October, 2013

Having experienced the catastrophic disaster in 2011, Tohoku University has founded
the International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS). Together withcollaborating organizations from many countries and staff with a broad array of
specializations, IRIDeS conducts world-leading research on natural disaster scienceand disaster mitigation. Based on the lessons from the 2011 Great East Japan (Tohoku)
Earthquake and Tsunami disaster, IRIDeS aims to become a world center for the study ofdisasters and disaster mitigation, learning from and building upon past lessons in disastermanagement from Japan and around the world. Throughout, IRIDeS will contributeto on-going recovery/reconstruction efforts in areas affected by the 2011 tsunami,
conducting action-oriented research and pursuing effective disaster management to build
a sustainable and resilient society.
The 3rd United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 will be heldin Sendai City, one of the areas seriously damaged due to the 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami. IRIDeS will play an important role for the conference as an
academic organization located in the hosting city. Drafting of this report, focusing on
the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in terms of the core indicators ofthe Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, is one of the contributory activities to theforthcoming event.
This publication is the preliminary report toward the final issue, which will be released in
March 2014. We hope that the Japanese experience of past disasters including the Great
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami will be shared among national/local governments,
the private sector, and citizens all over the world.
Arata Hirakawa
Director
International Research Institute of Disaster Science
Tohoku University1. Introduction

1

2. World's 21st Century Natural Disasters

2

3. History of Natural Disasters in Japan (1888 - 2010)4

4. Damage due to 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

6

5. 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Review
HFA Priority for Action 1

8

Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority
with a strong institutional basis for implementation

HFA Priority for Action 2

13

Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning

HFA Priority for Action 3

16

Use knowledge, innovation and education
to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels

HFA Priority for Action 4

20

Reduce the underlying risk factors

HFA Priority for Action 5

Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels

26

Japan has one of the highest levels of urban risk of natural disaster in the world because
all the three values determining the risk—hazard, vulnerability, and exposed value—
are very high. Thus, Japanese society has struggled against natural disasters throughout
history.
In this context, the UN World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction was held in
Yokohama in May 1994 as a part of a mid-term review of the International Decade for
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). However, the most tragically disastrous event inJapanese history since World War II, the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, occurred the nextyear.
The earthquake led the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) to selectKobe City, Hyogo Prefecture, as its location for demonstrating the city’s remarkable
recovery from the earthquake. The Hyogo Declaration was adopted at the conference,and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 (HFA) was built as a 10-year plan
to safeguard the world from natural hazards. The HFA consists of the following fivepriorities for action, which would serve as guidelines to reduce future disaster damage
for every country or region.
Priorities for action 2005–2015:
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong
institutional basis for implementation.
2. Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.
3. Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilienceat all levels.
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors.
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
During that decade, the Great East Japan Earthquake with Mw 9.0 occurred on March
11, 2011. We must learn from such devastating experiences for the sake of futuresocieties. This report focuses on topics related to the earthquake and tsunami in terms of
HFA guidelines from the academic viewpoints of professors at the International ResearchInstitute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS), Tohoku University, to disseminate the event’s
lessons learned.
Each topic deals with a specific case, contains context, the situation before and after the
event, good practices, and problems, followed by future recommendations summarizedat the end of each priority section.

1

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

50
28
12

27

20

24

47

30

15

29

14
37

31

22

19
26

1 21 36

33

49

46

44

39
32

40

No.

Month/Year

DisasterType

222,570

3,700,000

8,000

14 August 2003

Heat wave

Spain

15,090880

2 December 2004 Earthquake Indonesia 165,708

532,898

4,452

15 August 2003

Heat wave

Germany

9,355

1,650

2,420,000

4,000

16 December 2004

Earthquake Thailand

8,345

67,0071,000

Month/Year

1 January 2010

2

Estimated
Killed Total Affected Damage(US$ Million)

Estimated
Killed Total Affected Damage(US$ Million)

No.

Disaster
Type

Country

Earthquake Haiti

Myanmar 138,366

Country

3 May 2008

Storm

4 May 2008

Earthquake China

87,47645,976,596

85,00017 May 2006

Earthquake Indonesia

5,778

3,177,923

3,100

5 October 2005

Earthquake Pakistan

73,338

5,128,309

5,200

18 April 2010

Earthquake China

2,968

112,000500

6 June-August
2010

Heat wave

55,73619 September 2004

Storm

Haiti

2,754

315,59450

Russia400

7 December 2004 Earthquake Sri Lanka

35,3991,019,306

1,317

20 August 2003

Heat wave

Portugal

2,696

8 December 2003 Earthquake Iran

26,796

267,628500

21 May-June 2004

Flood

Haiti

2,665

31,283

9 July-August
2003

Heat wave

Italy

20,0894,400

22 May 2003

Earthquake Algeria

2,266

210,261

5,000

10 January 2001

Earthquake India

20,005

6,321,812

2,623

23 December 2012

Storm

Philippines

1,901

6,246,664

1,693

11 March 2011

Earthquake Japan

19,846368,820

210,000

Storm
24 August-September
2005

United States

1,833

500,000

125,000

12 August 2003

Heat wave

19,4904,400

25 May-August 2010 Flood

China

1,691 134,000,000

18,0001,023

26 October 2005

Guatemala1,513

France13 December 2004 Earthquake India

16,389654,512Storm

475,314988

9

HFA Review Report

Earthquake

Windstorm, Flood

Drought
Heat wave
Extreme winter conditions

This map indicates the fifty worst disasters
between 2001 and 2012. These disasters
are categorized into five types.

6
34
35 42
38

11
5

8

18

4

25

10
3

43

13

45

16

7

23

2

17
41

48

(Source: NOAA)

No.

Month/Year

Disaster
Type

Country

Estimated
Killed Total Affected Damage(US$ Million)

No.

Month/Year

Disaster
Type

Country

Estimated
Killed Total Affected Damage(US$ Million)

27 July 2006

Heat wave

France1,388

39 August 2007

Earthquake Peru

593

658,331600

28 August 2003

Heat wave

Belgium

1,175

40 February 2010

Earthquake Chile

562

2,671,556

30,00029 July 2003

Heat wave

Switzerland 1,039

41 February 2002

Drought

Malawi500

2,829,435

30 July 2006

Heat wave

Netherlands 1,000

42 July 2007

Heat wave Hungary

500

31 November 2001

Flood

Algeria

43 August 2006

32 January 2011

Flood

Brazil33 January 2001

Earthquake El Salvador

921

280

45,423300

900

45,000

1,000
1,500

844

1,334,529

Extreme winter34 January-February
UkraineConditions
2006

801

59,60035 July 2003

Heat wave

Croatia788

36 May-June 2004

Flood

Dominica

688

10,00237 February 2004

Earthquake Morocco628

13,465400

38 October 2011

Earthquake Turkey

604

32,938

1,500

Flood

Ethiopia

498

10,0963

2010-March Flood
44 April
2011
Flood
45 August-September
2006

Colombia

418

2,791,999

1,000

Ethiopia

364

8,000

46 July-October 2012 Flood

Nigeria363

7,000,867500

47 April 2011

United States

11,000354

17,200Heat wave Australia
48 January-February
2009

Storm

347

2,000

49 February 2001

Earthquake El Salvador

315

256,02150 July 2003

Heat wave United Kingdom

301

349

Data Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)

3

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary ReportJapan is located in one of the most disasterprone areas in the world, and we Japanese
have experienced many disastrous events
throughout history. Thus Japanese society
and cities are skilled at disaster management.
Each disaster has helped develop andstrengthen our disaster management system.
Although we occasionally experiencecatastrophic disasters, the number ofdeaths and missing persons due to disasters
has been declining as a result of gradualimprovement of the various aspects of ourdisaster management system.

2000
1977
1993

Hokkaido-nansei-oki Earthquake (M7.8) : 230

1977

1963

Heavy Snowfall : 101

Heavy Snowfall : 231

2007 Niigata-ken-Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (M6.8) :15
1983

Storm damage : 670

2005

Torrential Rains in the Tokai Region : 10

→ 2003 • Specified Urban River Inundation
Countermeasures Act

Heavy Snowfall : 131

Heavy Snowfall : 152

1947 Mt. Asama Eruption : 11
1984

Fukui Earthquake (M7.1) : 3,769→ 1950 • Building Standard Law

Nagano-ken-seibu Earthquake (M6.8) : 291891 Nobi Earthquake (M7.9) : 7,273
1980

2010

Heavy Snowfall : 131

1938

1983

Torrential Rains : 117

1927
1943

1999

Typhoons 23, 24, 25 : 181

1983 Nihon-kai-chubu Earthquake (M7.7) : 104

1954

1948

Mt. Usu Eruption : 3

1965This map displays the distribution of majordisasters in Japan from 1888 to 2010. About
sixty disasters are classified into four types:
earthquake or tsunami, volcanic disaster,windstorm or flood, and heavy snowfall.

2000

Mt. Usu Eruption : —Heavy Snowfall : 152

Torrential Rains : 925
Kita-Tango Earthquake (M7.5) : 2,925

Tottori Earthquake (M7.2) : 1,083

Torrential Rains in Hiroshima→ 2000 • Act on Promotion of Sediment Disaster
Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Prone Areas

1946

1972

Torrential Rains : 447

1967

Torrential Rains : 256

1990

Mt. Unzen Eruption : 44

Nankai Earthquake (M8.0) : 1,443→ 1947 • Disaster Relief Act

1976

Typhoon 17 and Torrential Rains : 171

1914
1973

Mt. Sakurajima Eruption : 58

2004

Mt. Sakurajima Eruption : —→ 1973 • Act on Specia Measures for Active Volcanoes

1953
1957

Torrential Rains : 1,013
Torrential Rains : 722

1951
1945
4

1993

Typhoon Ruth : 943

Typhoon Makurazaki : 3,756

Torrential Rains : 79
Typhoon 23 : 98

1966 Typhoons 24,26 : 317
1958
1954

Mt. Aso Eruption : 12

1979

Typhoon 20 : 115

1950

Typhoon Jane : 539

1934

Typhoon Muroto : 3,036

Typhoon Toyamaru : 1,761

HFA Review Report

Deaths and Missing Persons by Disasters (1945 - 2010)

Year
1926
1952

Mt. Tokachi Eruption : 144

Number ofDisaster (Magnitude) : Deaths and Missing

Earthquake (epicenters marked), Tsunami
Volcanic disaster
Windstorm (landed places marked), Flood
Heavy snowfall

Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M8.2) : 33

(places with highest seasonal total marked)

1968

Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M7.9) : 52

1964
2008

Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake (M7.2) : 23

1933

Showa Sanriku Earthquake Tsunami (M8.3) : 3,064

Niigata Earthquake (M7.5) : 26

→ 1966 • Act on Earthquake Insurance Insurance

1978

Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake (M7.4) : 28

→ 1981 • Amendment of Building Standard LawInsurance

1960
1896

Meiji Sanriku Earthquake Tsunami (M7.1) : 21,959

1978
1948
1888

Izu-Oshima-kinkai Earthquake (M7.0) : 25

1947

Typhoon Kanogawa : 1,269

1982

Typhoon Kathleen : 1,930• Amendment of Act on Promotion of Sediment Disaster

Tonankai Earthquake (M7.9) : 1,223• Act on Promotion of the Earthwuake-proof
Retrofit of Buildings• Amendment of Act on Special Measures
for Large-scale Earthquakes→ 1997 • Act on Promotion of Disaster Resilience Improvementin Densely Inhabited Areas→ 1998 • Act on Support for Livelihood Recovery ofDisaster Victims

Torrential Rains and Typhoon 10 : 439

1944(M7.3) : 6,437→ 1995 • Act on Special Measures for
Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures→ 1996 • Act on Special Measures for Preservation of
Rights and Profits of the Victims of Specified Disasters

Izu-hanto-oki Earthquake (M6.9) : 30

Mikawa Earthquake (M6.8) : 2,306

Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake

1995• Amendment of Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act

Izu-Oshima Is. Eruption : —

1945

1953

approx.
Great Kanto Earthquake (M7.9) : 105,000

Miyake Is. Eruption : —1974• Amendment of Flood Control Act
Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Prone Areas

Miyake Is. Eruption and Niijima and Kozushima Is. Earthquake : 1

1983(M6.8) : 67

→ 2005 • Amendment of Act on Promotion of the
Earthquake-proof Retrofit of Buildings

Typhoon Ion : 838

1923

2000

Niigata-ken-Chuetsu
Earthquake

2004

Mt. Bandai Eruption : 461

1958

1986

Chile Earthquake Tsunami (M9.5) : 142

1959

Typhoon Ise-wan : 5,098→ 1960 • Soil Conservation and Flood Control
Urgent Measures Act

Torrential Rains : 1,124→ 1961 • Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act(Image from Wikimedia Commons)→ 1962 • Act on Special Financial Support
to Deal with Extremely Severe Disasters

Data Source: “Disaster Management in Japan” (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2011)5

