High Speed Rail Competitionin Italy
A Major Railway Reform with a “Win-Win Game”?

11

Discussion Paper 2016 • 11
Christian DesmarisLaboratoire Aménagement
Économie Transports,
University of Lyon, France

High Speed Rail Competition in Italy
A Major Railway Reform with a “Win-Win Game”?

Discussion Paper No. 2016-11

Prepared for the Working Group on
Public Transport Market Organisation and Innovation

Christian DesmarisLaboratoire Aménagement Économie Transports, University of Lyon, France

September 2016

The International Transport ForumThe International Transport Forum is an intergovernmental organisation with 57 member countries. It acts as athink tank for transport policy and organises the Annual Summit of transport ministers. ITF is the only global bodythat covers all transport modes. The ITF is politically autonomous and administratively integrated with the OECD.
The ITF works for transport policies that improve peoples’ lives. Our mission is to foster a deeper
understanding of the role of transport in economic growth, environmental sustainability and social inclusion and toraise the public profile of transport policy.
The ITF organises global dialogue for better transport. We act as a platform for discussion and pre-negotiationof policy issues across all transport modes. We analyse trends, share knowledge and promote exchange amongtransport decision-makers and civil society. The ITF’s Annual Summit is the world’s largest gathering of transportministers and the leading global platform for dialogue on transport policy.
The Members of the Forum are: Albania, Armenia, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China (People’s Republic of), Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.

International Transport Forum
2 rue André Pascal
F-75775 Paris Cedex 16
contact@itf-oecd.org
www.itf-oecd.org

ITF Discussion Papers
ITF Discussion Papers make economic research, commissioned or carried out in-house at ITF, available toresearchers and practitioners. They describe preliminary results or research in progress by the author(s) and are
published to stimulate discussion on a broad range of issues on which the ITF works. Any findings, interpretations
and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of theInternational Transport Forum or the OECD. Neither the OECD, ITF nor the authors guarantee the accuracy of any
data or other information contained in this publication and accept no responsibility whatsoever for any consequenceof their use. This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty overany territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or
area. Comments on Discussion Papers are welcome.

2

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

Abstract

The European railway industry continues to undergo reform and liberalization due to European law incentives.
Recent events in Italy give the country a special place in this process: a new competitor has commenced operationsin the high-speed rail (HSR) market based on a private initiative. This paper aims to investigate this rail transportinnovation looking for the driving forces and obstacles and to identify the main impacts for the Italian consumers.
We also try to provide some interesting results helpful for other countries regarding passenger rail reforms. Basedon the Italian case, it seems that open access competition in the HSR market is able to produce significant
improvements in favour of passengers and also a ‘win-win’ game between all railway actors.

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 20163

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

Table of Contents

Reform background: an institutional framework redirected in favour of rail competition ...... 5
Motivations for the reform and pressures against it ..................................................................... 7
A negative European macroeconomic environment and a declining Italian railway demand ........ 7
An ambitious and innovative Italian entrepreneurial approach ...................................................... 8
Barriers to entry and risk of non-cooperative behaviour of the incumbent .................................... 9
The main outcomes of the railway reform ................................................................................... 10
A strong supply shock with high consumer benefits .................................................................... 10
An intermodal competition deeply modified in favour of rail ...................................................... 11
A “win-win game”: positive effects for the entire Italian railway system? .................................. 13
Critical factors in the reform success and main risks factors .................................................... 14
Positive physical factors ............................................................................................................... 14
Institutional positive factors: the major rule of the rail regulator ................................................. 16
Main limitations and risks ............................................................................................................. 17
Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 19
References ....................................................................................................................................... 21

FiguresFigure 1. Italian rail transport markets ................................................................................................ 12
Figure 2.The high speed traffic growth in Europe............................................................................... 12
Figure 3. Italian High Speed railway network ..................................................................................... 16
TablesTable 2. European Railway Company’s performance ........................................................................... 7
Table 3. Trenitalia: Economic and financial performances ................................................................. 13
Table 4. RFI: Revenues from sales and services (millions of euros) .................................................. 14
Table 5. Italian HSR: NTV and Trenitalia’s market shares................................................................ 18
Table 6. NTV financial results ........................................................................................................... 18

4

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

The European Commission argues that rail renewal contributes to achieving the objective of asustainable transport system (European Commission, 1996, 2011; Ponti and al., 2013). Competition is
supposed to be the best way to reverse declining competitiveness and attractiveness of rail transport. For
long-distance passenger traffic, European law advocates 'open access' competition. But, in practice, very
few European countries allow on-track competition and very few newcomers have decided to enter thosemarkets. New entrants have been deterred by a lack of profitability and by advantages possessed by thelargest network operator, the state-owned incumbent. This has limited open access operations to selected
niche markets (Nash, 2008; Preston, 2012).
One example of a new entrant is NTV (‘Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori’) in Italy, which, since spring
2012, has been taking on the state-owned incumbent, Trenitalia. Italy is the only European country tohave opened its high speed railway (HSR) network to competition. This reform seems to have produced
huge effects on mobility patterns and some “win-win” results. The entry of a new operator is a major
event has focused on the high speed part the rail passenger transport business, the most high-tech
segment, and also the most profitable.
Our research is based on a literature review, both academic and professional, as well as on rail
statistics. We complement this approach with interviews of actors, as two Italian companies as the sector
regulator.
This paper analyses this major step in Italian railway reform and is structured as follows:(1) How did this public transport innovation come about?
(2) What forces encouraged this reform, but also what kind of obstacles did this reform have toovercome?
(3) What are the main impacts and effects of this reform for the consumers and the Italian transportsystem?
(4) What are the critical factors in the successes and the on-going challenges facing the reform?
(5) Regarding the Public Transport Market Organization and Innovation issues, what are the main
lessons we can draw from this case study?

