Understanding of the natural
resource conflict dynamics
The case of Tuareg in North Africa and the Sahel
INTRODUCTION
Tuareg are pastoral desert nomads who live in the northpart of Africa. Political environment at independence,migration and environmental changes have interacted
to influence, in a crucial way, their current situation.
This paper explores the impact of changing access tolivelihood resources on current conflict between Tuareg
and the governments of Mali, Niger and Algeria. It will
be argued that the processes that influenced the conflictare deeply entrenched in history, and in the composite
relations between Tuareg and the environment as wellas the policies and institutional context. These areexpressed in a range of ways, including natural resource
management, land tenure security, climate change
and humanitarian intervention. Further, polarisationof Libya and policies of levelling of social hierarchies
and sedentrisation initiated by Algeria, as well as theinternational processes of exclusion, have all contributed
to the vulnerability of Tuareg and the intensificationof the conflict. Boiled-over dissatisfaction of Tuareg
has provoked violent response by popular uprising andgovernment violent response.
The conflicts that have developed involve both regulararmies and militias and armed Tuareg groups. They
have centred on areas rich in resources (gold, uranium,
land and water), creating a whole economy based on
violence. Restoring the livelihood system, it will beargued, requires a long-term perspective that rethinks
the root causes of the problem and the entanglement of
livelihoods, power and resources. At the heart of such
understanding is the process through which the conflicthas resorted to arms and the role of different actors infuelling the conflict and allowing it to persist.
Understanding of this conflict is varied. This paper
examines this issue from the perspective of changing the
livelihood system and the vulnerability of Tuareg. An
adapted version of the sustainable livelihood framework(used by M Abdalla, 2008) will be used to guide theanalysis.1 It is worth noting that information on this
topic is rather scant. Data for this paper was gatheredfrom a wide range of published and unpublished materials, including field research by the author.

SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS
FRAMEWORKThe sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) is a configuration of opportunities and assets available to people inboth peaceful and conflict situations, as well as detailsof the sources of their vulnerability. It also includes theimportant dimension of formal and informal institutions, and processes and policies that constrain theirefforts. These issues are illustrated in five core principles
that guide the analyses (see Fig 1). These are capital
assets, the vulnerability context, the possible livelihood
strategies, the policy, institutions and processes that
influence the livelihood and access to resources, and thelivelihood outcomes.
Sustainable livelihoods (SL) frameworks encompass
the means, activities, entitlements and assets throughwhich people maintain a living, A livelihood comprises
the capabilities, assets – including both material andsocial resources – and activities required for a meansof living.2 The sustainability of livelihoods of Tuareg
will depend on how they are able to mobilise their asset
portfolios (or opportunity) in the long term.3 Until
recently, SLF was used mostly in peacetime, it has
now been adapted for use in conflict situations and incomplex humanitarian emergencies.4 The framework
recognises that livelihood activities in conflict situations are dynamic and context-specific. Accordingly,
this paper will explore the vulnerability of the Tuareg
resulting from unexpected shocks, long-term trends andseasonal stress. These factors make up the vulnerability
context and directly influence Tuareg’s asset status
and the options available to them to pursue successful
livelihood outcomes.

Muna A Abdalla • ISS Paper 194 • August 2009

Figure 1 Sustainable livelihood in situations of conflict – The Analytical Framework

Policies, Institutions,
Processes
State/government
institution

Vulnerability Context
Environmental/political/
economic/climatic/
military shocks andtrendsOther Shocks- Trends- Personal security
Broader context
Regional policies
Globalization
International
development

H

Environmenta
degradation

N

S

Influence& access
FP
Pol
F = financial assets
H = human assets
N = natural assets
P = physical assets
S = social assets
Pol = political assets

GLOBALISATION AND NATURALRESOURCE CONFLICT:CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Changes at global level in the post-cold war period haveunderlined the delegitimisation of the existing socialist
model, offering in its place a liberal concept of politics,
with the ‘opening up’ of economies and societies.
In the process, political conditionality transmitted
through global institutions, has led to the breakdown
or collapse of state authority and the erosion of nationalsovereignty.5 This new type of power relations has
influenced access to resources and conflict impetus fordifferent groups in Africa. The state becomes detachedand less accountable to its citizens than to global politics.
Increasingly, national governments are becoming
powerless in the face of global governance, economic
integration and neoliberal deregulation.6 Although
African economies have always been global, some authors
suggest that the intensity of the phenomenon has increased during the last two decades.7 The rapidly growing
scope of economic integration has directed attention
towards the linkages between the international economy
and the security concerns in various countries.8 Indeed,
there are many examples of conflict in mineral-richcountries, notably Niger, Mali, Angola, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. Two major
trends are becoming apparent in these conflicts: state
actors’ role has become less significant and non-state2

Foreign investment
Militarisation
Foreign intervention
TradingEthnic & religious
identity
Conflict and violence
Displacement

Livelihood
Opportunities

Livelihood
Strategies

Livelihood
Outcomes
Enhanced wellbeing
Reducedvulnerability

Laws
Land tenure
Justice system
Civil and political rights

actors, including rebel movements, militias and warlords,
have become much stronger. This has contributed toprolonging, factionalising and fragmenting conflicts tothe extent that they become long-term components of thepolitical environment.9
Multinational corporations (MNCs), foreign nations,rebel groups or governments that compete to gain control
over the lucrative profits, by fair means or foul, often
inflict harm on the population and the environment of
the resource-rich areas. But the distribution of harm andrisk usually vary considerably along several dimensions,
including ethnicity, culture, religion, location and typeof resources, and the major actors involved.10 Whilst acknowledging that global economic incentives surrounding precious natural resources can derive and influence
conflicts, it has been argued that conflict-ridden nations
often demonstrate some form of horizontal inequality,
including inequality of access to resources essential for
livelihoods.11 A major problem in Africa today is the conflict that emerges from the exclusion of minority groups.
Some authors have argued for analytical connections
between processes of globalisation and social exclusion. According to De Haan, with globalisation ‘… thediversity in prosperity and welfare between and withincountries has increased. It is still an inherent part of thedevelopment process that some groups are included andothers are excluded’.12 In this kind of environment there
is a critical need for a viable social contract based on therule of law, addressing inequality of access to resources

Understanding of the natur al resource conflict dynamics • ISS Paper 194 • August 2009

for all citizens and genuinely working towards a peacefulsettlement of grievances.

OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT DRIVERS
There are said to be several million Tuareg, but there areno accurate figures. Tuareg themselves estimate their
number to be more than three million13, whilst others
put the figure at around 1,5 to 2 million. Most live in
Mali and Niger14, primarily in Algeria, north-eastern
Mali and central and northern Niger, Libya, Mauritania
and Burkina Faso. Tuareg are predominantly Muslims
but generally follow a moderate and unconventionalversion of Islam. As a group, Tuareg is made up of several
tribes, including Kel-Air, Kel-Gress, Iwilli-Minden andImmouzourak. Tuareg society is conventionally feudal,
including nobles, clergy, vassals and artisans, and labourers (ex-slaves). Today, this stratification with its definedroles and functions is no longer as rigid as it used to be.
Historically Tuareg managed trans-Saharan traderoutes dealing in gold, ivory, salt and slaves. However,the development of the European maritime trade in the
16th century weakened the trans-Saharan commercial
routes and led to the collapse of trading hubs such as
Djenne, Gao and Timbuktu. Consequently, Tuareg had
to abandon trading and pursue nomadism, pastoralism
and limited scale agriculture as alternative means of
livelihood. They also shared a symbiotic relationship withsettled farmers. Conflict has always existed among different strata of Tuareg and between nomads and sedentarygroups. Pre-colonial rivalry and conflicts occurred overvarious issues, including struggle for political power
and over some defined geographic area, struggle to gain
access to grazing and water resources, and for control
of trans-Saharan trade routes.15 These conflicts havecontinued to varying extents after independence.

Competition over diminishing
resources has sparked internal
conflicts between different
groups and between thesegroups and the governmentsof Niger and Mali
Although Tuareg represents a huge spectrum of populations with different interest and goals, the nature of theirgrievance is broadly the same. Tuareg rose in rebellions

in the early 20th century to resist French colonisation.
In the subsequent revolts, particularly since the 1990s,
gaining an independent state of traditional Tuareg
territories in Mali and Niger become a cornerstone of
the struggle. Whilst their demand for a separate stateis attributed to long-term negligence and exclusion byvarious governments, their dream of independent state
was first sown when the colonialists issued the Act of
Law 57-7-27 of the Common Organisation of SaharanRegions (OCRS) with the aim of creating an entity toaccommodate nomads, particularly Tuareg. Although
the project did not materialise, it planted the seed of an
independent state in Mali, Niger and Mauritania.
When independence came, Tuareg were scatteredover different states. In each state they felt marginalised,with less power and wealth than other citizens. In
particular, land reform after independence was seen to
jeopardise and exclude Tuareg. This has been one of themost important factors in initiating attacks by Tuareg on
the post-independence governments of Mali and Niger.
In 1970s and 1980s, Tuareg territories were affectedby severe droughts leading to human and environmental
disasters. Tuareg felt that they were ignored and excluded
from humanitarian assistance. Large numbers fled
rural areas for cities, and others migrated to neighbouring Algeria and Libya. These events and others havesparked internal conflicts among Tuareg for diminishing
resources, between Tuareg and non-Tuareg farmers, andbetween groups of Tuareg and the governments of Niger
and Mali.
Tuareg dissatisfaction with social conditions and thegovernments’ policies gave rise to government violence
and the popular uprising. Certain factors have taken
the conflict further in the years leading to 2009. These
include the military training some Tuareg received
while in exile16, extensive mineral exploration and theproliferation of weapons and small arms and their
free flow across the borders, which also accentuatedinternal conflict and spread it across borders. Further,
exploitation of resources such as uranium and gold has
degraded the natural resources essential for livelihood
activities and had displaced Tuareg from their homeland.
Increasing scarcity of resources, driven by rising exploration, exacerbates such conflicts.
Currently, several Tuareg groups are engaged inarmed conflicts with governments and with each other.
The governments and the international community aretaking extreme stands driven by their particular interestsand general perceptions of the situation. Attempts toresolve the conflict have not been successful. While
conflict is intensifying Tuareg are less able to deal with
it due to the loss of their traditional mechanisms fornegotiation and conflict resolution and due to the strong
existence of many parties in the conflict
Muna A Abdalla • ISS Paper 194 • August 20093

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
The Tuareg region in the Sahel is prone to environmental
challenges, including drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion and insufficient supply of potable water.
The climate is characterised by frequent droughts, whichvary in severity from one year to the next. Agriculture
is principally rain-fed and depends on three to fourmonths of summer rainfall, which make harvests of foodand other crops highly uncertain. The majority of the
population depends on rain-fed agriculture and livestockas primary sources of employment.17 Past generations did
not overexploit their only source of survival, knowingthat their lives were dependent on their ability topreserve and sustain resources. But as climate change
has escalated desertification, farmers and herders on thesouthern fringe of the Sahara Desert struggle to survive
in a hostile environment. They have had no option but todisregard traditional means of coping, such as leaving theland fallow for a number of years to replenish nutrientsand rotate grazing. These measures simply have beensacrificed in the quest for mere survival. No helping hand
was extended in their struggle with the environment andthey have become active agents in land degradation.
Environmental disasters that eroded the ability tomake a living perhaps had more to do with the generallack of preparedness than climate variability. During the1950s and 1960s, colonialists and the newly independent
Sahelian government invested heavily in cash crops suchas cotton and groundnuts, sacrificing the cereal cropsthat were the staple food of the rural populations. Whenthe region experienced severe drought people dependenton land could not cope. Nor could the governments andpeople found themselves alone in the fight for survival.18

