ENHANCING THE COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES — GETTING THE
MEASURES ACCEPTED AND IMPLEMENTED
Tapio Lappi-Seppälä*
I. INTRODUCTION
Identifying the measures needed to reduce the prison populations and ensuring that thesemeasures are accepted and actually implemented are two different things. To get these measures
accepted it is necessary to convince all the key players in the criminal justice world. The policy makers(including government ministers) and legislators must be convinced; so must the judiciary and also thepolice and prosecutors. And it is vitally important to convince the media and the general public. Criticalissues, thus, remain:•••

how to get the laws accepted on the political level,
how to get them implemented on a practical level,
how to confront the punitive-populist pressure from the politicians and the media

On the basis of the foregoing chapters, we may distinguish the following elements or actors in thecriminal justice field, which need separately to be addressed in order to make a change.1
1. Political will. - Attitudinal and ideological readiness to bring down the number of prisoners may
be far more important than the choice of concrete means to achieve this end. The essential step in theprocess is, thus, to define prison overcrowding on a political level as a problem that should and can besolved.
In Finland this political will and consensus to bring down the prisoner rate was formulated within agroup of key individuals which later was able to produce a number of measures to change the situation.
Not only law reforms and alterations to sentencing practice but also low-level day to day decisions
contributed to the desired result.
2. The role of criminal-justice practitioners. - The content of crime policy is a result of different
practices run by different actors: the police, prosecutors, judges, the prison agencies, community
corrections and an increasing number of non-governmental agencies. A successful decarceration policy
requires that all key actors have committed themselves to this aim.
For example, collaboration with and assistance from the judiciary was clearly a necessary
prerequisite for the change in Finland, and this will be the case also in other countries.
One has to bring the key people together to promote policy discussions, leading to decisions as to thedirection in which policy ought to move. One concrete form of cooperation and the exchange of
information could be sentencing seminars arranged for the judges. Also the exchange of informationand cooperation between different agencies and actors is needed.
3. Information and education. - Society’s reactions against crime are heavily dependent on the view
the public, politicians and state officials have on the magnitude of criminality and the nature of thecrime problem. Much of the people’s and the politician’s response to crime and their reliance onpunishments is explained by their belief that criminal sanctions really are an effective way of dealing
with these problems. Reading the basic criminological facts from reliable sources, and not from themedia, usually changes – or should change – these views.

* Director
National Research Institute of Legal Policy – Finland
1

Good practical advice for constructing non-custodial alternatives is given also in Stern 2002 (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/
icps/developing_alternatives_to_prison.doc).

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Basic criminological facts should be communicated to politicians, decisions makers, state officials
and criminal justice practitioners. Clarification of the (modest) effects of punishments – and informing
the public of these effects as well as the existence of other possibilities – may reduce the unfoundedpublic confidence in the penal system.
4. Public opinion and the role of the media. - As crime policy becomes more and more politicized, therole of public opinion presumably only increases in the future. Therefore, one should be more and moreconcerned whether and how well informed these views are. The perceptions of the public are heavily
influenced by the biased picture of crime reality offered by the media. Governments should, therefore,
invest more in public education and information in these matters. Extra efforts are needed to raise thepublic awareness of basic research-based facts on criminality, the functioning of criminal justice and theexistence and content of different crime prevention strategies.
In the composition of the Finnish criminal policy, media has played a central role, mainly byretaining a sober and reasonable attitude towards issues of criminal policy. Generally, the Finns havebeen saved from low-level populism.
5. Constructive crime-prevention alternatives.- On the other hand, crime is a problem and politicians
are responsible for offering solutions to this problem. If nothing else is offered, criminal law and theprison system will also in the future prevail as the primary shield against crime. Therefore, thedevelopment of convincing crime prevention strategies outside the domain of criminal law becomes also
an issue of importance.
II. PRACTICAL LEVEL“Any policy of reducing the use of imprisonment and the length of sentences must win the hearts
and minds of the judges” (Walmsley 2001). The police and prosecuting authorities often exercise a major
filtering influence in the criminal justice system. Efforts to provide criminal justice officials withbalanced information about imprisonment should certainly extend to the police and prosecuting
authorities, as well as the prison and probation services.
A. Basic Facts and Professional Education
1. The reality of prison.- These key groups in criminal justice must become fully aware of what
imprisonment can and cannot achieve, and what harm it can do. Especially, all judges ought to be
familiarized with prison conditions and they should be well-informed about the opinions of prison
experts, especially including those who work in prisons and with prisoners. Furthermore, they should
also receive information concerning the impact of the sentences on prison population levels and on the
future criminal careers of those sentenced.
2. Basics in criminology. - Judges and prosecutors should receive training at least on the basic factsof criminology. Perceptions on the nature and causes of crime have a direct impact on punitiveness. If
crime is primarily understood as a problem created by social and environmental factors, one is lesswilling to rely on punishments, in comparison to views which identify criminality as a problem causedby evil individuals.
Assumptions on the effectiveness of criminal sanctions affect the result as well: It is easier to justify
harsh sentences if we believe they can lead to good results. The more clearly we realize the adverse
effects of penalties, the more critical will our attitude be towards them and the level of punishment.
Possibilities in this respect vary from one country to another. Those jurisdictions which haveprofessional judges are, clearly, better off. But to have professionals judges with legal training is notenough. The training itself should – for example the curriculum of law schools – reflect these concerns.
The ideal situation would be for criminology and criminal policy to be taught in the juridical faculties.
This has – to a certain extent – been the case in Finland, where local court judges and prosecutors are
relatively young, having received their university courses during the 1970s and the 1980s in the spiritof liberal criminal policy.

