REPORTS
OF THECOURSERESOURCE MATERIALSERIES
No. 56
GROUP 2CURRENT PROBLEMS IN RESPONDING TO THE CORRUPTACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AT THE INVESTIGATION
AND TRIAL STAGES, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THEM
Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Rapporteur
Co-Rapporteur
Members

Advisers

Mr. Sardar Muhammad Raza
Mr. Tamotsu Hasegawa
Mr. Emmanuel Onuoha
Mr. Yasushi Hatayama
Mr. Luis Artigas Jr.
Mr. Ruben Maitland
Mr. Yuji Suzuki
Mr. Yasuhiro Muraki
Mr. Omur Nogoyev
Mr. Nihal Sunil Rajapaksa
Professor Keiichi Aizawa
Professor Hiroshi Iitsuka

I. INTRODUCTION
The group discussion on current
problems and solutions in responding to thecorrupt activities of public officials at theinvestigative and trial stages was executed
under three sub-topics. The first part dealt
with the problems and solutions forsecuring independence and neutrality of
the investigative agencies and the courts.
The target of this sub-topic was to obtainan overview of the current structure,function, and control of investigative
agencies and the courts in the participants’countries, and to find appropriate orrecommendable measures to achieve
independence and neutrality.
Secondly, the problems and solutions for
detection and investigation of corruption
by public officials was the subject of
discussion in sub-topic two. Here, issues
regarding the problem of gathering
information, securing the cooperation ofpeople involved in the case, investigative
tools, investigators’ skill, and coordination
among different investigative agencies in

546(Pakistan)(Japan)(Nigeria)(Japan)(Brazil)(Grenada)(Japan)(Japan)(Kyrgyzstan)(Sri Lanka)(Japan)(Japan)the various countries, were discussed
exhaustively. The group also identified
appropriate solutions for the detection andinvestigation of corruption in the public
sector, and recommended these for
implementation by relevant agencies indifferent countries.
Thirdly, the group examined the
problems of and solutions for speedy andefficient administration of trial. The focus
of discussion was on the necessity for the
introduction of witness protection
programs, the reversal of burden of proof,
resources at the disposal of trial courts,
witness cooperation, dilatory tactics of the
defence, court monitoring systems andsentencing patterns.
Finally, the mass media’s role in
exposing corruption, as an instrument ofpublic mobilization against corruption, as
well as its influence on the investigative
agencies and trial courts in theparticipants’ countries, was discussed.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE
II. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONSFOR SECURING THE
INDEPENDENCE AND
NEUTRALITY OF INVESTIGATIVE
AGENCIES AND THE COURTS
A. Problems
The police force is widely accepted as theconventional organization responsible forcriminal investigations in many countries.
However, because it is also the duty of thepolice to maintain law and order (an issue
for which society also holds the executive
directly accountable), the tendency in somecountries is to avoid making the police
completely independent of executive
control. The executive can apply controls
through appointment or discipline of police
chiefs, budget, and different forms ofregulation. Where this is the situation, theindependence and neutrality of the policein handling cases in which public officials
charged with this duty of control are
involved, may be seriously jeopardized.
Since in several countries public officials
are the main target of legislation against
corruption, the suitability of the police as
the sole criminal investigative organ has
come under wide review. In somecountries, the police and the publicprosecutor share this function, while inothers special agencies are set up to
investigate corruption offences.
The above situation is also true of trial
courts. The conventional courts may prove
inadequate to address the level ofcorruption in some countries, necessitating
the designation of special courts for thispurpose. However, whichever agency or
court a country may use, the important
issue is the guarantee of its independence
and neutrality in the execution of theassigned function. The major elementswith which the independence andneutrality of such an agency or court may
be evaluated are:(i) Designation of Conventional or Special
Organs for Investigation and Trial
The important issue to consider here
is whether the agency is part of aministry as a government bureau or isa special organ directly under the
Parliament, Prime Minister/President
or some other independent committee.
(ii) Procedure for the Appointment andMaintenance of Supervisory Control
over the Investigative Agency and Trial
Court
The points of concern are the system of
appointment of personnel, terms of
employment, measures against
unwarranted dismissal, and fairdisciplinary procedures to secure theirimpartiality in the course of duty.
Moreover, which agency shouldsupervise the operation of thedesignated agency?
(iii)B u d g e t a r y C o n t r o l o v e r t h e
Investigative Agency and the Courts
It is important to determine if theagency would be better off sourcing its
funding directly from the legislature,or to depend on some othergovernmental organization.
B. Analysis of the Current Situationin Participating Countries
1. Brazil
The police service is responsible for theinvestigation of all criminal matters
including corruption cases. This duty is
spelt out in the Federal Constitution. The
criminal legislation is contained in afederal criminal code and is enforced by thefederal police in the federal domain and by
the state civil police services in the statedomain. The police do not require external
permission to begin or prosecute a case.
The Governor appoints the State
Secretary of Public Safety, the Police Chief
General and the Chief Justice. Decisions