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

Nasu Town
Nasushiobara City
Yaita City

0

50

0

141

0

183

Ohtawara City

0

126

Sakura City

027

Nakagawa Town
Nikko City

1

Kanuma City

0

Sano City

30

Ashikaga City

Mibu Town

01

Ichikai Town

085

Yamanobe Town

0

Motegi Town

012

Nagai City

0

169

0

0

0

13

0

1

0

Hanyu City

2

0

Sugito Town

0

Saitama City

1

4

0

Kiryu City

45
0

0

4

Takasaki City

Kita City
Suginami City

0

27

0
0

Bunkyo City

000

Taito City

20
0

15

Edogawa City
Koto City

1
2

0

Ota City
Setagaya City

10

4

0

23

0

2

0

12

2

23

2

Minato City

0

Machida City

0
2

Chiyoda City

29

13

0

0

0

Tokyo
Metropolis

80Sumida City

Tama City

2
1

2

20

Arakawa City

23

0

3

Adachi City

15

Katsushika City

1

Yamagata
Prefecture

Gunma
Prefecture

1

0

Oizumi Town

3

0

0

Tatebayashi City

1

Itabashi City

Fujisawa City

1

1

Kasukabe City

Kawaguchi City
Asaka City

0

1

0

Shibukawa City

2

0

Yoshikawa City

Hadano City

0

114
0

Miyashiro Town

2

Nanyo City
Kawanishi Town

39
0

Ageo City

Yokohama City

0

40

Kuki City

1

2

1

1

0

Kazo City

Kawasaki City

4
5

3

Konosu City

SaitamaPrefecture

Tochigi
Prefecture

130

1

0

Yamagata City

Oyama City

Kumagaya City

Nakayama Town

723
149

Shimotsuke City

5

0

1

1

Moka City

12

201

Haga Town

Mashiko Town

1
0

Obanazawa City

74
2

Takanezawa Town

90

Tochigi City

0

Nasukarasuyama City

7

6

0

Kanagawa
Prefecture
Ibaraki Prefecture
Sakura City

Sakae Town

Inzai City

Yachiyo City
0

Abiko City

Noda City

1

7

Kashiwa City

1

17

Matsudo City

Kamagaya City
Funabashi City
Ichikawa City

1

0
0

459

9

49

0

Urayasu City

Tomisato City

0

Narita City

Katori City

1

Choshi City

3,659

0

Sammu City

481

1

Ichihara City

0

0

27

0

1,513

Takahagi City

1

1,175

Hitachi City

201

33

Koga City

1

25

3

0

71

0

1

13

Naka City

3,797

3

327

Tokai Village

164

1

1,338
11

647

Yuki City

6

Bando City

1
1

1
1

Data Source: Fire and Disaster Management Agency, (as of March 26, 2013)

Tsukuba City

0

Mito City

3

7

Oarai Town

Namegata City

274
1

70

Moriya City

0

12

Tsukubamirai City

0

Kasumigaura City
Kashima City
Itako City
Kamisu City

66

Toride City

0

Tsuchiura City

0

Tone Town
Ryugasaki City

Inashiki City

319

Miho Village

279
0

121
1

81

Ami Town

Ushiku City

Kawachi Town

1

1
0

0

317

0

Hokota City

Joso City

887
2,067

1

Ibaraki Town

29
3

186

Hitachinaka City

Omitama City

19

Kujukuri Town

0

0
1
363

14

Oamishirasato City

0

158

3

Kitaibaraki City

1,165

Yokoshibahikari Town

Mobara City
Isumi City

15
0

1

1

1

162

0
Sosa City
Shibayama Town

Togane City
1

Kasama City

Shimotsuma City
13

0

Asahi City

Shirako Town

6

8

Hitachiota City

93
220

Chikusei City

2,309

0
0

Ishioka City

68

2

Shirosato Town

Sakuragawa City

97
0

0

Hitachiomiya City

18

0
Tako Town
Tohnosho Town

658
0

2

0
0

Kozaki Town

1

0

0

Shisui Town

30

722

0

Sodegaura City

233

85

119

Chiba Prefecture

238

140

1

Narashino City
Yotsukaido City
Chiba City

0

0

1

0

0

Daigo Town

604
0

132

1

829

2

958
0

26

2

3,861

1

2,821
0

0

615

107

26

75

21

1,949

HFA Review Report

Hokkaido

Hirono Town
Ninohe City

0

Ichinohe Town

03

Takizawa Village

115Morioka City

6

Shizukuishi Town

Sanami Town

Hakodate City

1

Erimo Town

0

0

0

3

Oirase Town

2
0

0

65

Kitakami City

2

503

Tono City

4

4

Oshu City

1

465

Hashikami Town0

Miyako City

Wakuya Town
Osato Town

Osaki City
0

43

0

15

Ohira Village
Taiwa Town

0

19

1

310

Tomiya Town

0

553

0
0

Nihonmatsu City
Fukushima City

0

10

469

4,185

Otama Village

112Inawashiro Town

081

Koriyama City

Yugawa Village0240

Iitate Village

105

477
Minamisoma City

2

Ten-ei Village

0211

Nishigo Village

3

390

Sukagawa City

11

4,752

Shirakawa City

12

2,058

0

298
2

940

Yabuki Town

0

1,881

Fukushima
Prefecture

Ishikawa Town

Asakawa Town

Yamatsuri Town

Nakajima Village

Tanagura Town

0

0

0

0

40,437
0
63

25

1

1

0

JMA
Seismic
Intensity
7
6+
65+
54
3
2
1

1,811

3,341

789

878
Tome City

324

8

1,442

11,053

Minamisanriku Town

837

3,320

Ishinomaki City

3,946

33,378

Onagawa Town

870

3,271

Higashi matsushima City
Rifu Town

Shiogama City

171

Shichigahama Town

156

Tagajo City
9

0

217

Marumori Town

33

27

47

Shiroishi City

1

3

956

3,843
1,323

5,476

934

139,4813,930

011,066

2,005

48

989
187

1,152

77

Sendai City

Yamamoto Town

8,088

7

Natori City

Kakuda City

0

1,999

Kesennuma City

Iwanuma City

2,342

275

3,539

716

3,302

171

0

39
606

614
102

－
－
402
－
－

Ofunato
16.7m
15m

7

32

Sendai
7.2m
Kamisu6.6m

Susaki
3.2m

13

3,655
3,934

756

577

Tamakawa Village

Kagamiishi Town

488

Watari Town

1,819
1,037

Furudono Town

Iwaki City
448
Samegawa Village

Ofunato City

3,717

Matsushima Town

0

Tamura City
1
215
Katsurao Village
171Namie Town 431
Futaba Town
111
Okuma Town
92
Tomioka Town
170
Kawauchi Village
49
Naraha Town
87
Hirono Town
35
Ono Town
049
Hirata Village
0
16

9
91

Izumizaki Village

58
226

40

Shinchi Town

Soma City

3

2

Shichikashuku Town

1
756
Kunimi Town
Kawamata Town
01
Miharu Town

1,130

202

0

Ogawara Town242

1

24,0620
0
4

Aizubange Town
Aizuwakamatsu City
Aizumisato Town

10

Kamaishi City

3,167

124
5

Zao Town
Date City

430

4,005

807

14

Shibata Town

Koori Town

550

3,030

Kami Town

Murata Town

236

1
6

Shikama Town

Kawasaki Town

0

1

200

1,282

3

1

270

10

Rikuzentakata City

Misato Town

032

Otsuchi Town

Ichinoseki City

Kurihara City

Motomiya City

1

Iwaizumi Town

21

MiyagiPrefecture479

Tanohata Village

Iwate
Prefecture

878

26
278

39

Yamada Town

Hanamaki City

69
2

0
6

Fudai Village

0
0

41

Hachinohe City

1
1

Aomori Prefecture

Misawa City

Noda Village

10

Yahaba town

1

Kuji City

2

Number ofCompletely and Partially
Destroyed Houses

Number of
Deaths and Missing

City, Town, Village

Hachinohe
6.2m

10m
Erimo
4.1m

2011-03-11 14:46(2011-03-11 05:46 UTC)

Epicenter
38° 6'12'' N, 142°51'36'' E
Magnitude 9.0
Depth of hypocenter: 24km

5m

1
201

ted
ima eytst E Survigh
He JMA
i
by
nam
Tsu

Data Source: Japan Meteorological Agency

7

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

HFA Priority for Action 1:
Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national
and a local priority with a strong institutional basis
for implementation
HFA Core Indicator 1.1:
National policy and legal frameworks for disasterrisk reduction exist and include decentralized
responsibilities and capacities at all levels.

Institutional Structure in Japan
Keywords:
institutional structure, disaster management plans, disastermanagement acts

After:The devastation of the Tohoku region after March 11, 2011,
has led to the creation of a new reconstruction agency forthe third time in Japanese history following the 1923 Great
Kanto Earthquake and World War II. The Reconstruction
Agency officially debuted on February 10, 2012, a 10-year
operation reporting directly to the Cabinet, to support andexecute the responsibilities of the Director-General. Createdunder two relevant laws—the Basic Law of Reconstruction
from the Great East Japan Earthquake (June 23, 2011) andthe Law Establishing the Reconstruction Agency—thisagency is primarily responsible for coordinating various
ministries’ budgetary and reconstruction procedures so thatreconstruction efforts in all localities can proceed timely(Fig. 1.1).

Context:
Japan’s national institutional and legislative frameworks,
originating in the 1880s, are well developed and have beenrefined after each large-scale disaster, in order to function
at all national, regional, and local levels. The current
disaster management framework is specified by the Disaster
Countermeasures Basic Act of 1961, after the Isewan
Typhoon of 1951, which caused severe damage. In thewake of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (hereinafter
GEJE), new laws have been enacted to create a new
institution for reconstruction and laws to ensure rebuilding
for future resiliency.
Institutional structure 1: Key national players for disasterrisk reduction and management: Cabinet Office, national
ministries, and Central Disaster Management Council
Before:A modern disaster management system has been introduced
at the national level in 1961, and several national key players
have taken central roles since then. The Cabinet’s Disaster
Management Section centrally manages coordination andcollaboration among ministries and other relevant nationalorganizations, and the section Director-General is tasked
with undertaking basic disaster management policies,
responding to large-scale disasters, and coordinatingwith ministries relevant to disaster management1. In the
Cabinet office, the Central Disaster Management Council(established in 1962) discusses, evaluates, and decides upon
crucial disaster management policy contexts. The Ministerchairs the council, and 25 members represent ministries,
quasi-governmental organizations, and distinguishedacademics. This council has Committees for Technical
Investigation, which investigate topics that require further
research and assessment for scientific inputs.
Since 2005, topics handled by the Central Disaster
Management Council have focused primarily on
preparation against mega-earthquakes (target regions:Tokyo metropolitan, Tokai and Tonankai, Japan trenchChishima Trench, and Chubu-Kinki) as continuing efforts
to include lessons learned from the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu
Earthquake (Kobe Earthquake), and to a lesser extent, largescale flooding and volcano eruptions.
18

Source: recreated from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, available at:
http://www.kantei.go.jp/fukkou/organization/reconstructiongrant.html

Fig. 1.1 Role of the National Reconstruction Agency

Concerns regarding disaster reduction at the Central Disaster
Management Council have also led to the creation of
two committees for technical investigation following the
GEJE. On April 27, 2011, a committee on earthquake andtsunami measures learned from the GEJE was established toscientifically assess and integrate the lessons learned fromthe GEJE Earthquake and Tsunami. Later in October of thesame year, the evaluation committee on disaster management
promotion was established, followed by two new working
groups for detailed analysis on the Nankai Trough and Tokyo
metropolitan earthquakes and their countermeasures.
Institutional structure 2: Managing disasters with plans
Before:Disaster management plans are tools for disaster
preparedness in three disaster phases: mitigation andpreparation, response, and reconstruction and recovery.
There are three types of such plans: Basic Disaster
Management Plan, Disaster Management Operation Plan,
and Local Disaster Management Plan, prepared by theCentral Government, Ministries and Quasi-Governmental
Agencies, as well as prefectures and municipalities. The
plan is organized by disaster type, for example, four
sections—earthquake, winds and floods, volcanoes, andsnow storms in the natural disaster category—and is

Ministries of Internal Affairs and Communications; Justice; Foreign Affairs; Finance; Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Health, labor and Welfare;
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Economy, Trade and Industry; Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; Environment; and Defense.

HFA Review Report

sequenced by disaster phases. It also articulates the roles ofnational, prefectural, and local governments and local residents.

HFA Core Indicator 1.2:
Dedicated and adequate resources are available toimplement disaster risk reduction activities at alladministrative levels.

The plan was first adopted in 1963 at the national level
and has since then been guiding the country’s disastermanagement. Its contents are revised as needed, with more
frequent revisions in recent years. Three revisions haveoccurred since 2005, including entire chapter reviews in
the same year, corresponding to increasing water-related
disasters worldwide and their countermeasures. Morerecently, in 2008, the plan expanded to include measures forresponse to nuclear-power disasters.

Dedicated and Adequate Resources for Disaster
Management in Japan

After:The major feature revised after the GEJE in the Basic
Disaster Management Plan is the response to a largescale tsunami. Previously, response to tsunamis had been
overlooked in the plan as building damage was the main
focus of earthquake damage. In addition, the unprecedented
magnitude of the earthquake led to reassessing damages
from potential mega-earthquakes, specifically in the
Nankai Trough and Tokyo metropolitan areas, whichwere subsequently reflected in the national plan. Thesefundamental changes at the national level have caused
modifications to the Disaster Management Operation Planas well as the Local Disaster Management Plan.

Context:
Japan is a unique country in that it invests ample
resources in disaster management. The budget fordisaster management is annually secured, and abundant
supplemental budgets have been provided for rebuildingin the aftermath of the GEJE disaster. Additionally, giventhat Japan is aging and losing population, new forms ofcollaboration have been emerging to secure adequate
human resources from the decreasing pool to fill the gap.
Such collaboration efforts have accelerated further after
the GEJE. Disaster white papers since 1963 are anotherform of useful resource for the national, regional, and local
administrations, as well as private citizens.

Legislative structure 1: Disaster Management Acts

Budgetary resources

Before:Since the disaster relief act of 1947, one of the oldest
disaster-related acts in modern legislation, Japan has passed
various laws and acts on the management of and response todisasters. These laws’ content varies depending on targets,
such as striving to reduce damages from earthquakes (e.g.,the Building Standards Act (1950)) and floods (e.g., theFlood Control Act (1949)), and more recently, to minimallysecure the livelihoods of affected families (e.g., the Act
on Support for Reconstructing the Livelihoods of Disaster
Victims (1998)). No new laws have been created since 2005,
except for several amendments to laws on flood contr¬oland earthquake damage mitigation as a response to floods
and earthquakes that had previously occurred.
After:
One of the major disaster management laws that passed theDiet after the GEJE is the Law on Regional Development
for Tsunami Disaster Management (enacted December 14,2011). Addressing the unprecedented scale of the tsunami,
this law strives to promote regional development that isresilient to future tsunamis in various localities nationwide
by combining both structural and non-structural measures.
This law has been the basis for reconstruction following the
GEJE. An adjustment to the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures
Basic Act was adopted on April 12, 2013, mainly to i)strengthen response capacity for large-area mega-disasters,ii) secure residents’ safe and smooth evacuation, iii)
improve long-term evacuation capacity and quality, and iv)
improve learning disaster management procedures during
normal periods. mega-disasters; ii) secure safe and smoothevacuation of residents; iii) improve quality of long-term
evacuation, and iv) stipulate disaster management effort
during normalcy.
2
3

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2011. “Disaster Management in Japan.”
Reconstruction Agency, 2013. “Reconstruction progress and issues.”

