GraSPP-DP-E-15-001

Scenario projects in Japanese government:

Twenty years of experience, ﬁve tales from the front line

Masahiro Kakuwa
March 2015

GraSPP Discussion Paper E-15-001

GraSPP-DP-E-15-001

Scenario projects in Japanese government:
Twenty years of experience, five tales from the front line
Masahiro Kakuwa

March 2015

・Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy
The University of Tokyo,
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan・Chief Economist, Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K.
e-mail: Masahiro.Kakuwa@showa-shell.co.jp

GraSPP Discussion Papers can be downloaded without charge from:http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/

Scenario projects in Japanese government:
Twenty years of experience, five tales from the front line
Masahiro Kakuwa 1

Abstract: How does scenario planning in government differ fromscenario planning in the corporate world? This paper considers fiveprojects done in Japan – four from the public sector, one from theprivate sector – and finds that when comparing to people in the private
business, public servants have cognitive and institutional constraints on
their thinking. This makes it hard for them to contemplate multiple,‘untidy’ futures, and imagine the possibility of policy failure: skills
which are essential for successful scenario projects. The possible
solution may be to shake them out of their thinking with ‘derailment’ –allowing them to discuss the future as they would like to come about,and then exploring ways in which that desired scenario might not occur.
The other observation is that, although there has been growing demand
from Japanese public sector organisation of scenario type brainstorming
opportunities, for public servants, these are preferred as an isolated
event rather than a routinely institutionalised process in the policy
making and policy execution. They enjoy the scenario planning only asa refreshing event and as a chance to explore and learn new things.

1. Introduction
This paper is an attempt at disciplined reflection, by a scenario practitioner, on his
twenty years’ experience in the field. In Japan, I work as a designer of study
processes, a facilitator in workshops, and an editor/writer of scenario reports. I am
writing this for the experts in scenario planning practices, in the hope that I can share
my working experience with them, and become more of a resource to the scenario
planning community outside Japan.
My reflection and thought will focus largely on projects for the Japanese public sector– especially since there is a growing need for scenario work in government. Scenario
planners are summoned once there is an obvious break from the past, and here in
Japan, now is such a time! However, scenario practitioners have to react with caution
to this new enthusiasm. Consider the following scenario, no doubt taking place acrossJapan as this is written.
A government organisation asks a scenario planner to conduct a project, and dozens
of bureaucrats come and join scenario workshops. Then, the planner gradually
notices that a ‘scenario-type’ discussion is an unpleasant experience for theparticipants. Efforts to dig up big issues in future do not necessarily galvanize them.
1

Visiting Professor, The University of Tokyo, also Chief Economist, Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K.

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This is not a question of the facilitator’s skill, but rather that their skills and practices
originated in the private sector and need refinement for their new audience. This is atale I know well.
My entrée into the scenario planning world was accidental. In 1992, my Japaneseemployer Showa Shell decided to send me to the scenario planning team in London,
the UK headquarters of the Shell Group. Up until then I had been a company oil
trader, a hardworking, high tension job, and the company seemed to expect me todevelop another side of myself in London. I became a scenario planner in Europe. I
returned to Japan in 1995, and ever since then scenario activities have always beenpart of my job. So that the methodology and skill I have been using at scenario
projects are basically “Shell style”. There is a distinctive characteristic in scenario
project conducted by the Shell style, which are well captured by R.D.Shell’s“Scenarios: An Explorer’s Guide, 2003”. [Shell International Ltd, 2003], and by Keesvan der Heijden’s “Scenarios : The art of strategic conversation” [van der Heijden,
1996]. Over and above, Wilkinson and Kupers [Wilkinson, 2014] successfully
reviewed this Shell-style mainly in the historical perspective. In this book many
precious insights are accrued from interviews of Shell scenario planners in thesealmost fifty years. I myself have modified some of the Shell style, tailored to Japan’s
local context, but by and large been with the development of the Shell-style process
and product. Interestingly, however, much of my work has been for Japanese
government, and has allowed me to consider in great depth the unique challenges ofworking with governments.
In the following, I will reflect on several scenario projects I have undertaken. Somewill be successes, and others will be failures – the latter being much more memorable
for me because the unsatisfactory outcome was often caused by my own mistakes,
which I have learned from. Then, I will generalise my experience and discuss byreferring to some of academic works related to scenario planning and Japanese public
policy making process. However, I don’t wish to discuss the analytical part fat anddull.
Some readers may wish to skip the in-depth description of scenario projects, the fiveexamples of which I have chosen to analyse, and jump straight to the discussion andconclusions: however, I hope that practitioners will also find much of interest in mytales of scenario projects in Japan.

Acknowledgement
I appreciate the helpful comments on the drafts of this paper, including those from Dr
Michael D. Rogers, Dr Tatsujiro Suzuki and Dr Kyoko Ohta.

2. Five tales: scenario projects in Japan
This paper is primarily meant to share my professional experiences with the peer
scenario planning practitioners. To begin this consideration of scenario planning inJapanese government, let me start with a tale of a project in the private sector.

22.1. The CEO fires himself: a tragedy
This was a bitter experience for me, in which a scenario planning process aimed at
helping managers make decisions eventually cost one of them his job.
The project was a series of top-management workshops, scenario-planning style,which could ultimately lead to the closure of a large factory and a significant numberof staff redundancies. I led a team of young researchers and was the facilitator for theworkshops themselves, in a process lasting half a year. I was commissioned to
conduct three half-day workshops every forty to fifty days with the management team.
The task and objective of each workshop was agreed beforehand, and well known tothe participants. Voices representing the factory workers were not invited, but
indirectly their opinions were well listened to.
A huge number of man-hours were mobilized, as the research team tried to explore
every option to keep the factory open, but the team failed to arrive at any convincing
scenario which allowed the factory to keep operating in the long term. Indeed, thepossible closure was a long-standing issue for the company, so that our research anddiscussion was often overwhelmed by data and insights from previous studies. We
were working under pressure: there was consensus amongst the executives that thetime had come to hammer out a final decision.
The workshop discussion was choked with competing interests, and offered little
space for exploring new things. I, as the facilitator, definitely needed this space. The
idea I threw to the workshop was this: ‘think how your competitors could play theirbusiness games after our factory closes.’ This question worked, and some innovativeideas emerged. The management team talked intensively and thoroughly, fighting
and bargaining with each other.
At the end of the second workshop, the discussion converged on the closure option,
which emboldened me to design the third and last workshop for ‘option generation’,considering how best the company could execute the difficult job of the closure, frompreparation to shut-down and aftercare. Some managers started to call researchers
under me, to commission a detailed study preparing for the closure.
Here, a tragedy hit the company. Just two days before the third workshop, the CEO of
the company suddenly resigned. The CEO had been one of those who hadn’t wanted
to close the factory, and had been asking me to come up with ideas to defend it.
Behind him there was an internal interest group, which had been strongly opposing
the closure.
I realised that the research and discussion, which was transparent and rational,
gradually drove the CEO into a tight corner. The CEO had had the courage to employ
scenario planning and to face its implications, but at the end of the day he was forced
to lose his manoeuvrability in the decision making process. With his position
untenable, he resigned.
The workshop, the third and the last, took place as scheduled. I facilitated thisalmost-unwanted event in a frosty climate. The executives were not a unified team
but a constituency with winners and losers. What they had to do was devastatingly3