Reform background: An institutional framework redirected in favour of rail
competition

The arrival of a new competitor in Italy’s HSR market is a major step in the Italian railways’ reformand liberalization process – and even in the European public transport context. It took place in a railway
institutional framework open to competition and aligned with the model advocated by the European
Union (EU). This private initiative received a strong domestic political support.
At the beginning of the 1980, the Italian railways were a strong double monopoly – monopolists inthe supply of railway services and monopolists in the demand of many assets -, but very however (orITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 20165

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

also) atypical. The Italian railways sold below market value and bought at abnormally high prices.
Managing a wide range of activities, not closely linked to the core business, the Italian State railway
Company had become a conglomerate benefiting from significant public subsidies, which could beconsidered very generous and ‘protective’ (Senn and Cini, 2011).
This unusual and costly situation is probably the reason why the railway reform began early in Italy.
In the middle of 1980, the Government became convinced that the Italian railways needed to be deeply
restructured to increase both efficiency and effectiveness. A reform program was embarked upon that
followed the European railway reform approach.
The first aspect of the reform was the corporatization of rail services and infrastructure. In 1985, theGovernment allowed Ferrovie dello Stato (FS) – today renamed Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane (FSI) – tobe an autonomous undertaking. In 1992, it had been converted to a joint-stock company, but still whollystate-owned. A little after, in 1998, complying with the European railway legislation, the Italian
government decided to vertically separate the infrastructure and services of FSI. Management ofpassenger service was given to Trenitalia, while the management of the railway lines was assigned to theinfrastructure manager, i.e. Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI). However, RFI is fully controlled by FS
Holding, which also owns Trenitalia and remains 100% state-owned.
The second main aspect of the Italian rail reform concerned the wide restructuration economic
program of FS. The reorganization of FS was required by two directives of the Prime Minister (in 1997
and again in 1999). The principal target was to achieve an economic and financial recovery requiring
among others things a strong effort to increase the labour productivity and the revenue, an optimizationof non-strategic assets and a significant increase of rail traffic. All these targets have been achieved,
except the last one (Senn and Cini, 2011). The most visible result had been the increase in the reductionin the number of employees, heavily downsized to more than 65%, from over 220 000 in 1980 to about
72 000 in 2012; which was much more drastic and tougher than in most of others European countries.
Basically, FSI succeeded to recover its economic and financial equilibrium, by controlling its costs andby raising passenger tariffs.
The Italian railway regulation has closely followed the European doctrine in favour of rail
competition. The EU’s rule requires that for freight and long-distance trains, competition among therailway undertakings is the rule and public subsidies are admitted only in specific cases. In Italy, open
access to the rail network for these services has been in force since 2001 (Law 388/2000), well before it
was compulsory under the EU’s rule. The liberalization of freight market has resulted in a market shareof the newcomers of about 30% and more on some international corridors (40% on the Brenner routeconnecting Italy with Austria). The Italian railway sector has, at least theoretically, opened its passenger
rail market, just like Germany, Great Britain and Sweden, and well ahead of the deadlines set by the EU.
Nevertheless, in practice, several obstacles remain, and for passenger traffic the share of new entrants
was negligible until the arrival of NTV (Senn and Cini, 2011).
Although the railway liberalization process in Italy was one of the earliest in Europe, paradoxicallythe responsibility for regulation of the railway companies was for a long time retained by theGovernment (Senn and Cini, 2011). From 11 August 2004 to 14 January 2014, an office of the Ministry
for Transportation, called Ufficio per la Regolazione dei Servizi Ferroviari (URSF), played the role ofthe Italian Regulatory Body (Stanta, 2013), established following the prescription of the European
legislation (Directive 14/2001). The Italian rail regulator was only made truly independent fromgovernment through the creation of ART (Transport Regulation Authority) on 17 September 2013, by thedecree-law 6 December 2011 n. 201 (becoming operational on 15 January 2014). This is very recent
compared with other major European countries.

6

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

To illustrate the impact of the railway reform on the Italian rail industry structure framework, we
propose the following table (Table 1). The initiative of the reform has been taken at a national level andthe main impact is the measure in favour of open access competition and the arrival of a new privatecompetitor on the HSR market.
Table 1. Italian HSR market structure framework: before and after reform
PublicPlanning(initiative)

National
X, YServicedelivery

Region/ City

PrivateLocal

Direct award

X

TenderingOpen
competition
Y

Note: X means “before reform”; Y “after reform”.
Source: Authors, discussion in OECD Public Transport Market Organization and Innovation Working Group.

Motivations for the reform and pressures against it

On-the-track HSR competition in Italy took place in an environment of adverse European
macroeconomic conditions and declining Italian railway demand. It has also had to face considerable
barriers to entry and the risk of non-cooperative behaviour of the incumbent. Facing these negative
aspects, the new operator’s shareholders opted for an ambitious strategy of costly investment and an
innovative rail business model.

A negative European macroeconomic environment and a declining Italian railway demand
Of all the major European countries, Italy is one for which the rail passenger transport market is theleast dynamic. This has been the case since the 1990s, until NTV’s entry in 2012. The incumbent’s
service offer and demand had both been generally sluggish. This can be observed in the overall passenger
supply and demand, expressed in train service kilometres and passenger-kilometres (FSI, 2014, 2010)(Table 2).
Table 2. European Railway Company’s performance
Supply 2010 in Trainkilometre (Million) (a)Changesince
1995

Traffic 2010 inPassenger-kilometre(Billion) (b)Changesince
1995

SNCF (France)

395.9

28.6 %

84.9

53.4 %DB (Germany)

674.9

5.4 %

77.2

27.6 %FS (Italy)

265.9

3.8 %

43.3

-1.2 %

ATOC (UK)507.4

36.3 %

53.3

77.7 %RENFE (Spain)

156.5

29.2 %

21.0

37.0 %SBB (Swiss)

136.0

50.5 %

16.9

44.0 %

Source: Our calculations, from UIC. (a) Passenger trains; Table 41. (b) Domestic and international traffic; Table 51.

