The Impact of Venture Capital on Innovation
Roberta Dessí∗and Nina Yin†
Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ and IDEI).
July 3, 2010

1. INTRODUCTION
Does venture capital foster productive innovation, and if so, how? Is the impactof venture capital on innovation very large? These questions are not only of
theoretical interest: answering them correctly is crucial for designing the best
public policies on innovation. Although it accounts for a rather low proportionof total entrepreneurial financing, notably compared to bank finance1 , venture
capital is widely regarded as a key factor in the successful performance of the U.S.
in terms of innovation, providing a model that has inspired emulation eﬀorts inmany other countries. From this perspective too, it is important to understandthe model well, and how it works.
This chapter begins by reviewing the empirical evidence on the impact ofventure capital on innovation. We identify some of the key challenges to empiricalresearch in this area, and discuss the methods that have been used to address
them. Our review is by no means exhaustive, but several findings emerge clearly.
∗

IDEI, Toulouse School of Economics, Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laﬀont,
21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France (dessi@cict.fr).
†
Toulouse School of Economics. 21 Allee de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France (yinnina.ccer@gmail.com).
1
For example, Berger and Udell (1998) find that in the US, 3.59% of small business financecomes from angel investors, 1.85% from venture capitalists, and 18.75% from commercial banks.
More recently, using UK data, Cosh, Cumming and Hughes (2009) find that 775 out of 952 firms
seeking external finance in their sample approached banks, while only 87 approached venture
capital funds and 83 approached private individuals. Moreover, rejection rates were much higher
among venture capital funds (46%) than among banks (17%).

First, there is evidence of a substantial impact of venture capital on innovation,measured by patent counts, at the industry level (at least for the U.S.). Althoughestimates vary, on average a dollar of venture capital appears to be three to fourtimes more potent in stimulating innovation than a dollar of traditional corporate
R&D (Lerner (2002)). Second, there is no corresponding evidence of a significant
impact of venture capital on innovation at the individual firm level. We discusspossible explanations for this diﬀerence, including the diﬃculties of adequately
controlling for the endogeneity of venture capital investment at the firm level.
While valid instruments have been found to address the endogeneity problem at
the industry level, this is much harder to achieve at the level of individual firms.
Third, there is very little evidence on how venture capital aﬀects innovation.
Concerning the second finding, the theoretical literature on venture capital has
focused primarily on one source of endogeneity: the ex-ante screening hypothesis.
The idea is that venture capitalists have a comparative advantage in evaluating
the entrepreneurs who seek funding from them, and selecting the "best" ones. As
discussed in section 2 below, this can bias upwards the estimates of the impactof venture capital on innovation, since firms with better entrepreneurs (projects)
are more likely to obtain venture funding and more likely to produce valuable
innovations. We argue however that there may be other sources of endogeneity,
introducing other biases, possibly going in the opposite direction, and making itdiﬃcult to draw inferences from reduced-form estimates obtained with firm-level
data.
Concerning the third finding listed above, the theoretical literature has highlighted two main mechanisms whereby venture capitalists aﬀect the performanceof their portfolio firms: monitoring and intervention2 , on the one hand, which
alleviates potential moral hazard problems on the side of the entrepreneur, andthe provision of advice and support3 on the other hand, which helps performance
directly. Both mechanisms could, in principle, apply to innovation. However,while there is growing evidence of the role played by venture capitalists in helping
to commercialize innovations4 , as well as their role in helping to recruit key personnel and replace founders with new CEOs5 , there is very little direct evidence
2See, for example, Dessí (2005) and Holmström and Tirole (1997).
See, among others, Bottazzi et al. (2005), Casamatta (2003), Cestone (2000), Cumming,
Fleming and Suchard (2005), Dessí (2010), Hellmann (1998), Jeng and Wells (2000), Kaplan etal. (2003), Lerner and Schoar (2005), Repullo and Suarez (2000, 2004), Riyanto and Schwienbacher (2006), and Schmidt (2003).
4
Colombo, Grilli and Piva (2006), Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002), Hsu (2006).
5
Hellmann and Puri (2002).
3