Environmental disasters which
erode people’s ability to maketheir living had perhaps more
to do with the general lack of
preparedness, as it was withsevere climate variability
In the past people were able to survive these harshconditions using their traditional mechanisms. But when
the harsh environment culminated in an environmental
crisis between 1972 and 1974 and 1984 and 1985 Tuareg
were overwhelmed. Although familiar with and expert in4

surviving and managing the hostile desert environment
for centuries, their means of survival were ineffective thistime. The famine of 1973 killed thousands of Tuareg andtheir livestock, agriculture was no longer able to support
the needs of the population, and the extreme shortageof water for farmers and pastoralists, threatened thesurvival of the nomads in particular. The drought createddeep bitterness among Tuareg for the government, as
they felt they had been ignored and that neither foreignaid, nor local assistance was distributed equitably. Large
number of Tuareg fled the rural areas for cities, whileothers migrated to neighbouring Algeria and Libya.
Upon their return home to Mali and Niger, theyfound that much of their land had been taken bysedentary farmers and they clashed with these farmers.
To complicate matters, Tuareg homeland areas havevast natural resources including substantial uranium
and gold reserves. Many countries have mining permits
to explore for uranium gold and oil. Among them are
France, China, India, Britain, South Africa, America,
Canada and Australia. Extensive exploration and industry of uranium has diminished and degraded Tuareg
grazing lands and led to the depletion of water andexacerbated the rate of desertification. Extensive exploration coupled by climate change has led to jeopardizing
Tuareg’s ability to maintain their livelihoods.19 Over thelast few decades, absence of lucid environmental policies
and development priorities, combined with population
growth, land degradation, erratic rainfall has exacerbated the vulnerability of the population and left them tocompete for the scarce resources that were left. Thoughthese are the common causes of conflict, but the specificfactors that led Tuareg to take up arm and the way such
revolts are handled vary from one country to the other.

DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS AND
CURRENT SITUATION: MALI
Mali is the main Tuareg country. It has a diverse ethnic
population with around six distinct ethnolinguistic
groups. Tuareg, numbering about 621 000, make up
around 1,7 per cent of Mali’s total population. They live
mostly in the northern part of Mali and are primarily
pastoralists. Challenges to Tuareg of Mali arise from thecountry’s ecology and composition of the population.
Mali’s climate spans the transition zone between arid
Sahelian savannah and the Sahara Desert. The region
is prone to severe periodic drought. Mali is currently
among the poorest countries in the world and remains
heavily dependent on foreign aid.20 Yet it is endowed withrich natural resources including gold, copper, diamonds,
iron, kaolin, manganese, phosphates, silver, uranium andzinc. Some of these resources are being exploited, whilst
others remain unexploited. Gold mining accounted

Understanding of the natur al resource conflict dynamics • ISS Paper 194 • August 2009

for 12,7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in
2004. Currently, the country is involved in large-scale
gold mining, which is encroaching on a large tract ofland formerly used by pastoralists or farmers. With the
opening of several new mines, including Morila andYatela in 2001, Mali has become Africa’s third largest
gold producer.21 Exploration operations concentrate on
the southwestern and southern parts of the country andare undertaken by several foreign companies, including Randgold Resources, Anglo Gold and IAMGold.
However, this industrial boom is not reflected in the
wellbeing of the citizens. The majority of the Malian
population lives below the poverty line, and the country
ranks 173 out of 177 countries on the United Nation’s
human development index.22

The conflict involving Tuareg
in Mali has strong roots in thecontrol over natural resources,
especially land. Many Tuareg
lost their source of livelihoods
and had to try new means
The conflict involving Tuareg has strong roots in thecontrol over natural resources, especially land. As in
the rest of Africa, the pre-colonial customary system ofland tenure in Mali was based more or less on collective
ownership. Although this collectivity did not imply an
automatic equal right to land for everyone, the system
worked since it was adequately flexible and resourcefulfor both pastoralist and farmer livelihoods.23 Duringcolonial time the French state pursued a policy of land
registration and accordingly many Tuareg lost theirright to the land they used to live in. In 1959 legislation
was passed allowing Mali to use land owned throughtraditional tenure rights for development projects. Vast
tracts of land were considered public property, andland was increasingly lost due to the encroachment ofcommercial agriculture. As a result, Tuareg became
among the most marginalised and disadvantaged
groups. Policies pursued by the successive post-colonial
governments continued to marginalise Tuareg frommainstream national development. At independence in
1960, the socialistic policies saw wide nationalisation ofindustry, commerce and land. Tuareg access to land wasfurther eroded. Over the years, there has been a strong
trend towards overlooking the needs of pastoralists andsmall farmers and the gradual eradication of pastoralism
mode of life altogether. The pastoral land tenure reformand resource management (‘terroir’ approach) applied in
Mali in 1990/91 involves extensive demarcation of rigid
boundaries for pastoralists, legal titling of individual andcollective lands and the reallocation of land to different
uses. The approach contributed to the loss of mobility of
Tuareg and their animals and disturbed their adaptation
to the conditions of dry-land Sahel. Coupled with theerosion of access to land, Tuareg experienced increasedmaterial hardship and had to compete for diminishing
resources. Conflict erupted not only between Tuareg
and the Malian government but also within the different
Tuareg groups and pastoralist society.
When Mali gained its independence from France
in 1960, Tuareg were marginalised and excluded frompositions of power in the national government, whilstsouthern ethnic groups were preferred. Whilst this event
sowed the seed of resentment, the intensification of theconflict and its progression into a war was sparked byland reform policies introduced by the Malian national
government. Many Tuareg lost their source of livelihoods
and had to try new means. Some Tuareg leaders felt thatthe reform was an attempt to destroy their culture andsocial cohesion.24
Opposition to government policies had developed into
an arm rebellion in 1963. Military revolts of Tuareg havebeen organised more around goals of legal autonomy,
equality and fair share of wealth. The formation of Tuareg
movements in different countries provided an important
impetus to the rebellions.25 The movement called forthe independence of three northern regions, Timbuktu,
Kidal and Gao, and the formation of a Tuareg state. Manygroups were formed since then, splintered, disappeared
or fought each other. In particular, early movements werecharacterised by confusion and factionalism26, which havepersisted as Tuareg movements maintain internal divergence and engaged in open violence against each other.
During the 1960s, the rebels were far from organised, andlacked coherence, a clear and coordinated strategy andmodern means of warfare. They adopted a hit-and-run
approach against several government targets, but could
not inflict much damage. Coercive measures were usedby the Malian government and both rebel- and non-rebel
Tuareg were targeted.27 The rebellion was crushed by 1964
and many Tuareg had to flee to the neighbouring countries. The events had created an atmosphere of distrustand hate, which the peace agreements that followed didlittle to change. Environmental stress and the resultant
resource scarcity further sharpened the conflicts. During
the 1970s and 1980s, Tuareg’s areas in Mali were severely
affected by drought and desertification. Tuareg accused
the government of neglecting them and excluding themfrom humanitarian assistance.28 The revolts that followed
Muna A Abdalla • ISS Paper 194 • August 20095

