1

explanations - for understanding the workings of a very

DUTY, IDENTITY, CREDIBILITY

complex phenomenon. The lead author however takes full
responsibility for any lack of clarity in the report.1

Fake news and the ordinary citizen inThis is a work of empirical evidence, not of opinions. Nonetheless,India

any opinions that have slipped through in the report are solely thoseof the lead author.

Lead author: Santanu Chakrabarti, Ph.D, Head ofAudiences Research team, BBC World Service

Nothing in this report is to be construed as indicating or reflecting
the corporate policy of the BBC, BBC World Service or any related
entity.

With Lucile Stengel and Sapna Solanki (SeniorResearchers, BBC World Service Audiences Researchteam).
And the teams at The Third Eye, and Synthesis.

A note on the authorship of this report:
This has been a truly collaborative project between the World
Service Audiences Research team and its agency partners. The
ideas, words and phrases in this report have come from many
places, including from discussions and meetings with thevarious individuals named above, as well as in presentations,emails, and conversations with all our partner agencies. In

Google & Twitter are co-sponsors of this independent research

particular, the lead author would like to credit our research

conducted by BBC and its partners. Google and Twitter had no input or

agency partners: one, The Third Eye, our qualitative research

influence over the scope, research methodology, process or final report.

partner, many of whose sentences - and insightful analysishave been used nearly unaltered in significant sections of thereport, and two, Synthesis, our data science partner, who cameup with sophisticated techniques - and easy to understand1

2

As indeed he does for the overuse of footnotes. Starting with this one.

Credits and Acknowledgments

Report contributors:

The BBC World Service Audiences Research team

BBC researchers:

would like to thank:

Santanu Chakrabarti, Ph.D



Lucile Stengel

Jamie Angus, Director, BBC World Service Group, for

Sapna Solankicommissioning the workMarie Helly, Tess Colley, Marysia Novak, Alex Milner

Research partners:
Ethnography - The Third Eye
Gitanjali Ghate
Jasmeet Kaur Srivastava
Jayadevan Ambat
Aamir Siddiqui
Arjun Surendra
Saloni Garg
Swapnil Sakpal

and Joel Gunter for pushing us to think in ways weweren’t accustomed to doing. And other colleagues fordiscussions and suggestions


Trushar Barot, for making all of this happenCatherine Blizzard, Director, World Service Marketing& Audiences, for her unstinting support

Dejan Calovski, for reading the report and ensuringthat every now and then research- ese was replaced by

Big data - Synthesis

human language

Ankit Kalkar

The rest of the World Service Audience Insight team,Harriet Robertsonfor picking up the slack without complaining

Suey Kweon, for her invaluable intellectual helpAnne Orwell, without whom nothing would move

And finally, our research respondents, for giving us so

Aakash Gupta
Report design
Mule Design

much of their time. We hope that if any of them read

Lucile Stengel

this report they will recognise much of the

Sapna Solanki

phenomenon we describe in this report

Contacts for this research:
Santanu Chakrabarti: santanu.chakrabarti@bbc.co.uk
Lucile Stengel: Lucile.stengel@bbc.co.uk
Sapna Solanki: Sapna.solanki@bbc.co.uk

3

CONTENTS

Part IV. The effective narratives of fakenews messages

Executive summary

1. The fake news messages circulating amongst those

Introduction

with a right leaning identity

Part I. The conditions for sharing news

IDENTITIES IN INDIA

INTERLUDE: THREE EMMERGING RIGHT WING

without verification

2. The fake news messages circulating amongst theleft

1. The lines between various kinds of news really blurry
2. Scepticism about the media’s motivations andPart V. Fact-checking and verification:

intentions

Limited and specific

3. The digital deluge – and the move to a high frequency
information environment

1. Two groups that assess fake news better than

4. Copying mechanisms for dealing with the deluge

others – and the techniques they use

5. The broken link between consumption and sharing

2. Verification – and the very specific use of Google
3. TV and Newspapers: Still some credibility (even if

Part II. The motivations behind sharing‘bought out’)
4. V.4. The challenges of fact checking - on and off

1. Sharing to verify (within the network)

the network

2. Sharing as a civic duty

Part VI. The fake news ecosystem

3. Interlude: Emerging political identities in India today
4. Sharing as an expression and projection of identity

Part VI. Conclusions

Part III. What is fake news?
INTERLUDE: WHY ATTEMPTS TO CURTAIL
FAKE NEWS FALL ON DEAF EARS
4

A note on the quotes from research respondents used here:
Most of the research interviews were done in the language the respondent was most familiar with, usually the local
language. Where respondents spoke in English, they have been left as is, without any grammatical or syntacticalcorrections. Where they did not speak in English, the interviews were translated into English and have been used in thisreport. We have not edited the translations or corrected grammatical errors in the translations, as we believe it gives abetter flavour of the original interviews. We are aware that out of context some of these English translations are likely tolook odd to the non-Indian observer; or they might give a misleading or negative sense of the linguistic ability of
respondents. When quotes or sections of quotes have been used they have not been edited, other than condensing
occasionally. When this has happened, it has been shown with ellipsis (…

5

Executive summary

In all of the heated discussion about fake news around the world, the one thing that has remained
subdued is the voice of the ordinary citizen. In this project, therefore, we started with a central
question: why does the ordinary citizen spread fake news, without verification? And if ordinary citizens
are concerned about fake news, as multiple surveys seem to show, how have they changed their
behaviour in response to that concern? We were also interested in understanding better the type of
fake news spread not as stories/urls but as images and memes - anecdotally known to be the key
method of information dissemination in private WhatsApp and Facebook feeds. We were however also
keenly interested in starting to explore the question of whether or not there was a fake news ecosystem
in India on social media.

Using a combination of in-depth qualitative/ethnographic and big data techniques, we found that:

1.

There are certain conditions that are necessary for the spread of fake news.

These are:
 The blurring of lines between all types of news
 Scepticism about the motivations of the news media
 The flood of digital information and the shift to a high frequency news consumption world6 The coping mechanisms for dealing with onrushing digital information. These are: selective
consumption, preference for images, sender primacy, source agnosticism, nature of the forum,and ‘feel’ over ‘think’ The broken link between consumption and sharing The audiences sharing tactics for WhatsApp and Facebook

2.

The motivations behind sharing are rich and complex and need to beunderstood to establish why fake news is shared.
These are:
 Sharing to verify within the networks
 Sharing as a civic duty Sharing for nation building Sharing as an expression of one’s socio-political identity.
We discovered that socio-political identity plays a key role in sharing of fake news, especiallyfor those on the right. While we see multiple distinct identities emerging within the right, they
are all bound by common narratives, but there is no real unified sense of a ‘left’ identity inIndia; instead there are micro identities (eg Tamil, Bengali, Dalit), and even within that a deeply
held socio-political identity can sometimes get reduced to the level of an issue for others within
the broad ‘left’.

73.

This means that four types of narratives in fake news messages are particularly

effective at passing by the critical filters of a wide swathe of the citizenry.
These are:
 Hindu power and superiority
 Preservation and revival Progress and national pride
 Personality and prowess (of PM Modi)
That is, validation of identity trumps verification of facts. We also discovered that similar tactics
were used, by right leaning and left leaning fake news messages, but the volume of right leaning
fake news messages was much more prominent in most respondent’s phones.

4.

There is some use of fact checking,For example the use of Google or going to television, but this is limited and specific. But even the
few groups that do engage in this kind of verification behaviour are prone to sharing unverified false
information if it resonates with their identity8

5.

There is an emerging fake news ecosystem on Twitter, where we find fake news

sources and amplifiers on the political right to be much more denselyinterconnected and intermeshed.
On the network analysis map produced during this research, we see that many more of theTwitter handles that have published fake news sit in the pro-BJP cluster, than in the anti-BJP
cluster. On Facebook, we also see signs of a polarised nation, with indications that those mostengaged with politics also seem to take the most interest in sources of fake news. We also find on
Facebook that legitimate news sources, and sources known to have published fake news, arefollowed by audiences with distinct interests.

We conclude that for the reasons discovered, checking the flow of fake news – especially in theircurrent predominant form of images and memes - is likely to be extremely challenging. We suggest that
all actors - platforms, media organisations, government, civil society- need to come together to tackle
the problem, since it is, in fact, as much a social problem as a technological problem.
But in this, ordinary citizens too need to take more responsibility about sharing things without
verification - and surely platform centric solutions to help them can be found without compromising
too much the essential characteristics of the platform. We also recommend that journalists investigate
further whether or not there is an organised ecosystem of fake news production and dissemination.

9

DUTY, IDENTITY, CREDIBILITY

time, this form of ‘fake news’ was even called ‘some sort of

Fake news and the ordinary citizen

Today, it is fair to say, the term ‘fake news’ carries few

in Indiairrespective of who is using it, though broadly speaking all

corrective to, and substitute, for mainstream journalism’.5

positive associations. Today it is an inarguably negative term,users of the terms refer to misleading or false information.
The term has been used by journalists and researchers inconjunction with words such as ‘crisis’, or even ‘democraticcrisis’6. As is well known, influential politicians around theworld have taken up the term to connote any news that is

INTRODUCTION

critical of them and their achievements.

There was a time, “what a time it was, it was a time ofinnocence, a time of confidences”2. In that ancient era, the‘Fake News’ in the Indian media

term ‘fake news’ was used to refer to a particular form of

In the course of this project itself, we have found thatsatire; and commentary of that time grappled with thecoverage of ‘fake news’ in the Indian media over the last threetroubling notion that young people might be getting their

odd years has grown by nearly 200%, partly driven by the

information not from actual legitimate journalistic outlets, but

Cambridge Analytica exposes at the time of state elections. In

from such satire3 4.

all there have been 47,5437 news articles online about ‘fake

We refer of course to the discussions in the early 2010s

news’ between January 2015 and September 2018. English

around The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, the American

language media were the first to start talking about ‘fake news’

TV shows that blurred the lines between ‘hard news’ andand continue to cover it most often, with vernacular media aresatire. Difficult as it is to imagine at this particular moment instarting to engage with the issue more of late. (See Figure 1
below)
5

2

Simon & Garfunkel. (1968). Bookends. Bookends. Universal Music. LP.
3
Amarasingam, Amarnath,ed. ,The Stewart/ Colbert Effect: Essays on theReal Impact of Fake News (Jefferson: McFarland, 2011)
4
Baym, Geoffrey, From Cronkite to Colbert: The Evolution of Broadcast News.

McChesney, Robert W., Foreword to The Stewart/ Colbert Effect. By

Amarnath Amarsingam (Jefferson: McFarland, 2011).
6

See, for example, https://qz.com/india/1335161/indias-fake-news-crisisto-worsen-ahead-of-election-oxford-study/ andhttps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44967650
7
Please see methodology appendix for details.

(Boulder: Paradigm Publishers , 2010)10

language media coverage of ‘fake news’ in India has spanned
across a number of topics. Unsurprisingly, 46% of thecoverage is domestic, though 15% is about ‘fake news’ in theinternational context. One of the most important points tonote here, though, is that reporting on ‘fake news’ related to‘scams and scares’ constitutes just 0.7% of the coverage. (This,as we will see later, is quite the inverse of the topics audiences
are sharing on their WhatsApp feeds). Interestingly, just 9% of
the coverage is about solutions to the ‘fake news’ problem,
indicating the complexity of the situation.

Gone missing: The ordinary citizen
A lot of the media commentary - and emerging research - on
Fig. 1: Coverage of ‘fake news’ by Indian media (Jan 2015-

the phenomenon has focused on the actors responsible for

Sep 2018)

creating ‘fake news’ (e.g. Macedonian teenagers from the townof Veles10; or suspected Russian state actors11), the platforms
thought to play a central role in the spread of ‘fake news’ (e.g.

In the recent past the ‘fake news’ discussion has mostly‘falsehoods spread faster on Twitter than does truth’12, therevolved around reports of often horrifying violence, with
WhatsApp often seen to be at the heart of the violence. The
media coverage has not quite been about the use of ‘fake news’

child-kidnappers-fake-news/; https://www.wired.com/story/how-facebooksrise-fueled-chaos-and-confusion-in-myanmar/
9
See Methodology appendix for more details
10
One of the best of these stories is this one:https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/
11
See for example:
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/31/facebook-russiaelection-midterms-meddling;
12
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D. , Aral, S. The spread of true and false news online (Science,websites, or fake website news stories masquerading as real,
as has often been the case in the American context. Of late, the‘fake news’ story in India has very largely centred around thetechnology (ie WhatsApp/ Facebook) and the violence. Whilethe combination of technology and violence has naturally led
to some gripping headlines8, we find9 that the English

2018) 1146 -1151.
13

8

See for example, these stories: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india45140158; https://globalnews.ca/news/4333499/india-whatsapp-lynchings-

See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/opinion/brazil-election-fake-news-whatsapp.html?module=inline

11

possible use of WhatsApp to ‘poison’ Brazilian politics13) or

better the ‘ritualistic function of communication’, some bits ofindeed the ‘victims’ of fake news - from individuals tothe academic research and a lot of the journalism so far havecommunities to even entire democracies. A whole host of

inadvertently diminished the agency of ordinary humanacademics from a whole host of disciplines - including

beings, focusing more on the technology of theeconomics, computer science, have sought to understandcommunication. Even Wardle & Derakshan, who do thinkvarious aspects of the phenomenon, from the consequences ofabout communication as culture, recommend action bydigital information overload to the economics of fake news

technology companies, national governments, media

production.

organisations, civil society, education ministries, and funding

A lot of the research in the area has been focused on thebodies - but don’t have anything to say about what the14

technology or platform and used technology in the analysis .

responsibility of the ordinary citizen is in addressing the

In all of the frenetic and frantic research and commentary,

problem of ‘fake news’.

there is one thing that has gone underexplored: the voice of

The occasional study has centred the public’s voice/role on

the ordinary citizen - and indeed, the responsibilities of thethe phenomenon of ‘fake news’. A study commissioned by theordinary citizen. Where the ordinary citizen does appear,

BBC’s commercial news arm, Global News Ltd., found that

especially in the media, s/he is sometimes inadvertently

79% of the public in 6 countries of the APAC region were ‘very

portrayed as dupe of malicious actors, or heavily influenced

concerned’ about the spread of fake news.17 A late 2017 global

by social media/chat app messages to the extent ofpoll in 18 countries conducted by Globescan for the BBC

committing acts of egregious harm.15 Despite the injunctions

World Service found that 79% of the respondents globallyof researchers like Alice Marwick, who call for awere concerned about ‘what’s fake and what’s real on the“sociotechnical approach” to understanding the ‘fake news’

Internet’.18 In Kenya, 87% of the respondents in a study byphenomenon, and Wardle & Derakshan16, who draw upon the

Portland reported that they had seen ‘deliberately false

work of James Carey and urge researchers to understandnews’.19 All of these studies shed some light upon thephenomenon as experienced by the public. However, theyanswer more of the what questions than the why or the how

14

See for example: Qiu, Xiaoyan, Oliveira, Diego F. M., Shirazi, Alireza Sahami,
Flammini, Alessandro Menczer, Filippo, Limited individual attention and online
virality of low-quality information (Nature Human Behavior, 2017), 1-132.
15
For example, the headline here says ‘How WhatsApp helped turn an Indianvillage into a lynch mob’: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india44856910
16
Wardle, Claire, Derakhshan, Hossein . Information Disorder (Strasbourg,
France: Council of Europe, 2017)17

BBC Global News Limited, The value of news (BBC Global News, 2017)
See: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41319683
19
Available here: https://portland-communications.com/pdf/The-Reality-ofFake-News-in-Kenya.pdf; the study did not go into the question of how
respondents knew the content was deliberately fake.
18

12

questions about citizens’ motivations and behaviours20.But

publicly available research has been centred in the USA, andbecause the research terrain is relatively new, these studies

to a certain extent, Europe. While there has been reporting onlead to more questions than answers. Above all, though, the‘fake news’ and its consequences from around the world andmain question that these studies throw up is this: what

extensive coverage of the issue in local media in many

exactly is this ‘concern’ that people seem to be expressing?

countries of the world, this has not yet been accompanied by a

And if indeed they are so concerned, how have they changed

similar volume of published research in those countries. In

21their behaviour in response to that concern ? It is well-nighIndia, especially, much of the discussion seems to have been

impossible to answer these questions by simply tracking theirconducted in the media, and not so much in the academy or

behaviour on technology platforms or even by asking them awithin think tanks.22 Of course, the research cycle moves

set of questions in a large scale quantitative survey. It is byslowly while the news cycle moves at the speed of light, but

immersing ourselves to some extent in the lives of these

the lack is glaring; and the first draft of history, which is whatordinary citizens to some extent can we start to understandjournalists write, should not become the final verdict on the

how social and cultural forces, and their own desires andphenomenon.

aspirations, come together to influence the role they play inthe spread and growth of ‘fake news’.

And what’s going on inside private WhatsApp andWhither India?

Facebook feeds?

In addition to this people sized hole at the centre of many ofIn addition, it is well-nigh impossible for researchers to use

the research projects and papers, much of the published or

algorithmic/computerized/automated techniques toinvestigate audience behaviour within encrypted private

20This is as it should be - quantitative surveys are better at answering certain
questions than others. However, it must be said that online quantitative studies
are increasingly easier and quicker to do than ever before, and many
journalists find it easier to report on such studies than others. Consequently,
quantitative surveys are often being used for purposes they are not designed
to fulfil.
21
We are assuming that ‘concern’ usually leads to some kind of change, firstin the individual’s internal state of being and then in their external actions.
We recognize though that there is a body of scientific evidence that argues
this is not inevitable and that existing human behaviour, say, for example,
humanity’s response to the threat of climate change, is ample evidence ofthe big gap that exists between attitudes and behaviour. (Which also leads
us to the depressing conclusion that the movie ‘Wall-E’s’ depiction of future
humans might be extremely prescient…).

networks (eg Facebook, WhatsApp) - and this is as it should beto ensure people’s privacy.23 As a result, the picture we haveabout how people are sharing information, especially ‘fakenews’, is from the ‘outside’, so to speak, assessed primarily
22

There have been research studies looking into government/ statedisinformation which have included India, for example:
http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/sites/93/2018/07/ct2018.pdf
23
In this paper we do not engage with the debate on fundamental issues ofprivacy and data collection on technology platforms.

