助成

Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・

IIPS International Conference“A New Horizon for Japan’s Security Policy—Basic Concept and Framework”
Tokyo, November 30 and December 1, 2004

“How Japan Can Contribute to a Peaceful World”
By
Dr. Carolina G. HernandezPresident
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies
Philippine

HOW JAPAN CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A PEACEFUL WORLD1
Carolina G. Hernandez, PhD2Introduction
This presentation is an ASEAN view of how Japan can contribute to a peaceful world. It
leaves the discussion of domestic debates and discourses on Japan’s security perceptions,and amending its constitution to the Japanese colleague in this panel. It also addresses thequestion of Japan’s security perceptions and basic security policy for the future only as
relevant in the thrust of this presentation. It argues that Japan’s constructive role incomprehensive security focused on economic cooperation since the 1970s had earned thetrust of many of its neighbors, particularly in Southeast Asia. However, contemporary
imperatives at home and abroad point to the need for a new security role for Japan. Hereits partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would be a key
component, having had three decades of working together in inter-regional reconciliationthat could form the core of Japan’s new security role, one that could be acceptable to East
Asia and to the rest of the world.

Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Security Relations

During two decades of the postwar era until 1991, Japan’s security role in theworld had been defined by the concept of “comprehensive security” where the military or
defense dimensions were confined to homeland security. Like ASEAN, Japan crafted theconcept of comprehensive security to be able to play a regional security role other than in
the military and defense dimensions. For its part, ASEAN sought to insulate Southeast
Asia from superpower competition, to build friendly and cooperative relations among thecountries in the region, including those in Northeast and South Asia, the broader Asia
Pacific, as well as Europe. Hence, its dialogue partnership with the advanced industrial
and democratic countries saw Japan as its earliest partner. That robust relationship has
1

Prepared for the International Symposium “A New Horizon for Japan’s Security Policy – Basic Concept
and Framework” hosted and organized by the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), ANA Hotel,
Tokyo, 30 November – 1 December 2004.

1

lasted more than three decades and has now entered the next thirty years with theagreements reached on the occasion of the Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit inDecember 2003 as its new foundations.

ASEAN views security as multidimensional and multilevel, with the defense andmilitary dimension as only one among others such as political stability, economic
development, social harmony, and even environmental protection. It also believes that
only by keeping each of the ASEAN members’ houses in order can a stable, peaceful,and prosperous regional order be realized. It is, therefore, the first task of each member
country to achieve national resilience by addressing the causes of insecurity from within
their respective societies. The priority given to domestic security was also shaped by thefact that in the 1960s and 1970s communist insurgency and other domestic armed
conflicts were the primary security threats faced by the five original ASEAN member
countries, in addition to underdevelopment, poverty, and social inequality.

Composed of small and medium-sized states, ASEAN has not aspired to acquire agreat power role. It simply sought to have a credible voice in the shaping of the regional
order where its equidistant approach to relations with the great powers would insulate its
members from great power rivalry while benefiting from cooperative relations with them.
In this regard, ASEAN has scored quite a good record of accomplishment in its 37- year
life.

When the cold war ended and the old balance of power that secured the stabilityof the world also came to an end, ASEAN led in the establishment of a regional security
dialogue. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to deal with security issues in the Asia
Pacific thus came to life. It was the only regional actor that could be trusted to take thiskind of initiative since none of the region’s great powers - the US, Japan, China, Russia,
and India - enjoyed the level of confidence of all the relevant strategic players in theregion as did ASEAN. Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the ASEAN region

2

Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines (Diliman), and Founding President and Chair,
Board of Directors, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. (ISDS Philippines).

2

became the economically fastest growing region in the world, a fact that helped in thebirthing of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Hence, ASEAN’s comprehensive security
and the policy of equidistant relations with all the great powers, plus its role in the
resolution of the Cambodian conflict of the late 1970s through the next decade and a half
had secured for it a credible position in the region.

Japan also developed its own concept of comprehensive security. In spite of its
huge potentials even in the wake of extensive devastation caused by the past war, its
peace constitution and lack of a sufficient web of constructive relations with others in theregion, including in Southeast Asia hindered its ability to play a security role in the
traditional sense. Its peace constitution authorized the establishment of an armed force
solely for homeland self-defense purposes. Its four nuclear principles inhibited its
evolution as a nuclear-weapons state. Its neighbors in Northeast and Southeast Asia
continued to harbor deep suspicions and even hostility in some cases due to theirunfortunate histories. All of these inhibited the emergence of postwar Japan as a“normal” state.