included attacks by ‘armed bandits’ on urban centres
that led to the killing and displacement of large numbersof people.
An agreement signed in April 1992 between the government and Tuareg rebel forces helped restore stability
in the north for a while. The new administrative regionof Kidal was created, Tuareg fighters were integrated in
the armed forces, the north was demilitarised and thegovernment of Mali vowed to apply greater economic
and political equality. However, there was no end to theviolent conflicts. A huge rupture has already occurred in
the social and economic fabric of various ethnic groups
in the country. Arab minority groups demanded social
justice and equality with other groups. Sedentary black
communities, who also felt alienated and became atarget of Tuareg rebel attacks with no protection, armed
themselves and formed the Gandakoy Movement in May
1994 with members from Mali, Mauritania and Niger.29
Inter-community conflicts developed rapidly between
Gandakoy and the Islamic Arab front of Azawagh(IAFA30), leading to many causalities.
A Tuareg rebellion broke out in early 2006. Malisought Algerian mediation in late 2006, and despite
criticism from the Malian elites, theAlger Peace Accordthat was signed halted the violence for a while. The
leaders of the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC)
were allowed to form the forum of Kidal (in 2007) andsome of them were elected as deputies in the July 2007
general election.31

Peace agreements have done
little to change the situationon the ground and some say
they have helped to spreadthe rebellion into Malian
cities beyond the north
But Tuareg rose up again and the 2006 agreement wasdead and buried.32 The 23 May 2006 formation of the
ADC (fr Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai pour leChangement) gave the conflict renewed momentum.
The movement’s members include Malian Tuareg,
particularly those who were instrumental in the 1990s
uprising. The group splintered in 2007, but retained its
name. Ag Bahanga’s faction of the ADC is currently themost powerful group and staged several strong attacks
in northern Mali. In July 2008, Algeria brokered a new
6

deal between the Ag Bahanga group and the Malian
government. However, towards the end of 2008 thegroup objected to some of the terms of the accord andfled to Libya, launching its attacks from there. This
group is now called Alliance Touaregue Nord Mali Pour
Le Changement (ATNMC). The Malian government
dismisses the new movement as a gold digger, insignificant in the conflict, and having no popular base among
the Tuareg community. Sporadic attacks by the ATNMC
and others continued up to early April 2009. Libya has
brokered an agreement between the government of Mali
and the ATNMC, but it is not expected to last.
Previous peace agreements have done little to change
the situation on the ground and some say they havehelped to spread the rebellion into cities beyond thenorth.33 The declared good intentions of the government
could not be transformed into realistic policies due tolack of resources, will and support from the international
community. Most importantly, the strength of different
parties with different interests has played a negative rolein the conflict. Natural resources played a very significant role in fuelling and sustaining the conflict. Resource
scarcity is increasing, due to the combination of climatechange, population growth and corporate control.

DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS AND
CURRENT SITUATION: NIGER
Niger is a landlocked sub-Saharan nation much of whichfalls in the Sahara Desert belt. Since independence, Niger
has been governed militarily and has suffered severe
political instability. The first free elections were held in
1993. The economy centres on subsistence crops, herding
and informal economic activities. The country remains
one of the poorest in the world34 despite having some of
the world’s largest uranium deposits. Niger had hardly
benefited from the 100 000 tonnes of uranium extracted
over the past four decades.35 Uranium is basically
explored by France’s Areva nuclear-power company.
Around 90 per cent of France’s electrical energy generation comes from nuclear power plants almost totally
reliant on uranium from Niger. Recently, other multinational companies have obtained exploitation licences innorthern Niger, including China Nuclear International
Uranium Corporation (SinoU), India Taurian Resources
Pvt Ltd and Rio Tinto, but Areva remains the main
partner of the government of Niger.
The expansion of exploration in recent years has had
implications for both the population and the environment. The exploration operations are all situated in thenorthern part of the country in Tuareg territory andwhere sizeable pastoral populations extract their living,such as the Tim Mersoi region and Aïr valley. This has
revived old dissidence. Lately the country embarked on

Understanding of the natur al resource conflict dynamics • ISS Paper 194 • August 2009

extensive exploration of uranium and some of the mostresourceful areas (the Takriza) were completely depleted.36 In 2006 alone Niger exported 3 500 tons of uranium
at $135 per pound.37 Massive expansion of uranium
exploration and industry has diminished and degraded
Tuareg grazing lands and has depleted water resources.
The mining industry has adversely affected the healthof Tuareg in the area as the groundwater has becomecontaminated with radioactive waste, causing myriad ailments including cancer, stillbirths and genetic defects.38
Climate change has also jeopardised Tuareg’s ability
to maintain their livelihood.39 Tuareg of Niger were
harshly hit by environmental crises during 1970s. As
their Malian counterparts, they felt that they were largely
ignored in relief and recovery efforts of the governments
compared to other groups in the same situation. This
has added to their previous discontent with the postcolonial government’s policies of marginalisation andoppression.40 In the early 1990s Nigerian’s Tuareg rose inrebellion in an effort to create a separate trans-Saharanstate. Accords signed during the mid-1990s brought to an
end a period of open Tuareg insurgency and a decade ofrelative peace in the region.

