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United Nations

General AssemblyDistr.: General
24 July 2024
Original: English

Seventy-ninth session
Item 100 of the provisional agenda*
Review of the implementation of the recommendations
and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its
tenth special session

Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
Report of the Secretary-General
Summary
In response to an ever-evolving global landscape, the Secretary-Generalrequested the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to conduct a strategic
foresight exercise over the course of 2024 and 2025 to identify present and futureinternational peace and security risks and opportunities emanating from advances inscience and technology in the period leading up to the centenary of the United Nationsin 2045.
The Secretary-General tasked the Board with several objectives: identifying andanalysing emerging peace and security trends, exploring interactions between
technology and weapon systems, assessing impacts and governance mechanisms andproposing measures to address risks and opportunities.
Now at the midway point in its discussions, the Board has highlighted a growing
need within the United Nations for a systematic analysis of how scientific andtechnological advances intersect with disarmament and arms control issues. The
Board has recognized the intricate and cross-disciplinary nature of its mandate,highlighting the varied drivers and effects of technological and scientificadvancements and their potential to either enhance disarmament, development,
peacebuilding and the protection of human rights or exacerbate inequalities andconflict dynamics. Moreover, it is cognizant of its unique position within thedisarmament machinery to comprehensively consider this topic of timely importance.
Key areas of concern included defining and ensuring human control overartificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous weapons, compliance with internationallaw, understanding the roles of various stakeholders including States and non -State
actors (private sector, civil society, the scientific community and non-State armed
groups) and the interactions of technological advancements with existing weapon
types, and anticipating the implications for the disarmament and arms control agenda,* A/79/150.

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efforts and machinery. Overall, the Board has underscored the need to navigate global
technological developments responsibly and enhance international peace and security
frameworks.
The Board considered several promising potential areas for action, which it willcontinue to examine and refine during the next 12 months for presentation to theGeneral Assembly in its 2025 report.
In its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Board reviewed the current programmes,
activities and finances of UNIDIR, including ongoing efforts to strengthen its policy
impact, achieve financial sustainability and further expand its global engagement. The
Board was briefed on several UNIDIR workstreams, including on the implications of
AI for international peace and security, on new developments in the domain of space
security and on the objectives and planned activities for its Middle East Weapons ofMass Destruction-Free Zone Project. Trustees discussed recent activities such as
Security Council briefings on cybersecurity and small arms, capacity-building
initiatives in AI ethics and international law, and improvements to strategic and global
communications. The Board endorsed plans for the programme of work and budgetof UNIDIR for 2025, emphasizing core research areas and the need for sustainablefunding to support the Institute’s vital research functions amid evolving global
challenges.

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I. Introduction
1.
The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its eighty-first session from
31 January to 2 February 2024 in Geneva. The Board held its eighty -second session
at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 26 to 28 June. Shorna -Kay
Richards (Jamaica) presided as Chair of the Board for both sessions.
2.
The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution
38/183 (O). It contains a summary of key considerations to date. The final
recommendations of the Board will be presented to the Secretary-General following
its eighty-fourth session in June 2025. The report of the Director of the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was approved by the Advisory Board,in its capacity as the Institute’s Board of Trustees, and has been submitted in
document A/79/146.
3.
Over the course of its eighty-first and eighty-second sessions, the Advisory
Board began a two-year programme of work focused on international peace andsecurity risks emanating from advances in science and technology. Specifically, theSecretary-General asked the Board to:• Identify and analyse relevant peace and security trends emanating from advancesin science and technology, associated risks and opportunities• Explore the interaction between these advances in science and technology andweapon systems• Identify possible impacts and cascading effects• Identify governance mechanisms and specific measures to respond to these risks
and opportunities
4.
In his policy brief entitled “A New Agenda for Peace”, 1 the Secretary-Generalcalled for preventing the weaponization of new domains and technologies andensuring the peaceful and responsible use of technological advances. Indeed,addressing risks emanating from new domains such as cyberspace and outer space, as
well as from technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, is a key
priority given the potential for such developments to affect human lives bytransforming the nature of conflict and warfare.
5.
The United Nations already serves as a platform for discussing various
technological developments affecting peace and security. Most prominent among
them are the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems,
the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information andcommunications technologies 2021–2025 and the Group of Governmental Experts on
Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. 2 States
parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention
and the Conference on Disarmament are also discussing this within their respective
mandates. Moreover, the Disarmament Commission has agreed to consider an agenda
item entitled “Recommendations on common understandings related to emerging
technologies in the context of international security ” during its 2024–2026 triennial
cycle, which presents an opportunity for Member States to consider cross -cutting
issues applicable to emerging technologies, as well as to consider those emerging
technologies that have implications for international security but are not currently
discussed in dedicated United Nations processes. Moreover, within several treaty
frameworks, States are increasingly considering the impacts of developments inscience and technology on existing weapon types, for example within the context of__________________
1
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United Nations, “A New Agenda for Peace”, policy brief 9, July 2023.
See https://meetings.unoda.org/.
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the Biological Weapons Convention and the Programme of Action on Small Arms. At
the same time, discussions within the United Nations on the application of AI to themilitary domain have not yet taken shape.
6.
Amid the growing concerns about the unknown impact of advancements inscience and technology, and in the light of the increasing role of foresight tools as
methods for developing a forward-thinking culture for better United Nations system
impact, the Secretary-General asked the Board to structure its approach to the topic
as a strategic foresight exercise. 3 The aim of such an exercise would be to produce an
overview of the most salient advances in science and technology in the context ofinternational security, assess their impact on disarmament, arms control andnon-proliferation and identify possible measures to meaningfully address, mitigate
and prevent risks, as well as seize on opportunities. 4 Considering the period to 2045,
the year in which the United Nations turns one hundred years old, Board members
were asked to consider what they believed to be the main issues when thinking about
advances to science and technology over the next 20 years.
7.
In a video message to the Board at its eighty-second session, the SecretaryGeneral emphasized the potential benefits and dangers of scientific and technologicaldevelopments for international peace and security, stressing the importance ofaddressing their risks, in particular in relation to weapons and the means and methodsof warfare. Highlighting concerns about lethal autonomous weapons systems, theweaponization of outer space, cyberthreats to critical infrastructure, three -dimensional
printing technologies that could spur the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons, and the integration of AI into military systems, the Secretary -Generalrequested the Board to consider proactive measures to prevent the misuse oftechnology, advocate peaceful applications and ensure responsible governance andgovernance structures. Moreover, the Secretary-General noted that the work of theBoard could meaningfully feed into the Summit of the Future to be held in September
2024, which presented an opportunity for the world to identify solutions for the use
and governance of technology, including breakthroughs such as AI in the context ofpeace and security.