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3. The benefits of community sanctions. - Ensuring that these groups understand the purpose andrationale of community sanctions and that they are favourably disposed towards using them requires
providing them with information and training. The key groups should be made aware of the generalbenefits of community sanctions and the general drawbacks of the widespread use of custodial
sanctions.
4. The functioning of other services. - Those working in the criminal justice system should be trainedin the rules, procedures and practices of the various other services involved. This is especially importantin countries where the roles and responsibilities are divided between social welfare authorities andcriminal justice agencies. Information exchange would make it easier for them to understand the
problems involved in community measures, and the possibilities of working together to solve these
problems.
B. Legal Conferences and Professional Training
The implementation of specific policies (for example new laws) usually requires additional training
and guidance. For some of the professional groups – especially the judges – this may pose additional
problems. All European jurisdictions value the independence of the courts as one of the cornerstones of
democratic society. Still, judicial independence does sot mean that any form of guidance is forbidden. It
merely means that this guidance must be given in a way that is in accordance with the principles
developed within each legal culture and with their traditions.
1. Most European Criminal Justice Systems regard both legislative norms and Supreme Court
decisions as proper forms of judicial guidance. Several European criminal codes have specific provisions
on sentencing and the choice of sanction. In some countries, the Supreme Court has the power to issue
sentencing guidelines that extend beyond the scope of cases at hand. Also appellate courts may have thepowers to guide the sentencing practices of the lower courts, for example by reviewing their sentencesor organising sentencing conferences (see below).2
Other strategies focus on drawing the attention of the courts to the official policy of favouringcommunity sanctions, for example through the adoption by the legislature or the executive of an official
statement of the purposes and principles of sentencing.3
2. Also judicial conferences or professional associations can assist in clarifying sentencing objectives
and guidelines. For example, they could specify the criteria and principles which permit the comparisonof various sanctions and the standardization of their use. The judicial conferences provide a special
form of training. Other forms include the arrangement of special courses and seminars at which newlegislation is introduced.
These kinds of training courses and seminars have been arranged for judges and prosecutors on aregular basis in Finland by judicial authorities – in co-operation with the universities. Basically all
major law reforms are accompanied by systematic training courses across the whole country.
These conferences and associations need not be limited to judicial personnel; they could be
expanded to include corrections personnel and other persons responsible for the administration ofsentences.
3. Annotated information on current court practices, published by research and statisticalauthorities, would also be useful. This can be done in the form of a publication giving the “normal”
sentences for the basic types of offences, which indicates how aggravating and mitigating circumstances
have affected the sentence. Such information would simply be provided to the courts as a tool, showing
the judges what other courts have done in similar cases.
2

In the Netherlands, the National Conference of Presidents of the Criminal Chambers of the Courts of Appeal has started toissue 'orientation points' for sentencing. These non-binding 'orientation points' project to some extend the common sentencing
practice of the Dutch courts and are designed to provide starting points for sentencing.

3This was recommended in the report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach.
Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1986, recommendation 12.06.)