clear, however. Having come to a decision, they had to speak with one voice, andthey did so. Later a young researcher asked me with resentment whether I had
ignored the CEO’s anguish. “I have noticed it”, he said.
On reflection, four points should be borne in mind:
First, the theme of the scenario project was to be the objective assessment of thefactory under several different business environments in the long term. However, top
management came to the workshops with their own pre-determined opinions,
underpinning a well-distilled Aye or Nay position on the closure.
Second, the scenario planning was expected to provide the discussion arena withanalytical thinking, and transparency in the decision-making process. In this regard atleast, it worked as planned.
Third, having observed the pressure for a decision, I tried to exercise my facilitation
to nurture common sympathy among the management team. The integrated executionof the closure would be a big task requiring the skills of the whole company, but inbetween the second and the third workshops the internal power-games came back tolife. I was duly concerned about this, but could not intervene, and this left me feelingpowerless and marginalised.
Fourth, during that six month process I actually changed my client. In the beginningthe client was the CEO who had initiated the project; however, gradually the client
turned out to be the whole management team. In general, scenario planning is aprocess designed to create collective understanding and wisdom. I tried to be loyal tothis idea but in the process I betrayed my original client, the CEO, and still I feel very
sorry for him. A good scenario practitioner can act as a personal counsellor for thedecision maker. I did not.
2.2 Nuclear power: the scenario as weapon and work of art
I will now move on to discuss my scenario projects for the Japanese public sector,
largely the central government, where I have most experience. Four in particular
stand out: “Nuclear Power scenario 2005”, “Energy 2030”, “Urban Mobility 2040”
and “China Scenario 2007”. Each project had different sponsors, with different
reasons to employ the scenario planning methodology, and each project taught me adifferent lesson.
‘Nuclear Power scenarios 2005’ is the next story I want to share. This project was
carried out in 2004/05 obviously before the earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima
Nuclear power incident in March 2011. This was a failed project, and a negative
personal experience. The scenario study in question would be abandoned, never to
see the light of day.
I was working with a Japanese quasi-governmental research institute, which initiatedthis project. Top experts were mobilized from the nuclear and energy industries, andfrom academia and public bodies. The team diligently carried out its research andanalysis, but gradually the president of the research institute’s motives for sponsoring
the study became clear.
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The president was a former high-ranking bureaucrat, and still maintained his
influence over Japan’s energy policies. His hidden intention was to challenge thecurrent policies of his younger successors. The president wanted to provide aplausible alternative, with himself as its champion. The world Japanese high-ranking
bureaucrats inhabit is adversarial and competitive in policy-making and propagation.
They behave not only as technocrats but also as politicians. This was a world which
the president did not want to leave. I found ‘his’ scenario was pre-composed. The
scenario research team was expected to write up a BAU (Business As Usual) story
based on current government nuclear policies, and the alternative, ‘his’ story, yielding
a better future.
My scenario practice could not meet the sponsor/client’s expectations. I did not
facilitate the discussion to arrive at the pre-composed storylines. The client’s own
vision was valid and quite consistent, but it was not the only vision, and we did notdiscard its rivals.
I now reflect that the sponsor/client expected only to get a neat policy paper, thick anddense, from the messy scenario study. Bureaucrats make it a habit to write papers in asober, repressed style, not dwelling on potential complications. The paper inevitably
becomes colourless, but can include subtle suggestions and room for politicians andbureaucrats to act upon the paper – in one direction. Contrary to that, scenario
practitioners know that writing scenarios is a different task. The scenario story has toacknowledge that the present situation may develop in several different ways.
Scenario researchers work to articulate stories that clearly and eloquently
communicate the essence of the relevant issues – including any complications – to thewider public.
Toward the end of the study some workshop attendants increasingly became worried
about the evocative style of the writing. The sponsor also found the work
uncomfortable. He expected to have a well-written and watertight advocacy paper,
not easily dismissed, but many things were being left unsettled. This fell short of hisgoal to establish a de facto high-powered expert council where, according to rules of
the Japanese political system, he would have a chance to set the terms of the future
policy debate. 2
Nonetheless the research team marched on, and eventually arrived at a distillate of theissue. The key uncertainty was over unresolved policies for dealing with spenturanium fuel from nuclear power plants. Japan’s official policy has long been to
construct a reprocessing plant in Japan, hopefully for full reprocessing, which
completes the so called ‘closed fuel cycle’: however, where to construct that plant has
proved a difficult issue.
Over the past forty years, nuclear power plants were built one by one after timeconsuming negotiations between local communities and private power companies.
Government assisted these negotiations with schemes to hand out huge amounts of2

Academics domestic and foreign generally agree that in Japan the high-profile expert council is thearena where real political bargains among different interest parties take place, and that theadministrative stake over the expert council is the power base of Japanese bureaucrats. Politicalbargaining and coordination among Ministries and Agencies is also tightly worked out in the process offixing the official report by the expert council. See [Morita, 2006], and the classic work of [Johnson,
1975]