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 20167

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

The low growth of passenger rail services in Italy is due to two factors. Firstly provincial andregional authorities have not increased traffic on their territories (Stanta, 2013). Secondly the State has
reduced from long distance supply, in part because bus market liberalization has increased competition
for long distance travel. As for operators, the low level of subsidization of regional traffic (one of thelowest in Europe (Cesarini, 2013)) leaves little room to invest in the renewal or extension of capacity of
the rolling stock.
A part of this sluggish railway demand is also due to the severity of the economic crisis, whose
effects are acutely felt in Italy: total passenger-kilometres fell from 50.2 billion in 2006 to 44.6 billion in2012 (an 11.1% reduction). By comparison, over the same period, in France the decrease was only 0.8%, in Spain -2.8%, in Greece -54.1%, the most crisis-affected European country.
The economic crisis is not the only reason for this weak railway demand. The number of passengerkilometres in Italy had increased only slightly during the 1990s and remained stable from 1999 to 2006,
with about 49 billion per year (UIC, 2013). Historically, the attractiveness of rail in Italy iscomparatively rather low. The modal share of rail passenger transport is in the lower middle range
among European Union countries, with 6.1% of passenger-kilometres in 2012 (EC, 2015), against 7.7%
on average in the EU15 (9.3% in France, 8.4% in Germany and 8.0% in the UK).
It’s in this unfavourable rail context that NTV has decided to compete on the high speed rail market
in Italy. Such a decision therefore requires further examination.

An ambitious and innovative Italian entrepreneurial approach
NTV was established in December 2006, by several Italian private entrepreneurs, Luca diMontezemolo, Diego Della Valle, Gianni Punzo and Giuseppe Sciarrone. Later, the French national
incumbent (SNCF) acquired NTV shares as a “technical partner”, without any involvement in the
management, and now SNCF holds 20% of the shares. NTV launched its first trains in April 2012 (Baronand Ciry, 2012).
NTV’s initial objectives were ambitious: to acquire 20-25% market share by 2014-2015; to breakeven by 2014; and to open, in a second stage, new destinations – Bologna, Padova, Venice and Turino(Sia Conseil, 2012). NTV’s strategy is based on several principles: a massive investment able to bring a
supply shock in the Italian railway market; a radically modern offer based on differentiated services, on
comfort and on a modern image; and, a unique rail business model.
NTV’s initial supply shock required a massive upfront investment. NTV has invested over
EUR 1 billion, including EUR 628 million in the purchase of 25 modern AGV trains and EUR 90 million
in the maintenance site in Nola, near Napoli (Sciarrone, 2014; Stanta, 2013). From a theoretical point ofview, this strategy makes sense because it has allowed NTV to benefit from positive economies ofdensity and network economies (Preston, 2012). For its start-up, NTV has also created jobs,
approximately one thousand direct jobs and almost the same amount of indirect jobs (Stanta, 2013).
Italo (NTV’s service brand name) offers three travel environments or classes, as in airplanes: Smart(economic), the Prima (Business) and Club (First Class). Smart offers a special coach for viewing highdefinition movies. The Club is equipped with individual video screens to watch live TV and meetingrooms. Italo also offers free Wi-Fi access for all passengers, a food vending machine (and a cold meal
service in Prima and Club), passenger information displays in each car, and even a video surveillance
security system in luggage areas.

8

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

NTV’s fundamental innovation lies in its business model (Sia Conseil, 2012). The NTV’s cost
structure is inspired by the 'low cost' airline. Fixed costs are minimized, with an overwhelmingly digitalticket distribution system, and even exclusively digital at the beginning. Customers can still buy tickets
directly on trains or terminals in main train stations, but not at regular stations elsewhere on the network.
The innovative pricing system is based on yield management as in France (drawing on the expertise of its
partner, SNCF). Many tasks are outsourced: maintaining costs of rolling stock, catering, security and thecall centre. The objective is clearly to keep costs low in order to have a lower profitability point than theincumbent. Furthermore, NTV management introduced an incentive-based remuneration model for staff.
The share of individual and collective incentives in the remuneration is high, under an exception tonational law. The total salary can increase by up to 25% above the base under a system of individual andcollective bonuses. There is also a profit sharing arrangement based on the firm results.
The objective of NTV's approach is clearly to enhance services quality while increasing productivity
and keeping costs down.

Barriers to entry and risk of non-cooperative behaviour of the incumbent
The rail industry, for example due to its sub-additive costs, is characterized by many barriers toentry and exit (Nash and Preston, 1992). Introducing competition is most successful where barriers toentry and exit can be reduced through a reduction in sunk costs (Preston, 2012). Both tangible andintangible entry barriers are present in the rail market.
The main tangible entry barrier is fair access to existing network infrastructure, terminals, depots,
maintenance facilities and retail areas, which are owned by RFI and to whom charges must be paid.
Further large investments are required to enter the market which might deter potential new entrants, suchas rolling stock (where the second hand market is poorly developed). Ensuring fair access to retailfacilities, information and ticketing systems and computer systems reservation can also be problematic.
Tangible barriers are usually reinforced by less tangible barriers. Among them, the 'innocent
barriers' relate to economies of experience, preferential access to capital and brand loyalty. These'innocent barriers' might be reinforced strategically by reputational and size effects. Larger firms may beable to withstand competitive battles longer than smaller and can develop strategies to block entry, forexample, by saturating the key infrastructure paths.
In the Italian HSR new competition, several authors and some newspapers suggest that NTV had toface and overcome several practical barriers to successfully enter the Italian HSR market. For example,
Bergantino et al. (2015) argued NTV faced discrimination regarding slots in some stations (NTV initiallydidn’t provide HSR services to several main railway stations such as Milano Centrale). This could havebeen a deliberate strategy by NTV to avoid entering the heart of the city, where speeds are reduced, or
the result of Trenitalia lobbing FSI, but from the outside it is not possible to know. Similarly, the initiallack of ticket machines in railway stations may also have been due to an entry barrier, but NTV presented
it as a positive element of its commercial offer, i.e. fully digital.
Entering a railway market always takes time. For NTV, it took one year to obtain the railway licensefrom the Ministry for Transportation. It took even longer to obtain the authorization to operate the new
trains from the Italian National Agency for the rail safety (ANSF), in March 2012, after nearly three
years of assessment (Stanta, 2013). NTV perceived this timer period as excessively long and as a barrier
to entry, which prompted them to appeal to the Antitrust Authority several times (Stanta, 2013). The
Antitrust Authority issued several reports to clarify relevant matters about the access to the infrastructureand started comprehensive investigation to check if RFI and Trenitalia abused their powers to make the

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 20169

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

start-up of Italo slower and harder. The Authority found no evidence of abuse of the incumbent’s
dominant position.

