thus seems to sit oddly both with Frege’s and with
Russell’s, even though he names the two, in the preface to the Tractatus, as the
major influences on his early work. I will argue that his idiosyncratic view ofobjects results from an attempt to marry Frege’s insights about the concept
horse paradox with Russell’s understanding of what a proposition’s being
about a particular object amounts to.

2

In “On Concept and Object”, replying to Benno Kerry’s criticism, Frege (1984b)
claimed that his distinction between an object and a concept is absolute and,hence, that it cannot happen that something is both an object and a concept.
The paradoxical consequence of such a view is that, according to Frege, of noconcept it can be truthfully said that it is a concept. The sentence “The concept
horse is a concept” is meaningful but false: the term “the concept horse” issaturated and thus refers to an (abstract) object, which, consequently, cannot
be also a concept and, hence, cannot fall under the (first-level) conceptreferred to by the predicate “x is concept” (Frege 1984b: 195). That horse is aconcept can only be “shown” in the predicative use of the expression which
denotes it (Frege 1984b: 201-202), as in a sentence(1) Bucephalus is a horse.
After Peter Geach’s (1976) influential interpretation, Frege’s concept horseparadox was identified as the main philosophical source of Wittgenstein’s
distinction between what can be meaningfully said and what can only beshown in the Tractatus; that it also importantly informed Wittgenstein’s
understanding of objects has not been sufficiently recognised.

316

Andrej Jandrić, "Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox | Andrej Jandrić

Although the concept denoted by the predicate “x is a horse” and the object
denoted by the name “the concept horse” are entities which belong to different
categories, they are not completely unrelated: the sense (Sinn) of sentence (1)can be conveyed equally well with the sentence(2) The concept horse is instantiated on Bucephalus.
Sentences (1) and (2) share their truth-conditions: in Frege’s view, they express
the same content or thought. The object referred to by the noun phrase “theconcept horse” is a proxy for the concept referred to by the predicate “x is ahorse” (Proops 2013: 79) and can be said to represent the concept (Parsons
1986: 452): such proxies enable speaking about concepts through the use ofobjects (Frege 1984b: 197). In a similar fashion, concepts of second or somehigher order can have their proxies in lower-order concepts and, ultimately, inobjects: all concepts thus can be represented solely by means of objects. The
proxy object reading of Frege’s concept horse paradox has been mostthoroughly developed by Terence Parsons, who, on the other hand, thoughtthat Frege was misled by the outward grammatical appearance of the term“the concept horse” into believing that it must be saturated. However,following through his initial assumption, it seems that Frege had no other way
to go but to endorse some sort of proxy object theory; in Parsons’s (1986: 455)
view, the way Frege describes a proxy for a certain concept is in many respects
similar to how he talks about the concept’s extension. Building on Parsons’s
ideas, Ian Proops (2013: 80-83) has recently shown that the claims about
objects (or lower-level concepts) going proxy for concepts (or higher-level
concepts) can be correctly expressed in Begriffsschrift, thus proving their
meaningfulness within Fregean semantics.

3

Unlike Frege’s intensional account of content expressed by a meaningful
sentence, Russell, in his logical atomist phase and earlier, had a more finegrained analysis of sentence meaning. In his view, what a sentence expresses
are not merely its truth-conditions, or an unstructured proposition, but rather
a structured or, as it later came to be called, a Russellian proposition. If asentence is used to make a claim about a certain object, then the proposition it
expresses has to contain that very object as its part: Russell thus gave an

Andrej Jandrić, "Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox | Andrej Jandrić

account of aboutness in mereological terms. If we, for the sake of example,
suppose that Socrates is an object, then Socrates, the very man, just is what all
the propositions about him have in common, regardless of how different they
may be in other respects (Russell 2010: 19). If Bismarck had used the sentence“Bismarck is an astute diplomatist”, by it he would have managed to express a
proposition that no one could have expressed but him, because it contains
Bismarck as one of its constituent parts. In Russell’s view, only Bismarck has adirect knowledge by acquaintance with himself, which is a necessary condition
for being able to refer to Bismarck by a logically proper name. In mouths ofothers, the same sentence would express a proposition which might beequivalent in truth value to the one that would have been expressed by
Bismarck himself, but which, nevertheless, could not be the same proposition
since there is no Bismarck among the objects it contains (Russell 2001: 30-32).
Hence, sentences (1) and (2) do not express the same proposition since, if
Frege’s proposed analysis is correct, the proposition expressed by sentence (2)contains the abstract object denoted by “the concept horse” as its constituent
part, while the proposition expressed by sentence (1) does not. An object
cannot appear in the content expressed by a sentence in a merely accidental
way: if it characterises an analysis of the sentence’s meaning, it must featurein each and every admissible analysis.

4

Wittgenstein accepted, though in a somewhat modified form, this constraint ofRussell’s. To be quite precise, he did not think that objects were parts of what
an elementary sentence, containing names of these objects, expresses, for thatis the sentence’s sense (or its truth-conditions). Nevertheless, objects appear asparts of the sentence’s would-be truth-maker, i.e. the state of affairs that thesentence depicts. If, at some level of logical analysis of a sentence, a name isreached, then the object denoted by that name must be a part of therepresented Sachverhalt. For a name is a semantically simple expression andadmits of no further analysis: hence, by additionally analysing the rest of thesentence, we can discover what other objects are also in the represented
Sachverhalt, but cannot remove the reference to the already recognised object.
Consequently, if a name appears in any analysis of an elementary sentence, it
must also appear in its final or complete analysis, which is, according to318

Andrej Jandrić, "Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox | Andrej Jandrić

Wittgenstein, unique (TLP § 3.25). Analogously, if a linguistically represented
state of affairs is featured by a particular object, it is necessarily so: taking theobject away would inevitably change that which is represented by thesentence.
The importance of the abovementioned considerations cannot be overstated,
for they buttress what Wittgenstein called his fundamental thought (Grundgedanke) in the whole of Tractatus, namely that “’logical constants’ are
not representatives” (TLP § 4.0312). Logical connectives, in Wittgenstein’sview, do not refer to abstract objects, as Russell thought at the time of workingon Theory of Knowledge. If negation, for instance, were a name of an object,then ~~p could not represent the same chunk of reality as p, for the former
would contain as its constituent part the object denoted by negation, while thelatter would not (TLP § 5.44); in such a case ~~p and p would not share acommon Sinn and would not express the same thought. It is important to stresshere that the reason why Wittgenstein believed that two sentences, which
represent two states of affairs such that one of them contains a certain object aand the other does not, could not express the same thought is not because thelatter sentence can be true in worlds without a, while the former cannot, since
there are no such worlds in Wittgenstein’s view. He claimed that possible
worlds do not differ from one another with regard to objects they contain (TLP§§ 2.022-2.0231), but only in view of how these objects are combined together
into Sachverhalte. The real reason, as suggested above, lies in his adoption ofRussell’s principle that being about a specific object is an essential
characteristic of a thought.
Quite analogously to the example with negation, if “the concept horse” is aname just as “Bucephalus”, as Frege claims, the thought expressed by sentence(2) involves the reference to the object named by “the concept horse”. Thisobject thus has to feature in every sufficiently carried out analysis of thethought in question. Since that thought cannot contain both the object namedby “the concept horse” and the property (or, as Frege would say, concept)
denoted by the predicate “x is a horse” (i.e. both the concept and its proxyobject), the analysis of the thought into Bucephalus and horse cannot be its
complete analysis. Hence, one cannot obtain the final structure of a sentence if
one stops at the level of analysis at which names are still being distinguishedfrom predicates; the predicates contain hidden names for so-called proxy

Andrej Jandrić, "Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox | Andrej Jandrić

objects and should be analysed further, until only the names remain. Fregebelieved that the elementary sentence Fa could be equally well analysed into “ais an F” or “the concept F is instantiated on a”; in Wittgenstein’s view,
however, the former cannot be the full analysis, and is merely an abbreviation
for the latter. The same applies to relational expressions: Rab can beinterpreted as “a stands in R to b” or “the relation R is instantiated on a and b”,
where “the relation R” is a name (which thus denotes not a relation, but anobject). Frege would be satisfied with both readings, but Wittgenstein, if mysuggestion is right, only with the latter one. Therefore, every elementary
sentence can be understood as claiming that the relation of instantiation holds
between some objects. But, it may be objected, this still leaves something
besides objects at the end of analysis, namely the relation of instantiation. Thisobjection presents no difficulty for Wittgenstein, since he would treat therelation of instantiation as what he labelled as formal concepts, which “cannot,
in fact, be represented by means of a function, as concepts proper can” (TLP §4.126). The relation of instantiation is not another constituent part of therepresented Sachverhalt but merely the way “objects fit into one another likethe links of a chain” (TLP § 2.03); analogously, instantiation is not represented
by some special expression in an analysed sentence, besides names (see TLP §3.1432), but instead it corresponds to the linear order of names within thesentence. Two or more objects can stand in many different relations, and it is
not possible to linguistically represent all these relations in a formally different
way; however, if by means of Fregean proxies, all these relations are reduced
only to instantiation between objects, the mere order of names will suffice.
The philosophical motivation for Wittgenstein’s controversial claims that anelementary sentence consists only of names and that the state of affairs it
represents contains objects only is to be found, if I am right, in Frege’s concept
horse paradox and Russell’s understanding of aboutness. I will here only notethat my proposed interpretation is not in accord with that of Max Black (1971),
who believed that Wittgenstein by “name” understood any semantically simple
expression, be it a traditional name or a predicate, and by “object” what wewould normally call a simple object, a primitive property or a primitive
relation. On the other hand, it is close in spirit to the interpretation of
Elizabeth Anscombe, who admitted of objects only and maintained thatmaterial properties, such as being red, are “formed by a configuration of320

Andrej Jandrić, "Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox | Andrej Jandrić

objects” (1959: 111). There is, however, an important difference: while
Anscombe uncompromisingly accepted Wittgenstein’s “objects only” ontology,
she allowed for different objects instantiating the material property of being
red by their taking part in configurations with different groups of others
objects; if my suggestion points in the right direction, each of these
configurations would have to contain among its constituents the proxy object
for redness, that is, in Fregean terms, the object denoted by “the concept red”.
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1959) An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, New York: Harper andRow, Publishers.
Black, Max (1971) A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Frege, Gottlob (1984a) “Function and Concept”, in: Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, andPhilosophy, ed. B. McGuinness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 137-156.
Frege, Gottlob (1984b) “On Concept and Object”, in: Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic,
and Philosophy, ed. B. McGuinness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 182-194.
Geach, Peter (1976) “Saying and Showing in Frege and Wittgenstein”, Acta Philosophica Fennica
28, 54-70.
Parsons, Terence (1986) “Why Frege Should Not Have Said ‘The Concept Horse Is Not a
Concept’”, History of Philosophy Quarterly 3, 449-465.
Proops, Ian (2013) “What Is Frege’s ‘Concept Horse Problem’?”, in: Peter Sullivan and Michael
Potter (eds.) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: History and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 76-96.
Russell, Bertrand (2001) The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, Bertrand (2010) The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, London and New York: Routledge.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1972): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Übersetzt von D. F. Pears und B.
F. McGuinness. Reprinted with corrections in the light of the publication of Wittgenstein’s
correspondence with C. K. Ogden about the first translation. London: Routledge and KeganPaul.
Acknowledgement
My research has been supported by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development andInnovation of the Republic of Serbia (451-03-47/2023-01/200163) and the University of Rijeka,
Croatia (uniri-human-18-239).

Andrej Jandrić, "Tractarian Objects and the Concept Horse Paradox". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein | Kristina Jaspers

Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig
Wittgenstein
Kristina Jaspers (Berlin, Deutschland)
Abstract
Susan Sontag (1933-2004) hat sich wiederholt mit Leben und Werk Ludwig Wittgensteinsauseinandergesetzt und an zentralen Stellen ihres Œuvres führt sie ihn als Referenz füreigene Thesen an. Ihr biografischer Zugriff folgt zunächst einem romantischen Geniebegriff,
für ihre Studienzeit in Harvard (1955-57) benennt sie Wittgenstein als einen der prägendsten
intellektuellen Einflüsse. In ihrer Bibliothek, die zusammen mit ihrem Nachlass in derUniversity of California verwahrt wird (Coll. 612), finden sich rund fünfzig Bücher von undüber Wittgenstein, die von ihr größtenteils durchgearbeitet und mit Unterstreichungen und
Anmerkungen versehen wurden. Auch Sontags Tagebücher und Notizhefte belegen ihre
intensive Wittgenstein-Rezeption, die letztlich auch ihr Selbstverständnis als Kritikerin und
kritische Denkerin berührt. Umso überraschender ist es, dass dieser Beziehung bislang kaum
Beachtung geschenkt wurde. Sontags Reflexionen zu Wittgenstein betreffen eine neue
Wahrnehmungsweise von Kunst und Nicht-Kunst, die Verbindung von ethischer undästhetischer Betrachtung und die Öffnung eines Resonanzraums für Spiritualität jenseits desSchweigens. In seinem aphoristischen und sich bisweilen an der Grenze zur Poesie
bewegenden Schreibstil erkennt Sontag eine adäquate Form der Weltbeschreibung und ein
Vorbild für ihr eigenes Werk.

Susan Sontag (1933-2004) hat sich wiederholt mit Leben und Werk Ludwig
Wittgensteins auseinandergesetzt und an zentralen Stellen ihres Œuvres führt
sie ihn als Referenz für eigene Thesen an. Ihr biografischer Zugriff folgt
zunächst einem romantischen Geniebegriff, für ihre Studienzeit in Harvard(1955-57) benennt sie Wittgenstein als einen der prägendsten intellektuellen
Einflüsse. In ihrer Bibliothek, die zusammen mit ihrem Nachlass von derUniversity of California in Los Angeles verwahrt wird (Coll. 612), finden sichrund fünfzig Bücher von und über Wittgenstein, die von ihr größtenteils
durchgearbeitet und mit Unterstreichungen, Anmerkungen und anderen
Lesespuren versehen wurden. Auch Sontags Tagebücher und Notizhefte (vondenen bislang nur ein Teil veröffentlicht wurde) belegen ihre intensive
Wittgenstein-Rezeption, die letztlich auch ihr Selbstverständnis als Kritikerin
und kritische Denkerin berührt. Umso überraschender ist es, dass dieser
Beziehung bislang kaum Beachtung geschenkt wurde. Sontags Reflexionen zu
Wittgenstein betreffen eine neue Wahrnehmungsweise von Kunst und NichtKunst, die Verbindung von ethischer und ästhetischer Betrachtung und dieÖffnung eines Resonanzraums für Spiritualität jenseits des Schweigens. In
seinem aphoristischen und sich bisweilen an der Grenze zur Poesie

322

Kristina Jaspers, "Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein | Kristina Jaspers

bewegenden Schreibstil erkennt Sontag eine adäquate
Weltbeschreibung und ein Vorbild für ihr eigenes Werk.

Form

der

1. Begabung, Zweifel und Verzicht

Als Kind in ihrer Familie stets unglücklich, sich unverstanden, als
Außenseiterin begreifend, hält die junge Sontag schon früh Ausschau nachmöglichen Wahlverwandtschaften und Vorbildern. Ihre ersten Notizen zu
Wittgenstein sind von einem romantischen Geniebegriff geprägt. Rückblickend
hält sie kritisch fest: „[I]ch wusste […], dass ich nicht klug genug war, um […]ein Wittgenstein […] zu sein. […] ich bin kein Genie“ (Sontag 2013: 177). Von
Selbstzweifeln geplagt ist sie, ähnlich wie ihr Vorbild, auf der Suche nach
Aufrichtigkeit. Sie fühlt sich unrein, kämpft mit Unzulänglichkeiten und
Schuldgefühlen. Wie Wittgenstein liest sie Dostojewski und Tolstoi. Ihr
Tagebuch bietet die Möglichkeit zur Selbstreflexion und ist zugleich Ansporn
zur Selbstformung. In zahlreichen Listen hält Sontag fest, was sie lesen, lernen,
an sich ändern will. Als 23-jährige Harvard-Studentin zählt sie Wittgenstein
neben Platon und Nietzsche zu den Philosophen, die sie am meisten verehrt.
Im Rückblick führt sie nur Wittgenstein für ihre gesamte Harvardzeit von 1955
bis 1957 unter der Überschrift „Meine geistige Formung“ auf (Sontag 2013:174). Während dieser Studienzeit hatte sie den Tractatus logico-philosophicus,
die Philosophischen Untersuchungen, sowie Das Blaue und das Braune Buch
durchgearbeitet. Bei Rogers Garland Albritton, dem Leiter der Fakultät mit
Schwerpunkt „Philosophie des Geistes“ und einem großem WittgensteinKenner, belegt sie im Wintersemester 1956/57 ein Seminar zum „Mind-BodyProblem“. In ihrer über achtzigseitigen Mitschrift finden sich zahlreiche Zitate
aus Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen (insbesondere §243-464)
mit ergänzenden Fragen, wie: Besteht ein dualistisches Verhältnis zwischen
Leib und Seele? Wo lässt sich das Denken lokalisieren? Ist ein Körper mit einer
Person gleichzusetzen? Und: Inwieweit können Worte Empfindungen (wiebeispielsweise Verliebtheit) ausdrücken? Unter den Aspekten eines „poetic
life“ und einer „aesthetic attitude“ (Sontag papers UCLA, Sign 612, Box 153, F.8)
findet sie bei Wittgenstein Stimulanzien, auf die sie in ihrem Leben wiederholt
zurückgreifen wird. Das Verhältnis von Sinnlichkeit und Askese, vonAufrichtigkeit und künstlerischem Ausdruck, von Inhalt und Form steht bei
ihrer Wittgenstein-Rezeption im Vordergrund (Jaspers 2022).

Kristina Jaspers, "Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein | Kristina Jaspers

An ihrem 32. Geburtstag notiert Sontag – nach einer Auflistung all ihrer
persönlichen Defizite – dass sie sich Wittgensteins Tagebücher kaufen will. Im
selben Jahr, 1965, beginnt sie mit Notizen für ihren Aufsatz über The Aestheticsof Silence. Darin spürt sie den Verbindungen zwischen Kunst und Spiritualität
nach, und Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus dient ihr dabei als
Referenz. In ihrem Tagebuch notiert sie: „Wittgenstein // […] Abkehr von der
Berufung: W. – arbeitet als Lehrer, Krankenpfleger […] Beschreibung [seines]
Werkes als belanglos –“ (Sontag 2013: 106). In dem Essay führt sie aus,
Wittgensteins „Absage an eine Berufung“ wurde „von der Erklärung begleitet,er betrachte seine früheren Leistungen in […] [der] Philosophie […] als
Bagatelle, als bedeutungslos. Doch diese Entscheidung, dauerhaft zu
schweigen, hebt [sein] Werk nicht auf. Im Gegenteil, sie verleiht dem, wasabgebrochen wurde, rückwirkend zusätzliche Kraft und Autorität.“ (Sontag
2011: 13f.) Wittgenstein betreibe eine „als Kunstform praktizierte
Philosophie“ (ebd, 14), deren Ziel sich vielleicht nur dadurch erreichen lasse,dass dieser „Kunst eine Absage erteilt wird.“ Wittgensteins Schweigen versteht
Sontag als eine Übung in Askese in „einem Reich der Meditation, derVorbereitung auf geistiges Reifen, als Prüfung“. Sie meint, Parallelen in derzeitgenössischen künstlerischen Praxis zu erkennen. Gerade die Performanceund Happening-Kunst zeige die positive Möglichkeit der Destruktion, die
Chance zum Neuanfang (Jaspers 2020: 163ff.). Wittgensteins radikale
Lebensentscheidungen (Verzicht auf das ererbte Vermögen, Wahl einer
praktischen Tätigkeit, Wechsel des Wohnorts) imponieren ihr. Sontag selbst
nimmt mit längeren Reisen verbundene Projekte oder Partnerwechsel
wiederholt zum Anlass, um sich in neuen Rollen zu erproben. Ähnlich wie in
Nietzsche, über den sie in den 1960er-Jahren an der Columbia Universität
Vorlesungen hält, sieht sie auch in Wittgenstein ein Modell zur ästhetischen
Lebensführung, für eine ars vivendi, die das Leben als Versuchsanordnung, als
Experiment begreift (Jaspers 2016: 43).
Wittgensteins Postulat „Alles was überhaupt gedacht werden kann, kann klar
gedacht werden. Alles, was sich aussprechen lässt, lässt sich klar
aussprechen“ (TLP: 4.116), wird von Sontag psychologisch und soziologischhinterfragt: „Warum, wann und unter welchen Umständen“ würde jemandalles in Worte fassen wollen, selbst wenn er es könnte? Und: „Gibt esüberhaupt jemanden, der ‚alles was sich überhaupt sagen lässt’, sagen will?“

324

Kristina Jaspers, "Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein | Kristina Jaspers

Im Schweigen meint sie ein Maximum an Integrität und Ernsthaftigkeit zu
erkennen und zirkelt damit wie Wittgenstein den Bereich der Metaphysik ab:„Wie Sprache im Schweigen auf ihre eigene Transzendenz verweist, so
verweist das Schweigen auf seine eigene Transzendenz – auf ein Sprechenjenseits des Schweigens.“ (Sontag 2011: 30)
2. Essayistisches Schreiben an der Grenze zur Poesie

Sontag zählt Ludwig Wittgenstein wie Friedrich Nietzsche zu den
Antisystematikern, und in Wittgensteins autobiografisch motiviertem und sichbisweilen an der Grenze zur Poesie bewegendem Schreiben erkennt sie ein
Vorbild für ihr eigenes Werk. Mit Verweis auf den rumänischen Philosophen
Emil Cioran – und unter Bezugnahme auf Kierkegaard, Nietzsche undwiederum Wittgenstein – spricht sie von dem „Risiko der Metamorphose“, dasdiejenigen eingegangen seien, die ihre philosophischen Gedanken in Form vonParabeln, Gedichten oder Erzählungen, als „Aphorismus, Anmerkung oder
Notiz“ artikulieren (Sontag 2011a: 14). Der klassische akademische Diskurs sei„zerbrochen“, das Schreiben an der Grenze der Poesie bleibt als einzig
adäquate Form der Weltbeschreibung. Damit berührt Sontag einen wichtigen
Punkt in Wittgensteins Selbstverständnis. 1933 hatte er notiert: „Philosophie
dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten“ (VB 1984: 483), und an anderer Stelle
schreibt er: „O, warum ist mir zumute, als schrieb ich ein Gedicht, wenn ich
Philosophie schreibe?“ (MS 133). Gerade sein autobiografischer Schreibstil,nach Sontag „aphoristisch, lyrisch“ sowie sein Selbstgespräch in Tagebüchern
und Notizheften faszinieren die Autorin noch in den 1970er- und 1980erJahren. Ihr Buchbestand zu Wittgenstein wächst in dieser Zeit bedeutend an
und auch die Biografien über ihn arbeitet sie systematisch durch. Die Idee,
einen Essay über das aphoristische Denken zu verfassen, führt sie nicht zu
Ende. Doch die Art und Weise wie Wittgenstein alltägliche Beispiele für seine
Reflexionen auswählt, hat auch Sontag in mehreren ihren Essays verfolgt.
Wittgensteins Erkenntnis, dass jedes alltägliche Ding die ganze Welt
repräsentiert (vgl. TB 1984: 178), könnte als Maxime über ihrem Schreiben
stehen, das sich oft dem vermeintlich Randständigen (wie dem
Katastrophenfilm oder Phänomenen wie „Camp“) widmet.
Sontags Essay „One Culture and the New Sensibility“ (2009a) schließt ihren
einflussreichen Band Against Interpretation (1966) ab und fasst diesen in
gewissem Sinne zusammen. Wittgensteins „Alle Erklärung muß fort, und nur

Kristina Jaspers, "Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein | Kristina Jaspers

Beschreibung an ihre Stelle treten“ (PU: 109) sowie sein Imperativ: „denk
nicht, sondern schau!“ (PU: 66) scheinen die zentralen Thesen dieses Buches
vorwegzunehmen, geht es ihr doch vorrangig darum, sich von inhaltlichen
Interpretationen zu befreien, um die unmittelbare sinnliche Wahrnehmung
und deren Beschreibung in den Vordergrund zu rücken. In ihrem Aufsatz überdie „neue Erlebnisweise“ versucht die Autorin die literarisch-künstlerische
und die naturwissenschaftlich-technische Betrachtungsform zu vereinen.
Hohes und Niedriges, Kunst und Nicht-Kunst, lassen sich nicht länger
unterscheiden. Zu den Trägern der neuen Wahrnehmungsweise zählt Sontag
neben Malern, Architekten, Regisseuren und Musikern auch Soziologen,
Neurologen und Philosophen. In ihrer namentlichen Aufzählung findet sichneben John Cage, Buckminster Fuller oder Claude Lévi-Strauss auch Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Diese Protagonisten reflektieren nach Sontag „eine neue, offene
Betrachtung der Welt und der Dinge der Welt.“ Man fühlt sich an
Wittgensteins Tagebuch erinnert, in dem es heißt: „Als Ding unter Dingen ist
jedes Ding gleich unbedeutend, als Welt jedes gleich bedeutend“ (TB 1984:178). Damit kann jedes Ding, auch das vermeintlich Entlegene oder Abwegige,
als ein Exempel der Welt dienen.
3. Kennerschaft in Theorie und Praxis

Sontag fühlt sich in den 1960er-Jahren von der Form, in der Wittgenstein seine
Beispiele wählt, besonders angezogen. In ihrer Bibliothek finden sich
Ausgaben der TB 1961, LA 1966, Z 1967 und CPE 1967. Entscheidend bei der
Betrachtung und Beurteilung von Kunst und anderen ästhetischen
Phänomenen ist nach Wittgenstein die Kennerschaft. Ob es um die Beurteilung
einer Beethovenschen Sinfonie oder den Schnitt eines Mantels oder eines
Anzugs geht (vgl. LA 1968), ist für Wittgenstein unerheblich. Sontag führt
diesen Gedanken weiter, indem sie ein Rauschenberg-Gemälde mit einem Songder Popband Supremes in Verbindung bringt. In den US-amerikanischen
Feuilletons sorgt dieser vermeintliche Vergleich 1966 für Furore. Tatsächlichhatte sie nicht die Werke, sondern die Art der Wahrnehmung verglichen:
Wenn die Kunst als eine Form der Schulung unserer Gefühle und derProgrammierung unserer Sinneswahrnehmung verstanden wird, dann könnte
das Gefühl, das von einem Bild Rauschenbergs evoziert wird, von der gleichen
Art sein, wie jenes, das ein Lied der ‚Supremes’ erweckt. (Sontag 2009a: 353).

326

Kristina Jaspers, "Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein | Kristina Jaspers

Etwas wird nicht zum Kunstwerk, weil es besonders erbaulich ist oder weil es
von einer Künstlerin oder einem Künstler erschaffen wurde, sondern weil es
als solches betrachtet wird. Das Ästhetische ist keine Eigenschaft der Dinge,
sondern eine Zuschreibung, eine Wahrnehmungsform, eine Haltung. Umwahre Kennerschaft zur Beurteilung dieser Phänomene zu erwerben, genügt
es nicht, die Dinge intellektuell zu durchdringen, sondern es empfiehlt sich,diese praktisch, im eigentlichen Sinne „tätig“ zu erfahren. So erweiterte
Wittgenstein sein Gespür für Proportionen und „schulte die Art, wie man
Dinge sieht“ (Drehmel/Jaspers 2011: 35), als er seiner Schwester ein Haus
baute, und er entwickelte ein tiefes Verständnis für Musik (und Grammatik)
durch das kunstvolle Pfeifen klassischer Musikstücke (Jaspers 2011). Susan
Sontag hatte zwar kein universitäres Studium der Filmwissenschaften
absolviert (die Film Studies begannen sich erst in den 1970er-Jahren zu
etablieren), aber als Cineastin ging sie beinah täglich ins Kino und nahm Endeder 1960er-Jahre die Gelegenheit wahr, selbst Filme zu drehen. So erwarb sie
sich sowohl als Rezipientin wie als Praktikerin eine große Film-Kennerschaft.
Diese schloss neben einem ästhetischen Verständnis auch moralische
Werturteile ein. Wittgenstein beschrieb die ethische Betrachtung als ein
Fragen nach der rechten Lebensweise (LE 1968: 78). Für Sontag ist diese
Perspektive mit jedem ästhetischen Diskurs untrennbar verbunden. Als sie
dreißig Jahre nach dem Erscheinen von Against Interpretation auf ihre frühen
Essays zurückblickt, erkennt sie sich selbst als „streitbare Ästhetin und […]kaum verhohlene Moralistin“ zugleich (Sontag 2001: 349).
4. Ethik und Ästhetik sind eins

Wie für Wittgenstein sind auch für Sontag ethische und ästhetische Reflexion
unmittelbar verbunden. Es gibt keine ewig gültigen Werte, das Gute, Wahre,
Schöne ist nicht statisch, sondern, ähnlich wie Moden – so Wittgenstein inseinen Vorlesungen zur Ästhetik (LA 1968: 25f.) – immer im Wandel,
kontextabhängig,
denindividuellen
Umständen,zeithistorischen
Gegebenheiten und kulturellen Prägungen unterworfen. Sontag hat ihre
eigenen Urteile wiederholt revidiert und angepasst. Prominentestes Beispiel ist
vielleicht ihre wechselnde Haltung in der Auseinandersetzung mit Person und
Werk Leni Riefenstahls zwischen 1966 und 1975: Während Sontag Mitte der1960er-Jahre in Against Interpretation noch eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem
formal beeindruckenden Œuvre Riefenstahls – unter Berücksichtigung dessen

Kristina Jaspers, "Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein | Kristina Jaspers

propagandistischer Implikationen – anregt (Sontag 2009:34f: „Nennt man Leni
Riefenstahls Triumph des Willens und Olympia Meisterwerke, so heißt das
nicht, Nazipropaganda mit ästhetischer Nachsicht glossieren. Die
Nazipropaganda läßt sich nicht wegleugnen. Daneben aber ist noch etwas
anderes in diesen Filmen enthalten, etwas, das wir zu unserem eigenen
Schaden ablehnen.“), lehnt sie dies knapp zehn Jahre später unter veränderten
gesellschaftspolitischen Bedingungen grundsätzlich ab (vgl. Sontag 2003).
Wittgensteins viel zitiertes „Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins“ aus dem TLP (6.421)
könnte aus Sontags Feder stammen, fordert sie doch, auch wenn sie übervermeintlich Abseitiges wie „Camp“ schreibt, stets eine moralische
Ernsthaftigkeit ein. Tatsächlich hat Sontag den Paragraphen 6.421 in ihrem
Tagebuch 1970 festgehalten, zusammen mit der Idee, einen Essay überWittgensteins Einfluss auf die zeitgenössische Kunst zu verfassen (was sie, wie
beim geplanten Essay über die Aphoristik, nicht tut). Wittgenstein hatte das
Verhältnis von Kunst zur Ethik wie folgt bestimmt: „Das Kunstwerk ist derGegenstand sub specie aeternitatis gesehen und das gute Leben ist die Welt
sub specie aeternitatis gesehen“ (TB 1984: 178). Ding und Welt, Kunst undMoral stehen also in einer Art Abhängigkeits- oder Abbildverhältnis
zueinander. Die „geistige Reifung“, die Sontag in einer ästhetischen
Lebenspraxis sucht und bewundert, berührt beide Sphären. Kunst versteht
Sontag daher als „spirituelles Projekt“ unserer Zeit, in dem die modernen
Künstler wie ehedem die Mystiker nach Transzendenz und an die Grenzen desBewusstseins streben. Beispielhaft steht hierfür John Cage und seine
Komposition 4’33 aus dem Jahr 1952. Schweigen sei hier nicht als Stille im
Sinne einer Abwesenheit von Etwas zu interpretieren, sondern als ästhetische
Erfahrung. Kunst ist nach Sontag niemals nicht-intentional, ohne emotionale
Resonanz. Das Schweigen wird zum Teil der künstlerischen Rhetorik. Hier
ließe sich ein Bogen zu Wittgensteins Unterscheidung von Zeigen und
Sprechen schlagen, die er im Tractatus entwickelt hat, und nach der das KlarAussprechbare den Raum des Unsagbaren, des Mystischen oder Ethischen,abgrenze und somit nur indirekt aufzeigen könne. Eben dieses „Sprechenjenseits des Schweigens“ ist es, das Sontag in ihrer Auseinandersetzung mit
Kunst, Literatur und popkulturellen Phänomenen immer wieder aufzuspüren
sucht.

328

Kristina Jaspers, "Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein | Kristina Jaspers

Wittgenstein als Vorbild, sein Leben und Werk, schärften Sontags Blick füreine neue Sensibilität für die alltäglichen Dinge, für die Übertragung
philosophischer Erkenntnisse auf künstlerische Konzepte und für einenselbstbewussten eigenen Schreibstil, der Offenheit, sowie ein Changieren
zwischen Theorie und Poesie als Stärke begreift. „Und eine Sprache vorstellen
heißt, sich eine Lebensform vorstellen.“ (PU: 19) notiert Susan Sontag am 26.
Juni 1966 in ihrem Tagebuch (Sontag 2013: 184). Ihre Lebensform, ihr Habitus,
war der einer Moralistin und Ästhetin, die ihr Leben als Kunstformpraktizierte. Ihr Vorbild Wittgenstein reflektierte sie dabei auf vielerlei
Ebenen.

References
Drehmel, Jan; Jaspers, Kristina (Hg.) (2011) Ludwig Wittgenstein. Verortungen eines Genies,
Hamburg: Junius.
Jaspers, Kristina (2011) „Vom Sprechen und Pfeifen“, In: Jan Drehmel, Kristina Jaspers (Hg.):
Wittgenstein-Vorträge. Annäherungen aus Kunst und Wissenschaft, Hamburg, 34-43.
Jaspers, Kristina (2016) „Friedrich Nietzsche – Leben als Experiment“, in: Gödde, Günter;
Loukidelis, Nikolaos (Hg.) Nietzsche und die Lebenskunst. Ein philosophisch-psychologisches
Kompendium, Stuttgart: Metzler, 38-46.
Jaspers, Kristina (2020) „Alles schon geträumt? Gesellschaftliche Zukunftsszenarien und das
kollektive Unbewusste bei Hannah Arendt und Susan Sontag“, in: Steinborn, Anke; Newiak,
Dennis (Hg.): Urbane Zukünfte im Science-Fiction-Film. Berlin: Springer, 149-165.
Jaspers, Kristina (2022) La filosofía como práctica artística. Sontag lee a Wittgenstein, in:
Abánades; Jorge Ruiz (Hg.): Centenario del Silencio. Wittgenstein en la Cultura Contemporánea
100 Anos despuésdel Tractatus. Granada (Spanien). Libros de la Caverna, 269-176.
Rhees, Rush; Smythies, Yorick/Taylor, James (Hg.) (2000): Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vorlesungen
und Gespräche über Ästhetik, Psychoanalyse und religiösen Glauben, Frankfurt/Main.
Sontag, Susan (2001) „Dreißig Jahre später…“, in: dies., Worauf es ankommt. Essays, Frankfurt/
Main: Fischer, 347-354.
Sontag, Susan (2003) „Faszinierender Faschismus“, in: dies. Im Zeichen des Saturn. Essays,
Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 97-126.
Sontag, Susan (2009) „Über den Stil“, in: dies. Kunst und Antikunst. 24 literarische Analysen,
Frankfurt/Main, Fischer, 23-47.

Kristina Jaspers, "Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein | Kristina Jaspers

Sontag, Susan (2009a) „Die Einheit der Kultur und die neue Erlebnisweise“, in: dies. Kunst und
Antikunst. 24 literarische Analysen, Frankfurt/Main, Fischer, 342-334.
Sontag, Susan (2011) „Ästhetik des Schweigens“, in: dies. Gesten radikalen Willens. Essays,
Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 11-50.
Sontag, Susan (2011a) „’Wider sich Denken’: Reflektionen über Cioran“, in: dies. Gesten
radikalen Willens. Essays, Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 99-124.
Sontag, Susan (2013): Ich schreibe, um herauszufinden, was ich denke. Tagebücher 1964–1980,
München: Hanser.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1968) „Ethik – Ein Vortrag 1930“, in: Baum, Wilhelm (Hg.) Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Geheime Tagebücher 1914-1016, Wien/Berlin: Turia und Kant, 77-86.

330

Kristina Jaspers, "Die Ästhetik des Schweigens. Susan Sontag reflektiert Ludwig Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Nonsense and Human History | Oscar Joffe

Nonsense and Human History
Oscar Joffe (Berlin, Germany)
Abstract
I build on Hans Sluga’s recent discussion of the place of history and temporality in
Wittgenstein’s work through a discussion of the austere conception of nonsense. Central to theearly Wittgenstein’s thought was the notion of an elucidatory recognition of nonsense, and as
Moore (2003: 186) remarks, such a judgement of nonsensicality is a “judgement concerning
the history, to date, of some particular sign.” I explore this idea by relating the austere view ofnonsense-recognition to Collingwood’s conception of the method of the historian, as
expounded in his Human Nature and Human History. I locate an interesting congruence
between various aspects of Collingwood’s account and the Tractatus’s conception ofjudgements concerning nonsensicality, with particular reference to Collingwood’s distinction
between the inside and outside of an event. I suggest that there seems to be a good sense inwhich the nonsense-recognition which undergirds Tractarian elucidation manifests a form ofhistorical understanding.

1. Introduction

Hans Sluga is struck by the Tractatus’s almost complete silence about history
and time (2017: 417). His avowedly modest intention in his (2017) essay is “tosingle out some of Wittgenstein’s characteristic thoughts on time and history inorder to determine what can be done with them” (2017: 420.) My yet moremodest intention here is to discuss a further point in the Tractatus, notdiscussed by Sluga (or indeed by Glock (2006)) at which Wittgenstein’s
thoughts edges towards historical matters, and which suggests a role forhistorical understanding in Wittgenstein’s early thought. I therefore aim to gosome short way towards extending Beaney’s (2006) notion of historicalelucidation in Frege’s work to Tractarian elucidation.
The idea of a judgement that some proposition is nonsensical occupies acentral role in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein tells us just before the end of his
book that we come to understand him when we recognise that his propositions
are nonsensical, and that it is in this revelation of nonsensicality that theelucidatory character of his propositions consists (§6.54.) Picking up on aremark from Moore (2003), I here examine the sense in which recognition of
nonsensicality, austerely understood, might be seen to manifest a form ofhistorical understanding. I end by raising a parallel between the Tractatus’sview of judgements of nonsensicality and Collingwood’s view of history as
expounded in his ‘Human Nature and Human History’ (2005 [1936.])

Oscar Joffe, "Nonsense and Human History". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Nonsense and Human History | Oscar Joffe

2. Austerity about nonsense

So-called resolute readers have stressed that, in the Tractatus, nonsense is only
ever simple lack of sense (see e.g. Diamond 1991, chapters 2 and 3.) Conant(2002: 380-381) distinguishes mere from substantial nonsense, and austerefrom substantial conceptions of nonsense. Mere nonsense is “simply
unintelligible – it expresses no thought”, while substantial nonsense resultsfrom placing separately intelligible symbols into illicit configurations. The
substantial conception is so called because it recognises substantial nonsense.
On the austere conception, there is only mere nonsense (Conant 2002: 380.)
Note that few would describe themselves as advocates of the substantial
conception, so construed. Hacker, the arch traditionalist, “emphatically rejects”
a reading which “attributes the illegitimacy of the sentential combination to
the fact that the meanings of these expressions cannot be so
combined.” (Hacker 2003, pp. 2-3; quoted by Sullivan 2003 in this connection.)
The substantial conception is not so much an interpretive device foisted on us
by advocates of some form of traditional reading, but rather arises quite
naturally from reflection on certain problematic examples, such as I discuss
below.
The Tractatus seems indeed to present what Conant calls an austereconception. Wittgenstein tells us that nonsense is what results when one fails
to “make some arbitrary determination” regarding the meaning of a sign, notfrom use of a symbol in a context in which it is impermissible (§5.473.)
Nonsense is not, that is to say, the result of combining meaningful symbols in amanner which their meanings disallow. The idea of substantial nonsense
seems to stand in conflict both with Wittgenstein’s context principle (§3.3) andwith his remark at §5.473 that “In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes inlogic.” (I will try not to venture any further into this particular dispute. See theessays by Diamond, Conant and Hacker in Crary and Read (2000) for further
discussion.)
If nonsensicality results not from the impermissible use of a symbol but from a
failure to determine meaning at the level of the sign, the ground of arecognition of such nonsense, it seems, must concern mere signs. Recognitionof nonsense must, that is, consist in a recognition of nothing more mundane

332

Oscar Joffe, "Nonsense and Human History". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Nonsense and Human History | Oscar Joffe

than that that the producer of the nonsense has failed to bestow a meaning ofsome of the signs out of which they have constructed it (cf. §6.53.)
Sluga identifies §6.54 as a point at which the Tractatus shifts from “thetimeless present that dominates most of [the text] to [a] genuinely temporal
moment” (2017: 418.) But I think the reader encounters genuine temporality atleast one proposition earlier, at §6.53. There, Wittgenstein describes the correct
method of philosophy as one according to which one abstains from saying
anything other than propositions of natural science, and otherwise breaks
one’s silence only to correct errant attempts at metaphysics. In its latter criticaltask, that is, philosophy is reactive; the philosopher lies silently in wait until atime at which their interlocutor tries to say something metaphysical, at which
point they respond by demonstrating to the interlocutor that they have failed
to assign meanings to some of the signs which compose their would-be
metaphysical proposition. Temporality enters the picture here, firstly, throughthis this reactive structure.
But what additionally makes §6.53 a “genuinely temporal moment” is its
expression of the austere conception of nonsense-recognition. The idea of
substantial nonsense is the idea of a sort of nonsense, recognition of which
would consist in recognition that a symbol has been mistakenly deployed;
deployed in a way that its meaning somehow prohibited. That recognition
would thus involve a reflection on the relevant concepts, and such reflection,
we can grant, has nothing particularly historical or empirical about it. But in
resolving to countenance only austere nonsense, one resolves to understandrecognition of such nonsense as involving a judgement about whether some
sign has been given a meaning. And this is in part a matter of arbitrary
linguistic convention (cf. §3.322.) Signs are repeatable (“'A' is the same sign as 'A'” (§3.203)) and perceptible (§3.32); they appear at times and in places. To
determine that a particular occurrence of a sign has not been given a meaningmight require concerted investigation into the relevant conventions. It willcertainly involve, as A.W. Moore puts it, a “judgement about the actual history,
to date, of some particular sign”, a judgement of the form: “‘’No meaning has
so far been given to this sign.’” (Moore 2003: 186.) There is, therefore, clearly agood sense in which recognition of nonsensicality, on the austere conception,
involves a kind of historical understanding.

Oscar Joffe, "Nonsense and Human History". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
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Nonsense and Human History | Oscar Joffe

A problem for the austere conception is that there are cases of apparent
nonsense which are hard to construe as instances of this general conception.
In reflecting on such cases, our eventual judgement that they fail to express asense seems not to be grounded in a judgement about signs, but one about themeanings of symbols. Moore's example is “It is five o’clock at the North Pole”.
Most need to reflect momentarily on what it is for it to be five o’clock
somewhere on the earth before accepting that the rules for determining whattime it is at each point on the earth yield no result in this case. That is, ajudgement that the sentence is nonsense seems to be a judgement thatmeaningful symbols have been put together in a nonsense-yielding way. Suchcases might seem to suggest that nonsense-recognition consists in reflection on
sempiternal concepts after all (which in turn puts something of a dampener on
the idea that these matters open a door through which historical matters findtheir way into Wittgenstein’s early thought.)
Moore’s recommended response to such cases involves the thought that
linguistic rules determine when sense is made, but that they do not “except by
default” determine when sense is not made. The most we can say on the basisof reflection on the relevant concepts is that according to the rules for applying
those concepts, “no meaning attaches to the sentence” (2003: 186.) The
judgement that a proposition in question is nonsense simpliciter is more
ambitious, purporting as it does to rule out the possibility that such aconfiguration makes sense according to any rules, since it involves a claim
about what rules there happen to be. A judgement of nonsensicality istherefore “always empirical, provisional, and metalinguistic” (Moore 2003:
186.)
The resulting view can be construed as one according to which a judgementthat a proposition is nonsensical (at least in cases of non-obvious nonsense)
has two parts. It involves, on the one hand, a provisional and empiricaljudgement about the history of a particular sign. But where we are confronted
by an initial illusion of sense (such as in the case of Wittgenstein’s own
propositions), recognition of nonsensicality involves identification of theconcepts which produced that illusion (for “where illusions of sense areconcerned, there are always relevant concepts” (Moore 2003: 187)) andrecognition that the rules attaching to those concepts determine no sense in
the present case.

334

Oscar Joffe, "Nonsense and Human History". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Nonsense and Human History | Oscar Joffe

Objections can be mounted regarding just how austere this view is (see Moore
2003: 187ff. for discussion.) In what follows, however, I will merely draw
attention to an interesting and, I hope, clarifying congruence between the
resulting view of nonsense-recognition and R.G. Collingwood’s conception of
the historian’s method.

3. Collingwood on discerning the thought in an event

In his ‘Human Nature and Human History’, Collingwood is concerned in partwith the demarcation of the discipline of history. He begins with a brief
discussion of the Enlightenment idea of a science of human nature. The
approach to investigating self-knowledge of the sort we find in Locke, Hume,
Reid, and even Kant, contends Collingwood, foundered and broke downbecause it was “distorted by the analogy of the natural sciences” (The Idea of
History: 207; cf. Tractatus §§4.11-4.1122, particularly the reference to Darwin.)
The shape of such thinkers’ approach was understandably influenced by the“new birth of physical science” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (p.
207) and just as the new physics figured for them, writes Collingwood, history
figures for his contemporaries – “history occupies in the world of to-day a
position analogous to that occupied by physics in the time of Locke: it isrecognized as a special and autonomous form of thought, lately established,
whose possibilities have not yet been competely explored.” Thus some havebeen led to assert that “all reality is historical” (p. 208.)
These optimistic historicists have hit upon something right, according to
Collingwood, namely that while the methods of science are appropriate to thestudy of nature, “the right way of investigating mind is by the methods ofhistory” (p. 208.) But the claim that all fields of enquiry are best understood ashistory, thinks Collingwood, is a mistake. He rejects, for instance, the idea thatevolutionary theory has shown that natural processes are really historical
processes (cf. Tractatus §4.1122 on the irrelevance of Darwinian theory tophilosophy.) According to the working historian, and to the conception towhich Collingwood subscribes, history’s remit begins and ends with humanaffairs. Thus the archaeologist, who thinks of artefacts in terms of the humanpurposes they once served, is engaged in history, while the palaeontologist,“arranging fossils in a time-series, is not working as an historian, but only as a

Oscar Joffe, "Nonsense and Human History". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Nonsense and Human History | Oscar Joffe

scientist thinking in a way which can at most be described as quasihistorical” (pp. 210-211.)
In defending the non-arbitrariness of this distinction, Collingwood presents his
positive characterisation of the historical method. That method relies on a
distinction between the inside and the outside of a past event. The outside ofan event comprises every aspect of it “which can be described in terms ofbodies and their movements: the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain
men, across a river called the Rubicon at one date, or the spilling of his bloodon the floor of the senate-house at another.” To the inside of an event belongs
everything about it which one can only capture “in terms of thought” –“Caesar’s defiance of Republican law, or the clash of constitutional policy
between himself and his assassins”. An action, on this picture, “is the unity of
the inside and the outside of an event.” Historians are interested in actions,and so in both the insides and outsides of events. While historians might“begin by discovering the outside of an event”, their aim is then to work theirway into the action from the outside, “to discern the thought of its
agent” (p. 212.) Events in history are “things which the historian looks, not at,
but through, to discern the thought within them” (p. 213.)
It is this last idea of Collingwood’s, the idea of looking through an event todiscern the thought within it, that I want to suggest yields a clarifying
perspective on elucidatory recognition of nonsense in the Tractatus. In
Collingwood’s description of the historian’s role, we can locate each element of
an elucidatory recognition of nonsense, as outlined above. The historian
begins with the outside of an event, that part of it which can be understood interms of the movements of bodies, and works their way into the thought
through which the event is made intelligible. The event’s outside, we might say
following Tractatus §3.32, is what can be perceived of the past action which
the historian attempts to understand; the Tractarian analogue of Collingwood’s‘outside’, then, is the sign. The reader of the Tractatus seems to begin alreadyinside; they are confronted with propositions apparently expressive ofthoughts, and work their way to a recognition that these propositions express
nothing. They thereby arrive at the outside, though with a clarified
understanding of that outside. In order to accommodate the appearance of
substantial examples of nonsense, Moore makes use of the idea that wherever
we have an illusion of sense, we have relevant concepts which explain that336

Oscar Joffe, "Nonsense and Human History". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Nonsense and Human History | Oscar Joffe

illusion, even if those concepts are not themselves what ground the judgementof nonsense. This extension of the account, which might have seemed to vitiate
the historical character of nonsense-recognition, seems rather easily alignedwith the historian’s task as conceived by Collingwood; one begins with theoutside of the event (in this case some speaker’s offering some nonsensicalproposition) and works one’s way into an understanding of its inside; not inthis case a thought, but the concepts which led the speaker to think their
proposition capable of expressing some thought.

4. Conclusion

Collingwood had, to be sure, a rather particular conception of the discipline ofhistory. He famously considered metaphysics to be a sort of history, forexample. Given the apparent strangeness of his conception, the parallel I draw
in this essay might be seen merely as illustrating the wide scope of thatconception, rather than telling us anything interesting about the things whichfall under it. But my point is not just that on Collingwood’s idiosyncraticallybroad conception of what counts as historical understanding, theunderstanding that a proposition is nonsensical counts as historical
understanding.
My suggestion, rather, is that recognition of nonsensicality (some among which
recognitions are elucidatory) austerely understood as recognition that anarbitrary determination of the meaning of some sign happens not to have been
made, and thus that where we thought we had perceived a thought, there wasnone, is interestingly and clarifyingly seen as something like the reverse of thehistorian’s way of proceeding, as presented by Collingwood. Collingwood’s
historian begins at the outside of an event, and tries to discern the thought
within it; the reader of the Tractatus begins at what seems to be the outside ofa thought, and learns to discern the lack of thought within.
References
Beaney, Michael (2006) "Frege and the Role of Historical Elucidation: Methodology and theFoundations of Mathematics", in: José Ferreirós Domínguez and Jeremy Gray (eds.) The
Architecture of Modern Mathematics: Essays in History and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 47-66.

Oscar Joffe, "Nonsense and Human History". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Nonsense and Human History | Oscar Joffe

Collingwood, Robin G. (2005) The Idea of History: With Lectures, 1926-1928, edited by Willem J.
van der Dussen, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conant, James (2002) "The Method of the Tractatus", in: Erich H. Reck (ed.) From Frege toWittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crary, Alice, and Rupert Read (2002) The New Wittgenstein, London and New York: Routledge.
Diamond, Cora (1991) The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Glock, Hans-Johann (2006) "Wittgenstein and History", in: Alois Pichler and Simo Säätelä (eds.)
Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works, Berlin and Boston, MA: De Gruyter.
Hacker, P.M.S (2003) "Wittgenstein, Carnap and the New American Wittgensteinians", The
Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210), 01–23.
Moore, A. W. (2003) "Ineffability and Nonsense", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,Supplementary Volumes 7, 169–93.
Sluga, Hans (2017) "Time and History in Wittgenstein", in: Hans Sluga and David G. Stern (eds.)
The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
417–40.
Sullivan, Peter (2003) "Ineffability and Nonsense" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,Supplementary Volumes 7, 194–223.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2023) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by Michael Beaney,
Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Oscar Joffe, "Nonsense and Human History". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein | Amadeusz Just

“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later
Wittgenstein
Amadeusz Just (Warsaw, Poland)
Abstract
The aim of my talk is to discuss a way in which Wittgenstein explores the limits of language in
his later thought. I shall suggest that we can see him engaged in the activity of making thelimits of language clear from inside at two points—in MS119 and On Certainty—, when heappeals to Goethe’s phrase “In the beginning was the deed”. I shall argue that what is involvedin this activity is the recognition of certain uses of language as reactions (or deeds), i. e. byrecognizing a use of language as a reaction, we recognize a limit of language from within.
First, I look briefly at two ways of understanding of the notion of limits of language in theTractatus. Then, I discuss Bernard Williams reading of OC §§401-402. I argue that Williams iswrong in taking Wittgenstein’s reference to Goethe as espousing a view of the primacy ofpractice. I bring out some problems with Williams’s reading by looking at an exchange
between Norman Malcolm and Rush Rhees on the status of primitive reactions. Finally, I givea reading of Wittgenstein’s appeal to Goethe in MS119 in reference to Bertrand Russell’s paper“The Limits of Empiricism”.

I

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wanted to draw a limit to the expression ofthoughts from within, i.e. in language (cf. TLP: 9, 4.114ff, 4.51). One of the main
debates in the reception of the Tractatus in recent decades can be formulated
as a dispute over the understanding of Wittgenstein’s notion of the limits oflanguage. According to the dominant family of interpretations – theseinterpretations are usually referred to as traditional or ineffabilistic readings(cf. Bronzo 2021: 51) –, the notion of the limits of language is meant to indicatethat while the limits of language constrain our expression of thoughts bysetting limits to the meaningfulness of propositions, there is something
inexpressible beyond those limits. The inexpressible cannot be put into words
as any attempt at doing this would violate the criteria of meaningfulness, it can
only be shown. Thus, this group of interpretations appeals to the distinction
between saying and showing as crucial for Wittgenstein’s enterprise in theTractatus. Insofar as there are some ineffable truths about reality excluded by
the limits of language from the sayable, we can get a grip on them only invirtue of their manifestations (cf. TLP 6.522). As Peter Hacker put it:“Wittgenstein’s claim is, or at least seems to be, that by the very nature oflanguage, or indeed of any system of representation whatsoever, there arethings which cannot be stated or described, things of which one cannot speak,

Amadeusz Just, "“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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but which are in some sense shown by language.” (Hacker 2000: 353). This
understanding of the limits of language has been challenged by a family ofinterpretations known as the resolute readings. On the resolute reading, thelimits of language are not constraining our expression of thoughts in any way,
as there is no quasi-propositional content excluded from the sayable on theaccount of violating the logical syntax of language. The inexpressible, insteadof being something on the other side of the limits, is rather – as Juliet Floyd put
it – “a fiction, an illusion produced by an overly simplified conception ofhuman expression” (Floyd 2007: 177). Wittgenstein’s exploring of the limits oflanguage is understood here as an activity of making the limits of language
clear from inside.

II

Bernard Williams takes Wittgenstein’s reference to Goethe’s phrase “Im
Anfang war die Tat” in §402 from On Certainty as espousing a view of the
primacy of practice (Williams 2008). Let me put this remark in a broader
context. In a sequence of remarks to which §402 belongs, Wittgensteinchallenges Moore’s claim that we can know certain group of propositions
about physical objects (cf. OC §389). In a nutshell, Wittgenstein wants to bringout that in an ordinary case, there is in principle no justification forpropositions like, e.g. “I know that that is a tree”, which accomplishes morethat the very proposition “That is a tree” itself. What is puzzling is that insofar
as these are empirical propositions, it seems that it should be possible to state
grounds justifying our expressing them (i.e. answering questions like ‘How do
you know that that is a tree?’). But after looking closer at possible justifications,
it turns out that they cannot do the work. (I should mention that one important
kind of justification that Wittgenstein rules here out is an appeal to perception.
In OC Wittgenstein’s refutation of perception as possible evidence for this kindof empirical propositions is directly addressed to Moore’s argument in the“Proof of the External World” (cf. OC: 250). In the last section, I discuss
Wittgenstein’s rejection of this kind of grounding of empirical propositions inreference to his criticism of Bertrand Russell’s ideas.) Given that, Wittgensteinconsiders whether these empirical propositions could be in turn conceived ofas hypotheses, and our drawing consequences from them would show that weknow them. But he is dissatisfied with this either. First, it seems that in this340

Amadeusz Just, "“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein | Amadeusz Just

way we could imagine an infinite number of hypotheses from which we
supposedly draw consequences – “And don’t I know that there is no stairway
in this house going six floors deep into the earth, even though I have neverthought about it?” (OC §398). Second, our drawing consequences would rather
only show that we accept the hypothesis. And the propositions in question are
not propositions which we merely accept. Wittgenstein continues withhesitation saying that he is “inclined to fight windmills, because [he] cannot
yet say the thing [he] really want[s] to say” (OC §401). But he begins the next
remark resolutely, saying what he wants to say: “I want to say: propositions of
the form of empirical propositions [ Erfahrungssätze], and not only
propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (withlanguage). (…)”. And in the following one he comments on that: “In this remark[§401] the expression ‘propositions of the form of empirical propositions’ isitself thoroughly bad; the statements in question are statements about material
objects. And they do not serve as foundations in the same way as hypotheses
which, if they turn out to be false, are replaced by others. (…and write withconfidence ‘In the beginning was the deed’.’)” (OC §402). Wittgenstein suggests
in these two remarks that it is confusing to regard the statements aboutmaterial objects, like e.g. ‘That is a tree’, as empirical propositions or
propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and that we should rather
conceive them as the unmoving foundations of our language games (cf. OC§403). Yet, it is rather unclear, how the quotation from Goethe added at theend of §402 in brackets hangs together with the rest of the remarks.
Let me now get back to Williams. Williams assumes that in the sequence§§401-402 Wittgenstein advances a view of the primacy of practice and,further, appeals to Goethe in order to remind us that the primacy of practice is
not “the primacy of descriptions of practice” (Williams 2008: 24). He attributes
to Wittgenstein an idea that when one is investigating the grounds of ourbeliefs, the limit one comes across are our practices. But representing thesepractices as grounds of our beliefs is in principle impossible, because any
description of the way in which language is grounded in practice would itself
be grounded in practice. Therefore, any description trying to represent
practices as grounds of certain propositions, would be incomplete insofar as it
could not at the same time describe the way in which it itself is grounded inpractice. Thus, Williams argues that our beliefs are meaningful only in virtue

Amadeusz Just, "“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein | Amadeusz Justof a historically comprehended set of practices, but the very relation between
beliefs and practices “cannot fully be theorized or captured inreflection” (Williams 2008: 25). Although in his essay Williams is not interested
in the semantic meaning of a proposition, but in the meaningfulness of a set of
propositions as expressing e.g. liberal political beliefs, his argument is basedon his reading of Wittgenstein as presenting a general view on the relation
between language and reality according to which language, theories, beliefs,
etc. are grounded in practices. It seems that in his reading of OC, Williams
takes the quotation from Goethe at the end of §402 as a continuation ofthoughts expressed by Wittgenstein in previous remarks. He reads
Wittgenstein as saying that insofar some empirical propositiosn form thefoundation of all operating with thoughts, there is still something deeper,
something more fundamental. Williams thinks that Wittgenstein brings it out
by quoting Goethe. Thus, on this reading, quotation from Goethe continues
Wittgenstein’s suggestion by pointing out the grounding of the statements
about material objects in deeds, actions, and practices.
Williams’s reading falls in with the first understanding of the limits oflanguage. The limits of language are constrains. Beyond those limits there arepractices and, in particular, the very relation between language and practices,which we cannot put into words. Insofar as our “powers of reflection on thisrelation are limited” (Williams 2008: 24), Williams takes this relation to besomething unsayable. But it is a mistake on William’s part to separate
language from practices. One of the central concepts of Wittgenstein's later
vision of language, the concept of language game, is intended as bringing out
the intertwining of language and activities. Elsewhere, Wittgenstein expresses
this directly: “We talk and act. That is already presupposed in everything that I
am saying” (RFM, VI, §17).

III

In this section I want to look at an exchange between Malcolm (Malcolm 1996)
and Rhees (Rhees 2005) on the status of primitive reactions. The relation
between primitive reactions and language games can be considered one caseof the more general issue of the relation between language and practice.

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with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein | Amadeusz Just

According to Malcolm, one of the important themes present in Wittgenstein’s
later work is that „language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination” (OC §475). Malcolm claims that with this remark Wittgenstein “istrying to call attention to something that underlies all languagegames” (Malcolm 1996: 82). He suggests that this something underlying all
language-games, indeed underlying all rationality of human life, is instinctive
behavior. He reads Wittgenstein as attributing two general roles to instinctive
behavior. First, our learning of first words is “an outgrowth of unthinking,instinctive behavior”. Second, he suggests that “something of the same kindpermeates and surrounds all human acting and all use of language, even at
sophisticated levels” (Malcolm 1996: 81). Instinctive behavior is conceived of as
something that underlies all rational actions and uses of language and,
therefore, something that itself lies beyond being justified or unjustified (cf. OC
358f).
Malcolm bases his reading of Wittgenstein on five different kinds of examples.
The first three examples focus on cases in which certain linguistic expressions
are a kind of replacement for unlearned, instinctive reactions. These are: 1) the
first person immediate expressions of sensations, emotions, feelings, attitudes,
intentions [Äusserungen], 2) our responses to other’s pain- or fear-behavior, 3)
the use of the word ‘cause’ and other causal expressions. The last two
examples, on the other hand, are intended to show that instinctive behavior
belongs in an important way to our use of language in general. These are: 4)
the first learning of names of objects and later use of these names in language
games, 5) going on in the same way in case of following a rule.
Let’s take a look at one of Malcolm’s examples. In remark §244 from PI
Wittgenstein considers relations between words and sensations and gives anexample of a child who „has hurt himself and […] cries; then adults talk to him
and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new
pain-behaviour.” (PI §244). Malcolm thinks that this remark represents a shift
from non-conceptual, non-linguistic, instinctive pain-behaviour to linguistic
expression of pain being a new pain-behaviour. And, according to Malcolm,
our possession and understanding of concepts grows out of such reactions byusing words symbolizing these concepts along with or in place of unlearned
reactions. However, Wittgenstein’s move is much more complex. What
Malcolm seems to ignore is that in the remark §244, the linguistic expression of

Amadeusz Just, "“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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pain is granted a double qualification. On the one hand, as a use of language, itbelongs to the order of language, but on the other – precisely because it has
replaced instinctive pain-behavior – it belongs at the same time to the order ofprimitive reactions. While Malcolm wanted to draw our attention to thetransition from the non-linguistic to the linguistic, if we recognize the double
qualification of such uses of language, it should be rather said that
Wittgenstein’s aim is to blur or at least nuance the contrast between the nonlinguistic and the linguistic. When Wittgenstein says in §244 that the parents
are teaching a child the words ‘I am in pain’ when he cuts his finger, he saysthat they are teaching him a new pain-behaviour. Afterall, we should keep inmind that language game is a behaviour (see Z §545).
Rhees pointed out further problems with Malcolm’s approach. First, he argues
that on Malcolm’s reading it seems as if Wittgenstein, instead of describing
language, was putting forward a theory explaining the origins of language.
Rhees notes that while Wittgenstein did write that language did not emerge
from ratiocination, he did not suggest that it emerged from somewhere else.
Second, he claims that non-linguistic primitive reactions may have an
important role but only within a language game. Thus, it is a mistake toconceive them as the foundation of our language as it would suggest thatprimitive reactions are something that cannot be misunderstood. On Rhees’sview, we can understand a reaction as such-and-such a reaction only when it isseen as already belonging to some language game.
Rhees wants to direct our attention to the fact that the use of both words andgestures presupposes mastery of a certain technique, which we have to learn.
And it is only within a technique that words and gestures have meaning.
Malcolm thinks that he makes a gesture with which he points to nonconceptual instinctive behaviour situated beyond the language game. But thepossibility of such a gesture is an illusion. Everything Malcolm canmeaningfully point to is within the space of language games he has mastered.
When parents teach a child the word ‘pain’ by replacing his primitive
reactions with this word, from the parents’ perspective, the child’s primitive
reactions already belong to a language game with the word pain.
Rhees says that there is only one remark, which seems to support Malcolm’s
reading – the one in which Wittgenstein appeals to Goethe.

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with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein | Amadeusz Just

IV

Let me now move to a sequence of remarks “Ursache und Wirkung: Intuitives
Erfassen”. The background of Wittgenstein’s reflections is Bertrand Russell’s
article “The Limits of Empiricism” (Russell 1935-1936). In this article Russell
considers the relationship between empirical knowledge and sense data. He
reaches a conclusion troublesome for empiricism, that this relationshipinvolves a kind of causal relation. He argues that the basis of empiricalknowledge consists in the possibility of perceiving a causal relation between
that knowledge and what we perceive. For instance, the sentence ‘There is acat there’ is a sentence “perceived to be caused by something perceived” – a cat(Russell 1935-1936: 137). Russell claims that the kind of causality involved hereis causality that we are immediately aware of. Wittgenstein begins his
manuscript with a similar example, in which it seems that we come to know
the cause by intuition: “I am frightened, because he looks sothreatening” (Wittgenstein 1993: 371). Wittgenstein agrees with Russell that
there are cases of causality where we do not rely on observing regularsequences of events. But Russell's explanation of this cases in terms of 'being
immediately aware of' is misleading as it suggests that there are propositions
that rest on themselves (cf. WCL: 16ff). Thus, Wittgenstein intends to redescribe these cases in terms of 'reactions to the cause' - we call the cause what
we react to - and suggests that "one root of the cause-effect language game is tobe found [...] in our looking out for a cause" (Wittgenstein 1993: 373). In one of
the concluding remarks of this section of the manuscript Wittgenstein appeals
to Goethe: “The origin and the primitive form of the language game is areaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language – I
want to say – is a refinement, ‘In the beginning was the deed’.” (Wittgenstein
1993: 395). Malcolm took this remark as saying that our language games
emerged from reactions. I think that he missed the point. I want to suggest two
things. Firts, this remark should be read in the context of one of the preceding
remarks: "What we are doing here above all is to imagine a basic form [oflanguage game]: a possibility, indeed a very important possibility. (We very
often confuse what is an important possibility with historicalreality.)" (Wittgenstein 1993: 377). This remark cuts off any reading on which
Wittgenstein is taken to be making a conjecture that non-linguistic reactions

Amadeusz Just, "“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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are the historical origin of our language games. Second, Wittgenstein is asking
us in this remark to look at the origin and the primitive form of language gameas reactions. A reaction can be a non-linguistic glance or gesture, but it canalso be a use of language (cf. PPF: §289). Therefore, Wittgenstein asks us here
to recognize certain uses of language as reactions that cannot be further
explained.

V

Williams and Malcolm take a perspective external to language in an effort topoint out what language is grounded in. Rhees, meanwhile, adopted aperspective internal to language by drawing our attention to the variety oflogical roles played by the means of our language. It is from this perspectivethat he criticized Malcolm that instinctive behavior cannot be taken as a basis
for words in a language game, for it only has meaning within language games.
An analogous argument can be made in case of Williams: practice cannot betaken as the basis for our sentences or beliefs, for the only meaning it can haveis within language. Any ineffable meaning tied to practices or the way
language is embedded in practices is nothing else but a fiction. My approach inthis paper can be seen as an extension of Rhees’s perspective. I’ve tried toshow that in his later philosophy Wittgenstein is engaged in an activity ofclarifying the limits of our language from within. And one thing involved inthis activity consists in distinguishing various functions our words andsentences may have. The group of utterances that Wittgenstein wants to draw
our attention to when he appeals to Goethe in OC and MS119 are utterances
whose character resembles reactions or deeds. These utterances 1) are notrepresentations of reality, yet they are meaningful, 2) cannot be further
explained. What is important is that in recognizing them – i.e. in recognizing a
use of language as a reaction – we recognize a limit of language from within.
References
Bronzo, Silver (2012) „The Resolute Reading and Its Critics”, Wittgenstein-Studien, vol. 3, 45-80.
Floyd, Juliet (2007) “Wittgenstein and the Inexpressible”, in: Alice Crary (ed.) Wittgenstein and
the Moral Life. Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 177-234.
Hacker, P. M. S. (2000) “Was he trying to whistle it?”, in: Alice Crary, Rupert Read (eds.) The
New Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 353-388.

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Amadeusz Just, "“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein | Amadeusz Just

Malcolm, Norman (1996) “Wittgenstein: The Relation of Language to Instinctive Behavior”, in:G. H. von Wright (ed.) Wittgensteinian Themes. Essays 1978-1989, Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press.
Rhees, Rush (2005) “Language as Emerging from Instinctive Behaviour”, Wittgenstein’s On
Certainty. There – Like Our Life, ed. by D. Z. Phillips, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 93-105.
Russell, Bertrand (1935-1936) “The Limits of Empiricism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, vol. 36, 131-150.
Williams, Bernard (2008) “In the Beginning Was the Deed”, in: In the Beginning Was the Deed.
Realism and Moralism in Political Argument, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 18-28.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1975) On Certainty, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright, trans.
Denis Paul, G. E. M. Anscombe, Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1989) Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford: BasilBlackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1993) „Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness”, in: PhilosophicalOccasions 1912-1951, ed. by James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 370-426.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2011) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Side-by-Side-by-Side Edition.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2007) Zettel, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M.
Anscombe, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2017) Wittgenstein’s Whewell’s Court Lectures. Cambridge, 1938–1941.
From the Notes by Yorick Smythies, edited, introduced and annotated by Volker A. Munz andBernhard Ritter, Malden: Wiley Blackwell.
Acknowledgement
This paper is a result of the research project “Ludwig Wittgenstein and Social Normativity” (no.
2019/33/N/HS1/03103) financed by the National Science Center, Poland.
I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing Whewell's Court Lectures to my attention.

Amadeusz Just, "“In the Beginning Was the Deed”: On the Limits of Language in Later Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis | Janusz
Kaczmarek

Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism andPerzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis
Janusz Kaczmarek (Łódź, Poland)
Abstract
In this paper I consider some of Wittgenstein’s theses contained in his Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus concerning the ontology presented there. The work on logical atomism is a joint
work of Russell, Wittgenstein and to some extent Whitehead. The present paper is acontinuation of the research contained in (Kaczmarek 2019a and 2019b). In the second half ofthe 20th century, some formal interpretations of Wittgenstein’s concept emerged. The
proposal of Wolniewicz, through which the basic theses of the Tractatus are interpreted bymeans of the lattice of elementary situations as well as the proposal of Perzanowski, who
proposed his combinational ontology are examples of this. Both theories were inspired by the
ontology of Leibniz and Wittgenstein. Perzanowski, within the framework of his theory,
defined the basic concepts of Leibniz’s and Wittgenstein’s ontology, including: situation (stateof affairs), possible world, co-possibility, God, monad and others. In the paper we show that
Wittgenstein’s approach can be put in the language of lattice theory, but also in the languageof general topology. The topological approach allows us to consider an atomistic ontology andone in which we have no atoms. I call lattices constructed from topological spaces in whichatoms can be indicated and spaces in which atoms are not present hybrid lattices. In the final
section, I will give a fragment of the topological account of combinational ontology and sometheorems of topological ontology in the hope that they shed some light on how to understandand interpret the theorems of Wittgenstein’s ontology.

1. Logical atomism and ontology.

Logical atomism is a joint work of B. Russell and L. Wittgenstein ((Russell
1918), (Wittgenstein 1921)). This is evidenced by Wittgenstein's
acknowledgment in the Preface of the Tractatus and addressed to Frege andRussell. This does not mean, of course, that Russell's and Wittgenstein's logicalatomism are identical. They differ in many aspects (cf. Wolniewicz (1999:
194-195)). Wittgenstein's TLP proposes, among other things, an ontology oflogical atomism in theses 1-2,063 (compare Glock's position in (Glock 1996),
entry: Tractatus logico-philosophicus). Of course, it is impossible to discussthese theses, so I will point out the most important ones and, at the same time,those to which I will refer in later sections of the work.
1 The world is everything that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.2 The world divides into facts.

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Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis | Janusz
Kaczmarek

1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else
remain the same.
2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
2.0124 If all objects are given, then thereby are all possible atomic facts also
given.
2.013 Every thing is, as it were, in a space of possible atomic facts. I can thinkof this space as empty, but not of the thing without the space.
2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs.
2.02 The object is simple.
2.021 Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot becompound.
2.022 It is clear that however different from the real one an imagined world
may be, it must have something—a form—in common with the real world.
2.023 This fixed form consists of the objects.
2.04 The totality of existent atomic facts is the world.
2.05 The totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts do
not exist.
2.06 The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. (Theexistence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a
negative fact.)
2.061 Atomic facts are independent of one another.
2.062 From the existence or non-existence of an atomic fact we cannot infer
the existence or non-existence of another.
2.063 The total reality is the world. (Wittgenstein (1921), trans. C. K. Ogden)
Let us emphasize that the concepts of fact, state of affairs, atomic fact, world asa totality of facts and logical space are central to this ontology. The world aswell as the merely conceived world must have a common form. And this form
is founded by objects: simple objects that form the substance of the world (cf.
2.021, 2.022, 2.023).

Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Kaczmarek

2. Wolniewicz and the interpretation of the ontology of the Tractatus in a theory oflattices

In (Wolniewicz 1982 and 1985), compare also (Wolniewicz 1999), a lattice wasproposed by means of which the interpretation of the basic theses ofWittgenstein's Tractatus was given. The exact axioms of this lattice will beomitted here while we present below an example of such a lattice given in(Wolniewicz 1999), among others.

Figure 1. A lattice with signature (2, 2) refers to dimension D1 = {a, d} with 2elements and dimension D2 = {b, c} with 2 elements. Source: (Wolniewicz 1999:
30)
The set {a, b, c, d} is a set of atoms, i.e., simple states of affairs (simple andcompound states are called elementary situations by Wolniewicz). If weassume, for example that “it’s cold” = a, “it’s wet” = b, “it’s dry” = c and “it’swarm” = d, respectively, then {a, d} and {b, c} are two logical dimensions oftemperature and moisture. Wolniewicz assumes that the number ofdimensions is finite but the number of atoms in a given dimension D isarbitrary (finite or infinite). Every lattice of elementary situations SE has two
improper situations: the impossible situation λ and the empty one 0 (0 ≠ λ).
Wolniewicz assumes, additionally, that the set ES’ = SE – {λ} is a set of possible
elementary situations, and CES = ES – {0, λ} is a set of contingent situations.
The set {w1, w2, w3, w4} is a set of possible worlds (called also a logical space).

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Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis | Janusz
Kaczmarek

Obviously, for any situation x: 0 ≤ x ≤ λ. If we want, for example, to interpretthesis 1.2, we only need to consider the worlds of w2 and w4 to see that in theformer a is a fact, while in the latter it is not, 'and everything else remains the
same'.

3. Lattices and topological ontology

In short, topological ontology is a fragment of formal ontology (comp.
(Kaczmarek 2008)), which uses the concept network and theorems of general
topology. In (Kaczmarek 2019a) I generalized Wolniewicz's approach byshowing that it is possible and worthwhile to construct a lattice in which there
are an arbitrary (including infinite) number of dimensions and in eachdimension an arbitrary number of atoms (atomic situations). I have given thisby passing to lattices constructed from topological spaces. This is because it iseasy to see that if - for example - we replace 0 into ∅, a into {a}, b by {b}and w1by {a, b}, then a pair({a, b}, {∅, {a}, {b, {a, b}})is a topological space. Hence, the Figure 1 can be replaced by:

Figure 2. A lattice with four maximal topological spaces. Source: Author

Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Recall that a pair (X, TX) is called a topological space when X is any set and TX isa family of sets that satisfies the conditions: a) ∅ and X belong to TX, b) any
union of sets from TX also belongs to TX, and c) a finite intersection of sets from
TX belongs to TX. The topological space (X, TX) is called an anti-discrete one, if (X, TX) = (X, {∅, X}). If any subset of X belongs to TX, then (X, TX) is called adiscrete topological space. The pair ({a, b}, {∅, {a}, {b, {a, b}}) is an example ofdiscrete topology. It is possible to proof:
Fact 1. Every Wolniewicz’s lattice is isomorphic with some lattice composed offinite discrete topological spaces.
It is a well-known fact that Wittgenstein had trouble to provide an example ofa simple sentence that 'hits' an atomic state of affairs. Hence, in (Kaczmarek
2019a: 410-412, I considered lattices consisting of topological spaces that haveno atoms. I called such lattices hybrid lattices. In this paper, I propose that thefunction of atoms is performed by the bases of ontological spaces. We thenobtain the following fact of topological ontology:
Fact 2. In a Wolniewicz lattice, any elementary situation is the supremum ofsome set of atomic situations (comp: Axiom 8 in (Kaczmarek 2019a: 399)),
while in a hybrid lattice, any situation is the supremum (union) of some setsfrom the basis.
Remark. A family B of sets is a base of a topological space (X, TX) if and only if
any set A of TX is a union of some sets of B.
This means that in the hybrid approach some possible worlds are represented
by topological spaces with atoms and others by spaces without atoms, but theabove Fact 2 is always true. Wittgenstein's problem with indicating an atomic
state of affairs is perhaps related to the observation that (my hypothesis) someparts of our world (universe) are 'atomic in its nature' and others are not. An
example of a hybrid lattice can be visualized in the following way (comp.
(Kaczmarek 2019a: 412)).

352

Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis | Janusz
Kaczmarek

Figure 6. Hybrid lattice of topologies, where A1 = {1, 2, 3}, A2 = (0, 1> andSource: The author

4. Theory of analysis and synthesis. Combination ontology

Between 1989 and 2004, Perzanowski developed his combination ontology(CO), including the theory of analysis and synthesis (AS).
Perzanowski personally (Perzanowski 1989: 290) writes about the basic
concepts of AS and CO as follows:
Note that this list includes the basic concepts of Leibniz's ontology: copossibility, possible worlds, eminent existence, God, and before that,monad (= element) and complex; as well as the concepts of Wittgenstein's
ontology: situation, possible world, possibility (= making possible), hence,and form, and before that, object (= element) and configuration (=complex). This is so for good reason. Indeed, the ontology presented here

Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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arose from thinking - in temporal order - about the ontology ofWittgenstein's Tractatus and Leibniz's Principles of Philosophy.
Combinational ontology is based on the so-called analysis and synthesis (AS)theory. Its primary concepts are: being simpler (in context: object x is simpler
than object y - symbolically: x < y), analyzer α, which, acting on any object y,gives the totality of (simpler) objects obtained by breaking down (i.e.,analyzing) y, and synthesizer σ, which in turn, acting on any object y, gives thetotality of objects obtained by assembling (i.e., synthesizing) objects obtainedby analyzing y (i.e., objects belonging to α(y)).
On the basis of these concepts, Perzanowski introduces further concepts:
superelement, element, complex, ontological universe, etc. Thus, we have:(a) object x is a superelement when there are no objects simpler than it,(b) x is an element when any object simpler than it is equal to x or is asuperelement,(c) x is a complex when it is not an element (and therefore a superelement).
The set of all elements constitutes the so-called ontological universe or
substance (of the considered universe of objects), while the set of all elements
simpler than a given object x is called a substance of object x. Thus constructed
the totality of objects OB (i.e. superelements, elements and complexes),
together with the primary concepts <, α, σ, constitutes the ontological universe (OU).
An important role in combinational ontology is played by the so-called modal
ontologic sensu stricto (MO), i.e., the theory of three operators MP, MI and ON
expressing basic ontological modalities and allowing to express therelationship between any two objects. The primary concepts here are:MP(x, y) =df x makes y possible,MI(x, y) =df x makes y impossible,
ON(x, y) =df x and y are ontically neutral.
The first two concepts are used to express possible or impossible combinations
between objects, while the third is used to express the ontological neutrality ofobjects (their assembly is then not a relationship, but a loose composition).

354

Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis | Janusz
Kaczmarek

Then, using only the MP operator theory, we can define:(O1) An object is coherent iff (definitional equality) is made possible by its
substance.
(O2) Objects x and y are co-possible iff they make each other possible.
(O3) The object is founded (or: the object exists ontically) iff there is an object
that makes it possible.
(O4) Object x exists eminently in object y iff there is an object z simpler than ythat makes x possible.
(O5) Object x is central (or: is God) iff x makes possible every object.
(O6) Object x is a situation iff is a complex that is made possible by thesubstance of the universe under consideration.
(O7) Object x is a possible world iff due to the order of "being simpler" (<) x is a
maximal object.
(O8) Any x is ontically possible when it is made possible by some possible
world.
(O9) Two objects are ontically equivalent when they make possible the same
object (objects) and are made possible by the same object (objects).
(O10) Two objects are of the same ontic type when they are onticallyequivalent.

5. Some conclusions of topological ontology

Question 1
Let us begin with some remarks on the interpretation of ontology from theTractatus.
Referring to Chapters 2 and 3 of this paper, a maximal topological space in a
lattice built of topological spaces is a counterpart of a possible world. The
elements (sets) of each topological space are called - after Wolniewicz elementary situations. In Wolniewicz's works, the term elementary situation is
supposed to be an intermediary between Wittgenstein's "Sachverhalte" and"Sachlage." Wolniewicz, however, specifies: '"Sachverhalte" are thoseelementary situations which are atomic and "Sachlagen" are certain sets of theformer' (comp. Wolniewicz (1999: 11)). I adopt this standpoint. In addition following the paper of Łoś (1960) - Wolniewicz introduces the notion ofJanusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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realization: a realization is any maximal set of all elementary situations in a
lattice K (e.g., realization Ri = {a: a ∈ K and a ≤ wi}). Using the topologicalapproach, I identify a realization with a maximal topology. Since Wolniewicz
proposes to identify one of the possible worlds with the world representing thereal world, so the realization defined through this world will consist of the realelementary situations themselves, i.e., facts (equivalent to Wittgenstein's
Tatsachen). Of course, in the topological approach proposed here, the facts are
the elementary situations of the selected topological space, which we treat as
the space representing the real world. All atomic elementary situations that do
not belong to the selected topological space are states of affairs but are notfacts.
In the Tractatus theses (2.0123 to 2.023), Wittgenstein outlines his approach to,among other things, the form of the object (2.014 and 2.0141) and the form of
the world (2.022, 2.023 and 2.0231). Note that Wolniewicz's lattices do not talkabout objects at all, while in the topological approach, where the elementary
situation is understood as a set, the objects are the elements of the set.
However, when we speak of a set in the sense of set theory, an element of a set
has no internal qualities. Thus, if the substance of the world were composed ofsuch objects, then in the absence of their (the objects') internal qualities, one
cannot speak of the form of the object and thus of the form of the world.
Topologists, however, when considering topological spaces, also consider such
spaces whose universes contain, for example, numbers or functions or ideals,
etc. (cf. Zariski's topology). Thus, considering Figure 2, I can understand the set{a} as one in which the element a is the equivalent of a sphere in threedimensional space (e.g., x2 + y2 + z2 = 4). Then such an object already has
certain internal properties, e.g., the radius of this sphere is 2. The totality ofsuch internal qualities (according to 2.0123, 201231, 2.014 and 2.0141)
constitutes the form of the object, while the totality of the forms of all objectsof the substance of the world constitutes the form of the world (2.023, 2.0231
and 2.026). It is clear that the sphere defined above enters into such and notother external relations (configurations), e.g. with the sphere x2 + y2 + z2 = 16.
The reviewer of my paper proposal pointed out to me many interesting issues
and difficulties. I partly tried to describe them above. The reviewer also
pointed out that there are many interpretations of Wittgenstein's thought, and356

Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Kaczmarek

I should address them by indicating where my proposal lies in this spectrum.
He wrote: 'For me, the ultra-realistic interpretation is one out of several,
ranging from therapeutic interpretations to interpretations that allow TLP
both philosophical substance and continuity with his later work. A paper likethis (that is my paper - JK) should, or so I think, at least hint at where in thisspectrum of interpretations it should be located. I will respond as follows. I am
not a historian of analytic philosophy but a modest formal ontologist, and I
think that appropriate hints as to the place of my proposal will be indicated,
perhaps, by others. I am unable to do so. However, taking into account theclassification of different types of situation ontologies (S-ontologies) proposedby Wolniewicz (cf. Wolniewicz (1999: 61), I can say that the topologicalapproach creates the possibility of studying S-ontology, which is: separated,
pluralistic, atomistic (but also non-atomistic), next genuinely pluralistic (likeRussell's one) and dimensions binary (like Wittgenstein's ontology) but also
dimensions arbitrary.
Question 2
Consider the following problem. Here we have seen that the possible world
can be interpreted as a maximal topological space in a given lattice. Let's
assume that the relation of being simpler (<) is a set theory inclusion, analysis(operator α)is understood as indicating the basis for the topological space, andsynthesis (operator σ) of objects is the union of some of them or the union of
all of them. Then, we obtain some new facts (I'm only listing some, not all).
Fact 3. Let B1 and B2 be two different bases of the same topological space. Then
B1 and B2 are ontically equivalent. Moreover, each basis can be treated as a
substance of the given topological space (possible world)
Fact 4. A possible world can be made possible by different bases (i.e. bydifferent substances).
Fact 5. Let L be a lattice composed of topological spaces. Moreover, let FB be afamily of bases such that at least one base of a given topological space belongs
to FB. Then FB makes possible every situation in the lattice and every possible
world of this lattice.
Conclusion. Based on (O5) FB is God.

Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Question 3
Note that in Leibniz's ontology, God is understood as the so-called central
monad, and therefore a monad. A monad, on the other hand, is simple and FB
is a complex. Thus, the problem arises how to give an interpretation of thecentral object, which at the same time, in the spirit of Leibniz, would be asimple object, using topological tools. I can see such a solution but it goesbeyond the tools of general topology.

References
Glock, Hans-Johan (1996) A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kaczmarek, Janusz (2008) "What is a Formalized Ontology Today? An Example of IIC", Bulletinof the Section of Logic, vol. 37, No 3-4, 233 – 244.
Kaczmarek, Janusz (2019a) "Ontology in Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus. A TopologicalApproach", in: Gabriele M. Mras, Paul Weingartner, Bernhard Ritter (Eds.), Philosophy of Logic
and Mathematics, Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Berlin:
De Gruyter, 246 – 262.
Kaczmarek, Janusz (2019b) "On the Topological Modelling of Ontological Objects: Substance in
the Monadology", in: Bartłomiej Skowron (ed.), Contemporary Polish Ontology, Berlin: De
Gruyter, 149 -159.
Kuratowski, Kazimierz (1977) Wstęp do teorii mnogości i topologii, (wraz z dodatkiem R.
Engelkinga: Elementy topologii algebraicznej), (Introduction to Set Theory and Topology with asupplement by R. Engelking: Elements of algebraic topology), Warszawa: PWN.
Łoś, Jerzy (1960) "Fields of Events and their Definition in the Axiomatic Treatment of
Probability", Studia Logica, vol. 9, 95 - 132.
Perzanowski, Jerzy (1989) "Logiki modalne a filozofia (Modal Logics and Philosophy), in: Jerzy
Perzanowski (ed.), Jak filozofować? (How to philosophize?), Warszawa: PWN, 262 - 346.
Perzanowski, Jerzy (2004) "Towards Combination Metaphysics", Reports on Mathematical Logic, 38, 93 - 116.
Russell, Bertrand (1918) "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", The Monist, Vol. 28, Issue 4, 1,
495–527.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1921) "Logisch – philosophische Abhandlung", In: Annalen der Naturund Kulturphilosophie 14, 185–262 (Leipzig 1921) (translated by C. K. Ogden in 1922 as TLP
1922).

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Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis | Janusz
Kaczmarek

Wolniewicz, Bogusław (1982) "A formal ontology of situations", Studia Logica, vol. 41, no. 4, 381– 413.
Wolniewicz, Bogusław (1985) Ontologia sytuacji (Ontology of Situations), Warszawa: PWN.
Wolniewicz, Bogusław (1999) Logic and Metaphysics. Studies in Wittgenstein’s Ontology of Facts, Biblioteka Myśli Semiotycznej, no 45, (ed.) J. Pelc, Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo
Semiotyczne (Polish Semiotic Society).
Acknowledgement
This paper is sponsored by the National Center of Science, Poland: Grant - 2017/27//B/HS1/0283

Janusz Kaczmarek, "Topological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism and Perzanowski’s Theory of Analysis and Synthesis". In 100 Yearsof Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein | Ulrike Kadi

Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit
Wittgenstein
Ulrike Kadi (Vienna, Austria)
Abstract
Strukturähnlichkeiten zwischen philosophischer Methode und therapeutischem Vorgehenbilden den Hintergrund einiger Überlegungen angesichts der plötzlichen Einführung eines
neuen Namens während einer psychoanalytischen Kur. Der Gebrauch des neuen Namens
betrifft das Geschlecht der gleichermaßen benennenden wie benannten Person. Sie erlebt den
anlässlich der Geburt verliehenen Vornamen und das vom frühen Soziuskreis zugeeignete
Geschlecht als unpassend. Der neue Name steht für den Satz: Ich habe kein weibliches undkein männliches Geschlecht. Mit dem neuen Namen wird ein etablierter Sprachgebrauch
kritisiert, korrigiert und gleichzeitig negiert. Der geschlechtsneutrale Name lässt sich als ein
Insistieren darauf verstehen, dass der Sprachgebrauch nicht zu reglementieren ist. Dochworauf kann sich ein neuer Name stützen? Das Geschlechtskongruenzerleben der Person mit
neuem Namen steht meinem Unbehagen gegenüber, einen neuen, verwirrenden
Sprachgebrauch verordnet zu bekommen. Es werden mithilfe von einzelnen Beispielen vonWittgenstein Argumente gesucht, um das Unbehagen einerseits besser zu verstehen.
Andererseits wird ein Perspektivenwechsel vorgeschlagen, der dem Unbehagen weniger Platz
lässt.

„Sie haben mich gegendert.“ D. hat mich in den ersten Jahren der
psychoanalytischen Kur mehrfach mit diesem Vorwurf konfrontiert. D.
versteht darunter meine versehentliche Bezugnahme auf das zugeordnete
Geburtsgeschlecht in grammatischen Satzkonstruktionen wie Anreden inelektronischen Nachrichten oder in Nebensätzen von Deutungen. In der Regel
verwende ich in Analysen in meinem Reden selten oder nie
geschlechtsfixierende Ausdrücke („Sie als Mann“ oder „Sie als Frau“). Es
kommt eher aus Versehen vor, dass ich eine Formulierung wie „Sie, die diesoder das erlebt“ oder „Sie, der dies oder das wünscht“ verwende. In
elektronischen Nachrichten ist die Frage des Genderns in konventionellen
Formen der Anrede allerdings nicht so leicht zu umgehen. Neben derAuslassung des Namens in der Anrede bieten sich Formen wie „Hallo Vorname
Nachname“ oder „Guten Tag Vorname Nachname“ an, – in der deutschen
Grammatik weniger leichtfüßig als in der englischen.
Im Rahmen ihrer Behandlung hat die Person D. den Vornamen geändert undvon der Umgebung gefordert, man dürfe sie statt mit dem, anlässlich derGeburt verliehenen Vornamen von nun ab nur noch mit „Fran“ anreden. Da
ich mit meinen Patient*innen nicht per Du bin, betraf mich diese360

Ulrike Kadi, "Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein | Ulrike Kadi

Ankündigung nur für die oben genannte Sonderform einer Anrede in den
Emails. Doch mir passte etwas daran nicht. Ich hatte den Eindruck, dass ich inein Geschehen verwickelt werden sollte, in das ich mich nicht sofort
inkludieren lassen wollte. Seither beschäftigen mich Fragen nach dem
Funktionieren des Namens, nach den Vorgängen eines Namenswechsels undden Zusammenhängen zwischen Name und Geschlecht. Mein eklektischer
Blick auf Überlegungen von Wittgenstein zum Namen dient einerseits dazu,
mein Unbehagen (jenseits von psychoanalytischen Übertragungs- undGegenübertragungsdynamiken) als ein philosophisch relevantes Unbehagenzu verstehen. Andererseits enthält dieser Blick auch den Versuch, das
Unbehagen zu überwinden, ein Verständnis des Namenswechsels zu
gewinnen, das diesen bejahen kann.
Die Fragen, die mit dem Gendern, der Zugehörigkeit und der
Nichtzugehörigkeit zu Cis- oder Trans-Formen von Geschlechtern verbundensind, werden gegenwärtig breit diskutiert (z.B. Nelson 2021, Gamero Cabrera
2022, Gérardin-Laverge 2022, Lobo 2022, Treviño-Tarango 2022). Die
Aufmerksamkeit für epistemische, hermeneutische oder testimoniale
Ungerechtigkeiten, denen sich Angehörige bestimmter wie unbestimmter
Geschlechter ausgesetzt fühlen, steht in Verbindung mit umfassenden
politischen Perspektiven, die im Folgenden keine Rolle spielen werden.
Strukturähnlichkeiten
zwischenphilosophischer
Methodeundtherapeutischem Vorgehen werden vorausgesetzt (vgl. PU 1971: §133), um„feine[ ] Verhäkelungen“ im Denken wie „unter der Lupe“ (Ms 114: 76) in einer
Situation zu betrachten, in der sich ein Sprachgebrauch mit und gegen
Absichten von Sprechenden etablieren soll.

1 Geschlecht mit Namentäfelchen

Die Einführung des Namens Fran, eine Art zweiter Taufe, erinnert an einen„okkulten Vorgang[ ]“ (PU 1971: §38), was ihn freilich nicht vom ersten
verliehenen Namen bei der Geburt unterscheidet. Denn jedes „Benennen
erscheint als eine seltsame Verbindung eines Wortes mit einem
Gegenstand“ (ebd.). Ich soll den Namen Fran, der zunächst auftaucht wie ein„Namentäfelchen“ (PU 1971: §26), das sich jemand umhängt, lernen und ihn in
der Folge richtig gebrauchen. Zu diesem Zweck bekomme ich von der sowohl

Ulrike Kadi, "Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein | Ulrike Kadi

benennenden wie benannten Person über lange Zeit Situationen vonaußerhalb der Behandlung geschildert, in denen sich ihrer Ansicht nachMenschen als zu dumm oder zu unsensibel erweisen, um den neuen Namen
und seine Bedeutung zu verstehen.
Fran ist ein Eigenname, ein Personenname. Als solcher gilt er Wittgensteinnicht als einfacher, eigentlicher Name. Wie Nothung, das im Nibelungenlied
Balmung heißt, ist Fran ein neuer, ein erfundener Name. Und wie Nothung,Siegfrieds Schwert in Richard Wagners Oper, ist Fran ein zusammengesetzter
Name, der für eine Analyse durch Worte zu ersetzen ist, „die Einfaches
benennen“ (PU 1971: §39). D. ersetzt Fran durch eine Erklärung. Ich bekomme
gesagt, dass Fran für ein Ich steht, das programmatisch von einem Satzbegleitet wird, der lautet: Ich, Fran, habe kein weibliches und kein männliches
Geschlecht.
Mir fällt es schwer, einen Namen zu verwenden, „dessen Bedeutung ich nicht
kenne“ (PU 1971: §79): Fran umfasst einerseits so viel und andererseits sowenig an Bedeutung – so viel, weil er als Eigenname ausdrücklich mit einer
neuen geschlechtlichen Konnotation eingeführt wird und so wenig, weil diese
Konnotation im beigefügten Satz inhaltlich gleichzeitig negiert wird. Als
Neologismus und in seiner Kürze erinnert der Eigenname „Fran“ anWittgensteins Frage, welchen Sinn ein Ausdruck wie „bububu“ haben könnte.
„Kann ich mit dem Wort »bububu« meinen »Wenn es nicht regnet, werde ich
spazieren gehen«?“ (Ts 227a: 30). Kann jemand mit „Fran“ meinen, er/sie/es
habe kein weibliches und kein männliches Geschlecht? Genügt ein neues
Namentäfelchen, um einen neuen Sprachgebrauch mit so weitreichenden
Konsequenzen zu etablieren? Was wird alles ungesagt vorausgesetzt oder auchmitausgedrückt, damit „Fran“ bedeuten kann, was D. vorgibt? Mein
Unbehagen lässt sich folgendermaßen präzisieren: Mit dem Ausdruck Fran
wird gleichzeitig kritisiert, korrigiert, negiert. Und mir fehlen vor allem
Kriterien, die den veränderten Sprachgebrauch stützen könnten.
Der Name Fran ist eine Kritik. Er schneidet mit dem Programm, das er
vermitteln soll, in Sprachgewohnheiten und in vielfach unthematisierte,langfristig habitualisierte Wahrnehmungen hinein. Mit dem zum
Verschwinden zu bringenden, alten Namen wird dem zugeordneten
Geburtsgeschlecht, das im Falle von D. nicht intersexuell war, die Bedeutung

362

Ulrike Kadi, "Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein | Ulrike Kadi

entzogen. Die verlorene Bedeutung hing, wie es beim Geburtsgeschlechtüblich ist, an optischen Eindrücken (Ultraschallbilder von Organsystemen,äußerer Phänotypus des Geschlechts). Fran ist nicht nur ein Eigenname mit
einer ausgesprochenen Bedeutung, sondern eine Kurzform für eine Kritik aneiner zweiwertigen Einteilung der Geschlechter. Weiblich oder männlich – ein
Drittes ist nicht vorgesehen. Mit dieser Kritik könnte sich D. auch auf
Wittgenstein beziehen, der darauf hinweist, dass ein solches Ausschließen
eines Dritten den Überblick eines Gottes voraussetzt (vgl. PU 1971: §352). D.
stellt mit Fran eine gängige Form des Sprechens infrage, die sich implizit auf
einen derartigen Überblick stützen möchte.
Der Name Fran ist eine Korrektur. Die frühe Geschlechtszuweisung, diegeschlechtertheoretisch als Sex einer Person bezeichnet wird, ist nicht dereinzige Anknüpfungspunkt für D.s Geschlecht. Sondern der zuerst verliehene
Eigenname ist auch der Name für das, was einer Person vor, bei und nach dem
ersten Akt der Namensgebung von Anfang an und im Laufe der weiteren
Entwicklung vom engen Soziuskreis (vgl. Laplanche 2008: 120) an Gender, d.h.
an Geschlechtsrolle, zugeschrieben wurde. Diese Zueignung umfasst explizite,
inexplizite und – psychoanalytisch gesprochen – vor allem rätselhafte
Botschaften. D. wendet sich korrigierend an die eigenen Eltern und andere inder Kindheit nahestehende Personen und klärt sie über einen grundlegenden
Irrtum auf. Diese Korrektur erfolgt mit Verweis auf ein eigenes Empfinden
einer Kongruenz zwischen der Bezeichnung und der eigenen Wahrnehmung
des Geschlechts.
Fran ist näher durch eine Negation bestimmt, die sich auf die Attribuierung
zweier Geschlechter bezieht. Zum besseren Verständnis wäre zu klären,worauf sich die Negation richtet: Weist D. das Geschlecht in jeder Hinsicht
zurück? Oder ist vor allem ein weibliches oder männliches Attribut desGeschlechts angesprochen? Das Negierte gilt als das einzige Bestimmungsstück
des Namens. Wittgenstein hat für Moses und für einen verstorbenen Mann
namens N. überlegt, unter welchen Bedingungen Sätze über sie noch sinnvoll
sind (vgl. PU 1971: §79). Wieviele nebensächliche Eigenschaften dürfen fehlen,ohne dass Moses oder N. ihre Bedeutung verlieren? Daher lautet die Frage anFrans programmatischen Satz: Sind beide – Geschlecht und die Attributeweiblich und männlich – gleichermaßen nebensächlich? Für Wittgensteinkommt es darauf an: Nur dann, wenn ich das Geschlecht und die genannten

Ulrike Kadi, "Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

363

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Attribute für nebensächlich halte, kann Fran eine existierende Person
kennzeichnen. Jeder Satz und jede Anrede, in welchen „Fran“ vorkommt, sindlogisch betrachtet, Unsinn, solange ich die Prädikate Geschlecht oder weiblichund männlich als wesentlich für die Person ansehe (vgl. ebd).
D.s Kritik an gängigen zweiwertigen Einteilungen des Geschlechts ist im
Hinblick auf eine zentrale, den Sprachgebrauch regulierende Instanz
einleuchtend. (Dass sich D. mit der Namensänderung in die Position einersolchen Instanz begibt, muss einer späteren Untersuchung vorbehalten
bleiben.) Wittgenstein betont, dass es (zumindest von der Philosophie her)
nicht möglich ist, einen Sprachgebrauch zu reglementieren (vgl. PU 1971: §81).
Das ist ein Argument gegen mein Unbehagen und eine darin enthaltene
Versuchung, lieber festzuhalten an Gewohntem als neue Namen zu lernen. Es
ist auch ein Argument gegen eine Betrachtungsweise, in welcher für jeden
Eigennamen die „Idee“ des Geschlechts „als Brille auf [meiner] Nase
[sitzt]“ (PU 1971: §103).

2 Geschlecht wie Schmerz

Nun vermittelt eine Reglementierung nicht nur Einschränkungen für den
Sprachgebrauch. Sie ermöglicht auch Verständigung. Die Namenskorrektur
macht mich hinsichtlich der Möglichkeit, mich zu verständigen, unsicher.
Woran soll ich mich halten, um zu wissen, was ein neuer Ausdruck oder ein
Satz bedeuten? So wie Wittgenstein nach den Regeln fragt, die sagen, „ob man
so etwas“, was eben noch ein Sessel war, jetzt aber verschwunden ist, „noch‚Sessel‘ nennen darf“ (PU 1971: §80), so sind auch Regeln des Gebrauchs von
Ausdrücken wie „Geschlecht“, das weder „weiblich“ noch „männlich“ undmöglicherweise sogar verschwunden ist, unklar.
Aber lassen sich überhaupt Regeln angeben für etwas, was jemand über das
eigene Geschlecht sagt? Im Zentrum von Kritik, Korrektur und Negation mit
dem neuen Namen steht die Erklärung einer Kongruenzempfindung zwischen
Bezeichnung und Wahrnehmung des eigenen Geschlechts. Der neue Name unddie damit verbundene Prädikation eines (Nicht-)Geschlechts führt zu einigen
Aspekten, die Wittgenstein unter dem Titel Schmerz diskutiert. Meine
unbehagliche Position, in die mich Fran mit der Namensersetzung bringt,ähnelt der Position, in die jemand einer Person gegenüber geraten kann, die364

Ulrike Kadi, "Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein | Ulrike Kadi

Schmerzen hat. So wie ich den Schmerz einer anderen Person nicht selbst
haben kann (vgl. PU 1971: §253), so ist es mir auch nicht möglich, einGeschlecht und dessen Erleben von jemanden anderen zu haben. Nur aus
Analogien, die sich in den Äußerungen von jemanden über das eigene
Geschlechtsempfinden darstellen, ließe sich – wie beim Schmerz aus
Schmerzäußerungen – erschließen, ob jemand anderer ein ähnliches,vergleichbares Erleben des Geschlechts hat wie ich. Ich bin dabei aufÄußerungen von D. angewiesen. Unbehagen bereitet mir an dieser Stelle, dass
D. mir gegenüber unbedacht auf visuelle Eindrücke zurückgreift, um unser
beider, angeblich gleiches Geschlechtskongruenzerleben zu verknüpfen. Wie
könne ich, so die Frage, die ich doch auch kein weibliches oder männliches
Geschlecht hätte, mit meinen großen Ohrringen so tun, als wäre ich weiblich?
Die Zueignungen des frühen Soziuskreises bilden den Kontext, in welchem ein
Kind lernt, das eigene Geschlecht zu benennen und sich dazu passend zu
verhalten, so wie es lernt, ein entsprechendes Schmerzbenehmen an den Tag
zu legen und einen Schmerz als Schmerz zu bezeichnen. Den Schmerzen
können auch neue Namen gegeben werden. Wittgenstein betont, dass solche
Namen für Schmerzen nicht kontextfrei aufkommen. Es findet sich in der
Sprache ein „Posten [ ], an den das neue Wort gestellt wird“ (PU 1971: § 257).
Für D.s Fran-Bezeichnung und den zugehörigen Satz über das Nicht-Geschlechtsind freie Stellen in der Sprache vorhanden. Sie gehören allerdings zu einem
Sprechen, das von der Grammatik her binär gestaltet ist. Damit hängt wohlzusammen, dass meine großen Ohrringe und ihre behauptete Nähe zu einem
weiblichen Geschlecht hineingeraten in einen Regulierungsversuch des neuen
Sprachgebrauchs. Eine Klarheit über D.s Geschlechtskongruenzempfinden
lässt sich infolge des etablierten sprachlichen Rasters nicht leicht gewinnen.
Fran und der mit dem Eigennamen verknüpfte Satz „Ich habe kein weibliches
und kein männliches Geschlecht“ sind keine Beschreibungen vonüberprüfbaren Tatsachen in einer miteinander geteilten Realität. Es werden
erinnerte und nicht erinnerte Erfahrungen, Fantasien, körperliche Lust- undUnlustzustände D.s zu einer Formulierung über ein fehlendes
Kongruenzerleben zusammengesetzt. Der vorgestellte Ort, die seelische
Verankerung der Aussage, scheint geeignet, ihr ein besonderes Gewicht zu

Ulrike Kadi, "Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein | Ulrike Kadi

verleihen. Denn wenn überhaupt jemand wissen kann, ob Fran zum fehlenden
Kongruenzerleben passt, dann müsse es doch D. sein. Weshalb der Mitteilung
also misstrauen?
Mit Wittgenstein ist die Selbstverständlichkeit einer Mitteilung seelischen
Erlebens zu bezweifeln (vgl. PU 1971: §363). Was D. andeutet über eine
Kongruenzempfindung, soll bei mir als eine Vorstellung ankommen. Ich soll
im Anschluss an die Mitteilung „wissen“, was die Vorstellung enthält (ebd.).
Aber es macht keinen Sinn zu fragen, was die Vorstellung einer solchen
Empfindung ist oder was mit ihr in einem Kopf „geschieht“ (PU 1971: §370).
Die Empfindung der Kongruenz zwischen der Geschlechtszuschreibung undder Wahrnehmung des eigenen Geschlechts lässt sich nämlich analog zum
Schmerz als der Käfer betrachten, den jeder mit sich in einer Schachtel trägt
und nicht herzeigt (vgl. PU 1971: §293). Es muss offenbleiben, ob die Schachtelüberhaupt einen Käfer enthält. Entsprechend könnte für D. an der Stelle derKongruenzempfindung ebenso nichts stehen. (Wörtlich genommen, besagt
Fran für D. übrigens genau dies, dass nämlich D.s Schachtel eines kongruenten
Geschlechtserlebens leer ist, sich an diesem Posten im Sprachspiel nichts
findet.)Auch das Nichts in der leeren Schachtel löst das Problem, wie darüber
gesprochen werden kann, nicht. „[Die Empfindung] ist kein Etwas, aber auchnicht ein Nichts! Das Ergebnis war nur, dass ein Nichts die gleichen Dienste
täte wie ein Etwas, worüber sich nichts aussagen läßt“ (PU 1971: §304). Das
Geschlechtskongruenzempfinden „fällt […] als irrelevant aus der Betrachtung
heraus“ (ebd.). Die Bedeutung, für die das Empfinden steht, ist für eine
Unterscheidung von Sinn und Unsinn der Aussage nicht belastbar.

3 Geschlecht lesen

Mein aus verschiedenen Quellen gespeistes Unbehagen hindert mich,einzustimmen und gemeinsam mit D. die Grammatik der – bis vor Kurzem
noch weitgehend unbezweifelt als gemeinsam angesehenen – Spracheargwöhnisch zu betrachten und an der Abschaffung der Kategorie Geschlecht
oder dessen weiblicher und männlicher Eigenschaft mitzuwirken. Für D. ist
das
in
ihrer
Kur
nicht
ohne
Folgen.
Denn
mit
dem
Geschlechtskongruenzempfinden ist es wie mit der Röte einer Vorstellung. Für366

Ulrike Kadi, "Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein | Ulrike Kadi

meine Vorstellung von Rot ist das, was der andere, der ebenfalls eine
Rotvorstellung hat, sagt und tut, ein Kriterium. Daran kann ich mich halten.
Ich allein kann aber kein Kriterium für Rot entwickeln (vgl. PU 1971: §377).
Und so kann D. allein kein Kriterium für Fran und dafür entwickeln, kein
(weibliches oder männliches) Geschlecht zu haben. D. ist auf meineÄußerungen angewiesen, um den neuen Namen sprachlich zu verankern.
Aber braucht D. meine Zustimmung, um den Namen Fran sinnvoll
einzusetzen? Nein. Diese Annahme ist falsch. Zum einen würde ich mich übermeine Wichtigkeit für D.s Sprechen täuschen. D. ist ja keineswegs die einzige
Person, die mit einem geschlechtsneutralen Namen bemüht ist, ein Sprachspiel
neu zu gestalten. Sie kann sich auf eine anwachsende Vielzahl anderer
Sprecher*innen stützen, die in diesem Spiel mitspielen. Zum anderen kann D.
den neuen Namen auch ohne Erfüllung rechtfertigender Kriterien verwenden:„Ein Wort ohne Rechtfertigung zu gebrauchen, heißt nicht, es zu Unrecht zu
gebrauchen“ (PU 1971: §289).
D. erfindet einen neuen Namen, ein neues Sprachspiel (vgl. PU 1971: §27).
Solch ein Name lässt sich als ein Farbmuster ansehen, das D. mir zeigt, als „ein
Muster dessen, was der Andere sagen soll“ (PU 1971: §16). Für mich als
angesprochene andere Person ist der Weg zu einem behaglichen Gebrauch desneuen Namens allerdings viel länger und vor allem ein anderer, als ich es inmeinem Versuch, mein Unbehagen durch logische Überlegungen loszuwerden,
vorausgesetzt habe. Es gilt etwa am Tonfall zu unterscheiden, zu beachten, um
welche Art von Satz es sich handelt (vgl. PU 1971: §21). Es braucht eine
Einschätzung, ob sich im jeweiligen Vorkommen dieses neuen Namens vor
allem eine Frage, eine Prophezeihung, eine Meldung, eine Behauptung, ein
Befehl, ein Geständnis, eine Prüfung oder vielleicht ein „Rätsel“ (vgl. PU 1971:§23) ausdrücken. Im Hinblick auf D.s aufgegebenen alten Namen habe ich
außerdem zu berücksichtigen, dass Sprachspiele nicht nur „entstehen“,sondern auch „veralten“ (ebd.).
Für das weitere Sprechen komme ich nicht drum herum, den Gebrauch desneuen Namens zu lernen. D. schlägt vor, dass das Geschlecht vor allem richtig
zu lesen sei. Fran soll das Lesen von D.s Geschlecht erleichtern. Wittgenstein
verweist auf die musikalische Seite des Lesens (vgl. PU 1971: §22, §156). Lesen
heißt, etwas Notiertes verlauten lassen (vgl. PU 1971:§156), was auf

Ulrike Kadi, "Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein | Ulrike Kadi

unterschiedliche Weise geschehen kann. Ich kann die Noten einzeln wie
Buchstaben lesen, ohne dass daraus ein Musikstück wird. Ich kann sie
auswendig vortragen, mechanisch ohne Verständnis des Gelesenen. Der
Vorwurf des Genderns trifft mich dort zu Recht, wo ich die Noten
gewohnheitsmäßig und insofern wie eine, in einem binären Notationssystemabgerichtete „Lesemaschine“ (PU 1971: §157) interpretiert habe. Das FranSprachspiel ist anderer Art. Wie manche Notation zeitgenössischer Musikenthält es unbekannte Noten und Zeichen, die D. und ich gemeinsam lesen,interpretieren und für die Arbeit in der Kur nutzen können. Kann ich wissen,wann es mir gelungen ist, das Spiel auf die richtige Weise lesend mitzuspielen?
Ja, denn dann wird es ein anderes Lesen sein. Es lässt sich daran erkennen,
dass mir „‘[d]ie Worte, die ich ausspreche, in besonderer Weise [kommen].‘ […]Sie kommen von selbst“ (PU 1971: §165).
In dem von D. initiierten Sprachspiel ist für ein Unbehagen kein Platz. „Unser
Fehler ist, dort nach einer Erklärung zu suchen, wo wir die Tatsachen als‚Urphänomene‘ sehen sollten. D.h., wo wir sagen sollten: dieses Sprachspiel
wird gespielt“ (PU 1971: §654).
References
Gamero Cabrera, Isabel G. (2022) „Acknowledging Women. Some Wittgensteinian Ideas toClarify the Cis/Trans Debate”, Nordic Wittgensteinian Review. Prepublication for open review.
https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3624 (29.3.2023)
Gérardin-Laverge, Mona (2022) „A Realistic Approach to the Performativity of Gender", Nordic
Wittgensteinian

Review.

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for

open

review.

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www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3635 (29.3.2023)
Laplanche, Jean (2008) „Gender. Geschlecht. Sexuales“, Forum der Psychoanalyse 24, 111–124.
Lobo, Camila (2022) „Speaking Silences. A Wittgensteinian Inquiry into Hermeneutical
Injustice“, Nordic Wittgensteinian Review. Prepublication for open review. https://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3643 (29.3.2023)
Nelson, Laura (2021) „Are Sex and Gender Natural Kinds? A Wittgensteinian Investigation“,
https://lnelson10051954.medium.com/are-sex-and-gender-natural-kinds-a-wittgensteinianinvestigation-a9cd13edd0d9 (29.3.2023)
Treviño-Tarango, Martha (2022) „Transfeminism and Political Forms of Life“, Nordic
Wittgensteinian

Review .

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www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/article/view/3626/15 (29.3.2023)

368

Ulrike Kadi, "Name. Assoziationen zum Verständnis von Geschlechtern mit Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanzianInterne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley,seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie
Christian Kanzian (Innsbruck, Austria)
Abstract
In diesem Beitrag soll gezeigt werden, wie in Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus(TLP) das Thema ,Interne Relationen‘ aus einem Binnenstreit über einschlägige Thesen
Francis Bradleys herausgehoben, originell auf den Punkt gebracht und so zu einem wichtigen
Gegenstand der aktuellen Ontologie gemacht wird. Um dies darzulegen, sind die
entsprechenden Passagen aus dem TLP zu sichten. Zuvor aber müssen wir uns derEinführung von internen Relationen bei Bradley, Appearance and Reality, widmen, bzw. deren
kritische Auslegung in Moores einschlägigen Publikationen und bei Russell, in erster Linie
seinen Principia Mathematica, berücksichtigen. Dann soll, ausgehend von Wittgenstein, die
Relevanz interner Relationen für die gegenwärtige Ontologie angezeigt werden: Interne
Relationen sind unverzichtbar für eine konsistente ontologische Weltbeschreibung. In diesem
Artikel müssen wir uns auf Grundlinien beschränken, noch dazu gesehen aus einer
bestimmten Perspektive, somit ohne jeden Anspruch auf eine vollständigere Darlegung derEinführung und der kritischen Diskussion des Themas. Auch die Gegenüberstellung voninternen zu externen Relationen kann nicht geleistet werden. Ziel ist Wittgensteins
Brückenfunktion zwischen der Britischen Philosophie des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts und deraktuellen Ontologie.

1. Interne Relationen in Bradleys Appearance and Reality (AaR)

Grundanliegen von AaR ist, Paradoxien aufzuzeigen, die unsere alltägliche
Welt der Erscheinungen prägen. Die Erscheinungswelt ist uns als Ort
alltäglicher Praxis vertraut, bei genauerer Analyse stellt sie sich allerdings,
aufgrund der Paradoxien, als „theoretically unintelligible“ (AaR: 21) heraus.
Will man die Realität adäquat interpretieren, muss man den „Schleier“ derErscheinungswelt überwinden und zu einer „wahren“ Einstellung zur einen,
absoluten Wirklichkeit (an sich) kommen. Bemerkenswert für unser Thema
Interne Relationen ist, dass sie sowohl im Aufweis besagter Paradoxien als
auch bei der Darlegung eines metaphysischen Monismus spezifisch eingeführt
werden.
Beginnen wir bei Ersterem: In Buch I, Abschnitt III, wird die Differenzierung
in Relationen und nicht-relationale Qualitäten als eine zentrale, dieErscheinungswelt prägende Paradoxie vorgestellt. Dort kommt auch derBegriff „interne Beziehung“ erstmals vor (AaR: 26).

Christian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

369

Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanzianNach Bradley sind Qualitäten durch einen Doppelaspekt charakterisiert, undzwar im Hinblick auf Relationen. Jede Qualität kann als Fundament vonRelationen aufgefasst werden. Die Tatsache z.B., dass ich 176cm groß bin, ist
Fundament der Relation kleiner-als, in der ich zu sehr vielen Objekten stehe.
Dann aber muss eine Qualität auch als durch Relationen fundiert verstanden
werden. Denken wir an Farbqualitäten, etwa Orange, das notwendig als
Resultat einer Differenzierungsrelation zu anderen Farben, etwa Gelb und Rot,
aufzufassen ist.
Der besagte Doppelaspekt jeder Qualität besteht nun darin, Fundament undFundiertes von Relationen zu sein. Diese beiden Aspekte aber stehen in etwas,
das Bradley zunächst eher leichtfertig eine interne Relation nennt. Innerhalb
jeder Qualität besteht diese Beziehung. Das Paradoxe ist, dass diese interne
Relationen die ihnen mutmaßlich zukommende Funktion nicht erfüllen
können. Das wäre die Zusammenfügung zur Einheit von innerlich komplexen
Qualitäten. Jeder Aspekt von Qualitäten, der Fundament-Aspekt und derFundiertsein-Aspekt, kann nämlich als solcher wiederum als Qualität erachtet
werden, auf die sich die gegebene Analyse beziehen lässt. Das Ergebnis ist ein
letztlich infiniter Regress: „[…] with an internal relation A’s unity disappears,
and its contents are dissipated in an endless process of distinction“ (AaR: 26).
Die innere Einheit von Qualitäten wird also durch einen solchen Doppelaspekt
im Hinblick auf Relationen zerstört. Interne Relationen sind die tragischen
Hauptakteure dieses Dramas, dessen Auslöser die Differenzierung zwischen
Qualitäten und Relationen ist, die man auch als extern bezeichnen könnte.
Die Paradoxie von Relationalität in der Erfahrungswelt ist jedoch nicht das
Letzte. Die Realität „an sich“ besteht ja gerade unabhängig von der Erfahrung.
Diese ist für Bradley eine, umfassende Ganzheit. In dieser einen Ganzheit kannes keine ontologisch relevanten Elemente, keine Teil-Entitäten, geben. Dasschließt innere strukturelle Differenzierung nicht aus. In diesem monistischen
Szenario können wir eine neue Verortung interner Relationen vornehmen.
Zum einen dadurch, dass ihr Gegenstück, das sind externe Relationen, vonvornherein irrelevant sind. Worauf sollten sich externe Relationen auchbeziehen, wenn letztlich nur eine Ganzheit existiert? Zum anderen werdeninterne Relationen auch positiv charakterisiert. Bradleys Monismus schließt
strukturelle Differenzierung der einen Wirklichkeit nicht aus, somit auch nicht

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Christian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanzianjede Pluralität, folglich Relationalität, solange gewährleistet bleibt, dass
Relationen nur in oder aufgrund der einen Wirklichkeit bestehen. Das InternSein der Relationen besagt somit, dass sie strikt von der einen Ganzheit
abhängig sind, somit keinesfalls den Status von selbständigen Entitäten
beanspruchen können. Sie sind Aspekte oder Merkmale der einen Ganzheit:„Plurality and relatedness are but features and aspects of unity“ (AaR: 125).
Daraus folgt, dass Relationen, so verstanden, stets mit einer qualitativen
Modifikation ihres Trägers einhergehen. Dies schließt nochmals externe
Relationen aus, für die nach Bradley gilt, dass sie ihre Relata gerade nicht
modifizieren. Das Fazit: „[…] any attempt to maintain the relations as merely
external must fail.” (Ebd.)

2. Russell und Moore als Kritiker Bradleys

Beginnen wir mit Russell, der Erörterung interner Beziehungen in seinenPrinciples of Mathematics (PoM). Zwei Kontexte sind hier relevant, weil sie sichauf Bradley beziehen und maßgeblich für die Entwicklung des Themas Interne
Relationen sind: §§ 212-216, in denen es um asymmetrische Relationen geht,
bzw. §§ 426f, in denen sich Russell mit Raum bzw. Raumpunkten beschäftigt.
Russell spricht Bradley eine „monistic view“ zu, die jede Relation zwischenzwei Relata a und b als Eigenschaft R einer Ganzheit, bestehend aus a und b,
auffasst (PoM: 221, 224), jedenfalls als eine der Ganzheit rein interne Instanz.
In diesen Abschnitten weist Russell darauf hin, dass eine solche generelle
Reduktion aller Relationen auf rein interne die Asymmetrie mancher
Relationen nicht gewährleisten kann, z.B. der Relation kleiner-als. In einermonistischen Analyse wird die Sachlage, dass a kleiner als b ist, durch „kleinerals (a, b)“ wiedergegeben; dass b kleiner als a ist, aber durch „kleiner-als (b,a)“. Die Ganzheiten, das ist der springende Punkt, (a, b) und (b, a) aber sind
exakt dieselben. Somit besteht kein Unterschied zwischen „kleiner-als (a, b)“
und „kleiner-als (b, a)“. Diese Analyse kann lediglich einholen, dass in einer
Ganzheit eine Differenz von Größen besteht. Wie diese aber verläuft, bleibt
offen. Somit gilt: „the distinction between an asymmetrical relation and its
converse, is one which the monistic theory of relations is wholly unable toexplain“ (PoM: 225).

Christian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanzianRussell sieht es als „Ausweg“ für Monisten an, dass die einzig wirkliche
Ganzheit ein Absolutes ist, das in einem eigentlichen Sinne keine Teileaufweist (PoM: 226). Das Problem dabei: Über eine absolute Ganzheit ohne
Teile kann man keine affirmativen Aussagen machen. Denn jede
wahrheitsfähige affirmative Aussage erfolgt in Form einer Prädikation, also in
einer Behauptung in Subjekt-Prädikat-Dichotomie. Auf eine absolute Ganzheit
bezogen, setzte das aber eine echte Differenzierung voraus, zwischen ihm
selbst (Subjekt) und eben seinen Eigenschaften (eingeführt durch Prädikate),
damit auch das Bestehen von Relationen zwischen dem Absoluten und diesen
Eigenschaften (vgl. PoM: 448). Diese aber müssen extern sein, was die
Behauptung ihres Nicht-Bestehens widerlegt.
In External and Internal Relations (EIR) bekundet Moore zunächst, dass es ihm
schwerfällt zu verstehen, was mit der Leugnung von externen Beziehungenüberhaupt gemeint sei (EIR: 40). So besteht die Auseinandersetzung mit
Bradley zunächst in verschiedenen Rekonstruktionsversuchen seiner Thesen.
Im
Fokus
dabei:„ No
relationsarepurelyexternal“
imBegründungszusammenhang mit „All relations […] modify or make adifference to the terms between which they hold“ (ebd.). Ein wörtliches
Verstehen dieser Modifikation implizierte, dass jede Relation kausal in ihren
Relata eine Änderung bewirkt, so wie ein Stück Wachs schmilzt, wenn man es
in Beziehung setzt zu einer Flamme (EIR: 42). Als allgemeine Behauptung, wie
sie von Bradley zur generellen Leugnung externer Beziehungen vorgetragen
wird, ist die Aussage falsch. Es gibt offenkundig Objekte, die durch das
Eintreten in Beziehungen keine Änderung in diesem Sinn durchmachen (EIR:
43). Wenn ein Objekt a zu einem Objekt b in die Beziehung kleiner-als tritt,ändert sich a dadurch nicht, zumindest nicht wie Wachs durch kausale
Einwirkung.
Wir müssen, um Bradleys Behauptung Sinn zu geben, die Modifikations-Theseselbst modifizieren. Sie hat überhaupt nur dann Chancen auf Erfolg, wenn
man nicht weiter von Relationen spricht, sondern von relationalen
Eigenschaften, um von den Letzteren zu behaupten, sie können einem Träger
nicht zukommen, ohne in diesem irgend eine Differenz zu erzeugen, wobei
Moore folgende Formulierung dafür vorschlägt: „in the case of every relational

372

Christian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanzianproperty, it can always be truly asserted of any term x which has thatproperty, that any term which had not had it would necessarily have beendifferent from x“ (EIR: 47).
Auch diese wohlwollende Interpretation kann allerdings das Erklärungsziel„No relations are purely external“ nicht erreichen. Als Gegenbeispiel führt
Moore mereologische Relationen bzw. relationale Eigenschaften an. Nehmen
wir einen Kreis, der zur einen, oberen Hälfte rot, zur anderen, unteren Hälfte
aber gelb ist. Dann entsteht im gesamten Gebilde eine Differenz, wenn die
Beziehung zu einem seiner Teile wegfällt. Das Umgekehrte gilt jedoch nicht.
Die untere, gelbe Kreishälfte ist die gleiche, ob sie nun als Teil des Ganzen
aufgefasst wird oder nicht. Somit haben wir ein Beispiel einer relationalen
Eigenschaft, nämlich Teil einer Ganzheit zu sein, die sogar bei
wohlwollendster Interpretation die Modifikations-These als falsch erweist.
Damit wird das „Dogma interner Beziehungen“, wie Moore auch sagt,
widerlegt. Es gibt relationale Eigenschaften, nämlich Teil einer Ganzheit zu
sein, die in ihrem Träger keine Differenz erzeugt. Das tut umso weniger die
Beziehung zwischen dem Teil und der Ganzheit. Somit modifiziert dieseBeziehung zumindest ein Relatum nicht. Bradleys Begründung für das InternSein aller Beziehungen ist hinfällig.

3. Interne Relationen im TLP

Wenn wir uns Wittgensteins Tractatus zuwenden, wollen wir darlegen, wie er
Bradley rezipiert, weiterentwickelt und für kommende Theorienbildungenfruchtbar macht. Dass er damit interne Relationen aus der
Auseinandersetzung zwischen Bradley und Russell bzw. Moore heraushebt,
ergibt sich daraus ebenfalls (vgl. dazu Macha 2015, part II).
Wittgenstein greift im TLP manche Elemente der Thesen Russells und Moores
zu internen Relationen auf. So führt Wittgenstein, wie Moore, dieDifferenzierung zwischen internen Eigenschaften und internen Relationen als
nicht strikt ein. In TLP 4.123 spricht Wittgenstein von einem „schwankenden
Gebrauch“ dieser Begriffe. Das entspricht bei Wittgenstein der Einführung
sowohl von „interne Eigenschaft“ wie von „interne Relation“ im Kontext derAusführungen zu sogenannten „formalen“ Eigenschaften bzw. Relationen in
TLP 4.122. Formale Eigenschaften sind Eigenschaften der Struktur vonChristian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanzian

Tatsachen. „In demselben Sinne“ kann man in diesem Zusammenhang, sprichhinsichtlich struktureller Merkmalen von Tatsachen, auch von „formalen
Relationen“ sprechen. Zu internen Eigenschaften bzw. Relationen ist es nur
noch ein kleiner Schritt, der in einer terminologischen Festlegung besteht:„Statt Eigenschaft der Struktur sage ich auch ‚interne Eigenschaft‘; statt
Relation der Strukturen ‚interne Relation‘.“ (Ebd.)
Von Russell scheint Wittgenstein eine Bestimmung interner Relationen aus
den Philosophical Essays zu übernehmen. Dort charakterisiert Russell interne
Relationen als „grounded in the natures of the related terms“ (160), was besagt,
dass die Relata interner Relationen so sind, dass sie nicht ohne die Beziehung
gedacht werden können. Wenn wir z.B. die Farbqualität Hellblau annehmen,
so liegt es in deren „Natur“, heller als Dunkelblau zu sein. Heller-als ist indiesem Sinn eine interne Beziehung. Diese Bestimmung finden wir nun auchin TLP 4.123: „Eine Eigenschaft ist intern, wenn es undenkbar ist, dass ihr
Gegenstand sie nicht besitzt. (Diese blaue Farbe und jene stehen in derinternen Relation von heller und dunkler eo ipso. Es ist undenkbar, dass diesebeiden Gegenstände nicht in dieser Relation stünden.)“ Eine interne
Eigenschaft bzw. interne Beziehung ist nach Russell und Wittgenstein so durch
ihre Träger bzw. ihre Relata determiniert, dass Letztere ohne diese Eigenschaft
bzw. Relation nicht gedacht werden können. Im Hinblick auf Relationen geht
dies so weit, dass sich der „nichts anderes als“-Reflex einstellen mag: Für das
Bestehen der internen Beziehungen heller bzw. dunkler braucht es nicht mehrals das Vorliegen zweier unterschiedlicher Farbqualitäten.
Mit beiden, Moore und Russell, kommt Wittgenstein in der Ablehnung eines
einfachen Reduktionismus von externen auf interne Relationen überein.
Ebenso ist Wittgenstein kein Reduktionist im Sinne des „Dogmas interner
Beziehungen“ (Moore). Allerdings, und darin geht Wittgenstein über beide
Referenzautoren hinaus, wird ein solcher Reduktionismus im TLP deshalb
abgelehnt, weil er eine Lösung eines Problems ist, das sich, bei richtigem
Verstehen, erst gar nicht ergibt. So „erledigt sich nun die Streitfrage ‚ob alle
Relationen intern oder extern‘ seien“ (4.1252), wenn man einsieht, dass interne
Relationen „zwischen möglichen Sachlagen“ bzw. „zwischen den sie
darstellenden Sätzen“ bestehen (4.125); wobei wir unter „Sachlage“ eine
komplexe oder molekulare Struktur von Sachverhalten verstehen dürfen (vgl.
Glock 2000: 332). Was auch immer externe Relationen sein mögen, es ist klar,

374

Christian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanziandass sie auf solche Struktur-Merkmale nicht reduziert werden können. Die
Annahme einer Reduktion ist weder wahr noch falsch, sondern schlicht
sinnlos.
Inwiefern lässt sich Wittgenstein nun auch auf Bradley beziehen? Eine erstenaheliegende Antwort ist, dass er externe Beziehungen zwar nicht auf interne
reduziert, sie im TLP aber weitgehend ignoriert. Jedenfalls haben externe
Beziehungen im Gefüge des TLP, im Unterschied zu den internen, keine
tragende Funktion. Überall dort, wo Beziehungen echte theoretische Relevanz
haben, werden sie explizit als interne deklariert, etwa die
Abbildungsbeziehung zwischen Sprache und Welt in 4.104, sowie logische
Beziehungen in 5.131 (Wahrheitswertbeziehungen) bzw. in 5.21ff (logische
Operationen zur Erzeugung von komplexen Sätzen).
Ein weiterer Aspekt ist, dass interne Beziehungen im TLP jedenfalls nicht
selbst als Sachverhalte oder echte Teile derselben aufgefasst werden.
Konsequenterweise können sie selbst nicht durch Sätze abgebildet werden:„Das Bestehen solcher interner Eigenschaften und Relationen kann aber nicht
durch Sätze behauptet werden […vielmehr] zeigt es sich in den Sätzen, welche
jene Sachverhalte darstellen“ (4.122). Das erinnert an Bradleys monistische,besser holistische Interpretation von internen Relationen, derzufolge diesenicht selbständig als etwas, als Entität bestehen, sondern nur „in“ oder „durch“
eine umfassende Ganzheit. Diese Ganzheit wird bei Wittgenstein freilich nicht
im Sinn von Bradleys Absolutem verstanden, sondern als Sachverhalt bzw. als
Sachlage in eingeführtem Sinn.
Interne Beziehungen sind auch bei Wittgenstein so strikt von einer Ganzheit
abhängig, dass sie keinesfalls den Status von Entitäten beanspruchen können.
Wittgenstein führt allerdings Bradleys Monismus oder Holismus vom
Absoluten weg hin zu einem Holismus der Sachverhalte. Dennoch, und das ist
im TLP wie bei Bradley klar, kann keine systematische Weltbeschreibung aufinterne Relationen verzichten. Bradley schließt ja strukturelle Differenzierung
der einen Wirklichkeit nicht aus, somit auch nicht Pluralität, welche interne
Relationalität erfordert. Analoges kann im TLP festgestellt werden:
Sachverhalte haben eine innere Struktur, den „Ort“ interner Relationen. Diese
Struktur zu erfassen, ist unumgänglich für eine Beschreibung der Welt.

Christian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanzian

Im Folgenden soll skizziert werden, wie die zentralen Elemente derCharakterisierung interner Relationen im TLP maßgeblich für ihre Etablierung
in der aktuellen Ontologie sind. Dabei können wir uns auf (i) das Gegründetsein, (ii) die Nicht-Darstellbarkeit in Sätzen und (iii) die Unverzichtbarkeit interner
Relationen konzentrieren.

4. Interne Relationen in der aktuellen Ontologie

Um die Relevanz interner Relationen im Sinne der TLP-Kriterien in deraktuellen Ontologie anzudeuten, soll auf zwei repräsentative Autoren
verwiesen werden, sowie auf zwei „puzzles”, deren Lösung auf (i)-(iii)Beziehungen angewiesen ist.
So definiert Kevin Mulligan interne Relationen folgendermaßen; „[…] arelation is internal with respect to objects a, b, c etc., just if, given a, b, c etc.,
the relation must hold between and of these objects” (Mulligan 1998: 344). Das
Vorkommen mancher Objekte ist hinreichend, natürlich auch notwendig
dafür, dass die fraglichen Relationen bestehen. Wittgensteins Kriterium (i) desGegründetseins wird dadurch explizit zur Geltung gebracht. Jonathan Lowenennt Mulligans interne Relationen ausdrücklich „founded or grounded
relations”. Er erachtet sie als „entirely determined by their relata”.
Entscheidend ist, dass beide, Mulligan und Lowe, diese Relationen als „noadditions to reality” auffassen, wie Lowe festhält (Lowe 2006: 46). Die „noaddition to reality”-These besagt jedenfalls, dass besagte Relationen keine
eigenständigen Entitäten sind. Sie machen keine Tatsachen aus, wie es
Eigenschaften zusammen mit jenen Dingen tun, die sie charakterisieren. Das
beeinflusst die semantische Interpretation der sprachlichen Ausdrücke, durch
die jene interne Relationen repräsentiert werden, was unmittelbar
Wittgensteins Kriterium (ii) betrifft. Nichtsdestotrotz, und damit kommen wir
zu (iii), sind diese internen Beziehungen unumgänglich für eine systematische
ontologische Weltbeschreibung. Der Verweis auf zwei eingangs erwähnten
puzzles mag das belegen: die kleiner-als Beziehung und die Beziehung derCharakterisierung zwischen Dingen und ihren Eigenschaften.
Um bei kleiner-als zu beginnen, zeigt sich, dass seine Interpretation als
gegründete Nicht-Entität die einzige Möglichkeit ist, es in eine systematische
Beschreibung der Welt zu integrieren. Das ergibt sich aus dem Versuch, das

376

Christian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanzian

Gegenteil anzunehmen: Wenn wir eine nicht-gegründete zweistellige kleinerals-Entität zwischen zwei Objekten a und b annehmen würden, müssten wir
auch zweistellige kleiner-als-Entitäten zwischen a und allen jenen Objektenannehmen, die größer als a sind. Das aber sind nicht nur infinit, sondern auchunbestimmbar viele; zumal nicht nur klar identifizierbare Objekte größer als asein mögen, sondern auch Teile von Objekten, Summen, Agglomerate, ohne
klare Kompositions- und Identitätsbedingungen. Die einzige Chance, einesolche prinzipiell unüberschaubare, und somit einer systematischen
Weltbeschreibung entgegenstehende Vermehrung von relationalen Entitäten
zu entkommen, ist, am Status von kleiner-als als interner Relation im Sinnevon (i)-(iii) festzuhalten (vgl. Kanzian 2016: 173f).
Auch Charakterisierung muss als interne Relation aufgefasst werden. Genaudann, wenn ein Objekt x die Eigenschaft F hat, ist es der Fall, dass F xcharakterisiert. Das Standardargument gegen Charakterisierung als nichtgegründete zweistellige Entität ist, dass in diesem Fall auch etwas erforderlichwäre, um die relationale Entität mit ihren Relata, mit x und mit F, zu
verbinden. Fassten wir diese Relationen zweiter Stufe als weitere zweistellige
Entitäten auf, so lässt sich ein infiniter Regress nicht vermeiden. Denn auch die
Relationen zweiter Stufe müssten mit ihren jeweiligen Relata verbunden
werden. Oder sollten wir die Relationen zweiter Stufe als Nicht-Entitäten
auffassen? Das stoppte den Regress, ließe aber die Frage offen, warum wir
nicht auch den Relationen erster Stufe diesen Nicht-Entitäten-Status zubilligen(vgl. Mellor/Oliver 1997: 16).
Die einzige Möglichkeit, dieser paradoxen Situation zu entkommen, ist
Charakterisierung als interne Relation im Sinne von (i)-(iii) zu erachten.
Charakterisierung zeigt sich in „x ist F”-Tatsachen, ohne selbst eine Tatsache
zu sein, oder eine Tatsache zu konstituieren, die wir in einem Satz abbilden
könnten. Die begrifflichen Voraussetzungen dafür finden wir in Wittgensteins
Tractatus: einer manchmal unterschätzten Brücke zwischen der Britischen
Philosophie des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts und der aktuellen Ontologie.
References
Bradley, Francis (1966) Appearance and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Glock, Hans-Johann (2000) Wittgenstein-Lexikon, Darmstadt: WBG.

Christian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie | ChristianKanzianKanzian, Christian (2016) Wie Dinge sind, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.
Lowe, Jonathan (2006) The Four-Category Ontology, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mácha, Jakub (2015) Wittgenstein on Internal and External Relations, London: Bloomsbury.
Mellor, David; Oliver, Alex (eds.) (1997) Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore, George Edward (1919-20) “External and Internal Relations”, Proceedings of the
Aristotelean Society 20, 40-62.
Mulligan, Kevin (1998) “Relations – Through Thick and Thin”, Erkenntnis 48, 325-353.
Russell, Bertrand (1956) The Principles of Mathematics, London: Allen & Unwin.
Russell, Bertrand (1910) Philosophical Essays, London: Allen & Unwin.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1963) Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Acknowledgement
Dieser Artikel ist eine ins Deutsche übersetzte, gekürzte, überarbeitete Version von ChristianKanzian, Internal Relations. In: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Ed. by Andreas
Georgallides. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle Upon Tyne 2021, 47-60.

378

Christian Kanzian, "Interne Relationen. Der Tractatus als Brücke zwischen Bradley, seinen Kritikern und der aktuellen Ontologie". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“Peter Keicher (Karlsruhe, Germany)
Abstract
This contribution refers to Friedrich Waismann’s “Dictation to Schlick”. Earlier I had theopinion that Ludwig Wittgenstein had dictated this text, which Georg Henrik von Wright gave,in “The Wittgenstein Papers”, the number D 302. A research article by Joachim Schulte“Waismann as spokesman for Wittgenstein” changed my mind. I am now convinced that it
was Friedrich Waismann, who dictated it, although Friedrich Waismann was using many
manuscripts by Ludwig Wittgenstein. I compared the “Dictation to Schlick” with the two
Ludwig Wittgenstein Nachlass manuscripts MS 114ii and MS 115i, and I came to the following
conclusion: It was 1933/1934, when the dictation took place. I will now show that the text was
dictated by Friedrich Waismann to Moritz Schlick and to Rose Rand within 1934-36, and that
there are many texts which form the basis of the “Dictation to Schlick”; I will show, that theversion of the so-called “Dictation to Schlick”, that was published — from Friedrich
Waismann’s Nachlass — by Antonia Soulez and Gordon P. Baker, is a later version elaborated
by Friedrich Waismann himself.

Einleitung

Ludwig Wittgenstein kam 1929 nach Cambridge zurück; man hat die Zeit von1929 bis 1936 als „Mittlere Periode“ bezeichnet. Zu dem Zeitraum 1933/34
bemerkt Georg Henrik von Wright: „Klar ist, daß Wittgenstein hier den
Versuch unternimmt, ein Buch zu schreiben und seinen damaligen
philosophischen Standpunkt in geordneter und zusammenhängender Formdarzulegen.“ (von Wright, 1986, 60) Damals entstand auch das „Diktat für
Schlick“, sorgfältig vorbereitet von Ludwig Wittgenstein, verfasst vonFriedrich Waismann.
Es sind fast dreißig Jahre, dass ich mich – einmal mehr, einmal weniger – mit
dem „Diktat für Schlick“ beschäftigt habe: Ich habe 1994 begonnen, mich mit
dem Diktat zu beschäftigen; diese Arbeiten wurden jedoch erst später
veröffentlicht (Keicher, 1998). Es war der Vergleich mit den Manuskripten MS
114ii/MS 115i, der damals meine Datierung des „Diktats für Schlick“ auf die
Jahre 1933/34 begründete (Keicher, 2000).
Dieser Beitrag soll das „Diktat für Schlick“ in Erinnerung rufen. Jede Autorin
und jeder Autor wird mit nur wenigen Literaturangaben zitiert. Tatsächlichliegen mir durchaus weitere Bezugnahmen vor. Das Ziel ist nicht die
philosophische Rezeption des „Diktat für Schlick“, in der das „Diktat für
Schlick“ bona fide Wittgenstein zugeordnet wird (Schulte, 2011, 237). Es geht

Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

mir ebenfalls nicht darum, ob Waismann Teile des Diktats für Publikationen
verwendet hat. Mein Arbeitsgebiet ist der Nachlass Wittgensteins.

1 Was ist das „Diktat für Schlick“?
1.1 Die Geschichte des „Diktats für Schlick“

Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis (McGuinness, 1984) enthält zahlreicheGespräche zwischen Wittgenstein und Schlick, die Waismann notierte; dieseGespräche reichen vom 18. Dezember 1929 bis 1. Juli 1932; ein Konflikt
zwischen Wittgenstein und Carnap trat dazwischen und die Aufzeichnungenwurden beendet (Carnap, 1931). Wittgenstein traf selbstverständlich, seit 1932,
noch Schlick und Waismann persönlich. Mit Waismann plante Wittgensteinsogar eine gemeinsame Publikation.
Im Jahre 1933 äußerte Wittgenstein seine Unzufriedenheit über einen Beitragvon Richard Braithwaite zu seiner aktuellen Philosophie. Wittgensteinerschien zu einer eigenen Publikation geradezu verpflichtet (Keicher, 1998,
57). Die Entstehung des „Diktats für Schlick“ muss in diesem Zusammenhang
gesehen werden.
Das „Diktat für Schlick“ entstand vermutlich in Wien, in einer oder mehreren
Sitzungen, mit oder ohne Publikum, an denen Waismann, Schlick undwahrscheinlich auch Rose Rand teilnahmen; Waismann verfügte über Kopien
oder Abschriften von Wittgenstein und sehr wohl über selbst Geschriebenes,
Schlick hatte ein Schreibeheft dabei.
1.2 Die Datierung des „Diktats für Schlick“

Das Treffen, das zum „Diktat für Schlick“ führte, hat von 1934 bis 1936
stattgefunden. Das Jahr 1936 ist der Tod von Moritz Schlick. Juha Manninen
hat das Treffen – und zwar mit Rose Rand als Protokollantin – auf das Jahr
1935 datiert (Maninnen, 2011, 251).
1.3 Die werkgeschichtliche Einordnung des „Diktats für Schlick“Das „Diktat für Schlick“ reiht sich in Manuskripte und Typoskripte desWittgenstein Nachlasses bis 1934 ein, die mit einem ähnlichen Satz, wie z.B.
das sog. „Big Typescript“, TS 213, und MS 114ii/MS 115i, beginnen: „Versteht
man einen Satz oder ist es erst ein Satz, wenn man es versteht?“. Es folgen

380

Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

zwei „Zwischentitel“: „Verstehen eines Satzes analog dem Verstehen einer
Melodie als Melodie“ (S. 2) und „Verstehen eines Genrebildes“ (S. 8); in den
letzten beiden Dritteln fehlen diese „Zwischentitel“.
1.4 Der Brief von Waismann an Schlick

In einem Brief von Waismann an Schlick, vom 9. August 1934, in dem die
schwierige Lage einer gemeinsamen Publikation mit Wittgenstein besprochen
wird, heißt es:
Allein es zeigte sich, dass Wittgenstein gleich mit dem Anfang nicht
einverstanden war und erklärte, so könne doch das Buch nicht beginnen.
Das seltsame ist, dass gerade dieser Anfang von ihm stammt. Er hatte mir
nämlich zu Ostern, als er den Plan des Ganzen entwickelte, vor allem
erklärt, wie er sich den Anfang vorstellt und sogar auf einem Bogen Papierziemlich ausführliche Bemerkungen niedergeschrieben, – eben die Sätze,an denen er jetzt Anstoß nahm. Als ich ihm das sagte, wollte er es
durchaus nicht glauben, bis ich zum Glück den Bogen fand und ihm nun
schwarz auf weiß zeigen konnte, dass diese Sätze von ihm sind.
Waismann to Schlick, 9.8.1934 (Iven, 2015, 160f.)
In Waismanns Nachlaß findet sich – nach Auskunft von Christoph LimbeckLilienau – kein „Bogen Papier“. Zwischen Ostern 1934 und Sommer 1934 gab
es also eine neue Ausrichtung Wittgensteins, die – indirekt – mit dem „Diktat
für Schlick“ verbunden war.
1.5 Das „Diktat für Schlick“ in unterschiedlichen Nachlässen

Im Folgenden erhält der Leser eine Aufstellung unterschiedlicher Nachlässe,die das „Diktat für Schlick“ enthalten, jeweils mit Nachlassnummern undkurzen Angaben dazu.

Ludwig Wittgenstein Nachlass, Trinity College, Wren Library, Cambridge (UK)D 302

Sog. „Diktat für Schlick“, Typoskript, 32 S., sog.
„Waismann Exemplar“Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

Georg Henrik von Wright Nachlass, von Wright Archiv, University of Helsinki
(FIN)
D 302

Sog. „Diktat für Schlick“, Typoskript, 32 S.,
Bemerkungen des Abschreibers

Friedrich Waismann Nachlass, Bodleian Library, Oxford (UK):
Sog. „Diktat für
Schlick“Typoskripte, Zettel, textidentisch oder weniger
textidentisch mit sog. „Diktat für Schlick“, inTeilen des Nachlasses, u.a. in „Ältere Reste“,Überschriften Waismanns

Moritz Schlick Nachlass, Wiener Kreis Archiv, Noord Hollands Archief, Haarlem(NL)
183, D.1

Heft „Wittgenstein“, 37 S., Stenogramm „StolzeSchrey“

183, D.3

Typoskript, Transkription von D.1, 32 S.

Rose Rand Nachlass, University of Pittsburgh Library System, Pennsylania (USA)RR 11-16-3

Heft „Wittgenstein Manuscript I.“, Stenogramm„Gabelsberger“, circa 66 S.

Das „Diktat für Schlick“ im Wittgenstein Nachlass ist dem Waismann Nachlass
entnommen und es wird indirekt von Oakes und Pichler als sog. „Waismann
Exemplar“ bezeichnet (Oakes / Pichler, 2023, 264).

2 Die Textgeschichte des „Diktats für Schlick“
2.1 Die „Cornell Copy“Die 1969 in Europa fertig gestellte und an die Cornell University in New York
(USA) transferierte Verfilmung des damals bekannten WittgensteinNachlasses, auf Mikrofilm, seither als „Cornell Copy“ bezeichnet, enthält die
Diktate D 301-302, jedoch nicht die Diktate D 303-310 (Cornell, 1969). Die"Cornell Copy" enthält, mit den 32 Seiten des D 302 in maschinenschriftlicher
Fassung, eine Bemerkung des Abschreibers (Keicher, 1998, 73f.).

382

Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

2.2 Die Werkausgabe bei Suhrkamp und die Wiener Ausgabe

Von der Werkausgabe ist Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis aufzuführen; hiergibt B. McGuinness indirekte Angaben zum „Diktat für Schlick“ (McGuinness,1984).
Die von M. Nedo im Springer Verlag und bei Vittorio Klostermann
herausgegebene Wiener Ausgabe enthält keine Planung des „Diktats für
Schlick“ (Nedo, 2019).

2.3 Die BEE und Wittgenstein Source

In der 2000 veröffentlichten Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic
Edition auf CD-ROMs (BEE, 2000) wurde das „Diktat für Schlick“ in einer vonder „Cornell Copy“ abweichenden Version veröffentlicht. Es handelte sich dabei
um ein Typoskript, 32 Seiten, das nicht den Vermerk des Abschreibers enthält;
es ist das sog. „Waismann-Exemplar“ (Oakes / Pichler, 2023, 264).
In der BEE waren die Diktate D 301-310 vollständig verfügbar; das Diktat D
306, eine Transkription des Stenogramms aus dem Schlick Nachlass, warveröffentlicht. Die BEE lief ab circa 2010 nicht mehr auf herkömmlichen
Computern und der Vertrieb der BEE wurde von Oxford University Press
eingestellt.
Auf der Website von Wittgenstein Source fehlt – so wie in der BEE – die Version,
welche den Vermerk des Abschreibers enthält; das D 306 ist jedoch
veröffentlicht.

3 Die Wittgenstein Forschung zur Autorschaft des „Diktats für Schlick“
3.1 Peter Keicher (1998): Wittgenstein und Schlick

Die erste Einordnung des D 302, „Diktat für Schlick“, wurde von mir erarbeitet.
Das Typoskript, das mir vorlag – es war kein Stenogramm –, enthielt, auf einem
Deckblatt, die folgende, vermutlich von Rush Rhees, handschriftliche
Information:Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

383

Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

Diktat für Schlick. This typescript was found among Waismann's papers.
Dictated by Wittgenstein, probably to Waismann. Date: 1932-1933.
Dem Typoskript selbst steht voraus: „Wittgenstein. From among Waismann's
papers; labelled Diktat für Schlick.“ Das Stück enthält, auf Seite 28a, die
Bemerkung des Abschreibers.
Danach wäre es also nicht Waismann, dem Wittgenstein das „Diktat für
Schlick“ diktierte, sondern Schlick. Dies war – damals – eine Entdeckung. Ich
fand auch das zweiseitige D 306, das die Transkription eines Teils von Schlicks
Stenogramm des „Diktats für Schlick“ darstellt.
3.2 Mathias Iven (2009): Wittgenstein und Schlick

Mathias Iven hat das „Diktat für Schlick“ ebenfalls als ein Diktat vonWittgenstein an Schlick dargestellt und auf September 1933, in Istrien, datiert(Iven, 2009). Iven hat dabei aus meinem Beitrag zitiert (Keicher, 1998). Im
September 1933 hatte Wittgenstein das MS 114ii noch nicht abgeschlossen unddas MS 115i noch nicht einmal begonnen.
3.3 Juha Manninen (2011): Waismannn und Schlick

Juha Manninen, aus Finnland, hat Rose Rand als Protokollantin belegt. Seine
These ist, dass das „Diktat für Schlick“ eine „presentation by Waismannn for
Schlick's seminar early in 1935, in this sense a dictation für Schlick, although
not by Witttgenstein“ sei (Manninen, 2011, 251).
3.4 Joachim Schulte (2011): Waismann und Schlick

Für Joachim Schulte ist es, in „Waismann as spokesman for Wittgenstein“,
eindeutig klar: Es war Waismann, der das „Diktat für Schlick“ verfasste(Schulte, 2011, 237f). Schulte belegt dies mit Waismanniana, z.B. seinem
Gebrauch von „Traktat“, „Epigramm“, „psychomechanisch“, „Über einen
Leisten schlagen“, die „Woge“ und „Das Nichts nichtet“ (Schulte, 2011, 239f.).
Schulte 2011 enthält auch eine ausgezeichnete Darstellung desphilosophischen Inhalts, so z.B. zum Begriff des „Bedeutungskörpers“ (Schulte,
2011, 226f).
3.5 Michael Oakes und Alois Pichler (2023): Wittgenstein, Schlick und Waismann

Michael Oakes and Alois Pichler haben zweimal (2013 und 2023) versucht, dieAutorschaft des „Diktats für Schlick“ mit Hilfe der Stilometrie zu klären. In
beiden Fällen ist das Ergebnis, dass es nicht auszuschließen ist, dass das

384Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher„Diktat für Schlick“ ursprünglich auf ein Diktat Wittgensteins an Schlick
zurückgeht.

4 Die Bucheditionen des sog. „Diktat für Schlick“
4.1 Antonia Soulez: Dictées de Wittgenstein à Waismann et pour Schlick

Antonia Soulez publizierte die französische Version des sog. „Diktat für
Schlick“ 1997 (Soulez, 1997), ein Jahr vor meinen „Untersuchungen“ zumDiktat (Keicher, 1998). Ich war überrascht, denn das Diktat war nicht
dasjenige, über das ich gearbeitet hatte.
In der von Waismanns Schriften ausgehenden Veröffentlichung (…) findet sicheine durchgehende Reihe von Zwischenüberschriften, die meines Erachtens
nicht nur den ursprünglichen Charakter des Diktats verstellt, den Schwung desTextes unterbricht und die kompositorische Entwicklung durch Zwischentitel
zerstückelt. (Keicher, 1998, 67)
Die „Zwischentitel“ stammten – offenbar – von Waismann. Da die Edition vonSoulez schnell besorgt wurde, lagen nicht immer die von Waismann gewählten„Zwischentitel“ vor. Gordon P. Baker – ein älterer, verdienstvoller Herr – war
unter Druck gesetzt; er plante die Veröffentlichung in Englischer Sprache(Baker, 2003). Soulez hat die zweite Auflage, mit Verlagswechsel, ihrer
Buchedition im Jahr 2015 publiziert (Soulez, 2015).
4.2 Gordon P. Baker: The Voices of Wittgenstein

Die englische Version des sog. „Diktat für Schlick“ (Baker, 2003) entsprach nicht
meinem Dokument des Diktats. Gordon P. Baker – 2002 verstorben – stellte fest:
In one case ('Diktat für Schlick'), external evidence suggests the text to be a
typescript of a dictation to Waismann of material that Ludwig
Wittgenstein wished to transmit to Moritz Schlick; this probably dates
from December 1932. (Baker, 2003, xvi)
Schulte kritisierte, der Text sei „a dictation to Waismann“, zurecht als
fehlerhaft und die Datierung „this probably dates from December 1932“ alsnicht begründet (Schulte, 2011, 240). Es ist Schulte außerdem zuzustimmen,

Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

dass das „Diktat für Schlick“, wie es bei Soulez und Baker publiziert ist, kein
Diktat darstellt; es ist die Ausarbeitung eines Textes, mit „Zwischentiteln“, dienicht von Wittgenstein stammen, sondern von Waismann.
4.3 Die Buchedition des sog. „Diktat für Schlick“ von Antonia Soulez

Was hat Soulez als sog. „Diktat für Schlick“ publiziert? Schulte wollte kein
„Szenario“ des eigentlichen Diktats darlegen (Schulte, 2011, 240). Baker sieht
die verstreute Form als möglichen Aufschluß dafür, wie die erste Gestalt desDiktats zu sehen sei; Schulte hält, umgekehrt, Rückschlüsse auf Waismanns
Kenntnisse von Wittgenstein für möglich.
This story has the advantage of explaining the fact that the parallels
between this document and Wittgenstein’s writings can be found in suchextremely diverse parts of the source material: as a first step, Waismannused a fair but surveyable number of different passages to piece together
short texts; and as a second step these short texts were employed to
produce the Diktat, thus stirring up the elements of the earlier mixtures tomanufacture a new patchwork.
(Schulte, 2011, 240)
Soulez hat, nachdem sie – „as a first step“ – die „Älteren Reste“ in Waismanns
Nachlass rezipiert hatte, tatsächlich – „as a second step“ – ein verstreutes„Patchwork“ vom sog. „Diktat für Schick“ publiziert. Auch zeitlich könnte
Waismann alles dies auch noch nach dem „Diktat für Schlick“ bewerkstelligt
haben, sogar noch deutlich nach 1936.

5 Neue Aspekte für die Wittgenstein-Nachlass Forschung
5.1 Die Stenogramme „Gabelsberger“ und „Stolze-Schrey“

Von den Stennogrammen war die „Stolze-Schrey“ in Deutschland damals
geläufig, und die „Gabelsberger“ war es in Österreich. Diese Stenogramme
waren für Tagebücher und für philosophische Manuskripte von besonderer
Bedeutung. Schlick verwendete die „Stolze-Schrey“, Waismann und Rose Rand
verwendeten die „Gabelsberger“.

386Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

5.2 Das Ende der „Mittleren Periode“

Der bereits oben zitierte Brief von Waismann bildet einen Blick von außen, auf
die Ansichten Wittgensteins.
Er hat ja die wunderbare Gabe, die Dinge immer wieder wie zum ersten
Mal zu sehen. Aber es zeigt sich doch, meine ich, wie schwer eine
gemeinsame Arbeit ist, da er eben immer wieder der Eingebung desAugenblicks folgt und das niederreißt, was er vorher entworfen hat.
Waismann to Schlick, 9.8.1934 (Iven, 2015, 161)
Waismann entging ein entscheidender Punkt, denn spätestens das Braune Buch
, eine Vorform der Philosophischen Untersuchungen, war für Wittgenstein ein
Neuanfang.

Zusammenfassung

Das „Diktat für Schlick“ hat eine lange europäische Geschichte hinter sich, die
mit der Cornell University und der University Pittsburgh auch die USA umfaßt.
In den 1990ern bis in die 2000er Jahren wurde das „Diktat für Schlick“ als ein
Werk Wittgensteins angesehen, dann wurde, ab 2011, argumentiert, dass das
Diktat von Waismann diktiert wurde. Der Titel des „Diktats für Schlick“ ist - ineinem gewissen Sinne - ein Konstrukt der Wittgenstein-Forschung, denn z.B.
im Rose Rand Nachlass würde niemand das Stück so bezeichnen.
Als ich in den 90er Jahren über das „Diktat für Schlick“ schrieb, war mir
Schlicks „Stolze-Schrey“, Waismanns und Rose Rands „Gabelsberger“, dasspäter in der BEE veröffentlichte Diktat und G. H. von Wrights Kopie desDiktats unbekannt. Im Jahre 2015, dem 650sten Jubiläum der Universität Wien,
fand an der Universität Wien die Ausstellung Der Wiener Kreis statt; mein
damaliges Arbeitsgebiet war vor allem der Nachlaß Wittgensteins (Limbeck /Stadler, 2015). Die vorliegende Darstellung weist Ähnlichkeiten und
Unterschiede auf, zum von Iven verfassten Kapitel Diktate im Wittgenstein
Handbuch (Iven, 2020) und zur erwähnten Darstellung von Oakes und Pichler(Oakes / Pichler, 2023).
Die Erforschung des „Diktats für Schlick“ steht erst am Anfang. Klare Aussagen
sind erst nach der Einsichtnahme der Schriften am Moritz Schlick Nachlass inPeter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

387

Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

Haarlem (NL), am Friedrich Waismann Nachlass in Oxford (UK) und im Rose
Rand Nachlass in Pittsburgh (USA) möglich. Als ein Grenzfall des WittgensteinNachlasses ist die Erforschung des „Diktats für Schlick“ für die Konzeption
einer Gesamtausgabe Ludwig Wittgenstein in elektronischer Form oder intraditioneller Buchform durchaus wünschenswert.
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für Schlick'“, in Bergen Language and Linguistics Studies, Nr. 3: Bergen, 221-239

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Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“ | Peter Keicher

Oakes, Michael and Pichler, Alois (2023), „The 'Diktat für Schlick': Authorship Research andComputational Stylometry Revisited“, in Friedrich Stadler (Hg.), Wittgenstein and the Vienna
Circle. 100 Years After the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Vienna Circle Society, Springer:
Wien, 247-268
Limbeck-Lilienau, Christoph, Stadler, Friedrich (2015), Der Wiener Kreis. Texte und Bilder zum
Logischen Empirismus, LIT-Verlag: Münster, Wien
Nedo, Michael (2019), Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wiener Ausgabe, Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt
a.M.
Schulte, Joachim (2011), „Waismann as spokesman for Wittgenstein“, in: B.F. McGuinness(Hg.), Friedrich Waismann - Causality and Logical Positivism, Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook,Springer: Wien, 225-241
Soulez, Antonia (1997), Dictées de Wittgenstein à Friedrich Waismann et pour Moritz Schlick, I.
Textes inédits, Années 1930, Presses Universitaires de France, Collection: Philosophie
d'aujourd'hui, PUF: Paris
Soulez, Antonia (1999), Dictées de Wittgenstein à Friedrich Waismann et pour Moritz Schlick, II.
Etudes Critiques, Presses Universitaires de France, Collection: Philosophie d'aujourd'hui, PUF:
Paris
Soulez, Antonia (2015), Ludwig Wittgenstein. Dictées. À Friedrich Waismann et pour Moritz
Schlick. Années 1930, Joseph Vrin, Collection: Analyse et Philosophie, Vrin: Paris
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (Cornell, 1969), Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1914-1951, Division of Rare andManuscript Collections, Cornell University Library: New York
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (BEE, 2000), Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition,
Oxford University Press: Oxford
von Wright, Georg Henrik (1986), Wittgenstein, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M.
Acknowledgement
Für Unterstützung danke ich Herrn Dr. Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, University of Toronto, Kanada.

Peter Keicher, "Bemerkungen zu Waismanns „Diktat für Schlick“". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A
Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman | André Kfouri

Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman
André Kfouri (Lisbon, Portugal)
Abstract
The extent of John Henry Newman’s influence on Wittgenstein’s later works, and particularly
on On Certainty, has been the topic of some debate in recent years. After a brief overview of
the issue of direct influence, I will discuss some deeper affinities between both of boththinkers, going beyond epistemological anti-foundationalism and including a generalorientation towards practice and an interest in the limits of philosophical language. While theepistemological aspect is evident in Newman’s concepts of real and notional assent, I suggestthat the broader metaphilosophical points can be seen in his discussion of their correlate
objects, the concrete and the abstract. Finally, I will discuss how these different issues cometogether in Newman’s conceptions of rationality and the ‘illative sense’, where the mostimmediate contrasts with Wittgenstein become apparent, and suggest some possible paths forcompatibilizing the different views. With this, I hope to show how a deeper study of Newman
in his own terms may be helpful interpreting Wittgenstein, or of interest to Wittgensteinianphilosophers in general.

1. Direct Influence

We may, as a starting point, establish some of the arguments for the direct
influence of Newman’s work on Wittgenstein. The most explicit point ofcontact, and only written mention of Newman by Wittgenstein, is the passage
used as the opening paragraph of On Certainty, alluding to “a curious remark
by H. Newman” (OC 1; for an argument that this is a reference to John Henry
Newman, see Kienzler 2006:118, 135-5). While this may appear slim, Newman
was a recurring topic of discussion between Wittgenstein and his students
between 1936 and 1949, as recorded independently by Drury, Malcolm,
Smythies, Geach and, at the latest and most extensive, Bouwsma (1986:33-7).
From these various notes, we can know for sure that Wittgenstein read
Newman’s philosophical autobiography, the Apologia (Newman 1913) in full;
about his more thorough treatise, the Grammar of Assent (Newman 1903),
there is some disagreement: Anscombe claimed in 1977 that Wittgenstein
hadn’t read it (FitzPatrick 1978:42), while Bouwsma’s notes from 1949 record
him has claiming he did (Bouwsma 1986:34). While I am inclined to think
Wittgenstein must have read it at least in part, it is worth noting that manywell-known points from the Grammar of Assent may also be found in the
Apologia.

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André Kfouri, "Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman | André Kfouri

It scarcely needs saying that there are far more differences than similarities
between the two philosophers. Most clearly, Wittgenstein disagreed with muchof Newman’s thought on religion, and particularly on miracles (Bouwsma
1986:34-5), and “disliked the theological writings of Cardinal Newman, which
he read with great care during his last year at Cambridge” (Malcolm 1984:59).
This ‘great care’, while seemingly puzzling, has been rightly justified with theidea that Wittgenstein would have still found much agreement with Newman,
particularly with the anti-foundationalist points of his epistemology.
Thus, most recent works on Wittgenstein and Newman (see Kienzler 2006;
Pritchard 2015; Venturinha 2019) have focused on these points, andparticularly on Newman’s proposed distinction between real and notionalmodes of assent. Real assent, which Newman equates to belief proper, is held
as certain without the need for traditional epistemic foundations, as happens
with Wittgenstein’s hinge certainties. The mention of Newman in the OC
notebooks, as well as on lectures on this topic in 1946 (PGL 120), and the use ofsimilar examples of certainties (OC 234; Newman 1903:177-8), all cometogether to suggest that Newman’s idea of real assent had a plausible impact
on Wittgenstein’s latest thoughts on epistemology.
What follows will be a proposal for deepening the study of affinities between
these two philosophers beyond these immediate epistemological points. In this,I will also follow suggestions left by Pritchard, who proposes that “viewing OC
through the lens on Newman’s remarks on the structure of reason is a usefulintellectual exercise” (Pritchard 2015:198); and by Kienzler (2005:128ff37), whoremarks that the proximities between the Grammar of Assent and On Certainty
may come through in a comparison between the works as logical, rather thanepistemological. Following these threads leads us into two main areas ofaffinity, corresponding, respectively, to Newman’s categories of concrete andabstract objects: the priority of action and the critique of logic.

