ISSBN0286-312X
ISSN0286-312X

専修大学社会科学研究所月報

No. 4812003. 7. 20

Road Congestion Charging in London
David Foot
Department of Geography, University of Reading, UK

1. Introduction: Transport in London

On 17 February 2003, Congestion Charging was introduced into Central London. Any vehicle
driven into the Central London area shown on the map between 7am and 6:30pm, Monday to Friday(excluding public holidays), has to pay a fee of £5 per day (London Transport Website 2003). There
are very few cities in the world that have applied congestion charging. Why was it thought necessary
to introduce such a scheme in London? Will a £5 fee deter sufficient motorists to affect congestion?
What are the political implications? What has been the impact on road use, public transport and thegeneral public after three months? These are the questions being investigated in this paper.
Transport in London is under the direction of the Mayor and the Greater London Authority, alongwith the officials at Transport for London, TfL (Transport for London Website 2003). They manage theroad infrastructure, London Buses, Docklands Light Railway and Croydon TramLink. Also from 15 July
2003, London Underground will be managed by TfL, although private companies will be running theunderground on 30 year leases, in a Public Private Partnership scheme (PPP). All railways into London
and all buses other than London Buses are run by private companies. However, TfL has responsibility
for both the planning and the delivery of transport facilities and therefore works closely with both public
and private operators. The mayor was able to introduce congestion charging as it comes under his
authority.

2. The Congestion Charging Scheme

The congestion charging zone in Central London is 21 square kilometers and there are 174 entry− 1 −− 2 −
London Transport Website 2003

and exit points around the zone (London Transport Website 2003, BBC London Congestion Charging
Website 2003). All vehicles are observed from cameras at 230 pole positions, of which 180 are on theedge of the zone. There can be up to 7 cameras on each pole, which means that every single lane oftraffic is monitored at both entry and exit points. Therefore no in-vehicle equipment is required tooperate the system. Vehicle owners have to pay the £5 fee before or during the day that they enter thezone. The fee can be paid on the web, by telephone or at retail outlets in the zone.
The cameras provide high quality video-stream signals and use X-wave technology to provide good
pictures in poor light. The cameras are linked to an Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)
computer system that records the exact date and time of the image. The car registration number ischecked against the list of vehicle owners that have paid the £5 charge. Those not yet paid have until
midnight to pay the fee, otherwise a penalty notice will be issued to the vehicle owner.
The congestion charging scheme is very simple for the motorist to use. They just pay the £5 fee atsometime during the day that they enter the zone. However, it is a huge technical exercise to organize
and TfL have engaged a private company, Capita, to operate the system. TfL spent £200 million
developing and implementing the scheme ready for the start in February 2003. In addition to thecameras and computer systems, there were many traffic management schemes undertaken over the year
before February 2003. Extra bus lanes, changed vehicle flows, rephasing of traffic lights and roadcalming measures were undertaken to allow the scheme to run smoothly. It is estimated that the cost ofoperating the scheme will be £50 million per year. However, TfL estimate that £130 million will becollected from congestion charges each year, giving a profit of £80 million which must be spent on thetransport network.

3. Traffic Congestion in Britain

The reason for congestion charging being applied to Central London is that traffic congestion had
reached an intolerable level. Average traffic speeds went below 10 mph in 2000, the first time sincerecords began.
Traffic congestion is a problem in all towns and cities in Britain, and indeed most cities around theworld (see Tolley and Turton 1995, Hoyle and Knowles 1998, Whitelegg 1992). In Britain, the hugeincrease in car ownership from about 2 million cars in 1950 to 21 million in 2000, together with theincrease in car use, means that 85% of all distance travelled is by car. Similarly, the vast majority offreight is now carried by road, not rail. There has been a change in land use patterns in most British− 3 −urban areas, with old centers of employment closing and being replaced with a far more dispersed
pattern. Out -of-town shopping centers have grown up as urban areas have expanded. All thesechanges have resulted in a much more mobile population, largely choosing to travel by car andconsequently a massive increase in traffic volumes. Most city centers have a historic road network thatwas not designed for the car, and so it is in city centers that the worst congestion generally occurs.
From 1945 to the early 1990s, every effort was made to provide more road space. This involved
traffic management schemes to achieve maximum flows of traffic on existing roads, and an extensive
road building program. The policy became known as ‘predict and provide’ where the supply of road
space was expanded to fit the ever increasing demand. It was a policy followed by every developed
country in the world. In Britain a large national motorway network was built between 1959 and about
1985. Traffic management schemes were applied extensively and very successfully to existing roads,
and especially urban areas. To assist public transport, many bus lanes were provided on roads in urban
areas. All these schemes helped to increase traffic volumes in urban areas, but still there was traffic
congestion.
By the early 1990s, it was generally recognized that limits had been reached on the provision of
extra road space and therefore, since the mid-1990s, there has been a change in policy to one of traffic
demand management. This policy tries to influence demand for road space so that it fits the supply.
In the late 1990s, the government announced that new road building would be a policy of last resort. In
2000, Parliament passed a government bill that allowed Local Authorities to introduce congestion
charging, with money collected being spent on transport improvements. The bill also allowed Local
Authorities to introduce workplace car parking fees on companies in their area in order to discourage
people traveling to work by car.
In 2001, with severe congestion on Central London roads, and speeds well below 10mph, the newMayor and Greater London Authority decided to introduce road pricing as the only conceivable way of
reducing the level of traffic. Every day 1.1 million people travel to work in Central London and 85%
already travel by public transport. In 2002, there were 40,000 vehicles an hour driving into thecongestion zone during the morning peak period and the scheme aims to reduce this number. The main
aims of the scheme are to reduce congestion and through traffic, further encourage the use of public
transport, create a better environment for walking and cycling, and to help businesses by speeding up the
movement of goods and people.

