EAJ Report 2021-05

STI Roadmap to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals
The Road to 2050

February 2022
THE ENGINEERING ACADEMY OF JAPAN
Science, Technology and Innovation 2050 Committee(STI2050)
The Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

■1Abstract
The Committee was established in November 2019 with the aim “to determine thenecessary technologies for achieving the desired future vision for 2050 based on anassessment the current situation, including an inventory of technologies looking
forward to 2050, and to draw a roadmap for science, technology and innovation tomaterialise these technologies.
As the impacts of COVID-19 became more serious in Japan, discussion on
selection of issues changed. The debate was reexamined, and selections were
narrowed down to the following three issues.
1) Realisation of smart cities and comfortable and resilient human settlements
2) Realisation of sustainable and equitable access to water, food and energy3) Realisation of governance based on visualised evidence and tolerance ofdiverse values
・ The report presents measures to enhance mutual understanding and trust
among people, society, policy makers, and the scientific community, and torealize an advanced knowledge-based society that can respond flexibly to new
events that the world will face in the future.
・ Although the energy-food-water relationship has synergies and tradeoffs witheach other, the concept of Sufficiency was introduced to present a roadmap forachieving carbon neutrality and Energy Sufficiency in all regions of the world.
・ Furthermore, as a vision for the future city, we propose a "Multi-AI Networked
city" that successfully utilizes cyber and physical space, pursues well-being withhumans at the center, and aims to ensure comfort during normal times andsafety and security during outbreaks.

Recommended citation:
Science, Technology and Innovation 2050 Committee (STI2050): STI Roadmap to Achieve
the Sustainable Development Goals. The Road to 2050, The Engineering Academy of Japan,
2022
The Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

■2
Table of Contents
AUTHORS LIST ......................................................................................................................................................................... 5
COMMITTEE MEMBERS ...................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.

INTRODUCTION: TURNING TO THE PREFACE ............................................................................................ 72.

THOUGHTS ON A FUTURE SOCIETY IN 2050 ............................................................................................... 92.1. BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 92.2. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE ............................................................................................................10
2.3. TOPICS TO BE ADDRESSED ...............................................................................................................................................................11
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................................................................13

3. ROADMAP TOWARD REALISATION OF GOVERNANCE BASED ON VISUALISEDEVIDENCE AND TOLERANCE OF DIVERSE VALUES ................................................................................... 14
3.1. INTRODUCTION: "WHAT DOES GOVERNANCE LOOK LIKE, AND WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO ACHIEVE? ...................143.1.1.
Significance of this chapter................................................................................................................................................143.1.2.
Why visualised evidence and governance are currently a challenge .........................................................143.1.3.
Science and technology and society in the 20th century ..................................................................................15
3.1.4.
Transformation of society’s relationship with science and technology in the 21st century - theemergence of the SDGs ..........................................................................................................................................................................15
3.1.5.
The need for “governance” ................................................................................................................................................16
3.1.6.
Governance of science, technology and innovation built upon on push-and-pull tension andmutual respect...............................................................................................................................................................................................18
3.1.7.
The aim of “governance” .....................................................................................................................................................20
3.2. THE ROLES OF VISUALISED EVIDENCE, DIVERSE VALUES AND WELL-BEING...................................................................20
3.2.1.
Well-being and QoL ...............................................................................................................................................................20
3.2.2.
QoL development by government ..................................................................................................................................21
3.2.3.
National well-being .................................................................................................................................................................22
3.2.4.
Local government initiatives (Bristol, UK) ..................................................................................................................23
3.2.5.
Life satisfaction and values in Japan ...........................................................................................................................24
3.2.6.
Technology to measure well-being in the age of AI .............................................................................................25
3.3. REDESIGNING SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY SYSTEMS TO RESPOND TO THE SDGS AND THE PANDEMIC - THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE SCIENCE-POLICY-SOCIETY INTERFACE: FROM LINEAR MODELS TO ECOSYSTEMS ..........................26
3.3.1.
Redesigning scientific advisory systems driven by the COVID-19 pandemic - from linear models
to ecosystems ...............................................................................................................................................................................................26
3.3.2.
The historical evolution of scientific advisory systems and the impacts of the SDGs and COVID19 pandemic ...................................................................................................................................................................................................26
3.3.3.
Direction of the redesign of scientific advisory systems to respond to the SDGs and the
pandemic .........................................................................................................................................................................................................29
3.4. THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEGISLATIVE BODIES TO SCIENTIFIC ADVICE, WITH EUROPEAN ACADEMIES AN
INDISPENSABLE PRESENCE ..............................................................................................................................................................................31
3.4.1.
Interesting points on the relationship between academies and legislatures in Europe ....................31
3.4.2.
The situation in Japan ..........................................................................................................................................................34
3.4.3.
Necessary measures ............................................................................................................................................................35
3.5. ISSUES CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN THE ERA OF COVID-19 ...............35
3.5.1.
COVID-19 as a major event commanding a transformation in the relationship between scienceand society ......................................................................................................................................................................................................35
3.5.2.
Scientific, social and political responses to COVID-19.......................................................................................36
3.5.3.
Key issues in the relationship between science and society uncovered by COVID-19 ....................39
3.6. THE IDEAL FUTURE DIRECTION OF SCIENTIFIC ADVICE AND THE TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP .......................................44
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................................................................48

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GLOBAL FOOD, ENERGY, AND WATER NEXUS IN 2050: WITH A FOCUS ON ENERGY 51
4.1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................................................................52
4.2. WHERE TO PLACE THE TARGET IN TERMS OF ENERGY? ........................................................................................................53
4.3. REVIEW OF POLICIES AROUND THE WORLD ON ACHIEVING CARBON NEUTRALITY AND ENERGY SUFFICIENCY54
4.3.1.
Status of CO2 emissions in Japan and around the world and future emission projections (U.S.
EIA and IEA) ..................................................................................................................................................................................................54
4.3.2.
Status of national initiatives to achieve carbon neutrality (EU, US, Japan, China) .............................57
4.3.3.
the COP26 Conference and the Glasgow Climate Pact ....................................................................................61
4.3.4.
National efforts to achieve “Energy Sufficiency” ....................................................................................................61
4.4. GLOBAL STRATEGIC THEORY (FIVE PRINCIPLES) ....................................................................................................................62
4.4.1.
The five principles...................................................................................................................................................................62
4.4.2.
Key countries called upon to achieve carbon neutrality and Energy Sufficiency simultaneously63
4.4.3.
Key countries called upon to prioritise Energy Sufficiency ...............................................................................65
4.4.4.
Cooperation with fossil fuel producing countries ...................................................................................................66
4.4.5.
Cooperation with countries with CO2 sinks such as large areas of tropical rainforest and large
algal breeding areas and coral reefs.................................................................................................................................................66
4.4.6.
Specific examples of response and cooperation measures in these important countries ...............66
4.5. TECHNOLOGY THEORY .......................................................................................................................................................................68
4.5.1.
How can we change the energy supply structure? ...............................................................................................68
4.5.2.
How can we change the structure of energy demand? ......................................................................................69
4.5.3.
How should energy policy and energy distribution structures be changed? ...........................................71
4.5.4.
"CO2 fixation" ............................................................................................................................................................................72
4.5.5.
The overall engineering challenge.................................................................................................................................73
4.6. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE: TREATMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY ...............................................................................................74
4.7. "POLICY FRAMEWORK ROADMAP" AND "TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP” .................................................................................75
4.7.1.
"Policy Framework Roadmap" .........................................................................................................................................75
4.7.2.
"Technology Roadmap” .......................................................................................................................................................77
4.8. TOWARDS REALISATION OF A "ENERGY = FOOD = WATER" NEXUS ..............................................................................79
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................................................................84

5.

SMART CITIES FOR COMFORTABLE AND RESILIENT HUMAN SETTLEMENTS ................ 88
5.1. INTRODUCTION: CITIES ARE KEY TO ACHIEVING WELL-BEING THROUGH STI ................................................................88
5.1.1.
Human Security and Well-Being.....................................................................................................................................88
5.1.2.
Why are cities the key to well-being through STI?................................................................................................89
5.1.3.
The new urban structure .....................................................................................................................................................89
5.1.4.
What should people living in cities pass on from generation to generation?..........................................90
5.1.5.
How will pandemics change cities and the people who live in them? ........................................................90
5.1.6.
The ethics of cities..................................................................................................................................................................91
5.2. A “NEW LOCAL” BASED ON MULTI-AI IN A “NEW NORMAL” ERA ............................................................................................91
5.2.1.
Human security and well-being in urban areas ......................................................................................................91
5.2.2.
Urban challenges for the 21st century .........................................................................................................................92
5.2.3.
Role of the “Multi-AI Networked City”...........................................................................................................................94
5.2.4.
Positioning and objectives of the "Multi-AI Networked City" ............................................................................96
5.2.5.
The “Multi-AI Networked City”: “New local” city spheres in a “new normal” era ...................................97
5.2.6.
Ageing population and population decline over the long-term .................................................................... 100
5.2.7.
Developing and realising the Multi-AI Networked City ..................................................................................... 101
5.2.8.
Summary .................................................................................................................................................................................. 103
5.3. MAWSS (MULTI-AI WELL-BEING SURVEY SYSTEM) ......................................................................................................... 104
5.3.1.
Proposal for multi-scale and multi-layer living spheres/city spheres........................................................ 104
5.3.2.
What is MAWSS and what can it do? ....................................................................................................................... 105
5.3.3.
Is MAWSS feasible? Examples of implementation............................................................................................ 106
5.3.4.
Summary .................................................................................................................................................................................. 106
5.4. TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP TO REALISE THE “MULTI-AI NETWORKED CITY” .................................................................. 107
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■45.4.1.
What is the goal of the “Multi-AI Networked City”? ............................................................................................ 107
5.4.2.
Technologies to support the “Multi-AI Networked City” and a society that accepts them............. 108
5.4.3.
Scenarios for realisation................................................................................................................................................... 112
5.5. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO EMERGING COUNTRIES BASED ON THE “MULTI-AI NETWORKED CITY” .............. 115
5.5.1.
Social sharing of data in developing countries (DCs) ...................................................................................... 115
5.5.2.
Urban issues in developing countries (DCs) ......................................................................................................... 116
5.5.3.
Rundown of issues and introduction of new technologies ............................................................................. 118
5.5.4.
New technologies that transform cities and agriculture................................................................................... 120
5.5.5.
Summary .................................................................................................................................................................................. 121
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 124

6.

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................................ 129

APPENDIX1

WORKSHOP ON AUG. 5TH, 2020 .............................................................................................. 132

APPENDIX 2

STI FORUM SIDE EVENT, 6 MAY 2021 ............................................................................... 143

APPENDIX 3 EAJ STI2050 COMMITTEE, ACTIVITY REPORT, SUMMARY OF WORKSHOPPROCEEDINGS .................................................................................................................................................................. 145

The Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

■5Authors list

Chapter 1 Taikan OKI
Chapter 2 Taro ARIKAWA
Chapter 3 Chair
Section 3.1
Section 3.2
Section 3.3
Section 3.4
Section 3.5
Section 3.6

Satoru OHTAKE
Ikuo SUGIYAMA
Tateo ARIMOTO
Hiroshi NAGANO
Satoru OHTAKE
Satoru OHTAKE

Chapter 4 Chair
Section 4.1
Section 4.2
Section 4.3
Section 4.4
Section 4.5
Section 4.6
Section 4.7
Section 4.8

Chapter6

Yuko YASUNAGA

Yuko YASUNAGA
Yuko YASUNAGA
Yuko YASUNAGA
Yuko YASUNAGA
Yuko YASUNAGA
Yuko YASUNAGA
Yuko YASUNAGA
Yuko YASUNAGA, Taikan OKI, Miho KAMEI

Chapter 5 Chair
Section 5.1
Section 5.2
Section 5.3
Section 5.4
Section 5.5

Satoru OHTAKE

Ikuo SUGIYAMA

Hideaki KOIZUMI
Ikuo SUGIYAMA, Taro ARIKAWA
Yoshikazu NAKAJIMA
Ikuo SUGIYAMA, Haruhiko KUSAKA
Ikuo SUGIYAMAMichiharu NAKAMURAThe Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

■6Committee Members

Chair: Taikan Oki, Senior Vice-Rector, United Nations University; Professor,
Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo
Secretary: Taro Arikawa, Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering, Faculty of

Science and Engineering, Chuo University
Tateo Arimoto, Adjunct Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Yozo Fujino, Distinguished YNU Professor, Institute of Advanced Sciences,
Yokohama National University; Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo
Secretary: Shoko Hirakawa, Deputy Manager, Office of STI for SDGs, Department ofStrategic Planning and Management, Japan Science and Technology Agency
Secretary: Miho Kamei, Researcher, Architectural Engineer, Strategic, andQuantitative Analysis Center, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies
Takaaki Kobayashi, Senior Researcher, Digital Financial Business Planning,
Department I, Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.
Hideaki Koizumi, Executive Vice President, The Engineering Academy of Japan
Takao Kuramochi, Senior Deputy Director-General, Center for Research andDevelopment Strategy (CRDS), Japan Science and Technology Agency
Haruhiko Kusaka, General Manager, Future Design Division, The KAITEKI
Institute, Inc.
Naoki Mori, Director of Knowledge and Communication, Strategic Management
Office, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies
Hiroshi Nagano, Executive Director, The Engineering Academy of Japan
Yoshikazu Nakajima, Professor, Department of Biomedical Information, Tokyo
Medical and Dental University; Director, The Engineering Academy of Japan
Michiharu Nakamura, the Deputy Chairman, The Engineering Academy of Japan;
a member of the UN 10 Member Group supporting the Technology Facilitation
Mechanism for STI for SDGs
Kenji Oeda, Executive Director, The Engineering Academy of Japan
Chair of Chapter 3: Satoru Ohtake, Project Professor, Institute for Future Initiatives,
The University of Tokyo
Yoshihiro Shiroishi, Chief Architect, Technology Advisor, Research &Development Group, Hitachi, Ltd.
Chair of Chapter 5: Ikuo Sugiyama, Professor, KIC Graduate School of Information
Technology, Visiting Professor, Osaka University, Senior Advisor, NIKKENSEKKEI Civil Engineering Co., Ltd
Chair of Chapter 4: Yuko Yasunaga, Head, United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, Investment and Technology Promotion Office, Tokyo (UNIDOITPO Tokyo)
Yoshifumi Yasuoka, Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo*Regarding affiliation, the position held at that time is listed.
*Alphabetical order except for the chairperson of the committee

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■7

1. Introduction: Turning to the preface
In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously agreed on the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), and Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business
Federation) expressed its resolve to promote ‘Society 5.0’ in order to realise the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) set out in this agenda by radically revising its Charter ofCorporate Behavior in 2017. In addition, large long-term investors such as pension funds andreinsurance companies are increasingly demanding that companies disclose non-financial
information such as proactive practices related to the environment, society and corporate
governance. Companies that pursue short-term, self-serving profit are increasingly excluded
from long-term investment.
Meanwhile, although human damage from natural disasters has been on a downward trend
worldwide over the long term due to infrastructure development through active investment indisaster prevention and improved risk management, economic damage is increasing, and inparticular, the negative impacts of climate change caused by anthropogenic global warming
are becoming more apparent. The Paris Agreement, which aims to limit the increase in global
average temperature to 2°C or lower compared to pre-industrial levels, was adopted by theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2015 and went into effect in2016.
Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have scientificallyshown that greenhouse gas emissions must be brought to zero globally by the second halfof the century to achieve the Paris Agreement. Many developed countries have announced
their intentions to achieve zero GHG emissions by 2050, i.e. carbon neutrality, and have set
ambitious reduction targets as milestones to be achieved by 2030.
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic that began in late 2019, with still no clear end insight, there is an increasingly urgent need for governments, local authorities, businesses,
universities and research institutes to engage in initiatives from a long-term view in order toachieve the desired future society. While realising a carbon neutral society is a must, thedevelopment and diffusion of information and communication technologies also has animportant role to play in transforming the world into the better society without disparities, asAgenda 2030 aims to achieve. The realisation of a desirable future society requires not only
a shared vision, but also the technology and institutions to make it a reality.
In 2017, the Engineering Academy of Japan (EAJ) launched a project entitled “The Role of
Science, Technology and Innovation in the SDGs” (led by Haruo Takeda) with the aim of
ensuring that the Japanese government and its ministries and agencies introduce andimplement policy on various strategies to achieve the SDGs related to science, technology
and innovation. In 2019, the project recommended the establishment of a “Special Committee
for Creation of a Sustainable Society (tentative name)”, an organisation in which EAJ would
be centrally involved. In response to this recommendation, the “Committee for Science,
Technology and Innovation 2050” (STI2050 Committee) was launched with a new name asa special committee. This Committee was established by the Board of Directors in November
2019, and its volunteer members from both inside and outside EAJ have been engaged in
discussions since. At the time of its establishment, the issues listed below were envisioned
to be the main topics of debate. The first three points were borrowed from the three steps of
the Talanoa Dialogue, which was held after the UNFCCC COP23 in the lead up to COP24 in2018 to motivate action on climate change.

The Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

■8(1) To ascertain where we stand today: “Where are we?”(2) To present a vision for the future: “Where do we want to go?”(3) To discuss concrete proposals for action to achieve these goals: “How do we getthere?”(4) Development of a roadmap for technologies to support social innovation(5) Creation, recommendation and review of an action plan to realise a sustainable
society
The goals of the Committee were to talk about our engineering dreams on what kind of
future society could be realised in 2050 and 2100, to review visions for the future proposed
both in Japan and abroad to determine an ideal future vision for 2050, or potentially 2100, to
identify key or niche technologies that would facilitate the structural transformation of society
necessary to realise this vision, to draw a roadmap for social innovation supported by thesetechnologies, and to recommend an action plan for realising a sustainable society looking
ahead to the 22nd century. In addition to predicting the future in 2030 and 2040 based on
current prospects for technological development, the Committee also looked back at history
to draw an ideal future image of what kind of "better world" we want to materialise, taking into
consideration the unchanging desires and behaviours of humanity. Then it tried to apply abird's-eye view approach to think about the technological development that needs to be done
now to achieve it.
In the course of these discussions, we came to the obvious consensus that it would be very
difficult to look at the entire technology roadmap for 2050, and tried to narrow the discussion
down to three main points.
• Technologies to break away from economic systems dependent on fossil fuels• Technologies that contribute to the elimination of poverty and inequality• Technologies that contribute to a dramatic improvement in quality of life
Initially, the plan was to intensify discussion on these three technological aspects, identify
the key technologies and create a technology roadmap for a better society in 2050. However,in light of the worsening impacts of COVID-19, a majority of members agreed that it would
be better to reexamine the plan in its entirety. The Committee then decided to hold aworkshop in August 2020 with lectures from external experts. The following topics were newly
narrowed down, corresponding to the three groups of this report.
• Realisation of smart cities and comfortable and resilient human settlements• Realisation of sustainable and equitable access to water, food and energy• Realisation of governance based on visualised evidence and tolerance of diverse
valuesAlthough it was not always easy for committee members to make time for voluntarycommittee activities, their high sense of purpose and ambition, especially of the main authorsof the chapters, has resulted in this unprecedented report. It is the hope of the EAJ STI2050
Committee that this report will contribute in some way to the future development of technology
in Japan and around the world, and help to build a better future society. Last but not least, I
would like to express my deepest respect and gratitude to the workshop lecturers, tocommittee members Taro Arikawa, Miho Kamei and Shoko Hirakawa, who served as
dedicated coordinators, and to committee member Michiharu Nakamura (former Deputy
Chair of EAJ) for giving us this opportunity.
Taikan Oki, Chair, EAJ STI2050 Committee

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■9

2. Thoughts on a future society in 2050
2.1. Background
The Club of Rome, founded in 1970, launched a project on the “Predicament of Mankind”.
Dr. Dennis L. Meadows, who was the Director of the project, coauthored “The Limits toGrowth” in 1972, a commissioned analysis report on the project.2.1.1) In the afterword to theJapanese translation of the book, Mr. Yasukawa, then Chairman of the Club of Rome Tokyo
Office, described the report’s background in detail.
The Club of Rome's sense of urgency was based on an understanding of the benefits ofrecent scientific and technological progress alongside the existence of various disharmonies
as a hidden by-product of these benefits.
In 1970, the world faced many issues:
1 Escalation of nuclear capability
2 Population growth
3 Widespread environmental pollution
4 Depletion of natural resources
5 Progression of urbanisation
6 Growing social unrest
7 Alienation of the youth
8 Widespread inflation
9 Collapse of traditional values
In particular, the report expressed the fear that the pursuit of wealth did not necessarily leadto the well-being of mankind as a whole.
The report was based on the results of research at MIT on modelling global systems. Fifty
years later in 2020, the concerns of that time are increasingly prominent in Japanese society,including the impacts of environmental pollution and increasing urbanisation, as well as
regional disparities due to the collapse of traditional values. Moreover, amidst advancing
globalisation, creating models of global systems is essential.
While calling for a shift from growth to global equilibrium, the report also speaks to thedifficulty of dealing with human values: “As soon as a society recognizes that it cannot
maximize everything for everyone, it must begin to make choices.” It then focuses on the
trade-offs that arise due to the finite nature of the earth, identifies realistic alternatives, andestablishes social goals. The report highlights the importance of defining long-term goals,
then setting short-term goals that are compatible with them. Dr. Meadows later pioneered thecommunity of Cobb Hill in a project called Cobb Hill CoHousing2.1.2), which aimed to develop
a lifestyle that enabled cyclical production and consumption within the community while
maintaining interdependence with the outside of the community (local production for local
consumption), and to study sustainability and train the next generation of leaders. However,Dr. Meadows died in 2001 before he could witness the completion of the project. Since then,the project has continued, and the web page (http://www.cobbhill.org/) reports on the life in
the community.
Further, in 2009, Rockström et al. proposed the “Planetary Boundaries” framework involving
the following nine indicators.2.1.3)
1 Climate change
2 Biodiversity loss
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■10
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Biogeochemical flow boundary (Nitrogen cycle, Phosphorus cycle)
Global freshwater use
Change in land use
Atmospheric aerosol loading
Chemical pollution
Ocean acidification
Stratospheric ozone depletion

Among these, biodiversity loss and biogeochemical flow boundary have already reached very
dangerous levels, while the threats of climate change and land use are increasing. 2.1.4)
In this context, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted at the UN Summit
in September 2015 as the successor to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2001,
set forth the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as international goals aimed at realisinga sustainable and better world by 2030. Consisting of 17 goals and 169 targets, the SDGs
pledge to "leave no one behind" on the planet. 2.1.5)
In working towards these goals, reports published by IIASA (International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis) in 20182.1.6) and 20192.1.7) are considered to provide a roadmap.
The report titled “The World in 2050” (TWI2050) shows the six transformations that would be
effective for achieving the 2030 goals. Likewise, Sachs et al. (2019) 2.1.8) presents six
transformations and classifies numerically how each relates to the 17 goals of the SDGs. The
six transformations are as follows:(1) education, gender and inequality;(2) health, well-being and demography;(3) energy decarbonisation and sustainable industry;(4) sustainable food, land, water and oceans;(5) sustainable cities and communities; and(6) digital revolution for sustainable development.
These six transformations are considered to be Sustainable Development Pathways(SDPs), and how to realise the transformations is examined based on Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways (SSPs) (Riahi et al., 2017) 2.1.9). For example, for (1) education, gender andinequality, the impacts of enhanced education levels on demographics are shown.
Furthermore, for 6) digital revolution for sustainable development, which is also discussed inparticular in the 2019 report, digitalisation in all fields is said to be essential to achieve theSDGs. Moreover, homo sapiens in such a society are referred to as homo digitalis by theGerman Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) 2.1.10).
In this context, the global spread of COVID-19 in 2020 led IIASA to issue the third TWI2050
report 2.1.11), the central theme of which was “from efficiency to sufficiency”. This report could
be considered a response to Dr. Meadows’ report of 50 years ago. It is an attempt to moveaway from the pursuit of wealth and economic rationality to realising the well-being of
humanity as a whole by focusing on “sufficiency”. We will follow this approach in this report.
2.2. Background and objectives of the Committee
The Committee was established in November 2019 with the aim “to determine the necessary
technologies for achieving the desired future vision for 2050 based on an assessment thecurrent situation, including an inventory of technologies looking forward to 2050, and to draw
a roadmap for science, technology and innovation to materialise these technologies. Its goals
are to review visions for the future proposed both in Japan and abroad to determine an ideal
future vision for 2050, or potentially 2100, to identify key or niche technologies that would
facilitate the structural transformation of society necessary to realise this vision, to draw a
The Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ■11roadmap for social innovation to support these technologies, and to recommend an action
plan for realising a sustainable society looking ahead to the 22nd century.
2.3. Topics to be addressed
The committee has met 20 times to develop this roadmap and action plan, with the aim ofidentifying topics and challenges to be addressed, identifying the necessary technologies toaddress them, and considering pathways to get there. The committee carried out discussion
to narrow down the topics to be addressed to around three.
Following the example of the “Talanoa Dialogue” held in the run-up to the UNFCCC COP24
to motivate action on climate change, the Committee has asked, (a) “Where are we?”, and(b) “Where do we want to go?” to ascertain where we stand today and to determine thedesired future to aim for (goals). Likewise, it asked (c) “How do we get there?” to discuss
concrete proposals for actions to realise this future.
As the impacts of COVID-19 became more serious in Japan, discussion on selection ofissues changed. The debate was reexamined, and selections were narrowed down to thefollowing three issues.
(1) Realisation of smart cities and comfortable and resilient human settlements(2) Realisation of sustainable and equitable access to water, food and energy(3) Realisation of governance based on visualised evidence and tolerance of diverse
valuesLastly, we would like to conclude with a few remarks on how the debate underwent change
before and after COVID-19.
The themes of "topics and challenges to be addressed leading up to 2050” and“technologies considered necessary to toward addressing these challenges” were assigned
as homework at the third committee meeting and discussed at the fourth committee meetingat the beginning of 2020. At that time, keywords related to “topics and challenges to beaddressed leading up to 2050” included:• World peace• Decarbonised societies• 100-year-life societies• Stable food supply• Resilient and sustainable societies• Enhanced QOL• Financial revolution• Enhanced level of well-being
It is evident that before the COVID-19 pandemic, the main focus was on how our societies
could cope with issues such as climate change, population decline, aging population, work
style reform, and natural disasters. On the other hand, once the full-blown pandemic had
begun, discussions concentrated on the “realisation of governance based on visualised
evidence and tolerance of diverse values”, mentioned in (3) above. Also related to responses
to climate change, many agreed that the state of governance in our increasing digitalsocieties is an important key to building a sustainable society.
Accordingly, this report begins with a discussion on the realisation of such governance, thenaddresses the issue of the water-food-energy nexus, and finally describes a vision of the
future in which cities realise the well-being of all people, which can easily become a trade-off
with the pursuit of wealth. We are pleased to report that part of this report has also been
published as a paper in the IATT report 2.3.1).
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Figure 2.3.1 STI's Positioning of the STI2050 Committee's Efforts Toward a Co-Creation
Society that Leaves No One Behind
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■13References
2.1[2.1.1] Meadows, D. H., The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's
Project on the Predicament of Mankind, Universe Books, 1972.
[2.1.2] Meadows, D. H. and Cobb Hill Cohousing, Seicho no genkai kara kabu hiru
e: Donera H. Medozu to jizoku kano na komyuniti [From “The Limits to Growth” to
Cobb Hill: Donella H. Meadows and the sustainable community], Seikatsushoin,
2007, ISBN 978-4903690087[2.1.3] Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K. et al. A safe operating space forhumanity. Nature 461, 472–475 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1038/461472a[2.1.4] https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries.html[2.1.5] For example, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/sdgs/index.html[2.1.6] TWI2050 - The World in 2050 (2018). Transformations to Achieve theSustainable Development Goals. Report prepared by the World in 2050 initiative.
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria.
www.twi2050.org
Available at: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/15347[2.1.7] TWI2050 - The World in 2050 (2019). The Digital Revolution andSustainable Development: Opportunities and Challenges. International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria. [pure.iiasa.ac.at/15913][2.1.8] Sachs, J.D., Schmidt-Traub, G., Mazzucato, M. et al.: Six Transformations
to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Nat Sustain 2, 805–814 (2019).
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0352-9[2.1.9] Riahi, K., Vuuren, D., Kriegler, E. et al.: The Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways and their energy, land use, and greenhouse gas emissions implications:An overview, Global Environmental Change, Volume 42, 2017, Pages 153-168,
ISSN 0959-3780, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.05.009.
[2.1.10] https://www.wbgu.de/en/[2.1.11] TWI2050 - The World in 2050 (2020). Innovations for Sustainability.
Pathways to an efficient and post-pandemic future. Report prepared by The Worldin 2050 initiative. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),
Laxenburg, Austria. www.twi2050.org
2.3[2.3.1] Taro Arikawa, Ikuo Sugiyama, Yoshikazu Nakajima, Hideaki Koizumi andTaikan Oki, The Future of Urban Design, UN IATT report 2021: Emerging science,
frontier technologies, and the SDGs– Perspectives from the UN system andscience and technology communities

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3. Roadmap toward realisation of governance based on visualised evidence andtolerance of diverse values
3.1. Introduction: "What does governance look like, and what are we trying to achieve?
3.1.1. Significance of this chapter
The aim of the Committee was to draw up a “science, technology and innovation” roadmap
to materialise the technologies required for an ideal future vision for 2050. Specifically, in
addition to the two themes of smart cities and comfortable and resilient human settlements,and sustainable and equitable access to water, food and energy, going forward the projectwill share the common theme of the realisation of governance based on visualised evidence
and tolerance of diverse values, which will also incorporate the first two themes.
This theme was handled by Group 3 of the Committee. While working on this topic, wewere aware of the fact that when looking ahead to future society and its challenges to draw
up a roadmap for the technologies needed to develop society and solve its problems, it wasnecessary to take a broader view and not merely consider the technologies themselves.
3.1.2. Why visualised evidence and governance are currently a challenge
Science and technology are the product of human intellectual activity. Multiple individuals
come together to form a society with each human being an individual component. Accordingly,
science and technology are strongly related to the state of the society at the time. The originof modern science, which is the basis of today's science and technology, occurred in the mid17th to early 18th century, coinciding with the formation of modern states in Western Europe,
the emergence of Western democracy and the Industrial Revolution. Science and technology
to date have developed mainly in societies where Western democracy was a common value,and economic development via the Industrial Revolution was remarkable. But what about thesocieties of today? Although many developed countries profess themselves to be
democracies, division has become a serious problem. Meanwhile, authoritarian and despotic
countries have emerged, affecting the future of developing countries. Likewise, in thedeveloped world, now that rapid economic growth has become stunted, inequality is widening.
In this changing world, people's values are becoming more diverse. What people andsocieties are demanding is dramatically different from the simplicity of the past, where
economic growth brought material wealth. In other words, societies must recognise thatpeople have diverse interpretations of well-being and aim to bring about, not a maximum, but
a reasonable level of well-being to as many people as possible.
Science and technology, which are closely related to society, must respond to changes insociety and present compelling facts and options for the best available approaches to fulfill
the wishes of as many people as possible. Furthermore, this process must be carried out not
only with science and technology, but also with the participation of people and society. As
the development of science and technology wields significant impacts on society, this process
is governance itself, defined as "decision-making among the actors involved in a collective
problem that leads to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms andinstitutions" (Wikipedia), in this case as it pertains to science and technology and society.
The formation of mechanisms and platforms for stakeholders to participate in this process
and take action is essential.
Therefore, this chapter will first briefly review the increasing complexity of society’schanging relationship with science and technology, and then present an example of how
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today's cutting-edge science and technology, represented by the use of AI, could visualise
the situation and grasp the diverse demands and values of people. We will also outline thedevelopment of scientific advice, which is an important process in society’s relationship with
science and technology, from the perspectives of scientists and engineers, policymakers,
scientific academies and legislative bodies, both as it relates to Japan and the situation
overseas. COVID-19 is used as a recent example of how science and technology have
responded to problems facing the world. Based on this, we will attempt to present a roadmap
for better governance of society’s relationship with science and technology.
3.1.3. Science and technology and society in the 20th century
Since the second half of the 20th century, society’s relationship with science andtechnology has become extremely interrelated and complex. For the first half of the 20th
century, the relationship developed along a linear model in which the results of scientific andtechnological research were utilised by various players in society, i.e. industry and publicorganisations, as they spread throughout society. However, society’s relationship with
science and technology has become more bidirectional as they influence each other. One
example is the environmental pollution of the 1970s, which raised the issue not only of thebenefits that the products of science and technology bring to society, but also of the negative
impacts on society due to side effects generated in production processes. At the same time,
while technological progress since the Industrial Revolution had sought to achieve greater
productivity and efficiency and to produce higher economic value from the same resourcesand effort, as societies and standards of living reached a certain level of affluence,
perspectives shifted from the pursuit of solely quantitative goals, to also include qualitative
ones. In other words, rather than a single criterion based on economic value, society has
begun to pursue goals based on a variety of values.
For example, when the global environment became a major issue in the 1990s, developed
countries that had already achieved economic development argued for curbing economic
development to some extent in order to prevent further destruction of the global environment,
whereas developing countries differed in their stance. They felt that responsibility for thedestruction of the global environment lay with developed countries, and that because theireconomies were not sufficiently developed, they should not be deprived of the right tocontinue.
Developing countries that have recognised the benefits and harmful effects of technology
and development are calling for minimising these effects, and values have diversified. In
contrast, the benefits of economic development have not reached the majority of the world.
This difficult dilemma was incorporated into the term “sustainable development”.
3.1.4. Transformation of society’s relationship with science and technology in the 21st
century - the emergence of the SDGs
Sustainable development, and all the complex problems around the world that it involves,
has become a more prominent global issue in the 21st century alongside the increasinglyinterdependent and globalised nature of the world's people, material flows and economies. It
is no longer just about the environment. From the point of view of sustainable development,
the disparity in development level around the world became an issue, and the Millennium
Development Goals were established. These set out eight goals, with a focus on improving
the situation of developing countries.

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The 8 Millennium Development Goals
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development
In this context, for example, if we look at extreme poverty (living on less than 1.9 USD aday), which is related to basic human rights and can trigger regional conflicts, there has beena significant improvement from 36% of the population in 1990 to 10% in 2015. However, thefact remains that there are still 700 million people facing extreme poverty.
Subsequently in 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by theUnited Nations to build on the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
and to put forth stronger efforts to address unachieved goals, as well as to provide a set ofcommon global goals that are also relevant to developed countries. The SDGs are a set of
17 goals, underpinned by 169 targets. The 17 goals were developed to encompass the
proposals of various stakeholders, and the 169 targets are intricately linked to each other.
Recognised as a set of goals with complicated benefits and drawbacks that cannot be
addressed by simply extending existing approaches, the SDGs call for new innovations. For
this reason, high expectations have been placed on science and technology and the new
innovations resulting from them (hereafter referred to as science, technology and innovation).
This calls not only for the creation of higher economic value, as has been the case in the past,
but also for more sophisticated solutions, such as ways of demonstrating synergy andachieving optimisation in the achievement of mutually conflicting goals. For example, theissue of cities can be seen as a compound issue involving poverty, food, industry and theenvironment. Likewise, it is clear that food, water and energy security are strongly correlated,
and that maximising solutions to one issue could have negative impacts on the others. For
instance, maximising the supply of food according to people’s preferences would consume
large amounts of water and energy, upsetting the balance. Science, technology andinnovation are called upon to address these conflicting issues by first clearly showing thecorrelations between them, and then creating alternative methods or new ways of dealing
with them.
This is the first time that such high expectations have been put on science, technology andinnovation with regards to global issues. On the other hand, although research anddevelopment in various fields of science and technology is ongoing, it is not possible to deal
with the complex issues mentioned above by confining ourselves to certain fields which can
only produce partial solutions. Therefore, science and technology, as well as those involvedin them, need to operate from a bird's eye view and carry out initiatives across fields that
actively acknowledge the need to “cross borders”.
3.1.5. The need for “governance”
The SDGs and science, technology and innovation call for a kind of management thatdiffers from the past. In other words, as implied in the title of this report, after acknowledging
diverse values and factoring in society’s evaluation of these values, potential solutions should
be sought based on data and objective facts. These solutions should then be proposed to

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society and implemented with a certain level of consensus. This process can be called a newkind of governance.
3.1.5.1. Governance required for science and technology
We begin by discussing the governance that is needed for science and technology as wellas those involved in it. As mentioned earlier, many of the challenges we face today arecomplex and involve multiple perspectives and disciplines, so the pursuit of simple objectives
will not lead to solutions to these problems. Firstly, as mentioned at the end of the previous
section, those involved in science and technology must have an understanding of theseissues. While this may sound obvious, it can be surprisingly difficult. This is because
scientists and engineers, compared to those in other fields, generally have a special interestin a certain field or on a certain issue, regarding which they acquire a great deal of knowledge
that is translated into scientific and technological results. It is therefore natural that they are
more aware of the importance of the issues that they themselves address. Moreover, thefields of science and technology that are more closely related to society, such as various
engineering disciplines, are tackling real social issues, and therefore research anddevelopment is being carried out from a broader viewpoint. However, we must be more
imaginative in asking ourselves if our own research and development are truly set apart fromother relevant fields and social issues.
Accordingly, when undertaking projects to tackle various issues, it is advisable toincorporate measures to gain a broader perspective. For instance, when addressing aparticular issue, in addition to core stakeholders in the field, parties interested in social issues
from other fields, especially those in the humanities and social sciences, as well as experts
from NGOs and non-profits, could be invited to participate in the discussions to contribute toa broader view from the project’s conceptual stage. To date, the main methods employed
have been meetings to seek consensus and public comments at the deciding stage of aconceptual proposal, as well as evaluation from ethical, legal and social perspectives (ELSI)
at the final stage of the conceptualisation. However, by seeking more diverse opinions fromthe conceptual stage, we can better reach solutions that respond to the challenges of today'ssociety.
When carrying out a project and compiling results, it is essential to carefully explain what
is known and what must be done for outside the project, particularly those who will be involvedin the hands-on work of social implementation, such as policymakers and business people,
to gain their understanding.
3.1.5.2. Governance required on the part of society
On the other hand, there are also demands on the part of society, which will enjoy the fruitsof the challenges posed by science, technology and innovation. Even if those involved inscience and technology formulate a concept based on exchange with a wide range ofstakeholders, the way in which their results are materialised in the real world is often left up
to others, such as policymakers and business people, not the scientists and engineers.
On the part of society, including policymakers and businesses, there are important issues
to be considered when utilising the results of scientific and technological innovation. First ofall, it is important to understand without prejudice what is currently understood and what is
possible. Specifically, the more serious the situation, the more urgently solutions are sought.
Accordingly, it is easy to look to what is easily understood, but disregarding facts and easy
judgments should be avoided. This may seem obvious, but in reality, it often happens. Whencertain figures or facts regarding scientific and technological innovations are presented,
practitioners often dismiss them in favour of prioritising other reasons. For example, in the

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recent collapse of a staircase in an apartment building, the designers had intended to use
metal materials, but for some reason wood was used, leading to the accident.
Policymakers and businesses need to pay due respect to the solutions obtained throughscience, technology and innovation, and when they decide to take a different approach, theyneed to give full consideration and a clear explanation of the change. Of course, in somecases scientific and technological innovations are not feasible in the real world, and in suchcases those involved in science and technology must be included in the discussion.
One example is the triage of the sick in a disaster situation, where the available medical
resources have to be ranked in order of priority from a professional perspective.
Today's challenges are more complex than ever, and the science and technology involved
is wide-ranging and complicated. The complexity and depth of science, technology andinnovation must be borne in mind by policymakers and businesses in society when choosing
how they will deal with issues. Moreover, it should be clearly understood that solutions
proposed by those in science, technology and innovation are scientific advice only, and thatthe responsibility for determining solutions lies primarily with the policymakers andbusinesses.
3.1.5.3. The premises of governanceA prerequisite for realising the governance called for on the part of science, as well as on
the part of society, especially policymakers and business practitioners, is a greater
understanding and agreement among people and society on the relationship between
science and society.
First, people must be interested in the relationship between science and society. We havethe opportunity to think about policymaking and business practices during elections and in
the choice of products and services, but what about science? For example, science can neverbe 100%, but many people expect “absolutes” or “perfection”. Various responses based on
science, including medical treatment and drugs, are choices between benefits and risks. It is
up to the people to understand the nature of science - that it is not magic, but repeatedattempts to gain benefits while minimising risks. Of course, careful effort on explanations ispresupposed on the part of science.
Secondly, science is only one element, albeit an important one, in policymaking andbusiness operations. To give a simple example from the perspective of the science of COVID19, the most effective measures called for by infectious disease medicine may be known, but
economic activity cannot be completely stopped. Both the state of emergency declarationsin Japan and lockdowns in Europe and the US allowed a minimum level of activity,
accompanied by some risk, therefore requiring extra time to control the spread of infection.
The above mutually understood relationship between society and science is a precondition
for governance.
3.1.6. Governance of science, technology and innovation built upon on push-and-pull tension
and mutual respect
In summary, those involved in science and technology must be prepared to use their
imagination to understand the various aspects of the challenges facing society, and be willingto work with many others to do so. Meanwhile, policymakers and businesses must takeresponsibility for making tough decisions, including making choices in conflicting situations
based on the understanding that complex issues rarely have simple solutions.
Turning to experience to date, we can reflect on two facts regarding the accident at
TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant following the Great East Japan Earthquakeof 11 March 2011. One is the response of scientists and engineers and the other is the
response of business operators.
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3.1.6.1. Issues with the response of science and technology professionals
In the face of the nuclear accident and the subsequent spread of radioactivity, a number of
researchers, mainly in the field of radiation, appeared in the media and rushed to the side ofindividual politicians. I would like to believe that many of them did so as an act on goodwill
as experts in the field, in order to help people and society who were anxious about theaccident and the invisible threat of radiation, wanting to know the facts. However, the problem
was that they focused only on the parts of the complex and massive technology of nuclear
power that were related to their own expertise, thereby contributing to the confusion by
discussing the issue in a way that lacked an overall picture and giving difficult explanations
using too many technical terms. In addition, the effects of radiation are imprecise, making it
difficult to say with certainty what the effects will be at low doses. It was not possible to makepeople fully understand this inherently difficult phenomenon, and in some cases the various
explanations only increased anxiety.
Public opinion polls at the time showed that a majority of people felt that there had not beenenough communication from the science and technology side about the nuclear accident,
while many people also called upon experts to express their opinions. Thus there is a gap
between the perception of the science and technology side, which felt that it had done theright thing.
This situation can be attributed to a lack of adequate preparation on the part of those
involved in science and technology in Japan. When it comes to society’s relationship with
science and technology, the understanding and support of the public have been importantsince the 1950s, when science and technology policy began. In 1996, at the time of theformulation of the Science and Technology Basic Plan, public understanding wasincreasingly promoted. It can be said, however, at the time that science and technology
helping society was seen as a given, and this was only asking for the understanding of thepeople on this matter. In other words, this was an idea that came from the side providing theknowledge, but it did not address the questions and or awareness on problems of people andsociety, nor attempt to promote science and technology based on fully listening to people’s
opinions. Even for policymakers and business operators, explanations were focused on
benefits and advantages.
In contrast, in 2013 the Science Council of Japan revised the Code of Conduct for Scientists
to stipulate the position of scientists when giving scientific advice. The Code of Conduct wasestablished in 2005 to restore public trust in the scientific community following a series ofincidents involving research misconduct and misuse of research funds, and was revised
following a review in 2011.
We believe that this is the starting point for the governance of those involved in scienceand technology
3.1.6.2. Challenges for the users of nuclear technology
There is a lot of debate about nuclear power and how it should be treated in order to achievecarbon neutrality in the future. Nuclear power, with a lack of a clear policy pathway for theultimate disposal of waste, has long been the subject of debate. Here, we examine thequestion of whether nuclear power, in the wake of a nuclear accident, can be safely controlled
as a technology from the perspective of governance.
The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant has led some to argue
that nuclear power cannot by controlled by humans. However, the same type of reactor at
the Tohoku Electric Power Company’s Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant was subjected tosimilarly severe conditions, but the initial safety equipment functioned and an accident was
avoided. Therefore, with proper governance by operators, nuclear power should be
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considered controllable. However, the Onagawa plant benefited from the fact that it was
designed and built to cope with the largest possible earthquakes and tsunamis based on
historical facts. Thus, as mentioned earlier, governance over the use of such advanced
technology should begin at the conceptual stage.
Science, technology and innovation, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated andcomplex, entail not only benefits, but also risks. Those utilising the outcomes must be awareof the risks and have the governance to minimise them as they maximise benefits.
3.1.7. The aim of “governance”
It is of utmost importance that those who produce science, technology and innovation, as
well as the policymakers and businesses who implement the results in society, be aware ofwhat they are aiming for based on the governance described above.
The SDGs aim to address a range of human-induced global challenges by the year 2030.
However, not all of the goals have processes drawn up for reaching complete solutions by2030, and some have set numerical targets for improvements by 2030. The year 2030 is atransit point, and efforts must be made to look even further ahead.
When we consider the course of humanity within this process, various ideas emerge andgreater demands are made on governance. This introduction will conclude in mentioningsome of them.
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), an international nongovernmental public interest group that is looking beyond the SDGs, along with others, has
proposed “sufficiency” as a way to achieve sustainable development. In contrast to“efficiency”, which has been a requirement of economic development to date, sufficiency isseen as a concept that restricts unlimited desires, aiming to find a balanced state of
sufficiency based on at least the fulfillment of basic human needs. It is a concept worthy offurther discussion in order to achieve more balanced progress among developed, emerging
and developing countries to materialise sustainable development within the limited resourcesand environment of our planet.
An important aspect of the sufficiency debate is how to achieve well-being for people along
the way. Well-being is highly subjective, and many efforts have been made to find a way tomeasure the level of well-being, but no definitive conclusions have been reached.
Nevertheless, people and society would find science, technology and innovation
unacceptable if they only caused people and societies to endure and suffer. Governance thattakes into account what human well-being is and how to contribute to its realisation is needed.
In this respect, the Sixth Science and Technology Basic Plan, approved by the Cabinet in
2021, which clearly states that it aims to develop policies with a view to people’s well-being,
can be considered an epochal development.
Furthermore, an issue related to the SDGs is that in the pursuit of welfare and well-being
for the world and society as a whole, the existence of large disparities can lead to conflict,thereby reducing overall welfare and well-being. Economically speaking, it is difficult for theuneven distribution of wealth to trickle down to all corners of society, and according to theeconomist Thomas Piketty, inequality tends to increase in capital terms. Addressing growing
inequalities is an issue on which consciousness should be raised.

