Below-Replacementin the European Union (EU-15)
Review of Population andSocial Policy, No. 7,Fertility
1998, 83–101.

83

Below-Replacement Fertility in the European
Union (EU-15): Facts and Policies, 1960–1997
Jean-Claude CHESNAIS*

Abstract
Throughout the developed world the total fertility rate (TFR) has
dropped well below the replacement level. The theory of demographic transition
has to be reconsidered: post-transitional societies will face a permanent disequilibrium (hyperaging and ultimate population implosion). The basic paradigm has
reversed: in the past, there was a large proportion of unwanted pregnancies andfamily planning programs were designed to reduce them; now, in post-industrial
contexts, the opposite is true. Many desired pregnancies do not occur; in theEuropean Union, for example, the TFR is 1.4 whereas the desired number ofchildren is 2.1. Thus, there is a latent demand for family support. In countries wherefamily support is better (like those in Scandinavia), the gap between the ideal andthe real family size is narrow, whereas in societies where family support is minimal (as in sexist societies such as Germany, Italy, and Spain), this gap is maximal.
This is the essence of the present feminist paradox: feminism and pronatalism
work together; in societies that alleviate the burden of working — or potentiallyworking — mothers, the fertility rate is higher than in societies where traditionalroles prevail. Two basic measures have a decisive impact: the implementation ofparental leave and the allocation of pension benefits to parents for each child.
Both of these measures tend to alleviate the cost of child care for the mother andthe family and to reduce the main obstacles to childbearing.

1.

Introduction“Demography is destiny.” At first glance this statement seems strong or a bit exaggerated, but it is historically true for human entities like nations, civilizations, religions, or even commercial blocks such as the European Union, North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of South East Asian Nations(ASEAN), etc. In the short run demographic trends have no impact, but in the longrun they have a cumulative, multiplicative effect. For example, a population with aconstant net reproduction rate (average number of surviving daughters per mother)of 1.5, such as Germany under Bismarck’s rule, tends to multiply its number by 10 inabout two centuries; conversely, a population with a constant net reproduction rateof 0.7, such as Germany during Helmut Kohl’s regime, tends to divide its number by
10 in about two centuries. In other words, the same population can end the period__________________________________________________________________________________* Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques, Paris.
[ 83 ]

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Jean-Claude CHESNAIS

of simulation (two centuries) with a ratio of 1 to 100. With the present example, thepopulation of Germany in 1900 (about 60 million inhabitants) would have exploded to reach 600 million in 2100 under the traditional fertility conditions prevailing one century ago; reciprocally, the same population would shrink to only 6
million in 2100 if the present fertility pattern had been applied throughout the
1900–2100 period. Fertility thus shapes the fate of a population in terms of growthand structure.
The case of Europe best illustrates this point. Throughout the eighteenth andnineteenth centuries and until the 1930s, the population grew faster in Europe thanin the Third World (Asia, Africa, Latin America). This was the era of undisputed
European supremacy: territorial expansion, political domination (colonization of
the New Worlds — the Americas, Australia, Siberia, etc. — and occupation of old
civilizations such as Caucasia, central Asia, Africa, Middle East, India, andIndochina), unprecedented emigration (more than 50 million people) during thepeak of the European population explosion (1850–1913), and economic leadership.
Retrospectively, who could have imagined that a small island lost in the fog (England) could have been a superpower dominating the world throughout the nineteenth century until the interwar period? It is impossible to understand such aparadox without introducing the population factor into the strategic equation. The
population of England increased sixfold between 1750 and 1900 (it, along with thatof Russia, experienced the fastest growth in the world at the time) and provided a
massive emigration to North America, Oceania, and other regions (more than 8
million emigrants). English became the first language of the Western world, replacing the formerly predominant French language. And the United States, England’sdaughter, became the only remaining superpower at the end of the twentieth century. Here again, growth is significant. The population of the United States was
only 9 million in 1820, but it reached 150 million in 1950 and 270 million by theend of 1997; America ranks third in population after China and India (1.3 and 1
billion respectively), both of which are handicapped by a big technological gap.
Since the 1930s and especially since World War II, the second phase (decline) of
the European cycle has been under way. The reverse mechanism is at work: thedivergence is growing between a potentially shrinking Europe and expanding numbers in the so-called Third World. European fertility has fallen to low levels while
the benefits of mortality decline have rapidly spread throughout the developing
continents, thus creating a huge population explosion (the rate of growth culminated at 2.5% per year during the 1960s). By contrast, the population growth inEurope has been relatively slow and regularly diminishing. Between 1930 and
1997, Europe’s share of the total world population (excluding the European part of
the former Soviet Union) fell from 18% to 8%: added to the European civil wars of
the century, this was a major argument for the construction of a European Com-

Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union (EU-15)

