14
WHO DECIDES? ENGAGEMENT AS ‘VIABLE PROCESS’ IN ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISION MAKING
Bikramaditya K. Choudhary1, Arun Kumar Tripathi2 and Jeetesh Rai2
1

Assistant Professor, Centre for the Study of Regional Development,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Corresponding author email: bkcjnu@gmail.com; bkchoudhary@mail.jnu.ac.in
2
Assistant Professors, Kirorimal College, University of Delhi, Delhi, India
Email: arunkmc@gmail.com, jeeteshrai@gmail.com

How to cite this paper:
Choudhary, Bikramaditya K,

Tripathi, Arun Kumar andRai, Jeetesh (2021) Who
decides? Engagement as‘viableprocess’inEnvironmental
Decision,
Journal of Global Resources,
Vol. 07 (02)DOI:
10.46587/JGR.2021.v07i02.014

Received: 21 March 2021
Reviewed: 18 April 2021
Revised: 31 May 2021
Final Accepted: 05 June 2021

Freely available Online
www.isdesr.org

Abstract: Environmental decision-making is usuallyconsidered a linear process that moves through discrete
stages before arriving at a final decision (Davoudi 2006;
Schon 1999). Scholars like, Ascher and Healy 1990; Dryzek
2005; Keeley and Scoones 2003; Kingdon 2003; Street
1997; Yeager 1991. This paper proposes ‘stakeholder
engagement processes’ as alternative to traditional
environmental decision-making as alternative that has thepotential to achieve better outcomes. In the process it
presents criticisms of the technical-rational model anddiscusses theoretical reasons for supporting stakeholder
engagement processes in light of other available policy
options. Taking examples from developed and developing
countries, it brings to the audience the inherent differencesin these situations and presents the limitations of theseapproaches. Specifically, drawing on brief empiricalexamples from Joint Forest Management (JFM) in India,
agricultural policy in Ethiopia, agricultural and conservation
policy in Zimbabwe, fisheries management in Europe andClean Development Mechanism (CDM) negotiations (further
details of which are presented in the footnotes), this paper
concludes that deliberative, inclusive and participatory
approaches to environmental decision-making could bebetter in certain cases, depending on the context. The paper,
therefore, argues that these approaches should becircumspectly
institutionalised
withinenvironmental
decision-making processes.
Keywords: Environmental Decision-Making, Stakeholder
Engagement Approaches, Decentralization

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Introduction
Decision making in general involves more than one step. The first step in decision making
invariably has to be recognition of a ‘need’. Rachel Carson’s book ‘The Silent Spring’ way backin 1962 highlighted the need to change the existing order and prevalent development practices
with regard to environment. O’Connor (1994) writes that environmental crisis has given liberalcapitalist society a new lease of life, as the expanding liberal capitalist economy, otherwise
saturated, found justification for the experiments with new technologies which will ‘save’ theenvironment. Use of new elements in mechanical operations, replacement of existing
combustion materials, possibility of new and ‘clean’ technologies became the ‘buzz word’ forcontemporary production system and global political and economic negotiations. Decision
making in any field is kind of choosing a suitable alternative from available set of possibilities.
Here, the question is who is picking the most suitable option, and what are the alternatives andpossibilities are considered. There are multiple models of decision making at the international
levels, where national governments decide for their people, their finances, their livelihoods andthe environment. The nature of national government varies and it could be an autocratic,
authoritarian, monarchy or democratic one. Diverse methods of decision making are thenfollowed in each of the nation-state, which are territorially and politically sovereign entities. The
usual top-down approach of decision making is more widely practiced and in terms ofenvironment in theory, it is accepted as heads of the state decides. Articulated position,
though, is usually in favour of local actions. The articulated and adapted interventions at best
remain favourable to some and making rest vulnerable. This is bound to happen as the limited
understanding and modelling of the environmental processes, causes and consequences aredefined based on certain known and generalized variables leaving other complexities andwickedness which in reality determine the environmental consequences and guide adaptation
strategies at multiple levels from micro to macro scales. This paper critically evaluates the
traditional decision making process and argues in favour of participatory decision making
process involving different stakeholders. Engaging multiple sets of people in decision making
is one possible way to address the question of dynamism, and multi-scale realities ofenvironmental issues. Engagement of community means series of deliberations andparticipation of multiple power-blocks in the decision making, which would be inclusive to someextent. ‘Stakeholder engagement processes’ here would be referred to as ‘deliberative,
inclusive and participatory’ approaches to environmental decision-making.
