A/78/287

United Nations

General AssemblyDistr.: General
31 July 2023
Original: English

Seventy-eighth session
Item 103 of the provisional agenda*
Review of the implementation of the recommendations
and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its
tenth special session

Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
Report of the Secretary-General
Summary
The present report on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
contains an urgent call to action on an issue of strategic importance. In a bleak
international peace and security environment often characterized by a lack of trust
and respect for international laws and institutions and in which global militaryspending is at a record high of $2.24 trillion, a fresh perspective and recommendations
are offered to secure greater human security and achieve the decades-old objective of
Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, the least diversion of theworld’s economic and human resources to armaments.
At the request of the Secretary-General, and following two years ofdeliberations, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters has developed threepathways and related actions which it believes, when pursued in tandem, could
contribute to a transformative shift to a more holistic conception of security thatwould see fewer resources allocated to competitive arms acquisition and more toactions that meet the needs of peoples and the planet, such as mitigating climatechange and reducing socio-economic inequalities. The pathways are centred aroundmeasures that (a) encourage critical, innovative and transformative thinking on
military spending; (b) contribute to the lessening of threat perceptions and risk
escalation and to a reduction of military spending; and (c) strengthen analysis, datacollection and public awareness on military spending.
The ideas contained in the pathways could deliver immediate, medium- andlonger-term impacts. They target Member States, the United Nations system, regionaland civil society actors, researchers and other stakeholders. Crucially, dialogue anddiplomacy are given primacy, as are respect for international law, a reco mmitment to
the elements that make up the contemporary peace and security architecture, and thedesign of new strategies, as means to improve the wider security climate and to slow
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the upward cycle of military expenditures at a time when new insights and e nergy aresorely needed.
In its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Board reviewed and provided strategic advice
on the Institute’s consolidated programme of work, activities and financ es. The
Institute’s unique position as a bridge-builder and convenor in the field of
disarmament led to several achievements in 2023, notably (a) a substantial increasein events and publications; (b) new digital policy portals on artificial intelligence a nd
space security; and (c) influential expert technical support to States, regionalorganizations and multilateral bodies, including through signature events oninnovation, outer space and cyberstability. The Board was briefed on the evolving
global disarmament research network, the UNIDIR Academy and improvements madeto the website and research dissemination that enabled cost optimization and should
enhance outreach. The Board approved the report of the Director on the activities of
the Institute for the period from January to December 2022 and the proposed
programme of work and financial plan for 2023 and 2024.

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I. Introduction
1.
At the request of the Secretary-General, the Advisory Board on Disarmament
Matters undertook a two-year programme of work to consider the topic of global
military spending. The objective was to recommend actions that could revive a long standing objective, anchored in Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, ofachieving the least diversion of resources towards arms, thereby reversing the current
upward trend in military spending since 1998, and to encourage States to reimagine
security, not only in military terms, but for the benefit of economic, environmental
and social development. Specifically, the Secretary-General requested the Board toreflect on three main questions: (a) what opportunities exist to reinforce transparency,
confidence-building and practical dialogue as alternatives to stockpiling weapons;(b) how to build effective and durable cooperation-based security architectures; and(c) how to facilitate new and transformative thinking on military spending. The timingof the Board’s work meant that it was able to contribute to the development by the
Secretary-General of A New Agenda for Peace, which is aimed at addressing a myriadof global challenges and strengthening global governance for the sake of present andcoming generations.
2.
In 2022, following an initial two sessions, the Advisory Board produced aninterim report on the topic (A/77/263). It resumed discussion in 2023, holding its
seventy-ninth session from 1 to 3 February in Geneva and its eightieth session from21 to 23 June in New York. It convened for informal intersessional meetings in
October 2022 and in January, April and May 2023. Elissa Golberg of Canada presided
as Chair of the Board for all sessions.
3.
The present report, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution
38/183 (O), captures the Board’s substantive discussions and presents its specificrecommendations. It also details its work as the Board of Trustees of the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), including its approva l of thereport of the Director of the Institute (A/78/163).

II. Substantive discussions
A.

Context and background4.
The founding objective of the United Nations, as captured in the preamble of
the Charter, is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to ensure
that, save in the common interest, armed force shall not be used. The obligations
under the Charter thus include a prohibition on the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, but acknowledge the rightof Member States to individual or collective self-defence where this is not respected,
including through regional arrangements, which has also been interpreted by the
Security Council and the General Assembly to include peacekeeping operations andaction to protect civilians who may be at risk. The Charter also requires the regulationof armaments and the establishment and maintenance of international peace andsecurity with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic
resources. 1
5.
Regrettably, the momentum towards this last goal of least diversion, which has
always been irregular, has slowed if not reversed in the past two decades. Global
military spending is now at its highest since the end of the cold war, and arms
competition is largely unconstrained. According to April 2023 data from the__________________
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See preamble and articles 26 and 43–54.
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military spending grew by
19 per cent over the decade from 2013 to 2022, rising every year since 2015, and is
now at a record high of $2.24 trillion dollars. Although the almost continuous increasein military spending prevails on a global scale, it does not apply equally. There arevast differences in spending levels between regions, individual States, groups ofStates and political-military alliances, both in absolute figures and relative to a
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). 2 While this spending generates notable
implications for resource allocation for domestic purposes in both developed anddeveloping countries, the existential impacts may be even more dire for low -income
countries. Most recently, and for multifaceted reasons, many States have committed
to continuing increases in military spending, reflecting, for some, concern at acuteand emerging uncertainties in their security environments.
Figure I
World military expenditure, by region, 1988–2022(Billions of United States dollars)

Source: Trends in world military expenditure, 2022, Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute, April 2023.

__________________
2

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Lorenzo Scarazzato, Trends in world military expenditure, 2022 (Stockholm, StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute, 2023).
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Figure II
Share of world military expenditure of the 15 countries with the highest
spending in 2022
(Percentage)

Source: Trends in world military expenditure, 2022, Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute, April 2023.

6.
The Board was mindful that for several decades, various initiatives of limited
or uneven impact had been developed at the United Nations with the aims of
constraining and promoting transparency on military spending. This included generalappeals to all States to exercise self-restraint in military expenditure with a view toreallocating saved funds to economic and social development; specific proposals forStates with large militaries to reduce expenditures to free up funds for developmentaid; the long-established commitment to achieve general and complete disarmament;
and the creation of the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures to share andcompare information on military spending among Sta tes. The Board was also awarethat the Security Council had failed to meet its obligations under Article 26 toformulate, with the aid of the Military Staff Committee, plans for the establishmentof a system to regulate armaments, in part because the latter had not given priority tothat duty in its programme of work.
7.
More recently, all Member States endorsed the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, which presented an opportunity to foster a new, common understandingof the relationship between disarmament and sustainable and inclusive development.
In its resolution 77/45, the General Assembly stressed the importance of the symbiotic
relationship between disarmament and development and the important ro le of security
in that connection and expressed concern at increasing global military expenditure,
which could otherwise be spent on development needs.

