VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINSTTRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME:THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT
Matti Joutsen*
I. CRIME: FROM A DOMESTIC TO
AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
Before World War II, crime was almost
solely a domestic issue. Few persons wereconcerned with what happened beyond
their borders, since this had little effecton day-to-day life. This scenario has now
changed fundamentally.
Some of the changes have been due totechnology. Faster air service for people
and goods means that it is easier to getaround, and also easier both for offenders
to move from one country to the next,
keeping more than one step ahead of thelaw enforcement authorities, who mustr e s p e c t ju r i sd i c ti o n a l li m i ts . M o r esophisticated telecommunications makethe planning and directing of crimes
p o s s i b l e f ro m a d is ta nc e, a l s o f r om
abroad. Electronic fund transfer meansthat the profits from crime can be rapidly
m oved be yo nd the rea ch of natio nal
authorities.
A mong the politica l a nd economicchanges have been the establishment ofregional trade groupings such as theNorth American Free Trade Associationa nd the Europ ean U nion, which a reremoving barriers to the movement ofpeople, goods, services and capital. The
opening of formerly closed economies anddisruptions in economic development
have contributed to an enormous increasein crime, crime which has had an impact* Director, International Affairs
Ministry of Justice, Finlandeven outside the region. And because ofpolitical developments and corruption in
many countries around the world, somegovernment officials have shown their
willingness to collude with offenders in,for example, terrorism, drug trafficking,money laundering and economic crime.
The social changes have included theimpoverishment of people, in particularin developing countries and the countries
in transition. Although informal social
control still operates effectively in large
parts of the developing world, m any
developing countries have undergone
massive rural-urban migration, with the
new arrivals in the cities faced with analm ost total lack of prospects foreducation and employment. In many
countries, attemp ts at economic
development have failed, leaving a legacy
of a growing external debt. War andinternal conflict have not only had adisastrous effect on persons caught in
the ir gr ip , the y ha v e inc re a se d thenumber of internally displaced persons
and the international flow of refugees.
Given the scale of such problems, it isunderstandable that the criminal justicesystem in many developing countries isunder-resourced and under-trained.
According to one dominant explanation
for changes in the structure and level ofcrime, the routine activity approach, theamount and structure of crime is affectedby three factors: the number of suitabletargets for crime, the number of likely
and motivated offenders, and the absenceof capable guardians to prevent would-be

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offenders from committing crime. 1 In all
three respects, the potential for crime andfor organized crime is expanding worldwide and the technological, political,
economic and social changes just referredto have intensified this expansion.
The number of suitable targets forcrime has increased. The increase in
ind ustria l pro d uctio n a nd , in m a ny
c o u n tr i e s, t h e c ha n ge f r o m a st a t ee co nom y to a m a rke t e co nom y ha ve
increased the amount of consumer goods
a vailab le. R adios, televisions, vid eo
recorders, compact disk players, brandname clothing, cosmetics and other goodsa r e n o w b e i n g p ro d u ce d in g r e a t e r
numbers domestica lly. These factors
i n cr e a se th e n u m b e r o f ta r ge ts f o rproperty crime.
In a somewhat parallel manner, fore xa mple the introduction of m odernt e le c o m m u n i c a ti o n s a n d c o m p u t e rsystems, the proliferation of privatecompanies, and the wide use of new forms
of non-ca sh payment (such as credit
cards) have increased the number oftargets for economic crime.
The number of likely and motivatedoffenders has increased. Throughout thewo rld, m illions of pe op le have be en
willing or unwilling participants in what
has been called the “shadow economy” or“underground economy”, which grew outof the iron laws of supply and demand.
What the legal market could not produce
and distribute in sufficient quantities
and/or of adequate quality (which inmany countries often seemed to be justa b out anything and everything) the
shadow economy sought to supply. This1

See in particular Cohen, L. and Felson, M., Social

leads, among others, to smuggling, illegal
migration, and prostitution.
The borderline between the legitimate
economy and the shadow econom y isoften im possib le to d raw , a nd ma ny
people received their indoctrination into
crime in this way. Where economic times
have been bad, the standard of living has
dropped, unemployment has spread andinflation has increased. As a result, more
and more persons have turned to theshadow economy and to crime as a meansof sup plem enting their inco me . The
reality (and perception) of increased
crime has contributed to the readiness tocommit crime.
T h e p o o l o f lik e l y a nd m o ti va te doffenders is also being expanded by theprison system. The prison population inma ny c ountries ( pa rticula rly in the
United States, the Caribbean, Central
and Eastern European and Central Asia)
is quite high, and has been expanding
during the 1990s. 2 Conditions in such
prisons appear to be very poor by UN
standards, and these prisons can thus dolittle to rehabilitate the offenders. On thecontrary, the time spent in prison can
provide the prisoners with information on
ne w cr im e te ch ni que s and su ita b letargets, as well as supply them w ith
willing partners in crime.
The readiness and ability of society to
i n t e r v e n e i n c r i m i n a l a c t iv i t y h a s
weakened. The current resources andapproach of the criminal justice systems
in many countries cannot provide aneffective response to the increase incrime. There are shortages in personnel,
facilities and equipment. Training and2

Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List.

change and crime rate trends: A routine activity

Secon d ed ition. Home Of fice Res earch ,approach, American Sociological Review, 1979,

Development and Statistics Directorate, Research

vol. 44, pp. 588–608, passim.

Findings No, 116, London 2000.

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119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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the level of knowledge among
practitioners in many cases is woefully
inadequate. With the recent economicchange s, the relative sa lary level o f
criminal justice professionals has often
deteriorated, making it difficult to recruitand retain competent individuals. The
poor economy also means that criminal
justice agencies are often unable to obtainor upgrade their facilities and equipment.
For example, many officials in Central
and Eastern European countries havesadly noted that they are trying, both
figuratively and literally, to use Ladas
and Moskvitches to catch criminals whoare speeding away in BM Ws andMercedes-Benzes.
The developments reviewed briefly
above have contributed to the growth ofordinary crime as well as to the growth
and the internationalisation of organizedcrime. Organized crime as such is notnew. For exa mple I talian, Nigerian,
Chinese and Japanese organized crime
has long roots, and organized criminalgroups from these countries have had
mem bers or cells even in foreigncountries, as well as the international
conta cts needed to exploit em erging
markets for illegal goods (such as drugs,
but also illegal firearms, pornography,
smuggled alcohol and cigarettes,
counterfeit currency, counterfeit goods
and stolen goods) as well as for illegal
services ( such as pro stitutio n, slave
labour, loan-sharking, money launderingand illegal immigration). What is new is
the degree to which they are prepared to
expand their activities internationally,
supplementing their traditional criminal
areas with new areas, and networking
with other criminal organizations.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALJUSTICE
A. From Strict Territoriality to the
Recognition of the Need forInternational Cooperation
A nd ho w h a s the cr iminal justicesystem responded to the grow th andinternationalisation of crime? As long as
cr im e w a s d e f ine d a s ( a n d, in m os t
respects, actually was) a local or at mostnational issue, criminal law remained
almost wholly territorial, concerned onlywith acts or omissions that had beencommitted in the territory of the forum
state. This was the approach taken inparticular by the common law countries:
offences committed abroad were not theirconcern, and their authorities would nottend to be willing to assist the authorities
of another State in bringing offenders tojustice.3
Where formal cooperation in criminalcases is impossible, informal cooperation
may arise. This began to emerge in law
enforcement during the 1700s and early
1800s, when the major international law
enforcement concerns were related to3This attitude was not limited to criminal law, but
could also be seen in civil cases. It is true thatprivate international law began to evolve already
du r ing the 1 20 0s . T hi s d is ci pl in e se e ks todetermine what law should govern a transaction
or occurrence that has a connection with two or
mo re juri sdi ctions. H ow eve r, inter national
cooperation even in civil cases was almost nonexistent up until the 1800s. A person who wanted
to summon a person in another country or enforce
a civil court judgment in another country often
found this to be impossible. It was not until the
mid-1800s that growing interest was expressed ininternational cooperation in civil matters. One of
the earliest treaties on service of process for civil
cases was signed in 1846 by France and by theGrand Duchy of Baden (later, part of Germany).

