Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University
Working Paper Series No. 330

The impact of time preference on bequest behavior:
Evidence from Japanese survey data
Riko Noguchi
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University

Abstract
The plan of whether people leave an inheritance to their children is one of the important decisionmaking on how to spend money after retirement. In this paper, we examine the effect of time
preference on bequest behavior by using data obtained from a questionnaire survey entitled“Preference Parameters Study”. Despite of the benefits from possible help or care by their children
in the future, if individuals’ time discount rates are high (i.e., their discounts placed on returns
available in the future are high) , they may seek their own current consumption without leaving
an inheritance to their children. We use two types of time discount rates with different conditions
for estimation. The estimation result is that the higher the respondents’ time discount rates, thegreater the probabilities of choosing not to leave an inheritance to their children. This result also
indicates that the respondents with a high time discount rate usually leave their property forthemselves. In addition, we also find out that besides time preference, a number of sociodemographic characteristics play an important role in bequest behavior.
Keywords: Time preference; Time discount rate; Bequest behavior; Socio-demographic
characteristics; JapanJEL classification: D10; D81; D90

1. Introduction

Japanese people have the longest life expectancy in the world. In this situation, we need toconsider how people spend their money after retirement. Aside from consumption, decisions must
be made on whether to bequeath money to one’s children. When it comes to personal financial
choices, time discounts may deeply impact the decisions made. Therefore, in this study, we clarify
the effect of the time discount rate on bequest behavior, and we examine what factors influence
bequest decision making.
The life cycle savings hypothesis provides a theoretical framework about consumption
throughout a person’s life. It says that people work and earn money when they are young, andthey live by using their savings after their retirements. However, in many empirical analyses, theelderly do not reverse savings as much as the theoretical prediction of the life cycle hypothesis.
One explanation is preliminary savings. This is the theory that money is left in preparation for (1)uncertainty in life expectancy and (2) uncertainty in medical expenses. De Nardi (2010) reported
people save money for possible future medical expenses [1]. However, people deal withuncertainties with various forms of insurance. Moreover, savings rates of the elderly differ before
and after their retirements, and these decisions are made after retirements [2]. Another explanationis the bequest motive. This theory claims money is saved for altruism and strategic reasons. In
this situation, someone plans to leave an inheritance to their children for their future either forpurely altruistic reasons or to incentivize some behavior [3, 4]. Horioka et al. (2018), reported
that bequest behavior is influenced by the expectation of a bequest, the degree of altruism, andwhether the bequestors received an inheritance from their parents [5].
Discount rates, that is, the time value of money, also affect consumer behavior and bequest
decision making. The discount rate represents a preference for a current utility versus a future
utility1. The higher the time discount rate, the higher the current utility weight [6, 7, 8]. Thus,
people with a high time discount rate place higher importance on the utility gained from current
consumption. For this reason, people may have a greater preference for the utility gained fromcurrent consumption than the utility a bequest would give their children in the future. Huffman etal. (2019), report that elders’ wealth is associated with lower discount rates, expressed as lower
impatience [13]. In our research, we examine causal relationships between discount rates andbequest behavior. Our purpose is to find out how time preference affects the bequest motive. We
also analyze the effect of several types of time discount rates.
In this study, we investigate the relationship between bequest behavior, time preference, and1Time preference is an individual characteristic of intertemporal choice, and it may varydepending on the period and amount of money. In particular, it has been reported that
hyperbolic discount describes a real event [9, 10, 11, 12].

the effect of the discount rate on bequest behavior.