The rise of communism on the Chinese mainland and its spread to the former
Indochinese states amidst the cold war competition between the US and the Soviet Union
provided the opportunity for Japan’s economic and political recovery with US blessingsand support. By the 1960s, Japan emerged as a major economic power that was ready toplay a regional and international role. However, it was inhibited from becoming apolitical-security player, especially in the traditional sense. The definition ofcomprehensive security was an avenue in which it could “normalize” its relations,particularly with its Southeast Asian neighbors, many of whom were non-communist
states. When ASEAN was established, its emphasis on intra-regional reconciliation musthave been attractive to Tokyo and its comprehensive security concept was one Japan
could understand. Like the ASEAN countries, Japan viewed security as comprehensive,
consisting of economic, political, social, and other dimensions.

3

When its poorer Southeast Asian neighbors launched its dialogue partnership,
Japan was the first to respond in a very positive way, focusing its area of cooperation in
the less sensitive economic and functional fields. Its official development assistance(ODA) focused on infrastructure development while its trade relations helped theSoutheast Asian economies of primary producers to export their goods to Japan,
particularly in areas where Japan needed them most, such as in oil and timber.

From Japan’s perspective their trade and investment relations had four dimensions.
These are: (1) Japan depends on less developed countries (LDCs) as sources of raw
materials and markets for Japanese products; (2) the shipping lanes passing through
ASEAN are crucial for Japan’s economy; (3) Southeast Asia is crucial in solving the
problems between developed (North) and developing (South) countries; and (4) Southeast
Asian security and stability are vital for Japan’s comprehensive security.3

Their three decades of constructive and mutually beneficial relations demonstrate
how reconciliation between former “enemies” can be transformed to one that has evolved
from mutual economic benefit, to better understanding of each other, to financial aid andassistance as a means to promote economic and political stability, and to regional
cooperation as strategic partners.4 This relationship was not without problems, as in the
beginning Japan’s economic overtures were viewed in Southeast Asia with suspicion, its
height being the violent student demonstrations in Bangkok and Jakarta during the visitof Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in 1974, and to this day, Japan has not apologized forwartime atrocities, including the issue of comfort women.5 On the whole, however, theirpartnership is a best practice in international relations that could serve as an example forJapan’s reconciliation with its Northeast Asian neighbors, a condition so essential inbuilding an East Asia community with the ASEAN+3 process as a starting point.

3

Kinju Atarashi, “Japan’s Economic Cooperation Policy towards the ASEAN Countries”, International
Affairs 61 (1) 1985: 109-127, as cited in Narongchai Akrasanee and Apichai Prasert, “The Evolution of
ASEAN-Japan Economic Cooperation”, in ASEAN-Japan Cooperation: A Foundation for East Asian
Community (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2003), p.63.
4
Akrasanee and Prasert, in ibid., p. 63.

4

Japan as a Comprehensive Security Actor in Southeast Asia

Constrained by its peace constitution, its Self-Defense Forces were limited to thedefense of the national territory. Its security policy however has been informed by both
domestic and external factors leading to incremental shifts in defense policy over time.
These factors include (1) the end of the cold war, (2) continuing sources of instability in
the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula, (3) the issue of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, especially in two Northeast Asian nuclear-weapons states
China and Russia, and North Korea’s refusal to abandon its nuclear-weapons production
program; (4) increasing threats from transnational crime and other non-traditional
security challenges, and of late (5) the prominence of the threat of international
terrorism. 6 Three important foundations continue to underpin Japan’s security policy.
These are “(1) the maintenance of US-Japan security alliance; (2) the build-up of Japan’s
defense capability; and (3) the use of diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace andstability”.7

For many years, Japan’s defense budget was pegged at a ceiling of 1 percent of
GNP, even as this put Japan as among the biggest defense spender in the world due to thesize of its economy that was second only to that of the US. The role of the SDF wasstrictly for the defense of the national territory and its weapons system was also for selfdefense. As already noted, three non-nuclear principles – non-possession, non-production,and non-introduction into Japan - further constrained defense policy.