Keywords:
budgetary resources, human resources, informational
resources

Before:Although the proportion of the budget allocated for disastermanagement in the general account budget was decreasingprior to the GEJE, from 8% in 1997 to 3.5% in 2010, 1.24
trillion yen were appropriated for disaster management in20102. In addition, abundant supplemental budgets haveoften been provided for rebuilding public infrastructures
after significant disasters.
After:The GEJE’s direct economic damage is calculated as 16.9
trillion yen. As of July 2013, budgets for rebuilding postGEJE are calculated to cover around 23.5 trillion yen for
total direct losses3.
Human resources
Before:Inter-prefecture and -locality partnerships for mutual
help, including objectives to share human resources, havebeen encouraged since 1995. Such partnerships havelargely involved exchanging agreements. More recently,
as a goal of decentralized governance, the Kansai LargeArea Coalition (Kansai Koiki Rengo) was formed on
October 27, 2010, the first such organization in modern
government administrations. This coalition comprises sevenparticipating prefectures of the Kansai region. One of theseven administrative goals of this coalition is to establish alarge-area disaster management system so that participating
prefectures can provide or receive support for emergencies
resulting from disasters beyond their own control. This
coalition also strives to secure sufficient human and otherresources for potential disasters.

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IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

HFA Core Indicator 1.3:
Community participation and decentralization are
ensured by delegating authority and resources to local
levels.

Community Participation in Japan
Keywords:
voluntary community organization, business communities

Source: http://blog.kahoku.co.jp/saisei/2012/03/post-33.html

Fig. 1.2: Counterpart Support by the Kansai Large-area Coalition

After:For the first time in disaster management history, the largearea administrative coalition is supporting the affected largearea regions. As part of the “counterpart system approach,”
Osaka and Wakayama Prefectures partner with Iwate;
Hyogo, Tottori, and Tokushima partner with Miyagi; andShiga and Kyoto partner with Fukushima, each partnership
including the dispatching of volunteers and specialists for
short-term response and long-term rebuilding (Fig. 1.2). As
of August 30, 2013, 136,000 man days in total have been
dispatched. Additionally, the prefectures temporarily hostevacuees from other prefectures4.
Informational resources
Since 1963, the Cabinet has published an annual disaster
white paper structured to report significant disaster datafor damages, responses, and changes affecting disastermanagement. This paper is a useful resource for national,
regional, and local administrations as it reports the relevant
statistics on disasters and their management, budget, andrelated laws and institutions. Administrations refer thispaper for updating disaster management plans that theyneed to review annually. Since the GEJE, statistics andrevised laws and regulations have been updated annually.

4

10

Context:
Japan has a long history of community participation indisaster reduction activities. The notions of “self-help,”“mutual-help,” and “public-help” have been widely shared,
especially after the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake. The
voluntary community organization for disaster management,
represented by firefighting activities, is consideredespecially important for self-help and mutual help actions.
Business communities have also begun preparing business
continuity plans since 2005, when the Central Disaster
Management Council prepared a guideline on this topic.
Vo l u n t a r y c o m m u n i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r d i s a s t e r
management
Before:Vo l u n t a r y c o m m u n i t y o rg a n i z a t i o n s f o r d i s a s t e r
management are regulated in the Disaster Countermeasures
Basic Act of 1961, number 5, article 2. According to thestatistics of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
139,000 voluntary community organizations existed in 1,658
localities in 2009, and their activities covered 73.5% of allhouseholds across the nation5.
After:
Various communities that were significantly affected by the
GEJE and had practiced their volunteer activities during
normal periods in preparation for emergency response foundtheir preparedness functional and effective. For example,
creating a list of the population needing help (handicappedand elderly) was useful when evacuating them. Rules
adopted prior to the GEJE to inform the community
about individuals’ safety during significant disasters havealso helped community members to identify those who
were missing. Nevertheless, various issues emerged: forexample, in the relationship between local governments
and voluntary community organizations, some were
unofficial and inhibited direct work, such as when goods
and supplies for temporary evacuees were available only tothose in designated evacuation shelters, whereas, in reality,
evacuation shelters existed in many other places as demand
was high after the GEJE’s unexpected size6. Currently,
many activities led by voluntary community organizations
are being reviewed and assessed for better operations in the
future.

Kansai Large-Area Coalition. “Response of Kansai Large-Area Coalition on the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. Retrieved September 3, 2013, fromhttp://www.kouiki-kansai.jp/contents.php?id=219.
5
Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2009. “Chapter 4 Disaster management activities by self-help and regional resilience creation to disasters.” Firefighting White Paper,
retrieved September 29, 2013, from http://www.fdma.go.jp/html/hakusho/h21/h21/index2.html#dai4.
6Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2009. “Chapter 4 Disaster management activities by self-help and regional resilience to disasters.” Firefighting White Paper.
Retrieved September 29, 2013, from http://www.fdma.go.jp/html/hakusho/h21/h21/index2.html#dai4.

HFA Review Report

Business communities preparing for disaster
Before:The Special Committee of the Central Disaster Management
Council in 2005 developed and began promoting BusinessContinuity Plans (BCPs), which enable private corporations
to prepare for disasters to mitigate damages and to continue
operations during the response and recovery stage. Targetinglarge and medium enterprises in particular, this effort was
expected to enable sustained business operations even in
emergencies.
After:The business community has researched the effectiveness of
BCPs during and immediately after the GEJE. According to
web-based research led by NTT data (the national telecom
company) 7, 44.7% of corporations either had or weredeveloping a BCP when the GEJE struck, among which
45% of large corporations already had BCPs. Regarding
BCP operation, 65.7% of 263 corporations reported thatthe BCP either had problems in functioning, partially orcompletely, with the GEJE’s impact to the global supply
chain, which extended beyond the size of “expected”
disasters. A complete review is currently on-going inbusiness communities to revise the contents of BCPs tooperate more efficiently in future disasters.

HFA Core Indicator 1.4:
A national multi-sectoral platform for disaster risk
reduction is functioning.

Japan’s Multi-sectral Platform for Disaster Risk
Reduction
Keywords:
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, volunteer activities,
wide-area response and mutual support between
municipalities
Context:
Japan’s multi-sector platform for disaster risk reduction isfunctioning under the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures BasicAct. However, the GEJE and Tsunami have proven that
there is no perfect system resilient to all types and sizes ofdisaster, regardless of how well the platform is establishedand operated. The national government response waslimited, incapable of quickly responding to the needs ofthe affected local government as it was difficult for them toinvestigate the overall damage. Meanwhile, having a multisector platform has also proven that support from nonstructured segments, such as volunteer efforts, could bequite useful. The platform then incorporates these lessons
via modification of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act,in order to improve response capacity against future megadisasters.
Before:Under the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act,the national government, local governments, Japan Red
Cross, other key semi-governmental and humanitarianorganizations and communities were prepared to function
under emergency conditions throughout the response stage.
The Act was significantly revised to further strengthenfunctions of emergency response headquarters and traffic
regulations for better emergency management after the
1995 earthquake. At this time, the word “volunteer” wasfirst included in the Act and in national law. Since 2005,
the Cabinet office has established the Committee forDisaster-related Volunteer Activities to encourage citizens’
greater participation in disaster reduction activities.
Various committees were established and meetings held inseveral cities nationwide, including topics related to widearea response and networking on disaster management.
Encouragement to reach agreements on mutual support
during emergencies between neighboring local governments
has increased during this period, and in 2010, 90% of local
governments across Japan had reached such agreements8.
Problems:
Although local governments are technically mandated to act
centrally for disaster response and management, prefecturaland national governments are also required to step in andtake the lead in responding to mega-disasters like the GEJE
by creating emergency headquarters in their administrations.

7

Ohashi, K., 2011. “How do we reflect lessons learned from the earthquake? Findings from the survey results of business continuity by corporations affected by the GEJE.”
Retrieved September 29, 2013, from http://www.keieiken.co.jp/monthly/2011/1109-04/index.html.
8Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2007. “Enhancing mutual-supporting system between municipalities.” Retrieved August 28, 2013,from
http://www.fdma.go.jp/neuter/about/shingi_kento/h24/tikoutai/01/shiryo_02.pdf.
9National Institute for Educational Policy Research, 2012. Activities by NPOs and volunteers following the Great East Japan Earthquake. Retrieved on September 28, 2013, fromhttp://www.nier.go.jp/jissen/chosa/rejime/2011/02_npo_vol/05_chapter3.pdf.

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IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

Nevertheless, because of the size and complexity of the
GEJE and Tsunami, national and prefectural government
provision of the necessary support to local governments
was delayed because local governments’ help requests
encountered complications resulting from the devastating
damage to the usual means of reaching the national
government.
Good practices:
Despite the initial difficulties in reaching the affected areas
because of an insufficient volume of damage information
and avoiding secondary disasters, numerous volunteers andorganizations, including international and domestic NGOs,
NPOs, and student groups, joined in to provide support in
the affected areas (see Fig. 1.3 for volunteer participation
six months later in Ishinomaki City). So far, 936,900 people
in total have volunteered to support the affected region
within the two years after the GEJE9. Furthermore, various
inter-governmental agreements have effectively supported
the affected region by, for example, hosting disaster-affected
populations who lost their houses in disasters.
After:
I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e G E J E d i s a s t e r, t h e D i s a s t e r
Countermeasures Basic Act was amended, effective April
12, 2013. Major revisions include i) strengthening response
capacity for large-scale disasters; ii) providing residents
with smooth and safe evacuation routes; iii) improving
response capacity, and iv) enhancing learning of disastermanagement procedures in normal periods— all of whichemphasize improvement in response to large-scale disasters.
Another major focus for change has been public volunteer
coalitions for better response capacity for mega-disasters.
A unit called the “Coalition Group of Volunteers andCorporations for the Public Interest” was established in the
Reconstruction Agency on February 10, 2012, replacing
an existing volunteer management unit in the Cabinet
office. In addition, the proportion of local governments’mutual support extending beyond prefectural boundaries isincreasing. For instance, there were 46.9% extra-prefecturalagreements but in 2012, it has increased to 55.1%10.

Future recommendations:
In summary, we offer three main recommendations.
First, building a strong institutional basis for promoting
disaster risk reduction at all levels, national and local,
is a several-decades-long effort. Japan’s history of
institutionalizing disaster management system highlights
several key points: first, national level leadership inestablishing a disaster management system helps toorganize horizontal and vertical structures effectively;
second, creating a law to implement a disastermanagement system will further legitimize the systemand thus support further actions; and third, shaping
an institutional basis in which all participating levelsof organizations—national, regional, and local—
are responsible for creating disaster management
plans will enable all to create a disaster management
plan, and therefore, that basis should ideally include
measures against diverse types of disasters in different
sequences of disaster phases. All these actions will takeconsiderable time, but initiating a system and revising it
as necessary through post-disaster assessments is criticalfor improvement.
Second, various national recovery agencies have been
established after mega-disasters. In addition to the
Recovery Agency of Japan after the GEJE, examples ofrecent interim institutions in the national government
include the BRR after the Indonesian Ocean tsunami(2004), the ERRA after the Pakistan earthquake (2005),
and the CERA after the New Zealand Canterbury
earthquake (2011). Although such agencies are often
created for an interim period, usually between five andten years, their responsibility and power are significant.
As these agencies often set the stage for long-term
rebuilding and future resilience, identifying funding
and allocating decision power within the existing
relationship of ministries and departments (e.g., public
works, building construction, social welfare, and health)prior to mega-disasters are extremely important. As
in the case of Japan, starting a new agency causes
confusion and disorder, which contribute to delays in therecovery effort.
Third, in-kind support systems are becoming
increasingly important. As we exist in an insecure world,
where vulnerabilities to disasters are increasing andsingle-government financial security and liability are
declining, preparing mutual support networks between
various players in society is crucial. Such networks
include supporting structures among local, prefectural,
regional, and national governments, where financial
obligations are a non-primary concern. The participationof citizens as well as private sector entities in this inkind system is also essential, as disaster size and degree
are unforeseeable.

Fig. 1.3 Volunteers Camping in a School Field, Six Months after
the GEJE

12

10

Fukumoto, H., 2013. Supporting affected areas by municipalities during emergency – assessing effectiveness of inter-governmental mutual-support agreements –.

HFA Review Report

HFA Priority for Action 2:
Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks andenhance early warning
HFA Core Indicator 2.1:
National policy and local risk assessments basedon hazard data and vulnerability information areavailable and include risk assessments for key sectors.
HFA Core Indicator 2.2:
Systems are in place to monitor, archive anddisseminate data on key hazards and vulnerabilities.
HFA Core Indicator 2.3:
Early warning systems are in place for all major
hazards, with outreach to communities.

