115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS

CURRENT ISSUES IN CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT AND
EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES: TRANSFER OFSENTENCED PERSONS
Candido Cunha*
Sovereignty limits the space of those
who fight crime
Both the theory and the practice of State
sovereignty have always prevented thearms of the judge, as those of thepoliceman1, from stretching any farther
than the border of other countries.
Indeed, States are all the more eager toassert their privilege of sovereignty inrespect of criminal matters that the rightto punish is a right that States jealously
keeps to themselves alone. Moreover,criminal law expresses certainly therequirements of a given society, notnecessarily universal concerns.
There is in principle no question forState A to allow State B to exercise, within
the territory of State A, the right of State
B to punish. Otherwise the sovereignty ofState A might be questioned. Adding tothat there is the assumption that thevalues with reference to which State B
would exercise its right to punish may
differ from the values pursued under thecriminal law of State A.
Nothing limits the space of criminals
Crime however knows no borders, inthat borders do not confine crime, not evendo they deter crime. Quite on the contrary,borders attract crime to the extent thatthey hinder the action of all those whose
task it is to control crime. Borders also
produce crime in the sense that whatever
it is that they seek to separate often is*

Head of Division, Council of Europe
1 References in the masculine gender are intended
to include both genders.

matched with a demand to bring together.
Often, the action of bringing together again
amounts to crime or is easier done, or donein a more profitable way, by resorting tocrime.
Human relations have crossed the wallsof the family home to go beyond the bushesof the village, the limits of the county andthe borders of the state: we are in thisglobal village all in contact with each other.
Most of us all now share the net, Coca-Colaand Champagne, drive Toyotas, fly
Boeings, work for a multinational company
or organisation. In particular, the global
economy has brought men and women fromall over the world to be in contact eachother, often to visit each other. It wasdifferent with our grand-parents.
Therefore, the chances are high thatcrime committed today has aninternational dimension; the chances areeven higher that crime committed
tomorrow will have an international
dimension.
How to deal with transborder crime
Because national judges and policemen
cannot act beyond their respective borders,States have since early civilisations2 agreed
on methods of inter-state co-operation incriminal matters, designed to overcomethat difficulty.

2

Cherif Bassiouni (cf. International Extradition:
United States Law and Practice, Oceana, New York
1999) mentions the Egyptian, Chinese, Chaldean
and Assyro-Babylonian civilisations)263

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The simplest and most common method
is that of mutual legal assistance. The
underlying philosophy of mutual assistanceis that, to the extent that State A may notcarry out action in State B, State B carries
out action on behalf and at the request ofState A, for purposes relating toproceedings pending in State A. State B
acts in lieu of State A. Mutual assistance
may also consist in State B authorising
State A to carry out action on its territory.
Because there is virtually no limit towhat may be requested under the bannerof mutual assistance, all other methods ofinter-state co-operation should beconsidered. Traditionally however manymethods of co-operation are autonomously
identifiable and indeed separately
regulated both in domestic andinternational law.
The oldest method is extradition. It is
the surrender of a person by State A to
State B, at the request of State B, where
the person is being proceeded against inState B or is wanted by State B for the
carrying out of a sentence. Extradition
applies when the person wanted is in one
state while the person’s criminal file is in
another State.
The classical approach to extradition is
the following. Firstly States accept to
extradite a person for the sake ofreciprocity. Where reciprocity is notguaranteed, extradition is not possible.
Secondly, extradition is only granted tothe extent that the person concerned is nota person protected by the State to which
extradition is requested. Thus nationalsof that State are usually not extraditable.
Nor are persons otherwise protected, suchas refugees.
Thirdly, extradition is not granted when
the interests at stake, beyond the criminal

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nature of the case, are closely linked to thesovereignty of the State requesting
extradition. Thus, tax matters, military
matters and political offences are usually
not extraditable.
Lastly, where the consequences ofextradition might shock fundamental
values of the State to which extradition isrequested, it is usually refused. The
circumstance that death penalty may be
applied is for many countries one such
example.
A simplified method of extradition has
developed these last years. It applies tocases in which the person concerned
consents to his extradition.
When the person wanted is in one state
and the person’s criminal file is in anotherState, instead of transferring the person
by way of extradition, it may be possible totransfer the file. Where the file takes theshape of proceedings, that is called transfer
of proceedings in criminal matters. It
applies in particular where extradition is
not an option. It also applies, regardlessof whether extradition is or is not an option,
where the interests of justice so require,for example where evidence or important
evidence is to be found in the country where
the person is, not in the country where thefile is.
An extension of the concept of transfer
of proceedings allows a state not only totransfer the proceedings but also totransfer the person concerned along withthe proceedings. One is no longer in asituation where the file is in one country
and the person in another. The situationis one where both the file and the person
are in the same country although there arereasons to transfer both to another country.
Such reasons may have to do with theavailability of evidence or with thecircumstance that different persons are

115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
being prosecuted for the same acts indifferent countries and justice would betterbe served by trying them together in thesame courtroom.
Where the file is transferred in the shapeof a final sentence, that is calledinternational validity (or recognition) of
criminal judgments. Such a method allows
State A to recognise and enforce a criminal
judgment passed by a court of State B. It
applies in particular where the sentenced
person is in one state and the sentence waspassed in another state. However it may
also apply in a situation where the person
is in the same state where the sentence waspassed although there are reasons totransfer both to another country. Suchreasons may have to do with better chances
for the rehabilitation of the person
concerned, for example, where the person
is a national of the other state.
An extension of that latter form ofinternational validity of criminal
judgments may allow a state to transfer
both the person and the sentence under asimplified procedure. That is called
transfer of sentenced persons. I am going
to concentrate on that method ofinternational co-operation in criminal
matters.
Transfer of sentenced persons
Foreign detainees
In many countries - certainly in most
European countries - the number of foreign
inmates is disproportionately high whencompared with the total number ofinmates. That is not because human beings
have some special propensity for offending
when they move beyond the borders of theirnative community, as if social control
dropped when people are amidst foreigners.
In the fringes there may be a little of that.
For the main bulk of the offences, thereasons are elsewhere.