2. Action and the Concrete

A first major point connecting Newman to the later Wittgenstein is his
prioritization of action and practice. I will now discuss some expressions of
this priority and its importance in a correct understanding of Newman’s
different concepts of assent. This pragmatic focus is, in fact, the grounds

André Kfouri, "Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman | André Kfouri

proposed by Newman for his anti-foundationalist stance: “Life is for action. If
we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to action: to act you
must assume, and that assumption is faith.” (Newman 1903:95; 1907:295). As
he stresses, even the attempt “to analyze our modes of thought” should still “besubservient to action.” (Newman 1907:295).
Curiously, these passages, and the theme of action as the ‘bottom’ ofjustification (OC 204) were already noted at the earliest stages of discussions
on Wittgenstein and Newman (FitzPatrick 1978:43). While this point has lost
focus on recent contributions, it cannot be overstated. Newman’s favoring ofpractice over theory is not only a general feature of his thought and ajustification for his epistemology, but also a central point in establishing the
aforementioned concept of real assent. Within the context of Newman’s
philosophy, the main distinguishing mark of real assent is not its lack of
traditional epistemic grounding, but rather its taking concrete objects.
Newman defines the relations between real assent, the concrete, and action as
such:
Real Assent then, or Belief, as it may be called, […] does not lead to action;
but the images in which it lives, representing as they do the concrete, havethe power of the concrete upon the affections and passions, and by meansof these indirectly become operative. (Newman 1903:89).
In other words, real assent is notable for its concrete objects, which provide
reasons for acting, to use a term popularized by Anscombe. The same goes not
only for concrete objects in themselves, but for their representations by theimagination, one of the central faculties in Newman’s understanding of themind, which allows one to “believe as if I saw” (Newman 1903:102).
When discussing the concrete, Newman often puts it in contrast with theabstract, which is taken as an object not by real, but by notional assent. While
the relationship between these modes of assent has been discussed by the
recent comparative works on epistemology mentioned above, I suggest thatsuch analysis is incomplete without considering the rather unique definitionsof their respective objects. Though the concrete-abstract pair is a recurring

392

André Kfouri, "Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman | André Kfouri

figure in the history of philosophy, Newman defines them not in ontologicalterms — so that concrete would equal true or particular — but in affective
ones.
Belief, […] being concerned with things concrete, not abstract […] has for
its objects, not only directly what is true, but inclusively what is beautiful,useful, admirable, heroic; objects which kindle devotion, rouse thepassions, and attach the affections; and thus it leads the way to actions ofevery kind […] and is thus again intimately connected with what isindividual and personal. (Newman 1903:90-1).
By including both possible ontological truths and objects of affective appeal ina single category of object of belief, Newman may show a way forward for
discussions on the symbolic dimension of religious belief (see Venturinha
2019:110), as well as have significant implications concerning the epistemic
status of metaphor. His list of objects which may be concrete includes “motives
and actions, character and conduct, art, science, taste, morals,
religion” (Newman 1903:90). To these we may add poetry, which is a recurring
theme in Newman’s works — most notably in is own major poem, The Dreamof Gerontius — and serves not only as a frequent example of concrete thing,
but also as the most reliable way of verbal expression of the concrete. Poetic
language, then, is set in opposition to inferential language, whose limitations
Newman is keen on exposing.

3. The Limits of Inference and the Illative Sense

For this final section, I will introduce Newman’s critique of inference andinferential logic, as well as the resulting conception of human reason; I willthen consider how and why these might be appropriated by Wittgensteinianphilosophy. In a rough analogy to Wittgenstein, Newman does not set out to“draw a limit to thinking” or “to the expression of thoughts” (TLP, Preface), butdoes attempt to set specific limits to logical language. Newman, rather
derisively, introduces his concepts of inference and logic as follows:
Let then our symbols be words: let all thought be arrested and embodied
in words. Let language have a monopoly of thought; and thought go for
only so much as it can show itself to be worth in language. […]André Kfouri, "Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman | André Kfouri

Ratiocination, thus restricted and put into grooves, is what I have called
Inference, and the science, which is its regulating principle, is Logic.
(Newman 1903:263).
We can note, here, not only a generalized dislike for the overextended reach offormalized logic, but also that Newman’s critique of logical language consists
in assigning to it a limited role, with no pretensions of representing the totalityof thought:[Logical inference] proposes to provide both a test and a common measureof reasoning; and I think it will be found partly to succeed and partly to
fail; succeeding so far as words can in fact be found for representing thecountless varieties and subtleties of human thought, failing on account of
the fallacy of the original assumption, that whatever can be thought can beadequately expressed in words. (Newman 1903:264).
In this view, logic is restricted to a fundamentally instrumental role, due to its
capacity for clarity in the transmission of thoughts. As a ‘common measure’ ofreasoning, it is compared, in the Grammar of Assent, to the specialized
notations of mathematics (Newman 1903:265-7) and, in the Apologia, tomaterials for measuring and notation: “For myself, it was not logic that carried
me on; as well might one say that the quicksilver in the barometer changes theweather. It is the concrete being that reasons […] the whole man moves; paper
logic is but the record of it” (Newman 1913:265). As a human pursit, Newman
places it side by side with other “intellectual exercises of the mind” as an“instrumental art” (Newman 1903:358). Though Newman’s thoughts on
language are not fully developed, a further affinity could be drawn with
Wittgenstein’s own instrumental analogies (PI 11-2, 23).
Finally, once inference is given its limited role in Newman’s broader
conception of reason, we may consider what other rational faculty is set incontrast to it. It is here that we find the main apparent ‘weak spot’ ofNewman’s theory from a Wittgensteinian standpoint, namely, the illative
sense. Closely related to his idea of conscience, it is responsible for the “soleand final judgement on the validity of an inference in concrete
matter” (Newman 1903:345). It is a faculty of implicit reason, as Newman
referred to it in earlier works (Newman 1909:251-77), contrasted with

394

André Kfouri, "Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman | André Kfouri

traditionally conceived, explicit reason. It is introduced as a development, andextension, of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis (Newman 1903:354-5): a
suggestion that much of our concrete knowledge about the world, like theaforementioned examples of certainties, are known in a manner analogous topractical knowledge, rather than via grounded demonstration. As such, part ofthe illative sense’s assuring powers are granted by its habitual nature, and thecapacity to be strengthened by exercise.
However, in religious epistemology, the illative sense gains a providentialist
and revelatory dimension, made most clear in the final chapter of theGrammar of Assent, where Newman compares ‘natural’ and ‘revealed’ religion
in an attempt to show the shortcomings of a purely natural approach(Newman 1903:384-447). In the general argument’s structure, thisprovidentialism serves as the keystone which holds an otherwise plainly antifoundationalist epistemology in place as fully compatible with mainline
Catholic thought: without it, there would be no guarantee that the concreteshould coincide with traditional inferences or historically established doctrine.
It is clear that, in contrast to the other concepts discussed so far, the illative
sense has no analogue in Wittgenstein’s works or in modern Wittgensteinian
thought. In fact, in its providential role, it would seem to fall precisely under
the category of ‘disliked theological writings’ mentioned by Malcolm. Facing
this incompatibilty, I will end by considering two possible responses.
The first would be to see the providentialist side of the illative sense asconceptually inseparable from its role as implicit reason. In that case, wemight consider what Newman’s epistemology might look like with no illative
sense at all. This is, in some sense, the approach taken by Wittgensteinian
readings of Newman thus far, where the illative sense is seldom mentioned(see Kienzler 2005:129-30; Boncompagni 2022:959). Rather than complete
collapse, the removal of this keystone may instead leave the Grammar of Assent
standing on its own as an important forerunner of modern antifoundationalist and practice-oriented epistemology.
The alternative — and my closing suggestion — would be the attempt toappropriate the concept of the illative sense without its providentialist
dimension. While this has not yet been explored by Newman or Wittgenstein

André Kfouri, "Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman | André Kfouri

scholars alike, some clear points of interest stand out. Once the providential
issue is set aside, it appears that Newman’s concerns in introducing the illative
sense range over various points of continued philosophical importance in thenexus of relations between theoretical and practical knowledge, epistemic
justification and rationality. An adequate appropriation of this notion may not
only expose the interconnectedness of all these concerns, but also shine a lighton the relations between the everyday certainties that Wittgenstein andNewman had in mind and the broader fields of philosophy of mind and ofaction.
References
Boncompagni, Anna (2022) “Religious Hinges: Some Historical Precursors”, Topoi 41, 955-965.
Bouwsma (1986) Wittgenstein: conversations, 1949-1951, Indianapolis: Hackett.
FitzPatrick, P. J. (1978) “Eine komische Bemerkung H. Newmans”, in: W. Leifeller et al. (eds.),
Wittgenstein and his Impact on Contemporary Thought, Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 42-45.
Kienzler, Wolfgang (2006) “Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman on Certainty”, Grazer
Philosophische Studien 71, 117-38.
Malcolm, Norman (1984) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Second Edition, London: Oxford
University Press.
Newman, John Henry (1913) Apologia Pro Vita Sua, London: Oxford University Press. https://www.newmanreader.org/works/apologia/.
Newman, John Henry (1907) Discussions and Arguments, London: Longmans, Green, andCo. https://www.newmanreader.org/works/arguments/.
Newman, John Henry (1903) Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent, London: Longmans, Green,
and Co. https://www.newmanreader.org/works/grammar/.
Pritchard, Duncan (2015) “Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman”, in:Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas, Berlin: De Gruyter.
Venturinha, Nuno (2019) “Wittgenstein’s Religious Epistemology and Interfaith Dialogue”, in:
G. Andrejč, D. Weiss (eds.), Interpreting Interreligious Relations with Wittgenstein. Leiden: Brill,
97-113.
Acknowledgement
This paper was written as a part of the research project Mary B. Hesse’s “New Epistemology”.
Principles and Legacy (EXPL/FER-FIL/0276/2021), with funding by the Portuguese Foundation for
Science and Technology (FCT).

396

André Kfouri, "Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman | André Kfouri

I would like to thank Professor Nuno Venturinha and my colleagues in the Lisbon WittgensteinGroup for their comments. I owe the critique of the illative sense as providentialist to Michael
Williams’s talk “Moore’s mistake: Wittgenstein, Knowledge and the Limits of Doubt”, presented inthe 3rd Hinge Epistemology Conference (Lisbon, 08/06/2022).

André Kfouri, "Further Affinities between Wittgenstein and Newman". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein in the Public Domain | Michele Lavazza

Wittgenstein in the Public DomainMichele Lavazza (Milan, Italy)
Abstract
In spite of not being particularly “round”, the 70th anniversary of an author’s death isparticularly important. This is because, in many countries around the world, the beginning of
the calendar year following that anniversary marks the expiry of the copyrights on that
author’s works. This, in turn, means that as of 1 January 2022 the rights on Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s writings had expired in almost every jurisdiction. This paper outlines thedefinitions of “copyright” and “public domain” and it briefly presents the current
international landscape of copyright law, in order to clarify why Wittgenstein’s writings now
qualify as out of copyright in most countries. This paper also argues for the importance of the
public domain as an integral part of intellectual property law and as an institution which
protects the public’s common interest in the availability of creative works outside of a strictly
commercial logic. Lastly, this paper introduces the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project, acollaborative endeavour aiming to make Wittgenstein’s writings that were published in bookform during the 20th century available on the internet free of charge and under a free licence.

1. Introduction. There Are Anniversaries of Many Kinds

Anniversaries seem to have the power—so to speak—to bring back the past:
the more remote an event, the more prestigious the anniversary; the moreprestigious the anniversary, the more worth commemorating the occasion; themore worth commemorating the occasion, the more current and relevant theevent.
Anniversaries, in other words, are important because they are opportunities tocelebrate or reminisce. However, some anniversaries are also importantbecause they have a specific relevance to copyright law. In many countries, inparticular, an author’s works enter the public domain at the beginning of thecalendar year following the 70th anniversary of their death. This verypractical, somewhat trivial circumstance has a major import from the editorial
point of view.
In this paper, the expiry of the copyright term on Wittgenstein’s writings will
be discussed, firstly, by introducing the legal framework which makes 70 th
anniversaries so special, and, secondly, by presenting the case study of the
Ludwig Wittgenstein Project, a free-culture initiative aiming to makeWittgenstein’s works easily accessible online.

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Michele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Wittgenstein in the Public Domain | Michele Lavazza

2. The Public Domain and Its Importance

While this is not the time and place to delve into the details of copyright law, it
is a suitable context in which to briefly introduce this subject.
Copyright is a form of intellectual property. For a creative work to be
copyrighted means that its author has a monopoly on its reproduction and on
a set of other prerogatives which they may decide to licence, typically for a fee.
Symmetrically, it is prohibited for the public to copy, resell, modify acopyrighted work without explicit permission from the author or theirauthorised representatives, which permission is, again, usually granted for afee.
Apart from this relatively straightforward definition, copyright is a complex
issue. Its complexity partly lies in the fact that copyright laws vary country bycountry and that multiple national legislations must often be taken into
account at once. This has become more and more problematic since the dawnof the digital age, as national boundaries have become easier to cross from thepoint of view of the exchange of information, but not any less meaningful fromthe point of view of copyright laws and their enforcement (Fitzgerald et al.
2011: 38–40).
Some general principles of copyright, however, are widely shared by mostcountries in the world—including but not limited to those which have been
established by the Berne Convention, an international treaty first signed in
1886 and last updated in 1971.
One of these principles is that a creative work (literary, visual, musical, etc.) isprotected by copyright the moment it is created, without its author having tosubmit it to or register it in any kind of public or private database (Nimmer
2003: 65). Creation is sufficient for copyright to exist, and publication is usually
sufficient proof of authorship for copyright to be enforced. In this respect,
copyright is different from patents and trademarks.
Another principle of general validity is that copyright’s duration is finite.
While the duration of the copyright term varies across legislations, it is always
a certain number of years after the author’s death or after the publication of
the work.

Michele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Wittgenstein in the Public Domain | Michele Lavazza

This means that copyright goes hand-in-hand with its complementary, thepublic domain (Lessig 2004: 119–120). Whereas a copyrighted work has, by
default, a status whereby all rights are reserved, a work in the public domain
has a status whereby no rights are reserved. A public-domain work can becopied and remixed, and the copies and derivative works can be distributedand sold without having to ask for permission or pay a fee.
In most countries, copyright on an author’s works expires either 70 years after
the author’s death (the majority of countries in Europe and the Americas,
Australia) or 50 years after the author’s death (the majority of Asian and
African countries); in a few cases the copyright term is shorter or longer; in yetother cases, and in particular in the US, the duration of the copyright term is
not tied exclusively to the date of the author’s death, but also to other factorsthat may include the publication date and whether or not certain formalities
were respected when the work was first published.
It should also be noted that works may be ineligible for copyright protection,for example because they fail to meet the threshold of originality; that they
may enter the public domain upon creation, for example in the case of works
that are created as part of a US government officer’s or employee’s official
duties; and that they may be released in the public domain in any moment by
the author or by the author’s heirs, who can waive their rights if they wish to
do so.
The public domain ought to be considered as important a feature ofintellectual property laws as copyright. The purpose of intellectual property is
usually thought of as being to balance the interest of authors and the interestof the public (Lessig 2001: 1072–1073). Copyright and the public domain aresupposed to work together in order for those two interests to essentiallycoincide: copyright ensures that the author, through the publisher (or gallery,or label, etc.), has at least a chance to earn a living thanks to their creative
labour; this is also in the interest of the public insofar as a successful creator
will likely be able to continue giving their audience what the audience wantsfrom them; once the author dies and, thus, no longer needs an income, theexpiry of copyright grants the public full ownership of a piece of culture whichbecomes available for them to enjoy and to build upon.

400

Michele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Wittgenstein in the Public Domain | Michele Lavazza

Within this conceptual and ethical framework, it is somewhat questionable
that a work should remain copyrighted after the author’s death, when it only
benefits their descendants or their appointed successors (Boyle 2008: 15).
While some argue that, financial matters aside, it is a good thing for the heirs
to remain in control of the editorial choices that may affect a literary work’s
distribution as opposed as the public being able to dispose of the works freely
as soon as the author passes on, there is no evidence, and not much of anargument, to prove, for example, that the quality of the editions of a book areconsistently or significantly worse when they are made without the mandateof the writer’s heirs; some even point out that “[c]ensorious heirs orpurchasers of the copyright might prevent the reprinting of a great work
because they disagreed with its morals” (Boyle 2008: 25). Additionally, thesheer duration of the copyright term seems to disproportionately favour theheirs’ interest at the expense of the public’s—so much so that all media that
become unavailable while still copyrighted (for example, books that go out of
print) are at risk of being lost and forgotten, never to actually enter the publicdomain (Lessig 2004: 299).
The public domain is subject to both erosion and infringement. I call “publicdomain erosion” the trend whereby copyright terms worldwide haveconsistently become longer over the last century (Nimmer 2003: 88); I call“public domain infringement” the phenomenon whereby former copyrightowners attempt to discourage the free reuse of public domain works byleveraging uncertainties in the interpretation of the relevant laws, threatening
court actions, or simply adding the copyright symbol where it does not belong.
Faced with this situation, those who believe that culture should be treated as acommon good rather than a commodity sometimes attempt to “enforce” thepublic domain. This means ensuring that, when copyright on a work expires,that work is not only theoretically free to use, but also practically and easily
accessible on the internet.
In the context of a discussion on the public domain and its importance for freeculture, it is necessary to briefly introduce the Creative Commons licences—aninnovative tool for sharing texts, pictures, music, and other types of creative
works which became available in the early 2000s, right when sharing suchmedia on the internet became viable from the technological point of view

Michele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Wittgenstein in the Public Domain | Michele Lavazza(Aliprandi 2011: ch. 1). The Creative Commons organisation devised a set of six
licences which fill the gap between traditional copyright (all rights reserved)
and the public domain (no rights reserved) by affording creators several
formulas where some rights can be reserved while relinquishing others.
Thanks to the Creative Commons licences, whoever creates a work andpublishes it may decide to grant everyone permission to reuse it for free, andwithout having to ask for an ad-hoc authorisation, while still requiring thatsome conditions be respected.

3. Wittgenstein in the Public Domain

Ludwig Wittgenstein died in 1951. 29 April 2021 was the 70th anniversary of
his death, and on 1 January 2022 his works entered the public domain in thosecountries where the copyright term is 70 years post mortem auctoris (p.m.a.).
However, the fact that Wittgenstein’s works had entered the public domain in
those countries where the copyright term is 70 years p.m.a. did not mean, inand of itself, that they could all be lawfully published on the internet. This isbecause anything that is available on the internet is effectively available
worldwide, regardless of national boundaries, but works that are out of
copyright according to a country’s laws may not be according to another’s.
Even though the international copyright system has not been updated to meetthe challenges of the digital age, and we therefore lack clear obligations in thecontext of online publishing, it is generally considered a best practice to only
release web editions of works that are in the public domain both in theircountry of origin (as defined by the Berne Convention) and in the country
where the website is based (which depends on the location of the servers, on
the registration of the domain, and potentially on other factors).
A work’s country of origin is, in most cases, the location where it was firstpublished. As far as Wittgenstein is concerned, this means Germany (for works
such as the TLP and the NB), the UK (for works such as the PI and the BBB), theUS (for works such as the NL and the LE), the Netherlands (for the RF) andAustria (for the PDE) (Pichler, Biggs and Szeltner 2011). According to the lawsof some of these countries, the 70 years p.m.a. term having expired may not bea sufficient condition for an author’s works to be in the public domain. In the402Michele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Wittgenstein in the Public Domain | Michele Lavazza

UK, for example, literary works created before 1 August 1989 are still
copyrighted even if the author has been dead for more than 70 years in thefollowing cases: if the work was published before 1 August 1989 and theauthor died more than 20 years before publication (in which case copyright
expires 50 years after publication); if the work was unpublished as of 1 August
1989 and the author died before 1 January 1969 (in which case copyright
expires on 31 December 2039) (National Archives 2022: 15).
A thorough case-by-case analysis, however, which has taken all of this into
account along with several more factors which it is not appropriate to list here,
has led to the conclusion that a wide selection of Wittgenstein’s work was
indeed out of copyright in their country of origin as of 1 January 2022 (Lavazza2023).

4. The Ludwig Wittgenstein Project

Often, when an author’s works enter the public domain, many new editions
and translations appear, because publishers no longer have to ask forpermission from the copyright holders, nor do they have to pay royalties tothem.
Similarly, the original texts tend to become available online, where they arelawfully uploaded by individuals who view the internet as a universal library
where knowledge and culture should be freely accessible to all. Among theplatforms that host public-domain content are the Wikimedia projects(Wikimedia Commons for scans, Wikisource for transcriptions), the Project
Gutenberg, the Internet Archive, and many others.
Some of Wittgenstein’s texts were already available on these sites: the TLP, forexample, which entered the public domain in the US 95 years after its
publication, was available on American websites both in the original language
and in Ramsey’s translation.
Additionally, much of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass had been available since the2010s on the websites of the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen,both as high-resolution facsimiles and as interactive renders of XML-TEI
transcriptions. This was made possible by the generosity of the copyrightMichele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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holders of Wittgenstein’s writings, who agreed to let the WAB make themaccessible online (Pichler 2019: 139–146).
Wittgenstein’s “works”—those among his writings that were collected, edited
and published posthumously as books by his literary executors—were boundto gradually become available online as isolated enthusiasts uploaded this orthat PDF to this or that website. In 2020, the author of this paper had the idea
to create a dedicated website where the effort to make Wittgenstein’s works
available online could be made into a coordinated and systematic one. This is
how the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project was started.
The project is inspired by the values of the free-culture movement. According
to its “mission statement”, as listed on the site’s home page, the LWP is “amultilingual website that aims to make Wittgenstein's works available free ofcharge and with a free licence”.
The multilingual nature of the project was at its very core from the outset.
Wittgenstein’s own originals are written partly in German, partly in English.
Because Ramsey died at a very young age, and before Wittgenstein himself, histranslation of the TLP would enter the public domain at the same time as theoriginal German. More translations would enter the public domain after the
project’s launch, and some might even be released under a free licence by
their authors. For all these reasons, it made sense for the project to have aninternational, multilingual scope.
Creating and running an ad-hoc website promised multiple advantages.
Compared to the option of using a platform such as the Internet Archive, itmeant not merely uploading PDF files, but publishing true digital editions as
HTML pages; this, in turn, implies much better searchability and accessibility,
mobile responsiveness, and the user’s ability to build upon the text and remix
it easily. Compared to the option of using a platform such as Wikisource, itmeant the possibility to also include previously unpublished translations.
Additionally, whereas both the Internet Archive and Wikisource are based in
the US, the new website—given both the nationality and the domicile of thewebsite’s founder—would be based in Italy, where the copyright term is 70
years p.m.a.

404

Michele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
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Wittgenstein in the Public Domain | Michele Lavazza

The LWP’s website went online in December 2020. In 2021, the available texts
were prepared for publication; a call for volunteers was opened; an outreacheffort was started in order to raise awareness about the project and startcooperations, or at least friendly relationships, with some of the establishedinstitutions in the Wittgensteinian community, such as the WAB, Trinity
College at the University of Cambridge, the British Wittgenstein Society, theInternationale Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, the Wittgenstein Initiative.
On 1 January 2022, the now-public-domain texts and the freely licenced
translations were published on the website. In the following months, traffic
increased steadily and many volunteers joined the project; thanks to theirwork, new translations were published, new features were added to thewebsite, and a conference was organised in Milan in collaboration with the
ILWG.
Thanks to a productive exchange with the BWS, a quality policy wasestablished in summer 2022.
Between 2021 and early 2023, the LWP applied for a few grants frominstitutions such as the Wikimedia Italia NGO and the University of Milan, andit ran a successful crowdfunding campaign. Thanks to the money thus raised,
several original translations were made and published.
Compared to the WAB’s websites, which provide invaluable resources forresearchers and scholars by giving them access to the Nachlass, the LWP aims
to provide less specialised readers with user-friendly Leseausgaben of
Wittgenstein’s writings that were published as books during the 20th century.
Its target audience is broader, as it extends to students and philosophy
enthusiasts in general.
Compared to similar websites aiming to make a philosopher’s works available
on the internet, a somewhat innovative trait of the LWP is its focus ontranslations. Within the legal framework which was outlined in the previous
section, translations remain copyrighted for decades after the translator’s
death, regardless of the copyright status of the source. This tends to make it
difficult to access a public-domain work in languages other than the one inwhich it was written. The LWP’s model of publishing new translations underfree Creative Commons licences was inspired by the so-called “crowdfunding

Michele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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for Open Access” model (Bulock 2018: 138–141) in the field of academic
publishing: instead of paying a journal’s yearly subscription fee, universities
and libraries are given the opportunity to pledge a sum which is then used torelease articles as Open Access; then, all will be able to access them freely. The
LWP’s translations (except for those that are made entirely on a voluntarybasis) are born in a similar way: instead of buying the book, institutions andindividuals are given the opportunity to award a grant or make a donation
which is then used to pay a translator and release their work under a freelicence; then, again, all will be able to access the work freely.
The first period of the LWP’s life has been exciting and successful, and eachmeeting with members of the Wittgensteinian community has given us achance to hear valuable insights, fruitful suggestions, and constructive
feedback. We look forward to continuing the work and the conversation.

References
Aliprandi, Simone (2011) Creative Commons: A User Guide, Milano: Ledizioni.
Boyle, James (2008) The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind, New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Bulock, Chris (2018) “Crowdfunding for Open Access”, Serials Review 44 (2), 138–141.
Fitzgerald, Brian F.; Shi, Sampsung Xiaoxiang; Foong, Cheryl; Pappalardo, Kylie M. (2011)“Country of Origin and Internet Publication: Applying the Berne Convention in the Digital
Age”, NIALS Journal of Intellectual Property (NJIP) 1, 38–73.
Lavazza, Michele (2023, to be published) “The Copyright Status of Wittgenstein’s Works”,
Wittgenstein-Studien 14 (1).
Lessig, Lawrence (2001) “Copyright's First Amendment”, UCLA Law Review 48, 1057–1073.
Lessig, Lawrence (2004) Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock
Down Culture and Control Creativity, New York: The Penguin Press.
National Archives, The (2022), Copyright and Related Rights.
Nimmer, David (2003) Copyright: Sacred Text, Technology, and the DMCA, Alphen aan den Rijn:
Kluwer Law International B.V.

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Michele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Wittgenstein in the Public Domain | Michele Lavazza

Pichler, Alois; Biggs, Michael A. R.; Szeltner, Sarah Anna (2011, updated 2019) “Bibliographie
Der Deutsch- Und Englischsprachigen Wittgenstein-Ausgaben”, Wittgenstein-Studien 2 (1), 249–
286.
Pichler, Alois (2019) “A Brief Update on Editions Offered by the Wittgenstein Archives at the
University of Bergen and Licences for Their Use (as of June 2018)”, Wittgenstein-Studien 10 (1),
139–146.

Michele Lavazza, "Wittgenstein in the Public Domain". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax | Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau

Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax
Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau (Graz, Austria)
Abstract
While the Tractatus was intensely discussed in the Vienna Circle in the second half of the
1920s, the members of the Circle also rapidly noticed Wittgenstein’s revision of central claimsof his book. We show that it was especially the Tractarian claim of the independence ofelementary propositions and the color exclusion problem, which led the members of theCircle to the view that a new logical syntax was necessary, a syntax going beyond the Tractatus. This led within the Circle to a discussion about the nature and justification of a logical syntax,
especially between Carnap and Waismann. Retracing this discussion, I claim that in thisdebate Wittgenstein and Waismann first opted for a logical pluralism, while Carnap only later
adopted a similar view, famously expressed in his principle of tolerance.

Famously, the Vienna Circle discussed the Tractatus in 1925-27. But while theCircle tried to understand Wittgenstein’s work, the latter already was revising
central claims made of his book, as became apparent in his conversations withRamsey and somewhat later with Waismann. One such central claim wasabout the independence of elementary propositions. The discussions of thecolor exclusion problem showed that this original Tractarian claim was highly
problematic. Once Wittgenstein abandoned his independence claim, this was
rapidly known within the Circle. This revision also led to the view, shared by
Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap, that a new logical syntax was needed, i.
e. a syntax different from the one in the Tractatus. Besides the necessity of a
new logical syntax, a second problem was raised: how can a syntax be justified
and what should guide us in the choice of a syntax. I claim that Wittgensteinand Waismann agreed that a syntax can be freely chosen, before Carnap wasconvinced of such a solution. I also claim that this discussion shaped Carnap’s
later adoption of his principle of tolerance.

1. The Color Exclusion Problem

The Tractatus claimed famously that every proposition must be analyzable
into elementary propositions and that elementary propositions are
independent from one another. This meant that from one elementary
proposition we cannot infer or exclude another elementary proposition: “thelogical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor
a contradiction” (TLP 6.3751)

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Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, "Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax | Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau

In relation to this independence claim, Wittgenstein discussed the problem
that two colors cannot be attributed to the same place in the visual field (thecolor exclusion problem). This implied that the attribution of a color to a placein the visual field cannot be an elementary proposition but must be complex.
As the attribution of red to a place at a time excludes the attribution of green,
the proposition attributing red cannot be an elementary proposition. Ramsey
had criticized this claim of the independence of elementary propositions asvery implausible (Ramsey 1923: 473). In “Some Remarks on LogicalForm” (1929: 168–69) and in his conversations with Waismann, Wittgenstein
finally abandoned the independence claim:
I thought that all inference was based on tautological form. At that time I
had not yet seen that an inference can also have the form: This man is 2mtall, therefore he is not 3m tall. This is connected with the fact that I
believed that elementary propositions must be independent of one
another, that you could not infer the non-existence of one state of affairs
from the existence of another. (McGuinness 1984: 64)
Wittgenstein also thought that the claim of the independence of elementary
propositions was linked to a basic mistake, namely to the belief that thesyntactic rules defining the logical constants were independent of “the inner
structure of the propositions” to which they were applied (McGuinness 1984:
74). Indeed, a truth-function of two elementary propositions (p, q) gives thetruth value for all possible distributions of truth values over these elementary
propositions. The truth values of the elementary propositions indicates thepossibility that the fact represented by the proposition obtains or does not
obtain, and whether a certain fact does obtain or not is independent of any
other. But now it appeared that one fact (p: X is 1 m) excluded another fact (q:X is 2 m), although proposition p ˄ q was not a contradiction. The conjunction
seems to indicate a truth-possibility which turns out to be impossible (namely
p: true and q: true). This truth-possibility forms, as Wittgenstein says, “animpossible combination” (Wittgenstein 1929: 170). Wittgenstein concluded that
it is “a deficiency of our notation that it does not prevent the formation of suchnon-sensical constructions and a perfect notation will have to exclude such
structures by definite rules of syntax” (Wittgenstein 1929: 170–71).

Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, "Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The consequence of this problem was that the logical syntax of the Tractatus
was defective in that it allowed constructions which seemed to represent
logical possibilities which in fact were not given, which in reality were
impossible. But Wittgenstein interpreted this impossibility as a “logicalimpossibility”. While expressing a physical or a metaphysical impossibility still
makes sense, logical impossibilities lead to non-sense. The fact that
Wittgenstein interpreted all possibility (and impossibility) as logical was due tohis conception of the modalities, especially his view that all modalities were
logical. Soames calls this view „the tractarian collapse of metaphysical,
epistemic, and logical modalities into one another” (2018: 12). Given the
exclusion problem and this Wittgensteinian conception of modalities, animproved logical syntax was needed which excluded logical impossibilities, i.
e. the mentioned non-sensical cases. The color exclusion problem, thedependence of elementary propositions and its consequences were repeatedly
discussed in the Vienna Circle (Stadler 2015: 81–83). Carnap was well aware of
the problem and he took extensive notes on Wittgenstein’s 1929 paper, which
had presented the problem and the need for a new syntax going beyond theTractarian conception (Carnap Papers, Pittsburgh: RC 102-78-05).

2. A New Logical Syntax

Given that the “logical syntax” of the Tractatus was insufficient, a new aim
arose in the discussions in the Vienna Circle, namely to develop a new andimproved logical syntax. Especially Carnap and Waismann pursued this aim.
Between 1929 and 1931, Carnap and Waismann repeatedly discussed the form
such a logical syntax could take. Then, just before leaving Vienna for Prague(1931), Carnap presented an outline of his own conception of a logical syntax
in the Vienna Circle (Stadler 2015: 107–23).
Several questions were of focal importance in the discussions of a new logicalsyntax, since at least 1929: Is there only one syntax or are there several
possible logical syntaxes? If several different syntaxes can be constructed,
what could justify the choice of one syntax over another? Is it necessary tohave a meta-language in order to formulate a logical syntax?
In his 1929 paper, Wittgenstein thought that the syntax should reflect thestructure of the phenomena. For example, the syntax of our color terms should

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Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, "Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax | Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau

reflect the structure of color space. Given a certain structure of the color space,
we would lay down the syntactic rules which exclude the attribution of “red”
and “green” to the same spatio-temporal place, while “red” and “dark” would
not be mutually exclusive. Wittgenstein gave the color octahedron as apossible structure of color space (see fig. 1). Based on that phenomenal color
structure, we would fix the syntactic rules of our statements about color.

Fig 1. The octahedron of colors, as given in Philosophical Remarks (PR: § 221).
The octahedron gives a “conspicuous representation” (or “a bird’s eye view”)
of the syntactic rules of color terms. It shows that, given these rules, the terms“green” and “red” are mutually exclusive while we can speak of a “dark” and“red” spatio-temporal region or a “light” and “red” spatio-temporal region.
Carnap seemed also to agree with the conception that the syntactic rules
should reflect the structure of experience and of the phenomena: when Rose
Rand collected notes about the respective positions of the different members of
the Vienna Circle about the Tractatus, she reported Carnap’s position as
follows:
The syntax depends on the form of experience. […] A state of affairs,
which consists of elements, must be designated by a language with thesame numbers of degrees of freedom – e. g. a system of colors must be

Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, "Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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designated by a system of color signs, that has the same multiplicity as thecolor space. (Stadler 2015: 124–25)
Somewhere between 1929 and 1931, Carnap, like Wittgenstein, thought thatthe syntax depended upon the structure of experience.
Still, the status of the syntactic rules was not clear. Repeatedly the question
whether empirical facts can justify syntactic rules or whether they were
justified by something else was raised. Schlick and Waismann had discussed
the question with Wittgenstein in 1930. Several options were discussed: either
the syntactic rules were justified by experience, for example the structure ofcolor space as described by psychology, or the rules depended on the“meaning” (“Sinn”) of the terms, e. g. the meaning of “red” implied that it could
not be attributed to a region which had already another color (e. g. green), or,as a further option, the syntactic rules were justified by synthetic apriori
truths such as the a priori truth that red excludes green, an option attributedby Schlick to Husserl (McGuinness 1984: 76–79, see also Stadler 2015: 83). Afterseveral hesitations, Wittgenstein rejected the empirical option. Syntactic rules
are not justified by certain empirical and psychological facts about thestructure of the phenomena:
An octahedron with the pure colours at the corner-points e. g. provides arough representation of colour-space, and this is a grammaticalrepresentation, not a psychological one. On the other hand, to say that insuch and such circumstances you can see a red after-image (say) is amatter of psychology. (This may, or may not, be the case – the other is apriori; we can establish the one by experiment but not the other.) Using
the octahedron as a representation gives us a bird's-eye view of thegrammatical rules. (PR: § 1, written in 1930-31)
Syntactic rules were supposed to delimit the meaningful (sense) from themeaningless (nonsense), and what was meaningfully expressible could not belimited by the empirically given facts, for example an empirically given
structure of the color space, as other structures of the color space weremeaningfully thinkable. The octahedron represented therefore a certain

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Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, "Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax | Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau

choice of grammatical rules which delimited what was meaningfully
expressible in our use of color terms. But why choose these grammatical rules
and not others?
If there is no empirical justification for the syntax, then how can the choice of asyntax be justified? Neither Wittgenstein, nor the other members of the Circle
were attracted to a Husserlian synthetic apriori (see McGuinness 1984: 67–68
and Stadler 2015: 83). Wittgenstein and Waismann opted finally for thesolution that there is no theoretical justification for the choice of syntactic
rules. Wittgenstein expressed this clearly in his conversations with Waismann:
The essential thing is that syntax cannot be justified by means of language.
When I am painting a portrait of you and I paint a black moustache, then I
can answer to your question as to why I am doing it: Have a look! Thereyou see a black moustache. But if you ask me why I use a syntax, I cannot
point at anything as a justification. You cannot give reasons for syntax.
Hence it is arbitrary. Detached from its applications and considered byitself it is a game, just like chess. (McGuinness 1984: 104–5)
This view of syntactic rules is connected to Wittgenstein’s conception of acalculus. A calculus is defined by a series of rules that specify how to operatewith (mathematical or other) symbols. A calculus does not say anything, it isjust a set of rules. Syntactic rules are conceived in the same way. They specify
an arbitrary calculus, which may then be more or less convenient in its
application (McGuinness 1984: 126–8, 170). The calculus defined by thesyntactic rules may for example be more or less convenient in its application
to our chromatic experiences.

3. Waismann and Carnap on Tolerance

Waismann adopted this same conception of syntactic rules and discussed itwith Carnap (and others) in the Vienna Circle. In a discussion in the Circle on
February 12, 1931, in presence of Carnap, Waismann said:
The syntax cannot be justified by means of language. The rules of syntax
cannot be gained from experience or by derivation. The rules of syntax are
conventions [Festsetzungen]. A rule of syntax can be postulated,

Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, "Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax | Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau

demanded, fixed, like the axioms of mathematics. If one wanted toconstruct a language in the purely formal sense, then one could say thatsyntax is a game. The game becomes serious as soon as it is applied.
(Waismann as reported in Stadler 2015: 82–83)
From the notes on the discussion in this session of the Vienna Circle, it is notclear what Carnap thought of such a pluralistic and conventionalist conceptionof logical syntax. But given the standard interpretation about the origin of his
principle of tolerance, Carnap did not accept the idea of different
conventionally chosen syntaxes before the end 1932 (almost two years after
the mentioned discussion). The first signs of Carnap’s pluralistic conception oflogical syntax appear somewhere between September and November 1932,
when Carnap writes “On Protocol-Sentences” (Carus/Awodey 2009: 97). Carnap
explicitly formulated the idea in his “Principle of Tolerance” (1934: § 17).
Another detailed study would be needed in order to investigate why he did not
accept the idea of logical pluralism earlier or why he may have resisted theidea until then. But the idea of logical pluralism was repeatedly discussed by
Wittgenstein and by members of the Vienna Circle before Carnap famously
adopted for that view.
References
Awodey, Steve and Carus, André (2009) “From Wittgenstein’s Prison to the Boundless Ocean:
Carnap’s Dream of Logical Syntax”, in: Pierre Wagner (ed.) Carnap’s Logical Syntax ofLanguage, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 79–106.
Carnap, Rudolf (1932/33) “Über Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis, vol. 3, 215–228.
Carnap, Rudolf (1934) Die logische Syntax der Sprache, Vienna: Julius Springer.
McGuinness, Brian (ed.) (1984), Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
Trans. McGuinness (ed.) Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. Conversations recorded by
Waismann, Blackwell, 1979.
Ramsey, Frank (1923) “Critical notice of L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”,
Mind 32, 465–78.
Stadler, Friedrich (2015) The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of
Logical Empiricism, Cham: Springer.
Soames, Scott (2018) The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy. A New Vision, Princeton University
Press.

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Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, "Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax | Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau

Wittgenstein,

Ludwig(1922),

Tractatus

Logico-Philosophicus,

London:

Kegan

Paul,

Trench, Trubner & Co.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1929) “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 9, p. 162–171.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1984) Philosophical Remarks [PR], ed. by Rush Rhees, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Acknowledgement
Research for this paper is funded by the FWF within the research project “Naturalizing
Meaning” (FWF: J 4502-G).

Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, "Wittgenstein, Waismann and Carnap on the Nature of Logical Syntax". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus | Montgomery Link

Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus
Montgomery Link (Boston, Mass., USA)
Abstract
There is an old dispute between two accounts of the nature of philosophical inquiry. Some
think of it as a single method, while others consider it to involve a plurality of methods. On theformer view, the philosophical system provides the arena. In choosing one method, one
rejects the alternatives. On the latter view, methods are tools of the trade. Philosophy makes
skillful use of all of them. The subject of this talk is the methodology of the Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus. This topic was among the myriad topics Hao Wang discussed with Kurt Gödel.
The influence of it on them is greater than is commonly appreciated. Their conversation
indicates substantial agreement about the form of inquiry taken in the Tractatus, the only
significant dispute being over a matter of degree. That is to say, on their view of inquiry theformal system is what the method comes to be, in which case there is a single method ofphilosophical inquiry in the Tractatus. The Tractatus provides a logical space through aminimalistic construction.

Kurt Gödel discussed the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP 1921, TLP 1922,
TLP 1961) with Hao Wang in 1972, mainly in April, but then in October andagain in November (Wang 1996: 178–180). There was further but more limited
discussion in 1975. Did it influence them? Surprisingly, yes, in several ways,
but one in particular. Instead of cataloguing all the varieties of influence, andall the aspects of the Tractatus they consider, this talk focuses on broader,systemic issues and a basic theoretical philosophical system. The influence isrevealed by taking the bare structure of the Tractatus and augmenting it. Thisidea is not a new one herein, for it was theirs. Wang seems to have introduced
the idea to Gödel. Wang and Gödel each acknowledged that his own world
system could be seen as an augmented version of the Tractarian world systembut to different degrees. The augmentation is evidence of an influence of theTractatus on their conceptions of philosophical inquiry.
Presumably, there were other conversations about the Tractatus. Gödel knewof Wang's brief discussions of Wittgenstein's "two philosophies" (Wang 1974:
13–14). Gödel was closely familiar with Carnap's interpretation of theTractatus, with which he disagreed. Later in life, Wang had the idea that one
could construct a nice philosophical system by beginning with the Tractatus,
its world and objects, and then building that out. He thought one could give arough sketch, a sort of minimal based account, of Gödel's philosophical system,by building out from the Tractarian backbone. Gödel did not seem to disagree

416

Montgomery Link, "Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus | Montgomery Link

with Wang on this point. Nothing he says suggests he did not think thedescription apt, if minimalistic. Indeed, while their discussions are congenial,
they are very different philosophers, but when it comes to Wittgenstein's
Tractatus, they are two voices singing the same tune but each in his own key.
Of course, there were many conversations on many topics both in person andlater more increasingly by telephone. There was also a correspondence
beginning in 1967, in three phases (Gödel 2003: 380). What Wang reports Gödel
to have said is authoritative. Gödel himself read carefully what Wang wrote.
He discussed and adjusted fine details with Wang. Wang himself is anauthority on Wittgenstein, having published several important accounts. He is
the author of the anthropomorphic view of the later Wittgenstein (Wang 1963:
39–41), a view he later broadened. Putting chronologically first things first,
however, Gödel studied the Tractatus during his school days in Vienna (Wang1987: 76–77). It is the first thing people ask when they hear about this topic.
The Vienna Circle read the Tractatus, and Kurt Gödel quietly participated inthat group in those days.
What is the world in the Tractatus with which Gödel and Wang begin? It is abarebones first order logical system with formalized operations for doingarithmetic (Rogers and Wehmeier 2012; Link 2007: 131). How did Wang comeup with the augmentation idea? He had been working on the thought of thelater Wittgenstein when he did his work on a formal game of dominoes which
led to important results on the decision procedure for first order logic. He
realized that while Wittgenstein had used language games largely in a negative
way to undercut other philosophies, a language game is also a model of reality.
Wang extended the idea of a language game to a formal game and then to thecomputable. He was less concerned with metaphysical reality than withmathematical and computational reality (Wang 1974: 1–5). He came to see his
own philosophy as the sum of Wittgenstein's philosophical system, which hethought of as an anthropological account, extended by the resources ofcomputability. Since the interpretation of the later Wittgenstein became
increasingly under debate, a more secure base for an augmented philosophy
comes from the Tractatus than from the Remarks on the Foundations ofMathematics (RFM 1956). The augmentation of Wittgenstein's philosophy canbe understood as preceding in two stages. The first augmentation is to add

Montgomery Link, "Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus | Montgomery Link

computers to the Tractarian system. The result of this addition is, roughly,
Wang's philosophy. The second augmentation is a bit more complex, involving
concepts and Leibnizian elements, as well as principles that govern theiroperation. The result is something like a minimalistic account of Gödel'sphilosophy.
Gödel's "grand project," according to Wang, is an "enrichment" of the world of
the Tractatus:
if we enrich the theory of the world in Wittgenstein's Tractatus by
distinguishing between concepts and objects (the monads and all sets ofobjects), taking perception and appetition as the primitive faculties of themonads, and using as axioms some of the Leibnizian principles and someof the rudimentary laws governing the operations of perception andappetition, we may hope to arrive at a reasonable theory which agrees
with our crude intuitions [see (Link 2012: 171)] and to see, in particular,that the true propositions of logic in Gödel's sense are all true in every
possible world according to such a theory. ... it seems to me possible tointerpret Gödel's project in this apparently weakened sense. (Wang 1996:
10; cf. Wang 1987: 195)
In addition to adding concepts, one adds monads (Leibniz 1956: 1044) inamong the objects. Monads are basic metaphysical constituents. They "have nowindows," which means they are not causally interactive but admit degrees ofperception. They change states using rudimentary laws (Leibniz 1956: 1045-8).
The two great principles that would seem to be required are the Principle ofSufficient Reason and the Principle of Contradiction, thereby providing for the
Identity of Indiscernibles (Leibniz 1956: 1049).
There is a debate about whether or not there are kinds of Tractarian objects
that are not first order (Link 2016: 143), but Gödel thinks unlikely: "Is theTractatus compatible with basic stuff of the conceptual sort? Probably not. If
so, we must take it as a matter of counter-proof of the system" (Wang 1996:
178). Wang acknowledges that Wittgenstein in 1930 or 1931 said that theobjects include particulars and universals, then remarks that "it is not so easy
to accommodate the universals in his system."

418

Montgomery Link, "Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus | Montgomery Link

The word 'logical' in the first half of the Tractatus "has to do with 'logical space'and logical possibilities. It prepares the ground for dealing with thepropositions of logic (6.1). But our interest here is only to bring out W's
sweeping elimination of thought by the move to language" (Wang 1985: 77).
Further, amore direct connection is with the central position of language occupied in
W's philosophy. He puts in the center of philosophy the relation between
thought and the world or, more specifically, the limit of thought, andtransforms it into one about language and the world, taking logic as the
key to the answer. (Wang 1985: 77)
The Tractatus has a dual purpose, Gödel observed in January 1972:
The Tractatus gives a well-rounded picture. The first philosophy is asystem, the second a method. It is hard to speak of the second philosophy.
The only thing in common is the rejection of metaphysics. In a stronger
sense Wittgenstein refuted metaphysics. The main points are therefutation of metaphysics and the centrality of language. (Wang 1996: 178)
Gödel's project also separates into two independent parts, the monadologicaland the methodological. Many at this conference will agree with Wang's
interest in the second part and his lack of interest in the first. He says thatwhile the monadology is "beyond my informed concerns," the methodologicalpart makes a "stimulating contribution." He names Gödel's "extended
discussions of logic and set theory, minds and machines, and Platonism inmathematics." For Wang, what is essentially added to Wittgenstein's logicalstructure is concepts, concepts that are rendered as sets and studied in thattheory. The inclusion of the reality of these concepts marks the intrusion ofconceptual platonism into Wittgenstein's world.
With that separation in place, three methodological degrees are evident. These
are degrees of philosophical systems to compare. The first degree is a barebones first order system. The second degree adds computability to that firstorder system. The third degree includes conceptual platonism and a robust
metaphysics. Wang positioned his system between the other two as sharing

Montgomery Link, "Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus | Montgomery Link

some of the benefits of both, adding the additional benefit of the shared space,
while extricating it from some of the more extreme and unwelcome features ofthe first and third.
Let us now consider and contrast three different philosophical systems,
considering comparative strengths and weaknesses.
T1 is the base Tractarian first order theory; T2 is T1 plus computability; T3 is
T2 plus second order concepts and the transfinite. Wang claimed that T3 was aminimalistic version of Gödel's conceptual platonism, and Gödel did not denyit. Obviously, T2 is an appealing minimalistic approach to philosophy that does
not get hung up as much as T1 on what can be said and what cannot while
avoiding the tendency of T3 to get hung up in saying too much and thereby
allowing in all sorts of paradoxical talk. But T3 opens vistas not available toT2, while T1 satisfies the craving for simplicity. T1 while simple is still a single
system. Wittgenstein rejects this simple system in his later writings and turns
instead to base grammar, system T0. Systems of type T0 are grammar systems
with basic recursions, systems of type T1 are first order logic systems, systemsof type T2 are computational systems, systems of type T3 are transfinite
systems of set theory. T3 does not fit with an investigation of ordinary
language. T1 is not adequate for computability. Wang thought thejuxtaposition of the T's would lead people to opt for T2. This is histriangulation argument. In this form of inquiry, the method is supreme.
Wang comes to think of his philosophy of substantial factualism as covering awide spectrum from the ordinary to the formal. He sees the ordinary and theformal as limit points for philosophy. These are polar extremes that cannot
both be incorporated into a single framework. They are in conflict. Yet the two
extremes, Wang thinks, can be made coordinate in his system by ridding eachof some of its excesses. For example, the strictly anthropological finitism
associated with Wittgenstein Wang later tempers and broadens. On Wang's
developed view, Wittgenstein's finitism becomes more like the finitism often
associated with primitive recursive arithmetic (Link 2009: 227).
Wang uses a sort of reflective equilibrium to marry disparate elements. His
systemic approach internalizes the extremes. They are unified by experience,
one side being everyday experience and the other being "reflections on our

420

Montgomery Link, "Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus | Montgomery Link

experience in specialized pursuits" (Wang 1991: 267). For Wang everyday
experience is more fundamental but does not encompass all experience:
In my opinion, each of them [Wittgenstein and Gödel] is exceptionallyeffective in reflecting on the part of experience they choose to attend to,yet there is a natural tendency to generalize and assume that the fruits of
their reflections are also valid beyond the selected part of experience. In
particular, even though everyday experience is more fundamental, thespecialized experience with (say) mathematics serves to magnify certain
aspects of our elementary experience, thereby enabling us to see these
aspects (such as the 'big jump') more distinctly. (1991, p. 267)
The argument is powerful. If one attends to experience, then specialized
experience illuminates aspects of elementary experience that one might nothave noticed otherwise. In response, Wang develops a new system ofexperience to overcome and assimilate the diversity across the spectrum ofphilosophy. In the face of these diverse methods, his response is to develop a
new system of philosophical inquiry.
But there is another approach to philosophical inquiry. On this approach, amethod is a tool of the trade. Different methods and skills are involved inphilosophical research and discussion. Philosophical inquiry is the skilled useof a variety of such techniques. On the form of inquiry of the Tractatus, as
described by Wang and Gödel, there is one and only one methodology. Fix thatand accept the results. Whatever they are, they are justified by the system. The
method captures what the philosopher does; however, on the other approach
to inquiry, there is a plurality of methods. The choice of tools is a skill that is
not predetermined. But further exploration of this pluralistic perspective on
philosophical inquiry goes beyond the scope of this talk, for it is an option thatneither Wang nor Gödel entertained.

References
Gödel, Kurt (2003) Collected Works. Volume V. Correspondence H-Z, Solomon Feferman, etal.
(eds.) Oxford: Clarendon.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1956) Philosophical Papers and Letters, Leroy E. Loemker (ed.)
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Montgomery Link, "Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus | Montgomery Link

Link, Montgomery (2007) "Wittgenstein and Logical Analysis", in: Herbert Hrachovec, Alois
Pichler, and Joseph Wang (eds.) Philosophy of the Information Society. Papers of the 30th IWS,
Kirchberg am Wechsel: ALWS.
Link, Montgomery (2009) "Marks of Mathematical Concepts", in: Volker A. Munz, Klaus Puhl,
and Joseph Wang (eds.) Language and World. Papers of the 32nd IWS, Kirchberg am Wechsel:
ALWS.
Link, Montgomery (2012) "Mathematical Proof and Intuition", in: Martin G. Weiss and Hajo
Greif (eds.) Ethics – Society – Politics. Papers of the 35th IWS, Kirchberg am Wechsel: ALWS.
Link, Montgomery; Rollow, David (2016) "Relations Operationalized", in: Stefan Majetschak
and Anja Weiberg (eds) Aesthetics Today: Contemporary Approaches to the Aesthetics of Natureand of Art. Papers of the 39th IWS, Kirchberg am Wechsel: ALWS.
Rogers, Brian; Wehmeier, Kai F. (2012) "Tractarian First-Order Logic: Identity and the NOperator", The Review of Symbolic Logic 5, 538-573.
Wang, Hao (1963) A Survey of Mathematical Logic, Peking: Science Press.
Wang, Hao (1974) From Mathematics to Philosophy, New York: Humanities.
Wang, Hao (1985) Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What We Know, Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
Wang, Hao (1987) Reflections on Kurt Gödel. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Wang, Hao (1996) A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1956): Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics / Bemerkungen überdie Grundlagen der Mathematik. Hg. von G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees und G. E. M. Anscombe,übersetzt von G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1921): „Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung“. In: Annalen der Natur- undKulturphilosophie 14, S. 185–262 (Leipzig 1921). Hg. von W. Ostwald.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Hg. von C. K. Ogden, übersetzt
von C. K. Ogden und F. P. Ramsey. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and
Scientific Method. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Übersetzt von D. F. Pears und B.
F. McGuinness. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
Acknowledgement
Thanks to Brian Kiniry and Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Revisions thanks to Friedrich Stadler and an
incisive reviewer.

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Montgomery Link, "Conversations between Gödel and Wang on the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063) | Filippo Mosca

World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary andInterpretation (2.04-2.063)
Filippo Mosca (Rome, Italy)
Abstract
This article discusses Wittgenstein’s definition of world, reality and negative facts andproposes a possible way to stem the (alleged) contradiction that arise (or seems to arise) in
sections 2.04-2.063 of the Tractatus logico-philosophicus. In section 2.04, Wittgenstein defines
the world as the totality of existent atomic facts. In section 2.06, he defines reality as thetotality of existent atomic facts and non existent atomic facts. Nevertheless, according tosection 2.063, the total reality is the world. How can we reconcile these seemingly
incompatible statements? According to the interpretation proposed here, the world andreality are two different things and at the same time the same thing. In Fregean terms,“world” and “reality” have different “Sinn”, but the same “Bedeutung”. Furthermore, it isargued that the difference between “reality” (2.06) and “total reality” (2.063) is not a trivial
difference; instead, it is a difference with a substantial theoretical weight. The first expression
indicates the totality of positive atomic facts and negative atomic facts. The second expression
indicates the totality of positive atomic facts, negative atomic facts, positive complex facts andnegative complex facts.

1. World and Reality

In section 2.04 of the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Wittgenstein defines theworld as follows:[2.04] The totality of existent atomic facts is the world.
At first glance, it might seem that this assertion is nothing more than arestatement in more “technical” and rigorous terms of the content expressedby these opening remarks:[1] The world is everything that is the case.
[1.1] The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
…
[2] What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
But why would Wittgenstein indulge in a pleonasm without theoretical
purpose?

Filippo Mosca, "World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063)". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063) | Filippo Mosca

In fact, one only has to glance at the following sections to realize that section
2.04 is not just a superfluous recapitulation of what has been established fromthe very first lines of the text, but a reformulation aimed at excluding certain
facts of a certain specific nature.
What Wittgenstein intends to convey here is that there are, evidently, facts
that are not actually existent atomic facts. In particular, we must bear in mind
that there are a very large number of atomic facts that could exist (or could
have existed) but do not exist (or did not exist). After all, if we consider anatomic fact of this kind - a fact that do not happen - we are in some way
imagining a different and additional fact to the existent fact. These facts are, in
Wittgenstein’s terminology, “negative facts”.
[2.06] […] (The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their nonexistence a negative fact)
Significantly, in the first part of the section just mentioned, Wittgenstein
introduces the notion of “Wirklichkeit”:[2.06] The existence and non existence of atomic facts is the reality […]On a closer inspection, this is a problematic notion. If section 2.04 and section
2.06 are juxtaposed, the result is an opposition between world and reality. The
former appears to be the totality of atomic facts currently existent. The second,on the contrary, seems to consist of both the actualization and the non
actualization of atomic (possible) situations. If we were to stick to these two
sections alone, we could say that the world is configured as the positive core of
reality, which is instead a comprehensive domain that incorporates positive
and negative poles within it. Unfortunately, section 2.063 rejects this prima
facie plausible interpretation by identifying the world with “total reality”.
[2.04] The totality of existent atomic facts is the world.
[2.06] The existence and non existence of atomic facts is the reality […][2.063] The total reality [“die gesamte Wirklichkeit”] is the world.
Section 2.04 seems to suggest that only the currently existing atomic facts
properly belong to the world. But if we read section 2.06 and section 2.063
together, we are forced to conclude that the world must also include, in a424

Filippo Mosca, "World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063)". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063) | Filippo Mosca

certain sense, non existent atomic facts. But this is contradictory: how is it
possible for the set of positive facts (the world) to coincide with the set of both
positive and negative facts (reality)?
The answer to this question lies, perhaps, in the peculiar ontological nature of
the so-called negative facts that the Tractatus is introducing. Although
Wittgenstein speaks explicitly of negative facts, we should not be disoriented
by an impulse of ontological repugnance towards non-being. By introducing
the notion of negative facts, Wittgenstein is not giving ontological dignity to
non-existent Meinong-like units “going about the world” (as Russell would say:
1918: 211). Rather, presumably, when negative facts are mentioned in theTractatus, the following is meant. Let us assume that “xyz” is an elementary
proposition. If it were true, it would be a fact that xyz; and since ex hypothesis
we are speaking of an elementary proposition, the fact would be an atomic
fact. But let’s suppose now that the elementary proposition “xyz" is false. Thatwould mean that “¬xyz” would be true. This is what Wittgenstein has in mind
when he speaks of negative atomic facts: not non-existent entities that
incomprehensibly are the case even though they are not the case, but the
ontological correlates of propositions that contain the logical operator ofnegation and that by virtue of the comparison with reality can becharacterized as true (cf. NL: 97, 99).
For this reason:[2.05] The totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts
do not exist.
As negations of possible but not actual atomic facts, negative atomic facts are
merely the flip side of positive atomic facts. It follows that, determining whichof all possible atomic facts are concretely part of the world indirectly means
determining which atomic facts are not. Since (a) objects - the substance of theworld (2.021) - exist in every possible world (2.022) and since (b) these objects
cannot actually exist in the world except in conjunction with other objects(2.0121; 2.0122), it follows that given all existent atomic facts (all the facts thatexist in this specific present configuration of the existing), we can reconstruct,from the objects they contain, the list of all the atomic facts that do not exist.

Filippo Mosca, "World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063)". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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This clarification allows us to stem the contradiction mentioned above.
Wittgenstein would be implicitly saying, in his typically oracular style, that
although the notion of the world and the notion of reality are two distinct
notions, they are in fact identified with each other. We could say, in Frege’s
words (but bearing in mind that this distinction does not work in Wittgenstein
as it does in Frege) that “world” and “reality” have different “Sinn”, but thesame “Bedeutung” (cf. Frege: 1892).
In a certain sense, the world is not identified with reality. Why? Because theworld does not correspond to the sum of positive and negative facts but,rather, to the sum of positive facts alone: the world is “everything that is thecase” (1) in the sense that it is, properly speaking, the totality of actuallyexistent atomic facts. To clarify in what sense world and reality are two
distinct notions, it is worth comparing them with the notion of logical space.
Just as physical space is formed by physical places, logical space is formed by“logical places”. According to 3.4, each significant proposition determines alogical place. Subsequently, Wittgenstein specifies that “the geometrical andthe logical place agree in that each is the possibility of an existence” (TLP:
3.411). It follows that logical place corresponds to the atomic possible fact
depicted by an elementary proposition. The metaphor can be easily extended
by likening the existence of a possible atomic fact to the filling of a place inphysical space with matter (cf. Frascolla: 2004): when a certain possiblecombination of objects exists, we can say that a certain logical place is filledwith matter; when a certain possible combination of objects does not exist, we
can say that a certain logical place is empty of matter. From this point of view
we could say that, given the entire logical space, which being composed ofobjects is structurally unchangeable (2.0271), the world is nothing but the
totality of matter that currently fills logical places, while reality is nothing but
the current distribution of matter among logical places - a distribution inwhich some of them are filled with matter while the rest are left empty. Anyother possible world, any conceivable configuration of reality other than thepresent one, differs from the latter either because some (at least one) of thelogical places that are in fact filled with matter are empty in it, or becausesome (at least one) of the logical places that are in fact empty are filled withmatter in it, or because of both.

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Filippo Mosca, "World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063)". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063) | Filippo Mosca

Note that this analysis shows, collaterally, that the notion of reality is also
distinct from the notion of logical space. The world is the totality of atomic
facts that currently exist. Reality is the totality of atomic facts that currently
exist and, at the same time, atomic facts that do not currently exist. Logicalspace, finally, is the horizon of all possibilities (Möglichkeiten) pre-contained in
the nature of the objects that constitute the substance of the world. This means
that, like logical space and unlike the world, reality also includes atomic facts
that do not currently exist. But this also means that, like the world and unlike
logical space, reality ‘photographs’ a current distribution. When we speak ofreality we are still in the realm of facts, not in the realm of objects - we are stillin the realm of what is the case or what is not the case, not in the realm ofwhat forms the fixed constitution of what can be and what conversely cannotbe.
In another sense, however, the world is identified with reality. Why? Because
positive and negative facts are structurally inseparable. Indeed, on the one
hand, it is impossible to conceive of positive facts apart from the possibility of
their negative implications (a fact is a fact precisely insofar as it may also not
be a fact); on the other hand, as emerges in sections 1.12 and 2.05, it is only andonly the actual configuration of the world that determines per differentiam also
what it is not. If the list comprising all existent atomic facts and all non
existent atomic facts is nothing but an automatic by-product of the narrower
list of all existent atomic facts, then world and reality, though conceptually
distinct notions, are in fact the same thing. Reality and world, we might say,mutually involve each other: the structure of the world is involved in the
structure of reality because reality is the set of negative atomic facts and alsoof positive atomic facts; the structure of reality is involved in the structure of
the world because it is (solely and only) the set of actual configurations thatthe world assumes from time to time - the set of positive atomic facts - thatindirectly defines the domain of negative atomic facts.

2. Reality and Total Reality

At this point, we might ask: why does section 2.063 not speak of “reality” butspeak of “total reality”? If we want to avoid concluding that “reality” and “total
reality” are equivalent and that the expression for “total” - “gesamte” - is just a

Filippo Mosca, "World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063)". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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purely rhetorical device aimed at conveying a generic sense of completeness,
we have better take a look elsewhere.
In the next section Wittgenstein asserts that:[2.1] We make to ourselves pictures of facts.
With section 2.1, then, the ontological examination of the Tractatus comes toan end: what was an attempt to decode reality that was fundamentally exempt(though not entirely: see 2.0211 and 2.0212) from considerations of theconditions of our representation immediately becomes an investigation ofwhat we do with the facts of which the world is made up.
Consequently, to answer our question we must plausibly turn our gaze to thesections immediately preceding 2.063:[2.061] Atomic facts are independent of one another.
[2.062] From the existence or non-existence of an atomic fact we cannot infer
the existence or non-existence of another.
Given two atomic facts, no consequence follows from the hypothesis that oneof them exists as to the existence or non-existence of the other, and the same
applies to the hypothesis that the first does not exist.
This is clearly a reformulation of an important introductory remark:[1.21] Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else
remain the same.
But what is the raison d'être of such a reformulation in this context - a context
in which he is sketching (albeit allusively) the relations between world andreality?
The general reason why Wittgenstein imposes this requirement of mutual
independence on the atomic facts lies in the fact that the renunciation of
independence would amount to an unjustified restriction of the domain of
possible worlds. All combinations of atomic facts are perfectly equal from alogical point of view: once the domain of atomic facts has been defined, it is
the simple application of the Principle of the Excluded Middle and the428

Filippo Mosca, "World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063)". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063) | Filippo Mosca

Principle of Non-Contradiction that generates the entire range of conceivablecombinations. We cannot a priori restrict the possible distributions of matterin logical space.
Nevertheless, the reason why Wittgenstein stresses this requirement at thisparticular argumentative stage is presumably the following one. If the mutual
independence of atomic facts postulated by 1.21 and claimed again by 2.061
and 2.062 did not apply, the existence of an atomic fact p could always dependon an atomic fact q. In such a case, there would be facts of a different naturethan atomic facts: facts of the type “the occurrence of A depends on theoccurrence of B” (where A and B denote two different atomic facts,
respectively). Of course, the most obvious examples of such facts would befacts expressed by utterances that imply the notion of causality such as “A
because B”. To simplify, we shall then speak of “causal facts”. Causal facts
require, by definition, that the application of the dependency relation be
restrictive: it only makes sense to speak of a dependency relation where thisrelation applies to certain pairs of facts and not to others.
Suppose, for example, that a house caught fire, that the circuit was blown, that
Pierluigi dropped a still lit cigarette. Suppose, finally, that these are all atomic
facts (example taken from Morris: 2008: 54). Evidently, we are right to argue
that the house caught fire because the circuit blew only insofar as we would
like to exclude other dependency relationships. For example, if we try toreconstruct what happened, we might be interested in excluding that thecircuit blew because the house caught fire or that the house caught fire
because Pierluigi dropped his cigarette. But if dependency relations exist
between certain pairs of facts and not between others, then we can no longer
say that the possible existence of a certain causal fact will depend exclusively
on the possible existence of the atomic facts involved.
Intuitively, in fact, it could very well be the case that the house caught fire, thatthe circuit blew and that Pierluigi dropped his cigarette, without it necessarily
being true that the circuit blew because the house caught fire or that the housecaught fire because Pierluigi dropped his cigarette.
To sum up, if certain atomic facts depended on other atomic facts, there would
be certain further facts (what we have called “causal facts”) whose existence

Filippo Mosca, "World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063)". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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would not be determined by the mere existence or non-existence of the atomic
facts. In such a case, it would not be sufficient to draw up a list of all theexistent atomic facts in order to go back to the set of all the facts - both atomic
and complex - that may arise in the world, because it would also be necessary
to record the specific relationships of dependence that from time to time arise
between certain pairs of atomic facts and not between others.
But it is precisely this that section 2.061 and section 2.062 propose to exclude.
Since atomic facts are independent of one another, the problem does not arise.
Determining which of all possible atomic facts are the actually existing facts
does not only mean determining which facts do not exist. In fact, determining
which of all possible atomic facts are the actually existing facts means, also,
determining which are all facts, including complex facts. Hence, “the world is
everything that is the case” (1) precisely insofar as it is the totality of existentatomic facts (2.04). Moreover, the world delimits not reality, i.e. the totality ofpositive atomic facts and negative atomic facts, but total reality, i.e. the totalityof positive atomic facts, negative atomic facts, positive complex facts andnegative complex facts. The world is reality because it is only and solely theworld - the set of positive atomic facts - that also determines what the set of
negative atomic facts is. The world is, in addition, total reality because it is onlyand solely the world - the set of positive atomic facts - that determines what
the set of complex facts - whether positive or negative - can be.
This restatement of the reciprocal independence of atomic facts is also,
basically, a restatement of the key-idea that shape these opening sections: thefundamental units of the world are not objects; the fundamental units of theworld are mutually independent (atomic) facts. Not surprisingly, then, thisrestatement closes definitely the tractarian attempt to understand reality andopens the tractarian attempt to understand our representation of reality.
References
Frascolla, P. (2004), On the nature of Tractatus objects, in Dialectica, 58.3: 369-382.
Frege, G. (1892), Über Sinn und Bedeutung, in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische
Kritik 100: 25–50; trans. M. Black, as “On Sense and Meaning”, in Frege, G. (1984), Collected
Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell.
Morris, M. (2008), Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Oxford, Routledge.

430

Filippo Mosca, "World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063)". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063) | Filippo Mosca

Pears, D. (1987), The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Vol.
I, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. (1918), The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, in Russell, B. (1956), Logic and Knowledge, pp. 175-282, London: George Allen and Unwin.
Wittgenstein, L. (1922), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden, London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1922. [TLP]
Wittgenstein, L., Notes on logic, printed as Appendix I of Notebooks 1914-1916, ed. G. H. vonWright and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd edn, 1979, Oxford: Blackwell. [NL]

Filippo Mosca, "World, Reality and Negative Facts: An Attempt at Commentary and Interpretation (2.04-2.063)". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen | Aloisia Moser

Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logicophilosophicus zeigen
Aloisia Moser (Linz, Austria)
Abstract
Bildet sich Ludwig Wittgensteins logisches System im Nummerierungssystem des Tractatuslogicus-philosophicus ab? In diesem Beitrag behaupte ich, dass dies der Fall ist, undpräsentiere eine Interpretation, die erklärt, warum Wittgenstein .0/.00-Positionen verwendet,
anstatt mit 0.1 fortzufahren. Mein Ansatz zeigt, dass die Sätze des Tractatus wie
mathematische Gleichungen funktionieren: Was auf der linken Seite steht, ist gleich oderidentisch mit dem, was auf der rechten Seite steht. Es gibt jedoch keine Regeln, ob und wie dieeine Seite eines Satzes auf die andere reduziert werden kann. Ich verstehe die rechte Seite der
Gleichung als Klärung oder Verdeutlichung der linken Seite. Der Tractatus verdeutlicht denersten Satz „Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist“ im nächsten Satz 1.1 mit „Die Welt ist die
Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge“. Wittgensteins Nummerierungssystemfunktioniert so, dass n für einen Satz steht und n.1 für dessen Verdeutlichung. In einigen
Fällen fährt Wittgenstein jedoch mit .01 fort statt mit .1. Meine Interpretation zeigt Folgendes:
Wenn wir auf die logische Ebene .01 stoßen, handelt es sich um Sätze, die eine Aussage überdie Existenz von etwas machen sollen – was sie jedoch nicht können. .001 wiederum steht fürSätze, die etwas über die Wirklichkeit oder Realität im Gegensatz zur Möglichkeit aussagen
sollen – ebenfalls etwas, was nicht gesagt werden kann, sich aber zeigt. Nach meiner Lesart
drückt das Nummerierungssystem des Tractatus die logische Struktur aus, indem es zeigt,
dass die Sätze .0 und .00 nicht einmal „gesagt“ werden können.

Ludwig Wittgenstein wollte ein System von Sätzen über die Welt entwickeln,
die ein minimales Gerüst dessen bilden, was wir über die Welt sagen können.
Sätze, die genau abgrenzen, was als wahr oder falsch gesagt werden kann.
Wittgenstein wollte die Logik der Sprache klar zum Ausdruck bringen, damit
klar wird: „Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon
man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ (Wittgenstein 1984) Die
philosophischen Probleme wären so entlarvt, denn sie beruhten nur auf
Missverständnissen der Logik unserer Sprache. Sie sind keine Probleme, übersie muss man schweigen. Die Sätze des Tractatus sind hier wie logischaneinandergereihte Punkte, aber später sagt Wittgenstein, dass sie als Pfeile
verstanden werden müssen - weil die Sätze einen Sinn haben und treffen.
Wittgenstein schreibt im Vorwort weiter, der Wert der Abhandlung bestünde
darin, „daß in ihr Gedanken ausgedrückt sind“. Und daß es sein Ziel war, dieseGedanken besser auszudrücken. Den zweiten Wert seiner Arbeit sah
Wittgenstein darin, „daß sie zeigt, wie wenig damit getan ist, daß diese(philosophischen) Probleme (alle) gelöst sind“. An dieser Stelle des Vorworts

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Aloisia Moser, "Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen | Aloisia Moser

findet sich auch der erste Gebrauch des Wortes „zeigen“. Die Klarheit, die
Wittgenstein für die Sprache der Philosophie fordert, versucht er im Tractatus
selbst einzulösen: nur ausdrücken, was klar auszudrücken geht, nämlich
Gedanken – und über den Rest, das heißt alle philosophischen „Probleme“,schweigen.

1.

Lesarten der .0/.00-Sätze

Zu Beginn einige Interpretationen zur Nummerierung des Tractatus. Am
Beginn ist Stenius’ Darstellung von 1960, die im ersten Teil explizit auf die
Nummerierung eingeht. (Stenius 1996) Zu den Nullsätzen hat Stenius nichts zu
sagen. Zwar sieht er, dass das philosophische System Wittgensteins alle
Aspekte der Beziehungen zwischen Menschen und Welt unter einem
bestimmten Gesichtspunkt zusammenfassen will und dass Wittgenstein dabei
die Philosophie aber als eine Ansammlung von Unsinn verdammt. Seine Sätze
erläutern, dass derjenige, der ihn versteht, sie als unsinnig erkennt und „durch
sie – auf ihnen – über sie hinausgestiegen ist“. (Tractatus-Einleitung) Stenius
formuliert ein Prinzip der Nummerierung, das er der Fußnote Wittgensteins
entnimmt: Die Dezimalzahlen sollen das logische Gewicht der Sätze andeuten.
Allerdings kommentiert er den Satz 2.01 lediglich dahingehend, dass hierfraglich ist, welchen Satz dieser Satz kommentiert, denn Satz 2.0 gibt es nicht.
Stenius’ Lesart der Sätze 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 und 7 als Forte und der folgenden als
Decrescendos, die auf die vorangegangenen Crescendos folgen, ist eine schöne
musikalische Metapher, erklärt aber die Nullsätze nicht.
Verena Mayers Arbeit über den Tractatus als System (Vossenkuhl 2001)
beschreibt, dass seit Stenius die Nummerierung als inkonsequent angesehen
wird. Sie schlägt vor, den Tractatus als ein System von definitorischen Sätzen
und daraus abgeleiteten Folgerungen zu betrachten (vgl. Mayer 2001, 12), wasmeiner Lesart der Sätze der Form „S ist P“ als Definition ähnlich ist. Was
Mayer Substitution nennt, drücke ich mit der Analogie zur mathematischen
Gleichung aus, die ja auch nichts anderes als eine Substitution ist. Mayer sagt
nichts über die Bedeutung der 0-Sätze, obwohl sie sich über den Begriff „Sinn“
viele Gedanken macht. Auf S. 17 schreibt sie, der Sinn nehme eine
Schlüsselstellung als Verbindungsstelle zwischen Sprache und Welt ein. Die

Aloisia Moser, "Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Unterscheidung zwischen Sinn und Unsinn bestimmt die Grenzen der Welt. Sienähert sich einer Interpretation der Nullsätze, wenn sie feststellt, dass es eine
Klasse von Sätzen gibt, die „nicht von Gegenständen, sondern von Formen(etwa den Formen der Sachverhalte oder der Sätze) handeln. Sie bilden im
strengen Sinn der Definition keine möglichen Sachlagen ab. Zwar enthalten sie
scheinbare Namen; diese ‚bezeichnen‘ jedoch keine einfachen
Gegenstände“ (vgl. Mayer 2001, 31).
Ich zeige im Folgenden, dass Wittgenstein den Sätzen über Existenz im
Tractatus eine Nullstelle gibt und Sätzen über Wirklichkeit zwei Nullstellen.
Ich stimme mit Mayer überein, dass alle Sätze des Tractatus Sätze überFormen von Sachverhalten sind, weshalb sie alle als „unsinnig“ im Sinne
Wittgensteins verworfen werden müssen.
Mayer gibt im Rückblick auf den Prototractatus (Mayer 1993) eine Genealogie
des Nummerierungssystems. Sie verweist auf den von Martin Pilch (2015)
nachgewiesenen verlorenen Folianten. Ein wichtiger Unterschied ist, dass derPrototractatus eine Erklärung für Sätze wie 2.01 und 2.001 gibt; es handelt sichum die Genese der Nummern, die nachträglich eingefügt wurden: Weil 2.1
schon vergeben war, wurde die Nummer 2.01 vergeben, weil 3.01 schonvergeben war, wurde unter 3.001 ein weiterer Kommentar zu 3 gegeben.
(Mayer 1993, 112) Das Nummerierungssystem ist somit Kompositionsmethode.
Luciano Bazzocchis Interpretation (2015) der Baumstruktur geht nicht voneinem linearen, sondern von einem hierarchischen Text aus, ähnlich den
Hypertexten eines Softwareingenieurs (vgl. ebd., 334). David Sterns (2023)
jüngster Artikel über Baumlesungen unterstreicht dies. Beide betonen, dass
der Tractatus bisher nur linear gelesen wurde.
Ich denke jedoch, dass man automatisch beginnt, die Hauptsätze nacheinanderzu lesen und dann die Untersätze in Verbindung. Ich habe in meiner
Studienzeit lange vor dem Erscheinen des Tractatus im Baumdiagramm
verschiedene Markierungen verwendet: Hauptsätze fett, erste Untersätze
unterstrichen, zweite Untersätze kursiv, dritte Untersätze kursiv undunterstrichen usw. Die Nummern machen den Text des Tractatus übersichtlich,
wie Wittgenstein selbst in einem Brief an Ludwig von Ficker im Dezember
1919 schreibt. Stern interpretiert die Sätze in Geschwister- und Eltern-Kind-

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Aloisia Moser, "Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen | Aloisia Moser

Beziehungen und macht damit den Baum zum Stammbaum; manche
Bemerkungen haben viele Nachkommen. Die neue Ausgabe von Bazzocchi
erlaubt es, den Tractatus in dieser Struktur zu lesen, aber mein
Markierungssystem aus meiner Studienzeit hatte den gleichen Effekt.
Auf Seite 16 gibt Stern dann eine Interpretation der 0-Sätze, die sich auf den
Familienstatus dieser Sätze bezieht: Auch er bemerkt, dass die .0- und .00-Sätze
Kommentare zu einer nicht existierenden Bemerkung sind – 4.001 und 4.01
beginnen mit einer Reihe von Bemerkungen über 4 –, und meint, sie seien
genau so stark wie die Reihe, die mit 4.1 beginnt. Dies erklärt aber nicht,
warum es Nullsätze gibt. Meine Lesart der Nullsätze gibt ihnen einen „Sinn“,auch wenn er darin besteht, dass sie unsinnig sind und deshalb nicht
ausgeschrieben wurden: Das Nummerierungssystem ist die Art und Weise, wie
die Sätze konstelliert sind, und stellt selbst eine Sinnkonstellation dar, nämlich
jene, dass diese Konstellation etwas zeigt, was die Sätze nicht sagen können.

2.

Was die Tractatus-Sätze nicht sagen: Existenz

Was sagen die Sätze des Tractatus? Sie sollen Gedanken gut ausdrücken unddies hat mit der Logik und den Missverständnissen der Sprache zu tun. Ich
werde mich mit der Logik der Sprache beschäftigen, dabei vorwegnehmen,dass Wittgenstein im Spätwerk nicht von Logik, sondern von Grammatik
spricht. Auch die Entstehungsgeschichte des Tractatus ist äußerst merkwürdig:
Wittgenstein schrieb die Sätze des Tractatus im Schützengraben und später als
Kriegsgefangener in Monte Cassino. Das Modell eines Autounfalls bei einer
Gerichtsverhandlung inspirierte Wittgenstein, den Tractatus so aufzubauen,
dass die Sprache in ihrer Logik als Modell der Welt dargestellt wird.
Satz 1 sagt: „Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist“ – eine Prädikation, die aus dem
Subjekt „die Welt“, dem Objekt „was der Fall ist“ und dem Prädikat „ist“
besteht. Kann man sich diesen Satz als Modell vorstellen? „Die Welt“ istSubjekt des Satzes und dadurch definiert, dass sie alles ist, „was der Fall ist“?
Aber wie stellen wir uns das vor, „was der Fall ist“? Der nächste Satz 1.11
erklärt: „Die Welt ist durch die Tatsachen bestimmt und dadurch, daß es alle
Tatsachen sind.“ (Hervorh. i. O.) Was hier erläutert wird, ist die „Gesamtheit“.
Die Tatsache wird erst ab 2. erklärt.

Aloisia Moser, "Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Vergleichen wir die Sätze des Tractatus mit den Sätzen der Mathematik, etwa
„12 ist 5 plus 7“. Auch hier wird das, was auf der einen Seite ist, erklärt durchdas, was auf der anderen Seite ist. In der Mathematik handelt es sich um eine
logische Verbindung. Wenn man 5 und 7 zusammenzählt, erhält man 12. Die
meisten mathematischen Sätze und Gleichungen sind von dieser Art undkönnen ausgerechnet werden, man sieht, auf beiden Seiten das Gleiche: 12
ist 7 plus 5, 12 ist 12. Was wir erhalten, ist eine Tautologie. Dennoch ist der Satz
„12 ist 7 plus 5“ keine Tautologie, obwohl er auch sagt: 12 = 12. Auch in den
Sätzen des Tractatus will Wittgenstein zeigen, dass es logische Verbindungenzwischen den Bestandteilen gibt und dass wir alle Sätze mit sehr wenigen
Elementarsätzen aufbauen können.
Gehen wir zum zweiten Satz des Tractatus: „Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist
das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.“ Wir „rechnen“ jetzt weiter „aus“, was auf
der „rechten Seite“ der Gleichung steht. Was ist das Bestehen oder die Existenzvon Sachverhalten? Wittgenstein erläutert dies im nächsten Satz, der die
Bezifferung 2.01 erhält. Der Satz, der hier fehlt, 2.0, ist der Satz, der die
Existenz der Dinge „erklärt“. Das Bestehen oder die Existenz selbst zu erklären
wäre Unsinn oder Metaphysik, und Wittgenstein setzt eine Nullstelle, die er inallen folgenden Sätzen beibehält. 2.01 erklärt, dass „der Sachverhalt eine
Verbindung von Gegenständen (Sachen, Dingen) ist“. Stellen sie sich ein Modell
der Welt vor, in dem alle Tatsachen durch Sachverhalte dargestellt werden,
die Verbindungen von Gegenständen sind. Die Dinge sind nur die Bestandteile
dieser Sachverhalte.
Und nun erklärt Wittgenstein zum ersten Mal, inwiefern das etwas mit Logikzu tun hat. Er sagt: „Wenn das Ding im Sachverhalt vorkommen kann, so muß
die Möglichkeit des Sachverhaltes im Ding bereits präjudiziert sein.“ (Hervorh.
i. O.) Wir können uns die Dinge gar nicht anders vorstellen als in der
Möglichkeit, dass sie in Beziehungen zu anderen sind. Wir kennen einen
Gegenstand oder ein Ding nur dann, wenn wir seine internen Eigenschaften
kennen – nämlich zu welchen Sachverhalten er sich zusammenstellen lässt –,und nicht, wenn wir seine äußeren Eigenschaften kennen – etwa wie groß er
ist oder welche Farbe er hat. Diese Möglichkeit des Auftretens in
Sachverhalten nennt Wittgenstein „die Form des Gegenstandes“ (2.0141).

