108TH INTERNATIONALSEMINAR
VISITING
EXPERTS’
PAPERSVISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS

RECENT TRENDS OF ORGANISED CRIME IN EUROPE:ACTORS, ACTIVITIES AND POLICIES AGAINST THEM
Ernesto Ugo Savona *I. EUROPE: A CROWDED MARKET
PLACE AND CROSSROADS
The internal situation of the European
Union countries is characterised by therelevant and stable presence of Italianorganised crime groups, not only in the
country of origin. But also in France,
Germany and sporadically, even in Austria
and the United Kingdom. It is alsocharacterised by the development of“domestic bilateral organisations”
operating from country to country, e.g
between Belgium or Great Britain and theNetherlands, for taking advantage of theopportunities offered by drug pricedifferences in these countries. In othercountries there is the presence of domesticorganised groups (gangs), specifically inFrance, Great Britain and Spain.
The European Union is also thecrossroads for other criminal groups
operating internationally. The west
Colombian cartels are still predominant in
the importation of cocaine, helped bynational criminal groups. Galicians in
Spain and mafia in Italy co-operate withthe cartels to import and distribute cocaine
in the whole of Europe. From the south,
Nigerian groups characterise the drugtraffic and exercise their expertise in thearea of fraud. Other groups from the
Maghreb area are involved in hashish
importation. From the East, Chinese
Tr i a d s h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d s t a b l ecommunities in Spain, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, Italy, Austria,* Professor of Criminology and Project Director of the
Research Group on Transnational Crime, School ofLaw, Trento University, Italy.

Belgium and Portugal, Their main
activities of drug trafficking, aliensmuggling, local extortion, illegal gamblingand prostitution rackets are interrelated.
Turkish and Pakistani groups control the
trafficking of heroin from the Middle East
and Central Asia, through former
Yugoslavia or other Eastern countries.
Part of Europe’s modern criminal historyis the threat of the progressive expansionof organised groups from eastern andcentral Europe, mainly from Russia. But
to call these groups “Russian” means
keeping an old label for a new product. The
process of criminal fragmentation that ishappening today in Russia, in other CIS
Republics and the states of the former
Yugoslavia should be considered withextreme attention, especially for the future
implications it could have on the European
geography of organised crime. Talks withnational law enforcement agencies in many
European countries confirm that groups ofRussian, Polish, Czech, Rumanian andformer Yugoslav origin are active in Spain,
Germany, Finland, Austria, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden.
Their main activities are drug trafficking,the export of stolen cars, alien smuggling
and prostitution.
II. MULTIPLICATION OF
TRAFFICKING ROUTES AND
RAMIFICATIONS OF EUROPEAN
KEY POINTSThe organised crime development inEurope shows a progressive multiplicationof trafficking routes either by sea, air orland towards Europe and the ramifications

5

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
from European key points to outside
countries. Spain and Italy are still the
major entry points for cocaine in Europe,
along with Portugal. Spain and Portugal
are, however, also increasing theirimportance as entry points for heroin
coming from the south Asia area andPakistan, via African routes (touchingamong others Angola, Mozambique andCape Vert). Cocaine and heroin from Spain
spreads into Europe through France or by
sea from Italy. In both cases the Italianmafia plays a leading role in controlling thedeliveries.
Transhipments of heroin, Coming from
central Asian regions and Middle Easterncountries, and cocaine from South America,
are also conducted by Nigerians via air
through the main international airline
points. Also Turks and Kurds are involved
in heroin trafficking from the production
points to Germany and the United
Kingdom, passing through the Balkanroutes and Greece. Heroin distribution
inside these European Countries is carriedout by specialised Turkish networks within
their immigrant communities.
The entry of Eastern organised crime
into the international market has changed
and increased the routes traditionally used.
Russia and the other eastern European
regions are increasingly becoming the newtransit routes for drug trafficking as well
as for other criminal purposes, such as cartheft from Germany, The UK and theNetherlands, and illegal aliens smugglingfrom South-East Asia. The Baltic States,
Finland and Sweden are the main pointsof entry into Europe from the North. Twomain migration routes lead throughPoland. The eastern route, controlled by
Russian organised crime, is used totransport Asians, mainly Armenians,
Indians, Afghans and Africans (mostly
Somalis, Algerians and Nigerians). The
southern route is most often used by

6

Balkan residents, mainly Romanians. The
eastern route starts in Moscow, From
Where the Asians and Africans take a train
to Belarus and are then transported by car
to the Polish border with Lithuania, or to
the Ukraine, and finally into the European
Union.
Due to consolidated interaction among
Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese gangs,
Austria has become a transit country forheroin coming from the central Asian
regions and for cocaine arriving via central
Europe and Russia. In the south of Europe,
Albania has replaced the traditional transit
route used through Yogoslavia for drugtraffiking. This route is also used for aliens
being smuggled into Italy, as a point ofentry into Europe. France is a transit routefor hashish originating in South-West Asia
and North Africa. Ireland, due to its coastal
extension, is another entry point for drugs(hashish from North Africa) destined to theUnited Kingdom and continental countries.
Ports and airports in Europe are themain points of ramification inside andoutside Europe. Frequent examples show
Nigerian criminals, specifically active inthis context, as importers of cocaine andheroin along routes involving Lagos(Nigeria), London, Athens, Antwerp(Belgium) and other main international
airline points. They also act as exporters
towards the United States (Chicago) andCanada (Toronto). Part of the heroin
imported by Nigerians and the hashishcoming from South West Asia and Northern
Africa, first crosses France, then is reexported towards other European andNorth American or Canadian markets.
Opium also enters through the Frenchborders and, after being refined locally, isexported as pure heroin.
In the Netherlands, local networks are
becoming the main producers of synthetic
drugs in Europe. From here they are

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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exported through new routes leading outof the European Union, utilised also for
trade in marijuana and hashish, which isstill flourishing. Several internal routes aredesigned to transit synthetic drugs
produced in the Netherlands, andamphetamines produced in Poland, into
Sweden, Finland and other European
countries via Dutch, Belgian and Polishnetworks. Also Belgium is a consumer
market for synthetic drugs and trafficking
is carried out through co-operation between
rooted networks of Belgian and Dutch
citizens.

Criminalisation of money laundering
has solved the problem of distinguishing
between what is formally criminal and theinvestment that becomes criminal becauseof where the proceeds come from.
Organised crime and economic crime
become more closely linked, and the future
trends of organised crime tend towards
those productive activities where
opportunities are big, risk is lower and theorganisation required from criminals
reaches high complexity. Some of these
activities are outlined in the following
paragraphs.

