March 2023 | issue 28

Strategic Security Analysis

Recipe for Success: Israeli and Lebanese
Analytical Perspectives on the Maritime
Delimitation Negotiations
Eastern Mediterranean Initiative

www.gcsp.ch

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONSThe Geneva Centre for Security Policy
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international foundation
serving a global community of organisations and individuals. The Centre’s
mission is to advance peace, security, and international cooperation by
providing the knowledge, skills, and network for effective and inclusive
decision-making through executive education, diplomatic dialogue,
research, and policy advice.

Strategic Security Analyses
The GCSP Strategic Security Analyses series publishes short papers
that address a current security issue. These papers provide backgroundinformation about the theme, identify the main issues and challenges,
and propose policy recommendations.

About the authors
The paper draws on analyses made by experts from Israel and Lebanonin the context of the Eastern Mediterranean Initiative (EMI), a dialogue
platform that brings together non-governmental experts from around theEastern Mediterranean region.
Through its Diplomatic Dialogue activities, the Geneva Centre for Security
Policy (GCSP) provides substantive and logistical support to the EMI andacts as its secretariat. For more information, visit
https://www.gcsp.ch/diplomatic-dialogue.

ISBN: 978-2-88947-314-4© Geneva Centre for Security Policy, March 2023
The views, information, and opinions expressed in this publication are
the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the GCSP or themembers of its Foundation Council. The GCSP is not responsible for theaccuracy of the information.
Cover photo: esfera, Shutterstock.com

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

Key points•	The Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary agreement is not a direct
agreement between the two countries, but rather two separate
agreements with the United States.
•	It is unique: the first such agreement reached between countries
with no diplomatic relations, the first between adjacent states inthe Eastern Mediterranean, and the first in the region to be resolved
through indirect negotiations facilitated by a mediator.
•	A confluence of domestic and geopolitical events contributed to thesigning of the agreement, including elections in Israel, the deteriorationof Lebanon’s economy and the country’s descent into political crisis,
and the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the global
energy market.
•	Effective mediation between parties was more important than the
degree of trust the parties had in the mediator or the mediator’s
relative neutrality on the issue. The United States was not an unbiased
mediator, but because of its own incentives to deliver an agreement
and its leverage over both parties it was the only possible one.
•	International oil and gas companies influenced the negotiations, but
did not directly participate in them. Due to their vested interest in
securing their existing or prospective investments, they used public
communications and discrete engagements with the Israeli and
Lebanese governments to encourage a deal.
•	This agreement could serve as a model for other maritime disputes bydemonstrating at least two things. Firstly, solutions can be achieved
when parties delink their maritime negotiations from the core issues
in their bilateral relationship. Secondly, if two sides are committed toreaching an agreement, the international law of the sea is sufficiently
flexible for them to find a solution, even when one party is a signatoryof the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the other is not.

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONSIntroduction
On 11 October 2022 Israel and Lebanon reached a historic agreement todelimit the two countries’ territorial seas and exclusive economic zones(EEZs)1 in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

It is the firstmaritimeboundary
agreementreached between
countries thathave no diplomatic
relations – asituation that
continues, despite
the agreement.

The agreement is consequential for several reasons. Firstly, it is the firstmaritime boundary agreement reached between countries that have no
diplomatic relations – a situation that continues, despite the agreement.
Secondly, it is also the first maritime delimitation agreed between
adjacent states in the Eastern Mediterranean; previous delimitationagreements in the region involved opposite states.2 Lastly, it is the firstmaritime boundary dispute in the region to be resolved through indirect
negotiations facilitated by a mediator. The maritime boundary deal is nota direct agreement between Israel and Lebanon, but rather two separate
agreements with the United States3.
This Strategic Security Analysis, which surveys the context, process,and implications of the maritime boundary deal, draws on analyses
made by experts from Israel and Lebanon in the context of the Eastern
Mediterranean Initiative, an inclusive dialogue platform consisting ofexperts from around the region supported by the Geneva Centre for
Security Policy.

