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Brown-Watson Case 15-03

Barrick Gold’s Pascua Lama Drama
Costs and Bonds in Chile’s Regulator-Driven
Mining Monitoring System

By: Matthew Ostrow

WATSON INSTITUTE, BROWN UNIVERSITY
Prepared for Professor Peter Gourevitch
Course on Corporate Accountability
Fall 2015

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Transnational mining corporations often cut corners in their extractive processes andexploit the institutional systems of developing nations for the sake of profitability. An epitomic
case is that of Barrick Gold’s Pascua Lama mine in Chile. The Canadian mining company’sefforts to extract gold from the Huasco Valley in the Andes Mountains led to environmental
damage, such as glacial destruction and water pollution.i These damages have downstream
human rights impacts, such as economically destabilizing agricultural-dependent Chileans. After
two decades of environmental complaints, Chile’s environmental regulator took action against
Barrick Gold after it failed to address water management problems in early 2013. The Chilean
Superintendency of the Environment sanctioned Barrick in April 2013 with a $16 million fineand indefinitely suspended work at Pascua Lama, which led Barrick to halt the project on
October 31, 2013. The Pascua Lama case is the first time in Chilean history in which theenvironmental regulator has significantly countered a multinational mining corporation, whenover 20 percent of tax revenue and over 55 percent of exports come from the mining sector.iiiii
This poses a focal question: what was unique about the Pascua Lama case that prompted theupholding of environmental regulations despite the economic benefits of the mine? Simply, what
political pressures made environmental regulatory accountability a reality in Chile?
This research focuses on the political drivers that empowered the Chilean environmental
regulator – and its environmental courts – to tame Barrick’s ecological destruction at Pascua
Lama. I argue that three political forces led to the enablement of Chile’s environmental regulator
la Superintendencia del Medio Ambiente (Superintendency of the Environment or SMA) to hold
Barrick Gold accountable. First, Chile’s accession process to the OECD in the mid-2000s
required the revamping of its environmental regulator, upgrading the financial penalties atChile’s disposal against ecological ruin caused by mining companies. Next, increasing public

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participation and NGO involvement over the Pascua Lama issues led to Chile’s first major
mining protests, prompting the SMA to sanction Barrick to avoid global shame for lacking
democratic accountability. Lastly, Chile’s signing of ILO Convention 169 created legal
protection for indigenous residents, allowing the SMA to facilitate court action against Barrick.
Thus, political pressures enabled the SMA to curtail Barrick’s environmental degradationand catalyze a major regulatory change in Chile’s mining industry. The confluence of thesefactors in 2013 raised Barrick’s costs of doing business in Chile, prompting it to voluntarilysuspend its mining operation. These costs can be translated into a set of generalizable tools to
promote a regulator-driven monitoring system. Argentina can leverage these factors to ensure
Barrick’s environmental compliance in its Veladero mining project. Responsible mining ispossible, given the appropriate bonds backed up by a state regulator and the force of law.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part 1 summarizes Barrick’s involvement at Pascua Lamaand its inadequate self-regulation. Parts 2-4 explore the three political drivers – OECD accession,
public protest, and indigenous rights – that motivated the environmental regulator to act against
Barrick Gold at Pascua Lama. Part 5 concludes by summarizing the costs and bonds imposed by
the SMA against Barrick and how they could be generally applied in other countries.
Part 1: Barrick Gold, Pascua Lama, and the Inadequacy of Self-Regulation
Toronto-based Barrick Gold is the world’s largest gold producer, which operates dozens
of multi-billion-dollar mining projects across 6 continents. Barrick became interested in the
Pascua Lama site in 1991, as a mine there could produce 850,000 ounces of gold and 35 million
ounces of silver in the first five years of a 25 year lifespan.iv Barrick was approved to survey themine by a COREMA office (a regional environmental regulator) in the Atacama Desert in 2001.v

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Despite the environmental impact assessments (EIAs) required for exploration, Barrick omitted
data about glacial destruction as a result of lax, legacy Pinochet-era mining regulations.vi After
exploration concluded in 2004, Barrick submitted revisions to its EIAs in order to start building
the mine in 2009, after the resolution of the mine’s tax issues between Chile and Argentina.vii
From 2009 until 2013, Barrick Gold performed seemingly rigorous actions to mitigate its
ecological impact and build support among the locals. Barrick spent $15 million and 200,000
hours creating 5,336 pages of environmental reports with the paid help of 10 ecologicalconsultancies and Chilean and Canadian universities.viii Barrick’s report stated that there would
be no impact on glaciers and it agreed to Chile’s 400 environmental conditions. Barrick held
1000 meetings with community members and invested in education and health programs, as partof its culture of “trust, transparency and shared responsibility and accountability.”ix Despite
Barrick’s efforts, locals remained concerned about the project’s environmental impacts.
Despite Barrick’s claims, the project was fraught with environmental violations.
Exploratory work imperiled 3 glaciers in the Huasco Valley region due to effluent and dust
production, threatening snowmelt-dependent agriculture by irrevocably melting some parts of theglaciers.x While COREMA requested additional information about the mine’s detrimental effects
on the glaciers, it received minimal information from Barrick, yet it still approved the projectupon receiving water management plans.xi Barrick took advantage of Chile’s environmental
regulator via a piece-mealing strategy. The company divided its mining proposal into multiple
parts to ensure lighter assessments by regional COREMA offices instead of the stricter
regulations imposed by the national regulator CONAMA. These reviews were also biased
towards Barrick, as COREMA granted the company unfair extensions to provide documentation,

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prioritizing private investment over public well-being.xii Also, the lack of independent reviewersof its ecological reports allowed Barrick to omit key information regarding glacial destruction.xiii
The crisis came to a head in January 2013 when Barrick admitted that a water diversion
channel had collapsed, leading to Barrick site managers deciding to let natural runoff water flow
through the mining site, in direct abuse of Barrick’s environmental permit.xiv Barrick admitted to
not building infrastructure to prevent the incident and admitted to 22 of 23 charges brought
against it by the SMA in order to attempt to avoid court time and pay a lower fee than the SMA’s$16 million sanction.xv However, appeals by the indigenous Diaguita people led to the SMA
fining Barrick for $16 million in May 2013, following the April 2013 appeals court ruling that
halted construction work indefinitely.xvi Barrick itself decided to fully halt the project in October
2013 due to costs escalating above $8 billion from its initial $1.5 billion projections, mainly due
to its environmental mismanagement leading to several delays.xvii Ramp-down activities neededfor environmental protection purposes were completed during the second quarter of 2014.
The Pascua Lama mining case evinces the errors of self-regulation: one cannot be held
accountable for environmental degradation unless these damages are properly verified by a state
entity. The lack of independent reviews of corporate ecological reporting processes led to thefailure of the state regulator to identify and close EIA loopholes. Barrick took advantage of the
disjointed regulatory environment until its damages could be confronted by the newly createdSuperintendency, which went into operation in December 2012. While Barrick attempted to selfregulate, its voluntary regulations could only be effective when paired with governmental
authoritative rule-making, as evinced by Richard Locke more broadly: “private voluntary
regulation can best succeed when layered on and interacting with public (state) regulation.”xviii
Before the SMA, Barrick was economically incentivized to misrepresent its ecological damages