2

showing that they play an important role in fostering innovation.
There is, nevertheless, evidence from recent work, discussed in section 2, showing that venture capitalists are highly eﬀective in evaluating the quality of innovations early on, identifying correctly the patent applications that are likely to
succeed and lead to the development of valuable new products. Dessí and Yin(2010) build on this observation to develop a theoretical model that highlights
some additional ways, beyond monitoring and advising, in which venture capital
may influence innovation. In sections 3, 4 and 5 we present and analyze a highly
simplified model based on Dessí and Yin (2010), to show some of the eﬀects atwork and the implications for innovation. The model also illustrates a potential
source of endogeneity of venture funding that is unrelated to screening. The theoretical analysis therefore suggests that endogeneity can indeed be an importantconcern in empirical work. On the positive side, the analysis yields a number ofpotentially testable predictions: investigating predictions of this kind empirically
could help to shed new light on the mechanisms whereby venture capital aﬀects
innovation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
brief overview of the empirical evidence on the link between venture capital andinnovation. Section 3 introduces a simple theoretical model, based on Dessí (2009)and Dessí and Yin (2010). The model is analyzed in sections 4 and 5. The
implications of the model are discussed in section 6. Section 7 suggests potential
avenues for future research and concludes.

2. VENTURE CAPITAL AND INNOVATION: A BRIEFOVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A large and growing empirical literature examines, in diﬀerent ways, the link between venture capital and innovation. Our brief overview, summarised in Table
1, is not intended to be exhaustive; it only aims to highlight some of the main
contributions and implications. Moreover, it focuses on research that explicitly investigated the impact of venture capital on innovation, rather than more generally
the impact of venture capitalists on the firms they finance.
A key challenge in this line of research has been to establish a causal relationship between venture capital funding and diﬀerent measures of innovative
performance, such as patent counts. This issue has been addressed with diﬀerent
methodologies, using data at the industry level and the individual firm level.
32.1. INDUSTRY DATA
The diﬃculty of establishing causality can be illustrated by reference to the following framework. Consider innovative performance at the industry level, denotedby  , where the subscript  denotes the industry and  denotes time. Supposethat this depends on total R&D expenditure in the industry ( ), on the ratioof venture capital investment to total R&D expenditure (  ), and on unobserved technological opportunities ( ). This suggests estimating the following
regression6 ,ln  =  +  ln  +  ln() + 
(2.1)

to see whether venture capital has a significant impact on innovation; i.e.
whether the estimated coeﬃcient  is statistically significant. The diﬃculty hereis that the unobserved technological opportunities, captured by the error term  ,are likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables: if there is a positivetechnology shock that increases technological opportunities in a given industry,
venture capital investment in that industry is likely to increase, as is total R&D
expenditure. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that they will increase so
as to leave the ratio unaﬀected. To the extent that the explanatory variables arecorrelated with the error term, OLS estimates of their coeﬃcients will be biased.
The problem can be addressed by estimating an instrumental variable regression, provided appropriate instruments are found. The first paper to do this was
Kortum and Lerner (2000). They cleverly exploit the policy shift that occurredin the U.S. in the late 1970s, when the U.S. Department of Labor clarified the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, freeing pensions to invest in venture
capital. This led to a sharp increase in the total funds invested in venture capital,
unrelated to changes in technological opportunities. Thus it could be used as an
instrument in the estimations.
Kortum and Lerner found that, even after instrumenting, venture capital has asubstantial positive impact on innovation, as measured by the patent count at theindustry level. Their results applied to the period 1965-1992. More recently, Ueda
and Hirukawa (2008) have replicated these findings with a longer sample period,
up to 2001 (i.e. including the period of very high growth of the U.S. venture
capital industry in the late 1990s). They show that venture capital continued tohave a substantial positive impact on industry patent counts during the boom
6

See Kortum and Lerner (2000) for the theoretical underpinnings of this specification.