III. ORGANISED CRIME TRENDS
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Car theft has become an extensive
problem in the European Union, where thenumber of stolen cars almost tripled
between 1989 and 1993. A good indicatorof the quantity of vehicles involved is thenumber of missing cars reported and neverrecovered by the police. Based on the firstnational crime statistics for 1993, it can be
estimated that last year some 250,000
passenger cars disappeared without tracein the European Union.1 The stealing ofcars by Polish, former Yugoslav andRussian criminal networks has become aparticularly profitable market because of
the wide range of expensive cars “offered”
especially in countries such as Germany,
the Netherlands and Finland, and becauseof the huge demand for stolen cars comingfrom countries such as the former Soviet
Union, the Asian states or North Africa.
From Poland the vehicles are taken to theBaltic republics, or the Ukraine, to Russia,
the Caucasus region or Kazakhstan (thenations that have emerged from the Soviet
Union are a common destinations for theflourishing traffic in stolen luxury cars andsport or utility vehicles2). Bulgarian andRussian criminal groups have become amajor force in this particular area of crossborder crime, together with indigenous
crime groups who carry out the theft andrebuild the cars to give them a new identity.
The results are evident in the consumer

Analysis of the inteaction between thepatterns of organised crime money
laundering cycles and patterns of antimoney laundering responses allows us tooutline present trends. In this section,changes in opportunities and mutations inthe structure of criminal organisations will
be considered. Both variables are relevantin terms of policy implications because
their modification through more effective
policies could result in a reduction of theextension of the organised crime problem.
A. Developing a Mix of Illicit andLegitimate Businesses
The traditional distinction between
illicit and legitimate activities, withreference to organised crime, is becoming
less evident in the modus operandi oforganised criminals. At the same time, thedistinction between what is criminal andwhat is not becomes more and more vague.
The escalation of traditional criminal
activities (drug trafficking) and of theinvestment in legitimate industries (thecontruction or tourist industry) of theproceeds generated by criminal activities
is in a continuum.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
states. While less serious than some of theother activities of organised crime, this isan additional source of revenue (often
mixed with organised insurance fraud),
helping these groups to consolidate theirposition in certain countries. In those cases,
co-operation of criminal syndicates with themilitary is of special importance. Untilr e c e n t l y, t h e m a i n m i l i t a r y a i rtransportation centre was situatded on
Polish soil. Thieves steal cars in Germany
and drive them to Poland. Then the cars
are put on board military transportationand flown to Russian military airports.
Russian companies which run the business
are not necessarily part of the criminal
ring, and sometimes they are even unaware(or prefer to be unaware) of the real originof the cars, though, of course, the majority
at least guess where the cars come from.
Practically, all Russian dealers in foreign
cars insist on receiving already renovatedcars from aboard. In cases of stolen cars
(as opposed to genuine second-hand cars)
the renovation takes place in Poland, theBaltic Republics and, on rarer occasions,in the Czech Republic, Slovakia or
Hungary.
Since 1988, the counterfeit industry has
considerably increased the sophisticationof its products and, in some instances,counterfeit credit cards have been of better
quality than the genuine cards they
purport to be. 3 The American Bankers
Association (ABA) and the International
Bankers Association (IBA) have expressed
concern over the extensive use of computer
technology to counterfeit corporatecheques, bonds, securities and negotiable
instruments of governments andcorporations. The counterfeits are virtuallyindistinguishable from the genuine items.
In addition to counterfeit currency, bonds
and other monetary instruments, there has
been an escalation in the international
production and fraudulent use ofcounterfeit access devices: commercial

8

credit cards, telecommunications,computers, identification documents.4 The
number of cases of counterfeit currency inwestern Europe seems to have tripled in
1993, compared to 1991.5 In 1992 and 1993,
printed counterfeit versions of the new one
hundred and two hundred Deutschemark
notes were discovered, coming from Poland
and Italy. Counterfeit money is becoming
big business in eastern Europe. The bleak
economic outlook coupled with an unstablecurrency and high rate inflation, have led
to the Deutschmark and the US dollar
being used in place of the local currency inseveral Newly Independent States where
even basic products can only be obtainedwith foreign currency. Such a situation
provides ideal conditions for the production
and distribution of counterfeit money.
Frauds against the financial interests ofthe European Union are a traditionalsource of illicit proceeds from the
exploitation of legislation or from the lackof domestic controls. These criminal
activities are not only carried out by
professionals in the legitimate industry at
the margin of their business but also byextensive organised crime networks,
which, in Belgium, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Italy, have grown into wellestablished criminal trading communities.
On the expenditure side, in 1995 8% of thecases accounted for 74% of the amounts atstake. These figures lend further support
to the Commission’s belief that fraud
against the European Community is not aquestion of petty pilfering but of large scaleorganised financial crime.6 They intertwine
with normal trade and industry and use
their facilities to sell products and tolaunder profits. Frauds occur at different
stages of the criminal process. Instruments
such as front companies could either
generate illegal proceeds from fraud, orthey could be used to launder proceeds fromother crimes such as corruption. The
number of frauds against the financial

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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interests of the European Union isincreasing, although we do not know if they
are increasing in the number of thosecommitted or those reported. Data recently
produced by the Commission of theEuropean Union7 shows the dimension of
the phenomenon and calls for more
attention to be paid to the problems linked
with international frauds, internationalorganised crime and money laundering.
This criminal phenomenon is not restricted
to food or agricultural products but it
involves goods of every kind through a wide
range of more or less sophisticatedmethods. Other kinds of fraud, carried out
by the same organisations, are VAT frauds
and generally a wide range of financial andcommercial frauds.
Criminal organisations are engaged in
the massive smuggling of illegal aliens into
the European Union from poor regions suchas North Africa, eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union, Asia and South-East Asia.
The Russian mafia group that controls theroute makes an estimated $12 million ayear on this traffic.8 Most illegal
immigrants coming from the East try toenter Poland through the porous, 102kilometer Lithuanian border. In the firstsix months of 1995, border guards stopped
341 people in 14 groups, mainly from India,
Pakistan, Somalia and Nigeria. 9 The
Southern route is plied mainly by
Romanian, Bulgarian, Turkish and former
Yugoslav citizens. Most of them arrive
legally in Poland, taking adventage of aninternational agreement on visa-free
tourist traffic.10 In Poland the government
estimates that there are 100,000 migrants
waiting to be smuggled into Germany.11
German officials are collaborating very
closely with the Polish government totighten controls along the border, but thesmugglers are diversifying their routes:
Other landing places of choice are
Mediterranean ports such as Marseilles
and the coastal border in Italy. For the year

1993, the International Centre forMigration Policy Development (ICMPD) in
Vienna estimated that migrants frombetween 100,000 to 220,000 in number had
used the help of smuggling syndicates moreor less intensely in one or several phasesof the transfer, in order to reach a western
European state. The estimate by ICMPD
is based on the assumption that between
15% to 30% of immigrants (between
250,000-300,000) entering Europe illegally
have used the traffickers and that between
20% to 40% of those requesting asylum
without founded rights (estimated at
300,000) have done the same. On theassumption that immigrants pay
traffickers sums between $500 USD (pricefor crossing of a west European or Middle
Eastern border) to $25,000 USD (forbringing Chinese people from China into
the USA), ICMPD believes that every
foreigner who reaches western Europe withthe help of traffickers, pays an averageamount of $2,500,USD to $5,000USD. On
the basis of this calculation, ICMPD finds
it realistic to estimate the profit of thetraffic syndicates for that year as aminimum of $100 million to a maximum of$1.2 billion USD. According to ICMPD, theworld profits in this criminal sector for thesame year was around $5 billion USD to$7 billion USD.12
This phenomenon has two effects, notonly is it a threat to the basic ingredientsof national sovereignty, it also places theimmigrants themselves in jeopardy. 13
These would-be immigrants are highly
vulnerable, and women in particular areoften forced into sexual slavery in order topay off their debt to the criminal smugglingorganisations. In fact, the increase in thesmuggling of aliens is directly connectedwith prostitution. Experts estimate that
more than 10,000 young women have been
recruited in east European countries.14
In Europe, considerable alarm has been

