Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 36, Number 2, 2015, pp62-78

The Food and Water Shortage after Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines:
A case study of the local “last mile” logistics from the viewpoint of food security

Masanori Takeshita* and Natsumi Aratame*** Associate Professor, Faculty of International Studies, Takushoku University**Professor, Faculty of International Studies, Takushoku University

ABSTRACT
Food security has become increasingly discussed as a matter of concern in some developed
countries, including Japan. Immediately after the Great East Japan Earthquake, many people had tospend several days without any food and water due to the slow delivery. This delay can be interpreted
as a failure of the food security policy in Japan. In order to meet the needs of the times, the foodsecurity policy should be changing like in Britain and other Western countries. Japan realized thisfact after the failure of the Great East Japan Earthquake at last, and recognized the importance ofhumanitarian logistics. However, the most difficult part of humanitarian logistics is the local “lastmile.” It is still unknown whether food assistance could reach remote rural areas smoothly. We
studied Typhoon Haiyan as a case study of this “last mile” problem. The results confirmed that there
was severe food and water shortage immediately after the typhoon struck, but at the same time, theresults indicated the resilience of rural areas. These findings can serve as useful basic information forfurther food security in Japan and other countries.
Keywords: food security, food chain, resilience, Typhoon Haiyan, food and water, disaster,
humanitarian logistics

1. Introduction

exists “when all people, at all times, have physical andeconomic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food tomeet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active
and healthy life” (FAO 1996). It is, however, too broad adefinition to be practical. Other than this UN definition,
various definitions of national food security exist and they
have been changing with the times. In order to understandthe idea of food security from a historical perspective,
Britain’s experience seems to be appropriate because Britain
is the first country that experienced the Industrial Revolution
and, since then, Britain has been a large net food importerlike Japan, so food security has been critical all the time.
Similar to Japanese food security policy, Britain
used to focus on the food self-sufficiency ratio as a wayof insulating the nation from uncertainties such as war,
economic calamity, drought, and natural disaster. Thisview was set out in the 1975 British White Paper Foodfrom our own resources. The identification of domestic
self-sufficiency with food security is rooted in Britain’s

Food is a fundamental requisite for human existence,and in recent years, food security has become increasingly
discussed as a matter of concern in some developed
countries, including Japan. Two main triggers appear to
be at work: One is the low food self-sufficiency ratio inJapan, and the other is the clumsiness of the government’s
response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. That is to say,
immediately after the earthquake, many people had to spend
several days without any food, because delivering food tothe disaster-stricken area was relatively slow. This delay
can be interpreted as a failure of the food security policy inJapan.
Discussions around food security, however, can be
confusing because not only is food security a slippery
concept but also for a developed economy like Japan multifaceted and complex. According to the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), food security

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there was plenty of food and water in Tokyo, but this food
could not be delivered to the disaster-hit area swiftly. We
previously interviewed more than forty victims for anotherresearch project, and found that most of them had to spend
several days without any food and water supply. For mostJapanese people, however, this slow response might not
be seen as a failure of food security, but other countries
expect such emergencies beforehand and prepare for the
disruption of food channels. For example, in the UK, both
the government and business sectors work together to build
resilience of critical infrastructure such as food chains.
In order to minimize the impact of natural disasters, they
made the “Resilience Cycle,” which consists of four steps(identifying risk, assessing risk, building resilience, andevaluating resilience) (UK Cabinet Office 2011). In the firststep, both the government and business sectors identify risks
based on a reasonable worst-case scenario for each type of
hazard, which include hydrological hazards (e.g., droughts,
floods), geological hazards (e.g., earthquakes, landslides,
volcanoes), and climatic and atmospheric hazards (e.g.,
extremes of heat and cold, windstorms). Then, the stepsof building resilience and evaluating resilience follow.
Furthermore, the government developed guidance and achecklist for business sectors and all those with a stakein the delivery of essential services (including regulators,
suppliers, and emergency planners).
As another example, the Australian government
introduced the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN)
in order to cope with threats affecting the food supply
chain (Australian Government 2012). TISN is a forum inwhich the Australian government and business community
work together. The forum covers a wide range of sectorsthat include industry groups, supermarket retailers anddistributors, major food and beverage processors, major
foodservice providers, representatives of primary producers
and their suppliers, and so forth.
On the other hand, the Japanese government did not
make any such preparedness before the Great East Japan
Earthquake. We also interviewed a store manager of amajor supermarket (York Benimaru) in disaster-hit areas
in 2013 and he assured us that there was no linkage andpreparedness between government and supermarkets. So
the York Benimaru had to struggle to restore their food
distribution systems by their own hand.
The Great East Japan Earthquake, however, madethe government reconsider food security in Japan and by
the next year, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries published a new guideline assuming natural
disasters, in which the word “supply chain” was used for the
first time (MAFF 2012).
At the time of disaster, a supply chain or a food chain
is called “humanitarian logistics.” Of course, humanitarian
logistics has been widely studied in disaster research because
it is one of the most important factors. If humanitarian
logistics become poor in quality such as long delivery timeor dirty water, it can mean the loss of lives (Kovács andSpens 2007; Beamon and Balic 2008). Added to this, recent
reports have indicated that logistics accounts for some 80%