3.2. The roles of visualised evidence, diverse values and well-being
3.2.1. Well-being and QoL
The Constitution of the World Health Organisation (WHO) written at its founding in 1946
states the relationship between health and well-being as follows: “Health is a state ofcomplete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
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■21infirmity”. Moreover, in WHO’s WHOQOL-26 (2011) 3.2.1), a further summary of the WHOQOL100 established in 1996, quality of life (QoL) is defined as “individuals’ perceptions of theirposition in life in the context of the culture and value systems in which they live and in relation
to their goals, expectations, standards and concerns”, and identifies it as a factor alongside
physical health, mental health and social relationships 3.2.2). Amartya Sen's research on“capability” is also relevant to QoL. He set out requirements for achieving “quality of life”,
which he considers to be a combination of “doing” and “being”, where “capability” is the“freedom” to choose between them 3.2.3).
In 2007, the European Commission (EC), European Parliament, Club of Rome,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and WWF organised the“Beyond GDP” international conference, which was followed by a series of national initiatives
to develop indicators to measure wealth. In 2008, French President Sarkozy asked Joseph
Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean Paul Fitoussi to establish the Commission on the
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (CMEPSP). CMEPSP’s report
proposed 12 recommendations and the following indicators. Some of the CMEPSP
messages are as follows.
“More and more people look at statistics to be better informed or to make decisions. To
respond to the growing demand for information, the supply of statistics has also increased
considerably, covering new domains and phenomena.”“…the time is ripe for our measurement system to shift emphasis from measuring economic
production to measuring people’s well-being.”
To support these messages, CMEPSP proposed the following measurements of well-being.
a) Material living standards (income, consumption and wealth)b) Healthc) Educationd) Personal activities including worke) Political voice and governancef) Social connections and relationshipsg) Environment (present and future conditions)h) Insecurity, of an economic as well as a physical nature
While a) is a conventional economic indicator, the other items b) through h) correspond towell-being. This concept led to Joseph Stiglitz’s statement at a UN Summit in 2015, that the“SDGs are important in setting global norms” and Amartya Sen's assertion that “Democracy
is a key to achieving sustainable development” 3.2.4). These ideas on well-being led to theconcept of physical, mental and social well-being, which became the goal of the SDGs
adopted by the UN General Assembly in September of the same year. In the view of theauthors, when comparing the above-mentioned definition of “well-being” and that of “QoL”
referred to in WHOQOL-26, the difference is that well-being sees the individual externallyfrom the viewpoint of economy and society, while QoL is based on individuals’ self-perception
within the culture and values in which they live. However, for an awareness survey report in
the UK entitled “Personal well-being in the UK: April 2019 to March 2020”, despite the use ofwell-being in the title, focus is on self-perception.
3.2.2. QoL development by government
In the United States, President Johnson (1963-1969) stressed the importance of improving
the quality of life of the people. Subsequently in the 1968 presidential election, President
Nixon remarked, “We need a high standard of living, but we also need a high quality oflife...We need a strategy of quality for the 70’s to match the strategy of quantity of the past”.
In 1968, Norman Dalkey of the RAND Corporation attempted to better define quality of life in
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■22order to promote concrete improvements in the lives of citizens, proposing the following ninebasic elements of an individual’s QoL: health, status, affluence, activity, sociality, freedom,security, novelty and aggression. President Nixon's “high standard of living” corresponds tothe a) material living standards (income, consumption and wealth) indicator in the CMEPSP
report (2009) mentioned above, and the “high quality of life” corresponds to the b)-h)indicators. Comparing the CMEPSP (2009) b)-h) indicators and Dalkey’s (2009) nineelements, we find that although the subject of CMEPSP’s report is well-being and Dalkey’s
paper refers to QoL, they have many similarities.
3.2.3. National well-being
Let us look at the background and objectives of the UK’s advanced efforts to measure wellbeing. The indicators of the UK’s Statistical Information Service system, which began in the
1970s, have included the Sustainable Development Indicators (SDI) of 1996, which followed
1987’s Our Common Future (Brundtland) and the 1992 Rio Summit, the Voluntary QoL
Indicators of 2001, and developing again into the Sustainable Development Indicators (SDIs).
The SDIs were then split into SDGs and National Well-being Indicators in 2016, after which
the SDIs were retired. The National Well-being Indicators were then replaced by personaland economic well-being in the UK 3.2.5), which is ongoing. The 2019 “Dashboard” of wellbeing indicators included eight economic indicators such as disposable income andunemployment rate and four personal indicators such as happiness and anxiety about life.
The total of 12 indicators are presented with changes over time (Figure 3.2.1).

Figure 3.2.1 Personal and economic well-being in the UK: Dashboard as of February
2019 3.2.6)
For the four personal well-being indicators, as of the end of March 2020, the percentage of
people who were happy decreased by 1.1%, and the percentage of people with anxiety
increased by 6.5% compared to the same period in 2019, coinciding with the COVID-19
lockdown in the UK. Meanwhile, in a slightly later period from July to September 2020, theaverage percentage of those who were happy increased by 2.1%, coinciding with the end of
the lockdown. These changes are depicted visually by region and city, as well as over time,
as shown in Figure 3.2.2. This provides a clear picture of the contrast between theperformance of public administration and personal well-being.
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■23Figure 3.2.2 Personal well-being in the United Kingdom (2019-2020) distribution byregion and city 3.2.7)
3.2.4. Local government initiatives (Bristol, UK)
The City of Bristol has a metropolitan population of 760,000 (2017) and is recognised as oneof the best places to live in the UK. In 2001, Bristol became the first city in the UK, ahead of
the central government, to launch a QoL survey based on its own local indicators. Thissystem of indicators is intended serve as a source of information to redress inequalities andimbalances in the city as a whole, as well as to monitor the performance of the city's One City
Plan and other projects based on it. According to the city's “Quality of Life Survey 2020/21
Priority Indicators: Briefing Report” (Jan 2021), surveys were conducted online and by postin 33,000 households in 34 randomly selected wards (Figure 3.2.3).

Figure 3.2.3 Local-level QoL survey 3.2.8)
The survey consisted of 70 questions relating to 200 indicators such as health, lifestyle,community and local services. The system includes an element of push-and-pull tension. If
the performance of the municipal government and related bodies is deemed inadequate, thebudget of departments in charge is cut. In regard to COVID 19, 4,000 respondents wereasked to select the most important of several key words. Top responses included: business,
community, family, health, jobs, local, normal, safe, support, social, stay and work (Figure
3.2.4). It is noteworthy that even in difficult times, the municipal authorities and related
institutions have a wide range of systems to monitor and support the lives of citizens, whichleads to a sense of trust and participation of citizens in the administration, which is at theheart of governance.
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Figure 3.2.4 Key words from the COVID19 questionnaire in the Bristol Quality of Life
survey 2020/21 3.2.8)
3.2.5. Life satisfaction and values in Japan
Various indicators that measure quality of life and well-being include the OECD’s Better
Life Index (BLI), the Inclusive Wealth Index of the United Nations University (UNU) and theUnited Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Happiness of the United
Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network. Japan has also made efforts toincorporate multifaceted assessment in the "Dashboard for Satisfaction and Quality of Life
Indicators” of its 2019 Framework Policy. The OECD's Better Life Index, for example,
provides quantitative assessments in 11 areas of QoL, ranging from employment and income
to safety. For Japan, results show low levels of satisfaction with regard to work stress,
housing and sanitation, holidays, sense of health, and civic life and governance (Figure 3.2.5).
In terms of values, this means that people see value in measures and policies that improvebalance between work and personal life, and at the same time increase their sense ofparticipation in government and society. This is relevant to the multi-AI city described in
Chapter 5 of this report, which proposes living spheres that enhance well-being and reducestress, and which can be realised through automated decision-making systems involving AI
and human collaboration. In other words, the realisation of the multi-AI city is compatible tothe desire of Japanese people to ameliorate their current complaints and worries, and has
the potential to contribute to improved governance both in normal times and during
emergencies.
Civic Engagement

Income and WealthHouseholdincomeVoter Having no
Householdturnout
say in
S80/S20
wealthLack ofgovernment*
income sharesocialSocialratio*
support*Connections
Housing
Housing
Socialaffordability
interactions
Overcrowdingrate*Work-life
Gender gap inhours
Balance
Employment
worked*rate
Time off

SafetyLong hours
in paid work*

Homicides*
Negative
affectbalance*

Subjective
Well-being

Average
Inequality

Work
and Job
Quality

Genderwage gap*

Gender gap infeeling safe

Life
expectancy

Gap in life
expectancy
Student by education
Life
Access Students skills in(men)*
satisfaction
atisfaction Exposure
to outdoor to green with low science
air pollution* spaceskills*Environmental
Quality

HealthKnowledge andSkillsFigure 3.2.5 OECD Library How's Life? 2020: Measuring Well-being, 3.2.9)
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3.2.6. Technology to measure well-being in the age of AI
Methods for directly measuring comfort, one aspect of well-being, are being developed.
Figure 3.2.6 shows an example of such a method, which uses AI image recognition
technology to estimate walking comfort based on the difference in facial expressions fromtwo videos: the upper one of a lakeside walkway and the lower one of a train station
concourse during rush hour. The curve for the lake video (blue) in the middle is higher thanthe curve of the rush hour video (orange) at the bottom, meaning that we can predict that thewalker on the lakeside walkway felt more comfortable when walking (vertical axis: comfort,
horizontal axis: time).

Figure 3.2.6 Estimating spatial comfort by facial expression
Figure 3.2.7 (left) shows a pedestrian’s line of sight (target) while walking using eye tracking
technology. Figure 3.2.7 (right) shows the count of people, motorbikes and cars in UAV(drone) images using AI image recognition technology. Combining these techniques with
comfort analysis of facial expressions, it is possible to measure where and what we see
during walking that makes us feel comfortable or uncomfortable.

Figure 3.2.7 Pedestrian viewpoint analysis (left) and aerial object identification (right)
In addition, vital data from wearable devices and mobile applications can be used tomeasure body temperature, blood pressure, physical activity and metabolic rate with regards
to personal health. By combining these health data with location data from smartphones andthe comfort measurement technology described above, it is possible to monitor changes inpeople’s well-being during different activities in their daily lives. In order to realise sustainable
cities, particularly in the context of COVID 19, maintaining well-being while avoiding the riskof infection is essential. The Multi-AI system proposed in Chapter 3 of this report is based on
the creation of an open platform to enable evidence-based scientific advice, at the core ofwhich is the use of image recognition technology to measure well-being and visualise it inreal time.
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3.3. Redesigning scientific advisory systems to respond to the SDGs and the pandemic- the importance of the Science-Policy-Society Interface: from linear models to
ecosystems
3.3.1. Redesigning scientific advisory systems driven by the COVID-19 pandemic - fromlinear models to ecosystems
Scientific advice has been defined as “the provision of expert advice by individual or groupsof scientists (including engineers, physicians, and scientists in the humanities and social
sciences) that enables governments to make sound policy and decision-making decisions onparticular issues” 3.3.1), but this interpretation is now coming under pressure to be redesigned.
In response to the pandemic which began last year, scientific advisory systems establishedmainly in developed countries were generally dysfunctional. At present, various efforts arebeing made to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the political, economic, social
and technological realities of each country. Based on this experience and lessons learned,case studies are being collected, analysed and discussed in depth at the United Nations,
IIASA, OECD, ISC (International Council for Science and Technology), and International
Network for Governmental Scientific Advice (INGSA), to redesign scientific advisory systems
aimed at achieving the SDGs and preparing for future pandemics over the mid- and longterm 3.3.2). Japan needs to actively participate in these discussions.
3.3.2. The historical evolution of scientific advisory systems and the impacts of the SDGs
and COVID-19 pandemic
As a premise for discussion, we would like to briefly summarise the historical evolution ofscientific advisory systems as follows.
It was in the 1970s that the theoretical study of scientific advice and the creation andimplementation of systems began in earnest. Before that, scientific knowledge was simply
used in a variety of policymaking activities because it could lead to better policies by providing
neutral and accurate knowledge to be applied to the issues. In the 1970s, this simple
arrangement began to fall apart as people began to question whether a clear division could
be made between science and policy, and whether science could produce and provide
neutral and objective knowledge. Around this time, the field of policy studies began torecognise that there were two main pillars to science and technology policy. These were“policy for science” and “science for policy”. This becomes an important framework when
considering the objectives of scientific advice. In Japan, this framework was finally written
into law with 2020’s Basic Act on Science, Technology and Innovation, which is discussed
below. The following is an overview of the evolution of the scientific advisory system sincethe 1970s, divided into three periods.
3.3.2.1. 1970s to 2000: growing recognition of importance and accumulation of examples
During this period, as environmental pollution and pharmaceuticals and food safety becamesocial problems (e.g. “Silent Spring”, Minamata disease), systems for risk assessment andrisk management began to develop. In the 1980s, global issues such as global warming andinfectious diseases became a major focus in international politics. As evidence-based
policymaking was increasingly emphasised, risk assessment and risk management systems
were developed in Japan, including the Food Safety Commission, the Pharmaceuticals andMedical Devices Agency, and the Earthquake Research Commission.
In 1999, the World Conference on Science, co-organised by UNESCO and the International
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), adopted the “Declaration on Science and the Use of
Scientific Knowledge (Budapest Declaration)”. In addition to the traditional “science forknowledge”, the global scientific community agreed on “science in society and science for
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society” as the responsibility of science in the 21st century, confirming the importance of
scientific advice. A World Science Forum is still held every two years to review this declaration.
3.3.2.2. 2000 to 2010s: growing institutionalisation of scientific advisory systems and the
expansion of international networks
Entering the 21st century, many governments and academies developed principles andmethods for scientific advice, as well as other systems such as codes of conduct (seereference). International networks of scientific advisers and organisations have also
expanded rapidly.
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・(Reference) Universal principles of scientific advice (note: these principles now need to bereviewed) Separation of risk assessment and risk management. Ensuring the quality ofscientific knowledge at international standards. Provision of objective evidence. Ensuring
independence and transparency on the part of science. Appropriate selection of experts andexpert bodies and avoidance of conflicts of interest. Openness of the process. Ensuring thequality and quantity of data. Communication with society. Political decisions should be
influenced not only by scientific evidence, but also social, economic and political factors.
Understanding of the differences in speed and of both sides and continuous dialogue andtrust building.
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
Internationally, the Foreign Ministries Science and Technology Advice Network (FMSTAN)
and the International Network for Government Science Advice (INGSA) were established;
INGSA has held biennial conferences since its launch in 2014 (Auckland, Brussels, Tokyo(2018) and Montreal (2021)) and is the international leader in the review of scientific advisorysystems and their dissemination and implementation in countries around the world. In 2018,
ICSU (International Council of Scientific Unions, 1931) and ISSC (International Social
Science Council, 1952) merged to form the International Science Council (ISC). The ISC
aims to promote cross-disciplinary collaboration between the natural and social sciences toensure the foundation and quality of science in the fast-changing 21st century and to addressa range of challenges facing society. This marked a turning point in the 300-year history ofmodern science, which had seen increasing fragmentation of disciplines and separation of
the humanities and sciences. During this period, the OECD compiled reports that formed thebasis of current scientific advisory systems, including "Scientific Advice for Policy Making"(2015) 3.3.3) and “Scientific Advice During Crises” (2018). OECD is actively working on
projects related to mobilisation of science during crises and research integrity.
In the aftermath of the Tohoku earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident,
distrust of science and technology grew in Japan, and our country’s system of scientificadvisory was criticised internationally 3.3.4), 3.3.5). In response, the Nuclear Regulation Authority
was established (2012) and the Science Council of Japan established a new section on“scientific advice” in its “Code of Conduct for Scientists” (2013). In 2015, the Science andTechnology Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Advisory Board for the
Promotion of Science and Technology Diplomacy were established, becoming key membersof the global community on scientific advice and science and technology diplomacy.
3.3.2.3. 2010s to present: SDGs commanding changes in the STI system
In the 2010s, as seen in the UN resolution that adopted the SDGs (2015), socio-economic,
as well as science and technology, goals were greatly expanded to encompass not only
economic value, but also public and social value such as quality of life, environment, etc.
Accordingly, the science and technology policies of countries expanded to become science,technology and innovation policies, shifting to promoting social change. The SDGs have
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commanded major changes not only in the values aimed for and methods of science andtechnology, but also in the scientific advisory systems. The COVID-19 pandemic
instantaneously accelerated this pace of change. In terms of technology, digital technologies
such as AI and big data are expected to support these changes.
In 2020, Japan extensively revised the Basic Act on Science and Technology. The majordifferences from the previous law (1995) are that the law now includes “innovation” as an
objective in addition to “improvement of science and technology”, and that promotion of thehumanities and social sciences is clearly stated. As mentioned earlier, the two pillars ofscience and technology policy, “policy for science” and “science for policy”, which were
proposed in the field of policy research in the 1970s, have for the first time been legallydefined in Japanese law. The major objectives of the Science, Technology and Innovation
Basic Plan (2021-2025), formulated on the basis of this law, include social change, well-being
and people’s happiness, values that had never been pursued by conventional science andtechnology policy. These domestic and international trends call for reform of the governanceof science and technology, in particular expansion of the objectives, methods and scope ofscientific advice, as well as new methods and knowledge and capacity building of theorganisations and people involved.
3.3.2.4. 2020 onwards: The convergence of two international trends in scientific advice - aparadigm shift
The 2015 and 2019 editions of the Global Sustainable Development Report, the quadrennial
report released by the UN Scientific Advisory Board that is highly influential in the theory andpractice of STI for SDGs activities worldwide, when read in detail from the perspective of
scientific advice, reveal that the term “science-policy interface”, one of the foundational
concepts of the reports, was changed to “science-policy-society interface” 3.3.6). In the 2015
edition, as exhibited in the definition of scientific advice mentioned above, the emphasis isundeniably on providing expert knowledge from the science and technology side to thepolicymaking side—a linear model. However, following discussion on STI for SDGs
roadmaps and the sharing of practical examples over a four-year period, the 2019 edition
deliberately added “society”, indicating a deeper recognition that three-way collaboration andthe formation of an ecosystem are essential.
The advisory systems for scientific advice and their methods and standards, establishedsince the 1980s led by the providers of scientific knowledge, such as ISC (former ICUS),INGSA, and scientific academies in developed countries, remain active today. On the other
hand, since the UN resolution on the SDGs, the UN Scientific Advisory Board, STI Forum for
SDGs, and IIASA have played a central role in focusing attention and analysis on theimportance of the structure and function of scientific advisory systems from the perspectiveof addressing social problems. As these two trends converge, discussion is progressing on
a paradigm shift and redesign for scientific advisory systems. Some recent developments aredescribed below.
With a view to achieving the SDGs and responding to future pandemics, the UN and IIASA
emphasise the diversity of the science-policy-society interface across countries and regions,the development and implementation of roadmaps for sustainable interaction of the threesectors to achieve the goals, and partnerships at multi-levels (global, regional, national, local)that take local values and culture into consideration 3.3.6), 3.3.7). In its flagship report "STI
Outlook 2021", published in February this year, the OECD, under the broad framework of theimportance of establishing science and technology governance to respond to challenges
such as COVID-19 and the SDGs 3.3.8), stressed the need to strengthen scientific advisorysystems, to formulate mission-oriented policies 3.3.9), and to use digital technologies,
transdisciplinary research (TDR) 3.3.10) and foresight strategies as the basis for such
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governance. Meanwhile, the 4th INGSA Conference will be held in Montreal this autumn
under the theme “Build Back Wiser: Knowledge, Policy, and Publics in Dialogue”. In the lightof lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, the conference will bring together a diverse
range of organisations and people to discuss the structural transformation and redesign ofscientific advisory systems, bringing together national and regional experiences, case studies,and proposals for reform with the aim of consolidating the paradigm shift trend. One authorof this report is a member of the programme committee, whose prospectus states: “There isno single path for the future of scientific advice. There must be multiple pathways to respondto the diverse contexts and dramatic changes in the relationship between science, policy andcivil society” 3.3.11).
3.3.3. Direction of the redesign of scientific advisory systems to respond to the SDGs andthe pandemic
This section will summarise discussion so far into five points and describe the direction of theredesign of scientific advisory systems. We hope that the Engineering Academy of Japan, in
collaboration with related organisations both in Japan and overseas, can move forward tocreate and implement a scientific advisory system for a new era.
3.3.3.1. Building a scientific advisory ecosystem for a new era
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the weaknesses of the traditional linear model ofscientific advice that bridges politics and science. Utilising lessons learned, we must now
create an ecosystem in which diverse stakeholders in society participate in the advisory
process. An understanding of the science-policy-society interface is important to do so 3.3.2).
Approaches for society are often difficult. The scope of societies, their political economies
and their cultures are diverse, and national and local authorities must carefully consider
feasible interfaces between the three areas according to their respective characteristics andcontexts. In addition, the importance of involving citizens in the scientific advisory process
has long been pointed out, but has been put off due to difficulties in designing a process 3.3.3).
These challenges now need to be addressed head on in our responses to the SDGs andpandemics. Figure 3.3.1 shows IIASA's proposal for a local-national-global network for socialchange using digital technologies such as big data and AI 3.3.7). Introducing these digitaltechnologies into the citizen engagement process must be considered.

Figure 3.3.1 A networked governance approach for societal transformation3.3.7)

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3.3.3.2. Setting the agenda and developing a roadmap for scientific advice
As the definition, scope and objectives of scientific advice broaden and become more diverse
with recent emphasis on inclusion and resilience, the agenda-setting capacity andimplementation processes of advisory bodies are key. In addition to emergency responses,
countries and sectors need to work together to develop roadmaps and actionable mid- andlong-term strategies for recovery from crises and preparation for future pandemics anddisasters 3.3.12). In the age of social media, the humanities and social sciences have a keyrole to play in dialogue among stakeholders with diverse values, trust-building, trade-off
analysis of conflicting values, and consensus-building. The diagram below shows the steps
in the development, implementation and evaluation of the roadmap developed by the UN
IATT, in which the function of scientific advice needs to be explicitly incorporated.

Figure 3.3.2 Six Steps and Core Inputs for Roadmaps, by UN IATT3.3.12)
3.3.3.3. Expansion of frameworks for scientific advice and incorporation of new technologies
Scientific advice began within the framework of risk assessment, risk management and risk
communication, but this framework has now expanded and diversified at both national andlocal scales to encompass global issues and initiatives such as smart cities. As seen in the“Local SDGs” efforts, accumulating practical examples and experiences in addressing social
issues and scientific advice in local areas with differing conditions, and conducting metaanalysis of these are essential. To this end, it is important to incorporate new methods into
the advice process, such as big data, AI and other digital technologies, sensor technologies
for social measurement, and foresight approaches. Moreover, transdisciplinary research(integration and collaboration on the knowledge and experience of various disciplines andstakeholders), including the humanities and social sciences, is essential. 3.3.13)
3.3.3.4. Ensuring the development of human resources for scientific advice and the sciencepolicy-society interface
Securing and developing human resources with the ability and determination to respond todiverse and dynamic scientific advisory activities has become a major global challenge. The
UN and ISC have jointly proposed four categories of such personnel 3.3.2). They are the“generators”, “synthesisers”, “brokers” and “communicators” of scientific knowledge. The EU
has similarly emphasised the development of a “new type of scientists for policy” 3.3.13). To
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■㻟㻝realise these aims, it is essential to enhance the skills and capacities of individual scientists,
as well as to establish incentives and career paths, which will lead to the overall reform of thescience and technology system.
In addition to the individual’s role in scientific advice, organisational capacity building orcollective knowledge is also important. The Engineering Academy of Japan is expected tofunction effectively as a "boundary organisation" 3.3.2) for scientific advice, with its capacity toeasily cross disciplinary, organisational, gender, generational and national boundaries (2).
3.3.3.5. Japan’s presence in international collaboration and competition in scientific advice
Recent years have seen a rapid increase in global issues, such as climate change, SDGs,
the COVID-19 pandemic and large-scale disasters, and it is essential to establish aninternational system for coordination that transcends the boundaries of governmental,
industrial, academic, and civil sectors. As shown in the figure below, international networks
and partnerships in each sector related to the SDGs are rapidly expanding and taking shape,and considerable efforts are needed to maintain and increase Japan’s presence (see figure
below) 3.3.14). Moreover, rebuilding of countries’ scientific advisory systems that were crippledby the pandemic involves an element of competition. Japan must work to strengthen its
scientific advisory system as soon as possible taking into account lessons learned.

WorldInternational
Science Council

Regions: Asia,
Africa, etc.

Country

Global Young
Academy2022 conference inJapan

Local academies

International
Network for
Government Science
Advice (INGSA)Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)

Each country’s
INGSA Regional
science academies, Chapters: Asia, Africa,
engineering
Latin America & the
Caribbean, Europe,
academies
Each country’s universities,
public-private-partnership; forexample, Carbon Neutrality
Coalition

UN, ECOSOC,
World Bank,UNESCO, WHO,
etc.

OECD “STI Policy 2025",
MOIP, TDR, Integrity,
development of new indices,
ministerial meetings

World Science
Forum (WSF)

North America

Locality

Foreign Ministries
Science & Technology
Advice Network(FMSTAN)

Each country’s STI
policy decision-making
mechanism, fundingorganizations, think
tanks

EU:
Strongerlink between
STI policies+ localpolicies
S3→S4

Japan: Local SDGs,
SDGs Future Cities,
etc.

Achieving multi-layered cooperation across fields, organizations
and countries and ensuring training of people to lead such efforts

Science & technology

AAAS,
ESOF,
GESDA,STS
Forum
Science Agora,
Japaneseversion of
AAAS,
Expo 2025
Osaka

WEF, Welcome
Trust, G-STIG,
GSS,
foundations,
think tanks

Respect for viewpoints on
history and the world, andfor culture, values anddiversity

Society/Business

Figure 3.3.3 Deepening partnerships between scientific advisory organizations in
response to the SDGs and pandemics 3.3.14)
3.4. The relationship of legislative bodies to scientific advice, with European academies anindispensable presence
3.4.1. Interesting points on the relationship between academies and legislatures in Europe
When considering scientific advice, it is important not only to advise government, but also tohave a relationship with parliament. The political systems in Europe have a long history, andthere are many differences between countries, with revolutions and surviving monarchies.
There is also a great deal of mutual influence, and as a result there is some commonality inthe way that the people themselves think about the political system.
In terms of the relationship between science and politics, the creation of the Office ofTechnology Assessment (OTA) in the United States had a major impact on Europe. Even
after the abolition of OTA, sharing of scientific and technological information with politics and
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discussion of science and technology in political affairs have developed in various ways inmany European countries, with technology assessment (TA) at the core.
In 2017, the Engineering Academy of Japan (EAJ) was commissioned by the National Diet
Library to conduct a research study entitled “Policymaking and Science Literacy”. As a partof this study, we conducted a survey on the relationship between parliaments and scientificacademies. One of the interesting findings was that in the 1950s, the Royal Swedish
Academy of Engineering Sciences and the Swedish Parliament jointly established anorganisation called the “the Swedish Society of Parliamentarians & Scientists” (Rifo) to freely
discuss policy based on science. RIFO frequently organises seminars and tours forparliamentarians and scientists to promote interaction and mutual understanding between
them. RIFO has about 500 members, of which about 100 are members of parliament (as of
October 2017), which is nearly a third of the total 351 MPs. The Royal Academy ofEngineering Sciences organises a major event once a year, which is said to be the largest
gathering of MPs in Sweden outside the parliament hall. This regular interaction between
MPs and the scientific academy is said to have precipitated Sweden’s first agreement on along-term energy strategy between the eight ruling and opposition parties in 2016, after which
the Minister for Energy expressly praised the practice. This is an example of the importanceof providing information to parliament, which plays a key role in determining the direction ofpolicy, and of parliament making decisions on the basis of appropriate information, in theoperation of government. Recognising the importance of building relationships between
legislatures and academies, the EAJ conducted further research into the situation in a
number of European countries in 2019. The case of the UK is illustrated in the following
diagram.
UK
Executive
branchPrime minister

Legislature
Parliament
House of Lords andHouse of Commons
Libraries

Pairing
schemes

Government
chief scientificadvisor

Fellowship

Academies
Scientists
ElectionMedia

Citizens

Figure 3.4.1 Flow of scientific advice to Parliament in the UK
The country surveys revealed a number of interesting points.
a) Parliaments and scientists in European countries have a close relationship, notonly relationships with individual scientists, but also between parliaments andacademies as organisations of scientists.
b) The role of the academy is to propose policy options, which the parliament utilises
to debate and decide on policy.
c) Many academies grew out of spontaneous gatherings of scientists that were later
approved by kings and other authorities. Accordingly, they are not institutions ofgovernment, but independent entities, and it is unlikely that parliaments or
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governments would seek to influence the activities of the academies.
Furthermore, scientists have played an indispensable role in shaping Western
society, and academies are considered to have a respected role in society.
d) To support their activities, the independent academies are provided with funds
from parliaments and governments, who then receive recommendations.
e) Some activities to create contact between scientists and parliamentarians arenoteworthy. For example, in the United States, the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS) has led the Science and Technology Policy
Fellowships programme since 1973, in which every year 30 young scientists
spend one year in the Congressional Research Service or under the supervisionof a member of Congress, gaining first-hand experience, including drafting
legislation and handling petitions. The programme has been ongoing for nearly
50 years, so that in the United States more than 1,000 people on both sides,
science and politics, have been trained in two languages (the language ofscience and the language of politics). Pairing schemes also operate in the UK
and the EU, with activities aimed at similar objectives. Yet, Japanese scientists
and politicians remain unaware that these steady efforts to connect scientists andpoliticians have been taking place for many years.
The activities of parliaments and academies in Europe and the United States in sharing
scientific and technological information with parliaments and developing human resources
for this purpose is depicted in the following diagram.
Organizational sharing of
science information
National
Engineering
Policy Centre(UK)

Legislaturelibrary

Science and Technology Options
Assessment Panel (European Parliament)
Royal Swedish Academy of
Parliamentary Office for Scientific andTechnological Assessment (French
Engineering Sciences
Parliament)
Office of Technology Assessment
TA-SWISS(German Bundestag)

Academies(in each country)

Institute of Technology
Assessment (Austria)

Academies

Note: Shaded backgroundindicates organizations within
the legislature, whitebackground indicates thoseoutside the legislature.

Parliamentary Office of
Science and Technology(UK Parliament)
Science Media Center

Congressional Science& Technology Policy
Fellowships (US)Legislature

Pairing schemes (UK, EU)

Human resource development(Science and policy literacy)

Figure 3.4.2 Provision of scientific information to parliament and human resource
development (Europe, USA)The top half represents science and technology information sharing activities, with examplesof organisations carrying out initiatives on the parliamentary side on the right and academyled initiatives on the left. The bottom half shows examples of activities to improve the policy
and political literacy of researchers. Parliamentary libraries are on the right, near the centre
line at the top. In the case of Japan, while the National Diet Library fits into this category,
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there are no other organisations conducting activities that could be represented in thisdiagram.
3.4.2. The situation in Japan
So what is the situation in Japan? As shown in the diagram below, there is no mechanism inplace for academia as an organisational body to advise the legislature.

Japan
Executive branch
Prime minister

Legislative branch
Diet

Committees, researchcommissions

National Diet
Library

Cabinet Office,
MEXT etc.

Research offices ofboth houses of the Diet

Expertwitness

ScienceCouncil ofJapan

Academies
Engineering
ngineering Academyof Japan

CSTI
etc.
JST
etc.

Science andTechnology Advisor
to the Minister for
Foreign. Affairs

Committee member

Scientists

ElectionMedia

Science bureau

Citizens

In Japan, there are systematicroutes for academia to givescientific advice to the
executive branch, but not to
the Diet.

Figure 3.4.3 Flow of parliamentary scientific advice in JapanThe Science Council of Japan, which has been in the news a lot recently, has its mandate
defined by the Act on Science Council of Japan, making it legally obliged to submit advice
and recommendations to the government. From its outset, it was not assumed to have any
relationship with the legislature. The Japan Academy, regarded as the Japanese scientificacademy, does not carry out such activities, so in effect, there is no contact point between
the legislature and an academy as an organisational body of scientists. Accordingly, it is notpossible in Japan for the legislature to debate and make optimal policy decisions utilisingmultiple options proposed by a scientific academy. As a result, the legislature in our country
debates on the basis of information provided by the government. Interestingly, this is rarely
perceived as a problem. Yet, this also creates a problem for the scientific community as there
is little opportunity to train scientists who can explain what the people are calling for and what
can be achieved as policy based on scientific evidence.
These deficiencies came to the fore in Japan in 2020. In early spring, when measures basedon the views of infectious disease experts were put into effect in response to COVID-19, there
was a debate on whether experts should be allowed to decide policy, exposing the lack of a
firm division of roles between experts and policymakers. Later, the opinions of experts infields other than infectious diseases, such as economics, began to emerge. At the time,political scientist and University of Tokyo Professor Izuru Makihara, sounded an alarm,“When the opinions of both infectious disease experts and other experts emerge, politics
waits for and takes advantage of the opinions that are most convenient. This causes
frustration on the part of the public at the lack of transparency in the policymaking process,which in turn leads to dissatisfaction and criticism of both experts and government. When thissituation worsens, it can lead to the rise of populism.” The refusal to appoint members of the
Science Council of Japan in the autumn may have seemed sudden, but both of these
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problems may be partly due to the absence of a regular channel of communication between
scientists and the legislature.
3.4.3. Necessary measures
Not necessarily related to the current situation we face, the Engineering Academy of Japan
has been looking into the issue of the relationship between legislature and academia since2017, as mentioned at the beginning of this report. Based on the results of our research, we
decided to hold meetings to promote dialogue between members of EAJ and Diet members.
The first meeting was held in December 2020 on the topic, “The state of science, technology
and innovation in post-COVID times”. Both Diet members and members of EAJ reported thatthey found taking the time to exchange opinions on a single topic to be meaningful.
Accordingly, a second meeting was held in March 2021 on the topic of “Co-creation withyoung researchers who will be responsible for Japan’s future”, and a third meeting was heldin June on the topic of "Co-creation towards an inclusive STEM education and research
environment”. The meetings attracted a great deal of interest from the media. Moreexperience needs to be accumulated over many more meetings, and we are not sure exactly
how this project will develop in the future, but we will continue to aim to build the relationshipbetween the legislature and academia, which is the missing link in Japan's policymaking
system. In order to improve the governance of policymaking in Japan, it is essential not only
to point out problems, but also to solve them through action, and the Engineering Academyof Japan will make every effort to do so.
3.5. Issues concerning the relationship between science and society in the era of COVID-19
3.5.1. COVID-19 as a major event commanding a transformation in the relationship between
science and society
The novel coronavirus that began spreading in China in late 2019, igniting a major global
crisis. Named COVID-19, the virus has yet to be adequately contained 18 months later in
mid-2021, due to the emergence of various variants. The impacts of COVID-19 on people
and societies around the world has been, as predicted, great.
COVID-19 is urgent issue for people and societies because it has no borders, is faced by
all people equally, and its transmission and spread is closely related to lifestyle. In addition,
it commands a balance between three essential elements of modern societies (the search
for a compromise in a trilemma): the realisation of public health by controlling the spread of
the virus, the realisation of economic activities involving physical contact between people,
and the guarantee of human rights in society related to freedom of action and protection ofprivacy. This balance must also respond and flexibly adapt according to time and place.
On the other hand, although coronaviruses have been known for some time, COVID-19
involves many unknowns and differs from previous coronaviruses in many ways, being highly
infectious and causing cytokine release syndrome (a severe form of cytokine storm), whichleads to disease in the lungs and other organs. Under these circumstances, the academic
and scientific communities were confronted with a major challenge that demanded
appropriate action both implicitly and explicitly.
The COVID-19 pandemic is an event that continues to have major impacts on people andsociety. Because it involves many unknowns, science can play a major role in resolving it,
and the multifaceted relationship between science and society also comes into play in how it
is handled. In this regard, it serves as an example of the governance of science, technology
and innovation looking ahead to 2050, and can be viewed as a valuable experience for bothscience and society. Next, we will consider issues that have emerged regarding the

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relationship between academia, science and society, with particular regard to policymaking,referring to examples from both Japan and overseas.
3.5.2. Scientific, social and political responses to COVID-19
In the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, the relationship between politics and science has evolvedin a number of ways, both nationally and internationally, and has been subject to various
recognitions and criticisms. We will look at some examples of how science provides scientificadvice for policy decisions, and how politics responds to that advice.
3.5.2.1. The UK Example
The UK has continued to develop its system for scientific advice to government based on
experience. In the 1990s, following criticism of the scientific community’s response to bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as mad cow disease, in which it wasclaimed that there was no oral transmission of the disease, there was a growing debate about
the role of scientists in policy among various stakeholders in the scientific community,
including the Government Office for Science led by the Chief Scientific Adviser, and the Royal
Society. In 2010, a guidance entitled, “Principles of scientific advice to government" wascompiled, establishing guidelines for the roles and responsibilities of scientific advice,
independence from politics, transparency and disclosure. Subsequently, the Science
Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) was set up under the Chief Scientific Adviser, tobring together scientific advisers from various ministries in times of crisis. Since 2009, SAGE
has been effective in responding to infectious diseases such as Ebola and influenza, volcanic
ash from Iceland, and flooding. In 2011, following the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant, SAGE was the first to release estimates on the impacts of radiation in
the Kanto region based on publicly available information on nuclear fuel and weather
forecasts, and to advise British citizens in and around Tokyo that there was no need toevacuate.
The UK’s response to COVID-19 has been criticised by the Asahi Shimbun (7 August 2020)
as “a response that followed the science but then lagged behind”. Within SAGE, scientists
apparently advised caution on stringent measures, and as a result relatively modest action
was taking leading to some of the most serious devastation in Europe. The Prime Minister,
Boris Johnson, has himself expressed regret at this. The UK's highly developed scientificadvisory system did not produce the best results in the face of the COVID-19 crisis and its
many unknowns. The minutes and documents compiled for each meeting of SAGE, chairedby Sir Patrick Vallance, the Prime Minister's Chief Scientific Adviser, are available on its
website. These documents have become an important source information for verification of
the UK’s scientific advisory system, to learn from past challenging experiences and improve
the system for the future, as called for by the Prime Minister.
The UK’s cumulative number of infected people is around 4,450,000, with 128,000 deaths(12 May). The UK has been systematically vaccinating its population, with two lockdowns(three in England), and dealing with variants arising from the large scale outbreak. Having
developed policy based on experience, the UK now expects to return to normal life in late2021, with a view to achieving herd immunity through vaccinations.
Of course, the situation will continue to be unpredictable, for example, due to the impact ofa variant from India, with which the UK has a close Commonwealth relationship. Nevertheless,the UK's efforts will undoubtedly serve as a substantial reference point for improving scientificadvice and responding to potential future unknowns. The UK’s COVID-19 measures will be
reviewed by an independent panel in spring 2022, likely leading to further progress inestablishing the relationship between science, society and policymaking.