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
raised by nuclear materials trafficked bycountries belonging to the former Soviet
Union. Although it is almost clear that forthe moment, rather than criminalorganisations, the traffickers are greedy
freelancers, traders, adventurers oropportunists15, looking for a demand in thearea. It is likely that in the future, criminalorganisations will enter this market for
extortion purposes. If purchasers cannot befound and the material is on hand, thenextortion may appear particularly
attractive. There are currently several
hundred tons of weapon-usable fissile
material under inadequate physicalsecurity and material control in Russia.
Kilogram quantities of weapon-usable
fissile materials have been stolen frominstitutes in Russia since the break-up of
the Soviet Union. Part of this material is
not intercepted before leaving the Russian
borders. The quantities that have alreadybeen stolen (and fortunately intercepted)
are sufficient to make small nuclear
weapons. It has been noted16 that sufficientfissile material can be diverted from
Russian stockpiles, with a high probabilityof success, to provide a sub-national groupwith one or two nuclear weapons, or evena rogue state with a sizeable arsenal.
Infiltration by organised crime groups,
both traditional and relatively new ones,
into the legitimate economy stems mainly
from the need to invest their illicit proceeds
in order to obtain a legitimate income, butalso to reduce the overall risk of being
detected and having their capital seized
and confiscated. Recent stringent antimoney laundering policies adopted by themember states have stimulated, via themoney trail, a more efficient detection of
the real owners of these proceeds, and theseizure of capital of illicit origin. It istherefore likely that organised criminals
are seeking to internationalise themselvesin order to reduce the risk that theircriminal proceeds will be seized andconfiscated.
10

Infiltration of the licit economy stems
also from the need criminals have always
had for respectability. The history of
criminal organisations shows that
infiltration in legitimate businesses
belongs in the evolutionary ladder of many
criminal organisations. American
experience has shown that this has
happened in the past, while the situationof the ex-Soviet Union already displays thisevolution. In the latter country, today’s
criminal class, going through the processof contemporary infiltration into legitimate
businesses and gaining respectability, willprobably be joining the ruling classes oftomorrow.
It is possible to distinguish threedifferent effects and four areas of thelegitimate economy in which organised
criminals operate: the product market, thelabour market, capital and, as aconsequence, the stock market.17
In the product market, the criminal
enterprise can seriously distort competition
among legal enterprises. It strives todishonestly acquire a leading position in
the market or to engage in a coalition withlegitimate enterprises, and it is clear that,in this phase, it also tries to take over therole of the State. This means that criminalorganisations or legitimate enterprises, ina context of different and varying relations,seek to acquire a leading position over themarket, using weapons of voilence andbreaking the rules of competition. The more
the State or its institutions or markets are
weak or weakly controlled and defended,
the more easily attainable this objective
becomes. In the European Union today,
criminal organisations operate where
profits are to be made, but also where theState or its institutions are weaker.
Moreover, crimial penetration within the
ex-Soviet republics is due also to these two
fundamental requisites: the maximisation

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
of profits and the weakness of legislationand control instruments. It is therefore
clear that the major distortions incompetition produced by illicit methods
stunts the entrepreneurial initiative of
those actors operating in accordance withthe law, and that it produces a major lackof equilibrium in the market.
Another important factor is distortion in
the labour market. Two basic distortions
arise in the labour market due to criminal
infiltration. The first is that the criminal
enterprise offers job opportunities at higher
prices and with lower costs than those fixedin the legal market. Control is exerted over
the work-force by the use or the threat ofviolence. By recruiting labour (especiallyforeign illicit aliens), criminalorganisations directly handle job
placements, negotiations, wages, thus
protecting themselves against strikes orother forms of claimant behaviour.
Also of major importance for criminalorganisations is the capital market. Almost
all of the European Union authorities areaware of illicit capital entering capital
markets. In investing their surplus money,
criminal organisations increasingly tend touse professionals and lawyers who makeit possible to conceal the real ownership ofmoney thus averting the risk of its
detection and seizure. It is evident that
financial markets are certainly the mostdesirable sectors for criminal infiltration
today.
But there is a further aspect ofpenetration which is of particularimportance: the effect of stock markets.
Today, an interesting phenomenon within
the European Union is that criminalorganisations tend to invest the laundered
money by acquiring the property ofenterprises. Through the acquisition of alimited corporation, the criminal investor
can gain personal legitimisation, as well

as a profitable, unsuspected way tocommingle licit and illicit funds without
directly using financial institutions.
Depending on the surrounding economy orcriminal culture, such penetration may be
perpetrated through violence, extortion,usury or other more sophisticated financial
methods. This kind of infiltration isparticularly important because it clearly
illustrates the type of distortion produced.
It is also true that today, through theenterprise and its re-capitalisation withcriminal proceeds, a distortion ofcompetition mechanisms may beengendered. Legal enterprises in fact
borrow capital by paying an official interest
rate, not paid by those enterprises thathave the opportunity of resorting tocriminal proceeds to satisfy their need for
liquidity and capital. Of course theseenterprises can operate in the market withmore competitive prices.
B. Changing Structures andRelations of Criminal
Organisations
The increased activities generated by the
new opportunities offered through theglobalisation of the markets seem to induce
criminal organisations to develop in two
different directions: specialisation anddiversification.
The trend towards specialisation in one
or more markets or specific illicit goods is
provoked by a combination of increased
competition among criminal organisations
and powerful investigations by law
enforcement agencies. Both are forcing
criminal organisations to develop theirexpertise and to become increasingly
efficient in their activities. Galicians in
Spain and the mafia in Italy havespecialised as cocaine importers and main
suppliers for Europe. Local criminal groups
in the Netherlands and Belgium havespecialised in the production and export of11

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
synthetic drugs in and outside theEuropean Union, whereas local groups ofwhite collar criminals still based in thesecountries have developed a long-standing
expertise in financial, European Union and
VAT f r a u d s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,specialisation depends also on the
traditional expertise and on the specificgeographical position of the country oforigin to the criminal groups. It happensthat the Turkish and Kurdish drugtraffickers for example, are devoted almost
exclusively to heroin trafficking, becauseof the vicinity of Turkey to the source area,and because of the wide immigrantcommunities in the heart of the European
Union.
Wi t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r o c e s s o fdiversification as opposed to specialisation,some groups are developing a wide set ofopportunities providing goods and services
on an opportunistic basis. They are sold toother criminal organisations even though
they may be competitors in a specificmarket or territory (arms trafficking andhuman smuggling, for example). Nigerians
and eastern European criminal networks(headed by the Russian mafia) havedeveloped their activity of delivery services
for a wide range of products and customers.
The former have started importing cocaine
from the Colombian cartels, extending
further to heroin from South-East Asia.
The latter, due to the geographic position
and the extension of the territory available,
have diversified the products from drugs(both heroin and cocaine) to arms, alien andprostitute smuggling, and are in return
exporting cars and synthetic drugs from
Europe.
In terms of changes in organisational
structure, there are two main changes thatcan be outlined; greater flexibility and more
co-operation with other criminal groups.