The main outcomes of the railway reform

NTV’s entrance produced effects both for intra-modal competition (inside the railway sector) andfor inter-modal competition (with other transport means, such as air and car travel). We can also observe
positive effects on the whole Italian railway system.

A strong supply shock with high consumer benefits
As suggested by theory, HSR competition in Italy has produced a triple competitive effect: morecapacity, frequency and connections, lower prices and better services delivering high consumer benefits.
Firstly, the entrance of NTV has led to a large increase in the overall supply of high speed train
services. Then when Italo services commenced in 2012, a huge increase in supply of HSR services wasobserved: the commercial service was quickly built up to 50 train services per day, hourly frequency
between Milano and Roma, bi-hourly frequency between Roma and Venice, 6 non-stop runs between
Roma and Milano, 9 cities and 12 stations served, 12 million train kilometres per year (Santa, 2013).
Since December 2013, Italo services have operated on the Adriatic corridor, linking Ancona to Milano
and Torino, competing with Trenitalia on these routes (Bergantino, 2015). In 2012, in its first year ofoperation, NTV succeeded to provide 38 daily services on the major axis Turino-Milano-Roma-Napoli(Cascetta and Coppola, 2013) and had added approximately 45% to the total HSR supply - Trenitalia
provided 89 services on this axis each day. This increase in supply has been sustained. As of early 2016,
Italo offered 56 services daily (against 48 in 2015), more frequency on the Rome-Milan and a newservice to Brescia opened on 1 March.
Trenitalia has also contributed to this strong HSR supply shock. Its HSR supply has progressively
increased since 2009, when Trenitalia started to run high speed services on its upgraded lines. And while
the competitor introduced new trains on the densest Italian HSR routes, the incumbent did not reduce its
HSR supply. Trenitalia’s HSR services (the “Frecce”) continued (ART, 2015). As a consequence, the ontrack competition in the Italian HSR market produced a substantial supply growth on the main Italian
HSR corridors (Cascetta & Coppola, 2014): in the Milano-Some authors noticed that HSR also serving
new stations in Rome and secondary stations in Milano.
Secondly, the HSR competition produced a strong effect on the structure of prices (Bergantino etal., 2015; Cascetta and Coppola, 2013; Mazzola, 2014). Prices started to decrease within a few months ofthe entrance of the new competitor. Cascetta and Coppola (2014) estimated an average reduction in theprice per passenger of about 30% between 2011 and 2012. The main reason is the new pricing structure
and availability of promotional offers which has also expanded the “gap” of tariffs, similar to the effectof the introduction of low-cost flights in the air market. This period of price competition and falling
prices may now be over. Trenitalia has made up all these tariffs early 2016. They had not been changed
since 2011. And the services are now clearly more modern, faster and with more connections andfrequencies (F.Q., 2 January 2016).

10

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

Thirdly, competition also had significant positive effects on the quality and variety of services. The
ancillary services were improved (such as free Wi-Fi, the on-board entertainment and working
environment). Up to now, the two operators seemed to compete on the quality of services more than on
travel time. The competitive advantage used to be based on the customer satisfaction by the various
levels of services and service frequency. Recently, Trenitalia began to introduce new rolling stock (theFrecciarossa 1000 which are the ETR 400 from Bombardier-AnsaldoBreda) able to run in commercial
speeds up to 360 km/h. The incumbent wants to make speed and the reduction of travel time a new tradeadvantage that NTV will find hard to follow for technological reasons (Charlier et Cacozza, 2015).
In conclusion, the entrance of the new competitor contributed to an increase of the consumer surplus
by more capacity, more frequency, higher speed, lower prices and more supply from the secondary
railway stations, which now have more direct connections in the main Italian transport corridors. This
competition also affects intermodal competition.

An intermodal competition deeply modified in favour of rail
The entrance of NTV has pushed up HSR’s modal share, particularly on specific corridors, which
has strong effect on the whole Italian mobility behaviours.
HSR demand in Italy is in increasing trend, with a major inflection point in 2009 (whichcorresponds to the completion of the network in its current configuration). The number of HSR
passenger-kilometres increased from 8.9 million in 2008 to 10.8 million in 2009, and continued toincrease with 12.8 million in 2013 (Figure 1). This HSR traffic growth is over 4 million passengerkilometres in 4 years – an increase of about 44%. This result is all the more remarkable during the
economic crisis, which tends to lead to stagnation or even reduction in mobility (ART, 2015; EC, 2015).
The explosion in demand for HSR, in the context of introduction of competition, shows HSR’s capacity
to compete successfully with air and road.
At the same time, demand for Trenitalia’s services on conventional lines dropped where it
introduced HSR trains, which offset these gains, e.g. on the Milano-Roma line (Bergantino et al., 2015).
As such, the rise of HSR has not (yet) in Italy, unlike other European countries, succeeded in increasing
the total rail passenger traffic (Figure 1). The number of passenger-kilometres in 2013 was 48.7 million,
still below its last peak in 2006 of 50.2 million (EC, 2015).

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 201611

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

Figure 1. Italian rail transport markets

Source: Adapted from EC (2015). EU Transport in figures 2015.

As a result of this stagnation of total rail passenger traffic in Italy and the rise of the HSR, the shareof high speed has particularly increased in the total Italian railway transport. Over the past 10 years thehigh speed rail share nearly doubled, going from 14.4% to 28.7%, though still below the corresponding
shares in Spain and France (Figure 2).
Figure 2. The high speed traffic growth in Europe

Source: Adapted from EC (2015). EU Transport in figures 2015.

Nevertheless, with a low overall progression of the rail, in a global context of reduced mobility, themodal share of rail has improved slightly lately: 5.5% in 2009 and 2010, it increased to 5.7% in 2011 and6.4% in 2012 – but down to 6.3% in 2013.