Traditional Methods of Environmental Decision-Making
Existing mainstream environmental policy theories are based on the assumption of ‘homo
economicus’ (Gsottbauer and Bergh, 2010), though it is difficult to ascertain the complex natureof human behaviour and the basis of their made choices in a given situation. The WesternWorld post-Carson era of the twentieth century, developed concern for the environment which
was different from the nineteenth century ‘systematic, rational concern for environmental
quality’ (Yeager, 1991). After the industrial revolution, the industrial clusters of the world
especially the cities and towns started reporting deterioration of the physical environment andthe negative consequences to the human health. The possibility of the exhaustion of the raw
materials including minerals and timbers prompted groups and individuals to have concerns
for the longevity of intensive extraction of raw materials, such as lumber, for commercial use
and sale. Environmental management in this background focused on regulating pollution andsustaining the environment for commercial purposes. Negative and evident health externalities
were considered threat to the healthy life and healthy city. In order to address emerging
environmental problems, groups and individuals relied on scientific disciplines, such as biology
and ecology, to expose the limits of human exploitation and tried linked the limit to nature withthat of the population (Ehrlich, 1968; Meadows and Meadows, 1972; Keeley and Scoones,
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2003). Conservation of different elements in the nature, like specific birds, specific animals andspecific forest became one of the important front activities. Colonial masters focussed on
mapping resources across the world and tried for efficient exploitation of resources including
timber, and minerals. The exploitation of nature was aggravated with the adopted hunting andgamin g by the officers appointed by the empire to oversee the resource extraction. Examples
of such behaviour can be seen from Africa, to South Asia and Southeast Asia and Pacific,
where the relation between indigenous population and nature was brought under the authorityof the colonial regimes (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Beinart, 1989). Grove (1989) identified asignificant departure in the colonial policy towards the nature and the environmental processes
by early nineteenth century, which became ‘more concerned with finding meaningful unities’
amongst natural factors like run-off, forest, demography and so on. However, entire natural
pool was conserved for the use of colonial developmental need and people were slowly
constrained from using natural resources. Boundaries were drawn and buffers were created
to protect forest for the utilitarian purposes. Developed in the West, this method ofenvironmental decision-making was exported to the colonies, including India and numerous
African countries, which were the sites of natural resource extraction (Beinart, 1989; Guha,
1983; Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Conservation was considered as a future prospect forbiodiversity conservation across the world (Kareiva and Fuller, 2016). The broader
philosophical undercurrent with regard to conservation usually remain no to visit the historicalreference and focus on change, which in inclusive was might be flexible and entrepreneurial.
The problem with such stride is that it ignores the structural cause of ecological depletion andalso the question about ‘what should be and could be conserved’ (Damiens, et al. 2017). In
India and elsewhere in the colonial regions wild life conservation was given greater emphasis
rather than conservation of livelihood options. Environmental assessment became part of theenvironmental decision making process in the 1960s to address environmental concern in asystematic way (Nilsson and Dalkmann, 2001). Different states introduced environmental
assessment as significant guiding principal towards state-led environmental action. That alsomeans environmental protection strategies primarily concentrated on individual and corporate
regulation, with the developing countries focusing more on individual behaviour, and leavingout corporate as these economies wanted to attract corporate for economic reasons. Whileenvironmentalists inveigh against consumption, the developmentalists blame population andkeep talking about economic drivers and technological solutions with a focus on specified
conservation (Adams, 1995; Abernethy, 1995). In the process, the state became the seat ofenvironmental decision-making, and also throttling such decisions exercising ‘bureaucratic andadministrative control. The rationale for such an act seemingly lies upon ‘a set of scientificanalyses, framed in particular ways by certain groups of experts’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).
More often the State policy-makers and experts are found to be ‘technician[s], exercisingprofessional judgment on behalf of the public’ (Selin and Chevez, 1995, 189), though interestof public at best is ignored be it in case of aggressive conservation measures or granting
operational authorization for industries discharging lethal chemicals or are prone to accidents
to the scale of Union Carbide Factory of Bhopal.
Technical Rationality as Traditional Environmental Decision-Making
Environmental decision-making for policies in the twentieth century remained based on theabove sets of principles, where technical experts hired by the state determine the course ofaction for the people. In doing so, more often a kind of contempt is displayed for the practices
and centuries old collective knowledge base of the inhabited communities in general and of
the indigenous communities in particular. Following this paradigm, tacit knowledge wasconsidered subaltern to the supreme faith in science. This paradigm essentially was supportedby the adoption of technical rationality in environmental decision-making, often emphatically
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propagating ‘will do’ approach of science, though of late the hubris of science has been rightly
questioned (Jasanaoff, 2019). Assuming that science could explain the consequences ofenvironmental destruction, environmental policy-makers relied on scientists to‘establish…facts about environmental realities’ to enable them to develop ‘policy options inlight of the established facts’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, 25). This simplified model, often
termed technical rationality or the technical-rational model, is viewed as ‘the positivist
epistemology of practice’ (Schon, 1999 cited in Davoudi, 2006, 685) and has had significant
influence in general policy-making (Rai and Soni 2019). Technical rationality is fixated withproblem-solving, and often focuses on the optimal means to achieve a specified end rather
than the end in itself (Davoudi, 2006; Rai and Soni 2019). However fundamental issues
remained with identification of the problem itself. Consideration of a ‘problem’ for theenvironmental condition and deterioration got decided on the basis of ‘science’. Nevertheless,the core of the problem in most of the cases may not be scientific and rather be political. Rooted
in the positivist view of knowledge, technical rationality sees ‘no need for excessive
consultation over technical decisions, as any group of experts would eventually arrive at similar[policy] conclusions’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). This model views the public as passive
witnesses to policy-making and relies on strict dichotomies between objective and subjective
knowledge; facts and values; problem setting1 and problem solving; knowledge and power;
experts and policy-makers; and technical and social dimensions (Davoudi, 2006). The
technical rationality model defines each set of binaries in a positivist and instrumental manner,
where the other is either tacit or non-rational and non-essential in determining the policy.