12

1. More Flexibility
More flexibility occurs in the compositionof the criminal groups and their operations.
A market with a varying demand for illegal
products or services, such as the European
one, acts as a magnet for present and newadventurers. Criminal organisations
require a flexible structure in order topromptly re-organise their acitivities
according to demand and to the number ofcompetitors. Occasional businesses or
specific targets more often require small
task forces of criminal specialised experts,
who work with external individuals,
providing services and expertise in fields
unknown or not directly accessible to thecriminal organisation. This networking canbe observed in the drug market, where theexample of the Nigerian networks is aclassical one. Small groups of excutives oreven individuals carry out the operationaltasks or missions, co-ordinated andinstructed by a strategic centre in the
country of origin. In the field of fraudcommitted by Belgian or Dutch white collar
criminals, and for car thefts carried out by
Polish and Yugoslav networks, these
networks have acquired a specific expertisein the division of labour for every task.
Flexibility also occurs in a wider gap
between the ranks of the organisational
structure. This means that the hierarchicaldistance between the leaders of a crimeenterprise and the rank-and-file isbecoming increasingly greater. This alsomeans that the “trail of evidence” linking
the crime and the top level has become
obscured, providing insulation against law
enforcement. At the lower levels, work is
carried out by small units (namely “cells”)
which are aware of only a part of theorganisation’s activities or which function
only as servicing units. This phenomenon
has been observed in the drug markets,
where “veterans” are able to recruit a wide
network of trusted executives.

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
The organised crime groups analysed
above require a wide range of services,
information and skills. Therefore, theproblem of co-operation comes either
through the collusion/conflict with othercriminal groups or through corruption/
conflict with law enforcement and judiciary
personnel.
2. More Co-operation among Criminal
Organisation18
At the political and law enforcementlevels, attention is being paid to the
problem of collusive agreements among
criminal groups. Recent alarm about suchagreements denotes the awareness that thelevel of competition among criminal groups
in some markets, and its development insome cases towards monopolistic positions
or collusive agreement, is relevant forunderstanding the way in which organised
crime faces opportunities and risks. Since
collusive agreements are made with the
purpose of optimising opportunities andrisk (in this case, trading lesser
opportunities against less risk), in regard
to a monopoly where these two variables
are high (higher prices are an easy target
for the police), it is understandable that law
enforcement agencies are concerned whena trend towards more collusive agreements
develops. For the same reason there is the
opposite concern on behalf of organised
criminals. It is possible to hypothesise thatthese collusive agreements are favoured in
a combination of:• Systemic variables: such as alengthy inter-criminal conflictwith inevitable spreading ofviolence;• Organisational variables: such as
weakness of the organisations due
to infiltration, turncoats,
conviction of the top leaders;• Economic variables: such aschanges in the markets, reductionof resources, demand forspecialisation;• Perception of an increase of law
enforcement risk.
There is a continuum from complete
merger between organisations at the one
extreme, to independent spot market
transactions on a one-off basis, at the other.
These alliances can take many forms,
including operating linkages, licensing or
franchise agreements and joint ventures.
In this case, tactical arrangements, rather
than strategic alliances are developed,
because of the lack of long-term
expectations. In many respects suchactivities seem to be typical of a significant
part of the drug-trafficking industry, thatis, they are carried out by small,independent organisations that have cometogether to exploit a particular trafficking
route and a specific way of circumventing
customs and law enforcement. Many ofthese are small-scale tactical alliances
based on transnational networks, but when
they prove effective they have an inherent
capacity for growth. At the same time, theirloose, fluid nature makes it equallyplausible that they will be disbanded andtheir constituent elements reformed indifferent constellations. Tactical alliances
are made for specific purposes and are often
followed by a search for other partners tomake shipments to different locations
using different modes of concealment.
In the first place, alliances are a rationalresponse, multiplication of the business
opportunities (legitimate and criminal)
provided by the opening of the European
markets. The development of alliances canbe understood as a response by criminal
enterprises to the business environment
and as an attempt to overcome their own
limitations. One of the most importantways to accomplish this is by aggressively

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
gaining access to new markets. Sometimes,
at the lower level (mainly involving street
drug smuggling or prostitution rackets),
this access happens with the use of violencein order to establish supremacy among
exploiters of the same market, as inGermany among east European groups orin the United Kingdom among street gangs.
The other way is to co-operate with thoseenterprises which are already entrenchedin these markets, having greater
knowledge of local conditions and being
more attuned to local problems, rather thantrying to insert themselves as competitorson unfamilliar territory. In this case,alliances can also provide an effectivemeans of circumventing restrictions
imposed by government or antigovernmental organisations, which canmake it difficult for foreign organisations
to penetrate the market. In this context,
links are also increasing between criminal
and terrorist organisations. Indeed, thedistinction between terrorist groups
pursuing essentially political objectives
and criminal organisations pursuingeconomic goals is likely to become
increasingly blurred as can be noted in
terrorist groups such as the IRA and the
INLA in lreland and the Kurds in Germany
and Turkey. They all act to achieve
economic support that could be
instrumental in the case of terrorists, orthe end result in the case of organised
crime.
Paradoxically, co-operative tactics offer
a rational and effective response to a highly
competitive situation. Obviously theorganisations already in the market haveto be offered something substantial in
return, or some other form of reciprocity
has to be exercised.
Co-operation among criminalorganisations is often aimed atcircumventing law enforcement andnational regulations. From this14

perspective, it is clear that at least some of
the alliances among them can beunderstood as risk-reduction alliances.
Criminal organisations make allianceswith governments, either throughcorruption or coercion or, more often, a mixof both. A reoccurring feature of thisbehaviour is the extended use of bribery in
Italy in order to enhance control on
territory, to minimise the risk of law
enforcement and to strengthen theirposition against external competitors.
Another example is offered by the criminal
networks carrying out European Union or
VAT frauds which must necessarily develop
ties with institutions both at a national andEuropean level. Even criminal groups
dealing with the transportation of illicit
goods through the European Union borders
must have accomplics at some level in the
Customs sector.
IV. THE EUROPEAN POLICIES 19
The European Union context gives
criminals a fertile ground for theirtransnational activities. The Treaties
establishing the European Community andfollowing Treaty of Maastricht grant a total
freedom in moving capital, goods, services
and persons across the borders of theMember States. It is, therefore,
understandabele how organised criminalrings are taking advantage of thissituation, specialising themselves intransnational illegal behaviours, exploiting
this large possibility of movement within
the Union in connection with the loopholesof national legislation. Consequently
criminals tend to become transnational andorganised, building up illicit enterprises,
moving criminal goods and criminal
proceeds from one country to another,establishing their bases in the most secure
nations and entering those illegal sectors
where they perceive high opportunities for
gain, with low risk.