13

What do we mean when we use the term ‘fake news’ in thisfrom the metrics that are available within the analytics
24

systems of the platforms . This picture is especially fuzzy

report?

when it comes to the WhatsApp and Facebook. Not that much

As we have touched upon earlier, there are multiple uses - andis known25 of the content of what is actually in the feeds/

abuses - of the term ‘fake news’. While a precise definition ofgroups of users. Nor is that much known about the actual

the object of inquiry is critical to high quality research, one ofstrategies and tactics people adopt to share messages on

the objectives of this project was to understand how ordinary

WhatsApp. WhatsApp, for example, has been put at the heart

citizens defined the term, if at all. That being said, Wardle’sof Indian coverage of ‘fake news’ and violence, but it has not

categorisation27 of ‘mis and disinformation’ into seven broad

been fully explained, which innate characteristics of

categories of satire/parody, misleading content, imposter

WhatsApp have made it so central to the debate. Or, talking

content, fabricated content, false connection, false context,

about Facebook, or Twitter, or any other platform for thatand manipulated content, was certainly a starting point.

matter, how exactly – and for what purposes - ordinary

However, classifying ‘fake news’ by the intent into mis, dis

citizens are using these platforms - and how that matters inand mal-information seems problematic, because judging

the context of ‘fake news’. Not that much work has been done

intent from outcome is - as journalists well know28- no easy

either in categorising the messages within these networks bytask. Also, including satire/ parody in the bucket of mis/dis-

content, even though there have been proposals to categorise
these by intent

26

information because it has the ‘potential to fool’29 sat.

uncomfortably with us: not just because satire has been
historically a weapon of the weak against the powerful but
also because we suspected that most people for the most part
did have the ability not to be ‘fooled’ by satire.
In this report, we will use the term ‘fake news’30. Our rationale
for doing so, as opposed to the variety of other terms proposed

24

Here we are referring mainly to Facebook and Twitter. WhatsApp lacks evenrudimentary analytics systems, or at least does not make it available widely this is a feature, not a bug, from the perspectives of its founds, a consequenceof their commitment to user privacy and lack of interest in advertising. See forexample, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/30/jan-koumwhatsapp-co-founder-quits-facebook.
25
At least not to the external world; Facebook, for example, will know about
the material flagged for moderation.
26
Wardle, Claire, Derakhshan, Hossein . Information Disorder (Strasbourg,
France: Council of Europe, 2017)

27

Ibid.
See, this: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/reader-center/donaldtrump-lies-falsehoods.html
29Wardle, Claire, Derakhshan, Hossein . Information Disorder (Strasbourg,
France: Council of Europe, 2017) p17
30
A number of prominent social scientists observed in an article in Science, thatjust because a terms has been weaponised should not mean we do not use it.
See: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1094
28

14

such as ‘mis-information/mal-information/disinformation’31,

conveyed, in whichever format, on whatever platform, which is, or even ‘propaganda’, is in line with many of the

not fully supported by factual evidence.36 That is, our starting

arguments of Marwick33. However, while Marwick, borrowing

definition of fake news certainly goes much beyond the news

from Caroline Jack, prefers to use the term ‘problematicstories on websites, located somewhere on the internet,

information’, we persist in using the term ‘fake news’ for theavailable by using an url, and shareable on social media

simple reason that this project starts with the emic

platforms using that same url. We deliberately include all‘junk news’

32

34

perspective , even if it does not end there as we will see later,

formats of information sharing, primarily because wethat the term that the ordinary citizen uses to refer to the

anecdotally know that the dominant form of information

entire spectrum of incorrect or misleading information (andsharing on private networks in India is not through newsmore) is - for good or for bad - ‘fake news’. It is mainly for thisstories as defined above, but very much in the form of images,

35

reason that we use the term fake news in this report- and not

pictures, memes, etc.

just as a heuristic. Note, though, that while we were keenly

Approaching this project: Ordinary citizen, sharing, andinterested in understanding how citizens perceived fake news,

verification

we did not use their definitions in the analysis of news stories

Our starting observation for this project was the simple

or the content of their private networks. We have used Indianobservation that there are a few basic conditions that arefact-checking sites such as altnews and boomlive to assess therequired for fake news to spread through networks. It

truth claims of news articles called out as fake. Researchers on

certainly needs someone to create the fake news, and it

this project have also assessed the truth claims of various

certainly needs platforms and technologies which enable

pieces of private network content. As a starting point, then,them to spread. But it also needs one critical element:

our definition of fake news was this: information, howeverordinary citizens to share the fake news in their networks.
And it needs these things to be spread on without verification.

31

Wardle, Claire, Derakhshan, Hossein . Information Disorder (Strasbourg,
France: Council of Europe, 2017) p17
32
Bradshaw, Samantha, Howard, Phillip N.,Why does junk news spread so quickly
across social media ? Algorithms, advertising and exposure in public life (Oxford
Internet Institute, 2018)33
Marwick, Alice E.,Why do people share fake news: a sociotechnical model ofmedia effect (Geo. L. Tech.Rev.474, 2018).
34
For a good- but very specialist discussion- see Harris, Marvin, History andSignificance of the Emic/Etic Distinction (Annual Review of Anthropology, 1976)
329-50.
35
We report relief at this point to be able to drop the quotation marks from‘fake news’!

For us, then, an understanding of the fake news phenomenon
is simply incomplete without understanding this key
question: why does the ordinary citizen share fake news without
36

We note here that the issue of what constitutes ‘evidence’ can be debated, ofcourse. In India, for example, debates around history in India often centre
around what constitutes evidence. For the purposes of this project, we follow
the standards of factual evidence that are regarded as normative in theacademy and can be arrived at by a process of inductive or deductive reasoning.

15

verification? The simplest and therefore simplistic37 answer is

we also look deeply at the way they are using platforms

that they don’t care about ‘facts’ and ‘accuracy’ or even ‘truth’.

(Facebook and WhatsApp, mainly). We pay attention to the

Equally reductive is any sense that the majority of ordinary

amplifiers39 and influencers of fake news messages as much as

citizens spreading fake news are either malicious or

we do to the platforms.

duplicitous, or conversely dupes of malicious state actors.
None of these assumptions and explanations seemedsufficient to us as researchers, leave alone the necessity to
explain the phenomenon of fake news.
To be absolutely clear, our focus in this project is neither state
actors nor government propaganda. In this project, we aim to
shift the focus to the actions of ordinary citizens. We aim tounderstand the fake news phenomenon as a socio-culturaland socio-political phenomenon enabled by technology rather
than as a purely technological phenomenon.
In this project then, we draw upon the British Cultural Studies
research tradition to understand the usage38, but in particular,
the sharing of fake news by ordinary citizens, both within
encrypted Facebook networks and within WhatsApp. And inparticular, we aim to understand if and why sharing happens
without verification. We attempt to situate this sharing

Fig. 2: How we are studying fake news in this project

activity of citizens in their specific sociocultural contexts. In
this project, therefore, we start with people and the nature,content, and structure of the messages they are sharing, but
37

And more common in more circles of discussion than anyone would careto admit…
38
Without arguing that media effects are minimal. In fact, one of the central
objectives of this project is to assess the effects of people’s networks ontheir sharing behaviour.

39

16

We describe what we mean as ‘amplifiers’ in the last section of the reportThis project is exploratory in nature, and aims to approachsomething close to a ‘thick’ description

40

Key to deciding on approach was the fact that the fake newsof the phenomenon

phenomenon is very new indeed, and not yet that wellof fake news. However, while being exploratory, it is also

understood. When a phenomenon is new or not very wellconclusive in many of its findings, given the breadth andunderstood, qualitative research techniques are especiallydepth of the fieldwork. We do hope this report will be read

useful. These techniques - in this case, in-depth interviews

widely by anyone interested in ‘fake news’ or for that matterand up-close observation of sharing behaviours - allowed us to

India, but the principal audience we had in mind while writing

explore fake news with nuance, richness and depth. And

this report are academic researchers. We want this report tobecause we wanted to know what was spreading in encrypted

spur exploration and research across multiple fields of inquiry,

private networks like Whatsapp, semi ethnographic

and as such we have borrowed magpie like from multiple

approaches – in this case, visiting people at home - was41

disciplines in the writing of this report.

essential. This allowed us to understand the individual in full,and establish how their histories and backgrounds hadbrought them to the present point; and how they wereAbout the methodology and research processcontending with societal and cultural forces surrounding

We set out in this project to try and answer the question ofthem.

why ordinary citizens spread fake news without verification a little understood part of the fake news equation. The project

We debated using large sample quantitative surveys42 but wewas extremely quick turnaround, from starting to final reportcame to believe that the survey methodology should follow

publication was to be completed in three months flat. This

the establishment of a conceptual framework and intellectual

meant that we would not be able to address all of thescaffolding. Our interest was in exploring audience

questions we would like to answer and we would also not be

psychology in-depth to start with, in particular to understandable to use all of the methodological tools at our disposal.

what citizens meant by the term ‘fake news’, so we decided
against using survey methods for this project.
Fieldwork and analysis were carried out in six overlapping
stages (see Methodology Appendix for more detail on eachstage of the methodology):40

See Geertz, Clifford, The interpretation of cultures (New York: Basic Books, Inc,
Publishers,1973)
41
The lead author takes full responsibility for this cavalier approach todisciplinary boundaries, and drawing upon literature he is only passingly
familiar with.

42

Not least because we work in a journalistic organisation and haveobserved that journalists feel the most comfortable reporting on research
whose findings are conveyed in charts and graphs!

17then analysed using a grounded theory approach43 -1. Respondents were recruited and consent forms signed.
Respondents came from a mix of social, political, age,given that this was a new phenomenon being explored-

gender and economic backgrounds. They were first

and the results married to what was being found in theasked to share with researchers what they foundanalysis of the messages.

interesting in their WhatsApp and Facebook feeds and3. The messages shared by participants were in parallel

were sharing within their networks. Researchers wereanalysed by semioticians on the one hand, and data

very careful to not use the term ‘fake news’ at thisscientists using machine learning methods on the otherstage-because one of the key objects of the inquiry was- for tone, content, style and structure.

to assess whether or not respondents were able to4. Data science approaches were then used to retrieve anddetect what was fake and what was not; and what they

analyse the media coverage of fake news in India, inlabelled as fake.

English and vernacular languages.

2. Post seven days of such sharing, in-depth, in home

5. After a list of fake news sources was generated ininterviews were held, where researchers had detailed

stages 3 and 4, the Twitter network of fake news

conversations touching on multiple aspects of theirsources and amplifiers in India was mapped44 , andlives – from childhood to adulthood, their influences,clustering analysis was conducted to understandtheir idols, their likes and dislikes, their reaction toagents sharing similar connections.

their changing environments, their news consumption,

6. Publicly available Facebook advertising data was usedtheir usage of digital platforms, their social, cultural,

to understand strength of affinity between audiences ofand political perspectives and their sharing activity,

fake news sources and audiences of legitimate news

eventually arriving at the topic of fake news. During

sources, and build a network map of these various

the course of - and again at the end of - the sessions,communities.

respondents were asked to show researchers theThat is, the project ended up using multiple methodologies

contents of their WhatsApp and Facebook feeds, andeventually:

discussions were held on what they would share, would
not share, and why. Also, they were shown known fakeonews messages and asked whether or not they foundIn-depth in home qualitative and semiethnographic approaches: 120+ hours of inthese credible and why. Respondents were finallydepth interviews at home across 10 cities and 40

asked to share with researchers. Their interviews were
43
44

18

See methodology appendix for more details
See methodology appendix for more details

individuals in India. The cities in which theby the research teams to create initial presentations, finallyinterviews were conducted were a mix of metros

followed by this report that you are reading.

and smaller towns, spanning the north, south,

For taking the time to read this report, thank you.

east, and west of the country: Mumbai, Delhi,
Kolkata, Chennai, Rajkot, Vijayawada, Raipur,

And now, here’s what we found.

Udaipur, Amritsar, Varanasi. The interviews
were conducted in the language the respondent
was most comfortable in- in most cases the local
language. The interviews were transcribed andtranslated. Original recordings, photographs andvideos taken inside the respondents’ homes
were used for analysis, alongside English
language translations of the conversations.
oAuto ethnography: Collection of a corpus of fakenews messages.

oSemiotic analysis: Understanding signs,
symbols, and structures of fake news messages.

o

Big data/ network analysis: Across 16,000
Twitter profiles (370,999 relationships); 3,200
Facebook pages & interestsoNews scan and topic modelling: Media scansfrom last two years of news about fake news, inEnglish and in local languages. 47,543 in total.

The findings from all of these stages- plus learnings from desk
research/ review of existing literature- was brought together

19

The findings20

In the next few45 pages we will tell you the story of fake news

5. Fact-checking and verification: In which we address why

and ordinary citizens in India as we see it from our analysis ofverifying behaviour is limited and specificthe data. We will tell you this story in six main parts.

6. The fake news ecosystem on social media (Twitter and
These are:Facebook): In which we try to understand if there is a fake

1. The breeding ground: In which we outline what our

fake news, are interacting with political and media actors.

news ecosystem, and see how sources known to have sharedanalysis suggests are the necessary conditions for the spread

7. Conclusions and suggestions for further research. Doesof fake news. We outline six ‘conditions’ from the news

what it says on the tin

environment to psychological attributes to citizens’ sharing
strategies on the sharing platforms.

2. The motivations behind sharing: In which we try tounderstand why people share. In an interlude, we outline ourobservations on the socio-political identities we see
crystallising in India today- as we find this quite central tounderstanding sharing behaviour by citizens

3. What is fake news: In which we address this question fromthe perspective of the citizens

4. The narratives of effective fake news messages: In which
we understand the narratives that effectively short-circuit
critical thinking (And we look at fake news messages of theleft and right) effective

45

Ok. It’s not exactly ‘few’.

21

The breeding groundThe conditions created for sharing
news without verification

22

1

I.

The breeding ground: thethese demarcations originated from the world of printconditions created forstarted. But the emergence of Facebook as a key platform fornewspapers, and were carried over into TV news when it firstnews – and the centrality of its ‘newsfeed’- established asharing news without

forum where not only hard and soft news and ‘news’ and‘features’ blended together; it also created a forum whereverification‘news’ about your niece’s birthday and ‘news’ about adictator’s latest autocratic actions merrily intermingle. A third
demarcation is of most importance for our purposes - thedemarcation between ‘fact’ (i.e. just the pure reporting) andI.1. The lines between various kinds of news have‘opinion’, with the category of ‘analysis’ lying somewhere inblurredbetween. This has been a key feature of traditional journalismwith its routines, structures and adherence to the norms of

When discussing fake news, both parts of the term areobjectivity and/or impartiality.47 It is this distinction between

equally important. So first, we must understand how people

fact/reporting and opinion that seems to have been almost

understand the term ‘news’, before we move onto issues ofcompletely decimated by digital news sources, especially by

fake and genuine.

social platforms, such as Facebook.

As a term, ‘news’ itself has always had more than one

This, at the level of the ordinary citizen has had certain very

meaning: on the one hand, news is what you got in yourimportant consequences. In India, we see amongst our

newspapers and televisions and radio sets; on the other hand,

respondents an upending of the traditional divide between

news is also information about you, your family, and others

news and opinion. For the respondents, news is primarily

important to you. In the realm of institutional news providers

47- and researchers of media - too, there has always been a

These are related but different terms, with ‘objectivity’ more commonlyused in the American journalism context. For example, see the BBCs editorial

further demarcation between ‘hard news’ and ‘soft news’ 46 as

guidelines ( https://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/guidelines/bbc-

there has been one between ‘news’ and ‘features’. Many ofeditorial-values/editorial-values) for how it thinks about the idea of
impartiality, and Tuchman’s classic sociological investigation of the workings

46

See, for example, Reinemann, Carsten , Stanyer, James, Scherr,of objectivity in an American newsroom: Gaye, Tuchman. "Objectivity as a

Sebastian, Legnante, Guido. Hard and soft news: A review of concepts,

Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity."

operationalizations and key findings. (Journalism, 2012) 221-240(American Journal of Sociology , 1972) 660-679

23divided into two categories to start with. First, citizens thinkcodes and norms of Indian vernacular news media - whichin terms of ‘information’, which is related to the ‘fact’ that thehave traditionally been quite different from those of theheadline conveys - and mostly that. And then, there is ‘news’

English language media in India49.

which is the actual content. It is acknowledged and largely

What is new though, is that with the definition of news

desired that there be a layering of opinion - or at least a stancebecoming expansive and all encompassing, we find that- on the facts. It is then this layering in of opinion on to facts

anything of importance to the citizen is now considered ‘news’.

that makes it news.

It then also stands to reason that they are happy receiving

Crucially, news is now considered to be as much about ‘how it

information from just about anyone – and not just a handful of

makes me feel’ as about ‘what it tells me.’ ‘Human interest

news organisations with rigorous journalistic practices,stories’, or softer news in general is considered to be a coretrusted brand images, and legacies of accuracy. Even morepart of news, while political and policy reportage is expected

importantly for our purposes, we find that people don’t

to not just be dry and analytical, but to express some emotion.

differentiate – or more accurately find it too hard or too

In other words, people expect news to not just inform but toresource intensive50 - to differentiate between various sources

entertain.

of news (in the broad sense outlined above). Social media, with
its low barriers to entry provides innumerable sources ofThis is not an entirely new phenomenon. This collapsing of

information - and the distinctions between them are flattenedboundaries between various types of news - albeit many of thein the minds of the users. In fact, as we detail later, theboundaries said more about news organisation norms thanidentity of the source is not at all central to the question ofnews consumer needs- predates the rise of digital and social

consumption or sharing of information. But this is - at least

media. Media scholars have been expressing anxiety about the

partly - a function of the sheer volume of digital information

blurring of news and entertainment for a while now,that the average Indian user of WhatsApp and Facebook now

lamenting the rise of global ‘infotainment’ and thereceives in their feeds every day.

‘Bollywoodization of news’.48 It will take us outside of thepurview of this report, so we will not develop the idea at
length: but it seems to us that one of the ways to understandthis development is to see it as the ‘mainstreaming’ of the48

49

See, for a discussion, Rajagopal, Arvind. Politics After Television: Hindu
Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India. (Cambridge,UK:
Cambridge University Press., 2001)
50
Here, when we say ‘resource’ we primarily mean time and cognitive
resources. See later sections where we discuss this in detail.