2. Methodology
2-1 Estimation model

We use a multinomial logit model with questions that have more than two options. The
multinomial logit model does not assume the order of options.
The estimation model for an individual i selecting option j * is as follows.
∗∗∗∗
2 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡2,𝑖> 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡1,𝑖, 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡2,𝑖> 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡0,𝑖∗∗∗∗𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = { 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡1,𝑖 > 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡2,𝑖 , 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡1,𝑖 > 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡0,𝑖∗∗∗∗0 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡0,𝑖> 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡2,𝑖, 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡0,𝑖> 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡1,𝑖∗𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑖=α+𝛽𝑗 𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖

(1)

Regarding whether or not to leave an inheritance to their children, we take 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 =0 if they
absolutely will leave a bequest, or if they have a strategic motivation for leaving one,
𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 =1 if they will leave a bequest if they can afford it, and 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 =2 if they will not∗leave a bequest. The parameters 𝛽𝑗 and 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑖are different for each option. We expect

people with a higher time discount rate to select 𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 =2 because they focus on their current
utility.

2-2 Data: bequest behavior

The data used in this study is obtained from a survey entitled “Preference Parameters Study”
that was conducted in four countries by the Global Centers of Excellence (Global COE) programat Osaka University: in Japan in 2004; in the U.S. in 2005; in India in 2009; and in rural and urban
areas in China in 2006 and 2007. We use data from the 2010 surveys in Japan.
The data analyzed is based on the following question and its eight associated possible
responses:
How do you feel about leaving an inheritance to your children?
(1) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter what.
(2) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) if they provide care (including nursingcare) during my old age.

(3) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide financial assistanceduring my old age.
(4) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they carry on the family business.
(5) I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but will
leave whatever is left over.
(6) I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances because
doing so may reduce their will to work.
(7) I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances because
I want to use my wealth myself.
(8) I want to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but I won’t because I don’t have thefinancial capacity to do so.
When respondents selected (1), (2), (3) or (4), the response was coded as “will leave an inheritanceto my children no matter what” or as “having strategic motive” (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 =0). When (5) was
selected, it was treated as “whatever is leftover” (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 =1), and when (6), (7) or (8) wereselected, it was handled as “will not leave an inheritance” (𝐵𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 =2).
2-3 Data: time preferenceTime preference is assessed from responses to Q1, shown in Table1-1 and 1-2. Q1 is about
the respondent’s intertemporal choices. We elicited time preference based on the respondent’s
choices in the following situation: “Let’s assume you have two options to receive some money.
You may choose Option A, to receive ¥10,000 today, or Option B, to receive a different amountin seven days. Compare the amounts and timing in Option A with Option B and indicate which
you would prefer for each of the 9 alternatives.”
We measured the discount rate (DR) as the mean of the interest rate at the point where there
was a shift in the preferred option from A to B [14, 15]. For example, if a respondent chose Option
A for an interest rate from -10% to 10% and then shifts to Option B for a rate from 40% to 5000%,
his/her time discount rate was calculated as 25%—the mean of 10% and 40%. Responses thatwent back and forth between Option A and Option B and those with a negative discount rate were
excluded from the analysis. We analyzed two types of discount rates. DR1 is a discount rate fortoday versus seven days and DR2 is a discount rate for 90 days versus 97 days.

2-4 Descriptive statistics

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used for estimation. The sample size is1623. The mean discount rate of DR1 is 392.9174 – the mean value for where there was a shift

Table1-1 Questions about time preference (DR1: today vs. 7days)
Let's assume you have two options to receive some money. You may choose Option A, to receive ¥10,000 today; or
Option B, to receive a different amount in 7 days. Compare the amounts and timing in Option A with B and indicate
which you would prefer to receive for each of the 9 choices.
Option A (receive today)

Option B (receive in 7 days)

annual interest rate(%)

10000

9980

-10

10000

10000

0

10000

10019

10

10000

10076

40

10000

10191

100

10000

10383

200

10000

10575

300

10000

11917

1000

10000

19589

5000

Table1-2 Questions about time preference (DR2: 90days vs. 97days)
Let's assume you have two options to receive ¥10,000 ninety days from today or receive different amount in ninety-sevendays from today. Compare the amounts and timing in Option A with B and indicate which you would prefer to receive foreach of the 9 choices.
Option A (receiving in 90 days)