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3.5.2.2. The Sweden example
Sweden also opted not to adopt lockdowns of its cities, rather took more lenient measures
such as social distancing. As a result, its death toll was one of the highest in Europe. Initially,
it was said that the country’s aim was to achieve herd immunity against COVID-19, but theSwedish government denied this. Stating that any response must not be a short-term fix, butwould require a long-term approach that takes into account people’s acceptance and social
lives, the government claims to have made policy decisions that took into account theopinions of scientists and experts. The state epidemiologist leading the response, Dr. Anders
Tegnell, frequently briefs the public. Although infections have been spreading since late 2021,
experts and policymakers have been carefully explaining the challenges of the previous
response and the changes in policy. As a result, public support for government policy does
not appear to be significantly lowered.
This demonstrates the importance of repeated explanations by experts and policymakers
over sufficient periods of time.
3.5.2.3. Examples from other countries
On the other hand, there are some leaders in the world who pay little heed to the advice of
scientists and experts, or who view taking their advice as problematic. COVID-19 infections
have been particularly rampant in countries whose leaders did not take the pandemic
seriously.
One of the biggest challenges from the perspective of academia and science is scepticism
of science. According to Australian environmental scientist Dana Nuccitelli, scepticism ofscience begins with “denial”, followed by “blame shifting”, “trivialisation”, “criticism of the costof measures”, and then “pessimism that it is too late” (Asahi Shimbun). A typical example isscepticism about global warming, and the same phenomenon has occurred for COVID-19.
Scepticism of science in the US is a typical example. In its response to COVID-19, the Trumpadministration put an exceedingly limited emphasis on science. John Holdren, the Obamaadministration’s Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, claims that while theprevious administration understood how important science was to addressing the nation’schallenges, the current administration has left expert positions empty and experts haveremained silent so as not to offend the leadership. He also points to the relationship withdivision in society, as people are encouraged to accept the leader’s claims as the truth rather
than listen to the experts.
But while blind faith in scepticism is a problem, for its opposite, blind faith in science, theproblem is that sceptical debate about science should not be renounced. Excessive trust inscience is also a problem, and a certain amount of scepticism and debate in society is healthy
and leads to the refinement of science. A healthy relationship between society and scienceis closely related to a mature democracy.
In the United States, Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases, who was at the centre of the Trump administration’s fight against
infectious diseases and provided scientific advice and statements, was temporarily shunnedby the administration for his criticism of its measures. However, when Joe Biden becamepresident-elect after winning the election against Donald Trump, Fauci became Biden's chief
medical adviser and became involved in the Biden administration’s infectious diseasemeasures. As a scientist, Fauci set the standard for scientific advisers by speaking and acting
on scientific evidence and not deferring to policymakers. He is also to be commended for his
courage in confronting the “anti-science” trend head-on, even in the face of anonymousthreats and public criticism from the Trump administration.

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3.5.2.4. The case in Japan
With regard to the Japanese government’s response to COVID-19, the Cabinet Office set up
the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters in January 2020 in cooperation with the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and other ministries, to carry out infection control
measures. An expert panel on the novel coronavirus, with more than 30 members, was also
convened in February 2020. Most of the members of the expert panel were medical
professionals and virologists, whose mission was to provide medical advice. Although theexpert panel did its best to analyse the spread of infection and proposing concrete
countermeasures, it was criticised for going beyond its advisory role to actually determine
measures to be taken by the government. In June 2020, after six months of activity, the panel
issued a press release explaining that it was concerned enough about the situation to
propose measures, rather than just express views on the administration’s proposals as
originally requested. However, as the expert panel was not required to keep detailed minutesof its discussions, and politicians claimed that they had taken the view of experts into accountin their political decisions, society viewed the experts as deciding everything.
Japan's experience in dealing with infectious diseases has led to a well-establishedbureaucratic system within the government, which may have prevented a flexible response
to COVID-19, which has had a faster and greater impact than infectious diseases to date andinvolves more unknowns. In this light, the response of experts went beyond “expressing
opinions” within this system, to expressing opinions on the need to change the status quo.
The biggest problem lies in the way policymakers handle scientific advice. In the case of
COVID-19, politicians always explained that they had “taken the opinions of experts into
account” in their political decisions. Yet they do not clearly state their reasons, nor adequately
explain what advice they received from experts, which parts of the advice they adopted intheir policy decisions, and which parts they did not. The press and media who attend
politicians’ press conferences rarely ask clear questions on this point, and even when they
do, they do not receive clear answers. Many scientists have felt that politicians have usedthe experts as an excuse to make decisions that differ in their objectives from preventing the
spread of the disease, as politicians must also consider stimulating the economy.
Emergency measures were put in place nationwide, or in certain areas, on three occasions
as of mid-2021, but when the third round of measures was applied, many experts opposed
the initial response plan that the government had asked for from a committee of experts (theSubcommittee on Basic Response Policy of the Expert Committee on Novel Influenza
Countermeasures), and the government had to reissue the plan in line with the experts’opinions. As a result, measures were taken that were more effective in preventing the spreadof infection, but challenges to the relationship between policymakers and experts became all
the more apparent. Experts reportedly communicated with each other the day before thecommittee meeting to discuss what action was appropriate, but by all rights, discussions
should have been recorded at the expert meeting. The question was raised as to whether thegovernment perceived the role of the expert committee to be an endorsement of thegovernment’s draft plans. In May, Tetsuya Matsumoto, president of the Japanese Society of
Chemotherapy, made the following statement. “We are now in the fourth wave of thepandemic, and the number of seriously ill patients has reached a record high, partly due tothe effects of variants. The situation is becoming more serious with each successive outbreak.
Some people still want to take a wait-and-see approach with an optimistic outlook, but thereality is that the declaration and lifting of the state of emergency is based on vague grounds
that are difficult to understand. I would like to see more respect for the opinions of experts.”
This statement reveals the doubt in the government’s response to the opinions of experts
and the facts presented by academia and science.

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In contrast to the UK, where there are clear principles guiding scientific advice ontransparency, disclosure and accountability for policymaking, Japan’s meager guidelines
include the Science Council of Japan’s revision of its Code of Conduct for Scientists in 2013,
in which a chapter on “Science in Society” emphasises the importance of dialogue between
scientists and society, and describes methods of scientific advice. This revision was made in
response to the disparate responses of various scientists on the politics of the nuclear
disaster that occurred immediately after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. However,unlike in the UK, there are no provisions that set out the basics of dealing with scientificadvice for the government, which is on the side of receiving scientific advice. For example,
there are no provisions that establish how government should publicly explain the reasonsfor their policy decisions, or how evidence for decisions should be indicated, particularly
where decisions are inconsistent with scientific advice. Scientific advice is only one basis onwhich policy decisions are made, and policymakers make decisions based on a wide rangeof possible considerations. Policymakers need to understand the limitations of science andclearly state the rationale for their decisions. They should take responsibility for theirdecisions, not rely on scientific advice to justify them.
3.5.3. Key issues in the relationship between science and society uncovered by COVID-19
COVID-19 and its many unknowns have revealed a number of issues in the relationshipbetween science and society.
3.5.3.1. What society needs from science
What exactly do people and societies expect from science in the face of the unknown?
Looking at COVID-19 and earlier examples, there are three main points. These are: theprovision of information and science-based explanations on various situations; research anddevelopment to directly address mitigation and adaptation to various situations; and theprovision of scientific evidence-based options for better policy decisions (scientific advice).
a) Provision of information and explanations on COVID-19
In response to an unknown situation, people and societies first seek information andknowledge on what is happening. On the other hand, in many cases, fears and worries about
the situation contribute to the appearance of various speculations and false remarks.
Historically, there have been false rumours after the Great Kanto Earthquake, the Rumor in
Orleans, and more recently, urban legends. However, the recent development of social media
has made the rapid spread of questionable information become a problem. In response,
science needs to communicate accurate information based on systematic knowledge in aneasy-to-understand and rapid manner if it is to stifle this false information in the way that witch
hunts were quelled by modern science.
Confusion arose surrounding the nuclear accident that followed the Great East Japan
Earthquake when various scientists explained the situation using limited knowledge from theirown research fields. Even if the scientists thought they had explained the situation, theexplanations did not reach the society. In comparison, for COVID-19, accurate information
was delivered to the people and society in Japan. Of course, some false information was
spread on social media networks, but it was countered by appropriate explanations fromexperts.
What is noteworthy in this context is that scientists from various fields, not limited to
medicine and other scientific fields directly related to infectious diseases, used theirknowledge and experience to examine various aspects of COVID-19 and express many
helpful opinions. For example, for predictions on infections and scenarios for containment, in
addition to medical scientist Hiroshi Nishiura’s proposal for an “80% reduction in contact”,
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mathematicians and physicists presented the results of studies into human behaviour andprediction of infection spread. These predictions were generally complementary. Use of theresults of scientific research to date transformed lifestyles and society and influenced policy
decisions.
While recent information and explanations provided by scientists to society are commendable,
it is our hope that going forward efforts will be made to test the system and achieve the evenmore systematic, accurate and prudent provision of information.
b) Direct responses to COVID-19
Next, people and society expect science and scientists to indicate measures to mitigate andadapt to the crises they face. During a discussion on the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) at the United Nations in 2017, the Chair of the Forum on Science, Technology andInnovation, Kenya’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Macharia Kamau, said that society
has invested significant resources in scientific activities in the past and that science was now
expected to provide possible options today in the face of the common global problems
outlined in the SDGs.
The main players in the response to COVID-19 are medical professionals. Those in
medicine, particularly in the clinical field, are focused on the treatment and care of patientsand the testing and study of infections. In non-clinical medicine, many researchers areworking to develop drugs and vaccines for COVID-19. In foundational research fields suchas virology, researchers are working to understand the properties of coronaviruses, such as
infectivity and mechanisms of transmission. This will serve as basic knowledge to come up
with better countermeasures.
Moreover, many scientists and researchers in scientific fields other than medicine are using
their knowledge and capabilities to tackle COVID-19, including the examples of mathematicalscience and physics mentioned above. Professor Shinya Yamanaka of Kyoto University has
also proposed using the PCR capabilities of university laboratories to expand opportunities
for PCR testing. These initiatives, which initially utilised existing materials or allocated existing
research funds, are highly appreciated by society.
It is important to note, however, that in Japan in particular, despite the efforts of various
stakeholders, research into COVID-19 and the development of vaccines for it has lagged
behind that of Western developed countries. This may be in part due to issues of policy,
which will be discussed later.
c) Scientific advice on policies to address COVID-19
How has science responded to policy surrounding COVID-19?
As noted in the UK situation, the governments of many Western countries have scientificadvisors, expert panels and advisory mechanisms in place to advise on policy. They also
have prescribed basic matters related to advice, requirements for advisers and how
policymakers should treat scientific advice. Examples include the UK guidelines and US
federal regulations.
Coming back to Japan, our scientific advisory system remains underdeveloped. In 2010, a
panel of experts issued a report on scientific advice within the Cabinet Office, but due to achange of administration, the report was never implemented. The only existing provisions on
scientific advice are in the “Code of Conduct for Scientists” that was revised by the Science
Council of Japan in 2013.
As already mentioned about the relationship between policymakers and experts on COVID19 in Japan, policymakers did not clearly explain which parts of the policy were based on theopinions of scientific experts and which parts were based on different points of view. In somecases people questioned whether experts were making all the decisions, and in others
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claimed that expert opinions were not sufficiently respected, showing how convoluted therelationship is. The section on “Scientific Advice to Policy Planners and Decision Makers” in
the Science Council of Japan’s “Code of Conduct for Scientists” states:“When scientists offer scientific advice to persons who plan or decide on policy, they shallrecognize that while scientific knowledge is something to be duly respected in the processof creating policy, it is not the only basis on which policy decisions are made. In the eventthat a policy decision is made that diverges from the advice of the scientific community,scientists shall request, as necessary, accountability to society from the policy planner
and/or decision maker.”This statement concerns only how scientists should behave, and does not prescribe thebehaviour of policymakers. It is also unclear whether this Code of Conduct is widely sharedthroughout the scientific community.
In order to ensure that the relationship between science and policy facilitates meaningful
scientific advice that leads to better policy, it is essential to have a set of rules that can beshared by the scientific community and policymakers.
3.5.3.2. Pursuit of governance that can respond to unknown challenges
When it comes to policymaking, how policymakers (or in short, politics) view their
responsibilities is an important point, but the administrative system also presents a problem.
For COVID-19, government was involved in infectious disease control, and it had experience
with the H1N1 influenza. In this respect, the situation is unlike that of the nuclear accident,
where the tacitly accepted safety myth was that no accident would occur. Provision of
information and development of related research at least went more smoothly. However,three main problems arose with the administration.
a) Structure of administrative system and flexibility
Governments respond to challenges faced by society by establishing administrative systems.
Strong administrative structures are essential for the effective implementation of a range ofmeasures.
In terms of infection control, a robust system based on past experience was in place.
However, this robustness may have made it difficult to cope with COVID-19, with its many
unknown factors. Japan, which had established vaccines, testing systems and methods todeal with successive global influenza epidemics and had escaped the Ebola, SARS andMERS epidemics, was too busy maintaining its established administrative system to focus asense of urgency or deal flexibly with a new situation.
While noting that there is a certain incompatibility between a steadfast response to existing
infectious diseases and flexible responses to unknown infectious diseases, globalisation andthe expansion of global interactions is predicted to pose greater risks, including new
infectious diseases. Responses, however difficult, are required.
b) Proposing administrative reforms and monitoring their implementation
The infectious disease administration missed the opportunity to take advantage of the expert
report of 2010, which followed the global pandemic of the H1N1 influenza virus in 2009, that
did not cause serious damage in Japan. The report looked ahead to necessary preparationsin the event of a similar situation in the future and included matters that have been recognised
as problems in the response to COVID-19, such as a stronger system for testing for infectious
diseases (e.g. crisis management, PCR), stronger border control measures, and a stronger
system for vaccine development. In fact, not only were the report’s recommendations notheeded, but the system was weakened by staff cuts at the National Institute of Infectious
Diseases and public health centres.
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■42This is an unfortunate precedent. While the reasons that this report was not implemented
should be examined, on the other hand, we must continue to expect the government to beproactive when it comes to well-founded proposals for reform. It is also essential that reforms
based on proposals are monitored, including ongoing examination of their effectiveness.
c) Science, technology and innovation policy and a scientific community that supports
the administration
Although not directly related to measures on infectious disease, the focus of research on
trendy issues, which is the result of the tacit agreement between science and technology
policy and the scientific community mentioned above, has resulted in a significant lack ofability to respond to unknown events. On the policy side, the emphasis on “choosing andfocusing” research has undermined the range of science and influenced the decision-makingof the scientific community, creating an atmosphere in which "trendy" research is valued. On
the other hand, there are complaints from the scientific community that science andtechnology policy is overly biased towards "immediately useful" research. Yet, the scientificcommunity has also pushed researchers, especially young researchers, toward "trendy"
research, for example by placing excessive value on the citation of papers. In any case, as aresult of the tacit agreement between policy direction and the inscrutable will of the scientificcommunity, science has not developed to encompass a sufficient range, resulting in a lackof scientific capacity to deal with unknown events such as the current one. The scientificcommunity should not merely criticise the government, but also make efforts to explain thesignificance, depth and potential of scientific research to society in an easy-to-understandmanner, and to cultivate in scientists an awareness of the position of science in society. We
should also make efforts to cultivate in scientists the meaning and perspective of science insociety. The will and ideas of people and society will become more and more important forthe betterment of government and policy in the future.
Finally, a significant part of scientific research, including in the field of medicine directed at
COVID-19, stems from the voluntary actions of scientists, who allocate their resources, timeand abilities to their research. Society should not merely thank them for these actions, butshould always strive to understand and respect the significance and importance of highquality research across a wide range of fields and the high aspirations of scientists. Likewise,
government should take financial measures to reward their efforts by covering the necessary
costs.
3.5.3.3. Summary of governance issues seen in the COVID-19 response
COVID-19 has provided valuable opportunities and experience in the acceptance of diverse
values, which will become increasingly important in the future, and the consideration of better
governance based on this acceptance.
a) Shared awareness on multi-faceted challenges
In the beginning, the response to the spread of COVID-19 was concerned with therelationship between infection control and the economy (dilemma), then became a trilemma
as people’s freedom of action also became a factor. The first point of building governance is
to foster a shared awareness among the sciences, as well as people and society, on themulti-faceted nature of the issue, which is relevant to different sciences (e.g. infectious
disease medicine and economics), and that solutions are best not based on one over another.
Science, and especially engineering that addresses practical problems, has the potential tolook at the issue from a bird's eye view.
b) Clarification of the scientific perspective

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In order for people and society to understand situations and make judgments, and forpolicymakers to formulate better policies or more accurately indicate the basis of policy
decisions, it is essential to accurately indicate the facts and interpretations on which decisions
are based. This includes stating what is known and what is not known appropriately at a given
point in time, as well as what assumptions are being made in interpretation. Here, thescientific point of view should first be presented with facts and scientific knowledge. Of course,
it can be presumed that a final decision would be based on a variety of other grounds. In
other words, there is no need to speculate that the scientific viewpoint will be incompatible
with other opinions, much less to present only a part of the scientific viewpoint deemed to bein line with the most likely final decision.
It is the responsibility of policymakers to synthesise various views to make policy decisions,and science should recognise that it is inappropriate for science to serve in this role. If scienceattempts to do so, it would bear an undue responsibility to society for the results.
c) Establishing communication between science and society
Communication between science and society should be primarily focused on how tocommunicate the significance and nature of science to society.
This should include the inherent uncertainties and certainties of science, as well as theincomplete aspects of current science. It is imperative to indicate what is understood andpossible in science at present, what is yet to be achieved, and the benefits and risks thatscience brings. Conventional science and technology communication developed from thenotion of a top-down effort to “enlighten the ignorant”, and activities only touted the enjoyment
and benefits of science. We need to clarify the possibilities and limitations of science,
including what the intellectual activities of science can do for people and what scientists areaiming to do, and work harder to improve both society's view of science and science's viewof society.
In doing so, it goes without saying that a broad perspective on society and high aspirations
on the part of scientists are required.
d) Etiquette for scientific advice
It is important that scientists and policymakers share a common understanding of themeaning and handling of scientific advice if science, technology and innovation are to havea strong relationship with society and policy going forward. The UK's establishment ofguidelines for scientific advice is an important reference point in this regard. Moreover, amechanism for creating this shared understanding within society and the scientific community
is required.
It is also essential to include a record of the process by which scientific advice is formed,
i.e. what facts and data are used and what arguments were made, to ensure that it can beverified later and experience carried forward into the future.
e) Reconfirmation of the main points of science, technology and innovation policy
Science, technology and innovation is expected to play an increasingly important role in thetransformation and development of society. At the moment, however, no one can foresee thefuture. Accordingly, even if individual researchers or research groups are able to narrow down
the topics to work on, it is risky for institutions and governments to at some point focus
resources on a few options looking to the future. Naturally, society's resources are finite, andtheir effective allocation is required, especially for public institutions funded by taxes.
Moreover, policy that lacks any "choosing and focusing" at all not only makes policy intentions
unclear, but also significantly undermines the tone of the research field.

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■44Nevertheless, if we are to seek optimal solutions in the future based on the existence ofdiverse values in society, excessive "choosing and focusing" would deny diversity andsquash possibilities. The scientific community should not simply seek a balance between“choosing and focusing” and maintaining diversity. Rather, it should avoid excessive"choosing and focusing" while indicating the role that diversity has to play in future society
and focusing wisdom on bringing about science, technology and innovation policy that is most
likely to lead to diverse possibilities in the future.
f) Suggestions for administrative flexibility
As a part of scientific advice, the scientific community should be proactive in describing themechanisms of science, technology and innovation if it is to play an even greater role insociety. Government organisations are by their nature skilled at steadily implementing what
has already been decided, so flexible responses are difficult. With this in mind, co-createdproposals are ideal.
It is also important for the scientific community to continuously verify the implementationand subsequent effects of specific proposals.

3.6. The ideal future direction of scientific advice and the technology roadmap
In order for science and technology to accurately respond to the problems facing humansociety in the future, those involved in science and technology must systematically promote
policy, research and development, and concrete measures based on facts and data related
to said problems, while including the various people and ideas that make up society. In otherwords, we must try to create a roadmap by listing a wide range of actions that the Engineering
Academy of Japan can take to collect and present visualised evidence such as facts anddata, build societies that tolerate diverse values, and realise systematic governance basedon such evidence.
1. Development of tolerance for diverse values, including responses to global warming
and other global issues: Outreach to society and participation in international
activitiesa) Spread knowledge in society on the significance of the future aimed for by the SDGs
Opportunities for public debate at symposiums and dissemination via the webb) Activities to realise SDGs and evaluation of processes aimed at achieving themContinued deliberations by EAJ members
Participation in international activities by EAJ and its individual members
2. Fostering a culture of governancea) Society and people: Acceptance of the significance of science in co-creation anddiscovery of diverse opinions in society
Shared recognition of the multi-faceted nature of issues, need for clarification ofscientific perspectives (science that provides evidence), development ofcommunication between science and societyb) Policymakers: Interaction with those involved in receipt of scientific advice andpolicymaking, such as politicians and bureaucrats; calls for policy and requests to
the government

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■45c) Scientific community: Interaction with EAJ on acceptance of diversity in society andunderstanding of policy (in cooperation with the Science Council of Japan andscience-related non-profit organisations)
3. Systematisation of governancea) Develop draft guidelines on governance, especially on the various standpoints,
relationships, and responsibilities of the scientists and engineers who give scientificadvice and the policymakers who receive it, and encourage the government to enact
them.
b) Verify the scale of the groups subject to governance and the effectiveness ofgovernance (for various policies)c) With regard to governance, enhancement of methodologies, especially for scientificadvice, and capacity building of those involved
4. Demonstration of science and technology that contributes to assessing theeffectiveness of governancea) Trial of methods for evaluating the effectiveness of governance through visualisationof evidence and tolerance of diversity.
Example: An attempt to use AI to engineer a way to measure people's well-being, oneof the goals of scientific and technological innovation.
The future vision for the ideal relationship between society, policymaking and science that
this draft recommendation puts forth is as follows.
Science and technology hold great potential to solve various societal problems and society
has high expectations for them. Yet, when considering any future constructive relationshipbetween society and science and technology, it is important for both society and the scientificcommunity to share the facts about science and technology on three points. First, science
has its own inherent uncertainties, and the understanding of nature by science andtechnology involves probability. Second, current science and technology is still in the processof development, and there are limits to our current understanding. Finally, interpretation mayvary from one scientist to another, even based on the same facts and data. If theseunderstandings are shared, expectations for science and technology will not be excessive,and excessive reactions to and fear of published research results will be curbed. Likewise,scientists and engineers will be able to solemnly go about their research, creating anenvironment in which policymakers make accurate and rational decisions.
The scientific community aims to be a community of scientists and engineers who view
science as part of society and who tolerate and understand diverse values. Moreover, it
conveys to society the significance of science as a broad and profound human intellectual
activity, and based on ongoing research, provides knowledge and information, including
explanations and predictions, on various issues facing society, including global-scale issues.
Likewise, it offers options for possible scientific and technological measures, and supports
better policymaking by providing evidence to be used in decision making on policy.
The aim of the scientific community is to create a society in which people have tolerance fordiverse values and utilise intellect as well as emotion to make decisions on various issues
supported by the knowledge and information provided by science.
While recognising the diverse values held by people and societies, policymakers should fully
respect evidence provided by the scientific community, as well as other grounds, and take

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■46
personal responsibility for making decisions and clearly explaining the process and rationale
for these decisions to the people, society, and the scientific community.
Creating such relationships will strengthen mutual understanding and trust between people,
society, policymakers, and the scientific community, and will enable the advancement of aknowledge-based society that can flexibly respond to new events that the world will face inthe future. However, the lack of any one of these elements could lead to the estrangement ofscience from society, a descent into populism, or political stagnation.
Such a knowledge-based society will be one that allows for a variety of challenges andactions to respond to new situations, and supports people and groups that defy conventions.
Such efforts, including failures, could also serve as an important reference for developing
countries that aim to develop based on scientific and technological innovations.

Figure 3.6.1 Vision of expected governance

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■47Figure 3.6.2 Roadmap toward realizing the governance by STI
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■48
References
3.2[3.2.1] WHOQOL Measuring Quality of Life
https://www.who.int/mental_health/media/68.pdf[3.2.2] Welubiingu towa? (What does well-being mean?)https://monstar-lab.com/dx/technology/about-well-being/[3.2.3] Sen, Amartya Kumar (1999). Commodities and capabilities. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. ISBN 9780195650389[3.2.4] Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen on the Sustainable Development Goals by
Annett Victorero September 2015
https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/joseph-stiglitz-and-amartya-sensustainable-development-goals[3.2.5] Norman C. Dalkey, Quality of Life, Rand Corporate,1968[3.2.6] Office for National Statics UK, Personal and economic well-being in the UK:
February 2019https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/bulletins/person
alandeconomicwellbeingintheuk/february2020[3.2.7] Office for National Statics UK, Personal well-being in the UK: April 2019 toMarch 2020
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/bulletins/measu
ringnationalwellbeing/april2019tomarch2020[3.2.8] Bristol Quality of Life survey 2020/21– Final Report (July 2021)
https://www.bristol.gov.uk/documents/20182/33896/Bristol+Quality+of+Life+survey+2020+to+2021+report.pdf/40acbac5-6166-0413-3df765ffd1362829?t=1616171291250[3.2.9] OECD Library How's Life? 2020: Measuring Well-being,https://www.oecdilibrary.org/sites/3e80c09cja/index.html?itemId=/content/component/3e80c09c-ja

3.3[3.3.1] Tateo Arimoto, Yasushi Sato, Keiko Matsuo, Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, Scientific
Advice—Science, Technology, and Policy Making in the Twenty-First Century (textin Japanese), University of Tokyo Press, 2016.
[3.3.2] “Lessons Learned from COVID-19 for the Science-Policy-Society Interface”,
Joint submission by ISC and INGSA: K.Allen, Emerging science, frontier
technologies, and the SDGs, by IATT Report for the STI Forum 2021, May 2021.
“Strategy guidance note on the Science-policy interface”, The United Nations
Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA), “Lessons learned for the
Science-Policy-Society Interface”, International Science Council. “America’s
Science Policy and Science Diplomacy After COVID-19”, William Colglazier,
Editorial in Science and Diplomacy, June 28 2020. “Brokerage at the science-policy
interface: from conceptual framework to practical guidance”, P. Gluckman et al.,Humanities and Social Sciences Communication, 2021.
[3.3.3] “Scientific Advice for Policy Making – The Role and Responsibility of Expert
Bodies and Individual Scientists”, March 25 2015, OECD.
[3.3.4] “Rebuilding Public Trust in Science for Policy Making”, T. Arimoto and Y.
Sato, Science, September 7, 2012.
[3.3.5] “Critical Mass”, Editorials, Nature, December 15, 2012.

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■49[3.3.6] “Global Sustainable Development Report 2019”, United Nations, 2019. “The
Covid-19 pandemic: A wake-up call for better cooperation at the science-policysociety interface”, Policy Brief no.62, DESA, United Nations, April 2020.
[3.3.7] “Innovation for Sustainability – Pathways to an efficient and sufficient postpandemic future”, 3rd Report prepared by the World in 2050 Initiative, IIASA. \, July
2020.
[3.3.8] “Governance of science, technology and innovation for crisis and recovery”,
Chapter 8, in “OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2021”, OECD,
2021.
[3.3.9] “The Design and Implementation of Mission-Oriented Innovation Policies –A New Systemic Policy Approach to Address Societal Challenges”, Policy Papers,
OECD Science, Technology and Industry, February 2021.
[3.3.10] “Addressing Societal Challenges using Transdisciplinary Research”, STI
Policy Paper, June 2020. OECD. Japanese translation by the Center for Researchand Development Strategy, Japan Science and Technology Agency, October 2020.
[3.3.11] “INGSA2021 Conference Montréal – “Build Back Wiser: Knowledge, Policy,
and Publics in Dialogue”, 30 August – 2 September 2021.
[3.3.12] “Guidebook for the Preparation of Science, Technology and Innovation(STI) for SDGs Roadmaps”, United Nations Inter-Agency Task Team on STI for
SDGs, February 2021.
[3.3.13] “Science for Policy Handbook”, edt. by V. Sucha and M. Sienkiewics,
EU/Joint Research Center, 2020.
[3.3.14] “A New Mode and Pathway of International Collaboration for SDGs &Pandemics”, Tateo Arimoto, at “SDGs and International Research Collaboration”
Session, Nobel Prize Summit: Our Planet, Our Future, April 28, 2021.
Overall reference[3.3.15] Tateo Arimoto, “Kagakuteki jyogen no paradaimu tenkan [Paradigm shift inscientific advice]”, The Journal of Science Policy and Research Management, Vol.
36 (No. 2), 106-107 (in Japanese), https://doi.org/10.20801/jsrpim.36.2_106
3.4 Overall references[3.4.1] Policy Decisions and Scientific Literacy: Science and Technology Research
Project Report, Research Materials 2017-7, March 30, 2018, The Engineering
Academy of Japan, National Diet Libraryhttps://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/download/digidepo_11065239_po_20180461.pdf?content
No=1[3.4.2] Engineering Academy of Japan, Kokkai giin to kagakusha no
Seisaku kyoso jitsugen ni muketa teigen: “Rippofu to akademia no chiteki jyoho
kyoyu ni kansuru tyosa/shiko kenkyu [Proposal on achieving co-creation of policies
by Diet members and scientists: Report on results of “Survey and trials on
knowledge sharing between the legislative branch and academia]”, EAJ Report
2020-1, July 7, 2020,
https://www.eaj.or.jp/app-def/S-102/eaj/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/eaj-report2020-01.pdf
3.5 Overall references[3.5.1] United Nations: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000101401.pdf (English)
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■50
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000101402.pdf (Provisional JapaneseTranslation)[3.5.2] UK Government Office for Science: Guidance “Principles of scientific advice
to government”, Published 24 March 2010https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scientific-advice-to-governmentprinciples/principles-of-scientific-advice-to-government[3.5.3] Documents of the UK Government Scientific Advisory Group for
Emergencies (SAGE) concerning COVID-19 in the UK is available under thefollowing heading. Collection: Scientific evidence supporting the government
response to coronavirus (COVID-19)
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/scientific-evidence-supporting-thegovernment-response-to-coronavirus-covid-19[3.5.4] “Why did Sweden Choose Not to Lock Down? Constitutional Provisions andNational Character are the Background Factors”, NIRA Opinion Paper No. 52, July2020.
[3.5.5] Okina Yuri, “Sweden no korona taisaku no shinjitsu [The throuth about
Sweden’s corona response]”, Toyo Keizai, August 16, 2020.
[3.5.6] Members of the Novel Coronavirus Expert Meeting, “Tsugi naru nami ni
sonaeta senmonka jyogen soshiki no arikata ni tsuite [The ideal expert advisoryorganization in preparation for the next wave of infections]”, June 24, 2020.
[3.5.7] Science Council of Japan, Code of Conduct for Scientists: Revised Version,
January 25, 2013.
[3.5.8] Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Report of the Review Meeting on
Measures against Pandemic Influenza (A/H1N1), June 10, 2010.
[3.5.9] “2020 bei daitoryo sen/bunkyoku shakai ‘futsugo na kagaku kyozetsu no
ugoki [2020 US presidential election\social polarization ‘Moves to rejectinconvenient science’]”, Asahi Shimbun, August 10, 2020.
[3.5.10] “Torampu daitoryo no korona taiou (Horudoren shi eno intabyu [President
Trump’s Response to COVID-19 (Interview of John P. Holdren), Asahi Shimbun,
September 12, 2020.

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■51

4. Global Food, Energy, and Water Nexus in 2050: With a focus on energy
In both developed and developing and emerging countries, achieving sufficiency in energy,
water and food for people while taking into consideration the balance between sustainability,
the global environment and the economy, namely pursuing the global “energy-food-water
nexus” toward 2050, is an extremely major challenge for the current generation.
Looking at these three elements individually, first of all, energy requires massive
infrastructure to build a supply network. Also, on the demand side, it is not always easy torespond to changes in supply patterns due to varying patterns of energy usage and extremely
large numbers of users. Indeed, in recent years, distributed energy systems are becoming
more technologically and economically feasible, but when viewed as a whole, they remain alarge social and economic system. With regard to food, it is noteworthy that natural conditions(e.g. temperature, precipitation, soil) as well as the food culture of people living in any certain
area vary, and that it takes a certain amount of time to improve varieties of food. Water isalso highly dependent on natural conditions (e.g. temperature, precipitation, condition ofrivers and underground aquifers, etc.), as well as local demand patterns for agriculture anddaily life, industrial composition, and the state of pollution. What is even more important are
the mutual synergies and trade-offs among these three elements. For example, foodproduction and distribution require inputs of water and energy. The production of drinking
water and the purification of waste water also require energy. Moreover, many processes for
obtaining energy require the use of water.
In this context, particularly with regard to energy issues, there is an increasingly sharedrecognition in the world of the need to achieve carbon neutrality by the middle of the century
in order to solve global environmental problems while taking into account the balance
between society, the global environment and the economy. Energy is representative of issues
that need to be approached through engineering to solve complex global environmental
problems in a rational manner based on close cooperation among nations. Accordingly, thischapter will focus on the issue of energy and examine the following.
(1) A review of challenges faced by each country and the status of policies and initiatives;(2) Establishment of the following five principles to achieve global carbon neutrality “not longafter 2050” and Energy Sufficiency in all regions of the world “as soon as possible before
2050”.
i) The establishment of a forum (tentative name: FICNES) where developed countries anddeveloping and emerging countries can discuss not only energy and environmental
policy, but also industrial policy, agricultural and food policy, urban policy, transportation
policy and technology policy.
ii) For the poorest and least developed countries in particular, allow for a shift in policy
towards carbon neutrality from a long-term perspective, while prioritising the achievementof Energy Sufficiency for the time being.
iii) For developing and emerging countries with large populations (exceeding 100 million in2050) that are already achieving high economic growth rates, the world should provide
support and investment for measures to simultaneously achieve carbon neutrality andEnergy Sufficiency.
iv) For infrastructure related to renewable energy and energy storage and transport, taking
advantage of regional characteristics and construction of infrastructure among multiple
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■52
countries should be discussed at the abovementioned FICNES forum to build
international consensus and promote investment.
v) The world should monitor CO2 emissions and sequestration, design and build aframework for the steady development and diffusion of new technologies, ensure thesafety of nuclear power, manage transitional fossil fuel resources, elucidate CO2
sequestration mechanisms, and recruit and train outstanding human resources in theseareas.
(3) Based on these five principles, specific countries that could be called upon tosimultaneously achieve carbon neutrality and Energy Sufficiency were selected based onfour criteria, and the nature of cooperation to resolve any issues was examined. (Of these,
the seven countries identified as “particularly important target nations for cooperation” wereIndia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Philippines, and Vietnam.)(4) In addition to an examination of the various technology options currently advocated in thethree areas of energy supply, energy demand, and energy distribution, critical issues forengineering to create a sustainable society were identified.
(5) Since the readiness of individual technologies remains unclear and we are not at the stageof narrowing down the list, a “Policy Framework Roadmap” was developed which includes
four elements: “policy and international cooperation”, “human resources development”,“technology assessment systems” and “investment guidance schemes”. In addition, in order
to identify timescales and challenges, a Technology Roadmap was developed as a generalframework for technology. Both roadmaps need to be continually updated by the relevant
communities, and it is important that they are always discussed as a 'pair'. This is because
achieving carbon neutrality and Energy Sufficiency requires both top-down and bottom-up
approaches.
(6) Finally, based on the above, we examine the realisation of the “Energy-Food-Water
Nexus”.
4.1. Introduction
According to the latest report published by Working Group I of the Inter-governmental Panelon Climate Change (IPCC) in August this year, an increase in global average temperature of
1.5°C is “likely to occur” between 2021 and 2040 4.1.1). This is about ten years earlier thanprevious reports have predicted, and shows that global warming has accelerated in recent
years. This means that the “1.5°C scenario” agreed upon in the Paris Agreement is going to
be more difficult to achieve than previously thought, and there will also likely be greater
impacts on energy, food and water security. In light of this information, it will not be easy toachieve overall optimisation of energy, food and water. Moreover, any attempt would require
an extremely large investment of funds and time to achieve. Even if we try to make changes
today (in 2021), it will take at least 30 years to create a “new world”. Therefore, the questionof what the world's energy, food and water nexus should look like in 2050 must be viewed as
an urgent issue for engineers to address.
The following is a summary (with a focus on energy) of discussions in the Working Group II
of the Science, Technology and Innovation 2050 Committee (STI2050 Committee)
established by the Engineering Academy of Japan (EAJ).

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■534.2. Where to place the target in terms of energy?
The “world” is diverse. That diversity will likely remain, and we do not believe that it isnecessarily appropriate or realistic to achieve a uniform society. It is important to have diverse
visions of the future that take into account the characteristics of each country and region.
Nevertheless, in order to proceed with concrete discussions, it is first necessary to set ourtargets related to energy.
It goes without saying that the first challenge for energy is global warming (climate change),
which is mainly caused by the CO2 emitted from burning fossil fuels. The European Union,
Japan and the United States have already pledged to achieve net zero CO2 emissions by
2050, and China, currently the largest CO2 emitter, has also pledged to do so by 2060.
According to the Climate Ambition Alliance, more than 120 countries around the world havealready committed to carbon neutrality by 2050 4.2.1). However, considering that Annex I
countries as defined by the Paris Agreement (mainly developed countries) account for about
40% of emissions, while emissions from "non-Annex I countries" (mainly developing andemerging countries) account for about 60% (of which about half is China) 4.2.2), and the factthat the latter generally have higher rates of population and economic growth4.2.3), it will not
be easy to achieve on a global basis. Therefore, we believe that the goal should be to achievecarbon neutrality on a global basis, including both developed countries and developing andemerging countries, not long after 2050. If will not be possible to do this solely based on theactions of the mainly developed countries that are currently committed to carbon neutrality.
It will be necessary for these advanced countries to take measures to become carbon
negative above and beyond achieving carbon neutrality in their own countries.
On the other hand, the world's energy supply is not equally accessible to all. For example,
as shown in Figure 1, even in recent years, roughly 770 million people remain without accessto electricity, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa4.2.4), and Goal 7 of the SDGs, “Ensure accessto affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all”, has not been achieved. Here,
we introduce the concept of “Energy Sufficiency” to describe the state of affairs where“everyone has access to a minimum of affordable energy”. We also recommend setting agoal of “achieving Energy Sufficiency in all regions of the world as soon as possible before
2050”. For those of us living in developed countries, we tend to view Energy Sufficiency as agoal only for developing countries. Yet, the concept of sufficiency also implies “knowing whatis enough”, i.e. curbing excessive and wasteful consumption and leading cultured lives using
the minimum amount of energy necessary. It is therefore necessary to review the current
energy consumption in developed countries.

Figure 4.2.1 Global electricity access in % of population (2018)
Source: World Bank (2018) Access to electricity (% of population)
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■54(Note 1) According to an IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis) report
entitled “Innovations for Sustainability - 3rd Report Prepared by the World in 2050 Initiative",“sufficiency” level is defined as the level at which services (e.g. water, food, healthcare,energy) are provided beyond decent living standards (DLS) 4.2.5).
(Note 2) It is difficult to make a sweeping definition of sufficiency level because it varies
according to differences in individuals, societies and cultures. In general, there are two kindsof social and environmental limits: (1) Pareto efficiency (i.e. one individual’s sufficiency does
not deprive others of their sufficiency), and (2) remaining within the planetary boundary of theearth’s resources and environment 4.2.6).
(Note 3) Although it is not easy to give a detailed description of sufficiency level, the WG2generally supported the view that the current situation in middle-income countries, specificallyprovincial cities in Thailand and Malaysia, may correspond to such a condition in terms ofboth supply stability and price. Both countries have a per capita GDP around 8,000-11,000
USD. Furthermore, China's per capita GDP is also generally at this level, and on average isconsidered to have achieved Energy Sufficiency. However, as there are large economic
disparities between large coastal cities and rural and inland areas of China, it is assumed
here that a sufficiency level is roughly the level of the average provincial city in Thailand andMalaysia.
(Note 4) This type of policy cannot be called economically efficient because obviously
regarding the marginal cost of reducing CO2 emissions per unit volume: developed countries> emerging countries ≒ middle developed countries > developing countries and poorest
countries. In other words, in order to minimise CO2 emissions on a global basis, if we judge
on the basis of economic rationality, we should reduce emissions beginning in the places
where the marginal cost of emissions reduction is low. In order to solve this dilemma,
developed countries need to realise an energy supply and demand structure with “lowinstallation and operating costs and low CO2 emissions” based on new technologies.
(Note 5) According to the World Bank’s "Access to electricity" data, in 2019 there were 29
countries in the world where the population without access to electricity did not reach 50% of
the total population in 2019. All but two of these countries (Haiti and North Korea) are in subSaharan Africa 4.2.4)
4.3. Review of policies around the world on achieving carbon neutrality and Energy
Sufficiency
4.3.1. Status of CO2 emissions in Japan and around the world and future emission
projections (U.S. EIA and IEA)
In 2018, Japan’s CO2 emissions were the fifth largest in the world, as shown in Figure 4.3.1.
The world's largest emitters, in descending order, were (1) China (28.2%), (2) United States(14.5%), (3) India (6.6%), and (4) Russia (4.7%). These four countries accounted for morethan half of global emissions. While the emissions of other individual countries are less, thefour European countries of Germany, UK, Italy and France together account for 5.2% of
global emissions. If we are to achieve carbon neutrality globally, it is crucial that thesecountries become carbon neutral. Meanwhile, India and Russia have not committed to any
specific deadlines for becoming carbon neutral. Factors that determine the quantity ofemissions include population, scale of economy, industrial structure (e.g. proportion of
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■㻡㻡carbon-intensive industries such as steel and chemicals), energy supply structure, energy
consumption efficiency, efficiency of energy trading markets, land area and number of cars,
and average temperature. In any case, it should be clear that achieving significant changes
in these complex factors in the short-term is problematic.
Japan is the world’s fifth largest emitter of CO2. Most of its CO2 emissions are from energy
sources.