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8.
In addition to Member States, the Secretary-General 3 and various United
Nations agencies, the research community has also increasingly encouraged
rethinking security to protect and manage “the global public good of peace”(A/75/982, para. 89), which could involve commitments to reduce excessive military
budgets and enable adequate social spending, address root causes of conflict anduphold human rights and link disarmament to development opportunities. One such
perspective sees military and human security as a “single security space” whereby
financial claims are balanced against all vital risks and threats, regardless of theircause. This would involve an evaluation of military spending in relation to othermeans of protecting people’s security, including addressing concerns related toclimate change, inequality and poverty reduction. It could potentially lead to areallocation of funds among the different dimensions of security to improve humanwell-being, without leading to a reduction in overall security, broad ly defined, 4 andeven enhance security by addressing non-military threats and reducing the risks ofintemperate armament.

B.

Considerations and reflections of the Board
9.
Aware of this context and its strategic importance, the Board welcomed theopportunity to reflect in a sustained manner on the topic of rising military spending
and means to limit it. It saw the value in offering a fresh perspective on ways in which
States could be encouraged to pursue pathways that reinforced the pr inciple of least
diversion. Such an approach, the Board considered, might foster a constructive global
conversation that animated a transformative shift to a broader, holistic conception of
security, one that saw fewer resources allocated over time to comp etitive arms
acquisition and more to actions that might make people feel safer in response totwenty-first century threats such as climate change and pandemics, gender inequality,
extreme poverty and crime. The Board sought to understand the obstacles to p ast
efforts to reduce military spending as a basis for determining what pre -existing
initiatives might remain relevant and what new avenues could be explored. It saw its
task as especially timely, not least given the rising military spending in a current
international security environment characterized by antagonistic inter-State relations
and hostile rhetoric, a resort to armed aggression in violation of international law,arms-race-like dynamics, and mutual suspicions and trust deficits between States inmany regions.
10. Indeed, it must be said that the two years during which it deliberated on thesubject were tumultuous for arms control and disarmament. There were somedeclarations and commitments related to nuclear weapons, such as the January 2022
reaffirmation by the leaders of the Permanent Five countries that “a nuclear war
cannot be won and must never be fought” and the June 2022 statement by parties to
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons condemning all nuclear threats inany circumstance and calling any use or threat of use of these weapons a violation ofinternational law. But overall, the picture was bleak, reflecting a steady attrition in
respect for international laws and institutions, including, as some members variously
noted, the war in Ukraine and the violation of the Charter of the United Nations in__________________

Including in his 2018 Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament, recent reports
to the Security Council on women and peace and security and the 2021 report “Our Common
Agenda”, in which the Secretary-General called for efforts to rethink unconstrained militaryspending, advocating for people-centred policies and reductions in military spending.
4
See Michael Brzoska, Wuyi Omitoogun and Elisabeth Sköns, The Human Security Case of
Rebalancing Military Expenditure (Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,2022); see also Carlo Rovelli and Matteo Smerlak, “A Small Cut in World Military Spending
Could Help Fund Climate, Health and Poverty Solutions”, Scientific American, 17 March 2022.
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that context, 5 and continued brutal armed violence elsewhere, such as in the Sahelregion, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories. There has been shockingly inflammatory rhetoric about the potential use
of weapons of mass destruction, a further erosion and abandonment of theimplementation of valued treaties and agreements that comprise the global
disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation architecture, 6 and an inability toreach consensus on an outcome document at the tenth Review Conference of theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This sombre landscape spurred
the Board to work collaboratively to develop the set of practical ideas outlined belowthat seek to address the request of the Secretary-General, including by considering
what more the United Nations could do to promote cooperative responses to reverse
these negative trends.
11. In so doing, the Board put a premium on dialogue and diplomacy, which areparamount in a context where trust is lacking; treaties, practices and bodies that weremeant to shore up international security appear more vulnerable than anticipated,
including the Security Council; significant challenges, notably with respect to climatechange and gender and economic inequalities, persist; military spending and arms
build-ups are on the rise; and many brutal wars and situations of armed violence areunresolved. The world is at a pivotal moment, and the Board was unequivocal inconsidering that there must be respect for international law and a recommitment to
the treaties, agreements and instruments that make up the contemporary international
peace and security architecture, including the Charte r of the United Nations, and tofulfilling their ultimate vision of cooperation among States in the interests of all
peoples and the planet. Dialogue and diplomatic action were seen as invaluable bothto improving the broader security climate and as an ena bler in slowing the current
upward cycle of military expenditures.
12. Given the period in which it conducted its work, the Board had meaningful androbust debates about the current war in Ukraine and its origins. There was sharedconcern at its human consequences, the risks of wider conflict, and the global
implications of a deepening and protracted crisis, including for food and nuclear
safety and security. There was also discussion on some of the effects of a Security
Council member brazenly violating the Charter. Several Board members underscoredthe conflict’s relationship to and impact on military spending in Europe and someother regions. The Board encouraged the Secretary-General to continue his urgent andvital diplomatic efforts to reduce escalation, diminish risks to global food security
and radiological security, identify a peaceful and sustainable resolution of the conflict
and, in due course, support efforts to identify and put in place a revitalized pan European security architecture that would mitigate the likelihood of such eventsoccurring again.
13. Driven by an unrelenting commitment to peace, the Board sought to strike abalance in its discussions on a need for creative vision and an appreciation of thepragmatic limits imposed by today’s context. The sense of urgency that has informed
its work and resulting recommendations should motivate all Member States, decision
makers, researchers and civil society actors, who must now decide whether and how
to carry forward its proposals.