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piracy, the slave trade, smuggling andcross-border forays by bandits. At thattime, the tendency was for States to takeunilateral action to make arrests andbring the offenders to justice. This could
take the form of blatant incursions into
foreign territory (with or without the
support of law enforcement colleagues on
the other side of the border), such as
seizures of suspected pirate or slave-trade
ships even when they lay in the
territorial waters of a foreign state, orwhere posses rode across the Rio Grande
from the United Sta tes to Mexico inpursuit of bank robbers or cattle rustlers.
Such informal and unilateral actions,c olou rfu l as they may be, w ere an
unsatisfactory response to a growing
problem. Unilateral action could create
unnecessary tensions between nations.
For the police to be able to work acrossborders, arrangements had to evolve on
three different levels: the political level,
the structural level and the practicallevel.
On the political level 4 (what Benyon
calls the macro level), governments must
create the legal and political possibilities
for international police cooperation. Thisis the level that deals with thec o ns t it u t io n a n d le g i s la ti o n o f t h e
individual countries, and within te rna tion a l agre e m e nts. It is th epolitical level that determines the legal
issues relating to police opera tional
powers across borders. Countries that
had many cases in common graduallyb ega n to enter into more formalised
arrangements for cooperation, including
bilateral treaties. In 1919, Belgium and4

Benyon, John (1997), The Developing System ofFrance even agreed on allowing theirrespective police forces limited crossborder authority. In its most ambitious
form, the political level seeks to unify andharmonise the way in which criminal
justice and law enforcement is carried out
in two or more countries.
The second level, the structural level(referred to by Benyon as the meso level),d e a l s w it h o p e r a t io n a l s t r u c tu r e s,
p r a c ti ce s a nd p ro c e d u r e s . I t is th e
structural level that provides the tools forco operatio n. These tools include
information systems, common data bases,m e t h o d s o f c o o rd in a ti o n , a c c e s s to
information, and where necessary theestablishment of specialist organisations
dealing, for example, with counterfeitingor fraud.5
One
expandingele mentofinter national wor k on the second,
structural level consists of training andte chnica l co ope ra tio n. Co nsidera b lebilateral and multilateral efforts havebeen made to develop police skills andtechniques, through joint training andjoint exercises, and through the provisionof direction, training and resources. Sucha s si st a n ce i s p r o v id e d n o t o nl y f o r
altruistic reasons of helping the police inother countries to deal w ith serious
problems, but also for understandable
reasons of national interest, such asefforts to stabilise a re gim e in aneighbouring country, or to assist in
preventing and controlling crime thatmight otherwise spread internationally.
The third level is the practical level(referred to by Benyon as the micro level).
5

As Benyon points out, cooperation on this second

Police Cooperation in the European Union, inlevel often takes place between different law

McDonald, William F. (1997) (ed.), Crime and

e n f o r c e m e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n s e ve n w i t h o u t

Law Enforcement in the Global Village, Anderson

go v e r nm e n ta l i n it i at iv e o r pa r l i am e n ta r y

Publishing Company, Cincinnati, pp. 103–121.

approval.

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It is this level that is concerned with theinvestigation of specific offences and withthe prevention and control of particularforms of crime. Where the specific case athand has points of contact with a foreign
State, the practical steps may involvet ur n in g th e m a tt e r o ve r t o p r iv a t e
investigators, turning the foreign aspectsof the case over in full to the foreign law
enforcement body (or bodies), or granting
law enforcement authorities the power toact on foreign territory.6
J u d ic i a l c o o p e r a t i o n i n c r im i n a lmatters was even slower in emerging
than was cooperation in law enforcement.
Once again, it was cooperation in civil
matters that evolved first, and in someways paved the way for cooperation inc rim inal m a tte rs. 7 E xtrad itio n an dmutual assistance in criminal matters
lagged behind. Some work was done on
the subject by the League of Nations
Committee of Experts for the Progressive
Codification of International Law, and adraft convention was prepared in 1928,
covering “m easures of enquiry”, thesummoning of witnesses and experts toattend in the requesting S tate (w ith
6

immunity from prosecution in respect ofearlier conduct), the transfer of persons
in c ustody to appear as w itnesses(available only on the basis ofreciprocit y), and the s urren der of
exhibits. Assistance could be refused if
the relevant offence was notextraditable.8 The Harvard Draft
Convention in 1939 dealt with service ofprocess, obtaining evidence abroad andsupply of certain records relating toconvictions and to convicted offenders(McClean, ibid.). In respect of extradition,
the f irst multila tera l trea ty d id no t
emerge until 1933; this was theConvention on Extradition preparedwithin the framework of the Organizationof American States.9 In respect of mutual
assistance in criminal matters, even more
years had to pass until a multilateraltreaty was drafted: the Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of
1959, prepared within the framework of
the Council of Europe.
This is not to say that judicial
cooperation did not exist in criminal
m atter s be for e the 1933 and 1959
treaties. A few bilateral treaties wereNadelmann notes that today, this third type of cooperation, where law enforcement authorities from two
or more countries work directly together on specific cases or types of activities, is increasing. He observes
that lower-level officials tend to regard international politics as a hindrance, and that they therefore seek
to establish working relationships with foreign colleagues based on a common professional culture andobjectives. Ethan A. Nadelmann, in McDonald, op.cit, pp. 107–108.

7

Many bilateral treaties on the service of process and the taking of evidence abroad were made during the1800s. At the end of the 1800s, multilateral initiatives emerged. In 1889 and 1890, a Latin American
Congress on Private International Law was held in Montevideo. It produced the 1889 Convention on Civil
Procedure. Only a few years later, the first permanent intergovernmental structure for progressive
unification of the rules of private international law was set up: the Hague Conference on Private Law
began regular meetings in 1893. The Hague Conference meets every four years, and brings together
official delegations from a wide spectrum of legal systems around the world. It not only develops draft
conventions, but follows their implementation and, as needed, updates them. Already in 1894, the Hague
Conference produced a draft Convention on Civil Procedure, which was signed one year later. It was thisConvention that created the system of central authorities, which supplemented the existing network of
consular authorities.