Japan’s CO2 emissions (2018)
Non-energy
related CO2
7%

Other
30 million t
Industrial
processes
40 million t

Transportation
200 million t
Residential
50 million t

Global CO2 emissions (2017)

CO2 from
energy sources
93%
Energytransformation

CO2 emissions 4460 million t
1.14 billion tons

Commercial
60 million t

2017

UK

FranceGlobal CO2
emissions(Share by country)
Total global emissions

Australia

Approx. 32.8 billion tons

Industry
Transportation

Source: Handbook of Japan's & World
Energy & Economic Statistics (EDMC)
2020 edition

US

MexicoJapan Russia
R

Indonesia

Other

Italy

BrazilIndustry
280 million t
Energy transformation
Residential

China

OthersIndustry
Industrial
processes

Germany
Canada

India

South
Korea

Source: Created based on “The GHG Emissions Data of Japan”, GIO
Source: Created based on Greenhouse Gas Inventory Office of Japan’s data㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌㻠㻚㻟㻚㻝 Breakdown of Japan’s CO2 emissions by sector (2018) and global CO2 emissions
by country (2017) (Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry data)
It is also clear from 㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌㻠㻚㻟㻚㻝 that, even now, emissions from the Paris Agreement’s Annex
I countries (mainly developed countries) account for roughly 40% of the world's emissions,while emissions from non-Annex I countries (including China and many so-called developing
countries) account for about 60%. Unless exceptional measures are put in place, it is clearthat a significant share of GHG emissions in 2050 will come from China (which has declaredits intention to be carbon neutral by 2060, but will still be emitting significant amounts in 2050,
albeit at reduced levels) and so-called developing/emerging countries.
The “OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050”, published by the OECD in autumn 2011 basedon analysis prior to the Paris Agreement, estimates that GHG emissions in 2050 will be 81
gigtonnes (CO2 equivalent) 4.3.1). As of now, little concrete progress has been made towards
carbon neutrality worldwide, so it may be appropriate to consider this figure as a baseline(almost no action) scenario.
According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projections shown in Figure 3,
global emissions of CO2 from energy sources will increase by 0.6% per year between 2018and 2050, decreasing by 0.2% per year in OECD countries, and increasing by 1.0% per year
non-OECD countries 4.3.2), which suggests emissions of about 41 gigatonnes in 2050.
In addition, according to "Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector"
published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in autumn 2020, if countries implement
existing or announced policies (Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS)), global energy-related
CO2 emissions will increase from 34 gigatonnes in 2020 to 36 gigatonnes in 2030, and willremain at about the same level until 2050. Furthermore, in the Assumed Pledges Case (APC),
where countries are assumed to have fully realised their pledges to achieve carbon neutrality
by their commitment dates, emissions in 2030 are predicted to be 30 gigatonnes, falling to
22 gigatonnes in 2050 4.3.3).
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■56There are understandably large discrepancies between these figures, as the assumptions
underlying the projections differ. In reality, especially in developing countries with large
populations growing at high rates, we can expect a demographic bonus in terms of labour
supply, an increase in the growth rate due to the synergistic expansion of inputs based onincreased investment, an increase in energy consumption due the enhanced consumerpurchasing power and changes in industrial structure. The above analyses by U.S. EIA andIEA are premised on technologies that are still under research and development or not yet
commercialised, so it is important to keep in mind when planning responses that actual
emissions may be even higher. It should be noted that the GDP elasticity of energy
consumption during Japan's high growth period (before the first oil shock) was above 1, so
the growth in emissions, especially in developing countries, could be even higher.

Figure 4.3.2 U.S. EIA projections on energy-related CO2 emissions from 1990 to 2050
Moreover, as a matter of course, continuation of the social structures and technologicalsystems of the past cannot be a precondition of realising the 2°C/1.5°C scenarios aimed forin the Paris Agreement. Figure 4 compares the historical increasing trend in greenhouse gas
emissions, projected emissions in 2030 (under the current policy case) and the emissions
that must be achieved if the 1.5°C scenario is to be realised 4.3.4). As can be seen in thegraphic, without drastic social and technological change at a level that humanity has neverexperienced before, this scenario will never unfold.

Figure 4.3.3 Difficulty of achieving the 2°C/1.5°C scenarios (Source: Climate Action Tracker)
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■57
4.3.2. Status of national initiatives to achieve carbon neutrality (EU, US, Japan, China)
4.3.2.1. EU and European countries
In February 2020, the European Council agreed on an intermediate target of an at least 55%
net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 4.3.5). This was asignificant increase from the previous target of a 40% reduction 4.3.6). However, in theconsensus-building process, Central and Eastern European countries such as Poland andHungary strongly argued that this target was too ambitious, and that the adoption of nuclear
power and fossil fuels such as natural gas would be necessary to achieve it (specifically, thatthese two options would have to be classified as green in the EU taxonomy). Reportedly, thewords "technology neutrality" were thus included in the document on the targets. However,
the Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act adopted by the European Commission in June 2021
still does not clarify whether natural gas and nuclear power are "economic activities capableof making a substantial contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation". The
Commission has noted that although these activities do not meet the technical criteria of theTaxonomy, they contribute to greenhouse gas reductions, which would be covered by thecomplementary Delegated Act 4.3.7). (More precisely, "natural gas is not included in theTaxonomy at this time because it remains controversial" and "there are no major barriers toincluding nuclear energy")4.3.8). The share of renewable energies in the EU's total final energy
consumption for 2019 was 19.7%4.3.9), nearly meeting the 20% target for 2020. The
Commission also stated in October 2020 that “key characteristics of the energy market (inparticular the high capital intensity, long investment cycles, new market dynamics, coupledwith a low rate of return on investment) make it difficult to attract sufficient levels ofinvestment”, recommending further support. The report’s analysis further concludes that “Inthe ocean energy, renewable hydrogen and wind industry, the EU currently holds a firstmover advantage” 4.3.10).
The situation in individual EU member states varies. France has policy on introducing
hydrogen while making the utmost use of the nuclear option, in particular using surplus
electricity from nuclear power plants to produce hydrogen by water electrolysis4.3.11).
Germany plans to review its EEG surcharge system, which has served as a driving force in
the introduction of renewable energies such as solar and wind power. Debate is ongoing on
the relationship between the high level of FIT (levy on electricity prices) needed to maintain
incentives for investment in renewable energies and the associated maintenance of theavailability of existing power sources such as lignite thermal power 4.3.12), 4.3.13). In addition,
the treatment of lignite, which represents an important part of the domestic energy supply
and employment, is likely to be a focal point, particularly going forward as further renewableenergy is introduced. Moreover, there are various initiatives ramping up in the industrial
sector, such as production, storage and use of hydrogen, fuel cell automobiles, and largescale HVDC transmission.
The UK's exit from the EU has, in fact, given it a greater level of freedom in global warming
measures. In November 2020, Prime Minister Johnson announced the “Ten Point Plan for a
Green Industrial Revolution” 4.3.14). The plan, among other things, calls for a four-fold increase(40 GW) in offshore wind power by 2030 (40 GW) supported by abundant wind resources off
the North Sea, and an expansion of low carbon hydrogen production and testing to allow up
blending of hydrogen into the gas distribution grid for all homes from 2023. Other ambitious
goals, such as the establishment of four CCUS industrial clusters in the North Sea by 2030,
are also laid out. The plan would allow the government to announce a 68% reduction(previously 57%) in CO2 emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels at COP26 in Glasgow
in November 2021.

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4.3.2.2. United States
After the former President Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement,
President Biden declared the US’ return to the Paris Agreement on the day of his inauguration.
The US, following the EU and Japan, also announced that it would achieve net-zero CO2emissions by 2050 at the latest 4.3.15). The Biden administration’s policy includes the principleof "environmental justice", which seeks to redress inequalities manifested in climate change
and other environmental problems to ensure that the most vulnerable groups in society who
suffer from these problems receive a substantial share of the benefits of the policies. To
achieve this, the policy plans for a two trillion USD investment in clean energy, andspecifically aims to achieve net zero emissions in the power sector by 2035.
On the other hand, the situation in the United States is characterised by very proactive andvigorous actions on the part of non-federal government actors. For example, immediately
after former President Trump declared his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement inJune 2017, former California Governor Jerry Brown and former New York Mayor Mike
Bloomberg proposed the formation of “America’s Pledge”, a network of corporations, local
governments, NGOs, universities, and others working together to achieve carbon neutrality
4.3.16). Already, nine US states have set goals on becoming carbon neutral by 2050 (or earlier),and 13 states have set goals to achieve 100% renewable energy in their electricity supply. In
addition, plans for decarbonisation investments have been announced by a number of large
corporations, particularly in the IT sector, and the manufacturing sector is following along.
4.3.2.3. Japan
Former Japan's Prime Minister Suga declared in a speech to the Diet in October 2020 thatJapan would “aim to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050”, i.e. tobecome carbon neutral in 2050 and achieve a decarbonised society 4.3.17). In the Green
Growth Strategy 4.3.18) published by the Japanese government in December 2020, 14 sectors
are identified as "key fields”. Of these, those related to energy supply include "offshore wind
power", "fuel ammonia", "hydrogen" and "nuclear power", and those related to energy
consumption in the industrial sector include, "automobiles and batteries", "semiconductors
and telecommunications", "shipping", "logistics, people flow and civil engineering
infrastructure", "food, agriculture, forestry and fisheries" and "aircraft". Other fields identified
are "carbon recycling", "housing and buildings/next generation solar power", "resource
circulation" and "lifestyle". Although some questions remain from a technical point of view,
such as the fact that geothermal energy is not included, the plan is commendable in that it
envisages the bold introduction of new technologies while taking into account continuity withcurrent energy supply and demand. In general, the strategy is aimed at taking measurescovering all the bases to find solutions from the long-term perspective based on the best mixof various measures. In this sense, future investment in R&D and promotion of social
implementation are extremely important.
In April 2021, at the U.S.-hosted Climate Change Summit, Former Japan's Prime Minister
Suga announced 4.3.19) a new target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 46% by 2030
compared to 2013 levels, and to continue to ambitiously aim for a 50% reduction. According
to the government's "Basic Policy for Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2021"
4.3.20), in order to achieve this goal, the government will 1) promote policies that contribute to
growth with a focus on decarbonisation, 2) ensure that renewable energy is the main sourceof green power, and 3) promote the use of renewable energy as the main source of electricity.
The policy also states that "based on the Green Growth Strategy, Japan will promoteresearch and development and capital investment in priority areas such as offshore wind,hydrogen and storage batteries". The Government of Japan is expected to take measures
focusing on the expansion of non-fossil power sources (especially renewable energy) in the
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■㻡㻥
electricity sector, and the electrification of the industrial, consumer and transport (nonelectricity) sectors with decarbonised electricity, hydrogen, methanation and synthetic fuels,
and further energy conservation. This will not be an easy task and will require radical
innovations in technology, as well as social and economic institutions.
In addition, according to the government's "Sixth Basic Energy Plan (draft)" 4.3.21) presented
in July 2021, the share of renewable energies in Japan's primary energy supply in FY2030
would have to be around 20%, with the share of renewable energies in terms of the power
supply mix around 36-38%. The breakdown is "solar power: around 15%, wind power: around
6%, geothermal power: around 1%, hydroelectric power: around 10%, biomass: around 5%",but the draft states that this breakdown indicates "an outlook for energy supply and demandwhen various challenges are assumed to be ambitiously overcome", reflecting extremely
ambitious figures. In addition, the proportion of nuclear power in the power supply mix in 2030
is stated at around 20-22%, which is quite a large figure considering the current state ofoperation of nuclear power stations. From this point of view, there are major hurdles in theway of actually realising the Basic Plan.
Ministry of
Economy,Trade andIndustry

Carbon-Neutral Industry
Hybrid aircraft

Hydrogen-powered aircraft

Electricity: Fully decarbonize and promote electrification of the industrial sector

Electrification technology used in apart of the propulsion system

Use of hydrogen as fuel, plus theuse of fuel cells

Hydrogen: Key technology broadly utilized in power generation, industry, transportation etc.
CO2: Recovered for carbon recycling or carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)Blue carbon

Offshore wind
power generation(floating turbines)

Solar panels

Mine

Storage of carbon in coastal andmarine ecosystems

Zero-emission vessel

Fuel cell ships, electric
propulsion ships,
ammonium and other gasfueled ships

Electrolysis plant

Production of hydrogenthrough water electrolysis

Electric aircraft

DAC

Small aircraft withcapacities of several
passengers could befully electrified

Direct extractionof CO2 from theatmosphere

Biofuel plant

Production of fuel from CO2
using seaweed, wastematerials, and waste pulp

Hydrogenation plant
Gas field

Steelworks

MCH plant

Chemical plant

Production of zero-carbon
steel through the hydrogen
reduction of iron ore

Methylcyclohexane

CCS

Production of plastic through artificial
photosynthesis, photocatalytichydrogen production

CCS

MCH carrier
Hydrogen carrier

Concrete plant

CO2-absorbing
absorbing concrete

Offshore wind power
generation (bottom-fixed)

Ammonia plant

Production of ammonia fromnatural gas and renewableenergyMethanation/Synthetic
fuel production plant

Hydrogen storage tanks

Electrolysis plant

Production of methane gas
and other fuels from
CO2and hydrogen

Production of hydrogenthrough waterelectrolysis

LNG carrier

Agriculture, forestry and fishery
Paper millAmmonia carrier
LNG thermal
power generation

Coal carrier

Coal-fired thermal power plant

Combustion of ammonia and biomass
in USC/IGCC and other highefficiency thermal power generation

Combustion ofhydrogen, etc. in
high-efficiency
GTCC

Hydrogenpower
generation

Combustion ofhydrogen

Conversion to biomass
fuel

Grid power storage batteries

Biomass-based new material

Stable storage of green electricity

Solar panels

Ammonia power
generation

Local production and local
consumption of energy

HTGR, fusion reactors

Superior safety and generation
efficiency; also enables carbonfree production of hydrogen

Combustion of ammonia
fuel

Synthesized
fuel（e-fuel）

Hydrogen station

Dispersed energy system

Fuel cell train cars

Nuclear reactors, small
modular reactors

Biomass power
generation

Forests of elite and fastgrowing trees absorb
CO2

Increased level of safety andeconomyCharging station

Fixed storage: storage
batteries, fuel cells
EV・PHV
storagebattery

CCS

FC bus
Logistics
EV/FC trucks

Data center

The foundation of digitalsociety

Sewage treatment
facility
Use as biomass

LegendHydrogen Electricity

Powersemiconductors

Used in all types ofelectric equipment

CO2

Carbon recycling

CO2 is turned into a resource through recycling into fuel,plastics, concrete, and other materials to be used all
around us.

Housing/Buildings
Next-generation PV(Perovskite solar
cells, etc.)
Lifestyle transformation
Resource circulation

EV/FCV for
construction
Wooden structures used inhigh-rise buildings and otherarchitecture

Figure 4.3.4 The Japanese government's image of carbon-neutral industry
4.3.2.4. China
In September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced at the UN General Assemblythat China would "achieve carbon neutrality by 2060" and "peak CO2 emissions by 2030"
4.3.22). China is currently the largest emitter of CO2, accounting for roughly 30% of global total
CO2 emissions. To date, China has been at the forefront as the leader of developing
countries at the Conferences of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (COPs), asserting that developed countries have greater responsibility for
global warming, which was caused by massive consumption of fossil fuels and massive
emission of CO2 over nearly three centuries since the industrial revolution, and thatdeveloping countries that only started to grow in the latter half of the 20th century have the
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right to use more fossil fuels 4.3.23), 4.3.24). Moreover, it has also been argued that China's
imports of steel and textiles are the result of China’s bearing the burden of manufacturing forthe developed world. China's large CO2 emissions are in fact associated with the decline of
the manufacturing industry in Japan, Europe and North America, and some analyses haveshown that curbing China's emissions would lead to restrictions on the consumption of thesegoods in importing countries 4.3.25).
The background to China's major policy shift may be seen in the following points.
1) China accounts for approximately 70% of the global share of the entire value chain of
crystalline silicon solar cells (e.g. polycrystalline silicon, wafers, cells, modules) andlithium-ion batteries. It also holds a 50-70% share of the market for materials for lithiumion batteries (cathode materials, anode materials, electrolytes, separators).
2) In addition to being able to produce and procure at home the mineral resources essential
for the production of lithium-ion batteries, such as lithium from Qinghai province andgraphite from Heilongjiang province, China has a near monopoly in the world on the
production of heavy rare earths (such as Dy) that are added to Nd-Fe-B magnets, which
are essential for the production of wind turbine generators and motors for EVs and FCVs.
3) Even though China has a long coastline, it is located on the eastern edge of the continent,
which is unfavourable for wind power generation. Nevertheless, it has great potential foroffshore wind power. In addition, the political system allows for the implementation ofpolicies with strong incentives to promote the use of hydrogen stations and fuel cellvehicles, which have already started.
Taking into account these industry and economy-related realities, as well as criticisms ofdomestic air pollution caused by coal consumption and the progression of motorisation, China
has taken a "proactive" stance in viewing carbon neutrality as a driving force for further
expansion of exports and economic development.
According to the Action Plan4.3.26) published by the State Grid Corporation of China in March
2021, the government will promote the development of new energy sources such as offshore
wind power and photovoltaic power, the development of hydroelectric power in the southwest
region, and the development of nuclear power plants in coastal areas to achieve carbon
neutrality. In addition, the government will promote the construction of pumped-storagehydropower plants to enhance the grid's regulation capacity, and LNG power plants tostrengthen the peak load regulation super-capacity, as well as the use of energy storage
facilities. It will also set out policy on "replacing coal and oil with electricity" in energy-intensive
industries.
However, there are still issues to be addressed for China’s plans to be realised. For example,
China must break away from its dependence on coal (especially in the power sector, where
about two-thirds of the power supply mix is coal-fired), which has been an overwhelmingly
advantageous energy source from both the perspective of cost and amount of resources thathas underpinned China's economic development (even if CO2 is buried underground using
CCS). Another issue lies in China’s power transmission infrastructure, the so-called “west-toeast” transmission, by which power is generated in sparsely-populated western regions andsent to the densely-populated eastern and coastal regions. Furthermore, it should be notedthat the plan presumes that CO2 emissions will continue to increase until 2030, which meansthat China's share of global CO2 emissions will become even higher. Achieving carbon
neutrality in the subsequent 30-year period will involve many difficulties.

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4.3.3. the COP26 Conference and the Glasgow Climate Pact
The 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Glasgow, UK, in October-November 2021, finallyconcluded with the following final agreements4.3.27).
・ In response to the frequency of natural disasters in recent years, the committee
decided to "resolve to pursue efforts to limit the impact of climate change to
1.5°C," and requested each country to review and, if necessary, strengthen its
emission reduction targets by the end of 2022.
・ The biggest focus of the resolution was on coal-fired power generation, where
India and other countries insisted in the final phase that they would “accelerate
efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power”.
・ In order to promote climate change countermeasures in developing countries,
the $100 billion annual financing by developed countries is to be steadily
implemented until 2025.
・ The Paris Agreement's "leftover" rules for emission reduction trading will also be
amended to allow reductions certified under the Kyoto Protocol to be included in
the 2030 reduction target.
The final agreement document including the above is called the Glasgow Climate Pact.
Besides these government agreements, it is noteworthy that the Glasgow Financial Alliancefor Net-Zero (GFANZ) and Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) groups, including governments,
city/regional governments, automakers, and logistics companies, have announced many
commitments on their own measures to deal with the issue.
4.3.4. National efforts to achieve “Energy Sufficiency”
It goes without saying that achieving Energy Sufficiency is a very high priority policy issue indeveloping countries. Thailand's past policy on electrification4.3.28) is cited here as an example
of a ‘success story’.
In the early 1970s, the Thai government, with the aim to electrify all villages within 25 years,
formulated the National Plan for Accelerating the Electrification of Thai Villages in 1973. The
Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) led the effort and steadily promoted the project withgovernment subsidies and low-interest loans based on monetary policy. In 1972, theelectrification rate (population basis) outside the Bangkok metropolitan area was reported to
be about 10%; however, by 1981, the national electrification rate (village basis) was 44%,and by 1996, had reached 98%. In other words, nearly all villages were electrified in the 25
year-period as originally targeted. Further, since the 1980s, Japanese companies haveactively set up factories in Thailand, and this investment environment is considered to havebeen a factor in promoting electrification. According to a JETRO survey of Japanesecompanies with factories overseas4.3.29), Thailand was selected least often out of countries in
Asia for "underdeveloped infrastructure" related to electricity (Thailand = 5.1%, Vietnam =22.5%, India = 61.2%, Myanmar = 83.7%), making it clear that a substantial level of industrial
electricity supply has been achieved.
In India, for example, per capita electricity consumption was 1,122 kWh (2017), which isless than one-third of China (3,762 kWh), less than 10% of the US (12,988 kWh), about oneseventh of Japan (7,836 kWh), and only one-third when compared to the global average(3,104 kWh). However, the government has to date supplied 80 million households with LPG
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connections and is currently adding 10 million more. Moreover, the government's budget for
2021 includes plans to expand the city gas distribution network to more than 100 areas overthe next three years. In addition, India has the fifth largest proven coal reserves in the world(8.3%), and ranks second globally in production and consumption (9.7% and 12.3%
respectively) 4.3.30). Accordingly, the continued reliance on consumption of coal, a cheap anddomestic resource, is thought to be a necessary option to pursue Energy Sufficiency in thiscountry where many people are still poor. This may become a major point of contention interms of achieving global carbon neutrality in the future.
In the so-called middle-income countries such as Thailand and Malaysia, where per capita
GDP has reached 8,000-11,000 USD, this level of per capita GDP, from a macroeconomic
point of view, can be viewed as an approximate level at which Energy Sufficiency is mostly
achieved.
It should also be noted that access to electricity implies access to communication networks
and information at the same time, and from this point of view, ensuring access to electricity
is becoming increasingly important for improving quality of life.
4.4. Global strategic theory (Five Principles)
4.4.1. The five principles
As mentioned above in 4.2, strategies and tactics should be developed based on thefollowing five principles to achieve the two goals of: global carbon neutrality not only indeveloped countries but also in developing and emerging countries “not long after 2050” andEnergy Sufficiency in all regions of the world “as soon as possible before 2050".
[Principle 1] The establishment of a forum (tentative name: Forum for International Carbon
Neutrality and Energy Sufficiency (FICNES)) where developed countries and developing andemerging countries can discuss not only energy and environmental policy, but also industrial
policy, agricultural and food policy, urban policy, transportation policy and technology policy
toward cooperation to globally achieve the second goal in a rational manner. FICNES will
naturally take into account existing environmental problems (e.g. water quality, air, noise)
aimed at sustainable development, while also taking into account the long-term energy supply
security. Specifically, an appropriate approach could involve reorganisation of the IPCC's
Working Group III that examines measures to mitigate climate change, reduce GHG
emissions and remove GHGs from the atmosphere, or the independent operation of WGIII inclose collaboration with the Paris Agreement. This would be extremely important in thecontext of scientific advice for policymaking, similar to the way in which IPCC is tasked withaccumulation of scientific knowledge on the facts and causes of global warming. The forum’s
mission would be to coordinate policies globally to achieve an inclusive and sustainableenergy supply and demand structure based on scientific knowledge.
[Principle 2] For the poorest and least developed countries in particular, allow for a gradualshift in policy towards carbon neutrality from a long-term perspective, while prioritising theachievement of Energy Sufficiency for the time being.
[Principle 3] For developing and emerging countries with large populations (as a rule ofthumb, exceeding 100 million in 2050) that are already achieving high economic growth rates,
the world should provide support and investment for measures to simultaneously achievecarbon neutrality and Energy Sufficiency. Moreover, these countries would also be allowed
an incremental "time lag", depending on CO2 emissions and GDP levels. In any case, theyshould work towards achieving global carbon neutrality not long after 2050.

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■63[Principle 4] With regard to the key points of adopting renewable energies and infrastructure
for energy transport and storage, the introduction of solar power, solar thermal power, wind
power, geothermal power, biomass, and hydropower should aim for overall optimisation bytaking advantage of regional characteristics. Likewise, international consensus building andpromotion of investment should be carried out through the above-mentioned FICNES forum
when building infrastructure that spans multiple countries (e.g. multilateral power grids, CCS
facilities and CO2 pipelines).
[Principle 5] In order to achieve carbon neutrality, developed countries and developing/
emerging countries should monitor CO2 emissions and absorption (including by oceans) ineach country, design and establish frameworks to facilitate the development and diffusion ofvarious new technologies (incentives for research and development and mechanisms fortechnology diffusion), ensure the safety of nuclear power, manage trade in fossil resources
during transitional periods, elucidate the mechanisms for CO2 absorption by oceans andforests, and recruit and train outstanding human resources in these fields.
4.4.2. Key countries called upon to achieve carbon neutrality and Energy Sufficiency
simultaneouslySpecific countries that fall under the third principle above "developing and emerging countries
with large populations already achieving high economic growth" and that are called upon toachieve carbon neutrality and Energy Sufficiency simultaneously will be selected based on
the following four criteria.
[Criterion 1] Countries with a projected population over 200 million in 2050. Followed bycountries that fall between 100 and 200 million and have the potential to become large CO2
emitters based on economic growth. (Population projections are based on the UN’s World
Population Prospects 2019 4.4.1).)[Criterion 2] As an approximate value of potential for future economic growth, countries withan average GDP growth rate (in real terms) over the eight-year period from 2012-2019
exceeding 4.6% per year, which is the average for developing and emerging economies
during this period. Followed by countries with a growth rate of more than 3.4% per year thatare also considered to have the potential for pronounced economic growth in the future. (Notethat in 2020, due to COVID-19, many countries have negative economic growth rates, butthese were considered outlier values and excluded from calculations.) (The IMF's World
Economic Outlook 2020 4.4.2) was used for data for economic growth rates.)[Criterion 3] Countries with current per capita GDP significantly below the levels of Thailand,
Malaysia and China (USD 8,000 to 11,000 USD), with a low percentage of population having
access to electricity, and where Energy Sufficiency is seen as a major challenge. As
mentioned above, there is a particular need in these countries for energy and environmental
policies to aim at achieving carbon neutrality and Energy Sufficiency simultaneously. (Percapita GDP data was also taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 2020 4.4.2). For dataon percentage of population with access to electricity, the World Bank’s Access to Electricity
4.2.4)
was used.)[Criterion 4] Some of the countries targeted in this study currently have agricultureß-basedindustrial structures that emit little or no CO2. However, assuming future economic growthand shifts in industrial structure, future emissions are unlikely to remain at low levels.
Nevertheless, as current emissions can be used as a basis for forecasting future emissions,
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■64priority should naturally be given to countries that have a certain scale of emissions (e.g. 100
million tonnes at present). (The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 4.4.3) was used as the data source
for CO2 emissions.)
Based on these criteria, the relevant countries (excluding OECD countries and Russia, which
are considered to be developed countries) are listed below. China has already committed toachieving carbon neutrality by 2060 and is therefore listed below for reference (andcomparison) purposes only.
Table 4.4.1 Important target countries for cooperation on simultaneous achievement ofcarbon neutrality and Energy Sufficiency(Note 1) Nigeria's sluggish economic growth, particularly for 2016-2019, can be
attributed mainly to low oil prices. (Similar trends can be observed in the Middle East
gulf countries, Angola and Venezuela, which are outside the scope of this study.)(Note 2) Brazil is expected to reach a population of 229 million in 2050, and its per
capita GDP in 2019 (8,798 USD) was already higher than Thailand’s, with thepercentage of the population with access to electricity reaching 99.8% in 2019.
Accordingly, it is not included in the above discussion.
(Note 3) Turkey is also expected to reach a population of 97 million in 2050, and its
per capita GDP in 2019 (8,958 USD) was also higher than Thailand's. The
percentage of the population with access to electricity in 2019 was 100%. As such,it is not included in the above discussion.
(Note 4) The population of Iran is predicted to reach 103 million in 2050. Iran’s per
capita GDP in 2019 was 5,506 USD, while the percentage of the population withaccess to electricity was 100% in the same year. Because Iran is a very large oiland gas producing country, it has been excluded from the above discussion.
Based on the aforementioned four criteria, the following seven countries can be identified as"particularly important target nations for cooperation" to achieve carbon neutrality and Energy
Sufficiency simultaneously from the perspective of Japan: 1) India, 2) Nigeria, 3) Pakistan, 4)
Indonesia, 5) Egypt, 6) Philippines, and 7) Vietnam. In addition, the following five countries
are designated as "important target nations for cooperation": 8) Ethiopia, 9) Democratic
Republic of the Congo, 10) Bangladesh, 11) Tanzania, and 12) Kenya. (However, from the
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perspective of criteria 3 and 4 above, the Congolese and Tanzanians need to focus more on
Energy Sufficiency. In Egypt, Indonesia (especially Java), Philippines (especially Luzon) and
Vietnam, where Energy Sufficiency is considered to be at a reasonable level, measures
focused more on carbon neutrality are necessary.)
Considering the current CO2 emissions of these countries, India’s measures are extremely
urgent and important considering that it is the second largest emitter after China among the"non-Annex I" countries of the Paris Agreement, and will have the world's largest populationin 2050. Also, India’s CO2 emissions (6.9% of the world's total) greatly exceed the countries
that follow it in volume of emissions.
4.4.3. Key countries called upon to prioritise Energy Sufficiency
On the other hand, there are some countries where achieving Energy Sufficiency should be
the first priority, and it is a major challenge for Japan to promote cooperation with thesecountries. The following are selection criteria for countries that should be prioritised forcooperation with Japan.
[Criterion 1] As an approximation of Energy Sufficiency, the percentage of population withaccess to electricity is used, and countries with low levels (generally below 40%) are targeted.
(For data on the percentage of population with access to electricity, the World Bank's “Accessto Electricity” 4.2.4) was used.)[Criterion 2] Countries with a projected population of less than 100 million and more than 30
million (p) in 2050. (For population projections, the UN’s World Population Prospects 2019was used 4.4.1).
[Criterion 3] Countries with current per capita GDP significantly below the levels of Thailand,
Malaysia and China (approximately 8,000 to 11,000 USD). (The IMF's World Economic
Outlook 2020 4.4.2) was used for per capita GDP data.)
Table 4.4.2 Important target nations for cooperation to prioritise Energy Sufficiency

Country

BeninBurkina Faso
BurundiCentral African Republic
Chad
GuineaGuinea-Bissau
Liberia
Madagascar
MalawiMozambique
Niger
RwandaSierra Leone
SomaliaSouth Sudan
UgandaZimbabwe

Percentage of
population withaccess toelectricity
(%)
40.3
18.4
11.1
14.3
8.4
42.4
31
27.6
26.9
11.2
29.6
18.8
37.8
22.7
36
6.7
41.3
41.1

Population
forecast (2050)

Per capita GDP
in 2019(in millions)
24
43
25
8
34
26
4
9
54
38
65
66
23
13
35
20
89
24

(USD)
1,217
718
310
448
861
981
785
704
464
371
484
405
825
547
(N.A)
275
770
860

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Based on these three criteria, Japan should consider the above 18 countries (with a
combined projected population of 600 million in 2050) to be appropriate ones with which tocooperate, giving first priority to achieving Energy Sufficiency. All of these countries arelocated in sub-Saharan Africa, and in addition, almost all of them had a per capita GDP ofless than 1,000 USD in 2019. Even if these countries sustained a 5% annual GDP growthrate for 30 years, their economies would be only 4.3 times larger than they are today. In otherwords, unless these countries achieve a level of economic development that cannot be
predicted at present, it is highly unlikely that they will be able to achieve the Energy
Sufficiency that Thailand and Malaysia have achieved today, even 30 years from now. In lightof this, ensuring Energy Sufficiency, such as the establishment of electric power infrastructure,in these countries is an urgent issue. As it would be considerably difficult for these countries
to achieve Energy Sufficiency based on their own autonomous economic development,
Japan and other developed countries should get actively involved to contribute to theachievement of Energy Sufficiency.
4.4.4. Cooperation with fossil fuel producing countries
It should be noted that the countries that are currently producers of oil, natural gas and coaland exporters to Japan (e.g. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Brunei, Indonesia, Oman,
Qatar, Mongolia) may become suppliers of "blue hydrogen" (or blue ammonia) to Japan in
the near future. While many of these countries may be financially well off due to their fossil
fuel exports, they could face domestic political instability and the inability to use these fossil
fuels, which are a source of foreign currency, for their own economic development if they
move too rapidly towards decarbonisation. Therefore, we should promote cooperation withthese countries in the development of renewable energies from a long-term perspective, as
well as technical cooperation toward the realisation of CCS/CCUS facilities and in theconstruction of hydrogen and ammonia production and export infrastructure to enable thestable production and export of blue hydrogen and blue ammonia.
4.4.5. Cooperation with countries with CO2 sinks such as large areas of tropical rainforest
and large algal breeding areas and coral reefs
Furthermore, considering the extremely high technological, economic and social hurdles thatstand in the way of carbon neutrality, it is also extremely important to consider how toconserve and expand the amount of CO2 absorbed by the world's largest CO2 sinks: theAmazon basin, Kalimantan Island and the rainforest jungles of the Congo basin. Meanwhile,
research results have shown that the Amazon basin, in particular, has in recent years become
more of an emission source than a CO2 sink due to deforestation in some parts4.4.4). Likewise,a rapid shrinkage of forest area due to the expansion of palm oil plantations in Kalimantan
has been pointed out. The fact that the products of these forests are exported to the world
market also suggests that global economic development is reducing the CO2 sinks in thesecountries. In the context of conserving the CO2 absorption capacity of these rainforests, it isimportant to cooperate with countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as with
the Congolese people, in the conservation, management and regeneration of theserainforests. It is also important to cooperate with relevant countries in the conservation,
management and regeneration of large algal breeding grounds and coral reefs, which areconsidered to be similarly large CO2 sinks.
4.4.6. Specific examples of response and cooperation measures in these important countries
The following section provides specific courses of action for response and cooperation
measures in the "particularly important target nations for cooperation" of India, Nigeria and

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Indonesia, for the simultaneous achievement of carbon neutrality and energy sufficiency.
These will require further expert examination.
4.4.6.1. India
While it is basically necessary to put in place all measures possible, improved access toelectricity and city gas, which the current government is promoting, is of utmost importancewith regard to energy sufficiency. In particular, with its large land area and abundant sunlight,
India has great solar power potential, and wind power surpasses solar power in the country's
current renewable energy supply. In addition, wind power potential is especially great in thesouth, and development is expected in the future. In terms of local energy, the expansion of
the biogas use from food waste from households and commercial establishments and animal
manure is also attracting attention (which would also contribute to solving conventional
environmental problems). Trials of these various approaches will be important to achieveboth carbon neutrality and energy sufficiency.
At the same time, in the realm of energy consumption, challenges include decarbonisationof coal-fired power plants and the heavy chemical industry (e.g. steel, chemicals), theestablishment of a mass distribution system using high-speed (electric) railways, thewidespread use of energy-saving devices in the consumer sector (in particular LED lighting
and air conditioners with inverters), and the widespread use of affordable and compact
electric vehicles.
4.4.6.2. Nigeria
In this large oil-producing country, CO2 emissions from the oil production sector are likely to
be significant, making it important to first consider the feasibility of adopting CCS/CCUS tocontrol these emissions. As Africa's largest oil-producing country, Nigeria has abundant oil
resources, and oil will likely continue to play an important role in its economic development.
Meanwhile, the country is well aware of the need to reform its oil-dependent economic
structure, and with a very large young population, industrial diversification will be a key focus.
Moreover, the development of renewable energies (e.g. solar, wind) is important in terms ofenergy sufficiency, especially in rural areas. Furthermore, as a large country with anestimated 2050 population of 400 million, challenges for the energy consumption sector
include promoting the widespread use of energy-saving devices in the consumer sector(especially LED lighting and air conditioners with inverters) and affordable and compact
electric vehicles. Nigeria has traditionally faced racial and religious problems and economic
disparities between the south and the north, which have been one of the hurdles to politicalstability and the introduction of foreign investment, making harmonious development of thecountry as a whole a top priority.
4.4.6.3. Indonesia
Achieving the widespread use of renewable energies will be a major key. With regard to fossil
fuel production, it is important to expand the use and export of natural gas (especially green
natural gas with CO2 removed, and the production of green hydrogen). It is also important tofigure out how to continue to use coal, a valuable domestic energy source, without emitting
CO2 through CCS/CCUS. In terms of mobility, it is again important to promote the use ofaffordable and compact electric vehicles. Furthermore, CO2 emissions from logging,
destruction and fires in forests, as well as from the destruction (fire) and decomposition ofpeatlands, accounts for an extremely large proportion of the country’s total emissions 4.4.5). It
has been suggested that significant emission reductions can be achieved in Indonesia by (1)curbing deforestation, (2) preventing peatland fires, (3) improving peatlands, (4) managing
forests sustainably, and (5) regenerating degraded forests. In addition, appropriate use of the
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country's abundant biomass resources (e.g. woody biomass for thermal power generationand jet fuel production) has the potential to reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuels.
4.5. Technology theory
The following is an examination of various options (alternatives) currently proposed in thefour areas of energy supply, energy demand (industrial, transport, consumer), energy
distribution and carbon fixation.
4.5.1. How can we change the energy supply structure?
Based on the measures that countries are putting in place and IEA reports, energy supply
structures in the future are likely to move in the following direction.
1) Each country will consider reliance on a single energy source unrealistic, and try to create
a new best mix by combining multiple options, taking into account the country's locationand continuity with the current energy supply structure. With many unknowns in thetechnology, as well as concerning cost and adaptability, it is dangerous to be "decisive" atthis point, and all options need to be addressed.
2) In terms of future options, renewable energy is a serious consideration for all countries.
Countries also have a strong recognition of the importance of strengthening electricity
transmission and distribution grids and infrastructure for energy storage (e.g. storage
batteries, conversion of gaseous hydrogen into organic hydrogen for storage in liquid form)
for highly fluctuating energy sources such as solar thermal, photovoltaic and wind power.
The focus of renewable energy, particularly over the past two decades, has been on solar
PV and onshore wind power, but in recent years expectations for offshore wind power have
expanded. In addition, countries share a recognition of the importance of further researchand development in storage batteries. It is also likely that, depending on the country, asignificant proportion of renewable energy will be operated in a decentralised andindependent manner.
From an engineering point of view, the fundamental problem with renewable energies isthat, in principle, their "low energy density" cannot be overcome. In particular, when
considering the locations in developing and emerging countries, it is important to consider
the following options: for solar photovoltaic and solar thermal, the location should be at alow latitude with a high rate of sunny days; for wind power, the location should be at 3060° latitude on the west coast of continents with westerly winds; for geothermal power, thelocation should be in a volcanic country; and for biomass, the location should be in an
equatorial region with fast plant growth rate and high precipitation. Thus, it is necessary to
focus on and specialise in renewable energies that are suited to the climatic conditions andcharacteristics of respective regions.
3) As for energy used as a heat source, the use of hydrogen and ammonia, which do not
produce CO2 from combustion, has been proposed and research and development isunderway. The two main options for hydrogen production are "blue hydrogen", which is
produced from fossil fuels such as coal, lignite and natural gas whereby CO2 is buried in
the ground using CCS, and "green hydrogen", which is produced by electrolysation of waterusing electricity generated from renewable energies and nuclear power. For CCS,
geological location constraints and cost issues have been identified, and for the latter,efficiency constraints and cost issues have been identified. Moreover, ammonia is
attracting attention as it can be transported and stored using existing infrastructure and,unlike hydrogen, can be co-fired with fossil fuels without the need to use energy to extract
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■69hydrogen from organic hydrogen carriers. Furthermore, a method for reacting recovered
CO2 with hydrogen to produce synthetic methane by methanation has been proposed.
4) With regard to nuclear energy, not all countries have positive views on the construction of
new nuclear power plants due to related social circumstances. However, research anddevelopment on new reactors with improved safety is underway in some countries, andmany believe that the role of nuclear energy cannot be ignored at least for a certain portionof power supply. In addition, many countries pursuing carbon neutrality believe that itshould not be ruled out as a viable option at this point.
On the basis of the above views, the future global energy supply structure is equivalent tofinding a solution that satisfies the following five equations.
(1) Ensuring the required amount of energy supply(Esustainable + Estorage) + Efossil + Enuclear > Demandpeak * Ks(p)(where Ks is safety factor (margin))(2) Minimisation and net-zeroing of energy-derived CO2 (carbon neutrality)
CO2fossil ≦ CO2ccs/ccus + CO2absorption(where CO2ccs/ccus is the amount anthropogenic absorption by CCS/CCUS,
and CO2absorption is absorption by oceans, forests, coral reefs, etc.)(3) Equation for maximisation of security for energy supply∫Rfossil・Dfossil dt +∫Rhyrogen・Dhydrogen dt+∫Rrenewable・Drenewable dt +∫Rnuclear・Dnuclear dt ≦ LGDP
(where R is the supply risk function, D is the disruption damage function, dt isthe time integral, and L is the maximum economic loss allowed)(4) Equation for ensuring sufficiency of energy supply
Esupply/Ppopulation ≧ Esufficiency(where Esufficiency is per capita sufficient energy supply)(5) Equation for minimisation of social cost for energy supply
Cenvir + Csecurity + Cinfra + Coperation ≦ B(where Cenvir is environmental cost, Csecurity is the cost of security measures, Cinfra is
the cost of building infrastructure, Coperation is the cost of operating
infrastructure and B is the total benefit of using the new infrastructure)
4.5.2. How can we change the structure of energy demand?
The most important engineering, social and economic challenges with regard to the structureof global energy demand are considered to be as follows.
a)

From an industrial point of view, a major issue is whether or not a new process can be
developed that would enable the energy-intensive steel and chemical industries(followed by ceramics, glass, cement, paper and pulp) to significantly curb fossil fuelconsumption. Iron ore, which is an oxide of iron, is used as raw material for steel, andcarbon (coke) has been used for its reduction because of its superiority as a reducing
agent and its heat value. In Japan, a project called "Course 50", a joint effort between
NEDO and major blast furnace manufacturers, aims to reduce the proportion of direct
reduction of carbon out of three types of reduction reactions (indirect reduction of CO
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■70gas (exothermic reaction), indirect reduction of hydrogen gas (endothermic reaction) anddirect reduction of carbon (very large endothermic reaction), and thereby reduce CO2
emissions by reducing the heat required for the reduction of iron in the blast furnace asa whole. The project’s aim is to reduce CO2 emissions by 30%. In other words, due tothe nature of the reaction, it is extremely difficult to completely replace coke withhydrogen (if hydrogen is the only reducing agent, there would be only an endothermic
reaction that would lower the temperature in the blast furnace and reduce the efficiencyof the reduction process) 4.5.1). This suggests that the conditions for the systems andlocations of the steel industry may change significantly.
In addition, petroleum products are complementary products. The refining andpetrochemical industries produce ethylene and propylene from the lightest naphtha,
which is used as a raw material in the manufacture of various plastics, and distill the lightto heavy components into gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, kerosene, fuel oil, and coal tar,with each product produced for a specific application. To make the industry carbon
neutral in the future, it will be necessary to take into account major changes in the overallmaterial balance of petroleum products and plastics. It should be noted that this will
inevitably lead to a global restructuring of the industry as the global supply and demandbalance for crude oil, petroleum products and plastics is likely to change significantly.
Likewise, the impact of changes in the price structure will also need to be considered.
There is also the question of whether it is possible to create social systems that radicallyreduce the amount of steel and fossil fuel-based plastics used.
In the case of steel, it may be possible to curb the demand for virgin steel and CO2
emissions to a certain extent by using electric furnaces to recycle the steel retained ininfrastructure, but global demand for infrastructure is likely to remain strong, particularly
in developing and emerging countries, and this may not be enough to curb demand.
When it comes to plastics, the question is to what extent it is economically rational toincrease the use of bio-based materials. In addition to these innovations in processes,
we must of course also consider product innovation, i.e. the development of alternative
materials to steel products and plastics. In the case of steel, this presents extremely highhurdles in terms of strength, heat resistance, moldability, cost and availability of raw
materials (iron ore). As for plastics, it is also a difficult task to establish scientific andindustrial systems for materials that do not use carbon (C) as a starting material.
Additionally, we must also address the issue of reducing the power consumption of data
centres. While they have not been considered energy intensive industries thus far, theirpower consumption has increased rapidly in recent years and is expected to continue toincrease in the future. It has also been proposed that carbon recycling could be achievedby adopting CCUS in cement and other industries, but there are many issues that need
to be addressed, such as cost reduction.
b)

Among the means of transport (e.g. cars, aircraft, ships, etc.), particularly for cars, weare moving in the direction of complete conversion to hydrogen or electric power (with acarbon-free power source). It should be noted that the average service life of a car inJapan is about 12-15 years, which means that there are only two renewal cycles before
2050, but other forms of transport are used much longer. Undoubtedly, decarbonisationof the power supply mix is key if electrification is to proceed. In addition, policy
involvement is likely essential for the construction of filling infrastructure (especially forhydrogen). Biomass fuels are also seen as an effective option for aircraft and ships, ashydrogen and electrification have elements that are difficult to achieve technologically.
In Thailand and Indonesia, plans are already advancing on the construction of power
generation infrastructure using biomass-derived fuels and ideas for conversion of jet fuel

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4.3.23). Thus, Japan should strengthen cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia where
the potential of biomass resources is high and commercial mass cultivation is possible,
using the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) to count a certain portion of the CO2
reductions associated with biomass-derived fuels produced and consumed in thesecountries as Japan's CO2 reductions. Furthermore, from a long-term perspective, it isclear that robots, ICT, and AR (Augmented Reality)/VR (Virtual Reality)/ER (Expanded
Reality) will be used in education, employment, commercial facilities, and daily life, as
evidenced by the current COVID-19 pandemic, during which remote working has driven
advances in terms of both hardware and software. The question of how to build new
urban infrastructure based on the premise of minimising physical movement will be key.
c)

The promotion of so-called energy conservation, as Japan experienced after the first oilshock, basically requires the assurance that energy is relatively more expensive thanenergy-using equipment and that energy-efficient equipment is technically feasible andprovided at a price affordable enough to allow for diffusion. The question is whether it ispossible to build an economic system that allows for this and whether investment can beincreased (induced) without compromising the overall performance of the economy.
Given the high proportion of electrification in future demand sectors, progress in power
semiconductors, batteries and capacitors will be crucial. In developing countries, energy
saving in industrial equipment and household appliances is also expected to play an
extremely important role.

d)Moves in these directions would, as a matter of course, require sweeping reforms inurban planning, for cities, factories, schools, housing, shops, hospitals and road
networks, as well as the corresponding infrastructure for the distribution of water, food,energy and information. We will not discuss this in detail here, but it is considered to be
an extremely important factor. However, it is important to note that, particularly in the
consumer sector, there will naturally be an increasing number of lifestyle changes.
Nevertheless, it will also be imperative to respect indigenous cultures (e.g. food,calendars, etc.) and religions (e.g. various events, etc.). The challenge will be toincorporate this diversity into the infrastructure for energy supply and use of the future.