__________________

Remarks by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Ukraine of 2 March 2022 and 23
and 24 February 2023.
6
Including with regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Treaty between the UnitedStates of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) and the Treaty on Open Skies.
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Current drivers and implications of military spending
14. The Board recognized that there could be no one-size-fits-all approach given
the complex factors that influenced military spending and noted that absolute numbers
offered only a partial picture. Therefore, it examined the political, economic,
institutional and social factors driving military spending, in particular with regard toregional or global security concerns. It also considered the impacts of militaryspending, both direct and in terms of opportunity costs limiting resources for othereconomic, social and global purposes, and additional negative externalities, including
on the environment. Understanding the underlying factors that drive today’s militaryspending and identifying ways to address them may make it possible to shift resources
not simply to domestic State purposes but also to urgent shared global priorities. The
Board’s discussions on the above were informed by experts of various regions,genders and disciplines. A full list with summaries of their presentations is included
in annex I.
15. A central observation by the Board was that there are a range of complex andinterlocking geostrategic, domestic (social, political, cultural) and institutional
factors that determine the choices and decisions being made with respect to militaryspending and procurement. Depending on the context, State security considerations
and threat assessments, alliance and partnership requirements, regional and global
prestige, bureaucratic competition, industrial pressure and processes of decisionmaking on defence, as well as political and electoral considerations, may all play apart. A lack of global leadership by vital bodies such as the Security Council, whose
ability to mitigate specific crises has been hindered in recent times, may also play apart. Crucially, the Board saw mutually reinforcing relationships today among thestrained, and in some instances crumbling, disarmament, arms control andnon-proliferation regimes, the tense and conflictual internationa l environment,
attempts to erode international law and institutions, and increasing military spending
including on modernization and development of new weapons systems.
16. Members reflected on how, under certain conditions, decisions related tomilitary spending may not accurately reflect the threat environment or sufficiently
consider how such spending may be misperceived by adversaries or contribute toinsecurity and instability. It was noted that military spending choices might be intension with spending to address other, non-military threats, or in some instances leadto other adverse effects such as on the environment or inequality. Examples were citedof procurement decisions that were unduly shaped by industry and/or other lobbying,procurement decisions that involved corruption, projects that cost significantly morethan what was projected and resulted in significant wasted spending, and difficulties
with eliminating military facilities that no longer had strategic value. The Board also
considered the impact of emerging technologies as a factor driving up militaryspending. Concern was expressed that the pursuit and use of such technologies forwarfare in new domains such as space and cyberspace and in areas such as hypersonicand artificial intelligence technologies risked arms-race-like dynamics. Its discussions
also included consideration of whether an emphasis on defensive systems could be
encouraged, but the blurred lines between offensive and defensive systems, with agreat deal depending on how they were used, risked undermining efforts to do so.

C.

Proposed pathways forward
17. This section presents three separate but complementary pathways for action by
States, the United Nations system, civil society, academia and other stakeholders, inline with the request of the Secretary-General. The three pathways are centred aroundmeasures that (a) encourage critical, innovative and transformative thinking on