8

David McClean, International Judicial Assistance, Clarendon, Oxford, 1992, p. 125.

9This has subsequently been replaced by the 1981 Inter-American Convention on Extradition.

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made already during the 1800s, and inrespect of drug trafficking, which has
l o ng bee n the co re o f tra n s na tiona lo r ga ni z e d c rim e, e ve n m ult ilat e ra ltreaties were made at the beginning of
the 1900s. 10 The International Opium
Convention was completed in 1912, and as e c o n d C o n v e n t i o n o n th i s s u b j e c t
appeared in 1925. This was followed, in
1931, by the Convention for Limiting theM anufacture and Regulating theDistribution of Narcotic Drugs,11 and in
1 9 5 3 b y t h e P ro to co l L im it in g a n dRegulating the Cultivation of the Poppy
Plant, the Production of, Internationala nd Wholesale Tra de in, a nd U se o f
Opium.
Bringing these multilateral treaties up
to the present, the 1961 Single
Convention established new mechanisms
a nd o bl i ga t io ns. I t as s igned certa infunctions to the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs and to an International Narcotics
Control Board. It also required States toprovide annual estimates of drugs usedfor various purposes, to abide by
restrictions on manufacture, production
and import, to criminalise the possession,
supply and transport of drugs, and makethem extraditable offences.
The main drug treaty today is the 1988
United Nations Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs andPsychotropic Substances, which enteredinto force in 1990. The 1988 Convention
calls for criminalisation of a range ofcriminal offences, including theorganisation, management or financing ofdrug offences, and the laundering of theproceeds (art. 3). If two States have acted
in th is r e sp e c t , t h e re s h o ul d b e n o
problem w ith the double criminality
requirement in extradition. According toarticle 6, the offences criminalised by the
1 9 8 8 C o n v e n t io n a r e b y d e f i n i t io n
extraditable offences, and the convention
itself can be regarded as providing thenecessary legal basis for extradition andm u t u a l a s s i s t a n ce . A rt . 5 c o n ta in sprovisions on confisca tion, a rt. 7 o n

10 Many countries have long preferred bilateral agreements over multilateral agreements. The advantage ofbilateral agreements is that they can be tailored to the specific needs of the two countries in question, andthey can be expanded, amended or terminated relatively easily, as required by the situation.
Furthermore, the two States will obviously have greater control over the planning, implementation andfollow-up of the cooperation.
Multilateral agreements, in turn, require that the States in question commit themselves to certain
common rules agreed upon by all the States involved. They are more difficult than bilateral agreements
to draft, amend and terminate. The infrastructure that is often required for the implementation ofmultilateral agreements calls for the investment of resources. At the same time, however, multilateralagreements provide a greater degree of stability to international cooperation. They represent an intention
to create lasting institutions based on mutual solidarity and shared responsibilities. Moreover, accession
to a multilateral agreement relieves the State of the responsibility for entering into a number of different
bilateral agreements, each of which may require different procedures. Finally, the extension ofmultilateral agreements lessens the possibility that offenders can seek to evade justice by operating in orfrom, or escaping to, States that are not parties to such agreements. (A list of multilateral treaties on
criminal law issues is provided in Bassiouni, M. C., A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 1987, pp. 355–475.)
Several countries (in Europe, these include Austria, Finland, Germany and Switzerland) have adopted
national legislation on international cooperation, which makes cooperation possible with those countries
with which there is no bilateral or multilateral agreement in force.
11 The 1925 Convention has subsequently been amended many times with protocols.

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119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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mutual assistance,12 art. 8 on the transfer
of proceedings, and art. 11 on controlled
delivery.
Asides from the topic of drugs, before
the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (thePalermo Convention) was opened forsignature at the end of 2000 there werea lmost no m ultilateral treaties thatwould have defined aspects of organizedcrime.13 During the 1970s, in response toa rash of sky-jacking and other hostagetaking, treaties w ere signed on thist o p ic . 1 4 I n 1 9 8 0 , a C o n ve n t i o n w a scompleted on the physical protection of
nuclear material, ten years later theCouncil of Europe completed the
C onve ntion on L a unde ring, S e ar ch,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds
f ro m C r i m e, a n d i n 1 9 9 6 t he I nt e r American Convention against Corruption
was com pleted. As this scattere dexamples show, it has taken a long time
for the w orld to rea liz e the need for
12 One notable aspect of the 1988 Convention is thata State Party may not refuse to render mutual
legal assistance on the grounds of bank secrecy.
13 Among

the few exceptions are treaties on theslave trade, the trade in women and children, theforgery of currency and terrorism. See Roger
C l a r k ( 1 9 9 4 ) , T h e U n i t e d N a ti o n s Cr i m ePrevention and Criminal Justice Programme.
Formulation of Standards and Efforts at Their
Implementation. University of Pennsylvania
Press 1994, p. 201, fns 10 through 21.
14 The1970 Convention for the Suppression of

Un lawfu l Seiz ure of A ircraft, th e 1971
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

agreeing on the rules for international
coop erationin respondingtotr an sn ationa l o rga nize d crime . T he
Palermo Convention can well be said torepresent a significant and welcomechange in this respect.
B. Moving On to the Next Stage: The
Emergence of International
Criminal Policy
Bilateral and multilateral treaties only
establish the framework for international
cooperation. In many respects, even thisframework remains very incomplete.
Responding to transnational organizedcrime requires more than the capacity to
extra d ite fu gitive s o r pr ovid e b asic
mutual legal assistance. During the postWorld War II period, countries aroundthe w o rld ha ve show n a n incr ea se dreadiness to go beyond treaties, and seek
to a g r e e o n a c o m m o n a p p r o a c h t ocriminal justice issues—in effect, they are
seeking to develop international criminal
policy.15
O ne elem ent in this e mergence ofinternational criminal policy has been thestrengthening of international academic
and profe ssion al co ope ration. T he
International Penal and PenitentiaryCommission was established already in
1846, and began to organize international
congresses. The International Associationof Penal Law was established in 1924.
Many other international academic andprof essiona l a ssocia tions ha ve b een
established since then.16 The early workof the United Nations crime prevention
and criminal justice programme can beagainst the Safety of Civil Aviation, the 1973
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

15 The term “international criminal policy” is used

Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons

here to refer to the mutual alignment by several

including D iploma tic Agents, and the 1 979

c ountri es of thei r c rim inal po lic y. It is no t

International Convention against the Taking ofinten ded to su ggest th e exist en ce of a

Ho sta ge s. I n 1 9 88 , the Co nve nti on for th es u pr a n a t io na l b o dy w i th t h e a u th o r it y to

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

establish its own “international criminal policy”

of Maritime Navigation was completed.

independent of the will of sovereign nations.