The main focus of its comprehensive security role was in trade and investments
and development assistance especially to its Southeast Asian neighbors whose close ties

5

Masashi Nishihara, “Japan’s Political and Security Relations with ASEAN”, in ASEAN-Japan
Cooperation: A Foundation for East Asian Community, pp.155-156.
6
The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report – Japan’s Visions for Future Security and
Defense Capabilities, October 2004, Part I – “Japan’s New Security Strategy”, p. 3.
7
Noel M. Morada, “Japan’s Security Thinking and Defense Strategy in East Asia: Challenges andConstraints to an Aspiring “Normal” Power”, in the author’s Multilateralism and Regional Order: Essays
on Major Power Relations and East Asian Security (Quezon City: National Defense College, undated), p.
160.

5

to the US - particularly during the Vietnam war - enabled them to acquire modern
economic and social infrastructure as foundations for successful economic development.

Thus it was that when ASEAN was established in 1967, Japan used theMinisterial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia as the basis ofbilateral relations with ASEAN. While welcoming Japanese ODA, ASEAN countries
continued to worry about Japanese economic domination. Despite however of the trade
frictions of the 1970s, by 1977 aided by the end of the Vietnam war, ASEAN adopted
economic development as its priority for which Japan’s economic assistance wascritically important. When Japanese manufacturing structure moved toward hightechnology production and labor prices went up, ASEAN became a natural destination
for production activities of Japanese firms that saw a comparative advantage in moving
part of their operations in Southeast Asia. Japan’s overflow of FDIs, and transfer oftechnology and management skills to its neighbors thus contributed hugely towards
making the region economically competitive by the 1980s and 1990s.

When the financial crisis struck, Japan also took an active role in assisting
ASEAN countries severely affected by it. Japan proposed the establishment of an AsianMonetary Fund, it announced a Special Yen Loan Facility of Y600 billion to stimulate
employment and economic reforms, and offered an economic recovery package in theamount of US$30 billion under the New Miyazawa Initiative to help ASEAN countries. It
also concentrated its ODA to ASEAN, especially its new members to narrow the ASEAN
divide. In November 1999, the Obuchi Initiative targeted human resource development
and exchange in East Asia, building social safety nets, cooperation for the developmentof ASEAN, reinforce the revitalization of ASEAN economies, and meet the challenges of
the information age, as well as combat piracy. In July 2001, Japan reiterated four fields ofcooperation with ASEAN; in January 2002, Koizumi proposed the concept of an East
Asian Community; in November 2002 Japan and ASEAN signed the Joint Declaration on
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, promised Y200 billion in ODA to ASEAN for6educational purposes in the next five years,8 and in 2003 the Japan-ASEAN year ended
with the commemorative summit that launched their new partnership in the newmillennium.

In the political-security field, Japan has slowly been shifting its policy of selfinhibition to one of willing participant in regional security cooperation.9 In the 1980s, due
to increasing Japanese concerns over piracy in the SLOCs, the scope of maritime selfdefense was extended to cover 1,000 nautical miles from its national territory. This raised
serious concern among its Northeast and Southeast Asian neighbors fearing a departurefrom self-defense and a risk of the resurgence of Japanese “militarism”. This wasfollowed by the breaching of the ceiling on defense expenditures that went beyond 1
percent of GNP. In the 1996, the US-Japan Declaration on Security was also seen as
further evidence of Japan’s emerging security role in the traditional field. A new law wasenacted to implement this joint declaration, authorizing the SDF to provide logisticalsupport in non-combat areas for US forces operating near Japan’s national territory.
China took this to include contingencies such as conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the eventof the US involvement in cross strait conflict should Taiwan declare independence andBeijing suppresses this by force.

Nevertheless, although there is suspicion by China and South Korea about any
move that in their view would lead to Japanese “militarism”, on the whole they have notopposed Japan’s increasing involvement by the SDF in peacekeeping operations outside
the Japanese homeland.10 In response to domestic and external imperatives, since 1991,
Japan’s political security role began to change: (1) it dispatched several minesweeping
ships of the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) to the Persian Gulf in 1991; (2) it
participated for the first time in UNPKO under the UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992 bysending 600 troops there; (3) it sent 700 SDF members to East Timor in 2002; (4) itenacted a special law in 2001 to allow the SDF to participate in the global campaign
8

A summary of Japan-ASEAN cooperation in trade and investment and ODA is found in Akrasanee andPrasert, “The Evolution of ASEAN-Japan Economic Cooperation”, pp. 63-74.
9Nishihara, “Japan’s Political and Security Relations with ASEAN”, p. 154.