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
about promotions and dismissal of suchofficers are also made by the Governor. The
Governor can veto the decision on an officer
considered guilty after an administrative
process, and the decision of the
Administrative Court is not binding on
him/her. Furthermore, the assignment ofpolice officers, prosecutors and judges torespective state units/branches is also theprerogative of the Chief General of each
institution, and may be politically
influenced.
The executive arm of government
proposes the police annual budget andsubmits it to the legislature for approval.
Thereafter, disbursement of the fund is
carried out by the executive. From thisarrangement, it is obvious that theexecutive has extensive control over theappointment and promotion of police
leadership, as well as budgetary control oft h e a g e n c y, w h i c h c a n a f f e c t i t s
independence and neutrality in handlingissues involving high-level public officials.
An agency whose independence isguaranteed is preferred. The independenceof the judiciary is guranteed under theConstitution. There are no special courts
for the trial of corruption cases.
2. Grenada
The Royal Grenadian Police is the only
organ responsible for the investigation of
all criminal offences, including corruption.
It is not under the statutory control of any
other organ of government when
conducting an investigation.
The appointment of the head of the Royal
Grenadian Police is made by the GovernorGeneral, on the advice of the Prime
Minister. The Prime Minister almost
always assumes control of the Ministry of
National Security under which the police
fall. The Police Commissioner may be
appointed from outside the police service.

548

Annually, the Ministry of Financerequests and disburses budgetary support
for the police under a separate vote. In allserious criminal investigations, theDirector of Public Prosecutions must be
notified and s/he provides advice. The
independence of the judiciary is guranteed
under the country’s constitution. Grenada
has no special courts for corruption
offences.
3. Japan
The police (prefectural police) and publicprosecutors are responsible for theinvestigation of corruption offences. Thereis no specialized anti-corruption agency inJapan. However, the three major District
Public Prosecutor’s Offices (Tokyo, Osakaand Nagoya) have Special Investigation
Departments, which have successfully
investigated a number of corruption cases
involving high-ranking government
officials and politicians. This systemappears to be working efficiently becauseof mutual cooperation between the police
and the public prosecutors, as well as their
independence from political influence being
sufficiently maintained.
The public prosecutors are appointed by
the Minister of Justice and are under his
control generally in regard to theirfunctions. However, each public prosecutor
is authorized to conduct their duties
independently from political influences,and they enjoy almost the same guaranteeof status as judges. In addition, theMinister of Justice is authorized to control
only the Prosecutor-General in regard to
the investigation and disposition ofindividual cases. In this way, theindependence of prosecutors is secured.
On the other hand, prefectural police
are established as one of the organizationsof each local government. In order to secure
the political neutrality of the police, it issubject to the control of the Public Safety

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE
Commission, which is not under thecommand nor order of the prefectural
governor. In Japan, independence of thetrial courts is guranteed. There are no
special courts for corruption cases.
4. Kyrgyzstan
The Ministry of National Security,
Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Public
Prosecutor’s Office are responsible for theinvestigation of corruption offences in
Kyrgyzstan.
The head of the Ministry of National
Security, Ministry of Interior Affairs andthe Prosecutor-General are appointed by
the President, on the recommendation of
the Prime Minister. The office of the publicprosecutor is an independent entity. The
parliament controls the budget of the above
investigative organs. The salary of public
servants, including the police, isinadequate.
There is no obvious political oradministrative interference in the duty ofthese agencies, and although Krygyzstan
is still a young republic, so far the agencies
are effective in controlling corruption. The
courts are independent. Corruption cases
are tried in conventional courts.
5. Nigeria
The Nigerian police force is charged withthe duty of investigating all criminal casesin the country, including corruption by
public officials. There are special units
within the police service responsible for theinvestigation of cases of corruption.
The Inspector-General of Police isappointed by the President. He can also
fire him; and this prerogative has been
exploited especially by military regimes,
without explanation. The Ministry of
Police Affairs exercises control over thepromotion and discipline of senior membersof the police service. The Ministry of Police

Affairs also disburses the police budget.
The perception is that if the independence
and neutrality of the police is not directly
influenced by the Head of State, it could
also be checked through other Stateapparatus. This situation is amply
expressed in the low budgetary provisions
made for the police in the past which,combined with other factors, tend to erode
public confidence in the ability of the police
to fight corruption. The President has
already sent a Bill to the National
Assembly for the establishment of an
independent agency to investigate
corruption offences.
The independence of the judiciary isprotected by the Constitution. However,there were cases of the forceful retirementof judges in the past. Moreover, thejudiciary would like to have their budget
allocated directly by the National
Assembly. No special courts are designatedto try corruption offences.
6. Pakistan
In Pakistan, two agencies are
responsible for the investigation ofcorruption offences. They are the AntiCorruption Establishment which was set
up in 1947, and the Ehtesab(Accountability) Commission which wasadded in 1998 to complement the activitiesof the Anti-Corruption Establishment. The
Anti-Corruption Establishment is headed
by a director who is subject to appointment
or removal by the government. S/he iscompletely controlled by the government,
and operatives are often seconded from thepolice service (to where they can also
return). On the other hand, the Chief
Ehtesab Commissioner is appointed by thegovernment in consultation with the leaderof the opposition in the National Assembly
and the Chief Justice of Pakistan. The
Chief Ehtesab Commissioner cannot be
removed from office, except by a decisionof the Supreme Judicial Council on charges