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readily described as being based on a
networking of individual academics andprofessionals, with a focus on research,and gradually also on norms andstandards.17
Three develop ments in pa rticular
contributed to international alignment of
national criminal policy. One, of course,
w as the practical reality: during theperiod since the Second World War, crossb order crime ha s become a practicalproblem, and countries realised thatdomestic or unilateral efforts alone were
not enough. At the same time, crime was
becoming a political issue that forced
som e co untries to re consid er ho w it
should be approached. This was mostcle arly e viden t w ith the ca se of theUnited States and its “war on drugs”,
which fo cused attentio n also o n the
16 Among

the

more

widely

known

such

organizations, in addition to the International
Association of Penal Law and the International
Penal and Penitentiary Foundation, are the Asianinternational aspects. The emergence ofinternational terrorism during the 1960s
served to enforce this internationalisationof criminal policy.
A se cond development was theintensifying cooperation among certain
neighbouring countries, such as thec o o p e ra ti o n a m o n g th e f iv e N o r d ic
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sw eden) and among theth r e e B e n e l ux c o u n tr i e s ( B e lg iu m ,Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The
Nordic countries, for example, organizedregular meetings among their respective
ministers, at which also criminal policy
issues were discussed. Cooperation was
also close in the drafting of legislation, so
close that in 1960 , all five countries
e n a c t e d s i m i l a r l e g i s l a t io n o n t h e
extradition of offenders, and in 1963 on
the enforcement of sentences. As a resultof this and other harmonized legislation,
extradition and mutual legal assistancewithin this group of countries becamevery simple and effective.

Crime Prevention Foundation, the International
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), Amnesty
International, Defence for Children International,
the H o w a r d L ea gu e fo r Pe na l Re fo r m , th e
International Association of Juvenile and Family
Court Magistrates, the International Commissiono f Ju r is ts, the I nte r na tio na l So ci e ty fo r
Criminology, the International Society for Social
Defence, and Penal Reform International.
17 Although thedelegations at the sessions of theUnited Nations Committee on Crime Prevention
and Control and at the quinquennial Congresses
represented Member States, the discussions
maintained a strong fla vour of i ntel lectual
disco urse and the exchange of pr ofessi onal
experience. It was not until the reform of thestructure of the United Nations programme at the
beginning of the 1990s that Governments clearlybegan taking an active interest in the decisionmaking process. See, for example, Clark (op.cit.),and Manuel Lopez-Rey (1985), A Guide to United
Nations Criminal Policy, Cambridge.

352

The third and perhaps most importantf a c to r le a d in g t o t h e e m e r g e n c e o finternational criminal policy was theestablishment of inter-governmentalorganisations that provided theframework for the development of suchpolicy. These organisations took various
forms.
•

the United Nations has already been
mentioned. As noted, during its earlyyears the UN crime prevention andcriminal justice programme focusedmore on academic and professional
issues. Over the past fifteen years,
however, it has become very active in
mobilising international cooperation,a s sho w n b y the d ev e lop m e nt o f
several mode l trea ties, a nd mostclearly in the drafting of the United119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.18••

a second form is represented by the
Commonwealth
Secretariat(established in 1965), that provides alink among countries that share a
sim ila r cultur a l he rita ge . O the rexamples of similar cooperation canbe found among the Francophonecountries, and between Portugal andPortuguese-speaking Africancountries.
a third form is represented by thevariousintergovernmentalorganisations for general regional andsubregional cooperation, such as theCouncil of Europe and the European
C o m m un ity ( late r the E uro p e anUnion), the Economic Community ofWest A frican States, the Arab
League, the Organisation of African
Unity (to be replaced in 2002 by theAfrican Union), the Organisation ofAmerican States, and by cooperation
am ong the Southern Africancountries, and among the Mercosur
countries (A rgentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay).

The types of cooperation carried out
within these structures vary considerably.
The main forms include the developmentof n ew internat ion al ag reements,
internatio na l legal assistance , nonbinding recommendations, resolutions
and guid elines, a nd the e xcha nge of
information and experience.
To da y o ne ca n a lrea d y spe a k o f a
problem with a proliferation of actors andagencies in international cooperation incriminal justice: various Government
agencies (not always working in harmony
ev e n w it hin a c o unt ry ), a ca de m ic s,Interpol, Europol, regional bodies for
Africa, Europe and Latin America, theCustoms Co-operation Council, the Groupof Seven (which established the Financial
Action Task Force), the Commonwealth
Secretariat, the Organisation of Economic
C oo p e ra tio n a nd D e ve lop m e nt, a nd
various bodies with the United Nations.
Asides from the practical difficulty of too
19 In

the Asian and Pacific region, for example,

regional cooperation has developed perhaps moststrongly among Australia, New Zealand and other
South Pacific jurisdictions, for example in theform of the annual Pacific Island Law Offices
Meetings. Perhaps the premier recurring theme•

a fourth form is the organisations
that focus on specific issues. Thesemay be interregional, such as the
Financial Action Task Force. On theregional level, there are many
examples.19

at these meetings has been law enforcement cooperation and development. Essentially the samegroup of countries is brought together by theS o u th Pa c if ic Fo r u m o n L a w En fo r c e me n t
Cooperation. The heads of government of the
Sou th P aci fi c Foru m i s su ed a “Hon i ara
Declaration” in 1992 that dealt with such basic

18 Prior to the 1980s, the only significant organizedissues as mutual assistance in criminal matters,

crime issues addressed in the United Nations

forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, extradition,

related to organized crime were trafficking in

the Financial Action Task Force, customs, police

women, and drugs (see, for example, Lopez-Rey

and drug issues, and training.

1985 an d Clark 1994) . T he spread of

The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee

transnational organized crime, the establishment

meets regularly, as does the Asian and Pacificof the United Nations Commission on Crime

Conferences of Correctional Administrators. The

Prevention and Criminal Justice, and the model

Asian and Pacific Economic Community appearsof the 1988 Convention all contributed to theto be taking tentative steps towards including

activation of the UN also in this area.

criminal justice-related issues on its agenda.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
many meetings, the agencies may end up
p u r su in g d if f e r e n t a p p ro a ch e s a n d
instruments. Already now, some aspectsof existing treaties (especially in relation
to the proceeds of crime) are technicallydifficult for the legislator and the court.
Multiplying them could well increase
these difficulties.

A. International Cooperation isStrengthening with Increasing
Rapidity
The first trend is clear enough:international
coop erationhas
str e ng th e ne d , a nd is d oi ng s o w it hincreasing rapidity.
This can be seen on a number of levels:

III. THE DYNAMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONIN CRIME PREVENTION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Section II above has outlined some ofthe historical develop ment ofi n te r n a t io n a l c o o p e r a t io n i n c r im e
prevention and criminal justice. It is time
to put some flesh on the bones, and lookat how the system works in practice. This
will be done by presenting five trends,
w ith special reference to the need torespond to transnational organized crime:
•
•

•

•

•

international cooperation is strengthening with increasing rapidity
theintensityofinternational
cooperation varies , and we are
increasingly seeing the emergence ofsmall groups of “fast track” countries,
among which coop eration isdeveloping very rapidlyinternational cooperation is becoming
formalised and “deeper”, with “soft”
resolutions and recommendations
being increasingly supplemented bytreaties and joint decisions
international cooperation is developing from an ad hoc (thematic) focus oni nd i vi d ua l o f f e n ce c a te g o ri e s o r
issues, to a more general international criminal policy
international cooperation is becoming
increasingly politicised.

