HANDBOOKPROFILING
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS

Alfredo Malaret Baldo
Manuel Martinez MirallesACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all the Institute’s activities. This
research area of the Conventional Arms Programme is supported by the Government of Germany.
The Handbook owes gratitude to the participants of the UNIDIR Expert Review Meeting, carried out
in Chatham House, London, in December 2019, who provided valuable direction and feedback andhave themselves previously conducted the ammunition profiling studies on which this Handbook
is grounded. In particular, this Handbook recognizes the important work of Conflict Armament
Research; the Small Arms Survey; the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament andDevelopment in Latin America and the Caribbean; and Sou da Paz Institute. The Handbook owes
gratitude to the experts who helped review it, namely, Ana Pamela Romero, Andre Desmarais, Andres
Perez, Bob Seddon, Bruno Langeani, Cleveland Crooks, Daniel Mack, Gene Gesite Navarra Jr., Glenn
Lawrence, Hardy Giezendanner, Ivaylo Stefanov, James Bevan, Jonathan Rickell, Lenka Filipova,
Leonardo Lara, Marie-Jacques Cantinelli, Miguel Bernard, Natalia Pollachi, Natalie Briggs, Nicholas
Florquin, Nils Holger Anders, Rachel Bolton-King, Renata Dalaqua, Robert Kondor, Rodolfo Gamboa,
Roland Martial, Santiago Boggione, and numerous serving officials who wish to remain anonymous.
The Handbook also owes gratitude to the Small Arms Survey for making figures available and to
Olivia Denonville for her guidance. The authors also thank UNIDIR staff who supported and guided
this research, in particular Renata Dwan, Himayu Shiotani, and Eric Schulz.

ii

NOTE

ABOUT UNIDIR

The designations employed and thepresentation of the material in thispublication do not imply the expressionof any opinion whatsoever on the partof the Secretariat of the United Nations
concerning the legal status of any country,
territory, city or area, or of its authorities, orconcerning the delimitation of its frontiers
or boundaries. The views expressed in the
publication are the sole responsibility of theindividual authors. They do not necessaryreflect the views or opinions of the United
Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members orsponsors.

The
UnitedNations
Institutefor
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is avoluntarily funded, autonomous institutewithin the United Nations. One of the few
policy institutes worldwide focusing on
disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge
and promotes dialogue and action on
disarmament and security. Based in Geneva,
UNIDIR assists the international community
to develop the practical, innovative ideas
needed to find solutions to critical security
problems.
www.unidir.org | © UNIDIR 2020

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHHANDBOOKPROFILING SMALL
ARMS AMMUNITION
IN ARMEDVIOLENCE SETTINGSTABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................... 1
PART 1. INTRODUCTION................................................................... 5
1.1 Why small arms ammunition?.........................................................5
1.2 What is ammunition profiling?...................................................... 12
1.3 Objectives of this Handbook........................................................ 13
1.4 Who can benefit from this Handbook?....................................... 14
1.5 Guiding principles........................................................................... 15
1.6 Scope of small arms ammunition................................................ 17
1.7 Technical overview of small arms ammunition..........................19
1.8 How to use this Handbook........................................................... 20
PART 2. METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES...................................... 23
2.1 Defining the evidence target.........................................................25
2.2 A step-by-step guide, per database...........................................27
DATABASE 1: EVIDENCE.......................................................... 29
Section A: Data collection................................................................... 31
Section B: Data analysis..................................................................... 58

DATABASE 2: RECORDS............................................................71
Section A: Data collection...................................................................73
Section B: Data analysis......................................................................79
DATABASE 3: ILLICIT MANUFACTURE..................................... 85
DATABASE 4: INTERVIEWS WITH AFFECTED COMMUNITIES.. 95
PART 3. INTERPRETING RESULTS................................................ 107
3.1 Distilling findings...........................................................................107
3.2 A word of caution......................................................................... 112
3.3 Transforming findings into actionable information: A pipeline
to transform knowledge into action................................................ 115
3.4 Leveraging knowledge to reduce violence............................... 119
3.5 Recommendations.......................................................................122
3.6 Moving forward.............................................................................126
PART 4. ANNEXES........................................................................ 129
Glossary................................................................................................129
References........................................................................................... 131

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHABOUT THE LEAD AUTHORS
Alfredo Malaret Baldo is a Researcher with UNIDIR’s
Conventional Arms Programme. He coordinates the
Urban Violence research portfolio. Alfredo specializes inpublic policy analysis, urban violence reduction strategies,
and linkages between security and development efforts.
Alfredo joined UNIDIR after working for the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute, the United
Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament andDevelopment in Latin America and the Caribbean, and for Ret. US Ambassador
Dennis Jett. He has a bachelor’s degree in Political Science and masters’degrees in Public Affairs from Brown University and International Affairs andEconomic Development from The Pennsylvania State University.
Manuel Martinez Miralles is a Researcher with UNIDIR’s
Conventional Arms Programme. He coordinates theconventional ammunition research portfolio. Manueljoined UNIDIR after five years of working on peace anddisarmament issues at the United Nations Regional
Centre for Peace, Disarmament, and Development in
Latin America and the Caribbean. He has spearheaded
more than 40 arms control trainings, awareness andimplementation initiatives in 15 Latin American and Caribbean countries,
training more than 300 government officials. Manuel is part of the pool ofexperts for the Arms Trade Treaty Outreach Project funded by the European
Union and the United Nations SaferGuard Quick-Response Mechanism for
Ammunition Management. He holds a master’s degree in Public Administrationfrom the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

ABOUT THE RESEARCH TEAM
Adam Baird is a UNIDIR Non-Resident Fellow. Adam is a
trained researcher and gender expert with a backgroundin peace and conflict studies, international cooperation,and human rights. His focus is on urban violence, using
masculinities as a lens to understand gangs and crimein the Global South, particularly Latin America and the
Caribbean. His research is impact oriented with the aimof fostering policy and practice to promote sustainable
violence reduction. In the last two decades Adam has directed research
projects in Belize, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Trinidad andTobago, and has been funded by the ESRC, AHRC, OSF, IDRC, SSRC, UNDP,
British Academy, the Leverhulme Trust, and Coventry University.
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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHA NOTE FROM THE AUTHORSThis Handbook should be understood as a technical guide, yet one with profoundhuman implications. While we have strived to be as accurate as possible regarding
the technical aspects of ammunition and data gathering, we have also strived to avoid
losing sight of the motivation behind this work.
It is our position that aggregated data on ammunition can contribute to theunderstanding of the conflating factors that enable armed violence, but it is also ourview that every round of ammunition represents the potential to cut a life short —putting dreams to an end and families through the nightmare of losing a loved one. And,in terms of lives lost, armed violence is an irreversible injustice. So, as we aggregate
data and seek for solutions, we must never forget that each data point represents apreventable injustice.
Big-data should never obscure the human stories behind the statistics –in fact, weunderstand them as complementary. Public security must be understood as peoplecentred security. And our efforts to profile ammunition, should be understood asefforts to prevent the further loss of life and promote the socioeconomic wellbeing ofaffected communities.
We are releasing this Handbook with a call to work together and generate a multipliereffect –and doing so urgently. This Handbook recognizes that the success of ourendeavour, cutting illicit ammunition flows with a view to reduce armed violence,
requires coordinated action by UN System partners, Member States, the entire
national security sector, mayors, academics, practitioners and local organizations.
The solutions to ending armed violence are within reach, but we must reach together.
We can do this. We must do this.

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vii

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
viii

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHEXECUTIVE SUMMARYWorldwide, more than half a million people dieviolently every year, with the vast majority of violent
deaths (82%) occurring in non-conflict settings,
mostly in towns and cities (Hideg and Mc Evoy,
Global Violent Deaths 2017: Time to Decide, 2017).
Furthermore, more than half of the homicides
worldwide are caused by firearms or, more precisely,

More than 500,000
people die violently
every year, withthe vast majorityof violent deaths
occurring in nonconflict settings.

by their ammunition (United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide, 2019). The scale and impactof armed violence means that it is consistently a leading policy concern
for governments and international organizations. Armed violence causes
an ocean of human suffering, hinders economic development and traps
communities in vicious cycles.
Focusing on ammunition flows and misuse can help reduce armed violence.
There are several potential advantages to focusing on ammunition: Unlike
firearms, ammunition must be replenished once used, and restricting its
flow can therefore “starve firearms of oxygen”. Also, ammunition supply
chains tend to be shorter from transfer to use, increasing the scope fordomestic policy to have an immediate effect in reducing armed violence. In
short, improved research into ammunition flows and the dynamics enabling
lethal outcomes can inform policy responses, with the potential to reducethe impact of firearms-related violence.

The purpose ofthis Handbook is
to offer users a
step-by-step guidefor ammunition
profiling.

The purpose of this Handbook is to offer users a
step-by-step guide for ammunition profiling. Thismeans generating an overview of the small arms
ammunition that have been diverted, trafficked ormisused in settings affected by armed violence. The

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main benefit of using this Handbook is that it helps build an evidence base to
inform downstream policies aimed at curbing the flow of ammunition thatwould otherwise be destined for unauthorized hands or unauthorized use.
Afterwards, the aggregated evidence and lessons learned collected fromsettings affected by armed violence can be channelled upstream to inform
multilateral and global processes. Therefore, this Handbook presents two
distinct contributions to the field:
i.

it codifies a method for any interested user to utilize it and yield results
in a standardized manner, andii.

it presents the ammunition profiling methodology with an armed
violence lens, for replication studies to follow suit.

This Handbook is structured in three broad sections: Part 1 provides a brief
introduction and sets the context of the problem. Part 2 is the core of the
Handbook as it presents the step-by-step guide for ammunition profiling.
Part 2 introduces each of four databases in turn.
The databases that ought to be constructed for a comprehensive profile ofammunition are the following:•

Database 1: Evidence (ammunition recovered from crime scenes,
ammunition seized in domestic operations, and ammunition seized atentry-exit points);•

Database 2: Records (ammunition imports, ammunition manufactured
in-country, and ammunition stocks);•

Database 3: Illicit manufacture; and•Database 4: Interviews with affected communities.

For Databases 1 and 2, the guidelines in are separated into two main actions:(Section A) data collection and (Section B) data analysis. Part 3 concludes
the Handbook by presenting options for a more refined distillation of
ammunition-specific findings.

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Using this Handbook is voluntary and carries no reporting requirements.
Further, all data generated belongs to the utilizing entity. Should technicalsupport be requested, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research stands ready to provide guidance on using the methodology.

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PART ONE:INTRODUCTION

4UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

PART 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Why small arms ammunition?
Worldwide, more than half a million people die violently
every year, with most violent deaths (82%) occurringin non-conflict settings, mostly in towns and cities(Hideg and Mc Evoy 2017). The scale and impact of
global armed violence means that it is consistently aMore than halfof the homicides
worldwide
are caused byfirearms or, more
precisely, by theirammunition.

leading policy concern for governments and armed
and security forces worldwide. This violence is a result of complex drivers,
requiring institutions worldwide to continually seek effective and novel
approaches to reduce it. Focusing on ammunition flows and misuse caninform this effort. Focusing on ammunition does not mean ignoring firearms;
rather, it means studying ammunition flows as an indispensable accomplicein firearms-related violence. Firearms and ammunition do not operate
independently, rather they are inextricably tied and interdependent when
deployed. As such, in the efforts to reduce armed violence, ammunition
should be studied and analysed with the same urgency as firearms.
More than half of the homicides worldwide are caused by firearms or, more
precisely, by their ammunition (UNODC 2019). Although armed violence
evolves, there are cycles and trends in violence that, if identified, can help
inform policy responses. Armed violence tends to occur in concentrated
spaces, mostly in urban areas where resources and opportunities are
scarce. It is particularly high and widespread across Latin America and the
Caribbean, in certain cities in the United States, and in parts of westernand southern Africa. Policies in chronically violent contexts have, however,often struggled to sustainably reduce violence (Adams 2012), hence
the importance of fresh thinking and approaches to promote effective
interventions and combat policy inertia.

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So, why focus on ammunition? Research suggests that increases inhomicides may be connected to increased firearms and ammunitionuse (UNODC 2019, 19). If 2017 figures are compared with 2012 figures,
firearms-related homicides accounted for 61,804 additional victims in
2017, representing an increase of around 35% from the earlier figure in justfive years (UNODC 2014, 2019).1 When firearms infiltrate spaces, such asurban peripheries, they tend to stay there, creating a weapons sink (Baird,
Bishop, and Kerrigan 2018). Beyond the coercive and menacing effect ofartisanal and replica weapons designed to resemble modern ones (withlittle – if any – intent to discharge), firearms only fire when serviced by aflow of ammunition. And as demonstrated by the global ammunition trade,
this flow is vast (UN Comtrade 2019). Additionally, diversion and trafficking
dynamics allow ammunition flows to reach unauthorized hands (ConflictArmament Research 2016, 2017a, 2017b; PRIO 2013; UNODC 2019; WCO2019).
Table 1: Reported value of ammunition imports & exports, 2015–2018,
UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database2
Year

Total imports trade value (in billions)

Total exports tradevalue (in billions)2018$10.121$14.4072017$10.167$15.2282016$10.048$14.366

2015$8.704$13.1391      The 2013 Global Study on Homicide showed that the number of firearms-related homicides in2012 was 177,000 (UNODC 2014, 65). The 2019 Global Study establishes that number, five years
later, in 2017, at 238,804 (UNODC 2019, 19).
2
See: https://comtrade.un.org/data

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Although access to ammunition enables and accelerates lethal outcomesin armed violence, ammunition remains understudied. In spite of this,some notable technical and methodological context-specific studies have
paved the way for this Handbook. For example, studies led by the United
Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin
America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) in the Dominican Republic (2018),
the Small Arms Survey 2006 primer on ammunition(Pézard and Anders 2006), the Small Arms Survey
Ammunition Tracing Kit (Bevan 2008a), and ConflictArmament Research guides on Warsaw Pactcalibre ammunition quantity tables and box marking(2014a, 2014b) have laid the foundations in the fieldof small arms ammunition research. Both ConflictArmament Research and the Small Arms Survey
have applied these profiling efforts to the field, suchas in nine countries in Africa (Conflict Armament

Improved research
into flows andeffective controlof ammunition can
generate improvedand coherent
policy and reducethe incidence of
firearms-related
violence.

Research 2012); in northern Mali (Conflict Armament
Research and Small Arms Survey 2013); in the Niger (de Tessières 2018); in
Kenya (Bevan 2008b); in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia (Diehl and JenzenJones 2014); in Côte d’Ivoire (Anders 2014); in Libya and the Syrian Arab
Republic (Jenzen-Jones 2014b, 2014a); in the Central African Republic oncross-border weapon transfers in the Sahel; in the Sudan; in a three-year
investigation across Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic; in South Sudan(Conflict Armament Research 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2019; LeBrun andLeff 2014); and across seven countries and territories (Florquin and Leff
2014).
The collection and analysis of spent casings in Rio de Janeiro for the 2014–2017 period (Sou da Paz Institute 2017) and in 2018 (Olliveira and Demori2019) have also offered significant methodological insights on which thisHandbooks seeks to build. Finally, this Handbook owes gratitude to the

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7

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Study on Homicide(UNODC 2019) for providing a comprehensive analysis of international
homicide figures and improving our collective understanding of the drivers,
mechanisms and contributors to violence.
Nonetheless, gaps in understanding remain, particularly regarding how
ammunition flows influence rates of armed violence and how the issuecompares in different cities. Furthermore, while there are generally robust
policies to control drugs or arms flows, these do not consistently respondto the particularities of ammunition flows, hence the need for research toshine a light on their importance.
There are several potential advantages to focusing on ammunition
control: Unlike firearms, ammunition must be replenished once used,
and restricting its flow can therefore “starve firearms of oxygen”.
Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that in scenarios with elevatedrates of armed violence, the time frame from transfer to use in the
ammunition supply chain tends to be short, increasing the scope for
local and national policy to have an immediate impact on reducing lethal
outcomes. In short, improved research into flows and effective control of
ammunition can generate improved and coherent policy and programming
responses with significant potential to reduce the lethality and incidence of
firearms-related violence.
Although this Handbook is intended to serve as a how-to guide forammunition profiling, it is important to recognize the broader socioeconomic
and political implications of conducting such work. Inadequately regulated
arms and ammunition enable and sustain armed violence and perpetuatesocioeconomic injustices.