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as the threat of effective government regulation and the private costs to Barrick for polluting
were low, as Locke generally notes: “without the support and legitimacy of government
regulation, these private initiatives will produce only limited and often unsustainableimprovements.”xix Private regulation did not quell bad behavior, leaving room for public
regulation to fill the accountability gap. Plainly, the three political drivers – OECD accession,
public protest, and indigenous rights – motivated the Chilean government to give its regulator
more financial and political legitimacy in order to raise Barrick’s costs of pollution.
Part 2: OECD Accession and Chilean Environmental Regulatory Reform
Among the drivers that led to the creation of an Environmental Superintendency that wasable to suspend the Pascua Lama project was Chile’s desire to become the first South Americancountry to join the OECD. It aimed to reap the benefits of associating with the world’s wealthiest
nations and adopting economic standards to transform Chile into a developed nation. Chile’s
accession process to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in the mid2000s required the formation of an improved environmental regulator, which upgraded the tools
at Chile’s disposal against ecological destruction caused by mining corporations, such as raisingfines against Barrick through the SMA. The benefits of developed nation status andenvironmental accountability outweighed the costs of conflict with the mining industry and being
seen as unmodern if environmental standards were not improved. To understand the shift inpolitics that made both liberal and conservative presidents support the formation of the SMA andits strong efforts against Barrick, it is important to review the drivers of environmental politics inChile. Also, I look at how leaders adopted a cost-benefit analysis that supported sustainablegrowth through fining companies for ecological damages.

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2005: President Lagos and the OECD Environmental Performance Review
During the presidency of social democrat Ricardo Lagos (2000 to 2006), Chile courted
the OECD to get considered for membership. As part of the consideration process, the OECDpublished an environmental performance report for Chile, highlighting areas of environmental
institutional improvement.xx The report recommended that Chile create an environmental
inspectorate, make ecological information public, and strengthen its laws as to provide oversightover the commitments made by private mining companies, such as Barrick.xxi While Chile waslauded for its economic performance, it was criticized for its environmental mismanagement.
The OECD accused Chile of giving priority to private investment and neglecting sustainable
development policies, according to researchers at the World Economic forum.xxii
The report criticized the dispersion of regulatory activities across both the environmental
and mining ministries’ various regional offices, which spread inspection financing too thin to
identify and redress environmental wrongdoing. The OECD advised that the supervisory role of
the regulator be increased at the regional level, where the conflicts of interests and transaction
costs are lower than at the local or national levels.xxiii Such an “environmental superintendency”
would act independent of political sway to address violations.xxiv Yet, without a guarantee ofaccession, Lagos did not make environmental reforms. In the last days of his presidency in
February 2006, CONAMA endorsed the Pascua Lama project, granting Barrick a permit despite
public opposition of the project’s glacial damages.xxv While there were environmental debates inChile in early 2006 that centered on motions presented in Congress by Senator Horvath and acoalition of political parties, the reforms ran into opposition by Barrick and Chile’s state mining
company Codelco that sought to profit from the Pascua Lama revenue. The EIA submission andthe OECD report highlighted Barrick’s lack of accountability for glacial damage during its

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exploration phase, leading to mass protests and an opportunity for the government to confront
Barrick without economic sacrifice by aligning with a global regime of democratic and economic
standards. The OECD’s critique of Chile’s lack of oversight of the environmental commitments
made by private companies provided political motivation to improve environmental standards.
President Bachelet: The Turning Tide of Environmental Regulatory Reforms
Environmental regulation in Chile began to shift with the election of socialist Michelle
Bachelet in 2005 and during her presidency (2006-2010). As her election coincided with therelease of the OECD report, Bachelet made Chile’s acceptance into the OECD a key goal.xxvi She
believed that membership would solidify Chile’s commitment to democracy, sustainable
development, and international integration since the restoration of democracy in 1990. It would
accelerate Chile’s transition to becoming a developed nation, believing that being part of “thiscommunity of democracies and best practices” was the optimal developmental path.xxvii Joining
the OECD would help Chile set the trade standards of the global economy and raise national
income, at the low cost of modernizing environmental enforcement. Bachelet noted the need tostrengthen execution through a new environmental institutional framework, including a Ministry,a Superintendency, and an Evaluation Service.xxviii To solidify her commitments during her 2005
campaign, Bachelet signed an agreement with leading environmentalists to create the OECDframework entities if elected.xxix Thus, Bachelet leveraged the accession process as a catalyst forenvironmental institutional reform. In early 2007, Bachelet appointed Ana Uriarte as theEnvironment Minister to push the environmental reforms through the Chilean Congress. xxx
The modest attempts at environmental reform garnered the OECD Council’s approval of
Chile’s roadmap to accession in November 2007, which required environmental reforms.xxxi
Thus, it took several years of piece-meal institutional reforms to garner the political will ofCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Chile’s legislature to improve sustainable mining conditions. Amendments to the Environmental
Framework law were introduced under Law 24,017 in January 2010, leading to Chile’s accession
to the OECD on May 7, 2010.xxxii The OECD recognized that Law 24,017 would help ensure“Chile’s convergence with OECD countries’ environmental standards and practices.”xxxiii Law
24,017 addressed criticisms by transforming CONAMA into an empowered Ministry of theEnvironment,

Environmental

Assessment

organization,

andaSuperintendency.

The

Superintendency, which was scheduled to replace CONAMA in December 2012, was given
improved fining, inspection, and enforcement capabilities, raising the bar of ecological
performance. It had increased accountability through economic penalizations and rigorous
assessments of Barrick’s ecological impacts, but not until it went into service in December 2012.
The Environmental Courts and President Piñera
Chilean citizens initially feared the reforms would be repealed at the March 2010 start ofcenter-right President Sebastián Piñera’s presidency. Despite his conservative tendencies, Piñera
achieved political compromise by brokering a deal with center-right oppositionists to create“special environmental courts through which companies [would] be able to challenge sentences
imposed by the regulator.”xxxiv The addition of the environmental courts allowed the SMA to use
a fine-first strategy, where the regulator can easily sanction misbehaving mining companies, whothen can appeal sanctions in the environmental courts. By having judges specialize in economics
and science, it provides an accountability system in which mining companies can be fairly
judged regarding the amount of damage they have caused.xxxv It also provides a “shadow of thestate” mentality in which mining corporations would choose to obey environmental regulations,
as it would be economically costlier to pay fines and legal fees during litigation than to obey thelaw.