experience of wartime disruption. In World War Two,
Britain’s food imports were seriously impeded by German
U-boats, overseas enemy occupation, and the Pacific War.
By 1943, food and feed imports were only half their 1930s’level (British Ministry of Food 1946). After World War
Two, severe food shortages arose. War-induced dislocation
in international trading relationships and shipping shortages
precluded the resumption of food imports to pre-war levels.
Thus, the post-war drive for greater self-sufficiency acrossEurope was a response to shortage.
The new agricultural policy, however, was a success. It
overcame wartime shortages, and by the 1970s, agricultural
output had trebled (Ingersent & Rayner 1999). This trend
was observed not only in Britain but almost all over theworld. Japan introduced the rice acreage-reduction programin 1970 in order to respond to an oversupply of rice. So
it is no exaggeration to say that the age of plenty began
after the 1970s. These changes and trends in international
circumstances altered Britain’s understanding of foodsecurity and the role of the self-sufficiency ratio. In otherwords, self-sufficiency makes little sense in today’s worldof inter-related markets. Thus, Britain concluded that foodsecurity relates fundamentally not to self-sufficiency but toaffordability of, robust access to, and confidence in foodsupplies (DEFRA 2006).
Why Britain no longer put emphasis on the selfsufficiency ratio is summarized as follows. The first reason
is the fact that since the Industrial Revolution, Britain
has never been self-sufficient in food (DEFRA 2006).
Secondly, according to the DEFRA, self-sufficiency fails
to insulate a country against disruptions to its domestic
supply chain, which might occur as a result of natural
disasters (e.g., extreme weather events), food health scaresat the processing stage, fuel disruptions, or other sources.
Thirdly, the UK is the fourth most densely populated
country in Europe, and is denser than populous countries
like China and Pakistan. Basic trade theory teaches thatin densely populated countries like the UK where land isrelatively scarce, agriculture is unlikely to be a major sourceof international competitive advantage. Rather, it makes
economic sense for the UK to source part of its raw foodrequirements from countries with more appropriate resource
endowments (DEFRA 2006). Fourthly and above all,self-sufficiency is clearly less valid in today’s dependentworld. Domestic agriculture itself depends upon a varietyof imported inputs such as fertilizer, fuel, and machinery.
Circumstances in which food imports are cut off would
also be likely to hamper domestic production potential. Put
simply, food security goes beyond agriculture. It involves
promoting resilience in the food chain, the security ofindustrial and trading infrastructure, and, fundamentally,
the security of energy supplies. The key point of enhancing
security is “diversifying supply options.”
As mentioned above, Britain’s food security has
been changing in order to meet the needs of the times, but
Japan’s food security is still clinging to self-sufficiency.
The fatal flaw of Japan’s food security surfaced in the Great
East Japan Earthquake. Immediately after the earthquake,63

Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 36, Number 2, 2015, pp62-78