Option B (receiving in 97 days)

annual interest rate(%)

10000

9980

-10

10000

10000

0

10000

10019

10

10000

10076

40

10000

10191

100

10000

10383

200

10000

10575

300

10000

11917

1000

10000

19589

5000

in preference. The unit of income and household financial assets is 10 thousand yen. The mean
income is about 6.7 million yen and the mean of household financial assets is 17.5 million yen.
Borrowing is a binary variable, with about 38% of people having some debt. This debt includes
everything, such as a mortgage or a car loan. About 9% of the respondents had been hospitalized
in the previous year. Respondents were evenly divided between males and females and were from50 to 77 years old, with an average of approximately 60 years old. The largest household size was9, while the average was 3.21. About 15% were self-employed, 31.6% were regular employees,
16.3% were part-time workers, 15.8% housewives, and 12% were unemployed. 23.1% of
respondents had a college degree or higher, 55.5% were living with their parents, 37.8% hadreceived an inheritance from their parents, and about 18.7% had partners who inherited from theirparents. The average number of children was two, and their average age was 27.8, indicating that
their children are adults and have jobs.

Table2 Descriptive statistics table
Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

time discount rate 1 (DR1: today vs. 7days)

1623

392.9174

707.5171

5

3000

time discount rate 2 (DR2: 90days vs. 97days)

1657

467.4019

826.7662

5

3000

income1623

667.0364

403.4503

100

2000

Financial assets

1623

1749.384

2018.282

250

10000

Borrowing

1623

0.383857

0.48647401hospital

1623

0.090573

0.287089

0

1

HealthAnxiety

1623

3.311152

0.996253

1

5

male

1623

0.503389

0.500143

0

1

age

1623

60.88176.782298

50

77

household size

1623

3.214418

1.367985

19self employed1623

0.150955

0.358115

0

1

fulltime

1623

0.316698

0.465332

01

parttime

1623

0.163278

0.369733

01

housewife

1623

0.158349

0.36518

0

1

umemployed

1623

0.119532

0.324513

01College graduate

1623

0.231054

0.421637

01

Living with parents

1623

0.555145

0.49710301Inheritance from parents (partner)

1623

0.377696

0.4849601Inheritance from parents

1623

0.187308

0.390278

0

1

number of children

1623

2.178065

0.709083

1

6

age of children

1623

27.8053

8.8536152

3. Estimation results

In this study, estimates were made using two types of time discounts. DR1 used in Table 31 is the discount rate derived from Table 1-1. This represents the time preference for the "today
or 7 days later" choice. DR2 used in Table 3-2 represents the time preference for the "90 days or
97 days" choice. The difference between the two types of discount rates relates to how time-valuechanges as the impact of a choice is moved further into the future. DR1 is the selection at a point
relatively close to the present, while DR2 is the selection at a point relatively far from the present.
We investigate particularly how these parameters affect the choice of not leaving an inheritance(Bequest = 2).
In this multinomial logit model, we derived coefficients based on Bequest=0 (to leave an
inheritance to my children no matter what or by having a strategic motive). Tables 3-1 and 3-2