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against terrorism that enabled the MSDF to supply fuel for the naval forces of othernations in the coalition operating in the Indian Ocean; and (5) it enacted another special
law enabling Japan to dispatch SDF troops to Iraq with a specifically non-military
mission in non-combat areas.11

Another evidence of Japan’s shifting political-security role is its bid since July
1993 to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and to this end has argued
the need for UN reform and sought the support of its friends and allies, including ASEAN
countries. The then Prime Minister Miyazawa declared “Japan is ready to take as much
responsibility as it is capable of”. Subsequent addresses to the UN General Assembly by
Japan’s prime ministers since then carried the same message, to wit: Hosokawa said in
1993, “Japan is ready to take as much responsibility as it can in a reformed United
Nations”: Hashimoto said in 1996, “Japan is prepared to fulfill its responsibility as apermanent member of the Security Council”; Koizumi said, “I believe that we should
now focus our discussion on such questions as the number of seats on the enlarged
Security Council in September 2002, and then in September 2004, “ We believe that therole that Japan has placed provides a solid basis for its assumption of permanent
membership on the Security Council”. He stressed that 2005, when the UN celebrates its
60th anniversary would be a fitting occasion for “changes on all fronts… the Security
Council in particular”. He also argued for the removal of the “enemy state” clauses in the
UN Charter referring to enemies of the Allied Powers in World War II including Japan
and Germany.12

In its bid for UN reform and Security Council membership, it is likely that Japan
would receive the diplomatic support of ASEAN member states.

10

Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan, “ASEAN’s Political and Security Relations with Japan”, in ASEAN-Japan
Cooperation: A Foundation of East Asian Community, p. 147.
11
Nishihara, “Japan’s Political and Security Relations with ASEAN”, pp. 154-155.

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Imperatives for Japan’s New Security Role in the 21st Century

A new political-security role for Japan in the 21str century is driven by a numberof important factors, some internal, but others external. They are discussed at great length
in the October 2004 report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities alreadycited above. The following is a brief discussion of what this author thinks are among themost important imperatives:

1. The end of the cold war - As already noted, the uncertainties of the post cold war
world had led Japan to review its security policy, seeking to sustain its security
alliance with the US. This is seen in their Joint Declaration in 1996 that definedburden sharing, among other dimensions of their security cooperation. Japan alsocollaborated with ASEAN in launching the ASEAN Regional Forum for politicalsecurity dialogue in the Asia Pacific region.

2. The rise of China – In a matter of two decades, China’s phenomenal rise as an
economic powerhouse has enormously boosted its capacity to meet its four
modernization goals. There are positive predictions that it would surpass the US
economy in another decade, and Taiwan’s defense capability in a couple of years.
ASEAN’s loss of economic competitiveness to China’s market of more than 1.2
billion people and of Japan’s lost decade that paved the way for China’s
attractiveness to ASEAN and other neighbors are only some of the othermanifestations of this rise of China.

China’s rise was also marked by significant improvements in US-China
relations, no doubt shaped by economic forces and the global terrorist threat,
although in the long run, they are likely to remain strategic competitors. China has
also challenged Japan, long an ASEAN strategic partner (for having both been
non-communist, open economies, and reliant on US security umbrella since the12“Prime Minister Koisumi Declares Japan’s Determination to Become Permanent Member of the UN
Security Council”, http://www.fpcj.jp/e/shiryo/jh/0436.html accessed on 11/12/2004.

9end of World War II), but whose overall position relative to China has beeneroded largely by the consequences of Japan’s lost decade and unfinishedeconomic liberalization. China’s entry in the global market with its large economy,huge share of world trade, and specialization in almost every level oftechnological progress has exerted a tremendous impact on every major economic
region in the world including East Asia.

3. Reduced threat perceptions about China by ASEAN countries – China’s rise andits diplomatic offensive vis-à-vis ASEAN have helped moderate ASEAN
countries’ perceptions about China as a security threat. ASEAN countries
severely affected by the 1997 financial crisis appreciated China’s decision not torevalue the renmimbi.

