CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSECIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSEA POST-MILITARY W E A P O N S SYSTEM

Gene Sharp
With the assistance of Bruce Jenkins

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESSP R I N C E T O N NEW JERSEYCopyright 0 1990 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,
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Sharp,Gene.
ida an-based defense :a post-military weapons system /by Gene Sharp ;with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins
p. an.
ISBN 0-691-07809-2 (alk. paper)
1. Civilian-based defense. 1. Jenkins, Bruce. 11. Title.
UA10.7.S47 1990
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Contents

PrefaceOne
Defense W~thoutWar?
The Need for Defense
Civilian-based Defense
Historical Prototypes
Impmoised Struggles against Coups d ' ~ t a t
Impmised Struggles against Invasions
A Basis for Systematic Development
Notes

Two
Tapping the Sou~cesof Power
Unexpected Capacities
Dependent Rulers
Identilying the Sources of Power
Dependency on the Governed
Repression Insufficient
The Possibility of Collective Resistance
Requirements for Implementation
The Structural Basis of Popular Control
The Structural Basis of Freedom
Societal origins of Defense
Notes

Three
Wielding PowerA Nonviolent Weapons System
The Methods of Nonviolent Action
Wielding PowerThe Importance of Strategy
The Importance of the Loci of Puwer
The Opponents' Problems
Repression
Combative Nonviolent Discipline
Political Jiujitsu
Four Mechanisms of Changevii

CONTENTS

Vi

Factors Influencing Coercion and Disintegration
Removing the Sources of Power
Failure or Success?
Changes in the Struggle Group
Even against Dictatorships
Notes
Four
Civilian-based Defense
Developing a New Defense Policy
Agression for Land or Genocide
The Attackers' Calculations of Objectives and Success
Deterrence by Civilian-based Defense
Fighting Capacity in Civilian-based Defense
Maintaining kgitimacy and Capacity for Self-government
Selecting Strategies for Defense
Resisting the Aggressors' Violencel h Strategies for the Initial Stage
Strategies for the Course of the Defense Struggle
International Support for Civilian-based Defense
Success and Failure
Notes
Five
Toward Transarmament
Improvised Nonviolent Struggle and Civilian-based Defense
Motives for Waging Civilian-based Defense
Are Fundamental Changes Necessary Preconditions
for Civilian-based Defense?
A TranspartisanApproach to Considerationof the Policy
The Process of Transarmament
Models of Policy Considerationand Transarmament
Civilian-based De@~eand the Superstates
Potential Benefits of a Civilian-based Defense Policy
Further Considerationof This Option
Notes

For Further Reading on Civilian-based Defense
Index

153
155

Preface

CIVILIAN-BASEDDEFENSEis intended to be a substantive introduction to
the developing policy of civilian-based defense. Instead of military
weaponry, civilian-based defense applies the power of society itself todeter and defend against internal usurpations and foreign invaders. The
weapons are psychological, social, economic, and political. They are
wielded by the general population and the institutions of the society.
The propositions of this book are two: that civilian-based defense
policies against internal takeovers and foreign aggression can be developed, and that dictatorships and oppression can be prevented and disintegrated by the capacity to wage powerful nonviolent struggle. Massive noncooperation and defiance would aim to prevent attackers fromestablishing effective control over the defending society, to deny theattackers their objectivesfand to subvert the reliability of the attackersf
administrators and military forces.
Civilian-based defense is presented for research, investigation, andpublic and governmental evaluation. In some countries limited aspects of the policy have already been incorporated into existing defense
policies.
My objective has been in part to prepare a book that stimulates
thought among members of the general public who are searching for
better answers to our defense problems. The aim has also been to present new information, conceptions, and options that merit attention bydefense analysts, security specialists, government officials, military officers, strategists of nonviolent struggle, scholars, students, and members of society's voluntary organizations who would play indispensible roles in civilian-based defense.
This volume is focused on the broad security problems that may be
faced by many countries, not only those of a single part of the world, in
contrast to my earlier book Making Europe Unconquerable. Given a desire for democracy and independence, therefore, this presentation ofcivilian-based defense is of interest to very diverse countries. All countries, no matter what their political or economic status, must concern
themselves with the possibility of foreign invasion or internal usurpation. These are the problems addressed in this book. Using this broadpresentation, the people of virtually all countries will be able to assess
the possible relevance of civilian-based defense for their particularsocieties, each with its own traditions, security threatsf and military
options.

PREFACE

Viii

This book was origrnally suggested by Sanford Thatcher of Princeton
University Press some years ago. His encouragement, perceptive recommendations, critical comments, support, and patience have enabled
the project finally to come to fruition. Since Mr. Thatcher's departurefrom the Press, Ms. Gail Ullman, as Social Science Editor, has ably seen
the manuscript through the final stages. Charles Ault at the Press madesuperb editorial recommendations.
For the past year I have been extremely fortunate at the Albert Einstein Institution to have had the most able assistance of Bruce Jenkins
in the preparation of this book. His research, perceptive substantive
criticisms and suggestions, as well as his editorial skills, have made thisa far better book than it would otherwise have been.
I am grateful to the Albert Einstein Institution and to its donors andstaff for making this work possible. With expanded support for suchorganizations, many other studies of the nature and potential of nonviolent struggle as a substitute for violence against aggression, didatorships, genocide, and oppression will become possible.
During the 1980swe witnessed the most important worldwide expansion of the practical use of nonviolent struggle that has ever occurred.
From Tallinn to Nablus, Rangoon to Santiago, Pretoria to Prague, Beijing to Berlin, people around the world are ever more employing nonviolent struggle to assert their rights for freedom, independence, andjustice. Scholarly investigations, hard-headed assessments, and sophisticated strategic analyses are now needed to understand this techniquefurther and to increase its effectiveness. This book is only one of many
that need to be written on the nature, problems, and potential of nonviolent struggle. These will help us to assess what roles nonviolent struggle and civilian-based defense may play in confronting and solving
the problems of dictatorship, genocide, oppression, and war.

Gene Sharp
Albert Einstein Institution
1430 Massachuetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
10 January 1990

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSEOne
Defense without War?

The Need for Defense
Two THINGSare certain about the future of politics and international
relations: conflict is inevitable and effective defense will be required
against internal usurpers and international aggressors.
All political societies whose members do not wish to become victimsof these attacks need-among other things-a security policy and aweapons system of some type to struggle against them. This policy andweapons system must be able to accomplish two tasks: to deter and to
defend.
First, the weapons system needs to be sufficiently strong and wellenough prepared to have a high probability of deterring internal usurpation and international aggression. The aim of deterrence is to convince
potential attackers not to attack because the consequencescould be unacceptably costly to them, including the failure to gain their objectives.
Deterrence is a crucial part of the much broader process of dissuasion: to
induce potential attackers to abandon their intent to attack as the resultof any of several influences, including rational argument, moral a ppeal, distraction, and nonprovocative policies, as well as deterrence.
However, a major problem exists. Dissuasion may fail, and no deterrent can ever be guaranteed to deter. Consequently the results of the
failure of deterrence and the use of one's chosen weaponry must be
survivable and remediable.
Second, if and when deterrence fails the weapons system must beable to defend effectively. Defense should be understood literally asprotection, presewation, and the warding off of danger. The means
used to defend must be capable of neutralizing and ending the attack
but must not destroy the society being defended. The defense capacity
must be able to cause the attackers to desist and withdraw, or to defeat
them, and to restore the society's prior condition of peace, autonomy,
and chosen constitutional system.
Most people and governments have believed that only militarymeans can deter foreign aggression and defend against it. Opinions
differ on the adequacy of military policies to accomplish those tasks
and on the severity of the problems they entail. These opinions include

4

ONE

the view, on the one extreme, that strong military means constitute theonly realistic option in face of international dangers, and that toweaken--even worse, to eliminatethose means is both politically andmorally irresponsible. On the other extreme is the pacifist view that
war itself is worse than any other political evil and that individuals andwhole societies ought therefore to oppose, and refuse to participate in,all military action and preparations. There are many other views andcombinations of opinions between these two extremes.
This book is not about any of those views, and an assessment of themerits and relevance of the analysis here does not depend on one's
opinions about the relative adequacy of military policies or one's convictions concerning the acceptability of "just wars" or of "pacifism."
Indeed, both of those extreme positions may today be inadequate or
incomplete on both political and moral grounds. The important point
here is that today virtually no one claims that military means are perfect or denies that military means are associated with very serious
problems and dangers. In addition, virtually no one would argue thatmilitary means always succeed in gaining their objectives. Massive
devastation aside, defeat is always possible.
The extreme destructiveness of modem military technology has
stimulated a great variety of reactions and proposed alternatives. Fewof these attempt both to prevent or limit attacks and destruction and toprovide a defense as we have defined it.
One response has been to call for the restructuring of military forcesalong strictly defensive lines. Alternately called "defensive defense,""nonoffensive defense," and "nonprovocative defense," this approachhas been well developed in Western Europe and bears important similarities with the long-standing defense policy of Switzerland. In the
Swiss policy both weaponry and strategic planning are designed for
exclusively defensive use, without preparations or the capacity tocounterattack the territory of possible aggressors.
The exponents of this approach-which has several variants-haveproposed military forces outfitted with less destructive weapons thathave limited mobility and range, making them unsuited for offensive
purposes. For example, anti-tank weapons are favored over tanks
themselves, and short-range fighter planes are preferred to long-range
bombers or rockets. Some exponents have also proposed adoption ofstrictly defensive strategies for using that equipment, without contingency plans and preparations for offensive attacks, or even counterattacks. Such defensively structured forces, it is argued, would reduce
the threat perception of other countries, making preemptive attacks
more unlikely. In some countries, as in West Germany these ideas
have gained a certain credibility. They merit serious critical examina-

DEFENSE WITHOUT WAR?

5

tion as a proposed policy to assist deterrence and defense without
weapons of mass destruction.
A detailed criticism of "defensive defense" is not possible here, but
it is necessary to note that this approach clearly contains some serious
problems. First, the danger of escalation of a war would remain a possibility. On the aggressors' side, if the limited military defensive measures proved to be a serious impediment to successful aggression, theattackers would likely increase the severity and destructivenessof theironslaught. On the defenders' side, if their limited defensive military
measures were not deemed to be adequate, there would be pressure, if
the capacity existed (or could be quickly developed or procured) to use
more destructive weapons.
Second, "defensive defense" measures would almost guarantee vastcasualties among the civilian population. A military conflict without a
traditional front and with numerous small military units widely dispersed throughout the territory is an invitation to high casualties. (Theproposal to reduce this danger by declaring urban areas "open cities,"
which would not be defended militarily does not eliminate this problem.) In certain respects, the "defensive defense" approach is basicallya modification of guerrilla warfare for defense, generally combinedwith high technology military weapons for precision attacks on the invaders. The basic problems inherent in guerrilla warfare for defense
apply to "defensive defense." That policy, when applied, is likely
therefore to have important similaritieswith the experience of guerrilla
struggles in various countries, including Yugoslavia, occupied parts of
the Soviet Union, Algeria, and Vietnam. In such cases, the numberof dead among the defending population was exceptionally high,often more than ten percent of the whole population. Vast physicaland social destruction was also typical. In densely populated Central
Europe, where "defensive defense" proposals are to be applied, thelevel of casualties and destruction could be catastrophic. Finally evenin the case of victory, there are likely to be long-term social, economic,
political, and psychological consequences due to the conflict itself, including harm to the socieifs institutions and the buildup of militarysystems.
Military-based "defensive defense" therefore does not seem to be asatisfactory solution to our common dilemma of the need for deterrence and defense on the one hand and the massive destructiveness ofpresent military technology on the other. Whatever may be our various
opinions about military means in general, it is highly desirable to explore whatever nonmilitary alternatives may exist or could be developed to meet the needs of societies to deter and defend against external
attacks and internal usurpations.

6

ONE

We do have some limited resources in the search for such nonmilitary alternative means of deterrence and defense. Largescale noncoop
eration and defiance have already, in a number of cases, been improvised for defense against foreign aggression and internal usurpations.
These cases are not usually well known, and their potential significancefor defense has rarely been examined seriously. Yet they exist, thereby
establishing that an alternative to military and paramilitary means fornational defense is possible under at least certain circumstances. The
important question, therefore, becomes how the potential of nonmilitary struggle can be developed so that its capacity in diverse cases will
really deter attacks and, if need be, defend successfully against them.
Can there be an effective post-military defense policy capable of providing deterrence and defense while avoiding the dangers of modem
war?

Civilian-based Defense
This type of alternative policy is called cidian-based defense in the
United States and usually cidian defense or social defense in Europe. The
term indicates defense by civilians (as distinct from military personnel)
using civilian means of struggle (as distinct from military and paramilitary means). This is a policy intended to deter and defeat foreign military invasions, occupations, and internal usurpations. The latter includes both executive usurpations and the more usual coups d'btat,
that is, seizures of the physical and political control of the state machinery, often by an elite political, military, or paramilitary group fromwithin or without the established government. Such coups may be conducted purely internally or may receive foreign instigation and aid.
Deterrence and defense against external aggression and internal
usurpation are to be accomplished by reliance on social, economic, political, and psychological weapons. (By "weapons" we mean those
tools or means, not necessarily material, that may be used in fighting
whether in military or nonviolent conflicts.) In civilian-based defense
these nonviolent weapons are used to wage widespread noncooperation and to offer massive public defiance. The aim is both to deny theattackers their objectives and to make impossible the consolidation of
their rule, whether in the form of foreign administration, a puppet regime, or a government of usurpers. This noncooperation and defianceis also combined with other forms of action intended to subvert theloyalty of the attackers' troops and functionaries, to promote their unreliability in carrying out orders and repression, and even to inducethem to mutiny.

DEFENSE WITHOUT WAR?

7

Civilian-based defense is an application, in a refined and developed
form, of the general technique of nonviolent action, or nonviolent
struggle, to the problems of national defense. It is to be applied by thegeneral population, by specific groups most affected by the attackers'
objectives and action, and by the society's institutions. Which of theseare most involved varies with the attackers' aims-whether they are
economic, ideological, political, or another sort.
Civilian-based defense is meant to be waged by the population andits institutions on the basis of advance preparation, planning, andtraining. These in turn would be based upon the findings of basic research into nonviolent resistance, upon indepth analysis of the political system of the attackers, and upon intensive problemsolving research, such as how to increase the population's capacity to continue
resistance in the face of severe repression or how best to maintain effective channels of communication when under attack. Understanding of
the requirements to make these nonviolent forms of struggle as effective as possible and insights into the ways to aggravate the attackers'
weaknesses are the foundations for developing successful strategies ofcivilian-based defense.
Civilian-based defense rests on the theory that political power,
whether of domestic or foreign origin, is derived from sources withineach society. By denying or severing these sources of power, populations can control rulers and defeat foreign aggressors. This theory will
be examined more closely in Chapter Two. In Chapter Three, we will
examine the application of this theory of "dependent rulers1' throughthe broader technique of nonviolent action, from which civilian-based
defense derives numerous precepts. Chapter Four will then sketch theoutlines of a possible civilian-based defense policy. This policy, as withmost defense measures, is meant to be waged on the basis of advance
preparation, planning, and training. Chapter Five will examine several of the steps that can be taken (or, as in several cases, have alreadybeen taken) in investigating, preparing, and implementing a policy of
civilian-based defense.

Historical Prototypes
We have major resources in earlier improvised struggles from which
we can learn in preparing for future civilian-based defense against aggressors. We can learn about the nature of nonviolent struggle and its
potential by examining cases involving a great variety of issues.
As the following examples reveal, the heritage of nonviolent struggle
is quite diverse and extends far beyond struggles for national defense

8

ONE

purposes. Nonviolent action has played a major role in resistanceagainst dictatorships, in struggles for achieving greater freedom, in
campaigns against social oppression, in opposition to unwanted political changes, and in struggles against colonial rule and for national independence. Contrary to usual perceptions, these means of struggleby protest, noncooperation, and disruptive intervention-have played
major historical roles in all parts of the world. These experiences include cases in which historical attention has been primarily focused on
the violence that occurred simultaneously or later on in the conflict.
Relevant resistance movements and revolutions against internal oppression and dictatorships in recent decades are the Polish movementsof 1956,1970-1971, and 1976; the Polish workers' movement, 1980 to
1989, for an independent trade union and political democratization; the1944 nonviolent revolutions in El Salvador and Guatemala against established military dictatorships; the civil rights struggles in the UnitedStates in the 1950s and 1960s; the 1978-1979 revolution against the
Shah in Iran; the 1953 East German Rising; major aspects of the 19561957 Hungarian revolution; the 1963 Buddhist campaign against the
Ngo Dinh Diem government in South Vietnam and the 1966 Buddhist
campaign against the Saigon regime; the 1953 strike movement at
Vorkuta and other prison camps in the Soviet Union; and civil rights
and Jewish activist struggles in the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s.
Earlier instances of politically sigruficant nonviolent struggle against
domestic tyranny and foreign rule include the American colonial nonviolent revolution (1765-1775), which produced major victories for theAmericans and replaced most British governments in the North American colonies; Hungarian passive resistance against Austrian rule, especially 1850-1867; Finland's disobedience and political noncooperation against Russia, 1898-1905; major aspects of the Russian Revolutionof 1905, and the February Revolution of 1917 (before the October Bolshevik coup d'btat); the Korean nonviolent protest (which failed)against Japanese rule, 1919-1922; and several Gandhi-led Indian independence campaigns, especially in l93O-l93l.
Other countries in which significant nonviolent struggles have occurred in the 1970sand 1980sinclude Chile, Iran, Brazil, Mexico, China,
the Soviet Union, Haiti, the Philippines, India, South Africa, Bunna,
Hungary, South Korea, New Caledonia, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan,
Panama, and the Israeli-occupied Palestinian temtories.
To the surprise of many people, nonviolent struggle during 1989 became a major characteristic of the Chinese prodemocracy movement.
The first phase of that struggle ended with the massacre in Tiananmen
Square and elsewhere in Beijing but the struggle then gradually entered another phase. The Soviet Union during 1989 experienced ex-

DEFENSE WITHOUT WAR?

9tremely widespread and massive nonviolent struggles by, among others, coal miners, factory workers, and various nationalities (especiallythe Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Armenians, and Georgians, someof whom demanded secession from the Soviet Union). Later in 1989,
nonviolent revolutions shook East Germany, CzechoslovakiaIand Bulgaria with amazing rapidity. It is impossible to predict where the next
cases will occur.
Most people are unaware that, in addition to the above types ofcases, unrefined nonviolent forms of struggle have also been used as amajor means of defense against foreign invaders or internal usurpers.
In this chapter we shall sketch four cases of improvised nonviolent
struggle for national defense, two against internal coups d'ktat and two
against foreign military invasions and occupations. The anti-coup cases
are the resistance to the Kapp Putsch in Weimar Germany in 1920 andthe opposition to the attempt by French military officers in Algeria tooverthrow the government of President Charles de Gaulle in 1961. The
anti-aggression cases are the German attempt to defend the Ruhr fromthe Franco-Belgian invasion and occupation in 1923 and the national
defense struggle in Czechoslovakia against the Soviet and Warsaw
Pad invasion and occupation in 1968-1969.
These cases are chosen because they are the clearest applications ofnonviolent struggle for constitutional defense and national defense as
far as we are now aware and because a reasonable amount of historicalmaterial is available on them. In all four cases, however, the resistance
was improvised, and the populace, its institutions, and government
apparently lacked any preparation, organization, training, appropriate
equipment, and contingency planning in nonviolent resistance (all ofwhich military-based defense usually enjoys). This lack is a grave
weakness in these cases. One can imagine how successful wars would
be if there were no prior organized armies, no training of soldiers, nodevelopment and amassing of weapons and ammunition, no studies of
military strategy, no preparation of officers' corps, no arrangements fortransportation and communication, and no emergency supplies ofblood and provision for medical services. The four cases outlined
below occurred under such conditions.
There have been other examples of improvised nonviolent struggle
for national defense. These include major aspects of the Dutch antiNazi resistance, 1940-1945; major aspects of the Danish resistance to
the German occupation, 1940-1945 (including the 1944 Copenhagengeneral strike); the largest parts of the Norwegian resistance to theQuisling regime; and governmental and popular resistance to nullify
anti-Jewish measures in several Nazi-allied and Nazi-occupied countries, such as Bulgaria, Italy, France, and Denmark.

10

ONE

All these cases of improvised defense merit careful research, study
and analysis. Not all succeeded. (Nor have all prepared military defense struggles been successful, especially not in gaining their objectives.) These cases demonstrat~implybecause they have occurredthat this type of defense struggle is possible. Their results show that
nonviolent struggle for defense can be powerful and effective. The
cases also provide important insights into the dynamics and problemsof such conflicts.
Improvised Struggles against Coups d'~tat
The two cases of civilian struggle against coups d'etat described here
are very different. However, both demonstrate that the legitimate government may be saved by action of 0rdwu-y people, civil servants, or
regular soldiers, acting nonviolently. The German and the French cases
are not the only examples, however.
It is interesting that Lenin for several years after his coup in October
1917 was confronted by noncooperation from the old bureauaacy.
Government employees caused very serious problems for the newCommunist government after the Bolshevik seizure of the state apparatus from the provisional government and the various rival revolutionary parties. The problems were still severe more than four years
later. In March 1922, Lenin declared at the Eleventh Congress of theRussian Communist Party that "the political lessonI1of 1921 had beenthat control of the seats of power does not necessady mean control ofthe bureaucracy. He stated that the Communists "scatter orders rightand left, but the result is quite different from what they want."
Other cases meriting research and analysis include the general strikein Haiti against temporary President PiemLouis in 1957, the successful noncooperation against a military coup in Bolivia in 1978, and Polish popular noncooperation against the regime of General Jaruzelski
following the coup in 1981 (although the resistance was not widespread in the bureaucracy, police, or military forces).

Germany, 1920
In 1920, Germany's new Weimar Republic, already facing very severe
economic and political problems, was attacked by a coup d'etat organized by Dr. Wolfgang Kapp and Lieutenant-General Walter vonLiittwitz, with the backing of General Erich Ludendorff, who had in
1917been virtual dictator of Germany. While most of the German army

DEFENSE WITHOUT WAR?

11

remained "neutral"-neither participating in nor opposing the coupex-soldiers and civilians organized in Freikorps units occupied Berlin on
March 12. The legal democratic government under President Friedrich
Ebert fled, eventually to Stuttgart.
While the Kappists in Berlin declared a new government, the legal
government in flight proclaimed that it was the duty of all citizens toobey only it. The Under (states) were directed to refuse all cooperation
with those who had attacked the Republic.
After a strike of workers against the coup broke out in Berlin, theSocial Demoaatic Party issued a proclamation calling for a generalstrike, under the names of Resident Ebert and other Social Demoaatic
ministers (but without their official approval). The Kappists werequickly confronted with largescale noncooperation. Civil servants andconservative government bureaucrats refused to cooperate with theusurpers. Qualified men refused to accept posts in the upstart regime.
All along the line people denied authority to the usurpers and refused
to assist them. On March 15, the legal government refused to compromise with the usurpers, and the Kappists' power further disintegrated.
Many leaflets calling for resistance, entitled 'The Collapse of the Military Dictatorship,'' were showered on the capital by airplane. Repression was often harsh. Some strikers were shot to death.
However, the impact of noncooperation grew. On March 17, the Berlin Security Police demanded Kapp's resignation. The same day Kappresigned and fled to Sweden. That night, many of his aides left Berlinin civilian clothes, and General von Liittwitz resigned. Some bloody
clashes had occurred in the midst of the predominantly nonviolent
noncooperation. The Freikorps units then resumed obedience to thelegal government and marched out of Berlin. As they did so, however,they killed and wounded some unsympathetic civilians. The coup was
defeated by the combined action of workers, civil servants, bureauaats, and the general population, who collectively refused the popularand administrative cooperation that the usurpers required to maketheir claims to power effective.
Other grave internal problems continued for the Weimar Republic.
However, it had withstood its first frontal attack by the use of popular and governmental noncooperation and defiance against its internal
attackers.

France, 1961
Early in April 1961, French Resident Charles de Gaulle indicated that
he was abandoning the attempt to keep Algeria French. Then, in

12

ONE

French-ruled Algeria on the night of April 21-22, the French First Foreign Legon Parachute Regiment rebelled and captured control of thecity of Algiers from the legitimate French officials, while other rebel
military units seized key points nearby. There was no serious opposition. At least three French generals in Algeria loyal to the legal government-including the Commander-in-Chief-were anrested by the rebels. This was the culmination of earlier policy conflicts between the
French army in Algeria and the civilian French government in Paris.
On April 22, the rebel "Military Command" declared a state of siege
in Algeria, announced it was taking over all powers of civil government, and would break any resistance. Four colonels had organized theconspiracy, but this statement was issued under the names of four recently retired generals (Challe, Jouhaud, Zeller, and Salan). The next
day the coup was backed by General Nicot (acting head of the French
Air Staff), General Bigot (commanding the air force in Algiers), andthree other generals. The usurpers seized control of newspapers andradio, giving them (they thought) a monopoly on communications in
French Algeria.
The French government in Paris was in trouble. Half a million French
troops were in Algeria, leaving very few operational units in France
itself. Two French divisions stationed in Germany were of doubtful
reliability. The loyalty of the paramilitary GendarmerieNationale and theCompagnies Rkpublicaines de Sbcuritb was also in doubt. It was fearedthat a parallel coup might be attempted against the government in
Paris or that the air force might transport rebel troops to invade France
and oust the de Gaulle government. The success of the coup in Algiers
hinged on replacing the legal government in Paris.
On Sunday April 23, the political parties and trade unions in France
held mass meetings, calling for a one-hour symbolic general strike thenext day to demonstrate that they would oppose the coup. That night,
de Gaulle broadcast a speech to the French nation, urging people todefy and disobey the rebels "In the name of France, I order that allmeans-I repeat all means--be employed to bar the way everywhereto these men until they are brought down. I forbid every Frenchman,and in the first place every soldier, to cany out any of their orders."
The same night, Prime Minister Debr6 in his own broadcast warnedof preparations for an airborne attack and closed down the Paris airports. While stressing "all meansu-which obviously included military
ation-Debre placed his confidence in nonviolent means as he called
for popular ation to persuade soldiers who might be flying in to resume loyalty to the legal government: "As soon as the sirens sound, go
there [to the airports] by foot or by car, to convince the mistaken soldiers of their huge error."DEFENSE WITHOUT WAR?

13

De Gaulle's broadcast from France was heard in Algeria via transistor radios by the population and members of the military forces, manyof them conscript soldiers. Copies of the address were then duplicatedand widely distributed. De Gaulle credited his talk with inducing
widespread noncooperation and disobedience: "From then on, the revolt met with a passive resistance on the spot which became hourly
more explicit."
On April 24, at 5:00 P.M., ten million workers took part in the symbolic general strike. De Gaulle invoked emergency powers accorded to
the President by the constitution. Many right-wing sympathizers werearrested. At airfields, people prepared vehicles to be placed on runways to block their use if planes attempted to land. Guards were stationed at public buildings. A financialand shipping blockade was imposed on Algeria. That night General Cr6pin announced that French
forces in Germany were loyal to the government, and the next morningthey were ordered to Paris.
French troops in Algeria acted to support the de Gaulle government
and to undermine the rebels. By Tuesday two-thirds of the available
transport planes and many fighter planes had been flown out of Algeria, making them unavailable for an invasion of France. Other pilots
pretended mechanical failures or blocked airfields. Army soldiers simply stayed in their barracks. There were many cases of deliberate inefficiency: orders from rebel officers were lost, files disappeared, there
were delays in communications and transportation. The conscripts
generally recognized the power of their noncooperation in support ofthe legal government. Leaders of the coup had to use many of theiravailable forces to attempt to keep control and maintain order among
the French troops in Algeria itself. Many officers temporarily avoided
taking sides, waiting to see how the contest would go, preparing to join
the winning side.
French civilians in Algeria, including the Algiers police, at first supported the coup. But civil servants and local government officials in thecity of Algiers often resisted, hiding documents and personally withdrawing so as not to be seen as supporting the coup. On Tuesday evening, April 25, the Algiers police resumed support for the de Gaulle
government. Internal disagreements developed among the leadersof the revolt, with some advocating violent measures. That night,
in another broadcast, de Gaulle ordered loyal troops to fire at the rebels. There was no need, however. The coup had already been fatally
undermined.
The leaders resolved to call off the attempted coup. The night ofApril 25-26, the First Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment withdrew
from Algiers and rebels abandoned government buildings. General

14

ONE

Challe surrendered and the other three retired generals heading therevolt hid.
There were a few casualties, probably three killed and several
wounded in Algeria and Paris. The attack had been decisively defeatedby defiance and dissolution. De G a d e remained Resident and Algeria
became independent in 1962.

Improvised Struggles against Invasions
A very large number of cases exist of nonviolent struggle waged
against foreign occupation-regimes that were established years, decades, or even centuries earlier. These cases include, for example, muchof Irish resistance to English rule, the Hungarian resistance to Austrian
rule, 1850-1867, and the Indian campaigns against British occupationin the first half of the twentieth century. The following cases are, however, more obviously relevant to our discussion. First, the resistancebegan v i r h d y immediately at the time of the invasion and continued
into the occupation. Second, both cases had official sponsorship fromthe government and major institutions of the society. They are, therefore, more appropriate as prototypes of what could be developed.

Robably the first case in history of nonviolent resistance as official
government policy against a foreign invasion was the German struggle
in the Ruhr against the French and Belgian occupation in 1923.
The Ruhr struggle is especially complex and covers the period fromJanuary 11 to September 26,1923. It is impossible here to do more thanmention some of its features. The French and Belgian invasion was
launched to secure scheduled payments of reparations (following theFirst World War) despite Germany's extreme financial difficulties andto gain other political objectives (such as separation of the Rhinelandfrom Germany).
The occupationwas met by the Germans with a policy of noncooperation, which had been decided upon only days before the actual invasion. There had been no preparation, but the resistance was to be financed by the German government. Trade unions had strongly urged
adoption of the policy. One of their spokesmen had argued: "If civil
servants and workers stop work whenever the invaders appear, andthe employers refuse to fulfill the demands of the Franco-Belgian com-D E F E N S E WITHOUT WAR?

15

missions, it should be possible to deprive the commissionsand militaryforces of the means of carrying out their tasks."
Actual noncooperation against the invasion forces developed gradually. The means included the refusal to obey orders of the occupation
forces; nonviolent acts of defiance; the refusal of mine owners to serve
the invaders; massive demonstrations at courts during trials of resisters; the refusal of German policemen to salute foreign officials; therefusal of German workers to run the railroads for the French; thedismantling of railroad equipment; the refusal of shopkeepers to sell toforeign soldiers; the refusal of ordinary people, even when hungry, touse occupation-organized soup kitchens; defiant publication of newspapers in spite of many bans; posting of resistance proclamations andposters; and refusal to mine coal.
Repression was severe. It included such measures as the impositionof a state of siege; the expulsion of resisters into unoccupied Germany;
courts-martial; the tolerance of bands of thugs and robbers; imprisonment without trial or trialsimposing long prison sentences; whippings;
shootings; killings; the seizure of money and personal property; control of the press; billeting of troops in homes and schools;imposition ofidentity cards; and the issuing of a multitude of repressive regulations.
Widespread food shortages as a consequence of resistance and repression resulted in severe hunger.
Resistance was complicated by various types of sabotage, including
demolitions, which sometimes killed occupation personnel. This sabotage was associated with spies, informers, and assassinations of suspected informers. Demolitions also tended to reduce the international
shift of sympathy toward Germany. The Prussian Minister of the Interior Severing, the trade unions, and the population of the occupied area
for the most part strongly disapproved of the sabotage by outsiders,which upset the previous unity of the resistance. The sabotage also led
to severe reprisals and punishments, both official and spontaneous byangry occupation soldiers. One such measure was the ban on road traffic. Widespread unemployment and hunger were severe problems
along with continuing extraorinflation. The unity of resistance,
and to a large extent even the will to resist, was finally broken.
On September 26, the German government called off the noncooperation campaign, but the sufferings of the population inaeased. Complex negotiations occurred. Germany finally stabilized the currency,
while facing a series of Communist and extreme right-wing insurrections and attempted coups in several of the Under.
Belgians widely protested against their govemment's actions. Some
French people became advocates for the Germans, called advocats des

16

ONE

boches. Toward the end of 1923, Poincarb admitted to the French National Assembly that his policies had failed. Germany could not claim
victory, but the invaders finally withdrew, and the Rhineland was notdetached from Germany. The invaders had achieved neither their economic nor their political objectives.
Britain and the United States inte~enedand secured a restmduringof reparations payments. The Dawes Plan was developed to deal with
reparations, occupation costs, and German financialsolvency, and provided a loan to Germany--all on the assumption that Germany would
remain united.
Occupation forces were all withdrawn by June 1925.
Czechoslovakia, 1!%8-1969
Civil unrest created serious problems for Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe in the decades following the Second World War, at times
threatening Soviet control in several countries. This took various
forms, both nonviolent (strikes, parades, defiant demonstrations, andseizure of control by the populace) and violent (as in rioting and evenmilitary action). Among the most significant cases of civilian struggle
were the democratization movement in Czechoslovakiain 1968and theCzech-Slovak national defense resistance of 1968-1969.
The 1968-1969 Czechoslovak case is a most unusual one, and constitutes perhaps the most significant attempt thus far to improvise civilian
struggle for national defense purposes. Ultimately, the result was defeat, but not quickly. The first week of resistance was a most remarkable application of noncooperation and defiance. Even after that, foreight months, the Czechs and Slovaks prevented Soviet officials fromachieving their political objective, namely, a regime responsive to Soviet wishes. It has been reported that Soviet officials had originally expected military resistance and had estimated they could crush it, installa puppet regime, and then withdraw, a l l within a few days.
The Soviet leaders thought that invasion by the nearly one-half million Warsaw Pact troops would crush the Czechoslovak army andleave the population in confusion and defeat. The invasion would
make possible a coup d'btat to replace the DuMek reform regime. Accordingly, as soon as possible, several of the important Czechoslovak
leaders were kidnapped by the KGB, including Alexander DubZek, theCommunist Party's First Secretary, Prime Minister Oldrich Cernik, andNational Assembly President Josef Smrkovsky and National Front
Chairman FrantiSek KriegeL The President of the Republic, Ludvik
Svoboda, was held under house arrest.

DEFENSE WITHOUT WAR?

17

However, this did not signal a Czechoslovak defeat. Had Czechoslovak leaders decided to resist militarily. their army almost certainly
would have been quickly overwhelmed by the immensely larger Warsaw Pact invasion troops. Instead, Czechoslovak officials had given
emergency orders for the troops to stay in their barracks and a very
different type of resistance was waged.
The particular character of this nonviolent resistance caused serious
logistical and morale problems among the invading troops. Reports
indicated that it was necessary to replace large portions of the ori@
invasion force within a short period, some within a few days.
Owing to resistance at several strategic political points, a collaborationist government was prevented. Resistance began in the early hoursof the invasion as employees of the government news agency refused
to issue a press release stating that certain Czechoslovak Communist
Party and government leaders had requested the invasion. President
Svoboda refused to sign a document presented to him by a group of
Stalinist Communists. A clandestine defense radio network called forpeaceful resistance, reported on resistance activities, and convened
several official bodies that opposed the invasion.
Government officials, party leaders, and organizations denounced
the invasion and the National Assembly demanded release of the arrested leaders and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops.
During the first week, the defense radio network created many forms
of noncooperation and opposition and shaped others. It convened theExtraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress, called one-hour generalstrikes, asked rail workers to slow the transport of Russian communications-tracking and jamming equipment, and discouraged collaboration. The radio argued the futility of violent resistance and the wisdomof nonviolent struggle. It was impossible for the Soviets to find su€€icient collaborators to set up their puppet regime.
Although totally successful militarily. Soviet officials found they
could not control the country. In the face of unified civilian resistanceand the increasing demoralization of their troops, the Soviet leaders
flew President Svoboda to Moscow for negotiations, but once there
Svoboda insisted on the presence of the arrested Czechoslovak leaders.
A compromise--which was probably a major strategic mistakewas worked out, legitimizingthe presence of Soviet troops and sacrificing some of the Czechoslovak reforms. Many of the basic reforms weremaintained, however, and the reform group was returned to Prague totheir officialpositions. The general population saw the compromise asa defeat and for a week would not accept it.
Despite weaknesses and compromises, the reform regime and manyof the reforms were maintained from August until the following April

18

ONE

when some anti-Soviet rioting provided the pretext for intensified Soviet pressure. This time the Czechoslovak officials capitulated, ousting
the Dubiek reform group from party and government positions andreplacing them with the hard-line Husak regime.
The Soviet officials had been forced to shift from their initial use of
military means to gradual political pressures and manipulations, andhad experienced an eight-month delay in gaining their basic objective.
Had fullSoviet control been held off for eight months by Czechoslovak
military resistance against such overwhelming odds, the struggle
would have been classed with the Battle of Thermopylae, in which asmall number of Greeks fought to the last man against an immensely
superior Persian army.
The nature and accomplishments of the Czechoslovak defense are
already forgotten by many and, when noted, are frequently distorted.
The defense struggle ultimately failed as a result of capitulation by
Czechoslovak officials, not defeated resistance. But it had held off fullSoviet control for eight months-from August to April-somethingthat would have been impossible by military means.
All this was done without preparation and training, much less contingency planning. This accomplishment in these highly unfavorable
circumstances suggests, despite the final defeat, that refined, prepared,
and trained nonviolent struggle for actual d e s e may have a power
potential even greater than that of military means.

A Basis for Systematic Development
Such cases as those described and cited in this chapter may provide
the basis for systematic development of a new type of defense capableof deterring and defending against foreign invasions and internal usurpations.
Up to now, this type of action has been an underdeveloped politicaltechnique. It has been as unrefined as was military action five thousandor so years ago. As indicated earlier, the participants in nonviolent
struggles have always lacked the prior organization, preparation, improved weaponry, training, and in-depth knowledge of past conflicts
and strategic principles that military practitioners have had for thousands of years. Only conscious efforts to improve the weaponry, organization, training, and strategy of military action multiplied its combat
effectiveness and destructive capacities.
No such efforts have yet been put into civilian struggle. In spite ofthis major disadvantage, the practitioners of nonviolent struggle forDEFENSE WITHOUT WAR?

19

national defense have achieved impressive results. We need now togive attention to the question of how so much has been achieved and towhether-and if so, how--a more effective policy of prepared deterrence and defense, drawing in part on the above prototypes, might becreated for the future.

Notes
For further analysis and information about points made in this chapter,see Gene Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston: Porter
Sargent, 1980), pp. 263-284, and Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent
Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 63-105.
The discussion of "defensive defense" presented here contains only
the most common features of the numerous proposals in this area. Key
advocates of this approach include Horst Afheldt, Anders Boserup,
Norbert Hannig, Jochen Liiser, Albrecht von Miiller, and Lutz Unterseher. For introductory reviews of this approach, see Jonathan Dean,"Alternative Defence: Answer to NATO'sCentral Front Problems?" International AfFrirs, vol. 64, no. 1 (Wiiter 1987/1988), pp. 61-88, andStephen J. Flanagan, "Nonprovocative and Civilian-Based Defenses,"in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Graham T. Allison, and Albert Carnesale, editors,
Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988), pp. 93-109. See also Frank Barnaby andEgbert Boeker, "Defence Without OffenceNon-nuclear Defence forEurope" (Bradford, England: University of Bradford, Peace Studies
Paper No. 8, 1982). Major publications in the field include Horst
Afheldt, Defensim Verfeidigung (Reinbek, Hamburg Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983); Anders Boserup, "Non-offensive Defense inEurope," (University of Copenhagen; Centre of Peace and ConflictResearch, Working Paper No. 5, 1985); Norbert Hannig, 'Yerteidigung ohne zu Bedrohen," (Universitiit Stuttgart Arbeitsgruppe Friedensforschung und Europiiische Sicherheit, Paper No. 5,1986); HansHeinrich Nolte and WIlheIm Nolte, Ziviler Widerstand und Autonome
Abwehr (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1984); Lutz Unterseher, Defending Europe: Toward a Stable Deterrent (Bonn:Studiengruppe Alternative
Sicherheitspolitik, 1986).
For discusion of "defensive defense" in the context of Swiss defense
policy, see Dietrich Fischer, "TnvulnerabilityWithout Threat: The Swiss
Concept of General Defense," in Burns H. Weston, editor, Toward Nuclear Disarmament and Global Security-A Search for Alternatiues (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 504-532.