Improvement in Risk Assessment and Early Warning
Systems with Real-time Monitoring: Lessons fromthe 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami Tohoku
earthquake and tsunami
Keywords:
hazard map, tsunami early warning, real-time monitoring,
earthquake early warning, long-term earthquake forecast
Before:Tsunami inundation maps produced from the risk evaluation
based on historical events over 400 years have been
distributed among the residents in coastal communities
for utilization in developing their evacuation plansand preparedness procedures. Nevertheless, previous
inundations were much smaller than the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake and Tsunami, which caused more casualties
without evacuation. Earthquakes followed by tsunamis
recurred throughout history in each coastal area. Japan’s
Cabinet Office Central Disaster Mitigation Council
evaluated the earthquakes and tsunamis for the target
regions’ safety levels, and the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)
Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion (HERP)
evaluated seismic activities, which are updated every
year. Those results are available for creating hazard
maps, conducting disaster response drills, and increasingawareness through the mitigation plan. However, the gap
between the estimated and observed inundations was solarge that it allowed people to take insufficient action.
Although the tsunami warning was issued roughly 3
min after the earthquake, about 19,000 people (90% of
casualties) were killed by the 2011 Tohoku Tsunami within
20–30 min of its arrival at Sanriku and roughly 1 h of its
arrival at Sendai bay; only two people were killed by thetsunami on the Pacific Ocean. The warning from the PTWC
and Japanese media should have led to immediate Pacificcoastal evacuation. Japan’s tsunami warning system began
in 1952, providing information on the estimated tsunami
arrival time and height, which is divided into two categories,
depending on the arrival time lesser or greater than 1 h, thatis, near or far field, respectively. The first tsunami warningin the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake was underestimated becauseof the lower earthquake magnitude estimation, and thesecond was updated using the tsunami data observed bya GPS buoy in real time offshore from Sanriku, Tohoku.
Reasons for the large number of casualties due to thetsunami remain under investigation and discussion. Not
only the warning’s accuracy but also its dissemination,
traffic jams on the roads, and wrong directions to safe
places have been reported by eyewitnesses.
HERP, a special governmental organization attached to
the Prime Minister’s office (now part of MEXT) andestablished in 1995, has been releasing probable seismic
hazard maps annually since 2005, compiling thousands of
instrumental, historical, and paleoseismological data andnumerical models of plausible future earthquake sources.
The map released in 2005 was the first publically available
probabilistic seismic hazard map of major shaking forvarious purposes such as city planning and emergency local
government response. In the map, the HERP expressed
concern about frequent M7-8 earthquakes along theJapan trench (the Sanriku coast to the Boso Peninsula)and announced a 98% chance of an M7.4-8.0 earthquake
offshore of Miyagi (Sendai) for the next 30 years, basedon 37-year average inter-event time of large subduction
earthquakes during the past 200–300 years. Such highprobability has effectively stimulated seismic retrofits,better city planning, and disaster drills. However, the extent
of the M9.0 2011 Tohoku Earthquake’s large shaking
areas was much wider than the map estimates, especiallyin Fukushima and Ibaraki, the southern region of the 2011source.
Despite the size of the main Tohoku shock and areas oflarge seismic intensity, numerous buildings collapsed(~400,000), mostly from the tsunami; the number collapsingfrom shaking was rather limited. Less damage was observedin the newer buildings and houses. The ratio of the death
toll associated with the collapses was less than several
percent of the total, demonstrating that Japan’s building
code, regulated since 1981 and reflecting the 1978 Miyagioki earthquake, worked effectively.
After the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, the Japanese government
funded an enormous budget to deploy thousands ofseismometers and GPS stations to monitor seismic andcrustal activity. The National Research Institute for Earth
Science and Disaster Prevention (NIED) has built three
seismic networks (Hi-net, F-net, and K-net) for various
purposes, and the Geospatial Information Authority ofJapan (GSI) has operated 1,240 permanent GPS stations tomonitor near-real-time ground movement. Furthermore, theALOS satellite launched in 2006 by the Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency (JAXA) has been providing synthetic
aperture radar data associated with several devastating
earthquakes, including the Tohoku Earthquake, which
expanded understanding of the earthquake rupture process.
Data circulation and data sharing have improved annuallyand now allow even foreign scientists and engineers to
help us provide better models and warnings. Such dense
networks and real-time monitoring systems enable the Japan
Meteorological Agency (JMA) to publically announce
seismic intensity distribution within 1.5 min and theactivity’s detailed hypocenter and magnitude information
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IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

within several minutes, supporting urgent rescue responses
and operations. However, the Tohoku Earthquake’s size
was so great that immediate estimate of magnitude was
7.9 because of magnitude saturation in the high-frequency
domains, causing underestimates of the tsunami height.
Since 2007, the JMA has been operating the earthquake
early warning system, which provides immediate estimatesof strong shaking within seconds to people before theactual seismic wave arrives. People can be informed of thewarning via TV, radio, and mobile phone, as well as special
devices, when the estimated JMA intensity reaches 5 or
higher. Seventeen cases of the early warning through 2010
have proven its validity and efficacy for disaster mitigation,for example, by suggesting that students hide themselves
under their desks in school. In the Tohoku Earthquake,the system provided a warning eight seconds before theprimary wave arrived at the city of Sendai, and successively
stopped bullet trains in the Tohoku area. However,it underestimated ground acceleration in the Tokyo
metropolitan area. Furthermore, the Tohoku Earthquake’s
numerous aftershocks revealed the weakness of the early
warning system in that it released a number of false alarms
resulting from unexpected remote simultaneous aftershocks
and interruptions of data transmission.
The JMA has been announcing advisories about theprobabilities of subsequent large shaking (intensities 5
or higher) due to aftershocks since the 2004 Niigata-kenChuetsu Earthquake (M6.8). Statistics of well-recorded
early aftershocks enable us to extrapolate the subsequent
three- or seven-day probability of large aftershocks. It
is useful to promote public awareness of the continuing
danger. The advisory worked after the Tohoku Earthquake.
However, the widespread aftershocks and remotely triggered
earthquakes were unprecedented because of its extent ofcrustal deformation. Several M6 class inland earthquakes
have occurred and caused local damage in Akita, Fukushima,
Nagano, and Shizuoka Prefectures, located 100 km to 300
km from the locus of high seismic slip.
After:
To overcome the problem of inadequate evacuation due
to the map’s underestimated inundation, the guideline forcreating a tsunami hazard map is undergoing modification
and revision. For example, the scenario should include theprobable maximum as well as the previous maximum, andshould be expanded to several scenarios to avoid a sense ofcertainty, especially of unjustified safety.
A new offshore network system in the Pacific Ocean, eastof Japan, is going to be installed with more than 50 seismic
and tsunami monitoring sensors, covering the trough in the
deep sea where earthquakes and tsunamis have repeatedly
originated. The system enables monitoring them in real timeand providing more accurate estimations, even for a largescale event.
The HERP confirmed the validity of the methodology
for creating the probabilistic seismic hazard map
by retrospective tests beginning in 1890. The map
underestimated the strong ground motion in Tohoku becauseof the ~200–300-year relatively short period of reliable
historical and instrumental data.
14

We may have to consider hypothetical M9 super-cycles bytaking pre-historic and paleoseismic data into account. The
magnitude of the anticipated large earthquakes along the
Nankai trough for southwest Japan has now increased to
M9.0, based on the tsunami sediment and paleo-geodesy
along the coastal regions.
To overcome the magnitude saturation issue that emerged
from the Tohoku Earthquake, the Geospatial Information
Authority of Japan (GSI) and Tohoku University havebeen developing a real-time magnitude determination
system using continuous GPS data and a data assimilation
technique.
Problems:
Limitation in the deterministic evaluation for a lowfrequency event such as the 2011 Tohoku disaster suggests
a new approach, combining the statistical method withan inter-disciplinary approach including history, geology,
sedimentrology, and physiography. A multi-scenario
prediction would reduce the risk of governments andcitizens having a false sense of certainty or safety.
Although the tsunami warning for a far field event iseffective, the issues in a near field event remain because of
having a short evacuation window. An early warning systemshould trigger the people to evacuate or take mitigating
action. This system should be connected or cooperate withthe planning of evacuations and systems/facilities in eacharea, which would require understanding people’s reasonsfor not taking action to move to safe areas despite receiving
the warning in the 2011 Tohoku disaster. At the beginningof the earthquake and tsunami generation, errors orindefinite remains can be reduced by monitoring data in realtime, indicating a speed–accuracy trade-off. It is importantto receive the updated information timely after the event.
Then the dissemination system, by combining mass media,
ICT, and public information, can ensure people’s access to
information at any time.
The recent destructive earthquakes including the
Tohoku Earthquake raised several critical issues in theprobabilistic seismic hazard map. However, the map,
averaging probabilities of strong ground motion fromvarious sources in a given place, remains useful for seismic
damage mitigation. The larger issue is to avoid people’s
misunderstanding: the map does not indicate “earthquake
probability.”In the Tohoku Earthquake, Japan’s recent building codedemonstrated its protection against strong seismic motion.
However, the domain of seismic acceleration and local
intensity at a subduction earthquake is frequently different
from that caused by large, shallow, inland earthquakes.
Reconstructions and seismic retrofits of the old buildings
are strongly recommended.
The earthquake early warning system has been steadily
improving since its 2007 initiation. Frequent drills in theimmediate action necessary within seconds before a seismic
wave arrives have become far more important for protecting
human life. Thus, we need to educate people on thewarning system’s limitations, particularly for large inland
earthquakes, and further promote seismic retrofits to preventthe collapse of old buildings.

HFA Review Report

Fig. 2.1 a) Earthquake Probabilities of Subduction Earthquakes for the Next 30 Years (HERP, 2010).
b) A Comparison between the Expected Seismic Intensities Calculated from the Long-term Forecast and Observed Intensities
Recorded for the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake.

Fig. 2.2 Observed Seismic Intensities of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake (left) and Intensities Estimated from the JMA
Earthquake Early Warning System (right). (Yamada, 2011)15

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

HFA Priority for Action 3:
Use knowledge, innovation and education to build
a culture of safety and resilience at all levels

Table 3.1 List of Great Natural Disasters and Academic ResearchInstitutes for Natural Disasters.

HFA Core Indicator 3.1:
Relevant information on disasters is available andaccessible at all levels, to all stakeholders (throughnetworks, development of information sharing
systems, etc.)

Information Sharing, Cooperation, and Expert
Training provided by Academic Research Institutes
for Natural Disasters
Keywords:
academic research institute for natural disasters,
background, mission
Context:
Various countermeasures have been implemented on thebasis of the experiences of many great natural disasters,
including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, tsunamis,
typhoons, landslides, etc. This section focuses on the roleof academics suggested by any previous great disaster. HFACore Indicators in this section are altered from the originalindicators, maintaining the original priority.
Before:First, we summarize the century-long history of theestablishment of academic disaster research institutes.
The Tokyo University Earthquake Research Institute (ERI)
was established in 1925, two years after the great Kanto
earthquake. The principles and goals of scientific research
are to promote research of the solid earth, and to pioneer
a way to better understand earthquakes and volcanic
activities.
The Kyoto University Disaster Prevention ResearchInstitute (DPRI) was founded in 1951 in response to severe
damage caused by a huge typhoon that struck Japan thatyear. Since its establishment, the DPRI has responded toa variety of natural disasters and has promoted research in
the disaster sciences, with the goal of mitigating damage.
Many researchers and graduate students work in the DPRI,
with specialties ranging from natural science, engineering,
informatics, to social sciences. It also maintains 15
experimental and observatory facilities outside the campus
for unique field investigations, on-site observations, andlarge experiments.
The National Research Institute for Earth Science andDisaster Prevention (NIED) was established in 1963,
motivated by the disastrous 1959 Typhoon Isewan.
Originally, an independent administrative institution isdefined as one that efficiently and effectively promotes
programs that should be securely administered from thepublic perspective, but always need not be executed by thegovernment itself and cannot be expected to be supported
by private enterprises. Research on disaster prevention is
one such work.
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Memorial Disaster
Reduction and Human Renovation Institute (DRI) offers
programs in which visitors can learn the effects of that
16

earthquake and lessons learned from the experience thatshould be shared with younger generations. The DRI began
in 1959 as an archive project and after 2002 has also worked
to convey expertise and knowledge to the public in an easyto-understand manner so as to help our cities, communities,
and the populace becomes better prepared against disasters.
Such efforts are based on the concept that disaster risk
management and mitigation requires the involvement of
not only the national and local governments but also local
communities and individuals.
After:For a hundred years, fundamental science and technology
related to disasters has been developed in Japan basedon fundamental scientific knowledge, and many experts
have emerged. However, our knowledge has proven to be
insufficient to save lives, to provide correct information, andto make well-informed decisions, because the damage by
the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake was extraordinarily
massive and the damaged area so vast, as never before
experienced. Experts in each division are less experienced
in connection to that in other divisions. The highest priority
is thus an integrated system of knowledge.

HFA Review Report

Such a system demands consideration of social engineering,social sciences, and humanities in implementing
countermeasures. It also requires reinforcing efforts for
effective risk communication about a very low frequency
great disaster, including its uncertainty, limitation ofpredicting natural phenomena, and the promotion of
integrated research among different fields such as
seismology, geology, archeology, history, and practicalexpert training.
Having experienced the catastrophic disaster in 2011,
Tohoku University founded the International ResearchInstitute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS). Along withcollaborating organizations from many countries and withbroad areas of specialization, the IRIDeS conducts worldleading research on natural disaster science and disastermitigation. Based on the lessons from the 2011 Great East
Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster, theIRIDeS strives to become a global center for the studyof disasters and disaster mitigation, learning from andbuilding on past lessons in disaster management fromJapan and around the world. Throughout, the IRIDeS willcontribute to ongoing recovery/reconstruction efforts inaffected areas by conducting action-oriented research andpursuing effective disaster management to build sustainable
and resilient societies. The IRIDeS innovates the previous
paradigm of Japan’s and the rest of the world’s management
for catastrophic natural disasters to become a foundationof disaster mitigation management and sciences. Disastermitigation management seeks to avoid or reduce potential
losses from natural hazards, to ensure prompt assistanceto victims, to achieve rapid and effective recovery, and tobuild disaster-resilient and sustainable societies through thefive stages of the disaster management cycle: mitigation,
preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction. The
action-oriented research of the IRIDeS addresses each stage
in the cycle and integrates and universalizes the scientificdiscoveries for implementation worldwide.
The Inter-Graduate School Doctoral Degree Programon Science for Global Safety, the Ministry of Education(MEXT) program for Leading Graduate Schools,
commenced in 2012, and the IRIDeS contributes to thisprogram. Participating students have an integrated practicalprogram, an all-round resource, called the “Kopeito”(cultivate) model.
Good practices:
Having experienced many catastrophic disasters throughhistory, we have established academic/research institutes
and education systems from various aspects.
Problems:
Promotion of integrated research of different fields such as
seismology, geology, and archeology was insufficient. The
failure to anticipate massive earthquakes and tsunamis bytaking every possibility into account was noted.

HFA Core Indicator 3.2:
School curricula, education material and relevant
training include disaster risk reduction and recovery
concepts and practices.