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The reforms – including inspection budget increases, higher fines, and independent
environmental reviews – have been supported by a multi-party coalition of political and businessleaders. Recent changes in the mining sector reforms have resulted from a “a cross-politicaleffort between a highly respected private sector, civil society and political representatives.”xxxvi
Also, the original bill for the SMA’s rigorous Strategic Environmental Assessment system wasdrafted by President Sebastian Piñera’s conservative administration. Thus, the conservative
Piñera administration was able to uphold the liberal environmental regulations passed by the
Bachelet administration, believing that respecting the rule of law would allow Chile to best reap
the benefits of trade liberalization through OECD membership. Piñera believed the future of theChilean economy would be dependent on the services industry and not the foreign-driven mining
industry, thus it made sense to support sustainable mining as to improve Chile’s position in the
global value chain by transitioning from extractive to creative production.
Environmental Regulation in Practice at Pascua Lama
To monitor and combat Barrick Gold’s ecological damage, the SMA under Piñera
engaged in a series of reforms. It implemented more rigorous and independent inspections andraised the levels of fines from tens of thousands to tens of millions of dollars to increase
compliance. The SMA fined Barrick Gold for $16 million in May 2013, following the April
2013 Chilean appeals court ruling that halted construction work. The SMA still continues
inspections, both schedule- and complaint-driven, through today to ensure environmental
compliance, under the threat of financial sanctions against Barrick. Increasing regulatory power
has imposed financial costs on Barrick while proactively preventing more damage. The fines
were designed to be discouraging instead of punitive. They were intended to make it preferable
to comply with environmental regulations, such as using particle filters, instead of being fined,Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
sanctioned, or taken to court, following Piñera’s economics-driven policies. xxxvii This new“bond”, under the shadow of the state, created an agreement in which Barrick Gold wascompelled to obey the SMA’s environmental regulations on its own, or else pay fines and facework halts upon committing a violation. The bond proved to be strong, as Barrick chose to halt
development of Pascua Lama in October 2013, for its wrongdoings had become too costly to
overcome. Thus, the SMA was successful in making environmental compliance economically
preferable, as continued action at Pascua Lama would have further inflated Barrick’s costs.
Piñera’s full support for the SMA came after a May 2013 meeting with Canadian Prime
Minister Stephen Harper, who supported the SMA’s call for the Toronto-based Barrick to
improve its performance in 23 areas and that the mine be stopped until the water management
issue was resolved.xxxviii The Canadian prime minister encouraged Piñera to state that “Chile is ademocratic country that follows the rule of law.”xxxix As Chile’s OECD benefits were threatenedby the Pascua Lama disaster, the SMA and the Piñera administration were able to counter
Barrick and set a precedent that only sustainable mining can exist in Chile and unaccountablecompanies will be punished. Piñera made sure that piece-mealing at the local level cannot occur,by requiring the SMA to investigate total ecological impact of a project and consult the public,
who will be provided a study of how mining projects will impact a region, or else a company
will face further fines. Thus, OECD accession increased the effectiveness of regulatory fines.
Part 3: Public Political Participation and NGO Involvement in Regulation
Another driver of regulatory reform in Chile’s mining industry is the greater participationof civil society and non-governmental organizations in bringing the government’s attention toaddress environmental offenses. The public shaming of Barrick, and of Chile’s lax regulations,Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
prompted the SMA to employ a new tool – a court injunction to stop mining activities at Pascua
Lama to resolve violations. The use of protests and international journalism escalated the Pascua
Lama conflict to shame the Chilean government into taking action against Barrick, whereas
NGOs provided scientific and legal support to civil society claims. Public shaming successfully
drove the SMA to halt Barrick’s project. The political motivation to respond in the Pascua Lamacase is best represented by Keck and Sikkink’s boomerang model of transnational advocacy
networks: when the linkages of trust between the state and its people are broken – such as incases of poor environmental enforcement – domestic civil society organizations and NGOs
directly seek international allies to bring in international pressure to force a change in the state’s
behavior.xl Below, I explore why the Pascua Lama case was the first instance in which thetransnational advocacy boomerang strategy was effective in forcing state regulatory action .
Public Political Participation and Protests
Since the reclamation of democracy in Chile in 1990, the participation of average citizens
in mining development has been low, as legacy regulations did not require public consultation
for mining projects. Yet, the citizen protests against Barrick’s Pascua Lama project demonstrated
growing activism, prompting the Chilean state to incorporate public consultation in miningenvironmental decision-making, which previously was limited to technocrats and businessleaders.xli Historically, the private mining sector has distorted politics, pitting profits against theecological concerns of environmental agencies and citizens. While mining companies pay
royalties of 5 percent of profits – over $250 million in 2008 – there has been growing publicpressure to increase investments in community and ecological protection and to halt harmfulprojects, as Chilean domestic affairs have become more frequently reported in the international
sphere as part of the OECD integration process.xlii The scarcity of water in the Atacama Desert

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first galvanized the Barrick conflict, as the Pascua Lama site consumed a disproportionate
amount of water while polluting glacial freshwater, leading to publicized conflicts.xliii
The protests made international news during the June 4th, 2005 protests in the Chilean
capital Santiago and in Vallenar, drawing 2,000 Huasco Valley residents to bring to light
Barrick’s plans to “relocate” the three glaciers at Pascua Lama through controlled blasting.xliv
Protests persisted through the 2005-2006 approval process, starting with a letter with 18,000
signatures delivered to President Lagos in November 2005 during a protest at the Plaza de laConstituición in Santiago, but the protesters were met with police opposition. This led to followup protests in Vallenar and Santiago and international uproar over the police trying to silencepeaceful protesters.xlv Civil society concerns coalesced into the Vallenar Defense Committee,
which protested against Barrick’s water contamination and asked the government to halt the
project instead of solely forcing Barrick to compensate them for damages.xlvi
The 2006 CONAMA approval of Pascua Lama led to a boom of highly-publicizedprotests against Barrick, posing a new set of problems for the flailing regulator: how to address
public concerns over mining in a manner similar to OECD countries. The Pascua Lama mining
protests that started after the 2006 approval inspired other protests over environmental
degradation, including protests against thermoelectric plants in Punta de Choros, marking an
increasing voice of civil society against the energy and mining industries.xlvii After the Pinochet
years, the Chilean public demanded a greater role in environmental decision- making, posing as a
new actor in a relationship traditionally held between the State and mining companies. Pascua
Lama marked a turning point as while Chilean leaders in the 1990s thought mining protests only
existed outside of Chile, they could not ignore the current publicized protests.xlviii With global
eyes on Chile due to Bachelet’s bid for Chile’s OECD accession, there was political pressure toCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
respond democratically to protesters as to demonstrate government accountability. While Lagos
failed to reform, Bachelet felt a need to respond to the protests or else lose Chile’s OECD bid.
The protests began to gain traction in 2007 via civil society efforts to shed light on
Barrick’s environmental offenses through displaying documentaries and presentations, leading toannual protests in Vallenar (the capital city of the Huasco Valley). This built up to February
2007 and August 2008 protests that blocked roads to the mining site while thousands protested in
Santiago.xlix The protests’ expansion to the state’s capital demonstrated rising support against
Barrick among powerful, well-connected activists and not just among a small regional
community. This created “boomerang” connections to the Environmental Justice Network
throughout Latin America and internationally to MiningWatch Canada and GreenpeaceInternational.l Activists leveraged these transnational advocacy networks to spread informationand shame Barrick and the Chilean government through mailings and presentations in othercountries. This international shaming brought the glacial destruction and human rights violations
to the global stage, making it an international responsibility to protect melting glaciers andvulnerable populations.li Protesters also traveled to Canada to lobby against the Canadiangovernment for not regulating the Toronto-based Barrick Gold, bringing further scrutiny.
Following the findings of the 2010 Halifax Initiative (a Canadian NGO focused on
corporate reporting verification), it became apparent that Barrick Gold “deliberately undermined
the Chilean environmental impact assessment system” through the piece-mealing strategy.lii This
strategy allowed Barrick to misrepresent the environmental impact of the project by diminishingits inter-regional expanse, seeking the lower regulations held for smaller, separate projects
instead of the regulations for mega-projects.liii It became verified that many of the consultations
with environmental activists and with the Diaguita people were not considered in the 2006