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Although detailed sentencing statistics have been published in several countries, the information
does not necessarily reach the judges. In Finland experiments with a computerized sentencing register
were carried out in the 1980s. The Dutch judiciary has recently presented a database for sentencing to
be used by the courts, providing means to compare alike cases where possible.
4. The selection of the sanction is often determined by the motion of the prosecutor, or by the way inwhich the case is presented. For this reason, prosecutorial guidelines should also be developed on thepresentation of the court, on the prosecutor's proposal for sentence (where this is possible), and onwhether or not the prosecutor can and should appeal decisions to a superior court.
C. Extra Efforts in Sustaining the Credibility of Community Sanctions
Community sanctions will not be imposed or implemented if the courts or the probation services
regard them as non-credible, ineffective or inappropriate. This credibility of community sanctions canbe tied to their success in achieving certain pre-defined practical goals and their symbolic (expressive)function (Bishop 1988).
1. The multitude of practical aims. - Among the practical goals of community sanctions are thereduction of the prison population, the reduction of the costs of the system of sanctions, social
reintegrating and the reduction of recidivism.
This multitude of practical aims is both a strength and a weakness. Since there are many aims
which often are not made explicit by the legislator, different groups may have different expectations.
Therefore it can be expected that some groups will always criticize the sanctions as having been
“failures” in the light of some unspecified criteria, and may refuse to cooperate in their implementation.
But due to the multitude of aims, a failure in one respect does not necessarily mean a failure in otherrespects. For example, even if recidivism would be the same as after a prison sentence (which is not thecase, see they below), some other intermediate treatment goals might have been achieved. Therefore,
when success or failure is being evaluated, one should keep in mind all the different dimensions
involved (see Bottoms 2001 p.87 ff).
Growing international evidence confirms that community service offers the offenders rewarding,constructive experiences and reciprocal social relationships. Community service is also experienced by
the offenders as a fair sentence, resulting from the offender’s own behaviour – and not as being the“judge’s fault”. Both of these elements explain why community service systematically results to(slightly) lower re-conviction rates (see Rex 2001 p.77 ff).
2. Symbolic dimensions. - Non-custodial sanctions also have a punitive dimension. Their credibility
can, thus, be enhanced if they are not seen as excessively lenient. Even terminology might be used toenhance the perception of community sanctions as punitive. Instead of speaking of the “waiving of
measures” or “absolute discharge”, for example (both terms imply that “nothing happened”), one might
speak of “punitive warnings” or “penal warnings” or, even, “final warnings”.
3. Ensuring continuity in training. - Several experiences from different countries indicate that when
new measures are implemented, there is ample enthusiasm, as those groups and persons who haveoriginated the project are still personally involved. However, once the programme is placed on a moregeneral footing, there is the danger of falling into routines. Moreover, unexpected difficulties in
implementing the sanctions may occur, local circumstances may cause trouble, and the work has to bedone with new people who, perhaps, are not as committed to the original purpose of the programme.
This all means that demonstrating the appropriateness of community sanctions to the courts andthe practitioners is an ongoing process which by no means ends with the adoption of the requisite
legislation and the arrangement of an initial training phase. In a way, the idea must be sold over andover again, also to those working for and with the programme.
4. Taking care of community relations. - The community must also be informed. The success of many
community sanctions depends to a large extent on the interaction between the community and the91