As in Mali, the Tuareg revoltsin Niger have escalated since
mid-2007 and have taken ona momentum of their own.
Nigererian authorities resorted to
extreme measures to suppress it
As in Mali, the Tuareg revolts in Niger have escalated
since mid-2007 and have taken on a momentum of theirown. Tuareg in Niger, apparently frustrated by continuing inequalities41 and the encroachment of mining intheir areas, formed their first organised armed movement, the Movement for Justice (MNJ), a militant groupin northern Niger in conflict with the Niger government
since 2007. The movement is fighting for greater economic development and a fair share of northern Niger’s
uranium wealth. The MNJ openly demands a 50 per centshare of the development companies’ taxes for the benefit
of local authorities.42 The MNJ believes that explorationof uranium by both the government of Niger and foreigncompanies is leading to an imminent ecological disastersuch as that seen in the uranium mining site of Arlit.43
Therefore, it is calling for the protection of the spacesurrounding the mining operations to allow inhabitants
to pursue their traditional livelihoods. The MNJ has also
employed international declarations such as the UN’s
14 September 2007 declaration which states that people
cannot be removed from their land without their free
and informed acceptance.44 The MNJ has carried out anumber of small military actions, including an attack on
an Areva base.
In 2007, the MNJ split to form the Niger Patriotic
Front (FPN), which carried out significant armed attacks
in Niger’s northern Saharan region. The Niger government responded by deploying 4 000 government troops
and allocating more than $60 million to the effort. Yet
this did not halt the MNJ attacks especially on andaround the exploration points in Arlit and on strategic
targets in and around the regional capital of Agades. Asof late-2008, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb started
to make use of the insecurity in Niger, taking foreigners(UN personnel, employees of multinational companies
and tourists) as hostages in exchange for the release ofMuslims detained in Europe. This new trend has led
to reinforced security measures in northern Niger. In
August 2008, Niger’s government declared a ‘state ofalert’, placing the region under martial law, closing it
off from the outside world and expelling international
NGOs. In reality, it is spreading terror, arresting, torturing and abusing civilian.45 An Amnesty International
report of 2008 indicated that there were grave humanrights abuses committed by government forces, such as
extensive extrajudicial execution of Tuareg civilians.46
In early 2009, the FPN split from the MNJ andexpressed willingness to negotiate with government. In
April 2009, another peace deal was signed between the
MNJ and the Niger government, in terms of which MNJ
will lay down weapons and join a peace process and thegovernment will grant greater rights to the Tuareg minority. However, to the contrary, the Niger government
has granted less recognition to the Tuareg movement anddismissed most of their claims.47

DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS AND
CURRENT SITUATION: ALGERIA
Algeria, in northern Africa, shares borders with Mali
and Niger to the south, Tunisia and Libya to the east, andMorocco and Mauritania to the west. The population
is predominantly Arab, but different groups disputethe country’s exact identity as a nation. Some support
an Islamic state, others a secular republic. Some seethemselves as Arab, some as Berber and European.48
The Berbers or Imazighen (‘Free people’), which include
Tuareg, are considered the most repressed ethnic group.49
They are concentrated in southern Algeria in the massifs
of Ajjer, Ahaggar and Kabyles region.
Muna A Abdalla • ISS Paper 194 • August 20097

At the time of independence, Tuareg still claimed alarge class of slaves (‘Iklan’), often black African, darker
than the generally light-skinned Tuareg.50 Algeria had
adopted the socialist ideology, Arabising the Berber, andhad abolished slavery and settled Iklan in towns, where
they would join the official economy. This led to conflicts
between the freed slaves and their former masters.51
There was also violent opposition to the Arabising of theBerber community, which the government containedby imprisoning of some Tuareg and the introduction of
the sedentarisation policy.52 Tuareg in Algeria (unlike
in Mali and Niger) were eventually assimilated into theAlgerian system, yet they were never completely Arabised
and have preserved their language and culture.53 Becauseof mistrust of Tuareg, the Algerian authorities resorted to
extreme measures to assimilate them in the society.54
Poverty and exclusion of large groups of society,particularly Tuareg, from decision-making lead to frustration, which for some is released in crime, involvementin radical movements and violence. Algeria has a long
history of struggle with Islamic extremist movementsthat committed numerous atrocities against Algeriancitizens and the army. Although Tuareg were not known
to be attracted to extremist movements, they suffered therepercussions. Tuareg fighters have long shared symbiotic
relations with Algerian Islamic insurgents, the Salafist
Group for Combat and Preaching (GSPC) in northernMali, and they ran trans-Saharan smuggling routes into
North Africa.55 But the relationship soured when GSPC
attempted to recruit Tuareg to the movement. Bitter
fights erupted between the two and the hostility has notbeen contained to date. The transformation of the GSPC
into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) led to an
upturn in violence from mid-2007.56 Tuareg in Mali and
Niger continued to have various military engagementswith AQIM in their territories. Tuareg have no history
of Islamic extremism and the link between this groupand Tuareg fighters is still not very clear.57 With AQIM
in Tuareg territory in northern Mali and Niger, Algeria
has reason to fight them and has sought the assistance of
the US in fighting them within and outside Algeria. The
US and Algeria have maintained good relations and haveformed coalition against terrorism in the region.58 The
main losers in this fight are the Tuareg.

DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS AND
CURRENT SITUATION: LIBYA
The population of Libya is primarily Arab, Berber andTuareg, Tuareg being among the oldest inhabitants of theancient region that is now Libya. When Colonel Qaddafi
came to power, his ambition was to create a Saharanstate to embrace all the Sahelo-Saharan countries,
particularly those with territories of populations of the8

Kel-Tamasheq. Consequently, in 1989, Mali, Niger andChad were considered by Libya as Arab countries. Large
numbers of Tuareg from these countries migrated to
Libya. Since the early 1960s the revenue of petroleum
and gas has financed the transformation of Libya froma poor nation to a rich one. Thousands of migrant
workers were attracted to the country in search of newsources of livelihoods as theirs had been diminished
as a result of drought. In 1980, Libya attempted to stir
up sub-nationalist feelings among the Tuareg in Niger
following a diplomatic rupture, and several Tuareg civil
servants were attracted to Libya.59 Young Tuareg were
given military training and recruited in the so-called
Islamic Legion, which had destabilised the regimes ofMali and Niger.60 In the 1980s, the governments of Mali
and Niger called upon their Tuareg populations in Libya
and Algeria to return, promising them compensation
and resettlement projects.61 Tuareg returnees demanded
greater autonomy and equal shares in power and wealth,but large numbers were arrested and prosecuted. But thistime they were equipped with arms, rocket launchers andmilitary training, which they put to use. By 1985, Tuareg
were organised as a separate military force and launchedseveral attacks on targets in Mali and Niger. In the mid1990s, Colonel Gaddafi had to play down his support
for Tuareg movements temporarily as his country faced
increased political and economic crises. But he remained
supportive of Tuareg and their movements. On different
occasions, Gaddafi, proclaimed that Tuareg were Libyan
Arab tribes facing genocide in other countries. He asked
Tuareg to return to Libya, ‘their original homeland’.62
More than once, he brokered mediation between Tuareg
rebel groups and the Sahelian governments. However,
Libya was accused of backing the MNJ Tuareg movement
and of instigating several attacks on Niger and Mali.63
Currently Libya is hosting the anti-Malian government,
Alliance Touaregue Nord Mali Pour Le Changement(ATNMC). Furthermore, Libya continues to maintainterritorial claims about 19 400 sq km of land in thenorthern part of Niger.

