The Arms-Related
Risk Analysis Toolkit
Practical guidance for integrating
conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and prevention
SIMON YAZGIERICA MUMFORD

About UNIDIRThe United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous
institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security.
UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateraldisarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on
Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to a variety of existing andfuture armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working
with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980,UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR
activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations.

Acknowledgements
Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all the Institute’s
activities. This area of research of the Conventional Arms Programme is supported by theGovernments of Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Contributors
The authors wish to thank the following experts who have provided valuable direction
and comprehensive feedback during the review process, including, Cate Buchanan, Hana
Salama, Jerome Mellon, Lesley Myers, Marco Donati, Masayo Kondo Rossier, Naomie
Miyashita, Nicolas Florquin, Nora Allgaier, and the Disarmament, Demobilization andReintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) sections of the United Nations
Department of Peace Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. We
are also grateful for the UNIDIR Conventional Arms Programme team members who
provided valuable inputs into the Toolkit, namely, Himayu Shiotani, Paul Holtom, Hardy
Giezendanner, Barbara Morais Figueiredo, Sarah Marie Grand Clement, Alfredo Malaret
Baldo, Francesca Batault, and Theo Bajon. Layout and design by Nicolas Quiroga.

Reference
UNIDIR (2021) “The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit: Practical guidance for integrating
conventional arms-related risks into conflict analysis and prevention”

Note
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do
not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of theUnited Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of
its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views
expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They
do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff
members or sponsors.
Photo credit for cover page: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

unidir.org | © UNIDIR 2021

UNIDIR

The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
Practical guidance for integrating conventionalarms-related risks into conflict analysis and prevention

This is a UNIDIR Toolkit, designed to contribute to ongoing efforts toinclude conventional arms and ammunition-related risks in conflict
analysis and conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts.
The Toolkit consists of three tools: the Arms-Related Risk Analysis
Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool and the Arms-Related Information
Sources Compendium Tool.
This Toolkit should be considered a working document subject tochanges, additions, edits and corrections. The working document ismeant to stimulate discussion, debate and feedback. The authors may
revise and correct the text without announcing the edits or issuing aformal erratum. As such, users are encouraged to use the most up-todate version of the Toolkit, as posted on the unidir.org website.
UNIDIR welcomes and encourages all feedback on improving the
Toolkit and building on it for future iterations.

Users of the Toolkit are encouraged to provide UNIDIR with feedback
that can support improvement by completing a short feedback form,
available at: https://forms.office.com/r/vpEVX6ae3e

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abbreviationsvi
About the authorsvii
Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1
Purpose of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
3
Audience for the Toolkit
3
Methodology4Structure of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
4
Overview of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
6Part 1: Why apply an arms control lens to conflict analysis?�������������������������������������� 9
Applying a conventional arms control lens to conflict analysis 
Addressing challenges to include arms control in conflict analysis

1011Part 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit����������������������������������������������� 13
What is the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool?
Risk Areas 
Risk Factors
Risk Points
How to use the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
Risk Factor Selector Tool
Considerations for using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
Weighting and aggregation
Gender-sensitive conflict analysis

14
15
15
15
16
18
18
18
18

Part 3: Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool����������������������������������������������������������������������� 21
Risk Area 1: Proliferation of conventional arms
Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms
Risk Area 3: Use of conventional arms during a conflict
Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict
Risk Area 5: Weapons and ammunition management

23
39
53
63
83

Part 4: Risk Factor Selector Tool������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 91
Assessment of Risk Factors according to conflict parameters
Assessment of Risk Factors according to geographic scope of application
Assessment of Risk Factors according to different stages of a conflictiv

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKIT

93
95
97

UNIDIR
Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool�������������������������������99
Selection of information sources and collection methods
List of information sources by theme

100
101

Part 6: The Way Forward��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������111
Annex A: Templates for the Risk Factor Selector Tool�������������������������������������������� 113
Assessment of Risk Factors according to conflict parameters
Assessment of Risk Factors according to geographic scope of application 
Assessment of Risk Factors according to different stages of a conflict

114
115
116

Annex B: Glossary of key terms and definitions�������������������������������������������������������� 117
Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������125

Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and preventionv

Abbreviations
DDR

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

GBV

gender-based violence

IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
IED

improvised explosive device

INTERPOL

International Criminal Police Organization

MOSAIC	Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium
Natcomnational commission

NGO

non-governmental organization

SALW

small arms and light weapons

SGBV

sexual and gender-based violence

UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament ResearchWAMviweapons and ammunition management

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

About the authors
SIMON YAZGI is a Senior Advisor at the United Nations Integrated Transition
Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). He is also a senior non-resident
fellow at UNIDIR where in 2019, as a member of the Conventional Arms
Programme, he helped to launch UNIDIR’s workstream on Integrating Conventional Arms Control into Conflict Prevention and Management. Prior tothis he was the senior advisor on security arrangements in the United Nations
Stand-by Team of Senior Mediation Advisors and the Chief of Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in the United Nations Departmentof Peace Operations. Simon has over 20 years of experience in peacemaking
and peacekeeping with the United Nations in the field and at headquarters. His areas of expertise include conflict prevention and management,
ceasefires, peace mediation, DDR, security sector reform, conflict analysis,
Small Arms and Light Weapons control and political risk analysis.

ERICA MUMFORD is an Associate Researcher with UNIDIR’s ConventionalArms Programme, where she focuses on the Integrating Conventional Arms
Control into Conflict Prevention and Management workstream. Prior to thisshe worked with the United Nations Department of Peace Operations in the
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section covering
issues related to weapons and ammunition management in peacekeeping settings. Her areas of expertise include conventional arms control
and disarmament in peacekeeping contexts and conflict prevention. Erica
holds a master’s degree in International Security from the Institut d’études
politiques of Paris, Sciences Po, and speaks French and English.

Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and preventionvii

Photo Credit: UN Photo/Marco Dormino

Introduction
1

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Introduction
Since 2001, the number of conflicts worldwide has increased.1 Conventional arms have been theweapons of choice in almost all these armed conflicts,2 and it is unsurprising that this increase inviolence and armed actors has been matched by an increase in the availability of such weapons
globally. There are over 1 billion firearms in the world, the majority of which are in civilian hands.3
Without these and the millions of other conventional arms and ammunition, there is no such thingas an armed conflict. Their availability, low cost and ease of operation make it relatively easy for
conflict parties to initiate and sustain armed conflict, complicating and undermining international
efforts to prevent conflict, restore peace and deliver humanitarian assistance.4
For the United Nations and other peace and security actors, better accounting for the impact ofillicit arms and ammunition on facilitating and prolonging armed conflict brings enhanced understanding of how to leverage arms control to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. The need to doso was reaffirmed through Security Council resolution 2171 (2014), which stated:
a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy should include, inter alia, early warning,
preventive diplomacy, mediation, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, practical
disarmament and other measures to contribute to combating the proliferationand illicit trade of arms, accountability measures as well as inclusive post-conflict
peace-building.5
The United Nations Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament noted that “there has been
limited engagement within the [United Nations] system on how issues relating to arms, includingarms trafficking, and how measures within the disarmament toolkit can be utilized for conflict prevention, management and resolution”.6 Integrating arms control into conflict prevention is therefore
not a new concept, but it remains an underexplored and underutilized one.
Against this backdrop, the United Nations has renewed its commitment to conflict prevention,
placing a particular emphasis on preventing conflicts from occurring (upstream prevention), in
addition to preventing the escalation of conflicts or resolving them.7 It has also stepped up its
conventional arms control activities, at both the global and national levels. For instance, efforts todisarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants have become common activities since their introduction to peacekeeping in Central America in 1989,8 and the major multilateral conventional arms
control instruments have all been introduced since 1991.9
1

Pettersson and Oberg (2020).

2

Security Council Report (2013).

3

Karp (2018, 4, box 1).

4

Duquet (2009, 169–85).

5

United Nations Security Council (2014).

6

UNODA (2018b, 42).

7
“The Security Council further recalls that a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy should include, inter alia, early
warning, preventive deployment, mediation, peacekeeping, non-proliferation, accountability measures as well as post-conflict
peacebuilding, and recognizes that these components are interdependent, complementary, and non-sequential.” United Nations Security Council (2018).
8
The agreement reached on 7 August 1989 by the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras andNicaragua established a joint plan for voluntary demobilization, repatriation or relocation of the members of the Nicaraguan
resistance. An International Support and Verification Commission was established by the United Nations Secretary-General andthe Secretary General of the Organization of American States on 6 September 1989 and was tasked to collect the weapons,materiel and military equipment of members of the Nicaraguan resistance. United Nations Security Council (1989).
9

These include the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (1991); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and prevention2

Despite these efforts, the sheer number of conventional arms has meant that global measures tocontrol them have been met with limited success. Conflicts involving conventional weapons still
occur, and there is a need to reorient arms control efforts to address this at regional, national andlocal levels. Practical measures to do so already exist, but they are rarely integrated into conflict
prevention strategies. Instead, conflict prevention efforts largely focus on the underlying causes ofconflict that drive people to take up arms.
Conventional arms key terms
This Toolkit uses the term “arms” interchangeably with “conventional arms”. The types of weapons being
discussed in this Toolkit include small arms and light weapons (SALW), military weapons, civilian arms, andfirearms, which have different meanings when used in context. The use of “military weapons” or “civilian
weapons” does not infer legality in this context.

BOX 1

Military weapons in this context are used by non-State actors in an armed conflict in sufficient quantities
to match those held by government forces, as opposed to the use of hunting rifles or shotguns. Military
weapons are likely to be used for political violence by armed actors who seek to challenge security forces.
Civilian weapons in this context are intended for personal use outside of the armed service of a State(including by private security companies) or for recreation and are less suitable for insurgency. The legal
definition of a civilian firearm varies, as some States allow civilian ownership of certain firearms that are restricted to military use in other States. In most countries, civilian ownership of SALW is limited to small arms,
or firearms, meaning “any portable barreled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily
converted to expel a shot, bullet or projective by the action of any explosive”.10 The United Nations Registerof Conventional Arms defines seven categories of major conventional arms, in addition to SALW, which aredefined in its glossary. 11

Purpose of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
In the 2018 Agenda for Disarmament, the United Nations Secretary-General called for the integration of conventional arms control into United Nations conflict prevention and management
activities and requested that “the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Institutefor Disarmament Research and all other relevant entities … explore how to better integrate anunderstanding of the impact of arms into assessments, risk analyses and conflict prevention
activities carried out by the Department of Political Affairs and other relevant entities”.12 This
Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit responds to this call by providing guidance on how to gather
and interpret arms-related information for conflict prevention efforts.

Audience for the Toolkit
The target audience for this Toolkit includes the United Nations departments, offices and programmes, and their corresponding field presences, tasked with conflict prevention, as well asother actors undertaking conflict analysis for other purposes. The target audience includes:•

Special envoys•

Regional offices•

Special political missions•

United Nations resident coordinators•

Peacekeeping operations•

United Nations country teams13

Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, also known as the Ottawa Convention(drafted in 1997 and opened for signature in 1999); the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Tradein Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2001); and the Arms Trade Treaty (2013).
10

Small Arms Survey (2011); United Nations General Assembly (2001).

11

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: https://www.unroca.org/categories

12 UNODA (2018b, 42).
13

3

See UNDPA (2016).

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
These actors carry out conflict analysis, whether this is directly related to conflict prevention(such as the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs) or peripheral to it (such as somecountry teams and humanitarian country teams). These structures typically address conflicts indifferent stages of their evolution:•

Resident coordinators, country teams and regional offices: prior to a conflict breaking
out and post-conflict (upstream prevention and the prevention of reoccurrence of conflict,respectively)•

Regional offices, special envoys and peace operations: in times of conflict (conflict
management and resolution)

As a premium is put on upstream prevention, it is particularly important to increase the conflict
analysis capacity of resident coordinators and country teams, which are often the least well-resourced to undertake this task.14 Therefore, this Toolkit has been developed for use with minimal
resources and can be used by all United Nations prevention actors, as well as non-United Nations
actors undertaking conflict analysis, whether for prevention or other purposes, such as to inform
humanitarian interventions.

Methodology
The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit builds on research undertaken by UNIDIR as part of its
workstream “Integrating Conventional Arms Control into Conflict Prevention and Management”.
Launched in October 2019, the workstream consisted of several activities that contributed
towards the development of this Toolkit, including:•

A comprehensive literature review of conflict analysis, arms control, and prevention papers•

A preliminary survey of United Nations arms control and prevention actors•

A series of online meetings, across a nine-week period, as part of a community of practice
workshop that brought together arms control experts and prevention actors15•

Fieldwork in East and West Africa•

A review of 24 United Nations conflict analysis frameworks, guides and policies

Structure of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
This Toolkit is a practical guide that conflict prevention analysts can use to identify and integrate
conventional arms-related factors into their work. As such, it does not replace a traditional conflict analysis but complements and expands it. The Toolkit consists of three tools: theArms-Related Risk Analysis Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool, and the Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool. It is organized as follows:Part 1: Why apply an arms control lens to conflict analysis? Provides an overview of conflict
analysis and prevention and then explains the benefits of integrating arms-related factors into
conflict analysis frameworks for conflict prevention.

14

Duursma (2017, 823–47).

15

UNIDIR (2020).
Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and prevention

4

Part 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit: Provides an overview of the main toolsthat make up the Toolkit (the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool andthe Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool) and describes how analysts can apply
them to measure arms- and conflict-related risks in practice.
Part 3: Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool: Presents the framework for assessing arms-relatedrisks across the following components:
Risk Areas: Cover different features of how conventional arms affect conflicts.
Risk Factors: Represent conditions that increase the risk of (or susceptibility to) the outbreakof, escalation of or return to conflict.
Risk Points: Support assessment of the likelihood of the Risk Factor occurring and its impact
on conflict dynamics.
Options for assessing the Risk Point: Suggest methods to measure the presence of each
Risk Point and Risk Area.
Indicators: Provide markers against which to measure approximate change to each option
for assessing the Risk Point.
Part 4: Risk Factor Selector Tool: Guides analysts in choosing the appropriate arms-related Risk
Factors to consider for their conflict analysis.
Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool: Offers information collection
methods and suggested information sources to enable analysts to identify appropriate information to be used with the Arms-Related Risk Analysis and Risk Factor Selector Tools.
This Toolkit is the starting point, not a full blueprint. Using this Toolkit, analysts can identify theappropriate arms control-related risks for their context, understand how those risks might affectthe situation, and be guided on where to find information to include in their conflict analysis. The
suggested Risk Areas, Risk Factors and Risk Points are meant to trigger ideas for more effective
conflict analysis by integrating conventional arms and ammunition considerations into theanalysis. As more data and information sources related to weapons become available and more
analysts use the Toolkit, practices will evolve, ideas may be refined, and this document might be
updated.

Users of the Toolkit are encouraged to provide UNIDIR with feedback that can support improvement by completing a short feedback form, available at: https://forms.office.com/r/vpEVX6ae3e

5

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
Overview of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMSRISK FACTORRISK POINT
1.1.1: Number of conventional arms and ammunition available

1.1:  Availability of conventional arms andammunition

1.1.2: Conventional arms and ammunition seizures
1.1.3: Types of conventional arms and ammunition
1.1.4: Use of conventional arms to commit violent acts
1.1.5: Legal sales and ease of access to conventional arms and ammunition

1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition

1.2.1: Geographic spread of conflict events

1.3: Societal values andconventional arms
and ammunition

1.3.1: Societal values on conventional arms use

1.2.2: Geographic spread of conventional arms and ammunition
1.2.3: Presence of armed actors in a particular location or area

1.4.1: Size and equipping of State security forces
1.4: Levels of militarization

1.4.2: Presence and formation of armed movements or movements thatembrace and promote military values
1.4.3: Nature and use of State security forces
1.4.4: Role of the military in politics and public life, and societal acceptance

RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMSRISK FACTORRISK POINT

2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers

2.1.1: N umber and types of conventional arms and systems transferred

2.2:  Diversion of arms
and ammunition

2.1.2: Presence of unilateral or multilateral arms embargoes
2.2.1: Diversion-enabling factors
2.2.2: Points of diversion and methods used
2.2.3: History or record of diversion
2.3.1: I nvolvement of armed groups in illicit trafficking in weapons andmilitary equipment

2.3: Illicit transfers andmarkets

2.3.2: State capacity to detect possibly illicit weapons cargos
2.3.3: State capacity to address illicit weapons transfers
2.3.4: Availability of illicit conventional arms and ammunition
2.4.1: Civilian acquisition and holdings

2.4: Civilian purchase of
conventional arms

2.4.2: L egal frameworks governing civilian possession of weapons andthe ability to ensure their compliance2.4.3: Arms dealers
2.4.4: Perceptions of safety

Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and prevention

6

RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICTRISK FACTORRISK POINT

3.1: Conflict intensity,
tactics and targeting

3.1.1: Changes in conflict intensity

3.2: Types of conventional arms present

3.2.1: Types of conventional arms present in country

3.3: Who is using theweapons

3.3.1: Armed actors and their levels of cohesion

3.4: Where (in which
regions and areas)
conventional arms arebeing used

3.4.1: Territorial control and the deployment of weapons

3.1.2: Changes in a conflict actor’s tactics and targeting

3.3.2: Supply and control of arms by and for conflict actors

RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A
CONFLICTRISK FACTOR
4.1: Modalities forending the conflict
4.2: Use of arms inpost-conflict settings
4.3: Types of arms andarmed violence

RISK POINT
4.1.1: Modalities for ending the conflict
4.2.1: Scope and intensity of post-conflict armed violence
4.2.2: Perpetrators and targets of armed violence
4.2.3: Responses to armed violence
4.3.1: Types of conventional arms
4.3.2: Types and nature of armed incidents
4.4.1: Signatory State and non-State parties
4.4.2: Non-signatory parties

4.4: Managing current
and former armed
actors and their
weapons

4.4.3: State-sponsored or other armed actors
4.4.4: I nformal security providers and redeployment of State security
providers
4.4.5: Improved use and management of arms and ammunition held by
the security forces.
4.4.6: Arms caches and residual weapons
4.4.7: Civilian arms control programming

4.5: Geography andtargets of armed
violence

4.5.1: Geographic mapping of armed violence
4.5.2: Targets of armed violence

RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)
RISK FACTOR
5.1: National regulations
for WAMRISK POINT
5.1.1: Legal and regulatory frameworks at the national level
5.2.1: National structures for WAM
5.2.2: Integration of WAM into security institutions

5.2: National capacities
for WAM

5.2.3: Stockpile management standards and procedures
5.2.4: Marking and record-keeping systems
5.2.5: Disposal including destruction
5.2.6: Community-based WAM

7

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and prevention

8

Photo Credit: UN Photo/Stuart PricePart 1:
Why apply an arms
control lens to conflict
analysis?
9

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Part 1: Why apply an arms control lens to conflict analysis?
This section provides an overview of how and why it is important to integrate arms-related risks into
conflict analysis frameworks for conflict prevention. It outlines the differences between conflict
and armed conflict and discusses how to apply an “arms control lens” to supplement a traditional
conflict analysis. Finally, it discusses some of the challenges for integrating arms control into
conflict prevention and how these challenges have informed the development of the Arms-Related
Risk Analysis Toolkit.

Conflict and armed conflict

BOX 2

Over 1.5 billion people around the world live in a community affected by armed conflict, armed violence orhigh levels of crime, and over 526,000 people die each year as a result of violence or conflict.16 Whereas
within the United Nations reference is usually made to “conflict prevention”, the focus of most related
activities are on armed conflict prevention. Therefore, for the purpose of this Toolkit, references to“conflict” or “conflict prevention” should be taken to mean armed conflict and armed conflict prevention.
This distinction is important as conflict is inherent to all societies and can be a constructive driver of positive
societal change, although it is also a key precursor to armed conflict.
Armed conflict, however, destroys lives and livelihoods, triggers forced displacement, hinders development
efforts, destroys infrastructure and impedes investment in reconstruction, among other undesirable
outcomes. It creates a climate of impunity, mistrust and corruption that is a barrier to reconciliation andpeacebuilding, undermines vital public institutions and is closely tied to transnational crime. In many
countries, realizing development outcomes, including the Sustainable Development Goals, requires dealing
with armed conflict first. Therefore, although it may not always be appropriate to avoid all conflict, it isalways advisable to avoid armed conflict.

Applying a conventional arms control lens to conflict analysis
Strategies to prevent, manage or resolve violent conflict are more likely to succeed if they are
grounded in a clear understanding of the causes and potential trajectory of a conflict.17 Conflict
analysis addresses the relationship of an issue (in this case, conventional arms) with conflict,instability and peace, and it can provide a baseline to evaluate the impact of interventions on
a conflict.18 As without conventional arms and ammunition there can be no armed conflict, orat least no party to conflict armed with sufficient firepower to challenge a State’s monopolyof force, it is difficult to undertake a comprehensive conflict analysis without considering thepresence and impact of weapons on the conflict. Conventional arms control information is,
however, often left out of conflict analyses. Where it is considered, it is usually integrated into
conflict analysis during or after a conflict, once arms are visible and have been used.19 In casesthat focus on upstream prevention,20 arms-related indicators should be used as a part of conflict
16 Gates et al. (2015).
17 An analysis of 26 case studies and over 1,000 consultations with practitioners found strong evidence that the “more practitioners know about the conflicts they are trying to address, the more likely they are to identify effective avenues for work, andthe less likely they are to make mistakes”. Likewise, the same study found that ineffective programmes often had something incommon: they either were not based on a conflict analysis or were informed by inadequate analyses. CDA Collaborative (2013).
18

Herbert (2017).

19 In many cases, the same is true of the arms control measures used by the United Nations. The United Nations recognized
this in General Assembly resolution A/RES/51/45 N of 10 December 1996, which stressed the importance of measures such as
the collection, control and disposal of arms, especially small arms and light weapons – coupled with restraint over the production, procurement and transfer of such arms, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, demining, andconversion – for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in areas that have suffered from conflict.
20 Beyond the moral imperative for the international community to prevent armed conflicts from occurring, there is afinancial incentive, as prevention is economically beneficial: even in the most pessimistic scenario, the average net savings ofprevention are close to US$5 billion per year. In the most optimistic scenario, the net savings are almost US$70 billion. United
Nations and World Bank (2018).

Part 1: Why apply an arms control lens to conflict analysis?

10analysis that takes place before a dispute becomes an armed conflict21 and should inform
upstream prevention strategies to avoid this from happening.
Applying a conventional arms control lens to conflict analysis can usefully guide the adaptation ofan analysis by identifying additional arms-related issue areas and/or questions that could easily
be added to existing conflict analysis tools, making them more arms control sensitive. It can
improve coherence by focusing attention on a set of challenging issues that reside at the nexusof peace, security and development and can help analysts and prevention actors think throughcomplex issues regarding the causes and effects of armed conflict.22 Introducing a conventionalarms control lens to conflict analysis can also help identify strategic entry points for intervention.
This Toolkit provides a framework for integrating arms-related data into conflict analyses to allow
for the formulation of more strategic or targeted interventions.23

Addressing challenges to include arms control in conflict analysis
Despite the broad understanding that excessive arms proliferation and acquisition is a driving
factor for conflict, analysis of the role and impact of weapons rarely goes deeper than this, andarms control is seldom integrated into conflict prevention strategies. Some of the practicalreasons for this have been identified by UNIDIR in its work on conflict prevention.24 These
reasons include:•

Concerns around the political sensitivity of arms control•

A limited understanding of how arms affect conflict settings•

A lack of technical resources or know-how to analyse conventional arms-related issues•

Limited access to information sources and resources

This Toolkit addresses these constraints by providing guidance and a simple method for integrating arms control into conflict analysis. In doing so:•

The data required for the analysis have been kept as simple and non-technical as
possible to allow persons with little or no background in arms control to apply an arms
control lens.

•Suggestions have been made on information sources and how to collect information
required for the analysis (see Part 5).

•

The Toolkit focuses on key elements of interest in conflict trend analysis, seeking tosupport existing conflict analysis data points (such as on armed actors) by bringing in
new elements of information.

•

The options for assessing the Risk Point provided were designed specifically tosupport the analysis of conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

21

This requires conflict analysis to be used in both conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

22

Lucey (2015, 500–11).

23 As a tool of violent conflict, conventional arms can be considered a part of structural conditions (e.g. a factor of militarization of society); however, they are more often viewed as a proximate cause of violence as they can accentuate structural causes
and contribute to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation. The Risk Points and options for assessing
the Risk Point developed as part of this Toolkit consider arms as both structural and proximate factors. The Toolkit considers
that they may be both predictors, that is to say “phenomena or risk factors that are highly correlated with incidence of armed
violence” (Kisielewski et al., 2010), and sustainers of armed violence since they allow armed conflict to continue once it has
started.
24

11

UNIDIR (2020).

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Part 1: Why apply an arms control lens to conflict analysis?

12Photo Credit: UN Photo/Hector Latorre

Part 2:Using the Arms-Related
Risk Analysis Toolkit
13

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Part 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
This section provides an overview of the main tools that make up the Toolkit (the Arms-Related
Risk Analysis Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool and the Arms-Related Information Sources
Compendium Tool) and describes how analysts can apply them to measure arms- and conflict-related risks in practice. It also provides information on the components for assessing the arms-relatedrisks using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool.