85

munity. The corresponding (or contemporary) period has been one of relative
economic and political decline: the decolonization process began with the independence of India (1947), then extended to Africa (by 1960), to generalize until the
splitting of the former Russian-Soviet empire (1989–1991). After Europeanizationof the planet (1492–1942), the process of de-Europeanization is under way (1942–
1997); similarly, after centuries of forced Russification under the czars and thenSoviet rule, the era of de-Russification (emigration of former colonizers in the
newly independent states back to the slavic republics) has begun. Once again, thefertility differential has been a key factor in that historical shift. Europe, which was
traditionally the first continent of emigration, is presently (since the beginning of the
1980s) becoming the first continent of immigration: the region has no more surplus toexport, and the labor scarcity in some sectors is so acute that wages are high andthus attract people living in poor areas of Africa and Asia that are characterized byhigh fertility, massive unemployment, and low pay.
Since fertility differentials are — along with technology and ideology — among
the major engines of history, this paper will focus on this demographic componentof the change in societies. Specifically, it will examine the following issues:
1) Global population and fertility trends in the European Union (EU-15) andamong its major member countries over the period 1960–1996. A more preciseview will be given on the geography of fertility inside the EU, showing the surprising contrast between the Mediterranean countries like Spain or Italy, with a total
fertility rate of 1.15–1.20 children per woman in 1996 (an unprecedented world
record), and the Nordic countries like Sweden, whose TFR never fell below 1.6 andwhose replacement level even experienced a recovery at the end of the 1980s.
2) The possible “causes” and “consequences” of below-replacement fertility(consequences may become causes in the long run, thus generating an exponential
spiral of population implosion); at this stage, we will try to identify strategic — orreversible — factors that offer a margin for action by policymakers.
3) The preliminary conditions for an effective policy response leading to fertility change, including public awareness, political legitimacy and willingness, thelatent demand for a family policy (as measured by the difference between thedesired family size and the real family size), and improvement of the status of
women and children.
Finally, on the basis of historical evidence we will show that if family policy is
responsive to the public’s expectations regarding social orientation and economic
content, it will offer a wide margin for action, thus creating a potential for fertility
recovery and for bringing the TFR close to the replacement level. Fertility is elastic;
it can be reduced by family planning programs when it is considered too high(according to Population Inquiries conducted by the United Nations); it can also be
stimulated by social policies when it is considered too low.

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Jean-Claude CHESNAIS

2.

The Diagnosis: A Permanent Disequilibrium

2. 1. Births in Europe

On the eve of World War I, the average number of annual births in Europe was 10
million for a total population of 300 million inhabitants; by the year 1995, thisnumber had dropped to 6 million for a corresponding population of 500 million;
hence, the population had increased by two-thirds while the number of births fellby 40%. Such a decline was structural and even rather linear; the following data
represent the number of births (in thousands) from decade to decade throughout
the twentieth century:
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950

9,900
9,500
8,700
7,900
8,040

1960
1970
1980
1990
1996

7,980
7,600
6,860
6,240
5,900

The post-World War II baby boom was limited in time, space, and magnitude;
it occurred only among the Western allies and its duration was usually short (15 to
20 years). In 1960 as well as in 1950, the number of births in Europe was similar toits 1940 level: around 8 million; the idea of a fertility cycle had no meaning forEurope as a whole. The 1940s and 1950s marked a stagnation, not an upswing.
Then the secular movement resumed steadily, but it is very difficult to predict thebottom line since we have no comparable reference in our past. In 1996 the total
fertility rate for Europe, with or without the European part of the former Soviet
Union, was 1.4 — the lowest in the world. For Europe alone the birth deficit —defined by the difference between the number of births required for replacement
and the number observed — now reaches 2 million per year.
2. 2. The Demographic Landscape of the EU-15

The EU-15 is a commercial unit comparable in numbers with NAFTA: 370 million
inhabitants. But the dynamics are quite different; the population of NAFTA countries has grown ten times faster than that of EU-15 members; the age pyramid ofNorth America is still relatively young, at least rectangular at the basis, thus incorporating a future potential increase. Conversely, on the other side of the Atlantic, inWestern Europe, the number of youth has dropped severely, with the risk of an
exponential decrease in the future when the corresponding birth cohorts reachchildbearing ages. Within the present borders, the population of NAFTA could
reach 500 million by the year 2030, while it should diminish or, at best, remain