INTERNATIONAL POLICIESWhen Tuareg rose, they apparently had no intention of
spreading terror in the region; rather their goals were agreater share in wealth and equity. It was the vulnerability of Tuareg’s livelihoods that drove them to carry arms.
However, they were dismissed both internally and internationally as terrorists or Islamic jihad, which justified
suppression of their movements and populations. The
US issued the Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2003, superseded in2005 by the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative(TSCTI) to support Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania intheir fight against Islamic terrorists. The major alliances

Understanding of the natur al resource conflict dynamics • ISS Paper 194 • August 2009

for the US in this strategy have been Algeria, Niger andMali, and together they executed combined military
operations. These have intensified Tuareg rebellions
and increased insecurity of the southern Sahara-Sahelregion. The US has branded the northern parts of Mali
and Niger ‘terrorist zones’, which has negatively affected
the local tourism industry and related livelihoods, andhas infuriated Tuareg populations in the region, hence
many operations are directed against American targets.64
Many were carried out by the ‘terrorist’ AQIM65, but
the relationship between this group and Tuareg has notbeen established.
Multinational exploration companies are said tobe involved in one way or another in the conflict. In
Niger, the government has accused French and Chinesecompanies of taking side and supporting Tuareg rebels.
In particular, Areva was accused by the Nigerian
government of supporting Tuareg militia groups to deter
competitors.66 The MNJ has accused China of providing military backing to Niamey to crush rebellion in
exchange for exploration permits.67 It is clear that whilst
the conflict involving Tuareg has developed locally, it has
been enforced through various external actors.

There is a need for a morecomprehensive solution that takes
into account the root cause of the
problem in order to avoid having
another Darfur in the region
PROSPECT OF PEACE
No practical solution has been offered for a peacefulsettlement for all groups. None of the states involved
has created and implemented enabling frameworks tonegate and resolve the conflict. Furthermore, overlapping
systems of resource exploitation and inability to deal with
the issue of climate uncertainty remain at the root of
the conflict. Neither Niger nor Mali is likely to grant theTuareg legal autonomy, as Tuareg territory is a new home
for gold and uranium (among others) exploration andproduction. Mali and Niger are expected to be very keenon ending the chain of Tuareg rebellions to ensure that
intensive exploration by foreign corporations proceeds
uninterrupted. To this end, the Nigerian government islikely to continue exerting military pressure on the rebels
by tightening the grip on their territories and launching aseries of attacks on their bases. The Malian government,

which has adopted a relatively softer approach, particularly in recent negotiations, will probably make someconcessions and implement community development
initiatives to win the ADC leadership over to its side.
On the other hand, Tuareg movements will remain
fragmented and suffer continuous internal splintering,and penetrations and manipulations by external forces.
Peace accords signed so far proved of little significance.
Whilst some factions might accept the offerings, others
will reject them and seek their own victory. The presenceof international powers, whether as mineral explorers or
as makers of influential policies towards the conflict will
always serve to weaken these movements.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The analysis has shown that persistent inequality inaccess to land and natural resources in the countries
concerned have been at the heart of the conflict ofTuareg. The livelihoods of Tuareg and the opportunities
available to them to achieve sustainable livelihoods inall their traditional territories are strongly connectedto access to livelihoods resources, including water andpasture land. Changing access to resources amid current
tensions and conflict reveals the role of various actors
in supporting or hindering people’s efforts to achievesustainable livelihoods.
Tuareg resorted to armed struggle in response tochanging access to livelihood resources. The situation
was also influenced by the policies, institutions andprocesses that underline the vulnerability of Tuareg’smeans of livelihood. These include land reform after
independence, sedentarisation, militarisation of Tuareg
by governments of the region and their use in the
counterinsurgency campaigns of Libya and Algeria.
As climate change and mining exploration accelerate desertification in the region, competition between
herders and farmers for dwindling resources has
escalated dramatically. The repercussions of drought
were exacerbated by lack of government support to theaffected population. Although the strategies adopted by
Tuareg to cope with these events were not all positive,
they have enabled them to survive with diminishing
resources. In Niger and Mali, the governments’ concern
is to secure profits from resource exploitation of Tuaregoccupied land to maintain exports. To clear the fields,
Tuareg have been labelled extremist or Islamic jihadists.
Many times Tuareg were expelled from one country andfound themselves on the doorstep of another.
Since the beginning of 2009 the conflict involving
Tuareg has intensified as never before. The problem
cannot be solved with broad-brush policies, because of
the diversity of social actors and the diversity of political, economic and social factors within the countries
Muna A Abdalla • ISS Paper 194 • August 20099

concerned. But as a first step there is a need for a morecomprehensive solution that takes into account theroot cause of the problem in order to avoid having
another Darfur in the region. The challenges for states
where Tuareg live included addressing the issue of thewidespread poverty and exclusion of Tuareg from themain stream society need to be addressed. In that it isimportant to link rights-based approaches with livelihoods approaches, or to articulate the political economy
of conflict as part of the process of forming the type of
livelihood support required. Regional policies could
be reversed in order to make a significant contribution
to bringing peace to the region. By facilitating andsupporting an enabling environment for resolving theconflict through a consensual process drawing on old
traditions of conflict resolution. International responseto the Tuareg should be guided by principles of humanrights law, the right to dignity and non-discrimination.
Furthermore, methods for managing conflicts overland, water, and other resources should be strengthened.
Agreement after another did not last long and theconflict resumed again, as fierce as it could be. Current
fragile peace, and fear of famine, poses a threat of more
conflict. Sustainable conflict resolutions cannot be
achieved unless all the parties to a conflict are includedin the process of conflict transformation. It is imperative
to assign equal weight to the interests of all the parties
involved, but more importantly include those excluded
sections of population involved in the process of finding
a solution.

NOTES
1

M Abdalla, Poverty and inequality in urban Sudan: Policies,
institutions and governance, 2008, African Studies Centre,
University of Lieden, Netherlands.