− 4 −4. The Principles of Congestion Charging

The ideas on congestion charging have been discussed for many years (May 1992). Economists
argue that congestion is a market failure and that urban motorists do not pay the full cost of their use of ascarce resource, road space. When motorists make decisions about travelling, they only consider theirown private marginal cost and do not think about costs to the general community which include
environmental costs like noise and air pollution, delay costs to other motorists, accidents and public
service costs. These community costs are always present, but they increase considerably as congestion
increases. Charging motorists an extra fee for entering an urban area will create a market for road
space, with some motorists deterred by the cost while others will continue to make their journey and pay
the fee.
The big unknown with congestion charging is the price elasticity of demand for road space by
motorists in an urban area. Will the £5 per day fee to travel into Central London deter a large or asmall number of motorists from travelling? Surveys of motorists were carried out in London in 2002 to
ask about what they intended to do when the £5 fee was imposed and then estimates made about thelikely effect of the fee. However, it is only when a scheme is implemented that the true impact isknown.

With a decrease in congestion and fewer trips, there will be an improvement in theenvironment of the urban area with less pollution for pedestrians. The effect on businesses is generally
positive as accessibility is improved. Some smaller businesses might be adversely affected, but most
prefer to pay a fee to travel on less congested roads, rather than suffer the costs of a congested roadsystem.
Revenue from the £5 per day fee does not go to the Government, but is used to pay for operating
the system (£50 million per year) and all the profits must be spent on transport provision for the area
(estimated at £80 million per year). Spending the profit on improving transport in the area, does makethe charge far more acceptable to the public. Getting the motorist and general public to accept
congestion charging is a major concern of politicians. Motorists have always had free access to roads
in Britain and so the imposition of a fee to enter an urban area is a major change. Motorists do not like
restrictions on their travel and politicians are very reluctant to upset motorists who of course vote at thenext elections. The interesting point here will be whether Ken Livingstone, the London Mayor, can get
re-elected in May 2004 after introducing congestion charging. There is an added political issue in
London with a general disagreement between the Government and the Mayor over several transport
issues, particularly the way the underground should be improved.
− 5 −There are still very few cities in the world that have introduced congestion charging. This ismainly because of a lack of political will, but also because of the technical difficulties involved in
introducing a scheme. The best example is Singapore which has been running a scheme in its central
business and shopping district since 1975, firstly by a manual system and then since 1995, an electronicsystem (see Hoy le and Knowles 1998). The Singapore Government decided that a small island with alarge population (over 3 million in 2001) could not cope with high car ownership. As well ascongestion charging, they have made car ownership extremely expensive and put limits on the numberof new licenses issued. A second country to introduce congestion charging is Norway in the early
1990s when it was introduced in Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim. The fee is not high and the number ofmotorists deterred was rather small, but since the money collected is used for transport improvements,
the scheme was accepted by the public. This was not the case with a pilot scheme in Hong Kong in the
1980’s which worked well, but was abandoned for political reasons.

5. Public Transport

If congestion charging is being introduced to deter motorists from using their cars, then it isessential to have good public transport in order to attract motorists to an alternative mode of travel.
Singapore has developed a mass-rapid rail transit system with an extensive bus network that feeds thestations and travels the island. Fares and services are regulated and it is estimated that most of the
population live within 5 minutes walk of one the 250 bus routes. So people living in Singapore have avery good alternative to using the car.
The situation in London is very different. Under-investment in public transport in Britain overmany years has resulted in a system that is often overcrowded and expensive. Currently, about 940,000
people use public transport to travel to work in Central London and the effect of congestion charging
will be to increase that number. The London Underground and rail routes into London, are very
crowded at peak times and also the most expensive in Western Europe. Bus travel, which is also an
important mode of travel within London, is cheaper than rail, but is disrupted by traffic congestion.
The problem for TfL and the Mayor, is that major improvements to public transport require many years
to implement.

Singapore has worked for 28 years to develop a suitable system to go with its

congestion charging. Therefore, London has developed short term and long term strategies for public
transport improvements.
The only conceivable way of providing extra public transport for February 2003, was to provide− 6 −extra buses (London Transport Website 2003). Over 200 extra buses were run on routes into the zone
from 17 February 2003. Over the previous year, new bus lanes were designated, road junctions alteredand traffic lights rephased, all to improve the speed of buses into the area. These improvements will
also make it better for pedestrians, which is important because most people making the journey to work
will walk the final part of their journey. Further improvements will be made over the next few years to
improve bus provision, using money collected from the congestion charge.
In the long term, there is some interest in new tramway systems, similar to the recently opened
Croydon TramLink which is proving highly successful. However, the big long term improvement
should be an upgrade to the London Underground. There has been underinvestment for many years
and at last this problem is being addressed. There was considerable disagreement on the method of
upgrading the system.

The Government wanted a Public Private Partnership (PPP) scheme withprivate companies operating the network and improving the system with investment money raised on the
open market. The Mayor wanted TfL to organize the upgrade using money raised from a Bond issue,
similar to the way the New York subway system was successfully improved. After several court cases,
the Government finally won the issue (see Transport for London Website 2003). The undergroundsystem has been divided into three infrastructure companies and 30 year contracts signed with privatecompanies in May 2003. London Underground, which previously organized the system, will become
part of TfL and will manage the PPP contracts. Delivery dates for infrastructure improvements are
written into the contracts. It is going to take some time to improve the system, but with better track andsignalling systems, a greater frequency of trains can be gained and hence the capacity of theunderground can be increased.