I mentioned above that the chances arehigh that crime committed today has aninternational dimension. Adding to this
there is the fact that offences of trafficking,especially drug trafficking, are amongst themost intensively investigated and heavily
punished. Indeed they account for a highnumber of foreign detainees. And of course
there is the circumstance that nonnationals are less likely than nationals tobenefit from such measures as bail andconditional release, because of thesuspicion that they might easily takerefuge in their native country, i.e. abroad.
Foreign prisoners frequently encounterparticular difficulties on account of suchfactors as different language, culture,
customs and religion. If they do notunderstand the language of the country ofdetention they may not be able tocommunicate with staff and other inmatesand may not have access to information andreading material, and thus risk being
excluded from participating in the prison’s
activities and facilities. Imprisonment in
a foreign environment poses additional
problems, especially if customs and food are
unfamiliar or incompatible with theprisoner ’s religious precepts. All thisproduces alienation and isolation which isincreased by the fact that foreign prisoners
will have difficulty in maintaining contact
with family, friends and others in theircountry of origin; visits are rare or nonexistent. In addition, lack of a common
language will impair communication withthose persons and agencies responsible forassisting the prisoner in his resocialisation.
As a result, the foreign prisoner’s chancesof social resettlement are greatly reduced.
At the same time, the problems ofcommunication with foreign prisoners andthe necessity to take account of their
special needs and problems place anadditional burden on prison
administrations: they must seek to provide

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interpretation and translation, to makespecial arrangements for prison visits andother contacts with the outside world, toadjust educational and professional
training facilities, to observe special dietaryrequirements - to mention but a few of the
problems posed by the detention offoreigners.
Under such circumstances the purposesof imprisonment are partially impaired.
The nationality of the offender has no
incidence on objectives such as to keep theoffender away from society, to prevent himfrom offending again, to defend the society
against him, to show that society reacts tocrime, or to ensure that serious crime does
not remain unpunished. However, theobjective of resocialising or resettling or
rehabilitating the offender, is highly
impaired by the circumstance that theoffender is not a member of that
community, in particular where he is analien.
It follows that, all else being equal, thesame sanction is harsher when imposed ona foreign prisoner than it would otherwise
be if applied to a national. There is anelement of justice that requires being taken
into consideration when the prisoner is nota national.
And it also follows that the burden put
on the prison administration is heavier
with respect to foreign prisoners thatnationals. A heavier burden means extra
expenses which, in an environment where
resources are limited, usually will becompensated by bringing down the level of
expenditure elsewhere in the system withobvious disadvantages to the system as awhole.
The need therefore is there, on different
accounts, to reduce the number of foreignprisoners. One way of achieving that result
is to transfer.

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THE CONVENTION ON THE
TRANSFER OF SENTENCEDPERSONSHistorical background
The Convention of the Transfer ofSentenced Persons, drawn up within theCouncil of Europe by a committee ofgovernmental experts under the authorityof the European Committee on Crime
Problems (CDPC), was opened forsignature on 21 March 1983.
At their 11th Conference (Copenhagen,21 and 22 June 1978), the European
Ministers of Justice discussed the problems
posed by prisoners of foreign nationality,
including the question of providing
procedures for their transfer so that they
may serve their sentence in their homecountry. The discussion resulted in the
adoption of a Resolution (No. 1), by which
the Committee of Ministers of the Councilof Europe was invited to ask the European
Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC),
inter alia, “to consider the possibility ofdrawing up a model agreement providing
for a simple procedure for the transfer ofprisoners which could be used between
member states or by member states in theirrelations with non-member states”.
Following that initiative, a SelectCommittee of Experts on Foreign Nationals
in Prison was set up in June 1979.
The committee’s principal tasks were to
study the problems relating to thetreatment of foreigners in prison and to
consider the possibility of drawing up amodel agreement providing for a simple
procedure for the transfer of foreignprisoners. With regard to the latter aspect,at its own request, the Select Committee
was authorised to prepare a multilateralconvention rather than a model agreement,
provided it would not conflict with theprovisions of existing European
conventions.

115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
The Select Committee was composed ofexperts from fifteen Council of Europe
member states (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom). Canada and the UnitedStates of America as well as theCommonwealth Secretariat and theInternational Penal and PenitentiaryFoundation were represented by observers.
The Convention on the Transfer ofSentenced Persons of 21 March 1983 is an
example of European legal co-operation
which has been extended well beyond
Europe. 45 States are a Party to theConvention, 37 of them European and 8
non-European. Its purpose is to provide a
procedure under which a person serving aprison sentence in a country of which he is
not a national may be transferred to thecountry of his nationality in order to serve
there the remainder of the sentence.
The draft was finalised in May 1982 andforwarded to the Committee of Ministers
that approved it in September 1982 anddecided to open it for signature on 21 March
1983.
General considerations
The purpose of the Convention is tofacilitate the transfer of foreign prisoners
to their home countries by providing aprocedure which is simple as well as
expeditious. In that respect it is intended
to complement the European Convention
on the International Validity of Criminal
Judgments of 28 May 1970 which, althoughallowing for the transfer of prisoners,
presents two major shortcomings: it has,so far, been ratified by only a small numberof States, and the procedure it provides is
not conducive to being applied in such a
way as to ensure the rapid transfer offoreign prisoners.

With a view to overcoming the lastmentioned difficulty, due to the inevitableadministrative complexities of an
instrument as comprehensive and detailed
as the European Convention on theInternational Validity of Criminal
Judgments, the Convention on the Transfer
of Sentenced Persons seeks to provide a
simple, speedy and flexible mechanism forthe repatriation of prisoners.
In facilitating the transfer of foreignprisoners, the convention takes account ofmodern trends in crime and crime policy.
In Europe, improved means of transportand communication have led to a greater
mobility of persons and, in consequence, toincreased internationalisation of crime. As
penal policy has come to lay greater
emphasis upon the social rehabilitation of
offenders, it may be of paramountimportance that the sanction imposed on
the offender is enforced in his home country
rather than in the State where the offence
was committed and the judgment rendered.
This policy is also rooted in humanitarianconsiderations: difficulties incommunication by reason of language
barriers, alienation from local culture andcustoms, and the absence of contacts withrelatives may have detrimental effects on
the foreign prisoner. The repatriation ofsentenced persons may therefore be in thebest interests of the prisoners as well as of
the governments concerned.
Unlike the other conventions on
international co-operation in criminal
matters prepared within the framework of
the Council of Europe, the Convention on
the Transfer of Sentenced Persons does notcarry the word “European” in its title. This
reflects the draftsmen’s opinion that the
instrument should be open also todemocratic States outside Europe. Twosuch states — Canada and the UnitedStates of America — were, in fact,
represented on the Select Committee by