2

DFID: Guidance Sheet 2.6 (1999) Policy Reform Department
For International Development, UK (1.1).

3

Ibid, p 25.

4

For example, see H Young, A Osman, A Abusin, M Asher andO Egemi, Livelihoods, power and choice: The vulnerabilityof the northern Rizaygat, Darfur, Sudan, 2009, FeinsteinInternational Center, Tufts University, USA.

5

T Mkandawire, Globalisation, equity and, social development,
African Sociological Review, 6 (1), 2002, pp 115–137.

6

T Mkandawire, Maladjusted African economies and globalisation, Africa Development, Vol XXX, (1&2) 2005, pp 1–33.

7

Ibid, p 11.

8

Stephen G Brooks, Producing security: Multinational corporations, globalisation, and the changing calculus of conflict,
2005, Princeton University Press and copyrighted.

9Catherine Longley and Daniel Maxwell, Livelihoods, chronic
confl ict and humanitarian response: A review of current approaches, Natural Resource Perspectives, Number 89, ODI, UK.

1010 Scott Pegg, Globalisation and natural-resource conflicts – thenew strategic environment, Naval War College Review LVI, No
4 Autumn (2003), 82–96 Autumn 2003, Vol.
11 S Mansoob Murshed, Inequality, indivisibility and insecurity
in intrastate conflict, governments and security: Dilemmas
Of deterrence and assurance, 2008, Stephen M Saideman andMarie-joelle Zahar (eds). Published by Routledge.
12 L de Haan, Globalisation, localisation and sustainable livelihood. Sociologia Ruralis (2000), 40, 3 (p 340) 339–365.
13 Mohand Salah TARI, Tuareg: The tragedy of a forgotten
people, The Algerian Tuareg, 2002, Amazigh World (Amadal
Amazigh), North America, North Africa.
14 Ibid.
15 Kalifa Keita and Dan Henk, Conflict and confl ict resolution in
the Sahel: the Tuareg insurgency in Mali, 1998, Departmentof the Army, the Department of Defense Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College.
16 Many Tuareg who migrated after the 1960s revolts and the 70s
and 80s drought have come back to their homelands in Mali
and Niger.
17 Serigne Tacko Kandji, Louis Verchot, Jens Mackensen,
Climate change and variability in the Sahel region: Impacts
and adaptation strategies in the agricultural sector, 2006,
United Nations Environment Programme UNEP and World
Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF).
18 Ibid.
19 Stefan Simanowitz, Bluemen and Yellowcake, The struggle of
the Tuareg in West Africa, 29 March 2009, Media Monitors
Networks http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/60963 (accessed 11 April 2009).
20 Library of Congress – Federal Research Division, Country
profi le: Mali, January 2005 http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/
profi les/Mali.pdf (accessed 14 April 2009).
21 Rani Parker and Fred Wood, Hidden treasure? In search ofMali’s gold-mining revenues, 2006, Oxfam America.
22 UNDP, Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a
divided world, 2007/2008 Human Development Report, United
Nations Development Programme.
23 T Well, Land tenure and the cadastral system of Mali, 1999,
SIE526, University of Maine, Department of Spatial Information
Engineering Cadastral and Land Information Systems.
24 Kalifa Keita and Dan Henk, Conflict and confl ict resolution in
the Sahel: the Tuareg insurgency in Mali, 1998, Departmentof the Army, the Department of Defense Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College.
25 These include: The Azawad Popular Movement (MPA),
based in the Kidal, the Azawad Arab Islamic Front, based in
Mauritania, the Azawad Liberation Popular Front (FPLA),
the Azawad Revolutionary Army made up of rebels of the
MPA (the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad – Azawad
People’s Movement) and FPLA, (Front Populaire de l’Azaouad:
The Popular Front of Azawad) and the Azawad National
Front. These movements came together to form the Azawad
Unified Front.
26 JS LCocq, That desert is our country: Tuareg rebellions andcompeting nationalisms in comtemporary Mali, (1946–1996),

Understanding of the natur al resource conflict dynamics • ISS Paper 194 • August 2009

2002, (227), Dissertatio, Faculty of Social and Behavioural
Sciences, Unversity of Amsterdam.

Seminar on 27 November (2007) p 3, ifri.Sub-Saharan Africa
Programme. Website: www.ifri.org (accessed 4 May 2009).

27 Ann Hershkowitz, The Tuareg in Mali and Niger: The role ofdesertification in violent conflict, ICE case studies 151 (August2005) http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/tuareg.htm (accessed
10 March 2009).

45 Jeremy Keenan, Uranium goes critical in Niger: Tuareg
rebellions threaten Sahelian conflagration, Review ofAfrican Political Economy, 35:117 (2008), 449–466, ROAPE
Publications Ltd.

28 Kadiatou Kourouma, “Nomadic conflict in Mali”, Internshippaper, 2008, Justice Africa.

46 Stefan Simanowitz, Bluemen and Yellowcake, The struggle of
the Tuareg in West Africa, 29 March 2009, Media Monitors
Networks http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/60963 (accessed 11 April 2009).

29 BF Bankie, The Afro-Arab borderlands – ambiguous relationsin the Sahel region of Africa, 2009, http://theblacklistpub.ning.
com/profi les/blogs/the-afroarab-borderlands.
30 A movement with Islamic and Arab orientation, largely
supported by Algeria.
31 Ferdaous Bouhlel-Hardy, Yvan Guichaoua, Abdoulaye
Tamboura, Tuareg crises in Niger and Mali, January 2008,
Seminar on 27 November, (2007) p 3, ifri.Sub-Saharan Africa
Programme. Website: www.ifri.org (accessed 4 May 2009).
32 AL-AHRAM, The Tuareg have had enough, 5–11 June 2008,
Issue no 900 Published in Cairo, http://weekly.ahram.org.
eg/2008/900/in6.htm (accessed 14 April 2009).
33 JS LCocq, That desert is our country: Tuareg rebellions andcompeting nationalisms in comtemporary Mali, (1946–1996),
2002, Dissertatio, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences,
University of Amsterdam.

