助成

Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・

IIPS International Conference“A New Horizon for Japan’s Security Policy—Basic Concept and Framework”
Tokyo, November 30 and December 1, 2004

“Japan's New Security Strategy
and Its Implications for Korea”
By
Dr. Dukmin Yun
Professor, Director-Generalfor National Security and Unification Studies
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security
Republic of Korea

[DRAFT]

Japan's New Security Strategy
and Its Implications for Korea

Dukmin Yun
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security

The IIPS
Conference of"A New Horizon for Japan's Security Policy:
Basic Concept and Framework"
30 November-1 December 2004

1

Ⅰ. Foreword
The terrorist attacks of September 11 provided an important

turning point for Japan's pursuit of a larger field of operation for the
Self-Defense Forces. The unprecedented atrocity of this attack
which resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians andthe consequent furor for effective responses against acts ofinternational terrorism created an atmosphere favorable to any
measure the Japanese government might choose to take in thename of combating terrorism. In marked contrast to the situation
during the Gulf War, when the SDF could not even deploy transport
aircraft for refugees, the September 11 incident led to thedeployment of the SDF in the Indian Ocean within just two months.
The Japanese government also expressed active support for the
U.S.-led war in Iraq and finallysent its forces to join in the

military campaign. This marks the first occasion since WWII that
the SDF will be deployed in an overseas combat zone, and in fact
exceeds the terms of Japan's avowed "exclusively defenseoriented" policy.
Today Japan is mending inadequacies in its defense postureresulting from the defeat in World War II and the public allergy to
war and is expanding its security role at the global level, away fromthe traditional exclusively defense-oriented policy. To back this up,
Japan is improving its defense capability and preparing for legal andinstitutional changes. With the end of the Cold War and theredefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it has strengthened its
alliance with the U.S. on the one hand, and is assertively pushing
forward legal and institutional consolidation on the other hand, as
can be seen in the debates over constitutional revision concerning
the right of collective self-defense.

2

Ⅱ. Changing Strategic Environments
Compared with the time when the National Defense Program
Outline (NDPO) was affirmed in 1995, the Koizumi Cabinet judgesthat Japan's strategic environment has changed greatly, and ispushing forward a revision of the NDPO by the end of 2004. The
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) is seeking to build up defense
capability that can effectively deal with real threats away from theConcepts of "Basic Defense Force," judging that the 1995 NDPO,
which was based on the Cold War-type Concepts of Basic Defense
Force, can hardly deal with sudden changes in Japan's strategic
environment after the 9/11 terrorist incidents. According to the JDA,
the Far Eastern Russian Forces had made large-scale reductions
while China had made a drastic military buildup and North Korea's
nuclear and missile threat had been materialized. In August 2001,
therefore, it came to an assessment that the security situation
surrounding Japan had changed considerably and announced that it
would form a mid- to long-term defense strategy and revise the
NDPO by 2005. The September 11 terrorist incidents accelerated
the revision of the NDPO.
While maintaining the basic tenets of the 1976 NDPO based
primarily on the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements and theConcepts of Basic Defense Force, the current NDPO, which wasrevised in 1995, centers around the acquisition of new defense
capability and qualitative improvement to counter threats after theCold War. Even if the 1995 NDPO keeps the main framework of the
1976 NDPO, its main focus was placed on the building of a flexible
defense capability that can respond to various situations.

3

The most noteworthy in the 1995 NDPO is the fact that Japan
made it clear that it would change the then SDF deployment
concentrated along the northern Japan like Hokkaido into the onethat is evenly deployed across the country. This signifies thatJapan's defense posture weighing heavily on the northern parts ofthe country has been shifted to the one along the western Japan toguard against contingencies in China and the Korean Peninsula. The
1995 NDPO, however, provides no rationale for such a change in
defense posture including the even deployment of SDF units, andespecially no description on China's military expansion. Moreover,the 1995 NDPO envisioned Japan's potential capabilities to respond
immediately to various situations overseas as well as domestic byincreasing the mobility and information-collecting capability of the
SDF. Japan

