Copyright 2008. No quotation or citation without attribution.
IR/PS CSR Case #08-04

One World Trust:Global Accountability Report
By: Katrina B. Fernandez

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND PACIFIC STUDIESUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Prepared for Professor Peter Gourevitch
Edited by Kristen Parks
Corporate Social Responsibility
Fall 2008

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Table of Contents
Introduction....................................................................................................................... 3
Global Accountability Report.......................................................................................... 4
Scoring ............................................................................................................................... 6
Data Collection .................................................................................................................. 9
Selection and cooperation............................................................................................... 10
Funding ............................................................................................................................ 13
Governance...................................................................................................................... 16
Transparency................................................................................................................... 18
Unsatisfied stakeholders................................................................................................. 19
Incentives ......................................................................................................................... 21
Conclusion: does the GAR satisfy the knowledge condition?..................................... 23
Discussion Questions....................................................................................................... 25

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Introduction
In 1951 a group of British Parliamentarians established the All-Party ParliamentaryGroup for World Government (APPGWG). The nonpartisan organization was a response
to growing post WWII concerns about keeping the world's newest financial, governingand monitoring institutions democratic, accountable and transparent.
In the year of its inception APPGWG created the One World Trust (OWT), an
independent trust dedicated to educating the public about the [non] compliance ofinternational organizations and institutions dedicated to maintaining global governance.
The major focuses of the OWT were research and advocacy. Today the mission remains
the same:
Promote education and research to achieve the eradication of poverty, injustice,environmental degradation and war.
Develop recommendations to make governments and powerful organizations moreaccountable.
Educate political leaders, decision makers and opinion-formers about the findings ofour research.1

Three sectors of One World Trust

The OWT divides its projects into 3 major
categories illustrated in the figure to theaccountableorganizations• Global accountability
project

left. (1) The accountable organizations
category

includesAccountability

1

Reportthe

Globalandtheengagedcitizens

internationallaw

Accountability Principles for Research• Parliamentary
oversight project• Responsibility toprotect project

Institute. (2) International law includes

www.oneworldtrust.org

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the Responsibility to protect project aimed at investigating systematic human rights
abuses as well as self-regulation initiatives. (3) And finally the engaged citizens category
consists of a Parliamentary oversight project that monitors and encourages reform of
democratic institutions.2 This case study will be focused exclusively on the accountableorganizations sector of the OWT and more specifically, the Global Accountability Reportthat monitors the accountability of International Nongovernmental Organizations(INGOs), Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Transnational Corporations(TNCs).

Global Accountability Report
The Global Accountability Report (GAR) was born out of OWT’s Global Accountability
Project. In 2003 a pilot report was done which evaluated 18 organizations. Three years
later, in 2006 the first full report on 30 major international organizations was released.
The GAR has now become an annual tri-sector report which compares the accountabilityof ten INGOs, ten IGOs and ten TNCs using four overarching criteria that are evaluatedbased on the policies an organization has established and the systems in place to ensure
the policies are enforced. The four criteria are as follows:(1) Transparency
This section looks at how accessible information about an organization is to all of its
stakeholders. The GAR defines two kinds of stakeholders in an organization, internal andexternal. An internal stakeholder is different for each type of organization but in generalrefers to the staff. An external stakeholder is someone who is affected by the actions of

2

www.oneworldtrust.org

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the organization; the pool is generally very broad and can include any member of thegeneral public. The following chart gives a more detailed breakdown of stakeholders bysector.

3(2) Participation
The GAR defines participation as the active involvement of both internal and external
stakeholders in an organization, specifically looking at their ability to influence decisionmaking. Beyond transparency an organization must also make itself open to the demandsof both its staff and its users in order to call itself accountable.
(3) Evaluation
Evaluation criteria refer to an organization having a formal method of self-evaluation inplace that monitors performance and establishes learning criteria for future planning.
(4) Complaint and response mechanisms
These are mechanisms in place for the organization to deal with both internal andexternal problems. Much of an organization’s score in this category is based on how
quickly they respond to complaints and the level of effectiveness of the response.

3

Blagescu, M., & Lloyd, R., (2007). 2006 Global Accountability Report. One World Trust.

