PROMPTING MICROFINANCE BORROWERS TO SAVE:A FIELD EXPERIMENT FROM GUATEMALA

June 2012
Jesse Atkinson
Alain de Janvry†
Craig McIntosh‡
Elisabeth Sadoulet†

Abstract
Can microfinance borrowers use the discipline of regular loan repayments in order to accumulatesavings if prompted to do so? In an experiment, we offered commercial savings products to themicrofinance borrowers of Guatemala’s largest public-sector bank. We find that giving theseborrowers the opportunity to develop a saving plan and be reminded of saving at the time of loan
repayment caused no increase in the opening of savings accounts but led to balances among saversthat were two and a half times those in the control. A second treatment arm that proposed adefault savings contribution of 10% of the loan payment caused the fraction of clients using linked
savings accounts to double as well as elevating deposits among savers, leading to final savingsbalances that were more than five times the control. The savings treatments also generate faster
pay-down of debt and weakly better overall repayment performance, suggesting that simultaneoussavings and borrowing can be complementary activities. A theoretical model shows that thesimultaneous provision of debt and self-commitment savings products can also help a greater
fraction of the population to eventually escape a debt-financed equilibrium.

†University of California at Berkeley and ‡University of California at San Diego. We thank the CHN
leadership for its close collaboration, Tomas Rosada for help in making the experiment possible, theAssociate Editor and two anonymous referees for useful comments, and John Kucharski and Deborah Hirt
for excellent research assistance, and BASIS/USAID for funding.

-1-1. Introduction
Saving is important for the poor in managing their liquidity (Collins et al., 2009). Yet, most people
have difficulty meeting their savings objectives, particularly the poor as their income streams provide themwith few abilities to commit to savings plans. Recent advances in behavioral finance have, however,shown that assistance to save can be provided through relatively simple product innovations. This paper
reports on the results of an experiment that introduced a new set of commercial products based on planningand reminders to help microfinance borrowers from Guatemala’s largest public-sector bank build theirsavings. We justify promoting this apparently counterproductive behavior where saving is at a lower
interest rate than borrowing with a model of borrowers who are time-inconsistent but willing to save in the
future: saving while borrowing helps them fulfill their goal of transiting from less debt-financed to moresavings-financed investment.
Behavioral explanations for the difficulty of saving focus on the group of individuals who wish tosave but prove unable to do so. Such self-control problems may arise for a variety of reasons, including
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997), intra-household disagreements (Ashraf et al., 2010), temptation
goods (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2009), and procrastination (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001).1 In any ofthese environments, individuals say today that they would be willing to save tomorrow, but will decide not
to do so once tomorrow arrives. They therefore fail to execute their own savings plans. While individuals
in developed countries have access to many financial instruments linked to income earnings that help themovercome these problems (regular direct deposits, retirement contributions, life insurance payments, etc.)2,
the cash-based economic environment of micro-entrepreneurs in the developing world is typically devoidof such instruments (Collins et al., 2009). Available evidence from developing countries shows that
substantial demand for savings exists and that commitment devices are likely to have strong impacts on
behavior (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2006; Dupas and Robinson, 2009; Bruhne, Giné, Goldberg, and Yang,2011). As of yet, however, few commercial financial institutions in developing countries have piloted
scalable financial savings products that exploit these insights.
In collaboration with Crédito Hipotecario Nacional (CHN), we randomized the deployment of
new behaviorally-motivated financial products across the bank’s entire microfinance clientele. CHN offers
microfinance loans with monthly repayments over terms of 12 to 36 months, and therefore provides aunique opportunity to use the discipline of regular loan repayments over a long period of time to offer
borrowers different savings strategies. In order to focus on the behavioral dimensions of savings productdesign, the treatments induce no direct financial incentives for clients at all and instead differ only in themanner and extent to which borrowers are ‘nudged’ to save. Since many commercial financial institutions
may find binding their clients into true commitment products difficult or objectionable, our products are

1

This is not to deny other reasons why people do not save, in particular when there is pressure from relatives andfriends to share their savings (Baland, Guirkinger, and Mali, forthcoming; Bruhne, Giné, Goldberg, and Yang, 2011)
2
Such as the ‘Save More Tomorrow’ plan based on automated paycheck contributions to a 401(k) plan in the U.S. (seeThaler and Benartzi, 2004). More recent empirical work on behavioral issues in US pension plan contributions include
Card and Ransom (2011) and Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2011).

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driven by asking clients to determine a savings trajectory that they wish to follow over the course of theloan and then prompting them to make these self-specified savings deposits at the time of each loan
payment. The bank does not, however, penalize clients for failing to meet this trajectory, and deposits,
once made, can be freely withdrawn at any time without charges. Our products therefore are based moreon provoking mental accounting and reinforcing the salience of savings (Karlan et al., 2010) than on theuse of true commitments such as the ‘lock box’ of the SEED accounts of Green Bank in the Philippines(Ashraf et al., 2006), the non-withdrawable deposits of the Grameen Pension Scheme (Collins et al., 2009),
or the free deposits and costly withdrawals implemented by Dupas and Robinson (2009). Our results showthat this light-handed, easily scaled approach can indeed be very successful at increasing savings balances.
In order to minimize effects arising from variation in understanding of the basic savings products
and terms offered, or from the salience and promotion effect of the intervention, we define as the control agroup that receives a savings promotion (brochure plus verbal reinforcement), an explanation of contract
terms, and is offered the chance to open a savings account at the time of loan disbursement (Basic Savings).
We then compare two treatment arms to this control. In the first of these, clients taking new loans areoffered the opportunity to define a monthly savings deposit that they will then be prompted to make eachtime they make a loan payment. This Open Treatment has no financial penalties for failing to make thestipulated deposit, and hence can be thought of as an experiment in planning and reminders (Karlan et al.,2010). The second treatment arm is offered this same option but told that the bank will set this amount at
10% of the loan payment unless clients decide to change it (Default Treatment). This arm is motivated bythe ‘status quo bias’ (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) and decision deferment (Tversky and Shafir, 1992)
found in many studies of behavior, under which agents are much more likely to accept the default option
offered by the program than would be expected from simple optimization theory.
Those who desire today to save tomorrow will likely take on the opportunity to open an account,regardless of whether they really will prove able to save or not. Much of the procrastination that iscommon in deciding to undertake the first step of opening an account should be taken away by thisopportunity (DellaVigna, 2009). What the Open Treatment offers is an additional mechanism to reinforce
savings behaviors, but it provides no framing of the decision as to how much to save. To the extent thathaving to make this decision engenders procrastination or delays, this treatment may not elucidate the fulldemand for savings. The Default Treatment offers the same planning and reminder device, but in addition
frames the savings amount at 10% of the loan payment, and clients are now required to ‘opt out’ if theywish to change to any other value, including zero saving.3 Based on theory and previous empiricalevidence, this default option should raise the uptake of the product (Beshears et al., 2008; Benzarti andThaler, 1995; Johnson and Goldstein, 2004). Because both treatments cause tellers to prompt clients tosave each time they make a loan deposit they introduce a ‘direct appeal’ dimension, one that has beenfound to drive behavior in fields as disparate as charitable giving (Della Vigna, List, and Malmendier,3

10% was chosen as the default commitment savings amount by the bank because they felt that it was unlikely thatclients would adjust the commitment amount upwards, and hence wanted to stipulate an amount that reflected the upper
end of the range that would realistically be chosen by clients.

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2009; Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman, 2011) and voter turnout (Green and Gerber, 2008),

Most

importantly, however, the lack of enforcement of commitments and the full flexibility to deposit orwithdraw savings at any time make these products completely equivalent in a financial sense. Hence, theydiffer only in the behavioral nudges that they provide.
The bank had no intention and no legal means of enforcing any of these self-commitments. Hencethese savings plans offer individuals a psychological means of committing themselves to a savings
trajectory with no financial penalties for failing to implement it. Despite a wealth of recent empirical work
demonstrating the efficacy of hard commitment, there are at least two reasons why self-commitment may
provide a more attractive alternative in practice. First, hard commitment is likely to be more effective atcreating savings, but also hampers one of the core reasons to building savings balances, namely to buffer
against shocks. Self-commitment, if effective at promoting savings, retains broad latitude for households touse savings to protect themselves from shocks even during the asset accumulation phase. Secondly,commercial firms are likely to find it difficult to impose hard commitment on clients in competitivemarketplaces, and in this sense self-commitment may prove a more feasible means of taking the results ofthis new behavioral research to scale via the commercial banking network.
These three financial products were randomized across the 20 microfinance branches of CHN,
stratified on the baseline number of clients. Over the course of two months of active lending, 1,375
individuals took new microfinance loans from CHN and were offered one of the three products. This
relatively small experiment generates good baseline balance, and because impacts observed are so large,
provides us with compelling evidence as to the efficacy of the treatments.
We find that savings behavior is strongly divergent across treatments even though they provide
identical direct financial incentives, suggesting a pervasive role for behavioral issues in savings decisions
among this sample of Guatemalan entrepreneurs. Those offered the Open Treatment are no more likely toopen a savings account than the control, but are 20% more likely to make at least one deposit, andconditional on opening an account have net accumulated savings that are 3.5 times the control value of $10.
Overall average savings (intention-to-treat) are $11.50 higher for the Open Treatment than the Basic
Savings (equal to $4), not quite significantly different. The Default Treatment doubles the probability thatan individual will open a savings account when taking a loan (77% versus 40% in the control), and theneven in this expanded group of savers it increases savings rates and final balances by an amount similar to
the Open treatment. These extensive and intensive margins combine to produce (intention-to-treat) Default
final savings balances that are more than six times those in the control, $25 versus $4. Loan repayment is ifanything better in the treatment arms than the control, and 69% of clients in the default arm who took asubsequent loan elected to retain the savings reminders in the new loan cycle. These results indicate thatcommercial microfinance lenders can use soft commitment savings products in a manner that is both
effective and popular with clients.
New borrowers represent an attractive group to whom to promote savings products in the sensethat they are considering the medium-term future and will be regularly interacting with the financial-4-

institution. A natural question, however, is whether it makes sense to use ‘nudges’ to promote savings at a
4% interest rate to a group of people currently repaying loans at a 26% interest rate. We present arguments
both theoretical and empirical to suggest that this can be a sensible approach. First, there are the wellestablished benefits of liquid savings in buffering against shocks, a use to which long-term loans cannot
easily be put. We find treatments that generate large savings deposits also generating the most frequent
withdrawals, consistent with the use of the accounts for buffering. Secondly, we present a theoreticalmodel showing that the simultaneous provision of debt and commitment savings products can allow agreater fraction of the population to eventually escape a debt-financed equilibrium than if individuals areforced to choose between a loan and commitment savings. Finally, we present evidence that savings
deposits and loan repayment are in fact complementary; the savings treatments generate faster pay-down ofdebt and weakly better overall repayment performance. Hence it appears that the savings generated by ourtreatments come from a different source than loan repayments and that savings promotion improves theoverall loan portfolio for the bank. This is interesting to microfinance institutions that have been pressed toreduce external financial dependency in the context of currency risks and international interest rates
volatility and to build a greater reservoir of domestic savings (CGAP, 2010).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide a simple theoretical motivation for thesimultaneous provision of loans and commitment savings products.