4.5.3. How should energy policy and energy distribution structures be changed?
In light of discussion in 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, the following points on global energy policy andenergy distribution structures may be important.
a) The following principles should be shared internationally and nationally for environmental
and energy policies.
1 To make "minimisation of CO2 emissions" and "achieving energy sufficiency", interms of both supply and consumption of energy, the objective variables of policy,
alongside "ensuring stable supply" and "not restricting economic activity".
2 In order to achieve carbon neutrality globally “not long after 2050”, each country’s
state of progress on carbon neutrality should be assessed by maintaining the current
Paris Agreement's system of periodic pledges and expert reviews of the targets set
by each signatory nation on reduction and control of emissions. This should be further
developed to create a mechanism to promote policy collaboration between countries.
(The current Paris Agreement uses a "pledge and review" approach, which should
be further developed into a "pledge, review and coordination" approach.)
3 The creation of a global coordination and cooperation mechanism to achieve energy
sufficiency targets, especially in developing/emerging countries. (For instance,
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incentives (e.g. priority or preferential treatment in carbon neutral investments in said
developing/emerging countries) could be provided to companies or governments thatcooperate to improve access to energy for the poor while restricting CO2 emissions(emission intensity (p)) in developing/emerging countries within certain limits).
4 Even if efforts are made to the maximum extent possible, it will be extremely difficult
to achieve the carbon-neutral target. Thus, consideration should be given to ensuring
absorption by forests, oceans and coral reefs, and to research and development toenhance the amount of absorption. It is also necessary to devise an international
agreement to count the clear improvements achieved in absorption as reductions in
CO2 emissions.
b) With regard to energy distribution systems, the following points may be important.
1 In order for hydrogen and ammonia to become widely-used fuels of the future, a priceformation mechanism for hydrogen and ammonia and a mechanism to promote
investment in hydrogen and ammonia infrastructure should be established. Also, theform of infrastructure, distribution mechanisms, and price formation mechanisms, aswell as the usability of existing infrastructure and necessary renovation costs would
differ for blue hydrogen, which is suitable for large-scale production in coal and gas
fields and is treated as an internationally traded good, and green hydrogen, which is
produced using renewable energy (electricity) and is often treated as a locallyproduced and locally-consumed good. As such, it is necessary to create investment
promotion measures that are adapted to each of them.
2 The construction of decentralised infrastructure, mainly in areas with low population
density and small cities, as well as the construction of distribution infrastructure thatspans multiple countries. Specifically, this includes (superconducting) power grids(including storage batteries and pumped-storage power plants), and hydrogenpipelines (mainly liquid organic hydrogen or ammonia, from the viewpoint of transport
efficiency, since the density of gas is low). In addition to the development of such
hard infrastructure, international trading rules for electricity, hydrogen and ammonia
should also be established.
3 Establishment of an international mechanism to accurately and to the utmost in realtime ascertain and analyse the “global CO2 balance” (both emissions and sinks) andto share this information.
4.5.4. "CO2 fixation"
Even if the various measures mentioned in sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.3 are promoted, achievingcarbon neutrality globally “not long after 2050" is an extremely challenging task. CO2 fixation
could therefore be a very important technological challenge. While the preservation,
management and regeneration of tropical rainforests and large-scale algal breeding areasand coral reefs is discussed in 4.5., a discussion of CCS/CCUS follows.
At present, the only business model for CCS/CCUS seems to be enhanced oil recovery(EOR) based on re-injection into reservoirs to increase oil sales, so a new business model isessential. If carbon pricing is implemented in some way, there is great potential for new
business models to emerge, but at the same time, the system needs to be designed so thatcarbon pricing does not become a disruptive factor in the global energy market. In addition,
the geological location of CCS is a major constraint (large back-slope structure andimpermeable caprock are necessary), and therefore, from an international perspective, it isnecessary to study the technical issues for the coordinated use of CCS/CCUS facilities in
multiple countries, as well as the price formation mechanism and stable trading rules for CO2
burial and commissioning. It is also considered necessary to establish a CO2 trading market
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■73with a mechanism and stable trading rules. In addition, it will be necessary to establish rules
for trading of CCS/CCUS use rights and trading of credits for CO2 burial (this also applies toabsorption by tropical rainforests, large algal blooms and coral reefs).
4.5.5. The overall engineering challenge
While individual challenges are presented above, the combination of these elements
presents the following critical issues (challenges) for engineering that we will face in thecreation of a truly sustainable society.
1) In order to achieve carbon neutrality, it is necessary to create compound infrastructure
based on a variety of technologies, taking into account not only energy supply, demandand distribution, but also water, transportation, urban planning, ICT, and waste
management. In addition, since the optimal scale for each of these differs, the questionof “how to create the optimal solution for social infrastructure that is complex
superimposed infrastructure of various types and different sizes and with different timescales in technological development” cannot be answered by the "aggregation ofindividual optimal solutions" as has been done in the past. Therefore, it is necessary forengineering to take on a leadership role and present pathways to form an appropriate
consensus in cooperation with policy authorities, industry and citizens.
2) There is a critical shortage of human resources in Japan's current academic and research
institutions that are needed to achieve these goals. It is therefore important tofundamentally strengthen research in these fields at universities and public research
institutions, both qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, the establishment ofgraduate level education and research institutions to study this field could be one way of
doing this. For this purpose, and from the perspective of contributing to both Japan andthe rest of the world, social institutions should be adjusted so that a large number ofoutstanding young people, especially from developing/emerging countries, are brought
into Japan and can play an active role in the country even after graduation. It may benecessary to teach science and engineering subjects at the university undergraduatelevel completely in English.
3) In addition, given that the biggest barriers to the social implementation of newtechnologies in the energy sector are "scaling up" and "cost", it is essential to have asystem that allows not only so-called lab-based R&D, but also the expansion oftechnologies on discontinuous scales - bench scale, pilot scale and real plants. Likewise,
it goes without saying that it is essential to have policies to reduce risks. In this regard,
input from engineering should be provided.
(Note) Naturally, the closer we get to the social implementation phase, the more the cost
components will vary greatly according to country, location and market conditions. For
example, in the case of photovoltaic power, the price of solar cells has fallen significantlyin the last 30 years, and related peripheral equipment has also become cheaper in the last
decade or so. Thus, the two biggest factors in the spread of the technology in Japan areland prices and the FIT (Feed-in Tariff) purchase price (long-term predictability of the price).
4) In addition, considering that Japan's problem for the past 20 years has been that "thetechnology exists, but investment has not progressed", it is important to establish afinancial mechanism to promote investment in the social implementation of newtechnologies in these fields in line with the rest of the world. In addition, we must consider
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incentives such as the application of FIT to power generation using alternatives to existingfossil fuels, such as green hydrogen, biomass fuels, and synthetic methane frommethanation, as a way to induce private investment. Engineering input should also be
provided in the design of such a system.
5) Furthermore, the major responsibility of the engineering community is to evaluate thetechnology readiness and appropriateness for investment without uneven distribution
among each specialised field considering the various technological options that havebeen proposed toward achieving carbon neutrality, with many options still expected to be
developed in the future, and to present these to the society both internationally anddomestically. In particular, it should be noted that guidance for appropriate future
investment will not be possible without clarification of such issues as scalability, thepotential for diffusion in terms of cost, other location constraints, the social institutions
required for diffusion and the burden on society that this will bring. It will be important forexperts to discuss these issues at the aforementioned FICNES and to present certain
views.
4.6. Supplementary note: treatment of nuclear energy
The treatment of nuclear energy is controversial both domestically and internationally. The
main point of contention is safety. The Engineering Academy of Japan has opted to discussand mention nuclear energy in this report according to the following policy.
[Policy 1] It is a fact that nuclear power is an energy source with extremely low CO2 emissions
throughout its value chain. Apart from the pros and cons, it is appropriate for theEngineering Academy of Japan to engage neutrally in discussion from the perspective ofpresenting options for the future from the standpoint of engineers.
[Policy 2] In particular, measures proposed by national governments and institutions such as
the IEA towards achieving carbon neutrality are dependent on the development of various
technologies that have not yet been implemented in society on a sufficient scale and at an
economically acceptable level, such as the use of hydrogen as a fuel, the use of
CCS/CCUS technology for the treatment and use of CO2, and the use of high-performancebatteries to expand the capacity of the power grid. As such, it is not appropriate to narrow
down the options.
[Policy 3] In addition, we are not in a position to simply promote the resumption of operationof existing nuclear power plants or the construction of new nuclear power plants based on
the current state of nuclear technology. In order to operate nuclear power safely (especiallyin a country like Japan, where the risk of natural disasters such as earthquakes andtsunamis is high), new technologies that have not yet materialised are necessary, as is thedevelopment of technologies for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and decommissioning(These technologies will be necessary even if nuclear power is not used in the future.). The
development and commercialisation of these technologies will require measures topromote them on a national scale.
[Policy 4] The choice of nuclear energy as an option for future energy supply should also be
a decision for future generations of citizens and policymakers to make in the context ofinternational cooperation.

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4.7. "Policy Framework Roadmap" and "Technology Roadmap”
Two types of roadmaps will be prepared for 1) achieving carbon neutrality on a global basis,including both developed countries and developing and emerging countries, “not long after
2050”, and 2) energy sufficiency in all regions of the world “as soon as possible before 2050",
according to the following policies. First, since the readiness of individual technologies is not
yet clear, as mentioned above, we are not yet at the stage of narrowing down technology
options. Therefore, a "Policy Framework Roadmap" including four elements, namely "Policy
and International Cooperation", "Human Resources Development", "Technology Assessment
Systems" and "Investment Guidance Schemes", will be developed. In addition, the“Technology Roadmap” will be developed to indicate the timescales and the broad directionof the issues.
4.7.1. "Policy Framework Roadmap"
The four elements to be incorporated in the Policy Framework Roadmap are as follows.
1) Firstly, in terms of policy and international cooperation, the aforementioned Forum forInternational Carbon Neutrality and Energy Sufficiency (FICNES) needs to be establishedby the early 2020s to discuss not only energy and environmental policies, but also
industrial, agricultural, food, urban, transportation and technological policies. At the sametime, it is necessary for Japan to begin policy dialogue and implementation of cooperationand investment inducement measures with the "particularly important target nations forcooperation" (India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Philippines and Vietnam), and the“important target nations for cooperation” (Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Bangladesh, Tanzania and Kenya) from the perspective of pursuing simultaneous
realisation of carbon neutrality and energy sufficiency.
2) Secondly, in terms of human resource development, current human resource development
measures, such as the ABE Initiative, should be fundamentally strengthened, and about
30,000 human resources in science and technology innovation should be welcomed fromdeveloping countries and emerging countries every year. Support must be provided fortheir research activities at graduate schools and national research and development
institutes, as well as for any subsequent entrepreneurial and social activities. Naturally, it
is also necessary to strengthen support for young Japanese researchers andentrepreneurs in a broad range of fields concerned with carbon neutrality. To facilitate thestable development of such human resources, the establishment of education andresearch at the postgraduate level, the creation of funds by the public and private sectors,
and the development of residential facilities around the country are also important issues.
3) Thirdly, in terms of a system for evaluating technology, a forum for evaluating technology
readiness should be formed within FICNES. Within this forum, the maturity of various
technologies for achieving carbon neutrality would be assessed based on data frompapers, patents, press releases, etc., and this information would be disseminated andshared with the world. This forum would be significant for attracting private investment on
an appropriate scale and in an appropriate direction. The forum should also be launchedat the same time as the establishment of FICNES in the early 2020s.
4) Fourthly, with regard to an investment inducement scheme, alongside the abovementioned system for evaluating technology, a mechanism should be established to share
information on availability of various public and private funds and information on themarginal cost of CO2 emission reduction by each technology. In this case, it is likely that
information would be focused only on pre-competitive stages due to the relationship with
anti-trust laws. But, it should be recognised that in some cases it may be necessary toconsider including international treaties and legislative measures within each country.
These are summarised in the roadmap shown in Figure 4.7.1.
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■76Figure 4.7.1 Global Carbon Neutral/Energy Sufficiency "Policy Framework Roadmap"
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4.7.2. "Technology Roadmap”
The "Technology Roadmap" that can be presented at this time is shown in Figure 4.7.2,
organised into the four areas of "energy supply", "energy consumption", "energy distribution",and "CO2 fixation". Essentially, the technology roadmap should be created considering thecurrent level of technology and future trends, matching the technologies that will likely beneeded at certain points to achieve certain targets and the R&D elements that will be required
to bring the technology from its current level to the future. From this point of view, what isshown in Figure 4.7.2 is still an insufficient technology roadmap. It will be necessary toperiodically update this roadmap to be realistic and achieve carbon neutrality and energy
efficiency, through the aforementioned FICNES forum and by bringing together the wisdomof those involved in industry, academia and government. In addition, it should be noted that
the Policy Framework Roadmap and Technology Roadmap should always be discussed asa "pair" going forward.
The International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) can be referred to as
an example of how to clarify priority areas for investment of human and financial resources.
It will be important to identify (1) areas expected to be feasible if left up to the market, (2)areas expected to be feasible based on joint initiatives between companies and research
institutes and private funding, and (3) areas that require large-scale investments and a major
framework for cooperation by governments and international organisations.
(Note) In the ITRS, the required specifications of semiconductor technology (mainly thetechnical issues associated with the miniaturisation of Si-CMOS semiconductors) at thetime of formulation and up to 15 years later were clearly indicated. They were divided bycolor, with white (no colour) = "a manufacturable solution exists that is being optimised",yellow = "a manufacturable solution is known", and "red" = "there are no known
manufacturable solutions”. The "red" was called the "red brick wall" to attract the interestof leading researchers at universities, as well as to attract government funding.
It should be pointed out that both "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches are crucial to theissues of carbon neutrality and energy sufficiency. Setting big "top-down" goals and principles
are indeed indispensable to achieving carbon neutrality, which entails major social reforms.
However, if the concrete methods, such as technology and investment, required to realise
the big goals and principles are unrealistic, then there is a risk that sceptical forces will try torender them ineffectual. From the point of view of engineers, a two-way approach is essential,
keeping in mind the major goals and principles, while at the same time promoting a "bottomup" discussion on how to move the world towards them while confirming that they are indeed
realistic.

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■78Figure 4.7.2 Global Carbon Neutral/Energy Sufficiency " Technology Roadmap "The Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

■79
4.8. Towards realisation of a "Energy = Food = Water" NEXUS
The relationships between energy, food and water have synergies and trade-offs, making it
essential to add in the elements of economy & industry and environment to consider all fiveelements together. Accordingly, the following diagram has been set up as a model for
consideration. For all five elements, there are ten different relationships existing between
elements, as shown below.

Figure 4.8.1 Pentagonal relationship diagram including ‘Economy & Industry’ and‘Environment’ in addition to ‘Energy’, ‘Food’, ‘Water’Representative examples of the ten relationships shown in the above diagram are as follows.
1) Thermal power generation requires water (steam) to drive turbines, and desalinationand transport also require energy.
2) A large amount of water is required for grain cultivation, making trade in agricultural
products indirectly equivalent to trade in water.
3) Environmental protection of farmland is necessary for food supply, and theunplanned cultivation of agricultural land and excessive use of agricultural chemicals
leads to environmental degradation.
4) The risk of environmental pollution increases with economic development, but the
primacy of environmental protection retards economic activity.
5) A stable energy supply promotes economic activity, but economic development
further increases the demand for energy.
6) Energy is needed to grow and transport food, while biofuel crops lead to energy
production.
7) A good environment allows for a continuous and stable supply of water, but a goodenvironment can also be maintained by the proper treatment of waste water.
8) A stable food supply promotes economic activity, and economic development
amplifies the demand for and distribution amount of food.
9) Burning of fossil fuels leads to global warming, while environmental pollution makes
it socially difficult to secure underground resources.
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■8010) Plentiful industrial water promotes economic development, but economic
development increases the demand for and distribution amount of water.
It will also be necessary to develop numerical models for quantitative analysis of thesynergies and trade-offs between elements in the future. As a starting point, snapshot
evaluations of the current situation for each of the five elements are shown in Figure 4.8.2
and Figure 4.8.3. Figure 4.8.2 was created to assess the sufficiency of energy, water, food,economy & industry and environment for individuals, while Figure 4.8.3 was created toassess them on a national basis. Naturally, the more balanced the pentagon is and the larger
its area, the more desirable the situation is for both the individual and the country. Goingforward, the dynamic situations of these elements must be analysed to further optimise them.
The static assessments for water and food that have emerged from the study so far are as
follows.
First for water, according to Oki and Kanae (2006), on a macro level, a sufficient supply ofwater is available, even after taking into account population growth and economic
development in the 21st century. However, based on Oki’s (2012) assertions that available
fresh water resources are unevenly distributed in space and time, and that water
infrastructure is not in place to transport water over long distances from water-rich to poor
areas or to store water during relatively abundant seasons for use during dry seasons, there
will be countries without sufficient water according to region and seasons. The world's
population grew by five billion people from about 2.5 billion in the 70 years between the mid20th century (1950) and the present, and it will grow at most by another four billion people
over the next 80 years to reach the predicted population size of about nine to eleven billion
by the end of the century. Thus, the macro increase in water demand will be "slower" than in
the past. The water challenge, then, is not so much a quantitative issue, rather is contingent
on whether investments can be made to facilitate the development, maintenance andoperation of regional water storage and conveyance infrastructure (which could be achallenge not only for developing countries but also for more mature and developed countries
with declining populations). On the qualitative side, it comes down to whether it is possible toimprove social systems to provide water that is safe from the perspectives of sanitation andenvironment.
In terms of food, FAO estimated that in 2019, 690 million people around the world (about
8.9% of the world's population) would be undernourished due to conflicts and increased
droughts and floods caused by climate change, as well as the negative impacts of economic
downturn on the poor. In Africa, about 250 million people, or 19.1% of the population, areestimated to be in a state of starvation. FAO predicted in 2012 that the number ofundernourished people averaging less than 2,000 kcal per day would be completely
eliminated by 2030, as low-income countries were expected to experience rapid economic
development. Meanwhile, concerns have grown over impacts on agricultural production ofworsening regional conflicts and increasing natural disasters due to climate change. A reportpublished by FAO in 2020 predicted that more than 800 million people will still be
undernourished in 2030. Thus, when looking at food supply, it is not always possible to talk
only about the quantitative aspects from a macro perspective, as there are significant impacts
due to economies at the local level, agricultural land, climate and natural environment, andthe adaptability of technology. Moreover, on the demand side, in addition to cultural traditions
rooted in the region, it is necessary to take into account changes related to food culture, suchas changes in lifestyles, health maintenance and the promotion of environmentally friendly
diets.
The following is an example of the interrelationship between water and food. According to
Oki et al. (2017), it is estimated that about 70% of the world's water intake and about 90% of
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■81
water consumption is for agricultural use. Because the unit cost of water is low, rather thantransporting water for agricultural production, production takes place where water is available
and agricultural products are transported in highly active “virtual water trade”. Water is usedin large quantities to grow cereals, and cereals are used in large quantities to produce meat.
Meat production is also environmentally damaging in other ways, which is why the European
EAT-Lancet Commission has called for a halving of meat and sugar consumption and adoubling of vegetable, fruit, nut and legume consumption in a bid to reform sustainable foodproduction and healthy diets.
In this case, if the water consumption for meat production (in the form of cereal production)
could be reduced from the point of view of sustainability, the water availability in the said area
would increase. On the other hand, the decline in the meat production industry would require
an alternative industry to ensure the income of the people. In the simplest case, land could
be reallocated from cereal and meat production to the cultivation of vegetables, fruit, nuts
and legumes, but in practice a number of factors would need to be considered.
Figure 4.8.2 and Figure 4.8.3 show the pentagonal relationships for individual and national
assessments, based on currently available data. Roughly speaking, the closer the individual
ratings are to a large equilateral pentagon, the more balanced and abundant the situation.
Further research is needed on elaboration of the index and the assessment approach.

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■82FactorIndicator

Unit

SourceENERGY

Total energy supply (TES)/population

TES per capita

IEA2018

WATER

Total renewable water resources per
capitam3/year per
capitaGlobal Note

FAO

Total renewable water resources=internal water resources+external water resources
・Internal water resources: Surface water and groundwater generated within a country through rain
・External water resources: Part of a country’s renewable water resources that has been generated in a given
year in upstream countries (surface water and groundwater)

FOOD

Average daily dietary energy
consumption per capita

kcal

Honkawa Data
TribuneFAO

Daily food supply per capita in terms of calories.
Global average: 2,790 kcal; Average for developing nations: 2,120 kcal; Average for industrialized countries:
3,430 kcal

ECONOMYReal GDP per capita

US$

Global Note

IMF2019

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Measure of a country’s wealth and living standards

ENVIRONMENT

Environmental Performance Index
(EPI)

YCELP

The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is an environmental index developed through joint research
between Yale University and Columbia University.
In addition to the quality of each country’s environment, it reflects their environmental improvement efforts,
environmental policy implementation outcomes and other factors. Assessments are made from the perspectivesof environmental health and ecosystem vitality on a scale of 0 to 100 points to determine the index. (Factors
considered: Environmental health; air quality; water resource management; biodiversity; agriculture, forestry andfisheries; climate change, etc.)

pts

Global Note

Final source

Details

Total energy supply (TES) is the total amount of primary energy supplied, and it indicates how much primaryenergy is supplied for economic and living activities within a country.
Total energy supply= (primary energy produced) + (primary energy imported)- (primary energy exported)(international maritime bunkers)- (international aviation bunkers) ± (stock changes)

Figure 4.8.2 Pentagonal relationship diagrams by country on individual sufficiency of ‘Energy’,‘Food’, ‘Water’, ‘Economy & Industry’ and ‘Environment’
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■83FactorIndicator

Unit

SourceFinal source

説明

Overall energy self-sufficiency is the percentage of the primary energy required for a country’s living andeconomic activities that can be met by domestic energy production in a given year. It tends to be higher forcountries rich in natural resources and lower if they are poor in natural resources, even for industrializedcountries.
Overall energy self-sufficiency (%) =energy produced domestically/primary energy supplied x 100

ENERGY

Overall energy self-sufficiency％

IEA2018

WATER

Total renewable water resources

km3/year

Global note

FAO

Total renewable water resources=internal water resources + external water resources
・Internal water resources: Surface water and groundwater generated within a country through rain
・External water resources: Part of a country’s renewable water resources that has been generated in upstream
countries (surface water and groundwater)

FOOD

Grain self-sufficiency rate%

Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and
Fisheries, 2020

FAO

Self-sufficiency of all grains including animal feed.
The weight-based percentage of the domestic consumption of grains (rice, wheat, barley, naked barley, corn,
etc. including that for animal feed) that is met by domestic production. This indicator is the most widely usedaround the world.

ECONOMYReal GDP/per capita

US$

Global Note

IMF2019

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita ：measure of a country’s wealth and living standards

YCELP

The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is an environmental index developed through joint research
between Yale University and Columbia University.
In addition to the quality of each country’s environment, it reflects their environmental improvement efforts,
environmental policy implementation outcomes and other factors. Assessments are made from the perspectivesof environmental health and ecosystem vitality on a scale of 0 to 100 points to determine the index. (Factors
considered: Environmental health; air quality; water resource management; biodiversity; agriculture, forestry,
and fisheries; climate change, etc.)

ENVIRONMENT

Environmental Performance Index
(EPI)

pts

Global Note

Figure 4.8.3 Pentagonal relationship diagrams of country-based sufficiency of ‘Energy’,‘Food’, ‘Water’, ‘Economy & Industry’ and ‘Environment’
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■84
References
4.1[4.1.1] IPCC Working Group I contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2021 The
Physical Science Basis”,(https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pd
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Sustainability – 3rd Report Prepared by the World in 2050 Initiatives”, pp.35-36,(http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/16533/1/TWI2050-web-2.pdf)[4.2.6] IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis), “Innovation for
Sustainability – 3rd Report Prepared by the World in 2050 Initiatives”, pp.36-37,(http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/16533/1/TWI2050-web-2.pdf)
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Change”, (https://www.oecd.org/env/cc/49082173.pdf)[4.3.2] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Outlook 2019
(IEO2019)”, (https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/ieo2019.pdf)[4.3.3] IEA, “Net Zero by 2050 A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector”,(https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050)[4.3.4] Climate Action Tracker, “CAT Emission Gap”,(https://climateactiontracker.org/global/cat-emissionsgaps/#:~:text=The%20benchmark%20emissions%20from%20a%201.5%C2%B
0C%20compatible%20pathway,gap%20of%2020%E2%80%9323%20GtCO%20
2%20e%20in%202030)[4.3.5] An official EU website, “2030 Climate Target Plan”,(https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eu-climate-action/2030_ctp_en)[4.3.6] An official EU website, “2030 Climate & Energy Framework”,(https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en)[4.3.7] Vanessa Havard-Williams, Jon Tan, “Inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in
EU taxonomy?”,(https://sustainablefutures.linklaters.com/post/102h2j8/inclusion-of-nuclear-andnatural-gas-in-eu-taxonomy-next-steps)[4.3.8] Clifford Chance, “ESG: European Commission Finalises Taxonomy“TECHNICAL SCREENING CRITERIA” for Climate Mitigation and Adaptation”(May 2021), (https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2021/05/esg--europeancommission-finalises-taxonomy--technical-screening.html)[4.3.9] Eurostat website, “Renewable Energy Statistics”(Dec. 2020),(https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsThe Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

■85
explained/index.php?title=Renewable_energy_statistics#:~:text=In%202019%2
C%20renewable%20energy%20represented%2019.7%20%25%20of,sources%
2C%202019.%20%28%25%20of%20gross%20final%20energy%20consumptio
n%29)[4.3.10] European Commission, “REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on progress of clean energy
competitiveness”,(https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/default/files/documents/report_on_clean_ener
gy_competitiveness_com_2020_953.pdf)[4.3.11] World Nuclear News “Nuclear stands out for clean hydrogen, says French
parliamentary
Report”, World Nuclear News, (21 May 2021),(https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Nuclear-stands-out-for-cleanhydrogen-says-French)[4.3.12] Clean Energy Wire “What’s new in Germany’s Renewable Energy Act
2021”, (23 Apr. 2021), (https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/whats-newgermanys-renewable-energy-act-2021)[4.3.13] Ministry of the Environment, “Doitsu no Enerugi hennkaku ni kannsuru
doko chosa [Survey of trends in Germany’s energy transformation]”,(http://www.env.go.jp/earth/report/h29-03/h28_ref01_1.pdf)[4.3.14] HM Government “The Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution”,(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at
tachment_data/file/936567/10_POINT_PLAN_BOOKLET.pdf)[4.3.15] Briefing Room “Paris Climate Agreement”Statement and Release （Jan20, 2021）, (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/01/20/paris-climate-agreement/)[4.3.16] America’s Pledge Homepage(https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/)[4.3.17] Website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speechby the Prime Minister to the 203rd Session of the Diet”,(https://japan.kantei.go.jp/99_suga/statement/202010/_00006.html)[4.3.18] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry website, “‘Green Growth
Strategy Through Achieving Carbon Neutrality in 2050’ Formulated”,(https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2020/1225_001.html)[4.3.19] Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, “Prime Minister Suga’s attendance at
the Leaders Summit on Climate”,(https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ic/ch/page6_000548.html)[4.3.20] Cabinet Office website, “Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal
Management and Reform 2021”, (https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizaishimon/kaigi/cabinet/2021/decision0618.html)[4.3.21] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry website, News Release (22October 2021), (https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2021/1022_002.html)[4.3.22] “UN General Assembly: China Commits to Becoming Carbon Neutral by2060”, (https://www.sciencetimes.com/articles/27417/20200923/china-commitsbecoming-carbon-neutral-2060-during-un-general-assembly.htm)[4.3.23] Takaaki Ishii, “Ondanka/kankyo mondai, Chugoku dakega warui noka?
Seisan katagawari no kensho [Is China solely to blame for global warming andother environmental issues? Examining China’s role as the world’s factory]”,
2013, Global Energy Policy Research website,(https://www.gepr.org/contents/20130617-02/)

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■86[4.3.24] Verbal statement by Yuko Yasunaga, one of the authors of this chapter,
who was deputy director-general of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
at the time, on his impression of attending the COP intergovernmental meeting
held in Bonn, Germany in June 2013. “During the week-long meeting, almost no
progress was made up to Thursday, with the developing countries and small
island developing states (G77) repeating their claim: Global warming to date has
undoubtedly been caused by advanced countries, which have continued burning
fossil fuels since the industrial revolution, and those countries are responsible
for emitting most of the accumulated volume of greenhouse gasses. We have
only begun burning fossil fuels in recent years, and we therefore have the rightto use fossil fuels until we reach the level of economic development achieved byadvanced countries”.
[4.3.25] Yuko Hoshino, Taishi Sugiyama, Takahiro Ueno, “CO2 emissions
embodied in trade: International comparison of Japan, China, US and UK” (textin Japanese), Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry website,
2009,(https://criepi.denken.or.jp/hokokusho/pb/reportDetail?reportNoUkCode=Y08028)[4.3.26] JOGMEC website, “Chugoku: Kokka denmo koshi: ‘tanso piku auto, cabon
nyutoraru’ kodo hoshin [State Grid Corporation of China’s ‘carbon peak andcarbon neutrality’ action plan]”, (http://coal.jogmec.go.jp/info/docs/210325_33.html)[4.3.27] Glasgow Climate Pact、(https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop26_auv_2f_cover_decision.pdf)[4.3.28] GNESD Energy Access Knowledge Base “Accelerated Rural
Electrification Programme of Thailand” 、(https://energy-access.gnesd.org/projects/16-accelerated-rural-electrificationprogramme-of-thailand.html)[4.3.29] JETRO, “Tokushu Asia: Asia/Oceania kakkoku no denryoku jijo to seisaku[Focus on Asia: The state of electricity and related policies in Asian and Oceanic
countries]”, May 2015, 4 (in Japanese),(https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/_Reports/01/7e86a725b4b62adf/20150019a.pdf)[4.3.30] JOGMEC website, “Indo no sekitan karyoku hatuden keikaku no doko toippantan yunyu doko chosa [Survey of trends in India’s coal-fired power
generation and fuel coal import]”,（http://www.jogmec.go.jp/content/300355318.pdf）
4.4[4.4.1] United Nations, “World Population Prospects 2019”,(https://population.un.org/wpp/)[4.4.2] IMF, World Economic Outlook 2020,(https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economicoutlook-october-2020)[4.4.3] IEA, World Energy Outlook 2020 Climate change,(https://www.iea.org/topics/climate-change)[4.4.4] Luciana V. Gatti, et al., “Amazonia as a carbon source linked todeforestation and Climate change”, Nature (online, published 14 July 2021),(https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03629-

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6?fbclid=IwAR0p9dzE2BcgUBvFtddKK6SiFiGkEiqrFktwzsAkWxxwzSR5eU3yD
GgrYjs)[4.4.5] Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Center for On-Site
Education and Research, Kyoto University website, “Indonesia Riau shu ni
okeru deitann kasai no tokucho to sono hassei youin no kaimei [Characteristics
of peatland fires in Riau, Indonesia, and the elucidation of factors that triggerthem]”, (https://jisedai.asafas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/fw_report/2851/)
4.5[4.5.1] NEDO website, “Development of Environmental Technology for
Steelmaking Process”,(https://www.nedo.go.jp/english/activities/activities_ZZJP_100050.html)

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■88

5. Smart cities for comfortable and resilient human settlements
5.1. Introduction: Cities are key to achieving well-being through STI
Our solar system came into being 4.6 billion years ago, and life on Earth began 3.8 billion
years ago. Later, photosynthesis by cyanobacterium spread throughout the shallow seas on
the Earth's surface brought oxygen to the atmosphere, and about 500 million years ago,during the Cambrian period, a diverse range of species (mostly Animalia) emerged. The Earthenjoyed the high energy and low entropy photons from the hot solar surface, emitting low
energy and high entropy photons into the cold universe. Organisms have survived in the formof separate heat engines linked to this larger heat engine. Evolution led to mammals, andeventually to humans, who came into being five to seven million years ago. Human history
spans an extremely short period of time, just 0.001% of the total history of life. However, thepresent human species reigns supreme over all species on the planet in terms of total weight,
dominates a tremendous number of domestic animals, and has forced the diversity of thenatural world into an abnormal situation. At the same time, human activity is concentrated incities, and human artefacts are destroying not only urban areas but also natural ecosystems
such as rainforests and boreal forests. This is considered to be the main cause of global
warming and pandemics.
The urbanisation rate was 13% in 1900 (urban population of 220 million), then 29% in 1950
(732 million). It exceeded 50% in 2007, and is expected to reach 60% (4.9 billion) by 2030
(WUP2018). Therefore, the future planning of the cities where populations are concentrated
is key to preserving the entire global ecosystem for the foreseeable future. For example, amyriad of organisms symbiotically coexist in the topsoil of countries like Japan that arelocated in temperate zones, but the mechanisms are not yet fully understood. How to deal
with the unresolved aspects of science will also be a critical issue for the future of science.
Design and planning of optimal cities with the limited scientific and technological resourcesof humankind is both a realistic and unavoidable challenge.
<Note 1> STI: Science, Technology and Innovation
In Japan, the term STI was used in the Fourth Science and Technology Basic Policy(2011) as an abbreviation for Science, Technology and Innovation; the OECD has a
Directorate of Science, Technology and Innovation, and the term has been usedfrequently since the 2000s.
<Note 2> Well-being
Well-being refers to "sustainable, multifaceted happiness". Happiness, on the other hand,
generally refers to “single, short-lived, momentary happiness”. The Japanese word forhappiness may include both meanings, but traditionally, when used in the fields of
medicine, health and welfare, it usually refers to well-being. The right to the pursuit ofhappiness, enshrined in the Japanese Constitution, comes from the French Revolution
and the US Declaration of Independence (Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness),and is still much debated.
5.1.1. Human Security and Well-Being
When the Cold War’s wall between East and West collapsed in 1989, the concept of common
security led to the concept of "human security". 1991 saw the establishment of the Common
Security Forum (CSF) <Note 3>, which contributed to the 1993 Oslo Accords (a settlement
between Palestine and Israel). Then in the 2000s, Japan participated in the CSF as an activity
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■89of the United Nations. Meanwhile, welfare states, which advanced particularly in Northern
Europe in the 1980s, ensured medical care and security for the aged, but at the same time
the need for purpose in life emerged.
Security and safety alone do not necessarily equate to happiness. When the goal of wellbeing is juxtaposed with security, we get the phrase "human security and well-being", anexpression now used frequently by the Engineering Academy of Japan (EAJ). This phrase
better encapsulates the concept of a better life, rather than mere happiness 5.1.1).
<Note 3> The Common Security Forum (CSF) is a coalition of about ten organisations,
including FAFO (Norway), led by the Centre for History and Economics (Director: E.
Rothschild) at the University of Cambridge in the UK. Its UN-related activities since 2000
have been led by Emma Rothschild, Amartya Sen, Sadako Ogata and others.
5.1.2. Why are cities the key to well-being through STI?
More than half the weight of the atmosphere is within six kilometres of the Earth's surface
and is oxygenated by living organisms. Thus, the Earth's biosphere is like a thin film attachedto the Earth's surface. Within this thin film, the only way to make the whole ecosystem
sustainable is to make changes to the human way of life that is currently hindering thediversification of life as a whole. Science, technology and innovation pointed in the right
direction and based on ethics are inevitably required to preserve the global biosphere, where
diversity is vital based on equal human rights.
In addition, by maximising the efficiency of human lifestyles concentrated in certain areas
through urbanisation, from the perspective of energy and entropy <Note 4>, the upper limitof the number of people who can live equally (environmental carrying capacity) is determined.
As energy is also equivalent to the mass of matter, energy is needed to reduce entropy. The
control of entropy also involves information. This implies that ecosystems, encompassing
humanity, should be understood as a world of interwoven matter and information. Particularly
in today's world of increasing material limitations, STI should be utilised with a focus on
information. The numerous sprouts of innovation can grow to substantially contribute to wellbeing if they are rooted in ethics.
<Note 4> The first and second laws of thermodynamics. Energy is consumed when
information is erased.
5.1.3. The new urban structure
We are entering an era in which we must closely examine the multilayered structure ofmaterial and information in urban planning for the future. The transformation of physicalspace, with its long history and the constraints of the surrounding environment as seen in
actual cities and towns, is subject to many limitations. On the other hand, as part of the rapid
development of DX <Note 5>, there is a new trend towards the development of cities with an
added layer of information space on top of the real city. In this sense, the "Multi-AI Networked
City" described in 5.2 of this report (Figures 5.2.5 and 5.2.6) is a realistic proposal 5.1.2). Many
concepts have been discussed in the history of city planning <Note 6>, but the idea by Mr.
Sugiyama of this committee offers a new perspective on harmonising human artifacts andnature in the context of advanced information technology <Note 7>.
<Note 5> DX (Digital Transformation) generally refers the way in which physical space
and information space have become overlapping and structured entities in multidimensional space due to the rapid development of digital devices and systems (ITC/OT,The Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

■90
AI, IoT, etc.). Stolterman et al., Information Technology and the Good Life (2004). In
Information Systems Research, pp 687-692.)<Note 6> Garden Cities (E. Howard), Ville radieuse (Le Corbusier), Metabolism City
(Kisho Kurokawa) and others.
<Note 7> AI (Artificial Intelligence) is a concept that originated with Alan Turing andemerged at a conference at Dartmouth College in 1956. The concepts of digital andanalogue are important to note when dealing with “information”. As in ancient atomic
theory and the Chinese classic Book of Changes, digital and analogue are ways ofseeing things from microscopic and macroscopic perspectives. From a microscopic pointof view, the human being is a digital system whose nervous system, which transmits andcontrols information, is based on the threshold of inter-neuron communication. When we
see things as particles, the so-called “bit” is the elemental unit, but when we see things
as waves, essential differences appear as qubits.
5.1.4. What should people living in cities pass on from generation to generation?
If both civilisation and culture are not passed on from generation to generation, the highest
level of empathy (Sympathy at the top of the empathy hierarchy), which is essential for theorganisation and maintenance of society, cannot be handed down. Civilisation is passed on
through language and skills, but without high-level empathy, which our culture depends on,
human society can neither be formed or maintained.
Here, the issue of the "language" (symbols) acquired by modern human species gives rise
to a profoundly important challenge. The human brain, like that of other animals, has evolved
around physicality. Whether or not the hierarchical structure of the language of modern
humans existed in Neanderthals (who died out tens of thousands of years ago) is now being
studied from genetic analysis of bone marrow fossils.
Language has brought a high degree of sociality to modern humans, but its power is also
giving rise to many of the challenges of our time. This is because language has given modern
humans the ability to think about the future. In other words, it has not just given us the simple
future, but also the intentional future. Language has also created an afterlife. Civilisation has
prospered due to language, but the importance of culture that is not easily expressed throughlanguage has emerged, particularly in recent times. Culture must be passed on fromgeneration to generation. This includes, for example, the arts, a category which cannot beeasily expressed in language, and which is difficult to pass on through intellectual education
alone. This is one of the challenges of the new type of city.
5.1.5. How will pandemics change cities and the people who live in them?
The mechanisms of zoonotic diseases are closely linked to natural ecosystems. The novel
coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 is likely to have been transmitted from bat species to humans. The
same is true for SARS. The Ebola virus was also transmitted from the faeces of a species ofbat to non-human primates, and then to humans. Likewise, the topsoil of tundra, which is now
melting, is alive with tremendous numbers of viruses and bacteria. There are also countless
microorganisms living in a state of equilibrium in tropical and temperate topsoils. It is a mustthat we realise that the equilibrium of the natural world, which science does not yet fully
understand, is falling apart. With the proximity of human and wildlife populations and theincreasing frequency of cross-border movements, zoonotic diseases are likely to increase. In
the context of the development of civilisations, pandemics can be an opportunity to restore
human humility and a strong sense of empathy. As seen in the SDGs, it is important toremember the essence of human existence and to look at the trunk, not the branches.
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■㻥㻝There is an urgent need to create cities that are resilient to new pandemics, including
COVID-19. In order to prevent and quell infection explosions, measures are needed in thecontext of the relations between "freedom and constraint" that guarantee a better quality oflife (human security and well-being).
For subclinical infections, including COVID-19, visualisation of infections is crucial. As
shown in Figure 5.1.1, sewage is structurally suitable for quantitative monitoring of virus
distribution in a fractal structure from individual elements of houses and facilities to the whole
city <Note 8>. It could be a scientific indicator to determine lockdowns, and is likely to benecessary for urban design in the future.
<Note 8> In the case of COVID-19, for example, the SARS-CoV-2 virus is eliminated in
the faeces of infected people from an early stage of infection (not directly linked to
infectious capacity). Thus, the virus and its fragments attached to the surface of sewersolids sediment following initial treatment can be used to test sewage and ascertain thestate of infections, thereby visualising affected areas and enabling efficient PCR testingof the residents 5.1.3), 5.1.4).
5.1.6. The ethics of cities
The most important aspect of cities is the coexistence of the self and others. The importanceof ethics emerges from the need to be considerate of others in order to maintain a sustainable
society. The highly informatised and optimised city will require a comprehensive approach to
becoming an "ethical city", which is likely to increasingly be an issue going forward.
Fractal structure of urban sewage system andidentification of infected areas

Principle of narrowing down COVID-19
infected area by testing sewage
Broad area

SewagesamplePositive
Negative

Narrowed area

PCR testingof residents in
infected area

Sewagetreatment plant

Track back to individual house or
facility (increased testing
efficiency and accuracy)

Figure 5.1.1 Fractal structure for PCR testing of sewage
5.2. A “new local” based on multi-AI in a “new normal” era
5.2.1. Human security and well-being in urban areas
The United Nations Development Programme (1994) 5.2.1) notes that the actors threatening
human security have shifted from catastrophic threats such as war to everyday insecurities
such as work, income, health, environment and crime, also pointing out that these are nolonger limited to individuals, regions or nations, but have become global.
The Independent Commission on Human Security, chaired by Sadako Ogata and AmartyaSen, also noted that human security is a public good, and that nation states and theinternational community need to work together to protect and assist people in vulnerable
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■92situations. Furthermore, in 2012, UN Resolution A/RES/66/290 5.2.2) defined human security
as “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair”. In thiscontext, the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2019 has posed a threat to human security.
Widespread and prolonged lockdowns were implemented in cities around the world, andaccording to the UN, this was the first time since 1998 that poverty increased on a global
scale. The New Urban Agenda (NUA) 2020 shows that living in cities contributes to economic
prosperity, environmental protection and social equality 5.2.3). Therefore, we must urgently
consider how cities can develop sustainably in the face of infectious diseases, in order toensure human security and well-being.
The idea of Koizumi (2015), that it is important in cities not only to ensure human security
but also to consider the well-being of residents, is shown in Figure 5.2.1. Meanwhile, we havelearnt from our experience with COVID-19 to date that prolonged lockdowns have thepotential to adversely affect health, both physically and mentally. Based on these ideas, thisreport proposes a new type of city that allows for sustainable economic development while
ensuring comfort in normal times and decent living standards (DLS) <Note 2> during
outbreaks.
<Note 1> On 26 February 2015, Mr. Hideaki Koizumi, a member of this committee, gave
a lecture at the Japan Economic Research Institute entitled, "Urban Design Concepts
Going Forward in the Creation of Living Spheres and Neuroscience". He presented anurban design concept to achieve human well-being, in which cities pursue optimisationof interwoven material and information to create a future in which people grow up healthy,
grow old healthy, and experience the joy of living.
<Note 2> In order to ensure well-being, DLS requires both the right to receive necessary
goods and services and the opportunity to fulfil one's potential. The former refers toprimary goods such as public services, the surrounding environment, food, clothing andhousing (Rawls 1971) and basic goods (Reinert 2011), while the latter refers to thecapability approach of Nussbaum 2000 and Sen 1987.