436

Aloisia Moser, "Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen | Aloisia Moser

Wir haben ein Bild der Welt, wir sehen Dinge, allerdings nicht als Stühle oder
Tische mit bestimmten Maßen und Materialien, sondern als Elemente vonSachverhalten, deren Bestehen wiederum Tatsachen sind, wobei die
Gesamtheit der Tatsachen bestimmt, was der Fall ist und was nicht, und die
Welt alles ist, was der Fall ist. Ich habe den Anfang des Tractatus hierentwickelt, um sagen zu können, was im Tractatus gesagt und was gezeigt wird.
Nur etwas später, in Satz 2.1, kommt es zu einer überraschenden Wendung im
Text: „Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.“ Ein kompletter
Perspektivwechsel. Jetzt ist nicht mehr das, was links ist, das Gleiche wie das,
was rechts ist, sondern wir machen etwas. Die Tatsachen werden von uns
dargestellt. Wenn die Tatsachen aus Sachverhalten bestehen, die wiederum
aus Dingen zusammengestellt sind, dann ist der Satz, den wir sagen, ein Bilddieser Tatsachen. 2.12 lautet: „Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit.“ Hier
finden sich die Ansätze zur Interpretation des Tractatus als Bildtheorie odervielmehr als Bebilderungstheorie (vgl. Moser 2021, 91). Wie die Dinge im
Sachverhalt, so verhalten sich die Elemente im Bild, die die Dinge darstellen.
Die Dinge und ihre Konfigurationen im Sachverhalt werden durch die
Elemente im Bild „vertreten“ oder repräsentiert. Aber wie? In Satz 2.16 sagt
Wittgenstein: „Die Tatsache muß, um Bild zu sein, etwas mit dem Abgebildeten
gemeinsam haben.“ Wittgenstein führt weiter aus, dass zwischen Bild und
Tatsache etwas identisch sein muss, damit das eine Bild des anderen sein
kann. Was hier gemeinsam ist, damit das Bild die Tatsache abbilden kann,nennt Wittgenstein die „Form der Abbildung“. Das Bild bildet also die Tatsacheab, indem es mit der Tatsache die Form gemein hat. Und interessanterweise
schreibt Wittgenstein weiter in 2.172: „Seine Form der Abbildung aber kanndas Bild nicht abbilden; es weist sie auf.“ (Hervorh. A. M.)
Dieses Aufweisen ist der Anhaltspunkt für die Interpretation des Zeigens im
nächsten Teil meines Beitrags. Ich habe aber noch nicht die Frage beantwortet,
was das Bild, das wir uns von der Tatsache machen, aussagt. Ich muss nochhinzufügen, dass ab Satz 3. klar wird, dass dieses logische Bild der Tatsachen,
auf das Wittgenstein hingearbeitet hat, der Gedanke ist. Der Anfang desTractatus liefert also eine Theorie dessen, was ein Gedanke ist, indem er ihn
als logisches Bild von Tatsachen charakterisiert; und Wittgenstein erklärt,
Denken sei nichts anderes, als dass wir uns Bilder von Tatsachen machen,

Aloisia Moser, "Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Bilder von Sachverhalten, in denen die Dinge geordnet sind, von dem, was derFall ist – und alles, was der Fall ist, ist die Welt.

3.

Was die Tractatus-Sätze nicht sagen: Wirklichkeit

Satz 3 sagt: „Das logische Bild der Tatsachen ist der Gedanke“, das heißt, imGedanken wird die Existenz des Sachverhalts vorausgesetzt. Es gibt keine
Sätze 3.0 und 3.00. Satz 3.0 müsste etwas über die Existenz aussagen und 3.00
über die Existenz und die Wirklichkeit oder Realität, die im Satz abgebildet ist.
In den Untersätzen von Satz 3 finden wir Satz 3.001: „‚Ein Sachverhalt ist
denkbar‘ heißt: Wir können uns ein Bild von ihm machen.“ Satz 3.01 lautet
dann: die „Gesamtheit der wahren Gedanken” sei „ein Bild der Welt“. Oder
anders gesagt: Die Gesamtheit der wahren Gedanken ist gleich einem Bild derWelt. In Satz 3.02 ist deutlich zu sehen: „Der Gedanke enthält die Möglichkeit
der Sachlage, die er denkt. Was denkbar ist, ist auch möglich.“
Aber wann ist ein Gedanke, der ein logisches Bild von Tatsachen ist, wahr?
Wenn er eine Prädikation ist, die etwas Wahres sagt, indem er ein Bild ist, das
wir uns machen, wobei das Bild und die Tatsache die Form des Bildes
gemeinsam haben. Es ist dann im Satz, so sagt es 3.1, dass der Gedanke sichsinnlich wahrnehmbar ausdrückt. Und 3.11 erklärt: „Wir benützen das
sinnlich wahrnehmbare Zeichen (Laut- oder Schriftzeichen etc.) des Satzes als
Projektion der möglichen Sachlage. Die Projektionsmethode ist das Denken desSatz-Sinnes.“ Hier sind wir einen Schritt weitergegangen. Wir sehen jetzt, dassdas Bild, das wir uns machen, sich in Zeichen ausdrückt, die entweder als
Laute gehört oder als Buchstabenschrift gesehen werden. Mithilfe dieser
sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Zeichen projizieren wir den Satz auf die mögliche
Sachlage, das heißt, wir machen uns ein Bild, und in der Projektion dieses
Bildes denken wir den Sinn, nämlich indem wir die Form des Bildes mit derForm des Sachverhalts vergleichen und urteilen, ob der Satz wahr oder falschist.
So können wir etwas sagen. Diese Bildtheorie ist eine Projektionsmethode, es
handelt sich nicht um ein statisches Bild, um Namen, die wie Punkte

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Aloisia Moser, "Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen | Aloisia Moser

angeordnet sind, sondern um einen Satz, der ein Pfeil ist. Wenn wir einen Satz
sprechen oder schreiben, projizieren wir ein Bild auf die Tatsachen der Welt,
die aus Sachverhalten besteht und in Sachlagen liegt.
Was hier nicht „gesagt“ werden kann, ist die Form der Abbildung, also gerade
das, was dem Satz oder dem Bild und der Tatsache als dem Bestehen oder der
Existenz von Sachverhalten gemeinsam ist. Es kann nicht vom Satz selbst
gesagt werden. Wittgenstein sagt, der Satz weist sie auf. Er zeigt sie.

4.

Was die Tractatus-Sätze zeigen: Satz-Sinn

Wenn Wittgenstein das Zeichen, mit dem wir Gedanken ausdrücken,„Satzzeichen“ nennt und den Satz das „Satzzeichen in seiner projektiven
Beziehung zur Welt“, so wird deutlich, dass die Projektion, also das Bild, dasder Satz ist, zum Satz gehört, nicht aber das, was projiziert wird. Der Sinn desSatzes ist also nicht im Satz enthalten, nur die Möglichkeit, ihn auszudrücken.
Man muss sich das Satzzeichen einmal nicht aus Schriftzeichen, sondern aus
räumlichen Objekten zusammengesetzt denken. Dann wird klar, der Sinn desSatzes ist durch die gegenseitige räumliche Lage der Dinge bestimmt. Ob derSatz seinen Sinn aber zeigt, hängt noch von etwas anderem ab, nämlich vonder Art der sinnlichen Zusammensetzung seiner Elemente, seien es die Dinge
der Welt oder die Elemente des Satzes.
In Satz 4.022 des Tractatus schreibt Wittgenstein: „Der Satz zeigt seinen
Sinn.“ (Hervorh. i. O.) Der Sinn des Satzzeichens zeigt sich uns, ohne dass er
uns erklärt wird. Nun liege es auch, so 4.027, im Wesen des Satzes, dass er „unseinen neuen Sinn mitteilen kann“ (Hervorh. i. O.), was er mit „alten
Ausdrücken“ (4.03) tut. Im Satz werde „gleichsam eine Sachlage probeweise
zusammengestellt“ (4.031).
Die Feststellung, ob ein Satz wahr ist oder falsch, ist demnach nur möglich,
weil der Satz vorher einen Sinn hat. Dieser Sinn wird dann bejaht oderverneint. Wenn die Sätze der Sprache als sinnlich wahrnehmbare Zeichen
Bilder sind, die wir auf die Welt projizieren und die in ihrer Bedeutung wahre

Aloisia Moser, "Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

439

Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen | Aloisia Moseroder falsche Bilder sind, dann ergibt sich der Sinn dieser Bilder oder Sätze aus
den Konstellationen entweder der Zeichen im Satz oder der Dinge in den
Sachverhalten.
Der Sinn des Satzes oder gar des Pfeiles, der zeigt, ist kein logischer, sondern
einer, der im Zusammenstellen der Elemente des Satzes oder aber der Dinge
besteht. Durch die Wahl der Nummerierung seiner Sätze hat Wittgenstein einebestimmte sinnliche Konstellation im Satzzeichen gewählt. Die (sechs von)sieben Hauptsätze werden durch ihre jeweiligen Untersätze erklärt. Ich habein diesem Beitrag gezeigt, dass die Wahl von .0/.00-Sätzen in Ludwig
Wittgensteins sinnlichem Satzzeichen einen Sinn ergibt, allerdings nicht einen,
der durch die Sätze oder die Nummerierung selbst ausgesagt ist, sondern dersich durch das Fehlen der Sätze, die Wahl von .0 und .00 zeigt.
References
Bazzocchi, Luciano. 2015. „A Better Appraisal of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Manuscript“.
Philosophical Investigations 38 (4): 333–359.
Mayer, Verena. 1993. „The Numbering System of the Tractatus“. Ratio 6 (2): 108–120.
Mayer, Verena. 2001. „Der Tractatus als System“. In: Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm (Hrsg.). Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus: 11–33.
Moser, Aloisia. 2021. Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Pilch, Martin. 2015. „A Missing Folio at the Beginning of Wittgenstein’s MS 104“. Nordic
Wittgenstein Review 4 (2): 65–97.
Stenius, Erik. 1996. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of the Main Lines of Thought.
Reprint of the 1960 ed. Wittgenstein Studies. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Stern, David G. 2023. „Tree-Structured Readings of the Tractatus: Prepublication for Open
Review until 22.03.2023.“Nordic Wittgenstein Review, February.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1984. Werkausgabe, Band 1: Tractatus logico-philosophicus / Tagebücher
1914–1916 / Philosophische Untersuchungen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

440

Aloisia Moser, "Was die Nullsätze (.0/.00) in Ludwig Wittgensteins Tractatus logico-philosophicus zeigen". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus— 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees | Martin Ohmacht

Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees
Martin Ohmacht (Klagenfurt, Austria)
Abstract
Die langjährige Ehefrau von Rush Rhees, Jean Rhees (geborene Henderson) war in London bis
1980 als Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin tätig. Die Ausbildung dazu umfasst in der Regelauch eine gründliche Freud-Lektüre. Wittgensteins machte bei ihr auf seinen Reisen zwischen
Cambridge und dem Kontinent mehrfach Pause, und daher kann man vermuten, dass er ihr
Know-how in puncto Psychoanalyse als Ressource nutzte. Außerdem kann man spekulieren,dass sich auch Rush Rhees bei sachlichen Unklarheiten in der Dokumentation der Gespräche
mit Wittgenstein über Freud bei ihr rückversicherte, um nicht sich selbst zum reinen
Mitschreiber zu reduzieren. Leider hat sich herausgestellt, dass die Quellenlage zu diesem
Thema eher dürftig ist, sodass das Folgende als Spekulation bezeichnet werden muss und ich
solcherart die Verantwortung dafür übernehme. Was ich aber zur Verfügung stellen kann, isteine Klärung, dass Ausbildungskandidaten in Jungianischer Analyse durchwegs Freud lesen,und zwar obwohl Jung und Freud ja auseinander gingen. Dieses Faktum der Freud-Affinität
der Jungianer ist Wissen aus der psychoanalytischen Szene.

1. Besprechung des Nachrufs auf Jean Rhees:

Obituary Notice Jean Rhees:
Jean Rhees died at her home near Cambridge on 18 May 1981, six months
after she had finally retired. She was 78 years of age.
She will be greatly missed in the Society of Analytical Psychology, andmost particularly in the Children's Section. She was a training analyst, andher supervisees had found her warm and supportive; she was also a goodteacher and her seminars were popular and stimulating. In her younger
days she had served on the various committees of the Society, including
the Professional Committee, where she undertook a large amount of work,
collating from the minutes the main themes that had emerged in themeetings since the earliest days of the training.
From 1965 onwards she was one of those who assisted the editors on The
Journal of Analytical Psychology. She contributed several book reviews
and translated two books from Italian. She was an active member of thePsychotherapy Section. Although not directly involved in the Child
Analytic Training, she maintained a great interest in it and continued toattend the meetings of the Children's Section right up until the time when
she left London, and she made pertinent and often unique contributions to

Martin Ohmacht, "Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees | Martin Ohmacht

the ongoing discussion. It could be said that she was one of the midwives
who assisted in the prolonged labour of the birth of the Child Analytic
Training.
Jean had been brought up in Italy and educated at the International School
in Naples. She was something of a linguist, was very musical, knew a great
deal about art and had read English literature at Edinburgh. Her husband
is a philosopher.
Out of this wealth of personal endowment Jean chose to express herself
first as a psychiatric social worker and later as an analytical psychologist.
She often talked with enthusiasm and great insight about the work she
had done with evacuee children in Wales during the early days of WorldWar II. She worked for many years at the Child Guidance Training Centre
where she supervised student P.S.W.s, and she was highly regarded in
P.S.W. circles.
Davidson, Dorothy (1982): Obituary Notice: Jean Rhees, in: Journal of
Analytical Psychology 27(1):83-84.
Eine Detailanalyse des Nachrufs auf Jean Rhees:
Vorweggenommen sei, dass in diesem Nachruf Jean Rhees‘ Ehemann Rush nur
kurz und etwas lapidar mit seinem Beruf als Philosoph erwähnt wird. Von derEhe der beiden wird sonst nichts berichtet: „Her husband was a philosopher“.
Dieses Schweigen in dem Nachruf trägt eine gewisse Auffälligkeit.
Das erwähnte „Professional Committee“, in dem Jean Rhees mitarbeitete,deutet auf Engagement und dadurch Einfluss auf die interne Organisation derSociety of Analytical Psychology ein, wobei es in diesen therapeutischen
Vereinen in erster Linie die Ausbildung der jungen Leute ist, die organisiert
werden will.
In der Folge gehe ich, diesen Nachruf als einzige Quelle studierend,
hauptsächlich auf die Frage der Kinderanalysen ein.
In diesem Punkt ist der Nachruf nämlich in sich (inhärent) widersprüchlich,und zwar entsteht ein gewisses interpretatorisches Spannungsgefüge bei der
Frage, welche Wichtigkeit die Tätigkeit als Kinderanalytikerin für Jean Rhees

442

Martin Ohmacht, "Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees | Martin Ohmacht

hatte. Die psychoanalytische Arbeit mit Kindern wurde jedoch nicht bei den
Jungianischen Analytikern erfunden, sondern geht auf Innovationen derFreudianerin Melanie Klein zurück, die diese Technik entwickelte – in London
in der berühmten Tavistock Clinic. Von Melanie Klein ist bekannt, dass die ihre
eigenen Kinder analysierte.
Einerseits heißt es in dem Nachruf, „She will be greatly missed … particulary
in the Children’s Section [of the Society of Analytical Psychology]", andererseits
heißt es dann aber: „Although not directly involved in the Child Analytic
Training, she maintained a great interest in it”. Eine Möglichkeit, diesenWiderspruch aufzulösen, besteht darin, dass sie sich zwar aus der aktiven
Kinderarbeit zurückgezogen hatte, aber die Ausbildungskandidaten in diesem
Metier beraten (supervidieren) konnte, weil sie eine Zeit lang direkt (selbst) indiesem Bereich gearbeitet hatte. Um eine Einschätzung in der Relevanz derKinderarbeit für die Analytischen Psychologen ( = Jungianer) zu gewinnen,
müsste man die Frage stellen, wie man damit umging, dass die eigentlichen
Innovatoren in einem anderen Verein (den Freudianern) zu finden waren, weil
man ja die dadurch entstehende Abhängigkeit irgendwie gestalten musste.
Man darf nicht vergessen, dass dieser andere Verein ein Konkurrenzverein
war.
Zum Abschluss dieser Besprechung des Nachrufs möchte ich noch auf die
Bemerkung eingehen: „Her seminars were popular and stimulating“. Der
Ausdruck von den inspirierenden Situationen, die Jean Rhees als
Seminarleiterin schuf, ist nicht in dem Ausmaß objektivierbar und ist daher
möglicherweise der Rhetorik eines Nachrufs geschuldet. Aber daran, dass die
Lehrveranstaltungen „popular“ waren, kann abgelesen werden, dass es Jean
Rhees offenbar gelang, viele Leute, junge Männer wie Frauen, anzuziehen undin einer deutlichen Kontinuität der Besuche auch zu halten. Und dieser
Indikator lässt einen Schluss zu, der nicht ganz unerheblich ist, nämlich den,dass das Interesse der Ausbildungskandidaten an Ausbildungsanalysen (bis zu
dreimal die Woche!) und Supervisionsstunden bei Jean Rhees inausreichendem Maße vorhanden war, um ihr eine ökonomisch sorgenfreie
Existenz zu ermöglichen. Diese anstrebenswerte Situation finden nicht alle
Psychoanalytiker vor.

Martin Ohmacht, "Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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2. Carl Gustav Jung, Jean Rhees und Sigmund Freud

Jean Rhees war bis 1980 in London im Rahmen der Society of Analytical
Psychology als training analyst tätig, das heißt, sie machte Analysen mit jungenLeuten, die als Ausbildung anerkannt wurden. Dabei wird sie als „Jungian
Psychoanalyst“ bezeichnet: Norman Malcolm (2001: 123). Wittgenstein hat sie
mehrfach besucht – einmal hat er vierzehn Tage lang bei ihr gewohnt und ihr
Blumen (eine „Hortensie“) geschenkt. Diese Zwischenstopps in London mit
freundschaftlichem Austausch wären eine hervorragende Gelegenheit
gewesen, das Wissen über die Psychoanalyse bei Jean Rhees, das bei ihrvorhanden war, nutzbar zu machen.
Das wichtigste Argument für diese Überlegung ist die Tatsache, dass Jean
Rhees dokumentierter Maßen passabel Deutsch lesen konnte: sie übersetzte
nämlich zwei Artikel von Carl Gustav Jung ins Englische. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt
um 1940 existierte Stracheys maßgebliche Edition der Texte Freuds auf
Englisch noch nicht. Insbesonders Freuds Traumdeutung stand erst ab 1953
auf Englisch zur Verfügung. Und die frühe Übersetzung der Freud’schen
Traumdeutung von A. A. Brill gilt ja als gescheitert.
Die Frage, die in diesem Paper beleuchtet werden soll, ist inwieweit die
Ressource des Kontaktes zu Jean Rhees als Quelle für Wittgenstein für das
Thema „Psychoanalyse“ gesehen werden kann. Ich habe in einer Detailstudie
dargelegt, dass sich Wittgenstein in seinem Nachlass und anderen Schriftenmit über hundert einschlägigen Bemerkungen als ausgesprochen gut
informiert über die Psychoanalyse zeigt. (Ohmacht, 2023). Im Lichte dieser
meiner Kompilation muss man die Anmerkung von Brian McGuinness aus
dem Jahr 1979, „Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über die Psychoanalyse machen
insgesamt keine systematische Rezeption der Psychoanalyse aus“, neu
bewerten. Das Wort „systematisch“ klingt scholastisch, ja fast ein wenig
zwanghaft, und daher will ich es nicht verwenden. Kurt R. Fischer verwendet
1991 den Ausdruck von der „critical acceptance“ Wittgensteins für Freud. Ich
persönlich würde sagen, Wittgenstein assoziiert im Nachlass zur
Psychoanalyse.
Als Beispiele seien die Begriffe „Lehranalyse“ (Seite 191), „Angsttraum“ (Seite
213) und die Erwähnung von „Pierre Janet“ (ebenso Seite 213) genannt. Alledrei Zitate sind in den Gesprächen mit Drury (1987) zu finden.

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Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees | Martin Ohmacht

Jean Rhees, die langjährige Ehefrau von Rush Rhees war analytische
Psychologin. Die Ähnlichkeit des Terminus „analytical psychology“ mit dem„psycho-analytical movement“ ist auffällig und richtet sich auf den Schweizer
Analytiker Carl Gustav Jung. Das Buch von John Kerr, das ja ein WittgensteinZitat als Titel trägt, „eine höchst gefährliche Methode“, wird von den
Jungianern als valide Historiographie dieses Zweiges der psychoanalytischen
Bewegung akzeptiert, obwohl Kerr ausführlich beschreibt, wie Jung einejahrzehntelange nebeneheliche Liebschaft mit einer ehemaligen Klientin undspäteren Schülerin lebt, die beide am Burghölzli (dem sehr bekannten
Krankenhaus in Zürich) wohnten.

3. Carl Gustav Jung und Alfred Adler als Deserteure von Freud

Da hier Carl Gustav Jung mit seiner analytischen Psychologie als Know-howGeber für Jean Rhees auftritt, soll kurz seine Position in der Psychoanalyse
besprochen werden.
Freud hat sich mit mehreren seiner Weggefährten zerstritten: Wilhelm Reich,
Alfred Adler, Carl Gustav Jung und der Budapester Psychoanalytiker Sandor
Ferenczi wären hier zu nennen. Ich gehe hier primär nur auf Alfred Adler undCarl Gustav Jung ein. Aus einer historiographischen Systematik sind aber auchdie Konflikte mit Wilhelm Reich relevant, weil er für die psychoanalytische
Bewegung mit seiner frühen steilen Karriere und seinem späteren Abfall ein
Trauma darstellt, das dann in der Folge als Grund dafür gesehen werden kann,dass die Ausbildungskandidaten keinen verbindlichen Ausbildungsvertragerhalten, sondern lange Zeit in Abhängigkeit gehalten werden. Aus einer
wissenschaftssoziologischen Perspektive wäre ein Vergleich derrealpolitischen Abhängigkeit bei einer Lehranalyse und einer Habilitation
relevant. In der Tat wird die Entscheidung, ob sich jemand zum
Psychoanalytiker eignet, am Ende der Analyse getroffen. (Auskunft Johannes
Ranefeld, 1997)Über Alfred Adler schreibt Freud in Die Geschichte der Psychoanalytischen
Bewegung, er hätte zu ihm gesagt: „Glauben Sie denn, dass es ein großes
Vergnügen für mich ist, mein ganzes Leben in Ihrem Schatten zu
stehen?“ (Freud, 1914, 94). Dies bezeichnete Freud als Ungeheuerlichkeit.
Alfred Adler ist es tatsächlich gelungen, nicht nur in Wien, sondern auch in

Martin Ohmacht, "Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees | Martin Ohmacht

anderen Städten Zweigvereine für seine Individualpsychologie zu etablieren.
Von Wien weiß ich, dass man sich aber später (gegen Ende des 20.
Jahrhunderts) ausgesöhnt hat: die jungen Adlerianer absolvieren manche
Ausbildungsschritte bei Psycho-Analytikern des Wiener Arbeitskreises fürPsychoanalyse (WAP).
Dieses Phänomen, dass Freuds Mitarbeiter sich von ihm (oder er sich vonihnen) abwandte, wird als das Phänomen der „Desertionen“ bezeichnet: siehe
Clark, 1985, 318ff.
Der generelle Eindruck, den ich in Wien über die Jungianer gewonnen habe,
ist der, dass sie sich ihrer historischen Gewordenheit stellen und in ihrer
Bezugnahme auf Freud (mehr oder minder offen) akzeptieren, dass er für sie –wie klarerweise auch für die Psychoanalytiker selbst – von großer Relevanz ist.
Das ist für die Einschätzung der Position von Jean Rhees wichtig, weil man
davon ausgehen kann, dass sie sich im Zuge ihrer Ausbildung zum
analytischen Psychologen, ja sogar training analyst (Schwerpunkt:
Kinderanalysen), mit einer gewissen Gründlichkeit und Ausgiebigkeit mit den
Schriften Sigmund Freuds beschäftigte.
Ein entscheidendes Argument für die Wichtigkeit der psychoanalytischen
Vereine im engeren Sinne für die Jungianer ist, dass diese das Interesse fürKinderanalysen von ihnen (vor allem von der Psychoanalytikerin Melanie
Klein) gewissermaßen übernahmen.
Ein bekannter Jungianer (mit einer Ausbildung in der Schweiz) ist
beispielsweise Paul Watzlawick. Bei ihm ist die Freud-Lektüre ziemlich
offensichtlich.
Meine Vermutung ist also, dass Jean Rhees sich nicht nur mit C.G. Jungbeschäftigt hat (wie gesagt hat sie kleine Teile der Bände II und IX seiner
Gesammelten Werke ins Englische übersetzt), sondern auch Freud gelesen hat.
Vielleicht lassen sich noch historiographische Spuren von internen Seminaren
zu Freud bei den Londoner „Analytikern“ (so die Kurzsprechweise für die
Experten in „analytical psychology“) feststellen.

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Martin Ohmacht, "Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees | Martin Ohmacht

4. Jean Rhees, Wittgenstein und Rush Rhees

Als Kernpunkt dieses Papers möchte ich jetzt das kooperative Dreieckbesprechen, das Rush Rhees, seine langjährige Ehefrau und Ludwig
Wittgenstein darstellten. Die Gespräche über Freud entstanden zwischen 1940
und 1946, also relativ spät, und sind allgemein bekannt.
In meiner Bearbeitung eines der Träume Wittgensteins, dem Traum vom
störrischen Maultier (vom 27. April 1930), habe ich schon als Resultat gebracht,
dass es vermutlich zwischen 1924 und 1927 war, dass Wittgenstein begann, dieFreud‘sche „Traumdeutung“ zu lesen.
Rush Rhees genoss bei Wittgenstein eine Vertrauensstellung allerersten
Ranges. Man kann vermuten, dass Wittgenstein ahnte, dass Rush Rhees
Protokolle von den Gesprächen der beiden fixierte, aber ihre Kooperation
wurde von dem unausgesprochenen Einverständnis getragen, dassWittgenstein diese Protokolle nicht zu Gesicht bekam. Die Erfahrungen mit
Waismanns Versuchen in Wien in den 1930ern, ein gemeinsames Buch zu
produzieren, waren hier maßgeblich. Das Bauernopfer, das man in Kaufnahm, bestand darin, dass die Zeitgenossen nicht über den Inhalt der
Gespräche über Freud informiert wurden. Wittgensteins großes Vertrauengegenüber Rush Rhees wurde nicht enttäuscht.
Eine der Zorntriaden Wittgensteins wegen des Durchsickerns vonInformationen bekamen John Wisdom (1931, 1934), Alfred J. Ayer (The Listener, 1946) und Brian Anthony Farrell, der 1946 den Ausdruck vom„therapeutischen Positivismus“ in Umlauf setzte, zu spüren. Die ausführlichste
Schilderung von diesem Zornesausbruch findet sich in Ayers Autobiographie(1977) auf den Seiten 304–306. Leider hat sich nicht klären lassen, ob es zwei
Zornesausbrüche gab oder nur einen Zornesausbruch mehrfach (so wie 1958
bei Norman Malcolm erzählt wird).
Man muss sich in die Situation von Rush Rhees hineinversetzen, als er kurznach Sigmund Freuds Tod am 23. September 1939 erfuhr, dass Wittgenstein
mit ihm Protokolle anfertigen wollte, die zum Ziel hatten, seine Einstellung
gegenüber einem völlig fernen und ausgesprochen revolutionären
Psychologen darzustellen. Was für eine Verantwortung! Würde Rush Rhees
diese Funktion übernehmen und dabei

Martin Ohmacht, "Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

447

Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees | Martin Ohmacht• einfach Wittgensteins Aussagen ungeprüft wiedergeben oder
• sollte er versuchen, sie annähernd sachlich prüfend zu verstehen?
Erstere Variante würde bedeuten, sich zum Protokollanten degradieren zu
lassen und die Verantwortung für die Sachebene, die ja von den Haltungenberührt werden würde, allein Wittgenstein zuzuschanzen. Das Objekt dieser
Gespräche konnte Rush Rhees selbst vermutlich bestenfalls vom Hörensagen
kennen. Aber auch Wittgenstein pflegte keine nennenswerten Kontakte zu
Psychoanalytikern im engeren Sinne. Die zweite Alternative, ein Mehr an
Verantwortung zu übernehmen, schien da fast ein Sachzwang zu sein.
In diese heikle Situation eines Dilemmas fügt es sich nun ganz geglückt, dass
Rush Rhees‘ Ehefrau Jean als Jungianische Analytikerin ausgebildet war. Sie
war damals knapp 40 Jahre alt, und da kann man davon ausgehen, dass die
Ausbildung schon fortgeschritten war.
Ich möchte jetzt die Katze aus dem Sack lassen und eventuell die Vermutungäußern, dass Wittgensteins Entscheidung, diese Gespräche überhaupt ins
Leben zu rufen und zwar so spät, dadurch gefördert wurde, dass Wittgensteindiese Konstellation um 1940 erkannte und planvoll auf sie zusteuerte. Rush
Rhees würde die Möglichkeit erhalten, die eherne Regel, wonach niemand vonden Zeitgenossen vom Inhalt der Gespräche über Freud informiert werden
durfte, punktuell zu umgehen, um mit seiner psychoanalytisch gebildeten
Ehefrau Aspekte der Sachebene der Gespräche zu erörtern. Heute würde man
ein solches Vorgehen Coaching oder Supervision nennen. Diesequalitätssichernde Maßnahme war Teil eines vermutlich dennoch
unausgesprochenen Planes, der insgesamt als Möglichkeit entstand, weil
Wittgenstein Rush Rhees so sehr viel Vertrauen entgegenbrachte.
Man denke nur daran, dass jeder Psychoanalytiker einem strengen
Verschwiegenheitsgebot unterworfen ist.
References
Ayer, Alfred J. (1946): Freedom and Necessity, Polemic, no. 5, pp. 36-44.
Ayer, Alfred J. (1946): Contemporary British Philosophy, in: The Listener, 5. Dezember, pp. 787f.
Ayer, Alfred J. (1947): The Claims of Philosophy, in Polemic, no. 7, pp. 18–33. WA 1949.
Ayer, Alfred J. (1977): Part of my Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees | Martin Ohmacht

Clark, Ronald W. (1985): Der Bruch mit Jung, in: Sigmund Freud, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer
Taschenbuch, Seiten 359–383.
O´C. Drury, Maurice (1987): Gespräche mit Wittgenstein, in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Porträts undGespräche. FfM: Suhrkamp Verlag, Seiten 142–235.
Farrell, Brian Anthony (1946): An appraisal of therapeutic positivism, in: Mind 1946
Farrell, Brian Anthony (1961): Can Psychoanalysis be refuted?, in: Inquiry I, Seiten 16–36.
Farrell, Brian Anthony (1981): The Standing of Psychoanalysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fischer, Kurt R. (1990): Wittgenstein and Freud: Philosophical Analysis and Psychoanalysis, in:Haller, Rudolf (Hrsg.): Wittgenstein – eine Neubewertung. Akten des 14. Internationalen
Wittgenstein Symposiums, Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Seiten 132–141. Auf Deutsch mit
variiertem Inhalt als Fischer 1991.
Fischer, Kurt R. (1991): Bemerkungen zu Freud und Wittgenstein (und über Adolf Grünbaums
Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse), in: derselbe: Philosophie aus Wien. Wien–Salzburg: Edition
Geyer.
Forrester, John & Cameron, Laura (2017): Freud in Cambridge, Cambridge: CUP, speziell die
Seiten 334–362.
Freud, Sigmund (urspr. 1914): Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung, in:Gesammelte Werke Band X, Seiten 44–113.
Kerr, John (1996): Eine höchst gefährliche Methode. Freud, Jung und Sabina Spielrein,
München: Droemer Knaur.
Malcolm, Norman (urspr. 1958, 2001): Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir, Oxford & New York:OUP.
McGuinness, Brian (1979): Freud und Wittgenstein, in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Schriften. Beiheft
3: Wittgensteins geistige Erscheinung, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, Seiten 67–81.
Ohmacht, Martin (2023): Appendix 2: Wittgensteins kritisch-wertschätzende Akzeptanz der
Psychoanalyse, eine Compilation, in: Wittgensteins Traumprotokolle. Rekonstruktion einer
Selbstanalyse. Klagenfurt: Privatdruck.
Society of Analytical Psychology (ed.), Davidson, Dorothy (author): Journal of Analytical
Psychology 1982, Volume 27 (Jan.): Obituary: Jean Rhees (died on 18 May 1981, aged 78), pages
83 – 84.
Wikipedia: Rush Rhees, last access 17. März 2023.
Wisdom, John (1931): Interpretation and Analysis in relation to Bentham’s theory of defining,
London: Kegan & Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

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Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wisdom, John (1934): Problems of Mind and Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wisdom, John (1953) Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis. Reprinted from Polemic 1946 No. 4, WA
in: Wisdom 1953/1969, Seiten 169–181.
Wisdom, John (1953) Philosophy, Metaphysics and Psycho-Analysis, WA in: Wisdom 1953/1969,
Seiten 248–282.
Wisdom, John (first printed 1953, 4th impression 1969): Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis.
Oxford: Blackwell. (Wisdom hat anscheinend 1931 den Begriff ‘analytic philosophers’ in
Umlauf gesetzt und dabei ,the nature of soul‘ ins Spiel gebracht: siehe Forrester, Seite 348.)
Wisdom, J. Oulten [Neffe von John Wisdom] (1966): Testing a psychoanalytic Interpretation, in:
Ratio 8.
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Martin Ohmacht, "Wittgenstein und die Jungianische Psychoanalytikerin Jean Rhees". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein | Luca Oliva

Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein
Luca Oliva (Houston, US)
Abstract
Wittgenstein’s TLP shifts logic toward the analysis of language, breaking with Frege’s andRussell’s views. Its main claim is that the business of logic consists of representing or (a)picturing reality (TLP 4.01). Nevertheless, (b) saying something about the world implies that asentential picture must share with reality a logical form (Maury 1983, Morris 2008, Frascolla2007). On the contrary, (c) logical propositions per se say nothing. Instead, they show the
logical scaffolding of the world, which relies on (d) analytic propositions or tautologies (BakerHacker 1984, Dreben-Floyd 1991, Glock 2008). However, Wittgenstein also bestows (c) ametaphysical connotation since logical sentences disclose how the world could be. Scholars(Anscombe 1965, Juhl-Loomis 2010) usually overlook the implications of this possibility andadopt Wittgenstein’s dismissive attitude toward analytic claims. Differently, I argue that, in
TLP, (a) relies on (c). If correct, it follows that (d) is prescriptive and bears a normative
connotation supporting (b).

In TLP, Wittgenstein identifies logic with the fundamental forms of any
symbolic representations. His view breaks with tradition significantly. Insteadof timeless and language-independent relations between abstract entities(Frege 1884), logic deals with the most general conditions for the possibility ofrepresenting. “The abstract logical structure of a correct conceptual notation
would reveal,” clarify Baker and Hacker, “the essential nature of any possible
sign-system which can represent reality” (1984: 39). Unlike Frege and Russell,
Wittgenstein’s “logic is not an investigation into the nature of languageindependent judgements, concepts and laws of thought, but an elucidation of
the essential properties of symbols alone (TLP 6.113, 6.126).” (Hacker 2009: 41)
Consistently, he reduces philosophy to the analysis of a natural language
where that logical structure is at work. Therefore, ordinary language is in good
logical order since to represent or depict at all; it must already have theessential structure making representation possible, namely a logical structure.
So, logic doesn’t improve (as Frege and Russell held) but clarifies a natural
language by revealing what is hidden in the symbolism of a language itself.
This clarification consists in analyzing linguistic propositions that, for
Wittgenstein, rely on a semantic structure. This latter per se says nothing but
supposedly shows the logical essence of the world. In what follows, I argue
that analytic propositions (dubbed as ‘tautologies’ by Wittgenstein) support
such an essence. My claim relies on Baker-Hacker’s conclusion that “All the

Luca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein | Luca Oliva

propositions of logic follow from operations generating tautologies out oftautologies” (1984: 44) and furthers related arguments by Anscombe (1965),
Dreben-Floyd (1991), Frascolla (2007), Glock (2006), Mácha (2015), McGinn(2006), and Morris (2008), among others. Despite the differences, Wittgensteinbuilds on Frege’s and Russell’s claims, from which his notion of analyticity (seeWilliamson 2007: 54-7) ultimately derives.
[In TLP 6.1 and 6.11] Wittgenstein asserts that the propositions of logic aretautologies, say nothing, and are the analytical propositions, he iscontinuing the Idealist and Moore-Russell traditions of identifying theclass of analytic propositions with tautologies […] and is directly attacking
Frege’s conception of logic. (Dreben-Floyd 1991: 28)

I – THE PICTURE THEORYFor Wittgenstein, the essence of representation lies in the description; namely
the depiction of a state of affairs employing a proposition. So, he focuses on
elementary propositions, reducible to “a sensible sentence which is logicallyindependent of every other such sentence” (Baker-Hacker 1984: 39-40). An
elementary proposition has no (non-trivial) entailments but describes theexistence of an elementary state of affairs. Let’s recall that, for example, aformula P is trivial for a background formula set Γ if Γ |= P or Γ |= ¬P (read: Γsemantically entails (i.e., is true of) P or non-P). Otherwise, P is nontrivial for Γ(see Clark 1967). So arises the picture theory of the proposition, which contains
the essence of all descriptions that, in turn, capture the essence of the world.
Its main claim is that “A proposition is a picture of reality” (TLP 4.01).
For what is essential for a description is whatever makes possible therepresentation of states of affairs in reality, and whatever structuralfeatures states of affairs possess in virtue of which they can be describedat all are themselves the essence (the essential form) of reality. (BakerHacker 1984: 40)
According to the picture theory (hereafter PT), analytic sentences are reducible
to tautologies (see Glock 2010). Tautological (and contradictory) claims don’t
describe anything but prescribe the rules for any descriptions. In
Wittgenstein’s TLP, logical truths cannot be reduced to universal laws applying

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Luca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein | Luca Oliva

to every statement. Indeed, they don’t say anything about the world. They
instead represent tautologies whose business is to show the logical “scaffoldingof the world” (TLP 6.124). E.g., see the law of non-contradiction. So,
Wittgenstein sharply separates saying and showing in any sentence. However,what does it entail? These notions need clarification.
Let’s start with saying. Unlike Frege, Wittgenstein denies referentiality tosentences and sense to names: names have reference but not sense, and claims
have sense but no reference. An elementary proposition comprises simple
indefinable names denoting sempiternal objects in reality (such as
spatiotemporal points or simple, unanalyzable qualities), conceived as theworld’s metaphysical substance. We combine names to form elementary
propositions using conventional logico-syntactical rules that specify
combinatorial possibilities.
To assign a given object to an arbitrary name as its referent, the logicalsyntax of the name must mirror the combinatorial possibilities of theobject in reality, viz. its ability to combine with other such objects toconstitute a state of affairs (e.g., a given spatio-temporal point’s having
such-and-such a quality). (Baker-Hacker 1984: 40-1)
So, the notion of saying presupposes that of showing. An object’s nominalreferent entails the object’s combinations in reality. The logical form of thatname implies specific semantics and relies on a particular syntax, althoughconventionally established. So, this logical syntax becomes prescriptive for(representing) those combinations. The possibility of such actual combinations
depends on the syntactic normativity that underpins their mirroring semantics.
A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always
important that it is a possible mode of signifying. And that is generally soin philosophy: again and again the individual case turns out to be
unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case discloses
something about the essence of the world. (TLP 3.3421)
Notoriously, the proposition shares its essence with the world. Wittgensteincalls this common feature between proposition and world ‘the logicalform’ (see Maury 1983). As Morris says, “sentences have the same form as thereality they depict” (2008: 152). Indeed, “the proposition is a picture of the

Luca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein | Luca Oliva

situation,” explains Frascolla, “and is, in this sense, ‘essentially connected’ (T4.03) with it” (2007: 12).
To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all
description, and thus the essence of the world. (TLP 5.4711)
Implicitly, determining the logical forms of names (required by the essence ofa proposition) entails a standard tripartition of linguistic analysis.
(a) Syntax defines a set of valid formulas, e.g., ‘Wet · Rain.’(b) Semantics specifies a set of models (configurations of the world) for each
formula, e.g., as follows.

(c) Inference rules establish, given f, what new formulas g can be added that
follow (f/g). E.g., from ‘Wet · Rain’ follows ‘Rain.’PT’s central tenet is the isomorphic relation of proposition and reality despite
the names of objects being arbitrary and their logical syntax conventional.
Once conventions are fixed, “the relation between an elementary proposition
and the state of affairs it depicts is essential and internal” (see Mácha 2015),
namely “the proposition must be isomorphic with the state of affairs it depicts,
it must have the same logical multiplicity and identical logical form” (BakerHacker 1984: 41). So, the combination of names adopting logical-syntacticalrules represents a logical picture of a state of affairs (see McGinn 2006: 81).
Such a strict isomorphism between sentence and reality shows the logical formshared by the sentence and what it depicts. So, PT supports an obtainment
theory – a sentence is true iff the state of affairs it depicts obtains. Therefore,
PT differs from deflationary theories in that it involves an ontology of states ofaffairs/facts; and it “can be transformed into a type of correspondence theory:a sentence is true iff it corresponds to, i.e., depicts an obtaining state of affairs(fact)” (Glock 2006: 345).

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Luca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein | Luca Oliva

These theses enshrined a form of the Augustinian picture at the heart of theTractatus, as a picture, not of the surface forms of language but of its
underlying structure (see Bearsley 1983, Burnyeat 1987).

II – TAUTOLOGIESPT (TLP 2.1-3.84) treats a genuine proposition as a picture depicting how things
are, if it’s true, or how they are not but could be if it’s false (TLP 4.6). A picture(i.e., proposition) is true if it corresponds with how things are, while it’s false if
it doesn’t. Still, “whether true or false, a picture/proposition must depict theway things might possibly be or possibly not be” (Juhl-Loomis 2010: 19). Indeed,
it must depict a possible state of affairs (see TLP 4.01-4.05), meaning neither
impossible nor necessary. If anything cannot possibly be the case, nothing isthere to be depicted. Similarly, a pictorial proposition cannot portray anythingthat must be the case, i.e., that cannot possibly not be (see TLP 4.063). Picturing
such a state of affairs would not possibly be false (5.61), but it tells us nothing
about how the world actually is. “Since it could not fail to be true, it would becompatible with every possible circumstance, and so would not tell us how theworld in fact is” (Juhl-Loomis 2010: 20).
Hence, “the sense of a molecular proposition is thus given by its truthconditions, which reality may or may not satisfy” (Baker-Hacker 1984: 42).
Accordingly, ‘p & q’ requires the conjoint realization of the states of affairs p
and q obtains, whereas ‘p v q’ allows the realization of p alone, q alone or both.
So, Wittgenstein analyzes significant sentences into truth-functional
combinations of atomic ones, whose conjunctions or disjunctions generatequantified sentences. Baker and Hacker suggest considering necessarily true
propositions in the Tractatus as non-extensional contexts, analyzable into
pseudo-propositions or, in fact, extensional ones. Let’s recall that extensional
contexts prioritize reference over sense, e.g., ‘the morning star and the evening
star’ or ‘21/3 and 7’ have the same extension but different intension. In similar
syntactic contexts, a sub-sentential expression (e.g., ‘Satan’) can be replaced by
an expression (e.g., ‘Lucifer’) retaining equal extension and truth-value of thewhole sentence (e.g., ‘the fallen angel who seduces humans into sin or
falsehood’).

Luca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein | Luca Oliva

A molecular proposition’s truth value depends on the distribution of truth
values among its constituents. But Wittgenstein identifies two exceptions, (a)tautology and (b) contradiction, respectively, true or false however we assign
truth values to the propositional constituents. E.g., ~(p & ~p), ((p ⊃ q) & p) ⊃ q.
These propositions of logic are limiting cases since they aren’t bipolar. Indeed,“tautologies leave open,” say Baker and Hacker, “the whole of logical space,since they are true however things are in the world, and contradictions close
off the whole of logical space, since they are false no matter what.” (1984: 43).
Being unconditionally true or false, tautologies and contradictions have nosense since they have no truth-conditions.
The propositions of logic are tautologies. (TLP 6.1)
Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing. (They are the analytic
propositions.) (TLP 6.11)
So, tautologies have no content. “They are simply (senseless) consequences ofour conventional symbolism for combining propositions” (Baker-Hacker 1984:
43). Therefore, expressing necessary truth or necessary falsity obtains no
genuine proposition. Such statements merely stand for tautologies (if true) orcontradictions (if false) by means of their form alone.
It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize thatthey are true from the symbol alone, and this fact contains in itself thewhole philosophy of logic. And so too it is a very important fact that thetruth or falsity of non-logical propositions cannot be recognized from the
propositions alone. (TLP 6.113)
Notably, Wittgenstein employs these semantic classes to describe the nature ofarithmetic propositions, which he deems as pseudo-propositions expressing nothoughts (see TLP 6.2-6.21).
However, “All the propositions of logic follow from operations generating
tautologies out of tautologies” (Baker-Hacker 1984: 44). So, logic isn’t a science
resting on self-evident axioms, but the manipulation of signs determined byrules of logical syntax. Knowing the logical syntax of any sign-language
suffices for obtaining all the propositions of logic. Consistently, analytic
propositions show logical necessity brought to light by analyzing the456

Luca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein | Luca Oliva

underlying structure of language. Therefore, philosophical pronouncements
appear now to be ill-formed sentences violating the rules of logical syntax.
More precisely, their illegitimate categorical concepts (e.g., substance,
property) are merely variables, not names. These metaphysical pseudopropositions pretend to say necessary truths about reality but lack bipolarity(see McGinn 2006: 98). Quite the opposite, “only bi-polar propositions picture
reality; and only tautologies are necessary truths, and they say nothing about
the world.” (Ibid)
Nevertheless, let’s briefly remind that the late Wittgenstein abandoned PT for
its supposed incapacity to account for falsity; specifically, “it fails to provide asatisfactory account of the distinction between true and false
propositions” (Shieh 2019: 11). But this development isn’t my current purpose.

III – CONVENTION AND NOTATIONAs stated above, Wittgenstein distances himself from Frege, who conceives
logical laws as stating general truths about the world. However, he retains a
non-trivial purpose of tautology and contradiction, to which he reduces thelaws of logic. Indeed, such laws show “the formal - logical - properties oflanguage, of the world” (TLP 6.12). Roughly put, the language has certain
formal features that show the formal properties of the world, although they
say nothing about it.
Notwithstanding, Wittgenstein’s TLP mainly relies on three achievements ofFrege, later developed by Russell.
(1) The similarity between semantics and mathematical logic. Frege comparesa predicate and the expression of an arithmetical function, e.g., ‘(x)2’. The
notion of propositional function, such as ‘x is bald’, lies in this comparison.
Accordingly, we obtain a sentence if we replace the latter ‘x’ with a (real)
proper name, “just as from ‘(x)2’ we get an expression of definite value by
replacing the ‘x’ by a definite number” (Anscombe 1965: 14).
(2) The modern conception of quantification. In modern (post-Fregean) logic,
quantification reformulates sentences such as ‘Everything is heavy’ and‘Something is heavy’ as: ‘For all x, x is heavy’ and ‘For some x, x is heavy’ (orLuca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

457

Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein | Luca Oliva‘There is an x such that x is heavy’), respectively. It does so by adopting asymbolic notation.
(3) The replacement of subject-predicate logic with function-theoretic logic. A
proposition is a function of its constituent expressions, decomposable intofunction and argument.
As Anscombe notices, Frege’s notation has some non-technical relevance.
Indeed, it can disambiguate puzzling arguments. Consider, for example,
Descartes’s version of Anselm’s ontological argument stating that the notion of
God involves that of existence, as that of a triangle implies its various
properties. After Frege’s notation, the argument sounds like “if anything is atriangle, it has those properties, so if anything is God, it must possess eternal
existence” (Anscombe 1965: 15). From the argument’s premise, now correctlystated, doesn’t follow Descartes’s intended conclusion that God exists. Since“from: ‘For all x, if φx, then ψx’, we cannot infer: ‘There is an x such that φx’” (Ibid). Suppose ‘φx’ stands for ‘x is God’ and ‘ψx’ for ‘x has eternal existence;’
we cannot infer ‘There is a God’ from ‘For all x, if x is God, x has eternal
existence’.
Importantly, Wittgenstein maintains that logical constants, such as
connectives, quantifiers, identity signs, and others, don’t represent anything.
On the contrary, although syncategorematic, for Frege, these expressions
denote actual concepts and relations (such as unary and binary functions),
mapping truth-values on truth-values. But, in PT, these expressions signify
operations for generating compound statements from elementary ones, andnot logical objects. Despite that, for Wittgenstein, necessity is a consequence ofarbitrary conventions of logical syntax for the compounding of propositions.
However, such a metaphysical flavor of PT (and the related notion ofanalyticity) dissatisfied all empiricists, especially the Vienna Circle’s members(Schlick and Carnap in primis) concerned with avoiding any metaphysicalimplication. So, they proposed treating the truths of logic as expressions ofconventions governing a given language (see Glock 2008). Besides theconventional connotation (see Schlick 1974: 69-79), Circle’s members maintain458

Luca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein | Luca Oliva

the Wittgensteinian properties of the logical laws, namely their incapacity to
say anything about the way things are and their capacity of spelling out therelations and/or implication among statements.

Conclusion

The separation between (a) saying and showing presupposes the (b) pictorial
theory of meaning, Wittgenstein’s signature thesis in the Tractatus. Although of
conventional origin, the logical form of showing becomes necessary once
established. It shares certainty with (c) tautologies (i.e., analytic propositions)and contradictions, whose truth values’ distribution disregards all relations
with reality. (d) Such logical propositions show the linguistic scaffolding of theworld but nothing else within it. However, Wittgenstein also bestows them ametaphysical connotation since they disclose how the world could be. Scholars
usually overlook the implications of this possibility and adopt Wittgenstein’s
dismissive attitude toward analytic claims (see Anscombe 1965, Baker-Hacker
1984). Differently, I argued that (b) relies on (d). If correct, it follows that (c) isprescriptive and bears a normative connotation supporting (a).

References
Anscombe, Gertrude E.M. (1965). An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Harper & Row.
Baker, Gordon P. and Hacker, P.M.S. (1984) Language, Sense and Nonsense, Blackwell.
Bearsley, Patrick (1983). Augustine and Wittgenstein on Language. Philosophy 58/224, pp.
229-36.
Burnyeat M. F. (1987). The Inaugural Address: Wittgenstein and Augustine De Magistro.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 61, pp. 1-24.
Clark, Michael (1967), The General Notion of Entailment. The Philosophical Quarterly 17/68, pp.
231-45.
Dreben, Burton and Floyd, Juliet (1991) Tautology: How Not to Use a Word. Synthese 87, pp.
23-49.
Juhl, Cory and Loomis, Eric (2010). Analyticity. Routledge.
Frascolla, Pasquale (2007). Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Routledge.

Luca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Frege, Gottlob (1950 [1884]). The Foundations of Arithmetic. J. L. Austin (translator). Blackwell.
Glock, Hans Johann (2006). Truth in the Tractatus. Synthese 148/2, pp. 345-68.
Glock, Hans-Johann (2008), “Necessity and Language: In Defense of Conventionalism”,
Philosophical Investigations 30, 24-47.
Glock, Hans-Johann (2010), “Necessity, A Priority and Analyticity: A Wittgensteinian
Perspective.” In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language (Palgrave, 133-47).
Hacker, P.M.S. (2009) Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Blackwell.
Mácha, Jakub (2015) Wittgenstein on Internal and External Relations, Bloomsbury.
Maury, André (1983). Reality and Logical Form. Synthese 56/2, pp. 171-80.
McGinn, Marie (2006). Elucidating the Tractatus. Oxford University Press.
Morris, Michael (2008). Wittgenstein and the Tractatus. Routledge.
Schlick, Moritz (1974). General Theory of Knowledge. Springer-Verlag.
Shieh, Sanford (2019). Necessity Lost. Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy, Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961 [1922]). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Routledge; abbr. TLP.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958) Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1967) Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, MIT.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1969) On Certainty, Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974) Philosophical Grammar, Blackwell.

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Luca Oliva, "Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

The Tractatus in Buchenwald | David Palme

The Tractatus in Buchenwald
David Palme (Frankfurt, Germany)
Abstract
Throughout his autobiographical work, the concentration camp survivor Jorge Semprún
mentions Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus several times. Chiefly, he uses
TLP 6.4311 as a device to reflect on his experiences in the Nazi concentration camps andwhether death is part of life. At first glance, Semprún’s objection roots in a superficial readingof the Tractatus. He rejects Wittgenstein’s claim that “death is not an event of life” because wewitness the death of others in everyday life. His criticism can be met by connecting 6.4311
with the propositions following 5.6 and looking at Wittgenstein’s own experience with death.
However, there is a deeper discussion about the nature of death and its transgression in thecamps present in Semprún’s work which deserves more examination with Wittgenstein’s
thinking. Survivors and philosophers have argued in favour of an existential change in theconcepts of life and death regarding the concentration camps. The paper is an effort toconnect Wittgenstein with the ongoing debate about Nazi atrocities.

1. Wittgenstein and the Wars

Ludwig Wittgenstein conceived most of the Tractatus during the first World
War, during which he volunteered for the German-Austrian side. Twenty years
later, in the second World War, Wittgenstein sided with the British,
volunteering in a London hospital, helping against the German onslaught.
However, the Allied victory caused little joy in Wittgenstein. In the preface tothe Philosophical Investigations, he mentions the “darkness of our times”
which can be read as a reference to the War, its advancement in the capacity
to kill, its Propaganda machine, the Nazi camps, and the Holocaust (Monk
1991: 385-400, 480-48). While Wittgenstein agreed with the claim that theconcentration camp of Buchenwald proves that there was another, non-Nazi
Germany that was killed and oppressed by the Nazis (Venturinha 2018: 200),
he could not have known that one person held in Buchenwald used his work toreflect on his own experience.
The paper discusses how the concentration camp survivor Jorge Semprún uses
proposition 6.4311 of the Tractatus in his autobiographical books. Semprún
discusses the nature of death and its transgression in the camps by criticizing
Wittgenstein. The paper presents his reading of proposition 6.4311, discusses
whether his critique is substantial and claims that Wittgenstein’s thinking is
fruitful for the philosophical debate on camps.

David Palme, "The Tractatus in Buchenwald". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
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The Tractatus in Buchenwald | David Palme

2. The Tractatus in Buchenwald

Jorge Semprún was born in 1923 in Madrid. He fled the Spanish Civil War to
The Hague and ultimately to Paris, where he studied philosophy. After Nazi
Germany invaded France in 1942, Semprún joined the French Resistance in1943. He was captured, tortured and deported to the concentration camp
Buchenwald near Weimar in Germany, where he was kept prisoner till thecamp was liberated in 1945. His philosophical background makes him standout among the survivors who wrote about their time in the camps.
In his book L'Ecriture ou la vie [Literature or Life/Schreiben oder Leben],Semprún tells the reader that on his last day at Buchenwald, a passage from abook he bought in Paris in Winter 1940/41 came to his mind: a German-English
edition of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Semprún 1997: 202-206). The bigger part ofthe central chapter on the capacity and power of writing is framed by his
relation to the Tractatus (Semprún 1997: 202-235). On the one hand, it is a
device to introduce Semprún’s prior studies of philosophy. He informs thereader about his difficulties translating the first two sentences of TLP 6.4311
into French and how he discussed Wittgenstein’s comments on death injuxtaposition with Heidegger’s Time and Being. On the other hand, it is aneffort to reflect on the concept of death inside the camps. The most condensed
passage has the occasion of the death of his friend and fellow inmate Diego
Morales on the 26th of April 1945:
And then I remember Ludwig Wittgenstein. ‘Death is not an event of life.
Death is not lived through’ wrote that idiot Wittgenstein. Yet, I had
experienced the death of Morales, and I was living through it. As well as I
had lived through the death of Halbwachs. Did I not live through the deathof the young German soldier who had sung La Paloma? The death I had
given him? Did I not experience all the horror, the compassion, of all these
deaths? Of all death? (Semprún 1997: 230; a similar passage can be foundin Semprún 2001: 58-69)
In the quote, Semprún states that death is an experience in our lifetime. We
are present when others die; thus, death is a common experience; an event oflife; even more so when surrounded by death and suffering in the War and thecamps. Therefore, according to Semprún, Wittgenstein should have written: “462David Palme, "The Tractatus in Buchenwald". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Tractatus in Buchenwald | David Palme

My death is not a part of my own life” (Semprún 1997: 206). But then, it would
have been a banality, he adds.

3. “Death” in the Tractatus

Presumably, Wittgenstein would not object to inserting “my” into the first
sentence of 6.4311. The proposition quoted by Semprún actually expresses that“my death” is not part of “my life”. However, in the Tractatus, it is hardly abanality but a claim about the relation of limits. The strength of this reading
becomes clear when the passage is considered in context. The proposition
directly references earlier ones by stating in the last sentence of the
proposition that “our life is endless in the way our visual field is without
limits” (TLP 1922: 6.4311). In TLP 5.633-5.6331, Wittgenstein claims that
although the eye limits the visual field, it is not a part of it. Thus, both life andthe visual field could be considered endless because their limits areimperceptible by what they limit. TLP 5.633 itself is, in turn, a sub-paragraphof “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (TLP 1922: 5.6). If
the same principle applies to proposition TLP 5.6 as to its sub-sections,whatever limits language or the world does not belong to it as well. This is not
to say that there are no limits, but they can not be expressed by means of what
they limit.
Remarkably, in TLP 5.6, Wittgenstein included the possessive pronoun
Semprún wants to add. It is addressed in the final proposition of the section:“The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the ‘world is my world’” (TLP
1922: 5.641). Thus, the world of which death is not a part but its limit, is myworld as it is my death: So too at death the world does not alter but comes toan end" (TLP 1922: 6.431). The claim that death does not alter a set of facts isthe same as stating it is not an event in life; if we understand “life” as asequence of alterations of facts. In proposition 6.431 “death” has to be thedeath of the “I”, my death, since it seems obvious that the death of others is not
the end of the world as such. It might be the end of their world, but not mine.
The first draft of proposition 6.4311 was conceived in July 1916 (TB 1961: 74).
During a Russian breakthrough on the eastern front, at Wittgenstein’s position,
the Austrians suffered heavy casualties, and Wittgenstein ponders the matterof death (Baum 1984: 6-7). Authors such as Max Black have suggested that theDavid Palme, "The Tractatus in Buchenwald". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Tractatus in Buchenwald | David Palme

claim that “death is not an event of life” has to be read as a stoic remark about
the non-being of death, in vain of the Platonic argument against the fear ofdeath: when it happens, one will not be there to experience it, so why fear it?
(Black 1971: 370-374) Other remarks of Wittgenstein in his notebooks support
this interpretation, such as “A man who is happy must have no fear. Not evenin face of death” (TB 1961: 74). Wittgenstein’s remark about death not being an
event of life states as well the limitlessness of life. The second sentence of
6.4311, “eternal life belongs to those who live in the present”, evokes elementsof the Christian faith (Appelqvist 2013). One might suggest that Wittgenstein
was trying to comfort himself with the proposition about death, especiallyregarding his situation during the war. If this should be true, it gives Semprún
another reason for calling Wittgenstein an “idiot”: the heroic or stoic andblissful ignorance of death was simply not an option in the camps. Thisobjection might be superior to the superficial accusation that Wittgensteinmight not have been aware that “death” is an everyday event in life. Although,I do not agree with this interpretation.
Instead, Semprún is misreading Wittgenstein by focusing too narrowly on thefirst two sentences of TLP 6.4311 and ignoring the general theme of the limit
throughout the Tractatus. The same applies to the comforting reading of the
proposition just mentioned. Semprún's misinterpretation appears to be basedon his juxtaposition of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. He suggests that while
Heidegger is able to differentiate the undeniable empirical fact of everyday
death and the existential certainty of one’s own (Heidegger 2006: §52) and
Wittgenstein is not. However, he ignores that “death” in TLP 6.4311 is notsupposed to denote the end of “man, the human body or the human soul” but“the philosophical I” (TLP 1922: 5.641). Wittgenstein himself was quite awarethat death is an undeniable empirical fact, yet it had an existential aspect.

4. Death in the camps

There is another layer to Semprún’s reflection on the possibility of theexperience of death. It relates his reasoning to the larger discussion about
suffering and death in the camps. According to what can be called
the “paradox of the witnesses”, famously expressed by survivors like Primo
Levi or Elie Wiesel and philosophically discussed, for example, by Giorgio

464

David Palme, "The Tractatus in Buchenwald". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Tractatus in Buchenwald | David Palme

Agamben in Remnants of Auschwitz (1998), there are no witnesses of whattruly happened in the camps. Whoever survived was privileged in that they
had not experienced the horrors of the camp in full (Levi 1986: 13-14; Schmidt
2007: 91-95; Kusch 2019: 982). In reverse, the paradox implies that “the only
true witness is […] the one who went all the way with the experience, the one
who ended up dead” (Semprún 2003: 12). The experience in the camps issomething they cannot speak of, it seems to lie beyond the limits of language(Kusch 2019: 983-985). Indeed, Levi characterizes the true witnesses by the lossof their capacity for language and judgment long before they actually died
(Levi 1986: 84-84). Following the paradox, the experience of the camp is
unspeakable. Kusch (2019) suggests that it is also unspeakable in
Wittgenstein’s terms, although he uses On Certainty for his argument.
Thus, one way to describe the atrocities of the camps, in the words of theTractatus, is that their “human body” was still alive, but their “philosophical I”
had gone. Since the “philosophical I” is, just like death, not a part of the world,
but its limit, they are beyond that limit, but yet alive. So to speak, death had
become a part of their lives (cf. Agamben 1998, 3.23). In this regard, it ispossible to retell Agamben's argument with concepts of the Tractatus.
While Semprún acknowledges the privilege of survival, he rejects theimpossibility of testimony. Instead, he expresses the conviction that“everything about this experience can be said” (Semprún 1997: 23). The
problem is less the quality of the experience but whether the survivors areheard and live in a way that allows them and others to remember (ibid.).
However, the mentioned passage in Literature or Life ends with a question:“Have I really come back?” (Semprún 1997: 234) For many survivors, thehorror of the camps never ended; they relived it in dreams and felt a great
discomfort in the world they were supposed to return to. Semprún tells thismost explicitly in the story of his ‘own’ death in L'homme qu'il faut [The Dead
Man we Needed/Der Tote mit meinem Namen]. In order to survive and to elude
the SS, he fakes his death with the help of the Resistance inside the camp byswitching identity with another inmate. He spends a night alone with the dying
man, who is similar in physique and biography. After the man’s death,
Semprún takes up his name (Semprún 2003). Semprún wants us to take thisless metaphorically: He did not return from the camps but lived through his
own death. He also declares that death has become a part of his life, although

David Palme, "The Tractatus in Buchenwald". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Tractatus in Buchenwald | David Palmein a different way. The camps make it necessary to rethink the concept ofdeath and to challenge the idea expressed in TLP 6.4311. In the camps, death as
the limit of life was transgressed. Those prisoners who lost their languagetransgressed the limits denoted by the various propositions in the Tractatus.

5. After the Tractatus

Semprún directly connects Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to the discussion about
concentration camps. The paper tried to show in which way his rejection of
TLP 6.4311 is relevant to this discussion. Vice versa, the philosophicaldiscussion about Fascism and the camps can contribute to the discussion of
Wittgenstein’s writing. This examination is far from over. It is a pity how littleis written about the influence of European Fascism, the Holocaust and theSecond World War on Wittgenstein’s thinking, and how little use is made of
Wittgenstein’s writings to grasp what happened. To add on closing observationin that regard: Unlike other German-speaking thinkers, “death” became norecurring topic for Wittgenstein. Others, like the already mentioned Heidegger,
would become obsessed with the concept; they would not, so to speak, returnfrom the war. On the contrary, they kept promoting death in a way thatcommitted to the European movement of Fascism.
In fact, the later Wittgenstein did not return to the topic at all. The concept of“death” is not discussed in his later writings. Probably, the later Wittgensteinwould agree with Semprún's criticism of the Tractatus. There might bedifferent reasons for that. Wittgenstein’s own experience of the war might
have changed him psychologically, as Baum suggests on the basis of
Wittgenstein’s diaries (Baum 1984: 6-7). More importantly, Wittgenstein’s viewof language changed. While the author of the Tractatus might have been more
intrigued by the “paradox of the witness”, the later Wittgenstein would sidewith Semprún that everything can be said. Still, the troubles of testimony are afact. It can, however, not be explained by an opaque or private quality of theexperience of death nor simply by the distance between “us” and the world of
the camps (Kusch 2019: 990). Instead, the troubles of testimony are with theworld after the liberation of the camps. Since the world did not change

466David Palme, "The Tractatus in Buchenwald". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Tractatus in Buchenwald | David Palme

enough, there is no “agreement in form of life” (PI 1953: §242). It might be partof what Wittgenstein felt when he spoke in the preface of the Investigations of
the “darkness of our times”.
References
Agamben, Giorgio (1998): Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Homo Sacer III.
New York: Zone Books.
Appelqvist, Hanne (2013): “Why does Wittgenstein say that ethics and aesthetics are one andthe same?” in: Sullivan, Peter; Potter, Michael (Eds.): Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. History &Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 40–58.
Black, Max (1971): A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Baum, Wilhelm (1984): “Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘Geheime Tagebücher’” in: Zeitschrift für
katholische Theologie. Vol. 106 (4), pp. 3–22.
Heidegger, Martin (2006): Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Monk, Ray (1991): Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Duty of Genius. London: Cape.
Kusch, Martin (2019): “Das Zeugnis der Holocaustüberlebenden: Gewissheit, Skeptizismus,
Relativismus” in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie. Vol. 67 (6), pp. 979–991.
Levi, Primo (1986): The Drowned and the Saved. New York: Summit Books.
Semprún, Jorge (2001): Die Ohnmacht. Frankfurt: Suhkamp. Originally published in 1967:
L’evanouissement. Paris: Gallimard.
Semprún, Jorge (1997): Schreiben oder Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Originally published in
1994: L’Écriture ou la vie. Paris: Gallimard.
Semprún, Jorge (2003): Der Tote mit meinem Namen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Originallypublished in 2001: Le mort qu’il faut. Paris: Gallimard.
Schmidt, Sibylle (2007): “Für den Zeugen zeugen” in: Janine Böckelmann, Frank Meier (Eds.):
Die gouvernementale Maschine. Münster: Unrast, pp. 90-106.
Venturinha, Nuno (2018): “Wittgenstein on British Anti-Nazi-Propaganda. A Fragment” in:Nordic Wittgenstein Review. Vol. 7 (2), pp. 195-208.

David Palme, "The Tractatus in Buchenwald". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein | Ratikanta Panda

The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in
Wittgenstein
Ratikanta Panda (Mumbai, India)
Abstract
Wittgenstein saw things in a more metaphysical framework and saw individual relationships
within the larger framework of the world and cosmos. In this paper, we will analyze
Wittgenstein’s position concerning the individual and its place in a greater framework, theimpact of culture on the same, and the origination of their particular viewpoint in light ofAristotle’s theory of the man-world relationship. Thus, the first section of this paper deals with
Aristotle’s theory of man and his place in society. The second section explores Wittgenstein’s
viewpoint on the concept of the individual and society.

Wittgenstein saw things in a more metaphysical framework and saw
individual relationships within the larger framework of the world and cosmos.
In this paper, we will analyze Wittgenstein’s position concerning theindividual and its place in a greater framework, the impact of culture on thesame, and the origination of their particular viewpoint in light of Aristotle’s
theory of the man-world relationship. Thus, the first section of this paper deals
with Aristotle’s theory of man and his place in society. The second section
explores Wittgenstein’s viewpoint on the concept of the individual and society.

I

There are several theories proposed regarding the man world since man
started doing philosophy. The distinction between these two philosophers canbe appreciated only with the background of the other theories put forward
before them. The earliest theory in this regard comes from Aristotle inWestern philosophy, who rejected the idealist universe of Plato and advocatedthe physicality of this world as true and worth desiring. For him, reality did
not constitute ideal forms only as Plato had preached. Instead, reality consistedof forms idealized in their particular instances. Universals had no existenceapart from the particulars they instantiated. Man, similarly, is not just the
instantiation of universal manhood, but rather the constituent whole of matterplus mind. Each entity of the world, in the platonic scheme of things, was apoor representation of pure, ideal forms that resided in their own realm. Each
entity, for Aristotle, on the other hand, is the individual, concrete unity

468

Ratikanta Panda, "The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein | Ratikanta Panda

manifesting a particular nature of its own different from others. Man is thus
not the poor shadow of a pure intellect as Plato had envisaged but a complete
being on its own, residing at the center of this world. Thus, for the first time,
Aristotle emphasized the concrete, physical nature of the human being, alongwith the concreteness of the world he inhabited. He brought the man downfrom the platonic world of pure forms to the ground reality of worldly
existence. Man is both a form as well as a matter. “Form and matter constituteone indivisible whole, distinguishable only by thought” (Thilly, Frank, 1992,
108). The highest good for man is the realisation of one’s true part-rational
part. Realization of this is possible only when one promotes the interest ofothers and serves one’s country. He considers man’s reason as a spark of
divine reason. Man is a social being and disposed to live with others. One canrealise one’s true self only in society and the state. In this sense, Aristotle issteering a middle course between “statism” and “individualism”. Nobody
chooses happiness for their own sake but for the sake of our happiness withthe hope of promoting happiness for others. This is called by him selfsufficient. It does not mean sufficient for one-self to live a solitary life. But
includes other beings. He says, “That includes parents, wife and children,
friends, and fellow citizens in general” ( The Nichomachean Ethics, 2004, 14).
Though Aristotle did not have any theory of the emergence of both world andman, except for both coming from a self-moved mover called God, he did havesome ideas about the particular natures of both of these. He stressed thecontingency involved in both of them. He talked about the nature of the world
in his Metaphysics and the nature of man in his Nicomachean Ethics. For him,
the proper dimensions of man in his relationship with the world relate to his
routine conduct and transactions with the world, which consisted of not justphysical objects but also other human beings. In Nicomachean Ethics, heelaborates upon the good life of a human being which is to realize its
potentiality by rational guidance. The reason is to guide and enable humanbeings to realize their full potential. The reason, according to Aristotle, is what
separates human beings from other animals. Man alone possesses the ability toreason and language, allowing him to form social groups and communities. He
tries to find the “good” in both the personal behavior of individuals and thepolitical behavior of the state as well.

Ratikanta Panda, "The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein | Ratikanta Panda

For Aristotle, ethics and politics thus presented two sides of the same coin. We
can interpret this equation as that the rules which govern the personal
behavior of an individual (ethics) should not be different from rules whichgovern the collective behavior of a group, city, or state (politics). This view was
to have a towering influence on man-world theories in Western philosophy.
Western philosophy always saw the man-world relationship in pragmatic
aspects – in day to day behavior of the individual and framed accordingly therules of ethical behavior.
Since, by nature, men are desirous of leading a happy and prosperous life, it isbut natural that they would exercise whatever power they have and covet
more in case they have none. But obviously, power is not equally distributed
among people as wealth is not. Consequently, all men are found engaged inthis momentous power struggle. To prevent anarchy and peaceful cohabitation
in society, therefore, it is just that some control is exercised at the center. This
society brings about by establishing an authority or government at the center
to which people, ideally, should yield their freedom for that power to function.
When people agree to form such a government and yield their interests tothem, the social contract comes into force. However, it is to be noted in thisregard that this social contract is not between people and that power. It isamong people themselves and with each other, whereby they decide to abideby the dictates of that power called Government.

II

Wittgenstein vehemently echoed the tyranny of civilisation in their writings.
In a remarkable contrast is young Wittgenstein’s position. Though, like
Oriental thinkers, he did not stress the inherent spirituality of men, like
Western thinkers, he too did not lay emphasis on the materialist nature ofman. For him, the man was primarily a ‘philosophical subject’ who isnevertheless rooted in the everyday world. His mind, language, and meaning
are the product of his daily transactions with the world he is immersed in. His
existence, ideas, thoughts, desires, wishes, etc. are defined and shaped by theparticular cultural form he is born in. He is part of the world, a subject, whoapprehends not only the inanimate objects scattered about him, but also othersubjects like him. Thus, man is at the same time a subject and an object which

470

Ratikanta Panda, "The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein | Ratikanta Panda

is subject to some other man. By admitting the existence of other subjects like
one's own self, Wittgenstein cleverly overturns the solipsist charge that could
have been made upon him. His conception of man as a subject is not a
Cartesian ego bundled in his own skull, but a subject engaged in day-to-day
activities of the world around him incessantly. This subject can know othersubjects like him through the medium of language that they both share. The
shared context that Wittgenstein calls the form of life is the product ofconvention, which is in turn the product of human agency. Since, man, rightfrom birth, is enclosed within some or other form of life, the agency is neverseparated from man, and hence, language. Agency strikes a balance between
man and the world he inhabits. This is because, without being able to act upon
the world around him, man would merely become one of the world's objects.
The agency gives rise to transactions or dealings with the man with othersubjects like him. The emergence of such transactions gives rise to meanings to
the word employed in these transactions. Derek Bolton notes in this regard,“Words have meaning because they are used by men in their activity.” (Bolton
Derek, 1979, 179)
Thus, language and meaning cannot be set apart from human action. Humanexistence is fraught with action; there could not be existence without ceaselesshuman activity. Thus, language and meaning, which are the bedrock of humanreality, are, necessarily dependent upon the activity-ridden existence ofhuman beings.
Language is not just a medium of manifesting what the person feels in his
mind. This is because, according to Wittgenstein, whatever we feel and theway we express are two sides of the same coin. The content and the expressionof mental states cannot be separated from each other. And both of these arelearned through shared contexts in their particular language-games. This isgoing against the Cartesian assumption, which stored the essence of man in
the pineal gland of the skull and affirms existentialists’ position which insisted
vehemently upon the concrete existential reality of human beings. In the end,
we can say that early Wittgenstein, in part, was an existentialist too. However,
one demerit of this approach is that by dragging everything in theintersubjective realm, i.e. language, meaning etc. the human subject is devoidof the originator of knowledge. But that can be easily counteracted by the factthat not only knowledge, but even the criteria, which decides what piece ofRatikanta Panda, "The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein | Ratikanta Panda

information is to be called knowledge, are decided by the society, and not theindividual alone. Foucault, in this context, highlighted the presence of rulingauthority or Power as one of the significant factors deciding the knowledge
issue.
Wittgenstein’s thrust upon ordinary language, which remained throughout hislife (i.e. in post-Tractatus days), further amplifies his existential underpinnings
in the nature of man. He was thoroughly against any picture of the essence ofman that divorces him from worldly reality and imprisons him either in the
Platonic ideas or Cartesian mind. There is nothing about man which is wholly
inside his mind. Even language, the vehicle of his thoughts and ideas, is highlyintersubjective. There is nothing called private language. At a barefundamental level, language is the expression of sensations man has. To
communicate them correctly to others, he must have shared contexts whereinothers can apprehend the meaning of his words correctly. Other’s consequent
behavior would tell whether he has been able to express correctly or not; or, ina nutshell, whether he has been able to use language properly or not. If hewould use a language that is known to him only, how he would come to knowwhether the language he just used is correct or not? Because, in that case,there would be no one to testify this to him. Even if, the man continues to utter
the same sentence for the apparently same kind of sensation, how he would
come to know that the sensations so denoted were really alike? Wittgenstein ismaking a point that pain like that stomach pain, for instance, is denoted by
Stomach-Pain only because of the convention that people share. If I havestomach pain, and I correctly communicate about this pain with the words
Stomach-Pain, only then others who share my context will come to know about
my predicament. However, if I continue to use my private word for such kindof pain consistently for example Tee-Pain, nobody would be able tounderstand it, since such a word nowhere exists in our language-game. Even if
I continue to use it in my private conversation with myself for my purpose, I
would never get to know whether this is the correct word to describe suchkind of pain unless there is someone who points out to me that such a word isinappropriate. It is in this manner that private language is not possible and aself-contradiction.
Wittgenstein stresses one more point that forms of life are not separable fromeach other – they overlap, criss-cross each other at various points. Some forms

472

Ratikanta Panda, "The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein | Ratikanta Pandaof life closely resemble each other; some do not. It is at this juncture that
Wittgenstein speaks about family resemblances about forms of life that sharecommon elements. While defining the essence of a ‘Game’, he finds theirfeatures overlapping in different games and exclaims:
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network ofsimilarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail. ... “family resemblances”; for the various
resemblances between family members: build, feature, colour of eyes, gait,
temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way – And I
shall say: ‘games’ form a family. (PI 1953, 66-68)
Political ideas form families in the same way. One cannot define the contextridden terms like economic oppression, imperialist agenda and politicaldomination without taking into account different games or forms of life inwhich they occur, and shape the society and individuals there in. The simple
imperialist agenda implicit in economic oppression takes an entirely different
coloring in the language-game of globalization wherein different actors cometo play their role. The interdependence of economy, culture and man’s relation
will be discussed in the later section of this chapter.
The post-Tractatus philosophy exhibited in Philosophical Investigation of
Wittgenstein is, thus, concerned with humanising the earlier non-humanized
form of language. It is transforming the idealist clothes of language toexistential ones. Tractatus was centred with showing language as a formal
system comprising of tokens that stood in one-to-one relation with theelements of outside reality. Whereas in Philosophical Investigations, language
is seen as a tradition or a social custom that is constructed over and over again
in inter-personal transactions of the people. Language is dragged from theformal world of a mathematician’s symbols to the social world of an
existentialist. It is in accordance with this shift that Wittgenstein defines theother things, be it mind, world or self. Wittgenstein’s conception of man is thus
neither a purely idealistic self nor a pure materialist self. While Cartesianconception gave birth to man as a mind housed in a body, materialist’
conception saw man as chiefly a product of matter. Wittgenstein rejects both.
For him, man is primarily what Robin Holt called, ‘linguistic self’ – a self whichcannot be aware of its own existence, let alone others without the

Ratikanta Panda, "The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein | Ratikanta Panda

intersubjectivity which is shared through language. Elaborating upon self andidentity, Holt says,
Self and identity are framed in world of experience which is not reducible
to a world of knowledge or truth, be it structural or solipsistic. The self is aconnective force which is never absolutely constituted nor constituting but
a being who has learnt and is learning the uses of language in infinitely
possible contextual ways. The identity of this self is found in those aspect ittakes up and grasps as defining or representational, aspects which exist at
narrative distances of grammatical non-contradiction, distances
established by temporary cessations (which can still, however, last alifetime) in the habitation and exploration of the limits of language. These
aspects are brought about by disruption as much as discussion(pragmatically useful) or discovery (principle), and once used, become
norms internally linked with the motive force of agency and the power ofarticulation – norms concerning what it makes sense to say and which wecome to accept as providing the criteria by which what we come to say issaid to be intelligible. (Holt Robin, 1997, 63)

Conclusion

The apprehensions of Wittgenstein is still proving to be right in the form of themonster god of globalization. Man-World relationship has radicallytransformed into a consumer-producer relationship, resulting in devastating
ecological effects. In this giant network of consumer relationship, man is no
more a being endowed with a spark of divinity but someone having the power
to contribute to the markets of the world, either by producing or by
consuming. Man has suddenly been reduced to a mere number in the statistics
of governments. Instead of spiritual, man has been reduced to a bundle ofmaterialist tendencies which the expanding economies of the world can satiate
through their products. Globalization has added to the spiritual degradation ofman. Man’s inherent nature is no better or divine but materially hungry,
which companies can satisfy. Human values of equality, brotherhood,satisfaction, justice, morality etc. are replaced with inequality, profiteering,
avarice, hoarding etc.
welfare for all.

474

Individual’s own interest have taken priority over

Ratikanta Panda, "The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein | Ratikanta Panda

References
Thilly Frank, A History of Philosophy, Central Publishing House, Allahabad, 1992.
Thomson J.A.K, The Nichomachean Ethics (tr.), Allen & Unwin, Penguin Classics,2004,
Bolton, Derek, An Approach To Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Macmillan Press, UK, 1979.
Wittgenstein Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, 1953.
Holt, Robin, Wittgenstein, Politics And Human Rights, Routledge, UK, 1997.

Ratikanta Panda, "The Concept of Individual and its Place in Society: A Study in Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70
Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

475

„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | Moritz René Pretzsch„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Moritz René Pretzsch (Kassel, Germany)
Abstract
Untersuchungsgegenstand dieses Beitrages ist der Satz 5.552 des Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus, in dem Wittgenstein bekanntlich zwischen zwei verschiedenen Verständnissen
von Erfahrung unterscheidet und zugleich eine bestimmte Ordnung festlegt, von „Was“ derWelt, „Dass“ der Welt, Logik und dem „Wie“ der Welt. Die Logik ist für Wittgensteinerfahrungsunabhängig und einen platonischen Realismus, wie Russell ihn vertritt, lehnt er ab.
Dennoch, so werde ich in diesem Beitrag zeigen, muss sich die Logik auf die „Erfahrung“, dassetwas ist, beziehen, und eben diese Quasierfahrung kann mit dem Mystischen identifiziert
werden. Untersucht und diskutiert werden soll, wie die beiden verschiedenen Verständnisse
von Erfahrung zu unterscheiden sind, inwiefern das „Was“ aus Satz 5.552, welches der Logik
vorausgesetzt ist, mit dem Mystischen selbst zu identifizieren ist und was dies für die Logik
bedeutet. Letztlich werde ich aufzeigen, dass die Logik zwar von der Quasierfahrung, dassetwas ist abhängt, aber unbestimmt bleibt, ob Wittgenstein damit allein die Gegenstände
meint oder er sich dabei immer schon auf die Tatsachen bezieht. Damit bleibt letztlich
ungeklärt, ob der Logik nur einfache Gegenstände vorausgesetzt sein müssen oder ob für die
Logik eine Welt a priori notwendig ist.