perceives

the regional security

environment inNortheast Asia has greatly changed since the establishment of thecurrent NDPO in 1995. First of all, the potential threat posed by
Russia who has long been a major focus in Japan's NDPO has
diminished rapidly over the past few years. Russian military powerin the Far East, for instance, has fallen to a mere quarter of what it
was during the Cold War, and no longer figures as a potent threat
to Japan's national security. On the other hand, China hassignificantly enhanced its armed forces and is continuing to invest
in the military sector. Whereas Japan's defense budget is relatively
unchanged since the 1990s began, China's has grown by an averageof 13% each year, surpassing even its considerable rate of
economic growth. Projections based on current figures indicatedthat China's real defense budget would exceed that of Japan around2001, provided that the exchange rate and the rate of economic
growth remain stable. In recent years, the Chinese government not
only acquired such state-of-the-art vessels as the Sovremenny-4

class destroyers and the Kilo-class submarines, but also acquired
and/or indigenously developed aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines,
and missile destroyers, thus taking giant steps toward building an
ocean-going navy. The PLA Air Force has also been equipped with
the SU-30 long-range attack aircraft, further contributing to thedramatic increase in the PLA's long-range power projection
capability. In addition, China is exerting serious effort intomodernizing its nuclear arsenal, including the development of the
DF-31 ballistic missile. Although the PRC's military power in the
21st century may not be equal to that of the U.S. or Japan in termsof quality, it will likely become the strongest in the region before
too long.
The second significant change affecting regional security inNortheast Asia is North Korea's development of weapons of mass
destruction. Japan views North Korea's nuclear and missile
programs as serious threats. Pyongyang has already test-fired theRodong missile and the Daepodong missile toward Japan, and evenindicated that these missiles were designed to target Japan itself as
well as U.S. military bases within Japan. North Korea hasreportedly deployed some 100 to 200 Rodong missiles in locations
capable of covering the entire Japanese islands.
The third consideration in Japan's assessment of regional
security is the shift in U.S. alliances following the September 11
terrorist attacks. The events of 9/11 demonstrated the fearsome
power of international terrorism to the entire world, and prompted
the U.S. to seek a new international order for the prevention andmanagement of such threats. In pursuing its war on terror, the Bushadministration adopted a unilateral policy and revised both theconcept and character of its alliances with foreign nations.
Abandoning the traditional emphasis on achieving deterrence

5

against invasion through defensive cooperation, the U.S. began toregard a particular country's willingness to participate in its antiterrorism

andanti-WMD

activities

as

a

key

criterion

indistinguishing its allies.
Ⅲ. Revision of NDPO
In 2001, the Japanese government decided to revise the 1995
NDPO to reflect the various changes in the regional security
environment over the past six years. In September of that year, the"Defense Capability Review Committee," headed by the director
general of the Defense Agency, was formed; it has since beenworking to establish a long-term defense strategy and amend the
National Defense Program Outline. As a result of such efforts, theJapanese government is fundamentally revising the defensive
scheme upheld since the formulation of the 1976 outline, which
specified that Japan was to "possess the minimum level of basic
defense capability as an independent nation." In particular, the Cold
War-era defense policy designed with standard warfare against
foreign countries in mind is being transitioned to a "threat
response" policy capable of meeting diverse new kinds of threats.
Eschewing its former posture, which was predicated onlimited response to direct invasions, Japan has assumed a new
defense posture geared toward responding to such new kinds ofthreats as missile strikes, infiltration by guerrillas and armed spy
boats, and large-scale terrorist attacks. The 2003 Defense White
Paper stresses that "the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles and the presence of dictators andterrorists have completely changed existing conceptions of war,"and that "Japan must aim to become a country that can quickly and6capably respond to these types of threats." The white paper alsoemphasizes the importance of responding to new threats including
cyber warfare, attacks by guerilla or special operation units, andnuclear/biochemical weapons in outlining the future direction of
defense armaments. It states, "It is necessary to enhance the ability
to offer a considered response to such asymmetrical attacks asinternational terrorism and missile strikes, to attacks from terrorist
organizations and other non-state actors, and to illegal acts." As
the current system of the Self-Defense Forces does not provide
sufficient response capacity against asymmetrical attacks, Japan isexerting much effort into acquiring anti-asymmetrical warfare
capabilities.
Last October, Japan’s Council on Security and Defense
Capabilities, a private advisory panel to Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi, submitted its final report on the proposed future directionof the country’s security policy at the beginning of the month. The
report, entitled "The Vision for Future National Security and
Defense Capability," deserves special attention. It will be the basis
for the Japanese government’s new national defense program
outline due by year’s end, and in line with this, Tokyo will announcea revision of the National Defense Program Outline. Claiming theproliferation of ballistic missiles and terrorism as the two mainthreats to Japan’s security, the panel’s report demonstrates
Tokyo’s strong interest in a shift in its definition of defense. thereport stressed that the SDF should be well prepared to deal with alarge number of potential emergency situations or take part invarious international missions.