12

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

However, in some high passenger traffic corridors, HSR was able to fundamentally change themodal split in favour of rail. Evidence from the corridor Roma-Milano shows how the modal shares ofair, car and train travel can be deeply influenced by the introduction of HSR. On such routes, air and rail
travelling times are now very similar, and the transport modes can be considered as substitutes. From2008 to 2014, the rail modal share significantly increased, from 36% to 65% (ART, 2015). Passenger on
airplanes halved (from 50% to 24%) and travel by car was reduced from 14% to 11%. These trends
began before the arrival of the competition, and the arrival of the NTV in 2012 has extended them.
HSR has induced broader changes in mobility beyond modal choice. In the long term, HSR demandis also affected travellers’ lifestyle choices (Croccolo and Violi, 2013). HSR has opened the possibility ofcommuting further. Higher frequency and connections between the major Italian cities centres, coupledwith lower prices as a consequence of competition, can lead to higher attractiveness of HSR commuting.
HSR is able to create new possibilities for work-related travel, including return journeys and the creationof ‘macro residential area’ as a result of increased regional integration. It’s the reason why the HSR
network and trains in Italy have been dubbed Italy “Italy’s metro” (Croccolo and Violi, 2013)

A “win-win game”: Positive effects for the entire Italian railway system?
Some commentators have argued that the introduction of competition in HSR has delivered positiveeffects to the entire railway system (Croccolo and Violi, 2013). There are at least two observations
supporting this argument, the first concerning Trenitalia and the second concerning RFI.
Trenitalia continues to obtain good commercial and financial results, even after two years of fullcompetition on HSR. Trenitalia still stayed the major Italian HSR player with a market share around
75%-80%, against 25%-20% for NTV (Table 5). On track competition was accompanied by an increasein the total Italian market of HSR and did not reduce the HSR demand for the incumbent.
Trenitalia’s financial statements show growth in global revenues, including HSR traffic, freight andconventional rail (Table 3). This growth is in particular due to increasing HSR passenger volumes, eventhough the revenue per passenger decreased because of competition. However, it is not possible to makein-depth analysis as Trenitalia’s financial statement does not disaggregate its revenues and costs bymarket segment. Moreover, the analysis of Trenitalia income is made particularly difficult because of the
detrimental impact of the economic crisis on traffic, both freight and travellers. The aggregate data showsthat the company has been drastically reducing its operating costs over the last years, while its operating
revenues are stable. According to A. Mazzola (Interview, 2015), the competition was very useful for
Trenitalia to reform and trade unions to accept an agreement that brought more versatility, increased
working time and therefore productivity gains. The company shows positive and increasing operating
profits in recent years. This improvement has made Trenitalia one of the most profitable railways in
Europe (Mazzola, 2014).
Table 3. Trenitalia: Economic and financial performances(Million €)Changesince 2007(%)

ChangeMillions euro

2007

2009

2011

2012

2013

2014

2014/2007

Operating revenues

5 521

5 638

5 708

5 498

5 498

5 577

56

+1.0

Operating costs

5 281

4 656

4 317

4 148

4 113

4 121

-1 160-22.0

Operating profit(EBITDA)

240

982

1 391

1 350

1 385

1 456

1 216

+506.6

Source: Trenitalia, Financial Statements.

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 201613

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

Secondly, we observe that the on-track competition produced some positive effects on theinfrastructure manager, RFI. Bergantino et al. (2015) report a greater utilisation of the Italian rail
network. As a result, we suggest that with the introduction of HSR, RFI benefited from an increase of
HSR access charges (toll revenues). RFI’s financial statement supports this assumption, though HSR
tolls and conventional lines tolls are not separately identified (Table 4).
Table 4. RFI: Revenues from sales and services (millions of euros)
Millions euroState grants
Tolls (access charges)
Electric traction
Ferry services
Total

2009

2011

2012

2013

2014

Changesince 2009
(Million €)Changesince 2009
(%)

849.3

975.4

1 110.4

1 050.4

975.6

126.3

+14.9

903.1

969.5

1 028.6

1 103.2

1 051.2

148.1

+16.4

77.0

79.0

75.0

76.0

93.4

16.4

+21.3

31.8

22.3

20.5

18.1

18.0

-13.8

-43.4

1 861.2

2 046.2

2 234.5

2 247.7

2 138.1

276.9

+14.9

Source: Adapted from RFI, Financial Statement, 2010-2014.

We observe a EUR 148 million increase in total toll revenue over the period 2009-2014. In 2014,
toll revenue fell slightly, probably because of Ministerial Decree n.330 (10 September 2013), which
reduced by 15% the tolls on the HSR tracks. We don’t know yet the impact of the last ART decision
70/2014 which further significantly reduced HSR tolls. The evidence above suggests that higher traffic
volumes on the HSR network could help to compensate for the lower price.
More generally, as suggested by Croccolo and Violi (2013), investment in high-speed rail is also
having knock-on effects for the conventional network. The creation of new HSR track frees up capacity
on the conventional track for commuting or goods traffic. Where HSR services share the same track asconventional services, the greater speed of HSR also frees up capacity. Moreover, network deployment
was accompanied by substantial investment in railway stations and urban hubs, an area in which Italy is aworld leader, not least because of the difficulties of crossing historically and culturally important cities.
If the investments in new or upgraded lines weigh heavily on Italian taxpayers, they should probably beevaluated in light of the benefits for the communities, which appear to be rather important as suggested
by Bergantino et al. (2015).

Critical factors in the reform success and main risks factors

The positive outcomes of the Italian HSR open access reform are the combined result of positive
contextual factors, some physical, others institutional. Further, this newly introduced competition doesn't
yet provide strong and undeniable proof that the current gains will be sustained.

Positive physical factors
The launch of NTV's HSR offer reflects the opportunistic decision to take advantage of several
favourable objective factors.