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permitting , leading to protests. This report highlighted Chile’s regulatory facade: despite having
many state regulators present; the disparate offices did not ethically or effectively garner a full
picture of the environmental impact to hold Barrick accountable. Thus, the Piñera administration
was tasked with consolidating all stakeholder opinions into the plans for the SMA, or else risk
making Chile appear hypocritical after its accession to the OECD a few months earlier.
In response, the Piñera government passed legislation to ensure public participation inenvironmental studies and to require developers to explain how projects complied with landdevelopment regulations, pleasing environmental activist and investors who were concerned withthe lack of clarity of mining corporation environmental performance.liv Piñera also created the
National System of Environmental Enforcement Information as a public database of mining
ecological impact reports in order to provide average citizens with clear communication aboutmining projects.lv Community participation and public information helped gained investor
support and prevented investment flight, for the returns of a mining company’s project are morepredictable if there is improved compliance and a decreased frequency of fines and court cases.
The Santiago-based support changed the accountability language of the Chilean
government under Bachelet and Piñera, a movement away from Pinochet’s neoliberal policies
and towards a balance between mining investments and the basic rights of citizens.”lvi The
national discussion over the Pascua Lama project catalyzed discussions to re-evaluate themining-environment relationship once the concerns of the Huasco Valley residents were brought
to all of Chile and the world, via “national and international media such as The Independent, The
Economist, The New York Times [and] Al Jazeera TV.”lvii While the Piñera government
responded favorably to the protests, it had to wait until the end of 2012 to utilize the new
Superintendency to take direct action against Barrick, as any executive action against BarrickCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
would seem unsubstantiated until the new regulator could verify existing damages. Yet, thepresence of ecological NGO verification helped support the SMA’s “boomerang” action when it
came to power by providing political motivation to confirm the damages observed by NGOs.
NGOs as Ecological Verifiers and the SMA’s and Environmental Court’s Injunction Tool
Non-governmental organizations became part of the legal and regulatory process against
Barrick Gold by influencing public opinion through environmental research to inspire theprotests and government action against Barrick. NGOs provided scientific evidence and legal
support to legitimate civil society claims about environmental degradation and government
ineffectiveness, prompting the need for reform. Wanting to find the truth about Barrick’s
damages, NGOs such as OLCA (the Latin American Observatory of Environmental Conflicts)
and OCEANA-Chile (the Ocean Protection & Restoration Environmental Advocacy group)
found evidence the Chilean government had to address, completing the boomerang effect.
The OLCA provided hard scientific evidence during the April 2013 trial that contested
Barrick Gold’s environmental impact assessments, stressing the need for independent auditors ina mining project’s ecological assessments. OLCA Director Lucio Cuenca confirmed that the
OLCA’s research agreed with Chile’s own General Water Department’s research that “Pascua
Lama [was] destroying glaciers”, proving that the Chilean government ignored its own researchand instead relied on Barrick’s biased reports, as Barrick paid the researchers, leading to aconflict of interests.lviii Correspondingly, Cuenca also noted that OLCA water tests confirmedthat “illegal work on the mine has caused episodes of severe pollution in rivers in the area, andthe environmental institutions have responded in a biased manner.”lix The Piñera administration –through the courts – was forced to hold Barrick accountable for misleading the government.

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The April 2013 Copiapó Appeals Court verdict was unanimous: all mining activities at
Pascua Lama besides those related to environmental protection were indefinitely suspended,
upholding the SMA’s injunction to stop work after the January 2013 water management issues.
In response to the decision, Cuenca responded that the government had finally taken into accountthe severity of the complaints “made by the community with respect to the infractions committed
by Barrick.”lx Representing the conservative Piñera administration’s support of the court ruling,
Interior Minister Andrés Chadwick applauded that “it was possible to bring work on the mine toa halt, through a judicial organism”, demonstrating the effectiveness of the boomerang effect.lxi
In short, the confluence of public protests and NGO verification empowered the SMA
and environmental courts to hold Barrick Gold accountable, even under a more conservative
administration. The public shaming of the Chilean government for not knowing of the damages
claimed by protesters and shown by these NGOs prompted the SMA to conduct its own
investigations regarding the damage and the downstream effects of Barrick’s Pascua Lama
efforts or else face international shame.lxii Keck and Sikkink’s boomerang effect functioned as apolitical tool that resulted in the SMA-backed court order to halt mining work at Pascua Lama.
Part 4: Indigenous Human Rights Accountability for Eco-Damage in Court
Another way in which the Chilean regulator and courts were empowered in the Pascua
Lama case was through the state’s obligation to defend indigenous peoples affected byenvironmental degradation or else face litigation and shame for not upholding the rule of law andhuman rights. Below, I explore how an international standard – ILO Convention 169 – gained
domestic clout in the Pascua Lama case to support the SMA-backed court order to suspendCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
mining activities, following the Richard Locke model of the need for the state’s authoritative
power to make international standards domestically enforceable to protect citizens.
In 2006, the Bachelet administration recognized the Diaguita people as a protectedindigenous group under Chilean legislation, as part of the OECD accession process to accountfor environmental damages against native peoples.lxiii In September 2008, the Bachelet
administration ratified the International Labor Organization’s Convention Number 169: “TheILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989) imposes on States the obligation to
consult and afford wide participation to indigenous peoples.”lxiv This provided legal support for
the rights of indigenous peoples to be protected in cases of environmental degradation. Under the
Chilean constitution, the ratification of ILO 169 is considered to be a legally-binding instrumentthat demands that the State and mining companies must consult with indigenous populations incases in which their resources are threatened, making consent a key part of accountability.lxv
Despite historic tensions with its native population, the OECD accession process under Bachelet
prompted Chile to ratify international treaties and uphold human and environmental rights.
While indigenous and environmental rights were paltry under Pinochet, the return todemocracy revived focus on these rights. Before Barrick’s 1994 arrival, Chile in 1993 codified
basic indigenous rights, leading to piece-meal gains in indigenous-environmental rights throughChile’s courts. These rights were greatly improved under Bachelet’s first presidency, which had
a wave of judicial activism unheard of during the Lagos administration. Progressive judges usedtheir power to counteract the excessively lax mining regulations that persisted from the Pinochetera, leading to the new paralysis of “an estimated $50-billion worth” of mining and industrial
projects with egregious ecological damages.lxvi Much of this focused around leveraging ILO 169
to defend indigenous peoples against mining-caused ecological destruction. While ILO 169 is a