6. Results of the Scheme after 3 months

TfL carried out extensive research during 2001-2 in order to assess the likely impact of congestion
charging on London traffic (see Transport for London Website 2003). However, nobody quite knew
what would happen until it began on 17 February 2003. Would there be mass protests? Would there
be chaos on the roads? Would motorists know how to pay the fee? Would £5 deter sufficient
motorists? Many newspapers carried stories about the problems that might occur or the first few days
(Observer 16-2-03).
To many peoples amazement, the congestion charging scheme ran very smoothly from day one.
All the technology worked, the cameras, computer systems and the organizations behind them. There− 7 −was little confusion about the method of payment with most motorists entering the zone having alreadypaid the fee. There was a substantial reduction in vehicles entering the zone. There were no protests
from motorists, they just accepted a new situation and adapted to it. The people changing mode of
travel had worked out their new method of travelling beforehand. Although the scheme was introduced
at school half-term, the second week ran just as smoothly and this has continued over the months.
The congestion charging scheme is being monitored very carefully by TfL. They report that after
3 months (see Transport for London Website 2003, The Times 9/6/2003), congestion inside the zone has
been reduced by 40%, well above the expected reduction of 20-30%. The number of vehicles in the
charge zone has decreased by 16% which is broadly similar to the 15% reduction expected. The
average speed of vehicles in the zone has increased from 9mph to 11mph. On average, each day,payment is made by 98,000 individual motorists and for 12,000 company vehicles. Public transport
has coped adequately with the extra passengers and pedestrians are enjoying a less congested central
London. The one problem has been that extra traffic has diverted to roads close to the charge zone
where traffic speeds have been further reduced.
Why is it that congestion charging has been introduced so smoothly, when many people werepredicting chaos? There seems to be two main reasons. Firstly, in Britain, traffic congestion has
become such a problem that almost everyone has come to accept that some form of restraint in urban
areas is necessary and inevitable. Motorists and businesses would rather not pay the fee, but cannot
suggest any better method of restraining traffic in towns and cities. They seem to feel that the time hascome to ‘do something’. Also any profit from the fees paid will go directly to improving transport in
the area, which is far more acceptable to motorists than a general tax. Secondly, new technology isavailable in the form of cameras and computer systems, which has allowed a scheme to be developedthat is very easy for the motorist to use. There is no complicated in-car equipment, no toll booths, justthe same road system as before with road signs indicating entry to the zone. A motorist just pays a fee
for the day and this can be done before or after entering the zone. All very simple for the motorist touse.
At the same time, Central London is a unique situation. About 1.1 million people enter Central
London each day and 85% already use public transport. Therefore, an extensive public transportsystem already exists which is available to those people changing mode of travel away from the car.
The 40,000 people who live in the charge zone and own a car are entitled to a 90% discount on the fee,although surveys show that a third of them never drive their cars within the hours when the charge is inoperation. Other cities and towns in Britain have a very different pattern of employment, residential− 8 −population, public transport provision and level of car use and congestion charging might well produce
more problems than the Central London situation.

7. Conclusion

Introducing congestion changing into Central London was a bold plan, but it has been implemented
with very few problems and can be deemed a success. It has been accepted by motorists, businesses
and the general public and the new technology has ensured that the scheme has run smoothly. It has
worked far better than most people expected.
Many other Town and City Councils in Britain are looking at how successfully the scheme works inCentral London before deciding whether to commit themselves to congestion charging in their urban
area. The London Mayor is so pleased with the first 3 months of the scheme that he is already talking
about expanding the zone westwards into Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea by 2005. This would
be a different test for congestion charging in London, because these areas have a high residential
population and a high car ownership.
Mayors and city councils throughout the world are also looking at the results of the scheme in
London. All cities have traffic congestion problems and their mayors or councils are interested in any
method of redressing the problem. Above all, they want to know if a Mayor can introduce congestion
charging and still get re-elected. If the answer is no, then politicians around the world will be very
reluctant to upset motorists and new congestion charging schemes are unlikely to happen. However, if
the answer is yes, and Ken Livingstone wins in May 2004, then other city mayors and councils will lookvery seriously at introducing congestion charging schemes in their cities.

References

Hoyle, B. and Knowles, R. (eds) 1998, Modern Transport Geography, Chichester UK, Wiley.
May, A.D. 1992, Road Pricing: An International Perspective, Transportation, 19(4).
The Observer, 16 February 2003.
The Times, 9 June 2003.
Tolley, R.S. and Turton, B.J. 1995, Transport Systems, Policy and Planning: A Geographical Approach,
Harlow UK, Longman.
Whitelegg J (ed) 1992, Traffic Congestion: Is there a way out?, Leading Edge.
− 9 −Websites

BBC London Congestion Charging Website (7 March 2003).
/http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/congestion/
London Transport Website (7 March 2003).
/http://www.londontransport.co.uk/tfl/cc_fact_sheet
Transport for London Website (3 July 2003)/http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/

デイヴィッド・フット氏は、本学の協定校であるイギリスのレディング大学の地理学科で教鞭をとっておられます。ご専門は交通論ですが、地域・都市経済や経済立地の分野にも造詣が深く、本学の徳田堅二所員や黒田彰三所員も在外研究時にフット先生のお世話になったと聞いております。2003 年 4 月からは、本学経済学部客員教授として「地域研究特殊講義」や「国際事情」等 4 科目を担当していただきました。この論文は、6 月 17 日（火）に生田校舎 8 号館 832
会議室で人文科学研究所との共催で開かれた研究会での発表をまとめられたものです。

− 10 −Urban Transport in France: moving to a more sustainable policy
Bruno FAIVRE D’ARCIER1
Transport Economics Laboratory (LET)

Abstract

The organisation of urban public transport in France has some specificity in comparison to other
European countries, even if problems are similar and the creation of the European Union leads
progressively to an harmonisation. To understand these differences, it is first necessary to focus on
historical and institutional aspects, including the 1982 Transport Law. This paper describes the evolutionof the urban transport policy, giving illustration through the case of Lyon’s conurbation; it highlights thereasons for an unsuccessful attempt to reduce car use for urban trips, and discusses the main stakes for
implementing new sustainable transport policies in French cities.