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observers and actively associated with theelaboration of the text.
Presently, the Convention is in force withrespect to 45 States, 8 of which are nonmember States.
The convention distinguishes itself infour respects:
With a view to facilitating the rapidtransfer of foreign prisoners, it provides fora simplified procedure which, in its
practical application, is likely to be lesscumbersome than that laid down in theEuropean Convention on the International
Validity of Criminal Judgments.
A transfer may be requested not only by
the State in which the sentence was
imposed (“sentencing state”), but also by
the state of which the sentenced person isa national (“administering state”), thus
enabling the latter to seek the repatriationof its own nationals.
The transfer is subject to the sentenced
person’s consent. Thus, for all practical
purposes, the Convention operates on thebasis of a threefold consent, namely, thesentencing State, the administering Stateand the person concerned.
The Convention confines itself toproviding the procedural framework fortransfers. It does not contain an obligation
on Contracting States to comply with arequest for transfer; for that reason, it was
not necessary to list any grounds forrefusal, nor to require the requested state
to give reasons for its refusal to agree to arequested transfer.
Its objectives according to the preambleare (a) further the ends of justice and (b)contribute to the social rehabilitation ofsentenced persons.

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The question has been raised of how toestablish priorities between the two
objectives stated in the Preamble if andwhen such objectives enter into conflictwith one another.
In this respect it has been recognisedthat the ends of justice, including theenforcement of the sentence, are a major
aim of the Convention. The latter therefore
does not authorise action designed toobviate or by-pass the execution of thesentence. Indeed, upon agreeing to atransfer, administering States undertake
to execute the sentence, either by way ofcontinuing enforcement, or by way of
conversion.
Difficulties may arise where there isgreat discrepancy between the actual
length of the prison term that thetransferee, should he not be transferred,
would have to serve in the sentencing Stateand the actual length of the prison termthat the transferee, should he betransferred, would have to serve in theadministering State.
Where there is great discrepancy, someStates tend to consider that, should theperson be transferred under suchconditions, the ends of justice are notserved.
It has also been recognised that thesocial rehabilitation of sentenced persons
is equally a major aim of the Convention.
This aim can better be served by allowing
sentenced foreign persons to serve theirsentence within their own society, i.e. bytransferring them.

The two aforementioned aims of theConvention are placed on the same footingin the Preamble. In technical terms, there
is no gradation of importance or priority
between them. It follows that both

115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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objectives must be pursued compatiblywith one another.
However, whilst the ends of justice may
be achieved regardless of the Convention,
rehabilitation of foreign detainees canbetter be achieved through the Convention.
The objective of rehabilitation is the “raisond’être” of the Convention.
Furthermore, the Convention has ahumanitarian dimension. Indeed, bringing
foreign detainees back home amounts to
reducing their hardship to the same level
as that of national detainees, by way ofgiving them the same chance that the latteralready have, i.e. “to serve their sentences
within their own society”.
In principle, the objective of
rehabilitation is served in all cases oftransfer; the objective relating to the aimsof justice might, in the view of some States,
not be entirely served in all cases. Hence,the situation where States may have toponder between either (a) serving
rehabilitation while not entirely fulfillingthe ends of justice, or (b) not serving
rehabilitation while ensuring thefulfilment of the ends of justice.
Whilst recognising that the balance
between the two terms is not even, onemust accept that there is no
straightforward answer to the dilemma.
Only on a case by case basis, depending on
the particular circumstances of each case,will it be possible to decide one way or theother.
Scope
The definition of “sentence” makes clearthat the convention applies only to apunishment or measure imposed by a courtof law, which involves deprivation of liberty,
and only to the extent that it does so,regardless of whether the person concerned
is already serving his sentence or not.

Article 9.4 provides that any State whichcannot avail itself of one of the proceduresreferred to in that Article to enforce
measures imposed in the territory of
another Party on persons who for reasonsof mental condition have been held not
criminally responsible for the commissionof the offence, and which is prepared toreceive such persons for further treatment
may, by way of a declaration addressed to
the Secretary General of the Council ofEurope, indicate the procedures it will
follow in such cases.
That Article implicitly extends the scopeof the Convention to persons who forreasons of mental condition have been held
not criminally responsible for thecommission of the offence.
Due however to the variety of proceduralways of dealing with such persons, itremains to be confirmed whether all theParties to the Convention are in a position
both to transfer out and transfer inmentally disturbed offenders.
Ways and means ought to be found totransfer such persons to their countries oforigin. Indeed, it makes no sense to keepthem in a country where little can be madeto take proper care of them. Their transfer,
however, should take place under formal
arrangements that take due care of:- the interests of the person concerned,
who probably cannot give his or her
consent;- the need to ensure that the society into
which the person is being transferredis properly protected against him orher;- the need to ensure that the person does
not move on, uncontrolled, to anothercountry, including the country fromwhich he or she was transferred out.
General principle
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governed by the general principle thatstates shall afford each other “the widest
measure of co-operation in respect of thetransfer of sentenced persons”. This isintended to emphasise the convention’s
underlying philosophy: that it is desirable
to enforce sentences in the home countryof the person concerned.
Although Parties are in no way underan obligation to proceed to any requested
transfer, they must examine in all goodfaith, with respect to each such request,
whether transfer is not an option.
The right of initiative
Transfers may be requested by either thesentencing state or the administering state.
Thus the Convention acknowledges theinterest which the prisoner’s home country
may have in his repatriation.
Although the sentenced person may notformally apply for his transfer, he may
express his interest in being transferredunder the Convention, and he may do soby addressing himself either to thesentencing state or the administering state.
Seven conditions for transfer(1) Nationality
The first condition is that the person to
be transferred is a national of theadministering state.
In an effort to render the application of
the convention as easy as possible, thereference to the sentenced person’s
nationality was preferred to including in
the convention other notions which, in theirpractical application, might give rise to
problems of interpretation as, for instance,
the terms “ordinarily resident in the otherstate” and “the state of origin”
Contracting States may, however, define,by means of a declaration, the term
“national”. And indeed many have defined270

that term in such a way as to include
persons having their permanent residence
in their territory.
It should be pointed out that any State
may define the term national for the
purposes of this Convention only as far as
it is concerned (Article 3.4). That meansthat each State may describe which persons
it wishes to come under the category of its
own nationals. Such a definition is relevant
where the state concerned is theadministering state, not the sentencing
state. No state is authorised to define thecategory of nationals of any other given
state. It is important to note this because
an analysis of the declarations entered bysome states shows that they haveinterpreted the provisions of Article 3.4 ina different way.
One consequence of this is that dual
nationality should not prevent a personfrom being transferred from the country of
one of its nationalities to the country of theother nationality.
The question may be raised of re-transfer
to a third State, as follows. A person thathas two nationalities, after having beentransferred to one of the countries of his
nationality, may request to be retransferred to the other country of his
nationality. The question is whether aperson transferred under the Convention
may be re-transferred to a third State and,if so, under which conditions.
In this respect the following observations
are relevant. The Convention must not be
used as if it were a travel agency. However,
it is the primary purpose of the Convention
to facilitate the rehabilitation of thesentenced person and, thus, re-transfer
must not be ruled out. Re-transfer should
require the agreement of (1) the person
concerned, (2) the sentencing State, (3) the
first (or intermediate) administering State

