A/76/183

United Nations

General AssemblyDistr.: General
19 July 2021
Original: English

Seventy-sixth session
Item 103 of the provisional agenda*
Review of the implementation of the recommendations anddecisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenthspecial session

Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
Report of the Secretary-General
Summary
The present report outlines a series of recommendations in response to theSecretary-General’s request that the Advisory Board on Disarmament Mattersconsider a new vision and new approaches for nuclear disarmament and arms control.
In light of the current fraught geo-strategic context, the Board’s proposals encourage
States to talk, and to identify common goals, language and practices that could resultin nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament; for the United Nations toplay a decisive role in creating an enabling environment; a nd for the global public to
be robustly engaged. Over a period of two years, the Board actively explored whatclear, realistic goals could elicit the best contributions by stakeholders towards
proactive action, in both the intermediate and longer term.
Nuclear weapons continue to pose an existential threat to the world and, as such,the Board underscored that the international community must continue to focus its
collective efforts on specific steps, rooted in a renewed common and shared vision,that would achieve the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world in a manner thatis verifiable, irreversible and transparent. The Board was equally convinced that
biological and chemical weapons demand urgent action.
The Board believed that a credible and achievable way forward would build on
the existing, decades-long system of disarmament and arms control measures in orderto: (a) preserve and reinforce existing treaties and agreements; (b) sustain andstrengthen the norm against the testing, proliferation and use of nuclear weapons;(c) reduce the role of nuclear weapons as instruments of statecraft; (d) address therisks and spillover effects of various technological innovations in heightening nuclear
dangers; (e) consider new and emerging technologies and potential new domains ofconflict, including their potential interactions with nuclear weapons; (f) increase
opportunities for effective bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral dialogue; and* A/76/150.

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A/76/183(g) promote verifiable and irreversible action towards nuclear, chemical andbiological weapons disarmament.
Advancing these goals, the Board believed, requires a diverse and modern
diplomatic toolkit, comprised of various formal and informal actions, pursued
simultaneously across official and unofficial channels, including with numerous civilsociety stakeholders. Renewed political dedication and robust leadership are needed,alongside a convincing narrative to both heighten global public awareness around thecontinued dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and to mobilize support on
their elimination.
In its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Board received targeted overviews on three
UNIDIR workstreams: nuclear disarmament, nuclear deterrence and strategic arms
control dialogue; activities in support of the Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and Their Destruction; and disarmament and the women and peace andsecurity agenda. The Board also reviewed current programmes, activities and financesof the Institute, including ongoing efforts to strengthen its policy impact, achievefinancial sustainability and further expand its global engagement. The Boar dapproved the report of the Director on the activities of the Institute for the period fromJanuary 2020 to December 2020 and the proposed programme of work and financial
plan for 2022.

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I. Introduction
1.
The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its deliberations for 2021
through videoconferencing, convening for its seventy -fifth session on 4, 9 and
11 February and for its seventy-sixth session on 8, 10, 15, 17 and 29 June. Selma
Ashipala-Musavyi (Namibia) presided as Chair over both sessions.
2.
Beginning in January 2020, the Advisory Board undertook a two -year
programme of work based on the request of the Secretary-General to consider a new
vision and new approaches for nuclear disarmament and arms control. Specifically,
the Secretary-General asked the members of the Board to tackle three main questions:(a) how to reduce siloed approaches and create a shared understanding about thedestabilizing nexus of rapidly developing new technologies, including those inpossible new domains of conflict, with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction; (b) how to mobilize the support of Member States to reinvigorate nuclear
disarmament and arms control, especially in the current challenging international
climate; and (c) how to ensure that the actions of the United Nations system enable
the development of creative, yet realistically achievable, new appro aches to thecommon goal of nuclear disarmament.
3.
In 2020, the Board produced a preliminary report on the above topics ( A/75/283)
based on two sessions of substantive discussion. The present report, submitt ed
pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/183 (O), summarizes the deliberations of
the Board during the past four sessions and presents the Board’s specificrecommendations to the Secretary-General. It also describes the work of the Board inits capacity as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR), including its approval of the report of the Institute’s Director(A/76/175).