4

period of the late 1990s.
Ueda and Hirukawa then go on to study the impact of venture capital on diﬀerent measures of innovative performance, including total factor productivity (TFP)
growth. They find that, in contrast to the results with patent counts, venture capital does not significantly and positively aﬀect TFP growth. It seems therefore
that venture capital funding may be particularly important for one measure ofinnovative performance: patenting success.
2.2. INDIVIDUAL FIRM DATA
The findings just discussed at the industry level clearly show the need to understand how venture capital funding may aﬀect innovation. This is also crucial inthinking about implications for public policy.
However, the empirical evidence on the mechanisms whereby venture funding
impacts on innovation is limited. Hellmann and Puri (2000) examine a sampleof high-technology companies in Silicon Valley, both venture-funded and nonventure-funded. They classify companies as "innovators" or "imitators" basedon information about their initial strategy. Innovators are either creating a newmarket, or introducing a radical innovation in an existing market, or developing
a technology that will lead to either of the first two outcomes.
Hellmann and Puri report several interesting results. They find that innovators are more likely to be financed by venture capitalists than imitators. This
result could be consistent with diﬀerent possibilities though: it may be that venture capitalists have a comparative advantage in fostering innovation, throughthe provision of valuable advice for example. It may also be that venture capitalists have a comparative advantage in identifying the most promising innovative
companies.
Hellmann and Puri also find evidence that venture-backed companies, especially innovators, are faster in bringing their product to market. Again, this could
be due to helpful advice by venture capitalists, or to selection of companies withcharacteristics that are observed by the venture capitalists but not measured in
the available data, which make them more likely to bring their product to market
in a shorter time.
Some of the more recent studies of the relationship between venture funding
and innovation suggest that venture capitalists’ ability to evaluate the quality ofinnovations (patent applications) plays an important role, and that venture capitalists may help to foster growth - but not innovation. Engel and Keilbach (2007)5

analyze a panel of young German firms. They find that firms with a higher number of patent applications are more likely to receive venture funding. Once thefirms are venture-funded, they tend to grow more than comparable non-venturefirms, while their innovative performance (in terms of patent applications) does
not diﬀer significantly. Caselli, Gatti and Perrini (2006) and Peneder (2007) find asimilar result using data on Italian and Austrian firms, respectively. These studies
carefully estimate propensity scores to match venture-funded firms with otherwise
comparable non-venture firms, and thereby minimize the potential selection bias7 .
Nevertheless, the problem remains to the extent that venture-backed firms diﬀer
from the non-venture firms they are matched with in terms of unobservable characteristics (observed by the venture capitalists that finance them).
Haeussler, Harhoﬀ and Müller (2009) examine data on German and British
biotechnology firms. Their results are consistent with those of the studies justcited: firms with a higher number of patent applications obtain venture funding
sooner. The authors go on to investigate the quality of patents, measured byreceived citations, and find that firms with higher patent quality receive venture
funding more quickly. Importantly, the citations occur mostly after the venture
capital investment decision, implying that venture capitalists are highly eﬀectivein identifying high-quality innovations (patent applications). This finding willplay an important role in the theoretical analysis we develop below.
2.3. IS THERE A LINK?
Comparing the evidence from studies using firm-level and industry-level dataraises a question: why does venture funding appear to have a positive impact
on innovation at the industry level but not at the firm level? The comparison is
obviously fraught with diﬃculties, since diﬀerent studies use diﬀerent sample sizes
and data from diﬀerent countries and time periods. This is potentially important
given that the venture capital industry has developed quite diﬀerently in diﬀerent
countries.
There is also a more fundamental diﬃculty though, as suggested in the discussion above: it is very hard to address the selection issue in a completely satisfactory way with firm-level data. This would require an experiment in which
7

The propensity score methodology is also employed by Da Rin and Penas (2007). Their
paper attempts to address directly the question of how venture capital aﬀects innovation byfocusing on the determinants of absorptive capacity. They report that indeed venture capitalfavors the build-up of absorptive capacity.

6

start-up firms are randomly assigned to receive venture funding or funding fromother sources; alternatively, it would require the availability of appropriate instruments, highly correlated with venture capital investment in the firm but uncorrelated with unobservable (to the econometrician) firm characteristics which aﬀect
innovative performance.
In the absence of such solutions, could we nevertheless argue that firm-levelstudies may provide persuasive evidence against the hypothesis of a positive impact of venture capital on innovation? Theoretical analysis can shed light on thisclaim.
In the existing theoretical literature on venture capital, the main hypothesis
concerning selection has been the ex-ante screening hypothesis: venture capitalists, according to this hypothesis, are highly eﬀective in evaluating the entrepreneurs that seek funding from them, and selecting the "better" ones8 . Applied toinnovation, this hypothesis suggests that venture capitalists will select and fundthe entrepreneurs with the greatest potential for innovative success. Since the entrepreneur’s potential is not observed by the econometrician, empirical estimatesof the impact of venture funding on innovative performance will tend to be biased
upward; intuitively, some of the estimated eﬀect will be due to the entrepreneur’s
potential, which makes it more likely that he will be venture-funded and that hewill be successful in innovating.
If we could be sure that estimates will be biased upward, we might be able
to make some inferences concerning the true underlying relationships. However,more recent theoretical work suggests that, at least in some circumstances, otherinfluences may generate a downward bias. We illustrate this possibility below.
If diﬀerent and opposing biases are present at the same time, the net eﬀect is
not clear. It then becomes diﬃcult to draw inferences from reduced-form estimates obtained with firm-level data. An alternative but complementary approach
might be to exploit the full power of theoretical analysis and test a richer set ofpredictions, as suggested at the end of this chapter.
We can summarize the main findings from our brief overview of the empiricalliterature as follows. First, there is evidence of a substantial impact of venture
capital on innovation, measured by patent counts, at the industry level (at least
for the U.S.). Second, there is no corresponding evidence of a significant impactof venture capital on innovation at the individual firm level. One possible reason
8