1. Introduction

Since the sixties, the development of car industry in France led to a high level of households’
motorisation. The consequence is to increase car use in the cities and to favour peripheral urbanisation
which induces more traffic jams, especially in the city centre where the street network cannot absorb carflows. For several years, French cities tried to contain congestion by developing public transport (PT)supply. But the PT market share remains low and tends to decrease over years. As air pollution, noiseand congestion are still growing, the 1982 Transport Law asserts the need to give priority to PT
reinforcement to cope with the objectives of a sustainable development. As larger cities can get financial
resources from a dedicated Transport Tax, created in the middle of 70’s, many projects of right-of-way
transport system are now implemented in order to create a more attractive alternative to car use. The
choice is made to favour on-street systems, such as tramway lines, which have a capacity more adapted
to the patronage flows, and offer an opportunity to reduce road capacity and to re-design urban public
spaces for pedestrian and cycles. Despite these heavy investments, the reduction of car use is not

1

Professor in Transport Planning, Faculty of Economics and Management, University Lumière Lyon 2, France− 11 −

achieved. Moreover, the low level of patronage limits the fare revenue and can lead to a hard financial
crisis for PT networks. Nowadays, city councillors are convinced the urban transport policy cannot belimited to PT supply increase and have to penalise car use by different ways.
To illustrate this new orientation, a brief description of the evolution of urban transport policies inFrance is necessary (part 2), then a presentation of the institutional organisation is made to understandthe difficulty to implement coherent transport policies in urban areas (part 3). Finally the main
characteristics of daily mobility are presented through the example of the Lyon agglomeration and its
transport policy is detailed (part 4). The conclusion discusses some ways to go further in the control of
car use in French cities.

2. A recent history of urban transport in France

Some years after the reconstruction following the second World War, the French government
decided to build a strong automobile industry, which can favour a quick economic development. The
national Planning Agency 2 promoted in the 3rd and 4th five-year plans the progressive adaptation of theold Latin-typed cities to the automobile through a massive programme of urban renewal and road
construction. As the exodus from rural areas to cities was very strong, a hard housing crisis obliged thegovernment to create new suburban residential zones, which cheap industrialized buildings. City
planners were influenced by the American way of life and the belief in automobile as a symbol of social
progress led to a zoned planning, sharing employment location and residential areas. Such a spatial
segregation of activities can be done if most of the households can have a car. At the end of the 50’s,
most of the main cities decided to close their streetcar networks, which were perceived as oldtechnologies and signs of the past.

The inability to finance urban road networks leads to develop Public Transport

At the end of the 60’s, the quick increase of population and the higher level of car ownership leadto a heavy traffic congestion in the small roads of the historical city centres. Even if huge programs ofmodernisation of road networks are planned, most of the cities are unable to finance these projects(Dupuy, 1991). In a so centralised country, the State only can manage the realisation of new

2

Commissariat Général du Plan

− 12 −

infrastructures. In this ‘era of concrete’, the cities are then obliged to reduce pavements to increase thecapacity of existing streets.
In such a context, the public transport (PT) is considered as a ‘social service’, i.e. a means oftransport for poor people who cannot buy a car. The reorganisation of PT networks is done to reduce thelevel of service, as private companies cannot get benefits. Bus lines are limited to radial routes, to let
people travel from their peripheral flat to their work in the city centre. Tariffs are drastically lowered tocope with the limited revenue of their customers. In order to save money, private companies reduce thenumber of on board employees from 2 to 1 in the buses. Indeed the quality of service is very low, andthe rolling stock cannot be renewed. This ‘vicious circle’ leads to a higher use of private cars and anincrease of traffic congestion (Lefebvre, Offner, 1990).
To cope with these traffic trouble in the centre of the main French cities, the Ministry of Transport
proposes in 1971 to implement new Traffic Management Schemes (TMS). Their goal is to reduce
congestion through two main actions: i) increasing the number of traffic lights at the main crosses, ii)
generalising one way streets. If these measures let to increase the average speed for cars, they arequickly insufficient to improve traffic, and the cities decide complementary measures, such as pedestrianareas for too narrow streets, and bus lanes on radial routes, to favour modal split.
But the most important decision taken by the Ministry of Transport is to create the ‘Versement
Transport (VT)’: this transport dedicated tax is based on the total wages paid by the firms of more than 9
employees, and located within the Urban Transport Area. The idea is that firms indirectly benefit fromthe existence of a PT network (home-to-work trips, traffic congestion reduction, improved
accessibility).3 The VT lets the cities get a large amount of money to increase and improve the transport
supply. Another important impact is to incite the communes to create a union to manage together the PT
network, as this tax is allowed only for conurbation of more than 100 000 inhabitants (see below for
institutional aspects).
Then the 70’s are a period of a fast and strong development of public transport in French cities. The
1973 oil crisis incites to implement energy saving policies, and the population begins to be sensitive toenvironment (air pollution, noise,…). The Ministry of Transport helps cities with PT Development
Grants to buy modern buses, and supports the decision of the three main French conurbations (Lille,
Lyon, Marseille : more than 1 million inhabitants) to build their first subway lines. At the same time, the3

The VT varies from 0.5% to 2.5%, depending on the size of the Urban Transport Area, and the existence ofright-of-way transport systems.

− 13 −

road policy changes: the creation of radial roads to enter the city is banned to favour PT use, and thefunds are given for building by-passes of inter-city highways. In the cities, the TMS are designed topenalise through-traffic, but an effort is still made to increase the number of parking lots for cars, oftenvery close to the city centre.