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offender. Therefore, special measures should be adopted to communicate to the community the benefits
and crime control potential of community sanctions.
Examples of such measures include information on the true content of these sanctions and theirimplementation as well as on the positive reintegrating effects, the situation of offenders and the use
and existence of mediation or dispute settlement mechanisms in the community. The value of volunteer
work and the citizens' associations role in the implementation of community sanctions deserves clear
recognition – also to be publicly announced by the governmental officials.
III. POLITICAL LEVELThe laws that criminal justice practitioners apply and implement are the result of politicalprocesses and political decisions. In the end, the content of any given criminal justice system is definedby these processes. This entails, that the level of penalties and the extent of incarceration is determinedby the prevailing political culture and by the degree to which criminal political decision making isdirected by rational analyses on aims and means, and the extent to which criminal policy is directed by
the media and subordinated to general politics or the quest for political popularity.
A. Combating Penal Populism
1. Penal Populism
1. The flaws of penal populism. - Within a fairly short period of time, a new concept – “penal
populism” or “populist punitiveness” – has entered in the criminological literature (Bottoms 1995 andHough & Roberts 2001). The concept refers to the “tendency of legislators to enact policies based
primarily on their anticipated popularity, with disregard for their penal value” (Hough & Roberts 2001).
This phenomena is closely connected with the general politicisation of crime policy, which has takenplace during the last two decades (see above). The basic flaw in this new form on penal policy is that: (1)it offers simple solutions to complex problems, (2) it is inconsistent with the results of systematic
criminological research and, (3) it leads to unnecessary suffering and extensive material and social
costs in its unfounded reliance on incarceration.
2. The results of penal populism. - In this populist process politicians are locked into a penal “armsrace”, where each party is offering tougher and tougher measures in order to protect the public – and to
gain popularity among the voters. This process of penal escalation has reached its peak in the US, butsome European countries seem to have taken the same route.
Perhaps, the most worrisome feature of the present European political context is that due to thelogic of this “arms race” even the most radical – often openly racist – populist movements may haveconsiderable impact on the penal policy of the mainstream parties. Despite the fact that these parties
distance themselves from the populist programmes of the right wing movements, there is one area
where they do not like to disagree – the requirement of being “tough on crime”. No party seems to bewilling to accuse another of exaggeration when it comes to measures against criminality. Being “soft on
crime” is an accusation that no one wishes to accept. And it is this fear of being softer than one's political
opponents that tends to drive politicians, in the end, to the extremes of penal excess (Hough & Roberts2001).
3. Confronting penal populism. - In many cases this policy is based on “harmless ignorance” on
crucial criminological facts. But the worst forms are examples of sheer political calculation based on theinsecurity and fears of the general public. And in the most appalling cases, these movements do not
only exploit but also increase and strengthen the fears and prejudices of the public against racial andethnic minorities. In this respect, confronting the penal populism becomes, not only a matter of morerational penal policy, but also an issue of better democracy and social justice.
2. The Will of the People?
Having said this, one has to consider the counterarguments too. The standard defence for thesepunitive claims is that in advocating harsher sentencing, populist politicians are simply being
appropriately responsive to the democratic will. Several objections to this can be added:92121ST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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1. In the first place, public opinion is much more complex and nuanced than is generally supposed.
In many cases, there simply does not exist any uniform public opinion, but a variety of differing views,
changing among different segments of the population. Those who speak in the name of “the people” very
often speak just for themselves.
In addition to this, a careful analysis on penal politics shows that politicians lead as much as follow
the public opinion (see especially Beckett, 1997). Punitive public demands may well be the result – notthe cause – of punitive policies.
2. Secondly, rarely – if ever – are these proposals based on reliable research on the actual content ofpublic attitudes. In many cases, those who refer to “public opinion”, are expressing mainly their own
personal values which they wish to authorize by the force of public opinion. In some cases the source of“public opinion” is a media-prepared poll, designed to serve certain prefixed political purposes. Bothcases have nothing to do with serious attempts to follow the “voice of the people”.
3. Thirdly, even if there are reliable measurements of the public opinion, we may encounter someprincipled difficulties in their implementation. “Counting heads has nothing to do with validating
moral reasons”. This applies also to our conceptions of justice. It would, furthermore, be a simplistic
form of democracy that delivered flawed criminal justice policies simply because there was (anapparent) public demand for them. As Hough & Roberts summarize: “This would amount to democracy
by uninformed plebiscite, quite different from the form of government by elected representatives that
our ... nations purport to uphold.” (Hough & Roberts 2001).
3. Raising the Rationality of the Criminal Political Decision Processes
1. Inform the politicians of the basic facts. - To begin with, penal policies in many developed
democracies are characterized by misinformation on the part of both politicians and of the people whomthey were elected to represent. Informing the politicians of the basic facts would be the first thing to do.
Much of what is said below on informing the public will apply directly to the politicians. This holds true
both with the form and the content (the politicians are at least as active readers of the tabloid papers as
any of us). However, at least some of the politicians are willing to acquire additional information, once it
is given in a concise enough form. Special efforts should be taken to provide accurate and concise
information packages.
Politicians are in a position to make policy choices between different alternatives. That is their maintask. And it their basic responsibility to be able to explain the pros and cons of the possible alternatives.
In any case, that is what the public should demand them to do. Therefore, politicians must be helped tounderstand what imprisonment can achieve, what its limits are, and what its dangers are. They mustalso fully understand the financial costs entailed by a high level of imprisonment. Even if they are notimpressed by the arguments for greater humanity and social reintegration, they will sometimes be
impressed by the expense of imprisoning so many people (Walmsley 2001).
Sometimes it might be useful to draw attention to how similar countries or jurisdictions copedifferently (Hough & Roberts 2001). The value of this comparison is, of course, greatest in thosecountries that have the most severe practices. For others – such as Finland – international comparisonsare becoming more and more dangerous.
2. Political culture. - Providing the necessary information will not be enough, if the political culture
remains unreceptive to rational argumentation. In this respect, there are great differences between
different cultures. The political culture in the Scandinavian countries has traditionally appreciatedevidence-based policies and pragmatic rational argumentation over populist and symbolic gestures. The
situation may well be different in other countries – in fact, this is precisely what a “drift towards penal
populism” is all about. The main question, then, remains: Is there anything that can be done in order toinfluence the political rhetoric itself and the way of argumentation? At least, two additional pieces ofadvice can be given.
3. Apply the normal rules of political accountability also in penal discourse. - In several otherspheres of political life (other than criminal justice) proposals are supported, research-based