What is the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool?
The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool enables an integrated analysis and risk assessment ofarms-related risks. It facilitates the systematic collection of accurate and reliable information for
an assessment of arms-related risks in conflict-affected and high-risk areas. While this tool may
support other types of analysis, it is primarily aimed at better understanding conflict-affected
and high-risk areas as opposed to countries where the threat of an outbreak of conflict is relatively low.
The Toolkit contains three main components for assessing arms-related risks:•

5 Risk Areas•

19 Risk Factors•

54 Risk Points► 134 options for assessing the Risk Point► 371 indicators

figure1

The main components of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool

5 Risk Areas

19 Risk Factors

54 Risk Points

covering different features of how conventional arms affect conflicts

representing conditions that increase therisk of (or susceptibility to) the outbreakof, escalation of or return to conflictsupporting assessment of the likelihood of
the Risk Factor occurring

Part 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

14

Risk Areas
Each of the five Risk Areas covers a different feature of how conventional arms affect conflict:
Risk Area 1: Proliferation of conventional arms
Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms
Risk Area 3: Use of conventional arms during a conflict
Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict
Risk Area 5: Weapons and ammunition management
The Risk Areas cover a variety of issues that may influence the trajectory of a conflict or shape
the type of actors involved, including the types of conventional arms, who holds them, and how
they are used.

Risk Factors
Risk Factors are conditions that increase the risk of (or susceptibility to) the outbreak of, escalation of or return to conflict. These factors include arms-related behaviours, circumstancesor elements that create an environment conducive to the outbreak, escalation or recurrenceof conflict. They provide conflict analysis actors with a broad “menu” of options for includingarms-related information in their analysis. Each Risk Area includes several arms-related Risk
Factors. Each Risk Factor offers a set of other considerations, which may facilitate analysis andstimulate thinking on the use of the indicators.

Risk Points
Risk Points represent specific arms-related issues for consideration by analysts when examining
Risk Areas and Risk Factors. The Risk Points are used to evaluate the likelihood of the Risk
Factors occurring and their impact on conflict dynamics. The Risk Points consist of the following
two elements:
Options for assessing the Risk Point
Options for assessing the Risk Point provide suggestions on methods to measure the presence of a Risk Point in a particular context in order to facilitate information-gathering in situations where reliable data could be limited and to support the triangulation of information whenavailable.
Indicators
Indicators provide markers against which to measure approximate change to each option forassessing the Risk Point.

15

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
How to use the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

figure2

Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

STEP 1

STEP 2

STEP 3Arms-Related Risk
Analysis Tool

Risk Factor Selector
Tool

Arms-RelatedInformation Sources
Compendium Tool

Select Risk Area(s)and Risk Factor(s) of
relevance for youranalysis

Consider the Risk
Factors of relevanceto narrow down theanalysis further

Complete youranalysis using
appropriate
information sources

Step 1 - Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool: Select Risk Area(s) and Risk Factor(s) of relevance foryour analysis. Decide on which Risk Areas and related Risk Factors are applicable in the context
the analyst is looking at and select the ones to use.25 During this step of the analysis process, theoptions for assessing the Risk Points and indicators provide information that signals change andallows the analyst to see differences or developments (for example, improvements or deterioration)
in a conflict situation. Because in most cases the changes are abstract, the indicators should not beseen as a tangible measure of change, but they can help approximate the change.26 The options forassessing the Risk Point must be considered as part of the broader context, rather than in isolation,
and analysts are encouraged to look at other factors affecting a conflict setting in addition to thevariables offered in the Toolkit. Finally, each Risk Factor offers a set of “other considerations”, which
may facilitate analysis and stimulate thinking on the use of the Risk Points.
Step 2 – Risk Factor Selector Tool: Consider the Risk Factors of relevance to narrow down theanalysis further. Decision-making on the selection of Risk Areas and Risk Factors is supportedby the Risk Factor Selector Tool and should be used in parallel to, or to complement, the process
outlined in Step 1.
Step 3 - Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool: Complete your analysis using appropriate information sources. To conduct the analysis using the selected Risk Areas, Risk Factors
and Risk Points, analysts should turn to the Arms-related Information Sources Compendium Tool.
An analyst should use the Risk Areas, Risk Factors and Risk Points to guide the collection andassessment of information for a given situation. An integrated and balanced approach to examiningarms-related information as part of broader political, security and economic factors is recommended.
25 Annex A – which disaggregates the Risk Factors by applicability in terms of their impact on conflict parameters, their geographic scope of application and their application at different stages of a conflict – can support in this.
26 “Indicators are inevitable approximations. They are not the same as the desired change, but only an indicator of thatchange. They are imperfect and vary in validity and reliability.” Patton (1996, 159).
Part 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

16figure3

Considerations for using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

Choosing Risk Areas and Risk Factors
Not all Risk Factors need to be present for there to be a significant arms-related risk that might influence the likelihood of armed
conflict or the direction of an existing conflict.
The Risk Factors and the indicators are not ranked, as their relative
importance will differ according to the context. Depending on
the situation being analysed, some Risk Factors will have greater
relevance than others or will be manifest more often than others.

Selecting Risk Points
The choice of Risk Points will be determined by the analysts applying
them and might be dictated by the areas in which information issought; the availability of data or other information to measure a
Risk Point; the ability to triangulate data; and whether the data isrepresentative by location, time and theme. For this reason, there
are different options for assessing the Risk Points and indicators
provided for analysts.
Many of the Risk Points used in this tool do not neatly fit into
specific categorizations, and some are therefore situated withinmore than one Risk Factor. There are also several Risk Points that
do not directly aim to measure progress in conflict prevention orarms control but that could be regarded as proxy indicators onthese themes. Caution should also be given to the selection of Risk
Points to avoid making simplistic associations that disregard thebroader context.

Conducting the assessment
There may be situations where, although the data gathered point
to the presence of an arms-related risk, this does not materializein the assessment. This could be due to the absence of a triggering
event or the presence of a strong mitigating factor. These mitigating factors can fade or disappear, and triggers can occur unexpectedly leading to a sudden change in the situation and the need for a
new assessment.
Analysts will need to be flexible when considering and weighing all
the elements in this framework and situate them within a broader
political, contextual, historical and cultural analysis. An analysis
using the Risk Points should not be conducted in isolation fromthese contextual factors. In addition, given the emergence of new
trends and patterns of conflict-related violence, assessments
should be open to new elements that might surface over time.

17

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
Risk Factor Selector Tool
Analysts can use the Risk Factor Selector Tool to support their analysis. This tool guides decision-making on which Risk Factors and Risk Areas are appropriate for a specific analysis, basedon their relevance according to the following parameters:; Assessment according to conflict parameters (likelihood, duration, intensity, type and actors); Assessment according to geographic scope of application (regional, national and local); Assessment according to different stages of a conflict (before, during and after)
Analysts should review the suggested applicability columns within each table to identify the Risk
Factors pertinent to their context. The assessment of the applicability of each Risk Factor to acertain parameter is indicative and may vary within different contexts. The Risk Factor Selector
Tool, therefore, provides suggestions or a starting point for further nuanced, context-specificresearch as to how arms may influence a given situation. It can support decision-making but
should not be seen as a replacement for more in-depth analytical processes and consultations
required for planning purposes.

Considerations for using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
Weighting and aggregation
Weights represent an informed assessment of the importance of each Risk Point that an
analyst needs to decide on. The weights of each individual Risk Point can then be aggregatedto provide an overall weighting for an issue. The aggregation involves a further value judgment
on how important an individual Risk Point is in relation to the other Risk Points chosen. This ishighly subjective and dependent on the context analysts are considering. As a result, weights
have not been pre-established in the Risk Points suggested in the Toolkit, although analysts
are free to develop their own context-relevant weightings when assessing them.
In many cases, the data suggested in the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit are aggregatedand analysed to establish trends over time, and the Risk Points are likely to be ordinal, meaningthat they give information in terms of “more or less”, but not precisely how much more or less.
This methodological approach was chosen as it was felt that it complements the nature of thesources and types of information required for the analysis.

Gender-sensitive conflict analysis
A conflict analysis that is gender blind fails to account for the different roles and diverse needsof people of all genders, ages, including children and youth, and can lead to the exacerbation ofrisks. Therefore, undertaking a gender-sensitive conflict analysis is the first – and a vital – stepin bringing a gender lens to conflict prevention programme design and monitoring and evaluation. Women, men, boys, girls and people of different gender identities will have different
experiences, opportunities and constraints due to gender norms in their society. Consequently, gender-sensitive conflict analysis recognizes that the causes and impacts of armed conflictare gendered. Applying a gender lens can enhance a conflict prevention actor’s understandingof the situation by analysing the differentiated impact of armed conflict on people of all ages
and genders, and their multiple roles in such conflict. This more nuanced understanding of aconflict supports the ability to respond by involving new perspectives, actors, entry points andopportunities for positive change. In addition to collecting gender- and age-disaggregatedPart 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

18data on the impacts of a conflict, conducting gender-sensitive analysis requires systematicefforts to understand the gendered causes, structures, stakeholders and dynamics of a conflict, including discriminatory or exclusionary practices that lead to targeted violence against
certain groups.
Integrating gender considerations into arms control risks for conflict analysis may appear
less obvious, but many of the Risk Points proposed as part of this tool support an analysis
not just of arms flows but also of perceptions of security or safety, the acceptance of weapons and armed violence, the use of these weapons to perpetrate different types of violence,the perpetrators and victims or target groups, all of which are gendered. Finally, it should be
remembered that “paying no specific attention to gender in interventions does not makethese interventions ‘gender-neutral’; rather, they may reinforce the status quo or even advanceinequality”.27

Typology of conventional arms and ammunition

BOX 3

27

19

In addition to looking at the number of weapons, a typology of conventional arms and ammunition to disaggregate data by make, model, origin, calibre and age of weapons is encouraged across all Risk Areas
to provide deeper insights on conflict dynamics. Data on both the number and type of weapons could beindicative of new sources of illicit supply and heightened demand. Variations and sudden shifts in the types
of weapons and ammunition circulating might indicate a changing risk or aggravation of conflict. This consideration may be applied across all Risk Areas, depending on the prevalence of arms in your setting.

Tielemanns (2015, 12).

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Part 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

20Part 3:Arms-Related Risk
Analysis Tool
21

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Part 3: Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool
The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool presented in this section is composed of five Risk Areas foruse in analysis. These provide analysts with a choice of Risk Factors that may be applicable in thecontexts they are working on, as well as options for assessing them and indicators for measuring
each one. These are supported by the Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool, which
provides a non-exhaustive list of information sources and data collection methods to support theanalyst in using this tool.

ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOL:OVERVIEW OF THE RISK AREAS AND RISK FACTORSRISK AREA 1:
PROLIFERATIONOFCONVENTIONALARMSRISK AREA 2:
CHANNELS OF
ACCESS TOCONVENTIONALARMSRISK AREA 3:
USE OF
CONVENTIONAL
ARMS DURING A
CONFLICTRISK AREA 4:
USE ANDMANAGEMENTOF
CONVENTIONAL
ARMS AFTER A
CONFLICTRISK AREA 5:
WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION
MANAGEMENT(WAM)

RISK FACTOR
1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition
1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition
1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition
1.4: Levels of militarization

RISK FACTOR
2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers
2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition
2.3: Illicit transfers and markets
2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms

RISK FACTOR
3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting
3.2: Types of conventional arms present
3.3: Who is using the weapons
3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being
used

RISK FACTOR
4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict
4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings
4.3: Types of arms and armed violence
4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons
4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence

RISK FACTOR
5.1: National regulations for WAM
5.2: National capacities for WAM

Part 3: Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool

22

Risk Area 1:
Proliferation of conventional arms
Armed conflict is most likely to occur in countries where the inputs for armed conflict, including
weapons, are present. This section looks broadly at what the presence of conventional arms andammunition indicates with regard to the likelihood of conflict and how their presence can shape aconflict. To do so, this section examines four Risk Factors relating to conventional arms proliferation.

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 1
RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS
Risk Factor

Risk Point
1.1.1: Number of conventional arms and ammunition
available
1.1.2: Conventional arms and ammunition seizures

1.1:  Availability of conventionalarms and ammunition

1.1.3: Types of conventional arms and ammunition
1.1.4: Use of conventional arms to commit violent acts
1.1.5: Legal sales and ease of access to conventional arms
and ammunition
1.2.1: Geographic spread of conflict events

1.2:  Geographic proliferationof conventional arms andammunition

1.2.2: Geographic spread of conventional arms andammunition
1.2.3: Presence of armed actors in a particular location orarea

1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition

1.3.1: Societal values on conventional arms use
1.4.1: Size and equipping of State security forces

1.4: Levels of militarization

1.4.2: Presence and formation of armed movements ormovements that embrace and promote military
values
1.4.3: Nature and use of State security forces
1.4.4: Role of the military in politics and public life, andsocietal acceptance23

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 1.1: AVAILABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND
AMMUNITION
The availability of weapons indicates the capacity that actors may have to initiate, continue orresume armed conflict. Greater availability of weapons reduces the barriers for actors to arm
themselves, and the presence of a high number of military weapons has been shown to be a strong
predictor of the incidence of civil wars.28 Moreover, the availability of such weapons provides agreater ability to inflict casualties and thus can affect the intensity of violence, a key factor intriggering an armed conflict. Although conflicts can be started with a small number of weapons,continued access to weapons, and especially ammunition,29 is necessary to sustain armed conflict.
The key measure for assessing the number of weapons will be the increase or decrease in thenumber, type and use of arms and ammunition, with an increase signalling a higher risk and/or
intensity of conflict and a decrease signalling a lower risk and/or intensity of conflict.30

RISK POINT 1.1.1: NUMBER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITIONAVAILABLE
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Arms and ammunition production facilities present in the
country, including information on production capacity(type of items, volume, etc.), primary customers (civilianor security forces, for domestic consumption or export),
and market (civilian or military).

a) Number of weapons andammunition acquired by acountry over time

Increase or decrease in the number and types of weapons and ammunition imported into a country over time:
an increase in the number of weapons imported increases the overall availability of weapons in a country.
Changes in national acquisition plans and increase or
decrease in orders of conventional arms: an increase in
the number of weapons ordered increases the overall
availability of weapons in a country.
Increase or decrease in the typical price32 of weapons
in the illicit market over time: a decrease in the priceof weapons may indicate greater availability of and/or
demand for weapons and ammunition; an increase may
signify lower availability and/or demand.

b) Illicit market pricemonitoring31

28

Killicoat et al. (2007, 256–87).

29

Florquin (2014); Small Arms Survey (2013c).

30 The relationship between the number of weapons available and the likelihood of conflict is still debated in academic literature. For example, while Gallea (2019) finds “a positive effect of arms import on the number of internal conflicts, the onset
of internal conflict, the number of battle-related deaths, and the number of refugees fleeing the destination country”, Bara
(2016, 41) posits that “although ongoing conflicts lead to the emergence of illicit arms markets in the first instance, the mere
existence of these markets does not automatically translate into an increased availability of weapons, at least not until the endof a conflict leads to a market oversupply”. See also Bourne (2012, 33–34).
31 Although Killicoat et al. (2007) argue that “cheaper weapons prices lead to an increased risk of civil war, independently ofother conflict risk factors”, ongoing research suggests there is a lack of comparable data and information to be able to consistently use illicit arms price trends as an indicator of their availability (Florquin, 2014). Nevertheless, the value of monitoring illicit market prices for weapons and ammunition to improve our understanding of illicit markets and conflict dynamics is important(Bara, 2016; Small Arms Survey, 2013c).
32 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2020a) defines this as “The typical price paid for a specific weapon in
the street or black market. This may refer to the median (or alternatively, the average) price derived from several observations
obtained through intelligence operations (e.g., undercover initiatives), or it may be obtained from knowledge derived from
Risk Area 1: Proliferation of Conventional Arms24c) Ease of access to smallarms and light weapons

Increase or decrease in ease of access to small arms andlight weapons within a particular country over time as
measured by a perception survey: a perceived increase inaccess signifies greater availability of weapons; a perceived decrease in access signifies lower availability.
Public perception and awareness surveys indicating theavailability and use of weapons: survey questions on thefrequency of gunshots being heard, including celebratory
gunfire, and the frequency of open carrying of firearms
may indicate evolving trends in weapons availability anduse or misuse.

RISK POINT 1.1.2: CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION SEIZURES
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) Number and types of illicit
weapons seized33

Increase or decrease in number and types of illicit weapons and ammunition seized: an increase in the number
of weapons and ammunition seized can indicate anincreased supply; a decrease in the number of weapons
and ammunition seized can indicate a decrease in supply.

b) Date of production (or“age”) of seized weapons

Monitoring of the age of production of seized weapons,
which can demonstrate new channels of supply andavailability of new weapons: new weapons can indicate
new supplies; old weapons can indicate legacy supplies
or recirculation of weapons from other areas and sources (domestic or international supply).

c) Changes in arms andammunition seizures fromarmed groups or groups ofinterest

Increase or decrease in seizures of weapons from a particular group or segment of society: changes in certain
types of weapons may indicate new access to supply
chains or sources of supply and increased or decreased
logistical capacity of armed groups to access weapons.

RISK POINT 1.1.3: TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) Changes in the types of
conventional arms and ammunition present

Increase or decrease in a particular type of weapon andammunition, which can provide indications about thepossible use or end user of the weapons. Military weapons are likely to be used for political violence by armed
actors who seek to challenge security forces; civilian
weapons are less suitable for insurgency and more likely
to be for personal use (security, recreation, armed crime,etc.).

b) Presence of new or unusual types of weapons andammunition

Presence of new or unusual weapons for the local context (based on type, model, age and calibre), which canbe indicative of new sources of illicit supply and heightened demand.

professional expertise in the field.”
33

25

See Box 4, Analysing arms and ammunition seizures.
THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK POINT 1.1.4: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TO COMMIT
VIOLENT ACTS
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) Casualty recording

Increase or decrease in the number of victims with gunshot wounds (as a proportion of all violent injuries), whichreflects changes in the availability of arms used to commit these acts: higher numbers of victims with gunshot
wounds indicate a higher presence and use of weapons;
lower numbers of victims with gunshot wounds indicate
a lower presence and use of weapons.

b) Armed criminal activity34

Increase or decrease in the levels of armed criminal
activity, which may reflect changes in the availability ofarms used to commit these acts: higher levels of armed
criminal activity indicate greater availability of arms andammunition; lower levels of armed criminal activity indicate lower availability of arms and ammunition.

c) Rates of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) or
number of incidents involving
a firearm35d) Presence of an effective
criminal justice response toarmed violence

Increase or decrease in the levels of SGBV or incidents
involving a firearm, which are linked to greater availabilityof weapons: higher levels of SGBV or incidents involving
a firearm indicate greater availability of arms and ammunition; lower levels of SGBV or incidents involving a firearm indicate lower availability of arms and ammunition.
Monitoring of specific types of violence, such as SGBV,
which can be a broader indicator of a breakdown of social controls.
The enactment of an effective criminal justice response
to armed violence and its application, as demonstrated
by the number of persons arrested, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced for crimes involving arms.

RISK POINT 1.1.5: LEGAL SALES AND EASE OF ACCESS TOCONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) Laws to exercise effective
control over the production,
export, import, transit or retransfer of conventional arms
and ammunition

The presence and application of laws to regulate accessto weapons during the production, export, import, transit
or retransfer of arms and ammunition, which indicates adesire to limit this supply. Changes in the laws or in theirapplication can indicate a change in stance regarding access to weapons (loosening or tightening of legal barriers
to acquiring weapons).

34

Braga et al. (2021); Cook (2013); van Kesteren (2014).

35

Hemenway (2002).
Risk Area 1: Proliferation of Conventional Arms

26b) Legislative measures toestablish as criminal offences under domestic law theillegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and tradeof conventional arms andammunition

Increase or decrease in the presence and application oflaws to criminalize the illegal manufacture, possession,stockpiling and trade of conventional arms and ammunition; loosening of such laws decreases the penalty forthese actions and can increase the likelihood of theiroccurring; tightening of the legislative penalty can discourage these activities.

c) Ease and accessibility ofacquiring a firearm licenceand regulations on arms
ownership

The presence and application of laws to regulate civilian
access to weapons (permissive or restrictive) and thetypes of arms that can be legally acquired, etc.: restrictive legislation on firearms ownership is likely to limit
legal ownership and indicate a desire to limit civilian
firearm holdings; permissive firearms regulations canfacilitate legal access to weapons and indicate a desire
to stimulate or ease civilian arming.

d) Civilian firearms possession

Increase or decrease in the number of civilian licences
granted, which reflects an increase or decrease in thenumber of legal weapons available.
Increase or decrease in the number of weapons dealers
or markets, which indicates changes in supply and demand for weapons: a higher number of weapons dealers
or markets is likely to indicate both increased availability
and facilitated supply of weapons; a lower number of
weapons dealers or markets signals more limited availability and access.

e) Weapons dealers ormarkets

Increase or decrease in the number of applications forlicences and permits, and the number of weapons andammunition in these applications to be imported or purchased by dealers for sale in the country.
Increase or decrease in the number of weapons and ammunition sold by weapons dealers or in markets, whichindicates changes in supply and demand for weapons
and ammunition: higher sales indicate increased demand
for weapons and ammunition; lower sales signal more
limited demand.

27

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
Other considerations• In pre- and post-conflict settings, the information to be gained from an increase or decrease in the presence anduse of conventional arms in a particular region may be most revealing when combined with information that may
indicate possible stress points where conflict may erupt (for instance, information on societal divisions or thepresence of and competition over natural resources).
• Where conflict is already ongoing, changes in the number of weapons and ammunition may provide information on
the belligerents’ ability to sustain the conflict, while disaggregation by the types of weapon available may provide
indications about the nature of violence or the levels of intensity for an ongoing conflict. For instance, the sudden
appearance of new or unusual types of weapon that can provide a tactical advantage, even if not significant in
numbers, can be a game-changer in an evolving conflict. In post-conflict settings, the continued presence of or an
increase in weapons and ammunition is linked to a higher possibility of resumption of conflict (see Risk Area 4).
• When paired with data on ethnic, religious or linguistic identity, the presence of large numbers of weapons canprovide insight into the likelihood of there being additional or fewer armed movements. A greater availability of
weapons facilitates the formation of more numerous and diverse groups. In a similar context, limited or restricted
access to weapons may provide for a smaller number of armed groups with a more diverse membership.36• Casualty data should be disaggregated by gender and age of casualty and type of conventional weapon to givea better understanding of the availability and impact of certain kinds of conventional weapon, which can support
analysis on weapon origins and flows.

Analysing arms and ammunition seizures

BOX 4

36

Changes in information on the number of weapons and ammunition seized, or even the number of actual
seizures, should be put in context. When assessing the number and types of illicit weapons seized, attention
must be given to the impact of special operations targeting illicit arms flows and the issue of arms trafficking.
Significant changes may be due not only to a change in supply or availability of arms but also to otherfactors, such as improved or decreased reporting, targeted operations to eradicate illicit arms trafficking,or an “unusual” one-off seizure. While data on the number of weapon seizures is useful for tracking trends
over time, images of seized items often provide more detailed qualitative information about the type, end
users and proliferation patterns of the seized items. 37

Marsh (2007, 29).

37 Schroeder and Shumska (2021, 23).

Risk Area 1: Proliferation of Conventional Arms

28

RISK FACTOR 1.2: GEOGRAPHIC PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS
AND AMMUNITION
The geographic proliferation, or spread, of weapons indicates the ability of actors in a particulararea or areas to control territory and to access and use weapons. Monitoring the geographic
proliferation of weapons can indicate the actual or potential spread of conflict into new areas andthe likelihood of violence erupting or intensifying. It can also indicate possible areas of contention
where different armed movements may seek to control the same zones. As weapons permeate
into border areas, this can have implications at the local, national and regional levels as the risk ofspillover of arms and conflict can heighten the likelihood of further armed violence in neighbouring
areas or States.38 The simplest measure of the spread of weapons may be the spread of fighting
involving those weapons to new areas or fronts.

RISK POINT 1.2.1: GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF CONFLICT EVENTS
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) Geographic location of
militarized disputes, armed
clashes or other conflict
events

Mapping of the location of military disputes, armed
clashes or other conflict events, indicating a spread or adecline of conflict locations and a change to a conflict’s
intensity in a given region or area.

RISK POINT 1.2.2: GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND
AMMUNITION
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Increase or decrease in the number of weapons per
capita in a particular location or area compared withother regions, which can reflect perceptions of insecurity: higher numbers of weapons indicate a greater
perception of insecurity or anticipation of violence; lower
numbers of weapons indicate a greater perception of
security.

a) Presence of weapons in aparticular location or area

Increase or decrease in the number of arms and ammunition seized per location over time: higher numbers ofarms and ammunition seized indicate a greater presenceof weapons in a particular area; lower numbers of arms
and ammunition seized indicate a lower presenceof arms and ammunition. Changes in the number of
weapons seized can also indicate that a State is particularly concerned about arms reaching specific geographically based groups.
Increase or decrease in a particular type of weapon or
ammunition (e.g. military or civilian weapons), which canprovide indications of the risk of aggravation or de-intensification of violence in new locations.

38

29“Countries with more porous borders tend to have lower weapons prices.” Killicoat et al. (2007).

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK POINT 1.2.3: PRESENCE OF ARMED ACTORS IN A PARTICULARLOCATION OR AREA
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Mapping of the presence and areas of operation and/or control of military armed police and other security
forces, including armed private security companies,
paramilitary forces or militias, indicating a militarypresence and/or control, or lack thereof, in a certain
region.

a) Geographic spread ofmilitary and other security
forcesIncrease or decrease in the number and locations ofmilitary depots, barracks and other operating bases,
including arms and ammunition storage, which reflects
changes in the presence of security forces or otherarmed actors: establishment of new military installations signals an increased presence; abandonment orconversion of military installations signals a decreased
presence.
Tracking the formation and/or disbandment of paramilitary forces or militia to identify the impact on their areasof control and operation.

b) Geographic spread of
non-State armed actors

Mapping of the presence and areas of operation of
non-State armed groups.
Tracking of the formation, disbandment, merging or fracturing of non-State armed groups that may affect theirareas of control and operation.