47 Reuter, Nearly 600 Malian rebels disarm in north, Tuesday 17
February 2009 11:44am EST http://www.reuters.com/article/
homepageCrisis/idUSLH689592._CH_.2400 (accessed 6 May
2009).
48 J Mundy, Eat the state, 21 November 2001, The Algerian
Connection (2001), http://eatthestate.org/06-07/
AlgerianConnection.htm (accessed 12 April 2009).
49 Ibid.
50 Mohand Salah TARI, Tuareg: The tragedy of a forgotten
people, The AIgerian Tuareg, 2002, Amazigh World (Amadal
Amazigh ), North America, North Africa.
51 Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of
Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Algeria: Berbers, May
2008. UNHCR Refworld, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/49749d64a.html (accessed 23 April 2009).

34 As it ranks right at the bottom of the United Nations Human
Development Index.

52 Ibid.

35 IRIN News, Niger: Uranium – blessing or curse?
Monday 6 April 2009, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.
aspx?ReportId=74738 (accessed 5 April 2009).

53 J Mundy, Eat the state, 21 November 2001, The Algerian
Connection (2001), http://eatthestate.org/06-07/
AlgerianConnection.htm (accessed 12 April 2009).

36 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency/L’Agence pour l’énergie
nucléaire, Uranium 2001: Uranium resources demande, 2002,
OECD, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France.

54 Mohand Salah TARI, Tuareg: The tragedy of a forgotten
people, The AIgerian Tuareg, 2002, Amazigh World (Amadal
Amazigh ), North America, North Africa.

37 AL-AHRAM, The Tuareg have had enough, 5–11 June 2008,
Issue no 900, Published in Cairo, http://weekly.ahram.org.
eg/2008/900/in6.htm (accessed 14 April 2009).

55 Reuters, Algerian militants ambush Malian Tuaregs, kill 9, 24
October 2006 13:25:14 GMT http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/
newsdesk/L24313095.htm (accessed 9 May 2009).

38 Stefan Simanowitz, Bluemen and Yellowcake, The struggle of
the Tuareg in West Africa, 29 March 2009, Media Monitors
Networks http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/60963 (accessed 11 April 2009).

56 UK Border Agency, Algeria, Country of origin information
service report, Home office, 30 September 2008.

39 Ibid.
40 North Africa.com, Peace and conflict: Why is the MNJ fighting? 5 February 2008 http://www.north-of-africa.com/article.
php3?id_article=467 (accessed 4 May 2009).
41 BBC, Q&A: Tuareg unrest, Friday, 7 September 2007, 11 http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6982266.stm.
42 Ferdaous Bouhlel-Hardy, Yvan Guichaoua, Abdoulaye
Tamboura, Tuareg crises in Niger and Mali , January 2008,
Seminar on 27 November, (2007) p 3, ifri.Sub-Saharan Africa
Programme. Website: www.ifri.org (accessed 4 May 2009).
43 Jeremy Keenan, Uranium goes critical in Niger: Tuareg
rebellions threaten Sahelian conflagration, Review ofAfrican Political Economy, 35:117, (2008), 449–466, ROAPE
Publications Ltd.
44 Ferdaous Bouhlel-Hardy, Yvan Guichaoua, Abdoulaye
Tamboura, Tuareg crises in Niger and Mali , January 2008,

57 Stefan Simanowitz, Bluemen and Yellowcake, The struggle of
the Tuareg in West Africa, March 29, 2009, Media Monitors
Networks http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/60963 (accessed April 11th 2009).
58 J Mundy, Eat the state, 21 November 2001, The Algerian
Connection (2001), http://eatthestate.org/06-07/
AlgerianConnection.htm (accessed 12 April 2009).
59 Mohand Salah TARI, Tuareg: The tragedy of a forgotten
people, The AIgerian Tuareg, 2002, Amazigh World (Amadal
Amazigh ), North America, North Africa.
60 Ibid.
61 Minority Rights Group International, World directory ofminorities and indigenous peoples – Niger: Tuareg, July 2008,
Online. UNHCR Refworld, available at:http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/49749cd62.html (accessed 23 April 2009).
62 Mohand Salah TARI, Tuareg: the tragedy of a forgotten
people, The AIgerian Tuareg, 2002, Amazigh World (Amadal
Amazigh), North America, North Africa.

Muna A Abdalla • ISS Paper 194 • August 200911

63 AL-AHRAM, The Tuareg have had enough, 5–11 June 2008,
Issue no 900 Published in Cairo, http://weekly.ahram.org.
eg/2008/900/in6.htm (accessed 19 April 2009).

65 Was known as Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et leCombat (GSPC), but in 2006 was renamed Al-Qaeda in theIslamic Maghreb (AQIM).

64 Jeremy Keenan, Uranium goes critical in Niger: Tuareg
rebellions threaten Sahelian conflagration, Review ofAfrican Political Economy, 35:117 (2008), 449–466, ROAPE
Publications Ltd.

66 AL-AHRAM, The Touareg have had enough, 5–11 June 2008,
Issue no 900, Published in Cairo, http://weekly.ahram.org.
eg/2008/900/in6.htm (accessed 19 April 2009).

12

67 Ibid.

Understanding of the natur al resource conflict dynamics • ISS Paper 194 • August 2009

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ABOUT THE PAPER
The paper highlights the process leading to the armed conflictof Tuareg and the role of different countries in the conflict.
In particular, it examines the way three dramatic events haveshaped the livelihoods of Tuareg: the reorganisation of society
in the post-independence period; the drought and desertification of 1970s, and 1980s, and the exploration and discovery of
uranium and gold beneath their land in Mali and Niger. These
events have created a hierarchy of rights to natural resources,
with Tuareg being marginalised.

As a leading African human security research
institution, the Institute for Security Studies(ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa
characterised by sustainable development, humanrights, the rule of law, democracy, collaborative
security and gender mainstreaming. The ISS realises
this vision by:■ Undertaking applied research, training andcapacity building■ Working collaboratively with others■ Facilitating and supporting policy formulation■ Monitoring trends and policy implementation■ Collecting, interpreting and disseminating

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Muna A Abdalla is a senior researcher with ISS, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia. She received her basic education in Sudan and Egypt
and her PhD from the University of Leiden, Netherlands. She
has 15 years’ work experience in policy research, throughaffi liations to governmental and non governmental institutionsin Sudan, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire and South
Africa. Previous experience includes researching Africa’s development challenges, poverty, institutions and capacity building.

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Understanding of the natur al resource conflict dynamics • ISS Paper 194 • August 2009