8

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHAs the Secretary-General has emphasized:“Armed violence aggravates poverty, inhibits access to social services
and diverts energy and resources away from efforts to improve humandevelopment. Armed conflict and high levels of armed violence represent
a grave impediment to economic growth. There is nothing more damaging
to an investment climate as armed insecurity. Its detrimental effect onpoverty and on access to social services, development and economic
growth has a profound impact on fundamental economic and social
rights”(United Nations Security Council 2017).
It is clear that progress on virtually all security and development goals
is severely hampered, if not outright reversed, in contexts awash withpoorly regulated arms and ammunition and high levels of violence. And
although the manifestations of armed violence can be profoundly local intheir undercurrents, they affect global peace and security and the well-beingof all peoples. Therefore, conducting ammunition profiling research, with aview to helping reduce armed violence, can also be considered as an effort
to strengthen the foundations of sustainable development processes.
Although the undercurrents of armed violence might be local, andimmediate reduction strategies might need to be context-specific, theproblem is truly a global one. As such, ammunition profiling efforts and theensuing lessons learned ought to be shared in multilateral forums in pursuitof global improvements. That is, multilateral processes and global action canbe leveraged to mobilize political will and resources at the regional, national
and local levels and thus facilitate the establishment of adequate countrylevel and localized systems. For example, there are several international
negotiations and multilateral processes that would benefit from monitoringflows of ammunition and channelling insights upstream; these could, in turn,

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9

jump-start political will and resource mobilization to support programmes
at the local level. Profiling and monitoring ammunition flows can inform andimprove armed violence reduction efforts, including the following:•

The United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 72/55 and74/65 on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional
ammunition stockpiles in surplus, which called for a Group ofGovernmental Experts to convene and explore possibilities for better
ammunition management•

The Arms Trade Treaty, especially as the Conferences of States Parties
hold thematic discussions on specialized topics such as gender-based
violence and diversion•

The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and the United
Nations SaferGuard Programme, as the authoritative international
body tasked with improving national stockpile management capacity
and addressing risk mitigation on ammunition•

The Sustainable Development Goals, specifically target 16.1, whichseeks to “reduce all forms of violence and related deaths everywhere”,
and target 16.4, which seeks to, inter alia, significantly reduce illicit armsflows

All these processes, with their different legal strengths and memberships,
benefit from an upstream flow of new evidence regarding the source, supply
chain pathways, dynamics facilitating unauthorized use, and overall impactof ammunition flows.
So, what is the added value of this Handbook? This Handbook seeks
to generate a catalytic effect, to the extent that anyone interested in
conducting ammunition profiling can do so by using this how-to guide asa starting point. In addition, this Handbook aims to codify an ammunition
profiling methodology into a tool that extracts useful insights to reduce

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

armed violence, which mostly occurs in urban environments. Most of
the previous ammunition profiling studies have focused on conflictaffected settings or actual battlefields, yet most global casualties
occur outside of conflict settings. As such, this Handbook offers not
only a how-to guide for conducting ammunition profiling studies but
also an armed violence lens for doing so. Therefore, this Handbook
presents itself as a novel product with two distinct contributions to thefield:•

Codifying a methodology for any interested user to use and yield results
in a standardized manner•

Presenting the ammunition profiling methodology with an armed
violence lens, for replication studies to follow suit across different
cities and towns

This Handbook acknowledges that the criminal use of ammunition in someareas may be dependent on diversion from conflicts to feed a certain demandin armed violence settings. As such, research into conflict-related material
could provide information on ammunition diversion and its use elsewhere.
Hence, this Handbook underscores the importance of sharing researchfindings across conflict settings and regional partners, in addition to otherlocations affected by criminal violence, to gain a deeper understanding of
supply chains and the dynamics surrounding illicit trafficking networks.
Finally, while some practices described in this Handbook may alreadyexist at the national level, they might not be harmonized or aggregated(e.g. different elements are collected by difference national authorities
or experts, and hence the output might not be comparable), and in mostcases, this data is not collected with the intent to monitor and profile smallarms ammunition. As such, one further added value of using this Handbook
is that it will yield results in a standardized format, which facilitates internal
and international documentation comparison and time series analyses.

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1.2 What is ammunition profiling?
This Handbook offers a road map for ammunition profiling, which isdifferent from ammunition tracing. The key difference is that tracing efforts
generally intend to determine the exact origin and recreate the supply
chain of documented ammunition, when packaging or markings permit andconfirmation is received from the relevant entities, whereas ammunition
profiling is better understood as a data generation tool to gain a baseline of
information regarding volumes and origins, variations (trends and patterns),
and dates of production. Ammunition profiling generates baseline data
for subsequent efforts to build on. As such, ammunition profiling
contributes to understanding of the problems of diversion, trafficking
and misuse but, in isolation, will not present definitive answers. Thatis, ammunition profiling needs to be complemented with additional
layers of data and followed by the analysis of context-specific policies
and their implementation.
In the case of this Handbook, ammunition profiling is intended to shedlight on the general source of ammunition recovered from unauthorized
hands or from unauthorized use in armed violence settings and variations
therein, without necessarily being able to recreate the entire supply chain.
Ammunition profiling, contextualized with the undercurrents of armed
violence in specific environments, can be useful to inform ammunition control
and tailor armed violence reduction strategies. In other words, ammunition
profiling contributes to building a novel evidence base. At its core, thisHandbook understands ammunition profiling as the systematization andanalysis of data, built by documenting, at a minimum, the calibres, markings,
manufacturers and manufacturing years of the ammunition recoveredfrom scenes of armed violence, as well as accompanying law enforcement
reports. To facilitate the data systematization, aggregation and analyses,
this Handbook breaks down the effort into separate databases (see Part 2).

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1.3 Objectives of this Handbook•

The objective of this Handbook is to contribute to the generationof new data on ammunition, since baseline data on ammunition isa global shortcoming.

•

This Handbook offers users a codified how-to guide to creating a
profile of small arms ammunition in armed violence settings.
»

The main benefit of using this Handbook is that is helps strengthen
domestic capacity to build an evidence base that could be
subsequently leveraged to inform policies aimed at curbing theflow of ammunition reaching unauthorized hands or unauthorized
use in armed violence settings.

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1.4 Who can benefit from this Handbook?
This Handbook is written with multiple readers in mind:•

Practitioners working at the operational level, such as authorities
working in forensic ballistics and crime laboratories, criminologists,
law enforcement, intelligence, and police and military officers on the
ground who seek to explore aggregated dynamics of ammunition flows
and armed violence in their respective environments•

National policymakers interested in leveraging an evidence base of theammunition flowing in, out and within a particular setting for better
management and regulation of ammunition flows•

Members of regional and international organizations, including
specialized United Nations agencies, who, in partnerships with national
authorities, seek collaborative pathways to understand flows of
ammunition, limit illicit ones, and reduce their impacts

•

Field

users,

academics

andmembersofnon-governmentalorganizations (NGOs), who may find this Handbook a useful guide tocapture, analyse and shed light on dynamics enabling armed violence inaffected communities•

All other users, including journalists, who are interested in identifying
and uncovering trends in ammunition misuse, diversion and trafficking

This Handbook will refer to readers and users as “users”, since following theguidelines below is, at its core, a research effort.

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1.5 Guiding principles
The methodology presented in this Handbook has been designed with
six guiding principles in mind. These principles underpin the value of thisHandbook. The six principles are the following: piloting and iteration
learning, national ownership, readiness, affordability, informativeness, andimpact. Each of these guiding principles is described as follows:
1. Piloting and iteration learning: The methodology outlined in thisHandbook is intended to act as a set of working guidelines that need
to be updated to reflect lessons learned from piloting and iterated
uses in different context and regions. It is to be understood as a living
document intended to shed light on the global problem of ammunition,and it will evolve as the community universalizes its use.
2. National ownership: The methodology seeks to be sustainable,
recognizing that national ownership is the key to sustainability. To
spur national ownership, political will and operational support must bepresent. One way to ensure consistent and standardized operational
support is to use this research methodology to inform or update
national standardized operating procedures (SOPs), within the context
of defined national legislation and regulations. To facilitate this, themethodology is designed to be practical and accessible without
representing a significant additional burden on operational national
authorities and existing procedures.
3. Readiness: The methodology is also designed to be adopted andimplemented immediately. This means that it has been designed
around data that is readily available to most national authorities. Thatis, data that has already been collected but is sometimes overlooked,
scattered or not systematized. Therefore, the methodology can be

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15

best understood as a road map to systematize information that national
authorities have under their jurisdiction.
4. Affordability: The methodology is also designed with simplicity
in mind. This means that collecting the required data does not
require substantial financial investment or recurrent expenses. The
methodology attempts to rely on equipment that is affordable for mostnational actors or likely to be already in their possession. Further, it isa methodology that will not require licences or fees. A certain degreeof technical knowledge is needed, but this could already exist at thenational or local level or could be easily learned. The United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) stands ready to provide
technical guidance when applying this Handbook, upon request.
5. Informativeness: The methodology is designed to produce an
overview of small arms ammunition flows, which is informative for thenational control and management of small-calibre ammunition. It is
not designed to solve individual firearms-related cases, but rather toshed light on larger patterns and produce actionable information thatmight have previously gone unnoticed. The overview will be generated
by aggregating case-by-case information and distilling the patterns andtrends affecting the determined territory.
6. Impact: The methodology aims to produce actionable information that
leads to effective policy prescriptions to reduce armed violence. As
such, it seeks to uncover trends that are both informative and impactful.
In this vein, the methodology revolves around diversion, trafficking andmisuse, as well as the dynamics and conflating factors that facilitate
lethal outcomes in firearms-related incidents.

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1.6 Scope of small arms ammunition
For the purposes of this Handbook, small arms ammunition will beconsidered those rounds designed to be fired through firearms with rifledbarrels up to a bore diameter of 14.5 mm and cartridges designed for use
in smooth bore weapons up to 10 gauge (19.7 mm). For ease of reference,
this Handbook uses the terms “small arms ammunition” and “small-calibre
ammunition” interchangeably.
Small-calibre ammunition, as referred to in the Handbook, mostly services
small arms, which include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles andcarbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns, andshotguns. These are the most common weapon systems used in incidents
of armed violence in urban environments. Nonetheless, some heavymachine guns (usually called “light weapons”, as opposed to “small arms”)
can also use small arms ammunition.
Figure 1: Small arms ammunition threshold (letter Y)33      Source: Bevan 2008a (Small Arms Survey).

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Figure 2: Common pistol, rifle and shotgun cartridges4

Explosives and explosive ammunition and munitions are outside of thescope of this Handbook. Manipulating explosives and explosive ammunition
and munitions requires specialized safety protocols that are not addressedin this Handbook. In addition, manipulating ammunition should always bedone under the guidance or supervision of specialized officers, in somecontexts referred to as Ammunition Technical Officers (ATO). For safety
reasons, this Handbook warns against approaching or manipulating
ammunition outside the scope of small arms ammunition, encompassed by
the area with the letter Y in Figure 1.

418     Source: Bobbfwed. This image is intended to serve as an illustration of commonly recovered smallarms ammunition and to illustrate the scope of this Handbook. The image serves an illustrative,
rather than a comprehensive or technical purpose.

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1.7 Technical overview of small arms ammunition
For those requiring a technical overview of the nuances of identifying smallarms ammunition, the Small Arms Survey has an easy-to-use open accesshandbook on weapons identification, with a chapter dedicated to theidentification of small-calibre ammunition, with open access.
For those interested in ammunition tracing and protocols and procedures
for recording small-calibre ammunition, including examples of templates torecord and report relevant information from the ammunition samples, theSmall Arms Survey also has an easy-to-use Ammunition Tracing Kit, with
open access. This Ammunition Tracing Kit also includes fully completed
examples that could be used as reference.
Further,in

conducting

ammunition

profiling,

specialized personnel might need to be consulted.
As such, this Handbook advises users to consult
with small arms ammunition or weapons intelligenceexperts to verify the inputting of data and analysis to
avoid misidentification.

This Handbook
advises users to
consult with smallarms ammunition
or weapons
intelligenceexperts to verify
the inputtingof data andanalysis to avoid
misidentification.

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19

1.8 How to use this Handbook
Users requiring a refresher on identifying small-calibre ammunition should
consult the sources mentioned in section 1.7.
Users ready to begin the process of profiling small-calibre ammunition
should jump straight into the guidelines in Part 2.
Users interested in options for a refined distillation of ammunition-specificfindings should use Part 3.
Part 2 is the core of the Handbook as it presents a step-by-step guide forammunition profiling. Part 2 introduces the four databases in turn.
The guidelines for Databases 1 and 2 are separated into two main
actions: (Section A) data collection and (Section B) data analysis. These
guidelines are designed to assist users who are building an ammunition
profile from scratch by presenting self-contained, per database, instructions
on how to collect the data and then analyse it. Completing this effort will
yield a comprehensive profile of ammunition recovered in armed violencesettings.
The databases are discussed separately because the end users might bedifferent, and the information might be stored in different departments orcollected by different personnel or agencies. For example:
•
•

•

20

Database 1: Evidence might be built by crime scene or forensic
laboratory officials, tactical law enforcement, or customs officials,
working independently or as a multi-agency task force.
Database 2: Records might be built by the national agency tasked withapproving and allocating the ammunition supply or, in cases where nocentral agency controls national distribution, it will have to be built in
partnership with the ammunition end users, manufacturers and holders,
including armed and security forces.
In the cases of Database 3: Illicit manufacture and Database 4:
Interviews with affected communities, it is recommended thata trained user in qualitative methods takes the lead. Although the
databases might be constructed independently, legislative officials andpolicymakers might be interested only in a final report, as opposed tostand-alone databases. As such, it is important that the informationcollected is thoroughly analysed and presented in the form of a briefing

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

that details the main findings, the implications of these findings, andthe recommended next steps.
This Handbook also acknowledges that the collection of data concerning
ammunition from crime scenes, seizure from domestic operations,and seizure at entry-exit points may not be the responsibility of one
single department or agency. As a result, a certain level of inter-agency
coordination may be required at the local and/or national levels in theconstruction of the databases.
That being said, practitioners may use only the information thatis available to them and still gain valuable insights concerning
ammunition flows that can help inform policy at either the municipal or
national levels. UNIDIR stands ready to provide guidance on inter-agency
coordination when applying this Handbook, upon request.

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS

21

PART TWO:METHODOLOGICALGUIDELINES

22

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

PART 2. METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES
To shed light on trends regarding ammunition misuse, trafficking anddiversion, this Handbook suggests building four databases, which can becross-referenced against one another. By organizing the methodology
around databases, the data-collection effort is divided into achievable
milestones. These guidelines offer a road map to creating the four
databases, which encompass three broad types of information:
1. Primary evidence:
Database 1: Evidence•

Built from the following information points: (a) ammunition
recovered from crime scenes, (b) ammunition seized in domestic
operations and (c) ammunition seized at entry-exit points. Whenthe ammunition recovered from any of these information points isaccompanied by a law enforcement report, contextual informationfrom that report should also be included in the spreadsheet.

2. Records of information:
Database 2: Records•

Built from the following information points: (a) records of ammunition
imports, (b) records of ammunition manufactured in-country and (c)records of ammunition stockpiled in the country.

3. Contextual information:
Database 3: Illicit manufacture
Database 4: Interviews with affected communities

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23

Database 1 will be, most likely, constructed from unprocessed or semiprocessed evidence. To build this database, users will have to extract
data from pieces of ammunition and law enforcement reports and input
it into spreadsheets. Database 1 will represent the primary evidence of
ammunition misused, illicitly held or trafficked. The “information points”
can be understood as the source or event where the data originates from,meaning crime scenes, seizures in domestic operations, or seizures atentry-exit points.
Database 2 will be, most likely, already partially documented in records by
the responsible national agencies. To build this database, users will haveto systematize information from records into a format that facilitates its
analysis. Database 2 can be considered the benchmark of information topotentially contrast against Database 1.
Finally, Databases 3 and 4 will be qualitative research based on interviews,
exchanges, group discussion and community knowledge. The importanceof these two databases is that they will help contextualize findings fromthe primary evidence (Database 1) and records of information (Database 2).

24

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

2.1 Defining the evidence target
In an ideal scenario, a study focusing on monitoring and diagnosing smallarms ammunition diversion, trafficking and misuse would document theentire universe of ammunition in circulation across a determined territory.
However, this is often not possible. As such, the second-best option is to
document a representative sample. The evidence target defines the sample
that will be analysed.
When defining the evidence target, it is important to ensure that the sample
is representative of the universe (also referred to as the “population”).5
To make such a determination, the scale of the universe must be known,at least roughly. For example, if a territory has had 100,000 documented
incidents of ammunition discharge in the time frame under examination,then users must use that number as a benchmark to determine whatpercentage of those cases would constitute a representative sample. A
representative sample allows findings to be generalizable. In addition, thedocumentation of the sample must be achievable within the limits of theavailable resources. As such, it is a balance between “representation” and“achievability”.
A representative sample can be defined as a subset of a population that
accurately reflects, on average, the characteristics of the universe.6 To limit
biases, random sample selection is crucial, as it offers the best chanceof generating a sample with the same characteristics, on average, as theuniverse. In other words, it minimizes potential biases that could yieldskewed results. Finally, when defining the evidence target, it is crucial to do
so by addressing the following: What research questions are the authorities
trying to answer?
5     For a definition of “universe” in statistics, see: https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.
asp?ID=2087#:~:text=Definition%3A,and%20coverage%20of%20the%20study.
6 For more on representative samples and sampling, see: https://link.springer.com/
referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-007-0753-5_2476.

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS

25

The combination of the four databases discussed

The combination of
the four databases in Part 2 aims to paint a comprehensive pictureof the ammunition circulating in, out and withinaims to paint aa determined territory. Simply put, the morecomprehensive
comprehensive the data, the more robust the
picture of theammunition
analysis to draw from to answer the research
circulating in,question. Nonetheless, users should not be
out and within
discouraged if constructing all the databases ora determinedcollecting all the data entry points is not possible, sinceterritory.

some information, even by itself, can be informative,
and the full picture can be built progressively. For

example, collecting five years of information would be very informative but
might not be immediately achievable. As such, an acceptable compromise
can be to start with the latest year and extract initial findings from only themost recent cases, while clearly stating so when drawing conclusions. In
addition, not all databases will necessarily be relevant to every study, sincea user might decide to focus only on ammunition diversion or trafficking or
misuse or to study a particular point in time to assess the impact of a new
regulation, as opposed to studying the three activities at once or studying
a longer period of time.
The main takeaway from this discussion is that users should feel free todefine their own evidence target, which needs to answer the question
identified by national authorities and be based on a representative sample.

26

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

2.2 A step-by-step guide, per database
This section is an illustrated step-by-step guide of how to constructeach database, with suggestions for their analysis. Moving forward,
note that Databases 1 and 2 will need to be systematized into different
spreadsheets, with drop-down menus or tabs to input data arising fromdifferent information points, whereas Databases 3 and 4 will be recorded
as qualitative information. Also note that data inputting should be doneat the smallest level of disaggregation possible, yet without doubling theentries for identical samples. For example, should two boxes of ammunition
contain identical cartridges, then one entry in the spreadsheet summing
the total number of boxes and cartridges recovered will suffice. However,should the two boxes contain different calibres or markings, a separate
entry will be needed for each separate calibre or marking identified.
Afterwards, to thoroughly analyse the information

This Handbook
encourages
analysis section will propose cross-referencing fields
users to avoid
among the different databases.
duplicating any
data that is alreadyFinally, this Handbook encourages users to avoid
being collected
duplicating any data that is already being collected
and to attempttosource data,
and to attempt to source data, where possible, from
where possible,
existing mechanisms.
from existingmechanisms.
and create a comprehensive ammunition profile, the

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS

27

DATABASE ONE:EVIDENCE

28

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHDATABASE 1: EVIDENCE

Justification: Database 1: Evidence with its three information points will
generate overviews of:(a) the ammunition used in firearms-related scenes of violence, which cangenerally be characterized as ammunition misuse;(b) the ammunition circulating illegally or as unauthorized possession andseized within national borders; and(c) the ammunition trafficked illicitly and seized at border controls.7
Information points: This database will be built from the following
information points: (a) ammunition recovered from crime scenes, (b)ammunition seized in domestic operations and (c) ammunition seized atentry-exit points.