20

ONE

For a presentation of "defensive defenseffas applied to Britain's defense, see Alternative Defence Commission, Defence Without the Bombb n d o n and New York Taylor and Francis, 1983).
The quotation from Lenin is from "Political Report of the Central
Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)," delivered
March 27,1922, at the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist
Party (Bolsheviks), in K I. Lenin: Selected Works in Three Volumes (NewYork International Publishers, 1967), vol. 3, pp. 692-693.
The account of resistance to the Kapp Putsch is based on Wilfred
Hanis Crook, The General Sfrike (ChapelHill, N.C.: University of North
Carolina Press, 1931),pp. 496-527; Donald Goodspeed, The Conspirators(New York
1962), pp. 108-188; Erich Eyck, A History of the
Weimar Republic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962),
vol. 1,pp. 129-160; Karl Roloff (pseud.: Karl Ehrlich), "Den Ikkevoldelige Modstand: den Kvalte Kapp-Kupet," in K. Ehrlich, N. Lindberg,
and G. Jacobsen, Kamp Uden Vaaben (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, Einar Munksgaard, 1937), pp. 194-213; and John WheelerBennett, The Nemesis of Pozoer (New York St. Martin's Press, 1953),
pp. 63-82. See also Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 4041
and 79-81.
The account of resistance to the coup d'ktat in French Algeria isbased upon that of Adam Roberts, "Civil Resistance to Military
COUPS,"J O U of~ Peace Research (Oslo), voL m, no. 1(1975), pp. 19-36.
All quotations are from that source.
The description of the Rulu struggle is based on that of Wolfgang
Sternstein, 'The Ruhrkampf of 1923," in Adam Roberts, editor, Civilian
Resistance as a National Defense (Hannondsworth, England, and Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 128-161.
The account of Czechoslovak resistance is based on Robert Littell,editor, The Czech Black Book (New York Praeger, 1969); Robin Remington, editor, Winter in Prague (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1969);
Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968 (New York
Columbia University Press, 1%9), and Vladimir Horsky, Prag 1968:
Systemveranderung und Systmerteidigung (Stuttgark Ernst Klett Verlag
and Munich: Kosel-Verlag, 1975). See also H. Gordon Skilling, Czechosl-s
Interrupted ~ o l u t i o n(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1976).

Two
Tapping the Sources of Power

Unexpected Capacities
How, E x m BY ACCIDENTor under the most exceptional circumstances,
could the cases of nonviolent struggle against usurpations and aggression surveyed in the previous chapter have happened? Is there any
significanceto such events beyond recording for history what occurredin those specific times and places? Or, is it possible that those cases are
expressions of a general type of action that has wider relevance?
Other questions quickly arise. Could nonviolent struggle succeed
against dictatorships in the future and, if so, how? Could people using
this technique really prevent the rise of new systems of oppression?
Could a whole society successf~~I.Iy
develop and apply a defense policy
based on this technique to deter and defeat coups d'btat and foreign
aggression?
To most people, it seems to be a strange, if not absurd, idea that a pop
ulation could-without armies, tanks, planes, bombs, and rocketsdemolish a dictatorship, make impotent invading armies, block an unconstitutional seizure of the state, and defeat aggressors.
It is no stranger an idea, however, than one that existed in the mindsof only a very few scientists in the 1930s. Certain tiny, previously unseen, pieces of matter called "atoms," it was hypothesized, contained agreat power potential that could be tapped to produce an explosive capacity unprecedented in human history. The validity of that idea may
seem obvious today, but in 1939 most people with "common sense"
would have dismissed it, on both the Nazi and Allied sides. There had
been no prototypes of such weapons, no smallscale experiments evenby the most barbarous, or technically advanced, of aggressors.
Had it not been for the special circumstances of that war, the notionof turning millions of tiny atoms into bombs might have indefinitely
remained only the strange conception of a few intellectuals. However,in response to a grave international crisis, vast human and material
resourres were made available to scientists and technicians in an attempt to transform the power potential of tiny atoms into the world's
most devastating weaponry. The consequences are well known.

22

TWO

An insight into political power exists that may have comparably extreme but beneficial consequences. Thus far it has been tapped only toa limited degree. The insight is that a power potential is inherent insocieties that can be harnessed and skillfully applied to destroy oppression and tyranny and to deter and defeat aggression so effectively thatmilitary weaponry will no longer be needed. In coming years and decades this power potential is likely to have more sigxuficant consequences in politics and international conflict than almost anyone has
imagined. This is the power potential that was utilized, in very limited
degrees, in the cases outlined in the first chapter.
As will be argued in the following chapters, this power potential canbe refined, and its effectiveness greatly increased. This enhanced
power capacity can then be applied in future acute conflicts, and will
likely prove capable of providing both deterrence and defense, without either the weapons of mass destruction or the vast conventional
military arsenals that today lack the capacity to defend.
In the four cases surveyed in the previous chapter, the populations
were not in fact helpless and unarmed. They were, indeed, "armed,"
but with other weapons-psychologicad, social, economic, and politicalones. These weapons were able to strike at the very sources of theusurpers' or aggressors' power. This largely accounts for the fighting
capacity of those nonviolent struggles.
The reason why movements of noncooperation and defiance havebeen at times able to depose once powerful rulers is that such movements strike at the Achilles heel of all governments: they are dependent
on the people and the society they rule. Withdrawal of popular andinstitutionalcooperation with aggressors and dictators diminishes, andmay sever, the availability of the sources of power on which all rulers
depend. Without availability of those sources, the rulers' power weakens and finally dissolves. This is the essence of the insight into politicalpower presented in this chapter.

Dependent Rulers
It is an obvious, simple, but often neglected insight of great theoreticaland practical significance that the power wielded by individuals andgroups in the highest positions of command anti decision in any government-whom we shall for brevity call rulers-is not intrinsic tothem. They are not born with it, they do not possess it, and they do not
personally apply it. Rather, they are able to use such power only as
long as it is made available to them.
By "political power" we mean the totality of all influences and pressures, including sanctions (or punishments), available for use in efforts

TAPPING THE SOURCES OF POWER

23

to determine and implement policies for a political society. Politicalpower may be possessed by governments, the state, institutions, opposition movements, and other groups. Such power may be directly applied, or may be maintained as a reserve capacity. Power is therefore
present, for example, in negotiations as well as in war. Power in conflicts is wielded by both the winning and losing sides. Political power
may be measured by the relative ability to apply pressures, to control
a situation, people, and institutions, and to mobilize people and institutions to accomplish some purpose.
Rulers are not omnipotent, nor do they possess self-generating
power. By its very nature, political power must come from outside thepersons of the rulers. Alone, rulers have neither the physical nor theintellectual capacities to accomplish everything they wish. If rulers
are to wield political power, they must be recognized as possessing
authority, be able to direct the behavior of other people, draw on large
resources, both human and material, direct bureaucracies in the administration of their policies, and command organizations of repression or combat. The availability of each of these sources is dependent
on the cooperation and obedience of the population and of the manygroups and institutionsof the society to be ruled. That means that thesecomponents are not automatically at the disposal of the would-be
rulers.
Full cooperation, obedience, and support will increase the availability of the needed sources of power and, consequently,the power capacity of the rulers. On the other hand, restricting or withdrawing cooperation will directly and indirectly reduce or sever the availability of therequired sources of power. Much like the flow of water from a faucet iscontrolled by turns of the valve, cooperation and noncooperation cancontrol the availability of the resources required to rule.
Naturally, rulers are sensitive to the imposition of limits on theircapacity to do as they like. They may well see danger in the spread ofsuch ideas. Rulers are therefore likely to threaten and punish those
who disobey, strike, or fail to cooperate, with the aim of breaking theirdefiance. However, that is not the end of the story.
If, despite repression, the sources of power can be restricted, withheld, or severed for sufficient time, the initial results may be uncertainty and confusion within the regime. That is likely to be followed bya perceptible weakening of the rulers' power. Over time, the result of
withholding the sources of power will eventually be the paralysis andimpotence of the regime, or even in severe cases its disintegration. The
rulers' power will die, slowly or rapidly, from political starvation.
This same principle of political power was expressed by Etienne dela W e in 1548. Speaking of the tyrant, he wrote, "He who abuses you
so has only two eyes, has but two hands, one body, and has naught but

24

TWO

what has the least man of the great and infinite number of your cities,
except for the advantage you give him to destroy you." It was from thesuffering people, Bdtie argued, that the tyrant gained everything heneeded to rule: legitimacy, money aides, soldiers, even the young
women with whom he spent his nights. Consequently Boetie concluded, if tyrants "are given nothing, if they are not obeyed, without
fighting, without striking a blow, they remain naked and undone, anddo nothing further, just as the root, having no (soilor food, the branchwithers and dies."

Identifying the Sources of Power
Political power emerges from the interaction of all or several of thefollowing sources:
Authority. The extent and intensity of the rulers' authority, or legitimacy, among the subjects is a m c i a l factor affecting the rulers' power.
How widely, deeply, and firmly do the people believe in the rulers'right to govern them? If the rulers' authority is strong, other sources ofpower are more likely to be made available, and the need for threat or
use of sanctions to enforce obedience and cooperation is likely to besmall.
Human resources. The power of rulers is affected by the number of
persons and groups which obey cooperate, 01: provide special assistance; by the proportion of those persons in the general population;and by the extent, forms, and power of their orpnhations. How many
people and what institutions are helping, or are refusing to help?
Skills and knowledge. The rulers' power is also affected by the skills,
knowledge, and abilities of persons and p u p s who are willing toobey and assist the rulers, as well as by their ability to supply the rulers' needs. Do they possess the capacities which the rulers require?
What is the extent of the rulers' dependency on their skills, knowledge,
and abilities?
Intangible factors. Psychological and ideological factors, emotions andbeliefs, are also important in supporting the nulers. These factors include habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, andthe presence or absence of a common faith, ideology, or sense of mission. If these factors are strong, the rulers will likely find other sourcesof power more readily available, whereas if thle intangible factors are
weak or absent, the availability of other sources;of power will be more
problematical.
Material resources. The degree to which rulers control--directly or
indirectly-property, natural resources, financial resources, the eco-

TAPPING THE SOURCES OF POWER

25

nomic system, the means of communication and of transportation
helps to determine the limits of the rulers' power. Are these material
resources readily available to serve the rulers' objectives, or are theynot?
Sanctions. The final source of the power of rulers is the type and extent of sanctions (or punishments) available to them. Such sanctions
may be threatened or applied both against the rulers' own subjects,
when they are disobedient or noncooperative, and against the countries and forces of foreign rulers with whom they are in conflict. These
questions therefore arise: What pressures, punishments, and means of
struggle are at the disposal of rulers in such situations? Are these readily, reliably, and fully available, or are they restricted?
It is almost always a matter of the degwe to which some or all of thesesources of power are present. Only rarely, if ever, are all of them fully
available to rulers or completely absent. The availability of such
sources is subject to constant variation. These changes bring about increases or decreases in the rulers' power. The degree, extent, and duration of the rulers' power is determined by the extent to which rulers
have unrestricted access to these sources.

Dependency on the Governed
A closer examination of these sources of the rulers' power will indicatethat they depend greatly or completely (varying with the situation)
upon the obedience and cooperation of the governed. Let us look further at the consequences of the withdrawal of these sources.
If the subjects deny the rulers' right to rule, they are withdrawing thegeneral agreement, or group consent, that makes the existing government possible. This loss of authority, or legitimacy, sets in motion theweakening or disintegration of the rulers' power. Where the loss is extreme, the existence of that particular govemment is threatened. The
denial of authority to internal usurpers and to foreign aggressors istherefore a key element in a civilian-based defense struggle aimed atpreventing the establishment of a new govemment of internal or foreign oppressors. Once the population has denied the rulers' authority,
it is likely to restrict its cooperation, obedience, and assistance, or refuse them entirely. Disobedience and noncooperation are serious problems for any regime.
Every ruler needs the skill, knowledge, advice, labor, and administrative ability of a sigxuficant portion of the subjects. The more extensive and detailed the rulers' control is, the more such assistance therulers will require. Contributions to the rulers' power will. range, for

26

TWO

example, from the specialized knowledge of a technical expert, the research endeavors of a scientist, and the organizational abilities of a department head to the assistance of typists, factory workers, computer
specialists, communication technicians, transportation workers, andfarmers. Both the economic and the political systems operate becauseof the contributions of many individuals, organizations, and subgroups.
The rulers' power depends on the continuid availability of all thisassistance, not only from individual experts, officials, employees, andthe like, but from the subsidiary organizations and institutions thatcomprise the system as a whole. These may include departments, bureaus, branches, committees, and the like. Just as individuals and independent groups may refuse to cooperate, so too these subsidmyorganizations may refuse to provide sufficient help to maintain therulers' position and to implement the rulers' policies.
If the multitude of the subjects and institutions of the society thathave previously assisted the rulers in providing the various sources ofpower come to reject the rulers' authority, then the availability of thosesomes is threatened. The population and ix1stitutions that once assisted reliably now may instead only carry out the rulers' wishes inefficiently may even abrogate unto themselves certain decisions, or may
flatly refuse to continue their past assistance, cooperation, and obedience to the rulers.
Without conscientious and reliable work by many employees, theskills, knowledge, and human resources crucial to a functioning administration and bureauaacy will not be present. Without dependable
participation of numerous laborers, farmers, technicians, managers,
transportation workers, communication employees, and researchers,
the economic system will not function effectively. Unless the police andsoldiers dependably obey the orders from their officers, the institutionsof repression will not be able to act reliably against resisters.
Refusal to do what one is told is not dependent upon carefulstudy of
the writings of Henry David Thoreau or Mohandas K. Gandhi. Veryyoung children, as well as many youths and adults, become veryskilled in disobedience and noncooperation quite naturally. It is a phenomenon widely recognized in our society, c~ommunicatedin the oldsaying, "You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drinlc"
Rather than being necessarily based on a profound understanding ofpolitical theo~y,an acceptance of certain religious precepts, or achievement of a higher level of moral development,,the capacity to disobey
and refuse political cooperationis simply rooted in our human propensity to be stubborn when it suits us. However, when applied by massesof people acting collectively for a cause in which they believe, the ac-

TAPPING THE SOURCES OF POWER

27

tion becomes powerful because it coincides with the type of action prescribed by an understanding of the basic nature of political power.

Repression Insufficient
Rulers will neither be pleased by nor will easily acquiesce in the face ofdefiance. Indeed, as noted above, the withdrawal of consent by noncooperation will most likely be seen as a severe threat. In the face of serious political unrest, if the regime is not prepared to make changes
to meet popular demands, it will have to place increased reliance on
enforcement.
In order to regain or ensure the assistance, obedience, and cooperation they require, officials may threaten or apply punishments, which
may include beatings, imprisonments, torture, and executions. Such
sanctions are usually possible despite widespread dissatisfaction withthe regime because very often one segment of the populace remains
loyal and willing to help the regime maintain itself and to carry out its
policies. In such a case, rulers may use the loyal subjects as police orsoldiers to inflict punishments on the remainder of the people. Sanctions, however, will still not then be the determining force in maintaining that regime for two reasons. The ruling group (foreign or domestic)
will still be united by something other than sanctions, such as religious
belief, economic self-interest, ideology, belief in their mission, and thelike. Furthermore, the rulersf ability to apply sanctions at home orabroad arises from and dependsupon a significant degree of help fromthe subjects themselves.
Sanctions are important in maintaining the rulers' political powerespecially in crises. That does not mean, however, that those punishments will always succeed in restoring submission and obedience,either in the long or short run.
Even if the rulers' punishments do at first result in a degree of outward conformity, that will be insufficient to produce a lasting effect.
Rulers need more than grudging, outward forms of compliance. Forced
submission will often lead to inefficiency in carrying out duties, if not
to deliberate slowdowns. As long as the extent and intensity of therulers1authority among these subjects is limited, submission inducedby threats and punishments will inevitably be inadequate to ensure
lasting full power capacity.
Even in the short-run, the rulers cannot be assured that their punishments against a resisting population will necessarily succeed in restoring submission, nor even that the capacity to apply sanctions will
always be fully available to them. Even when the repressors1sanctions

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TWO

are applied reliably against a defiant populafion, they are not necessarily effective in producing renewed obedience and cooperation.
Whether punishments are or are not effective depends on the subjects'
particular pattern of submission. This hinges not only on how fully the
population in normal times obeys orders and instructions. It also depends on whether at that particular time and under those specific conditions the subjects are prepared to obey and cooperate or whether
they are prepared to continue to defy the rulers despite the threatenedor applied punishments.
Even when resisters are confronted with punishments, there is a role
for an act of will, for choice. They can choose to obey, thus avoiding the
sanctions threatened for disobedience. Or, they can choose to disobey
and risk receiving the threatened sanctions. 'I'his is not necessarily amatter of great political sophistication. Many headstrong young children, as well as rebellious teenagers, repeatedly court risks of punishments, albeit milder ones.
If people are unwilling to comply except for the prospect of punishment, the sanctions in order to be effective must be feared. Their consequences must be seen as more undesirable than the expected results ofobedience. Threatened or inflicted punishments only produce obedience and submission when they affect the subjects' minds and emotions, when the subjects fear the sanctions and are unwilling to suffer
them. Sanctions, by themselves, do not produce the desired results: abeaten protester may return the next day a jailed striker still does notwork, and an executed mutineer can never again carry out orders. Punishments only succeed if they increase submission to a degree adequate
to accomplish the rulers' objectives.
Importantly when fear of punishments doe:; not control the subjects'
minds, repression is unlikely to succeed. As in wars, the prospect ofphysical injury and death does not cause sold~ersat the front to flee or
to surrender. If the "fighting forces"-militiuy or civilian, violent or
nonviolent-believe in their cause sufficienth~;they are likely to continue the struggle regardless of the danger to them individually. Insuch conditions, repression may even aggravate the alienation of the
population against the regime and increase the numbers of resisters.
The rulers' power is also vulnerable in another way. As we noted,
the ability to impose sanctions derives from the obedience and cooperation of at least some subjects. Arrests, imprisonments, beatings, andother forms of repression require action by police, army paramilitary,or other forces, and often some type of assistance from the general p o pulation. The agents of repression must be willing to inflict such punishments reliably. In some circumstances that will not be the case.

TAPPING THE SOURCES OF POWER

29

The police, soldiers, and the like, may no longer accept that the pastor would-be rulers currently have any right to give such orders. Or, themembers of such forces may actually be, or become, sympathetic to thecause of the resisting population, and hence hesitate to punish people
who are acting on behalf of that cause. The police and troops may intentionally carry out orders inefficiently when they think they have atleast to appear to obey their superiors. Also, the experience of police andtroops of inflicting violent repression against nonviolent resisters has, ina variety of circumstances, reduced their own willingness to obey. At
times, the result has even been large-scale disaffection, disguised disobedience, or open mutiny against orders to continue brutal repressionof nonviolent people. This is one important reason why maintenance ofnonviolent discipline, discussed in Chapter Three, is so important.
All three of those important factors-denial of authority, sympathy
with the resisters' cause, and distaste for committing violence against
nonviolent people-can be consciously influenced in ways that could
significantly weaken, if not dissolve, the rulers' power.

The Possibility of Collective ResistanceIf the rulers' power is to be controlled by withdrawing help and obedience, widespread noncooperation and disobedience must be maintained in the face of repression aimed at forcing renewed submission.
Once there has been a major reduction of, or an end to, the subjects'
fear, and once there is a willingness to suffer sanctions as the price ofchange, large-scale disobedience and noncooperation become possible.
Such action then becomes politically significant, and the rulers' willis thwarted in proportion to the number of disobedient subjects and thedegree of the rulers' dependence upon them. The answer to the problem of apparently uncontrollable political power may, therefore, lie in
learning how to initiate large-scale withdrawal of cooperation and how
to maintain it despite repression.
The theory that political power derives from violence, and that victory necessarily goes to the side with the greater capacity for violence,
is false. Instead, the choice to disobey, the will to defy, and the ability
to resist become extremely important in securing victory over oppressors, tyrants, and aggressors who have almost unlimited capacity todestroy and kill.
In July 1943, Hitler admitted that "ruling the people in the conquered regions is, I might say, of course a psychological problem. One
cannot rule by force alone. True, force is decisive, but it is equally im-

30

TWO

portant to have this psychological something which the animal trainer
also needs to be master of his beast. They must be convinced that weare the victors."
What, then, if people refuse to accept the rnillitarily successful invaders as their political masters? What if people repudiate the claims of
their own military forces that have occupied the capital, arrested or
killed elected officials, and declared that the rebellious military forces
are the new government?When the general polpulation understands its
own potential, rooted in the very nature of political power, these questions raise realistic, if rarely explored, practicall options.

Requirements for Implementation
If this insight into political power is to be implemented, the key question becomes how.The lack of knowledge of how to a d against existing
oppressive rulers and how to prevent the rise of new ones has been oneof the most important reasons why people have not more often acted
effectively on this insight and long since abolished tyranny and oppression. Action on this insight has at least two major requirements.
First, the people must actively express their rejection of the tyrannical government by refusing to cooperate. This refusal may take many
forms. Few of these will be easy, many will be dlangerous, and each will
require effort, courage, and intelligence.
Second, there must be group or mass action. When the ruling minority is unified and well organized but the nded majority is divided
and lacks independent organization, the people are usually weak
and incapable of collective opposition. They c,an be dealt with one byone. Effective action requires collective resistance and defiance. Ordinarily, the sources of the rulers' power are lthreatened significantly
only when assistance, cooperation, and obedience are withheld bylarge numbers of subjects at the same time, that is, by social groups andinstitutions.
For example, sermons by a dissident priest may affect only a few
devoted local parishioners, while denunciation of the regime by theentire church as illegitimate, speaking to the wrhole nation, can lead tothe government's collapse. A handful of workers who walk off theirjobs in protest may simply be fired, while a well-organized strike by asolid union of many thousands may force major concessions. A few
govemment employees who ignore orders may hardly be noticed,
while noncooperation by most of the bureaucracy can make the executive impotent.
Noncooperation and disobedience by organizations and institutions,as distinct from isolated individuals, is therefore essential. The ability

TAPPING THE SOURCES OF POWER

31

of such bodies to withhold the sources of power they supply is consequently pivotal.

The Structural Basis of Popular Control
The ability of the population to a d collectively to control its rulers will
be highly influenced by the condition of the society's non-state organizations and institutions, since it is through these bodies that people can
a d collectively. These non-state organizations and institutions are theloci of power. They are the "places" in the society in which power islocated, converges, or is expressed.
The precise form and nature of these loci of power varies from society to society, and from situation to situation within the same society.
They are, however, likely to include such social groups and institutions
as families, social classes, religious groups, cultural and nationality
groups, occupationalgroups, economic groups, villages and towns, cities, provinces and regions, smaller governmental bodies, voluntary organizations, and political parties. Most often they are traditional, established, formal social groups and institutions. Sometimes, however, lociof power may be less formally organized. They may even be created orrevitalized in the process of achieving some objective or in the development of the resistance struggle itself.
In any case, the status of organizations and institutions as loci of
power will be determined by their capacity to a d independently, towield effective power, and to regulate the power of other loci or the
power of the rulers commanding the state apparatus.
This complex of independent units and power relationships provides the "structural" basis for potential control of rulers and would-be
rulers. The "structural condition" of the society as a whole is determined by three factors. The first is the extent and vitality of these lociof power. This includes whether such independent groups and institutions exist, their number, the degree of their internal strength andvitality, how centralized or decentralized they are, and their internal
decision-making processes.
The second factor comprises the relationships among these independent groups and institutions of the society. Can these loci of power
work together for common objectives? Can they coordinate their planning and action?
The third is the relationship between these loci and the rulers. Are
the loci really capable of independent action vis-bvis the rulers, that is,capable of disobeying and not cooperating with them, thereby restricting or severing sources of the rulersf power? Or is the degree of theiractual independence of action quite limited?

32

TWO

The structural condition will set the broad boundaries of the rulers1
potential power, beyond which they may not go without structuralchanges or without increased authority, voluntary acceptance, and active assistance from the subjeds and their institutions. If power ishighly decentralized among strong and vital independent institutions,that condition, in emergencies, will greatly strengthen the capacity ofthe subjects and their institutions collectively {towithdraw the sourcesof the rulers' or would-be rulers' power in order to inpose popular
control.

The Structural Basis of Freedom
When power is effectively diffused throughout the society amongstrong loci, the rulers1 power is most likely subjected to controls andlimits, thus enabling the society to resist oppression, usurpation, andaggression. This condition is associated with political "freedom"
When, on the other hand, such loci have been seriously weakened or
their independence of action has been destroyed, when the subjects are
all equally impotent and the society's power has become highly centralized, then the rulers' power will most likely be uncontrolled. Thiscondition is associated with "'tyranny." It is no accident that past totalitarian systems have attempted either to eliminate all independentgroups or to subject them to full control by the party or state.
Ultimately therefore, freedom is not something that rulers "give"
their subjects. Nor, in the long run, do the formal institutional structures and procedures of the government (as, for example, may be laidout in the constitution)by themselves determine the degree of freedom
or the limits of the rulers' power. A society may in fact be more free ormore oppressed than the formal constitutional or legal arrangements
would indicate. Instead, the extent and intensity of the rulers' power
and the actual degree of freedom of the society will be set by thestrength of the subjects and the condition of: the institutions of thewhole society. The rulers' power and the degree of the society's freedom may in turn, be expanded or contracted by the interplay between
the actions of the rulers and those of the suljects: some rulers may
choose not to be as oppressive as the structurall condition permits, andother rulers may receive more support than ithe structural condition
requires, making them more powerful.
Increases in the rulers' power are directly or indirectly determined,on the one hand, by the willingness of the subjects to accept the rulers,
to obey to cooperate and to carry out their orders and wishes. On theother hand, reductions in the rulers1power are determined by the sub-

TAPPING THE S O U R C E S OF POWER

33

jects' unwillingness to accept the rulers, coupled with their ability todisobey, to withhold cooperation, to defy orders, and to refuse demands made upon them.
The degree of liberty or tyranny in any political society is, it follm, largelya reflection of the relatiw determination of the subjects to be free, of their
willingness and ability to organize themselves to live in freedom and, wry
importantly, their ability to resist any efforts to dominate or enslave them. In
other words, the population can use the society itself as the means to establish
and defend its freedom. Social puzuer, not technological means of destruction,is the strongest guarantor of human freedom.

Societal Origins of Defense
These insights into the nature of political power and the means of imposing limits on-or dissolving-the rulers' power are highly relevantto the problem of how to provide effective defense of the society
against both internal usurpers and foreign aggressors. They indicatethat both the general population and the society's institutions can play
key roles in providing an effective defense.
The population and institutions can do this by refusing to grant theacceptance, submission, and cooperation that attackers require. The
principle behind these actions, as we have seen, is simple: restriction of
the sources of the power-authority, human resources, skills andknowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and sanctionsweakens, while their severance disintegrates, the rulers' power.
This insight opens the way for the defenders to combat the attackers
by directly applying the internal strength of the society against the attack By maintaining its own standards of legitimacy, its own way oflife, the autonomy of its institutions and its constitutional principles,the society can neutralize an attack and maintain itself. By mobilizing
the full power of the society not to cooperate with efforts to achieve theattackers' goals, the society can defeat the attackers' efforts to force thesociety to provide any economic, political, or ideological gains. Psychological, social,economic, and political pressures and sanctions of thewhole society can be used to produce final defeat of the attack by making ineffective and unreliable the attackers' own forces of administration and repression.
Under certain circumstances, various sections of the state apparatus
that have loyally served past rulers may become less reliable in conflictsituations. These groupings may sometimes be whole governmental
institutio11s---such as the state bank, the supreme court, or provincial
governments. At other timesthey may be groupings within such insti-

34

TWO

tutions-such as parts of the bureaucracy and civil service or sectionsof the police or military forces.
When whole institutions or signhcant sections of them begin to
make their own decisions and a d autonomou;ly in defiance of orders
from the rulers or would-be rulers, they become unstable elements of acentrally controlled state apparatus. They are then taking on major
characteristics of independent loci of power in the society. If those disaffected d o n s of the state apparatus continue this process of increasing their autonomy they will contribute to the disintegration of thatparticular state apparatus. This is, of course, a profound threat to thegroup that is attempting to remain or become "rulers," which the society rejects as despots, usurpers, or aggressors.
This weakening and destruction of the power of attackers is possible
without use of destructive military weaponry. When a society is internally strong, committed to its self-determinatic~n,and is well prepared
to defy attackers and oppressors, then its most effective response toattempts at internal usurpation and foreign aggression is defense bysocietal power.
In cases of international aggression, efforts to stimulate or capitalize
on dissent and opposition in the attackers1 homeland and to arouseinternational poIitical, diplomatic, and economic sanctions against theattackers also become important components of the defense efforts.
The ability of the defending society to gain support from the attackers1
home base and from the international community will also be influenced in part by that society's previous policies.
In summary, the ability of a population with strong loci of power toresist usurpers and aggressors will be influenced by various factors.
These include (1)the relative desire of the populace to resist the attackers, (2) the number, strength, and independence of the society's organizations and institutions, (3) the ability of these loci of power to work
together to defend the society, (4) the amount of social power that theloci can independentlywield, (5)the sources of power that they control
and the attackers' relative need of those sources, (6)the defenders' relative ability to withhold their cooperation despite repression, and (7)their skill in applying nonviolent struggle effectively.
If the defenders want to resist, have strong independent institutions
capable of controlling significant sources of political power, and areable to mount a skillful campaign of noncooperation and defiance, thendefense by societal power is a realistic choice to fight the attack. Generalized obstinacy and collective stubbornness aue not sufficient, howW to conduct theever. Before they begin, people will need to ~ I I I Dhow
struggle that will follow their initial a d of defiimce. They will need tounderstand the nonviolent technique of action that is based on the in-TAPPING THE SOURCES OF P O W E R

35sight into political power presented in this chapter. What makes thistechnique fail and succeed? What is required to produce maximum effectiveness?What options does it provide, and what requirements does
it impose? This needed understanding of nonviolent action must include its specific methods, its dynamics of change, requirements for
success, and its principles of strategy and tactics.

Notes
For a much more detailed development of this analysis of power andmany references, see Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 7-62 and Gene Sharp, Social Power andPolitical Freedom (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), pp. 21-67. Among thetheorists whose insights have been used in the development of thoseanalyses are Auguste Comte, T. H. Green, Errol E. Harris, Etienne de la
B&e, Harold D. Lasswell, John Austin, Baron de Montesquieu, JeanJacques Rousseau, William Godwin, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Robert MacIver, Chester I. Barnard, Niccolo Machiavelli, W. A. Rudlin, Max
Weber, Herbert Goldhamer, Edward A. Shils, Karl W. Deutsch, Jeremy
Bentham, Georg Simmel, E. V. Walter, Franz Neumann, David Hume,Thomas Hobbes, Jacques Maritain, and Alexis de Tocqueville. Specificreferences to their works are contained in the above cited studies.
On the factors contributing to success or failure in nonviolent struggle, see Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 726-731, 754-755,
and 815-817.
The quotation from Bogtie is from Etienne de la B&tie, "Discours dela Servitude Volontaire," in Oeuvres Completes d'Etienne de la Bdtie(Paris. J. Rouam & Cie., 1892), p. 12 and pp. 8-11. The translation is byMadeleine Chevalier Ernrick. See also Bogtie, Anti-Dictator: The "Discours sur la servitude volontaire" of Efienne de la Wtie, trans. by Harry
Kurz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942).
The quotation from Hitler is contained in Alexander Dallin, German
Rule in Russia 1941-1945 (New York: St. Martin's, 1957), p. 498.

Three
Wielding PowerA Nonviolent Weapons System
INP o u n c ~TJBMS,~ nonviolent action is based on a very simple postulate: people do not always do as they are told, and sometimes they dothings that have been forbidden. Subjects may disobey laws they reject.
Workers may halt work. The bureaucracy may refuse to carry out instructions. Soldiers and police may inefficiently carry out orders to inflict repression, or may even mutiny.
When these and similar activities happen simultaneously the rulers'
power dissolves as its sources are restricted. The regime disintegrates
and the persons who have been "rulersrr simply become ordinary
human beings. This may be achieved even though the government's
military equipment remains intact, its soldiers uninjuredI its cities unscathed, the factories and transport systems still fully operationall andthe govemment buildings undamaged. Yet,everything is changed because the human assistance that created and supported the regime's
political power has been withdrawn.
How is this insight into power to be translated into action relevant
for defense of the society? What methods can defenders use in order towithdraw the sources of power needed by foreign aggressors and internal usurpers? What do they need to do in the face of expected repression? A closer analysis of the technique of nonviolent action may
provide some answers.
Nonviolent action is so different from milder, peaceful responses toconflict (such as conciliation and arbitration) that several writers havepointed out that it has instead significant similarities to conventional
war. Nonviolent action is a means of combat, as is war. It involves thematching of forces and the waging of "battles," requires wise strategy
and tactics, employs numerous "weapons," and demands of its "soldiers" courage, discipline, and sacrifice. Nonviolent action may understandably also be called "nonviolent struggle," especially when strong
forms of this technique are employed against determined and resourceful opponents who respond with repression and other serious countermeasures.
This view of nonviolent action as a technique of active combat is diametrically opposed to the once popular, though uninformed, assertion

38

THREE

that no such phenomenon really existed, or that anything "nonviolent"
was simple passivity and submission. Other d~etractorsacknowledged
the existence of nonviolent action, but argued that,at its strongest, thisform of struggle relied on rational persuasion of opponents or on theimpact of moral appeals and the "melting of heartsr1-both of whichwere manifestly unlikely to happen in acute conflicts. However, theundeniable power of important nonviolent struggles, espeaally in theyears since 1968-such as the Czech and Slovala resistance, the Solidarity movement in Poland, the Filipino victory over Marcos, the 1989
nonviolent revolutions in East Germany CzechoslovakiaI and Bulgaria-has compelled a degree of recognition tzven from skeptics.
Nonviolent action is just what it says: actwn that is nonviolent, notinaction. This technique consistsI not simply of' words, but of action in
the form of symbolic protests, social, economic, and political noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention. Overwht?lminglynonviolent action is group or mass action. While certain dorms of this technique,especially the symbolic methods, may be regarded as efforts to persuade by action, the other forms, especially tlhose of noncooperation
may, if practiced by large numbers, paralyze or even disintegrate theopponents' system.
The motives for using nonviolent action instead of some type of violent action differ widely In the overwhelming number of past cases
nonviolent struggle was selected because it wals seen as more likely to
succeed than other means. In some situationsI previous direct experience with the use of violence, or knowledge of its consequencesIhas led
people to be cautious about using such techniques. ('Wolence" here
refers to the threat or deliberate infliction of physical injury or death on
persons.) Experience with violence may have included riots, violent
insurrections, terrorist campaigns, guerrilla warfare, or conventional
wars. The prospect of bloody defeat, the probability of immense casualties and vast destruction, or the likely long-term consequences of violence (social distrust, economic decline, increased chances of future
military ruleI or stimulation of internal violence) have led people toexplore nonviolent options. In a relatively few other cases violence has
been rejected for religious, ethical, or moral reaso-thus
opening theway for the nonviolent technique. In still others, a mixture of practicaland principled motives led to a rejection of violence.
Once nonviolent struggle has been selected for use in the conflictIthe
task for people seekingvictory through this form of action is to increase
their basic strength and to apply the technique skillfully. Nonviolent
action has requirements that need to be fulfilled if it is to be successful.
Practitioners of nonviolent action must seek to satisfy these requirements to the maximum of their abilities.

W I E L D I N G POWER

39

While it is widely assumed that nonviolent action takes longer tosucceed than violent struggle, this is not necessarily true. At times, violent struggles have taken many months or years. Look, for example, atthe duration of many guerrilla struggles, say in China, Yugoslavia, Algeria, and Vietnam, or the length of various international wars, such as
the two world wars. (Remember the Thirty Years War and the Hundred Years War in Europe?) The presumption that military warfare
works quickly as a general rule is false, as is the belief that militarymeans offer good chances of success. At least half of the time militaryefforts are in fact defeated-neside loses. And that does not evenconsider whether the original objectives of the struggle were in fad
gained. In cases of military stalemate, neither side wins.
On the other hand, nonviolent struggles have at times not only succeeded (sometimes even dissolving oppressive governments), but havedone so quickly. The Kapp Putsch, for example, was defeated in lessthan five days. The Salvadoran dictator General Maximiliano Hemtindez Martinez was ousted by a nonviolent insurrection in less than three
weeks in April and May 1944. The military dictator Jorge TJbico wasremoved from the presidency in Guatemala in a struggle that lasted
only eleven days in June of that same year. In 1989 the East German,
Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian dictatorships collapsed after only a few
weeks of large-scale nonviolent resistance in each country.
Not all struggles succeed so quickly, but whether they take days or
years, effectiveness depends on the capacity of the users of nonviolent
action to stick with the technique they have chosen and to apply it
persistently and skillfully.This is not a technique that can produce success if it is thoughtlessly initiated or easily abandoned. Rather, greatcare is required in planning and strict discipline in implementation if
the impact is to be the greatest.
It is dangerous to view nonviolent ation as a trivial sideline to themain (most likely violent) ation or simply a precursor to some othergrand strategy of struggle. Clearly nonviolent action is not a techniquethat can be advantageouswhen combined with violence. In fact, that ismost dangerous, for, as will be discussed more fully later in this chapter, violence is counterproductive to essential elements of the nonviolent technique. Such violence, frequently in even limited degrees, has
had the effect of reducing the numbers of resisters and thereby weakening the strength of their noncooperation. In addition, violence may
reduce the impact of the nonviolent character of the movement on the
opponents' camp (especially on police and troops) and lessen the degree of sympathy and support from third parties. Violence, therefore,
added to a nonviolent struggle, actually weakens, not strengthens,such a movement.

40

THREE

Nonviolent action is a distinctive form of conflict. It employs its own
strategies, tactics, and "weapons system." Planned and employedwisely, the technique is capable of offering to its users ways to apply
and to mobilize their power potential to a greater degree than does
violence.
In order to explore the defensive applications of nonviolent action, it
is first necessary to examine the multitude of nonviolent "weapons," orspecific methods of action, with which this technique operates. Then,the mechanisms by which nonviolent action produces success need to
be explored. Based on this general understanding of the nonviolent
technique, attention can then be focsused in Chapter Four on the problems of internal usurpation and foreign aggression.