Other considerations• Combining data on State presence with the spread of weapons can support information on the formation ofarmed movements. Areas where there is a lack of State presence may provide shelter for insurgents and support
mobilization when other movements fill the gap left by the State. Moreover, wherever State authority is missing,communities may organize locally to provide security for themselves.39• Understanding the various actors’ motivations and conflict drivers allows analysts to understand why conflict may
break out or spread to certain areas. Motivating factors may include control of resources, for example access towater and pastures; the illegal exploitation of natural resources; control of trafficking or logistic routes or hubs ofstrategic and financial value; and the capture of weapons and military equipment from security and defence forces(Including Troop Contributing Countries of United Nations Missions).
• The geographic spread of weapons may also affect conflict in the following ways: the emergence of new armed
actors as previously peaceful communities gain access to weapons; changes in the balance of power between
communities or armed groups. This also holds true for voluntary weapons collection or disarmament programmes,
which can also affect the balance of power in geographic areas unless applied evenly and simultaneously.
• Changes in the deployment (positions and numbers) of armed actors is likely to trigger changes in the locations(growth in numbers or differences in locations) of militarized disputes, armed clashes or other conflict events.
• Military weapons are likely to be used for political violence by armed actors who seek to challenge security
forces, whereas civilian weapons are less suitable for insurgency and more likely to be for personal use (security,
recreation, etc.).

39

Yin (2020).

Risk Area 1: Proliferation of Conventional Arms

30

RISK FACTOR 1.3: SOCIETAL VALUES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND
AMMUNITION
The presence of high numbers of conventional arms, including within private or civilian hands, islinked to higher levels of armed violence and a general weakening of the social fabric in conflict-affected and at-risk settings.40 Lower levels of acceptance of conventional arms by a population can
reduce a culture of violence, while higher levels of acceptance of arms can support such a culture.
Societal values on conventional arms use can have an influence on the numbers and types of
conventional arms within a society by making it more or less acceptable to hold arms and can also
be a factor in a society’s ability to implement conventional arms control measures. Such values
may change over time and can be a reaction to other factors, such as key events or perceptions of
security or insecurity, that may influence the acceptance or rejection of weapons.

RISK POINT 1.3.1: SOCIETAL VALUES ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS USE
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) Shifts in cultural values
resulting in a weaponizationof society and/or acceptanceof armed violence

Indicators
Public perception of security surveys,41 disaggregated bygender and age, to gauge increases or decreases in the
population’s acceptance or rejection of weapons, whichmight affect people’s desire to own weapons or theacceptability of doing so. Survey questions on open use
and carrying of weapons could indicate societal acceptance or rejection of weapons in the community.42
Public perception of security surveys to assess how
people of all gender identities different age feel about
the security environment: perceptions of improved
security can indicate a lower need to hold weapons for
personal security; perceptions of a worsening security
situation can increase the desire to own weapons for
personal safety.
Analysis of the forces promoting violence and/or aculture of weapons and how they may draw on gender
expectations and identities.

b) Calls for regulations or restrictions on arms ownershipor holdings by certain groups
or segments of society43

40

Monitoring of public calls for new rules and regulations
restricting arms ownership by certain groups within asociety, which may indicate a targeting of specific groups
within a society by limiting their access to weapons.
Increased calls for restricting ownership in areas whereparticular groups are dominant (e.g. local disarmament
activities) may indicate increased vulnerability of suchparticular groups compared with others.

See UNDP (2005).

41 Public perception of security surveys measure changes in how people understand or feel about the security situations
or environment by assessing how the population feels about levels of security and insecurity and the role of different actors
present in the community and their impact on security. See MOSAIC 05.10 (2012a).
42

See SEESAC publications (Table 1); Small Arms Survey (2014b).

43 Depending on the context, groups or segments of society may refer to groups defined by ethnicity, cultural attitudes,
religious beliefs, political beliefs or political party affiliation.

31

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRc) Calls for arming certain
groups or segments ofsocietyd) Legal measures on theformation of militias or otherarmed movements

Monitoring of public calls to arm particular groups or
actors within society. An increase in such statements
may indicate a willingness to resort to armed violence asa means to express grievances, affecting the likelihoodof an armed conflict. A decrease may signal a reductionin tensions.
Monitoring of calls for populations to defend theirhomes (usually against an internal or external “threat”
or “enemy”), which provides an indication of increasing
fractures in society, the targeting of persons or groups(the “enemy”) or a broader fear of conflict, giving an
impetus to populations to seek weapons to defend
themselves, their community or their country.
Monitoring the establishment and/or application of legislation banning or allowing the raising and maintenanceof militias or other armed movements: relaxed legislation
can support an increase in the ease and acceptabilityof forming such movements; tightened legislation can
restrict the formation of such movements.
Existence of laws or decrees establishing self-defenceor paramilitary groups that would remove barriers to theformation of such movements and officially sanction
their presence and support: permissive laws can facilitate the ease of access to weapons and increase thecapacity of armed groups to engage in armed conflict.

Other considerations• Societal values around weapons, and especially the acceptance of conventional arms as a part of everyday life,
are closely related to the level of diffusion of weapons in a society (how far weapons have permeated a society).
Studying these values can also provide an understanding of who is holding weapons, or is perceived to be holding
them, and whether this changes over time. Coupling such analysis with an analysis of groups within a society,including intersocietal dynamics, rivalries, hostilities or alliances, can help better understand the fault lines along
which armed movements may develop, who the armed parties may be, who they represent, what their values
and grievances may be and what measures may be taken to prevent them from using arms to express theirgrievances.44• Levels of diffusion and availability of weapons to civilians and armed movements have been found to be linked.
Where civilian and military weapons are available to both civilians and armed movements in large quantities,
there are likely to be more diverse and fractured armed actors. Where civilian and military weapons are available
to armed movements, but not to the civilian population, the armed movement is likely to be dominated by one
group.45• Societal values around weapons may draw on gender expectations and may facilitate gender-based violence(GBV). An assessment of the levels of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) or GBV, including violence against
women and femicide, may support a better understanding of this type of violence and how to tackle it. This
assessment should also include consideration of the societal attitudes towards such acts. Consideration of thetype and sources of weapons used can inform arms control programmes to support efforts to tackle GBV.
• Perceptions of security may also be different depending on the gender and age of the persons interviewed or
surveyed. It is important to undertake inclusive surveys that provide gender- and age-disaggregated data to better
understand how different parts of the population may perceive security and safety.

44 This statement should not be taken to signify that highly diverse societies are necessarily more conflict prone. “Rather,states characterized by certain ethnopolitical configurations of power are more likely to experience violent conflict. First, armed
rebellions are more likely to challenge states that exclude large portions of the population on the basis of ethnic background.
Second, when a large number of competing elites share power in a segmented state, the risk of violent infighting increases.
Third, incohesive states with a short history of direct rule are more likely to experience secessionist conflicts.” Wimmer et al.
(2009).
45

Marsh (2007, 29).

Risk Area 1: Proliferation of Conventional Arms

32

RISK FACTOR 1.4: LEVELS OF MILITARIZATION46
The level of militarization indicates a propensity to seek military solutions or an intent to engage
in a conflict as opposed to seeking more peaceful means of conflict prevention or resolution.
High levels of militarization are commonly seen as a factor of increased likelihood or intensityof conflict.47 The levels can be assessed by looking at the relative size and equipment of armed
forces and how they are deployed, the presence of other armed movements, or perceptions of the
security forces and their role in society. High levels of military spending have also been linked to anincreased likelihood of conflict, and it has been revealed that military expenditures increase as agovernment gravitates towards armed conflict or seeks to protect itself from it.48 At the same time,high levels of militarization do not necessarily result in a higher likelihood of conflict and can beoffset by other factors. For instance, there is evidence that a society with a well-established, mature
democracy is less likely than others to foster a culture of violence,49 and militarism has been associated with low to middle levels of economic development.50

RISK POINT 1.4.1: SIZE AND EQUIPPING OF STATE SECURITY FORCES
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Number of armed services personnel per 100,000(vertical proliferation): higher numbers represent a higher
level of militarization; lower numbers indicate a lower
level of militarization.

a) Size of the State security
forces in relation to the population

Number of police per capita: higher numbers represent
a higher level of militarization; lower numbers indicate alower level of militarization.
Expansion of voluntary or forceful recruitment into thesecurity forces. Expansion of the security forces will
drive higher levels of militarization.

b) Military expenditure andarms procurement plans

Changes in military expenditure and share of grossdomestic product: higher levels of expenditure are linked
to higher levels of militarization; lower levels of expenditure are linked to lower levels of militarization.
Analysis of national conventional arms acquisition plans,
which can support forecasting of the types and number
of weapons that may be available in the future and cansignal militarization tendencies.

46 The Bonn International Centre for Conversion publishes a Global Militarization Index that assesses militarization according to six factors: military expenditures as percentage of gross domestic product; military expenditures in relation to healthspending; military and paramilitary personnel in relation to population; military reserves in relation to population; military andparamilitary personnel in relation to physicians; heavy weapons in relation to population.
47

Carlton-Ford (2010, 864–89).

48 Castillo et al. (2001) found that perceived threats may be the most significant factor contributing to increases in military
expenditure.
49

Kisielewski et al. (2010, 18).

50

Mayer (2008).

33

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRc) Numbers of conventional
weapons held in national
stockpiles

Levels of arms and ammunition imports and exports:
higher numbers of, and also more advanced or capable,
weapons and ammunition imports and exports are afactor driving higher levels of militarization. See also Risk
Points 1.1.1 and 2.1.1.
Number and type of heavy weapon systems: increases in
the number of, particularly of more advanced or capable,
heavy weapons drives higher levels of militarization;
lower numbers of heavy weapons over time indicate
decreasing levels of militarization.

RISK POINT 1.4.2: PRESENCE AND FORMATION OF ARMED MOVEMENTS
OR MOVEMENTS THAT EMBRACE AND PROMOTE MILITARY VALUES
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Number of non-State armed opposition groups, vigilantegroups, private security companies or others: higher
numbers of such groups indicate a higher level of militarization; lower numbers of such groups indicate a lower
level of militarization.
Presence of programmes for the distribution of arms
to civilians (e.g. proxy forces, militias and community
security groups): the presence of such programmes
increases the levels of militarization of society as thenumber of weapons increases and ownership diffuses
through society; the lack of such programmes decreases
the levels of militarization of society as weapons
ownership and diffusion through society are restricted.

a) Presence of non-State
armed actors

Analysis of forced recruitment or abduction into armed
movements, including who is being recruited or mostvulnerable to recruitment, disaggregated by gender andage.

RISK POINT 1.4.3: NATURE AND USE OF THE STATE SECURITY FORCES
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) Modernization of themilitary

The acquisition of new equipment and technology by
the military and other State security forces, indicating
political and financial support for them.

b) Militarization of police

The equipping and use by the police service of militaryequipment in its functions: an increase in police accessto military equipment indicates a higher level of militarization; a decrease or limited access indicates a lower
level of militarization.

Risk Area 1: Proliferation of Conventional Arms34b) Militarization of police(cont.)

Increase or decrease in the number of incidents
involving the use of lethal force and/or armed responses
to civilians by police or security forces: increases insuch incidents indicate higher levels of militarization;
decreases in such incidents indicate lower levels of militarization.

c) Military doctrine

Review of the military doctrine to consider the fundamental
set of principles that guide military forces as they pursue
national security objectives. Considering the military doctrine can help to understand national security policymaking,the use of force, and the role of the different armed security actors within a society.
Participation in international confidence-building measuresthat provide for information-sharing on weapons acquisition, which indicates levels of transparency of State security forces. Increased sharing of information on planned
military acquisitions and defence budgets with other Statesindicates higher levels of transparency; decreased sharing
of information on planned military acquisitions and defence
budgets indicates lower levels of transparency.

d) Transparency andopenness of procurement
and weapons holdings

Participation in transparency measures, which indicatestrends in the government’s approach to national and regional security: reporting under international instruments(including the United Nations Register of ConventionalArms) and with other international and regional organizations that publish data on international arms transfers,
military spending, etc., indicates transparency; the absenceof such reporting indicates secrecy and increased regional
or global uncertainty.
Existence of procedures or systems for disclosing information on defence spending or weapons acquisition plans toparliament or government agencies, which indicates higher
levels of oversight of State security forces. Secrecy arounddefence spending or weapons acquisition plans indicateslower levels of oversight of State security forces and regional or global uncertainty.

RISK POINT 1.4.4: ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE,
AND SOCIETAL ACCEPTANCE
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Presence of military personnel in high-level government
posts usually reserved for civilians.

a) Military presence ineveryday life

35

Deployment or presence of heavily armed police orsoldiers on the streets: large numbers of police orsoldiers deployed indicates higher levels of militarization;
small numbers of police or soldiers deployed indicateslower levels of militarization.

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Presence of political structures and institutions thatprovide an alternative or counterbalance to military
influence in society and government: strong counterbalancing institutions can support in limiting the roleof the military; weak counterbalancing institutions canencourage the military to take a stronger role.
a) Military presence ineveryday life (cont.)

Assessment of changes in attitudes (increased disenchantment or satisfaction) towards military rule or thepresence of the military in positions of power.
Assessment of gender composition of the military andpolice forces as this relates to society support for andperceptions of security forces in everyday life.

b) Support for or promotionof the security forcesc) Support for military action
or intervention

Use of language and rhetoric by government authorities regarding the security forces in public statements:
more frequent positive statements indicate increased
political support for the security forces; decreased ormore negative references to security forces indicate adecrease in political support for them.
Increase or decrease in the number of military displays,
parades or other symbolic activities to promote thearmed services: an increase indicates greater support forthe military; a decrease indicates less prominence given
to their role in society.
Monitoring of societal perceptions of the military,
including views of military intervention and the useof military force to resolve existing conflicts: positive
attitudes held towards the military and/or military intervention may indicate popular support for and acceptanceof military intervention; negative attitudes towards themilitary and/or military intervention may indicate popularsupport for and acceptance of conflict prevention,
mediation or resolution activities.
Monitoring of threats, displays of force or use of force
against perceived enemies (States, political opposition,communities, individuals): frequent threats may indicate
a willingness to engage in armed conflict; the absenceof threats may indicate a willingness to prevent theoutbreak of conflict.
Presence of programmes for the provision of militarytraining to civilians: their presence increases the numberof persons trained to use weapons and indicates apossible greater acceptance of military action or activity.

d) Extension of military
influence and priorities into
civilian life

Analysis of factors promoting recruitment into forces
or security services or militias, including perceptions ofgendered roles.
Public perceptions of security surveys to assess
attitudes and values around militarization within the
population: surveys that confirm the presence of militarized values among civilians may indicate higher levels of
militarization.

Risk Area 1: Proliferation of Conventional Arms36d) Extension of military
influence and priorities into
civilian life (cont.)

Assessment of perceptions of the military in relation totheir role in perpetrating, facilitating or concealing actsof sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): support
for military forces despite their role in facilitating acts of
SGBV indicates support for the military forces; opposition to military forces due to their role in facilitating actsof SGBV indicates resistance to or decreased support for
military forces.
Context analysis of the history of military coups or otherovert examples of military involvement in the economic
and political life of a country, which may provide insight
into the acceptability of such activities.

Other considerations• Post-conflict levels of military spending, including on arms, have been shown to be a predictor of a higher rate of
return to conflict. Military spending increases during conflict, typically by 50% during a civil war.51 Once a conflict
has ended, military spending may be difficult to return to its former level due to the influence of continued risks ofconflict, enhanced political power of the military in non-democratic regimes, reluctance on behalf of the military
to reduce its budget, and efforts to integrate rebel forces into the army, which creates pressures for military
expansion.52 This increased military spending reduces economic growth, and increased military spending has notbeen shown to be a deterrent to rebellion.53 Military spending may also remain high when efforts to reform thesecurity forces also involve the procurement of new weapons. (See also Risk Factor 4.4.)• Militarization can have destabilizing regional effects. It has been demonstrated that a country’s illicit weapons
prices will tend to drop if neighbouring countries increase their military spending because of resulting proliferation.54 If cheaper weapons lead to an increased risk of civil war, militarization within a State may support anincreased risk of civil war beyond the borders of that State.55• Civilian actors or police with military training and access to weapons might be considered more likely to resort tomilitary means (use of force and/or armed responses) when challenged, and there is a likelihood of escalation ofviolence as opposed to a de-escalation.
• A society’s level of militarization may be influenced by the presence of a “gun culture”, which may include theassociation of guns with power, pride and masculinity. This can be addressed through programmes to challenge
norms of violent masculinities and offer alternatives; encourage social customs dissociating guns from power,
pride and masculinity; and increase capacity for non-violent conflict resolution. Where the possession of arms is
deeply embedded in society, efforts can be made to control arms, including by restricting the types of weapon thatcan be legally held and mandating registration of ownership.

51

Collier et al. (2003, 86).

52

Collier et al. (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 3).

53 “Thus, although governments increase military spending in an effort to deter rebellion, the expenditure appears to beineffective.… During the inception stage of rebellion a large military response might be ineffective, or event counterproductive:
excessive repression by government forces assists rebel recruitment and appears to be a common error of counter-insurgency.”
Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 13).
54

Killicoat et al. (2007).

55

Killicoat et al. (2007).

37

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Risk Area 1: Proliferation of Conventional Arms

38

Risk Area 2:
Channels of access to conventionalarms
Photo Credit: UN Photo/Renata Ruiz

The acquisition of weapons is one of the pre-requisites for the formation of armed movements.
Looking at how armed actors access weapons can provide a measure of an armed actor’s ability toundertake and sustain armed activities, and can provide an indication of the types of armed actor
that may emerge in a conflict. This section looks at four Risk Factors relating to different means bywhich State and non-State conflict actors can obtain weapons.

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 2
RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS
Risk Factor

Risk Point

2.1: Government-authorizedarms transfers

2.1.1: Number and types of conventional arms andsystems transferred
2.1.2: Presence of unilateral or multilateral arms
embargoes2.2.1: Diversion-enabling factors

2.2: Diversion of arms andammunition

2.2.2: Points of diversion and methods used
2.2.3: History or record of diversion
2.3.1: Involvement of armed groups in illicit trafficking inweapons and military equipment

2.3: Illicit transfers andmarkets

2.3.2: State capacity to detect possibly illicit weaponscargos
2.3.3: State capacity to address illicit weapons transfers
2.3.4: Availability of illicit conventional arms and ammunition
2.4.1: Civilian acquisition and holdings

2.4: Civilian purchase of
conventional arms

2.4.2: Legal frameworks governing civilian possession of
weapons and the ability to ensure their compliance2.4.3: Arms dealers
2.4.4: Perceptions of safety

39

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 2.1: GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED ARMS TRANSFERS
International arms transfers provide actors with the means to engage in armed conflict, and theassociated high levels of military spending on arms have a statistical correlation with an increased
likelihood of conflict.56 Moreover, large-scale arms transfers can be a source of tension in peacetimeand generate high levels of casualties once hostilities begin. Information on government-authorizedtransfers57 can provide an indication of the number and types of licit weapons that may be available
in a country, which can in turn provide information on the weapons that may be diverted from theintended end user to unauthorized end users, including armed movements58 (see Risk Factor 2.2).
Information on international arms transfers for many States is openly available, and considering theweapons distributed and transferred within the legal realm can provide analysts with insight into
the weapons that may be available on the illicit market.

RISK POINT 2.1.1: NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND
SYSTEMS TRANSFERRED
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Analysis of arms acquisition and holdings, indicating
whether the country acquires arms via domestic manufacture or imports and helping indicate the impact ofrestrictive measures (i.e. arms embargoes) on the abilityof armed actors to sustain their forces during armed
conflict.

a) Number and types of conventional arms and systems
transferred to a country overtime

Increase or decrease in imports or exports of certain
weapon types over time as an indication of a State’s militarization and ability to engage in conflict. See also Risk
Point 3.2.1.
Increase or decrease in arms acquisition of nationallyproduced arms and ammunition: increased domestic
production can indicate increasing capacity of a State tosustain a conflict.

b) Level of external support
provided to conflict actors ina country (State or non-State)

56

Existence of and/or levels of external support from acountry with capacity and experience or channels for an
extensive arms supply: higher levels of support indicate
increasing capacity and resources of either State or
non-State actors to engage in armed conflict.

Collier et al. (2003, 86).

57 Assessing the flows of conventional arms has been made easier with the launch of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and other instruments, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s reporting on smallarms and light weapons. Other sources of information include the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and theInternational Institute for Strategic Studies.
58 The diversion of weapons from legal stockpiles is one of the main sources of illicit weapons for armed movements. See
Conflict Armament Research (2018, 9).

Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms

40

RISK POINT 2.1.2: PRESENCE OF UNILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL ARMS
EMBARGOES
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) Existence of multilateralsanctions, including arms
embargoes, against a State

Indicators
Imposition of mandatory or non-mandatory unilateral orinternational arms embargoes against a State, a government or non-governmental forces active in a country.
Existence of a United Nations panel of experts or groupof experts established to monitor sanctions or arms
embargoes, providing information on the illicit transfer of
weapons.

Other considerations• For States that do not have a domestic arms manufacturing base, imports are their only method of acquiring
weapons. For States that do have the ability to manufacture and produce arms domestically, and especiallyammunition, these capacities should be taken into account when thinking about conflict dynamics and the abilityof the State to sustain a conflict.
• The legal transfer of weapons has been recognized as an issue by the United Nations, and arms embargoes are
one of the tools for preventing conflict actors from legally accessing weapons.59

59 It can be said that there are three categories of end goal to be achieved through United Nations arms embargoes: (a)addressing threats against global security (conflict prevention), (b) strengthening legitimate government authority, and (c)achieving the peaceful political settlement of a violent armed conflict through conflict management (conflict management andresolution). Strandow and Wallensteen (2007).

41

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 2.2: DIVERSION OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION
Diversion of arms and ammunition, or the point at which a weapon or ammunition moves from thelegal to the illicit realm, can take many forms60 and can provide an indication of an armed group’s
ability to arm itself at the expense of the government, including by acquiring weapons fromgovernment stocks. The diversion of arms can also indicate the existence of other conflict-relatedrisks or vulnerabilities, such as corruption, international trafficking routes and supply chains, or
institutional weakness or fragility. Diversion from government stockpiles can be difficult to measure
as governments are often reluctant to admit that such diversion occurs or are unable to measure
it reliably. A key determinant of an armed group’s ability to access weapons will be the government’s ability to control and secure its stockpiles (see Risk Area 5), and factors such as whether agovernment maintains strict and effective control over its arms and military equipment and theirfurther transfer can support in assessing the likelihood of diversion occurring.61

RISK POINT 2.2.1: DIVERSION-ENABLING FACTORS62
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Increases or decreases in levels of cross-border trafficking in arms and ammunition throughout a region
following State collapse or fragmentation, as indicatedby changes in the number of weapon seizures at borders
or other ports of entry. See Risk Factor 2.3.

a) Institutional weaknesses
and failure contributing todiversion

Assessment of the end user’s capacity to maintain anddeploy imported arms or ammunition following thedownsizing, dissolution or reorganization of security
forces: higher capacity indicates more likelihood thatthe end user will retain the arms or equipment; lower
capacity indicates a higher risk that the arms or ammunition will be diverted.
Contextual analysis looking at the prior history of government-sponsored unauthorized transfer or retransfer,for example to national or foreign armed actors. A historyof government-sponsored unauthorized transfer orretransfer may indicate a higher risk of arms ending up in
the hands of unauthorized armed actors.
Assessment of the type, quality and quantity of arms andammunition supplied and how it matches the stated end
user’s military requirements (e.g. its existing inventory
and force structure): a good match indicates a higher
probability that the weapons will be retained; a poor
match can indicate that the equipment is not intended
for the stated end user and could be retransferred.

60 Points of diversion throughout the transfer chain and the life cycle of arms include diversion from manufacture; diversion
during transfer; diversion from stockpiles (State-owned and private); diversion during active use and deployment; diversion
by regularization and through gaps in national controls; and diversion by unauthorized cross-border movement. Baldo et al.
(2021). See also, Conflict Armament Research (2018, 8).
61

For further information on preventing diversion, see Wood and Holtom (2020).

62 Risk Points for diversion from government stockpiles may be measured in two ways: (a) the ability of a government tocontrol its stockpiles, as measured through the weapons and ammunition practices in place (see Risk Area 5), and (b) diversion-enabling factors, or circumstances that facilitate or exacerbate diversion.

Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms

42

Contextual analysis looking at prior history of diversion
as a result of deliberate choices or due to negligence ofgovernment authorities (e.g. military commanders) orindividuals within the security forces. A history of suchdiversion may indicate a higher risk of arms ending up in
the hands of unauthorized armed actors.
a) Institutional weaknesses
and failure contributing todiversion (cont.)

Assessment of levels of corruption that may facilitate
diversion. High levels of corruption and impunity foroffences committed by public officials can facilitate
diversion.
Presence of effective legislation for investigating andpunishing theft, corruption and other diversion-related
offences.63 Diversion will be made more difficult if such
legislation is in place and enforced, and the supply of
actual and potential weapons available in illicit markets
will also be limited.

b) Deception of State andnon-State actors contributing
to diversion

History of known or suspected unauthorized transfer orretransfers of arms or military equipment by a recipient
to a third party using fake, forged or altered import orexport licences and end user documentation. A historyof transfers or retransfers to a third party using false
end user documentation may indicate a higher risk ofdiversion.
History of physical alteration of arms and their marking
requirements to avoid identification or tracing in contravention of domestic legislation, which indicates a higher
risk of diversion.

