助成

Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・

IIPS International Conference“A New Horizon for Japan’s Security Policy—Basic Concept and Framework”
Tokyo, November 30 and December 1, 2004

“US Security Strategy in Asiaand the Regional Security Regime
A Chinese View”
By
Dr. Shulong Chu
Professor and Director
Institute of Strategic Studies,
Tsinghua University
ChinaUS Security Strategy in Asia and the Regional Security Regime
A Chinese View

CHU Shulong
Institute of Strategic Studies
Tsinghua University
November 2004

The United States has been a major player and force in the Asia since the endof the Second World War in the 1940s. And the bilateral alliance system that the US
has with Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, and the Philippines, has been amajor security structure or mechanism in the region. However, that US-led andUS-centered bilateral system has never been sufficient nor comprehensive enough toserve as the overall regional security regime in the past, today, and in the future. For alonger term run and perspective, Asia does need and will develop a comprehensive
and overall security regime in the future, with or without the United States.
I.

US Security Strategy in Asia

The US security strategy has remained to be stable and unchanged for
relatively quite long time since the 1950s or early 1960s, that is the “forward
deployment” of American troops in East Asia and Western Pacific, and US bilateralalliance with a number of countries in Asia and Western Pacific. Those are“cornerstone” of American security strategy in Asia, plus its relations with China,
Russia and other countries in the region.
1. “Forward Deployment”
Since the end of the WWII, the U.S. has maintained forward deployment of
troops in East Asia and the Western Pacific. This includes American military force inJapan, ROK, the Philippines before 1993, Australia, Guam, and the Seventh Fleet
ships in Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. These forces are supported by American
troops in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Third Fleet in East Pacific.
1

In later 1970s and early 1990s, the Carter and Senior Bush administrations did
something to shift and cut American forward deployment forces in Asia to somecertain degree. However, since early 1990s, there had not been any major changes ofAmerican forces in the region, compared with major American “forward deployment”
troops cut from 300,000 in Cold War era to 100,000 in the post-Cold War time,
including today. America has maintained basically 100,000 troops in East Asia andWestern Pacific today, almost the same number in the Cold War era.
Recently, Pentagon has outlined the plan to cut the “forward deployment”
forces in Asia, mostly from Republic of Korea. According to the plan, some 12,500
troops will be moved from ROK and some smaller number from Japan in the next few
years till 2008.1 The American “revolution of military affairs” (RMA or “Rumsfeld
Revolution”) downplays the significance of stationing large number of military forcesin the set areas, while emphasizes the mobility and capability of American forces in
the world, especially quickly movement of the forces to the potential crisis areas suchas Middle East and Taiwan Strait.
2. The Alliance System
Next to the “forward deployment” forces, another American “cornerstone” inAsia is the alliance system in the region. And the two are related together becauseeven the “forward deployment” is dependent very much on the bilateral alliancesystem.
The system was established in the 1950s and early 1960s. It remained
basically sound in the past forty to fifty years since then. However, some changes hadtaken place and weakened the system to certain degree. The major shift of the system
took place in the 1990s when the Pilipino Senate refused to authorize the continuity ofAmerican troops in the bases in the Philippines. The large naval and air force bases
there closed and close to 10,000 military troops and their dependents left theSoutheast country in middle of the 1990s. Some hundreds of American troops havecome back in the Philippines in recent years for helping the country to fight against
terrorism, however, they are not same as the old days’ military presence in the country
and looks American troops will not come back in such a large scale in the future “joint
war against terrorism.”
Besides the strong bilateral alliance with Japan, ROK, and Australia, the U.S.
has worked out some “arrangements” with Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, andIndonesia for America to use some facilities in those countries and store some militarymaterials there. However, they are neither standard military alliance nor in the large
scale of significance.
3. Bilateral Relations
In recent American national and Asian regional strategy reports and majorstatements, American political and military leaders also site American relations with
1