Background to and genesis of thenegotiation process
Since the late 1990s many efforts have been made to define themaritime boundaries of the Eastern Mediterranean in order to explore
for and exploit the region’s offshore resources. In 1999 and 2004 theIsrael Planning Administration outlined legal policies and plans foroffshore exploration for gas and oil. Small-scale production began in
2004, but explorations in 2009 and 2010 by Noble Energy and the Delek
Group revealed two major gas fields – named Tamar and Leviathan– that transformed Israel’s energy outlook from energy importerto potential energy exporter. This development impacted Israel’s
domestic and regional energy policies. It also incentivised Israel todelineate its maritime boundaries so as to maximise future offshore
exploration. In 2010 Israel and Cyprus reached an EEZ agreement on
their common maritime boundary, and in 2011 Israel submitted its
proposed northern maritime boundary to the United Nations (UN), which
was commonly known as “Line 1” (see Map 1). It also secured exportagreements with Egypt and Jordan. These processes benefitted Israel
diplomatically, enabling it to be among the deciding voices in the Eastern
Mediterranean’s new regional architecture.
Lebanon also endeavoured to become a gas-producing country. Pushed
by neighbouring Cyprus, which wanted to delimit its EEZ in order toattract international oil and gas companies to explore in its waters,
Beirut and Nicosia reached a maritime boundary agreement in 2007, but
the Lebanese parliament never ratified the agreement. When Israel and
Cyprus reached a maritime boundary agreement using the coordinatesfrom the Lebanon-Cyprus EEZ agreement, using Point 14 as the starting
point to demarcate their boundary, Lebanon, which was not a party
to the Cyprus-Israel negotiations, was in the process of revising its
methodology for maritime delimitation and objected to the conclusions– and most importantly the boundary lines – contained in the CyprusIsrael agreement. Lebanon identified its maritime border as lying south

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

of Line 1, which was to become known as “Line 23” (see Map 1), and the
Lebanese government sent the coordinates to the UN in 2011. The resultof these events produced 860 square kilometres of disputed maritime
territory between Israel and Lebanon.

Map 1: The Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary

Several factors,
including
Lebanon’s
economic collapse,
the coronavirus
pandemic, andconcerns over
how Israel would
respond tosuch unilateral
action, delayeddevelopments in
Block 9.

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Source: Middle East Economic Survey (MEES)

Frustrated that this dispute might prevent future exploration, Lebanese
officials turned to the United States in 2012 in the hope that Washington
would be able to broker an agreement. However, this process – led byFrederic Hof – failed to produce an accord. For its part, Israel refrained
from issuing tenders in the disputed area out of the belief that the parties
would inevitably return to the negotiating table and a desire to reduce
potential tensions. Lebanon decided to proceed unilaterally, continuingwith identifying its offshore blocks, which were divided into ten parts;
resuming its preparation of the legal and technical documents necessary
to launch the first round of bidding; and establishing the LebanesePetroleum Administration as the regulator of the sector. Israel filed official
complaints to the UN about these activities.
During the ensuing decade no offshore discoveries were made in
Lebanon’s waters. Beirut launched its first bid in 2013, but due to multiple
political deadlocks it was unable to finalise the bid until 2018. Only one
consortium of three companies (Total, Eni and Novatek) applied, and won
two blocks. In April 2020 Total undertook its first exploratory drilling inBlock 4, located north of Beirut, but the well was dry6. Total also planned
to drill in Block 9, of which a small percentage of the space overlaps
the disputed zone with Israel. But several factors, including Lebanon’s
economic collapse, the coronavirus pandemic, and concerns over how
Israel would respond to such unilateral action, delayed developments
in Block 9. The second licensing round was postponed four times.
Although Lebanese officials were eager for the country to discoveroffshore resources, its energy sector lagged behind those of its Eastern
Mediterranean neighbours, and continues to do so.

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

Why the deal was madeThe Israeli context

With parliamentaryelections being
held in Israel andindirect presidential
elections in
Lebanon, theconditions seemedcrucial for theparties to makethe necessary
concessions toachieve an accord.