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legally-binding international convention, it only became domestically enforceable via its
ratification by the Bachelet administration, which incorporated the law under protections granted
in its constitution. The judicial activism of leftist judges supported the establishment ofindigenous-environmental precedents to solidify a strong interpretation of the ILO Convention
regardless of the political administrations. Also, these judge appointments lasted past Bachelet’s
first administration, leading to similar interpretations through Piñera’s administration. The
progressive precedents set by these judges have allowed ecological regulation to be effective inChile by encouraging mining companies to adopt a proactive approach to environmental
compliance, public consultation, and human rights protection. Else, companies will resort tolitigation, where judicial precedents have decreased offenders’ abilities to avoid harsh sentences.
Thus, the 2006 approval of the Pascua Lama mine violated the Diaguita indigenous
community’s rights to informed consent about natural resources near traditional lands. Whiledomestic indigenous law lacked political force to support the Diaguita people, the ratification of
ILO 169 provided international pressure to support the rights given to native peoples.lxvii Yet,ILO 169, like other international treaties, relied on domestic Chilean support to act properly. The
Pascua Lama case provided a nice overlap of indigenous and environmental law to bridge the“implementation gap”, as the Diaguita community highly depends on the Huasco River water for
its survival, so any pollution would greatly threaten them.lxviii Given that Barrick’s 2009environmental impact assessment omitted that the gold ore was located underneath glaciers thatwere essential to the lives of the Diaguita people, the Diaguita community in the Huasco Valley
submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on December 2009.lxix
The Diaguita claim against the Chilean State (and thus against Barrick) by the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) legitimated human rights claims, by linking

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
health and indigenous rights abuses to ecological damage.lxx They citied violations of ILO 169’s
guarantees of prior consultation and natural resource protection by Chile’s maintenance ofBarrick’s environmental permit, as to sue the Chilean government for violating its promises
guaranteed not only under international law, but under national law via the ILO 169 ratification.
They cited that “the size of the Toro I, Toro II, and Esperanza glaciers had experienced fifty toseventy percent reduction in size” since Barrick’s work commenced at Pascua Lama, threatening
water access to the agricultural-dependent indigenous population.lxxi This use of international law
led to the Commission granting the Diaguita case admissibility, providing them with a legal
avenue to sue Barrick in Chile’s domestic courts in 2013 after the water management fiasco
became public. Supporting the Diaguita’s right to water, in April 2013, the Court of Appeals of
Copiapó supported the indigenous residents claims under ILO 169 by ordering the indefinite haltof Pascua Lama, except for environmental protection work, for SMA inspections found “heavy
concentrations of arsenic, aluminum, copper, and sulfate” in the community’s water source.lxxii
The Diaguita community was able to hold Barrick accountable for its environmental
degradation by holding the Chilean government accountable for its past lax environmental
permitting processes. Through ratification and progressive judge appointments, a strong
interpretation of ILO Convention 169 created linkages between human and environmental rightsthat allowed for court action to be taken against Barrick to halt the mining project. More broadly,
the SMA has reported that $10 billion in mining investments remain blocked following queries
of indigenous communities appealing to ILO 169 due to lack of consultation and corresponding
ecological damage.lxxiii Chile’s ratification of ILO 169 has shown that agreeing to international
standards is not solely symbolic; judicial precedents have allowed the SMA to sanction
offending mining companies while ensuring the courts follow a similar legal interpretation forCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
ecological violations. The cohesion of environmental regulation and indigenous rights law show
how the SMA’s regulatory efforts enforce existing law to reduce ecological destruction.lxxiv
President Piñera highly supported the court ruling, stating “How could they [Barrick] notanticipate all these problems? … Pascua-Lama must comply with the requirements we’ve set
forth and cannot resume work until it does.”lxxv The court’s April 2013 decision suspended allmining operations at Pascua Lama. The court also facilitated conversations between Barrick andthe Diaguita people, who reached an agreement in April 2014 that provided the Diaguitas withproject details, allowing them to consult with environmental experts regarding the quality of
Barrick’s cleanup efforts, thus promoting accountability to the local people moving forward.lxxvi
Thus, the ratification of ILO Convention 169 functioned as political driver to improve theenforcement capability of the SMA and environmental courts This follows the Richard Lockemodel of the state being needed to ensure final compliance: government regulation – including
supportive courts – is required because only the state has the authority and legitimacy to enforce
international legislation like ILO 169 in order to protect rights and confront Barrick.lxxvii
Part 5: Costs and Bonds: Making Mining Regulation Widespread
What lessons can be taken from Pascua Lama that can be translated into “bonds” between
mining companies and state regulators to promote responsible mining and monitoring? These
insights could specifically aid Argentina’s regulator to ensure Barrick’s environmental
compliance in its Veladero gold mining project, located just south of the Pascua Lama site.
The regulator-driven monitoring system’s success in getting Barrick to comply withenvironmental standards was due to political factors that raised three costs of doing business.
First, the Bachelet and Piñera administrations conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the OECD