__________________

Strategic foresight can best be described as a structured method that helps to navigate
uncertainty, imagine better futures and chart new paths forward. It is not about predicting thefuture but rather about understanding potential, probable and preferable futures to inform current
actions. Strategic foresight is increasingly being integrated into United Nations decision -making
and programming to help navigate the complexities of the twenty -first century.
4
To achieve the objectives outlined above, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research(UNIDIR), together with the Office for Disarmament Affairs, developed a tailored methodology.
Upon assessing and weighing the advantages and disadvantages of th e various foresightmethodologies that exist, it was decided that an exercise centred on “futures wheels” would best
serve the Board’s goals. The futures wheel, also known as the implications wheel, enables asystematic exploration of possible future impacts by considering a wide variety of criticalchanges that are on the horizon. It uses structured brainstorming and visualization to e xplore thedirect and indirect (first, second and third order impacts) of a trend or event. An importantelement of this method is that it recognizes that each seed of change triggers or generates acascade of impacts – direct and indirect, positive and negative – that can continue ad infinitum.
The “futures wheel” approach ultimately produces an overview of the strategic and policy
implications of identified trends related to science and technology, as well as a mapping of
possible solutions to maximize positive returns and mitigate negative outcomes.
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II. Substantive discussions
A.

Context and background8.
The international peace and security landscape is increasingly shaped byadvances in science and technology. These developments are not only transforming
economies and societies but also significantly influencing strategies and approaches
in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts. The international security
environment remains tense and complex, characterized by a deficit of trust among
States and new challenges to global governance posed by both traditional andemerging threats. Persistent conflicts, regional instabilities, organized crime, thethreat of weapons of mass destruction and the scourge of illicit small arms and light
weapons continue to pose significant challenges for global peace and security, as well
as for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.
9.
Mindful of its timely and strategic importance, the Advisory Board welcomed
the opportunity to reflect in a sustained manner on the topic of advances in scienceand technology and their implications for peace, security and disarmament over the
next two years, with a view to offering a set of specific recommendations in responseto the Secretary-General’s request. The Board recognized that it was faced with aformidable task given the subject’s multifaceted and interdisciplinary nature, themany unknowns related to ever-evolving scientific and technological innovations,and the nature of rapid changes in technological developments and their applications
in conflict situations.
10. At the outset, the Board noted that certain technological advances held thepromise of transformative benefits for the global community, in particular indeveloping countries. When harnessed for good, such advances could help to enhanceliving standards and foster economic growth and social development worldwide,
promoting a more equitable and interconnected global society. Acknowledging thesignificance of peaceful uses of emerging technologies for developmental purposes,
the Board noted the need for a balanced approach to innovation and regulation.
11. At the same time, Board members believed that the international community
must confront the risks to global peace and security. They noted that recent advancesin technologies such as commercial cyberintrusion capabilities, AI -enabled militarysystems and the production of small arms and light weapons using illicit additive
manufacturing technologies were already causing severe harm to individuals,
affecting various regions and disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups. That
impact was particularly pronounced in situations of armed conflict but also extended
to people’s social and economic well-being in non-conflict settings, as sometechnological developments could have adverse environmental consequences or
widen income gaps. The Board emphasized the need to consider those alreadyapparent consequences and ways to ensure accountability in its foresight discussions.
In addition, members stressed the importance of acknowledging the responsibility ofhumans throughout the life cycle of emerging technologies to foster innovation that
benefited the common good rather than creating harm or exacerbating existing
inequalities.
12. The Board resolved to identify constructive ideas about: (a) the most pressing
relevant peace and security trends emanating from advances in science andtechnology; (b) mechanisms and tools to address associated governance gaps andchallenges to ensure responsible and accountable technological advances; and (c) therole and added value of the United Nations disarmament machinery and agenda inmeaningfully and effectively anticipating and proactively responding to thosechanges.

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B.

Scoping of challenges and opportunities
Scanning the horizon
13. Considering a 2045 timeframe, the Board performed an initial mapping ofcurrent and future developments in science and technology of relevance to weapons
and the means or methods of warfare. 5 Several critical factors were identified fromthe discussions and expert presentations from an external speaker and Board
members.
14. A pivotal consideration was the rapid evolution and convergence of emerging
technologies, which are already reshaping military landscapes globally. In the Board ’s
assessment, these technologies span, inter alia:• Digital technologies– Information and communications technology– Quantum technologies– AI• Autonomy• Data science• Biotechnology• Space and aerospace technologies• Materials technologies– Additive manufacturing of small arms, including the use of non-traditional
materials 6
15. The foresight exercise was designed so that Board members examined relevant
trends, which covered issues that align with the Secretary-General’s priorities as
outlined in his policy brief on A New Agenda for Peace and where there is a real needfor multilateral approaches and solutions. The trends included increased reliance on
digital technologies and data; the evolving role of non-State actors and theirrelationship with States in technology development, governance and use; increased
convergence of emerging technologies and domains of application; increased
diffusion of technology and competition to gain a technological advantage; and theweaponization, malicious uses and proliferation risks of emerging technologies. The
Board discussed their impact on three different areas in depth, namely: (a) conflict,peace and security; (a) disarmament and arms control (the disarmament machinery);and (c) the disarmament, development and human rights nexus. In so doing, Board
members identified the following four guiding questions:• What types of technology developments should be considered?
• Who are the different types of actors, and what role will they each play?
• Why will different types of actors pursue technological development s, adoption,
deployment and/or governance?