Policy-making proceeds in a linear fashion, moving through stages of agenda-setting, decisionmaking, implementation and evaluation, and it is assumed that decision-makers always makerational choices in response to short-term considerations (Yeager, 1991). However, rational
for what remains questionable, as the problem itself is political and unless we deliberate on
the framing of the problem, it would be inappropriate to consider ‘problem setting’ as acceptedin the traditional rationality model. Technical rationality presents a model for the environmental
decision-making process that has been used in both developed countries and in the developingworld, throughout which much environmental policy is based on colonial environmental
regulations (Beinart, 1989; Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Guha, 1983).
Questioning Technical Rationality
Technical rationality has been the maker and key determinant of traditional decision making
process about the environments and ecologies, which were often external to the decision
makers. Despite its historic dominance in environmental decision-making, technical rationality
is extensively and rightly termed as ‘inadequate theoretically, politically, and practically’(Davoudi, 2006, 694). One of the reasons traditional environmental policy has been called into
question is due to its failure to achieve desired outcomes (Dryzek, 2005; Rai and Soni, 2019).
The failure in achieving outcome can partially be attributed to misplaced focus of the priorities
and partially to expect humans behaving as rational being. Humans act not as a copy-bookcharacteristics of the laboratory based atomized being, but as adaptor and negotiator to thegiven situation and crisis based on their individual and collective capabilities. Technicalrationality paradigm did not consider these realities as worth enough to give attention andremained rooted in certain set of scientific evidences, which did lead to the improvement ofspecific environmental parameters like change in the cooling technology globally2. It has been
unsuccessful in many areas, including climate change and persistent ecosystem threats.
Consequently, there has been ‘a growing lack of faith in scientists and…policy institutions[…and] the legitimacy and authority assumed for successfully implementing the rational linear
model are being undermined’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, 29). This model has also beenchallenged for its focus on the technical aspects of environmental issues, which were
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propagated as universal. Because socio-cultural and economic aspects are omitted, it ‘is notalways clear when a policy issue [should…] be decided on technical arguments and when on
other criteria’ and it is not clear who should select the technical experts under what conditions(Keeley and Scoones, 2003, 26). This is particularly significant in developing countries, inwhich technical expertise – as defined in Western, positivist terms – is said to be a ‘relatively
scarce commodity, often held predominantly within government’ (Ascher and Healy, 1990,
179). Further, if technical rationality is adhered to, then other non-technical, but potentially
useful forms of knowledge are inevitably excluded (Ascher and Healy, 1990) and collective
wisdom ignored. Critics also argue that technical rationality is an inaccurate and oversimplified
model of environmental decision-making (Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Kingdon, 2003; Yeager,
1991). Rather than moving neatly between stages and ultimately reaching a discrete ‘momentof decision’ (Ascher and Healy, 1990, 159), this model adapts uni-linear determinism.
Serendipity, contingency and chances have to be important components in policy formulation(Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Environmental policies are supposed to be altered and contested
at various stages before a decision is made (Choudhary et al., 2019). For example, while the
Kyoto Protocol negotiations on CDM-sinks3 were multilaterally supported as a climate changesolution, their prominence in legislation was lessened due to actors’ interests and other tradeoffs (Boyd et al., 2008). In the United States, hundreds of actors, including policy-makers,
interest group representatives, researchers and journalists are involved in policy-making,representing different interests, perceptions and policy preferences (Sabatier, 1999). Outlined
criticisms of technical rationality primarily rest on the fact the environmental decision-making
process is ultimately a political one, involving contests among multiple actors.
Technical rationality model fails to acknowledge issues of power and the impacts ofsocio-cultural, economic and political issues at different stages of the policy process (Keeley
and Scoones, 2003). Science is not isolated and must be viewed as socially constructed
knowledge, since ‘experts’ are members of society and certain types of research are better
funded than others (Jasanoff , 2019; Keeley and Scoones, 2003). In environmental policy,
economists, physical scientists, and engineers are typically more influential thananthropologists or political scientists, because the former produce quantifiable facts while thelatter explore the qualitative effects of environmental policy choices (Ascher and Healy, 1990;
Nightingale, 2016). Technical rationality is also often unable to handle uncertainty (Street,1997); even when ‘scientists directly involved in producing knowledge…admit high levels of
uncertainty,’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, 29) decision-makers may admit lower levels in orderto enhance their authority, as seen in the case of global climate change science (Shackley and
Wynne, 1996). Therefore, the dualisms assumed by the technical-rational model do not often
hold and decision-making is an inherently political process subject to manipulation by thosewith economic or political power (Adams et al., 2003). The various stakeholders involved ‘draw
on their current knowledge and understanding to cognitively frame’ environmental issues,
which may limit the responses each decision-maker is willing to consider from the outset,
notwithstanding any facts revealed during the process (Adams et al., 2003, 1915-16). Thus,
as Yeager (1991) notes, ‘it is ironic that for all the rationalization of Western industrial societies
and the key roles played by science and technology, forecasting and planning, this area ofpolicy exposes fundamental limits to rationality[,] …from the state to individual action' (Yeager
1991, 323).
