GraSPP-DP-E-14-003

Quantifying Chinese Public Financing
for Foreign Coal Power Plants

Takahiro Ueno, Miki Yanagi, and Jane Nakano
November 2014

GraSPP Discussion Paper E-14-003

GraSPP-DP-E-14-003

Quantifying Chinese Public Financing
for Foreign Coal Power Plants

Takahiro Uenoa, Miki Yanagib and Jane Nakanoc

November 2014

a Visiting Researcher, Graduate School of Public Policy

The University of Tokyo,
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656,Japan
Researcher, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, Japan
Phone: +81-3-5841-0217
e-mail: t-ueno@criepi.denken.or.jp
b Senior Researcher, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japanc Senior Fellow, the Energy and National Security Program

The Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States

GraSPP Discussion Papers can be downloaded without charge from:http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/

Quantifying Chinese Public Financing for Foreign Coal Power Plants
Takahiro Ueno, Miki Yanagi, and Jane Nakano1

Abstract
A call to essentially end public financing for new foreign coal power plants, initiated by
the United States and supported by several countries, is gaining momentum as somemultilateral development banks (MDBs) have adopted similar policies. Moreover, acarbon emissions performance standard which would significantly limit export credits
for coal power plants has been proposed to the OECD Export Credit Group. These
policies seem to assume that the public financing by the developed countries and MDBs
underpins the deployment of coal power plant in the developing countries and thus
curtailing such financing would significantly reduce carbon emissions. This paper aims
to quantify the scale of public financing by China, which as a non-member is not boundby OECD policies, through a systematic survey of announcements and media sources.
Consequently, we found that China is the largest provider of public financing for foreigncoal power plants; Chinese financing accounts for approximately 40 percent of the total
amount of public financing provided by major countries, such as China, Japan, Germany,and the United States. This finding implies that, even if the developed countries
stopped financing, continued demand for coal power generation in the developing
countries would likely be met by Chinese public financing, negating the intended
benefit of the proposed OECD effort and, possibly, leading to higher carbon dioxide
emission levels as China generally exports low efficient, subcritical coal power plants.

1. Introduction
Over the centuries, coal power generation has played a pivotal role in enhancing publicaccess to energy and supporting economic growth by providing a stable and low-costsupply of electricity and will continue to do so especially in developing countries.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), non-OECD demand is forecast to
Takahiro Ueno is a Visiting Researcher at Graduate School of Public Policy at the University ofTokyo as well as a Researcher at the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, Japan andcan be reached at t-ueno@criepi.denken.or.jp. Miki Yanagi is a Senior Researcher at the Institute ofEnergy Economics, Japan. Jane Nakano is a Senior Fellow in the Energy and National Security
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The views expressed in this paper aresolely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization.

1

1

grow by 1.2 percent per annum, from 1,298 Mtoe in 2011 to 5,170 Mtoe in 2035, driven
mainly by non-OECD Asian countries.2 On the other hand, there arises a concern that awide-scale introduction of coal power plants in developing countries would lock inincreased future carbon emissions.
To facilitate the reduction of carbon emissions from coal power generation, U.S.
President Barak Obama announced in 2013 a policy to end “public financing for new
coal power plants overseas” and called for other countries and multilateral developmentbanks (MDBs) to follow suit (Executive Office of the President 2013).3
To date, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United
Kingdom have followed suit, and halted public financing for new foreign coal power
plants.

Among MDBs, the World Bank Group, the European Investment Bank, andthe European Bank for Reconstruction and Development adopted similar policies in
2013. Furthermore, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands haveproposed to the Export Credit Group of the Organization of Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD), which deals with OECD rules on export credits, a “carbon
emissions performance standard that limits export credit agency support of high-carbon
power plants” (Executive Office of the President 2014). Reportedly, the proposed
standard is as stringent as the one proposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency for new U.S. power plants that essentially necessitates carbon capture andstorage (CCS) technology for new coal power plants (Volcovici 2014).
Public discussion to date seems to assume that the public financing by the developed
countries and MDBs significantly underpins the deployment of coal power plant in thedeveloping parts of the world.

The studies on public financing for foreign coal projects

by the Environmental Defense Fund (Rich 2009) and the Natural Resources Defense
Council (Schmidt 2013) reported that much of public finance had come from thedeveloped countries and MDBs (see Section 2 for details). This prevailing assumption
has led many policymakers to believe that curtailing such public financing would
significantly reduce capital for building coal power plants in the developing countries
and lead to the deployment of alternative, non-fossil fuel based power plants. The
above-mentioned proposal by the U.S., UK and Dutch governments at the OECD
2

These numbers are based on the New Policies Scenario of the World Energy Outlook 2013 by IEA.

3, The U.S. policy provides exceptions for financing to coal power plants “that (a) are located in theworld’s poorest countries, utilize the most efficient coal technology available and where no othereconomically feasible alternative exists, or (b) deploy carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).”2

reflects this prevailing thinking.
In reality, however, a significant amount of public financing for coal power projects inthe developing countries appears to originate in the developing world, led by China.
As trade statistics show, China is the largest exporter of coal power equipment and its
key ingredients such as boilers and steam turbines in the world (Figure 1), suggesting ahigh likelihood that China is leading the world in providing public financing to foreigncoal power plants to expand export of Chinese manufactured boilers and steam turbines.
If so, coal power plants in the developing countries will not lack needed capital so longas China continues the public financing for foreign coal power plants.

3.00(USD billion)

2.50
2.00
2009
1.50

2010

1.00

2011
2012

0.50

2013
0.00

Figure 1: Export of steam or other vapor generating boilers(other than central heating hot water boilers) between 2009 and 20134
Source: UN Comtrade Database5
As we discuss in Section 2, there has been no quantification research on the scale ofChinese public financing for new foreign coal power plants that is based on a systematicsurvey of government and corporate announcements and media sources.