__________________In this regard, the Board noted the Secretary-General’s 2023 report on this subject (A/78/268)
and agreed that further in-depth discussions on those and other technologies, such as
cybersecurity, space, AI and quantum computing technologies as well as advances in additive
manufacturing and material sciences and the synthesis between biology and ch emistry, would beneeded at its future sessions.
6
For example, polymers, the use of three-dimensional printing, and modularity in weapon design.
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A/79/240• How will science and technology developments practically influence theinternational peace and security ecosystem?
16. The above guiding questions served as broad areas of focus and as a starting
point for further debate on trends and on the scoping of impacts, associated risks andopportunities on conflict, peace and security, disarmament, and human rights andsustainable development. The key impacts that emerged from the Board’s discussions,which are now at their midway point, are summarized below.
17. Board members remarked on several occasions that many technologies could be
used for good or ill, depending on motivations, circumstances and applications. By
extension, the Board cautioned against taking a deterministic approach to advancesin science and technology. Rather, it noted that the evolution of technology was asocial process that depended on the skills and knowledge of particular combinationsof actors, whether technology was developed in military or civilian contexts, whether
the development involved national military forces or non-State actors, advanced
industry or local workshops, and how techniques and artefacts were diffused.
Initial analysis of risks and opportunities for conflict, peace and security
18. Board members signalled that technological developments held the potential todramatically alter how wars were fought, with a high degree of unpredictability as totheir impact, including their interactions with existing weapons, specifically nuclear
weapons. Taking the 2045 timeframe, they envisioned an increase in asymmetricconflict, an ever-increasing reliance on autonomous and automated technologies inconflict, and the advent of (generative) AI in the military domain.
19. At the same time, the Board noted that various technological applications werecurrently being designed, developed and deployed by militaries, as well as non -State
actors, and used in various conflicts around the world. That included cybercapabilities
that enabled actors to conduct disruptive and destructive operations against criticalinfrastructure, data and communications systems, AI-enabled target identification
systems, the use of polymers, the use of three-dimensional printing, and modularity
in small arms and light weapon design, which fuelled the illicit proliferation of thoseweapons, enabling armed violence. In addition, cryptocurrencies facilitated theevasion of international financial control mechanisms, which enabled non -State
actors to fund their operations or States to avoid international sanctions.
20. The Board warned that conflicts and transnational issues of grave concern suchas terrorism and organized crime would continue to be fuelled by conventional
weapons, small arms and light weapons, which were increasingly developed using
emerging technologies in particular. The Board also discussed “vernacular”
technologies involving easily available resources and customized technologies,
including military technologies, such as craft-produced weapons, commercial
cyberintrusion capabilities, improvised explosive devices made from fertilizers andtriggered by mobile phones, or commercially available uncrewed aerial vehicles(commonly referred to as drones) armed with explosives, which could have adevasting effect on larger pieces of military equipment as well as individuals. Those
were only a few examples, the number of which might multiply severalfold in the
future. The Board noted that easier access to such commercially available orvernacular technologies could offset supposed asymmetries.
21. The Board assessed how some key aspects of emerging technologies such as
autonomy could ease intensive military functions such as logistics, staff duties,
communications and infantry sentry roles, noting that there might be some benefits
to technological advances in weapon systems. At the same time, Board members
debated the assumption that technological advancement would lead to “better
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day wars. Board members questioned the assumption that emerging technologicaladvances were a panacea for various military needs. Consequently, such thinking
might spark an arms race, which would be further fuelled by the massive investments
made by private industry in their quest for global markets, haste in using weapons notadequately tested for reliability, safety or appropriateness for national military
doctrines, and an inclination to downplay the human costs of modern conflicts, withthe risk of affecting groups in vulnerable situations and regions unequally. The Board
cautioned that automation bias might also develop because the reliance on technology
could diminish critical thinking and oversight, with important details or alternative
solutions potentially overlooked. The Board emphasized that emerging technologies
might change the reasoning behind warfare, making it easier for wars to be started
and to escalate quickly while also making wars more difficult to end.
22. Discussions also underscored the dynamic nature of technological development,
shaped by supply-demand dynamics and historical contexts of the adoption oftechnologies in conflict scenarios. This included instances in which civilian
technologies such as uncrewed aerial vehicles were widely used during conflicts suchas those in Afghanistan, Gaza and Ukraine. Equally, members pointed out that thelead in developing technologies shifted between civilian and military entities, driven
by changes in resources and incentive structures, such as peacetime versus wartime
situations.
23. The Board reflected on the need to adequately define the concept and practicalimplementation of human control, as well as the need for human -centred approaches
to science and technology. It discussed how notions of “human control” might change
as a result of the adoption of various technologies and reliance on data provided bymachines, with an impact on the human willingness and cognitive ability to assume
responsibility. Equally, it stated that, as a principle, the standard of wh at constituted
human control must be guided by relevant international law norms and ethics. Withsystem operators being further and further removed from the battlefield through theuse of technology, including increased autonomy, the Board flagged the risk of greater“dehumanization” of people caught up in armed conflict. Moreover, the dual-use
nature of these technologies complicated matters further, as innovations intended for
civilian purposes often found their way into military applications, blurring the lines
between peaceful and potentially disruptive uses.
24. Board members discussed the pivotal role of data in the digital technology
revolution, emphasizing the profound influence of data in determining whereknowledge and power were located, with a multiplicative effect. This point was
further unpacked by Board member Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who, in his dedicatedpresentation, 7 assessed how the proliferation and reliance on data might transformconflict, noting that increasing data transparency had both positive (enhanced
prevention and humanitarian response capabilities) and negative (from vulnerability
to exploitation) implications. The blurring line between civilian and military targets
further complicated warfare tactics, exacerbated by the impact of disinformation andauthoritarian measures. Furthermore, throughout the life cycle of emerging
technologies, reliance on data, in particular personal data, raised critical issues of dataappropriation, data colonization and privatization that could lead to violations offundamental human rights.
25. Members noted that the private sector was largely driving technological andscientific developments, which raised questions about companies becoming
increasingly involved in battlefield operations, as had already been the case in certain
ongoing conflicts, and about their potentially outsized role in influencing government
policy on technological developments. In that connection, they saw a role for the__________________
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A full summary of the presentation is included in annex I.
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private sector, including researchers, scientists and civil society actors, to be involvedin bottom-up lawmaking and norm-building in an effort to put effective governancesystems in place.
Initial analysis of risks and opportunities for disarmament, arms control andnon-proliferation
26. Addressing the positive and negative implications of emerging technologies on
disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, the Board examined a broad set ofissues, including how advances in science and technology exacerbated existing risks
and created new ones, the growing interconnectedness among various technologicaldomains, and how rapid advances in science and technology could contribute to theescalation or de-escalation of crises. Board members noted that the impact of
emerging technologies on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation should beassessed in the broader context of interlinkages with the maintenance of international
peace and security and the promotion of the developmental and humanitarian agenda
on the basis of international cooperation and dialogue.
27. The Board devoted considerable time to exploring developments related tomilitary AI, noting that, at present, no dedicated discussions on that topic wereongoing within the United Nations. In her presentation on the issue, Board member
Jina Kim outlined the way in which the military AI market was growing, driven byincreased investment, with militaries of leading countries expanding spending in thatfield, with the trend expected to continue owing to its potential benefits. 8 In thatconnection, Board members considered the potential positive impact of military
applications of AI, which might include enhanced intelligence, real-time target
investigation, the neutralization of cyberincidents, and reduced maintenance costs. It
could also facilitate non-compliance recognition and reliable monitoring and mitigate
vulnerabilities in arms export control.
28. At the same time, members discussed how AI deployment in military contexts
could pose significant challenges. It might encourage riskier behaviour and reinforce
the trend in blurring the distinction between war and peace and between civilians andthe military. It might also alter the reasoning behind engaging in warfare owing toautomation bias and the emphasis on speed in decision-making, potentiallyexacerbating trust deficits and susceptibility to data poisoning attacks and leading toconflicts, and even permanent wars, in unanticipated ways.
29. Crucially, members noted that a lack of or challenges to governance in various
areas, including with respect to military AI, meant that the international community
was lacking a shared understanding of and response to the risks posed for peace andsecurity more broadly, and disarmament and arms control efforts specifically. They
discussed the need to ensure accountability, transparency and impartiality in AI
systems through adaptive governance while acknowledging the challenges. The latterincluded the intangible and fast-changing nature of the technology, the global
availability of the human expertise and material resources capable of repurposing AI,
and the fact that AI research and development was currently concentrated in a small
number of States and primarily private sector actors. Moreover, regulatory efforts
were complicated by the dual-use nature of AI and its widespread civilian
applications, raising further challenges in enforcement and compliance.
30. In that connection, Board members pointed out a distinct knowledge andawareness gap among policymakers, civil society and the general public about
quickly evolving AI technologies and their applications in military contexts, which
could outpace public awareness and understanding and might not be widely discussed__________________
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A full summary of the presentation is included in annex I.
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or understood outside specialized circles. Addressing those knowledge gaps required
efforts to evolve an understanding of the categorization of risks and to enhancetransparency in military AI practices, facilitate informed public debate througheducation and engagement and promote ethical frameworks and regulations thatgoverned AI applications in military settings. That could help to bridge the divide
between technological advances and public understanding, ensuring that AI inmilitary applications was used responsibly and ethically.
31. The Board also noted that advances in biotechnology offered promisingscientific advances and potential risks in the realm of biological weapon proliferation.
Advances in biotechnology, including genetic engineering and synthetic biology, haddual-use potential for medical breakthroughs and biowarfare capabilities. The dual use nature of biotechnological research underscored the importance of robustinternational frameworks and regulations to prevent misuse and ensure peacefulapplications. In addition, given that civilian activities were increasingly dependent on
space-based systems, the Board believed that the militarization of outer space
introduced new threats with potentially devastating consequences, intensifying
competition and potential conflicts in orbit.