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military spending; (b) contribute to lessening threat perceptions and risk escalation
and reducing military spending; and (c) strengthen analysis, data collection and publicawareness on military spending. All the pathways need to be pursued even if progress
on one may be more feasible at a given moment than others.
18. The Board considers that the following recommendations could contribute to acultural shift in thinking about peace and security that puts people and planet at thecore. This could result in a strategic and calibrated approach to reducing arms
spending and have tangible impacts in the immediate, medium and longer terms,
including in creating an international context conducive to fostering inclusive
sustainable development for the benefit of all.
Pathway I: Encouraging more critical, innovative and transformative thinking on
military spending
19. While the Board strongly believes that the immediate priority of theinternational community must be actions to halt current conflicts and reduce themilitary dimension of contemporary geopolitical competition, significant progress
towards meeting the injunction under the Charter of the United Nations of the least
possible diversion for arms of the world’s human and economic resources will requirea transformative approach to security. In that regard, the Secretary -General and theUnited Nations system can contribute to stimulating and promoting multilateral andmulti-stakeholder discussions, including with civil society, to enable such a shift.
20. It is the responsibility of Member States to determine the level of their militaryspending; however the Board considers that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat
can help to refocus attention on the Charter’s vision of the least possible diversion of
resources to military spending, the factors that may determine and distort militaryspending decisions, and the consequences of military spending. In that way,
Governments from all regions might be supported to balance different priorities andaccount for the relative contribution of military spending compared with other usesof State resources.
21. The Board considers that regional forums, where they exist, are another valuable
venue for States to discuss, evaluate and assess military spending. As noted above ,each region is faced with a unique security environment and challenges that are also
influenced by transnational drivers and domestic considerations. Regional approaches
may allow neighbouring States to address their concerns in a cooperative forum thatcan contribute to an improved security climate and shifts in security approaches.
There may also be burden-sharing opportunities to reduce individual country
procurements (e.g. early-warning technologies and research on natural hazards) andto alleviate budgetary pressures, especially for low-income countries facing major
security threats.
22. The Board also sees potential for strengthened exchanges and new initiatives
between the United Nations and regional organizations to facilitate exchanges that
promote transparency and dialogue. Such exchanges could leverage best practices andlessons learned from current and past regional cooperation, including on theestablishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as the Board heard with respect toSouth-East Asia.
23. Lastly, the Board noted that, to the extent that they exist, institutionalized checks
and balances and a whole-of-society approach that engages civil society on military
budgeting could help to minimize waste and misuse of funds. In some countries,
however, military budgeting is still primarily the preserve of the military
establishment or a very small group of non-elected officials, often shrouded insecrecy. Enabling better oversight by legislative bodies also could help to reduce
wasteful expenditures and lessen possible corruption. That would require national
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institutions to become more participatory and responsive to public opinion to enhancetransparency and accountability.
Recommendations(a) The Secretary-General should convene States, eminent persons and civilsociety for a special event during a high-level week or another significant opportunity
to identify and develop concrete actions that support a more comprehensive approachto security that focuses not only on the security of States but als o of societies andindividual citizens. In order to achieve greater human security, such an event would
need to consider non-military threats, such as climate change, inequalities or
pandemics, and should consider the implications that a transformative app roach might
have for realigning financial allocations of military spending, and solutions forovercoming obstacles to such an approach;(b) During the above discussions, consideration could be given to establishinga regular forum of government representatives, regional representatives and experts
as an institutional framework to further mainstream a human -centred approach tosecurity within the United Nations system and explore, as appropriate, a newgeneration of confidence-building measures to deal with non-traditional threats andconstructively tackle twenty-first century global strategic and technologicalchallenges;(c) The Secretary-General should mandate a future Advisory Board on
Disarmament Matters to examine the impact of new technologies on conflict andconflict resolution;(d) Regional organizations should organize multi-stakeholder dialogues toenhance knowledge and understanding of military spending, its opportunity costs, andmeans to reduce it, all of which can contribute to achieving the goal of Article 26 of
the Charter of the United Nations. The Secretariat should strengthen its collaboration
with regional organizations on those issues, tailored to their dynamics, and encourageinteraction among regional organizations to share lessons learned and best practices
and to encourage efforts to reduce the role of the use of force among States;(e) The Office for Disarmament Affairs should continue to offer practicalassistance to States for their annual submission to the United Nations Report on
Military Expenditures, including through training programmes, high -level dialogues
and meaningful engagement with civil society organizations. All States could be
encouraged to integrate and strengthen impact assessments by governmental
oversight bodies for planned military procurement, such as auditors and evaluation
teams, to identify potential risks, counter distortions and help to ensure efficient use
of national resources.
Pathway II: Measures that contribute to reducing threat perceptions and the riskof military escalation: the need to bolster dialogue and diplomacy, including
confidence-building, transparency and disarmament and arms control
24. In this dangerous period, it is essential that States return to dialogue anddiplomacy to (re)build trust and confidence, manage conflicts of interest, reinforce
multilateral action, cooperation and collective measures as foreseen in the Charterand lessen the risks of crisis escalation. This necessitates a central role fordisarmament, arms control and non-proliferation measures, including operationaltransparency and confidence-building measures centred around the notion ofcooperative security. These measures can be unilateral, bilateral, regional or
multilateral in nature. Taken together, they can help to address perceptions andmisunderstandings about military actions and policies, avert escalation and lessen
military spending pressures, facilitating a shift in approaches to international peace
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and security. The Board underlines that all Member States share an interest in such
efforts, including as means of mitigating regional rivalries and avoiding arms racing,and in doing so, containing the growth of military spending. In addition, the Board
stresses the need to urgently sustain and bolster existing agreements in this field andfoster new strategies and imaginative thinking that address twenty-first century
challenges, including the role of new and emerging technologies.
25. The Board considers that transparency can foster increased security by reducing
uncertainties about respective capabilities and dispositions that contribute tocompetition, thereby helping to build needed trust between States. Transparency
measures can also enhance accountability and be part of an effort to promote serious
re-engagement within and between States on their security concerns. As such, theBoard sees scope to better position the United Nations as a relevant, neutral andaccessible hub for data and information. It notes the utility and potential of the U nited
Nations military expenditures database and the United Nations Register ofConventional Arms, which could be better leveraged as vehicles to accurately informthe military spending decisions of States and debates among policy experts,
disarmament practitioners and the public alike. The Board expresses concern at thediminished number of States reporting to these databases, believing that participationin both should be prioritized. Moreover, fostering information exchange on national
policies on emerging technologies and potential new domains of conflict, and theircorresponding military spending, might be pursued. All these actions can havecorresponding benefits to potentially reduce the growth of military spending. In thatregard, the Board also suggests that the time may be ripe for a review of the military
expenditures database, given that it was last assessed by a group of governmental
experts in 2017.
26. Lastly, and crucially, in a context of heightened nuclear risk, the Board reaffirmsthat the international community must not lose sight of achieving the goal of a
nuclear-weapon-free world. It expresses deep concern about the dangers inherent in
the very existence of nuclear weapons, the increased arms racing arising from theirmodernization and the expansion of existing arsenals, as well as proliferation risks,potential escalatory dynamics and rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons. It urgesthat cooperative action be taken to mitigate such dynamics and to put the world backon track towards their total elimination. It also underscores the relevance of its past
recommendations, including in its 2020–2021 report, aimed at securing nuclear
disarmament and arms control (A/76/183).
Recommendations(a) The Secretary-General should continue to use his good offices to help
bring about a resolution to various significant geostrategic conflicts and situations ofarmed violence, including the conflict in Ukraine. More broadly, the Secretary General and the United Nations Secretariat should continue to promote regional
confidence-building and conflict resolution measures to reduce today’s tensions,encourage restraint, decelerate military build-ups and lessen the role of military force
as a means of security. Both bilateral engagement and engagement with regionalorganizations and by multilateral bodies could offer opportunities to do so;(b) States, notably and urgently those in possession of nuclear weapons,should establish, deepen and/or reinvigorate dialogue at all levels, including bilateral
strategic dialogues, military-to-military exchanges, and exchanges among politicians
and civil society. Their purpose should be, inter alia, to enhance mutual
understanding, identify confidence-building measures, mitigate threat perceptions
that drive military spending, and address questions related to doctrine, posture andpolicies. Given their specific responsibilities in relation to a rticle VI of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, exchanges among the nuclear-weapon
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States must continue to be pursued. Owing to their potential strategic implications,
States involved in nuclear-sharing arrangements should also undertake relevant
actions in accordance with the above;(c) States and military alliances should regularly reassess their military
postures and doctrines. Particular attention should focus on whether those posturesand doctrines, as well as their procurement strategies, directly or indirectly increase
security concerns for other States and populations, fuel escalatory dynamics,
contribute to accumulation of excessive or redundant capabilities, are ill -suited to thethreat environment or jeopardize efforts to advance human security for societies,
communities and individuals and to protect nature, and if so, they should be amended
accordingly;(d) At the multilateral level, States should carry forward their efforts to
identify and implement transparency and confidence-building measures in emerging
fields such as outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence and life sciences toencourage the development of such technologies within the framework of acooperative human-centred security policy and to help lessen the extent to which they
are contributing to perceptions of heightened military threats. To that end, theSecurity Council should request the Secretary-General to prepare an annual review ofsuch developments, as well as of how military competition is developing in new ways
across scientific and economic domains, independent of specific treaty regimes. Suchan approach could facilitate anticipatory norm-setting and treaty-making. An annual
Security Council debate could be organized on receipt of the report;(e) All States should submit their reports to the United Nations military
expenditures database and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and, forthe former, include disaggregated spending figures in their reports, including on the
different branches of service of the military and on functional categories of spending;and the General Assembly, through its biennial resolution entitled “Objective
information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures”,
should seek to further strengthen the military expenditures database so that it is well
positioned to address contemporary issues;(f) The Office for Disarmament Affairs should continue to improve theaccessibility and comparability of official data on military spending submitted to theUnited Nations Report on Military Expenditures, including by seeking to render thatdata comparable between States and over time, making use of standards foraccounting for currency exchange rates and inflation.
Pathway III: Strengthening analysis and data collection on military spending
27. The Board considers that analysis is needed on the practical policy andoperational implications of implementing a more comprehensive approach to security
for levels and types of military spending and calls for new academic and policy-based
research to be encouraged on the topic of military spending. Indeed, some three
decades have passed since the General Assembly last mandated studies exploring theinterlinkages between disarmament and development or on the wider consequencesof military spending. New research would increase readily available expertise, bringgreater prominence to the issue and, ideally, generate increased domestic andinternational public attention and oversight. A twenty-first century analysis that offersa more current understanding of the political, socioeconomic and environmental
consequences of military expenditures and accounts for contemporary priorities,
including in relation to gender equality, climate change, co nflict prevention(including early warning and action), protracted crises and democratic oversight andinstitutional capacity, would be invaluable.