•

•
•
•
•

the increase in arrangements for
inform al cooperation betwee n
individual agencies, including theestablishment of formal and informal
networks;
the growing mesh of liaison officers
around the world; 20
the growing interest in the exchange
of information in different fora;
the increase in the number ofinternational cooperation projects;
the increase in the number ofoffenders extradited;

20 TheUnited States has been the most active insending out liaison officers and legal attaches. On
the European experience with liaison officers, seefor example Malcolm Anderson and Monica Den
Boer (eds.), Policing Across National Boundaries,
London 1994.
The magnitude of this work can be seen for
example in the fact that the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration alone has some two
hu ndre d agents s tation ed ab ro ad. Ano ther
example is that the United States Embassy inRome has forty persons working full-time on
operational cooperation in criminal justice related
matters; many of them have a regional mandate.
The five Scandinavian countries have developed au ni qu e form of coopera tion : th eir pol ice
authorities have established a joint network ofliaison officers in Austria, Cyprus, Germany,G r e e c e , H u n ga r y, I ta l y, th e N e th e r l a nd s ,Pakistan, Poland, Spain, Thailand, Turkey andthe United Kingdom. Information collected bythese liaison officers is then shared directly withth eir colleagues back h ome in all f ive
Scandinavian countries.

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119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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the increase in the number ofrequests for mutual legal assistance,and so on.

Mere expansion of activity, of course, isno measure of its effectiveness. Much
operational cooperation remains
frustrating and bureaucratic, with forexample requests for assistance often notleading to the desired results. Similarly,
much cooperation in institution-building
is of doubtful effectiveness for a numbero f r e a s o n s: th e p r o j e c t s a r e p o o rl yp la n ne d a n d im p le m e nte d , the r e isneedless overlap with other projects, little
or no attention is devoted to follow-up,
and so on.21
Nonetheless, the growth in the amountof activity reflects the growing concern
over crime, and the increasing hopes
being placed on the capacity ofinternationa l coop eration to help inproviding a suitable response.
B. The Emergence of Groups of“Fast Track” Countries
As a general rule of thumb, the wider
the geographical scope, the looser thecooperation in crime prevention andcriminal justice.
At one extreme, the United Nations
includes some 190 member States, andhas traditionally worked on the basis ofconsensus—something which has provento be difficult to achieve in respect of suchcontentious criminal justice issues as theuse of capital punishment, the use of
mutual evaluation or the establishmentof joint investigative teams.

21 See,At the other extreme, as already noted,
b ilate ra l f or ms o f co o pe ra tio n ha veconstituted and will doubtless continue toconstitute the mainstay of international
coopera tion in crime prevention andcriminal justice.
Somewhere between the globality of
the United Nations on one hand andbilateral cooperation on the other isregional cooperation. For example theCouncil of Europe is a much sma ller
entity than the United Nations, and has
arguably had considerably more impact
on the development of the criminal policyof its member States. When establishedin 1949, it brought together ten Western
European countries which—despite thed if f e r e nc e s b e tw e e n th e G e rm a ni c,
French and common law legal systems
and certain other differences in criminal
justice—shared fundamental values andgoals.
Th e Cou ncil of Eu rope h as been
expanding at a ra pid rate. From ten
original members in 1949, it grew to 21
M emb e r S ta t es t e n yea rs a go, to 4 3Member States today. This expansion has
been largely towards the East, with theRussian Federation the most significant
new member (January 1996). In joining,
the new Member States have implicitly
and expressly endorsed the same values
and goals.
An even smaller unit, the European
Union with its fifteen members at present
has a lso been expanding. Currently,
discussions are underway with twelve
co un t ri e s o n th e i r a p p l ic a t io ns f o r
membership in the European Union, 22
and the possibility exists that some mayfor example, Matti Joutsen, International

Cooperation. T he Development of Crim e

22 Bulgaria,

Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,

Prevention and Criminal Justice in Central and

Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,

Eastern Europe. HEUNI Papers no. 2, Helsinki

Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Negotiations

1994.

are at an earlier stage with Turkey.

355

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
become members in 2003 or 2004. Within
the EU, in turn, there are even smaller
units of more intensive integration, andagain these are expanding. For example,
the current parties to what are known ast h e S c h e n g e n a c c o r d s a r e A us t r ia ,Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Spain and Sweden.23 The
Schengen accord countries have agreed
among themselves on such highly
developed forms of cooperation and hot
pursuit across borders, trans-bordersurveillance (i.e. surveillance carried out
b y l a w e nf o r c e m e n t o f f ic e r s i n t h eterritory of another state) and controlled
delivery (following the internationaldelivery of, e.g., narcotics in order toascertain the source and the destination).
Perhaps even more importantly in theelectronic a ge, la w enforcem ent andb o rd e r a uth o ritie s in t he S c he nge n
co untrie s sha re certain info rma tionsystems.
Continuing with the example of theE urope an U nion, o ne of the current
f a shio nable te rms is “flexibility” indecision-making. In a speech given in
June 2000 in Berlin, Mr. Jacques Chirac,the President of France, suggested that a
new “pioneering group”, self-evidently led
by France and Germ any, would
henceforth guide developments in theEuropean Union. Other countries might“join forces” with France and Germany ins u c h a gr o u p . 2 4 H e s u g g e s t e d t h a t
flexibility would allow groups of countries
t o g o a h e a d w i th n e w p r o j e c ts a n dinstitutions whether the countries leftoutside those ventures liked it or not. And

if flexibility was not enough, said Mr.
Chirac, France and Germany should cooperate outside the framework of the EU
treaties entirely.
The conclusion here is that there is an
obvious need f or m ore intensive
coopera tion in crime prevention a nd
criminal ju stice. If this cannot be
achieved within a larger entity, smallergroups of countries with the greatest
interest in cooperation may well form a
sub-group that moves onto the fast track.
O thers, rea li si ng the b enef it s b ei ng
achieved, may soon seek to join thissmaller group—but this at the same time
may complicate the problems involved infinding a common approach.
C. “Soft” Resolutions andRecommendations are Being
Increasingly Supplemented with
Treaties and Joint Decisions
Reference has already been made to
the fact that cooperation in criminal
justice usually begins with law
enforcement, and only then expands toinclude judicial cooperation. Law
enforcement cooperation tends to be
based on direct contacts and a pragmatic
approach, while judicial cooperation often
requires a legal framework. For thisr e a so n , o n e tr e nd i n in t e r n a ti o n a lcooperation is towards formalisation.
T his tre nd to ward s f orm alisation
appears for example in the increasing use
made of treaties and binding decisions. As
h a s b e e n n o t e d , u p u n ti l r e c e n tl y ,relatively few multilateral treaties havebeen signed in the crime prevention and

23 Although Norway and Iceland are not members of

24 Mr. Chirac did not refer to any other country by

the Eur o pe a n Un io n , the y a r e i nvo l ve d inname in this connection, just as he did not refer to

Schengen cooperation. This is due to the fact that

the Commission. Past experience suggests that

they, together with three EU members (Denmark,Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands

Finland and Sweden), form a passport-free zone

might wish to associate themselves with such aof their own.

group.