show the marginal effects of each option.
3-1 Estimation results: DR1 (today vs. 7days)(1) Bequest=0
First, the estimation result using DR1 is confirmed in Table 3-1. Respondents who make thischoice are planning to leave an inheritance to their children no matter what. According to theestimation results, the discount rate is insignificant. Other variables, including income, financial
assets, male gender, self-employment, part-time employment, and inheritance experiences fromparents, are all significant. Respondents with higher incomes show an increased probability ofplanning to leave an inheritance no matter what, and the higher the financial assets of thehousehold, the more likely they are to leave an inheritance. Men were more likely to be willingto leave an inheritance than women. Self-employed workers are more likely to leave an
inheritance to their children, and those who inherited from their parents are more likely to plan toleave an inheritance to their children.
(2) Bequest=1
Respondents who make this choice is planning to leave by “strategic motive or whatever isleft over.” According to the estimation results, the time discount rate is insignificant. Income andfinancial assets are significant as in (1) and have a positive effect. Furthermore, borrowing, healthanxiety, gender, household size, and college degree are significant. Contrary to income andfinancial assets, borrowing has a negative effect on leaving an inheritance. Anxiety about healthalso has a negative effect, reducing the willingness to leave an inheritance if he/ she is concerned
about his/her future health. Unlike (1), women were more likely to make this choice than men.
As well, the higher the respondent’s educational background, the more likely they were to choose
to leave an inheritance.
(3) Bequest=2
Respondents who made this choice “do not plan to leave their inheritance to their children”.
Discount rates here showed a small but significant and positive effect. Those who have large
discount rates, and are active in their current utility, are more likely to not be willing to leave theirchildren an inheritance. Income, financial assets, borrowing, the experience of a visit to a hospital,
anxiety of health, part-time employment, college graduation, inheritance from parents, andnumber of children are all significant. People with higher incomes are less likely to choose not toleave an inheritance to their children. This result is consistent with the result of (1) because people
with higher incomes can leave an inheritance. In addition, the higher the financial asset, the lower
the probability of choosing to leave no inheritance. Those with higher debt were more likely tonot to leave an inheritance, as were those who had been hospitalized in the last 1 year and thosewith concerns about their health. Moreover, compared to regular employees, part-time workers
are were likely to not leave an inheritance. College graduation decreased the probability ofplanning not to leave and inheritance, in other words, those with higher educational levels are
more likely to leave an inheritance, consistent with (2). Respondents who received an inheritancefrom their parents were less likely to plan not to leave an inheritance. Thus, inheritance from theparent leads to the willingness to leave an inheritance for their children. Finally, the greater thenumber of children, the higher the probability of not leaving and inheritance. This is explained by
the financial assets left for each child decreasing as the number of children increases.

3-2 Estimation results: DR2 (90days vs. 97days)

The estimation results using DR2 are presented in Table 3-2.
(1) Bequest = 0
The discount rate (DD2) is significant and has a negative effect. This result indicates that thehigher the time discount rate, the lower the probability of leaving an inheritance. It is conceivablethat the higher the time discount rate is, the more positive the current utility is, and the lower the
probability of leaving an inheritance.
Similar to the result of DR1, income, financial assets, gender, self-employment, andinheritance from parents are significant.
(2) Bequest = 1
The discount rate is not significant for bequest=1. Income, financial assets, and college
graduation have a positive effect, while debt, health anxiety, male gender, and household size
have a negative effect.
(3) Bequest = 2
In this case, the discount rate is significant and had a positive effect. This is consistent with
DR1. In other words, the higher the time discount rate, the higher the probability of not leaving
an inheritance to their children. Borrowing, health anxiety and number of children have apositive effect, while income, financial assets, male gender, college graduation, and inheritancefrom parents have a negative effect.

Table3-1 Estimation results of multinomial logit model (today vs. 7days)(1) Bequest=0(2) Bequest=1(3) Bequest=2

time discount rate (today vs. 7days)-2.50e-05

3.00e-06

2.20e-05**(1.70e-05)(1.73e-05)(1.09e-05)

income7.55e-05**

0.000129***-0.000205***(2.99e-05)(3.86e-05)(3.77e-05)

Financial assets

4.24e-05***

4.22e-05***-8.46e-05***(6.44e-06)(1.20e-05)(1.53e-05)-0.00867-0.0612**0.0699***Borrowing
hospital(0.0246)(0.0278)(0.0210)-0.0516-0.00868

0.0603**(0.0383)(0.0419)(0.0305)

Health anxiety

0.00737-0.0351***

0.0277***(0.0109)(0.0122)(0.00934)

male

0.0930***-0.0604**-0.0326(0.0254)(0.0293)(0.0219)age-0.00259

0.00291-0.000319(0.00303)(0.00337)(0.00261)

household

0.00698-0.0179*

0.0110(0.0103)(0.0108)(0.00784)