The nature of decision making based on so called ‘technical rationality’ is a politicalprocess rather than a non-political one. The selected scientific basis also depends on the kindof political and economic regimes take such decision and choose those scientist andtechnocrats to carry forward and justify those decisions. The complexities of this politicised
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process are compounded by the complex and interdisciplinary nature of environmental
problems (Ascher and Healy, 1990; Dryzek, 2005; Reed, 2008; Nightingale, 2016). Being
borderless, the complex environmental problems often affect multiple countries simultaneously
and are thus addressed in the international arena through global scientific debates andinternational treaties and conventions (Choudhary et al., 2019). Owing to differential access,in the process, the intersection of national and international policy processes adds layers ofcomplexity to environmental decision-making4 (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Consequent
neglect of environmental complexity often leads to misunderstandings about the possible
outcomes of environmental policy decisions. Unfortunately, when complexity is recognised
within the technical-rational model, it often ‘stimulates an overreaction that […gives] too muchauthority […to] technical experts mistakenly thought to be the masters of complexity’ (Ascherand Healy, 1990, 175). As scientists are directed to produce ‘facts’, ‘an important part of thescientific enterprise is seen as generating universalizable statements’ (Keeley and Scoones,
2003, 27), which neglect context and omit complexity while identifying problems. The
seemingly simple process of ‘problem setting’ may in fact be much more complex, because
underlying assumptions are often contested and problems are not ‘self-evident’ (Adams et al.,2003). Furthermore, simplistic constructions of environmental problems ‘lead to thedomination of policy by the single agency that has the relevant mandate or technical expertise’(Ascher and Healy, 1990, 160). For example, declining crop production and food shortage in
Ethiopia was left to the Ministry of Agriculture, which focused on ‘aggressive technology
transfer’ of seed and fertilizer while ignoring other environmental issues such as soil
conservation (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Yet, as Dryzek (2005) notes, ‘problems of any
complexity defy such centralization […because] nobody can possibly know enough about thevarious dimensions of an issue such as acid rain…not to mention the social and economic
aspects of these issues’ (Dryzek, 2005, 93). A more pluralist approach to environmental policy
is need of the hour because the state may require the support of other entities to make effective
environmental decisions (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Critics of technical rationality support
arguments that due to the complexity of environmental issues, environmental decision-making
ought to ‘depend on the widespread support and involvement of an informed public […whose]rights, roles and participation…should be expanded’ (WCED, 1987, 21).
Alternative to Technical Rationality Model
Alternative to the ‘technical rationality’ appeared as ‘conciliatory approach’ and ‘voluntary
approach’. Conciliatory approaches adopt a model where policy is to be designed throughcooperation between the regulators and those being regulated. The binary, though, almost
ensures that there would be relative power balance in favour of those regulate and others haveto reconcile with the proposition or retaliate or negotiate or bargain, which depend on therelative capability of the individual or group and in most cases favour state and its agencies.
The voluntary approaches constitute efforts where groups choose to self-regulate and often
run into the developmental agenda of the state and the state supported and state promoted
corporates. Plethora of examples like, opposition to Metro Project passing through forest of
Mumbai, ‘save the Great Barrier Reef against Mining’ are available where state acts against
the voluntary group or make them look like ‘anti-development’ and in certain cases ‘antinational’. Moreover, theoretically these approaches are proposed and often propagated inliterature as some believe that ‘if you want to secure people’s compliance…then it makes
sense to give them some stake in it’ (Goodin, 1986, 436). Experiences suggest that theseapproaches, specifically voluntary agreement5, do not add legitimacy to the regulatory processand ‘are in no way morally superior to legislative compulsion’ (Goodin, 1986, 443). This isargued because the state not only could still impose comparable or even stricter regulation but
also can act against those having an understanding of the environment and decides to act inJournal of Global Resources, July 2021, Volume 07 (02) B. K. Choudhary, Arun K. Tripathi and Jeetesh Rai Page 139 | 14

one particular way with regard to the chosen environment. However, both pragmatic andethical arguments are used to suggest that stakeholder engagement processes are superior
to traditional rationality, providing additional support for these approaches.
Stakeholder engagement processes are those in which stakeholders are active indecision-making and there is a ‘joint decision-making approach to problem resolution where
power is shared’ (Selin and Chevez, 1995, 190), and ‘lay input is inherent to, and integrated
with, the process’ (Petts and Brooks, 2006, 1048). Owing to the wide range of interpretationsof these concepts (Reed, 2008) and the development of frameworks internationally (Bruch,2004), these processes assume a variety of formats, including scenario workshops, citizens
juries and round tables, café approach6 depending on the context and country of
implementation (Konisky and Beierle, 2001; Street, 1997). While stakeholder engagement inenvironmental processes normally consists of consultation or small-scale, in-depth,
discussion-based forums in the developed world, developing countries have used more sitespecific and action-oriented approaches, emphasising empowering communities to make theirown environmental decisions (Choudhary et al. 2019; Davies et al., 2005; Reed, 2008;). In
addition to the lack of compelling arguments for voluntary and conciliatory approaches,
stakeholder engagement processes are supported for numerous practical reasons. First, theincreased inclusion of stakeholders can lead to greater flexibility in the decision-making
process because the various interests represented can be addressed (Reed, 2008). Second,in recognizing that participants have different interests from the outset, the focus can be on
deliberation – characterised by careful consideration and discussion of an issue – which may
reduce the ‘confrontational politics that typify environmental policy’ (Beierle and Cayford, 2002,
5). Third, by including a variety of stakeholders, the decision-making process could become
more transparent and less susceptible to political or other types of manipulations possible incontemporary neoliberal regimes (Reed, 2008). Fourth, inclusion of stakeholders embraces adiversity of knowledge and values, accepting the locally based knowledge of citizens as equal
to that of expert knowledge (Berghöferet al., 2008; Dryzek 2005; Irwin, 1995; Tilleman, 1995).