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28. The Board is concerned that broad public awareness of the need and value ofactions in support of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation has waned. It
also considers that there is insufficient recognition of the trade -offs between militaryspending and socioeconomic investments and between such State spending anddealing with global threats. It recognizes that sophisticated and differentiatedapproaches to raising awareness would be needed given the vastly different levels of
public debate, sentiment and civic engagement across the globe. In both past andpresent, United Nations entities and civil society groups have played an indispensablerole in raising awareness and mobilizing support around important global issues. For
instance, the world’s youth have collectively rallied around the issue of climatechange, advocating urgent political leadership, systemic shifts and decisive action to
enable a better, safer and more secure future for all.
29. Noting that it has been some 40 years since the World Disarmament Campaign
was launched, the Board sees scope for the Secretary-General, the United Nations
Secretariat and relevant agencies, funds or programmes to expand on current efforts
to heighten global public understanding and awareness. It was underscored that a
participatory and inclusive approach was vital – bringing in voices, experiences andperspectives that did not always find space or footing in international security
discussions and where the United Nations was uniquely positioned.
Recommendations(a) The General Assembly, through its Disarmament and International
Security Committee, should urgently request that a group of independent international
experts carry out the following studies:(i) An updated study on the social, cultural, economic and environmental
consequences of military spending, including the costs of war and arms races,
informed by a wide range of stakeholders;(ii) A study of the elements of a more comprehensive and cooperative
approach to global, State and human security, obstacles to its pursuit and ways
to overcome those obstacles, and the implications of such a transformative shift
for levels and types of military spending;(b) Additional, more specialized studies could be undertaken by the Office for
Disarmament Affairs, UNIDIR, other international bodies, academic institutions orcivil society organizations. Examples of such studies include:(i) A study analysing all the factors that determine and increase militaryspending and procurement, and their relationship to resource allocation. Such a
study would also account for different military postures and strat egies and theimplications of the development and deployment of new and emerging
technologies with military applications, such as artificial intelligence, as well ascapabilities in potential domains of conflict, such as cyberspace and outer space;(ii) A virtual compendium or toolbox of effective measures and best practices
in the public and parliamentary oversight of military procurement, theireffectiveness, the implications for reducing wasteful military spending and how
to encourage the adoption of such practices to help foster transparency as partof a whole-of-society approach to military budgeting. Such a compendium could
also include a focus on, inter alia, corporate lobbying, the hiring of former
military personnel in military industry positions and corruption;

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A/78/287(iii) In conjunction with the next report on human security of the United
Nations Development Programme, 7 a study that outlines ways to undertake
integrated security needs and impact assessments in relevant budgetary andplanning processes, similar to environmental impact assessments. This should
include methodologies to quantify potential financial savings that can berealized from the implementation of disarmament agreements and how a portionof any such savings could be used to support sustainable development andfurther efforts in the field of disarmament;(iv) A study of the implications of reductions in military spending for industrial
capacity and personnel and how international support could be provided for theconversion of defence industrial capacity to socially useful production (forexample, through loans or technical support) and the reintegration of military
personnel into civilian life. Such recommendations could contribute to
mitigating the consequences of reductions in and reduce pressure for sustainedlevels of military spending. This study could benefit from the cooperation
among international and regional economic institutions, the United Nations andother stakeholders;(v) A comprehensive assessment on the past, current and possible future costsof nuclear weapons programmes, including their economic, health andenvironmental consequences, their relationship to the structure and drivers ofmilitary budgets, and the opportunity costs of withdrawal from arms control
agreements;(c) A twenty-first century World Disarmament Campaign should be launchedby the Secretary-General. Coordinated by the Office for Disarmament Affairs andpursued in conjunction with other relevant United Nations agencies, funds andprogrammes, the Campaign would strengthen global public understanding, educationand support for disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and peace. It should
include increasing the awareness of young people of the implications of rising
military spending and the catastrophic consequences of modern war, with a special
focus on nuclear war;(d) Military spending could be the theme for a forthcoming International Day
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness and Disarmament Week.
Conclusion
30. At the outset of its work, the Advisory Board knew that it had been given a
singular challenge by the Secretary-General, namely, to bring new energy and insights
to a commitment made more than seven decades ago at the creation of the United
Nations. It knew that there would be no magic formula, no single solution to reverse
the rise in military spending. It does believe, however, that active diplomacy, dialogue
and research can offer a pathway back to the goal of enabling the least diversion of
the world’s financial resources away from social and economic development andenvironmental sustainability. A less conventional, more holistic appreciation of
security can be embraced, which would see more resources spent on climate action,social and economic justice and gender equality and less on weapons. The “golden
nuggets” in the present report are actionable and must urgently be put to work forpeople, planet and prosperity.