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
of misconduct. The budget of the AntiCorruption Establishment is controlled by
the Finance Ministry. The EhtesabCommission gets its budget from theparliament.
In the wake of the prevailingcircumstances, the independence of theAnti-Corruption Establishment is yet to bea s s u r e d . H o w e v e r, t h e E h t e s a b
Commission enjoys a reasonable degree of
independence although, there is public
apprehension that the agency might beused against groups opposing thegovernment in power.
In Pakistan, the Constitution
guarantees the independence of the
judiciary. There are specific judges
assigned to try corruption cases. However,the financial resources of the judiciary arevery lean. Moreover, judges are sometimes
appointed from outside the bench.
Because, therefore, of the financial
insecurity of the judges, and the lack ofconfidence and overt political inclinationof those judges appointed from outside thebench, they sometimes cannot exercise
their independence.
7. Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has established a separate
agency known as the Allegations of Bribery
and Corruption Investigation Commission,
to deal with corruption cases. The
Commission is statutorily independent.
The members cannot be removed fromoffice except by a two-third majority
decision of the Parliament. Members of theCommission consist of two retired judgesof the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal
and one senior officer of a law enforcement
branch.
The President appoints members of thiscommission in consultation with the Prime
Minister. The salary of members of theCommission is paid from a consolidated

550

fund created in the Constitution. Theirsalaries cannot be diminished during theperiod of service with the Commission.
Investigators are usually seconded fromthe police. Only two courts located in thenational capital try corruption cases. The
independence of the Commission and the
judiciary is guaranteed by the Constitution.
8. Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is
responsible for the investigation ofcorruption offences. This agency has threefunctional departments: namely
Operations, Corruption Prevention andCommunity Relations. Respectively, thesedepartments are responsible for theinvestigation of corruption offences,plugging of corruption loopholes ininstitutional practices and procedures, andthe education and enlistment of public
support.
The head of the ICAC, theCommissioner, is appointed by theGovernor. The Commission is independent
in its operation, however its activity ismonitored by the legislature. It also has
four advisory committees chaired by nonmembers. A Complaints Committee acts
as check on the agency. The ICAC budget
is guaranteed by law and is provided
directly by the legislative arm ofgovernment. The agency receives sufficient
resources for its day-to-day operations andto hire professionally competent staff.
C. Recommendations for Achieving
Independence and Neutrality ofInvestigative Agencies and the
CourtsDepending on the situation in eachcountry, the choice in features of aparticular agency will differ considerably.
H o w e v e r, s u s t a i n a b i l i t y o f t h e
independence and neutrality of any agency
saddled with the responsibility of113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE
investigating corruption cases hinges on
the following factors:(i)

The strengthening of thecommitment to duty, professionalismand economic base of the operatorsof the system through adequate
remuneration and training. This is
judged necessary to increase theirconfidence and self esteem, and to
avoid external influence.

(ii) E x c l u s i o n o f p o l i t i c a l a n dbureaucratic control by applying
constitutional as well as legislative
checks against any interference with
the independence of the investigation
agency and trial courts. Legislationis required to curtail excessive
discretionary powers of the executive
arm of government and bureaucrats,
and to infuse transparency into
governance, as well as the guaranteeof basic freedom.
(iii) Democratization of procedures forappointment of judges/magistrates
and the leadership of theinvestigating agency.
(iv) Establishment of an independentagency to investigate corruption
cases in those countries in which thecurrent system is not effective.
However, countries that prefer theuse of a distinct agency to combat
corruption are advised to refer to the
Global Program Against Corruption1
for the guidelines necessary for
1

This document was jointly prepared in February
1999 by the Centre for International Crime
Prevention, Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention, and the United Nations Interregional
Crime and Justice Research Institute. It outlines
the general principles guiding the establishmentof a national anti-corruption investigative unit, its
functioning, resources and operational methods.

securing the independence andneutrality of such an institution.
(v)

The budget of the judiciary and theinvestigative agency should not be
subject to undue bureaucratic control.
If a special agency is responsible forinvestigation, ideally the parliamentshould allocate funds directly to thisinstitution.

III. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONSFOR DETECTION ANDINVESTIGATION
A. Problems and Solutions for
Gathering Necessary Informationand for Securing the Cooperationof People involved in the Case
The issues involved in the detection andinvestigation of any criminal case will
include: cognizance of the crime,
determination of time of its occurrence, themodus operandi of the perpetrators,
persons involved in the act (including theirvarious degrees of involvement) andpossibly, reasons for the crime. To resolvethese issues, the investigator mainly
engages in the collection, analysis andcommunication of data related to theoffence.
In corruption cases, the task of theinvestigator is often exacerbated by theuniquely limited sources of information.
Discussion on this sub-topic sought toidentify the sources of information open to
the investigator, and the provision of an
enabling environment for the detection andinvestigation of corruption offences.
1. Sources of Information(i) Investigation of Other Cases
An investigator may come acrossinformation on corruption committed
by a public official while in pursuit ofa different case. This happens more
frequently during investigations of551

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
money laundering and tax evasion
cases. The experience in Japan andother participant countries has
confirmed that this is an importantmeans to reveal corruption cases
which might otherwise remain
unnoticed.
(ii) Accusation/Complaint
An individual or non-governmentalorganization might also file acomplaint with the investigating
agency regarding the corrupt activityof a public official. In this case, thecomplainant is usually willing tocooperate with investigators,
although in many countries people
seldom use this approach.
(iii) Information Media
Through investigative reporting, thenews media sometimes reveals
corruption cases. This is the case in
all participant countries.
(iv) Observation of Parliamentary
Question and Answer Sessions
The corrupt activity of public officials
may be revealed by investigators
through their private observations orinformation obtained during
parliamentary question and answer
sessions. Investigators in Japanutilize this source.
(v)

552

Anonymous Reports
Sometimes people who do not want
to disclose their identity pass
information to the investigating
agency to reveal the corrupt activitiesof public officials. These people may
also take the cover of fictious names.
In some cases, they may have insider
information or they might come fromoutside the organization. Anonymous
reports are more frequent in regions
where special post office box numbers
are provided to encourage the passingof information like in Indonesia,
Hong Kong, Nigeria etc.
(vi) Other Departments/Agencies
Corruption of public officials may berevealed through information
supplied by other government
agencies, such as the audit/inspection
departments, tax agency or Securities
Exchange Surveillance Commission.
In Japan, this is a useful source.
2. Associated Problems
Although the sources mentioned above
are available to the investigator to obtain
information regarding the corruption of
public officials, there are nonethelessproblems associated with the collection ofsuch information and for securing thecooperation of people involved in the case.
These problems include:(i)

Unwillingness to Make Complaints/
Accusations
People are often unwilling to reveal
corruption cases because of fear of
reprisals that may endanger their life
or career prospects, rejection fromcolleagues or peer groups, official
secrecy laws and red tape, or lack ofconfidence in the investigative organ.
It may also be that those who know
about the crime are also involved in
it. Whatever reason is responsible forthe people to adopt this position, theeffect is felt in most participating
countries.

(ii) Late Revelation of Incidents
In several countries, as is the case in
Nigeria and Pakistan, the tendency
is for people to make a complaint
about the demand of a bribe by apublic official when the official fails
to deliver the promise. In such cases,
the official may have noticed thestrained relationship with the victim
and taken necessary action to cover

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE
the trail. This is also true of cases
revealed through the mass media.
(iii) False Complaints
When complaints of corruption arereceived, it is the responsibility of theinvestigator to verify suchcomplaints. In many cases,
complaints may be made to gain
advantage over rivals or for several
other malicious purposes, in whichcase they may be fabricated. This is
typical of complaints received fromanonymous sources or accusations
made by political opponents in theparticipating countries.
(iv) Refusal to Testify
In many cases in the participating
countries, there are people who may
be willing to reveal corruption cases
but are not inclined to being used as
witnesses in court. This attitude may
be developed due to perceived lengthy
periods of investigation and trial,absence of effective witness
protection schemes, or fears ofcultural sanctions.
3. Recommended Solutions(i) Improving Tools for the Collection ofInformation
Agencies are encouraged to set up
information collection centers(information boxes, hot-lines, etc).
The P.O Box 1000 of Hong Kong, P.O
Box 5000 of Indonesia and A22 of
Nigeria are applicable examples.
(ii) Public Education
The investigating agencies should
create a section within theirorganization whose duty will include
public education on the evils ofcorruption and the need to expose it
wherever it is found. This is alreadybeing implemented by the ICAC in
Hong Kong.

(iii) Witness Protection
Each agency should promote strong
witness-protection schemes tosafeguard witnesses fromvictimization arising fromcooperation with the organization.
B. Problems and Solutions for
Improving Investigative Tools
1. Problems Posed by Insufficient
Investigative Tools
In some of the participant countries,
investigation of corruption offences is
actually hampered by the inadequacy or
total lack of necessary tools. The group
discussion considered some of the problems
that confront investigators, caused by thelack of necessary tools for efficientinvestigation, under the following subheadings:(i)Resources(a) Infrastructure
In developing countries like
Grenada, Nigeria and Pakistan,
the movement of investigators isoften hampered by inadequatemeans of transportation. There
are also situations when the onlymeans of communication is bytelephone systems which may not
be reliable. Moreover, theseagencies lack basic casemanagement tools like computersand necessary office equipment.
(b) Finance
Efficient investigation requires
the availability of funds for
information, to offset
investigators’ travel expenses, andto meet other incidental needs.
Adequate funds are also required
to provide the training necessary
for improved investigatorperformance and the acquisitionof relevant equipment. However
in some countries, sufficient funds