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evaluations of their effectiveness. Those politicians advocating different proposals (concerning forexample economics, traffic or education) usually need to explain the sources of the funds; how much theproposals cost and where the money can be taken from. These same requirements should also be
applied to punitive crime policies. It should not be enough just to demand “law and order”: Proposals fortougher sentences should be accompanied with research-based estimations on how much crime will be
reduced, and what are the financial costs of increased incarceration. If the same standards ofaccountability that are applied elsewhere in politics, were followed in the criminal justice debate, theattractiveness of punitive claims might be significantly reduced.
Moreover, objective evaluation of all major projects should be mandatory. This should also apply tochanges in sentencing policies.
4. Increase the political costs of penal populism. - In addition, there may be some (albeit limited)
scope for reducing the political payoffs in “talking tough on crime”. At the same time that penal
populism has been growing, there also has been a growing distaste for populist posturing as such,among both the public and the media.
The politicians have realized this, too. Usually, no one wishes to be labelled as a penal populist. This
also means that if a certain politician’s arguments can be shown – by researchers and pressure groups
for penal reform – to include attitudinal oversimplification, political opponents would undoubtedly use
this opportunity to introduce new slogans such as “act smarter – not tougher” could also be of someassistance in the debate (Hough & Roberts 2001).
Giving intellectual weapons in the hands of political opponents of any penal populist – irrespective of
the party he/she represents – is one way of improving the quality of political discussions and, thus,
enhancing the rationality of political decision-making processes.
B. Public Opinion and the MediaThe media and the general public play a crucial criminal political role in many developed countries.
The politicians respond to the requirements of the public (whether these demands are “real” or“imaginary”). Media, on the other hand, influences in many ways public opinion and people’s attitudes.
1. Better Measurements of the Public Opinion
Despite what has just been said in the preceding chapter, the politicians will undoubtedly respondto the requirements of public opinion also in the future. This being the case, efforts should be made toraise the quality of attitude measurements in criminal justice as well as the interpretation of theavailable evidence.
1. Avoid stereotypes in the interpretation. - Careful studies show that public opinion is far fromunidimensional or monolithic. Many people have sophisticated views about punishment; many areambivalent about the appropriate response to offending. Whilst the majority think that the courts are
generally too soft, majorities also tend to recognize that prison is expensive and damaging (Hough &Roberts 2001). If given other opportunities in addition to punishments in the polls (which is rare),people tend to support alternative, non-punitive responses (Beckett 1997).
2. Avoid oversimplification in the measurement. - In most opinion polls, there is the tendency ofoversimplification. The ways in which attitudes are measured tend to exaggerate popular punitiveness.
Questions are too vague and too general. As a consequence the respondents fill the “gaps ofinformation” with their own imagination which, in turn, is coloured by the information given in the
media.
For example, the questions concerning proper sentencing levels are answered specifically withpersistent or violent criminals in mind, while the clear majority of offenders who appear before thecourts, are poorly educated, unemployed young men charged with property offences. Answers about
penalties for drunk drivers are given with “killer drivers” in mind, while a normal drunk driver (inScandinavia) is someone who had too many drinks the night before and got caught in an early morning