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Scoring
The GAR uses two scoring methods for each of the four criteria mentioned above. The
binary system simply gives the organization one point if a policy or system is in placeand zero points if it is not. The dimensions that are deemed more pertinent for defining
accountability are scored using a weighted system that increases their importance in theassessment process. The GAR also scales the scoring for some of the weighted questions(i.e. an organization can earn partial points for being at different stages of establishingpolicies or systems to deal with a certain criteria).
Example:0 points: No organizational document
0.25 point: A vague commitment
1 point: A strong commitment but limited in reach
1.25 point: A strong commitment
The scorecard below4 gives an example of a scaled, weighted question abouttransparency. In this instance the organization can earn a quarter of a point for claiming
to have a transparency policy (without any actual written documentation), half a point fora policy that is not available to all stakeholders, and the full 1.25 points for an all
inclusive information disclosure policy.

4

One World Trust, (2008), Global Accountability Report Indicators. One World Trust.

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It seems that by awarding points when a policy or system is not physically in place is anattempt by the GAR to measure intent as well as actual practice. Theoretically this seems
like a good idea because intent is a precursor to actions that uphold accountability,
however it is also easy to feign intent for the purposes of inflating one's score. It would
be interesting to know how the GAR triangulates claims of policy, perhaps throughinternal or external stakeholder interviews.
It is also important to note that while the goal of this report is to compareorganizations across all three sectors using the same criteria, indicators for the evaluation
category are slightly different for TNCs.5 The GAR splits the measure of evaluation
between a TNCs evaluation of environmental and social impact. For example, question
3.1 of the TNC version asks whether an organization has a specific written policy thatguides the evaluation of social and/or environmental impact. The point breakdown forthis question is 0.625 points for social and 0.625 points for environment. The samequestion for NGOs and INGOs simply asks about written policy that guides evaluation
practices; there is no specification of environmental or social impacts. This is a curious
difference because there is an underlying assumption that NGOs and INGOs are notparticipating in activities that could adversely affect society or the environment.
50% of each criteria score is based on an organizations policies and 50% is basedon its systems. The overall score that an organization earns from the GAR is an
accumulation of all four criteria scores that are weighted evenly at 25% each. However,giving each category equal weight in the final grade seems counter intuitive. Should
transparency hold the same weight in evaluating accountability as complaint and5

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response mechanisms? What if the organization is completely transparent but takes a day
or two longer than usual to respond to complaints about their website, should these tocategories have the same baring on accountability, or does the low score given in thecomplaint and response category undermine the score given for transparency?
Another issue to consider is that of cross-sector comparison. The OWTrationalizes its tri-sector approach by saying:[TNCs, INGOs and IGOs] are powerful organizations with a wide reachand influence; they all come under scrutiny from governments, the public
and each other; and as a result need to better share the challenges thatthey encounter when responding to calls for increased accountability. The
Global Accountability Index does not attempt to provide an in-depth
analysis of the state of accountability in each of the assessedorganizations. Rather the Index focuses on the key principles ofaccountability that are applicable across the three sectors and thathighlight broad lessons and trends.6
While comparing INGOs, IGOs and TNCs is a novel idea, and probably a step in theright direction toward a uniform system of global governance, one must ask whether thescoring criteria should hold the same weight across all three sectors? While transparency
should be the ultimate goal for all organizations, will the lack of it in TNCs have a
deeper, more negative impact on society than the lack of transparency in INGOS? That isa difficult decision to make, and perhaps the criteria used by the GAR is not refinedenough to make that assessment, but these are all points to keep in mind when evaluation
what the report findings mean.

6

http://www.oneworldtrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=79&Itemid=66

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Data Collection7
Two types of data are collected as part of the evaluation process. (1) Internal data iscomes directly from the organization in the form of publicly available information orinternal stakeholder interviews. This data is important in understanding the structure ofan organization as well as which policies and systems are already in place. However,
because the information comes from within the organization, there is a high probability
that it will have a positive bias so the GAR triangulates the gathered internal data withexternal data. (2) External data is gathered from interviews with experts on a particularorganization and professional publications about their practices. This information
complements the internal data in that it explores the effectiveness of the policies andsystems already in place.
Compiling all the data for the GAR is a five-month, four phase process thatconsists of desk-based research interviews, internal review, and feedback. (1) In the first,
desk-based phase, reviewers gather all publically available information available about
the organization that can be accessed without having to contact the organization itself.
Through this process, reviewers start to get an idea of the “gaps” in transparency that
could potentially be answered through internal interviews with the organization. (2) In
the second phase of data collection, reviewers do just that – interview the internal
stakeholders of an organization as well as external experts to fill in gaps and confirm
information about the organization. (3) The third phase of data collection consists of aninternal review. At this point in the process organizations have already been scored andthese scores are all looked at together by GAR staff to ensure consistency in

7

One World Trust, (2008). Methodology for the 2007 Global Accountability Report. One World Trust.

