JAEA Report:
Review and Perspective of the Safety Research
for Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Nuclear Safety Forum 2010 (NSRF2010)“Perspectives of Safety Regulations and Research forRadioactive Waste Disposal”
February 23, 2010
The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

Hiroyuki Umeki
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

The Japanese geological disposal programme- Stepwise implementation
2010

2010

Requirements
on Geological
Environments
to Select
DIAs

2020

Basic Safety
Guideline

2040

Safety Guidelines

Safetyand Standard

Review

Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

R&D Framework for GD in Japan
Atomic Energy Commission, “Framework
for Nuclear Energy Policy”

R&D byImplementer

Nuclear Safety Commission, “Focused
Research for Nuclear Safety”

R&D for Establishing Scientificand Technical Basis(Coordination Executive for
Geological Disposal R&D）
METI - ANRE

Regulatory Research

MEXT

METI - NISA
JNES

Nuclear Waste
Management
Organizationof Japan（NUMO）ANRE R&D program:Contractors for FY09
-JAEA-GIRDD-RWMC-CRIEPI-AIST-Institute for
Geo-Resources andEnvironment-NIRS

Geological
Isolation
ResearchandDevelopment
Directorate(GIRDD)

Nuclear
SafetyResearchCenterAIST –
Research
Core for Deep
Geological
Environments

JAEA

Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan2

Progress in Safety Research for GD –An Overview (1)• HLW disposal¾ Site investigation methodology− Research on long-term stability of geological environment (JAEA, AIST,JNES, etc)
9 Development of investigation techniques and evaluation methods;
accumulating required databases− Hydrology and mass transport in relevant geological environments(JAEA, AIST, RWMC, CRIEPI)
9 Knowledge base and model development for regional hydrology,
groundwater flow through faults, colloid-facilitated transport, andgroundwater “age” determination− Development of geological investigation methodology

9 Improvement of geosynthesis methodology (JAEA, RWMC)
9 Investigation techniques for nea-field host rock (AIST, RWMC)¾ Establishment of requirements and criteria for selecting DIAs
− Development of relevant investigation technologies within two URL
projects (JAEA)− Proposed guidelines for Preliminary Investigation (JNES)− Development of techniques for Preliminary Investigation and in-situ
tests (CRIEPI)
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan3

Progress in Safety Research for GD –An Overview (2)• HLW disposal¾ Approach and methodology for safety assessment− Development of probabilistic approach and methods (JAEA, CRIEPI)− Realistic model development for key processes (JAEA, CRIEPI, RWMC)− Development of databases for performance assessment (JAEA, NIRS)− Survey and review of status of international standards and guidelines
and regulations in each national programs (RWMC, NSRA)¾ Integrity and robustness of the EBS− Knowledge base on long-term behaviors of EBS components (bentonite
buffer, low-pH cement, etc) (JAEA, CRIEPI)− Database development of characteristics of EBS components (JAEA)− Evaluation of effects of repository construction on long-term
performance (JAEA)• Relevant research carried out for other waste disposal¾ Scenarios and safety analysis− Safety assessment methods (models, data, etc) for co-disposal of HLW
and TRU waste (JAEA, JNES)¾ EBS and geosphere performance− TRU EBS behavior and gas migration tests (RWMC, CRIEPI)− Development advanced waste forms (RWMC)
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

4

General Overview of the Outcome of R&D (1)z H12 (1999) and TRU-2 (2005) formed a solid basis for thedemonstration of the fundamental feasibility of safe geologicaldisposal of HLW and TRU waste in Japan: although technology has
advanced significantly, the basic conclusions of this project are stillvalid
z This generic fundament has been complemented by subsequent
work to show how implementation at a specific site could betailored to local conditions in a manner that:¾ Takes into account local geological and topographical boundary
conditions¾ Recognizes the need to ensure not only long-term safety but safety
during construction and operation (and other pragmatic constraints)¾ Facilitates information transfer to all interested stakeholders andencourages development of dialogue¾ Ensures flexibility in the program to accept advances in science andtechnology and changes of socio-political requirements¾ Utilizes an advanced KMS, recognizing that the information explosion
has surpassed the capabilities of past information management
procedures
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

5

Taking account of local geological andtopographical boundary conditions
Extension of generic studies in H12 and TRU-2 for specificgeological conditions at study sites

Key aspects:¾Tailoring investigation techniques and evaluation methods
for the geological environment at a given site
¾Extension of the repository engineering knowledge base
¾Development of methods and databases to compare
different sites, repository concepts and implementation
options

Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

6

Development of site-specific investigation
techniques and evaluation methods – example¾Stepwise development of Site Descriptive Model (SDM)
EL. (m)500