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cash to the local governments that committed to take on the burden. Indeed, somelocal communities would become dependent on these subsidies. To date the only
major issue which remains is the choice of disposal sites for high-level radioactive
waste. This will have to be stored at deep underground repository, whose only
purpose is to shelter the hazard. Japanese government and power industry were awareof the problem, but had been putting off tackling the issue. The scenario researchers
jumped in and did so, only to find that they could not work unencumbered bycompeting voices and interests.
The study was finished. The scenario researchers had done their work articulating
stories that could communicate the essence of the issue to the public. I tried to weave
a variety of stories into the scenario picture. “Nuclear Power scenarios 2005”
addressed how the spent fuel issue could be solved. One story mentioned the nameof a local community, which was the proposed venue for a high-level radioactive
waste disposal and storage facility. Some experts became hesitant to mention thename in order not to evoke local NUMBYism. (What is that? It stands for “Not Under
My Back Yard”). Others insisted on mentioning it.
This was the start of a process of deterioration, as one after another, intriguing points
in the scenarios were regarded as ‘best left unsaid’ and were discarded. The work
started to lose purpose and clarity. The research team wallowed in frustration. I was
terrified of being abandoned by the sponsor: and despite the concessions made on thereport, that is exactly what happened. Six months’ work ended up scrapped.
To sum up, this project had eventually turned into a magnetic field for experts’
earnest debate on Japan’s nuclear policy. Seeing this unheralded development, thepresident switched off the project abruptly. I lost face to everyone. I could haveshortened the reins when the research team started to rebel and resisted the substantialchanges that were demanded in the scenario that they had made. But I couldn’t. My
heart was with the researchers. Scenarios are an art form, rather than a political
weapon.
2.3. Energy: a successful case of derailment
The “Energy 2030” project was sponsored by METI, the Japanese Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry, took nine months to finish, and was published in May
2005.
Renowned experts from inside and outside government were called in, and thescenario workshop was eventually made up of one-half METI personnel and one-halfoutsiders from academia and the private sector. In one scenario workshop, I invited a
co-facilitator from the Shell Group, my old colleague, who was English speaking.
Discussion in a foreign language brought a certain clumsiness to the discussion, butalso a freshness for the Japanese participants. With that, METI recognized that its
outlook should be publicized in English to acquire a wider audience. Hence, “Energy2030” was later translated, and became available for English speakers.
In making the ‘Energy 2030’ scenario, we employed the inductive approach. In this,research starts from the issues seen at present, then the present transforms itself in
multiple ways as the current set of issues interact and naturally develop. In ‘Energy62030’, the national economic system and Japan’s changing society evolved naturally
and interacted with each other. The framework of the scenario is shown below.
Figure 1.
Paths to 2030 and Multiple End Results
Economy Environment
Win-WinSustainability

・Sustainability
・regulations on CO2

Self sustaining
Development
scenario

Environmental
Constraint Scenario

BAU
scenario
Wealth andHigh economic Growth

Low Growth

NOW

CrisisScenarios

・energy guzzler
・economy growth・market mechanism

Environmental
Burdens

＠ＭＥＴＩ

The aspiration of the client, METI, was clear. They wanted to drive the present
societal-industrial system to a less carbon-intensive model, given that it was theinternational fashion in 2004 to develop visions of the future ‘low carbon society’.
Unsurprisingly, the “Self-sustaining Development” scenario was the one METI
wanted to promote. During the scenario study process I accepted their eagerlychasing the low-carbon vision, and the storylines toward the year 2030 were created.
Then, in the following workshop, I asked the participants to deliberately derail fromthe preferred scenario and think of any possible ‘failed’ scenarios. Suddenly, theworkshop process was revitalized.
The worrying future of No Action(“Environmental Constraint”) and Not-Enough Action (“BAU” again) appeared. The
research team willingly jumped in to consider the new issues. The METI client alsodecided to incorporate potential oil shocks into their thinking in order to give anabrupt discontinuity to their stories. Thus the scenario framework was found andfixed. All that remained for me to do was to edit scenario stories. “BAU”,“Environmental Constraint” and “Crisis” were written to be as equally plausible as“Self-sustaining Development”.
In March 2005, ‘Energy 2030’ was presented to a government-led, high-powered
expert council advising on Japan’s energy policy. The work was well-received, and I
was pleased to see the scenario evoked a high quality debate. Also, the paper
appeared on government website for several weeks to invite public comments, fromwhich METI could collect many interesting inputs and opinions. The council decided
to keep the scenario story in its policy paper, which went straight to politicians who
are to decide Japan’s long term energy policy. “Energy 2030” was a triumph.
7

Then there was a postscript. The METI senior official, a fan of scenario planning,
moved to his next posting, and a new bureaucrat took over. His role was to make the“Self-sustaining Development” scenario come about. How to do it? Eventually hefound the so-called ‘back casting approach’ which had been proliferating in IPCC
papers: that is, defining a desirable future and then working backwards to identify
policies and programmes which will connect that future to the present. The new
official decided to introduce this novel approach to ‘his’ energy outlook. METI again
called me with several econo-energo-metric 3 modellers to set out, in narrative and in
numbers, the solid path to “Self-sustaining Development” in the year 2030.
The back casting approach appealed to the modellers. They were suddenly free fromthe data sets of the past and were allowed to tinker with numerical targets in the future.
Uncertainties and dynamics in the course of arriving at the distant targets were simply
buried in the complex model. In this second-round study, industry was encouraged toprovide information on state-of-the-art technologies and their possible development.
The outcome was an Energy Road Map and a Technology Road Map.
In this study, I found I could not contribute much. For the modellers, a meddlingscenario man was persona non grata. Government still called the outcome a scenario
study; however the special flavour of the old exploratory spirit was lost.
“Energy 2030” was a timely work amid the increasing pressure to respond to theglobal climate change agenda. “Self-sustaining Development”, the vision scenario of
METI, was presented to those who were to decide, which led to the follow up works:
the Road Maps.
2.4. Urban planning: academia learns the public scenario gameIn 2008/09, I edited a book of six scenario studies focusing on Japan’s long term
future. This project was undertaken by university scholars and took two years. I
joined the project as the designer, facilitator and writer of scenario stories. The
academics would not act on the scenarios they created, but advocate implications of
the study to the general public, especially those interested in public policy.
One of the works was “Urban Mobility 2040”. Here, we the study team tried toillustrate the several possible shapes of Japan’s urban design and civic mobility in the
coming century. We came up with two scenarios. “Public Transport Scenario” told ofheavy investment in, and utilization of, Japan’s public urban transport system,
bringing about a society with low carbon emissions. “Private Transport Scenario”
explained how electric vehicle (EV) technologies and related services would boost theJapanese economy and gradually change Japan’s transport and urban societal system.

3

An econo-energo-metric model is one of the tools energy economists use to forecast future
developments in the energy system, nationally or regionally. In the simplest terms, experts use themodel to measure past relationships among such variables as GDP growth, sectoral energy demand
growth, tax rates or subsidies on energy use, supply availability of energy sources (oil, coal, gasuranium and renewables) and so on, and then try to forecast how changes in some variables will affectthe future course of others.

8Both scenarios called for the government to play a significant role in order to bringthem about.
Figure 2.