87

Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union (EU-15)

constant in EU-15. The contrast in age structure is also crucial for the economic
future of the two entities.
In EU-15, the rate of population growth is slowing down and now close to zero;
immigration is the unique factor that has had a dampening effect on this slackening
process (in many cases, it prevents a depopulation). Between the mid-1960s and the
mid-1990s, the natural increase fell by more than two million, from 2.56 million in1965 to 0.33 million in 1995. As the number of deaths was approximatively constant, this phenomenon essentially can be attributed to a substantial drop in thenumber of births, which declined by more than one-third in only three decades(from 6.1 million in 1965 to 4.0 million in 1995). Despite the fact that the EU has
100 million more inhabitants than the United States (370 million versus 270 million), the number of births is similar (3.915 million in the United States in 1996).
During the last few years, for the first time in the history of the European community the contribution of immigration to population growth is stronger (indeed,much stronger) than the impact of natural increase (which, in turn, is stimulated bypast immigration); see Table 1. The lesson is clear: the EU is entering a new
historical stage, the age of migratory dependency.
This movement toward population stagnation is similar for all nations within theEuropean Union. To simplify the presentation, we have produced population
figures for the five largest member countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, andthe United Kingdom), which together comprise 80% of the total population of EU15. The German population has tended to stabilize around 80 million; the French,
Italian, and British a bit below 60 million; and the Spanish slightly below 40 million(Table 2). The total population of these five countries could peak at about 300
million and then, if present fertility trends persist, begin to shrink.
Table 1Year

Population, natural increase, and net migration in the EU-15, 1960–1995
Population*(millions)

Births**
B

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995***

314.8
328.6
340.0
348.6
354.6
358.5
363.7
371.6

5,784
6,097
5,495
4,748
4,630
4,275
4,379
3,980

NaturalDeathsincrease(thousands)
D
B−D
3,386
3,542
3,679
3,793
3,737
3,765
3,721
3,650

* As of January 1.
** The peak was reached in 1964 with a total of 6.25 million births.
*** Preliminary data.
Source: Eurostat, Population statistics (Luxembourg, 1996).

2,398
2,555
1,816
955
893
510
658
330

Net
migration

43
80
− 390
295
588
156
1,030
600

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Jean-Claude CHESNAIS

Table 2 Population of the five largest member countries of EU-15 (millions),
1960–1996
Year

FranceGermany(United)

Italy

Spain

U.K.

Total

1960
1970
1980
1990
1996

45.5
50.5
53.7
56.6
58.3

72.5
78.3
78.2
79.1
81.8

50.0
53.7
56.4
56.7
57.4

30.3
33.6
37.2
38.8
39.3

52.2
55.5
56.3
57.5
58.8

250.5
271.6
281.8
288.7
295.6

Source:Eurostat, Population statistics (Luxembourg, 1996).

Table 3 Number of births (thousands) in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and theUnited Kingdom, 1960–1995
Year

FranceGermany

Italy

Spain

U.K.

EU-15

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995*

816
862
848
745
800
768
762
729

1,362
1,325
1,048
782
866
814
906
765

910
990
901
828
640
577
569
515

660
674
661
669
571
456
401
357

918
997
904
698
754
751
799
732

5,784
6,097
5,495
4,748
4,630
4,275
4,379
3,980

* Provisional estimates.
Source: Eurostat, Population statistics (Luxembourg, 1996).

2. 3. The Variation in the Number of Births: A Key for Management

In the United Kingdom as well as in Italy, the annual number of births in the mid1960s was close to 1 million; it has fallen by one-quarter in the United Kingdom
and by nearly one-half in Italy. In Germany, the absolute decline is still more
impressive: 1.3 million in 1965 compared to about 0.8 million in 1995; the difference is 500,000 births per year (Table 3). The case of France differs for two
reasons: there the fertility decrease was not as steep as in neighboring countries ofcontinental Europe, and the age structure had a protective impact; France had
more baby boomers at childbearing ages. These crude data on births are importantbecause they shape the age structure, and finally they constitute the most essential
variable for political authorities at all levels (local, regional, national, and international). Under present conditions of very low mortality, they determine the numberof students, the number of future inflows in the labor market, the number ofconsumers, of taxpayers, etc.; they have a decisive impact on long-range variations
in demand, on investment (infrastructure, housing), and on corresponding sectorial
labor needs (teachers, doctors, builders, etc.). For businessmen, marketing lays on

89Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union (EU-15)

people and money. We will come back to this point.
2. 4. International Differences in Total Fertility Rates