14

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

First, geography and demographic characteristics offer Italian HSR strong opportunities. A highproportion of economic activities in Italy are concentrated in the north. In this area, most cities are
separated by distances of 150-250 kilometres, which makes HSR competitive against air traffic and car(also, there are congestion problems to approach cities) (Cascetta and Coppola, 2013). This is consistent
with Vickerman (1997), who shows that for distances between 200 and 600 kilometres HSR has a clear
advantage over air travel. The Milano-Roma corridor (two of Italy’s most populous cities) are separated
by just over 500 km. Nash (2015) points out how serving a large population, by example in a string oflarge cities, is crucial for HSR success.
Secondly, successive Italian governments have invested in the national HSR network – spendingaround EUR 50 billion to date. Providing and opening up this network, has made the competition
possible. In all network industries, the quality and the open access of the infrastructure are among themain conditions for enduring and profitable competition.
The Italian mesh high-speed railway network was substantially completed over the 2006-2009
period (Figure 3). The first link, the “Direttissima“, was partially opened in 1977, connecting Roma andCittà Della Pieve (central Italy), while the remainder of route between Roma and Firenze (257 km) wascompleted in 1992. In the late 2000s, several new lines were successively put into operation: RomaNapoli and Turin-Novara (2006), Milano-Bologna (2008) and in 2009, Novara-Milano, FlorenceBologna and Napoli-Salerno (UIC, 2014). Some other line extensions are planned or programmed,
including Milano-Venice (245 km), which is due to open in approximately 2020. The heart of the HSR(or TAV “Treno Alta Velocità”) network will form a “T”, extending from north to south of the peninsula,connecting Turin to Salerno-Venice with the axis Milano-Roma as the main corridor.
Most of the Italian HSR network can now sustain a maximum speed of 300 km/h, but will likely be
improved up to 350 km/h. The Italian Ministry of Transport and the incumbent are currently testing the
speed increase of the different segments of the high-speed network in the country. Trenitalia expected theauthorization to introduce some direct service between Milano and Roma to the speed of 350 km/h in2016 (Charlier et Cacozza, 2015).
NTV had directly benefited from a near-complete high-speed network of 923 kilometres. The entire
rail network served by large trains is even more important because high-speed trains also run on theconventional rail network, at lower speeds, to maximize the network effect.

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 201615

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

Figure 3. Italian High Speed railway network

Source: Mazzola (2014), FSI. Transforum Meeting.

Thirdly, the incumbent Trenitalia HSR offer was still somewhat limited. In 2011, the share of HSR
in the total of rail transport, expressed in passengers-kilometre, was 26.2% in Italy (Figure 2), which isrelatively undeveloped compared to peers in the EU: 27.4% in Germany, 49.3% in Spain and even 58.5%
in France (EC, 2015).

Institutional positive factors: the major rule of the rail regulator
The new rail regulator, the ART (Autorità di Regolazione dei Trasporti) seeks to promote the highspeed rail competition, both by legal decision and also by routine trade-offs.
An important decision has been the large reduction of the HSR network access charges. Moreprecisely, the criteria to be applied by RFI to the determination of charges to be paid by HSR businesses
during 2015 led to a reduction of approximately 30% compared to the previous year, from
EUR 12.8 train/km to EUR 8.2 train/km. Over the previous decade, the access charges for HSR in Italy
averaged EUR 13.4 per train/km against EUR 3.4 per train/km for conventional trains (Arrigo and Di
Foggia, 2013; Stanta, 2013).

16

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

This decision of the ART confirms the line already taken by the Ministry a year earlier, when adecree reduced HSR rates by 15% (Il Fatto Quotidiano, 5 November 2014). The reduction in tolls actsfavourably on the financial balance of railroad companies, because the tolls of infrastructure represent asignificant proportion of the costs of the railway operators. By some estimates, this measure should allow
NTV to pay only EUR 65 million of tolls in 2015, a saving of EUR 35 million – and for Trenitalia
EUR 140 million, a decrease of EUR 80 million (Meillasson and Charlier, 2015). By comparison, thistoll saving is similar to the total loss made by NTV in 2014, which was EUR 37 million (Table 6).
As Arrigo and Di Foggia (2013) say, ‘The level and structure of the charges are therefore crucial toestablishing competition.’ High access charges limit the potential for profitable entry. It seems to be thecase in France, where the access charge is around EUR 18.5 train/km. Conversely, lower track accesscharges help to promote and to make head-on competition commercially feasible, as we can see in
Sweden (Preston, 2012) and now in Italy. In the longer term, the effects of a change of access charges
over the entire rail system concerns many stakeholders (Crozet, 2012; ECMT, 2005; Valletti andEstache, 1999), but are still very uncertain.
Some other ‘secondary’ measures taken by the ART (Cambini and Perrotti, 2015) could have longterm positive impacts on the level of HSR competition. One of them aims to achieve a higher level oftransparency in the operational coordination process and may be conducive to more open minded
allocation of scarce capacity. Another measure reduces the flexibility margin from 15 to 10 minutes forrequested capacity within peak hours to competitors ‘in the market’. This measure could bring morecapacity for HSR. Some other measures concern the performance regime to make the rail service
providers more responsible for the delays or train cancellations. The ART also ruled that rail service
providers must have a reasonably comparable degree of access to services and facilities at stations forticketing, advertising and providing information to customers.
By trying to find the best empirical balance between the interests of the all stakeholders, theregulator also contributes to sustaining competition and to obtaining the best possible service quality for
travellers with the lowest cost for taxpayers (Croccolo, 2015).

Main limitations and risks
So far, NTV can be considered a qualified commercial success, but it may yet become a financial
failure.
NTV has successfully entered the HSR market, even if it took six years between the establishmentof NTV and its operations commencing. Moreover, NTV managed to claim a significant market share,around 20% in only two years (ART, 2014). By 2013, the announced target of market share had beenreached and it continues to attract new passengers. The year 2015 confirms the positive commercial
appeal of the new comer NTV who carries more than 9 million of passengers, an increase of 40%
compared with 2014. NTV obtains almost 23% of the Italian HSR market share expressed in volume ofpassengers (Table 5) and even more (26.4%) when expressed in passengers-kilometres, with 3.98 billion
in 2015 (2.76 billion in 2014). It would also have been meaningful to present the NTV occupancy rates
results to accurately assess the NTV trade situation, but these data are commercially sensitive so are notpublicly available.

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 201617

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

Table 5. Italian HSR: NTV and Trenitalia’s market shares
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Passengers (million)
Trenitalia
NTV
Share of passengers

23.4
0.0

25.1
2.0

26.2
6.2

29.1
6.5

31.2
9.1

Trenitalia

100%

92.4%

80.9%

81.6%

77.4%

NTV

0.0%

7.6%

19.1%

18.4%

22.7%

Source: ART first Annual Parliament Report (2014, p. 70); EC (2015); Trenitalia; F. Croccolo.