115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
and (4) the second (or final) administeringState. The question of who may take theinitiative is irrelevant in practical terms.
(2) Final and enforceable judgment
The second condition is that the
judgment must be final and enforceable.
This means that all available remedies
must have been exhausted or the time-limit
for lodging a remedy must have expired
without the parties having availed
themselves of it. This does not preclude
the possibility of a later review of thejudgment in the light of fresh evidence, as
provided for under Article 13.
(3) Length of sentence
The third condition concerns the lengthof the sentence still to be served. For theconvention to be applicable, the sentence
must be of a duration of at least six months
at the time of receipt of the request fortransfer, or be indeterminate.
(4) Consent of person concerned
The fourth condition is that the transfer
must be consented to by the person
concerned.
This requirement constitutes one of thebasic elements of the transfer mechanism
set up by the convention. It was noted
above that the simplified procedureprovided by this Convention is possible only
because the person concerned consents toit.
Where in view of the age or physical ormental condition of the person concerned,
one of the two states considers it necessary,the consent of the sentenced person’s legal
representative is required in lieu of thesentenced person’s consent.
While the requirement for consent is laid
down in Article 3.1.d, the rules applicable
to consent are laid down in Article 7.

The sentencing State must ensure thatthe person required to consent to thetransfer - either the sentenced person or
his representative, as appropriate - does
so voluntarily and with full knowledge ofthe legal consequences which the transfer
would entail for the sentenced person.
The procedure for giving consent isgoverned by the law of the sentencing state.
The sentencing State shall afford an
opportunity to the administering State toverify through a consul or other official
agreed upon with that state, that theconsent is given in accordance with theconditions set out in the Convention.
A document certifying the consent of theperson concerned must be forwarded by thesentencing state to the administering state.
The circumstance that consent isrequired led the drafters to consider it notnecessary to lay down a rule of speciality.
It results that any person transferredunder the convention may be proceededagainst or sentenced or detained for an
offence other than that relating to theenforcement for which the transfer has
been effected. That information must ofcourse be included in the information on
the substance of the convention which is
to be given to sentenced persons.
(5) Dual criminality
The fifth condition is intended to ensurecompliance with the principle of dual
criminal liability.
The condition is fulfilled if the act whichgave rise to the judgment in the sentencing
state would have been punishable ifcommitted in the administering state andif the person who performed the act could,
under the law3 of the administering state,
have had a sanction imposed on him.

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The basic idea is that the essential
constituent elements of the offence shouldbe punishable in the administering State.
An interesting question has been raisedin Norway. A Norwegian citizen applied to
be transferred to Norway to serve asentence imposed on him in another state.
He claimed that he had been provoked by
the police into performing the illegal act
for which he was sentenced. Suchprovocative methods by the police are
accepted and legal in the sentencing state;
however, they may not substantiate aconviction in Norway. Thus, the Directorof Public Prosecution concluded that, had
the act been committed in Norway, no
punishment could have been imposed. The
Norwegian authorities thus rejected theapplication for transfer. However, internal
Norwegian procedures under the Public
Administration Act allow for an appeal. On
appeal, it was found that the conditions in
Article 3(1)(e) had been met and, therefore,transfer was finally granted.
In reaching conclusions in the appeal,emphasis was put on the aims of theConvention, as stated in the Preamble andin Article 2.
Once transferred, the person claimed
that he was illegally detained in Norway
because the act for which the sentence was
imposed, does not constitute a criminal
offence in Norway.
The first question here is whether the
expression <<double criminality>> should
be interpreted as double criminality inconcreto or double criminality in abstracto.
Most experts are in favour of dual
criminality being assessed in concreto.
3

Unless where it results otherwise from the context,
the word “law” is always used to mean both enacted
law and common and customary law.

272

Dual criminality should mean : (a) looking
at the law of both countries, as it applies,
or as it would apply, to the concrete
circumstances of the case, and (b) assessing
whether there is sufficient overlap in viewof the effect sought. In fact, once the person
concerned - not a hypothetical person in ahypothetical case - is transferred, there
must not be any legal impediment, inparticular of a constitutional nature, thatwould prevent the administering state fromexecuting the sentence passed by the otherstate. In most states individuals areprotected against deprivation of liberty bystrict rules of a constitutional nature thatcannot be overruled, for example, by theprovisions of this Convention. It follows
that the Convention would be prevented
from operating should double criminality
in concreto not apply.
One must however be careful inestablishing the limits of such a concept.
Indeed it cannot be interpreted to meanthat in both states concerned the law
provides likewise in respect of thecircumstances of the case. Sufficient
overlap was used above to mean thefollowing. The facts for which the person
was sentenced, under the circumstances inwhich they occurred, including thecircumstances relating to the persons
involved, should they have come under thelaw of the administering state, would havecarried a criminal sanction.
In the case under review, it should berecalled that Article 7.1 requires that theperson requested to give consent to thetransfer does so voluntarily and with fullknowledge of the legal consequences
thereof. Such a consent must therefore beseen to carry with it the acceptance of theeffects of transfer in the administering
state.
One must have in mind that theConvention operates in particular on the

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basis of respect for a legitimate interest of
the sentencing state in that the sentence
be served. Such an interest cannot be
frustrated by allowing for the sentence tobe challenged in the administering state.
The possibility must therefore not be
considered of giving transferred persons
the right to challenge the effects of transfer
in the administering State.
Moreover, it would be circumventing theprovisions of Article 13 (i.e.: “Thesentencing State alone shall have the rightto decide on any application for review of
the judgment.”) to give transferred persons
the right to apply to the administering state
for a direct or indirect review of thejudgment.
Because the world in not perfect, it canalways happen that it is not before theactual transfer of the person that it
becomes apparent, or that it is found, thatthe dual criminality requirement was nomet. In such circumstances, the remedy
could not be to free the person, but rather
to annul the transfer and return the
person.
(6)Agreement of the sentencing state
The sixth condition is the agreement of
the sentencing state.
(7)Agreement of the administering state
The seventh condition is the agreementof the administering state.
In the view of certain experts, theConvention is too rigid and in that way
inadequate to cope with present-day needs.
It is not flexible in the sense that requests
are either to be totally granted or totally
rejected. It does not provide a mechanism
for ad hoc arrangements that may take careof the particularities of each case. Because
the Convention does not preclude ad hoc
arrangements, more should be done inorder to facilitate such arrangements.

