Upgrading to World Class:
The Future of the New YorkRegion’s Airports

01

Discussion Paper 2013 • 01
Jeffrey M. ZUPAN

Senior Fellow for Transportation,
Regional Plan Association,
New York, United StatesUpgrading to World Class:
The Future of the
New York Region’s Airports
An Update

Discussion Paper No. 2013-1

Prepared for the Roundtable on
Expanding Airport Capacity under Constraints in Large Urban Areas(21-22 February 2013, Paris)

Jeffrey M. ZUPAN
Senior Fellow for Transportation
Regional Plan Association, New York, United States

February 2013

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UPGRADING TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF THE NEW YORK REGION’S AIRPORTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ........................................................................................... 5
2. SUMMARY OF 2011 RPA REPORT .................................................................................. 5
3. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ................................................................................................. 11
4. OTHER POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS...................................... 13
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................ 19

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UPGRADING TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF THE NEW YORK REGION’S AIRPORTS

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKSThis paper is intended to serve three purposes. First, it presents a slightly abbreviatedversion of the summary of the book published by Regional Plan Association (RPA) 1 inJanuary 2011 about the serious capacity and delay problems at the three major airports
in New York and what might be done about it.2 Second, the paper provides informationon the response by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the owners andoperators of the three airports and what has transpired in the two years since the book
was published. Third, the paper discusses some relevant emerging issues that will likely
further affect the ability to address the growing problem of capacity and delays at these
airports.

2. SUMMARY OF 2011 RPA REPORTIntercity travel is at the core of an increasingly interconnected and competitive global
economy. Without the ability to efficiently transport business and leisure travelers andtime-sensitive cargo, both domestic and international business would grind to a halt.
Since virtually all long-distance travel is by air, along with a high proportion of shorter
distance travel between cities, metropolitan economies depend on their ability to provide
high-quality airline service to many destinations. This is especially true for world-city
regions like the New York metropolitan area that are even more dependent on industries
with a high propensity for flying. In New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, the leading
economic sectors all rely on frequent air travel to many destinations. Indeed, the region’s
status as a nexus for domestic and international air travel is intricately linked to its role
as a premier center of global commerce.
This crucial link between air travel and economic prosperity is threatened by a lack ofadequate capacity in the region’s aviation system, including air space, airports andlandside connections. This is manifested in flight delays that greatly exceed those of
every other major airport in the United States. These delays cost the region hundreds of1.

Regional Plan Association (RPA) is an independent, not-for-profit regional planning
organization that seeks to improve the quality of life and the economic competitiveness of the
31-county New York-New Jersey-Connecticut region through research, planning, andadvocacy.

2. Upgrading to World Class: The Future of the New York Region’s Airports by Jeffrey M. Zupan,
Richard E. Barone, and Matthew H. Lee. The full report is available online at
http://www.rpa.org/2011/01/major-new-rpa-study-finds-new-airport-capacity-needed.html.

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UPGRADING TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF THE NEW YORK REGION’S AIRPORTS

millions of dollars each year in lost wages and business income. In the future, without
additional capacity the impacts will be far more severe. While delays cost valuable timeand can inhibit some from flying, having too few flights to handle demand will prevent
millions from flying and cost the region thousands of jobs and billions of dollars.
Strained capacity at the airports is more than a local problem. Delays at the region’s
three major airports – Kennedy, Newark and LaGuardia – ripple through the national
aviation network causing delays from Washington, DC, to Los Angeles, CA. Constraining
the New York region’s capacity for air travel growth would also weaken the nation’s
ability to compete for global business in finance, media and other industries for which
New York is the nation’s leading international center.
Solutions will require both short-term and long-term actions, as well as a coordinatedstrategy by a number of public and private sector participants, including the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, which operates the three airports, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), which regulates and controls the nation’s airspace, theprivate airlines that operate terminals and schedule flights, and the city and stateagencies responsible for the roads and transit network connecting to the airports.
Today, the region’s three airports regularly rank worst delays among the nation’s
airports, with more flights than the region’s constrained airports and airspace can handle.
To limit the delays created by the excessive flights scheduled during peak times, the FAA
placed a cap on hourly flights at all three major airports. This action limits the ability ofthe three airports to meet current or projected growth.
The demand for air travel is almost certain to continue to increase substantially over the
coming decades. Air traffic has increased in every decade since commercial flights wereintroduced, and a growing international service economy will drive up demand in the
future. It is expected that passenger demand, which was 104 million in 2010, will reach
150 million by as early as 2030, if the capacity is available. The growth is fueled by
global economic expansion, the continuing attraction of the New York region for visitors,
and expected growth in the New York region’s population.
If they can be accommodated, these additional air passengers represent a major sourceof growth for the region’s economy. In 2009, air passengers and cargo generated$16.8 billion in wages and $48.6 billion in sales to the region, and supported nearly
415,000 jobs. Without additional capacity, the region will forego an increasing number ofjobs, wages and sales each year. By the 2030s, these losses could reach as many as
125,000 jobs, $6 billion in wages and $16 billion in sales each year.
To both reduce delays and accommodate future demand for air travel, the region willneed to expand capacity by 78 additional flights per hour – or one third more than today.
This added capacity will be needed to serve an additional 39 million passengers, who
without it would be unable to fly into and out of the region’s airports with reasonablepredictability. Just to maintain the current uncompetitive level of 20-minute delays, there
would still be a need for 45 more flights per peak hour to handle an additional 22 million
passengers.
Creating this capacity will require a combination of actions, some of which can be
implemented in the next few years while others could take two decades or more tocomplete. RPA examined six categories of potential investments and demand
management.