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roadside traffic control on his/her way to work. If the questions are rephrased to correspond moreaccurately to real life situations, also the punitiveness decreases.
Questions should be more specific and they should avoid value-laden terms. Asking “are courts
tough enough on persistent criminals” is guaranteed to elicit agreement from the vast majority of the
population. Even more misleading are the media organised “on-line net-polls”, arranged in connection
with every major crime event.
3. Include also cognitive dimensions in the measurement. - Better measurement of public attitudes
also involves placing the results of an opinion poll in context with what people actually know of the
problem being explored. All attitudes are partly based on beliefs of the factual conditions (what thecrime rate is, what kind of people the criminals are, how effective the sanction system is, etc). Whileconsidering the relevance of public opinion as a criminal political argument, one should also take into
account what the factual premises behind this opinion are.
Results showing that people want more severe punishment are of little worth if at the same time a)people have no idea about the actual level on penalties, b) the public is mistaken on the nature anddevelopment of crime, and c) people have overly optimistic views on the possibilities to influencecriminality by means of raising penalties. After all, in these cases we may well conclude that if people
would have had correct information of the facts then they would also had shown different views on theappropriate penalties.
2. Informing the Public Opinion
Penal populism feeds off public ignorance and misunderstanding about crime and punishment. The
obvious remedies are to improve the quality and availability of information and to provide better accessto the research evidence about the crime strategies that work and the ones that do not.
1. The reality of crime. - Empirical research shows that those who know less of the facts of crime andcrime control also have the highest fears and most punitive demands (Hough & Roberts 1998). Thus,
improving the general level of knowledge would also reduce the punitive demands of the public. The
public’s fear of crime and hostility towards offenders in general needs to be counteracted by providing
more accurate descriptions of criminality, crime rates as well as the offenders and the circumstances inwhich they commit the offences. People systematically overestimate the increase (and the gravity) of
crime.
2. The reality of punishments. - Also information on the functions of punishment, on the relative
effectiveness of custodial and community measures, and on the reality of prisons is needed.
For example, the public is generally aware of neither the problems faced in prisons nor the dangers
in the uncontrolled use of imprisonment nor its human and financial costs. Too many take for granted
the media posters which parallel prisons with hotels.
The public is also unaware of the actual level of sentences. Demands for harsher sentencing do notspring from a systematic study of sentencing pattern in the courts. People read or hear about sentencesfrom the media. In the light of the summary of facts provided in the news, the sentence seems to be toolenient, which leads to the conclusion, that “we need to do something about sentencing”. One way tolessen the public anxiety about specific sentencing decisions would be information systems which could
successfully summarize overall sentencing patterns whilst managing to communicate what the “goingrate” is for specific sorts of crime.
Governments and research institutes bear the basic responsibility for informing people about crime
trends and court practices. However, in practice, the media will continue play the key role as a source of
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3. Raising the Quality of Crime News – Can the Media be Influenced?
The media are the source of much information, both true and false. Unfortunately, the media imageof crime is selective, simplified and skewed. It drives the discussion (on the television) down to the levelof five second sound-bites, thus preventing any efforts to have more nuanced and complicated analyses.
Still, this is the reality we have to live with. Free media and the freedom of expression are also oneof the cornerstones of any democratic society. The possibilities to influence the way that the mass media
cover crime and punishment are heavily restricted, based mainly on the self-criticism of the media itself(at best). What then – if anything – can be done?
1. Challenge media misrepresentations. - Representatives of the media who are receptive to theseissues can be drawn into a debate on how criminal justice should be reported. The basic requirement isfor more responsible media coverage. Media watchdogs could be required to ensure that coverage on
sensational and rare offences and incidents is balanced; at the very least such coverage should point out
how rare such incidents are.
2. Most news on crime tends to underline that crime is becoming more and more threatening, even if
national crime figures are going down. The growth of crime is always news, declining figures receive
much less attention. A 10 per cent increase means that crime is “soaring” whereas a 10 per centdecrease means “a small reduction”. Therefore, it would be important to place reports of individual
crimes in a statistical context. This is a common practice in the Finnish media, but evidently much rarer
in other countries.
3. Often the style of crime reporting is the result of sheer ignorance. Reporters do not have the skill
nor the time to make better stories. Media personnel are prone to the same misunderstandings as theaverage citizen. Those responsible for informing the public on these matters – the governmental
officials and research agencies – need to ensure that the media is also given accurate information about
criminal justice. One has to remember that responsible reporters are also receptive to well-foundedcritique.
4. Governmental research agencies play a central role in serving the media with accurate
information. For example, in Finland the National Research Institute of Legal Policy has, since 1975,
published detailed yearbooks on both crime and sentencing statistics. This book (over 300 pages) is now
also available on the Internet.
Other useful means may include: appointing press officers, improving media access to statisticians
and academics, and using more efficiently the new technology to communicate statistical information to
the press. In most Scandinavian countries the public and the press have free access to the frequently
updated national crime statistics on the internet.
5. Editorial policies may be moderated if their unintended consequences are pointed out to theeditors. Key persons in the media market (editors, leading reporters, etc.) should be cooperated with. In
the UK there was at least a temporary break on the tabloid media’s style to sensationalise crime, after
influential media personalities were invited to participate in a committee that examined the media’srole in exacerbating the fear of crime (Hough & Roberts 2001).
C. Constructing Convincing Political Alternatives
Politicians need some persuasive alternatives. As noted by Hough & Roberts, any attempt to render
the penal debate “fireproof ” against populism cannot be simply defensive: “Politicians have to be able torespond to public concern about crime; they will listen to the message that Draconian sentencing isineffective only when they are provided with positive and plausible suggestions for effective
replacement strategies” (Hough & Roberts 2001).
On the other hand, if other, more functional instruments can be advocated, it will also become more
and more difficult to justify severe sentences. The development of convincing crime prevention
strategies outside the domain of criminal law reduces, thus, the political strains on the criminal justicesystem.