32. In the area of robotics and autonomous weapons, members discussed thepotential benefits of robotics technology (for example, in aiding mine clearance)
while noting a pressing need to put in place guardrails around lethal autonomous
weapons systems. They underscored that, without comprehensive multilateralregulations, the creation, design, development and use of these systems raised
humanitarian, legal, security and ethical concerns and posed a direct threat to humanrights and fundamental freedoms. It recalled the Secretary-General’s position thatmachines with the power and discretion to take lives without human involvement
were “morally repugnant and politically unacceptable” and should be prohibited
under international law.
33. Beyond scrutinizing individual emerging technologies, the Board was seized of
the urgency of addressing their interplay and interconnectedness with existing
weapon systems. This was emphasized by Board member D. B. Venkatesh Varma,
who prepared a “food-for-thought” paper in support of the Board’s discussions. In thepaper, he underscored, among other things, the need not only to examine thoseindividual technologies but also to analyse their interaction. 9 . In that connection,
Board members noted that the following areas of interaction posed particularconcerns:• AI and autonomous weapon systems• AI and life sciences• Information and communications technologies (ICTs), AI and outer space• ICTs, AI and nuclear-weapon systems
Such convergences not only enhanced the lethality of military capabilities but alsopresented significant regulatory challenges owing to their uneven and largely
unregulated development across national borders. That trend was exacerbated by the
rapid pace of technological development, which outstripped the ability of existing
regulatory frameworks to keep pace, leading to concerns about strategic surprise.
34. Board members discussed how the convergence of, for example, AI and nuclear
weapons could create destabilizing conditions under which States could feelcompelled to use nuclear weapons first, leading to rapid and uncontrolled escalation.
Members were alarmed at the notion of integrating AI into nuclear command, control__________________
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and communications, which could lead to compressed time frames for decision making, with the speed of AI-enabled actions capable of outpacing human capacity,
resulting in the potential for miscalculation and escalation during crises. Additional
concerns centred on data poisoning and “black box” decision-making, which had
implications for conventional command and control within militaries.
35. Board members Rose Gottemoeller and Anton Khlopkov further examined how
advances in science and technology exacerbated existing strategic risks and created
new ones. 10 Ms. Gottemoeller posited that the introduction of artificial general
intelligence was emerging as a pivotal concern, as it could introduce unpredictability,
posing new risks of unintended escalation and undermining traditional deterrence
strategies reliant on predictability. Mr. Khlopkov underlined that, in an increasingly
complicated landscape, emerging technologies such as AI, quantum technologies andhypersonic weapons presented dual-use capabilities that could either stabilize ordestabilize international security. For instance, AI could optimize military operations
and enhance early warning systems, yet its misuse could escalate conflicts or increase
vulnerabilities in strategic systems.
36. The Board also conducted a preliminary exploration of potentially positive
implications of science and technology developments for disarmament, arms control
and non-proliferation. For instance, with regard to nuclear disarmament, members
touched on the possibility of AI or satellite imagery playing a role in monitoring andverification, including by improving on-site visits and enabling monitoring by civilsociety groups. Innovations such as remote sensing, advanced imaging and data
analytics could play crucial roles in enhancing transparency and confidence-building
measures. In addition, Board members considered that the fears and game -changing
nature of general AI could also present opportunities for States to collaborate
strategically. By addressing shared concerns and vulnerabilities, fostering normative
frameworks and engaging in diplomatic efforts, States could potentially enhance
global security and stability, not least with the aim of preserving the nuclear taboo.
Initial analysis of associated risks and opportunities for the nexus between
disarmament, development and human rights
37. Board members assessed the impact of advances in science and technology on
development, including on the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals, the extent to which
advances in science and technology lead to, affect or otherwise exacerbate trade-offs
between development, prosperity and security, and what role the multi-stakeholder
community could play in assessing their human rights impacts.
38. In that connection, the Board spent time discussing how social, economic, civil
and political rights intersected with emerging technologies, posing complex
challenges and opportunities for the respect and fulfilment of human rights globally,
regionally and nationally. Members discussed how technologies that reduced humancontrol could undermine civil and political rights, affecting individuals ’ safety andautonomy. They also discussed the need to ensure that technological advances ,including military advances, did not infringe upon fundamental human rights,
including the right to life, the right to dignity and other rights as provided for in theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international andregional human rights treaties. In addition, Board members briefly touched oncollective or group rights, such as the rights of people with disabilities, women,children, refugees and indigenous groups, noting the importance of criticallyreflecting on how those groups – most of whom were more vulnerable to violence –__________________
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were affected by the development and use of emerging technologies in the military
domain.
39. The Board noted that advances in technology could positively affectdevelopment agendas – such as poverty reduction through improved infrastructure,
increased agricultural productivity, improved access to and delivery of health andeducation services, and support for humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. In thatregard, technology might lead to the realization of human rights provided for in theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other regional
human rights instruments.
40. Nevertheless, members expressed concern that a lack of access to or uneven
distribution of certain technological or scientific advances would lead to growing
inequalities between individuals and groups and among States, maintain or exacerbate
exploitative structures and result in an increasingly uneven distribution of power anddevelopment at the global level. A scramble to extract the natural resources that werenecessary to bolster technological advances could further fuel inequalities such as
racial, ethnic, regional and gender inequalities, trigger possible resource collapse andeven precipitate conflict and armed violence. In addition, Board members consideredthat the development of those technologies could also exacerbate global inequalities
by diverting resources towards defence rather than addressing key socioeconomic
issues such as education, poverty and health care. Moreover, concerns arose aboutdata appropriation for military purposes, potentially at the expense of individual data
privacy and societal development needs, as well as, for example, big data and AI
systems stirring social unrest.
41. The Board also assessed how technological advances were fuelling thewidespread availability of (illicit) small arms and light weapons, exacerbating humanrights violations and stunting development across regions. In that connection, in a
tailored presentation, Board member Carolina Ricardo discussed the rise of privately
manufactured and non-industrial small arms, facilitated by advances such as threedimensional printing and computer numerical control milling. Those weapons, often
untraceable and highly lethal, exacerbated violence, in particular in regions plaguedby organized crime and structural inequalities. A further concern was that, in addition
to traditional smuggling routes, such weapons were increasingly circulated using
online platforms such as social media and messaging apps, which were supported byonline payment mechanisms, exposing significant regulatory gaps.
42. Board members discussed the need for a balanced approach to navigating theintersection of emerging technologies, including military technologies, human rights
and sustainable development that promoted innovation while safeguarding individualand collective rights. Members advocated approaches that promoted sustainable
practices, integrated environmental considerations into technological development,
ensured equitable access to technology, fostered inclusive economic growth andstrengthened regulatory frameworks to safeguard human rights and environmental
sustainability. By reinforcing international norms, enhancing education and fosteringtransparent dialogue through a multilateral approach, stakeholders could mitigate
risks and maximize the benefits of technological advances for global peace anddevelopment.
Potential future pathways
43. Although the Board is only at the midway point in its work, it has already begun
considering potential pathways. In doing so, it has focused on proactive international
cooperation and regulation to manage the profound impacts of new and emerging
technologies on global security and disarmament efforts, recognizing the need to keep
in mind that these should be applicable across a wide range of possible future
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developments and scenarios and have the potential to gain the broadest possible
international support.
44. Potential pathways that were discussed include standardized terms and criteria
for assessing technologies on the basis of their potential risks to peace and security
and categorizing technologies according to their complexity, such as through the useof a matrix, to determine issues pertaining to technical characteristics, risk andgovernance, in order to help determine whether they should be monitored, regulated
or prohibited. Furthermore, reaffirming international law, including human rights law,and international humanitarian law and their applicability to emerging technologies,
as well as exploring new concepts and frameworks with appropriate dialogue
platforms for managing emerging technologies, similar to those used for climatechange, for example, were also proposed.
45. The Board considered that navigating the impact of emerging technologies oninternational peace and security required proactive and coordinated efforts at thenational, regional and international levels. The role of the United Nations emerged as
pivotal in fostering international cooperation and setting norms and global standards
in that evolving landscape while encouraging dialogue among Member States in othercontexts. Members discussed the role of the United Nations disarmament machineryand how it could best be employed as a platform through which to discuss and regulate
such technologies. The need for a revitalization of structures to enable better
harmonization among Member States was noted, as was the need to include
considerations of the impact on individuals, their rights and society at large to be able
to holistically address the risks and threats of new technologies to international
security. The Board highlighted that existing multilateral, regional and bilateral
forums must adapt to address the impact of technological advances on existing
weapon types, such as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. That
could include leveraging frameworks such as the Biological Weapons Convention and
the Chemical Weapons Convention. Beyond the disarmament machinery, leveraging
the United Nations as a dialogue platform with unique legitimacy given its universal
membership was considered by the Board. It notably discussed, among otherproposals, the possibility of the permanent five providing a st atement on emerging
technologies and their impact on international security, as well as the organization ofa high-level gathering on the sidelines of the General Assembly to highlight the issue
and build consensus towards a long-term global compact on emerging technologies
and international security.
46. At the same time, given the critical role of the private sector in driving
technological and scientific developments and that of civil society in ensuring that
individuals’ voices were heard and ensuring accountability, members underlined thatany effort must be multi-stakeholder and inclusive in nature and aimed at the entire
technological life cycle. The necessity of regulation at the international level was
mentioned, as well as the importance of developing appropriate and relevant norms,
ensuring due diligence, corporate responsibility and regulation of the private sector(for example, through codes of conduct) and reorienting the focus onto principles ofcommon public good. Board members saw opportunities for capacity -building throughincreasing education on and awareness of the technologies, including dual-use
technologies, conducting technology assessments, establishing new dialogue platforms,
strengthening tailored and specific research, creating publicly funded computing
capacities to generate greater public ownership, strengthening and reaffirming existingnorms and developing new ones, and enhancing public awareness with a view tobetter managing the risks and opportunities presented by technological advances in
the military sphere.