Problemexposition: In Auseinandersetzung mit Bertrand Russells
Typentheorie schließt Ludwig Wittgenstein im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
eine kontingente, empirische Basis der Logik aus. Die Regeln der Logik lassensich Wittgenstein zufolge nicht durch den Verweis auf die Bedeutung vonZeichen rechtfertigen. Eine Typentheorie wie Russell sie vertritt, lehnt
Wittgenstein ab. Die Logik, erfahrungsunabhängig, „muss für sich selbersorgen“ (TLP, 5.473) und damit auf eigenen Beinen stehen. Sie ist fürWittgenstein „transcendental“ (TLP, 6.13) und in seinen Augen, ebenso wie die
Ethik, eine „Bedingung der Welt“ (MS 103: 30). Sie ermöglicht uns ein
sinnvolles Sprechen über die Welt. Zu gewissen Problemen führt diese
Bestimmung der Logik, wenn Satz 5.552 des Tractatus herangezogen wird.
Denn dann scheint sich die Logik in ihrer Erfahrungsunabhängigkeit in Fragegestellt zu sehen. So heißt es:
Die „Erfahrung“, die wir zum Verstehen der Logik brauchen, ist nicht die,dass sich etwas so und so verhält, sondern, dass etwas ist: aber das ist
eben keine Erfahrung.
Die Logik ist vor jeder Erfahrung – dass etwas so ist.
Sie ist vor dem Wie, nicht vor dem Was. (TLP, 5.552)

476

Moritz René Pretzsch, "„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | Moritz René Pretzsch

Der Logik geht eine „Erfahrung“ (im Folgenden wird diese als Quasierfahrung
bezeichnet) voraus. In diesem Beitrag möchte ich mich der Frage widmen, wie
der scheinbare Widerspruch aufzulösen ist, dass die Logik einerseits
erfahrungsunabhängig sein soll und andererseits doch von einer „Erfahrung“
abzuhängen scheint, wenngleich diese Quasierfahrung gerade keine
Erfahrung im gewöhnlichen Sinne sein soll. Dabei möchte ich die These
aufstellen, dass sich die Logik auf die Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist, beziehen
muss und diese Quasierfahrung mit dem Mystischen identifiziert werden
kann. Beginnen werde ich zunächst mit einer reinen Textexegese:
Insgesamt taucht der Begriff der „Erfahrung“ an acht Stellen im Tractatus auf(vgl. TLP, 5.552; 5.553; 5.634; 6.1222 und 6.363). Dabei gebraucht Wittgenstein
stets das Substantiv „Erfahrung“, niemals verwendet er das Verb „erfahren“.
Besonders intrikat und für den frühen Wittgenstein eher untypisch, da er
sonst nicht an ein und derselben Stelle mittels Anführungszeichen zwischen
einem Begriff differenziert, ist, dass im Tractatus in Satz 5.552 und nur in Satz
5.552 zwischen Quasierfahrung und Erfahrung unterschieden wird. Zunächst
geht aus Satz 5.552 hervor, dass die Quasierfahrung gerade keine Erfahrung im
Sinne von „dass sich etwas so und so verhält“ ist resp. „dass etwas so ist“. Die
Erfahrung, „dass sich etwas so und so verhält“, ist für Wittgenstein ein„Erleben der Tatsachen“ (vgl. MS 106: 197). Anders dagegen, die
Quasierfahrung, „dass etwas ist“. Diese zielt auf das „Was“. Die Erfahrung,„dass sich etwas so und so verhält“, kurz, „dass etwas so ist“ zielt dagegen auf
das „Wie“. Demnach gibt es einerseits eine Quasierfahrung, die das „Was“
meint und andererseits eine Erfahrung, die auf das „Wie“ zielt. Weiteraufzuschlüsseln ist die Dichotomie in „Was“ und „Wie“ folgendermaßen:
Das „Was“ und „Wie“ scheinen letztlich auf die Welt bezogen, wie die
nachfolgenden Sätze des Tractatus deutlich werden lassen (vgl. etwa TLP
6.432, 6.44). Es sei zunächst das „Was“ betrachtet: Das „Was“ der Welt wird
durch die singulären Termini vermittelt, welche die Gegenstände – die die
Substanz der Welt bilden (vgl. TLP, 2.021) – benennen. Dabei entscheidend ist,
dass die singulären Termini zwar die Gegenstände vertreten (vgl. TLP, 3.22),
sie „benennen“ und damit von ihnen „sprechen“, sie allerdings „nicht
aussprechen“ können (vgl. TLP, 3.221). Folgerichtig gilt: „Ein Satz kann nur
sagen, wie ein Ding ist, nicht was es ist“ (TLP, 3.221). Weiter gilt: Die
Gegenstände, das „Was“, sind „fest“, „bestehend“ (vgl. TLP, 2.0271),

Moritz René Pretzsch, "„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

477

„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | Moritz René Pretzsch„einfach“ (TLP, 2.02) und damit „nicht zusammengesetzt“ (TLP, 2.2021). Die
Gegenstände „bilden die Substanz der Welt.“ (TLP, 2.021) Und „[d]ie Substanz
ist das, was unabhängig von dem was der Fall ist, besteht.“ (TLP, 2.024) Ergo:
Die Gegenstände bestehen unabhängig von dem, was der Fall ist, der Welt als
Menge der bestehenden Sachverhalte.
Das „Wie“ bezieht sich auf das „Wie“ der Welt: Wie die Dinge sich in der Welt
verhalten. Es bezieht sich auf die kontingenterweise in einer Welt realisierten
Gegenstandskonfigurationen (vgl. Majetschak 2000: 98). Die Erfahrung ist eine
Wahrnehmung, dass dies oder jenes in der Welt der Fall ist. Sie ist damit ganz
auf das „Wie“ der Welt ausgerichtet, auf „dass etwas so ist“. Dass sich die Dinge„so und so“ verhalten, könnte genauso gut auch anders sein (vgl. TLP, 5.643).
Wie hängen nun die Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist, welche sich auf das „Was“
bezieht, und die Erfahrung, dass etwas so ist, welche sie auf das „Wie“ bezieht,
mit der Logik zusammen? Und wie hängt die Logik dabei von dem „Was“ ab?
Wittgenstein erklärt den Satzes 5.552 gegenüber Moritz Schlick so,
aufgezeichnet von Friedrich Waismann:
Die Logik ist vor dem Wie, aber nicht vor dem Was. Die Logik hängt davonab, dass etwas existiert (im Sinne von: etwas vorhanden ist), daß es
Tatsachen gibt. Sie ist unabhängig davon, wie die Tatsachen beschaffensind, von dem Sosein. Daß es Tatsachen gibt, das ist durch keinen Satzbeschreibbar. Wenn Sie wollen, würde ich genau so gut sagen: Die Logik
ist empirisch – wenn Sie das Empirie nennen. (McGuinness 2021: 77)
Aus dieser von Waismann aufgezeichneten Bemerkung Wittgensteins geht nun
hervor, dass die Logik davon abhängig ist, dass es Tatsachen gibt. Wie die
Tatsachen beschaffen sind, das fällt nicht mehr in den Bereich der Logik,
sondern bildet den Inhalt der Erfahrung, dass etwas so ist resp. dass sich etwas
so und so verhält (vgl. TLP, 5.552). Wie ist der Inhalt dieser Bemerkung weiterzu erklären? Bislang wurde das „Was“, von dem die Logik abhängt, mit den
Gegenständen identifiziert (vgl. auch Anscombe 2001: 165). Und so lässt sichauch verstehen, dass Wittgenstein die Logik gewissermaßen für „empirisch“
erklärt. Denn sie scheint in der Hinsicht „empirisch“ zu sein, als dass wir die
Gegenstände a posteriori kennen müssen, um zu wissen, welche logischen
Strukturen von ihnen abgeleitet werden können (siehe hierbei auch

478

Moritz René Pretzsch, "„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | Moritz René Pretzsch

Majetschak 2000: 98 f.). In der von Waismann aufgezeichneten Bemerkung
verweist Wittgenstein allerdings auf die Tatsachen, das Bestehen von
Sachverhalten. Bei genauer Betrachtung scheint Wittgenstein zudem zu
differenzieren zwischen „dass etwas existiert“ und „dass es Tatsachen gibt“.
Hängt nun die Logik von den Gegenständen ab oder von den Tatsachen? Fest
steht, dass es nur Tatsachen gibt, weil es Gegenstände gibt. Damit hängt die
Logik evidentermaßen immer von den Gegenständen, dem „Was“ ab. Aber
hängt die Logik auch davon ab, dass die Gegenstände in Sachverhalten eine
Verbindung eingehen, und damit von Tatsachen (vgl. TLP, 2.01)? Fest steht:
Gegenstände können eine Verbindung eingehen, sie müssen allerdings keine
Verbindung eingehen. Diese zunächst kontraintuitiv erscheinende Lesart,
weiß sich gesichert, wenn Satz 2.013 herangezogen wird. In diesem heißt es:„Jedes Ding ist, gleichsam, in einem Raume möglicher Sachverhalte. Diesen
Raum kann ich mir leer denken, nicht aber das Ding ohne den Raum.“ (TLP,
2.013) Theoretisch wäre damit ein leeres Denken des logischen Raumes
möglich, herbei einem Hinweis Norman Malcolms folgend (vgl. Malcolm 1989:
139 f.). Das hieße dann, dass gar nichts der Fall ist, keine Sachverhaltebestehen und die einfachen Gegenstände somit auch in keinem Verhältnis
zueinander stehen. Die Gegenstände würden damit im logischen Raumexistieren, ohne dass sie in irgendeinem Verhältnis zueinander stünden. Damit
wäre auch möglich, dass keine Sachverhalte bestehen und keine Welt ist. Derlogische Raum bliebe damit leer, und entbehrte jeder Sachlage. Welche
Konsequenz hätte dies für die Logik?
Wittgenstein schreibt u. a. in Satz 6.13, dass die Logik „ein Spiegelbild derWelt“ (TLP, 6.13) ist. Eine Logik ohne Welt könnte diese auch nicht mehr
spiegeln, sondern würde nur noch die einfachen Gegenstände selbst
widerspiegeln. Aber eben dies scheint nicht möglich. Denn die Logik ist nur als
weltspiegelnde Logik denkbar, als angewandte Logik. Eine Logik ohne Welt,
ohne Sachverhalte, ist nicht anwendbar. Aber die Logik kann nicht
vorwegnehmen, was zu ihrer Anwendung gehört (vgl. TLP, 5.557). Eben diesscheint Wittgenstein zu meinen, wenn er in Satz 5.5521 für eine Abhängigkeit
der Logik von der Welt argumentiert (vgl. hierbei etwa Hacker 2001: 130 und
Anscombe 2001: 165). Damit scheint sich die oben aufgestellte These zu
bestätigen: Die Logik ist abhängig von der Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist, undeben diese Quasierfahrung bezieht sich auf die Gegenstände, die in Satz 5.552

Moritz René Pretzsch, "„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

479

„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | Moritz René Pretzsch

mit dem „Was“ gemeint sind. Und wie der letzte Abschnitt gezeigt hat: Die
Gegenstände müssen dabei in Sachverhalten eine Verbindung eingehen.
Tatsachen müssen „vorhanden“ sein; dafür argumentieren etwa auch Arthur
Kenny und Brian McGuinness in ihren Beiträgen (vgl. Kenny 2006: 87 und
McGuinness 1989: 175 f.). Selbst wenn man einwenden mag, dass die
Bemerkung oben nur vermeintlich direkt von Wittgenstein stammt, letztlichaber von Friedrich Waismann aufgezeichnet wurde und gar nicht klar ist, ob
die Logik nun allein von Gegenständen abhängt oder davon, dass es auch
Tatsachen gibt, so blieben dabei immer noch Wittgensteins Bemerkungen in
Satz 5.5521 bestehen. Diese Frage leichtfertig als philologische Frage vom Tischzu wischen – ein Zug, der in einer solchen Situation natürlich immer gemacht
werden kann –, hieße sich um eine wichtige wie mühsam zu erarbeitende
Einsicht in die inneren Strukturzusammenhänge des Tractatus zu bringen,zudem wäre damit auch das Problem der Deutung von Satz 2.013 noch nicht
gelöst.
Wittgenstein bemerkt in Satz 5.552 auch, dass die Logik der Erfahrung, dassetwas so ist vorangeht, ebenso dem „dass sich etwas so und so verhält“ unddamit dem „Wie“ der Welt (vgl. TLP, 5.552). Wittgenstein scheint damit
letztlich die Gedanken aus Satz 6.124 zu berühren, in dem er davon spricht,
dass die Logik von nichts „handelt“ (vgl. TLP, 6.124). Und dies lässt sich nur soverstehen, dass die Logik den kontingenterweise realisierten
Gegenstandskonfigurationen in der Welt, dem „Wie“ was „auch anders sein“
kann (TLP, 5.634), nichts hinzufügt. Die Logik kann die Welt nicht korrigieren.
Weder kann sie das kontingent Gegebene bewegen, noch wird sie umgekehrt
vom Kontingenten bestätigt oder nicht bestätigt. Ihre Beziehung zum
kontingent Gegebenen, zum „Wie“, liegt allein darin, dass sinnvolle Sätze überdas „Wie“ gebildet werden können. Und dies ist durch die Voraussetzung
gegeben, „dass Namen Bedeutung, und Elementarsätze Sinn haben“ (TLP,
6.124). Wenn nun gilt, dass die Logik erfahrungsunabhängig ist, nicht aberunabhängig ist von der Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist, so mag an dieser Stelle
die Frage aufkommen, ob eben diese Quasierfahrung das Mystische berührt.
Wie ist das aufzulösen? Hängt die Logik letztlich von dem Mystischen ab?
Das Mystische meint, dass die Welt ist (vgl. TLP, 6.44). Es kann sich, so
Wittgenstein, als „Gefühl“ niederschlagen, dem „Gefühl der Welt als
begrenztes Ganzes“ (ibid.). Allein vom Text des Tractatus ausgehend, ist im

480

Moritz René Pretzsch, "„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | Moritz René Pretzsch

Grunde nicht einmal gesichert, ob das Mystische auch mit Gott identifiziert
werden kann. Letztlich scheint das Wittgenstein’sche Mystische nur eine
andere Bezeichnung für das zu sein, was jeder diskursiven Explikation
entzogen ist, sich aber in seiner eigenen Bedeutung im subjektiven Erleben
einer Person zeigen kann, indem es eine Perspektive auf den Sinn der Welt zu
eröffnen scheint (vgl. Majetschak 2000: 118). Die Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist, wird von Wittgenstein im Tractatus selbst nicht mit dem Mystischenzusammengebracht (vgl. TLP, 6.44, 6.45 und 6.522). Die Quasierfahrung, dieder Logik vorgehen muss, bringt lediglich zum Ausdruck, dass Gegenstände
sind und zielt damit auf das „Was“. Auffällig an dieser Stelle ist eine
Unbestimmtheit:
Zum einen meint das „Was“ evidentermaßen, dass etwas ist. Dass die
Gegenstände existieren, vorhanden sein müssen (vgl. McGuinness 2021: 77).
Zum anderen aber betont Wittgenstein, in der Aufzeichnung von Waismann,
dass die Logik abhängig von den Tatsachen ist – dass Tatsachen sind. Das„Was“ scheint damit nicht einfach nur auf die Gegenstände bezogen zu sein,von der alle möglichen Welten im logischen Raum abhängig sind, sondern esscheint gerade so darauf bezogen, dass die Gegenstände Verbindungen in
Sachverhalten bilden, sodass es Tatsachen gibt, unsere reale Welt. Eine solche
Deutung hätte zufolge, dass das „Was“ damit sehr wohl mit dem Mystischen
identifiziert werden kann. Und damit auch, dass die Logik von der
Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist, dass Tatsachen existieren, abhängig ist.
Letztlich aber bleibt unklar, ob Wittgenstein mit dem „Was“ nur die
Gegenstände, meint oder ob diese eben immer schon in Sachverhalten
Verbindungen eingehen müssen, die ausnahmslos Tatsachen sind. Und dieseUnbestimmtheit hält sich bei genauem Lesen auch in seinem Vortrag überEthik und in seinen Tagebucheinträgen durch. Es wird eben nicht
unterschieden, zwischen „dass etwas ist“ und „dass Tatsachen sind“. So wie
sich im Folgenden zeigt:
Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern dass sie ist. (TLP, 6.44)
Am ehesten läßt sich dieses Erlebnis, glaube ich, mit den Worten beschreiben,
daß ich, wenn ich es habe [die Grenzerfahrung], über die Existenz der Welt
staune. Dann neige ich dazu, Formulierungen der folgenden Art zu
verwenden: „Wie sonderbar, daß überhaupt etwas existiert“, oder „Wie

Moritz René Pretzsch, "„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | Moritz René Pretzsch

seltsam, daß die Welt existiert“. […] Wenn ich sage: „Ich staune über die
Existenz der Welt“, mißbrauche ich die Sprache […] Die Aussage „Ich staune
darüber, daß das und das der Fall ist“, hat nur dann Sinn, wenn ich mirvorstellen kann, daß es nicht der Fall sei. (VE, 14 f.)
Das […] Wunder ist, daß es die Welt gibt. Daß es das gibt, was es gibt. (TB,
20.10.1916)
Ich denke nicht, dass man beide Bestimmungen leichtfertig für synonym
erklären darf. Sicherlich gibt es hier weiteres Diskussionspotential (vgl.
McGuinness 1989: 175). Unabhängig davon, welche Deutungsweise zu
bevorzugen ist, feststeht, dass die Logik einer Quasierfahrung bedarf. Und
diese Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist, bezieht sich auf das Sein der Substanz,
der Gegenstände. Dem Diktum Adornos Beachtung schenkend, – alles, washineininterpretiert wird, kann auch wieder herausinterpretiert werden – stelltsich dennoch die Frage, ob die Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist, äquivalent eines
vortheoretischen
–
Logik
und
Sprachezuvorkommenden–
Seinsverständnisses ist, das jedem Denken über die Welt vorausgesetzt ist. Und
damit möglicherweise nicht nur als bewusste geistige Episode, sondern als
etwas, das implizit im Denken angelegt ist (vgl. Glock 1996: 94 und Vossenkuhl
1995: 94 f.), möglicherweise erhielte sie damit auch den Status desVorprädikativen, die der Logik und Sprache als Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit
vorausliegt. D. h. sie käme der logischen Prädikation zuvor und läge damit der
theoretischen Bestimmung von etwas als etwas, der Relation von einem
Subjektbegriff mit einem Prädikatsbegriff, als Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit
voraus. Das bedeutet, um noch einmal auf Satz 5.552 zusprechen zu kommen,
dass die Erfahrung, dass etwas so ist, dass sich etwas so und so verhält, erst
der Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist bedarf. Erst dann können überhaupt erst
Unterscheidungen in der Welt getroffen werden. Anders gesagt: Jeder Mensch,der über die Welt nachdenkt, muss diese Quasierfahrung haben. Anders
jedoch als etwa Parmenides, Leibniz, Schopenhauer oder Heidegger ist für den
Wittgenstein des Tractatus ein sinnvolles Nachspüren nach dem Gehalt dieser
Quasierfahrung nicht möglich. Dass es diese Quasierfahrung gibt, dies scheint
sich ähnlich wie das Mystische oder die logische Form nur zu zeigen.
Schlussbemerkung:482

Moritz René Pretzsch, "„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | Moritz René Pretzsch

Auch wenn in diesem Beitrag aufgezeigt wurde, dass die Logik von der
Quasierfahrung, dass etwas ist, abhängt, so ist nicht klar, ob sich Wittgenstein
damit allein auf die einfachen Gegenstände, die Substanz, bezieht, oder aber,ob er damit immer schon die Tatsachen meint. Und so bleibt letztlich
unbestimmt, ob Wittgenstein nur die feste Form jeder möglichen Welt meintoder ob er letztlich eine Welt – diese reale Welt – meint. Daran aber hängt die
Frage, ob der Logik nur einfache Gegenstände vorausgesetzt sein müssen oderob für die Logik eine Welt a priori notwendig ist. Dies scheint wiederum vonden Auslegungsmöglichkeiten des Satzes 2.013 abzuhängen und bleibt alsmöglicher Diskussionspunkt bestehen. Weiter bleibt ungeklärt, ob die
Quasierfahrung leichtfertig als mystische Erfahrung interpretiert werden darf,
wie dies in der Sekundärliteratur immer wieder zu beobachten ist, oder obdies schlichtweg Überinterpretation ist. Darüber hinaus lässt sich fragen,inwiefern die Quasierfahrung mit ihrem Bezug auf das Sein der Gegenstände,mit deren Formen (TLP, 2.0251) selbst verbunden ist, insbesondere der Zeit.
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (2001) An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Wittgenstein Studies),
New York: St. Augustine's Press.
Glock, Hans (1996) A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell.
Hacker, P. M. S. (2001) Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Kenny, Anthony (2006) Wittgenstein, Oxford: Blackwell.
Majetschak, Stefan (2000) Ludwig Wittgensteins Denkweg, München: Alber.
Malcolm, Norman (1989) Sprache und Gegenstände, in: Joachim Schulte (Hg.) Texte zum
Tractatus, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 136 – 154.
McGuinness, Brian (1989) Die Mystik des Tractatus, in: Joachim Schulte (Hg.) Texte zum
Tractatus, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 165 – 191.
McGuinness, Brian (Hg.) (2021) Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm (1995) Ludwig Wittgenstein, München: Beck.

Verwendete Werke Ludwig Wittgensteins:

Moritz René Pretzsch, "„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

483

„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus | Moritz René Pretzsch

Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. The Bergen Electronic Edition. Hg. vom Wittgenstein-Archiv an derUniversität Bergen unter der Leitung von Claus Huitfeldt. Oxford: Oxford University Press
1998–2000.
Werkausgabe Band 1. Tractatus logico-philosophicus / Tagebücher 1914–1916 / Philosophische
Untersuchungen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1984.
Vortrag über Ethik und andere kleine Schriften. Hg. und übersetzt von Joachim Schulte.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1989.
Acknowledgement
Ich möchte mich an dieser Stelle noch einmal ganz herzlich bei Herrn Professor Stefan Majetschak(Universität Kassel) für den hilfreichen wie lehrreichen Austausch bedanken.

484

Moritz René Pretzsch, "„Erfahrung“ und Erfahrung – eine Untersuchung des Satzes 5.552 im Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100 Years of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic Propositions | Adam
Roman & Jakub Gomułka

Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with theCase of an Infinite Number of Atomic Propositions
Adam Roman, Jakub Gomułka (Krakow, Poland)
Abstract
TLP 6 offers a formal definition of the concept of the truthfunction based on the N-operation.
We offer an alternative solution whose key element a new S-operation. Unlike Wittgenstein’s
original conception of joint negation, our logical device can perform the task of producing atruly linear sequence of all consecutive truth-functions of a given collection of atomic
propositions because it is a genuine invariable difference between any base and its successor
throughout the sequence. Although, the formal construction of the S-operation is not an easytask, the intuition behind it is relatively simple: all truthfunctions of any given number ofElementarsätze can be generated using Wittgenstein’s own shortened notation that comprises
only truth-value signs. The notation can be transformed into binary numbers that, in turn, canbe enumerated using the operation of binary successor. Our joint article (yet unpublished) is
dedicated to a detailed development of this intuition. One can raise the question of whether
our new formula works for the case when the collection of atomic propositions is infinite. As
is well known, the Tractatus does not determine if the number of elementary propositions is
finite or not. The answer to this question is positive as long as we are dealing with a countableinfinite number of atomic propositions as well as a countable infinite number of predicatesand assume that each meaningful molecular proposition only depends on a finite number ofElementarsätze. The present paper provides a detailed justification for this answer.

In our yet unpublished (although accepted to History and Philosophy of Logic)
paper "Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: An Algorithmic Alternative to Wittgenstein’s
Trade-off" (Roman, Gomułka unpublished), we propose to substitute thefamous TLP 6 formula "[‾p, ‾ξ, N(‾ξ)]" with a different one "[t, ξ, S(ξ)]" that uses
the new operation S. In other words, we offer a different recipe for generating
the Tractarian series of forms of propositions and thus a different definition of
the formal concept of the proposition. The key element of that recipe is the Soperation that can perform the task of producing a linear sequence of allconsecutive compound propositions – truth-functions of a given collection of
atomic propositions – being invariable difference between any base and its
successor throughout the sequence. Though simple and elegant, Wittgenstein’s
original N-operation falls short of this task as scholars’ attempts todemonstrate its possible use make clear (cf. Anscombe 1965: 133, Sundholm
1992, Cheung 2000).
The presentation of the S-operation that is provided in our paper follows thepath paved by Anscombe and only considers the very simple case of a

Adam Roman & Jakub Gomułka, " Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic
Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen
Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler,
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic Propositions | Adam
Roman & Jakub Gomułka

collection of two atomic propositions. However, the solution allows to generate
all possible molecular propositions for a given list of atomic propositions, nomatter how long the list. We notice that "it can be demonstrated that a similar
approach will allow us to define the S-operation for the case of an infinite(albeit countable) number of atomic propositions, assuming that eachsignificant proposition only depends on a finite number of atomic
propositions" (Roman, Gomułka unpublished). Here, we would like to provide
an extensive formalised explanation of how this can actually be done.

The construction of the S-operation

Unlike Wittgenstein’s original N-operation, our S-operation is not a simple
logical device. However, the intuition behind it is relatively easy to grasp: wecan generate all possible truth-functions of any given number of elementary
propositions by using a simplified form of Wittgenstein’s own shortened
notation (cf. TLP 4.442) that comprises only truth-value T and F signs which
are assigned to truth-possibilities generated by a given collection of atomic
propositions, converting those signs into 1 and 0 digits, considering theresulting strings of zeroes and ones as binary numbers, and carrying on fromthe all-zeroes to the all-ones with the binary arithmetic successor operation.
(Actually, as will be elucidated in the main text, we start from 000...01; ourpenultimate step is 111...11; and we finish at 000...00. These sequences
represent, correspondingly, the joint negation of all considered atomic
propositions, the tautology, and the contradiction.) Thus, we have a successive
application of the same operation at each step, as is required by TLP 5.2521–
5.2523 and 5.32. There is reason to speculate that such a solution was notcompletely alien to Wittgenstein himself as he experimented with ordering
truth-functions according to T’s-and-F’s patterns of their shortened notations(cf. TLP 5.101).
The formal definition of the S-operation assumes that it is a composition of
three sub-operations: π, σ, and π−1 (i.e. the inverse of π). The operation π takes
as its argument the simplified shortened notation in the form of (i1i2...i2n),where ik is a k-th truth-value sign (T or F), and 2 n is a number of truthpossibilities generated out of n atomic propositions. The operation returns the486

Adam Roman & Jakub Gomułka, " Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic
Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen
Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler,
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic Propositions | Adam
Roman & Jakub Gomułka

corresponding binary sequence (d1d2...d2n), where dk is a k-th binary digit (1 or0). In other words, π transforms the series of T’s-and-F’s into the binary series
by putting 1 instead of each T and 0 instead of each F. Since π is a bijection,
there is the inverse operation π−1 that for some given binary sequence (d1d2...d2n) yields a simplified shortened notation (i1i2...i2n) by putting T instead of each
1 and F instead of each 0. Meanwhile, the crucial sub-operation σ takes as its
argument a binary sequence and returns its successor:
σ((d1d2...d2n)) = (d1d2...d2n)2 + 1 (mod 2n)where 2n is the number of truth-possibilities generated by n atomic
propositions, and (d1d2...d2n)2 represents d1d2...d2n as a binary representationof a number. For example, (0011)2 is the binary representation of the number
three with trailing zeroes, as it is stored in the memory of any digital machine.
Thus, the definition of the S-operation is as follows:S( ξ ) = ( π−1 ◦ σ ◦ π )( ξ ) = π−1( σ ( π ( ξ ))).
As we can see, S is a composition of the above-defined operations. Its crucial
feature is its uniformity at each step: it provides the genuine constant form of
the propositional variable (cf. 4.1271).
Due to the fact that the sub-operation σ is modulo 2n, the S operation generates
truth-functions in a cyclical manner, so we can choose the initial truthfunction as we please. However, the starting point can no longer be acollection of atomic propositions because the series of forms should consist of
uniform elements. Wittgenstein’s decision to begin the series with ‾p was yet
another distortion of his own initial idea of the series of forms. Instead, we cancommence with the truth-function that is closest to ‾p; namely, N(‾p).
Therefore, we make use of Wittgenstein’s N-operation of joint negation thatgenerates a molecular sentence which states that all its component atomic
propositions are false.
Thus, we come to the formulation of our TLP 6 expression replacement:[t, ξ, S(ξ)],

Adam Roman & Jakub Gomułka, " Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic
Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen
Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler,
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic Propositions | Adam
Roman & Jakub Gomułka

all of whose subexpressions have the same form of a truth-function of a given
collection of atomic propositions: the initial expression t stands for the
aforementioned joint negation, that is, N(‾p); the middle expression ξ is theseries’ schematic letter and stands for any member of the series; and the last
expression S(ξ) that involves our S-operation stands for the subsequent
member of the series.
For any given n being the length of a collection of atomic propositions, wehave 2n truth-possibilities; that is, the sequences of T and F signs that code
truth-functions related to that collection are 2n-long. From this follows that the
total number of those truth-functions is 22^n. It is easy to demonstrate that thepenultimate truth-function of a series that starts with t and is generated by S
(that is, the 22^n–1-th member of the series) is a tautology represented by all T’s(and, respectively, all ones that is a binary representation of the number 22^n–1). However, this is not the last unique member of the series: with yet anotherapplication of the S-operation, we yield a contradiction represented by all F’s
and, respectively, all zeroes: adding 1 modulo 2n to 22^n–1 yields zero.

The case of infinitely many atomic propositions

So far, we have only dealt with a finite number of atomic propositions.
However, the Tractatus does not determine if the number of Elementarsätze isfinite or not (cf. TLP 4.1272). Therefore, one can legitimately raise the questionof whether our new formula works for the case when the collection of atomic
propositions is infinite. As we have written in our previous paper, the answer
is positive as long as we are dealing with a countable infinite number of
atomic propositions as well as a countable infinite number of predicates andassume that each meaningful molecular proposition only depends on a finite
number of Elementarsätze. Again, the idea is relatively simple: we divide all
well-formed formulas into subsets based on the number of atomic propositions
and the maximum index of the atomic proposition in a formula (This method
can be easily extended in order to cover the quantificational calculus by
including the number of predicates and quantifiers)

488

Adam Roman & Jakub Gomułka, " Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic
Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen
Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler,
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic Propositions | Adam
Roman & Jakub Gomułka. For each such subset, we generate a three-dimensional matrix and exhaust it
diagonally; thus, each formula is generated after a finite number of steps.
The formalisation of that intuition can be defined as follows. Let P = { p1, p2, p3,...} be an infinite set of atomic propositions and let us order the elements of P,
so that pi < pj ⇔ i < j. For each i, j = 1, 2, 3, ... define A(i, j) = {X ⊂ P : ( X ) = i ∧max( X ) = pj }, where max(X) is the largest element in X, A(i, j) is the set of ielement sets of atomic propositions, such that the largest proposition in each ofthese sets is j. For example, A(2, 3) = {{ p1, p3 }, { p2, p3 }}. The following
algorithm generates all propositions. Notice that the algorithm will never end,
but each proposition will be generated in a finite number of steps. This isbecause the set of all (finite) propositions composed of infinite but countablesets of atomic propositions is recursively enumerable.
1. For each j = 1, 2, 3, … do
2.
3.

For each i = 1, 2, …, j do
For each X ∈ A(i, j–i+1) do

4.
Generate all propositions for the set of atomic propositions X
using the S-operation
We will demonstrate that the procedure is correct; that is, it will generate eachpossible proposition in a finite number of steps. First, notice that for a given X
of size i, there is a finite number 22i of propositions generated in step 4;
therefore,step 4 will end in a finite number of steps for every i and j. Let p be a
proposition built with the elementary propositions pi1, pi2, …, pik and let ik > imfor m = 1, …, k – 1. The set X = {pi1, …, pik} belongs to A(k, ik). This set will beconsidered in step 3 of the algorithm in the k-th iteration of the main loop (step1) and, within this iteration, in ik-th iteration of the inner loop in line 2. Since
we have observed that step 4 is always finite, the processing of A(k, ik) willconclude after a finite number of steps.
The procedure described above is symbolically presented in the figure below.

Adam Roman & Jakub Gomułka, " Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic
Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen
Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler,
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic Propositions | Adam
Roman & Jakub Gomułka

The arrows present the sequence of processing the consecutive sets A(i, j). Eachcell in the table corresponds to some finite set X of atomic propositions. The Soperation, based on this set, generates the (finite) set of all propositions builtwith the atomic propositions from X.
References
Anscombe, Elisabeth (1965), An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, New York: Harper and
Row.
Cheung, Leo (2000), "The Tractarian Operation N and Expressive Completeness", Synthese 123,
247–261.
Roman, Adam; Gomułka, Jakub (unpublished), "Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: An Algorithmic
Alternative to Wittgenstein’s Trade-off", History and Philosophy of Logic, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01445340.2023.2182627>.
Sundholm, Göran (1992), The General Form of the Operation in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Grazer
Philosophische Studien 42, 57–76.

490

Adam Roman & Jakub Gomułka, " Tractatus 6 Reconsidered: How the S-operation Can Deal with the Case of an Infinite Number of Atomic
Propositions". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen
Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler,
Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. | Pascale Roure

Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus.
Pascale Roure (Istanbul, Turkey)
Abstract
In his logical-philosophical treatise published in 1921, Ludwig Wittgenstein defined “allphilosophy” as Sprachkritik, “but not in the sense of Mauthner” (TLP 4.0031). This strange
tribute to Fritz Mauthner (1849-1923) undoubtedly contributed to marginalise him as anillustrious and unknown outsider, even if Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, interpreted as aturn from logical language to ordinary language analysis, has been considered to be much inline with Mauthner’s semantic and pragmatic reflections on language as a human activity.
This interpretation of a turn in Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the related presentation ofMauthner as a “precursor” of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy should be questioned. I suggestthat the seemingly negative reference to Mauthner’s Sprachkritik in Wittgenstein’s definitionof philosophy as language critique in the Tractatus is more complicated than it seems and thatit represents a key to understanding the continuities in Wittgenstein’s conception ofphilosophy as critical activity and language analysis. Rather than merely identifying common
motives of Mauthner and Wittgenstein, which are particularly significant in the latter’s
posthumous Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), the aim of this paper is to question, fromthe very text of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and its subtext, what it means to definephilosophy as critique of language, and what such a conception implies concerning thenature, method and purpose of philosophy as a unique kind of theoretical activity.

“Alle Philosophie ist ‘Sprachkritik’. (Allerdings nicht im Sinne Mauthners.)”
Wittgenstein’s unexpected reference to Fritz Mauthner in the proposition
4.0031 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is an enigmatic hapax andcontrasts, in its elusiveness, with the few names recurrently mentioned in theTractatus, those of the logicians Frege, Russell and Whitehead. Mauthner’sname appears as a rebuttal, without any further clarification. Wittgenstein’s
elliptical exclusion presupposes that there are different ways of understanding
the critique of language, and that Mauthner’s understanding of it is marginal,
perhaps even alien to philosophy. All philosophy is Sprachkritik, but is all
Sprachkritik philosophy? To understand in what sense philosophy is, or shouldbe, a language critique, Wittgenstein provides only one key, in the form of anon-clue: the name “Mauthner.” What does this name mean? How to explain
the ambiguity of this citatory gesture, which both eludes and highlights
Mauthner’s Sprachkritik?
Although crucial, Wittgenstein’s definition of philosophy as Sprachkritik andthe negative reference to Mauthner have been relatively neglected in the

Pascale Roure, "Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. | Pascale Roureliterature (see however Haller 1974; Bastianelli 2011; Nordmann 2013).
Comparisons between Mauthner and Wittgenstein, based on doctrinalreconstructions of their respective epistemological positions, tend to oppose
the two authors (Janik & Toulmin 1973; Gabriel 2013), or on the contrary to
identify them, by emphasizing later developments of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy as analysis of ordinary language (Weiler 1958, 1970; Leinfellner
1969, 1995; Kampits 1990). Yet the very question of the unity and consistencyof Wittgenstein’s philosophy cannot be decided without questioning thispuzzling reference in the frame of the Tractatus itself. I argue that Mauthner’s
Sprachkritik, as an immanent critique of language use, or its interpretation as
an activity oscillating between the two poles of sceptics and mystics (Landauer
1903), constitutes an invisible or rather unspoken canvas of the Tractatus. I
therefore propose to read the Tractatus from what it ostensibly excludes andtry to determine what it shows, negatively. To read it from its end andreconstruct some steps of the ladder that Wittgenstein enjoins the reader toreject. Beyond the historical interest of this issue for Wittgenstein studies, theaim is to clarify both the meaning and the scope of a controversial mutation ofphilosophy into language analysis or linguistic philosophy.

The reference to Mauthner’s Sprachkritik is intriguing in its very form. The
compound Sprachkritik, put between quotation marks, is followed by anautonomous parenthesis, referring to Mauthner’s concept and at the sametime denying the reference: in inverted commas, the well-known or the socalled Sprachkritik; in parenthesis, and as a wink to the reader (allerdings),
Mauthner’s name and its outright rejection. In the polemical rubric “Sprachkritik” of his Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Mauthner presented his own
language critique as a new philosophical discipline and mocked the academicsof his time, who were ostensibly trying to distance themselves from him whileat the same time adopting his concepts (W2: 442ff.). In the Tractatus,
Mauthner’s name is side-lined, but his concept of Sprachkritik maintained, inplace of the more neutral expression “Kritik der Sprache.” Assuming that
Wittgenstein had a first-hand knowledge of Mauthner’s writings, how should
his split use of the term “Sprachkritik” be understood?

492

Pascale Roure, "Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. | Pascale Roure

Mauthner’s immanent concept and practice of Sprachkritik contrast with theprescriptive understanding of it, including the nationalist and conservative
Sprachkritik aiming at linguistic purism, but also artificial and universal
language projects, aiming at a more logical or standardized language (Roure
2019, 2022). Mauthner’s Sprachkritik does not consist in improving language
use or developing a meta-language, but in continuing to use the samelanguage, both object and medium of his criticism, in a way that exposes the
non-reflected, implicit meaning of conventional language use. Sprachkritik
must be performed in and through language and supposes to find a way to“kill the bedbugs without killing the Pope” (B1: 2f.), to keep on using language,
while defusing its dogmatic potential. Mauthner’s philosophical Sprachkritik
managed to do it through modes of irony and parody and can be read,stylistically, as a continuation of his literary criticism (Roure 2015). Lutz
Danneberg’s remark that literary “Sprachskepsis” does not usually lead to thesilence of the writer can be applied to Mauthner’s prolix work and its
reception: “Die gelegentlich als inkonsequent kritisierte, oftmals als
Selbstwiderspruch begrüßte Fortsetzung des Schreibens muß weder ohne
Folgerichtigkeit sein noch eine unbeabsichtigte Selbstwiderlegung darstellen.” (Danneberg 1996: 1539).
The proposition 4.0031 identifies “all philosophy” with language critique,referring “in the same breath” (Weiler 1958: 83) to Mauthner’s irrelevance and“Russell’s merit” (Kremer 2012). If philosophy is language critique, but not in
Mauthner’s sense, then in what sense is it such? Moreover, how should weinterpret the universal quantifier used there? Is philosophy as Sprachkritik
what philosophy should be, a method that rejects as nonsensical the
propositions of a pseudo-philosophy staying at the surface of language, as thereference to Russell and the “logical form” seems to suggest? But in that case,would the language of critical philosophy, based on a correct understanding of
the logic of “our” language, also be nonsensical? Or is the definition only
descriptive of what philosophy has ever been, a nonsensical language trying to
say what can only be shown, and therefore distinct from Mauthner’s
conception of Sprachkritik understood as an immanent, self-reflexive criticism
of philosophy?
In the architecture of the Tractatus, 4.0031 is the unique extension of 4.003,
which qualifies “most of the propositions and questions written on

Pascale Roure, "Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. | Pascale Rourephilosophical things” (philosophische Dinge) as nonsensical (unsinnig), i.e.,neither true nor false; “Most questions and propositions of the philosophersresult from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language.” How
can a proposition be nonsensical? Using Frege’s terminology, Wittgenstein
identifies as nonsensical “metaphysical” propositions, that are logically wellformed but possess no “sense” (Sinn), because their author omitted to provide
certain signs with “reference” (Bedeutung) (TLP 6.53). The lack of reference,
however not considered as a lack of attribution by the speaker, characterizes
what Mauthner calls “pseudo-concepts” (Scheinbegriffe), which unlike the “realconcepts” (Realbegriffe) are not abstracted from any reality. Mauthner writes
that “many of our philosophical concepts” are Scheinbegriffe, i.e., “substantival
concepts” deprived of any “adjectival” effects. The danger of these
metaphysical concepts lies in their psychological power: they “do exist in thehuman language or thought, as representations, and as such they can motivate
actions, which very often have led to murder and manslaughter (religion wars,
witch-burning)” (W1, xcv).
Mauthner regards the idea of a projective relation of language to the world,conceived as a correspondence between the isolated word and the thing it
names, as a “word superstition” (Wortaberglaube). Just because a word exists
does not mean that something real must correspond to it (B1: 159). However,language always refers to the real world, but “metaphorically,” i.e. through thedistorting filters of experience and memory. The most abstract concepts canalways be reduced to something material. Considering the verb “bedeuten,”
Mauthner refers the meaning of meaning to the action of indicating (hinweisen), suggesting by showing something (durch Hindeutung etwas veranlassen):“The pointing of a sign to a future event or to a hidden fact” (B1: 158). To meansomething is to show it, but the meaning is constantly changing throughdiscrete semantic shifts -from the observable to the unobservable, from theempirically ascertainable to the essence, from the act of showing to that ofsaying and naming. Originally deictic, language is essentially metaphorical,
since words convey more meaning than what is meant or experienced;
metaphors in that sense are not true or false in itself but tell something about
our representations of the world (Roure 2013).
In 4.003, the quantifier “most” suggests that some of the propositions andquestions of philosophers are not nonsensical. Does this mean that philosophy

494

Pascale Roure, "Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. | Pascale Rourecontains apophantic statements and significant questions? If so, what would betheir status and their relationship to the truths of science, and to logic? In theTractatus, a proposition that has sense (Sinn) can be said true or false, since it
relates to a possible Sachverhalt. In that sense, a significant proposition is “apicture of the reality” (TLP 4.06) or “a model of the reality as we think itis” (TLP 4.01). The “totality of true propositions is the total natural science[…]” (TLP 4.11) and true propositions, as well as hypothesis in natural science(e.g., the Darwinian theory), have “nothing to do with philosophy” (TLP 6.53
and 4.1122). Propositions of natural science are not the opposite of nonsensicalproposition, but of tautologies or contradictions, which are “without sense” (sinnlos) since they are either always true or always false (TLP 4.461),
expressing the modalities of the necessary and the impossible.
Philosophy “is not one of the natural sciences” (TLP 4.111) but an activity
drawing the limit of “the disputable sphere of natural science” (TLP 4.113).
How, then, should philosophy be situated in relation to the sphere it delimits,encompassing this sphere without being included in it? Is it as a demarcationfrom the outside that philosophical propositions are nonsensical, but perhaps
useful, or temporarily true, in the process of doing philosophy? How should
the nature of philosophy be understood, in regard to Wittgenstein’s assertion
that the reader, who has understood him correctly, must eventually recognise
the TLP’s propositions as nonsensical (unsinnig), after having “climbed out
through them, on them, over them” to “see the world rightly” (TLP 6.54)? As an
activity, philosophy shouldn’t assert propositions but keep to the descriptive
task of clarification (TLP 4.112), which can be interpreted as a logical but also
semantic analysis of science.
The Pyrrhonian ladder metaphor (Marek 1979) symbolises also in Mauthner’s
Beiträge the performative paradox of the Sprachkritik. The first occurrence of
this metaphor expresses the historicity of the empirical acts of speech (see the“mobile steps” by Bréal 1897: 199): the deactivation of the dogmatic characterof language takes place as the writing proceeds, making the positivity of thecontent elusive and fugitive (B1: 1f.). The Tractatus deploys another scepticalstrategy, by completing the construction and rejecting the whole scaffolding
afterwards, mirroring Mauthner’s portrait of the philosopher-clown:

Pascale Roure, "Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. | Pascale Roure“Tragicomic would be the clown who climbed to the top of a free-standing
ladder in the circus, and then tried to pull his ladder up to himself. He would
share the fate of the philosophers and fall down.” (B3: 632f.)
The conception of philosophy as a self-reflexive activity with a therapeutic
vocation (Mauthner compares the disease he calls “Logismus” to alcoholic
dependence (B1: 43)), is sceptical in the sense of an epistemological attitude (Skepsis), not of scepticism (Skeptizismus) as philosophical doctrine (B3: 617,
TLP 6.51). Mauthner’s position is that the language of natural science does notreflect a “demonstrable worldview” (Weltanschauung), but only temporary“pictures of the world” (Weltbilder). In his posthumous work on the Drei Bilder
der Welt, we read that mystic (Mystik), “if it does not prefer to remain silent,
still talks about gods, spirits, forces and things, but it knows that gods likethings have only a symbolic being, are only in human thought or in language;”
The mystical is also an attitude, a feeling toward the world, unlike metaphysics
or ontology, in which the “things of thought” (Gedankendinge) are “likeauxiliary terms of mathematics,” that “must disappear if the result of thecalculation is to have any sense” (DBW: 77f.). Ontology is “an obsolete termthat encompasses all sterile disputes about the reality of ideas, about essence[…], about being, in short, about the ineffable (Unsagbare),” but ontology isnever mystical, it “always wants to be logic” (W2: 294).
If we go up another notch up in the architecture of the Tractatus, 4.003 and4.0031 are embedded in a definition of the thought (der Gedanke) as “thesignificant (sinnvoll) proposition” (TLP 4). They are preceded by two fragments
conceptualizing language, defining it as “totality of propositions” (4.001) anddescribing the relations between language and thought as those between the“clothes” and the “form of the body” (4.002). Wittgenstein considers “humanlanguages” as well as “colloquial” or “everyday language” (Umgangssprache),which is, as a “part of the human organism,” complicated and not restricted to
the logical propositional language: “The silent adjustments to understandcolloquial language are enormously complicated.” The same fragment defines
language as “the clothing of the thoughts,” a definition that echoes Russell’s
distinction between the real and apparent logical form of a proposition(4.0031) and suggests a distinction between logical and human languages.
However, as humans, we cannot express the logical form: “Propositions cannot
represent the logical form: this mirrors itself in the propositions.” (TLP 4.12).

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Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. | Pascale Roure

The “logic of language” ( Sprachlogik ) is “humanly impossible (menschenunmöglich) to gather immediately” from the colloquial language, and
it is precisely through a misunderstanding of the “logic of our language,” i.e.,
human language, that Wittgenstein explains nonsense.
Human language, however, does not require logical reform or improvement.
Everyday language is “logically completely in order” (TLP 5.5563). Mauthneralso considers that language works well as medium of communication (Verständigungsmittel), despite all ambiguities (B3: 240, see TLP 3.323), because
language uses are always involved in an intersubjective situation of speech (Gemeinsamkeit der Seelensituation) and are never restricted to the logical
propositional language. Mauthner ironizes the fact that “only philosophers oflanguage suffer from the deficiency of languages,” so that the “healing ofgrammar is not such an urgent task as, say, a good workers’
legislation” (Mauthner 1906: 36). These remarks highlight the non-corrective
and non-reductionist dimension of Sprachkritik, including in the Tractatus.
The aim of the Tractatus is defined in its preface as follows: to “draw a limit tothinking, or rather not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, todraw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of thislimit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).
The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the otherside of the limit will be simply nonsense.” This is the aim of philosophy itself
which, according to 4.114, “should delimit the thinkable (das Denkbare) andthus the unthinkable (das Undenkbare). It should limit the unthinkable fromthe inside through the thinkable.” The aim of philosophy is therefore to signify
the unspeakable (das Unsagbare bedeuten) by clearly showing what can be said
(TLP 4.115).
In a similar way, Mauthner links his conception of philosophy to the limit ofwhat can be said or thought, identifying both activities: “Denken ist Sprechen[...] Philosophie ist die Grenze der Sprache selbst, der Grenzbegriff, der limes: ist
Kritik der Sprache, der Menschensprache. In Engelszunge können wir nicht
reden.” (B3: x). Through his definition of philosophy as Grenzbegriff, heinscribes in the tradition of Locke and Kant, rejects explicitly a position of
exteriority and overhang. Language critique is a human activity like any
language: “we cannot speak with the tongues of angels.” Mauthner’s definition

Pascale Roure, "Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. | Pascale Roureof philosophy as a limit aims to show the “senselessness” ( Unsinn) of a
Sprachkritik that would misunderstand, either by praising or denigrating it,
the human nature of our language and therefore the human, “hoministic”
character of our philosophies and “pictures of the world.”

These considerations on proposition 4.0031 show that the usual interpretationof it as a criticism or as a disdainful rejection of Mauthner’s Sprachkritik is not
self-evident and deserves to be re-examined on the basis of a rigorous readingof the Tractatus itself and a discussion of the difficulties and potentialities thatthe text presents. What is at stake here is not a question of precedence in thechronology of the history of ideas, nor of a confrontation between two authors
whose approaches and places of discourse production are totally different. The
point is rather to make the comparison productive by questioning theredefinition of philosophy as critical analysis of language: what conception of
language, what conception of critique? It is generally considered that in his
later works, Wittgenstein rectified the point of view adopted in the Tractatus,
moving from the “crystalline purity” of logic to the “rough ground” of“everyday language,” what allowed Elisabeth Leinfellner to argue that
Wittgenstein’s critique of language ends up being “in Mauthner’s sense.” If
Wittgenstein’s concept of a logical world-picture gives way in his later work to
the idea that logic is a “Luftschloss” lacking something essential, i.e., a theory of
the meaning of language use, this can be read in continuity with what theTractatus shows without affirmatively expressing, and as an attempt to refutefrom within a dogmatic understanding of language critique.
Taking seriously the dialogue between Mauthner and the young Wittgensteinalso has a historical dimension that remains to be investigated. Mauthner’s
definition of philosophy as activity at the limit of language and the associatedtopos of nonsense appeared in the preface to the second edition of the third
volume of the Beiträge on grammar and logic, dated 1913 -the year in which
Wittgenstein decided to leave Cambridge and started working on the Tractatus. Mauthner mentions there again the negative reception of his Sprachkritik
among scholars, with few exceptions including Ernst Mach. In this context, herecounts his discussions with a “young philosopher” he met in 1907 -the year
Wittgenstein was studying in Berlin-, who was enthusiastic about his critique

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Pascale Roure, "Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Philosophy as Sprachkritik. The Palimpsest of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. | Pascale Roureof language and developed the plan to write a doctoral thesis on it. The young
philosopher, Mauthner tells, visited him later in Freiburg and asked him toformulate the “guiding principles” (leitende Gedanken) of the Sprachkritik in a
few words. Mauthner “warned” the apprentice philosopher that, if he were notan “enemy of all -isms,” he could have called his doctrine “Hominismus,” toavoid the anthropolatry associated in his view to the term used by F.C.S.
Schiller as the “catchword of Anglo-American pragmatism,” Humanismus. The
young philosopher, Mauthner writes, was “in a hurry to make up his mind andtold me, he wanted to heed my warning and disavow (verleugnen) me in his
doctoral dissertation, but instead write soon another book entitled ‘From
Humanism to Sprachkritik.’ I had a hard time getting the ambitious
philosopher to promise that he would not write this nonsensical book either.”That Mauthner may allude to Wittgenstein in this humorously malicious
anecdote is a conjecture worthy of investigation. Yet Mauthner’s portrait ofthis young philosopher is striking, and it reminds us that it is at least possible
to read the Tractatus as a subtle response to Mauthner’s warning on thenonsense of a doctrinal system of Sprachkritik, which would neglect thehuman nature of our language world-pictures.
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Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

501Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism | Inês Salgueiro

Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s PsychologismInês Salgueiro (Lisbon, Portugal)
Abstract
This paper focuses on two major issues discussed in Wayne Waxman’s A Guide to Kant’s
Psychologism: via Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Wittgenstein: (1) the “I think” as the core of
logical meaning, and (2) the distinction between human understanding and non-humananimal varieties of understanding. These topics are related to Waxman’s claim that Kant’s
critical philosophy should be viewed (via Wittgenstein) as an a priori form of psychologism
rather than as opposing Hume’s psychologism. I seek to explore the implications of theseissues for Waxman’s claim that they allow for some degree of psychologism. However, thekind of psychologism that I acknowledge is very different from the kind of psychologism that
Waxman has in mind when speaking of a priori psychologism. This suggests that at least puregeneral logic is, in Kant’s view, free from psychologism.

In his book A Guide to Kant’s Psychologism: via Locke, Berkeley, Hume, andWittgenstein (2019), Wayne Waxman claims provocatively that Kant’s criticalproject is an extreme version of psychologism insofar as it includes logic andmathematics in its scope. Waxman states that the laws of thought are
generated by social convention. He asserts that “the only logical universality
ever present to consciousness is the one inherent in the representation ‘I think’so that everything else universal in it is so only because it incorporates pure
intellectual self-consciousness into its representation” (Waxman 2019,148-149). According to Waxman, we need to admit that a psychological element—the “I think”—is the basis for explaining logical universality. If we could
have knowledge of logical rules independently of consciousness, they would be
distinct from those acts of thought. Waxman’s book is well-argued and hassome allies in the literature. For example, Patricia Kitcher’s Kant’s
Transcendental Psychology (1990) and Andrew Brook’s Kant and the Mind(1994) seem to point in a similar direction. However, Waxman’s argument fails
to take seriously Kant’s commitment to a distinction between pure and applied
logic. In this paper, I shall focus on two topics that are directly relevant toWaxman’s main thesis and how these topics could be responded to, drawing
on some of Wittgenstein’s findings. They relate to the “I think” as the core of
logical meaning and to the distinction between human understanding and nonhuman varieties of understanding.
First, the original synthetic unity of apperception is not something that can be
examined using the methods of empirical psychology. Although Kant tells us502Inês Salgueiro, "Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism | Inês Salgueiro

that the “I think” is associated with all our representations (KrV B 132), he also
claims that psychological principles should be excluded from pure logic. Kant
was clearly opposed to psychologism in logic. As he writes:
Some logicians, to be sure, do presuppose psychological principles in logic.
But to bring such principles into logic is just as absurd as to derive morals
from life. If we were to take principles from psychology, i.e., fromobservations concerning our understanding, we would merely see how
thinking does take place and how it is under various subjective obstacles
and conditions; this would lead then to cognition of merely contingent
laws. In logic, however, the question is not about contingent but about
necessary rules; not how we do think, but how we ought to think. The
rules of logic must thus be derived not from the contingent but from thenecessary use of the understanding, which one finds in oneself apart fromall psychology. (Log 9: 14)
Kant claims that pure logic concerns how we ought to think. He makes puregeneral logic coincident with grammar. As he writes:
Logic is related to the whole use of the understanding just as grammatica
is to a language. (V-Lo/Blomberg 24: 24)
Kant also states that pure logic should be independent of any empirical facts
about the mind:[A]ll psychological observations must be excluded from (pure) logic. (V-Lo/
Dohna 24: 693)
Pure general logic deals with the rules of thought, while applied general logic
deals with the content of thought. As Kant writes in the first Critique:Now general logic is either pure or applied logic. In the former we abstractfrom all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised,e.g., from the influence of the senses, from the play of imagination, thelaws of memory, the power of habit, inclination, etc., hence also from thesources of prejudice, indeed in general from all causes from which certain
cognitions arise or may be supposed to arise, because these merely
concern the understanding under certain circumstances of its application,and experience is required in order to know these. A general but pureInês Salgueiro, "Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism | Inês Salgueiro

logic therefore has to do with strictly a priori principles, and is a canon of
the understanding and reason, but only in regard to what is formal intheir use, be the content what it may (empirical or transcendental). (KrV A
53/B 77)
Likewise, pure general logic is analytic and does not increase our knowledge(KrV A 60/B 85, A 151/B 191). To see that pure general logic is analytic, noticethat it is valid even when our thoughts are not connected to intuitions. We still
have rigorous logical reasoning even when our thoughts do not afford us any
knowledge (KrV A 262-63/B 318-319). This means that we must have some
intrinsic access to pure general logic despite our individual experience; it must
be available to guide our reasoning. To come to know the “I think”, we need tohave prior logical capacities. Applied general logic has psychologicalprinciples. However, this is “neither a canon of the understanding in general
nor an organon of particular sciences, merely a cathartic of the common
understanding” (KrV B 78). We should keep in mind that Kant considers thatapplied general logic should not be referred to as logic:
Applied logic really ought not to be called logic. It is a psychology in which
we consider how things customarily go on in our thought, not how theyought to go on. (Log 9: 18)
Second, Waxman builds his argument on the basis of Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy. This is questionable because we would have to assume that theearly and the later Wittgenstein are radically opposed. There is no doubt thatmany aspects of his later philosophy differ from the Tractatus. However, asJohn Koethe points out, “it does not follow that the relation between the earlier
outlook and the later is one of diametric opposition” (Koethe, 2018, p. 1).
Despite some important changes, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy can be seen
as a continuity of his earlier philosophy rather than a radical departure fromit. The Philosophical Investigations are supposed to clarify the logical grammarof our language by showing the limits of sense and nonsense in the use of
sentences. The concept of “depth grammar” can be found there. As
Wittgenstein writes:
In the use of words, one might distinguish ‘surface grammar’ from ‘depth
grammar’. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a504Inês Salgueiro, "Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism | Inês Salgueiro

word is the way it is used in the sentence structure, the part of its use—one
might say—that can be taken in by the ear. — And now compare the depth
grammar, say of the verb “to mean”, with what its surface grammar would
lead us to presume. No wonder one finds it difficult to know one’s way
about. (PU 2009, I, 664).
The “depth grammar” can be understood as limiting the boundaries of sense.
This is not so distant as it may seem from Wittgenstein’s views on logic in theTractatus. Indeed, there is a continuity in his thought about what makes a
proposition meaningful. This argument can be developed bytracing Wittgenstein’s thesis that every meaningful expression has a logicalstructure but that logic itself cannot be represented:
Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot represent
what they must have in common with reality in order to be able torepresent it—the logical form.
To be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to put
ourselves with the proposition outside logic, that is outside the world. (TLP
4.12)
Wittgenstein did not believe in the possibility of propositions about logicalform because they would require us to transcend the language we use toexpress them. As he writes:
What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality
in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logicalform, that is, the form of reality. (TLP 2.18)
Logical form is fundamental to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. In speaking oflogical form, we are referring to a single form that must be present in all
propositions (TLP 2.18, 2.181, 3.032, 4.12, 4.121, 5.47, 5.511, 6.124). As he puts it:
To the proposition belongs everything which belongs to the projection; but
not what is projected.
Therefore the possibility of what is projected but not this itself.
In the proposition, therefore, its sense is not yet contained, but thepossibility of expressing it.

Inês Salgueiro, "Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism | Inês Salgueiro(“The content of the proposition” means the content of the significant
proposition.)In the proposition the form of its sense is contained, but not its content.
(TLP 3.13)
Wittgenstein also tells us that logic precedes experience:
The “experience” which we need to understand logic is not that such andsuch is the case, but that something is; but that is no experience.
Logic precedes every experience—that something is so.
It is before the How, not before the What. (TLP 5.552)
He claimed that the propositions of logic are already given (TLP 6.124). So, it
seems that Wittgenstein assumed that logic is innate. As he says:Hence there can never be surprises in logic. (TLP 6.1251)
Kant and Wittgenstein both argue that logical form is self-consistent. As Kant
writes:Formal truth consists merely in the agreement of cognition with itself, incomplete abstraction from all objects whatsoever and from all differencesamong them. (Log 9: 51)
He tells us that the formal criteria of truth in logic are the principle ofcontradiction and the principle of sufficient reason (Log 9: 51). These
principles are true in an empty domain. Kant states:
By virtue of the fact that in immediate inferences only the form of
judgments is altered and not in any way the matter, these inferences differ
essentially from all mediate inferences, in which the judgments are
distinct as to matter too, since here a new concept must be added as
mediating judgment or as middle concept (terminus medius) in order todeduce the one judgment from the other. (Log 9: 115)
Given this textual evidence, it makes more sense to say that logic is notdependent on psychological principles. Immediate inferences only involve theform of judgments. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that most of our

506Inês Salgueiro, "Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism | Inês Salgueiro

inferences involve psychological elements that our capacity to infer beganfrom nothing. Waxman, however, argues that we did start out with nothing.
He maintains that the conditions of formal truth are given by the psychologicalcapacities we acquire via social convention. Waxman does not regard puregeneral logical innatism as a valid solution because it is difficult for him tounderstand how the capacity for such representations could have evolved
from minds without this capacity. As he writes:
Innatism, again, is not an option. Aside from the absence of evidence,
there remains the question of how the capacity for such representation
can plausibly be supposed to have evolved from minds that lacked it.
(Waxman 2019, 143)
I have argued elsewhere (Salgueiro 2020) that even though Waxman is a
proponent of phylogeny, it is difficult to see why he takes this position. If thephylogenetic tree derives from beings as elemental as bacteria, then obviously
evolution can, logically, explain such a possibility. The oldest known fossil, thestromatolite, dates to about 3.7 billion years ago. With evolution, the functionsof living beings have become more complex. By providing a progressive viewof the complexity of living beings throughout evolution, phylogeny allows us
not only to study the nervous system but also to inquire into consciousness. In
this sense, it also allows for the establishment of bridges between our humanunderstanding and non-human varieties of understanding. Hence, when
Waxman resorts to Wittgenstein’s claim that “[i]f a lion could talk, we wouldn’t
be able to understand it” (PU 2009, II, 327), he overlooks the fact that there are
phylogenetic bridges between different species that allow for interspecificunderstanding. So, besides the existence of a physicalist part of ourconsciousness and a part acquired by convention, which corresponds tocertain rules, it is possible that there is another part that consists of deep rules
from which surface rules can be built. If these deep rules exist, they will bestrictly pure. Waxman rejects this and resorts to Wittgenstein’s comparison of
language to a city in Philosophical Investigations (PU 2009, I, 18) to substantiate
his position:
Nor is there any equivalent in psychological representation to the landcities require—land of the appropriate sort for building cities atop—or its
linguistic analogue: the wider social infrastructure and species-wideInês Salgueiro, "Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
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Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism | Inês Salgueiro

lifeways on which human conventions generally and linguistic
conventions more particularly wholly depend. Instead, the representing
subject has to produce the underlying land for its structures—theunderstanding that supports them—along with the structures themselves.
This is just to say that psychologically generated representations have only
so much and no more meaning or structure than the subject doing therepresenting puts into them: they connect up with others only insofar as
the subject produces a connection between them, have complexity only
insofar as the subject synthesizes them from simpler ingredients, andcombine to form unities only insofar as the subject fashions a unity fromthem. (Waxman 2019, 133)
I do not reject Wittgenstein’s analogy. However, the view that all structures inlanguage are entirely created by human minds constitutes an extreme case ofanthropocentrism, in my view, and is thus difficult to support. I also think thiswas not Wittgenstein’s understanding. Proof of this is the idea of “hinge
propositions”, as expressed in On Certainty (ÜG 341, 343, 655).
However, we are unable to establish that logical innatism is true; its possibility
is as valid as its impossibility. Whether we are looking at things from asceptical or a naive perspective, it is important to avoid coming to any sort of
dogmatic conclusion. Waxman cannot reduce Kant’s entire critical project topsychologism. The truth is that Kant considered that critical investigation aims
to draw the boundaries of what can be known and what cannot be known(KrV A 758/B 786). Critical analysis cannot rely on empirical sources alone. In
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks a kind of knowledge—a priori—that is
not changeable, unlike what psychologism argues. He viewed themetaepistemological results of the first Critique as negative but unassailable.
Any changes that have occurred and will occur in our understanding, forexample the introduction of imaginary numbers and new grammatical rules,
are in fact changes within a system that Kant viewed as attached to a given,
innate depth. In the future, there may be other beings superior to us, withenhanced cognitive capacities, as Waxman claims, but these beings will beothers. As human beings, we have a natural evolutionary history (early Homo,
Australopithecus, hominoids, cetaceans, therapods, etc.) and specific genetic
characteristics in which the existence of deep logical rules allows us toestablish new synthetic a priori constructions, such as classifying numbers as

508Inês Salgueiro, "Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism | Inês Salgueiro

natural, whole, rational, irrational or integers. It is only on the basis of thesepure, deep rules that we can create models of knowing. Thus, Kant’s criticalproject rests on a peculiar sceptical method, one that must not be led astray by
Hume’s sceptical psychologism, as Waxman claims, insofar as scepticism, inKant’s words, “rest[s] only on facta, which are contingent, but not on principles
that could effect a necessary renunciation of the right to dogmatic
assertions” (KrV A 767/B 795). There is a Kantian distinction between empiricalfacts and the transcendental conditions of those facts. Facts of reason are not
the very limits of pure reason alone.
In conclusion, it is clear that at least pure general logic is beyond the scope of
psychologism. Indeed, if we regard logical rules as valid even when we arethinking without intuitions, we ought to assume that they cannot be generated
by social convention. I suppose that in responding to Waxman’s arguments,
Wittgenstein would emphasize this, teaching us that every meaningfulexpression has a logical structure but that logic itself cannot be represented.
Pure general logic is not contingent on the psychological states of individual
thinkers. Instead, pure general logic is the basis of universal and necessary
truths. Even though psychologism deserves our attention, pure deep rules
cannot be reduced to psychologism.
References
Brook, Andrew. 1994. Kant and the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (KrV)
Kant, Immanuel. 1992. Lectures on logic. Translated by Michael Young. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. (Log)
Kitcher, Patricia. 1990. Kant’s Transcendental Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koethe, John. 2018. The Continuity of Wittgenstein’s Thought. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Salgueiro, Inês. 2020. “Review of Wayne Waxman’s A Guide to Kant’s Psychologism: via Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, and Wittgenstein.” Wittgenstein-Studien 11, no.1: 311–317.
Waxman, Wayne. 2019. A Guide to Kant’s Psychologism: via Locke, Berkeley, Hume, andWittgenstein. New York: Routledge.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. On Certainty. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright.
Translated by D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell. (ÜG)

Inês Salgueiro, "Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

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Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism | Inês Salgueiro

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. Edited by P. M. S. Hacker and J.
Schulte. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Oxford: WileyBlackwell. (PU)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by C. K. Ogden.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (TLP)
Acknowledgement
This paper was prepared with the support of the Portuguese Foundation for Science andTechnology (FCT), grant number 2020.05875.BD.

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Inês Salgueiro, "Deep Rules: Remarks on Waxman’s Psychologism". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death.
A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/
W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber | Priyambada Sarkar

Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of
the Dark Chamber
Priyambada Sarkar (kolkata, India)
Abstract
One finds ample evidence in the biographical literature of Wittgenstein that feeling of moral
imperfections and loneliness runs through his early career. This is why the question of thewilling subject, the meaning and transformation of life and world remains important
throughout this period. But the problem lies in fragmentary, dense and cryptic writings ofWittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, where the discussion of the willing subject
is confined to only one and a half page and a few entries in Notebooks 1914-16. Of these
remarks, Tractatus 6.43 poses a special enigma to the commentators. In this paper I intend tooffer an interpretation of these remarks through the lens of the ideas of the play The king of
the dark chamber authored by Rabindranath Tagore, Wittgenstein’s favorite. In order to attainthis objective I would like to divide the chapter in three sections. In the first section, I would
like to refer to the controversies involved in various interpretations of T6.43 and related
remarks on the willing subject and of the transformation of the world. In the second section I
will discuss the theme of ’the king of the dark chamber’ along with Tagore’s interpretation. In
the final section I would like to claim that more sense can be made of Wittgenstein’scontroversial remarks about the willing subject and of the transformation of the world, if we
juxtapose them with thoughts of Tagore in these matters.

One finds ample evidence in the biographical literature of Wittgenstein thatfeeling of moral imperfections and loneliness runs through his early career.
This is why the question of the willing subject, the meaning andtransformation of life and world remains important throughout this period.
But the problem lies in fragmentary, dense and cryptic writings ofWittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, where the discussion of thewilling subject is confined to only one and a half page and a few entries in
Notebooks1914-16. Of these remarks, Tractatus 6.43 poses a special enigma to
the commentators.
In this paper I intend to offer an interpretation of these remarks through thelens of the ideas of the play The king of the dark chamber authored by
Rabindranath Tagore, Wittgenstein’s favorite. In order to attain this objective I
would like to divide the chapter in three sections. In the first section, I would
like to refer to the controversies involved in various interpretations of T6.43
and related remarks on the willing subject and of the transformation of theworld. In the second section I will discuss the theme of ‘the king of the darkchamber’ along with Tagore’s interpretation. In the final section I would likePriyambada Sarkar, "Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber ". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber | Priyambada Sarkar

to claim that more sense can be made of Wittgenstein’s controversial remarks
about the willing subject and of the transformation of the world, if we
juxtapose them with thoughts of Tagore in these matters.

I

If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of
the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language.
In brief, the world must thereby become quite another, it must so to speak
wax or wane as a whole.The world of the happy is quite another than thatof the unhappy. (Wittgenstein,1921,T6.43)
This passage is controversial for it talks about too many important things withloose ends such as good or evil willing, the limits of the world and changing
the limits of the world, transformation of the evil world into good one and viceversa. Let us attempt to untie ‘the knotted understanding’ and tie the looseends.
The paragraph suggests that willing ,be it good or bad, could change the limitsof the world and by changing the limits, one can change one’s unhappy world
into happy one and vice versa. But contrary to this he has declared earlier"The world is independent of my will." T6.373. This is consistent with an entry
in the Notebooks 1914-16: "I cannot bend the happenings of the world to mywill: I am completely powerless." (Wittgenstein1961, 73). Hence the problem
is: how can something which is completely powerless and not connected withthe world could bring about transformation and change in the limits of theworld? Again, Tractatus paragraph T5.631 makes things more complicated
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include areport on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate
to my will, which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the
subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no
subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book. (Wittgenstein
1922, T5.631)

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Priyambada Sarkar, "Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber ". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber | Priyambada Sarkar

He clearly states here that there is no such thing as thinking subject. But what
is not clear is the status of the willing subject. He admits that “ it is undeniable
that in a popular sense there are things that I do, and other things not done byme.(Wittgenstein 1961,88 )”But why did he say that in an important sense, there is no subject? Did he talkabout the willing subject here? Is it identical or different from the thinking
subject?
Is it identical with the metaphysical subject (Wittgenstein
1922,T5.633),which exists also as the limit of the world? If one intends tounderstand the relationship between the metaphysical subject and the willing
subject, one will have to understand the basic characteristic features of thesubject. Chon Tejedor has argued against the transcendentalists view that thewilling subject and the metaphysical subject are the same and she opines that
Wittgenstein has discarded the notion of willing subject in 1916 even before
writing the Tractatus and she thinks that the willing subject is not identicalwith the metaphysical subject (Tejedor 2013,62). Jordi Fairhurst (Fairhurst
2019,75-95) has justifiably argued against Tejedor and the transcendentalists
account of willing subject by setting forth an alternative reading, which
conceives of the metaphysical subject as an ethical subject , without
subscribing to the main thesis defended by the Transcendental Reading.
However, this is not the end of all controversy. In another paragraph,
Wittgenstein declares:
My will penetrates the world. (Wittgenstein 1961, 73).
The will is an attitude of the subject to the world. The subject is the willing
subject. (Wittgenstein 1961, 86).
How to interpret these passages? It seems that Wittgenstein is proposing two
different kinds of will, phenomenological and ethical in the Notebooks1914-16.
Ethical will is the bearer of good and evil. This distinction follows from theTractarian distinction between fact and value. Phenomenological will belongs
to the fact of psychology which can explain the volition as a fact in our
everyday life; whereas ethical will is not in the world but the limit of theworld. In accordance with the Tractarian theory of meaning and sayability,
one can talk about the phenomenological will which is part of the world but
not about the willing/ethical subject, the bearer of good and evil. For

Priyambada Sarkar, "Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber ". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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Wittgenstein, good life is happy life and harmony is the criterion of happy life
(Wittgenstein,(1961) p.78). The question is: how can we secure such good/
happy life?Wittgenstein states that man can be happy only ' through the life ofknowledge….The life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of themisery of the world. The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce theamenities of the world. .” (Wittgenstein 1961, 81). Wittgenstein’s biographers
tell us how Wittgenstein himself lived such happy life by renouncing theamenities of the world. It is through the attitude of renunciation, one canchange the unhappy world to a happy one. If one could acquire this attitude
then worldly state of affairs like not fulfilling one’s desires will not ultimately
affect him.
However, the above remarks fail to clarify how good will specifically could
bring about changes in the limit of the world and make it happy. How is it
consistent with renunciation? Isn’t Wittgenstein being inconsistent here instating that my will cannot affect or bring about changes in the facts of theworld on the one hand and saying on the same breath that it alters the wholeworld for the subject by altering the limits of the world on the other?.
Here I would propose an interpretation by taking recourse to Wittgenstein’sfavorite play “The king of the dark chamber’.

II

The King of the Dark Chamber(Rājā) is a metaphoric spiritual play by
Rabindranath Tagore which was published in Nov, 1910. Wittgenstein had
first read the play in German translation in 1921, when Tagore wasenormously popular in Europe, particularly in Germany and Austria. While
reading the English version,Wittgenstein had a feeling that the translation isinadequate to capture the deeper significance of the play. Because of this, healong with Yorick Smythies attempted another translation,where theychanged 'old fashioned or stilted formulations by idiomatic equivalents'. .
(Munz and Ritter,2017,325-326)
The play revolves round the relationship between a mysterious invisible kingand his proud wife .His reticence towards being seen causes most of the drama
centering round his queen. Queen was eager to meet her king and desires to514

Priyambada Sarkar, "Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber ". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber | Priyambada Sarkar

see him in daylight whereas the king so far has met her only in a darkchamber. The king warns her about the capriciousness of sensuality and saysthat she will not be able to bear his sight if he reveals himself in light, inoutside world.. Queen Sudarshana thought that she will be able to recognise
the king in broad daylight during spring festival. But she failed ---a hugecatastrophe occurred for her failure. She had to go through utter despair, pain
and humiliation and then finally her king showed himself only after she had
cast her pride and prejudices away . Complete surrender allows her to see theking, to realize him in everything
Tagore clarifies:
She (Queen Sudarshana) surrendered herself in her mind to Suvarna on
seeing his beauty. Then--- how a fire started on all sides of her; how abattle over her ensued among a group of many false external kings /rājās
as soon as she left the rājā internal; how her introduction to her own Rājāoccurred in the midst of that conflagration; how her vanity was destroyedby the shock of sorrow; and eventually how after accepting defeat, leaving
the palace, standing in the street, she gained the company of that Lord ofhers. The Lord who can be perceived in all lands, in all times, in all forms,
in the blissful rasa of one’s own interior; ---- all that has been narrated inthis play. (Lal Ananda 1987,269)
In accordance with the narration of Tagore, I would rather like to interpret
T6.43 and other entries in the Notebooks1914-16 in the next section

III

The play centers round the transformation of queen Sudarshanā who at the
beginning of the play was proud of her intelligence and of her love for the
king .The queen represents a finite individual in the domain of facts, which
can be expressed in sensible words. This is why we can feel the agony of queen
Sudarshana, her urge to see the king in broad daylight, not in the darkchamber; but the king represents the infinite, the unbounded, which belongs
to the domain of the inexpressible.. In a sense the play is based on therelationship of the sensible and the non sense, of fact and truth . This is mostevident in the assurance of the king,when he says:.

Priyambada Sarkar, "Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber ". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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King: Your own mirror will not reflect them. It lessens you, limits you, andmakes you look small and insignificant. But could you see yourself
mirrored in my own mind. How grand would you appear! In my own
heart you are no longer the daily individual who you think you are—youare verily my second self. (Tagore,1961,53)
The remarks of the king are significant. He represents the queen as his second
self who somehow gets lessened, limited in her smallness and insignificance inthe factual world. But what does he mean by "the second self'? How could thequeen see herself mirrored in King's mind? It seems here we run against theboundaries of sensible language . And Wittgenstein even in 1938 had
reverence for that which lies beyond the limits of language.He writes 'Humanbeings have a drive to run up against the boundaries
oflanguage"(Wittgenstein 1965,11-12)
Now the question is: when will the queen realize that she is king's second self?
The answer seems to be: she will have this realization only when she changes
her attitude to the world, that is, when one casts one’s own pride, gets over
one’s infatuation with material wealth and amenities, beauty and surrenders
unconditionally to the Supreme with love and trust. Such changes in one’s
attitude bring transformation in oneself as well as the world s/he inhabits.’
Apropos to the distinction between the invisible king and queen Sudarshanā,his second self, one finds in Early Wittgenstein the distinction between the
Metaphysical/willing subject/philosophical I as the bearer of ethicalattributes and our ordinary notion of a psychological, thinking subject or self.
He remarks:
The Philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or thehuman soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysicalsubject, the boundary,(not a part)of the world. The human body, however,
my body in particular, is a part of the world among others, among
animals’ plants stones, etc.etc... (Wittgenstein 1961,82)
Here the concept of the’ philosophical I’ / willing subject, seems to bepersonified in the character of the king in the play and our ordinary subject
with lesser body and mind is represented by Queen Sudarshanā. Hence when
the body, or mind or soul with psychological properties gets mirrored in the

516

Priyambada Sarkar, "Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber ". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber | Priyambada Sarkarboundary, the relationship between the two gets established. In T
6.531.Wittgenstein denies the thinking subject as an object of experience. He
says: I ‘confront every object in the world but not the “I”. Similarly, one cannot
experience the king in his kingdom.
As mentioned earlier, T6.43 states that good or evil willing alters the limit of
the world and by altering the limits of the world, it can contribute to an
altogether different world. But this is in contrast with the view that the ethical/
metaphysical subject cannot bring about any change in the domain of facts. It
is completely powerless against the happenings of the world.This gives rise toan apparent inconsistency.
In the play we see queen Sudarshana's phenomenological willing to see theking in broad daylight could not bring about any change in the external
world.She mistakenly chose King Subarna as her king and fell into despair. But
the matter didnot end there.She had a longing to reach out beyond theboundedness of language and the world and be united with her king,whichgets realized at the end.Early Wittgenstein is candid in representing suchattempts to go beyond the boundary as "My whole tendency and the tendencyof all men who ever tried to write or talk ethics or religion was to run against
the boundaries of language". (Wittgenstein 1965,11-12).
However queen Sudarshana could ultimately realize her longings to meet theking only by changing her attitude to the world,which transformed her
unhappy world to a happy one.Hence by changing her attitude ,she becomes
ready to receive the king as he actually is in himself, he joins her in her
dealings with the world. Certainly her world ‘waxes and wanes as awhole’ (T6.43) with changes of her inner world incorporated. That changes theboundary of the world, making an unhappy world into a happy one. This is notinconsistent with the fact that phenomenological willing didn't have any
control over the happenings of the world .Infact,ethical willing istranscendental and it encompasses viewing sub specie aeterni (T6.45) that
could transform one's world not by changing the facts,but by changing its
boundaries.
For Wittgenstein, happy life is a harmonious life which can be had only by
those who can renounce the amenities of life(Wittgenstein 1961,81) andPriyambada Sarkar, "Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber ". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber | Priyambada Sarkartranscend the limits of language and those of the world. One notices here how
the queen has renounced the amenities of the factual world in order to realize
herself as the second self of her king . Wittgenstein describes it as ‘waxing andwaning as a whole'..
The above analysis shows why it would be normal for Wittgenstein to bephilosophically drawn to The king of the dark chamber. Also we find T6.43
along with other cryptic passages from the Notebooks 1914-16 making sense
together in light of the ideas contained in the play that fascinated thephilosopher.

References
Fairhurst Jordi 2019. The Ethical Subject and Willing Subject in the Tractatus: an Alternative to
the Transcendental Reading”, Philosophia 47 (1):75-95
Lāl, Ānanda. 2001. Rabindranāth Tagore: Three Plays . Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Priyambada Sarkar, "Tractatus 6.43: An Interpretation in the Light of Tagore’s The King of the Dark Chamber ". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362 | Edoardo Sartore

The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362
Edoardo Sartore (Zürich, Switzerland)
Abstract
Whereas Wittgenstein’s post-1929 considerations on the will have been subject toconsiderable attention, his (extremely condensed) treatment of freedom of the will in theTractatus has been largely neglected. Recently, however, a few scholars have attempted toprovide an exegesis of the relevant passages (most importantly TLP 5.1362) and have come toremarkably different conclusions. Their disagreement concerns both the purpose and thestructure of the argument that is ascribed to Wittgenstein. In the following I will focus on
Diego Marconi’s recent presentation of the passage in “Tractatus 5.1362 (reloaded)” (2021),
which is supposed to avoid an issue of intelligibility that arises in connection with traditional
interpretations, such as Giovanni Mion’s “Tractatus 5.1362”(2017). I will show that Marconi’s
proposal suffers from a problem analogous to the one he detects in the traditional reading. To
drive home this point, I shall make use of a distinction between what I call metaphysical andepistemic incompatibilism. The main result will be that, their differences notwithstanding, thetraditional and Marconi’s alternative reconstructions of TLP 5.1362 share one crucial feature:in both cases, Wittgenstein’s argument implicitly commits him to metaphysical incompatibilism, i.e., the view that freedom of the will is incompatible with determinism. Most importantly, allsides of the debate have failed to see that, by their own lights, Wittgenstein is so committed.

Wittgenstein's considerations on freedom of the will in the Tractatus havebeen neglected by most commentators. Recently, however, some scholars haveset out to provide a thorough reconstruction of the argument contained in the
key passages, prompted in part by Frascolla's quite heterodox presentation ofit (Frascolla 2007). Surprisingly, they have come to remarkably different
conclusions, disagreeing both on the purpose and on the structure of theargument they ascribe to Wittgenstein. In the following I shall focus on two ofthese contributions, namely, Giovanni Mion's traditional reading (Mion 2017)and Diego Marconi's alternative interpretation (Marconi 2021).

1. The Traditional Reading

The discussion on free will in the Tractatus is confined to this passage:
The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing [now]actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality
were an inner necessity like that of logical inference. – The connection
between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity.

Edoardo Sartore, "The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362 | Edoardo Sartore(“A knows that p is the case”, has no sense if p is a tautology). (TLP 5.1362)
According to a traditional reading, here Wittgenstein is arguing for freedom of
the will on the grounds that it is impossible to infer future events (including
one’s own actions) from our knowledge of the present (Mion 2017). The
argument goes like this:(A) We have free will if and only if we cannot predict our future actions.
(B) If we could predict our future actions, then the causal nexus would
be a necessary nexus.
(C) The causal nexus is not a necessary nexus.
These three premises jointly entail that we have free will, although
Wittgenstein doesn’t explicitly draw the conclusion. (A) and (B) correspond to
the first and second sentence of TLP 5.1362 respectively, whereas (C) is
supported by TLP 5.136, 5.1361. Hence, there is little doubt that the argument is
consistent with the text. More contentious is its soundness. Against (B), forinstance, it may be objected that one may know the future even thoughnothing one knows in the present necessitates something happening in the
future: probabilistic considerations might be enough to warrant a knowledge
claim. However, the author of the Tractatus would deny that such probabilistic
predictions constitute knowledge: non-deductive patterns of inference may
support reasonable belief in future events, but the only knowledge-preserving
inferences are deductive ones. The upshot is a very restrictive conception ofknowledge, which Wittgenstein explicitly accepts: “It is an hypothesis that thesun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it willrise” (TLP 6.36311). (C) also represents a contentious claim. However, it is astraightforward consequence of the following Tractarian commitments:(i)

All necessity is logical necessity (cf. TLP 6.37)(ii) Future events are connected to present events causally, if at all.
(iii) Future events are not logical consequences of present events (cf.
TLP 5.1361).
Although it is not spelled out in the text, (ii) transpires from TLP 5.135 and
5.136, where Wittgenstein implicitly assumes that anyone who believes in thepossibility of inferential knowledge of the future takes such inference to be
based on causation.