7Under the new NDPO, Japan's new defense policy departs
from the conventional notion of deterrence, focusing instead on
assuming an "effective defense posture" in the following ways:(1) Effective missile defense: Japan is working to establish a twostep missile defense system within an expedited time frame. The
Aegis destroyer, currently in construction, will be capable ofintercepting theater missiles in high altitudes, while the acquisitionof new Patriot III missiles will allow Japan to intercept low altitude
missiles from the ground.
(2) Enhanced strategic intelligence capability: Japan is reinforcing
its ·early warning and surveillance systems by dramaticallyenhancingits

strategic

intelligencecapability,

includingthelaunching of several surveillance satellites and the fortification of
intelligence analysis functions.
(3) Countering new threats: In order to respond effectively to suchthreats as terrorism, guerilla warfare, and infiltration by armed spy
ships, a new special operations unit has been created within the
SDF, capable of responding to international military conflicts.
Efforts are also underway to acquire new missile ships and patrol
helicopters.
(4) Improved overseas projection capability: The acquisition oftanker planes (which greatly expands the flight range of fighterbombers) and large-scale supply ships (which enables the longdistance deployment of naval fleets) are radically enhancing the
SDF's overseas projection capability. Further- more, plans toacquire the new C-X transport aircraft, in addition to thedeployment of the Osumi-class amphibious warfare ship, is
expected to raise the SDF's transportation capacity to a new level.
8(5) Systemic enhancements: Japan is fundamentally revamping thestructure and equipment system of the SDF to facilitate swift
response
reinforcing

todiversethe

C4I

emergencies,
system

to

as

well

enabletheasmaintaining/
efficientandcomprehensive operation of the Japanese armed forces.
(6) Legislative measures: The Japanese government is taking
legislative measures to better respond to new kinds of threats. The
recent Emergency Law provided legal grounds for deploying the
SDF in cases of military invasion, while various other laws
including the PKO Law, the Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding
Japan, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and the Law
ConcerningtheSpecialMeasureson

HumanitarianandReconstruction Assistance in Iraq are expanding the SDF's range of
operation outside of Japan. In particular, efforts to legalize theoverseas deployment of the SDF (formerly enabled through limited,
temporary legislations) on a permanent basis are also under way.
To sum up, Japan is shifting its defense policy to enableeffective responses to new kinds of threats, effectively moving
beyond its traditional adherence to an "exclusively defenseoriented policy."
Ⅳ. Push for Constitutional Revision and the Right to Collective SelfDefense

A so-called “conservative-leaning” trend is rising in Japanesesociety today, as Cabinet members' remarks in support ofconstitutional amendment, the prime minister's visit to the Yasukuni
Shrine, the authorization of a right-wing history textbook, and the9emergency legislation. This trend is partly due to Japan's decadelong economic stagnation that bruised its pride, but mostly due toJapan's pursuit of a normal state.

The biggest change in Japan of late is the consensus on its
need for a certain amount of military force. The dominant mood ofpeace was shattered when North Korea's Daepodong missile shot
through the Japanese territory, showing how vulnerable it was.
Despite the end of the Cold War, not only the parties that had
participated in conservative coalition, but even main opposition
parties, such as the Democratic Party of Japan seem unopposed toobtaining a certain level of military forces. While maintaining its
defense expenses at 1 percent of its GNP, Japan plans to pursue
high-technology military forces, such as its joint development oftheater missile defense (TMD), and also improve the legal
framework regarding its Self Defense Forces, namely by pushingfor the revision and legislation of the Emergency Law.
Alongside this movement, the most critical movement inpresent Japan's political situation is the debates on constitutional
amendment. In the early 1990s the main streamers in Japanesepolitics centering around Ichiro Ozawa tried to resolve the problem
through interpretation without revision of the Constitution, andtoday those who argue for Constitutional revision are becoming themain stream in Japanese politics. The latest debate over such a
move holds significance in that it was maintained by not only
conservatives, but reformists, such as its Democratic Party. In
1999, the parliamentary law was revised so that Research