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What is needed is a comprehensive national crime reduction programme based on a partnership on
prevention, employing all relevant crime prevention strategies. The shape of such a programme will, ofcourse, vary across jurisdictions, and it needs to be responsive to local conditions and priorities. Thesekind of national programmes have now been implemented in several European countries, includingFrance, the UK, Sweden and Finland. The content of these programmes fall, however, outside of thispresentation.
IV. WHY DO HIGH PRISONER RATES MATTER?
“The more criminals you lock up the less crime they can commit.” But there is clear evidence that tohave a significant effect on crime levels you would have to lock up far more people and for longer
periods - at a great public expense - than even the countries who are most enthusiastic about
imprisonment have been willing to do (Walmsley 2001).
The benefits of massive use of imprisonment in crime prevention could easily be achieved withother, more economic and humane measures. What, then, are the costs involved?
High and growing prison population sizes lead to overcrowding. Overcrowded prisons are a breachof United Nations and other international standards which require that all prisoners shall be treatedwith the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human beings, which includes being
accorded a reasonable amount of space.
High prison population numbers bring with them poorer conditions of hygiene, poorer sanitation
arrangements, less time for outdoor exercise, insufficient bedding and clothing, insufficient nutritionand health care, more tension, more violence between prisoners, more violence against staff and moresuicides.
Growth in prisoner numbers means less effective supervision by staff, less time to organise
activities to ensure the chances of successful reintegration, less treatment programmes, increased
stress and higher sickness levels among the staff.
And what does it say about the state of a country that it finds it necessary to lock up more than one
per cent of its male population (as the case is in the US and Russia). The picture looks even darker, if
we recalculate the figures excluding boys too young to be imprisoned and older men. And if we look at
how many urban male citizens belonging to ethnic minorities aged 15 to 30 are being locked up, we are
faced with even more serious questions concerning the social costs of mass imprisonment: “Thehardening of social and racial divisions, the reinforcement of criminogenic processes; the alienation oflarge social groups; the discrediting of legal authority; a reduction of civic tolerance; a tendency towards
authoritarianism.” (Garland 2001 p.204).
One can but hope that the same political structures that once enabled the birth of mass
imprisonment will, in the long run, work against it. As David Garland concludes: “But over the longterm it is probable that its conflict with the ideals of liberal democracy will become increasingly
apparent, particularly where penal exclusion ... is so heavily focused upon racial minorities. A
government that routinely sustains social order by means of mass exclusion begins to look like anapartheid state.” (ibid).

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