RISK POINT 2.2.2: POINTS OF DIVERSION AND METHODS USED
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Increase or decrease in domestic incidents of diversion
due to loss through negligence in stockpile management:
Frequent reports of domestic incidents of diversion
from stockpiles can indicate weaknesses in a State’s
ability to effectively manage weapons as well as weakcontrol mechanisms over State-owned stockpiles, which
increase the likelihood of diversion.

a) Diversion from stockpiles(State-owned and private)

History of theft and violent capture from stockpiles in therecipient country, which may indicate a risk that diversion
may occur in the future (particularly if the analysis does
not also show the strengthening of weapons or stockpile
management procedures; see Risk Area 5).
History of government-supported community-based
security providers (community police, self-defence
groups etc.). Frequent cases of such occurrences can
indicate a high risk of diversion if weapons are given tosuch groups as a part of a formal or informal policy toarm them.

63

43

Arms Trade Treaty (2018, 23).
THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRa) Diversion from stockpiles(State-owned and private)(cont.)

Presence of adequate procedures for safe and securestockpile management, including for surplus or obsolete
weapons and ammunition.64 Diversion from stockpiles
will be made more difficult if such procedures are inplace, and the supply of actual and potential weapons
available in illicit markets will also be decreased. Lack ofadequate procedures for effective stockpile management and the existence of vulnerabilities in State-owned
stockpiles can be exploited by armed actors, enabling
the diversion of weapons. See Risk Point 5.2.3.
Existence of programmes to distribute weapons tocivilians, which indicates the ease of access to illicit
weapons by civilians and the risk of diversion to unauthorized end users.

b) Diversion during transferc) Diversion during active use
and deployment

Presence of an effective arms transfer control system(import, export, transit and trans-shipment). Diversion
during transfer will be made more difficult if such procedures are in place, and the supply of actual and potential
weapons available in illicit markets will also be limited.
Frequency of attacks on military garrison and police
stations, patrols and other deployments that may provide
opportunities for diversion during active use and deployment, including by violent capture in conflict-affected
settings (battlefield capture). Frequent occurrences can
indicate a high risk of diversion.

RISK POINT 2.2.3: HISTORY OR RECORD OF DIVERSION
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Inclusion of the country under study in reports on arms
tracing by organizations that track changes in ownershipof weapons to identify the point in the transfer chain
at which the weapon entered the illicit market.65 This
information can indicate a history of diversion within the
country or can demonstrate measures taken to mitigate
or prevent diversion by the State.

a) Arms tracing information
establishing a record of thediversion of arms and ammunition

Existence of past and/or current tracing requests andother investigations into trafficking and transfer control
violations, such as lists of persons and entities convictedof trafficking and related offences and those named in
United Nations arms embargo violation reports.
Levels of cooperation of national authorities with tracing
requests received, as per reporting by United Nations
and other entities issuing such requests. High levels ofcooperation indicate lower risks of diversion; low levelsof cooperation indicate higher risks of diversion.

64 International standards recommend destruction as the preferred method of disposal for arms and ammunition identified
as being surplus to the requirements of the armed services of a State (MOSAIC 5.50, 2012c). See also MOSAIC 5.20 (2012b) andspecific and relevant International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (https://unsaferguard.org/un-saferguard/guide-lines).
65

See Small Arms Survey (2014a).

Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms

44

Other considerations• Diversion from State-owned stockpiles can be difficult to measure as governments are often reluctant to admitthat such diversion occurs or are unable to measure it reliably, and/or the local media do not investigate due tolack of interest or due to risks for journalists; therefore, reliable information sources and reporting may be limited.
In addition to factors that can help prevent diversion, such as those listed in Risk Area 5, there are some that may
encourage it, including:► Irregular payment of security forces’ salaries, which might provide an incentive to sell weapons or
ammunition► A market for illicit weapons, which can facilitate the sale of diverted weapons► Ongoing conflict or tensions, which provide a demand for weapons► Individual control of weapons by fighters (as opposed to a centrally managed system), which can weaken
control over arms and facilitate onward sales• Battlefield capture can be difficult to track, but it can be inferred that attacks on government security installations
and forces or other forces (peacekeepers, training missions, etc.) provide an opportunity for armed groups tocapture weapons. The types of forces involved in actions where weapons may have been lost could provide afurther measure of the likelihood of battlefield loss, as elite forces have been found less likely to lose weapons
than other types of forces.66• Analysing government-sponsored diversion can serve the dual purpose of allowing prevention actors to intervenewith the States responsible to shut down the supply of arms into a conflict area and support an understanding ofoutside parties who support and may carry influence with the conflict parties.

66

45

Felter (2007, 37).

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 2.3: ILLICIT TRANSFERS AND MARKETSIllicit weapons transfers represent one of the primary sources of arms for non-State actors, whousually do not have access to legal channels for acquiring weapons. Illicit transfers and markets
facilitate the formation and activities of non-State armed actors, fuel crime and insecurity at allstages of a conflict, and often contribute to high levels of post-conflict violence. As it is impossible
to measure the exact number of illicit arms in circulation, proxy indicators must be used to gauge
the presence and levels of illicit arms. This includes looking at historical examples of illicit transfers
and at factors that can facilitate illicit transfers, such as:•

The ability to raise funds to purchase arms via black markets67•

Access to territory or infrastructure that facilitates illicit trafficking in weapons•

Weak State capacity to control borders or otherwise stem illicit flows of weapons•

The presence of armed conflict in neighbouring countries

Each factor will positively or negatively affect the ease with which illicit arms might be obtained bybelligerents, making their access to enough of the types of illicit arms required for armed conflict
more or less likely.

RISK POINT 2.3.1: INVOLVEMENT OF ARMED GROUPS IN ILLICIT
TRAFFICKING IN WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Increase or decrease in the number and types of illicit
arms seized68 from traffickers linked to armed opposition groups: an increase in the number of arms seized
can indicate higher levels of trafficking; a decrease in
the number of arms seized can indicate lower levels of
trafficking. See Risk Point 1.1.2.

a) Involvement of armed
opposition groups engaged
in illicit trafficking in weaponsand military equipment

Increase or decrease in the number and types of
seizures of weapons linked to armed opposition groups:
an increase in the number of seizures can indicate higher
levels of trafficking; a decrease in the number of seizures
can indicate lower levels of trafficking.
Contextual analysis of prior history of armed oppositiongroups engaging in illicit trafficking in weapons andmilitary equipment,69 which indicates the capacity ofarmed groups to procure weapons and/or sustain armed
conflict.

67 Sustainable Development Goal 16.4 includes illicit financial and arms flows (“By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial
and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”). See Bromley etal. (2019) on how to measure Sustainable Development Goal 16.
68

See Box 4, Analysing arms and ammunition seizures.

69 Data on past conflict trends can be used to generate projections about future conflict. Such data can generate baseline
projections of the likely incidence and intensity of future conflict. Data on past conflict trends assume that conflict in the future
will continue to follow whatever trend line has characterized its incidence in the past; however, such data do not allow forpossible or probable changes at the global, regional and national levels. See Szayna et al. (2017, 73–96).

Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms

46b) Involvement of armed
opposition groups in illegal
resource exploitation orother revenue-generating
activities that allow them topurchase weapons

Contextual analysis of prior history of armed oppositiongroups’ engagement in illegal resource exploitation orother revenue-generating activities, which indicates thecapacity of armed groups to raise funds to support theirmilitary activities (including procuring weapons and ammunition) and/or sustain armed conflict.

c) Armed opposition groups’
access to territory or infrastructure that facilitates illicit
trafficking in weapons andresources

Armed opposition groups’ presence in or occupation of
territory (e.g. border areas) or infrastructure (e.g. ports or
airports) that could increase their ability to engage in theillicit trafficking of arms and ammunition; loss of territory
or access to infrastructure could impede their ability toengage in illicit trafficking.

RISK POINT 2.3.2: STATE CAPACITY TO DETECT POSSIBLY ILLICITWEAPONS CARGOS70
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Level of State control over ports, transportation routes,
infrastructure, border crossing points and supply chains:high levels of control can discourage trafficking in illicit
weapons and ammunition; low levels of control can
encourage such trafficking.

a) Ability of the government to control borders andairspace

Assessment of resources deployed to monitor authorized entry points in relation to the nature of national
borders (maritime borders, length of border to monitor,etc.): higher levels of resources in relation to the lengthof the border and number of authorized entry points
indicate greater control; limited resources in relation to
the length of the border and number of authorized entry
points indicate limited control.
Percentage of arrests for illicit border activity leading
to convictions: higher levels indicate better capacity to
enforce border controls; lower levels indicate limited
capacity to enforce border controls.
Increase or decrease in number and types of illicit conventional arms seized or found at borders or entry points:
an increase in the number of weapons seized or foundcan indicate an increase in trafficking and/or in capacity
for counter-trafficking; a decrease in the number of
weapons found or surrendered can indicate a decreasein trafficking and/or in capacity for counter-trafficking.71

70

Risk Point and measures drawn from Garcia (2009).

71 Increases and decreases in number of weapons seizures can indicate higher levels of supply but may also be due to otherfactors such as a strengthened or weakened capacity to intercept arms and ammunition.

47

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK POINT 2.3.3: STATE CAPACITY TO ADDRESS ILLICIT WEAPONSTRANSFERS
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) National legislation relating
to illicit weapons transfers

Indicators
Existence of national laws on illicit weapons transfersthat would put in place barriers or disincentives toengaging in illicit weapons trafficking. The absence ofsuch laws, or the existence of permissive laws, can facilitate illicit weapons transfers.
The ability to enforce national laws on illicit weaponstransfers as demonstrated by the number of persons
convicted for illicit conventional arms trafficking or theunauthorized use of small arms and light weapons.
State participation in regional efforts to limit illicit
weapons, as measured by the ratification of or accession
to regional instruments to combat illicit weaponstransfers.

b) Participation in regional
efforts to limit illicit weaponstransfers

State funding allocated to implementing regional efforts
to limit illicit weapons transfers.
Membership of regional bodies and instruments seeking
to limit illicit weapons transfers and active participationin them, which can support exchanges of informationthat reduce arms trafficking.

RISK POINT 2.3.4: AVAILABILITY OF ILLICIT CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND
AMMUNITION
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) Presence or availability ofillicit conventional arms andammunition

Increase or decrease in the number of illicit arms seized
as indicated by information from specialized reporting
or official press releases on illicit weapons seizures: ahigher number of weapons seized indicates greater availability of illicit arms; a lower number of weapons seizedindicates lower availability of illicit arms.72b) Price of illicit conventionalarms and ammunition on theblack market

Increase or decrease in the typical price73 of weapons
in the illicit market over time: an increase in the priceof weapons signifies lower availability of weapons; adecrease indicates greater availability.

c) Presence of illicit markets
where weapons are soldIncrease or decrease in the number and/or size ofknown illicit arms markets: a greater number or size ofthe markets indicates greater availability of and ease ofaccess to illicit weapons; a lower number indicates lower
availability of and ease of access to illicit weapons.

72 Increases and decreases in number of illicit arms seized can indicate higher levels of supply but may also be due to otherfactors such as a strengthened or weakened capacity to intercept arms and ammunition.
73 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime defines this as: “The typical price paid for a specific weapon in the street
or black market. This may refer to the median (or alternatively, the average) price derived from several observations obtained
through intelligence operations (e.g., undercover initiatives), or it may be obtained from knowledge derived from professional
expertise in the field.” UNODC (2020a).
Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms

48c) Presence of illicit markets
where weapons are sold(cont.)

Assessment of the types and calibres of arms andammunition for sale or purchase at known illicit black
markets, which provides some indication of the types
of weapons available and possibly the intended use of
those weapons.74
Assessment of illicit production of conventional arms byor for armed groups, which provides information on theability of the groups to access locally produced weapons
as well as on the types of weapon that may be available
to them.75
Increase or decrease in levels of armed violence,
including crimes committed using conventional arms,
which indicates a greater or lower availability of arms.
These levels can be tracked using casualty recording(see 1.1.4 a), crime statistics (see 1.1.4 b) or data on
gunshot victims from hospitals and other medical facilities.

d) Levels of armed violence

Increase or decrease in levels of armed violence, disaggregated by type of weapon: an increased proportion ofcasualties inflicted by the weapons of concern indicatesincreased access by groups to those weapons.
Responses to armed violence in the form of prosecutions or convictions of perpetrators of different types ofarmed violence, which may support an understanding of
attitudes and tolerance towards various types of armed
violence, including sexual and gender-based violence.

Other considerations• The legal or illicit nature of firearms and their movements is closely linked to the regulatory framework that applies
at national, regional and international levels, which can vary significantly from country to country (see Risk Point
1.1.5). National firearms control regimes are influenced by social, cultural and political circumstances and contexts(see Risk Factors 1.3 and 1.4), particularly as control regimes may relate to civilian ownership, possession, andmanufacturing, as well as transfers and disposal of arms and ammunition.
• Illicit transfers or arms trafficking can range from large-scale arms trafficking, sometimes facilitated bygovernments engaged in proxy wars, to smaller amounts of firearms and ammunition being trafficked in relatively
constant flows (the “ant trade”). It may involve the dissemination of military weapons into civilian hands in theaftermath of wars or regime changes, or illegal commerce motivated by criminal gain.
• Seizures of small consignments of one or two firearms may be linked to individual use and most commonly include
handguns. Seizures of larger quantities of conventional arms seem to relate to conflict actor demands. Seizuresof military small arms and light weapons (SALW) generally involve larger quantities, as armed conflicts are usuallyfought using these weapons and require them in large numbers.76• The modes of transport used to move illicit weapons may influence the size of the shipment (the ability to move
more arms in one shipment) and the number of shipments. The mode of transport can vary, for instance as
suppliers of illicit arms change modes to avoid detection or in response to supply and demand. Levels of demand
can therefore influence the size of shipments and the choice of mode of transport.
• Illicit transactions are easier when there is little or no State control, such as in areas of rebel influence andwhere transborder cooperation with friendly populations or governments in neighbouring countries is possible.
Considering State presence and control of borders and other access routes as part of an analysis can therefore
provide information on an armed group’s ability to acquire arms.

74 Non-State actors in an armed conflict need military arms. Civilian weapons (such as hunting rifles or shotguns) may besufficient to maintain high levels of criminal violence.
75

See Schroeder (2014).

76

UNODC (2020a, 10–11).

49

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 2.4: CIVILIAN PURCHASE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS
Civilian possession is usually not considered a strong indicator of armed conflict due to the type(usually hunting rifles or pistols) and quantity (often single items) of weapons available for purchase.
However, the civilian purchase of weapons can signal perceptions of insecurity and a militarizationof society (see Risk Factor 1.4), as populations experiencing fear arm themselves for protection.77
The increase in legitimate acquisition of weapons by individual citizens can be a proxy predictorof actual increased violence or perceptions of violence in a society, perpetuating instability andfacilitating armed conflict.

RISK POINT 2.4.1: CIVILIAN ACQUISITION AND HOLDINGS
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Review of national firearms registries to assess thenumber of firearms and ammunition licensed to civilians
and private security companies, indicating increases ordecreases in weapons acquisition by individuals and/or
private security providers.

a) Levels of civilian acquisition or holdings of weapons

Number and types of firearms held by civilians indicatedby civilian holdings surveys: high numbers indicate a wide
diffusion of weapons in a society and an increased likelihood of armed violence; low numbers indicate a limited
diffusion of weapons in society and a lower likelihood ofarmed violence. Increased purchase of specific types offirearm, such as handguns, can indicate increased civilian
ownership of firearms for self-protection.
Analysis of firearms-related crimes to determine the distribution between legally owned firearms and illicit onesin criminal incidents, including disaggregation by type ofcrime and target gender and age group.

RISK POINT 2.4.2: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS GOVERNING CIVILIANPOSSESSION OF WEAPONS AND THE ABILITY TO ENSURE THEIRCOMPLIANCE78
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) International and regional
systems (formal and informal)
to regulate firearms

State participation in regional efforts to regulate firearms
as measured by the ratification of or accession toregional instruments to combat illicit weapons transfers.

77 “When the State loses control over its security functions and fails to maintain the security of its citizens, the subsequent
growth of armed violence, banditry and organized crime increases the demand for weapons by citizens seeking to protect
themselves and their property.” United Nations (1997, para. 42).
78 Options for assessing this Risk Point are drawn from the Firearm Regulation for the Purpose of Crime Prevention andPublic Health and Safety. ECOSOC (1997).

Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms50b) National legislation on
civilian possession

The presence or absence of national laws regulating
civilian possession that would put in place barriers,
disincentives or incentives for civilian possession andthe legal ownership of all or certain types of conventionalarms by civilians.
The ability to enforce national laws regulating civilian
possession, as demonstrated by evidence of criminal
investigations for violations.

c) National regulations
relating to firearm safety andstoraged) Appropriate penalties and/or administrative sanctions
for offences involving themisuse or unlawful possession of firearmse) A record-keeping system
for firearms, including for thecommercial distribution of
firearms, and a requirement
for appropriate marking of
firearms at manufacture andat import

The existence of a system to regulate firearms safety
and storage that supports stronger firearms safety andstorage measures and makes it more difficult to accessfirearms that are safely stored.
The ability to enforce firearms safety and storage regulations, as demonstrated by evidence of criminal investigations for violations.
The State’s adoption of legislative measures that
establish as criminal offences activities involving themisuse or unlawful possession of firearms.
The ability to enforce legislative measures that establish
as criminal offences activities involving the misuse or
unlawful possession of firearms, as illustrated by prosecutions under these penal codes.
The establishment of a record-keeping system for
firearms to ensure the proper marking and registrationof firearms and, where required, ammunition.
The ability to enforce legislation on record-keeping, as
demonstrated by measures to prosecute those not incompliance with the record-keeping system.

RISK POINT 2.4.3: ARMS DEALERS
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
The existence of regulations for the licensing of arms
dealers.

a) Legal frameworks regulating arms dealers

The application of regulations for the licensing of arms
dealers, as evidenced by criminal investigations and convictions for violations.
The existence of systems for ensuring that arms
transfers by dealers are subject to government approval.
The application of systems for ensuring that arms
transfers by dealers are subject to government approval,
as demonstrated by criminal investigations and convictions for violations.

51

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRb) Databases of licensed
weapons, ammunition production facilities and commercial arms tradersc) A licensing system
including the licensing of
firearms trading businesses

The existence and maintenance of national databases
listing licensed weapons, ammunition production facilities and commercial arms traders.
The enactment of a system to license firearms businesses.
The application of a system to license firearms businesses, as demonstrated by evidence of criminal investigations for violations.

RISK POINT 2.4.4: PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Assessments of whether civilians purchase and rely
on weapons within a particular country over time as
measured by perception surveys: a perceived need forweapons may indicate increased insecurity; the perception that weapons are not needed indicates positive
perceptions of security.

d) Perceptions of security or
insecurity that may drive thecivilian purchase of weapons

Perceptions of safety surveys, disaggregated by genderand age, to measure how segments of society feel about
the level of security or insecurity, which may indicate
attitudes within different parts of society about weapons
ownership and use.
Perception surveys, disaggregated by gender and age,to measure the level of confidence different segmentsof society have in security forces, which can indicate
attitudes held about the need to possess weapons.

Other considerations• The establishment of mechanisms to address grievances (for instance, judicial institutions, human rights
commissions, peace commissions) and policies to address grievances and divisions – such as punishment of
perpetrators – can address some of the underlying reasons that civilians hold weapons and can support civilian
disarmament. Likewise, the ability of the State to control its territory, protect the lives and property of citizens from
crime and violence, and enjoy a legitimate monopoly of force reduces the requirement for civilians to organize andhold weapons for personal or community security.

Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms

52

Risk Area 3:
Use of conventional arms during a
conflict
Photo Credit: UN Photo/Nektarios Markogiannis

The use of weapons during a conflict can provide information on escalation or de-escalation andprovide a yardstick by which to measure progress, for example in a ceasefire, or compliance witha peace agreement. This Risk Area can help identify hotspots that may require greater attention,changes in the military capability of armed actors, or changes in tactics. The Risk Area can also
assist in identifying logistical support and supply chains, proxies or backers who may be given or
who may provide weapons to conflict parties, all of which can be useful in supporting prevention
strategies. This section considers four Risk Factors related to the use of weapons during a conflict.

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 3
RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT
Risk Factor

Risk Point

3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics
and targeting
3.2: Types of conventionalarms present

3.1.2: Changes in a conflict actor’s tactics and targeting
3.2.1: Types of conventional arms present in country
3.3.1: Armed actors and their levels of cohesion

3.3: Who is using theweapons

3.3.2: Supply and control of arms by and for conflictactors3.4: Where (in which regions
and areas) conventional arms
are being used

53

3.1.1: Changes in conflict intensity

3.4.1: Territorial control and the deployment of weapons

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 3.1: CONFLICT INTENSITY, TACTICS AND TARGETING
The types of weapons and ammunition deployed in conflict settings can affect the intensity of aconflict, as they alter the fighting party’s ability to inflict casualties, including civilian casualties. The
deployment of more powerful weapons and ammunition and the ability to target strikes using thoseweapons will affect the intensity of a conflict. Changes in tactics or the use of new types of weapon
may indicate a shift in the capacity or position of the armed actors, both militarily and politically,
as such changes may be linked to a hardening or softening of positions, including, for example, on
adherence to international humanitarian law.

RISK POINT 3.1.1: CHANGES IN CONFLICT INTENSITY
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) Changes in intensity offighting

Indicators
Assessment of the intensity of fighting by measuring thenumber of battlefield deaths over time, disaggregatedby gender and age: a higher number of battlefield deaths
and casualties indicates an intensification of a conflict; alower number indicates a decrease in the intensity of aconflict.
Assessment of the types of weapons deployed, which
may support in assessing a party’s ability to intensify afight by deploying more numerous or powerful weapons
or types of ammunition, or the party’s intent to de-escalate by withdrawing certain conventional arms.

RISK POINT 3.1.2: CHANGES IN A CONFLICT ACTOR’S TACTICS ANDTARGETING
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Evidence of broadening or narrowing of the scope oftargeting practices to include or exclude certain groups(ethnic, religious or other armed actors) or individuals(e.g. religious or community leaders, civil servants, orjournalists).

a) Changes in targeting

Evidence of targeting civilians, including through indiscriminate attacks, as measured by casualty recording,disaggregated by gender and age.
Assessment of the targets of armed violence, disaggregated by gender and age, so as to establish whether
specific gender or age groups have been singled out inacts of violence.

b) Changes in tactics

Evidence of the acquisition, deployment and/or use of
new types of weapon, indicating shifts in tactics.
Evidence of the use of weapons in new ways, such ascomplex coordinated attacks.

Risk Area 3: Use of conventional arms during a conflict54

Monitoring of statements or engagements by armed
actors that they will adhere by international humanitarianlaw.
c) Use or misuse of weapons
by conflict actors

Monitoring of outreach activities to armed actors to raise
their awareness of international humanitarian law.
Evidence of violations of human rights and humanitarian
law by armed actors, including sexual and gender-based
violence.

Other considerations• A change in the weapons used can provide information on new alliances or supporters79 that supply theseweapons. The options for deploying and using different types of weapon may change as armed groups acquire
new weapons, and knowledge and experience in how to use them.
• Insurgencies may start with small numbers of weapons and ammunition, but prolonged conflicts can offer armed
groups an opportunity to diversify their sources of acquisition of conventional arms and ammunition. Diversification may also occur as channels of supply are shut down, for example through the imposition of arms embargoesor through the increased ability of a State to interdict illicit arms transfers.
• Armed groups may vary their use of weapons over time and location, and the types of weapon used will usuallydepend on the objectives of the armed group at a point in time. The use of weapons may be adapted dependingon, inter alia, the group’s military goal, the geography and topography of the conflict area, and available finances.
Use of weapons may also be influenced by factors such as a desire to escalate or de-escalate a situation.
• In situations of prolonged peace negotiations, there may be lulls or increases in the intensity or geographic spreadof fighting as armed actors seek to demonstrate a willingness to engage, or a show of force, in advance of peacetalks resuming.
• Conflicts are dynamic and, over time, patterns of violence may emerge, often related to changes in the intensityof fighting. These patterns may be linked to events that affect the intensity of fighting, such as climate (wet–dry
seasons), agricultural calendars, seasonal population movements (transhumance), religious holidays or progressin peace talks.80 Once identified, conflict patterns can represent an entry point for prevention actors to introduce
preventive measures.

79

See ICRC (2021).

80 For example, as Barnett Koven (2017) summarizes, “a confluence of three factors — the conclusion of poppy cultivation,
improved weather conditions and recesses in madrassas in neighboring Pakistan — have made spring Afghanistan’s ‘fighting
season’.”55

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 3.2: TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS PRESENTThe types of conventional arms used during conflict can be an indicator of the conflict parties’
relative military strength and ability to escalate a conflict.81 Information on the types of arms used
in a conflict provides a way to differentiate between the parties to the conflict with regard to theweaponry employed, which in turn can provide information on the types of unit on the ground andthe differences in the armed actors’ military capabilities. Such information can also provide indications on the duration of a conflict,82 the tactics, or the type of conflict that is likely to occur.83 The
presence of new weapons can signal new capabilities or alliances, which in turn may mean a change
in the balance of power or ability to escalate a conflict.84 Assessing the types of conventional arms
used requires considering the availability of the weapons (Risk Factor 1.1) as well as their location
and use in a conflict (Risk Factor 3.4). A basic understanding of the capabilities of the weapons
deployed can support analysts in considering possible trends in terms of battlefield advantage andintensity of conflict, as well as indicate potential external suppliers.

RISK POINT 3.2.1: TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS PRESENT IN
COUNTRY
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against
baseline) of different types and categories of major conventional arms, including small arms and light weaponsand corresponding ammunition.85
Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against
baseline) of weapons prohibited or banned by international humanitarian law (e.g. cluster munitions or mines).

a) Presence of different
types of conventional arms incountry

Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against
baseline) of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Assessing the level of sophistication (against baseline)of IEDs and the manufacture of IEDs (knowledge andtraining are needed to manufacture sophisticated IEDs).
Presence and use (increase or decrease) of dual-use
vehicles (i.e. “technicals”) or other dual-use goods anditems.
Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against
baseline) of specific types of armed uncrewed aerial
systems.