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See United Nations Development Programme, 2022 Special Report: New threats to humansecurity in the Anthropocene: Demanding greater solidarity (February 2022).
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III. Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research
31. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, acting in its role as the Board ofTrustees of UNIDIR, met twice in 2023, on 31 January and 20 June, to review theInstitute’s programmes, funding and operations.
Results and impact
32. During the first meeting, the Director of UNIDIR outlined the Institute’s
activities and strategic impact in 2022, illustrated by means of case studies of its
contributions to the ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological
Weapons Convention, its work on the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons andother weapons of mass destruction, the project on managing exits from armed conflict
and the UNIDIR Academy, and programme priorities for 2023. In that context, theDirector updated Trustees on his efforts to further strengthen impact measurement
and reporting. It was suggested that UNIDIR continue to refine its various impact
narratives, streamlining further as appropriate, and to develop them into a coherent
overarching narrative that outlines the Institute’s value proposition.
33. Trustees expressed satisfaction that notwithstanding the challenging
international geostrategic environment, including setbacks on disarmament and arms
control, UNIDIR had reinforced its position as a bridge -builder and convenor byproviding necessary spaces for difficult but vital reflections on a range of peace andsecurity matters and enabling expert and inter-State interactions, including throughsignature initiatives such as its Outer Space Security Conference, Innovations
Dialogue and Cyberstability Conference, and by supporting multilateral processes.
Moreover, Trustees welcomed the Institute’s meaningful work on youth engagementin 2022, including a model United Nations exercise, an essay competition withapplicants from 38 countries and a self-paced e-learning course and related videointerviews with young UNIDIR professionals. Trustees expressed regret that a lackof funding might hinder the project’s continuation and suggested that more entities
and countries be approached as potential future funders, including those from whichyoung people had participated in previous activities.
34. Following the briefing in June 2022 on the Institute’s four-year strategic
research framework, Trustees were given further details on the prioritie s for 2023,
notably, the global disarmament research network, the UNIDIR Academy and the roll out of the multi-pillar programme structure. On the research network, Trustees
recommended a gradual approach, linked with UNIDIR priorities, and underlined theimportance of inclusivity and flexibility. Concerning the Academy, Trustees requested
that UNIDIR engage in a strategic discussion with the Office for Disarmament Affairs
to clarify their respective priorities and offerings related to capacity -building. Lastly,
the Board took note of the Director’s plan to begin work on the next strategic plan in
2024, which was planned to cover the period from 2025 to 2030.
Finances
35. The ability of UNIDIR to showcase a strong value proposition resulted in arecord number of donors (33) from all continents in 2022 and record revenue
generation (close to $8 million), which was expected to be sustained into 2023.
Trustees were pleased that all five permanent members of the Security Council had
financially supported the Institute, for the first time since 2010. As it continued toconsolidate its resource mobilization strategy, UNIDIR was exploring potential
private capital and philanthropic partners. The Director indicated how UNIDIR had
used the subvention allocated by the General Assembly, which had increased to
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A/78/287$683,500 from $280,700 in 2021 and had enabled quarterly disarmament briefings
for all United Nations regional groupings, the convening of seminars in three
non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
and the hiring of an Executive Officer to enhance efficiency and oversight.
36. While considering priorities and budget scenarios for 2023, the Board was also
briefed on the Institute’s financial constraints, including a restr icted interpretation of
official development assistance definitions by some OECD Development AssistanceCommittee donors and a high degree of earmarking (having risen to 92 per cent in
2022 from 75 per cent in 2018), with concomitant risks related to mediu m-term
financial stability and operational capacity to respond quickly to emerging themes or
issues.
37. Trustees discussed potential mitigation measures, encouraging UNIDIR tocontinue to diversify its resources, to assess the benefits and risks of reque sting a
re-evaluation of the Institute’s official development assistance coefficient and toengage the Chair of the Development Assistance Committee on the matter.
Furthermore, Trustees asked that UNIDIR present a refined set of principles forengagement with the private sector/private capital, which was subsequently presented
and endorsed at the June meeting.
38. Trustees noted that while the subvention increase from the United Nations
regular budget had provided some additional predictability, it fell sh ort of what
Trustees had recommended. Given that the subvention is not budgeted on the basis ofstandard United Nations staff costs each year, in future, it will be insufficient to coveractual staff costs of the positions it supports. In view of that and the growing
importance of the Institute’s mandate and activities for all United Nations members,
the Board requested the Director to develop a draft business case for a further
subvention increase to safeguard the Institute’s independence, stability andsustainability, which was presented to the Board in June 2023. The Board agreed thatan application for a further subvention increase was warranted and should aim tocover, at a minimum, the research programmes and the Deputy Director to provide
substantive leadership, quality control and coordination of all research and activities.
Further discussion was needed on the scope, scale and timing of a request (2024 or2025), and the Director was requested to further develop the proposal and its rationale
in order to present it to the Trustees at their next meeting, in January 2024.
Interim 2023 achievements and 2024 programme of work
39. During its June 2023 session, the Board considered and adopted the Institute’sannual work programme for 2024 and the proposed annual budget estimates,
acknowledging recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions on the draft report of the Director. Trustees requested thatthe programme of work and financial estimates for the following yea r be included asa separate agenda item in the June meetings of the Board. Work will also be done toenhance onboarding for Trustees related to sequencing of decision -making.
40. The Director presented the Institute’s recent growth and key achievements,
noting the substantial increase in events and publications, which were two thirds
higher in 2022 than in 2021, new digital policy portals on artificial intelligence andspace security, and expert technical support provided to States, regional organizations
and multilateral bodies. To support the increased workload, full-time staff grew from41 in 2022 to 61 in June 2023. As also suggested by the Advisory Committee, theBoard recommended an evaluation of staffing requirements to sustain the delivery ofhigh-quality, timely research in line with the Institute’s mandate. Trustees also
requested that a standing agenda item on human resources be included for future
Board meetings.
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41. UNIDIR reported that a high-level retreat with the Office for Disarmament
Affairs was planned for later in 2023, which would provide the opportunity to discuss
respective priorities and offerings, including related to education. Cooperation
between the two will therefore be reviewed at the next meeting of the Trustees.
42. Trustees were briefed on the constructive impact of the New York liaison office
and its role in supporting Member States, strengthening links between research,
events and activities in Geneva and New York and supporting programmatic action.
Trustees and the Director discussed various options for filling this currently vacant
position. In future meetings, reports on the New York liaison presence will be
included in the general update.
43. Lastly, Trustees were briefed on quality and cost-efficiency improvements
across the website, research dissemination and brand consistency, before going on to
explore the Institute’s work on artificial intelligence and its conventional arms andammunition programme.

IV. Future work and other matters
44. The Board of Trustees proposed possible future topics for focus by the Advisory
Board. It referred in the first instance to the recommendation contained in the present
report under Pathway I to examine the impact of new and emerging technologies on
conflict and conflict prevention. Particular focus could be given to the military
applications of artificial intelligence and their impact on arms control anddisarmament efforts. Other potential topics for discussions included the following:(a) “Maintaining the nuclear taboo” – reducing nuclear threats, crafting
practical measures for risk reduction and forging an attainable path towards a world
free of nuclear weapons, notably in view of the upcoming 100th anniversary of theirinvention and use;(b)

Implications of the threat of use of nuclear weapons;(c) Application of early-warning systems in conflict prevention and theirutility for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation;(d) Strengthening the United Nations disarmament education efforts bydrawing on current global best practices and exploring means to operationalize themost recent strategy of the Office for Disarmament Affairs;(e) Implications for disarmament of the growing role of private armies,
paramilitary forces and private technology companies engaging on the battlefield.
45. To support future Boards in undertaking their work both in serving theSecretary-General and as UNIDIR Trustees, it was suggested that an enhanced
onboarding process be developed, including providing all new Members with acomprehensive briefing package that included an overview of recent discussion topics
and reports, a detailed description of responsibilities, meeting processes and expected
outputs, and a notional plan for the year ahead.