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measurement and scoring methods. (4) Finally the preliminary reports are sent back out
to organizations and experts for feedback. This is an opportunity for an organization toclarify or defend any points that may not have been clearly articulated during theinterviews.

Selection and cooperation
The GAR has several filters for selecting the organizations to be assessed including size,
number of countries of operation, and number of public policy issues the organization
impacts. The general rule for GAR organization selection seems to be internationalorganizations with a broad reach and deep impact on a global level. Beyond this genericdefinition, the selection process by the Independent Advisory Panel seems to be relatively
subjective. There are no concise prerequisites for selection written anywhere on thewebsite, in the reports or in the publically available information for download online.
This may be because the organization is still in the process of creating those criteria;
however not having the information available shows a lack of transparency on the part of
the GAR. By keeping this list private, or not having one, the GAR frees itself to assess
any organization it wants to without question as to whether that organization fits thepredefined criteria. Not having a master list of organizations from which to randomize
selection each year can easily be misconstrued as an attempt to pick and chooseorganizations whose assessment will somehow be in the interest of the GAR.
Once an organization is selected for assessment it is sometimes the case that theychose not to participate in the evaluation process. This essentially means that theorganization is not willing to make itself of its resources available to the GAR for. The

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GAR will still evaluate organizations that refuse to participate in the reporting process.
Those that do not participate are evaluated using publically available information as wellas input from experts in the industry. In the final report the nonparticipatingorganization’s lack of cooperation is indicated with an asterisk next to their name (seechart below). This policy can be seen as effective in that organizations cannot evade theevaluation process simply because they refuse to comply with the evaluators. At the sametime nonparticipating organizations may be biasing the sector findings in the final report.
For example, in 2006 out of the 10 organizations that chose not to cooperate with
the GAR, 4 were TNCs, 4 were INGOs and 2 were IGOs. As can be seen on the graphbelow, taken from the 2006 report, those 10 organizations ranked among the lowest intransparency. Consequently, in overall accountability for 2006 IGOs (the group with theleast non-participators) scored the highest. There is no way of knowing if the correlation
between these two events is significant, but it would make sense that refusing to workwith the GAR to explain the policies and systems of an organization would result in lessunderstanding of the organization and thusly, lower scores.

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Nonparticipation rates for the three reports are as follows:
2006, 10 out of 30 = 33%
2007, 7 out of 30 = 23%
2008, 6 out of 30 = 20%
Nonparticipation rates seem to be declining each year, which could be an indication of
the growing presence of the report in the international community, and perhaps anindication of the weight that a score from the GAR carries. It is difficult to makeassumptions about how the GAR is received internationally because there is no literature
available on the effectiveness of the report. Because the GAR is only three years old, it
has not completed a full cycle of reporting in that no organization has been reviewed
twice. Once a full cycle is completed, the effects of the GAR review will become more
susceptible to judgment. . In the meantime, however, we have no way of knowing

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whether this report is having any impact on the organizations it reviews, or the public
who support them.

Funding
The fact that the GAR seems to have no outcome measure is particularly troublesome.
The usual stipulations of project-based grants, which call for measure(s) of successproving wise use of funds, seem to be missing in this case.
From the 2006-2007 annual repot for the OWT, we note that £303,46 of the
OWT’s £373,213 budget come from charitable grants that have restrictions for use,
meaning they are earmarked for certain projects. It is not clear from the report however
which organizations were giving grants to the OWT. Previously, the OWT would publish
an Accounts Report (in addition to the Annual Report) that provided a significantly moredetailed account of fund allocation. Unfortunately the Accounts Report was discontinued
after the end of 2005. Thus there was no report available that detailing the sources andprecise allocations of GAR funding. Tracking this information down was a more difficult
process, and as a result the OWT appears less transparent than in previous years.
GAR funding information had to be found in the acknowledgements on the report
itself, and even then there was only mention of a foundation without further details. Thus
it would appear that the sole funder of the GAR is the Ford Foundation. The Ford
Foundation website8 shows that there was a grant for $600,000 (roughly £405,000)
awarded to the OWT for the 2006 and 2007 fiscal years and $700,000 (roughly £470,000)
awarded for the 2008 and 2009 fiscal years. Both grants said that they were for specific8