II. Substantive discussions and recommendations
4.
Three years ago, the Secretary-General, in Securing our Common Future: An
Agenda for Disarmament, underscored the key role of disarmament in safeguarding
humanity and saving lives. That agenda remains relevant and urgent. The Board
appreciates that several Member States have stepped forward to champion or support
one or more of the Agenda’s 40 detailed commitments on non-proliferation, arms
control and disarmament, in collaboration with United Nations entities.
5.
However, these collaborative actions stand in sharp contrast to the continued
fraying and further atrophying of disarmament instruments, machinery andinstitutions with worrying consequences. These developments reflect broader
divisions and tensions between and among States. The Board felt strongly that suchcleavages must not be allowed to prevent international cooperation on
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament or efforts that advance respect for
and adherence to international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
6.
In considering a new vision for nuclear non-proliferation, arms control anddisarmament, the Board actively explored what clear, realistic goals could elicit thebest contributions of key stakeholders towards proactive action, in both theintermediate and longer term.
7.
The Board heard presentations from experts on non-proliferation anddisarmament, on new and emerging technologies and on how to draw on theexperience of global responses derived from the climate change movement, including
ways that movement had generated enhanced public engagement. It discussed these
topics with a view to developing practical and concrete suggestions and21-10033

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recommendations for bringing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
disarmament and arms control back to the heart of common efforts to strengtheninternational peace and security and sustainable development.

A.

Risks and opportunities in a changing global security environmentState of affairs and associated risks
8.
The Advisory Board observed with concern that the current international
security environment continues to be marked by an absence of trust, diminishingtransparency, growing trends of competition over cooperation and a lack of dialogue.
The last two decades have been characterized by the intensification of global andregional political-military fault lines that risk undermining progress made in the
period immediately following the cold war, including widening divergences among
States over fulfilling legally binding obligations relevant to advancing efforts on
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the ultimate goal of the totalelimination of nuclear weapons. All opportunities should be sought to foster
comprehensive and cooperative security.
9.
The Board noted that despite isolated instances of progress on the path towards
nuclear arms control and disarmament in the current multipolar context, the overall
momentum appears to be regressing alarmingly. Signific ant recent signs of reversal
have included the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate -Range andShorter-Range Missiles; the breakdown of the Treaty on Conventional Ar med Forcesin Europe; and the possible collapse of the Treaty on Open Skies, on top of the
breakdown of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.
Members also noted that 25 years after the opening for signature of theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, it has not yet entered into force. Members
further expressed deep concern about the re-emergence of dangerous rhetoric andpractices among States about the utility of nuclear weapons, including on their use.
10. The Advisory Board was equally convinced that biological and chemical
weapons demand urgent action. As the ongoing coronavirus disease (COVID -19)
pandemic has underscored, infectious disease outbreaks have the ability to bring theworld to a virtual standstill, cripple economies, undermine global security and cause
untold human suffering and loss of life. The Secretary-General has highlighted to the
Security Council that the weaknesses and lack of preparedness exposed by thispandemic provide a window onto how a bioterrorist attack might unfold, and may
increase its risks. Those risks are exacerbated by the current absence of complianceand verification, as well as of transparency measures and robu st institutional support
for the Biological Weapons Convention. Moreover, as chemical weapons are the mostwidely proliferated and used weapon of mass destruction in history, the Board stressed
the urgent need for tangible and practical steps to uphold the authority and integrityof the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpilingand Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in order to achieve the totalelimination of such weapons, and to exclude their use through the s trict
implementation of all its provisions.
11. The Board observed that, after the cold war, any broad public understanding
about the need and value of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmamentand risk reduction appeared to fade within the public consciousness. Meanwhile,
within some relevant State institutions, there are often questions about the role ofarms control and disarmament in improving mutual security and international
stability. In this context, consensus-based multilateral disarmament negotiations have