Urban Mobility 2040

＠Dr. Hironori Kato
Univ. of Tokyo

Public Transport
Scenario

Private Transportscenario

Society•Invest Public transport
infrastructure•Civic right to move around : Oldies
and Poors•Compact city policy•Busy city centre with eye spies•Abandonment of many rural
agricultural communities•Virtual accessibility by ICT•People dwells dispatched•self responsibility•New life style•Income disparity widen•Local communities go bankruptcy•Small, medium towns cease public
transport services

CO2•Public transport system reduces
CO2•EV dominates market, reduces CO2

Economy•Regulation and redistribution•Low growth•Gov’t pour big R&D money to EVtechs and dissemination•High growth, high logistic costThis was an academic work trying to evoke civic discussion. We therefore tried towrite stories that were easy to read, with lots of illustrations. In that regard, we
succeeded: today we see some activity that refers to this scenario work, suggestingthat it has been read and noticed. But, wait a minute: from the scenario practitioners’
viewpoint, there is a weakness in the framework of this study.
The “Urban Mobility 2040” anticipates that problems will resolve themselves once
the government notices that they exist, and can put its policies into effect. The
Japanese government will exercise its masterful organising force, marshallingscientific and engineering enterprise to transform society. Indeed, this scenario work
did communicate well with the Japanese government and other public sector
organizations specializing in the urban planning. However, what then? Can webelieve that governments will always do fine? That government has never failed?
To get to grips with this question, I must introduce another scenario.
2.5. China: when governments go wrong
During the last ten years I have performed many scenario exercises relating to country
risk analysis, particularly with regards to developing countries. There has been agood demand for this kind of work both from private and public organizations.
When discussing the future of certain developing countries, unstable domestic politics
and/or malfunctioning governments very often come up as key uncertainty. For
example, in 2006/07 I performed a scenario study on China for a Japanese research
institute, a not-for profit organisation (NPO). The aim of the work was to ignite aconversation between Chinese and Japanese experts on energy saving issues.
9In this scenario work we pointed out that the success of China’s drive for an energysaving society was conditional on the state of the Chinese domestic economy. A
global economic downswing could happen any time, and would hit hard the Chinese
economic boom, which for many people then (as now) appeared unstoppable. ‘China
Scenarios 2007’ provocatively suggested that, if the Chinese government wasincompetent to cope with an international or domestic macroeconomic crisis, therecession might be prolonged for years to come. Moreover, any recovery might
become steadily more difficult, as China faced the onset of an ageing society, and a
resultant smaller workforce and higher social welfare bills. Economic activity would
plunge, resulting in less energy consumption but also eclipsing in peoples’ minds theimportance of energy saving. The scenario argued that the energy saving mind set isseeded mainly in city dwellers’ affluent spending behaviour, not among the rural
population in China. This is the message Japanese energy experts wanted to deliver,outspoken and undimmed. It ought to be noted that this work was finished andpresented before the Lehman Shock in autumn 2008.
Figure 3.
@CRIEPI, 2007

China Scenario 2007: Outline
Economic
GrowthShanghai EXPO

‘2010

‘2020

Energy Saving
Giant

Beijing
Olympic‘2008
Aging weighs on China.… gradually …
Macro Economic
Crisis ?!

AnchorScenario

We presented ‘China Scenario 2007” at an international conference in Shanghai
focused on energy conservation. Notable researchers, regulators and business leaderslistened to the scenario. We received many comments and questions from the floor.
Chinese experts wanted us to show the numerical relationship between amacroeconomic crisis and energy-saving habits, and having anticipated this line ofquestioning we were ready to share our research results. A good exchange of views
took place, with Chinese and Japanese thinkers freely speaking their minds to eachother. Later after the conference, we were told that many senior official in the
Chinese government attended our presentation and conversed with energy experts.

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I would like to return to our trail, and the question posed in the previous section.
Governments can make mistakes. ‘China Scenarios 2007’ advocated that the Chinese
government might do so. What, then, about Japan? We Japanese inherit an ancient
wisdom saying that we must always live with the ‘four disasters’: earthquakes,
thunderbolts, firestorms and unwise rulers. We know that they are always with us.
The best we can do is learn to survive them.
However, for understandable reasons, Japanese government bureaucrats themselves
are much less willing to accept this truth. When I work for them, it is quite hard tofacilitate a discussion of how a dysfunctional government could cause a social
disaster. This assumption instantly embarrasses bureaucrats; sometimes so much sothat they won’t come to the next workshop.
From my experience, business people are generally more receptive to stories in which
their (mis)management causes a crisis. They even giggle while jotting down theirown possible mistakes. On the contrary, I observe that bureaucrats have a general
inhibition to anticipate their eventual failure. A high-ranking bureaucrat once told
me that the process of implementation in government is far more complex and widerin scope than that in private sector – and that therefore, the complex process of policy
making and implementation could only be trusted to masterly public servants. The
other, natural, interpretation – that because of the complexity, mistakes are more
likely in government – had not occurred to him. Didn’t he ever call to mind theancient wisdom about Japan and its rulers?
If people in the government feel very unwilling to acknowledge the chance of theirwork eventually going wrong, then the scenario exercise is pointless for them. This
exercise usually depends on accepting the assumption that the environment aroundpolicy implementation may change over time, that implementation itself is imperfect,
and that one therefore has to be ready for when things go wrong.
2.6. Recapitulation: Five scenario projects
In this paper I have shared tales of the five scenario projects. What have I learned
from each?
“A tragedy” was a tough project for a business entity. It was designed as a series ofworkshops for the top management team, which had been divided over the possible
closure of a large factory. During the exercise, scenario planners experienced
compelling pressure calling for a decision, and the rebirth of internal power-games,
which made it very difficult for the planner to facilitate the project.
“Nuclear Power scenarios 2005” was initiated by the personal aspirations of an ex
high-ranking bureaucrat, after the possible revision of current government nuclear
policies. The scenario planners learned that the world inhabited by Japanese highranking bureaucrats is adversarial and competitive in policy-making and propagation.
The scenario exercise was conducted analytically but was unfit for the ex-bureaucrat
because it was not designed to tell one story of his, namely that the chosen policy
package would yield ‘a better future’ than any other.
The “Energy 2030” scenario was born amid increasing pressure to respond to theglobal climate change agenda. The Japanese government wanted to envision a low11