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
Drug trafficking, money laundering,
fraud (especially against the European
Union’s interests), corruption, traffickingof aliens with the scope of their exploitation
are all illicit behaviours that are an everincreasing threat not only to the single
states of the Union, but also to all theEuropean Community. Money launderingin particular is advantaged by all the newtechnologies present in modern society.
This is the way in which the European
Union institutions try to define thephenomenon:“Organised crime is increasingly
becoming a threat to society as weknow it and want to preserve it.
Criminal behaviour is no longer thedomain of individuals alone, but alsoof organisations that pervade thevarious structures of civil society, andindeed society as a whole. Crime isincreasingly being organised acrossnational borders, also taking
advantage of the free movement ofgoods, capital, services and persons.
Technological innovations such as
Internet and electronic banking turnout to be extremely convenient
vehicles either for committing crimes
or for transferring the resulting
profits into seemingly licit activities.
Fraud and corruption take on massive
proportions, defrauding citizens andcivic institutions alike”.20
How can European Union organisms
react to this complex situation? Since theexistence of the European Union, with its
rules and aims, is itself a push factor to
the spreading of organised crime, how do
the European institutions envisage toendow themselves with specific means forcombating organised crime? Unfortunately,
despite the general sovra-national power
given to European institutions within theeconomic framework of the Union, as far
as crime, legal co-operation in criminal
matters and immigration are concerned,

the situations differ widely.
Only since November 1993, does the
Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty, throughthe so-called ‘third Pillar’ of the Union,
make specific provisions in the field ofjustice and home affairs, which includes
immigration, drug addiction and cooperation in civil, penal, custom and police
fields, giving life to a special decision
process. In these fields, Member States do
not fully give up their sovereignty to theEuropean Union, because decisions
continue to be taken unanimously. The
previous informal co-operation has now
been transformed into an institutionalised
method. That is to say that this particulardecision-making standard is a half-way
between the traditional Community
system involving all the European
institutions and intergovernmental cooperation at the diplomatic level.21 While
the European Parliament and theCommission have a very reduced role, theEuropean Council, always unanimously,
can adopt joint actions and decisions (whichbind the Member States to the extent inwhich they contain explicit obligation) andpredispose Conventions. It is mainly in thislegal framework that, at European Unionlevel, the fight against organised crime canbe contained.
It is difficult to draw a detailed pictureof the most recent actions developed
against organised crime in the European
Union’s context. Anyway, the criterion
adopted here is based on the different
illegal activities contrasted, on theimportance of the instruments settled andon the methods of fighting crime.
As drug trafficking and addiction areproblems that afflict all of the Member
States, some efforts have been undertaken
to enhance international co-operation anddata exchanges. The action by theEuropean Union in this sector is based on

15

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
the 1994 Communications from theCommission to the Council and on the
conclusions of the Cannes and Dublin
European Councils (held in June 1995 andDecember 1996 respectively). The aim ofthese instruments is to combat drugtrafficking, to reduce drug demand and todevelop co-operation among countries.
During the European Council held in
Dublin 13 and 14 December 1996, theneed was underlined for harmonisinglaws, developing further co-operation
among law enforcement agencies, paying
attention to synthetic drugs and fully
implementing the European Union’s
Directive on money laundering,considering its application outside theclassical financial sector.22 Also the role
played by information, education andtraining on health matters in reducing
drug demand was highlighted. In thefield of co-operation among nations, theEuropean Council also gave prominence
to the implementation of internationala g r e e m e n t s , s u c h a s t h e Vi e n n aConvention against Illicit Trafficking inNarcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substancs, and to a better informationexchange among partners about drugs(especially with countries of Latin
American, Caribbean, central Asia,
central and eastern Europe).
Following this advice, a joint action23 wasissued on the approximation of the laws
and practices of police, customs services
and judicial authorities to combat drug
addiction and to prevent and combat illegal
drug trafficking. This joint action, further
to harmonising legal, police and customs
systems within the nation so as to improve
prevention and fight against illegal drugtrafficking, urges Members States to:combat illicit movements of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances within theCommunity (including “drug tourism”);
punish serious drug trafficking offences16with the most serious penalties available
in their penal systems for crimes of thesame gravity; endeavour to change theirlegislation or to fill the legal vacuums inregard to synthetic drugs; take appropriate
steps to combat illicit cultivation of plants
containing ingredients with narcotic
properties; make it an offence to publicly
and intentionally incite or induce others,by any means, to commit offences of illicit
use or production of drugs. On 16 December
1996, the Council issued a resolution aimed
at dismantling the illicit cultivation andproduction of drugs within the European
Union. On 20 December 1996, the Council
adopted a resolution on sentencing forserious drug offences, asking Member
States to ensure the possibility of custodial
sentences for serious illicit trafficking in
drugs. On the same date, the Council
adopted another joint action on theparticipation of the Member States in a
strategic operation planned by the Customs
Co-operation Council to combat drug
smuggling on the Balkan Route. Recently,
on 16 June 1997, the European Council
enacted a joint action related to
information exchange, risk assessment andthe control of new synthetic drugs.
As far as police co-operation related todrugs is concerned, a special unit, theEuropean Drug Unit (EDU), was createdby ministerial agreement in June 1993.
The initial task of this Unit was to solicit
exchanges of information on narcotics andmoney laundering. When talking about
Europol and police co-operation later on,
EDU will be discussed in more detail.
Concerning fraud against the European
Union’s financial interests, in 1994 UCLAF(Unitè Contre la Lutte Anti Frode) wasestablished by the European Commission.
This is a special Unit in charge of theprevention and repression of fraud
affecting the budget of the Union. This typeof fraud, which is seriously damaging not