See, for example, Brander et al. (2002), Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2006, 2007), Garmaise (2006) and Ueda (2004). Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) and Lerner (1994) provide evidenceof venture capitalists’ ex ante screening role.

7

for this diﬀerence is the diﬃculty of adequately controlling for the endogeneity ofventure capital investment at the firm level. While valid instruments have beenfound to address the endogeneity problem at the industry level, this is much harderto achieve at the level of individual firms. Third, there is very little evidence on
how venture capital aﬀects innovation. Here theoretical analysis can shed somelight, and suggest promising avenues for future empirical work. In what follows,
we focus on this possibility.

3. A SIMPLE MODEL
This section introduces a very simple model, based on Dessí (2009) and Dessí andYin (2010). The main purpose of the model is to illustrate some of the ways inwhich venture capital may aﬀect innovation.
There are two periods and three dates,  = 0 1 2. At the beginning of the first
period ( = 0), an entrepreneur with an innovative idea seeks funding to invest in
turning the idea into a valuable new product or process. At the end of the first
period ( = 1), the outcome of this investment is realized. If the investment is
successful in producing a valuable innovation, the entrepreneur can apply for apatent. At this stage, another entrepreneur may enter the industry and invest in
a competing project. During the second period, the patent application succeedswith probability . The returns from all projects are realized at the end of thesecond period ( = 2). Entrepreneurs possess no capital and need to raise financefrom outside investors. For simplicity, there is no discounting. All agents in themodel are assumed to be risk neutral and protected by limited liability.
3.1. THE INCUMBENT
The first entrepreneur, henceforth also called "the incumbent", requires an initialoutlay of value  to undertake his project. He succeeds in producing a valuable
new product or process at  = 1 with probability : we can think of this as
capturing the quality of the entrepreneur and his idea. A valuable innovation
can be patented with probability , which depends on the characteristics of the
product. For simplicity,  is assumed to take one of two values,   or   , withequal probability (      0). If the innovation is patented, the incumbent’s
project yields verifiable returns  at  = 2 with probability , and 0 otherwise,
where     0. However, if the innovation is not patented and a potential
competitor has entered the industry, the incumbent’s probability of success (high8returns) is reduced to  −   0.
For simplicity, we assume that in the absence of an innovation, the incumbent’s
returns are equal to zero.
3.2. THE ENTRANT
At  = 1, a second entrepreneur (henceforth also called the entrant or rival)
may enter the industry and invest in a competing project. The entrant’s projectrequires an initial outlay of value  . It succeeds with probability , unlessthe incumbent obtains a patent for his innovation: in this case the entrant’s
probability of success is reduced to zero. Success yields returns  while failureyields zero;     0.
3.3. INVESTORS
Entrepreneurs may seek financing from a venture capitalist, or from other investors. A venture capitalist who funds the incumbent, and interacts closely withhim during the first period, is assumed to possess enough information, expertise and industry-specific knowledge to be able to evaluate the probability that apatent application by the incumbent will be successful. Other venture capitalists,
who have not been involved in the development of the innovation during the first
period, will not have suﬃcient information, and will not be able to evaluate thisprobability correctly. Nor will other investors, even if they have funded the incumbent at the beginning, because they will not possess the necessary industry-specificknowledge and expertise.
To focus on the implications of this informational diﬀerence, we abstract fromother diﬀerences between venture capitalists and other investors, and assume thatthey are all competitive.
3.4. INFORMATION
Our key informational assumption, as mentioned above, is that the realizationof  at  = 1 is only observed by the venture capitalist that has funded theincumbent (if external finance is raised from a venture capitalist). The idea isthat firm "insiders" possess an informational advantage concerning the innovation,
which is not fully disclosed in the patent application; moreover, venture capitalists
have greater expertise and industry-specific knowledge enabling them to assess thelikelihood that an innovation will be granted a patent.
9This assumption is consistent with the findings by Haeussler, Harhoﬀ andMüller (2009), discussed in section 2, showing that venture capitalists are highly
eﬀective in identifying high-quality patent applications.
3.5. ASSUMPTIONS
We make the following assumptions throughout the analysis:(A1) 12 [(1 −   ) + (1 −   )]  This implies that in the absence of any information concerning the realizationof , the expected return from funding the entrant is negative once the incumbent
applies for patent protection for his innovation.
(A2) (1 −   )    (1 −   )
The entrant’s expected profits are strictly positive when the probability ofa patent being granted to the incumbent is low, and strictly negative when theprobability of a patent being granted to the incumbent is high.
3.6. TIME LINE
=0
=1
=2
______________________________
IncumbentInnovation?
Project returns
seeks funding.
VC observes .
realized.
If funded, invests.
Patent application?
Entry?
Patent granted or not.