Thussu, Daya Kissan. News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global
Infotainment. (London: Sage Publications, 2007)24

I.2. Scepticism about the media’s motivations andintentions

M: News is coming from your father’s time, so the news
which you get at those days like the way of telling, theAmongst our respondents, we see a loss of trust about

topics, in all things comparing it with the news now what

the intentions of the news media, accompanied with a longing

it is, is there any difference?

for a past era when all was well and journalism was of thehighest standards. There is widespread belief that TV- and to“R: At that time, what the reality in news wassome extent, print - are motivated by profit more thananything else; if anything, for today’s citizens, the agenda ofthere it has come down compare to now. At thattime, Doordarshan mean like news telling etc.
and it was real news.”

the media isn’t even so much hidden. The media is certainly
felt to be more biased and partisan today than it was before,
and the credibility of journalism per se is not dramatically(Male, 25, Vijayawada)

high. This attitude, though, comes from exposure to satellite
TV stations, particularly in the local languages, which are“Like if you see Doordarshan, the host is a simple

known for their shrill and sensationalistic tone and hyperbolic

one and just read the news but the private news
channel they make the small news into a breaking
news. To increase their TRP, they will hype that
small news to a breaking channel.”presentation style. Those whose media mix includes
newspapers are not that negative about journalism. (And
Doordarshan,51 considered staid and boring by many, does
have some amount of residual affection - in part because staid(Female, 25, Udaipur)

and boring stands out in marked contrast to sensationalisticand hyperbolic!) But overall, the sense is that the media has its“If we take TV news, each channel is biased with

own agenda, stemming from its affiliation, with eithersome party, so there is no one neutral. In
newspaper also, each paper is biased with someparty. Only the social websites have common
news because it is uploaded by a common people
only, so I feel that, this is only unbiased news.”

business, or political interests. There is a caveat emptor
attitude when it comes to the output of Indian media, especiallythat of TV news channels.
51

The Indian state broadcaster, now a network of channels. Still consumed
widely, despite the number of private players in the market. See:
http://www.indiantelevision.com/television/tv-channels/viewership/urbanareas-dominate-dd-viewership-zapr-180225(Male, 26, Chennai)

25

Note here the last line of the last comment. This will be ofthink twice about sharing digital media, irrespective of theimportance later in the story.

nature of said media.
As a result, we find our respondents inundated with messageson WhatsApp and Facebook. There is a near constant flurry of“Fake news was not there as on Doordarshan andnotifications and forwards throughout the day on theirphones - encompassing from news organisations updates to a

CNN and BBC would put paid content in biased

mindboggling variety of social messages (for example,

view, but they won't put fake and untrue things.

“inspiring quotes” and “good morning” forwards, the latter ofwhich seems to be a peculiarly Indian phenomenon, even thesubject of discussion in the international media).53

I.3. The digital deluge- and the move to a highNews providers - and there are tens of thousands of them infrequency information environment

India54- do not make it any easier, by sending regular, evenincessant, notifications to phones.

Indians today are having to deal with a huge volume ofdigital information in their WhatsApp and Facebook feeds.

“I am attached to social media, and I have an appof ABP news and it updates me in every 2-4
minutes about job and at present it is coming, andit may have a lot of notifications of news”.

This is partly a result of the recent and dramatic drops in thecost of data as well as the costs of smart phones andsubsidised feature phones.52 Since data costs are no longer a
key constraining factor in the use of digital networks, unlike(Male, 34, Amritsar)

their peers in Kenya and Nigeria, people simply do not have to

52

See for example, Majumdar, Romita. “Two years of Jio: How free calls,

53

See, for example, Purnell, Newley. “The Internet Is Filling Up Because
Indians Are Sending Millions of ‘Good Morning!’ Texts.” The Wall Street
Journal. 22 January 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-internet-isfilling-up-because-indians-are-sending-millions-of-good-morning-texts1516640068 (accessed November 4, 2018)

data catalysed India's digital revolution”, Business Standard. 6 September
2018. https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/two-yearsof-jio-how-free-calls-data-catalysed-india-s-digital-revolution118090501169_1.html (accessed November 3, 2018).

54

26

Source for saying the number of news providers available

“Because contacting has become easier due to

The default behaviour for our respondents at the moment
seems to be to have notifications on rather than off- and wesocial media, people are easily connected on
WhatsApp, Facebook, there you relate to eachother, you get to know the birthdates of people,
you keep on getting texts, notifications about
people. Earlier this was not there, earlier people
needed to meet each other, talk face to face. But
now things have changed, people talk with eachother on WhatsApp, so that change has happened.
Connection has become easier now”

believe this behaviour is quite widespread, for many
respondents, when asked how they come to know about anews event, say that it’s ‘ because of notifications’. The rise ofdigital as the central means of acquiring information has
effectively transformed news behaviour from a high time spent,
low frequency behavioural pattern to a high frequency, low timespent behavioural pattern. In other words, people have many
more moments of news consumption than ever before, buteach of these moments is now of really short duration. In(Respondent, Male, 63, Delhi).

India, citizens actively seem to be privileging breadth of
information over depth, partly as a response to the digital

In India, the need to stay ‘updated’ (and that is exactly the

deluge. This, we find, is necessitating the adoption of coping

term that respondents use) overrides any anxiety aboutmechanisms – which then end up facilitating the spread ofneeding to cope with the constant stream of digital signals

fake news.

asking for attention. Over the years, in multiple research
projects, including this one, we have repeatedly picked up a

I.4. Coping mechanisms for dealing with thedesire from Indian citizens to somehow stay abreast of

delugeeverything that is going on. This is especially pronounced
among the young- the reasons for this are multifaceted, fromnot wanting to come across as uninformed in a peer group, toTo be absolutely clear, Indians at this moment are not

the pressures coming from the country’s competitive entrance

themselves articulating any kind of anxiety about dealing

exams, many of which test candidates on “general knowledge”.

with the flood of information in their phones. If anything, they
only see the positives of social media.

“Our knowledge will be increased if we get

updated with the news, so if tomorrow we go in
any interview or we gets attached to any website,27

“... You don’t want, but still, the posts are comingor communicate with any customer, then we givethem information.”through, right? The people keep sharing it, it’svery irritating…Constantly, you will keep getting.
There are groups in that people have theirpolitical affiliations. The regular ones have come,it's Okay. Political things keep coming. It's very
irritating.”(Male, 38, Mumbai)(Male, 34, Amritsar)

In effect, navigating WhatsApp and Facebook is now part ofeveryday life and people are doing it without consciously
thinking about how they are doing so. That does not mean
though that it is easy to do. WhatsApp and Facebook - which
we will from this point refer to collectively as digital sharing
platforms- are quite likely leading to a situation of

But while people are not articulating their anxieties, we findinformation overload.55 For example, refer to the quote earlier

that they are certainly adopting a slew of tactics andfrom the male respondent in Delhi; he says “you keep on

stratagems to cope with their digital feeds. It seems, though,getting texts, notifications about people”. The telling phrasethat as Qiu et al56 have suggested when reviewing thethere is: “keep on”, and we hear similar use of language to talkliterature on cognition in computer mediated/ digital

about information flows in these networks, but while itenvironments, that “paradoxically, our behaviouralsometimes flows over into irritation, a tone of anxiety ormechanisms to cope with information overload may makeconcern about the difficulty of managing these flows does notonline information markets less meritocratic57 and diverse,

really come through.

increasing the spread of misinformation and making usvulnerable to manipulation”.

55“Information overload” is not the most well-defined of terms, despite

being used in diverse fields such as cognitive science, business, andtechnology. Clay Shirky argues that the problem is not ‘information
overload’, because we have always been dealing with information overload,but ‘filter failure’ – there are no economic incentives for producers of digitalcontent to filter for quality before publication. See Juskalian, Russ.

56“Interview with Clay Shirky Part I.” Columbia Journalism Review. 19

Xiaoyan Qiu, Diego F.M. Oliviera, Alireza Sahami Shirazi, Alessandro

Flammini, Filippo Menczer. “Limited individual attention and online virality

December 2008of low-quality information .” Nature Human Behaviour, 2017, 4

https://archives.cjr.org/overload/interview_with_clay_shirky_par.php?page

57

The approach here is based in the field of economics, so merit and quality
are not limited to ideas of the accuracy of a piece of information.

=all (accessed November 4, 2018).

28

The strategies that are being adopted by people include:
I.4.1 Selective consumption58: This operates in two ways. First,
given the volume of messages in their feeds, a significant
proportion of the messages received in their feeds, especially
WhatsApp feeds, are simply not opened or consumed. Second,messages are often part consumed before they are forwarded
on. This part consumption could be based simply on theheadline without actually consuming the content59 This cansometimes lead to situations where messages are forwarded
on, whose content is not even subscribed to by the sender, butthey are sent on because the image attached to the message

Image 1: WhatsApp message forwarded with a ‘Jai Shreetriggers an emotion in the sender, or a desire to show an

Ram’ note appended to show fondness for Lord Rama, evenendorsement of that image.

though the sender did not intend to endorse the actual
content of the message.

58

We use this term to differentiate this from the very well-known media

psychology term ‘selective exposure’, where citizens favour information
which reinforces their pre-existing views. See Klapper, Joseph T. The effects
of mass communication . (Free Press, 1960) - (and a library of research after
that)
59

Of all the people reading this, who are also active on any social media,
90% of them have shared something without consuming. The other 10% arelying to themselves. (Estimates, obviously!)29

I.4.2 Preference for images60: Images (memes or otherwise) or
image heavy messages are overwhelmingly preferred for
consumption or to engage with. Long text forwards and videos
are generally not preferred: the time/ effort involved inconsuming these and the low storage available in most phones(for videos), are big barriers to the consumption of theseformats.
Given the demands on people’s attention and cognition, thefact that they would be using visual cues to decide whether or
not to engage with the content does make sense; while theclaim that visuals are processed 60,000 times faster thanwords is an internet myth61, there is certainly evidence that
pictures – especially those with a positive or negative affect(crudely, ability to arouse an emotional response) - areprocessed faster than words.62
This is, in fact, one of the central discoveries of this project.
The canonical example of fake news, for example, the story60

It could be argued that this is so much same old-same old. The history ofcommunicating in India more through images than through words is longand rich. See for example Jain, Kajri. Gods in the bazaar : The economies ofIndian calendar art. (Durham : Duke University Press, 2007) and Pinney,
Christopher. 'Photos of the Gods' : The printed image and political struggle in

Image 2: A fairly typical example of unopened messages in a

India. (London: Reaktion, 2004)

WhatsApp group61

Or should we say ‘visuals are processed 60,000 times faster than words’ isfake news?
62
See, for example, Jan De Houwer, Dirk Hermans. “Differences in the
Affective Proccessing of Words and Pictures .” Cognition and Emotion , 1994:
1-20

30

about the Pope endorsing Donald Trump, created bythis with ex- Prime Minister Manmohan Singh replacing

Macedonian teenagers, and circulating all over social media,

Narendra Modi are found too in WhatsApp/Facebook feeds).

does not seem to be that prevalent in WhatsApp feeds in
India63. To be clearer, stories as a collection of words on a
website, circulated in the form of the url, do not seem to be themost prevalent means of sharing information (anddisinformation).
The form of information that is consumed or engaged with
more, is visual information, sometimes layered with aminimum amount of text.

Image 4: Translation “Modi ji had said he would increase
Image 3: Translation: “In a list of honest leaders issues in theGDP. He meant he would increase [the price of] Gas, Diesel,

USA, there is only one person from Indian, that is Shree

Petrol. The failure to understand was ours, what’s his fault?”

Narendra Modi, and that too in first place” (Note: Versions ofSince people prefer to consume information in visual heavy
formats - or at best, very short text formats - they also prefer

63

Note that this is based on observations of the respondent’s WhatsApp andFacebook feeds. It would be useful for future researchers to establish exact
proportions through quantitative surveys.

to share in these formats. A very common mode of sharing is31through ‘screenshots’. In fact the practice of ‘screenshotting’ isFinally, because networks are relatively large and personal

something that has become relatively automatic andrelevance of messages is hard for the sender to assess,instinctive!

screenshots become a way for the sender to signal to the
network that the sender does not know if this is relevant, butwill be happy to send more information (for example, the fullvideo) if required. It is also a way to compensate for the“There was inspiring news after long time searchpossible low memory of the recipient’s phone – andnews had come. There was a program in Delhi for
Kerala flood relief. Supreme Court lawyer andjudge they did the singing and did the charity. I
took the screenshot and forwarded. That time
people came to know that judge can sing.”

consequent irritation if the message turns out to be irrelevant
but hogs memory.

“Because I am sending screenshot to other person(Male, 56, Rajkot)

and if he or she finds it useful then they willmessage me that you send more details about it.
If I am sending in the group, some person might
think that this is useful but cannot download it
properly, then that person might get irritated.

‘Screenshotting’ (and storing it in the photo gallery) is used asa method of sending something at a time later than the time
when the material has been consumed. Screenshots also act asaide memoires:

M: So, you feel it should send a small page?

“Whatever I wish to purchase in gadgets I save its

R: Yes. If a person asks for more information,then I will send that person more details aboutthat information personally.

screenshots on my phone…I have kept it for mycollection of all the things I liked and want to lookin detail about them.
(Male, 20, Udaipur)

M: So, you feel people will get irritated if you
have shared the entire article?

32

R: Yes, since I myself feel irritated. Suppose I am
not giving RPSC exam and somebody writes to me
that this is very important please download it, I
downloaded it but that was no use for me, so I am
losing my MB, my memory is full, then I get some
irritation”

consumption decisions are disproportionately influenced bywhich individual has sent the message in the first place. If that
individual happens to be a person of influence or social
standing in the recipient’s online or real life network, or
perhaps even more importantly an ideological/political leader
chances are that the message will be consumed and even(Female, 25, Udaipur)

shared. On the flip side, certain individuals are labelled as‘pointless spammers’ and their messages are avoided.

This preference for images, screenshots and minimal text has
three key consequences, important for our purposes:a) in depth information or analyses conveyed in words finds it“As I told you, I respect [xxx] Bhai, he isdifficult to flourish in this environment

knowledgeable and knows more than me. So
whatever, he sends me, I follow it. He has taught
me a lot of things, I didn’t know”b) the headline often is the full storyc) it is harder for both the consumers - and for researchers/
analysts - to get to the source/creators of the information.

(Male, 24, Varanasi)

For example, in an environment that is predominantly image
heavy, the very effective digital techniques such as those“I trust anything my Mamaji sends, he knows asuggested in A Field Guide to “Fake News” and otherlot about the world. There are my other uncles
who stay in our hometown, I instantly mistrust
anything they send. I don’t even open most of
their forwards”

Information Disorders,64 become more difficult to pull off (asmost of the “recipes” in the Field Guide start with urls, whichin the case of images, rarely exist).

(Male, 27, Mumbai)

I.4.3. Sender primacy: Given the overwhelming amount of
information and the consequent inability or disinclination to“(On a piece of fake news) My friend has sent

subject each message in ones’ feed to rational critical analysis,

this to me, why would he send anything fake tome?”people use heuristics to decide which content to engage withand even to assess what they find credible. As such,(Female, 24, Vijayawada)
64

See the various “recipes” suggested at https://fakenews.publicdatalab.org/.

33

“XXXX is a leader who talks facts and figures.

environment where the scepticism about the motivations andintentions of the media is widespread- so it’s not as if there isPeople may sleep in his speech but he talks
numbers. That is why when he shares anything ortalks I just pay attention to it”

someone established as an arbiter of truth anyway. And as we
will see later, for many types of messages, the question ofwhere the message originated from becomes immaterial, since(Female, 23, Raipur)

they are anyway not about truth or lies, they are aboutsomething much deeper than that.
Note here the ages of the individuals quoted: they are all
young people. Our analysis suggests that sender primacy
operates across all ages and demographics, and does nothave that much to do with levels of formal education.

I.4.5. The nature of the forum: The forum or composition of theWhatsApp group something has been sent in becomes a key
determinant of engagement with and sharing of a message. It
matters whether the message is a personal one (i.e. sent one to

I.4.4. Source agnosticism: This reliance on the identity of theone) or whether the message has been sent in a group. If a

sender to judge the content of the messages is related to whatgroup, it matters what type of group it is: is it a family group,

we are calling ‘source agnosticism’. That is, people really don’t

or is it a group from work, or is it, in fact, a group dedicated toseem to worry too much about where the messages they arepolitics - formal or informal? People think very actively about

receiving originated from, especially on WhatsApp. It is not

the composition of their WhatsApp groups and therefore whatthat people don’t know that there are more credible and lessshould be shared in which group. The same message

credible sources. Nor is it the case that they don’t care about

considered appropriate to share in one group can be

consuming incorrect information. It’s that on the digitalconsidered completely inappropriate to share in anotherplatforms, while contending with the flood of onrushinggroup.

information, they simply cannot be bothered. The credibilityof the sender is what gives legitimacy to the message. The

I. 4.6: The affective more than the cognitive66: Given the deluge

original source, if at all present in the message itself, is often

of digital information and the (unarticulated but certainly

ignored or unnoticed in Facebook,65 or completely absent inexperienced) pressure to process information quickly, what is

WhatsApp. This is also happening, as detailed earlier, in an

engaged with more often than not, is what triggers an emotion.
And the way citizens often learn about things is through an

65This is true even after consumption. A private study commissioned by the
BBC World Service has established that on Facebook as less as 30% of theaudience recognised the source of a news item, even after they had consumed
the news item.

66

We are using these terms here in the sense used in the field of education/
learning. See, for a quick overview:https://thesecondprinciple.com/instructional-design/threedomainsoflearning/34

affective style, not a cognitive one. Put in non-academic

considerations of relevance do not come into play and theylanguage, digital sharing platforms seem to be operating moreare shared very widely and very quickly.

in the domain of ‘feeling’ than ‘thinking’, though once in a

“Health news and information - I will share withwhile, there is some critical engagement based on whether or
not something is of interest or relevance. Very importantly, inall, someone will benefit out of it”

the Indian case, what is engaged with and then shared is what
resonates with their ideology, especially their socio-political
identity. We will come back to this point later.