areas. When packed with donated relief goods, these“DHL speedballs” can hold up to 25 kg; they are better
able to withstand airdrops and stay afloat longer than othercontainers (DHL 2015).
It can be said that humanitarian logistics has become
far more sophisticated and robust in the last decade.
However, as has often been pointed out, the most difficult
part in humanitarian logistics is the local “last mile” (Fenton2013). That is to say, it is relatively easy to deliver foodand water to a big city, but it still remains an open question
whether the people in remote rural communities could
actually get the necessary food and water smoothly. As far
as we know, there is no report that has studied the actual
situation of rural areas in terms of food and water. It has
to be confirmed because the actual situation of rural areas
is critically important for both food security and disasterstudies.
Then, Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in 2013.
Over a 16-hour period, the “super typhoon,” with a force
equivalent to a Category 5 hurricane, directly swept
through six provinces and affected over 10% of the nation’s
population of 105 million people. Haiyan’s estimated windspeeds were between 195 mph and 155 mph, with wind
gusts of up to 235 mph. (By contrast, Hurricane Katrina hadwind speeds of 140 mph at landfall.) The typhoon knocked
out power, telecommunications, and water supplies.
Between 65% and 90% of structures were heavily damaged
or destroyed. Three weeks after the typhoon, more than 5,000
deaths and 1,600 people missing were reported (OCHA2013).
Haiyan caused a massive demand for humanitarianassistance requiring effective humanitarian logistics. In
terms of humanitarian logistics, Typhoon Haiyan served
as a real test. The success would be measured by theeffectiveness of logistics, whether food and water wereactually delivered or not, particularly in the first few days
after the typhoon struck (i.e., the immediate response
phase). According to media reports, three days after thetyphoon hit, food assistance by WFP reached the city of
Tacloban (UNiFEED 2013). The WFP distributed rice andhigh-energy biscuits (HEBs) to more than 170,000 people.
It is, however, still unknown whether the food assistancecould reach the remote rural areas and how those people
endured difficult conditions until the food came. For thesereasons, the purpose of this study is to confirm (1) when thepeople in remote rural areas could get food, water, and otherrelief goods, and (2) what the actual needs of the people
were at that time. In other words, we intended to record thereal situation of the local “last mile” for the future researchof food security and logistics.

of the cost of disaster relief operations (Tatham and Pettit
2010; Whiting 2010). Therefore, a European ambassador
who observed the immediate aftermath said, “We don’t needa donors’ conference; we need a logistics conference” (Shaneand Bonner 2005).
In the history of humanitarian logistics, it was the
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 that represented a turning
point. On December 26 th 2004, huge waves severely
struck the coastal fringe of most of the countries fronting
the Indian Ocean including those in East Africa, the west
Indonesian Archipelago, and the Malaysian Peninsula.
It claimed approximately 230,000 lives and displaced
1.7 million people. Over 40 countries and 700 NGOs
provided humanitarian assistance (Thomas and Fritz 2006).
Immediately following the tsunami, aid providers had tocollaborate on an unprecedented scale among a numberof governments, NGOs, United Nations (UN) bodies, theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and themilitary. The scale of the disaster was so large that in theearly stages of the crisis it was only possible to get aid toa few of the worst affected areas with the use of military
resources. The 2004 tsunami finally provided evidence thatthe effectiveness of the emergency aid response hinges on
logistics speed and efficiency (Pettit et al. 2011), thereby
increasing awareness of the crucial role of logistics inhumanitarian relief operations (Christopher and Tatham
2011).
In the wake of the 2004 tsunami, all emergency
response systems had to be reviewed and overhauled. At
first, the UN established the Humanitarian Response Review(HRR) in 2005, representing one of the most significant
attempts in coordinating humanitarian response and disastermanagement (Altay and Labonte 2011). Then, the HRR
led to a major innovation—the Cluster Approach (CA).
The CA identifies different sectors, and it assigns a specificrole to each of them (cluster lead) within the UN system.
For example, the leading role of water and sanitation was
assigned to UNICEF, emergency shelters to UNHCR,
emergency telecommunication to OCHA, and logistics to
WFP.
The WFP (World Food Programme)—the leader ofthe logistics cluster—has established five Humanitarian
Response Depots in key locations around the world:
Brindisi, Italy; Panama City, Panama; Accra, Ghana; Dubai,
UAE; and Subang, Malaysia. In addition to storage services,
the WFP improved logistic preparedness and inter-agency
coordination, training programs, tracking systems, online
toolkits, and manuals (WFP 2015).
Other than UN bodies, a number of companies
in different sectors have developed emergencyresponse capabilities (Budhiraj and de la Torre 2010):
in manufacturing (Coca Cola, GlaxoSmithKline), in
retail (Home Depot, Lowe’s, Target, Wal-Mart), and intransportation (Federal Express). DHL employees, forexample, recognized that conventional transport containers,
such as boxes, are often insufficiently robust. Instead, theyused durable, waterproof DHL courier bags to deliver
goods as part of the relief efforts to remote and inaccessible

2. Research Methods
2.1. The study site
Typhoon Haiyan quickly created a humanitariancrisis. The hardest-hit areas were the coastal communities
in Leyte Province and the southern tip of Eastern Samar.