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Annex I
Summary of expert presentations at the seventy-ninth session of
the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
1.
Over its two-year mandate, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters,
seeking gender-balanced panels, benefited from presentations and question -andanswer sessions with diverse external speakers from various geographical locations
and disciplines, including conflict management, defence economics, disarmament andarms control, regional cooperation, sustainable development, human security andgender equality.
2.
The Board’s interim report (A/77/263) contains a summary of the discussions at
its seventy-seventh and seventy-eighth sessions, as well as a detailed summary ofexperts’ presentations. The present annex includes summaries of the presentations
that the Board heard at its seventy-ninth session in Geneva in February 2023. At its
eightieth session in New York, the Board focused on private deliberations without
external experts.
Seventy-ninth session
Panel 1
Opportunities for strengthening and promoting regional cooperation on
military spending
3.
Four peace and security specialists offered regional perspectives on the ways inwhich military spending was addressed in Latin America and the Caribbean, SouthEast Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
4.
Patience Zanelie Chiradza, Director of Governance and Conflict Prevention at
the African Union Commission, emphasized the centrality of Agenda 2063: The
Africa We Want to the efforts of the African Union to address shared security threatson the continent and reduce incentives for arms racing. She noted that States membersof the African Union face numerous threats, including from communal violence, rebel
movements and insurgencies, drug trafficking and other forms of transnationalorganized crime, terrorism and violent extremism, unconstitutional changes ingovernment and the effects of climate change. As such, expenses related to building
and maintaining national security architectures, including safeguarding borders,citizens and economies, also constitute necessary military and/or defence spending.
Architectures such as the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, thededicated Peace Fund and the African Standby Force all contributed t o enhancing theeffectiveness of continental responses to security risks, conflict prevention andpeacebuilding efforts, and facilitated burden-sharing to reduce military spending inindividual African Union countries. The African Union Master Road Map of Practical
Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030 is aimed at tracking progress towards
armed violence reduction. Ms. Chiradza underlined that the Commission wascommitted to working with the United Nations and other partners to support its
members in effectively implementing commitments regarding defence and military
cooperation as a strategy to reduce military spending.
5.
Pier Angelli De Luca, Specialist of the Department of Public Security at theOrganization of American States, outlined the Organization’s emphasis on limiting
military spending, in accordance with a 2003 political commitment by leaders, andactions to promote the comprehensive implementation of global disarmament
frameworks in the region, notably to address small arms and light we apons. She noted
that, notwithstanding the disparity in absolute spending levels among member States(i.e. North America versus the rest of the region), military budgets in some parts of
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Central America and the Caribbean constituted a relatively large part of national grossdomestic products, reflecting a heightened prevalence of armed violence andorganized crime in recent years, which had generated pressure for the military to be
involved in security and law enforcement tasks. This dynamic raised a crucia lquestion regarding the appropriate role(s) of the military versus law enforcement inaddressing societal security threats, with consequences for budgetary allocations. The
diversion of small arms and light weapons from national stockpiles for illicit pur poses
or by illicit actors was also of serious concern. Ms. De Luca advocated for acomprehensive approach to stockpile management to mitigate spiralling militaryspending and proliferation, including enhanced assessments and inventory control
and storage, which the Organization sought to enhance by providing technicalassistance to its members. The Inter-American Defense Board offered a venue todiscuss military spending, and specific confidence-building measures related tomilitary spending were in place and were tracked and discussed every two years.
While the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons
Acquisitions of 1999 was aimed at promoting regional transparency, until very
recently it was hampered by low reporting rates and th e absence of a technicalsecretariat and dialogue.
6.
Robert Matheus Michael Tene, Deputy Secretary-General of the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the ASEAN Political-Security Community,
noted that, while ASEAN did not have a specific mechanism to track or limit militaryspending, its emphasis on dialogue and confidence-building measures was aimed at
mitigating threats and threat perceptions that could lead to excessive expenditures.
Noting that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Sou theast Asia embodied theuniversal principles of peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation among States inSouth-East Asia, ASEAN member States had agreed on specific areas for defence
cooperation, including counter-terrorism, maritime security, humanitarian assistanceand disaster response (including mine action), peacekeeping operations andcybersecurity. Regional summits, forums and high-level meetings offered platforms
encourage the engagement of relevant global and regional actors who played a rolein maintaining peace and stability in South-East Asia at a time when otheropportunities for such encounters were limited. The region had seen increased
strategic competition and enhanced threat perceptions over the last five years, but it
remained unclear whether that environment would result in a spike in militaryspending. It was also noted that ASEAN is waiting for the nuclear-weapon States tosign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon -Free Zone,
which was inhibiting confidence. In addition, a dialogue with China on a maritime
code of conduct was under way.
7.
Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, spoke to sobering and complex security and militaryspending dynamics in the Middle East. He cited several reasons why expenditures
were on the rise, including prestige, standing, regime and/or State security
considerations, threat assessments, alliance and partnership requirements, and adisillusionment with regional disarmament processes that had either stagnated (e.g.
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the establishment of a Middle East zone
free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction) or not resulted inaccountability (e.g. chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic). Greater
reliance on indigenous weapons and capabilities had also emerged as a phenomenon,
in order to diversify economically, enhance self-reliance and foster deterrence in
response to shifts in focus by key global allies. In that context, Mr. Hokayem referred
to an increase of “mini-lateralism” in the region, defined by clusters of countries
coming together to cooperate on certain issues, including defen ce, and tacticalescalation on several fronts, notably the largely unrestrained use and export of missile
systems and uncrewed aerial vehicles. Since a reversal of those trends was not
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anticipated in the near term, he recommended actions that took a more holistic
approach to regional security, beyond an arms control persp ective (i.e. rather thanfocusing on what States were buying or spending on the military, examining why they
were doing so). He also recommended greater transparency in arms transfers.
Panel 2
Opportunities for disarmament and arms control
8.
Two high-level and experienced practitioners who had each negotiated practical
disarmament and arms control measures and treaties were invited to offer reflections
on how such processes could be pursued, even under the most strained geopoliticalcircumstances. They also exchanged views on the factors that had led to the current
war in Ukraine and its consequences.
9.
Grigory Berdennikov, Ambassador-in-Residence at the Center for Energy andSecurity Studies and former Russian negotiator of the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, noted the valueof discussions on military spending, which he expected would continue to rise f or theforeseeable future. He recalled the initiative undertaken by the former Soviet Union
in 1973 to pursue a resolution of the General Assembly seeking to reduce military