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
are not provided to meet theseneeds, either because of the
weakness of the economy orsimply that the needs of theinvestigating agency are not given
adequate priority.
(ii) Covert Operations
The activities categorized under thissub-heading include decoy
operations, communicationinterference and electronic
surveillance. Decoy operations arecarried out in several forms. One
form is the trap procedure, applied
where a person approaches theinvestigative agency to file an official
complaint that a public officer isdemanding a bribe. The use ofundercover agents is another form of
decoy operation. Furthermore, covert
operations may be implemented
through interference with the meansof communication or other forms ofelectronic surveillance.
Whereas in some of the participants’countries like Brazil, Nigeria,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the trap
procedure is used to obtaincorroborative evidentiary facts inbribery cases, it is judged a breach of
the basic rights of the accused inother countries. Moreover, Brazil iscurrently the only country in thegroup where communicationinterference is legally permissible,
with judicial approval, as a means of
securing evidence in corruption cases.
In view of the covert and consensual
nature of the environment in which
corruption is executed, theunavailability of these covert tools toinvestigators in the countries where
their use is not permitted might
constitute some obstacle to successful
investigation.

554(iii) Secrecy of Financial Transactions
In most of the participant countries,
financial institutions are accorded
some degree of secrecy fromdisclosing clients’ particulars to any
investigating agency, unless awarrant is obtained from a court ofcompetent jurisdiction. Moreover,where there is the need to check theaccount record within a limited time,even the need to obtain a warrant is
considered a hindrance to timely
investigation.
2. Solution for Improving Investigative
Tools(i) Agencies should endeavor to installand use computerized criminal
information management systems forfaster storage and retrieval of
information. Adequate security
controls should be built into thesystem to safeguard it against misuse.
An integrated criminal justiceinformation system, is a model that
may be adopted by all the countries.
(ii) Investigative agencies should be
adequately equipped with
operational vehicles, and necessarycommunication equipment. They
should also be provided withadequate operational funds by thegovernment, especially where thereis the political will to combat
corruption.
(iii) It may be necessary to review theexisting laws in some countries tosecure evidence through covert
operations and also to guarantee thejudicial admissibility of such evidence.
This will depend on the situation ofcorruption in each country and thepeople’s reception of such a measure.
It is recommended, however, that its
application be subject to judicial
control, to avoid abuse.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE(iv) The investigating agencies should
work in concert with the financial
institutions for the examination of asuspect’s financial records without
the hindrance of secrecy regulations,
as is the case in Japan. In addition,
legislation should be made in eachcountry to make it mandatory for
financial institutions to reporttransactions exceeding an amount tobe determined by the circumstancesof the relevant country.
C. Problems and Solutions for
Improving Investigator’s Skills
1. P r o b l e m s A s s o c i a t e d w i t hInvestigator’s Skill(i) A s s i g n m e n t o f I n e x p e r i e n c e d
Personnel to Investigate Corruption
Cases
The covert and consensual
environment in which corrupt
activities are executed often entails
the application of a wide range ofexperience in the area ofinvestigation to successfully solve acase. However, in some of theparticipating countries, rookies may
be assigned to the investigation ofthese cases. The consequence of thisis obvious.
(ii) Lack of Relevant Skill
Investigation of corruption cases
often involves the examination ofcomplicated financial and computerr e c o r d s . H o w e v e r, n o t m a n yinvestigators possess the expertise toperform such examination. Under
these circumstances, it would appear
that criminals are operationallyahead of the law enforcement, which
is not desirable.
(iii) Heavy Workload
In view of the limited number ofinvestigators with relevant
experience and skill, theseinvestigators are often overworked.
Not only does this affect the amountof time they can devote to a given
case, it may sometimes result in theembarrassment of the agency,
especially if there is pressure fromgovernment, the press or the public.
Heavy workloads also do not leave
the investigator, and invariably theagency, adequate time to analyze theunderlying issues involved incorruption cases, in order to devise astrategy to combat it in the long run.
(iv) Integrity Issues
Unfortunately, in some agencies thelevel of corruption is high and thisgravely impinges on the performanceof the individual investigator.
2. Solutions for Improving Investigator
Skill(i) Develop Professionally Competent
Investigative Teams
In each agency, the leader of aninvestigation team should possess
adequate legal knowledge andoperational experience. In addition,s/he should have maintained an
impeccable integrity record.
(ii) Specialized Training
The agency should endeavor to avail
investigators of the opportunity forspecialized training, especially inaccounting and information systems,
at the local and international level(when appropriate).
(iii) Re-training
Agencies are enjoined to update theskills of investigators, whennecessary, through re-training
programs.
(iv) A d e q u a t e n u m b e r o f s k i l l e dpersonnel should be deployed to theinvestigation of corruption cases.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
Ideally, the agency would need to set
up an analysis unit.
(v)

Investigation by public prosecutors,
as long as it complies with the basic
legal system of the country, might bean effective tool to tackle corruption
by politicians and high-ranking
officials. Among the participating
countries, public prosecutors inJapan effectively carry out theirauthority to investigate corruption
cases on the basis of their knowledge
and expertise in law, as well as theirpolitical neutrality.