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been deadlocked for more than two decades, while bilateral negotiating channels havebeen allowed to stagnate, or to remain comparatively nascent.
12. The Board reflected that the current level of geopolitical tensions and distrust
are driving military modernization and expansion efforts, fuelling a deeply
concerning dynamic.
13. The Board also noted that, while advances in areas such as artificial intelligence,cybersecurity, outer space and nuclear, biological and chemical scienc e could
contribute to progress on the Sustainable Development Goals and potentially reduce
nuclear, chemical and biological risks if used properly in the realm of their peacefulintent, they could also worsen existing security risks, create additional dang ers andopen new domains for conflict. Mismanagement of such technological developments,
or of rapidly evolving offensive and defensive missile technologies, could diminish
predictability and mutual trust, contribute to arms races and even produce a rapid
escalation in the use of force, potentially leading to the use of nuclear weapons,
including inadvertently or through miscalculation.
14. Taken together, these overlapping factors have created a combustible
international setting where our common security, as well as that of the key
protagonists, is increasingly challenged and under growing threat.
Potential opportunities
15. Focusing on nuclear arms control and disarmament, the Board consideredseveral developments that could contribute to improving the international security
climate.
16. The Board welcomed the recent five-year extension of the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty),
regarding this agreement as important both for global strategic stability and for future
opportunities to reinforce existing arms control and disarmament regimes, especiallyby the United States and the Russian Federation. It also took note of t he entry into
force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which reflects its parties’commitment to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context,
the Board recalled that the Treaty had its origins in the renewed consid eration by
States of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as well as a widely held
frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament and the implementation of
non-proliferation and disarmament commitments.
17. The Board welcomed the reaffirmation by the Russian Federation and the UnitedStates and by China and the Russian Federation of the Reagan -Gorbachev principlethat a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
18. The Board observed that other prominent issues of global con cern, including theclimate change crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, may provide important
opportunities to increase public awareness and understanding of disarmament -related
issues. For example, the pandemic and the climate crisis each could be used topromote serious debate on: (a) the constituent elements of the concept of “humansecurity”; and (b) practical means for States to apply a broadened definition of
security that highlights the broader costs of military and arms competition.
19. While noting that it was still too early to identify all the consequences of the
COVID-19 pandemic, Board members described it as a wake-up call to improve
preparedness, international cooperation and transparency, not only for future health related crises, but also for other challenges and catastrophes. In this regard, also
noting that the pandemic had underscored the direct and indirect costs of biosecurity
and biosafety incidents, the Board underlined the critical importance of revitalizing
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activities within the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention and on
strengthening the implementation of the Convention, including through thedevelopment of potential verification and transparency measures.

B.

Goals for contemporary nuclear disarmament and arms control
20. The Board welcomed the opportunity to consider ways to revitalize andmodernize the global disarmament architecture and the United Nations disarmamentmachinery, both to address the dangers and risks associated with the continued
existence of nuclear weapons and to chart a course towards their total elimination. An
intermediate objective would be to support a global security environment that is morestable and secure in the near term with reduced nuclear risks and where constructive
actions enable a revitalized pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
21. Reaffirming that nuclear weapons continue to pose an existential threat to theworld, the Board underscored that the international community must continue to focus
its collective efforts on specific steps, rooted in a renewed common and shared vision,for the ultimate goal of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world in a manner that isverifiable, irreversible and transparent.
22. The Board underlined the shared interest of all Member States to pursue
cooperative action in international non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament
in order to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, whether intentionally, by accident or
through miscalculation, and to avoid the severe consequences that may ensue from it.
The necessity to avert such risks should provide the foundation for the political willneeded to pursue further progress in that area.
23. A credible and achievable way forward would build on the existing decades long system of disarmament and arms control measures so as to: (a) preserve andreinforce existing treaties and agreements; (b) sustain and strengthen the norm against
the testing, proliferation and use of nuclear weapons; (c) reduce the role of nuclear
weapons as instruments of statecraft; (d) address the risks and spillover effects ofvarious technological innovations in heightening nuclear dangers; (e) consider new
and emerging technologies and potential new domains of conflict, including theirpotential interactions with nuclear weapons; (f) increase opportunities for effective
bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral dialogue; and (g) promote verifiable andirreversible action towards nuclear, chemical and biological weapons disarmament.
24. In considering how to develop a cooperative global securi ty regime, the Board
underscored the need for a diverse and modern diplomatic toolkit capable ofaddressing tensions between States; re-establishing habits of dialogue andcooperation; significantly enhancing transparency; building and sustaining mutual
trust and confidence; refraining from strategic nuclear competition; and fostering
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in national security doctrines, postures andpolicies. In plain terms, the Board saw the need for States to talk; for them to identify
common goals, language and practices; and for the public to be robustly engaged.
25. Such a toolkit would be designed to: (a) identify major strategic concerns
driving today’s competitive relationships, as well as their constituent parts; and(b) match them with appropriate methods of response, with a view to tackling
multiple concerns in tandem. Where appropriate, identifying and responding to one
particular element of a broader strategic concern could allow an initiative’s scope tobe narrowed to a clear set of realistic deliverables.
26. Advancing these goals, the Board believes, will require various formal andinformal actions along the lines of those suggested under the section on key points
and recommendations below. Such actions would require simultaneou s engagement

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across official and unofficial channels, including to gain insights and support fromcivil society stakeholders. The need to consider various formats and avenues fordiscussion and action is particularly notable in view of the difficult curren tnegotiating environment, including the entrenched deadlock within theintergovernmental disarmament machinery.