carbon society and the transition paths from the present to the future. The scenario
planner allowed the participants to chase this vision, then asked them to deliberately
derail from their visionary future and to think of possible ‘failed’ scenarios. Thisfacilitation successfully revitalised the project.
“Urban Mobility 2040” was the scenario work conducted by a team from Japanese
academia. The work illustrated two different stories of Japan’s urban design and wasintended to encourage wide civic discussion. The two stories expected that Japan
would become a low carbon society and called for government to play a significant
role to realize this future. The scenario planner questioned himself whether thegovernment would always do so constructively.
Lastly, “China Scenarios 2007” was the work done by a Japanese research institute.
The intention was to ignite a constructive conversation between Chinese and Japaneseexperts on energy saving issues. The scenario stories were crafted in an intentionallychallenging manner. A Japanese-made scenario pointed out that the Chinese
government could make mistakes in coping with an international or domestic
macroeconomic crisis, which would have an influence on the behavioural aspect ofChinese energy use. This story was made cautiously, stemmed from solid analysis.
The venue of the presentation was designed free from political debates, hence, thiswork brought about a good exchange of views among the policy makers and experts.
To sum up what I, as a practitioner, have learned:
First, scenario exercises under heavy pressure from the participants’ politicalstandpoints, such as “A tragedy” and “Nuclear Power Scenario 2007”, are very
difficult to conduct.
Second, in order to secure a free space amid existing agendas, the facilitator could
employ the ‘derailment’ process seen in “Energy 2030”, whereas in “Nuclear Power
Scenario 2007” ‘derailment’ effort turned to be unsuccessful.
Third, assuming possible government failure in scenario stories is a tough task, bothfor the facilitator and participants from Japanese public sector.
Fourth, there is a difference between private and public entities as clients. Unlike theCEO, who had to face the possible closure of the large factory and the consequences
for his job, bureaucrats in general expect (at least in theory) that the political process
will work itself out externally to their workplace, which provides a destined policy
objective set for them.

3. Analysis and Discussion: Scenario projects in government
Following is a trial to generalise my experience and discuss. Academic works related
to the scenario planning and the Japanese public policy making processes are referred.

12

3.1. Review of scenario literature
Scenario planning has formed a growing area of interest in the interface ofgovernment policy-makers and private sector, scenario practitioners and academia.
There is a good recapitulation and evaluation of the scenario literatures by Volkery
and Ribeiro [Volkery, 2009], where impacts and effectiveness of scenario planning on
the environmental policy making is reviewed. Ringland produced two comprehensive
books, “Scenarios in Public Policy, 2002”, and “Scenario Planning Managing for the
future (2nd ed.), 2014”, which contain the records of many valuable case studies ofscenario planning employed in the area of public policy making. Some of the records
are contributed by practitioners on the ground.
As Ringland proposes we can establish two categories when sorting the cases for
scenario projects related to public policy, namely ‘scenarios in public policy’ and‘scenarios in the public sector’ [Ringland, Scenarios in Public Policy, 2002].
In the world of practitioners the former theme of ‘scenarios in public policy’ has beendeveloped into a particular school. Here, the scenario planning process is regarded asa potentially useful tool for changing current societal, public situation into a better
future. It ranges from Kahane [Kahane, 2012] who has been offering scenario
planning to ignite collaboration among different, sometimes hostile parties 4 , to a
campaign of Michel Godet who sees scenario planning (prospective stratégique) as anormative, constructive movement for creating better future. [Godet, 2004] 5 Thisschool calls those who involved in the scenario project for clarifying anticipatory
choices and taking actions for the future.
Other practitioners regard scenario planning as a tool for inspiring organizational
learning. This school is heralded by de Geus. [de Geus, 1997] In line with this,Chermack and van der Merwe clarified the theoretical relation between constructivist
learning and teaching theory, and scenario planning process. [Chermack, 2003] Thisschool calls those involved for the reflection and re-construction of their mental
model; that is how to make renewed sense of the world. Naturally, for this school
practices focus on how an organization and/or persons can be positively affected andcan bring new things in their recognition after their engagement of the scenario
planning.
As seen, this paper mainly covers Ringland’s category of ‘scenarios in the public
sector’, and tries to discuss, firstly, the functional aspect of scenario projects
4[Kahane, 2012] argues;“Transformative scenario planning is a particularly effective away for a team of actors to generatecollaborative forward movement on complex, stuck, problematic situation.” p.92,
also; “Transformative scenario planning centres on constructing futures for our situation, but it take thewell-established adaptive scenario planning methodology and turns it on its head- so that we constructscenarios not only to understand the future but also to influence it.” p. XV
5Particularly for the domain of strategic consultancy, Michel Godet argues;“There are, of course, future studies containing no clear strategic character for an actor as well as
strategic analysis of firms or sectors whose interest in the future is embryonic or even nonexistent, For
the sake of clarity, the expression “strategic prospective” will, therefore, be reserves for futures studies
having strategic ambitions and end points for those understanding them.” The Art of Scenarios andStrategic Planning: Tools and Pitfalls, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 65 (2000), 3-22,
Elsevier Science Inc.

13

employed by the government officialdom, and secondly, its individual andorganizational learning through the experience of scenario projects.
In this context, the key question I would define is what sort of roles and functions
scenario projects has been expected by the public servants ?
In the following in order to highlight the unique character of the public organization, I
sometimes refer to the scenario projects done by private entities.
In general, scenario projects for the public sector are to contribute to support better
policy making. Howlett and Ramesh argues that there are five stages in policy
making process, i.e. first, policy issue identification, second, policy issue-framing andagenda-setting, third, policy measure development, fourth, policy measure
implementation and then fifth, policy measure effectiveness assessment or policy
termination [Howlett, 2005].
Here, referring to Howlett’s work, a useful framework is proposed by Volkery andRibeiro [Volkery, 2009] concerning the different functions of scenario planning inorder to support the government policy making along with its different stages (Figure4.). Volkery suggests followings; first, the indirect form of scenario based decision
support is useful for the early stage of policy making. Because in this stage, public
servants have to and are willing to explore alternative policy options widest possible.
Novel ideas or criticism from the range of stakeholders will be welcomed in order tobuy-in their engagement. Another suggestion of Volkery is that in the latter stage ofpolicy making process, decision support activity may take more direct form such as
framing decision-making agenda and option generation for further actions. Here, thepolicy making process often encounters the political debates where different interests
crush seeking for compromise. This is the stage that logical and analytical discussion
may not work. Serious political and administrative process dominates, andopportunities for wider participation of stakeholders become limited.
Figure 4. Forms of scenario-based decision support