Education to Build a Culture of Safety and
Resilience at All Levels around Academic ResearchInstitutes
Keywords:
outreach, social decisions, personal action, daily training,
local media, IT-network, SNS
Before:For longer than the past decade, there were two main
backgrounds for countermeasures for disaster prevention in
Japan: science communication and administrative policy.
The White Paper on Science and Technology, 2004 noted
the importance of scientists and engineers, as members ofsociety, engaging in exchanges with the people, so as tostrengthen mutual trust and to encourage the people to treat
science and technology as issues of personal importance.
In 2005, on the basis of those backgrounds, programs forscience communication had begun at Hokkaido University,
Waseda University, and Tokyo University by the Scienceand Technology Promotion Fund. Science communication
programs had then spread across other universities, andmany outreach programs were held at universities, large
academic research projects, and academic societies.
Research institutes contributed to public programs basedon the political concept. During these 10 years, the NIED
has performed public services through basic research anddevelopment on disaster reduction as well as disseminationof research results for the benefit of society. Regarding
the seismic hazard, two major projects proceeded utilizing
the nationwide seismic network and the 3D Full-scale
Earthquake Testing Facility (E-defense), both of which wereconstructed after the disastrous Kobe earthquake in 1995.
The DPRI serves as a national research center on natural
disasters and their prevention and mitigation, authorized
by the MEXT. Researchers working on natural disasters
from various Japanese universities gather at DPRI, use its
experimental and observatory facilities, and jointly workwith DPRI researchers. Another role of the DPRI is topromptly provide diverse support at disaster sites in andoutside Japan by offering advice regarding what to do, what
aid is needed, how to secure and organize volunteers, andother relevant issues while working on pragmatic tasks withlocal personnel. In preparation for such tasks, our teamis developing skills and expertise for managing potential
challenges at disaster sites. Furthermore, several institutions
and UN organizations related to disaster management
are located in this area. This proximity enables the DPRI
to serve as one of world’s key centers for information
on disaster risk management, in collaboration with theseorganizations.
The good qualities of human beings such as flexibility,
kindness, generosity, strength, and joviality are the basis forbuilding an attractive life, home, community, and society.
To promote a prosperous society of the 21st century basedon harmonious coexistence with nature, the DPRI will strive
17

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

to disseminate useful disaster management information andexpertise, which we believe are closely linked with the mindsetof appreciating the importance and preciousness of life.
After:The ERI speedily provided scientific information on theearthquake. The ERI succeeded in making the mechanismof the earthquake and tsunami easy to understand on thebasis of precise analysis.
In addition to its domestic activities, the DPRI has
established formal Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)
with 40 foreign research institutions (as of August, 2012)and organizes numerous joint projects and seminars toserve as an international center for research and education
on natural disasters and their mitigation. The past decade
has witnessed a notable increase in the intensity of natural
disasters, such as the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake andTsunami. To respond to the serious needs for the protectionof the lives and assets of our people and society, the DPRI
promises to continue to enhance its research efforts, using
the knowledge and experience accumulated over the last
several decades.
On the basis of NIDE’s practical outputs in the past 10
years, they entered “The Third Five-year Plan” period
in April, 2011 through negotiation with the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology as
well as the Ministries of Finance and of Internal Affairs
and Communications. Synchronized with this turning
point, we have changed the organization of our instituteto create a more efficient system. The research sector
was reorganized into three departments: Monitoring and
Forecast, Experimental Research, and Social Systems;
the management sector was simplified by spinning off theplanning section. Further, the Outreach and International
Research Promotion Center was newly established tostrengthen public services and international activities,
archive projects including a rental camera system forvictims, etc.
In April, 2011, “The 4th Science and Technology BasicPlan” was also launched by the Council for Science andTechnology Policy, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. In
this plan, the role of science and technology is highlighted
to challenge important policy goals, one of which is“Realization of Rich and High-quality Life.” Lessons fromthe Great East Japan Earthquake are summarized in the
White Paper on Science and Technology, 2012. The public’s
trust in scientists declined because of the gap between
expectation and reality. We thus urgently need promotion of
integrated research of different fields such as seismology,
geology, archeology, and history to sufficiently understandearthquakes and tsunamis. There was overconfidencein embankments and technology; some people did notevacuate because they lacked knowledge of the limitationsof existing countermeasures and technologies. Scientific andtechnological risks and uncertainty involved have not been
seriously considered with regard to the government’s andexperts’ provision of information to the public. Therefore,
most of the people lacked an adequate understanding of thesituation.
Social engineering, social sciences, and humanities must be
considered in implementing countermeasures. Anticipating
18

massive earthquakes and tsunamis must take every
possibility into account.
The IRIDeS has created a new academia of disastermitigation that subsumes the lessons from the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake and Tsunami and the findings of world-leading
research into our societies with the purpose of establishingsocial systems that respond promptly, sensibly, andeffectively to natural disasters, withstanding adversities
with resiliency, and passing and exploiting the lessons tothe subsequent disaster management cycles. Enhancing
cooperation with the local municipalities and governmentsin the affected areas and contributing to their recovery andreconstruction efforts, the IRIDeS conducts action-oriented
research. They strive to create disaster-resilient societiesthat can overcome the complex and diverse processes ofnatural disasters, not only by mitigation strategies but also
by preparing for and responding to them, and achieving
recovery and renovation, thus engendering the culture ofdisaster-resiliency incorporated into our social systems.
The action-oriented research of the IRIDeS focuses on thefollowing points:
1) Investigating the physics of global scale natural disasters
such as mega-earthquakes, tsunamis, and extreme weather,
2) Reconstructing disaster response and mitigation
technologies based on the lessons of the 2011 Tohoku
earthquake and tsunami disaster,3) Inventing “Affected Area Supportology” in the aftermathof natural disasters,
4) Enhancing disaster-resiliency and performance ofmultiple-fail-safe systems in regional and urban areas,5) Establishing disaster medicine and medical service
systems towards catastrophic natural disasters,6) Designing disaster-resilient societies and developing thedigital archive system to pass the lessons from thedisasters.
The Inter-Graduate School Doctoral Degree Programon Science for Global Safety develops human resources
through integrated education in the five-year doctoral
program across university departments for students
in humanities, sciences, and technologies. It develops
leaders in the area of global safety who have a substantial
knowledge of liberal arts, international adaptability, a highsense of ethics, and a clear vision, and are able to think
and act appropriately on such bases. They are expected tocontribute to the protection of human lives, societies, andindustries from global disasters such as the Great East Japan
Earthquake.
In this program, interdisciplinary cutting-edge education
and research are conducted on the basis of practical disasterprevention studies in the (IRIDeS), with participation by the
Graduate Schools of Science, Engineering, Environmental
Studies, Arts and Letters, and others, so that this integrated
program can combine knowledge from the natural sciences,
social sciences, and liberal arts. This program strives todevelop excellent human resources with core specialties,
the ability to apply them in various areas, and other required
abilities for leaders, through activities at recovery sites fromthe Great East Japan Earthquake and conducting worldclass research.

HFA Review Report

Finally, we focus on the action of non-experts. For roughly
the past decade, many technologies have enabled people
to transmit information rapidly and simultaneously.
Government offices transmit disaster information and action
indicator messages through mass media and people expect
unified information from responsible organizations. During
the past several years, Internet technology has developed.
The specific information path has diverged with interactive
communication. Personal interactive information excluding
mass media now enables direct personal interaction.

Education about disaster prevention for non-experts
is very important. We learned from the Great East
Japan Earthquake that it is effective to teach people
the preconditions of hazard estimation. During the
emergency, people themselves had to decide how to
avoid hazards and protect property because of theinadequate information from outside their community.

Fig. 3.1 Evacuation Drill for Tsunamis at an Elementary School

Good practices:
1) Scientific experts have increased in Japan. The speedy
supply of scientific information about the mechanismof earthquakes and tsunamis has occurred. That
information is open for access and quickly archived.
2) Disaster prevention education by Dr. Katada of the
University of Gunma, which underpinned the “Kamaishi
Miracle,” became famous after the Great East Japan
Disaster. Dr. Katada said that it was skills for life, not amiracle. Kamaishi is in the Sanriku Coastal Area, where
disaster prevention education and countermeasures wererelatively active. He emphasized the reality of tsunamis
and the existence of preconditions in the hazard map
to overcome the gap between well-informed action
and carelessness regarding hazards. That orderly andrepeated education caused success.
Problems:
The public’s trust in scientists has declined because of
the gap between expectations and reality. We urgently
need integrated research in different fields to sufficiently
understand earthquakes and tsunamis. Communities lack asufficient number of interpreters and coordinators between
experts and non-experts.
Future recommendations:
The establishment of a domestic system for local hazard
risk is the highest priority effort, comprising anobservation system, a system for archiving andextracting data, expert training, and other elements. The
establishment of an integrated knowledge system is thenext priority.

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IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

HFA Priority for Action 4:
Reduce the underlying risk factors
HFA Core Indicator 4.1:
Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective ofenvironment-related policies and plans, including
for land use, natural resource management andadaptation to climate change

Post-tsunami Recovery Strategies in Sanriku
Coastal Areas after the 1933 Tsunami
Keywords:
land use regulation, relocation to higher land, 1896 Sanriku
Tsunami, 1933 Sanriku Tsunami, transition of housing
location, urban recovery strategy
Context:
Land use mitigation is one of the most reliable strategies
for avoiding future tsunami disaster. The Sanriku Coastal
Area, one of the most tsunami-prone areas in Japan, locatedin the north part of the main island, was seriously damagedby catastrophic tsunamis in 1896, 1933, and 1960 before
the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. The
Japanese government prepared resettlement space onhigher ground for the victims after the 1933 Great Sanriku
Tsunami.

hundreds of buildings in the lowlands again (Fig. 4.2). In
contrast, the houses on the higher resettlement area provided
by the government after the 1933 Tsunami survived thedestructive 2011 Tsunami.
Good practices:
The fact that the resettlement on higher ground provided
by post-tsunami recovery planning and policy after the1933 Tsunami was not damaged by the 2011 Tsunami
demonstrates the importance of land use mitigation fortsunami disaster reduction. This successful experience inthe tsunami-prone coastal area should be referenced in the
future.
Problems:
Although the government developed the safer resettlement
area for residents after the 1933 Tsunami, many people
began living in the vulnerable lower lands or returnedto the original tsunami-prone sites until 2011. Previous
research1 describes how several districts in Sanriku Coastal
Area suffered from this hazardous situation because of the
populace’s lack of tsunami risk recognition, convenience,or inherited lands. The recovery planning and policy for theland use regulation was efficient in reducing tsunami risk in
one sense, but it was not a mandatory strategy that required
people to live only in the safe area.

Before:Fig. 4.1 illustrates the transition of housing location after
the 1933 Tsunami in Hongo District, Iwate Prefecture1.
Because of the relocation strategy, there is almost nobuilding as of 1948, except in the higher elevations
provided by the government. However, many buildings had
been constructed in the vulnerable lowlands in the twentiethcentury.
After:The 2011 Tsunami struck the district, washing away

Fig. 4.2 Building Damage in Hongo after the 2011 Tsunami (left)
and Pre-tsunami (right)2

Fig. 4.1 Change of Housing Location in Hongo, Touni Village (1948–2010)1
1

20

2

Murao, O., and Isoyama, S. (2012). Transition of Housing Location in Villages in Iwate Prefecture after the Sanriku Tsunamis in 1896 and 1933, Joint Conference Proceedings of
9th International Conference on Urban Earthquake Engineering (9CUEE) and 4th Asia Conference on Earthquake Engineering (4ACEE) (CD-ROM), 1877-1882, Tokyo, Japan.
Geospatial Information Authority of Japan. Retrieved from http://saigai.gsi.go.jp/h23taiheiyo-ok/photo/photo_dj/index.html.

HFA Review Report

HFA Core Indicator 4.2:
Social development policies and plans are being
i m p l e m e n t e d t o re d u c e t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f
populations most at risk

Measures for People Requiring Assistance during a
Disaster
Keywords:
elderly people, Guidelines for Evacuation Support ofPeople Requiring Assistance During a Disaster, evacuation,
emergency network
Context:
It is vital for the elderly and disabled to be supported andassisted by neighbors in immediately evacuating fromdisastrous situations. The government and neighboring
communities must strive to establish a framework for
managing the various aspects of this issue.

After:
Fig. 4.3 indicates the number of casualties, by age, due tothe 2011Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami andthe 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake. Both exhibit a similartendency of the death toll by age in that the ratio of theolder populace is higher than that of the younger. However,
the ratio in the 2011 event is remarkably higher than that in
the 1995 Earthquake. The deaths from the 1995 Earthquake
were caused largely by building collapse, so a dwelling’s
structural type and age were significant. In contrast,
the 2011 deaths were caused largely by the tsunami, so
evacuation methods from the vulnerable area to safer places
were critical. Thus, residents’ age or health condition was
an important factor affecting their fate. Following theguidelines, many districts had strived for strong community
assistance for such people, but not all community plans
worked well because of the size of affected areas andgeographical conditions.

Before:To support such community activities, the Cabinet Officereleased the Guidelines for Evacuation Support of People
Requiring Assistance During a Disaster in 2005 and thePreparation of Measures for Supporting Persons Requiring
Assistance During a Disaster, which contains case studies
from recent disasters, in 2007. They were also supposed tosupport municipal governments in producing overall plans.
The 2005 Guidelines document consists of the following
five activities.
1. Improving the information communications system
Announcement of evacuation preparation information
Establishment of a support unit for people requiring
assistance
Secure communications through various means such as
the Internet and emergency call message service
2. Sharing of information concerning people requiring
assistance during a disasterCollection and sharing of information on people
requiring assistance in various ways
Promotion of exceptional use of social-welfare-related
personal information to prepare evacuation support systems
3. Creating a tangible evacuation support plan forpeople requiring assistance during a disaster
Creation of an evacuation support plan for eachindividual requiring assistance
Recognition of the importance of making communities
resilient to disasters
4. Assistance at evacuation centers
Establishment of an information desk for people
requiring assistance at evacuation centers
Establishment of welfare evacuation centers
5. Collaboration among related organizations
Continuity of welfare services in disaster situations
Wide-area support of health nurses
Establishment of a committee on evacuation support forpeople requiring assistance at the municipal level

3
4

Fig. 4.3 Casualties, by Age, due to the 2011Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami and the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake3

Good practices:
There were many elderly people needing assistance inshelters after the tsunami. Homehelpers in Japan dispatchedsupporters for them, and because of keeping accurate
records of the elders’ information, that plan worked well4.
Problems:
The Cabinet Office4 noted problems in each response phaseclarified by the event, as follows:
Before: lack of supporting systems, including acceptanceof people and organizations, lack of dissemination of theprocedures, shortage of helpers, shortage of previous drills.
Emergency response: no list of the elderly, not knowing
how to use the lists, no guidelines, no information on
evacuation for the elderly.
At the shelters after the emergency response: difficultyin continuing to live with other people, lack of shelters,
limitation of response systems to the elderly, unsatisfactory
health care, lack of information and materials, insufficient
support by local governments because of damage,difficulties faced by infants and expectant mothers.