Though, there is a problem in taking these propositions as they seem to be, as society also
has dynamic relation amongst contesting power groups and they are also susceptible tomanipulation, threat and corruption especially in the developing country. A research project on
focussed on creation of multi-stakeholder platform in Indian city suggests existence of wicked
urbanization with an obvious nexus of real-estate developers and land owners (Ely et al. 2020).
Despite the evidences from different parts of the world about the possible contestations andgroup-interest being pursued in the name of consultations and negotiations, these processes
has potential to avoid ‘intellectual vacuum of closed-door thinking’ (Tilleman, 1995, 343) byacknowledging that citizens’ familiarity with their local environments can provide a more
complete understanding of dynamic environmental systems along with the social issues inwhich they are embedded (Reed, 2008; Irwin, 1995; Street, 1997, Bruch, 2004; Petts andBrooks, 2006; Berghöferet al., 2008). For example, farmers in Zimbabwe7 became increasingly
influential in the 1990s, following the recognition that Agritex’s8 technical approach had failed
and farmers had better understandings of environmental processes (Keeley and Scoones,
2003). Additionally, including local knowledge can ensure that policies will better address theneeds of those to be affected by a proposed decision (Davies et al., 2005; Reed, 2008; Street,
1997; Tilleman, 1995). Further, inclusion of stakeholders can ensure sustainability of projects
by providing information to and creating incentives for those affected and to gain their support
based on their consent (Davies et al., 1995; Reed, 2008; Ascher and Healy, 1990; Berghöferetal., 2008). In 1980s Zimbabwe, the CAMPFIRE9 program and other initiatives were createdand maintained by stakeholders ‘convinced of the validity of alternative approaches …whostrategized and built alternative actor networks’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, 158). In the
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absence of such support, neglected individuals may ‘create their own policy in practice’ (Keeley
and Scoones, 2003, 173) by resisting legislation (Ascher and Healy, 1990).
Stakeholder engagement approaches are seen ethically sound, as they enable citizens
to engage in the process and ensure some kind of democratic right. Reed (2008) emphasized
the possibility of environmental interest and pressure groups’ participation as articulated by theUnited Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s 1998 Aarhus Convention. In democratic
countries, these possible participations are seen as ‘fundamental challenge for administrative
governance’, which even within the conciliatory or voluntary framework, tries imposing a predetermined hierarchical model to manufacture ‘consultative consent’. Though, a democraticsystem demands transparency in reconciling the need for expertise in managing administrative
programs (Beierle and Cayford, 2002). In these societies, stakeholder participation and ‘publicdeliberation is something that is desirable… because it can help us to achieve the kind of fair,democratic society to which we generally aspire’ (Davies et al., 2005, 600). Stakeholder
engagement processes are promoted in all societies, however, regardless of their democratic
status, due to claims that ‘stakeholder participation reduces the likelihood that those on the
periphery of the decision-making context or society are marginalised, promoting… active
citizenship…with benefits for wider society’ (Reed, 2008, 2420). It is argued that theseapproaches adhere to a lateral decision-making process instead of the hierarchical structure
supported by technical rationality (Selin and Chevez, 1995). Even more compelling are claims
that ‘stakeholder participation…can empower stakeholders through the co-generation ofknowledge’ (Selin and Chevez, 1995).
Deliberative, Inclusive and Participatory Processes: Theoretical Claims and theChallenges
Since late 1970s, deliberative, inclusive and participatory processes in one or other form havebeen doing rounds (Street, 1997). Literature dedicated to stakeholder participation generally
focuses on efficiency and argue in favour of engaging those who hold a stake (whether directly
or indirectly) in the scope of their initiative, though they fail to even attempt a meaningful
engagement with the wider public (Reed, 2008). Stakeholders in such cases are defined as
individuals, groups, and formal organizations having interest or impact on a particularenvironmental decision (Selin and Chevez, 1995). Experiences across the world especiallyform the developing countries like India, suggest appropriation and manipulated consent
manufacturing in the name of stakeholder participation. Villages and towns in these countries
have layered community relation and hierarchical power relation based on caste and economic
status. It is in this background that despite the pragmatic and ethical theories in support ofdeliberative, inclusive and participatory processes as a superior alternative, recognising theinadequacies of technical rationality ‘does not lead to an unqualified and uncritical acceptanceof deliberative approaches’ (Davoudi, 2006, 697). Multiple studies claim effectiveness of suchapproaches with moral superiority, however, ‘there is little empirical evidence to support manyof the other claims that have been made’ (Reed, 2008, 2427). An essential caveat is that
establishing a single definition of success in relation to these approaches is highly problematic.
The problem of single definition becomes more evident with the existence of various forms ofthese approaches in different context along with the multiplicity of goals that managers try
pushing through in adopting these processes (Petts and Brooks, 2006). Consequently, claims
about the success or failure of these approaches need to be evaluated in relation to specificprocesses. Nonetheless, there are common themes that run through critiques of stakeholder
engagement approaches to environmental decision-making.