The 1982 Transport Law and the Urban Trips Plans

The beginning of the 80’s is characterised by a large movement of decentralisation in the country:
the government decides to transfer a lot of responsibilities from the State level to the regional and local
levels. Then the cities get financial means from the State, calculated in relation to their population andrichness, and can decide locally which their priorities are. Even if urban transport is already a question
managed by cities, the 1982 Transport Law 4 re-designs the share of responsibilities. As public transport
is recognised as a main public service, which can be accessible to everyone, the law creates new Transit
Authorities (‘Autorités organisatrices’ –AO) in charge, not only of the PT organisation, but of the whole
local transport policy, including car traffic, parking, and ‘soft modes’ (cycling and walking). Such amulti-modal orientation means a fundamental change for local policies, as the competition between
private car and PT is replaced by a search for complementarity between transport modes (Lefebvre,
Offner, 1990).
As PT appears to be the more efficient transport mode in dense areas, a lot of French Transit
Authorities decided to create surface light rail lines, such as tramways, in medium sized cities: Nantes(1985) and Grenoble (1987) are the first cities to do so. Three reasons can explain the choice of the
tramway: i) the investment cost is 5 times cheaper than a subway line, as it is built on surface; ii) the rail
track needs to be out of traffic jams and let have an attractive commercial speed for customers; iii)
implementing the line on existing streets is a way to reduce road capacity and penalise car use.
The 1996 Air Quality and Energy Rational Use Law lets now the Urban Trips Plans be an
obligation for cities of more than 100 000 inhabitants and decides then the reduction of car traffic is oneof the main objectives of such plans. The 2000 Urban Solidarity and Renewal Law is a latest step to amore sustainable policy, as it imposes the local Land Use Plans to be compatible with the urban Trips
Plans. It also give the possibility to Transit Authorities to be responsible for parking policy (including
tariff) and to extend the Urban Transport Area in order to take into account peripheral urbanisation. It

4

Loi d’Orientation sur les Transports Intérieurs (LOTI)− 14 −

also decides to transfer the regional railways management to the Regional Councils, to incite for a better
co-operation between regional and local networks.
Nowadays most of middle sized cities have implemented (or will implement) surface right-of-way
transport lines, such as tramways or guided buses. But the main goal of reducing car traffic is not yetachieved. Several reasons can explain it: i) the institutional organisation in France is very complex and
not really adapted to the management of transport; ii) the urban sprawl to peripheral areas, where
households can buy a small house with a garden, is not in favour of PT use, as distances are longer, andlow density zones cannot favour a high quality transport supply.

3. Institutional aspects of local transport in France

The French administrative system comes from the 1789 revolution, and since that time, it has only
slightly changed. Its main characteristic is to share competencies between a large number of local actors
who are responsible on various territories. The 1982 Decentralisation Law tries to reorganise the shareof responsibilities in a more clear system, but such an evolution will need time, after so many years ofcentral administration dependency.

The three main levels of territorial administration

The basic level is the ‘commune’ (a village or a city), which was pertinent two centuries ago, as itcorresponded to the catholic parish-based organisation. There still are more than 36 000 communes,
some of them can be very big (like the city of Marseilles – more than 1 million inhabitants), some others
having only 200 inhabitants or less5. Each commune has its own mayor and city council, and is
responsible for all aspects of the administration duty and the management of public services. In the fieldof transport, the mayor is in charge of roads works and traffic management and can operate its own
public transport system.
In order to adapt the administrative organisation to functional territories, several laws were voted tocreate unions of communes. The 1999 National Territorial Administration Law creates three types ofunions:5

The Paris region has a specific organisation, due to its status of capital of the country− 15 −

•the Urban Community for the major agglomerations (more than 500 000 inhabitants) can benefit
from an obligatory quasi full transfer of competencies from the communes which decide to bemembers;•

the Agglomeration Community is a union for middle-sized cities (more than 50 000 inhabitants,
with one commune of more than 15 000 inhabitants): the main competencies (economic
development, land use planning – including PT, housing policy) have to be transferred, but someothers can be transferred or stay under the responsibility of each commune, such as street andparking, public utilities, water supply, environment, sports and cultural equipment,…

•

the Commune Community is for smaller cities, and only land use planning and economic
development are responsibilities which have to be transferred; in this case the organisation of
public transport is a facultative competency to be transferred.
One of the main differences between these three types of unions concerns the creation of a uniquelocal tax for firms for the first two cases, i.e. this tax revenue is then managed by the community. This is
a way to reduce inequities between poor and rich communes. In the case of Commune Community, each
commune keeps its tax revenue and just gives a grant to the community.
It has to be noted that the adhesion to a community is voluntary , but financial incentives from theState will help to develop that kind of unions of communes. If the responsibility of public transport istransferred the community becomes the Transit Authority, but the urban Transport Area can be smaller
than the territory of the community. Nowadays, more than 200 Transit Authorities are born by the wayof these communities.

The second official level of territorial administration is the ‘Département’ (99 in France), which is
now in charge of education (2° degree – ‘collèges’), social assistance (low income households, aged
people), local inter-city roads and non urban road public transport (and especially school bus lines).

The third level is the Region (21) which is in charge of education (professional training and 1°
degree – ‘Lycées’), economic development and land use, and since 2001, regional railways lines.

In this organisation, the State has no more responsibility for local transport, but it keeps a wide
influence through the organisation of highways and national roads networks, national railways lines(including High Speed Trains), and it can still act on local policies by the way of investment grants.

− 16 −

The main difficulty induced by the administrative organisation is to generate a gap between
political and functional territories, as the borders of each commune has nothing to do with the geographyof inhabitants’ daily trips. Figure 1 shows the case of Lyon’s conurbation case, where the Urban
Transport Area (55 + 6 communes) is nearly the same as the Urban Community, but the pertinent area tomanage daily mobility should be the Urban Area (239 communes) which is defined taking into accountthe home-to-work trips distribution. This means the organisation of public transport has to beco-ordinated between the Urban Community (urban transport), three ‘Départements’ (non urban bus
networks, school buses) and the Region (suburban regional trains). It is a source of difficulties, as theco-ordination in terms of level of service (frequency, interchanges) is not well assumed and tariff
systems are rarely integrated: everything works separately.

The role of private transport companies in urban public transport

In France, the Transit Authority can decide to operate the public transport by itself (‘Régie’ type) or
to transfer this duty to a private company. In this case two main types of contracts exists (CERTU,
2000):•a public/private company is created, in which more than 50% belongs to the public institution : itis called ‘Société d’Economie Mixte’- SEM. The rolling stock and the buildings belong to thiscompany.