C.

Strategies to support nuclear disarmament and arms control
27. The following paragraphs set out some key propositions and findings from theBoard’s deliberations. Together, they comprise elements of an agenda forcollaborative action by all Member States and civil society to reduce the dangers
posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and revitalize
pursuit of a world free of these weapons.
Action to mobilize the support of Member States to reinvigorate the pursuit of
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament of nuclear weapons and otherweapons of mass destruction
Key points and recommendations
28. As a first and urgent priority, the international community must preserve andrenew the existing system of bilateral and multilateral measures, agreements andtreaties for non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, built over generations,to both lessen the likelihood of nuclear war and build on this foundation for the pursuitof the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. This means they must be implemented
in full and in a verifiable and transparent manner.
29. Preserving and fortifying the existing non-proliferation, arms control anddisarmament architecture is the essential foundation for recrafting pertinent strategies
to reflect the realities, challenges and dynamics of today’s world. The Board notedthat the Russian Federation and the United States together hold the vast majority of
the world’s strategic nuclear weapons and have not exhausted their options forpursuing further bilateral reductions. At the same time, global multipolarity makes it
necessary that all States, including nuclear-weapon States, engage in effective
dialogue on how to: (a) refrain from competition in the strategic security arena and reduce
nuclear dangers; and (b) adopt arms control and disarmament actions that will return
States to a common path to a world free of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
30. The United States and the Russian Federation, as well as other parties to theTreaty on Open Skies, should endeavour to preserve the Treaty, building on the
successful five-year extension of the New START Treaty by the Russian Federationand the United States. The Board emphasized the importance of ensuring the successof the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, believing a positive outcome to be in the interest of all States
parties. Furthermore, States should join and fully support a collective global effort tosustain other non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament treaties, such as the
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. It further
stressed that States should take full advantage of other near-term milestones forrenewed multilateral dialogue and concrete deliverables, notably the forthcoming
review conferences for the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Biological Weapons Convention. Board
members also pointed to the urgent need to strengthen in stitutional support for theseand other treaties. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty, which is long overdue, would represent an important concrete step both to