ASEAN claimants in the contested features in the South China Sea also
appreciated growing Chinese moderation in its behavior from the 1980s armed
conflict with Vietnam, the occupation of and military build up in the Mischief
Reef between 1995 and 1998, and its overall creeping occupation, to a more
accommodating posture as seen in the adoption of the Declaration on the Conduct
of Parties in the South China Sea with ASEAN in 2002. Although the latter falls
short of a binding code of conduct, ASEAN was able to get China and Malaysia
to accept the principle of no new occupation, a necessary element to stabilize thecontested area.

In 2001, China also concluded a Comprehensive Economic Cooperationagreement with ASEAN that prompted Japan to launch its own bid for an
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2002. China’s ASEAN
diplomacy has succeeded in eroding ASEAN solidarity to the extent that eachmajor ASEAN country has regarded relations with China, if not the mostimportant at least among their top three foreign policy priorities. Of late, China
has also seriously engaged the Philippines in crafting closer defense cooperation10

in an obvious bid to wean it from its close security relationship with the US andclose comprehensive security relationship with Japan.

Tokyo cannot afford to have its close relations with ASEAN underminedby Chinese “diplomatic victories” as described above. Although both countries
are part of the ASEAN+3 process and are regarded by ASEAN member states as
key to a stable, peaceful, and prosperous regional order, in the long run, thestrategic interests of Beijing and Tokyo are likely to compete, if not clash.
Mindful of that future scenario, Japan needs to catch up with China in the defense
and security field, after China has begun to overtake Japan in the economic field
where Japan was pre-eminent among Northeast and Southeast Asian economies in
the past. The attractive Chinese market and its contribution to the economic
recovery of ASEAN member states are among the reasons behind ASEAN
member states warming up to Beijing.

4. International terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs – Following the attacks
against the US on 11 September 2001, US allies and countries throughout theworld with a domestic problem perceived to be linked to the global terrorist
movement have become members of the global coalition against terrorism invarying degrees. This problem has led Japan to adopt in 2001 a special legislation
enabling Japan to join in the international campaign against terrorism, paving theway for the sending of the MSDF as a refueling force in the Indian Ocean forcoalition members engaged in operations against al-Qaeda forces.

The concern that terrorist and other groups could use weapons of mass
destruction to attack the US and its allies and friends has also led Japan to join in
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) with other like-minded countries in theregion. Eleven nations signed the Statement of Interdiction Principles on 4
September 2003 and by 1 June 2004, the PSI core group has reached 17 with 60

11other countries signaling their interest to supporting PSI activities. 13 Joint
exercises of PSI countries have in fact been held in Japan in 2004. Only Japan andSingapore so far have joined the PSI among East Asian countries.

At the same time, Pyongyang’s recalcitrance about its nuclear-weapons
development program has increased Japan’s concern over WMD proliferation. It
does not help that South Korea has also reportedly been engaged in nuclear
weapons development in an obvious bid to enhance its security vis-à-vis North
Korea and other parties.

5. Rise of transnational crime, especially piracy and illegal trafficking in drugs,
small arms and light weapons, as well as human beings, particularly women andchildren – Japan’s strategic interests include the safety of international navigation,
particularly of the SLOCs through which critical oil resources from the Middle
East and Southeast Asia pass and through which its exports of manufactures aretransported to their foreign markets. Piracy and armed robbery at sea constitutes
one of the most important threats to the safety of the SLOCs. Southeast Asia’sinternational waterways had reportedly seen the most number of piratical attacks.
For example, in 2000, 262 out of 469 of these incidents in the world occurred inSoutheast Asia, while 189 out of the world’s total of 445 incidents also took placein this region.14 These numbers are to be regarded as conservative counts, given
the fact that many such incidents are unreported.

The oceans are also used by transnational criminal organizations in theillegal trafficking of drugs, small arms and light weapons, and human beings.
Southeast Asian countries are major producers, transshipment points, anddestination of illegal drugs, including heroin and “ice”. They are also very muchpart of the small arms and light weapons illicit trade where Cambodia and13

The Military Balance 2004-2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute forStrategic Studies, October 2004), p. 19.

12Vietnam are suppliers to local armed insurgencies in Indonesia, Myanmar, thePhilippines, and Southern Thailand, as well as to transnational criminal groups.
The region is also one of the principal sources, transshipment point, anddestination of trafficked human beings, particularly women and children. China isalso involved in these types of transnational crime, and Japan could be a
destination country for trafficked women.15

In this regard, Japan cannot be immune to the threats posed to regional
security by these transnational criminal activities in which some of its own
criminal groups could also be involved. Thus, it has engaged in bilateral andmultilateral cooperation in coast guard policing to enhance maritime safety andsecurity with a number of neighbors, including ASEAN member states.