7      To differentiate between illicit possession and illicit trafficking, the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime defined the terms as follows in its latest study on firearms:
Illicit possession: The unlawful possession of regulated or prohibited firearms, their partsand components or ammunition. Carrying a handgun without a licence is an example of illicit
possession.
Illicit trafficking: The import, export, trans-shipment, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement ortransfer of arms, their parts and components, and ammunition from or across the territory of
one State to that of another State if any one of the States concerned does not authorize it inaccordance with national law of one of the countries involved or if the arms are not uniquely
marked upon manufacture and marked upon import. Arms that were not properly deactivatedaccording to the national legislation of the destination country can also be illicitly trafficked or
smuggled.

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29

Where to find this information: This information might be located inforensic ballistics units, law enforcement evidence storage and case files,
firearms focal points, gun crime intelligence centres, crime departments,or the judiciary, if the ammunition is presented as evidence in judicial
proceedings. In addition, this data may be stored in depots held by law
enforcement agencies, by the armed forces, or by customs, coast guard,
port and airport authorities.

30

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHSECTION A: DATA COLLECTION
To start the process of monitoring and diagnosing small arms ammunition
diversion, trafficking and misuse,8 the most important effort is to document
the various types of ammunition recovered from circumstances that could
be characterized as misuse, illicit possession or trafficking. The difference
between illicit possession and illicit trafficking is that the latter involves
unauthorized cross-border movement, whereas the former is definedby confiscations within national borders. This data-collection effort
can be considered a systematization of information extracted from theammunition recovered from crime scenes and from seizures in domestic
operations and at entry-exit points. Constructing this database relieson documenting, at a minimum, the different characteristics observedon the ammunition headstamps, the packaging and the accompanying
law enforcement reports, when available. The ammunition cartridges
and packaging will represent the hard evidence, whereas the reports willcontextualize the ammunition-specific findings. These two sources of data
are mutually reinforcing and deepen understanding of the relationshipbetween ammunition and armed violence.

8     Monitoring and diagnosing small arms ammunition diversion, trafficking and misuse is partof a project undertaken by UNIDIR’s Urban Violence work stream. For more information on
the project, see: https://unidir.org/projects/urban-violence-adapting-arms-control-newenvironments-1.

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31

Step 1.1: Ascertain safety risk in the place of data collection 9
When planning to handle small arms ammunition as physical evidence,
it is imperative to follow all necessary safety prevention procedures, inaccordance with the specific conditions of the location. Before entering
the place of collection, the first step is to conduct a full risk assessmentof the site or storage facility and secure supervision and clearance from acompetent specialized officer or Ammunition Technical Officer. Small arms
ammunition might be stored in locations or storage facilities that may also
contain explosive conventional ammunition, explosives (whether military,commercial, or homemade), explosive stores (detonators and detonatingcord), improvised explosive device components, or toxic industrial
chemicals and other elements that pose a safety risk, both for the persons
and the surroundings. Items beyond small arms ammunition fall outside thescope of this Handbook. Thus, items beyond small arms ammunition should
not be sampled or manipulated following the methodology outlined in thisdocument. As such, there should be no interaction with the working site
until a full risk assessment has been carried out by a competent Ammunition
Technical Officer, the appropriate mitigation measures have been taken, andthe site has been cleared for tasks outlined in this methodology to begin. In
addition, users are strongly advised to refrain from manipulating any firearmand should leave all clearance of firearms to qualified individuals.

932     This section should not be considered an exhaustive manual of safe operating practices, butrather illustrative of the minimum measures that should be considered before entering a scenethat could contain firearms, ammunition or explosives. To ensure the safety of users and thesurroundings, a full thorough risk assessment of the location must be completed by a competent
Ammunition Technical Officer.

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

More detailed guidance on safety in storage facilities is available in thefollowing publications:•

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, International
Ammunition Technical Guidelines•

UNIDIR, Utilizing the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines in
Conflict-Affected and Low-Capacity Environments

It is highly encouraged to handle all evidence with nitrile gloves. Nitrile
gloves serve two purposes: they prevent the transfer of material to theevidence, and they provide protection to the wearer from contamination
with hazardous materials such as body fluids, lead, gunshot residue andpropellant compositions. Users need to be particularly cautious whenhandling projectiles since, after impacting, recovered projectiles may becontaminated with body fluids or have exposed lead cores.
Additional safety measures:•

Users should take special precautions with biological residue fromevidence that might have been extracted from a deceased or injured
person.

•Gloves are sound measures to protect against biological residue, butusers should also consider wearing a mask and lenses.

•

If the research takes place inside an evidence storage locker or shooting
range where lead residue is prevalent, users should wear a mask to
avoid inhaling lead.

•

When possible, users should use tweezers to manipulate the evidence,as this adds another layer of separation between the user and theevidence.

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS

33

»

Users must use plastic tweezers (as opposed to metallic ones
or metallic ones covered with plastic tips) to avoid adding
individualizing marks to the ammunition cartridges recovered
as evidence, since the contact and movement between metallic
tweezers and ammunition can leave toolmarks and jeopardize
forensic ballistics analyses.

•

Any unfired ammunition which, on examination, is found to becorroded or otherwise damaged should be set aside for inspection
by a specialized officer or Ammunition Technical Officer. Cracked
cartridge cases or rounds with loose projectiles may cause thespillage of propellant, which is sensitive to flame, friction andelectrostatic discharge.

34

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Step 1.2: Collect the working materials•

The ammunition samples and the reports10 from which to extract theraw data•

Nitrile gloves to offer some protection to users•

Magnifying glasses to enhance the view of headstamp markings•

Chalk to enhance worn or erased markings for observation andphotography•

Plastic tweezers to hold ammunition without leaving individualizing
marks on the cartridges•

A magnet to help determine the composition or coating of ammunition
cartridge cases and bullets or determine the projectile type11•

A computer with spreadsheet access through which to input andsystematize the information•

A digital photographic camera and photo scales (a suitable ammunition
gauge or ruler could also be used in lieu of photo scales)•

Callipers (or ammunition gauges) for measuring cartridge case lengthand cartridge case head diameter to ensure correct calibre identification•

Record-keeping paper forms to document any and all physical evidence
manipulated (for more on chain of custody, see Box 4)1011

In other words, recovered ammunition and the accompanying law enforcement reports.
The magnet attracts ferrous materials.

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35

Step 1.3: Build the first spreadsheet
This step is crucial as it can be considered the research design. It will define
what characteristics will be extracted from the ammunition sample andaccompanying reports, and which ones will not. It is recommended that
this process undergoes a thorough national review to ensure all the desired
fields are considered. The first spreadsheet will have two parts, eachcorresponding to a different source of information: small arms ammunition
evidence and accompanying law enforcement reports. These sources of
information, once systematized into a spreadsheet, will represent Database
1: Evidence. To collect the desired information, a sample spreadsheet
template can be downloaded here.12 Alternatively, for users interested
in building an organic spreadsheet, some recommended data-collection
fields are as follows:
Information from recovered small arms ammunition (part 1 of
spreadsheet)•

Unique identifying number (assigned by the users)•

Case number (assigned by law enforcement)•

Number of identical ammunition cartridges, cases or complete rounds13•

Information point (crime scene, seizure in domestic operations, seizure
at entry-exit point)•

Type of evidence (projectile,14 fired or spent cartridge, live ammunition,or ammunition in manufacturers’ packaging)•Lot number•

All headstamp alphanumerical and monogram markings15, following
clockwise order documentation

12   The template can be downloaded at www.unidir.org/Profiling-Template13   The number of cartridges recorded in the spreadsheet should reflect the actual number in the
package or box and not just the nominal number printed on the packaging.
14   For ease of reference, this Handbook uses “projectiles” and “bullets” interchangeably. For more  
detailed guidance, see Jenzen-Jones (2018).
15   This Handbook encourages users to note the alphabet type in the ‘Additional comments’ field, if
more than one alphabets are documented

36

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH•

Import code, if any16•

Year of manufacture, if known•

Headstamp symbols,17 if any•

Country of manufacture, if known•

Manufacturer, if identifiable18•

Factory, if identifiable•

Exporter, if identifiable•

Importer, if identifiable•

Calibre19•

Length of cartridge case20•

Markings stamped on the body or groove of the cartridge case, if any21•

Composition or coating of the cartridge case (brass, steel, copper,
aluminium, iron, nickel, plastic, etc.)22•

Colour of primer annulus sealant, if any•

Projectile lacquer colour23•

Projectile shape (blunt nose, conical nose, hemispherical nose,
parabolic nose, ogive nose, sphere, pellet, etc.)•

Projectile type, purpose or function (ball, lead round nose, wad cutter,semi-wad cutter, semi-jacketed, full metal jacket, semi-jacketed hollow
point, jacketed hollow point, BB, BBB, etc.)

16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23

This Handbook refers to import codes as the markings added at the point of manufacture, uponrequest of the importer. Import codes are usually unique to the importing entity and would offer
important information, when available, to map the life cycle of the ammunition.
   For data inputting purposes, when there is no possibility to include a visual representation of theheadstamp symbols, a written description should be defined, included and used consistently, forexample “NATO four-pointed star”.
The name of the manufacturer could, at times, be confused with the brand (seller or distributor)of the ammunition; for example, ammunition headstamps may indicate manufacturer, whereas
the packaging may correspond to the seller or distributor. When recording this field, keep in mind
that this Handbook is interested in the manufacturer, defined as the producer of the ammunition,
as opposed to the commercial brand. Should this information be unclear or not available, users
are advised to consult with an expert or review the resources available in Part 3.
  As a reference for a calibre homologation framework, see: https://bobp.cip-bobp.org/fr/
homologation_public.
  To assess the case length, it is advisable to use a specialized ammunition gauge. In addition,
should there be any doubt regarding the exact calibre, measuring and recording the exact
cartridge case mouth internal diameter would assist in making a determination.
Markings stamped on the body of the cartridge are mostly present in shotgun cartridges (andshotgun waddings might also present useful information), but some manufacturers can, uponrequest, also mark the side or groove of all small arms ammunition cases with codes.
To discriminate between brass and steel, a magnet is necessary. Some ammunition gauges
already incorporate a magnet for this purpose.
This is not the colour of the bullet per se, but the code colour, which is usually painted orlacquered on the tip of the bullet. This code depends on the country or organization for which it
was manufactured (if applicable). For more detailed guidance, see Jenzen-Jones (2018).

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37

•

Notes on firing pin impressions, if any•

Fired by a registered firearm (yes/no)»

If yes, firearm identified and type of licence to be added toadditional comments•

Reloaded (yes/no)»

If yes, observations added to additional comments•

Photography digital file number24•

Additional comments

Contextual information from accompanying law enforcement reports(part 2 of spreadsheet)•

Report case number (assigned by law enforcement)•

Date of the crime or seizure (dd/mm/yyyy)•

Time of the crime or seizure (recommended time format is 24:00)•

Location of the crime or seizure
Household»Public space (port, airport, postal office, public road, building, etc.)•

Address or coordinates of the crime or seizure•

Situational context (if available)25

24
25

38

»

»

Organized crime related»

Gang-related»

Corporate crime-related»

Intimate partner/family-related»Inter-communal violence»

Terrorism related»

Civil unrest»

Other crime»

Not applicable»Not known

For general guidance on photographing ammunition, see Box 3.
Typology retrieved verbatim from the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes(ICCS) prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2015, p 99), see:https://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/doc15/BG-ICCS-UNODC.pdf

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH•

Outcome of the crime (harm caused in the crime scene)26»

Intentional homicide»

Femicide»

Attempted intentional homicide»

Non-intentional homicide»

Robbery»

Assault»

Destruction or damage to property»

Sexual violence»

Domestic violence or intimate partner violence»

Coercion»

Kidnapping»

Illicit discharge•

Gender of the victim (only for crime scenes)•

Sex of the victim (only for crime scenes)•

Age of the victim (only for crime scenes)•

Gender of the perpetrator•

Sex of the perpetrator•

Age of the perpetrator•

Perpetrator’s relationship to the victim (if applicable and only for crime
scenes)26»

Current intimate partner or spouse»

Former intimate partner or spouse»

Blood relative»

Other household member»

Friend»Acquaintance»Colleague or work relationship»

Authority or care relationship (doctor, nurse, police, etc.)

Typology informed by the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS)
prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2015), but not retrieved
verbatim. This typology is intended to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive. Users should
tailor this field to the national context and definitions stipulated in national legislation.

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS

39

•

•

»

Offender known to victim»

Offender unknown to victim»

Relationship not known

Incitement-related factors»

Alcohol»

Illicit drugs»

Gender related

»

Other

»

Not applicable»

Unknown

Reason for intervention or detection method»

Combination with other detected illicit activity

»

X-ray

»

Intelligence-led search»

Canine inspection»

Random control»

Behaviour unit»

Emergency services»

Gunshot detection systems»

Tip-lines or hotlines•

Concealment method (only for seizures)•

Outcome of intervention (only for seizures)»

Arrest for presumed illicit possession or illicit trafficking (only forseizures)

•

40

»

Charges filed, but person freed (only for seizures)»

Confiscation of ammunition (only for seizures)»

Pending further law enforcement investigation (only for seizures)»

Returned to owner

Direction of flow (only for seizures)»

Inbound: entering the country»

Outbound: leaving the country

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH•Country of origin or destination (only for seizures)•

Any available police intelligence generated from the scene of the crimeor seizure•

Additional comments
Box 1: Gender-based violence and the importance of gender 		disaggregated data collection
Gender-based violence (GBV) is a form of violence motivated by ordirected at victims solely because of their biological sex and/or gender
identity. Gender, in this case, is understood as a fluid continuum andencompasses those who identify as non-binary. GBV may include
physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and psychological abuse against
non-binary persons, men, women, boys and girls. As evidenced by thefindings of the Small Arms Survey, lethal violence, including firearmsrelated violence, is highly gendered. The majority of both victims andperpetrators of firearm violence are male, with most of the female victims
being killed as a result of GBV committed by men.1 The possession anduse of firearms and ammunition have been linked to both GBV andgender inequalities entrenched in society. Firearms and ammunition
may also exacerbate patriarchal conceptions of toxic masculinity, whichassociates the use of firearms and ammunition with cultural norms of
power and control.
Addressing GBV and, more specifically, the link between GBV and firearms
and ammunition, requires gender disaggregated data on victimization,
perpetration and other roles played in the facilitation of armed violence.
For this reason, it is important to include gender disaggregated indicatorsin all aspects of data collection. These indicators include those that may
be found in crime scene reports when profiling ammunition, including
gender of the perpetrator, gender of the victim, relationship between
perpetrator and victim, and any incitement-related or exacerbating
factors identified. It is also important to keep in mind that outcomes ofcrimes such as femicide or sexual violence can be indicative of GBV.
Gender disaggregated data collection provides a more nuanced
and refined understanding concerning the impact of firearms andammunition on gender equality. This information could also help
determine the levels of GBV committed both with and without firearms
and ammunition. Through the collection of gender disaggregated data
in ammunition profiling, we can better understand the role that firearms
and ammunition play in GBV. With this new evidence base, policymakers
and practitioners can better address the gendered aspects of armed
violence and ammunition proliferation and improve corresponding
national policies and programmes.
1

Alvazzi del Frate, Hideg and LeBrun (2020)

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41

Step 1.4: Design the research production line
Once the fields of information to be documented have been selected,
the primary evidence located, the workplace cleared following safety
protocols, and the sample defined and approved by national authorities,
users should organize their work to input the ammunition data in the mostefficient manner. A clear organization will allow users to document large
amounts of evidence in a short period of time and respect safety protocols.
However, should users prefer to integrate ammunition-specific datacollection practices into SOPs, authorities will generate this database overtime and facilitate time series analyses. In either case, users will likely needto accomplish a combination of the following tasks:•

Determine the universe of information, to define the evidence target.

•

Access loose ammunition, ammunition recovered in manufacturers’
packaging, and the law enforcement reports.

•

Photograph the ammunition sample.

•

Extract ammunition-related data and information from the reports.

•

Enter the data into the database.

•If applicable, repackage evidence in line with chain of custodyrequirements.

To accomplish these tasks, users could organize their profiling method ina research production line. For example, if the ammunition profiling effort
will be carried out at once, as opposed to integrated into national SOPs,
users could define specific roles for each one of the members of the teamand repeat them throughout the entire data-collection process, following
the principles of division of labour and specialization. As a preliminary
step, it is crucial to first count the total number of packages orevidence available (and confirm that none of the packages is empty) todetermine the scale of the universe of information. Such a benchmark

42

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

is then used to define a representative sample, otherwise referred toas the “evidence target”. This way, the user will be able to claim thatthe documented sample represented “X percent” of the entire pool of
all existent evidence (for more on sampling and defining the evidence
target, see section 2.1. Defining the Evidence Target).
After determining the universe of information and evidence target, and if ateam is working together to develop the ammunition profile, one user could
start the research production line by selecting the evidence and opening
the packaging, then the next user could photograph the ammunition (bothheadstamps and side-profile shots) and evaluate the cartridge and markings
to extract relevant information; a third user could input the raw data intoa spreadsheet. It is essential that one user is tasked with photographingeach individual piece of physical evidence, using photo scales (or a suitableammunition gauge or ruler) to capture the exact dimensions of the cartridge.
That user must also ensure that the photographic digital file numbers arerecorded next to the corresponding ammunition entry in the database, inorder to verify the data entered afterwards (for more detailed guidance on
photographic ammunition, see Box 3).
Once the documentation process is completed, each piece of evidence, if
applicable, must be re-stored safely in keeping with national requirements
for maintaining the integrity of the chain of custody (for more detailed
guidance on chain of custody, see Box 4). Afterwards, a new entry in the
database would begin with all users repeating the same task, but with adifferent ammunition exhibit. This repetition will allow the team to process
information rapidly and develop dexterity in their respective tasks. It is
recommended that only one piece of evidence or report should be open ata time to avoid misplacing evidence or mixing cases. Orderly operations are
key to the safety of users and the location.