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reaffirm the importance of the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmamentarchitecture and to build political momentum to strengthen it further.
31. Given the tense international security environment, the Board underscored theneed for risk reduction measures, which should include actions to demonstrate nuclear
restraint, renew or strengthen robust and action-oriented bilateral and multiparty
dialogues to that end, reduce the likelihood of conventional conflict and improvetransparency and verification methodologies. All States should equally maintain andadvocate the moratorium on nuclear tests pending a successful effort to achieve theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s entry into force and support sustained andpractical efforts to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All States should also cooperate to ensurecompliance with the legal obligation not to use chemical and biological weapons.
32. Strengthened official and unofficial dialogue, including as a means to increasetransparency among relevant States, is essential. It should include dialogue on thesize, make-up and management of nuclear arsenals, as well as on related future plans.
In addition, such dialogue would contribute towards a better shared understanding of
national doctrines and decision-making processes, both among nuclear-weapon Statesand vis-à-vis the broader international community. In particular, establishing clear
channels of communication in the event of contingencies that could lead to nuclear weapons use could help prevent miscalculation by adversaries, while also building
accountability and mutual confidence.
33. In addition, the Board noted that both traditional and innovative confidence building measures must be a key element of efforts to rebuild trust, as well as toreduce and mitigate risks. In that regard, the Board saw merit in potential initiatives
by States or other actors to achieve limited successes in revitalizing cooperative
security action. It also encouraged initiatives that expand and open communication
channels at bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral levels, with a view topursuing simultaneous and overlapping dialogues as necessary, including, forexample, efforts that are under way towards the establishment of a Middle East zone
free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
34. In this connection, the Board is of the view that renewed, sustained andsubstantive dialogues among and between nuclear-weapon States, at multiple levels,
is essential to rebuild cooperation, mutual trust and confidence, maintain strategic
stability and promote meaningful strategic risk reduction. Such discussions, the Board
noted, could address each party’s respective strategic concerns relating to nuclear
weapons and associated concerns, such as conventional weapons, missile defences
and issues related to novel and emerging technologies, including activities incyberspace and outer space, and their respective and combined potential impact on
strategic stability.
35. With regard to the dialogue among nuclear-weapon States within the P5 process,the Board noted that:(a) Nuclear-weapon States should expand their discussions to address andagree to measures to promote a better understanding of perceptions and postures,
reduce strategic risks and enhance confidence and cooperation;(b) Nuclear-weapon States should update their discussions to increasetransparency and incorporate a more discernible action-oriented approach;(c) Nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate their leadership in maintaining
and enhancing the regime under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, including by advancing efforts to ascertain their and Member States’
compliance and fully implementing their disarmament obligations under article VI of
the Treaty and past commitments;
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A/76/183(d) Nuclear-weapon States should enhance the transparency of their dialogue
and foster interaction with non-nuclear weapon States on the results achieved.
36. The Board noted that in their dialogues States should commit t hemselves tosolving or moving past legacy issues in order to address forward -looking topics aspart of a broad, encompassing, twenty-first-century disarmament and arms control
agenda. With numerous arms control concerns vying for urgent action, States sho uld
seek to address and minimize risks from the full spectrum of strategic concerns, notjust nuclear weaponry. This includes the impact of new and evolving militarytechnologies (e.g. advanced conventional weapons, missile defence and electronic
warfare), and expanding competition in new domains (e.g. artificial intelligence,outer space and cyberspace), including the nexus between novel technologies andnuclear weapons. Depending on the particular technology focus and domain, these
dialogues should include many other States, for example in relation to activities inouter space and cyberspace and those related to verification and risk reduction. Theseother States need to be actively involved in efforts to regulate such areas.
37. This set of bilateral, plurilateral, regional and multilateral dialogues could pave
the way for future disarmament and arms control actions. Those actions could takethe shape of legally binding bilateral or multilateral treaties with detailed verification
provisions where such agreements are appropriate, but many alternative options exist.
For example, States could pursue informal agreements that are politically but notlegally binding for their parties, or unilateral actions taken with an expectation ofreciprocity, whether or not they are done in coordination with other States. Additional
approaches could include joint declarations; bilateral, multiparty and multilateralcodes of conduct and rules of the road; and transparency measures. Other tools could
include informal dialogues between Member States and experts (potentially initiatedby the Secretary-General) as well as groups of governmental experts and expert
working groups. The Board noted that the most suitable format and shape of aparticular initiative would depend on what issues are on the table as well as theparticular negotiating partners. The Board also noted the potential to pursue packagesof multiple measures simultaneously.
38. Board members further underlined the importance of making full use of existingmechanisms, such as the First Committee of the General Assembly and theConference on Disarmament. Noting the past achievements of the Conference,
members expressed a firm desire to see it again pursue negotiations on nuclear
disarmament and other issues of strategic stability, and therefore reemphasized theimportance of members of the Conference exercising the necessary political will andflexibility to enable it to fulfil its mandate.
Action to ensure that the actions of the Secretary-General enable thedevelopment of new approaches to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world
Key points and recommendations
39. As it has been since its founding, the whole United Nations system, led by the
Secretary-General, must remain steadfast in its support for the ultimate global
elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and must
integrate disarmament across its priorities. The Board, mindful of the robust actions
outlined in Securing Our Common Future, touched during its deliberations on
additional steps the United Nations system could undertake to enable the developmentof new approaches to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.
40. The Board highlighted that it was indispensable that the Secretary -Generalrobustly continue to promote and defend the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
It expressed its belief that the Secretary-General could use his good offices to further
support and amplify the norm against the use of nuclear weapons. It also expr essed
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its belief that the Secretary-General could productively advocate reducing the role ofnuclear weapons in national security doctrines.
41. The Board recommended that the Secretary-General continue to encourage
strengthened dialogue, particularly among relevant States, and offer his good offices witha view to facilitating informal dialogues to build trust and common understanding.
The Board noted past meetings of the Security Council devoted to nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament, and in this regard the Secretary-General could
encourage members of the Council to consider a dedicated discussion on reducing thedangers posed by nuclear weapons and identifying potential ways forward.
42. The Board proposed that the Secretary-General stimulate a global multi-stakeholder
conversation about what a sustainable and secure world without nuclear weapons
could look like.
43. The Board recommended that the Secretary-General promote and facilitate
engagement among Members States to help shape new thinking on ways forward thatmeet the challenges of today’s world with regard to the non -proliferation, arms
control and disarmament of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Action to address interlinkages across key technology domains (cyberspa ce,outer space and others) that affect international security, in particular withregard to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
Key points and recommendations
44. As part of a new vision to advance nuclear disarmament and arms contr ol, Statesshould develop the habit of discussing strategic issues across varied formats andforums so as to help break down silos between individual arms control concerns andmaximize the opportunity for solutions. The Board noted that, as of yet, nointergovernmental process has addressed concerns about how technologicalinnovations could potentially increase the risks of the use of nuclear weapons.
45. Noting the contributions of ongoing intergovernmental initiatives for addressing
challenges posed in particular areas, such as cybersecurity, outer space and lethal
autonomous weapon systems, the Board underscored the strong necessity ofpromoting a better understanding of the interlinkages between evolving technologicalcapabilities and emerging challenges across a wide range of arms control issues, andrisks of the use of nuclear weapons in particular. A comprehensive review of how
nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities are becoming increasingly entangled would
enable States and other stakeholders to develop practical ways to mitigate theresultant intersection risks. A group of governmental experts on such a matter and/or
a report by the Secretary-General could greatly contribute in this regard.
46. The Board felt there were some areas where States could take more immediate
actions to mitigate risks of miscalculations or misunderstandings, such as agreements on
non-interference in nuclear command, control and communications systems. States could
also take appropriate unilateral actions to ensure there are no unauthorized, inadvertentor accidental operational decisions with respect to control of nuclear weapons.
47. The Board noted that any successful effort to reinvigorate the pursuit of nuclear
disarmament and arms control must include new and different official, semi-official
and civil society voices. Bearing in mind the intergovernmental nature ofmultilateral/international negotiations and related actions due to the primary role ofstates to maintain international peace and security and safeguard State s overeignty
and national security, the Board noted that, nevertheless, historically, participationfrom civil society, including from women’s organizations, had been vital in helping
to create incentives and pressures for action. Looking forward, the Board noted that
the United Nations system could consider wide-ranging options to intensify and10/14