Several internal and external factors encouraged Israel to resume themaritime boundary negotiations with Lebanon. Firstly, Israel’s national
security establishment quietly pushed for a deal. Since October
2019, when economic protests first swept across Lebanon, Israeli
officials openly expressed concern that the worsening situation in theneighbouring country could negatively impact Israel’s core security
interests. This concern only increased following the August 2020 Beirut
port explosion7, and remained a central position among those who
advocated for a maritime boundary deal with Lebanon. These fears wererealised in July 2022, when Hezbollah sent multiple drones towards the
Karish field8, located near the disputed maritime zone. Although mostIsraelis assumed that a conflict with Hezbollah was a matter of when it
would occur, not if, the prospect of a violent conflict affirmed the positionof the camp advocating for an agreement and increased this camp’s
visibility among the Israeli public and policymakers.
Secondly, Israeli officials were influenced by changes in the global
energy market. The global shift away from fossil fuels accelerated thetimetable for extracting natural gas, incentivising Lebanon to strike adeal. At the same time, Europe’s need to wean itself off Russian fossil
fuels in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict presented a new incentive tocompromise for the sake of meeting Europe’s short-term and mediumterm energy needs. US officials similarly identified Eastern Mediterraneanhydrocarbons as one of several sources that could resolve Europe’s
energy crisis.
Lastly, domestic and commercial incentives were also factors. With
parliamentary elections being held in Israel9 and indirect presidential
elections in Lebanon10, the conditions seemed crucial for the parties tomake the necessary concessions to achieve an accord.

The Lebanese context
Various internal and external factors helped to reanimate Lebanon’smaritime boundary negotiations with Israel.
Two internal factors propelled Lebanon to enter negotiations: thecountry’s political and economic situation. Lebanon’s political class was indisarray, losing its previous control over the country. On several occasions
between 2019 and 2022 hundreds of thousands of Lebanese citizens
took to the streets demanding reforms, social justice, improvements
to their economic well-being and a change in the political system. US
sanctions were clamping down on high-ranking officials. The Beirut port
blast damaged or destroyed thousands of buildings across a broad swathof the capital, leaving more than 200 people dead, over 7,000 injured
and an estimated 300,000 homeless, and causing approximately US$15
billion in property damage11 12. Lebanon’s political class needed to act, andthe maritime boundary dispute was one area where the United States
would be ready to listen. More than anything else, however, pushing thenegotiations forward was an act of survival.
Over the course of the negotiation process the priorities of Lebanon’s
political class shifted from political to economic interests. With thecontinued collapse of the economy and pressure from the international
community to enact reforms that would go against the interests ofthe political class, a maritime boundary agreement would potentiallyreopen the doors to natural gas development. If Lebanon’s political class6

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

managed to secure a commitment from Total and the United Statesthat exploration activities would start in Block 9 immediately following
the signing of an agreement, it could start a chain reaction that would
support Lebanon’s position vis-à-vis the International Monetary Fund, towhich the country had to apply for loans to support its failing economy13.
If Total made a discovery worthy of exploitation, this would potentiallydeliver stability, fresh flows of foreign currency, and the start of Lebanon’s
economic recovery – all with limited pain for the country’s political class.
US, French and Israeli enthusiasm to strike an agreement reinforced theinternal factors at work in Lebanon.

The negotiation process
The only way forboth parties toresolve the dispute
over the maritime
boundary
was throughmediation.

The only way for both parties to resolve the dispute over the maritime
boundary was through mediation.
Israel naturally preferred direct negotiations, which in its view could
clarify disagreements and effectively bridge differences of opinion.
In addition, direct negotiations could help to build trust between thenegotiating parties as they advanced towards an agreement. But because
Lebanon did not recognise the State of Israel, direct negotiations were
never a realistic option.
Although Lebanon preferred the involvement of the UN, Beirut realised
quite quickly that the international organisation lacked the influencenecessary to bring Israel to the negotiating table. Israel ruled out UNled negotiations because it saw the international body as a biased entitythat lacked sufficient influence to see complicated negotiation processes
through. Both parties eventually agreed that negotiations needed tobe mediated by an actor other than the UN, but that the internationalorganisation – and more importantly, the international law of the sea asreflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which
Lebanon is a signatory, but Israel is not – provided a framework throughwhich an agreement could be approved. The UN also provided space at
Naqoura for indirect talks to take place14.
The United States was the only potential mediator that was seriously
considered. Israel had an understandable trust in the United States, while
Lebanon saw it as the only actor capable of pressuring Israel. From the
Lebanese perspective, therefore, the United States had the potential tobe an effective and acceptable mediator, even if it favoured Israel.
US mediation efforts should be divided into two main periods: one
designed to renew the negotiation process between the two sides, andthe other that focused on the substance of the negotiations to achieve anagreement. The US officials tasked with managing this file affected eachof these periods.
Two US mediators – Frederic Hof and Amos Hochstein – stood out more thanthe others. Hof's mediation efforts between 2010 and 2012 had a profound
impact on the negotiation process by setting the bar for subsequent
negotiations. While his efforts did not produce an agreement, all futurenegotiations were centred on the legitimacy of the process he administeredand the so-called “Hof Line”, which allocated 55% of the 860 square
kilometres disputed zone to Lebanon and the remaining 45% to Israel15.
Hochstein twice led the negotiations. His first effort, during the Obamaadministration, failed to bring the sides together, but familiarised him
with the Lebanese political class and helped him to understand Lebanon’s
need to address its domestic energy issues. But his second attempt,