6. Rise of human security issues and humanitarian disasters – Already an advocateof comprehensive security, Japan also adopted human security as a framework for
non-traditional security cooperation with other countries. It set up a Trust Fundfor Human Security that provided Y100 million to the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) to help rebuild the agricultural capacity of communities in
Burundi whose peoples were internally displaced or repatriated from Tanzania. It
also pledged the same amount to assist farmers in Sierra Leone. The Trust Fundfor Human Security has also helped the FAO to implement the New Rice for
Africa (NERICA) Program.16

In response to humanitarian disasters such as in East Timor and under the
UN auspices, Japan has also been willing to participate in responding to this type14

Yoshitaka Toi, “Our Challenges to Enhance Maritime Security”, a presentation at the 2nd Japan-ASEAN
Security Symposium, organized by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies, hosted by Japan’s MOFA in Singapore, 27-28 October 2004.
15
See Carolina G. Hernandez, “Transnational Crime in East Asia: Illegal Traffic in Drugs, Natural Persons,and Small Arms and Light Weapons”, a paper presented at the 2nd Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium,organized by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Singapore’s Institute of Defence and Strategic
Studies hosted by Japan’s MOFA, Singapore, 27-28 October 2004, for a fuller discussion of these forms oftransnational crime in which Japan-ASEAN security cooperation can be built.
16“Japan Contributes to African Farmers and Refugees through the Trust Fund for Human Security”,
October 5, 2004, in http://www.un.int/japan/ accessed on 11/12/2004.

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of emergencies. It sent a PKO contingent in East Timor tasked with non-combat
duties. This role is likely to grow in the future, given its identification in the two
Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium and Workshops of their Team of Experts asdirected by The Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action attached to The Tokyp Declaration
for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Pertnership in the New Millennium
adopted at their commemorative summit in December 2003.

7. Reform of multilateral institutions – The inability and/or weakness of the United
Nations to fulfill its primary goal of maintaining international peace and security
has been traced to the structure of world politics dominated by the cold war
during its first fifty years. The assumptions behind the founding of the UN are
also no longer realistic in the present century. These include the definition of thegreat powers that had a permanent membership in the Security Council, thestructure of power in the world in 1945, the response to conflict as either pacificsettlement under Chapter 6 or action with regard to threats to the peace, breachesof the peace and acts of aggression under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and theneed to ensure that “enemy states” remained outside of the UN system, among
others. These assumptions have contributed to the limited effectiveness of the UN
to deliver on its functions. Thus, there is a need to reform the UN system,
including permanent membership for Japan in the Security Council.

Moreover, US hegemony has also reduced the authority of the UN to deal
with peace and security. Time and again, the US has either not sought authority
from the Security Council to undertake action against presumed disturbers of thepeace such as in Kosovo and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In both instances,international norms embodied in instruments such as the UN have been eroded.

8. Domestic imperatives – Within Japan, public opinion has also been changing withregard to the country’s security role. Of late, there appears an increasing
willingness to venture into security terrains not traveled in the past, including
since 1991, peacekeeping operations, participation in the global campaign against14

terrorism, non-combat support for armed operations against new “enemies” suchas al-Qaeda, and preemptive interdiction to prevent the movement of WMDs into
Japan and the region under the PSI.

As already noted, in order to remove the constraints inhibiting a greater
security role, Japan has enacted special legislation to enable its SDF to undertake
security tasks beyond the defense of the homeland. Moreover, Japan’s citizens
have become increasingly willing to have their country evolve into a “normal”
state, including through the amendment of its peace constitution. To build
confidence, it is wise to involve its friends and allies in the evolution of Japan’s
new security role.

How Japan Can Contribute to a Peaceful World

From the above discussion, it is clear that Japan’s national interest would include
both traditional and non-traditional security concerns, and would adopt a mix oftraditional, comprehensive, and human security perspectives in the security role it could
play in the future. While it will remain burdened by its historical past, especially inNortheast Asia where a consensus on the interpretation of their common history hasremained elusive, a carefully crafted new security role for Japan can be acceptable tomost countries in the region. Japan has to make genuine efforts at reconciliation byapologizing for its behavior in World War II. It also needs to make reparation to woundedparties, such as the comfort women of Asia who are slowly but surely dieing away.