•

A contract is signed with a private company. Depending on the type of contract, rolling stock andbuildings can belong to the Transit Authority or the private company.
In general the contract is signed for a 5-6 years period. In every case, the operating company has amonopoly on all the concerned transport area. For example, non urban bus companies cannot have bus
stops within the urban transport area, except if the urban Transit Authority agreed to allow a limited
number of stops.

For several years a concentration of transport companies has taken place since the reinforcement ofcompetition due to the 1982 Transport Law. Moreover, the European Union’s directives incite now to awider competition, opening national markets to foreign companies. There are now three main groups inFrance, which are:− 17 −

Figure 1 : the territorial administrative organisation in the Lyon’s conurbation

Lyon city
Villeurbanne city
Urban Community

Rhône Département(55 communes)

Ain Département

1990 Urban Area
(239 communes)Isère Département
Loire Département•

CONNEX, which is the world-wide leader in passenger transport, even if it is only the number 2
in France (in terms of the number of operated urban networks). This company is a subsidiary of
the Vivendi Environnement Group (VEOLIS).

•KEOLIS is the number one in France. It is now a subsidiary of the French National Railway
company (SNCF). The Lyon’s network (which is the main network in France, the Paris Region
excluded) is operated by a subsidiary of KEOLIS.

•

TRANSDEV is the third group. Its specificity is to propose SEM type contract, as it is asemi-public company.

•

Some public transport networks are still operated by smaller private companies, mainly insmaller cities, but they are now frequently contested at each new tender. Some of them createdan association, named AGIR, to be stronger in the competition with the three main groups.

In the contracts, different types of remuneration are possible, depending on the way the risks on thecommercial revenue are shared: in most cases the fare revenue is given to the Transit Authority, whichpays to the operator the difference between total operation cost and fare revenue. It is the responsibilityof the Transit Authority to design all the characteristics of the transport service, such as frequency, busstop location, and so on, as urban transport remains a public service, even if it is operated by a private− 18 −

company. The 6 year bidding system is supposed to favour a reduction of the operation costs. This
seems to work for smaller cities, but in the main ones, changing the operator is rare, except in case of a
specific conflict with the Transit Authority.

The responsibilities of the Transit Authority

In accordance with the 1982 Transport Law, the Transit Authority assumes the following missions:•

It defines all the characteristics of the transport supply, i.e. routes, location of bus stops,
frequency, time-table; it can also determine the level of service quality the private operator has toreach, such as punctuality, cleanliness, users’ information, through a system of financial
penalties in the contract.

•

It defines the fare systems, including social fare reduction (students, aged or unemployed people),but it has to cover the deficit due to this social fares. If the private operator wants to offer othercommercial reduction it is under its own responsibility. As a consequence, the Transit Authority
will pay for the deficit due to the difference between operation costs and fare revenue.

Table 1: main characteristics of the Lyon’s transport network in 2001
Transport systems
SubwayTramway

Number of lines Length (km)
4
30
2
19

Bus routes
Bus lanes
Park-and-ride
Total (per year)
Total per year andper inhabitant

100

9Rolling stock184
39
945 buses
87 trolley buses
31 mini buses

Vehicle.km
28 %
3%
62 %
5%
2%

Number of trips
52 %6%

50.4 millions

1.2 millions

45 km

140 trips

42 %62
3,600 cars

Source : SYTRAL, 2002

− 19 −

Table 2: the Lyon’s Transit Authority budget in 2001
Resources
Fare revenue
53 M€
Transport Tax
168 M€
Community funds
121 M€
Other receipts
53 M€
Loans
106 M€
Other Investment receipts
59 M€
Total
560 M€

9.5 %
30.0 %
21.7%
9.5%
18.9 %
10.5
100 %Expenses
Operating contribution
154 M€
Current expenses
37 M€
Financial charges
59 M€
Sinking funds
76 M€
Investments
116 M€
Savings
118 M€
Total
560 M€

27.5 %
6.6 %
10.5 %
13.6 %
20.7 %
21.1 %
100 %Source : SYTRAL, 2002•

It defines and finances the investment plans for the development or the improvement of thetransport network: building a new tramway line, renewing bus fleet or fare collection system,
building park-and-ride lots or interchange stations, and so on.

•

It has to define the multi-modal transport policy on all the Urban Transport Area. Such an Urban
Trips Plan (UTP) is designed for 10 years and revised after 5 years; it covers all aspects oftransport conditions, such as the public transport supply development, the traffic and parking
conditions, pedestrian and cycling routes, and since a couple of years, the urban goods logistic
scheme and the companies’ employees home-to-work trip organisation.

In the case of Lyon, the Transit Authority is an institution regrouping the Urban Community andthe Département du Rhône. This kind of mixed union is not frequent and it is due to the fact that the
Lyon Agglomeration is the second one in France and plays an important role in the Département. This is
a way to favour a better co-operation between urban and non urban transport, even if the urban transportareas is limited to the Urban Community’s one. The development of such mixed union is now
encouraged.

Before presenting the main orientation of the present Lyon Agglomeration UTP, let me describe
some characteristics of the evolution of daily mobility in this area.

4. The urban transport demand and the new policies in the Lyon Agglomeration
Evolution of daily mobility in the Lyon Agglomeration
Transport demand depends on many parameters, which include home and activities location. As in− 20 −

many French cities, one can observe an important trend of peripheral location, which has twoconsequences: i) the density of the central area is lower; ii) the distance for travelling is increasing. The
evolution of job location in the Lyon urban area is given in table 3.