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

under the Biden administration, proved more fruitful, successfully
steering the domestic politics of both sides while also managing thenegotiation process.

The role of international oil and gas companies
Negotiations between Israel and Lebanon did not happen in a vacuum.
International oil and gas companies, chiefly Energean and Total, actively
influenced the process from outside the negotiating table. Energean,
which was developing the Karish field, encouraged a settlement thatwould ensure the security of its investments. The company was undersignificant pressure when negotiations were relaunched under Hochstein,
and the Lebanese team presented a maximalist approach that claimed
territory beyond the disputed area and put the Karish field into a “greyzone”. Later the Lebanese team changed tactics from claiming the Karish
field to presenting a “Karish field for Qana field” ultimatum.

International oil
and gas companies
actively influenced
the processfrom outside thenegotiating table.

Energean stayed quiet during the first phase of the negotiations,publishing press releases on its plans to construct a floating production,
storage, and offloading (FPSO) facility and announcements that theinaugural extraction was going according to schedule. Even when thesituation escalated in June and July 2022 with the arrival of the FPSO unit
at the site, Energean consistently distanced itself from the negotiations.
As Hezbollah’s threats intensified, however, Energean changed its tactics,
delivering regular communications on its progress at the Karish field,
while reiterating that the technical tests were not real production in order
to assuage Lebanese concerns. Just days before the deal was announced,
Energean released a statement regarding a new offshore discovery justsouth of the Karish field16, indirectly reminding the Israeli government of
the economic opportunities at stake.
In contrast, Total made it clear to the Lebanese officials that it was
not prepared to begin offshore explorations prior to the completion ofnegotiations, a position that placed tremendous pressure on the Lebanesenegotiating team to find a solution. Later, Lebanon wanted guarantees
that Total would start exploration once the deal was concluded. It needed
Total’s approval of some terms related to the exploration of the prospect– mainly vis-à-vis the company’s responsibility to financially compensate
Israel if a percentage of the Qana field or any future discoveries crossed
into the Israeli EEZ. Total did not act alone, however, and was encouragedby the French government.
In summary, without Energean’s and Total’s external involvement in theprocess, it is possible that a deal would not have been reached.

The mediator’s interests
US mediation was a core component of the negotiation process and theUnited States was the only mediator that was seriously considered byboth Israel and Lebanon. This is not to say that the United States did
not have its own set of interests and incentives to reach a deal. Without
these interests, it is unlikely that the US officials who acted as mediators
would have been directed to engage the parties over the course of an
entire decade and three different US administrations.
US interests in resolving the Israel-Lebanon dispute over the past decade
included a desire to (1) reduce tensions between Israel and its neighbours;(2) defuse a potential security threat posed by Hezbollah; (3) contribute toincreased regional stability and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean;(4) support Israel’s interests in exporting its natural gas; (5) undermine
Iran’s influence in Lebanon; and (6) strengthen US allies during the war in
Ukraine and find new energy sources for Europe17.

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

Substance of the talks
Israeli perspective

The unique
circumstancesin which thenegotiations
took place – while
Lebanon was facing
unprecedented
economic andpolitical crises –were seen in Israel
as a potential
opportunity to help
stabilise Lebanon.