“Bush Announces Largest U.S. Force Restructuring in 50 years,” Washington File, August 17, 2004. pp.2~3.
2other non-allied countries as something necessary “supplement” to American forward
deployment troops and the bilateral alliance in Asia. Those relationships that are
significant to American security strategy in Asia are US relations with China,
Southeast Asia, and recently with India and Pakistan in Southern Asia.
US and China
To be sure, American security strategy in Asia does not depend on its relations
with the People’s Republic. However, its relations with China have great impacts to
American security interest and goals in the region.
China remains both positive and negative in American security strategy in theregion. The positive elements locate on the issues and areas of counter-terrorism,
coordination or cooperation on Korean issues including nuclear issue, non-traditional
security problems such as search and rescue and many others. In recent years, theareas of Sino-US coordination and cooperation have been growing, especially in the
war against terrorism and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
In the war against international terrorism, China actually can do little to help
Americans directly. China does not have too much “intelligence” about international
terrorism to “share” with Americans. Nor China like to provide troops, money andmaterials to the US in latter’s war on terrorism. What China can do and has done isvery much indirect coordination and cooperation with the U.S. in the war against
terrorism. They are including providing more then US$150 million to Afghanistan in
its rebuilding after American operation in October 2001, political support andeconomic aid to Pakistan in its front-work against terrorism. China has cooperated
with American counterparts in checking international financial flows and law
enforcement cooperation and coordination, in the efforts against international
terrorism.
In other strategic and security area of non-proliferation, China has worked
together with the United States in opposing nuclear tests in South Asia since 1998,
and in trying to resolve North Korean nuclear issue since 2002. China has worked
very hard to bring the six countries of DPRK, the US, ROK, Japan, Russia and China
itself together for the “six-party talks” over North Korean nuclear issue in the passing
years. Three rounds of talks have taken place in Beijing, and the planned September
2004 talks have been delayed due to differences between DPRK and the UnitedStates.
In the important area of US stationing troops and maintaining bilateral alliancesin East Asia and Western Pacific, China in recent years has soften its position toward
those key issues to American security strategy in the region. Chinese leaders,
governmental officials and officers now talk little about American forward military
deployment in Asia and bilateral alliance with Japan, ROK and Australia. Comparedwith the strong criticism in the middle 1990s, in recent years there have been little
words from the Chinese side on the subjects.

3However, China is still a critical concern of American Asian security strategy
even after “the 9/11.” Along with the North Korea, China is one of the two countries
that American strategists and military have “planned” a possible war with in the future.
Although since September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington,
and American strategic focus/priority has been shifting to the war against terrorism,
China remains as a long-term strategic concern and target of American security
strategy in Asia. Taiwan situation in recent years have increased the possibility of a
Sino-US war over Taiwan issue, especially since President Gorge W. Bush stated on
April 25, 2001 that the US “would do whatever to protect Taiwan” when the island is
attacked by the Mainland.
Therefore, the strategic and security relations between the U.S. and China
remain unclear, uncertain, and dangerous sometime since the end of the Cold War inlate 1980s and the early 1990s, though the two countries engage in economic, political,
and security cooperation in many other areas.
US and Southeast Asia
Besides Northeast Asia, the Southeast Asia is another major area of American
Asian security strategy. After the Vietnam war, the United States no longer has astrategic target in the sub-region, its strategic priority lies on strengthening anddeveloping security cooperation with the countries of Singapore, Thailand, thePhilippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
According to American statements, the U.S. no longer emphasizes bases in theregion of Southeast Asia. Instead, the U.S. has been interested in seeking “facilities”
to restore strategic goods and the “rights” to use the air and sea facilities in case when
they are needed. In the post-Cold war era, the U.S. has made a number of agreementswith Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia for the purpose. In the Philippines, the U.S.
has some hundreds troops in the country for helping the Pilipino government andmilitary in their war against terrorism in recent years. However, it seems unlikely that
the U.S. will restore its bases and send large scale military force in the Southeast
country anytime in the foreseeable future, as it did before the early 1990s.
US and India/Pakistan
The South Asia had not been a major strategic area to American security
strategy in Asia for long time till recent years. However, it becomes increasingly
significant to the United States even before “the 9/11.” Both Americans and Indians
have talked lot about their “strategic partnership” in recent years before and after “the9/11,” and after “the 9/11” and in the war against the terrorism, the country of
Pakistan becomes strategically important again to the United States. US Secretary ofState Collin Powell announced that the U.S. takes Pakistan as a “strategic alliance”
during his visit to that country last spring, which made the Indians unhappy.
It is quite understandable for why Pakistan becomes strategically important to4