Short of this or preferably in combination with it, Japan can begin healing thewounds, already underway in Southeast Asia by undertaking a joint project with its
Northeast and Southeast Asian neighbors to study their common past in the effort to build
consensus on this issue and to teach what the joint study would have learned to their
future generation. A rewritten common regional history is a project long overdue if
Japan’s new security role were to face smooth sailing in the region and if its call to build
an East Asian community were not to have a hollow ring to it. It remains true that15

inasmuch as most of Southeast Asia’s people have forgiven the past, there are still
pockets of powerful public opinion where Japan’s wartime policies are recalled whenever
opposing Japanese-initiated policies or seeking Japanese support for initiatives andpolicies other countries wish to advance that would involve Japan.

Japan also needs to consult with its neighbors on the evolution of its new security
role as part of trust and confidence building among them. The present conference and theseries of Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium and Workshops of their Team of Experts
sponsored by Japan’s MOFA through the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
and Singapore’s Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) are very important
examples of this suggested policy approach.

It would also help to build its new security role by starting with the non-traditional
security fields such as combating transnational crime, including piracy and armed
robbery at sea before going to traditional security activities, such the deployment of its
armed forces in combat missions abroad, and to undertake security activities inpartnership with other countries.

In particular, Japan’s interest in association with its friends and partners in theregion could be benefited immensely if its new security role would be hewn as closely as
possible to the points already discussed above and expressed in the following approaches:

1. Sustain Japan’s focus on comprehensive and cooperative security
2. Develop further a human security perspective to guide Japan’s foreign andsecurity policy
3. Evolve a new security policy in non-threatening ways, by starting with lesssensitive non-traditional security areas before going into the more politicallysensitive traditional security areas
4. Collaborate with others in an equal, mutually beneficial, and symmetrical manner

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5. Cooperate with like-minded partners in restoring the credibility and authority ofmultilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations beginning with the muchneeded reforms in its structure and roles
6. Work closely with trusted partners such as ASEAN who do not aspire to a great
power role, and in particular help build their capacity for enhanced security
cooperation

Japan-ASEAN Partnership as a Critical Component of Japan’s New Security Role

From an ASEAN perspective, there is merit in making the Japan-ASEAN
partnership as a critical component of Japan’s new security role for the following
reasons:

1. Their three decades of close cooperation guided by comprehensive security are astrong argument that given the political will and a balanced mutually advantageous
framework for cooperation, former adversaries can become strategic partners.

2. ASEAN’s track record as a credible external actor, although somewhat eroded by
the consequences of the financial crisis can be used to lend credibility to, andtherefore acceptability of Japan’s new security role. Put differently, ASEAN canserve once again its earlier function of interlocutor for a Japan that had little trustfrom its neighbors.

3. ASEAN is a medium-sized actor and poses no threat to anyone in the region. In fact,
because of this character, it had been sought not only by Japan, but also more
recently and to an increasing extent by China in the achievement of Beijing’s
regional political and strategic objectives.

4. ASEAN and Japan have complementary capacities for security cooperation as seenin their complementary economies whose different levels of development also havecreated complementarities in the security field. For example, Japan’s superior

17defense technology and excess resources can be used to upgrade ASEAN’s capacity
for security cooperation. Enhanced security capacity among ASEAN countries
would improve their ability to provide maritime safety and security to keep the
SLOCs free and safe from hostile forces. Likewise, in the combating various formsof transnational crime, Japan’s superior technology to detect and deter crime canhelp build similar capacities in ASEAN in the areas of money laundering, document
fraud, external control procedures, etc.

5. Japan and ASEAN member countries have also participated in PKO activities under
the United Nations. Regional PKO training, including interoperability anddevelopment of a common set of doctrines compatible with those of UN PKO can be
an area of Japan’s security role where ASEAN is a partner.

In this regard, the set of recommendations developed for the governments of Japanand ASEAN member countries by the Team of Experts in August and October 200417
merits support from both sides. As a whole, these recommendations can be the starting
point for the evolution of Japan’s new security role in the 21st century, measures in which
ASEAN is also involved as a security partner.

17

The set of recommendations will be submitted to the governments of Japan and ASEAN member
countries through their SOM for the consideration of the leaders of these countries at their Summit inNovember 2004.

18