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III. Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research
47. The Advisory Board, acting in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), met twice in 2024 (on30 January and 25 June) to review the operations, funding and programmes of
UNIDIR.
Achievements in 2023/2024: results and impact
48. At the first meeting, in January 2024, the Director of UNIDIR provided an
overview of the Institute’s activities and impact in 2023, including notable growth inrevenue and donor diversity, an ever more global and inclusive range of events on key
issues, expert support for Member States and institutions at every level of governance,
the launch of several new digital tools, a notable increase in key research outputs andthe delivery of a more user-friendly, modern website. The Board was then briefed by
UNIDIR heads of programmes on work relating to the growing use of craft -produced
and improvised weapons, lessons learned and ways forward for gendered approaches
to arms control and disarmament, research into the relationship between nuclear risks
and converging technologies, and participatory research projects with conflict affected young people. Trustees noted the timeliness, relevance and significant
potential impact of those planned research activities, whose diversity reflected thebroad spectrum of research that UNIDIR was currently undertaking.
49. Trustees noted with satisfaction a significant rise in the overall productivity of
UNIDIR (with a 500 per cent increase in combined event and publication figures since2018) and recognized the importance of the Institute ’s year-round support for several
General Assembly-mandated groups of governmental experts and open-ended
working groups, numerous review conferences and a wide range of other multilateraland regional processes. Trustees also acknowledged the role of UNIDI R in organizing
critical events on topical issues, including a first-of-its-kind high-level retreat on
revitalizing the Conference on Disarmament, the first global symposium on weapons
and ammunition management, and a workshop on international law and the behaviourof States in the use of ICTs. They were briefed on the extension of the Middle East
Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone Project and the initiation of its second phasein the third quarter of 2023. Trustees welcomed the expansion of the Institute ’s rangeof digital platforms for supporting multilateral processes and dialogue, with the AI
Policy Portal, the Biological Weapons Convention National Implementation
Database, the Space Security Portal, the Lexicon for Outer Space Security and the
Cyber Policy Portal Database all launched in 2023.
50. The outcomes of a two-day UNIDIR-Office for Disarmament Affairs strategic
retreat in October 2023, which was aimed at ensuring regular cross-institutional
coordination and information-sharing at all levels, were presented. Going forward,
regular coordination meetings between UNIDIR and the Office will cover strategic
priorities, workplans and events, providing a further boost to joint strategic initiatives
and advancing the shared goal of strengthening multilateral disarmament and arms
control. Noting increased demand for educational activities from the international
community, the Director underlined the complementarity of the two entities: while
the Office took the lead on the disarmament education aspect, UNIDIR focused on
the substantive research aspect and offered research-based courses aimed at building
capacity in specific areas. That work complemented existing educational tools,
materials and formats used by both institutions.
51. During the second meeting, in June 2024, the Director provided details ofpriority areas for research in 2024 and of the activities of the Institute ’s Futures
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Laboratory, including work on international security in 2045, the exploration ofpotential research angles in the field of maritime security, and analysis of the links
between disarmament and development. Trustees were briefed on key recent
activities, including Security Council briefings on cybersecurity and small arms andlight weapons; the round table for AI, security and ethics; the innovative Women in
AI fellowship building capacity among a group of 31 women diplomats from 31
countries around the world; and a novel capacity-building course on norms,
international law and cyberspace. In showcasing impact monitoring by UNIDIR, theDirector also highlighted one specific and recognized impact case study on theInstitute’s work towards the establishment of a comprehensive national weapons andammunition management framework in Somalia.
52. Trustees noted with appreciation the focus of UNIDIR on diversity, which wasreflected in its donor base, personnel and efforts to increase global reach through newpartnerships and events in all regions. Similarly, trustees welcomed the Institute ’s
global disarmament research network initiative and encouraged further streamliningof that networked approach to address the complexities of the twenty -first century
security environment. Trustees were also briefed on the Institute’s fellowship
programme, which had recently been revamped following a period of reduced activity
related to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. In 2024, UNIDIR started
appointing a range of senior fellows whose globally diverse expertise offered theInstitute valuable support and insight.
53. The Board was briefed on the increased efforts of UNIDIR to inform and engage
its diverse stakeholders through improved strategic communication. Trustees noted
the much-needed reinforcement of the Institute’s communications team and expressed
appreciation for the detailed presentation on activities in that area. In that connection,
Trustees also noted that the Institute had the potential to reach an even wider
audience, in particular among young people and in the global South, and it was agreed
that efforts to do so would be discussed at future Board meetings. Finally, the Board
received briefings from UNIDIR heads of programmes on the implications ofartificial intelligence for international peace and security, on new developments in thedomain of space security and on the objectives and planned activities for phase II of
the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone Project.
Financial and human resources
54. With regard to UNIDIR finances, the Director noted that demand for theInstitute’s work continued on the steep growth trajectory of recent years. Donorrevenue reached an all-time high of $12.6 million in 2023, up from $8 million in 2022.
The Institute also had a record number of donors (37) in 2023, and – for the second
year in a row – donors were drawn from all United Nations regional groups andincluded all five permanent members of the Security Council. That donor diversity
was expected to continue in 2024.
55. Trustees were informed of the decision of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development to grant the Institute an official development
assistance co-efficient of 36 per cent from 2024 onward, up from 27 per cent in 2019.
It represented a positive step for current or potential donors that had demonstrated astrong commitment to that criterion. The Board reiterated its appeal to all Member
States to continue to make financial contributions that were multi -annual andunearmarked wherever possible to ensure the viability, independence, impartiality
and research excellence of UNIDIR over the long term. The Director explained thateven nominal unearmarked contributions were welcome as they helped todemonstrate the broad-based support that the Institute enjoyed.