10Commissions on the Constitution could be installed to deliberate theconstitutional amendment issue in the Diet. The Commissions wereactivated in January of 2000 and deliberations on the constitutional
amendment has since been under way in the Diet.
At a press conference on April 27, 2001, newly elected Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi stressed the Cabinet's stance in supportof constitutional amendment by being the first prime minister topropose a public election of the post. Defining the Self-Defense
Forces as armed forces, he also called for the amendment of
Article 9 of the Constitution in order to recognize Japan's right ofcollective self-defense.
The focus of the debate over constitutional amendment lies inwhether or not to allow Japan the right of collective self-defense.
The right of collective self-defense means a right to repel anarmed attack when a friendly nation comes under armed attack andeven if it is not under direct attack. Up until today, the Japanese
government's official position is that it denies such rights on the
grounds that Article 9 of the Constitution should be interpreted asprohibiting the possession of arms beyond the minimum necessary.
But at the end of the Cold War as the U.S.-Japan alliance began toshift toward an alliance for regional peace and stability, the logic is
gaining momentum that recognition of the right of collective selfdefense is inevitable to maintain the security arrangements, whileconstitutional amendment is a necessity. In a proposal on March 23,
2001, the Defense Committee of the LDP called on the need for theright of collective self-defense to secure trust of the U.S.-Japan11

alliance and to minimize the factors impeding cooperation andsupport in areas surrounding Japan.
Since the inauguration of the Koizumi Cabinet, political reforms
including constitutional amendment have been actively discussed inJapan. And as the public's concern about security has grown by the
9/11 terrorist incidents, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the North
Korean nuclear crisis, etc., intense debates are going on overconstitutional amendment. According to a Yomiuri Shimbun survey
on April 1, 2003, for example, 54 percent of the Japanese favor anamendment of the Constitution including Article 9, constituting a
steady majority for 6 consecutive years since 1998. In January
2003 Research Commissions on the Constitution established four
subcommittees on security and international cooperation, governingorganizations, etc. They are deliberating major issues including
consitutional amendment, the right of collective self-defense, andthe emperor system, and are scheduled to report the result of theirdeliberations to the Speaker of the House of Representatives andthe Speaker of the House of Councillors.
The LDP's study panel on the Constitution recently issued the"the original draft for Constitutional Amendment" that deal with thepossession of military units, approval of exercise of the right ofcollective self-defense, strengthening of the prime minister's
authorities in contingencies. While leaving the clause renouncing
war unchanged, the draft proposes the Constitution allow Japan tohave a "minimum military capability to exercise the right toindividual and collective self-defense." It also says the envisaged

12

military force would be able to make international contributions byrelying on military power.

Ⅴ. South Korea's Response: How to deal with Japan's New Security
Strategy

Japan already revised its northern-oriented strategy vis-a-vis
the former Soviet Union and adopted a new defense posture thatputs special emphasis on the defense of the western Japan and themetropolitan

area.

Reflecting

thechangesin

its

strategic

environment such as the disappearance of the Soviet Union, therising threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles, andthe strengthening of Chinese military forces, Japan has shifted its
military strategy from a northern-oriented one focusing on
Hokkaido to an evenly dispersed deployment across the nation,
pointedly West Japan and the metropolitan area that lies in thevicinity of the Korean Peninsula. In the past, Japan's role during
emergency situations on the peninsula had been limited to providing
its SDF bases to the U.S. armed forces, but according to the 1998
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the SDF was
authorized to take more active part in support operations for the
U.S. Even if an SDF unit takes action in high seas, not in combat
areas, Japanese military activities will be more prominent aroundthe Korean Peninsula. As the SDF's power projection capability
improves gradually, the likelihood of conflicts between Japan and
China would increase in areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula.
Also, Japan is moving in the direction of building up its defense