In contrast to the strong market share performance, the financial results have not yet really met
expectations (Patuelli, 2015). During the first years, until 2015, all successive operating results arenegative and by consequence, all net profits also (Table 6). The year 2015 could be the beginning of thefinancial success expected by shareholders of NTV. This result has yet to be confirmed. However, thestrong growth in revenue and traffic in 2015 are objectively favourable indications. To cope with its debt,
NTV's shareholders, in July 2015, accepted an increase of EUR 100 million capital, with a first trancheof EUR 60 million already released, and approved a new business plan for including reduce operationalcosts and the continued development of the offer in Italy and even abroad.
Table 6. NTV financial results
Millions euro

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015 (*)

Total

Net revenues

0.2

1.5

4.5

24.7

102.9

249.6

270

308

961.4

Operating Profit
Net Profit

-3.9
-5.6

-11.9
-13.2

-21.7
-20.7

-41.4
-39.3

-137.2
-77.1

-77.5
-77.6

-50.3
-37

58
1.8

-285.9-268.7

Debts

89

103

104

196

755

782

761

-

-

Source: Adapted from NTV financial statements; (*) La Republica (11 March 2016).

These poor initial financial NTV results seem to be explained. The deep economic crisis of 2008
could not have been forecasted. Its impact had been considerable on the Italian economy and on theoverall demand for transport (ART, 2015; EC, 2015). It is difficult to know what NTV financial results
would have been without this crisis. There is debate in Italy about the extent to which NTV unsuccessful
financial results also depended on management decisions. For example, it is not clear why NTV invested
in a maintenance site so far away from the network centre. Perhaps the NTV’s main mistake was tooverestimate the extent of the Italian market liberalization. Ponti (2014) argues that the lack of success of
NTV is partially due to the incomplete rail competition in Italy. Trenitalia, by operating in all passenger
and freight markets, enjoys large and positive economies of scale and scope which represent a substantial
economic advantage in competition with newcomers (Stefanato, 2014). NTV has applied unsuccessfully
for some time for access to intercity and regional passenger markets (Ponti, 2013, 2014). It remains
unclear if the Italian rail regulator will draw a new regulatory framework to open all the segments of therailway market to competition and hence provide additional opportunities to NTV.
Another question is relative the economic sustainability of the head-to-head competition between
several companies on the HSR market. Some authors (Preston et al., 1999) suggest that competition on
the tracks could lead to duplication of services and to an unprofitable competitive outcome. For now, theobserved results do not really support this conjecture. The HSR passenger market seems generally18

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

profitable in Italy, probably even with open access competition. It’s obviously the case for the incumbent
Trenitalia. The operational margin of Trenitalia has increased from 20% to 25% since 2009 (ART, 2015),
while the share of high-speed in the Italian passenger traffic is increasing sharply. Up until 2015, thefinancial results for NTV have been mixed at best (Table 6). Clearly it is difficult to compete with aformer monopoly that is large and capitalized with public money, in an area where the product is almost
identical (Stefanato, 2014). In any case, NTV does not appear to have correctly predicted the Italian railincumbent’s reactions to the market entry. NTV has probably underestimated Trenitalia’s ability to adapt
its services, pricing and operational costs to respond to competitive pressures.
For the FSI, the open access competition raises the crucial issue of public service obligations(PSOs) (Cesarini 2013). If HSR on-track competition results in “cream skimming” of the most profitable
rail markets and if new competitors are not requested to contribute to PSOs, it will become very difficult
to finance them with the same level of public subsidies. The incumbent will no longer be able to financethese PSOs through cross subsidization, particularly in an Italian context where PSO are alreadyundercompensated. Cesarini (2013) suggests introducing a long-term coherent model of contribution by
all rail service providers and/or public financing for PSOs. A co-financing system for universal services
should be set up, through royalties on more profitable passenger services.
There is also another debate about the modal competition equilibrium. Is the new modal sharebetween air and rail socially more optimal? At a first level of analysis, we suggest, following Ponti and
Erba (2002) that the answer depends on the balance between infrastructure costs and environmental
costs. Rail infrastructure is very costly and incremental air travel is less environmental friendly. As roughorder of magnitude: a kilometre of high-speed line costs around EUR 15 million while environmental
cost for a passenger-kilometre on a plane is less than EUR 0.05. With an HSR demand less than
30 million passenger- kilometres per year, air would be, according to this calculation and assumptions,the better solution. In 2015, the entire HSR Italian market was about 15 million passenger-km (F.
Croccolo).

Conclusions

This study investigated the case of the introduction of a new competitor in the HSR market in Italy,
which is so far unique in Europe. This case provides some interesting results for other countries.
1. This open access competition reveals the capacity of the rail industry (including incumbents) toinnovate and improve competitiveness. The successful aspects of this Italian HSR on-track competition
also provide strong support to the European liberalization railway policy, i.e. the forthcoming Fourth Rail
Package. The Italian example supports the case for more competition in the domestic passenger market,
especially in unsubsidized services. Until now, competition has only been compulsory in the EU forinternational passenger lines. It also provides arguments in favour of a more independent network
manager. The non-discriminatory access to the rail network, to stations and other facilities appears to bea key to encouraging competition.
2. This new HSR competition brings significant improvements to the overall Italian mobility
system, and mainly in rail mobility, in favour of consumers. The greatest advantages are for passengers:
more supply and capacity, more frequency and connections, more differentiated services at lower prices