As far as Israel is concerned, national security interests always takeprecedence. This principle also applies to the maritime boundary disputewith Lebanon, a country with which Israel has a long history of distrustand conflict. From an Israeli perspective, Lebanon is a failed state
where Hezbollah dictates the country’s domestic politics, and conflict
between Israel and Hezbollah is inevitable. Because of this perspective,
many Israelis saw the chance to defuse tensions and avoid a possible
escalation as serving their country’s national security interests. The
unique circumstances in which the negotiations took place – while
Lebanon was facing unprecedented economic and political crises – wereseen in Israel as a potential opportunity to help stabilise Lebanon. Israel’s
economic interests were important, specifically with regard to securing
the country's share in future gas discoveries, but were secondary to its
national security interests.
Israel viewed the possible agreement as an important achievement:
establishing a mutually agreed-upon maritime boundary could stabilise
the fraught relationship between the two countries. The possibilityof normalising relations with an enemy country such as Lebanon did
hover in the background, but it did not occupy a central place in Israeli
thinking and calculations towards reaching an agreement. Instead,
Israel saw an agreement as a way of committing Lebanon to the Eastern
Mediterranean’s rapidly developing regional energy landscape and, in theevent that gas was found, contributing to the region’s relative commercial
and geopolitical value.

Lebanese perspective
The Lebanese negotiating team entered the negotiations with differencesin opinions and positions among the political class that were soon
publicly revealed. The team insisted that Line 23 was arbitrary and lacked
any methodological foundation. They demanded that Line 29 should be
the maritime boundary between the Israeli and Lebanese EEZs (see Map1), which relied on the methodology developed through the case lawof international courts and tribunals. This methodology uses a threestage approach of (1) drawing an equidistant line;18 (2) looking for special
circumstances to justify any changes to this initial line; and (3) checking
for any disproportionate effects in the line that is finally drawn.19 Basedon this methodology, Lebanon had the right to claim an additional areaof 1,430 square kilometres beyond the contested 860 square kilometres.
The Lebanese team argued that the starting point for the maritime
boundary should be Ras El Naqoura, and that the Tekhelet Rock near the
Israeli shoreline should not be taken into consideration because of its
disproportionate effect. Israel and the United States rejected both points.
Not everyone in Lebanon agreed with the negotiation team’s strategy, andthe negotiations shifted from the Lebanese and Israeli representatives toan internal negotiation among the Lebanese themselves. This domestic
dispute – between various camps in the Lebanese political class –continued from December 2020 to February 2022. Over this period theLine 29 position lost support and was eventually shelved.
The negotiations moved from a legally based approach to a more
pragmatic economic one. The political class focused on saving the
Qana prospect after President Aoun rejected Lebanon’s maximalist
position. The discussion inside Lebanon shifted to oil and gas and the9

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

need to find creative solutions to finalise a maritime deal that would
allow Lebanon to exploit its potential gas resources. It was no longer
about rights, methodologies, mismanagement and political deals. The
Lebanese officials in charge of the negotiations pivoted from focusing on
international law and maritime delimitations to emphasising the economic
gains of a potential agreement. It no longer mattered what UNCLOS said:
what mattered for the Lebanese officials was a deal that would allow thecountry to start exploration in its EEZ.

An internal orexternal crisis canbe conducive toreaching a final
settlement andto encouraging
concessions. Bothsides saw avoiding
an escalationof these crises
as an incentivethat served theirinterests.

Basically, the negotiations were one way to advance Lebanon’shydrocarbon agenda. In light of the crises facing the country, this soon
became a necessity, and the Lebanese officials were therefore more open
to creative solutions, which meant more actors, mainly the internationaloil companies with interests in the region, had to be involved in thenegotiations. Having a mediator like Hochstein, who had the confidence ofthe White House and had previously worked in the energy industry, was ofadded benefit to the process.

Key lessons learned from the process
Timing/window of opportunity
Factors such as elections in Israel and the war in Ukraine created a
confluence of events that supported the efforts of Israeli and Lebanese
officials to reach an agreement. The last phase of negotiations waslaunched when the Lebanese economy was at its lowest ebb and the
Lebanese political class was desperate for a lifeline. Lebanon’s diresituation presented an opportunity that was seized on by the UnitedStates and Israel, and also by the decision-makers in Lebanon, as away out of a severe crisis. The crisis involving the drones that Hezbollah
launched towards the Karish gas field in July 2022 was also an incentive(or an excuse) for Israel to agree to concessions. Thus, an internal orexternal crisis can be conducive to reaching a final settlement and toencouraging concessions. Both sides saw avoiding an escalation of thesecrises as an incentive that served their interests.