The purposeof this study is, therefore, to quantify the scale of Chinese public financing for new

We used the export data of the commodity code titles “Steam or other vapour generating boilers.” It
includes not only boilers for coal power generation but boilers for other types of power generation suchas oil-fired and waste-heat-recovery generation.
5 UN Comtrade Database is available at:
http://comtrade.un.org/ (last accessed on November 3, 2014).
43

foreign coal power plants and enhance the understanding on the scale and nature ofsuch public financing. This paper consists of six parts.

Section 2 presents our review ofthe existing literature on public financing for foreign coal projects and of the existingunderstanding on the scale of Chinese public financing; Section 3 outlines our datacollection methodology; Section 4 presents the results of data collection and our analysisof the scale of Chinese public financing for new foreign coal power plants; Section 5compares the findings on China with the findings on other countries, such as the UnitedStates and Japan; and Section 6 illuminates the implications of the Chinese publicfinancing, especially what would happen if the OECD member countries ended
financing foreign coal power projects while the Chinese financing stayed its course.
2. Literature Review
The scale of public financing for foreign coal projects has been examined byenvironmental NGOs in the United States. Among them, Foreclosing the Future,authored by Bruce Rich and published by the Environmental Defense Fund (hereafter“Rich (2009)”) and Way Too Much Public Funding is Going into Coal Projects in KeyCountries, authored by Jake Schmidt and released online by the Natural Resource
Defense Council(hereafter “Schmidt (2013)”) are the most comprehensive studies todate.6
Rich (2009) reviewed the information on public financing for over 140 coal power plants
around the world, mainly in the developing countries. One of the key findings of thisstudy was that 88 coal power plants had received public financing and the total amountwas USD 37.04 billion. The data was collected on “new coal power plants andexpansions and life extensions of existing plants” for which financing was approved
from 1994 to January 2009. The information on power plants gathered for Rich (2009) isavailable online, including the name, location, annual and projected volumes of carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions, name of public financial institutions, and amount and type offinancing.7
Schmidt (2013) presented as preliminary data the scale of public financing for foreigncoal projects approved by multilateral development banks, export credit agencies, andaid agencies of the OECD member countries. The total amount of such public financing
Another well-cited study is Yang and Cui (2012), released from the World Resources Institute; thisstudy relied on the data provided by Rich (2009) with regard to public financing for coal power plants.
7 The database is available at http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/9584_coal-plants-spreadsheet.xls(last accessed on November 3, 2014).
6

4

is estimated to be USD 51.47 billion. The scope of research included “coal power plants”,“coal mines”, as well as “others” for which finance was approved from 2007 through2013. Since the collected data is not disclosed, how the study arrived at the estimate is
unknown. For example, it is unclear whether the investments in “coal power plants”
concern only new plants or include life extensions or other types of work for existing
plants.
Table 1 compares the results of the two studies by listing their estimates of publicfinancing from respective institutions. Among MDBs, both Rich (2009) and Schmidt(2013) estimated that the World Bank Group is the largest provider. With regard tonational financial institutions, the studies identified Japan—which provides financing
through the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the Nippon Export andInvestment Insurance (NEXI), and the Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA)—as the largest provider of public financing for foreign coal projects. According toRich (2009), the Export-Import Bank of the United States (US EXIM Bank) ranks as thesecond largest export creditor and, according to Schmidt (2013), the US EXIM Bank
approved more funding to coal mines than to coal power plants. On the other hand,according to Schmidt (2013), Germany—which provides loans through Kreditanstalt fur
Wiederaufbau (KfW) and insures loans through Euler Hermes—is the second largest
provider of public financing in the world.

5

Table 1: The Amount of public financing estimated by Rich (2009) and Schmidt (2013)(Unit: billion US dollars)World Bank Group
African Development Bank(AfDB)
European Investment Bank
Multilateral(EIB)
Development
Asian Development Bank
Banks
(ADB)
European Bank for
Reconstruction andDevelopment (EBRD)
Japan Bank for International
Cooperation (JBIC)
Nippon Export and Investment
Japan
Insurance (NEXI)
Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Export-Import Bank of theUnited States
United States
Overseas Private Investment
Amout ofCorporation (OPIC)
publicCommerce Exterieur
financingFrance(COFACE)
Kreditanstalt fur
Germany
Wiederaufbau (KfW)
Euler Hermes
UnitedUK Export Finance (UKEF)
Kingdom
Servizi Assicurativi delItaly
Commercio Estero (SACE)
Russian Development Bank
Russia
(VEB)

Korea

China

Estimate by Rich (2009)
Estimate by Schmidt (2013)(1994-January 2009)(2007-2013)
New coal power plants and Coal
Coal
power
Other
Total
expansions and life
mines
extensions of existing plants plants
5.315
5.39
0.09
1.06
6.54
0.5

2.84

n.a.

n.a.

2.84

2.511

1.54

n.a.

0.04

1.58

3.913

0.79

n.a.

n.a.

0.79

0.869

0.41

0.26

n.a.

0.66

8.139

7.46

4.22

0.22

11.9

2.089

4.8

0.2

0.29

5.28

n.a.

1.73

n.a.

n.a.

1.73

3.479

2.22

5.02

n.a.

7.24

0.685

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a

0.475

1.71

n.a.

n.a.

1.71

1.769

0.69

0.10

1.14

1.93

1.174

2.94

0.36

n.a.

3.31

0.606

n.a.

0.10

n.a.

0.10

0.789

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

0

n.a.

0

2.50

0

2.50

Export-Import Bank of Korea(Kexims)

0.7

1.92

n.a.

n.a.

1.92

Korea Trade Insurance
Corporation (K-sure)

n.a.

0.30

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

China Development Bank
Export-Import Bank of China
Sinosure

1.681
0.58
0.562

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a
n.a
n.a

Source: Rich (2009) and Schmidt (2013)
As for their findings on Chinese public financing, Rich (2009) identified that three coal
power projects in Indonesia received public financing from such “Chinese policy banks”8as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, and that the
total amount was USD 3.131 billion.

As for Schmidt (2013), the public financing by

Chinese institutions was not accounted for and the study provided the following
disclaimer:“We have some data for the Chinese institutions, but this data is

According to Martin (2012), Chinese policy banks are those wholly or partially owned by the Chinese
government and implement the policies set by China’s State Council. “China’s policy banks operate
financially by either receiving a capital contribution from the central government or by issuing bonds,”
which are presumed to be “backed by the full faith and credit of the Chinese government, with little orno risk of non-payment.”