American security strategy in Asia, because Pakistan is a “frontier” country in the war
against international terrorism, the number one strategic priority to the Americans, atleast for the time being. Without the support, cooperation, and involvement, it would
be very hard, if not impossible, for Americans to undertake the military operation
against Taliban in October 2001, to rebuild Afghanistan after the operation, and to
avoid the terrorist force come back in Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself. Therefore,
Pakistan is and will remain to be a “strategic” importance to American security
strategy in Asia, including South, Central and West Asia, as long as the war against
terrorism is going on.
On the other side, the meaning and significance of “strategic partnership”
between the U.S. and India is less clear compared with such a relationship between
the U.S. and Pakistan. The saying of relationship between the worlds’ two largest
democracies does not suggest anything real in strategic sense. Therefore, it has beenquite confused and unclear for what does the “US-Indian strategic partnership” mean?
One explanation, at least to some Chinese strategists’ understanding, that if
there is anything real strategically in the US-Indian strategic partnership, it must be
the common interests between the U.S. and India in coping with the “rising China”
next door to India. This understanding believes that the rationale and purpose of
US-Indian strategic partnership are aiming at China, and try to check or even contain
China now and in the future.

II.

The US and An Asian Regional Security Regime

Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, the United States has
played a major role at least, and a leading role at the most, in regional security
structure in Asia. Any future regional security regime in Asia will be difficult or
impossible for not having the U.S. to continue to play a significant role in it. At thesame time, there is also the possibility that the U.S. security role in Asia might been
decreasing, and it is not totally unlikely for Asians to develop a regional security
regime without the country of the United States, by option of Americans or Asians, orby chance in the long term future.
1．A Bilateral Alliance Regime
The U.S. has always took its bilateral alliance system in Asia as thefoundation/cornerstone as the country’s regional security strategy and regional
stability. It certainly would like to maintain the system after the Cold War and in the
21st century, although with some adjustments now and in the future.
However, not every country is Asia has accepted the US position, or in orderwords, the American bilateral alliance system could not and cannot become an
acceptable, designable, and workable regional security regime in Asia in the past,
today, and the future.
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First, compared with the NATO system in Europe which covers most of thecountries in Western Europe and whole Europe, the American bilateral alliancesystem in Asia includes only few countries in the region, thus it does not even looks
like a “regional” security regime.
Second, the bilateral alliance system is a bilateral in nature, it is not a
regional system. When anybody read the articles, guidelines of those alliance/treaties,
one world find they are basically serve the purpose to protect the allied countries, notserve the whole region.
Thirdly, some countries like China, DPRK, have always opposed the alliancesystem because they believe the system was built up in the Cold War time and served
the purpose of East-West confrontation, and a military/security alliance always has athird country as the target. Many other Asian countries do not oppose the system, but
do not believe that the bilateral alliances serving the purpose to protect themselves, oreven do not need such a protection, especially in the post-Cold War era.
2.

An Asian NATO?