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3. Results

In particular, the city of Tacloban (population 220,000),
capital of Leyte Province, was one of the hardest-hit
places and a scene of concentrated destruction and death.
Thousands of Tacloban residents likely drowned in a “twostory-high” storm surge, including people seeking safety ina sports stadium that served as a shelter (Bradshear 2013).
In fact, however, many observers and aid workers feared
even greater desperation in more remote areas beyond thecities, where there was little or no communication.
It is appropriate for our study to choose a remoteand rural area as the study site in order to obtain a better
understanding of the effectiveness of logistics. Therefore,
we chose Tolosa in Leyte Province as our study site, which
is located 24 kilometers south of Tacloban City.
Tolosa was one of the poorest parts of the Philippines.
Since the people in the area had no access to big markets,humanitarian relief seemed to be vital. To make things
worse, most of the population depends on agriculture. Thismeans if their agricultural resources are destroyed by atyphoon, harmful effects will last for long time.

3.1. The agriculture of Capangihan Barangay
Capangihan is one of the small barangays (villages)in Tolosa, whose population is allegedly around 600.
Most residents engage in agriculture. In fact, among 50
households, we interviewed 35 people (70%) who were
engaged in agriculture, of which 14 were land owners and
28 were wage laborers on the farmland (Fig. 1). The maincommercial crops were coconut and rice. Other than that,they also cultivated tomato, squash, gourd, sweet potato,okra, corn, mango, etc. The wages of the laborers in the
farmland were very low, around 200 pesos (4.5 US dollars)
per day. Most residents had been living there for more than
20 years.
3.2. The typhoon damage
According to the answers of the interviews, mostresidents in Capangihan Barangay evacuated to relatively
safe places before the arrival of Typhoon Haiyan. This isbecause the captain of the barangay announced that the
typhoon would be so huge that everyone had to evacuate.
The power of the typhoon, however, was bigger than
expected, so some of them had to evacuate to another safer
place again because their primary shelter was blown away.
A woman said that she had to crawl on hands and knees for
300 meters in the middle of the heavy storm. She saw pigs
were flying in the high air, and iron roofs of houses were
flying, too.
Fortunately, nobody died in Capangihan Barangay due
to the advance evacuation, but almost all houses collapsed
completely (Fig. 2). The damage to agriculture was so hugethat fallen trees were scattered everywhere. One farmer
used to cultivate 400 coconut trees, but only 50 remained
after the typhoon. Coconut trees usually show substantial
resistance to heavy wind, thus thousands of coconut trees

2.2. Structured and in-depth interviews
Structured interviews were conducted at Capangihan
Barangay (Village) in Tolosa Municipality in Leyte
Province to collect basic information such as the lack offood, water, and other essential goods. The reason thatstructured interviews were used instead of questionnaires
was because most of the residents in the barangay were
illiterate. The interview questions were arranged into
several variable groups, including demographic data,
damage data, relief information, agricultural problems, andchronological events before and after the typhoon struck(see the appendix). With the cooperation of the Universityof the Philippines, the survey was conducted with 50
households on May 27th through 29th in 2014. And this wasfollowed by in-depth interviews so as to understand thepost-disaster problems in detail.

Figure 1: The occupations of the residents in Capangihan Barangay (N=50)

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that he had never seen such devastation in 68 years. It isbeyond doubt that Capangihan Barangay was one of themost severely damaged areas by the typhoon.

used to be planted in such a typhoon-prone area. However,Typhoon Haiyan was unexpectedly enormous. Anotherelderly farmer who also lost most of his coconut trees said

Figure 2: The damage to the houses caused by Typhoon Haiyan (N=50).

3.3. The food and water shortage immediately after thetyphoon struck

A similar tendency was observed for water. At first,
many suffered from a lack of water, and then the lack ofwater declined as time went by. However, in contrast withthe food shortage, only 40% of the residents claimed they
had too little water to drink soon after the typhonn (Fig.4).
This did not mean the bottles of relief water were delivered
immediately, but that there was a water-pump in the village
and it was still available even after the disaster. The relief
water was delivered during 7 to 14 days after the disasterlike food.
In summary, it was almost one or two weeks after thetyphoon struck when the relief goods reached this village.
Until then, lots of people suffered from hunger unless they
had a stock of food in their houses.