http://www.fordfound.org/grants/inquiry/global/2/en

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use on the GAR. The fact that the funding for this report is coming from the Ford
Foundation does not bring into question its credibility. The Ford Foundation is a wellknown granting foundation that would have a much to lose in terms of credibility if itwere biasing the projects it funded. However, what is questionable is that the GAR does
not seem to be reporting back to the Ford Foundation on the effectiveness of the report inorder to receive subsequent funding. The only measure of effectiveness the GAR offers isthat of growing popularity. The 2007 GAR report boasts:
By early February 2007 the 2006 Report had been downloaded from our
website more than 7000 times. In both years the hardcopy edition of theReport went into reprint to meet requests for copies from researchers,
practitioners and assessed organizations for training and learning
purposes. This is mirrored by wide referencing of our work in the researchand policy community.9
However, popularity of the report cannot be assumed to translate into effectiveness andwithout a formal measure of change in the assessed organizations, the GAR cannot say
much about what the report is doing. It would seem that the GAR should have a methodof following up with assessed clients to monitor whether this fairly expensive report isactually motivating a shift in organization behavior toward accountability. Without thisoutcome measure, it is difficult to know how the GAR is still able to get funding from theFord Foundation that is traditionally very selective in its funding choices and seems to bevery adamant about only funding effective programs. One paragraph from the Ford
Foundation grant page reads:
Our mission is broad, and we carefully target how our grants can be usedmost effectively. Once the foundation decides to work in a substantive or
geographic area, our program staff consults with practitioners,
researchers, policymakers and others to identify initiatives that might
9

Hammer, M., Oatham, J., & Lloyd, R., (2008), 2007 Global Accountability Report. One World Trust.

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contribute to progress. We explore specific work grantees mightundertake, benchmarks for change and costs.10
While this all sounds very good on paper, we must question why there is currently nofollow up by the Ford Foundation with the OWT before awarding another grant. Of
course it is possible that there is some sort of effectiveness measure in place, however if
this is the case, than why has it not been made available to the public?
Beyond project-based grants, the OWT also raises funds through consulting
services aimed at making international organizations more accountable. The 2005 OWTAccounts Report11 shows that these services bring in just under £10,000 per year. Finding
this figure in the 2006 and 2007 annual reports is more difficult but in both reports it
looks as though very little money is coming from sources other than project-based grants.
The OWT claims that there is a self-imposed limit on the amount of consulting services
they provide per year in order to assure that most resources are allocated to the projects
that are more strongly in line with their mission. The financials of the trust corroborate
this claim.
Limiting the amount of consulting the OWT does speak to the credibility of theorganization in many ways. Consulting is a highly lucrative business, and there is little
doubt that when it comes to criteria for accountability, the OWT is an expert in the field.
If they allowed themselves, the trust could bring in a lot more money from consulting,however this would require hiring more consultants and drawing resources away from10

http://www.fordfound.org/grants/inquiry/global/2/en
One World Trust, (2006). Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31 December 2005. One
World Trust.
11

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other OWT projects, which could potentially lead to mission creep. The fact that they
have chosen to remain focused on monitoring shows strength of culture within the trust.

GovernanceOne method of establishing whether or not the GAR is a credible monitoring organization
is to identify the people behind it and consider the possible motives they may have forjoining the workforce or board of directors of the OWT.
The Executive Director, Michael Hammer, has been with the trust since July of
2006. He is a specialist in African urban and rural land conflicts. Just prior to coming towork for OWT, Hammer worked as an Africa researcher and program director forAmnesty International, one of the organizations evaluated in 2006 by the GAR. Although
one of Hammer’s responsibilities as Executive Director is to co-author the GAR, it is not
likely that he joined the OWT team early enough in 2006 to influence any decisions
about Amnesty International’s scoring; and if he did, he did not introduce positive bias.
Overall Amnesty International ranked 6th out of 10 INGOs in transparency, 4th out of 10
in participation, 6th out of 10 in evaluation and 7th out of 10 in complaint and response
mechanisms. Such non-partisan assessments lend credibility to the executive choices
made by the trust.
The OWT’s governing body is made up of a Board of Trustees who governs withthe support of a group of Vice Presidents and International Advisors. The 12 member
Board of Trustees is comprised of five politicians, four academics and three private
businesspeople. The 13 Vice Presidents provide advice and support to the Trustees andCopyright 2008. No quotation or citation without attribution.