The Cabinet Office (2011). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/bousai2011/html/honbun/2b_sanko_siryo_06.htm.
The Cabinet Office (2012). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hisaisyagyousei/youengosya/h24_kentoukai.

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IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

HFA Core Indicator 4.3:
Economic and productive sectoral policies and plans
have been implemented to reduce the vulnerability of
economic activities

Business Continuity Planning after the 2011 Great
East Japan Earthquake
Keywords:
Business Continuity Planning, Business Continuity and
Resiliency Planning, post-disaster recovery
Context:
Business Continuity Planning (BCP), which is also called
Business Continuity and Resiliency Planning (BCRP),“identifies an organization’s exposure to internal andexternal threats and synthesizes hard and soft assets
to provide effective prevention and recovery for theorganization, while maintaining competitive advantage
and value system integrity” 5 . The importance of anorganization’s having a form of continuity planning in
preparation for disaster management had been discussed
since Japan’s 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake.
Before:The Cabinet Office released “Business Continuity
Guideline – For Disaster Reduction and Improvement ofDisaster Management for Business in Japan”6 in 2005.
The document directed organizations in developing theirpost-disaster management plan, as shown in Fig. 4.4 andencouraged them to review it with a checklist. It was
updated in 2009. Thus, the BCP concept had been widely
disseminated among Japanese companies before the event
on March 11, 2011.
Conceptual Diagramof BCP

Fig. 4.4 BCP Concept6

After:The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
somewhat influenced the companies located in thedamaged areas. Teikoku Data Bank conducted surveys onorganizations’ BCP status in April 2011 and February 2012.
The report7 revealed the BCP status of 10,713 organizations
after the event, summarized as follows:(1) The ratio of the companies whose business wasinterrupted by the event was 64.5% (6911 organizations),
5

22

largely because of the difficulty faced in materials
procurement (supply chain) affected by the damage tosuppliers.
(2) Of the discontinued companies, 72.9% had resumed
business within three months after the event. Another
6.5%, and notably the additional 9.2% in the four damaged
prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, and Ibaraki), had
not resumed business as of February 2012.
(3) The most consistent conducted preparedness activity
was establishing an emergency network (55.0%), followedby having multiple suppliers (38.0%) and multi-backup
information systems (33.8%).
(4) As of February 2012, 10.4% of the total organizations
had internal business continuity planning, and 50.8% had noplan, although they knew about BCP. Thus, the proportionof organizations with a BCP increased by 2.6% and that of
the organizations that knew about BCP increased by 24.3%
compared with the April 2011 status (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 BCP Status7
Done
Apr.
2011
Feb.
2012

837
(7.8%)
1,116(10.4%)

Know butundone3,150(29.2%)
5,446(50.8%)

Not know

Unknown

5,139(47.7%)
2,660(24.8%)

1,643(15.3%)
1,491(13.9%)

Good practices:
Natori Oil Plant8 is an industrial waste company in Natori
City, which collects and recycles waste oil to sell as clean
recycled fuel. The company released its BCP in January
2011.
It reopened on March 18, 2011, after a one-weekinterruption by the event. They had refined waste oil andsold it to a trading partner until their two factories wereseriously damaged by the Tsunami. Instead of self-refining,they outsourced the process to another company outsideof the prefecture as they had prepared to do before theTsunami. They could thus continue in business despite thedifficult conditions immediately following the event. Their
rapid recovery was also very supportive to the city because
they devoted themselves to cleaning up the debris aroundthe damaged coastal area. That is a successful case of
having a BCP.
Problems:
First, although some companies had developed BCPs before
the disaster, not all BCPs functioned well after the event
because of lack of feasibility.
Second, it was more difficult for declining businesses or
medium-sized and small companies to recover rapidly.
Third, a small business that had operated in a small
surrounding area had difficulty surviving the destruction
because of its limited client base, which had also beendamaged in the disaster.
Finally, BCPs that addressed only the company’s individual
situation did not efficiently function because they had notaccounted for supply chain continuity.

Elliot, D., Swartz, E., and Herbane, B. (1999). “Just Waiting for the Next Big Bang: Business Continuity Planning in the UK Finance Sector,” Journal of Applied Management
Studies, Vol. 8, pp. 43-60.
6
Cabinet Office (2005). “Business Continuity Guideline – For Disaster Reduction and Improvement of Disaster Management for Business in Japan.” Retrieved fromwww.bosai.go.jp/kaigirep/chuoubou/20/pdf/shiryo51.pdf.
7
Teikoku Databank Ltd. (2012). “Survey of Companies’ Business Continuity Planning.” Retrieved from http://www.tdb.co.jp/report/watching/press/pdf/p120308.pdf.
8Retrieved from www.opnatori.co.jp.

HFA Review Report

Before:The Act on Promotion of Earthquake-proof Retrofit of
Buildings was passed in 1995 after the Kobe Earthquake.
It was amended in 2006 after the 2004 Niigata-ken
Chuetsu Earthquake. The act serves to increase the ratioof earthquake-resistant buildings from 75% in 2005 to
90% by 2015. Fig. 4.6 shows the change in the number ofearthquake-resistant buildings in a 2010 report released by
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism10.
Each local government had supported to strengthenbuildings in the jurisdiction.

HFA Core Indicator 4.4:
Planning and management of human settlements
incorporate disaster risk reduction elements,
including enforcement of building codes

Promotion of the Earthquake-proof Retrofit of
Buildings after the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake
Keywords:
1 9 9 5 G re a t K o b e E a r t h q u a k e , b u i l d i n g d a m a g e ,earthquake-proof retrofit, seismic reinforcement

After:The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake’s building damage
was not as great as that by the Tsunami or by the 1995
Great Kobe Earthquake because of the relationship between
the structural natural period and seismic characteristics.
However, slightly damaged buildings, including destructionof non-structural elements, were widely distributed.
Having strong misgivings about building damage due to theestimated destructive earthquake occurring in the Nankai
Trough, the government amended the act again in 2013.
The amended act requires the evaluation of seismic capacityof large-scale public facilities and publication of that
information, among other actions.

Context:
More than 100,000 buildings were severely damaged
and roughly 150,000 were moderately damaged by the
Hyogoken-Nanbu (Kobe) Earthquake on January 17, 1995.
Most human casualties were caused by building collapse,
and the building damage conditions depended on structural
type and construction period (Fig. 4.5) 9. Specifically,buildings constructed after the 1971 and 1981 amendmentsof the 1950 Building Standard Law were less damaged.
Consequently, that event indicated the importance ofstrengthening buildings to reduce future building collapse
risk.

Good practices:
Learning from previous disasters, the government passed
and repeatedly amended the act. This cycle is vital for
future disaster management. Setting a quantitative goal forthe proportion of earthquake-resistant buildings in near
future would also be effective.
Problems:
Some residents are not willing to strengthen vulnerable
houses because of (1) uncertainty of the cost, (2) doubt
about the building strength after the retrofit, and (3) the ideathat it is inefficient to spend much money for reinforcing
old buildings.

Fig. 4.5 Damage Ratio of Wood-frame Buildings by the 1995
Kobe Earthquake Classified by the Construction Period9

Progress on Earthquake-Proof House
2003

2003 → 2008
Rebuilding: 0,9 million houses
Retrofit: 0,3 million houses

about
7 million
houses

Before1981

2015 (goal)

2008
about
10,5 million
housesabout
11,5 million
houses

After
1982
about
28,5 million
housesabout
6,5
millionhouses

Before1981

Non-earthquake-proof
housesabout
6,5
millionhousesEarthquake-proof
housesEarthquake-proof houses
after 1982

about
5 million
houses

Before
1981

After
1982

After
1982

about
32,5 million
housesabout
38 million
housesTotal Number of Houses : about 47,0 million
Earthquake-proof: about 35,5 million
Non-earthquake-proof : about 11,5 million

Total Number of Houses : about 49,5 million
Earthquake-proof: about 39,0 million
Non-earthquake-proof : about 10,5 million

Total Number of Houses : about 49,5 million
Earthquake-proof: about 44,5 million
Non-earthquake-proof : about 5,0 million

The ratio of earthquake-resistanthouses: about 75%

The ratio of earthquake-resistanthouses: about 79%

The ratio of earthquake-resistanthouses (goal) : about 90%*Estimated record in 2003

*Estimated record in 2008

*The goal was set in 2005

Fig. 4.6 Change in the Number of Earthquake-resistant Buildings (2003-2015)10
9

Yamazaki, F., and Murao, O. (2000). “Vulnerability Functions for Japanese Buildings Based on Damage Data due to the 1995 Kobe Earthquake,” Implications of Recent
Earthquakes on Seismic Risk, Series of Innovation in Structures and Construction, Vol. 2, pp. 91-102, Imperial College Press.
10
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2010). Retrieved on [date] from http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000188412.pdf.

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IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

HFA Core Indicator 4.5:
Disaster risk reduction measures are integrated with
post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes

Post-tsunami Recovery for Risk Reduction after the2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
Keywords:
urban recovery strategy, land use regulation, relocation,
concentration, avoiding, slowing, steering, blocking,compacted terraces and berms, reinforcement
Context:
Post-disaster recovery is a significant process for rebuilding
a society with new, improved disaster reduction systems forthe future. The Tohoku Region coastal areas had previously
experienced several huge tsunamis and took measures tomitigate tsunamis’ damage through the twentieth century.
However the March 11, 2011, Tsunami struck them again
and washed away the residential areas. Every district
examined and designed its recovery plan according to its
circumstances, and they are exploring strategies to build
their new towns in the context of certain problems.
Before:As described HFA Core Indicator 4.1, the government
developed inland resettlements for the 1933 Sanriku
Tsunami victims, but houses again increased in the lower
elevations by the ocean, only to be washed away. The death
toll including missing people was 21,000 as of March 26,
2013.
After:The number of damaged municipalities by the Tsunami was 62,
and 43 municipalities had released their post-tsunami recovery
plans for future tsunami damage mitigation as of May 2012.

According to a survey for 208 damaged districts conductedby the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, andTourism11, the post-tsunami recovery plans can be classified
into five types and comprise four mitigation systems: (1)relocation as a land use mitigation system; (2) levee toblock tsunamis; (3) compacted terraces and berms to avoid,slow, or steer tsunamis; and (4) tsunami mitigation designfor facilities. The five classifications are as follows (Fig
4.7):
A. Relocation (127)
B. Concentration (6)C. Compacted terraces and berms (19)
D. Relocation and compacted terraces and berms (18)
E. Reconstruction on the original site with facility
reinforcement (38)Good practices:
Every damaged district in Japan devised its recovery
plan that reduces future tsunami risk based on previous
experience. Public involvement has been recognized as anespecially significant factor in devising recovery plans sincethe 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake.
Problems:
Now that the damaged municipalities have announced theirrecovery plans, each local government must implement
it. However, they encounter several challenges in
implementing actual projects, depending upon the regionalsituation, such as the following examples:• Disagreements between governments and residents
about the destruction of a beautiful piece of scenery by
levee construction, or levees’ adequate assurance of safety• Shortage of available land for relocation• Shortage of construction materials and workers for the
extraordinarily large damaged area
• Construction costs

Fig. 4.7 Regional Urban Recovery Types Proposed after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 324

11Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2012). Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000209868.pdf (revised for this material by the author).

HFA Review Report

HFA Core Indicator 4.6:
Procedures are in place to assess the disaster risk
impacts of major development projects, especiallyinfrastructure

Comprehensive Post-tsunami Recovery after the2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
Keywords:
post-tsunami recovery projects, tsunami simulation
Context:
To support local governments to arrange proper regional
plans for tsunami disaster reduction, the Japanese
government published the “Tsunami Disaster Estimation
Manual” and “Guideline to Strengthen Tsunami Disaster
Management in Local Disaster Prevention Plans” in 1997,
followed by the “Tsunami and Tidal Wave Hazard Map
Making Manual (2004)” and “Guideline for Management of
Tsunami Evacuation Buildings (2005).”
Before:Considering these guidelines, local governments in thedamaged areas had developed their disaster management
systems according to regional conditions. However, the2011 Earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku was greaterthan expected, and some management systems failed towork well.
After:
Each municipality performed two types of tsunami
simulations, depending on the occurrence risk to devise
recovery plans for resettlement. The Japanese government12
prepared several projects (Fig. 4.8) to support their plandevelopment and implementation.

⑧ Reinforcement of tsunami mitigation
facilities (lock gates, seawalls, etc.)

Future recommendations:
Relocation to higher land from the waterfront area asa post-tsunami recovery strategy should be performedby national/local government purchase of the lowlands
to avoid future private usage of vulnerable waterfront
space.
More thorough business operation analysis should be
performed to devise BCPs including the network
required for maintaining the supply chain.
Reinforcement of buildings is essential to reducing therisk of collapse. Setting quantitative goals and education
figure strongly in promoting this effort.
Pre-disaster recovery planning worked well in Kobe’s
Mano District after the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake aswell as in Tokyo after the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake.
Pre-disaster recovery planning is an important process
for reaching agreement among the local governmentand residents on a future vision of the district. Sharing
the future vision prior to a disaster may avoid emotional
conflicts at the stages of developing or implementing thepost-disaster recovery plan.
Prediction of available resources as well as disasterdamage is necessary for implementing reconstruction
activities. Reconstruction activity estimation should beconsidered at the national, local, and community levels
corresponding to predicted damage levels.