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119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
criminal justice field, and only a few
countries have been active in draftingb i la t e r a l t r e a t i e s . A s a r e s u l t,intergovernmental cooperation has long
relied almost solely on “soft” resolutions
and recommendations, in which states are
merely requested to adopt certain policies.
For example the United Nations has
produced a large number of non-binding
statements of principles in the form of
r e s o l u ti o n s,
r e c o m m e n d a ti o n s,
declarations, guidelines, and standards
and norms.25 Also other intergovernmental
and even non-governmental organizations
have produced statements of principles
which are designed to guide the work of
their membership, but which have nobinding effect.
It is true that even “soft,” non-binding
instrum ents ca n b e influentia l. Fo r
example the Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by
the United Nations have clearly guided
national practice in corrections and, inseveral cases, helped bring about legal
reform. However, states havetraditionally been quite protective of
their sovereignty in this field, as can beseen in the protracted negotiations thatare required when such instruments arebeing drafted or when there is discussionof possible m onitoring of theimplementation of these instruments. 26
25 Foran analysis of the legal nature of United

Nations instruments, see Clark 1994, pp. 141–144
and passim.
26 Discussions

on

the

monitoring

of

the

implementation of standards and norms haveoften run up against different understandings ofwhat exactly “monitoring” involves. Currently thepreference is to use different terminology. The
Secretary-General of the United Nations does not“monitor implementation” of standards andnorms, but for example “promotes their use andAs a result, the wording in resolutions
and recommendations tends to allow
different interpretations of how theyshould be applied.
Today, “soft” resolutions andrecomm endatio ns continue to be
produced, but there has been a clear
increase in the drafting of “hard” bilateraland multilateral treaties world-wide. On
the regional level, several multilateraltreaties have been prepared for example
in Europe and in Latin America. On the
global level, the United Nations 1988
Convention Aga inst Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances was a decisive step in thisdirection. One of the weaknesses withmost multilateral agreements has beenthat they have been offence-specific, andhave presumed (often, incorrectly) theprior existence of workable arrangements
for extradition and mutual assistance.
The 1988 Convention was innovative inincluding provisions on, for example,
extradition and mutual assistance. As aresult, the Convention has proven to beworkable. It has, for example, contributed
to the relatively rapid spread of thecriminalisation of money laundering, andto the revision of le gisla tion o n theforfeiture of the proceeds of crime.
The 1988 Convention was followed by
the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.
Reference should also be made to themodel treaties prepared by the United
Nations, on extradition, m utual
assistance, the transfer of proceedings incriminal matters, the transfer of foreignprisoners, and the transfer of supervisionof offenders conditionally sentenced or
conditionally released. Currently, work
has begun on a United Nations
convention against corruption.

application”. See, for example, Clark 1994, pp.
229 ff.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
A parallel development—one that is so
far limited to some parts of the world—
has been the develop ment of newm e cha nism s to e nsure the e ff e ctive
implementation of treaty obligations
related to criminal justice. One model hasb een th e 1 950 Con ven tion for th eProte ction o f Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms, prepared by the
C ou n cil of Eu rope. Accept an ce bysignatory states of the jurisdiction of theEuropean Court of Human Rights meansthat even individual citizens can turnultimately to the Court when they believethat their human rights (as defined by
the Convention) have been violated. Since
this provides considerable protection
a gainst such viola tions, the various
articles of the European Convention on
Huma n R ights ha ve clea rly affected
na t i ona l l e gis l a t io n a nd p ra ct ice i ncriminal procedure, for example on issues
r ela ted to to rture o r to inhum a n or
degrading penalties or treatment (art. 3);
conditions of arrest and charges, transfer
before a magistrate and right to recourse(art. 5), the right to a fair trial (art. 6),
and the legality of punishment (art. 7).27

Accordingly, home and justice issues
form what is called the “third pillar” of
the European Union.28 In areas defineda s b e i ng o f “ c o m m o n i n t e re s t ,” t h eEuropean Council may adopt frameworkdecisions and joint positions, and draw up
conventions. Once a framework decision
has been adopted, member states are
required to amend their laws and practiceto bring the se into lin e. 29 Onc e theEuropean Union has adopted a joint
position, member states are required toabide by it in international organisations
and at the international conferences theyattend. This means that even in respectof contacts with non-member states, EU
members must “toe the line” adopted on
an international level.
Overall, “soft” methods of cooperation
will remain an important element ofinternational criminal policy. These allow
individual states considerable leeway todecide on how best to realise the goals set
in the resolutions or recommendations.
However, in particular the response to
28 In

EU jargon, the “first pillar” is essentiallye co no mi c co ope r atio n thr o ugh the or i gi nal

The tenor of international cooperation
changed once again in Europe with the
1992 Maastricht Treaty, by which theEuropean Communities metamorphosed
into the European Union, and by the 1997
Treaty of Amsterdam. Having previously
focused more on economic integration, themember states of the European
Communities realised that also home andjustice affairs must be placed on theagenda for European integration.

European Communities, the second is foreign
relations and security, and the third is home andjustice issues.
29 One example of obligations on member states inrespect of criminal justice relates to Community
law. The European Court of Justice has foundthat Member States have an obligation to act
against violations of Community law as if thesewere violations of national law (Commission v
G reece, ECR 1979, p. 2965). In Germ any v.
Commission C-240/90, the Court ruled that the
Eur ope an Com munity has the author ity to

27 The European Convention on Human Rights has

require that a Member State enact appropriate

al so h ad an im pact on the use of capi tal

sanctions against violations of Community law.

punishment (protocol no. 6 from 1983, and theNote, however, that this is an indirect obligation:

possibility allowed under the 1957 European

Community law cannot dir ectly change theConvention on Extradition to refuse extradition if

c r i m in al l a w o f a M em b e r Sta te . A ny

the requesting country could impose the death

amendments or reforms would have to be made bypenalty).

the Member State through domestic legislation.