In Section 3 we describe theexperimental design, give more details on each of the treatments, and present tests of the balance of theexperiment. Section 4 presents impacts on the opening of accounts, the accumulation of savings balances,loan repayment, and loan renewal. Section 5 provides some estimates of the share of liquidity needed forthe lending operations of the bank that could be raised through this savings program, and Section 6
concludes.
2. Commitment savings alongside credit
2.1. Savings and borrowing
In what follows we provide a theoretical motivation for two unusual features of our experiment,
namely the offering of a savings product to people who are currently repaying a loan, and the use of ‘selfcommitment’. The simple take on this problem would be to say that, given the gap between lending andborrower rates, it makes sense to pay down debt rather than to save. We motivate here the idea thatoffering a savings product alongside loans can make sense. One simple reason why this could make senseis the buffering provided by savings; costly default under unexpected shocks could be prevented with acushion of savings.

The model presented here takes a different tack, showing that simultaneouscommitment savings and borrowing can allow individuals who would otherwise borrow indefinitely toescape the debt-financed equilibrium via saving and repaying the loan simultaneously. In order to make theunique point about the value of simultaneous provision of debt and savings, we first model a true-5-

commitment product, and then extend the model to consider the case of voluntary self-commitment tosave.4
A rich literature exists detailing a variety of informal means to execute control over future selves,
most particularly rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) (Besley, Coate, and Loury, 1994;
Anderson and Baland, 2002; Ambec and Treich, 2007). Intriguingly, the suggestion has recently emergedthat microfinance borrowing itself can be used as a commitment device to accumulate a lump sum of cash
(Bauer, Chytilová, and Morduch, 2009; Banerjee and Duflo, 2010). This works because it is much moredifficult to fail to repay debt than it is to fail to save. Imagine an individual who wants to buy a new
durable object, but who lacks self-control and also lacks access to a commitment savings mechanism. Suchan individual will wish to save (naïve) or plan to save (sophisticated) but finds himself unable to do so, andtherefore remains without the durable good. The introduction of credit allows the present self to turn thetables on future selves; many future selves that are unwilling to save will be willing to make loan payments,
given the large penalties that are attached to failing to repay (default) versus failing to save (none).
The ‘beta-delta’ formulation for the hyperbolicity problem lets us consider time inconsistency in a%(
simple environment. In the standard formulation, utility is given by U t = Et 'u(ct ) + ! $ " k u(ct+k ) * . The&)
k#1
parameter ! " 1 gives the degree of time inconsistency, and ! " 1 is the discount factor. The standard casewhere only the discounting factor matters obtains when ! is equal to one, and as it falls towards zeropreferences become more time-inconsistent.5 To focus on first-order effects, we linearize marginal utilityu (ct ) = ct and ignore uncertainty.

Individuals receive an exogenous per-period income flow of yt . We abstract away from the speed
at which an individual chooses to save, and consider the question of the decision to save one unit of capitalfor one period, which can then be invested in the following period in a good that returns a profit ! " 1 .
Consumption under savings is yt ! 1 today and yt+1 + ! in the next period. The individual will choose tosave today if !"# > 1 . This sets him up on a long-run higher consumption path ct = yt + ! " 1 , withsavings-financed investment every year.
We model access to the credit market as the ability to borrow one unit of startup capital and toreceive the benefits of investment immediately (this is in contrast with the one year delay necessary forsavings to generate enough resources for a productive investment). In this formalization, a time unit
corresponds to the terms of the loan, which typically is 1 to 3 years in the context we are studying. For
many microfinance loans, this time is often even shorter at 4-6 months. Tomorrow’s self will pay back that4

For a theoretical model specifically focused on the question of how reminders to save drive behavior, see Karlan etal., 2010.
5
To see the time inconsistency, note that the MRS between t+1 and t+2 evaluated at time t is u ! ( ct +1 ) " u ! ( ct +2 ) but
the MRS between the same two periods from the perspective of the decision maker at time t+1 is

u ! ( ct+1 ) "# u ! ( ct+2 ) .

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one unit of capital plus r, the interest rate.6

Consumption today is ct = yt + ! , while consumption

tomorrow is ct +1 = yt +1 ! (1 + r ) . An individual will find it beneficial to take a loan today if 1 + r <!
.
"#Credit generates a benefit by allowing the individual to shift profit forward relative to the time at which thegood is ‘saved’ for, but does so at the cost of the interest rate when the loan is eventually paid back.
Applying the same logic year after year, the long run consumption path with borrowing each year is
ct +! = yt +! # (1 + r ) + " .

The decision to save, therefore, is driven by !"# , while the decision to borrow is driven by!
$ r . This says that short-sightedness discourages savings and encourages debt, and profit increases"#
them both. To summarize, utility under the different choices are:Autarky :Saving:Borrowing :+ % !" # yt+#

U ta = yt+ !" yt+1

U ts = yt & 1+ !" yt+1 + ' & 1

U tb = yt + '+ !" yt+1 & 1+ r + '

(

(

(

# $2

(1)

)

+ % !" # yt+# + ' & 1) )+ % !" # yt+# & 1+ r + '

# $2

# $2

(

(

(

)

(2)

) )

(3)

Which individual chooses which path depends on the discount factors that shape the perception oftime, !" between now and tomorrow, and ! between any two future years. Areas where savings andborrowing are superior to autarky are defined by values of !" relative to

1!
and. The solution is!
1+ rillustrated in Figure 1, panel a, for the case when ! 2 " 1 + r , or profits are relatively low.7 The optimal
choice is defined by three horizontal bands, with borrowing for !" <1#
, savings for !" > , and1+ r#autarky between the two values.
It is important to recall that these choices are critically determined by the weight of short-term
considerations. In the long-term, the saving-investment path allows for sustainable higher consumption
than the debt driven path by the amount of the interest rate (or more generally by the difference between the
borrowing and the deposit interest rates). Savings-driven investment would therefore always be preferredover the long run. As clearly shown by the comparison of expressions (2) and (3), this long-term benefit ofsavings is balanced by a large difference in the very first period only, whereby borrowers can start
6

This formulation, in which the consumption increase from investment is realized now, permits both entrepreneurialand consumption-driven motivations in borrowing.
7
When profits are high, ! 2 " 1 + r , both borrowing and saving become more attractive and there is no area of1!
autarky. There is a large area in which both savings and borrowing are superior to autarky, when.
< "# <!
1+ r
Comparing both options shows that borrowing is preferred when !" #$ +1
(1 % " ) . In this text, we only develop thermore likely case of ! 2 " 1 + r , although introduction of commitment savings done further gives similar results for thehigh profitability case-7-

consuming at a high level while savers have to reduce their consumption. This initial difference is a criticaldriver of the behavior of the impatient and the hyperbolic.
2.2. Introducing commitment savings
A commitment savings plan can permit a time-inconsistent individual to consume in the first
period but start saving in the second. We now examine whether introduction of commitment could be usedby some individuals to switch from a borrowing to a savings regime, and if so whether it would make sense
to save and borrow simultaneously during this transition.
Commitment savings products can allow sophisticated, time-inconsistent individuals for whom!" <1
< " to switch from the non-investment consumption path ct = yt to the investment path#ct +! = yt +! + (" # 1) , after one period in which consumption is ct +1 = yt +1 ! 1 . Utility with commitment

savings is:
Commitment savings :U tcs = yt + "# ( yt +1 & 1) + ' "# ! ( yt +! + $ & 1)

(4)

! %2

In a situation where individuals could a priori choose between saving now, commit to save in the
future, or invest as alternative strategies, commitment savings is preferred to autarky when !" <

1
<" ,
#

$ 1
%
r
and preferred to borrowing when '+ 1( (1 & ! ) < . This is represented by the area above the curve AB#) "!
*on Figure 1, panel b. This mapping in the parameter space completely defined the optimal choice in asituation where individuals have to choose either one of these financial instruments, but not two. One canread the optimal choice for a given time inconsistency ! along the diagonal of slope ! . Individuals withmoderate time inconsistency (high value of ! ) will choose to borrow if very impatient, stay in autarky ifless impatient, take commitment savings if somewhat patient, and immediate savings if most patient.
Individuals with stronger time inconsistency (low value of ! ) may never choose autarky or immediatesavings, and only move from borrowing to commitment savings.
Consider now the case of an individual who is on a borrowing path. As a saving commitment
instrument is made available, he can contemplate switching to savings. This entails starting to save inperiod t + 1 . Note that if borrowing was profitable to start with ( "# <!
), the individual will prefer to1+ rborrow in year t and t + 1 even as he starts to save. The utility associated with this additional path that
includes borrowing in period t and t + 1 while starting to save in period t + 1 is therefore:

Commitment savings with borrowing
U tcsb = yt + " + #$ (yt +1 & (1 + r ) + " & 1)+ #$ 2 (yt + 2 & (1 + r ) + " & 1)+ ' #$ ! ( yt +! + " & 1) (5)
! %3

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Comparing U tcsb with U tb shows that switching from a borrowing path to a saving path is optimal when

! 2 (1 + r ) > 1 . This is represented in Figure 1, panel c, by the area ABEF.
In conclusion, commitment savings offer a powerful tool for individuals to transition from a debt
financed investment path to a savings financed investment path if they are time-inconsistent but willing tosave in the future. Maintaining borrowing while transitioning to accumulating savings to invest is superior
to having to endure a period without investment in the transition. It also increases the range of individualthat would be willing to transition.
In the model, we assumed that one loan period’s commitment savings allow the project to be fully
financed in the next period. The linearization of marginal utility made it easier for an individual todecrease consumption a great deal today by repaying debt and saving at the same time. In reality, ourresults will show that the average balance achieved by savers is only about 2-5% of the amount of the loan,and so the commitment question appears to call for less sacrifice but a longer period of accumulation thanprovided for in our model. While the linearization of utility makes this sacrifice easier, a concave utility
function would mean that the willingness to sign on to commitment savings would be highest when one has
the most money in one’s pocket. Even in this case, then, it can make sense to market commitment savingsat the time of disbursement of loans from a dynamic targeting perspective. This model thus makes a point
new to the literature, which is that while commitment savings products allow a set of individuals to escapedebt financing, the simultaneous provision of debt and commitment savings can be more effective yet.
Those currently taking a loan are consequently a natural sample in which to test this hypothesis. This iswhat motivates the CHN experiment.
2.3. Role of self-commitment.
We now consider explicitly the fact that while borrowers have committed to save a given amount,
there is in fact no penalty for them failing to do so. This type of self-commitment has been explored in theliterature on goal-setting (Harding and Hsiaw, 2011) and reference points (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979);
evidence to date shows that equilibrium decisions can be altered by framing a self-commitment around a
specific objective for a behavior. We model the role of self-commitment by positing a utility cost κ that isincurred by agents if they fail to undertake a plan that they had committed to. An agent who has committed
to save tomorrow will only follow through if tomorrow’s penalty for breaking the self-commitment is large
enough to overcome the benefits of current consumption, or if κ > 1 − βδπ . This indicates that theparameter space for successful self-commitment savers is thus reduced to those for whom

1− κ

π

< βδ <1π<δ .