The Methods of Nonviolent Action
Nonviolent action may involve acts of omission-that is, people may
refuse to perform acts that they usually perfonn, are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perfom; acts ofcommission-that is, people may perform ads that they do not usually
perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden bylaw or regulation to perform; or a combination of the two.
These ads comprise a multitude of specific means of action or"weapons." Nearly two hundred have been identified to date, and,without doubt, scores or hundreds of additional ones already exist or
will emerge in future conflicts. Three broad classes of nonviolent weapons exist within the technique of nonviolent sbuggle: nonviolent protest
and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent internention.
Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion
This is a large class of mainly symbolic actions of peaceful opposition
or attempted persuasion, extending beyond verbal expression but
stopping short of noncooperation or nonviolent intervention. These aren g methods are
the mildest of the nonviolent "weapons." k t ~ ~ theseparades, vigils, public speeches, declarations by organizations, renunciations of honors, symbolic public ads, picketing, posters, teach-ins,
mourning, and protest meetings.
Their use may simply show that the protesters are against or forsomething. The act may be intended primarily to influence the opponents. Alternatively, the act may aim to communicate with the public,
onlookers, or third parties, directly or through publicity, in order toWIELDING POWER

41

arouse attention to and support for the desired change. The act may
persons directly affected by the issue-to take action themselves, such as
to participate in a strike or economic boycott. Certain mild methods ofthis class (such as leafleting) are intended to persuade in order to produce a stronger action (such as an economic boycott) by someone else.
These methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion have been usedextremely widely in the forms of distributing leaflets, picketing, carrying posters, or conducting marches. Here are just a few examples. AntiNazi pastoral letters were read in German chuches on several occasions. The Presidium of the Czechoslovak National Assembly sent a
declaration denouncing the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia anddemanding "immediate withdrawal" to the governments and parliaments of the five invading Warsaw Pact countries. A "Memorandum"
signed by dozens of Hungary's elite Communist writers and artists inearly November 1956requested the Central Committee of the Communist Party to stop officials fiom applying "antidemocratic methods
which cripple our cultural lifeff and called for "a free and sincere andhealthy and democratic atmosphere imbued with the spirit of popularrule."
During President Wllsonfsaddress to Congress on December 4,1916,
five suffragists in the gallery unrolled a banner saying: "MIL PRESIDENT,
WHAT WILL YOU DO FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE?" During the 1963Buddhist campaign against the Diem regime in South Vietnam, students at the Chu
Van An boy's school in Saigon tore down the government flag andhoisted the Buddhist flag. In occupied Poland in 1942the Germans destroyed all monuments that commemorated Polish heroes or patriotic
events. The Poles then made conspicuous detours around those spots
and even offered prayers there, to the outrage of German officials.
In Sofia, Bulgaria, Jews organized a protest against planned deportations, which was joined on May 24,1943, by many non-Jewish Bulgarians. There were clashes with the police and many arrests. Matei Yulzari
wrote: "Fearing internal unrest, the Fascist government and the kingwere forced to give up their plan to send the Jews of Bulgaria to their
doom in the death camps." All Jews who were Bulgarian citizens were
saved.
In Algiers on August 31,1962, a crowd of 20,000 gathered in a squareto protest the on-going quarrel between the leaders of the newly independent country and to prevent the outbreak of civil war. In Brazil,
massive public demonstrationsbecame a major force in the movementof the early 1980s for restoration of civilian government, with strictly
nonviolent mass demonstrations at times involving as many as one
million and two million people.

also be intended primarily to induce the "grievance group"-the

42

THREE

On November 4,1989, at least 500,000 protesters marched throughEast Berlin demanding free elections, a free press, and civil rights.
Some demonstratorsposted their demands on the walls of the Councilof Ministers building as they filed past. In Prague, on November 25,
1989, one-half million protesters shouting "Shiune! Shame! Shame!"gathered to denounce the mere shuffling of the despised Communist
leaders as a "trick" intended to subvert reform.
Noncooperation

Most of the methods of nonviolent action involve noncooperation ofsome type. Noncooperation involves the deliberate discontinuance, restriction, withholding, or defiance of certain existing relationshipssocial, economic, or political.
People may, for example, totally ignore members of the oppositiongroup. They may refuse to buy certain products, or they may stop
work They may disobey laws they regard as immoral or refuse to pay
taxes. Such people struggleby reducing or ceasing their usual cooperation, or by withholding new assistance, or both. This produces a slowing or halting of normal operations. The action may be spontaneous orplanned, legal or illegal.
The methods of noncooperation are divided into three main classes:
social, economic, and political.

Social nuncooperation may involve a refusal to t l a n y on normal social
relationships, either speafic ones or all types, with persons or groups
regarded as having perpetrated some wrong or injustice.
Social boycotts are very well known. During the 1923 Ruhrkampf,
French and Belgian soldiers and officials were socially boycotted by theGermans. When soldiers entered a tavern for a &ink, the German guests
would promptly leave. In Denmark during the Second World War, Danes
commonly practiced the "cold shoulder" against German soldiers,
sometimes looking right through them as though they did not exist.
The methods of social noncooperation also encompass various otherforms, including refusal to comply with expected behavior patterns or
established practices of the society or the opponent group. Amongother similar methods are excommunication, Lysistratic nonaction,suspension of social and sports activities, boycott of social affairs, student strikes, stays-at-home, and the offering of sanctuary.
Economic noncooperation consists of suspension of specific economic relationships or refusal to initiate new ones. Economic forms of noncoop-

WIELDING POWER

83

eration are much more numerous than those of social noncooperation.
This subclass includes both economic boycotts and the strike.
Economic boycotts involve the refusal of certain economic relationships, especially the buying, selling, or handling of goods and services.
They may be either primary or secondary ones. The primary boycott isthe direct suspension of dealings with the opponents, such as the refusal of German rail workers to transport coal to France during the
1923Ruhrkampf and the week-long refusal in September 1941of Prague
citizens to buy Germancontrolled newspapers. The secondary boycott
is applied against third parties to induce them to join in the primary
boycott against the opponents, such as boycotts of stores in the UnitedStates selling boycotted California grapes or boycotted South African
products.
Economic boycotts take many forms, includingconsumers' boycotts,
rent withholding, international consumers' boycotts, producers' boycotts, lockouts, refusal to pay debts or interest, withdrawal of bank deposits, and international trade embargoes.
Economic boycotts have been used mainly by labor unions and national liberation movements. Economic boycotts may be conducted byconsumers, workers and producers, distributors, owners and managers, holders of financial resources, and governments.
The strike is a refusal to work. It is a collective, deliberate, and normally temporary restriction or suspension of labor designed to exertpressure on others. The issues are usually economic, but not necessarily so. The aim is to produce some change in the relationships of theconflicting groups. The strikers usually make certain demands as a precondition for resuming work. Sometimes, simply the threat of a strike
may induce concessions from the opponents.
Strikes may be conducted by agricultural workers and peasants, industrial and office workers, or other groups. Strikes may be full withdrawals of labor, or be restricted in some way as in a slowdown. They
may take many forms, including protest strikes, quickie walkouts,
peasant strikes, farm workers' strikes, prisoners' strikes, professional
strikes, industry strikes, working-to-rule strikes, reporting "sick," andgeneral strikes. Business owners and workers may unite in producing
an economic shutdown.
Strikes may be symbolic to express views. For example, on January
15,1923, four days after the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr, thepopulation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland held a tlurty-minute protest
strike to express its will to resist. Beginning only hours after the entryof Russian troops into Prague in August 1968, the Czechs conducted anumber of protest strikes to signal their intention to defy the invaders.
On November, 27,1989, millions of Czechs and Slovaks brought their

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THREE

country to a standstdl in a two-hour general strilke to show support for
free elections and opposition to Communist dornination
Much more often strikes are intended to wield economic power.
There is a long history in many countries of the use of strikes by tradeunions to improve wages and working conditiolns. On occasion, however, strikes are direded to achieve political or revolutionary objectives. From April 29 to May 8,1943, a wave of :strikesoccurred in the
Nazi-occupied Netherlands, involving a majority of industrial workers
protesting the planned internment of Dutch army veterans in Germany. BeginningJune 30,1944, Danish workers lheld a five-day generalstrike to force the Germans to withdraw the statle of martial law and to
remove the hated Danish fascist Schalburgkorps from Denmark Negotiations produced some German concessions.
Labor strikes may be combined with business closures to produce
economic shutdowns. Such action was a key factor in the struggle torestore Finnish autonomy within Imperial Russia in late 1905. A fully
nonviolent business shutdown in 1956 was a h a key factor in theouster of Haitian strongman General Magliore from the presidency.

Political mooperation involves refusal to continue the usual forms ofpolitical participation under existing conditions. Individuals and small
groups may practice such methods. However, political noncooperation
usually involves larger numbers of people, government personnel, oreven governments themselves.
Political noncooperation may take an almost infinite variety of expressions, depending upon the particular situation. Basically, they allstem from a desire not to assist the opponents by performing certain
types of political behavior. Political noncooperation may take the formof rejection of the ruler's legitimacy and authority; boycott of governmental bodies and edicts; noncooperation and disobedience of diverse
types; stalling and noncooperation by government officers, employees,
and constituent units; and international governmental action. Civil disobedience-the deliberate, open, peaceful violation of particular laws,
decrees, regulations, ordinances, military or police orders-is one of
the best known of these methods.
The purpose of political noncooperation may simply be protest or
personal dissociation. More frequently, however, an act of politicalnoncooperation is designed to exert pressure on the government, on an
illegitimate group attempting to seize control of' the governmental apparatus, or sometimes on another government. The aim of politicalnoncooperation may be to achieve a limited ol~jective,to change thegovernment's policies, to alter its composition, or even to destroy it.
Practiced against internal usurpers, a puppet government, or a foreign

WIELDING POWER

45

occupier's administration, the aim of political noncooperation may be
to defeat the attack and to restore the legitimate government.
Various types of political noncooperation were significant fadors of
resistance in all four cases cited in Chapter One. Political noncooperation is the key component of denying legitimacy to the usurpers or
occupiers. If granted, legitimacy leads to the more ready availability ofsuch other important sources of power as human assistance, administration, economic resources, and the like. On January 19, 1923, theGerman government forbade all state and local authorities to obey any
Franco-Belgian occupation orders, instructing them to comply onlywith pre-invasion German authorities. In Czechoslovakia, in 1968,
three days after the Soviet invasion, the lord mayor of Prague refusedeven to see representatives of the occupation forces that had been sent
to negotiate with him.
Among the many forms of political noncooperation is the boycott ofgovernment-supported organizations, such as the refusal of Norwegian teachers to become members of the new fascistcontrolled teachers
association created by the Quisling regime in 1942. The refusal to assist
troops or police, to acknowledge appointed ffofficials,"or to dissolve
existing institutionsare also important in thisregard. General administrative noncooperation was a key factor in the defeat of the Kapp
Putsch. In occupied Norway both Norwegian police and German soldiers were sometimes deliberately inefficient in making arrests andeven facilitated escapes. Largescale mutinies of Imperial Russian
troops were an important factor in the February 1917 Revolution,
which ousted the tsar.
The capacity of the nonviolent resisters to wield the weapons of noncooperation--social, economic, or political-is of extreme importancein the dynamics of a particular nonviolent campaign. Such methods
may be used both defensively and offensively. Used defensively, thesemethods may thwart an attack by maintaining independent initiative,
behavior patterns, institutions, and the like. Used offensively noncooperation may attack the operation and even the existence of institutions and organizations that support the attackers.
Nonviolent Interuention

The methods in this final class are distinguished from those in the two
above classes by directly interfering in a situation-disrupting it-by
nonviolent means. These acts are not intended simply to communicate
a viewpoint or to withhold cooperation. Instead, the people using thesemethods seize the initiative and directly disrupt the system or situation

46

THREE

so that it cannot remain as it was unlessthose intervening are somehow
removed or their action neutralized.
The methods in this class may take psychological, physical, social,economic, or political forms. They include fasts,,sit-ins, nonviolent obstruction, establishment of new social behavior, stay-in strikes, alternative economic institutions, inviting imprisonment, work-ons without
collaboration, and parallel govemment.
Used offensively, nonviolent intervention may cany the struggle
into the opponents' own camp, even without any immediate provocation. These methods may disrupt, and even destroy established behavior patterns, policies, relationships, or instituticm that are seen as objectionable. Or, these methods may establish sew, preferred behavior
patterns, policies, relationships, or institutions.
Compared with the other classes of nonviolent action, the methodsof nonviolent intervention pose a more direcit and immediate challenge. However., this does not necessarily mean more rapid success. A
first result of the action may be speedier and more severe repressionwhich, of course, does not necessarily mean defeat. If intervention is
successful, however, victory is likely to come more quickly than bynoncooperation because the disruptive effects of the intervention are
harder to withstand. For example, a sit-in at a lunch counter or an office
upsets normal operations more immediately and completely thanwould, say picketing or a consumers' boycott to end discrimination.
There are numerous examples of this type of nonviolent action. In
the American civil rights campaigns, physical interventions in theforms of sit-ins were used extensively to end racial discrimination atlunch counters. In 1955a mass nonviolent invasiion of Goa took place todefy Portuguese sovereignty over that part of India. In 1953when Russian tanks were used to disperse a crowd of 25,000 East German protesters, demonstrators sat down and blocked the paths of the tanks.
From 1969 to 19n, Native Americans nonviolently occupied Alcatraz
Island in the hope of reclaiming it as unused tribal land. During theGerman occupation of their country, Poles established an alternative,
independent educational system outside of Nazi control. In Czechoslovakia in August and September 1968 an alternative radio broadcast
system operated for a full two weeks, defying the Soviet invaders, refuting their propaganda, offering information about events and individuals, and giving instructions for further nonviolent resistance. On
December 11,1989, tens of thousands of protesters encircled the state
security headquarters building in Leipzig, East Germany forcing thehead of the local security forces to concede to a filmed "people's inspection" of the security complex Thirty "inspectors" documented evidence of state "spying" on Leipzig citizens and halted the destructionof incriminating documents.

WIELDING POWER

47

Parallel government can be an especially important factor in nonviolent struggles in which the whole direction of the society and politicalsystem is at stake, as in revolutionary situations or national defense
against internal usurpations or foreign occupations. In a revolutionary
situation, parallel government refers to the establishment of a new sovereignty that aims to replace the existing one. A new political structure
evolves to claim the support and allegiance of the populace. A parallel
government emerges and with widespread popular support graduallytakes over the governmental functions, eventually squeezing the oldregime out of existence by delegitimation and disuse.
This method of nonviolent struggle has hitherto lacked careful analysis and comparative study. The phenomenon has occurred in diverse
situations, sometimes to only a limited extent. However, on occasion, aparallel government has become a significant fador in a struggle, attimes even fully replacing the original government.
A classic case is the emergence of parallel govenunents during theAmerican independence movement in the years 176547'75. Prior to1774, colonists resisting Britain's effort to increase its authority over
the American colonies innovated many methods of nonviolent struggle. By the time of the crisis of 17'744775,brought on by the Coercive
Acts, Americans had lost confidence that constitutional methods could
redress their grievances. In addition, colonial governors in several
regions forbade legislatws to remain in session if they were likely tosupport resistance.
In response, colonists began to form new political institutions andtransform existing ones, which included the organizing of provisional
legislatures and committees of resistance and governance. This trend
was given impetus by the Continental Association, a sophisticatedprogram of economic and political noncooperation adopted by theFirst Continental Congress in October 1774. An extensive network of
local, regional, and colony-wide committees supported and enforced
resistance to the Coercive Acts. Along with committees of correspondence established earlier, these committees took on many functions ofgovernment. As Ronald McCarthy shows, parallel governing structures performed legislative and executive roles, took responsibility for
taxation, and even replaced the courts in some areas. In certain cases,colonial legislatures rejected British sovereignty and became organsof resistance and autonomous governments. In others, entirely neworganizations operated as alternative political authorities. At thispoint, the struggle shifted to a more fundamental level as these bodies
became substitute governments.
Very clear examples of parallel government emerged in both the1905 and 1917 Russian revolutions. In 1905, the Bureau of Zemstvo
Congresses exercised considerable authority, and entire regions a .

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THREE

nationalities broke off control from the capital and established theirown autonomous governments, some of which Survived into 1906.
Prior to the Bolshevik coup d ' k t in October 1917, both the Provisional Government and the independent sovi~ets,or councils, exercised governmental powers. Nascent elements o f parallel governmental structures also developed in India during the 19304931satyagraha

In a defensive situation, the role of parallel igovenunent can be of
extreme importance, as will be discussed in Chaipter Four.

Wielding PowerTo a degree that has never been adequately apprceciated, the nonviolent
technique operates by changing power relationships. Nonviolent action wields power, both to counter the power of an opponent groupand to advance the objectives of the nonviolent group.
This technique of conflict wields power in ways that diverge significantly from popular assumptions about corfict and struggle-inparticular, the assumption that violence can be effectively met onlywith violence. Nonviolent methods are much more complex than previously thought, and are clearly more diverse and complicated thancomparable processes of political violence. This is, at least in part, because nonviolent struggle is able to strike at the bases of the opponents'
system.
No two cases of nonviolent action are ever exactly alike. They will
differ in many respects, including the influences and pressures wieldedby the nonviolent group, the responses of the opponents, and the nature of the conflict situation. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate significant characteristics that are likely to be present in the operation ofthese conflicts.
Several interrelated forces and processes are likely to operate simultaneously during a given nonviolent campaign. In most cases these will
include the effects of the significant increase, or even multiplication of,
noncooperating and defiant subjects, the persistence of the resisters in
the face of repression, and possible pressures by third parties. Psychological and morale factors, which are highly important in conventional
military campaigns and guerrilla warfare, are of still greater importance in nonviolent struggles.
The nonviolent technique can be viewed both iE strikingat the opponents' power more directly and also more indirectly than does violence.
Violence in its various forms operates primarily by efforts to wound
and kill members of the opponents' military forces and, at times, vari-

WIELDING POWER

49

om officials and aides. This is often accompanied by largescale physical destruction.The military forces and the capacity to conduct military
campaigns are themselves the products of the political, social,and economic power of the regime and depend upon much deeper sowes ofpower than, say, quantities of tanks,rifles, or bombs. Military efforts tocounter the opponentsf military power can therefore be viewed as attacking expressions of the opponents' power rather than removing its
bases.
In contrast, the nonviolent technique strikes at the very sowes ofthe opponents' power, thus operating more directly than does politicalviolence. Each of the sources of the opponents' power, identified in theprevious chapter, depends directly or indirectly on the obedience andcooperation of their own agents and officials, the general population,and the institutions of the society. Noncooperation and defiance subvert the needed obedience and cooperation. For example, rejection of
the rulers' legitimacy reduces a crucial reason for obedience by bothaides and the general populace; extensive popular disobedience anddefiance creates immense enforcement problems; massive strikes canparalyze the economy; widespread administrative noncooperation of
the bureaucracy can thwart governmental operations; and mutinies ofthe opponents' police and troops can dissolve the opponents' capacity
to repress nonviolent resisters.
Nonviolent struggle operates directly against the opponents in another way. It can be focused on the issue at stake, rather than at militaryforcesor pieces of geography that are often only tangentially related tothe conflict. For example, if the crux of the conflict is primarily economic, then economic action, such as boycotts or strikes, may be appropriate. In response to excessive working hours, for example, workers
can simply go home at the end of a certain time, as they did in seeking
the eight-hour day during the Russian 1905 Revolution. The struggle
would then largely hinge on the opponents' vulnerability to those economic leverages and the workers' capacity to withhold economic cooperation. Similarly, if the issues are primarily political, then political action may be most effective. For example, when the Kappists attempted
to seize control from the Weimar Republic, the civil servants, bureaucrats, and governments of the states simply refused to acknowledge
their legitimacy or to do their bidding in any way. That was fatal for the
coup.
More specifically, if censorship of the press and publishing is an
issue, then defiance of censorship regulations can be applied to nullrfy them. Publications can be issued in complete disregard of established laws either openly, in appropriate eircumstances, or clandestinely. Such means were used widely in the Russian 1905 Revolution,

50

THREE

the Dutch resistance to the Nazi occupation, the Polish struggle of
19W1989 for greater freedom, and the Palestinian resistance to Israeli
occupation. During the Nazi-occupation of Denmark, 538 illegal newspapers were published. In 1944 their combined circulation was over ten
million.
The nonviolent technique may also be viewed as striking at the opponents' power more indirectly than does violence. Instead of confronting the opponents' police, troops, and the like with forces of the same
type, the nonviolent resisters confront them indirectly without counterviolence. This operates to undermine the opponents while helping tomobilize increased strength and support for the cause that the resisters
espouse.
For example, by responding to repression nonviolently instead ofwith counterviolence, those using nonviolent action may demonstratethat the opponents' repression is incapable of both intimidating the
populace into submission and provoking resisters into using the very
methods that the opponents are well equipped to counteract. This continued resistance while maintaining nonviolent discipline may haveother advantages for the resisters. The contrast of violent repression
against nonviolent resisters may alienate the opponents' usual supporters, hence weakening their relative power position. The number ofnonviolent fighters may grow and support for <themmay also increase
sigxuficantly. All this may happen because the opponents' violence iscountered indirectly instead of violently. This i s the process of "political jiujitsu," which is discussed later in this chapter.
In this type of conflict situation, both the relative power and the absolute power of each of the contending groups are subject to constantand, at times, rapid and extreme changes. This is because the degrees of
support given to each may vary considerably and continuously, increasing or decreasing the availability of the crucial sources of power.
These variations in power can be much greater and can occur more
quickly than in situations where both sides use violence. In this asymmetrical conflict situation, nonviolent struggle is directly altering thevery sources of the power of each side. The impact of this is felt more
immediately than in a strictly violent conflict, which affects thosesomes only indirectly.
The nonviolent strategists must capitalize on these potential suddenchanges in each side's power. To do this, the practitioners of nonviolent
struggle must seek to influence the strengths and loyalties of threegroups. First, they need to seek continually to increase their own
strength and that of their supporters. Second, they will also gainstrength if they can increase active participation among the wider

WIELDING POWER

51

group affected by the grievances. Third, the nature of nonviolent struggle makes it possible for the resisters to win considerable support evenin the opponents' camp and among third parties. This possibility isdiminished if violent means are used because the absence of violenceenables observers to evaluate the issues at stake independently of reactions to the use of violence. Moreover, reliance on only nonviolentmeans commonly brings sympathy to the participants in the struggle.
The ability to gain support in the opponents' own camp and among
third parties gives the nonviolent group a capacity to influence-and attimes to regulate indirectly-its opponents' power, by reducing or severing its sowes.
Usually the results of these complex changes in the relative power
positions of the contenders will determine the struggle's final outcome.

The Importance of Strategy
Changes in power relationships will be greatly influenced, and thewhole course of the struggle to a large degree shaped, by the strategy
and tactics applied and the specific methods used by the nonviolent
group. Strategy is just as important in nonviolent action as in military
warfare.
The aim of a strategy is to use one's resources to maximum advantage to gain one's objectives at minimum cost. The specific methods ofnonviolent action used will be most effective if they work together toimplement an overall strategy or conception of how to accomplish theobjectives. The strategy and tactics chosen and the methods used will
help to determine which power sources will be affected and the degree
to which they are reduced or severed. These should normally be related to specific issues. Usually for example, economic action is appropriate for economic issues, and political noncooperation and intervention for political issues. There is far from a universal pattern, however,
and at times economic resistance can be very useful in a struggle whose
issues are primarily political. In all cases, the action needs to be finely
tuned as part of a carefully developed overall plan.
The nonviolent strategistsneed, therefore, to plan their strategy withmuch thought and extreme care, drawing upon the best available resources about strategic principles and their own knowledge of nonviolent struggle and the conflict situation. General discussions of strategy
in nonviolent struggle are available elsewhere, and some of the strategic principles and options in civilian-based defense will be discussed in
Chapter Four.

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THREE

The Importance of the Loci of PowerThe ability to conduct nonviolent struggle will be highly influenced by
the independent institutions and groupings in the society that may
conduct and support such action, as discussed in Chapter Two. That
discussion showed that nonviolent struggle will be greatly strengthened when it is conducted by, or with the support of, the establishedinstitutions of the society such as professional olrganizations, religious
institutions, trade unions, political parties, and social organizations,and has the backing of regional, cultural, national, or kinship groupings, and even local, provincial, and regional governments or their subdivisions.
Loci of power may also be less formally organized, or may be createdjust prior to or during the nonviolent struggle. Or,they may be older
bodies that had been long inactive or that had their capacity for independent action and initiative weakened drastically by deliberate measures of a highly centralized political system. Such bodies may become
revitalized in the process of achieving some a~bjectiveor of broadly
opposing the rulers or attackers of their society. Therefore, both newly
created loci and revitalized ones are likely to play si@cant roles in
the conduct of nonviolent struggle.
This was the case, as noted above, in the nonviolent phase of theAmerican independence movement with the formation of the committees of correspondence and the extralegal provincial governments in
1774 and 1775. In Rhode Island, for example, established local governments, town meetings, and even the official provincial government became key instruments against British rule in the three noncooperation
campaigns of 1761775.
During the nonviolent first phase of the 1956Hungarian Revolution,a new, vast, and powerful workers' council movement developed
among factory workers, professionals, and other groups. The movement quickly took on political dimensions, fedelrating to form for someweeks a substitute national government, until,, in the violent second
phase of the revolution, the Russians defeated the Hungarian army.
In various other cases, longestablished organizations have served
similar roles as bases of resistance, such as sports clubs, teachers' organizations, and, in Norway during the Nazi occupation, the State
Church. In resistance to the Kapp Putsch, political parties, trade unions, provincial governments and other bodies were crucial. In the
Czechoslovak resistance of 1968even the Comn~unistParty became forsome weeks an instrument of resistance against the Russians. In the
Polish movement for democratization in the '1980s the independentWIELDING POWER

53

trade union Solidarity and a variety of other newly created organizations, including studentsfand peasants' groups, became powerful bodies in the struggle. (Despite martial law after a military coup d'ht,
these bodies, while weakened, were not eradicated.) These and otherloci, such as underground publishing houses, were instrumental in thecontinuation and strengthening of the democratic forces in Poland in
the late 1980s.

The Opponents' Problems
The challenge presented by nonviolent action may be a mild one anddisturb the status quo only slightly. In extreme cases, however, thechallenge may shatter it. In any event, attention will have been called
to the grievances and to the presence of the opposition. The underlying
conflict will be brought into the open, probably leading to an initialpolarizing of opinion.
Opponents facing strong nonviolent action may be seriously threatened. The gravity of this challenge will vary with such factors as theissues of grievances at stake and their apparent justification; the qualityof the action; the numbers participating; how the withdrawal of obedience and cooperation is expressed; and the ability of the resisters tomaintain their nonviolent discipline and their refusalto submit despite
the opponents1reprisals. The outcome will also, in part, be determinedby the social and political milieu in which the struggle takes place.
These basic conditions include the degree of nonconformity the system
can tolerate without altering its nature; the degree of support for, or
hostility to, the regime among all groups involved; the chances that
noncooperation and defiance will spread; and, finally, the degree towhich the material, human, moral, and institutional sources of power
necessary for the government's existence continue to be available, arerestricted, or are withdrawn.
The opponentsf difficulties in coping with nonviolent action are consequences of the special dynamics and mechanisms of the technique(which will be examined shortly). These difficulties do not depend on
their being surprised by the absence of violence or being unfamiliar
with the technique. The opponents' knowledge of nonviolent struggle,
for example, does not by itself provide the capacity to defeat the nonviolent fighters. In wars, both sides use their knowledge of military
struggle to increase their chances of success. In nonviolent struggles,
with more knowledge, the opponents may become more sophisticatedin countermeasures, and perhaps less cruel and more able to face the

54

THREE

issues. However, the nonviolent group also may learn how to struggle
more skillfully and how to respond to the opponents' controls and sophistication more effectively.
Only very rarely, if ever, do governments and other hierarchical systems face the extremes of having complete support or none. Most frequently they receive partial support. Even whein the regime is eventually destroyed by disobedience, noncooperation, and defiance, it may
have been supported sufficiently and long enough to inflict brutal repression against the nonviolent group. It is therefore necessary to explore how the nonviolent technique operates in struggle against violent
opponents, the several ways in which changes are finally produced,
and the specific factors that determine whether a given campaign will
be a success, a failure, or something in between.
It is an error to equate using nonviolent struggle with keeping the
opponents good-natured. The opponents are not likely to appreciate achallenge to their power or policies, even if the challenge is nonviolent.
If the action poses a serious threat to their conltrol, and if they do notintend to grant the resisters' demands, the opponents must react.

Repression
Nonviolent action is designed to operate against opponents who areable and willing to use violent sanctions. In fad, nonviolent struggle
has been employed against such violent regimes as Nazi Germany theCommunist governments in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, China, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, Jorge
Ubico's Guatemala, El Salvador under Maximiliano Hernhdez Martinez, Pinochet's Chile, apartheid South Africa, and Burma under Ne
Win. Such opponents, when faced with the nonviolent challenge, aremost unlikely suddenly to renounce their violence, or even to restrict it
consistently.
Repression is therefore a likely response to a serious nonviolent challenge. Repression can take such forms as censorship, confiscation offunds and property, severance of communiciltions, economic pressure, arrests, imprisonments, conscription, cormntration camps, useof agents prooocatacrs, threats, beatings, shootin~gs,massacres, torture,martial law, executions, and retaliation against relatives and friends.
The amount and type of repression w i l l vary, being influenced by several factors. The repression of the nonviolent group, however, may besignificantly more limited than the opponents would use against a violent rebellion or a foreign enemy using military means. This is not
because of any gentility., but derives from a recognition that extreme

WIELDING POWER

55

violent repression can be counterproductive to the regime that is facing
the nonviolent challenge.
The high probability of violent repression is strong evidence that
nonviolent action can pose a real threat to the established order. This isa confirmation of, and tribute to, the power of the technique. The opponents' violence is no more a reason for abandoning nonviolent action
than is the enemy's military action in a war a reason to abandon one's
own military adion
The violence of such repression may also be in part a demonstrationof the underlying nature of that system. This demonstration may influence the course of the struggle. Extreme repression may vividly expose
the violent nature of the system to many citizens and third parties,
possibly further alienating support for the opponents and increasing
assistance to the nonviolent resisters.
As was pointed out in the previous chapter, repression will not necessarily produce submission. For the opponents' sanctions to be effective, they must operate on the minds of the subjects, producing fear andthe willingness to obey. Just as in war, however, there is the likelihoodthat planning and discipline, or some overriding loyalty or objective,
wiU cause the nonviolent fighters to persist despite the dangers.
In case after case, contrary to what might be expected, there has been
independent testimony that people have not submitted to such fear.
They have either, as in the front lines of war, learned to control theirfear or, more dramatically have apparently lost their fear. The action of
the women of the Plaza del Mayo in Buenos Aires who persistently
paraded with the photographs of their "disappeared" husbands orchildren is only one small example of this defiance in face of danger.
Gerald Reitlinger-an early scholar of the Holocaust--gave a large partof the credit for the saving of more than 75 percent of the Jewsin France
from extermination to the refusal of French people to submit and comply in the face of Gestapo terror and other intimidation: "the final solution. ..failed in France because of the sense of decency in the common
man, who, having suffered the utmost depths of self-humiliation,
learnt to conquer fear." When officials conducted mass arrests and private persons resorted to bombings during the Montgomery, Alabama,
bus boycott, the result was increased determination and fearlessness by
the city's African-Americans. Martin Luther King Jr., wrote that 'The
members of the opposition . .. were not aware they were dealing with
Negroes who had been freed from fear. And so every move they madeproved to be a mistake." In Halle, East Germany on June 17, 1953,
although Russian tanks had been patrolling the city streets and thePeople's Police had been firing warning shots into the air, between
60,000 and 80,000 people attended a mass anti-government meeting in

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THREE

the city market place. In Manila in February 1986 masses of peaceful
Filipinos blocked the paths of army tanks sent to attack disobedientmilitary officers and troops.

Combative Nonviolent Discipline
Faced with violent repression, nonviolent resisters, if they have thestrength, must persist and refuse to submit or retreat. They must be
willing to risk punishment as a part of the price of victory. The chancesand severity of repression will vary. This risk is not unique to nonviolent action, however. There are also risks-ustdy far more s e v e r ewhen both sides use violence.
Nonviolent discipline refers especially to the maintenance of persistent nonviolent behavior even in the face of violent repression. However, in planned campaigns, nonviolent disciplinealso includes orderly
adherence to the predetermined strategy, tactics, methods of action,and the like.
There are in history many examples of groups defying overwhelming violence, both violently and nonviolently, while pursuing thestruggle with impressive discipline. Among these examples are thebrave defense by Spartan soldiers who fought to the last man against
the vastly superior Persian army at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. and the1944 uprising against the Nazis by the Jews of the Warsaw ghetto. In a
myriad of cases, nonviolent combatants, too, have overcome fear of
reprisals, or even death, and continued their disciplined defiance.
These examples range from Indian nationalists who in 1930 refused toretreat from their raid on a salt depot at Dharasana in the face of British-ordered beatings that fradured skulls, to the Berlin women who
returned to their protest seeking their Jewish husbands' release despite
the threat of being machine-gunned.
The nonviolent group in a repressive situati~onmust maintain nonviolent discipline to gain increased control over their opponents, toreduce the violence against themselves, and tcb increase their chancesof winning. Maintaining nonviolent discipline jn the face of repression
is not an act of moralistic naivete. Instead, it is a requirement for success and is a prerequisite for advantageous s l in power~
relationships. Nonviolent discipline can be compromised only at the severerisk of contributing to defeat. Other factors are, of course, highly important too, and maintaining nonviolent disci1Aine alone will not ensure victory.
Faced with repression and suffering, the nonviolent group will needto make efforts to strengthen its morale, feelings of solidarity, and de-WIELDING POWER

57

termination to continue the struggle. Advance training in the use ofnonviolent action and how to behave under stress can help in these
efforts. People may also become more disciplined as they learn fromdirect experience that the rigorous application of the nonviolent technique bears great advantages for them. The nonviolent fighters may
also learn from their own experience (and that of others) that their nonviolent response to violence may reduce casualties. While resisters andbystanders do get wounded and killed during nonviolent struggle, thenumbers are consistentlymuch smaller than in comparableviolent resistance movements, such as violent insurrections, guerrilla warfare, andconventional military wars. An awareness of all these factors may help
people to maintain the required discipline during harsh repression.
Opponents may wish the resisters had instead chosen violent means,
which do not present the same kind of enforcement problems. Since theopponents are generally better equipped to deal with violence, they
may therefore deliberately seek to provoke the resisters into violence,either by severe repression or by the use of spies and agents p mcatatrs. For example, in combating the Finnish nonviolent noncooperation movement for independence from tsarist Russia in the first yearsof the twentieth century, the Russian governor-general arranged for
the Ochrana (the Russian secret police) to hire agents pmcatatrs tocommit violence against Russians or to instigate such violence by Finns
to help justify savage repression of the movement.
If the nonviolent group maintains its discipline, persists despite repression and other control measures, and conducts massive noncooperation and defiance involving sigruficant sectors of the populace, theresult may be that the opponents' will is effectively blocked.
The arrest of leaders may simply lead to the movement developingin such a way that it can carry on without a recognizable leadership.
The opponents may make new acts illegal, only to find that attempts torepress defiance at certain points are countered by a broadened nonviolent attack on other fronts. The opponents may find that massive repression, instead of forcing cooperation and obedience, is constantly
met by refusal to submit or to flee. Not only may repression prove
inadequate to control defiant subjects, but agencies of repression may,in extreme cases, also be immobilized by the massive defiance. Theremay be just too many people defylng the system in too many places tobe controlled by the available police and troops.
While the sufferingcan be severe, there is no more reason for alarmin the face of the opponents' anger and repression than there is formilitary officers to panic at the first sign of casualties. The comparable
situation in a nonviolent struggle, however, must be handled wisely. If
it appears that the opponents are simply becoming brutalized, or that

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THREE

resisters are not able to withstand the suffering, a change in tactics andmethods may be required within the framewtork of nonviolent struggle. Barring that, however, there is reason to believe that the brutalities
are a temporary phase, though not necessarily a brief one. Brutality
thrives on fear, anger, or counterviolence. In their absence and where
there is evidence that both the repression and the brutality read upon
and weaken the opponents' own position, the opponents will tend to
reduce their violence.

Political Jiujitsu
Repression of a nonviolent group that both persists in struggle and also
maintains nonviolent discipline triggers the special process of "political jiujitsu." This process throws the opponents off balance politicallybecause their violent thrusts are met with neitkler violent resistance nor
with surrender.
Brutality against a nonviolent group is more difficult to jusbfy (to the
opponents' own people or to the world at large) than brutality against
violent rebels. The degree to which a regime will feel able to defy
world-or d o m e s t i ~ p i n i o nwill of course vary, but a problem remains. News of brutalities may eventually leak out despite censorship,and harsher repression may increase rather than reduce hostility andresistance to the regime.
The opponents' repression, when confronted with the discipline, solidarity, and persistence of the nonviolent challengers, puts the opponents in the worst possible light. As cruelties to nonviolent people
increase, the opponents' regime may appear dill more despicable, andsympathy and support for the nonviolent side may grow still morefrom several quarters. The general population may become more alienated from the opponents' regime and more willing to join the resistance, so that the numbers of the resisting population increase and they
become more determined to continue despite the costs. Persons divorced from the immediate conflict may increase support for the victims of the repression and turn against both the brutalities and thepolicies of the repressing regime. On November 17, 1989, Czech riot
police brutally suppressed nonviolent demonstrators demanding freeelections and democracy in the streets of Prague. These beatings galvanized political opposition to the hard-line Communist regime. Czechs
and Slovaks erected shrines at the main sites of the beatings, raisingthose injured to the stature of heroes. Hundreds of thousands took to
the streets daily following the police actions. A s one student put it, theWIELDING POWER

59

beatings were "the spark that started the whole movement."
four weeks the Communist hard-liners were forced to resign, and theCommunist Party had to relinquish its majority of Cabinet positions.
The effect of national and international public opinion varies widelyand cannot be relied upon to effect major change. Nevertheless, such
opinion may play an important role. It may rally to the support of thenonviolent challengers and may at times lead to significant politicaland economic pressures against the opponents' regime.
Finally even the opponents' own supporters, agents, and troops
may become disturbed by the brutalities committed against nonviolent
people and may begin to doubt the justice of their government's policies as well as the morality of the repression. Their initial uneasinessmay grow into dissent and at times even into noncooperation and disobedience, perhaps leading to strikes and mutinies.
Thus, if repression leads to an increase in the number of nonviolent
fighters and enlarges defiance, and if it leads to sufficient opposition
among the supporters of the opponents so that their capacity to deal
with the defiance and continue their policies is reduced, the repression
will clearly have rebounded against the opponents. This is "politicaljiujitsu" at work.
Significant elements of political jiujitsu have occurred in a great variety of cases. The massaclre of hundreds of nonviolent petitioners near
the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg in January 1905 turned hitherto
loyal masses into defiant revolutionaries, launching a year-long revolution throughout the Russian Empire. The killings of hundreds of nonviolent demonstrators by Russian troops in February 1917 was a major
factor in producing widespread mutinies and desertions of the tsar's
soldiers, making it impossibleto save the imperial system from the predominantly nonviolent February Revolution. Severe repression in the
Ruhr in 1923 not only aroused international support for the Germans
but opposition to the policy in France itself. The brutality of British repression of nonviolent nationalists in India, in the 1920s and 1930s especially, aroused much opposition in Britain and added to the growthof support for Indian independence. The Sharpevillemassacre in South
Africa in 1960 aroused massive international protests, boycotts, andembargoes. The brutal repression in 1963 of nonviolent Buddhists opposing the Ngo Dinh Diem regime caused the United States to withdraw its support from the government to which it had been committed
for years. Beatings, killings, bombings, and the like against civil rights
demonstrators in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, as in Montgomery, Atlanta, Birmingham, and various places in Mississippi, rebounded to increase protests and gain widespread American and in-

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THREE

ternational support for an end to both the repression and the segregation policies. The massacre of hundreds, if not thousands, of Chinese inT
i Square, other parts of Beijing, anti elsewhere in China on
June 4,1989 (and the following days), further undermined the authority of the Communist regime and aroused deep opposition to it inChina and throughout the world. The full consequences of this massacre await to be seen.