Some people, at least some American and Asian academics, recognized thebilateral nature and the limitation of the American alliance system, and suggest that
put all those bilateral alliance together to set up an American-centered multilateral
security regime in the region – the so called “Asian NATO.”This idea has not become a governmental policy of the allied countries, and it
would be impossible for it to develop into a regional security regime in Asia even it
becomes an official policy of the nations and eventually is established.
Because there are huge differences among the American allied countries in
Asia. ROK, Thailand may have different understanding and positions with Japan, theU.S. and Australia on regional security affairs, and policies toward China, North
Korea, and many other matters of regional security.
Also, as stated above, it is hard, if it is not impossible, for four or fivecountries in a region to form a security “regime” and then state that the
few-country-structure is an overall regime for a large region of more then twenty
countries. It is one thing for whether the five countries can agree on the formation of
the multilateral alliance, and it is still quite another then to say whether it can be
accepted and actually serve the purpose as a regime which maintains the peace andsstability in Asia.
4. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
So far the only widely accepted official regional security approach is ARF(ASEAN Regional Forum). Although it is still a “forum” and the major function has
been limited to exchange views and dialogue among the countries, it does have thecapacity to develop into a major regional security regime in the future.
First it is an official security cooperation body. It is only official multilateral
security approach in Asia. Other multilateral processes such as APEC (Asia-Pacific6Economic Cooperation), APT (ASEAN Plus Three), have been mainly in the areas of
economic cooperation.
Second, ARF is a regional security process. With membership of the nineteen
countries currently, the process covers almost all the nations in Northeast Asia,
Southeast Asia, and some countries in South Asia, plus countries of the U.S., Canada,
Australia, Russia, and EU. No other security process has such a regional coverage andacceptance in the region.
Thirdly, the ARF countries have basically agreed on the direction that theprocess should be going on, that is from CBM (confidence building measures) to thestage of preventive diplomacy. This means that ARF can develop into a workable,
problem resolving body, from the current process of “dialogue” on security matters.
Certainly this is going to be long process, and whether it will develop into such a
decision-making regime remains uncertain.
The U.S. has been a member of the ARF process, and it is possible for thecountry to play a bigger role in the process if it choose to do so, and work together
well with others in the process.
5. The Six-Party Talks and Regional Security Cooperation In Northeast Asia
As the 6-Party talks on North Korea nuclear issue going on, there is thepreference and design from American, South Korean, Japanese, and Russian sides todevelop the 6-Party talks into a permanent process of Northeast Asian security
dialogue and cooperation. However, the North Korean and Chinese positions are notclear yet. North Korea’s major concern and goal is the United States, the security
threat, economic sanction and assistance, and normal relations with the US. It may notinterest too much in a multilateral development in Northeast Asia. And China cares
both North Korean position at one hand, and worries about US military alliance withJapan and ROK at the other, and thus has a deep doubt about a multilateral approachon security when half of the members are military alliance on one side.
The Chinese academy seems to be more willing towards a Northeast Asia
security approach. As put by Professor Pang Zhongying at China Daily recently,“Northeast Asia should not base its security measures on just bilateral framework any
more,” and “the nuclear stalemate on the Korean Peninsula could be turned into a
catalyst for the establishment of a multilateral security system in Northeast
Asia……Regional peace can only be achieved through the collective and objective
actions of the countries in the region.”2
6. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
Among the multilateral activities, approaches, processes, organizations or
institutions in East Asia, the APT is the only one which is truly East Asian regional
multilateral process. All others are either sub-regional or cross-regional which include
non-Asian countries. Till now, the APT has been a multilateral approach for economic
2

Pang Zhongying: “Building Regional Security System,” China Daily, March 26, 2004, p.A6.
7

cooperation, and its direction is not clear, nor certain. Its membership and areas ofcooperation seem to be open. It has the possibility to become a comprehensive
regional mechanism covering multilateral cooperation on both economic andpolitical/security areas in East Asia, and even whole Asia in the future.
The APT was formed by ASEAN in middle of the 1990s. ASEAN is a
sub-regional multilateral organization in Southeast Asia which was established in1967. The original members of ASEAN are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, thePhilippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It has been expended to ten members in 1999,
then formally includes the other four Southeast Asian countries of Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam.
ASEAN’s meeting with the “outside” members is called ASEAN + 1. Thatmeans ASEAN, the ten members as a whole now, is one side, and one of the othercountries is another side. At the early stage of ASEAN + 1 meetings, the outsiders
were Japan, Korea. China joined the process in 1996, and India became the other“one” in 2003.
In 1994, the ASEAN invited Japan, ROK and China to attend a meeting after
ASEAN’s own meeting, that actually is the informal birth of ASEAN + 3. In 1995, theASEAN summit formally proposed a summit meeting between ASEAN and China,
Japan and ROK. In each year of the recent years since 1997, ASEAN did not only
hold “bilateral” summit meetings with each of the three outside countries, but also had
the annual “informal summit meeting” with all the outside dialogue states together,since all of them were in the same place at the same time. That comes to theformalization of “ASEAN plus Three” meetings and process. Before 1999, ASEAN+3 meant 9 + 3 when Cambodia was not a formally member of ASEAN, that was
ASEAN 9 plus China, Japan, and ROK. After all the four other Southeast nations
formally joined ASEAN in 1999, then ASEAN +3 becomes 10 + 3.
The APT process has made a number of important and some substantial
progresses in the short period of past seven years since 1997.
 The annual informal summit meeting of the APT since 1997 has become themost important event of the process. It has been the highest gathering anddecision-making body within the framework. In the 1999 summit meeting
held in Manila, the thirteen leaders of ASEAN + 3 issued a Joint Statement on
East Asian Cooperation, which sets the future direction of the approach. In thestatement, the thirteen countries agree to promote cooperation in economy,
finance, human resource development, science and technology. They also
pledge to continue dialogues aimed at lasting peace and stability in theregion. 3 Guided by the statement, the APT countries are expected toaccelerate trade, investments and technology transfer, encourage technicalcooperation in information technology and e-commerce, and inspire active
participation in the development of East Asia’s growth areas.4
34