EL. (m)500

NS

EL. (m)500

NS

EL. (m)
500

N
S

0

0

0

-500

-500

-500

-500

-1000

-1000

-1000

-1000

-1500

-1500

-1500

-1500

Tokyo Datum

7 00

0

0
640
E-W 0
(m)

0

(m
)

Tokyo Datum

Step 250-6(m 900
)
0

E-W

-2000
5 60

720

JGD2000

Step 30

N- - 68
S ( 80
0
m
)
-6
80
0

0

Tokyo Datum

Step 1
全ボー リング孔における全水頭の実測値と解析 値の差の標準偏差 ［m］

7 00

0

- 69
60

(m
)

6 00

0

E-W

-2000

N-S

0

0

- 70
00

7 00

6 00

0

(m
)

0

E-W

-2000

- 70
00

0
- 70
00

6 00

NS ( -69
m 00
)
0

-2000

NS ( -69
m 00
)
0

0

0

N
S

Step 44540
35Adaptive site investigation to refine the SDM
within geosynthesis (Example: Mizunami URL)
30
25

ステップ1

ステップ2

ステップ3

ステップ4

20
1

3

5

7

9

11

13
15
17
19
解析ケース数 ［ケース］

21

23

25

27

29

31

Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan7

Development of site-specific investigation
techniques and evaluation methods – example¾ Development of a time-dependent regional groundwater flow
analysis code (3D-SEEP) and verification at a study site
Analysis for present SDM
Tokyo Bay

Total head (m)300

Analysis for SDM evolution (８0,000 years)

a

北

北
a
’ Pacific Ocean

南

SDM for Boso Peninsula

150

cross section a-a’aa’Time dependent
groundwater flow
analysis with evolutionof SDM by uplift anderosion南Realistic safetyassessment method0Realistic
Vertical scale x4 regional analysis for evolution of the SDM as aresult of uplift-erosion
climatechange
SDM evolution basedandon regional
uplift-erosion
data
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan8

Development of the repository
engineering knowledge base – example

Data search function• Thermal• Extrusion/Erosion• Hydraulic• Gas permeability➢experimental
conditions,buffer material
density,bentonite-sandmixture, etc• MechanicalDevelopment of a comprehensive buffer database;user interface
Front
page emphasisof Buffer Material
specialonDatabasedata for saline Graphicalgroundwater
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

9

General Overview of the Outcome of R&D (2)z H12 (1999) and TRU-2 (2005) formed a solid basis for thedemonstration of the fundamental feasibility of safe geologicaldisposal of HLW and TRU waste in Japan: although technology has
advanced significantly, the basic conclusions of this project are stillvalid
z This generic fundament has been complemented by subsequent
work to show how implementation at a specific site could betailored to local conditions in a manner that:¾ Takes into account local geological and topographical boundary
conditions¾ Recognizes the need to ensure not only long-term safety but safety
during construction and operation (and other pragmatic constraints)¾ Facilitates information transfer to all interested stakeholders andencourages development of dialogue¾ Ensures flexibility in the program to accept advances in science andtechnology and changes of socio-political requirements¾ Utilizes an advanced KMS, recognizing that the information explosion
has surpassed the capabilities of past information management
procedures
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan10

Demonstration test of low alkali cement¾

Mitigation of effects of high pH plume from
cementitious material on long-term safety

Shotcretey Test in a mock-up tunnel (FY06)
y Planning underground in-situ test (FY07)
y In-situ test at Horonobe URL (FY09)



Cast-in-place concretey Laboratory test for selecting compositionand planning for in-situ test at Horonobe
URL (FY08)


Grout

In-situ shotcrete demonstration
test at Horonobe URL：July, 2009y Selection of composition and planning forin-situtest (FY08)
Developmentof the technical basis fory In-situ test at Horonobe URL (FY09)
practical application of low alkali cement
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

11

General Overview of the Outcome of R&D (3)z H12 (1999) and TRU-2 (2005) formed a solid basis for thedemonstration of the fundamental feasibility of safe geologicaldisposal of HLW and TRU waste in Japan: although technology has
advanced significantly, the basic conclusions of this project are stillvalid
z This generic fundament has been complemented by subsequent
work to show how implementation at a specific site could betailored to local conditions in a manner that:¾ Takes into account local geological and topographical boundary
conditions¾ Recognizes the need to ensure not only long-term safety but safety
during construction and operation (and other pragmatic constraints)¾ Facilitates information transfer to all interested stakeholders andencourages development of dialogue¾ Ensures flexibility in the program to accept advances in science andtechnology and changes of socio-political requirements¾ Utilizes an advanced KMS, recognizing that the information explosion
has surpassed the capabilities of past information management
procedures
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