I.6 Sharing Strategies on WhatsApp andFacebook
Our two platforms of focus, WhatsApp and Facebook,

I.5. The broken link between consumption andare used quite differently and quite strategically by citizens,

sharing:but in their own ways ,both end up facilitating conditions
conducive to the sharing of fake news.

For the ordinary citizen, consumption is hard, andcritically- engaged consumption is even harder. However,

How WhatsApp is used by citizens

sharing is easy. Digital sharing platforms are built to makeWhatsApp is today the indispensable67 platform for citizens. It

sharing easy - and there is no requirement built into theis also the platform de jure to share. It is the platform toplatforms that sharing be done only after the consumption ofconnect with people you –well - have a connection with. The

content. This means that there are very few considerations

connection could be personal (ie family/ friends), or slightlythat arrest the process of sharing, other than propriety andless personal (larger township, where it could include

relevance to the group that it is being shared in.

strangers), or it could be a group about politics (a group for a
RSS shakha, say). But every group in WhatsApp has

There is little verification by the citizen of the accuracy orsomething that bonds the group together - and makes it

authenticity of the content that is being shared today. There

behave like a group. That is, WhatsApp groups have groupare some categories that are considered to be important for all:norms, and it is seen as socially quite problematic to breach

non-political or soft news (for example, health) , updates (forthose group norms. Generally speaking, these groups – once

example, ATMs are going to be closed for five days) or policy
news ( for example, taxes have risen in the latest budget).

67

Strictly speaking we can’t make this claim from a qualitative study; anyquantitative study should be able to easily validate, this, though.

Because these are seen as being of universal relevance,
35

created - do not grow too fast, and because there are definite
criteria for membership of groups, there is a natural limit totheir size.
Very importantly for our purposes, sharing in WhatsApp
groups is very targeted. WhatsApp usage is about validation of
one’s beliefs and identities through the sharing of news andinformation. Messages that originate in one group don’t find itthat easy to move to another group. People are acutely
conscious of which messages belong in which groups. The
most actively political of persons might post a rabidly anti
Congress or BJP message in the political group s/he is part of,but s/he will not post that same message in a family group.

“I have not forwarded this to my lawyers group, I
am in the minority there, they are all different
kinds of people there. I share things in mycousin’s group, many like-minded people there,
we can have discussions”(Male, 62, Chennai)

Image 4: The same political message – about deshdrohi ortraitor to the nation- shared in multiple political groups

However, if that person is part of multiple political groups, she(some groups masked to preserve respondent anonymity).

will share the same message in all of the political groups. This,

Notethe preponderance of the saffron colour, whichthough, imposes costs in terms of time and effort. There isn’t

indicates this person is a strongly right wing Hindu

any easy ‘one click’ way of sharing with everyone in every

nationalist.68

group you are part of, thereby imposing a threshold on thenumber of people any message can be shared with relative
ease.

68

Note also the beer mug emojis in the name of the group at the bottom, rightnext to the saffron flag, quite delightful touch!

36This suggests that the chances of a fake news message

conversations or contribute to existing discussions, even if

spreading on a nationwide scale on WhatsApp might actuallythese discussions rarely get full blown.

be quite limited. The defining feature of WhatsApp groups in

At the same time, the range of discussions, or the ability for

India might then not be its reach or scale or speed of

opposing viewpoints to find an airing is limited. There mighttransmission of messages, but the fact that it is enabling

not be an algorithm like in the case of Facebook, but many ofhomophily,69 or the drawing together of people in tightthe groups operate under unsaid rules about sharing what

networks of like-mindedness.

everyone in the group approves of, or not sharing at all. There

But because of this this tightness, then, we suggest that it isare also some said agreements about what to share and not topossible to use WhatsApp to mobilise. This starts to explain

share in particular types of groups, with admins of the groups

why WhatsApp has seemed quite central to some cases ofplaying an active role in weeding out those who breach groupviolence in India. It’s not the speed, or the reach of WhatsApp

rules, and individual members too policing content they feelthat has been central to these issues, but the homophily of its

does not belong in that group, given the composition or thegroups that has enabled mobilization in the cause of violence.

stated intent behind the setting up of that group.

The platform is also very much known for spreading low“I am from the Kanyakubj samaj, we have like-quality information of doubtful veracity. Most citizens areaware of and have personally encountered messages that areminded people, with similar beliefs, so we sharemany things on that without thinking. I don’t doit on Raipur Doctors group”

either trying to scam them, or peddle information that is
considered quite fantastical.

(Male, 34, Raipur)

Despite that, WhatsApp is also a high engagement platform in
India with a high usage for news and news-related discussion-“M: Do you discuss only cricket related topics
here?

and, concomitantly, a high amount of fake news. There iscertainly deliberate sharing of material here to start69

R: Yes. It tells us about the trip series match,timings, the trophy picture is put up. I have a few
friends in this group who are in favour of Modi
and a few who are against him they constantly

See Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, James M Cook. “Birds of a

Feather: Homophily in Social Networks.” Annual Review of Sociology, 2001:
415-44437

have fights over this. I just comment once or twice
here. If it goes on then the Admin of the grouptries to calm them saying this is a cricket group,no Kejriwal or Modi discussions. At times theirarguments heat up so much that till 1am thephone keeps buzzing. I have to mute the group. I
have not made a group to discuss politics
specially”(Male, 41, Delhi)

Image 5: Response to a posted message: “Please do not sharesuch messages. Group admin please pay attention to thismessage38How Facebook is used by citizens:

some degree of dialogue around the news- and perhaps toFacebook, however, is very clearly perceived as a broadcastingeven come across some viewpoints opposed to your own. At

platform, with the main source of news being the newsfeed,

the same time there is a level of self-censoring and self-

rather than one on one shares. Citizens do actively curate

checking going on in Facebook- and this is pronounced among

their Facebook feed, ‘liking’ the pages of various news or news

those who have had some kind of a negative experience fromlike organizations. Facebook is not seen as a platform for

a comment or post of theirs. Also, let’s be under no illusions

likeminded or hemophilic groups, especially since itthat people are using Facebook as some kind of digital agora

constitutes of many contacts who are ‘added’ with very little

or a fully functioning public sphere70 has been created.

personal connection to them. This nature of Facebook- added

Ultimately it seems that whatever the Facebook algorithm

to the extreme ease of sharing with every one of your ‘friends’-

might serve up (and Facebook itself has done studies thatmakes it a broadcasting platform and every comment there isshow that in theory people are at least exposed to somewhat

considered an articulation of ones own stance. Activity on

opposing points of view) 71, people are skimming over orFacebook is much more designed to attract attention- in a way

skipping past opposing points of view, with not that muchthat activity on WhatsApp is not. While people are perfectly

appetite to engage. In extreme instances, they are resorting

content to not receive reactions to everything they say oralso to unfollowing or unfriending. In effect, then, bothevery piece of content they put across on WhatsApp, they

WhatsApp and Facebook are ending up being to some extent

expect and crave reactions for things they put on Facebook.

echo chambers, with a lot of confirmation bias going on.

And because Facebook does not constitute of homophilic

On both of these platforms, though, a key feature is thegroups in quite that way, there are few barriers to actively

sharing of content without active, engaged consumption. Thatevangelizing your beliefs and seeking to convert others tois, there is no necessary relationship between the activity ofyour beliefs, or at the very least evoking a strong counter

consuming something and the sharing of that thing.

response.
70

However, in contrast to WhatsApp, Facebook as a platform

In the sense, obviously, of Habermas. There are strong counterargumentsthat at best what has historically existed is not a ‘public sphere’ but‘public sphericules’ See, for an interesting debate: Calhoun, Craig.

has quite a ‘clean’ reputation. Because many have subscribed

Habermas and the Public Sphere. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-53114-3.

to their preferred journalistic sources on Facebook, it is seen

Boston, MA. : MIT, 1993.

as more truthful and reliable, less local and more national, andgreat for breaking news. Unlike WhatsApp then, on Facebook,71

See: https://www.adweek.com/digital/exposure-to-diverse-informationon-facebook/

it is quite possible through ‘likes’ and ‘comments’ to have39verification: they indulge in selective consumption, exhibit apreference for images

Summing up: Implications for Fake News
These conditions that we observe seem to be necessary tocreate an environment in which fake news can spread:The lines between various types and sources of news
blur, especially when they are all available in the same
spac e- and since every type of ‘news’ is in the same
space, ‘fake news’ too can be hosted there.

A skepticism about the news media’s motivations andintentions leads to an openness for alternate sources ofnews and information

The digital deluge , with its near infinite sources, andnear incessant notifications, contributes to a highfrequency, low time spent news behaviour - therefore
reducing the individual’s scrutiny on a single piece of
information

As citizens try to manage the flow of digital information, andbecause they can’t scrutinize the truth claims of this flood ofdigital information, they adopt a number of behaviours andstrategies, which allow fake news to be shared without

40

The motivations
behind sharing

41

2‘national myths’ (more on which later, after a discussion on

II. The motivations behind

identities).

sharing

Why do people share in the first place? What are theygetting out of it? And how do these motivations allow fakenews messages to slip through the cracks?
Before we look at these motivations, let’s look at what they
are sharing. Analysing the corpus of WhatsApp messages
collected during the fieldwork,72 we noticed that thecategories emerging are quite at odds with what we saw inmedia coverage of fake news73(see fig. 1 on next page).

Image 1: A fake news message warning citizens against

This is no more than indicative, given the limitations of theforwarding any posts/videos regarding “politics/

methodology, but it is certainly suggestive of what’s being

present situation about Government/PM” as everything

shared in the private networks. As you can see, unlike in theis apparently being ‘monitored’.

media coverage which the majority was about ‘domestic news
and current affairs’, the top category here (at 37%) is Scares &If these are the types of messages they are sharing, why

Scams, closely followed behind by what we are calling

are they in fact sharing? The reasons people sharemessages on digital sharing platforms form a mix of the72

This was supplemented with fake news messages from the /unkill threadon Reddit
73
Note: we are not quite comparing apples and apples here. First we aretalking different time frames here. Then, the media coverage classification
was of news stories about fake news; the message classification is about
messages shared overall, including fake news messages. This was a functionof the limited time available to the project team, but we do see in the datathat there is a strong correspondence between type of messages shared andtypes of fake news messages shared.

not too surprising and the quite counterintuitive.

42

Fig. 1: Categorisation of messages sharedwithin private networks in India(Indicative)

43

sharing and dissemination of information becomes almost a
civic duty. There is a sense that certain things need to be

II.1. Sharing to verify (within the network)

spread farther, wider and faster. This falls into two broad

One of the more counterintuitive behaviours wecategories:

discovered was that of people sharing messages of dubiousa. First, as a duty to spread information far and wide

provenance or facticity within the networks, because they

because it is thought to be in the public interest andwant someone in the network to verify the information

could help someone, even if the onus of verification iscontained in the messages. Usually, though, these messages

left to the receiver. Importantly, these are the types ofare not shared with an explicit request to verify; but it isfake news messages where the costs to the recipient ofshared in the expectation that someone in the network itself

the information being false are not seen to be high. But

would get back to the sender disproving the contents of the

before we delve into the next motivations for sharing,message if it were untrue. Usually, for every individual there

we must take a detour to understand the new form

is someone in the network who is trusted - either on specificidentities are taking in India today.

issues, or because they are generally considered to be ‘learned’or ‘educated’ - to point out if something is untrue. In someways, this is mirror behaviour to what we earlier termed‘sender primacy’. Cues about veracity are being sought notfrom third parties, but from someone in the network. As aresult, fake news messages are spreading, even if the intention
is very much there to check verification.

II.2. Sharing as a civic duty
Sharing something and coming across to your friends
as ‘in the know’ certainly continues to drive some sharing
behaviour. But in an environment where the media’s
motivations are considered suspect, and as an ordinary citizen,
you feel like you finally have the power to spread the word,
44

Image 6: An example of a fake news message sent,

Image 7: An example of a message sent as civic‘just in case it helps’

duty since the ‘nation’s media is ignoring him’.
Translation: This is Dr. Vishal Rao who has invented a device
which can help throat cancer victims recover their lost voice.
This device costs just Rs. 50. Today, media from over the worldis praising him, but the media in our country is ignoring him.
Let’s together help him progress.

45

Interlude

Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 as

Emerging socio-political identities in India

Hindu nationalism or Hindutva77, the ideology closely

today - findings from this project

associated with the BJP, encompasses a range of discourses,

the Prime Minister of India.

ranging from the comparatively mild to the extreme, and there
is much that is fascinating and contradictory in that discourse.
As with any ideology, the ideology of Hindu nationalism

India is a nation grappling with the various ideas of India74

encompasses a range of discourses, ranging from theand Indians are trying to work out what it means to be ancomparatively mild to the extreme, and there is much that is

Indian in the world today. Social media such as Facebook andfascinating and contradictory in that discourse. What unites

Twitter, and messaging apps such as WhatsApp have become

this range of discourse is the central idea that India is a

the terrain on which this is playing out. The story of the lastcountry for Hindus, or more accurately reflecting the view

three decades in Indian politics is mainly about the rise of two

point that India is a culturally Hindu country. This idea ofimportant forces: Hindu nationalism and the Dalit rights

culture is central to the discourse of Hindutva; and because

movements.75 Hindu nationalism, in particular, has positioned

culture is central to Hindutva, one could be an atheist and still

itself directly against Nehruvian socialism (and secularism);be an adherent of Hindutva, as indeed was one of its key

and the triumphal moment of Hindu nationalism, aided by anfounding fathers, V.D. Savarkar. It was Savarkar himself who

impressive mastery of social media,76 was the election of74

75

in the eponymous book coined the term ‘Hindutva’ and sought
to distinguish it from Hinduism78.

Still one of the best discussions of what defines India- at least in thevision of Nehru, one of its founding fathers, is to be found in Sunil
Khilnani’s The Idea of India. Khilnani, S. (1999). The idea of India.
New York: Farrar Straus Giroux

For Savarkar, it was Hindu culture that embodied Indian
national identity. Hindu culture comprised of the religion, thelanguage (Sanskrit and Hindi which was derived from it), theThese are very closely interconnected and the first is often seen as areaction to the second. See for example: Jaffrelot, C. (1996). The
Hindu nationalist movement in India. New York: Columbia
University Press ; and Vanaik, A. (1997). The furies of Indian
communalism: Religion, modernity and secularization. London: Verso

cult of the golden Vedic age, and the territoriality of India as
the sacred Fatherland of ‘Hindusthan’, the name Savarkar
claimed had been the preferred name for India through the
77

These are not necessarily identical terms, but for simplicity we will use
these two terms interchangeably in this report.
78
Jaffrelot (1996)76

See for example: https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/coverstory/story/20140224-narendra-modi-bjp-prime-ministerial-candidatecampaign-social-media-800175-1999-11-30

46

ages. Since Hindusthan played such a central role in defining

differences between religions. Our fieldwork has picked up the

who a Hindu was, all those professing religions that had

different ways in which socio-political identities are shaping“grown out of the soil of India”—not just Hindus and Hindu

up – and differentiating even within those who are affiliatedsects but Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs as well—were willy-nilly

with the right and identify as Hindu; and of course, amongst

embraced into the fold of Hindus. Christians and Muslims

those who broadly are affiliated against it. And we find thatwhose holy lands were outside of India were suspected tothese are in turn influencing the intensity and spread of fakehave ‘extraterritorial loyalties’ but could be admitted backnews.

into the Hindu fold if they gave up their ‘alien’ beliefs.
Hindutva was not about the Hindu religion, but about a ‘whole
way of life’79. On top of this Muslim men were seen as

Research Findings: The Crystallising Identities

lascivious and lustful, not only raping Hindu women, but
symbolically raping Bharatmata [Mother India], or the Indianof the Rightnation itself 80

There are multiple socio-political identities crystallising inIndia, with three broad groups on the right: one which we call

Importantly, and often forgotten in discussions about it,

Hindu/tva Conservatives; two, the Hindu/tva Progressives;

Hindutva should not be understood as identical with thethree, the Hindu/tva Warriors. We are using the u/tva

Hindu religion. In fact, the diversity of practice of Hindu

formation to indicate that some of these individuals are

religion is not necessarily seen as a very good thing, lacking as

Hindus without being strongly wedded to Hindutva, while

it does a central locus around which to unite. As it happens,some in the group are indeed ideologically aligned to

one of the founding fathers of Hindu nationalism, Veer

Hindutva.

Savarkar, was an atheist, but as he said himself, he was‘culturally Hindu’.

1. Hindu/tva Conservatives:

Media commentary about India often uses the term

They are typically older and they see conformity to traditions‘polarisation’ to talk about the divisions in Indian society

and following rituals by the whole family as all important,

today. These discussions usually veer off into existingeven non-negotiable within the family. They are highly
resistant to change, finding security in continuity. Modernity

79

See Jaffrelot (1996), and Hansen, Thomas Blom. The saffron wave :Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton, N.J: Princeton
University Press., 1999
80
Bacchetta, 2005; Hansen, 1999

is therefore a threat, as is any foreign culture, the fear of
cultural erosion is constant and times gone by are47

This talks to an issue that has certainly been politicised by Hindutva

remembered nostalgically. Many of them are explicitly – andideologues and has led to some acts of horrific violence, but the idea of theeven vociferously- supportive of Hindutva ideologies, but it

cow as life bestowing mother is also something that is quite deeply felt by

should be remembered that being Conservative Hindu does

many conservative - and non-conservative - Hindus. 81 (Note: This message

not automatically make into a strong supporter of Hindutva,

is here as an illustration of general sharing behaviour, not fake news sharing

but it is quite likely.

behaviour).

“….. in Hinduism it is a custom that if you are

performing the last rituals, you will not beallowed to leave the house or meet people, youhave to sit separately and eat once a day for 10
days until the day you shave your hair it is also acustom. These are some rituals and customs thathave been followed religiously since generations
now, so we are bound to do it….There are many
rituals like this... But nowadays children say
about rituals "I won't be able to do it you do it
please or I would just join my hands and prayonce" so they do it as just a formality they don't
mean it.”(Male, 60, Varanasi)

81

Though by no means all. Cow worship as being quite central to a ‘Hindu’identity is historically quite a recent phenomenon, and Savarkar was staunchly
opposed to cow worship. See: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toiedit-page/the-cow-and-savarkar-where-the-bovine-is-not-divine-but-theframework-is-still-hardline-hindutva/. And beef is consumed in many parts ofthe country by Hindus who don’t see it as dissonant with their Hindu identity.