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
accession. The benefits of international integration and trade outweighed the costs ofmodernizing environmental infrastructure, leading them to adopt the OECD recommendations toincrease financial sanctions for environmental violations from tens of thousands to tens of
millions of dollars. While the $16 million sanction against Barrick was relatively small comparedto the multi-billion-dollar value of the project, it was large enough to garner Barrick’s attention,
which led to them admitting to 22 of 23 environmental charges. The piece-meal reforms andsupport of OECD standards allowed the SMA to hold Barrick accountable with a common tool
used in other countries. Secondly, transnational advocacy through protests and NGO support
helped bring international attention to Chile’s struggle against Barrick’s glacial damage at
Pascua Lama. Through the boomerang effect, activists were able to leverage international
journalism and NGOs to shame the Chilean government for failing to address Barrick’s
ecological damages, leading to state action against Barrick once NGOs independently verified
the damages and accused the government of impropriety. Lastly, Chile’s ratification of ILO 169
under Bachelet led to legislation and judicial precedents that intertwined human rights andenvironmental damages. The Diaguita claim through the IACHR allowed indigenous people tosue the Chilean government for not stopping Barrick’s damage of their water sources, prompting
the Chilean government to redress the issue through indefinitely suspending work at the Pascua
Lama site. These financial sanctions and work halts proved to be too costly for Barrick, as after
years of rising costs due to environmental mismanagement, Barrick shelved the entire project on
October 30, 2013. The SMA effectively made Barrick choose between pursuing a responsible
project or shelving the mine, and Barrick selected the latter.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
External Validity: Contextualization and Generalizability
While these costs seem to be generalizable to other nations confronting the abuses oftransnational mining companies, there are some important features about the Pascua Lama casethat make the regulator’s response contextually-specific. For example, the relatively high social
stability and centralization of the Chilean political system upon democracy’s return in 1990
provided an atmosphere in which environmental regulation was respected and credible NGO
relationships could be established.lxxviii Secondly, the OECD process was a major driver of the
SMA’s reform, yet only 34 countries are current members of the OECD. While Chile benefited
from the accession process, the promise of OECD membership is only a motivator for middleincome countries that already have good institutions that support the rule of law. Third, timing
played a crucial role. The confluence of the 2006 EIA of Pascua Lama, the start of Bachelet’s
first term, and the OECD bid made the ecological destruction of mining company paramount inChilean politics, where Bachelet could easily win over a liberal majority Congress to sacrificesome mining tax revenue to address ecological damage. Also, it was opportune timing for the
SMA, which started operating in December 2012, to take a first mover advantage in the January
2013 water management issue at Pascua Lama in order to demonstrate its new powers. Lastly,
the large size of Barrick’s $8 billion Pascua Lama site, Barrick’s size as the world’s largest gold
miner, and Barrick’s reputation as one of the world’s most unethical and polluting companies
made it an easy target for the SMA, while a lesser known company may fly under the radar.lxxix
Regardless of these specific conditions, the costs exhibited in the Pascua Lama case canbe translated into general “bonds” a state regulator can make with mining companies to holdthem accountable for environmental damages.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
From Costs to Bonds: How Argentina can confront Barrick Gold
There are three sets of bonds that a regulator-driven monitoring system can provide to ensure
future environmental responsibility. First, the state regulator can ensure that future permits
specifically outline financial sanctions appropriate to project scale and the potential ecologicalimpacts. Even without the OECD motivation, the shadow of the state mentality provided byhigher fines ensures that companies are aware they will be charged for non-compliance, and thus
can save money and avoid project stalls by complying with environmental standards. An
escalating cost structure for repeat offenders can also help build accountability. Thus, revisions
to permitting and new fines and sanctions act as an Akerlof “guarantee”, where ecologicaluncertainty is corrected for, as it assures the government of a certain level of environmental
performance, or else violations of an environmental permit will result in escalating payments.lxxx
Next, the regulator should actively seek out public concerns during new mining projects
in order to identify and redress ecological problems before they lead to irrevocable destruction
and international shame. Like Chile, new environmental permitting should require publicconsensus and concessions to balance the rights of the local populace and the desires of mining
companies. This would limit public protests and trials that would be too costly for both a nation’s
courts and a mining company’s bottom line. The state can also provide clear processes for NGOs
to act as independent verifiers of environmental impact assessments. While it is hard to ensure
NGOs remain vigilant, it is important for the state regulator to provide a space for them tocontribute information. It is up to the regulator to require stricter independence of auditors forassessments to prevent the frequent lying of the Pascua Lama self-reports. Following the Akerlof
cost models, requirements for independence will improve accountability, for self-regulation

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
creates incentives for dishonesty, such that “dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings outof the market”lxxxi The punitive fines and work halts function as a bond to ensure independence.
Lastly, a state environmental regulator can leverage linkages between ecological and humanrights issues to ensure that court rulings concur with the meaning of existing regulations. The
incorporation of international law into domestic enforcement builds the credibility of indigenous
claims against mining companies. While the creation of human rights legislation is dependent on
the rise of a liberal regime, strong environmental-human rights linkages can be secured for futureadministrations through judicial activism to reflect the true intentions of the law.
The conditions for the Argentinian government to confront Barrick Gold and hold it
accountable at Veladero, which has suffered recent water pollution issues, seems promising.
First, the new center-right President Mauricio Macri has garnered enough support to formallylaunch its OECD accession process in February 2016, which will likely lead to OECD-driven
environmental reforms such as higher financial sanctions.lxxxii Additionally, Macri is supporting
improvements in environmental inspections of mines, in order to generate trust at home among
his citizens as well as provide investors with stability by assuring them the state will work
cooperatively with mining corporations to ensure sustainable mining.lxxxiii Argentina can adopt
some of the aforementioned bonds to make environmentally accountable mining a reality.
Conclusion
Evidently, the state – through its environmental regulator and courts – is essential in
upholding the environmental demands of the populace. Barrick’s self-regulation was not enough,as private initiatives need to be embedded “within a system of authoritative rule making” if wehope to encourage sustainable mining practices with the threat of financial and legal

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
sanctions.lxxxiv The aforementioned political motivations can raise a mining company’s costs ofcommitting ecological damage. Thus, a government can promote sustainable mining through theefforts of a strong state environmental regulator like the SMA holding mining companies
accountable through a system of costs and bonds.