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Alternative research production options
An alternative method for sustainable data collection is integrating some ofthese considerations into the SOPs of national authorities, for example atthe forensic ballistics or crime laboratories. If the above-mentioned data iscollected from a database at the same time as the ballistic information isprocessed, authorities will generate this database over time and facilitate
time series analyses. This option may be the most practical approach incountries where the volume of evidence is high. This approach, however,requires inter-agency coordination and data sharing, as usually no single
entity, including the crime labs, would have access all data points.
To counter the often-siloed nature of public security efforts, theestablishment of a Firearms Focal Point (FFP) or gun crime intelligencecentre, can be leveraged to centralize ammunition data and build a common
framework for inter-agency collaboration. An FFP can streamline datacollection and provide enhanced intelligence to tackle armed violence.
Where an FFP exists, this entity could be well-positioned to lead andconsolidate ammunition profiling efforts. In jurisdictions where no FFP
exists, but there is interest in creating one, starting an ammunition
profiling Task Force could inexpensively set the foundations for the
future establishment of a more comprehensive FFP, while moving theissue of inter-agency collaboration and ammunition profiling forward.27
The Small Arms Survey has been piloting the feasibility of performing
ammunition profiling by extracting relevant data contained in the Automatic
Ballistics Identification System used by some countries. The profiling
method pioneered by the Small Arms Survey consists of extracting the“ammunition profiling-relevant data” from these automated systems, which
the system acquires automatically when running ballistics correlations,and then offloading the data into a database. It is a method designed to
27 For an example of a Firearms Focal Point initiative, provided by Arquebus Solutions, see: https://arquebus.uk/firearms-focal-points/

44

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

avoid the labour-intensive task of inputting data, cartridge by cartridge,
into a spreadsheet. This method is potentially applicable for jurisdictions
that systematically upload all their cartridges into an Automatic Ballistics
Identification System.

Box 2: Automatic Ballistics Identification Systems
industry cooperation
Ammunition profiling can be labour intensive and represent additional
work for jurisdictions that already upload all fired cartridge cases andprojectiles into the Automatic Ballistics Identification Systems (ABIS) ofdifferent technological suppliers. Thus, to avoid duplicating efforts, it isimportant to extract ammunition information where it is already available–such as, potentially, extracting data from the different ballistics
identification systems, when available and in jurisdictions where all recovered exhibits are systematically uploaded into these systems. Nonetheless, to streamline this work even further, it is important thatcommercially available ABIS embrace the ability to automaticallyacquire and systematize, using standardized lists to avoid inconsistencies or misidentifications, all fields necessary to generate baseline data on recovered ammunition and/or the ammunition profilingdatabase. To achieve this, engaging with private industry and clearly expressing the needs emerging from public security, with a view to finding
practical solutions, is of utmost importance.
In addition, another important opportunity to cooperate with the ABIS
industry is to explore ways to make the different technological systems
communicate and exchange information among themselves, with enhanced agility; since, to date, proprietary data and non-interchangeable
formatting can represent a barrier to information sharing. This solve thischallenge it is important to engage with the ABIS industry to promote theuptake of a shared file format, allow for cross-platform intelligence-led
searches, and communicate emerging needs as the field of ammunition
evolves.

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Step 1.5: Document the sample of ammunition
Step 1.5.1: Document information from recovered small arms
ammunition
Example 1: Loose ammunition
This step consists of inputting the observed characteristics of ammunition
from the sample into the spreadsheet. This is precisely what the Handbook
refers to as “constructing a database from raw unprocessed data”. At thispoint, the users have designed the spreadsheet and can begin inputting
raw data from ammunition. For example, consider the photographs ofthe headstamps in Figure 3 as the first pieces of evidence that will be
documented.
Figure 3. Selected examples of small arms ammunition headstamps28
1

2

3

4

All the information in these headstamps can be distilled into precise data
entries and inputted into the spreadsheet (see Tables 2–6). These would
28

46

  Sources: The two headstamp photos on the top have been provided by Rodolfo Gamboa,
Senior Technical Officer at UNLIREC, and the two headstamp photos at the bottom by © Hardy
Giezendanner, UNIDIR Researcher.

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

be considered the first four entries in Database 1: Evidence. In Table 2, theheadstamps have been identified as follows: top-left with ID number 1, topright ID number 2, bottom-left ID number 3, and bottom-right ID number 4.
In Table 6, the associated digital photography file numbers 122, 123, 124 and125 have been added.
Table 2: Selected example of data input from case information
Case information
ID

Case Number

Number of rounds

Information Point

Type of Evidence

1

EXAMPLE

1

Crime Scene

Spent Cartridge

2

EXAMPLE

1

Crime Scene

Live ammunition

3

EXAMPLE

1

Crime Scene

Spent Cartridge

4

EXAMPLE

1

Crime Scene

Live ammunition

Tables 3–6: Selected examples of data input from loose ammunition
Lot number

All alphanumerical marking

Import codeYear

Symbols

Country

N/A

EP 00 9mm PARA

N/A

2000

N/A

BrazilN/A

G 00 5.56

N/A

2000

N/A

GuatemalaN/A

BOF 83 7.62x39

N/A

1983

N/A

Bangladesh

N/A

10 00

N/A

2000

N/A

Bulgaria

Manufacturer

Exporter

Importer

Factory

CalibreCBC

BrazilPeruvian ArmyCBC

9 x 19 mm PARAG

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

5.56 x 45 mm

BOF

Unknown

Unknown

Bangladesh OrdnanceFactory

7.62 x 39 mm

ArsenalUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

7.62 x 39 mm

Length of cartridge

Markings on the body

Composition/coating

Colour of primer

19 mm

N/A

Brass

N/A

45 mm

N/A

Brass

Green

39 mm

N/A

Unknown

Red

39 mm

N/A

UnknownRed

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Projectile
Shape

Projectile
Type/Purpose

Notes

Registeredfirearm

Photo digital
file number

Reloaded

Additionalcomments

N/A

N/A

N/A

Unknown

122

N

Manufactured
for the Armed
Forces

Ball

FMJ

N/A

N/A

123

N

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Unknown

124

N

N/A

Ball

FMJ

N/A

N/A

125

N

N/A

From the sample data outlined above, users can see how an overview ofsmall arms ammunition flows begins to take shape. For example, three outof the four documented exhibits were, most likely, manufactured in the year
2000. The more information that is entered into this database, the morereliable and informative the observed trends will be.29
Additionally, some loose ammunition samples might have identifying
markings stamped on the body or groove of the cartridge case, as Figure
4 shows. Although body or groove markings may be present in a minorityof cases, it is important for users to consider and document such markingsin the spreadsheet in its corresponding field, as this might facilitate crossreferencing and shed light on the origin of such rounds. It is also a goodmarking practice that ought to be replicated, when possible.

29

48

This Handbook recognizes that users might encounter ammunition markings that may need to be
documented and recorded using Cyrillic, Hebraic, Chinese and other characters and symbols thatare not included in the example above. The characters encountered will depend on the context
and the type of ammunition circulating in that environment or region.

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Figure 4: Markings stamped on the body or groove of the cartridge case30

Example 2: Ammunition in manufacturers’ packaging
In some cases, the ammunition will not be recovered as loose exhibits, but inthe presumed original packaging (boxes or crates) from the manufacturer.
While these cases might be the minority, original boxes or crates usuallycontain significantly more information than loose ammunition. For example,
lot-numbered boxes or packaging are, in principle, traceable, and they
expedite the inputting of data since all the ammunition cartridges contained
tend to be identical. To illustrate this point, consider the photographs of theboxes in Figure 5 as additional pieces of evidence that will be documented
in the spreadsheet. The first image corresponds to photography digital filenumber 133 in the spreadsheet example shown in Table 10, and the second
one has photography digital file number 134.

30

Source: Andre Desmarais, forensic ballistics experts at the Small Arms Survey. Note: (a) Example
of markings stamped on the body of a cartridge case. First digits: calibre. Second digits: code of
the merchant. (b) Example of individual marking in the groove of a cartridge case.

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49

Figure 5: Selected example of ammunition recovered in manufacturers’ packaging31
5

6

The information in these ammunition packaging boxes can be distilled into
precise data entries and inputted into the spreadsheet as shown in Tables
7–10. These would be considered the fifth and sixth entries into Database
1: Evidence.32

31

32

50

Sources: The photos on the top have been provided by the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Arms Embargo Cell (MONUSCOAEC), and the two photos at the bottom have been provided by Manuel Martinez Miralles, UNIDIR
Researcher.
For shotgun cartridges, the lot or batch number is, on occasions, printed on the inside of the
packaging rather than the outside.

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Table 7: Selected example of data input from case information
Case information
ID

Case Number

Number of rounds

Information Point

Type of Evidence

5

EXAMPLE

720

Seizure at entry-exit point

Packaging

6

EXAMPLE

25

Crime Scene

Packaging

Tables 8–10: Selected examples of data input from ammunition seized in
manufacturers’ packaging
Lot
numberAll alphanumericalmarking

Importcode

Year

Symbols

Country

Manufacturer

Exporter

68

N/A

N/A

1971

N/A

China

China - 964

Bulgaria

N/A

ARMUSA 16

N/A

2012

N/A

Spain

CARMUSA

Spain

Composition/coating

Colour ofprimerProjectile
ColourImporter

Factory

CalibreLength ofCartride

Markings
on the Body

DRC MoD

964

7.62 x 39 mm

39 mm

N/A

Iron

Red

No colour

Unknown

CARMUSA

16GA

67 mm

ARMUSA 16

Plastic

Red

N/A

Projectile
Shape

Projectile
Type/Purpose

Notes

Registeredfirearm

Photodigital filenumberReloaded

Additional comments

Ball

FMJ

N/A

N.A

133

N

Type 56 assault rifle

Pellets

BB

N/A

N/A

134

N

Hunting

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Box 3: Guidance on photographing ammunition
Capturing the ammunition recovered as evidence in a photograph will leave anenduring record for subsequent analysis and verification. It is of utmost importance to photograph all unique cartridges since this represents the main
quality assurance mechanism built into the methodology. If photographedcorrectly, the related data entered can then be verified (or even deciphered
when in doubt) by an individual expert or group of experts, as long as there is aphotographic record linked to the ammunition data. The ability to corroborate
the data collected from the physical ammunition exhibits will be dependent on
the quality of the photos taken and the use of measuring equipment such as
photo scales (or a ruler) to demonstrate the measurements of the cartridge.
Photos showing case length against a scale are imperative to confirm calibre.
Therefore, each unique cartridge ought to be photographed at least twice, with
one image capturing the headstamp and the second capturing the side-profile of the cartridge positioned against a scale or ruler (or an alternative unitof measurement). In addition, a clear electronic photo can be enlarged on acomputer afterwards and be used to identify particularities such as character
spacing, curving or effaced markings. As such, it is crucial to imbed a step into
the methodology for taking good quality photographs. Some general pointerson photographing ammunition are as follows:
•
•
•
•

•

Ensure that the photography area is well lit and that the item is in focus.
Photograph each unique ammunition sample individually and try to remove
all other objects from the background.
For each unique ammunition sample, capture the entire headstamp, keeping around 150 mm of distance between the camera lens and the headstamp.
For each unique ammunition sample, capture the cartridge on its sideagainst a ruler or photo scale, with the rim of the cartridge placed at the 0
cm mark of the unit of measurement.
» Ensure the photo captures all the markings on the side of the cartridge
case, when available.
Ensure that each photograph’s digital file number is integrated or linked tothe corresponding ammunition entry in the spreadsheet.

Detailed guidance on photographing small arms ammunition can be found in
the following open sources:• James Bevan (Small Arms Survey), Ammunition Tracing Kit, p. 20.
• United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context: A Handbook for United Nations DDR
Practitioners, annex 6.

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Figure 6: How to photograph headstamps33

Figure 7: How to photograph cartridge length34

33 Source: Bevan 2008a (Small Arms Survey).
34 Source: Bevan 2008a (Small Arms Survey).

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Step 1.5.2: Document contextual information from the accompanying
law enforcement reports
Example 1: Crime scene reports
The headstamps presented in example 1 of Step 1.5.1, if recovered from acrime scene, will most likely be accompanied by a report prepared by law
enforcement. Such a report, if it exists, will contain valuable information since
it will contextualize the crime scene and offer a glimpse into the conflating
factors that enable lethal outcomes in incidents of armed violence. If thereport is available, the users should also attempt to systematize informationin the spreadsheet. For example, consider the fictitious report below.
Crime scene report: Fictitious example
On Monday, 17 March 2020, a 22-year-old male was found dead-onarrival at 45 Excel Street in the Sugar District. The body presents
entry and exit bullet wounds and was found lying near the porch ofresidence 43. One spent cartridge casing was recovered from thescene, which was submitted for forensic analysis under voucher
number Ev-A-500. No projectiles were recovered. Neighbours
claim to have heard the victim arguing with another male and thena single gunshot at 23:00. No firearm was found in the surrounding
areas. The neighbour of the victim who alerted the police hadcalled earlier in the night to file a noise complaint. The initial report
indicated the presence of two males and a woman outside theresidence. Empty alcohol containers were found in the vicinity ofthe presumed scene of the crime.
The information from the extract can be systematized as follows in Tables
11 and 12.

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Tables 11 and 12: Example of data input from a crime scene report
Date of crime/
seizureTime

Location

Address/
coordinates

Situational
Context

Outcome of thecrime/intervention

Gender ofVictimSex ofVictim3/17/2020

23:00

Public45 Excel St.

Community
relatedHomicide

Male

Male

Age ofVictimGender ofperpetrator

Sex ofperpetrator

Age ofperpetrator

Perpetrator’s relation
to the victim

Incitement
related factor

22

Unknown

Male

Unknown

Known to victim

Alcohol

The information recorded maintains the anonymity of the victim, theperpetrator and the reporting officer yet documents important information
to contextualize the recovery of the spent cartridge casings. Please notethat this research methodology is designed to uncover patterns and trends,
not to solve specific criminal cases. The same process of imputing data fromlaw enforcement reports also applies to reports from seizures in domestic
operations and reports from seizures at entry-exit points.
Example 2: Seizure in domestic operations reports
Similarly, the boxes of ammunition presented in Figure 5, if recovered froma seizure, would most likely be accompanied by a report prepared by thenational authorities that conducted the interception. Such a report, if itexists, will contain valuable information since it will contextualize the law
enforcement intervention and offer a glimpse into the conflating factorsthat enabled unauthorized possession and potential lethal outcomes. If
the report is available, the users should also attempt to systematize its
information into the spreadsheet. For example, consider the fictitious report
below. Please note, in some contexts, due to pressing circumstances, limited
capacity or practices, or incomplete understanding of the information athand, there will not be a report accompanying the evidence (or it will not bemade available), or it could contain inaccurate information or informationthat was corrected in the subsequent stages of the investigation. In such

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55

contexts, users might only have access to a depot with the recovered or
seized ammunition. When faced with this limitation, users should still
document the primary evidence and continue with the other databases.
Law enforcement report: Fictitious example
On Monday, 17 March 2020, at 04:00, a 21-year-old female and a
22-year-old male were stopped for driving a motorcycle without
a vehicle licence. The police stopped the motorcycle when
passing through the checkpoint located on Lemon Avenue in
the Sugar District. During a routine examination, the female wasfound in possession of a box of ammunition, without appropriate
documentation. The ammunition was found in her purse. The
female argued she was carrying the ammunition for her uncle, who
is a hunter. The male denied any knowledge. The female was taken
into custody for presumed illicit possession and the evidence
submitted for processing under voucher number H-1-ma-2020.

The information from the extract can be systematized as follows in Tables
13 and 14.
Tables 13 and 14: Excel example of data input from a law enforcement seizure
reportDate of crime/seizure

Time

Location

Address/
coordinates

Situational
Context

Outcome of thecrime/intervention

Genderof Victim

Sex ofVictimAge ofVictim17/03/2020

4:00

PublicAv. El Limon,
Sugar DistricUnknown

Illicit poessession

N/A

N/A

N/A

Gender ofperpetrator

Sex ofperpetrator

Age ofperpetrator

Perpetrator’s relation
to the victim

Incitement
related factor

Concealment
MethodFemaleFemale

21

N/A

N/A

Purse

56

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

The information recorded maintains the anonymity of both the presumed
unauthorized user and the reporting officer yet documents the necessary
information to contextualize the seized boxes of ammunition presented.
Please note that this research methodology is designed to uncover patterns
and trends, not to solve specific criminal cases. By building the database,case by case, patterns and trends in how ammunition moves within
national borders or across national borders will start to form.
Box 4: Continuity and integrity of the chain of custody
All evidence must be managed in accordance with national processes
and procedures, as determined by the competent national authority.
Following guidelines from national authorities in terms of record-keeping
as well as examining, resealing, re-stamping and signing evidence
packages from criminal procedures will protect the continuity of thechain of custody. It is also recommended that users have a parallelsystem of record-keeping, ensuring that every piece of physical evidence
retrieved and examined from an evidence package is re-stored in thesame conditions. At the end of the working session, these records
ought to be signed by everyone involved, confirming the integrity ofthe evidence packages as witnessed by the active participants. The
entire process ought to be photographically documented, startingwith the evidence itself and including the packaging and its handling. A
good quality photographic record can make evidence available to moreenhanced analysis from other subject matter experts and act as credible
documentation to corroborate findings. As a general rule, to protect the
integrity of evidence collected and the chain of custody, it is advisable
to only open one evidence package at a time, thus preventing evidence
from one case mixing with that from another.
The precautions outlined above follow the prerequisite of obtaining
the necessary clearances from the competent national authorities to
examine the evidence collected from crime scenes. Such clearances may
also need to clarify whether other work related to the cartridge cases
has already been done and that the evidence in question is “free” for the
profiling documentation. In other words, users should not manipulate,handle or interfere with cartridges that are currently earmarked forfingerprinting and/or DNA lifting or otherwise jeopardize the value ofphysical evidence, since this could interfere with ongoing crime scene
and forensic examinations in open cases. For more detailed guidance on
preserving the chain of custody and the value of physical evidence, theUnited Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has made the “Crime scene
and physical evidence awareness for non-forensic personnel” e-bookfreely available here.