8

6

incomplete so we haven’t included this in the totals.”

Incidentally, the period coveredby Schmidt (2013)—from 2007 to 2013—was when Chinese public financing institutions
generally expanded their foreign financing in order to support the “Going Out” policy by
the Chinese government;9 there has been no indication that Chinese public financing
for foreign coal power plants that promote exports of Chinese manufactured equipment
and components would have been an exception.

The lack of quantification of Chinese

public financing for this period had, therefore, meant a significant gap in our
understanding of the total scale of public financing for foreign coal power plants.
3. Our Data Collection Methodology
3.1. Difficulty in quantifying Chinese financing and our approach to dealing with thedifficulty
Gathering comprehensive data is one of the challenges in quantifying the scale ofChinese financing. While the OECD member countries have obligations to report to theOECD the information on loans, guarantees, and insurance provided by their export
credit agencies (ECAs) or their aid agencies, 10 developing countries have nocomparable reporting obligation (the Export-Import Bank of the United States 2014). In
addition, the public disclosure—such as by press releases and annual reports—of how
taxpayer money is spent in the form of loan provisions, insurance or grants by ECAs
and aid agencies is a common practice among the OECD member countries. In contrast,
Chinese policy banks rarely release such information. The lack of public disclosure by
Chinese banks hinders systematic collection of data.
The lack of access to the primary source-information on Chinese public financing forced
us to rely on official press releases by recipient countries as well as news articles andresearch reports.
In order to systematically assemble the information, we took the following three steps.
First, we conducted an Internet search where we used queries comprised of a country
name and a name of Chinese policy banks—e.g., a combination of “Indonesia” and“Export-Import Bank of China.” The search results were sorted out by project in order toprevent any project from being accounted for more than once. Second, we reviewed thesearch results for the monetary amount of public financing for each of the projects that
The explanation of “going out policy” by the Chinese government is available at:
http://www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-03/15/content_227686.htm (last accessed on November 3, 2014).
10 For information on the OECD reporting guidelines under the OECD, see OECD (2014) and OECD
(2007).
97

were financed by the Chinese policy banks.

Third, we compared a list of the Chinese

financed projects that we gathered against a list of coal power plants whose boilers or
turbines were supplied by Chinese manufacturers.

We used the Platts UDI WorldElectric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP) to determine which plants used Chinese
manufactured boilers or turbines. In effort to make the data collection as comprehensive
as possible, we repeated the first two steps for the power plants whose boilers or
turbines were supplied by Chinese manufacturers but did not show up in our initial
Internet search.
Many studies on various kinds of Chinese financing adopted a similar methodology. For
example, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (2014) collected news articles
through LexisNexis and created a database of projects that received Chinese export
finance. Wolf et al. (2013) also utilized LexisNexis to collect information when analyzing
the scale, trend, and composition of China’s foreign aid and government-sponsoredinvestment activities. In order to track Chinese aid for other developing countries,
Strange et al. (2013) developed a web-based data platform called AidData to compile
and present news articles in such a way that one can view the database through theInternet.
However, as pointed out by Strange et al. (2013), the information extracted from media
sources tends to be less accurate or complete than official statistical data, even if
researchers make their best efforts. Recognizing this challenge, we do not claim that ourestimates presented in Section 4 are comprehensive or complete. For example, we wereunable to find any information on Chinese financing for many power plants that used
Chinese equipment. It is impossible for us to know whether the lack of informationmeans the lack of Chinese finance or simply the lack of public disclosure.
3.2. Accounting criteria
When tallying the amount of Chinese public financing for foreign coal projects, welimited the scope of data collection to public loans, guarantees and insurance for new
foreign coal power plants whose financing agreements were concluded between 2007
and 2013. Because the new U.S. coal financing policy applies only to new plants, we
excluded public financing for retrofitting, maintenance or other investments for existing
units of coal power plants. In addition, we excluded finance agreements that weresigned before 2007 or after 2014, so as to smoothen the comparison of our findings
with—or, possibly to complement—the preliminary findings by Schmidt (2013), which8tallied the amount of financing approved between 2007 and 2013.
Moreover, we counted loans, guarantees and insurance that had reached the level ofagreements in order to avoid inflation of our estimate. We only included the projects forwhich we found information that explicitly mentioned a loan agreement, financial close,or other types of financing agreements; we excluded projects that were only in aplanning stage.
3.3. Extracted information
We extracted the following six types of information from the news articles and othersources we gathered: (1) the name of country where the publicly financed coal power
plant exists, (2) the name of publicly financed coal power plant, (3) the name of thefinancial institution that provided a loan, a guarantee or insurance, (4) the amount of aloan, a guarantee or insurance, (5) the installed capacity, and (6) the year in which afinancing agreement was concluded.
There are three Chinese public finance institutions that are active in financing foreigncoal power plants and they are the China Development Bank (CDB), Export-Import
Bank of China (China Exim Bank), and China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation(Sinosure).11 CDB, established by the Policy Banks Law of 1994, originally financed
domestic development projects, including the Three-Gorges Dam, but has increasingly
financed foreign projects at a commercial rate in recent years12 in support of the “Going
Out” policy of the Chinese government. CDB has been regarded as “a link between thestrategic ambitions of the Chinese government and the commercial interests of Chinese
firms because the financing it provides to support cross-border deals connects statepolicy to commercial activity” (Downs 2011). China Exim Bank, also established as apolicy bank in 1994, is wholly “owned by the Chinese government and under the direct
leadership of the State Council” 13 and has provided export credits since its
establishment. It offers loans both at a commercial rate14 and at a concessional rate,
See Brautigam (2011) and Martin (2012) for further information on these banks.
Details on CDB loans are available on the following website called, “China Power Contractor”
operated by China National Machinery Industry Corporation (Sinomach), a state-owned enterpriseand one of the major contractors of power plant construction in China and the world:
http://www.china-power-contractor.cn/Special-Commercial-loan-for-foreign-Projects-by-China-Develop
ment-Bank.html (last accessed on November 3, 2014).
13 For details, see the following website of the Export-Import Bank of China:
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/en-TCN/index_617.html (last accessed on November 3, 2014).
14 Details on China Exim Bank buyer’s credits are described on the China Power Contractor website(see footnote 5):
http://www.china-power-contractor.cn/Buyer's-Credit.html(last accessed on November 3, 2014).
11
12