Image 8: The caption says “Perhaps this is why inIndian culture, the cow is given the status of mother”.
48

“We cover our head with saree or dupatta in front

love marriages82, they are supportive of women working, andthe men amongst them see this support as a key indicator ofof elders, we need to respect elders...My daughterin law also does it…all the ladies in our family
follows this.“their modernity. Some of them have even quite a laissez faire
attitude to the extremely politicised issue of the banning ofbeef. But while they are at ease with new fashion, technology,(Female, 57, Udaipur)

food, and social media, they also tend to look upon the ‘West’as a source of many ills. They believe that the extreme“I am proud to be a Brahmin..I do my pooja daily

liberalism of the West has led to its downfall or erosion andfor 2 hrs, tomorrow we have havan in out housefor progress and peace..I try my best to teach my
kids all this..I make sure if not 2hrs then 15-20
min they pray daily in the morning”

this leads them to be extra vigilant about conserving theircultural or religious identity.
They celebrate and project religio-cultural traditions, with(Male, 40, Rajkot)

social media of course a prominent venue to do this. But they
are also animated by a sense of pride, which often manifests
as a sense of superiority of their country and culture. They
firmly believe that there is much good in the culture , which
has been lost or submerged, and can be retrieved to return the

2. Hindu/tva Progressives:country to its lost glories. At the same time, they are also

To the Western observer of the Indian political scene, thisfearful that the country is under threat of contamination,

term might seem contradictory. But this group is defined bydilution or even destruction at the hands of the ‘other’, andboth by its affinity with Hindutva ideologies, and also by thethey are therefore the protectors against such outcomes. Theyfact that members of this group see themselves as sociallysense that they are involved in a cause bigger than themselvesprogressive (compared, that is, to the Orthodox Hindu- making a positive difference to the Hindu community andConservative). Usually between youth and middle age, they

the country. In the process, they see themselves as building

are highly judgmental about blind faith, regressive practices,likeminded communities, excluding the rest who are notand strident religion. They are – in their own perceptions-bought into the narrative or the vision.

extremely ‘modern’: for example, they are open to the idea of82

In India most marriages are still ‘arranged’ by the family as opposed to be
being ‘love marriages’. And lest this sound antediluvian to the foreignobserver, 74% of those aged 18-35 said in a 2013 survey that they preferredarranged marriages.

49

It is worth noting here that for this group and the earlier group

The Hindu/tva Progressive sees in Prime Minister Modi a(Hindu/tva Conservatives), Hindus are more or less identified

personality that embodies their own identity andwith India. But it is also worth remarking upon how the mostphilosophies: he is both progressive but also rooted in andpart this group is not supportive of the extremes of religiously

aiming to restore pride in Indian culture, understood bymotivated intolerance. Their attitude towards minorities,

default to be a Hindu culture.

especially religious minorities and in particular Muslims, is

While this group is not lacking for confidence in their identity,

not driven by out and out antagonism, but a feeling that the

every now and then they do have moments of doubt, and they

Hindu religion is the ultimate guarantor of the freedoms ofare not totally closed off to debate. They sometimes also have

Muslims & Christians. This idea - that Hinduism in India is thequite unexpected responses to issues, especially unlike thereligion under the umbrella of which every other religion

next group we will encounter, the Hindutva warriors. (See forexists - certainly has deep roots in Hindu nationalist

example the comment below on the ‘beef ban’).

ideology83. In today’s India, this translates into a subtle
majoritarianism amongst some of the Hindu/tva Progressives.

We believe that this group is likely to be the biggest group of
the three in the country, though this research being

We see that there is no desire to include the ‘other’ inqualitative and exploratory we can’t say this with any

WhatsApp groups, or generally engage with them otherwisecertainty.

offline - and there is a marked resistance to intermarriage orcomingling. But we don’t see in this group any desire to wreak
violence on minorities, even if there is a sense that there arewrongs that have been done to Hindus in the past by ‘Muslim’“My mother and mother in law only wear Sari,

rulers, or by over privileging of Muslim interests by non BJP
governments, both at the state and the center.

84

There is, in

but I don’t want to be like them.. Freedom is big
for me, earlier times there was no freedom. I don’t
like to be restricted so I am making sure that mykid has complete freedom”

fact, for these respondents, a marked distaste for the reportsof violence that comes out in the media every now and thenrelated to Hindu nationalism.

(Female, 33, Rajkot)
83

See Jaffrelot (1996) and Blom Hansen (1999)
The politics of twentieth century Hindu nationalism and the confused
responses to it from supposedly non Hindu nationalist forces is too complex
a topic to get into at length here. Once again Jaffrelot (1996) and Blom
Hansen (1999) are two of the best books on the subject.
84“You cannot keep following all the traditions. If I
go out and work, I cannot ask people of other50

communities not to touch me (ritual purity). We
have to move with the times”

this, it is our dharm”(Male, 34, Udaipur)(Male, 25, Vijayawada)“They are copying western culture blindly…It isgood if somebody has good spoken power inEnglish but they shouldn’t neglect their roots
also…It is not good if they can’t speak or read
Bengali…”“India is a secular country. We all have thefreedom to practice, preach and follow thereligion of our choice. People may eat if they likeor not if they do not like but forcing them to quit
eating by imposing rules and regulations does notseem correct to me. It must be a matter of choiceand not imposing. If a person is a non-vegetarian
it does not matter what meat he is eating. India isa free country [for] open minded thoughts. It is
not correct to restrain the people on such choices.
Let them do what they like. We can set
limitations to it like not cutting the animal inopen premises, steal and all. We are independent
and we should be allowed to take our decisions.
Government must not interfere in this.”(Male, 37, Kolkata)“There is none other religion other than

Hinduism who takes all religions together, andHindus and Muslims don’t get that respect there
in foreign which is given in India, and this is thereason that people of all religion are living here
like Muslim, Christian, but they say themselves
Indian firs. Why they say themselves because
there is a love of Indian, there is a brotherhood,
like people who are Sikhs or Muslims or Christianthen Sikhs are seen in temples, there was a fair in
Saawan, I went to temple, one lady comes
towards me she was of age 35-40 and ask me thatwhich thing is known as Shiv ling, which are
Ganesha, which are Parvati, and it is not possiblethat she belong to Hindu culture, she may be of
any other religion, and in spite of that she comesto temple as she is Indian”(Male, 41, Delhi)“We celebrate all the festivals, today is Baach

Baras, my mother does tika85 to males of thefamily, we pray to cow on this day..I have shared
how and why this is celebrated with other people
also so that they know the purpose and reason
behind the celebration..everyone should know all
85(Male, 34, Amritsar)

Temporary ceremonial mark on forehead

51and therefore their communication and sharing behaviouris marked by an extreme anti-other stance. They deal invery heightened emotions and this tone spills over into thekind of news and information they share. This the groupthat often finds itself in the limelight due to the incendiary
tone and content of many of their messages. The messages
that they share are often extremely offensive- and possibly
are also geared to generate offence. These types ofmessages are most often shared in very particular
WhatsApp groups- the Hindutva warrior will be careful
about not sharing this on, say, a family group but will
share it in the political groups created in WhatsApp. Of all
the groups defined here, the Hindutva warrior is likeliest
to be on Twitter, seeing it as a battleground for his battles.
(The Hindutva warrior is also more likely to be male thanfemale). 86

Image 9: Fake news seen in the feed of a Hindu/tva
Progressive

3. Hindutva warriors

86

The explanations are sociological, not biological, obviously. Note thatsome of the most virulent and vitriolic discourse of the Hindu right of thelast few decades has come from women (for eg Sadhvi Rithambara). See forexample: Bacchetta, Paola. Gender in the Hindu nation : RSS women as
ideologues.(New Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2004.) Anand Patwardhan’s
Father, Son and Holy War is an exceptional dissection of the crisis ofmasculinity driving Hindu nationalism in the 1990s.

These are the people who wear their Hindutva ideology on
their sleeves. They are very significantly animated by asense of threat to their identity, a lot of it revolving arounda sense of cultural dilution. Most importantly, their stance52

Sociopolitical identities of the ‘Left’
In some ways, the classic leftist is somewhat thin on
the ground amongst the ordinary citizenry. In our process ofrecruiting respondents, it was much easier to find someone on
the extreme right end of the political spectrum than it was tofind someone on the extreme left end of the political
spectrum.89 We are therefore choosing to use the term ‘Left’
within quotation marks. This is a way to suggest that thesegroups are more defined by their opposition to the right thanas being truly on the ‘left’.

Image 10: Fake news message shared by a Hindutva Warrior.
Caption in the red band translates to: “The Quran sanctions

Unlike the three groups discussed above, unified by arape of young girls if they are of a different religion”

particular way of being Hindu, we find that the individuals on
the left have no unifying thread other than an opposition to
the right. They are not animated by a unified narrative but
occasionally cohere around particular issues; unlike theWhile these groups have their distinct characteristics asgroups on the right, there is no consistent underlying

outlined above, they are all ‘hailed’87 by the discourse ofnarrative that constitutes their subjectivity.

Hindutva as ‘Hindu’ subjects. This is of course a particular
type of Hindu subjectivity, usually upper caste88 , North

We see in our fieldwork, four main ways in which thisIndian and even Brahminical.

positioning against the right playing out:

1. Anti Modi-policies:
87

The term is very much used here in the Althusserian sense. See Althusser,Louis. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. Michigan: Monthly Review
Press, 1972
88
Hindutva has historically been an upper caste ideology; and its latetwentieth century expression is often seen as a reaction to lower caste
movements. The Hindu nationalist movement has made concerted efforts toembrace lower castes into its fold of late. Cordbridge & Harris (2003) in fact
see Hindu nationalism as an ‘elite revolt’ of the upper castes

A focus on the grievances rather than identity or ideology,
89

This is not to argue that they don’t exist, especially since central India,
where we did conduct some fieldwork has been marked by a Maoist
insurgency for the last xxx years. It’s that amongst the citizenry we did
profile, it was53

often driven by a sense of indignation, or harm felt by policies,
such as the introduction of the GST and demonetisation.

“You know people say that (after Modi) India’s

2. Anti-Hindutva:

international image has improved – we have an
identity beyond poverty and snake charmers- but
see Rome was not built in a day. Many people
have contributed towards it. Modi is very good inmarketing. ”

Those who see themselves as ‘secular’ as opposed to the
Hindu nationalism of the BJP, and minorities who are worried
about their safety, and indeed, place in the India of today.

3. Anti Modi- personality:(Male,27, Mumbai)

A group that might even have voted for Modi initially but now
disappointed by what they see as a lack of tangible change.

“All these big big schemes, Make in India,

Start up India all are only in PM’s speeches,nothing on the ground. These schemes aredesigned to exclude states where the state
government is not a BJP one”

4. Pro Congress/ other parties:
Those who have long been supporters of other parties andhave still held on.

(Female, 24, Vijayawada)

This is not to say that these individuals don’t have identities,
but their identities play out on a more localised scale. There
are strong geographically defined identities (i.e. Tamil,
Bengali), or identities defined by status as religious minorities(e.g. Christian, Muslim) or by caste status (e.g. Dalits), or
finally, by being secular. On top of the fact that these groups
do not coalesce around identities but around particular issues,
we see that what is core to the identity of each one of thesegroups (say, Dalits) is often dismissed by other groups as‘issues’.
54that what they are sharing is driven by the issue rather thananything deeper or continually resonant (psychologicallyspeaking).
What this means politically is out of the scope of this report,
but it has important implications for the spread of fake news
in the digital sharing platforms.

The Disengaged
The discussion above should not lead us to believe that every
one who falls in one of the categories of the right or the nonright is actively sharing content all the time. In fact there is agroup, drawing from both the right and their opponents, who
are kind of in the middle of the spectrum. This is not really aconsidered ‘centrist’ position or a Blairite/Clintonite ‘third

Image 11: Shared by an upper caste member of the left.

way’91 type positioning but more a disengagement fromTranslation: “Despite getting the 99th rank Namrata Jain could notjoin the IAS, but Chandrakant Verma who ranked 352nd got throughpolitical news and the news cycle. They consume more thanbecause of reservations.90 For a reservations free India share the post

they share; when they do share they share near news andas widely as you can. Make sure you share the post”. (Post masked to‘updates’ they think are non-contentious. When they dopreserve anonymity)

engage with and share political news, it’s more humourous/
political images and cartoons: they are aiming to entertain

This lack of a central overarching identity usually means that

their network rather than provoke, or engage with them overthese groups engage with news and share news primarily

political issues.

around issues. When a news event, occurs their sharing
activity increases, and when the news cycle dies down their
sharing dies down too. We shall discuss below in more detailwhat exactly they do share, but the key thing to remember is
90

91

The Indian term for affirmative action.

55

See: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/feb/10/labour.uk1

We come back now to the reasons for sharing. (Just to recap,

networks- and therefore a significant amount of the fake news

the first two motivations for sharing were ‘sharing to verify

shares are geared to reaffirm and validate people’s identities.

within the network’ and ‘sharing as civic duty’.

The identity work happens most strongly on the right,
especially as each new message works well in reaffirming thecore Hindu identity; or in the case of those not on the right it

II.3. Sharing for community- and nation- building:works in reaffirming their sub –identity. Again, because
what’s at play here is so much deeper than sharing

News/ information is now seen as something that

information, fact checking and truth claims become quitebuilds awareness about key issues (but particularly theirrelevant.

country’s progress). Importantly news and the circulation ofnews is something that allows for likeminded people to cometogether and keep the ‘other’ out. This sense of purpose- of
doing something bigger than oneself- is felt more in certain
groups than others, but we have observed that this aspect of it
applies not just to individuals united by a right leaning
identity but by some of the ‘non-right’ as well. In fact, as we
saw with the message shared about IAS and reservations,
there is a belief amongst the creators and sharers of thesemessages that sharing means active participation inawareness raising- and therefore building on the specific idea
of India that the particular citizen believes in. This sense of
purpose overrides the need to assess truth claims of content
for the most part.

II.4 . Sharing as an expression & projection of identity:
Sharing might be thought of as an act ofcommunication, but on WhatsApp and on Facebook today,
sharing is mostly an expression and projection of identity. A
significant amount of the shares that we see on these private
56

Summing up: Implications for Fake News
What we find therefore is that sharing on digital platforms isvery rarely, if at all, about communicating, leave alone
engaging in rational critical discussions.
There are, then, two broad ways in which sharing of fake news
happens: the first comes from relatively good intentions ofhonest citizens to either share as civic duty or to attempt toverify through the network. The second comes from a sense of
purpose when sharing is for community and nation building
or for projection of identity.
Both of these broad ways of sharing are happening forreasons which make the question of the truth content of themessages fairly redundant. As a result the question ofverifying the content of the messages before sharing simply
does not arise.
We will discuss at length the nature, content and structure of
how these identities shape the consumption and sharing of
fake news messages, but first let’s address an all importantquestion. What is ‘fake news’, at least from the perspective of theordinary citizen?
57

What is fake news?
How validation of identity
trumps verification of facts

58

3

this immediate connection made with scams and theIII. What is fake news? How

fantastical is because they have had moments of truth in thevalidation of identity trumps

past - either because they have clicked on a link or shared anumber and have subsequently been spammed, or they haveverification of facts

suffered the social embarrassment of being called out forsomething fantastical they have shared. None of these twocategories are remotely in the territory of political or ‘hard’
news. There is not much thought given by citizens to who is

We are now ready to understand what, from thecreating these types of ‘fake news’ other than scammers

perspectives of the citizens, is ‘fake news’. How we come topossibly trying to make a quick buck, or ‘marketers’ trying tothis needs some explanation. Note that a critical part of theget personal details through nefarious means.

research design involved not disclosing to participants when
auto-ethnographic collection of the content they had shared

When probed, or in deep conversation, however, they label as

would happen. This was therefore a project trying to‘fake’ things that clash with their socio-political identities, orunderstand the dissemination of fake news. In fact, for the

deeply cherished beliefs. Usually, these are to do with politics,

most part, the moderators of the interviews did not bring up

policies, personalities and culture. Fake news messages are

the term ‘fake news’ till such time as the respondents did sousually associated with, and considered, the handiwork of thethemselves. If the respondents did not bring up the term in thepolitical parties - the opposition trying to discredit the rulinginterview right till the very end, then the moderator would

party, and the ruling party trying to defend their position.

introduce the term. This was a deliberate choice, aimed at

There is a slightly blasé attitude to this: that this is the way

understanding how central to citizen’s discussions of news

the political game has always been played. So, often, most of

and information the term fake news was, and how they used it.

what is coming from the political party you support is then
the truth, while what is coming from your opponent is ‘fake

Our analysis suggests that people India are not that concerned

news’.

about fake news, no matter what they say in quantitative
surveys. First, the initial association with or the working

Beyond this simplistic schema, there is no sense of fake news

definition of the term ‘fake news’ is largely limited to scams

being any larger a problem - or more importantly, there is no(all kinds of schemes, offers and attempted cons) that theysense that this is might be a social problem needing akeep coming across, or messages in the realm of thecollective solution. There is no connection to this politicallyfantastical, which are just too incredible to believe. Usually,polarised nature of fake news having consequences beyond59

“I follow many TV channels, newspaper pages on

the immediate. In fact, even knowledge of fake news messages
associated with violence is fuzzy at best - and recalled vaguely

Facebook and most of their news is biased
towards Yogi93 and Modi. It is all fake. They havebought out all the channels and they only say
what BJP want them to say”

from media reports rather than from encountering thosemessages themselves. There is certainly no recognition that it
might be getting harder and harder to differentiate between
what’s fact and what’s not. And in many ways, there is a level(Male, 24, Varanasi)

of overestimation of their own abilities to detect fake fromfact. As part of the research process, respondents were

“Many new anchors have come today. It has madenews interesting. But some I don’t agree with,they have no data or they just don’t like BJP”

exposed to a mix of real and fake news messages. And almost
no respondent was adequately able to identify the fakes. But
one of the more concerning things that we observed(Male, 34, Raipur)

happening, though, is that those some looked at legitimate
news items or sources and judged them to be fake.
Going back over all that we have discussed so far, it isunderstandable why this is so. Ultimately, the main work thatcitizens are doing on messaging apps and social media is notrational critical debate and discussion. They are effectively
looking for validation of their belief systems. And beliefs are,by definition, not about facts. On these platforms then,validation of identity trumps92 verification of the facts.