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Edoardo Sartore, "The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362 | Edoardo Sartore

What about (A)? The left-to-right direction of entailment is intuitively
plausible, as its contrapositive reads “If we can predict our future actions, wehave no free will”. To dispel possible misgivings, consider that if I know now
that I will do X tomorrow, then, since knowledge is factive (“The connection
between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity” TLP
5.1362), it follows that I will do X tomorrow. That is, regardless of how I act,
nothing could change the course of events, my doing X tomorrow ispredeterminate by present facts, and my will is not free (Frascolla 2007: 133).
The right-to-left side of the biconditional (which occurs essentially in theargument above) is more objectionable. It reads: “If we cannot predict our
future actions, we have free will”. Here one might raise the “standard
objection” that “our epistemic shortcomings have no metaphysical import: thefuture may well be necessitated by the present, whether or not we know it isor how such determination goes” (Marconi 2021: 116). That is, determinism
might well be true, and yet we might be in principle unable to know themechanisms by which present facts necessitate the occurrence of future
events.
Now, this objection finds a natural response within the text of the Tractatus.
For, if “The only necessity that exists is logical necessity” (TLP 6.37), then either
propositions about future events are logical consequences of propositions
about present states of affairs or determinism is false (as there is no otherform of necessity). However, Wittgenstein contended that the logical relationsof entailment between two propositions can be shown in the structure of the
propositions (TLP 5.13). That is, in the logically transparent notation of theTractatus, the “inner connection becomes obvious” (TLP 5.1311). But then thevery idea of knowing a proposition while being in principle unable to knowwhat follows from it is incoherent. If a proposition about what I will dotomorrow followed logically from a proposition about what is the case rightnow, I could know the former by virtue of knowing the latter. In short, given
the Tractarian dictum that all necessity is logical necessity, determinism isincompatible with the unpredictability of the future.
Here is where, according to Marconi, we encounter an exegetical problem. On
the one hand, at this point in the Tractatus Wittgenstein has not made thereduction of necessity to logical necessity explicit. Yet such a reduction is
crucial to the argument: without it, premise (A) encounters the standard

Edoardo Sartore, "The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362 | Edoardo Sartore

objection. On the other hand, with the reduction at one’s disposal, a morestraightforward argument for freedom of the will is at hand, one that does not
require mention of epistemic notions. One could argue like this: “If allnecessity is logical necessity, and future events are not logical consequences ofpresent events, then the future is not necessitated by the present (i.e.,
determinism is false). And if future events are indeterminate, then a fortiori
our actions are also not determined in advance, and our will is free”. That is, aneater argument for freedom of the will would only require to assume thelogical nature of necessity together with the lack of any logical entailment
between present and future events (both these committments are clearly spelt
out in the Tractatus). Here talk of inference, ignorance and knowledge would
be avoided as an unnecessary detour. According to Marconi, the availability in
the Tractatus of this straightforward argument casts a doubt on the traditional
reconstruction of TLP 5.1362.

2. Two Kinds of Incompatibilism

According to Marconi, the traditional account makes the argument
unintelligible – meaning that it escapes understanding why Wittgenstein would
argue in this way, why he would go "the epistemic way":
Why not just argue that there is freedom of the will because determinism
is false, as there are no necessary connections whatsoever between
present and future events (including our future actions)? Why insist that
we cannot infer our future actions, rather than just claiming that the
future is not determined by the present – period? (2021: 119)
Marconi believes that the intelligibility of the argument in TLP 5.1362 can berestored if we read the incipit (A) not as a premise but rather as the conclusionof Wittgenstein’s argument. On this reading "Wittgenstein is not arguing forfree will, but for the essential connection [...] between free will and ignorance unpredictability - of future actions" (2021: 121).
Before considering Marconi’s alternative reconstruction of the argument, it
pays to distinguish two different incompatibility theses. I call metaphysicalincompatibilism the thesis that freedom of the will is incompatible withdeterminism, as expressed by the biconditional:

522

Edoardo Sartore, "The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362 | Edoardo Sartore(MI) We have free will if and only if the future is not necessitated by
the present.
I distinguish this thesis from what I call epistemic incompatibilism, the viewthat freedom of the will is incompatible with the predictability of the future:(EI) We have free will if and only if we cannot predict our future
actions.
Since (EI) is just another label for (A), Marconi effectively reads TLP 5.1362 as
an argument for epistemic incompatibilism.

3. Marconi’s Alternative Reading

Marconi proposes to reconstruct Wittgenstein’s argument semi-formally as
follows (2021: 120):
1. If we could predict our future actions, there
would be no freedom of the will.

Premise

2. Suppose we cannot predict our future actions.

Hypothesis

3. Suppose there is no freedom of the will.

Hypothesis

4. Future actions are necessitated by present
facts.

(3)

5. All necessity is logical.

Premise6. Future actions are logical consequences ofpresent facts.

(4), (5)7. Knowing present facts, it is possible to infer
future actions.

(6)

8. We can predict our future actions.

(7)

9. We cannot predict our future actions.

(2), Reiteration

10. There is freedom of the will.

(3)-(9), Reductio

11. If we cannot predict our future actions, there
is freedom of the will.

(2)-(10), Conditional
introduction

12. There is freedom of the will if and only if wecannot predict our future actions.

(1), (11),
Biconditional

Edoardo Sartore, "The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362 | Edoardo Sartore

introduction
The biconditional (EI) is deduced from premises (1) and (5). Premise (5)expresses Wittgenstein's logical conception of necessity. Premise (1)(predictability entails lack of free will) is equivalent to the left-to-right side of(EI) itself (free will entails unpredictability), which is taken to be intuitively
plausible. Hence, the gist of the argument consists in establishing the otherside of (EI) (unpredictability entails free will). We do so by assuming that wecannot predict our future actions (2), and that there is no free will (3). Then we
argue from (3), via assumption (5), to the conclusion (8) that we can predict our
future actions, thus contradicting assumption (2). Since (3) led us to acontradiction, we can discharge it and infer its negation: there is freedom of
the will (10). And since (10) depends exclusively on (2) and (5) we candischarge the former and obtain the conditional in (11) (unpredictability
entails free will). The last step just joins the two sides of the biconditional (EI).
There is one crucial thing that Marconi does not highlight, however. In theinference from (3) to (4), it is tacitly assumed that lack of free will entails
determinism. This is equivalent to the right-to-left side of (MI) (indeterminism
entails free will). With this third premise in place the argument is valid.
On this reading, Marconi claims, Wittgenstein’s argument is made intelligible.
Wittgenstein had to go the “epistemic way”, for the conclusion he sought toestablish, the biconditional (EI), is itself epistemic: it expresses a relation
between freedom of the will and impossibility of predicting (knowing now) our
future actions.

4. Problems with the Alternative Reading

My contention is that, just like an unanswered why-question (why does
Wittgenstein go the epistemic way to prove freedom of the will?) tarred the
traditional reconstruction of the argument, a similar issue affects the newversion. We might ask: why did Wittgenstein find it sensible to prove theconnection between the unpredictability of the future and free will? After all,
we have seen in section 2 that the Tractatus has all the resources needed toprove freedom of the will via the rejection of determinism: why also botherproving the weaker point?

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Edoardo Sartore, "The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362 | Edoardo Sartore

I think the most plausible suggestion is that Wittgenstein, in TLP 5.1362, seeks
to establish a thesis (epistemic incompatibilism) which holds independently of
any metaphysical commitment. Hence, even though Wittgenstein later
explicitly rejected determinism (TLP 6.37), thereby admitting the existence of
free will, the thesis established in TLP 5.1362 is a more general one, which canbe maintained even if one doesn’t share Wittgenstein’s stronger claims. In that
passage he is homing in on the point that, regardless of whether determinism
holds, all there is to our will being free is that we cannot know the future. If
this is what the argument proves, then it makes a genuine point: all it takes for
our will to be free is that we cannot know our future actions, whether these
are necessitated by the present or not.
Indeed, this is a natural reading of the incipit to 5.1362. To say that “Thefreedom of the will consists [besteht] in the impossibility of knowing [now]actions that still lie in the future”, suggests that, as long as we are necessarily
ignorant of the future, then, whether or not the future is determined, the will isfree. To use our labels, Wittgenstein would be arguing for epistemic
incompatibilism while simultaneously leaving open the possibility of
metaphysical compatibilism (i.e., we might have free will in a deterministic
world).
However, this is precisely what the argument fails to do. It fails to prove
epistemic incompatibilism without assuming metaphysical incompatibilism aswell. For, as we shall see, in Marconi’s reconstruction, (EI) is established byappealing to premises which jointly entail (MI).
This is not hard to prove. As I mentioned before, the right-to-left direction of(MI) (indeterminism entails free will) is implicitly assumed in the argument
above. All we need to show, then, is that its converse (free will entails
indeterminism) can be deduced by using the same resources of Marconi’s
argument. We do that by deducing its contrapositive, the claim that
determinism entails lack of free will.
1. If we could predict our future actions, there
would be no freedom of the will.

Premise2. All necessity is logical.

Premise3. Suppose future actions are necessitated byHypothesis

Edoardo Sartore, "The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362 | Edoardo Sartore

present facts.
4. Future actions are logical consequences ofpresent facts.

(2), (3)5. Knowing present facts, it is possible to infer
future actions.

(4)

6. We can predict our future actions.

(5)

7. There is no freedom of the will.

(1), (6), modus
ponens

8. If future actions are necessitated by present
facts, there is no freedom of the will.

(3)-(7), Conditional
introduction

Here metaphysical incompatibilism is obtained without assuming any premisethat wasn’t already at play in the argument for epistemic incompatibilism (mypremises (1) and (2) correspond to Marconi's premises (1) and (5)). This showsthat TLP 5.1362 does not present an independent argument for the "essential
connection" between unpredictability and free will, since anyone who accepts
the premises of the argument is also committed to the incompatibility between
determinism and free will.

5. Conclusion

To conclude, let me point out that the difficulty I have raised is not exclusive to
Marconi’s interpretation of TLP 5.1362. For even on the traditional
reconstruction, Wittgenstein is read as presenting an argument for free will
while taking no substantial stance on determinism. The idea is that “thefreedom of the will consists merely in the fact that we cannot know, that is,logically infer, our own future actions” (Glock 1996: 387): “merely”, that is,irrespective of any metaphysical commitment to determinism. Mion himself
subscribes to this view when he writes: “for Wittgenstein, free will does notdepend upon an indeterminate future, but upon the impossibility to logicallyinfer the future from the past” (2017: 30). In the traditional picture, then,Wittgenstein is presented as a metaphysical compatibilist and epistemic
incompatibilist. As I have shown, however, this is not a position that he cancoherently hold, since the Tractarian grounds that support (EI) also commit
their proponent to (MI).

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Edoardo Sartore, "The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362 | Edoardo Sartore

References
Frascolla, Pasquale (2007) Understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus. London-New York,
Routledge.
Glock, Hans-Johann (1996) A Wittgenstein dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell.
Marconi, Diego (2021) “Tractatus 5.1362 (reloaded)”, in: Andreas Georgallides (ed.)
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, 108-123.
Mion, Giovanni (2017) “Tractatus 5.1362”, Philosophical Inquiries 5(1), 27-32.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1972): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Übersetzt von D. F. Pears und B.
F. McGuinness. Reprinted with corrections in the light of the publication of Wittgenstein’s
correspondence with C. K. Ogden about the first translation. London: Routledge and KeganPaul.

Acknowledgement
This publication was supported by the UZH Candoc Grant, grant no. FK-22-075.

Edoardo Sartore, "The Tractatus on Free Will: Interpreting TLP 5.1362". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About Kierkegaard's or (Wittgenstein's) Writings | Franz Schörkhuber

Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About
Kierkegaard's or (Wittgenstein's) Writings
Franz Schörkhuber (Bratislava, Slovakia)
Abstract“But both authors claim not to be putting forward doctrines but rather to be engaging ina particular sort of activity. If they are to be taken at their word, therefore, it would
seem that it is only in grasping why their texts have the particular shape that they dothat we grasp what sort of enterprise it is which they take themselves to be engaged in. It
is thus that we grasp what philosophy, as they practise it, is.” (Conant 1995, 250)
Conant wants to put “two and two together”. He aims to make explicit what he experiences as
essential in reading the books of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. I think that by doing so heforgets Frege’s teaching that a concept, a form—in our case: an idea of philosophical practice—cannot be communicated directly, without rendering it into an object of speech (thusperverting the very idea he seeks to elaborate).

In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (11846) the
fictitious Johannes Climacus characterizes the subjective thinker as an artist in
regard to how he communicates his thoughts. Being aware of the ‘double
reflection’ essential to every thought that is not merely outward (judging stable
things) but inward (reflecting one’s relation to oneself), the subjective thinker
perceives “that a direct mode of communication is [both] a fraud practised
upon himself, as if he had ceased to be an existing individual [i.e., in process ofcoming to be]; and [also] an attempt to defraud the recipient of thecommunication; a fraud which brings him into contradiction with his entire
thought.”
Just as the subjective thinker has made himself free through the
reduplication given his reflection, so the secret of all communicationconsists precisely in emancipating the recipient, and that for this reason
he must not communicate directly. (Kierkegaard 1992, 68–69)
James Conant (1995) famously pointed out that this indirect mode of teaching,displayed by Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, andespecially the latter’s revocation of everything that he had so meticulously
elaborated in his voluminous book, can fruitfully be compared to what
Wittgenstein prompts us to do at the very end of the Tractatus. There too, theframe (the foreword and the last propositions) hints towards putting aside the528Franz Schörkhuber, "Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About Kierkegaard's or (Wittgenstein's) Writings". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About Kierkegaard's or (Wittgenstein's) Writings | Franz Schörkhuber

purported core of the book (i.e. its theories of meaning, thought and language).
By recognizing these (misguided) attempts as resulting in mere tautologies, weare shown (and thus may come to see) that any attempt of depicting theboarders of language from within is equally nonsensical as trying to transgress
language in order to depict them from without. What shows itself in theTractatus are thus not, as many commentators would have it, importantfeatures of language and reality which, in lack of appropriate means, we could
not demarcate (but at least hint at). Rather, as Conant (1993) puts it in anotherseminal paper:
The guiding assumption of both the Postscript and the Tractatus is that thephilosopher (typically) suffers from an illusion of understanding, from the
projection of illusory sense onto a (pseudo-)proposition which lacks a(clear) sense. The task therefore is not to refute what he thinks, but toshow him that there is nothing of the sort that he imagines himself to be
thinking. […] The method employed in both the Postscript and theTractatus relies upon the thought that under such circumstances the only
procedure that will prove genuinely elucidatory is one that enters into thephilosopher’s illusion of understanding and explode it from within. (217–
218)
The core teaching of Conant then comes to this: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein
are authors who are not putting forward philosophical thesis, but trying to
make the reader aware that any such thesis would lack meaning (stood inneed of a sense-giving practice); and this is achieved by elucidating thesenselessness of exactly those propositions which, on first sight, seemed todemonstrate that very thought.
The strange thing with Conant’s writings is that I accept everything he says––orat least, that’s what I suppose. But in accepting this it becomes quite unclear if
and how it had been possible to understand (hence to accept) anything at all.
Conant pictures the practice of philosophizing in a way that it becomesradically problematic whether such a picture can in fact be given. He speaks tothe end that philosophy is a matter of form, but he does so by means of putting
forward depictable content––which is, according to his own teaching, not a
possible means to teach me anything. This puzzlement of mine is not designed
to make a spectacular philosophical point; it is real and it is quite disturbing.

Franz Schörkhuber, "Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About Kierkegaard's or (Wittgenstein's) Writings". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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And it is intrinsically linked with the not less disturbing question how to write
about authors such as Kierkegaard or Wittgenstein––if at all. Because thefeeling I have is that Conant is right if he is to be understood as making(exegetical) claims about the consistency (or inconsistency) of different views(theses) we have about their writings. I would believe that his (i.e. the resolute)
reading is the most convincing, but still it is a reading about something––and it
is exactly this aboutness which disturbs me, having learned by Conant himselfthat philosophy, properly understood, isn’t about something. Hence, I ask how
I had been able to ‘learn’ this when at the same time this learning tells me thatits form is uncoherent for the purpose of such a teaching.
To start with, let me present a (later on revoked) thought of Johannes
Climacus, the humourist in and the pseudonymous author of the Postscript. In
the second part we find him reflecting about what he calls the ‘doublereflection of communication’. With regard to speaking or writing, hedistinguishes the form and the expression of what is communicated. First, weneed to find the correct shape, the proper words and their arrangements
which give expression to what we think. This is achieved by a first reflection, areflection of the correct relation between my ideas and the language in which I
try to fit it. The second reflection though, concerns not the relation of thought
and language but the relation I, as a living and thinking being, have to theideas thus shared. This second aspect does not cause problems when we talkabout objective facts towards which we do not have an existential bound, likemost scientific findings, the weather forecast or a cooking recipe. But thischanges when the thought (which by the first reflection has been put into its
proper shape) reflects (or pretends to reflect) our own existence. The way we
present (communicate) our thought must then itself correspond to thisthought, because otherwise we, allegedly reflected in this thought, would
betray ourselves. The crucial thought of Climacus then is that this second
reflection of inwardness makes it impossible to communicate directly, because
any such direct speech would presuppose that the relation of oneself to thethought (in which one is living) had come to an end, had found its telos in an
objective, transmittable result; whereas in fact the living relation to one’s own
thought is characterized by becoming ever more inward, eluding completion,
eluding direct expression. Yet, in religious praying or in philosophical teaching
we are continually tempted to assert what, by mere assertion, becomes a

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deceit––to both who speaks and who receives. Funny, though, after Climacus
has elaborated this thought, he admits that to speak it out directly is to fall into
the very fallacy it is about: “To point this out directly would again be acontradiction, because the form would be direct in spite of the double
reflection in the content.” (Kierkegaard 1999, 63) And he goes on to illustrate:
Suppose it were the life-view of a religiously existing subject that one must
not have a disciple, that this is treason to both God and men; suppose hewere also a little foolish […] and said this directly, with unction andpathos, what then? Well, yes, he would indeed be understood. Soon ten
would apply, asking to be engaged just for a free shave once a week topreach this doctrine; i.e., and as further information of the doctrine’s
truth, he would have had the extraordinary good luck to acquire disciples
who accepted and spread his teaching about having no disciples. (63)Suppose someone wanted to impart the conviction that it is not truth thatis truth but that the way is the truth, i.e., that the truth is only in the
becoming, in the process of appropriation, that hence there is no result.
Suppose he were a philanthropist who must needs proclaim this to all andsundry; suppose he made the splendid short cut of imparting this in the
direct form in Adressavisen, thus gaining a mass of adherents, while theartistic way would, despite hit utmost exertions, leave it unclear whether
he had helped anyone: what then? Why then, his statement became
precisely a result. (66)
Climacus is a humourist. And Kierkegaard was one too, of some sort. Climacus
first wrote 700 pages filled with thoughts like these, just to revoke it. And
Kierkegaard wrote numerous books under pseudonyms of which he wasserious that in them could not be found one single thought which was his own.
I was never able to imagine Wittgenstein as a funny guy, but advising me tothrow away the ladder (Tractatus) or saying that all is up to me and that hewas not propounding anything (PI), I felt kind of mocked. Now, I am nottackling the task to make sense out of this––Conant’s papers (1989, 1992, 1995)
do, and I am, truthfully, very convinced. What I’m asking myself instead: Whatis it that I was taught by Conant, when within an academic paper he instructs
me about writings which are eager to demonstrate that there is nothing to belearnt by means of direct communication. Because after all, what Conant isFranz Schörkhuber, "Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About Kierkegaard's or (Wittgenstein's) Writings". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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doing, is a form of direct communication (or at least so it appears to me). Even
though he is reminding his readers about the importance of attending to thepeculiar form of our philosopher’s texts, Conant’s own writings are still
academic texts in which we see him arguing for the coherence of his (so-called
resolute) reading. And I myself, not being all too humorous, do not want toblame him on that; but I am wondering why it is that I think that I havelearned a whole lot by reading his papers, which should not have beenpossible, if they were right in what they say in regard to the essentias ofKierkegaard’s (Wittgenstein’s) writings.
What is the characteristic of academic texts? In a most general way, it is their
being about something, either a specific topic, argument, historicaldevelopment, or––in philosophy more often than in other fields––about thewritings of humans who are regarded as philosophers. If it now happens thatsome of these authors write texts to the effect that we should become aware of
the nonsensicality of these text’s propositions, it seems to be a rather obvious
method to the academic writer to focus on the specific form rather than themere (purportedly nonsensical) content of the work. Hence, authors such as
Conant focus on the frame of both the Tractatus and the Postscript in order todemonstrate that what is written within that frame is to be regarded as mere
and absolute nonsense (and not just some grade of it). Yet, we know, or wehave been taught by Frege, that it was “a mere illusion to suppose that aconcept can be made an object without altering it.” (Frege 1960: xxii) And
Wittgenstein himself called it the fundamental idea of the Tractatus “that there
can be no representatives of the logic of facts” (4.0312). –– Of course, these arethemselves quotations of works of philosophy who by this very nature mightprove to be nonsensical, especially if quoted and thus put outside the context
in which the reader experiences them on their proper places. But still, I get thismuch out of it, that to write about the structure of a philosophical work is not
the same as reading and living within it (even though one might at the end
come to acknowledge that he or she had been moving in an illusory sphere).
To follow a rule (even if, later on, we come to see that it was an illusion that wewere forced to do so) is not the same as to stand outside and interpret it. To
read the Postscript is a completely different task than to read Conant’s texts
about the Postscript. –– Yet this, as it stands, is obvious. But what I’m curious
about is what the latter can actually teach us if in the former such a huge effort

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is undertaken to first lead us into nonsense just in order to then show to us
that it was? I know, of course, that many commentators have asked thisquestion before: How can we speak about a work of nonsense? And isn’t it selfcontradictory to use for that purpose quotations from this very work? But myemphasis in asking lies not so much on the task of speaking about nonsense
but, more generally, on this queer attempt to speak about a form––hence,about a philosophical treatise, whatever it’s content may be (if there is one atall).
In the foreword to the Tractatus Wittgenstein lists Frege and Russell as“stimulation of [his] thought” but declares that he won’t give sources, because
it was indifferent to him whether what he thought had “already been thought
before”. This casual way of putting it makes it sound as if he found it annoying
to quote and hence legislate his sources, as if he had well been able to do so
but simply didn’t like. But I think there’s more to it. I rather take it to indicatethat to practice philosophy is never to refer or denote but always to elaborate
trough one’s own lingual and conceptual practice. (That the object is missing inthis last sentence is again intended to show that there is none.) To make itsound quite spectacular, I may speak of a fraud, a betrayal, as soon as we treat
a work of philosophy as if it was something that could be referred directly bymeans of quotes. There is a funny idea of Ludwig Hohl, a highly
underestimated writer, who in his Notizen once says that those who truly
could be accused of plagiarism should in fact be admired, for to this effect they
had to write anew (to relive) the whole oeuvre of the plagiarized. What is thenthat I say here? That there is no philosophy to be communicated, but always
and simply only to be put into practice––by means of one’s own lingual,conceptual, poetical abilities. That these abilities can be strengthened byreading Kierkegaard or Wittgenstein is out of question. And they may make us
see not only how to use them but also that we shouldn’t expect all too muchfrom putting them to power. But the attempt to vocalize their idea ofphilosophy by describing the structure (frame, pseudonymity, revocation etc.)from the outside seems misguided to me. Let’s rather dick into their non/sense(because it’s the only way to experience that) and then to speak for ourselves.
Conant wants to put two and two together. He aims to do what, for an
academic, comes quite natural: to make explicit what he experiences inreading (i.e., living in) the books of Kierkegaard or Wittgenstein. And I haveFranz Schörkhuber, "Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About Kierkegaard's or (Wittgenstein's) Writings". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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not read better papers with a comparable aim. But still, I think it is the wrong
thing to do. In 1930 Wittgenstein wrote a sketch for a foreword, now printed in
Culture and Value, saying that ‘the spirit’ in which his book is written was not
the spirit “of the main current of European and American civilization”.
Lacking culture and some shared value, this civilization would not allow for
great work of arts, but only for “the unimpressive spectacle of a crowd whose
best members work for purely private ends.” But “the disappearance of aculture”, he goes on, “does not signify the disappearance of human value”. And
he concludes by saying: “So I am really writing for friends who are scatteredthroughout the corners of the globe.” (Wittgenstein 1984, 6e) After that,though, he starts to ponder about the “danger of a long foreword” (7e), because‘the spirit’ of a book would have to be “evident in the book itself and cannot be
described.” –– “Everything ritualistic (everything that, as it were, smacks of thehigh priest) must be strictly avoided, because it immediately turns rotten.” (8e)And he then stops by just writing: “It is a great temptation to try to make thespirit explicit.” (8e)When later in this same collection we find Wittgenstein saying: “What thereader can do too, leave to the reader” (77, my trans.), it appears to me ofimportance to leave it to the reader, not the interpreter or the academic––whopermanently have the temptation to speak out what eventually has to be done.
References
Conant, James (1989): “Must We Show What We Cannot Say”, in: Flemin, Richard; Payne,
Michael (Ed.): The Senses of Stanley Cavell. Lewisbury (PA): Bucknell University Press, 242–283.
Conant, James (1993): “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and Nonsense”, in: Cohe, Ted; Guyer, Paul;
Putnam, Hilary (Ed.): Pursuits of Reason. Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavell. Texas Tech
University Press, 195–224.
Conant, James (1995): “Putting Two and Two Together: Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and thePoint of View for Their Works as Authors”, in: Tessin, Timothy; Ruhr, Mario von der (Ed.):
Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 248–331.
Frege, Gottlob (1960): The Foundations of Arithmetic. A logico-mathematical Enquiry into theConcept of Number. Translated by G. L. Austin. Second Revised Edition. New York: Harper.
Hohl, Ludwig (2014): Die Notizen oder Von der unvoreiligen Versöhnung. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

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Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About Kierkegaard's or (Wittgenstein's) Writings | Franz Schörkhuber

Kierkegaard, Sören (1992): Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments.
Edited and Translated with Introduction and Notes by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong.
Princeton: University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1984): Culture and Value. Edited by G. H. von Wright in collaboration
with Heikki Nyman. Translated by Peter Winch. Chicago: University Press.
Wittgenstein,

Ludwig(2015):

Tractatus

Logico-Philosophicus.

Logisch-philosophische

Abhandlung. Side-by-Side-by-Side Edition, containing the original German, alongside both the
Ogden/Ramsey, and Pears/McGuinness English translations. (http://people.umass.edu/klement/
tlp/tlp-ebook.pdf)

Franz Schörkhuber, "Keeping Two and Two Apart – On the Fraud of Writing About Kierkegaard's or (Wittgenstein's) Writings". In 100 Years ofTractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Deep Jokes | Mira Magdalena Sickinger

Deep Jokes
Mira Magdalena Sickinger (Vienna, Austria)
Abstract
In this paper I draw attention to the grammatical “deep joke”. Wittgenstein refers to this typeof joke in PI §111, comparing its depth to the depth of philosophy. I start with a brief review ofWittgenstein’s notions of “grammar” and “depth”. Building on these ideas, I first offer some
general considerations regarding jokes and then present descriptive remarks about deepjokes. I evaluate possible examples of deep jokes, including primary examples provided by
Wittgenstein, which appear in preliminary versions (1936-46) of the PhilosophicalInvestigations but were cut later. I attempt to capture the distinctive qualities of deep jokes
and seek to elucidate their philosophical potential. The results of the investigation of deepjokes provide an original reflection on our (mis-)understanding of linguistic practices.

Introduction

Malcolm’s memoir includes a remark on how Wittgenstein once declared thata serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely ofjokes. (Malcolm 1984: 27f.) In his Philosophical Investigations (PI; I will refer tothe English translation of 2009) Wittgenstein raises the issue of “depth”. He
ascribes depth to problems that stem from a misinterpretation of forms oflanguage.
The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms oflanguage have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; they are
as deeply rooted in us as the forms of our language, and their significanceis as great as the importance of our language. —– Let’s ask ourselves: why
do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is what the depth ofphilosophy is.) (PI 2009: §111)

What Is Grammar?

The way Wittgenstein uses the term “grammar” differs from common usage.
His notion of grammar omits school grammar (declension, conjugation, tense,
gender, word order); it rather has to do with a philosophical investigation of
language that is concerned with the description of word meaning and use.
Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order tofulfil its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human536

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Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Deep Jokes | Mira Magdalena Sickinger

beings. It only describes, and in no way explains, the use of signs. (PI 2009:§496)
Thus, instead of prescriptive rules defining the grammatical correctness oflanguage, Wittgenstein assumes descriptive grammatical rules describing theestablished uses of terms. These rules constitute our conceptual scheme.
Philosophy may explicate that scheme by describing our linguistic practices.
(Glock 2017: 237) In this sense, philosophy itself is “grammatical investigation”,
similar to conceptual analysis. The aim of such an investigation is to provide
an overview of our language use. As, for Wittgenstein, it is precisely the lack ofoverview that often hinders understanding.
The task of philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is not to explain how things really are,but rather to make conscious and critically reflect on the participatory
knowledge that speakers of a natural language automatically acquire by
speaking a certain language and living a certain form of life. The philosophicalinvestigation of language does not emphasise language’s sufficiency. On thecontrary, it shows that the speakers of a language are deeply embedded in thelanguage’s system, deeply entangled in its rules and in the confusions that stemfrom its use. This is not to suggest an attempt at a reformed, improved
language, as it is not an ideal state of surveyable order that is relevant here,
but the activity of constantly emphasising distinctions, (PI 2009: §132) of reordering and regrouping language.

What Is Depth?

Wittgenstein's notion of “depth” comprises structural as well as affective
components; both closely linked to language. Deep problems result fromgrammatical confusions. It seems as if such confusions stem from the inability
to distinguish between a word’s grammatical possibilities; in particularbetween its “surface” and “depth” grammar. The reason why we confuse
surface grammar with depth grammar is that we have learned to identify
language with words, instead of understanding it in terms of the practices that
confer meaning upon those words. Words do not denote prescriptively; thus,
perceiving them superficially undermines any form of comprehensive
understanding. We provide words with depth in our practices of language
games, of communication. If words denote variably, then their intended

Mira Magdalena Sickinger, "Deep Jokes". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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meaning depends on expression, context, sentence structure, etc. Graspingwords comprehensively, which means grasping their intention and theirdepths, is a prerequisite for successful communication.
Depth also contains psychological, or emotional significance, where a felt
uneasiness that stems from language is “deep”. (Ts 302: 29) Wittgensteinspeaks of “deep disquietudes”, (PI 2009: §111) caused by misinterpretations of
our forms of language. These are not only formal problems, but they haveaffective consequences. Wittgenstein rejects the strategy of simply eliminatingsuch deep problems from the world, as trivial philosophy does. (see Ts 211:
593) It is necessary to acknowledge the feeling of language-induced
disquietude and to apply meaningful methods of “therapy”. Such methods
would aim at raising awareness of our conceptual scheme and our languageuse.

What Are Deep Jokes?

Let us now try to apply the previous considerations to our common concept ofa joke, in order to get an idea of what a deep joke could be. Joking is a social
practice. The form of the practice is determined and familiar to most people. A
person tells a joke and tries her best in telling it correctly. The recipient listens
and tries her best to understand; a possible answer to a successful jokepractice is laughter. The motives for telling a joke may vary, so do thesituations in which jokes are told. It seems generally fair to claim that in manycases jokes are told to amuse and perhaps to illustrate a particular point. There
are different theories regarding the mechanisms of humour and jokes. The
predominant theories are the theories of relief, superiority, and incongruity.
For a comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of humour, one may
consult, e.g., Morreall. (see 2009, 2020) The theory of incongruity in particularillustrates how jokes thwart our expectations by bringing together apparently
incongruous schemes. While the set-up creates certain expectations, these may
be violated within the punchline. According to such an account, expectation,
irritation, and surprise are fundamental elements that serve the pattern ofjoke narratives.
Wittgenstein urges that the conventional philosophical form of explanationmust be replaced by description; however, Wittgenstein’s writings do not

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Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Deep Jokes | Mira Magdalena Sickinger

contain clear descriptions; they rather consist in thought experiments,
questions, aphorisms, fictional dialogues, and the like. These, in a way similar
to jokes, seem to serve the aim of irritating or surprising the reader, forcing
them to look at things in a different way; (Janik 2001: 193f.) forcing them toperceive familiar things in a way that may not be the most familiar.
Having sketched some of the joke’s general features we now may ask about the
deep joke’s distinctive qualities. Deep jokes may share the structural andformal qualities of a more general type of joke, they cannot be distinguished inconcerns of style or form. What seems to be the idea is that deep jokes bringour grammatical confusions to display. They corrupt conventional ways ofthinking and speaking in order to initiate a reflection on meaning. In this way
they incorporate both the problem and the solution; not the shallow solutionof reduction, rather the active solution that aims at surveyability of our use oflanguage. Deep joking may be an activity of re-ordering in a humorous mode.
The punchline of a deep joke tears the recipient out of her ordinary forms oflanguage. It brings unspoken assumptions to light that are presupposed in theway we think and talk, (Yablo 2019: 3) or emphasises distinctions which ourordinary forms of language make us overlook. The effect of such an eruption
may be disquieting, to use Wittgenstein’s term. Or, to remain within
Wittgenstein’s images, we may say that the punchline leads to concussions,such as those we get from running up against the limits of language. (see PI
2009: §119)
Voltolini (in an online discussion with Yablo, 2020) sees an example for a
possible deep joke in Wittgenstein’s PI §246:
It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m inpain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps that I am in pain? (PI2009: §246)
In this sense, a deep joke could originate from a senseless sentence that arises
out of a misunderstanding of the rules of grammar for the expressions they
contain. Though not amusing in a conventional sense, one may concede that infact it is a funny thing to claim that one possesses knowledge of one’s pain. One
may argue that knowledge must be open to doubt and that is not feasible in thecase of one’s own pain. One can have pain, be in pain; knowledge may be

Mira Magdalena Sickinger, "Deep Jokes". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
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Deep Jokes | Mira Magdalena Sickinger

irrelevant here and wrongly referred to. The joke thus arises out of themisunderstanding of the grammar of “know” and of “pain” (or of expressionsof sensations more generally).
Fortunately though, we are not restricted to assumptions since primary
examples of deep jokes can indeed be found within Wittgenstein’s writings.
Preliminary versions of the Philosophical Investigations, beginning with Ms
142 (1936-37), feature a separate remark, following §111, entirely on the deepjoke. This remark was cut in Ts 227a, 227b, §111, p. 85 (1944-46); only the first
sentences remained. Since its content is of high relevance to an investigation of
the deep joke, I am quoting it at full length:
Fragen wir uns: Warum empfinden wir einen grammatischen Witz in
gewissem Sinne als tief? (Und das ist ja natürlich die philosophische Tiefe.)(Worin liegt die Tiefe des Witzes: “We called him tortoise because hetaught us”?
Wir werden plötzlich aufmerksam darauf, daß eine solche Ableitung desSubstantivs unmöglich ist. – Warum sollte sie aber so unmöglich sein? Sie
ließe sich auch sehr wohl denken (Zcechische Zunamen die ein
Imperfectum sind). Und nun scheint der Witz seine Tiefe verloren zu
haben. Dies kommt aber daher, daß wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit
verschoben haben. – Betrachte ein andres Beispiel: Lichtenberg läßt eine
Magd in einem Brief über Literatur die Zahl Hundert so schreiben: 001.
Wenn man sich sagt: „nun, es könnte ja auch in der andern Richtung
geschrieben werden” – so fühlt man die Tiefe der Komik nicht. Diese liegt,
glaube ich, in dem Zusammenhang unseres Dezimalsystems, in welchem
das Zeichen “001” eine gewisse Stelle hat. Die Tiefe der Absurdität des“001” erscheint erst für den, der, sozusagen, die mathematischen
Konsequenzen aus diesem Schreibfehler ziehen kann. Nicht für den, dernur weiß, daß man so nicht ‘hundert’ schreibt. – Man kann, das ‘taught us’betreffend sagen: Ein Verbum hat für uns, eine Grundstellung (wie man
bei Turnübungen sagt) & dann verschiedene Stellungen verschiedenen
Verrichtungen gemäß. Eine beliebige dieser Stellungen als Bezeichnung
dessen nehmen, der (z.B.) lehrt, ist so, als nähme man für das Standbild
eines Menschen irgend eine Stellung, in der er sich auch einmal befinden
kann. Die Grundstellung, könnte man sagen, repräsentiert den Menschen

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von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Deep Jokes | Mira Magdalena Sickinger& der Infinitiv das Verbum. Es hätte so für uns nicht das Komische desSubstantivs “taught us”, wenn man statt dessen den Infinitiv des Verbs zur
Bezeichnung des Lehrenden verwendet hätte. – Die Tiefe der Absurdität
liegt hier wieder in Verhältnissen, die einer längeren Erklärung bedürfen;
weil sie den eigentümlichen Bau unserer Sprache betreffen.– Wenn wir
auf das System unserer Sprache sehen, dann haben wir das Gefühl der
Tiefe. Es ist, als sähen wir durch ihr Netz die ganze Welt.) (Ms 142: §112)
The “tortoise-joke” Wittgenstein is referring to is out of Lewis Carroll’s Alice:“Once”, said the Mock Turtle at last, with a deep sigh, “I was a real Turtle.”(…) “When we were little”, the Mock Turtle went on at last, more calmly,
though still sobbing a little now and then, “we went to school in the sea.
The master was an old Turtle — we used to call him Tortoise — ”“Why did you call him Tortoise, if he wasn’t one?” Alice asked.
“We called him Tortoise because he taught us,” said the Mock Turtle
angrily: “really you are very dull!” (Carroll 1865: 135f.)
It is the last sentence of the dialogue, the “Tortoise/taught us”-pun, which
reveals itself more directly when read out aloud, that features the “depth” inquestion. If we follow Wittgenstein’s idea, then we notice how the fictional
character Mock Turtle illustrates the grammatical error of a faulty derivation.
The Turtle who teaches became the “Tortoise”; drawing on the phonetic
proximity of “tortoise” /tɔːr.təs/ and “taught us” /tɔːt/ /əs/.
A handwritten marginal note was added to the remark in Ts 239 (1937),
wherein Wittgenstein explains vividly why the above joke may be perceived as
deep:„Wir empfanden ihn als tief, weil er ein grelles Licht auf das System
unserer Sprache zu werfen schien.”/ “We perceived it as deep because it
seemed to shed a glaring light on the system of our language.” (mytranslation; second marginal note Ts 239: §117)
The depth of a joke appears only when one draws the consequences from it.
And that is the reason why such deep jokes may also cause disquietude. A jokethat sheds light on the operating modes of language, shows, above all, theMira Magdalena Sickinger, "Deep Jokes". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Deep Jokes | Mira Magdalena Sickinger

possibilities of confusion, problems, dysfunctionalities that have formed in theevolution of language. A recipient who takes these possibilities seriously may
begin to doubt their own use of language, their own communicativecompetence, their own linguistic knowledge. Such doubt may initiate a processof reflection on the linguistic establishment and interpretation of meaning.
Let me propose another candidate for a deep joke that I regard as a revelatory
example. There are actually two versions of this joke, aiming for opposing but
equally original punchlines:
A group of salespeople had been travelling the country for many years,
always sharing the same carriage in the train and always telling one
another jokes. Over the years, they had become so familiar with theirjokes that they just used numbers to indicate them. One of them would say“23” and they’d all laugh. Or “89!” A young person joined them and after a
few journeys decided she’d take part. In a moment of silence, she
exclaimed “97!” But nobody laughed. The young person wondered where
she could have gone wrong. Had she chosen the wrong number? She got
the answer from one of the salespeople “One must also know how to tell ajoke.”
The alternative, positive punchline, instead, goes as follows:
There was a lot of laughter and one of the salespeople turned to her andsaid: “That’s a good one! – We hadn’t heard that one before.”This joke may not be entirely in line with Wittgenstein’s examples. For the joke
itself does not really illustrate misunderstandings that stem from grammaticalconfusions, but it rather illustrates the very process of linguistic establishmentof meaning and its limitations. Conferring or reducing fictional content to anumber might strike us as an unusual practice. However, abbreviations are acommon form of meaning conferment in most languages. This legitimates thedepth of the joke-story and allows to draw conclusions that are relevant for
our actual linguistic practices.
The salespeople in the joke have actively and consciously conferred meaning
to the numbers they utter, and they seem to be very aware of the grammaticalrules of their practice. However, as a new person joins their practice it

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Mira Magdalena Sickinger, "Deep Jokes". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Deep Jokes | Mira Magdalena Sickinger

becomes apparent how easily these rules are called into question. Of course,
the new person was not present when the rules were established; nobody told
her: “See, this joke (telling of the joke story ‘1’) is denoted by ‘1’, etc.” Theperson had no possibility of learning the game. Cavell puts it this way:(…) we do not learn words in all the contexts in which they could be used
(what, indeed, would that mean?) and (…) not every context in which aword is used is one in which the word can be learned (e.g., contexts inwhich the word is used metaphorically). And after a while we are expected
to know when the words are appropriately used in further contexts.
(Cavell 1979: 168)
A consideration of the ways we learn words is important, however the point
crucial to the punchline is yet another: the salespeople themselves do not seemto be fully aware of their utterances’ meanings. The joke also succeeds inillustrating the psychological or emotional consequences of linguistic
disquietudes. The negative punchline articulates a response of uneasiness thatstems from the corruption of a language game. The positive punchline instead,evokes a feeling of uneasiness that stems from the realization of the practice’s
arbitrariness.

Conclusion

I have shown how our grammatical confusions and the communicative
difficulties we meet in our linguistic practices are reflected within jokes thatfeature a quality of depth. The investigation of grammar via deep jokes is anactivity that emphasises distinctions, re-orders and regroups language. As thefictional characters displayed in the joke-stories are torn out of their linguistic
entanglement, so are the recipients of a deep joke who reflect on its
consequences. In such a way, deep joking may serve as a form of philosophicalinvestigation.
References
Carroll, Lewis (1865) Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, London: Macmillan.
Cavell, Stanley (1979) The Claim of Reason, New York: Oxford University Press.

Mira Magdalena Sickinger, "Deep Jokes". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Deep Jokes | Mira Magdalena Sickinger

Glock, Hans-Johann (2017) “Philosophy and Philosophical Method”, in: H.-J. Glock and John
Hyman (eds.) A Companion to Wittgenstein, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 231–251.
Janik, Allan (2001) Wittgenstein’s Vienna Revisited, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Malcolm, Norman (1984) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morreall, John (2009) Comic Relief. A Comprehensive Philosophy of Humor, Malden MA: WileyBlackwell.
--- (2020) “Philosophy of Humor”, in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/humor.
Voltolini, Alberto (2020) Deep Jokes (Online Discussion with Stephen Yablo, LLC Lecture,
University of Turin), https://www.llc.unito.it/eventi/llc-lecture-2020-online-stephen-yablo.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009): Philosophical Investigations / Philosophische Untersuchungen. Hg.
von P. M. S. Hacker und Joachim Schulte, übersetzt von G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker undJoachim Schulte. New York: Wiley.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2015-) Bergen Nachlass Edition. Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at
the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source. Curated
by Alois Pichler (2009-) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020-) [wittgensteinsource.org]. Bergen:
WAB.
Yablo,

Stephen(2019)

Deep

Jokes

(Philosophy

Club

Lunch

Talk

MIT),

https://

www.academia.edu/42179228/Deep_Jokes.

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Mira Magdalena Sickinger, "Deep Jokes". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations | Kim Solin

Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations
Kim Solin (Uppsala, Sweden)
Abstract
I present some of Rush Rhees’s remarks on the Tractatus. They can be found in papers written
in the 1960s, which were later included in Rhees’s book Discussions of Wittgenstein (Rhees
1970). The focus is on two of the papers: Rhees’s review of Elizabeth Anscombe’s book An
Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and on his paper “Some Developments in
Wittgenstein’s View of Ethics”. I have chosen remarks that can be characterised as typicallyRheesean and will consider what they reveal about Rhees’s way of thinking and writing in
general.

1. Introduction

Rush Rhees was one of Wittgenstein’s friends and literary executors, and an
editor of several of the books we today – for better or for worse – recognize as
works by Wittgenstein (Wallgren 2023). The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
was published the same year Rhees turned sixteen, but Rhees later studied theTractatus in detail, and was also familiar with some of the first commentaries
on the famous book. Indeed, in the 1960s he published detailed reviews of
Elizabeth Anscombe’s An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Alexander
Maslov’s reissued A Study in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and Max Black’s A
Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. He also reviewed George Pitcher’s The
Philosophy of Wittgenstein and paid special attention to the Tractatus and its
relation to the Philosophical Investigations. The Tractatus plays a central rolein his essay ‘Some Developments in Wittgensteinstein's View of Ethics’. Thesepapers were included in the volume Discussions of Wittgenstein, edited byRhees’s student D.Z. Phillips (Rhees 1970). Today, Rhees’s papers are largely
forgotten. The aim of this short note is to collect and present some ideas ofRhees's that I have found thought-provoking, and in particular themes that one
could argue are characteristically Rheesean. My focus will be on the review of
Anscombe’s book and on the essay on ethics.

2. Anscombe on the Tractatus

In his review of Anscombe’s book (1960), Rhees claims that Anscombe fails tobring out Wittgenstein’s main point, as he stated it in a letter to Russell:

Kim Solin, "Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations | Kim Solin

She makes ‘the picture theory of the proposition’ central for at least thefirst half of her book. But she does not show clearly how this is related towhat Wittgenstein called ‘the main point’ in his letter to Russell. […] And
with her account of the ‘picture theory’ I wonder if she could.
Wittgenstein said in that letter that ‘my main contention, to which
the whole business of logical propositions is only a corollary ... is thetheory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions – i.e. by language(and what comes to the same thing, what can be thought); and whatcannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which I
believe is the cardinal problem of philosophy ...’. (Rhees 1970: 2)
Anscombe’s primary focus is on the picture theory, and with her view of it,
Rhees wonders if she would even be able to give an account of Wittgenstein’s
main contention. He then proceeds to discuss aspects of Anscombe’s
understanding, which he believes lead her astray from the main point. I foundsome of Rhees's remarks rather interesting, but I cannot make any claims as tohow original they are. I shall concentrate on the following: (1) abbilden andpicturing, and the connection to a general rule, (2) truth, falsity and the senseof a proposition, and (3) the difference between logic in the relative sense offormalised languages and the absolute sense of the Tractatus.
(1) Rhees claims that Ancombe’s translation of the verb ‘abbilden’ as ‘depicts’ isoften misleading (Rhees 1970: 4). Wittgenstein’s use of ‘Bild’ is connected to ‘
abbilden’, and Rhees reckons Wittgenstein got this from mathematicians:
abbilden is a concept used when finding a model for one system in another (Iguess Rhees is simply thinking of functions or homomorphisms). Rhees
suspects that Wittgenstein had this in mind when he spoke of ‘Logik derAbbildung’ or of ‘Abbildung der Wirklichkeit’. Since there, according to Rhees, isno good English translation, one has to use translations like ‘picture’ and‘picturing’ (Rhees himself translates Abbildung as ‘representation’ in notesfrom 1959 (Rhees 2006: 34), but there is no mention of this in the review). This
leads Anscombe to neglect what Wittgenstein called the ‘inner’ similarity
between picture and pictured. And worse, from Rhees’s perspective,
translating it as ‘picturing’ leaves out the connection to the idea of a generalrule, which is exactly what is needed for understanding how the abbilden

546

Kim Solin, "Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations | Kim Solinworks (cf. T 4.01). With a homomorphism in mind, the idea of a general rule issomehow innate. And this leads us to Rhees’s next concern, the distinction
between the truth and falsity of a proposition and its sense.
(2) The question is, Rhees thinks, what it means to say that language is an ‘
Abbildung of reality’. In the case of two mathematical systems, we can consider
each system separately, but not so in the case of reality. Although T 4.05 may
confuse one here, one needs to keep in mind that Wittgenstein there begins a
discussion of true and false propositions. “And it is important not to confuse
picturing reality with saying what is true. Not to confuse what we do when wewant to determine whether a proposition is true or false, and what we dowhen we want to decide whether it has sense – i.e., whether it is a propositionat all” (Rhees 1970: 5; T 4.06). Yet, it is exactly this confusion that Anscombe is
guilty of, according to Rhees. Rhees quotes Anscombe saying that in T 4.463 “aproposition, as well as a picture or a model, is conceived as something that canhave both a positive and negative sense” (Rhees’s italics). And according toRhees this is is a mistake:
She goes on to say: "Here [T 4.463] at any rate a proposition, as well as a
picture or a model, is conceived as something that can have both a positive
and a negative sense" (my italics). And this is a misunderstanding, or atleast misleading.
There are positive and negative ways of expressing the same
proposition. But they do not express different senses of the same
proposition, for that means nothing. The double negation has the same
sense as the proposition itself. On the other hand, the negative orcontradictory does have a different sense, and for this reason it is not thesame proposition. (Unclarity here might make one mix up ‘affirmative or
negative’ with ‘true or false’.) But the sense is not negative in this caseeither. It is incompatible with what it contradicts; that is all. (Rhees 1970:
13)(3) This is connected to laws of logic as laws of thought, not only as formal
systems, as Rhees explains:
A logic which was confined to formalized languages, for instance – or forwhich the distinction of true and false had sense only in formalized

Kim Solin, "Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations | Kim Solinlanguages – would not be logic at all in the sense in which Wittgenstein is
writing of it here. He used to say later that if there were a set of rules
which we followed only in connexion with a particular game that wesometimes played, then we should hardly call them laws of thought – even
if these were the only rules we had for "and" and "or" and "not" and "if . . .
then". We would call them laws of thought only if they went through thewhole of our life. (Rhees 1970: 9)
It is unclear to me if Rhees sees this as something Anscombe falls prey to, or if
he just wants to stress the point to the reader. I have selected this remark
because of the emphasis on something going through the whole of our life, atypical Rheesean theme. Whether or not Anscombe’s view of logic is too close
to formalised languages, Rhees still claims Anscombe makes another mistake:she says that sense and saying are different, that a proposition might show
how things are while saying that they are not. But Rhees holds (Rhees 1970: 11)
that in the case of propositions, saying and having sense amounts to the samething. “It is in saying something that a proposition pictures reality.” This is how
one should understand T 4.022: “The proposition shows its sense.”
These limitations of Anscombe’s understanding of the picture theory, together
with some other miscomprehensions, result in her failure to express the main
point of the Tractatus, Rhees asserts. It is unclear to me exactly how Rhees
reaches that conclusion, what Rhees’s argument is, if any (I’ll return to this in
the conclusion). It was also unclear to Judith Jarvis how some of the things
Anscombe says hang together (Jarvis and Summers 1961). Indeed, Jarvis also
found Rhees’s review rather obscure, although she had some sympathy for his
main point. Jarvis’s review nevertheless shows an understanding of picturingof the kind Rhees is criticising, the kind where Abbildung in the mathematicalsense is not a leading – picture.

3. Developments in Wittgenstein’s Views on Ethics

In the reviews of Maslow and Black, Rhees continues his detailed examinationof Tractatus interpretations. I don’t have the space to comment on them here,
but some of the more interesting points, in my opinion, concern colours andarithmetical operators, respectively. In the review of Pitcher, Rhees stresses
the continuity between the Tractatus and the Investigations. He also points to548

Kim Solin, "Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
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Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations | Kim Solin

Part II, xii, as the clearest short statement of the method of the Investigations;perhaps a clue as to why the editors included Part II in the original edition in
the first place. In the essay ‘Some Developments in Wittgenstein’s View of
Ethics’ (1965), which I shall consider in this section, Rhees studies similarities
and differences between Wittgenstein’s early and later work, again
accentuating things that go “through the whole of our life” (cf. above).
In the essay, Rhees considers differences between ethical judgment and logicaljudgment, as an elaboration of T 6.42, “there can be no ethical propositions”.
He asks us to compare ‘absolute value lies outside the world of facts’ and‘logical necessity lies outside the world of facts’. Neither of these can bedirectly expressed, but logical necessity can be shown using the truth-table
notation in a way that absolute value cannot. “For”, Rhees writes, “where there
is a question of judgment of absolute value, the question ‘Is it true or false?’
means nothing” (Rhees 1970: 95). Note that here the truth table is a logicalsymbol in the absolute sense I mentioned above, not an explanation.
And adopting an ethics is not like getting a physical theory right. This is what
Rhees says:
Well, suppose I say Christian ethics is the right one. Then I am making a
judgment of value. It amounts to adopting Christian ethics. It is not likesaying that one of these physical theories must be the right one. The way
in which some reality corresponds – or conflicts – with a physical theory
has no counterpart here. (Rhees 1970: 101)
It seems to me that this is one reason why Rhees has difficulties understanding
Simone Weil, when she writes that physics and especially its mathematicalformulation are ideals for our moral lives. But in that context, Rhees
nevertheless gives Weil the benefit of the doubt:
Remarks of this kind invite academic criticism and seem wide open to it.
But when I do criticise them in this way, I always suspect that I am being
stupid, that I am failing (unable) to read what she has written in the waythat it should be read, that I am simply misunderstanding something towhich my eyes have not been opened. And then I conclude that I mustleave it there. (Rhees 1999: 64)

Kim Solin, "Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
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Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations | Kim Solin

When interpreting the Tractatus, Rhees is very certain in his judgments, butwhen reading Weil (1968) he is suddenly full of hesitation.
Related to this, perhaps, Rhees considers situations where it is difficult to
express what something means to someone. His example is: “There is nosentence that could convey all I meant when I thanked him” (Rhees 1970: 98).
He says that we could try to describe the situation in as much detail andcontext as possible, and yet fail and perhaps only be able to say something like“it goes deep with me”, that it was not a trivial thing. Rhees thinks that many
would understand this distinction. And he claims that the Tractatus speaks ofproblems of life in this sense, but doesn’t characterise them further. The
Tractatus does not speak of when or in what circumstances we are prone totalk about ‘problems of life’.
In the Tractatus it is implicit, although not elaborated, that we cannot express
judgments of value just anytime, but that there are certain circumstances inwhich it makes sense and others in which it does not (Rhees 1970: 98) . In the‘Lecture on Ethics’, Wittgenstein was more clear about this, as he had already
dropped the idea that one could give a general account of propositions via
truth functions. Instead, Wittgenstein works with many examples, but it seems
to Rhees that he is still looking for a core. He gave this up in the Investigations,as there the multitude of examples is rather aimed at preventing one fromlooking for a core, for the “characteristic features”. In a letter to von Wright,
Rhees pointed out how Wittgenstein later (around 1948) again emphasised
similarities between philosophical problems and problems of life (Rhees to vonWright, 22.9.1976).

4. Conclusion: Reading Rhees

Rhees’s reviews are not exactly charitable, and perhaps that is why Peter
Geach retaliated with a rather disrespectful review of Rhees’s book Without
Answers, published some ten years after Rhees’s review of his wife’s book(Geach 1971). Geach characterises Rhees’s book as follows: “These jottings do
not give us much consecutive argument, but seem to have been selected
because of their tone; we hear much of the need to be deep and serious.”
Perhaps this was aimed at Philips as much as at Rhees. However that may be, I
think they still express a common first reaction to reading Rhees. It is like550

Kim Solin, "Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations | Kim Solingetting thrown straight into an intense discussion, with abundant detail and an
earnesty more characteristic of problems of life than of intellectual puzzles;
one can see that what he says goes deep with him, but not where he is comingfrom or where he is going. There is not much argumentative cheerfulness inRhees. Nor is there much consecutive argument, not much “lückenlose Folge”.
Indeed, from that perspective, Rhees’s writings are full of gaps, just as readers
have noticed. Rhees was well aware of this aspect of his published work andwas hesitant to publish more in the same style (Rhees to Albert Chao, 5.2.1972).
Rhees's style is not surprising, considering the influence Wittgenstein and theInvestigations had on him. Although similar to the Investigations, the jottings,
or rather fragments, are still characterised by the more tangible presence ofsomeone having something to say, due partly to the fact that they were often
written in letters. One is given a handful of observations, often repeated withslight alterations. They are, therefore, difficult to summarize. The aggregate
form of Phillips’s editorial work does not do them full justice. To see the unityof Rhees’s own work, one must, I belive, appreciate his ideas about the unity of
langauge and the growth of understanding (for pioneering work on this, seeHorn 2005 and Hertzberg 2012). This kind of growth can also be seen in
Wittgenstein's development from the Tractatus to the Investigations. Growth inRhees's sense is not about a better understanding of how something works,
about consecutive arguments or mechanism, but rather about changing one’s
way of looking at things (Rhees 2006: 73). I'm reminded of what Odo Marquard
once said: Merken ist wichtiger als Ableiten.

References
Geach, Peter (1971) ‘Review of Rush Rhees: Without Answers, ed. D.Z. Phillips’, The Journal of
Philosophy 68(17): 530-532.
Hertzberg, Lars (2012) ‘Rhees on the Unity of Langauge’, Philosophical Investigations 35(3-4):
224-237.
Horn, Patrick Rogers (2005) Gadamer and Wittgenstein on the Unity of Language: Reality andDiscourse without Metaphysics, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Jarvis, Judith and Sommers, Fred (1961) ‘Review of G.E.M. Anscombe: An Introduction to
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’’, Philosophy 36(138): 374-377.

Kim Solin, "Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations | Kim Solin

Rhees, Rush (1969) Without Answers, edited by D.Z. Phillips, New York: Shocken Books.
Rhees, Rush (1970) Discussions of Wittgenstein, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Rhees, Rush (1999) Discussions of Simone Weil, edited by D.Z. Phillips, assisted by Mario vonder Ruhr, Albany: SUNY Press.
Rhees, Rush (2006) Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, 2nd edition, edited by D.Z.
Phillips, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wallgren, Thomas (ed.) (2023) The Creation of Wittgenstein, London: Bloomsbury.

Correspondence:
Rush Rhees to Albert Chao, 5.2.1972, held in the Rush Rhees Collection at the Richard Burton
Archives at the University of Swansea.
Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright, 22.9.1976, held in The von Wright and Wittgenstein
Archives at the University of Helsinki.

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Kim Solin, "Rush Rhees and the Tractatus: A Handful of Observations". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen | Line Soryano

Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen
Tractatus und UntersuchungenLine Soryano (Cologne, Germany)
Abstract
Unter den auffälligen inhaltlichen, aber auch formalen Unterschieden, die den Tractatuslogico-philosophicus von den Philosophischen Untersuchungen unterscheiden, fließt eine
gemeinsame Unterströmung, die stilistischer Natur ist und tiefer geht als die teilweise sehr
großen Unterschiede auch im Stil. Der Hang zum „Erhabenen“ in der Schreibweise bleibt
Wittgensteins Gesamthaltung eigen – folglich auch seinem Schreibstil. Der Vortrag deckt diese
Stilkonstante auf und auch das grundsätzliche Paradoxon, das sie enthält: Beim Erhabenen
besteht das Mittel zum Erreichen des Erhebungsgefühls in erster Linie in einer
minimalistischen, einfachen Ausdrucksweise. Er zeigt anhand ausgewählter Textstellen, dassin beiden Werken vergleichbare Stilmittel eine vergleichbare Wirkung hervorbringen. Von
Bedeutung ist die ästhetische Kategorie des Erhabenen auch für die Philosophie. Denn durch
die Schreibweise drückt hier Wittgenstein seinen grundlegenden Apophatismus aus, den er
unmöglich direkt thematisieren kann.

Zwischen dem Tractatus logico-philosophicus und den Philosophischen
Untersuchungen ist der Bruch radikal und augenfällig. Inhaltlich und formal
scheinen es verschiedene Welten zu sein. Der Tractatus ist eine schmale
Abhandlung, die sich durch Prägnanz und systematische Stringenz
auszeichnet, unpersönliche, universelle Urteile wie „Ukase“ (Russell) fällt;dargestellt wird die Quintessenz des Denkbaren – und zwar „unantastbar und
definitiv“ (T 1922: 92). Die Untersuchungen dagegen haben die Offenheit eines
mäandernden Spaziergangs: im mündlichen Ton lädt ein Ich-Sprecher den DuLeser zu einem langsamen, ungezwungenen aber sorgfältigen Fortschreiten
ein.
Der Abstand zwischen beiden Hauptwerken Wittgensteins ist also nicht zuübersehen. 1932 schreibt Wittgenstein:
Meine Hauptdenkbewegung ist heute eine ganz andere als vor 15–20
Jahren.
Und das ist ähnlich, wie wenn ein Maler von einer Richtung zu einer
andern übergeht. (MS 183, 141)
Der Vergleich mit dem Malstil zeigt, dass Wittgenstein um die fließendenÜbergänge von den philosophischen Inhalten eines Denkers zu seinem
sprachlichen Stil weiß. Philosophische Thesen und Voraussetzungen, ja dieLine Soryano, "Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Auswahl der Themen selbst bilden untrennbar zusammen mit der Form desGeschriebenen ein Ganzes, das man mit dem Wort „philosophische Haltungoder Stil“ festhalten kann. Dem möchte ich mich in diesem Vortrag zuwenden.
Als Beitrag zur klassischen Frage nach den Brüchen und Kontinuitäten
zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen gehe ich hier – weniger klassisch –auf den Schreibstil dieser Werke ein. Dafür widme ich mich allerdings nicht
weiter den Stilunterschieden zwischen beiden Hauptwerken, die sofort
auffallen. Eher versuche ich zu zeigen, dass es zwischen dem Tractatus undden Untersuchungen einige seltene, aber prägende Stilkonstanten gibt, die als
Unterströmungen fortleben.
*
Zu einem stilistischen Vergleich zwischen dem Tractatus logico-philosophicus
und den Philosophische Untersuchungen schlage ich vor, die ästhetische
Kategorie des Erhabenen heranzuziehen. Als Terminus technicus derLiteraturwissenschaft „bezeichnet das ‚Erhabene‘ nicht so sehr das Erhobene,
als eher die Bewegung der Erhebung selbst, oder genauer noch das Gefühl
dieserBewegung:
Schwung,
Begeisterung,
Jubel,
Schwindel,
Schrecken.“ (Hache 2000: 14)
Das Erhabene zerreißt, wenn es im richtigen Augenblick hervorbricht, wie
ein Blitz alle Dinge und zeigt mit einemmal die ganze Gewalt des Redners.
sagt der Pseudo-Longinos, der in der Antike Vom Erhabenen schreibt (PseudoLonginos 1966: §1). Kennzeichnend für diese Kategorie ist jedoch die paradoxe
Situation, dass nicht „große Worte“ das „Große“ am besten ausdrücken,
sondern das Stilmittel zum Erreichen des Erhebungsgefühls in einer
minimalen, einfachen Ausdrucksweise besteht. Das zentrale Beispiel hierzu,
stammt aus Buch Genesis:
Gott sprach: Es werde Licht und es ward Licht. (Genesis I, 3)
Kann ein Satz einfacher ausfallen – und dennoch grandioser?
Im Kern des Begriffs des Erhabenen steht letztlich der Gegensatz, die
Anspannung: Größe aus Einfachheit, Erhebung aus Enthaltsamkeit. Der
Maßstab dieses Stils, der seit dem XVII. Jhd. in Frankreich und noch einmal

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Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen | Line Soryano

zentral im XIX. Jhd. in Deutschland die klassische Ästhetik prägt, könnte
lauten: „Weniger ist mehr.“ Wohl ein Motto, das vom Architekten Ludwig Miesvan der Rohe stammt und für die Wiener Ästhetik der Jahrhundertwende
steht. Das Erhabene kann aber auch zum Verständnis einer postmodernenÄsthetik herangezogen werden – und auch für die Wittgensteins
Philosophischer Untersuchungen.
*
Das Spannungsfeld zwischen innerem Streben und zurückhaltender
Ausdrucksweise kennzeichnet auch Wittgensteins Schreibstil, selbst wenn er
selten die Worte „das Sublime“ oder „das Erhabene“ verwendet. Er umschreibt
es etwa hier:Mein Ideal ist eine gewisse Kühle. Ein Tempel der den Leidenschaften als
Umgebung dient ohne in sie hineinzureden. (MS 107,130)
Der „Tempel“ deutet auf Heiliges und Großes hin; der Kontrast von„Leidenschaften“ und „Kühle“ (zusammen mit dem Sprachverzicht „ohne insie hineinzureden“) sorgt für besagte paradoxe Bewegung. Am
Bezeichnendsten für diese Ästhetik, die Wittgenstein aus der deutschen
Romantik oder Tolstois Kurzer Darlegung des Evangeliums übernommen
haben könnte, ist eine Reihe von Bemerkungen über die Bibel:
Die Quelle, die in den Evangelien ruhig & klar fließt, scheint mir in den
Briefen des Paulus zu schäumen. [...] mir ist es, als sähe ich hiermenschliche Leidenschaft, etwas wie Stolz oder Zorn, was sich nicht mit
der Demut der Evangelien reimt. […]In den Evangelien – so scheint mir – ist alles schlichter, demütiger,
einfacher. Dort sind Hütten, – bei Paulus eine Kirche. Dort sind alle
Menschen gleich & Gott selbst ein Mensch; bei Paulus gibt es schon etwas
wie eine Hierarchie; Würden, & Ämter. (MS 119, 71-73)
Mit der Kontrastierung zwischen den Briefen und den Evangelien stehen auf
der einen Seite ein mit grandiosen Ausdrucksmitteln dargestelltes Grandioses(„Würden & Ämter“) – in dem Fall besteht Kongruenz von Sprache undLine Soryano, "Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen | Line Soryano

dargestellter Sache –, auf der anderen Seite aber das wahrhaft Heilige. Bei
diesem authentischeren Erhabenen der Bibel „ist alles schlichter, demütiger,
einfacher“.
Wittgenstein ist wohl der kreative Widerspruch zwischen dargestellter Sache
und Ausdrucksmittel bewusst:
Die Gleichnisse des N.T. lassen jede beliebige Tiefe der Interpretation zu.
Sie sind ohne Boden.
Sie haben weniger Stil, als das erste Sprechen eines Kindes. Auch im
höchsten Kunstwerk ist noch etwas, was man ‘Stil’, ja auch, was man‘Manier’ nennen kann. (MS 162b, 63r)
Nicht effekthascherische rhetorische Mittel (in diesem Zitat „Stil“ oder
„Manier“ genannt) drücken das Heilige getreu aus, sondern die Nacktheit einer
Ausdrucksweise, die schlichter noch sprechen soll als das „erste Sprechen
eines Kindes“.
Diese Dialektik zwischen Unvergleichlichkeit des Inhalts und bewusster
Zurückhaltung in den Ausdrucksmitteln glaube ich sowohl in der konzisen„Kristallreinheit“ des Tractatus (PU 2009: § 97, 107-108) erkennen zu können,
als auch in der eigenartigen Mischung aus Herzblut und Nüchternheit, die die
Untersuchungen auszeichnet. Im zweiten Hauptwerk ist das Erhabene freilich
weniger auffällig, aber es findet sich durchaus auch darin wieder, wenn auchin einer anderen, postmodernen Form.
Im Folgenden stelle ich einige vergleichbare in beiden Werken vorkommende
Stilmittel vor, die zusammengenommen ein ganzes Netz von Perzepten und
Konzepten bilden, das eben am treffendsten als „Erhabenes“ bezeichnet wird.
Dieses Sehnen, das nie zum expliziten Ausdruck findet, weil es gerade dadurch
verloren ginge, gibt beiden Werken – nicht nur dem Tractatus –, eine
eigentümliche Gestalt.
Von Interesse ist diese Einsicht auch für die Philosophie. Denn damit findet das„[s]ublim“ Transzendentale der logischen Ausführungen des Tractatus (cf.
T 1922: § 6.13, PU 2009: § 89), das man in Wittgensteins zweiter Philosophie für
eliminiert hat halten können, – nicht in Gestalt von Thesen, wohl aber in ihrem
verdeckt erhabenen Stil – seinen Niederschlag.

556Line Soryano, "Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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Zum Bilden der Dynamik des Erhabenen, braucht es 1) Einfachheit in derAusdrucksweise. Eine bloße, sozusagen „einfache“ Einfachheit genügt
allerdings nicht: Man hätte damit nur Trivialität. 2) Es braucht genau das
Gegenteil davon: anbrechende Anspannung – sei es in Form von Anspruch,
Leidenschaft oder Verzückung – allerdings entweder verdeckt oder inhomöopathischen Dosen erteilt. Andernfalls erreicht man nur Kitsch. Damit
wird 3) die Einfachheit zu einer Einfachheit zweiten Grades: das Ergebnis
eines akzeptierten Verzichts – also einer Beherrschung. Diese deutet auf eine
Vollkommenheit, deren Spuren in einem stilistischen Ebenmaß und
Gleichgewicht zu finden sind.
Zum Ersten: Auch wenn es nicht einfach ist, Spuren eines Verzichts zu finden,
kann schon das Fehlen philosophischen Jargons – bereits im Tractatus – als
repräsentativ dafür gelten. Außerdem wird jeder Leser bereitwillig
zustimmen, dass – so unterschiedlich beide Werke sind – beide einem sehr
einfachen Stil verpflichtet sind. Genova charakterisiert die Aussagen desTractatus als „thin and un-clever“ (Genova 1995: 108, 128) und schreibt überdie Philosophischen Untersuchungen:
Like Beckett’s, Wittgenstein’s later style is prosaic to a fault. Words collecton the page without apparent necessity. A typical sentence for either ofthem drones on noisily. [...] Chatty, even dull, not a smidgeon of musicsneaks into his expressions or sentences. [...] only the most commonplaceand banal observations, things that normally escape notice because they
are so banal, pass his lips [...].
Bedeutet das, dass das Erhabene damit abflaut? Nein. Der Vergleich mit
Samuel Beckett zeigt es: Bei aller Kargheit glimmt bei Beckett unverkennbar
das Feuer unter der Asche; auch sein Schreibstil berührt das Erhabene.
Freilich äußert sich diese Grundtendenz in beiden Büchern in zwei
verschiedenen Varianten: Im Tractatus ist die Schlichtheit minimalistisch,extrem beherrscht; in den Untersuchungen liegt das stilistisch Einfache in derAlltagssprache, also im Stil des Allbekannten und Vertrauten. Doch die
Grundrichtung bleibt.

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Unter vielen möglichen Beispielen findet sich im Tractatus (T 1922: § 2.12-2.14):
Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit:
Den Gegenständen entsprechen im Bilde die Elemente des Bildes.
Die Elemente des Bildes vertreten im Bild die Gegenstände.
Das Bild besteht darin, dass sich seine Elemente in bestimmter Art und
Weise zu einander verhalten.
Die wortkarge Kürze der Sätze; das Verschwinden des Sprechers; die abrupte
Parataxe; die semantische Armut sowie die Wiederholung desselben
elementaren Satzschemas (Hypozeuxis) vermitteln ein Ethos neutraler
wissenschaftlicher Strenge.
Aus den Untersuchungen nun einen sehr kurzen Auszug:[...] Ich dachte an mein Frühstück und ob es heute spät damit würde. [...](PU 2009: § 607)
Wie könnte man dasselbe sparsamer und schlichter ausdrücken?
*
Die zweite, gegensätzliche Komponente vermittelt Entzückung, indem sie auf
etwas Überwältigendes hindeutet. In der Bibel schafft die Thematik des allesüberstrahlenden Jenseits dramatische Anspannung. Das genügt schon.
Auch im Tractatus logico-philosophicus wird Größe thematisiert, nämlich inder Umkehrung der letzten Seiten, in denen plötzlich die Rede von Sinn und
Wert, vom Transzendentalen und vom „Mystischen“ ist. Genau in diesem
Moment endet das Buch. Hier zeigt sich eindeutig Verzicht, so dass die zwei
Hauptkomponenten des Erhabenen vorhanden sind.
Thematischquilltdas
Erhabene
auch
aus
der
Eröffnungsmetaphysik der ersten Zeilen hervor (T 1922: § 1-1.2):

gewaltigen

Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.
Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge.
Die Welt ist durch die Tatsachen bestimmt und dadurch, dass es alle
Tatsachen sind.

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Denn, die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen bestimmt, was der Fall ist und auch,
was alles nicht der Fall ist.
Die Tatsachen im logischen Raum sind die Welt.
Die Welt zerfällt in Tatsachen.
Hier herrscht (wie im ersten oben erwähnten Auszug aus dem Tractatus)
Schlichtheit. Doch betonen diesmal gerade semantische Armut und
Wortknappheit das Monumentale.
Andere, allerdings seltene Passagen wirken erhebend durch bildhafte
Wendungen:Diese Zuordnungen sind gleichsam die Fühler der Bildelemente, mit denen
das Bild die Wirklichkeit berührt. (T 1922: § 2.1515)
Die Grammophonplatte, der musikalische Gedanke, die Notenschrift, die
Schallwellen, stehen alle in jener abbildenden internen Beziehung zu
einander, die zwischen Sprache und Welt besteht.
Ihnen allen ist der logische Bau gemeinsam.
(Wie im Märchen die zwei Jünglinge, ihre zwei Pferde und ihre Lilien. Siesind alle in gewissem Sinne Eins.) (T 1922: § 4.014)
Das verträumte Ende vom § 4.014 wird zum lyrischen Höhepunkt dieser
Bemerkung, die zunächst pädagogisch-wissenschaftlich einsetzt. Aber auchdort ist Zurückhaltung zu spüren: denn der Vergleich steht unter
abmildernden Klammern.
Selbst diskrete Anspielungen auf einen „Gott“ gibt es im Tractatus. Dochwirken diese Momente gerade durch ihre Seltenheit und durch den Kontrast
mit dem streng wissenschaftlichen Korsett der übrigen Bemerkungen um sie
herum umso unverhoffter, umso wunderbarer.
In den Philosophischen Untersuchungen sind die – auch dort sehr sporadischen– erhabenen Momente gänzlich stilistischer Natur. Wie im Tractatus sind es
zuerst Bilder, die regelrecht gewaltig ausfallen können:

Line Soryano, "Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen | Line Soryano[...] Könnte ich mir nicht denken, ich hätte fürchterliche Schmerzen undwürde, während sie andauern, zu einem Stein? Ja, wie weiß ich, wenn ich
die Augen schließe, ob ich nicht zu einem Stein geworden bin? [...] (PU2009: § 283)
Das Bild, das Wittgenstein den Märchen entnimmt, hat mythologische
Tragweite. Doch die Folge der Bemerkung legt den dichterischen Höhenflugbald ab und geht ins Ironische über – denn solche Momente dürfen nicht
dauern.
Zwei Beispiele seien hier noch erwähnt:„Aber schließt Du eben nicht nur vor dem Zweifel die Augen, wenn Du
sicher bist?“ Sie sind mir geschlossen. (PU 2009: 236)
Auf die verhältnismäßig viel längere, eine Metapher beinhaltende Frage fällt
die Antwort als knapper, definitiver Satz – und scheint selbst durch die Kürze
und das aktuelle Präsens etwas zu schließen. Die Lyrik ist unverkennbar – undder Schluss ist in seiner Knappheit zugleich verhaltend und erhebend.
Unsere letzte Passage hat Rudolf Heller zu Recht hervorgehoben:
Die Probleme, die durch ein Mißdeuten unserer Sprachformen entstehen,haben den Charakter der Tiefe. Es sind tiefe Beunruhigungen; sie wurzeln
so tief in uns wie die Formen unserer Sprache, und ihre Bedeutung ist so
groß wie die Wichtigkeit unserer Sprache. – Fragen wir uns: Warum
empfinden wir einen grammatischen Witz als tief? (Und das ist ja die
philosophische Tiefe.) (PU 2009: § 111)
Die pulsierende Wiederholung des Wortes „tief“, mit seinem langen [i:], dasdurch Kursivierung noch betont wird, gibt der Endfrage den Charakter einer
quälenden Frage. „[T]iefe Beunruhigungen“ werden zu Abgründen. Aber derdozierende Ton der Frage hält sie unter der Decke.
*
Mit diesen letzten Beispielen treffen wir auf Aphorismen. Diese
prononcierteste aller „einfachen Formen“ gehört sicherlich mit zum
Erhabenen. Allerdings stellen Aphorismen eine so ausgewogene Mischung ausÜberraschung, Verzückung und Einfachheit dar, dass hier das Gleichgewicht

560

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erreicht wird, das zum dritten Moment des Erhabenen gehört. Der Aphorismus
ist ein Bruch- und Höhepunkt im Textfluß, in dem für eine Zeit lang Weisheit
erreicht wird und „Friede[n] in den Gedanken“ (VB 1994: 91; MS 127, 82)
einsetzt. Auch stilistisch. Da er eine Lösung darstellt, ist er aber auch wie alle
Weisheit grundsätzlich einfach. Einfach – und trotzdem überwältigend.
Das Talent Wittgensteins für aphoristische Formulierungen wird schon im
Tractatus meisterhaft bewiesen. Dort stehen sie im Vordergrund: apodiktisch,schneidend, immer alleinstehend. Auch später zeigt sich diese Tendenz
deutlich. Allerdings so, dass die Aphorismen in den Untersuchungenerstaunlich bescheiden, ja fast unmerklich ausfallen. Man bemerkt sie zwar,
aber eher beim zweiten Lesen.
Den typischen Rundungseffekt schaffen die Aphorismen durch ihre kunstvoll
ausgearbeitete Form (auch in den Untersuchungen, selbst wenn es dort nicht ingleichem Maße auffällt) sowie durch ihre Kürze und den kategorischen Ton.
Aber auch durch den Rhythmus, auf den ich mich hier konzentrieren will.
Manche Formeln tragen den absteigenden Rhythmus, der abschließt undabrundet – hier dank eines Semikolons (Heller 1978: 91):
Der Philosoph behandelt eine Frage; wie eine Krankheit. (PU 2009: § 255)
11 ; // 5.
Andere zeigen einen ausgesprochen fließenden Sprachrhythmus, der einenkurzen Satz reibungslos zu Ende bringt:
Die Welt und das Leben sind Eins. (T 1922: § 5.621)
Der tiefe Aspekt entschlüpft leicht. (PU 2009: § 387)
Einige weisen die Ausgewogenheit des symmetrischen Rhythmus auf. Im
Tractatus:
Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. // Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.
(T 1922: § 6.522)
10. // 9. (= 3, 6)
Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, // darüber muss man schweigen.
(T 1922: §7)
7, // 7.

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So wie im milderen Ton der Untersuchungen:[…] Einen Satz verstehen, heißt, // eine Sprache verstehen. Eine Sprache
verstehen, heißt, // eine Technik beherrschen. (PU 2009: § 199)
7, // 7. 7, // 7.
Dieser zweigliedrige Rhythmus aber kommt auch sonst im Text und in allen
Manuskripten so häufig vor, dass man ihn allgemeiner einer starken Tendenz
von Wittgensteins Stil zuordnen kann. Ein besonders gesättigtes Beispiel dafürfindet man in PU 2009: § 242:[...] Richtig und falsch ist, was Menschen sagen; / und in der Sprache
stimmen die Menschen überein. // Dies ist keine Übereinstimmung der
Meinungen, / sondern der Lebensform.
Zur Verständigung durch die Sprache gehört nicht nur eineÜbereinstimmung in den Definitionen, / sondern (so seltsam dies klingenmag) eine Übereinstimmung in den Urteilen. // Dies scheint die Logik
aufzuheben; / hebt sie aber nicht auf. // – Eines ist, die Meßmethode zu
beschreiben, / ein Anderes, Messungsergebnisse zu finden und
auszusprechen. [...]
Nicht umsonst ist rhythmische Symmetrie das Markenzeichen des Stils derBibel (Meynet 2021). Man kennt die poetische Kraft der Wiederholung, die ausder Wiederspiegelung eines, also auch etwas Einfaches macht:[...] Wie im Märchen die zwei Jünglinge […]. Sie sind [...] in gewissem Sinne
Eins. (T 1922: § 4.014)
Dies gilt, zumal der symmetrische Rhythmus meistens in Zusammenhang mit
einfachen, kurzen Hauptsätzen vorkommt und sich fast eintönig inwortwörtlichen Wiederholungen niederschlägt. So vermittelt er den Eindruckvon Gleichgewicht, Ebenmaß und Einfachheit.
*
Das Erhabene als stilistische Konstante durchzieht zwei so unterschiedliche
Schreibweisen wie die des Tractatus logico-philosophicus und derPhilosophischen Untersuchungen. Freilich fällt die „Schicht“ kalter Asche, unter
der das Feuer glimmt, „dicker“ in den Untersuchungen aus als im Tractatus –,562

Line Soryano, "Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen | Line Soryano

aber diese Verhaltenheit führt nicht zum „Erlöschen“ der paradoxen
Bewegung, die Erhebung bringt, sie macht sie womöglich nochbeeindruckender.
Was besagt das über Wittgensteins Denken?
Die Ästhetik des Erhabenen markiert eine Kernfrage Wittgensteins, die quer
durch seine ganze Philosophie verläuft, gerade weil sie nicht direkt verarbeitet
werden kann: die Frage der Grenze. Schweigen ist Ausdruck einer tieferen
Einsicht. Auch wenn das Spätwerk diesen Apophatismus weniger thematisiert
als das Frühwerk, darf man die Klärungsarbeit der Untersuchungen „arefinement of the silence of the Tractatus“ nennen (Garver 2008: 15).
Womöglich schweigt Wittgenstein allerdings auch, um dadurch über die
Grenze hinauszuweisen. Denn die Sehnsucht nach einem Jenseits der Grenze
bleibt bestehen. Hier wird eine suggestive Zurückhaltung erforderlich: eine
Art stilistischer Seiltänzerkunst. Wittgenstein thematisiert die Grenze nicht
direkt, sondern dieses gleichzeitige Sich-Sehnen und Sich-Enthalten kommt im
Denk- und Schreibstil performativ zum Ausdruck.
Diese Grundhaltung kristallisiert sich in der hier beschriebenen Ästhetik des
Erhabenen.
References
Garver, Newton (2008) « Grammar and Silence », in: Alois Pichler, Herbert Hrachovec (eds.),
Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Information (Publications of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society, New Series, n°6), Francfort: Ontos Verlag, 7-22.
Genova, Judith (1995) Wittgenstein: A way of seeing, New York / London: Routledge.
Hache, Sophie (2000) La langue du ciel. Le sublime en France au XVIIe siècle, Paris : HonoréChampion.
Heller, Erich (1978) « Unphilosophical Notes », in: K. T. Fann (eds.) Ludwig Wittgenstein: The
Man and His Philosophy, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 89-106.
Meynet, Roland (2021) Traité de rhétorique biblique, Louvain : Peeters.
Pseudo-Longinos (1966) Vom Erhabenen, Reinhart Brandt (trans.), Darmstadt: WBG.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922) Tractatus logico-philosophicus, London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner & Co / New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

Line Soryano, "Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen | Line Soryano

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1994) Vermischte Bemerkungen, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009) Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations, G. E.
M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker & J. Schulte (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell.

564

Line Soryano, "Das Erhabene als verborgene stilistische Konstante zwischen Tractatus und Untersuchungen". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Picture | Ioannis Spiliopoulos

Wittgenstein’s Picture
Ioannis Spiliopoulos (Athens, Greece)
Abstract
This paper aims at a discussion of the sense of the term “picture” in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus and the relation of it to the everyday and colloquial use of the same
term, via the employment of a simile. More specifically, it will be argued that Wittgenstein’s
concept of “logical picture”, as it appears in the Tractatus, can be seen as the philosophicallymotivated extension and sublimation of the ordinary concept of picture. This extension isachieved through the transformation of the notion of an external and phenomenal likeness(between a picture and that which the picture depicts), relevant in the colloquial use of theconcept of picture, into the notion of an internal and non-perceivable likeness. In other words,
the everyday concept of picture is philosophically extended through the sublimation of alikeness that is visible and, on the surface, into a likeness that resides under the surface and is,in a way, hidden from view.