Public opinion
In the Lebanese case, public opinion was part of the negotiation process.
The media extensively covered every technical round; experts and nonexperts alike had a say in the negotiation tactics and approach. The issue
therefore became a matter of public discussion and scrutiny.
By contrast, public opinion played a minimal role in Israel. More attention
was drawn towards the process during the incident of the Hezbollah
drone attack, because it was seen as a national security issue. Interest
also picked up as negotiations reached their conclusion during an Israeli
election cycle where opposing political parties tried to utilise the event toserve their agendas. Only once the agreement was signed did the Israeli
government present its full case to the public.

Role of the mediator
It would have been impossible for Israel and Lebanon to hold direct
negotiations. Other legal options, such as international arbitration, werealso not realistic. As explained above, both parties saw indirect negotiations
through a mediator as the only possible path forward. The choice of themediator was also a crucial factor in the negotiation process. Even though
the Lebanese complained of US bias towards Israel, they called on the
United States to be the mediator because they knew that Washington
possessed leverage over both sides and could deliver an accord.

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONSThe effectiveness of the mediation between the parties can arguably
be more important than the relative degree of trust they have in the
mediator or his/her persona. During the process different US mediators
took the lead, so ultimately a resolution of the dispute may have had lessto do with “who” was conducting the negotiations than with the timing
and intensity of the negotiations, and the maturity of the parties in termsof their willingness to accept a mediated process and reach a resolution
over the existing alternatives. The lesson is that one does not have to findthe perfect unbiased, neutral and objective mediator for a negotiation
process to be successful. Often it is the mediator with both incentives
and interests who can be the most effective.

Beyond delimitation

Natural resource
discoveries in
disputed zones
can lead tosolutions and notnecessarily toescalation or war.

Each party entered into the negotiations with different incentives,
but with the same objective: to resolve the dispute. Lebanon wanted
economic gains and a political success; Israel wanted stability andsecurity on its northern border; and the United States wanted a
diplomatic achievement that would support its wider strategic goals. All
the incentives were met in this agreement. To fulfil their respective needs
the sides did not have to fully agree about the precise technicalities ofthe boundary delimitation process. Instead, they found a creative formulathat both focused on resource swapping and incorporated the interests ofinternational oil companies (IOCs). Especially if one or both sides have aproblem in even recognising the legitimacy of the opposite party, the useof intermediaries such as IOCs can be useful in negotiations of this kind.

Negotiating resources
Halfway through the negotiations the discussions moved from thetechnicalities of maritime boundary delimitation to resource swapping.
The focus for Lebanon was its ability to exploit its resources beyond
the lines and boundaries that were discussed. However, this approachpresented risks because the existence of the resources had not been
confirmed (Karish is a proven field and is about to start production; gas
has yet to be discovered in the Qana field). There is a debate among
energy experts as to how much retrievable offshore natural gas canpotentially be found in Lebanon’s waters. But the assumption that there
is sufficient gas to make further exploration worth pursuing – and thata resolution of the maritime dispute is the only way to encourage IOCs
to explore for and develop these assets – contributed to the completionof negotiations. Unproven reserves were seen as an opportunity andcreated the perception that an agreement would create a win-win
situation. However, expectations must be managed in the future to avoid
misunderstandings and further crises.
An important lesson can be drawn from this experience: that natural
resource discoveries in disputed zones can lead to solutions and notnecessarily to escalation or war. At the same time, creative formulas also
have their weaknesses, because they are less straightforward and havemore loopholes. In this case, the role of the third player – a mediator orother trusted interlocutor – is crucial.

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONSRegional implications
Can these conditions be replicated elsewhere in the Eastern
Mediterranean? Early signs suggest that the Israel-Lebanon agreement
has encouraged some regional actors to thaw their own frozen
negotiations. Lebanon and Syria reportedly attempted (but failed) torestart negotiations on their maritime boundary dispute20. Turkey hailed
the agreement, suggesting that it could serve as an example for the
maritime disputes surrounding the island of Cyprus21. Egypt, Israel and thePalestinian Authority are also trying to advance talks on developing thelong-ignored Gaza Marine field22, while Israel and Cyprus have promised toresolve their outstanding issues over the Aphrodite-Yishai field23.

Israel’s andLebanon’s
achievement
resided in delinking
the core issues
in their bilateralrelationship fromthe potential
solutions to theparticular maritime
boundary dispute.