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 201619

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

and the possibility to choose between providers. Moreover, the on-track competition had probably
produced a ‘win-win’ game between all railway actors. Even if NTV is not yet breaking even, itscommercial success in gaining significant market share is non-trivial. In addition, this competition seems
to be commercially and financially positive for the incumbent, Trenitalia, pressed to improve its services
and to cut the operational costs, and even for the infrastructure manager, RFI, which has gained increased
access charge revenue.
3. The success of this new structure market is the result of several positive and specific conditions.
The first success condition has been an ambitious and entrepreneurial spirit in the new entrant, who
accepted an expensive and risky investment both physically and organizationally and who developed an
innovative business model. The second success condition has been the very active and positive role
played by the Italian Government to promote this competition. The large public financing of the new
HSR dedicated network mainly contributed to make this competition technically feasible in solving the
major capacity constraints, even on the busiest routes. The third success condition concerned the positiverules and decisions of the rail regulator. For example, its decision to decrease the level of access charges
significantly appears to have enlarged the scope for profitable entry and to make more sustainable theinvestment of the new comer. The fourth success condition is the capacity of the incumbent to improve
its own services and to react to the competitive pressure.
4. The specific factors of the Italian situation suggest some caution in directly applying the lessons
to forecasting open access impacts and regulation patterns in others European countries. Nevertheless,some meaningful ideas can be drawn from the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of this new
HSR open access regime. In this sense, we hope that this Italian case contribute will contribute to “better
practice” for OECD member countries.
Furthermore, we are conscious that this study is based on a too short period and that the results arealso impacted by the adverse consequences of the present European wide economic crisis. Further
research will be needed to bring out more mature conclusions.

20

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

References

ART (Autorità di Regolazione dei Trasporti), 2014. Primo Rapporto Annuale al Parlamento.
ART (Autorità di Regolazione dei Trasporti), 2015. Secondo Rapporto Annuale al Parlamento.
Baron L., Ciry B., 2012. NTV : nouvel opérateur ferroviaire à grande vitesse. Revue Générale desChemins de Fer, 217. Juin. 32-44.
Bergantino, A., Capozza, C. Capurso, M., 2015. The impact of open access on intra - and inter –modal rail competition. A national level analysis in Italy, Transport Policy, 39, 77-86.
Cambini C., Perrotti L., 2015. The New Transport Regulation Authority in Italy: Structure,
Competencies, and First Regulatory Decisions, March, 54.
Cascetta E., Coppola P., 2013. Competition on the fast track: a short term analysis of the firstcompetitive market for HSR services. EWGT2013 – 16th Meeting of the Euro Working Group on
Transportation.
Cesarini A., 2013. Is there a ‘Latin way’ of regulating railways?’. The view of the Italian incumbent
operator. 7th Florence Rail Forum. FSR, Florence, November 29.
Charlier L., Cacozza M., 2015. Italie : vers une grande vitesse commerciale à 350 km/h., La Lettre
ferroviaire, 143, 8 décembre.
Croccolo F. and Violi A., 2013. New Entry in the Italian High-Speed Rail Market. OECD-ITF.
Discussion Paper 2013-29. New Delhi, December 18-19, 2013.
Croccolo F., 2015. Interview as former General Director of the URSF, the first Italian rail Regulator,
on the 4 May 2015.
Desmaris C., Croccolo F., Patuelli A., 2016. The High Speed rail competition in Italy: How are theregulatory design and practices concerned? 14 thWCTR. Shanghai, 10-15 July 2016. Forthcomingpresentation.
EC., 1996. European Commission – Directorate-General for Energy and Transport. Keep Europe
moving. Sustainable mobility for our continent, Brussels.
EC., 2011. European Commission – Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport. White paper.
Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource-efficient transport
System, Brussels
EC., 2015. EU Transport in figures 2015. Statistical pocketbook. Luxembourg.
F.Q. 2016. ‘Treni, costo dei biglietti dell’Alta Velocità aumenta del 2,7%. Milano-Roma passa da 86
a 89 euro’. IlFattoQuotidiano.it.
FSI, 2010. Financial statements. Roma.
Mazzola, A., 2014. The Italian High Speed Rail system in Transforum meeting. Roma, June 12,
2014.

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 201621

Christian Desmaris – High Speed Rail competition in Italy: A major railway reform for a “win-win game”?

Nash, C., 2008. Passenger railway reform in the last 20 years – European experience reconsidered.
Research in Transportation Economics, 22, 61–70.
Nash C., 2015. When to invest in high speed rail?, Journal of rail Transport Planning &Management, 12-22.
Nash C., Preston J., 1992. Barriers to entry in the Rail Industry. WP 354. ITS. University of Leeds.
Patuelli A., 2015. High-speed rail: is competition in the market sustainable? An Italian case.
International Research Society for Public Management Conference 2015. University of Birmingham. 30
March - 1 April 2015.
Ponti, M., Boitani A., Ramella F., 2013. The European Transport policy: it’s main issues. Casestudies of Transport Policy, 1, 53-62.
Ponti, M., 2013. « Chi controlla i binari: la lezione del caso Italo ». Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2 November
2013.
Ponti M. 2014. « Ferrovie: fare concorrenza agli Intercity. La proposta di Marco Ponti per il futuro
dei treni NTV ». FerPress. 5 September 2014.
Preston, J., Whelan G., Wardman M., 1999. An analysis of the potential for on-track competition in
the British passenger rail industry. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 33(1), 77–94.
Preston J., 2012. Competition and cooperation, organisations and markets: how to deal with barriers
to entry and market powers in CERRE Policy paper "Beyond the quiet life of a natural monopoly:
Regulatory challenges ahead for Europe’s rail sector". Brussels.
Sia Conseil, 2012. Italo : une Ferrari à très grande vitesse.
Sciarrone, G., 2014. From zero to Italo: so competition was born. NTV. Presentation to theEuropean Passengers’ Federation.
Senn L., Cini T., 2011. Italy in Reforming Railways – Learning from Experience. CER, Eurail
Press, Hamburg.
Stanta F., 2013. Twelve years of rail reform in Italy: achievements and problems. 13 th Thredbo
conference – Oxford, September 15-19, 2013.
Stefanato P., 2014. «Il futuro di Italo? Fare concorrenza agli Intercity». Il Giornale.it, 5 September
2014.
UIC, 2013. International Railway Statistics 2012. Paris.
Valletti, T. M., Estache A. (1999). The theory of access pricing: An overview for infrastructure
regulators. Discussion Paper Series no. 2133. Centre for Economic Policy, London.
Vickerman R., 1997. High-speed rail in Europe: experience and issues for future development. The
Annals of Regional Science, March 1995, 21–38.

22

ITF Discussion Paper 2016-11 — © OECD/ITF 2016

International Transport Forum
2 rue André Pascal
F-75775 Paris Cedex 16
contact@itf-oecd.org
www.itf-oecd.org