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1.

Implement NextGen I and II, a phased implementation of technologicalinvestments and operational and procedural changes that would transform thenation’s air traffic control system

2.

Encourage the use of outlying airports – Stewart International in Orange County
and MacArthur in Suffolk County – to free up capacity at the three major airports

3.

Improve intercity rail service to free up capacity at the airports by shifting
passengers from shorter-distance flights

4.

Build a new airport to handle growing demand

5.

Manage demand to reduce peak period flights

6.

Expand runway capacity at the three major airports

These actions vary widely in terms of the capacity potential, cost, timeframes,
implementation barriers and environmental impacts. Some actions have benefits beyond
their potential to increase the effective capacity of the region’s airports, and may beregional priorities even if their ability to relieve airport congestion is limited.
The potential to add capacity or reduce demand for peak-period flights was quantified foreach set of actions, and the probable magnitude of costs and other impacts wereconsidered in developing recommendations. Because of the costs and possible
environmental impacts associated with runway expansion, all other possible actions were
thoroughly examined to determine if, taken together, they could preclude the need tophysically expand the airports.
Of all the actions considered, expansion at Kennedy and Newark airports provide thegreatest potential for increasing capacity and reducing delays. The implementation of
NextGen could potentially address capacity needs in the next five to ten years, but itwould not alleviate the need for eventual airport expansion. Other actions would only
slightly delay the need for airport expansion, yet many also provide other benefits. To
ensure that New York maintains a world-class aviation system, it should strive for thedual objectives of meeting a projected demand of 150 million passengers by 2030 andreducing average delays from 20 minutes to the national norm of 10 minutes.
The only way to meet these objectives is through the expeditious implementation of
NextGen and immediate planning for the eventual expansion of Kennedy and Newark
airports. Other short-and-intermediate-term actions, especially expanding service at
Stewart and MacArthur airports, should be encouraged to serve nearby markets,
although they will have little effect on the need for new runways at Kennedy and Newark.
Improving intercity rail service should also be implemented to increase traveler options.
The benefits and issues for each set of actions, including the potential of each to expand
the capacity to handle peak-period demand is summarized below.
NextGen I and II. The FAA’s NextGen program is a package of new technologies, such as
Global Positioning Systems, that is used to track and guide aircraft, as well as a suite ofoperational and procedural changes. NextGen, which is being deployed by the FAA overthe next few years, is capable of reducing delays and expanding airport landing and takeoff capacity. This report concludes that NextGen could have a favorable effect on capacity
if deployed for that purpose, but only for the next five to ten years. NextGen I, with fullJeffrey Zupan — Discussion Paper 2013-1 — © OECD/ITF 2013

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UPGRADING TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF THE NEW YORK REGION’S AIRPORTS