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119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
transnational organized crime isrequiring “harder” methods, and at leastin Europe states are agreeing torelinquish part of their sovereignty tothis end. Although no other regions haveintergovernmenta l political entities
comparable with the European Union,
the “European model” may point the way
to multilateral development also
elsewhere.
D. From an Ad Hoc Focus to a More
General International Criminal
PolicyThe
traditional
patternininternational cooperation in this field has
been for states that find that they share acommon concern to agree among
themselves, on a case-by-case basis, on
the appropriate mechanism and response.
The existing international treaties thatdeal for example with criminal justiceissues have all been signed by quite
different sets of states.
S uch a ca se- by-ca se a ppro ach has
undeniable benefits, in that the states
can focus on a specific issue and find theappropriate response. It nonetheless does
not promote a more integrated and longterm policy in international cooperation.
Theoretically, each state, as it were,
continues to act entirely on its own,
without any reference to the interests ofother states in crime prevention andcriminal policy.
The alternative would be for groups ofstates to agree on certain priority issues,and develop an integrated strategy for
dealing with these issues.
T he Council of Europe ha s been af orerunner in this. The C ouncil ha sregularly organiz ed meetings on
Eu ropean crimin al policy, and its
C o m m it te e o n C r im e P r o b le m s h a soffered a forum for discussion on further
action.
M ore re cently, a lso the Euro pe anUnion has been identifying priority areas.
I n J un e 1 9 9 7 , t he E u r o p e a n U ni o nadopted a “Plan of Action” to combat
organized crime. This plan of action was
drawn up following discussions about
what types of measures in general wereneeded to respond to organized crime
nationally and internationally. In effect,the 1997 decision embodied an agreedup on inte rnatio nal crim inal po licy.
Moreover, instead of being presented as a
resolution, recom mendation orde claration that ha ve so o ften been
adopted in other fora, regrettably oftenwith little practical impact, the European
Union decided on specific action, with aclear division of responsibilities, a clear
timetable and a mechanism for
implementing the action plan. The strong
consensus reached by Member States on
the 1997 Plan of Action helped to create
the political and professional climate
required on both the EU level and thenational level to take and implement thenecessary decisions.30 In the year 2000,
the Plan of Action was replaced by a new
integrated EU strategy to prevent andcontrol organized crime, “The Prevention
a nd C on tro l o f O rga niz e d C r im e : A
European Union Strategy for the
beginning of the new Millennium.”
The shift from an ad hoc approach toattempts to formulate a more coherent
and general international criminal policy
can also be seen in the work of the United
Na tio ns. F or me rly, the re w a s little
30 The model for this was taken from the “European

Plan against Narcotics” adopted by the European
Union in December 1990, and updated several
times since then, most recently in December
2000, when a strategy was adopted for the years
2000–2004.

359

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
evidence of an over-all strategy in thework of the United Nations Committee on
Crime Prevention and Control. Although
the Committee dealt with a large numberof important issues, this was almost
invariably done on a piece-meal basis.
At the beginning of the 1990s, twodevelopments took place that ensured
that organized crime would become acentral issue in the United Nations crime
prevention and criminal justiceprogramme, and that a strong attempt
would be made to move from an ad hoc
approach to the setting of policy.
The first development was that thestructure of the United Nations
P ro gr a m m e w a s r e f o r m e d . T h e 2 7 member Committee on Crime Prevention
and C ontro l, which consisted ofindividual experts, was replaced by a 40m ember Com mission on Crim ePrevention and Criminal Justice. Thesem e m b e rs w e re M e m b e r S ta te s. Th ere form also ca lled for the se tting o fpriorities in the programme.
At its second session in 1993, theUnited Nations Commission decided ont h e p r io r it y th e m e s f o r t he U n it e dNations crime prevention and criminal
justice programme. Organized crime was
identified as part of one of three priority
themes. The formulation of this priority
theme is “national and transnational
crime, including organized crime,
economic crim e (including money
laundering), and the role of criminal law
in the protection of the environment”.31“strategies to deal with transnational
crime”. Only five months later, a seminar,
co-organized by HEUNI, was held in
Suzdal, Russian Federation. This
international seminar brought together
leading law enforcement officers andex p er ts fr om f ift ee n co un trie s. T heseminar prepared a report which soughtto d e scrib e the p ro f ile o f o rga n iz e dcriminal groups, and went on to provide alarge number of recommendations on
sub sta nt ive l eg isla tio n , p ro ce d ur a llegislation, law enforcement methods,
organisational structures, international
cooperation, and evaluation. Both sets ofrecommendations were forwarded to thene wly e stablishe d U nited Nation s
Commission. The Commission annexed
the tw o sets to a brief resolution o norganized crime, which was subsequently
adop ted b y the E conom ic and Socia lCouncil.32
The third and most important meeting
was the World Ministerial Conference on
Organized Transnational Crime, held in
Naples, Italy on 21–23 November 1994.
Delegations from 142 countries agreed on
the broad outlines of cooperation in theprevention and co ntrol of o rga niz ed
transnational crime. The agreement was
31 Theother two priority themes are (ii) crime

prevention in urban areas, juvenile and violent
cri m e; a nd ( ii i ) effi ci en cy, f ai rn es s an di m pro ve me n t i n th e m a na gem en t an dadministration of criminal justice and related
systems with due emphasis on the strengtheningof national capacities in developing countries forthe regular collection, collation, analysis andutil isa ti on o f data i n th e de ve lo pm en t a nd

The second development was a series ofthree meetings, culminating in a major
conference at the end of 1994. First, an
expert g roup meeti ng was h eld in
Bratislava (Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic) in 1991. The meeting developed
a set o f fifte en re co mme nd ations on360

implementation of appropriate policies.
32 E/CN.15/1992/7,

draft

resolution

II.

The

Commission also adopted a resolution entitled“Control of the Proceeds of Crime”, which ing e ne r a l c a ll e d o n M e m b e r S ta t e s a n d t he
Secretary-General to take action to prevent andcontrol money laundering; ibid, resolution 1/2.

119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
embodied in a draft resolution for the
G en er a l A sse m b ly e ntitle d “ Na ple s
Political Declaration and Global Action
Plan against Organized Transnational
Crime.” This was approved by th e
General Assembly by its resolution 49/
159.
T h e N a p le s P ol itic a l D e c la ra tio nconsists of ten paragraphs that express
the intention of the countries represented
at the Conference to join forces to develop
co-ordinated strategies and other forms ofi n t e r n a t io n a l c o o p e r a t io n . S p e c i a l
ref erence w as m ad e to the 19 88 UN
C onvention a ga inst Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrop ic
Substances. States which had not yet
done so were urged to become parties tothis Convention, and to fully implement it
as well as other relevant ex isting
agreements.
The same document also expresses thewish of the participants to strengtheninternational cooperation, in particular in
relation to closer alignment of legislation
on organiz ed crim e, operational
cooperation in investigation, prosecution
and judicial activity, the establishment ofm o d a l itie s a nd b a sic p rin c ip le s f o r
regiona l and glob al coopera tion, theelaboration of international agreements,and measures and strategies to preventand control money-laundering.
The G lobal Action Plan consists ofseven sections:a. the definition and description of transnational organized crime,b. specific issues in national legislationand guidelines,
c. operational cooperation,d. regional and international cooperation,e. the feasibility of international instruments on organized transnational
crime,
f. the prevention and control of moneylaundering, andg. follow-up and implementation.
The Naples Political Declaration and
the Global Action Plan led, in time, to theUnited N a tio ns C onve ntio n a ga inst
Transnational Organized Crime, andthus their significance has to a large
extent been overtaken by events. Even so,they, together with the Vienna
Declaration adopted at the Tenth United
Nations Congress in the year 2000, arefurther illustrations of the trend towards
adopting broad statements on
international policy regarding criminal
justice issues.
E. International Cooperation is
Becoming Increasingly
Politicised
Although all states are undoubtedly
agreed on the necessity of determining
priorities and establishing policy, thisprocess has not run smoothly. Different
states will continue to have different
priorities. Furthermore, if too m any“priority issue s” a re accep ted into a
programme, or if these priority issues aredefined too broadly, they do not assistde c isio n- m a kin g on th e n a tio na l orinternational level.
These difficulties are clearly
perceptible in the work of the United
Nations. One of the fundamental reasons
for restructuring the United Nations
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Programme was that the Programme had
become inundated with a large number of
mandates, and the Secretariat as well as
the other implementing bodies had notbeen provided with the resources
required to implement anywhere near allof these mandates.