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SECTION B: DATA ANALYSIS
Step 1.6: Analyse the data
After inputting primary information from crime scenes, seizures in domestic
operations and seizures at entry-exit points into the database, users should
proceed with analysing the data. The question here becomes: Whatshould users look for? This section is intended to act as a guide to thedifferent analyses and summary statistics that could be extracted from thedatabase. The following guide is not comprehensive, but rather illustrativeof the findings that might be possible to extract. This section also limits
its scope to the more accessible statistical methodologies using standard
spreadsheet options. The discussion explores field by field what useful
information could be extracted to build a profile of ammunition.
Time series analyses, when possible, offer a more comprehensive anddynamic picture, as opposed to a static reflection of one particular point intime. That is, for any and all fields to be analysed, should the data represent
a sizeable time period, then a separate breakdown per natural year, fiscal
year, quarter or month would shed light on chronological trends andpatterns.
Step 1.6.1: Analyse information from recovered small arms
ammunition•

Number of identical ammunition cartridges: At a minimum, thiscolumn should be summed in its entirety to compute the total numberof ammunition rounds documented.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

The total number of pieces of evidence collected cross-referenced
against, and divided by, the total number of cases documented, will
yield the ratio of ammunition-related evidence per case. This figure canbe further disaggregated by information point (see below).

58

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH•

Information point: The information points of crime scene, seizure indomestic operations and seizure at entry-exit point should be placedin a drop-down menu (see screenshot) to isolate entries from each ofthese sources of data. For example, authorities might be interested
in isolating data from crime scenes only and treating the other two
information points (ammunition seized in domestic operations and atentry-exit points) as separate units of analyses. This field will allow forsuch separation.

•

Type of evidence: This field should be grouped by the type of evidencecollected – that is, projectile, spent cartridge, live ammunition, or
ammunition in manufacturers’ packaging. A percentage distribution will
suffice. This field will yield the distribution of the type of ammunitionrelated evidence recovered and could be informative of local dynamics
surrounding crimes committed with firearms and unauthorized
possession.

•

Lot number: This field should be grouped by the different lot numbers
or batch numbers documented. Lot-numbered boxes or packaging are,in principle, traceable and researchers should leverage the lot numbers
documented to recreate, as much as possible, the supply chain byrequesting confirmation from the relevant authorities. This field canshed light on the legal origin, supply chain, and intended end-user ofthe documented ammunition.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin and/or intended end user, the findings from this column should be crossreferenced to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
•

All headstamp alphanumerical and monogram markings: This
field will serve as the baseline of information from the headstamp
markings, which will be disaggregated in the fields that follow. In caseof uncertainty, this field will act as the reference for double-checking
correct identification of the desired fields, including manufacturer,

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59

codes and symbols. Not all recovered evidence will have alphanumericalor monogram markings.
•

Import code: This field should be grouped by the different importcodes documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on theorigin and/or intended end user of recovered ammunition that was
legally imported into the country. Not all recovered evidence will havean identifiable import code.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin and/or intended end user, the findings from this column should be crossreferenced to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
•

Year of manufacture: This field should be grouped by year of
manufacture. A percentage distribution will shed light on the age of themarked ammunition. This field will showcase the lifespan of some of
the ammunition recovered and could be useful in developing a “timefrom manufacture to crime” indicator for small arms ammunition use.
Not all recovered evidence will have an identifiable year of manufacture.
In the absence of year of manufacture markings, age can be estimatedby contacting the ammunition manufacturer or by cross-referencing
batch or lot numbers (if identified) against records.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin
and/or intended end user, the findings from this column should becross-referenced to the findings from the same column in Database 2:
Records.
•

Headstamp symbols: This field should be grouped by symbols. This field
will support identification of the legal origin and/or original intended end
user (and possibly the supply structure) of the ammunition documented.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin and/or
original intended end user, the findings from this column should be crossreferenced to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.

60

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH•Country of manufacture: This column should be grouped by thedifferent countries of manufacture documented. A percentage
distribution will shed light on the origin of the ammunition documented.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal
origin, the findings from this column should be cross-referenced
to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
•

Manufacturer: This field should be grouped by the different
manufacturers’ markings identified. On most occasions, this field
will be populated with the interpreted name of the manufacturer,
yet confirmation will require additional research, cross-referencing
and outreach to the presumed manufacturers. In some cases, thesemarkings can also help indicate the brand of the ammunition, which
is sometimes different for commercial purposes. A percentage
distribution will shed light on the more prevalent manufacturers (andassociated brands) of the ammunition documented.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin and/or intended end user, the findings from this column should be crossreferenced to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
•

Factory: This column should be grouped by the different factories
documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on the origin
and/or intended end user of the ammunition documented.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin and/or intended end user, the findings from this column should be crossreferenced to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
•

Exporter: This field should be grouped by the different exporters
documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on the origin of
the documented ammunition that was legally imported into the country.

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CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal
origin, findings from this column should be cross-referenced
to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
•

Importer: This field should be grouped by the different importers
documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on the intended
end user of the documented ammunition that was legally imported into
the country. If the jurisdiction under observation is not a producer of
ammunition, the absence of import references or documentation could
be an indication of illicit trafficking. As such, it is important to closely
monitor the “unknowns” documented in this field and cross-reference
them with Database 2: Records.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the intended
end user, the findings from this column should be cross-referenced
to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
•

Calibre: This field should be grouped by the calibres documented. A
percentage distribution will shed light on the more prevalent calibres
documented in the different information points. For a more detailed
analysis, each calibre may be analysed by itself and cross-referenced
against likely manufacturers and relevant data from law enforcement
reports.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin and/or intended end user, the findings from this column should be crossreferenced to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of therelationship between firearms-related crime and calibres, thefindings from this column should be cross-referenced to thecrime scene reports: address or coordinates, situational context,
outcome of the crime, perpetrator’s relationship to the victim,
and any available police intelligence, among other information.

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHNOTE

To assist in correct and consistent calibre identification, a frame ofreference can be useful, whether that is a local frame of reference or aninternational one. Such a frame of reference can include the dimensions,specificities, glossary and exact name of the calibres, detailing how to
input them into the spreadsheet. It is recommended that this field,
given its importance, is identified in coordination with a specialist inforensic ballistics or a competent individual with specialized knowledge.
•

Length of cartridge case: This field will inform the calibre determinationof a particular ammunition sample, when in doubt.
»

Similarly, if the cartridge case head diameter is measured andrecorded, it would also confirm correct calibre identification.

•

Markings stamped on the body or groove of the cartridge case: This
field will serve as complementary information from available markings
on the body or groove of a cartridge case. In case of uncertainty, thisfield will act to provide additional information and correct identificationof the available fields, including manufacturer, codes and calibre. Not all
recovered evidence will have alphanumerical or monogram markings.

•

Composition or coating of the cartridge case: This field can informthe origin (some materials are characteristic of manufacturing regions)and the purpose of the cartridge and/or calibre of a particular evidence
sample, when in doubt.

•

Colour of primer annulus sealant: This column should be grouped by
the different colour rings identified. The colour of the primer annulus
sealant can, on certain occasions, shed light on the authorized end userand end use of the ammunition, as some authorized end users and uses
are assigned particular colours.

•

Projectile lacquer colour: This field should be grouped by the different
projectile colours documented. Projectile colours are important asthey might be an indication of the cartridge load and the organization
for which it was produced, and, potentially, shed light on the purpose of
the ammunition round.

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•

Projectile shape: This field should be grouped by the different projectile
shapes documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on the
more prevalent projectile shapes of the ammunition documented.
Projectile shapes are important as they might be an indication of the
cartridge type and could shed light on the purpose of the ammunitionround.

Figure 8: Examples of projectile shapes35•

Projectile type, purpose or function: This field should be groupedby the different projectile types, purposes or functions identified. A
percentage distribution will shed light on the more prevalent projectile
types, purposes or functions from the ammunition documented.
Projectile types are important as they might be an indication of the
cartridge function, thus assisting determination of the purpose of theammunition round. Please note that unless the ammunition is recovered
in its packaging, it is difficult to determine projectile type (load) without
cutting it or x-raying it.

35

64Graphic provided by Rodolfo Gamboa, Senior Technical Officer at UNLIREC.

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

•

Notes on firing pin impressions: The notes of the firing pin impressions
can be used for identifying class characteristics (rectangular, circular,etc.) on specific samples of evidence. For example, a Glock pistol may
leave rectangular firing pin impressions. After systematically recoding
notes on the firing pin impressions, specific patterns might emerge
from the qualitative observations. This observation requires training
in forensic ballistics or specialized knowledge. As such, competentballistics examiners should provide guidance when recording this fieldand could, for example, point to cases of misfires.

•

Fired by a registered firearm: This field should be grouped by “yes”
or “no” responses. This field will shed light on the licensing dynamics
of crimes committed with firearms, highlighting the proportion ofcrimes committed with registered or with unregistered firearms fromthe documented sample. Every jurisdiction defines “registered firearm”
differently, and when completing this field, the national definition of thejurisdiction under observation should prevail. The term is used here as
an indication of a legally acquired and appropriately licensed firearm.
Any remarks related to this field should be included in the “additionalcomments” column.
»

For example, ballistics reports can, on occasion, link fired
ammunition from crime scenes to test fired cartridge cases
or bullets that are stored in national firearms registries. This ispossible in jurisdictions where every firearm that is legally imported
or acquired and licensed is test fired and imaged onto a databasethat is later cross-checked against any fired casings or bullets
recovered from shooting incidents.

•

Reloaded: This field should be grouped by “yes” or “no” responses. If
a large percentage of the ammunition recovered from a crime scenesuggests that the sample has been reloaded, this could be indicativeof a challenge with illicit manufacture. Notes from this field should
be systematically documented under “additional comments”. ThisHANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS

65

observation requires specific training in forensic ballistics. Some fields
to keep in mind while collecting the data or performing the analysis
could be:»Original or new cartridge»

Sophisticated or rudimentary reloading work (e.g. made with apress, versus basic work made with a hammer)•»

Perfectly suitable (industrial-made) projectile or home-made bullet»

Any new or secondary markings on the reloaded roundPhotography digital file number: The digital file numbers of thephotos taken from the cartridges and ammunition in manufacturers’
packaging should be recorded in the database next to the information
extracted from the sample. This way, the photos will act as a record
documentation and as the main quality assurance mechanism of thesample and will clarify any questions that might arise when cleaning
and analysing the data.

•

Additional comments: The additional comments should be used
for contextual information on specific samples of evidence. Specificnoteworthy patterns might emerge from the qualitative observations.

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Step 1.6.2: Analyse contextual information from the accompanying
law enforcement reports•

Date of the crime: This column should be organized in chronologicalorder. This column will shed light on the temporal dynamics of crimes
committed with firearms or seizures in either domestic operations orat entry-exit points.

•

Time of the crime: This column should be organized by time distribution.
This distribution will shed light on the temporal dynamics of crimes
committed with firearms or seizures in either domestic operations orat entry-exit points.

•

Geographical location of the crime: This column should be organizedby either “household” or “public” space. This will shed light on the spatial
dynamics of crimes committed with firearms and of illicit possession ortrafficking.

•Address or coordinates: This field should be geo-localized to enable
identification of spatial hotspots of crimes committed with firearms orof illicit possession or trafficking.

•Situational context: This field should be grouped by the different
circumstances identified. This field will shed light on the environmental
and societal factors that facilitate or drive crimes committed with
firearms, as well as illicit possession and trafficking.

•Outcome of the crime: This column should be organized by thephysical harm caused to the victim. This distribution will shed light on
the more recurrent outcomes after an incident involving a firearm.

•

Gender of the victim: This column should be organized by the gender
identification of the victim. This column will shed light on the gendered
dynamics behind victims of crimes committed with firearms.

•

Sex of the victim: This column should be organized by the sex of thevictims. This column will shed light on the sex dynamics of victims ofcrimes committed with firearms.

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•

Age of the victim: This column should be grouped by the age
distribution of the victim. This column will shed light on the age
distribution of victims of crimes committed with firearms.

•

Gender of the perpetrator: This column should be organized by thegender identification of the perpetrator. This column will shed light on
the gendered dynamics behind perpetrators of crimes committed with
firearms.

•

Sex of the perpetrator: This column should be organized by the sexof the perpetrator. This column will shed light on the sex dynamics ofperpetrators of crimes committed with firearms.

•

Age of the perpetrator: This column should be grouped by the age
distribution of the perpetrator. This column will shed light on the age
distribution of perpetrators of crimes committed with firearms.

•

Perpetrator’s relationship to the victim: The relationship of theperpetrator to the victim should be used for contextual information.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!

Specific noteworthy patterns might emerge from thequalitative observations in Databases 3: Illicit manufacture
and Databases 4: Interviews with affected communities.
•

Incitement-related factors: This field should be grouped by thedifferent incitement-related factors identified. This field will shed lighton the environmental and societal factors that provoke, facilitate or cooccur with crimes committed with firearms or with illicit possession ortrafficking.

•Reason for intervention or detection methods: This column should
be organized by a typology of law enforcement or border control
actions that concluded in the discovery of the crime scene or the
seizure of ammunition. This distribution will shed light on the different
dynamics behind discovering crime scenes and illicit trafficking andbehind controls at entry-exit points and other approaches that haveresulted in seizures.

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

•

Concealment method: This column should be organized by thedifferent concealment methods identified. This distribution will shedlight on the dynamics and concealment modalities surrounding illicit
possession or trafficking.

•Outcome of interception: This column should be organized according
to the resulting consequences faced by the presumed unauthorized
holder or trafficker. This distribution will shed light on the more recurrent
outcomes after a seizure of ammunition in domestic operations or atentry-exit points.

•

Direction of flow (inbound/outbound): This column should beorganized by the intended flow of the seized ammunition, either
inbound (attempting to enter the country) or outbound (attempting
to leave the country). A percentage distribution will shed light on the
dynamics behind unauthorized movement of ammunition.

•

Country of origin or destination: This column should be organizedby the different countries identified. For inbound flows, the country oforigin should be documented. For outbound flows, the intended countryof destination should be documented. A percentage distribution of thecountries identified will shed light on the dynamics behind unauthorized
movement of ammunition. Please note that, for inflows, this field refers
to the country of ‘immediate’ origin, not necessarily the country of
production.

•

Any available police intelligence generated from the scene of thecrime: This field should be used for contextual information. Specificnoteworthy patterns might emerge from the qualitative observations.

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DATABASE TWO:RECORDS

70

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHDATABASE 2: RECORDS

Justification: Database 2: Records will generate a picture of the ammunition
legally imported, manufactured in-country and stockpiled in the country,
which will serve as a benchmark for comparison against Database 1:
Evidence, with its information regarding misuse, illicit possession andtrafficking.
Information points: This database will be built from the following
information points: (a) records of ammunition imports, (b) records ofammunition manufactured in-country and (c) records of ammunition
stocks.36 In contexts with a documented history of diversion fromammunition stored or earmarked for destruction, it might be important todocument those holdings in addition to the active stocks.
Where to find this information: These records might be stored by different
national agencies. For example, the records of ammunition imports might
be stored in the offices that regulate international trade of ammunition
or in the records departments of the armed forces or law enforcement
supply units. When available from the Arms Trade Treaty reports, focal
points can provide information on which entities issue national control lists,

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71

authorize imports or keep records of ammunition imports (e.g. it could be
the ministry of interior, the ministry of defence, or the ministry of tradeor commerce). Records of ammunition manufactured in-country might
be stored by the offices that authorize domestic production, the records
department of the armed forces, or State-owned or private ammunition
manufacturers. Records of ammunition stocks might be kept by private
security companies, law enforcement, or armed forces logistical corps orrecords departments; if these records are not available or are insufficiently
detailed, then the characteristics of ammunition in the authorized civilian
and nationally owned stockpiles may need to be physically documented.

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHSECTION A: DATA COLLECTION
To continue the process of monitoring and diagnosing small arms ammunition
diversion, trafficking and misuse,37 it is important to document the various
types of ammunition legally imported, manufactured and stockpiled in the
country. It is important to document the supply of legal ammunition since
it will provide a benchmark of information to compare against findings fromother databases. It is crucial to have this benchmark of legal ammunition
because the overwhelming majority of ammunition involved infirearms-related incidents and of ammunition that is illegally held or
trafficked had a legal origin and was diverted to unauthorized users at
some point during its life cycle. As such, it is important to understand thetypes of ammunition that are legally available in the area of interest. This
step can also be considered a systematization of information available fromthe records of ammunition imports, ammunition manufactured in-country,
and existent stocks. Constructing this database relies on documenting thedifferent characteristics of the ammunition, the information relevant to its
approval process, and the different entities to which the ammunition was
allocated. This database will consist of a systematization of records, andeach entry will constitute a separate line in the spreadsheet, as detailedin Step 2.1. The more disaggregated and individualized the entries, thericher the data set.

37

Monitoring and diagnosing small arms ammunition diversion, trafficking and misuse is partof a project undertaken by UNIDIR’s Urban Violence work stream. For more information on
the project, see: https://unidir.org/projects/urban-violence-adapting-arms-control-newenvironments-1.

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Step 2.1: Build the second spreadsheet
This step is crucial as it can be considered the research design for the second
spreadsheet. It will define which characteristics will be extracted from therecords of ammunition and which ones will not. It is recommended that thisprocess undergoes a thorough national review process to ensure all thedesired fields are considered. This database could require three information
points: (a) records of ammunition imports, (b) records of ammunition
manufactured in-country and (c) records of ammunition stocks. However,keep in mind that these records might not all be held by one agency and thatthe records themselves might not be standardized. These compilationsof all the records, once systematized into a spreadsheet, will represent
Database 2: Records. To enable collection of the desired information, somerecommended spreadsheets fields follow:

74•

Unique identifying number (assigned by the users)•

Record or file number (assigned by the national authorities)38•

Number of live ammunition rounds•

Information point»

Records of ammunition imports»

Records of ammunition manufactured in-country»

Records of ammunition stocks•

Country of manufacture•

Manufacturer•

Factory•

Exporting country•

Exporter•Transit country•

Importing country•

Importer

38

Record or file number assigned by national authorities should be documented by the users andincluded in the spreadsheet for referencing and record-keeping, quality assurance, and future
verification purposes. This number identifies the record or document under examination. The
record of file number will only be used to referencing research purposes.  