Others however think that theConvention should not be used as an
instrument under which ad hoc
arrangements may be agreed upon,
according to which the States involved
would follow a course of action opposite tothat which is foreseen under theConvention. They question whether ad hoc
arrangements are consistent with the spiritof the Convention. Is it not one of the
purposes of any Convention to close
negotiations as to how to deal with a given
category of situations? Should it now
become routine practice to discuss fromscratch the terms under which sentenced
persons are transferred, then theConvention would become purposeless.
Obligation to furnish information
The Convention provides for an
obligation to furnish information at four
different levels. Firstly, the sentencing
state must inform the sentenced person on
the substance of the convention, provided
of course that the sentenced person may
be eligible for transfer under theconvention (Article 4.1). In order tofacilitate that information, the Council ofEurope has prepared a standard text withall the information deemed to be necessary
at that level. The Secretariat of the Councilof Europe invites all states that become aParty to the Convention to translate thattext into their own language or languages,
adding if appropriate any other relevant
information. The translated version is thendistributed to all the other states. It
becomes then possible to any state toprovide to any person eligible to transfer
under the convention relevant informationin that person’s language.
Secondly, once the sentenced person has
expressed an interest in being transferred,
information between the two statesconcerned is required. (Article 4,paragraphs 2, 3 and 4)

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 57
Thirdly, the sentenced person shall be
informed, in writing, of any action taken
by one state or the other, as well as of any
decision taken by either state on a request
for transfer.
Fourthly, Article 15 of the Convention
provides for the administering state to
inform the sentencing state on the state ofenforcement:
a. when it considers enforcement of thesentence to have been completed;b. if the sentenced person has escapedfrom custody before enforcement of
the sentence has been completed; orc. if the sentencing State requests a
special report.
Requests and replies
Requests, replies and supporting
documents are dealt with under Articles 5
and 6 of the convention. They must be inwriting and should follow channels ofcommunication determined beforehand.
Article 6.2.(a) of the Convention provides
that the sentencing state must provide theadministering state i.e. with a certified
copy of the judgment. However, in somecases the full facts on which the sentence
is based are not apparent from the text ofjudgement. That is the case for example
with judgements on appeal. A
comprehensive statement of the facts is inany case necessary for the administeringState to ascertain double criminality. And
indeed Article 4.3.(c) requires thesentencing State to forward to theadministering State a statement of thefacts upon which the sentence was based.
In order to increase efficiency and savetime, states should, when providing copies
of judgements that do not contain a fulldescription of the facts, also forward a
separate statement to that effect.
Where a translation of the judgment is274

required by the administering state, andthe original sentence is long and/or
complicated, as a general rule translationof select extracts of the judgment, or asummary thereof, should suffice. Where
and when the administering state deems
necessary to have more information thanthat contained in the translated extractsof the judgment, it may of course so requestfrom the sentencing state.
All the information that is necessary inorder to carry on speedily with theprocedures should promptly be madeavailable in order to avoid unnecessary
delays. In particular, the “penal” situationof the person concerned (duration ofremand in custody, how long he has served
the sentence, any credit of time due to somespecial reason, etc) must be clearly spelt
out in the documents.
Effects of transfer for sentencing state
Article 8 provides that transfer shallhave the effect of suspending theenforcement of the sentence in thesentencing state. As from the point in timein which the administering State considers
enforcement of the sentence to have been
completed, the sentencing state may nolonger enforce the sentence.
It results from the wording of this Article
that the Convention does not prevent thesentencing State to resume enforcement of
the sentence after transfer in so far as
enforcement will not have been completed.
Such would be the case, for example, where
the transferred person escapes from theadministering state and ends up being
recaptured in the sentencing state.
This Article aims at preventing transferfrom leading to the same person being
punished twice for the same facts (ne bis
in idem).

115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
Effect of transfer for administering state
According to Article 9, the administering
state may choose between two ways ofenforcing the sentence. It may either:

Rule common to both alternatives
In both cases, the enforcement isgoverned by the law of the administering
state.

-

continue the enforcement immediately
or through a court or administrative
order; in that case, the administering
state continues to enforce the sanction
imposed in the sentencing state,possibly adapted;-

or convert the sentence, through a
judicial or administrative procedure,
into a decision which substitutes asanction prescribed by its own law for
the sanction imposed in the sentencing
state; the sanction is converted into asanction of the administering state,with the result that the sentence
enforced is no longer directly based on
the sanction imposed in the sentencing
state.

Continued enforcement
Where the administering state opts forthe “continued enforcement” procedure, it
continues to enforce the sentence imposedin the sentencing State, as if it had been
imposed in the administering state. In
particular, it is bound by the legal nature
as well as the duration of the sentence as
determined by the sentencing state.

The alternatives are respectively called“continued enforcement” and “conversionof sentence”.
It must be underlined that, under Article
3.3, States may enter a formal declaration
excluding one or the other of these methods
in their relations with other Parties. Suchdeclarations have as a result, not only thatthe state having made the declaration
chooses once and for all the alternative that
it will follow, but also that that state will
not transfer any person to any state that
follows the barred alternative.
In fact only two states, namely France
and Italy, have entered declarations thatcan be interpreted to mean that. Other
States have invoked Article 3.3 to makedeclarations to the effect of announcing
beforehand the alternative of their choice
where they act in the capacity ofadministering states.