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T h e f o u r t re nd s i n in t e r na ti o n a lcooperation described above—theincreasing rapidity of its strengthening,the development of groups of “fast track”
countries, the supplanting of “soft” formsof cooperation with treaties, and the shiftt o w a r d s t h e f o rm u la ti o n o f a m o r egeneral international criminal policy—
are all in themselves welcome features. It
is the fifth trend—the increasing
politicisationofinternational
cooperation—that raises questions.
Furtherm ore, the po liticisa tion ofinternational criminal policy (a process
which is perceptible at least in the workof the United Nations Commission, butalso for example in the European Union)
raises the spectre that international
criminal justice forums will be used as atool in national and international politics.
One illustration of this danger can betaken from the recent global debate overmoney laundering. In July 2000, theFinancial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering published a so-called“blacklist” of 15 jurisdictions that, in its
v ie w , h a d n o t b e e n s u f f ic ie nt ly c o operative in preventing and controllingmoney laundering.33 Since the blacklist
appe ar ed, m any if not all o f the sejurisdictions have been more active in, forexample, reforming their legislation andfiling suspicious activity reports (SARs).
Some, however, have regarded this public
blacklisting and the related measures asa violation of their sovereignty, and as an
attempt to steer their economy, to thea dva ntage of the wea lthi er FA TF
members.

T he neg otia tions ove r the U nited
Nations
Convention
againstTransnational Organized Crime provided
a few examples of the politicisation ofinternational criminal policy. Amongthese were the debate over whether or not
to include a specific reference to therecommendations adopted by the FATF,34
how to address the interrelationshipbetween terrorism and organized crime,35
how to d eal with the issue ofso vereignty, 36 and w hethe r or not amechanism should be created to monitor

34 The solution adopted was to delete references to

the FATF resolutions or any other resolutions,a nd re fe r o nly to usi ng a s a guide line “therelevant initiatives of regional, interregional andm u lt il a te r a l o r ga ni za ti o ns aga i n st m o ne ylaundering”. References to FATF as well as tos e ver a l o the r r egi o na l o r gan i zat io n s w er einserted into the travaux preparatoires.
35 The issues involved here are complex. Essentially,

several States are convinced that terrorism is one
form, and indeed a particularly dangerous form,of organized c rime . The majority of State s,
however, were of the view that a distinction
should be made between terrorism and organizedcrime, not least because including terrorism inthe scope of the Convention would raise vexatious
political problems with the definition. The view ofthe majority was that terrorism ultimately had
p o li ti c a l a i m s, w h i l e o r ga ni z ed c r i m e h a dmaterial aims. Having said that, it was explicitly
recognized that terrorists may commit acts (suchas murder, arson, extortion and robbery) to which
the Convention would clearly apply.
36 One source of tension in the discussions was theconcern of some States that, when transnationalorganized crime is at issue, some States may

33 FATF

updated the list in June 2001. It now

engage in actions that violate the sovereignty ofi n c l u d e s C o o k I s l a n d s , D o m i n i c a , Eg y p t,o the r Sta tes . T hi s c o nc e r n w a s ra is e d, fo r

Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Lebanon,

exampl e,

Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria,

investigations (art. 19) and special investigative

Niue, Philippines, the Russian Federation, St.

techniques (art. 20). The issue was resolved by

K i t ts a n d Ne v i s, a n d St . V i nc e n t a nd th e

including in the Convention a separate article

Grenadines.

entitled “Protection of sovereignty”.

362

when

sp ea kingabout

join t119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
impleme ntation
obligations.37

of

the

treatyIV. CONCLUSIONSCrime has evolved considerably overthe past few years. Economic, social andpolitical fa ctors have contributed tochanges in the amount and structure ofcrime. Theories that are based on theconcept of a weakening of self-control andon the opportunity for crime help us tounderstand what has happened.
The background factors—economic
in te gr atio n, po lit ical an d e c o no m ic
reform s, w ide- sprea d w ars and civil
disturbances, and demographic
changes—are factors that either cannot
be changed (or will not be changed solely)in the interest of crime prevention. For
example, although economic integration
leads to a greater opportu nity foreconomic crime, this is the cost we seemt o b e p r e p a r e d t o p a y f o r a h i gh e rstandard of living. And although there
are loud calls in many countries for a
return to the “good old da ys” bef oree conom ic and p olitical ref orm , such
reform will presumably not be halted—
and certainly not on the grounds that theprocess appears to increase the amount ofcrime.

37 For example European Union countries advocatedthe inclusion in the Convention of arrangements
for mutual evaluation. According to this system,in te r na ti on a l e xpe r ts as se s s ho w w el l th e
authorities of a State are implementing their
responsibilities. Several States were sceptical ofsuch a system, for example on the grounds that it
amounted to interference with State sovereignty.
Ultimately, the reference was modified to a rather
vague “information provided ... through suchsupplemental review mechanisms as may beestablished by the Conference of the Parties.”

The effects of these changes on crime
and the control of crime, however, can be
influenced in order to lessen the amountand seriousness of crime, and provide afair allocation of the costs of crime and ofcrime control. The strengthening fear ofcrime in many countries, fanned by the
media and by political rhetoric, calls forattention—in particular since this fear is
influenced by false or misleading
information, and the rhetoric may lead tocounterproductive policy decisions, or atworse, to the spread of hate crimes.
Many states are responding to theirnational crime problem by reviewing theeffectiveness of their criminal policy andby setting up a varie ty of crime
prevention councils and projects. Becauseof the growing ties between countries, it
is not surprising that information onsu c c e ss f ul i n it i a t i v e s is s p r e a d i ng
internationally. Although each country’s
situation is unique, and projects thathave worked elsewhere can rarely betransplanted as such, they can lead tomodified approaches that are successful
in this different environment.
The response to the international
aspects of crime has also been notable.
International cooperation is broadening
and strengthening to the extent that, ins u ch a r e a s a s d r u g t ra f f i c k i n g a n dorganized crime, we can speak of broad
agreement on the general goals. However,even with such regional initiatives (inEur ope) as the Council of Europe,
Schengen, Maastricht and Europol, we
are a long way from developing a truly
international crime policy, much less aninternational criminal justice system.
The different states will continue to havedifferent view s of the general role ofcriminal law in society. Integration canhelp the different states in responding totheir crime problems, but it can neverreplace national and local action.

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