① Development of urban districts(compacted terraces and berms,
countermeasures againstliquefaction, etc.)⑩ Reinforcement of erosion control
construction (countermeasures against
erosion, landslides, and steep slopes)⑬ Improvement ofrailway facilities⑥ Reinforcement of river
maintenance facilities (river
improvement, countermeasuresagainst tsunamis and tidal waves,earthquake resistance, etc.)

Good practices:
Problems:
HFA Core Indicator 4.6 good practices and problems arethose previously described for HFA Core Indicators 4.1 and4.2.

⑫ Development of residential
facilities (housing for victims,
welfare facilities, etc.)② Improvements for evacuation facilities (evacuation
centers, storage warehouses for disaster supplies kits,water tanks, tsunami evacuation towers, etc.)④ Improvement of
information andcommunication facilities③ Development of support
facilities for post-tsunami recovery⑪ Improvement of roadinfrastructure⑤ Development ofurban parks② mprovements for evacuation facilities (evacuation
centers, storage warehouses for disaster supplies kits,water tanks, tsunami evacuation towers, etc.)⑨ Improving
sewage systems⑦ Reinforcement of coastal protection
facilities (levees, countermeasures against
erosion, earthquake resistance, etc.)⑭ Improvement ofharbor facilities(berths, etc.)⑮ Others

Fig. 4.8 Urban Recovery Projects at a Glance after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami12
12

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2013). Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/report/fukkou-index.html.

25

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

HFA Priority for Action 5:
Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective
response at all levels
HFA Core Indicator 5.1:
Strong policy, technical and institutional capacities
and mechanisms for disaster risk management, with adisaster risk reduction perspective, are in place.

Measures and Agenda for Large-scale Disasters
in Japan: from the Perspective of Personal
Information and Disaster Prevention Education
Keywords:
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, Personal Information
Protection Law, local knowledge
Context:
Because of the several disasters such as typhoons,
earthquakes, tsunamis, and heavy snowfall in Japan, thecountry has suffered a great loss of people’s lives andassets and a massive economic loss. On the basis of theseexperiences and lessons learned, disaster-related acts,
policies, and legal frameworks have been developed andenacted to prepare for and respond to disasters.
Before:The 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was enacted
on the basis of the experiences of the 1959 Typhoon
Isewan. Before that, the national and local government
roles and responsibilities had not been stated clearly.
The Act regulated the roles and authorities of each levelof government for disaster risk reduction, response, andrecovery to secure the victims’ welfare and social orderby protecting citizens’ lives and assets from disasters.
Municipalities have the responsibility of establishinga disaster response office; however, to respond to a
massive disaster (causing damages beyond the capacity ofprefectures and municipalities), the national government isrequired to establish a disaster response office to provide
the necessary assistance.
After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, major revisions to
the Act included 1) easing the conditions of establishingthe disaster response office and strengthening the disaster
response office’s authority; 2) mayors’ issuing a request forthe deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF)
to the governor and reporting the disaster situation to the
Director-General of the Defense Agency; 3) traffic control;and 4) training of the local voluntary organizations fordisaster risk reduction, including measures for the elderly
and persons with disabilities.
After:The experiences from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami revealed that the existing act was insufficient
for response to such an unexpected disaster. The April
2005 Personal Information Protection Law hampered theconfirmation of people’s safety, making it difficult to obtain
the information and pre-determine whether people would
require extra support lives. The leaders of communitybased organizations and the chairpersons of neighborhood
associations addressed such issues. As a result of such26

problems, the number of casualties of the elderly andpersons with disabilities reached was double that ofordinary persons.
Another issue was the citizens’ lack of awareness oftsunamis. The areas affected by the 2011 Tsunami included
regions with no previous tsunami experience, and a numberof citizens there had no proper knowledge and believed thata tsunami poses no danger. They held such beliefs fromtheir knowledge of the 1961 Chile Earthquake and wereconvinced that their residential areas were safe as they had
no such earlier incidents.
On the basis of the lessons learned from the 2011 Tsunami,
the Act was again revised, and local governments gained theauthority to develop a list of affected people, specificallythrough information gathered by municipalities, and theinformation on the elderly and persons with disabilities, inparticular, can now be submitted to relevant offices, with
the individuals’ consent. In addition, the dissemination of
the lessons learned and disaster education will strengthen
the capacity for local disaster risk reduction.
Good practices:
Quick response is required after a disaster, whereas
enactment of a law is, by its nature, a post-process.
Therefore, now is the time to revise the fundamental act
for disaster measures on the basis of the experiences ofthe 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami and the 1995
Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake.
In an attempt to determine the essential knowledge, forexample, the education committee of Shizuoka Prefecture
has established the Fundamental Education Policy ofDisaster Presentation of Shizuoka Prefecture (2012 revision)
to prepare for a Tokai Earthquake. The policy addresses
several guidelines with two main purposes of education
for disaster prevention. Beginning in preschool, the first
purpose is to develop knowledge and understanding,interest, motivation and attitudes, thinking and judgment,
and skills (social contribution, etc.). At each stage ofmaturation, the second purpose comprises developing theabilities of self-preservation (kindergarten to lower gradesof elementary school), actively applying knowledge (midhigh grade of elementary school), contributing to local
society’s safety, understanding and responding to thesituation (middle school), and rebuilding a safe society(college/university student, working people).
Problems:
Preventing municipal access to private information is
the largest barrier constraining local networks. When thechairman of the municipality, who is a local community
leader, is not concurrently a member of the public welfarecommittee, it is difficult to understand the issues of acommunity’s vulnerable people such as senior citizens.
Furthermore, a dilemma exists in that the idea of being ina “safe place,” handed down from olden times, continues
in the community with no validity. This phenomenon isunderstandable for the short-term to mid-term stage ofrecent history; people might have difficulty understanding
the reality of a once-in-a-thousand-years event. This
mindset has become clear from the precedent that migrants
to higher places have returned to the coast repeatedly in the
Sannriku region.

HFA Review Report

HFA Core Indicator 5.2:
Disaster preparedness plans and contingency plans
are in place at all administrative levels, and regulartraining drills and rehearsals are held to test anddevelop disaster response programmes.

Three Coastal Districts in Iwaki City, Fukushima
Prefecture: Differences Resulting from the Local
Residents Organization Disaster Response Activities
Keywords:
neighborhood association, regional activities, disasterprevention
Context:
Overview of three coastal districts in Iwaki City:
Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture, is located approximately
50 km south of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
There are about 33 million people in less than 500 districts.
Coastal areas in this city were also damaged by the tsunami
caused by the 2011 Earthquake, resulting in the deaths offewer than 300 people. The population of the coastal areas
discussed here is roughly 5,000: over 2,000 in districts A
and C, and less than 1,000 in B. Fig. 5.1 and Table 5.1,
respectively, present each district’s location and population.

FutabaNamie

Fukushima No.1
nuclear power plant

20km

Fukushima

10km

KawauchiOkuma

Tomioka

Fukushima No.2
nuclear power plant

NarahaHironoIwaki

Numanouchi
UsuisoToyomaFig. 5.1 Map of Iwaki City Area

Table 5.1 Overview of each district
poplation

households

damage䞉death 310, missing 37
133,270 䞉completely destroyed 7,640
housesIwaki City

343,008

A

2,200

660

䞉death 85
䞉completely destroyed 䠐䠎䠌

B

760

260

䞉death 130
䞉completely destroyed 䠎䠏䠌

C

1,600

District

700 䞉completely destroyed 47

Table 5.2 reports disaster-related activity evaluations before
and after the earthquake. The next section explains thedetails of this evaluation.
Table 5.2 Activity Evaluation before and after the Earthquake
BeforeDistrict

Activities

Preparationof disaster

After
call formanagement
evacuationor search

FutureA
B
C

Before:(1) Pre-disaster activities of each district
A:
There was an activity at each districtlevel (Gyosei-ku), block associations (Chonai-kai),and neighborhood associations (Tonari-gumi). This
district has many festivals and activities organized byeach block association.
B:
Activities in the latter were mainly inthe district and neighborhood associations. The only
event was the Children’s Day Festival, which is held
once a year in May.
C： The district is divided into small towns (Buraku),
composed of neighborhood associations and a
district with many festivals.
(2) Preparation for disaster in each district
The “Iwaki Regional Disaster Prevention Plan” (Iwaki
Conference on Disaster Reduction, revised 2010) had
been enacted before the earthquake. However, efforts toensure its effectiveness were left to the districts because
this is only a “guideline.” Disaster preparedness in each
district is as follows.
A： Although planning occurred in the district, blockassociations had insufficient time to effectively
support it.
B:
This district was the only well-known refuge
for residents.
C:
District officers have created primarily ahazard map that was well known to residents.
After:(1)Communication of each area of the disaster
immediately afterward: call for tsunami evacuationA:
The mayor personally performed the call for
evacuation. Residents escaped to the shelter while
helping each other.
B:
There was no particular communication plan as a
district; it had only a refuge by neighborhood
association unit.
The mayor personally performed the call forC:evacuation and opened the shelter (community
center). Then the officers gathered without a specificcall to them because there was a tacit understandingthat everyone should “Go to the community center,
if there is a disaster.”(2)Communication of each area of the disaster
afterward: shelter management or missing person search.
A: Under the mayor’s direction, district officers kept
in touch with other districts and the system engineer
27

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report(SE) volunteered to help make a missing persons list.
It was difficult for the district to support
communications immediately.
C:
After performing their roles (foods,
communication, health, collecting information, etc.),
officers of districts took action to manage sheltersand seek missing persons.
(3) Future response plans: activities for disaster prevention
and mitigation, from the efforts of the emergency drillon August 31, 2013.
B:

Iwaki City has presented for each district the “2013Comprehensive Disaster Training in Iwaki City.” Thedocument provides an outline that includes an overview
of training, time schedule, and publicity materials ineach district. The districts had to revise it according to
the actual situation for shelters and response methods.
A:
The emergency drill was supported at theblock association level. The mayor conducted it,with three district conductors and the heads of theneighborhood associations. Under each conductor,
the association head called for evacuation andguided residents to shelter. After the head confirmed
the number of people displaced in the primaryevacuation site, he reported it to each conductor.
B: The district asked two neighborhood associations
to collaborate via a circular notice. The others
were difficult to implement for the disaster drill.
C:
The district conducted the drill at theneighborhood association level. Thirty association
heads had residents evacuate to the primary placeof refuge, and reported the number of evacuatedpeople to the district officers. After moving evacuees
to the secondary shelter according to the officers’
instructions, officers reported the results to the mayor.
Good practices:
Daily regional activities enhance disaster prevention
awareness and lead to involvement in creating the hazard
map, which enables better post-disaster support byorganizations. Furthermore, autonomous organizations
formed by local residents (A, C) can utilize various
functions to prevent disasters.
Problems:
Even if there is partial solidarity, such as a blood–territorial
relationship, if the community is not active and the selfgovernment organization function is weak, the community’s
disaster response capabilities before and after the earthquake
are also weak (B).

HFA Core Indicator 5.3:
Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms arein place to support effective response and recovery
when required

Preparedness for Low-frequency and High-impact
Disasters from a Medical Perspective
Context
After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, Japan has
made changes and progress in its disaster management
mechanism, especially in the medical assistance field.
However, the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami raised the issue of the need for further
consideration and progress in both short- and long-term
medical services provision in a disaster situation, including
public health issues.
Keywords:
disaster response preparedness, medical assistance, publichealthBefore:Japan’s disaster response mechanism has been regulatedby the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, which
responded to the experiences of the Typhoon Isewan
in 1959. The Act specifies that municipalities and/or
prefectures are responsible for developing a regional
disaster risk reduction plan, along with the Basic Disaster
Prevention Plan, and to respond to disasters. However,the Act was developed without the expectation of a largescale disaster such as the 2011 Tsunami, with damages andimpacts beyond the management capacity of prefecturesand municipalities.
On the basis of the experiences of the 1995 Great Kobe
Earthquake, many initiatives have been taken, including
the establishment and maintenance of disaster basehospitals, development of the Disaster Medical AssistanceTeam (DMAT), and establishment of a wide-area medicaltransportation system and Emergency Medical Information
System (EMIS). At the time of the Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake
in 2007, whose damages occurred within a restricted area,
the disaster medical response was implemented immediately
after the event and provided effective assistance bytransporting the seriously injured to a disaster base hospital.
In addition, since 2008, a disaster medical response system
has been established in each prefecture and municipality,
603 disaster base hospitals have been constructed, 1000
DMATs have been formed, and 6000 DMAT members havebeen trained.
During:
Because of the 2011 Tsunami, more than 16,000 lost theirlives, and more than 2700 were missing. The cause of
more than 90% of the deaths was drowning, which wascompletely different from the case of the Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake, wherein the major cause was crushing bybuilding collapse.
Ishinomaki City was severely affected by the Tsunami. In
the City, several hospitals located along the coast areas
were forced to evacuate. Only the Ishinomaki Red Cross
Hospital, which had just moved inland prior to the 201128