Israel’s and Lebanon’s achievement resided in delinking the core
issues in their bilateral relationship from the potential solutions to theparticular maritime boundary dispute. In doing so the parties founda creative formula that did not address their core issues or advancethe sides towards the wider normalisation of their relationship, but
was enough to resolve their differences on one issue. This served thecomplementary interests of both sides, chiefly to advance their respectiveenergy interests.
Another point that is instructive to other regional actors is the roleof the international law of the sea. Israel and Lebanon reached anagreement once the focus was on finding solutions rather than using
the international law of the sea as a way of legitimising one side’s claim
against the other’s. Provided that the two sides are interested in reachingan agreement, the international law of the sea is flexible enough for any
two parties – even those who do not officially recognise each other,like Israel and Lebanon – to find a creative solution that is mutuallyagreeable, including when one party is a signatory of UNCLOS and theother is not.
The Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary agreement suggests that the rightbalance of timing, compatible interests and an appropriately invested
mediator can yield a breakthrough. Resolving maritime disputes is not
only about extracting resources, but also about removing sources ofconflict and gradually developing trust between aggrieved parties. Even
if the hydrocarbon age is slowly coming to an end, there are multiple
reasons why the United States, the European Union, and Eastern
Mediterranean states should pursue similar types of maritime agreementsin the future.

Conclusion
The Israel-Lebanon agreement is a unique – but potentially replicable– example of how a committed, mediated process between two parties
found a creative solution that addressed a common issue without
resolving the entirety of their bilateral disputes. The insights gainedby examining both the process of mediated negotiations between
2010 and 2022 and the terms of the agreement itself should provide
a roadmap for future maritime delimitation negotiations in both theregion and elsewhere. Identifying the right balance of timing, compatible
interests, and invested mediator proved to make the difference for Israel
and Lebanon – but most of all the key factor was the two countries’
readiness to delink their historical grievances from what was ultimately
a commercially driven set of interests that served both parties – andpotentially averted future escalation and regional conflict.

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

Endnotes
1

2

3

The international law of the sea divides the sea into several maritime
jurisdictional zones – among which the territorial sea and the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) – in which States have different rights andobligations. The territorial sea is a strip of sea that extends up to 12
nautical miles from the coastal baseline. The coastal State generally enjoys
full sovereignty in its territorial sea. The EEZ is a maritime zone extending
up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal State's baseline, within which theState has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, and manage the natural
resources found in the water column, on the seafloor, and in the subsoil.
These resources may include fish stocks, oil and gas reserves, and minerals.
While Part V of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea establishes the
specific legal regime of the EEZ, several of its provisions are considered
to be part of customary international law, as was confirmed in a 1985
Judgment of the International Court of Justice (“The exclusive economiczone” in R. Churchill et al. (2022) The law of the sea. Fourth edition,
Manchester University Press, pp. 253-299).
Adjacent coasts are “coasts lying either side of the land boundary between
two adjoining States”, while “opposite coasts [is] the geographicalrelationship of the coasts of two States facing each other. Maritime zones
of States having opposite coasts may require boundary delimitation to
avoid overlap” (DOALOS – UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the
Sea (2000) Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, New York,
United Nations, p. 146, 157).
For a legal analysis of the contents of the agreement, see C. Yiallourides
et al. (2022) “Some Observations on the Agreement between Lebanon and
Israel on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone”, British Instituteof International and Comparative Law, 26 October, https://www.biicl.org/
blog/47/some-observations-on-the-agreement-between-lebanon-andisrael-on-the-delimitation-of-the-exclusive-economic-zone?cookiesset=1&ts=1676996316.

4 Point 1 is the southernmost point of the 2007 Cyprus-Lebanon EEZ
delimitation agreement (C. Yiallourides et al., 2022).
5

P. Stevenson (2022), “Israel & Lebanon Strike ‘Historic’ Maritime BorderDeal”, Middle East Economic Survey, 14 October, https://www.mees.
com/2022/10/14/geopolitical-risk/israel-lebanon-strike-historic-maritimeborder-deal/d967c670-4bba-11ed-89f2-8dcc67b9879e.

6

Oil & Gas Journal (2020), ”Total comes up dry on Block 4, offshore
Lebanon”, 29 April, https://www.ogj.com/exploration-development/
article/14174991/total-comes-up-dry-on-block-4-offshore-lebanon.

7

G. Balkiz et al. (2020), “Lebanon explosion: Thousands injured acrosscapital Beirut”, CNN online, 5 August, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/08/04/
middleeast/beirut-explosion-port-intl/index.html.