Four Mechanisms of Change
Despite the variations among cases of nonviolent action, it is possible
to distinguish four general "mechanisms" of: change that operate innonviolent action. These are conversion, accomimodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration.
Conversion
In conversion, the opponents, as a result of the actions of the nonviolent group, adopt a new point of view and accept the goals of thatgroup. Such change may be brought about by reason and argumentation, though it is doubtful that such intellectual efforts alone will produce conversion. Conversion in nonviolent action is likely also to involve the opponents' emotions, beliefs, attitudes, and moral system.
The nonviolent group may deliberately seek conversion so that in theend the opponents not only grant the objectives of the nonviolent groupbut also want to grant them, feeling that it is right to do so.
In conversion attempts, the suffering of the nonviolent combatants
may play a major role in affecting the opponents' emotions. Conversion will often be difficult, in part because barriers to clear perception
may exist. These include the phenomenon of '"social distanceff-a failure to recognize members of another social group as fellow humanbeings who merit empathy and respect. It may therefore take a considerable period of time to eliminate social distance and achieve conversion, if it ever does happen.
One case where it did occur took place in Vykom, South India, in
19244925. Gandhi's supporters sought to gain the right of the "untouchables" to use a road passing an orthodox Brahman temple. A
group of high-caste Hindu reformers together with their untouchable
friends first attempted simply to walk down the road, stopping in frontof the temple. Orthodox Hindus attacked the protesters severely, andthe maharajah's police arrested some of them, who received prison sen-

WIELDING POWER

61

tences of up to a year. Volunteers arrived from all over India and acontinuous vigil was held in the road at the police barricade. Volunteers, operating in shifts, stood in an attitude of prayer through the hotsunny months and the rainy season, sometimes with water to theirshoulders while the police patrolled in boats. When the maharajah's
government finally removed the barricade, the demonstrators declined
to walk forward until the orthodox Hindus changed their minds.
Finally, after sixteen months, the local Brahmans said: 'We cannot
any longer resist the prayers that have been made to us, and we areready to receive the untouchables." The case had wide reverberations
throughout India.
The V j b m vigil is far from typical of nonviolent action, however.
For a variety of reasons, efforts to convert opponents by nonviolent
suffering may be ineffective. Also, some nonviolent strategistsmay reject convmion as undesirable, unnecessary, or impossible. Hence they
may seek change by the other mechanisms of accommodation, nonviolent coercion, or even disintegration. In most situations, the outcomesare likely to result from the combined pressure of elements of all fourmechanisms, no one of which being fully carried to culmination. The
most successful applications of nonviolent action may involve the wiseand deliberate combination of these elements. For example, efforts toconvert some members of the opponents' population can assist accommodation and successful efforts to convert the opponents' soldiers canlead to nonviolent coercion.

Accommodation
Accommodation is an intermediary mechanism between conversion
and nonviolent coercion. The opponents are neither converted nor
nonviolently coerced; yet elements of both mechanisms are involved in
the opponents' decision to grant concessions to the nonviolent group.
This is probably the most common mechanism of the four in successful
nonviolent campaigns. Here, the opponents grant all or some demands
without fundamentally changing their minds about the issues.
In contrast to conversion, the mechanism of accommodation (as well
as nonviolent coercion and disintegration) brings success by changing
the social, economic, or political situation by nonviolent action, rather thanchanging the minds and hearts of the opponents' leadership. Basic
power relationships have changed so as to alter the entire picture.
Accommodation occurs, however, while the opponents are still able
to choose whether to grant concessions. The opponents may agree toaccommodate in order to undercut internal dissension and actual op-

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position within their own group. In economic struggles, accommodation may result from an effort to minimize losses, especially fromstrikes and economic boycotts. The opponents,may also decide to accommodate voluntarily to the demands if they anticipate that the nonviolent movement will grow in strength. The specific issues at stake
may be of less importance than the possible consequences of a protracted struggle, which may include the populace discovering its considerable power. Such consequences may have long-term effects on thesocial structure and political processes of the society. A face-savingformula may be important in a settlement resulting from accommodation,with the opponents not wanting to appear that they have capitulated to
the resistance.
The mechanism of accommodation operates in the settlement ofmany cases when nonviolent action is used. 11: is most obvious in thesettlement of labor strikes, in which (as is almcost always the case) the
final settlement of issues lies somewherebetween the original positionsof the employers and the trade union. In larger international conflicts,
accommodation is also sometimes involved. I I Uindependence~
fromBritain in 1947 did not occur directly as a consiuence of a particular
nonviolent campaign, but highly significant elements of accommodation were involved, derived in part from the simggles of the previous
decades. Accommodation resulted from the recognition that independence for India was a legitimate policyl that it .would be exceptionallydifficult if not impossible even with British d i t a r y force to keep India
under British control, and that economic gains to Britain from India
had disappeared in part because of the boycott movements and thehigh cost of maintaining administration and repression.
In many situations, neither conversion nor iaccommodation will beachieved, for some opponents will remain unwilling to grant any of thedemands of the nonviolent resisters. A third mechanism of change thenremains open to the Challengers: nonviolent coercion, which can lead tosuccess contrary to the will of the opponents.

"Coercion" needs to be understood here with a more precise meaning
than is frequently the case. Coercion does not here mean submitting
under threat or use of superior force. Instead, "coercion" here is theforcing or blocking of change against the opponents' will. The opponents' ability to a d effectively has been taken away from them, but they
still retain sufficient power to hold their positions and to capitulate to
the resisters' demands. In short, "nonviolent coercion" as a mechanism

WIELDING POWER

63

of nonviolent action occurs when goals are achieved against the will of
the opponents, but short of the disintegration of the opponents' system.
Nonviolent action becomes coercive when the nonviolent resisters
succeed directly or indirectly in withholding to a major degree the necessary sources of the opponents' political power: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources,
and sanctions.
Nonviolent coercion may be produced when the opponents' will isblocked in any of three ways. First, the defiance may become too widespread and massive to be controlled by repressive measures. Changes
in the status quo may be m a d m r blocked-by the mass action, sothat the opponentsf agreement or acquiescence is irrelevant. Second,
the system may be paralyzed by the resistance. Noncooperation may
make it impossible for the social, economic, and political systems tocontinue to operate unless the resistersfdemands are met and the noncooperators resume their normal duties. Third, even the opponents'
ability to apply repression may be undermined and at times dissolved.
This occurs when their soldiers and police mutiny their bureaucracy
refuses to provide assistance, or their populace withdraws authority
and support. In any of these circumstances, or in any combination ofthem, the opponents may find that they are unable to defend their policies or system in the face of determined and widespread nonviolent
action, even though their aims remain unchanged. This frustration of
the opponents' efforts is usually directly proportionate to the extent of
the noncooperation and defiance.
Blockage of the opponentsf will appears to result more frequently
from massive resistance and paralysis of the system than from the dissolution of the opponents' ability to apply repression. That patternmay, however, be reversed in certain circumstances. In nonviolent coercion, nonviolent action has so altered the social and political situationthat the opponents can no longer wield power in ways contrary to thewill of the nonviolent group.
In some very successful labor strikes, the employers have simply
given in to virtually all the demands of the unions (including, in past
decades, recognition of those organizations as bargaining agents) because the employers no longer had an effective choice. Tsar Nicholas I1of Imperial Russia, completely against his beliefs, issued the constitutional manifesto of October 17,1905, granting a duma (parliament).He
seems to have had no choice, although he remained tsar. The 1905
Great October Strike in Russia was so effective and inclusive that for awhile the government was simply unable to govern and the country
was gripped by what was called "some strange paralysis." The departure from the presidency of both General Hernhdez Martinez of El

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THREE

Salvador and General Ubico of Guatemala in the spring of 1944 in theface of massive economic shutdowns and political noncooperation
were cases of coercion. The departures occurred even before their administrative, police, and military systems colla.psed around them.
Disintegration
When the sources of power are nearly completely withheld from the
opponents, they will not simply be coerced. Their system of government may in fad be dissolved. This mechanism of nonviolent change
operates by removing the sources of power t~oa sufficiently extreme
degree that the opponents' system of government simply falls apart.
Only individuals or very small, largely powerless, groups remain. Coercion does not take place because there is no longer any effective unit
to be coerced. The populace has overwhelmix~glyrepudiated the authority of the opponents either to rule or to l~rovideany leadership,
guidance, or controL V i y no one will any longer assist the former
dominant group. Hence, those individuals and groups that once werepowerful no longer possess the expertise and economic resources thatenabled them to function in the past. In addition, the police and military forces have either mutinied against their former masters or have
simply fallen apart so that no organized system of repression remains.
The mechanism of disintegration is the most extreme application ofwithdrawal of the sources of power.
As a result of the massive noncooperation in the February 1917Revolution in Imperial Russia, Tsar Nicholas I1 abdicated, but his militarycommander in Petrograd did not know to whom to surrender. George
Katkov concluded that the Imperial government had just been "dissolved and swept away." In the 1920 Kapp Putsch and the Algiers generals' coup in 1961, it is clear that as a result of the withholding andwithdrawal of needed support, both of those attempted usurpations
simply disintegrated.
When disintegration of the opponents' regime occurs in the absenceof an alternative legitimate government, other governmental institutions will develop. Sometimes a parallel government (discussed earlier
in this chapter) emerges. If it has already done so, or if the legitimate
government has survived in some form from the past, as before a coup&&at or invasion, it can, at the point of the opponents' disintegration,
expand its authority and influence and consolidate its power. This is atime for vigdance by the resisters, as unrepresentative military or political groups may attempt to seize control of the rstate apparatus in orderto establish a new dictatorship, rather than allowing the development
or restoration of a popularly based democratic system.

WIELDING POWER

65

Factors Influencing Coercion and Disintegration
A variety of factors may produce nonviolent coercion or disintegration.
The sources of power affected will vary, as will the degree to which
they are severed. Variations, therefore, exist in the pattern of action that
produces the nonviolent coercion or disintegration: massive defiance,
economic or political paralysis, or mutiny. Some or all of the following
factors will determine the outcome:the number of nonviolent resisters and their proportion in the general population;
the degree of the opponents' dependence on the nonviolent resisters forsources of their power;
the skill of the nonviolent resisters in applying the technique, including the
choice of strategy, tactics, and methods, and their ability to implementthem;
the length of time that the noncooperation and defiance can be maintained;
the degree of sympathy and support for the nonviolent resisters from third
parties;the means of control open to the opponents and used by them to induce
consent and force a resumption of cooperation, and the maction of nonviolent resisters to those means;the degree to which the opponents' subjects, administrators,and agents s u p
port or refuse to support them, and the action that they may undertake towithhold that support and to assist the nonviolent resisters; andthe opponents' estimate of the probable future course of the nonviolent
struggle.

Removing the Sources of PowerThe specific methods used to remove the sources of power will differ
from case to case. Variation also occurs in who severs them. It may be
the nonviolent group, third parties, disenchanted members of the o pponents' own group, or a combination of these factors. These variations
make it imperative to carefully analyze strategies that were used inpast conflicts or that may be used in the future.

Authority
The nonviolent challenge to opponents clearly demonstrates the degree to which their authority is already undermined. The struggle may
help to alienate more of the opponents' supporters. At times there will

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be a clear transfer of loyalty from the opponents to a rival authority,even to a competing parallel government.
The denial of authority to usurpers and aggressors is a key elementin preventing the establishment of a new government of oppressors.
This was clearly seen in all four of the cases described in Chapter One,but it was most obvious in the defense against the Kapp Putsch and theFrench generals' coup in Algiers. The persistent refusal to grant theusurpers legitimacy doomed the attacks.
In another example, in February 1943 the Dhtch Reformed Church
and the Roman Catholic Church in the Netherllands urged their members to commit civil disobedience and to refwe collaboration with
Nazi-occupation authorities as religious duties. This action by the
Dutch churches reduced the authority of occupation officials and inaeased the legitimacy of noncooperation and tiisobedience.
Human resources

Widespread nonviolent action may also redu~ceor sever the humanresources necessary to the opponents' political power, as when themasses of subjects who maintain and operate the system withhold theirgeneral obedience and cooperation. Both the economicand the politicalsystems operate because of the contributions of many individuals, organizations, and subgroups. The principle of the general strike cantherefore be applied to both the economic and the political system.
In the case of a foreign occupation, two distinct population groups
are involved. Although withdrawal of human resources by both thepeople under occupation and those in the occupier country would be
most powerful, the noncooperation of only the people in the occupied
country may prove effective given the presence of certain other favorable conditions.
The sheer multiplication of noncooperating, clisobedient, and defiant
members of the grievance group creates severe enforcement problems
for the opponents. Also, the opponents' traditional supporters may attimes withdraw their assistance, thereby rectucing the opponents'
power further.
The withdrawal of human resources will also affect other needed
sources of power (skills, knowledge, and matelrial resources). Thus, ina conflict, the opponents will require greater power at the very timethat their enforcement capacity is being reduced. If the resistance
grows while the opponents' power weakens, eventually the regime
may become powerless. This occurred on a relatively small scale
among the troops under British command in the Northwest Frontier

WIELDING POWER

67

Province of British India in April 1930 during the 1930-1931 civil disobedience campaign. In Peshawar, at least 30 and perhaps 125 resisters
were shot to death on April 23, 1930. After this,two platoons of theRoyal Garhwal Rifles, which were ordered to Peshawar, refused to proceed on the ground that their duty did not include shooting "unarmed
brethren." The night of April 24 the British withdrew their troops from
Peshawar, temporarily abandoning the city, which was then controlled
by the local Indian National Congress Committee until British-led reinforcements with air support returned on May 4.
Other examples of withdrawal of human resources include the walkout of twenty-nine Philippine computer operators who refused to assist the perpetration of election fraud and the "strike" of major parts of
the Philippine army which simply refused to carry out repression andstayed in an army camp, neither initiating civil war nor obeying ordersof the Marcos government.
In Norway during the Nazi occupation in December 1940, the entire Norwegian Supreme Court resigned in protest against the declaration by Reichskommissar Terboven that the Court had no right todeclare his German occupation 'laws" unconstitutional. In 1942 thefascist government of Norwegian "Minister-President" Vidkun Quisling ordered the creation of a dictatorially controlled teachers organization with compulsory membership. It was to be the model for other"corporations" to be established later, and also an instrument for indoctrinating school children. The teachers, however, refused all cooperation with the new organization. Hundreds were arrested andinterned in a concentration camp. Parents protested the government
action and the teachers not arrested refused to be intimidated. Eightmonths later the teachers were released. Quislings desired "Corporative State" never came into existence in Norway the fascist teachers'organization was stillborn, and the schools were never used for fascist
propaganda.
Skills and Knowledge

Certain individuals or groups possess special skills or knowledge ofparticular importance; they include administrators, officials, technicians, and advisors. Withdrawal of their assistance disproportionately
weakens the rulers' power. Thus, in addition to outright refusal, reduced assistance may also be important.
During the 1923 Kapp Putsch,Dr. Kapp pronounced that a government of experts was needed. However, when qualified men virtually
unanimously refused appointments to his "Cabinet," Kapp was left

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THREE

without their expertiseI having been repudiated by potential competent aides. Officers in the Ministry of War mefused to obey orders.
Reichsbank officials refused to allow Kapp to withdraw ten million
marks, citing the lack of an authorized signature. (Allof the undersecretaries refused to sign and Kapp's own signature was deemed worthless.) No notable politicians supported Kapp. Tlhe Berlin security police
reversed their initial support and demanded Kapp's resignation, andnumerous other civil servants refused their ccmperation. Kapp could
not even find a secretary or a typewriter (all of which were locked inclosets) to have his initial proclamation typed; Ihence, it did not appear
in the next day's newspapers. This denial of stdministrative cooperation, combined with a massive general strike, forced the Kappists toadmit defeat and to retreat from Berlin.
Intangible Factors
Habits of obedience and loyalty to authority may also be threatened bywidespread nonviolent action.
The East German Rising of June 16-17,1953, produced what was toCommunists and their supporters the shocking scene of workers publicly protesting in the streets and denouncing the purported workers'
state. This breaking of the pattern of automatic support and obedience
contributes to further questioning by the rest of the population ofwhether or not to obey.
Erosion of faith in Communist ideology and its supposedly noble
goals has been multiplied by the impact of military and government
repression in such places as East Germany, Czc2choslovalciarHungary,and Poland. Such repression not only led many. Communists and theirsupporters in those countries to lose their ideological commitment, butalso led to largescale disaffection by foreign C~ommunistparties, suchas in Italy, and to the resignations of Commutnist Party members invarious countries.
In other situations, as in Hungary in 1956, massive conformity to thesystem that had existed for years was shattered as millions of people
realized that a vast percentage of the population in fact hated the regime. Initial small acts of defiance helped to trigger that awareness andto launch the first major, nonviolent, phase of the Hungarian Revolution. In 1989 ideological erosion had grown so great-and the people's
willingness to conform had virtually dissolved-in East Germany andCzechoslovakia that the Communist regimes in each country wereforced to accept fundamentalpolitical changes. In Czechoslavakia, theCommunist Party was even forced to hand over the presidency.

WIELDING P O W E R

69Frequently in the course of a nonviolent movement, major spokespersons for accepted moral, religious, and political standards of thesociety take the lead in denouncing, or support the denunciation of, theoppressive system and urge the population to resist, to change, or todestroy it.

Material Resources
Nonviolent action may reduce or sever the supply of material resources to the opponents. Sixty-one of 198 identified methods of nonviolent action involve economic boycotts or labor strikes, or combinations of them, operating domestically or internationally. They aredesigned to disrupt, reduce, or destroy the availability of material resources, transportation, raw materials, means of communication, andeven, in extreme cases,the capacity of the economic system to function.
Large-scale nonviolent struggles in which the issues were predominantly or avowedly political have often employed economic forms of
noncooperation. These have included the noncooperation campaignsof the American colonists against British rule in 1765-1775 and the Indian noncooperation movements against the British in the 1920s and1930s. Both had enormous economic impact on the British economy
and govenunent and induced powerful pressures within Britain insupport of the colonials.
While there has been much dispute in recent decades about the effectiveness of international economic sanctions, it is clear that many specific cases of their use have often been illconceived and virtually unprepared. However, as the Arab oil embargo of 1973 demonstrated,such sanctions can be very effective in inducing changes in a government's policies (in this particular case, numerous countries altered theirforeign policies toward the Middle East).
Within a country., labor strikes for both political and economic objectives have been at times widespread and politically significant. A government whose nature or policies produces strikes that paralyze theeconomy is unlikely to be very popular or durable. Although not a l l
strikes succeed, they can at times be powerful instnunents. The resistance to the Kapp Putsch in March 1920 included what was called "thegreatest strike the world had ever seen." This was in spite of the factthat Kapp made picketing a capital offense. The role of strikes in othersituations has already been noted.
The Nazis viewed mass noncooperation in the form of a generalstrike as a most dangerous weapon, especially as they were seeking toconsolidate control of the state. After the burning of the Reichsfag (par-

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THREE

liament building) on February 27,1933-possibly by the Nazis themselves as a provocation to facilitate repression of opponents and thus
help gain full state control-the Nazis issued cln March 1a decree thatprovided punishments both for "provocation t(oarmed conflict against
the state1' and for "provocation to a general strike." Delarue in his
study, The Gestapo, writes that at this time "what the Nazis feared themost was a general strike."
Strike, even general strikes, are not tools to be used routinely on any
issue, and especially in defense crises. Their intended impact, thestrength of the population to conduct them, anti the means for the society to sustain itself during the economic struggle, all have to be carefully considered.
Both strikes and economic boycotts demonstrate the capacity of nonviolent struggle to weaken and remove another of the main sources ofpower---economic resources-from existing or would-be rulers. With
control of the economy, including transportation, communications,and the like, in the hands of a resisting population, any government isin a vulnerable position. This is especially true of upstart dictators or
foreign aggressors in the early stages of attempting to establish political control of the society. If one of their key objectives is economic exploitation of the society, then they are in double trouble.
Sanctions

Even the opponents' ability to apply sanctionsmay on occasion be negatively influenced by nonviolent action. The supply of military or police weapons may be threatened by a foreign ~counwsrefusal to sellthem, or by strikes in the weapons and munitions factories and transportation system. In some cases the number of agents of repressionpolice and troops-may be curtailed as the number of volunteers forthe military forces declines and potential conscripts refuse duty. Police
and troops may carry out orders inefficiently or may refuse them completely-that is, mutiny-potentially leading to nonviolent coercion of
the opponents or disintegration of their system of government.
Mutinies and the unreliability of troops in repressing the predominantly nonviolent Russian revolutions of 1905and February 1917werehighly significant factors in the weakening and final downfall of thetsar's regime. The Nazis recognized that if they lost control of the army
their power would be drastically weakened. Goebbels revealed that inearly February 1938 the Nazis most feared not a coup d'6tat but thecollective resignation of all high-ranking military officers.
During the East German Rising of 1953, police sometimes withdrew
or willingly gave up their weapons. Some East German soldiers muti-

WIELDING POWER

nnied. Even some Soviet soldiers were sympathetic, as evidenced by reports that a thousand Soviet officers and others refused to fire at demonstrators and that fifty-two Communist Party members and soldiers
were shot for disobedience after the collapse of the rising. Reports that
the Soviets had to replace all of their initial invasion force in Czechoslovakia in 1968 after only a few days further demonstrate the capacity of nonviolent action to weaken the reliability of the opponents1
troops and, therewith, the opponentsf capacity to apply sanctions. Thispower potential, if developed and enhanced, may be highly importantin future struggles against usurpations and invasions.

Failure or Success?
No type of struggle or action is guaranteed to produce success in the
short term every time it is used. This is especially true if no consideration is given to how the means of action are applied, the circumstancesof their use, and the degree to which the requirements for effectivenessare fulfilled.
The improvised nonviolent struggles of the past have varied widelyin the degree to which they succeeded or failed to reach their avowed
objectives. The struggles have also varied in the degree to which theapparently unsuccessful conflicts contributed to the gaining of theirobjectives at a later date. The record, however, includes significantly
more cases of full and partial success than are generally recognized.
Among those successes can be counted both small and large campaigns in which nonviolent struggle was the sole or the predominant
technique.
These successes include the gaining of de facto independence formost of the American colonies before the War of Independence; thecollapse of the tsarist system of Imperial Russia in February 1917; thedefeat of the Kapp Putsch and preservation of the Weimar Republic in
1920; the saving of 1,500 Jewish men in Berlin in 1943 by their wives'protests; the rejection of fascist control of schools in 1942by Norwegianteachers and the general population; the ousting of the dictators of El
Salvador and Guatemala in 1944; the defeat of the military coup in
Bolivia in 1978; the defeat of the Algiers generals' coup in 1961; theouster of military dictators in the Sudan in 1964 and 1985; the oustingof the military regime and return to constitutional democracy in Thailand in 1973; the defeat of election fraud and ouster of President Marcos in the Philippines in 1986; the relegalization of Solidarity, the restoration of reasonably free elections, and the selection of a Solidarity
Prime Minister in Poland in 1989, and the sudden democratization inlate 1989 of East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. Many other

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cases could be cited that have been signiscant in the advancement of
popular control over rulers.
While not the only factor, nonviolent struggle also has played a verysignificant role in a series of other major changes in domestic and international situations. These include the extension of religious liberties in
Britain and Massachusetts in the seventeenthand eighteenth centuries;
the struggle against slavery in the United States prior to the Civil War;the recognition of labor unions and improvements in wages and working conditions; the gaining of universal manhood suffrage, especiallyin Sweden and Belgium around the turn of the c:entury; the securing ofvoting rights for women in the United States and Britain; the saving of
the lives of many Jews from the Holocaust during the Second World
War, especially in Bulgaria, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and France;
the abolition of legalized racial segregation in the United States; thegaining of independencefor India, Pakistan, and Ghana; the gaining ofrights of emigration for Soviet Jews in the IWOs; the movement for"civilianization" of government in Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s; andthe growth of African economic power in South Africa through strikes,
the organization of African trade unions, and economic boycotts in the
1970s and 1980s.
"Success" has been used here to indicate the achievement of substantive objectives by a party in a conflict. This is quite independent ofability to inflict casualties and destruction on opponents. 'Tailure"then indicates that the substantive objectives have not been achieved.
As in other types of conflicts, partial successes and partial failures alsoof course occur.
In addition to measuring success or failure im attaining objectives,
one should also examine two other factors. These are the (1) increases
and decreases in the absolute and relative power of the contending
groups and (2) changes in the wider influence of and sympathy foreach group and its objectives. These factors may contribute to a settlement of unresolved issues in the future,which also may, or may not,bring to fruition the original goals of an earlier nonviolent struggle.
Failure of nonviolent action may be caused by weaknesses in thegroup employing the technique, by the group not fulfilling important
requirementsfor effectiveness, by its acting in W i a F that undermine theoperation of the technique, by its capitulating or turning to violence inthe face of repression, or by neglecting to develop and apply effective
strategy and tactics. These factors are similar to those that contribute todefeat in military action, except that in cases of nonviolent struggle theopponents' overwhelming military capacity need not be so influential.
If the group using nonviolent action does not possess sufficient internal strength, determination, ability, and related qualities to make non-

WIELDING POWER

73

violent action effective, then repetition of phrases and words like "nonviolence" will not save it. There is no substitute for genuine strengthand skill in applying nonviolent action If the nonviolent group does
not possess these qualities in sufficient quantity to cope with its opponents, the group is unlikely to win.
On the other hand, if the nonviolent fighters are determined, use
intelligently chosen strategies and tactics, skillfully a d to advance theircause, fulfillthe requirementsfor the working of the technique, and areable to persist in the face of repression, then victory is possible. Suchsuccess is likely to have significant advantages over victory by violence. These advantages include fuller and more lasting achievement of
the objectives, more equitable power relationships, greater understanding and perhaps even respect between the former contending
parties, and increased ability to defend the gains from future attackers
or oppressors.
Of the four main examples given in Chapter One, the resistance tothe Kapp Putsch and to the coup d'etat in Algiers were both fully successful. Both attempts to seize control of the state apparatus and impose new governments and policies were defeated, with the perpetrators' efforts simply dissolving in the face of nonviolent resistance.
The Ruhrkampf against the Franco-Belgian invasion and occupation
produced mixed results, and only after some time. The withdrawal did
not come immediately in response to nonviolent resistance, but only
after it had weakened and been called off by the German government.
On the other hand, the invasion forces did finally withdraw and theRhineland was not separated from Germany. With the aid of international intervention from Britain and the United States, the German
reparations payments continued, but at a highly reduced rate more
approximate to what Germany could afford to pay. The Poincare government, which had launched the invasion, admitted its failure to gain
its objectives. It had been responsible for such brutal repression thatmany French people came to sympathize with the Germans, who hadvery recently been enemies in war. The Poincare govemment was defeated in the next national election.
The Czechoslovak case was in the end a defeat. In April 1969,
the Dubiek reform-minded group was removed from the leadershipof the Communist Party and the government, being replaced by themore compliant Husak leadership. However, even with the compromise in the Moscow negotiations discussed earlier, the change inleadership had taken the Soviets eight months to achieve, instead of the
few days they had reportedly envisaged. Signhcantly., the Soviets,
backed by a half million troops, had to shift from direct military action
to slower political manipulations, working with sympathetic sections

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THREE

of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to gain one limited point after
another. In the end, the collapse of the resistance leadership in faceof a Soviet ultimatum (made after anti-Russian riots in April, which
may have been staged) was a more significant fador in the defeat
than any loss of wiU or capacity by the populace. The economic andpolitical costs had been high for both sides. Siguticantlyp. however,both sides had been spared the high cost of death and destructionthat would have inevitably followed a Czechoslovakian military resistance. Discouragement and disillusionmen~tamong Czechs andSlovaks was also part of the price paid. However, the population
survived with its honor intact to be able to move again at a later
date toward greater human rights and democratic freedoms. Indeed
in late 1989, Czechs and Slovaks forced the collapse of Communist
one-party rule through massive protest and defiance. The previously
jailed dissident, Vaclav Havel, was installed as president and theoncdeposed Alexander DubEek was elected dlairman of the National
Parliament.
Sometimes, the results of nonviolent action have been a "draw" oran interim settlement, exhibiting characteristics of an accommodation.
At the end of the 1930-1931 independence campaign in India, formal
negotiations took place between Mohandas Gamdhi, representing theIndian National Congress, and Lord Irwin, the Viceroy representing
the British government. The result was known as the Gandhi-Irwin
Pact. It contained provisions that were seen as advantageous to boththe British and the Indians, although it clearly did not represent an
Indian victory.
In other cases, a fuller, though still incomplete, victory may beachieved. The struggle then may be terminated with negotiation and aformal agreement. In some cases, the opponents;may without a formal
settlement, simply institute or accept changes desired by the nonviolent resisters. The opponents might then even deny that the shifts inpolicy had anything to do with the resistance. In extreme cases, theopponents' regime may completely collapse or disintegrate as a resultof the withdrawal of the sources of power as already noted.
In the long run, the most significant result of nonviolent struggle islikely to be its impact on the resolution of the issues at stake, on theattitudes of the groups toward each other, andl on the distribution of
power between and within the contending groups. In more extreme
situations, acceptable results will be measured only by drastic alteration in the nature of the opponents' policies or system of government,
or in its full defeat or disintegration.The latter is especiallytrue in cases
involving extreme systems of oppression and dictatorship and of attempted internal usurpations and international aggression.

WIELDING POWER

Changes in the Struggle Group
Participation in nonviolent action is likely to have several important
effects on the people taking part. As is true of groups engaged in othertypes of conflict, the group using nonviolent action tends to become
more unified, to improve its internal cooperation, and to increase its
feelings of solidarity.
Participation in nonviolent action both requires and produces important psychological and attitudinal changes within the nonviolent
group. These may include increased self-esteem, self-respect, and selfconfidence, and reduced fear and submissiveness. There appear to be
special qualities in nonviolent action that contribute to these results. As
people learn about and experience this technique, they may also gain
greater awareness of their own power and increased confidence intheir ability to influence the course of events. If the nonviolent struggle
is conducted reasonably competently, the participants are also likely to
become more skilled in the formulation and implementation of strategies and tactics, more capable of maintaining nonviolent discipline in
the course of the struggle, and more able to see the conflict throughdifficult periods. The internal strength of a resisting society and thetenacity of its loci of power are also likely to grow.
These changes in the nonviolent resisters, the grievance group, andthe society at large are likely to have important influences on the opponents and the course of the conflict. These are precisely the sort ofchanges that are detrimental to any type of dictatorship, of either domestic or foreign origin.

Even against Dictatorships
Aristotle pointed out that a tyrant "wants his subjects to have no mutual confidence, no power, little spirit." This is the opposite of the situation produced by participation in nonviolent struggle, as has been
demonstrated in case after case. Despite the measures taken by tyrants
to deny the subjects those capacities and to gain approval as a supposedly benevolent ruler, Aristotle concluded, ""Still, oligarchy and tyranny are shorter-lived than any other constitution." Had more attention been paid to that insight over the centuries, and particularly inrecent decades, we would now have a deeper understanding of thereasons for the relatively short duration of dictatorships. With that understanding people could have further explored how to exacerbate theweaknesses of dictatorships. Had that been done, it is likely that humanity would now be much further along in developing the capacity to

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THREE

prevent and destroy dictatorships and oppression and to gain and preserve human freedom and justice.
Dictatorships are not as omnipotent as their leaders would have us
believe. Instead, dictatorships contain inherent weaknesses that contribute to their inefficiency, reduce the thoroughness of their controls,
and limit their longevity. At least seventeen such weaknesses havebeen identified. These include routinization of the operation of the system; erosion of ideology; inadequate or incorrect information received
from below by the rulers; inefficiency in the operation of a l l aspects ofthe system; internal conflictsamong the leadership; restlessness among
intellectuals and students; an apathetic or skeptical public; accentuation of regional, class, cultural, or national differences; competition
among the political police or military forces with the ruling group;
overconcentration of decision making; and the problem faced by all
governments of securing a high degree of reliable cooperation and obedience from the general population.
These weaknesses, and others, can be pinpointed and resistance canbe concentrated on those "cracks in the monolith." Nonviolent struggle is much more suited to that task than is violence.
As the historical record shows, nonviolent struggle has been usedagainst dictatorships, even very extreme ones, in the form of protests,
resistance, uprisings, disruptions, and revolutions. These have occurred in Latin America and Asia, in Nazi-occulpied countries, in Communist-ruled Eastern European countries, in the Soviet Union, and in
China.
The conditions for nonviolent struggle in sulch cases were difficult
not only because of the repressive political tircumstances. Limited
knowledge of this technique, lack of preparation, and the almost complete absence of training have greatly compounded the difficulties. In
addition, nonviolent action has also been commonly, used amidst conditions of great confusion and in the face of unexpected crises or
known terror.
The fad that such cases have occurzed in the past suggests that nonviolent struggle will be used again in the future. Even the would-be
tyrants to come will never be able to free themselves from dependence
upon the society they would rule.
Nonviolent struggle in the future is Likely to have greater success tothe degree that the participants have advance knowledge of the requirements and strategic principles that make this technique more effective. Struggles conducted with increased knowledge and preparation should be much less difficult than the impnwised cases of the past.
However, the many problems in conducting these future struggles andWIELDING POWER

77

in developing strategies that people can use to disintegrate well-established dictatorships require urgent, careful attention. The massacre ofhundreds of protesters in China in June 1989 is a reminder that all dictatorships do not fall easily, even when faced with massive popular
repudiation.
Gaining and dispersing knowledge of the methods of nonviolent
struggle, solving the problems of resistance, developing wise strategies, and launching programs of preparation and training are therefore
major components of the task of developing a post-military defense
policy, a policy that can deter and defend against both internal andexternal attacks and that can prevent the establishmentof new dictatorships in any form.

Notes
For a full account and analysis of the nature of nonviolent struggle,
with supporting evidence and docrumentation for the analysis andpoints made in this chapter, see Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent
Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 63-817. This book includes
analyses of characteristics, methods, and dynamics, including the process of political jiujitsu and three of the mechanisms of change. The separation of "disintegration" from "nonviolent coercion" occurred following its publications.
Most of the examples briefly cited in this chapter are taken from The
Politics of Nonviolent Action. When there is no specific reference given
for a case cited in this chapter, the reader is referred to the index andQuotafootnotes of The Politics of Nonviolent Action (hereafter TPONA).
tions from that volume are cited here by the page number and the footnote number so that the original source can be located more easily.
Occasionally, the full original source is included here. The order of references here follows that in the text.
For an account of the Salvadoran case, see Patricia Parkman, Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador: The Fall of Maximiliano Herrufndez Martinez (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988).
For a short account of the Guatemalan case, see TPONA, pp. W93.
On the Hungarian writers' memorandum, see TPONA, p. 125, n. 33.
On the women's suffrage demonstration, see TPONA, p. 126, n. 39.
On adion by the Bulgarian Jews, see TPONA, p. 153, n. 178. The source
is Matei Yulzari, 'The Bulgarian Jews in the Resistance Movement," inYuri Suhl, They Fought Back The Stoy of Jewish Resistance in Nazi Europe(New York Crown Publishers, 1967), pp. 277-278.

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THREE

The source on the Brazilian demonstrations is Maria Elena Alves,lecture at the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, March 16,1!386.
On the Czech newspaper boycott, see TPONA,, p. 222 n. 21, and Josef
Korbel, The Communist Sutroersion of Czechoslmdia 1938-1948, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959).
For information on the East Berlin demonstration, see the New YorkTimes, November 5,1989, p. 1. On the Prague demonstration, see the
New York Times, November 26,1989, p. 1.
On the two-hour general strike in Czechoslovakia, see the New YorkTimes,November 28,1989, p. Al.
On the 'people's inspection" of the state a d t y headquarters inLeipzig, see Die Zeit (Hamburg), December 22,1989, p. 6.
The McCarthy reference on parallel governmental institutions is toRonald M. McCarthy, "Resistance, Politics and the Growth of Parallel
Government in America, 1761775," in Walter Conser, Ronald M. McCarthy,David Toscano, and Gene Sharp, editors, Resistance, Politics andthe American Struggle for Indepemhce' 1765-1775 (Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), p. 498. The whole of the chapter, pp.
472-524, is also relevant. See also in the same bcmk, David Ammerman,"The Continental Association: Economic Resistance and Government
by Committee," pp. 225-277.
For additional discussion on parallel goveinunent, see TPONA, pp.
423-433.
On the Russian 1905Revolution, see Sidney Ilarcave, First Blood: The
Russian Revolution of 1905 (New York Maernillan, 1964, and London:
Collier-Macmillan, 1964); Solomon M. Schwartz, The Russian Reznolutionof 1905: The Workers'Movement and the Formation of Bolshmemm
and Menshevism, trans. by Gertrude Vakar, with a Preface by Leopold H. Haimson (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 19671, especially pp. 129-195. See also Richard Qlarques, The Twilight of Imperial
Russia (London: Phoenix House, 1958), pp. 111--139;Leonard Schapiro,
The Communist Party of the S& Union (New York Random House,
1960, and London: Eyre & Spotiswoode, 1960), pp. 63-70 and 75; HughSeton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914 (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, and London: Methuen & Co., 1952), pp. 219-260;
Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (New York Dial Press,
1948, and London: Thames and Hudson, 1956), pp. 278-336; and Michael Prawdin, The Unmentionable Nechaev: A Key to Bolshevism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 147-149.
On the February 1917 Russian Revolution, see especially George
Katkov, Russia 1917: The February bolution (New York Harper &Row, 1967).

W I E L D I N G POWER

79

On Danish illegal newspapers, see Jeremy Bennett, 'The Resistance
Against the German Occupation of Denmark 194045," in Adam
Roberts, editor, Civilian Resistance as a National Defence (Harmondsworth, England, and Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 200.
On the 1956-1957 Hungarian Revolution, see, for example Report of
the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (New York: United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18-A/3592 1957). On the workers' councils, see especially
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, and London:
Faber & Faber, 1963).
On the Polish movement since 1980, see, for example, Nicholas Andrew~,Poland, 1980-1981: Solidarity Against the Party (Washington,
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985); Madeleine Korbel Albright, Poland: The Role of the Press in Political Change (New York:
Praeger, 1983); Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity
1980-1982 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1983); Ross A. Johnson, Poland in
Crisis (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, 1982); Leopold Labedz
and the staff of Sumey magazine, editors, Poland Under Jaruzdski (NewYork: Charles Scribnerls Sons, 1984); and Jan Joseph Lipski, KOR. A
History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981 (Berkeley,
Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1985).
On the role of fearlessness in France in saving Jews, see TPONA, p. 549,
n. 105. The original source is Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution: The
Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (New York: A. S.
Barnes, 1961), p. 328.
On fearlessness in Montgomery, Alabama, and for the Martin LutherKing, Jr. quotation, see TPONA, p. 548, nn. 1WlO1.
On blockage of army tanks in Manila, see Monina Allarey Mercado,
editor, People Power. The Philippine Revolution of 1986. An Eym'tness History (Manila: James B. Reuter, S. J. Foundation, 1986), chapter five.
On aspects of the Indian 1930-1931 campaign, including the raid at
Dharasana, see Gene Sharp, Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Puwer:
Three Case Histories, introduced by Albert Einstein (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1960), pp. 37-226, and S. Gopal, The Viceroyality of Lord Irwin, 1926-1931 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957),
pp. 54-122.
There have as yet been no serious comparative statistical studies ofcasualty rates between various types of violent conflicts and those inwhich one side is using nonviolent struggle. A brief discussion of thisis contained in TPONA, pp. 583-586, but it is insufficient. Scattered dataon the numbers of dead and in]"ed in violent conflicts, when compared to similar data on nonviolent struggles such as those surveyed orcited in this book, suggest that the differences are not only vast but

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THREE

consistently so. It is hoped that someone will undertake such a comparative study soon, taking into consideration vaious factors, including
the scale of the conflict, the numbers of people involved, the nature of
the regimes and populations, the types of issues at stake, and others.
On Finnish resistance, see TPONA, pp. 593-594, n. 93. The o r i p a l citation is to W a a m Robert Miller, Nonviolence: A Christian Interpretation(New York Association Press, 1964)' p. 247.
On the repression of nonviolent demonstrators in Prague, see the
New York Times,December 15,1989, p. A17.
On the 19244925Vykom satyapha, see TPONA, pp. 82-83, and references in n. 18. The original sources are Joan V. Bondwant, Conquest ofVwlence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1958), pp. 46-52; Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-violent
Resistance (New York Schocken Books, 1967), Indian edition,
Satyagraha (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1951) pp. 177203; and Mahadev Desai, The Epic of Travancore (Ahmedabad: Navapvan, 1937).
An introductory discussion of strategic principles in nonviolent
struggle is presented in TPONA, pp. 492-510.
On the Peshawar evacuation, see TPONA, pp. 335,432,675, and 747,
and S. Gopal, The Viceroyality of Lord Imin 1926-1931, pp. 68-69.
On the walkout of Philippine computer operators, see Mercado, People Power, pp. 67,7576.
On the Norwegian teachers' resistance, see (GeneSharp, "Qranny
Could Not Quell Them," pamphlet (London: Peace News, 1958, andlater editions).
On aspects of the 1953 East German Rising, see Stefan Brandt, The
East German Rising (New York Praeger, 1957), and Theodor Ebert,"Non-violent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" in Roberts,
Cidian Resistance as a National Defence, chapter 8.
On the economic impact of the American colonial noncooperation
movements, see Comer et al., Resistance, Politics, and the American
Struggle for Independence.
On the economic impact of Indian ~ o ~ c o of
W British~
goods, see
TPONA, pp. 751-752, nn. 184-189.
On the Arab oil embargo, see Mohammed E. Ahrari, The Dynamics of
Oil Diplomacy: Conflict and Consensus (New Y c r k Arno Press, 1980)'
chapter 6, and Sheikh Rusturn Ali, OPEC: The Failing Giant (Lexington,
Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1986)' chapter 5.
The quotation on the strike against the Kapp Putsch is from S. Wdliam Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy: A Polii!ical History of the Reichfrom 1918 to 1933 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1963 [1946]), pp.
179-180.