The interviews revealed that more than 70% of theresidents suffered from a lack of food for the first few days
immediately after Typhoon Haiyan struck, and this suffering
lasted for a week (Fig. 3). Then, the lack of food declined
sharply during 7 to 14 days after the typhoon struck. On theother hand, about 30% of the residents answered they had
enough food immediately after the typhoon. This did notmean the relief foods were delivered soon after the disaster,
but it meant they had a stock of food in their own broken
houses. In fact, the relief goods were delivered to almost
everybody during 7 to 14 days after the disaster.

Figure 3: The food shortage caused by Typhoon Haiyan (N=50).

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Figure 4: The water shortage caused by Typhoon Haiyan (N=50).

3.4. What was needed most at that time?

for example, immediately after the giant earthquake andtsunami in 2011, the demand for temporary housing rose
dramatically. In the Philippines, on the other hand, people
tended to demand not temporary housing but building
materials such as nails, hammers, saws, and iron sheets forroofs. For them, building their own houses by themselves
seemed to be a quite natural practice. About two weeks
after the typhoon, the demand for building materials
began to decrease gradually, and the demand for financial
assistance increased instead.

The interview results revealed a clear tendency
regarding what was needed at that time (Fig. 5). In thef irst one week, most people wanted food and water,
but after that, the need for food and water decreased
dramatically due to the arrival of relief goods. Instead, theneed for building materials for their shelters increased.
This appeared to be the Philippines’ distinctive trend
compared with other Western countries or Japan. In Japan,

Figure 5: The people’s answers to the question “What did you need most?” (N=50).

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sheet, hammers and saws, iron sheet, and nails weredistinctive as already mentioned.
Table 1 lists the donors and volunteers who actually
helped Capangihan Barangay. There must be many moreorganizations that helped them, but these 22 organizations
were names that people could remember. There weresome abbreviations whose correct names we cannot figure
out, but most of the names on the list were internationalorganizations. So this list clearly proved that a variety
of international logistics channels were actually used
immediately after Typhoon Haiyan struck.

The answers to the question “What kind of goods
did you receive after the typhoon?” are shown in Figure
6 (about food) and Figure 7 (about materials). These
results also revealed an interesting contrast between thePhilippines and developed countries like Japan. In Japan,
immediately after the giant tsunami, many cooked foods
such as rice balls or boxed meals were delivered, while in
the Philippines, most of the delivered foods were raw rice,vegetables, salt, and sugar. When it comes to the delivered
goods, blankets, medicines, and sanitary napkins werecommon in both the Philippines and Japan, but waterproof

Figure 6: What kind of food was delivered? (N=300).

Figure 7: What kind of materials were delivered? (N=445).

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Names and abbreviations of organizations
ABC-CBNAccord Care
ChildFund,
Christian Aid
Christian HydeCRS (Catholic Relief Services)
DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and Development)
GMA
ICAN
NAMI
NASA
Northern Access Mining Inc.
PLAN
Red CrossSamaritan's Purse
Save the Children
Senior Citizens
TVS
UK AIDWFP (World Food Programme)
World Vision

Table 1. The list of donors and volunteers
Table 1: The list of donors and volunteers

4. Discussion

For example, a wage laborer’s family had been living intheir house for more than 60 years, but after Typhoon
Haiyan struck, the land owner forbade them to rebuild theirhouse because the land owner wanted to sell the land on
which they had lived. That is to say, the land owner took
advantage of the typhoon to expel the wage laborers fromhis land. The wage laborer’s family, however, did not haveany place to go, so the only choice left was to go downtown
and become squatters. Therefore, the wage laborer’s family
decided to refuse eviction and to stay in their original
house. The land owner then began to harass them withsome violence. This led to the fleeing of a pregnant woman
who felt her life was in danger.
As described above, the damage of the typhoon was
not only in visible cases, but also in invisible cases like therelationship between land owners and wage laborers.

4.1. The unique problems in the area
Although nobody died in Capangihan Barangay,
almost all of the houses were torn down. Moreover, theirliving conditions have been deteriorating due to Typhoon
Haiyan. The in-depth interviews revealed unique problems
in this area.
Since most people in this area depended on coconut
farming for a living, the death of coconut trees was morecritical than losing houses. According to residents’ words,
it will take ten years to grow coconut trees again sufficient
to bear fruit. Therefore, they will have to subsist on othersources of income for the next ten years.
In addition to that, the typhoon exposed a conflict
between land owners and wage laborers on the farm land.