14

3.2. Scenario Planning in Japanese government
Referring to the Figure 4., one can observe that the tales from Japan in this paper
confirm this theoretical framework. Different stages of policy making requiredifferent function of the scenario planning. In Japanese policy making process,government sometimes calls for a scenario style brainstorming event with participants
outside the government, such as NGOs and academics. However these initiatives
appear when the process is in the stage of issue identification and/or issue-framing
and agenda-setting; that is the early stage of policy making process. This is seen in“Energy 2030” and, in a sense, in “Nuclear Power Scenarios 2005”. In ‘politicallymatured society’ there is a legitimate call from civic society for more involvement in
the policy making process and Japan is not an exception. Those who wish to have asay on issues and agendas ask for venues to express, and government responds byproviding the venues. For public servants, who have to administrate to make thisvenue happen with papers and budget, following right process is the base for theauthenticity of the venue and discussion. And for scenario practitioners, as private
consultants, they see this as the market to offer their expertness, and theycommercially compete by proposing the rightest process and rightest venue to theclients/sponsors in the public sector. This circumstance may eventually lead to thestandardization (and mechanization) of both process and venue.
On the other hand, when the process develops to the stage of policy development andpolicy measure assessment, Japanese government officialdom turns to be cautious toinvite voices from outside. Obviously the policy making stage has reached the“close-down alternative”. As said above, bureaucrats will have to maneuver and craftcompromise with limited number of stakeholders.
My experience of scenario projects for Japanese public organizations ranges from theearly phase of “open up alternatives” to the later phase. In some cases, the scenario
planning was employed to appraise the robustness of the preferred options for future
actions. Alike the story of “CEO fires hjimself”, the facilitation for decision making
support was a no laughing business. In this paper I can share few of the cases wherebureaucrats were participants. Circumstances make me hesitant to publicise.
Accordingly following analysis and discussion would be argued with inadequate dataand examples, with regret, and scant to academic interests, with regret.
Let me allow moving forward by stating my general observation.
As a practitioner I have noticed a distinctive psychological barrier that Japanese
government officials show in the scenario-type discussion.
Following, I am going to discuss the nature and origin of this barrier.
3.3. A Practitioner’s Tool: normative and exploratory approach
When I was conducting a workshop with government officials as my client, asymptom of this psychological barrier could often be observed.
In the scenario developing process a practitioner can choose one of the two
approaches of how to frame scenarios i.e. normative approach and exploratory one.
Everyone who has some knowledge of scenario planning theory has encountered thisdichotomy in the way that a scenario framework and stories can be shaped, and in15

how the workshop can be conducted 6. This distinction is theoretically important, andoften rescues the practitioner when he or she is stuck and confused in the middle of aworkshop discussion.
The normative approach starts with that the set of characteristics at the end of time
horizon, and works backwards to see what would take to get there. This approach is
employed when the client knows the future he wants to describe. On the other hand,the exploratory approach can be used when the client doesn’t need to be ready for hisdesired future. With the exploratory approach the client is open to explore and takeup any uncertainties which might affect his future plans and wishes to achieve.
In general, the scenario exercises for Japanese government organizations follow thenormative approach. As explained in “Energy 2030”, bureaucrats can admit that the
future is not a simple extrapolation of the past quantitatively modelled; however they
very often cling on to one single future, which is desirable for them. Recognising that
this is normative, scenario practitioners can assist them in understanding that the
future can take several different shapes. In practice, the facilitator can allow thebureaucrats to write up a story line leading to their desirable future. Then in the nextstage, the facilitator can ask them to think about the plausibility of the story they
made, and to think through the critical uncertainties which might prevent the smoothdevelopment of their story from the present. I call this thinking process “derailment”.
Hence the bureaucrats are allowed to always refer to their normatively constructed
future, with their exploratory adventure of derailing from it.
The exploratory approach is another choice, but I have learned that for public servants,
this approach is psychologically challenging. In the course of exploring vague,
unshaped uncertainties in the future, some of them start to feel insecure and soon
invent excuses not to turn up at all. They feel insecure because this approach deploys
qualitative, rather than quantitative, analysis 7. When exploring, we have to get rid of
the anchor of data sets and conventional modelling, and learn to experiment with the
top-down, or ‘deductive’ approach. Because the data set and conventional frameworkis the prime source of confidence and legitimacy among bureaucrats, they often see
the scenarios formulated through the exploratory approach either as baseless oroverambitious.
This paper is not arguing that the normative approach our bureaucrats so much like isinappropriate. A society can agree on its desired direction, such as sustainable
development, after which government and individual bureaucrats move on to theirown agenda of how they can influence transition. However, as Grin et.al discussed[Grin, 2010] it seems reasonable to say that some issues are open-ended, and are best
approached, or explored, with a mind-set that allows for the possibility of change.
Now let us go into more detail on the characteristics of the bureaucracy in Japan. I
want to conduct my argument that the characteristics I am going to introduce would
be a prime mover that the bureaucrats prefer and cling on to the normative approachnotwithstanding in the early stage of policy making process.
6

See, Scenarios: The art of strategic conversation, Kees van der Heijden,1996, John Wiley & Sons,
pp.195-216
7See, Shell International Ltd (2003), Scenarios: An Explorer’s Guide, London: PXS Shell International.
p.16. It argues that, “The story form of scenarios enables both qualitative and quantitative aspects to
be incorporated, so ideas are not excluded on the basis that they can’t be measured.”16

3.4. Technocrats
Bureaucrats are technocrats and want to be rational, neat and tight. They frame theirquestions in terms of what is best and what is true and they pride themselves on theirprofessionalism. A technocrat wishes to be an excellent executor of given policy
goals. For them, the goals have to be politically agreed beforehand. In this sense, thetechnocrat is like a good chef. He has meat, fish, vegetables and flavourings. He has
his secret recipes, but definitely needs an order from his customers. Will the order befish or meat? Italian or Chinese? Having taken the order, the chef will make every
effort to satisfy customers’ appetite. He is not allowed to fail.
Like the chef, the bureaucrat inhibits himself from even imagining any failure in theiradministrative execution. In fact, this psychological barrier seems commonly felt
among anyone who regularly engages in the policy-making process. Academics andprivate-sector experts sometimes face such a psychological barrier when discussing
the national policy agenda. The scenario exercise “Urban Mobility 2040” implicitly
envisaged that the user of the scenario study would be the senior bureaucrats
experienced in urban planning. I observed there was an unsaid consensus among theacademic authors to discard any stories of government doing bad or foolish things.
“Urban Mobility 2040” was keen, probably overkeen, to find an audience withbureaucrats.
Adding to the psychological barrier, there is an institutional one. For bureaucrats, thepossible existence of several different but equally plausible futures means that ascenario project is going to jeopardize what the political process has officiallyforeseen and agreed. This means that bureaucrats will not yet be able to hook theirpolicy packages onto the one comprehensive picture of the future. Hence, bureaucrats
will flatly carry on the scenario study until the scenario project gives birth to an only
child! The participants in any study around a politically sensitive issue, according tobureaucrats, have to arrive at the one single future, which will be a great improvementon the present, and bureaucrats will strive to bring about that future by spending
taxpayers’ money.
This is the institutional barrier that prevents the full usage of the scenario planning.
We may be able to say that the technocratic nature of the government institution
nourishes the technocratic personality of each bureaucrat. I have seen many times
bureaucrats – and how smart they are! – arriving at my workshop already well-armed
with their own thorough policy package, which would make Japan far better than it istoday. For them, a scenario exercise is simply muddying their clear vision of a better
future. Why, a bureaucrat asks himself, is this workshop so loosely managed? Why
does the facilitator stubbornly push me to think of ‘other’ visions? The future has
already been agreed, and shortly, the government will launch a concrete policy
package to bring it closer. This exercise is dysfunctional and even dangerous. Is thefacilitator a born cynic? Is he a trouble maker? The bureaucrat’s frustration boils
over. This is not simply a matter of a scenario exercise taking place at the wrong time
for the bureaucrat’s working mission, nor is he confused by the scenario making
process. Simply, he has found the scenario workshop to be a dangerous event.