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
only the right functioning of theCommunity, but also the interests of all
Member States, is more and more in thehands of organised criminal networks.
UCLAF has both legislative andoperational functions, being responsible
not only for studying all kinds of measuresfor protecting the European Union’sbudget, but also, more generally, fordeveloping a contrast strategy against
economic and financial crime prejudicial to
the Community and operationalcountermeasures against counterfeiting.
Another task of UCLAF in that of
information, publishing a yearly report on
the outcome of its activity.24
The most noteworthy actions by theEuropean Union in the fraud sector havebeen:
• Community regulations aimed atco-ordinating the administrative
co-operation between Member
States and the European
Commission in the customs andagricultural fields;• Directive issued on 18 December
1995, on the protection of theEuropean Community’s financial
interests, that, amongst otherthings, defines the acts damaging
the Union’s budget;• Convention on the Protection of theEuropean Communities’ Financial
Interests (adopted by the Council
on 26 July 1995), that fixed acommon definition of fraud andbinds the Member States topunishing this behaviour (and its
instigation or attempt) as acriminal offence in their national
penal systems.
Keeping in mind that corruption is avery common criminal activity practised inorganised criminal networks when doing
business, and in particular, considering thenegative and prejudicial role played bycorruptive practices both at theCommunity and national level, theEuropean Council, on 26 May 1997, drewup the Convention on the Fight Against
Corruption Involving Officials of theEuropean Communities or Officials ofMember States of the European Union. The
aim of this Convention is to strengthen
judicial co-operation in the fight against
corruption. The Convention gives legal
definition of active and passive corruption,
obliging Member States to punish thesebehaviours as crimnal offences if
committed either by national or by
European Union officers. Those committingthese offences, or instigating the conduct
in question, should be punished byeffective, proportionate and dissuasive
criminal penalties, including, in the mostserious cases, deprivation of liberty, which
can give rise to extradition processes. Other
rules foresee the jurisdiction of the Member
States and the total co-operation ofMember States in investigating,prosecuting and carrying out thepunishment of such offences, when they
involve more than one country.
A more and more alarming criminal
question within the European Union is the
trafficking of migrants. This phenomenon
is controlled mainly by powerful criminalorganisations, capable of establishingcontacts among nations, of corrupting
officials, of counterfeiting documents andof controlling black labour markets. In thishuman trade, particularly weak subjects
are women and children, as they can easily
be sexually exploited in host countries. The
European Union institutions have recently
become more aware of this criminal issue.
A Communication, including
immediately effective steps to combat childpornography on the Internet, and a Green
Paper on the Protection of Minor andHuman Dignity were adopted by theEuropean Commission on 16 October 1996.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
A Communication by Commissioner Anita
Gradin on Trafficking in Women for the
Purpose of Sexual Exploitation whose aim
was:“to stimulate a broad policy debate
and to promote a coherent European
approach to this issue....such an
approach should include measures toimprove both international andEuropean co-operation, whilst putting
more effective measures in place atthe national level”.25
The European Council, on its behalf, has
adopted:• a joint action extending the
mandate given to Europol Drug
Unit’s to include trafficking inhuman beings26;• a joint action to establish a
programme for sharing
information among Member
States on trade in human beingsand the sexual exploitation ofchildren (the so-called STOPp r o g r a m m e ) . 27 T h e S T O P
programme should develop coordinated initiatives on the
combating of trade in humanbeings and the sexual exploitationof children, on the disappearancesof minors and on the use of
telecommunications facilities forthe purposes of trade in humanbeings and the sexual exploitationof children. The specific aim of the
programme should be providing
training, exchanging
programmes, holding meetingsand seminars, doing studies andresearch, disseminating
information for judges, publicprosecutors, law enforcement
agancies, civil servants or the
public services that come tocontact with this particular
phenomenon;• a joint action introducing a18

programme of training, exchanges
and co-operation in the field ofidentity document 28 (the so-called
SHERLOCK programme), run by
the European Commission, witha view of making more effective
the action against the false papers
used, especially by clandestine
immigration networks.
Another method for fighting organised
crime within the European Union is tostrengthen legal co-operation in thecriminal area among all Member States.
For example, to facilitate and simplify
extradition procedures for criminals who
have committed particular offences, could
be a good way for speeding up processes
against persons involved in organised
criminal rings operating in thetransnational arena. The Convention on
Simplified Extradition Procedures between
the Member States of the European Union,
adopted by the European Council on 10
March 1995, is aimed at abolishing a
number of bureaucratic formalities when
the person in question agrees to be
extradited. The Convention relating toExtradition between the Member States of
the European Union, adopted by theEuropean Council of Dublin on 27
September 1996, is aimed at increasing the
posibilities of extradition. The requested
State cannot refuse the demand forextradition if the fact is punishable under
the law of the requested State with at least
12 months of liberty deprivation, and by
the law of the requested Member State
with a penalty of at least 6 months ofdeprivation of liberty. In the cases in which
the offences are classified in the requesting
State as conspiracy or association tocommit an offence, the requested Statecannot refuse the extradition, claiming thatits penal law does not provide for the samefacts to be an offence, if the conspiracy or
the association is finalised to commit
crimes related to terrorism and drug

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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trafficking or other forms of serious illicit
behaviours against individual freedoms orcreating a collective danger. It is, in any
case, necessary that these acts should bepunishable by the requesting Member witha penalty of at least 12 months ofdeprivation of liberty. Extradition may not
be refused on the grounds that the person
requested is a national of the requested
Member State. These two Conventions are
currently being subjected to the process of
ratification by Member States.
Furthermore, in the European Union
framework, a new inportant Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters iscurrently being drafted. It tends to reducedifficulties deriving from cross-borders
searches of evidence and to makeprocedures simpler and speedier, bymaking it easier to obtain evidence comingfrom other countries, bettering andintensifying cross-border investigations
and allowing contact and informationexchange among investigators and judges
of different Member States.
Considering how criminal groups
prosper, thanks also to the discrepancies
among legal systems of the European
Union’s States, it not difficult to realise
why, in the field of legal co-operation, theinstrument used to contrast the activities
of organised crime is the harmonisating ofpenal legislation of the Member states. A
fruitful example of this attempt is theCouncil Resolution on lndividuals who Cooperate with the Judicial Process in theFight against International Organised
Crime, adopted on 20 December 1996. In
this case the Council calls all Member
States, to take appropriate measures toencourage persons who participate, or haveparticipated, in an association of criminals
or other criminal organisation of any kind,or in organised crime offences, to co-operatewith the judicial process. To co-operatemeans to reveal essential information to

the investigation authorities or tocollaborate in helping authorities todeprive criminal groups of their illegal
resources or of the proceeds of crime.
Information may cover the composition, thestructure or the activities of the criminal
network; the existing links with otherillegal groups or the offences committed orthat might be committed by the criminal
ring. Following the advice of the Council,
Member States should introduce in theirlegislation rules granting benefits to these
individuals who, breaking away from thecriminal organisations they belonged to,help authorities in collecting evidence
essential for reconstructing facts,
identifying perpetrators of crimes andleading to their arrest. Stringent protective
measures should be granted to thesecollaborators and to their parents, children
or other people who, as a consequence ofthe revelations, are likely to be exposed toserious and immediate danger. In the end,
the Council underlines the need forfacilitating judicial assistance among
States for processes involving individuals
co-operation in the fight againstinternational organised crime. Also
keeping clearly in mind that the
instrument of the resolution is not binding
for Member States, the relevance of theCouncil’s act must be stressed, for it
represents a moral imperative and a welldefined way to address criminal organised
networks operating in Europe.
The elaboration of an efficient strategy
against international criminal syndicatesshould result in combating them on aninternational scale, and it should allow for
the circulation of police information andknowledge among the law enforcement
agencies of the Member States, at least as
fast as organised crime gangs crossnational borders. The European Union
institutions have always felt the need forpolice co-operation in the fight againstorganised crime, and have acted