WIELDING POWER

81

On the Nazi ban on general strikes, see TPONA, p. 532, n. 43. The original reference is to Jacques Delarue, The Gestapo: A History of Horror(New York: William Morrow, 1964), p. 8.
On Nazi fear of military resignations, see TPONA, p. 753, n. 192. The
source is Walter Gorlitz, History of the German General Stafl, 1647-1945,
trans. by Brian Battershaw (New York: Praeger, 1%2), p. 319. See also
p. 341. On mutinies during the East German Rising, see TPONA, p. 753,
n. 194.
On Russian troop morale problems in Czechoslovakia and consequent replacement, see Robert Littell, editor, The Czech Black Book: Prepared by the Institute of History, Czechoslmak Academy of Sciences (NewYork: Praeger, 1969), pp. 212-213.
The quotations from Aristotle are from The Politics, trans. by T. A.
Sinclair, revised by Trevor J. Saunders (Harmondsworth, England, andBaltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1983 [19811), pp. 227 and 353.
The phrase "cracks in the monolith" is from Karl Deutsch. See his
essay, "Cracks in the Monolith," in Carl J. Friedrich, editor, Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 308-333.
On weaknesses of dictatorial systems see also Gene Sharp, ''Facing
Dictatorships With Confidence," in Social Power and Political Freedom(Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), pp. 91-112, and the sowes cited there.

FourCivilian-based Defense

Developing a New Defense Policy
CIVILIANSTRUGGLES
of noncooperation and defiance have been conducted for a variety of objectives, ranging from the granting of voting
rights to the toppling of dictators. As shown in Chapter One, suchstruggles have also been improvised, as official national defense policy,
by Germany, France, and Czechoslovakia, against both internal andforeign attackers.
This chapter focuses on whether-and if so, how--defense by civilian resistance can be made a realistic choice for the coming decades.
Security threats are likely to be with us for a long time, and military
defense options will continue to suffer serious limitations and disadvantages for those who would defend their liberties, self-determination, and chosen social systems. Therefore, civilian-based defense merits careful and rigorous analysis.
We will consider how to combine the disparate methods of nonviolent action in more refined ways, to adapt them specifically to the
purposes of deterrence and national defense, and to enrich their application with new knowledge, insight, strategy, and preparation. With
the benefit of additional research,policy studies, strategic analyses,
contingency planning and training,it would be possible to develop for
consideration a refined, coherent policy, with multiple strategic options. The cumulative result would be to multiply the effectiveness ofcivilian-based defense. It should not be too difficult to produce an effective power (conservatively estimated) at least ten times greater thanthat demonstrated in the most powerful of the past cases of improvised
nonviolent struggle.
This chapter presents the outlines of a deliberately developed, postmilitary defense policy.
such a policy in place and operational, thepopulation of a country will be ready to resist in case of a domestic
usurpation or a foreign invasion. Readiness is highly important inbuilding both the deterrent and the defense capacities of this policy.

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FOUR

Aggression for Land or Genocide
Attention to the objectives of the attackers is a arucial factor in the planning of civilian-based defenses. The fad that attackers may have certain
extreme objectives such as territorial aggran~ldizementor genocide,often causes people to dismiss a civilian-based defense policy as naive
and useless. However, rigorous examination of the military defense
alternatives in such extreme cases will reveal serious grounds for
doubts about their utility. Indeed, a defensive war or violent resistancecan facilitate mass slaughter and provide to tlhe perpetrators helpful"justifications," such as blaming "war-time necessities" or assertingthat their actions were self-defensive measures against "terrorists."
The attackers may even claim that their aggression and mass killings
were merely regrettable but necessary "preemptive" measures to savethemselves from intended extermination by their victims.
War-time situations seem to provide the conditions under which
weapons intended to depopulate vast territories are more likely to be
used, weapons such as poison gasses, c h e m i d , and biological agents,
or neutron nuclear bombs. These could also be used against nonviolent
resisters, but there appear to be impediments tcb such use, and there are
no known cases of this type.
In cases of attempted genocide and territoriall aggrandizement, longterm dependency on the attacked population and society is obviously
not intended by the attackers-eliminating for the attacked population
an important leverage in its defense effort. However, there is historicalevidence showing that even attackers intent or1 seizing territory for its
own sake or to perpetrate genocide, at certain stages at least, have required the submission and even cooperation of their victims.
The shift, on pragmatic grounds, of German policy in the occupiedparts of the Soviet Union from 1940 to 1944-even in wartime--is noteworthy in this respect. The Nazis regarded the Slavic inhabitants ofEastern Europe and the Soviet Union as subh~mans,to be driven out
or exterminated in order to provide empty temtory for German colonization, Lebensraum for the German Volk. For a long time, therefore, German officials did not even seek cooperation from the Untermenschen(subhumans). Nevertheless, despite the Nazi ideological position,some German officials and officers reluctantly concluded that in orderto maintain control in the Tastern territories," cooperation wasneeded from the very population to be exterminated. Many such instances have been cited by Alexander Dallin in his study of the German
occupation. For example, Dallin reports that Mrilhelm Kube, the Generalkommissar in Belorussia, reluctantly conceded in 1942 "that German
forces could not exercise effective control without enlisting the population." Dallin quotes a statement by German ~nilitarycommanders in

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

85

the Soviet Union in December 1942: 'The seriousness of the situation
clearly makes imperative the positive cooperation of the population.
Russia can be beaten only by Russians." General Harteneck wrote in
May 1943: 'We can master the wide Russian expanse which we haveconquered only with the Russians and Ukranians who live in it, neveragainst their will."
Against attempts of genocide, a well-prepared noncooperation campaign can increase the problems of control of the population in theinterim stages before genocide could be perpetrated, hence slowing
down the process. Against attackers seeking empty land, such resistance could impede effective control of the territories involved. Also,
various types of nonviolent action can influence the willingness of
those ordered to inflict mass killings. If news spreads of both the intent
and the initiation of mass slaughter, there may be time to enlist the aidof the aggressors' home population, other governments, and international bodies to bring a halt to such acts. Unfortunately, newer forms ofthe technology of killing enable aggressors to speed up the genocidal
process once it is launched.
The continued development and exploration of policies to preventand defeat such atrocities must nevertheless continue, and an attitudeof helpless fatalism must be prevented. Research and analysis should
include attention to the unique problems involved in nonviolent struggle in these situations. This examination cannot be done here. It should
be noted, however, that various types of nonviolent resistance against
the Holocaust were used with some success in both Germany and in
Nazi-allied or Nazi-occupied countries. Much is still to be learned
about how to prevent and defeat genocide and other mass killings.
It is important to recognize that the objectives of territorial aggrandizement and genocide are present in only a clear minority of the attacks against which defense is required. Most cases of internal usurpation and foreign military aggression have different objectives. Hence,the case for civilian-based defense does not stand or fall on the basis of
one's judgment about extreme cases. Whatever measures may finallybe judged necessary to deal with those situations, an effective civilianbased defense to prevent internal usurpation and foreign invasion andoccupation can be developed. It is to these much more common situations that the remainder of this chapter is addressed.

The Attackers' Calculations of Objectives and Success
Both internal usurpations and foreign invasions are intended toachieve some objective. Internal usurpations, by coup &&at or executive takeover, may aim to bring greater power to the individual or

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FOUR

group heading them or may have longer-range political, economic,
or ideological objectives. Most cases of foreign invasion and occupation are conducted for such purposes as establishing a puppet or subservient government, annexing territory with^ its population intact,economic exploitation, gaining certain raw materials, extending an
ideology or religion to a new population, removing or preempting aperceived military threat, and transporting military equipment andtroops to attack a third country.
The success of all such internal or external attacks depends on theachievement of their objectives. They are consequently most likely to
be rationally planned ads, rather than spontaneous fits of rage or purposeless displays of massive destruction. For example, the FrancoBelgian invasion of the Ruhr aimed to secure ~cheduledpayments of
reparations and to separate the Rhineland from Germany. The Soviet
Union in 1968 wanted to restore a rigid Communist system in Czechoslovakia. Internal usurpations always aim to oust the previous government and impose a new one in control of the state apparatus and thesociety, as in the Kapp Putsch and the French generals' coup. Unlessthe attackers gain their objectives, they will have lost. They will have tocalculate, therefore, how to achieve their goals.
In order for attackers to secure most or ail of their objectives, theymust also govern the occupied country. If not the prime objective itself,
political control is a necessary step toward gaining the attackers' othergoals. Economic exploitation, transportation of materials, ideologicalindoctrination, evacuation of inhabitants-all require a great deal ofcooperation and assistance from the people an~dinstitutions of the attacked country. It is not sufficient simply to control the country's land.
The attackers must also control its population and institutions. The
costs of controlling a resisting population mqy greatly influence thewould-be attackers' decision to attack.
Potential attackers usually will calculate the odds for and against
achieving their intended goals to determine whether the benefits areworth the anticipated costs. If the chances of su~ccessare small, and thecosts high, the potential attackers are not likely to attack. They are
deterred.

Deterrence by Civilian-based Defense
Deterrence, therefore, is not intrinsically tied tc~military means, muchless to nuclear weapons capacity. Deterrence can occur within the context of strictly nonviolent means.
Whether civilian-based defense can provide deterrence in a specificsituation, and the degree to which it does so, will depend on two main

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

87factors: (1)the actual capacity of the society to deny to the attackers their
desired objectives and to impose unacceptable costs (alone or in cooperation with others) and (2) the potential attackers' perception of thatsociety's capacity to deny their objectives and impose costs.
Let us look at these factors more closely. In contrast to militarymeans, civilian-based deterrence would not be produced by the threatof massive physical destruction and death on the attackers' homeland.
Rather, deterrence would be achieved if the attackers perceive that theattacked society could deny them their goals and impose excessive
costs.These costs would include harm to the attackers' regime domestically (internal dissent and disruption), internationally (diplomatic andeconomic costs), and in the attacked country itself (denial of objectives,
blockage of effective political controls, and inducement of disaffection
among the attackers' troops, functionaries, and population). In otherwords, the deterrence capacity of civilian-based defense is based directly uponan actual dejense capacity. This contrasts with both nuclear and largescale conventional military deterrence capacities, which today canoften effectively avenge after attacks but rarely defena against attack(meaningto protect one's population, way of life, and institutions). The
military weapons that are to be used are far too destructive to provide
the civilian society with protection.
Beyond the initial period of research,policy development and evaluation, and feasibility studies, two crucial elements are required to produce a deterrence capacity by civilian-based defense. The first of theseelements is intensive preparation and training for the whole population and all its institutions. At times this preparation may be accompanied by institutional and social change (generally toward increased
devolution of power and greater acceptance of responsibility by individuals, groups, and institutions). The aim of these changes is to enhance the resilience, self-reliance, and resistance capacity of the society.
This includes the defenders' ability to prevent the attackers from consolidating political control and the capacity to deny attackers any otherobjectives. The defense capacity will also include the ability to increase
drastically the costs to the attackers of such a venture and to multiply
the domestic and international problems that can be imposed on theattackers.
The second requirement is a program to communicate to all possible
attackers an accurate perception of the powerful defense capacity thatcan be mobilized under the new defense policy. Given a genuinely
powerful and prepared defense capacity, publicity-not merely openness-about it will increase the deterrent effect on both internal usurpations and foreign invasions.
As noted in Chapter One, deterrence is a mcial part of the muchbroader process of dissuasion of attack. Dissuasion may additionally

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include the influences of rational argument, moral appeal, distraction,and nonprovocative policies. If the country wishes to discourage attacks on itself, in addition to building up its civilian-based deterrence
capacity, it will do well to gain for itself respect and sympathy frompeople in other countries. This may be achieved through positive perceptions of the kind of society the country is, or is becoming, andthrough the kind of foreign relations it conducts. Certain types of foreign assistance, emergency relief efforts, and other positive international relations may be among these measures. Together, these policies
may result in less hostility against and more good will for countries
employing a civilian-based defense. While not necessarily decisive,these policies could in some circumstances reduce the chances of attack However, such policies alone are unlikely to be sufficient. An adequate capacity to defend the society if it is nevertheless attacked is alsoessential.
A civilian-based w a r d strategy is a possible additional means ofpreventing foreign attacks in certain situations. Such a strategy could
be employed against attacks that seek to achieve certain specific objectives-even those that aim to control only limited parts of territory(such as for naval bases, airports, the extraction of mineral resources,
and the likebin ways in which conventional civilian-based strategies
are of dubious effectiveness.
In such a case, a civilian-based defense might spread technical'?know-how" on the ways dissatisfied groups in the aggressor's homeland (or in other occupied countries) might conduct effective nonviolent resistance, and even massive civilian insurrection. This could bedone through radio, television, telephone, printed matter, letters, cassettes, and videos. Resistance and uprisings at :home are not favorable
circumstances for dispersing troops and functionaries abroad against
well-prepared, defense-minded countries.
No deterrent-military or civilian-can ever be guaranteed to deter.
Capacity to deal with its possible failure is theirefore essential. In contrast to military means, the deterrent capacity of civilian-based defense
rests directly upon its capacity to defend. Unlike nuclear deterrents, thefailure of civilian-based defense preparations to deter does not bringannihilation, but implementation of the real defense capacity for the
first time. It is therefore essential that we exploire the broad outlines of
how that special type of defense could operate.

Fighting Capacity in Civilian-based Defense
As we have seen, the capacity of this policy to defend against an attack
rests on the ability to deny the aggressors' objectives and to inflict ex-

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89

tensive domestic and international costs. In order to implement civilian-based defense, people must have the will to resist, to prepare well,and to struggle in the face of casualties, just as they do with militarymeans. Potentially the whole population-regardless of sex and ageand all institutions of the society are participants in the struggle.
In many cases of internal and external attacks, there has been an
initial period of confusion, frequently accompanied by a sense of helplessness and lack of direction in the attacked population. This wasclearly the case in Norway following the Nazi invasion in April 1940. It
took some months for people to realize how, once military resistance
had ended, they might resist both Quisling's fascist party, the Nasjml
Samling, and the German military occupation backed by the Gestapo.
With advance preparation and widespread knowledge of the general
guidelines of resistance (including responsibilitiesand possible roles ofvarious parts of the population and particular institutions), the population would have been much more able to avoid such a sense of uncertainty and confusion and instead would have been able to face the coming crisis with determination, spirit, and confidence.
General opposition and a desire to defend the society against theattackers are insufficient, however. They must be translated into a
grand strategy of ation. This will include the general goals of defense,
the issues on which the struggle will concentrate, the choice of thegeneral technique of action, and other broad means that will be used
to achieve defense. The formulated grand strategy in turn must be
developed into various individual strategies of struggle for particularpurposes and situations. Each strategy will set forth how a particularcampaign will develop and how its separate components will work
together. Each will encompass diverse tactics, or more restricted plansof ation, to achieve limited objectives. Tactics and specific methods ofaction must be chosen carefully so that they contribute to achieving thegoals of each particular strategy.
The weapons, or methods, of civilian-based defense are nonviolent
ones: psychological, social, economic, and political, as surveyed in
Chapter Three. Among those that have been used in past improvised
cases of nonviolent struggle are the following: symbolic protests, paralyzing transportation, social boycotts, specific and general strikes, civil
disobedience, economic shutdowns, political noncooperation, adoption of false identities, economic boycotts, public demonstrations, slowdowns, publication of banned newspapers, deliberate inefficiency incarrying out orders, assistanceto persecuted people, broadcast of resistance radio and television, public defiance by the legislature, judicial
resistance, formal governmental opposition, denial of legitimacy to theusurpers, noncooperation by civil servants, legislative procrastinationand delay declarations of defiance, continuation of old policies and laws,

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student defiance, children's demonstrations, refusal of collaboration,individual and mass resignations, massive and selective disobedience,
maintaining the autonomy of independent organizations and institutions, subversion of the usurpers' troops, and incitement to mutiny.
No single blueprint exists or can be created to plan deterrence anddefense capacity by civilian-based defense for a l l situations. That ismuch more true of civilian means than of militiuy means of conflict. In
both conventional military and nuclear conflicts the weapons overwhelmingly destroy and kill in essentially the m n e ways regardless of
the issues at stake in the conflict. In civilian-based defense, however,the political, social, economic, and psychological weaponry applied inany given case should specifically target the kiues in contention. The
choice of methods, therefore, should be primarily affected by the specific strategies selected to prevent the aggressolrs' from achieving theirgoals and by general strategic principles of nonviolent struggle, as
noted in Chapter Three.

Maintaining Legitimacy and Capacity for Self-government
A fundamental precept of any sound strategy in civilian-based defense
is to maintain the legitimacy and capacity for self-government of thesociety in the face of the attackers' attempts to1 impose their own rule.
Stated negatively, the defenders must always deny legitimacy to theattackers and prevent them from effectively governing the countryI
whether the attackers attempt to take over the existing governmental
apparatus or to establish their own. The defeinders must oppose anddefeat both of these aims.
Defense of the political system of the country is crucial even if theattackers' primary objective is not to restructure it on their own model.
As previously noted, to achieve almost any objective that takes time torealize, the attackers will have to obtain extensive cooperation from theattacked society's population and institutions. They may attempt toachieve this either by securing the submissiveslssistanceof the existing
governmental structure or by imposing a new one to cany out theirobjectives. It is, therefore, crucial that the population refuse all legitimacy to the attackers and that the existing golvernment be kept from
submitting and collaborating. In civilian-based defense it is necessary
to keep the attackers from utilizing the defendling government's symbolism, legitimacy, administration, and institutions of social and political control, as well as its police and any existing military forces.
When the aggressors seek to establish (or have succeeded in establishing) their own "government," it is vital &at the defenders (1)isolate this "government" through various meam of noncooperation andCIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

91(2) maintain their own governmental forms parallel to those of the aggressors. The defenders' parallel government may retain the old governmental structure if the attackers have been unable to seize it, or theparallel government may take less formally organized forms. In either
case, this parallel government should operate alongside the ostracized
structures created by the attackers.
Parallel government was discussed in Chapter Three, where the examples were primarily cases that had occurred in revolutionary situations. Here, instead, the focus is on maintaining the moral and legal
authority of a system that has been attacked and keeping effective institutions of govemance outside of the control of the attackers, be theyinternal usurpers or foreign invaders. Definitive analysis of parallel
governments and careful examination of their role in civilian-based defense struggles have not yet been undertaken. However, a survey ofvarious examples suggests that the maintenance of an autonomous
legitimate government is highly important in preventing would-be
usurpers or foreign invaders from gaining political control.
In both the German and the French cases of defense against coups&&at described in Chapter One, the legitimate government survived
fully or in some limited form, throughout the conflict. Even though theEbert government fled from Berlin and the capital was occupied, thehighest officials retained their positions and the governments of theprovinces were never replaced. With the bureaucracy and various governmental agencies obeying the legitimate government, the putschists
were left with little control. In the French case, the de Gaulle-Debr6
government in Paris was never toppled, due to various factors. Thiswas crucial to the final collapse of the coup in Algiers. Even there, therebels' initial hold on the governmental apparatus soon eroded. The
continued existence of the government of the Weimar Republic during
the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr was also vital in establishingand supporting the noncooperation policy.
During the Second World War, several governments-in-exile locatedin London played signifwant parallel roles. They both served as alternative institutions of legitimacy-in contrast to the collaborationist
regimes established under the German occupation-and at times assisted resistance movements in the home countries. The Norwegian
government-in-exile, for example, managed to get money into occupied Norway to support families of arrested nonviolent resisters, andthe Netherlands' government issued calls for the Dutch railway workers to initiate a strike in September 1944 (which lasted into 1945) toassist the Allied invasion of Europe.
In the Czechoslovak case in 19684969, the government and Communist Party initially followed a policy of complete noncooperation
with the Soviet occupation. This initial response is exemplary. During

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this period, the Soviets were never able to establish even the semblanceof a new government. It can be said that the ultimate failure of the
Czechoslovak defense struggle began with the willingness of government and party officials to compromise with the Soviets in the Moscow
negotiations, es+yin legitimizing the presence of Warsaw Pad
occupation troops in the country. This was followed by bit-by-bit concessions to the Soviets over the ensuing months, until the final capitulation to Soviet demands in April 1969 to replacel the DubiSek leadership.
In short, uncompromising leadership from the pre-invasion politicalstructure existed only for a week or so at the beginning of the struggle.
Effective nonviolent struggle for defense was waged as long as the established government maintained its legitimate role despite the presence of the Soviet military command. Defiance of the occupation forces
and potential Stalinist collaboratorsby the esta,blishedpolitical system
was vital. The Soviet failure to gain its political objectives through military might forced them to shift to gradualist political pressures, towhich the Czechoslovak leadership succumbec1.

Selecting Strategies for Defense
In addition to keeping the attackers from seizing control of the politicalsystem, it is essential to make great efforts to deny the attackers any
additional goals they may have. If the attackers' aims are, for example,
economic exploitation, the most appropriate sbrategies and methods ofare likely to be economic, and will diier from the means ofdefdefense appropriate if the attackers' aims we.re political, ideological,
territorial, genocidal, or other.
For example, in their invasion France and Belgium aimed, among
other things, to exploit the coal reserves of the Ruhr. Hence, a significant part of the Germans1defense efforts focused on denying the occupiers access to the vast coal reserves. Minersf sirikes, occupation of themines, boycotts by transport workers, and the like were high among
the important methods of resistance used.
On the other hand, the issue may be political. The point in contention
at any given moment may be a fairly limited me, as in the previously
noted Norwegian case of keeping the schools out of fascist control. In
that case, the primary methods of resistance were forms of social andpolitical noncooperation as well as various farms of wider symbolic
protest and intervention (including the conducting of improvised
school classes in private homes).
As discussed earlier, the initial Russian aim in Czechoslovakia wasalso political, but on a grand scale: to replacel the DubiSek party andCIVILIAN-BASED D E F E N S E

93government leadership with a compliant Stalinist group. Consequently, the resistance focused initially to a large degree on preventing
the formation of a collaborationist government of Stalinists, employing
extremely strong psychological, social, and political pressures.
With civilian-based defense planning, defenders can pinpoint potential attackers' likely objectives and their strategies, enabling the defenders to devise counterstrategies and options before an attack occurs.
Planning can also lead to the development of alternative strategiesandcontingency plans that would allow defenders to maintain the initiative in a civilian-based defense struggle. All these strategic analyses
in peacetime would greatly maximize the defenders' power underwartime conditions.
The choice of civilian-based defense strategies and the means for implementing them ought also to be influenced by the following factors(not in order of importance):
the nature of the attacking regime or group;
the degree to which the two sides feel close to, or alien from, each other inother relationships;
the nature of the attackers' means of action and repressive measures;the degree to which third parties can influence or pressure the attackers;
the degree to which the defenders can be influenced by third parties;
the internal strength of the attacked society and its non-state institutions;the vulnerability of the attackers' regime and system;
the degree and nature of the advance preparations for defending the society;the relative importance of the issues at stake for the attackers and defenders;the vulnerability or self-relianceof the defending society economically, especially for food, water, and fuel; andthe willingness of the defenders to sustain casualties as the price of defense.

The civilian defenders will also need to consider which mechanismof change is most likely to achieve victory, as discussed in Chapter
Three. The defenders may wish to convert the attackers to the view thatboth their objectives and the attack itself are unjustified. The defenders
may be willing to accommodate, as is done in most strikes. However,compromise with one's attackers is not a laudatory objective for most 'defense struggles. Instead, the defenders may aim to coerce the attackers into abandoning both their original goals and the attack itself.
In special cases, coercion will be insufficient. When the foreign attackers' home regime has oppressed its own people and is in a precarious condition, the aim might be not only to coerce it into withdrawing
its troops from the defending country, but also, in cooperation withresisters in the attackers' homeland, to force its disintegration. Or,
when the attack is an internal usurpation, the aim should be to secure

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its dissolution. The attacking group should not survive as a politicalunit, even one that is willing to capitulate. There should remain nosurviving organized part of that group able to make a similar attemptin the future.
In practice, the mechanisms of conversion, accommodation, andnonviolent coercion are intimately blended, as mentioned earlier, anddisintegration may result from a mixture of con~versionand nonviolent
coercion. A preference for one mechanism or another will, however,strongly affect the choice of the grand strategy for defense and also of
the particular methods of ation applied.
Care may be required in determining what other types of action
might be used with nonviolent struggle in a ciwllian-based defense. The
answer is not determined simply by asking whether the action is "violent'' or "nonviolent." Those are but two spacial categories within awider range of other, clearly distinguishable types of action, including
destruction of property. While the issue of the compatibility of thesemeans with civilian-based defense is clearly important, the answer is
not always obvious.
There appears to be little or no problem with some of these activities
that fall between military resistance and nonviolent struggle. For example the removal of key parts from machinery or vehicles, the removalor release in safe ways of fuel for vehicles, the removal or destruction,
in ways not risking lives, of records and files or computer informationof government departments and agencies (as the police). Also, damage
or destruction of one's own property to prevent it from being seized orused in the future by attackers-such as demcdishing key bridges ortunnels to block an invading army-seems to be compatible with civilian-based defense.
Clearly very dangerous to the effectiveness of nonviolent struggle,
however, is demolition and destruction of rnacllinery, transport, buildings, bridges, installations, and the like where these ations in any degree risk injury or death. This judgment is not necessarily ethical but
pragmatic. While further examination of the evidence and issues ismerited, this type of a d appears to be at best extremely risky and atworst highly counterpmductive for civilian-based defense. As experience in the 1923 Ruhrkampf seems to show, this type of sabotage may
kiU not only troops and other persons serving the attackers but also
one's own people. In addition, it may contribute to extreme repression,
tend to shift the basis of the struggle from nonviolent resistance to destruction of p r o m , and reduce sympathy mi support for the resisters. In the Ruhrkampf, this type of sabotage helped to undermine thepreviously stronger nonviolent resistance. Demolitions and similar acts
are therefore generally best excluded from the armory of civilian-based
defense.

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95

Not all civilian-based defense struggles will be equally successful,and there is no formula that, if followed, will guarantee victory. However, it is possible to indicate broadly that the effectiveness of civilianbased defense will depend on at least seven factors (again not listed inorder of importance):
the population's will to defend against the attack;the internal strength of the attacked society;the ability of the population and institutionsto retain control of their sourcesof power and to deny them to the attackers;
the strategic wisdom exercised by the defenders;the ability of the defenders to deny to the attackers their objectives;the capacity of the civilian defenders to fulfill the requirements for effective
nonviolent struggle, including the maintenance of nonviolent discipline
and resistance despite repression; andthe defenders' skill in aggravating the weaknesses of the attackers' system
and regime.

Resisting the Aggressors' Violence
People will need the knowledge of how to endure the pressures of
struggle and also the strength to persist despite repression. They willneed to know how to transform sigruficant intermediate triumphs into
lasting final successes. Understanding, planning, and concerted informed action will enable the defending population to mobilize theirpower potential and maximize their defense capacity.
The success of nonviolent methods hinges to a large degree upon
persistence in their application despite repression and upon maintenance of nonviolent discipline in the face of provocations. A shift toviolence would alter the conflict from an asymmetrical one of nonviolent against violent weapons (which has great advantages for thecivilian defenders) to a symmetrical one in which both sides are using
violent weapons (which generally accords greater advantage to thebetter-equipped attackers).
Repression against civilian defenders may be harsh. Resisters, family and friends may be arrested, tortured, and killed. Whole population groups may be denied food, water, or fuel. Demonstrators, strikers, and obstructive civil servants may be shot. Mayors, city councilo~~,teachers, and clergy may be sent to concentrationcamps. Hostages may
be executed. Protesters may even be massacred. The human costs ofdefense must not be underestimated. The casualties and other sacrifices
involved in civilian-based defense must, however, be placed in the context of the vastly higher costs of both conventional and guerrilla wars,
to say nothing of nuclear war. Sufferingand death are virtmlly inevita-

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ble in any case of acute struggle. Nonviolent struggles, however, tend
to minimize casualties and destruction. As noted in Chapter Three, thecasualty rates for dead and wounded appear from limited available
evidence to be but a small fraction of those in roughly comparable conventional wars, and especially of those in guerrilla wars.
As in any major conflict, including military wars, flight or capitulation in the face of the attackers' violence is an unacceptable response.
The civilian defenders must not be surprised by severe repression andbrutalities. When these occur, the defenders must not cease their resistance. Repression is often a reaction to the recognition that the resistance is indeed imperiling the success of the attack. Any attempt to halt
the attackers' violence, however brutal, by dinninishing or ceasing resistance will only teach the attackers to repeat such violence even more
severely in the future, for it produced the desired result: submission.
While the defenders may shift to other methtds of nonviolent actionthat challenge the attackers in different ways, the defenders must not
capitulate to violence. When casualties occur in nonviolent struggles,
they can bring the process of political jiujitsu into operation, which inmany cases can be crucial in achieving success.

Two Strategies for the Initial StageNo single blueprint can be designed for every civilian-based struggle.
It is possible, however, to outline some of the likely main components
and strategies of most civilian-based defenses.
When both the deterrent effect of civilian-based defense preparations and the dissuasive effects of other domes'ticand foreign policies
have failed to prevent an invasion or internal usurpation, it is time to
put the defense policy into operation. Some type of defense strategy
must be applied immediately in the first stage of the attack. It is very
important that the attacked society make major efforts to seize the initiative in the struggle and not simply respond to ads of the attackers.
The initial strategies of the defenders are likely to take one of two
main forms, one designed to communicate the defenders' will to resist
and to warn of powerful future struggle, and the other, while also communicative, planned to demonstrate in action some of the stronger
types of resistance that are likely to be used at a later stage.
As developed strategies, neither has exact historical precedents, although particular elements of each have occurred in past cases. In
Czechoslovakia in 1968, for example, various initial methods wereused that are here incorporated as elements of both strategies. They
included people linking hands to block bridges that Soviet troop carriers needed to cross, passing out leaflets to Soviet soldiers, symbolicCIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

97

strikes, defiant declarations by the National Assembly, and stopping
the movement of Soviet tanks in Prague by surrounding them with
masses of people. A combination of methods used as part of a wellplanned civilian-based defense is likely to give these strategies far
greater impact than the initial actions taken in any past cases of improvised nonviolent resistance for defense.
The strategy of communication and warning is not designed primarily as resistance itself but as simple communication. This strategy isaddressed first and foremost to the attackers but also to third parties
and even to one's own people. By means of words and symbolic ads,
the attackers are informed that the society will be defended by a determined, well-prepared, civilian-based defense on a large scale. This
strategy may be more appropriate against a foreign invasion than acoup d'etat or executive usurpation, against which strong noncooperation and defiance may be required from the very beginning. Importantelements of this strategy could, however, be combined with massive
noncooperation.
Initial action using a strategy of communication and warning will be
relatively mild, as compared to later strategies of noncooperation anddefiance, but that does not mean that this action is insignificant. This
communication of the intent to wage strong nonviolent resistance inthe future can be compared to the cocking and aiming of a pistol being
mild in relation to the subsequent firing.
The strategy of "nonviolent blitzkrieg" may in contrast to thecommunication strategy, take the form of a dramatic demonstration ofmassive nonviolent resistance and defiance, probably combined withsome of the methods of the communication strategy. The "blitzkrieg"
strategy is appropriate against internal usurpations and, on occasion,
foreign invasion or a coup supported by foreign troops.
This nonviolent blitzkrieg would take such forms as largescale repudiation of the attackers' authority., general strikes, massive politicalnoncooperation, widespread appeals to the attackers' troops, and similar methods (developed more fully below). The odds that the attackers
might be shocked into a quick retreat by the clear demonstration ofsolidarity are usually quite small, but favorable in special circumstances. In any case, the blitzkrieg strategy will communicate to all concerned that the attack will be met by a determined defense
The Strategy of Communication and Warning

In this strategy, the civilian defenders will seek by words and actions toconvey the message that a vigorous and powerful defensive struggle
will be waged, of a type especially difficult to counteract and defeat.

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Some of this communication will be aimed at the leaders of the attackers. They may not have included in their calculations the strong
will of the population to resist the attack. The attackers also may nothave taken seriously the power of civilian-basled defense, especially if
this happens to be one of the early well-prep;& applications of thepolicy. If either is the case, there may still be a small chance to correct
the attackers' misperceptions and to induce them to halt the attack,perhaps with some face-saving excuse.
In the case of invasion, some of the warning and communicationwill
also be aimed directly and indirectly at the general population of theattackers' home country. In the case of coup d'cht, the warning would
be directed within one's own society. In either case, it may be necessary
to correct lies the population has been told about the attack. Because
officials of one's own government or military forces may be involved ina usurpation, or may have "invited" foreign military intervention (theSoviets attempted to use this excuse initially in Czechoslovakia), it isimportant that people are able to distinguish and resist unconstitutional and illegitimate ads by their own 'leaders." This is more likely
to occur where the defenders use nonviolent rather than militarymeans. In the past people have sometimes passively submitted to amilitary coup primarily because they wished to avoid a civil war.
Words and actions to communicate the intent to defend and themeans by which the defense will be conducted will also be aimed at
one's neighboring countries, the general international community,
and, in cases of civilian-based defense treaty organizations, at one's
allies. This communication will lay the groundwork for (a) helpful
kinds of aid to the attacked country; (b)the avoidance of actions thatwould harm the defense; and (c) facilitation of international diplomatic, moral, economic, and political pressures against the attackers.
Communications and warnings addressed to the attackers will also
be heard by one's own people. Descriptions of tlhe defense to be offered
will also be important for sections of the population that may havebeen little involved in or inadequately informed about the defense policy. (Where civilian-based defense has been adequately prepared, thiswill not be as important.)
Radio, television, newspapers, and leaflets may be used directly bynational and local leadership to communicated i i y with the defending population. While not planned in advance, radio, television, andresistance newspapers were all used in the early days of the invasionand occupation of Czechoslovakia. The radio bnoadcasts, which helped
to guide the population in its nonviolent resistance, were credited withbeing highly significant, With benefit of advance planning and preparation, all these means of communication will be especially important.

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99

Whether through communications addressed to the attackers or
aimed at one's own population, the people will hear much more than
the news of the attack. They will also receive the message that theirwhole society is becoming involved in a vitally important defensive
struggle, and that they have an important role to play in it. This message wiU support specific preparations and actions in their neighborhoods and places of work and can contribute to the growth of the spiritof resistance in the population as a whole.
During this period, domestic sympathizers with the attackers andpersons who may opportunistically seek to enrich themselves or togain positions of power, will need to be warned. By words and actions,they will be told both that strong defense will be offered by the wholesociety and that (while no physical harm will be done to them) collaborators will become targets of persistent resistance. They will be
regarded as betrayers of their own people and be prevented from retaining any rewards from the attackers.
The attackers' troops and functionaries will be especially important
targets during this stage of the struggle. They may have been told lies
about the situation in the defendingcountryl about what to exped fromthe population, or even about what country they have invaded. One of
the key ways to dissolve the attempted takeover or occupation is to
reduce or take away the loyalty., reliability, and obedience of the troops
and functionaries of the attackers' regime. Those persons, therefore,
singly and as a whole, must be given an accurate picture in order tocorrect the lies and to enable them to understand their role and responsibilities. The civilian defenders will need to communicate to the troops
and functionaries the issues at stake in the conflict, the nature of thesociety that has been attacked, the perceived goals of the attackers, andthe importance for the peoples of both contending parties that the attack be halted and the attempted takeover or occupation ended.
The defenders will also need to communicate that, while the defense
waged against the attack will be vigorous, determined, and persistent,
it will be of a special character. Its aim will be to defeat the attackand defend the society without threatening the lives and personalsafety of the individuals in the attacking forces. That information andpractice can be very helpful in subverting the attackers' troops andfunctionaries.
Such communication will lay the groundwork for later appeals. Soldiers and functionaries may be asked to be deliberately mild or inefficient in applying controls and repression, to aid the population ofresisters in specific ways, to ignore orders for harsh actions, to mutiny
or to go into hiding in the countryside or among the defending p o pulation, which will help them. In such ways the attackers' capacity

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for repression and administration may be, under certain conditions,slowly or rapidly dissolved.
A variety of means of communicationwill be used to reach all thesegroups. The means of verbal communication may include letters, leaflets, newspapers, personal conversations, radio and television broadcasts, audio and video cassettes, wall slogans, posters, and banners.
Also, drawn or painted symbols,significant colors, defiant flying of thenational flag, flags at half mast, tolling of bells, silence, wailing of sirens, certain songs, and many variations on these methods may be
used. All such methods should be carefully chosen to produce thekinds of effects that the defense struggle required at that stage.
Direct symbolic intervention and obstruction may also be used incommunicating with the attackers' forces. For example, persons may
block with their bodies-standing, sitting, or lying down-bridges,
highways, streets, entrances to towns, cities, anti buildings. Allof thesetypes of action primarily rely for their impact on psychological or
moral influences. Mechanical obstructions may also be used. For example, people may block highways and airpo&i with abandoned automobiles or may dismantle machinery to make facilities at seaports,
airports, and railways inoperative. Although some of the mechanicalobstructions may physically impede or delay the dispersion of troops
or the occupation of certain locations or facilities, the effect is likely tobe temporary and therefore even these obstr~ictionshave primarily
psychological impact.
Another category of actions may also initially be used symbolically.
These could include temporary application of such methods of noncooperation as the general strike, an economic shu~tdown,a massive stayat-home (making every town and city appear empty of people), or closing all government offices. These are brief uses of some of the same
methods that in sustained applications are employed in a nonviolent
blitzkrieg and in long-term defensive stru@etj. On August 23, 1968,
only a day-and-a-half after the Warsaw Pad invasion, the Czechs held
a one-hour protest strike, producing an almost complete work stop
page. These short actions simply illustrate a pt~tential.They not only
communicate opposition and an intent to resist, but also demonstratesome of the more serious and substantive means of defense that lie
ahead if the attack is not halted.
Defenders may also use dramatic forms of intervention in an initialstrategy of communication and warning. These may include massive
defiance of curfews, the holding of street paties for all (including
the hostile troops), persistent conduct of "business as usual," andlargescale efforts to undermine the loyalty of the troops and minor
functionaries.