Figure 1, panel d, shows the effect of self-commitment on equilibrium outcomes. As the penalty
for breaking the self-commitment rises to be as large as the benefit of current consumption (e.g. κ = 1 ) thenself-commitment will be just as effective as full commitment. The evidence from our sample of borrowers
makes it clear that self-commitment is both demanded and effective among borrowers, and so we represent-9-the case whereπ
1+ rable to self-commit.

>

1− κ

π

, meaning that some of those who previously chose borrowing will now prove

We see that those who were the closest to being able to save without commitment

will be most able to save with self-commitment, but that those individuals who most ‘need’ commitment(in the sense that they are high δ and low β types) may be unable to self-commit if κ is small. These
individuals will be unable to benefit from self-commitment precisely because the utility benefits from
reneging are so high.
This set of individuals who desire but fail to self-commit suggests an interesting redefinition of thenature of ‘sophistication’ or ‘naiveté’ of potential savers when we consider soft commitment savings
products. Do borrowers properly understand the limits to their own ability to self-commit? If they
understand them, we would expect to see the lower rectangle in Figure 1, panel d, manifest itself through alack of demand for the savings product. A sophisticated individual who sees that a self-commitment
product will not work will simply not demand it. If, on the other hand, individuals are naïve as to their own
ability to self-commit, then we are likely to see uptake of the product (in the sense that these naïve selfcommitters elect to open an account when offered the chance to do so) but that they then prove unable toaccumulate savings in the face of their own inability to self-commit. We return to this theme in the results
section.
2.4. Role of a default option in decision making
The second treatment arm in our study is the ‘Default’ treatment, under which clients are opted
into the savings account rather than having the implicit default option be that they are not prompted to save.
In the Default Treatment product, an amount of 10% of the loan payment is offered as the default option.
This focus on the role of the default option is motivated by Samuelson and Zeckhauser’s (1988) concept of‘status quo bias’, and by several recent empirical papers demonstrating surprisingly large effects of opting
into savings-based financial services. Madrian and Shea (2001) and Beshears et al. (2008) examine theeffects of a switch to automatic enrolment in 401(k) plans for employees of large US firms and find thatboth enrolment and contribution amounts are strongly driven by the defaults provided by employers.
Beshears et al. (2010) show that reducing a complex choice of a retirement savings plan into a binary
choice between the status quo and the pre-selected alternative dramatically increases participation. Tversky
and Shafir (1992) and Dhar and Nowlis (1999) find that a procrastination effect becomes more common as
the choice set expands, contrary to the principle of value maximization. Hence our Default Treatment, by
providing a yes/no decision over both savings and the savings amount, may ease the decision to begin
saving.88

In a related argument, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) motivate status-quo behavior as being driven by the intersectionof procrastination and incorrect expectations about future behavior. Because taking a decision involves some pain thatcan be deferred to tomorrow, hyperbolic individuals (particularly naïve ones) will put off deciding. By changing theaction that will be taken if an agent procrastinates in deciding what to do, we can have powerful effects on observed
outcomes.

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The potential effectiveness of the Default treatment can be motivated via a cognitive cost incurredin altering the savings choice away from the option provided by the bank (the material or time costs to thisaction are virtually nil, consisting merely of indicating on the saving form that the amount is different from
10% of the loan). Whereas previously a savings amount of 10% of the loan would have been chosen only
if this was the superior option, under the default treatment it will be chosen unless the utility difference
between the 10% and the next-best option exceeds the cognitive cost of switching. Our experiment
provides relatively rich information as to the existence of this cognitive cost of re-optimization and its
relationship to the role of self-commitment in savings. If clients are induced to agree to the 10% rule due tothe influence of default options but self-commitment is ineffective, then the Default treatment will see highuptake but no appreciable increase in savings.

If the default option has no influence but the self-commitment is effective, then we will see uptake rates, commitment savings targets, and actual savings
amounts that are similar to the Open treatment. If both the default option and self-commitment are
effective, then both uptake rates and final savings will be increased in this arm relative to the Open
treatment. Our data make it clear that this latter case prevails; both self-commitment and default options
appear to be important drivers of the savings behavior in our sample.
Given the behavioral flavor of the interventions studied here, it is important to highlight analternate explanation for the potential effectiveness of default options; namely the endorsement effectproposed by Madrian and Shea (2001). According to this channel, individuals interpret the default as aform of advice coming from a knowledgeable party. In our case this explanation may be particularly
pertinent; forced savings of 10% of the loan payment are not uncommon in microfinance, nor is the use ofcurrent savings balances to determine the size of future loans. Hence it is possible that the Default
Treatment affects decision making not because of the creation of a reference point at 10% savings, but
because it provides new information and hence influences clients’ sense of what is optimal. Under this
explanation it is not the ease of deciding aspect of the default product that would drive behavior but theframing of the ‘correct’ amount at around 10%. This endorsement effect may not be considered purely
behavioral insofar as it reflects the transmission of information rather than an instrument for self-control.
While we will not be able to disentangle these two mechanisms using the Default Treatment, ourexperiment reveals an unusually pure set of behavioral impacts. This is because, under the 10% default
savings, there is in fact no automated transfer of money as would be the case for the 401(k) plans studied in
the literature. Rather the borrower is prompted to make a voluntary deposit. Hence, even under the‘default’, real action is still required for the agent to save. This is an important difference in helping achieve
discipline in savings between the formal sector (where savings can be automatically deducted from wage
payments) and the informal sector (where savings must be decidedly added to interest payments). What iscommon between the two is the strict periodicity of wage and loan payments that serve as a disciplinary
deadline for the savings commitments made. Finding such deadlines is more difficult in the informal sector
where self-employment prevails than in the formal sector where wage-employment is the norm

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3. The experiment and research design
3.1. The Experiment
We conducted our experiment with CHN, which currently offers a full range of financial products
including mortgage credits, business loans, insurance, and microfinance lending. The microfinancedepartment was opened in August 2006, and was growing quickly prior to the experiment initiation in July
2008. In the first half of 2008, CHN increased its microcredit client base by 67% to 9,000 and its
microcredit portfolio by 74% to Q122 million ($15.3 million). During those six months, CHN opened new
branches and added microfinance services to existing branches. Still, microcredit represented only 14% of
total lending.
Within CHN, microfinance is generally defined as an individual loan below $3,125. Nearly all of
CHN’s microfinance loans are individual loans with constant monthly payments. Group loans, loans with
uneven payments, or payments timed to the harvest season represent less than 10% of outstanding loans
and were excluded from the experiment and analysis. Loan terms are exceptionally long relative to
microcredit standards, with about 50% of them at 36 months, 30% at 24 months, and the rest at 12 and 18
months. Because the microfinance department was relatively new and repayment periods long, mostclients were not returning clients. Interest rates varied from 20 to 35%, with most loans offered at 26%.
CHN charges interest on a declining balance basis, and clients are allowed to pay their loan faster andearlier than the terms without penalty, giving them full control over their indebtedness.

CHN’sadministrative records indicate that 85% of loans were made for small business use and about 10% forhousing (repair, improvement, or financing), although this is not necessarily meaningful as money isfungible. At the beginning of the experiment, in July 2008, CHN was experiencing portfolio repayment
challenges. Nearly 28% of capital was more than 30 days behind, up from 20% at the start of the year.
Having set out to build commitment-like savings products, a bank could promote them by trying
to locate individuals wanting to save and then using a set of reminders and prompts to encourage them tostick to this chosen path. This relationship requires that the bank and its clients be able to communicate andtransact small amounts regularly, making per-transaction costs a central concern. The lending practices of
CHN provide an opportunity to forge this relationship, because the institution combines regular monthly
repayment periodicity with unusually long-term individual loans. Thus marketing the product to current
borrowers provides the transactional framework in which to offer a commercial savings product with two
features: an initial option to self commit and subsequent monthly savings reminders to reinforce the savings
decision. The CHN microfinance setup thus allows to link a commitment-type savings product with a longterm microfinance loan repaid monthly over 1 to 3 year periods. The possibility of adding a savings
reminder at negligible additional cost to either the client or the bank engenders a sustainable savings
relationship between borrowers and the bank. While CHN fits this situation, traditional microfinanceinstitutions offering group lending with short loan terms may not.
In the initial research design, CHN branches were to be randomly assigned one of the three
products and then offered that product for approximately three months before switching to another product.
- 12 -

This design would have created multiple cohorts for comparison and allowed a difference-in-difference
analysis. The experiment started mid-July 2008, with expectation of the first product rotation by midOctober 2008. From July 15th through the end of August, the portfolio continued to grow at the recent
average pace of about 250-350 new loans every two weeks.