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may at times be asked to advocate on the Trust’s behalf.12 They are ten politicians(current and retired), one activist, and two academics. The group of20 International
advisors to the OWT are overseas advisors (mostly PhDs) for the trust who are contacted
for their expertise on a particular project or subject matter. There is little otherinformation available about the International Advisors (other than their names) that isunderstandable, as they do not have any formal power within the trust. However, because
these advisors are asked for counsel in all subject matters, it would be interesting to know
more about their values and respective backgrounds.
Four of the five politicians serving on the Board of Trustees are from the UK’s
Labour party, and currently active members of the parliament. This warrants someattention in assessing the OWTs credibility as the political party affiliation may influence
the decision making of the board. Members of the Labour party are seen in otherpositions of OWT governance as well. Seven of the thirteen OWT Vice Presidents arealso representatives of the Labour party in parliament. Historically the Labour party in
the UK has been a socialist party that, as the name would imply, champions the rights ofworkers. In recent years however the Labour party has become increasingly more
supportive of free trade and, as we will see later in this paper, this political and economic
position may have an influence on the GAR.
To take this same point in another direction, political parties aside, the fact that somany influential members of the OWT are UK politicians may play a role in biasing the
GAR’s selection and scoring process. By nature, politicians must put country first, and it
is difficult to assume than while in the position of OWT Board Member or Vice12

http://www.oneworldtrust.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=92

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President, these politicians are able to switch hats and bush the interests of the UK aside
in order to objectively assess the state of global governance. Of course there will bebiases not only toward similar forms of government, but also toward organizations that
embody economic or social ideals favorable to the UK. An example of this, which will bementioned later in the paper, is development banks. Economically the UK is a capitalist
country that benefits greatly from the work done by development banks all over theworld. Usually a bank will give development loans to countries that include certain
structural adjustments that reduce barriers to trade and allow for more foreign investment.
This is highly beneficial to countries like the UK who are always looking to enter cheapermarkets with fewer restrictions.

Transparency
The OWT seems like a very transparent organization, especially with regard to the GAR.
Almost everything about the report’s intent, scoring criteria, methodology, finances andboard members is published and easily accessed online. However, when there is missing
information, it is very difficult to get in touch with a knowledgeable representative. Thereis no actual e-mail address posted on the website, but inquiries can be channeled throughan online system connected to the trust. Unfortunately this feature does not work, and has
the online form has not been operational for the extent of this case study (at least twomonths).
The other option for contact is by phone. Phone numbers are clearly posted on thewebsite, however every time I attempted to contact Mr. Robert Lloyd, the GAR project
manager, he was out of the office and my calls were not returned.

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As was mentioned earlier, one of the four criteria the GAR uses to evaluate
accountability is complaint and response mechanisms. However, it does not seem like the
OWT would score well in this category. The mechanisms for inquiry and complaint are
in place, but the response mechanism is not. This brings into question (1) whether serious
complaints about the OWT or the GAR ever reach the trust’s headquarters and (2) if
and/or when they are ever addressed. It is particularly important for the OWT to be open
to complaints and inquiry after the publication of the GAR as there is always sure to be areaction of sorts.

Unsatisfied stakeholders
One example of this came after the publication of the GAR 2007 in which the

Asian Development Bank (ADB) was given a perfect score in the category oftransparency (see chart below)13.

13

Modified chart taken from: Hammer, M., Oatham, J., & Lloyd, R., (2008), 2007 Global Accountability
Report. One World Trust.