1

Suppose someone proceeded in the following way: He takes a picture of
Wittgenstein (e.g., the one taken in 1929 on the occasion of the conferment of a
Trinity College scholarship), makes a photocopy of it, then uses the photocopy
to make a new photocopy of it and so on until 299 copies are produced. Hethen arranges the whole in the form of a book composed of the following 300
pages:
Page 1 is a picture of Wittgenstein,
page 2 is a photocopy of page 1,
page 3 is a photocopy of page 2,…,…,
page 300 is a photocopy of page 299.
The description of the preceding process makes one expect a book with all its
pages alike, i.e., page 2 should be similar to page 1, page 3 should be similar topage 2 (and because of the previous step, page 3 should also be similar to page1), …, page 300 should be similar to page 299 and because of all the previous
steps, page 300 should ultimately be similar to page 1.

Ioannis Spiliopoulos, "Wittgenstein’s Picture". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Picture | Ioannis Spiliopoulos

Yet, it is an empirical fact that an actual photocopy machine is not 100%
accurate, which means that an actual photocopy is a slightly distorted versionof the original of which it is a copy. Thus, as the number of photocopies
increases, the material resemblance of each new photocopy with the starting
picture gradually diminishes until we are left with a copy that bears noresemblance at all to the starting picture (page 300 is an almost blank page).
However, there holds a formal relation between any photocopy of the above
series and the starting picture, for any photocopy of that series is in a sense a
copy of that first picture. Let "p" be the starting picture and "C(x)" theoperation that gives the photocopy of a given picture x, then the series of thebook’s pages can be seen as the repeated application of the operation C(x) firstto p and then to its own result. Accordingly, the book’s pages can be expressed
as: p, C(p), C(Cp), C(CCp), and so on. This way of presenting the series ofphotocopies makes apparent the formal relation that all of them have to page 1(the 1929 picture of Wittgenstein).
Since every page of the book has a formal relation to page 1, all the book’s
pages can be regarded as pictures of Wittgenstein. For example, page 300 canbe seen as a picture of Wittgenstein since it is a copy of a copy of a copy of…acopy of a picture of Wittgenstein. On the other hand, page 300 bears no
physical resemblance to a picture of Wittgenstein at all (it could be a picture ofanything and nothing). That is, even though all 300 pages can be conceived as
pictures of Wittgenstein, they do not all look like pictures of Wittgenstein.
In other words, there are two senses in which a copy from the above series canbe said to be a picture of Wittgenstein: 1) Because it is formally related to a
picture of Wittgenstein (e.g. page 300) and 2) Because it looks like a picture of
Wittgenstein (e.g. page 10).
We could say that all the copies are pictures of Wittgenstein in sense 1 (minus
page 1) but not all of them are pictures of him in sense 2. If a page of the book
is a picture of Wittgenstein in sense 2, then it is a picture of him apart frombeing part of the book. On the other hand, if a page is a picture of Wittgensteinin sense 1 exclusively, then it is a picture only by virtue of the copies thatprecede it and so, considered in-itself, it loses its pictorial character. Such a
gradual distortion of the picture of Wittgenstein can also be seen as an

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Ioannis Spiliopoulos, "Wittgenstein’s Picture". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Picture | Ioannis Spiliopoulos

instantiation of the sorites paradox since it is not unambiguous where a limit
should be drawn to distinguish pages that look like pictures of Wittgensteinfrom those that do not.
To sum up, the series of photocopies described above are to be seen as arepresentation of the gradual transformation of the sense of “picture of
Wittgenstein” from something ordinary to something, as it were, sublimatedand purified.
I assume that the expression “picture of Wittgenstein”, in its ordinary sense,
presupposes a physical resemblance between the picture and Wittgenstein’s
appearance. In contrast to this, “picture of Wittgenstein” can also be used in amore extended and sublimated sense in which the physical resemblance(between the picture and Wittgenstein’s appearance) drops out ofconsideration and a different criterion of what-it-is-to-be-a-picture-of takes its
place, that is, the formal relation stressed above.
This kind of extension of the concept of “picture” (and the ensuingconsideration as pictures of things which would not be considered as such in
the ordinary sense of the term) is used as a simile for the use of the term
“picture” in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

2

The term "picture" ("Bild" in the German original) is an essential conception
for the Tractatus. I neglect the many different meanings the word “Bild”
carries in German (e.g., model, …) and for simplicity, focus just on its meaningas picture. After all, it is a commonly accepted view that Wittgenstein offered
the “picture theory” of language in the Tractatus and not, e.g., the ”model
theory” of language, etc. One of the central premises of TLP is the comparisonof the sentences (propositions) of language with pictures. As a picture
represents its subject matter, so does a proposition represent its sense. That is,a proposition of ordinary language functions essentially like a picture, it is a
representation of a state of things, that can then happen to be the case or not.
In the first case the proposition is true, in the second it is false, but in bothcases the proposition is a representation of something distinct from itself, it isa picture and what it pictures is its sense.

Ioannis Spiliopoulos, "Wittgenstein’s Picture". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Wittgenstein’s Picture | Ioannis Spiliopoulos

Wittgenstein’s use of the term "picture" is broad enough to include all different
kinds of things (e.g., portraits, spatial pictures in general, but also non-spatial
kinds of pictures). He argues that what all possible kinds of pictures have incommon, as far as they all are pictures, is a certain parity of structure, acommonality of logical form between them and what they are pictures of. In
other words, a picture and that which is depicted in it, should be structurally
alike even if the former is a different kind of entity from the latter.
Accordingly, Wittgenstein can be seen as giving expression to the formal andlogical prerequisites that any picture (of whatever kind) has to satisfy just by
virtue of the fact that it is a picture, i.e., that it is able to represent something
different from itself.
Such a broad conception of “picture” makes it possible for Wittgenstein toconsider as pictures things which would not be taken as such in the ordinary
sense of the term (e.g. a musical score on paper, or the inscriptions on agramophone record). It also enables him to consider as pictures the
propositions of ordinary language, entities that prima facie do not look likepictures.
The sense in which Wittgenstein uses the term “picture” is best exemplified inproposition 4.014 of the Tractatus, where the relation between language(picture) and the world (what-is-pictured) is compared to the relation between
the gramophone record of a musical piece, the written musical notes of thesame piece and the sound waves that transmit it:
The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves ofsound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, whichholds between language and the world.
To all of them the logical structure is common.
(Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are
all in a certain sense one.) (TLP 1922: 4.014)
Even though the gramophone record and the written musical notes are about
the same musical piece, when the two are placed side by side they look totallydissimilar. Despite this, Wittgenstein argues that there must be an internal

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Ioannis Spiliopoulos, "Wittgenstein’s Picture". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Picture | Ioannis Spiliopoulos

similarity between them, a common internal pattern shared by both, which iswhat makes the translation from the one to the other possible (TLP 1922:
4.0141).
In relation to the series of copies described above: If we say that thegramophone record and the written musical score have something in common,then the expression “in common” is used in a similar sense to “Page 300 has
something in common with Wittgenstein”, and not in a similar sense to “Page 1
has something in common with Wittgenstein”. That is, the common pattern is
not something perceived but something, as it were, residing under the surface
forms of phenomena.
It must already be apparent that for such a broad use of the term "picture", thephenomenal similarity between the picture and the thing it pictures drops outof consideration as irrelevant as long as there is an internal structural parity
between them. Put differently, the structural parity that Wittgenstein asserts
there is, need not be accompanied by a phenomenal likeness between the
picture and that which it pictures.
However, Wittgenstein also held that in the completely analyzed propositionsof everyday language a material likeness between them and the situation they
picture would be evident, or that the completely analyzed proposition would
look more like a picture than its unanalyzed counterpart. E.g., the case of“aRb” which Wittgenstein considers as being a picture (in the ordinary senseof the term) of the fact of “a being in a certain relation to b” (TLP 1922: 4.012).
In cases of everyday propositions where such a kind of physical resemblance
is not visible (due to the misleading surface form of everyday propositions),
logical analysis was supposed to be performed and the result would be asentence´s true logical form in which the likeness between it and what it
pictures would be rendered visible. In other words, the logical analysis of an
ordinary sentence was supposed to un-cover the pictorial character it, acharacter that was nevertheless assumed to be already implicit in theunanalyzed ordinary sentence, albeit hidden under its surface form.
I wish to contrast this kind of super-extended use of the term “picture” with its
use in colloquial language (from which the notion of "picture" is derived in thefirst place). In the latter use, the look-alikeness of the picture with the thing it

Ioannis Spiliopoulos, "Wittgenstein’s Picture". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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pictures is in a way relevant (I assume for convenience that a nonrepresentational picture of something is not a picture in this primary sense).
For example, a picture of Wittgenstein normally looks like Wittgenstein, or a
picture of a chair normally looks like a chair. Whereas in the sublimated sensein which “picture” is used in the Tractatus, the identity of logical form between
picture and thing pictured is seen as the essential characteristic (for the
picturing relation to hold) and any kind of physical likeness between them
retreats into the background. Plainly put, a picture, in such a sense, need notlook like one.
We can sum up the situation by saying that a logical picture of a thing need nothave an aesthetic (I use this word in its old sense, as denoting that which isperceived by the senses) likeness or similarity with that thing, it need not “looklike a picture”. Whereas for something to be a picture in everyday English, itnormally has to have an aesthetic likeness with that which it pictures, it has tolook like a picture.

3

To conclude, Wittgenstein’s concept of “logical picture” in the Tractatus can beseen as a philosophically motivated extension and sublimation of the ordinary
concept of picture. For such a concept, the logical parity of structure between
picture and thing-pictured is considered as the essential feature and not any
external likeness between them. Hence, from the ordinary notion of picture
where such an external likeness plays a role, Wittgenstein arrives at a
sublimated and purified notion of it, where this characteristic drops out as
irrelevant.
As page 300 of the photocopy series can be said to be a picture of Wittgensteinin an extended sense of the term “picture” (that is, page 300 can be conceived
as a picture of Wittgenstein even if it bears no physical resemblance to him), so
the concept of logical picture can be seen as an extension of the everyday
concept of picture (that is, picture and what-is-pictured must share a common
logical form without necessarily looking alike). In other words, the TLP notionof (logical) picture can be seen as an extension of the everyday notion of
picture that results from the sublimation of “aesthetic similarity” into “logicalsimilarity” (the transformation of a perceivable and material likeness into one

570

Ioannis Spiliopoulos, "Wittgenstein’s Picture". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein’s Picture | Ioannis Spiliopoulos

that is formal and, as it were, hidden beneath appearances). In order to be able
to regard the sentences of language as pictures, Wittgenstein has to rely on asublimated notion of picture, he has to philosophically sublimate the common
and the ordinary.
The series of photocopies presented above can also be seen as a visual
exposition of a traditional characteristic of philosophical reasoning, namely,
the non-ordinary conclusion (page 300 is a picture of Wittgenstein) that canfollow from an ordinary premise (page 1 is a picture of Wittgenstein) and thestrict following of an un-ambiguous rule (a copy of a picture of Wittgenstein isa picture of Wittgenstein).
References
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922), Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus, London: Kegan Paul.

Ioannis Spiliopoulos, "Wittgenstein’s Picture". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

571

Of Pictures and Trivialities | Tue Trinh

Of Pictures and Trivialities
Tue Trinh (Berlin, Germany)
Abstract
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language (PTL) unites grammar and logic as two sides of thesame coin. A consequence of this theory, which Wittgenstein refuses to accept, is thattrivialities are ill-formed. This turns out to be precisely what is claimed by Logicality, arecently developed thesis about natural language which has been corroborated by a large
amount of empirical arguments. Logicality also provides an explanation for Wittgenstein’s
dissonant attitude towards trivialities. The discussion on PTL and Logicality brings out
reasons to take a closer look at the historical relationship between analytic philosophy andgenerative linguistics.

Wittgenstein (1921), i.e. the Tractatus, proposes that sentences are pictorial:"Der Satz ist ein Bild der Wirklichkeit" (4.01). They represent states of affairs inthe same way as, say, the score of Schubert's Unvollendete represents thesound of this symphony: "Die Grammophonplatte, der musikalische Gedanke,
die Notenschrift, die Schallwellen, stehen alle in jener abbildenden internen
Beziehung zu einander, die zwischen Sprache und Welt besteht" (4.014). Thus,
the structure of a sentence is isomorphic to the structure of the state of affairs
it describes: "Der Konfiguration der einfachen Zeichen im Satzzeichen
entspricht die Konfiguration der Gegenstände in der Sachlage" (3.21). Just as
we can compare the musical score and the musical sound to see if they match,
we can compare a sentence and reality to see if the sentence is true: "Die
Wirklichkeit wird mit dem Satz verglichen" (4.05). Grammar, then, specifies
what states of affairs can exist, as it specifies what sentences are well-formed,
i.e. can be true: "Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner
Welt" (5.6). Logic would then "für sich selber sorgen", since inferences would
be constrained by reality in the same way depiction is. Just as we cannot fail tosee in a picture what must be the case if it is true: "Wir können uns, ingewissem Sinne, nicht in der Logik irren" (5.473). This is known as the "picture
theory of language", henceforth PTL (Daitz 1953, Keyt 1964, Hintikka 1994).
One would think that a consequence of PTL is that trivialities, i.e. sentences
which are tautological or contradictory, should not be part of the symbolism.
In other words, tautology and contradiction should be excluded from the set ofstructures which can be generated by the combinatorial rules of therepresentational system. They should be "ill-formed", so the speak. This is572

Tue Trinh, "Of Pictures and Trivialities". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Of Pictures and Trivialities | Tue Trinhintuitive: just as we cannot use musical notation to produce a score whichmatches every or no possible piece of music, we cannot use linguistic signs toconstruct a model of every or no possible state of affairs. At various places in
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein seems to show awareness of this result: "Tautologie
und Kontradiktion sind nicht Bilder der Wirklichkeit" (4.462). Since sentences,by hypothesis, are pictures of reality, it follows that "Sätze, die für jede
Sachlage wahr sind, können überhaupt keine Zeichenverbindungensein" (4.466). This means tautologies are ill-formed, and the same, of course,
should hold for contradictions, which are the negation of tautologies:"Tautologie und Kontradiktion sind die Grenzfälle der Zeichenverbindung,
nämlich ihre Auflösung" (4.466). However, Wittgenstein stops short ofidentifying triviality with ill-formedness. He calls combinations of signs, suchas "Socrates is identical", which violate logical syntax "unsinnig" (nonsensical),and says, explicitly, that "Tautologie und Kontradiktion sind [...] nicht
unsinnig", insisting that "sie gehören zum Symbolismus" (4.4611).
Nevertheless, he ends up using an word which is very close, morphologicallyand semantically, to "unsinnig" to describe trivialities. The word is"sinnlos" (senseless): "Tautologie und Kontradiktion sind sinnlos" (4.461). Thus,
nonsensical sentences and senseless sentences are both uninterpretable, but
only the former violate the rules of logical syntax, i.e. are ungrammatical.
Wittgenstein's position, in my view, is inconsistent. The theory of language heproposes entails that trivialities are not sentences, as they are not pictures.
However, Wittgenstein maintains that trivialities are sentences. Why does
Wittgenstein commit to the last proposition?
I submit that Wittgenstein has committed an error in distinguishing between
senseless and nonsensical sentences in the Tractatus. I would make the casethat PTL is consistent only if this distinction is eliminated, i.e. only if senselesssentences are also nonsensical. My hypothesis is that the reason Wittgensteindoes not consider trivialities ill-formed is phenomenological: he succumbs tothe natural intuition that sentences can be trivial and well-formed at the sametime. Thus, it would seem obvious to Wittgenstein, for example, that "it'sraining and not raining", a sentence perceived as well-formed, has the analysis[rain & not-rain], which is a contradiction. This intuition, I propose, is an
illusion, caused by the failure to recognize the proper "transformative
analysis" of the sentence (Beaney 2002, 2003, 2016). Thus, I would say that

Tue Trinh, "Of Pictures and Trivialities". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Of Pictures and Trivialities | Tue Trinh

Wittgenstein falls prey to precisely the kind of problems he sets out to solve.
What would have helped him out of the fly bottle in this case, I believe, is atheory of natural language which (i) identifies triviality with ill-formednessand (ii) shows what the proper transformative analysis of sentences such as"it's raining and not raining" is under which it is not trivial.
There is, as it turns out, such a theory. It has recently been developed inlinguistic research and goes by the name of "Logicality". Logicality states that
universal grammar has access to a natural deductive system which filters out
and marks as ill-formed sentences expressing trivialities (von Fintel 1993,
Krifka 1995, Fox 2000, Gajewski 2003, Fox and Hackl 2006, Chierchia 2013, Del
Pinal 2019, Pistoia-Reda and Sauerland 2021, Del Pinal 2022). To illustrate,consider the contrast between the sentence "every student but John came",
which is clearly perceived as well-formed, and the sentence "a student but
John came", which is clearly not. This contrast, as pointed out by Peters &Westerståhl (2023), was observed as early as in the 14th century by William
Ockham: "An exceptive proposition is never properly formed unless its nonexceptive counterpart is a universal proposition. Hence, "a man except
Socrates is running" is not properly formed" (from Summa Logicae Part II:18,
translated by Alfred J. Freddoso and Henry Schuurman). An influential
account of the contrast is von Fintel (1993). The central idea in this account isthat the word "but" has a semantics which results in the first sentenceentailing 'every student who is not John came and it is not the case that every
student came' and second sentence entailing 'a student who is not John cameand it is not the case that a student came'. As the second entailment is
contradictory, the second sentence, i.e "a student but John came", is ill-formed.
(For examples of ill-formedness caused by sentences being tautologous see
Barwise and Cooper 1981, Bylinina and Nouwen 2018, Haida and Trinh 2020,
among others.)
Logicality, of course, has to explain why "it's raining and not raining" feels
perfectly well-formed. One variant of Logicality (Del Pinal 2019, Pistoia-Redaand Sauerland 2021, Del Pinal 2022) proposes that natural language grammar
contains a covert, context-sensitive "rescaling" operator which attaches to "nonlogical" expressions and shifts their meaning. The logical form of "it's raining
and not raining" is then not [rain & not-rain] but [R(c)(rain) & not-R(c')(rain)],which is not a contradiction, because the meaning of R(c)(rain) might be574

Tue Trinh, "Of Pictures and Trivialities". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Of Pictures and Trivialities | Tue Trinhdifferent from that of R(c')(rain). In other words, the sentence can have thenon-contradictory reading of 'it's raining in some sense and not raining inanother sense'. Speakers, however, may not be consciously aware of thisprocess. The interaction of the natural deductive system and universal
grammar takes place at a subconscious level. It results in judgements ofacceptability which speakers can intuit but not explicate. Note, importantly,that rescaling will not rescue "a student but John came", as no semantic
modulation of the non-logical terms – i.e. "student", "John", "came" – could
rescue the sentence from being a contradiction.
An issue arises which the proponents of Logicality must address and which isalso raised by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. This is the issue of how to
distinguish between logical and non-logical constants? For Wittgenstein, thelogical constants are those expressions that will disappear in the proper
semantic analysis: what they express, namely entailment relations, would
emerge from the pictorial nature of the symbols in the ideal notation. Until we
succeed in constructing such a notation, however, we have to deal with logicalconstants in our non-ideal language. Wittgenstein says of such expressions thatthey do not represent: "Mein Grundgedanke ist, dass die 'logischen Konstanten'
nicht vertreten" (4.0312). This description more or less captures our intution
about such words as "every", "a", and "but". The rescaling story works under
the assumption that these words are logical constants. It is true, in some sense,that they do not "represent" anything. However, this description turns out to
be too vague. It is not clear what would prevent me from saying, for example,
that "every" refers to the relation 'is a subset of', which is the set of pairs <X,Y>such that X is a subset of Y. We need a more rigorous definition of logicalconstants.
It turns out, however, that such a definition is quite difficult to formulate.
Gajewski (2003) suggests to define logical constants in terms of "permutation
invariance". Logical constants, then, would be those expressions whose
denotation remains constant across permutations of individuals in thedomain. Gajewski's proposal is widely known and cited. However, it clearlycannot be the whole story, as it classifies predicates like "exists" or "is selfidential", which supposedly denote the universe of discourse U, as logical.
Obviously, U remains the same under all permutations of the individuals in it.
It can be observed, however, that these expressions do not incur ill-

Tue Trinh, "Of Pictures and Trivialities". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Of Pictures and Trivialities | Tue Trinhformedness as we would expect: neither "every man exists" nor "every student
is self-idential" is ill-formed, despite the fact that no matter how we modulate
the meaning of "man" and "student", the sets they denote will be a subset of U.
There would then be no reading of these sentences in which they are nottrivial. This means that "exists" and "self-identical" are in fact not logicalconstants, as far as the language system is concerned. To the best of myknowledge, an adequate intensional definition of logical constants is still
missing. At this stage, a wealth of data find illuminating explanations in termsof Logicality. These explanations appeal to an intuitive notion of "logicalconstants", but the distinction they draw between logical and non-logical terms
is, in the end, stipulative. It is, of course, also possible that the distinction willturn out to be essentially stipulative, i.e. that analyticity is conventional by
nature.
We can thus summarize Logicality as follows: (i) trivialities are ill-formed; (ii)seemingly trivial sentences that are perceived as well-formed are in fact nottrivial.
Recall Wittgenstein's inconsistency: he takes trivialities to be well-formed eventhough the theory of language which he proposes, PTL, predicts them to be illformed. This inconsistency, I hypothesize, is due to his inadequate analysis of aclass of natural language expressions: he analyzes a sentence such as "it'sraining and not raining", which is perceived to be perfectly well-formed, as acontradiction. Logicality provides a way to overcome this inadequacy: it makes
it possible to analyze this sentence as contingent.
I will now briefly comment on some points of contact between analytic
philosophy and theoretical linguistics which have been brought into relief byour discussion.
Analytic philosophy began with the insight that the "logical form" of asentence, i.e. one which captures its semantic properties, might be quite
different from its "surface form", i.e. one which captures its syntactic,
morphological and phonological properties. The most well-known example isperhaps Russell's (1905) analyis of definite descriptions, according to which thesentence "the present King of France" has the logical form which is true if andonly if there is there is exactly one king of France who is bald. This constitutes

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Tue Trinh, "Of Pictures and Trivialities". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Of Pictures and Trivialities | Tue Trinha "revolution" in the way we think about natural language sentences: semantic
analysis must be carried out on a structure different from one which inputs
pronunciation or writing. Beaney (2016: 235) puts it succinctly: "[T]here is no
decomposition without interpretation". The term "interpretation" here is to beunderstood as 'translation' or 'transformation'. Thus, semantic analysis
consists of (i) the step of "transformative analysis" which translate the surface
form of the sentence into its logical form, and (ii) the step of "decompositional
analysis" which dissects the logical form and computes its consequences(Beaney 2000, 2002, 2003, 2016, 2017).
This means, effectively, that a sentence is associated with at least one structure
which inputs pronunciation and one other structure which inputs
interpretation. Transformative analysis is the step that relates the two. As it
happens, the idea that a sentence is associated with more than one structure isfoundational to modern linguistics. It brought about the "generative
revolution" in the 1950's (Chomsky 1988). In the current "minimalist" versionof generative grammar which has established itself more or less as cannonical(Chomsky 1991, 1995, Radford 2004), a sentence is associated with two
structures: a "phonological form" (PF) and a "logical form" (LF). PF inputs
pronunciation while LF inputs interpretation. PF and LF are related by"transformational rules" which build complex structures from lexical items
step by step. The LF of a sentence, just like the logical form which results fromtransformative analysis, can differ drastically from how we hear the sentenceor see it written on paper. We can thus witness an interesting parallel between
the "analytic revolution" in philosophy and the "generative revolution" inlinguistics. A notable fact is that the former came much earlier. Its beginningcan be dated to Frege's 1879 debut, Begriffsschrift, wherein he proposes
quantificational predicate logic (Beaney 2016: 228). The beginning ofgenerative grammar, in contrast, came with Chomsky's 1955 magnum opus,
The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, wherein he proposestransformations. And it would take the linguists about 20 years more to comeup with the idea of LF as a structure which disambiguates scopal relations
between quantificational elements in the sentence (May 1977, Chomsky 1981,
Huang 1982, May 1985). What is the reason for this delay?
The answer, I believe, lies in the difference between early analytic
philosophers and generative grammarians with respect to their view on the

Tue Trinh, "Of Pictures and Trivialities". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Of Pictures and Trivialities | Tue Trinhsurface form of natural language sentences. For the former, this form ishaphazard. Serious investigation can only begin after transformative analysis,
which is carried out by the philosopher contemplating on what the sentencemeans. However, the step of transformative analysis is itself shrouded inmystery: there is no theory of it. Coming up with the logical form of a sentenceis, therefore, similar to scientific discovery in its spontaneous and revelatory
nature. In contrast, generative grammarians take the relation between PF and
LF to be systematic: both are derived by transformational rules, which arecodified in a unified theory. It is understandable that it takes more time tofigure out how something works than to realize that it works.
References
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Linguistics and Philosophy 4, 159–219.
Beaney, Michael (2000) "Conceptions of analysis in early analytic philosophy", Acta Analytica
15, 97-115.
Beaney, Michael (2002) "Decompositions and transformations: Conceptions of analysis in theearly analytic and phenomenological traditions", Southern Journal of Philosophy 40, 53-99.
Beaney, Michael (2003) "Russell and Frege", in: Nicholas Griffin (ed.) The Cambridge
Companion to Bertrand Russell, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 128-170.
Beaney, Michael (2016) "The Analytic Revolution", Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 78,
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Beaney, Michael (2017) Analytic Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Bylinina, Lisa, and Rick Nouwen (2018) "On zero and semantic plurality", Glossa: a journal ofgeneral linguistics 3, 1-23.
Chierchia, Gennaro (2013) Logic in Grammar, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chomsky, Noam (1955) The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, Manuscript, Harvard
University and MIT.
Chomsky, Noam (1981) Lectures on Government and Binding, Dordrecht: Foris.
Chomsky, Noam (1988) The Generative Enterprise: A Discussion with Riny Huybregts and Henk
van Riemsdijk, Dordrecht: Foris.

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Chomsky, Noam (1991) "Some notes on economy of derivation and representation", in: RobertFreidin (ed.) Principles and Parameters in Comparative Grammar, Cambridge: MIT Press,
417-454.
Chomsky, Noam (1995) The Minimalist Program. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Daitz, Edna (1953) "The picture theory of meaning", Mind 62, 184-201.
Del Pinal, Guillermo (2019) "The logicality of language: A new take on triviality,'ungrammaticality', and logical form", Noûs 53, 785-818.
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von Fintel, Kai (1993) "Exceptive constructions", Natural Language Semantics 1, 123-148.
Fox, Danny (2000) Economy and Semantic Interpretation, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Fox, Danny, and Martin Hackl (2006) "The universal density of measurement", Linguistics andPhilosophy 29, 537-586.
Frege, Gottlob (1879) Begriffsschrift: Eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache desreinen Denkens. Halle: Neubert.
Gajewski, Jon (2003) "L-analyticity in natural language", Unpublished manuscript.
Haida, Andreas, and Tue Trinh (2020) "Zero and triviality", Glossa: A journal of generallinguistics 5, 1-14.
Hintikka, Jaakko (1994) "An Anatomy of Wittgenstein's Picture Theory", in: Carol C. Gould andRobert S. Cohen (eds.) Artifacts, Representations and Social Practice: Essays for Marx Wartofsky, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 223-256.
Huang, C.-T. James (1982) Logical Relations in Chinese and the Theory of Grammar, Doctoral
Dissertation, MIT.
Keyt, David (1964) "Wittgenstein's picture theory of language", The Philosophical Review 73,
493-511.
Krifka, Manfred (1995) "The semantics and pragmatics of polarity items", Linguistic Analysis
25, 209-257.
May, Robert (1977) The Grammar of Quantification, Doctoral Dissertation, MIT.
May, Robert (1985) Logical Form: Its Structure and Derivation, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Peters, Stanley, and Dag Westerståhl (2023) "The semantics of exceptives", Linguistics andPhilosophy 46, 197-235.

Tue Trinh, "Of Pictures and Trivialities". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
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Pistoia-Reda, Salvatore, and Uli Sauerland (2021) "Analyticity and modulation - Broadening the
rescale perspective on language logicality", International Review of Pragmatics 13, 1-13.
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Russell, Bertrand (1905) "On Denoting", Mind 14, 479-493.
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Acknowledgement
This work is supported by the ERC Advanced Grant "Speech Acts in Grammar andDiscourse" (SPAGAD), ERC-2007-ADG 787929.

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Tue Trinh, "Of Pictures and Trivialities". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment.
Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg.
von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case | Jasmin Trächtler

The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on
What is Not the Case
Jasmin Trächtler (Dortmund, Germany & Bergen, Norway)
Abstract
Susanne K. Langer was an early recipient of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus andrepeatedly drew on his picture theory in her early studies on the logic of symbols. In her
paper “Facts: The Logical Perspectives of the World” (1933), she also critically discusses theTractatus’ “woeful world of facts”. Her main criticism is that facts are not complexes ofobjects, and metaphysically final constituents of the world, but are one of many possible
logical (propositional) perspectives of the world. While some of her criticisms are valid andher conception of facts can shed light on some of the problems in TLP, Langer’s approach has
its own shortcomings, especially when it comes to negative facts, which she conceives as mere
background “automatically determined” by some other defined form (cf. 1933: 185). However,this overlooks the logical connection between a positive fact, or its expression in a propositionand precisely its negation, which, according to Wittgenstein, consists in “that negation must be
related to the logical place determined by the negated proposition” (TLP 2016: 4.0641) anddoes so through an opposition of sense (cf. TLP 2016: 4.0621). In the following, I want to bringLanger’s and Wittgenstein’s views on (negative) facts into dialogue and show that both
approaches can complement each other in a fruitful way. To this end, I will first briefly
present Langer’s critique of Tractarian facts, then outline the shortcomings of her conceptionof negative facts and finally propose a Wittgensteinian solution to the problem of negative
facts.

1. A Critique of Tractarian Facts

Langer begins her paper “Facts: The Logical Perspectives of the World” (1933)
with the question “What is a fact?”, which for her is “one of the great mysteriesof philosophy” (cf. ibid.: 178). This mystery lies above all in the nature of facts,
which oscillates between propositional and “object-like” structure. Following
the logical-atomistic views prevailing in the early 20th century, “facts” have thesame form as propositions in that they are “about” certain entities and that“just as the logical system can be analysed into propositions […], down to the‘atomic’ type, so ‘the world divides into facts’, with the ‘atomic’ facts as its
ultimate terms (ibid.: 179). According to Langer, this view contains two
premises: first, an atomistic conception of facts and second, a Wittgensteinian
picture theory of the proposition (cf. ibid.: 180). That is, an atomic proposition
pictures an atomic fact by combining the object-names in a similar way as theobjects themselves are combined in the atomic fact, so that an atomic fact canbe represented by a completely singular proposition, i.e. in Wittgenstein’s
terminology: an elementary proposition (cf. ibid.; TLP 2016: 4.21). According toJasmin Trächtler, "The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case | Jasmin Trächtler

Langer, however, the premise of atomic facts and picture theory are
incompatible and lead to a paradox: for if, according to Wittgenstein, in theelementary proposition “[o]ne name stands for one thing, and another for
another thing, and they are connected together. And so the whole, like a living
picture presents the atomic fact” (TLP 2016: 4.0311), then the question arises
how this connection, i.e., the relation of objects is represented in theelementary proposition. While the configuration, the relation of objects in theatomic fact, is not an ontologically distinct entity, but precisely the atomic fact(as Sach-Verhalt), propositions must contain more than mere names in order todepict an atomic fact as a configuration of objects at all: they must containrelations or properties, i.e. something that is not particular, but universal (cf.
Langer 1933: 181; cf. Felappi 2017: 44).
The paradox stated by Langer thus is that “a fact whose factors are allparticulars, is represented by a proposition whose factors separately denotethe items that compose the fact, but the factors of the proposition do not all
denote particulars” (Langer 1933: 181). It arises, she states, from a “tacit
premise” about the nature of analysis of which Wittgenstein, but also Russell
and Moore, were not aware, namely “that a complete analysis is always
exhaustive of the possibilities of analysis in its object” and – as she adds – “thisis the axiom which I believe is false” (ibid.). This axiom is false because ananalysis always refers only to formalised “conceptual constructions” andtherefore involves an abstraction from the content, from reality, which “might
conceivably have some other form” (ibid.). The common mistake made by
Wittgenstein and his fellows, then, was “to confuse the ultimate products ofanalysis with the necessary elements for synthesis”, which is akin to assuming“that, because a line can be analysed into an infinity of unextended points,
therefore an infinite number of unextended points can compose a line”, while
it is clear that “an infinity of points will not in itself produce a line, because thepoints are abstractions – locations on the line, not parts of it” (ibid., 183). Thatis, just because we can analyse propositions into their constituents, that does
not mean that we can analyse or divide the world into facts (TLP 2016: 1.2),
with the “atomic facts” as its ultimate terms consisting of “a combination of
objects” (ibid.: 2.01).
Rather, it is the confusion of things with their propositional expression that“has given rise to the idea that facts are both the actual constituents of reality,

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Jasmin Trächtler, "The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case | Jasmin Trächtler

and the content of propositions” (Langer 1933: 184). But what then are facts
according to Langer?
The answer is, obviously, that facts are not complexes of real objects, andmetaphysically final constituents of the world. They are not events. A fact
is that which is expressible in a proposition and is a perspective of an event. As such, it is always an abstraction, involving one of the possible
formulations of the event. No matter how detailed it may be, it is still
formal, i.e., dependent upon some “logical language”. (ibid.: 185)
Facts, for Langer, are “propositional in form” (ibid.), they are propositional or
logical perspectives of the world, or in Langer’s terminology: of an event.
(Obviously, the notion of “event” that Langer uses here to avoid difficulties
with her earlier conception of reality as a Kantian thing-in-itself raises
questions of its own – but these are questions that cannot be answered here;
cf. Felappi 2017.) Thus, for Langer, the world does not divide into a disjointed“mosaic” of facts (cf. Black 1971: 28), rather, the world and the objects have adensity that allows for many possible factual perspectives. By rejecting theconception of facts as complexes of objects and as metaphysically ultimate
constituents of the world, some problems of the Tractarian conception of facts
and, connected with it, of names, elementary propositions and logical analysis
can be illuminated. For, the representation of facts by the proposition isneither a symmetrical relation nor the only representation of the world, butrather one of many possible, propositional representations of the world.
However, Langer’s approach has its own shortcomings, especially when it
comes to negative facts, which I will explain in due briefness below.

2. Langer’s Woeful World of Negative Facts

Langer specifies her view of the relationship between propositions, facts andevents as follows: While there are past, present and future events, facts are
general, particular, positive or negative; and while events are referred to by aproposition, facts are what propositions express (cf. Langer 1933: 186).
Unfortunately, Langer remains quite silent about negative facts in particularand connected to that, negative propositions (cf. Felappi 2017). In what follows,
I will mention some problems arising from Langer’s all too brief account ofnegative facts, leaving aside questions of truth and falsity in this context,

Jasmin Trächtler, "The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case | Jasmin Trächtler

partly for the sake of simplicity, partly because Langer herself found that“[t]ruth and falsity are, after all, metaphysical gods, not to be worshipped
openly in the realm of logic” (1927: 127). In her paper on facts (1933), Langer
explains negative facts as follows: first, “a negative fact is simply a structure
which is automatically determined whenever some other form [e.g. a
proposition] is distinguished from the general system [i.e., logical language] – itis the background, the portion of the system rejected by the definition of aform” and second, “[a]ll the positive and negative facts which can be
simultaneously asserted of an event, constitute its presence in a universe of
discourse” (ibid.: 185; ann. JT. Since Langer has a very broad concept of logic,
encompassing the study of all symbols, including e.g., poetry and music, she
speaks here generally of a “form” instead of a proposition and the “generalsystem” as the respective symbol system of the form, i.e. here of logicallanguage).
This view is problematic in several respects: First, Langer explains negative
facts themselves in negative terms, merely as that which is automaticallyrejected into the background by a defined form, e.g. a proposition. Negative
facts are thus all those perspectives that are not expressed by the proposition
or, in other words, everything that is not the case according to the proposition’s
assertion. In her second explanation of negative facts, Langer seems to limit
them at least by their reference to an event, insofar as all positive and negative
facts that can be simultaneously stated as propositional perspectives of a given
event “constitute its presence in a universe of discourse”, where “the event’s
universe of discourse” means something similar to its “logical space” inWittgenstein’s terminology. That is, a negative fact, according to Langer, isanything that is excluded by the assertion of a proposition about an event – butthat still seems to be a lot of things!
And it leads to the following problem: if negative facts are all those logicalperspectives that are not the proposition’s assertion “p” about an event, thismeans that negative facts are precisely not only ~p, but also m, n, o, etc., if m,n, o, etc., are not p. Unfortunately, Langer says nothing explicit here about theconnection between negative facts and negative propositions. But if, according
to Langer, facts themselves have a propositional structure and are expressedby sentences, it seems plausible to assume that negative sentences, i.e.
sentences with negations, express negative facts. For, if we do not want to584

Jasmin Trächtler, "The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case | Jasmin Trächtler

deploy a truth-maker, the only way to determine what is not the case is bymeans of a negative sentence, and this is not everything that is not the case. But
this is precisely what Langer’s conception of negative facts as the backgroundof a positive proposition does not provide since, e.g. m, n, o are excluded as
negative facts not only by the assertion “p”, but also by that of “q” (if m, n, o,
are not q). In other words, negative facts cannot only be the background lying
outside the positive proposition but must be determinable by what is negatedin the negative proposition, so that the logical connection between a positive
fact and precisely its negation is unambiguous. Langer’s negative facts are
merely contrasts to positive facts, not their contradictions, which we want toexpress in logical language. Neither does it seem very plausible to Russell “tosay that in addition to facts there are also these curious shadowy things going
about such as ‘That today is Wednesday’ when in fact it is Tuesday. I cannot
believe they go about the real world” (Russell 1918: 56). Apart from the fact
that, as Russell continues, this is simply difficult to imagine (cf. ibid.), the fact
“That today is Wednesday” is, as said, not only a negative fact when in fact
today is Tuesday but also when in fact today is Monday.
I don’t think Langer really meant to take such a view of negative facts, but her
truncated account of negative facts as “the portion of the system rejected by
the definition of a form” seems to amount to such a view of negative facts as“curious shadowy” – though not things, but – logical perspectives “in the
background” of a positive fact. In the following, I would like to present analternative conception of negative facts with Wittgenstein, which avoids the
problems of Langer’s “woeful world of negative facts”, in particular by taking
into account the logical connection between a positive fact and its negation.

3. Wittgenstein on What is Note the Case

Wittgenstein comments more extensively on negative facts and negative
propositions than Langer, dealing in particular with the relation between apositive proposition and its negation: A negative fact, according to
Wittgenstein, is first of all the “non-existence” of atomic facts and thus thecounterpart of the positive fact as the “existence of atomic facts” (TLP 2016:2.06). Negative facts are what is not the case, nevertheless, what is not the case,belongs to the world just as much as that which is the case, for the world is the

Jasmin Trächtler, "The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case | Jasmin Trächtler“totality of facts” (ibid.: 1.1), i.e., the world consists of the “facts in logical space” (ibid.: 1.13; emph. JT). In language we can map this logical space and (also)
say what is not the case. However, in doing so, precisely because of the thinglike nature of atomic facts, it seems clear that the non-existence of aconfiguration of things in the proposition cannot be depicted as such directly
by representing objects through signs (cf. ibid.: 5.5151). In other words, wecannot represent pictorially what is not the case, but can only deny in the
proposition the picture of what is the case. Referring to an early diary note,Wittgenstein later explains as follows: “I can draw a picture of people fencing
with each other; but not of two people not fencing with each other (i.e. not a
picture that shows only that)” (BT 2005: 89; cf. NB 1979: 29/09/14). Thus, thesentences “p” and “~p” have “opposite senses, but to them corresponds one
and the same reality” (TLP 2016: 4.0621), i.e., “the signs ‘p’ and ‘~p’ can say thesame thing” and this “shows that the sign ‘~’ corresponds to nothing inreality” (ibid.). Indeed, as Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus, this is his basic
idea, namely “that the ‘logical constants’ do not represent” (ibid.: 4.0312).
Accordingly, “[e]very proposition must already have a sense” and the sense isprecisely that which the affirmation affirms and the negation denies (ibid.:
4.064), thereby inverting or opposing it to the affirmation (cf. ibid.: 5.2341).
Like Frege, Wittgenstein conceives of negation as an operation which shows“how one can get from one form of proposition to another” (ibid.: 5.24) and
can further be characterised by the fact that it can “undo the effect of another”
through iterative application, so that operations can also cancel each other out,
as in double negation (ibid.: 5.253; cf. NB 1979: 23/01/15; PU 2009: §447). If
negation is an operation that is applied to a content, this means, according toFrege, that it is “in need for completion”, just as a function is only “saturated”
with an argument (cf. Frege 1960: 132). According to Wittgenstein, this meansthat “one could say that negation must be related to the logical place
determined by the negated proposition” (TLP 2016: 4.0641).
At first, this may sound similar to Langer’s explanation of negative facts as the
background automatically determined by a defined form, e.g. a positive
proposition as rejected – for here, too, the negative is fundamentally
determined by the reference to the negated, i.e. the positive proposition.
However, for Wittgenstein this reference is much more specific than forLanger, or rather, the logical place determined by the negated proposition is586

Jasmin Trächtler, "The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case | Jasmin Trächtler

not simply its entire background, and precisely because of this, the ambiguities
that characterise Langer’s account of negative facts can be avoided. Thus, inthe Tractatus, Wittgenstein considers, quite in the spirit of Frege’s conceptionof “unsaturation of negation”, that “the sign of a negative proposition [must]
be constructed with that of the positive proposition” (ibid.: 5.5151) and that itis precisely for this reason that “every proposition has only one negative, since
there is only one proposition that lies completely outside it” (ibid.: 5.513). For
we can only “say that two propositions are opposed to one another if they havenothing in common with one another” (ibid.). That is, by containing andoperationally negating the picture of the positive, i.e. the picture of what is thecase, every proposition, according to Wittgenstein, has only one negative
which is completely, i.e. contradictorily, and not merely contrarily opposed toit, or which is unambiguously determined as that which is not the case. This isprecisely the advantage of his view over Langer’s diffuse background ofnegative facts, namely, that it is specified what is not the case since “not-p”
does not mean “everything else but p” (cf. Glock 2000: 334). For when one saysthat something is not the case, e.g. that “‘They’re not fencing with each other’”,then this “doesn’t mean that that isn’t being talked about. That’s precisely what
is being talked about; it’s (just) that it’s being ruled out” (BT 2005: 89).

To sum up: I have tried to show that Langer’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptionsof (negative) facts complement each other, insofar as Langer’s conception offacts as logical perspectives of the world represents an alternative solution to
the Tractarian problem that elementary propositions cannot only represent a
concatenation of simple names but must always already contain something
universal. On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s conception of negative
propositions avoids Langer’s indeterminacy or ambiguities of negative facts.
What follows from the complement of the two approaches is that negative
facts are only a special propositional form of reference to what is the case.
Woeful, then, is the “world of negative facts” at most insofar as it does not exist
as a world or background but is only a modified logical perspective of theworld.
References
Black, Max (1971) A Companion to Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’, Cambridge: CUP.

Jasmin Trächtler, "The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case | Jasmin Trächtler

Felappi, Giulia (2017) “Susanne Langer and the Woeful World of Facts”, Maria can der Schaar
and Eric Schliesser (eds.) Women in Early Analytic Philosophy, special issue of the Journal for
the History of Analytical Philosophy 5:2, 37-51.
Frege, Gottlob (1960) “Negation”, Peter Geach and Max Black (eds.) Translations from thePhilosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell, 117-136.
Glock, Hans-Johann (2000) “Tatsache”, Wittgenstein-Lexikon, Darmstadt: WBG.
Langer, Susanne (1927) “A Logical Study of Verby”, The Journal of Philosophy 24: 120-129.
Langer, Susanne (1933) “Facts: The Logical Perspectives of the World”, The Journal of
Philosophy 30, 178-187.
Russell, Bertrand (1918) “The Philosophy of Logical atomism”, The Monist 28, 496-527 and 29,
32-63, 190-222.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) Notebooks 1914-1916, NB, Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2005) The Big Typescript, BT, Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009) Philosophical Investigations, PI, New York: Wiley.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2016) Tractatus logico-philosophicus, TLP, side-by-side edition, version
0.44, http://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/.

Acknowledgement
I thank Simon Wimmer, Giulia Felappi and Mats Thunestvedt for helpful discussions on Susanne
Langer and negative facts.

588

Jasmin Trächtler, "The Woeful World of Negative Facts - Langer and Wittgenstein on What is Not the Case". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein | Timur Uçan

The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell andWittgenstein
Timur Uçan (Istanbul, Turkey)
Abstract
This paper consists in a comparative study of the notions of negative fact in the early works ofRussell and Wittgenstein. How to account for our ability to think both that it is false that what
is not the case is the case and incorrect to think that it is true that what is not the case is thecase? Are the truth and the correctness of such thoughts and of their expressions meant to be
insured by the existence of negative facts? Or do we need to think of negative facts
differently? In his early works, Russell argues not only that negative facts exist, but also thatthe philosophical problem they suffice to solve is real. While in the Tractatus, Wittgensteindissolves the philosophical problem by letting the superfluity and misleadingness of theaffirmation of the existence of negative facts be seen as such.

This paper consists in a comparative study of the notions of negative fact in theearly works of Russell and Wittgenstein which addresses three questions. The
first is that of the reasons for which both Russell and Wittgenstein agreed on
the philosophical importance of accounting for the intelligibility of negative
facts. The second is that of the reasons for which it is both philosophically andplainly important to account for the intelligibility of negative facts, either byconstruing a notion of negative fact as Russell did, or, by clarifying the notionof negative fact as Wittgenstein did. The third is of the explanation of thecontributions of each philosopher to the philosophical resolution or
dissolution of this philosophical problem. Thereby, I hope to contribute to theachievement of a better understanding of the similarities and divergences ofRussell’s philosophical project in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and that ofWittgenstein in the Tractatus.
Russell expresses as follows the philosophical problem, also addressed by
Wittgenstein, which concerns the intelligibility of negative facts: “You have afeeling that there are only positive facts, and that negative propositions havesomehow or other got to be expressions of positive facts.” (Russell, 2010: 41-42)
The misleading requisite addressed by Russell is one according to which
negative propositions, or negative sentences in the grammatical sense, must be
expressions of positive facts. The repugnance Russell expresses stems from thealleged necessity that to negative propositions correspond positive facts, thatthe possibility to form negative propositions necessarily implies their

Timur Uçan, "The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein | Timur Uçan

correspondence to positive facts. That which is thereby a priori negated is thata negative proposition can suffice to express a negative fact, and that anegative proposition does not need to correspond to some fact or to express
some other fact.
Russell and Wittgenstein agree with the common sense assumption of thesuperfluity of ontological counterparts to account for negative propositions.
But they disagree with the common sense assumption formulated by Russell,
according to which the non-existence of ontological counterparts to negative
facts would imply the negation of the existence of negative facts. They
attempted either to establish or clarify that a negative fact can both be truely
and really expressed by a negative proposition. According to Russell, one
should a priori establish that to a negative fact corresponds a negative
proposition. The epistemological construction in which sense data theory
consists provides groundings or insure that a logical clarification of theexpression of our thoughts may be intelligible. Such theory should render
possible the establishment of pertinent correspondence between propositions
and facts, and thereby, insure that propositions are about the world, despite
the possibility of skeptical denials of the existence and knowledge of theexternal world. But then, one central difficulty is that meanings of words could
result entirely from assignations. By contrast, Wittgenstein calls into question
the need of such a priori establishment of the correspondence of a negative
fact to a negative proposition, and proposes a philosophical dissolution of the
problem of the reality of negative facts. As brought out by Floyd (2006) and
Sullivan (2013), Wittgenstein does indeed reject the a priori. But contrary to
the approach proposed by Oaklander and Miracchi (1980), this dissolution
does not amount to a rejection of the notion of negative fact. For, theconceivability of the verification of some negative facts does not imply that thepossibility of the verification of the truth of a negative fact should becoordinated to the negative proposition. The logical clarification of theexpressions of our thoughts is not based upon or rendered possible by anepistemological theory. This aspect of Wittgenstein’s method with the Tractatus
has been brought out by Conant (2002) and Diamond (1981). Wittgensteinrather renders clear that propositions compatible with scientific theories
whose validity can possibly be established can be clarified by analysis.
Thereby is not called into question the possibility of assignation of meaning to

590

Timur Uçan, "The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein | Timur Uçan

propositional components, but the sufficiency of the model of arbitrary
meaning assignation to account for the monstration by a proposition of its
sense.

Russell’s resolution of the problem of the intelligibility of negative facts

Russell proposed the construal of a logically perfect and ideal language(Russell, 2010: 25-26), to address, among other problems, the fantasy, or myth,of a private language. Such language, devoid of the ambiguities of actual
languages, could analytically be construed by the establishment of a one-toone correspondence between the components of a proposition and those of afact, except logical connectives. Such language would suffice to exhibit thelogical structure of the asserted or denied facts. One-to-one correlations would
foundationally be needed to be established between words and objects toreach some understanding, ungrounded otherwise. Such correlations would befoundational of mutual understanding and guarantee the neutral evaluabilityof facts, characteristic of neutral monism (Klement, 2018: 174). But then, theestablishment of the truth of negative propositions, composed as positive onesof propositional elements correlated to objects would not be possible, except ifsome truth-functional composites would correspond to negative facts. Sometruth-functional composites, negative ones, would thus need to correspond asothers to correlations of objects that could and would need to be established
for a negative proposition to correspond to a negative fact. But how can suchcorrespondence be established, if that to which a negative proposition would
correspond would precisely need to be that whose existence is denied by the
proposition?
Russell’s solution is the correspondence of elements of distinct classes. The
attainment of ultimate simples “out of which the world is built, and that those
simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else.” (Russell, 2010:111) would thereby be rendered possible. That is to say, analysis not only
needs to be possible, but also to end with unarbitrarily determined correct
answers. For Russell and Wittgenstein, the condition for the achievability ofanalysis is that some propositions, atomic ones, express atomic facts. For, thealleged incapacity to affirm that which is not the case could not ground ourabilities to reject, whenever required, falsities or injustices. According toTimur Uçan, "The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein | Timur Uçan

Russell, to account for the groundedness of our ability to reject, wheneverrequired, the false and the unjust, we would have to re-establish theintelligibility of polyadic relations (Russell, 2010: 26). We could not but have tostart by reconstruing the elements of the relations of separate things and theirrelations to render these intelligible again. Such move obviously raises theobjection of infinite regress (Descombes, 2014: 144).

Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Russell’s resolution of the problem of the intelligibilityof negative facts

As Russell, Wittgenstein is concerned with logical symbolism but does notsuggest that everyday language could be imperfect by contrast with logicalsymbolism. A non-logically construed ambiguous language could not andshould not be opposed to a logically construed unambiguous language.
Wittgenstein acknowledges that Russell showed that the assumption of theequivalence between the apparent and the real form of a proposition can bemisleading (TLP, 4.0031). But he also renders clear that equally misleading
would be to reject the possibility of such equivalence, required to account foranalysis. Such rejection would involve both renouncing the intelligibility ofnovelty and the systematic rejection of the orderliness or articulateness ofpropositions of colloquial or everyday language (TLP, 5.5563). Wittgenstein
clarifies a plain assumption that should eventually not be discarded by any
philosophical attempt, that true negative propositions are sufficient to express
negative facts: negative facts can be accounted for.
Russell and Wittgenstein criticized the distinction of the notions of being andexistence implied by metaphysical conceptions that sought to guarantee ourability to express ourselves through correlated categories which would enable
us to distinguish possible from impossible combinations of sensical elements,
and thereby, sense from non-sense. Nevertheless, the criticism Russell
addressed to such conceptions implied granting that our ability to express
ourselves could and should be restored against any such conception. The
substitutability of correspondence of correlated elements comprised in types orclasses should be affirmed to oppose conceptions according to whichcorrelations of categories would render us able to articulate propositions byenabling us to relevantly distinguish possible from impossible combinations of592

Timur Uçan, "The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein | Timur Uçan

sensical elements. When Russell argued “that there were negative
facts” (Russell, 2010: 42); he insisted about the importance of not dogmatizing,of not considering negative facts as existences to affirm: “I do not say positively
that there are, but there may be” (Russell, 2010: 42). Russell thereby
discommits the consideration of the philosophical problem of the intelligibilityof negative facts from the assumption of the necessity of the existence of an
ontological counterpart correlated to true negative propositions. He thereby
proposes a new solution. But as remarked by Wittgenstein, this solution can
immediately raise concerns with respect to the situatedness of logical space, of
the whole of possibilities. Some distinction between conceivable and relevant
possibilities should indeed be accountable for from within logical space. This is
one of the main motives for which Wittgenstein calls into question both thepossibility and intelligibility of would-be attempts to restore our ability to
express ourselves against or despite categorial conceptions.
With his theory of types, Russell dispenses with the task of the coordination ofa negative proposition to a positive proposition and thereby to a positive fact,
whose need is asserted by Raphael Demos: “a negative proposition is an
ambiguous description of some positive proposition [...]” (Demos, 1917: 196).
But Wittgenstein further dispenses with Russell’s theory. The adequacy of ournotion of proposition is indeed called into question by the defense of Russell’stheory: “that the word ‘proposition’, in the sense in which we ordinarily try to
use it, is a meaningless one” (Russell, 2010: 103). By contrast, Wittgenstein’s
approach in the Tractatus is that any philosophical conception of our ordinary
notion of proposition needs to be able to account for the complete intelligibilityof propositions. Russell’s paradox needs to be dispensed with. Wittgensteinsummarizes Russell’s intuition for conceiving the theory of types in 3.332: “Noproposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign
cannot be contained in itself”. The propositional sign having been defined as“the sign through which we express the thought” (TLP, 3.12) and as the fact “that its elements, the words, are combined in it in a definite way” (TLP, 3.14),
the impossibility for the propositional sign to be contained in itself can beestablished as follows. Were we to admit that the propositional sign could becontained in itself, then we would also have to (misleadingly) admit that any
propositional sign could not have served to express any determinate thought.
Wittgenstein’s answer to Russell thusly involves seeing in which sense

Timur Uçan, "The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Russell’s theory is unconcerned with a certain indetermination within
language that Wittgenstein provided us the means to dispense with. By
contrast with Russell, Wittgenstein urges us not to ascribe any role to themeaning of a sign in logical syntax. For the purpose of the implementation of alogical notation, the description of expressions is necessary and sufficient(TLP, 3.33).
Wittgenstein specifies the process through which the formalization of the
proposition can be achieved without Russell’s theory in 3.315. Two aspects ofsuch process should retain our attention: (i) as a step in the implementation oflogical notations, the process does not depend on a particular linguistic
convention but on the nature of the proposition. Russell’s paradox vanishes in
the Tractatus, without the introduction of allegedly logical a posteriori
principles which could have forbidden illegitimate combinations ofpropositional elements. The vanishment of the paradox is rather achieved by
the clarification that a logical accident against which insurance would be
required could not have happened anyway. (ii) Correlatively, the starting pointof the formalization of the proposition is necessarily a posteriori and theformalization process necessarily happens a posteriori. Propositions andimages are facts (TLP, 2.141 – 3.14), and there is no such thing as an a prioritrue image (TLP, 2.225). The starting point of a logical analysis could not havebeen an a priori truth. The formalization of components parts and of the whole
proposition could not have led to a priori propositions supposedly meant to
restrictively limit that which can be said. Wittgenstein thus showed that theestablishment of a correspondence between elements of distinct classes tosolve the alleged problem of the correspondence between true negative
propositions and negative facts is superfluous and misleading.

Wittgenstein’s dissolution of the alleged correspondence problem

In sections 2.04-2.06 of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein reconceives the notion of“world” by means of the distinction between facts and states of affairs and thenotion of the space of possible states of affairs. The totality of actually holding
states of affairs is the world (TLP, 2.04). Facts are acknowledged asdetermining the world as a whole by determining both what is the case andwhat is not the case (TLP, 1.11-1.12). Similarly, the totality of holding states of594

Timur Uçan, "The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein | Timur Uçan

affairs is also acknowledged to determine those which do not hold (TLP, 2.05).
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein does not claim that there is a totality of non-holding
states of affairs. Wittgenstein distinguishes a state of affairs that holds from
one that does not by calling the former a positive fact and the latter a negativefact. Yet the distinction of the positive and the negative does not apply to statesof affairs. The distinction between facts and states of affairs matters to disarm
the difficulty mentioned by Russell which can arise in a discussion about
negative facts.
Wittgenstein provides us with means to dissolve the aporia as follows. First, aswith positive facts, equating negative facts with things, the ones named by thewords used to designate those things, is misleading. A negative fact is not something, or an entity, that could and would be missing for or to someone. Rather,for example, something can be absent or lacking to someone, and that negative
fact can be noted, envisaged, or remarked. Second, similarly to positive facts,
each negative fact does not involve only one entity in isolation from all others.
The absence of something from a given place can be remarked as we canimagine that a given thing could have occupied that place, as could have held astate of affairs that does not hold in a given situation. Third, as facts, states ofaffairs do not mutually depend on each other (TLP, 2.061): facts are
independent of each other, that is to say, necessarily logically independent
from each other (TLP, 6.37). Fourth, that a state of affairs holds or not cannot
be inferred from whether another state of affairs holds (TLP, 2.062). Thus toaffirm both that contradictions are formal and that a priori propositions arevacuous could not have involved a contradiction.
Insofar as a depicting state of affairs, a proposition, necessarily depicts a stateof affairs which could have held, the way in which a true negative proposition
can and does suffice to express a negative fact can be explained. Exactly as we
can use a scale to measure, we can use a proposition to determine whether
reality is as depicted by that proposition (TLP, 2.1512). We can provide toourselves a correct answer to a determinate closed question concerning thetruth of a fact by comparing reality to the proposition. The determinacy of theresult of this comparison is involved by the determinacy of the result of theoperation of negation (TLP, 5.2341; Narboux, 2009: 124). This point also settles
the question of the bipolarity of the proposition in the Tractatus as therelevance of the realizability of the operation of negation could not be entailed

Timur Uçan, "The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein | Timur Uçan

by its achievability. As remarked by Diamond (2019: 223), the notion of
bipolarity is of limited usefulness. Propositions of logic (TLP, 5.44, 6.1, 6.121)
and propositions (TLP, 3.14, 3.141, 3.251) could neither be mutually exclusive
nor indistinct. We can determine whether a depicted fact holds by means of a
depicting fact. In a given situation we can obtain a correct answer to a given
question that we can pose to ourselves by determining whether holds or not agiven depicted fact (the state of affairs) depicted by a depicting one (theproposition). If the depicted state of affairs holds, then the fact is positive. If
the depicted fact does not hold, then the fact is negative. True negative
propositions are thusly adequate to express negative facts. Surely this is not a
possibility that could have awaited to be established by means of aphilosophical conception. But this plain assumption has been philosophicallyrendered clearer by Wittgenstein with the Tractatus.
References
Conant, James (2002) “The Method of the Tractatus”, in: E.H. Reck (ed.) From Frege toWittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 375-462.
Demos, Raphael (1917) “A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition”, Mind 26, 188–
96. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2248642
Descombes, Vincent (2014) The Institutions of Meaning: A Defense of Anthropological Holism,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Diamond, Cora (1981) “Throwing Away the Ladder”, Philosophy 56, 5-27.
Diamond, Cora (2019) Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going on to Ethics, Cambridge &London: Harvard University Press.
Floyd, Juliet (2006) “Wittgenstein and the Inexpressible”, in: Alice Crary (ed.) Wittgenstein and
the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond, 177–234.
Klement, Kevin (2018) “Russell on Ontological Fundamentality and Existence”, in: Landon
Elkind and Gregory Landini (eds.) The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: A Centenary Reappraisal,
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 155–79.
Oaklander Nathan; Miracchi Silvano (1980) “Russell, Negative Facts, and Ontology”, Philosophyof Science 47, 434–455.
Narboux, Jean-Philippe (2009) “Négation et totalité dans le Tractatus de Wittgenstein”, in:Chauviré, Christiane (ed.) Lire le Tractatus de Wittgenstein, Paris: Vrin, 127–176.
Russell, Bertrand (2010) The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, London and New York: Routledge.

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Timur Uçan, "The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein | Timur Uçan

Sullivan, Peter (1996) “The ‘Truth’ in Solipsism, and Wittgenstein’s Rejection of the A Priori”,
European

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Philosophy

4,

195–219.

Availableat:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

1468-0378.1996.tb00074.x.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2003) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (transl.) C.K. Ogden, New York:
Barnes & Noble.
Wittgenstein,

LudwigUniversity

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Map .

Availableat:

http://

tractatus.lib.uiowa.edu/ (Accessed: 8 May 2023).
Acknowledgement
This paper has been centrally inspired by achievements of James Conant, Cora Diamond, Juliet
Floyd, Jean-Philippe Narboux, and Peter Sullivan, concerning the philosophy of Ludwig
Wittgenstein. I am grateful to them. I am also grateful to Donald Cornell, for his very helpful
suggestions and remarks on earlier versions of this text.

Timur Uçan, "The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years
after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian
Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with
Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Miroslav Vacura

The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Miroslav Vacura (Prague, Czech Republic)
Abstract
At the beginning of the 20th century, opinions on the problem of the nature of the willappeared divided between the empiricist tradition and Schopenhauer’s philosophy. It is
common knowledge that the young Wittgenstein was influenced primarily by Schopenhauer;
however, it is reasonable to ask how much his early views on the nature of the will were
influenced by the empiricists. In this paper we analyze Wittgenstein’s statements on thenature of the will in the Tractatus and show that they present a fragment of a theory
obviously closer to Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophy and evincing only limited
empiricist influence.

Introduction

At the beginning of the 20th century, opinions on the problem of the nature of
the will appeared divided between the empiricist tradition (Hobbes, Locke,
James, Russell) and Schopenhauer’s philosophy. It is common knowledge that
Wittgenstein was influenced primarily by Schopenhauer at the beginning of
his philosophical work (Schroeder 2011). It may still be asked how much of theyoung Wittgenstein's views, which we find in the Notebooks and the Tractatus,
were influenced by empiricism, and specifically by James.
Wittgenstein had already encountered James’s work during his studies at
Cambridge, probably thanks to G.E. Moore, who taught Moral Sciences andwho had written an article on James’s Pragmatism (Tarbox 1989: 91). The
question is whether he had already become acquainted with James's
reflections about the nature of the will, which can be found only in the second
half of Volume 2 of The Principles of Psychology (James 1890: 488).
In general, the question of the will in Wittgenstein’s early writings has so far
been of little interest to most researchers. For example Hacker (2000: 194) says
about young Wittgenstein’s encounter with the problem of the will that he“only touched upon it unsatisfactorily in the Tractatus“. Other commenters
focus primarily on the later works (e.g., Munz and Ritter 2017, Vacura 2018).
Tractatus 5.1362—Freedom of the Will

We shall look first at the context of the first discussion of the will in theTractatus. The text in Section 5 deals with propositions, understood as “truthfunctions of elementary propositions” (TLP 5), which “can be arranged in

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Miroslav Vacura, "The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Miroslav Vacura

series” (TLP 5.1). The truth of one proposition can (logically) follow from otherpropositions; we can see (ersehen) this from the structure of propositions (TLP
5.13). For example, we can see that the truth of proposition p follows from thetruth of proposition p ∨ q and the truth of proposition ~q (TLP 5.1311).
This deduction is possible, first, because the propositions have common parts (p,q), and second, because of their structure. Elementary propositions(propositions with no structure) cannot be deduced one from another (TLP
5.134).
Wittgenstein now moves from the discussion of propositions to the discussionof situations. While inferences from propositions are possible (when they meetthe conditions described above), inferences from situations are not: “There isno possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to
the existence of another, entirely different situation” (TLP 5.135).
While we have a way to perform deduction on propositions (based on theirstructure), we do not have any such method for situations. This negation holds
for concurrent situations as well as for diachronic situations (situations
following one after another in time). While we may tend to think of causality
as a kind of inference, this notion is a mistake. Causal inference (as strict
inference) is not possible: “There is no causal nexus which justifies such aninference” (TLP 5.136).
Causal inference from situations is therefore not possible, and the “events ofthe future cannot be inferred from those of the present” (TLP 5.1361).
What immediately follows is a famous statement about freedom of the will
(TLP 5.1362), which we will divide into three parts:(1)“The freedom of the will consists in the fact that future actions cannot
be known now.”(2)“We could only know them if causality were an inner necessity, likethat of logical deduction.”(3)“The connection of knowledge and what is known is that of logicalnecessity.”

Miroslav Vacura, "The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Miroslav Vacura

In (3) Wittgenstein claims that the term “knowledge,” when applied to therelation between two propositions, can be used strictly in the cases describedabove when one proposition follows logically from another—cases of “logicalnecessity.” In (2) he says that the case of causality, i.e., the case where the truthof one proposition seems to causally follow from the truth of another, does nothave the character of “logical necessity.”
Causal reasoning is not logical inference, and once again “events of the future
cannot be inferred from those of the present” (emphasis added); belief in thecausal nexus is “superstition” (TLP 5.1361, 5.136). This formulation expresses
Wittgenstein’s well-known indeterminism (Scheer 1991).
The belief that causal reasoning provides knowledge about the future issuperstition. According to Wittgenstein we cannot know anything about the
future; therefore we cannot know our future actions. This “impossibility ofknowing actions that still lie in the future” Wittgenstein calls “freedom of thewill” (1).
This passage obviously provides no explanation of what the will is. By
subscribing to indeterminism, supported here by the observation thatcausality has no connection to logical necessity, Wittgenstein merely allows fora theory of free will, i.e., will that is not subordinate to causality.

Tractatus 5.631—The Will as a Pointer to the Subject

The second discussion of the will at the end of the 5th section of the Tractatusfocuses on a different topic: the question of the limits of language, i.e., whether
there is anything beyond the totality of propositions (including all thecomplexities of their mutual relations and their relations to states of affairs,
discussed earlier in the Tractatus).
Wittgenstein’s short answer is no: “The limits of my language mean the limitsof my world” (TLP 5.6). There is nothing beyond the world of propositions; thatworld is also my world, and my world, strictly speaking, is myself (TLP 5.63).
The obvious question now arises: where, in this description of the world as asphere of facts and their pictures (propositions), am I, the thinking self, thesubject? Wittgenstein’s answer is again striking: nowhere. In another famous

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Miroslav Vacura, "The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Miroslav Vacurastatement he says: “There is no such thing as the subject that thinks orentertains ideas” (TLP 5.631). He elaborates on this claim in the rest of theparagraph: “If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have toinclude a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were
subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of
isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there isno subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book” (TLP 5.631).
This statement is quite puzzling in the context of the rest of the Tractatus.
What does it say? If Wittgenstein were to provide a list of the objects heencountered in the world, a few objects (such as arms and legs) would have a
special property of being “subordinate to my will.” We know that
Wittgenstein’s objects have internal and external properties (TLP 2.01231) (seeMácha 2015 for a detailed discussion). This special property is not internalbecause “a property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should notpossess it” (TLP 4.123). Is it therefore an external property, such as a table’s
being red and not white?
A property of being “subordinate to my will” that can be ascribed to some
objects seems to be a property unlike any other. My arm’s being subordinate to
my will is not an external (or internal) relation between two objects, my will
and my arm. The will is not an object.
One way to understand this difficult passage is that the property of being“subordinate to my will” is a kind of pointer that points beyond the totality of
propositions, beyond the world. This property is a strange relation of being“subordinate to” that starts at my arm and goes beyond my world, pointing to
the non-object, “my will.”
When Wittgenstein speaks of using subordination to the will as “a method of
isolating the subject” that shows that “in an important sense there is no
subject” (TLP 5.631), he implies that “the will” is for him somehow connectedor related to the metaphysical subject (not unlike Kant’s and Schopenhauer’stranscendental subject; see Leinfellner 1982). However, the relation of the will
and the subject is already beyond what can be meaningfully and precisely
described. The metaphysical subject itself, whose “existence” is manifested by
the encounter with entities with the specific property of being subordinate toMiroslav Vacura, "The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Miroslav Vacura

my will, is not in this world: “The subject does not belong to the world: rather,
it is a limit of the world” (TLP 5.632).
Section 5.6 concludes with the well-known analogy of the eye’s not being seen
in a visual field (TLP 5.633) and the repeated statement that “the philosophicalself is…the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it” (TLP
5.641).

Tractatus 6.37—Volitional Necessity

Wittgenstein returns to the problem of the will once more in the 6th section of
the Tractatus. This section continues the discussion of propositions and theirgeneral form. Wittgenstein also revisits the question of causality and rejects
any form of the principle of induction or of Kantian apriorism with regards tocausality (TLP 6.31). He then repeats his conviction that logical necessity is the
only form of necessity: “There is no compulsion making one thing happen
because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logicalnecessity.” (TLP 6.37).
This conviction also has implications for the objects “subordinated to my will”
described in the previous section. It may seem that there is another kind of
volitional necessity based on these concepts of the metaphysical subject andthe will. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein says that there is no such necessity,
because there is no logical one: “there is no logical connexion between the will
and the world” (TLP 6.374). Again, the only acceptable necessity for
Wittgenstein is logical necessity (“the only necessity that exists is logicalnecessity” TLP 6.375) and such necessity is not present here. This conviction
also reveals the meaning of the puzzling remark that “the world is
independent of my will” (TLP 6.373).
How, then, can we explain the fact that my will controls my hand? For
Wittgenstein this question is akin to the question of causality. Causal necessity,
as we have said above, is rejected, so regularities observed in the world cannot
be explained by causal necessity (in a strict sense). (A large part of section 6 isdevoted to this discussion.) Similarly, my control of my arm may manifest

602

Miroslav Vacura, "The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Miroslav Vacurasome regularities; there is, however, no necessity in this circumstance. My
hand may stop responding to my will at any time or even become completely
autonomous.
There is a well-known phenomenon called “alien-hand syndrome” (sometimes
called “Dr. Strangelove syndrome” or “anarchic hand syndrome”) – in the mosttypical cases, affected patients experience that one of their hands cannot bevoluntary controlled, acting seemingly on its own or being “disobedient” while
the other hand acts normal (Scepkowski 2003). Sometimes, the hand is evenpersonified – patients give it a name as if it were an independent agent (Doody
1992, see also Vacura 2022).

Tractatus 6.42—The Will and Ethics

The last discussion of the will in the Tractatus is in Section 6.4 and is related tovalues and ethics. In the context of Wittgenstein’s pictorial theory developed in
the Tractatus, all propositions are pictures of states of affairs and are therefore
purely descriptive; in this sense, it is possible to assert that “all propositions
are of equal value” (TLP 6.4). Because of the descriptive character of
propositions “it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics” (TLP 6.42).
That is why “it is impossible to speak about the will insofar as it is the subjectof ethical attributes” (TLP 6.423, emphasis added), i.e., it is impossible to sayanything about “good/evil will” and the like. This statement can be considereda reaction to Kantian ethics, with its declaration that “it is impossible to thinkof anything at all in the world…that could be taken to be good without
limitation, except a good will” (Kant 2011: 4:393). The point is not that the willis unrelated to ethics, but that what Kant tried to say cannot be said. Becauseof the descriptive character of propositions, our ability to speak is limited to
depictions of states of affairs.
The will is, however, relevant to ethics. We have seen above that the will is akind of pointer beyond what can be described by propositions—that is, beyond
the world. This idea is reiterated here: “If the good or bad exercise of the will
does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not
what can be expressed by means of language” (TLP 6.43).

Miroslav Vacura, "The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus | Miroslav Vacura

The following statement, expressing a “holistic” conception of the will, is again
quite puzzling: “In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether
different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole” (TLP 6.43). This
remark has been explained by Wenzel (2016), who links it to Kant’s concept ofan “intelligible” or “noumenal” choice (Wahl) by means of which one chooses
the whole world (of appearances).

Conclusion

The will is not mentioned in the rest of the Tractatus, so we are left with the
few remarks analyzed above. They present a fragment of a theory which seemto be based on Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophy, showing only limited
empiricist influence. Wittgenstein’s view on the problem of the will changed
somewhat in his later works. For example, Hyman (2011) and Wenzel (2016),
believe that Wittgenstein’s later reflections on the nature of will in
Philosophical Investigations are in reaction to James’ ideas, presented in his
seminal work The Principles of Psychology, which he opposes. Wittgenstein’sviews cover merely a few pages of this book, these pages, however, attracted
much attention and sparked multiple discussions. But this development isbeyond the scope of the present exposition (see Vacura, 2018).
References
Hacker, P. M. S. (2000) Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Part I: Essays, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hyman, J. (2011) “Wittgenstein on Action and the Will”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 82, pp.
285–311.
James, W. (1890) The Principles of Psychology, Vol 2, New York: Dover.
Kant I. (2011) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A German-English Edition, Cambridge:
CUP.
Leinfellner, W. (1982) Is Wittgenstein a Transcendental Philosopher? (Wittgenstein and Kant),
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, T. 38, Fasc. 1, Actas do Colóquio Luso-Austríaco Sobre Ludwig
Wittgenstein (Jan. – Mar.), pp. 13-27.
Mácha, J. (2015) Wittgenstein on Internal and External Relations: Tracing all the Connections,London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Munz, V. A., Ritter, B., eds. (2017) Wittgenstein's Whewell's Court Lectures: Cambridge, 1938–
1941, From the Notes by Yorick Smythies (WCL), Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2017.

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Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Scheer, R. K. (1991) Wittgenstein's Indeterminism, Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 255 (Jan.).
Schroeder, Severin. 2011. “Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein.” In A Companion to
Schopenhauer, ed. B. Vandenabeele. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Tarbox, E. J. (1989) Wittgenstein, James and Bridge to Radical Empiricism, American Journal of
Theology & Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 2.
Vacura, M. (2018) “Wittgenstein and the Problem of Will in Philosophical Investigations”, The
Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. Contributions of the 41th International Wittgenstein
Symposium, edited by Mras, G. M., Weingartner, P., Ritter, B., Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria,
August 5-11, 2018, ALWS.
Vacura, M. (2022) “Neurophilosophical Perspectives on Wittgenstein’s Puzzles of the Will”,
Platonism. Contributions of the 43th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by
Hrachovec, H., Mácha, J., Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, August 7-13, 2022, ALWS.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), translated by Pears, D. and
McGuinness, B., London: Routledge.
Wenzel, Ch. H. (2016) Wittgenstein and Free Will, Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods
and Perspectives, Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl and Harald A. Wiltsche (eds.), Walter de Gruyter 2016,
pp. 47–62.

Miroslav Vacura, "The Problem of the Will in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's
Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein
Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein.
Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus| Elena Valeri“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics andAesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Elena Valeri (Venice, Italy)
Abstract
In this paper, I will analyse proposition 6.522 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, whichstates that “[t]here is indeed the inexpressible” (TLP 6.522). My aim is to show that this
proposition is closely related to much of what we read about ethics, aesthetics (and logic) andtheir connection in the Tractatus. In particular, I will first point out that the problem of theinexpressible refers back to an issue that is central both in the Tractatus and in Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy, that is: the idea that the sense of a proposition is not “something” different
and distinct from the proposition itself, just as the sense of life is not “something” different
and distinct from life itself. In the last part of the paper, I will illustrate how this idea also
underlies the way in which Wittgenstein addresses aesthetic matters and the distinction
between world and facts of the world.

As is widely known, according to Wittgenstein the problem of what can be said(or expressed) by a proposition and what can only be shown by it is the“cardinal problem” of philosophy (WC: 98, letter to B. Russell, 19.8.1919). Again
according to Wittgenstein, it was the failure to fathom this that prevented
Russell from really understanding his first book. The explicit formulation ofthis ‘cardinal problem’ is found in proposition 6.522 of the Tractatus, whichreads: “There is indeed the inexpressible [unaussprechlich]. This shows itself; itis the mystical” (TLP: 6.522). As we shall see, the problem in question also
involves ethics and aesthetics, although it might not be so easy to recognise
this without analytically considering what the Tractatus (together with thewritings contemporary to it) suggests about ethics, as well as aesthetics. Morespecifically, one should consider what is stated in proposition 6.42 and some ofits comments.
In proposition 6.42 Wittgenstein writes that “there can be no ethicalpropositions” (TLP: 6.42), while in the first paragraph of proposition 6.421 hewrites that “ethics cannot be expressed [aussprechen]” (TLP: 6.421). If we readthese two statements alongside the last paragraph of proposition 6.421, where
ethics and aesthetics are identified by stating – with dizzying conciseness – that“[e]thics and aesthetics are one” (TLP: 6.421; see Schulte 2013), we cannot but
extend to aesthetics what Wittgenstein writes about ethics: there can be noaesthetic propositions and aesthetics, like ethics, cannot be expressed.

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Elena Valeri, "“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100
Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus| Elena Valeri

The same consideration applies to the second paragraph of proposition 6.421:“Ethics is transcendental” (TLP: 6.421). If ethics is transcendental, and if ethics
and aesthetics are one, then aesthetics too is transcendental; as is logic,
according to one of the two paragraphs of proposition 6.13: “Logic istranscendental” (TLP: 6.13). Note also that, according to a fairly explicit remark
in the Notebooks 1914-1916, the fact that ethics is transcendental means that it“does not treat of the world [as science does]. Ethics must be a condition of theworld, like logic” (NB: 77e, 24.7.1916). Assuming one continues to take theidentification between ethics and aesthetics seriously, it follows that neither
does aesthetics treat of the world. Instead, for aesthetics, as for ethics (andlogic), “[h]ow the world is, is completely indifferent” (TLP: 6.432). It is sciencethat is interested in discovering how the world is; on the contrary, what ethics
and aesthetics (and logic) are interested in is “[n]ot how the world is, […] butthat it is” (TLP: 6.44). And this is just another way of saying that ethics andaesthetics (and logic) are ‘conditions’ of the world. Therefore, it is absurd to
speak of ethics as a science, just as it is absurd to speak of a “science of
Aesthetics” (LA: 11). Indeed, we might say that among the facts into which theworld is divided (cf. TLP: 1.2) there are properly neither ethical nor aesthetic
facts, just as there are no logical facts.
Of course, in order to come to terms with all this, one has to ask what
Wittgenstein properly means by ‘condition’ when in the Notebooks he speaksof ethics, of logic, and thus – as I am suggesting – also of aesthetics as “acondition of the world” (NB: 77e, 24.7.1916). But I will return to this in a
moment. First, it is worth clarifying the distinction between saying (orexpressing) and showing, to which – as mentioned above – Wittgenstein
assigns paramount importance. In particular, attention should be drawn to thefact that, in the Tractatus, this distinction plays different roles and has at least
two senses or uses.
(1) There is a sense (or use) in which Wittgenstein speaks of showing in
relation to propositions (with sense – sinnvoll) and, more generally, to pictures.
I will try to explain this point in the least ‘technical’ terms possible through thefollowing example. The proposition ‘It is raining’ tells us that it is raining – and
it is true if it is raining, false if it is not raining. But that ‘It is raining’ is a
proposition, is not, in turn, something that the proposition tells us: theproposition does not say of itself that it is a proposition; rather, it shows that it

Elena Valeri, "“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100
Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus| Elena Valeri

is one the very moment we understand it. We might also say that when wehear ‘It is raining’, we do not need to worry about the proposition (‘Is it really aproposition?’); instead, we usually simply wonder whether it is raining or not.
In other words, what we care about is not the proposition, but the weather. As
Wittgenstein writes in the Notebooks, we do not “need to worry about
language” since “language takes care of itself” (NB: 43e, 27.4.1915 and26.4.1915 respectively). In the Tractatus, the proposition does not say, but “shows its sense./The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And it says
, that they do so stand” (TLP: 4.022). We could then say that, by distinguishing
between saying and showing, Wittgenstein does not at all wish to maintainthat there is something, i.e. saying, that the proposition should or would like todo, but nevertheless cannot or is unable to do.
Certainly, what Wittgenstein writes could suggest otherwise, but I believe thatwhat Wittgenstein stresses in a significant remark in the PhilosophicalInvestigations, namely that often in philosophy “[t]he great difficulty [...] is not
to present the matter as if there were something one couldn’t do” (PI: §374),
also applies to the Tractatus. Indeed, overcoming this difficulty here means
recognising that what the proposition shows, by showing its sense, is simply
that it is a proposition. And this is because, according to the Tractatus, thesense of a proposition is not ‘something’ that is added to the proposition or
accompanies it. But, I repeat, this is not an easy difficulty to overcome if, as
Wittgenstein somewhat disconsolately reminds us in Zettel, “[w]e don’t get freeof idea that the sense of a proposition accompanies the proposition: is there
alongside of it” (Z: §139).
(2) But there is also a second sense (or use) of the distinction between saying(or expressing) and showing, and it can be explained as follows. What
Wittgenstein wants us to recognise is that ethics (but also, as we know,
aesthetics) does not treat of the world and that, consequently, its problems arenever problems of natural science (cf. TLP: 6.4312; see Perissinotto 2022). Let
us suppose, for instance, that someone asks: ‘How can our life have any sense
if we are destined or condemned to die?’. Suppose now that it turns out thatthe human soul is eternal and survives death. The question that Wittgensteinwould ask us at this point is why an eternal life thus understood, i.e.
understood as ‘temporal immortality’, should have a sense that our mortal life
does not have (cf. TLP: 6.4312). Such a question leads us acknowledge that the

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“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus| Elena Valeri

sense of life does not depend on how the world is. Moreover, this explains“why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could
not then say wherein this sense consisted” (TLP: 6.521). For if it could be said
what the sense of life consists in, this would mean that the sense of life is not
life, but ‘something’ that happens (or fails to happen) within it. What
Wittgenstein has in mind here is explained very well in an annotation from1930 that deserves more attention than is usually given to it: “If anyone should
think he has solved the problem of life and feels like telling himself everythingis quite easy now, he need only tell himself, in order to see that he is wrong,that there was a time when this ‘solution’ had not been discovered; but it musthave been possible to live then too and the solution which has now been
discovered appears in relation to how things were then like an accident” (CV:6).
I think that the link between points (1) and (2) is quite evident. Just as thesense of a proposition is not ‘something’ added to the proposition, so, in a very
similar way, the sense of life is not ‘something’ added to life. Just as we cannot
discover that a proposition was not yet a proposition, so we cannot discoverthat life was not yet (fully) life. In short, a life with a sense is not life plus its
sense, just as a proposition with a sense is not a proposition plus its sense.
Incidentally, it is remarkable that Wittgenstein treats the semantic and theethical sense in the same way.
To return now to the men of proposition 6.521, among whom Wittgensteinhimself should perhaps be counted, it could also be said that their attitude
towards life has radically changed, even though life (the world) may haveremained unchanged as far as its ‘how’ is concerned. The sense of life, so to
speak, does not come to us as an inheritance that makes us rich from poor, or
as a medicine that gives us back the health we had lost. All this could also be
expressed by saying that no fact is ethically relevant. It is for this reason that“there can be no ethical propositions” (TLP: 6.42), even if “[t]here is indeed theinexpressible” (TLP: 6.522). And what is ‘inexpressible’ is life itself, not some
hidden or profound side or aspect of it.
Now, as we already know, what applies to ethics also applies (with all due
distinctions) to aesthetics. Here again, an example may be useful to clarify theissue. Cézanne painted the Sainte-Victoire mountain in Provence many times.