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sustain dialogue among legal experts, policymakers, technologists and othernon-State stakeholders on issues related to new technologies, including the full andequal participation of women, with a view to identifying creative approaches toaddress new challenges.
Action to mobilize public participation and support for decisive action on
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament of nuclear weapons and otherweapons of mass destruction
Key points and recommendations
48. The Board stressed that revitalizing the pursuit of a world free of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction requires renewed political dedication
and robust leadership. A convincing narrative on nuclear disarmament efforts is alsoneeded, one that would both heighten public awareness and mobilize public support
for decisive political action. This narrative could include an appeal to political leadersand government officials to think of themselves also as global citizens, underscoringthat the risks and consequences of their actions, including reliance on nuclear
weapons, have worldwide ramifications. Here, the Board noted that the United
Nations should seek out and take advantage of advice from and collaboration among
diverse stakeholders, including academia, the media, civil society organizations, theWomen and Peace and Security Focal Points Network, youth groups, think tanks andothers, including the private sector. It would also benefit from speaking with
communities directly affected by such weapons.
49. The Board suggested that the Secretary-General appoint a special envoy fordisarmament and civil society, reporting to the High Representative for Disarmament
Affairs, who would engage with civil society, the public at large and other criticalstakeholders with a view to giving prominence to the issues of non-proliferation, arms
control and disarmament.
50. The Board recommended that the Secretary-General and the Office for
Disarmament Affairs expand on their efforts to generate greater awareness andunderstanding among the wider public by engaging in targeted public outreach, including
through convening periodic informal gatherings and disarmament education.

III. Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research
51. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, acting in its role as the Board ofTrustees of UNIDIR, met twice in 2021, on 2 February and 17 June. Both meetings
were conducted virtually owing to the ongoing pandemic. At those meetings, theofficer-in-charge, Giacomo Persi Paoli, in February 2021, and the Institute’s new
Director, Robin Geiss, in June 2021, briefed the Board on the implementation of theInstitute’s activities.
52. During its meeting in February 2021, the Board commended UNIDIR for its
performance in 2020, the year that marked the Institute’s fortieth anniversary. In
particular, the Board noted that despite the significant disruptions caused by the
pandemic, UNIDIR had issued a record-breaking number of publications (52) andhosted 48 events, with some 7,600 participants taking part in the Institute’s activities.
Trustees welcomed the enhanced visibility of UNIDIR and its improved online
engagement. This included a significant improvement in its number of website users(up 75 per cent) and social media followers (up 35 per cent) globally. The Board
emphasized the importance of and expressed support for the Institute’s efforts todeliver on its mandate while effectively supporting the health and well-being of its
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personnel. The Institute’s performance during the pandemic had demonstrated its
strength, adaptability and resilience.
53. Trustees recognized the importance of the unique convening role of UNIDIR in
supporting multilateral disarmament and encouraged the Institute to continue its
efforts to facilitate dialogue and generate ideas. The Board welcomed the Institute’s
efforts to engage with audiences and to identify new research opportunities beyond
Geneva, as well as the translation of research products into other United Nations
official languages, and noted the upcoming establishment of the New York liaisonpresence. The Board encouraged the Institute to further leverage partnerships andresearchers based in local settings for its applied research during the ongoingpandemic. It also encouraged the Institute to consider how the Institute’s businessmodel might change in the long term as a result of the pandemic, especially in termsof travel and events. The Board recommended that the Institute continue to invest inefforts to measurably track, monitor and assess the impact of its work, including
working towards a harmonized set of impact-related indicators across the programmes.
54. The Board noted the continued improvement in the financial situation of
UNIDIR. The Institute’s income had increased to $6.8 million in 2020, while its
expenditures had increased to $6.0 million at the time of presentation. The Board also
noted the Institute’s revised 2021 expenditure projections. Efforts by UNIDIR todiversify its donor base, including through outreach to the private sector andfoundations, were noted. The Board recalled its desire to receive financial informationin advance of its meetings to support constructive engage ment.
55. The Board welcomed the General Assembly’s recent resolution on UNIDIR
(resolution 75/82) and notably its invitation to the Secretary-General to submit, in thecontext of the 2022 programme budget, a proposal for an increase in the subvention
to the Institute. The Board reiterated its longstanding recommendation that theInstitute’s subvention be increased proportionate to its contemporary requirements
and in line with the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his report of July
2018 (A/73/284). The Board also welcomed the Assembly’s appeal to all Member
States to continue to make financial contributions to the Institute, if possible formultiple years and unearmarked, so as to contribute to the Institute’s viability,
independence and impartiality and the quality of its work over the long term. In linewith its own previous recommendation (A/75/283), the Board welcomed theAssembly’s recent request for, and the Secretary-General’s subsequent efforts toprovide, accommodation for the Institute in the Palais des Nations in Geneva at a
reduced rate established to cover operational expenses only.
56. The Board supported the Institute’s intention to re-establish the position of
Deputy Director (D-1) in 2021, given its current size and scale of activities, throughsavings arising from the abolition of two P-5 posts (Chief of Operations, and Chiefof Research).
57. The Board endorsed the broad research priorities of UNIDIR for 2021 andlooked forward to the development of a new multi-year strategic plan as proposed by
the Director. In the area of conventional weapons, these included strengthening policy
and practice on weapon and ammunition management, adapting conventional arms
control to changes in conventional warfare, and preventing and mitigating armed
violence in urban and local settings. In the area of gender and disarmament, theInstitute will investigate gender approaches to cybersecurity, including topics related
to women in the cyberworkforce, online harassment, gender-sensitive capacitybuilding and fairness in artificial intelligence systems, while also identifying entry points
for gender mainstreaming and for improving women’s participation in weapon andammunition management. With respect to the Middle East weapons of mass
destruction free zone project, priorities included addressing related research gaps,
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developing more capacity for future negotiations and continuing to foster regional
dialogue. On security and technology, UNIDIR would facilitate the implementation of
cybernorms and strengthen cyber crisis management mechanisms, explore theimplications of increasing the use of autonomy in weapons systems and other military
applications and support a better understanding of the challenge a nd opportunities ofinnovation with a specific focus on digital destabilization. Finally, in the area of
weapons of mass destruction and other strategic weapons, the Institute’s priorities
included examining the future of arms control and disarmament of we apons of mass
destruction, reducing strategic unpredictability, strengthening compliance enforcement,enhancing nuclear transparency and verification and advancing space security
and sustainability.
58. In view of the limited time, the Board received targ eted overviews on three
UNIDIR workstreams: nuclear disarmament, nuclear deterrence and strategic arms
control dialogue; activities in support of the Biological Weapons Convention; anddisarmament and the women and peace and security agenda. The Board welcomed thework of UNIDIR on the nuclear disarmament, nuclear deterrence and strategic arms
control dialogue. Immediate priorities for the programme included the identificationof opportunities to recraft strategic arms control and revitalize the pursuit of nuclear
disarmament. The Board commended the work of UNIDIR in support of the
Biological Weapons Convention, which aimed to stimulate thinking around options
and opportunities for States parties to consider in seeking to strengthen this important
disarmament treaty at its ninth Review Conference. The Board expressed its
continued support for the work of UNIDIR to strengthen synergies between
disarmament and the women and peace and security agenda. In 2021, the gender anddisarmament programme will facilitate dialogue on the means and benefits ofintegrating weapons governance into the women and peace and security agenda andwill identify best practices that connect disarmament with the agenda’s priority
themes. The programme will work with Member States and stakeholders to foster
collaboration between different parts of the multilateral system, ensuring that relevant
treaties and conventions deliver for all.
59. At its meeting held in June 2021, the Board considered and approved the
proposed programme of work and financial plan for 2022 (see A/75/134), including
on the basis of comments and recommendations on the proposed budget from theAdvisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The Board
welcomed the new UNIDIR Director, Robin Geiss, who joined the Institute in April
2021, as well as the report of the Director, which provided a thorough account of theInstitute’s activity in 2020. It noted with the appreciation the work done by the former
Director, Renata Dwan. The Board also took note of the initial impressions andplanned short term priorities of the new Director, including the recruitment process forthe Deputy Director, further strengthening of the Institute’s digital communications
capacities and the launch of the UNIDIR liaison presence in New York.
60. On communications, Board members commended the Institute’s recent efforts,
in particular its success throughout the pandemic, and supported the Institute’s plans
to strengthen digital communications. In this respect, Trustees suggested leveraging
existing capacities within the United Nations system, including to keep operating
costs at a minimum. In addition, the Institute was advised to consider how it might
ensure that its communications remained accessible to all audiences, including thosewith disabilities.
61. The Director announced that the New York liaison presence had recently been
established, and was expected to deepen knowledge, partnerships and opportunities
for resource mobilization. The small capacity consisted of one Liaison Officer at the
P-4 level based in New York. The officer was already meeting with officials in New York,