Shao Zongwei, “Nations Aiming for Same Goal,” China Daily, November 29, 1999, p.1.
Ibid.
8

 The Final Report of APT Research Group was concluded in 2001. It raises
seventeen measures of cooperation in the near future and nine areas for
middle and longer term goal, including studying the possibility of establishing
East Asian Free Trade Area and the Summit Meeting of East Asia.5
 Under the informal summit meeting framework, the APT has so far
established eight mechanisms of ministers’ meetings, or in other words, thedialogue processes. These include financial, economic, foreign affairs,
agriculture, labor and welfare, environment, health, and travel (tourism)
ministers of the thirteen APT countries. Under the ministers’ meetings, there
are high level official working meetings, private sectors’ meetings, and news
media and academic networks.
 The financial ministers and central bank governors of the APT hold meeting
once every year since 1999. They usually discuss the global and regional
economic and financial situations, and exchange views on financial
cooperation among the East Asian countries. The meetings have reached someagreements for financial cooperation, and some programs such as training
have been under way.
A substantial development and cooperation of APT is the “Chiang Mal
Agreement” in 2000. That agreement establishes a currency assistance system
within APT members. Through the bilateral agreements under the agreement,
APT nations will provide assistance to others when some members havecurrency difficulties. The agreed amount of currency will be provided now
reaches to US $35 billion. This is an APT united action to deal with possible
Asian-financial-crisis problem
 Foreign ministers’ meeting of APT has been held annually since 2000. The
ministers take the opportunity to discuss political, economic, and security
situations in the region, exchange views on regional issues, and study themeasures for promoting regional cooperation. The 2000 meeting issued a jointstatement to support de sovereign and territory integrity and national unity ofIndonesia. The 2002 meeting discussed about enlarging and deepening East
Asian cooperation in economic, political and security areas, and foreign
ministers of the thirteen countries spoke about their countries position on
those issues.
 The minister-level “East Asia Development Meeting” was held in Tokyo in
August 2002. This is a dual-minister meeting within the APT framework, witheach member state sent a foreign and an economic ministers or vice ministers
to the meeting. The major issues at the meeting are political-economic ones in
the region.
 APT health meeting on SARS took place in Beijing in early June of 2003.
Officials and experts of the thirteen countries exchanged experiences andview about SARS, discussed measures and cooperation against the disease. A
special meeting among APT health ministers’ meeting on SARS was taken
5

Wang Xiaoguang, “Zhu Rongji Chuxi Dongmeng Yu Zhong Ri Han Lingdaoren Huiyi (Zhu Rongji Attends
ASEAN + 3 Leaders’ Meeting),” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), November 5, 2002, p. A1.
9place in Cambodia in June 2003. The meeting discussed about the joint
measures and cooperation among them in fighting against the SARS. The
meeting issued a joint statement.
 APT also has established the process in other areas, including dialogue,
consultation, and cooperation against illegal drugs, smuggling, organized andtransnational crimes.
 In trade area, there is no regional-wide efforts have been underway, however,three parts of free trade area talks have been underway within APT. They are
FTA of ASEAN, China and ASEAN FTA talks, and Japan-ASEAN FTA
incentive. An East Asia region-wide free trade area (EAFTA) is possible whenthose three FTA talks complete and implemented.
Although is only seven years’ old, the APT has made steady progress and has
become the central, more substantial, and real Asian multilateral mechanism. It is themost promising multilateral approach which has the possibility to develop into a
European Union-style regional integration in East Asia and whole Asia in thelong-term future, as a final goal and possibility.
One of the most important advantages of the APT is its feature, character, andreality as a whole and real Asia multilateral approach.
Even without South, Central, and Western Asia as members of the process,the APT is now the most inclusive and comprehensive multilateral approach in Asia.
ASPEC, ARF, Asia-Europe Dialogue, and CSCAP (Council on Security Cooperationin Asia-Pacific) all have more members involved then the APT, but they are not justAsian. All of them involve some other countries or group of countries outside Asia.
And among those Asian multilateral approaches, ASEAN, the 4-party talks and the
6-party talks, NEACD (Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue), and SCO (Shanghai
Cooperation Organization), only APT involves and includes most of the Asian
countries. Now the membership of APT includes three of all the five nations inNortheast Asia , and all ten countries in Southeast Asia. Together with current thirteen
nations, APT covers the area with 1,700 million people and economic strength (GDP)of US $7 trillion in current exchange rate of 2003. Thus the APT is so far the mostcomprehensive and inclusive multilateral approach in East Asia.
As discussed above, almost all other comprehensive multilateral approaches
involve Asia so far are more then Asia. This is not to say they are not good, notnecessary to the Asians. APEC, ARF, CSCAP, Asia-Europe Dialogue all havepromoted economic, political, security, cultural cooperation among Asian countries
and societies, and the dialogue and cooperation between Asia and other parts of theworld. These processes have contributed greatly to the growth of multilateralism andregional and global integration. Therefore, these multilateral approaches certainly
should be continuing and developing.
However, as Asians started to talk in the 1980s, Asia also needs some sorts of
its own multilateral approaches, just as all other parts of the world have their own
regional processes. This is not trying to be excluding but only recognizing the fact
10