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH•Point of entry (for imports only)•

Lot number or batch number•

Calibre•All headstamp alphanumerical and monogram markings•

Symbols•

Import code•

Year of manufacture•

Year of import•

Date of receipt•

Licensing entity•

Authorized end user•

Stockholder•

End-use additional information

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Step 2.2: Document the sample of ammunition records
Example 1: Records of ammunition imports
The records of ammunition imports might have different formats but will
most likely contain most of the information suggested below. If the records
are made available, users should attempt to systematize information into a
spreadsheet. For example, consider the fictitious report below.
Ammunition import record: Fictitious Example - file AA0001
Under authority granted by Law XX, the Homeland National Office
for Trade Control, Department of Sensitive Defence Materiel,
hereby authorizes the request from the National Police, Northern
Department, to procure and import ammunition, as requested ininternational tender #34-AM-2017, from the selected bidder. Thisapproval should be communicated to Customs Authorities at
Port Victoria for coordination of the importation of the controlledmateriel as expressed in the memorandum reference #688-2017,with notice of transit authorization through Middleland.
International tender #34-AM-2017 was awarded to Distantland–
Central Factory through Ammo Group 6 to produce five lots of
10,000 rounds of 5.56 x 45 mm (STANAG 4172) with an action dateof 16 October 2017. The ammunition shall be marked with the yearand “PNP”.
While the extract presented above might seem vague, it presents significant
information. The information from the extract can be systematized assuggested in Tables 15–17.

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Tables 15–17: Example of data input from ammunition import records
File
NumberNumber of live
ammunition rounds

Information
Point

Country of
Manufacture

Manufacturer

Factory

Exporting
CountryAA000150,000

ImportDistantland

N/A

CentralDistantland

Exporting
EntityTransitCountry

Importing
Country

ImporterPoint of
Entry

Lot/Batch
NumberCalibreAlphanumerical
Markings

Symbols

Ammo
Group 6

Middleland

HomelandNational
Office for
Trade

Port
Victoria

Unknown

5.56 x45 mm

PNP 17

N/A

ImportCodeYear of
Manufacture

Year of
ImportDate ofReciept

Licensing
EntityAuthorized

Stockholder

End-useadditional information

PNP

2017

2017

Unknown

National
Office for
Trade

PNP
Northern

PoliceN/A

Example 2: Records of ammunition manufactured in-country
The records of ammunition production approvals might have different
formats but will most likely contain most of the information outlined below.
If the records are made available, users should attempt to systematize
information into the spreadsheet created with the fields outlined below. For
example, consider the fictitious report below.
Records of ammunition manufactured in-country: Fictitious
Example - file AA0002
Under authority granted by Law XX, the Office of Defence Materielof the Armed Forces hereby extends the Military Industries
Manufacturing Plant the instruction to produce 9 x 19mm
ammunition, as outlined in strategic reference document #07AMB-15. This order grants authorization for the manufacturing of
12 lots of 1,000,000 rounds, with the corresponding Armed Forces(AF) marking in the headstamp, plus the year of manufacture. Thisapproval should be executed immediately and delivered to the
National Strategic Stockpile as envisioned in the five-year supply
plan for calendar year 2015.

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The information from the extract can be systematized as suggested
in Tables 18–20.
Tables 18–20: Example of data input from records of ammunition manufactured
in-country
File
NumberNumber of live
ammunition rounds

Information
Point

Country of
Manufacture

Manufacturer

Factory

Exporting
CountryAA0002

12,000,000

Manufacture
in country

Domestic

Military
Industries

Military
Industries

N/A

Exporting
EntityTransitCountry

Importing
Country

ImporterPoint of
Entry

Lot/Batch
NumberCalibreAlphanumerical
Markings

Symbols

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Unknown

9x
19 mm

AF 15

N/A

ImportCodeYear of
Manufacture

Year of
ImportDate ofReciept

Licensing
EntityAuthorized

Stockholder

End-useadditional information

N/A

2015

N/A

N/A

Office ofDefence

Armed
ForcesArmed
ForcesNational Strategic
Stockpile

The information recorded paints a picture of the supply of ammunition
that has entered the country or been manufactured in-country legally. Bybuilding this database record by record, users are building a baselineof information (or a statistical benchmark) of what exists in the
country legally, which can be used to compare against findings fromammunition recovered from firearms-related incidents or seizures.
The comparison between this baseline and findings from Database 1:
Evidence will shed light on the potential supply sources of ammunition
that is misused, ammunition illicitly held or trafficked, and ammunition
that has been diverted.

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHSECTION B: DATA ANALYSIS
Step 2.3: Analyse the data and cross-reference
After inputting primary information into the database, users should analyse
the data. The question here becomes: What should users look for? Thissection is intended to act as a guide of the different analyses and summary
statistics that could be extracted from the database. The following guideis not comprehensive, but rather illustrative of the findings that might bepossible to extract. This section also limits its scope to the more accessible
statistical methodologies using standard spreadsheet options. The
discussion explores field by field what useful information could be extracted
to build a profile of ammunition.
•

Number of live ammunition rounds: At a minimum, this column
should be summed in its entirety to compute the total number of live
ammunition rounds documented with a legal origin.

•

Information point: The information points should be placed in a dropdown menu to isolate entries from each of the sources of data (recordsof ammunition imports, of ammunition manufactured in-country andof ammunition stocks). For example, authorities might be interested
in isolating data from ammunition imports and treating the other two
information points as separate units of analysis. This field will allow forsuch a separation.

•

Country of manufacture: This column should be grouped according
to the different countries of manufacture documented. A percentage
distribution will offer a baseline of information or a benchmark forcross-referencing to assist in determining the origin of the ammunition
with a legal presence in the country that was documented in Database
1: Evidence.

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Manufacturer: This column should be grouped according to thedifferent manufacturers or manufacturers’ markings documented.
A percentage distribution will offer a baseline of information or abenchmark for cross-refencing to assist in determining the origin of theammunition with a legal presence in the country that was documented
in Database 1: Evidence.

•

Factory: This column should be grouped according to the different
factories documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baselineof information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to assist in
determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.

•

Exporting country: This column should be grouped according to thedifferent exporting countries documented. A percentage distribution
will offer a baseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing
to assist in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal
presence in the country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.

•

Exporter: This column should be grouped according to the different
exporters documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baselineof information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to assist in
determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.

•

Transit country: This column should be grouped according to thetransit countries documented. A percentage distribution will shedlight on the life cycle of ammunition that was legally procured andtransferred. This information may be helpful to the countries throughwhich the ammunition transited, or their neighbouring countries,
should they desire to pursue an ammunition profiling exercise.

•

Importing country: This column should be grouped according to thedifferent importing countries documented. A percentage distribution
will shed light on the life cycle of ammunition that was legally procured
and transferred. This information could be helpful to the countries

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

through which the ammunition transited, or their neighbouring
countries, should they desire to pursue an ammunition profilingexercise.
•

Importer: This column should be grouped according to the different
importers documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baselineof information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to assist in
determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence. If the jurisdiction
under observation is not a producer of ammunition, the absence ofimport references or documentation could be an indication of illicit
trafficking. As such, it is important to closely monitor the “unknowns”
documented in this field.

•

Point of entry: This column should be grouped according to thedifferent points of entry documented. This field will be categorized
by the names of the ports, airports or land crossings documented.
Together with information on ammunition diverted, trafficked andmisused, this field could shed light on the points of entry at higher risk.

•

Lot number or batch number: This column should be grouped
according to the different lot numbers or batch numbers documented.
A percentage distribution will offer a baseline of information or abenchmark for cross-referencing to assist in determining the likely
origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the country that was
documented in Database 1: Evidence.

•

Calibre: This column should be grouped according to the different
calibres documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baselineof information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to assist in
determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence. It could also be
used to imply the types of small arms for which the ammunition was
intended.

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS81•All headstamp alphanumerical and monogram markings: This fieldshould be grouped according to the different markings documented.
A percentage distribution will offer a baseline of information or abenchmark for cross-referencing to assist in determining the originof the ammunition with a legal presence in the country that was
documented in Database 1: Evidence.
»

This field can also be indicative of time points within the
manufacturing process where key changes may have been madeto the ammunition being assembled or manufactured.

»If the jurisdiction under investigation has no requirement for enduser or import-specific markings, then this field could overlap withthe manufacturer’s markings. Nonetheless, this parameter is still
worth exploring on its own and having as a full reference field.

•

Symbols: This field should be grouped according to the different
symbols documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baselineof information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to assist in
determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.

•

Import code: This column should be grouped according to the different
import codes documented, if any. A percentage distribution will offer abaseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to assist
in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.

•Year of manufacture: This column should be grouped according to thedifferent years of manufacture documented. A percentage distribution
will offer a baseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing
to assist in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal
presence in the country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.

•Year of import: This column should be grouped according to thedifferent years of import documented. A percentage distribution willoffer a baseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing toassist in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presencein the country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH•

Date of receipt: This column should be grouped according to thedifferent dates of receipt documented. A temporal distribution willshed light on the life cycle of ammunition that was legally procured andtransferred, demarcating the responsibilities of the different parties
involved.

•

Licensing entity: This column should be grouped according to
the different licensing entities, if more than one national approving
entity is documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baselineof information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to assist in
determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.

•

Authorized end user: This column should be grouped by the different
authorized end users or allocated entities documented, including
law enforcement, armed forces, private security companies, private
dealers or shops, or commercial importers or distributors. A percentage
distribution will offer a baseline of information or a benchmark forcross-referencing to assist in determining the origin of the ammunition
with a legal presence in the country that was documented in Database
1: Evidence.

•

Stockholder: This column should be grouped according to the different“holders” of the ammunition documented, including law enforcement,
armed forces, private security companies, private dealers or shops, orcommercial importers or distributors. A percentage distribution willoffer a baseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing toassist in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presencein the country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence. It is
probable that the stockholder documented will be the same as theauthorized end user.

•

End-use additional information: This field should be used forcontextual information on end-use justifications. Specific patterns
might emerge from the qualitative observations from end-use
information.

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DATABASE THREE:ILLICITMANUFACTURE

84

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHDATABASE 3: ILLICIT MANUFACTURE
Justification: Database 3: Illicit manufacture will generate a picture of theammunition produced illegally in the country, which is often done throughunauthorized reassembly or in cottage or artisanal industries.
Where to find this information: This information can be obtained byconducting interviews with law enforcement and forensic ballistics
departments, legal ammunition manufacturers and sellers, community
leaders and outreach organizations, users involved in black or grey market
dynamics, shooting sports enthusiasts, and managers of shooting ranges.
In addition, users are encouraged to explore and analyse online sources(visible and dark or deep web markets).
Flexibility: This database involves different research methods and is
the most flexible of the four as the problem of illicit manufacture varies
considerably, in both nature and impact, across different countries. Illicit
manufacture ranges from the use of simple home loading equipment
and repurposed fired cartridge cases to unauthorized factory-scale
manufacturing processes, whether as an instance of overproduction or acompletely illicit large-scale operation. At the small scale it may be a single
person with a reloading press producing 50 rounds; at the larger scale, it
may involve industrial-type processes. As such, this database will be deeply
context specific and require extensive local knowledge.
Ethics, safety and danger: Users are bound to respect ethical standardsof practice as per national directives or institutional bodies. Here, it isimportant to highlight that some interviews with individuals or groups
connected to the supply, storage and use of ammunition – such as gangmembers, criminals, prison populations or vulnerable individuals – should
be approved by the relevant authorities before taking place, given thepotential for danger.
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85

Who: Each institution or organization building the ammunition profile should
consider whether they have a user trained in qualitative methods or should
consider hiring one when developing this database. This person (or team)should have a strong research background with peer-reviewed publications
and postgraduate qualifications in a related field. Such users are often
academics from universities or professionals with significant experiencefrom research institutes or NGOs and can be hired as consultants, either
nationally or internationally.

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Step 3.1: Define the research questions and research methods
This step is crucial as it can be considered the research design of the
spreadsheet. The lead research question and secondary researchquestions, once the latter have been defined, will determine which
dynamics and conflating factors are explored. Once the research questions
have been identified and agreed on, users should find the best possible
research strategy or methodology to answer these questions.
LEAD RESEARCH QUESTION

What is the effect of illicitly produced ammunition on armed violence inurban environments?
Qualitative approaches are interpretive, and therefore flexible, but should
maintain focus on the data sought. This is how the lead research question
shapes the overall objective.
Secondary research questions
Semi-structured interviews allow for both control and flexibility. Secondary,more precise and detailed questions can also be numbered or coded for later
analysis (e.g. questions 1–13 below). This is particularly useful when multiple
users collect data, as coding makes the comparison of data easier. “Semistructured” means that a list of questions is used to direct the interviews
or focus groups without rigidly controlling them. This allows respondents
to provide insights users may not have been aware of beforehand andprovides a better flow to the interview process. This strategy functions
best using open (as opposed to closed) questions. It is also useful to ask
concluding questions such as “What have I missed?” or “What else
do you think is important that we have not yet discussed?” to capture
the maximum amount of significant data specific to each setting. These
secondary questions act as guides, and each user or team should tailor
them according to their circumstances to gain the best results possible.

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For Database 3, such questions could include:
1.

Do forensic ballistics laboratories or any other law enforcement
agency keep records of ammunition that seem to have been illicitly
manufactured? If so, do these samples seem to have a pattern? Can
you show us an example?

2.

Where do the projectiles, cartridge cases, propellent charges or live
primers (also known as “percussion caps”) come from? Are thesecomponents industrially manufactured?

3.

Where do the raw materials come from, if not industrially manufactured?

4.

What machinery or equipment is used to manufacture the ammunition,
and where is this equipment (i.e. press) coming from?

5.

Are any specific types of crime being committed with illicitly
manufactured ammunition? If so, how?

6. Is the illicit manufacture or unauthorized reloading of ammunition moreor less costly than acquiring industrially produced ammunition?
7.

Can you explain the relationship between illicit manufacturers of
ammunition and users of illegal ammunition? Who do these people
tend to be (without naming individuals)? Are the end users of illicitly
manufactured ammunition sports aficionados, criminals, gangmembers or others?

8.

In shooting ranges, what happens to the fired cartridge cases that areleft after practice shooting?

9.

In training, at either armed forces or police ranges, what happens to thefired cartridge cases that are left after practice shootings?

10. Is there a culture of sports shooting that involves the reloading of
cartridges? If so, why?
11. Is any geographical region known for the illicit production of ammunition?
If so, why?
12. Is there substantial know-how in ammunition manufacturing in a regionor area? If so, why?
13. What have we missed? What else is important to know about the illicit
production of ammunition?
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The user or research team should carefully plan the qualitative methods
to be used and carefully consider the ethical considerations involved. The
methods need to be tailored to each context to produce the best results.
This section outlines some recommended methods:•

Semi-structured interviews with a range of key actors•

Focus groups with key populations or groups of key actors•

Field observation of commercial dynamics, whether grey or black
market•Field observation of affected areas, sites and regions associated with
illicit ammunition manufacture•

Evidence from crime scenes and notes from Database 1: Evidence

The user can use some or all of these methods.39 As a minimum, interviews
with key actors should be sought to provide additional backgroundinformation or context. Field observation means that the user will visit
various sites where ammunition is presumed to be illicitly manufactured.
This will help the user better understand the specific contexts surrounding
the unauthorized manufacture of ammunition and can also help identify key
stakeholders for the interviews. Institutional managers should be awarethat any fieldwork, particularly involving criminal or potentially dangerous
subjects or vulnerable individuals, should adhere to legal ethical standards(see the Ethics, Safety and Danger section above).

39

The method of data collection (e.g. audio recordings, summary notes, field notes) needs carefulconsideration as it is important to be consistent in the approach because different datacollection methods yield different levels of data quality, and making notes can unconsciously orconsciously incorporate observer or interviewer bias.

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Step 3.2: Apply the research methods
Identifying a range of key actors and sources of information is essential togenerating valid qualitative data. This range should cover State, governmentand civil society stakeholders, from national to local levels, to provide a broad
and therefore balanced range of responses to the research questions. Users
should avoid collecting data from just one sector of the State, government
or society. The methodology can be applied by structuring the qualitative
research around the following forms of research and key actors:•

Semi-structured interviews with a range of key actors»

Interviews with legal ammunition producers and legal ammunition
retailers»Interviews with reloading sports enthusiasts or commerciallyoriented reloaders»Interviews with police, intelligence officers, crime scene
investigators and crime analysts»

Interviews with forensic ballistics specialists and firearms experts»

Interviews with managers of shooting ranges, either State-ownedor private»•

If possible, interviews with end users convicted of misuse

Focus groups with key populations or groups of key actors»

Focus groups with members of a region or community associatedwith illicit ammunition manufacture•

Field observation of affected areas, sites and regions associated with
illicit ammunition manufacture»

Notes from observing the commercial dynamics of surrounding
areas, sites and regions associated with illicit ammunition
manufacture»

Notes from observing shooting ranges, either State-owned or
private90

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH•

Field observation of commercial dynamics, whether grey or black
market•Evidence from crime scenes and notes from Database 1: Evidence»

Notes on ammunition recovered from crime scenes or seizures,
possibly held by forensic ballistics laboratories

The notes from applying the qualitative research methods will be used in
the final report to contextualize the findings from Databases 1 and 2 and as
stand-alone findings and indications for future research.

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Step 3.3: Review and analyse the data
When carrying out qualitative data analysis, always bear in mind that theoverall aim is to respond to the lead research question: “What is the effectof illicitly produced ammunition on armed violence in urban environments?”
The analysis can be done systematically by following the secondary
questions and assessing to what extent they have been answered by thequalitative data collected. The analysis write-up can then be organizedaccording to which insights or main themes and tendencies emerge.
It is important to review the qualitative data set to gain an overall “feel”
for what is taking place. This is an “inductive” approach, where the users
ask themselves, “What is the data showing?” Users should be open tocounter-intuitive or unexpected patterns and activities. For example,
illicit manufacture of ammunition may have little effect on armed violencein urban environments, or it may only lead to firearms-related accidents
and not homicides. Users should also be aware that unlike quantitative
methods, qualitative data is often contradictory and messy as it depicts
the “real world”, and they will not necessarily get clean, definitive answers
to all research questions. Users should expect unanswered questions andunknown processes occurring (good research should actually come up
with new questions). When analysing the data, it is important to recognize
the research limitations and reflect on the aspects that need further
clarification.
With these caveats in mind, when analysing the qualitative data, users
should be looking for:•Trends, patterns and tendencies that provide answers to the secondary
research questions.