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4.2. The resilience of a rural community

majority of the rural poor lived in safer lightweight houses(IFRC 1994).
The results of this study seemed to support the idea ofthe resilience of rural areas and the vulnerability of urban
cities. However, rural areas must have vulnerabilities aswell. For example, in a similar case to this study of a coastal
storm, Hurricane Mitch in 1998 killed 27,000 people inrural areas in Honduras and Nicaragua (Lavell 2002). A
major reason for these deaths was that the poor peasants
had no choice but to live on steep slopes and on flood pains
that were extremely unstable due to deforestation.
Yet from a different point of view, it is also a factthat in many rural areas, hazards, especially f loods,
are welcomed by the inhabitants as a means of natural
irrigation because once the waters recede, people canpractice flood-retreat agriculture, sowing their seeds inthe wet soil. In Bangladesh, the regular annual floods that
affect much of the country help to restore the soil’s fertility
with a new layer of productive silt. This process is essential
to life and livelihoods, and supports the dense populationof farmers and fishermen (Schmuck-Widmann 1996).

As mentioned earlier, rice and high-energy biscuits
were distributed to Tacloban City within three days after
the typhoon hit, but this study confirmed that the foodassistance reached Capangihan Barangay in one or two
weeks after that. Experts would be split on whether thistwo-week period was too late or not. At least, however,
because it missed the critical “72-hour response time,”
there is room for improvement.
At the same time, it was also a fact that in Capangihan
Barangay, more than 60% of the people had enough water
during those two weeks, and almost 40% had enough food.
This fact might indicate the resilience of rural areas. In
the case of Capangihan Barangay, the primary reason thatpeople did not suffer much without any food and water
assistance was because they had a water pump in thevillage that worked well after the typhoon hit, and they
could also find vegetables in the farm fields. In addition tothese advantages, the strong social bond in the barangay
seemed to be a great factor. The barangay leader not only
gave everybody appropriate disaster warning before thearrival of the typhoon, but also evacuated some villagers
who lived in weak shanty houses to strong concrete houses.
These efforts led to the good result of no fatalities even in
the miserable situation where three-quarters of the houses
collapsed completely.
In sharp contrast to this rural area’s resilience, manystudies have suggested the vulnerability of urban cities(Havlick 1986; Matsuda 1990; etc.). The most common
reasons are:4.2. Food security in the case of natural disaster
This st udy revealed the act ual sit uation of thedisaster-hit area from the point of view of food and water.
Predicting typhoons is easier than predicting earthquakes
or volcanic eruptions, so many international organizations
must have prepared for Typhoon Haiyan, but the results
conf ir med that the local “last mile” was diff icult.
Delivering food to rural areas took an extra one or two
weeks from the key city. Of course, shortening this timelag would be ideal, but it seems to be difficult.
At the same time, this study revealed the resilienceof rural areas due to their food stocks, water pumps,
and strong social capital. This finding reminds us of theimportance of a food stock. This means people in a remoterural area have to survive 7 to 14 days without any outside
help until the food delivery comes. Thus, food and water
stocks are critical.
As a precursor of a food stock, the Food and Grocery
Sector Group in Australia developed and maintains a webbased pantry list (“Emergency Pantry List—ensuring the
supply of critical foods and essential items for Australianconditions,” at www.pantrylist.com.au) to encourage
households that are willing and able to stockpile food for
emergencies, such as a pandemic, infrastructure failure,or natural disaster. The pantry list focuses on raisingcommunity awareness and self-reliance, in order to reducedemand on food channels during prolonged emergencies
and therefore strengthen food supply chain resilience.
Because of its effectiveness, the concept has also been
adopted in Canada, New Zealand, and California.
In conclusion, food secu r it y in ever y cou nt r y
including Japan has to prepare for the disruption of foodchains by natural disasters and in the event of a disaster,different approaches should be taken for rural areas fromcity areas.