Table 3: Evolution of job location in the Lyon urban area

Central area (communes of
Lyon and Villeurbanne)
Urban Community (53communes)
1999 Urban Area (241communes)
Total

1990/1982

1999/1990

1999 Distribution

1999 Population-0.5 %- 4.4 %

42 %

35 %

+ 14.5 %+ 5.9 %

36 %

36 %

+ 23.6 %+ 26.7 %

22 %

29%

+8.4 %+4.9 %

100 %

100 %

Source : SYTRAL, 2003 Data on daily mobility is only available on the Urban Community area, as itcorresponds to the urban transport area. Several surveys were conducted in 1976, 1986 and 1995, whichgive a good image of the main changes in transport demand. The main features are :•A continuous increase of car ownership, especially in peripheral areas, where there are now
about 800 cars for 1,000 inhabitants of more than 18 years old. This fact is important as the more
people have cars, the more they use it.

•

The daily mobility is more slowly increasing reaching 4.0 trips per day and per inhabitant. But
the modal split is still evolving in favour of car use, as it can be seen in table 4. Between 1986
and 1995, the number of trips made by car increased by 38 %, as the number of trips by PT
increased only by 17 %.

•The geography of trips is changing and reinforces the use of car. In the city centre, where PT
supply is the more dense, the number of trips by PT increased by 20%, as the number of trips by
car increased by 28 %. On the radial routes between city centre and peripheral areas, results arerespectively +8 % and + 25 %, and on peripheral trips, + 9% and + 47 %•The activity pattern is also changing, as the duration of work is reduced and leisure activity are
growing. Observing the purpose of trips shows home-to-work trips represent only ¼ total trips,
as leisure and shopping trips are growing to 48%. Another characteristic is the progression ofaccompaniment trips, i.e. trips done to accompany children to school or to leisure activities. Thisis due to the growing number of households living in low density peripheral areas, where
distances are seen too long for children.
− 21 −

Table 4: Evolution of modal split in Lyon urban community
Walking
Private car
Public transport
Cycling

1976
45.8 %
38.1 %
11.0 %
5.1 %1986
37.1 %
46.1 %
15.1 %
1.7 %1995
31.4 %
53.0 %
14.3 %
1.2 %Data : Lyon Household Travel Survey – 1976, 1986, 1995 – Source : Masson at al., 1997

Table 5: Evolution of trip purpose in Lyon urban community
Trip purpose
Home-to-work
Home-to-school
Accompaniments
Leisure / shopping1976
29.6 %
16.1 %
11.6 %
42.7 %

1986
27.8 %
14.6 %
11.4 %
46.1 %

1995
25.2 %
13.6 %
13.2 %
48.0 %

Data : Lyon Household Travel Survey – 1976, 1986, 1995 – Source : Masson at al., 1997

This evolution of mobility has several consequences on the public transport network. First newlines have to be created to keep close to home location, but the low density makes such lines very costly,
and the level of service is too weak to make PT attractive, in comparison with the availability and the
speed of private cars. Second, the changes in the origin-destination matrix show the development of
peripheral trips, as traditionally the PT network is designed for radial routes to the city centre. All theseelements can explain the loss in market share for public transport, and the continuous increase of the
deficit the Transit Authority has to cover.

Even if the Lyon Urban Community got benefit from the building of the subway network in the
middle of the 70’s, avoiding traffic congestion and increasing patronage, it seems the global transportsystem improvement and the lack of control on land use in peripheral areas induced a wider urban
sprawl, which is now a problem for the efficiency of the PT network. As in many French cities, thebalance sheet of a supply oriented policy appears to be inefficient, and new strategies have to be defined
to fight the present trend.

The 1997 Lyon Agglomeration Urban Trips Plan

Facing these problems, the Transit Authority decides in 1997 to design a new Urban Trips Plan,following the recommendations of the 1976 Air Quality Law. One of the goals is to make people− 22 −

understand the necessity to change some important features of the transport policy. The main one is tostop building new subway lines, due to the bad financial situation of the Transit Authority (the total debt
reaches 1.2 M€ in 2001). Another reason is underground subway lines have no impact on car traffic
limitation, as they reduce traffic congestion and favour induced traffic. In order to cope with sustainable
development objectives, the transport policy must try to stop the increasing use of car, mainly in the
more dense areas of the agglomeration. Consequently, the main goals of the 1997 UTP are(SYTRAL,1997):
1.

2.

3.

4.

Reducing negative external effects:•

Decreasing the number of accidents by 40% in 10 years•

Stabilising the level of noise in the city•

Limiting local air pollution (NO², particles)•

Improving the quality of urban public spaces (decreasing on street parking)

Improving accessibility and equity•

Inciting households to stay in the dense area•

Developing a credible alternative to car use with a high quality PT network•

Reducing the differences in PT service quality among districts

Increasing the PT market share for mechanised trips•

The 2005 trend is 19.0 % (1995 = 20.6%)•

The 2005 objective is 22.5 %Keeping walking practise at a good level•

City centre trips•

Inner districts trips

To reach these objectives, several measures are decided :1.

Creating 12 ‘high quality’ new PT lines (figure 2)•

completing the structure of the PT network and creating a direct link between the main
peripheral poles and the city centre.

•

Implementing right-of-way systems, such as tramway or guided trolley buses, with a highlevel of service (frequency, punctuality)− 23 −

•

Restructuring the bus network to provide links between peripheral areas and city centre withnot more than one transfer

2.

Developing regional railway lines in co-operation with the Regional Council for longer trips

3.

Creating a Cycle Route network in the city (up to 200 km in 10 years)

4.

Developing urban public spaces for pedestrian and residents

5.

Restructuring parking supply (fares, residents’ parking, goods delivery)

6.

Reorganising car traffic conditions (road capacity reduction on radial roads, speed limited area inresidential areas

7.

Defining a more coherent land use policy•

Limiting urban sprawl•

Giving priority for urbanisation to areas with a good PT supply (housing and economic
activities)•
8.

Defining a hierarchical structure for the urban road network

Rejecting inter-city traffic on peripheral by-pass highways (to be financed by the State)

In 2003, a first balance sheet of the UTP implementation is now on work. Two tramway lines are
now operating and give goods results in terms of patronage. The other right-of-way PT lines are planned
for the next 5 years. But it seems the fight to reduce private car market share is still not won, anddifficulties for parking cars in the city centre are increasing.