Bibliography
Note that all highlighted items are Spanish-language sources, and all translations to English are
my own.
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December 1. http://www.mintpressnews.com/chilean-farmers-and-foreign-mining-firms-face-off-over-andesgold/199434/.
ii
Stratfor Global Intelligence. 2015. “Chile’s Mining Sector.” Stratfor. June 5.
https://www.stratfor.com/image/chiles-mining-sector.
iii
Ministry of Finance of Chile. 2014. “Ministry of Finance - Macroeconomic Indicators.”
http://www.hacienda.cl/english/investor-relations-office/why-chile/economic-information/macroeconomicindicators.html.
iv
Smith, Craig, and Eric McCormick. 2014. “Barrick Gold Corporation: A Perfect Storm at Pascua Lama.” France:
INSEAD. http://oikos-international.org/publications/barrick-gold-a-perfect-storm-at-pascua-lama/. Page 7v
Fowler, James. 2010. “Government Study: Pascua Lama Threatens Glaciers.” Santiago Times.
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9800.
vi
González, Gustavo. 2006. “ENVIRONMENT-CHILE: Pascua Lama Gold Mine, a Threat to Sustainability.”
InterPress Service News Agency. http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/06/environment-chile-pascua-lama-gold-mine-athreat-to-sustainability/.
vii
Nolen, Stephanie. 2014. “Behind Barrick’s Pascua-Lama Meltdown in the Atacama Desert.” The Globe and Mail.
April 24. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/high-and-dry/article18134225/.
viii
Barrick Gold Corporation. 2015. “Pascua-Lama FAQs.” http://www.barrick.com/operations/argentinachile/pascua-lama/faq/default.aspx.
ix
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x
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November 19, 2015. http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10-10-08-CHILE-REPORT.pdf. Page 10
xiVel, Cynthia. 2014. “RESPECTING THE ‘GUARDIANS OF NATURE:’ CHILE’S VIOLATIONS OF THE
DIAGUITA INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEED TO
ENFORCE OBLIGATIONS TO OBTAIN FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT.” American Indian Law
Journal. http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Documents/ailj/Spring%202014/Vel.pdf. Pages 646-647
xii
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Barrick Gold Corporation. 2015. “Pascua-Lama FAQs.” http://www.barrick.com/operations/argentinachile/pascua-lama/faq/default.aspx.
xiv
Smith, Craig, and Eric McCormick. 2014. “Barrick Gold Corporation: A Perfect Storm at Pascua Lama.” France:
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xv
Pizarro, Carolina. 2013. “Radiografía de Una Crisis Medioambiental: Los Errores de Pascua Lama Y Las
Sanciones Que Arriesga.” La Tercera, 12 de Mayo.

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http://diario.latercera.com/2013/05/12/01/contenido/negocios/27-136634-9-radiografia-de-una-crisismedioambiental-los-errores-de-pascua-lama-y-las.shtml.
xvi
Simson, Caroline. 2016. “Barrick Can’t Ditch Investor Suit Over Gold Mine Compliance - Law360.”
http://www.law360.com/articles/638781/barrick-can-t-ditch-investor-suit-over-gold-mine-compliance.
xvii
Pizarro, Carolina. 2013. “Radiografía de Una Crisis Medioambiental: Los Errores de Pascua Lama Y Las
Sanciones Que Arriesga.” La Tercera, 12 de Mayo.
http://diario.latercera.com/2013/05/12/01/contenido/negocios/27-136634-9-radiografia-de-una-crisismedioambiental-los-errores-de-pascua-lama-y-las.shtml.
xviii
Locke, Richard M. (2013-04-30). The Promise and Limits of Private Power (Cambridge Studies in Comparative
Politics) (Kindle Locations 506-507). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
xix
Locke, Richard M. (2013-04-30). The Promise and Limits of Private Power (Cambridge Studies in Comparative
Politics) (Kindle Locations 74-75). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
xx
Bergamini, Kay, y Cristian Pérez. 2015. “Fiscalización Y Cumplimiento Ambiental En Chile: Principales
Avances, Desafíos Y Tareas Pendientes.” EURE (Santiago) 41 (124): 267–77. doi:10.4067/S025071612015000400013. Página 268
xxi
Sustainable Development Strategy Group. "Issues in the Chilean Mining Sector." October 10, 2008. Accessed
November 19, 2015. http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10-10-08-CHILE-REPORT.pdf Page 21
xxii
González, Gustavo. 2005. “Economy & Trade, Environment, Headlines, Latin America & the Caribbean
ENVIRONMENT: Chile Needs to Clean Up Its Act to Join OECD.” InterPress Service News Agency, January 31.
http://www.ipsnews.net/2005/01/environment-chile-needs-to-clean-up-its-act-to-join-oecd/.
xxiii
Bergamini, Kay, y Cristian Pérez. 2015. “Fiscalización Y Cumplimiento Ambiental En Chile: Principales
Avances, Desafíos Y Tareas Pendientes.” EURE (Santiago) 41 (124): 267–77. doi:10.4067/S025071612015000400013. Página 269
xxiv
González, Gustavo. 2005. “Economy & Trade, Environment, Headlines, Latin America & the Caribbean
ENVIRONMENT: Chile Needs to Clean Up Its Act to Join OECD.” InterPress Service News Agency, January 31.
http://www.ipsnews.net/2005/01/environment-chile-needs-to-clean-up-its-act-to-join-oecd/.
xxv
González, Gustavo. 2006. “ENVIRONMENT-CHILE: Pascua Lama Gold Mine, a Threat to Sustainability.”
InterPress Service News Agency. http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/06/environment-chile-pascua-lama-gold-mine-athreat-to-sustainability/
xxvi
OECD Observer. 2009. “Chile at the OECD.” OECD Observer. June.
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/3041/Chile_at_the_OECD.html.
xxvii
Ibid. Web.
xxviiiIbid. Web.
xxix
Azzopardi, Tom. 2010. “Saneando La Regulación Ambiental.” AmCham Chile. 25 de Febrero.
http://www.amchamchile.cl/2010/02/saneando-la-regulacion-ambiental-2
xxx
Ibid. Web.
xxxi
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2010. “Chile’s Accession to the OECD.” OECD.
http://www.oecd.org/chile/chilesaccessiontotheoecd.htm.
xxxii
Ibid. Web.
xxxiii
Sustainable Development Strategy Group. "Issues in the Chilean Mining Sector." October 10, 2008. Accessed
November 19, 2015. http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10-10-08-CHILE-REPORT.pdf Page 21
xxxiv
Azzopardi, Tom. 2010. “Saneando La Regulación Ambiental.” AmCham Chile. 25 de Febrero.
http://www.amchamchile.cl/2010/02/saneando-la-regulacion-ambiental-2
xxxv
Ibid. Web.
xxxvi
Hidalgo, Alonso. 2014. “In Neighboring Chile and Peru, Mining Reforms Couldn’t Be More Different.”
National Resource Governance Institute. June 26. http://www.resourcegovernance.org/news/blog/neighboring-chileand-peru-mining-reforms-couldnt-be-more-different.
xxxviiO’Neill, Eilís. “Chile Finally Gets Tough on Mining Industry.” March 26, 2014. Earth Island Journal.
http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/chile_finally_gets_tough_on_mining_industry/ .
xxxviii
Paucar Albino, Jorge. 2013. “Piñera Exige Que Minera Barrick Cumpla Normativa Ambiental.” La Mula. 30
de Mayo. https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2013/05/30/pinera-exige-que-minera-barrick-cumpla-normativaambiental/jorgepaucar/.
xxxix
Ibid. Web.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
xl