The “legal nature” of the sentence refers
to the kind of sanction imposed, as it isdefined under the law of the sentencing
state.
The administering State is neverthelessallowed to “adapt” the original sentence.
In practice that will prove necessary inmost cases. Indeed, the “legal nature” ofsanctions available is often not exactly thesame in any two countries. For example,
in most countries imprisonment breaks
down into a diversity of sanctions involving
deprivation of liberty, known by different
names that cannot be translated. Thus
“adaptation” is often necessary on suchgrounds in order to reach the nearest
equivalent available in order to make thesentence enforceable.
Adaptation of the original sentence may
also be necessary in order to ensure that it
does not exceed the maximum prescribedby the law of the administering state.
Moreover, the administering state isusually faced with the need to prescribe
some kind of legal procedure leading to adecision that fixes the amount of time —duration of sentence — that remains to beserved, taking into account the time served
and any remission earned in the sentencing
state up to the date of transfer. Indeed,275

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 57
any period of deprivation of liberty alreadyserved by the sentenced person must be
deducted from the sentence to be continued
in the administering state.
The administering state thus continues
to enforce the sentence imposed in thesentencing state, but it does so inaccordance with the requirements of its
own penal system.
Conversion of sentence
The conversion of the sentence to be
enforced is the judicial or administrative
procedure by which the sanction imposedin the sentencing state is replaced by asanction prescribed by the law of theadministering state.
Procedures of this kind, for example incivil matters, are often called exequatur
procedures. The name should probably be
avoided in this case because of thefundamental difference between
procedures under this Convention which
are based on the consent of the person
concerned and any legal procedure allowing
for the coercive enforcement of a foreign
judgment.

circumstance that the person was found to
be a recidivist in the sentencing state is, oris not, a binding “fact” in the meaning of
Article 11.1.a of the Convention. In otherterms, the question is whether or not the
court entrusted with converting thesentence in the administering state isbound by the circumstance that the person
was a recidivist in the sentencing state.
It might be said on this count that the
court in the administering state is boundby the findings of the court in thesentencing state, including its findings
with respect to the criminal record of thesentenced person. It may not, for example,
based on the fact that the person has aclean criminal record in the administering
state, find that the person is not a recidivist
and thus disregard the findings in thisrespect of the court in the sentencing state.
However, it does not follow that the courtin the administering state is bound to draw
any legal consequences from the findingthat the person is a recidivist.
S e c o n d l y, a s a n c t i o n i n v o l v i n g
deprivation of liberty may not be converted
into a pecuniary sanction.

The conversion of the sentence isgoverned by the law of the administering
state. However, four conditions are to beobserved by the administering state.

Thirdly, any period of deprivation ofliberty already served by the sentenced
person must be deducted from the sentence
as converted by the administering state.

Firstly, the administering state is boundby the findings as to the facts insofar as
they appear - explicitly or implicitly - fromthe judgment pronounced in the sentencing
state.

Fourthly, the penal position of thesentenced person must not be aggravated.

This requirement may lend itself todifficulties. For example, sentences
imposed are often aggravated because thecourt takes into consideration thecircumstance that the person is a recidivist.
Once the person is transferred, thequestion might be raised of whether the276This latter condition must be interpretedwith care because there is usually a great
variety of factors that contribute to defining
the penal position of the person concerned,
such as the duration of the sentence,
requirements for remission, prison regime,
etc. It is often delicate to establish a fairbalance between such factors in order toreach an overall assessment.

115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
Pardon, amnesty, commutation
The administering state alone is
responsible for the enforcement of thesentence, including any decisions related
to it, such as any decision to suspend thesentence. However, according to Article 12,
pardon, amnesty or commutation of thesentence may be granted by either thesentencing or the administering state, in
accordance with their respective laws.
Review of judgment
The condition that the judgment mustbe final and enforceable does not preclude
the possibility of a later review of thejudgment in the light of fresh evidence. In
such cases, the sentencing state alone has
the right to take decisions on applications
for review of the judgment.
This raises a difficulty because both theinterests of justice and the interests of theperson concerned require the personal
appearance of the person concerned before
the court that reviews his judgment. That
court, according to Article 13, sits in thesentencing state while the person sits in a
prison in the administering state.
The Convention makes no provision for
the transfer-back of the person. At the timeof preparation of the Additional Protocol
to the Convention, the question was
discussed of whether it should not beproper to include provisions designed tocover such a situation. However, theconclusion was that the solution should befound within the framework ofarrangements on mutual assistance
between the states concerned.
In fact, with respect to states that are a
Party to the European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
the issue is being solved by including in a
Protocol to that Convention, presently
being prepared, provisions on the personal
appearance of transferred sentenced

persons
Such provisions will render applicableto such persons the provisions of Articles
11 and 12 of that Convention, on the
personal appearance of persons in custodyfor purposes of being heard.
Termination of enforcement
Article 14 concerns the termination of
enforcement by the administering state incases where the sentence ceases to be
enforceable as a result of any decision ormeasure taken by the sentencing state (e.g.
the decisions referred to in Articles 12 and13). In such cases, the administering statemust terminate enforcement as soon as it
is informed by the sentencing state of any
such decision or measure.
Transit
Article 16 imposes an obligation on
Contracting states to grant requests fortransit, in accordance with their nationallaw, where the transfer in question has
been agreed upon by two other Contracting
States.
Languages
The Convention privileges the languagesof the countries involved, as well as theofficial languages of the Council of Europe
which are French and English. However,
the rules applicable change withcircumstances.
In this respect, the Convention provides
for the communication of information and/or documents on three different sets ofcircumstances, namely:(a) at a preliminary stage where theperson has expressed an interest in
being transferred (Article 4,paragraphs 2 to 4);(b) requests for transfer, replies andsupporting documents (Article 5 andArticle 6, paragraphs 1 and 2);(c) information and documents asked by

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 57
either state before any request fortransfer is made (Article 6.3).

question above should be found within theConvention.

Article 17 deals with the question of
languages to be used. It distinguishes
between the situations described above
under (a) and (b) and makes provision for
languages to be used in one case as in theother.

There appears to be no reason for
considering that declarations made under
Article 17.3 - which in fact have the purposeof derogating from the rule laid down in
Article 17.2-should apply to any
information and/or documents other than“requests for transfer and supporting
documents”.