In September however, the international

financial crisis hit the banking sector in Guatemala. New loan activity declined 65% due to liquidity
scarcity (and management concerns about the deteriorating microfinance portfolio performance).9 The
lending program was essentially closed in the first week of October 2008 in which CHN only disbursed 75
loans. By March 2009, microcredit lending had not recovered at a sufficient rate to justify revitalizing theexperimental design. Our experiment was therefore de-facto truncated. Yet, the initial randomization andtwo and a half months of active lending give us enough observations for a single difference estimation of
the impact of these products. In this paper, we therefore analyze the product acceptance rates and savings
behavior of this cohort of 1,375 borrowers taking loans between July 15, 2008 and March 2009, althoughmost of the experimental loans were disbursed by the end of September 2008.
3.2. The savings products
The three financial products (Basic Savings, Open Treatment, and Default Treatment) wererandomized across the 20 microfinance branches of CHN, stratified on baseline number of clients.10
Starting on July 15, 2008, all microcredit clients applying for a new loan were offered the savings accountassigned to their branch. The savings accounts were promoted by the loan officer during the loan
application meeting, which generally occurred one to two weeks prior to loan disbursement.11 The loan
officers used a color brochure to promote the benefits of savings, as well as explain the rules of the savings
account: the savings would earn 4% interest12, savings were not collateralized (could not be held or seized
if the loan is in default13), savings could be added to and withdrawn in part or in full at any time, and theloan approval was not contingent on acceptance of the savings product. Although there was no establishedminimum balance, clients must maintain a nominal balance of at least 1Q (12.5 US¢) to prevent accountclosure as part of Guatemala’s anti-money laundering laws. In short, there are effectively no restrictions on
the account. Additionally, we developed a one-page signature form asking clients if they understood thesavings product and if they agreed to accept the product. Due to banking laws, the savings account could
not be opened automatically, but required the client to complete separate forms, deliver them to the cashier,and wait a short period for approval. Although most clients were new to CHN, some already had savings

9

Lending standards were not changed during September, so clients are still comparable to August and July.
This was done by ranking the 20 branches by increasing size, randomly drawing the treatment of the smallest branch
and then applying the next treatment to the following branch until one reaches them all, where treatments are taken in
the order Basic, Open, Default .
11
Agencies generally disburse funds on one day, about every two weeks.
12
Prior to the month this experiment began, savings accounts earned 1.5% interest.
13
The savings and credit operations have always been quite separate within CHN, not even sharing client
identifications, which meant that CHN credibly never seized or even put pressure on clients’ savings when loans werein difficulty.
10- 13 -

accounts and were allowed to use those accounts. The pre-existing accounts took on the rules of the project
accounts.
The Basic Savings group was offered this savings product with no option to select an amount to bedeposited and no reminders. Savings could still be induced by this offer as it conveys the recommendationof the Bank to save and provides this one time incentive through elimination of transactions cost andincrease in the interest rate on deposits.
In the Open Treatment group, the loan officer gave borrowers the opportunity to opt-in to thesavings reminders, by choosing an amount they self-commit to save monthly. They could have chosen any
absolute monetary amount including 0. To accept the product, borrowers signed a form that included boththe amount of desired monthly savings and the number of months they will be reminded. When the
borrowers made their monthly loan payment, the cashier asked them if they would like to save their chosen
amount.
In the Default Treatment group, borrowers were told that unless they chose otherwise (opt-out), a
default savings level was set at 10% of their monthly loan payment. Clients could opt-out by choosing alower savings level, including zero. The signature form clearly stated the proposed savings amount (e.g.,
10% times Q290 loan payment = Q29 savings) and number of months. Like in the other options, savers
had to open their savings account separately. Borrowers that had selected a non-zero level of savings were
reminded to save each time they paid a loan installment. All other rules governing the account wereidentical to the Basic Savings product. The treatment, therefore, is just a framing exercise around a higher
monthly payment than just loan repayment. This framing is reinforced by the bank’s network of tellers,
who view a prompt screen as they receive the loan payment that includes the payment amount and thechosen savings amount broken out separately. Note that the tellers are not the credit agent, and that credit
agents are not responsible or even informed of the savings balance of their clients. This comes from adivision between savings and credit activities within the bank.
What the Default Treatment carries in addition to the Open Treatment is a focal point for thesavings decision. There is no difference in effort, time, or cost in choosing a savings level under the
Default and Open Treatments. Procrastination theory however applies to the extent that it saves on theneed to figure out how much to save, and hence makes it an easier decision. The “endorsement effect”
theory suggests that clients assume that this is a sort of advice from an institution that has higher
understanding or knowledge of what the optimal rate of savings should be. This is not necessarily an
irrational assumption given the low financial literacy of these clients.
Because the offering of savings products necessarily includes the promotion of savings, the Basic
Savings treatment was designed to capture the savings promotion effect, and allows us to isolate theplanning and reminder effect by using it as a control group.

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3.3. Data
CHN provided administrative data on its lending activities in the form of bimonthly portfolio
reports. These data provide the original terms of the loan, the issuing officer and branch, the number andamount of missed payments, the amount of interest and capital arrears, and remaining outstanding capital.
By identifying when the loan dropped out of the report, we pinpoint when the loan was closed within a 2weeks window. Separate information on renegotiated loans, starting in December 2008, distinguishes themfrom loans opened by clients without a preceding, defaulted loan.
Branches provided additional information on the exact loan payment amount including insurance
services, the loan’s intended use, the day on which the monthly payment is due, and the client’s gender andage.
On the savings side, we have information on all movements for the period April 2008 to
September 29, 2011, as well as balance of the accounts as of that final date. CHN produced a special reportlinking the savings account numbers to their owner’s loan number. We netted out the within day
transactions, and thus reconstructed the exact day-to-day running balance on each account. While there isnothing in these movements identifying which ones correspond to “planned deposits” as opposed to any
other use of the savings account, we will attempt at analyzing the effect of the treatments on deposit
behavior by not counting the very small deposits that correspond to interest payments.

However,comparison of the net balances includes all deposits and withdrawals.
There was no specific microfinance savings product prior to introduction of this experiment, andeven though some savings account certainly were owned by microcredit clients, there is no possibility to
distinguish them in the CHN information system. This is because the credit and savings data systems weremaintained separately, with no numerical customer ID link until August 2008 when CHN implemented a
new information system. We therefore cannot easily trace the effect of the savings promotion on the timeseries evolution of savings activities, nor can we compare deposits and withdrawal behaviors under thesenew products with the behavior of clients that used savings accounts even when they were not promoted.
3.4 Randomization tests
We verify the quality of the randomization in Table 1. These tests of equality of means are donein a regression framework, allowing for clustering standard errors at the branch level:
xib = ! 0 + !1Ob + ! 2 Db + " ibwhere xib is a characteristic of account i in branch b, Ob a dummy for the Open Treatment branches, Db adummy for the Default Treatment branches, and ! ib an idiosyncratic element clustered at the branch level.
We consider the 2,237 microfinance loans extended in the pre-experiment period, over the period
March to mid July 2008. We observe no statistical differences across the treatment arms on loan size,
terms, purpose, or delinquency level, nor on borrower gender and age (Table 1, panel A).
Ideally we would like to compare savings behavior among microfinance borrowers prior to theexperiment. However, as mentioned above, there is no way to identify savings accounts that correspond to- 15 -

microfinance borrowers in the pre-experiment period. When the experiment took place, however, about
10% of the clients already had a savings account with CHN. For these clients, taking up the savings offer
consisted in linking their existing account to their new loan. We observe the savings account balance at thetime of their new loan. For the purpose of this randomization test, we select the savings accounts more
likely to be similar to microfinance savings on the basis of their average balance. We restrict the sample ofpre-experiment CHN savings accounts to the 3,526 accounts with average balance over the pre-experimentperiod below the maximum of the distribution of balances of identified microfinance savings (some ofwhich will not belong to microfinance clients), and compare the activity recorded in these accounts over the
pre-experiment period in terms of number and average size of deposits and withdrawals. Panel B of Table
1 shows no significant differences in the level of activities of these savings accounts across treatment arms.
We then turn to the 1,375 new micro-finance loans extended after July 15, 2008 and that are theobject of the savings experiment. Since the treatments are not expected to have any effect on loan taking,we can compare borrower and loan characteristics. Comparisons across treatments are reported in Panel Cof Table 1. We observe no difference on the gender of the borrower and whether s/he has taken a loan with
CHN or had a savings account before the experiment, nor on loan size, terms, purpose, or delinquency
level. Finally, we utilize data from the 2002 Guatemalan census, in which the smallest geographic unit
‘department’ (or county) can be used to examine the population attributes of the residents in the vicinity ofeach branch. Panel D of Table 1 shows these comparisons; we detect some imbalances on the population
and rural share of these counties, arising from the fact that one of the branches in the Default treatment is in
the capital city and hence has a population an order of magnitude higher than the other areas. In reality thebranches of CHN are all located in urban areas and serve a predominantly urban population even in small
towns, and so in the remainder of Panel D we examine the cross-department balance using urban residents
only, and find the treatment arms to be very similar. Hence, despite the small number of randomization
units, microfinance borrowers are comparable across treatment arms in their credit and pre-treatment
saving behavior. This validates the use of simple differences to measure the impact of the treatments.
4. Comparison of savings behavior across treatments
4.1. Uptake and commitment amounts
We define uptake as opening of a new savings account or linking a pre-existing account to a newloan. Table 2 reports the average uptake across treatment groups.14 In the Basic Savings branches, 40.4%of the clients chose to open a savings account. Uptake is substantially higher by an additional 36.8% in the
Default Treatment branches, but not so in the Open Treatment branches. This result is robust to considering
the period of intense lending activity until October 2008 (col. 2) or to adding controls for the loan

14

Because of the small number of units over which the randomization was conducted, we use the ‘wild bootstrap’suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) to estimate standard errors (‘cgmwildboot’ in Stata). This results in
SEs that are larger than those generated either by normal ‘sandwich’ clustered regression, or by adjusting the SEs usinga T-distribution with 17 degrees of freedom.