D. Problems and Solutions for
Coordination amongst Different
Investigative Organizations
1. Problem of Coordination(i) Absence of Multi-Agency Forums
In the different countries, there areno common forums for exchange of
information or ideas for the agencies
involved in the fight against
corruption. Inter-agency cooperationis on a case-by-case basis, and is notinstitutionalized. Worse still,
unhealthy rivalry may develop
among the different agencies,
especially when their duties overlap.
This state of affairs cannot provide asuitable environment for effective
control of corruption.

corruption are transferred outside
the country of the perpetrator, legal
differences usually make it very
difficult for vital information
regarding the transaction to beobtained, and for the repatriation ofsuch funds.
2. Solutions for Better Coordination(i) Multi-Agency Committees
It is not helpful for inter-agency
cooperation on criminal
investigations to be on an ad hoc
basis. Multi-agency cooperation
within the same country is importantsince it will provide the forum fordifferent agencies to share vital
information and to discuss various
issues of common interest. In thisregard, each country should consider
the establishment of a Multi-Agency
Committee Against Corruption. This
committee is to be comprised ofrepresentative(s) of the agency
responsible for investigation ofcorruption, as well as other members
from various government
departments. Their mission will be
the exchange of information andideas on how to tackle thephenomenon of corruption.

(ii) Audit Query
In some countries, audit queries are
not made available to anti-corruption
investigation agencies for scrutiny.
This results in the loss of opportunity
for detecting corruption in theorganizations concerned.

(ii) Notification of Audit Query
Internal and external audit reports
should be given high priority andattention. Moreover, there should becooperation between the different
audit units. Copies of any adverse
audit reports should be madeavailable to anti-corruption
investigation agencies for
information and perusal.

(iii) Differences in Legislation
Differences in the laws of eachcountry often pose a serious threat
to international cooperation against
corruption. Where the proceeds of(iii) Bi-lateral Agreements
Although each country’s laws are
made to suit the culture of the people,
one cannot lose sight of the effects ofglobalization resulting from556

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE
advancement in information
technology. The proceeds from
corruption are usually transferredoffshore to safe havens by theperpetrators. It is important to find
new ways of cooperation amongst thedifferent countries to combat
corruption. At the international level
therefore, each country should strive
to increase bi-lateral or even multilateral agreements with different
countries on criminal matters. Suchagreements are especially relevant tocombat money laundering.
IV. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONSFOR SPEEDY AND EFFICIENTADMINISTRATION OF TRIAL
A. Problems Affecting Speedy Trial
While discussing the topic, the groupconsidered the factors involved in criminal
trial with a view to identifying associatedproblems. For corruption cases, thefollowing issues were examined:(i) Resources available to the Courts(ii) Role of the Prosecution(iii) Witnesses Cooperation(iv) Defense Tactics(v) Related Legal Issues(vi) Sentencing Patterns(vii) Control Measures
B. Analysis of Current Problems
The common problems identified at thetrial stage in corruption cases include:
1. Resources Available to Trial Courts(i) Manpower Resources(a) Excessive Caseload
Most of the participants reported
that although the cases the courts
have to handle are on the increase,
there is no commensurateincrease in the number of judges/
magistrates to deal with thesecases. In countries like Brazil,

Grenada, Japan, Kyrgyzstan and
Nigeria, there are no special
courts to try corruption cases.
Even in Pakistan and Sri Lanka,
where specific courts aredesignated to try corruption cases,
the number of cases they have totry by far outweighs their efficient
operational ability. The result isthat many cases are fixed forhearing on any given date, which
subsequently lead to frequent
adjournments. Moreover, judges
are left with little time to write
judgements or even to prepare
adequately for court hearings.
(b) Inexperience of Trial Judges/
Magistrates
Incompetence and ignorance ofthe law and lack of experience ofsome judges/magistrates is judged
as a contributory factor for delay
in trial. This class of judges/
magistrates often fail to takeproper control of proceedings
during court sittings to such an
extent that valuable time is loston unnecessary cross-examination
and arguments.
(c) Unskilled Court Assistants
Another major source of trial
delay in several countries is thelack of competent and skilled court
administrative personnel. These
courts rely on unqualified court
registrars, secretaries and bailiffs
to assist the judge/magistrate.
(ii) Material Resources(a) Equipment
In some of the participating
countries, court proceedings aremanually recorded by the judge/
magistrate. This is especially thecase in Grenada, Kyrgyzstan and
Nigeria. In these countries also,