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56. In addition to those positive trends, the Board was also briefed on various risks
that UNIDIR continued to face. First, in spite of growing donor diversity, the Instituteremained significantly dependent on voluntary contributions, in particular from alimited number of large donors, and funding was made less flexible by the growing
prevalence of earmarking. In 2023, 94 per cent of the Institute ’s revenue was
earmarked, compared with 75 per cent in 2018. The increase in the development
coefficient of UNIDIR was not expected to fully reverse the declining trend inunearmarked funds. The Director also conveyed that 2024 donor revenue wasprojected to be almost $2 million less than in 2023, demonstrating that UNIDIR was
not immune to shifts in donor priorities resulting from geopolitical and economic
uncertainties. Trustees were assured that the financial situation was being monitored
closely and that there were enough funds carried forward from the previous year toallow implementation to continue on the intended growth trajectory for 2024 at least.
57. Against that backdrop, the Director presented a case for another increase in thesubvention from the United Nations regular budget. He referred to the 2015 report of
the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (A/70/186), in which the Board
described the Institute’s “irreducible core” of institutional leadership and researchleadership as the driving force behind the Institute. The Director explained that anincrease in regular budget funding would protect the autonomy and sustainability ofthe statutory research functions of UNIDIR, enable it to attract and retain world -classresearchers to key positions and guarantee the Institute’s ability to respond to growing
demands for advisory support from the international community. Following theBoard’s endorsement of that proposal (in June 2023 and January 2024), the Director
briefed trustees on the Group of Friends meetings hosted by France and Germany on
28 March and 21 June 2024, at both of which the widespread support of Member
States for the Institute was confirmed. Noting the link between the volatile
geopolitical situation, shifting donor priorities, budget constraints and imminent risks
to UNIDIR in 2025, the Board underlined the timeliness and urgency of the request
for an increase in the subvention, which would safeguard the stability andsustainability of the Institute’s vital research functions. The Director also emphasizedthat a relatively moderate, timely investment at this point would have a significant
lasting impact and avoid even higher costs at a later stage.
58. Updating the Board on human resources, the Director noted that currently only
two of a total of 73 institutional positions (Director and Executive Officer) werecovered by the regular budget. He elaborated on the Institute ’s cautious approach of
deliberately delaying recruitment for certain posts, such as Deputy Director and New
York Liaison Officer, in order to conserve cash. In the interim, related tasks had been
subdelegated to heads of programmes and the Executive Office r. Considerable
measures had nonetheless been taken to retain talent, not least through the provisionof a medical insurance subsidy to staff on United Nations Office for Project Services
contracts. Trustees were also informed of the outcome of a staffing review carried out
by an external senior human resources specialist, as requested by the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. In the review, the specialist
concluded that the growth in UNIDIR’s staffing was justified, as it was due tosignificantly increased demand, and consequently a greater workload for the Institute,leading to an increase in its operational requirements. Having examined the funding
structure of UNIDIR, the specialist also recommended an increase in the regularbudget subvention as a means of improving the predictability and sustainability of theInstitute’s research in core areas.
2025 Programme of work and budget
59. In line with the Board’s request of June 2023, UNIDIR presented a separate
agenda item on the programme of work for 2025 and the proposed annual budget
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estimates. The Director briefed trustees on the consolidation, expected growth andcontinuous development of its five core research programmes in 2025: security andtechnology, conventional arms and ammunition, space security, weapons of mass
destruction, and gender and disarmament. The Institute’s project on managing exits
from armed conflicts and the second phase of the Middle East Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Free Zone Project would also continue to be implemented in 2025. For
the next research agenda, covering the period from 2025 to 2030, trustees proposed
to discuss the updated strategic priorities and cross-programmatic initiatives of
UNIDIR at the meeting in June 2025.
60. Trustees noted that UNIDIR had started its annual budgeting process for 2025,
which would ultimately produce granular cost plans. The Institute would again workon the basis of two budgets: a conservative baseline budget and an optimal delivery
budget. The budget figures would be presented at the Board meeting in January 2025.
Based on current demand, historical trends and the strategic research agenda of
UNIDIR for 2022 to 2025, the conservative projected expenditure indicated in the
Director’s report totals $12.3 million.
61. During the June 2024 session, the Board considered and adopted the Institute ’s
2025 annual programme of work for 2025 and the proposed annual budget estimates(A/79/146), taking into account the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the draft report of the Director to theGeneral Assembly.