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These initial actions will also help to remind the attacked populationof the intent to resist vigorously and firmly, of the type of resistance tobe applied, and of the need to ready themselves to fulfill their responsibilities in accordance with the advance preparations and the current
needs of struggle.
The attackers' countermeasures to these initial forms of communication and warning are difficult to predict. They may range from extremely mild to very brutal, even in the same situation.
The Strategy of "Nonviolent Blitzkrieg"
In this second initial strategic option, the population and institutionsof the society immediately launch a major campaign of defiance andnear-total noncooperation. This strategy is most likely to be used when
the attackers are perceived as relatively weak and uncertain or divided
in their initial decision to attack, and when the defending society views
itself as strong and its defense capacity as well prepared and powerful. The aim is to convince the attackers to call off their forces quickly
in the face of the massive defiance. This may take such forms as a
general strike, an economic shutdown, evacuation of cities, a stay-athome, paralyzing the political system, continuation of '%usiness as
usual," ignoring the attackers' demands, filling the streets with demonstrators or leaving them completely empty, massive attempts to subvert the attacking forces, defiant publication of newspapers, and broadcasting news of the attack and the resistance. There are many otherpossibilities.
Such massive defiance may also be intended to communicate to theattackers' leadership two things: that the civilian defenders are capableof waging a struggle that can deny to the attackers the fruits of victory,
and that the long-term effects of the defenders' actions and influenceon the morale, loyalty, and obedience of their own troops and functionaries may be potentially fatal to their reliability.
Even if a quick victory is not achieved by this strategy, at the very
least, a nonviolent blitzkrieg, effectively conducted, will clearly communicate to the attackers the intent of the attacked society to defend
itself. This should demonstrate in action the nature of the defense thatwill be used, as well as warn of future difficulties if the attackers do notwithdraw. When this strategy is employed with that objective, no
sharp distinction exists between the initial strategy and the subsequent
defense struggle.
Civilian defenders should not assume that either of the two initialstrategies of defense is likely to bring victory at that stage of the con-

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flict. Quick success would not only require a very remarkable initialdefiance by the civilian defenders, it would a h need a most unusual
leadership of the attacking forces (or the replacement of original leaders with ones less committed to the venture). The leadership would
need to be able to admit an error or to find a way to save face while
withdrawing. Only these unlikely circumstan(:es could make a quickend of the struggle possible.
If a rapid victory does not follow the nonvicllent blitzkrieg strategy,
the defenders will, nevertheless, have achieved something significant:the mobilization of their forces and the comm~unicationof both theirintent to resist and the special character of their defense policy. Thoseare similar to the results of a strategy of communication and warning.
At this point it would be time to shift to anolher strategy, one moresuited to the coming longer-term struggle and more able to counter theattackers' specific objectives.
Whatever happens in the initial stage, the defenders must be prepared to carry on the defense on the assumptic~nthat the struggle will
be extended and difficult. Whether the initial action has been a campaign of communication and warning, a nonviolent blitzkrieg or both(in combination or in one sequence or another),the initial period will atsome point draw to a close. The time will come for a more sustained
and substantial defense struggle.

Strategies for the Course of the Defense Struggle
In military wars the defenders may also attempt to achieve a quick,clear
victory. Yet, no demoralization or sense of defeat necessarily follows
their failure to do so. Instead, a shift of strategy is required for the nextstages of the struggle. In civilian wars of defense this is also true. The
initial campaign is to be regarded as simply the opening phase of a nonviolent struggle that, like a military campaign, may require a longer period of intense effort to achieve victory. A shift to a strategy more suitable for the next phase is, therefore, no reason for demoralization. On
the contrary, the shift is a demonstration that the defenders are taking
the initiative in shaping the struggle to help bring eventual victory.
With the advantage of advance planning and preparation, certain
general guidelines can be established to indicate the kinds of issues andcircumstances under which the population should protest and withhold cooperation, regardless of whether specific instructions have been
issued by any defense organization. Then, in an emergency, such resistance would be launched even if particular leadership groups had been

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103

seized or lines of communication effectively blocked. W~thsuch guidelines, no specific directives would need to be issued. The attackers'
measures would be sufficient to trigger the defense effort.
The specific issues or circumstances identified in the general guidelines for the launching of such "general resistance" might vary to somedegree from society to society. They are, however, likely to include
such occasions as these: the attackers' efforts to establish a substitute
government or to seize control of the society's political institutions;attempts to destroy the autonomy of the society's organizations andinstitutions; efforts to control education, religion, and political ideas;
attempts to impose censorship or suppress freedom of speech; promotion of an official ideology; and the perpetration of harsh repression
and killings against any sector of the society.
With advance identification of such points and prior training of the
population in the wide range of methods in civilian-based defense, thepopulation and institutions of the society could launch such general
resistance on their own initiative, with assurance that it would bewithin the range of good strategic judgment. F'rogramed general resistance provides a way to utilize the vitality of spontaneous resistance
while avoiding its potential damaging effects of poor focus on issues orundisciplined, counterproductive behavior.
Advance guidelines for general resistance would also make it difficult for the attackers to issue, falsely in the name of defense leaders,counterfeit "resistance instructions" that if implemented would help todefeat the defense and would help the attackers to achieve their goals.
Such instructions, obviously contradicting the standards laid out long
before in defense handbooks, pamphlets, and leaflets, would then be
easily identified and dismissed as provocations.
In contrast to general resistance, "organized resistance" would include those defense actions triggered by special directives from a resistance organization, and also those actions that require advance planning and group preparation. Organized resistance could be conducted
as long as responsible defense leadership was able to operate andmeans of communication to the population at large were available.
This type of resistance would have the advantage of being based on
careful strategic analysis and planning, so that the specific activities
would be more likely to succeed.
In facing the strategic problems of longer-range defense, the civilian
defenders can apply one of two major strategies: either a massive campaign of total noncooperation, similar to a nonviolent blitzkrieg, or someform of selective resistance. The defenders may also use each of thesemajor strategies at different times to meet specla1needs of the defense.

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Total Noncooperation
This strategy is also called "total resistance." It involves the refusal of
all cooperation-political, economic, and social-by the whole society
against the attackers' regime and policies. It may be generally appropriate at certain stages of the defense struggle: However, total resistance is exceptionally difficult to apply in practice except for limited
periods. For longer periods of time, it requires an exceptionallystrong
well-prepared, and self-reliant society. The conwquences of total noncooperation can be severe because of the cost of shutting down somany necessary aspects of their own society. This cost is high even if
the attackers do not engage in severe repression. The defending population must be able to survive the defense struggle, which can extend
over months or even years, as do most wars. Comprehensive preparations must help to make that possible, including provision of food,water, and fuel. Total noncooperation may not be used at all in certain
civilian-based defense struggles because of these severe requirements.
If the strategy of total noncooperation is used in the period of substantive defense, which follows the initial pericd, it is likely to be applied temporarily to achieve particular purposes. The points in the
strugglewhen this strategy may be effectively used should be carefully
chosen by the defenders. This strategy should not be used for any extended period without adequate preparation. It should not be applied
simply as an emotional response to the attack ilself or to an especiallyhonific action by the opponents. This strategy might, however, be usedin such situations if it is rationally selected.
Total noncooperation is probably best used at certain restricted
points to achieve particular objectives within a grand strategy predominantly using selective resistance. A few examples will illustrate this.
Let us suppose that the civilian defenders have for an extended period
conducted selective resistance against a specific policy of the attackers.
For example, the attackers may have attempted to bring the churches
under effective political controL As a result of s~lectiveresistance, thatmeasure has been seriously weakened or its implementation has been
blocked, but the attackers still intend to impose the policy. In this example, the resistance by the churches and other parts of the society has
proved too strong for the attackers, and they have retreated temporarily from efforts to destroy the independence of the churches. However,they still aim to resume the attack at the earliest opportunity. The strategy of total noncooperation may then be applied with the aim of forcing the attackers to abandon the policy altogether. A complete refusalof all parts of the society to have anything whatsoever to do with theCIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

105

attackers, their institutions, and their regulations may then be appliedin an effort to force the attackers, in their weakness, to pledge publicly
to recognize and respect the autonomy of religious institutions.
In case of severe brutalities against demonstrators or the general
population, a short total resistance action may be appropriate to demonstrate defiance and determination. One day will usually be sufficientfor that limited purpose. The action should not be extended much beyond that unless it is clear that the opponents are in a very weak position-that their troops are on the verge of mutiny for examplmr
unless some other potentially decisive condition exists. Extended use of
the total resistance strategy should be restricted to times when the attackers' capacity to maintain controls has been significantly weakened
and when the defenders are in a very strong position to sustain total
noncooperation despite possible severe repression.
This strategy may also be applied toward the end of a long struggle
that has primarily consisted of various campaigns of selective resistance. The conditions for total noncooperation must obtain, however.
The aim of total resistance at this point is to strike a knockout blow todefeat or disintegrate the attackers' reghe, to destroy their ability tocontinue the venture, and to restore the society's independence andfreedom.
With these exceptions, the main thrust of the society's defense must
be the strategy of selective resistance.
Selective ResistanceIn this strategy, the defense struggle is concentrated on certain vitalsocial, economic, or political issues. These issues are selected because of
their key role in keeping the entire social and political system out of theattackers' controL This strategy may also be called "nonviolent positional war" or "resistance at key points." Particular sections of the population would target specific issues at various times over the course of
the struggle. This strategy could be targeted sequentially on several
issues to keep the attacke~from gaining widespread control over thesociety.
The strategy of selective resistance deliberately concentrates resistance on particular objectives that are especially important for the defense effort. This strategy enables the defense to be focused instead ofdiffused. Also, it is less exhausting. In most cases, the major responsibility for waging the defense effort will shift from one sector of the
population to another as specificpoints and issues of resistance change.

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Six major questions must be considered in selecting the points forselective resistance:
What are the attackers' main objectives?
What will prevent the attackers from gaining or maintaining control over the
defenders' state apparatus or significant parts of it?
What will prevent the attackers from weakening or destroying the independence of the society's institutions and capacity for resistance?
What will concentrate defensecapacity on theespecially vulnerable points inthe attackers' system, regime, or policies, which if broken will imperil
their ability to achieve their objectives and to continue their venture?
What will enable the defenders to use their strongest qualities, capacities,
and sectors of the population (and avoiding use of their weakest ones) toadvance the defense?
Which specific issues typify the general principles and objectives of the
struggle, issues which help to arouse a spirit of justified resistanceamong
the defenders and make the attackersf aims and means seem the mostunjustified and deserving of condemnation?

It is especially important to focus the selective resistance on points
that can deny the attackers their main objectives. This is important because-as was seen in Chapter Two-the power of all rulers is dependent on sources that may be deliberately restric9ed or severed by the
defenders' withdrawal of cooperation, assistance, and obedience.
If the attack was a coup &&at or executive usurpation, for example,
then the defenders of constitutionalgovernment must make it impossible for the usurpers to consolidate control of the state apparatus andthe society. The defenders could accomplish this by insisting on observance of constitutional principles, by denying authority to the usurpers, and by preventing their control of the state apparatus and thewider society. Noncooperation could be practiced by civil servants, bureaucrats, government agencies, state and loci11governments, police
departments, and virtually all the social institutions, as well as the general population. Such methods, as seen in Chapter One, were widelypracticed against the Kapp Putsch.With benefit of preparation, the impad of such measures should be sisnificantly greater. The result would
be denial of legitimacy and prevention of co~lsolidationof effective
control.
If rulers of a foreign state attacked in order to impose a governmentof their own choosing, then collaboration at dl levels must be prevented. Would-be collaborators must be isolated, and control of thevarious departments, administrative bodies, police units, prison system, and military forces prevented. The defenders must also deny legitimacy to any new regime, massively refuse obedienceand cooperation,

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107

and persist in their loyalty to the principles and practices of the original
system.
For example, police would refuse to locate and arrest patriotic resisters. Journalists and editors would refuse to submit to censorship andwould publish newspapers in defiance of prohibitions, as occurred in
Poland during martial law in the 1980s. Resistance radio programs
would be broadcast from hidden transmitters-as happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Clergymen would preach the duty to refuse help tothe invadeboth Protestant and Catholic clergy did in the Netherlands under the Nazis.
Politicians, civil servants, and judges, by ignoring or defymg theenemy's illegal orders, would keep the normal machinery of government and the courts out of their controL Judicial noncooperation would
become another defense weapon. Judges would declare the "officials"of the internal usurpers or foreign attackers to be without authority.
They would continue to operate on the basis of the pre-invasion laws
and constitution and refuse to give moral or judicial support to theinvaders, even if it meant closing the courts. Civil servants and bureaucrats at times may conduct strikes, and at other times may practice a"work-on without collaboration." That is, they may persist in carrying
out legally established policies, programs, and duties with indifference
to, or in defiance of, contrary orders issued by the attackers.
If the invaders launched the attack to gain economic objectives, thenthe defenders must focus on denying these objectives. This denial canbe achieved by such means as having scientists, technicians, workers,
and administrators, and every institution involved, refuse cooperation
and assistance. This refusal would be applied at all relevant stages,
such as during the procuring of raw materials, research, planning,transportation, manufacture, supply of energy and parts, quality control, packing, and shipping. For example, workers and managers
would impede exploitation of the country by selective strikes and delays-as happened in the Ruhr in 1923.
If the attackers' aim is ideological, then it is crucial to block efforts todenigrate the beliefs of the defenders' society and indoctrinate the defenders' population with the attackers' political beliefs. This can beachieved by many kinds of noncooperation by persons and institutions
involved in education, religion, the media, publishing, youth activities,
and government. For example, teachers would refuse to introduce
propaganda into the schools (see the Norwegian example in Chapter
Three). Attempts to control schools could be met with the refusal tochange the school curriculum or to introduce the invaders' propaganda, while explaining to the pupils the issues at stake and continuing
regular education as long as possible. If necessary, schools could be

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closed voluntarily and classes held in private homes. Such an extralegal educational system operated in Nazi-occupied Poland, for example. In addition to resisting control of the educational system and thecurriculum, the teachers would press the students to consider the virtues of the freedom of ideas and the importance of practicing and d efending that freedom.
Selective resistance may be required to defend the society's inde
pendent institutions, the loci of power discussed in Chapter Two. The
attackers may intend to establish total control over the society, eradicate the possibility of effective resistance to their new order, or restructure the whole society on a totalitarian model. The attackers may,therefore, attempt to abolish the autonomy of all existing independent
institutions, to maintain them only in emasculisted submissive forms,
or to destroy them outright. Alternatively the attackers may create
new centrally controlled institutions that are harmonious with a totalitarian model and able to control their members;. The fascistcontrolledorganization for Norwegian teachers, which ithe resistance blocked,
was such a body. The defeat of that attempt, anti similar ones for otherprofessions, prevented the establishment of the corporative state in
Norway. Such efforts to control the society's institutions become points
for selective resistance. Defense planning and preparation should help
people identify the importance of such resistance and help make thestruggle successful.
Selectiveresistance ought also to be focused am especially vulnerable
points of the attackersfregime and on the loyalcy and reliability of their
troops and functionaries.
The attackers cannot, of course, be expected to welcome such vigorous defense efforts, albeit nonviolent ones. They must be expected touse whatever means they believe to be effective to halt, neutralize, orcrush the resistance. As discussed in Chapter Three and in this chapter,the civilian defenders must be prepared to wilhstand all such repression, persist in their defense, and hence bring the process of politicaljiujitsu into operation. Persistent defiance and a strong nonviolent discipline may make the costs of the venture unacceptable to the attackers,
deny their objectives, force a halt to the attack, or even dissolve theirforces and regime. As the attackers weaken and the defenders grow instrength, selective resistance campaigns of varicms types progressively
bring the defenders closer to victory.
While some civilian-based defense struggles may be relatively brief,
often the conflict may be a prolonged one. If so, the struggle is likely to
be difficult. The attackers' oppression may be exceptionally harsh, involving heavy risks to the defenders and many casualties. Under the
worst circumstances, many people may become discouraged and de-CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

IO9moralized, as happened in the later months of the Ruhrkampf. People
may also just become tired and need a rest.
Shifts in strategy, espeaally moving the responsibility for public action from one population group to another that is more able to ad, cansometimes help. Choosing to concentrate resistance on fewer or narrower issues can also help.
In circumstances of resistance fatigue it is unlikely that there will bea widespread desire to shift to violent struggle, for it would be obviousthat the chances of successby such means would be small and the number of casualtieswould increase. Nevertheless, it is possible that certain
small groups or individuals might take desperate measures, such as
planting bombs or attempting assassinations. While such ads mightmake the perpetrators, and even others, feelbetter, they would almost
certainly guarantee increased repression and political losses. More
importantly, such violence would likely undermine the effectivenessof nonviolent struggle. A shift to violence would require greater secrecy and hence reduce the numbers of resisters to those who could
join small secret groups. It is essential that nonviolent discipline bemaintained.
Even in the worst circumstances, it is crucial that resistance continue
in some form. Sometimes, under certain extreme conditions, it might
partially take the form of "cultural resistance." That is, people would
hold on to important elements of their way of life, language, customs,
beliefs, social organizations, and observances. Also, in cases whenlarger organizations and institutions, which had been bases for resistance, have been neutralized, controlled, or destroyed, nonviolent actsmight be conducted by individuals acting alone or by extremely small,often short-lived, groups. This has been called "micro-resistance."
Through all such times of great difficulty it is essential to maintain thespirit of the people, their desire to regain control of their own society,and a confidence, however shaky, that ultimately they will do so. Serious problem-solving research and strategic studies are needed on how
better to deal with these extreme situations.
In time, changed circumstances, unexpected events, new resistanceinitiatives, and renewed spirits and energies can lead to increased defense activities and the generation of greater capacity to pursue thestruggle. At the very times when a struggle is most difficult, significant
changes favoring the nonviolent resisters may be developing unseen.
These include the appearance or heightening of doubts, disagreements,and objections in the attackers' own camp.
Whether an exceptionally difficult period occurs or not, as the defenders' strength increases, changes of strategy may be required. For
example, instead of concentrating primarily on limited campaigns of

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selective resistance, there may be opportunitiesto conduct increasingly
widespread resistance. In favorable circumstant:es it may even be possible to move toward total noncooperation to sltrike a knockout blow.
On other occasions, different end-game strategies may be required. In
any case, it will be important to develop spetific steps to bring thedefense struggle to a successful conclusion.

International Support for Civilian-based Defense
Countries with civilian-based defense policies cim participate in a great
variety of international activities on bilateral, multilateral, regional,
and world bases. These countries need not be isolationist simply because they lack military capacities-unless they chose to be. Many of
their international activities would have little M
y to do with deterrence and defense needs; some activitieswould be intended to alleviatepressing needs, resolve issues underlying conflicts, correct unfoundedsuspicions and misunderstandings, and improve mutual understanding and friendship. These activitiescould reduce the number and intensity of future international conflicts.
Some of the international cooperation and assistance of these countries will focus directly on the preparations for and conduct of civilianbased defense. The nature of this defense policy makes it unnecessary
to be as secretive as one usually is in military defense matters. This
makes possible widespread sharing of knowledge and know-how
among countries already implementing the policy and countries investigating it. Such countries could with mutual benefit share research
results, policy analyses, plans for preparation and training, and knowledge about potential attackers. They can share information about strategies for resisting particular types of attack, means to ma>cimize defense effectiveness, methods of maintaining resistance in the face ofrepression, and measures to meet the society's material needs when
under attack.
Basic studies and contingency planning in these areas and in preparation and training could be initially conducted by individual countries, private institutions, several countries or treaty partners working
cooperatively, by regional organizations, or United Nations agencies.
These same bodies could also, by treaty arrangements or in response
to particular crises, provide nonmilitary assistance to countries withcivilian-based defense policies facing attack.
Appropriate types of assistance include (1) access to printing andbroadcasting facilities for the~ttackedcounby; (2) provision of foodand medical supplies; (3) transmission to the outside world of news

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111

about the defense struggle and the aggressors' actions; (4) mobilizationof international economic and diplomatic sanctions against the attackers; and (5) communication to the attackers' troops, functionaries, andpopulation of information about the attack (such as the issues at stake,forms of resistance and repression being used, news of dissent among
the attackers' usual supporters, and reports of pleas for help in ending
the attack and in restoring international friendship and cooperation).
All such international assistance is extremely important, but themain burden of the defense must be borne by the population of theattacked society itself. No substitute exists for self-reliance, soundpreparation, and genuine strength in civilian-based defense.

Success and Failure
The difficulties that the attackers will encounter when confronted by awell-prepared, sophisticated civilian-based defense must not be underestimated. The defenders' capacity to mobilize their own power of resistance and to undermine, directly and indirectly, the sources of theattackers' power can produce dramatic changes in power relationships.
Given real internal strength, strategic and tactical wisdom, disciplineand persistence in the face of repression, and the capacity to strike at
the opponents' weaknesses, the civilian defenders should be able tofrustrate and finally defeat their adversary.
The very terms success and failure must be used with precise meanings in discussions of this policy. This is necessary both to evaluate theeffectiveness of any given application of civilian-based defense and tocompare this policy with military defense.
Success in civilian-based defense is measured by whether the defenders have actually achieved their goals, that is, to dissolve the attack andrestore their independent capacity to live by their own principles andinstitutions.
Failure in civilian-based defense, on the other hand, means that theattackers have gained their objectives.
As with military struggles, not every attempt to apply civilian-based
defense will succeed. This type of struggle, like any other, can be successful only if its requirements for effectivenessare met, as discrussed in
Chapter Three. Military defeat is likely to result from vast physical destruction, loss of life, demoralization, and a perceived inability to bring
the struggle to a successful conclusion. These conditions can also accompany failure in civilian-based defense, but they need not.
Instead, there may be times when one side temporarily gains or loses
strength and achieves only some of its immediate objectives. The civil-

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ian defenders may be required to endure difficult times of great suffering and many casualties. As long as they maintain their will for defense, however, they can strengthen themselve:; and their institutions
and refine their ability to wage nonviolent struggle. The defenders canincrease their courage and persist in the face of intimidation and repression and apply new strategies to create conditions more favorable
to the cause.
Even apparent defeat is not permanent. Although the defenders may
not have achieved their goals at any given time,,it is possible that they
may do so at a later point. To the degree that the spirit of resistance andthe resilience of the society's independent institutions are maintained,
the population can renew the defense struggle at another time. In theinterim, rest, renewal of the society's strength and its capacity to rebound from attacks, the development of new strategies, and the selection of new, initially limited, and achievable goals may be necessary.
Success with these can lead to adoption of strategies with more ambitious objectives. In other words, definitive defeat in civilian-based defense need never exist as long as the populaticm and society survive.
The case of improvised nonviolent struggle in Czechoslovakia provides an example of this. The 1968-1969 Warsaw Pact invasion andsubsequent collapse of the DubEek leadership was followed by a harsh
period under the Husak regime. Advocates of freedom suffered disgrace and imprisonment, such as members of Charter 77. However, inlate 1989, the popular nonviolent movement vvas renewed, this time
forcing the collapse of Communist rule and the restoration of politicalrights in Czechoslovakia.
During nonviolent struggles there are likely to be considerable periods when the defenders have been partially successful but also havesuffered some setbacks. At these times, it is very important that they
fully recognize their achievements and strengths. As has sometimes
happened in past nonviolent struggles, people have fought well andmade sigmficant gains but, because they had not yet achieved their fullobjectives, have thought that they had been defeated. They have therefore lost spirit and allowed their resistance to wither or collapse. In
effect, they capitulated, thereby defeating themselves. That must be
avoided in civilian-based defense.
In the midst of an on-going struggle, the civilian defenders can assess
how successful they have been to that point by addressing the following questions:
To what degree have the civilian defenders maintained, weakened, or
strengthened their will to resist?
To what degree have the various persons and groups among the attackers

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113

maintained, weakened, or strengthened their will to continue the attack
and to pursue the original goals?
To what degree have the independent institutions (loci of power) of the defending society maintained, lost, or augmented their capacity to struggle
and to deny to the attackers the needed sources of power?
To what degree have the defenders and the attackers, respectively, demonstrated good strategic judgment or ineptness, and have their strategic
judgments deteriorated or improved?
To what degree have the civilian defenders increased their ability to wage
noncooperation and defiance, their capacity for disciplined action, andtheir ability to fulfill the requirements for effectiveness in nonviolent
struggle?
To what degree have the attackers' population, agents of repression, and administmtors experienced high morale, support for the attack, and active assistance to it, or instead experienced poor morale, dissent, unreliabilityj or
opposition to the attack?
To what degree, respectively, have the attackers' and the defenders' international friends and needed economic or political partners continued their prior
Felationships, offered support, or disapproved of their actions and withdrawn cooperation?
To what degree have the defenders maintained their capacity for autonomy
and ability to meet their economic needs?
To what degree have the attackers' measures of manipulation and repression succeeded or been ineffectivein halting the defense and gaining the attackers'
objectives? Or have they actually increased the defenders' resistance,
aroused opposition in the attackers' own camp, and provoked international action?
To what degree have the defenders continued or even i n d their resistance in the face of repression and brutalities?
To what degree have the attackers' original objectives (economic,political, ideological, or other) been attained?
Which side is exercising the initiative in the conflict?

When the answers to these questions indicate that the defenders
have made some gains but have also experienced some losses, it is time
for them to take corrective action to increase their chances of success.
They then need to take the following steps: increase their personal
strength; maintain and expand their societal strength; idenbfy andapply their most relevant and effective leverages on the attackers; improve their strategic judgment; focus resistance on the attackers' weak
points; and a d with deliberation, courage, and steadfastness.
The criteria for evaluating the final results of a civilian-based defense
struggle go beyond determining whether the attackers have been phys-

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ically destroyed or have capitulated to superior military forces.
Whether a particular civilian-based defense stniggle has been successful would be determined by answers to questions such as these:
Have the defenders continued to deny the legitimacy of the aggressors' regime and to maintain belief in their own principles and in the right tochoose their own system and policies?
Have the defenders maintained the autonomy of their society and met its
needs, despite an occupation or a usurping regime?
Have the attackers achieved or been denied their obljectives (economic, political, ideological, or other), and to what degrees?
Have the aftackers gained or lost important intem~tionalsupport?
Has the attackers' will to prosecute the attack been maintained or changed?
Have the defenders blocked the establishment and consolidation of a substitute government of any type?
Have the affackers'forces withdrawn or disintegrated?
Are the a t t a c h likely to launch similar ventures in the future?
Has the aggressors' regime survived or been replaced?

Not all civilian-based defense struggles will end with clear success or
failure measured by these standards. Rather, as shown in Chapter
Three, at times there may be degrees of success and failure.
The most important single factor in achieving success by civilianbased defense is that the attacked society is able to maintain its selfdirection and autonomy even with the presence of ruthless would-be
rulers backed by hostile troops. This capacity hinges on the strengthand determination of the populace and the society's groups and institutions (the loci of power discussed in Chapters Two and Three).
The strength to block the attackers' objectives may take a variety offorms. The following are only a few examples: the attackers' attempts
to gain legitimacy for a new regime are blocked and the populace remains loyal to the pre-attack constitutional system; the effort to impose
a new govenunent fails, as it is impossible simply to harness the previous bureaucracy and agencies of enforcement; g,overnmentbodies continue to apply the legitimate policies and laws and refuse to implement
the attackers' substitutes; the society as a whale isolates and ignores
any new bureaucracy or agencies created by the attackers; a de facto
free press continues to operate despite the attackers' censorship andprohibitions; radio and television broadcasts supporting the resistancecontinue from hidden transmitters or from the territory of sympathetic
neighboring countries; attempts to control religious organizationsmeet
massive defiance by the religious bodies and the population of believers; attempts to ban all political opposition are met with increased
political interest and activities among the population, with a multipli-

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115

cation of active political groups; attempts to replace independent
professional organizations and unions result in their invigorated persistence, thus becoming stronger organs of resistance; other social organizations, ranging from gardening societies to sports clubs, become
politically relevant centers of communication and activity loyal to theprinciples of the society; efforts to harness the economy to serve newmasters-are counterproductive, as strikes, boycotts, deliberate inefficiencies, and slow-downs reduce both quantity and quality of products
and simultaneously increase the costs of attempting to make the economy work for the attackers, far beyond any gains they may receive.
Such examples could be multiplied several times over.
In short, the civilian defenders prove able to block the establishmentof controls over the society, to prevent an effective collaborationist or
substitute government, to defeat the attackers' political, economic, ideological, or other goals, while increasing the economic and politicalcosts of the attackers' attempts beyond any acceptable level.
Under some circumstances--not always-the attackers may findthat their own troops and functionaries become more and more disenchanted with the venture and their personal roles in it. Collaborators
who have helped the attackers in the past may have second thoughts,
become unreliable, and even join the resistance as the situation changes
and they become targets of special "decollaboration" activities by theresisters. Even the attackers' home population gradually may begin todissent and to oppose the venture. Members of the international community may increasingly condemn the attack, then shift from vocal
condemnation to international action, perhaps including economic, political, and diplomatic sanctions.
When some combination of these developments occurs, the attack
will have been dissolved, and the attacked society's independence andchosen way of life restored.

Notes
This chapter draws heavily on Gene Sharp, "Civilian-based Defense:
A New Deterrence and Defense Policy." The article was originallycommissioned for UNESCO and later published in Yoshikazu Sakamoto,
editor, Strategic Doctrines and Their Alternatives (New York: Gordon
and Breach, 1987), pp. 227-262. A related discussion of these strategic
principles in a Western European context is contained in Gene Sharp,
Making Europe Unconquerable (London:.Taylor & Francis, 1985, andCambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985; second American edition, with aforeword by George Kennan, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1986).

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For a discussion related to "forward defense,"' see Sharp, lMaking Eu-

rope Unconquerable (second American edition), pp. 60-61.
For further discussion of the problems of employing sabotage within
a nonviolent movement, see Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 608-611.
For a discussion of the role of the radio in resistance movements, see
H. Gordon Skilling, Czechosluvakia's Intempted Reoolution (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 77,7478. See also Joseph
Wechsberg, The Voices (Garden City N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969).
On the protest strike in Czechoslovakia, see Skilling, Czechoslmakia's
Interrupted Reoolution, p. 775.
The quotations on changes in Nazi policies against the population in
the occupied Soviet Union are from Alexander Dallin, Geman Rule inRussia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies (New York St. Martin's Press, 1957, and London: Maanillan, 1957), pp. 218,497, and 550.
Nazi attitudes and intentions toward the Eastern Europeans are also
For an introductory essay on the Holocaust experience, see Gene
Sharp, "rhe Lesson of Eichmann. A Review-Essay on Hannah Arendt's
Eichmann in Jerusalem," in Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston:Porter Sargent, 1980). For relevant studies of genocide, see, among others Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution: The At,tempt to Exterminate theJews of Europe 19394945 (New York A. S. Barnes, 1961); Raul Hilberg,
The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, andLondon: W. H. Allen, 1961, and revised edition, New York Holmes
and Meier, 1985);Nora Levin, The Holocaust: The Destruction of European
Jewry 1933-1945 (New York Schocken Books, 1973); Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide (New York Free Press, and London: Maanillan,1979).
The term "nonviolent Blitzkrieg' was introdtzced by Theodor Ebert.
The discussion of the distinction between "g,eneralresistancef1and"organized resistance" was stimulated by Lars Porsholt. See Lars Porsholt, "On the Conduct of Civilian Defence," in T. K. Mahadevan,
Adam Roberts, and Gene Sharp, editors, Civilian Defence: An Intduction (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, and Bombay: Bharatiya
Vidya Bhavan, 1%7), pp. 145-149.
The term "micro-resistanceff was introduced by Professor Arne
Naess. See Arne Naess, "Non-military Defence and Foreign Policy," inAdam Roberts, Jerome Frank, Arne Naess, and Gene Sharp, Civilian
Defence (London: Peace News, 1964), p. 42.

Five
Toward Transarmament
Improvised Nonviolent Struggle and Civilian-based Defense
CNILIAN-BASEDDEFENSEis being developed as a policy for research, consideration, and adoption in advance of defense crises. This policy requires preparation and training of the population for its use. However,defense crises are likely to occur for countries that have not alreadyadopted this policy. When surrender and submission to aggression areunacceptable, and military responses are obviously futile or suicidal,
cases of imprmised nonviolent struggle against coups and invasions
will, in all probability, continue.
Despite the lack of advance preparation, future struggles axe likely to
be more sophisticated than those outlined in Chapter One. The reasonsfor this are twofold: general knowledge about the workings of nonviolent action and civilian-based defense is spreading rapidly and a growing number of countries have had direct experience with the use ofnonviolent struggle for diverse purposes.
Improvised nonviolent struggle for defense is not, however, civilianbased defense. In most cases, improvised nonviolent resistance will be
sigruficantly weaker than a well-prepared civilian-based defense policy, for it will lack the advantages of preparation and planning. For
example, without preparation there would be no deterrent effect,
which might prevent an attack in the first place. Also, the skills, training, strategic acumen, and resources that can be gained during yearsof planning and preparation would all be missing in an improvised
struggle.
Planning and preparation, consequently make nonviolent struggle
for defense substantially more effective (as is similarly true in militaryefforts). The results of preparation are likely to include the following:development of a deterrence and dissuasion effect; strategic assessment and planning; attitudinal preparation (to prevent confusion, fear,
and uncertainty); training by the society's institutions, civil servants,
police, remaining military forces, and governmental bodies for conducting noncooperation and defiance in case of attack; formulation ofcontingency plans; stockpiling of equipment, food, water, means of energy, communication, and other resources; and establishment of organizations of specialists in civilian-based defense strategy.

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In combination with planning and preparation, dissemination ofboth general publications (and other means of communications such as
cassettes and videos) and specific pamphlets and handbooks (as affecting transportation, the media, schools, religious bodies, labor, business,and the like) would help spread knowledge of how to operate effective
civilian-based defense. This would make it possible for the struggle tocontinue within the quirements for nonviolent struggle and the defined strategic plans, even though some of the earlier, more visible,
leadership might have been arrested or killed.
The advantages of advance preparations provide good reasons forcountries which might face a defense crisis to consider adopting a civilian-based defense, either as a supplementary component of predominantly military policies or as their basic deterrence and defense policy.

Motives for Waging Civilian-based Defense
In most cases, the motives for implementing civilian-based defense
would be the same as those of people who have fought in wars andwho now support military warfare for defense. People fight to defend
their country because they love it, cherish its independence, and wantto preserve their way of life (although they may also wish to improvetheir society). People are likely to fight because they believe it is theirmoral, patriotic, or religious duty. While people may be quite happy toargue among themselves about politics, social policy, and even basic
principles, they are likely to unite in the conviction that no foreign government or internal clique of would-be dictators shall be permitted torule them.
All these are powerful motives for participating in civilian-based defense. As in military wars, these social and political motives often combine with personal, individual ones. These may include the desire to
make a difference with one's life, to become important, to help defend
one's family and friends, and to prove one's bravery, initiative, andwillingness to sacrificefor others. Also, the mincxity section of the p o pulation, which for personal, religious, or ethical reasons has not supported, or objected to, violent measures will likely be able to participate
fully in civilian-based defense. Additionally, in civilian-based defense
all age groups and both sexes are able to participate in the various
aspects of the nonviolent struggle. Their motives and willingness toparticipate can be fulfilled because the nature of the defense permits allof them to play sigruficant roles.
For everyone in the population, however, a primary reason for s u p
port of and participation in this defense policy will be recognition of
the capacity and power of civilian-based defense to fight aggression

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and internal takeovers. This recognition will help inspire the population as a whole to wage the defense struggle with spirit, determination,and tenacity.

Are Fundamental Changes Necessary Preconditions for
Civilian-based Defense?
Various intellectuals have at times argued that mass nonviolent struggle is impossible for any of a whole series of impressivesounding reasons. These have included genetics, child-rearing practices, the culture,
the distorting effects of the social system, the type of educational system, family patterns and sex roles, accepted religious doctrines, or thepolitical system in control.
All of those "reasons" for the impossibility of mass nonviolent strugg l e a n d therefore of a civilian-based defense policy-can be discarded for purposes of this discussion: mass nonviolent struggle exists
and is therefore possible. Some of the given "reasons" are associatedwith proposals to improve human society and individual lives. The
merits of such proposals should be considered separately and not confused with the requirements of nonviolent struggle and a civilianbased defense policy.
Some intellectuals still argue, however, that fundamental changes inhuman beings or the world are required before a civilian-based defense
policy becomes realistic. Occasionally though much less often than in
the past, someone who has not carefully studied civilian-based defense
will say in effect, "Well, that is all very fine in an ideal world, and whenit comes into existence I will support that kind of defense."
These friendly commentators often mean that before civilian-based
defense can be realistic one of three fundamental changes must haveoccurred: (1) "human nature" has been changed so that people are
more loving and cooperative, (2) the international situation has been
so transformed that military systems have disappeared, or (3)the social system has undergone a major transformation producing greatersocial justice and equality (presumably removing the "causes" ofwars). While it might be highly desirable to achieve such changes(however unlikely they may be), none of them is a prerequisite for
implementing civilian-based defense. To the contrary, we know that
nonviolent struggle has operated in the "real world" for centuries,
if not millennia. We know also that this technique has already been
improvised for defense against hostile attacks. However, let us look
more closely at three of the arguments that a fundamental change
in people or society is required before civilian-based defense becomesrealistic.

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Is a Change of "Human Nature" Required?
Sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers, and theologiam-as well as all the rest of us-differ about what "humannature1' is, and what we might prefer it to be. However, those fascinating (or boring) discussions are all irrelevant. No change in the nature of human beings is required for masses of people to use nonviolent
struggle.
The fad is that, contrary to popular mkperceptions, nonviolent
struggle has occurred very widely throughout human history and has
been waged by human beings at least as imperfect as we are today. The
ability to resist without violence is not necessarily rooted in altruism,
forgiveness, belief in love, turning the other cheek, or a desire for "selfsuffering' to remove evil.
Instead, nonviolent struggle is rooted in a human propensity-evidenced also in many domesticated animals (including not only themule but our pet dogs and catskto be stubborn, to persist in doing
what has been forbidden, and to refuse to do what has been ordered.
This stubborn streak can be easily observed in children today. (Wemight just remember that we did many such acts when we werealso capable of workyoung-r
perhaps still do!) Fortunately we a ~ e
ing together and even being altruistic; but human stubbornness is very
widespread and is often a valuable component of our personalities. It
is the most fundamental psychological basis of nonviolent resistance.
Nonviolent struggle is simply the collective application of human stubbornness for social, economic, or political objectives.
A Change in the International System?

Nor does changing over from military to civilian-based defense require
any prior transformation of the international system, the disappearance of military threats, or universal adoption of the policy. External
threats to the security of numerous nations are likely to continue in theforeseeable future. Conflicts over natural resoimes, regional politicalinfluence, ideologies, geography socio-econonuc models of development, and the like are not about to disappear from the international
scene. That reality is among the reasons for the development and consideration of a civilian-based defense policy. All societies should havea capacity to deter and defeat attacks in a conflict-filled world by meansthat do not themselves threaten the population with either years ofparamilitary conflict or quick, massive annihilation.
Civilian-based defense seeks to deal with that reality: it is designed
to strengthen the society's actual deterrence and defense capacity.

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Therefore, there is no reason to wait to adopt it until potential enemies
have done so, any more than governments have waited to adopt new,more powerful military weapons until their enemies have first procured them. A basic change from the military "weapons system" to thearmory of civilian-based defense will only occur when the new, nonviolent weapons are perceived as being at least as powerful as the oldones.
A Change in the Social System?