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in line with existing COVID-19 restrictions. Trustees reiterated the need for UNIDIR
to develop clear impact metrics in order to effectively assess the new position.
62. With regard to the Secretary-General’s proposal for an increase in thesubvention to the Institute in the context of the 2022 programme budget, considering
its long-standing recommendation to increase the Institute’s subvention in proportion
to its contemporary requirements, the Board strongly supported the Secretary General’s proposal for a modest increase of $364,900.
63. Moving forward, Trustees reiterated their earlier appreciation, e xpressed in
February 2021, of the Institute’s efforts to engage with broader and more diverse
audiences globally, including the public and youth. Those efforts should continue,
including through strengthened communication and education, training and capaci tybuilding initiatives. With regard to youth more specifically, UNIDIR was encouraged
to consider a range of different engagement initiatives, including those tailored toyouth in different regions. The Institute’s continued efforts to translate research
products into other United Nations official languages, including Arabic, werecommended. The Board reiterated its support for the Institute’s initiatives to enhancediversity in research expertise through, inter alia, arrangements with visiting
researchers, non-resident fellows and paid graduate professionals. In addition,
Trustees encouraged the Institute to consider developing foresight and strategic
gaming capacities, as well as research on the nexus between arms control andeconomic development. Finally, Board members reiterated the need for the Instituteto strengthen its resource mobilization efforts, in order to equip itself with the funding
basis necessary to maintain and further expand its scope and impact.

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