- 16 -

characteristics (col. 3).15 Restricting to clients that did not have any existing savings account, uptake islower in Basic Savings branches, and impact even higher with the Default Treatment (col. 4), although notsignificantly more so than in col. 1.
So why is it that the Open Treatment did not induce some potential “sophisticated” individuals totake the opportunity of realizing the savings that they could not otherwise do, as expected from theory?
This is likely because the promotion to open a savings account was quite powerful. By offering to open asavings account with no fees and no obligation, a high interest rate on deposits, and de facto very little
transaction costs since the client was already doing business at the bank, time-inconsistent clients may haveopened an account whether they would in fact eventually make a deposit into it or not.16 As described in
Section 3.3 we cannot distinguish in the pre-program period the savings accounts that correspond to
microfinance borrowers, but the total number of new savings accounts being opened per day jumps from a
pre-program average of three to almost six on July 15 when the program begins. Hence it is in the use of
the account that we expect to see the planning and reminder effect. Column 5 indeed shows that only
13.9% in the control group ever made another deposit in their savings account, while 34.1% did so in theOpen Treatment, and 57% in the Default Treatment.
Why is uptake higher with the Default Treatment if anyone who ever intended or not to save could
be induced to open a savings account by the promotion package? The answer must lie in the only
difference between these two treatment arms, namely that clients must opt-in to the savings amount inOpen Treatment while they must opt-out of the default savings amount in Default Treatment. This isconsistent with non-zero cognitive costs to optimizing savings decisions. In the subsequent section we will
analyze whether this substantial difference in uptake translates into a meaningful difference in savings
rates, for which a meaningful ability to respect one’s self-commitment is necessary.
The Open Treatment was framed in monetary amounts, and hence very naturally clients plannedsavings amounts in multiples of Guatemalan bills (10, 20, 50, and 100 Quetzales). The Default Treatment,by contrast, was framed in terms of percentage, and all clients that opened an account planned to save thesuggested 10%. The resulting commitment amounts are thus very distinct between the two arms, with theOpen arm taking almost exclusively even integer values and the Default arm mimicking the more
continuous distribution of loan amounts. On average, self-committed amounts were $4.79 in the Open
Treatment and substantially higher at $7.91 in the Default Treatment (Table 2, col. 6, showing theregression of commitment conditional on uptake in the treatment branches, with a coefficient on the
Default treatment significant at the 10% level).
4.2 Compliance with own commitment

15

The results from this table as well as all those of Tables 4-7 are robust to adding individual controls (gender, age,whether the client had a prior loan with CHN, the purpose of the loan is housing, interest rate, loan term, and monthly
repayment), and the size of the branch.
16Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2011) show that small subsidies can greatly increase the demand for and use of savings
account in experiments done in Indonesia and in India- 17 -

Without any hard commitment device, the test of the efficacy of self-commitment revolves aroundwhether a planning and reminder treatment is sufficient to induce regular saving behavior in the amount one
has committed. The savings account bearers are still subject to the same difficult short-term decision to save,whether they have or not self-committed to regular deposits, except for the reference savings plan they gavethemselves. In this section, we look at the level of compliance of the savers with their own commitment.
Conditional on uptake and commitment amounts, both Open and Default Treatments consist of the sameintervention, namely a reminder to save at a set reference level. Yet, commitment amounts are different andthe Open and Default savers may not be comparable because of differential selection into opening a savings
account. We therefore look at them separately.
A first striking element of this planning and reminder effect is the size of the deposits made relative tothe committed amounts (Figure 2). While there are indeed some deposits that do not correspond to any precommitted savings amount, fully 69% of the deposits in the Open Treatment and 82% of those in the Default
Treatment are within 25% of the committed amount.17 It is interesting to observe that an externally suggested
amount (the 10% default option) has a stronger suggestive power than the self-chosen amount. Could it be thathaving decided oneself on an amount, one is more aware of the arbitrariness of the committed amount andmore prone to succumb to the self-control problem? This would in particular be the case if the 10% default
acts as an endorsement effect.
Despite the fact that both uptake levels and commitment amounts differ greatly across the twotreatment arms, conformity to the commitment is very similar for Open and Default Treatments savers. Table
3 provides tests of equality between the Open and Default arms, and begins by confirming how much larger
both uptake and commitment amounts were in the Default arm (both significant at the 1% level). Rows 2-7 ofthis table consider only those who elected to save. This group is endogenously selected but, if anything, istipped against finding superior outcomes in the Default arm since this treatment induced an additional half ofthe sample to open a savings account. We might expect these individuals to have a lower propensity to save.
Row 3 illustrates that, conditional on uptake, compliance with the commitment amount was virtually identicalbetween the two arms. Row 4 illustrates that, as a result, the difference in commitment amounts translates
directly into differences in median cumulated deposits.18 In rows 5-7 we show that compliance with thecommitment is similar for each loan maturity, and that those taking 12 or 18 month loans fell short of theircumulative savings goal by only 33-44%, whereas those taking longer term loans typically accumulated lessthan half of the originally committed amount. Figure 3 shows that this non-compliance has a strong time
signature illustrating that, while the fraction of savers making a deposit starts at very close to 100%(particularly in the Default arm), this rate decays rapidly. As of the third month, only 40% of the treatedsavings account bearers make a deposit (except for the 12-18 months loans in the default treatment). And thisshare further declines to 20% by one year into the loan. Figure 3 also reports the percentage of control saversthat make a deposit each month as an indication of behavior without a plan and reminders. Note that these17

Excluding the initial deposit at the opening of the savings account.
We use median tests for the distribution of cumulated deposits because the presence of certain very large deposits
and withdrawals generates substantial skewness in this variable.
18- 18 -

comparisons are only descriptive because selection into opening a savings account varies across treatment
arms. We do a proper estimation of causal impact on deposit behavior in the next section.
In conclusion, while uptake and commitment amounts differ strongly, compliance conditional oncommitment is very similar across the two treatments. CHN microfinance borrowers typically deposit inamounts close to what they have committed, even when this amount was suggested to them as in the Default
treatment. But the regularity of deposits faded rapidly, suggesting limits to the salience of self-commitment.
Over the entire loan term, savers deposited about half of what they had committed to.
4.3. Deposit and withdrawal behavior
In this section, we look at the intention to treat impact of the treatments on deposit and withdrawal
behavior. Most of these results are readily understood from the two components of uptake and behavior
conditional on uptake analyzed in the previous two sections. Uptake and commitments are higher in the
Default Treatment, but conditional deposit behavior is the same in the two treatments. As seen in panel A of
Table 4, the treatment effect on the number of deposits is large. While borrowers in the Basic Savings arm
make on average 0.78 deposits during the 3 years of the observations, those in Open and Default treatments
make 2.57 and 5.36 more deposits, respectively. These differences carry through when examined by loan term(col. 2 to 4). These aggregate numbers include borrowers that have ceased to take loans, others that haverenewed their contract with a new loan and continued commitment to savings, etc.
As seen in panel B, almost all deposits were made during the period of the loan. Panel C shows thatwhile borrowers in Default Treatment made more deposits, they also withdrew more often, especially thosethat had long 24 or 36-month loans.
Of the 1375 borrowers in the experiment, 974 have paid off the initial loan taken during theexperiment (panel D). The remaining 401 loans are in arrears, most of them 36-month loans that withexpected end in August 2011 or later. Of these 974 borrowers who completed their loans in good standing,
11.4% have made at least one deposit after having paid off their loan. This is 6.4% in the basic savings arm,
increasing to 12.1% and 15.6% for the Open and the Default Treatments, respectively. The point estimates of
the treatment effects are large, and particularly for long-term loans the fraction of clients making subsequentdeposits is more than four times as high in the treatment arms as it is in the control. While we lack thestatistical evidence to make definitive statements, these results suggest that self-commitment savings haveeffects that last beyond the initial loan term.
4.4 Savings accumulation
While savers largely meet their commitments with regular deposits, the ultimate ability of CHN
clients to accumulate meaningful savings will depend on a combination of uptake, deposit behavior, and thefrequency of withdrawals. We now look at the pattern of accumulation of savings and how it was affected by
the treatments. Using the information on all transactions, we construct the day-by-day balance on all savings- 19 -

accounts, starting from the day borrowers received their loan.19 Averages by treatment are represented inTable 5 and Figures 4 & 5. Because the treatments were linked to a loan, we separate the loans by the lengthof their term.
The pattern of savings of the 12 to 18 month borrowers in Figure 4 shows a sharp accumulation under
the Default Treatment, which is suddenly canceled at the end of the loan. Upon further investigation, thiscorresponds to the savings and withdrawal pattern of loans not renewed. The pattern of savings accumulationof the 24-month borrowers on the right panel shows a similar pattern, with a large decline after the term of theloans to reach the level of accumulation under the Open treatment. As for the 36-months borrowers, most ofthem had their expected loan closing time just before our last observation of September 2011. There is no
sharp decline to be observed yet. Despite these observed declines around the end of the loan term, thetreatment has a clear impact of savings accumulation. At the end of the 3 years of observations, borrowers
from the treatment groups accumulated $10-20, while the borrowers from the Basic savings group have no realsavings. Figure 5 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function of final savings balances across the three arms
(the figure is truncated at $150 on the x-axis for clarity of viewing). The stochastic dominance of the treatment
arms is visually clear, and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the similarity of any two of these distributions at
the 1% level.
While these individual-level non-parametric tests of the similarity of distributions indicate very large
treatment effects on final savings balances, when we attempt to account for the design effect in the
randomization we are confronted with twin estimation issues. First, the small number of clusters in this study(the 20 branches over which the randomization was conducted) generate a low-powered test when we properly
account for the design effect. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) illustrate that the usual ‘sandwich’estimator is likely to under-estimate standard errors with so few clusters. Secondly, we have a dependent
variable which is strongly skewed: the median savings balance in all three treatment arms is zero, but somevery large balances exist, creating a highly heteroskedastic variable with correspondingly large standard errors.
We deal with this pair of issues in two separate ways. First, we can use the ‘wild bootstrap’ estimator for
standard errors, eliminating the small-cluster bias that might otherwise cause us to over-reject. Secondly, we
can simply calculate cluster-level means and analyze the experiment with 20 observations. For the simple
intention-to-treat effect, these two methods provide almost exactly comparable point estimates, because we use
no individual-level covariates. The standard errors are actually slightly smaller when analyzed at the cluster
level, presumably because the distribution of average savings balances is quite normal while the distribution ofindividual savings balances is highly skewed.
This is presented in a regression framework in Table 5, where we estimate the overall (intention totreat) impact of the treatments on the accumulated savings at the expected term date of each loan. Borrowers
from the Basic Savings arm have accumulated just over $4, while borrowers from the Open and Default
Treatments have accumulated $15.6 and $25.7. This pattern is similar across loan terms. Point estimate are

19

These balances reflect not only the deposits and withdrawal initiated by the savers that we analyze in the previous
section, but interest payments, penalty, fees, and any other adjustments.