Certain advocates, as well as critics, of civilian-based defense have argued that the adoption and effective implementation of this policy
would require the prior transformation of the social system toward significantly greater democracy, equality, and decentralization of power.
They have argued-usually from certain ethical principles or ideological perspectives (such as socialist, anarchist, or pacifisththat only a"just society" or a "nonviolent society" can be defended by nonviolentmeans. Almost never do these critics cite historical evidence to support
their arguments.
As the examples in Chapter One show, improvised nonviolent struggle has in fact been used with a moderate degree of success to defend"imperfect" societies from internal and external attack. These societies
sometimes contained social inj~~~tices,class rule, ethnic or linguistic
heterogeneity, and even extreme internal conflicts. This was demonstrated in Germany in the 1920s. The Weimar Republic was hardly asocially harmonious society, yet it officially used improvised noncooperation and nonviolent defiance against both the 1920 Kapp Putsch andthe 1923 Franco-Belgian invasion and occupation. The repeated occurrence of nonviolent struggle in many parts of the world under highly
adverse circumstances, and at times against foreign aggressors, military cliques, and internal dictatorships, is evidence that the deliberate
use of this type of defense is possible in the future.
Although social harmony greater social justice, and a vibrant democracy would be more conducive to the use and success of a civilianbased defense policy, these conditions are not prerequisites. Civilianbased defense does not require ideal social conditions for its adoption
and practice.
Some social radicals may grant that civilian-based defense is possible, but argue that defending the existing social order by any means is
undesirable. These people and groups may be so dissatisfied with theexisting society, its violation of certain ideals, its injustices and various
types of oppression, that they will chafe at the idea that they should
defend the government and system they have previously condemned.

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Their aim has been not to preserve that system, but to transform or
replace it, so as to achieve greater political freedom, a more vigorous
democracy, or a more just social and economic system. There are,however, good reasons for even these radical critics to support a civilianbased defense policy.
When the society is attacked by those who want to impose a domestic or foreign dictatorship, it is the responsibility and opportunity ofeven the most radical advocates of social change to rally to the defenseof the attacked, imperfect society. A prerequisite to making a society betteris to prevent it from being made worse.
After a successful civilian-based defense, there will be opportunities
for the advocates of change to gain support lor their proposals. The
populace of that countryf having experienced its own power, would bein a stronger position to achieve internal social change nonviolently.
Radical groups may also have gained increased credibility throughtheir vigorous participation in the civilian struggle against the attackers, as opposed to having tried to use the situation only to advancetheir own partisan advantages, as certain political groups have done in
the past.
While highly imperfect societies have been defended by improvised
nonviolent struggle, this does not mean that the social and politicalconditions are irrelevant to the effectiveness of civilian-based defense.
There is a relation between the nature of the society to be defended andthe capacity of civilian-based defense to do so. This is for two reasons.
First, the intensity of popular willto defend the society and the numberof potential collaborators may be highly influenced by the degree towhich people are satisfied with the existing social order. Second, diffusion of power throughout the institutions of the society (the loci of
power) would increase the resilience of the society and its defense capacity. Therefore, an important part of the long-term preparation for
civilian-based defense would be to improve the quality of democracy
and justice in the society.
Certain military specialists (such as the late oxford military historian
Professor Norman Gibbs and the late Hon. Alastair Buchan, whofounded the Institute for Strategic Studies in London) were of the opinion that preparations for civilian-based defense would require the society to take steps to decentralize power within the normal peacetime
society. They had no objections to this, and saw such measures to have
independent merit, but argued that such social and political corollaries
to adoption of the policy should be acknowledged.
Even when steps to remove injustices and to diffuse power in thesociety are not taken, effective nonviolent struggle may still be possible. This can occur if the attacked population experiences an outpour-TOWARD TRANSARMAMENT

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ing of patriotism and a widespread conviction that the attackers must
be defeated so that the domestic problems can be dealt with at a later
date. Indeed, the civilian defense struggle may help the population to
gain the needed self-confidence and self-reliance to advance the democratization of the society after the defense crisis.
This does not mean, however, that eoery political system can be successfully defended by nonviolent struggle. The most clear negative
case is that of extreme dictatorships. These are regimes whose brutalities have aroused severe hatred among the population and which haveseverely restricted or abolished the independent institutions of a society that could serve as loci of power for mobilizing and conducting
civilian-based defense. Such regimes are unlikely to find among their
populace either the will or the capacity for such defense struggles.
However, even people living under highly oppressiveregimes might
wage improvised nonviolent struggle against foreign attackers. If the
populace had a sufficient distaste for the aggressors, the people could
mobilize themselves to defend their right of self-determination. An invasion of a society ruled by an authoritarian system might thereby
arouse an enthusiastic and effective improvised nonviolent defense
struggle on behalf of the country as distinct from the government. In
the pmess of struggle they might create new independent institutions,which simultaneously would be organs for defending and reshaping
the previous political system. This popular mobilization could thenlead to increased participation in political life, the building of additional autonomous institutions, and a significant modification or replacement of the earlier system.
Alternatively, officials of a highly centralized society could deliberately move toward decentralization and democracy (as developmentsin the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and in Spain under the successors to Franco show). Such a reform regime, if genuinely committed tobasic change, could even contemplate introducing elements of a civilian-based defense policy. That government could then a d on its own
initiative, perhaps with the stimulus or support of a dissatisfied public,
to resolve popular grievances, decentralizeinstitutions, increase popular political participation in decision making, and develop a popular
desire and ability to defend the society and its growing freedoms by
civilian struggle. This could be especially important in blocking a possible coup d'6tat by hard-liners among the ruling party, the political police, and the military forces.
Except where clearly noted, it is assumed in the remainder of thebook that we are discussing consideration of avilian-based defense
within a political system that has reasonable claims to being called ademocracy.

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A Transpartisan Approach to Consideration of the Policy
If the substance of a possible civilian-based defense policy is presented
on the basis of its potential utility-without ideological baggage-sucha policy might well receive widespread support across the political
spectrum in a demoaatic society. To make fair consideration of thepolicy on its merits possible, it is highly important that the presentationand evaluation of civilian-based defense proposals be made in a "transpartisan" manner. The policy must not be tied to any particular political or ideological group or perspective. Individual countries, politicalgroups, and the like, could, however, reasonably argue that the policy
was fully compatible with, and even required by their own ideals or
ideology, but they ought not to claim that it belongs exclusively tothem. In general, civilian-based defense would be best presented inways that make it sensible and appealing to groups and individuals
holding a great variety of political views and differing attitudes toward
military means and past wars.
Very importantly, no peace or pacifist group or radical political organization should identify itself as the prime acivocate of civilian-based
defense. Neither should the new policy be presented in ways thatmight alienate conservatives and members of the existing defense establishment or the independent social groups and institutions thatwould bear responsibility for carrying out the future policy.
All sectors of the society ought to play important roles not only in
exploring and evaluating civilian-based defense, but also in preparing
for and implementing the policy. Indeed, it is imperative that many
sectors of the society participate in the adoption of this policy. A civilian-based defense must rest on broad national consensus because it
must be implemented by the general population and institutions of thesociety, not special forces alone. Such consensus and solidarity cannot
be built upon purely partisan approaches. Staunch critics of a society's
present defense policy must join with fervent supporters of that policy
to open a rigorous investigation and discussion of the new civilianbased defense proposals.
A transpartisan approach would not erase or ignore important political differences within the society. Rather, it would aim at incorporating people holding various perspectivesin support of the development
and adoption of civilian-based defense. Assume, for example, that theimmediate policy proposal is to integrate only a small civilian-based
component into the society's existing, predominantly military, defense
preparations. Groups advocating full adoption of civilian-based defense should support the limited component on the grounds that as
more is learned, public confidence in civilian-based defense would

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likely grow, making total changeover to this policy at some point a
serious political possibility. On the other hand, present supporters of
the existing military policies could sincerely support the incorporationof the small civilian-based component, since it would add an extra
layer of deterrence and defense to the existing military posture. Someof these people might also hope, and expect, that acceptance of that
small civilian-based component would be the end of the matter!
A future decision on whether to expand the initially small civilianbased defense component, or eventually to move toward full adoption, could then be based in part on the merits revealed by an existing
civilian-based defense component and by the subsequent research andpolicy studies of its capacities. Expansion of the civilian-based defense
component could then become more sensible in the minds of mostpeople: the once unthinkable may gradually become the obvious andrealistic choice.
The ultimate decision on rejecting, retaining, or fully adopting thispolicy would be determined by the degree to which civilian-based defense is deemed to be adequate to deter and defend against internalcoups and foreign aggression. This book is based on the assumption that nocountry will permanently relinquish its military options unless and until it
has a desmed confidence in a viable, developed civilian-based defense policy.
In most situations, the adoption of a new defense posture could
hardly be achieved without the participation of the society's existing
defense establishment. Preliminary evidence from the addition of nonviolent resistance components into the defense policies of Sweden,
Austria, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia indicate that the participation of
the defense ministries in the consideration and development of civilian-based defense is both possible and constructive. Military institutions and personnel have also been involved in serious examinations of
this policy in Norway Finland, and several other countries.
There might be exceptions to the involvement of the military in theconsideration and adoption of civilian-based defense: a newly independent country may lack military forces, a country may have beenpermanently demilitarized by international agreement, or the geopolitical situation and military realities might exclude the building of effective military capacity. Another exception might exist in cases where themilitary forces have acted primarily as agents for imposing dictatorships on the population. In certain revolutionary situations, such
military organizations may have been soundly defeated and disbanded. In virtually all other situations, however, a "transpartisan"
approach is required. This approach needs to cut across traditional
partisan barriers and political alignments. It also needs to involve thesociety's various political parties, traditional military defense institu-

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tions, and non-governmental organizations-in short, all of the society's state and non-state institutions and the general population.

The Process of Transarmament
The process of changing over from military-based defense to civilianbased defense is called "transarmament." This Is not "disarmament," ifthat term is understood as the reduction or abandonment of defense
capacity. Instead, transarmament is the process of changing the type of"armamenYf from one relying on military forces and weaponry to one
depending on the whole population using the psychological, social,economic, and political weapons outlined in Chapter Three.
This discussion assumes that transarmament will proceed in accordance with democratically made decisions in which the government
plays a major role in both the choice of civilian-based defense and its
preparations. This need not be a universal pattern, however, and govenunental plans made without the support and participation of thesociety are unlikely to be sound or to be implemented effectively.
In some cases, especially when the government's democratic qualities are limited, societal groups and institutions may proceed withpreparations for civilian-based defense prior to or parallel with governmental evaluation and decision making. The recommendations of
non-state institutions, including occupational and professional groups,
might be examined to determine whether they could be integrated into
a comprehensive plan to serve as the basis for a government-adopted
policy. In most cases, however, governmental initiatives are more
likely to precede considerationby the non-state institutions and to provide the general framework for developing mare specific plans.
Obviously the process, occasion, extent, and timing of transarmament will vary widely from one situation to another. These will depend
to a significant degree on the &rumstances and capacities of present
policies. Most important, however, will be the degree of understandingof civilian-based defense and the assessment of its capacity to deter andsuccessfully defend against potential attackers.
In most cases,civilian-based defense could not be adopted quickly
as a full substitute for military defense. Given the complexity of transforming an entire nationsf system of defense, and the relatively untested nature of a civilian-based defense policy, rapid replacementof military defenses is virtually impossible. Some of the argumentsthat an abrupt abandonment of military systems is possible have been
derived from false premises. These include the notion that such ashift could be accomplished by mass conversion to pacifism, or that

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the shift would "naturally" follow from the use of nonviolent resistance for other purposes, or that a social revolution would eliminate the need for the military. However, there is no historical evidence
that a shift to nonviolent struggle in defense is at all likely to occur
on the basis of massive individual conversions to religious nonviolence. Nor will a shift to civilian-based defense happen as a natural consequence of the use of nonviolent resistance to achieve liberation from foreign rule or an internal dictatorship, as experience from
India, Iran, and elsewhere shows. Neither does a civilian-based defense policy come into existence simply as a result of a revolutionthat aims to establish a new social order in which class oppression
and exploitation-presumed causes of military systems-would notexist, as evidence from Russia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Nicaraguademonstrates.
Rapid changeovers are undesirable in most situationsbecause quick
shifts to civilian-based defense could not be well planned. That could
be fatal. Without adequate, comprehensive, and competent preparation, the civilian-based defense policy, when put to the test, probably
would be little more effective than improvised nonviolent resistance.
The resulting ill-prepared defense efforts would be especially subject toweaknesses and possible defeat. Ill-prepared, incompetent, and ineffective resistance practiced under the name of civilian-based defense
could well discredit the whole policy.
Civilian-based defense is likely to be adopted more or less on thesame basis that innovations in military policies are accepted. The newconceptions and weapons systems must be seen as improvements onpast defense assumptions, plans, and weaponry. Most countries interested in this policy will adopt a gradual, incremental approach, slowly
incorporating and testing civilian-based defense components in theiroverall, predominantly military, defense postures. These components
may be intended to provide policy options for special contingencies or
to provide a complementary defense capacity for tasks not otherwise
covered.
In this incremental approach to transarmament, the preparation andtraining would begin on a relatively modest basis, while the existing
military policy is still in place. The civilian-based component could
then be expanded in stages. The military capacity would not be downgraded or eliminated at first. There are two reasons for this. First, thepopulation would be unwilling to reduce its military preparations until
viable substitute civilian-based defense options were in place. Second,even given the will for change, the transition from a military policy toa civilian policy would q u i r e considerable time, as previously noted.
Preparations, training of the population, and other adjustments (in

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some cases including economic conversion) would need to be developed and implemented.
The emphasis in transarmament is primarily on the increase in effictive wense azpucity through development of the new civilian-based policy, not on the reduction or abandonment of military weaponry. Thatwould follow the development of deserved confidence in the new nonviolent deterrence and defense system. Gradually, if confidence in thedeterrence and defense capacities of the expanding new policy spreads,
the existing military weaponry would likely be seen as less and lessnecessary. This would be especially the case toward the end of the transarmament process. At that point, the military hardware could be gradually reduced and abandoned as antiquated weapons, as were bows
and arrows.
In all countries not subject to imminent attack, time is available forreasoned evaluation and decision as to whether to change defense
policies. This chapter is based on the assumption that there is time toconsider civilian-based defense, to research its capacities, dynamics,
requirements, and strategic principles.
The steps in the incremental adoption of civilian-based defense will
be of varying substance and duration. There is no blueprint of steps
and time scale that is applicable to all countries and situations. Careful
and unique plans would be required for each. In general, however, thefollowing elements will be included in the process of consideration andadoption:
research;
public education;
policy and feasibility studies;
evaluation by the public, private organizations, official institutions, defense
departments and ministries, and legislatures;
introduction of a modest civilian-based component (perhaps for specificpurposes);
preparing and training of the populace;consideration of adding other purposes for the use of civilian-based defense;
consideration of the desirability and viability of retaining both military andcivilian-based components or shifting further, or fully, to civilian-based
defense;legislative and administrative action on these decisions;strengtheningthe capacities of civilian-based defense; andunification of the defense policy.

Major attention must be given to comparative analyses of the advantages and disadvantages, the capacities and incapacities, of militarybased and civilian-based defenses to meet security needs for the present and the foreseeable future. This will be true both in the initial

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stage, when the society first decides to start civilian-based defense
preparations, and also in the later stage, when it is determining
whether the new policy will be adequate on its own. In an assessmentof the relevance of civilian-based defense to the security needs of a
specific country, the following factors become crucial:
the nature and circumstancesof the country's external situation and security
threats;
the nature and circumstances of the country's internal situation and dangerof usurpations;the country%perceived options in deterrence and defense; andthe assessment and perception of the viability of civilian-based defense tomeet those defense needs.

Models of Policy Consideration and Transarmament
No single model of policy consideration and partial or full transarmament can be created that will be applicable to all countries and situations. It is, however, possible to conceive of several general models by
which civilian-based defense might become either the central elementof a country's defense policy or a significant component within abroader, predominantly military, policy. There are at least four generalmodels:
L Full, relatively rapid, adoption of civilian-based defense as the country's defense policy by small countries that have no viable military or alliance alternative because of some special situation or condition.
2 The addition of a civilian-based component to a predominantly military defense policy to serve one or more specific purposes with no intent toexpand that component to play wider roles within the overall policy.
3. The phased introduction and gradual expansion of civilian-based defense elements with the objective of eventual full transarmament.
4. The negotiated, phased, multilateral transarmament of several neighboring countries, simultaneouslyintroducing civilian-based defense components, perhaps followed by a phased reduction of military weaponry.

Let us now look briefly in more detail at these possible models.
Full Rapid Adoption of Civilian-based Defense

Quick, full transarmament is most likely only for those countries thatlack sigdicant military options, or those for which the use of theirmilitary options would only bring certain devastation. Adoption of this

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policy might be possible for small countries that do not possess military forces, such as Costa Rica or Iceland. At present, such countries
depend on either a very strong internal police force and the option offoreign assistance (Costa Rica) or membership in a foreign military alliance (Iceland). Both of these arrangements have disadvantages if real
independence of action is a major objective.
Rapid adoption of the policy might also be possible for future newly
independent countries (such as Palestine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Armenia, Hong Kong, or Tibet). These countries would possibly continue to feel threatened by their militarily more powerful neighbor(that is, previous ruler). However, there would be no way they could
build up a self-reliant, adequate, military defense capacity. If the small
country allied itself with a foreign military power, the former ruling
government might well feel threatened or even provoked to invade.
For countries in such situations, careful feasibility studies and thoughtful consideration may lead to civilian-based defense being seen as arealistic and more complete altemative to military policies. It would nolonger be necessary to chaose between making violent, but impotent,
gestures or submitting passively to aggression or usupation.
The ways in which civilian-based defense might be adopted by such
newly independent countries might be more flexible than would be thecase with longer-established state structures. In some cases, governmental initiatives in exploring civilian-based defense might precedeconsiderationby the nonstate institutions. Those initiatives might thenprovide the general framework for developing more speafic plans. The
population and institutions of the society could then evaluate the proposed defense policy and prepare for their roles in it.
In other cases, the initiative to adopt civilian-based defense mightcome from the population and the independent institutions of the society. This initiative, and even first preparations-potentially buildingon the experience of an independence s t r u g g l ~ o u l dproceed priorto, or parallel with, governmental evaluation and decision making. In
such cases,the recommendations of the independent institutions andoccupational groups might then be integrated into a comprehensive
national plan for a government-adopted policy.
Since civilian-based defense is a policy that projects defense potential
on the basis of preparation and training beyond historical experience-as do innovations in most modem military weaponry-there are no
examples of the adoption of civilian-based defense precisely on thismodel. However, the situation of Germany following the First World
War is somewhat comparable. It still had military forces, but due toTreaty of Versailles provisions they were too weak to be a significant
international factor. The German army, for several reasons, was even

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unwilling to a d against the private armies of the Freikorps that attempted to overthrow the Weimar Republic in the Kapp Putsch of 1920.
In 1923 the German military forces were too weak even to be sent into
battle against the Belgian and French forces that had invaded the Ruhr.
In both cases the govenunent and political leaders initiated improvised
nonviolent struggle for defense as the only realistic option.
Newly independent countries in the futureshould have considerable
advantages over Germany's situation in the 1920s for several reasons:
there is much more historical experience, the nature of nonviolent
struggle and civilian-based defense is far better understood, and thereis time for making preparations and training the population to wage
the defense struggle.
Adding Civilian-based Componentsfor Special Purposes
The general model usually presented by civilian-based defense theorists is for a full transarmament to the policy over a period of someyears. These theorists have argued for full transarmament rather thana permanent combination of military and civilian-based defense on thebasis of defense effectiveness. It is clear, however, that the interest in
civilian-based defense is not limited to those few countries that initiallycontemplate a full changeover. There has been much more interest in
the addition of civilian-based components to predominantly military
policies.
When a civilian-based component is added to a predominantly military policy, there is no permanent commitment by the society or government to maintain that element at the initial level of operation andfor the original specific purpose. That component might later be ine a s e d , reduced, or eliminated, depending on future assessmentsof its
deterrence and defense capacity. Countries that have military options
with reasonable chances of repelling invaders without incurring unacceptable casualties and destruction are likely to continue for a considerable time to rely on military means in case of attack. They may
however, at some point add a permanent civilian-based defense component to their predominantly military defense policy, as Sweden,
Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Austria have already done. In such cases
there may also be other nonmilitary and paramilitary components.
For example, in April 1982the Austrian Defense Minister Otto Roschwrote: "I'he military portion of the national defense plan considers
civilian resistance and therewith the forms of social defense as necessary complements to military national defense. In this context, theseelements are systematically integrated in the ideological, civil, and

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economic areas of the UmfassendeLandesverteidigung [General National
Defense] and occupy a permanent position therein." The Austrian Landesverteidigungsplan (National Defense Plan), published in 1985, reaffirms that "civilian resistance is a necessary complement to the militarynational defense." It also states that in the event of a temporary occupation of portions of Austrian territory, "an organized civilian resistance," in full compliance with the international laws of war, could also
be "effective" in supporting Austrian military fighting forces in therelevant area.
Sweden added a civilian-based component to its "total defense" policy in April 1986 by unanimous parliamentary vote. This followed approximately twenty years of discussions and investigations involving
the parliament and the Ministry of Defense as well as political parties,
academic researchers, religious bodies, and others. During 1981-1983 a
commission+tablishedby Cabinet decision-worked within the
Ministry of Defense to prepare a plan for the use of "civil resistance" aspart of the country's defense policy. The commission recommended
that the "total defense" authorities should extend their planning to include "nonmilitary resistance" for territories that might be occupied incase of war. It also recommended establishment of a permanent commission that would initiate planning in stages, beginning with oneof the six Wigh Regional Commands" that already coordinate othercivilian components of the total defense policy. Basic and appliedresearch and investigation of the relationships between military andnonmilitary defense were also recommended. A Commission on
Nonmilitary Resistance was officially established on June 1,1987, withthese tasks: (1) to further the conditions for nonmilitary resistancethrough advice and recommendations to authorities and individuals;(2) to deal with questions of international law and psychological andother conditions of nonmilitary resistance, and (3)to further research in
the field. The Commission's head, Gunnar Gustafsson, has written that
preparations in peacetime for civil resistance "will achieve a valuable
mental readiness" that should help make a potential aggressor "thinkcarefully and perhaps abandon the original plans."
These cases, and others cited below, illustrate that nonviolent struggle for national defense is in certain countries accepted as an importantcomponent in overall national defense plans.
Civilian-based defense components would be intended to serve special purposes or to meet particular contingencies,while military means
would be used for other situations. Such combinations of militarybased and civilian-based defense are intended to be permanent; they
are not viewed as transitionary steps toward fulltransarmament. These
mixed policies would only be likely to change under one condition: if

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the society gained the confidence that civilian-based defense had amuch greater potential for deterrence and defense than had been originally assessed.
Due to the very Merent dynamics and requirementsfor success of
military action and nonviolent struggle, it is necessary to be clear about
the role of a limited civilian-based defense component within a predominantly military defense policy. The identification of such specificpurposes is crucial in the decision to adopt a civilian-based component.
Three purposes of a special civilian-based componenthave been identified as:
1. the first line of defense in situations in which military ~ i s t a n c toe invaders is obviously futile and suicidal
2 a reserve line of defense where military resistance has been used andhas failed to repel invaders
3. as the main defense against internal usurpations, such as coups d'btat.

Where military resistance is futile or suicidal. Some countries might basetheir assessmenton whether to adopt partially civilian-based resistameon the relative military might of the potential attackers. If it is comparatively weak, the resistance might well be military. However, if theattackers' military capacity is overwhelming, military-based defense
efforts would be obviously futile and suicidal. Then the civilian-based
component could be employed as the first line of defense.
This was the situation in the two cases of improvised nonviolent resistance described in Chapter One, the German Ruhrkampf against
French and Belgian invaders in 1923 and the Czechoslovak resistanceagainst Warsaw Pact invaders in 1968. With increased knowledge, feasibility studies, and time for preparation and training, the effectivenessof such defense should be greatly increased. Therefore, a civilian-based
component might be incorporated into the overall defense policy
partly to deal with that specific contingency.
W h e ~military resistance has failed. A civilian-based component mightalso be used where a country's military forces have attempted to repulse invaders but have been overwhelmed. This was the case in Norway during the German occupation, 1940-1945. The Dutch resistanceagainst the Nazis is another important example.
In 1967, a study commissioned by the Norwegian Cabinet and prepared by the Norwegian Defense Research Institution contemplated
the use of a prepared nonviolent resistance in case of the failure ofmilitary defense. "Nonviolent defense could accordingly be thought ofas a type of defense in depth, should the protection [by military de-

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fense] of territorial integrity collapse." The report stated: "In case one
assumes that a nonviolent defense in one form or another can beworked in as an addition to [the predominantly military] total defense,
there is reasonable ground to assume that this will serve to strengthen
Norway's resistance power and deterrence against enemy attack."
On March 1,1989, the Norwegian Atlantic Committee sponsored a
conference on "Complementary Forms of Defense." The introductorylecture on issues associated with an incorporation of ad resistancewithin Norway's "total defense" policy was presented by the Norwegian Defense Minister, Johan J q e n Holst, who was a co-author of the1967 report.
Such a component has been part of Swiss defense policy for sometime. In the Swiss "general defense" policy, in case of a failure of themilitary forces to repel foreign attackers, both "'armed resistanceff(guerrilla and paramilitary struggle) and "passive resistanceffwould
be used in occupied parts of the country.
Most of the population would not be participating in the violent resistance, however. Instead, citizens are instructed to refuse all collaboration while complying with international law. Although not resisting
violently and not aiding such violence, this section of the population"nevertheless does not make the smallest concessionsto the occupying
power and disapproves every attempt at rapprochement." Refusal ofcollaboration, "the cold shoulder" against occupation personnel, andrefusal of cooperation with all attempts to indodrinate the populationin the attackersf ideology are important responsibilities of the civilian
population in this situation, as identified in the Civilian Defense Book
issued in 1969 to every household in the country.
Finland is not among the countries that have already incorporated anonviolent resistance component into its overall defense policy. However, in 1971 the presidentially supervised Finnish Psychological Defense Planning Commission issued the first official study of civilianbased defense. The commission rejected any complete replacement ofmilitary capacity by the new policy. However, the commission accepted the utility of adding a nonviolent resistance component to thecountry's predominantly military policy.
The report stated: l'However, in certain crisis situationsthe methodsof weaponless resistance can be practical as a supplement to armed
resistance: they would come into question in an area which has comeunder the control of an invader. The examples gained from the experiences of various countries shows that these methods in combination
with armed resistance can prove suitable during occupation in the effort to secure the freedom of action of social institutions and finallyachieve liberation from occupation." After examining the possible ben-

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eficial uses of civilian-based defense, the 1971 Commission proposed
that, alongside military preparations, Finland should make plans andprepare for nonviolent resistance in situations in which it is seen as areasonable alternative, and that such work be initiated as quickly as
possible. This was, however, not done.
Yugoslavia has already included a nonmilitary component in its
Total National Defense policy. General Nikola Ljubicic writes thatwhile military power is essential in a rational strategic system, 'To win
victory in an all-people's defense war, all types of resistance must be
combined harmoniously and functionally, with armed struggle remaining the backbone." Yugoslav policy clearly allows for the use ofnonviolent resistance in occupied parts of the country. "Naturally,
units of the operational army and territorial defense may sometimes
find themselves in the position of being forced temporarily to abandon
further resistance and evacuate one or another town or settlement.
But they must leave behind a military-political organization capable ofcontinuing the struggle by political, diversionist and other forms ofadion."As Adam Roberts has outlined, these other Yugoslav forms of resistance include: (1) moral, political, and psychological resistancenonrecognition of capitulation and occupation, maintaining indigenous governmental structures, conducting agitation and propaganda,
and the like; (2) economic resistance-produdion and supply for resistance forces, protection of property, refusal to perform work advantageous to the attacker, and so on; (3)resistance in culture and education;and (4) passive resistance--social boycotts, refusal to cooperate, andgeneral attitude of noncompliance and hostility. The Yugoslav systemof defense "calls for the total involvement of the political, economic,
and social organizations. They are involved not only in executing
plans, but also in formulating them."
Where a civilian-based component has been incorporated into a
country's predominantly military defense posture, certain problems
may arise. Persons and groups with major defense responsibilities willneed to evaluate how the combination of military and nonviolent components is operating. For example, the resisters may wish to capitalizeon the nonviolent character of a defense struggle in order to undermine
the morale, reliability, and obedience of the attackers' troops (as occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968). However, such efforts will be madeexceptionally difficult or impossible if the same troops were previously
under military attack, if some of their friends were killed or wounded,or if they currently fear for their own lives.
The problems of combining violent and nonviolent techniq~~es
areespecially acute in proposals that would use both guerrilla warfare and

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nonviolent struggle within the same overall defense strategy. Several
recent "defensive defense" or "nonoffensive defense" models, as mentioned in Chapter One, contain this problem. If nonviolent resistanceand guerrilla warfare are used simultaneously by resisters in the samegeographical area, exceptionally serious problems could arise,not only
leading to very high casualties but also completely undermining theeffectivenessof nonviolent struggle as well. For these reasons, the addition of a civilian-based defense component to a military defense policy
should not be accompanied by the addition of gueniua warfare or certain "defensive defense" military components.
A mixed defense policy with both military and civilian components
is a clear advance from an exclusively military-based policy. However,continuing attention to the inconsistencies that can arise and their consequences will be required as the overall policy develops. If studies of
the civilian-based defense policy and experience in its development
and practice demonstrate greater defense capacity than had ori@y
existed or been perceived, these problems can potentially be resolved
by progressive movement toward full transarmament. Otherwise,
great care must be taken to prevent the undermining by the militarycomponent of the very factors that contribute to successby the civilianbased component. In general, the problems will be less acute if it ispossible to separate or isolate the operations of the military-based andcivilian-based defense systems.

Against internal usurpations. Another possible model of partial transarmament is the addition of a civilian-based defense component specifically to prevent and defeat coups d'ktat, executive usurpations, orother unconstitutional attempts to seize control of the state apparatus.
Internal attacks constitute a serious defense problem. Dozens of societies during recent decades have seen their constitutional democratic
governmenb-and other systems-thrown out of power, their political leaders killed, and a new dictatorial government imposed by thethreat or use of military force.
In some countries, such as Thailand, efforts to achieve greater democracy and social justice have been repeatedly disrupted by militaryor political coups over several decades. In some Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Peru, Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil, coups
have produced grave problems in past decades. In African countries,
where the military organizations are clearly better organized and more
powerful than much of the civil society, coups &&at have been a major
factor in shaping the political systems of the continent since their independence. Europe has had its share of coups in past decades as well.

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Quite diverse countries might therefore want quickly to adopt civilianbased defense, if only for preventing internal usurpations, while retaining military options for dealing with international dangers.
Most coups d'ktat are often largely or purely military operations.
Other coups are attempted seizures of the state by dictatorial politicalparties or "intelligence" bodies; sometimes coups are conducted or
supported by combinations of civilian and military groups.
Declaring such seizures to be illegal or unconstitutional is no solution to this problem: their perpetrators are quite willing to violate
standing constitutional and legal prohibitions. Few people are willing
to resort to civil war to block such attempts. Besides, when the militaryforces themselves are conducting or backing the coup, the chances of amilitary victory by civilians wanting to defend the constitution are extremely small. Except in those cases in which the putschists are only asmall group without much support and the military forces are overwhelmingly loyal to the constitutional government, there is no militaryanswer to this problem, just as there is no constitutional solution.
Civilian-based defense is potentially the only policy to block establishment of a dictatorship that does not risk civil war. The two cases
described in Chapter One-Germany in 1920 and France in 1961were successful. This suggests that the basic answer to the problem ofblocking internal usurpations may lie in a refined and developed policy that builds on the essential characteristics of those cases.
The basic pattern of civilian-based defense against such usurpations
would approximate the operations described in Chapter Four: denying
legitimacy to the attackers; seeking to prevent them from establishinga government and effective administration; keeping control of the civil
service, police, and military forces out of the attackers' hands; mobilizing the institutions and public of the civil society to refuse to accept
governance by the usurpers; attempting to subvert the troops and s u p
porters of the usurpers; and attempting to gain maximum international
nonviolent backing for the restoration of constitutional government.
P r e p a r a t i o ~ fthe society, the governmental apparatus, and thecitizenry-can be made to develop the capacity to defeat such attacks
by noncooperation and defiance. Those countries that have experienced such usurpations in the past should be especially attentive to thispossibility. That does not mean that other countries without such a
record should be indifferent. In the United States the 1987 '?rangate"
investigations revealed the existence of a small group-including thethen director of the Central Intelligence Agency-intent on establishing a self-sustaining, powerful, "secret government" to do what it
thought desirable and necessary regardless of the constitutional proce-

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dures and institutions of the U.S. government. This should be a serious
warning that very few, if a n y governments are immune to attemptedinternal take-overs and subversion.
In most cases, regimes and societies that feel themselves to be vulnerable to such usurpations can launch the same types of investigation,
public discussion, policy consideration, and decision making as would
be used for adoption of civilian-based defense for other purposes. Specific legislation and public education should establisha moral and legal
responsibility of everyone to refuse to support and obey any groupseeking to abolish the constitutional system and impose themselves as
the new rulers.
Under certain political conditions, however, if governmental consideration and preparations for defense against internal usurpations are
not made through the usual channels, another model exists.The policy
against usurpations can be discussed by the public through a widespread program of public education using, for example, newspapers,
magazines, handbooks, radio, and television, and by the institutionsof the society (loci of power). These organizationswould not be limited
to educational, social, religious, trade union, business, cultural, andsimilar elements of the society. They should also include government
officials, civil servants, police, soldiers, political party members, andother groups. This could produce a situation in which the nature ofcivilian-based defense would be widely known throughout the society,and basic responsibilities and specific defense responses would be wellunderstood. Under these conditions it should be possible to prevent an
unconstitutional seizure of power.
The adoption of civilian-based defense only for the purpose of maintaining constitutional government against internal usurpation can play
an extremely important role. This aspect of the policy should be ofinterest to most governments of the world. Regardless of the ways
many of them came to power, they often learn that to retain power theyrequire legitimacy and popular acceptance, and have no wish to bethemselves summarily thrown out by a coup d'ktat.
Planning for Phased Full Transarmament
There are a number of countries whose military capacity, when comp a d to potential attackers, is so limited that they are incapable ofserious military defense. The military may serve a largely symbolicrole
in some countries, or have only the capacity for repressive action intimes of acute domestic crisis in others. Limited military capacity canoccur for various reasons, including limited domestic resources, eco-

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nomic limitations, small population, and the like. In some countries,
such as Austria, domestic considerations may be made more complex
by international treaty limitations.
Poland, on the other hand, might be capable of supporting a larger
military system, given a solution of the economicproblems, but it could~(Indeed, thenever be adequate against the Soviet Union or N A forces.
main use of the Polish military forces in the 1980s was for internal repression.) A similar situation could exist for the increasingly independent and democratic countries of Eastern Europe, such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria.
Such countries as these might well give very serious consideration to
long-range full transarmament. An essential acceptance of the goal offull transarmament might be made, or at least widely accepted, early inthe process, but the transition would most likely be deliberately phased
to operate over some time, such as a ten or fifteen year period.
Actual transarmament for these countries would most likely begin
with incorporation of limited civilian-based components into exclusively or predominantly military policies. This would involve implementation of preparation and training and mobilization of defense
capacity throughout the society's institutions. By beginning with limited civilian-based components, the society and government would
gain experience in how to prepare, train, and conduct this type of defense. The initial components might then be gradually expanded andnew ones added, assuming that preparations and experience indicatedsufficient viability for the policy. As this capacity and confidence increases, it would be possible gradually to reduce reliance on militarycomponents until fulltransarmament was accomplished.
Full transarmament for such countries would have several advantages. First, they would not be military threats to their neighbors. Second, they would have enhanced deterrence and defense capacities.
And third, they would virtually have eliminated the possibility of aninternal coup &&at or executive usurpation by military means, while
having mobilized the capacity to defeat any such attacks. The defense
needs and domestic situations of certain countries are sufficiently serious, and the development of nonviolent struggle for defense and liberation sufficiently promising, that we should not be surprised when significant political steps are taken in this direction.
Multilateral 'I).ansamzament
Civilian-based defense has always been proposed as a policy that could
be adopted by unilateral decision in approximately the same way that

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governments have added new military weapons, or have shifted towhole new weapons systems. Because the new weaponry was seen as
increasing the combat power of the military forces, there was no need,or advantage, to negotiating agreements with neighboring regimes or
hostile governments-requiring them also to adopt the new weapons.
This has been the case with every change in military weaponry thathas ever been adopted. On the other hand, there have been many attempts to reduce the quantity or type of military weaponry by treaties
and negotiated agreements. In the long nm, these have not been notably successful.
If civilian-based defense is really a powerful policy for deterring anddefending against attacks, then there is no reason for any country to
wait to transarm-in part or in full-until its neighbors and potential
attackers are also willing to do so. It is possible, however, that some
type of multilateral, phased, partial or full transarmament might be a
viable option in certain situations. This option might be implemented
without formal negotiations and treaties, while in other cases thosemeasures would be an important part of the change in defense andmilitary capacities.
The multilateral introduction of civilian-based components, andtheir progressive expansion, might well occur in certain regions, suchas the Nordic countries, Central America, or Central Europe. The basis
is already laid for some serious research and policy studies on the potential of civilian-based components in the defense policies of four ofthe five Nordic countries-Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland.
Little, or nothing, has been done in Iceland, however.
Central America is a region where there has been little serious governmental interest in civilian-based defense. It is also a region where
military forces have bolstered or created military and political dictatorships, and where neighboring governments have at times threatenedor conducted aggression. One way in which the likelihood of international tensions and internal dictatorships might be reduced is throughthe phased introduction of civilian-based defense components, perhaps followed by reductions of various types of military weaponry andforces. The strengthening of civil institutions would be a vital element
in introducing the new defense policy in this region.
Transarmament by international negotiation might be arranged inCentral Europe, especially in light of the major changes which havetaken place in Eastern Europe and the widespread reassessmentsof defense and security policies among Western European countries.
Civilian-based defense might provide the missing Link that would facilitate major military reductions at least, if not full demilitarization, of abroad corridor from Northern to Southern Europe. The civilian-based

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components could be phased in on agreed schedules followed by reductions in the type and quantity of military armaments. When defense
capacity can be retained while an agreed process of demilitarization
proceeds, some of the barriers to negotiated arms reduction and disarmament are removed.

Civilian-based Defense and the Superstates
Much less attention has been given to the applicabilityof civilian-based
defense to present and potential superstates than to the defense problems of small and mediumsize countries. Superstates today most obviously include the United States and the Soviet Union. This status is notprimarily based on their possession of nuclear weapons, rather it isderived from the vastness of their territories and populations, and thesize of their state structures. In that context, China and India also belong in this category. A united Europe would also be a superstate,
though sigrhcantly differing from all the others. In addition to landsize and population, the degree of centralized control and the extent ofmilitary capacity are additional important criteria.
The applicability of civilian-based defense in the case of superstates
depends to a considerable degree on the assessment of the nature ofthese regimes and their objectives. Many people would, with evidence
and rationale, view one or more of these large states as being primarily
aggressive or oppressive, seeking to dominate its neighbors, to maintain rigid central control over its own population, or to direct the politics, economics, and military policies of distant countries. If that is thecase, such a superstate would be seen as a likely aggressor against
which civilian-based defense and other expressions of nonviolent
struggle must be waged.
On the other hand, to the degree that a superstate's aggressive foreign activity and internal repression is seen to be a defensive reaction
to perceived international threats, then civilian-based defense might
become a positive contribution to the development of those societies
and to a redudion of the more offensive characteristics of that superstate. According to Josef Stalin, the necessity to deal with foreign
threats made the ideal of a workers' democracy "impossible." Stalin
used arguments of national security against pleas for freedom of discussion within the Communist Party. He also argued that "to freethe state from bureaucratic elements ... a completely secure, peaceful condition all around" is needed "so that we would not need large
military cadres . ..which put their imprint on the other governmental
institutions."