19

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
accordingly by establishing Europol and
EDU.
In June 1991 in Luxembourg, Heads ofGovernment or States of all Member States
stressed, upon an initiative of the German
Chancellor Kohl, the urgency for creating
a force called Europol. While pending thedrafting of the Convention establishing
Europol, in June 1993 an embroyonic formof Europol, the European Drug Unit (EDU),
was set up through a ministerial
agreement. The initial task of EDU was theexchange of information among law
enforcement agencies on narcotics andmoney laundering. With a joint action
adopted by the European Council on 10
March 1995 29, the role of EDU was better
defined and this Unit was put in charge ofthe exchange of information andintelligence in relation to illegal organised
criminal activities affecting two or moreStates, and of helping police and relevent
national agencies combat them. The
criminal activities to be covered by EDU
were illegal drug trafficking, illicit
trafficking in radioactive and nuclear
substances, crimes involving clandestine
immigration networks and illicit vehicle
trafficking. With another joint action on 16
December 1996 30, the Council extended the
mandate of EDU also to the trafficking of
human beings.
The creation of EDU was principallycaused by the bureaucratic slowness linked
to the birth of Europol. The Convention on
the Establishing of a European Police Office(Europol Convention) was, in fact, drawn
up by the European Council on 26 July
1995, but until now it has not yet been
ratified by all Member States. On the basisof this Convention, and with the aim of
improving the effectiveness of thecompetent authorities in the Member
States and co-operation among them inpreventing and combating terrorism,
unlawful drug trafficking and all other20

forms of serious transnational crime,
Europol has been endowed with different
tasks: to facilitate the exchange of
information among Member States; toobtain, collocate and analyse information;
to notify the competent authorities ofMember States (without delay) of any
information and connections detectedamong criminal offences; to aid
investigation within the Member States; tomaintain a computerised system forcollecting information. In each Member
State a national Unit should be establishedor designed and should serve as a liaison
body between Europol and national
authorities.
At the Dublin European Council of 13
and 14 December 1996, conscious of theneed for serious and co-ordinated approachby the Union to organised crime problems,
the Council expressed the hope of a rapid
ratification of the Europol Convention by
Member States. In this Council further
decisions have been taken, the mostimportant of which was the establishing ofa High Level Group to draw up an action
plan with specific recommendations
covering all the aspects of organised crime.
This action plan, drafted by the HighLevel Group, was adopted by the Council
on 28 April 1997 and can be considered themost serious planning of the activities of
the Union against organised crime. The
final part of this paper will deal more at
length with this action plan because of its
relevance, its recent adoption, its broad anddetailed range of proposals and its longterm programme, that involves all
European institutions and Member States
in an active future collaboration. The
guidelines, expressed in recommendations,that the European Union and Member
States should follow in enhancing theirstruggle against organised crime are veryclear.

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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In the field of police co-operation, each
Member State should grant a high level ofco-ordination among all its law
enforcement agencies, providing a single
central contact law enforcement agency to
exchange information and keep contact
with the authorities of other Member
States (Recommendations no. 1-2). The
action plan also asks for the rapid
ratification and implementation of theEuropol Convention, stressing that thepowers of Europol should be broadened toinclude the following:“(a) Europol should be enabled tofacilitate and support the preparation,
co-ordination and carrying out ofspecific investigative actions by thecompetent authorities of the Member
States...; (b) Europol should beallowed to ask Member States to
conduct investigations in specificcases...; (c)Europol should develop
specific expertise which may be putat the disposal of Member States toassist them in investigating cases oforganised cross-border crime...; (d)Full use should be made ofpossibilities of Europol in fields ofoperational techniques and support,
analysis and data analyses files (forinstance registers on stolen cars orother property)...; (e) Access by
Europol may be sought to the
Schengen Information System or its
Europeansuccessor”(Recommendation no.25).
The possibility for Europol to collaborate
with third party countries andinternational organisations should also betaken into account (recommendation n.24).
The Commission, Council and Member
States should develop a comprehensive
policy against corruption, trying to betterthe transparency of public administration.
This object should be achieved by focusing
primarily on prevention elements and:
“Addrµessingµ such issues as theimpact of defective legislation, publicprivate relationships, transparency offinancial management, rules onparticipation in public procurement,
and criteria for appointments topositions ot public responsibility...”,
but also not forgetting “the area ofsanctions, be they of a penal,
administrative of civil character, as
well as the impact of the Union’s policy
on relations with third States”(Recommendation no.6).
Commission, Council and Member
States, together with the professionalorganisations concerned, should always
study and define methods for reducing thesusceptibility of liberal and otherprofessions to organised crime, for examble
through the adoption of codes of conduct(Recommendation no.12):“The Member States and theEuropean Commission should ensurethat the applicable legislation
provides for the possibility for an
applicant in a public tender
procedure,who has committed
offences connected with organised
crime, to be excluded fromparticipation in tender procedures
conucted by Member States and by
the Community. In this context it
should be studied whether and underwhat conditions persons who are
currently under investigation orprosecution for involvement inorganised crime could also be
excluded. Specific attention should be
paid to the illicit origin of funds as apossible reason for exclusion”(Recommendation no.7).
As far as fraud against the financial
interests of the European Union isconcerned, Recommendation no. 10 of theaction plan states that;“The Member States should consult
regularly the competent services of

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
the Commission with a view toanalysing cases of fraud affecting thefinancial interests of the Community,and deepening the knowledge andunderstanding of the complexities ofthese phenomena within existingmechanisms and frameworks. If
necessary, additional mechanisms
shall be put in place with a view toarranging such consultations on aregular basis. In this context, future
relations between Europol and theCommission’s anti-fraud unit (Uclaf)should be taken into account.”

On the basis of Recommendation no. 9,
the structural funds of the Union shouldbe employed to avoid large cities of theUnion becoming grounds for organised
crimial groups:“Particular attention should be given togroups not fully integrated in society,since these may be vulnerable targets
for criminal organisations.”• make as general as possible thecriminalisation of the launderingof the proceeds of crime,
considering the opportunity ofextending this offence to negligent
behaviours;• introduce in the legal systems of
the Member States confiscation
rules that allow confiscation
regardless of the presence of theoffender (including dead or
absconded);• extend the obligation imposed by
Article 6 of the European Directive
on Money Laundering to all
offences linked with serious
crimes and to persons andprofessions different fromfinancial institutions;• address the issue of money
laundering committed via
Internet and other electronicmeans of payment (it has to ber e m e m b e r e dt h a tRecommendation no.5 calls for acrosspillar study in the field ofhigh-technology crime);• try to reduce the use of cash
payments and cash exchanges bynatural and legal persons serving
to cover up the conversion of theproceeds of crime into otherproperties;• Consider common strategies to beundertaken in the fields of
economic and commercial
counterfeiting and in thefalsification of banknotes andcoins, also in view of theintroduction of single currency.