IV. Future work and other matters
62. The Board will continue the programme of work in 2025 with a view to drawing
up recommendations regarding the United Nations disarmament agenda andmachinery in the light of the potential impact of science and technology trends. It will
present its recommendations on the above in the 2025 report of the Secretary-Generalon the work of the Advisory Board of Disarmament Matters, to be presented to theGeneral Assembly at its eightieth session.

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Annex I
Summary of expert contributions at the eighty-first and eightysecond sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
At both sessions, the Board benefited from expert presentations and question and-answer sessions with both external speakers and individual Board members, eachtapping into their specific expertise, experience and areas of focus.
Elaborating on the issue of military applications of artificial intelligence (AI)was guest speaker Yi Zeng, a Professor and Director at the Brain -inspired Cognitive
Intelligence Lab and the International Research Center for AI Ethics and Governance,
both located at the Institute of Automation at the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Focusing on challenges and opportunities for a framework for military AI,
Mr. Zeng posited that more dialogue was needed – including on defining what
constituted “human control” and on how to ensure that such control was bothmeaningful and sufficient. That was especially important given that relying on themere existence of “human control” alone did not always lead to a desirable outcome,in particular in the case of cognitive overload in human-machine interactions. He gave
particular attention to the risks of cognitive escalation emerging from intelligent
behaviours that stemmed from large-scale language foundational models and thecoordination of multiple agents that made it possible for AI to develop unpredictablecapabilities. Such developments challenged traditional notions of hierarchicalgovernance and control.
Board members organized several sets of expert presentations, focusing on thefollowing sub-topics: new technologies, conflict and disarmament; new technologies
and strategic stability; and new technologies and disarmament, development andhuman rights.
Speaking on the issue of new technologies, conflict and disarmament was Jina
Kim, who provided a deep dive into, inter alia, developments related to military AI,
the ways in which such new and emerging technologies (may) affect armed conflict,
and what type of approaches would help to govern those technologies.
Ms. Kim examined the current landscape of the military AI market, which was
projected to grow by 33.3 per cent between 2023 and 2028. Leading countries’ armed
forces were notably expanding spending in military AI, with that trend expected tocontinue owing to its potential benefits. AI advances promised enhanced intelligence,
real-time target investigation, cyberattack neutralization, and reduced maintena nce
costs. It could also facilitate non-compliance recognition and reliable monitoring andmitigate vulnerabilities in arms export control.
At the same time, Ms. Kim noted that AI deployment in military contexts posed
significant challenges. It might encourage riskier behaviour and alter the reasoning
behind engaging in warfare as a result of automation bias and the emphasis of speed
in decision-making, potentially exacerbating trust deficits and susceptibility to datapoisoning attacks. States were generally resistant to arms control when weapons were
widely deployed, strategically valuable or uniquely effective, thereby offering
insights as to what timing would be most fruitful for pursuing disarmament and arms
control measures.
AI arms control faced hurdles in both desirability (ensuring reciprocity andmanaging vulnerability) and feasibility (establishing clarity and capability).
Regulatory efforts were complicated by the dual-use nature of AI and its widespread
civilian applications, raising significant challenges in enforcement and compliance.
Ms. Kim proposed potential successive steps that could be taken, including agreeing
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to shared definitions, outlining principles of responsible behaviour, promoting
transparency through unilateral declarations and pursuing non -legally binding
commitments among like-minded nations.
Addressing the potential implications of new technologies on strategic stability
were Board members Rose Gottemoeller and Anton Khlopkov, who examined a broad
set of questions, including how advances in science and technology exacerbatedexisting strategic risks and created new ones, how rapid advances in science andtechnology contributed to the escalation of crises, and what the roles of the diplomaticcommunity, policymakers and civil society were in understanding and acting on theimpacts of emerging technology.
Ms. Gottemoeller explored the evolving concept of strategic stability in thecurrent geopolitical landscape, beginning with its Cold War origins. Defined broadly,
strategic stability now encompassed crisis management, arms race prevention and thebroader goal of maintaining peaceful international relations among nuclear-armed
States. That broader view was necessitated by contemporary conflicts, challenging
traditional definitions and highlighting the importance of mutual predictability ininternational relations. Technological advances, such as additive manufacturing andadvanced remote sensing, presented both opportunities and challenges for arms
control and disarmament efforts. While technologies such as remote sensing enhanced
verification capabilities, allowing for more transparent monitoring of nuclear
activities, they also gave rise to concerns about the ease of missile production andpotential destabilization.
Ms. Gottemoeller added that the introduction of artificial general intelligence
was a pivotal concern, as it could introduce unpredictability into decision -making
processes critical to nuclear deterrence. That unpredictability posed new risks ofunintended escalation and undermined traditional deterrence strategies reliant on
predictability. Disparities in technological access among States further complicatedmatters, potentially exacerbating distrust and fuelling arms races. Effective
international frameworks and agreements were crucial for managing those risks,
promoting transparency and preventing the misuse of emerging technologies.
Diplomatic efforts and policy initiatives must prioritize understanding and regulating
those technologies to ensure that they contributed positively to international peaceand security, including through agreeing on norms and principles for safety andsecurity, creating early warning systems to pre-empt escalatory situations andconsidering law enforcement measures to counter malfeasance.
In considering strategic stability in the context of modern technologicaladvances and international frameworks, Mr. Khlopkov explored the definition andrelevance of strategic stability, the role of emerging technologies, and pathways forenhancing existing instruments and forums.
The idea of strategic stability remained centred on preventing nuclear conflictby minimizing strategic risks. Currently, it encompassed broader dimensions
including non-nuclear weapons with strategic effect, missile defence, space weaponsand cyberspace. The expanded scope complicated consensus among nuclear-weapon
States but was essential for global equilibrium and reducing the risk of catastrophic
military clashes, as affirmed by the permanent five countries.
In this increasingly complicated landscape, emerging technologies such as AI,
quantum technologies and hypersonic weapons presented dual-use capabilities that
could either stabilize or destabilize international security. For instance, AI could
optimize military operations and enhance early warning systems, yet its misuse could
escalate conflicts or increase vulnerabilities in strategic systems. Effective
application and regulation were crucial to harnessing those technologies fordisarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts.
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In that connection, Mr. Khlopkov examined ways in which existing multilateral,
regional and bilateral forums must adapt to address the impact of technologicaladvances on strategic stability. That could include leveraging frameworks such as the
Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention andenhancing dialogue on cyberspace and outer space security. International cooperation,
inclusivity in decision-making, and avoiding redundancy with existing regimes wereparamount in managing the implications of new technologies effectively.
Finally, Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Carolina Ricardo explored the implicationsof science and technology for the nexus between disarmament, human rights anddevelopment by assessing their impact on the achievement of the Sustainable
Development Goals and broader development goals, the extent to which advances inscience and technology led to, affected or otherwise exacerbated trade -offs between
development, prosperity and security, and what role the multi-stakeholder community
could play in assessing the human rights impacts of weapons used in armed conflict.
Ms. Ricardo focused her presentation on the role of small arms and light
weapons in cases of homicide, which, according to data provided in the Global Studyon Homicide 2023 of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, was the leading
cause of violent death globally, surpassing conflict and terrorism combined.
Emphasizing the disproportionate impact across regions, she explained that Africa
and the Americas faced significantly higher homicide rates. Firearms played a central
role, accounting for 40 per cent of global homicides, and up to 67 per cent in theAmericas. Specifically in the Americas, the conflicts that caused the most deaths were
those related to organized crime, gangs and violent crime. Those dynamics werestrongly related to structural inequalities resulting not only from present local
constraints but also from global illegal markets and structural violence.
Moving to technology and firearms, she discussed the rise of privately
manufactured and non-industrial small arms, facilitated by advances such as threedimensional printing and computer numerical control milling. Those weapons, often
untraceable and highly lethal, exacerbated violence, in particular in regions plaguedby organized crime and structural inequalities. In addition, she considered the diverse
channels through which the weapons were circulated, including traditional smuggling
routes and increasingly using online platforms such as social media and messaging
apps. Those digital channels facilitated illicit arms transactions and revealed
significant regulatory gaps.
Ms. Ricardo underscored the urgency of addressing the challenges collectively
and comprehensively. Globalization and technological advances had democratizedweapon production, necessitating coordinated responses to prevent those weapons
from fuelling further violence and undermining human rights. Potential solutions
could include prioritizing homicide prevention and reduction in global violence
agendas and ensuring that arms control was central to that endeavour, developing
comprehensive approaches to addressing privately manufactured and non-industrial
small arms, advocating enhanced regulation of online platforms and digital payment
services involved in arms trafficking, and encouraging the enhanced collection of dataon the differential impacts of violence by demographics, in particular by race or
ethnicity and gender, for targeted prevention efforts.
In his presentation, Mr. Guéhenno focused on the pivotal role of data in thedigital technology revolution, emphasizing their profound influence in determining
where knowledge and power were located, with a multiplicative effect. Drawing
parallels with the invention of the steam engine, he highlighted how technologicaladvances were reshaping power dynamics, driven largely by the private sector,
outpacing regulatory frameworks. Moreover, the proverbial target for regulation kept
shifting, as evidenced by the earlier hype around large language models that were
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now generally understood to be merely a first step towards the full capabilities of AI.
While artificial general intelligence was still a long way off, the concentration oftechnological power among States and huge corporations was a geopolitical concern,
influencing dependencies and vulnerabilities, in particular in data management andencryption capabilities.
Mr. Guéhenno described how the proliferation of and reliance on data mighttransform conflict, noting that increasing data transparency had both positive(enhanced prevention capabilities) and negative (vulnerability to exploitation)
implications. The blurring line between civilian and military targets further
complicated warfare tactics and was exacerbated by the impact of misinformation andauthoritarian measures. He was optimistic that there were opportunities fortechnology to fulfil a role as an enhancer of human capabilities, acknowledging that
how that transpired would depend on the ethics of all actors involved.
Examining ideas for addressing geopolitical competition related totechnologies, Mr. Guéhenno advocated ensuring open architectures to mitigate theconcentration of technological power and enhancing research accessibility acrossinstitutions to safeguard human rights. In addition, he emphasized the need to ensure
systemic accountability, protect critical infrastructures and leverage the data
revolution to combat corruption.
Finally, D. B. Venkatesh Varma provided the Board with a working paper inwhich he outlined the factors that might be useful in assessing the impact of new andemerging technologies on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament andsuggested that the role of the United Nations centred on fostering dialogue, rulemaking and rule harmonization to address the emerging governance deficit in thatfield.
Mr. Varma outlined a landscape in which rapid technological advances,spanning AI, quantum mechanics, biotechnology and more were increasingly
integrated into military applications worldwide. Highlighting the role of the private
sector in driving military innovation, he noted that technological advances
increasingly originated in private companies rather than solely in State -driven
initiatives. That shift challenged traditional notions of military oversight andregulation, as principles governing civilian applications might not seamlesslytranslate to the military domain.
Furthermore, the concentration of technological resources and capabilities
among a few dominant countries and corporations complicated efforts at international
regulation, with significant implications for global security and stability. Those
dynamics contributed to an evolving arms race driven by the pursuit of technologicalsuperiority, further complicating efforts to maintain strategic stability and upholdinternational peace agreements.