Figure 5.2.1 Fractal cities that prioritise humans <Note 1>
5.2.2. Urban challenges for the 21st century
Urbanisation is a global trend, with Japan's urbanisation rate reaching 92% in 2020. As oursociety faces a super-ageing population, a situation we have never experienced before, wetake a look back in time 100 years to find hints about where Japan's cities should be heading.
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In the latter half of the 20th century, many new towns were built in the suburbs of large cities
in developed countries. These were modeled on Ebenezer Howard's vision of garden citiesof early 20th century England. This was part of a social movement to help those who had
suffered from the poor living conditions of inner city London since the Industrial Revolution,and partly to combat the cholera epidemic of the 19th century in Europe 5.2.4). Letchworth,one of the garden cities, had a population of 30,000 in the town centre in an area of 405
hectares, and 2,000 people on agricultural land over an area of 2,025 hectares. The city took
into account the proximity of work and housing, and even supply of food. Howard's vision,
shown in Figure 5.2.2 <Note 1>, was for a network of cities, including Letchworth, to be linked
by rail to form a city sphere. However, the scheme was abandoned after two world wars andonly two cities, and was only realised in the two cities of Letchworth and Welwyn. Even after
100 years, they are still beautiful towns today.

Figure 5.2.2 Ebenezer Howard’s Garden Cities
In 1944, after World War II, the Greater London Plan was formulated, followed by theconstruction of several new towns around London. Unlike civil society’s vision for garden
cities, the government's suburban new towns were actually bedroom communities designed
to reduce overcrowding in central London.
Since the high economic growth period of the 1970s in Japan, a number of bedroom towns
have been developed in urban commuting areas, including the Senri New Town, Tama New
Town and Kozoji New Town. As motorisation progressed in the Tokyo metropolitan area, newtowns and small and medium-sized housing areas were developed, sprawling out into thesuburbs, encroaching on farmland and forest land, as shown in Figure 5.2.3 <Note 2>.

Figure 5.2.3 Expansion of Tokyo metropolitan area to suburbs
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As a result, even today, the Tokyo metropolitan area (including the metropolitan area andthree prefectures) retains the world's largest population of 36.61 million (2019). The averagecommuting time is 80 minutes one-way, roughly double the 38 minutes of Paris, 40 minutes
of New York, and 43 minutes of London 5.2.5).
While the cause of Japan's low productivity may not be entirely due to long commutes, it isalso true that the country's productivity per worker is the lowest of the G7 industrialised
nations 5.2.6). A 2017 study by UK-based insurance company, Vitality Health, Cambridge
University and the RAND Europe research institute also showed that groups who spend
longer hours commuting have higher rates of depression, financial worries and work-related
stress 5.2.7). In addition, the rapid influx of people into Japan's metropolitan areas during thecountry's rapid economic growth led to the development of towns in places unsuitable forhousing that are vulnerable to earthquakes and flooding. In cases where these areas werecreated by clusters of wooden houses, areas vulnerable to fire were also formed.
Teleworking has spread rapidly during the COVID-19 pandemic, creating an opportune time
to make changes in lifestyles formerly premised on retreat from vulnerable city centres andlong-distance commutes. To do this, we need to shift direction to move away from theunipolar concentration of the 20th century to a multipolar, decentralised city suitable for the
21st century.
<Note 1> This diagram was taken from E. Howard's book Garden Cities of Tomorrow, inwhich he proposes cities uniting the advantages of cities (e.g. opportunities,
entertainment, high wages) with those of rural areas (e.g. scenic beauty, fresh air, lowrents).
<Note 2> In uncontrolled sprawl, small pieces of farmland on the outskirts of cities areoften converted into urban areas. These are generally not connected to transport
infrastructure, so residents usually end up leading lifestyles dependent on privatelyowned automobiles.
5.2.3. Role of the “Multi-AI Networked City”
The "Multi-AI Networked City" aims to ensure sustainable human security and bring about
the well-being of inhabitants. This will require responses on carbon neutrality, NEXUS(energy, food, water) and outbreaks (natural disasters and infectious diseases) in the context
of an ageing and declining population. With sustainability and resilience as key words, thefollowing is an explanation of how this city would respond to these challenges.
With regard to the low carbonisation of cities, the Ministry of the Environment's "Towards
Carbon Neutrality in 2050" provides one direction 5.2.8). This is also linked to the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry's "Green Growth Strategy Through Achieving Carbon
Neutrality in 2050" 5.2.9). According to these plans, Japan's total CO2 emissions in 2018 were1.14 billion t-co2, of which the urban sector (commercial, households and transport)
accounted for 27% (310 million t-co2), as shown in Figure 5.2.4. This includes 110 million tco2 in the consumer sector (60 million t-co2 for commercial and 50 million t-co2 forhouseholds) and 200 million t-co2 in the transportation sector.

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■㻥㻡
Other
11%
Commercial/
Residential
10%

Transportation
17%

Electricity-related37%

Industry25%
Figure 5.2.4 Japan’s CO2 emissions by sector
First, we present our estimates for this reduction of 110 million t-co2 in the consumer sector.
According to the Ministry of the Environment's Statistical Survey on CO2 Emissions from theHousehold Sector (Household CO2 Statistics) 5.2.10), the annual emissions (total of electricity,
gas and kerosene) per house hold are 2.72 t-co2. If we assume, for the sake of simplicity,that the energy consumption of all 27 million house holds in the country is supplied byinstallation of solar energy on roofs, we get a reduction of 6% (2.72 t*27 million dwellings =73 million t-co2). We now turn our attention to the 200 million tonnes from transportation. If
we assume for the sake of simplicity that all private cars are replaced by renewable energyEVs, taking into account that the proportion of electric cars is increasing worldwide and thatabout half of the transportation sector's current emissions come from private cars, this would
result in a reduction of 8.5%, about half of the transportation sector (100 million t-co2). Thus,
adding the 6% for the consumer sector and 8.5% for the transportation sector, we estimate
a reduction of 14.5%, about half of the 27% of the urban sector (310 million t-co2).
These estimates show that in order to achieve a 46% reduction in 2030, ahead of carbon
neutrality in 2050, urban sector CO2 emissions will need to switch to local renewable energy
systems, at least in the household sector, and to switch from fossil fuel vehicles to EVs in thetransportation sector. This means the systems for both supply and consumption must bechanged simultaneously <Note 3>.
While the proposed "Multi-AI Networked City" aims to be an energy autonomous city, toachieve carbon neutrality by 2050 it will be necessary to further improve the environmental
performance of the city as a whole, including making buildings more low-carbon. Assessment
systems such as CASBEE (Comprehensive Assessment System for Built Environment
Efficiency) and LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) are in operation in
Japan as tools for assessing the environmental performance of buildings 5.2.11).
With regard to the "resilience" of cities, the Cabinet Office established the 2018 Guidelines
for Assessment of Vulnerability5.2.12). These guidelines list 12 core urban functions(government, police, fire dept., housing, insurance, healthcare, energy, finance, etc.) to be
maintained to cope with natural disasters, and five cross-cutting areas (risk communication,
human resource development, public-private partnerships, measures on deterioration, andresearch and development) to link the 12 functions.
The approach of the above guidelines—to avoid the collapse of the entire city by objectively
assessing its vulnerability—is consistent with the design concept of the "Multi-AI Networked
City", which is a network of multiple living spheres equipped with a minimum of core urban
functions.
Furthermore, in terms of long-term urban resilience, the spongification of city areas due topopulation decline has led to the withdrawal of transportation and lifeline networks. In
response, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism is currently working on
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the re-consolidation of urban areas under the Location Optimization Act, which is discussed
in Section 5.2.6.
<Note 3> Economic recovery from the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemicemphasises sustainable and decarbonised green recovery, recognising thatenvironmental measures are a source of economic growth.
5.2.4. Positioning and objectives of the "Multi-AI Networked City"
With regard to the informatisation of cities and smart cities, the Cabinet Office's "Integrated
Innovation Strategy 2019" designates smart cities as the precursor to realisation of a "Society
5.0". In other words, Society 5.05.2.14), which is a further development of Industry 4.05.2.13), an
example of IoT and AI, aims for a sustainable society where challenges related to regions
and districts are solved and realised together with stakeholders using ICT. Society 5.0 refers
to the potential for people-to-people, people-to-thing, and thing-to thing connections in cyberand physical spaces, noting that these connections will change the relationship between
cities and people, and between AI and people. Specifically, it points out that various
knowledge and information from physical space will be accumulated and visualised incyberspace, creating the potential for new lifestyles, communities and technologies toemerge.
In response, the Cabinet Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry, and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
established the "Smart City Public-Private Partnership Platform", whose members include
companies, universities and research institutes, local governments, and relevant ministries
and agencies, in order to accelerate smart city initiatives through public-private partnerships
5.2.15). In addition, as smart city-related projects, the Office for the Promotion of Regional
Revitalization under the Cabinet Office is promoting the "Future Technology Social
Implementation Projects", the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications' Information
and Communications Bureau is promoting the "Smart City Promotion Project for Facilitating
Data Linkage". Likewise, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's Manufacturing
Industries Bureau is promoting the "Project for Creating and Promoting New MaaS in
Regions”, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism's City Bureau is
promoting the "MLIT Smart City Model Project". These projects are overseen by the Officefor Science, Technology and Innovation Promotion of the Cabinet Office.
The basic function of the proposed "Multi-AI Networked City" is to accurately ascertain thecity’s situation during normal times and during outbreaks, and to visualise this situation using
AI to provide information to stakeholders (e.g. citizens, businesses, government) in an easily
understandable way. We believe that, as a result, each stakeholder would share in the visionand measures for the whole society, and that their actions would be guided to be autonomous,and empathetic.
In the long term, 21st century cities should not only prepare for sudden disasters such as
outbreaks of infectious diseases, which are expected to recur in the future, but also ensure astable supply of food, water and energy, and achieve a high level of decarbonisation, leading
to the human security and well-being that is needed for people in the future. This is precisely
the goal of the “Multi-AI Network Cities”. In this sense, the “Multi-AI Networked City” sharesthe direction of Society 5.0, which aims to create a sustainable society together withstakeholders by using ICT to solve problems related to regions and districts. The “Multi-AI
Networked City” can be positioned as one of the proposals for cities in Society 5.0.

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5.2.5. The “Multi-AI Networked City”: “New local” city spheres in a “new normal” era
Figure 5.2.5 shows the image of a “Multi-AI Networked City”, which forms “new local cityspheres” in a “new normal” era. In this figure, the six circles in the centre are physical living
spheres with a population of 10,000 to 30,000. These living spheres are networked together
to form a new local city sphere that is prepared for outbreaks even in normal times.
The upper part of the diagram is cyberspace, where various layers of information are
overlaid, and in the uppermost part of cyberspace, the information is visualised by AI. The
cyberspace in this diagram shows a situation in which medical care and supplies are broughtin from outside when the central living spheres are in lockdown. The bottom part of the
diagram depicts the local infrastructure, which shows the future transition from the current
wide-area network to a local infrastructure with a high degree of independence for each living
sphere.
The scale of a living sphere (population, area), shown on the right in Figure 5.2.5, is afundamental factor related to sustainability in a lockdown. In this proposal, we assume thatthe population of one living sphere is between 10,000 and 30,000. The rationale for this is,
firstly, that the Interim Report on the “Long-Term Outlook of Japan's National Land” 5.2.16)
points out that the probability of an urban area of 17,500 people being able to maintain life
service industries such as medical care and welfare under a declining population is 50%, andthat this is the limit for population. Secondly, calculations assumed a walkable urban areawith a two-kilometre diameter and a population density of 50-100 people per hectare, making
the population approximately 15,000-30,000. Accordingly, the population size of the citysphere unit is therefore assumed to be approximately 100,000-180,000 (15,000-30,000
person living spheres)*(6 living spheres).

Enhance medical care

SchoolMarketNursery

Housing

Hospital

StationCar-sharing depot

Enhance logistics
Partial lockdown

Heat map

Change in simulation
conditions

AI simulation

Values layer
Medical care layer
Outbreak layer
Transportation/logistics
layer
Energy layer

Lockdown

New local real city sphere

New local infrastructure

Infrastructure
maintenance andmanagement(on long-term andphysical basis)

Multi-AI Networked CIty

Park

Living sphere（circle is approx. 1 km in diameter）

Figure 5.2.5 The Multi-AI Networked City (left) and image of a 15,000-30,000 person living
sphere (right)
Using “The 15-minute city: How close is Chicago?” 5.2.17) as an example of the facilities
needed for living spheres, those needed for a 15-minute city in Chicago are: 1. grocery stores,
2. parks, 3. libraries, 4. elementary and middle schools, 5. hospitals and urgent care facilities,

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6. pharmacies, and 7. public railway stations. These are largely consistent with the image ofthe living spheres inFigure 5.2.5 on the right.
In this way, a "Multi-AI Networked City" is able to sustain a comfortable lifestyle using theseurban facilities during normal times, while at the same time is able to continuously provide
the necessary human resources, supplies and sharing of information, even when the living
sphere units are locked down during an outbreak. This requires the AI deployed in the living
spheres to monitor both the spread of infections and the well-being of the people living in thearea in real time. The decision to initiate or terminate lockdowns would ultimately be
determined and controlled by humans at the individual living sphere level, based on
information provided by AI and its analysis and predictions.
Figure 5.2.6 shows a comparison of infection rates of a unipolar concentrated city and amultipolar decentralised city patterned under the same conditions (infection rate of 0.05). For
the unipolar concentrated city in the upper row (N=20, L=18), 13 out of 20 living spheres are
infected at time T=20, while in the multipolar decentralised city in the lower row (N=20, L=20),
infections spread to only 4 of 20 living spheres for the same time. The same trend is observed
at T=40. These patterns of transmission suggest that the spread of infection takes more timein a multipolar decentralised city, making its structure more suited to partial lockdowns.
However, from a different perspective, this means that the speed of face-to-face informationtransmission in the multipolar decentralised city is inferior to that in the unipolar concentrated
city. For this reason, the "Multi-AI Networked City" can compensate for this weakness in
multipolar decentralised cities by using AI networks.
Unipolar concentrated city
(N=20, L=18)

Multipolar decentralised city
(N=20, L=20)

Cumulative number of infected living spheres

Figure 5.2.6 Infection patterns in unipolar concentrated city (top row) and multipolar
decentralised city (bottom row)
Regarding the actual characteristics of outbreaks of COVID-19 infections, Yoneoka et al.
conducted a questionnaire in Tokyo from March to April 2020 using the LINE app, andplotted the postal code areas of respondents with symptoms of both a) body temperature
over 37.5°C and b) breathlessness or rapid breathing, shown in Figure 5.2.7. The results
show that although there were some problems with the questionnaire, such as a bias in theage range of respondents, it is possible to obtain real-time information on the status of
infections over a wide and detailed area.
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■99Figure 5.2.7 Infection survey by LINE questionnaire
図 3.2.7
ラインアンケートによる感染調査
Figure 5.2.8 also shows the risk map of pre-vaccine COVID-19 infections in Tel Aviv in
March 2020, prepared by an Israeli company 5.2.19). This map shows the risk of infection forbuilding units, based on a survey of the travel routes of infected people. It shows that in thecity centre (6 km long and 10 km wide), infections tend to spread in clusters rather than at an
average speed. The "Multi-AI Networked City" control system for partial lockdowns by living
spheres would be suitable for such clustered infection patterns.

Figure 5.2.8 Infection risk in Tel Aviv city centre (6 km long by 10 km wide)

図 3.2.8 テルアビブ都心の感染リスク

Of course, a simple（縦comparison
cannotbe made between the Tokyo metropolitan area
6km*横
10km）
(population of 36.61 million in one metropolitan area and three prefectures) and Tel Aviv
(metropolitan population of 2.6 million) due to differing numbers of commuters and travel
distances. Yet, publicly available infection heat maps for several cities in the US show that
infections in urban areas spread in clusters, similar to Tel Aviv 5.2.20).
Particularly in situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic, where virus variants are emerging
one after another, it is assumed that we will have to rely on lockdowns for the time being, as
it will take time for new vaccines to be introduced into treatment. In this case, measures toquickly identify the source of an outbreak and contain it as early as possible would be effective
in an urban structure where infection is easier to control.

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5.2.6. Ageing population and population decline over the long-term
Next, we will discuss how Multi-AI Networked Cities should prepare for the long-term
challenges of an ageing and declining population.
According to the Interim Report on “Long-Term Perspective of Japan's National Land” 5.2.21)
by the Planning Promotion Committee of the National Land Council, Japan's total population
peaked at 128.08 million in 2008, and will decline to roughly 100 million by 2050, about thesame level as 1970. By age group, between 2015 and 2050, the working-age population in
Japan will decrease by 24.53 million, while the elderly population will increase by 4.54 million,
with the ageing rate rising from about 27% to about 38%.
Although the data precedes COVID-19, the total population of the three major metropolitan
areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya will decrease from approximately 60 million in 2015 to
50 million in 2050, while the population of all other areas will decrease from approximately
67 million in 2015 to 50 million in 2050. The Overview (edition1) of the Grand Design 2050
predicts the following more detailed picture of the situation in 2050 5.2.22).
(1) Rapid population decline, declining birth rate and ageing population•
The population of Japan in 2050 will decrease to about 97 million.
•
The population of about 60% of regions will decrease to less than half, and onethird of regions will become uninhabited.
•
An elderly population of around 40%, which no other country has ever experienced.
(2) Progression of globalisation•
Intensifying competition between countries and cities.
•
The geopolitical positioning will change greatly due to Eurasian dynamism.
•
The opening of the Arctic Ocean route and the re-expansion of the Panama Canal.
(3) Impending major disasters and ageing infrastructure•
The impending occurrence of an earthquake directly beneath the Tokyo
metropolitan area and a major earthquake in the Nankai Trough (70% probability ofoccurrence within 30 years).
•
Climate change will lead to more severe disasters.
•
More pronounced deterioration of infrastructure that was intensively developed
during period of rapid economic growth.
(4) Food, water and energy constraints and global environmental problems•
Expanding demands in food and energy, due to increasing population, theproduction and consumption will be a global challenge.
•
Imminent global warming and biodiversity crises.
(5) Dramatic advances in ICT and technological innovation•
A rapid increase in computers and their processing power will be necessary.
•
The widespread use of big data will spur the fusion of knowledge space and real
space.
The Spatial Reorganisation and Prosperity Creation Project 5.2.23) is being advance torespond to the so-called spongification of urban areas, where unused land is randomly
generated in the context of the situation described in (1) above, shown in Figure 5.2.9. Here,
we show an example of land use based on this project, where land use for EV sharing andurban agriculture is added. This example proposes the conversion of vacant land caused byspongification into bases for automated EVs (with solar power generation on the roofs) andurban agriculture, which are expected to increase in the future. This is designed tocompensate for the weaknesses of the Location Normalization Plan, which requires morethan 20 years to reorganise urban areas, in order to maintain the functioning of urban areas
by using vacant land without delay, rather than leaving it empty during a project.
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■㻝㻜㻝Automated EVs+ solar
power generation

Urban agriculture

Advancedspongification of cities

Area coveredby agreement
Parking

Vacantland●Street lamps,
benches, plantings,
etc.

Visitor parking

●
●
●
●

Meeting
hall

Maintenance andmanagement in line with
community needs

Vacantland

Vacantland

Vacant Vacant
land
land
Vacant Vacant
land
land

●
●
●
●

Restaurant serving
vegetable dishes

Vacantland

Before: Dotted withvacant houses

Produce standAfter: Processing and sale of produce fromurban agriculture; MaaS base

Reference：Toshi no sponjika taisaku (teimiriyo tochi kenri settei to sokushin keikaku/ritchi yudo sokushin shisetu kyotei) katsuyo sutadishu [Addressing urban spongification (plan for
promoting the establishment of rights, etc. to underused or unused land; Agreements to promote establishment of facilities], partially altered.

Figure 5.2.9 Conversion of spongified urban areas into urban agriculture, processing andsale produce, and MaaS bases
In response to population decline and spongification, MONET Technologies, a company
funded by Toyota Motor Corporation and Softbank, announced that it is working withgovernment and private retailers such as supermarkets to launch "Autono-MaaS", anautomated shuttle service combined with Maas (Mobility as a Service), in 2021. This is aparcel pick-up, delivery and shop pick-up and drop-off service that will support the creationof communities where people can continue to live, as well as shopping for the child-rearing
generation and the elderly. A demonstration project has started in Saijo City, Hiroshima
Prefecture.
Delta and Idemitsu Kosan have also announced that they will open an experimental Delta
EV Charging Station in August 2021 to roll out a new combined service model for EV charging
called Park&Charge. During the 30-minute EV recharge at the station, stations will be
developed to provide a variety of urban services such as shopping, banking and gyms in the
future. Running parallel with this, Idemitsu Kosan is developing an ultra-compact EV (around
1.5 million JPY) capable of speeds of up to 60 km/h, which is due to go on sale in 2022.
These initiatives are examples of how the private sector is leading the way in using vacantland as a resource for mobility and energy in response to the Grand Design 2050, which
predicts that the population of around 60% of regions in the country will fall to less than half,
and that one-third of these areas will be uninhabited.
5.2.7. Developing and realising the Multi-AI Networked City
The land use map of the Netherlands shown on the right in Figure 5.2.105.2.24) can serve asa reference for the "Multi-AI Networked City” of 2050. Meanwhile, the leftmost figure showsa 2010 land use map for the Tokyo metropolitan area (1 metropolitan area and 7 prefectures)
5.2.25). Comparing the two maps, we can see that in the Dutch land use map, urban areas are
dispersed and mixed with farmland and green spaces, while in the Tokyo metropolitan area,
urban areas and farmland are separated and urban functions are concentrated in one place.
While the Netherlands’ national land planning was carried out before AI networks and thedigital revolution, the question of why the Netherlands chose a multipolar decentralised
approach and Japanese cities did not, perhaps due to differing priorities of cities at the time
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for economic efficiency, comfort and disaster resilience, is one that should be examinedfurther.
The map in the centre of the figure shows population changes in the Tokyo metropolitan
area for 2010 and 2050. Yellow indicates areas where the population will decline by less than
50%, while light green indicates areas where the population will decline by more than 50%.
This shows that population growth is limited to the very small red areas.
Netherlands:
・ Consistent national land use policy of dispersion (prevention of
unipolar concentration and urban sprawl)
・ Multipolar dispersion of cities, agriculture, manufacturing,transportation hubs and other functions in line with policy
・ Coexistence of natural environments with living environments andagricultural production (world’s second largest exporter)●Population change in 2050
(compared to 2010)

LegendUnipolarconcentrated city

Population decline
across most areas

Randstad: Multipolar ring city

Figure 5.2.10 Comparison of land use in Tokyo metropolitan area (1 metropolitan area and7 prefectures) and the Netherlands
On this subject, Ito et al. state in the MLIT Policy Research Vol. 160 that "urban
spongification" is becoming increasingly apparent in urban areas, and that unused resources
such as vacant land, vacant houses, vacant shops and vacant public facilities is increasing.
They also argue that if necessary functions for communities (e.g. shopping, spaces forinteraction and living, childcare, recreation, etc.), could be added as a complement to thesevacant spaces, the quality of life of local residents could be maintained and improved 5.2.26).
With regard to the review of these living spheres, Carlos Moreno of the Sorbonne presented
a 15-minute city concept for Paris in 2020. Figure 5.2.11 on the left depicts the concept as it
was presented again in 2021 5.2.27). The concept of the 15-minute city has commonalities with
Howard's garden city and Jacobs's vision of a city rich in diversity while maintaining density,
which she presented in her book "The Death and Life of Great American Cities". In addition,
the 15-minute city of Paris adds to these the notion that the city should be enjoyable,
comfortable, safe and socially acceptable. A similar concept, albeit in different language, isthe hedonistic sustainability proposed by the architect Bjarke Ingels, which like the "Multi-AI
Networked City", is based on the concept of well-being in living areas.
So, are there any suitable areas where the "Multi-AI Networked City" could be realised first?
Figure 5.2.11 on the right shows the population and area (2016) of municipalities in theTokyo metropolitan area (1 metropolitan area, 3 prefectures). The figure shows that the
downtown area of the Tokyo metropolitan area is represented by the Chiyoda and Chuowards, which have night-time populations of 50,000-200,000 and areas around 10 km2 witha large daytime population inflow (circular area). Outside of this circle is mixed business andresidential zones made up of Shinjuku, Setagaya, Nerima, and Koto wards, with night-time
populations of 200,000-1,000,000 and areas of 20-60 km2. It is noteworthy that the outer
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suburbs, 20-40 km from the city centre (C-shaped dotted line), have many commuter cities
with areas of 10-30 km2 and night-time populations of 100,000-200,000.
The “Multi-AI Networked City” assumes six living spheres as a single unit with a populationof 100,000 to 180,000. Looking at the Tokyo metropolitan area with the borders of prefectures
removed, the populations and areas of each municipality in the suburban zone within a 2040 km radius of the city centre are close in scale to the “Multi-AI Networked City”. Thissuggests that there may be areas within a 20-40 km radius of the city centre that are suitable
for the multipolar decentralised model described in number 5) in the summary below, where
cities are initially multipolarised by multiple cyber living spheres and eventually form physical,
independent and autonomous living spheres. However, this is only a one-sided view, and theconsideration or assessment of specific candidate sites is outside of the scope of this report.
Unit: 10K
(people)

Paris

10km

Tokyo Metropolitan Area (Tokyo and its 3 neighbouring
prefectures) 251 cities, towns, and villages

Figure 5.2.11 Image of the Paris 15-minute city (left) and the population and area ofmunicipalities in the Tokyo metropolitan area (right)
5.2.8. Summary
1) We propose a "Multi-AI Networked City", where the pursuit of well-being is centred onhuman beings, with the aim of ensuring comfort in normal times and safety and security
during outbreaks.
2) The “Multi-AI Networked City” would consist of autonomous and independent
decentralised living spheres that do not destroy current urban structures, and would
prevent the collapse of the entire city under any circumstances, while at the same time
guaranteeing human security and well-being.
3) The “Multi-AI Networked City” would involve a MAWSS (Multi-AI Well-being Survey
System), which would allow people and AI to cooperate in the autonomous managementof the city with a variety of data moving freely between networked living areas.
4) The “Multi-AI Networked City” would be a cyber-physical city to ensure resilience to thechallenges Japan faces, including the declining and ageing population, impending megadisasters, global climate change, unstable supplies of water, food and energy, andoutbreaks of infectious disease.
5) The “Multi-AI Networked City” would differ from conventional urban planning in that it
encompasses a process whereby the city is initially multipolarised by multiple cyber living
spheres, but ultimately forms physical, independent and autonomous living spheres.

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■1046) To realise the “Multi-AI Networked City”, it is necessary to continuously communicate theconcept of this city to society in order to garner social acceptance and consensus, basedon the recognition that a city is a place of shared purpose and cultural inheritance acrossgenerations from the perspective of STI (science, technology and innovation).
5.3. MAWSS (Multi-AI Well-being Survey System)
5.3.1. Proposal for multi-scale and multi-layer living spheres/city spheres
Repeated natural disasters and the spread of infectious diseases such as COVID-19 havetransformed our way of life. We are at a crossroads where we must think about a society thatcan live with these occurrences, rather than treating them as transient phenomena. In order
to live with them, we must consider the appropriate isolation of living spheres, as well as
sharing and cooperation between these isolated living spheres. The scope of the isolated
living spheres (size, criteria for determining the boundaries) has been discussed in previous
sections. In order to constitute a living sphere, it is necessary to have all the infrastructurenecessary for daily life within the living sphere. In order for this infrastructure to work
sustainably over a mid- to long-term time scale, it will be important to have not only indicatorsfor economic activity, but also strategies to recover well-being (nearly = Humanity) and to
implement them in society.
First, we will consider the appropriate isolation of living spheres. The less restrictive theliving sphere, the closer activity is to normal, and the less comfort is compromised. The multiscaling of technologies is one solution. When living areas are isolated during natural disasters
or infectious disease pandemics, the size of the area isolated can be changed in a multi-scalemanner by grouping together multiple smaller living spheres according to the level of
emergency and adapting to the situation.
In addition, infrastructure can be divided into four main categories: (1) supply of water,
food, etc. (plus sewage treatment), (2) energy supply, (3) social services such as healthcare
and public administration, and (4) social production activities such as industry and education.
Each infrastructure element has a different number of people and a different population
density, and therefore a different optimal size, and it would be unreasonable to force all
infrastructure activities to be separated into one living sphere. In normal time, living spheres
would approach an equilibrium between supply and demand, and therefore tend to be
adjusted to a certain extent to a scope and density appropriate for the population. Even if wetake into account the possibility of isolation due to natural disasters or infectious disease
pandemics, it is natural to maintain the normal area of each infrastructure element to someextent. On the other hand, social conditions and administrative decisions/measures(hereinafter referred to as administrative measures) interact with each other in a way that
affects the other. Administrative measures change when influenced by the social situation,and conversely the effects of administrative measures change the social situation. As eachof these systems is non-linear and involves mutual interaction, the two monolithic (i.e.
considered as one) systems form a complex system. For simulations and calculations forcomplex systems, as proposed in 5.3.1), a system in which the social situation and theadministrative measures are implemented as separate layers and interact with each other isconsidered to work more efficiently than a single bulky system. The design of multi-layer living
spheres is one way of achieving this goal.
One solution to realising a society oriented towards well-being and a society that is resilient
to natural disasters and pandemics is the implementation of multi-layer and multi-scalesociety isolation, in which living spheres with differing scopes of infrastructure are multiscaled and multi-layered, and ascertainment of the social situation and administrative
measures are separately layered on top of each layer.

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5.3.2. What is MAWSS and what can it do?
Multi-layered and multi-scaled living spheres are one possible solution to maintain andimprove people's quality of life while becoming resilient to natural disasters and infectious
disease pandemics. However, the potential remains for the social implementation of such asolution to lead to increased complexity of the optimisation process, increased workload andincreased complexity in operations. These factors must be taken into account in the numberof layers of infrastructure and the multi-phased implementation of the scale of living spheres.
To do so, systems operating in each living sphere, in many cases computer systems or, inthe future, AI systems, could be utilised as one possible remedy.
An AI network connecting the AI in charge of monitoring each living sphere, or AI network
as a whole (AI nexus, AI consisting of AIs), is formed to coordinate information and decisions(as information). The Multi-AI Well-being Survey System (MAWSS) is defined as an AI
network that converts living spheres into multi-layers and multi-scales, taking into accountthe interaction of social conditions and administrative measures.
The Well-being Survey is a multidimensional survey and overview of information andknowledge to estimate the comfort zone of society. Its aim is to create a society that regains
its humanity, not just its economic rationality, and AI can help to implement this response insociety. The AI is an AI system to help us regain humanity in our society and our lives, andis not meant to simulate humanity. The world would not be managed by a single bulky AI
server. Rather, a group of AI servers in charge of a group of layers of appropriate size andwith appropriate granularity, would share information with each other to form a consensus.
This is ideal from the points of view of construction, management and updating of information
systems. One of the reasons why this decentralised AI network is suitable for implementationis that spheres that are close to each other in terms of content (concepts, contents) have a
lot in common and thus need to share a lot of information, while spheres that are far fromeach other need only share summaries, or a small amounts of information. For an accurate
understanding of the individual, we need detailed information on a wide range of individuals.
However, each individual interacts with other individuals in the world, and the amount of
information that needs to be shared depends on the distance between the spheres. We
cannot know the whole if we limit ourselves to the thoughts of the individual, but we must
know the individual in order to know the whole. The average value indicated by the law oflarge numbers is not necessarily the best, but in order to know the distribution, including
outliers, we can be aware that the whole is a set of individuals and that the combination of
information is powerful.
On the other hand, we must be aware of what information should be connected and what
information should not. Information, when combined, can render an individual exposed. Fromthe perspective of protecting personal data, information that is better not connected will insome cases not be connected, and even when information is available (and can beconnected), it should not be obtained unethically. Information should not be used without
consensus to force changes in behaviour that citizens will not accept. AI systems, with theirpowerful information gathering and analytic capabilities, also present challenges andconcerns in their operation.
As with other technologies such as nuclear power, chemicals, medicines, vehicles and othermechanical systems, mobile phones, the internet, concerns about abuse or misuse are
inevitable. Appropriate use must be made a prerequisite, and social ethics, operationalguidelines and regulatory legislation are needed to ensure this. However, even if social ethics
and regulation are required, we should not dismiss these technologies as unnecessary or
dangerous, given the history of human development based on the active introduction of such
STIs in the past. On the contrary, we should put in place measures for proper operation andactively implement these technologies in society.
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5.3.3. Is MAWSS feasible? Examples of implementation
When considering the feasibility of digital twinning of physical and existing systems, which inthis case refers to living spheres and people's activities in them, i.e. a complex system like
MAWSS, the key is whether or not the targeted system can be seen as a field and formed aswhole. In this context, key operations are the sharing of multi-property and multi-aspect
information between AIs, and decisions on measures that take into account a variety ofvalues.
For the former, the multimodal AI network being researched by Tokyo Medical and Dental
University as a medical AI system can be utilised as one form of implementation. It consistsof a number of AI clusters, and in addition to functioning to communicate and process data
between the AIs, additional AI agents for networking are included internally. The networking
AI agents communicate autonomously with each other, compute data paths and network toform a kind of AI nexus. In addition to distinguishing data format (i.e. whether the data isprocessable or not), they also determine the meaning of data (i.e. whether the data should
be processed or not), and configure the network accurately and efficiently according to therequired processing. The latter decisions on measures should take into account multiple
perspectives and diverse values, and are not easy to do with existing AI. Values change
according to social position, and the best measures will differ according to the location andscale being considered, e.g. differences in geographical coverage (domestic or global),differences in temporal coverage (local or global), tense, and whether they are past-oriented(maintaining the status quo, optimisation at present) or future-oriented. We have to look at
spatial and temporal changes, and take into account the passage of time (chronically), andrespond to different values, without making a single value judgment.
Most of the existing AI, especially (deep) neural networks, are machines that patternfrequent data distributions and obtain the probability of simultaneous occurrence. They are
inductive reasoning machines that follow the most successful experiences. As such, theycannot be creative about the future. However, AI can look through vast amounts of
information, summarise the important information (based on past experience), and present a
set of evaluations of various value indicators converted to mathematical formulas to help
make holistic and informed decisions. In addition, multimodal AI networks use deductive
reasoning to self organise. By creating multistage networks to propagate processing, clustersof AIs handle tasks that are simple one by one, but cumbersome in their complexity whenlayered into stages.
Natural disasters and infectious disease pandemics have in a flash transformed not only the
distance and scope of human connections, but also the balance between the cyber andphysical. As more and more information is digitalised and digitally linked, people can choose
to coexist with AI, letting it take over the simple but not insignificant information tasks andtheir linkages, to shape a better future. Furthermore, as values continue to diversify, it is also
worth considering the use of AI that can summarise and report on the status of various social,environmental and economic values (as is the case in foreign countries where AI with multiple
personality traits, such as positive/negative thinking, work together to trade stocks).
5.3.4. Summary
As one of the prescriptions for the realisation of a society and a way of life that can cope withnatural disasters and the spread of infectious diseases such as COVID-19, and that restores
humanity and achieves well-being in addition to economic rationality, we have proposed
multi-layer and multi-scale living spheres and city spheres. These would be supported by amultimodal AI network, and opinions were stated on the linkage of various layers in eachsphere and the linkage between spheres. In addition, since administrative measures must be
judged on a multi-aspect, multi-scale and multi-standpoint basis, it is extremely difficult for AI
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alone to make the best judgments. However, we reported that AI has the capacity to reporton the current situation in these conditions and present a list of evaluation values based ondiverse value criteria. We believe that this is not the only option, nor can it be guaranteed tobe the best, but it is one form that people can accept, and we have given it as an example.