8 Reuters (2022), “Hezbollah sends drones toward Israeli gas rig in disputed
waters”, 2 July, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israelshoots-down-unarmed-hezbollah-drones-heading-gas-rig-securitysource-2022-07-02/.
9

Reuters (2022), “Israel’s election campaign kicks off, polls predict
further deadlock”, 15 September, https://www.reuters.com/world/
middle-east/israels-election-campaign-kicks-off-polls-predict-furtherdeadlock-2022-09-15/.

10 J. Prentis (2022), “Lebanon braces for a drawn-out battle for thepresidency after elections”, in The National News, 27 May, https://www.
thenationalnews.com/weekend/2022/05/27/lebanon-braces-for-a-drawnout-battle-for-the-presidency-after-elections/.
11 Alarabiya News (2020), “Beirut explosion: Cost of damage exceeds $15
billion says President Aoun”, 12 August, https://english.alarabiya.net/
News/middle-east/2020/08/12/Beirut-explosion-Cost-of-damage-tops-15billion-says-president.

12 Reliefweb (2020), “Beirut Explosion Situation Report #4”, 25 August,https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/beirut-explosion-situation-report-4august-25-2020.
13 Fitch Ratings (2022), “Israel-Lebanon Maritime Deal May Support Credit
Profiles in the Long Term”, 14 October, https://www.fitchratings.com/
research/sovereigns/israel-lebanon-maritime-deal-may-support-creditprofiles-in-long-term-14-10-2022.
14 UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) (2020), Statementon the progress on maritime negotiations between Lebanon and Israel,
1 October, https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-progressmaritime-negotiations-between-lebanon-and-israel.
15 N. Blanford (2022), “Lebanon-Israel maritime border dispute picks
up again”, in MENASource, Atlantic Council, 16 June, https://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/lebanon-israel-maritime-borderdispute-picks-up-again/.
16 Asharq Al-Awsat (2022), “Energy Firm Starts Tests at Sensitive IsraelLebanon Border Gas Field”, 9 October, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3921076/energy-firm-starts-tests-sensitive-israel-lebanon-bordergas-field.
17 C. Kraus (2022), “An Israel-Lebanon Border Deal Could Increase Natural
Gas Supplies”, in The New York Times, 27 September, https://www.nytimes.
com/2022/09/27/business/energy-environment/israel-lebanon-naturalgas-europe.html.
18 The equidistant line or median line is “a line every point of which isequidistant from the nearest points on the baselines of two States”(DOALOS - UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2000),
Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, New York, United
Nations, p. 156).
19 States can delimit their maritime boundaries either by (direct or indirect)
negotiations that result in an agreement establishing a boundary; or byresorting to an international court or arbitral tribunal that will determine
the boundary. In the latter case, international courts and tribunals havedeveloped a standardized methodology consisting of a three-stage
approach, described in detail in the Maritime Delimitation in the BlackSea (Romania v. Ukraine) (International Court of Justice, 2009). However,while courts and tribunals have almost systematically applied the processsince the Black Sea case, the methodology has not become a mandatoryor customary rule of international law (“The delimitation of maritime
boundaries” in R. Churchill et al. (2022), The law of the sea. Fourth edition,
Manchester University Press, pp. 300-371).
20 D. Sabaghi (2022), “A new challenge: Lebanon’s maritime border disputewith Syria”, in The New Arab, 3 November, https://www.newarab.com/
analysis/new-challenge-lebanons-maritime-dispute-syria.
21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Türkiye (2022), Press Release
No. 323 reg. the Signing of the Maritime Boundary Delimitation Agreement
Between Lebanon and Israel, 27 October, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_323_-lubnan-ile-israil-arasinda-deniz-yetki-alanlari-sinirlandirmaanlasmasinin-imzalanmasi-hk.en.mfa.
22 Middle East Monitor (2022), “PA, Egypt, Israel, Hamas make Gaza
Marine breakthrough”, 3 December, https://www.middleeastmonitor.
com/20221203-pa-egypt-israel-hamas-make-gaza-marine-breakthrough/.
23 D. Zaken (2022), “Israel, Cyprus to resolve disagreement over maritime
gas field”, in Al-Monitor, 4 October, https://www.al-monitor.com/
originals/2022/09/israel-cyprus-resolve-disagreement-over-maritime-gasfield.

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSISRECIPE FOR SUCCESS: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME DELIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

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