In the cases described under (a)information must be furnished in thelanguage of the Party to which it isaddressed or in one of the official languagesof the Council of Europe.
In the cases described under (b) the ruleis that no translation shall be required.
However, any State may, by way of adeclaration, require that requests fortransfer and supporting documents beaccompanied by a translation. The
requesting State has a choice between
translating into the other state’s own
language or into one of the official
languages of the Council of Europe or intosuch one of these languages that the otherstate will have indicated in its declaration.
However, Article 17 remains mute withregard to the situation described under (c).
No other article of the Convention makes
provision for languages to be used in thesituation described under (c).
Hence the question: which languages
may be used for the purposes of applying
Article 6.3 of the Convention, i.e. when aState provides information and/or
documents asked for by another State
before any of them having requested thetransfer of a sentenced person.
Firstly it should be recalled that several
articles of the Convention clearly indicatethat the latter applies even before a request
for transfer is made. Thus the reply to the

278

Which leaves us with the rule under
Article 17.1 and the rule under Article 17.2.
The first applies to information under
Article 4, paragraphs 2 to 4; the second
applies to requests for transfer andsupporting documents. None apply to“information and/or documents asked byeither State before any request for transfer
was made”.
One is thus led to investigate, for the
purposes of the Convention and bearing in
mind its operation, which of the twosituations (i.e. (a) above and (b) above) is
closest to “information and/or documents
asked by either State before any request
for transfer was made”.
Article 4 bears the title “obligation to
furnish information”. That has to do withan obligation imposed on both States toseek and furnish such information as may
be required so that each and all the three
actors are in a position where they may
decide either to agree or not with thetransfer.
The context of Article 4 leads to theconclusion that it was drafted having in
mind information and/or documents asked
by either State before any request fortransfer was made.
Conversely, no clear argument appears
that would allow to bring closer together“information and/or documents asked by

115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
either State before any request for transfer
is made” and “requests for transfer, replies
and supporting documents”.
The conclusion therefore is that
information and/or documents asked,
under the provisions of Article 6, paragraph
3 of the Convention, by either State, before
any request for transfer is made, shouldbe transmitted in the language of the Party
to which it is addressed or in one of theofficial languages of the Council of Europe.
Costs
The main rule on costs is given in Article
17.5 that reads that <<any costs incurredin the application of this Convention shallbe borne by the administering State, except
costs incurred exclusively in the territoryof the sentencing State.>>.
This Article has been interpreted in thefollowing way.
Where the person is being delivered at acommon border, the sending State bears all
the costs incurred with transporting theperson to the border; and the receiving
State bears all the costs incurred as fromthat point onwards.
Where the person is carried by air, thesending State bears all the costs incurredwith transporting the person to the airportof departure; and the receiving State bears
all the costs incurred as from that point
onwards, including the price of the air fareand escort.
This means that - in principle - it wouldbe (examples) for the Australianauthorities to bear the costs incurred withtaking a prisoner from Tasmania to Sydney
and for the French authorities to take careof the air fare from Sydney to Paris, bothfor the prisoner and his escort.

States are often ready to go beyond theircommitments in order to speed up theprocedures or to overcome some technicalor other difficulty.
It may indeed be the case that - in someStates - the issue of costs plays a role inthe decision of whether to agree or not witha given transfer.
It is therefore advisable to remain open
in terms of internal regulations in thesematters.
The question may be raised of whether
the costs of transfer that the Convention
allots to the administering State (thereceiving end) may be, or ever are inpractice, devolved to the person concerned.
Thus, the following concerns only theadministering State.
Different countries have different
practices in this respect.
- one country may require persons whowish to be transferred to sign a“promissory note” with respect to costs,
then the government bears the costs
and then the government endeavours
to execute the promissory in order torecover the costs. Thus the question of
the actual transfer of the person isseparated from the question of thefinancial implications of the transfer;- in other countries, the person
concerned is not required to pay thecosts of transfer. However it is known
that, should the person wish to pay, thepace of the procedure will significantly
speed up;- the costs of transfer are as a generalrule borne by the State in a number ofcountries;
it may happen that the costs of transfer
are either borne by the State or
devolved to the person concerned,
depending on a case by case appraisal.

However, practice may be different since279

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 57
It should be noted that where transfer
is made subject to the person paying thecosts, that will prevent many persons frombeing transferred and thus constitutes an
obstacle to the application of theConvention.
Moreover it is adiscriminatory practice.
In fact, it is often in the financial interestof the sentencing state to bear the costs oftransfer. The provisions of Article 17 of theConvention do not prevent States frommaking arrangements to that effect inbetween them.
Choice between extradition and transfer
Where a national of State A wassentenced and serves a sentence in State
B; and proceedings are pending in State A
against the same person for an offenceother than the offence for which he wassentenced in State B; and State A seeks thepresence of the person on its territory forinvestigation and trial; one might raise thequestion of whether State A has an option
between requesting the extradition of theperson and seeking that person’s transfer
under the Convention.
Under the above-mentioned
circumstances, State A does not have an
option between extradition and transfer
since the only legally appropriate
procedure in order to achieve its aim is
extradition; to obtain the transfer of theperson under the Convention in order toobtain a result that cannot be subsumed
under the aims of the Convention would
amount to abusing the transfer procedureand to achieve a disguised extradition.
It is a general principle of international
law that treaties must be executed in goodfaith. It follows that the application of atreaty for purposes other than the purposes
recognised by the treaty itself is contrary
to international law. And it may bechallenged unless all the parties concerned

280

explicitly or implicitly consent. Thus, thetransfer procedure can only be legitimately
used in order to try the person if all theinterested parties are well aware of what
is going on and consent to it. This also
applies to the person concerned because his
consent is a conventional requirement forthe operation of the Convention.
The same conclusion can be drawn fromanother ground. Indeed, the Convention
requires that, in giving his consent to histransfer, the person must have “fullknowledge of the legal consequences
thereof”. It follows that, should theadministering State abstain from revealing
to the person certain legal consequences,the person’s consent will not have been fully
knowledgeable.
Some, however, might follow a different,
more pragmatic, approach according towhich:- transfer procedures, because they arequicker and less burdensome thanextradition procedures, may be usedinstead of the latter;- it is legitimate to do so because theperson concerned is necessarily awareof its past behaviour in theadministering State and, when heconsents to transfer, he implicitly
consents to proceedings and trial for
past behaviour, regardless of whether
proceedings have already been initiatedor will be initiated in the future;- the requirement in Article 7 of theConvention concerns “legal”
consequences only, present and future,
meaning consequences resulting fromthe law, abstract as it is, not concreteconsequences.
The Additional Protocol to theConvention on the Transfer ofSentenced Persons
An Additional Protocol to the Convention
on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons was