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the office equipment necessary forfast reproduction of court
proceedings, such as word
processors or photocopiers, arealso lacking.
(b) Finance
Perhaps the biggest problem
facing the judiciary in theparticipating countries is to deal
with lean budgetary provisions.
In Brazil, Grenada, Kyrgyzstan,
Nigeria, Pakistan and Sri Lanka,salary and conditions of service ofjudges/magistrates and ancillarystaff leaves much to be desired.
This has tended to imbue low
morale in the system. Financial
inadequacy sometimes also
hinders, or even stalls, thesmooth-running of the courts,
thereby delaying trial.
2. Prosecution Problems(i) Burden of Proof
One of the tasks encountered incriminal trials is for the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused. Thistask may pose a problem incorruption cases where theprosecution is required to prove thereceipt of the bribe, despite thepeculiar circumstances of the crime.
In Pakistan, there is a law whichshifts the onus of proof of innocenceto the accused, when the prosecution
has otherwise proved that such an
accused is in possession of assets wellbeyond visible earnings. This is not
the case in all other participant
countries, hence the prosecution
bears the entire burden of provingthat the assets in excess of official
remuneration were obtained throughbribery. Prosecutors in thesecountries feel that this is anenormous task and contributes todelay in trials.

558(ii) Report of Experts
In Brazil, Grenada, Nigeria, Pakistan
and Sri Lanka, expert reports take along time to be obtained because
there are few recognized experts.
These reports may be laboratory
reports needed for cases in which acovert operation is used to obtainevidence, or the report of an expert
handwriting analyst for disputed
documents. Thus, trials are
sometimes adjourned awaiting thereceipt of an expert opinion.
(iii) Lack of Preparation
In several countries, the prosecutors
are few compared to the number ofcases they have to deal with. These
prosecutors do not have enough timeto prepare their cases, and coupledwith inexperience, they are often
inclined to seek adjournments toenable them to prepare to handle theissues raised by the defence.
3. Witnesses(i) Non-Attendance
Another contributing factor to delay
in trial of corruption offences is thefailure of witnesses to attend court
sessions when required. Thissituation arises especially in cases
where the prosecution may betransferred to a different location andmay not be summoned in time.
However, the situation is worse incountries where there is no adequate
compensation for witnesses’
expenses.
(ii) Witness Protection
In most countries in the group, there
is no protection scheme for trial
witnesses in corruption cases.
Moreover, it is difficult to secure
direct witnesses in corruption cases,
except those who may haveparticipated in the crime. However,113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE
in a country like Kyrgystan, there is
no legal provision to allow any of theaccused persons as a witness for theprosecution.
4. Defence
Defence attorneys are in the habit ofprolonging trial time throughunnecessarily lengthy cross-examination,
disputation of exhibits being tendered by
the prosecution, requests for adjournments
and absence from trial on flimsy excuses.
This perhaps is the chief cause of delay,
especially when the accused person had
been granted bail.

(ii) M o d e r n i z a t i o n o f J u d i c i a l
Information Systems
It is necessary that trial courts keep
abreast of developments in
information technology and acquire
the necessary equipment to improve
the speed and accuracy of the
documentation of trials.

5. Control Measures
It was also noted that in certain
countries, the judge/magistrates are notworking as hard as they should.
Sometimes, the situation degenerates totruancy, especially as there appears to be
no authority designated to effectively
monitor their output. In these cases, thetrial judges/magistrates contribute to trial
delay by their bad work habits.

(iii) Training
Initial training is recommended forjudges/magistrates on first
appointment, as is the case in Japan.
Furthermore, periodic group training
courses may be required to update
their knowledge and to shareexperience on trends in corruption
amongst public officials, and thenecessary legal and procedural
adjustments for efficient and speedy
trial of these cases. Such training
courses will also enable each judge/
magistrate involved to identify whenand how to intervene, to minimize
delays that could arise due to defence
dilatory tactics.

6. Sentencing Patterns
The participants remarked that thepattern of sentencing for the same offence
often varies in different courts in the same
country. This practice may be caused by
the differing disposition of judges/
magistrates and is considered inefficient,
if not unjust. The variance in sentencing
is even more pronounced among different
countries as a result of legal differences.

(iv) Increased Budget
The budget of the judiciary should beenough to provide adequate salaryand conditions of service for judges/
magistrates, public prosecutors andcourt assistants. Improved budget
will also enable the payment ofadequate compensation to witnesses
and the purchase of necessary
supplies for use in the trial courts.

C. Recommended Solutions(i) Reduced workloads
To reduce the workload on trial
judges/magistrates, we recommendthat the relevant authority in eachcountry should appoint an adequate
number of experienced trial judges.
More court assistants would also be
required to speed up the processingof court proceedings.

(v)

Self Monitoring of Trial Duration
It may be necessary to establish
effective procedures for selfmonitoring of the operation andproductivity of judges/magistrates.
This will improve accountability inthe system and enhance speedy trial.
Furthermore, it is recommended thattrial judges/magistrates should
endeavor to conclude all trials of