•

Who is involved, and how, why, where and when? What are the key
intersections between illicit ammunition manufacturing and violence,

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if any? Are there regional dynamics? Are there cultural dynamics?
Does any group perceive an advantage in manufacturing their own
ammunition?
•

How clear is the qualitative data in providing answers to the secondary
research questions? How strong are these patterns? How confident
can we be in our claims? For example, did all the interviewees agree
that stopping illicit ammunition manufacture would reduce violence? If
not, what else is going on, why, and what does this tell us?

•

What can users learn by analysing the qualitative data together
with the other databases? This could provide researchers with theopportunity to identify any differences between information provided
by communities and the documented or recovered (seizures, domestic
or criminal operations) occurrences of illicit manufacture.

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DATABASE FOUR:
INTERVIEWS WITH
AFFECTEDCOMMUNITIES

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHDATABASE 4: INTERVIEWS WITH AFFECTEDCOMMUNITIES
Justification: Quantitative databases provide statistics around illicit
ammunition flows and misuse, creating key insights. Analysing these
databases may give some key insights but will tend to only provide apartial understanding of each case study and leave remaining questions
for further research. The better the specific context and the actors
involved in trafficking and criminal misuse are understood, the better the
analysis will be. Hence, it is important to contextualize quantitative findings
with qualitative contextual information. Adding qualitative methods, byinterviewing individuals ranging from national experts to local residents, canstrengthen research by incorporating “the stories behind the statistics”.
This approach will allow users to generate context-specific analysis andinterrogate the data more effectively; tailor the design of intervention
policies to each specific context; and compare different case studies
across the globe effectively.
Where to find this information: This information can be obtained byconducting interviews with law enforcement; forensic ballistics experts;
prosecutors; experts such as academics and researchers; policymakers
at governmental and State institutions; civil society representatives fromboth national and international NGOs; multilateral, development or aid
organizations such as in-country United Nations programmes; community
leaders; and convicted felons.
Ethics, safety and danger: Users are bound to respect ethical standardsof practice as per national directives or institutional bodies. Here, it isimportant to highlight that some interviews with individuals or groups
connected to the supply, storage and use of ammunition – such as gangmembers, criminals, prison populations or vulnerable individuals –should

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be approved by the relevant authorities before taking place, given thepotential for danger.
Who: Each institution or organization building the ammunition profile should
consider whether they have a user trained in qualitative methods or should
consider hiring one when developing this database. This person (or team)should have a strong research background with peer-reviewed publications
and postgraduate qualifications in a related field. Such users are often
academics from universities or professionals with significant experiencefrom research institutes or NGOs and can be hired as consultants, either
nationally or internationally.

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Step 4.1: Define the research questions and research methods
LEAD RESEARCH QUESTION

How do changing flows of ammunition impact levels of armed violencein urban environments?
Qualitative approaches are interpretive, and therefore flexible, but should
maintain focus on the data sought. This is how the lead research question
shapes the overall objective.
Secondary research questions•

Secondary, more precise and detailed research questions should be
developed for interviews and focus groups. Semi-structured interviews
and focus groups both allow for control and flexibility when probing
key interviewees, but interviews are potentially more valuable, open
and honest than focus groups. This process is “more of an art than ascience” and depends on the skill of the individual user. It is useful totake into account the following:•

The user should develop the secondary questions carefully (sample
questions 1–11 below) so that they provide access to the data the user
seeks.

•The questions may have to be modified or rearranged to suit different
respondents. For example, questions for a customs official may differ
slightly from those for a police officer, a community leader or a prison
inmate. The overall focus, however, should remain on answering thelead research question.

•

The user should attempt to commit secondary questions to memory
or write them down on a brief “cheat sheet”. This helps the flow of theconversation. The better the flow, the better the insights tend to be.

•

Questions may have to be asked more than once and/or reworded
at different times during the interview to gain useful responses. For

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example, sensitive issues are best asked later in an interview, when
respondents are likely to be more relaxed.
•

Whenever possible, the user should voice-record the interviews, after
seeking informed consent from the participant, and transcribe therecordings afterwards. Each interview or focus group should be coded
or numbered, with real names anonymized according to required
ethical standards.
»

Voice-recording allows the interviewer to concentrate on following
the conversation and asking follow-up questions. Subsequenttranscription means that no key information will be missed and thepotential for biased interpretation will be reduced.

•

It is vital that users are responsive during interviews, anticipating that
there will be new and interesting insights emerging that require further
exploration. This is where the skill and experience of the interviewer isinvaluable, and why a trained user is recommended to produce the best
results.

•

There is substantial literature available on interview techniques withpotentially difficult or dangerous respondents (Baird 2017; Crawford etal. 2017; Koonings, Kruijt and Rodgers 2019).

Secondary questions (e.g. questions 1–11 below) can also be numberedor coded for later analysis; see the Coding and Organizing the Responses
section in Step 4.2. This is particularly useful when multiple users collectdata, as coding makes the comparison of data easier. Simply agree on thequestions to be used, and then the responses to these questions can beorganized into corresponding codes for later comparative analysis. “Semistructured” means that a list of questions is used to direct the interviews
or focus groups without rigidly controlling them. This allows respondents
to provide insights that users may not have been aware of beforehand andprovides a better flow to the interview process. This strategy functions
best using open (as opposed to closed) questions. For example, “What is

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your opinion of…?” or “What do you think about…?” It is also useful to ask
concluding questions such as “What have I missed?” or “What else
do you think is important that we have not yet discussed?” to capture
the maximum amount of significant data specific to each setting. These
secondary questions act as guides, and each user or team should tailor
them according to their circumstances to gain the best results possible.
For Database 4, here are some questions that could be asked:
1.

Do you think changing flows of ammunition affect levels of armed
violence in urban environments? Why or why not?

2.

Which areas of the city have the most crime scenes involving the firingof ammunition or recovery of live ammunition? When do these crimes
tend to take place?

3.

If the supply of ammunition goes up or down, does this have an impact
on gun use and, more broadly, armed violence in urban environments?

4.

Where does ammunition come from? Is it bought legally, or does itcome from the black market, smuggling or some other way? Can you
explain how legal and illegal ammunition enters communities? How is it
stored, sold, distributed, etc.?

5.

Can you explain the relationship between suppliers and users ofillegal ammunition? Who do these people tend to be (without naming
individuals)? Do these users tend to be criminals, gang members orothers?

6. How does the role of men and women differ in these processes (i.e.
what is the role of gender in supplying and storing ammunition)? Whotends to hide the ammunition? Who pulls the trigger? Who tend to be
the victims? What else is going on in your view regarding gender andammunition that we are missing?
7.

What is the role of youth in these processes; for example, are younger
people in gangs the end users, and older people suppliers, or issomething else happening?

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8.

Would stopping the flow of ammunition into communities cause asignificant change in violence? In your view, what is the best way
to interrupt the supply of illegal ammunition into communities andultimately to end users?

9.

What proportion of ammunition discharge do you think is reported
to law enforcement in your country or local region, and what is youropinion based on?

10. How well do you think illicit ammunition is intercepted in your region,
and what is your opinion based on?
11. What have we missed? What else is important for us to know about
the role of illegal ammunition in armed violence in urban environments?
The user or research team should carefully plan the qualitative methods
to be used and carefully consider the ethical considerations involved. The
methods need to be tailored to each context to produce the best results.
This section outlines some recommended methods:•

Semi-structured interviews with a range of key interviewees•

Focus groups with key populations or groups of key interviewees•

Field observation

The user can use some or all of these methods.40 As a minimum, interviews
with key interviewees (outlined below) should be sought to provide
additional background information or context. Field observation means thatthe user will visit various sites where ammunition is presumed to have been
trafficked or misused, for example crime scenes. This will help the user
better understand the specific contexts surrounding the use of ammunitionand can also help identify key stakeholders for the interviews. Institutional
managers should be aware that any fieldwork, particularly involving criminalor potentially dangerous subjects or vulnerable individuals, should adhere
to legal ethical standards (see the Ethics, Safety and Danger section above).
40

100

The method of data collection (e.g. audio recordings, summary notes, field notes) needs carefulconsideration as it is important to be consistent in the approach because different datacollection methods yield different levels of data quality, and making notes can unconsciously orconsciously incorporate observer or interviewer bias.

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Step 4.2: Apply the research methods
Coding and organizing the responses
Agreed-on questions can be used by one or more interviewers as “codes”
to group the responses afterwards. The responses can be collated undercodes from a number of interviews or focus groups, which will create aqualitative database that can then be analysed systematically. This data canbe compared and analysed in conjunction with the other databases. The
overall aim of this analysis is to respond to the overarching research questionthat the other databases cannot answer alone: How do changing flows of
ammunition impact the levels of armed violence in urban environments?
Key interviews and focus groups
Identifying a range of key interviewees is essential to generating valid
qualitative data. This range should cover State, government and civil society
stakeholders, from local to national levels, to provide a broad and balanced
range of responses to the research questions. Users should avoid collecting
data from just one sector of State, government or society. Interviews andfocus groups could include:•

Expert interviews with individuals from:»State and government institutions, particularly those linked tonational security»

International organizations»

Academia and research institutes»

Civil society organizations or NGOs at a national level»

Communityorganizations,

includingwomen’s

and

youth

organizations•

Focus groups with members of communities affected by gun violence•Interviews with individuals who are involved in supply, storage and end
use of illicit ammunition:»

Local community members, via community visits accompanied byNGOs, community organizations, or women’s or youth groups
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»

Smugglers, traffickers, gang members, criminals and – potentially –imprisoned populations»

Others engaged in the use of illicit ammunition, depending on thespecific urban context (e.g. private security, mercenaries, militias,
self-defence groups)

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Step 4.3: Review and analyse the data
When carrying out qualitative data analysis, always bear in mind thatthe overall aim is to respond to the lead research question: “How dochanging flows of ammunition impact levels of armed violence in urban
environments?” The analysis can be done systematically by following
the secondary questions and assessing to what extent they have beenanswered by the qualitative data collected. The analysis write-up can thenbe organized according to which insights or main themes and tendencies
emerge.
It is important to review the qualitative data set to gain an overall “feel”
for what is taking place. This is an “inductive” approach, where the users
ask themselves, “What is the data showing?” Users should be open tocounter-intuitive or unexpected patterns and activities. For example,
reducing ammunition flows may have little effect on armed violence inurban environments, or it may lead to increasing numbers of homicides
without firearms. Users should also be aware that unlike quantitative
methods, qualitative data is often contradictory and messy as it depicts
the “real world”, and they will not necessarily get clean, definitive answers
to all research questions. Users should expect unanswered questions andunknown processes occurring (good research should actually come up
with new questions). When analysing the data, it is important to recognize
the research limitations and reflect on the aspects that need further
clarification.
With these caveats in mind, when analysing the qualitative data, users
should be looking for:•Trends, patterns and tendencies that provide answers to the secondary
research questions.

•

Who is involved, and how, why, where and when? Particularly, what do
the key intersections of age, gender, race and socioeconomic strata tell

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us about ammunition flows and violence?
•

How clear is the qualitative data in providing answers to the secondary
research questions? How strong are these patterns? How confident
can we be in our claims? For example, did all the interviewees agree
that reducing ammunition flows reduces violence? If not, what else isgoing on, why, and what does this tell us?

•

What can users learn by analysing the qualitative data together
with the other databases? This could provide researchers with theopportunity to identify any differences between information provided
by communities and the information documented in law enforcement
reports.

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PART THREE:INTERPRETINGRESULTS

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PART 3. INTERPRETING RESULTS
3.1 Distilling findings
3.1.1 Tools to corroborate ammunition-specific observations
In conducting ammunition profiling efforts, users will, at times, encounter
unknown headstamps or find certain characteristics of the ammunition
markings to be beyond their immediate knowledge. To corroborate
ammunition-specific observations and increase knowledge of the
documented characteristics, several tools and resources are available. The
following list is neither comprehensive nor an endorsement, but rather anillustrative compilation of existing tools and resources that may help users
when encountering unknown ammunition. Some of these resources require
a subscription, with monetary implications. This Handbook presents the list
to provide options for users’ consideration.

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Table 21: Tools to assist with ammunition identification and associated management
Name

Category

Description

WebsiteAssociation ofFirearm and Tool
Mark Examiners(AFTE)

Organization

AFTE is an international professional organization for practitioners of firearms andtoolmark identification. Among the useful
resources of the AFTE are an ammunition
headstamp guide, glossaries, training seminars and the AFTE Journal.

Accessible
Here

CartWinPro

Globaldatabase

CartWinPro is commercial software used
to identify ammunition. With over 26,800
headstamps recorded, it features calibre
measurements, colour code references,cartridge records, manufacturer information and specimen photos of various
projectiles. It is currently available in sevenlanguages.

Accessible
Here

Cranfield University Ammunition
Library

Library

Cranfield University compiles an authoritative list of academic resources for Ammunition Technical Officers.

Accessible
HereInternational
Ammunition
Association (IAA)

Informalassociation

The IAA is an informal association primarily
organized for cartridge collectors and hasan active forum community that holds
dynamic discussions on a diverse set ofheadstamps. The IAA also hosts its own
bimonthly magazine, the International
Ammunition Journal.

Accessible
HereElectronic North
Atlantic Treaty
Organization(NATO)

Database

The eNADB is a web-based ammunition
database with over 435,000 items held in
NATO inventories, as well as information
on NATO and non-NATO nations. Subscriptions are offered on a yearly basis.

Accessible
Here

Database

Now in its 11th edition, the Firearms
Guide allows the user to filter ammunition
through a web-based database, featuring
producers, ballistic specifications andpictures. Subscriptions run yearly.

Accessible
HereAmmunition Data
Base (eNADB)
Firearms Guide

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Category

Description

WebsiteSmall Arms
Survey, An Introductory Guide to
the Identificationof Small Arms,
Light Weapons,and AssociatedAmmunition

Handbook

This guide explains the process by which
weapons and ammunition are identified andarms flows are tracked, giving the reader “abasic understanding of how to identify andanalyse small arms and light weapons, and to
track their proliferation”.

Accessible
HereInternational
Ammunition
Technical Guidelines (IATGs) by
the UN Office for
Disarmament
Affairs

Technical
guidelines

The IATGs form a frame of reference toachieve and demonstrate effective levels ofsafety and security of ammunition stockpiles.

Accessible
Here

iTrace by ConflictArmament Research

Globaldatabase

The iTrace project is a global data set that
presents verified information required tounderstand weapons transfers. The project
combines an extensive programme of in-conflict field investigations with the world’s mostpowerful public access weapon tracking
database.

Accessible
Here

INTERPOL
Ballistics
Information
Network (IBIN)

Ballistics
network

While not necessarily a resource to identify
ammunition, the IBIN has an important role toplay in ammunition-related efforts. Member
States using the IBIN can share ballistics
data (extracted from ammunition recovered
as evidence) from crime scenes and link
gun-related incidents using the same firearm,regardless of physical distance, providing
valuable investigative leads.

Accessible
Here

Individual
ballistics experts

Experts

Ballistics experts are a vital resource when
confirming ammunition-specific observations, especially local experts. Local ballistics
experts are generally well acquainted with thespecifics of ammunition reaching unauthorized users or involved in unauthorized use.
On most occasions, these experts will workin forensic laboratories (or universities) andhave years of experience documenting andanalysing ammunition used in crime scenes
and testifying in court. It is recommended
that ammunition profiling efforts are revisedby ballistics experts and the evidence collection effort is done in close consultation withlocal experts.
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3.1.2 Cases of uncertainty
Some headstamps will be of uncertain origin or present unclear markings;
thus, making a determination will require expertise and a baseline of
information for guidance. While the uncertain cases will likely be a minority
in the documented sample, categorizing these exhibits is specialized
work that should be done by technical experts. When uncertainty
arises, it is important to look for indicators that could point towards apreviously documented case or lead to a probable identification. From
past ammunition profiling efforts, in one continent, the following roughly
estimated distribution of uncertain cases has been gathered:41•

Absence of markings (~3%)•

Incomplete or partially effaced markings (~1%)•

Fake markings (>1%)

The cases of uncertainty will require expertise and knowledge-sharing
within the community of practice. This situation highlights, once again, theutmost importance of good photographic documentation. Photos will beessential for later verification and for cross-checks from other recoveries.
In addition, a clear electronic photo can be enlarged on a computer toenable particularities such as alphanumerical character spacing, curving or
effaced markings to be identified.
As deciphering the meaning of markings can lead to mistakes, building
baseline documentation will be a key component for correct identification.
For example, after an initial documentation of ammunition cartridges, theuser may consider establishing a baseline document or “drive storage”
with all the photographic documentation (noting the correct identificationof country of manufacture, producer and year of manufacture) to help
41

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Estimates based on interviews conducted by the authors with Nils Holger Anders, a leading expert
and practitioner in the field of ammunition profiling and tracing.

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

others in the system with the data entry or for cross-comparisons when
uncertainty arises. For example, baseline documentation could include
a legend noting what specific codes represent, such as “10 = producer
code for Arsenal, Bulgaria”. Not only would baseline documentation reduce
uncertainty, it would expedite decision-making processes. In addition,baseline documentation will assist in identifying cartridge samples that were
not previously documented or were otherwise unseen in that jurisdiction,
thus serving as an early warning system to flag newly introduced inflows of
ammunition.