To design a population policy, the decision maker has to use an index that is notbiased by age structure and that reflects the sheer propensity to have children: thetotal fertility rate. The indicator is permanently calculated for the purpose of international comparisons, and it is widely produced to show the impact of a given plan
(antinatalist or pronatalist) of action. Table 4 shows that the European trends areradical. In most of the “big” countries of the EU, the total fertility rate fell on
average by 1.0 to 1.4 children per woman. In Spain, the decline was much sharper:
2.90 at the beginning of the 1960s but only 1.15 in 1996, 1.75 in absolute terms
and hence a relative decline of 60%. There is no more Mediterranean or Catholic
fertility, since Italy and Spain have experienced the lowest fertility ever seen in thehistory of mankind.
A comparison between northern and southern Europe through the examples of
Sweden and Italy is instructive. Until the 1970s the Swedish fertility rate was lower
than the Italian rate, and it was under the EU curve (Fig. 1). Now the opposite istrue; new generations of Swedish women have more children than corresponding
Italian women. The budget cuts initiated in 1992 (to follow the Maastricht criteria)
by the Swedish authorities had a negative impact both on family support and youth
employment, and the recent decline in the Swedish TFR (from 2.1 in 1990 to 1.6
in 1996) is likely due to this short-run political effect. Still, the Swedish fertility rate
remains higher than the Italian TFR and the EU average.
Another characteristic of the Swedish pattern is that Sweden, along with France
and the United Kingdom, was one of the few EU countries where the total fertility
rate never fell below the level of 1.6 children per woman. A historian of the welfare
state might be tempted to remind us that public officials in these three countries
Table 4 Total fertility rate (average number of children per woman) in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 1960–1996
Year

FranceGermany

Italy

Spain

Sweden

U.K.

EU-15

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1996*

2.73
2.84
2.47
1.93
1.95
1.81
1.78
1.70

2.37
2.50
2.03
1.48
1.56
1.37
1.45
1.30

2.41
2.66
2.42
2.20
1.64
1.42
1.34
1.20

2.86
2.94
2.90
2.80
2.20
1.63
1.34
1.15

2.20
2.42
1.92
1.77
1.68
1.74
2.13
1.60

2.72
2.89
2.43
1.81
1.90
1.79
1.83
1.75

2.59
2.72
2.38
1.96
1.82
1.60
1.57
1.40

* Preliminary data.
Source: Eurostat, Population statistics (Luxembourg, 1996).

90Jean-Claude CHESNAIS

Figure 1 Total fertility rate in Italy, Sweden, and Europe, 1955–1996
Table 5*

Net reproduction rate in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom,
1900–1995

PeriodFranceGermany(United)

Italy

U.K.

1901–10
1921–30
1931–40
1941–50
1951–60
1961–70
1971–80
1981–90
1991–95*

0.97
0.93
0.89
1.10
1.26
1.29
0.98
0.88
0.80

1.48
0.90
0.88
0.83
1.01
1.12
0.74
0.70
0.60

1.38
1.31
1.17
1.08
1.04
1.15
0.98
0.68
0.59

1.23
0.93
0.83
1.03
1.11
1.28
0.92
0.87
0.83

Preliminary data.

feared a population decline in the 1930s and that the creators of the social security
systems (William Henry Beveridge in England, Pierre Laroque in France, and theNobel Prize winner Alva Myrdal in Sweden) had comparable views — i. e.,pronatalist — on population matters and implemented a family-oriented social
policy at the time of World War II. This explicit demographic preoccupation
progressively eroded or vanished in the following decades, but family support is stilla non-negligible component of the welfare state. Few experts could imagine that
the Italian TFR was lower than the British rate in the 1950s and 1960s (Table 5).
A close look at the data suggests that there is no clearcut correlation between
family formation/dissolution patterns and fertility levels. The percentage of “illegitimate” births in Mediterranean Europe is minimal (about 1 out of 10 births in
Italy and Spain), whereas it reaches approximately one-third of all births in France

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Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union (EU-15)

and the United Kingdom and over one-half of those in Sweden. This percentage
tends to rise steadily from year to year in spite of sizable short-term fertility
fluctuations, namely in Sweden and France. The case of Germany, however, isnoticeable since the percentage has stabilized (around one-sixth): marriage and thefamily are protected by the German Constitution and the number of births has
been halved in the east, where “illegitimacy” was massive (Table 6).
Countries with so-called traditional family structures (high marriage rate, low
divorce rate, low illegitimacy rate, etc.) like Italy and Spain were totally“detraditionalized” in terms of fertility in less than two decades. Their paucity ofbirths has skyrocketed to a wholly unpredicted level. No official population forecast,either national or international, had anticipated a total fertility rate of 1.2 for any
country, no less for Mediterranean countries, which are still commonly viewed as“laggards” and usually family-oriented. This outcome is probably the biggest surprise of European demographics at the end of the present century.
In addition to this inversion of the geography of fertility between southern andnorthern Europe, another puzzling — and little studied — secular phenomenon
has to be stressed: the peculiarity of both British and French fertility since the middleof the eighteenth century (Table 7). The British and French societies were the firstto have nation-states and, as a consequence, a possibility of foreign influence. The
French Revolution (and subsequent troubles and wars) marked the beginning of thesecular fertility decline and weakened the relative economic position of the country,
whereas the industrial revolution in England encouraged family formation (earlier
marriage, higher fertility). Throughout the nineteenth century, the fertility gap
between the two rival nations was hugely detrimental to France (Fig. 2). During the
1800–1880 period, the difference ranged between 1.3 and 1.8 children per woman:that is the same value as the difference between the prevailing present fertility and zero. As noted,
this fertility differential had tremendous implications for foreign policy and for the
Table 6 Percentage of out-of-wedlock births in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 1960–1995
Year

FranceGermany

Italy

Spain

Sweden

U.K.

EU-15

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995*

6.1
5.9
6.9
8.5
11.4
19.6
30.1
36.8

7.6
5.8
7.2
8.5
11.9
16.2
15.3
15.4

2.4
2.0
2.2
2.6
4.3
5.4
6.5
8.3

2.3
1.7
1.4
2.0
3.9
8.0
9.6
11.5

11.3
13.8
18.6
32.8
39.7
46.4
47.0
52.0

5.2
7.3
8.0
9.0
11.5
18.9
27.9
32.5

5.1
5.0
5.6
6.8
9.6
14.9
19.6
23.0

* Preliminary estimates.
Source: Eurostat, Population statistics (Luxembourg, 1996).

92Jean-Claude CHESNAIS

fate of European colonies. France lost its position of leadership to England; theFrench language regressed all over Europe and, contrary to English, never acquired a world status; moreover, French emigration was very limited. By contrast,from the beginning of the nineteenth century British emigrants exported theirideas, their ideals, and their language on all continents. In “northern” America(north of the Rio Grande), only 2% of the entire population (namely, in Quebec)
uses the French language to communicate in daily life.
Table 7 Total fertility rate (average number of children per woman) in England andFrance, 1750–1996
PeriodEngland*FranceDifference

PeriodEngland*FranceDifference

1750–59
1760–69
1770–79
1780–89
1790–99
1800–09
1810–19
1820–29
1830–39
1840–49
1850–60
1861–70
1871–80

4.77
4.88
5.21
5.24
5.67
5.77
6.08
5.98
5.25
5.00
4.97
5.19
4.92

5.41
5.21
5.07
5.13
4.92
4.44
4.38
4.18
3.75
3.57
3.43
3.50
3.43

− 0.64− 0.33
0.14
0.11
0.75
1.33
1.70
1.80
1.50
1.43
1.54
1.69
1.49

1881–90
1891–00
1901–10
1911–20
1921–30
1931–40
1941–50
1951–60
1961–70
1971–80
1981–90
1991–95
1996

4.36
3.76
3.27
2.62
2.20
1.79
2.20
2.35
2.72
1.93
1.79
1.76
1.71

3.25
2.93
2.69
1.95
2.36
2.11
2.55
2.71
2.72
2.06
1.82
1.70
1.72

1.11
0.83
0.58
0.67
− 0.16− 0.32− 0.35− 0.360.00− 0.13
0.03
0.06
0.01

* England and Wales for the period 1850–1980, United Kingdom from 1981 onward.
Sources: Jean-Claude Chesnais, The Demographic Transition: Its Stages, Patterns and Economic Implications (Oxford
University Press, 1992), chap. 11 (for historical statistics, 1750–1940); Vital statistics of each country
since 1940.

Figure 2 Total fertility rate in England and France since the mid-eighteenth century

Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union (EU-15)

3.

93

Possible Causes and Consequences of Sustained
Below-Replacement Fertility

3. 1. The Determinants

The factors underlying the fertility decline are manifold; demographers do not havea clear causal framework, only intuition regarding a puzzle of changes affecting all
spheres of daily life; it is basically a demographic revolution directly linked to all
facets of modernization and globalization. Some of these determinants are includedin the classical theory of the demographic transition. This is true of the decline inpremature mortality, which depressed child demand; the urbanization and densification process (people abandon villages to live in crowded areas where space andtime become scarce); the virtual disappearance of illiteracy; the diffusion of Malthusian culture (fear of a food shortage, job shortage, etc.); the shift in occupational
structure (reproduction is limited to biological aspects, not to location, profession,or lifestyle).
Since the initial formulation of the demographic transition theory, other factors
relating to postmodernity and persistent obstacles to fertility have emerged. The list
is endless, but for the sake of simplicity, let us consider only five: (1) new antinatalist
biological technologies (the Pill, condoms, IUDs, safe abortion and sterilization,
contragestion: RU 486, etc.); (2) social atomization and related feminism (newgenerations of women are highly educated, sometimes with higher degrees thantheir partners, and cannot accept subordination); (3) the implementation of collectivized pension benefits (under prevailing rules, DINKS — Double Income No
Kids — couples enjoy high pension benefits, paid mostly by the children of large
families; old-age security has been totally disconnected from personal fertility); (4)the explosion of mobility or generalized nomadism: traveling is part of the modern
lifestyle (as a career necessity, geographic mobility if often required, and since thenumber of bi-active couples (father and mother on the job) is expanding, this works
against family formation and harmony, except in very high income brackets); and(5) the loss of youth as a majority. In traditional societies with high mortality/highfertility regimes, the vast majority of people were below the age of 30. Now we areexperiencing an inversion of the age pyramid, as the majority of people progressively tends to belong to the 50-and-over age group (present and potential retirees).
Although policymakers are adjusting to this shift, most advanced countries of theWest face a growing intergenerational inequity: relative prosperity and income
security for the elderly versus unemployment, job insecurity, or declining wages foryoung adults and potential parents.
The baby bust is, however, not a fatality. Many determinants of the recent
fertility decline are reversible, such as consumerist preferences, materialistic/individualistic lifestyles, state-driven welfare states, and economically deprived youth

94

Jean-Claude CHESNAIS(the decline in the value of assets and housing can improve the purchasing power ofyoung adults). But the main point is that the desired family size is usually close to thereplacement level, whatever the member country of the EU-15 considered; young
couples predominantly still wish to have two children (the preference of this model
varies from one-half to two-thirds of them) and sometimes three children (second
choice). Of course, the reality is far from this wish in countries like Italy and Spain
where the obstacles to childbearing are enormous and the economic sacrifices
made by mothers are viewed as unbearable. This contradiction between the cultural setting (family orientation, respect for tradition) and the economic circumstances (high youth unemployment, gender discrimination in the labor market,
rising opportunity cost of children, etc.) has a devastating impact on fertility. Young
women invent alternatives to family building, such as permanent celibacy, careercentered life, or new leisure patterns.
3. 2. The Consequences

The impact of the reversal of the age pyramid extends far beyond the usual description, which was commonly based on the assumption that below-replacement fertility was transitory and limited. But this is no longer the case: the post-transitional
fertility is permanently depressed, and the birth deficit is massive.
The direct — mainly financial — consequences of this change are widely recognized. Explored by institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Bundesbank,and national planning agencies, these consequences relate to pension and healthcosts and show similar results. This is purely a matter of arithmetic: the number ofretirees will grow rapidly (usually double) in the next three or four decades, while
the number of potential contributors to pension funds will shrink.
But the indirect, less visible, and deeper consequences are more complex andhave more to do with psychology than with sheer numbers. It is probably difficult
to imagine what the future of inverted age pyramid societies will be like. But somesolid insights can be made.
First, the percentage of people living below the poverty line is increasing among
young adults and their children, whereas it is diminishing among the elderly andmature adults. The demographic squeeze tends to play a role in this shift, since thepolitical power of young parents is fading. But other mechanisms are at work here,
such as the economic globalization that reinforced the competition between
younger generations of very different countries, particularly among semiskilled or
unskilled workers, on the one hand, and the present technological revolution, on
the other hand. Automation and new information technologies are massively laborsaving — hence the growing difficulty in finding long-term jobs in the internationalized and export-oriented sectors of the economy.

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Second, the significant reduction in the number of young households and in thenumber of children has had a major depressive impact on internal demand andeconomic competitiveness. The growth of cities and their markets was due to rural
out-migration and natural increase; now the rural exodus has ended and depleted
birth cohorts have reached the peak ages for demand (in terms of housing, equipment, building, and infrastructure). The need for new houses, furniture, schools,
roads, cars, etc., is shrinking, especially in mature economies like those of the Westand Japan where the consumption level is already very high. The issue of competitiveness is similar: the direct and indirect cost (pension, health, taxes) of labor rises
in aging societies, and this movement generates a permanent migration of capital,
a delocalization of enterprises. Foreign capital is highly volatile, depending on
short-term profit perspectives; one can bet that shrinking markets will lose theirpotential attractiveness. Confidence vanishes among investors; one can also guessthat graying societies are more past-oriented than future-oriented, hence less dynamic.
And third, there is a greater need for immigrants. New generations that havebeen educated in small and rather well-off families are no longer willing to perform
dirty or demanding tasks. Since many of these jobs cannot yet be mechanized or
robotized, employers are forced to recruit, legally or not, foreign labor. This phenomenon occurs in all below-replacement societies, whether European, American,
or Asian; although motivated by economic considerations, it raises fundamental
issues concerning the national identity, social cohesion, and integration of foreigners. In the first stages of depopulation (slow decrease), immigration can have asizable effect on numbers (it can delay or limit the population decline) but its
impact on aging is marginal or negligible; thus, demographically speaking, immigration is not a response to the birth deficit. The question is to repair, torectangularize the age pyramid: this would logically, mechanically, imply a massive
immigration of children without their parents; immigration should explicitly be
selective by age with a proper balance between male and female children. Because
the deficit is stronger among younger children (babies), the younger the children,
the stronger the preference for them. But who could implement such a drastic
solution, which is contrary to basic human rights and recalls universally condemned
racist (or agist) practices like the slave trade?

4.

Legitimacy and Efficiency of Population Policy

4. 1. Legitimacy

The rationale behind a fertility reduction plan and a fertility increase program isbasically the same: to ensure a societal equilibrium by filling the gap between the

96Jean-Claude CHESNAIS

number of desired children and the number of existing children. When the fertility
rate is too high, the proportion of unwanted children is important and there is,according to the coined expression, a “latent demand for family planning.” Conversely, when fertility is too low, many desired children never enter the world: there
are obstacles to family formation and growth, and there is a corresponding latentdemand for family support. One of the key aspects of this response is the equalization of
women’s status; historical and cross-sectional data suggest that there is a negative
correlation between fertility and women’s status; this is either only partially true or
no longer valid at the latest stages of development, namely in post-transitionalsocieties. In fact, the relation describes a U curve: in feminist societies like those in
Scandinavia, the fertility rate is not as depressed as it is in the sexist societies ofsouthern Europe. Having a child is an irreversible choice, a lifelong commitment; it
requires time, energy, and money. Most of the effort is expended by the mother.
The sacrifice is heavy for women who have invested more in education than theirpartners; if there is no measure to alleviate the burden — in terms of money, time,child care facilities — of young mothers, most of them stick to the one-child pattern. Feminism and pronatalism work together. The primary reason for public
intervention (state, regional, and local bodies, or private sector corporations andenterprises) is to alleviate women’s burden and improve their living conditions.
A second key motivation is the public interest: the well-being of future generations
is jeopardized by the collapse of fertility. The survival of civilizations is also threatened, and such an argument is essential in an international community that stresses
a respect for cultural originality (or ethnic difference) and the value of biodiversity.
In any country with an initial rectangular age structure, the perpetuation of very
low fertility patterns along the European or Japanese lines results in the progressive
extinction of new birth cohorts. After just about a century, the application of thepresent total fertility rate of Italy to the French population would create an exponential decrease in the number of births from 750,000 to approximately 100,000 (Fig. 3). The
issue is critical; the willingness to keep population constant or to avoid depopulation
would imply a total renewal of the human stock by massive immigration. It is
obvious that under these circumstances, a country’s native-born inhabitants would
constitute only a small minority of the population. Is the citizenry, together with its
business and political leaders, ready to face this historical challenge? In the name ofequity and solidarity, the couples who accept the responsibility to have children should be rewarded
and not penalized, as is the case with social status and standard of living. The survivalof the cultural heritage and the viability of the welfare system are in their hands,
and this deserves more than lip service.
Beyond the consideration of equality, any pluralistic democracy has to preserve
the possibility of free choice for all individuals. When it deals with the number ofchildren, free choice is purely theoretical: the cumulative cost of a child for his

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Figure 3 Fertility and age structure: Possible futures as illustrated by the case of France

parents in terms of time, energy, and money from birth to adulthood is huge. It isa massive investment in human capital. The return on this investment is also huge,
but it is not returned to the investors (the parents); rather, it is absorbed by thestate, pension funds, private companies, and various other organizations.
Many intellectuals tend to associate population policy with dictatorship or imperialism; this is an oversimplified view. Pronatalist policies were implemented byboth “rightist” (Hitler, Franco, Mussolini, etc.) and “leftist” dictators (Stalin,
Ceaucescu, Honecker, etc.) at a time characterized by the scarcity of democracies,
but pronatalist policies were also launched in democracies like France and Sweden.
A similar argument could be used for antinatalist policies: strong family planning
programs were imposed by authoritarian regimes, either military or communist, allover the developing continents. The most extreme case is that of contemporary
China. There, the underlying problem concerns the respect of human rights; this isa matter of political regime. Whether anti- or pronatalist, a population policy canwork in a pluralistic democracy provided (1) it is given financial and politicalpriority, and (2) it is built in accordance with social demand (improvement of theworking mother’s daily life, greater economic consideration for children, compensation for the cost of children: family allowances, tax rebates, grants, parental leave,

98Jean-Claude CHESNAISetc.). If adapted to the needs of parents and well explained to citizens, such a policy
is likely to become popular, even among the elderly; as they become older, they feel
frustrated if they do not have grandchildren.
4. 2. Efficiency

There are many paradoxes in conventional demographic thinking. One of them
relates to the impact of population policies — the message that family planning(reduction) programs are efficient well received and even fashionable among experts and the international community. Few statisticians would dare to say that
fertility decline is a matter of timing and that the state policy does not alter theultimate number of births, but only delays them. Practitioners who suggest social
measures to stimulate fertility when it is too low are regularly opposed the argument: “you will waste money: young couples will anticipate their family formation
to take advantage of the benefits, but they will not change their ultimate family
size.” This view is in vogue, but strongly biased.
All the historical evidence shows that the opposite is true. When a pronatalist
policy is well designed, it is efficient. Let us examine some well-known examples.
France was not really a victor of World War II, but the country paradoxicallyexperienced a stronger and longer baby boom than other continental Allies. Because until then France had had the lowest fertility rate in the world for many
decades, there is no other convincing explanation than the vigor of the family
policy of the time: by the year 1950, the proportion of expenditures devoted tochildren was 40% of the nation’s total social budget (compared to 10% in 1996). In
the same period (1945–1957), when the German state of Saar was under French
rule and thus benefiting from a generous family policy (high family allowances,significant tax deductions), the fertility rate was the highest of all German regions.
When the territory of Saar was ceded back to western Germany, where family
incentives were small, its TFR dropped to the lowest level in the country.
Another prominent example comes from the former East Germany when the
GDR was facing the consequences of heavy emigration, below-replacement fertility, and depopulation. By 1976, when the government implemented a pronatalist
policy, the difference in the TFR of the two parts of Germany began to growmarkedly. But this policy was dismantled after reunification. As a result, working
mothers, who were the norm, lost their social protection and the fertility rate wascut in half in only two years (from 1.50 in 1990 to 0.86 in 1992). There is nothingcomparable in world peacetime history. Among birth cohorts fully affected by thefamily policy from 1976 onward, like the 1955 female birth cohort, the percentageof women remaining childless was only 6% in eastern Germany, whereas it was
19.4% in western Germany; for the same birth cohort, the proportion of women
having two children was 54% in eastern Germany, as opposed to 37% in western
Germany.

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The strongest lesson can be derived from the present Western Europe. The
fertility differential between north and south that has emerged in the last two
decades is linked to the contrasting status of women. In Italy, for example, girls now
have higher average levels of schooling than boys; the age-old division of labor
between man (the provider) and woman (the tender of the home) is no longer
accepted. Young women wish to have roles in life other than that of spouse ormother, but the labor market is rigid and demanding, offering few part-time jobs inthe private sector. These young women no longer comply with the family arrangements their mothers or grandmothers considered natural; they have invested a lot
in education and have other expectations and ambitions. Having experienced
equality during childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood, they are looking for
financial autonomy, and they cannot tolerate subordination. The link between
these attitudes and fertility behavior is direct (the TFR in Italy has fallen to 1.2). A
woman who engages in repeated childbearing runs the risk of being relegated toroles from which young women struggle to escape.
By contrast, Sweden presents the highest level ever registered for female participation in the labor force in a high-income, industrialized country. But about half ofthe jobs held by women are part-time, thus limiting the conflict between economic
activity and fertility. For most women in Sweden, as in other advanced societies,
career and family are both important. Social arrangements help assure that these
two objectives can be balanced. Paid parental leave, provided from the first child,currently replaces 80% of the former wages or salary of either parent for at least
one year; access to creches is nearly universal; and family allowances are relatively
high. Moreover, women have a strong presence in political bodies; thus their voices
are heard and, through them, the interests of mothers and children are represented.
Empowerment of women ensures against a very low birth rate: despite severebudget cuts in the social protection of families, the Swedish fertility rate remains
higher (1.6 in 1996) than the Italian or Spanish TFR. It is the essence of thefeminist paradox in advanced societies.
5.

Conclusion

The logic behind the population policy is basically the same for countries where
fertility rates are too high or too low. As a mediator and a protector of the national
interest, the state must help its people to realize their wishes and, as a consequence,
to reduce the gap between the desired number of children and the real one. Appropriate measures, as shown by public opinion polls, can be implemented to remove
the obstacles to family reduction or to family increase. If these measures, as is
usually true in politics, are based on social demand and well explained to theelectorate, they will presumably become popular, particularly among women. This

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Jean-Claude CHESNAIS

Table 8 Total social expenditure per inhabitant and percentage spent for child support in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,
1994
Country

Social expenditure per head*

Share of family support (%)

FranceGermany
Italy
Spain
Sweden
U.K.

5,500
5,514
4,312
3,020
6,750
4,649

9.6
7.6
3.6
1.7
16.6
—

Note: Excludes support for health, education, and housing.
* in ECU (European Common Units); 1.00 ECU = US$1.10 in July 1998.
Sources: Eurostat, Basic statistics (1996); Statistical Yearbook (Sweden).

prospect is certainly stronger in a society having a deep sense of identity (like theJapanese one) than one with a different social fabric.
In any case, the resistance motivated by the potential cost of such a policy is notconvincing in the long run; it only shows a preference for blockage, for immobility(or future depopulation). The cost of population overaging would be much higher than the costof a sound family policy. Even in Sweden, where the social protection of children is thebest in the OECD region, the proportion of social expenditures devoted to children
represents only one-sixth of the total budget (Table 8). A sound family policy is thecore of human investment and a key to the future.
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