81 This is, however, only one measure of military capacity and may vary according to the generation of equipment deployed.
Other measures may, for instance, touch on force capability, structure or readiness.
82 Armed actors that use a mix of different arms (e.g. mechanized infantry, armour and aircraft) make short conflicts more
likely. This relationship was shown to apply equally to insurgencies. See Caverley and Sechser (2017).
83 For instance, an insurgency with access to small arms and light weapons facing an organized force with a full range of conventional weapons is more likely to engage in unconventional warfare. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2021,
223).
84

Forestier-Walker (2020).

85

The glossary (Annex B) lists the major categories of conventional arms.

Risk Area 3: Use of conventional arms during a conflict56

Reporting on the use (increase or decrease against
baseline) of industrial versus artisanal production of
weapons.

a) Presence of different
types of conventional arms incountry (cont.)

Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against
baseline) of less or non-lethal equipment.
Monitoring on the reported sighting and/or use of particular weapons.
Assessment of government records of firearms and ammunition seized in situations of armed conflict throughthe review of existing databases.

b) Order of battle assessment

Analysis and categorization of military units by echelon,
type and equipment to provide information on the typesof equipment that may be used by the units present in a
conflict area.

Other considerations• The presence or use of new types of weapon can signal a new supply or new alliances with groups that haveaccess to and knowledge of how to deploy new weapons platforms.86 This can result in changes in the balance ofpower on a battlefield as one side benefits from more modern or more powerful weapons, potentially providingthat party with an incentive to seek an armed solution, as the more powerful weapons reduce the potential cost tothem of going to war by increasing their chances of victory.
• The availability of different types of weapon also provides armed actors with more options for their use. Well-resourced or supported actors may have access to specialized weaponry that may, for instance, allow for more
precision when it comes to targeting. Armed groups with fewer resources have little choice but to use the mosteasily available, usually less sophisticated, weapons.
• Certain weapons, means and methods of warfare are prohibited.87 Assessing a conflict party’s use of weapons andtactics can therefore provide a measure of that party’s ability or willingness to adhere to international humanitarianlaw.
• Information on the types of weapons present in a conflict setting can be used by prevention actors to consider
options such as sectoral ceasefires, which may seek to limit the use of certain types or categories of weapons or
engage with armed actors to uphold international humanitarian law and the use of proscribed weapons.88 As a partof more formal ceasefire discussions, information on the types of weapons present can provide a baseline fromwhich to verify a declaration of forces by the parties.
• Changes in the deployment of weapons by conflict parties may indicate a change in the intensity of conflict in thatlocation as certain types of weapons may be used for offensive manoeuvres and others may be more suited tooccupation of existing territory. Likewise, monitoring the deployment of weapons may provide information on theconflict party’s intentions. Weapons may be redeployed in anticipation of or response to violence (opening of new
fronts, attempts to take new territory or protect existing territory from attack) or, for instance, away from a frontline in accordance with provisions for disengagement as a part of a ceasefire.

86

See ICRC (2021).

87 “The requirement that the legality of all new weapons, means and methods of warfare be systematically assessed is arguably one that applies to all States, regardless of whether or not they are party to Additional Protocol I. It flows logically from thetruism that States are prohibited from using illegal weapons, means and methods of warfare or from using weapons, means
and methods of warfare in an illegal manner.” ICRC (2006).
88

57

See ICRC (2018).

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 3.3: WHO IS USING THE WEAPONS
To know with which entities one should engage for prevention efforts, it is essential to understand who the parties to an armed conflict are. Knowing who holds weapons and is using them89
can support the identification of the parties to a conflict (this may include State forces, non-State
armed groups, militia and paramilitary groups, or criminal gangs). This includes not only those withweapons but potential allies who may be providing them with arms and ammunition (see also Risk
Area 2). Contemporary conflict settings feature both State and non-State armed groups (rebel
groups, militias, community-based armed groups and criminal networks). Effective arms control
and conflict prevention therefore depends not just on the identification and cooperation of States
and local governments but also on the successful engagement of non-State actors. Understanding
the levels of cohesion of the armed actors present in a conflict also supports arms control programming. It is important for analysts to understand the risk that these armed actors could splinter,
resulting in the formation of new armed groups.

RISK POINT 3.3.1: ARMED ACTORS AND THEIR LEVELS OF COHESION
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) Identification of armed
actors present in a country90

Conflict party analysis, including analysis on gendereddivision of roles in a conflict party and narratives towards
people of all gender identities and different ages.
Contextual analysis looking at historic evidence of aconflict party’s ability to exercise command and control(vertical cohesion) over its troops. This is weak whenleaders cannot control their fighters and strong when
they can.

b) Command and control andlevels of cohesion of armed
actors91

Degree of unity among leaders (horizontal cohesion).
This is weak when leadership includes competingand disjointed factions and strong when leaders haveconsensus over goals and are coordinated in action.
Size of the group. Larger rebel movements with intra-organizational diversity may be less unified than smallergroups.
Historical analysis looking at patterns of alliance building
and breaking by armed actors.
Level of access to weapons: increased access allows
subsets of large movements to arm themselves and act
independently, potentially facilitating the splintering ofarmed groups.

89 Conflict analysis usually involves an assessment of the actors and their competing interests and motivations, which canhelp explain why they hold weapons, although not necessarily where they obtain them from or how they deploy and use them.
90 This should include actors or parties directly involved in a conflict and armed actors that are not currently conflict parties
but that are present and could join the conflict.
91 Weak cohesion within nonstate armed groups (NSAGs) has often threatened to undermine negotiated transitions fromconflict. This can have an impact at any time—when parties are deciding on whether to join a process, during negotiation ofpeace agreements, and into implementation. [This also applies to State actors.]

Risk Area 3: Use of conventional arms during a conflict

58

RISK POINT 3.3.2: SUPPLY AND CONTROL OF ARMS BY AND FOR
CONFLICT ACTORS
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) Weapons supply routes forarmed actors

Indicators
Contextual analysis looking at prior external support toconflict actors, including sources of supply of arms andammunition. Changes in external support may increaseor decrease the ability of parties to engage in the conflict
and affect their willingness to seek a mediated solution.92
See Risk Point 2.1.2.
Analysis of armed actors’ alliances that may support
the transfer between armed groups of weapons andknowledge on how to use them.

b) Ownership or control of
weapons within an armed
conflict partyc) Arms storage and management

Information and analysis on internal control overweapons. Strong hierarchical control of weapons (controlled or owned by the group) can support arms control
initiatives; individual control or ownership of weapons
can make arms control initiatives more difficult toinstitute.
Analysis of weapons per combatant ratios within armed
movements to support an understanding of the weapons
holdings of armed actors and provide a baseline fordisarmament, demobilization and reintegration or similar
initiatives. See Risk Point 4.4.1.
Analysis of armed actors’ ability to control territory,
including vulnerability to air raids or other attacks: highlevels of control or low levels of vulnerability support
the development of secure stockpiles and facilities; lowlevels of control or high levels of vulnerability limit thedevelopment of secure stockpiles and facilities.
Analysis of size and types of deployments: larger deployments facilitate robust and centralized arms and ammunition management practices and facilities; smaller,
temporary deployments (including caches) limit arms
control practices.

92 The withdrawal of military support has been shown to push parties to enter into a peace process (Lindberg et al., 2011,36); however, the diversification of supply chains can reduce the effect of such a withdrawal of support.

59

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
Other considerations• Conflicts with multiple groups tend to be more intense and last longer, suggesting that they are harder to settle
and that it is harder to implement a settlement once one is reached as there are more actors to be disarmed andthe possibility of splintering is higher. In such a context, managing weapons becomes both more important andmore difficult.
• Armed groups have distinct patterns of internal weapons distribution depending on their organization. In conflicts
with multiple, decentralized non-State actors, their weapons stocks will likely also be decentralized, and commandand control (including on the ownership and use of weapons) may be hard to impose. This makes identifying andaccounting for weapons difficult and creates logistical challenges for collection. Decentralized groups also usually
have decentralized weapons stocks and may find it hard to apply good practices in weapons and ammunition
management.
• Centralized armed groups rely on clearly established rules and values, which are likely to be imparted to the rank
and file through indoctrination and training.93 Their hierarchy allows for a top-down approach, including on arms
control as part of ceasefires and on the final peace agreements facilitating arms control and disarmament. This
control can extend to internal arms and ammunition management practices and facilities as it allows for clear
procedures for such practices and for the development of secure stockpiles and facilities.
• Understanding the level of cohesion of armed movements can help in assessing the possibility that they will
splinter as they engage in prevention efforts that may not be well received by all parts of the armed group. This
may result in factions of groups that continue to fight and/or a shift in the group’s positions as new leadership
emerges. An armed group’s ability to exercise command and control over troops can also have implications fortheir ability to deliver on any engagement the leadership makes.

93

ICRC (2018, 23).

Risk Area 3: Use of conventional arms during a conflict

60

RISK FACTOR 3.4: WHERE (IN WHICH REGIONS AND AREAS) CONVENTIONAL
ARMS ARE BEING USEDThe regions or areas in which conventional arms are used during a conflict can support peaceefforts by, for instance, providing a basis for ceasefire negotiations. Whereas arms proliferation
analysts more generally look at the number of weapons entering into a conflict and how thoseweapons affect the intensity or likelihood of a conflict, the analysis of geographic distribution of
weapons used within a conflict can support the identification of hotspots – areas of particulartension – and provide a basis for where to focus efforts for de-escalation. These efforts can form
the basis for geographic ceasefires that take place in a geographically limited area, such as a region,
operational front or city. These ceasefires may be instituted for various reasons, including to test
goodwill, test a model, address specific hotspots, de-escalate conflict in a location, build trust andprotect populations.

RISK POINT 3.4.1: TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND THE DEPLOYMENT OFWEAPONS
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Mapping of where armed groups are located and inwhich areas they can be said to be responsible forviolence.
Assessment of whether there are interfaces with areasof control of other armed actors that may create flashpoints and increase the risk of conflict.

a) How areas of control ofarmed movements may
influence a conflict

Assessment of whether the control of territory facilitates the group’s ability to obtain weapons, for example
by providing access to borders, transport infrastructureor resources with which to purchase weapons. See Risk
Points 2.3.1(b) and 2.3.1(c).
Mapping of changes in areas of control that may reflecta change in the balance of power between armed
movements, or access to new resources or channels forweapons acquisition as territory changes hands.
Identification of areas or locations that are or are likely tobe the target of fighting (e.g. towns, critical infrastructure
and areas rich in natural resources).

b) How military goals or
incidents are shaped by thelocation in which they are
occurring (terrain and tactics)

Analysis of how environmental factors including topography, climate and specific weather events may influence
armed actors’ ability to store, manage and deploy and/or
use weapons.94 See also Risk Point 3.4.1(c).

94 For instance, steep terrain may constrain the use of certain usually heavier conventional arms, rainy seasons may makemovement of troops and equipment difficult or influence the storage of weapons and ammunition, and dense forest canopy
may hinder the use of aerial surveillance or bombardment, while also allowing for the establishment of larger arms depots thatwould otherwise be vulnerable to aerial attack.

61

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Assessment of whether the ability to control territory
allows armed groups to organize and sustain themselves,for example by raising funds with which to purchasearms and ammunition; establish camps, arms depots(see also Risk Point 3.3.2(c)) and training centres forrecruits; or use heavier weaponry.

c) Control of territory anddeployment of troops andequipment

Assessment of whether territorial control allows armed
actors to increase their armed capabilities by attracting more recruits and holding safe areas from which tolaunch more deadly attacks.
Tracking the deployment of weapons in a group’s areasof control to support an understanding of their militaryintentions, for instance where they may be seeking toconcentrate their strength for an offensive.
Analysis of changes in areas of control that can result inchanges in tactics, for example use of heavier or moreconventional weapons as groups control more territory,or use of improvised explosive devices and more indiscriminate weapons as control of territory weakens.

Other considerations• Most conflicts involve contestation over territory as a conflict driver. In some conflicts, as actors move to fightalong new fronts, the original locations see a de-escalation in violence, while previously unaffected areas
experience increased violence. This occurs as weapons and combatants are redirected to new fronts or locations,
resulting in a reduction in the intensity of violence in the areas the weapons have been moved from. Violence
can also expand to new locations, with the original areas not seeing a reduction in violence. This is more common
where armed groups rely on violence to extract resources within the territory they control, resulting in violencebehind front lines in the original areas of control.95• An understanding of the types of weapons held by conflict parties, and where they are located, can support
peace efforts by providing a basis for ceasefire negotiations. This information is key to the cessation of hostilities
and ceasefires, which are built around the control of weapons and putting them beyond use, often first throughdisengaging them and then removing them altogether from the battlefield.
• Information on the types of weapon present and where they are deployed can also support in the identification of
hotspots – areas of tension, providing information on where to focus efforts for de-escalation. This information
can form the basis for ceasefires that take place in a geographically limited area such as a region, operational frontor city. Such ceasefires may be instituted for various reasons, including to test goodwill or to address specifichotspots, de-escalate conflict in a location, build trust or protect populations.

95

See Schutte and Weidmann (2011).

Risk Area 3: Use of conventional arms during a conflict

62

Risk Area 4:
Use and management of
conventional arms after a conflict
Close to half of all conflicts between 1989 and 2018 have recurred, with 20% recurring three ormore times.96 Significant stocks of poorly managed arms and/or the illicit recirculation of legacy
arms and remnants of conflict provide a readily and easily available resource for a group seeking
to start or resume an armed conflict. The use of arms, however, also occurs outside of conflict,including in post-conflict settings. Around 82% of firearms-related deaths globally occur outside ofbattlefields.97 This violence may take many forms, and the changing nature of armed movements
has blurred the line between armed conflict and crime, and between politically motivated and economically motivated violence. High levels of armed violence in a post-conflict setting can negatively
impact a peace process and contribute to a relapse into conflict; they can also undermine economic
recovery, drain State resources, spark retaliatory cycles of violence, and create fear and mistrust
among the population, thus fuelling the grievances and fragilities that often underlie violent
conflict.98 The use and management of arms and ammunition remain key factors in the continuation of armed violence, whatever its form, and this section examines five Risk Factors related to the
management of arms and ammunition after a conflict as a measure of reducing armed violence.

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 4
RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER
A CONFLICT
Risk Factor

Risk Point

4.1: Modalities for ending theconflict

4.1.1: Modalities for ending the conflict
4.2.1: Scope and intensity of post-conflict armed violence

4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings

4.2.2: Perpetrators and targets of armed violence
4.2.3: Responses to armed violence

4.3: Types of arms and armed
violence
4.4: Managing the current
and former armed actors andtheir weapons

96

4.3.1: Type of conventional arms
4.3.2: Types and nature of armed incidents
4.4.1: Signatory State and non-State parties
4.4.2: Non-signatory parties

Jarland et al. (2020).

97 Direct conflict deaths accounted for 18% of all violent deaths in 2016, a confirmation that a large majority of victims oflethal violence continue to lose their lives off the battlefield. Small Arms Survey (2017).
98

63

World Bank (2011, 35).
THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

4.4.3: State-sponsored or other armed actors
4.4.4: Informal security providers and redeployment ofState security providers
4.4: Managing the current
and former armed actors andtheir weapons (cont.)

4.4.5: Improved use and management of arms and ammunition held by the security forces
4.4.6: Arms caches and residual weapons
4.4.7: Civilian arms control programming

4.5: Geography and targets
of armed violence

4.5.1 Geographic mapping of armed violence
4.5.2: Targets of armed violence

RISK FACTOR 4.1: MODALITIES FOR ENDING THE CONFLICTThe manner in which a conflict ends may have a strong influence on whether it will reoccur orwhether a new conflict may take place in the same area. The nature of the agreement and whether
it is comprehensive and addresses the underlying reasons why conflict actors took up arms may be
a factor and “a majority of recurring conflict episodes are over the same (64 percent) or overlapping
issues or grievances (27 percent)”.99 Likewise, the inclusivity of an agreement will signal whether
there remain conflict actors who are not part of the process and who may continue fighting despite
the signature of a peace agreement. This may stretch to other parts of society who, if excluded
from negotiations, may be motivated to turn to violence to ensure their inclusion in the peace
process and the achievement of their goals.

RISK POINT 4.1.1: MODALITIES FOR ENDING THE CONFLICT
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Assessment of the implications of the means of ending
the conflict – clear victory by one side, negotiated settlement, imposed peace by outside actors – on the sustainability of peace.100a) Modalities for ending theconflict

99

Assessment of the scope of the political agreement. A
comprehensive agreement that addresses the underlying grievances of the armed movements may be moresustainable than a “stand-alone” preliminary ceasefire
that only seeks to stop the fighting without addressing
the causes for it.101

Jarland et al. (2020).

100 “Intrastate conflicts are less likely to recur after government victories or after the deployment of peacekeepers.” Kreutz(2012, 26).
101 Preliminary ceasefires and comprehensive peace agreements are not mutually exclusive, and the former may often be
instituted to allow for a de-escalation in tensions while a comprehensive agreement is negotiated.
Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict64

Number of armed actors: the higher the number ofarmed actors involved in a conflict, the more difficult theimplementation of the agreement may be and the more
likely it is that these groups could splinter and return toconflict.102
Level of inclusivity of the peace process: the exclusionof certain armed actors from, or their refusal to join, thepeace process indicates that those actors will continue
the armed conflict.

b) Inclusivity of a peace
process or agreement

Level of cohesion of the signatory parties and likelihoodthat the parties may splinter into factions of those who
support the peace process and those who are opposed
to it. See Risk Point 3.3.1.
Exclusion from the process of certain groups orsegments of society. This can signal the formation of
new armed movements aligned to these excluded actors
if they feel the only way they will be given a role in or
benefit from the peace process is if they take up arms.
Meaningful participation in the peace process of peopleof all genders and different ages. Agreements reachedafter a negotiation process that includes meaningful
participation of women, youth and people of different
gender identities are more likely to hold because they
include a more representative reflection of society.103

Other considerations• A society that has experienced armed conflict is more likely to experience continued violence based on theoutcome of that conflict. This includes, for example, which faction or actors prevailed (such as opposition groups
or rebels, or the government in power) and whether the previous conflict was concluded with a negotiatedsettlement or a definitive victory by one of the sides in that conflict.
• The nature of armed violence often changes after a conflict, as the end of a conflict can lead to shifts in thebalance of power. This shift in the balance of power may be linked to the outcome of the conflict (one clear winnerable to dictate their terms or a negotiated settlement where some parties may feel excluded) as well as to efforts
to manage armed forces after a conflict, such as through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR),
which can often be one-sided, leaving one conflict party more vulnerable than another.104 In some situations, shifts
in the balance of power may also be linked to the political economy of war, where the economic basis on which
armed groups are formed continues to act as a factor for maintaining the group post-conflict and the organization
shifts into the criminal realm.
• The failure by a State to reassert control over weapons in its territory may damage its legitimacy, and high levels ofarmed crime may reduce general support for a peace process. Moreover, what starts out as non-political crime cansoon be met with a vigilante-style response, leading to organized centres of violence. Such situations can develop
with the politicization of the groups involved and the outbreak of civil war. The reassertion of control over weapons
is thus an important component of peacebuilding.105• Organized violence targeting civilians predominantly takes place in the context of intra-State conflict.106 Whereas
conflicts between signatories may be addressed through a peace agreement or ceasefire, violence against
civilians (or between armed groups) may continue. Therefore, even when intra-State conflicts end – temporarily or
permanently – armed violence involving these groups may continue.

102 See Kreutz (2012, 23).
103 Security Council resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security, adopted in 2000, was the first resolution to link
women to peace and security, acknowledging that armed conflicts impact women and girls differently from men and boys. The
subsequent resolutions urge mediators to have women and women’s civil society organizations effectively represented in peace
processes and institutions and to ensure adequate protection and funding for their needs. See UN DPA (2017).
104 See IDDRS 2.20 (2019a).
105 Kreutz et al. (2011).
106 Jarland et al. (2020).

65

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 4.2: USE OF ARMS IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS
Peace agreements can bring a formal end to a conflict, but this does not mean that they willaddress all forms of armed violence. In post-conflict settings, the nature of violence often changes;
for example, violence often transforms from organized conflict between recognized parties into
other forms of armed violence – such as political violence, disorganized criminal violence organg-related turf wars – or to land disputes or communal tensions turning lethal. Morphed violence
may involve some of the same actors as in the conflict as well as new groups, sometimes spun off
from conflict actors (such as breakaway or dissident factions, or the shift of armed movements into
criminal activities), or armed individuals in contravention of the law. It may also change in intensity
or shift location (see Risk Factor 4.5). It is often facilitated and intensified by the availability of
conventional arms used during the conflict, for instance by the diffusion of military weapons into
the hands of criminal groups. The perpetrators and targets of violence may also shift as the armed
structures and their motivations change, with some targets being considered more political – andtherefore more likely to signal a return to political conflict – and others more criminal, resulting indifferent types of arms-related instability. Furthermore, State responses to post-conflict armed
violence can manage or aggravate the situation. For example, armed violence tends to be characterized by vicious cycles of retribution. Such cyclical dynamics thrive in the absence of effective
justice systems, which should provide closure, resolve disputes and bring perpetrators to account.
Effective justice systems that reduce impunity can help consolidate peace; however, heavy-handed
State response to violence can undermine the population’s confidence in government structures.

RISK POINT 4.2.1: SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF POST-CONFLICT ARMED
VIOLENCE
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Number of incidents of political assassination or
attempted political assassination, disaggregated bygender: higher numbers represent higher levels ofpolitical violence and a sustained campaign to use
violence to effect political change.

a) Political violence

Number killed or wounded in political assassinations
or attempted political assassinations, disaggregatedby gender: higher numbers represent higher levelsof political violence and a sustained campaign to use
violence to effect political change.
Number of attacks on State military, police, paramilitaryand intelligence targets by new armed groups: higher
numbers represent higher levels of political violence anda sustained campaign to use violence to effect politicalchange.
Number killed or wounded in attacks on State military,
police, paramilitary and intelligence targets, disaggregated by gender, where possible by new armed groups that
may indicate a change in the armed actors.

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict66

Number of violent political demonstrations or protests inwhich conventional arms are used and/or present, which
provides information on the type of arms available andsignals a willingness to use them.
Estimated number of participants in violent politicaldemonstrations or protests in which conventional arms
are used and/or present, which can support an assessment of the levels of discontent and strength of thepolitical opposition.

a) Political violence (cont.)

Number of incidents where the government used repression or violence against participants in the event: higher
levels of repression may reduce government legitimacy
and fuel more extreme responses by opposition actors.
Number killed or wounded by conventional arms in situations where the government used repression or violenceagainst participants in the event.
Evidence of incidents in which the threat of violence isused for political purposes.
Evidence of violent clashes between two or more
non-State groups.
Number and type of terrorist acts or attacks involving
conventional arms.
Reporting on summary executions or extrajudicial
killings, which indicate the acceptability of violence
within State institutions (this may be tacit and possibly
linked to militarization or part of a directed campaign).
Civil rights violations by security forces, including
unlawful use of deadly force.
Reporting on attacks against civilians (including demobilized combatants) by military, paramilitary, police or otherState security forces.

b) State violence

Reporting on death squads within State security forces.
Existence and application of rules and regulations on
the use of force and firearms against persons by law
enforcement officials as a benchmark to measureexcessive use of force and firearms.
Levels of use of force and firearms in the dispersal ofassemblies, whether lawful or unlawful, that are non-violent.
Existence of legislation to punish as a criminal offence
the arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law
enforcement officials.

67

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRb) State violence (cont.)

Number of convictions of law enforcement officials
under laws to punish as a criminal offence the arbitraryor abusive use of force and firearms.
Perceptions of government legitimacy among the population or segments of the population, disaggregated bygender and age.
Number of firearms-related homicides per 100,000 population, disaggregated by gender and age.

c) Criminal armed violence

Presence of an effective criminal justice response toarmed violence, as measured by the number of persons
arrested, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced forcrimes involving arms. Alternatively, rate of firearms-related crimes remaining unresolved, with no perpetrator
brought to account.
Increasing or decreasing number of illicit firearms andammunition seizures reported by law enforcement. Alternatively, as a measure of illicit arms flows, increasingor decreasing prices of firearms and ammunition on theblack market.

d) Number of armed incidents
per location

Increase or decrease in the number of armed incidents
in a particular location or region: an increase in incidents
involving arms signals a higher intensity of violence;a decrease in incidents involving arms signals a lower
intensity of violence.

RISK POINT 4.2.2: PERPETRATORS AND TARGETS OF ARMED VIOLENCE
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Reporting on the social, political or identity group (i.e.
actor, perpetrator or victim) of armed violence, disaggregated by gender and age.
Reporting on the proportion and relationship between
perpetrators and victims (i.e. is one group targeting
another group disproportionally?).

a) Perpetrators and targets

Reporting on levels of violence against women and,
where possible, the types of weapon used.
Reporting on the State or other institutions or entities
targeted (e.g. central, regional, provincial or local government or institutions linked to political opposition).
Reporting of attacks on demobilized combatants. A
higher number of attacks or other security concerns may
provide ex-combatants with incentives to remobilize.

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict

68

RISK POINT 4.2.3: RESPONSES TO ARMED VIOLENCE
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Establishment and progress in weapons collection
programmes targeting weapons that have been held byformer combatants (weapons amnesties, voluntary collections, weapons-for-development initiatives, gun-freezones and other efforts to put guns beyond use).
Government strategies designed to reduce armed
violence, with rigorous success criteria and regularimpact evaluations.

a) Government actions

The creation or empowerment of a firearms focal point
or gun crime centre devoted to understanding, resolving
and preventing incidents of armed violence. Similarly,
appropriately staffed, funded and empowered government structures (i.e. agencies, task force) designed tocombat armed violence, with rigorous success criteria
and regular impact evaluations.
Rise in vigilante, paramilitary or law enforcement
agencies operating on the margins of the law. Unlawful
responses to armed violence, whether by the State or
permitted by inaction from the State, yield counterproductive results.
Perceptions of public security and perceptions of government effectiveness.