4. EXTERNAL FINANCE RAISED FROM INVESTORS
We begin by examining the case where the incumbent obtains external finance toundertake his project from investors who will not observe the realization of  atthe intermediate stage ( = 1). These may be "arm’s length" investors, who do
not interact closely with the entrepreneur while he tries to develop his innovative
idea into a valuable new product or process. They may also be investors who
do interact repeatedly with the entrepreneur, and are involved in a number ofstrategic decisions in the course of this relationship, but do not have the expertiseand industry-specific knowledge required to accurately assess the probability thatthe new product or process will be granted a patent.
10In this case there is essentially symmetric information about  between the "insider" investors and other, outside investors. In particular, none of them observes
the realization of  at the intermediate stage.
By assumption (A1), nobody will be willing to fund the entrant once theincumbent has applied for a patent. Outside investors will be willing to fund theentrant, on the other hand, if the incumbent does not apply for a patent, since  (1 −   )   . The entrepreneur will therefore apply for a patent when
he develops a new product or process, and this will deter entry. Ex ante, theincumbent’s expected return from his project is given simply by: =  − 

(4.1)

5. EXTERNAL FINANCE RAISED FROM A VENTURE
CAPITALISTIn this section, we assume that the incumbent obtains the required initial funding for his project from a venture capitalist, who will interact closely with theincumbent during the first period, and have suﬃcient information, as well as thenecessary expertise and industry-specific knowledge, to assess the probability thatthe incumbent’s patent application will be successful.
At the intermediate stage ( = 1), we now have asymmetric information between the venture capitalist who has funded the incumbent, and other investors:
the former observes the realization of , while the latter do not.
From assumption (A1), as before, we know that in the absence of any information concerning the realization of , investors will not be willing to fund theentrant once the incumbent has applied for a patent. Moreover, the incumbent isbetter oﬀ applying for a patent when he develops a new product, because in theabsence of a patent application investors will always finance the entrant.
The diﬀerence with the previous section is that the venture capitalist who
has funded the incumbent now observes the realization of . When  is low(  ), the venture capitalist may be willing to fund the entrant. We assume forsimplicity that in this case the venture capitalist would extract all the surplus
from the transaction, since the entrant could not obtain funding from anothersource. Denote the surplus by  ≡ (1 −   ) −  . To ensure that the venture
capitalist funds the entrant only when this is eﬃcient, the venture capitalist canbe given a claim to the final returns from the incumbent’s project (i.e. ), in
return for a transfer  to the incumbent. This means that the venture capitalist
11

fully internalizes the costs for the incumbent’s project when he decides whether
to fund the entrant. The venture capitalist will then finance the entrant if, andonly if, the following condition holds:(1)   (1 −   ).
Ex ante, the incumbent’s expected return from his project is now given by:  =  max[  +  − (1 −   )] − 

(5.1)

which will be higher than the expected return when financing is raised fromother investors if condition (1) holds.
We can define the threshold value ∗  as the value of  for which   = 0,
and the threshold value ∗ as the value of  for which  = 0. These are thethreshold values for  below which entrepreneurs will not be able to obtain funding
for their projects from venture capitalists and from other investors, respectively.
Clearly if condition (1) holds, ∗   ∗ ; otherwise, ∗  = ∗ .