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The major contestation is witnessed due to the existing binary of ‘local’ knowledge and‘expert’ knowledge or to say ‘tacit’ knowledge and ‘universal’ knowledge. Further, critics argue
that these approaches are not in fact deliberative, inclusive and participatory. Because of the
fixation on including local, citizen knowledge into environmental decision-making, it is argued
that these processes only highlight rather than challenge dualisms between the two (Ascherand Healy, 1990). These approaches ‘deny the possibilities of negotiation and deliberation ofknowledge, and set up an advocacy position that relies on new, but equally problematic, formof…expertise’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, 177) that is held by local or indigenous groups. The
underlying assumption about the integration of local knowledge in decision-making is that‘there are distinct realms of knowledge that exist prior to the research process: one is Western,rational and familiar, the other is local, multiple and strange’ (Mohan, 2001, 159), or uniqueand contextual which varies and suitable to only a particular situation. The fact is all knowledge
per se is contextual and has particular relevance as the constructivists would like to argue.
Paradoxically, even when citizens are included in the decision-making process and canchallenge expert claims, they both ‘value and demand expert knowledge in decision-making’(Petts and Brooks, 2006, 1045). The challenge then becomes to view these knowledge as‘different but complementary’ (Ascher and Healy, 1990, 168), since they are all instrumental
for decision-making, and to ‘move away from an acceptance of the predominance…of scientificrationality in decision-making to …build on knowledge from multiple domains’ (Petts andBrooks, 2006, 1047). Integrating different forms of knowledge may be difficult, as seen inattempts to establish ecosystem-based approaches to fisheries management in Europe, where
averages are used in scientific models while fishers’ experience is based on particular fisheries
and different spatial scales10 (Berghöferet al., 2008). Thus, adopting an unbiased view ofknowledge is challenging and does not occur regularly, in part because stakeholder
engagement processes are often initiated by groups or individuals from outside a particularsociety.
The current model of ‘deliberative, inclusive and participatory’ nature of stakeholder
engagement processes, faces challenge for it being west centric. The claim of the model
supporting their value have initiated in the West, and now being supported internationally, andbeen exported worldwide. However, in the process, actual engagement and community based
co-conservation process has been compromised especially in country like India in the interestof the west based global corporate. Two specific examples can be cited here, where local
community protested and fought to protect their forest again the EIA supported legally
sanctioned deforestation.11 Case in point here is that though the ‘buzzwords’ of development
practice include participation, empowerment, decentralization, and indigenous knowledge(Keeley and Scoones, 2003), and as environment and development issues have been
increasingly integrated over time, various actors have championed stakeholder engagement;
yet actual participation remains a kind of standardization that suits the copy-bookrecommendation of stakeholder participation rather than actual participation. For example, theWorld Bank was instrumental in supporting Joint Forest Management (JFM) throughout India
in the 1990s, as well as participatory approaches in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe (Vira, 2005; Keeley
and Scoones, 2003). These processes are seen ‘more as part of playing the development
game…and a necessary part of often donor-funded state activity’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003,
14) rather than genuine citizen engagement (Hildyard et al., 2001). For example, agencies in
Ethiopia in the 1990s ‘couch[ed] applications to donors in a participatory language’ (Keeley
and Scoones, 1003, 89) in order to gain funding for agricultural programs when they were infact still promoting the seed/fertilizer solution12. Additionally, cultural differences may cause
problems because ‘Western models of cognition assume that knowledge is mediated bylanguage, but most language is non-linguistic, tacit and generated in practice’ (Mohan, 2001,
Journal of Global Resources, July 2021, Volume 07 (02) B. K. Choudhary, Arun K. Tripathi and Jeetesh Rai Page 142 | 14161). Multiple languages, illiteracy, and cultural differences may also inhibit the engagementof all who wish to participate, or who planners think should participate, in such processes(Bruch, 2004). The international pressure to adopt stakeholder engagement processes may
also discourage government agencies and other institutions that lack the technical, financial,
and personnel resources (Bruch, 2004) to perform the ‘radical shift in…organisational culture’(Reed, 2008, 2426) which may be required to effectively implement these approaches.
Engaging stakeholders may be seen by such institutions as adding more delay to complex,
time-critical environmental decisions (Tilleman, 1995).
Critics also challenge the ‘deliberative, inclusive and participatory’ nature of theseprocesses based on the stage at which stakeholders are engaged. In many of these
programmes, the framework is determined in advance of engagement with stakeholders, suchthat the process becomes ‘a means for top-down planning to be imposed from the bottom up’(Hildyard et al., 2001, 59-60). Without flexibility built into the project design, it may be too late
to adjust the alternatives being considered, forcing stakeholders to agree to a project thatdiffers from their needs (Reed, 2008; Ascher and Healy, 1990; Koinsky and Beierle, 2001). For
example, the World Bank-funded JFM approach was said to be based on ‘mutual trust, definedroles and responsibilities to attain sustainable forest production and regeneration in keepingwith the needs and aspirations of all stakeholders’ (Bhatnagar, 2008). The primary argument
was that the focus of JFM is on empowering local community with livelihood options. However,
the model limited the rights of local people to use forest resources, while allegedly including
their input through village forest protection committees (Vira, 2005). Territorial conflicts
between two neighbouring groups or even between two hamlets of the same village are themost common conflicts encountered in JFM. This occurs because communities are engaged
in forest protection without demarcation of community boundaries, which often did not matchthe administrative divisions. Management conflicts arise when the Forest Department (FD)tries to fit the boundaries of the community managed forest with the existing administrative
boundaries for its own convenience, or when the FD felt their authority is challenged when thelocal forest protection committee (FPC) punishes violators. Differences in the perception ofand expectation for JFM also created problems. The FD sees JFM as a convenient means ofregenerating forests, the local communities view it as a means of meeting their daily need for
fodder, fuelwood, and small timber. In many Indian states, like Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra
JFM remains highly exclusionary. There was noted contestations and arguments while
granting the customary rights on bamboo to the Gram Sabha (village Panchayat) in the wakeof the 2006 regulation13 suggesting states to grant rights to indigenous people regarding use
of forest products including bamboo (Reddy et al. 2011). Later, Maharashtra and a few morestates allowed local communities to use non-timber forest products including bamboo, whichin certain cases contributed in transforming lives of people dependent on the forest products(Chopra, 2008; Reddy et al. 2011; Seetharman, 2015). Nevertheless, if stakeholders areengaged late in the process or the issue being addressed is outside the context of an actual
policy decision, then stakeholders have ‘limited efficacy in changing policy’ (Koinsky andBeierle, 2001, 823). The outcomes of such initiatives are not always in favour of the community
as Sundar (2017) argued that JFM facilitated elite capture of forest in India and has been
instrumental in ‘changing the socioeconomic lives of forest dependent communities from being
forest-cantered to one based on the money economy.