implementation expected by 2018, could add the capacity for 21 flights an hour in thepeak period. The impact of NextGen II is more difficult to predict. But even with themost optimistic projections, however, growing air passenger volumes will overwhelm its
ability to keep pace with demand.
Expanding the Use of Outlying Airports. The report examined the potential for shifting
demand to the region’s outlying airports, opening up more capacity at the three core
airports. We concluded that Stewart Airport in Orange County, acquired by the Port
Authority in 2007, and MacArthur Airport in Suffolk County, each would have a positive
but limited effect, attracting only 2.5 million of the 150 million passengers expected in
the 2030s, or about 5 of the 80 additional peak-periods flights needed by the 2030s.
Expansion of air service at these airports would bring other benefits, including better
access for locally generated traffic in the Hudson Valley and Long Island, and give aboost to those local economies.
Improved and High-Speed Intercity Rail. Higher speed intercity rail service is anothermeans to attract air passengers, as it has done in recent years with improved service in
the Northeast Corridor. The promise of still faster trains could attract still morecustomers. The expected progress in rail speeds by 2030 could shift 2 million air
passengers, or the equivalent of about nine peak period flights. Truly high-speed trains,which would require significant investments in new rights-of-way, would expand rail’s
attractive power to over 4 million passengers. A number of factors prevent theseestimates from being higher. In particular, only 15 percent of the air passenger trips toand from the airports in the region are to locations within 500 miles, and a large share of
air passengers flying short distances are connecting at the New York airports to otherplaces, making their use of rail to reach New York inconvenient for making connections.
In addition to these modest improvements in flight capacity, high-speed rail would add a
new dimension to intercity travel with a number of other travel and economic benefits.
Build a New Airport. Building an entirely new airport is difficult in a region as densely
developed as the tri-state metropolitan area. There must be sufficient land in locations
that are both suitable for development and accessible to enough potential passengers
that would choose it over existing airports. An exhaustive search for parcels large enoughto hold a new airport within 40 miles of the Manhattan central business district (CBD)
located no appropriate sites. The possibility of expanding existing small outlying airports
was also examined, but these sites were either too small or too far from the region’score. Finally, the concept of constructing an airport island to serve the region was
evaluated. It was concluded that the costs for a project of this scale, along with therequirement to close either Kennedy or Newark to open up airspace for the new airport,
made this option untenable.
Managing Demand. A number of potential demand management tools have beensuggested to use existing capacity at the three major airports more effectively byencouraging higher capacity aircraft and by better utilizing the times when airport
capacity is not fully used. These include bans of small-sized aircraft (under 50 seats),
ban of short flights (under 250 miles), a cap on the frequency in over-served markets,
pricing of peak flights to encourage shifts to the off-peak, and auctions. Most of theseeither proved unworkable or had only a small impact on freeing capacity.
A limited number of recommendations emerged from this investigation, including thepossibility of thinning out service in saturated markets. These recommendations, most ofwhich would be resisted by some constituencies, deserve consideration for their8

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UPGRADING TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF THE NEW YORK REGION’S AIRPORTS

beneficial effects on the margin, particularly in the long term at La Guardia, sincephysical expansion is not feasible there.
Regulation can play another role though. As passengers respond to higher speed rail
service or shift to outlying airports, there is no guarantee that airlines will respond by
dropping peak-hour flights. The establishment of a process to encourage airlines to drop
peak-hour flights would make these other travel options more effective to free up peak
airport capacity.
Ground Access and Impact on Airport Capacity. The report concludes that the limitationsof ground access, while in need of attention, do not limit growth. While traffic conditions
may cause additional delay and may deter some prospective passengers, they will notdiscourage a large number from flying if the imperatives to fly are there. Collaboration
among the transportation agencies is recommended to ease traffic congestion and todevelop the promising short- and long-term bus and rail transit options to all three
airports outlined in this report.
Expand Existing Airports. After consideration of all the potential capacity-increasing anddelay-reducing, this report concludes that expansion of the capacity at Kennedy andNewark will be necessary. Options to expand La Guardia, with a smaller footprint in amore developed area, would be untenable.
The Port Authority should begin to plan now since airport expansion will not happen
overnight and serious capacity deficiencies will become even more apparent in the nextten years. At Kennedy, four alternative configurations meet basic airspace and capacity
criteria. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. The choice among them, or withpossible variations and phasing plans, should be made by the Port Authority, working
with the local and environmental communities, in the next few years. At Newark, one
configuration stands out. It is within the airport footprint, minimizing impacts off-site, but
it would require the redesign and relocations of one or more of three terminals on the
airport.
Conclusion. A successful expansion or reconfiguration at Kennedy and Newark, along with
NextGen, can meet the twin goals of capacity and delay reduction in the 2030s andbeyond. Inaction will result in an economic drain on the region. It will discouragebusiness, limit visits, and prevent our region from fully participating in the global
economy.
The inability of the combined impacts of NextGen, outlying airports and faster intercity
rail to stem the need for eventual airport capacity expansion should not be viewed as areason to deemphasize these actions. To the contrary, they are each of great value.
NextGen will allow the reduction of delays and the expansion of capacity through moreaccurate tracking and more flexible airspace opportunities. Outlying airports such as
Stewart and MacArthur will serve localized areas, building up local economies andoffering air travel options. Faster rail travel, particularly in the Northeast Corridor, will
divert travelers from the highways and knit together the economies of the Northeast.