12

Facilitating communication with stakeholders
using analogue studies – example
100¾Accumulation ofLong-term corrosion
analogue data on glass
data for iron
出雲大社境内遺跡（鉄帯等）
corrosion, corrosion of
10[酸化性環境]iron and copper,
bentonite alteration, etc¾Implementation of long1
term laboratory tests,
10年間の長期
腐食試験データ取得
e.g. 10 years corrosion
出雲大社境内遺跡（鉄斧）[弱酸化性～還元性環境]
test for iron under
0.1
simulated repository
室内試験
鉄製埋蔵物（斧，やじり，刀など）
鋳鉄製水道管腐食事例
conditions
水道管黒鉛化腐食事例
0.01
横浜市鋳鉄管
¾Increase in
還元性環境での室内試験結果
understanding of long文献値(Araki et al., 1989)
第2次取りまとめ評価
term performanceandIncreaseconfidence
in long-term performanceby
0.001
its reliability
1
10
100
1,000
10,000

腐食量 [mm]

第2次取りまとめにおける1,000年間の腐食量評価値

extended laboratory
experiments under simulated deep
埋設期間 [年]
underground conditions together with relevant analogues
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

13

General Overview of the Outcome of R&D (4)z H12 (1999) and TRU-2 (2005) formed a solid basis for thedemonstration of the fundamental feasibility of safe geologicaldisposal of HLW and TRU waste in Japan: although technology has
advanced significantly, the basic conclusions of this project are stillvalid
z This generic fundament has been complemented by subsequent
work to show how implementation at a specific site could betailored to local conditions in a manner that:¾ Takes into account local geological and topographical boundary
conditions¾ Recognizes the need to ensure not only long-term safety but safety
during construction and operation (and other pragmatic constraints)¾ Facilitates information transfer to all interested stakeholders andencourages development of dialogue¾ Ensures flexibility in the program to accept advances in science andtechnology and changes of socio-political requirements¾ Utilizes an advanced KMS, recognizing that the information explosion
has surpassed the capabilities of past information management
procedures
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan14

Development of visualization and numericalanalysis methods for near-field evolution¾T-H-M-C model development for the near field and numerical experiments
13

12

緩衝材領域

モルタル領域

1110

9THMC連成解析結果
8
COUPLEの実験結果
7
0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

中心ヒーター壁面からの距離 [m]Application of advanced science and technology
for realistic analysisof repository systempHbehavior
Temperature
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

15

General Overview of the Outcome of R&D (5)z H12 (1999) and TRU-2 (2005) formed a solid basis for thedemonstration of the fundamental feasibility of safe geologicaldisposal of HLW and TRU waste in Japan: although technology has
advanced significantly, the basic conclusions of this project are stillvalid
z This generic fundament has been complemented by subsequent
work to show how implementation at a specific site could betailored to local conditions in a manner that:¾ Takes into account local geological and topographical boundary
conditions¾ Recognizes the need to ensure not only long-term safety but safety
during construction and operation (and other pragmatic constraints)¾ Facilitates information transfer to all interested stakeholders andencourages development of dialogue¾ Ensures flexibility in the program to accept advances in science andtechnology and changes of socio-political requirements¾ Utilizes an advanced KMS, recognizing that the information explosion
has surpassed the capabilities of past information management
procedures
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan16

KM for Geological Disposalz Characteristics of geological disposal¾ Need to ensure safety for very long timescale¾ Demonstration of safety based on a “Safety Case”¾ Huge multidisciplinary knowledge base (data, information, experience andknow-how, expert judgment, etc) is used to develop a Safety Casez Need for advanced KM¾ Safety Case should be built on sound scientific and technical knowledge:
R&D organizations should provide this in a goal-oriented manner¾ The knowledge exponentially increases and evolves in complexity as arepository program proceeds – The “Information explosion” and required
integration of knowledge are a critical issue¾ KM is needed to support stepwise development of Safety Case by creating,processing, updating, preserving and transferring knowledge throughout
repository implementation: it should also facilitate rigorous technical QA

z The JAEA KMS concept¾ Structuring knowledge (both explicit and tacit) according to the logicalsequence of the evolving Safety Case
¾ Flexibility to cope with rapidly growing knowledge base
¾ User-friendliness to provide knowledge at different levels¾ Maximum use of advanced electronic information management technology
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan17

Research to support a safety caseUser-specificStrategy includes balancing
of requirements (cost,environmental impact,
acceptance) that need to beagreed with all stakeholders
Initially simple, but
preparation for later rigorous
assessment must be planned(including operational phase)
Emphasis on criticalassumptions anduncertainties

Focused on decision to be
madeStructure of Safety Case – NEA 2004

Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

18

Integration of knowledge into a Safety Case YMP Licensing Application Documentation
Iteration of TSPA (Total System Performance Assessment)•TSPA 1991, 1993, 1995
•TSPA-VA (Viability Assessment) 1998
•TSPA-SR (Site Recommendation) 2001
•TSPA-LA (Licensing Application) 2008