budgets by 10 per cent and use a portion of the funds saved to provide assistance todeveloping countries. The disarmament and arms control architecture built in the lastphase of the cold war and immediately following did result in a significant reductionof armaments, despite the direct or indirect involvement of the parties in ongoin garmed conflicts at the time. That reduction, in turn, contributed to a decrease inmilitary spending levels. Conversely, Mr. Berdennikov saw a direct link between thepresent-day erosion and near collapse of the disarmament and arms control regime(with the exception of the successful extension to 2026 of the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), which, in his view, had begun
more than 20 years ago, its negative impact on strategic stability and the increase inmilitary spending in recent years. He also noted that the current dynamics hampered
the ability to pursue future disarmament and arms control agreements. Preserving
what remained of the arms control architecture should be the immediate and principal
objective, including the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
by those remaining States listed in annex II.
10. Rose Gottemoeller, Steven C. Házy Lecturer at Stanford U niversity and former
lead for the United States of America on the negotiations of the New START Treaty
with the Russian Federation, recalled that the transparency and confidence -building
stemming from arms limitations and arms control agreements between th e former
Soviet Union and the United States were understood to be in the national interests ofboth parties. That understanding had resulted in a valued predictability in posture andapproach, which enabled both parties to invest where most needed, rather than in
additional nuclear weapons. If such predictability was lost, there could be pressure toincrease spending on nuclear weapons with a concomitant risk of their deliberate or
accidental use, even if the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed the adage that a nuclear
war could not be won and must never be fought.
11. Ms. Gottemoeller noted that, while the New START Treaty currently faced,
implementation issues that were, in large part, technical and reversible, both parties
continued to abide by its central limitations and should negotiate its successor. She
also stressed the need to involve China in efforts to impose restraints, since all three
countries had modernized their arsenals, but there was more limited understanding of
the intent and doctrine of China. In that regard, she noted an evolving debate in the
United States about the prospect of having to engage two nuclear-capable peers. She
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underscored the need to preserve existing arms control arrangements and theopportunity to pursue innovative initiatives, drawing lessons on verification fromrecent efforts led by the Secretary-General and Türkiye related to the Initiative on the
Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports and theZaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.
Panel 3
Encouraging innovative and transformative thinking on military spending
12. The third and last expert panel focused on avenues to encourage fresh thinking
about military spending.
13. Robert Egnell, Vice-Chancellor of the Swedish Defence University andProfessor of Leadership and Command and Control, suggested that the current fraught
international security environment, which was notably due to the war on Ukraine, had
led many States to conclude, in the words of the Secretary -General, that they could
only find security in weapons rather than dialogue, with a consequential rise inmilitary spending. The present security environment was not ripe for concrete anddecisive action on disarmament. He therefore proposed a “defensive approach”,
whereby arms control measures could be designed to reduce the most dangerous andurgent risks, sowing the seeds for a more robust re-engagement on disarmament at alater stage. In the short term, Mr. Egnell recommended the active management ofarmament processes by certain countries (e.g. Germany and Sweden), with a view topreventing escalation and arms races; the prioritization of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform in any post -conflictsetting; the exploration of arms control regimes that accept post-conflict rearmament
up to certain levels; the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation; and a strongemphasis on disarmament issues involving new and potentially harmful technologies
and domains for war, such as artificial intelligence, q uantum mechanics, hypersonicmissiles, outer space and cyberspace. He also advocated for a new concept of security,
one that was not centred on nuclear deterrence or viewed security exclusively througha lens of external threats. He suggested that the United Nations definition of humansecurity could be appropriate, involving an array of stakeholders in civil society topreserve the interests of we the peoples. Such a definition would emphasize enhancing
the resilience of societies to external shocks, wheth er from the effects of climatechange or cyberinsecurity.
14. Neta C. Crawford, the Montague Burton Chair in International Relations at the
University of Oxford, diagnosed two problem areas for military spending andmilitarization that, if addressed, could meaningfully transform some of its negative
implications and externalities. She observed that, first, military spending routinely
crowded out other priorities and was unmoored to true defence requirements and,second, there was an enduring misconception and socialization around the notion thatmilitary spending automatically resulted in military capabilities or power, whilevarious armed conflicts suggested that such a correlation was not necessarily evident.
Ms. Crawford outlined several incremental options that might mitigate some of thoseissues, which included pursuing spending caps, cuts or targeted reductions (e.g. inpersonnel and bases and by modernizing armaments), and seeking to decarbonize
elements of the military and defence industries by transi tioning to renewable energy
and more efficient infrastructure, which could cut greenhouse gas emissions. She also
proposed several transformative ideas that, taken together, could constitute more
effective ways to reduce the risk of conflict escalation, military spending and, as apositive by-product, greenhouse gas emissions. The proposals included focusing themilitary on missions best suited to its value added (e.g. away from emergency
response), shifting from offensive to defensive military doctrines an d enhancing
cooperative regional security arrangements to burden-share costs and reduce waste
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spending. She recommended an in-depth analysis be prepared of successful defensive
responses to violence (i.e. defense in depth), which included articulating the range of
weapons seen as defensive and conducting a cost comparison between offensive anddefensive strategies. Such scenarios would need to be war-gamed. Last, she agreed
with Mr. Egnell that new technologies that were inherently provocative and escalator yshould be addressed through arms control and confidence-building measures.
Ms. Crawford also cautioned against allowing human security to be co -opted by the
military to prevent the undesired expansion of its threat responses and concomitant
increases in spending levels.

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Annex II
Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters 2023
Leena Al-Hadid
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan
Nabeela Abdulla Al-Mulla
Distinguished lecturer at the American University of Kuwait and Chairman of theBoard of Trustees of the Kuwait College of Science and Technology
Kuwait City
Lewis Dunn
Former United States Ambassador to the Review Conference of the Parties to theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Elissa Golberg (Chair)
Ambassador of Canada to the Republic of Italy, Ambassador designate to Albania,
San Marino and Malta, and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United
Nations Agencies based in Rome
Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution and Professorof Practice at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University
New York
Mary Kaldor
Emeritus Professor of Global Governance and Director of the Conflict and Civicness
Research Group of the London School of Economics and Political Science
LondonMarina KaljurandMember of the European Parliament
Brussels
Anton Khlopkov
Director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies
Moscow
Li Chijiang
Vice-President and Secretary-General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament
Association
Beijing
Amina Mohamed
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya
Zia Mian
Senior Research Scholar and Co-Director of the Program on Science and Global
Security at the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey
Marty Natalegawa
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia
Eghosa Osaghae
Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Lagos
Shorna-Kay Richards
Ambassador of Jamaica to JapanTokyo
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Margot Wallström
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden
Robin Geiss (ex officio member)
Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
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