9

like loans tied to the foreign aid.15

Sinosure, established in 2001, is a state-owned

enterprise that is a “policy-oriented” insurance company that provides export credit
insurance in support of China’s “foreign trade and economic cooperation.”16
4. Results
This section presents the amount of Chinese financing our research discovered; it isorganized by recipient countries. The details of data sources and how we discerned theamount are provided in the appended Supplementary Online Material (SOM).
4.1. The amount of Chinese public financing for respective countries(1) Indonesia
Between 2008 and 2013, China agreed to provide at least USD 4.34 billion to coal power
plants in Indonesia through public financing (Table 2). Indonesia launched a program toinstall approximately 10,000MW of coal-fired power plants in 2006, and awarded mostof the projects to Chinese contractors. The large-scale public financing by China
coincides with this program. With regard to the Celukan Bawang project in Bali, we
found that CBD made a loan agreement with a local power company in which
Huadian—one of the five major state-owned power generation enterprises in
China—holds a 51 percent share. While the total amount of the investment for the
project is reported as USD 0.638 billion, we were unable to find information on theamount of the loan.

15 According to the China Power Contractor website (see footnote 5), China Exim Bank provides
concessional loans (also known as “soft loans”) under the condition of sovereign guarantee by thegovernment of a loan recipient country. For more details, see the following website:
http://www.china-power-contractor.cn/Government-finance.html#b2 (last accessed on November 3,2014).
16 For details, see the following website of China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation:
http://www.sinosure.com.cn/sinosure/english/Company%20Profile.html(last accessed on November 3,2014).

10

Table 2:

Power Plant

The amount of Chinese financing for coal power plants in Indonesia

Financial
Institutions

South Smatra
CDB
Mine Mouth
Cilacap
CDB
Suralaya &China Exim Bank
PaitonPelabuhan Ratu China Exim BankPLTU NAD
China Exim Bank
Parit Baru
China Exim Bank
PacitanChina Exim Bank
Sinosure
Indramayu
CDB
Tanjung Awar
Sinosure
Awar
Rembang
CDB
Teluk Naga
Sinosure
China Exim Bank
Tanjung Kasam
Sinosure
Celukan
CDB
BawangTotal AmountAmount of
Installed
loans
Capacity(billion USD)

Year ofAgreement

0.318

2*150MW

2012

0.7

2013

0.481
0.124
0.133
0.293

660MW
660MW+
660MW
3*350MW
2*110MW
2*50MW
2*315MW

0.562

3*330MW

2008

0.372

2*350MW

2009

0.131
0.432

2*315MW
3*315MW

2008
2009

0.15

2*55MW2009

unknown

3*142MW

2012

0.64

2008
2009
2009
2011
2009

$4.34 billion

Source: Authors’ findings based on various sources listed in SOM(2) Vietnam
As shown in Table 3, Vietnam received Chinese public financing in the amount of USD
3.89 billion. Vietnam has abundant domestic resources of less flammable anthracite coal,
which necessitates particular technologies for ignition. Since 1980s, Chinese
manufacturers have obtained licensing from European and U.S. engineering
enterprises to produce steam generators that burn anthracite and semi-anthracite coals,
and supplied them to many plants in China (Che et al. 2004). Building on the domestic
experience, Chinese companies have won engineering, procurement, and construction(EPC) contracts for thermal power plants in Vietnam that burn anthracite coals,
including most of the plants listed in Table 3. The Chinese public financing has assistedsuch equipment exports by Chinese manufacturers.

11

Table 3:

The amount of Chinese public financing for coal power plants in Vietnam

Amount of
Installed
loans
Capacity(billion USD)
Vinh Tan 2
China Exim Bank
0.3
2*622MW
Uong Bi
China Exim Bank
0.176
330MW
Vung Ang
CDB
0.571
2*600MW
China Exim Bank
1.008
2*622MW
Duyen Hai 1
SinosureCDB
1
2*622MW
Duyen Hai 3
Sinosure
China Exim Bank
0.557
2*300MWHai Phong 2
Sinosure
Mao KheSinosure
0.275
440MW
Total Amount$3.89 billion
Power Plant

Financial
Institutions

Year ofAgreement
2010
2009
2011
2011
2012
2007
2011

Source: Authors’ findings based on various sources listed in SOM(3) India
We identified six cases in India for which China agreed to provide public financing thatamounted to USD 8.70 billion.

Among them are three cases where the status ofagreement remains at the level of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and a loan
agreement is not signed. Without these MoU level cases, the total amount of Chinese
public financing is USD 1.46 billion (Table 4).
Although these financing agreements in the form of an MOU may not have the samelegal standing as a formal agreement, Indian power producers who are signatories tothese MoUs have already placed procurement orders for major equipment for theirplants from Chinese manufacturers. However, the construction of these plants has been
either delayed or not commenced due to difficulties in obtaining various necessary
approvals, such as coal supply approvals and environmental clearances by the relevant
Indian authorities. Once these approvals come through, the construction will likely
commence and the loan agreements under the MoU will likely be concluded promptly.
In order to solve a chronic electricity shortage that has constrained the country’s
economic growth for many years, the new Indian Administration under Prime Minister
Narendra Modi seeks to expand domestic coal production by reforming the monopolistic
state-owned coal producer and encouraging more investments in coal power generation
while boosting other electricity sources, especially solar power17.
17

For example, the Indian government decided to expedite a regulatory approval for 90 coal mining

12

Table 4:

The amount of Chinese financing for coal power plants in India

Power Plant

Financial
Institutions

Sasan

CDB
China Exim Bank
Sinosure

Various power
CDB
plants of
China Exim Bank
Reliance Power
Anpara II and
CDB
HimawatCuddalore
Amarkantak
3&4, Babandh
and Vidarbha