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional
Politics.” International Social Science Journal 51 (159): 89–101. doi:10.1111/1468-2451.00179. Page 93
xli
Sustainable Development Strategy Group. "Issues in the Chilean Mining Sector." October 10, 2008. Accessed
November 19, 2015. http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10-10-08-CHILE-REPORT.pdf Page 3
xlii
Ibid. Page 8
xliii
Ibid. Page 3
xliv
Walker, Glenn. 2005. “Barrick Gold Strikes Opposition in South America.” CorpWatch. June 20.
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12447.
xlv
MiningWatch Canada. 2005. “Barrick Gold Faces Determined Opposition at Pascua Lama and Veladero.”
MiningWatch Canada. December 21. http://www.miningwatch.ca/barrick-gold-faces-determined-opposition-pascualama-and-veladero.
xlvi
Urkidi, Leire. 2010. “A Glocal Environmental Movement against Gold Mining: Pascua–Lama in Chile.”
Ecological Economics, Special Section: Ecological Distribution Conflicts, 70 (2): 219–27.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.05.004. Page 223
xlvii
La Nación. 2013. “HIDROAYSÉN Y PASCUA LAMA LIDERAN RECLAMOS DE LOS
AMBIENTALISTAS 2.0.” La Nación, 26 de Abril. http://www.lanacion.cl/hidroaysen-y-pascua-lama-lideranreclamos-de-los-ambientalistas-2-0/noticias/2013-04-26/151636.html.
xlviii
Sustainable Development Strategy Group. "Issues in the Chilean Mining Sector." October 10, 2008. Accessed
November 19, 2015. http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10-10-08-CHILE-REPORT.pdf Page 16
xlix
Urkidi, Leire. 2010. “A Glocal Environmental Movement against Gold Mining: Pascua–Lama in Chile.”
Ecological Economics, Special Section: Ecological Distribution Conflicts, 70 (2): 219–27.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.05.004. Page 225lIbid. Page 224
li
Ibid. Page 225
lii
Sustainable Development Strategy Group. "Issues in the Chilean Mining Sector." October 10, 2008. Accessed
November 19, 2015. http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10-10-08-CHILE-REPORT.pdf Page 17
liii
Ibid. Page 17
liv
Azzopardi, Tom. 2010. “Saneando La Regulación Ambiental.” AmCham Chile. 25 de Febrero.
http://www.amchamchile.cl/2010/02/saneando-la-regulacion-ambiental-2
lv
Congreso Nacional de Chile. 2010. Ley 20417: CREA EL MINISTERIO, EL SERVICIO DE EVALUACIÓN
AMBIENTAL Y LA SUPERINTENDENCIA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE.
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1010459.
lvi
Urkidi, Leire. 2010. “A Glocal Environmental Movement against Gold Mining: Pascua–Lama in Chile.”
Ecological Economics, Special Section: Ecological Distribution Conflicts, 70 (2): 219–27.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.05.004. Page 225
lvii
Ibid. Page 226
lviii
Jarroud, Marianela. 2013. “Chilean Court Suspends Pascua Lama Mine.” InterPress Service News Agency, April
10. http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/chilean-court-suspends-pascua-lama-mine/.
lix
Ibid. Web.
lx
Ibid. Web.
lxi
Ibid. Web.
lxii
Andres Abarca, Juan. 2013. “Barrick’s Pascua Lama Has Damaged Huasco Glaciers, Claims NGO.” BNamericas.
October 18. http://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/mining/barricks-pascua-lama-has-damaged-huasco-glaciersclaims-ngo.
lxiii
Nolen, Stephanie. 2014. “Behind Barrick’s Pascua-Lama Meltdown in the Atacama Desert.” The Globe andMail. April 24. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/high-and-dry/article18134225/
lxiv
Cavallo, Gonzalo Aguilar. 2013. “Pascua Lama, Human Rights, and Indigenous Peoples: A Chilean Case
Through the Lens of International Law.” Goettingen Journal of International Law 5 (1).
http://www.gojil.eu/issues/51/51_article_cavallo.pdf. Page 225
lxv
Sustainable Development Strategy Group. "Issues in the Chilean Mining Sector." October 10, 2008. Accessed
November 19, 2015. http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10-10-08-CHILE-REPORT.pdf Page 19
lxvi
Nolen, Stephanie. 2014. “Behind Barrick’s Pascua-Lama Meltdown in the Atacama Desert.” The Globe andMail. April 24. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/high-and-dry/article18134225/

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
lxvii

Vel, Cynthia. 2014. “RESPECTING THE ‘GUARDIANS OF NATURE:’ CHILE’S VIOLATIONS OF THE
DIAGUITA INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEED TO
ENFORCE OBLIGATIONS TO OBTAIN FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT.” American Indian Law
Journal. http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Documents/ailj/Spring%202014/Vel.pdf. Page 642
lxviiiIbid. Pages 643-644
lxix
Ibid. Page 648
lxx
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 2010. “Huascoaltinos Claim over Pascua Lama Deemed
Admissible by the Inter-American CHR.” http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9943.
lxxi
Ibid. Page 650
lxxii
Ibid. Page 653
lxxiii
Hidalgo, Alonso. 2014. “In Neighboring Chile and Peru, Mining Reforms Couldn’t Be More Different.”
National Resource Governance Institute. June 26. http://www.resourcegovernance.org/news/blog/neighboring-chileand-peru-mining-reforms-couldnt-be-more-different.
lxxiv
Locke, Richard M. (2013-04-30). The Promise and Limits of Private Power (Cambridge Studies in Comparative
Politics) (Kindle Locations 158-161). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition
lxxv
Nolen, Stephanie. 2014. “Behind Barrick’s Pascua-Lama Meltdown in the Atacama Desert.” The Globe andMail. April 24. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/high-and-dry/article18134225/
lxxvi
ECC Platform. 2015. “Pascua-Lama Mining Conflict in the Andes, Latin America | ECC Factbook.” ECC
Library. https://library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/pascua-lama.
lxxvii
Locke, Richard M. (2013-04-30). The Promise and Limits of Private Power (Cambridge Studies in Comparative
Politics) (Kindle Locations 4199-4200). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
lxxviii
Urkidi, Leire. 2010. “A Glocal Environmental Movement against Gold Mining: Pascua–Lama in Chile.”
Ecological Economics, Special Section: Ecological Distribution Conflicts, 70 (2): 219–27.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.05.004. Page 226.
lxxix
Kiser, Grace. 2016. “The Least Ethical Companies In The World (PHOTOS, POLL).” The Huffington Post.
Accessed January 22. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/28/the-least-ethical-compani_n_440073.html.
lxxx
Ibid. Page 500
lxxxi
Akerlof, George A. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488–500. doi:10.2307/1879431. Page 495
lxxxii
Buenos Aires Herald. 2016. “Government Seeks Full OECD Membership.” January 22.
http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/207216/.
lxxxiii
Castilla, Juliana. 2015. “Argentina’s Macri Would Give Provinces More Mining Profits -Adviser.” Reuters,
September 23. http://af.reuters.com/article/metalsNews/idAFL5N11T4MC20150923.
lxxxiv
Locke, Richard M. (2013-04-30). The Promise and Limits of Private Power (Cambridge Studies in
Comparative Politics) (Kindle Locations 534-536). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.