6. THEORY AND EVIDENCE
In spite of being highly simplified and stylized, the model analyzed above alreadyyields some insights9 .
As we have just seen, venture capitalists, after funding an entrepreneur withan innovative idea, may be able to extract surplus from potential entrants at
a subsequent stage, exploiting the informational advantage gained through closeinteraction with the first entrepreneur. Ex ante, this can make it possible to obtainfunding for innovative projects that would not be financed by other investors: inthe model, this will be the case if    0   .
There are then two eﬀects on innovation: a direct eﬀect on the number ofinnovative projects that are undertaken, and an indirect eﬀect on the average
quality of funded projects. The first eﬀect is obviously positive; it is analogous
to the eﬀect of monitoring by venture capitalists (as in, for example, Holmström
and Tirole (1997)), in the sense that it relaxes firms’ financing constraint, albeit
for a quite diﬀerent reason.
The second eﬀect can be seen by noting that ∗   ∗ . Thus ceteris paribus
the average quality of projects, as measured by the probability of innovation ,
will be lower among venture-backed entrepreneurs than among those funded byother investors. Obviously this eﬀect is due to the assumption that  is perfectly
9

For a richer model and analysis, see Dessi and Yin (2010).

12

observed by venture capitalists and other investors alike. Nevertheless, it illustrates in a simple way the point made at the end of section 2, that the endogeneityof venture capital funding can be due to a variety of reasons (not just the screening
hypothesis), and the nature of the resulting bias in empirical estimates cannot be
predicted with confidence.
The model analyzed in the previous section is very simple in many respects, andfurther insights can be gained by relaxing some of the assumptions. For example,
the probability of developing a valuable new product is assumed to be exogenous:
it does not depend on the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. One consequence of this is thatthe projects that are funded when    0   would not be worth funding
without the possibility of extracting surplus from potential entrants. However,once the model is extended to allow for the need to induce the entrepreneur
to provide eﬀort, it will typically be the case that the entrepreneur will earnsome rents, reducing the returns that can be earned by outside investors, so thatsome projects that would be worth funding cannot obtain outside financing. In
this case, the venture capitalist’s ability to extract surplus (informational rents)from potential entrants can make it possible to undertake projects that would
be profitable even on a stand-alone basis, but would be denied funding (Dessí(2009)).
Moreover, and for the same reason, venture funding may make it possible
to give more high-powered incentives to the entrepreneur (since the expectedsurplus from new entrants relaxes the venture capitalist’s participation constraint),
increasing his eﬀort (Dessí (2009)), and hence the probability of developing avaluable new product or process.

7. CONCLUSIONSThe existing empirical literature has shown considerable ingenuity in addressing
the challenges of establishing and quantifying a causal relationship between venture capital and innovation. There remains plenty of scope, on the other hand,for further work shedding light on the precise mechanisms through which venture
capital fosters innovation. In this chapter, we have argued, using a simple model
to illustrate our point, that a close interaction between theoretical and empiricalanalysis oﬀers a promising avenue for future research. For example, our model
suggests that the link between venture funding and innovative performance at thelevel of the individual firm may depend on the potential for surplus extraction
from other firms, and hence on industry characteristics and structure. It would13

be interesting to explore this empirically in future work.
The theoretical analysis could be extended in a number of directions: for example, allowing for exit decisions. The allocation of control rights has been shown to
be important for exit decisions (Cumming (2008), Dessí (2005), Hellmann (2006)),
and the design of optimal contracts for innovative entrepreneurs in the presenceof exit decisions as well as potential entry by competing firms deserves further
study. Empirically, much work also remains to be done to investigate the relationship between the form of contracts used by venture capitalists (e.g. control
rights, staging, syndication) and innovation.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the limitations of the simple analysis presented
in this chapter. For example, we have focused primarily on the role of private,
limited partnership venture capital funds, with no strategic or public interest ininnovation per se. The role of corporate and government venture capital has beenstudied elsewhere (see Gompers and Lerner (2004)), and represents an importantpart of the link between venture capital and innovation.

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17

Table 1
AuthorSample Description
Kortum and Lerner 20 U.S. manufacturing(2000)
industries between 1965
and 1992

Data Source
Method of Analysis
Industry patent counts are based on the IV estimation which exploits the policy
International Patent Classification
shift of US freeing pension to invest in
venture capital in 1979 ; alternative
assigned to each patent issued by
USPTO; Venture funding collected by method is using R&D as controls to
Venture Economics; Industrial R&D disentangle the endogeneity problem.
expenditures collected by USF

Ueda and
Hirukawa (2008)

Venture Economics proprietarydatabase(VentureXpert), the NBER
productivity Database, the NBER
Patent database, and the NSF R&D
database.