Another criticism rests on which stakeholders are included and to what extent theincluded stakeholder raises the concerns of the people in general. Some claim that theseprocesses only involve a small number of stakeholders and selection is often biased (Koinsky
and Beierle, 2001; Davies et al., 2005). Since ‘intensive deliberation necessitates a small
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group, an important issue is always the question of who is not participating’ and if those notparticipating are more important for the protection of the environment (Konisky and Beierle,
2001, 823). For example, many states in India under JFM programs neglected to include tribal
peoples in committees and thus lessened the traditional forest-use rights of these groups(Ascher and Healy, 1990). The selection of which stakeholders participate in the process also
impacts composition of and power relations within the group, as Reed (2008, 2420) notes,‘stakeholder participation does not take place in a power vacuum’. The inherent power
inequalities within groups (in age, gender, background, etc.) can hinder effective deliberationand consideration of issues affecting all parties (Selin and Cehvez, 1995). Often, stakeholder
engagement processes rest on the ‘dubious assumption that simply identifying different‘stakeholders’ and getting them around the table will result in a ‘fair’ consensus being reached’(Hildyard et al., 2001, 69). For example, some Village Forest Committees established in Indian
JFM programs were dominated by more powerful social groups and often only men (Hildyard
et al., 2001). Additionally, some stakeholder engagement approaches aim for consensus,
which ‘may…further empower the powerful vested interests that manipulated even the
research in the first place’ (Mohan, 2001, 160). This can also lead to ‘consultation fatigue’(Reed, 2008), where marginalised stakeholders become disillusioned after their needs arecontinually neglected, as seen with some JFM committees14. Therefore, consideration of thestage at which stakeholders are engaged, which stakeholders are included and the potential
power relations within a group is important to ensure the success of these processes.
A Way Forward‘Technical-rational model’ of environmental decision-making remains dominant despite failuresassociated with using it, implying that the linear conceptualisation of decision-making is thegreatest challenge to implementing stakeholder engagement processes (Petts and Brooks,
2006). However, given the complexity of the decision-making process, some argue that one‘must find some way of simplifying the situation in order to have any chance of understandingit’ (Sabatier, 1999, 4). Therefore, if one accepts the pragmatic and ethical arguments forstakeholder engagement processes discussed above, these processes should beinstitutionalised in environmental decision-making in order to ensure that they are not upstagedby technical rationality (Reed, 2008). Yet, institutionalising such methods should not mean
adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all model’. Studies show that the form of the processes does notdetermine process or success of the outcome (Chess and Purcell, 1999) and that even thoseparticipating in the same process may have different ideas of what constitutes ‘good’participation (Webleret al., 2001), indicating that such processes should consider context andpromote communication among stakeholders throughout. Therefore, the challenge becomes
how to institutionalise stakeholder engagement processes while avoiding ‘bureaucratic
participation’15 (Vira, 2005) and preserving flexibility of implementation. For deliberative,
inclusive and participatory processes to become superior alternative to the technical rationalityof traditional environmental decision-making, it is important to clearly define relevant
stakeholders and select them using a careful procedure with minimum bias (such as Q
methodology16). There could be a provision for incentive for the stakeholders, especially those
who are poor and who would lose a day’s wage in participation. There is a need for early
engagement of the stakeholder, as late addition is kind of manufacturing consent in the already
decided process and there is always a danger of confrontation. In a diverse country like India,
the form of the process should be selected based its appropriateness given the uniquedemands of particular socio-political, cultural and economic circumstances. Each process
should adopt philosophy of participation based on mutual respect for all forms of knowledge(‘local’ and ‘expert’) and for individuals to minimize power inequalities. Most important is toarticulate the nature of revenue generation and profit from the proposed changes in the
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environmental settings, as there is always an element of doubt because state sponsored or
supported corporate or multinational agencies eye for profit and do not want to share the samewith the local communities, while for the ‘ethical financing’ want the consent of local
communities. The deliberative, inclusive and participatory processes have the potential toescape the pitfalls discussed in this paper, if they adhere to the mentioned processes, as Reed(2008, 2421) argues ‘the quality of a decision is strongly dependant on the quality of theprocess that leads to it’. Deliberative, inclusive and participatory processes as a superioralternative to the traditional environmental decision making may involve a pathway approach,
if it has to succeed. The pathway approach allows decision makers to consider the dynamic
nature of the environmental issues and also the adopted pathways by different stakeholders
to deal with the changing scenario, called adaptation. Pathways in relation to adaptation canbe considered as set of approaches designed to deal with adaptation and adaptation based
decision-making process. Multi-stakeholder platforms, which ensure deliberations acrosspower-blocks, could be one such option to move in a direction which is inclusive andparticipatory.