Other considerations• Crime is a particularly difficult aspect to address in conflict prevention and management. In many cases, criminal
violence falls outside conflict resolution efforts, and the separation made between conflict and crime means thatcriminal actors who may have played a critical role in a conflict are left out of conflict resolution efforts or thatthe criminal aspects of armed factions, and the concerns these actors may have about criminal activities (which
can include concerns about legal pursuits or the need to continue criminal activities to raise funds and maintain
payrolls), are often not included in the peace effort. This leaves few alternatives to violent criminal organizations in
the post-war period.

69

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 4.3: TYPES OF ARMS AND ARMED VIOLENCE
Armed violence is often transformed in post-conflict situations as it changes from conflict-related to political or criminal violence. Whereas the latter may destabilize a post-conflict setting, it ispolitical violence that is more likely to signal a return to armed conflict as parties continue to deploy
armed violence to both signal and achieve political goals. The types of arms involved in post-conflict armed violence may indicate the different channels of illicit arms (such as military arms left
over from the conflict or civilian weapons, which are less likely to be related to the stocks or caches
from the conflict). Likewise, the way these weapons are deployed or used may indicate the intent of
the armed actors as well as their level of sophistication and ability to destabilize a fragile post-conflict situation. These motivations may further be assessed through statements put out by theperpetrators or an analysis of the targets or victims, which provide information on the intent of thearmed group or the motivation behind the use of armed violence.

RISK POINT 4.3.1: TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Assessment and trend analysis of the type (e.g. civilianarms or military weapons) and calibre of weapons
involved (small arms and light weapons or larger). See
Risk Areas 2 and 3.

a) Types of conventional arms
used in post-conflict armed
violence

Analysis of recovered and traced firearms to determine
their last known legal owner. Tracing efforts will inform
authorities of the possible origin of the diversion. See
Risk Factor 1.1.
Analysis of an ammunition profiling study to determine
trends and patterns in the use of ammunition anddiscover any new inflows of previously unseen brands ortypes of ammunition.
Analysis of the use of explosives, including improvised
explosive devices, to determine the perpetrators behind
the attack and the sources of the explosives used.

RISK POINT 4.3.2: TYPES AND NATURE OF ARMED INCIDENTS
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Analysis of the types of armed incidents to inform theuse of tactics or the motivations for armed violence.

a) Types of armed incidents

Rise in incidents of robberies, home invasions or“common crime” involving an armed perpetrator and/or illicit discharges. This indicator could be comparedagainst previous documented cases of the same type of
criminal activity to gauge if there has been an increase in
the level of violence.

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict70

Assessment of the sophistication and ability to deploy
weapons platforms, which may indicate the armed
groups’ or individuals’ strength, ability to intensify
violence and knowledge of how to effectively use
weapons, including the deployment of complex attacks
and the use of grenades.
b) Nature or complexity of
the incidents involved

Frequency of armed incidents to determine if they are
isolated incidents or part of a sustained campaign.
Assessment of the number of persons involved or thelevel of target, disaggregated by gender and age.
Type of target – soft or hard – and result of the attack,which may reveal information on the motivation andability of an armed movement.
Claims by armed groups or movements following an
incident.
Analysis of the expected reason for violence – forexample, to show presence; to obtain weapons, ammunition or other equipment; or to seize property or claim
territory.

c) Motivation behind
incidents of violenceTarget of armed violence – for example, State security
forces, a segment of the population, or other armed
gangs or groups – which may help assess the reason
behind an armed incident and the nature of the violence(political or criminal). See also Risk Point 4.5.2.
Mapping of exacerbating or conflating dynamics (alcohol,
late hours, gender norms and violent masculinities,
economic gains, etc.) behind incidents of armed violence.
Analysis of the socioeconomic situation of perpetratorsof armed violence.

Other considerations• The type of weapons used in post-conflict settings can provide information on the success of the efforts tomanage weapons as well as on the nature of the movements. Non-regularized weapons and caches from ex-combatants remaining in their possession after a demobilization process without authorization are often a source of
post-conflict armed violence or secondary diversion into other unauthorized hands.107 As such, systematic tracing
efforts could provide information on whether the weapons present in local crimes or neighbouring communities
could have recirculated from a determined conflict. In addition, systematic diversion monitoring efforts could shedlight on the origin or last legal owner of the diverted arms and related items.
• Ammunition is the oxygen of armed violence. Ammunition is a consumable item that must be replenished once
used, as opposed to arms, which are not consumable and are reused over time. As such, restricting the flow of
ammunition can have an immediate impact in reducing lethal outcomes (without ammunition, firearms are only
instruments of coercion or blunt force). In addition, calibres are also an important, but often overlooked, consideration. Simply put, the higher the calibre the more lethal a shooting can be. It is thus crucial to monitor firepower
capabilities and revise regulations that permit unrestricted access to ammunition. The availability of ammunitionof a specific calibre is also important when considering that different types of weapon can only be used withcertain calibres of ammunition.
• Armed violence is multicausal. As such, it should be understood as part of the larger societal context and analysedin conjunction with other dynamics, including prevailing gender norms, that may enable, facilitate or exacerbate
lethal outcomes. It is therefore important to consider weapons as instruments of violence while not losing sight ofthe enabling factors that lead to the final shooting scene.

107 See Project Divert of the Flemish Peace Institute: https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/en/divert

71

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 4.4: MANAGING CURRENT AND FORMER ARMED ACTORS AND
THEIR WEAPONSThe presence of large stocks of uncontrolled weapons can support a return to conflict or to regional
instability as they move across borders and fuel instability elsewhere. Weapons belonging tosignatory armed groups after a conflict are usually managed through two processes: final ceasefires and the disarmament component of a DDR programme. Studies have shown that without DDR
there are large groups of former fighters still tied into organized structures and therefore easily
able to be mobilized and armed if there is an abundance of readily available arms in the society.108
Such conditions are likely to result in a rapid recurrence of conflict and may be aggravated byuneven or scarce post-demobilization economic opportunities. Post-conflict arms control, however,is often applied to a limited number of parties to a conflict, usually the signatory armed opposition
or rebel movements, whereas it is important to consider the weapons of all armed actors, including
signatory non-State armed groups, non-signatory movements, militias and paramilitary groups,
State security forces and informal security providers. For example, the presence of militias andparamilitary groups can make a conflict last longer, produce increased levels of violence109 andmake the post-conflict period more volatile;110 however, such groups may not be included in peace
processes and may be excluded from measures to disarm and demobilize or dismantle armed
groups. This results in large bodies of armed persons, often in diffuse locations and with weakcommand and control, still present in post-conflict contexts, representing a threat to the peace
process and the possibility that they will involve themselves in political or criminal armed activities.

RISK POINT 4.4.1: SIGNATORY STATE AND NON-STATE PARTIES
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Incident, evidence or existence of a peace process.

a) Identification of parties toa peace process or signatory
parties to a peace agreement

Review of peace agreements to establish signatorygroups.111
Monitoring of public declarations of armed movements
to assess their position vis-à-vis the peace agreement.
Incident tracking disaggregated by armed group.

b) Provisions on arms control
or disarmament in the peaceagreement

Assessment of provisions on arms control or disarmament in the peace agreement.
Assessment of the implementation of provisions onarms control or disarmament in the peace agreement.

108 Kreutz et al. (2011).
109 Although they possess only a small proportion of the world’s small arms, because paramilitary groups and militias typicallyuse their weapons in ambushes, surprise attacks and against “soft” targets, their “arsenals tend to be far more deadly anddestructive” than those of their government adversaries. Small Arms Survey (2001, 77).
110 Day (2020, 3).
111 See also Risk Points 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 to assess the cohesion of armed movements and their control of weapons to support
an assessment of the likelihood that the movement will fracture or how well it may manage to control arms in a peace process
or post-conflict setting.

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict72c) Inclusion of clauses inpeace agreements on theneed to disarm or disband
armed groups

Assessment of peace agreements to assess theinclusion of clauses on the need to disarm or disband
armed groups.
Level of inclusion of the agreement: Does it include allarmed actors or only some?
Monitoring of the implementation of clauses on arms
control or disarmament of armed groups.
Programme reporting on the number of weapons
handed in as part of a disarmament, demobilization andreintegration (DDR) process, disaggregated by group or
party to the conflict.
Programme reporting on the number of weapons
collected as part of a DDR programme that have been
destroyed.
Physical characteristics of arms collected or surrendered (old or new compared with baseline information on
armed groups’ previous holdings).

d) Implementation of arms
control or disarmament
activities

Programme reporting on the number of combatants
disarmed and demobilized who have entered reintegration programmes, disaggregated by group or party to theconflict, gender, and age.
Programme reporting on the number of child soldiers
released and reintegrated, disaggregated by gender andage.
Ratio of arms to combatants. In the disarmament
component of a DDR effort, the ratio of arms to combatants compared with previous ratios, should be informative if the current process is in line with documented
experiences.
Programme reporting on number of weapons surrendered pre-DDR and community violence reduction.
Reporting on former combatants involved in armed
violence, which would indicate whether they still haveaccess to arms and ammunition.

e) Movement of conventional arms and combatants toother theatresf) Monitoring of former
fighters and their weapons

73

Reporting on the movement of conventional arms andcombatants to other countries experiencing conflict orhigh levels of armed violence.
Economic opportunities and/or levels of formal employment of former fighters. Alternatively, evidence offormer fighters participating in reintegration schemes togain market skills.
Reports of former fighters involved in criminal violence
and/or gender-based violence, including domestic
violence and violence against women, with firearms.

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Reports of former fighters joining other violent organizations and/or migrating to areas controlled by rebels tothe peace agreement.
f) Monitoring of former
fighters and their weapons(cont.)

Military or law enforcement reports of hidden armedcaches or former fighters caught illicitly armed.
Analysis of recovered and traced weapons seizedfrom former fighters to determine if their weapons areremnants of the conflict or newly acquired.

RISK POINT 4.4.2: NON-SIGNATORY PARTIES
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Reporting on the peace process.
Review of peace agreements to establish the non-signatory groups.

a) Identification of holdout
armed movements or
non-signatory parties to apeace agreement

Monitoring of public declarations of armed movements.
Incident tracking involving non-signatory parties, disaggregated by armed group.
Estimate of the ratio of arms per combatant in the
non-signatory group.

RISK POINT 4.4.3: STATE-SPONSORED OR OTHER ARMED ACTORS
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) Identification ofState-sponsored or othermilitia and paramilitarygroupsb) Provisions on arms control
or disarmament of militias inpeace agreementsc) Inclusion of clauses on theneed to disarm or disband
militias or other allied
movements in peace agreements

Indicators
Armed actor analysis that includes militia and paramilitary groups.

Review of peace agreements for provisions on arms
control or disarmament of militias.
Review of the implementation of provisions on arms
control or disarmament of militias in peace agreements.
Review of peace agreements for provisions on disarmament of militias or other armed groups associated withsignatory parties.
Monitoring of implementation of provisions on disarmament of militias or other armed groups associated withsignatory parties.

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict74

Establishment of a national policy and programme, as
well as capacity, to manage and collect weapons ofmilitias and other non-signatory groups.
d) Establishment of programmes to manage andcollect the weapons ofmilitias and other non-signatory groups

Number of weapons collected through programmes todisarm and dismantle militias and paramilitary groups.
Programme reporting on the number of weapons
collected as part of programmes to disarm anddismantle militias and paramilitary groups that have been
destroyed.
Number of incidents of armed violence attributed tomilitias and paramilitary groups.

RISK POINT 4.4.4: INFORMAL SECURITY PROVIDERS AND
REDEPLOYMENT OF STATE SECURITY PROVIDERS
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicatorsa) Identification of informal
security providers

Armed actor analysis that includes informal security
providers.

b) Peace agreements
stipulate the demobilizationof certain State forces or,where appropriate, their demilitarization

Review of peace agreements for clauses on the disarmament or control of State security forces.

c) Peace agreements include
clauses on the agreed
security providers post-conflict and on their redeployment throughout national
territory

Review of peace agreements for clauses on the interim
and final security arrangements.

Monitoring of the implementation of clauses on the disarmament or control of State security forces.

Monitoring of the implementation of clauses on theinterim and final security arrangements.

RISK POINT 4.4.5: IMPROVED USE AND MANAGEMENT OF ARMS AND
AMMUNITION HELD BY THE SECURITY FORCES
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) Security sector governance and reform initiatives
are instigated, which include
the training of State security
forces in the appropriate useof firearms (encompassing
respect for human rights andnon-lethal crowd control)75

Indicators
Inclusion of training of State security forces in the appropriate use of firearms in security sector governance andreform programmes.
Existence and application of rules and regulations on theuse of force and firearms by law enforcement officials.
See also Risk Point 4.2.1(b).

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRb) Armed forces, police or any
other body authorized to holdconventional arms establish
adequate and detailed
standards and procedures
relating to the management
and security of their stocks

Effective stockpile management measures. See Risk
Point 5.2.3.
Establishment of programmes for responsible disposal,
preferably through destruction, of surplus conventional
weapons, and adequate safeguarding of these stocks
until disposal, in line with international standards. See
Risk Point 5.2.5.

RISK POINT 4.4.6: ARMS CACHES AND RESIDUAL WEAPONS
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) Use of arms caches bysignatory parties to hideweapons and ammunition orotherwise prevent them frombeing handed over

Indicators
Contextual analysis of any prior history of armed groups
maintaining weapons caches during the conflict.
Review of peace agreements and monitoring of the implementation of clauses on the need for conflict parties
to hand over information on arms caches.
Reporting on the discovery of undeclared arms caches.

b) Operations to mop up
residual weapons in thehands of former combatants

Establishment and progress in weapons collection
programmes targeting weapons that have been held byformer combatants (weapons amnesties, voluntary collections, weapons-for-development initiatives, gun-freezones and other efforts to put guns beyond use).
Number and condition of illicit weapons, munitions
and equipment seized from persons associated withdifferent armed groups.
Contextual analysis of conflict history and the use ofmines, improvised explosive devices and other explosive
devices by the conflict parties.

c) Presence of demining
activities to clear mines andexplosive remnants of war

Requirement to declare minefields in peace agreements.
Formal square miles demined. It is important to complete
a thorough demining process to preserve life and to keep
mines that could be misused to fabricate improvised
explosive devices from falling into unauthorized hands.

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict

76

RISK POINT 4.4.7: CIVILIAN ARMS CONTROL PROGRAMMING112
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Existence of programmes to encourage citizens tosurrender illegal, unsafe or unwanted firearms. The
existence of such programmes can indicate positive perceptions of security and a willingness to disarm; the lackof such programmes can indicate the need to possess
weapons for personal or community safety.

a) Presence of programmes
to encourage citizens tosurrender illegal, unsafe or
unwanted firearms

Number of arms collected from or surrendered bycivilians, disaggregated by gender and age, over a
specific time period in a defined geographic area: highnumbers can indicate a decrease in civilian weapons
holdings; low numbers can indicate limited changes incivilian weapons holdings.
Establishment of clear regulations and guidance for thecollection, registration and disposal of arms collected,
ensuring transparency and building confidence in theprocess.

b) Presence of programmes
to support the regularizationof illicit weapons

Existence of programmes to encourage citizens to regularize illicit firearms by allowing them to register suchfirearms and facilitate their return to the licit realm. The
existence of such programmes can indicate positive perceptions of security and a willingness to control arms.
Number of arms regularized as the result of an arms regularization programme. This may provide information on
the number (estimated range of the problem) and type ofillicit arms present in a country.

112 Civilian arms control programming does not only apply to post-conflict settings. For more general considerations on weapons in the hands of civilians, see Risk Factor 2.4.

77

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
Other considerations• Most post-war security processes focus on “politically motivated” armed movements, usually those that havesigned a peace agreement. The widespread availability of weapons in post-conflict settings means that DDR
processes that only target combatants will not achieve comprehensive disarmament and weapons control.113
Additional measures are necessary to manage the weapons belonging to other groups.
• Post-conflict disarmament of militias and paramilitary groups can be complicated, as these informal security
providers may not be part of a peace agreement and subject to DDR programmes. In cases where a peace process
is not inclusive, governments may choose to maintain possibly inflated security structures. Governments may alsoseek to retain paramilitary groups and militias as they continue to serve a purpose in fighting non-signatory armed
groups,114 or paramiltary groups and militias may keep a role as traditional armed security providers.
• Community-based armed groups, such as vigilantes, militias and criminal gangs, that are embedded withincommunities and whose delineation can be defined by territory, blood ties or shared identities115 are more likely torespond to efforts to engage in prevention activities based on a local approach that includes persons of influence
within the communities from which the community-based armed groups draw their support.
• Paramilitary groups and militias often form out of intercommunal disputes, which continue to fuel violence wellbeyond the end of a conflict. Expending resources on conflict resolution can create a helpful feedback loop,
reducing tensions and drying up the recruitment opportunities into armed groups.116• High military spending post-conflict may reflect a correct perception of an unusually high risk of further conflictas post-conflict governments that prioritize military spending are inadvertently signaling that they will renege on
the peace settlement and those that prioritize social spending are signaling that they will adhere to it. The former
signal increases the risk of conflict, while the latter builds private sector confidence and thereby accelerates
growth.117• Under the Programme of Action on Small Arms and its International Tracing Instrument,118 States must ensurethat the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold SALW establish adequate and detailed
standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons that include
appropriate locations for stockpiles, physical stockpiles and security measures, regular review of stocks of SALW
held by security forces, and programmes for the responsible disposal of such stocks. (See Risk Area 5.)• Armed movements and civilians may retain weapons as a means of guarding against violations of an agreement
and a resumption of conflict. There is often a requirement to also manage or collect these weapons, for example
through searches for arms caches or similar programmes, or to bring them into the legal realm through registration and licensing.
• Civilian arms control programming must include social, political, and economic and gender programming considerations to reduce the perceived or real requirement or motivation for civilian possession of conventional arms.
The programming must be implemented in a transparent and inclusive manner that builds trust and confidence inall stakeholders, including people women, girls, boys, men and people of different gender identities, and does notleave communities vulnerable. Understanding why communities are being asked to disarm, how their security will
be ensured once this is done and what will happen to the weapons is key to building trust in the process.119

113 A “DDR process will thus not address the problems of an abundance of small arms in post-conflict countries as such, sincea large share of those weapons are found among the civilian population.” Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006, 15).
114 Day (2020, 20).
115 Schuberth (2015).
116 Day (2020, 23).
117 Day (2020, 23).
118 See Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects, https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/programme-of-action, and International Instrument to Enable
States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw.
119 De Tessières and Shiotani (2019, 17).

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict

78

RISK FACTOR 4.5: GEOGRAPHY AND TARGETS OF ARMED VIOLENCE
The changing causes of post-conflict violence can be accompanied by changes in intensity and in
the spread of armed violence to new areas.120 Violence could also morph into hyperconcentrated
localized violent incidents, also known as hotspots. It is therefore important to map patterns ofarmed violence and cross-reference incidents against a spatial analysis so as to determine geographic focus, thematic priorities and entry points for programmatic intervention. Armed violence
is often restricted to specific geographic areas of a region, country or municipality, while otherareas of a country or city may function normally. A spatial analysis of armed violence may also
be matched by the targets of armed violence, which considers the proportion of the population
subjected to abuse (such as targeted and selective violence, or indiscriminate abuse).

RISK POINT 4.5.1: GEOGRAPHIC MAPPING OF ARMED VIOLENCE
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Geographic distribution of incidents of political armed
violence.

a) Mapping political armed
violence

Geographic holdouts and rebel-held areas after a peaceagreement.
Geographic distribution of government entities or
garrisons targeted by political armed violence.
Regional distribution of levels of State repression or
areas with increased presence from the armed forces,
national guards or law enforcement.

b) Mapping State armed
violence

Perceptions of the State’s presence and effectiveness.
Reported alliances between criminal groups and otherorganized armed actors (insurgencies, rebel groups, etc.).
Mapping the location of firearms-related fatalities andattempted homicides.
c) Mapping criminal armed
violence

Mapping the location of criminal firearm discharges andnon-lethal incidents involving firearms.
Levels of gang-related disputes over territory involving
firearms.
Mapping of armed incidents including robberies.

d) Dispersion of violenceInternal levels of armed violence, measured at the city,community or town level and nationwide, compared withthe prior reporting period. These levels can be tracked
using hospital data on armed incidents. See Risk Point
2.3.4.

120 Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008, 49).

79

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRd) Dispersion of violence(cont.)

External levels of armed violence, measured in neighbouring countries at the city or town level, in neighbouring countries nationwide, and in other countries from theregion, compared with the prior reporting period.
Clustering of armed violence near State lines and near
national borders.
Mapping of hotspots within a city or town and spatial
analysis to determine risk variables.

e) Concentration of violence

Comparison of current hotspots with previously documented ones to determine changes and evolution ofarmed violence.
Comparison between perceptions of violence and officially reported incidents of armed violence.

RISK POINT 4.5.2: TARGETS OF ARMED VIOLENCE
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Emergence of armed “self-defence” groups.

a) Political armed violence

Types of government entities or garrisons targeted byviolence.
Number of former combatants targeted by armed
violence or extrajudicial killings.
Distribution of the religious, ethnic, racial and political
identification of the victims of armed violence.

b) State armed violence

Distribution of the religious, ethnic, racial and political
identification of the incarcerated population.
Distribution of the religious, ethnic, racial and political
identification of the displaced population.
Distribution of the socioeconomic status of the victimsof armed violence.

c) Criminal armed violence

Percentage of victims of armed violence with a firearms-related criminal record.
Analysis of the main victims of violence, disaggregatedby gender and age.

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict80

Other considerations• The return of State security providers to areas where there may have been informal or other security providers
can be seen as a threat or provocation to local non-State authorities. Civil wars often erupt in the regions with thepresence or return – not absence – of State security forces.121• In some settings, peripheral, marginal and historically neglected regions, such as border areas and city slums, areoften undergoverned and vulnerable to the growth of informal and/or predatory power structures, resulting in highlevels of armed violence and instability that is not necessarily considered to be armed conflict.
• Post-conflict societies may encounter a shift in violence as weapons, combatants and armed violence move fromfront lines or disputed areas to other geographic zones, including urban areas. The targets of armed violence may
also change. Post-conflict contexts may see high levels of GBV, including domestic violence and violence against
women.
• Armed violence can exhibit regional and transnational dimensions. For example, it can rapidly spread acrossterritorial borders when involving mobile groups (including nomads or pastoralists) or criminal groups that trafficarms from country to country.

121 Yin (2020).

81

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict82

Risk Area 5:
Weapons and ammunition
management
Photo Credit: UNDP/SEESAC

At any stage before, during or after a conflict, effective weapons and ammunition management(WAM) capacities play a critical role in preventing:•

The destabilizing transfers of arms and ammunition to conflict-affected and high-risk areas•

Diversions from national stockpiles to unauthorized end users•

Illicit trafficking, possession and misuse of weapons and ammunition

WAM contributes to reinforcing post-conflict recovery strategies by supporting the regulatory,
operational and technical components of security sector reform and DDR in mission and non-mission settings, as well as supporting the implementation of the obligations of arms embargoes.
By supporting better arms control and preventing diversion, transitional WAM as part of a DDR
process can be a strong component of the sustaining peace approach and contribute to preventing
the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict.122 This section examines two Risk
Factors related to effective WAM.123

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 5
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)
Risk Factor

Risk Point

5.1: National regulations forWAM

5.1.1: Legal and regulatory frameworks at the nationallevel
5.2.1: National structures for WAM
5.2.2: Integration of WAM in security institutions

5.2: National capacities forWAM

5.2.3: Stockpile management standards and procedures
5.2.4: Marking and record-keeping systems
5.2.5: Disposal including destruction
5.2.6: Community-based WAM

122 See IDDRS 2.40 (2019b); IDDRS 4.11 (2020)
123 See Giezendanner and Shiotani (2021).

83

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK FACTOR 5.1: NATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR WAM
The creation and implementation of national regulations for WAM in line with international
standards is a primary component of a comprehensive WAM framework and can indicate the levelof institutional capacity needed to prevent the illicit proliferation and diversion of arms. In peace
operation contexts, WAM is increasingly relevant. In recent years, there has been an increase inUnited Nations Security Council resolutions mandating United Nations missions to provide WAM
support to States.124 The absence of national regulations over State stockpiles presents vulnerabilities that may be exploited by non-State armed groups engaged in armed conflict and may increase
their ability to sustain a conflict.

RISK POINT: 5.1.1: LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS AT THE
NATIONAL LEVEL
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) National implementation of
relevant legally and politicallybinding arms control instruments

Indicators
Submission by the State in question of reports on theimplementation of politically binding conventional arms
control instruments, such as the Programme of Action
on Small Arms and the International Tracing Instrument;
and, submission of reports on the implementation oflegally binding instruments to which the State in question
is a State party, including the Arms Trade Treaty, theFirearms Protocol, and relevant legally binding regionaland subregional instruments.125
Engagement in countering illicit arms proliferation as
measured by the State’s participation in regional andinternational arms control frameworks.
Change (increase or decrease) in bilateral development
assistance devoted to direct and indirect armed violence
prevention and weapons and ammunition programmes.

b) Maturity of national legislation to enforce arms control
measures

Degree to which a State’s national legal framework onarms and ammunition is in line with international obligations, as measured by national reports submitted under
instruments to which the State is party and other appropriate standards and guidelines (i.e. use of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and the Modular
Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium).
The presence or absence of national laws on illicit
weapons transfers, including relevant provisions in the
Criminal Code.