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corruption cases within a reasonable
period, such as six months from thedate of indictment. However, in viewof inherent variations in thecomplexity of cases and the different
situation of each country, thepresiding judge/magistrate should
submit a report to the supervisory
authority within the judicial branch
for cases exceeding the relevant
period, to explain the underlying
circumstances of the case and reasonsfor the delay.
(vi) Pre-Trial Meetings
Pre-trial meetings involving
prosecutors, defence attorney(s) andthe judge to discuss/determine issues
involved in the particular case andagree on lines of argument to be
pursued, may speed up the trial
process. For this procedure to beeffectively applied, it is necessary for
all the parties to understand theissues involved and also to take steps
to avoid its abuse.
(vii) Witnesses Protection
An adequate witness protection
scheme is recommended to be put inplace in all countries to secure
witnesses from the danger posed byreprisals that may be contemplatedby the accused or their associates.
This is a necessary condition to obtainfull witness cooperation in the trialof corruption cases.
(viii) Designation of Special Courts for
Corruption Offences
As stated earlier in this report,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka have specificcourts to deal with corruption cases,
hence there was a proposal for the
adoption of this practice in othercountries. The advantage in this isthat the presiding judge will devote
more time to corruption cases, and560

through consistent practice, gain theexperience necessary to speed up
trials, as well as conduct efficientp r o c e e d i n g s . H o w e v e r, t h eparticipants did not reach aconsensus on this issue, as it was also
argued that the designation of special
courts will raise new issues of
independence. Moreover, it wasnoted that the existing courts havemore fundamental issues likemanpower and resource problems tograpple with before the considerationof special courts.
(ix) Reversal of the Burden of Proof
It may be necessary to enact laws ineach country requiring the accusedin a corruption case to prove that
assets considered disproportionate totheir income were not obtained
through corrupt practices. That sucha law may be perceived in somecountries as an infringement on theright of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved
cannot be overlooked. However,considering that human rights are
involved here, different countries
may have to deal with this issue
depending on their peculiar
circumstances regarding corruption,and the peoples perception of what
measures may be taken to combat it.
In Hong Kong and countries like
India and Pakistan, such legislation
was necessitated by the generaloutrage against corruption at thetime of introduction.
(x)

Equitable Sentencing
Trial courts in corruption cases
should make an effort to adopt aneven sentencing pattern within theircountry.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE
V. EFFECT OF THE MASS MEDIAAs already noted in section III, thecorrupt activities of a public official may
be revealed through publication by themass media. The role of the mass media
as a useful vehicle in the dissemination of
information on the activities of aninvestigative agency, and for the educationof the people on the evils of corruption,cannot be over-emphasized. Moreover, themass media is perhaps most suitably
located to generate the magnitude of public
support and backing required for successful
investigation of highly placed public
officials under corruption charges.
Furthermore, we cannot lose sight of theimportance of a free press in any
democratic society. However, that theactivities of the mass media sometimes
interferes with investigations, and even thetrial, of corruption cases has become athorny issue.
Most of the participants in the group feltthat media interference in corruption casesin their countries is commonplace. In
Brazil, Grenada, Nigeria and Pakistan, themass media is so powerful that theysometimes influence investigations and thedecisions of the court on several issues.
This development is considered unhealthy
since the media stance on a case may bebased on several issues which may not benecessarily connected to the realization ofjustice or equity in the particular case.
Without the application of proper
measures to avoid media interference,
public confidence in the investigative
agency and trial court may be eroded
through irresponsible media practice. The
solutions recommended for this problem
include:(i)

Implementation of a strict code of
conduct for media practitioners;(ii) Pursuit of programs of mutual

cooperation by investigative agencies
with the mass media;(iii) Application of existing laws oncontempt of court by judges; and(iv) Development of training programs forjudges and investigators to enable
them to resist the influence of themass media in the course of their
duty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The group discussed issues concerning
the investigation and trial of corruption by
public officials from the perspective ofinvestigators and judges. Regarding the
sub-topic on securing the independence andneutrality of investigative agencies and thecourt, the issue of whether or not a special
independent agency like the ICAC in Hong
Kong should be established in order toeliminate bureaucratic and politicalinfluences on the investigation was
examined.
To tackle the problem of investigation,
the group focused attention on seeking
efficient methods to source initial
information on corruption, as well as on the
personnel and budgetary situation, theexpansion of the witness protection
program and immunity for securing thecooperation of the people concerned. The
propriety of introducing new investigative
tools, such as decoy operations and how tosecure immediate access to bank accounts
in order to strengthen the ability to collectevidence, was also given attention.
To enhance speedy trial, the necessityof improving the material and personnel
resources of the court, as well as thepossibility of introducing the shifting of theburden of proof or establishing special
courts on corruption, were discussed. In
addition, based on the consensus among
the group members that excessive press
coverage interferes with the efficient

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administration of both the investigationand trial, the role of the media was given
special attention.
The group reached the conclusion thateach country should be entrusted with theselection and implementation of therecommended solutions in many aspects,
since the problems differ for each country
and the effectiveness of each solution
depends largely on the legal system,
culture and the seriousness of corruptionin each country. However, the mostimportant solution, which is common
through all these issues, is thatinvestigators and judges must keep making
an effort to improve their skills and ability
through training and self-discipline. We
believe that those who are engaged in theadministration of criminal justice must
recognize their accountability in theirduties and must, therefore, play an activerole in realizing speedy and proper
investigation and trial, which is thefundamental action against corruption.

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