5. Conclusion: the need to go further

The transport policies based on the increase of PT supply show their limits. In order to favour asustainable mobility, it becomes now to be clear that transport policies have also to act more drasticallyagainst car use. It means to modify the relatively good traffic conditions (except in the very city centre
where PT is faster than car: its market share is more than 40 %). Several possibilities are presently
studied, as in many European countries:− 24 −

•

Limiting door-to-door car speed can be done through different ways : reducing road and/or
parking capacity, limiting car access by regulations (no car streets in dense area). Such a measureneeds to strongly increase PT supply, in order to avoid congestion, air pollution and negative
impacts on economic activity in the city.

•

An alternative is given by the city of London, where an urban pricing scheme is implemented toreduce car use in the city centre. This solution seems to be more efficient, as it reduces car traffic,
without limiting average car speed (for people who accept to pay the toll), and it can have apositive impact on companies productivity. On the contrary, this solution can raise somequestions about social equity, as low income households are more penalised than rich ones.
Different types of road pricing can be implemented to reduce this problem, such as a fixedmonthly tax, which level can be adapted to the willingness to pay for some social groups.

•

Another strategy, which can be more coherent with the objectives of a sustainable development
is not to act on the number of trips done by car, but on the total travel distance done byhouseholds. Some researches are presently conducted on a system of gasoline rights to limits caruse. A free rights market can then operate, in which people who don’t use all their rights can sellthem to those who need to travel frequently by car.

•In the same way, land use policies can be designed in order to reduce travel distances, favouring
short distance trips, whatever the mode of transport is. But such a policy needs a good
co-operation between communes, and previous experiences show how difficult it is.

These examples of new strategies give an idea of what future urban transport policies in European
cities could be. Up to now, road pricing policies are not possible in France, due to juridical problems(tolling is only allowed for bridge or tunnel, and cannot be applied on the whole street network). Even if
transport experts are able to invent sophisticated solutions to improve transport policies, it will benecessary to incite to a public debate on their objectives, as it is not easy to get the agreement of a
population whose style of life is built on the basis of easy and speedy trips in the city. This can be themost difficult challenge for the next years.

− 25 −

References

CERTU, 2000, L'offre française en matière de transports publics, de la desserte urbaine à ladesserte régionale, Lyon

DUPUY G., 1991, L’urbanisme des réseaux, A. Colin, Paris

LEFEBVRE C., OFFNER J.M., 1990, Les transports urbains en question : usage – décisions –territoires, Ed. Celse, 220 p.

MASSON S., GODINOT C., RAUX C., 1997, Vingt ans de rétrospective à travers les enquêtes
déplacements de l’agglomération lyonnaise, LET, Lyon, 150 p. + annexes

SYTRAL, 1997, Plan des Déplacements urbains, LyonSYTRAL, 2002, Compte rendu d’activités 2001, LyonSYTRAL, 2003, La lettre – Plan des Déplacements urbains, n°2, 8p.

Web sites :http://www.certu.fr
http://www.sytral.fr
http://www.regionurbainedelyon.fr− 26 −

− 27 −

Figure 2: the urban transport network in the agglomeration of Lyon, and the present 5 year investment plan
Source: SYTRAL, 2002

The 900 M€ Investment Plan for 2002-2007

ブルーノ・フェーブル＝ダルシエ先生は、フランスにあるルミエール・リヨン第 2 大学経済・経営学部の教授です。先生のご専門は交通政策・交通計画であり、以前には同大学の交通経済研究所に所属しておられました。この夏には休暇を利用して客員研究員として本学を訪問され、
7 月 8 日（火）に社会科学研究所で「フランスにおける公共都市交通組織」（仏語）というタイ
トルで講演していただきました。講演会では樋口淳所員に通訳の労をとっていただき、ご婦人のイブリン・ルクレール教授（リヨン第 2 大学）、デイヴィッド・フット教授（レディング大学）
はじめ社研所員、本学大学院生など多数の参加者を得て、国際的な雰囲気の中で活発な討論が行われました。本稿は当日の議論をもとに英文に書き直されたものです。

− 28 −

〈編集後記〉
月報本号は英仏両国の都市交通論の英語論文二本からなっております。第一論文 はイギリ
ス・レディング大学のデイヴィッド・フット氏、第二論文はフランス・ルミエール・リヨン第二大学のブルーノ・フェーブル＝ダルシエ氏の論文です。両先生のご紹介は、各論文末に堀江
洋文所員、嶋根克己所員によってなされておりますので、そちらをご参照下さい。
デイヴィッド・フット氏の研究会発表は６月 17 日（火）、ブルーノ・フェーブル＝ダルシエ
氏の研究会発表は７月８日（火）でした。したがって月報への掲載も別号となる予定でありましたが、偶然、都市交通論という共通の領域における報告でしたので両論文を今月号にとりまとめることとし、両先生には無理を言って、論文のとりまとめを短時間にてお願いしました。
また、原稿化の過程で両先生とのコンタクトや執筆者紹介をお書きいただいた堀江、嶋根両所
員には、学期末のお忙しい中、綱渡りのような原稿化作業にご協力いただきました。ありがとうございました。
ところで、こうした「偶然」と特定の方々のご尽力だけに頼り切って、月報刊行が健全に継続されるとは思われません。研究会開催予定と月報投稿論文との、今よりさらに密な有機的な連携が望まれます。また、諸般の事情で研究会開催日時の選定が難しいのは周知のことですが、教授会開催日を避ける工夫を凝らしながら、今号のように共通のテーマが設定できるのであれ
ば、その機を逃さず討論を深めて、投稿論文に反映させる工夫も考えなくてはならないでしょう。
かくいう私、今年度初めて社研・事務局の編集担当を仰せつかり、この編集後記執筆が初仕事となります。今後ともよろしくお願いいたします。

（Ｊ）

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電話(044)911‑1089

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（発行者）
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作

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