17

3.5. Politicisation
Another reason why bureaucrats want to have a single future is more subtle and tricky.
Japan’s government organization is compartmentalized. It is divided into Ministries.
Ministries are divided into Secretariats (Kambo) and Bureaus (Kyoku), which further
divided into Divisions (Bu), and the Divisions into Sections (Ka) and Rooms (Shitsu).
Inside a Ministry, Bureau exercise huge influence over policy making process sincemajority of cabinet-sponsored bill are formulated here in Bureau. Each Bureau works
almost independently and enjoys the independence. There is a saying “Bureaus but
no Ministry”. Thousands of bureaucrats, particularly in the higher ranks, are notliving as one united officialdom, but in a very competitive working place 8. One partof the government challenges another part. Each tries to promote its own policy
packages to influential politicians. In order to demonstrate “its” policy is much better
than “others”, a visionary story of a bright future, told with colourful graphics andnarration, is very much appreciated. Scenario stories can communicate well. They
make it easy for listeners to capture the holistic image of a bright future. The visionand rhetoric are appreciated by politicians, who are the clients of the bureaucrats.
But my story doesn’t end at this point.
Japanese bureaucrats often make use of a scenario project as a benign negotiation
place for their stakeholders: a place where a small interest group can develop aroundthem. In the end the bureaucrats want to channel the stakeholders toward theirpreferred policy package. In a policy paper they habitually produce, there is “Part
One: Vision”, followed by the lengthy administrative narratives, as “Part Two”,
where they describe in detail how to implement the Vision. Armed with numbers, thewriting style of Part Two is rather detached, passive and marked by compromise. It
looks like a non-partisan document, but in reality it often represents the particularinterest of one part of the government, most cases the interest of a particular Bureau
or down under in a particular Ministry. The policy experts in academia and in private
sector are welcomed to work on Part Two together with bureaucrats; however they are
only welcome as faithful supporters (or clients). Although the experts have a chance
to intervene and consider details in Part Two, the experts usually don’t challenge Part
One. As seen in “Nuclear Power scenario 2005”, experts can often stumble across animportant unsolved issue, a big fish, but bureaucrats ensure that at the end of the day
it is put back in the refrigerator.
To them, Part One should be the smashing showcase, which one branch of thegovernment wants to ‘sell’ to politicians; therefore it is understandable that thebureaucrats don’t want to ‘sell’ a doomed future or a ‘shock scenario’ 9. The greatfear of political leaders is unexpected events, especially those which lie beyond theircontrol. So it is with bureaucrats. They cannot envisage the government doing its job
badly10. Bureaucrats are – and have to be – statists by nature.
8

For the short history of Japanese bureaucracy development, see Toye, John (2006), ‘Modern
Bureaucracy’, Research Paper No. 2006/52, UNU-WIDER, United Nations University (UNU), p.9.
9
A ‘shock scenario’ seen in the “Energy 2030” only works for confirming the legitimacy of theexisting policies around the energy supply security, which Japanese government has been very mucheager to enhance.
10
This reaction looks common to an experience in the UK. Tom Ling writes in his ‘Decision making in
the public sector’ in Ringland [Ringland, Scenarios in Public Policy, 2002], P.129, that “If “whatcounts is what works” is part of the credo of the new policy maker, it will be frustrating to18

3.6. Discussion
How can a scenario practitioner ease bureaucrats’ psychological barriers? We knowthat the time horizon for politicians is rather short, while the policy execution needs toplay out over a much longer period. This means that the environment around thepolicy execution, that is the task of bureaucrats, is ever more vulnerable to changewith time. Hence, the methodological risk assessment of the implementation of thecurrent plan must be in bureaucrats’ interest. How to convince them?
The scale of uncertainty itself can be useful in making the case. As seen in “Energy2030”, in the year 2004/05 the issue of climate change loomed large on the agenda
and Japanese civil society noticed that this was an issue not easily dismissed – butcountermeasures to the issue were not at all fixed. This condition called for a
scenario-style study, which could invite a variety of opinions and proposed solutions.
Bureaucrats conceded that they couldn’t control this new issue and appealed to the
public: “let’s think together.” Then, gradually climate change became a matter ofpolitical and administrative negotiations, international and domestic; the technocrats
became ready to construct their masterly regulatory actions. With this new phase, therole of scenario practitioners ended.
Another possible legitimisation for inviting scenario planning in Japanese officialdom
might be to boldly demonstrate the unavoidable uncertain nature of future horizon.
Scenario study will report the crude fact that any development of policy environment
toward future contains some uncertainty. A well-argued scenario framework could
convince audiences to accept the need of exploratory mind set and of being ready for
future surprises. This means that by offering a thinking framework in scenario style,public servants can establish its independency from political decision process. Here,choice will be made by politicians for his/her preferred policies and their plausible
outcomes. In return bureaucrats can claim with pride that their role is only to offer
several equally possible policy choices. They are now living in the realm of
professionalism; however, can they ever restrict their born ambition of being in partof important political decisions?
In this regard there was unique and appreciable event that may have affected the mind
set of senior bureaucrats, who are specialised in the energy policies. This event may
have told them that in some cases the political decision process offers no room for
public servants to play.
The recent political turmoil in Japan has been teaching bureaucrats that the governing
practices of the ruling party may not always work. In 2011/12, after the great earth
quake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accidents, Democratic Party, then ruling party,
strived hard and fixed the national energy plan with a package of numerical targets.
Bureaucrats specialised in energy policies were mobilised heavily and with the helpof outside energy experts crafted piles of supporting calculation and documents.
Furthermore, Democratic Party introduced a novel process of ‘deliberative poll’ inorder for the lay citizens to discuss and come to an ideological consensus around thefuture of nuclear energy and its industry. The conclusion was to disestablish nuclear
acknowledge that he cannot always clarify what works. Expressing uncertainty is seen to be politicallythe weak and administratively untidy. In response to such lack of certainty, the hard-writing of British
public policy making becomes apparent. ”