Self-employed0.0598**-0.0325-0.0274(0.0303)(0.0370)(0.0301)

Part time-0.0648*0.00260

0.0622**(0.0342)(0.0373)(0.0247)-0.0291

0.0331-0.00394

housewife(0.0363)(0.0403)(0.0304)

unemployed-0.0338-0.00868

0.0425(0.0373)(0.0415)(0.0317)

College graduate-0.00578

0.0835***-0.0777***(0.0257)(0.0322)(0.0277)

0.0318-0.0315-0.000314(0.0265)(0.0291)(0.0221)0.0371*0.00992-0.0470**(0.0215)(0.0253)(0.0197)

0.02500.00843-0.0334

Living with parents
Inheritance from parents
Inheritance from parents (partner)
number of children
age of children(0.0270)(0.0310)(0.0257)-0.0231-0.00532

0.0284**(0.0170)(0.0180)(0.0126)

0.00245-0.00138-0.00107(0.00253)(0.00199)(0.00224)
Observations
Log pseudolikelihood
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1,623-1442.647

Table3-2 Estimation results of multinomial logit model (90days vs. 97days)(1) Bequest=0(2) Bequest=1(3) Bequest=2

time discount rate (90days vs. 97days)-2.83e-05**-9.05e-08

2.84e-05***(1.42e-05)(1.47e-05)(9.64e-06)

income8.61e-05***

0.000119***-0.000205***(2.92e-05)(3.83e-05)(3.80e-05)

Financial assets

4.46e-05***

4.46e-05***-8.92e-05***(6.32e-06)(1.17e-05)(1.48e-05)-0.00196-0.0580**

0.0599***(0.0244)(0.0275)(0.0209)-0.0333-0.01620.0495

Borrowing
hospital(0.0377)(0.0417)(0.0311)

Health anxiety

0.00604-0.0306**

0.0246***(0.0108)(0.0122)(0.00939)

male

0.0905***-0.0498*-0.0407*(0.0249)(0.0289)(0.0216)age-0.000951

0.00191-0.000958(0.00293)(0.00333)(0.00260)

0.0110-0.0202*0.00930

householdSelf-employed
Part time
housewife(0.0101)(0.0107)(0.00781)

0.0762***-0.0526-0.0236(0.0294)(0.0360)(0.0289)-0.05480.00256

0.0522**(0.0336)(0.0367)(0.0245)-0.0276

0.0440-0.0164(0.0358)(0.0401)(0.0309)

unemployed-0.0364-0.00855

0.0450(0.0369)(0.0408)(0.0317)

College graduate-0.00383

0.0913***-0.0875***(0.0252)(0.0316)(0.0277)

Living with children

0.0372-0.0348-0.00238(0.0261)(0.0287)(0.0221)

Inheritance from parents

0.0485**-0.00499-0.0435**(0.0211)(0.0250)(0.0195)

0.01830.0157-0.0340(0.0270)(0.0310)(0.0258)-0.0181-0.00513

0.0232*Inheritance from parents (partner)
number of children
age of children(0.0165)(0.0176)(0.0125)0.00190-0.00130-0.000603(0.00218)(0.00249)(0.00196)

Observations

1,657

Log pseudolikelihood
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

-1469.2526*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table3-3 Estimation results of logit model(1)(2)
bequesttime discount rate (today vs. 7days)-2.19e-05**(1.09e-05)

income0.000205***(3.76e-05)-2.84e-05***(9.64e-06)
0.000206***(3.80e-05)

Financial assets

8.46e-05***(1.53e-05)-0.0698***(0.0209)-0.0602**(0.0304)-0.0276***(0.00934)
0.0330(0.0220)0.000368(0.00261)-0.0108(0.00785)
0.0292(0.0300)-0.0615**(0.0247)0.00505(0.0304)