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3. DEVELOPMENTS SINCEThe Regional Plan Association report summarized above was released in January 2011.
Soon after that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey launched their own
analysis, with consultant assistance. The instructions to the consultant: validate theanalysis and conclusion of the RPA report, accounting for the interactions of the three
airports and of Teterboro Airport, an important general aviation airport in the region. If
the findings indicated that runway capacity expansion at Kennedy and/or Newark isneeded, develop design options that that met the future needs. This work is underway.
Passenger Projections. In their current efforts, the Port Authority has revised the numberof air passengers they are planning for, extending it to 170 MAP (million air passengers).
Rate of growth the PA assumed is now higher than the highest of range of three that RPA
used in its report. This would result in the 170 MAP being reached by the early2030s,
while the highest RPA projection suggested that 150 MPA would not be achieved until
after 2032. These differences are shown in Figure 1, taken from the RPA report, with theasterisk added to indicate where the Port Authority projection falls.
Figure 1. Air Passenger Projections*

Source: Upgrading to World Class: The Future of the New York Region’s Airports; Regional Plan Association

Next Gen. In discussions with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), who are charged
with implementing NextGen, it has become clear that capacity gains in the near-term

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UPGRADING TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF THE NEW YORK REGION’S AIRPORTS

are not a given. The Port Authority and the FAA are working together to determine howmuch additional aircraft operating capacity can be gained over the next several years.
This leaves uncertain how much of the gain of 21 flights per hour assumed in the RPA
report can be realized by the 2018 implementation timeline for NextGen I. However, inthe long term (2025-2035), many of the Next Gen capacity benefits articulated in the
RPA report are likely to materialize if airlines are able and willing to equip their aircraft totake advantage of the new technologies.
Validation. The Port Authority consultant has essentially validated the conclusions that
RPA reaches regarding the impact of Stewart and MacArthur airports, intercity rail
improvements, management of demand at the existing airports, and the viability of a
new large airport in the region. None of these options will, even when taken together,
obviate the need for new runway capacity at Kennedy and Newark. Figure 2 shows thedifficulty in attracting demand to the two outlying airports identified in the RPA report.
Figure 2. Passenger Traffic History at Two Outlying Airports

Stewart Airport and MacArthur Airport
History of Passenger Traffic
1400

Annual Passengers (000's)

1200
1000
800
Stewart
600

MacArthur Airport

400
200

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

0

Source:Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; Landrum and Brown
Note: MacArthur Traffic is for fiscal years ending on September 30

Design of Additional Runways. To date, results of the search for a workable design for
new runway capacity at Kennedy and Newark are not yet clear.

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4. OTHER POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS

Passenger Demand. The RPA report was produced during a period of deep decline in air
passenger demand, a direct result of the recession that began in 2008. In 2007
passenger demand at the three airports reached 109.1 MAP, the culmination ofcontinuous growth since 1991, interrupted only briefly by the flying public’s reaction to
the terrorist attacks of 2001. By 2009 the passenger volume plummeted to 101.7 MAP,
resulting in the largest two-year drop in history in absolute terms (again with the
exception of the terrorist attacks period).
Since then traffic has begun to climb and 2012 is expected to almost reach the 2007
levels. The slow but steady recovery of the region’s economy over the past two years has
led to a surge in air passenger traffic with 2012 almost reach 2007 levels. However, only
if one believes that the rebound will continue more or less indefinitely, then the Port
Authority’s use of a more aggressive projection of 170 MAP by the early 2030s isjustified. One thing is clear; the region has lost almost five years of growth due to the“great recession.” One might argue that this reduces the urgency for action, but this ishardly the case. Very little has been accomplished during the past five years and the Port
Authority is essentially back where it was during the height of air passenger demand in
the region, with essentially the same facilities and constraints that existed in 2007.
Higher Aircraft Occupancy. One of the underlying factors in RPA’s projections of aircraft
operations at the three airports was the expected increase in the average number ofpassengers on each flight, following a long term trend of larger aircraft and higher
occupancy rates. RPA projected that the average flight taking off and landing would growfrom 91.4 passengers in 2007 to 99.8 passengers by the 2030s, driving down thenumber of projected aircraft movements. This trend has accelerated, even in the last five
years; the average occupancy at the three airports has reached 103.9 passengers,
already exceeding the RPA projection for the 2030s. Figure 3 shows the history of aircraft
occupancy at the three airports. As airlines strive for greater profitability (or less loss),using the slots within their control, and as international travel continues to grow fasterthan domestic travel, these trends should continue.