Sinosure
CDB

CDB
China Exim Bank
Total Amount (without MoU)
Total Amount (including MoU)

JhajjarAmount of
Installed
loans
Capacity(billion USD)

Year ofAgreement

1.1

6*660MW

2010

5.45

30000MW

2010
(MoU)

0.6

2*660MW +2*660MW

1.19

3*660 MW0.2

2*660MW +2*660MW+2*
660MW

2010

0.16

2*660MW

2010

2010
(MoU)
2010
(MoU)

$1.46 billion$8.70 billion

Source: Authors’ findings based on various sources listed in SOM(4) Other countries
Table 5 summarizes Chinese public financing for coal power plants in other countries.
We found explicit references to loan agreements or financial close for all of the listed
projects, except the Kostolac power plant in Serbia. Financing for the 350MW plant in
Serbia is assumed to be one of the projects to which China Exim Bank is expected toprovide a loan as part of a large-scale credit line China has set for 16 Central andEastern European countries. The Serbian government has already promised to provide
a sovereign guarantee for the promised loan by China Exim Bank.

projects of the Coal India Limited in November 2014 (Dhoot 2014).

13

Table 5:

The amount of Chinese financing for coal power plants elsewhere

Country

Power Plant

Sri Lanka

Norochcholai 2

Phillipines

Mariveles

Morupule B
Botswana
Bosnia andStanari
Herzegovina

Amount of
Installed
loans
Capacity(billion USD)
China Exim Bank
0.891
2*300MWCDB
0.493
2*300MW
Sinosure
Sinosure
0.784
4*150MWFinancial
Institutions

CDB

0.444

300MW

Kostolac

China Exim Bank

0.305

350MW

Uzbekistan Angren
BrazilCandiota

China Exim Bank
CDB

0.166
0.356

150MW
350MW

SerbiaYear ofAgreement
2009
2010
2009
2012
2013
(credit line)
2013
2008

Source: Authors’ findings based on various sources listed in SOM
4.2. The aggregate amountIn aggregate, our estimate of the Chinese public financing for new foreign coal power
plants between 2007 and 2013 is at least USD 13.1 billion on the basis of official loan
agreements, and USD 20.6 billion when agreements at the MoU level are included.
As noted in the Section 3.1, we were unable to find information on Chinese publicfinancing for many thermal power plants which had adopted Chinese equipment. We
cannot discern whether the lack of information means the absence of finance or simply
the lack of public disclosure. Therefore, we believe that our estimate is likely to belower than the actual amount of Chinese financing. While Schmidt (2013) included
financing for both coal power plants and coal mines, our estimate covered only the newcoal power plants. Accounting for public financing for coal mining would most likely
make the figure much higher.
5. Comparing the Chinese financing with the financing by other key countries
This section presents our estimate on the amount of financing by other countries thatprovide public financing and are home to coal equipment manufacturer, including
Japan, the United States, and Germany, and compares the estimates with our estimate
on China.
5.1. Estimates of public financing by other countries(1) Japan
As we mentioned in Section 2, both Rich (2009) and Schmidt (2013) concluded that
14

Japan, which provides financing through JBIC, NEXI and JICA, is the largest providerof public financing for foreign coal projects in the world. Schmidt (2013) preliminarily
estimated that JBIC, NEXI, and JICA approved financing in the amount of USD 7.46
billion, USD 4.80 billion, and USD 1.73 billion, respectively, for foreign coal power
plants between 2007 and 2013; the total per Schmidt (2013) accordingly is USD 13.99
billion. This amount is a slightly higher than the lower end of our estimated Chinese
financing (USD 13.1 billion).
However, we suspect that the preliminary analysis by Schmidt (2013) overestimated thescale of Japanese financing. For example, the List of Coal Power Plants funded by JBIC

(2004-2014), released through an online brief by Tanabe (2014) of the Japan Center fora Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES), a Japanese environmental NGO,
indicates that the amount of approved JBIC loans between 2007 and 2013 was USD
5.371 billion. 18 The Tanabe (2014) estimate is USD 2.09 billion less than the
preliminary estimate by Schmidt (2013). Furthermore, the Tanabe (2014) estimate
included a loan for purchase of existing plants in the Philippines. The total loan amount
only for new coal plants, according to the Tanabe (2014) estimate, thus is USD 3.81
billion. The Tanabe (2014) estimate, however, appeared to omit loan provision for one
project in India and loan guarantees against three politically risky projects in Indonesia,
which amounted to USD 1.39 billion (See Supplementary Online Material 2 (SOM2)).
Therefore, our estimate of the total amount of loans and guarantees by the JBIC is USD
5.2 billion, which is USD 2.26 billion less or roughly 30 percent lower than the
preliminary estimate by Schmidt (2013).
The significance discrepancy between Schmidt (2013) and Tanabe (2014) concerning theestimates on JBIC loans compelled us to undertake our own data collection on financing
by NEXI and JICA—the two other Japanese public financing institutions—between
2007 and 2013 primarily on the basis of their press releases. The result of our datacollection shows that the NEXT insured loans amounted to at least USD 1.16 billion and
JICA provided loans USD 1.3 billion (See SOM2).
In total, we estimate that JBIC, NEXI and JICA collectively approved USD 7.66 billionof financing for new foreign coal power plants between 2007 and 2013.