115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
opened for signature on 18 December 1997.
On 1 June 2000, it will enter into force inrespect of three States only (Estonia,
Poland and Macedonia). However fifteen
other States have signed it.
The purpose of the Additional Protocol
is to provide rules applicable to the transferof the execution of sentences in two
different cases, namely:(a) where a sentenced person has fled thesentencing State to go to the State of
his or her nationality, thus rendering
it impossible in most cases for thesentencing State to execute thesentence passed; and(b) where the sentenced person is subject
to expulsion or deportation as aconsequence of the sentence.
As with the mother Convention, theProtocol imposes no obligation on thesentencing State or the administeringState to agree to transfer. It sets theframework within which States involved
may co-operate, if they so wish, andprovides a procedure for this purpose.
Persons having fled from thesentencing StateIn this respect, the Protocol envisages asituation where a national of State A issentenced in State B and subsequently
leaves State B before or while serving thesentence and voluntarily enters State A.
It would apply most commonly to cases
where the sentenced person escapes fromlegal custody in the territory of thesentencing State and flees to the territoryof the State of his or her nationality,
seeking thereby to avoid the execution, orfull execution, of the sentence.
The mother Convention is of no use insuch situation because the sentenced
person is not present in the sentencing
State and is thus unavailable for transfer.
Nor can the problem in practice be dealt

with under existing forms of international
co-operation. For example, the normal
method of returning a fugitive from justice- extradition - is generally not available
because most countries do not extradite
their own nationals. Apart from this, theonly other option which may be available
at present is for the person to be prosecutedand sentenced afresh in State A for thesame facts - a process which is both
expensive and cumbersome. If neither
option is available, the consequence is thatthe person goes unpunished and thus theends of justice are frustrated.
It was recognised that the Convention
is to a great extent founded onhumanitarian principles and that, for thisreason, the consent of the person is an
integral element in it. But it was thoughtthat where the person has deliberatelysought to frustrate the judicial process byfleeing from justice, he or she has thereby
taken himself or herself outside the ambitof the Convention. Consequently, it wasconsidered that under such circumstances
the need for his consent was no longer
appropriate.
Article 2 of the Additional Protocol
provides that, upon a request from thesentencing State, the administering State
may, pending the arrival of documents
supporting the request, arrest the person
concerned on a provisional basis. The
maximum length of time for the provisionalarrest of the person concerned is however
not mentioned.
In normal circumstances, there should
be no great danger that the person might
abscond, because in any other third Statethe person is no longer protected against
extradition.
There is a sense of urgency in suchsituations, which is inherent to any
situation where a person is arrested on a

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 57
provisional basis. However, under thecircumstances described above, one mightrightly suggest that the person cannot
benefit from a presumption of innocence,but rather, on the contrary, that there is apresumption - based upon the declarationof a competent authority of the sentencing
State - that the person concerned is asentenced person whose sentence has not
yet been entirely served.
It follows that the sense of urgency
inherent to any situation where a person
is arrested on a provisional basis is lesspressing in the instant case that in othercases. In particular, it is less pressing thatin a situation where extradition isrequested.
One might therefore conclude that wherea limit is established for provisional arrest
under Article 2 of the Additional Protocol,that limit may go beyond the limit of 40days provided in Article 16 of the European
Convention on Extradition.
Sentenced persons subject to an
expulsion or deportation order
It does not serve the objective of
rehabilitation of the sentenced person tokeep such a person in the sentencing State
when it is likely that, once he or she hascompleted the sentence to be served, he or
she will no longer be permitted to remainin that State.
The situation here is one where theperson is subject to deportation or
expulsion as a consequence of the sentence.
Acknowledging that the Convention
operates on the basis of a three-foldconsent, i.e. the sentencing State, theadministering State and the sentenced
person, provision was nevertheless madefor the Convention to operate on the basisof a two-fold consent, namely the consent
of both the sentencing State and the282

administering State, where the person
concerned as a consequence of the sentencepassed is subject to deportation or
expulsion from the sentencing State.
Because transfer under the provisionsof this Article neither requires nor assumes
the sentenced person’s consent, the rights
and interests of the person should beotherwise protected. Hence the provisions
extending to such persons the benefit of theprinciple of speciality, as well as therequirement for the person’s opinion to be
examined and taken into account prior to
any decision being taken.
INFORMATION DOCUMENTSAVAILABLE
PC-OC / INF 1 *A Chart showing thestate of signatures andratifications of theCouncil of Europe
Conventions in the penal
field;
PC-OC / INF 2 *T h e f u l l t e x t o f t h eReservations andDeclarations entered by
States Party to those
Conventions*This information is available on theCouncil of Europe Internet site(http://
conventions.coe.int).
PC-OC / INF 3 A c o m p e n d i u m o f
Recommendations
adopted by theCommittee of Ministersof the Council of Europe
on the practicalapplication of those
Conventions;
PC-OC / INF 5 A guide to procedures on
the transfer of sentenced
persons in States Partyto ETS 112;

115TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
PC-OC / INF 6 T h e l i s t o f o f f i c i a l s
responsible for thepractical application ofConventions ETS 24(Extradition), ETS 30(Mutual Assistance) and
ETS 112 (Transfer ofSentenced Persons);[classified document]
PC-OC / INF 7 A c h a r t s h o w i n g
requirements of Stateswith respect to languages
used in requests received
under Conventions ETS
24 (Extradition), ETS 30(Mutual Assistance), ETS
11 2 ( Tr a n s f e r o f
Sentenced Persons), ETS
141 (Laundering)
PC-OC / INF 8 A list of bilateral treaties
on criminal matters
involving member States
PC-OC / INF 12 A standard text providing
information about
Convention ETS 112(Transfer of Sentenced
Persons), translated into
the national languages of
the Parties to theConvention
PC-OC / INF 14 FINLAND : International
Co-operation in the
Enforcement of Certain
Penal Sanctions Act (16January 1987/21) [Engl.
only]
PC-OC / INF 18 The Swedish system forinternational mutual
legal assistance
Le système suédois
d’entraide judiciaire
internationale

PC-OC / INF 19 Legal co-operation incriminal matters and therights of the defence Case-law of theEuropean Commission
and Court of Human
Rights
PC-OC / INF 20 SLOVAK REPUBLIC :Selected legal provisions
applicabletointernational legal cooperation in criminal
matters [Engl. only]

PC-OC / INF 23 ICELAND : Extraditionof Criminals and Other
Assistance in Criminal
Proceedings Act No 13 of
17 April 1984 [Engl.
only]
PC-OC / INF 26 H U N G A R Y: A c t o n
International Legal
Assistance in Criminal
Matters [Engl. only]
PC-OC / INF 30 I S R A E L : L a w o n
Transfer of Prisoners[Engl. only]
PC-OC / INF 32 USA: State Laws relating
to international prisonertransfer [Engl. only]
PC-OC / INF 33 COSTA RICA: Rules forthe application of theConvention on thetransfer of sentenced
persons
PC-OC / INF 35 ITALY: Case-law [Engl.
only]283