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Figure 3. Passengers per Aircraft -Three New York Airports
1978 to 2012

Passengers per Flight (INT and DOM)
140
120
100
80
60
40

EWR

JFK
LGA

20
0

Source: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Slot Use. At the three New York Airports (and at Reagan National Airport) the FAA limits
the number of hourly aircraft movements to reduce likely delays from the overscheduled
flights. The US General Accounting Office recently completed an examination3 of the slot
rules and concluded that they have the unintended effect of lowering the passenger
carrying capacity of these airports. The current rules require airlines to use their slots
only 80 percent of the time, allowing some existing airport capacity to go unused. The
rules apply to each airlines pool of slots, rather than individual ones, adding to thenumber of slots unused and unavailable to other carriers that do not hold them.
Furthermore, for those slots that are used there is a tendency to use some of them more
inefficiently with smaller aircraft to ensure the carrier meets the “80 percent rule” anddoes not forfeit any slots. If these rules are changed the New York airports can realize
gains in peak capacity that can absorb some of the traffic growth. The FAA is expected toaddress some of these limitations before the current orders imposing slots controls expire
this October (2013).
Consolidation. It can be expected that the consolidation of the airline industry with fewer
and larger airlines serving each of the New York airports, will result in fewer larger
aircraft in each market. To identify this trend, the 2003 and the 2012 distribution of air
passengers by airline was compared for both domestic and international markets at thethree airports. Six tables – one for each year for each of the airports are provided in the
Appendix. The tables also note whether the airline can be considered a hub or whether
the airline is a low cost carrier.

3.

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http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648219.pdf

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The highlights from these tables:
At JFK (Tables A-1 and A-2)
In 2003 six airlines carried 95.6 percent of all domestic traffic; by 2012 the top six
carried virtually all traffic, 99.2 percent. The top three airlines in 2003 carried 27.9
percent of all international traffic and in 2012 they carried 39.6 percent of allinternational traffic.
At EWR (Tables A-3 and A-4)
In 2003 Continental carried 63 percent of domestic and 51 percent of internationaltraffic: in 2012, with the Continental/United merger, the shares of the new United
Airlines carries 72 percent of domestic and 68 percent of international traffic.
In 2012, domestic market “runner up,” Delta Airlines carries 1/12 as much as did United.
Today, United has virtually no competition internationally among the American flag
carriers.
At LGA (Tables A-5 and A-6)
While there is some consolidation at LGA, it is not as pronounced as it is at the other two
airports; the share among the top seven airlines has grown from 88.1 percent to 97.9
percent.
Interchangeability Among Airports. The argument has been made that the three airports
duplicate their services and that the some of the airlines can consolidate their operations
at one airport rather than two, or even three. To examine this issue, the data in the
Appendix tables were used to examine the four largest domestic airlines to determine
how there traffic is distributed among the three airports. These airlines carry 70 percentof the passengers at the three airports. In Table 1 the 2012 passenger volumes (firsteleven months) and the shares by airport are shown for domestic and international
flights.

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Table 1. Share of Traffic by Airport - Four Largest Domestic Airlines
2012
JFK
Domestic
UnitedInternational

Domestic
Delta
International

Domestic
Jet BlueInternational

Domestic
AmericanInternational

EWR

LGA

TOTAL

Number

1 002 126

16 463 325

2 397 616

19 863 067

Percent

5.0

82.9

12.1

100.0

Number0

7 644 563

1 099

7 645 662

Percent

0.0

100.0

0.0

100

Number

7 374 559

1 399 455

8 943 620

17 717 634

Percent

41.6

7.9

50.5

100.0

Number

4 074 812

115 000

129 582

4 319 394

Percent

94.3

2.7

3.0

100.0

Number

9 445 035

1 321 512

1 128 123

11 894 670

Percent

79.4

11.1

9.5

100.0

Number

2 381 556

002 381 556

Percent

100.0

0.0

0.0

100.0

Number

4 414 071

1 053 795

4 793 635

10 261 501

Percent

43.0

10.3

46.7

100.0

Number

3 442 8840265 352

3 708 236

Percent

92.8

0.0

7.2

100.0

Source: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Table 1 indicates that none of the four airlines divides their traffic more or less equally
between JFK and EWR. Three of the four – United the exception – have at least fourtimes more traffic at JFK than at EWR. United is overwhelming concentrated at EWR, thelegacy of their Continental Airlines merger. There are several good reasons by none ofthese airlines would give up even there minority airport between these two. First, themarkets using JFK and EWR are very different. The share of west of Hudson River (New
Jersey and some New York counties) based passengers who use EWR over JFK is 83.5
percent. They find access to JFK difficult, either having to negotiate the traffic throughmuch of New York City, or deal with a multiple seat transit ride. If these three airlines
dropped airline service to EWR, these passengers would be hard pressed to use JFK andwould be further relegated to one airline – United – that largely controls flights to mostdestinations out of EWR.
The situation in reverse would not be true. In this case relatively small number of air
passengers who fly by United Airlines from JFK would still have their choice among theother three major airlines who carry about 20 times as many passengers combined as
United. They would not be forced to travel across the Hudson to reach a flight.