93

92

The very hard right Chief Minister of India’s most populous and perhaps mostpolitically important state.

No pun or political point intended. This just happens to be the mostappropriate word in this sentence.

60

During the fieldwork, we observed that citizens for the mostpart had either not quite noticed the tag or if they had noticed

Interlude: Why attempts to curtail fakethey had misinterpreted what it meant. In what is possibly annews fall on deaf ears

isolated case, a respondent even though that the tag was
encouragement to further forward the message on!

Knowing what we now know, we can see why attempts
to curtain the spread of fake news might fall on deaf ears. In“M: Now you will see there is a feature forward

India, WhatsApp, under heavy government pressure to curtailthe spread of disinformation introduced

94

it, have you noticed that, previously it was there?

the forwarded tag on

messages, and Facebook launched an advertising campaign

95

to educate citizens about the perils of fake news are likely

R: Yes, I have noticed it and previously it was notthere. Here forwarded means somebody has
forwarded to you and you should forward thesame.”

insufficient in combating fake news.

But more importantly, as we discussed earlier, the sender96
matters much more than the original source of the content (i.e.
who created the content); and since the decision to consume,
and, to an extent, to share further, is based on the identity ofthe sender, the forwarded tag does little to prevent sharing.

Image 1: The ‘forwarded’ tag on WhatsApp

Similarly, Facebook’s injunctions not to spread news thathasn’t been verified are likely not to have much traction
because, as we have seen most people do not believe they are
the ones spreading fake news. For them, the dominant
94

See: https://www.hindustantimes.com/tech/whatsapp-s-new-forwardedlabel-all-you-need-to-know/story-Ug5iUiGvXpP8Xleo2WeETK.html
95
See: https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/rising-fake-news-forcefacebook-to-pullout-full-page-ads-in-newspapers-educating/302010

96

Just to refresh our memory: when we say ‘sender’ we mean a person in the
network who has sent the message; and when we say ‘source’ we are referringto the original creator of the content, be it a news organisation or a Macedonian
teenager.

61

association of fake news is scams and scares, done by
nefarious actors for profit making, or at a deeper level fakenews is news that is dissonant with their closely held beliefs
and self-identity, done by those in a political out group. Eitherway, citizens don’t think they themselves have a role to playin this. This creates a challenge in tackling the spread of fakenews: if you don’t believe you have a role to play in the
sharing of fake news, then you certainly won’t respond tomessages exhorting you to not share fake news.

62

The narratives ofeffective fake news
messages

63

4

These types of messages are shared by more than one group

IV. The narratives of effectiveon the Hindu right, but in this project we did not really findfake news messages

them to be extremely commonplace.

Having looked at the central role that beliefs andidentities are playing on digital platforms, it is time now tolook at the messages themselves. What are the types of fakenews messages that are being shared in these networks? And
what relationship do they have with the identities andideologies described earlier?

IV.1. The fake news messages circulating amongst
those with a right leaning identity
Narrative 1: Overtly Anti- Minority Discourse:
The most Hindu/tva affiliated respondents share messages
that betray anti Muslim animosity. Broadly speaking, thesecan be divided into two categories. The first litigates supposed
injustices of the past, often using misleading or motivated

Image 2: The headline says ‘I haven’t forgotten’ (and this isreadings of history. History is for these groups a key

part of a series). The body copy says “I haven’t forgotten that impure

battleground on which ideas of India are being fought out 97

Akbar, who asked Hemu’s elderly 72 year old father to accept Islam and when
he didn’t acceded, beheaded him.” The key phrase here is “I haven’t forgotten”.
Not forgetting is critical of course, when history is up for grabs.

97

Many Indian historians have come under fire from Hindu nationalists for theirleftist leanings. This includes India’s possibly most well known historian, Romila
Thapar. See this commentary: https://www.firstpost.com/india/whipping-girlof-the-right-attack-romila-thapars-ideas-not-her-integrity-1792173.html. For
the counter view, see: https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/beyond-the-historians-the-ichr-s-project-must-be-to-depoliticize-the-liberalarts/cid/167694

64

The second category of fake news messages is the type sharedaiming in some ways to ‘take over’ India. Again, note here,by the out and out Hindutva warrior, which are locatedthat while the content of the message might be found quite

squarely in the present.

disturbing by many, and the tone quite inflammatory andalarmist, one cannot judge from the message alone that thesender is deliberately making up the facts. The important
thing here is that the recipients of the message will pass themessage on without verification, not because of the accuracyof the data in the message, but because of how the message
fits in with his or her worldview.
Similarly messages like the one below are shared: purportedly
a tweet from a genuine Muslim cleric, but coming – wesuspect- from a Hindu right wing network of parody/ satiricalaccounts. The cleric is apparently looking forward to ‘our rule’over India, reacting on Twitter to the opposition leader Rahul
Gandhi’s comment about Congress being a party for Muslims.

Image 13: Public tweet (ie not gathered from respondents during fieldworkfor this project), indicative of Hindutva warrior ideology.
The use of misleading, decontextualized or false tactics is a common move infake news messages. Note the use of the asterisk in the word Muslims, toexpress distaste for all adherents of the religion.

This fake news message plays upon the emotionally resonantidea, for this group, that Hindus are threatened by Muslims. In
its most hyperbolic form, this idea suggests that Muslims are65

Most of the other groups of the right, especially the Hindu/tva
Progressives, shy away from this type of outright animus. As
we have discussed earlier, they are quite reluctant to sharethings they believe might incite violence. What resonates forthem, though, are some of the softer narratives of Hindu
nationalism. These take various forms, including:Narrative 2- Hindu Power and Superiority: This is conveyed
through two main approaches. One, celebrating the supposed
glories of the ancient Vedic age, suggesting that many –if not
all - of the great achievements of humankind, had their roots
in ancient India (which is imagined to be exclusively Hindu).
A subset of this-playing on the fear of cultural dilution by theWest-are fake news messages suggesting that India is superior
to the ‘West’.

Image 3: From a pro-Hindutva parody Twitter account,circulating as genuine on WhatsApp. The text purportedly comesfrom a Muslim religious leader saying ‘Inshallah, now we will rule over India’.

As we have stated before, we believe that the Hindu/tva
warrior is in a minority amongst the Hindu right. And ouranalysis also suggests that their messages, especially at their

Image 4: A fake news message trying to persuade recipientsmost vitriolic, have relatively limited circulation. By this wethat NASA was set up by ancient ‘Vedic’ sages - and the story

mean that they have circulation within fairly tighly knit

was suppressed by ‘Muslim invaders’groups, and do not really become mainstream.
66

When situated in the present day, the messages are mostly
about how Hindus are superior to those who are non-Hindus.
Some of these messages use the classic technique of using
data or statistics (as in the tweet about rapes, above) to ask arhetorical question. Note that while the message draws uponestablished Hindu nationalist ideas about the divided loyalties
of Muslims and Christians, it does not resort to outrightvilification.

Image 6. Celebrating a ‘3500 year old Sree Ganesha98 temple’in Azerbaijan - and ignoring the fact that it was among other things also
dedicated to Ganesha and that it hasn’t been a Ganesha temple for 5000
years.99

Narrative 3 -Preservation and revival:

Image 5: A decontextualized message asking a rhetoricalA related narrative - and associated messages - are more to doquestion about why mosques & churches did not donate towith the preservation and revival of ancient glories (usually

the Kerala floods. This message works well for a recipient who believes

Hindu). These are mostly to do with the retrieval ofthat mosques and churches are somehow not fully Indian. For others, theanswer might well be something to do with relative wealth of temples, mosques,

98

Elephant headed Hindu god, son of the gods Shiva and Parvati
As you can see, fact checking beliefs makes the fact checker seem tediousand pedantic.

and churches in India.

99

67

supposedly long lost aspects of culture, especially rituals; andAre usually aligned to an issue of the day

it certainly has to do with positioning the ancient Vedic age asWill refer to non-Indian experts or non Indian bodies asa glorious chapter in history of humankind. But it has also tomarkers of credibility

do with drawing attention to neglect about the country’s(Hindu) cultural and architectural treasures.
The next two categories are interesting in that their content
resonates most with the identities of the right, but by nomeans are those on the anti-right entirely immune to theirappeal. In particular, the next narrative holds appeal across
many identity types.

Narrative 4-Progress and national pride:
One of the most common types of fake news messages foundin private encrypted feeds in India, these are built around acentral narrative of India’s near-unstoppable progress in themodern world. Often, international or global bodies like

Image 7: A classic example of a fake news message in the

UNESCO are included in these messages as evidence for the

Progress and national pride category, subtly conveying thetruth content of the statements. (In fact, for some reason,

success of the PMs demonetisation100 initiative by using the

UNESCO happens to be a favourite for the creators of theseterm ‘fiat’ currency. Another one picked up during the fieldwork infake news messages, popping up in multiple contexts in

Kolkata was about UNESCO declaring Bengali the world’s sweetest

multiple messages).

language.101

There are a few common characteristics to these messages.
They usually:

100

As good a summary as any is available here, (and apologies for the hereticalact of citing Wikipedia):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Indian_banknote_demonetisation

Urge ‘Indians’ to celebrate or be proud about an

101

achievement

Given that Bengalis have been declaring Bengali India’s sweetest language foryears, maybe it was about time for UNESCO to get in on the act.

68

Image 8: Another fake news message, works well with

Image 9: Fake news message trying to convey its audience ofHindu/tva Conservatives and Hindu/tva Progressives, who

the merits of a controversial statue of the Maratha leader

generally tend to be upper caste, and for whom ‘reservations’Shivaji, revered by many Hindu nationalists (and for thatare anathemamatter many non-Hindu nationalists as well).

69

The fourth narrative is linked to the third. It is in some ways
still about national pride and progress but in this case it isabout the progress wrought by one individual: Modi.
Narrative 4-Personality & Prowess (of PM Modi) :These messages are threaded with a common narrative, infact a narrative that has been seen time and again, thenarrative of the Great Man who singlehandedly is leading anation into a glorious future. These messages have someunderlying sub narratives- and visual signifiers- as well:Modi is the first Indian leader to get respect andrecognition in the West102



Image 10: Message listing Modi’s supposed achievements: aModi’s achievements, often listed and quantified with amixture of accurate statistics, and false, misleading or

barrage of data and statistics


decontextualized ones.

Modi’s achievements compared and contrasted withthe lack of achievements- and outright corruption- of
the then ruling Congress party.

Often featuring Modi dynamically striding forward
and/or looking upward at an angle: conveying a futurefacing leader

102

There are many contradictions in craving the recognition of the West, yetat the same time fearing cultural pollution from the same West. But thenhuman beings are contradictory!

70

Image 12: Fake news message falsely claiming that the ruling

Image 11: Fake news message suggesting that because ofCongress party siphoned off funds from World Bank loans,Modi, India has left behind the USA and Japan to become thewhile the Modi government has not taken a single paisa

world’s second largest installer of solar panels.

worth of loans from the World Bank; and is instead working
hard to repay those debts.

71they play on narratives of nation building and progress, they
are much more resistant to fact checking.

IV.2. The fake news messages circulating amongst theleft
We have seen above how the fake news messages circulating
amongst the right, play consistently on themes of Hindu
identity and national progress, and how the ones playing tonational pride and progress and Modi’s personality andprowess, sometimes also find traction in those not on theright . And just as identities are more diverse or fragmented
amongst those opposed to the right, we observe that fakenews messages too are diverse, united only in opposition to
PM Modi, the BJP and its affiliates. These are interested incalling out various imagined flaws and corruptions in Modi
and the Modi led government without any attempt at
providing evidence. Just as with messages on the right, on theleft too you see the use of multiple data points to establish
veracity; and there are attempts too, to use doctored images toestablish their points. There are examples found also of using
distortions of history to land anti Hindutva points.

Image 13: Misleading message claiming that because of thefear of bankruptcy laws changing, 2100 companies paid backbank loans worth 830,000,000,000.
These four narratives are extremely effective when it comes tosharing, and especially the last two, as they manage to cut
across quite a bit of the ideological spectrum. And because72Image 14: Fake news message circulating on the left, calling
Modi ‘The Emperor of Scams.’ It lists a whole list of these
supposed scams and rupee value of those so-called scams,
without even attempting to provide evidence. (The semiotic
analysis of why Modi is shown dressed partially in Batman and partially inSpiderman garb will, we are afraid, take up far too many pages for us toattempt here!)

Image 15: Facebook post with doctored image, replacing theimage of then Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif with that of Hafiz
Saeed, founder of the Pakistan based militant group
Lashkar-e-Taiba(LeT). The caption says “See ‘deshdrohis’ who is the real
traitor”. Deshdrohi is the term often used in right wing circles to call out theiropponents for lacking sufficient patriotism.

73

Image 27: Fake news message suggesting that when ‘thecountry was fighting the British, members of the RSS, were
saluting the queen. This image was created using a picture of Queen
Elizabeth II inspecting a guard of honour from Nigerian soldiers.

It must however be said here that in the course of our fakenews message collection from the field, and scanning of the
Reddit Unkill corpus of fake news messages, the volume offake news messages from the right and supporting the rightwas significantly higher than that from the left and on the left.
However, the point isn’t that somehow citizens on the left areless willing or able to share fake news messages. That issomething that can only be assessed by statistical techniques

Image 26: Fake news message stating that ‘none of the BJP

outside the scope of this project. A partial explanation for why

ruled states have come forward to help Kerala’, attributed to

we have unearthed many more right leaning fake news

a Justice Dharmavathi.

messages than left leaning ones could be in the sampling,
though inordinate care was taken with the recruitment toensure there were equal number of right leaning and ‘left’74leaning respondents; however it could be the case that
production of fake news messages on the right is much moreorganised, a topic for further journalistic investigation. (As wewill see later, we can certainly see that the dissemination ofright leaning messages on Twitter is certainly much moreorganised and closely connected). Before we go there, a quick
look at what types of fact checking and verification, ordinary
citizens are using, if any.

75Fact checking andverification:
Limited and specific76

5

“So many people share this news about Jet

airways I am convinced these are all fake news I
don’t think we would get anything free, for the
first time I received like this in my email sayingthat I would get a free iPad so that was the firsttime I believed and I forwarded that to many
people then someone told me that it is fake so I
stop sending such message”

V. Fact checking andverification: Limited andspecific(Female, 50, Chennai)

V.1. Two groups that assess fake news better thanothers – and the techniques they use

The other group of people who are able to call out fake news
messages are younger citizens who have grown up exposed to

We are not suggesting above that every citizen who

digital platforms. They have an intuitive understanding ofcomes across a message carrying one of the narratives‘virality’ and understand the idea of clickbait (the use ofmentioned previously is immediately persuaded by thosetantalising headlines to lure people into clicking on a link,messages. But we must remember that a significant portion ofwith the promise of the headline usually going unfulfilled)

messages are not consumed - and therefore, it cannot be theconceptually. They also use cues internal to the messages tocase that all fake news messages are being consumed byspot possible fakes, for example, excessive brand mentions,

everyone who receives it.

explicit and repeated calls to share, linguistic cues (e.g.
good/bad English) or seemingly morphed images.

There are two audience groups who are able to call out fakenews messages as such. The first group consists of citizens
who are voracious consumers of in-depth news. They are able
to weed out the more obvious fakes, for example, the one in
the image below. They are more aware of the fake news
discussion in the media, and can sometimes use structuralfeatures of fake news messages (e.g. too many exclamation
points; too many data points) or simply to call out
impossibilities (e.g. “too good to be true”)
77alleviate toothache). ‘Trust’ in Google is indeed high, but
trust mostly comes into play for these practical uses.

“Google news can never be false. It’s our God.
Even for kids’ products, from hair to needle
making work we search Google only”(Female, 33, Delhi)

Image 1: Fake news message urging people to switch off

When it comes to news, things are slightly different. While itphones lest high radiation from cosmic rays cause damage.

is well recognised by citizens that Google gives you ‘many

Note the use of ‘CNN’, ‘BBC’, ‘Google’, and ‘NASA’ to establish authenticity.

links’ so that you can – in theory- be exposed to a multiplicity

This is one of the messages that many respondents were able to identify asof opinions; in practice, it is too time consuming for someone

fake.

to either read material from all of those links or try to verify
information in a transient message! For example, none of theWhatsApp messages with reams of data about theV.2. Verification – and the very specific use of Google:

achievements of the Modi government are actually put
through Google for verification checks. The consumption andVerification by citizens of messages received on social
media is generally low. There are some instances when

the sharing on digital platforms is in the moment andcitizens are motivated to check the information received - andcontinuous, and, simply put, is not interrupted by fact

more often than not, the tool used for this is Google (verychecking.

much a synonym for searching in India). These are usually to

The type of behaviour where a citizen is patiently examining a

do with checking details about news events (e.g. which movie

billion points of views and coming to a conclusion about thecelebrities donated how much to aid victims of Kerala floods;

state of the universe is as rare in the real world as unicorns

farmers protests ) ; topics that you yourself are interested inwith two horns.

personally (‘something of my own concern’); or things therealm of practical usable information (e,g. what can I use to78

V.3. TV and Newspapers: Still some credibility (even if

disasters, especially international ones, or events of national‘bought out’)importance, or –unsurprisingly- news about celebrities. The

The paradox of the digital world seems to be that TV andpresence of visuals confirms the fact that the event has

use of TV for verification is largely about events, where thenewspapers are still seen to be credible. In particular, thehappened (or not!).

relationship that citizens have to TV news networks andespecially the local TV news networks in the various states isquite complicated. On the one hand they are seen as partisan“R: If you hear somewhere that Amitabh

and obviously linked to business or political interests andmany of them are ‘bought out’. Also because they are partisan,

Bachchan is no more he has met with an accident.
You can simply switch on the television andcheck if it is right or wrong.

citizens believe they don’t provide the ‘full picture’. Thiscertainly makes them purveyors of ‘fake news’ on occasion.
But at the same time, they are seen as entities that will not
traffic in extreme/obvious falsehoods. Citizens make intuitive

M: Ok, so that way you can check if there is anyother way that you could check? Do you have any
example of fake news in your phone?

judgments about the amount at stake for TV networks, andconclude that out and out falsehoods will be beyond the pale
for them. The fact that all TV news content features actual
people or personalities, as opposed to online / digital content

R: Yes, I had this in my phone only about Amitabh
Bachchan's death; there was an image ofAbhishek Bachchan and other people crying.

that is often ‘faceless’103 adds to the aura of credibility.
Importantly also, what really works to the advantage of TV isthat it is a visual medium-and as we have seen before citizens
are increasingly relying on visual evidence to assess whether
something has actually happened or not.