Main
documents－~ 10,000 pages

Integration
Supporting data and information - ~3 x 1077 pages
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

19

Information explosion in R&D supporting
geological disposal in Japan...with a limited (and aging) work forcez Over the last 2 decades, key integration and overview tasks havebeen carried out by teams whose experience has grown over that
period...these are now completely overloaded...and most experienced members are nearing retirementz Development of next generation KMS (JAEA-KMS) and CoolRep

Geological disposal (HLW/TRU waste) timeline
H3(E)(1993)

H12(E)/TRU-1(E)(2000)

H17(E)(2005)

TRU-2(E)(2007)

H22(2009)

Licensing(2030s)Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

Links between CoolRep and the JAEA KMS
home

CoolRep
Knowledge access- documents- figures, tables, data
- videos & animations- KM tools- QA records- ・・・

users (NUMO, Regulators,
R&D organisations,
Experts, Interested
Groups, …)

summary

Kernels-PA-Repository Engineering-Geoscience
-KMS
-QMS
-…

Knowledge supply

Knowledge search

JAEA KMS Knowledge
Interaction-knowledge input / assessment
in safety case context-dialogue between users &suppliers of knowledge-・・・

management tools- Argumentation models- All-in-one report- Expert systems- Ontology editors- ・・・

Knowledgebase-Database-Tech. reports- ・・・

Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

21

Safety research – Future direction (1)• “Focused Research for Nuclear Safety (Phase II)” (NSC, Aug. 2009)¾ Key research areas to support formulation of “Requirements of Geological Environment
to Select DIAs of High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal” and “Basic guidelines forsafety review of HLW disposal” including:
9 Further development of site investigation and evaluation methods for specific sites
9 Development of repository engineering and EBS for long-lived TRU waste
9 Assessment methodology for operational and post-closure safety¾ Key aspects of the approach

9 To provide a framework for integration of research results from individual areas by highlighting
their contribution to increasing confidence in the safety case
9 QA based on international state-of-the-art science and technology: associated timely
documentation of research results
9 Promotion of research common to safety aspects of different nuclear areas (extending thenuclear safety knowledge base, social science on safety regulation, risk communication
methodology, etc)

¾ Expectation of JAEA research

9 Evaluation methods for long-term geological stability
9 Extended understanding of the effects of construction on host rock conditions
9 Realistic modeling of repository- and regional- scale groundwater flow
9 Realistic performance evaluation of the EBS, taking long-term evolution of near-field boundary
conditions into account
9 Realistic modeling of radionuclide migration for specific geological environments
9 Scenario development a risk-informed approach
9 Development of an integrated knowledge base for geological disposal

Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

22

Safety research – Future direction (2)• “Regulatory research for waste treatment and disposal (FY2010 – FY2014)”(NISA, Oct. 2009)- Research identified based on the needs of NISA for formulation of safety
regulations¾ Focus of research program
9 Research to support the regulatory review of the results of Preliminary
Investigations and Detailed Investigations carried out by NUMO
9 Research to support the regulatory process for licensing for repository
construction, operation and closure¾ Approach and organization
9 To be carried out under a framework provided in NSC’s Focused Research for
Nuclear Safety
9 The outcome will provide input for NSC discussion of regulation formulation
9 The core organizations are JAEA SRC and AIST-Research Core for Deep
Geological Environments
9 JAEA SRC promotes collaboration with JAEA GIRDD and makes a maximum
use of infrastructure, such as URL
9 Utilize the results from R&D for Establishing Scientific and Technical Basis as
much as possible
Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan23

Summary and Concluding Remarks
•

•

•
•

•

The scientific and technical foundation based on generic studies has been
extended by R&D carried out in the major areas of site investigation,engineering and safety assessment, after promulgation of the Final
Disposal Act to apply to a specific site.
Continuous development of a geological disposal KB is critical to support
both repository development and regulation formulation by integrating
results from a diverse range of R&D.
For this purpose, JAEA has been developing an advanced KMS linked witha “next-generation” documentation approach.
In the KMS, individual R&D areas are structured by, and related to,knowledge supporting development and review of a safety case: thismakes the R&D goals clearer to all involved.
Future directions for the next five years have been identified in the NSC
and NISA safety research programs: these will promote research activities
in more integrated and focused manner.

Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan24

Thank you for your attention!
… with thanks to Dr. Shinichi Nakayama of JAEA
Nuclear Safety Research Center for his
valuable input to this presentation

Nuclear Safety Research Forum 2010 (NSRF2010), February 23, 2010, The Inoue Enryo Hall, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

25