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The relationship between JFK and LGA offers a different dynamic since the two airports
are about 20 minutes apart. As Table 1 shows Delta and American airlines split theirdomestic traffic between the two airports about equally. However, this hides the fact that
LGA flights are confined to shorter distances, which leads these two airlines to divide thetraffic for these two airlines by individual markets based on distance. Remove one airline
from LGA, for example would tend to transfer those flights to JFK where there are fewer
flights today. The same would be true if flights and airlines were shifted from JFK to LGA.
The effect would not likely lower the number of flights.
One way of showing this is to look at the top-ranked destinations for these two airports.
Of the top 14 destinations for JFK only four are also the top 14 for LGA. Seven of theother ten for JFK are western cities, well beyond the LGA distance limit of 1,500 miles.4
The closer destinations, by necessity have gravitated toward LGA and the longer ones to
JFK. In other words, there already is a separation by market. The four exceptions are
three Florida cities and Boston. It may be that the added traffic volume frominternational traffic transferring at JFK keeps these closer cities in play there even though
they are less than 1,500 miles away and are natural LGA market cities.
Improved Ground Access to EWR. The Port Authority has begun a study of extending
their PATH rapid transit system to EWR, spurred on by an RPA study which concluded it
would be of considerable value as a ground connection from Manhattan’s financial
district. PATH now connects lower Manhattan to downtown Newark and the extension
would be about two miles. The extensions value for addressing the airport capacity
problem at EWR and JFK is uncertain. If runway expansion occurs at EWR but not at JFK,
the PATH extension could help to shift some demand to the airport with added capacity –EWR. However, if the expansion occurs at JFK but not EWR, the PATH extension would
only have value as a ground access improvement.

4

Denver is the one exception, having been “grandfathered” in, despite being more than 1 600
miles away.

Jeffrey Zupan — Discussion Paper 2013-1 — © OECD/ITF 201317

UPGRADING TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF THE NEW YORK REGION’S AIRPORTS

APPENDIX

Tables of Airline Use at Three Port Authority Airports: 2003 and 2012
Table A-1
JFK International Airport

Airline
JetBlue
American *HUB? LCC?
Yes Yes
Yes

Delta **
Yes
UnitedBritish Airways
American WestAir France
Lufthansa
Virgin Atlantic
Aer Lingus
El Al
Air Jamaica
Northwest
Alitalia
KLM
KoreanSwiss Air Int'lTop 20Total Airport

2003

Passengers
Domestic International
7,165,455
04,017,328
3,119,034

Total
7,165,455
7,136,362

Domestic
43.6
24.4

Percent
International
0.0
20.4

Total
22.6
22.5

2,826,529
912,200
0651,983000000
138,9200000
15,712,415
16,434,651

3,982,290
1,257,591
1,256,784
651,983
650,581572,523516,272
441,514436,179
420,223
365,666
335,288274,725
274,585
230,055
25,968,076
31,732,446

17.2
5.6
0.0
4.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
95.6
100.0

7.6
2.3
8.2
0.0
4.3
3.7
3.4
2.9
2.9
2.7
1.5
2.2
1.8
1.8
1.5
67.0
100.0

12.5
4.0
4.0
2.1
2.1
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
0.9
0.9
0.7
81.8
100.0

Yes

Yes

1,155,761
345,391
1,256,784
0
650,581572,523516,272
441,514436,179
420,223
226,746
335,288274,725
274,585
230,055
10,255,661
15,297,795

Table A-2
JFK International Airport

Airline
JetBlue
Delta
AmericanVirgin America/Atantic
British Airways
UnitedAir France
Caribbean Air
Cathay Pacific
US Airways
Lufthansa
Emirates Airlines and SK
KoreanTurkish Air
KLM
Aer Lingus
Alitilia
Tam Brazilian
El Al
Top 20Total Airport

HUB? LCC?
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Cumulative Percent
Domestic International
43.6
0.0
68.0
20.4
85.2
90.8
90.8
94.8
94.8
94.8
94.8
94.8
94.8
94.8
95.6
95.6
95.6
95.6
95.6

27.9
30.2
38.4
38.4
42.7
46.4
49.8
52.7
55.5
58.3
59.8
61.9
63.7
65.5
67.0

Total
22.6
45.1
57.6
61.6
65.5
67.6
69.6
71.5
73.1
74.5
75.8
77.2
78.3
79.4
80.2
81.1
81.8