- 20 -

large but so are standard errors, and so despite these very large effects, only some of the Default Treatment
savings are significantly different from the Basic Savings. Panel B of Table 5 repeats the analysis presented inPanel A, but conducts the analysis at the branch level rather than the individual level.
Panel C uses branch-level analysis to show accumulated savings at loan term conditional on uptake ofthe savings account to average $10.1, $35.1, and $33.3, in the Basic Savings, Open Treatment, and Default
Treatment, respectively. Both treatment effects are significantly different from zero, but all point estimatesremain small in comparison with loan sizes. Remember, however, that the experiment took place in a periodof financial turmoil that was not favorable to savings overall. It is also important to remember that savings
accumulation is not the only benefit of having a savings account. The ability to withdraw small amounts whenneeded would bring substantial welfare if savers can avoid using a moneylender, forgoing a purchase
opportunity, or being penalized for missing a monthly loan payment. Unfortunately, we do not observe thisbroader set of behaviors and hence cannot document any such benefits.20 However, Figure 6 provides
suggestive evidence, illustrating that while the overwhelming majority of savings deposits take place within a
day of the intended loan repayment date, the timing of withdrawals is almost perfectly uniform over time. This
trajectory is consistent with the fact that the soft commitments are helping clients to save, and that withdrawals
are being used to smooth out a set of other shocks whose incidence is unrelated to the timing of loan payments.
Certainly, the Default Treatment savers have made many more transactions on their accounts than the Open
Treatment or the Basic savers.
These results broadly conform to the theoretical predictions presented in Section 2. The demand forthis form of soft commitment is strong, its use has induced an increase in savings, and the framing effects
surrounding the ‘default’ savings amount have strong impacts on the chosen commitment amounts.
Furthermore, savings balances tend to fall rapidly once the loan period has ended, suggesting that the
combination of frequent interaction with the bank plus reminders to save were necessary components in thegeneration of these savings balances.
4.5 Capital repayment and default
One obvious concern with this savings product is that, by making additional demands on theliquidity of borrowers, it may somehow damage their ability to repay loans. To make the same point fromthe perspective of the client, the product asks them to save at 4% interest when they are paying a 26%
interest on the loan. Is use of this savings product slowing down the rate at which their loans are being
repaid? If so, this could create a heavy interest cost on the client. Alternatively, it is possible that thepresence of liquid savings helps the borrower to smooth shocks and thus improves repayment performance.
To address this question, we examine loan repayment rates across the treatment arms, as well as
whether repayment correlates with the savings amounts. In looking at these results we emphasize that only
the treatment is randomized, and therefore variables like having opened a savings account or the savings
20

There is no pattern in the withdrawals of the Default Treatment savers that would suggest that they withdraw moneyfrom their accounts to meet their savings commitments or to pay their monthly dues, nor that they withdraw theircommitment deposits after having put them in.

- 21 -

rates are endogenous. If clients have extra money, they may choose to save more, repay their loan faster, or
both. The regression results in Table 6 show that clients do both. The capital repayment rate is measured
by the ratio of excess repayment of the principal as of the expected half-term and term dates. Problems
encountered by the Microfinance Department of CHN are illustrated by this result. In the control group,borrowers are on average behind their principal payment by 34.2% (col. 1). Note however that both
treatment groups are lagging much less in their repayments. Column 2 shows that clients with a higher
savings rate repay their loans faster. Column 3 shows that the improved repayment rates, notably under theOpen Treatment, all take place among the 24 and 36 months loans. Improved capital repayment as of the
expected term date under the treatments are smaller and not significant, but still equal to one third the basevalue.
Columns 5 to 8 show no increase in delinquency (defined as being at least 30 days behind
payments at half-term) or in the number of missed payments induced by the savings treatments, and anegative correlation between the amount saved and repayment problems.
The conjecture that inducing microfinance borrowers to save may delay their loan repayments or
jeopardize their abilities to make their monthly payments is not borne out by the experiment. Using theregularity of microfinance loan repayments as an opportunity to build the self-discipline to save in theinformal sector thus appears to be a “win-win” strategy for borrowing and saving.
4.6. Loan renewal and the use of balances when the loan cycle ends
Three years after the beginning of the experiment, most loans have reached their maturity date,although 401 loans, almost 30% of the experiment loans, are still outstanding. In this section, we examine
the probability of loan renewal for the clients whose loans have come to term as of late August 2011. By
that time, 856 loans had been paid off.21 Of these 161, or 18.8%, have been followed by another loan by
the time of our last observation, September 30, 2011. Results in Table 7, column 2, show no significant
difference across treatment arms, although point estimates show moderate positive effects of the twotreatments. We also show in column 3 that in fact clients with larger accumulation of savings before
closing their loans are more likely to renew it. This is true whether we use the savings balance relative tothe initial loan size (as reported), the accumulated savings balance itself, or even simply whether the client
had opened a saving account (results not reported). It does not seem though that saving accumulation is thetrue driver of non-renewal.

In column 4 we attempt to measure the causal effect of savings by

instrumenting for it with the treatment variables. Assuming that treatment had no effect on renewal except
through the induced accumulated savings, and hence the instruments are valid, we find no significant effectof accumulated savings on the probability to renew a loan.
Partitioning the sample by loan duration; we have 125 completed 12-month loans, 319 24-monthloans, and then a group of 328 36-month loans that had been paid off. Results on the probability of a newloan being taken after the closure of this initial loan is reported in Table 7, columns 5-7. For those small
21This does not include the 96 loans that have been renegotiated.

- 22 -

12-month loans, the Default Treatment decreases the probability of renewal, despite the fact that theiraccumulated savings is still only equal to 5% of their loan size (note that there are only 15 such loans in the
Basic Savings arm, and hence the results cannot be given too much weight). But for the majority of theloans, which are either 24 or 36 months long, we have the same result of no significant effect of thetreatment on renewal. Closed loans are of course a selected sample, since most of the loans that are not paid
off are in arrears. As a robustness check, we estimate in column 1 the probability of renewal for all loans
whose maturity date was at least one month before our last observation. Results are essentially the same,the treatments have no effect on renewal of loans.
In conclusion, while treatments induce higher level of savings, they have no effect on therelationship between the bank and its borrowers at the end of one loan cycle. Our theory predicts thatsophisticated hyperbolic borrowers should be using commitment as a way of escaping the debt-financed
equilibrium. Are these two in tension? Several things suggest that they may not be. First, one loan cycle
is obviously insufficient to build accumulating savings that can substitute for a loan, even if the clients had
met a 10% commitment. The accumulated savings (30 days before closing the loan) are 1.6% of the loan
size for all borrowers, 3.5% for the savers of the treated groups. It would take several cycles or a larger
saving rate to reach a point at which accumulated savings can substitute for a loan. Second, for thoseborrowers with the smallest loans and the greatest savings accumulation (12-18 month loans in the Default
Treatment) the relationship is in the hypothesized, negative direction. Finally, a large share of those who
took a second loan requested to have savings reminders on the subsequent loan when offered it, and these
uptake rates are strongly differential across treatment arms (only 29% for the control, versus 45% for theOpen and 65% for the Default treatment). This suggests that even for those borrowers that were not able totransition to self-financing after a single loan/savings cycle, there was a strong demand for savings
reminders during subsequent loans.
4.7. Heterogeneity of treatment effects
In this section we look for possible heterogeneous effects of the treatments along three
dimensions: gender of the client, whether this client has had a prior loan with CHN, and the loan amount.
We find no differential treatment effect by gender on openings of a savings account. In general womencommitted to lesser amount but not differentially across treatment arms. Women savers use their savings
account somewhat less, with fewer deposits and withdrawals, but at the end, their unconditional savings is
not different from that of men, nor differentially affected by the treatments.

Female repayment

performance on loans is overall somewhat worse than that of men, but the female/male repayment
differential is similar across treatment arms. In conclusion, women do have somewhat different savings
and repayment behavior, but they are not differentially affected by the treatments.
Of the 1375 experiment borrowers, 157 or 11.4% had a loan from CHN prior to the experiment,
and a quarter of them even had a savings account. While potentially quite different from new borrowers,- 23 -

they have no differential compliance conditional on uptake and reach the same accumulated savings as new
borrowers.
Finally, we found no heterogeneity of treatment effects by loan size in any of the dimensions wehave analyzed in this paper.
5. Savings mobilization
What is the potential value of these treatments in terms of savings mobilization for the institution?
Consider the savings balance of an account over the period of the loan. We compute the equivalentconstant savings balance b over the loan term as solution of:

B=b

1 − δ T +1 T
= ∑ bt δ t
1− δ
t =0

where bt is the savings balance on day t, B is the present value of the flow of balances bt , δ the daily
discount factor, and T the loan term. The daily discount factor δ = .961/365 is derived from the cost of thesefunds, i.e., an annual deposit rate of 4%. These average savings balances are reported in percentage of thetotal loan amount, by loan category in Table 8. Loans of typically $1,000 thus generate an equivalentsavings balance of $6-28 in the Basic Savings, $14-40 in the Open Treatment, and $16-48 in the Default
Treatment among savers (columns 2-4). With the reserve ratio of 15% that applies to commercial banks in
Guatemala, this provides the institution with funds for lending that can reach 8-24.8% of the loan amountunder the Default Treatment (columns 5-7).22
These balances should, however, be compared not to the loan amount but to the average
outstanding debt over the course of the loan, which is substantially lower than the loan amount. With
constant monthly payments and an interest rate of 26% over a declining capital balance, the average
outstanding debt is only 56.1% of the loan amount if the loan term is 12 months, and 57.3% if the loan termis 36 months (col. 1). Hence, on a 12-month loan of $1,000, the bank’s capital outlay is on average $561
while the generated savings allow additional lending of $248 with the Default Treatment, half of theoutstanding loan. These calculations are not ideal, as we lack long-term data on savings balances and theinterval over which we observe savings was a period of substantial economic tumult. They nonethelesssuggest that the bank would be able to leverage substantial additional lending capital with the savingsbalances generated by the treatment.
6. Conclusions
Despite a rapidly accumulating evidence base for the importance of commitment in savings, few
commercial banks have experimented with scalable, market-oriented products informed by behavioral
economics. We collaborated with the largest public bank in Guatemala to offer its microfinance clients the
22

Reserve ratio in 2005. Source: Competition Policies in Emerging Economies: Lessons and Challenges from Central
America and Mexico. Edited by Claudia Schatan and Eugenio Rivera. Springer/IDRC 2008.

- 24 -

opportunity of opening a savings account (Basic Savings) and of selecting two new types of savings
instruments (Open and Default Treatments). With the latter two, clients could plan to regularly deposit achosen amount in a savings account when paying the monthly due on their loan. They would be remindedof their self-commitment when they made their loan payments, but they had no obligation and would not be
penalized if they failed to deposit. In that sense, the product is no more than an exercise in planning withreminders. In the Open Treatment, clients had to choose the amount they wanted to deposit each month; inthe Default Treatment, the offer came with a default option of 10% of the monthly loan payment, butclients could change it to any amount they wanted, including 0. In both treatments and the control Basic
Savings, a promotion was offered to open a savings account with no fees, but no other conditions or
restrictions were imposed.
The results are striking, even if the experiment had to be discontinued earlier than desired with theadvent of the financial crisis. While the savings promotion was powerful in inducing clients to open asavings account (40% of them did so in the Basic Savings and Open Treatments), the Default Treatment
raised that number to almost 80%. The total number of deposits was quadrupled by the Open treatment andmultiplied by 6 by the Default treatment. 13.9% of the microfinance clients had an active savings accountin the Basic Savings promotion group, 34.1% in the Open Treatment, and 57% in the Default Treatment.
Deposits were most often within a small range of the committed amounts, despite the fact that uptake andcommitment amounts were both substantially higher in the Default arm than either the Open arm or thecontrol.
Activity in these savings accounts also shows numerous withdrawals, particularly in the Default
Treatment. After three years of observation, net accumulated savings is $4 in the Basic Savings group, $16
in the Open treatment and $26 in the Default treatment. Among those who opened a savings account,savings are $10 on average in the control and roughly $35 in both the Open and Default arms. On balance,
then, these results suggest that a widespread implementation of the 10% by Default Savings product islikely to lead to large increases in savings balances in the organization. A back-of-the-envelope estimate
indicates that universal implementation of the Default product would allow the bank to generate half of theliquidity required for short-term loans and 15% of the liquidity required for long-term loans through thissavings product alone. Further, we uncover no evidence that these larger savings balances in any way
damage loan repayment; if anything the reverse.
An alternate piece of evidence which is quite compelling in showing client satisfaction with this selfcommitment approach to savings is the re-uptake rate. Of the 162 subjects in the study that paid off their firstloan in good standing and then decided to take an additional loan, 48% chose to retain a commitment savings
product linked to their second loan. These percentages are strongly different across treatment and control(only 29% for the control, versus 45% for the Open and 65% for the Default treatment) and the re-uptake ratein the Default treatment is significantly higher than that in the Open treatment (t-statistic on difference = 2.08).
Compared to an initial uptake rate of 77% in the Default arm, this indicates that the large majority of thoseelecting to save the first time were sufficiently satisfied with the product to desire to use it again. Furthermore,- 25 -

the fact that the arm that saw the highest initial uptake and the most rapid accumulation of savings also sees thehighest re-uptake rate is inconsistent with the idea that clients felt coerced to save by the program, suggestingrather that this form of soft commitment helped them to achieve their own savings goals.
Overall, then, our results indicate that the use of these savings products has produced a ‘win-win’:borrowers use the prompting and framing to get closer to their desired savings trajectories, banks build local
liquidity out of which they can lend more safely than from capital acquired on the international market, and thepresence of these saving products speeds up loan repayment while slightly decreasing default. The frequent
withdrawals made from high-balance accounts suggest that the lack of true commitment is permitting clients to
use them to buffer against small shocks, which presumably improves welfare even relative to a true
commitment savings product. While our experiment took place during the onset of the financial crisis in
Guatemala and hence may reflect conditions unique to this circumstance, the product appears to be benefiting
both borrowers and the bank.
At a time when many credit-only microfinance lenders are undergoing the regulatory transformation
to be able to capture savings, there is a great deal of interest in how consumer-friendly, effective savings
products can be developed. While coercive savings practices such as the forced collateralization of savings
have justifiably come under criticism, a burgeoning empirical literature makes it clear that individuals are often
disappointed with their own ability to save. The products investigated in this paper suggest a way to resolve
this conundrum; generating substantial savings balances by revealing the clients who in fact desire to savewithout penalizing those who do not. Because they were offered to individuals already interacting with thebank, the products were very inexpensive to administer, requiring only one additional piece of paperwork at
the time of loan signing and the creation of a module in the bank’s computer system that indicates to tellers thesavings deposit they should prompt clients to make at the time of loan payment. We showed that thisapparently contradictory combination of high price credit and low reward savings can make sense from atheoretical point of view, and demonstrated empirically that savings are being generated in a way that is
directly complementary with both the speed and quality of loan repayment. Our research therefore provides apractical, cost-effective set of products that financial institutions can use to build local deposits while at thesame time fortifying the quality of their loan portfolio.

- 26 -

Table 1. Randomization tests
Basic Savings
Mean

Open Treatment
Test of equality
with Basic Savings
p-value
Mean

Mean

A. Pre-experiment loan activities
Female borrower
Loan purpose is housing
Loan size (US$)
Interest rate
Loan term (months)
Monthly payment (US$)
Delinquency (number of missed payments)
Number of observations

0.66
0.10
2,020
0.24
31.1
85.4
6.92
682

0.60
0.06
1,957
0.24
28.5
88.0
8.06
613

0.16
0.60
0.84
0.59
0.49
0.70
0.63

0.65
0.08
1,667
0.24
27.7
79.0
7.31
942

0.79
0.78
0.14
0.82
0.33
0.27
0.86

0.25
0.75
0.25
0.88
0.80
0.17
0.76

0.33
0.86
0.24
0.86
0.60
0.31
0.89

B. Pre-experiment savings account activities
Number of deposits
Number of withdrawals
Average deposit amount (US$)
Average withdrawal amount (US$)
Number of observations

1.34
1.83
188
151
1,148

1.54
2.10
182
177
1,179

0.43
0.52
0.72
0.33

1.64
2.45
171
162
1,199

0.42
0.11
0.25
0.57

0.83
0.49
0.36
0.55

0.54
0.24
0.42
0.60

0.74
35.3
0.157

0.67
36.4
0.121

0.37
0.08
0.51

0.71
36.9
0.149

0.58
0.17
0.89

0.51
0.63
0.66

0.66
0.11
0.79

0.012
0.06
1,675
0.25
30.3
75.6
527

0.037
0.06
1,690
0.26
27.7
80.6
379

0.36
0.89
0.95
0.21
0.37
0.50

0.020
0.10
1,478
0.25
25.4
77.0
469

0.39
0.54
0.16
0.98
0.10
0.86

0.54
0.43
0.41
0.23
0.53
0.73

0.51
0.72
0.36
0.37
0.22
0.79

71,659
0.35

0.99
0.01

188,329
0.45

0.29
0.04

0.31
0.34

0.48
0.02

0.90
0.67
0.12

0.82
0.81
0.63

0.90
0.64
0.14

0.66
0.70
0.25

0.84
0.54
0.52

0.91
0.82
0.50

0.83
0.93
3.00
6

0.22
0.78
0.74

0.82
0.96
2.97
7

0.23
0.30
0.86

0.94
0.20
0.87

0.37
0.39
0.95

C. Experiment borrowers / loans
Female borrower
Age of borrower
Borrower had a prior loan
Borrower had a savings account before theexperiment
Loan purpose is housing
Loan size (US$)
Interest rate
Loan term (months)
Monthly payment (US$)
Number of observations

D. Municipality characteristics (from 2002 census data)
Population
70,614
Rural share of population
0.67
Urban population
School attendance among 7-15 years old
0.89
Employed among 18-35 years old
0.66
Share in formal employment
0.11
Urban households
Share owning a kitchen
0.77
Share owning a bathroom
0.94
Number of rooms other than kitchen
2.93
Number of observations
7

Default Treatment
Test of equality Test of equality with
with Basic Savings Open Treatment
p-valuep-value

Joint test ofequality of meansin three groups
p-valuep-value based on robust standard errors clustered at the branch level.
Pre-experiment period of activities is March 1-July 14, 2008.
Loans are microfinance loans. Savings accounts are accounts with mean balance over the period below the maximum of the pre-existing savings account balances of borrowers in
the experiment. Branches in which savings were at times compulsory not included in savings account activities.

- 27 -

Table 2. Uptake: Opening of a savings account and commitment
Dependent variable:
Opens or links a savings account
(1)
(2)
(3)
Open Treatment

Opens asavings account(4)

Made a second
deposit(5)

Commitment,
conditional on uptake
(US$)
(6)

0.167
(0.120)0.508***(0.181)0.202*(0.117)0.431**(0.177)

3.119*(1.718)0.258(0.197)0.139(0.288)4.785*(2.488)
N
532
0.071

0.044
(0.134)0.368**(0.164)0.017(0.125)0.371**(0.171)

Intercept

0.404*(0.169)0.408*(0.176)

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Test Open=Default:
p-value

N
1,375
0.112

N
1,317
0.119

Y
1,375
0.141

N
1,242
0.190

N
1,375
0.149

0.127

0.0948

0.138

0.116

0.281

Default Treatment

0.119(0.119)0.416**(0.161)

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the branch level using wild bootstrapping method; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Uptake equal to 1 if client opened or linked a savings account at time of new loan.
Col. 2 restricted to period July 15 to October 11, 2008. Col. 4 restricted to clients without pre-existing accounts.
Col. 6 restricted to the treatment branches. The intercept represents the average commitment in Open Treatment branches.
Column 3 includes controls for borrower (gender, age, has prior loan), loan (amount, term, purpose is housing, montly payment), andbranch size;

Table 3. Saving behavior of savings account holders.
Open
Treatment

Default
Treatment

Test of equality between Openand Default Treatments:
p-value

0.449

0.772

0.000

4.79

7.90

0.000

-56.4
32.8

-53.2
63.0

0.642
0.020

-33.5
-61.9
-52.3

0.447
0.877
0.957

(1) Uptake: Open a linked accountAmong those who opened a linked savings account:(2) Commited amount (US$)
Cumulated deposits at loan term(3) - in excess of commitment (%) - median(4) - amount (US$) - median
(5)
(6)
(7)

Cumulated deposits at loan term, in excess of commitment (%) - median- 12-18 months loans-44.4- 24 months loans-58.3- 36 months loans-55.6

Test of equality for the median is performed using the continuity corrected Pearson test.