The data provided by Tanabe (2014) is available at:
http://sekitan.jp/jbic/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/jbiccoallisten.pdf (last accessed on November 3,2014).
18

15

(2) The United States
US EXIM Bank releases a list of long-term loans and guarantees authorizations
through its annual reports. We identified two cases of the bank financing for coal power
plants according to the annual reports: Sasan power plant in India, and Kusile power
plant in South Africa.19 The total amount of US EXIM loans for these projects is USD
1.46 billion, which is smaller than Schimdt estimate of USD 2.22 billion.
(3) Germany
Germany provides loans through KfW and insurance through Euler Hermes. Unlike
Japanese and U.S. public financing institutions, KfW rarely discloses details on coal
power projects for which it provides loans.20 Recently, it disclosed that the amount ofloans committed for coal-fired power plants from 2006 to 2013 was Euro 2.8 billion (KfW
2014). As for Euler Hermes, the Germany government discloses the list of projects
covered by Euler Hermes, but not their monetary amounts. We, therefore, collected dataon German public financing by surveying the official releases by recipient countries andnews articles. As shown in SOM2, we estimate that the German public financing thatwere agreed upon between 2007 and 2013 amounted to be USD 3.66 billion. This
amount is very close to the preliminary estimate of USD 3.63 billion by Schmidt (2013).
(4) France
France provides export loans through Compagnie Française d'Assurance pour leCommerce Extérieur (COFACE). We found only one loan for new coal power plant that
was approved by COFACE between 2007 and 2013—a loan for Medupi and Kusile
power plants in South Africa. The amount is USD 1.71 billion, which is consistent with
the Schmidt (2013) estimate.
(5) South Korea
South Korea provides export loans through the Export-Import Bank of Korea (Korea
Exim Bank) and insurance through the Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-sure).
We compiled the amount of loans by the Korea Exim Bank and insurance by K-surefrom their official releases. The loans and the insurance approved between 2007 and2013 amounted to USD 4.30 billion; this amount is nearly twice larger than Schmidt

Although there were many other cases where the United States provided public loans forturbine-generator exports, we found that these turbine-generators were for gas-fired power plants.
20 The limited public disclosure by KfW may be attributed to the fact that KfW export financing isprovided through its 100 percent subsidiary called the KfW IPEX bank, which is regarded as acommercial bank although the German government is a 80 percent shareholder of KfW.
19

16

estimate of USD 2.22 billion.

This amount was larger than the public financing by theUnited States, Germany or France. As shown in SOM2, the Korean public financing has
expanded since 2010, coinciding with the expansion of the Korean exports of boilers andsteam turbines.
(6) India
India provides export credits through the Export-Import Bank of India. The bankreports major contracted projects in its annual reports every year and reported only one
coal-fired power plant in the annual reports between 2007 and 2013. Although theamount of the financing for the project was not reported, the amount is likely to be
negligible, especially compared to the financing by most of the countries listed above.21
5.2. Comparison among countries
Figure 2 summarizes our estimates of public financing outlined above. According to ourestimates, China is the largest provider of public financing for new foreign coal power
plants, and the financing level is approximately 70 percent more than Japan, which our
research suggested to be the second largest provider. Chinese financing accounts for41.1 percent of the aggregated amount of public financing by China and the other fivecountries we examined: Japan (24.0 percent), South Korea (13.5 percent), Germany(11.5 percent), France (5.4 percent), and the United States (4.6 percent).

While India provides export insurance through the Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India(ECGC), we were unable to find information that ECGC has provided insurance for foreign coal power
projects during the target period.
21

17

14.0
12.0

(USD billion)

10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
China

Japan

South
Korea

Germany

FranceUS

Figure 2: Comparison of public financing for foreign coal power plants
between 2007 and 2013 among countries
Source: Authors
6. Discussion
Our quantification of Chinese public financing for foreign coal power plants andcomparison of the data with those of other countries have led us to conclude that Chinais the largest provider of public financing in the world. This is a finding that merits
consideration of implications for several policy issue areas.
6.1. Climate implications:

What if the OECD stopped providing public financing?

As mentioned in Section 1, the United States, the United Kingdom, and theNetherlands proposed to the OECD Export Credit Group a carbon emissions
performance standard that essentially prohibits export credits for coal power plants
without CCS. Given high capital costs and other challenges associated with CCS
deployment, this proposed standard would likely eliminate export credits for coal power
plants by the OECD member countries. Meanwhile, as China is not a member of theOECD, its Chinese provision of export credits for foreign coal power plants would not bebound by the new standard—if adopted by the OECD.
In fact, if the OECD adopted the proposed standard and stopped bilateral publicfinancing, China might simply replace the OECD countries and satisfy continued
demand for coal power plants forecasted for developing countries by providing public18

financing for foreign coal power plants, thus negating the intended benefit of the new
OECD policy. Such development is highly probable in light of growing excess production
capacity in Chinese manufacturing sector that is arising from slowing domestic demand
for new thermal power plants in China. According to trade statistics by the United
Nations, Chinese exports of boilers and steam turbines have rapidly expanded since2007 although the export level has fluctuated more recently after it peaked in 2011
(Figure 3).22

On the other hand, the annual addition of thermal power generation

capacity in China sharply dropped from 62.4GW in 2011, to 36.5GW in 201323 (Figure4). Declining domestic demand leads to redundancy in Chinese manufacturing capacity
for coal power generation equipment and components as each of the three majorstate-owned manufacturers in China—Harbin Electric, Dongfang Electric, andShanghai Electric—has annual production capacity of approximately 30GW.24 Suchcapacity redundancy could prompt China to facilitate exports of boilers and steam
turbines for coal power plants, with the assistance of public financing by CDB, China
Exim Bank and Sinosure, essentially reversing the declining trend in boiler and steam
turbine exports.25

The monetary amount of the loan agreements we identified in Section 4 peaked in 2009, which is
the year when Indonesia awarded many contracts to Chinese manufacturers.
23 Statistics are available on the website of the China Electricity Council:
http://www.cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/tongjxinxi/yuedushuju/2013-12-16/113898.html
24 Information on production capacity of these manufacturers is available at the following links:
http://www.harbin-electric.com/en-company2.asp (last accessed on November 3, 2014),
http://www.dongfang.com.cn/index.php/business?subCategory=FossilFuelPower (last accessed on
November 3, 2014).
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-03-29/news/31254847_1_supercritical-equipment-p
ower-equipment-sasan (last accessed on November 3, 2014).
25 Increasing domestic demand for nuclear power plants and combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT)
power plants could absorb a share of redundant production capacity of steam turbines, which are used
not only for coal power plants but also for nuclear and CCGT plants. On the other hand, the capacity
redundancy for large boilers adapted for thermal power plants would not easily be absorbed by the
introduction of alternative sources of energy because such boilers are too large for alternative sources.
Since China has by far the largest domestic market for coal power generation equipment, the Chinese
manufacturers would need to seek new business domains in addition to foreign coal power projects inorder to generate revenue.
22