2012
Passengers
Domestic International
9,445,035
2,381,556
7,374,599
4,074,812
4,414,071
3,442,884
1,070,365
546,78201,227,697
1,002,126
00903,6660735,5900666,474
657,95300543,574
0532,6480424,4440417,1640415,6700415,452
0406,899
0399,116
0
398,862
23,964,149
17,933,290
24,153,321
24,968,964

Total
11,826,591
9,084,652
7,856,955
2,641,382
1,227,697
1,002,126
903,666
735,590
666,474
657,953
543,574
532,648
424,444
417,164
415,670
415,452
406,899
399,116
398,862
40,556,915
49,122,285

Domestic
39.1
30.5
18.3
4.4
0.0
4.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
99.2
100.0

Jeffrey Zupan — Discussion Paper 2013-1 — © OECD/ITF 2013

Percent
International
9.5
16.3
13.8
2.2
4.9
0.0
3.6
2.9
2.7
0.0
2.2
2.1
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.6
71.8
100.0

Total
24.1
18.5
16.0
5.4
2.5
2.0
1.8
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.1
1.1
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
82.6
100.0

Cumulative Percent
Domestic International
Total
39.1
9.5
24.1
69.6
25.9
42.6
87.9
39.6
58.6
92.3
41.8
63.9
92.3
46.8
66.4
96.5
46.8
68.5
96.5
50.4
70.3
96.5
53.3
71.8
96.5
56.0
73.2
99.2
56.0
74.5
99.2
58.2
75.6
99.2
60.3
76.7
99.2
62.0
77.6
99.2
63.7
78.4
99.2
65.3
79.3
99.2
67.0
80.1
99.2
68.6
80.9
99.2
70.2
81.8
99.2
71.8
82.6

19

UPGRADING TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF THE NEW YORK REGION’S AIRPORTS

Table A-3
Newark International Airport

2003

Passengers
Airline
HUB? LCC? Domestic International
Total
Continental *Yes13,622,664.0 3,937,632.0 17,560,296.0
American1,951,950.0
5,584.0
1,957,534.0
United1,468,109.0
111,567.0
1,579,676.0
Delta
1,550,603.0
54.0
1,550,657.0
Northwest
838,284.0
122,652.0
960,936.0
US Airways
550,980.0
550,980.0
American WestYes
487,584.0
487,584.0
SAS
390,945.0
390,945.0
American Trans Air
336,369.0
4,303.0
340,672.0
Virgin Atlantic
Yes
310,140.0
310,140.0
British Airways
295,354.0
295,354.0
Alitalia
248,322.0
248,322.0
Airtran Airways
Yes
245,359.0
245,359.0
Air Canada
242,186.0
242,186.0
Lufthansa
207,254.0
207,254.0
Air India
169,257.0
169,257.0
El Al
147,894.0
147,894.0
Air France
147,621.0
147,621.0
Air Portugal
141,502.0
141,502.0
Top 2021,051,902.0 6,482,267.0 27,534,169.0
Total Airport
21,760,266.0 7,668,633.0 29,428,899.0

Table A-4
Newark International Airport
Airline
HUB? LCC?
UnitedYes
Delta
Jet BlueYes
US Airways
Southwest
Yes
American
Lufthansa
SAS
Air Canada
Virgin Atlantic
Yes
British Airways
Porter Airlines
Alaska Airlines
Air Portugal
El Al
Jet Airways
Swiss Air Int'l
Air India
Alitalia
OpenSkies
Top 20Total Airport

20

Passengers
Domestic International
16,463,325
7,644,563
1,399,450
115,000
1,321,5120245,0090
1,137,587
0
1,053,795
00534,9590432,5620397,6590375,3250341,3630334,692
198,16600180,7120
155,1790134,556
0102,832
0
97,146
0
84,950084,88921,818,844
11,016,387
22,841,456
11,213,266

Domestic
62.6
9.0
6.7
7.1
3.9
2.5
2.2
0.0
1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
96.7
100.0

Percent
International
51.3
0.1
1.5
0.0
1.6
0.0
0.0
5.1
0.1
4.0
3.9
3.2
0.0
3.2
2.7
2.2
1.9
1.9
1.8
84.5
100.0

Total
59.7
6.7
5.4
5.3
3.3
1.9
1.7
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
93.6
100.0

Percent
International
68.2
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.8
3.9
3.5
3.3
3.0
3.0
0.0
1.6
1.4
1.2
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
98.2
100.0

Total
70.8
4.4
3.9
0.7
3.3
3.1
1.6
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
96.4
100.0