that Asia, like all other parts of the world, has its own issues, problems, and interests,
thus it needs some sort of its own multilateral approaches to deal with those issues
and problems. Outside involvements are helpful, but they should not and cannot
replace Asians’ own multilateral processes.
And among the existing comprehensive, most inclusive regional multilateralapproaches, the APT is a real Asian approach. It is Asians’ own efforts, involves tomost of Asian countries. Thus if Asians want, need and should have their own
multilateral regional approach or mechanism, the APT is the right and only one here
in Asia today.
The membership of APT now includes almost all the countries in East Asia
except Mongolia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This is nota big problem when the two countries want to be included and when other membersof the APT find it ready to include the two East Asian countries. And it is possible for
the APT to expend to include South and Central Asian countries in the future.
Based on today and future conditions, intentions and policies of Asian
countries towards the APT and other regional multilateral approaches, a realistic
approach for the APT is stressing economic cooperation/economic security first.
Economic cooperation is everyone’s interests, and Asian countries have showed greatinterests to promote economic exchange, cooperation and institution in recent years,
especially after Asian Financial crisis in 1997. And Asians have strong intention tohave a Asian own economic cooperation mechanism, even at the same time they
accept and support the global institutions such as the IMF (International MonetaryFund), WB (World Bank) and WTO (World Trade Organization), and larger andcross-regional economic groupings such APEC. Asian financial crisis tells Asians
clearly that they need help themselves, and they need an Asian economic/financial
institution to help them when they have serious problems, at the same time they
accept and look for global institutions to offer them some sort of assistance.
Economic issues are increasing becoming security issues because
management of economic development, policy integration, financial stability, energy
security, network and information security all become security issues to Asia and theworld. And at the age of globalization, Asians cannot ensure their economic security
without cooperation with others.
The other promising area for APT to do, besides economic cooperation andsecurity, is the areas of non-traditional security issues. Countries have little problems
but common interests and positions in dealing with transnational security issues suchcounter-terrorism, fighting illegal drugs, smuggling and organized crimes,
environmental protection, search and rescue. When the APT has the experience andconsensus on those non-traditional security or “soft security” issues, then it is logic
and nature for it to go into the area of “hard security” issues in the region. APT can dosomething in regional peace-keeping, including peace-keeping training,
non-proliferation, maritime security. Countries also have common interests to ensure
regional security in those areas. Security problems solving will be the mostchallenging and remote goal of APT or any regional security multilateral mechanism
11