• Most of the cities are usually located on soft lowland
plains that are prone to damage by earthquakes andfloods.
• Roads in the residential areas are narrow, and open
spaces are scarce.
• There are many urban facilities that have not yet
experienced a strong earthquake, such as skyscrapers,
underground complexes, highways, and so on.
• The city slum residents often have little alternative otherthan to occupy unsafe land, construct unsafe habitations,or work in unsafe environments.
One example of such a case was the loss of life inflash flooding and mudslides in Caracas, Venezuela in 1999
(IFRC 2001). Thirty thousand people died and 100,000
were displaced by this disaster in the densely populated
coastal hills. Another tragic case, in 2001, was the mass
movement of compacted garbage at an open-air solid waste
plant that was triggered by heavy rainfall. This dump on
the northeastern edge of Manila is called Payatas, where
2,000 people lived in shacks, working as informal material
recyclers—700 were killed (Westfall 2001). The Latur
earthquake of 1993 in India is another example. In thiscase, the primary victims were the wealthy city dwellers
because they lived in non-reinforced heavy masonry
dwellings that collapsed due to the earthquake while the70

M.Takeshita, N.Aratame

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSIFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies) (1994) India: Earthquake Myths andRealities. World Disasters Report 1994, pp.119-24, Geneva:
IFRC.

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant
Number 25540157, and also supported by NHK Archives
Academic Trial.

IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies) (2001) Trapped in the Gap: PostLandslide Venezuela. World Disasters Report 2001, ch. 4.
Geneva: IFRC.

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Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. pp 103-19.
London: Kogan Page.

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Survival Strategies of Char-dwellers in Bangladesh.
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APPENDIX
The questions in the structured interviews
Information about the household head (HHH)
Name, Sex, Age, Occupation, Marital status, Highest grade completed, Birth place, Length of residence in thisbarangay.
Information about household members:
Number of household members living together, number of family members temporarily away from this household,Name, Age, Sex, Relationship to HHH, Highest education completed.
Chronological events before and after Typhoon Yolanda hit
The moment Yolanda hit

Q1. Where were you? What happened? The biggest problem was...
The first few days after Yolanda (0-3 days)
Q2. Where were you? What happened? The biggest problem was...

Q3. Did you have enough food and water? Who helped you? Who gave you food and water? What did you need most?
3-7 days
Q4. Where were you? What happened? The biggest problem was...

Q5. Did you have enough food and water? Who helped you? Who gave you food and water? What did you need most?
7-14 days
Q6. Where were you? What happened? The biggest problem was...

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M.Takeshita, N.AratameQ7. Did you have enough food and water? Who helped you? Who gave you food and water? What did you need most?
14 days to 1 month after Yolanda
Q8. Where were you? What happened? The biggest problem was...

Q9. Did you have enough food and water? Who helped you? Who gave you food and water? What did you need most?
At present
Q10. What is the situation now? Do you have enough food and water? Is there anybody helping you?

Q11. Who is helping you? Who gives you food and water? What do you need most?

About food security
Q12. What kind of food assistance did you receive after the typhoon?
1. raw rice
8. sugar

2. cooked rice
9. salt

3. canned food

4. noodles

5. biscuits

6. bread

7. snacks

10. others ( ______________________ )Q13. Did you receive any of the following after the typhoon?
1. food and water
7. medicine

2. blankets

8. money

14.sanitary napkins

3. clothes

9. gas (petrol)

4. tents
10. soap

15. hammers and saws

5. temporary shelters
11. towels

12. buckets

6. permanent shelters
13. waterproof sheet

16. others ( ________________ )Q14. When was it that your everyday food situation returned to the pre-typhoon level?
1. several days after the typhoon

2. one week after the typhoon

3. two weeks after the typhoon

4. one month after the typhoon

5. two months after the typhoon

6. still far from enough at present

About food security
Q15. Is there anybody in your household who died or is still missing due to the typhoon?
1. Yes (How many? _________________ ).

2. No

Q16. Is there anybody in your household who was severely injured by the typhoon?
1. Yes (How many? _________________ ).

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2. No

Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 36, Number 2, 2015, pp62-78

Q17. What was the extent of damage to your house?
1. Totally destroyed

2. Partially destroyed

3. No damage

Q18. How long do you think it will take (or did it take if completed) to repair or reconstruct your house?
1. one month

2. three months

3. six months

4. more than one year

5. no intention to repair

Q19. Did any volunteers come to help you?
1. Yes → Who/what organization?
2. No_______________________

Q20. Did you get any assistance from abroad?
_______________________

1. Yes → Which country?
What kind of assistance?

_______________________

2. No

About agriculture
Q21. Are you a farmer?
1. Yes, I do farming for living.