(a) multi-scale & multi-layer isolation and support based on multi-AI network simulation(b) Linking of AI clusters deployed by region and aspect
Figure 5.3.1

Example of multimodal AI network implementation

5.4. Technology roadmap to realise the “Multi-AI Networked City”
5.4.1. What is the goal of the “Multi-AI Networked City”?
As noted in section 5.1, the world's urbanisation rate exceeded 50% of the population in 2007,
and by 2018, about 55% of the world's 7.6 billion inhabitants was concentrated in cities5.4.1),
with this figure expected to reach 60% by 2030 (WUP 2018). This rapid urbanisation has
been driven mainly by the increasing efficiency and sophistication of economic activities. It
has likewise been supported by extensive urban infrastructure for mobility, lifelines, energy
and information, which has been made possible by the integration of systems and innovativetechnologies that emerge from time to time.
On the other hand, looking 30 years ahead to 2050, cities should aim not only to beeconomically efficient, but also to have low environmental impact, such as carbon neutrality,
and to have functions that keep them convenient, comfortable and safe. Furthermore, withthe recent increase in pandemics and disasters associated with global climate change, cities
need to be resilient in order to cope. These requirements are reflected in the "Multi-AI
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■108Networked City", with its ultimate aim of ensuring a high level of human security and wellbeing.
The “Multi-AI Networked City” is made up of a network of living spheres, and at the centreof the network in virtual space is the Multi-AI Well-being Survey System (MAWSS). MAWSS
is an AI network that connects that various urban infrastructure and living spheres via data.
For actual operation of the city, the solutions indicated by MAWSS may not always be thebest for individual living spheres. This is because, as elaborated on in section 5.3, the
MAWSS considers not only the well-being of individual living spheres, but also the harmonyof the city as a whole. In addition, the system is connected to multiple infrastructure networks
via data. For this reason, the technology roadmap shown in Figure 5.4.1 includes not only
the technological feasibility of reaching the end goal, but also the processes of consensus
building in society and dissemination of the technology based on measuring well-being andreflecting those results on the actions of each stakeholder.
5.4.2. Technologies to support the “Multi-AI Networked City” and a society accepting them
In Figure 5.4.1, the horizontal axis is the time, showing four images of the city that change
along this time axis. Furthermore, technologies are on the vertical direction, with eachtechnology field represented by a single bold arrow, arranged in the following order.
The top row is the basic technology of AI (black), and following rows are the four technology
fields (blue), with the MAWSS (black) that integrates the information of each technology field.
Below these are not technology fields, but are to assess well-being (green) that ensuressocietal acceptance, with the education and culture axis (green), which provides the criteria
for value judgments, on the bottom row. These bold arrows are connected including
redundancy via data to the MAWSS (black), which is at the core of the "Multi-AI Networked
City".
Each technology element required for the realisation of this city is placed in the middle ofeach bold arrow, and the year (red two-digits) in which it is expected to be implemented insociety is indicated at the end of each technology element.
These technology elements were selected from the "Eleventh Science and Technology
Foresight 2019 Synthesis Report (hereinafter referred to as the S&T Foresight)" 5.4.2). In the
S&T Foresight, 702 science and technology topics (i.e. technology elements) were identified,divided into the following a) - g), with the timing of technological realisation and social
realisation described for each technology element. Furthermore, the forecast period wasroughly the 30-year period leading up to 2050, and the target year of realisation was set at
2040.
a) Health, medical and life sciencesb) Agriculture, forestry and fisheries, food, biotechnologyc) Environment, resources, energyd) ICT, analytics, servicese) Materials, devices, processingf) Cities, architectural, civil engineering, transportationg) Space, oceans, Earth, scientific basis
In the following text, items (1) to (8) correspond to the bold arrows (technology fields) in
Figure 5.4.1. After selecting relevant technology elements from the above 702 science andtechnology topics, they were assigned to each bold arrow (technology field). These
technology elements are also underlined in the text below. Most of the selected technologies
are predicted to be implemented in society by 2040, which is one of the bases for the target
year of the “Multi-AI Networked City” being set at 2050.
(1) Development of high-efficiency, high-performance AI
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In order to realise the “Multi-AI Networked City”, the basis of all AI technologies is the speedof information processing and the connections between systems, which is based on thedevelopment of peripheral computer hardware and software.
On the hardware side, improving data verification speed and reducing power consumption
are problems, but the S&T Foresight predicts the development of (28) a computer with 100
times the power performance (2029) <Note 1>. Meanwhile, in terms of software, further
development of image analysis technology and human-AI interfaces for text translation, partsof which are already being used today, is expected. As the amount of information to behandled is expected to be enormous, technological innovation that integrates hardware andsoftware is essential.
In addition, (53) a comprehensive elucidation of brain functions (e.g. emotions, memory)(2041) is expected to facilitate the progress of the AI networks themselves, even though thisdirectly relates only to understanding of the human brain. At present, AI collaborative
networks are still in the phase of being designed manually, but futuristically, we can expect
the emergence of technologies that allow AIs to form networks autonomously with each other.
These technological developments are predicted to bring about highly functional AI that curbs
power consumption and emits less CO2, AI that can self-control for abnormalities, and AI thatcan work together autonomously to identify processes and tasks.
<Note 1> The first number (28) is the S&T topic number of the S&T Foresight, and thenumber at the end of the line (2029) is the year in which it is expected to be implemented
in society.
(2) Urban housing and mobility comfort
As shown in Figure 5.2.5, the “Multi-AI Networked City” is a network of multiple living sphereswith populations of 10,000 to 30,000, forming a city sphere unit with a population between
100,000 and 180,000. In normal times, this city sphere unit would function to ensure thesmooth operation of information, human flows and logistics in the living spheres, and thus
the efficiency of economic, cultural and social activities. On the other hand, in the event of an
outbreak, the living spheres must be sustainable enough to be separated as necessary andstill ensure Decent Living Standards (DLS) on their own for a certain period of time.
As technologies necessary for these independent and autonomous living spheres, the S&T
Foresight cites (545) the realisation of self-sustaining infrastructure independent of broader
infrastructure (2030). Likewise, to address the spongification of urban areas due to population
decline, it cites (550) technologies for the maintenance and management of under- and unutilised land generated by population decline (2031). The living spheres of the "Multi-AI
Networked City" aim to implement independent and autonomous infrastructure in order toimprove the resilience and DLS of the city. It makes sense to use under- or un-utilised land
to solve this problem, as each living sphere would have the capacity to function independently
for a certain period of time, allowing for the scope of lockdowns to be flexibly adjusted (Figure
5.5.6).
The S&T Foresight also identifies (93) automated driving and drone operation technologies
for public transport and logistics (2031) and (568) level-5 automated driving technology(2034) as key enablers of a low-carbon shift in mobility. These mobility technologies are
predicted to evolve to manage of short trips within living spheres, in addition to travel between
city sphere units and between living spheres. Futuristically, they will shift to CASE
(Connected, Autonomous, Shared, Electric), where AI and automated driving are integrated.
The current living spheres of the "Multi-AI Networked City" are aimed to be areas for walking.
However, even if we assume that the initial speed of automated driving will be 30km/h or less,if the above-mentioned CASE is realised for a much larger living sphere than is suitable for
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services. On the other hand, there are many issues that need to be resolved before
automated driving at level 5 can be widely adopted, including not only the technology but also
the structure of roads, the establishment of legal and insurance systems, and the formationof a social consensus on accident risk.
(3) Infrastructure and stable supply of food and energy
In terms of food production, S&T Foresight predicts that (273) technology to predict theregional and product-specific impacts of climate change on food production (2032) and (98)agricultural AI, IoT and robotics (2031) will be ready for social implementation in the first halfof 2030s. The introduction of AI into agriculture is expected to lead to a parallel increase in
the automation of distinctive agricultural products on small farmlands in city suburbs and oncomparatively large farmlands in rural areas, resulting in the diversification of items produced
and enhanced production efficiency.
However, the Japan Ecological Footprint Report5.4.3) points out that Japan's low
bioproductivity imposes environmental burdens on other countries, and at the same time,
Japan's food self-sufficiency rate is remarkably low among developed countries, posing
problems for food security. In addition, Johan Rockström of the Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research has proposed a "planetary boundary"5.4.4) for the Earth’s system, and points
out that biodiversity and the global cycle of phosphorus and nitrogen are beyond the realmof uncertainty. This implies the need for technologies that improve the efficiency of foodproduction, while at the same time limiting the associated increase in environmental impacts.
Further widespread adoption will require a mechanism that allows for the viability of
renewable energy businesses as a whole. In this respect, the current guidebook on
renewable energies produced for businesses by the Agency for Natural Resources andEnergy of the Ministry of the Environment is very easy to understand, but it does not indicate
what the bottlenecks and risks may be for businesses.
In general, it is difficult at present to meet 100% of demand at normal times in densely
populated urban centres with renewable energies, but rather they can be positioned as a
backup to avoid sudden energy shortages during outbreaks. For normal times, it will benecessary to build a diverse and flexible system of coordination, including lending between
multiple city spheres and living spheres, utilisation of hydrogen energy storage, and carbon
offsets for the country as a whole. The question is who will bear the cost of the functioning of
the system in both normal times and in the event of outbreaks.
This is true not only for energy, but also for city water supply. During outbreaks, natural
conditions, such as the use of rainwater and rivers, must be considered, and at the samesocial consensus must be built in normal times on the cyclical reuse of water.
In conclusion, the infrastructure of the "Multi-AI Networked City" will move towards
independent and autonomous decentralised infrastructure in the future, including renewableenergy projects. However, there are huge wide-area infrastructure networks in the cities oftoday, and we expect that these wide-area networks and MAWSS (AI), described in moredetail below, will maintain a loose relationship through data exchange in virtual space for thetime being.
(4) Environmental and disaster forecasting and evacuation management
To reiterate somewhat, for a "Multi-AI Networked City" to be sufficiently resilient in the eventof an outbreak, independent and autonomous urban activities need to be possible at the living
sphere level during normal times.
According to the S&T Foresight, the construction of this system would require (546) highprecision disaster hazard maps for specific areas (2029). At the same time, however, it will
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be a challenge to ensure that updates can be carried out in a timely manner to keep pacewith rapid changes in weather associated with global warming. The report of Working GroupI in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) 5.4.5), released in August 2021, states that if
temperatures were to rise by 2°C, the frequency of high temperatures would increase by afactor of 5.6, and the incidence of heavy rainfall would increase by a factor of 1.7, comparedwith the once-in-a-decade rate from statistics for the 1850-1900 period. This means that thedesign conditions for (212) design methods for self-sustaining urban spheres (2038), would
need to be updated based on the latest projections.
In the event of a widespread outbreak, the first challenge would be to ensure Decent Living
Standards (DLS), and the next would be to sustain people's well-being. However, in the eventof a severe disaster, these measures may become impossible. In large cities, it may benecessary to evacuate hundreds of thousands of people across multiple cities.
To respond, the S&T Foresight indicates technologies such as (523) AI integration forenergy saving and evacuation in housing and mobility (2030) and (563) mobility management
technology for emergencies (2031).
The transition from normal time to contingency operations would require the use of AI for
pre-event prediction and post-event information gathering, as well as associatedcountermeasures. In advance of an event, MAWSS (AI) would indicate the scale of theassumed disaster and the population that can be guaranteed DLS in each living sphere.
However, after a disaster occurs, it would be necessary to indicate in real time the movement
and evacuation of people from areas that differ from those assumed in advance.
(5) Infectious diseases, lifestyles and health monitoring
For infectious diseases, we need to build a system that takes advantage of our experience
with COVID-19 thus far. First of all, technology is needed to detect the presence of infected
people in living spheres. In Japan, monitoring of infectious diseases by analysis of sewage
was implemented in 2021 (see section 5.1.5., Note 8). Furthermore, the S&T Foresightpredicts the implementation of (62) ultra-lightweight sensors for rapid detection anddetermination of infections and infectivity of a particular infectious disease (2031).
In a “Multi-AI Networked City”, living spheres would be temporarily quarantined by meansof a living sphere lockdown in response to the spread of an infectious disease. In parallel,
DLS would be ensured within living spheres based on self-sustaining operation. With regard
to the effectiveness of partial lockdowns, the simulations in Figure 5.2.6 show that the spreadof infection in decentralised cities is slower than in unipolar concentrated cities, and also that
their structure makes it easier to carry out lockdowns.
(6) Measurements in the pursuit of well-being
For the “Multi-AI Networked City”, we are looking at the types of urban functions and theirarrangement in order to maximise the level of people's well-being. The key to this will be (60)technology for measurement, analysis and assessment of emotions such as pleasure,displeasure, likes and dislikes (2031).
It is important to note that a social consensus is needed to acquire and analyse data that
contains personal emotions. This will require both confidence in the procedures used toachieve this consensus and confidence in the technology used to protect the information. As
such, decisions need to be made by both companies and individuals concerning thetreatment of information, including what information should be open or closed, what
information to keep in AI, and what information to keep only in human hands. In this regard,
there must be (81) a social consensus on the relationship between humans and AI (2035).
Going forward, mechanisms for collaboration between data while protecting privacy are
expected to be at the core of the data driven society.
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Furthermore, in the "Multi-AI Networked City", which is envisioned for post-2050, we would
like to point out the possibility of using (53) a comprehensive elucidation of brain functions,such as consciousness, sociality, creativity, etc., (mentioned above in (1) for the year 2041)
to predict human judgments and actions that are influenced by latent and explicit memories
and emotions, and to connect this to the arrangement of physical urban functions.
(7) MAWSS (AI)MAWSS (AI) stands for Multi-AI Well-being Survey System. The basic role of MAWSS is torecord and integrate the various information of the “Multi-AI Networked City” in multi-layered
memory. In other words, MAWSS is "loosely" connected to the operators in the technology
fields (2) to (6) above via data, and its role would be to coordinate the well-being of eachliving sphere and city sphere unit as a whole, while maximising the capabilities of technology
fields and giving feedback on compromises to the living spheres.
Technologies for this loose connection to MAWSS (AI) include (532) open data on cities,
and the creation of platforms that can be owned and collaboratively used by various
stakeholders (2029), (534) infrastructure monitoring, prediction and control technology basedon seamless coupling of physical and cyber space (2030), and (13) AI-based control of realworld systems (2030). We predict that the social implementation of these technologies assystems will further accelerate the development of MAWSS.
(8) Shaping well-being through education and culture
The aims of a "Multi-AI Networked City" will be influenced by the values of its time.
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, although we have been able to stop the spread of
infections to some extent by refraining from economic activities, the widespread and repeateddeclaration of states of emergency has imposed on us a considerable economic andpsychological cost.
In Figure 5.4.1, the reason why (8), "Shaping well-being through education and culture", isplaced at the bottom is that education and culture are fundamental in influencing the criteria
we use for judgments that determine the direction of technology and system development.
These criteria are based on the values of the moment, and these values are in part universal
and in part changeable according to environment.
The unipolar concentrated cities of the present were built in the 20th century mainly aimed
at increasing labour productivity. One of the reasons for the widespread nature of therepeated emergency declarations is that the wide range of routes through which infections
can travel in a unipolar concentrated city cannot be ascertained. The problem is that thestructure of the city has not changed, even though our current value systems demand wellbeing based on a multipolar decentralised city with an emphasis on living spheres.
Such a gap between values and real space can also occur between the present and 2050.
In this sense, we think it necessary to share among the parties concerned a more accurate“goal image” for 2050 from the point of view of the present. Two episodes are laid out in
Figure 5.4.2. However, as Figure 5.4.1 and Figure 5.4.2 are themselves subject to futurechanges in the environment, they will need to be periodically reviewed.
5.4.3. Scenarios for realisation
We believe that (212) Design methods for self-sustaining and autonomous city spheres
based on smart use of materials and energy (2038) in S&T Foresight, will contribute to the
diffusion of the “Multi-AI Networked City”. This is because the establishment of design
methods will lead to further recognition in society of the roadmap and common use of thedesign procedures. The commonalisation of these procedures will reduce risks in thedevelopment of related technologies and systems, which will lead to their diffusion.
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The physical realisation of this city is assumed to take place after 2050, but the transition tothis city will be preceded by a virtual "Multi-AI Networked City", where only the information
systems are networked, while retaining current infrastructure networks and other city
frameworks.
In other words, as the four images at the top of the roadmap show, we anticipate that cities
will gradually become multipolar by first establishing multiple living spheres with virtualfunctions within unipolar concentrated cities. As a first candidate for the establishment ofliving spheres, Figure 5.2.11 shows a map of the residential population and area ofmunicipalities in the Tokyo metropolitan area. This has already been discussed in more detailin section 5.2.7 on the development and realisation of Multi-AI networked metropolitan areas.
To reiterate, Figure 5.2.11 shows that the population of one unit of a “Multi-AI Networked City”(100,000-180,000 people) and the many small cities in the suburban zone (C-shaped area)
20-40 km from central Tokyo are similar in population and area scale. Of course, while
population size and area alone do not make a “Multi-AI Networked City” highly feasible, thefact that areas exist with administrative districts physically matched in size is a clue to thequestion of where to start.
In conclusion, the goal of this proposal is the formation of a virtual "Multi-AI Networked City"by 2050, in which the bold arrows (1) to (7) shown in Figure 5.4.1 and MAWSS are loosely
linked via data. The subsequent transition to a real or physical urban structure (living sphereunits) is also an issue related to the framework of the area's infrastructure, and should be
pursued on a regional, district, or living sphere basis, planning for the timing of upgrades.

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■114Figure 5.4.1 Technology roadmap to realise Multi-AI Networked CityThe Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

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Episode 1
One day in 2050, Mrs. A, 40-year-old living in the city centre, left her house to go to the office where she works,
which is also in the city centre and is 10 minutes away on foot. Her daughter, whose high school is located within
their 2–3 km radius1 living sphere, she left the house with her. Mrs. A works at the office two days and at home twodays in a week. On their way, the two talked about how AI and humans can share information, the extent to which
AI can make decisions on genetic modification or warfare2, and the roles of culture and art in education essential
for humans. Mrs. A and her husband, also aged 40, are discussing moving to the suburbs because thecondominium building, they live in is nearing the end of its structural lifespan. What motivated them to choose
moving to the suburbs is that highly detailed hazard maps and information related to energy and other infrastructure
are disclosed through the socially open database (532-29) in easy-to-understand formats. Specifically, they cameto realize that by combining a home independent of broader infrastructure in terms of energy and water with level5 automated driving, they will be able to achieve a more sustainable lifestyle by living in the suburbs rather than in
the city centre. And even though the spread of remote work means that seats will be available on trains duringcommute, they are planning to choose where to move taking into account urban planning policies and future
residential population distributions.
Around noon that day, the COVID-50 pandemic hit, and Mrs. A’s living sphere was locked down because vaccines
were still in the process of being manufactured. The market where Mrs. A planned to shop on her way home wasoutside the virtual boundary of her living sphere, but she can cross the boundary since she has a wearable infection
sensor. Today, however, because AI recommended a different market based on the infection heat map, Mrs. A
followed the recommendation. Each life sphere has its own virtual boundary, but it changes slightly every day as
flexibly defined by AI, taking the state of infections and convenience of daily living into consideration. At night, Mrs.
A checked the results of her health and well-being measurements for the past week and enjoyed a conversation
with AI, which initiated the talk by asking her questions on her awareness and sociality, before going to bed.
Notes:
1. Many cities looking to the post-pandemic era consider life spheres to be areas coverable mainly on foot.
For example, Paris sets life spheres as the range within 15 minutes on foot, and Melbourne sets it atwithin 20 minutes on foot, equivalent to an area within a 2–3 km radius.
Although there are generational difference in waking speed and the effect of climate on the distance thatcan be covered on foot, but in many cases, average waking speed is set at 4 km/h and the length of one
trip on foot to be between 15 to 20 minutes.
2. Eleventh Science and Technology Foresight 2019 (Science and technology reference number)- (year ofsocial realisation [last two digits of the calendar year])

Episode 2
Mr. B, 70 years of age, had moved from the city centre to a house located 10 km away from a train station in thesuburbs several years ago when he retired from work. One day in 2050, after having a breakfast of home-grownvegetables, Mr. B checked his health, the percentage of electricity remaining on his home battery, the amount ofwater stored in his tank, and other matters while he waited for the automated car he reserved the previous night
to come pick him up. Based on the results of checking, he decided to sell electricity from his home battery andwater from his reservoir to the local power company and water utility. The automated car then arrived, but because
Mr. B sold electricity and charged the car, he ended up leaving his house about 30 minutes later than intended.
He had planned to check on the growth of his vegetables in the field today, but in fact had made a mistake entering
information into the farming robot; at the field, the farming robot had already finished harvesting the vegetables.
Hurriedly, Mr. B changed the automated car’s scheduled route in order to go sell the vegetables at the market.
While he was taking his vegetables to the market, however, a pandemic-induced lockdown of his living sphere
was announced. In a lockdown, he would be stopped by AI from going to the market, which is located outside theestablished virtual boundary, without his wearable infection sensor, so he hurried back home to get it. While athome, a forecast of flood in three weeks’ time was issued, so Mr. B had to reserve a means of evacuation on themobility management system, which took some time. In the end, he decided to go sell his vegetables tomorrow.
At night, AI, which had sensed Mr. B’s activities during the day, advised that he take a day off tomorrow in
consideration of his health. This reminded Mr. B that he had forgotten to enter his plan to go sell his vegetables
tomorrow, and so he hastily made a reservation for an automated car to take him to the market, and AI agreed tothe change of plans.

Figure 5.4.2 Two Future Stories
5.5. Technology transfer to emerging countries based on the “Multi-AI Networked City”
5.5.1. Social sharing of data in developing countries (DCs)As for technology transfer to developing countries (DCs), policy is explained in METI’s "Final
Summary" 5.5.2). What is characteristic of this summary is that it points out the effectivenessof the so-called co-creation model in the digital field, based on which data held by business
entities is made public as socially shared goods, so that economic benefits can be mutually
enjoyed.
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On the other hand, in a “Multi-AI Networked City”, the prospect of recurring urban outbreaks
such as COVID or natural disasters, creates the need to put certain limits during outbreaks
on the well-being that people enjoy in normal times. For example, it is impossible to ignore
the fact that making data a social common good in normal times poses the problem of conflictwith laws protecting companies and individuals. If a social consensus can be reached in DCs
on this point, then it would be possible during an outbreak to accurately assess damage
through the smooth circulation of data. As shown in Figure 5.4.1, an approach through thebi-directionality of information between MAWSS and other technology fields would beestablished.
5.5.2. Urban issues in developing countries (DCs)UN News5.5.3) forecasts a world population of 9.7 billion in 2050. Growth in Asia and Africa is
expected to be particularly striking, with urban populations in Asia and Africa predicted to
double in 2050 compared to 2015 (Figure 5.5.1 centre).
So what are the unique urban challenges of DCs? The first is that urban areas are rapidly
expanding due to a combination of population influx from rural areas and natural growth, asurban areas are sprawling into the suburbs. In this respect, DCs differs from developed
countries, where urban growth has ceased and some areas are shrinking or experiencing
spongification.
Secondly, insufficient public transport, such as railways, means that, aside from walking,people have to rely on bicycles, motorbikes, buses and private cars to get around, resulting
in chronic traffic congestion. Although traffic congestion also occurs in developed countries,
the difference is that in developed countries there are alternatives to private cars, as intercity and intra-city railways were developed before motorisation.
Thirdly, much of the housing development is illegal or informal, causing unplanned suburban
sprawl. For example, as shown in Figure 5.5.2, 70% of Africa's urban population is said tolive in informal settlements.
Fourthly, areas of urban sprawl are often located in terrains that are vulnerable to disasters.

Figure 5.5.1 Predictions for population trends up to 2050 in developed and emerging
countries

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■117Figure 5.5.2 70% of Africa’s urban population in informal settlements
To summarise these four challenges, in general, cities in DCs are experiencing ongoing
uncontrolled suburban sprawl to accommodate rapid population growth, which has led to the
expansion of slums and chronic traffic congestion. The result is a vicious cycle of economic
loss due to inefficient movement of people and goods, as well as the occurrence of air
pollution, noise and unnecessary CO2 emissions.
It is generally recognised that slums are breeding grounds for disasters, pandemics andanti-social organisations. However, slums, like traffic congestion, are a phenomenon
resulting from poverty in rural areas and the rapid influx of people into urban areas, and are
not the real cause of these urban problems.
Figure 5.5.3 shows the distribution of urban areas in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. The
sprawl is shown in the mostly light green informal suburban areas. Accordingly, to solve theseurban problems, it is necessary to improve the quality of life in rural areas and tosimultaneously put into place land registration systems in urban areas.
In this regard, we will discuss how technological progress is changing rural life and its impact
on land registration systems. Figure 5.5.4 shows the results of automated calculation of thearea of residential land, roads and greenery (trees) using image recognition technology
based on video taken from a drone. The use of AI, such as this image recognition technology,
is making it possible to capture, in real time, rapid changes in land use in areas of sprawl andillegal construction in slums, which was previously difficult to do. It is hoped that this newtechnology will lead to a reduction in informal settlements

Figure 5.5.3 Informal settlements as suburban sprawl (Kabul, Afghanistan)
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■118Figure 5.5.4 Classification of roads, residential land and green space from images
5.5.3. Rundown of issues and introduction of new technologies
In order to improve well-being in rural areas and to establish land registration systems forurban areas, issues can be divided into two categories: 1) long-term and wide-area issues,and 2) short-term and local issues. For the former, long-term and wide-area improvement, itis effective to proceed with the following five items simultaneously, focusing on a wide-area
Multi-AI network (Figure 5.5.7, left). These are a) creating urban visions; b) inheritance of
local culture; c) enhancement of rural well-being; d) coexistence of cities and agriculture; ande) concrete responses to outbreaks.
For the latter, short term and local issues, it would be effective to work simultaneously on
the following five issues, focusing on living sphere AI networks. These are a) land registration
systems; b) durable housing; c) water and sanitation infrastructure; d) promotion of renewableenergies; and e) diffusion of compact urban EVs (Figure 5.5.7, right).
With regard to the creation of urban visions, which is the overall key, Japan has a "municipal
master plan" system, which requires the establishment of a future vision for the city and theclarification of development policies for each district corresponding to the issues of the whole
region. Below, the preparation of this type of urban vision (i.e. master plan) is described as
PUD (Planning and Urban Design).
Why is the development of PUD (i.e. master plans) stagnating in DCs? One of the reasonsis the lack of human resources due to complete reliance on technology and funds fromdeveloped countries to prepare PUD. However, even if the human resources were available,
the unique challenges facing DCs would make it difficult to keep up with the rapid influx ofpeople into the city centres, and to obtain and update statistical data due to the fact that many
settlements are illegal or informal.
STI is a suitable solution to these problems. For example, with the recent proliferation ofsmartphones in DCs, it is becoming easier to estimate population and travel routes based on
location information obtained from call detail records (CDRs). In addition, satellites, drone
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■㻝㻝㻥aerial photography and related image recognition technologies are making it possible todetermine the number of housing units, quantify land use, and detect illegal construction at
an early stage. Thus, the "DC-type Multi-AI Networked City" has the potential to improve theacquisition and updating of statistical data through the acquisition and image recognition ofdata based on the development of various devices and aerospace technology.
Figure 5.5.5 shows an example of an agricultural model in DCs. This model was proposed
for a rural area around Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, which is not yet equipped with a wide
area electricity network. The core technologies in this model are solar PV, water pumping
and irrigation, microgeneration, micro-transmission and agricultural technologies and related
systems.
For rural communities in this agricultural model, the increase in cultivated area due toirrigation leads to an increase in income, which in turn enables the purchase of electricity
from local power companies. In other words, this agricultural model aims not simply topromote the diffusion of electricity, but also to increase overall self-sufficiency in energy, foodand water, to create new jobs related to agriculture and energy, and to realise create selfsustaining and autonomous living spheres.
In the World Bank report “Harvesting Prosperity: Technology and Productivity Growth inAgriculture”, it is argued that stronger investment in creating and ensuring the uptake of new
knowledge will lead to a dramatic enhancement of agricultural productivity and hence
agricultural incomes.
However, in relation to agriculture today, the UN’s Sustainable Development in the 21st
century (SD21) 5.5.4) points out that more than half of our food comes from three cereal crops- rice, maize and wheat - and that the spread of an infectious disease in any one of thesecrops could seriously damage the world's food supply. In the Netherlands, a leading
agricultural country, the Green Port policy has focused on the integration of primary
production, secondary processing and tertiary marketing of crops into a six-tier industry, withthe aim of selling the products at high prices in a timely manner. At present, focus has shiftedto how to increase production with fewer inputs (e.g. labor, energy, water, fertiliser).
We feel that the implementation of AI farming technology should be accelerated in thesuburbs of DCs to increase the production of a variety of crops with fewer inputs throughautomation and information technology, rather than relying on growing a single crop.

Figure 5.5.5 Pump and irrigation microgrid power system

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5.5.4. New technologies that transform cities and agriculture
To date, transportation policy in DCs has generally been to introduce subways and Bus Rapid
Transit (BRT) in city centres, and to develop the areas around stations as high-density urban
areas based on Transit Oriented Development (TOD) <Note 1>.
Under these circumstances, the practical application of automated driving is now within sightfor 2050. Users will be able to travel seamlessly from their point of origin to their destination
by Small Smart Vehicles (SSVs) for urban use through MaaS (Mobility as a Service). We
expect to break away from the conventional pattern of developing underground areas aroundsubway (or BRT) stations by TOD, and to shift to living spheres with centres based on walking
and SSVs, and to on-demand public transport with MaaS and SSVs in the suburbs.
As for the renewable energies that will support the decentralised transportation
infrastructure network of MaaS and SSVs, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimatesthat solar power could provide a quarter of the world's electricity by 2050, providing a tailwind
for low-carbon "Autono-MaaS". In Japan, the “PV2030+” roadmap published in 2009 by the
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO), predicts solar
power generation costs of 7 JPY/kWh in 2030, below current retail electricity prices. In DCs,
there will be a shift from the construction of large-scale power stations and power grids tosolar power generation on a city block basis in city centres and on a door-to-door basis in
suburbs. It is expected that the above-mentioned SSVs will also become a popular methodof contactless charging with green electricity while parked.
In terms of water supply, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) predicts that by 2050 about 40 percent of the world's population will face severe
water shortages, mainly in the context of population growth in emerging and developing
countries5.5.5). In areas where there is currently no water service, drinking and domestic water
are obtained directly from rivers, lakes, rainwater and groundwater. In these areas, there isa potential for shifting to local systems using a "membrane treatment method" instead of
constructing a network of public water supply to cover a large area. Direct Potable Reuse(DPR) has also been in the spotlight recently. In other words, drinking water is produced anddistributed at sewage treatment plants. In the United States, there are ongoing discussions
on technology development and public acceptance to promote DPR. For the time being, use
can be promoted as a backup in case of outbreaks, but use in normal times will depend onsocial consensus.
Judging from the above-mentioned trends related to transportation, energy and water
looking ahead to 2050, we expect that cities in DCs will shift towards a city type that is highly
compatible to agriculture, as shown in the (agricultural land + urban land) integration modelin Figure 5.5.6, where the dispersal of urban areas is covered by SSV mobility, withindependent and autonomous infrastructure. The integrated management of cities andagriculture using AI would be the "Multi-AI Networked City" in DCs.

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■㻝㻞㻝Urban land
Sprawled urban land
Rural land

Present

Integrated area (rural land
+ urban land)

1) Status quo model

2) TOD model

Negative impact on economy,
environment and society

Limitation to population inwalking-distance living spheres

3) Integrated model(rural land + urban land)

Need for innovative means oftransportation

Figure 5.5.6 Multi-AI Networked City: (rural land + urban land) Integration<Note 1> TOD (Transit Oriented Development) refers to a way of development that
focuses on transit (i.e. the movement of people) aimed at converting automobiledependent cities into rail-oriented cities, such as the systematic development ofresidential areas around suburban stations, while placing emphasis on commercial
facilities around stations in the city centre.
5.5.5. Summary
In DCs, the pace of urban change is exceeding the pace of necessary social reforms. The
greater part of populations face problems with water, sanitation, waste water, healthcare andschools, and in some countries, population censuses have not been conducted during thepast 15-20 years.
Correspondingly, Figure 5.5.7 provides a graphic representation of technology transfer toemerging countries through the “Multi-AI Networked City”. The diagram on the left shows
long-term and wide-ranging issues that are more suited to top-down action by central
governments. The diagram on the right shows short-term, local issues, which are more suited
to bottom-up approaches by local governments and businesses.
Regarding the diagram on the left, first of all, we need an urban vision (PUD) that includes
a system for upgrading, and this urban vision should include a roadmap to improve the wellbeing of rural areas by planning agricultural land and urban areas in an integrated manner.
With regard to the diagram on the right, we believe land registration systems urgently need
to be improved in order to ascertain the current situation and to reduce illegal settlements,
and next that diffusion of SSVs is important. This is because the land registration system isthe basis for the creation of the urban vision (PUD), while the SSVs will help to improve thewell-being of farmers through the sale of agricultural products and at the same time beeffective in transporting goods to cities during outbreaks.
In Figure 5.5.7, issues specific to DCs are colored blue, and issues common to developed
countries are colored green. The green issues are necessary elements in the transition from
unipolar concentrated cities to multipolar decentralised cities, even in developed countries. It
is hoped that DCs will be the first to introduce these elements, providing the momentum fordeveloped countries to also move towards multipolar decentralised and self-reliant cities.
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Rather than copying the "Multi-AI Networked City" of developed countries, necessary
technologies should be transferred to DCs, taking into account local cultures and lifestyles.
Specifically, we propose that the "DC-type Multi-AI Networked City", which connects the two
pentagons shown in Figure 5.5.7, should be socially implemented ahead of developed
countries. And finally, Figure 5.5.8 shows that the horizontal axis is time and the vertical axis
is well-being, while the third axis is STI. Innovation (STI). This figure shows how emerging
country cities skip the growth path of developed country cities due to the social
implementation of the leading 'DC-type multi-AI network city model' in emerging countries.
Note that both emerging and developed countries share the same goal of improving wellbeing
through 'multi-polarisation + real living areas'.
We have learned through our work on global issues such as global warming, energy,
refugees, and food that consumption of large amounts of resources and energy and improved
well-being in developed countries alone is problematic. We must remember the spirit of theSDGs, that "No one will be left behind" and "Endeavor to reach the furthest behind first". The
STI of the 21st century must be “Think globally, Act globally”.

Urban
visionOutbreaks

Wide-area
Multi-AI
Network

Coexistenceof cities andagricultureLand
registration

Inheritanceof local
cultureCompact
urban EVs
Rural wellbeingLifesphereMulti-AI
Network

RenewableenergyDurablehousing

Water andsanitation
infrastructure

Figure 5.5.7 Challenges for DC Multi-AI Networked City (Green: issues common todeveloped countries, Blue: issues specific to DC)

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Science, Technology andinnovation (STI)

Path for developing countries

Path for developed countries

Unipolarconcentration+virtualliving spheres
Multi-polarization+
virtual living spheres

Unipolarconcentration● Pandemics● Global warming● Water, food and energy
shortages● Frequent and more intense
disasters

Limits to growth(Earth’s capacity)
City

Multi-polarization+
real living spheres● Quantum computer● Full elucidation of brain functions● Environmental/disaster● Carbon-free cities
forecasting, evacuation● Increase in water, food and energ selfmanagement
sufficiency● Automated driving +MaaS● Data sharing platform● High-efficiency, highperformance AI development
Multi-AI Networked

Well-being &Human security

Society 5.0(Fifth Science andTechnology Basic Plan)

Time

■㻝㻞㻟

Figure 5.5.8 Future Vision of Multi-AI Networked City by STI

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References[5.1.1] Hideaki Koizumi, author and editor, Kankyo keisoku no saisentan [Mostadvanced environmental measurement], Mita Shuppankai, 1998, (H. Koizumi,ed., Trans-disciplinary Forum on Science and Technology for the Global
Environment, “Environmental Measurement and Analysis”, JST (1996). E.
Rothschild, “Environmental Measurement”, In the book above)[5.2.2] Ikuo Sugiyama, “Nyu nomaru jidai no AI kyozongata abanizumu [AIcoexisting urbanism in the age of the new normal]” presentation materials,
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November 2020
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5.2[5.2.1] Team for the preparation of Human Development Report 1994, Human
Development Report 1994, pp22-40,New York Oxford Oxford University Press
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the 2005 World Summit Outcome), 25 October 2012https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/476/22/PDF/N1147622.pdf?OpenElement[5.2.3] UN-Habitat, “The New Urban Agenda Illustrated”, 2020, UN-Habitat
https://unhabitat.org/the-new-urban-agenda-illustrated[5.2.4]Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of To-morrow, 1902, pp20-27,
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., Ltd.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garden_Cities_of_To-morrow[5.2.5] Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Referencematerials of the advisory committee on revitalization of the Metropolitan
Expressway 3－2, 2012, p2 (in Japanese)[5.2.6] Japan Productivity Center, Rodo seisansei no kokusai hikaku 2020
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WORTH OF STAFF PRODUCTIVITY, 17 May 2017https://www.uk.mercer.com/newsroom/britains-healthiest-workplace-flexibleworking-and-commuting.html[5.2.8] Ministry of the Environment, “2050 nen kabon nyutoraru no jitsugen ni
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https://www.env.go.jp/earth/2050carbon_neutral.html (in Japanese)
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■125[5.2.9] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Green Growth Strategy ThroughAchieving Carbon Neutrality in 2050, 2020, p3 (in Japanese)
https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2020/12/20201225012/20201225012.html(Provisional English translation:
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2020/pdf/1225_001b.pdf)[5.2.10] Ministry of the Environment, “Results of Survey on the Actual Conditionsof Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Residential Sector in FY2019 (Final
Figures)”, 2021, p3 (in Japanese)
http://www.env.go.jp/earth/ondanka/ghg/kateiCO2tokei.html[5.2.11] Japan Association of Real Estate Appraisers, ESG fudosan toshi nofudosan no kantei hyoka e no hanei: ofisu biru no kenzensei/kaitekisei, ribensei,
anzensei e no hyoka [Incorporating real estate appraisal in ESG real estate
investment: Assessment of the healthiness and amenity, convenience andsafety of office buildings], 2019, pp24–42 (in Japanese)[5.2.12] Cabinet Office, National Resilience Promotion Headquarters, Zeijyakusei
hyoka no kekka [Results of vulnerability assessment], 2018, pp74–91 (inJapanese)[5.2.13] Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Information andCommunications in Japan: White Paper 2018, “Indasutori 4.0 towa [What isindustry 4.0]”, 2018https://www.soumu.go.jp/johotsusintokei/whitepaper/ja/h30/html/nd135210.html[5.2.14] Cabinet Office website, “Society 5.0”,
https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/society5_0/index.html[5.2.15] Smart City Public-Private Partnership Platform
https://www.mlit.go.jp/scpf/about/index.html (in Japanese)[5.2.16] Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, “Interim Findingsof the Long-term Outlook on National Land” reference material, (figure I-16),
2020, 21 (in Japanese)
https://www.mlit.go.jp/policy/shingikai/content/001377610.pdf[5.2.17] Jeremy Glover, The 15-minute city: How close is Chicago, August 14,
2020
https://www.metroplanning.org/news/8917/The-15-minute-city-How-close-isChicago[5.2.18] D.Yoneda et.al, Large-scale epidemiological monitoring of the COVID19
epidemic in Tokyo, The Lancet Regional Health - Western Pacific, Volume3,October 2020
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7546969/[5.2.19] Arun Poojari, 5 ways AI is helping in the COVID-19 fight, Infocomm MediaDevelopment Authority, JULY 2020
https://www.imda.gov.sg/news-and-events/impact-news/2020/07/5-ways-AI-ishelping-in-the-COVID-19-fight[5.2.20] Larry Spruill, Heat map reveals Detroit neighborhoods hardest hit bycoronavirus (COVID-19), Click on Detroit, April 2020
https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2020/04/15/heat-map-reveals-detroitneighborhoods-hardest-hit-by-coronavirus-covid-19/[5.2.21] Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, National Land
Council, Policy Committee, Long-Term Outlook Subcommittee, “Long-term
Outlook on National Land” interim report figures, 2011, pp2–4 (in Japanese)
https://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000135837.pdf

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■126[5.2.22] Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Grand Design ofNational Spatial Development towards 2050, Japan: Creation of a country
generating diverse synergies among regions, Gaiyo 1 [Overview 1] (inJapanese), 2014
https://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudoseisaku/kokudoseisaku_tk3_000043.html[5.2.23] Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, City Bureau,
Urban Development and Improvement Division, “Aratana kukaku seiri shuho‘Kukan saihen nigiwai soshutsu jigyo [Overview of the Spatial Reorganisation
and Prosperity Creation Project, a new rezoning method]”, 2018, p10 (inJapanese]https://www.mlit.go.jp/common/001261462.pdf[5.2.24] Eric Koomen et.al, A utility-based suitability framework for integrated localscale land-use modelling, Computers, Environment and Urban Systems 50(2015) 1–14
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Land-use-base-maps-of-the-Netherlandsfor-2000-and-2015-following-autonomous-developments_fig6_40096451[5.2.25] Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, National andRegional Policy Bureau, National Land Information Division, “Kokudono
esugata: Doga de miru [A portrait of Japan’s national land: on video]”, 2010https://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/gis/land/movie/landuse/capital/mesh.html
https://www.mlit.go.jp/common/001046872.pdf[5.2.26] Natsuki Ito et.al, Suponjika shita toshi kukan ni okeru tei miriyo sutokku norikatsuyo sokushin ni muketa chiiki manejimento syuho ni kansuru chosa kenkyu[Study on regional management methods to promote the utilization ofunderutilized or unutilised resources in spongified urban spaces], Ministry ofLand, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Policy Research, Vol. 160, March
2021, pp54–55 (in Japanese)
https://www.mlit.go.jp/pri/houkoku/gaiyou/pdf/kkk160.pdf[5.2.27] B. Monechi, E. Ubaldi and V. Loreto, Sony CSL Paris, C. Chiappetta, B.
Campanelli and L. Rossi Mori, Sapienza University of Rome, ’The 15-MinuteCity unveiled’, SONY CSL Paris COVID19 Initiative, 02 March, 2021
https://csl.sony.fr/the-15-minute-city-unveiled/
5.3[5.3.1] K. Shea, Michael C. Runge, D. Pannell, W.J.M. Probert, S.L. Li, M.
Tildesley, M. Ferrari, “Harnessing multiple models for outbreak management,”
Science, 368(6491), 577-579, 2020.
5.4[5.4.1] United Nations, 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects, 2018https://population.un.org/wup/
Commentary on the above by Japan International Research Center for
Agricultural Sciences:https://www.jircas.go.jp/ja/program/program_d/blog/20180523[5.4.2] Eleventh Science and Technology Foresight 2019 Synthesis Reporthttps://nistep.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id=6657&item_no=1&page_id=13&block_id=21[5.4.3] Japan Ecological Footprint Report 2012：https://www.wwf.or.jp/activities/lib/lpr/WWF_EFJ_2012j.pdf

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■127[5.4.4] Example of explanations on planetary boundaries in Japanese: JohanRockström and Mattias Klum, Chiisana chikyu no okina sekai: puranetaribaundari to jizoku kano na kaihatsu [Big World Small Planet: Abundance within
Planetary Boundaries], Kazuhiko Takeuchi and Naoko Ishii, eds. Maruzen
Publishing, 2018
[5.4.5] Working Group I contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessmment Report(AR6), Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Full_Rep
ort.pdf
5.5[5.5.1] World in 2050 initiative., TWI2050 Report: Transformations to achieve theSustainable Development Goals,IIASA ,27 August 2020
https://iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/twi/Report2018.html[5.5.2] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Round Table for Infrastructure
Systems Export, Final Report, November 2020
https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2020/11/20201120003/20201120003-2.pdf (inJapanese; summary in English:
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2020/pdf/1120_003a.pdf)[5.5.3] Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN News, United Nations, 21
June 2017,https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/world-populationprospects-2017.html[5.5.4] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for
Sustainable Development, Back to Our Common Future Sustainable
Development in the 21st century (SD21) project Summary for policymakers,
p17, May 2012
[5.5.5] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) andNetherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, OECD Environmental Outlook
to 2050: The Consequenses of Inaction (Highlights in Japanese), March 2012,
pp3–4
https://www.oecd.org/env/indicators-modelling-outlooks/49884270.pdf

Sources for figures<Figure 5.2.1> Created by author<Figure 5.2.2> https://cosmosmagazine.com/people/society/ebenezer-howardgives-us-the-garden-city/< Figure 5.2.3> HasiBagan,YoshikiYamagata, Landsat analysis of urban growth:
How Tokyo became the world's largest megacity during the last 40 years,
Remote Sensing of Environment, Volume 127, December 2012, Pages 210-222
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rse.2012.09.011<Figure 5.2.4>
https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/seicho/seichosenryakukaigi/dai6/siryou1.pdf<Figure 5.2.5> Ikuo Sugiyama, “Nyu nomaru jidai no AI kyozongata abanizumu [AIcoexisting urbanism in the age of the new normal]” presentaton materials,
Second Osaka University TranSupport engineering forum, 28 January 2021
http://www.cfi.eng.osaka-u.ac.jp/assets/doc/event/20210128flyer.pdf

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and Tateo Arimoto et.al, materials for presentation “Public-Private
Partnership/Co-creation in response to COVID-19 and the Future Crises:
Lessons from cases in Japan” given at OECD GSF-TIP Workshop Improving
academia-private sector interactions: Lessons learned from the COVID-19, 16
September 2021
https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/improving-academia-private-sectorinteractions.htm<Figure 5.2.6> Program and data included in Terumasa Shimoyama et.al, Paison
jissen deta bunseki: 100 pon nokku [Python practical data analysis: 100
exercises], Shuwa System, 2021, used with partial changes made by author.
<Figure 5.2.7> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7546969/<Figure 5.2.8>https://www.imda.gov.sg/news-and-events/impact-news/2020/07/5ways-AI-is-helping-in-the-COVID-19-fight<Figure 5.2.9> https://www.mlit.go.jp/common/001261462.pdf<Figure 5.2.10>
https://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/gis/land/movie/landuse/capital/mesh.html
https://www.mlit.go.jp/common/001046872.pdf
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Land-use-base-maps-of-the-Netherlandsfor-2000-and-2015-following-autonomous-developments_fig6_40096451<Figure 5.2.11> Figure at left: https://csl.sony.fr/the-15-minute-city-unveiled/Figure at right: Created by author using Python open source basemap<Figure 5.3.1> Created by author<Figure 5.4.1> Created by author based on reference [5.4.2]<Figure 5.4.2> Created by author based on reference [5.4.2]<Figure 5.5.1> http://www.economicsinpictures.com/2014/08/trends-in-globalworking-age.html
http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer-2015/global/urban-world<Figure 5.5.2>https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/blog/what-doesrapid-urbanisation-mean-for-utility-service provision-our-takeaways-from-theafricaworks-conference/<Figure 5.5.3>
https://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=73045<Figure 5.5.4> Created by author<Figure 5.5.5> Created by author<Figure 5.5.6> Created by author<Figure 5.5.7> Created by author

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6. Conclusion
After the scientific revolution of the 17th century, an industrialised society developed based
closely connected to science and technology. In the second half of the 20th century saw theblossoming of an advanced information society based on electronics technology,
biotechnology and computer technology. Today, the world is experiencing new growth as adata-driven society. At the same time, however, challenges to the sustainability of the Earth's
systems have emerged, such as climate change, the consumption of global resources andthe destruction of terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Zoonotic diseases are also seen as aconsequence of the loss of the symbiotic relationship between nature and humans. Many
developing countries have been unable to fully benefit from science and technology, anddisparities between countries are increasing.
In this context, the United Nations has played a central role over the past half century in thedebate on environmental and human rights issues, shaping various political frameworks inthe form of individual treaties and joint declarations. In 2015, the UN General Assembly
unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda, which encompasses all of the above challenges andaims to create a sustainable society in which no one is left behind. The world is aiming toachieve the 17 goals of the SDGs by 2030. The values pursued here are recovery of thePlanet, basic rights of People, economic Prosperity, Peace and Partnership, collectively
known as the 5Ps. Needless to say, an ideal world will not be realised in 2030, but the SDGs
are seen as the first step towards realising a new global society.
In Japan, the “SDGs Implementation Guiding Principles” formulated by the SDGs Promotion
Headquarters in 2016, following discussions of the SDGs Roundtable Meeting, set out eightpriority issues aimed at realising the above 5Ps. This set out a new direction for Japan,
shifting from total commitment to economic growth to a focus on building a resilient societythat ensures the safety and security of citizens and the well-being of the people. While
initiatives on the part of national government, local governments, industry, academia and civilsociety in Japan in the SDGs have been internationally recognised, it has also been pointed
out that Japan lags behind particularly in the areas of climate change, women's
empowerment, conservation of marine and terrestrial ecosystems and international
partnerships.
EAJ has been engaged in a variety of activities, including policy recommendations andhuman resource development, in our mission to design a future society that aims for humansecurity and well-being. As part of these activities, the Board of Directors decided to establish
the Science, Technology and Innovation 2050 Committee (chaired by Taikan Oki) at its
meeting in November 2019. The committee’s aim was to draw up a vision of what society
should be like in 2050, and to consider “what” science and technology innovation can do and“how” it can be done. This committee was proposed by an earlier EAJ project entitled, “Roleof Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) in SDGs” (Project Leader: Haruo Takeda), andis designated as an ongoing activity towards the realisation of EAJ’s "Engineer the Future"philosophy.
In order to narrow down the issues to be addressed, the committee first introduced various
challenges concerning the current situation in Japan and the world. Subsequently, taking into
account the burgeoning domestic impacts of COVID-19, which had emerged in China in
December 2019, the following three themes were chosen.

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■130(1) Realisation of smart cities and comfortable and resilient human settlements(2) Realisation of sustainable and equitable access to water, food and energy(3) Realisation of governance based on visualised evidence and tolerance of diverse
valuesFor each theme, the aim was to attempt to create an STI for SDGs roadmap, taking into
account the spatial spread of the themes (global, national, local, sectoral, individual) andincluding a time axis in the design.
For smart cities, we examined the challenges of global population concentration in large
cities in terms of sustainability, resilience, infectious diseases, and convenience, andproposed the realisation of a "New Local City Sphere" as a multi-layer, multi-scaledecentralised society equipped with a multi-AI network. We also identified the technologies
and systems that will be required to achieve this, and gave an indication of when these will
be materialised. The creation of new local city spheres will also help to counter the“spongification” of cities due to the low birth rate and ageing population. This concept andmethodology can be applied not only to the redevelopment of large cities such as Tokyo andOsaka, but also to Japan’s regional development initiatives on the SDGs, on which Japanhas placed great emphasis. It also provides useful hints for approaches to cities in middleincome and developing countries, which face many challenges. In the future, it will be
important going forward to implement concrete pilot programmes and to share assessment
indicators for ascertaining city-level initiatives. Urban redevelopment is an issue that should
be addressed as part of a 100-year plan, and we will continue to examine this issue.
The committee deemed to discuss energy, food and water as a nexus because of their closeinterconnectedness, spending considerable time on energy this time. We proposed fiveprinciples to achieve the two goals of realising global carbon neutrality “not long after 2050”
and energy sufficiency in all regions of the world “as soon as possible before 2050" (seesection 4.4), and provided concrete guidelines for developed and developing countries towork on based on international cooperation. We also developed a technology theory forputting these principles into practice. We pointed out the following: the need for engineeringto cooperate with policy authorities, industry and citizens to indicate pathways to build an
appropriate consensus for the overall optimisation of energy systems; the critical shortage of
research personnel in the energy sector, and the need to remedy this situation; and theimportance of establishing a financial mechanism to encourage investment in the social
implementation of new technologies. We hope that a more in-depth examination of the nexus
from a global perspective, including food and water, will take place around the focal point ofrealising sufficiency.
The third of the common themes in implementing future projects is the realisation of
governance based on visualised evidence and tolerance of diverse values. The nature ofgovernance was regarded as a problem following the Great East Japan Earthquake and the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, and is an issue that has come to the fore
again in the current COVID-19 measures and the creation of the new Basic Energy Strategy.
Based on our discussions, we propose to reconstruct the interface between science, politics(executive and legislative) and society on the basis of push-and-pull tension and mutual
respect, from the point of view that governance is not intended to be unilateral rule bygovernment, but that diverse stakeholders with different values are also involved in theprocess. To this end, we urge the scientific community to transform the system for STI
through provision of scientific evidence, mission-oriented science and technology policies to
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propose potential pathways, interdisciplinary co-creation research, and clear explanations ofscientific knowledge.
The above-mentioned activities gave rise to questions on parts and the whole, and the needto quantitatively interpret the value that individual activities are creating at national and global
levels became clear. Along with trying to do our best in each part, we must always maintaina holistic view, returning to the discussion of where the world is going and what contributions
we can expect to make, thereby leading to greater value. Many committee members also
experienced knowledge gain from regular international activities that helped them to clarify
issues and consider methodologies to solve them. It is said that the Japanese are not goodat international networking, but we are not born with such a genetic predisposition, and I hopethat the younger generation, especially those who will lead the future, will be more involved
in international activities than ever before.
A number of committee and subcommittee meetings have been held and an online
symposium on this report was held in July 2021. External activities included a side event on
Future Cities at the UN STI Forum in May 2021, and the acceptance of our contribution to
the UN IATT report "Emerging science, frontier technologies, and the SDGs”. This reportsummarises the activities of the EAJ's Science, Technology and Innovation 2050 Committee
over the roughly two years since its founding. We would appreciate receiving honest
feedback from readers. As a standing committee, we would also like to invite not only EAJ
members but also non-members to participate in continuing to design our future society.
Finally, as PO, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to Mr. Taikan Oki, Chair of theCommittee and Coordinators Taro Arikawa and Miho Kamei for leading the activities of theCommittee, and the leaders of the three working groups, Ikuo Sugiyama, Taikan Oki, andSatoru Ohtake, as well as the committee members who prepared reports and all members
who participated in discussions with enthusiasm each time. We would also like to thank Prof.
Kenji Doi of Osaka University, Prof. Yukari Takamura of the University of Tokyo's Institute for
Future Initiatives, and Fellow Chieko Asakawa of the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center for
their thought-provoking presentations on the nature of the future society at the workshop heldin August 2021.

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Appendix1

Workshop on Aug. 5th, 2020

EAJ Annual Activity Report 2020/2021, pp7-8 (in Japanese),https://www.eaj.or.jp/?dlp_document=ar2020⚫ Purpose and Theme of the Workshop
Coincidentally, the pandemic caused by COVID-19 in 2020, 50 years after 1970,
has forced a review of everything in society, including lifestyles. In light of the impact
of COVID-19, the committee selected three issues from among various social
challenges, including the elimination of poverty disparities and immigration issues.
(1) Realization of smart cities and comfortable and resilient human settlements(2) Realization of sustainable and disparity-free access to water, food, and energy(3) Realization of governance based on visible evidence and tolerance of diverse
valuesIn the first workshop, we will discuss the future vision that we should aim for in 2050
with regard to these issues.
⚫ Contents
Three invited lectures and breakout sessions were conducted online.
Invited talk 1:" The New Normal and New Local towards smart cities and comfortable and resilient
human settlements"
Kenji Doi, Professor of Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University(Transportation and Spatial Planning, Laboratory of Civil Engineering)
Invited talk 2:" Towards sustainable and equitable access to water, food and energy"
Yukari Takamura, Professor of Law, The University of Tokyo, Institute for Future
Initiatives
Invited talk 3:“AI for Accessibility”
Chieko Asakawa, Fellow, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, U.S.A.

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Invited talk 1: The New Normal and New Local towards smart cities and comfortable andresilient human settlements
Speaker: Prof. Kenji Doi, Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University(Transportation and Spatial Planning, Laboratory of Civil Engineering)<Lecture Summary>As shown in Figure 1, we exist within the relationship between three foundations forexistence: "natural and historical infrastructure", "social infrastructure" and "social capital", allof which are indispensable. In recent years, the "social infrastructure" in the middle of the
diagram has become increasingly deteriorated and vulnerable to disasters, while the "social
capital" on the right side has become less community-oriented as individuals are moreisolated. Even more seriously, for the "natural and historical infrastructure" on the left, wehave forgotten the nature and history that underpin our cities. The number of people living incities is steadily increasing all over the world. This has led to major floods in Bangkok in 2011
and in Chongqing in 2020. Despite the fact that urban settlements and disasters are
inseparable, we have little memory of natural disasters. In order to overcome this situation,
we need to strengthen the relationship between the foundations of our existence, and wemust think about how humans can lead the way to build a relationship of coexistence taking
advantage of the features of AI.
In terms of smart cities, there is a serious separation between facilities and infrastructure(urbs) and citizens and communities (civitas) in real society, and AI is expected to play a rolein bridging this separation. Cities of the 18th and 19th centuries faced worsening public healthproblems associated with overcrowding. Suburban sprawl was one method to address thisissue. As a huge volume of automobiles flowed into cities from suburbs, communities (civitas)
were taken over by roads too wide for human scale and huge car parks, while pedestrian andcycling spaces were forgotten. There are growing hopes for cyber technology to serve as ameans for rebuilding these fragmented and diluted communities and restoring cities forpeople. It is also important to note that values have changed in recent years. Our values aregradually shifting from the traditional instrumental rationality to recognising the importance ofvalue rationality. Instrumental rationality is a way of thinking focused on narrowing down themeans to quickly achieve objectives, while value rationality is a way of thinking that takes along-term and multidimensional view of things. Taking transport as an example, based on
instrumental rationality, travel is a means to another end, and selecting the means that willreach the destination quickly and economically is most important. On the other hand, in value
rationality, mobility is an end in itself, and communities and users coexist, sharing unusual
journeys and experiences, improving quality of life and enhancing disaster resilience. Policies
and technological developments must be guided to respond to these changing values. It is
important to note that changes in values are relatively easy to ascertain, and that rather thanchoosing between the two rationales, a balance between them is needed.
With regard to the right balance, the “6S” are to be emphasised in smart cities. These are
divided into the 3S (Smart, Safe and Sustainable), qualities that a smart city should have,and the 3S (Shared, Secure and Scalable) that make the first 3S a reality. Here, 'shared'means sharing things and experiences, 'secure' means predicting, taking measures andpreventing spread, and 'scalable' means flexible in terms of the scale of the city based onneeds. Recently attention has been given to small 'scalable' neighbourhoods, based on 15minute walking distances, where travel within the neighbourhood is on foot, bicycle and small'shared' EVs called SSVs. The 15-minute city aims to switch from living areas to date that are
based on extensive travel by public transport, to the creation of a cluster of self-sustaining
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neighbourhoods that can withstand long-term lockdowns based on internal travel in compact'scalable' neighbourhoods.
In order to materialise such efforts, a platform is needed for a trial and error process andto guarantee dynamism unconstrained by current practices (inertia). Empirical studies in thisplatform would create new values and promote the accumulation of success stories innarrative mode. The memory of these successes would allow for the development of asystem in which repeated outbreaks are not ruled out. From a “new normal” point of view, it
is possible to reconstruct cities and transportation that are scalable and can be partiallylocked down. In addition, from a “new local” perspective in the age of “new normal”, it isnecessary to create an autonomous and self-sustaining sufficient economy that does notform a trilemma between freedom of movement, safety and security, and social and economic
vitality in times of disaster, as shown in Figure 2. This sufficient economy will enhance
freedom of movement, safety and security, and social and economic vitality and improve
quality of life not only in times of disaster but also in normal times. In order to maintain thisdual-mode sufficient economy, it is necessary to utilise the qualities of AI, which can process
and memorise a large volume of information. As a result, a way of coexistence between
humans and AI will be revealed, and in the long run, will lead to local employment andincreased productivity.

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Invited talk 2: Towards sustainable and equitable access to water, food and energy
Speaker: Prof. Yukari Takamura (Law), The University of Tokyo, Institute for Future
Initiatives<Lecture Summary>First of all, thank you very much for inviting me to this EAJ workshop. My specialty is law andjurisprudence, and I am more of a user of research results, debating legal policy based on
the results of research. In my presentation, I will review the current situation according to the
topic you have given me, and then after reviewing where the international community isheading with regard to these three themes, I will look at the impacts of COVID-19. Water,food and energy are all very big topics, so I will focus on energy, which is particularly relevant
to climate change.
First of all, there is no dispute that water, energy and food are all essential for people's wellbeing, as well as eradication of poverty and sustainable development. It is also recognisedthat the demand for water, energy and food on a global scale is predicted to growconsiderably over the period leading up to 2050 alongside population growth and economic
development. However, while demand is projected to grow, it may in fact grow while accessremains unguaranteed. In this case, the question of how to meet this demand also becomesa serious one. This issue is particularly acute in Africa. And on the issue of energy access,there are indications that significant populations, particularly in developing countries, havethe ability to pay for energy, but do not have access to it. We are now looking at the importantelements in how to build modern energy and electricity infrastructure. When it comes to air
pollution, it can be argued that improved access to modern energy could also lead to
improvements in health and air pollution.
In terms of climate change and the three areas of water, food and energy, naturally energy
is highly relevant. If you look at the major impacts of 1.5℃ and 2℃ in the IPCC’s 2018 Special
Report, it is very interesting to see that impacts on ecosystems and impacts on food are quite
different between 1.5℃ and 2℃. For example, climate change is predicted to affect crop
yields and combined with the effects of population growth and increased demand for water
will heighten water stress and increase the number of people affected. It has also been
forecasted that more land will become unsuitable for agriculture in the future due to the water
impacts of climate change. Moreover, there is also the issue of competition between biomassenergy and food. In the IPCC's 2018 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, some ofthe scenarios were based on the assumption of a significant dependence on biomass energy.
In fact, it has been pointed out in the UN security field that the adverse impacts of climatechange and environmental change will have extremely significant impacts on the stability ofregions and conflict zones. It is interesting to note that a common understanding is emerging
that the risks associated with water, food and climate change amplify the frequency, intensityand prolongation of conflicts.
Meanwhile, in the energy sector, we are seeing significant changes in the context ofinnovation in relation to climate change. The electricity sector, which accounts for one-fifth ofglobal energy consumption, is increasingly turning to renewable energy. However, in the heatand transport fuel sectors, where renewable energy cannot be substituted to advance
electrification, we are aware of the major innovation and technological challenge. However,
we recognise that the significant increase in renewables in recent years, particularly solarthat is not location specific, is an extremely historic shift. Within the five years starting fromThe Road to 2050 @ STI2050, EAJ

■136around 2014, renewable energy has become cheaper than the new construction of gas-fired
or coal-fired power plants in about two thirds of the world's countries and regions.
Unfortunately, in several Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, Indonesia andVietnam, it is still cheaper to build new coal-fired power plants. In the midst of this energy
transition, we have seen a gradual change in the structure of economic growth, whereby
increased energy demand has led to increased greenhouse emissions, i.e. CO2 emissions
from energy sources increased. Between 2014 and 2016, the trend in economic growth wasover 3% annually for the three-year period, but emissions were not increasing. This meansthat the phenomenon of decoupling of emissions from economic growth, which had once
been merely a theory, is now becoming a reality.
Moreover, on the technology side, I find the electrification of mobility to be very interesting.
There is a lot of ongoing cross-sectoral innovation in digitalisation to control the emissions ofsystems as a whole by reducing the emission factor of electricity or by making zero-emission
electricity. This is where various non-state actors, municipalities, cities, businesses, financial
institutions, organisations and universities are taking the initiative on climate action and theenergy transition.
The SDGs and the Paris Agreement provide a vision of where we want the world to go, but
it is clear that this will not be an extension of our current society. I think it is necessary toconsider what kind of social change and innovation will be needed for an ideal future, what
pathways will lead us there, and what challenges we will face along the way. Finally, I thinkthat the SDGs approach is very important, and the core of the vision is to enhance people's
basic needs and well-being. How to protect vulnerable people and societies is a challenge
we all must share. I believe that this challenge is even more acute in the current COVID-19
context.

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Invited talk 3: AI for Accessibility
Speaker: Chieko Asakawa, Fellow, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center<Lecture Summary>
I lost my sight during my second year of junior high school as a result of a swimming injury
in the fifth grade. It was very difficult for me to lose my sight, but I learned about two major
problems. The first is access to information. When I lost my sight, there were no computers,no internet and no smartphones. Therefore, I lost the ability to read textbooks by myself, andI could not newspapers, magazines or books either. The other problem is mobility. I couldn't
go to school or shopping by myself—I lost the ability to go anywhere by myself. I became
determined to change my situation of being dependent on others and become independent,
and that became my goal for the rest of my life. Then, in the late 1990s, the researchers
around me started to talk about the Internet and web browsing. As part of a research lab, I
was one of the first to have access to the Internet, and I still remember the shock I felt when
I first saw the information on the Internet and the Web. I can still remember the shock I felt
when I first saw the information on the internet and how easy it was to get all kinds ofinformation, even newspapers, every day. This was a real turning point in my life.
There is a very old Japanese anime that I remember very vividly from my childhood, and as
a researcher I have sometimes thought about this story. In the story, a little bird-shaped robot
sat on a boy's shoulders whispering in his ear about enemies approaching and telling him
about things out of his eyeshot. This was science fiction at the time. But now, in this age ofAI and IoT, I believe that this is no longer a fiction, but realistically possible. We developed
an indoor navigation system application called "NavCog" as a first step. NavCog is an iPhone
app that helps visually impaired people to navigate their way around a building. Our users
have told us that the app has given them new experiences, such as being able to get where
they are going without having to ask anyone, or being able to walk with confidence and say“No, thank you” when offered help.
Next, we need technology that can recognise what is around us. Object recognition is oneof the technologies that can achieve this goal, and it is an area that is rapidly becoming morewidespread due to the development and evolution of AI. However, it still makes mistakes.
Object recognition technology will no doubt become more and more advanced in the future,
but there is one yet unsolvable problem—the recognition of personal items, not generic ones.
We developed a Personal Object Recognition system that we train ourselves to recognise
personal items along with our own memories. This POR is a deep learning-based smartphone
application that is intended for use by visually impaired people.
Another interesting technology that uses this image recognition technology is Scene
Captioning technology. We take a lot of business trips and travel a lot. Even the blind canenjoy the atmosphere and the sounds and smells around them, but if there were a technologythat could explain the surroundings and the scenery, it would definitely improve quality of life.
I would like to move on to the next example: the AI Suitcase project. By integrating
recognition and robotic technologies, we are turning the Suitcase into a new travel companion.
We are now working on R&D for the fourth generation, which we have not released anywhere
yet. In terms of the software itself, we have a laptop computer put onto a suitcase that can
do all sorts of image processing, sensor analysis, heat, walking speed, and it can also act asa navigation robot to lead disabled people, rather than being a fully automated vehicle on its
own. We are continuing our research while tackling new technological challenges.
As we currently work with engineers on research and development for technical issues, werealise that there are many barriers to the diffusion of this technology in society in any real
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sense. First of all, there are legal and institutional barriers. In order to use the NavCog indoor
navigation system that I mentioned earlier, you need to install a Bluetooth beacon in theenvironment. The approval of the owner of the building is required. And in public spaces, they
are difficult to install without going through a complicated approval process. So now, we need
the understanding of society and the people. Broadly speaking, there are the two issues ofprivacy and safety. There is the issue of how to protect the privacy of all the data that is being
collected in a city. Then there's safety. Of course, because the navigation robot is designed
to help the disabled, there is a person beside it. But, it is still not common for robots to move
about cities or inside buildings, so more understanding is needed. Lastly, I'd like to talk briefly
about AI bias. AI is based on data, and that data is collected from our society. In other words,
AI is a mirror of our society. In order to build a society that is diverse and where no one is left
behind, AI, as a case in point, must strongly support diversity.
The need for accessibility has historically led to a number of innovations. The telephone issaid to have originated in the 1800s when Alexander Graham Bell, who had hearing-impaired
family members, was looking for a way to communicate with them. The keyboard is said tohave been developed in the same way, to help people with disabilities who normally found it
difficult to move their hands. More recently, it goes without saying that speech synthesis,character recognition and voice recognition technologies have also been influenced by theneeds of people with disabilities. And then, of course, there is AI. As a researcher in this field,
I would like to continue my research so that the technology that started with accessibility cancontribute greatly to changing our society in the future.

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Breakout session: Challenges in realising smart cities and comfortable and resilient human settlements

Discussion topics: 1) Towards optimisation of the three elements 2) What we should aim
for in 2050 3) What Japan should do to realise STI for SDGs
Participant
Affiliation
Participant
Affiliation
Kenji Doi

Osaka University

Ikuo Sugiyama
Yoshikazu
Nakajima

Kobe Institute of Computing
Tokyo Medical and Dental
University<Main points of discussion>
Summary of Prof. Doi’s lecture
It is possible to ascertain future changes in values. It is important to take a values rational
approach rooted in local and social contexts (culture and climate).
1) Smart cities: Guarantee trial and error process and dynamism based on lowering inertia(constraints). This creates meaning and fosters successful examples of narrative mode(thinking while doing) success stories. A memory system that does not rule out repeatedoutbreaks (LSTM).
2) New Normal: Scalable and partially lockdown-able urban and transportation structures toavoid the spread of risks are essential. Emphasis on pluralistic values and ensuring
diversity of activities and mobility under constraints.
3) New Local: Sufficient economy without a trilemma between freedom of movement, safety
and security, social and economic vitality (awareness of the limits of natural regenerative
forces and knowing what is sufficient) → enhancement of local productivity (= enhanced
level of satisfaction for oneself and others)
Report on results of breakout session discussions
・Three axes of evaluation, Appropriate as a method of explanation and thought
・Differs according to isolation/outbreak, COVID-19: Mobility of people Water disasters:
Commodities, such as food・Sufficiency Work communication is quite good, virtual accessibility is improved
・Inclusive Digitalisation makes it easier to acquire physicality through information linkage,
positive and negative effects

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Breakout session: Achieving sustainable and equitable access to water, food and energy
Discussion topics: 1) Towards achieving optimisation of the three elements 2) What weshould aim for in 2050 3) What Japan should do to achieve STI for SDGs
Participant
Affiliation
Participant
Affiliation
Yukari
Yoshifumi
Takamura
The University of Tokyo
Yasuoka
The University of Tokyo(guest lecture)(moderator)
Haruhiko
Michiharu
Kaiteki Institute, Inc.
JST
KusakaNakamura
United Nations Industrial
United Nations University
Yuko Yasunaga Development Organization Taikan Oki(UNU), The University of(UNIDO)Tokyo
National
InstituteofToshimitsu
Hiroaki
Kyushu University
Maritime,Port
and
Komatsu
KashimaAviation Technology
Yoshihiro
Shiroishi

Hitachi, Ltd.

Miho Kamei IGES
(recorder)<Main points of discussion>
Initiatives to integrate the three themes could be action research, where lessons are learned
from practice in a specific field, or international development aid initiatives by the EU and GIZ.
In terms of culture, it is very important that solutions arise from the needs of society. In Japan,
there are solutions, but the process of integrating into society is difficult and they often do nottake root. It is important for Japan now to create the seeds of innovation from the needs ofsociety and figure out how to materialise them. It is important to consider the relationshipbetween science and technology and society.
It is important to think of water, food and energy as a trinity. Compared to gender andinequality issues, water and food must be distributed, and they need to be transported bytechnology. Compared to Japan, which is concerned about crises (major disasters), there areregions that need cheaper and easier access. As far as food and energy are concerned, local
economic development is considered a necessary element, but if distribution is done well,
the world’s total can be secured. In order to get such distribution and access, information
sharing may be necessary.
It is not only science and technology that needs to be taken into account, but also a rethinkingof social systems. A total system, including legal and social systems, is important. There isalso a time gap between events in science and technology and in society, so we need tounderstand what technology is needed in the future. We also need the efforts of Japanesecompanies. We must aim high. We need people with cutting-edge knowledge to challenge
each other across borders. In the areas of water, food and energy, we need to bring together
the wisdom of more people because these are fields that are easy to relate to as general
concepts.
In addition, the fragmentation of the world is increasingly apparent. The East, including Japan,
originally had philosophy that favoured integration. Inclusivity is an important element of the
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SDGs. In relationships between developing and developed countries, as well as in our
coexistence with nature, can we create new values by caring for each other and enhancing
the value of each other, while remaining rooted in culture and philosophy? While the global
gap is widening, there is a need for solutions to achieve a global balance, such as the SDGs.

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Breakout session: Achieving governance based on evidence and tolerance of diverse
valuesDiscussion topics: 1) Towards the optimisation of the three elements 2) What we should
aim for in 2050 3) What Japan should do to realise STI for SDGs
Participant
Affiliation
Participant
Affiliation
Satoru Ohtake
The University of Tokyo
Hiroshi Nagano
EAJ
Tateo Arimoto
GRIPS; CRDS, JST
Goto
Rissho University
Yokohama National
Taro
Arikawa
Shibutani
Chuo University
University(recorder)<Main points of discussion>
1. Diversity: Broaden horizons and keep open minds when thinking about the future.
Social, spatial and temporal expansion and diversity.
2. Communication is important, and we need to first establish evidence, then move forward.
3. Trust is important and governance should include trust between society and people.
We must have not only a global perspective because building trust also needs a local
perspective. It is also necessary to have a local point of view, as a variety of knowledge isaccumulated locally.
4. From the perspectives of diversity and new systems, governance should place emphasison both value and values (sense of values).
5. In relation to society, consideration for culture and making efforts a part of culture are also
important to enhance trust, and the use of familiar stories and narratives is also necessary.
6. Governance should be evolving with constant feedback from society and awareness of its
value. In addition, the following specific examples were given.
o Risks
・The three pillars of communication are risk, assessment, and management.
・There is a big barrier between those with awareness and those without.
・Those with awareness should start making things.
・Invisible riskso Universalisation and localisation
・Dilemma between universalisation and localisation of values
・Clear up vagueness・Universalisation and localisationo Communication
・The habit of free discussion is important.
・Engineers lack political literacy.
・Politics and science, time axiso Trust, narratives
・Sharing of time axis
・Spread in time and space

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STI Forum Side Event, 6 May 2021

At the beginning of the session, Chairperson Oki introduced the organiser of the event, theEngineering Academy of Japan’s Science, Technology and Innovation 2050 (STI2050)
Committee. He also explained its mission to prepare STI roadmaps to realise a future vision
for 2050 and the necessary technologies to achieve it, based on an understanding of thecurrent situation, including an inventory of technologies looking ahead to 2050.
He then stated the agenda and objectives of the event, which were to identify some key
concepts and key technologies to be aware of when envisioning future urban design in theface of global issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change.
Lastly, he briefly outlined a new idea to develop a new discipline on outbreak risk
management by identifying the commonalities between different outbreaks, such as
pandemics, floods, traffic jams and communication failures, and exchanging ideas on how tomake compromises on the dilemma between redundancy and efficiency in preparations forrisk management.
Summary of presenters
Prof. Dr. Daniel Karthe: In Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, rapid urban growth has resulted in a
fragmented infrastructure. Inadequate water and energy supply in peri-urban ger districts(where people live in traditional Mongolian tents and simple houses), combined withworsening traffic congestion, especially in the city centre, is causing a decline inenvironmental quality (pollution of air, water and soil, and accumulation of pollutants in thebiosphere). Such environmental pollution and its negative impacts on physical and mental
health need to be taken into account in a comprehensive manner when planning future
infrastructure development.
Prof. Mikiko Ishikawa: Green infrastructure was created when humanity was facing crises.
Green infrastructure is social common capital created by strategic planning for thesustainability of the global environment, based on protection of the natural environment,enrichment of biodiversity and respect for cultural landscapes. Accordingly, green
infrastructure contributes to providing an environment safe from natural hazards andimproving the quality of life of citizens through the application of climate change mitigation
and adaptation policies.
Ms. Guzel Ishkineeva: Japan's smart city initiatives were introduced. Referring to the context
of Japan-Russia relations and the eight-point cooperation plan proposed by former Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016, she discussed the implementation of smart city projects in two
Russian cities. In particular, the efficiency of the implementation of the ARTEMIS smart traffic
signal system in Voronezh and Vladivostok, the urban infrastructure needs of Russian cities,
the problems faced by modern Russian cities, and the feasibility of Japanese smart citysolutions were presented.
Prof. Yoshikazu Nakajima: A multi-AI system can minimise infection risk by ensuring humancomfort and an appropriate standard of living. This system includes a) technology to detect
individual smartphone coordinates, b) technology to estimate one's physical and mental statefrom vital sign data, and c) technology to estimate comfort from daily facial expressions using
IoT technology. Although there are many challenges in developing this multi-modal AI, we
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believe that the key to realising the urban systems of the future lies in developing multimodal
AI that can link the diverse input data of urban areas.
Lastly, the following messages and ideas were shared:✔ Green infrastructure is sometimes considered a new concept, but it has a long history inurban design, going back thousands of years.
✔ Green infrastructure aims to maximise ecosystem services.
✔ There are different objectives and motivations for implementing smart cities, but theultimate goal is to improve the level of well-being by using the latest information andcommunication technologies to reduce environmental burdens such as energy consumption
and waste, and to free people from the hardships of traffic congestion, air pollution andunsatisfactory work.
✔ Technological solutions must be appropriate to the particular environment. In developing
countries, high-tech solutions have the potential to reduce costs and enhance efficiency, butthey may also exceed the local capacity to operate, maintain and dispose of them properly.
✔ Technological and infrastructural advances and socio-economic development can
influence each other to create and sustain a virtuous cycle of local development.
✔ When considering future urban design, we need to take into account how the cities of the
future will support the development of social sustainability, leaving no-one behind.

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Appendix 3

EAJ STI2050 Committee, Activity Report, Summary of Workshop Proceedings

Schedule
Date and time: 1 July 2021 (Thu), 10.00-12.00 (maximum)
1. Goals and objectives of the meeting
10:00 am - 10:10 am Aims and objectives of the STI2050 Committee (Chair Oki)
2. Presentation of results by each group (10-15 minutes each, 5-10 minutes Q&A)
WG1 10:10 am - 10:30 am Group 1 (Sugiyama)
WG2 10:30 am - 10:50 am

Group 2 (Yasunaga)

WG3 10:50 am - 11:10 am Group 3 (Ohtake)3. General discussion
11:10 am - 11:30 am (maximum 12:00 pm) General discussion
4. Overall summary (Advisor Nakamura)

1. Aims and objectives of the committee: Chairperson Oki
Although it goes without saying that science, technology and innovation are needed looking
ahead to 2050, writing this report was aimed at sharing a vision within EAJ. The very busy
members of the committee spent their weekends putting their ideas into writing. Today wewould like to share some of these. We may not yet have reached a unified whole or a detailed
technology roadmap, but we have had a great many discussions. Committee meetings havemade various discoveries and found new perspectives. We would like to share these points
with you today and receive your opinions and suggestions for further development of thecontent.
2. Presentation of each group's results
WG1: Presenter, Sugiyama
In order to realise a comfortable and resilient society, STI (the power of scientific andtechnological innovation) should be concentrated in cities, but new technologies such as AI
also entail risks and require various precautions. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic has insome respects made us rethink the things that humans should take into consideration. In thisreport, we have proposed a multi-AI networked city that pursues human-centred well-being,
specifically human security and well-being in both normal times and during outbreaks. The
concept of the multi-AI city is that a physical city is made up of units of living spheres that are
networked together. A cyber city is a city in which the data of a physical city is organised inlayers, with these data re-aggregated and visualised. Their size ranges from 10,000 to 30,000
inhabitants. It is envisaged that the city would be able to withstand long-term lockdowns as it
is equipped with basic urban functions. The Multi-AI Well-being Survey System (MAWSS),
which would support the Multi-AI Networked City, would cover different layers, such as
medical living spheres and business living spheres. In presenting a roadmap towards actual
implementation, it is necessary to consider the time gap between the 2050 time frame inwhich the city is to be realised and the progress of science and technology. For the time
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being, only cyber space would constitute the network space, with partial lockdowns put inplace. Futuristically, the physical side would also shift to an autonomous decentralised
system. Developed countries should actively share their technologies and experiences on
multi-AI networks with developing countries. The challenges of low carbon, NEXUS andinfectious disease control can be overcome based on global initiatives that transcend
generations and space, and are then passed on.
WG1 Discussion:・ In urban areas where lockdowns are possible and considering the number of various
businesses, it would be good to have one for every 10,000 or 20,000 people. However, if
the optimal unit were one for every 100,000 people, would provision of services thenpotentially be problematic? It would be interesting to see a list of the density of various
services and the appropriate unit of service.
・ If concentration in peri-urban areas progresses and the elderly are moved to urban areas
where they have no previous connections, the cost of care and other expenses may
become even higher due to the loss balance between physical and mental health. As
nursing care accounts for a much larger share of the national budget than infrastructure,explanations will be easier to understand if nursing care is included.
・ → It may be difficult for older people to travel from the suburbs to the city centre. If
automated driving can replace public transport, there may be no need to transform cities.
A balance between scientific and technological progress is important.
・ The fractal structure is both physical and virtual. Within is a hierarchical structure in which
the smallest unit is followed by another hierarchical unit. As it can be built up further, thestructure allows for overall control.
WG2: Presenter, Yasunaga
The content of WG2 was organised around energy. Lastly, water and food in the nexus isdescribed. Firstly, about 120 countries around the world want to achieve carbon neutrality by
2050. China, which emits up to 30% of the world's emissions, has pledged to achieve this by
2060. The realistic target date for global achievement is considered to be "not long after 2050".
Meanwhile, there are many countries in the world that do not have access to energy. From
this perspective, it is necessary to examine sufficiency level, such as DLS criteria (from the
IIASA report). There is a need for mechanisms of cooperation for sufficiency in developing
countries, from the perspectives of environment and stable supply. The water-energy-foodnexus is examined, adding the areas of economy & industry and environment to make fiveareas.
WG2 Discussion:・ It is assumed that developed countries and China will be able to meet their commitments,or that they must do so. The idea that developing countries must be supported by suchdeveloped countries may be a bit biased.
・ In the field of manufacturing, such as iron and steel, chemicals, etc., is it necessary todescribe how much has been done in terms of energy efficiency, and where thechallenges lie?
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・ → The technological hurdles are higher than you might think. There is a risk of upsetting
the material balance and changing the structure of the chemical industry. For example, it
is very difficult to know how far we can go without using plastics, and what will happen if
we change the total amount of plastics in the world.
・ Will cars overall shift to electric vehicles? What will happen to aeroplanes? Is it too muchto ask for such an overall picture?
・ → There is much more to it than just technological theory, such as cost. Research into
the use of biomass to produce jet fuel is actually taking place, and progress is being madeat the research level. However, costs also includes areas of cultivation, making it difficult
to complete only on the basis of technology.
・ → If the cost performance improves futuristically, would it be accessible to everyone in
the future? If we can use all the ecosystems and technologies available today, would it
be possible to transform society overall as we envision? Perhaps we should also mention
that there has not yet been a comprehensive study of how the price of fossil fuel-based
products will look in the future.
・ How should EAJ proceed with the nexus part? We hope that this will lead to amethodology linked to optimisation.
・ → Society as a whole will need human resources in the future, so there needs to be amechanism for universities to create departments to fund research specialising in thisarea.
・ If the poorest countries economically have a per capita GDP of about 4,000 USD in 30
years or so, they will not reach sufficiency in time.
Are there any ideas on decoupling per capita GDP and sufficiency for 2050-2060? It will
be very difficult to get there if GDP does not grow first.
・ → It is true that 30 years of 5% growth will only quadruple an economy. Countries with aper capita GDP below 1,000 USD may not yet achieve sufficiency. The poorest countries,
such as those in Africa, currently have nothing and need sustained economic growth. How
to define and achieve sufficiency in these countries should be a shared global concern.
WG3: Presenter, Ohtake
The third group was entitled "Realisation of governance based on visualised evidence andtolerance of diverse values". Here we have discussed the role of science and technology insociety, multidisciplinary cooperation and the importance of governance in this context, while
also taking into account the importance of sharing diverse values based on the cultures andhistories of societies, people's lifestyles and tolerance. Society’s relationship with scienceand technology is becoming closer and closer, and societal expectations are becoming
greater as science and technology become more complex. The language of various
disciplines has also become more complex. There are also the issues of AI and genes. The
speed at which impacts are being felt is also increasing. As in the case of COVID-19, there
must be a discussion of risks and benefits. Scientific advice must be a medium of reciprocal
action in order to include the diversity of views in society. It is also necessary to verify theeffectiveness of governance and to evolve the methodology of advisory systems—thedevelopment of guidelines is one way of doing this. The roadmap is a compilation of theseideas.
WG3 Discussion:
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・ We talk about accepting diverse values. For example, we ask the question, “how can westop global warming and limit it to 1.5 degrees?” Science can answer that we have a 60%
chance with these measures. We want economic development, we want to stop global
warming, we want to do both, but science tells us that we can't do the impossible. So what
can science do to address global issues when some people think it is better to prioritise
economic development?
・ → As a society, decisions are made by society as a whole. Traditionally, building
consensus is a major challenge. It is important to show what challenges for what issues
are on the table. Science provides the visual evidence. This is important, and thedecisions made after stakeholders have debated are political decision. However, not all
good results derived from science will be adopted, and science is only about presenting
options. Ultimately, a basis on which policymakers can make their decisions is a strongly
called for in a democracy. When a major disaster or accident occurs, ideally everyone
should be saved, but with limited capacity, consensus is needed even for tentativedecisions. The question of how to proceed in stages becomes a real policy issue. It is therole of science to be able to present such arguments.
・ For scientists and engineers, there is a lot of pressure not only for problem-setting andanswers, but also to give opinions on which option is better. These would include thevalues of the scientists who are asked. For WG3, what opinion prevails? Should we also
speak on the assumption that these are personal values, or that science should beneutral? →There is potential there, and we should first make clear what our values areintended to be, and that we recommend certain options from certain points of view, basedon the facts.
3. General discussion
・ The discussions in WG3 seem to have been highly influenced by the COVID-19 case.
There has likely never been a case where science has had such a close influence on, or
relationship with, political decision-making. Nor has it ever been so visible to the public.
The scientists involved in COVID-19 are not only natural scientists. They came together
with experts in economics and social sciences, humanities and other disciplines, and theirscientific judgements formed the basis of and influenced policy options. Going forward,
we would like to see an analysis and evaluation of this process that includes therelationship between politics and science. There is probably no more realistic case study
than this. It would be even more convincing if the results were summarised andrecommendations such as these made on the basis of them. It would be great if analysis
and evaluation of real cases could be carried out.
・ In the report, we have discussed this situation up to the present as much as possible,
looking at data and so on. One thing is the ongoing and varied nature of the situation,
which is currently causing trouble in other countries as well. We will take this situation into
account as we proceed. The report will need to be completed at some point, and we hope
to discuss it as an example at that stage.
4. Overall summary: Advisor Nakamura
The committee members have spent a lot of time and effort on this project, and I think theresults have been excellent. I would like to thank all of you who participated in today’s online
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symposium. The EAJ previously launched a project on the role of science, technology andinnovation in the SDGs, and within that project, we established a study group on SDGs
finance. It was then recommended that a committee should be set up for ongoing study on
the nature of science, technology and innovation for the SDGs. In response to thatrecommendation, this Science, Technology and Innovation 2050 Committee was launchedwith Chairperson Oki as its head. It was very important for us to narrow down the themes tothree. From the point of view of breadth and impact, This approach is right on target. It is
likewise very important to visualise the kind of society we want to create and to put this vision
onto a roadmap. Then we need a process for continuous review of the ongoing situation in
our society. I have been very impressed by your discussions today. I would like to thank you
all very much for joining us today.

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