Elena Valeri, "“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100
Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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As regards its ‘how’, the mountain painted by Cézanne was the same mountainthat the inhabitants of Aix-en-Provence, including Cézanne himself, saw everyday. Cézanne discovered nothing new about that mountain – at least, not in thesense in which a geologist, say, might discover something new about thecomposition of its rocks or its origin. Nevertheless, the former, the SainteVictoire mountain painted by Cézanne, is radically different from the latter,
the real Sainte-Victoire mountain. But insofar as it has nothing to do with how
the mountain is, this difference is ‘inexpressible’, even if – as Wittgenstein
writes – this “inexpressible [...] shows itself” (TLP: 6.522). We could say that in
Cézanne’s paintings of the Sainte-Victoire mountain the inexpressible shows
itself, and shows itself with such force that Cézanne’s mountain is, so to speak,more ‘real’ than the real mountain. After all, tourists in Provence are probably
more likely to photograph the former than the latter.
What we find here, in the case of Cézanne’s mountain, is the same attitude oridea that I have illustrated in relation to the sense of a proposition and thesense of life. Cézanne’s mountain does not have ‘something’ that a tourist’s
photograph or an amateur’s drawing does not have; at the same time,
however, the former is radically different from the latter. Nor does the former
convey information that the latter do not convey, or only convey in an
incomplete or inadequate way; however, there is no science that can explain
where the difference lies between Cézanne’s mountain and a Sunday painter’s
painting. In an almost Platonic spirit, we might thus say that Cézanne did not
paint a mountain but ‘the’ mountain. But we should also add, this time in a
non-Platonic spirit, that there is no other way to see ‘the’ mountain except bylooking at Cézanne’s mountain. This is precisely the way in which the problemof the inexpressible is transposed and addressed by Wittgenstein in the field ofaesthetics.
What I have highlighted so far also allows us to better understand what
Wittgenstein means when he speaks of ethics and aesthetics (and logic) as
conditions of the world, i.e. as transcendental. The term ‘condition’ lends itself
to many readings and misunderstandings, and it is perhaps no coincidence
that this expression is not taken up in the Tractatus but remains confined to
the Notebooks. Certainly, when he speaks of ‘condition’, Wittgenstein is notreferring to ‘something’ that precedes the world or stands at its origin as its
cause or foundation (see Tejedor 2014). In this sense, the term is devoid (or610Elena Valeri, "“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100
Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus| Elena Valeri

intended to be devoid) of any metaphysical significance. To put it somewhat
roughly, what we have is not the world on the one hand and its conditions on
the other. What Wittgenstein rather seems to be suggesting is that the world
already appears to be ethically and aesthetically connoted, even though thefacts of the world, as facts, are always indifferent and irrelevant to ethics andaesthetics (and logic). We could also put it this way: for science there are thefacts of the world, for ethics and aesthetics there is the world, even though theworld of ethics and aesthetics is not another world compared to the world of
scientific facts.
In a famous passage in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein makes this point clear
through the oft-quoted example of the stove – it may also be useful, whenreading the passage, to replace the word ‘stove’ with the expression ‘SainteVictoire mountain’. The example appears in a note dated 8 October 1916,
which opens with a statement that could be considered an explicit comment
on what I have tried to argue so far: “As a thing among things, each thing isequally insignificant; as a world each one equally significant” (NB: 83e,
8.10.1916). Perhaps in order to tone down his statement, Wittgenstein then
immediately explains himself by introducing the example of a humble andordinary object, the stove: “If I have been contemplating the stove, and thenam told: but now all you know is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial.
For this represents the matter as if I studied the stove as one among the manythings in the world. But if I was contemplating the stove it was my world, andeverything else colourless by contrast with it” (NB: 83e, 8.10.1916). It is alsointeresting to note that Wittgenstein realises the difficulty of expressing all of
this, so much so that he adds in brackets: “Something good about the whole,
but bad in the details” (NB: 83e, 8.10.1916). Evidently, this parentheticalremark expresses Wittgenstein’s dissatisfaction with his formulation, but it isalso a sign or clue that the ‘cardinal problem’ of the inexpressible has beenreached here. Significantly, in the annotation made the following day,
Wittgenstein plainly reveals the task ahead of him: “But now at last theconnection of ethics with the world has to be made clear” (NB: 84e, 9.10.1916) –and with it, we might add, that of aesthetics.
References
Perissinotto, Luigi (2022) “‘The Riddle Does not Exist’. On Proposition 6.5 of the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus”, Revista de Filosofia Aurora, 34 (63), 155-172.

Elena Valeri, "“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100
Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Schulte, Joachim (2013) “Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein”, in Perissinotto, Luigi (ed.) The
Darkness of This Time. Ethics, Politics, and Religion in Wittgenstein, Milano-Udine: Mimesis,
11-23.
Tejedor, Chon (2014) The Early Wittgenstein on Metaphysics, Natural Science, Language andValue, Abingdon, Oxon-New York: Routledge.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, ed. by C. K. Ogden, transl. by C. K.
Ogden and F. P. Ramsey, with an introduction in English by B. Russell, London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co. [TLP].
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1966) Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology andReligious Belief, ed. by C. Barrett, Oxford: Blackwell [LA].
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1967) Zettel/Zettel, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright,
transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell [Z].
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979) Notebooks 1914-1916, ed. by G. H. von Wright and G. E. M.
Anscombe, transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe, second edition, Oxford: Blackwell [NB].
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) Culture and Value. A Selection from the Posthumous Remains/
Vermischte Bemerkungen. Eine Auswahl aus dem Nachlaß, ed. by G. H. von Wright incollaboration with H. Nyman, revised edition of the texts by A. Pichler, transl. by P. Winch,
Oxford: Blackwell [CV].
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2008) Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Letters and Documents, 1911-1951, ed.
by B. F. McGuinness, Malden (MA): Blackwell [WC].
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009) Philosophical Investigations/Philosophische Untersuchungen, ed.
by P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte, transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte,
New York: Wiley [PI].

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Elena Valeri, "“There Is Indeed the Inexpressible”. Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". In 100
Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig WittgensteinGesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther HeinrichRamharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus | Maria Venieri

Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus
Maria Venieri (Rethymno, Greece)
Abstract
The question of solipsism in Wittgenstein’s early work is highly controversial. In this paper I
shall explore it by assessing two dominant interpretations concerning the relation between
solipsism and realism, as stated in paragraph 5.64 of the Tractatus. The first interpretation
takes realism at face value and advocates a “self-effacing solipsism” according to which theworld is independent of the subject, while the second defends a kind of transcendental
solipsism combined with empirical realism. The second interpretation has the advantage ofbetter accommodating the passages in the Notebooks and the Tractatus, which explicitly statesolipsistic theses influenced by Schopenhauer. Furthermore, the ambiguity at the heart of theTractatus concerning the nature of objects allows for a phenomenological interpretation,
which favors empirical realism. Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with proposition
6.431 about the world coming to an end at death.

The issue of solipsism is one of the most controversial in Wittgenstein’s earlywork. I shall approach it by mainly examining in what sense solipsism cancoincide with realism, as stated in paragraph 5.64 of the Tractatus. Concerning
this question, there are two dominant lines of interpretation. According to thefirst, realism means that the world is independent of the subject, while thesecond advocates a kind of empirical realism influenced by Schopenhauer. I
shall argue that the second interpretation does more justice to the solipsistic
passages in the early work and can be corroborated by a certain
understanding of the Τractarian objects, which form the substance of theworld.
Wittgenstein’s aim in the Tractatus, as expressed in the preface, is to draw alimit in language by developing a criterion for distinguishing sense from
nonsense. Our language has meaning because it is a picture or a model ofreality. Picturing is possible because language and world have the same logicalform. This form becomes manifest when we logically analyze our everyday
language and arrive at elementary propositions, which contain simple names.
Elementary propositions have sense because they correspond to states ofaffairs, consisting of simple objects, and are true if the states of affairs obtain,
or false if they do not obtain. Thus, only contingent propositions have sense.
Propositions of metaphysics that describe the relation of language and reality,
as well as the propositions of ethics, aesthetics and religion, are nonsensical (unsinnig) because they try to express what can only be shown, the unsayable,

Maria Venieri, "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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the mystical. The propositions of logic also lack meaning, as they aretautologies, but show the logical form of language and the world. Regarding
the propositions of the Tractatus itself, which are also nonsensical, this paper
is compatible with a “traditional” rather than a “resolute” reading of them (fora discussion of developments in this debate see Conant and Bronzo 2017).
We see that in the Tractatus the limits of language are drawn. These limits
coincide with the limits of the world. We can understand this, if we keep inmind that language and the world have a common structure, i.e. logical form.
On the one hand, logical form is the limit of language because it cannot be
expressed or pictured through language, although everything that can be said
must have a logical form; it can only be shown. On the other hand, logic sets
the limits of the world, all the possible combinations of objects, i.e. the form of
the world and not its content, which is the combinations that obtain, namely
the facts. Wittgenstein writes: “Logic pervades the world: the limits of theworld are also its limits” (TLP 1972: §5.61).
In his discussion of solipsism in §§5.6 – 5.641 of the Tractatus Wittgenstein
acknowledges that language and the world have the same limits and proceeds
to characterize language as my language and the world as my world: “Thelimits of my language mean the limits of my world” (TLP1972: §5.6). He thenidentifies the world with my world and adds: “This is manifest in the fact thatthe limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean thelimits of my world” (TLP §5.62). As my language, the one and only language I
understand, has the same limits as the world, the world becomes my world;
this is according to Wittgenstein a case of solipsism. Thus, it seems that headopts a version of solipsism, which is a doctrine that in its more traditional
metaphysical form maintains that only I and my experiences exist. In the same
paragraph we read: “For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it
cannot be said, but makes itself manifest” (ibid.).
After identifying the world with my world, he goes on with otheridentifications: “The world and life are one” (TLP 1972: §5.621) and “I am myworld (the microcosm)” (TLP 1972: §5.63). Concerning the I or self,
Wittgenstein clearly says that it is neither the human body nor the Cartesian614Maria Venieri, "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus | Maria Venieri

thinking subject nor the empirical self of psychology, which has experiences,thoughts and emotions, but the philosophical or metaphysical subject, which
does not belong to the world (TLP 1972: §5.641).
In the Notebooks and the 5.6’s there is indeed a strong prima facie evidence
that Wittgenstein advocates some kind of solipsism. In spite of all this evidence
for a solipsistic stance, are we justified in claiming that Wittgenstein was asolipsist in his early work? In order to tackle this question, which has received
widely different answers, we shall first examine the influence ofSchopenhauer’s work on the development of Wittgenstein’s views on solipsism.
In The World as Will and Representation the German philosopher distinguishes
the knowing subject from the objects of knowledge, which are representations
or phenomena. This subject is not the human body, but a presupposition of all
objects or representations. The knowing subject imposes, as in Kant, space andtime as a priori forms of intuition on the phenomena. The subject knows, while
it cannot be an object of knowledge (WWRI: 3-6). For Schopenhauer, theknowing subject and its objects, i.e. the world as representation that comprises
human beings, are manifestations of an underlying deeper reality, of a thing in
itself, which is the will. The body is known in two different ways, namely as arepresentation and as a manifestation of the will. The subject becomes anindividual because she has this special, immediate relationship to her body.
Αs in Schopenhauer, the metaphysical subject in Wittgenstein is not a part but
a presupposition of the world (TLP 1972: §§5.632, 5.641). He compares themetaphysical I and its relation to the world to the eye and its relation to thevisual field. As we do not see the eye, i.e. it does not form a part of the visual
field, in the same way the metaphysical subject is a limit of the world and is
not encountered in the world. Τhis is so because whatever we see and describe
could be otherwise, while the I is a priori (TLP 1972: §§5.633-5.634). It cannot
belong to the world, because then it would be an empirical subject, i.e. a partof the world, and so it could not be identified with the whole of reality. Indeed,
there is no other way to identify the metaphysical subject except through theworld and its objects, with which it is coordinated.
Along with these important similarities between Schopenhauer’s knowing
subject and Wittgenstein’s metaphysical or philosophical I, there is a key point

Maria Venieri, "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
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of divergence: For Wittgenstein, the metaphysical subject has no privileged
relation to a particular human body as in Schopenhauer. The human bodybelongs to the world like every other (composite) object. In this way
Wittgenstein is more consistent than Schopenhauer in separating themetaphysical subject from the world. This move of alienating the subject fromthe body and the world allows him to claim in the Notebooks: “This is the way I
have traveled: Idealism singles men out from the world as unique, solipsism
singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too belong with the rest of theworld, and so on the one side nothing is left over, and on the other side, as
unique, the world. In this way idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thoughtout” (TB 1998: 15.10.16). In the Tractatus his thoughts are formulated asfollows: “Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followedout strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point
without extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it” (TLP
1972: §5.64).
These passages are central for the interpretation of solipsism in the Tractatus.
If we take them at face value, they point towards a realistic view of the world,which would rule solipsism out. In order to see if this is the case, we shallinvestigate how solipsism can coincide (zusammenfallen) with realism. This
very controversial issue is intertwined on the one hand with the self and on
the other with the problem of the objects in the Tractatus.
We shall focus on two dominant interpretations. The first one maintains that
we have here a case of a “self-effacing solipsism” (Pears 1987: 166, Bell 1996:
160-162) according to which the self disappears and only independent reality
remains. In this way the metaphysical I could be seen as a formal concept
introduced to indicate that experiences are had and language is spoken from afirst person point of view, though this insight cannot be expressed in language
by meaningful propositions, but only shown (see Pears 1987, 165). Hence, asolipsistic language would not contain propositions that refer to the subject(the centre), e.g. “I am in pain”. In this language, expressions referring to thecentre will be replaced by expressions in the third person singular: “Τhere ispain” and when others feel pain the following proposition can be used: “Abehaves like the centre, when there is pain”. Thus, all mental events are on apar with physical events like “It rains” or “A bird is singing” and they belong to
the world. In this way the first person pronoun is banished at least for the616

Maria Venieri, "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus | Maria Venieri

centre. An example of such a language is presented in PB 1998: §§57-58 (seealso Bell 1996: 164-165).
The above expressed view about the subject is part of a realistic interpretationof the world in the Tractatus, in the sense that the world is independent of thesubject. This conception can be supported by the following considerations: theworld is just given to the metaphysical subject, as it is shown in the expression“the world as I found it” encountered in TLP 1972: §5.631. Consequently, thesubject is passive, as it cannot have any kind of influence on the world’s
formation. Thus, according to this interpretation, it could follow that
Wittgenstein is not a transcendental idealist in the sense that the subject
imposes certain features, such as space and time on the objects of the world(Vossenkuhl 2009: 98). Only logic is transcendental because it is thepresupposition of the possibility of picturing the world. Nevertheless, it is not
imposed on the world by the subject, as it is a mirror image of the world (TLP
1972: §6.13).
Indeed, if we understand §5.64 as pointing to a self-effacing solipsism, weshould maintain not just that the subject is passive, but that it completely
disappears, in the sense that it is not needed for the mirroring of the world.
According to this interpretation, we do not need a metaphysical subject as akind of “metalinguistic soul” to infuse life into the propositional sign andconnect it to the world, as Hacker maintains (Hacker 1986: 100). The
proposition has already intrinsically a sense and nothing substantial is added
but the empty formal concept of “I think” (Sullivan 1996: 211). The connection
between language and the world is achieved only through the common logicalform, which is presupposed in the use of everyday language by empiricalsubjects. In this sense, the metaphysical subject becomes redundant(Vossenkuhl 2009: 122).
As the reasons given thus far for this interpretation are not conclusive, wecannot give a final answer to the question of solipsism before examining thesecond interpretation, first proposed by Hacker, that Wittgenstein was anempirical realist and a transcendental solipsist. Hacker defines this kind ofsolipsism as follows: “What the solipsist means, and is correct in thinking, isthat the world and life are one, that man is the microcosm, that I am my world.
[…] They express a doctrine that I shall call transcendental solipsism” (Hacker

Maria Venieri, "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
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1986: 99-100). This interpretation allows for an empirical realism that
accommodates the representations in the work of Schopenhauer. On the other
hand, although Wittgenstein speaks of the world as will in the Notebooks (TB
1998: 17.10.16), there is no sign that the will has the role of the thing in itself in
the Tractatus.
Hacker’s interpretation takes into account the obvious fascination that
Schopenhauer’s idealistic views and their solipsistic implications exerted on
Wittgenstein. Hacker and the followers of his line of interpretation takeseriously those passages in the Tractatus in which Wittgenstein expressis verbis
declares the truth of solipsism (see also Tang 2011). This is an advantage over
the rival interpretation, but it is not sufficient for accepting a transcendental
solipsistic stance without further considerations pertaining to the objects of
the Tractatus.
We must stress that we cannot give a definitive answer to the problem ofsolipsism in the Tractatus, as long as the question of the nature of simple
objects remains open. Objects are the substance of the world, i.e. what is fixedindependently of the combinations in states of affairs (TLP1972: §2.024). As
long as the objects fulfill their role of guaranteeing that names have a fixedreference, there is no need that further clues are given, so that we can decide
about their nature. It is noteworthy that many years after the completion of
the Tractatus Wittgenstein had remarked that during its composition he hadthought that it was rather an empirical task and not his task as a logician todecide whether an object was complex or simple (Malcolm 2001: 70). Taking
this into account, we could think that as long as objects are postulated andlogical form guarantees the relation between language and world, there wasno need for Wittgenstein the logician to say much about the nature of simple
objects and their relation to the simple names. Hence, it is not clear if they areparticulars, universals or both. It is indeed open whether they are to berealistically understood at all, as it can be defended that the simple objects are
just postulates of his theory of meaning and cannot be identified
independently of their internal or formal properties, which are given by the
logical form of the corresponding names in language (see also Ishiguro 1969
and Venieri 1990).

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Maria Venieri, "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus | Maria VenieriThus, an ambiguity lies at the heart of the Tractatus, which allows for different
interpretations of the nature of objects. One could even defend a purely
phenomenological understanding of the objects. Such an interpretation of theTractarian objects cannot be excluded and is corroborated by the fact that
Wittgenstein himself advocated briefly in 1929/30 a primaryphenomenological language corresponding to phenomena. (PB1998: §§1, 54).
Such an interpretation would be compatible with Kantian empirical realism
from which Schopenhauer’s representations are derived (see also Schroeder2012).
Moreover, Wittgenstein’s saying that in death the world does not alter but
comes to an end (TLP 1972: §6.431) gives additional evidence forunderstanding pure realism in TLP §5.64 as a kind of empirical realism. If
realism is understood as pertaining to a world independent of the subject, thensolipsism cannot coincide with realism, because the mind-independent world
does not disappear in death. In this paper we cannot further expand on thequestion of death and the way the subject is to be understood in this context.
In treating the widely different views about solipsism in the Tractatus, we canmaintain that the difficulties arising in interpreting the relevant passages are
partly due to the fact that in the discussion of solipsism two strands ofWittgenstein’s thought meet, which cannot be easily reconciled. The first is
logical atomism, which explains how language connects to the world and thesecond is the idealistic strand inspired by Schopenhauer, which is introducedin the passages on solipsism and the self. The introduction of the metaphysicalsubject of solipsism in the austere logical system of picturing the world
produces a tension and so the metaphysical subject can be easily ignored as
redundant by the interpreters. Thus, solipsism collapses into realism in thesense that the world is independent of the subjects using the language. On theother hand, if Tractarian objects can be interpreted in such a way that they arecompatible with Schopenhauer’s representations, then the realism inparagraph 5.64 can be understood as a kind of empirical realism; this realism
can be combined with a kind of solipsism, where the subject is identified by its
representations and no independent reality in the form of the world as will ispostulated. This is a way to understand the passages on solipsism, where
Wittgenstein undertakes the task of drawing a limit of the world through theintroduction of the metaphysical subject.

Maria Venieri, "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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References
Bell, David (1996) “Solipsism and Subjectivity”, European Journal of Philosophy 4, 155-174
Conant, James; Bronzo, Silver (2017) “Resolute Readings of the ‘Tractatus’”, in: Hans-Johann
Glock and John Hyman (eds.) A Companion to Wittgenstein, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 175-194
Hacker, P.M.S. (1986) Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Revised
Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press
Ishiguro, Hide (1969) “Use and Reference of Names”, in: Peter Winch (ed.) Studies in the
Philosophy of Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 20-50
Malcolm, Norman (2001) Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir, second edition, Oxford: Clarendon
Press
Pears, David (1987) The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy.
Volume 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press
Schopenhauer, Arthur (1969) The World as Will and Representation. Volume I, translated by
E.F.J. Payne, New York: Dover [WWRI]
Schroeder, Severin (2012) “Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein”, in: Bart Vandenabeele(ed.) A Companion to Schopenhauer, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 367-384
Sullivan, Peter (1996) “The ‘Truth’ in Solipsism and Wittgenstein’s Rejection of the A Priori”,
European Journal of Philosophy 4, 195-219
Tang, Hao (2011) “Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, Philosophical
Quarterly 61, 598-607
Venieri, Maria (1990) “Über die Natur der Gegenstände im Tractatus”, in: Rudolf Haller andJohannes Brandl (eds.), Wittgenstein – Towards a Re-Evaluation, Wien: Hoelder-PichlerTempsky, 76-79
Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm (2009) Solipsismus und Sprachkritik. Beiträge zu Wittgenstein, Berlin:
Parerga
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) “Notebooks 1914–1916”, in: Notebooks 1914–1916, pp. 2–91. Editedby G. H. von Wright und G. E. M. Anscombe, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Second edition.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. [TB 1998]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998) Philosophical Remarks. Edited by Rush Rhees, translated byRaymond Hargreaves und Roger White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. [PB 1998]

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Maria Venieri, "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus | Maria Venieri

Wittgenstein Ludwig (1972) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears und B. F.
McGuinness. Reprinted with corrections in the light of the publication of Wittgenstein’s
correspondence with C. K. Ogden about the first translation. London: Routledge and KeganPaul. [TLP 1972]

Maria Venieri, "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics | Vincent Vincke

Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical(Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics
Vincent Vincke (Brussels, Belgium)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to clarify the central role played by Wittgenstein’s conception oflogical (im)possibility in his 1929 “Lecture on Ethics” (1965). This will be done in reference toChapters 26 and 29 of the Big Typescript, where Wittgenstein reflected extensively on the roleof imagination as a means to determine the sense(lessness) of a proposition and the logical(im)possibility of a state of affairs. To that end I will first provide an account of the difference
Wittgenstein observed between logical and physical (im)possibility. I will subsequently clarify
the role of imagination in relation to sense and logical (im)possibility. And lastly, I will argue,
against this backdrop that Wittgenstein’s insistence on the nonsensicality of both meaningful
ethical propositions and absolute or ethical facts, should, first and foremost, be understood asa result of their logical and not merely their physical impossibility. And, additionally, that heconceived absolute experiences to be ’absolute’ in virtue of their logically impossibility.

Logical and Physical (Im)Possibility

One of Wittgenstein’s most striking examples, clarifying the distinction
between logical and physical (im)possibility in the Big Typescript, is to befound in its chapter 96 in his reflection on what would determine thedivisibility of a black strip. (BT: 450)
There he argues that whether a black strip is divisible within the visual field,
or, alternatively, what the ‘divisibility’ of such a strip would mean, isdetermined by what counts as an attempt at dividing that strip. The logicalpossibility of that division would pertain precisely to the description of whatsuch an attempt would consist in and what would count as failed or successfulattempt. The physical possibility of that division, on the other hand, isdetermined by the success or the failure of such an attempt.
Whether or not the black strip is divisible will therefore depend upon one’s
actual success or failure in doing so, even if it is, by default, logically possible.
That is, even if its division was restrained by “physical facts” in the visual
space, e.g., due to a lack of dexterity or tools, and thus rendered physically
impossible, the strip would remain “infinitely divisible” in Euclidean space. As
such, according to Wittgenstein, whereas the logical possibility of this division622

Vincent Vincke, "Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics | Vincent Vincke

is stipulated as rule, the assessment of a physical possibility takes the form ofan empirical statement; as Trächtler (2020: 167) phrases it: “the scope ofphysical possibility is framed by empirical statements”.
Logical possibility thus precedes physical possibility; what is physicallypossible must be logically possible, but that must not be the other way round.
And, likewise, whilst what is logically impossible is by definition also
physically impossible, the opposite need not be. A logical impossibility thatwould happen to be a physical possibility, such as e.g. succeeding in drawing around rectangle, would be excluded as, according to Wittgenstein, “thepossibility, whatever it is, must be foreseen by logic (that is, there is no logicalsurprise).” (MS 108: 137; my translation) Or, alternatively, as he puts it in BT:“surprises do occur in the world, but not in grammar.” (BT: 63)
The only possible surprises are, by default, logically possible, yet astonish us
because we hadn’t considered their physical possibility:
So, if I hear that the book is lying – somewhere – on the table and now I
find it in a particular position, then I can’t be surprised and say “Ah, I
didn’t know that this position existed”; and yet I hadn’t foreseen thisparticular position, i.e., hadn’t envisaged it in advance as a particularpossibility. What surprises me is a physical possibility, not a logical one!
(BT: 318)

Being Able to Imagine “What it Would be Like” as a Criterion for Sense and LogicalPossibility

An important criterion Wittgenstein acknowledged to assess whether
something would be logically possible or whether a certain proposition could
have sense, was whether we could imagine what it would be like for it to be
the case, and, conversely, whether we could imagine it not to be the case.
We say that a proposition hasn’t sense, unless we can imagine it: we must
be able to make some sort of image of reality. If we can, what is expressedis possible; this is how possibility is expressed. (LC 2016: 18)
If something is logically impossible, however, then, by definition, the attempt
to imagine it will not be successful. An example of this would be the attempt toVincent Vincke, "Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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imagine something such as a round rectangle, or conversely to imagine what it
would be like if the law of excluded middle did not hold. We would not knowwhat it means for propositions expressing either of these situations to beeither true or false; such propositions would be senseless or nonsensical.
Wittgenstein, however, investigated this very criterion in chapters 26 and 27 of
BT, and aimed to clarify this very criterion ‘grammatically’, i.e., “What does itmean when one says: ‘I can’t imagine the opposite of that’?” (BT: 96) That is, hewished to clarify how one can “reinforce the senselessness of a proposition” bymaking use of such expressions. (BT: 96)
The unimaginability expressed in such statements does not pertain to anindividual’s ability to imagine such and such: “I’m not trying to indicate a lackof imagination.” (BT: 96)When someone utters that they can’t imagine either around square or the law of excluded middle to be otherwise, this does not
pertain to imagination in the psychological sense of the word; it is not a formof aphantasia.
Rather, as Wittgenstein argues, we are prompted to use such expressions as aresult of confusing empirical and grammatical propositions. That is, we display
a tendency to affirm rules of grammar as if they were verifiable propositions,such that, when presented with, for instance, the sentence “This rod is of acertain length” we are inclined to reply “Certainly!” or “I cannot imagine theopposite of that” rather than “Nonsense!”. (BT:96) To reply this is thensenseless, as Wittgenstein indicates, as much as the attempt to imagine what it
would be like for a grammatical rule to be true or false, to be verifiable.
Grammatical rules are indeed, as opposed to empirical propositions, arbitrary,i.e., in the sense that they are not verifiable or directly accountable to reality.
Grammar, rather, stipulates the meaning of these propositions and that
includes determining the requirements for them to be true or false. It
describes the structure and application of language: “what we would like tocall the connection between language and reality”. (BT: 441) Correspondingly,“what we call possible and what not depends entirely on our grammar, i.e., onwhat it permits.” (BT:99)That is, whereas the scope of physical possibility isframed by empirical statements, the scope of logical possibility is framed bygrammatical ones.

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Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics | Vincent Vincke

In delimiting what is logically possible and meaningful, the rules of grammar
formulate what is logically necessary, according to Trächtler (2020). Logicalimpossibility then stands opposed to what is logically necessary, i.e., togrammatical rules. The logical impossibility of drawing a round rectangle, forinstance, is excluded in virtue of the definitions (grammatical stipulations) of‘round’ and ‘rectangle’ we uphold in Euclidean grammar. It is logically
impossible and thus senseless because it is excluded by and would violate therules of grammar. We should therefore, similarly, be warry of confusing
verifiable propositions with such logical impossibilities. That is, whenpresented with, for instance, the sentence “This rectangle is round” we should
steer away from denying it, calling it false, and rather recognize its
senselessness.
However, whereas senseless statements such as “I cannot imagine the oppositeof that” indicate the confusion of grammatical proposition for an empiricalone, expressions such as “I can imagine [p to be the case]” or “I can draw what
it would be like if p is the case”, indicate, according to Wittgenstein, an
application of p; they indicate the use of the sentence p in a particular calculus(grammar). (BT: 96, 98) And conversely claiming “I cannot imagine p to be thecase” indicates the lack of such an application.
Although one might argue that, in virtue of the arbitrariness of what is deemed
to be logically (im)possible and what holds as logically necessary, one could“simply fabricate the rule” that would allow for say ‘round rectangles’, thiswould not suffice according to Wittgenstein. It would not be enough to provide
a description of what a round rectangle would be like, and thereby show thepossibility of this state of affairs we are asserting. Such a description would,
after all, at most, “do what a painted or sculptured image does” and could not“produce what is not the case”. (BT:99)For we would still have to stipulate how
this expression would have to be used and verified. A proposition lacking anapplication and a verification would be “empty”, “senseless” or “useless”. (BT:98, 99) (MS 107: 177)

The Logical Impossibility of Ethical Facts

Interestingly, from the vantage point of BT, Wittgenstein’s insistence on theimpossibility of both meaningful ethical propositions and absolute or ethicalVincent Vincke, "Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics | Vincent Vinckefacts, should, first and foremost, be understood as something determined bygrammatical rules.
Indeed, if there were such a thing as the subject matter of ethics, he argues
that it could not be expressed, as it would be “intrinsically sublime and above
all other subject matters”, whereas “all the facts described […] and in the same
way all propositions stand on the same level.” (LE 1965: 7)
This because, from the perspective of BT, the notion of either an ‘ethicalproposition’ or an ‘ethical fact’ is excluded by Wittgenstein’s definitions(grammatical stipulations) of ‘facts’, ‘proposition’ and ‘ethics’. Ethical facts are
logically precluded, and ethical propositions are senseless because the violate
grammatical statements, such as: “Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural andour words will only express facts. As a teacup will only hold a teacup full ofwater and if I were to pour a gallon of water over it.” (LE 1965: 7)
We speak here first and foremost of their logical and not of their physicalimpossibility, precisely because the success of any attempt to either formulate
an ethical proposition or discover an ethical fact is ruled out in advancegrammatically. In the same way as ‘a teacup’ will, by definition, “only hold ateacup full of water” regardless of the number of times I would try to pour agallon of water in it or the tools I would have at my disposal.
What makes ethical propositions senseless, and ethical facts “chimerae” is theimpossibility of their constitution, not their physical absence. (LE 1965: 7)Hence, it is not that the expressions we use in the absolute or ethical sense willremain unverified and will therefore remain senseless. It is rather that they
can by definition never be verified and can by definition never be meaningful.
We could thus never come across something like an absolute or ethical fact, inthe same way as we would not happen to succeed in drawing a roundrectangle: there are no logical or grammatical surprises; “surprises do occur inthe world, but not in grammar.” (BT: 63)
Curiously, Wittgenstein did attempt to imagine what an absolute or ethical fact
would be like:Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, ‘theabsolutely right road’. I think it would be the road which everybody on

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Vincent Vincke, "Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics | Vincent Vincke

seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for notgoing. And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs,
would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations,would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. (myunderlining) (LE 1965: 7)
That this holds as an ‘attempt’ becomes apparent in the light of Wittgenstein’s
tentative phrasing i.e. “what we could possibly mean”, “I think it would be” …,
which certainly seems appropriate from the vantage point of BT. That is,
Wittgenstein appears to attempt to imagine something logically impossible tobe logically possible. (LE 1965: 7)
From this perspective however, the tentative success of his attempt to imagine“what it would be like” for the sentence “this is the absolutely right road” to bemeaningful is not merely indicative of his own imaginative competences in thepsychological sense, but, strangely enough, suggests the tentative logicalpossibility of such a road.
And, as he phrased it in BT: “what we call possible and what not depends
entirely on our grammar, i.e., on what it permits.” (BT: 99) Hence, Wittgenstein
appears to be permitting the tentative description of something that could,
oddly enough, by his own grammatical stipulations, not be described.
I would, however, argue that in doing so, he is considering the possibility of agrammar that would allow for such ‘absolute’ or ‘ethical’ propositions, rather
than allowing a “grammatical” or “logical surprise”.
Yet, it would appear that even if we could conceive of such a grammar, thedescription of such a road, would, similarly to the tentative description of around rectangle at most do “what a painted or sculpted image does” and could
still not “produce what is not the case”. (BT: 99) Even if this tentativedescription would express a logical possibility, it would still be “lacking theessential rules of application for [a] proposition”, such as verification
requirements (BT: 99):
Each sentence is an empty game of strokes or sounds without therelationship to reality and the/its/ only relationship to reality is the modeof its verification. (MS 107: 177; my translation)

Vincent Vincke, "Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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Even if absolute or ethical propositions expressed logical possibilities, theywould still lack a mode of verification, and a such be ‘senseless’ or ‘useless’.

Logical Impossibility and Absolute Experiences

Interestingly, Wittgenstein rather immediately picks up the matter ofimaginability in relation to sense and logical possibility. Despite the seemingly
insurmountable senselessness and uselessness of ethical/absolute propositions,he acknowledges that we are “tempted to use such expressions as "absolute
good," "absolute value," etc.” and wonders “what have we in mind and what do
we try to express?”. (LE 1965: 7)
Something he wishes to tie to certain experiences that would, strangely
enough, prompt their usage. The experiences themselves, of course, “havetaken place then and there, lasted a certain definite amount of time andconsequently are describable”. (LE 1965: 10)
One such experience, that is, Wittgenstein’s own ‘absolute’ experience “parexcellence”, is the experience to “wonder about the existence of the world”. Anexperience which incited him to use expressions such as "how extraordinarythat anything should exist" or "how extraordinary that the world should exist”.
(LE 1965: 8)
Wittgenstein, of course, readily reaffirms that such statements are, of course,
nonsensical. He clarifies this as follows. Although it makes perfect sense towonder at something that would be (strikingly) extraordinary in the usual(relative) sense, such as a remarkably large dog. That is, at something that isthe case, but which I could imagine not to be the case or to be different:
To say ‘I wonder at such and such being the case’ has only sense if I canimagine it not to be the case. (LE 1965: 8-9)
It is, however, conversely, nonsense to (say that you) wonder at the existenceof the world, because you “cannot imagine it not existing”. (LE 1965: 9)
Whence the sense of wonder or surprise?
Put in terms of logical and physical possibility: it would be perfectly sensible towonder at something physically unlikely yet logically possible, such as a

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Vincent Vincke, "Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics | Vincent Vincke

noticeably large dog. Precisely because we would be speaking of somethingimaginable that nevertheless need not be the case. We can imagine theexistence of such a large dog, but it is its sudden manifestation, as a physicalpossibility, that would surprise us. This of course is perfectly in line with what
he would state in BT: What surprises me is a physical possibility, not a logicalone!” (BT: 318)
However, to argue that one could not imagine the world not to be the case, orthat one could not imagine the world to be otherwise, would in light of BT,
come down to the senseless affirmation of a logical necessity.
That is, we would be confusing a logical necessity (grammatical rule) for aphysical possibility (empirical proposition); and although it is perfectly
sensible to wonder about the latter it is senseless to wonder about the former.
Hence, when Wittgenstein argues in LE that “it is nonsense to say that I
wonder at the existence of the world, because I cannot imagine it not existing”
it becomes apparent, from the vantage point of BT that Wittgenstein issenselessly affirming a logical necessity (grammatical rule) to highlight thelogical impossibility of wondering about or being surprised by … a logicalnecessity (grammatical rule). (LE 1965: 8)Indeed, “wondering at the existenceof the world” is then, as he indicates, as nonsensical as “wondering at atautology”, according to Wittgenstein. (LE 1965: 9) Again, as he puts it in BT,“surprises do occur in the world, but not in grammar.” (BT: 63) Yet, it would
appear that Wittgenstein’s absolute experience “par excellence”, nonsensicalas it may be, precisely relates to being astonished not by a physical possibility,
but by a logical necessity or a grammatical rule.
As such, I would argue that for Wittgenstein an absolute experience consists inbeing surprised by logic or by grammar, which seems to be in line with his
own words at the end of the lecture:
Now I am tempted to say that the right expression in language for the
miracle of the existence of the world, though it is not any proposition inlanguage, is the existence of language itself. (LE 1965: 11)
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Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998): Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”.
Generally Known as The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Vincent Vincke, "Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
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The Philosophical Review 74, S. 3–12 (Ithaca, USA, 1965).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1975): Philosophical Remarks. Edited by Rush Rhees, translated byRaymond Hargreaves and Roger White. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1978): Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Edited by G. H. vonWright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Third edition,
revised and reset. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2006): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1967): Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis. Hg. von B. F.
McGuinness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Trächtler, Jasmin (2020): "Wittgenstein on “Imaginability” as a Criterion for Logical Possibility
in The Big Typescript", Nordic Wittgenstein Review 9, 165–186.

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Vincent Vincke, "Like Wondering at a Tautology: Imagination and Logical (Im)Possibility in the Lecture on Ethics". In 100 Years of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft /Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich
Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62 | Christian Helmut Wenzel

Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62
Christian Helmut Wenzel (Taipei, Taiwan)
Abstract
It is well known that Wittgenstein’s ideas of solipsism in Tractatus 5.6 are derived from
Schopenhauer. It is also well known that the passage “die allein ich” in 5.62 is ambiguous,
meaning possibly that there is a language that only I understand or that there is only one
language that I understand. Since an essay by Hintikka in 1958, scholars have usually opted
for the latter reading. But I am not convinced. The former reading should not be completely
dismissed. To show this, I point out another ambiguity in 5.62 that it seems to me has been
overlooked so far.

1. Solipsism and some of its historical roots

Wittgenstein did not read much classical philosophy. He mostly picked up
ideas here and there. To better understand his notion of solipsism in a wider
context, I give a brief account of relevant ideas before Wittgenstein.
In his book De anima Aristotle gives rich accounts of perception, imagination,and memory. He discusses the outer senses and the “common sense, or“common perception,” (κοινὴ αἴσθησις), a place in the soul where theinformation from the five senses is united and reflected upon. The soul takeson the “form” and “essence” (μορφή and εἶδος) of objects, and “at the side” (ἐνπαρέργῳ) it perceives that it perceives. Regarding language, in his Deinterpretatione, he said that words are symbols of impressions and passions inthe soul, and only indirectly refer to objects in the outside world. “What is in
the sound is a symbol for the passions and impressions in the soul; and thewritten is a symbol for what is in the sound” (ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶνἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, Deinterpretatione 16a; my translation). Words thus primarily refer to passions inthe soul and only indirectly to external objects. All human beings have thesame impressions, but languages are conventional and vary. Aristotle gave arich picture of the soul.
During the Middle Ages, the nature of mental representation and “mental
objects” was much discussed. These objects are mind-dependent, which
created worries about their ontological status. Many concepts were introduced
during that time, such as esse intentionale, repraesentativum, obiectivum, andapparens. I believe that these concepts were seeds for later idealist views. The

Christian Helmut Wenzel, "Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62 | Christian Helmut Wenzel

worry arose that we might perceive only inner mental objects and not the real
objects in the world outside. The real objects might be veiled. We would be
excluded from the outside world. Thus, the idea of a metaphysical solipsism
arose. Scholars such as Thomas Aquinas even argued that there is a languagein the soul (lingua in corde). Medieval scholars did not only follow Aristotle,
they also created an even richer picture of the soul.
Descartes wanted to make a new start, but like so many others until today, he
was still much entangled in the vocabulary and concepts of the Middle Ages.
According to him, we are thinking substances (res cogitans), set apart fromexternal objects (res extensa). In his Meditationes, he famously introduced amethodological solipsism. But his ideas of idea and repraesentatio were
problematic. They were ambiguous regarding the question whether they aremind-dependent. The ontological status of ideas and representations and how
they refer to their objects remained an unsolved problem. It was the old
problem of mental objects from the Middle Ages.
Kant conceived of a metaphysical self that is different from res cogitans. Thereis only a transcendental “I think” that “accompanies” and gives formal unity tomental representations (Vostellungen). The world as we know it is not theworld of things themselves, but only the world of mind-dependent
appearances (Erscheinungen). Similarly, the deeper motives of our actions are
unknown to us. The self and our will have become something transcendental. I
believe these were repercussions from medieval ideas about mental objects.
Schopenhauer followed Kant in much of this. He says the self is like an eye that
does not see itself, our representation is the whole word, we vanish but makeourselves the center of the world, and our microcosm is the macrocosm (seeHacker 1989: 88, 94).
Wittgenstein read Schopenhauer as a boy of fourteen (Anscombe 1965: 12, 168)and again when he was twenty-six and worked on the Tractatus (Hacker 1989:
89-99). His ideas of solipsism are derived from Schopenhauer and indirectlyfrom Kant and the Middle Ages. But he did not read Aristotle. His views aboutsolipsism remained entangled in idealist views and stand in stark contrast to
ideas he developed from Frege and Russell.

632

Christian Helmut Wenzel, "Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
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Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62 | Christian Helmut Wenzel

2. Solipsism in Tractatus 5.6

In the Tractatus, language mirrors the world. Thoughts are like pictures andmodels, isomorphic to their objects. Howard Mounce gives the example ofbooks arranged on a table as physical signs (Mounce 1981: 22-5). Zalabardo
speaks of bottles, cups, pencils, and sharpeners that are spatially arranged invarious ways (Zalabardo 2015: 48f). Nothing is said about the perceiving,
thinking, and understanding subject. Wittgenstein avoids psychology (Wenzel
2022: 3). Language has meaning by itself, comparable to Frege’s thoughts (Gedanken) that exist in a third realm, waiting to be “grasped.” Wittgenstein
metaphorically speaks of elements of the picture that have “feelers” and“touch” reality (2.1515). Again, the perceiving, imagining, remembering,
thinking, and speaking subject does not matter for the supposed mirror-likeisomorphism between language and reality. This is very different from
Aristotle, who gave detailed account of the soul, the “common sense,” andperception in his book De Anima, as I have indicated above. (See also Wenzel
2011: 20-22).
In German, there are two words, “Darstellung” and “Vorstellung,” which areboth translated as “representation” in English (Wenzel 2011: 15). Kant’s first
Critique is all about Vorstellung. But the Tractatus is all about Darstellung. A
Vorstellung is something mental, while a Darstellung is something physical,
like a sketch on a piece of paper or a model made of physical items, something
one can manipulate and show to others. The idea of a “Vorstellung” occurs
only once in the Tractatus, and there it is rejected: “Das denkende, vorstellende,
Subjekt gibt es nicht” (5.631). Kant would not have said such a thing, even lesswould have Descartes and philosophers of the Middle Ages said so.
The self that matters in the Tractatus is a metaphysical self. Influenced by
Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein compares it with the horizon of the visual fieldand says it is the “limit” of the world. But there is a difference. In Kant, the “I
think” and the categories matter for objects in the world and their individual
constitution as objects of appearance. In Wittgenstein, the self is the limit of theworld and matters only regarding the world as a whole. Kant offered a richaccount of the subject as having faculties of cognition by means of which itapprehends, recognizes, and even determines objects. There is nothing likethis in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. There is only language that seems to exist by
itself, mirroring the world, and ready to be used like Frege’s Gedanken. It is all

Christian Helmut Wenzel, "Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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about Darstellung, not Vorstellung. The soul in the Tractatus has shrunk to apoint, without faculties, without imagination, memory, and inner or outersenses. There is no Aristotelian sensus communis, or “common sense.” In theTractatus, the soul has no parts and no inner structure. “A composite soul
would no longer be a soul” (5.5421), Wittgenstein says.
This is very different from Aristotle and the philosophers of the Middle Ages,
who gave rich accounts of the soul and its parts and functions. In the Tractatus,
the soul has disappeared, which is due to an influence of Kant andSchopenhauer on the early Wittgenstein. But these idealist philosophers werestill Aristotelian enough to give accounts of perception and cognition. Kant
explains cognition in terms of faculties, namely sensibility, the power ofimagination, and understanding. He gives an account of categories andschematism. The Tractatus does not deal with cognition at all. In the Tractatus,
there is only a metaphysical self, a self that has shrunk to a point. Wittgensteinfollowed Frege in avoiding psychology. The self is isolated from the external
world. It is only its outer limit. “The subject does not belong to the world:
rather it is the limit of the world” (5.632). This is a kind of solipsism. One may
say it is a “thin transcendental solipsism.” Thought in the Tractatus is not aprocess. Cognition is not a topic. Time and consciousness seem not to matter.
Thought is something static as in Frege, existing by itself in a third realm,
ready to be “grasped” (fassen) as Frege says.

3. Reading Tractatus 5.62

Daß die Welt meine Welt ist, das zeigt sich darin, daß die Grenzen der
Sprache (der Sprache, die allein ich verstehe) die Grenzen meiner Welt
bedeuten. (5.62)
That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of thelanguage (the language that alone I understand) mean the limits of myworld. (5.62, my translation)
It is well-known that the passage “die allein ich” is grammatically ambiguous
and can be read in two ways: “die (allein ich)” and “(die allein) ich,” meaning“there is a language that only I understand” and “there is only one languagethat I understand.” In the former reading, I am singled out. In the latter, a634

Christian Helmut Wenzel, "Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
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Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62 | Christian Helmut Wenzel

language is singled out. Since Hintikka’s 1958 essay, scholars have agreed on
the latter reading: “(die allein) ich,” i.e., saying that there is only one languagethat I understand.
But when I read the passage for the first time, I read “die (allein ich),” and so
did Anscombe in 1959. She corrected herself in 1963, after having read
Hintikka’s interpretation (Anscombe 1965: 167). Others have followed
Hintikka, such as Stenius (1960: 221), Black (1962: 309), Mounce (1981: p. 91),
and Tang (2011: 604-5).
But I am not fully convinced. The reading “die (allein ich)” singles out the
subject as the only person who understands that language. It sets the subject
apart from others, who do not understand it. That would be a feature ofsolipsism regarding other minds. The reading “(die allein) ich” singles out thelanguage as the only one I understand. Others might understand that language
as well. Or they might not understand it. If others understand it, I will not bealone. I will not be set apart from them. We might be in the same boat, so to
speak. This would not be a feature of solipsism. It would be contrary tosolipsism. Hintikka goes for this reading. It fits the idea that the self is a
metaphysical-transcendental self, a formal feature that we all share. There is
only one such self. This would also fit Kant’s “I think,” a feature that applies toall of us as finite rational cognizing beings.
Thus, thinking of the Kant-Schopenhauer background and the transcendental“I think,” Hintikka’s reading “(die allein) ich” fits well. But why have Anscombe
and I read the passage the other way and read “die (allein ich)”? I think there
is a good reason for this. When one reads continuously from the beginning of
5.6, one gets the impression of “die (allein ich)”. We can see this as follows. In
5.6, it says: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world,” and not“The limits of the language mean the limits of the world” (italics mine). One
gets the impression that what is meant is my language and not a generallanguage in general that all human beings share. This gives an impression ofsolipsism and some weight to the die (allein ich)” reading. This I think explains
Anscombe’s original reading as well as my first impression.
Of course, in the end, Wittgenstein had the idea of a disappearing self and theidea of a language that does not require a thinking subject. Similarly, he liked

Christian Helmut Wenzel, "Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62 | Christian Helmut Wenzel

Lichtenberg’s “Es regnet.” There is no real subject in this sentence. It just rains.
Seen in this light, whether one says “my language” or “the language” seems not
to make any difference. But still, I doubt that the “die (allein ich)” reading isout of the picture. In the following, I will give more evidence for this, bypointing out another peculiar problem in the text.
There is an additional problem in 5.62 that as far as I can see has not been
noticed and discussed in the literature so far. The original German before thebracket reads “die Grenzen der Sprache,” and the article “der” is highlighted.
In the sentence the words “der” and “meine” are highlighted. This makes one
think that similar to how he thinks of “my” word, he thinks of “my” language.
Therefore, it seems to me that emphasizing “der” makes one think of otherlanguages, at least possible ones, that are different from my language. This
then changes the picture.
Wittgenstein himself emphasized the article “der,” and it seems to me hethought of the language in contrast to other real or possible languages. These
would be languages that others speak, and I myself might not understandthese languages. No matter whether one reads “die (allein ich)” and “(dieallein) ich,” one then thinks of other possible languages. But then one also
thinks of other possible speakers of these languages. This sets me apart fromthese speakers, which puts some weight on the “die (allein ich)” reading. I am
not sure how strong this weight is, but it seems to me that the fact that
Wittgenstein highlighted the word “der” has not been recognized in theliterature. But as I have explained, it explains Anscombe’s original reading aswell as my first impression. It puts more wight on solipsism, as does alreadythe earlier sentence 5.6.
Interestingly, translators have taken the article and the highlighting
differently. In the 1922 Ogden translation, the article is preserved. But it is nothighlighted. In the introductory note it says “the proofs of the translation andthe version of the original … have been very carefully revised by the author
himself.” If this is true, Wittgenstein approved of the highlighting in theoriginal German and the omission of it in the English. In the 1962 Pears &McGuinness translation, the article is simply omitted. Both translations by theway preserve the ambiguity of the German “die allein ich,” translating it as“which alone I.”

636

Christian Helmut Wenzel, "Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62 | Christian Helmut Wenzel

4. Conclusion

Let me briefly summarize and conclude. If one takes Wittgenstein’s originalemphasis seriously, it sounds as if there were several languages, hence several
worlds, and hence several selves, which indicates solipsism of other minds. If
on the other hand there is only one language, then it seems there is only one
self, a thin metaphysical-transcendental self, and there is only one world. Wethen all share that metaphysical-transcendental self. This is not an ordinary
empirical solipsism of other minds. That Wittgenstein’s idea of solipsism is not
the ordinary one, has already been pointed out by many scholars. But it seems
to me not to be very clear what exactly Wittgenstein meant when hehighlighted the article “der.” The emphasis on “der” gives the impression that
there are other languages and other speakers. This then invites the “die (alleinich)” reading and gives more weight on ordinary solipsism of other minds. I
believe that this feature should still be in the picture. Thus, there might bemore to the ambiguity than commentators seem to admit.
References
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1965) An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Second and revised
edition. Harper & Row. (Reprint of 1963, first edition 1959).
Black, Max (1962) A Companion to Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’. Cornel University Press.
Hacker, P.M.S. (1989) Insight and Illusion. Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Oxford
University Press. First edition 1972.
Hintikka, Jaakko (1958) “On Wittgenstein’s ‘Solipsism’,” Mind 67/265, pp. 88-91.
Mounce, H. O. (1981) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. An Introduction. The University of Chicago Press.
Stenius, Erik (1960) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. A Critical Exposition of the Main Lines of Thought.
Blackwell.
Tang, Hao (2011) “Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” The Philosophical
Quarterly 61/244, 598-607.
Wenzel, Christian Helmut (2021) “How Representational Is the Mind? Introduction andOverview,” Philosophy East and West 71/1, 13-37.
Wenzel, Christian Helmut (2022) “Can thoughts be read from the brain? Neuroscience Contra
Wittgenstein,” Synthese 200:183.

Christian Helmut Wenzel, "Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62 | Christian Helmut Wenzel

Zalabardo, José L. (2015) Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Oxford
University Press.
Acknowledgement
For helpful comments I wish to thank Peter Hacker, Shawn Standefer, and Paisley Livingston.

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Christian Helmut Wenzel, "Solipsism and How to Read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 5.62". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after
Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig
Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph
Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion | Peter K. Westergaard

A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of
Religion
Peter K. Westergaard (Copenhagen, Denmark)
Abstract
The paper compares Georges Bataille’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s accounts of religion, anddiscusses Bataille’s distinction between the “general” and the “specific practical” intentions ofreligion.

1. Introduction

References to the French writer and philosopher Georges Bataille are rare instudies of Wittgenstein’s thought. There are many good and persuasive
reasons for this, despite the facts, firstly, that the two thinkers were
contemporaries, secondly, that Bataille visited and gave lectures in Cambridgein 1949, and thirdly, that Bataille and A.J. Ayer met several times in Paris in the
1950s. There is no indication that the paths of Bataille and Wittgenstein evercrossed or that either ever became significantly aware of the other. It is
possible that Bataille heard about Wittgenstein from Ayer or from his friend
Blanchot, who made passing references to the Tractatus and its reflections on
the limits of language and the unsayable. In the case of Wittgenstein andBataille, we are dealing with two different characters and movements ofthought. On the one hand, the descriptive and analytical, on the other, thepersonal and eclectic. Here, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, there
Bataille’s heterology. On the rare occasions that Bataille’s name crops up in
discussions of Wittgenstein, it is a case either of a somewhat “arbitrary”
association, or of an account of contemporary historical context, or of apassing comparison. Neither does Bataille crop up in the few studies on
Wittgenstein and surrealism, despite some possible similarities between thetwo: on the one hand, between the collage techniques of surrealism andWittgenstein’s reordering of text fragments, on the other, between
Wittgenstein’s taste for inventing or constructing hypothetical language-games
and the aims of surrealism, insofar as both seek “to provide a newinterpretation of our surrounding world, to uncover its hidden truths”; thus
“Wittgenstein’s method, as with surrealism, does not involve building a new

Peter K. Westergaard, "A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion | Peter K. Westergaard

construction out of new material, but only ‘rearranging what we have always
known’ [PI 109], like the ‘rearrangement of books in a library’ [BB44]” (Gitsoulis 2021:77).
But despite the significant differences, Wittgenstein and Bataille do havecertain things in common. Namely, they are both concerned: firstly, withidentifying and mapping the fundamental horizon of experience that thereligious attitude presupposes; secondly, with determining the ambiguous
nature of this horizon; and thirdly, with critiquing Frazer’s intellectualist andutilitarian reconstruction of magic and religion. Both Wittgenstein and Batailleseek to highlight the experiences that are preconditional to the utilitarian or
instrumental use of religion. Wittgenstein and Bataille both have strong
reservations about any attempt to reduce the experience and meaning of thereligious attitude to rational or discursive statements. In the nineteen-thirties,
both were frequent readers of Frazer’s The Golden Bough.
Accordingly, when reading the clutch of publications that Bataille wrote about
the cave paintings at Lascaux, in which he lays out his ideas on transgression,
art, magic, religion and the sacred, and in which he presents his critique of
Frazer, one is almost inevitably reminded of Wittgenstein’s remarks on
religion and Frazer. In the following, I will seek to clarify this impression andthe implied parallels.

2. Man’s Fundamental Desire, or the Return to Intimate LifeIn the clutch of articles about Lascaux and in the monograph Prehistoric
Painting. Lascaux or the Birth of Art (1955), Bataille restates his decisive
distinction between the world of work, the realm of things, and the world of
inner experience, the realm of intimacy. In his description of the transgressionof the world of work towards an opening of the realm of intimacy, heintroduces a distinction between the “general” and the “particular” intentionof magic and religion. The clarification of this distinction leads into a critiqueof Frazer.
Bataille’s description of the general intention of religion revolves around anumber of considerations, the central leitmotifs of which are transgression
and intimacy. The latter, intimité, denotes a kind of immediate experience. It

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A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion | Peter K. Westergaard

entails a presence, a sense of being overwhelmed, and an intensity in various
types of experience and perception. In general terms, intimité denotes themode of experience and attitude that contrasts with aliénation: a reified modeof being. Intimité refers to an attitude that transcends the world of work. To
work implies a purposeful and instrumental relationship to the world,
whereas intimité denotes a surrender to the inner world. Sorrow, weeping,laughter and erotic experience (the ecstatic and excessive experience) are all
examples of intimité, which also entails a loss of self and the experience ofimmediacy: it is the sense of being overwhelmed and vanquished by the innerworld. Bataille identifies this personal and fundamental orientation as theessence of the religious attitude, which can thus be regarded as a way of lifethat recognises and ascribes validity to that which is overwhelming and nondiscursive; the aspect of inner experience that is beyond the rational, practicaland utilitarian.
In religion, intimacy is attained by following the path of non-purposeful play.
Play (le jeu) entails the negation and hence transgression of the realm ofthings, the realm that stands for duration and future. Through the negation ofplay, “the moment” makes itself felt. The negation of play gives validity to the“moment”. It achieves a transgression of the realm of things, leading to a reestablishing of the realm of intimacy. This transgression amounts to asuspension of the need for “time or duration”, which obscures or “hides” innerlife. The transgression of play essentially annuls that for which duration is aprerequisite, hence also the calculating and instrumental mode of being. With
this, one is brought back to the disposition of intimacy. In play, everything isgiven in “the miraculous moment”. The person who plays emancipates himself
from the realm of things. Play, the rite, religion constitute a movement
towards the restoration of something lost.
According to Bataille, play satisfies the human longing for the world of
intimacy, from which people have distanced themselves through work. Art,
magic and religion set man free from the enslaving yoke of labour. For
Bataille, the cave paintings at Lascaux are a legacy of Homo ludens: the person
who attains a humane world by indulging in play through the practice of art,
magic and religion. Art, magic and religion transcend the world of work.

Peter K. Westergaard, "A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
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Religion is a game, a form of play. Religion constitutes access to and an
expression of a world that is different from that of work. This is the “general”
intention of religion. “Religion […] is the search for lost intimacy” (OC VII:315).
Concerning the practical “particular” or utilitarian intention of religion,
Bataille points out that every civilisation or culture creates art, and practices
magic and religion under different conditions, what Bataille calls different“pretexts”. In this respect, art and religion are framed within the realm ofthings. The “external justifications” for an expression of art or of religion
assert themselves in extension of the inherent or “internal justification” of that
expression, insofar as each is also embedded in a given practical context in theworld of work (OC IX:340). The utilitarian intention is thus derivative and of asecondary nature. In short: “every work [of art or religion] reveals a specificpractical intention that adds itself to that general intention I wish to bringout” (OC IX:42).
Bataille is concerned with the features of art, magic and religion that arepresupposed by the “specific practical”, utilitarian intention. He conducts basic
research. His interest is directed towards the decisive “general intention” or“movement”, but he recognises that a concomitant of this movement is a“narrow” utilitarian or “practical intention” (OC IX:37). This is, however, anintention that overlaps with the “general intention”. The “specific practicalintention” is the aspect that includes the instrumental meanings of magic andreligion. And this can be ascribed to the fact that magic and religion areframed within the world of work. It is this additional aspect that raises thequestion of the functional or utilitarian intention of religion. For Bataille, bothintentions are operative, but Frazer and others, in their studies of magic andreligion, focus exclusively on this “practical particular”. Frazer overlooks the“general intention” of religion.
In his critique of Frazer and other “academic” accounts of religion, Bataillepoints out that the interest in the “practical particular intention” overshadowsor supplants the “general intention”: le jeu and the transgressive. Bataille’s
treatment constitutes a challenge to the widespread assumption that magicand religion serve an exclusively utilitarian function. But this renders bothpractices merely instrumental; it reduces them to “simple calculatingmachines”, to operative strategies. And this disregards the fact that both are

642Peter K. Westergaard, "A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion | Peter K. Westergaard

driven by “man’s fundamental desire, regardless of era or region, to be filledwith wonder” (OC IX:341). The “practical particular intention” is present, butaccording to Bataille it presupposes and unfolds against the background of apreconditional horizon: the “general intention”. “Any given work of art’s [orreligion’s] specific intention is thus of small account if one considers theconstancy and universality of that overriding purpose” (OC IX:37).

3. The Flea and the Dog or the Community of LifeOne trait that Wittgenstein and Bataille share is a focus on the “generalintention” of religion. Wittgenstein agrees with Bataille that religious
statements and forms of action can have a utilitarian and referential form:
their “particular intention”. But for Wittgenstein as for Bataille, this form is not
its primary concern. In all the remarks on religion to be found in
Wittgenstein’s late philosophical writings (from MS 139a to MS 176), his
fundamental interest is the “general intention”. Wittgenstein’s interest in
religious language is essentially an outcome of his efforts to identify theconditions and common framework that we have to presuppose in order toexplain the use of language in general. In parallel with this, on several
occasions he tentatively explores the “particular intention”.
In A Lecture on Ethics, in conjunction with a consideration of such experiences
as “wondering at the existence of the world”, the feeling of being “absolutelysafe”, the feeling of being guilty, “and I could have added others” (LE 43),
Wittgenstein notes that that the language of ethics and religion uses similes. In
his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, he suggests, like Bataille, that one
characteristic of magic and religion is the use of a principle of“personification”; in the case of magic, it is “based on the idea of symbolism
and language” (RF 125). He stresses that our thinking and attitude, inparticular in relation to magical and religious forms of action, presuppose therich and extensive background that is part and parcel of human life: “It goes
without saying that a man’s shadow, which looks like him, or his mirrorimage, the rain, thunderstorms, the phases of the moon, the changing of theseasons, the way in which animals are similar to and different from one
another and in relation to man, the phenomena of death, birth, and sexual life,
in short, everything we observe around us year in and year out,Peter K. Westergaard, "A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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interconnected in so many different ways, will play a part in his thinking (hisphilosophy) and in his practices, or is precisely what we really know and findinteresting” (RF 128–129). Rush Rhees adds: “What is done and spoken in theritual refers to something important in the lives of the people who practice it:to sunrise at the solstices or equinoxes, to planting and harvesting, to thecoming of the rainy season, to birth, to marriage, to burial, to going into battle,etc.” (Rhees 1982:72). In Lectures on Religious Belief, Wittgenstein suggests that,lying at the root of religious practice are “pictures” (LEC 71) of a kind thatcannot be regarded as literal descriptions, hypotheses or theories about factual
conditions. “The whole weight may be in the picture” (LEC 72). These pictures
and their content are connected to the conditions of human life and its formsof action. In his late writings, Wittgenstein points out the existence of a family
resemblance between, on the one hand, “the foundation” of the religious
attitude and belief and, on the other, the complex “pattern of our experiencethat is hard to describe” and which forms the basis of our reactions to andunderstanding of other persons’ behaviour and psychical states (MS 174:2).
Here Wittgenstein is calling attention to the fact that our use of concepts todetermine other people’s feelings and states is comparable to certain religious
uses of language. “If someone can believe in God with complete certainty, why
not in other minds?” (MS 137:67a). I could give further examples. But let mesummarise instead. Like Bataille, Wittgenstein is primarily concerned withidentifying and drawing attention to the aspects of life and experience that thereligious uses of language presuppose. “The surroundings of a way ofacting” (RF 147). The “general intention” of religion; the complex andinterwoven domains that invest religious statements with life. The domains ofreligion are internally related to Lebensprobleme. Elsewhere, he writes: “Areligious question is either a question of life or it is (empty) chatter. This
language game – one could say – gets played only with questions of life. Much
like the word “Au-weh” does not have any meaning – except as a scream ofpain” (DB 91).
Religious actions and utterances do not in principle include proposition-likestatements, insofar as the grammar of such actions and utterances can be
explained primarily in terms of a reaction to “what is constantly there andconstantly crucial in [our] lives”. Religious utterances are expressions anddeclarations of feelings, attitudes and values. Hence also Wittgenstein’s

644Peter K. Westergaard, "A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion | Peter K. Westergaard

criticism of Frazer’s description of magical acts and religious rites as derived
from hypotheses or theoretical assumptions about the world and the processesof nature. Taking aim at Frazer, he points out: “In the ancient rites we have theuse of an extremely developed gesture-language” (RF 135). Drury writes: it is“the need to express something; the ceremonies were a form of language, aform of life. Thus, today if we are introduced to someone we shake hands; if
we enter a church we take off our hats and speak in a low voice: at Christmas
perhaps we decorate a tree. These are expressions of friendliness, reverence,and of celebration. We do not believe that shaking hands has any mysterious
efficacy, or that to keep one’s hat on in church is dangerous!” (Drury 1973:x).
Wittgenstein writes: “It was not a trivial reason, for really there can have been
no reason, that prompted certain races of mankind to venerate the oak tree,
but only the fact that they and the oak were united in a community of life, andthus that they arose together not by choice, but rather like the flea and the dog.
(If fleas developed a rite, it would be based on the dog.)” (RF 139)

4. The Tightrope Walker, or on the Edge of an Abyss

Wittgenstein employs a variety images as illustrations when exploring andhighlighting the “general intention” of religion, its roots in “die unendlichen
Variationen des Lebens”, in the “Umgebung” of human life. One of these is thewell-known image of the tightrope walker. In this simile, Wittgensteinemphasises that the religious attitude rests on the foundation of what is“immediately given” in life, in contrast to the idea that religion and religious
belief and action are based on (theoretical or historical) evidence (“wisdom”)
or empirically verifiable observations (sensory experience). Religious belief
and the validity of this attitude are internally related to the intricate andmultifaceted nature of a person’s life and experience. This foundation isdifferent in nature from that of the scientific or rational attitude. And for thatvery reason, i.e. that the religious attitude does not draw support fromscientific, historical or ordinary criteria of validity, the person of a religious
attitude (the tightrope walker) gives the appearance of walking “on nothing
but air”. Yet this is not the case! For the foundation is simply something otherthan what we usually expect when justification is demanded. Wittgenstein
writes: “An honest religious thinker is like a tightrope walker. It almost looks
as though he were walking on nothing but air. His support is the slenderestPeter K. Westergaard, "A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

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imaginable. And yet it really is possible to walk on it” (CV 73). To use the wordsof Bataille, religious belief “is a leap into the unknown, with animality as its
impetus” (OC VIII:81). Or in a very different formulation of Wittgenstein’s:“Religious similes can be said to move on the edge of an abyss” (CV 29).
References
Bataille, Georges (1970–1988) Œuvres complètes, I–XII, Paris: Éditions Gallimard. (OC)Drury, Maurice O’C. (1973) The Danger of Words, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Gitsoulis, Chrysoula (2012) “Wittgenstein and Surrealism”, Essays in Philosophy, Vol. 13,
January 2012, 74–84.
Rhees, Rush (1982) “Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual”, in: Brian McGuinness (ed.):Wittgenstein and his Times, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 69-107.

646

Peter K. Westergaard, "A Note on Wittgenstein and Bataille: On the “General Intention” of Religion". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus —70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of theAustrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation
with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS 2023.

Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering | Wei Zeng

Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering
Wei Zeng (Nagoya, Japan)
Abstract
Conceptual Engineering is an approach to assess the concepts we use in language andimplement revisions to the defective concepts. According to Wittgenstein’s view in the
Philosophical Investigations, although some concepts have blurred boundaries and theirdefinitions lack exactness, they are not necessarily defective. This view of Wittgenstein may
seem to contradict the central idea of conceptual engineering. In this paper, by examining
Wittgenstein’s view in comparison with Waismann’s open texture argument, Carnap’s
explication thesis, and the theory of conceptual engineering, I argue that although
Wittgenstein does not consider the inexactness of concept as a defect, as he is concerned withwhether a concept serves our goals, he would accept the idea to engineer concepts when theymalfunction in serving specific goals.
Moreover, I demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s
observation that mathematicians introduce changes to mathematical concepts whenconvinced by proof provides insights into the practice of applying conceptual engineering tomathematics.

Conceptual engineering is becoming a popular topic of meta-philosophy
recently, attracting attention in philosophy, law, and psychology. Cappelen(2018:3) defines conceptual engineering as the process of assessing andimproving our representational device, namely, concepts. Similarly, Chalmers(2020) defines it as an approach to evaluate, design and implement concepts.
The essential idea of conceptual engineering is that because the concepts we
use in our language may be defective, we should assess these concepts andimprove them to serve various purposes. This idea seems to be what the later
Wittgenstein would reject as he asserts that there is no ideal language. In thisarticle, I argue that Wittgenstein’s view is not necessarily incompatible withthe theory of conceptual engineering.

Open Texture Argument, Explication Thesis, and the Later Wittgenstein

Although conceptual engineering is a relatively new term, the idea is not. It is
widely believed that there were two forerunners of conceptual engineering:Waismann and Carnap. In 1945, Waismann introduced the concept of open
texture. In Waismann's view, most empirical concepts are open-textured, notfixed. The following is what he defines as open texture:

Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering | Wei Zeng

Open texture is a very fundamental characteristic of most, though not ofall, empirical concepts, and it is this texture which prevents us fromverifying conclusively most of our empirical statements. Take any material
object statement. The terms which occur in it are non-exhaustive; thatmeans that we cannot foresee completely all possible conditions in which
they are to be used; there will always remain a possibility, however faint,that we have not taken into account something or other that may be
relevant to their usage; and that means that we cannot foresee completely
all the possible circumstance in which the statement is true or in which it
is false. There will always remain a margin of uncertainty. Thus theabsence of a conclusive verification is directly due to the open texture of
the terms concerned. (Waismann 1945, 123)
Waismann’s concept of open texture is that although we usually understandthe meaning of empirical concepts, such as “cat” and “gold,” and communicate
with these concepts without too many misunderstandings, there are scenarios
in which we are not able to verify whether an object is a referent of aparticular concept or not. Waismann elaborates:
Suppose I have to verify a statement such as ‘There is a cat next door’;
suppose I go over to the next room, open the door, look into it, and actually
see a cat. Is this enough to prove my statement? Or must I, in addition to it,
touch the cat, pat him and induce him to purr? And supposing that I had
done all these things, can I then be absolutely certain that my statement
was true? (Waismann 1945: 121)
For Waismann, because it is always possible for this kind of borderline case to
emerge, the concepts we use in our language can never be fixed, rather theyremain open-textured. Waismann's concept of open texture is widely believed
to be influenced by later Wittgenstein. In particular, there is an obvious
affinity between Waismann's instance of “cat” above and the following
paragraph of Philosophical Investigation:
I say, "There is a chair over there." What if I go to fetch it, and it suddenly
disappears from sight? "—So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion."— But a few seconds later, we see it again and are able to touch it, and soon. —"So the chair was there after all, and its disappearance was some

648

Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering | Wei Zengkind of illusion." —But suppose that after a time it disappears again—orseems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready forsuch cases—rules saying whether such a thing is still to be called a "chair"?
But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"? And are we to saythat we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are notequipped with rules for every possible application of it? (PI 2009:§80)
Baker and Hacker (1983) point out that although Waismann’s concept of open
texture is significantly influenced by PI§80, it is a misunderstanding ofWittgenstein’s viewpoint. According to Baker and Hacker’s reading,Waismann's idea of open texture presupposes “a distorted conception of what
it is for a set of rules to be complete (or incomplete)” and says that the conceptof a chair is an open-textured one means that rules of how to use this term areincomplete. (Baker&Hacker 1983:170) For Waismann, the completeness of thedefinition is conceivable but practically impossible. On the contrary,
Wittgenstein takes the pursuit of this completeness as nonsense. Based on thisobservation, Baker and Hacker argue that because the concept of open texture
is correlative to the completeness of definition, and Wittgenstein considers thecompleteness of rules to govern the use of a term to be nonsense, it can beinferred that Wittgenstein would reject the concept of open texture. Althoughthat Baker and Hacker’s observation of the difference between Waismann’sview and Wittgenstein’s original idea is plausible, we must not overlook thefact that both Waismann and Wittgenstein advocate that concepts are not
fixed and can be changed. From the perspective of conceptual engineering, it is
not critical whether the completeness of the definition is a utopia or nonsense.
What is more important is that Waismann and Wittgenstein have a consensus
that concepts have no clear boundaries and hence are not fixed but open tochanges. However, accepting the open-texture nature of the concept merelyshows that Wittgenstein shares the same basic stance with modern conceptualengineers. To find out whether Wittgenstein’s view is compatible with thetheory of modern conceptual engineering, we need to take a closer look at
Wittgenstein’s remarks and the view of conceptual engineers. In the following
sections, I shall consider two possible objections to the idea that Wittgensteinwould accept the theory of conceptual engineering and argue that they are notplausible.

Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering | Wei Zeng

Intentional and Unintentional Conceptual Engineering

For Wittgenstein, the use of language is not governed by any explicit rules. The
reason that most people seem to have a consensus on the meaning of a concept
is that we share the same form of life. Based on this view of Wittgenstein, somemight argue that even Wittgenstein admits that concepts can be revised or
replaced, he would maintain that conceptual changes are caused by thechanges in what most people mean when using these expressions, not becausesome philosophers or experts suggest that a concept should be revised in a
specific way. In other words, conceptual changes just happen in the language
in an unpredictable way; therefore, it is futile for philosophers to initiate
conceptual engineering activity. Thus, Wittgenstein would reject the idea ofconceptual engineering. I shall demonstrate that this objection is not plausible.
Cappelen(2018: 35-36) indicates that conceptual engineering activities caneither be intentional or unintentional. It is possible that we are engaged inconceptual engineering activities without having any awareness of it. For
instance, one is engaged in the activity of revising the concept of “marriage” if
she uses the term in an extended meaning, even if she denies it. On the other
hand, engineering projects like what Haslanger (2000) and Scharp (2007)
propose are intentional, as they are aware of the deficiency of concepts theywant to eliminate and have set clear goals, i.e., what kind of concept we shouldhave. Hence, even if, for Wittgenstein, all conceptual changes in practice areunintentional, he is partially in agreement with modern conceptual engineers.
Apparently, for conceptual engineers, it is intentional conceptual engineeringthat is worth more discussion as there is not much they can do tounintentional engineering. Would Wittgenstein agree with conceptualengineers that our concept should be intentionally engineered to serve a
specific purpose? In PI, Wittgenstein remarks:
We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: anorder for a particular purpose, one out of many possible orders, not theorder. For this purpose we shall again and again emphasize distinctions
which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may
make it appear as if we saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our
terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, may well
be possible. But these are not the cases we are dealing with. The

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Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering | Wei Zeng

confusions which occupy us arise when language is, as it were, idling, notwhen it is doing work. (PI: §132, italics Wittgenstein’s)
Although the central idea of PI §132 is that the task of philosophy is not toreform language for practical reasons in specific scenarios but to deal with theconfusion that arises in language, it is worth noting that here Wittgenstein
explicitly admits the possibility of implementing revisions in the concepts we
use for practical purposes, such as reduce misunderstanding. That is to say,despite the fact that Wittgenstein does not consider engineering concepts as amajor task for philosophers, he has no intention to deny the possibility andvalue of intentional engineering activities.
Similarly, in Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, Wittgenstein points
out that in mathematics, concepts are engineered by mathematicians
intentionally:
Can I say: “A proof induces us to make a certain decision, namely that ofaccepting a particular concept-formation”? Do not look at the proof as aprocedure that compels you, but as one that guides you. —And what it
guides is your conception of a (particular) situation.
But how does it come about that it guides each one of us in such a way that
we agree in the influence it has on us? Well, how does it come about that
we agree in counting? “That is just how we are trained” one may say, “andthe agreement produced in this way is carried further by theproofs.” (RFM 1978: IV 30, italics Wittgenstein's)
One important idea of RFM is that mathematical proofs lead to conceptualchange and conceptual formation in mathematics. Wittgenstein points out thatwhen a proof is discovered, mathematicians must decide whether a concept
should be revised accordingly. Although usually, mathematicians can easily
reach a consensus on what decision to make because they were trained in asimilar way, the decision-making process should be neglected. That is to say,for Wittgenstein when mathematicians are convinced by a proof that aconcept should be changed, they are aware of the conceptual change they
introduce and why they implement such changes. In other words, in this case,mathematicians are engaged in intentional conceptual engineering activities.

Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering | Wei Zeng

However, the remarks in PI §132 demonstrate that Wittgenstein is not keen toengineer concepts for practical purposes, as he implies that the defective
concepts are not the main source of our confusion. Similarly, in an earlier
paragraph, Wittgenstein remarks:
A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an
overview of the use of our words. —Our grammar is deficient insurveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind ofunderstanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence theimportance of finding and inventing intermediate links. (PI: §122, italics
Wittgenstein's)
Here Wittgenstein points out that the biggest deficiency in our language is thelack of surveyability. This is to say, failing to see the interconnections between
concepts is the main source of trouble that we have in language. This
viewpoint explains why Wittgenstein is not quite interested in engineering
single concepts. As indicated in PI §132, for Wittgenstein, improving single
defective concepts might help us prevent misunderstanding to some extent,
but the biggest problem in language cannot be solved by improving eachdefective concept. Rather, it can only be solved by seeing and creating
connections between different concepts. Therefore, we can see that
Wittgenstein has little motivation to engineer individual concepts, not because
he wants to downplay conceptual engineering activities, but because heintends to focus on the more crucial problem that causes bigger trouble to ourlanguage and understanding.
In fact, the significance of interconnection between concepts has been noticed
by some conceptual engineers. As Cappelen (2018: 158) observes, if we change
the meaning of “freedom,” the meaning of related concepts such as“responsibility” will also be changed. Although this causal chain of conceptualchange can be considered as an objection to the feasibility of conceptualengineering projects, it has not been sufficiently investigated. While admitting
this objection does make a good point, Cappelen’s reply is not satisfying. He
claims that because the process of conceptual change is “incomprehensible
and inscrutable”; therefore, how the change of one concept will influence652

Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
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2023.

Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering | Wei Zeng

other related concepts is unpredictable (2018: 158). Cappelen’s response above
reinforces Wittgenstein’s view that the lack of an overview of the connections
between concepts is a source of significant problems in our language.

What Are the Goals of Conceptual Engineering Activities?

Another possible objection is that Wittgenstein would be skeptical that there isa correct answer for what are defective concepts and how we should improvethem, as he rejects the idea that there can be any ideal language. Carnap,
another forerunner of conceptual engineering, argues that philosophers
should engage in the activity of explication. For Carnap (1950), the explicationof concepts is a crucial process to substitute an inexact, prescientific concept
with an exact one to serve our scientific purposes. Carnap believes that
inexactness is a significant defect of concepts that makes them less fruitful.
This view of Carnap is coherent with the modern theory of conceptualengineering but not consistent with Wittgenstein’s position. In PI (§66-§88),
Wittgenstein proposes the idea of family resemblance and argues thatconcepts are not always rigidly bounded, but concepts with blurred
boundaries, or inexact in Carnap’s term, can still be used. It seems that for
Wittgenstein, the vagueness or inexactness of concepts is not necessarily adefect that needs to be solved, which implies that he would not advocate theidea of engineering concepts that are inexact. However, it must be noted thatthe acceptance of the inexactness of concepts is not unconditional. For
Wittgenstein, the inexactness of concepts is not a defect only when the inexact
concept is usable. In PI §88, he emphasizes that an inexact concept can be
usable, whereas the exactness can be useless. Hence, we can infer that what
Wittgenstein considers as defects of concepts are those factors that harm theusefulness of a concept. As he remarks:“Inexact” is really a reproach, and “exact” is a praise. And this is to saythat what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than does what a moreexact. So it all depends on what we call “the goal”. (PI: §88)
Wittgenstein’s view above has an obvious affinity with the theory and practiceof modern conceptual engineers, who take the deficiencies of concepts ascontext-dependent and have a practice-focused perspective. For Wittgenstein,what is important for a concept is not whether it is rigidly defined or not but

Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering | Wei Zeng

whether it plays the role it should play in language. Similarly, conceptualengineers initiate engineering projects because some concepts we use are notgood enough to serve important practical goals, not because they lackexactness. For instance, Haslanger (2000) suggests that the concept of woman
should be revised to serve our goal of fighting for justice. For Haslanger,
despite that the old concept of woman is usable in the sense that it does notcause misunderstanding, it is not usable for serving our goal to fight for justice.
What Wittgenstein rejects is the attempt to change a concept merely because it
lacks exactness while ignoring the context it is being used and the fact that it
functions quite well in that context. But he would advocate an intentional
engineering project if its goal is to replace a partially unusable concept with amore usable one. Hence, although for Wittgenstein, unified deficiencies ofconcept do not exist, he would admit that there are various kinds of defects ofconcepts that are highly context-dependent, and case-by-case examination isnecessary when deciding whether these defects will make a concept lessusable. He would advocate the idea of intentionally engineering concepts if thedefects have made the current concepts not usable for our important goals
anymore.

Conceptual Engineering in Mathematics

Finally, as an instance of the practice of engineering concepts, let us examine
Wittgenstein’s idea on how mathematical concepts are formed and changed.
As indicated in the previous quotation from RFM, Wittgenstein stresses that inmathematical practice, mathematicians create new concepts or modify old
concepts when proof convinces them to do so. According to Frascolla’s reading:
From powerful and sophisticated means for establishing truth,
mathematical proof is transformed into a tool of persuasion for producing
conceptual changes that are not justifiable in any justifiable in way except
than in terms of the shared inclination to accept them, generated by theproof. (Frascolla 1994: 142)
Wittgenstein’s idea to consider proof as a tool to induce conceptual changes
not only shows that he admits that intentional conceptual engineering
happens in mathematics, but more importantly, he raises an insightful pointthat the defects in concepts are detected in practice, not in theories. In

654

Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering | Wei Zengmathematics, the practice that helps mathematicians discover the defect ofconcepts they should improve is mathematical proof. Similarly, in other fields,
conceptual engineering projects should be implemented when the current
concepts lose part of their utility to serve important social and political
purposes. As mathematics is a field that has not been investigated much byconceptual engineers, except by Tanswell (2018), Wittgenstein’s viewpoint
could contribute to the discussion of the applying conceptual engineering
approach to mathematics by proposing a practice-focused observation of theconnection between proof acceptance and conceptual change.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that as a forerunner of conceptual engineering, Waismann’s
open texture thesis is inspired by Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s view that it isnonsense to demand ideal language and exactness in concept seems to imply
that he would reject the idea of conceptual engineering. However, I havedemonstrated that although for Wittgenstein, the central problem of the
deficiency in our language is caused by lack of surveyability, not the defects ineach concept, he admits that engineering individual concepts could servevarious practical purposes. For Wittgenstein, lack of exactness is not a goodreason to intentionally engineer a concept, but when a concept is not playing
the role it should play, intentional conceptual engineering can be a solution. A
good example that illustrates Wittgenstein’s position is his observation thatmathematicians make decisions on whether a concept should be revised whena proof is discovered. This practice-oriented observation that mathematicians
are engaged in intentional conceptual engineering activities provides answers
to the question of whether the conceptual engineering approach can beapplied to mathematics and how conceptual engineering activities can be
implemented in mathematics.

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Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
2023.

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Wei Zeng, "Wittgenstein and Conceptual Engineering". In 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein's Death. A Critical
Assessment. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol.
XXIX. Hrsg. von / ed. by Alois Pichler, Esther Heinrich-Ramharter, Friedrich Stadler, in cooperation with Joseph Wang-Kathrein. Kirchberg/W.: ALWS
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