- 28 -

Table 4. Deposit and withdrawal behavior
All loans(1)12-18 month loans(2)

24 month loans(3)36 month loans(4)2.567*(1.390)5.357*(3.206)0.782(4.87)

1.153(1.524)6.483***(2.29)
0.920(0.716)2.236(1.821)
4.249(2.838)1.256(3.971)

3.356(4.134)5.443*(2.945)0.502(4.462)

B. Number of deposits during loan term
Open Treatment
2.384*(1.241)
Default Treatment
4.973*(2.931)
Intercept
0.732(4.491)0.699(0.739)6.008***(2.12)
0.740(0.512)2.064(1.662)
3.718*(2.188)1.155(3.104)3.350(4.01)
5.406*(2.924)0.502(4.36)

C. Number of withdrawals during loan term
Open Treatment-0.195(0.344)
Default Treatment
0.874***(0.31)
Intercept
0.770*(0.31)-0.0985(0.746)0.190(0.199)0.440(0.305)-0.214(0.340)0.650*(0.345)0.792*(0.351)-0.126(0.954)1.811***
0.643
0.812
(0.728)

251

484

640

0.0321(0.0621)0.0981(0.101)
0.0992(0.156)

0.0697***(0.0247)0.0648(0.0699)
0.0163(0.0155)

367

388

A. Total number of deposits
Open Treatment
Default Treatment
Intercept

Observations

1,375

D. Has made at least one deposit after loan closes (for closed loans only)
Open Treatment
0.0569-0.0212(0.0690)(0.843)
Default Treatment
0.09210.000439(0.0955)(0.00499)
Intercept
0.06380.175(0.0387)(0.117)
Observations

974

219

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the branch level using wild bootstrapping methods;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variables are indicated by the titles of the panels- 29 -

Table 5. Net accumulated savings (US$)
Dep. variable: Final balance

All loans(1)12-18 month loans(2)

A. All borrowers (individual-level analysis with wild bootstrap)
Open Treatment
11.43
2.544
(8.912)(3.218)
Default Treatment
21.60*
29.33**(12.93)(11.97)
Intercept
4.158
3.397
(23.34)(12.52)
Observations
Test Open=Default: pvalue

24 month loans(3)36 month loans
(4)

10.37
(9.394)18.62(15.66)5.690(23.58)16.58(12.07)18.93*(11.15)3.313(11.32)

1,371

251

484

636

0.517

0.0317

0.652

0.886

B. All borrowers (branch-level analysis)
Open Treatment
11.5
(9.9)
Default Treatment
21.65**(9.3)
Intercept
4.08(6.41)

2.54(9.0)
29.33***(8.5)
3.40(7.10)

10.4(13.4)
18.6(12.2)
5.69(8.83)

16.6(11.9)
18.9(12.0)
3.313(7.02)

20
0.241

15
0.615

20
0.122

19
0.172

0.331

0.00295

0.538

0.865

25.00*(12.6)
23.24**(10.5)
10.09(8.32)

10.1(7.7)
30.30***
(6.4)
9.436
(5.84)

16.4(21.2)
18.4(18.3)
16.77(15.28)34.13*(16.2)
19.5(14.0)
7.418(9.80)

Observations
R-squared
Test Open=Default:
p-value
C. Savers (branch-level analysis)
Open Treatment
Default Treatment
Intercept

Observations
20
11
20
17
R-squared
0.256
0.794
0.058
0.252
Test Open=Default:
0.879
0.00651
0.912
0.385
p-value
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the branch level using wild bootstrapping method in panel A;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Final balance as of the expected due date of the loan (4 loans were due after September 30, 2011)- 30 -

Table 6. Capital repayment rate and loan delinquency
Dep.variable:(1)
Open Treatment
Default Treatment

0.221**(0.108)0.159(0.126)

Capital repayment rate
at half-term(2)(3)
0.188**(0.0960)
0.0918(0.101)

Male borrower
Savings / owed capital

1.008*(0.612)

Heterogeneity of treatment effectOpen Treatment *24 month loans

Default Treatment *24 month loans
36 month loans

Loan term fixed effects
Observations
R-squared-0.342***(0.122)
N
1,375
0.039

Missed payments

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.0994(0.0801)
0.102(0.0897)
0.102**(0.0468)
0.0609(0.114)-0.153(0.111)-0.178(0.142)-0.0929(0.0851)-0.0559(0.0879)-0.135**(0.0553)-1.525**(0.723)-0.0511(0.0739)-0.0939*(0.0536)-0.0583(0.0722)-0.0818(0.0660)-0.0913*(0.0503)-1.167(0.770)-0.350***(0.124)
Y
1,371
0.113

0.596***(0.140)
N
1,375
0.027

0.442***(0.087)
Y
1,375
0.136

0.609***(0.053)
N
1,375
0.007

0.773***(0.065)
Y
1,375
0.054

0.129***(0.0458)
0.390***(0.151)

36 month loans

Intercept-0.0402(0.141)
0.0941(0.103)0.131**(0.0540)

Delinquentat term(4)-0.313***(0.111)
Y
1,375
0.086

0.0225(0.0664)-0.00469(0.0623)-0.184(0.122)
Y
1,375
0.089

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the branch level using wild bootstrap methods; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Capital repayment rate is the ratio of excess repayment over the loan size. Delinquency is being at least 30 days behind capital repayment at
mid-term. Missed payments is the fraction of bimestrial balance that shows at least one missed payment.
The savings to owed capial is computed at half-term, except in col. 4 where it is at termCol. 4: 4 loans have maturity date beyond our last observation of September 30, 2011

- 31 -

Table 7. Renewal of loan after closure
Dep. variable:
Renewal dummy variable

All closed loans

All borrowers
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.0149(0.0447)
0.0427(0.0578)0.0442(0.0855)
0.0119(0.0589)0.0201(0.0672)-0.0427(0.0813)-0.0594(1.294)
0.198***(0.0476)
Y
856
0.020

Open Treatment
Default Treatment
Saving balance 30 days
before closing / loan size
Intercept

0.174*(0.0943)

0.177*(0.103)1.472***(0.570)0.173*(0.101)

Loan term fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Test Open=Default:
Mean of renewal

Y
1,204
0.018
0.703
0.188

Y
856
0.023
0.755
0.188

Y
856
0.055
0.552
0.188

IV estimates(4)

12-18 monthclosed loans(5)24 monthclosed loans(6)36 monthclosed loans(7)-0.176(0.277)-0.389***(0.136)0.0274(0.0665)0.0426(0.0883)

0.0514(0.0993)-5.69e-05(0.00101)

0.765(1.105)0.458***(0.053)2.565**(1.304)0.187**(0.0909)2.298(2.614)0.0880(0.0678)

125
0.113
0.491
0.176

319
0.036
0.891
0.251

328
0.030
0.605
0.122

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the branch level, using wild bootstrap methods (except for the IV);*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Col. 1: Loans with maturity date no later than August 31, 2011.
Col. 2-7 Closed accounts as of August 31, 2011, excluding the loans that were renegotiated.
Col 4: Instruments are treatment variables

Table 8. Savings mobilization
Loan term
12 months
24 months
36 months

Average amount of
Average savings balance in percentage ofoutstanding loan
loan amount (savers only)(percent of loan amount)
Basic
Open
Default
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
56.1
56.0
57.3

2.8
2.2
0.6

4.0
2.1
1.4

4.8
3.7
1.6

Potential lending from savings balance(percent of loan amount)
Basic
Open
Default
(5)
(6)
(7)
7.4
5.8
1.7

12.0
6.4
4.3

24.8
18.9
8.2

Estimated liquidity available for lending = average balance * rate of savings account opening (40.4% in Basic Treatment,
44.8% in Open Treatment, and 77.2% in Default Treatment) / reserve requirement ratio of 0.15.

- 32 -

a. case ! 2 " 1 + r a. Savings or borrowing

a. Savings or Borrowing

b. Commitment savings OR Borrowing

!"

!"

! =1

! =1

high !

high !

Savings

Savings

1!

1!

Autarky

!
1+ r

low !

Autarky!
1+ rCommitment
savingsB

low !

Borrowing

Borrowing

1

!

A
1

1
!

a. case ! 2 " 1 + r

c. Commitment Savings AND Borrowing!

d. Self-Commitment AND Borrowing
!"

!"

! =1

! =1

high !

high !
Savings

Savings

1!

H

Autarky

!
1+ r

E

B

low !

1
1+ r

1
!

G

A
1

!

Autarky

!
1+ r
1! "
#

Commitment
savings withborrowingF

H
Selfcommitment
savings

Commitment
savings

I

Borrowing

1
!

G

E

I

B
Self-commitment
savings withborrowing

Borrowing

F
1
1+ r

Wish to self-commit
to save but cannot,
with borrowing

1!

Figure 1. Optimal path with availability of savings and borrowing instruments- 33 -

low !

A
1

!

Default Treatment

5060Open Treatment

30

Mean = 2.07
St.dev. = 5.03
Median = 1.03
Observations: 2483

0

10

20

Percent

40

Mean = 2.46
St.dev. = 7.28
Median = 1.00
Observations 1086

0

1

2

3

4

5

0

1

2

3

4

5

Ratio of deposit to committed amountExcluding initial deposit. Ratio above 5 assigned to 5 in graphic. 2% highest deposits not included in mean and st. dev.

Figure 2. Deposit amount relative to committed amount, by treatment status- 34 -

1

2

3

4

5
6
7
8
9
10
Months since loan distribution

Basic Savings
Default Treatment

11

12

13

14

Percent that made deposits in the previous month
0
20
40
60
80

0

24 Months Loans

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24Months since loan distribution
Basic Savings
Default Treatment

Open Treatment

Percent that made deposits in the previous month
0
20
40
60
80
100

Percent that made deposits in the previous month
0
20
40
60
80
100

12-18 Months Loans

Open Treatment

36 Months Loans

0

2

4

6

8

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
Months since loan distribution
Basic Savings
Default Treatment

Open Treatment

Figure 3. Percent of savings account holders that make a deposit, by treatment status- 35 -

24 Month Loans

US$
15

0

5

10

10

US$
20

20

30

25

40

12-18 Month Loans

0

2

4

6

8

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
Months since loan disbursement
Basic Savings
Default Treatment

0

2

4

6

Open Treatment

8

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
Months since loan disbursement
Basic Savings
Default Treatment

Top 1% excluded.

Top 1% excluded.

5

10

US$
15

20

25

36 Month Loans

0

2

4

6

8

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
Months since loan disbursement
Basic Savings
Default Treatment

Open Treatment

Top 1% excluded.

Figure 4. Running savings balance by treatment status- 36 -

Open Treatment

1
Cumulative distribution
.4
.6
.8
.2
0
0

50
100
Final balance at loan term (in US$)
Basic Savings
Default Treatment

150

Open Treatment

Figure 5. Cumulative savings balances by treatment arm (picture truncated at $150).

- 37 -

.3.2
Density
.1
0
-15

-10

-5
0
5
Days Before/After Monthly Loan Due Date
Deposits

10

Withdrawals

Figure 6. Timing of deposits and withdrawals, relative to loan payment date.

- 38 -

15

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