19power soonest possible. But, when in 2012 Liberal Democratic Party came back topower, the Democratic Party’s energy plan was instantly abandoned. Prime minister
decided to scrap the plan with a brief word of “it is not based on the reality, and needa full revision.”
A gross humiliation for bureaucrats. And this is a crisis for Japanese bureaucracy
because by force of habit, bureaucrats have been fixated on the high profile examples
and the well-understood procedures of the past. As Cerase discussed [Cerase, 2002],
this kind of administrative skill has been regarded as an important asset in order tohandle critical situation with a sense of stability. The above case betrayed, and hence
undermined the authority of officialdom. By drawing profound lessons, would theofficials cautiously retreat to their proud professionalism?
My account is that senior public servants won’t abandon their ambition to get
involved in the high level political decision process, which may eventually take themto possible careers in politics. In Japan senior public servants are regarded bypolitical parties as the reservoir of candidates for general election. Politicians andsenior bureaucrats are both statists and reliant on each other. For them the boundary
between political and administrative world is blurred. The senior public servants
want to claim themselves, hardheaded, earnest and reliable personalities, and hence
they are most hesitant to fiddle any hypothetical issues and questions, which thescenario planning is very much good at.
Let us be back on the track.
There is another idea for easing bureaucrats’ psychological barriers. This idea ismore practical and operational. Providing a venue for unfettered conversation often
works fairly positive on bureaucrats’ mind. This paper earlier pointed thatgovernment bureaucrats prefer the normative approach, which will arrive at one
single better future. The truth is that, bureaucrats are not philosophically normative
but are, once functioning in the officialdom, destined to behave normative. Therefore,
for them there is a need of venue outside the officialdom.
This desire of Japanese bureaucrats to have a free space for freer discussion seems
demonstrating in an interestingly subtle manner; weak governance on government
sponsored scenario projects.
There is a growing demand from Japanese governmental organisation on scenario
planning type project however; I, a practitioner, have been observing that when aproject starts, the governance on the process is very often left weak and unclear. The
client leaves the objectives of the project loosely defined at the initial stage, which
would gradually be found and formulated through the course of the scenario typebrainstorming. For the practitioner he/she will have to accept the shifting and evenfloating objectives that the client and the practitioner originally contracted. In thesecircumstances, the evaluation of success/failure of the project might be difficult if one
wishes to employ the criteria of target-result axis.
The reason for this seems simple. The client and the sponsor see the project as oneoff event and expect something novel would happen through the discussion process.
In Japanese public sector, doing scenario type project is yet an isolated event
compared to the day-to-day policy making and execution, therefore loose governanceover scenario type project is understandable.
20

The clients of scenario planning in public sectors wish to have a learning experience,
refreshment, breeze, wonder and intellectual adventure. Scenario practitioners
working for them accept to undertake this allocated role modestly. I see participants
are constructing individual meaning, taking in new information, accommodating themand changing their mental models. This is an individual learning, not an
organisational one. And this is the niche for the scenario projects in Japanese publicorganisation.

4. Conclusion
Reflecting Ringland’s proposal of two categories; ‘scenarios in public policy’ and‘scenarios in the public sector’, in Japan, the former type of scenario projects cancount numerous. Also in other part of the world. Future scanning projects andscenario projects have been developing in much more institutionalised and regularisedmanner in such as UK, Sweden, Norway, Singapore and notably EU. There, ‘futurescanning industry’ has become popular and flourishing.
However, seeing the long history of R. D. Shell scenario planning, I may be able topoint out that excess institutionalisation of these activity could bring about the loss of
momentum both in client side and in scenario practitioners.
Above concern seems well noticed in Japan, especially in the public sector. I see that,the loose governance of the scenario project and the isolation from the policy making
process might be intentional. Public officers hate to add administrative work fordoing scenario project. Bureaucrats live the world where neat, evidence-based
documents and proper administrative process are required, whereas a scenario projectis in general very time consuming, and only yields stories of the several plausible
futures! This may look awkward and disappointing outcome. The outcome can never
ever translate into concrete actions. However, public officers have known the best
cream of the project. The end result of the scenario project is not about a moreaccurate picture of tomorrow, nor producing an attractive report.
Since 2008, I have been working for the GraSPP (Graduate School for Public Policy)in The University of Tokyo, Japan, where I have been introducing academics andstudents to the methodology and practices of scenario planning. In 2012, a scenario
planning course has established mainly for the graduate students who hope to maketheir career in the public sector.
I hope that in future I could establish another scenario planning course in GraSPPwith the attendees of a mixture of Japanese bureaucrats, business people, students andacademics. The bureaucrats will preferably not be freshmen, but instead with five toten years of working experience behind them: they will have somehow experienced
difficulty and disappointment in their tasks and assignments. Business people will
come to the course to learn about the policy making and administrative process inpractice. Studying with them, bureaucrats can touch the real world in which businesspeople habitually claim they work.
Just alike “China Scenario 2007”, Japanese officials look for a proper venue,
politically safe, analytical but light hearted, to expose themselves onto outsiders’ open
criticism. In the course I could run in GraSPP, younger bureaucrats will be able toenjoy adventures in scenario planning, with classmates who want to trust the21

government. For bureaucrats, open and frank talks about government dysfunction
and mistakes, with people outside homogenous officialdom, are a tremendous
opportunity, and even holding such talks will be a crucial concession by them. Plus,some of them will instantly recognise that scenario planning is an effective tool forcommunication and engagement with society.
For me this seems enough. I share the view of As Arie de Geus, who claims;
Perception, to a human being, is an active engagement with the world 11. [de Geus,
1997]
In reflecting on my years working with the Japanese government, I have noticed thatyoung bureaucrats are more and more conscious of the institutional barriers ingovernment against scenario-type studies, as well as the psychological barriers within
individuals. With recognition will come change: that is my hope. Scenario planning
is a theory and practice to make public servants think exploratively, by making them
‘derails' their expected future.

References
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Development, Routledge, London
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11de Geus writes in The Living Company p.36, “We will not perceive a signal from the outside world
unless it is relevant to an opinion for the future that we have already worked out in our imaginations.
The more “memories of the future” we develop, the more open and receptive we will be to signals fromthe outside world.”

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