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Notes:1‘Problem setting’ (used by Schon, 1999) is defined as the process of converting a problematic situation into a

problem to be addressed (in Davoudi, 2006).
2A notable success in the environmental realm is the realisation that emission of CFCs and halons was leading todepletion of the ozone layer, leading to the adoption of the Montreal Protocol banning the production of CFCs andhalons.
3The CDM enables an industrialised country with greenhouse gas reduction targets to carry out emission mitigation
projects in a developing country. A ‘sink’ is “any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas,an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere” (Boyd et al., 2008, 96). It is claimed that many
sinks are currently located in developing countries, but critics argue that allowing use of these sinks through the
CDM will discourage developing countries from mitigating their impacts on climate change (Boyd et al., 2008).
4 For example, in the case of engaging stakeholders in various fisheries in Europe (including Spain, France,
Sweden, Denmak, and Norway), “even where decision-making power is explicitly devolved to sub-national
participatory arenas, the scope for agency is limited by a plethora of existing legislation made at national and EUlevel” (Berghöfer et al., 2008, p.247).
5 Voluntary agreement is often characterised by the quest for policies that are made through cooperation between
the regulators and those being regulated. In this process, “consultation and cooperation are decidedly preferredover compulsion; advice and accommodation are decidedly preferred over adversarial relations; self-regulation andvoluntary codes of practice are decidedly preferred over compulsory regulations, imposed from without and backed
by sanctions” (Goodin, 1986, 436).
6 Scenario workshops are “meetings that involve discussions among a range of local actors, with the aim ofdeveloping visions and proposals for technological needs and possibilities in the future” (Street, 1997, 144). Study
circles “typically engage 8 to 12 [volunteers] who meet regularly over a period of weeks or months to address a
critical public issue” (Konisky and Beierle, 2001, 818). Round tables “are deliberative forums that provide
opportunities for stakeholders concerned about specific issues to discuss and propose policy initiatives togovernment decision-makers” (Konisky and Beierle, 2001, 820).
7A poignant example of this is the case of Zephaniah Phiri who was once arrested for cultivating a wetland, but now
uses his farm as a demonstration site (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).
8Agritex (now AREX, the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension) is the national extension agency.
9 Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) was a program initiated in
Zimbabwe in the 1980s, which aimed to give decision-making authority about wildlife management to local
communities and to provide legalised ways of using natural resources for development purposes (Keeley andScoones, 2003).
10One specific case where this has been difficult is in the debate over how many grey seals should populate theBaltic Sea. Although it was acknowledged that fishers could be useful in gaining knowledge about seal populations,
Simply including the knowledge of small groups of local fishermen was not enough; several more regional andlocally specific mechanisms have evolved in a longer and complicated process (Berghöfer et al., 2008, 246).
11 The local community in Mumbai protested against the decision to clear ‘Aarey forest’ for the construction of Metrorail depot. They fought legal battle, when they lost the legal battle against the state which was against protection offorest and was branding them ‘anti-development’, it became political issue in the assembly election and the ruling
BJP lost the power. Consequently, the forest is protected as of now (Times of India, 5 Jan, 2018, TOI, Indian
Express, 10 Sep 2019; 7 Oct, 2019). Second case is about the highway construction through a dense forest in
Madhya Pradesh. Despite people, environmentalist, artists protesting felling of trees, there is little hope for the forest(NDTV, 24 July).
12The Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization claimed to be using bee-keeping, soil conservation, and fodder
management in coordination with local communities in addition to the traditional maize/fertilizer option, although thedegree to which these programs were actually implemented in the 1990s remains unclear (Keeley and Scoones,
2003).
13 ‘Forest Right Act 2006’ was promulgated to ‘recognize and vest the forest rights and occupation in forest landin forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who have been residing in such forests forgenerations but whose rights could not be recorded; to provide for a framework for recording the forest rights sovested and the nature of evidence required for such recognition and vesting in respect of forest land’(https://tribal.nic.in/FRA/data/FRARulesBook.pdf). But different state governments like One in Maharashtra
opposed it as it was not in conformity with the revenue model of 1988 Forest Act, which granted State the right tosell bamboo; for details see Times of India, 2008;
14Research reveals that the “quality of participation under JFM had declined over time” (Vira, 2005, 5072). There
was little active participation in the formation of committees, meetings of committees were irregular, members wereselected by the forest department, and enthusiasm declined over time (Vira, 2005.).
15 Bureaucratic participation “describes an implementation process that establishes standardised, administrative
formats for collaboration between the state and local people, but fails to account for the specific characteristics ofthe local context within which these partnerships are to be developed” (Vira, 2005, p.5074).
16The ‘outcome of a Q study is an improved understanding of the range of discourses or perspectives within society
related to a particular issue; these perspectives are derived through a process of assigning importance rankings tostatements describing the problem under consideration’ (Davies et al., 2005, p.609; cf. Dasgupta and Vira).

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