8.94e-05***(1.48e-05)-0.0599***(0.0209)-0.0494(0.0310)-0.0245***(0.00939)
0.0412*(0.0217)0.000992(0.00260)-0.00909(0.00783)
0.0266(0.0288)-0.0516**(0.0245)0.0180(0.0309)

unemployed-0.0429(0.0317)-0.0451(0.0317)

College graduate

0.0771***0.0866***(0.0277)(0.0277)

Living with children-0.000410

0.00158(0.0221)(0.0222)

Inheritance from parents

0.0473**(0.0197)

0.0442**(0.0195)

Inheritance from parents (partner)

0.0331(0.0257)

0.0334(0.0258)

number of children-0.0285**(0.0126)-0.0234*(0.0125)

age of children

0.00102(0.00199)
1,623-662.76743

0.000569(0.00196)
1,657-675.09828

time discount rate (90days vs. 97days)

Borrowing
hospital
Health anxiety
male
age
household
Self employed
Part time
housewife

Observations
Log pseudolikelihood
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3-3 Robustness check

To confirm the above results, the robustness was checked using a binomial logit model (seeTable 3-3). Answers to the question “How do you feel about leaving an inheritance to yourchildren?”, we expressed as a binary. Answers were coded as 1 when respondents chose (1), (2),(3), (4) or (5) and take 0 when they chose (6), (7) or (8). In Table4, (1) shows estimation results
using DR1, and (2) shows estimation results using DR2.
(1) DR1: today vs. 7days
As a result of the estimation using DR1, the discount rate has a negative effect. The
significance is small, however, it is consistent with the results in Tables 3-1 and 3-2, since thehigher the discount rate and the more aggressive the current utility, the lower the probability ofleaving an inheritance. Income, financial assets, college graduation, and inheritance from parents
have a positive effect. On the other hand, borrowing, hospitalization, health anxiety, part-time
employment, and the number of children have negative effects.
(2) DR2: 90days vs. 97days
As a result of the estimation using DR2, the discount rate has a significant, negative effect.
Income, financial assets, male gender, college graduation, and inheritance from parents have apositive effect, and unlike (1), male gender is significant. On the other hand, borrowing, healthanxiety, part-time employment, and number of children have negative effects as in (1).
As described above, as a result of checking robustness according to (1) and (2), it isconfirmed that both DR1 and DR2 have an effect of increasing the probability of planning not toleave an inheritance and corresponded to results by using multinomial logit model in Table 3-1
and 3-2.

4. Conclusion

In this study, we examined the effect of time discounts on bequest behavior. If the discountrate is high, there is a possibility of not leaving a legacy because it puts a large weight on theutility derived from current consumption. Therefore, we made an estimation using themultinomial logit model for three discrete options: "plan to leave absolutely", " plan to leave if
strategic or available" and "plan not to leave." As a result, it became clear that people with a highdiscount rate would be more likely to choose "plan not to leave." This is a meaningful result not
only for bequest behavior but also for consumption and saving.
Two issues should be considered in future studies. First, in this research, we used two types

of time discount rates, DR1 and DR2. DR1 is a time preference for a period closer to the present,
and DR2 is a time preference for a period farther from the present. Empirical studies have reported
that for periods further from the present, there is a lower discount rate. The questions for elicitingtime preference in our research are on a monetary choice, but the bequest choice is largely related
to preliminary savings resulting from issues such as health anxiety and illness. Therefore, it ismore ideal to examine by using the time preference for health.
Another issue for future research is how to classify decisions about leaving an inheritance.
In this study, responses about a bequest were divided into three possibilities, and estimation
performed using a multinomial logit model. However, it is more appropriate to treat only
questions in which one's consumption or future utility influences bequest selection, where time
preference can have a significant effect. In the current study, a response that indicates financial
problems was necessarily combined with a response that considers children’s working motivation.
This does not isolate choices regarding the respondent’s utility, something that future studies
should consider.

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