In the field of money laundering andconfiscation of the proceeds of crime, theaction plan (Recommendation no.26)
suggests to the Council, to the Commission
and to Europol to endeavour to:• improve international exchange ofdata;

The action plan (Recommendations no.’s
13-14) also calls for the rapid ratificationof the most relevant international
Conventions concerning criminal matters,such as the European Convention on
Extradition (Paris 1957), the Protocol to theEuropean Convention on Mutual

The action plan also considers thenecessity for countries to harmonise
national legal systems by adopting thesame offences all over the European Uniont e r r i t o r y. S o , o n t h e b a s i s o f
Recommendation no. 17:“The Council is requested rapidly toadopt a joint action aiming at making it
an offence under the laws of each
Member State for a person, present in
its territory, to participate in a criminalorganisation, irrespective of the locationin the Union where the organisation inconcentrated or is carrying out its
criminal activity.”22

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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Assistance in Criminal Matters (Strasbourg1978); the Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of theProceeds from Crime (Strasbourg 1990), theAgreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea,
implementing Article 17 of the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficin Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (Strasbourg 1995), theConvention on the Fight against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (Vienna 1988). It also warmly
invites Member States to ratify all the
relevant European Union Conventions: theConvention on Simplified Extradition
Procedure between the Member States of theEuropean Union; the Europol Convention,
the Convention on the Protection of theEuropean Communities’ Financial
Interests, the Convention on the Use ofInformation Technology for Customs
Purposes; the Convention relating toExtradition between the Member States of
the European Union; the Protocols to theConvention on the Protoction of theEuropean Communities’ Financial
Interests.
In conclusion, the Amsterdam Treaty
should also be mentioned which, modifying
yet again the essential structure of theUnion, could also be considered a firstattempt to follow some of therecommendations of the action plan.
Although signed on 21 September 1997,
this Treaty has not jet come into force, for
it is waiting for ratification by all Member
States. In many of its points theAmsterdam Treaty focuses on criminal
problems, requiring different levels of cooperation among law enforcement andjudicial authorities of Member States, andbetween them and Europol, and calling forthe creation of a European research,documentation and statistical network on
cross-border crime within five years. On thebasis of the Articles of the Amsterdam
Treaty, Europol can ask Member States to

conduct joint investigations in specificcases; Member States are invited to set up
joint crime-fighting teams, that can besupported by Europol; easer extradition of
criminals among Member States should bemade possible, and all over the Union acommon minimum standard for rules andpenalties in the field of organised crimeshould be adopted.
NOTES
1. J. Storbeck, “Developments of International
Organised Crime and Future Expectations Within
Europe”, paper presented at the Europe 2000
Conference, The Hague, April 1994, p.4.
2. N. Onishi, “Stolen Cars Find a World of Welcome”,
The New York Times, July 10, 1995.
3. “Chinese Connections”, The Banker, October, 1994.
4. The 1995 INCSR, p.478.
5. J. Storbeck, “Developments of International
Organised Crime and Future Expectations Within
Europe” paper presented at the Europe 2000
Conference, The Hague, April 1994, p.4.
6. Commission of the European Communities,
Protecting the Community’s Financial Interests,
The Fight Against Fraud - Annual Report 1995,
Brussels, 1996.
7. Commission of the European Communities,
Protecting the Community’s Financial Interests,
The Fight Against Fraud - Annual Report 1994,
Brussels, May 29, 1995.
8. E.U. Savona, G. Da Col and A. Di Nicola, “Dynamics
of Migration and Crime in Europe: New Patternsof an Old Nexus”, paper presented at theInternational Conference on Migration and Crime:
Global and Regional Problems and Responses,
Courmayeur, October 5-8, 1996.
9. G. Witkowski, “Illegal Migration West”, The
Warsaw Voice, September 10, 1995.
10. “The New Trade in Humans”, The Economist,
August 5, 1995.
11. Ibid.
12. J. Widgren, “Multilateral Co-operation to Combat
Tr a f f i c k i n g i n M i g r a n t s a n d t h e R o l e o f
International Organizations”, paper presented at
the Eleventh IOM Seminar on International
Response to Trafficking in Migrants and the23

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
Safeguarding of Migrant Rights, Geneve, October
26-38, 1994, pp. 5-6. For more details on this topic,
see TRANSCRIME, Migrazione e criminaltà - Ladimensione internazionale del problema, CNPDS,
Milano, June 1996, pp. 53-72. See also E.U. Savoma,
G. Da Col and A. Di Nicola, op. cit.
13. J. Fredman, “Smugglers Move 1 Million Yearly to
Industral World”, The Houston Chronicle, June 12,
1994, p.31.
14. J. Storbeck, op. cit., p.6.
15. R. Atkinson, “Official Say Contraband Not a
Threat”, The Washington Post, August 28, 1994.
16. T.B. Cochran, Prepared Testimony Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, European
Subcommittee, August 23, 1995.
17. Ernesto U. Savona, “Svilppi delle attività criminali
ed ii riflessi nel sistema economico nazionale edinternazionale”, in Economia e Criminalità,
Camera dei Deputati, Rome, 1993, p. 203-213.
18. This section draws upon the contributions of: P.
Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organisations:
Strategic Alliances”, The Washington Quarterly,
January 1995; R. Godson and W.J. Olson,“International Organized Crime”, Society, n. 2. vol.
32, January 7, 1995; E. Kemmelmeier, “Latest
Developments of Terrorism and their Relation with
Mafia Type Organizations”, paper presented at theEuropean Round Table Conference on Institutional
Threats to Parliamentarian Democracy - Organized
Crime, Terrorism, Corruption and European
Structured Answers, The Hague, 20-22 April, 1994.
19. This paragraph is mainly drawn on European
Commission, Directorate-General X, Task Force on
Priority Information Project, Security Supportingan Area of Freedom in Europe, Brussels, 1997, B
Nascimbene (ed.), Da Schengen a Maastricht.
Apertura delle frontiere, cooperazione giudiziaria
e di polizia, Giuffrè editore, Milano, 1995.
20. Action Plan to combat organised crime, adopted
by the European Council on 28 April 1997, Part I,
Chapter 1, paragraph 1.
21. U. Draetta, Elementi di diritto comunitario,
Giuffrè editore, Milano, 1994, pp. 44-45.
22. This Directive (no. 91/308, 10 June 1991) is aimed
at preventing traffickers from laundering theirmoney into European legal financial circuits, asking
Member States to criminalise this behaviour andfinancial institutions to be more strict in controlling24

the identity of their clients.
23. Joint action 96/750/JHA, adopted on 17 December
1996.
24. See, as an example, European Commission,
Protection of Community Financial Interest, Fight
Against Fraud - Annual Report 1996, Luxembourg,
1997.
25. A. Gradin, Communication on Trafficking in
Women for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation,
Brussels, November 1996.
26. Joint action 96/748/JHA, adopted on 16 December
1996.
27. Joint action 96/700/JHA, adopted on 29 November
1996.
28. Joint action 96/673/JAI, adopted on 28 October
1996.
29. Joint action 95/73/JHA, adopted on 10 March 1995.
30. Joint action 96/748/JHA, adopted on 16 December
1996.