124 UNODA (2018a).
125 The obligations contained within legally binding instruments (like the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol) andpolitically binding instruments (like the Programme of Action on Small Arms) carry a different weight on the State. Therefore,
the measures included to assess this Risk Factor may vary depending on the arms control instrument and the obligations thiscreates for States in terms of reporting.

Risk Area 5: Weapons and ammunition management84

Assessment of the State’s ability to comply with transfer
control requirements (including, as and where applicable,
exports, imports, retransfers, transit and trans-shipment,
as well as brokering), as measured by the presence ofa system for import licensing or issuing end user certificates and/or reporting on international transfers ofconventional arms.
Assessment of the ability to enforce national laws on
illicit arms transfers, as demonstrated by the number of
persons convicted for illicit conventional arms trafficking
or the unauthorized use of small arms and light weapons:
higher levels indicate better capacity to enforce nationallaws on illicit weapons transfers; lower levels indicate
limited capacity to enforce these laws. See also Risk
Point 2.3.3.
The presence or absence of national laws regulating
civilian possession (including firearms dealers andprivate security companies).

b) Maturity of national legislation to enforce arms control
measures (cont.)

Assessment of the ability to enforce national laws regulating civilian possession, as demonstrated by evidenceof criminal investigations and sanctions for violations:higher numbers of investigations and sanctions indicate
better capacity to enforce national laws regulating
civilian possession; lower numbers indicate limited
capacity to enforce these laws. See also Risk Point 2.4.2.
Presence of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) orcomparable documents or regulatory framework (armed
forces acts, police service acts) regulating State-owned
weapons throughout their life cycle.
Ability to enforce the regulatory frameworks on Stateowned weapons, as demonstrated by evidence of investigations and appropriate sanctions for violations. Higher
numbers of investigations and sanctions indicate better
capacity to enforce the regulatory frameworks; lower
numbers indicate limited capacity to enforce the regulatory frameworks.
Existence of a national legislative framework clearly
identifying the national authorities responsible for regulating or exercising conventional arms control through allstages of the life cycle.
The presence or absence of national laws establishing abasis for weapons collection.

c) Focal point for conventional arms control

Existence of a national commission (Natcom) or othercoordinating government ministry, agency or department for conventional arms or small arms, as identified
and provided for with a clear mandate by national legislation.
Assessment of the gender balance of the Natcom, if
such a commission exists.

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THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
Other considerations• Gaps in the implementation of conventional arms control instruments may leave a region vulnerable to illicit arms
proliferation despite the existence of national controls. Similarly, loose or inadequately enforced regulation in one
State can affect neighbouring States if significant numbers of weapons acquired by civilians can flow illegally
across borders.
• Conventional arms control instruments support positive norms in the international arms trade, promote transparency and confidence-building measures between States, and enhance multilateral cooperation to effectively
manage the risks of conventional arms. As such, the implementation of these instruments can be indicative ofpolitical will to prevent and reduce armed violence.

RISK FACTOR 5.2: NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR WAM
The maturity of national capacities, including structures and action plans to manage weapons, canhelp in determining the ability of a State to resolve or manage an ongoing conflict through arms
control-based measures. Within this Risk Factor, stockpile and management standards and procedures provide an indication of the risk of diversion,126 of the theft or loss of arms and ammunition
from storage sites, and of their onward proliferation, which in turn can be a catalyst for armed
conflict.127 This Risk Factor covers the oversight of the full life cycle of arms throughout their supply
chain stages, from manufacture to final use. The existence or lack thereof of a holistic approach
to WAM can indicate an inability of a State to respond to different types of violence and conflict
dynamics and can equally offer opportunities for conflict prevention strategies. Examining stockpile
management practices more specifically can support conflict analysis through an assessment ofdiversion risks (see Risk Factor 2.2) and channels of access to conventional arms (see Risk Area 2).

RISK POINT 5.2.1: NATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Increases or decreases in the budget allocated to theNatcom for work on WAM and small arms control.

a) Capacity of the national
commission (Natcom) on
small arms and light weapons(SALW)

Increase or decrease of international support andfinancing provided to the Natcom.
Contextual analysis looking at existing and prior historyof disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
and WAM initiatives supported by the Natcom.

b) Mandate of the Natcom on
SALW

Scope of the Natcom’s mandate to address issues
relating to small arms, ammunition, explosives and/or
other weapon types.

c) Competent national
authorities for exercising
control through the life cycle

Capacity (ability, knowledge, know-how, resources) of
the competent authority to address issues relating toregulating or exercising control through all stages of thelife cycle.

126 The United Nations Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament recognizes that “Inadequate physical security can also
result in diversion of arms to illicit markets, including to non-State armed groups, terrorists and transnational criminal organizations. Fragile States are particularly susceptible to problems posed by improper stockpile management practices.” UNODA(2018b).
127 Conflict Armament Research found that the most common cases of diversion documented in conflict-related cases
involved some kind of State failure or role, including ineffective physical security and stockpile management. See Conflict Armament Research (2018, 9); Group of Governmental Experts (2020); MOSAIC 5.20 (2012b); Wood (2020).
Risk Area 5: Weapons and ammunition management86c) Competent national
authorities for exercising
control through the life cycle(cont.)

Existence of specialized units on small arms, ammunition
or explosives in the security sector.

RISK POINT 5.2.2: INTEGRATION OF WAM INTO SECURITY INSTITUTIONS
Options for assessing the Risk
Pointa) National action plans androad maps on SALW

Indicators
Existence of a national action plan or road map on SALW
to set priorities and objectives for action and define
necessary resources. Assessment of gender considerations in SALW road maps.
Existence or evidence of monitoring and evaluation
mechanism for the action plan or road map.
Contextual analysis looking at prior history of awareness-raising and advocacy initiatives conducted on arms
control in-country (i.e. does the State promote SALW
amnesty campaigns, International Mine Awareness Day,and other global initiatives on armed violence, sexual andgender-based violence awareness, etc.?).

b) Integration of SALW andarms control issues in law
enforcement agencies

Capacity-building and training for law enforcement andsecurity personnel related to arms control and WAM inline with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation
Compendium, and the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, as measured byreporting under relevant arms control instruments.
Assessment of whether domestic and international
tracing operations have been conducted and/or are
conducted by law enforcement and security agencies.
Frequency of cross-border trafficking incidents of arms,
ammunition and explosives, as measured by reportingon the number of conventional arms seized or found atborders or entry points.

c) Border security capacity toaddress small arms proliferation (see also Risk Point 2.3.2)

Average volume of illicit flows in the region, as measured
by illicit price monitoring (see Risk Point 1.1.1(b)) seizure
data (see Risk Point 1.1.2), use of firearms in violent acts
or crimes (see Risk Point 1.1.4), and/or official reports orpress releases. See also Risk Factor 2.3.
Increase or decrease in resources and funding for bordersecurity forces and/or counter-trafficking operations.
Capacity-building and training for border security
personnel related to detection and investigation of illicit
small arms proliferation.

87

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRRISK POINT 5.2.3: STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Existence of a designated national security force authorized to manage (i.e. possess, store, handle andtransport) weapons.
Reporting on arms diversions and lost or stolen arms
and ammunition from government stockpiles, as demonstrated by evidence of investigations, prosecutions orcorrective action.

a) Compliance of State stockpiles of weapons with international guidelines and bestpractices

Reporting on the frequency of attacks on armouries,
which may demonstrate weakness in physical security
and stockpile management practices and indicate that
armouries may be deliberately targeted as an easy
supply of weapons.
Frequency and lethality of unplanned explosions atmunitions sites resulting from inadequately managed
conventional ammunition stockpiles: frequent unplanned
explosions can indicate poor or inadequately secured
stockpiles; infrequent unplanned explosions can indicate
effective stockpile management.

RISK POINT 5.2.4: MARKING AND RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEMS
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Existence of national practices and legal requirements
on marking and recording State-owned weapons,
including an analysis of the types of arms and ammunition that requirements apply to, which affects the ability
to track and trace diverted weapons.

a) Compliance of weapons
marking and record-keeping
system (inventory management and national accounting
system) with international
standards and guidelines

National marking programmes and training conducted
for armed forces and security forces on weapons
marking and record-keeping.
Number of functioning marking machines available.
Existence of procedures and trained personnel for record-keeping.
Number and types of civilian-owned weapons marked
and recorded in national databases, disaggregated bygender of owner.

Risk Area 5: Weapons and ammunition management

88

RISK POINT 5.2.5: DISPOSAL INCLUDING DESTRUCTION
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Number, type and, where possible, condition of weapons
and ammunition disposed of or destroyed as part of an
official DDR programme.

a) Disposal of illicit arms
and ammunition, surplus
stocks, unwanted or obsolete
weapons and ammunition incompliance with international
standards and guidelines128

Number, type and, where possible, condition of weapons
and ammunition disposed of or destroyed as part of an
official weapons collection programme.
Number, type and, where possible, condition of weapons
and ammunition disposed of or destroyed after identification by the government as being surplus to requirements.
Conduct by the government of public weapons and ammunition destruction activities, including an analysis of
the scope (weapons and/or ammunition) and method of
disposal (destruction, sale, gifting or other).

RISK POINT 5.2.6: COMMUNITY-BASED WAM
Options for assessing the Risk
Point

Indicators
Contextual analysis looking at prior history of community
violence reduction programmes.129
Programme reporting on number of beneficiaries ofcommunity violence reduction programmes, disaggregated by gender and age.

a) Community-based WAM
engagement with local populations (see also Risk Point
2.4.2)

Number of civil society organizations and local stakeholders undertaking activities, initiatives and programmes on WAM and small arms control. Assessmentof inclusion of women and youth groups and othervulnerable groups.
Inclusion of conventional arms control issues and activities in development plans and programming.
Programme reporting on number of youths, women andvulnerable groups who are beneficiaries in WAM activities.

128 There are specific risks associated with conventional ammunition as they may become damaged unless correctly stored,
handled and transported. See International Ammunition Technical Guidelines modules on risk management here: https://unsaferguard.org/un-saferguard/guide-lines; see also UNIDIR (2019).
129 Community violence reduction activities include awareness-raising and education on the risks of arms, the creation ofcommunity-based storage facilities and gun-free zones, development of weapons management capacity, and encouragementof the handover of a certain quantity of serviceable weapons. Through such activities, community violence reduction aims tobuild intra- and inter-community relations and decrease levels of armed violence.

89

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
Other considerations• Where States are under international sanctions, strengthening their national capacity for the governance ofweapons and ammunition can help enable those States to move towards an incremental lifting of punitive
measures against them and improve control over the full life cycle of weapons and ammunition.130• WAM activities, like support for stockpile management or community-based registration of firearms andammunition, can establish security within and between communities by reducing the open availability and visibilityof weapons and can provide increased information on and knowledge of armed groups holdings. A stockpile
inventory can provide additional detailed information on the weapon types contained in stocks, and this may beavailable from national authorities, past technical assessments or DDR programmes.
• During conflict, WAM may serve as a confidence-building measure between parties to a conflict, while also
keeping communities and United Nations personnel secure by mitigating the risk of diversion and unplanned
explosions. During peacekeeping operations, a secure system for managing weapons and ammunition reduces therisk of looting, theft or diversion by spoilers.131• Through mitigating the risk of diversion from national stockpiles, WAM measures can effectively disrupt one ofthe primary sources of supply of materiel for non-State armed groups and criminal networks, including terroristgroups. By limiting the availability of military materiel, WAM contributes to restricting the firepower of such armed
groups, thereby potentially helping de-escalate conflict.
• WAM may also take place in the context of a DDR process, for example transitional WAM activities are increasingly
integrated into DDR processes.132 In contexts where a peace agreement has been signed and the necessary
preconditions for a DDR programme are in place, transitional WAM can be used before, during and after the DDR
programme as a complementary measure. However, WAM may not be applicable at all stages of a conflict; forexample, it may take place in a more phased approach as part of a DDR process.
• Risk Point 5.2.3 on stockpile management can be analysed in conjunction with the Risk Points on geographic
distribution of weapons (see Risk Factor 1.2), points of diversion and methods used (see Risk Point 2.2.2), types of
conventional arms present (see Risk Factor 3.2), and armed actors (see Risk Factor 3.3).

130 De Tessières and Shiotani (2019).
131 United Nations General Assembly (2018, para. 82).
132 UNDPO and UNODA (2018); IDDRS 4.11 (2020).

Risk Area 5: Weapons and ammunition management

90Photo Credit: UN Photo/Marco Dormino

Part 4:
Risk Factor Selector
Tool
91

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Part 4: Risk Factor Selector Tool
The Risk Factor Selector Tool has been designed to complement the Arms-Related Risk Analysis
Tool featured in Part 3 of this document. It does so by supporting analysts in their decision-making
on the Risk Factors they may want to consider in a particular context, depending on the aspectsof conventional arms and armed conflict they are interested in analysing. The tool is designed tosteer practitioners towards a more comprehensive conflict analysis and subsequent prevention
responses.
This tool suggests Risk Factors based on their relevance, according to the following threeparameters:► Assessment according to conflict parameters (likelihood, duration, intensity, type andactors)► Assessment according to geographic scope of application (regional, national and local)► Assessment according to different stages of a conflict (before, during and after)
Assessment of applicability
Each of the three parameters is represented ona table to assess the applicability of each Risk
Factor. The assessment of the Risk Factors’
applicability is measured on the following scale:

StrongMediumLow

Analysts should review the suggested applicability within each table to identify the Risk Factors
pertinent to their context. The assessments of the applicability of each Risk Factor to a certain
parameter is indicative and may vary within different contexts. The Risk Factor Selector Tool
therefore provides suggestions, or a starting point, for further nuanced, context-specific researchas to how arms may influence a given situation. The tool can support decision-making but should
not be seen as a replacement for more in-depth analytical processes and consultations required forplanning purposes.
To facilitate analysts in selecting their own indicators, blank versions of the tables used in the Risk
Factor Selector Tool are included in Annex A.
The Risk Factor Selector Tool represents an initial attempt at steering people with limited
knowledge of arms control issues towards the Risk Factors most relevant to their work. It can also
guide future research that aims to disaggregate and further unpack the role of conventional arms
control in conflict prevention, management, peacekeeping and conflict resolution throughout theconflict continuum. Suggestions for changes or how to improve this tool are welcome and canbe provided through the feedback form (https://forms.office.com/r/vpEVX6ae3e) and directly tocap-unidir@un.org.

Part 4: Risk Factor Selector Tool

92

Assessment of Risk Factors according to conflict parameters
An assessment of Risk Factors according to their impact on conflict parameters can support theidentification of Risk Factors that can apply in various contexts. The parameters, listed below,
which characterize the nature of an armed conflict, were identified because of the impact that
arms will have on each of them. Armed conflict requires certain “inputs”, without which the likelihood of a conflict occurring is either diminished or increases. Access to and the use of weapons(availability) is one of the key requirements, or inputs, for an armed conflict to occur, for armed
groups and actors to form, and for conflict to be prolonged for extended periods of time. By
tracking one of the main armed conflict facilitators – the presence and proliferation of weapons –analysts can develop an indication of the level of risk of conflict, the type and intensity of conflict
and armed violence, and the role of armed groups or movements. This in turn informs the type of
conflict.
Because such parameters of armed conflict may vary according to numerous variables (suchas the number of actors, the types of actor, the type of conflict, the balance of power between
actors, and the belligerent’s ability to access supplies required for conflict, including arms andammunition), the parameters should be considered a basic framework or starting point for
conflict analysis.
Conflict parameters:•

Likelihood of conflict: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the likelihood of a conflictarising or a conflict reoccurring?

•

Duration of conflict: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the continuation andprolonging of a conflict?

•

Intensity of conflict: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the intensity of a conflict(usually measured in the number of deaths; for example, deaths per 100,000)?

•

Type of conflict: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the number and type of armed
violence incidents and armed movements?

•

Armed conflict actors: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the formation of anarmed group or movement, and the number and type of armed actors in a conflict?

93

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITPart 4: Risk Factor Selector Tool

RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT

94

4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence

5.2: National capacities for WAM

RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)

4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons

4.3: Types of arms and armed violence

4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings

4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict

5.1: National regulations for WAM

Intensity ofconflict

RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT

3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used

3.3: Who is using the weapons

3.2: Types of conventional arms present

3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting

2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms

2.3: Illicit transfers and markets

2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition

2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers

Duration of
conflict

RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition

1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition

1.4: Levels of militarization

Likelihoodof conflict
RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition

RISK FACTORAPPLICABILITY
TypeofconflictArmed
conflictactorsUNIDIR

Assessment of Risk Factors according to geographic scope of application
An assessment of Risk Factors according to their geographic scope of application supports theidentification of Risk Factors that can apply at different geographic levels of conflict. This set ofparameters was chosen because the geographic dimensions of weapons in a conflict can be an
important factor in understanding and preventing the spread of conflict within States and regionally between States. Monitoring the movement of arms and armed actors across borders can be
an indicator of the spread of conflict into new areas (“spillover”) and the likelihood of a conflictbreaking out or intensifying. Information on the geographic scope and regions in which arms areused can also provide a basis for ceasefire negotiations, identify hotspots of violence, and target
efforts to de-escalate a conflict. This section of the Risk Factor Selector Tool can also support
analysts according to their role within an organization (regional office, country-level office, local-level office), which is often linked to the type and level of analysis they will carry out.
This assessment of Risk Factors is based on three geographic levels, namely:•

Regional level: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to conflicts that affect a region (thatis, beyond a single State’s borders)?

•

State level: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to State-wide conflicts?

•

Local level: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to conflicts at a subnational level?

95

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITPart 4: Risk Factor Selector Tool

RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT

96

4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence5.2: National capacities for WAM

RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)

4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons

4.3: Types of arms and armed violence

4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings

4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict

5.1: National regulations for WAM

STATE LEVELRISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT

3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used

3.3: Who is using the weapons

3.2: Types of conventional arms present

3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting

2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms

2.3: Illicit transfers and markets

2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition

2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers

RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition

1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition

1.4: Levels of militarization

REGIONAL LEVELRISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition

RISK FACTORAPPLICABILITYLOCAL LEVELUNIDIR

Assessment of Risk Factors according to different stages of a conflictThis assessment of Risk Factors at different stages of a conflict supports the identification of
Risk Factors that apply before, during and after a conflict. This set of parameters was chosenbecause conflict prevention programming and responses can be considered at all stages of aconflict. Consideration of weapons and ammunition should be given in a consistent manner at allstages of a conflict. Some Risk Factors may be more useful when considering early warning andpreventive interventions; others may provide a different perspective, depending on when in theconflict continuum they are used. These parameters are also useful depending on the analyst
and their role within an organization as this relates to interventions undertaken prior to a conflictbreaking out (upstream prevention and the prevention of reoccurrence of conflict), during a
conflict (conflict management and resolution), or after a conflict (peacebuilding).
This assessment of Risk Factors is based on three temporal stages of conflict, namely:•

Prior to a conflict: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to preventing an outbreakof conflict or resolving disputes before violence breaks out (preventive diplomacy, conflict
prevention)?

•

During a conflict: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to reducing the levels of violence(peacemaking, peacekeeping, conflict management, conflict resolution)?

•

After a conflict: To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to consolidating and preserving
peace once it is attained (peacebuilding)?

97

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITPart 4: Risk Factor Selector Tool

RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT

98

5.2: National capacities for WA

5.1: National regulations for WAM

4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)

4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons

4.3: Types of arms and armed violence

4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings

4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict

RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT

3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used

3.3: Who is using the weapons

3.2: Types of conventional arms present

3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting

2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms

2.3: Illicit transfers and markets

2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition

2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers

DURING A CONFLICTRISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition

1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition

1.4: Levels of militarization

PRIOR TO A
CONFLICTRISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.1: A vailability of conventional arms and ammunition

RISK FACTORAPPLICABILITY
AFTER A CONFLICTUNIDIR

Photo Credit: UN Photo/Blagoje Grujic

Part 5:Arms-RelatedInformation Sources
Compendium Tool
99

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool
The Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool offers a non-exhaustive list of
information sources and data collection methods to support the analyst in using this Toolkit.
Specific and specialized information sources are suggested; however, analysts may decide togather additional information based on their conflict analysis needs. These decisions are left tothe discretion of the analyst. Analysts should collect reliable information from a variety of sources
to assess whether any of the chosen indicators are valid or have changed. Analysts should also
develop their own sources, especially at country level.

Selection of information sources and collection methods
Systematic data collection in conflict-affected settings may be particularly challenging andpolitically sensitive due to limited data gathering capacity, stigmatization and underreporting ofcertain types of violence, and logistical challenges of household surveys, particularly in high-violence regions. Guidance on how to gather and generate conflict-related data is available from:•UK Department for International Development, Compendium of Tools for Measurement,
Monitoring and Evaluation, March 2013•

United Nations Development Programme and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Measuring and Monitoring Armed Violence: Goals, Targets and Indicators, April 2010•

Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. “Chapter 4: Gathering
Information”, in Conflict Analysis Framework: Field Guidelines and Procedures, November
2017

In addition to the suggested sources, analysts may consider the following data collection
methods and types of source:

Desk-based
ResearchMedia
monitoring

Surveys &workshops• G overnmental and intergovernmental offices• UN agency reporting• Existing analyses
performed bygovernments, NGOs, civilsociety organizations atcountry level• Academic reports, studies,
literature• Media archives• Programme and research
reports• Think tank and research
institution analysis• Civil society organization
reports• Mainstream media• Social media• Newspaper, print journals,
blogs• National radio, television• Editors and journalistic
sources• Survey methods• Interviews with community
informants or experts• Focus groups• Workshops

Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium

100List of information sources by theme
This Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit is a living document. The list of information
Sources by theme is not exhaustive, and users of this Toolkit are encouraged tosupport UNIDIR in expanding and updating this list by suggesting new or alternative
information sources to: cap-unidir@un.org

Table 1: Information on national legislation and controls
Title

Link

African Union, Database on Silencing the Guns

http://stgpeaceau.org/enArms Trade Treaty Monitor

https://attmonitor.org/enArms Trade Treaty Annual Reports

https://thearmstradetreaty.org/annual-reports.html

Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Small
Arms and Light Weapons Guide

https://data.humdata.org/dataset/salwguideExpertise France

https://www.expertisefrance.fr

https://www.gichd.org/en/resources/
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Disartools-and-applications/detail/publication/
mament, Mine Action Intelligence Tool
mine-action-intelligence-tool-mint
Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards

https://www.unddr.org/the-iddr

International Ammunition Technical Guidelines

https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ammunition/iatg

International Mine Action Standards

https://www.mineactionstandards.org

Mines Advisory Grouphttps://www.maginternational.org

Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC)

https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/mosaic

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee

https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

https://www.osce.org/arms-control

Reaching Critical Will, First Committee Monitor

https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga

Saferworld

https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/
search

SEESAC Publications

https://www.seesac.org/publication

Small Arms Survey, Global Firearms Holdings

https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/global-firearms-holdings

Small Arms Survey, research on regulations andarms control

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/regulations-and-controls.html

Small Arms Survey, Unplanned Explosion at Munition Sites from 2019 (by request only)

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles/unplanned-explosions-at-munitions-sites.html

101

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRUNIDIR, Supporting Policies and Frameworks for
Weapon and Ammunition Management

https://unidir.org/projects/supporting-policies-and-frameworks-weapon-and-ammunition-management

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comparative Analysis of Global Instruments on Firearms
and Other Conventional Arms

https://att-assistance.org/sites/default/
files/2018/10/UNODCComparativeAnalysisPaper.pdf

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Relevant
Background reports and papers submitted to theConference of the Parties to the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime(COP) and relevant COP resolutions

https://www.unodc.org/unodc/fr/firearms-protocol/the-firearms-protocol.html

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Working
Group on Firearms

https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/
CTOC/working-group-on-firearms-2020.
html

United Nations Programme of Action, National
Reports

https://smallarms.un-arm.org/national-reports

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

https://www.unrec.org

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacifichttps://unrcpd.org

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the
Caribbean, Resource Center

http://unlirec.screativa.com/en/recursos/

University of Sydney, Gunpolicy.org

https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/home

US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms andExplosives, National Firearms Act Division, Data on
firearms registration

https://www.atf.gov/firearms/national-firearms-act-division

Table 2: Information on government-authorized arms transfers andmilitarization
Title

Link

Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Global
Militarization Index

https://www.bicc.de/de/research-clusters/
project/project/43

Bonn International Centre for Conversion, War andPeace database

http://warpp.info/en/data-tables

Correlates of War Project

https://correlatesofwar.org

Correlates of War Project, Militarized Interstate
Dispute Locations

https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDLOC

Correlates of War Project, National Material Capabilities

https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities

Economist Intelligence Unit

https://www.eiu.com/n/European External Action Service, Arms Export
Control Database

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headquarters-homepage/87534/arms-exports-control-launch-online-database-increasing-transparency-eu-arms-exports_
enPart 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium

102

European Union, Working Party on ConventionalArms Exports (COARM) Online System

https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/
sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078f616633118bb/overview

Forum on the Arms Trade

https://www.forumarmstrade.org

Freedom House, Freedom in the World Reporthttps://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world

International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 2020

https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance

Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers

http://nisat.prio.org/Data-Visualization/Arms-Trade-Mapper

Peace Research Institute Oslo and Igarapé Institute, http://nisatapps.prio.org/armsglobe/index.
Mapping Arms Data
php
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database

https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers

SIPRI, fact sheets on international arms transfer
trendshttps://sipri.org/publications/2021/
sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2020

SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database

https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

Small Arms Survey, Resource Libraryhttps://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources

Small Arms Trade, Transparency Barometerhttps://www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/trade-transparency-barometerTransparency International, Government Defence
Integrity Index

https://ti-defence.org/gdi

United Nations Comtrade Database

https://comtrade.un.org

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,
Military Expenditure Database (use by authorized
governments only)

https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/milex

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

https://www.unroca.org

United Nations Report on Military Expenditures(MilEx)https://milex.un-arm.org/

United Nations Secretary-General, reports on objechttps://www.un.org/disarmament/contive information on military matters (transparency ofvarms/milex
military expenditures)
United Nations Security Council, Sanctions Monitor- https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/monitoring-team/reports
ing Team
World Bank, DataBank

https://databank.worldbank.org/home

World Bank, Military expenditure data

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS

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THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Table 3: Information on illicit arms and ammunition transfers,
seizures and diversion
Title

Link

Armament Research Services

https://armamentresearch.com

Bellingcat

https://www.bellingcat.com/news

C4ADS, ConflictID

https://conflict.id/data

Calibre Obscurahttps://www.calibreobscura.com

Conflict Armament Researchhttps://www.conflictarm.com/publications

Conflict Armament Research, Diversion Digest
reports

https://www.conflictarm.com/digests/diversion-digest-issue-1

Conflict Armament Research, ITRACE

https://conflictarm.com/itrace

Conflict Awareness Project

https://www.conflictawareness.org

Flemish Peace Institute, Project Divert

https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/en

INTERPOL, news on seizures

https://www.interpol.int/en/News-andEvents

National firearms registration datan/aSustainable Development Goals Indicator 16.4.2 on
portion of seized arms

https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=&Target=16.4

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
data

https://dataunodc.un.org

UNODC, Global Firearms Programme

https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/index.html

UNODC, Global Study on Firearms Trafficking

https://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf

UNODC, Illicit Arms Flows Questionnaire

https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/iafq.html

United Nations Panel of Experts and Monitoring
Groupsn/a

US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives data

https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/data-statistics

World Customs Organization, Illicit Trade Report

http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/resources/publications.aspx

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104

Table 4: Use of conventional arms and ammunition in armed conflict
and armed violence
Title
ACCORD, conflict trends reporting

Link
https://www.accord.org.za

Action on Armed Violence (AOAV)

https://aoav.org.uk

AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor and data

https://aoav.org.uk/explosiveviolence

AOAV, Explosive violence in schools

https://data.humdata.org/dataset/explosive-violence-in-schools-2011-2017

AOAV, Impact of explosive weapons on health facilities

https://data.humdata.org/dataset/explosive-weapons-on-health-facilities

Afrobarometer, surveys on crime

https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online

Amnesty International

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news

Armed Conflict and Intervention Datasets

http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.
html

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project(ACLED)https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard

ACLED & UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Education and Conflict Monitor,
attacks on education in Africa and the Middle East

https://data.humdata.org/organization/education-and-conflict-monitor

BTI Transformation Index

https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html

Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Drone strikestatistics

https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
projects/drone-war
https://dronewars.github.io/data

Carter Center, Syria conflict mapping project

https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/conflict_resolution/using-conflict-data-for-demining-in-syria.html

Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College,
Drone Databook

https://dronecenter.bard.edu/projects/
drone-proliferation

CIRI Human Rights Dataset

http://www.humanrightsdata.com

Conflict and Environment Observatory

https://ceobs.org

Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker
Cross-National Time-Series, Data Archive (domestic
https://www.cntsdata.com
conflict event data)
ETH Zurich, GROWup, Geographical Research on
War, Unified Platform

https://growup.ethz.ch

GDELT Project, Global Database of Events, Language and Tone

https://analysis.gdeltproject.org

Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, Global Burden of Armed Violence reportand country-level assessments

http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence.
html

Human Rights Watch, World Reports

https://www.hrw.org

105

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR
Igarapé Institute, Evidências sobre Violências e
Alternativas para mulheres e meninas

https://eva.igarape.org.br

Igarapé Institute, EarthTime

https://earthtime.org

Insecurity Insight, data on attacks on civilians, aid
workers, and “people in danger”

https://data.humdata.org/organization/insecurity-insight

Institute for Security Studies Africa

https://issafrica.org

Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research,Center for Systemic Peace, High Casualty Terrorist
Bombings

http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.
html

Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research,
Armed Conflict and Intervention Datasets

http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.
html

International Committee of the Red Cross

https://www.icrc.org/en

International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch

https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed
Conflict Survey

https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey

International Network for Explosive Weapons

http://www.inew.org

INTERPOL, IBIS database

https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Firearms-trafficking/INTERPOL-Ballistic-Information-Network

Land & Cluster Munition Monitor

http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/home.
aspx

Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
MPICE_final_complete%20book%20%282%29.pdf

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism andResponses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism
Databasehttps://start.umd.edu/gtd

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict

https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
reports

https://data.humdata.org/dataset/compiled-reports-of-the-secretary-generalfor-children-and-armed-conflict-of-years2015-through-2017

PAX

https://www.paxforpeace.nl

Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Battledeaths
Datasethttps://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths

PRIO, Conflict Site Dataset

https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/
Conflict-Site

PRIO, GEO-SVAC dataset, Sexual Violence in Armed
Conflict Dataset (SVAC)

https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/
GEO-SVAC

Political Instability Task Force, Worldwide Atrocities
Datasethttp://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.
dir/atrocities.html

Political Terror Scale

http://www.politicalterrorscale.org

ReDHumus conflicto tierras y territorios

https://data.humdata.org/dataset/conflicto-tierras-y-territorios

Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium

106Safeguarding Health in Conflict

https://www.safeguardinghealth.org/

SIPRI, Global Registry of Violent Deaths

https://www.grevd.org

Small Arms Survey

https://www.smallarmssurvey.org

Small Arms Survey, Global Violent Deaths charts orarmed violence indicators

https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/global-violent-deaths-gvd

UNHCR, Global Trends reports

https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019

UN Human Rights, Guidance on Casualty Recording

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Guidance_on_Casualty_Recording.
pdf

United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Colombia, Attacks
against Civilians in Colombia

https://data.humdata.org/dataset/attacksagainstcivilianscolombiamun

OCHA Colombia, Armed actions in Colombia 2012–2019https://data.humdata.org/dataset/armedactionscolombia

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Measuring Violence against Women and Other
Gender Issues through ICCS Lenses

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/ICCS/Gender_and_the_ICCS.pdf

UNODC, National Survey of Crime Trends

https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/Crime-Monitoring-Surveys.
html

United Nations Panel of Expert reports

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/work-and-mandate/reports

United Nations Peacemaker, Peace Agreements
Databasehttps://peacemaker.un.org/document-search

United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions

https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/executions/pages/srexecutionsindex.aspx

University of Edinburgh, Peace Agreements Database

https://peaceagreements.org/amnesties

University of Edinburgh, Amnesties, Conflict andPeace Agreement dataset

https://www.peaceagreements.org

University of Maryland, Center for International
Development and Conflict Management, Minorities
at Risk (MAR) dataset

http://www.mar.umd.edu/mar_data.asp

University of Notre Dame, Peace Accords Matrix

https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/search-pam

UN Women, Global Database on Violence against
Women

https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.
org/enUppsala Conflict Data Program, Conflict Encyclopedia

https://ucdp.uu.se

US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/
under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor

World Health Organization, Surveillance System for
Attacks on Health Care database, with information
on attacks on health care by weapons type

https://extranet.who.int/ssa

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Table 5: Information on armed actors
Title

Link

CIA World Factbook

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, CTC
Sentinelhttps://ctc.usma.edu/ctc-sentinel

ETH Zurich, Ethnic Power Relations dataset

https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core

Geneva Call

https://www.genevacall.org

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometerhttps://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en

International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC
engagement with non-State armed Groups

https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/
wysiwyg/Activities/Humanitarian-diplomacy/icrc_engagement_with_non-state_armed_groups_position_paper.pdf

Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project

http://www.mar.umd.edu

Mapping coercive institutions: The State Security
Forces dataset, 1960–2010https://doi.
org/10.1177/0022343320913089

University College London, Pro-Government Militias https://militiasdb.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/
militias-public
Database Project
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, External Support
Data

https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads

Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium

108

Table 6: Information on correlates of armed conflict and proxy
indicators
Title

Link

African Union Commission, Youth development indicators

https://data.humdata.org/organization/auc

Amnesty International, The State of the World’s Human Rights

https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
pol10/3202/2021/en/

Carleton University, Country Indicators for Foreign
Policyhttps://carleton.ca/cifp

Eurostathttps://ec.europa.eu/eurostat

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, FAOSTAT

http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data

Fragile State Index

https://fragilestatesindex.org

Freedom House, Country data

https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores

Gallup Newshttps://news.gallup.com/home.aspx

GDELT Project (media monitoring)https://www.gdeltproject.org

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global
Internal Displacement Database

https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data

International Border Agreements Dataset

https://www.andrewowsiak.org/international-border-agreements-dataset.html

Reporters without Borders, Annual press freedom
surveyhttps://rsf.org/en/ranking

Transparency International Corruption Perception
Index

https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/
index/nzl

UN Comtrade, International Trade Statistics Yearbook

https://comtrade.un.org/pb

UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook

https://www.unhcr.org/statistical-yearbooks.html

United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Open SDG Data Hub

https://unstats-undesa.opendata.arcgis.
com

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Data Exchange

https://data.humdata.org

OCHA, World Humanitarian Data and Trends (annual https://interactive.unocha.org/publication/
datatrends2018
report)Vision of Humanity, Global Peace Index and maps

https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#

Worldwide Governance Indicators

https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi

109

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium

110Photo Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

Part 6:
The Way Forward
111

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Part 6: The way forward
The inclusion of arms control data in the analysis of an armed conflict remains underserved. It is
hoped that the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit will support analysts in remedying this and inincluding key information on one of the main facilitators of conflict in their work and that, in turn,this information will allow for more inclusive strategies for conflict prevention.
The Toolkit represents a first effort in this direction. It is a living document and will be adjusted as it
is rolled out and tested. Efforts have been made to make the Toolkit as approachable and comprehensive as possible as well as to facilitate its use by including the compendium of publicly available
information sources that analysts can draw from in their work.
So as to support the refining and further development of this Toolkit, users are encouraged toprovide feedback to UNIDIR. This can be done by completing a short questionnaire on the tool,
available at: https://forms.office.com/r/vpEVX6ae3e
UNIDIR would also welcome recommendations from users with regard to additional Risk Areas,
Risk Factors and Risk Points, as well as other or alternative indicators and/or information sourcesthat could be included in a second version of this Toolkit. Such suggestions can be sent to:cap-unidir@un.org

Part 6: The way forward112

Photo Credit: UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti

Annex A:
Templates for the Risk
Factor Selector Tool
113

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITRISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT

Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and prevention

114

4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence

5.2: National capacities for WAM

RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)

4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons

4.3: Types of arms and armed violence

4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings

4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict

5.1: National regulations for WAM

Intensity ofconflict

RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT

3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used

3.3: Who is using the weapons

3.2: Types of conventional arms present

3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting

2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms

2.3: Illicit transfers and markets

2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition

2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers

Duration of
conflict

RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition

1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition

1.4: Levels of militarization

Likelihoodof conflict
RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition

RISK FACTORAPPLICABILITY
TypeofconflictArmed
conflictactorsAssessment of Risk Factors according to conflict parameters
UNIDIR115
RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICTTHE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKIT

4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence5.2: National capacities for WAM

RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)

4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons

4.3: Types of arms and armed violence

4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings

4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict

5.1: National regulations for WAM

STATE LEVELRISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT

3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used

3.3: Who is using the weapons

3.2: Types of conventional arms present

3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting

2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms

2.3: Illicit transfers and markets

2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition

2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers

RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition

1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition

1.4: Levels of militarization

REGIONAL LEVELRISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition

RISK FACTORAPPLICABILITYLOCAL LEVEL

Assessment of Risk Factors according to geographic scope of applicationRISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT

Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and prevention

116

5.2: National capacities for WA

5.1: National regulations for WAM

4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)

4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons

4.3: Types of arms and armed violence

4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings

4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict

RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT

3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used

3.3: Who is using the weapons

3.2: Types of conventional arms present

3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting

2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms

2.3: Illicit transfers and markets

2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition

2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers

DURING A CONFLICTRISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition

1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition

1.4: Levels of militarization

PRIOR TO A
CONFLICTRISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1.1: A vailability of conventional arms and ammunition

RISK FACTORAPPLICABILITY
AFTER A CONFLICT

Assessment of Risk Factors according to different stages of a conflict
UNIDIR

Photo Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

Annex B:
Glossary of key terms
and definitions
117
117

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIR

Glossary of key terms and definitions
Ammunition: The complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant
powder, bullets or projectiles, used in small arms or light weapons. This includes cartridges (rounds)
for small arms and light weapons; explosive shells, grenades and missiles for light weapons; andmobile containers with missiles or shells for anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems.133 Ammunitionis the largest authorized traded small arms category at the global level, accounting for 41% ofreported small arms exports for the period 2015–17.134
Armed conflict: There is no widely accepted definition of armed conflict, although the Use ofForce Committee of the International Law Association determined that all armed conflicts havea minimum of two necessary characteristics: (a) the presence of organized groups and (b) the
engagement of those groups in intense armed fighting. Through such measures, the use of
weapons by the conflict actors serves to distinguish between “non-violent” conflicts (disputes orcrises) and violent armed conflicts.135
Armed group: A group that (a) has the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve
political, ideological or economic objectives; (b) is not within the formal military structures of aState, State alliance or intergovernmental organization; and (c) is not under the control of theState(s) in which it operates.136 The International Council on Human Rights Policy describes armed
groups as “groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not under state
control.”137
Armed incidents: Armed incidents can include raids, ambushes, bombings, targeted assassinations,gang-related incidents, communal disputes, kidnappings and other incidents in which the use or
threat of use of conventional arms is involved.
Arms control: The imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread of weapons by
an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce such restrictions.138
Arms dealer: An entity or person involved in retailing, wholesaling, buying and selling quantities
of arms and related items obtained from producers according to the demand of users and that
operates under national legislation and jurisdiction.139 Such activities may be closely associatedwith brokering in arms and related items but do not necessarily constitute brokering activities; theymight be undertaken by brokers as part of the process of putting a deal together to gain a benefit.140
Arms exports: The sending of weapons, guns and ammunition from one country to another, often
closely monitored and controlled by governments.141
Battlefield loss or capture: Battlefield loss or capture can be described as the “seizure [of arms and
133 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
134 Small Arms Survey (2020, 52).
135 See International Law Association (2010).
136 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
137 International Council on Human Rights Policy (1999).
138 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
139 Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (2001, 19).
140 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
141 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and prevention118

ammunition] from state forces by unauthorized users during fighting”.142
Broker: The natural person or legal entity that carries out a brokering activity; anyone who directly
performs an activity defined as a brokering activity in the exercise of their own commercial or legal
relations. The acts of natural persons, especially employees, are to be ascribed to the legal entity.143
Brokering: Activities carried out by a broker in the context of arranging or facilitating an international transfer of small arms or light weapons. Brokering activities include serving as a finder ofbusiness opportunities to one or more parties; putting relevant parties in contact; assisting parties
in proposing, arranging or facilitating agreements or possible contracts between them; assisting
parties in obtaining the necessary documentation; and assisting parties in arranging the necessary
payments.144
Ceasefire: A bilateral or multilateral halt in all or select offensive military actions among parties
engaged in official war, guerrilla warfare or violent exchanges with one another. Ceasefires
sometimes lead to more stable or permanent military or political agreements, but they minimally
aim to reduce immediate tensions and extreme losses while providing opportunities for the
initiation of other forms of conflict resolution or management.145
Ceasefire agreement: A binding, non-aggression pact to enable dialogue between conflicting
parties.146
Community disarmament or small arms limitation: In the context of peacebuilding, community
disarmament or small arms limitation advocates a change of public attitude towards the possession
and use of weapons, as well as the benefits of weapons control measures within the community.147
Conventional arms: Conventional arms are described by the United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs as “all weapons not considered WMD [weapons of mass destruction], including small arms
and light weapons”. Conventional arms therefore encompass a wide range of equipment not limited
to armoured combat vehicles, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, warships, small arms and light
weapons, landmines, cluster munitions, ammunition and artillery. The United Nations Register ofConventional Arms defines seven categories of major conventional arms:
Category I: Battle tanks
Category II: Armoured combat vehicles
Category III: Large-calibre artillery systems
Category IV: Combat aircraft and unmanned combat aerial vehicles
Category V: Attack helicopters
Category VI: Warships
Category VII: Missiles and missile launchers
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): A process that contributes to security andstability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants,
142 Conflict Armament Research (2018a).
143 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
144 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
145 Miller (2015, 18).
146 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
147 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

119

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRtaking the combatants out of military structures and helping them integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods.148
Disarmament: Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of smallarms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of
the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.149
Demobilization: Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatantsfrom armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend fromthe processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops incamps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to thedemobilized, which is called reinsertion.
Reinsertion: Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but
prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic
process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet
immediate needs and can last up to one year.
Reintegration: Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status andgain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic
process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It ispart of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.
Disposal: The removal of ammunition and explosives from a stockpile using a variety of methods(that may not necessarily involve destruction). Logistic disposal may or may not require the use of
render safe procedures.150
Diversion: Although there is no internationally agreed definition of “diversion”, it denotes “any lossof weapons or ammunition from state control and their resulting acquisition by unauthorized users,
including insurgent and terrorist forces and other non-state armed groups”.151 In the Arms Trade
Treaty context, diversion is the rerouting and/or appropriation of a transfer of conventional arms or
related items contrary to relevant national and/or international law leading to a potential change inthe effective control or ownership of the arms.152
Femicide: Femicide is generally understood to as the intentional murder of women because they are
women, but broader definitions include any killing of women or girls. Femicide is usually perpetrated
by men. Most cases of femicide are committed by partners or ex-partners and involve ongoingabuse in the home, threats or intimidation, sexual violence or situations where women have lesspower or fewer resources than their partner.153
148 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
149 IDDRS 1.10 (2014).
150 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
151 Conflict Armament Research (2018, 3).
152 Wood and Holtom (2020, 3).
153 MOSAIC 06.10 (2017); WHO (2012).
Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks
into conflict analysis and prevention

120

Firearms Protocol: The United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking
in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), supplementing
the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, defines illicit trafficking as “the import,
export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components
and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any
one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it … or if the firearms are not marked inaccordance with … this Protocol”.
Gender analysis: The collection and analysis of gender-disaggregated information. Men and women
perform different roles in societies and in armed groups and forces. This leads to women andmen having different experience, knowledge, talents and needs. Gender analysis explores thesedifferences so that policies, programmes and projects can identify and meet the different needs ofmen and women. Gender analysis also facilitates the strategic use of distinct knowledge and skills
possessed by women and men, which can greatly improve the long-term sustainability of interventions. In the context of DDR, gender analysis should be used to design policies and interventions
that will reflect the different roles, capacities and needs of women, men, girls and boys.154
Geographic proliferation: Geographic proliferation refers to the spread of weapons and indicatesthe ability of actors in a particular area or areas to control territory and to access and use weapons.
It is a measure of not only the actual or potential spread of conflict but also the likelihood ofviolence erupting or intensifying.
Illicit trafficking: Illicit trafficking in weapons is understood to cover “that international trade inconventional weapons, which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law”.155
Illicit transfer: The import, export, transit, trans-shipment or brokering of (a) small arms or light
weapons with the intention to supply a State under a United Nations Security Council arms
embargo or where any one of the States involved does not authorize the transfer, or (b) smallarms or light weapons that have been illicitly manufactured, have been stolen or otherwise illicitly
acquired, or have been unmarked, inadequately marked or have had marks removed, obliterated or
falsified.156
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs): A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy,
incapacitate, harass or distract. It may incorporate military stores but is normally devised from
non-military components.157
Indicators: Predictors, precursor events or other telling signals used in forecasting. The following is
one set of indicators: (a) systemic causes: general, underlying, structural, deep-rooted backgroundpreconditions; (b) proximate causes: specific situational circumstances; and (c) immediate catalysts:
idiosyncratic contingent triggers.158
Legal transfer: Legal transfers “occur with either the active or passive involvement of governments

154 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
155 UNDC (1996, para. 7).
156 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
157 UNMAS (2016).
158 Schmid (1998).

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THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKITUNIDIRor their authorized agents, and in accordance with both national and international law.”159
Light weapon: Any human-portable lethal weapon designed for use by two or three persons serving
as a crew (although some may be carried and used by a single person) that expels or launches,
is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or
projectile by the action of an explosive.160
Militarization: Militarization should be understood as the process whereby “military values, ideology,
and patterns of behaviour achieve a dominating influence on the political, social, economic, andexternal affairs of the State”.161
Non-State armed groups (NSAGs): There is no internationally agreed definition of NSAGs in international treaties. Hofmann and Schneckener (2011) define them as “distinctive organizations
that are (i) willing and capable of using violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii) not integrated
into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police, or special
forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military
operations, resources, and infrastructure. They may, however, be supported or instrumentalized bystate actors either secretly or openly, as often happens with militias paramilitaries, mercenaries,
or private military companies.”162 NSAGs are distinct from the armed and security forces of a Stateand do not have authorization from the State in which they are based or operate to possess anduse conventional arms. NSAG is used in this report as a synonym for armed non-State actor.163 The
various subgroups that could be categorized as NSAGs often have overlapping operational characteristics. The following list is a compilation of terms describing actors that could be consideredarmed non-State actors, based on the Harvard Law School Program on International Law andArmed Conflict:164•

Armed groups•

Armed terrorist groups•

Insurgents•

Armed elements•

Armed units••

Armed forces of ade facto governing
authority•

Armed vigilante groups

Organized armed
groups•

Belligerents••

Dissident armed forces

Organized criminalgroups•

Factions••

Foreign elements

Political armed
opposition groups

•

Gangs

•

Rebel groups•

Guerrillas•

Terrorist groups•

Illegal armed groups•

Armed movements•

Armed national
liberation movements•

Armed oppositiongroups•Armed rebel groups

Political violence: Violence used for explicitly stated political ends, violence that undermines and
159 Small Arms Survey (2001, 141).
160 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
161 Churches Commission on International Affairs (1982, 5).
162 Hofmann and Schneckener (2011).
163 Ruaudel (2013) defines armed non-State actors (ANSAs) as “Organized armed entities that are primarily motivated bypolitical goals, operate outside effective State control, and lack legal capacity to become party to relevant international treaties.
This includes non-State armed groups, national liberation movements and de facto governing authorities. ANSAs are usuallyengaged in armed struggle against State forces or other ANSAs in the context of non-international armed conflict or other situations of violence”.
164 Burniske et al. (2017).
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challenges the State’s legal monopoly over the legitimate use of force, or violence that implicatesthe State and its repressive apparatus.165
Post-conflict: Situation following an armed conflict, characterized by a clear victory of one party,
a declared cessation of war (that is, a peace agreement or ceasefire), a stalemate or a significant
reduction in armed violence.166
Proliferation: Proliferation relates to the increased accumulation and spread of weapons within anarea or society. It is a measure not only of the number of weapons but also of the potential availability of weapons within a society and of the militarization of that society.
Risk: Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm.167
Risk Area: Covers different features of how conventional arms affect conflicts.
Risk Factor: Conditions that increase the risk (or susceptibility to) the outbreak of, escalation of or
return to conflict. These conditions include arms-related behaviours, circumstances or elementsthat create an environment conducive to the outbreak, escalation or recurrence of conflict.
Risk Point: Can be used to evaluate the likelihood of each of the Risk Factors occurring and theirimpact on conflict dynamics.
Security sector reform: Involves the design and implementation of strategy for the managementof security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate andsupport reform of the national security infrastructure. The national security infrastructure includes
appropriate national ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitaryforces, police, intelligence services, private military companies, correctional services and civilsociety “watchdogs”.168
Small arm: Any human-portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that expels or launches,
is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or
projectile by the action of an explosive.169
Stockpile destruction: The physical activities and destructive procedures towards a continual
reduction of the national stockpile.170
Stockpile management: Procedures and activities designed to ensure the safe and secureaccounting, storage, transportation and handling of small arms and/or light weapons, including theirparts, components and ammunition.171
Trigger(s): Immediate event that accelerates the outbreak of a conflict. A sudden catalyst or spark(for example, the assassination of a leader, election fraud or a political scandal) can “ignite” theconflict.172
165 Krause (2019).
166 Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008).
167 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
168 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
169 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
170 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
171 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
172 Schmid (1998).

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Violence against women or gender-based violence: Defined as “any act of gender-based violence
that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring inpublic or in private. Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited
to, the following: (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including
battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape,
female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violenceand violence related to exploitation; (b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within
the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work,in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; (c) Physical,
sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs”(United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,1993).173
Weapons and ammunition management: The oversight, accountability and management of arms
and ammunition throughout their lifecycle, including establishment of frameworks, processes andpractices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, tracing and disposal.174

173 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
174 de Tessières and Shiotani (2019, 2).
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Photo Credit: UN Photo/Logan Abassi

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The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit
Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-relatedrisks into conflict analysis and prevention
The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit is a UNIDIR Toolkit
designed to contribute to ongoing efforts to include
conventional arms and ammunition-related risks in conflict
analysis and conflict prevention, management, and resolution
efforts. The Toolkit consists of three tools: the Arms-Related
Risk Analysis Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool; and theArms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool. The
Toolkit responds to the United Nations Secretary-General’scall for the integration of conventional arms control into
United Nations conflict prevention and management
activities by providing guidance on how to gather andinterpret arms-related information for conflict prevention
efforts. The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit builds upon
research undertaken by UNIDIR as part of its workstream
on “Integrating Conventional Arms Control into Conflict
Prevention and Management”.