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The reaction to this score was overwhelmingly negative amongst activist and nonprofit
organizations that monitor or deal regularly with the ADB. In a press release by theactivist group NGO forum on ADB, Pieter Jansen of Both Ends, a Netherlands-based
NGO, was quoted as saying,
One World Trust is misinforming the public with the report by not
checking ADB’s policies on paper written about accountability with thereality that members of Forum have been facing in daily practice. One
World Trust is risking losing its credibility with this report.14
Similar reactions to this score were seen in several publications all carrying the message
that ADB’s external stakeholders were not consulted during evaluations -- had they been,
the ADB would surely not have scored a 100 in transparency. Upon further research of
the NGO forum on ADB, I found that the organization is actually very large, with anestablished internal system of governance and member organizations in 16 Asian
countries as well as partner organizations all over the world. In terms of external
stakeholders of the ADB, the NGO forum on ADB seems to represent a lot of them.
This makes the claim that the GAR did not do a thorough job at collecting data
very serious, especially given the OWT's mission of keeping the public informed andengaged in the monitoring process. This perfect score in transparency seems unrealistic
since one of the largest independent monitoring organizations of the ADB (which would
clearly fall into the external stakeholder category of the GAR accountability criteria) was
not asked to participate in the evaluation process.
To add insult to injury, there was no public statement made by the OWTregarding this issue. This is either an indication of guilt, or one of arrogance where the14

NGO Forum on ADB, (2007). Press Statement: We Distrust “One World Trust’s” Findings. NGO Forumon ADB.

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OWT is saying that the NGO forum on ADB’s claim does not warrant a response. If it isguilt, than hopefully the GAR will take care in subsequent years not to let this happen
again. If it is arrogance, than perhaps the GAR is not as true to its mission as it seems on
paper and there are other interests being represented.

Incentives
As was mentioned before, an unusually large number of the OWT’s governing body ismade up of Labour party politicians or representatives. This does not come as a complete
surprise as the All Party Parliamentary Group on World Government was started by
Labour Parliamentarian Henry Usborne. As mentioned before the OWT was established
as a separate entity from the APPGWG in 1951 but remains closely tied to the group.
This is clearly reflected in the trust’s governing bodies. It was the Labour party whoreally pushed for the “world government” movement in Parliament by incorporating it
first as a specific objective of policy in the Labour Party Election Manifesto in 1960.
Seven years later, world government was declared to be a clear objective for all of “hermajesty’s government”15: a winning success for Labour and the UK.
It is admirable that global governance is a high priority for the UK Parliament, as
it should be for all democratic countries, however it cannot be ignored that the people
promoting world governance in the UK are also responsible for upholding the UK's
interests on the world stage. Such a partisan perspective conflicts with the credibility of
the OWT and its annual accountability report. Tying this back into the conflict over the15

One World Trust, (2008).Voices in Parliament; a brief study of a successful All-Party ParliamentaryGroup. One World Trust.

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ADB transparency score, we must ask what the incentive is for the GAR to be completely
objective in scoring the ADB vs. the incentives for scoring the bank well.
An objective score would be aligned with the OWT mission of educating the
public on the ADB’s governance. Those who would benefit are the banks external
stakeholders who deal with the bank on a regular basis (in essence, the loan takers).
Assuming the ADB makes the appropriate changes according to GAR recommendations,the external stakeholders will reap the benefits of a more accountable bank. In this firstscenario, the OWT benefits in knowing that it has upheld its mission. Those who may
suffer from an objective grade are the bank itself and foreign investors. Foreign
investment into the bank may decrease if it is not deemed accountable.
On the other hand, if the OWT were to make the ADB seem more transparent
than it actually is, the cost/benefit structure would be reversed. Now the loan takers
would suffer because there would be no incentive for the bank to be more transparent andthe bank would benefit from the good grade with increased foreign investment. Other
benefactors of an inflated ADB transparency score would be foreign investors andtraders, many of whom could be British. The OWT would be left in no better state forhaving biased the score, although members of its governing body may reap direct benefit
as investors or if the investment is good for the UK, indirect benefit as British citizens.
The threat in doing this of course is being caught. What cost would the OWT pay if it isshown that they are biased in their accountability reporting? Obviously the trust's
credibility as an unbiased monitoring agency would suffer which would in turnsignificantly reduce the amount of funding available for projects, as no foundation will
want to be associated with supporting bias research. Once this is all lost, there would beCopyright 2008. No quotation or citation without attribution.

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little reason to justify continuing (at least the international branch) of the OWT. Thus, thecost of dishonesty is great for the OWT and most likely not worth whatever indirect
benefit it may have. Having a high cost associated with credibility speaks favorably forthe accountability of the OWT.