19 U.S. manufacturingindustries from 1965 to2001

Summary of Findings
The impact of venture capital on technologicalinnovation is positive and significant, which is
3 times as potent as the corporate R&D andaccounts for 8% of industrial innovations in thedecade ending in 1992.

Similar methods as in Kortum and Lerner The regressions for patent counts confirm the(2000)(KL) adopted to re-examine thefindings of KL with bigger coefficients. But
results of KL in a extended period;
there is no significant impact of venture capital
Alternatively, utilizing total factor
on TFP growth; Although the impact of VC on
productivity (TFP) growth and labor
labor productivity growth is positive andproductivity growth as measures ofsignificant however, it is driven by
innovation.
substitutions of input factors away from labor.

Hellman and Puri 173 start-up companies that A uniquely hand-collected dataset built Probit model to examine the likelihood of Innovators are more likely to be financed by(2000)
are located in California's upon surveys, interviews anda company receiving venture capital
venture capital than are imitators. And
Silicon Valley, which iscommercial databases, as well as any financing; Cox proportional hazard model innovators obtain venture capital earlier in theculled from two database publicly available information
to explore whether the product strategy life cycle than do imitators. Venture-based
and the Silicon Valley
affects the time to receiving VC andcompanies, especially innovators are faster inbusiness press
whether the VC financing affects the time bringing their product to market.
to market.
Engel andKeilbach (2007)

Propensity score matching procedure to Firms with higher patent applications and
All German firms starts-up A dataset which merged ZEWalleviate selection bias which arises from higher educated management have a larger
Foundation panels provided by
between1995 and 1998,
probability of being venture funed. And
Creditreform (the largest German creditthe extensive pre-investment screening
including 50754 nonventure-based firms display a higher growth
venture funded firms and rating agency) with information from process of VC.
rate than the comparable non venture-funded
274 venture funded firms. other sources, including DPA patentfirms, however, their innovative performance
application data.
doesn't show significant difference.

Table 1(Continued)
AuthorCaselli, Gatti andPerrini (2008)

Sample Description
153 Italian IPOs firms
between1995 and 2004,
including 37 venturefunded firms and 116 nonventure-funded firms.

Peneder (2010)

250,000 Austrian
Database collected by Austrian Private A two-stage propensity score matching.
companies including 166 Equity and Venture Capital
venture funded companies. Organization (AVCO) combined withfirm database provided by the leading
Austrian credit rating agency and acomprehensive entreprise survey.

Haeussler, Harhoff 190 German and British
and Muller (2009) biotechnology companies
founded after 1989; 87 ofthem are VC-financed and103 of them are non VCfinanced.

Data Source
Method of Analysis
Summary of Findings
A self-collected dataset based on the Similar methods as in Engel and Keilbach The entry of venture capital into the company
information provided by Italian(2007).
does not promote continued innovation, but
Association of VC and PE operators,
mainly develops the sales.
VC-funded companies and the Italian
Trademark and Patents Office.

Questionare surveys; face-to-face
Cox proportional hazard model tointerviews with companies; and official investigate how patent related variables
patent reports from European Patent influence the hazard of obtaining VC
Office(EPO).
financing.

Da Rin and Penas 7808 Netherland portfolio CIS survey data covering 1998-2004;(2007)
companies;91 of them are VentureXpert; PATSTAT database
VC-financed; 7717 of them developed by OECD and EPO.
are non VC-financed.

VC-backed firms are constrained to obtainfinancing through traditional channels. VCbacked firms are more innovative which isprove to be a pure selection effects. And theygrow faster in term of turnover andemployment which encompass both causal
effects and selection effects.
Signals generated in patenting process increase
VC financing and attract VC faster. Companies
with higher quality of patent (measured in
citation) receive VC faster, while patentindicators generated by patent examiner has
weak effects on VC financing which indicatesthat VCs are capable of detecting high-quality
patent applications at the early stage.

Probit model to examine the relationship Venture capital favors the build-up ofabsorptive capacity and results in a more
between VC and innovation strategies;
furthermore, propensity score method to permanent in-house R&D efforts. While thedistinguish treatment effect from selection public funding relaxes the financial constraints,
but does not lead to a build-up absorptive
effect.
capacity.