19

(US billion dollars)

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 3: Trend of Chinese exports of steam boilers
Source: UN Comtrade Database26

70
60

(GW)

50
40
30
20
10
0
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Figure 4: Trend of annual addition of coal power plants in China
Source: The China Electricity Council
If France, Germany, Japan and South Korea—major exporters of coal power generationequipment and components who as of today do not ban the public sector financing forforeign coal power plants—stopped providing public financing and if China decided toreplace them in providing export credits for the purpose of export expansion, theamount of Chinese public financing could more than double, as suggested by Figure 2.27
UN Comtrade Database is available at:
http://comtrade.un.org/ (last accessed on November 3rd, 2014).
27 One alternative may be private financing. However, we believe that this alternative is much lesslikely. As shown in SOM and SOM2, foreign public financing for coal power plants prevails in many
26

20

We believe that the three Chinese public financing institutions have the capacity tofulfill such a policy objective because—despite the fact that public financing for foreigncoal power plants peaked in 2009—the volume of export credits by China Exim Bankand Sinosure has continuously expanded from USD 31.1 billion in 2010 to USD 45.5
billion in 2013 (Figure 5) , and the financing capacity will be even bigger when CDB
loans are added.

50
45
40

Public financing forcoal power plants
overseas by CDB,
China Exim Bank, andSinosure(USD billion)

35
30
25

Entire export credit by
China Exim Bank andSinosure (except CDB)

20
15
10
5
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5: Chinese public financing for foreign coal power plants and the total amount ofexport credits by China Exim Bank and Sinosure
Source: SOM and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (2014)
Furthermore, accelerating export of Chinese boilers and steam turbines causes anadditional climate change concern, as the power plants China exports are relatively
inefficient in generating electricity and they emit more CO2 than more efficient plants.
Although China is building energy efficient power plants like supercritical (SC) andultra-supercritical (USC) plants at home, they generally export plants that tend to use

countries, especially in Indonesia, Vietnam and India, where sovereign rating is not so high and thus
public financing plays an important role. We believe that borrowers would prefer relying on Chinese
public financing to limiting themselves to private financing. With regard to the role of private
financing, Jones et al. (2011) estimates that about 99 percent of coal power plants in the middle
income-category countries were financed solely by the private sector between 2000 and 2010. However,Jones et al. (2011) appears to narrowly define public financing as MDB concessional loans and regards
the rest as sole private financing. Our paper, as well as Rich (2009) and Schmidt (2013), include loans
and insurance by bilateral agencies into the category of public financing and, as shown in SOMs, wefound that many coal power plants in the middle income-category countries, such as Indonesia andVietnam, have received the public financing.

21

inefficient subcritical technology. Table 6 presents types of boiler technology that were
exported by Chinese manufacturers to non-OECD Asian markets in developing
countries after 2007, according to the 2012 edition of the Platts UDI World ElectricPower Plants Data Base (WEPP). The share of SC and USC boiler technology accounted
for less than 40 percent of the total coal power plants supplied by Chinese
manufacturers to Asian markets outside China. In comparison, the share of SC and
USC boiler technology accounted for over 60 percent in the coal power plants supplied
by Japanese manufacturers (including joint ventures with Indian firms that adopted
Japanese technologies) to the same markets (Table 7). If we limit the samples to theprojects that received public financing, the share of SC is 43 percent for Chinese
manufacturers and 65 percent for Japanese manufacturers. South Korean andEuropean manufacturers also tend to export more efficient power plants than do
Chinese manufacturers.

Table 6: Types of boiler technology supplied by Chinese manufacturers
to Asian overseas markets after 200728
Asia (except China, Japan,

India (as a part of the left

and South Korea)

column)Subcritical (MW)55,192

36,983

SC/USC (MW)29,94028,080Share of supercritical

35.17%

43.16%

Source: Authors’ calculation based on Platts UDI World Electric Power Plants Data
Base (WEPP)We totaled the generation capacity of coal power plants that started commercial operation after
2007 or were under construction at the timing of the release of the database in 2012. We excluded theplants which were still at a planning stage at the timing of the release of the database.
28

22

Table 7: Types of boiler technology supplied by Japanese manufacturers(including joint ventures with Indian firms) to Asian overseas markets after 200729
Asia (except China, Japan,

India(as a part of the left

and South Korea)

column)Subcritical (MW)

5,082

0

SC/USC(MW)

8,390

5,940

Share of supercritical

62%

100%

Source: Authors’ calculation based on Platts UDI World Electric Power Plants Data
Base (WEPP)As shown in Table 3, the Chinese manufacturers have recently expanded supply of SC
plants in India, which drove up the share of SC in the Asian markets. However,
Chinese-manufactured SC plants tend to be less efficient than SC plants manufactured
by other Asian manufacturers, because the Chinese boilers supplied in India do not
generate main steams or reheat steams that are hotter than approximately 565 degrees
Celsius; meanwhile, other manufacturers, including Japanese and Korean ones (as wellas an Indian manufacture that has obtained licensing from European enterprises) have
manufactured and supplied in India SC boilers producing the steams that are as hot as
approximately 565 degrees Celsius for main steams and 593 degrees Celsius for reheat
steams—the levels nearly analogous to steam conditions for USC plants (Uenoforthcoming).
If the less efficient coal power plants by Chinese manufacturers fill the gap in plantdemand created by the OECD ban on export credits and resultant absence of OECDlevel technology, more CO2 would be emitted into the atmosphere. Despite the statedintent of reducing CO2 emissions, the public finance restriction policy could produce acontrary result, depending on the efficiency of power plants supplied by Chinese
manufacturers.
Moreover, the public financing restriction could essentially hamper the advancement inresearch and development of clean coal technology, which is not limited to CCS, bylimiting their deployment opportunities as a combination of market conditions indeveloping countries and OECD policy direction inadvertently rewards less efficient
We totaled the generation capacity of coal power plants that started commercial operation after
2007 or were under construction at the timing of the release of the database in 2012. We excluded theplants which were still at a planning stage at the timing of the release of the database.
29

23

technology.