M: Really? How did you find out that it was fake?

Note, though, that while people do turn to TV to verify

R: I checked it on the TV.”messages received on WhatsApp and Facebook, this isbehaviour that is limited to occasions such as news about

103

A term that cropped up in the parallel research project in Nigeria, but isapplicable here as well

79

Newspapers - and here we are talking about the physical thing

fake news messages, especially those resonating with ones

itself - still retain an aura of high reliability, and benefit fromsocio political identity105.

the same attribute that is increasingly seen as a liability in theThis also makes these messages resistant to fact checking.

fast paced digital world: their slowness! The idea here for

Effectively, attempts at ‘fact checking’ are perceived not as

citizens seems to be that because the printed newspaper only

fact checking but – to coin a phrase - belief checking. And

comes out the next day, it gives enough time for them to get it

counter narratives, even if in the form of jokes, are quickly

right!104shut down, with group admins on WhatsApp often quite

Incidentally, international news channels like those from thevigilant about policing these.

BBC and CNN are generally considered to be free from the

These behaviours are not linked that much to being on thebiases and influences bedevilling Indian TV channels - butpolitical right or the political left. It is about the cognitive

because they are ‘international’, their relevance to Indiansystems of human beings. It is about the narrative coherence

affairs is felt to be limited. As a result, despite high credibilityof certain messages that allow all messages in that category toof these networks, citizens do not use them to fact check.

be more easily ingested. And it is about the production anddissemination of these messages.

V.4. The challenges of fact checking - on and off the
network
As discussed earlier in this section, certain citizens in certain
circumstances do indeed identify fake news, and also actively
verify information. But based on data gathered in this project,in general we would argue that high levels of education,
income, digital usage or indeed high levels of news
consumption cannot adequately guard against the sharing of

104

105

Now, if only digital news platforms were in competition with each otherto publish best, not publish first…

Clearly, this is one area for future quantitative studies to examine,possibly using experimental test-control designs.

80

The fake news
ecosystem81

6

understand a little bit about the methodology, its limitations,

VI. The fake news ecosystem on

and some key terms and concepts.106

social media

A note about the methodology and key limitations of theTwitter & Facebook network analysis:

When we started out this project, we did not know if
the term ‘fake news ecosystem’ was appropriate to use in the

One of the challenges of analysing fake news in the media iscontext of India. At the end of this project, we suspect therethat there are very few sources that can be classified as out

are some grounds to do so. As we have discussed, the fakeand out fake news sources. On the other hand, even the mostnews messages on the right have a narrative unity. And in ourwell respected journalistic sources such as Aaj Tak, Swarajya,

fieldwork, we found that fake news messages leaning right

India Today and CNN News 18 have on occasion slipped fromseemed to be dominant in people’s WhatsApp and Facebook

their standards and have been called out for spreading

feeds.

misinformation107.

But one of the main limititations of exploring citizen attitudes

As such, our analysis is not about ‘fake news sources’ (as thatand psychologies is that questions around production andindicates there are sources who only publish fake news) but

dissemination of fake news messages remain relatively

about ‘sources that have published fake news’. For theunexplored. In the interests of completeness for this project,purposes of the Twitter network analysis therefore, we define

we also wanted to explore the interrelationships of sources

two cateories, 1) ‘Sources of Identified Fake News’ and 2)

called out for disseminating fake news and sources of‘Likely Fake News Disseminatiors’. The ‘Sources of Identified

mainstream news; and indeed, the relationship between

Fake News’ are established in the two following ways:

sources disseminating fake news and the political sphere. As

A. Identified as fake news by a fact checking site (one orsuch we created a network analysis map of Twitter tomore of the following: smhoaxslayer, altnews,

understand the interplay of sources of fake news, mainstream

boomlive.in, factchecker.in ) or by the platform (e.g.

media and politics. We also created a Facebook network map

Facebook/ Twitter), orof audience affinities and interests to understand if fake news
consumption on Facebook in India was politically polarised.

106

For more details, please see the Methodology Appendix
See https://www.altnews.in/top-fake-news-stories-circulated-indianmedia-2017/

Before we go to the findings though, it is important to

107

82

B. Identified in the qualitative fieldwork by researchers or

network greater than immediate friends and family, and at

picked up from the /Unkill thread on Reddit.

a volume, which suggests more than personal updates.

We also use algorithmic techniques to establish a list of likely

The process of creating the Twitter network map started

disseminators of fake news in the following ways:

with the compilation of a ‘seed list’ of Twitter accounts of
the amplifiers as described above; this was divided into a

To identify these, we looked at sources very closely linked‘pro BJP’ seed list and and an ‘anti BJP’ seed list, and these

within our network analysis to Identified Sources of fakewere snowballed separately to mitigate any bias that mightnews, via at least one of the following:

have been introduced in the seed list selection. We
mathematically snowballed from this seed list into profiles

A. Twitter Following Network: At least 15% of theirthat these accounts are following, iteratively until wefollowing are being followed by the identified fakereached a count of ~16,000 profiles having ~370,000

news Source AND have at least 5000 followers, or

relationships we deemed sufficient for analysis. The

B. Facebook Audience Network: Classified in a modularity

network of relationships was then mapped using the Forceclass108 with at least 15% identified fake Sources, andAtlas 2 algorithm109,and finally, clustering analysis wasat least 80x affinity with identified fake news sources

done using the modularity maximisation algorithm, tooutline closely knit communities with social connections.

As must be obvious, the analysis would vary depending on
the choice of the ‘15%’ or the ‘80x’ affinity. However, theIn reading , a network analysis map here are the important

substantive results are unlikely to change much.

points to note:

We have also used the term Twitter ‘amplifiers’. These areaccounts that disseminate a high volume of content

The distance between nodes or Twitter handles
indicates shared connections: the closer they are the(defined as greater than 10,000 tweets), at least some ofmore the likelihood they have a common set ofwhich is fake news, to a wide audience (defined as greater

associations (ie sharing the same content,

than 10,000 accounts). It is reasonable to assume thatconnecting to the same other nodes, etc)

above these threshholds, accounts are broadcasting to a

109

See
https://medialab.sciencespo.fr/publications/Jacomy_Heymann_VenturiniForce_Atlas2.pdf

108

See , for the mathematics behind this:https://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.01016.pdf

83

The larger the size of the node (represented as a dot

anti-BJP amplifiers are very loosely interconnected but thein visualisations), the more the connections thatpro BJP amplifiers are very closely interoconnected.

nodes has in the network.
Note that we have used here the Twitter accounts of PM

A cluster is a mathematically generated group that

Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) and Rahul Gandhi

shares common interconnections.
(@RahulGandhi). To be absolutely clear, we have no evidence

Connector nodes are ones which bridge acrossto suggest that either of these political entities personally postinterests ; and highly connected nodes are the ones

all the messages on the network or indeed make activewith significant influence on the overall network

decisions around which other Twitter accounts they have(and possibly even culture at large)

interconnections with.
As such, all we can say about the next map is that the

The findings:@narendramodi Twitter handle follows multiple pro BJPYou can see from the map above that the Twitter network

amplifiers.

generated with the seed list breaks into six different clusters.
To the extreme left110 of the map are the anti-BJP amplifiers,
to the extreme right are the pro-BJP amplifiers. Somewhat in
the middle are mainstream media, politics and pop culture,
and above them are a loose configurations of Twitter accounts
that include a wide diversity of account types, ranging from
intellectuals to stand up comics.
The first thing to observe in the network map on Fig. 1 is that
the Twitter handle of the BJP and Narendra Modi are at alower distance to the pro-BJP amplifiers than the Twitter
handles of the Congress and Rahul Gandhi are to the anti-BJP
amplifiers. But what the map most clearly shows us is that the110

Note that this is just a representation on a network map. The terms ‘left’,‘right’ etc here are simply spatial and do not mean anything in the politicalcontext.

84

Fig. 1: Twitter network map

85

Fig 2: ‘Amplifiers’ followed by the @narendramodi and@RahulGandhi accounts

86least one piece of fake news, that sit in the pro-BJP cluster,
the @narendramodi account follows 15 of them113.

As it happens, of the accounts that the @narendramodi
handle follows, 56.2111% are unverified. Twitter uses a bluetick mark or ‘verified badge’ to indicate an account of public
interest.112 So the fact that the @narendramodi handle follows
a large proportion of unverified accounts could simply meanthat these are ordinary citizens being followed. We cannot
rule out this possibility, but we observe that most (61%) of
these followed accounts sit in the cluster of pro-BJP
amplifiers, and these accounts have an average following of
25,370 and have made an average tweet of 48,388 tweets intheir lifetime. This makes it probabilistically unlikely thatthese are simply ordinary citizens, though again, we cannot
completely rule it out. (Note that other leaders of national
profile @RahulGandhi and @ArvindKejriwal too follow
unverified accounts, but the proportions are lower than that of@narendramodi at 11% and 37.7% respectively).
After plotting the sources who have published fake news*, on
this network map a pattern does emerge, where we see that
handles that have published fake news* sit more in the pro
BJP cluster. And of the 29 sources known to have published at*As reported at least once, by at least one of the following
three fact checking initiatives: boomlive.in; factchecker.in;altnews.in
111

All the data is correct on the date of extraction, November 8 th, 2018. Anychanges to Twitter accounts and handles since that date will not bereflected in this analysis.
112
See: https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/about-twitterverified-accounts

113

These are Anshul Saxena; Vande Mataram; Gita S. Kapoor;
iSupportNamo; Jay(R); KavitaM; Mahesh Vikram Hegde; Modi Bharosa;
Narendra Modi Army; OpIndia.com; R Jagannathan; Republic; Rishi Bagree
IN; Sanju Verma; नंदिता ठाकुर

87

Figure 5: Handles known to have published fake news* sitmore in the pro- BJP cluster. Key: 1:Abhishek Mishra; 2: Anshul
Saxena; 3: Bhaiyyaji; 4: BharatPositive; 5: VandeMataram; 6: Gita S. Kapoor;
7: iSupportNamo; 8: Jay® ; 9: Kapil Mishra; 10: KavitaM; 11:Kunal Vimal(KV); 12:Mahesh Vikram Hegde; 13: Modi Bharosa; 14: Narendra Modi
Army; 15: News Nation; 16: No Conversion; 17: OpIndia.com; 18 : PostCard;
19: R Jagannathan; 20: Republic; 21: rightlog.in; 22: Rishi Bagree IN ; 23:
Sanju Verma; 24: SatyaVijayi; 25: ShankhNaad; 26:Shubhrastha; 27: The
India Eye; 28: True Indology; 29: VandeMataram; 30: Viral in India; 31: नंदिता
ठाकुर; 32:प्रशान्त पटे ल उमराव

*As reported at least once, by at least one of the following
three fact checking initiatives: boomlive.in; factchecker.in;altnews.in

88Note, again, we do not have any evidence here to suggest thatis not in its reach, but in its ability to influence the national

the BJP as a political entity or PM Modi himself is either

conversation, and for messages to emerge from Twitter into

aware of or supportive of other entities in their support

the citizen’s private networks. It is therefore especially

network publishing fake news. The reason why we see thisimportant for all entities who publish information on Twitter,pattern of known sources of fake news* (see note above) more

and others – including political entities that follow them - todominant in the pro BJP cluster could be because of a number

be cautious about what is fact and what is fake.

of points:

It seems, though, looking at the network maps above, that

As we have seen in the qualitative fieldwork,

there isn’t a lot of cross pollination going on between theverification and fact checking take second place to theactivity on the extreme left of the map and the extreme rightprojection of identity and ideologies, especially whenof the map i.e. there is certainly strong indications of politicalthose identities are very strongly held. It is a possibility

polarisation.114 This is also something that we see when we try

that Hindu/tva identities are more strongly held by

to look at audience affinities through publicly available

those operating these Twitter accounts and therefore

Facebook Advertising data (which reflects interactions of

no fact checking or verification is going on.

users with public content and advertising , taking into account

It is possible for fake news to have been spread fromstated likes/ preferences and behavioural data points).

these accounts through slippages in journalistic

The first thing to observe when we map this network ofstandards (for those that are journalistic accounts) oraffinities115 is that the landscape of politics and news, at least

error (for those that are not journalistic accounts).
observed through the lens of users on Facebook, is certainly

Fake news could have been shared because the entities

politically polarized. It is also interesting to observe thatinvolved believe in the truth content of what they areinterest in regional politics seem to be operating insharing, even if they do not pass the standards of

independent clusters for the most part, not engaging either

evidence of fact checkers or independent third parties.
with the media or the national political space. The final thing

And finally, it is possible, though unlikely, that theindependent fact checkers who have identified thesesources as having published fake news have madeerrors.

114

Note. Because the analysis here is about fake news, not politics,
conclusions are limited.
115
How many times more likely than the average Indian on Facebook is thisaccount likely to follow seed interest, for example audiences following BBC
News are 40x more likely to also consume NDTV

Twitter is more a platform used by ‘influentials’ than ordinary
citizens in India. Twitter’s importance as a platform therefore89

to notice is that vernacular media sits much closer to thepolitical interests in the main cluster than do English media.

This possibly indicates that those who consume English
media are likelier to express strong affiliations for either of thetwo main political parties.
Fig.3. Network map of affinities, from Facebook advertising
data

.

90

Next (Fig. 4.) we take a look at sources known to havepublished fake news. Here, we observe an interesting pattern.
Most sources known to have published fake news clusteraround political interests, indicating that audiences heavily
invested in a political identity or in political discourse are
more likely to be exposed to political fake news stories. This
adds a layer to our understanding from the qualitative
research that sociopolitical identities are playing a significant
role in the dissemination of fake news.
The Facebook network maps show us something else as well:that mainstream media and sources known to have publishedfake news are followed by audiences with distinct interests.
This has very important implications, if those who aresocioeconomically better off, or are fluent enough in English
to consume news in that language - and the two categories
have very high overlap in India - are in effect less exposed to
fake news than others. We would urge future researchers to
explore this further.

91

Fig. 4: Those with an affinity for politics are likeliest to haveconsumed sources known to have shared fake news*.
1: Viral in India
2: The India Eye
3: ShankhNaad
4: Republic
5: Prof. Abhishek Mishra
6: Phir Ek Baar Modi Sarkar
7: News Nation
8: Namo Supporter
9: India Support Namo
10: Bharat Positive*As reported at least once, by at least one of the following
three fact checking initiatives: boomlive.in; factchecker.in;altnews.in

92Summing up
We observe that there certainly seem to be signs that an
ecosystem of fake news is visible on right of the political
spectrum, at least on Twitter- if we are to define an ecosystem
as a community connected intimately through similarinterests. To be strictly accurate, though, what we observe isthat the dense interconnections on the right on Twitter are
enabling the effective circulation of fake news in a way theloose interconnections on the left of the political spectrum arenot.
More concerning from our point of view - given our interest isin understanding fake news at the level of the ordinary citizen- is what we see on Facebook. It is – we would suggestextremely harmful to democracy and an informed citizenry
that strongly felt political identities became a magnet for
exposure to fake news.

93Conclusions94

7

respondent interview tapes, but do get in touch if you want toConclusion

discuss. Our contacts are given below.
We have to conclude, though, that checking the flow of fakenews, especially in their current predominant form of images

The fake news problem is not going away anywhere

and memes is likely to be extremely challenging. We suggest

any time soon. While researchers have found some ways ofthat all actors - platforms, media organisations, government,

identifying and weeding out fake news circulating as news

civil society - come together to tackle the problem, since it isstories, in India, the challenge seems of a different order

not just a technological problem. But in this, ordinary citizens

altogether. Given that central to our observations is the idea

too, need to take more responsibility about sharing things

that people’s socio-political identities seem to influence their

without verification - and surely, platform centric solutions to

consumption and sharing of fake news quite a bit, and that

help them can be found without compromising too much on

national pride, and nationalistic feelings seem to affect their

the essential characteristics of the platform. We also

critical thinking, fake news will need to be handled as a social

recommend that journalists investigate further whether or not

problem.

there is an organised ecosystem of fake news production andWe would urge future researchers to quantitatively assess -dissemination.

perhaps through regression analysis techniques - just how

The fake news challenge in India is a big one. If this report, in

important socio-political identities are in fake news

time, contributes even a little to meeting the challenge, we

consumption relative to other factors. In fact we are eager thatwould consider it a job well worth the blood, sweat, tears andmany of the avenues that we have just started exploring insleepless nights.

this report are exhaustively navigated by other researchers.
We hope that this report will spur researchers from multiple
disciplines to investigate the fake news problem in India. This
report was intended to serve as a starting point in the research
conversation, and we are keen to carry on the research
conversation with anyone who is interested. We are also

BBC World Service Audiences team contacts:

happy to share the network analysis data sets for others toSantanu Chakrabarti: santanu.chakrabarti@bbc.co.uk

work on. For confidentiality reasons we cannot share the

Lucile Stengel: Lucile.stengel@bbc.co.uk
Sapna Solanki: Sapna.solanki@bbc.co.uk

95

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97

Data appendix

98

The cities in which the fieldwork was conducted were:
Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, Rajkot, Vijayawada, Raipur,
Udaipur, Amritsar, Varanasi

Data and Methodology Appendix

2. Analytical technique

I. Qualitative/ethnographic in-depth interviews

The approach to data analysis was mainly a groundedtheoretical one where the analyst does not approach the datawith ready hypothesis but induces the hypothesis from close
data analysis. In practice this means that across the data set(in this case the forty interview recordings or transcripts), one
gathers new data to test suppositions about theoreticalcategories till the properties of that category are ‘saturated’
with the data- at this point fresh data are not producing any
new insights. Central to the approach, and indeed goodqualitative research, is to not ignore any data at variance withothers, but find an explanation for that variance. In qualitative
data analysis the tools of analytic induction (eg the use of theconstant comparative method, or the search for deviant cases)
help ensure the rigour and credibility of the final analysis.