HFA Review Report

Tsunami, could remain functioning and played a central
role in disaster medicine at the frontline as a disaster basehospital.
In most affected areas, wide-area medical transportation
was required for dialysis and other treatments. One
characteristic of such a massive disaster is creating a wider
than usual variety of medical needs, not only at hospitals
but also at evacuation centers and homes.
After:On the basis of the 2011 Tsunami, the existing law was
modified to enable prefectures to provide the necessary
support to municipalities for their own initiatives.
DMAT was empowered to provide short-term,
middle-term, and long-term medical assistance.
The Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act was modified
and specified that municipalities must create a list ofpeople requiring special and additional assistance during
emergencies.
A manual for public health in emergency situations has
been discussed and coordinated in a series of meetingsorganized by relevant organizations, agencies, and groups
to unify the medical information in disaster situations.
Efforts to enhance public health, medicine, and social
welfare in emergency situations have been undertaken
at different levels, including the establishment ofspecialized medical teams to respond to radiation
disasters; developing psychosocial care teams, suchas the psychological first aid promoted by WHO;and initiating a lecture series for disaster medical
coordinators to train them to respond effectively to largescale disasters.
Good practices:
Practices developed after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake
Several medical teams including DMAT hastened toprovide medical services at evacuation centers in theaffected sites and provided assistance for hospital
evacuations.
Initiatives adapted after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake
were implemented at the time of the 2011 Tsunami,
including the operation of disaster base hospitals,
psychosocial support teams, networks for dialysis, EMIS,
and a wide-area medical transportation system.
Disaster medical coordinator
Under the leadership of the prefecture and municipality
level coordinators, collaboration and cooperation
between public and private sectors including the JSDF
and DMAT were strengthened. The coordinators played
an important role in many efforts, including autopsying
victims, requesting accommodation for injured people,
and disaster medical team deployment after the sub-acutephase.
University hospital
The university hospitals located in three affected
prefectures played crucial roles as disaster base hospitals
in providing support to the local hospitals, receiving thepatients, assisting wide-area medical transportation for
dialysis, and collaborating with prefecture-level disastermedical coordinators.
They provided and provisioned the required medical
personnel such as doctors, nurses, and pharmacists to thehospitals and medical facilities in the affected areas
Activities at evacuation centers
On the basis of the experiences and the lessons learned
from the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, there was aconcern about the increasing number of patients sufferingfrom post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression,and alcoholism. However, with active intervention by
psychosocial teams, the occurrence of these symptoms was
minimized.
Relocation of hospitals to higher grounds and hills
The Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital, which had justmoved to higher ground prior to the 2011 Tsunami,
played a central role as a disaster base hospital.
Problems:
Preparedness and measures against massive tsunamis
Earthquakes had been the main focus of existingmeasures. In the 2011 Tsunami, many needs emergedthat had not been seen during the 1995 Great Kobe
Earthquake and were thus unidentified for the required
response.
There were insufficient preparations and countermeasuresfor handling the interruption of regional public healthsystems and other serious damage.
It was extremely difficult to obtain information on
the situation and needs of expectant mothers, infants,
elderly persons, persons with disabilities, and foreigners
who require extra support and assistance. The medical
records of chronic patients were lost in some hospitals.
Hospital damages included not only the buildings
and equipment, but also human resources and medical
personnel, requiring hospital evacuation.
Disaster public health
When a large-scale disaster occurs, the functions of themunicipal-level disaster countermeasures offices and theprefecture and municipality public health centers cease.
The current policy and law do not clearly state how thenational and prefectural governments can assist theseoffices in the medical response in such situations, nor dothey provide planning tools or guidelines.
After the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake, the calculationof “disasters=DMAT=external injuries” was widely
acknowledged, and there was no concept of “disasterpublic health risk management.” Even the Disaster Relief
Act did not target activities related to public health,sanitation, nutrition, and welfare. Therefore, the adoptionof public health measures for welfare and nutrition,
relief activities for persons requiring extra support, andinfection control were delayed.
The absence of a comprehensive/holistic control andcoordination mechanism delayed the establishment of
the relief system. The interruption of communicationand information sharing and the severe damages inthe extensive affected areas hampered medical relief
activities at evacuation centers.
Preparation of receiving support
The affected hospitals were not sufficiently preparedfor receiving and managing assistance from externalorganizations effectively, although they were familiar with
providing medical assistance. There was no clear guideline
describing the mechanism of receiving support, such as how
the affected hospitals can request assistance for a wide area.
29

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

Relief supply
The emergency supplies stockpile was insufficient as it
had been prepared under the assumption that the lifeline
could be secured from private power generation and wellwater use facilities.
It was impossible to respond to the affected areas’
requests immediately because of insufficient manpower andequipment.

HFA Core Indicator 5.4:
Procedures are in place to exchange relevant
information during hazard events and disasters, andto undertake post-event reviews

Prospect of Future Information Exchange Methods
in the Event of a Disaster by Taking Advantage ofSNS.
Keywords:
mass media, social network service (SNS), Twitter, risk
communication
Context:
In the past two decades, there were two greatest
earthquakes, in 1995 and 2011. During this period, themethods of delivering and sharing disaster information to
the public have changed considerably. In 1995, the mostwidely used form of communication was newspapers andTV, whereas in 2011, Internet social network service (SNS)such as Facebook and Twitter were used. SNS have figured
prominently as an instant info-sharing cybertool, despite
the presence of ethical and privacy issues for individual
account holders. As a future goal, methods to respect andprotect SNS account users should be implemented, while
maximizing the instant info-sharing potential of SNS.
Before:When the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake occurred, TV andnewspapers were the main source of sharing information.
Immediately after the disaster, these media conveyed
the damage situation. It remained difficult to obtain
information regarding damage conditions in the earlystages. Over time, the information contents changed to
the victim’s perspective such as sharing information about
shelter locations, their conditions, and confirming people’s
whereabouts. With time, the relevance of information
contents changed for victims’ long-term living environment
in evacuation facility such as life lines, preventing second
disasters, medical services, and school re-opening. The
origin of the information was mainly the government,
and mass media delivered it to the public. However, there
was a lot of incorrect information or rumors around.
The mass media also had ethical issues; for example, theroar of broadcasting company helicopters reporting on
damage conditions, such as destroyed buildings or roads,
caused search-and-rescue crews difficulty in hearing thevoices of victims who were underground or in collapsedbuildings. Moreover, those mass media concentrated on
areas of massive or shocking events. Thus, it is difficult
to say that they provided sufficient information about
rescuing outcomes and emergency treatments. Community
radio and news programs for people with disabilities andforeigners have earned positive reviews. At that time,
the Internet had just begun to spread widely, and it wasconsidered the first full-scale media attention devoted toa disaster. One of online communication network, Nifty
Serve, has launched an earthquake information hub andprovided diverse information on administration, shelter, andvolunteer activities. However, much of the information had
previously been announced by the government, and in other30

HFA Review Reportcases, concerns existed about the information’s reliability
because of its origin.
After:
Using a wide range of mass media, including the Internet(SNS), for exchanging disaster information during the2011 Earthquake and Tsunami was novel. The hugetsunami, with more than 10 m waves, followed a magnitude
9.0 earthquake and reached an elevation of 40.1 m,
catastrophically damaging the Japanese Pacific coastal
area. TV and radio announced warning information such as
aftershocks and the second and third waves of the Tsunami.
After the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, they alsoannounced evacuation information by removal order andthe radiation diffusion of contamination areas. Media also
reported in detail on the rescue activities by the Japan SelfDefense Forces (JSDF) and experts from abroad. It informed
the public about the damage from liquefaction to the coastal
areas in Chiba Prefecture, and train and bus schedules forcommuters in the central Tokyo area. NHK and certain
commercial television stations provided real-time disasterrelated information via their websites to people who could
not watch TV due to power outage1 and so on. According
to the result of a survey of 100 companies in the Kantoarea, the percentage of the purpose of SNS usage including
Facebook and Twitter in April 2011 (immediately following
the disaster) increased: the percentage for communicatingwith family and friends before the disaster and for receiving
early information after the disaster rose from 32% to 49%,for supplying media report but with lack of information by
TV and newspaper rose from 20% to 33%, for informing tolarge numbers of people rose from 22% to 29%. Receiving
domestic and international information from mass media
ranked fourth (22%), and confirming family members’ andfriends’ whereabouts and safety occupied 21% of SNS
usage. Public information could be obtained via SNS2, butthey can also transfer private information. In addition toaffecting a wide area, the Great East Japan Earthquake andlarge-scale Tsunami caused the Fukushima nuclear plant
accident and subsequent secondary disasters. Therefore, it
is increasingly thought that a Nankai Trough Earthquake
has a high probability of occurrence, and discussion has
begun addressing it as a real and practical matter. Regarding
the effects of a large-scale earthquake in a big city, the2011 disaster triggered broad perspective discussions on
TV forums about disaster prevention and relief amongindividual, academic, industrial, and government experts.
In 2011, smartphones also played an important role.
Despite a phone charging problem due to power outage orcommunication towers being broken, many people sent realtime messages/news of affected areas using SNS throughsmartphones.
Good practices:By tying up with NHK, certain commercial television
stations and internet sites provided Nico-Nico movie news
and Ustream for people with disabilities and those unable
to watch TV because of the power outage. Yahoo Japan
and Google Japan launched a real-time disaster-related
information site and a people’s whereabouts information
site, respectively.
1
2

Moreover, people using SNS exchanged considerable
information. For example, fuel for cars or house heating
systems was not delivered to the affected areas, including
lightly affected areas, because of a malfunction of thelogistics system. Twitter users frequently shared information
via Twitter about the available gas stations. Twitter
messages also shared information on when aid and medical
supplies were not delivered on time, requesting the rescue
supplies, and people’s emotions, such as anxiety for theaftershocks and fears about cold temperatures. Information
on volunteer activities and people’s whereabouts was also
shared via SNS. SNS played an especially important rolefor foreigners who did not understand Japanese, sharing
real-time information in their native language.
Problems:
In virtual online space such as SNS, the first uploader’sopinion on the information occasionally has more
powerful influence, for better or worse. The point is thata vast amount of information is spread to public with noverification, which could cause chaos.

Future recommendations:5-1.
It is important to establish legislation for responding tolarge-scale disasters and re-establishing the network amongresidents in the municipalities and lower levels.
One goal is to develop an information-sharing system byreviewing how personal information may be excessively
protected, and by creating a database with detail, amanagement strategy, and the system’s application under
the regulation, through cooperation among residents, local
governments, and the national government.
The other goal is to share and hand down local knowledge,
including disaster information. To accomplish sharing andhanding down requires encouraging citizens to performdaily activities positively for their local community andembedding activities that increase safety awarenessand disaster relief (local knowledge), which can reduce
community vulnerability to disaster.
5-2.
As the countermeasures required of local municipalities(counties and cities) are only to present an outline,
voluntary, autonomous communication (such as hazard
mapping) at the community level is very important for theplan to be effective. Specifically, a disaster prevention andmitigation system in accordance with the historical pathdependency of each district is required. Examples include
spatial hierarchy such as district － block association －neighborhood association (A) and district － neighborhood
association (B, C); various forms of governing such as topdown decision-making (A) and combination of bottom-up
decision-making and roles by officers (B, C).
Community development and enhancement of the activities
of resident organizations is one key to achieving thesegoals.

The Cabinet Office (2011). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/bousai2011/html/honbun/2b_sanko_siryo_06.htm.
The Cabinet Office (2012). Retrieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hisaisyagyousei/youengosya/h24_kentoukai.

31

IRIDeS Review Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Preliminary Report

5-3.
The experiences of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami identified various issues and challenges.
The following are the recommendations and suggestions
considered most important on the basis of disaster medical
response experiences.
1. Enhancing the capacity of disaster base hospitals
2. Strengthening the Disaster Medical Assistance Team(DMAT)
3. Enhancing the Emergency Medical Information System(EMIS)
4. Expanding a wide-area medical transportation plan
including hospital evacuation
5.Training for disaster medical and public healthcoordinators
6. Capacity development of medical personnel for disaster
response
5-4.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 depict Twitter account classificationby the keywords “Great East Japan Earthquake” forAugust 30th and “Tsunami” for September 4th, 2013,
respectively. The total number of accounts for “Great
East Japan Earthquake” was 1,165 and that for “Tsunami”
was 797. Uploading messages and providing information
regarding the earthquake by individual occupied 52% of
the total accounts, suggesting a project by individuals orcommunities occupying 19% by the keyword “Great East
Japan Earthquake.” The keyword “Tsunami” occupied
46% of uploads from individual accounts and 20% frommunicipalities managing the account. This phenomenon
can be interpreted as demonstrating the power ofindividuals sharing information via SNS and proving SNS
to be the most effective method for sharing/exchanging
information, anytime and anyplace. As another point,
personal information such as bank account, tax, or healthinformation that are stored by municipalities must bedigitized and backup data kept in a secure place, safe fromnatural disasters. In the big data era, legal restrictions must
be created as a filter ensuring the high quality and quantityof data, analysis methodology, and method of interpretation.
Early ethical education for sharing information via SNS is
also required. Risk-related communication using traditional
multimedia, SNS, and WebGIS techniques can figure more
importantly as next-generation communication methods.

32

Fig. 5.2 Classification of Twitter Accounts by Keyword“Great East Japan Earthquake”

Fig. 5.3 Classification of Twitter Accounts by Keyword“Tsunami”*Since the keyword was searched in Japanese, it is possible that
results in English differ.

HFA Review Report

Contributors
HFA IRIDeS Review Panel
Fumihiko Imamura: Deputy Director, Professor of Tsunami Engineering (Chair)
Yuichi Ono: Professor of International Regional Cooperation Office (Chair)
Osamu Murao: Professor of International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation (Chief Editor)
Jeremy D. Bricker: Associate Professor of Technology for Global Disaster Risk
Kanako Iuchi: Associate Professor of Comparative Mitigation Society
Takako Izumi: Associate Professor of International Regional Cooperation Office
Shunichi Koshimura: Professor of Remote Sensing and Geoinformatics for Disaster Management
Miwa Kuri: Assistant Professor of International Regional Cooperation OfficeMichimasa Matsumoto: Associate Professor of International Regional Cooperation OfficeKazuya Sugiyasu: Assistant Professor of International Regional Cooperation Office
Shinji Toda: Professor of Natural Disaster Research
Carine J. Yi: Assistant Professor of International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation
Authors and Editors
Fumihiko Imamura: Chap. 5 (HFA Priority for Action 2)
Kanako Iuchi: Chap. 5 (HFA Priority for Action 1)
Takako Izumi: Chap. 5 (HFA Priority for Action 5)
Miwa Kuri: Chap. 5 (HFA Priority for Action 3)
Michimasa Matsumoto: Chap. 5 (HFA Priority for Action 5)
Osamu Murao: Chap. 1, Chap. 2, Chap. 3, Chap. 4, and Chap. 5 (HFA Priority for Action 4)
Shinji Toda: Chap. 5 (HFA Priority for Action 2)
Carine J. Yi: Chap. 5 (HFA Priority for Action 5)
DesignOsamu Murao
Hiroko Sakaba
supported by Sonoko Kato and Carine J. Yi

Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters
HFA IRIDeS Review Preliminary Report Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
Copyright ©2013 International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Tohoku University
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URL: http://irides.tohoku.ac.jp
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