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3.2 A word of caution
3.2.1 Data limitations
This Handbook offers a road map for ammunition profiling, which isdifferent from ammunition tracing. The key difference is that tracing efforts
generally intend to determine the exact origin and recreate the supply
chain of documented ammunition, when packaging or markings permit andconfirmation is received from the relevant entities, whereas ammunition
profiling is better understood as a data generation tool to gain a baseline of
information regarding volumes and origins, variations (trends and patterns),
and dates of production. Ammunition profiling generates baseline data
for subsequent efforts to build on. As such, ammunition profiling
contributes to understanding of the problems of diversion, trafficking
and misuse but, in isolation, will not present definitive answers. Thatis, ammunition profiling needs to be complemented with additional
layers of data and followed by the analysis of context-specific policies
and their implementation.
This methodology aims to contextualize ammunition profiling in a waythat provides insight into incidents of armed violence. Nonetheless, theHandbook promotes caution when interpreting conclusions, as these would
be based on a sample of the universe of ammunition recovered as evidence,
and anecdotal evidence suggests that only a fraction of ammunition
discharges are reported to or detected by authorities. As such, the universeof ammunition discharges documented is likely an underestimate of the“true” or “full” universe of ammunition discharges.
Analysing reports from crime scenes or from seizures in domestic
operations or at entry-exit points will require judgement calls and a degreeof subjectivity. To reduce subjective interpretations, it is important to define

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beforehand the possible categories that will be documented in fields suchas, for example, situational context, incitement-related factor, outcome of
the crime, outcome of the intervention, in line with domestic regulations.
In addition, having clear definitions will discipline the research effort into
analysable categories. In practice, this means that the information extracted
from the reports should be used to contextualize findings and provide adegree of situational awareness to the ammunition recovered. It should not
be understood, however, as sufficient to solve particular cases or serve, in
isolation, as leverage to make overarching claims about the public securityof the jurisdiction under consideration.
A baseline ammunition data set provides valuable, but limited,
analytical utility. When drawing conclusions, users ought to be extremely
cautious, especially when it comes to drawing conclusions about the supply
chain. For example, ammunition might be produced in a particular year andmarked with that year, but the transfer might not happen until two years
later, or a particular lot of ammunition might have been retransferred but
left with import markings from the original intended end user. Additionally,
manufacturers might produce different brands, or the packaging might
not correspond to the ammunition inside the box. Also, the assemblingprocesses vary, affecting how the casings are being produced. Therefore, it
is not advisable to make claims about the supply chain unless all States andentities involved in a particular transfer have been consulted and presented
with the data and, consequently, that information has been duly confirmed
and verified by the appropriate national authorities and entities. It is thus
recommended to argue on the basis of “known” or “interpreted/inferred”
information for fields such as ammunition manufacturer, where “known”
would imply obtained confirmation and validation from all involved parties
and “interpreted/inferred” would imply that headstamp or packaging
markings were visible but no confirmation was requested or received.

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3.2.2 Vocabulary: Degrees of likelihood
In profiling efforts, claiming certainty and making assurances about,for example, country of origin, manufacturer, manufacturing facility, orother fields of data extracted from the recovered ammunition sample
is often beyond the scope of the research effort. As such, ammunition
profiling operates in degrees of likelihood. In practice, this means that it
is often not possible to “assure”, but it may be possible to argue on thebasis of “ammunition with characteristics similar to manufacture in X”
or “ammunition with characteristics similar to a production in Y”. Someother language options include “possibly”, “likely” or “very likely” in orderto operate in degrees of uncertainty and unverified data by the relevant
national authorities.
To claim complete certainty and make assurances, the information
regarding the supply chain should be verified and confirmed by all States
involved in the suspected transfer. As such, it is recommended that usersof this Handbook leverage findings from the research effort to improve
human security, while respecting the uncertainty of operating in a greyscaleof likelihood.

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3.3 Transforming findings into actionable information: A pipeline totransform knowledge into action
The main objective of this Handbook is to offer users a guide to create aprofile of small arms ammunition diverted, trafficked or misused in a specificenvironment. The profile created will provide actionable information about
the ammunition in circulation and its misuse. This information could be
used to develop targeted policies and strategies to reduce armed violence
and curb illicit trafficking. As such, it is an action-oriented Handbook, withthe final goal of linking findings to actionable prescriptions. To reach thisgoal, this section suggests a series of steps.

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First step: Understand what the data says and ask the right questions
It is crucial to understand what the data says and the limitations of what it
does not say. That is, the data collected should be analysed in its context,
with attention given to the time period under scrutiny and policy changes
that could have led to variations. The analysis sections provide a road mapof what to look for with each database. To understand what the data istrying to say, it is crucial to draw the suggested cross-references and seek
to shed light on complex dynamics regarding possible origins, lethality
rates and conflating factors enabling armed violence. It is also important
to look for big picture trends and understand the databases not as isolatedsilos, but as pieces of a larger puzzle. In practice, this means that many
findings will require follow-up research to unveil a more disaggregatedpicture. As such, understanding what the data says can also be considered
as finding the right questions to ask.
Second step: Use the data to define actions
Once it is clear what trends emerge from the data and what questions remainunanswered, it is important to define a road map of actions. While some
findings might be mature enough to be turned into policy prescriptions,others might be indications that further disaggregated research isneeded. As such, this Handbook recommends a vigorous discussion on
the implications of each finding, with a view to defining the right ensuing
actions. In practice, this means that if the first step identified the rightquestions to ask, this second step identifies the right actions to take.
Third step: Monitor the data, seeking patterns
Some of the defined actions will involve policy suggestions; others will
be more research oriented. In either case, it is crucial to remain vigilant

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in monitoring the data and continue building the evidence base. An everexpanding evidence base will facilitate the observation of clearer patterns
and time series analysis.42 The basic premise of this step is that the morecomprehensive the data, the better. To achieve such comprehensive
data, it is important to consider this Handbook as a living guide for
ongoing research. In practice, this means that, as much as possible,
ammunition profiling data-collection efforts should be integrated into
national practices. The better the planning of the data collection from thedatabase generation point, the more complete the data set will be. Thatis, a version of this methodology, or parts of it, should be integrated into,
for example, SOPs and other data recording and collection methods usedby the different entities involved. Integrating data collection into SOPs will
yield an ever-expanding evidence base that will facilitate clearer monitoring
efforts to observe variations in trends across time and across different
policy interventions.
Fourth step: Channel prescriptions both downstream and upstream
An evidence base will help bring policy prescriptions into light. For example,
if over a five-year period, half of the ammunition recovered from crime
scenes had the same import code, while that code only represented 10% of
total imports, then officials should recreate the distribution pattern of thatimported lot of ammunition. Officials should recreate the life cycle of that
ammunition, as much as possible, to evaluate why that import code wasrecovered from crime scenes at a disproportionate rate compared to its
market share. If applicable, and once provided with appropriate evidence,
policymakers should tighten the controls that were found ill-suited in
keeping legally imported ammunition from unauthorized use.

42

It is worth cross-referencing peaks and dips with other associated factors or even crimes. For
example, when fired ammunition figures are decreasing, is knife crime rising?

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It is important to act on the policy suggestions aimed at reducing armed
violence at the local level. It is equally important to elevate lessons learned
from the local level to multilateral efforts. While solutions to firearms-related
violence might be local, the approach to finding these solutions might beglobally applicable. In practice, this means channelling prescriptions
downstream to the local level of government office in charge of
public security and then sharing the results and methods upstream
to institutions engaged in multilateral efforts. For those working on
multilateral negotiations, it means actively listening to the local level, andfor those working at the local level, it means documenting and sharing thelessons learned.43

43

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Changes in policy or legislation may also cause divergence within regions, so the potential risk
and impact for any change needs to be well explored and considered prior to its implementation.
Sometimes, local laws do reduce violence in their immediate jurisdiction but then create demand,
diversion or effects that increase violence in neighbouring areas as an unintended consequence.
Hence, a collaborative and holistic input is required to minimize unintended consequences.

UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

3.4 Leveraging knowledge to reduce violenceThis Handbook recognizes that analysing data, asking the right questions,acting on the findings, monitoring patterns and channelling lessons learned
are easier to do conceptually than operationally. As such, this Handbook
provides an example of how the knowledge generated through the pipelineof analysis can lead to reductions in armed violence.
Illustrative case
FINDING

Data shows that 25% of ammunition recovered from
crime scenes in the current year are marked with
manufacturer markings consistent with those from an
importation that took place the previous calendar year.

First step: Asking the right questions
At least two follow-up questions seem appropriate. First, it isimportant to determine the intended end user of the legally imported
ammunition, as well as the end uses for which it was authorized.
This will begin to shed light on the supply chain and identify thelast documented users. Second, it is important to determine thecomparative size of that importation against the overall inflow of
ammunition. This is important because the importation in question
might have accounted for 25% of all ammunition imported in thelast year or it may have only accounted for a miniscule proportion of
the overall inflow of ammunition. The latter would indicate that the
distribution patterns of that importation are causing that particularammunition to end up in crime scenes at a disproportionate ratecompared with its relative market size.

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Second step: Defining the right actions
For example, if the last documented user is identified as a private
security company (first question) and the imported lot turns out tobe minimal in comparison with the total yearly inflow of ammunition(second question), then the most appropriate actions would be torecreate and investigate the distribution patterns and uses of thatparticular private security company.
Third step: Monitoring the data and conducting time series
analysis
The current finding highlights what happened in crime scenes in
the current year, but it would also be important to look back at
all the ammunition distributed to that private security company
and maintain the monitoring effort, at a minimum, throughout therest of the year. These efforts will determine if the current findingis an abnormality or if it is part of a pattern of behaviour within a
distribution network that appears to be negatively affecting public
security.
Fourth step: Channelling prescriptions downstream andupstream
Should it be determined that the distribution pattern of private
security company X is affecting public security, then the data,
analysis and implications must be shared with all governmental
offices in charge of regulating trade in ammunition and overseeing
armed private security and home affairs, for example. This could
result in tighter acquisition regulations and oversight, enhanced
stockpiling and reporting controls, requirements for secondary
markings, removal of licensing privileges, or other policies that
the State could choose to pursue. At the same time, the course ofaction and results should be shared regionally and internationally,

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since neighbours and other interested States could be sufferingfrom similar challenges to their public security and could benefit
from the strategy taken.

This is just an example of how following-up from a finding can leadto changes in policy for the benefit of public security. Nonetheless,the potential scope of action based on the findings is bothwidespread and context specific.

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3.5 Recommendations
From previous studies of ammunition control practices and profiling
efforts, some recommendations have been repeatedly highlighted. This
Handbook presents them for national authorities to consider as options
when interpreting findings and considering follow-up actions.
•

Establish an inter-agency governmental task force to facilitate
information exchanges and address armed violence. Governmental
institutional design is often dispersed and lacks fluid exchange of
information. To reduce armed violence and the threat of armed
violence, public responses must be agile. Therefore, building bridges
across agencies could be a sound structural response, should adetermination be made that policy and implementation lag owing tosiloed agency action. One option to enhance inter-agency collaboration
would be to establish a Firearms Focal Point or a gun crime intelligencecentre. These entities can streamline information flows, generate dataon ammunition, and produce actionable intelligence to reduce armed
violence.

•

Standardize national reporting templates for documentation andrecord-keeping of ammunition recovered from crime scenes, seized indomestic operations, and confiscated at border controls. If adopted,
this recommendation will streamline domestic processes and facilitate
data gathering.

•

Establish a national ballistics database of registered firearms, with test
fires of ammunition of different materials. This will provide a benchmarkof information than can be used to compare the ballistics data fromammunition recovered from crime scenes against the repository oflegally acquired and licensed firearms. This will aid criminal investigations
and inform national policies regarding the firearms involved in shooting
incidents.

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For example, if all firearms in country X were test fired andregistered in a national database, should these firearms be used
in a shooting incident, the fired evidence from that scene can beforensically linked to the test fires in the registration database.
Such documentation when analysing the data could shed light on
the frequency with which crimes may be occurring with the same
firearm or different firearms within the country. If forensic ballistics
experts can draw correlations between the individualized markingsfrom ammunition recovered as evidence and ammunition registeredin the national database, and thus identify the responsible firearm,then the exercise of studying ammunition can be elevated to linking
the movement of firearms involved in different shooting incidents.

•

Request that all ammunition, imported or produced domestically, bemarked, per lot, at the point of production with a unique alphanumericalcode in either the headstamp or the groove of the ammunition cartridge.
This demand-side request will enable tracing of small arms ammunition
and facilitate accountability in cases of diversion.

•

Establish monitoring mechanisms to observe trends and patterns inammunition flows. Should an ammunition profiling methodology be
imbedded in national SOPs, time series data can be generated withminimal additional work for national authorities.
»Tofacilitate

monitoringmechanisms

andsafeguard

thesustainability of the efforts, seek to create or establish baseline
documentation for guidance and cross-referencing. In addition,
seek to create or establish a text-based standardized coding list to
support consistent reporting of alphanumerical characteristics andsymbols in future ammunition profiling efforts, such as the different
markings of particular factories, manufacturers or symbols (dot,five-point star, triangle, NATO, company logo, etc.).
•

Share findings from an ammunition profiling effort with regional partners
and organizations. It is important to pursue a regionally collaborative

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strategy, since local or national efforts alone will be unable to shed lighton regional or global patterns of trafficking or diversion.
•

Share ballistics information with neighbouring countries and/or thesubregion. This will enable authorities to connect crimes committedwith the same firearm by linking the ballistics fingerprint to the
responsible firearm; they can use the evidence to inform strategies to
disrupt regional armed violence and illicit trafficking networks.
»

Share ballistics information in bulk, and for every recovery
possible, to correlate ballistics data as frequently as possible
and not only compare ballistics data in a case-by-case mannerat the international level. To facilitate sharing in bulk, if possible
and equipped with the Integrated Ballistics Identification System,
explore becoming a member of the INTERPOL Ballistic Information
Network.

»

Explore and encourage, where possible, methods for informationsharing of ballistics data across different manufacturing
companies of ballistics information systems, as propriety data
formats represent a current barrier. For example, for countries
using different Automatic Ballistics Identification Systems, explore
alternative options for sharing information, such as double-castingor working through existent networks such as CARICOM, Europol
or INTERPOL.

•

Consider regulating the number of ammunition rounds that can belegally purchased in the private market, particularly in places affected byhigh levels of armed violence and with diversion (leakages) from private
actors identified as a main source feeding the unauthorized supply. This
policy could reduce the overall pool of available ammunition, thereby
reducing a source of diversion to unauthorized users.

•

Consider restrictions on identified conflating dynamics, such as thesimultaneous presence of firearms, alcohol, drugs, young men and latenight hours.

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•Consider adopting technology that detects and notifies authorities of
all ammunition discharges in urban environments. This could take theform of gunshot detection technology, such as ShotSpotter. Adding
this technological advance to the toolbox available to law enforcement
would provide two crucial advantages: first, immediate notification ofa shooting event, and second, a full understanding of the number of
ammunition discharges that occur in an urban environment. The former
advantage facilitates immediate emergency responses to shooting
events; the latter advancement would provide a more accurate estimateof the universe of ammunition discharged in an urban environment. For
ammunition profiling efforts, the latter area of improvement would
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the full extent ofshooting incidents and thus a better grasp of the sample observed.

•

Consider creating and contributing to a freely available depository of
ammunition with headstamp pictures and information from recovered
samples. The shared depository can help future efforts to learn, verify,
build on and test the feasibility of technological advances in ammunition
monitoring.

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3.6 Moving forward
This Handbook is a proposal to facilitate efforts to profile small arms
ammunition in settings affected by armed violence. This Handbook also
encourages users to use the guidelines as a starting point to think differently
about ammunition and to continue building on this approach to find whatworks best at the local level. As such, this Handbook should be understoodas a living document, open to any and all editions and additions as the fieldof small arms ammunition research advances and different case studies
build a comparable and systematic evidence base. While this Handbook
carries no reporting requirements, UNIDIR encourages users to share theirexperience and results. Feedback on the Handbook itself will allow UNIDIR
to update the product and results from the case studies, and this will
inform the Institute’s work on armed violence and in advising multilateralprocesses moving forward.
This Handbook also presents an opportunity to take a step back and rethinkarmed violence and reconsider the role of ammunition – a role that is central
to lethal outcomes in incidents of armed violence and often understudied.
It is the final message of this Handbook that to move forward, on someoccasions, it is crucial to take a step back to analyse the full picture. And
since the challenge of armed violence in is urgent, this analytical step backought to be taken without delay. The right solutions to armed violence
are within reach, but to find the right solutions, it is crucial to ask theright questions. The ultimate purpose of this Handbook is to lead users to
the right questions.
The Conventional Arms Programme of UNIDIR stands ready to support
users of this Handbook in developing an ammunition profile and exploring
ways to prevent armed violence.

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PART FOUR:
ANNEXES

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UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCHGLOSSARY
Generally, but not always, the nominal projectile
diameter, typically based on the bore of a weapon, as
measured across the features of the weapon’s rifling.

Calibre:(Definition per Small Arms Survey.)

A cased quantity of explosives (excluding rocket
motors) complete with its own means of ignition.

Cartridge:(Definition per International Ammunition Technical Guidelines [IATG].)

Diversion:

Movement – either physical, administrative orotherwise – of ammunition from the legal to the illicit
realm, in defiance of national and/or international law,to an unauthorized end user or for unlawful end use.
Diversion could entail appropriation and/or physicalrerouting leading to a potential change in the effective
control or ownership of ammunition to actors, groups
or entities that have not been authorized by competent
national authorities. Diversion could occur at any of thestages of the ammunition life cycle.
•
Diverting ammunition to an “unauthorized end
user” could refer to a sale, gift, lease, loan or barterexchange of ammunition throughout any of the stagesof the life cycle to the armed forces, law enforcement
agencies or other security forces of a particularState that has not been specifically authorized by
a competent national authority of an exporting andimporting State, through licensing arrangements andend-use undertakings. It could also refer to a natural or
legal person (an individual, group or corporate entity)
not authorized by such an authority.
•
Diverting ammunition for an “unlawful end use”
could imply that the end-use assurances will not be
observed. (Definition per GGE/PACAS/2020/3.)

End user:

The individual or organization that will operate theequipment or facility.
(Definition per IATG.)HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS

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Headstamp:

Alphanumeric characters and/or symbols applied to thebase of cartridge cases.
(Definition per Small Arms Survey.)

Live ammunition: Ammunition that has not been fired or renderedunserviceable.
Lot:

Predetermined quantity of ammunition or componentsthat is as homogeneous as possible and, undersimilar conditions, may be expected to give uniform
performance. (Definition per IATG.)

Marking:

The application of marks – including colours, descriptive
text and symbols – to munitions, parts and components
thereof, and associated packaging, for the purposes ofidentifying, among other things, their role, operationalfeatures, and age, and the potential hazards posed bythose munitions.
(Definition per IATG.)

Import marking: The application of markings, at the request of theimporter, to identify country of import, authorized end
user, importer, lot, year of manufacture, among othercharacteristics of the importation.
Tracing:

The systematic tracking of illicit ammunition from thepoint of its manufacture or import, through the lines ofsupply, to the point at which it became illicit.
(Definition per IATG.)

Transit:

Movement of goods across the territory of a Stateas part of a transfer between two other States,
including the transloading of the goods at the
points of entry into and exit from the transit State.
(Definition per Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium.)

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HANDBOOKPROFILING
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS