助成

Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・

IIPS International Conference“A New Horizon for Japan’s Security Policy—Basic Concept and Framework”
Tokyo, November 30 and December 1, 2004

“U.S. Security Strategy in Asia andthe Prospects for an Asian Regional Security Regime”
By
Prof. Ralph A. Cossa
President
Pacific Forum CSISU.S.

‘‘U.S. Security Strategy in Asia andthe Prospects for an Asian Regional Security Regime
By Ralph A. Cossa (draft: as of 11/08/04)
prepared for a conference on “A New Horizon for Japan’s Security Policy – Basic Concept andFramework” hosted by the Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan, Nov. 30 - Dec. 1, 2004
U.S. security strategy in Asia today is built today, as it has been for the past half century, upon thefoundation of a solid U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. This foundation, which has seen its fair share ofcracks and quakes, appears remarkable resilient at present. In fact, the depth and breadth of defense
cooperation between Washington and Tokyo in recent years have been unprecedented. While Japan may
not yet be the “U.K. of Asia,” as once envisioned by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, it is not
too far a stretch to call Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro Asia’s answer to Tony Blair. Prime
Minister Koizumi is one of a small, select group of Asia-Pacific leaders who have won Washington’sutmost trust and confidence (and sincere gratitude), given his unyielding support for the U.S. war on
terrorism in all its manifestations and his willingness to buck domestic public opinion to provide support tothe two major campaigns in Washington’s ongoing war: Afghanistan and Iraq. This has paid handsome
dividends in helping to achieve what both sides generally agree are the “best relations ever.”This paper will look first at how this “most important bilateral relationship, bar none” has evolved
over the past decade and especially since Sept. 11, 2001, looking at some of the current initiatives that lie
at the base of U.S.-Japan security cooperation today and in the immediate future. It will then look at
Washington’s presumed future vision for East Asia under a second Bush administration and how theongoing Defense Department Global Posture Review fits into this vision. Finally, I will discuss theprospects for broader multilateral cooperation and how any potential Asian regional security regime will
impact our bilateral relationship.
Background: A Decade of Enhanced Cooperation
The unprecedented decision earlier this year by Prime Minister Koizumi to deploy Japanese
Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) troops to Iraq to help in that country’s pacification and reconstruction
is just the most recent in a series of adjustments that have occurred in the operational arrangements
underpinning U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. And, while 9-11 and the resulting war on terrorism arepivotal in understanding and justifying the expanded defense relationship, it is important to look back to
the mid-1990s when examining the current evolution of the alliance, not just to put today’s changes into
perspective but because the current trend toward developing a “more equal” partnership really dates backto an earlier turning point in the relationship: the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the
21st Century issued by then-President Bill Clinton and his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister
Hashimoto Ryutaro, during their April 1996 summit meeting in Tokyo.
The 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Summit, which signaled an official end to the “Japan-bashing” era,
set the stage for the revised 1997 Defense Guidelines, which in turn set the stage for the more dramaticchanges we have witnessed since 9-11. It is interesting to note that the Joint Declaration and revised
Guidelines were stimulated by several events that are strangely reminiscent of more recent occurrences: aU.S.-led military campaign against Iraq and a Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis. One need only tocompare and contrast Japan’s response to the previous Iraq/DPRK crises with the current ones to realize
that, thankfully, it is not deja vu all over again. Despite justifiable criticism of President Clinton’s tendency
to ignore the alliance during the closing (Japan-passing) years of his administration, his Joint Declaration
with Prime Minister Hashimoto lay the initial groundwork that their successors would subsequently build
upon, especially after Sept. 11th provided the political cover to move the relationship forward much fasterthan anyone drafting the Joint Statement or revised Defense Guidelines would have then imagined.
I begin my paper with this brief current history lesson to emphasize a too often overlooked fact;
namely, that partisan election year bickering notwithstanding (and thankfully Japan was not a major issue1

in the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign), there is broad-based bipartisan support for the U.S.-Japan
alliance in the United States. There appeared to be great anxiety in Tokyo that, if Senator Kerry had won
the race, he would have somehow been angry with Prime Minister Koizumi for Japan’s outspoken support
to the U.S. before, during, and after the invasion of Iraq. To the contrary, I would argue that, had Kerrywon, he would have cited Japan’s current support as the model that other allies (especially Europeans)should emulate. He and Prime Minister Koizumi would have quickly become the best of friends.
With President Bush’s reelection, we should see a continued improvement in U.S.-Japan relations,with a high priority attached to alliance maintenance. There is one caveat, however: it appears that the
only thing that has risen faster than the level of cooperation between our two nations during theBush-Koizumi era has been the level of Washington’s expectations regarding the creation of an even more
“normal” defense relationship with its long-standing ally in East Asia. This may raise hopes in Washington(and in certain quarters in Tokyo) that will not be easily fulfilled as both sides strive to create a more equal
partnership.

The Bush-Koizumi Era
Pre-Sept 11th. U.S.-Japan defense cooperation has clearly been taken to a higher level under President
George W. Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi. While much of the progress has been attributed to Sept.
11th – and, as previously argued, the terrorist attacks on that day provided both the impetus and political
cover to move the defense relationship forward at an accelerated pace – both sides had already clearlysignaled their intention to create a broader, deeper security relationship.
Armitage/Nye Report. Just prior to the November 2000 U.S. presidential election, the Institute for
National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington published a report (on Oct. 11,
2000) outlining what a more activist U.S. security policy with Japan might look like. While the report wasdrafted by a bipartisan team of specialists led by Republican Richard Armitage and Democrat Joseph Nye(both former Assistant Secretaries of Defense), it was generally interpreted in Tokyo as a "Republican"
plan (and, to this day, is often referred to merely as “The Armitage Report”). The report called for"excellence without arrogance" from the United States while suggesting a more open door in Washington
for Japanese ideas and initiatives. It also encouraged Tokyo to expand its security and diplomatic
responsibilities in Asia.
The most controversial aspect of the report was the observation that Japan's decision not toexercise the right of collective defense is an obstacle to alliance cooperation. This was interpreted bymany in Tokyo as an endorsement of Constitutional revision. However, the report was careful toemphasize that decisions on the Constitution must be thoroughly considered by the Japanese people
themselves. For the most part, the report was well received in Japan, though many questioned whether
the Japanese political system, especially under a very weak and ineffective Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro,
was up to the task.
“Dynamic Approach” Initiated. This question was quickly laid to rest following the election of Prime
Minister Koizumi in April, 2001. But, even before Koizumi’s election, President Bush had issued a jointstatement with his predecessor during Prime Minister Mori’s visit to Washington that seemed to go beyond
the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Communique in pledging “a dynamic approach to bilateral defense
consultation and planning.” Included also was a pledge to “strengthen joint efforts to address thetransnational challenges of the 21st century.” (The ability of both sides to effectively handle the tragic
accidental sinking of a Japanese training ship by a U.S. submarine also demonstrated that the defense
and broader bilateral relationship were on solid ground.)The selection of Koizumi Junichiro as Prime Minister dramatically increased the prospects for still
deeper cooperation. Fears that Japan would prove to be a reluctant partner largely vanished amid
Koizumi's talk of leading his nation toward a more "normal" role in international affairs. Seemingly taking a2

page from the Armitage/Nye Report, Koizumi stated that it was desirable for Japan to be allowed toparticipate in collective defense activities and to help defend its allies (read: the United States) in the eventof regional crisis. He also noted that Article 9 of the Japanese constitution -- which stipulates that Japan
shall never maintain land, sea, or air forces -- “fails to reflect reality.” Koizumi’s view seems to dovetail
nicely with calls for a more equal relationship coming from Washington.
Shortly after taking office, Koizumi said that definitions of “rear areas” were flexible, implying thatJapan might be able to provide more support for U.S. forces in a contingency than had previously beenthought. His Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo also ordered studies on ways to lift restraints on
Japanese soldiers participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Koizumi also expressed support for
missile defense (telling the Diet in early June that the project deserves further study). In short, the trend
toward enhanced defense cooperation had been set in motion well before the tragic events of Sept. 11th.
9-11: The Beginning of a New Era
Response to 9-11. Immediately after the attack, Prime Minister Koizumi went on record stating thatJapan would “spare no effort in providing assistance and cooperation” in support of America’s war on
terrorism. He followed this up with even stronger commitments to provide intelligence and military
logistical support during his late September visit to New York and Washington. During his meeting with
President Bush, Koizumi said (in English, for emphasis): "We Japanese firmly stand behind the UnitedStates to fight terrorism." He then added, much to Washington’s amazement and delight, that "It will nolonger hold that the Self-Defense Forces should not be sent to danger spots. There is no such thing as asafe place."
Backing up these assertions, Koizumi quickly put together a seven-point program to respond tothe crisis. It included measures allowing the Self-Defense Forces to provide logistical support to the U.S.
military in the event of a retaliatory strike; strengthening security measures at important facilities in Japan;
dispatching Japanese ships to gather information; strengthening international cooperation overimmigration control; providing humanitarian and economic aid to affected countries; assisting refugees
fleeing areas that might be hit by U.S. retaliation; and cooperating with other countries to ensure stability inthe international economic system.
Enduring Freedom. Emergency legislation quickly enacted in Oct. 2001 allowed new operationalarrangements to quickly evolve. In early November 2001, two Japanese destroyers and a supply ship left
home port for the Indian Ocean to provide off-shore non-combat support for Operation Enduring Freedom.
The only disappointment was Japan's failure, despite not-so-subtle U.S. pressure, initially to include an
Aegis destroyer in its Indian Ocean task force. The Japanese Cabinet has since routinely voted to extend
SDF support for the war in Afghanistan and, in a significant step forward, finally decided in December
2002 to dispatch one of its high-tech Aegis-equipped vessels to the Indian Ocean as part of that effort.
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Immediately prior to the March 2003 Iraq invasion,Tokyo has stepped up its
logistical support for the coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. In early March, JMSDF ships began
refueling Italian, Spanish, French, German, New Zealand, and Dutch warships participating in Operation
Enduring Freedom, in addition to the U.S. and British vessels. This freed up U.S. logistics forces forsupport to Operation Iraqi Freedom. While Japan did not directly participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
the above measures allowed the U.S. to shift more assets to the Iraqi campaign and thus constituted
significant (yet still constitutional) indirect support to the war effort. It was sufficient to have Tokyo listedon the Iraqi Freedom coalition of the willing membership list, even before Prime Minister Koizumi’s
politically courageous decision to put "boots on the ground" in Iraq.
Korean Crisis. Japan’s support to the U.S. has not been limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. Tokyo has
been a steadfast supporter of Washington’s multilateral approach toward the nuclear stand-off on the
Korean Peninsula. Washington, in return, continues to argue that Japanese participation is “essential,”
despite complaints from Pyongyang and only luke-warm initial support from Beijing and Seoul for a

3

Japanese seat at the table. Tokyo has also played an important role at the regular Trilateral Coordination
and Oversight Group (TCOG) meetings with Washington and Seoul, urging U.S. flexibility at times, but
most importantly echoing Washington’s insistence that nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated in North
Korea, thus providing some much-needed backbone to Seoul, which seems to have a looser definition of“will not tolerate” than its other two TCOG partners.
Seldom have Washington and Tokyo been so close together in their views of how best to deal
with Pyongyang. Recall that in the closing months of the Clinton administration, there was great fear inTokyo that Washington was going to get too far out in front of Tokyo on this issue. Following an
exchange of high-level visits and amid preparations for a possible Clinton visit to Pyongyang, many wereconcerned that Japan would be pressured to speed up its normalization process with Pyongyang, perhaps
beyond a point that was politically sustainable. Conversely, once the Sept. 2002 Koizumi visit toPyongyang was announced, there were concerns expressed that Japan might get way out in front of amore cautious, tentative Bush administration which seemed reluctant to engage in meaningful dialogue
with a member of the so-called “axis of evil.”Today, however, both Washington and Tokyo appear in lock-step, with both insisting on an
immediate, verifiable halt to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs and ambitions (and an immediate
full accounting and satisfactory resolution of the abductee issue). Prime Minister Koizumi’s influence on
President Bush was most apparent after his second visit to Pyongyang, when Koizumi’s statements
stressing the need for a U.S. initiative resulted in Washington finally tabling a proposal at the Six-Party
Talks (following close TCOG consultation) providing a roadmap for defusing the crisis. Unfortunately,
Pyongyang has been hesitant to respond, apparently hoping – as it turns out, groundlessly – for “Regimechange” in Washington. At this writing, Pyongyang was still resisting returning to the talks but mostanalysts believed that, with the U.S. elections over, the North would eventually return to the dialogue.
Japan’s clear pronouncements about its right, under the principle of self-defense, to takepreemptive action in the event of an imminent DPRK missile launch, while not too credible militarily,
nonetheless provides political support to the U.S. doctrine of preemption while also underscoring the needfor close military-to-military cooperation between Washington and Tokyo. As a self-proclaimed member of
the “coalition of the willing,” Japan’s seemingly unqualified support for the U.S.-led military campaign
against Iraq also solidifies the alliance while sending North Korea a clear message that Tokyo would no
doubt be equally, if not more, willing to support Washington in dealing with threats closer to home.
Proliferation Security Initiative. Crossing yet another threshold in military-to-military cooperation,
Tokyo also became a charter member of the U.S.-instigated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed at
stemming the flow of weapons of mass destruction. The PSI, first laid out by President Bush in May 2003
and formalized at a 11-nation meeting (involving Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.) in Madrid a month later, is “a global initiative with global
reach,” under which coalition members agreed, in Brisbane in July, “to move quickly on direct, practicalmeasures to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles, and related items.”
At a third meeting, in Paris in Sept, the 11 participants also agreed on a Statement of Interdiction
Principles “to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop [WMD]
shipments . . . consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks,
including the UN Security Council.” The PSI now involves 18 countries, with Canada, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Norway, Singapore, Turkey, and most recently Russia joining the core group. Just lastmonth (October 2004), Japan for the first time hosted a PSI interdiction exercise in Tokyo Bay, involving
nine naval and coast guard ships from Australia, France, Japan, and the U.S., providing yet anotherexample just how deeply involved Japan has become in bilateral and multilateral security cooperation.
Missile Defense Cooperation. From the onset, Prime Minister Koizumi has also been a supporter of
U.S.-Japan missile defense joint research. A decision to develop and deploy such a system has been
another issue, however, since the necessary command and control coordination necessary for abroad-based system to be most effective would appear to cross the (ever-shifting) “collective defense”

4

barrier. Nonetheless, in late December 2003, Tokyo announced that it will begin building a missile defense
system, citing "a spread of missiles and a rise in weapons of mass destruction" as the primary reasons
behind the decision. Tokyo is also reviewing its 36-year-old ban on exporting weapons, their parts, and thetechnology to make them, with an eye to exempting the United States. The changes now being
contemplated open the door for still deeper military-to-military cooperation between Washington andSeoul.
Future Expectations: More Like the U.K. . . . or Germany?
What does Washington wish that Tokyo would do now? The answer seems to be: more of thesame. During his June 2002 Asia Society speech, Secretary Powell not only stressed Japan’s positive
contribution to regional stability (a familiar refrain) but also the alliance’s role in providing “a framework
within which Japan can contribute more to its own defense as well as to peace and security worldwide.”
Clearly Washington supports, and wants to encourage, a greater regional (if not global) security role
befitting a more “normal” Japan. As Secretary Armitage noted in Feb 2004, “I believe that Prime Minister
Koizumi has set a new benchmark, not just in the dispatch of Japanese Self Defense Forces to Iraq, butalso in redefining Japan’s role in the world.” But, with the decision to put boots on the ground in Iraq, it
appears unlikely that Washington will be looking to Tokyo to move further forward, at least during theremainder of President Bush’s first term in office.
Washington’s greatest concern now will be to avoid backsliding, especially if (when) Japaneseforces become targets, or worse yet suffer significant casualties, in Iraq. I for one have greater
confidence in Prime Minister Koizumi’s (and the Japanese public’s and JDA’s) resolve than many of
today’s pundits. But, it’s clear that Tokyo is more prepared militarily than it is politically or psychologicallyfor what appears to be an inevitable first true test under fire (notwithstanding the fact that Japanesediplomats have already been killed in Iraq and civilian peacekeepers were likewise killed in Cambodia).
How Tokyo responds will determine the pace (but not the direction) of future, deeper defense cooperation.
Following President Bush’s reelection to a second term, one can expect continued – hopefully
subtle and politically aware – pressure on Japan to continue to find new avenues of enhanced military
cooperation and involvement in security matters in East Asia and beyond. “Japan can count on America,
and increasingly, America can count on Japan,” Secretary Armitage noted in Tokyo in Feb 2004,“Certainly a more self-confident Japan, with its own unique style of global leadership, can only add to that
equation, both in the economic opportunities for our peoples and in advancing our shared global interests.”
As long as Prime Minister Koizumi remains at the helm, such gentle pressure will likely bewelcome and sufficient to see continued forward progress. The big issue is a purely Japanese one:constitutional revision or further reinterpretation to allow collective defense. Since many maintain thatJapan, under the UN Charter, is already permitted to exercise collective self-defense but has merely
chosen not to do so, it is possible that a political decision short of reinterpretation may be the vehicle
Tokyo chooses to move further forward in its quest to become a more normal nation. But, given Prime
Minister Koizumi’s earlier comments on the subject, one can anticipate a move toward actual constitutional
revision at some point in the not-too-distant future. Washington will be cheering along the sidelines, but
is likely to continue its official hands-off policy.
Will Japan become the UK of Asia? Perhaps, but it will not happen overnight, even if there isconstitutional reform. The German model may (I would argue, should) first apply. During the 1992 Gulf
War, Germany increased its military operations in the Mediterranean and other NATO areas to free up
more non-German NATO forces to participate in Operation Desert Storm, quite similar to what Japan did,and is continuing to do, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath. By Kosovo, Germany
had taken the next step in being a full partner in a wartime coalition and few blink an eye today atGermany’s active involvement in Afghanistan – it’s reluctance to participate in Iraq is driven by otherfactors, and not by the lingering ghosts of World War II. Before Japan can become the UK of Asia in the
21st Century, it must become the Germany of the last decade and finally put its own World War II ghosts to5rest.
Future Visions: A Continuing Coincidence of Views
As a general rule, American politicians, be they Democrats or Republicans, are not famous fortheir ability to think long term, much less plan or act in accordance with future visions. However, the 2002
National Security Strategy provides a clue regarding the Bush administration’s future vision (for thosewilling to read beyond the two pages that discuss preemptive attacks against an imminent threat involving
weapons of mass destruction). The NSS, like all its earlier versions (by Republicans and Democrats alike),calls for the maintenance of the U.S. alliance structure in East Asia, centered around the U.S.-Japan
alliance. The 2002 edition also puts a high premium on major power cooperation, citing both Japan and
China (and, in South Asia, India) as major Asian powers.
What remains missing – and what I would argue is sorely needed today – is a new East Asia
Strategy Report that lays out Washington’s vision for Asian security. In the absence of such a document,
allow me to speculate. I would argue that most serious American strategists see and support a continued
active political, economic, and security role for the United States in Asia one to two decades from now,
simply because it is in America’s national security interest to remain actively engaged. I also see acontinued role for current alliance relationships in this future, as part of an overlapping series of security
arrangements and mechanisms aimed at promoting a peaceful, stable security environment.
Few believe that current force levels could or should be sustained, absent a dramatic change inthe threat environment in East Asia post-Korean reunification or reconciliation. But the network of alliancesthat have served U.S. interests so well for the past half century – and that have provided the bases whichmake a continued force presence or even power projection from remote bases possible – will remain
useful, even if “lily pads” and operational or logistical “hubs”replace larger facilities as the future bases ofchoice. Ironically, one of the driving rationales behind the current U.S. force restructuring or Future of the
Alliance (FOTA) talks is to create a force posture that is sustainable into the future, based on the sharedunderstanding that the current footprint is too intrusive and thus not sustainable. As will be discussed in
more detail later, the problem today is not so much what is being done or why, but how it is being
accomplished.
The U.S.-Japan defense alliance maintains an important role in my vision of a stable future East
Asia, as does enhanced cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and an eventually reunified Korea, in what I
have described in earlier writings as a “virtual alliance.” While a formal trilateral alliance appears
unnecessary and could even prove counterproductive, the U.S., Japan, and ROK should work toward thedevelopment of such a virtual alliance, achieved through the continuation of a U.S.-Korea security
relationship post reunification, the continued revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and thestrengthening of bilateral security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. From a U.S. perspective – andone would hope from a Korean perspective as well – an openly antagonistic relationship between Seoul
and Tokyo or, worse yet, a reunified Korea that saw Japan as its primary adversary would be extremely
destabilizing. (So too, as I will soon address, would be a U.S.-Korea-Japan alliance aimed at China.)
Washington’s “best case” vision for a peaceful, prosperous Asia is one in which the “end of history” hasoccurred (at least as far as Korea and Japan are concerned), and both are working closely with the U.S. topromote a stable, secure Asia. This does not require transforming the current separate bilateral alliances
into a trilateral one but does require a continuation of today’s alliances and a deepening of the “weakest
link.”As regards the Korean Peninsula itself, I would argue that it is the common vision of the UnitedStates, Japan, and the Republic of Korea that one day in the future there be a single Korean nation
inhabiting the entire Peninsula, living securely in an area that encompasses the current recognizedboundaries of the North and South, under the political and economic systems and way of life that exist
today in the South. Such an outcome is in the national security interest of Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul
and in the best interest of the Korean people, North and South. For the purposes of this paper, we will6

leave how we get to such a state to others to debate; the only thing required here is to accept that this is acommon vision. It is – or should be – a vision acceptable to, and consistent wit the national security
interests of, Korea’s other neighbors as well.
This brings us to the most contentious aspect of America’s future vision of Asia; namely how todeal with a rising China. Here, it is a lot easier to agree on the type of China we would like to see than it isto agree on the type China we are likely to see. Even the most avid members of the contain China crowd(the infamous “blue team” in Washington) would acknowledge that the preferred outcome would be apeaceful, prosperous, stable China that is more tolerant both of its neighbors and of the aspirations of its
own people; a China that has reached a peaceful accommodation with Taiwan that is acceptable to thepeople on both sides of the Strait. While some fear that China’s current commitment to “peaceful rise” willchange once it has risen, most would agree that it would be easier to deal with (i.e., contain) a powerful,
antagonistic China than to deal with the consequences of a failed China. – one only need recall thepolitical and economic consequences of South Vietnam’s collapse to imagine the impact that a ten- (orhundred-) fold increase in Chinese boat people would have on East Asia and beyond.
I would argue that it is in our mutual long-term interest to see the peaceful rise of China and thatembracing China and wrapping it in a web of multilateral economic, political, and security relationships isthe best way of assuring, or at least increasing the prospects of, a peaceful risen China as well. But I
would also argue that a strong U.S. alliance network, not specifically aimed at China but at promoting
regional stability and enhanced crisis response capabilities wherever trouble may occur, also helps
present realistic boundaries that will help channel or guide China’s rise in the most beneficial direction.
For true stability to occur in East Asia, the four major powers – the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia– must all maintain cordial, cooperative relations both with one another and, of equal importance, with
Korea. As noted earlier, this simple fact is underscored in the Bush administration’s National Security
Strategy, as it was in the Clinton administration’s earlier versions of this document. Past Korean leaders
have also recognized this simple fact, and the role a continuation of the U.S.-ROK alliance plays inpermitting simultaneous good relations with all four powers. It is the sense of security provided by thealliance – Washington’s role as the “outside balancer” – that permits Seoul to maintain simultaneous
good relations with all of its powerful neighbors. The absence of the alliance would create a vacuum that
the ROK would either have to fill itself by considerable (including possible nuclear) military expansion or bylinking itself to one of the other nearby giants. Whichever one Korea choose – and China would be themost likely but not only conceivable choice – the other would feel threatened and likely respond in waysthat could be even more destabilizing. For this reason, at least from this American’s perspective, acontinuation of the U.S.-ROK alliance provides Seoul with the best opportunity to maintain good relations
with all four of its neighbors.
While one could argue that this future vision does not challenge China’s national security interests,
since it channels but does not seek to prevent or delay China’s peaceful rise, it is doubtful that such a
scenario is China’s first choice of potential outcomes. No doubt, China would prefer an East Asia 20
years hence in which it, rather than Washington, was the “balancer” and where Seoul looked first to
Beijing rather than to Washington (or Tokyo, or Moscow, or to itself) as the primary guarantor of Peninsulastability. The question, which only Seoul can answer, is “what does Korea prefer?”
From a U.S. perspective, it would be particularly unsettling if a future (unified) Korea looked toChina as its primary security partner, especially if they both looked toward Japan as the primary future
threat or enemy. It is an unfortunate fact that one of the few things that the people of North and South
Korea have in common today is an historical sense of distrust for their Japanese neighbors; a distrust
shared, and all-too-frequently played upon, by the Chinese. If future South-North or Korea-China ties arebuilt on this factor, however, with Japan emerging as the common concern today and future threat
tomorrow, this will put Korea on a collision course with the United States, whose national security strategy
rests upon the foundation of close U.S.-Japan relations and greater Japanese participation in regional
security affairs.

7There appears to be a certain fascination with China on the Peninsula and a tendency to give
China a free ride on sensitive issues, even while refusing to ignore any slight, real or imagined, that comesfrom Washington or Tokyo. Could you imagine, for example, what the response in Seoul would be if the
U.S. or Japan or almost anyone else tried to prevent Seoul from inviting a recognized internationalreligious leader to Korea? Yet, China has successfully pressured Seoul from inviting the Dalai Lama tovisit for years. Likewise, Beijing continues to argue against direct air links between Seoul and Taipei andplays hardball on a number of other issues. It has only been the most recent controversy over theancient kingdom of Koguryo that has gotten the attention of the Korean people and perhaps somewhat
lessened China’s teflon.
Again, from an admittedly biased U.S. perspective, a continued alliance relationship with
Washington, even after reunification or reconciliation, provides Seoul with its best chance of being an independent, self-sustaining actor among the proverbial whales that surround the Peninsula. President
Ron Moo-hyun, like Kim Dae-jung and others before him, professes to agree with this assertion, but on a
day-to-day basis does little to make this case to the Korean public, which in a democracy will ultimately
decide the future viability of the alliance. Likewise, U.S. leaders have been remiss in making the case fora future security relationship, letting a sense of anti-Koreaness, while modest, continue to fester in the
United States. This, in my view, serves neither country’s long-term national security interests.
In summary, the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances and the broader U.S. East Asia bilateralalliance structure that served well the cause of regional peace and stability during the Cold War cansimilarly help promote future peace and stability if properly maintained and focused on regional stability
rather than deterrence or containment, once the North Korean threat subsides.
Of course, deterrence remains the order of the day on the Peninsula as long as North Korea
remains a separate entity with a separate military. But the U.S., Japan, and ROK should begin now todevelop the rationale and lay the groundwork for future trilateral security cooperation post-reunification.
While a formal trilateral alliance appears unnecessary and could even prove counterproductive, all threeshould work toward the development of a virtual alliance, achieved through the continuation of aU.S.-Korea security relationship post reunification, the continued revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance,
and the strengthening of bilateral security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. This arrangement
should not be aimed at China and should not been seen as trying to prevent its peaceful rise, but should
help channel China’s emergence in a way that remains non-threatening to the Korean Peninsula and to
Korea’s neighbors or the broader international community. The two bilateral security alliances and thetrilateral virtual alliance should be part of an overlapping mosaic of cooperative security mechanisms
aimed at promoting a true concert of powers in East Asia.
U.S. Military Transformation: What it Means for Asia
Before discussing multilateralism in Asia, a few more words appear in order regarding
Washington’s ongoing Global Posture Review (GPR). One must assume that the Bush administration,with reelection now accomplished, will energetically move ahead with its post-Cold War militarytransformation. In mid-August 2004, President Bush announced significant planned cuts in the number ofAmerican forces based overseas. Over the next ten years, President Bush told the U.S. Veterans ofForeign Wars (VFW), 60-70,000 U.S. forces (and some 100,000 military family members and civilian
Defense Department employees) currently based in Europe and Asia would be brought home. Increased
U.S. mobility and force projection capabilities and dramatic changes in the nature of the post-Cold War
threat would allow such reductions without any lessening of U.S. combat capability or Washington’scommitment to its overseas allies. The force reductions, President Bush asserted, would make the U.S.
military “more effective at projecting [its] strength and spreading freedom and peace.” They would allow
U.S. troops to “surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats.”
Such assurances aside, the President’s announcement has created undue anxiety in somecorners (and perhaps unrealistic expectations in others). Despite its obvious domestic political motivation8

– presented during a heated presidential campaign to an influential veterans group – the announcement
actually reflects the culmination of three years of careful analysis by a Pentagon team which continues toattach high priority to “military transformation.” This was one of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s top
objectives, before Sept. 11, 2001 and the self-inflicted distraction of the Iraq War and its messy aftermathcaused Pentagon priorities to shift elsewhere. With President Bush’s first term drawing to a close, there
is a sense of urgency in the White House and Pentagon to get the new post-Cold War military frameworkfirmly in place, even if its implementation is years away (and no doubt subject to further negotiation andadjustment).
While details regarding the planned reductions are still sketchy, White House and Pentagon
officials have assured their overseas partners that the effort has been and will continue to be closely
coordinated with “all affected countries.” As one administration spokesperson proclaimed, “This issomething we’re doing with allies, not that we’re doing to allies.” Based on information received thus far,the planned reductions appear to impact Europe much more than Asia. Two U.S. Army heavy divisions
will be brought home from Germany; a move that was long overdue. Keeping forces in place that wereoriginally deployed to fight a now nonexistent Soviet Union “would be a victory for inertia over strategic
rationality,” said one of the plan’s chief architects, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith.
Feith laid out some basic principles underlying the Global Posture Review in Congressional
testimony in late June, by describing what the GPR is not about:-- "We are not aiming at retrenchment, curtailing US commitments, isolationism or unilateralism.”-- "We are not focused on maintaining numbers of troops overseas. Instead we are focused onincreasing the capabilities of our forces and those of our friends.”-- "We are not talking about fighting in place, but on our ability to move to the fight."
Anticipated changes in Asia, beyond those already announced for the Korean Peninsula, would be“not very dramatic.” Feith argued (in an Aug. 19 Washington Post editorial) that there was a “compelling
rationale” for some modest East Asia redeployments, focusing on the need to move ROK-based forces outof downtown Seoul – “plucking a thorn out of South Korea’s flesh” – and into more efficient “hubs” to allow
them to better respond to threats “from North Korea or anyone else.”
As part of the GPR, some 12,500 troops (out of 37,500 Korea-based forces) are scheduled todepart the Peninsula over the next few years; 3,600 have already left for duty in Iraq. It should be notedthat the ROK government is in agreement with the redeployments. Its current complaint is not over how
many or where, but when – South Korean authorities have asked (repeatedly and publicly) that the
timetable be extended until the security situation on the Peninsula is further clarified. While the need tolook at a post-Cold War (and post-9/11) military structure is readily apparent, it is important to rememberthat the Cold War has not yet ended on the Korean Peninsula; North Korea’s current nuclear saber-rattlingprovides an all too obvious reminder of this fact. After some foot-dragging, the Pentagon finally saw thewisdom in showing some flexibility, indicating the redeployment of some key weapons systems would bedelayed while agreeing to stretch out the troop cuts over the next four years, rather than by the end of
2005, as originally planned.
President Bush noted that even after the redeployments, “we’ll still have a significant presence
overseas.” Today, over 230,000 U.S. troops are stationed abroad, not counting the 150,000 additional
troops “temporarily” deployed to Iraq (which are not included in or affected by the broader plan). Roughly
25,000 appear destined to remain on the Korean Peninsula, serving a vital “reassurance” mission – theterm “tripwire” is no longer in vogue.
While not yet specified, only modest adjustments are expected in Japan, where more mobile U.S.
forces (mostly naval, air, and marine) already have a regional response mission. In fact, most of therumors associated with Japan troop realignment suggest mere shifting of forces from one location(Okinawa) to another (Japanese Self Defense Force bases on the main islands) or headquarters’ swaps:

9there is talk of moving the Army’s I Corp Headquarters to Camp Zama from Washington State while theFifth Air Force Headquarters at Yokota may be combined with the Thirteenth Air Force Headquarters in
Guam. All this remains extremely tentative, however. Negotiations – not only between Washington andTokyo, but also within the Pentagon and between the administration and the Congress – are far fromcompleted.
U.S. Not “Marching Out of Asia.” Alarmist headlines aside – the Far Eastern Economic Review
headline regarding Bush’s VFW speech read “Marching Out Of Asia” while its cover proclaimed “America
Pulls Back its Troops”– it is the intrusive American military footprint and not regional capability orcommitment that is being reduced. Nor is the GPR intended to be the “beginnings of the end of the[U.S.-ROK] alliance,” as a recent IISS Strategic Comments analytical article speculated. The GPR’s
overriding objective is to sustain, not devalue, existing alliances, in order to lay the groundwork for asustained overseas military presence, albeit at reduced levels and with more flexible, rapid response
forces.
While bases in Guam and Hawaii are likely to play an increasingly more important role as the“hub” or “lily pad” strategy unfolds, so too will current bases in Asia. Okinawa is particularly important, forthree reasons: location, location, location. While some efforts will no doubt be made to reduce thedefensive burden of the Okinawan people – as noted, some modest relocations from Okinawa to existing
Japan Self Defense Force bases on mainland Japan are reportedly being considered and the move from
Futenma Airbase to a less populated area on Okinawa has long been approved and (one hopes) will
eventually occur – U.S. Japan-based forces (like those operating out of Singapore) are already better
situated to support the new strategy than those located in Europe or the Korean Peninsula. This is why thechanges in Korea will be aimed at creating a more flexible, less intrusive, more sustainable presence, andchanges elsewhere in Asia will be “not very dramatic.”
Multilateral Security Cooperation: An Important Supplement to Bilateral Alliances
Washington’s long-standing emphasis on maintaining its bilateral alliances (including a forward
military presence), and the Bush administration’s somewhat overstated but all-too-frequently earned
reputation for unilateralism has resulted in the perception – largely erroneous, I would argue – that
Washington is against multilateral institutions or forms of cooperation. I believe this is particularly untrue
when it comes to East Asia. If anything, the Bush administration has renewed and reinvigorated U.S.
interest in the region’s two primary standing multilateral institutions – the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) “gathering of economies” – and, against some initialregional resistance and criticism, insisted on a multilateral approach, under the Six-Party Talks, for dealing
with the North Korean nuclear problem. And, as already documented, it places a great deal of importancein the TCOG, although some would argue that trilateral or “mini-lateral” mechanisms fall short of the true
definition of multilateralism.
Pro-Multilateralism, with Caveats. As a general rule, I believe Washington has historically viewed Asia
Pacific multilateral organizations as useful vehicles both for promoting greater political and economic
cooperation and for enhancing regional security. In fact, Washington has taken an active hand inestablishing some regional institutions and its concurrence and active participation have been instrumental
to the success of many of those proposed by others. This support for multilateral institutions in the Asia
Pacific has one important caveat, however: No U.S. administration, be it Republican or Democrat, is like toallow such institutions to be seen as substitutes for or as threats to U.S. bilateral efforts andarrangements. This is especially so in the security field. But, like the Clinton administration before it,
the Bush administration does not see bilateral and multilateral efforts as being in tension; rather, they
complement one another. As a general rule, East Asian multilateral organizations are seen as usefultools in pursuing U.S. national security objectives. The Bush administration has also been cautiously
supportive of multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN Plus Three and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, which do not include the U.S., although it appears the Bush administration is starting to casta more watchful eye, especially on those organizations established and/or dominated by China, to ensure

10that these do not represent efforts to diminish Washington’s involvement or interests in the region. And,as the post September 11th, 2001 U.S.-led international war on terrorism demonstrates, while Washington
is willing -- indeed eager -- to develop a multilateral approach in combating global terrorism, it has made it
clear that this will not deter America from pursuing its objectives unilaterally if necessary.
The ARF: “Very, Very Useful” but Limited
The ARF brings together foreign ministers from the ten ASEAN states (Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus Australia,
Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea,
North Korea, New Zealand, the United States, Vietnam, and for the first time in 2004, Pakistan, for annual
security-oriented discussions. Secretary of State Colin Powell has been to every ARF meeting held
during his tenure in office, something that neither of his Clinton administration predecessors accomplished.
He pronounced the ARF as “very, very useful” after his first meeting.
Various ARF study groups (called Inter-sessional Support Groups or ISGs) have also provided avehicle for the U.S. to move the multilateral process along in areas important to Washington, such as
preventive diplomacy, enhanced confidence building, and maritime (including search and rescue)
cooperation; all of which help promote greater transparency and military-to-military cooperation. Most
importantly, since Sept. 11, 2001, the ARF has helped focus regional attention on – and has served as animportant vehicle for practical cooperating in – fighting terrorism. At the most recent ARF meeting in
Jakarta in July 2004, the assembled ARF Ministers repeated annual pledges to fight terrorism and the
spread of weapons of mass destruction through ARF Statements on “Strengthening Transport Security
Against International Terrorism” and a “Statement on Non-Proliferation.” (They also confirmed theirintentions to further institutionalize the ARF process through the establishment of “an ARF Unit” within the
ASEAN Secretariat to serve as a de facto ARF Secretariat, to assist “in carrying out the mandates outlinedin the paper on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair” and to support the Experts and Eminent Persons
Group.)[The ARF’s research efforts have been supported, and occasionally prodded, by the parallel
efforts of non-governmental (so-called “track two”) organizations such as the multinational Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), which has helped to tackle more contentious issues,
such as the development of both a Working Definition and Statement of Principles of Preventive
Diplomacy and Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation. CSCAP links regional security-oriented institutes and,through them, broad-based member committees comprised of academicians, security specialists, andformer and current foreign ministry and defense officials; all participate in their private capacities. CSCAP
committees have been established in Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union,
India, Indonesia, Japan, South and North Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. Taiwan scholars
participate in their private capacities.]
While the ARF seemed well-suited to serve as the consolidating and validating instrument behind
many security initiatives proposed by governments and at non-official gatherings, and has become an
important vehicle in the war on terrorism, from a U.S. perspective its contribution to the regional security
order remains somewhat constrained. For example, Taiwan has not been permitted to participate and
the PRC has insisted that "internal Chinese affairs" not be on the agenda, effectively blocking ARF
discussion of cross-Strait tensions despite their obvious broad regional implications. The Chinese haveeven been reluctant to address conflicting claims in the South China Sea at the ARF, insisting instead on
separate talks with ASEAN or with the other claimants on an individual basis. The agreement to "move ata pace comfortable to all participants" was aimed at tempering the desire of more Western-oriented
members for immediate results in favor of the "evolutionary" approach preferred by the ASEAN states,
which see the process as being as important as its eventual substantive products. The Asian
preference for "noninterference in internal affairs" also has placedsome important topics essentially off limits. This suggested that the evolution of the ARF from a11

confidence building measures "talk shop" to a true preventive diplomacy mechanism (as called for in its
1995 Concept Paper) will be a long and difficult one.
APEC: Cautiously Testing the Security Waters
APEC is first and foremost a “gathering of regional economies” – it is not referred to as agathering of states or governments due to the presence in its ranks of Hong Kong and Taiwan which
members have agreed remain part of "one China." It started out as an informal dialogue group, growing
from an original 12 members (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States) in 1989 to 15 in 1991
(with the addition of China., Hong Kong, and “Chinese Taipei”) to its current strength of 21, with theaddition of Mexico and Papua New Guinea (1993), Chile (1994), Peru, Russia, and Vietnam (1997).
Institutionalization began in February 1993, when the APEC Secretariat was established in Singapore.
While primarily aimed at managing the effects of growing economic interdependence, APEC has
had an important political and security role as well, especially since the 1993 Seattle meeting when
President Clinton invited the APEC heads of state and government to the first of what have now become
regular annual Leaders’ Meetings designed to elevate the importance of this economic gathering. The
Leaders' Meetings have become an important vehicle for fostering political relations in addition to raising
the level of economic dialogue and putting pressure on the region's leaders (and especially the host state)
to move the process forward. (Taiwan's head of state is specifically not invited to attend the annual
leaders' meetings, even though Hong Kong’s chief executive regularly attends.)
APEC’s Evolving Political/Security Role. The political and even strategic significance of the Leaders’Meetings was first underscored in Auckland in 1999, a gathering that was significant more for what
happened outside the APEC venue than inside the meeting. Security issues dominated the side
discussions and the talk in the corridors. Not the least of these was the growing (and well-founded)concern over the deteriorating security situation in East Timor. The Auckland meeting was fortuitous inthat it provided an opportunity for regional leaders, including President Clinton and Australian Prime
Minister Howard, to work out arrangements for the Australian-led multinational peacekeeping mission(INTERFET) that was subsequently sent to East Timor. Obtaining on-the-spot Chinese approval of thiseffort, made possible by Indonesia’s reluctant acceptance of the intervention, helped assure UN Security
Council authorization of the subsequent UN operation, the United Nations Transitional Authority in East
Timor (UNTAET). (It should be noted that neither ASEAN nor the ARF were major players in the East
Timor crisis, demonstrating their limited utility as crisis response mechanisms.)
In similar fashion, APEC 2001 provided an important vehicle for President Bush to explain
Washington’s war on terrorism to his Asian colleagues and to garner their support. In addition to theusual annual APEC Leaders’ Declaration, the assembled leaders also issued an APEC Leaders’Statement on Counter-Terrorism -- the first political document to be issued in APEC’s 13-year history -which unequivocally condemned the September 11 attack and deemed it “imperative to strengtheninternational cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner.” This wasconsidered a real victory for President Bush and no doubt helped to increase APEC’s (or at least the
Leaders Meeting’s) relevance in his eyes.
The APEC Shanghai meeting also provided President Bush with his first opportunity to meet
directly with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, which helped to end the downward slide in Sino-U.S.
relations underway since Bush’s inauguration (and especially after the collision between a U.S.
reconnaissance plane and a Chinese jet fighter over the South China Sea in April 2001). The two leaders
were able to put the relationship back on track, aided by China’s willingness to cooperate in the battle
against terrorism. APEC 2001 also provided President Bush with another opportunity to build upon
Washington’s growing post-Cold War cooperation with Russia, and to meet for the first time with
Malaysian President Mahathir and Indonesian President Megawati, leaders of the two Southeast Asian
nations with predominantly Muslim populations. This allowed him to underscore that the war on terrorism

12was not aimed at Islam.
Security matters continue to be discussed at the Leaders Meeting, not to mention at the numerous
side summits that normally accompany this gathering. For example, at the October 2003 APEC Leaders
Meeting in Bangkok, the final communique referred to cooperation on combating proliferation of WMD,
while President Bush used the occasion, and his side meetings with the leaders of South Korea, Japan,
and China, to call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons aspirations, while repeating his offer toprovide Pyongyang with written assurances that the U.S. does not intend to attack North Korea. Similar
efforts are expected at this year’s APEC Leaders Meeting in late November in Santiago, Chile.
As long as APEC provides a useful venue not only for the promotion of free trade but also forfighting the war on terrorism, we can expect that Washington will continue to be an active player. However,as with the ARF, it will remain more suited to talking about security problems than to actually helping to
implement solutions. In addition to the usual drawbacks associated with East Asian multilateralism (asdiscussed below), APEC has the added “problem” of including Taiwan. Rather than using this venue as avehicle for incorporating Taiwanese views and concerns into the regional security debate in a“non-governmental” setting, Beijing has tried to block any substantive security-oriented activities and tofurther isolate Taiwan from the dialogue process.
Multilateral Pluses and Minuses
In short, American policymakers generally believe that Asia-Pacific multilateral organizations suchas the ARF and APEC are useful vehicles both for promoting greater political and economic cooperationand for enhancing regional security. While such organizations hold many promises for Asia, it is importantto understand their limits, as well as the opportunities they present. A comprehensive security
arrangement or NATO-type alliance aimed at containing or responding to a specified threat simply does
not apply to a post-Cold War Asia. Rather, East Asia multilateral security mechanisms should be viewed
more as confidence building measures aimed at avoiding or dampening the possibilities of, rather thanreacting to, crises or aggression. Peacekeeping and disaster relief operations and non-traditional security
issues (such as refugee problems, maritime safety, pollution, and other environmental and safety issues)also seemed well-suited to a multilateral approach. In many instances, the process is as important as the
product.
Efforts that build upon and seek to complement, and not to replace, existing bilateral relationshipsthat already exist in Asia are of particular value from a U.S. perspective. Any effort that is perceived atundermining U.S. bilateral dealings, and especially those that seek to diminish or replace America_s key
bilateral security alliances, are sure to be rejected by Washington both today and by any futureadministration.
More generally speaking, Asian multilateral security mechanisms can serve as important vehicles
for promoting long term peace and stability. They provide a framework for continued direct U.S.
involvement in regional security matters. They offer a means for Japan, China, and Russia, among
others, to become more actively involved in regional security affairs in a manner that is non-threatening totheir neighbors. They also provide a forum for exposing North Korea to regional realities while facilitating
bilateral dialogue between the North and South Korea, Japan, and the U.S., respectively. They also
provide a mechanism for other regional actors to be heard, while contributing to a sense of regional
identity and a spirit of cooperation and confidence building. Since Sept. 11, they have also become
increasingly relevant for coordinating regional views and efforts in the war on terrorism.
Six-Party Talks: Best Hope for Dealing With Pyongyang
If Washington has only limited confidence in institutionalized multilateral mechanisms (like the
ARF, APEC, and United Nations), it is developing a clear preference for ad hoc or tailored multilateralism
aimed at a specific task or objective and comprised of a “coalition of the willing.” The multinational force

13assembled for the war in Iraq provides one example, as does the aforementioned Proliferation Security
Initiative. The best example in Northeast Asia is the Six-Party Talks, established by Washington tomultilateralize what many initially viewed as a bilateral U.S.-DPRK problem.
The creation of the six-party process, in this author’s opinion, may represent one of the Bushadministration’s finest diplomatic hours. It draws from the lessons learned during the first North Korea
nuclear crisis, where – despite close coordination and consultation – Washington was widely perceived asunilaterally cutting a deal with Pyongyang before sticking Seoul and Tokyo with the bill. While Pyongyang
argued for bilateral consultations (and a separate U.S.-DPRK non-aggression pact), Washington rightfully
insisted this time that participation by Seoul and Tokyo was “essential.” It also acknowledges theimportant role that China, and to a lesser extent Russia, must play if multilateral security guarantees are tobe part of the final solution (as most would agree they are). Finally, the Bush administration recognized
and tried to work around Pyongyang’s strategy of trying to play all sides against one another by presenting
different, conflicting messages depending on the audience. All this is not to argue that the crisis could
not have been handled better; it is to say that the multilateral approach represents the most logical avenue
toward crafting a long-term solution that achieves not only Washington’s immediate goal of stopping
nuclear proliferation but also addresses the needs and concerns of North Korea’s immediate neighbors.
So Much for “Agreements in Principle.” While hopes for the six-party process remain high, at thiswriting, the talks remain in limbo. Optimism was beginning to abound following the third round of
Six-Party Talks in Beijing in late June, following the tabling by the U.S. of a detailed proposal which laidout the steps North Korea needed to take to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and, mostsignificantly, what Washington and its allies were prepared to do in return. While all agreed “in principle”
to hold a series of working group meetings and another plenary session before the end of September,
Pyongyang once again demonstrated that agreements in principle were only as good as the principles of
those doing the agreeing. The conventional wisdom, not challenged here, is that Pyongyang had alreadymade up its mind to wait for the outcome of the November U.S. presidential elections before proceedingwith any talks, given the Bush administration’s continued insistence on CVID: the complete, verifiable,
irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, including their clandestineuranium enrichment program (an effort Pyongyang allegedly admitted in October 2002 but now denies).
It remains to be seen what Pyongyang will do next, now that elections are over. But one thing seems clear,
the Bush administration will continue to insist on a multilateral six-party setting, even if it ultimately shows
an increased willingness to engage Pyongyang directly along the sidelines of the multilateral gathering.
The six-party format also provides a potential framework for more institutionalized multilateral
cooperation in Northeast Asia, once (and if) the North Korea-induced nuclear crisis is peacefully settled.
Washington remains receptive to suggestions by Seoul and Tokyo, and now even from Beijing. That thisforum could one day form the basis of a Northeast Asian Security Community. In fact, a more
institutionalized forum will likely be necessary to implement whatever type agreement is finally reached,both to monitor and verify compliance and to implement the multilateral security guarantees and likely
step-by-step economic incentives that are likely to be found in any eventual settlement.
Conclusion
The U.S.-Japan alliance will remain the cornerstone of U.S. security strategy in East Asia for theforeseeable future. Washington will be supportive of efforts by Japan to become a more “normal” nation
and will encourage Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security (while refraining from openpressure or from meddling in the debate over constitutional revision). The Global Force Review willcontinue and will likely result in some modest adjustments in the U.S. military footprint in Japan, but withno lessening of Washington’s overall commitment or ability to respond to regional rises. Meanwhile,
Washington will continue to support institutionalized multilateral mechanisms as useful means to promote
regional security and coordinate counter-terrorism efforts, while relying on ad hoc coalitions (or unilateral
actions if necessary) to address specific threats to its own security or to the security of its allies.

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Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [pacforum@hawaii.rr.com], a Honolulu-based
non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington
and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal [www.csis.org/pacfor].

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