Not only would such development challenge the prospect for driving down

the cost of clean coal technology deployment, but also handicap future market-based
responses in light of growing coal consumption in much of the world.
Furthermore, the momentum to severely limit the public financing for coal power plant
projects has emerged at the time when the robust production of shale gas has reversed
the levels of U.S. domestic natural gas production and begun facilitating the fuel-switch
away from coal in the U.S. electricity sector, compounding economic challenges to the
U.S. coal sector.

One effect of the U.S. shale revolution is that the now underutilized

U.S. coal supplies have become economically competitive in the global marketplace andare shipped abroad in high volume. For example, U.S. coal exports in 2011 grew by
171 percent from 2002, the year that marked the lowest annual export level of 40
million tons in the recent decades (USEIA 2012). Moreover, since 2009, U.S. coal exports
have been growing by about 20 million tons annually (USEIA 2012). The major
destinations for U.S. coal in 2014 include the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, andChina (USEIA 2014). This development calls into question the climate logic behind the
U.S. and several importing countries’ call for the financing restriction on coal power
plants while allowing for coal trade.

6.2. Geopolitical implications: Will the differing energy realities lead to a geopoliticalshift?
The momentum to widely promote the ban on public financing for coal power plant
projects has coincided with the emergence of new financing vehicles, such as the New
Development

Bank—commonly

known

as theBRICS

Bank—and

the

Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
The creation of the BRICS Bank was agreed upon by Brazil, Russia, India, China andSouth Africa at the fifth BRICS summit in Durban, South Africa, in March 201330—only
a few months before the U.S. announcement about the coal financing restriction as partof the Climate Action Plan in June 2013.

Following the U.S. decision, the policy spreadto the World Bank—where China, Brazil and India long opposed such a financing
restriction—and the Bank announced its new policy in July 2013 (World Bank 2013,

30 For more information on the Fifth BRICS Summit, see the following link:.
(last accessed on November 3, 2014).

http://www.brics5.co.za/

24Plumer 2013, Lattanzio 2013).

Moreover, even before the BRICS Bank was officiallysigned off at the sixth BRICS summit in Brazil in July 2014,31 Chinese President Xi
unveiled his proposal on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) during his
visit to Indonesia for the APEC Leaders Meeting in October 2013 (Xinhua 2013). A year
later, over 20 country delegates who gathered in Beijing signed the Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU) to launch the AIIB (Reuters 2014).

According to the MOU, thebank, with authorized capital of USD 100 billion, will be formally established by the endof 2015, and headquartered in Beijing—the capital of the country that reportedly
promised to contribute much of the initial USD 50 billion in capital, and as such would
become the largest stakeholder with a share of up to 50 percent (Feng 2014, Reuters2014).32
The emergence of these institutions seems to reflect the under-development of
infrastructure and the under-met financing needs to achieve such development in thedeveloping countries.

For example, according to the Asia Development Bank, regional

infrastructure needs in Asia are estimated to be $750 billion annually, between 2010
and 2020 (ADB and ADBI 2009).
While the current ban on coal power plant financing by several developed countries andseveral MDBs was formulated in genuine efforts to reduce the total greenhouse gas
emissions in the world, it reflects the widening reality in two camps of energy economies
as it relates to the role of coal.

On one hand is the United States and several western

European countries where addressing the climate change has become the overarching
political mandate and the policy pathway is aided by a combination of growing energy
production (in the United States) and the moderate level of energy consumption (boththe United States and Europe).

On the other hand is a collection of countries where

31 For more information on the agreement, see the website of the Ministry of External Relations ofBrazil:http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/219-agreement-on-the-new-development-bank-for
taleza-july-15 (last accessed on November 3, 2014). Reportedly, member disagreements over the voting
rights allocation and share structure held up the formal signing until a year later (Wild, Galvao andArkhipov 2013).
32 As pointed out by several leading experts of political economy, the BRICS Bank seems to reflect a
genuine grievance on the part of the developing countries about the “state of global economic
governance, including the recurring financial crises emanating from the United States and Europe inrecent years” (Goodman 2014) as well as the reluctance of the developed countries to fully adjust
institutional governance to reflect the growing prominence of the emerging economies. Meanwhile, theimpact of these emerging institutional arrangements on the existing global system that is generally
underpinned by rules of law and transparency remains to be seen. For example, the United States has“concerns about the ambiguous nature of the AIIB proposal as it currently stands,” and thus has“strongly urge[ed] that it meet international standards of governance and transparency” (Reuters2014).

25

coal remains a key part of their energy economics and where economic security drives
much of the energy policy agenda as they are generally either highly dependent onenergy imports or faced with a robust domestic energy consumption forecast. The latter
reality is a strong explanation for continued interest by emerging economies to build
coal power plants, provide public financing, and to launch new multilateral financing
institutions as they recently have.
In particular, the gap between the reality of energy and economic security in thedeveloping world and the climate vision among the developed countries has widened tothe extent that the effectiveness of existing institutions, such as the OECD and theWorld Bank, as well as the relevance of their missions are now in the domain of public
discussion. Even if the developed countries and the existing MDBs halted publicfinancing for coal power plants in the developing countries, financing by emerging
nations, such as bilateral financing by China and multilateral financing by the BRICS
Bank and the AIIB, could fill the void.
6.3. Conclusion
A call to severely restrict public financing for coal power plants overseas aims to help
reduce the global level of CO2 emissions. While its intended aim is indisputably
important, the policy direction has likely been handicapped by the limited
understanding of the scale and nature of public financing in this area. Ourquantification research shows that China is the leading provider of public loans, credits
and insurance for coal power plants overseas and, therefore, suggests that the publicfinancing ban by the developed countries would not lead to significant reduction incarbon dioxide emissions. In fact, this policy development has climate and geopolitical
implications that may generate unintended consequences, including a potential
increase in CO2 emission levels and a slow-down in robust deployment of clean coaltechnologies.
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