13capability to respond more effectively to new emerging threats-such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terror andguerrilla infiltration--beyond the realm of the exclusively defenseoriented policy.
Thus, if only to prevent in advance situations that may occur
due to unnecessary misunderstandings and distrust between Korea
and Japan, it is necessary to secure a direct channel of security
cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo. In particular, in preparations
for

the

weakening

mediator

role

of

the

U.S.,

a

gradualstrengthening of security cooperation between South Korea andJapan will be increasingly necessary. The security cooperation of
the two countries for the 21st century will be needed to promote
their common interests on the basis of free democracy and market
economy rather than a military alliance. The Republic of Korea
needs to consider the following three aspects in assessing thedirection of its new security policy.
First,

becauseJapanese

security

policyincludingtheexpansion of military role tends to be decided in a broader
dimension of the U.S. world strategy, South Korean perceptions on
Japan's expanded military role would depend on how South Korea
views the U.S. world strategy. In other words, the South Korean
position on the expansion of Japan's military role would depend onwhether or not America's world strategy and its strategy toward
Northeast Asia are in South Korea's national interest.
Second, depending on how South Korea assesses China, viewsin South Korea on the expansion of Japan's military role could alsochange. At present, while Japanese external policy has kept a14

considerable degree of transparency in international norms and has
been controlled within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security
arrangements, there has been no control whatsoever on China.
Japan has considerable military potential, and so does China. Also,South Korea's assessment of Japanese external policy would differ,depending on its judgment on whether or not Sino-Japanesecompetition is beneficial to it.
Third, depending on how it assesses North Korean military
threat, South Korea would have different perceptions of Japan. If
the South assesses that North Korean military threat is serious andcontingencies are highly likely on the peninsula, it would takepositive positions on the use of military bases within Japan, which
is a vital interest to South Korea, and Japan's expanded militaryrole centering on rear-area support for U.S. forces in Japan.
However, if North Korean military threat is not serious andcontingencies are not likely on the Korean Peninsula and if South
Korea places top priority on exchange and cooperation with North
Korea, then Japan's expanding military role under the pretext of theNorth Korean military threat and the revised Guidelines for U.S.Japan Defense Cooperation would be taken as contributing to risingtensions on the peninsula.
Since the 9/11 terrorist incidents, Japan has dispatched naval
fleets including Aegis destroyers into the Gulf area in the name ofassisting the U.S.-led war on terror and also dispatched SDF units
to Iraq as well. Now, Japan has become capable of deploying forces
beyond the region to anywhere in the world. Related to this,suspicionsarerising

that

the

15

U.S.

is

encouraging

Japan'srearmament rather than playing the role of a cork in the bottle.
However, it should not be overlooked that alliances have changedin the post-9/11 era. The key to alliances before the 9/11 terrorist
incidents was defense or deterrence, while that after the incidents
is participation in U.S. activities to combat terrorism. Japan appears
to be well understanding of the changing nature of alliances after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Of course, Japan is clearly taking
advantage of this change to become a normal state, that is, toexpand its military role. One thing clear is that only the UnitedStates is able to control Japan as a normal state. Without the U.S.Japan alliance in place, Japan's current movements would beviewed by many South Koreans as considerable threat to theirnational security. After all, if the U.S. and Japan maintain their
alliance and if the ROK and the U.S. maintain a robust alliance,
Japan as a normal state within the framework of its alliance with
the U.S. would be viewed as a stabilizing factor.
While the U.S. can control Japan, South Korea has no power todeal with Japan. From a South Korean perspective, a multilateral
security framework that can constructively digest the expanding
military role of Japan, along with the U.S.-Japan alliance, is worth
considering. The countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula are
all powerful ones that Korea alone can hardly deal with. If fact,
while South Korea is concerned about Japan's pursuit of a military
power, China's military expenditures are known to have outpaced
Japan's, thanks to its high economic growth in recent years. It isnecessary to build a multilateral security regime in East Asia
through regional confidence building and arms control, lest major

16

powers exercise their influence on South Korea in a negative
manner. Moreover, the growing power of Japan and China needs tobe constructively absorbed within the framework of cooperative
security. Promoting economic cooperation at the regional level also
deepens inter-dependence among regional countries and builds
confidence, thus contributing to regional peace and prosperity.
Construction of a multilateral economic cooperative forum at theregional level is an excellent scheme to alleviate the concerns
about Japan's path.
The surest way to prevent Japan from becoming a militarynationistomaintainamulti-dimensional

freedemocracy.