1. Sampling
The sample for the qualitative stage was drawn toachieve an equal mix or gender, age and political affiliation
across the total sample. For political affiliation the screening
questionnaire used a localised version of the 10 point leftright orientation questionnaire developed by John Curtice andCaroline Bryson.116 This allowed us to recruit for politicalaffiliation without asking questions about people’s voting
behaviours or support for particular political entities.
The final sample ended up looking like this:19-23: Male 6; Female 424-35: Male 4; Female 6

II. Big data/ data science / network analysis approaches

36-45: Male 5; Female 5

One of the challenges of analysing fake news in media

45-65: Male 5; Female 5is that there are very few sources that can be classified as out
and out fake news sources. On the other hand even the mostwell respected journalistic sources such as Aaj Tak, Swarajya,
India Today and CNN News 18 have on occasion slipped from116

See more detail here:
https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/core_ess_questionna
ire/ESS_core_questionnaire_socio_political_orientations.pdf

99their standards and have been called out for spreading

D. Facebook Audience Network: Classified in a modularity

117

class118 with at least 15% identified fake Sources, andmisinformation.

at least 80x affinity with identified fake news sources

As such our analysis is not about ‘fake news sources’ (as thatindicates there are sources who only publish fake news) but

As must be obvious, the analysis would vary depending on

about ‘Sources who have published fake news’ .For thethe choice of the ‘15%’ or the ‘80x’ affinity. However, thepurposes of the Twitter network analysis therefore, we define

substantive results are unlikely to change much.

two cateories, 1) ‘Sources of Identified Fake News’ and 2)

Some other definitions‘Likely Fake News Disseminatiors’. The ‘Sources of Identified
Fake News’ is established in the two following ways:

Amplifiers: We have also used the term Twitter‘amplifiers’. These are accounts that disseminate a highC. Identified as fake news by a fact checking site (one orvolume of content (defined as greater than 10,000 tweets),

more of the following: smhoaxslayer, altnews,

at least some of which is fake news, to a wide audienceboomlive.in, factchecker.in ) or by the platform (e.g.

(defined as greater than 10,000 accounts). It is reasonable

Facebook/ Twitter), or

to assume that above these threshholds, accounts are

D. Identified in the qualitative fieldwork by researchers or

broadcasting to a network greater than immediate friends

picked up from the /Unkill thread on Reddit.

and family, and at a volume which suggests more thanpersonal updates.

We also use algorithmic techniques to establish a list of likely
disseminators of fake news in the following ways:

Facebook Affinity: Affinity is the likelihood a person will
be interested in page B if they have shown interest in page

To identify these, we looked at sources very closely linked

A. By ‘interest’, Facebook means multiple touchpoints

within our network analysis to Identified Sources of fakesuch as liking, commenting, sharing, viewing content from,news, via at least one of the following:

responding to ads from etc. This is expressed as a multipleof the likelihood compared to an average Indian on FB - for

C. Twitter Following Network: At least 15% of their

example, BBC fans are 40x likely to also be interested infollowing are being followed by the identified fake

NDTV.

news Source AND have at least 5000 followers, or
117

118

See https://www.altnews.in/top-fake-news-stories-circulated-indianmedia-2017/

See , for the mathematics behind this:https://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.01016.pdf

100Facebook's discovery algorithm calculates an 'EdgeRank'.

The following seed nodes were used:

This determines the content Facebook serves to its users.

Pro-BJPThe Affinity score is important in the EdgeRank formula(although the formula itself has never been disclosed by"ShankhNaad","rishibagree","AskAnshul","PhirEkBaarMod

Facebook). When a user shows an interest in a certain page,i_","TheIndiaEye","KSHITIJartoons","Bharat_Positive","rigthere is a higher likelihood that they will subsequently be

htlog_in","swati_gs","RealHistoriPix","Kavita_M57","NWN2

exposed to closely related pages - those with high Affinity -019","HinduJagrutiOrg","AarVee18","noconversion","Modiby the Facebook algorithm

Bharosa","achhedin2019"
Anti-BJP

Twitter Network Map"Ramya_FC", "xposing_lies", "theViralinindia","DesiPoliticks", "AudaciousQuest", "Trend4India",

The process of creating the Twitter network map started"Aslam_khader", "SugarQuotedGirl", "bhakt2019"with the compilation of a ‘seed list’ of Twitter accounts of
the amplifiers as described above; this was divided into a‘pro BJP’ seed list and and an ‘anti BJP’ seed list, and theseIn reading , a network analysis map here are the important

were snowballed separately to mitigate any bias that might

points to note:have been introduced in the seed list selection. We
mathematically snowballed from this seed list into profilesthese accounts are following, iteratively until we reached a

The distance between nodes or Twitter handles
indicates shared connections: the closer they are thecount of ~16,000 profiles having ~370,000 relationships wemore the likelihood they have a common set of

deemed sufficient for analysis. The network of

associations (ie sharing the same content,

relationships was then mapped using the Force Atlas 2connecting to the same other nodes, etc)

algorithm119 and finally clustering analysis was done using

the modularity maximisation algorithm, to outline closely

The larger the size of the node (represented as a dot
in visualisations), the more the connections that

knit communities with social connections.

nodes has in the network.
A cluster is a mathematically generated group thatshares common interconnections.

119

See
https://medialab.sciencespo.fr/publications/Jacomy_Heymann_VenturiniForce_Atlas2.pdf

101



clustering analysis on the network to identify clusters sharing
similar connections using the Modularity Maximisation algorithm designed to outline closely knit communities within social
connections

Connector nodes are ones which bridge acrossinterests ; and highly connected nodes are the ones
with significant influence on the overall network(and possibly even culture at large)

The seed nodes constituted of:Political Entities: Narendra Modi, Rahul Gandhi, Arvind
Kejriwal, Akhilesh Yadav, Mulayam Singh, Mayawati, K
Chandrashekhar Rao, Chandrababa Naidu, Mamata Banerjee,
Uddhav Thackeray, MK Stalin, Karunanidhi, Jayalalitha, Shiv
Sena, BJP, Indian National Congress, AIADMK, Aam Aadmi
Party, Trinamool Congress, Communist Party of India(Marxist)

Facebook Network Maps
Facebook data is harder to source than Twitter data because
most of it isn’t publicly available. Most of it is also unusablefrom an ethical point of view. One useful dataset, however, isFacebook’s Advertising data, which captures the interactionsof Facebook users with public pages (which are mostly brand,
topic, and organisation’s pages) and adverts. The advertising
platform notably collects stated and behavioural data.

Media: BBC News, Indian Express, Times of India, The Hindu,
Economist, Aaj Tak, NDTV, Republic TV, Times Now, ABP,
Zee
News

In a first instance, we created a list of known Facebook
sources of fake news, made up of sources identified in thequalitative phase of the research project, and of other sourcesof fake news identified in the Twitter mapping exercise. From
this seed list, mathematically snowballed into 3200 pages
their audience also likely follows; and using network mapping
theory we plotted the relationships of pages with similaraudiences.

Other interests: Q’uran, Hindutva, Hindu Nationalism,
Brahman, Hindu Kriya

Online news scan
Webhose.io was used to extract online news articles
mentioning the topic “Fake News” or related keywords, inIndia from January 2015 to September 2018 and categorised
the different themes that emerged from this coverage. This
resulted in 47,543 articles, covering 1,046 news outlets in
English and 10 other languages.

Use these affinities (ie how many times more likely than the
average Indian on Facebook to follow seed interest), we
plotted a network using the Force Atlas 2 algorithm - a widely
accepted network mapping algorithm for mapping social
connections (traditionally designed to visualise interpersonalconnections and relationships on social media but works
equally well for shared interests). We then conducted a102

For the news scan, we fist sourced 112,000 articles datingfrom January 2015 to September 2018, which mentioned the
below keywords relating to “Fake News” in India.

Keywords used for extraction:"fake news" OR "misinformation" OR "disinformation" OR"whatsapp forward" OR ("fake" AND ("whatsapp" OR"facebook" OR "twitter")) OR "फेक न्यज़ू " OR "फेक न्यजू " ORIf a topic category seemed ambiguous or appeared tocontain more than one story, we took that category inisolation and performed another topic modelling onthat topic to gain more granularity
Lastly, we sized topics based on the number of stories
within each category.

The output achieved was a visualisation of the most recurrent“fake news” categories covered by Indian media outlets, fromJanuary 2015 to September 2018.

"ப ோலி செய்தி" OR "வதந்தி" OR "தவறோன செய்தி" OR"పుకారు" OR "నకిలీ వారత లు" OR "తపుుడు వారత లు" OR "গুজব" OR"ವದಂತಿಯನ್ನು" OR "ನ್ಕಲಿ ಸನದ್ದಿ" OR "ಸನಳ್ಳು ಸನದ್ದಿ" OR "തെറ്റായWhatsapp topic modelling of consumption of Fake Newsവാർത്ത" OR "വയാജ വാർത്ത" OR "खोट्या बातम्या"We reviewed the messages shared in private networks tocategorise & size the topics discussed by the public. In thisexercise, we used posts extracted from subreddit threads,
such as r/theunkillnetwork and r/india, and the content
shared by respondents in the qualitative phase of the project priority was given to content from the qualitative study that
could be automatically converted to text for easier cleaning
and analysis.Our total dataset what of ~1000 WhatsApp
forwards

We then moved on to statistical topic modelling, using the
LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) algorithm. This model
assumes that all documents within the dataset are a collectionof topics, and that each topic is a collection of words in the
document. Since the number of topics is unknown at the startof the process, topic modelling is performed iteratively toachieve optimal coherence in the topics.
The LDA model assumes that each document is a collection of
topics, however for sizing, we have used the dominant topic ineach document to ensure that no document is duplicated in
the sizing process.
The process consisted of 4 key stages:


Similarly to the first news coverage scan exercise, topic
modelling was processed using LDA (Latent Dirichlet
Allocation).
Process:

Firstly, we ran an initial topic model to generate top
words and to establish which is the mostrepresentative story in each topic
Next, we qualitatively analysed each topic to gaugethematic consistency of stories within each topic

103

We ran an initial topic model to generate key topics ofthe dataset, and establish which content pieces weremost representative of each topic.



We then qualitatively analysed each topic in our topic
modelling to gauge the thematic consistency of the
documents within. We isolated topics that seemedambiguous and performed another round of topic
modelling on that topic.

The output achieved was a visualisation of the most recurrent
themes shared by citizens in India.
If you have any further questions, would like to have access tothe network analysis data, or would like to have a chat about
the project, please send an email tosantanu.chakrabarti@bbc.co.uk.

104

Amendments, Corrections, and Additions

5. A footnote, on page 101 has been edited. The earlier version
read “Because the analysis starts with fake news sources as

We are thankful to all who have engaged with the report, andbrought to our notice areas that required more clarification.

seeds, the conclusions drawn here are limited”. The newversion reads “Note. Because the analysis here is about fakenews, not politics, conclusions are limited”.

In the process of doing these amendments and additions, wehave had the chance to once again go over our methodology
and our conclusions- which have only been strengthened
through this process. No changes have been made to theconclusions of our original analysis.
This version of the report has the following clarifications andcorrections:
1. An additional section giving further information on themethodology has been added.
2. The term ‘diwaliya’ was mistranslated. This has beencorrected.
3. The three fact checking initiatives that have been used toarrive at sources ‘known to have published fake news’ are now
signposted in multiple places in the report.
3. An online publisher- The Better India- that was incorrectly
labelled on the Twitter network map has been removed.
4. More clarity has been introduced in the network analysis
descriptions, maps and labels. Where there was scope for
confusion in the earlier version between various terms used todescribe methods, it has been clarified.

105

Further Information
On Methodology1061. What is the methodology for this study?



exploratory in nature. It is intended to serve as aThis is a multi-method study that involves:
‘starting point in the research conversation’ – not the
final word. We did this study in the hope researchers

Scan of 47,543 news articles in the English andwill further explore the topic using various research

vernacular media.
Network analysis on Twitter, across 16,000 profiles.

Network analysis on Facebook, using publicly available

techniques to extend, validate or finesse the findings.

advertising data, across 3,200 pages and interests.
Semiotic analysis of messages collected.



40 in-depth, in home interviews.

3. Why choose qualitative research techniques to explore this
topic?
The researchers perceived the discussion and debate
around the fake news issue to be overly centred on

2. Is a sample size of 40 adequate?
The research report states clearly that this project istechnology, with little research or understanding of
the role of individuals, their psychologies or of the

If this were a quantitative study (for example, a survey),societal forces around them. The research objective

a sample size of 40 would be too small to draw any

was to understand and describe a complex

meaningful conclusions. However, the sample size ofphenomenon which they believed to be insufficiently

40 is for a qualitative study- which uses the analyticalunderstood in the case of India. As stated in the report,

technique known as “grounded theory” for the data

the researchers’ interest “was in exploring audience

analysis. It aims to describe the various factors at playpsychology in-depth to start with, in particular towhen it comes to explaining the phenomenon of fakeunderstand what citizens meant by the term ‘fakenews. Recommended sample sizes for qualitativenews’”. The researchers wanted to understand why

studies using grounded theory techniques range

ordinary citizens say they are concerned about fakebetween 30 and 50. There are a range of publishednews in quantitative studies but still share information

academic papers on the topic of qualitative sample

without verification.

sizes and techniques; see also the discussions here:http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/4/how_many_intervie

Qualitative techniques were the most appropriate to
generate richness and depth, in an area of research

ws.pdf and here:that is to date under-investigated.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Whats_is_ideal_sa
mple_size_in_qualitative_research.
107

4. Can 40 people’s ‘opinions’ be representative of a nation ofresearchers use to study this phenomenon, the basic

130 crore people?

picture we have painted will remain recognisable.

What we can’t say from this project is the degree to

The objective of the research wasn’t to report onwhich the various factors outlined will apply.

people’s opinions- one of the reasons why quantitativesurvey techniques were not used. The objective is toThis study –being qualitative- cannot tell us therelative importance of each of these factors and how

trace the various factors that influence the sharing or

they will vary across different population groups. Whatspreading of fake news. By speaking to people- andit does tell us is that all of these factors will play somethen analysing the data- we try to understand theirrole. So it could well be the case that for young people

psychology, why they behave the way they behave andthe motivation of civic duty plays much more strongly

the various influences and currents and counter

than their socio-political identities- but we think itcurrents in their lives. We don’t simply take what

likely that both of these factors will apply. Similarly,

people say at face value and report on it. People don’t

we do not know from this study if men as compared touse terms like ‘sender primacy’ or ‘source agnosticism’;women are less likely or more likely to be influenced bythese terms come from the analysis. The aim here was

the technological factors when spreading fake news.

to outline as many factors as possible that play a role in

But we can be sure that for both men and womenthe spread of fake news.

technological factors will play some role. A quantitative
study would be required to understand the interplay
across these factors, but the factors needed to be

5. How confident are you that the research findings give aestablished in a qualitative study to allow the design

realistic picture of the role of the various factors play inand development of a quantitative study.

influencing the spread of fake news?


We can say with a high degree of confidence that the

6. How did you ensure quality in the sampling andpicture we have painted realistically depicts how

recruitment?

psychological factors (eg motivations for sharing;people’s identities and beliefs), technological factors (egsharing platforms), and the content of a message

The qualitative research was carried out in accordancewith the code of conduct of the Market Researchinteract to contribute to the spread of fake news. We

Society of India, the supervisory body for market

are confident that whatever the tools future

research in India. In this study, the sampling technique108

used is called purposive sampling, designed to recruit a

Our sample achieved had 50:50 male female split anddiverse range of cases relevant to the particular

50:50 split in ages below 35 and above 35. In terms ofphenomenon we are studying. In this project, as withsocio economic classification, 24 were from SECs

many others, the respondents are selected after

A1/A2/A3 and 16 from SECs B1/B2/C1.

multiple calls and multiple approaches to ensure that

The researchers adopted the method of very long in-

the respondents are appropriate for the researchhome interviews which feel to the respondents like freeproject. The steps taken to ensure that recruitment

flowing conversations about their lives rather than

was done to Market Research Society of India (MRSI)

being narrowly restricted to the topic at hand. This

standards include:

ensured that respondents did not really know the key

o

o

o

A recruitment screener was administered to

topic of inquiry till it was disclosed to them at the very

individuals to check their fit within theend of the sessions. The researchers did not have any

demographic criteria and their socio-economic

particular answers in mind they were seeking to get tostrata. In keeping with standard practice, thewhen interviewing, because the technique proposed for

new SEC (socio economic classification) scale

analysis was ‘grounded theory’. Critical to grounded

developed by MRSI & Media Research Users

theory is to not approach the data with preconceived

Council (MRUC) was used to recruit for socio-

notions or set hypothesis, but to develop these in theeconomic strata.

course of the analysis. So, in effect, the researchers are

Additionally, the recruitment screener also

not ‘looking’ for particular answers when they arechecked respondent levels of news consumption

interviewing; and there is no scope for respondents inalong with the platforms used.

turn to second guess the researchers.

Party political affiliations, associations or
memberships was not a recruitment criteria, but

7. Does the study have any limitations?

we ensured that the respondents finally
recruited had a range of political viewpoints.
o

There were two levels of 'back-checks' to verify

All research studies have limitations. One limitation ofthis project is that no interviews were carried out inthe veracity of information provided by therural areas, where digital penetration is still

respondents in the recruitment screener. These

comparatively low. We believe that the factors

back-checks were in the form of a personal visit

described in this report will still apply to rural citizens,

followed by a short telephone interview.
109but to what degree and scale it is hard to specify.

8. What are the criteria for inclusion as a source of fake news
in the network maps?


The report does not label any source as ‘source of fakenews’ or ‘fake news producer’. This is because there areunlikely to be any sources that exclusively produce
fake news. The study lists some Twitter handles as'sources known to have published fake news’, based onreports by one of the following three fact checking
initiatives :boomlive.in, factchecker.in, or altnews.in.
This is not based on judgments from the researchers or
the BBC.

factchecker.in and boomlive.in are certified by IFCN, aglobal verified network of fact checkers. AltNews
publish their criteria for fact checking here.

110