2. I grow crops but not for living.

3. No, I don’t do farming.

Q22. Do you have your own farmland?
1. Yes, I have my own farmland (and do not work on other people's land).
2. Yes, I have my own farmland (and also work on other people's land).
3. No, I don't own farmland; I am a tenant.
4. No, I don’t own farmland but I work on other people’s land as a wage laborer.

Q23. What kind of crops do you cultivate? Circle the most important crops.
1. rice area ____________ ha
2. coconut number of trees/ ____________ ha
3. pineapple
4. others _____________________

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M.Takeshita, N.Aratame

Q24. What kind of livestock (domestic animals) do you have?
1. chickens
2. cows
3. carabaos
4. pigs
5. others _____________________

Q25. How much do you earn annually from farming? _________________ pesos

Q26. Total annual household income including both farming and non-farming income_____________

peso per a year

Q27. How much were your crops or animals damaged?
1. No damage

2. less than half (50%)

3. 50-80%

4. more than 80%

Q28. (To Rs who were engaged in farming) Are you growing the same crops now?
1. Yes
2. No → What crops are you growing? _________________

Q29. How long will it take (or did it take) to repair or reconstruct your farmland?
1. one month

2. six months

3. one year

4. more than a year

5. impossible

6. no intention to repair

Q30. (To Rs who were engaged in farming) What kind of problems do you have in growing crops now?
_________________ __________ _____________

About disaster information
Q31. Did you know that the typhoon was going to be so huge before it arrived?
1. Yes → Where did you get that information?
		

1. radio

2. TV

3. newspaper

4. internet

		
2. No

6. others __________________

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5. neighbors/friends

Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 36, Number 2, 2015, pp62-78

Q32. Did you receive an order or instruction to evacuate before the typhoon hit your village?
1. Yes		

2. No

Q33. Was there a designated evacuation place in advance?
1. Yes		

2. No

Q34. Have you ever been taught what to do in a time of disaster such as typhoon, earthquake, and tsunami in school?
1. Yes		

2. No

Q35. Have you ever had evacuation drills for a big disaster like this before?
1. Yes (more than once a year)

2. sometimes (less than once a year)

3. never

About social capital
Q36. How often did/do you have dinner with your friends or relatives
1. before the typhoon?

(seldom) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (very often)

2. after the typhoon?

(seldom) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (very often)

Q37. How likely is it that you would ask your neighbors to take care of your children for a few hours if you were sick?		
(not likely) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (very likely)

Q38. How likely is it that you would ask your neighbors for help if you were sick?
(not likely) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (very likely)

Q39. How well did/do people in this barangay get along
1. before the typhoon?

(not well) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (very well)

2. after the typhoon?

(not well) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (very well)

Q40. How would you rate the togetherness or feeling of belonging in this barangay
1. before the typhoon?

(not close) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (very close)

2. after the typhoon?

(not close) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (very close)76

M.Takeshita, N.Aratame

Q41. Do you belong to any of the following groups/organizations or participate in the following activities in this barangay?

Name (if any)**Frequency of participation

1. Peace/safety/disaster relief
2. Religious
3. Political
4. Economic (e.g., co-operative)
5. Social/cultural/recreational
6. Other organizations or activities**Frequency

1. Every week

2. Every other week

3. Once a month

4. Rarely

Q42. How much do you feel you can trust the people in each of the following groups?
(not at all) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (to a very large extent)
1. People in this barangay						

____________

2. People in neighboring barangays					

____________

3. Family								

____________

4. Local government units						

____________

5. Government service providers (education, health, electricity, water)____________

6. Politicians							

____________

7. Judges, police, court						

____________

Q43. Generally speaking, would you say that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people, or that most people can betrusted?
(can't be too careful) 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 (most people can be trusted)77

Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 36, Number 2, 2015, pp62-78

About the aftereffects
Q44. Can you sleep well now?
1. can sleep well

2. sometimes difficult to sleep

3. always difficult to sleep

4. can’t sleep at all

Q45. Do you experience flashbacks of the fear of the typhoon?
1. Yes. → How often?
		
1. everyday

2. several times a week

3. several times a month

4. rarely

5. never2. No.

Q46. Did you have debt before the typhoon?
1. Yes. → Did your debt increase after the typhoon?
		
1. increased a lot
2. increased a little
2. No.

3. No change

4. decreased

Q47. What factors do you think helped you to survive over the past six months?

_________________ __________ _____________

Q48. Your opinion (What do you want to teach the next generation as a lesson learned from this disaster? )Thank you for your cooperation!!

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