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Annex II
Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 2024
Nabeela Abdulla Al-Mulla
Distinguished lecturer at the American University of Kuwait and Chair of the Boardof Trustees of the Kuwait College of Science and Technology
Kuwait City
Thompson Chengeta
Associate Professor of Law and Artificial Intelligence Technologies at the School of
Law of Liverpool John Moores University
Liverpool
Rose Gottemoeller
Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute of Stanford University
Stanford
Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Inaugural Kent visiting professor in conflict resolution at the School of Internationaland Public Affairs at Columbia University
New York
Mary Kaldor
Professor Emeritus of Global Governance and Director of the Conflict Research
Programme at the London School of Economics and Political Science
LondonAnton Khlopkov
Director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies
Moscow
Jina Kim
Dean of the Division of Language and Diplomacy at Hankuk University of Foreign
StudiesSeoul
Li Chijiang 1
Vice-President and Secretary-General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament
Association
Beijing
Federica Mogherini
Rector of the College of Europe and Director of the Pilot Programme of theEuropean Diplomatic Academy
Brussels
Elina Noor
Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace
Los Angeles
Eghosa Osaghae
Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Lagos__________________
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The President of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, Cheng Jingye, wasappointed in May 2024 to replace Li Chijiang.
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Patryk Pawlak
Visiting Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of theEuropean University InstituteBrussels
Carolina Ricardo
Executive Director of the Sou da Paz InstituteSão Paolo
Shorna-Kay Richards (Chair)
Ambassador of Jamaica to JapanTokyo
D. B. Venkatesh Varma
Ambassador (ret.) and former Permanent Representative of India to the Conference
on Disarmament
Hyderabad
Robin Geiss (ex officio member)
Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
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