Conclusion: Does the GAR satisfy the knowledge condition?
In conclusion, the OWT has room for improvement in their GAR reporting methods andin the transparency of the trust, but overall they are perceived as a very accountable
monitoring organization. Their incentive for deceit is low, the cost of being wrong ishigh, and ultimately the OWT does a fair job of satisfying the “knowledge condition”
criteria described by Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins.16 The chart in Appendix A
details the necessary steps for satisfying the knowledge condition. The steps which the
OWT has followed are highlighted in green and are listed below:(+  -)(+  -)(+  -)(+  -)(+  -)(+  -)(+  -)(+  -)Observable costly effort on the part of speakerSpeaker perceived to be trustworthy / unbiased
Speaker perceived to have knowledge/ expertise
Speaker has knowledge / expertise
Speaker is persuasive
External forces motivate speaker to tell truth
Enlightenment
Knowledge Condition

In this case, the “speaker” would be the OWT and those trying to achieve the knowledge
condition are the public. There is an additional scoring next to each step indicating to

16

McCubbins, L. & M.D.,(1998). The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need To
Know? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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what degree the OWT has satisfied the condition. From left to right the three boxes
indicate “yes”, “somewhat” and “no.”The assessment above is intended to determine the OWT's public perception. The
following dimensions did not score perfectly because after researching the OWT, there is
still doubt as to how certain we are that they are true: (1) whether the public perceives
the trust as trustworthy and unbiased, (2) if there are more external forces motivating the
OWT to be truthful than untruthful, and (3) how enlightened the public feels as a result of
the GAR. Since these three evaluation categories did not earn perfect scores, the OWT's
satisfaction of the knowledge condition cannot receive a perfect score. Nonetheless, thereporting performed by the OWT is a vital catalyst for improving transparency andaccountability amongst the evolving networks of international governance basedorganizations. The consistent growth in the OWT's impact is a strong indicator that the
GAR serves a relevant function for empowering the public with the knowledge needed toengage in crafting the future of the world's managing institutions.

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Discussion Questions
1. Should organizations still be evaluated if they refuse to cooperate with the GAR?
2. What are the implications for the GAR in not responding to claims of bad evaluation
criteria or methods?
3. Can a monitoring organization run by government representatives really be objective?
4. What information would have made this case study better?

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26

References
Blagescu, M., & Lloyd, R., (2007). 2006 Global Accountability Report. One World
Trust, www.oneworldtrust.org.
CFO.com, (2007). Global Accounting Board Cheered, Jeered on Transparency.
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Christensen, J. (2004). Asking the Do-Gooders to Prove They Do Good. New YorkTimes, www.nytimes.com.
Hammer, M., Lloyd, R., & Warren, S., (2008), 2008 Global Accountability Report. One
World Trust,
www.oneworldtrust.org.
Hammer, M., Oatham, J., & Lloyd, R., (2008), 2007 Global Accountability Report. One
World Trust, www.oneworldtrust.org.
Lang, C., (2007). Greenwashing and How to Encourage it: One World Trust studies what
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McCubbins, L. & M.D., (1998). The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What
They Need To Know? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
NGO Forum on ADB, (2007). Press Statement: We Distrust “One World Trust’s”
Findings. NGO Forum on ADB, http://www.forum-adb.org/.
One World Trust, (2006). Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31 December
2005. One World Trust, www.oneworldtrust.org.
One World Trust, (2008), Global Accountability Report Indicators. One World Trust,
www.oneworldtrust.org.
One World Trust, (2008). Methodology for the 2007 Global Accountability Report. One
World Trust, www.oneworldtrust.org.
One World Trust, (2008). Voices in Parliament; a brief study of a successful All-Party
Parliamentary Group. One World Trust,Copyright 2008. No quotation or citation without attribution.

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http://www.oneworldtrust.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=19
5&tmpl=component&format=raw&Itemid=55.
Sloan, M.F., (2008). The Effects of Nonprofit Accountability Ratings on Donor
Behavior. University of Kentucky.
Tokasz, J., (2000). ACCOUTABILITY; Putting a Cold, Hard Number of the Value ofGood Works. New York Times, www.nytimes.com.

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Appendix A: Satisfying the knowledge condition.

Satisfying the knowledge condition

SOURCE: Lupia and McCubbins, The Democratic

Dilemma.

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Copyright 2008. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Appendix B: Different measures of evaluation for IGOs, NGOs and TNCs

29

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Copyright 2008. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Appendix C: Accountability scores across 3 years

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