Militarism cannot take root in a multi-dimensional democraticsociety. After all, one should be reminded that standing firm to theideologies of free democracy and market economy shared by South
Korea and Japan is the surest way to prevent Japan's militarism andto deepen cooperation between the two nations.

Ⅵ. Conclusion

Reflecting the changing strategic environment following theend of the Cold War, Japan has sought to overcome several
inadequacies in its defense posture that had stemmed from thedefeat in World War II and public allergy to war and has sought toexpand its security role from the defense of Japan to cover bothregional and global defense. To achieve these goals, Japan isbuilding up its defense capability and preparing for legal andinstitutional changes. In 1995, Japan revised its NDPO, the basis of17its defense policy, and in the following year Japan issued the U.S.Japan Joint Declaration on Security that redefines the U.S.-Japan
alliance. Also, Japan revised the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation in 1997. As the JSDF dispatched units to the Gulf area
under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, it will dispatch
units to a combat zone for the first time after the end of World War
II under the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarianand Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. And in 2003, with thepassage of the emergency legislation including the Law Concerning
Measures in a Situation of Armed Attack, Japan entered a newphase in its pursuit of a normal state.
Changes in Japan's defense policy can be summarized asfollows. First, Japan is seeking to revise the 1995 NDPO again toreflect the changing strategic environment after the end of the Cold
War. Second, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks Japan has built
defense capabilities that enable it to take effective responses to
new emerging threats. Third, Japan, reaffirming the importance of
the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, is seeking to expand its
military role within that framework. Fourth, Japan is pursuing
rationalization and efficiency of its defense capability and seeking
to improve various elements of its defense capability, such as longrange power projection capability, missile defense capability. andcounter-terrorism/guerrilla warfare capability. Fifth, Japan isseeking to establish a military system appropriate for a normal
state by introducing the emergency legislation and recognizing theright of collective self-defense. Sixth, Japan is seeking to build a18system in which the JSDF can respond to various international
conflicts.
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the debates on
Japan's defense policy is Japan's effort to secure the sphere ofexternal military activities in which it can use SDF units without
restraint to protect its national interest. The Constitution bans theexercise of the right of collective self-defense, but Japan is moving
in the direction where it can make all SDF's ex-territorial activities
faits accomplis, through discussions on the expansion of the U.S.Japan alliance, the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation, the passage of the Law on Situations in Areas
Surrounding Japan, dispatch of SDF units into the war on terrorism,
and the recognition of the right of collective self-defense, in
addition to movements in favor of constitutional amendment.
Accordingly, the SDF is showing a tendency to acquire weaponssystems that exceed the realm of the exclusively defense-oriented
policy. Amphibious units capable of assault landing operations
overseas, large supply ships that can deploy fleets and attack
planes over a long-range, and aerial refuelers, combined withlegislation such as the PKO Law, the Law on Situations in Areas
Surrounding Japan, and the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law
are all part of Japan's efforts to transform the SDF into overseasdeployable forces.
In the past, Japan maintained its way to "peace state" while
blinking indifferently at the Cold War as if it were none of its
business.

Japan has been out of harm's way from severe regional

conflicts as well as potentially volatile regional circumstances-19

such as Korean War, Vietnam War, Taiwan Strait crisis, and China's
nuclear test.

With the advent of post-Cold War era, however,Japan is swiftly undergoing a significant change toward enabling
itself to utilize its military power.
Now, almost sixty years have passed since the end of Second
World War.

There is no doubt that Japan has been transformed

from a militant nation to a liberal democratic state.
traditionofestablished.

"civilian

controlovermilitary"isAnd, the
also

well

Nevertheless, Japan's neighboring countries who had

bitter historic experiences of the Japanese militarism still feel
uneasy about the recent rapid changes in Japan. The Peace
Constitution and the doctrine of "exclusively defense-oriented
policy" re the two important pillars keeping Japan as a peace statefor nearly sixty years. They are also the two major rationales thatJapan have used to reassure and persuade its neighbors that it
would remain as a peace state and never go to militarism
again. However, it seems only a matter of time that Japan would
abandon the two important pillars. Although Japan tries to justify
the extension of its military role as indispensable requisites formaintaining alliance with the United States and to become a normal
state, it seems hardly reassuring to its wary neighbors.

20