in the region.
The APT has been accepted by almost all the East Asian countries and it
shows a great potential to develop into a major or even the most important multilateralmechanism in whole Asia in the future. However, looking at the approach in the pastand today, the APT still has lot of difficulties and problems to become a workableregional mechanism. It definitely has a long way to go.
One of the biggest problems facing the APT is its nature when it wasestablished and the members have agreed on since.
The APT so far has been mainly a dialogue, a forum for economic andeconomy related cooperation approach. The areas of it have been expended to otherissues in recent years, but so far is not a regional political-security approach. It is still
has a long way to go even in the areas of meaningful economic cooperation in EastAsia.
The direction-setting “The Joint Statement of East Asian Cooperation” issued
at the 1999 APT summit clearly emphasizes economic cooperation as the central
theme, task, and goal of the approach. The areas that have been set are economy,
finance, social and human resource development, science and technology, culture andinformation, development, transnational issues, political and other areas.6 Guided by
the statement, the thirteen countries agree to accelerate trade, investment andtechnology transfer.7 Till 2003, the APT process has focused eight major areas forpromoting cooperation. They are economy, finance, agriculture, labor, tourism,
environment, health, and foreign affairs. The process is ready to expend its dialogue
and cooperation in other areas such as counter-transnational crimes and other
non-traditional security matters.
Proposed by the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, the ninth informal summit of
the APT in October 2003 in Bali, Indonesia, agrees to study the feasibility of an East
Asia Free Trade Area. “All this will pave the way for the ultimate formulation of an
East Asian Free Trade Area,” the Chinese Premier believes.8 The Chinese side did
propose political and security dialogue within APT process. Premier Wen said at themeeting that security issues remain prominent in the region, and that terrorism andother trans-national problems are increasingly become real challenges to all thecountries. He calls APT to do more on multilateral security dialogue and cooperation
on security issues in the region.9 Other members have also been interesting on
discussing and cooperation on non-traditional security issues, but it is the approach
which has virtually done nothing on so called “traditional security” area.
The other most important limitation and difficulty for the APT today andfuture lies at the national strategies of its member states, and bilateral relations among
them. ASEAN as a whole and its ten members as individual state, China, Japan, ROK,
all have their own concerns about regional cooperation in general and APT in
6“The Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation,” Renmin Ribao, November 29, 1999, p. A7.
Shao Zongwei: “Nations Aiming for Same Goal,” China Daily, November 29, 1999, p. A1.
8
Sun Shangweu: “Leaders Push Teamwork,” China Daily, October 8, 2003, P. A1.
9
Ibid.
7

12

particular. There have been increasing common ground among those countries in Asia,
but they are far from consensus for where and when the APT and other regional
multilateral approaches should go.
America is certainly one of the major factors affecting, if not determining,the development of any multilateral approach in Asia. And till now APT seems to be
acceptable to American policy makers, partly because the APT has been at early stage
and focus on economic issues, and also because America Asian strategy bases heavily
on the bilateral arrangements with Japan, ROK, Australia and other Asia-Pacificnations and those bilateral alliances seem to be strong right now. However, if APT
goes further in its economic grouping and security cooperation, Americans may find
to be nervous to see a regional security mechanism is developing without American
participation, just as the current attitude and position of the United States toward theEurope efforts to build its own security/defense structure.
However, Americans should or have to realize, soon or later, that a regional
economic and security arrangement in Asia without direct US involvement isinevitable in the long term run, simply because as in other regions such as Europe or
America, Asia needs its own economic and security mechanism to care itself, to help
each other. Regionalism is a basic and strong part of globalization, and the historical
trend will be going on with or without American support. The idea and proposal for an
East Asia cooperation such as EAEC has been introduced for long time since later
1980s, and in almost ten years since its introduction, most of Asian nations took very
cautious position towards it, partly because they cared about American concerns. But
the 1997 Asian financial crisis indicates clearly that Americans do not care Asians too
much, for it did not act to the crisis as it had done to Mexican financial crisis not longtime ago before the Asian one, when the US offered about $30 billion help to Mexico.
Therefore, since Americans do not care too much about Asia, why Asians should
always care American concern about East Asian grouping?
The more solid reason for Asians to go ahead with their grouping is the hardfact that Asians trade more among themselves then they trade with the United States
in recent years. This may be a revolution in East Asian economic relations, and thisreality definitely changes the mind-set of Asians on their foreign economic relations atleast.
It is pretty certain that the APT approach has been established, accepted andit will continue to grow in the region. However, the question will be how strong theapproach will be coming and what is the direction of the approach?
The most likely scenario for APT in the next five to ten years seems to be
maintaining as an economic-centered regional multilateral approach, and working
towards more cooperation on transnational/non-traditional security areas in East Asia.
Even with some important limitations and difficulties, it seems that compared withother multilateral approaches in the region, APT has and is continuing to grow more
quickly and substantially then others such as APEC and ARF. In next five and ten
years, APT looks like it can and will keep the momentum of growing quickly and13substantially in East Asia. And the area is likely to expend to include South Asia.
It has taken more then five decades for Europe to develop from cooperationin few areas to a real economic and political community, and trying to develop into asecurity and constitutional union now and in the future. In the interdependent andglobalized the 21st century, it may not need to take so long for Asians to develop an“East Asian Community.” However, the regionalism in East Asia is still at very earlystage and it needs long time and tremendous efforts to grow.

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