Cumulative Percent
Domestic International
Total
62.6
51.3
59.7
71.6
51.4
66.3
78.3
52.9
71.7
85.4
52.9
77.0
89.3
54.5
80.2
91.8
54.5
82.1
94.1
54.5
83.8
94.1
59.6
85.1
95.6
59.6
86.2
95.6
63.7
87.3
95.6
67.5
88.3
95.6
70.8
89.1
96.7
70.8
90.0
96.7
73.9
90.8
96.7
76.6
91.5
96.7
78.8
92.1
96.7
80.8
92.6
96.7
82.7
93.1
96.7
84.5
93.6

2012
Total
24,107,888
1,514,450
1,321,512
245,009
1,137,587
1,053,795
534,959
432,562
397,659
375,325
341,363334,692
198,166
180,712155,179
134,556
102,832
97,146
84,95084,88932,835,231
34,054,722

Domestic
72.1
6.1
5.8
1.1
5.0
4.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
95.5
100.0

Cumulative Percent
Domestic International
Total
72.1
68.2
70.8
78.2
69.2
75.2
84.0
69.2
79.1
85.1
69.2
79.8
90.0
69.2
83.2
94.7
69.2
86.3
94.7
74.0
87.8
94.7
77.8
89.1
94.7
81.4
90.3
94.7
84.7
91.4
94.7
87.8
92.4
94.7
90.8
93.4
95.5
90.8
94.0
95.5
92.4
94.5
95.5
93.7
94.9
95.5
94.9
95.3
95.5
95.9
95.6
95.5
96.7
95.9
95.5
97.5
96.2
95.5
98.2
96.4

Jeffrey Zupan — Discussion Paper 2013-1 — © OECD/ITF 2013

UPGRADING TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF THE NEW YORK REGION’S AIRPORTS

Table A-5
LaGuardia Airport

2003

Airline
HUB? LCC?
Delta *
Yes
American **Yes
US Airways ***Yes
UnitedNorthwest
Spirit Airlines
Yes
Air Tran Airways
Yes
American Trans Air
YesContinental ****Air Canada
Midwest Airlines
Yes
Frontier
Yes
Top 20Total Airport

Passengers
Domestic International
5,640,210
145,073
5,102,228
185,185
4,067,604
94,615
1,454,981
1,418,746
955,330
736,718
703,818
702,779
558,897
235,420
133,245
21,151,079
983,770
21,435,246
1,047,524

Table A-6
LaGuardia Airport

Airline
HUB? LCC?
Delta
Yes
AmericanYes
US Airways
Yes
UnitedSouthwest
Yes
SpiritYes
JetBlue
Yes
Air Canada
Frontier
Yes
WestJetYes
Miami Air Intl
Top 20Total Airport

Total
5,785,283
5,287,413
4,162,219
1,454,981
1,418,746
955,330
736,718
703,818
702,779
558,897
235,420
133,245
22,134,849
22,482,770

Percent
International
13.8
17.7
9.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
53.4
0.0
0.0
93.9
100.0

Domestic
26.3
23.8
19.0
6.8
6.6
4.5
3.4
3.3
3.3
0.0
1.1
0.6
98.7
100.0

Total
25.7
23.5
18.5
6.5
6.3
4.2
3.3
3.1
3.1
2.5
1.0
0.6
98.5
100.0

Cumulative Percent
Domestic International
Total
26.3
13.8
25.7
50.1
31.5
49.2
69.1
40.6
67.8
75.9
40.6
74.2
82.5
40.6
80.5
87.0
40.6
84.8
90.4
40.6
88.1
93.7
40.6
91.2
97.0
40.6
94.3
97.0
93.9
96.8
98.1
93.9
97.9
98.7
93.9
98.5

2012
Passengers
Domestic International
8,943,620
129,582
4,793,635
265,352
3,394,697
2,397,666
1,099
1,892,964
1,165,533
1,128,123855,634
395,650
146,081993
24,112,881
1,397,748
24,112,881
1,397,748

Total
9,073,202
5,058,987
3,394,697
2,398,765
1,892,964
1,165,533
1,128,123855,634
395,650
146,081993
25,510,629
25,510,629

Domestic
37.1
19.9
14.1
9.9
7.9
4.8
4.7
0.0
1.6
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0

Percent
International
9.3
19.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
61.2
0.0
10.5
0.0
100.0
100.0

Total
35.6
19.8
13.3
9.4
7.4
4.6
4.4
3.4
1.6
0.6
0.0
100.0
100.0

Cumulative Percent
Domestic International
Total
37.1
9.3
35.6
57.0
28.3
55.4
71.0
28.3
68.7
81.0
28.3
78.1
88.8
28.3
85.5
93.7
28.3
90.1
98.4
28.3
94.5
98.4
89.5
97.9
100.0
89.5
99.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

Source: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Jeffrey Zupan — Discussion Paper 2013-1 — © OECD/ITF 201321

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