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There are several ways that civilian-based defense may be useful tosuperstates. It is assumed that, because of their total reliance on vast
military resources, these states are incapable for the present time of
conducting full transarmament, either on the quick-changeover or the
long-term model. Initially, therefore, the points of practical relevanceof this policy for superstates are likely to be as supplementary components within predominantly military policies, as a means of blocking
coups d'ktat or as policies for their previously dependent allies.
Let us focus discussion briefly on the potential of civilian-based defense for superstates on the United States and the Soviet Union. Theirsituations have both similarities and sigdicant differences.
If present dependent allies of the United States-especially Western
European countries and Japan-are able to assume full, or at least primary, responsibility for their own defense through this new policy,
that would greatly reduce U.S. military expenditures-perhaps by half!
To that end, the United States could encourage its allies to investigate
civilian-based defense and perhaps assist them by sharing research results, feasibility studies, a d other knowledge about the policy. European and Japanese transarmament would also vastly simplify the security problems for the United States.
With the need to defend those dependent allies removed, the major
security threats for the United States would then theoretically be reduced to three: nuclear war, invasion, and internal usurpation. The
technical and logistical problems of a military invasion and occupationof the continental United States are so vast that it is virtually a nonproblem. Even minimal civilian-based defense preparations would sufficiently increase the problems of a foreign occupation to eliminate thatthreat. Civilian-based defense preparations would be needed to deterand defend against internal takeovers by coup d'ktat, executive usurpation, or "secret government," as already noted. That would leave
only the very serious, continuing problem of potential attack by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Significant steps havealready been taken in the direction of reducing that threat by combinations of multilateral agreements and unilateral actions. Reduction of
motives for such attacks would also be important. In short, civilianbased defense would not remove or solve all of the security problemsof the United States, but it has the potential of vastly simplifying themand effectively dealing with some of the most serious ones.
What, then, of the Soviet Union? If the peoples and political leadersof the Soviet Union genuinely wish to democratize and decentralize,
then civilian-based defense could become highly relevant to meeting its
own security needs. Assuming that the democratizing trends continue
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, civilian-based defense consti-

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tutes a way for Eastern European countries to become more independent of Soviet controls without becoming a military threat to the Soviet
Union. Transarmament of Eastern European countries would also pave
the way for the Soviet Union to reduce the great weight of its military
expenditures as its neighbors assume greater responsibility for theirown defense.
The same also applies to the nationalities problem within the Soviet
Union. For example, suppose that some nations now incorporated in
the Soviet Union, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, andGeorgia, become independent. To reduce military threats to the Soviet
Union, the newly independent countries could, as a condition of independence, be required to remain demilitarized and be prohibited fromjoining military alliances. Civilian-based defense would be a potentially sensible policy for them.
In regard to potential aggression against the Soviet Union, the problems of a successful military invasion and occupation are already sovast that a well-prepared civilian-based defense policy could constitutea powerful deterrent and an effective defense against such attacks. This
policy would be compatiblewith progress in internal democratization,
decentralization, and shifting economic and manpower resources tomake sigruficant, much-needed improvements in the material conditions of the population.
The Soviet Union, as most states, is vulnerable to internal usurpations, especially because of the high degree of centralization of the present system. This type of attack might be launched by neo-Stalinists
opposed to ghnost and perestroika and intent on restoring strong central controls, or by military or political groups wishing to reimpose an
authoritarian system of some other type. In case of a coup, a civilianbased defense capacity could be the only effective deterrence and defense that a democratized Soviet Union would have.
The situations of other superstates and large countries, such as
China, India, a united Europe, and the like, are very different. Examinations of the relevance of civilian-based defense to their security
needs are urgently needed.

Potential BenefiQ of a Civilian-based Defense Policy
In the long-run, civilian-based defense has the potential of producing
various benefits that are not possible with military defense policies.
These advantages are discussed below.
1. Civilian-based defense would increase the capacity for self-reliance in defense and security matters, even by small and mediumsize

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countries, by shifting the decisive factor from military to societal
strength. Dependency on foreign countries for military weapons andsupplies and alliances with militarily more powerful states would thenno longer be required. The financial and political costs of such dependency are thereby removed.
More importantly, self-defense, if possible, is always more reliable
than dependence on allies, who in a crisis may not come to one's aid aspromised. Witness Czechoslovakia abandoned by her allies in 1939,
and invaded by her allies in 1968! Civilian-based defense provides thefullest possible self-reliance in deterrence and defense, while reducing
the risks of war.
2. By its nonmilitary nature civilian-based defense provides deterrence and defense capacities without the fore@ attack capabilities of
military systems, thereby reducing international anxieties and dangers.
Internationally, many of the military weapons that may have beenprocured, or justified, for purposes of deterring and defending against
attacks can also be used to attack other countries. That reality has often,
with or without justification, increased international tensions, exacerbated arms races, and heightened the prospects of war. In contrast,
civilian-based defense is able to provide deterrence and defense without the capacity to launch military attacks on other countries.
3. As civilian-based defense becomes more widely adopted, successful, and recognized as powerful, the incidence of international military
aggression is likely to be reduced. Potential attackers are likely to be
deterred from aggression against other countries.
The prospect of having to deal with countries that have made themselves politically indigestible, capable of denying the attackers theirobjectives, and able to sow disaffection among the attacking forces,
is likely to cause aggressors to have second thoughts and to lead toThis effect is likely
abandonment of at least some cases of aggres~~ion.
to increase with the expansion of the numbers of countries adopting
civilian-based defense, and the accumulation of evidence from actual
civilian-based defense struggles that well-prepared countries will bedifficult or impossible to defeat.
4. Civilian-based defense may reduce nuclear proliferation by providing an alternative route to self-reliance in security policies whereconventionalmilitary means are perceived to be inadequate or impracticable.
One reason-not the only o n e w h y some states are interested indeveloping a nuclear weapons capacity is that they see their conventional military means to be insufficient and want to avoid dependency
on the weaponq and policies of military superpowers. Civilian-based
defense provides an alternative route, a way around nuclear weapons

TOWARD TRANSARMAMENT

145

to achieve independence in deterrence and defense. If this is understood, increasing adoption of this policy may reduce nuclear proliferation.
5. Civilian-based defense is likely to reduce the incidence of internal
usurpations and internal suppression by military forces. One of thegreat ironies for supporters of democratic governments has been thatin many countries, and under widely differing conditions, the militaryforces that have been created to defend that society and government
have themselves turned to attack it. In dozens of countries the militaryforces have thrown out the constitutional government and installed amilitary government. Or,military "defense" forces have been used tobolster dictatorships and to suppress domestic movements for greater
freedom and social justice, and even to perpetrate massacres (such as
by the British in Amritsar in 1919 and the Chinese in Tiananmen Squarein 1989).
This is not the case with civilian-based defense. In the first place, incontrast to military systems, civilian-based defense does not build up
an internal violent capacity for carrying out a coup d'btat against alegitimated constitutional government. In the second place, the preparations for noncooperation and defiance required by a civilian-based
defense policy actually create a deterrence and constitutional defense
capacity against internal usurpations. Furthermore, due to their nonviolent nature, the weapons of civilian-based defense cannot generally be
used for purposes of repression. If nonviolent struggle is used in internal conflicts, it can be disruptive, but the results are generally compatible with internal peace and order, and the consequences of internal
violence are avoided.
As the discussions in Chapters One and Four have shown, avilianbased defense is designed to defend against these internal attacks aswell as foreign aggression. This is something that military means usually cannot do without risking civil war, unless the would-be putschists
are a discredited small minority. Unfortunately in far more cases themilitary forces, police, and bureaucracy often assist or at least go alongwith the coup, whether for reasons of genuine support, a desire to
avoid civil war, or lack of knowledge of what else they can do. Civilianbased defense provides a powerful means of combatting internal usurpations without initiating widespread internal violence.
6. Adopting and preparing for a civilian-based defense policy may,under some conditions at least, contribute to a reduction of internal
violence by groups with grievances and indirectly encourage them toexpress their claims by nonviolent forms of action.
Internal violence may derive from deep differences of ideology andfrom the frustrations of suffering injustices, oppression, and poverty.

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Such violence may take the form of rioting assassinations, terrorism,or guerrilla warfare. The practitioners of violence may justdy themselves by citing the severity of the issues at stake and by the conviction that violence is the most powerful means of action available.
This latter argument is given credence by the society's commitment
to military action to deal with extreme inte~nationaland domestic
crises. Thus, that evaluation and legitimization of violence for "good"causes, such as national defense, may have unanticipated and unrecognized influences on how some acute domestic conflicts are conducted.
People with strong grievances may feel justified in employing violence
because other means seem to have failed and because their society
has given its imprimatur to using organized violence to settle severe
conflicts.
As a result of transarmament, violence is no longer endorsed by thesociety as the most powerful type of action that can be taken. Instead,nonviolent struggle is seen as a more effective course of action. The
legitimacy that had been given to violence for good causes is taken
away and given instead to nonviolent struggle.
7. Civilian-based defense is more likely than its military counterpart
to keep attention focused on the original objectives of the conflict rather
than on the damage inflicted on the enemy.
One of the tragedies of military warfare has been that it operates
primarily on the basis of how much destruction and how many deaths
can be inflicted on the enemy forces, population, and homeland. The
original issues in the conflict usually take a back seat to the means ofaction seen to be required to wage the war. Frequently, military victoryis gained while the deeper goals of the conflict are forgotten.
A very different dynamic operates in nonviolent struggle. Acts ofnonviolent protest and resistance are usually most effective if they arethemselves expressions of the issues at stake. Resistance to censorshipmay often be best implemented, for example, by the defiant exercise of
free speech and a free press rather than by killing members of the government that ordered the censorship.
8. Civilian-based defense, in common with nonviolent struggle moregenerally tends to produce fewer casualties and less destruction thancomparable military conflicts. That has major advantages.
While we do not have detailed statistical studies, all the available
evidence indicates that the numbers of dead and wounded, not to mention the amount of physical damage, during conventional wars, andespecially guerrilla wars, are vastly higher than in comparable nonviolent struggles. That takes into consideration the gravity of the issues atstake, the size of populations, and other factors.

TOWARD TRANSARMAMENT

147

9. By dispensing with conventional and nuclear attack capacities,
countries with a civilian-based defense are far less likely to be threatened or attacked with weapons of mass destruction.
Ironically present means of nuclear deterrence-intended to deter
attacks-have the effect of inducing other nuclear powers to target
countries with such weapons or, in extreme crises, even to launch
preemptive strikes against them, precisely becaw such countries arepotential attackers.
10. The likelihood of foreign attack may also be reduced by the development of a more "positive" foreign policy, which can strengthen acivilian-based defense by reducing international hostilities and increasing goodwill toward the country with the nonmilitary policy.
A civilian-based defense policy is more likely than a military policy
to facilitate these changes. The shift would also make more economic resources available for the domestic civilian economy and forproviding international assistance. Financial, material, and personnel
resources would no longer be tied to meeting military quirements
and could therefore be more available for helping to meet human needs
in one's own and other countries. More resources could also be freed tohelp resolve international problems short of violent conflict.
While such assistance should be undertaken for its own sake, it isadvantageous for countries with civilian-based defense poliaes to win
increased international goodwill by such means, goodwill that may
both discourage attack and bring international support in case of aggression. Such mutually supportive poliaes accompanyingtransarmament are likely to contribute to inmasing one's own national security
and to improving human conditions internationally.
11.A civilian-based defense policy would also reduce the size of government and the expense of deterrence and defense. Since wars andmilitary systems have been major factors in the vast growth of the state,
this shift to a nonmilitary system of defense would help to reverse thegeneral tendency to expand the size, and costs, of government and thedefense establishment.
While a civilian-based policy would have significant economic costs,
it would be far less expensive than a military-based policy. This is
primarily because civilian-based defense does not require military
hardware. Additionally defense responsibilities are shifted from large,
professional military systems to the general population and the society's independent institutions. This would not exclude the existence ofprofessional civilian-based defense research centers, strategic planninggroups, bodies working on aspects of preparation and training, for example, but they would be much smaller than military forces usually

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FIVE

are. There would also be a strong tendency for a major part of the civilian-based defense to be conducted through the independent organizations and institutions of the society, rather than through vast special
cadres.

12. Civilian-based defense would remove the centralizinginfluences
endemic to military systems and, instead, introduce decentralizing influences associated with nonviolent sanctions. These would especially
include the development of increased self-reliance. These influences toward self-reliance would contribute to the development of a less centralist and more pluralist social and political structure, with greater
popular participation, promoting the diffusion of power and responsibility throughout the society. All this is, of course, compatible with theideals of democratic systems.
13. Another benefit of a civilian-based defense policy would be tostimulate the citizenry to evaluate the principles espoused by their society and to assess how it stands up to those standards. By placing responsibility for defense on the people themselves, this policy would
encourage citizens to recognize qualities of the society worthy of defense and to consider how their society could lx improved.
14. By providing deterrence and defense by civilian forms of struggle,
the new policy provides a way by which war can be incrementally replaced with a less dangerous option. When that option is seen to be adequate, whole countries can then abandon military means because theywould no longer be needed. A gradual reduction in reliance on militarymeans becomes realistic to the degree that the new avilian-based defense policy is demonstrated to be capable of providing genuine deterrence and defense capacity. Single countries, or groups of countries,
can take sigmficant steps toward the abandonmentof war by the development and progressive substitution of its pohtical equivalent.

Further Consideration of This Option
The potential of a civilian-based defense policy needs to be examinedand discussed widely among the population and institutions of allsocieties with an internal or external defense problem. That means, in
effect, virtually all countries. While in some cases the initiative may
come from the government or even the military forces, it is much more
likely that the discussions will begin among the people, within various
independent institutions, and among scholarly researchers and policy
analysts.
Various steps can be taken to spread knowledge of the nature andpotential of this option throughout the society and to promote more

TOWARD TRANSARMAMENT

149

widespread official and nongovernmental evaluation of the policy.
The aim of these activities should be to extend knowledge, stimulate thought, and encourage a continuing evaluation of the practicalpotential of this policy. The effort should not be to gain converts or"believers."
A basic first step is self-education by individuals and small study
groups to gain or expand knowledge of civilian-based defense and tohelp them to assess their judgments about the need for further exploration and development of this policy. Individuals may wish to increasein public speaking and writing-to improve their
their own skills-as
effectiveness in educational efforts, or to continue their higher education to prepare themselves for research and policy analysis in this field.
Nonviolent struggle and civilian-based defense ought to be includedin the subject matter of broader courses within our educational systems, and special courses on these subjects need to be introduced or expanded. Their aim should be to disseminate knowledge and stimulate
students to think for themselves-not to come to a particular opinion.
Financial resources are urgently needed to assist the research, policy
studies, educational work, and public outreach about the nature andpotential of nonviolent struggle generally and civilian-based defense inparticular. Local, state, regional, national, and international organizations might establish special commissions to study civilian-based defense with a view to recommending whether this policy merits further
attention or action by the parent body.
At key points when the needed public groundwork has advanced
sufficiently, committees of legislatures, parliaments, national assemblies and the like can conduct private and public investigations of thisoption, and similar investigations can and should be undertaken bydefense departments and ministries and other military organizations.
The present dangers of international aggression and internal usurpations, on the one hand, and of military responses to them, on the other,are severe. As suggested in this book, significant evidence exists thatthe potential of civilian-based defense may be substantial. The contention here is that civilian-based defense could successfully deter anddefend against those attacks without precipitating the dangers andcosts of international and civil war.
This alternative policy is, however, in its nascent stage, and greater
knowledge and understanding of its problems and potential are required. It should, therefore, be thoroughly investigated. Feasibility
studies for particular countries and threats ought to be undertaken,
since the needs, potentialities, and problems of defense vary widelyfrom country to country.

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Consideration and phased adoption of civilian-based defense components are likely to continue to grow, in part due to the increasingly
obvious limitations on the real usefulness of military options for defense in many countries. Attention to civilian-based defense is also
likely to expand because of the greatly increasing use of nonviolent
struggle throughout the world.
It is time that these efforts be accelerated and vastly expanded. At
worst, they would reveal this to be a dead-end idea, on which no further attention and resources should be wasted. A moderate result of
those efforts would be the demonstration that, while unable at this time
to deal effectively with certain contingencies, civilian-based defense
could at Ieast make important contributions to deterrence and defense
in place of military options. At best, the investigations would revealthat civilian-based defense has a much greater potential than has beenrecogruzed and that, minimall> it may play a major role in future defense policies. The power of the people may finally prove to be thestrongest and safest system of d e f e n s m post-military defense.

Notes
For a related discussion of tr-ent,
see Gene Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable (London: Taylor & Francis,, 1985, and Cambridge,
Mass.: Ballinger Publishers, 1985; second Ame~icanedition, with a forward by George Kennan, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishers,1986), chapter three.
The quotation from the Austrian Defense Minister, Otto Riisch, is
contained in a letter he sent Dr. Andreas Maislinger, April 30,1982. I
thank Dr. Maislinger for this information.
For information on the role of civilian resistance in Austrian defense
policy, see Landewerfeidipngsplan (National Defense Plan)
Federal Chancellery, March 1985), pp. 49 and 55. I thank Dr. Heinz
Vetschera for supplyingextensive documentson Austria's defense policy and consideration of a civilian-based defense component.
The tasks of the Swedish Commission on Nonmilitary Resistance are
outlined in the Swedish Government ordinance, "SFS 1982199Forordning med instruktion for delegationen for icke-militiirt motsthd," April
23, 1987. I would like to thank Lennart Bergfeldt for this and otherinformation on nonmilitary resistance in Sweden. In addition, I thankthe Swedish Ministry of Defense and its military attach6 in Washington, D.C., for extensive documentation.
The quote from Gunnar Gustafsson is taken from his introduction to
H h Wall's MotstrOnd utan &Id (Resistance Without Violence) (Stock-

TOWARD TRANSARMAMENT

151

holm: Sveriges Utbildningsradio AB [Swedish Educational Broadcasting Company], 1988), pp. 2 and 3.
For further information on the Norwegian resistance to the Nazi occupation, see Gene Sharp, Tyanny Could Not Quell Them (London:
Peace News, 1958, and later editions), pamphlet. On the Dutch resistance to the Germans, see Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch Under German Occupation 19404945, (Palo Alto, Ca.: Stanford University Pressand London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
For the 1967 Norwegian study, see Johan Jargen Holst, Eystein
Fjaerli, and Harald bnning, '?kke-Militaert Forsvar og Norsk Sikkerhetspolitikk" (Nonmilitary Defense and Norwegian Security Policy)(Kjeller,Norway: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt [Defense Research Institute], 1967), pp. 44 and 46.
The quotations on Swiss civilian actions in case of an occupation arefrom Albert Bachmann and Georges Grosjean, Zivilverteidigung (Civilian Defense) Wes-Verlag, Aarau: Eidg. Justiz- und Polizeidepartement im Auftrag des Bundesrates [Confederal Justice and Police Departments by order of the Federal Council], 1969) pp. 273-300.
The information on Finland is taken from "Aseeton Vastarintal'(Weaponless Resistance) (Helsinki: Henkisen maanpuolustuksensuunnittelukunta, 1971), mimeograph pp. 27-28. In 1975, a second
Finnish report was issued, accepting the usefulness of "weaponless resistance" as a supplement to the armed resistance. See "Aseeton Vastarinta ja sen toteuttamisedellytykset Suomessa" (Helsinki: Henkisen
maanpuolustuksen suunnittelukunta, 1975), mimeograph p. 29. I am
grateful to Steven Huxley for research and translation of cited Finnish
documents.
The quotation from General Nikola Ljubicic is taken from his book,Total National Defense-Strategy of Peace (Belgrade: Socialist Thought
and Practice, 19779, p. 151.
The quote on the continuation of resistance after the cessation of military defense in the event of an occupation of parts of Yugoslavia, isfrom Lt.-Col. Milojica Pantelic, "Temtorial Defense," in Vukotic et al.,The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Medunarodna Politika), p. 280, and is cited in Adam Roberts, Nations in
A m , second edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 19861, p. 210.
The outline of nonmilitary forms of resistance in Yugoslavia is takenfrom an article, "Forms of Resistance in Nationwide Defense," Svenarodna Odbrana (Zagreb) (AugustSeptember 1972), as cited inRoberts, Nations in Arms, pp. 210-211.
See Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 179, for the quote on the role of political, social, and economic organizations in planning and implementing
Yugoslav defense.

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FIVE

On the "Irangate" investigations and the revdation of a "secret government," see Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the
Iran-Contra Affair, abridged edition (New York: Random House, 1988).
On Stalin's views on the impact of military threats on internal dictatorship, see Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography &,ondon:
Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 226,258,263, and 285.
On the potential of civilian-based defense to make European members of N A more~
self-reliant and to reduce the military role of theUnited States, see Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable.

For Further Reading on Civilian-based Defense

Brigadier General Edward B. Atkeson, 'The Relevance of Civilian-based Defense to US. Security Interests," Military Reztiau, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
vol. 56, no. 5 (May 1976), pp. 24-32, and no. 6 (June1976),pp. 45-55.
Adam Roberts, "Civil Resistance to Military Coups," Journal of Peace Research(Oslo), vol. m, no. 1 (1975),pp. 19-36.
,
editor, Civilian Resistance as a National Defense: Nonviolent Action Against
Aggression (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1968); reprint of The Strategy of
Civilian Defence(London: Faber & Faber, 1967). Paperback edition with a new
introduction, Civilian Resistance as a National Defense: Nonviolent Action
Against Aggression (Harmondsworth, England, and Baltimore, Md.: Penguin
Books, 1969). All out of print.
Gene Sharp, "Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal," pamphlet, Ira D.
and Miriam G. Wallach Award essay (New York: World Policy Institute,1980).
-,
Making Europe Unconquerable (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985, andCambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985; second American edition, with a forward
by George Kennan, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1986).
,National Security Through Ciztilian-Based Defense,booklet (Omaha. Civilian-based Defense Association, formerly Association for TransarmamentStudies, 1985).
-," The Political Equivalent of War1--Civilian-based Defense," in Gene
Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Introduction by Senator Mark 0.
Hatfield), Boston, Mass.: Porter Sargent, 1980).
For a selected multilingual bibliography of literature on civilian-based defense to 1985, see Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable, pp. 165-171, in the see
ond American edition

Also of Interest
Gene Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist, with Essays on Ethics and Politics,
Introduction by Coretta Scott King (Cambridge, Mass.: Porter Sargent 1979).
-,
The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Introduction by Thomas C. Schelling,
three volumes (Cambridge, Mass.: Porter Sargent, 1973). The three volumes
in paperback from the same publisher are: Power and Struggle, The Methods of
Nonz&lent Action, and The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action.
For information on other books (including various foreign translations) on
nonviolent struggle and civilian-based defense, and for information on theAlbert Einstein Institution, of which Gene Sharp is president write: Publications, The Albert Einstein Institution, 1430 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02138.

IndexAccommodation, 60,74,93; defined, 61;
pmcess of, 61-62
Agents provocateurs, 54,57
Alcatraz Island, 46
Algeria, 5,14,39,41
Algerian coup &&at of 1%1,9,64,66,Tl,
73,137; blockade to, 13; blocking of airfields in, 13; closing of airports in, 12;collapse of, 13,14; conhol of newspapers and radio in, 12; described, 11-14;
First Fomign Legion Parachute Regiment in, 1213; government appeals forresistance to, 1213; "Military Command" of, 12; objectives in, 86; radios
and appeals for Aistance to, 13; repsion by French govenunent in, 13; repressive measures in, 12; resistance by
French troops to, 13; resistance measures to, 12-13; retention of legitimate
government during, 91
American colonies: Coercive Acts and, 47;
committees of compondence in, 52;Continental Association in, 47; First
Continental Congress in, 47; loci of
power in, 52; nonviolent revolution in(1765-1775) 8, Tl; parallel governmentin, 47
Argentina, 136
Aristotle, on dictatorships, 75
Armenia, 8,9,130,143
Assassinations, 15,109,146
Attackers: assessing success against, 114;
attainment of objectives requires control of population, 86; blocking objectives of, 114; collaboration with, 99;
denial of legitimacy to, 106; denying objectives of, 6; denying sources of power
to, 33; deterring, 3,87; genocide and,85; identifying objectives of, 93; objectives of, 7,84,86,90,92,107; seizure ofterritory by, 84; selecting points of resistance against, 106. See also repression
Austria, 8,14,125,131,139; civilian-based
defense component in, 131-132; civilian
resistance against occupation of, 132;

General National Defense in, 132; National Defense Plan in, 132
Authority, 23,24,26,27,32,33; denial of,
25,29,6566; effeds of loss of, 25; Kapp
Putsch and denial of, 11.See a h civilian-based defense; sources of power
Belgium: gaining of universal manhood
suffrage in, 72; saving of Jews in, 72.
See also Ruhrknmpf
Bigot, General, 12
Bolivia, 71; noncooperation against 1978
coup in, 10
Boycotts, 42,45; of buses, 55; of Californian grapes, 43; in Ruhrkmnpf, 92; ofSouth African goods, 43. See also economic boycotts; political noncooperation; social boycotts
Brazil, 8,41,72,136
Britain, 16,73; extension of religious liberties in, 72; Indian struggles against, 66;
women's suffrage in, 72. See a h American colonies; India
Brutalities, 58,59,%, 105,113,123
Buchan, Hon. Alastair, 122
Bulgaria, 9,38,39,Tl, 139; protest against
deportations of Jews in, 41; saving ofJews in, 72
Bureaucracy, 11,26,30,34,37,49,63,91,
106,114,145; noncooperation of Soviet,
10. See also civil servants
Burma, 8,54
Capitulation, %, 112,135; in 1968-1969
Czechoslovakian struggle, 18,92
Casualties, 5,14,38,72,89,93,108,109,
112,136; civilian-based defense and,
146; lower in nonviolent struggle thanin military conflicts, 95; political jiujitsu
and, %; reduced by nonviolent &apline, 57
Censorship, 54,58,103,107,114,146; defiance of, 49-50
Central America, 140
Central Empe, 5,140

INDEX

brnik, Oldrich, 16
Challe, General, 12,14
Chile, 8,54,136
China,8,39,54,76,127,141,143;Beijing,
8;1989 massacre in, 60,77,145;1989
pro-dernoaacy movement in, 8;Tianmen square, 8,60
Civil disobedience, 66,89;1930-1931 Indian campaign of, 67;defined, 44
Civil rights: demands for, in East Germany,42;struggles in the Soviet
Union, 8;struggles in the United States,
8,46,59
Civil servants, 10,106;civilian-based defense and, 117;noncooperation in Kapp
Putsch, 11,68;resistance in Algeriancoup $&at, 13;Ruhrknmpfand, 14;
strikes by, 107.See also bureaucracy
Civilian-based defense, 6-7,-115,117150;adoption of, see transarmament; advance guidelines for, 102-103;advantages of planning and preparation in,
117;aims of, 6;assessing status of sustained defense, 112-113;attackers' objectives and, 84; Austria and, 131-132;
avoiding initial confusion in, 89;basic
pattern of, 137;blocking attackers' objectives by, 114415;capacity to defend
by, based upon denial of objectives, 88;
casualties in, 1%; changes in human nature and, 120;changes in international
system and, 120-121;changes in social
system and, 121-123;combining "defensive defense" and, 136;combining guerrilla warfare and, 135;combining othertypes of action with, 94;compatible actions used with, 94;coup d'6tat and,
136;critique of existing social order
and, 121-122;cultural resistance in,
109;decentralizationand, 148;defenseof dictatorships and, 123;defined, 6;democracy and, 122;demolitions and, 94;demoralization in, 108;denial of authority and, 25; denial of legitimacy and,90; deterrence by, 86-88;deterrence
and defense without attack capabilitiesin, 144;deterrence and preparations
for, 145;duration of, 108;enhancing effectiveness of, 83; evaluating effectiveness of, 111;evaluating final results of,
113-114;as extra layer of deterrence,
125;factors in assessing relevance of,

129;factors determining effectivenessof, 95;factols influencing choice of strategies, 93-95;factors of deterrence in,
87;failure in, 111;failure of deterrencein, 96;failwe of military resistance and,
133436;Finland and, 134435;flight orcapitulation unacceptable in, 96;forward strategy in, 88;further consideration of, 148-150;futility of military resistance and, 133;general resistance in,103;genocide and, 85;identifying attackers' objectives for, 93;ideologicalperspectives in discussion of, 121;irnportance of defense of political systemin, 90; importance of seizing initiativein, 96;internal usurpations and, 136138;internal usurpations in U.S. and,
142;international support for, 110411;
as limited component in defense policy,
127,131-138;maintenance of legitimacy and capacity for self-government
in, 90;methods of, 89-90; methods
determined by strategy in, 90;microresistance in, 109;military deterrencecompared to deterrence by, 87;military
expenditures and, 147;mixed results of,
112;models of policy consideration,
129441;motives for waging, 118-119;
need for strategy in, 89;nonviolent action and, 7;nonviolent discipline in, 95;
Norway and, 133-134;nuclear proliferation and, 144;organized resistance in,103;other terms for, 6; planning in, 93;
as political equivalent of war, 148;p o pular empowerment and, 123;"positive"
foreign policy and, 147;potential benefits of, 143-148;potential results of exploring policy of, 150;preconditions
and, ll%l:!Z$ preparation and training
in, 87;problems m combining military
defense with, 135;public education on,
148;purposes of limited componentsof, 133;readiness builds deterrence capacity of, 83;reduced incidence of internal military suppression and, 145;reduced incidence of internal usurpations
and, 145;reduced incidence of international military aggression and, 144; reduction of internal violence and, 145;relationship of deterrence and defense in,
88;repression and, 108;requirements
for deterrenceby, 87;research and de-INDEX

velopment of, 149; resistance fatigue in,109; secrecy and, 110; seizure of temtory and, 84-85; selecting mechanismsof change in, 93; selecting strategies for,92; self-education on, 149; sharing
knowledge of, 110; shift to violence
and, 109; shifts of strategy in, 102,109;
social justice and, 121; social and political conditions effect, 122; social revolutions and, 127; spontaneous resistancein, 103; steps to strengthen, 113; strategies for initial stage:communication
and warning strategy 96-101, (seealso
strategy of communicationand waming); strategies for initial stage: nonviolent blitLkrieg strategy, 101-102, (seealso strategy of nonviolent blikkrieg)
strategies for sustained defense: selective resistance strategy, 103,105-110,(seealso strategy of selective mistance);
strategies for sustained defense: total
noncooperation strategy, 103,104-105,(seealso strategy of total noncooperation); success and failure in, 111-115; superstates and, 141-143; Sweden and,
132; Switzerland and, 134; systems notdefendable by, 123; theory of powerand, 7; time for consideration of, 128;transarmament to, 117-150, (see alsotransarmament); treaties and, 110;
under extreme conditions, 109; Unionof Soviet socialist Republics and, 142143; United States and, 142; utility as
basis of considerationof, 124; waged
by, 7; weapons of, 6,8940; withstanding repmion and, 95-%; Yugoslavia
and, 135. See also nonviolent action/
struggle
Civilian defense. See civilian-based defense
Coercion, 62. See also nonviolent coercion
Collaboration, 17,66,90,115; preventionof, 99,106; xefusal of, in Swiss defense
policy, 134. See also work-on without
collaboration
Collective resistance, 29,30
Conversion, 60,61,93,94,126,127; defined, 60; process of, 60; role of social
distance in, 60; in y.kom Satyagraha
campaign, 60
Cooperation: attackers' objectives and, 86;
denial of authority and, 25; dictator-

ships and, 76; fear of sanctions and, 28;
of ktitutions, 26; Nazis and, 84; power
dependent on, 23,25,49; repression
and, 57; repression requires, 28; sanctions and, 27; withholding of, 30,66.
See also obedience; noncooperation
Costa R i a , 130
Coup &&at, 6,97,106,123,133,136,137,
138,139,142,145; Algerian coup &&atof 1%1,11-14; Kapp Putsch, 1M1; nonviolent struggle against, 10. See also Algerian coup d'etat of 1961; civilianbased defenses; internalwsurpations;
Kapp Putsck nonviolent action/
struggle
Cdpin, General, 13
Cuba, 127
Cultural resistance, 109
Czechoslovakia, 8,38,39,68,71,83,133,
135,139,144; 1968 Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress in, 17; 1968 onehour general strike in, 17; 1968 protest
strikes in, 43,100; 1968-1969 national
defense struggle described, 16-18; 1%9
capitulation of, 18; 1%9 defeat not permanent in, 112; 1989 general strike in,43; 1989 protest march, 42; 1989 protests in, 58,74; anti-Nazi newspaper
boycotts in, 43; anti-Soviet riot& in,
18; Charter 77 in, 112; clandestine radio
network in, 17,46,107; collaborationist
govemment prevented in, 17; disaffection of Soviet troops in 1968 invasionof, 7l;evaluation of 1968-1%9 resistance, 17-18; government and Party asorgans of 1%8 resistance in, 91; govemmental concessions to invaders 19681%9,92; initial methods of resistance in
1%8, %; morale problems among invading troops, 17; Moscow negotiations and compromise, 17.92; National
Assembly resGtance in, 17,i; noncooperation of pumalists in, 17; politicalnoncooperation in, 45; rail slowdowns
in, 17; repression of 1989 protests in, 58;
results of 1%8-1%9 struggle, 73-74; Soviet excuse of "invitation," 98; Soviet
objectives in 1968 invasion, 86

Dallin, Alexander, 84
De Gaulle, President Charles, 11,12,13,14
De la Bdtie, Etienne, 24INDEX

Dew, Michel, 12
Decollaboration, 115
Defense: by restriction of sources ofpower, 33-34; defined, 3; factors influencing capacity of, 34-35; militarymeans of, 3-4; requirements of, 3; societal origins of, 33-35. See also civilianbased defenses; defensive defense; deterrence; military policies
Defensive defense: advocates of, 1911;
problems of, 5; summarized views of,
4-5
Delarue, Jacques, 70
Denmark, 9,140; anti-Nazi general strikein, 9,44; anti-Nazi resistance in, 9;"cold shoulder" to Nazis, 42; saving ofJews in, 72; Schalburgkorps in, 44
Deterrence: actual defense capacity and,
87,88; aim of, 3; by civilian-based defense, 6,8648; civilian-based defense
as extra layer of, 125; defense and, 3; defense upon failure of, 3; denial of attackers' objectives and, 87; dissuasion and,3; factors of, in civilian-based defense,
87; failure of, 3,88, %; by militarymeans compared to civilian-basedmeans, 87,88; nuclear weapons and, 86;
pemption of ability to deny objectives
and, 87; readiness and, 83; requirements for, in civilian-based defense,
87; without attack capabilities, 144. See
also civilian-based defense; defense;
dissuasion
Dictatorships: Aristotle on, 75; civilianbased defense and, 123; concentrating
resistance at weaknesses of, 76; "cracks
in the monolith" and, 76; decreased
likelihood of, through civilian-baseddefense, 140; dependent on cooperation,
76; inherent weaknesses of, 76; militaryforces and, 145; nonviolent action/
struggle against, %75,76; preventing
futue, 76; as shortest lived politicalsystems, 75. See also Nazis, nonviolent
action/struggle
Disintegration, 60,61,63,70,74,93,94; accommodation and, 61; defined, 64; examples of, 64; factors producing, 65; potential results of, 64; process of, 64
Disobedience, 25,26,30,44,49,54; ofParty members and soldiers in Czech*

slovakia, 71; sanctions and, 28. See also
civil disobedience; mutiny; noncooperation; parallel government; work-on
without collaboration
Dissuasion, 87,88; defined, 3; detemnce
and, 3; failure of, 3; foreign relations
and, 88. See also detemnce
Dubtek Alexander, 16,18,73,74,92
East Germany, 38,39,42,54,68,7l, 139;
1953 East German Rising, 8,68; 1953
mass meetings, 55; 1953mutiny of police and army in, 70; 1953mutiny of Soviet soldiers and officers in, 71; 1989
nonviolent "inspection" of state security offices in, 46; 1989 protest march,
42; Leipzig, 46; nonviolent interventionin, 46
Eastern Europe, 16,76,84,139,142,143
Ebert, President Friedrich, 11
Economic boycotts, 41,43,49,62,69,70,
89; of British goods in India, 62; examples of, 43; forms of, 43; primary boycott defined, 43; secondary boycott defined,43; af South African goods, 59,72; strikes, see shikes
Economic noncooperation, 69; in American colo~ts,47; defined, 42. See also economic boycotts; economic shutdown;
embargoes; internationaleconomic
sanctions
Economic shutdown, 43,44,89,100,101;
1905in Finland, 44; in Haiti, 44
El Salvador, 8,39,54,63,7l
Embargoes, 43,59,69
Estonia, 8,9,130,143
Europe, 6,39,136,141,143; allied invasion of, 91. See also Central Europe; Eastern Europe; Western Europe
Excommunication, 42
Fear: collective resistance and overcoming,29; examples of overcoming, 55;
nonviolent discipline and overcoming,
56; repression and, 28; repression andovercoming, 55; of sanctions produces
obedience, 28; sanctions require, 55
Finland, 125,140; 1905economic shutdown in, 44; civilian-based defense
and, 134-135; noncooperation against
Russia (1898-1905),8; Psychological De-

INDEX

fense Planning Commission in, 134; useof agents provocateurs by tsarist Russia
in, 57
France, 9,43,59,83; CompagniesRkpublicairn de SPcurit6,12;Gendam-eNationale, 12; Poincad government, 73; saving of Jews in, 5 5 , Z See also Algeriancoup d'ktat of 1961, Ruhrkmnpf
Franco, General Francisco, 123
France-Belgian occupation of Ruhr. See
Ruhrkampf
Freedom: not given by rulers, 32; sodal
power best &man& of, 33; structural
basis for, 32
Gandhi, Mohandas, 8,26,60,74. See also
India
Genocide, 84,85; technology of killingand, 85
Georgia, 8,9,143&mrEtny, l4,7l, 83,130,137; 1943 Berlin
women's protest, 56,71; burning ofReichstag, 69; Dawes plan and, 16;
W e r in, 11,15; Rhineland, 14,16,73;
Social Demmtic Party, 11; Weimar Republic, 9,10,11,49,91,121,131. Seealso
East Germany; Kapp Putsch; Nazis;
Ruhrkmnpf
Ghana, 72
Gibbs, Professor Norman, 122
Goa: nonviolent invasion of, 46
Goebbels, Joseph, 70
Gorbachw, Mikhail, 123
Governments-inde, during Second
World War, 91
Guatemala, 8,39,54,64,7l, 136
Guerrilla warfare, 5,39,135,146; casualties in, %; nonviolent resistance combined with, 136
Gustafsson, Gunnar, 132
Haiti, 8; 1956 economic shutdown in, 44;
1957 general strike in, 10; m i d e n t Piefie-Louis, 10Harteneck, General, 85
Havel, Vaclav, 74
Hitler, Adolph, 29
Holocaust, 55,72,85. See also genocide;Jews;Nazis
Holst, Johan Jsrgen, 134
Hong Kong, 130

Hungary, 8,54,68; 1956 revolution, 8,41,
52,68; resistance to Aushian rule, 8,14
Husak, Gustav, 18,73
Iceland, 130,140
Independent institutions. See loci of
power
India, 8,127,141,143; 1930-1931 independence campaign, 67,74; accommodation and independence of, 62; Amritsar massacre in, 145; Dharasana salt
depot raid in, 56; gaining hdependence, 72; independen&camp&ns in,
8,14; Indian National Co"gress Committee of Peshawar, 67; negotiation of
Gandhi-Irwin Pact, 74; Peshawar killings, 67; Vykom Satyagraha Campaign,60
Institute for Strategic Studies, London,
122
Internal usurpations, 3,5,6,18,133,136;
aims of, 106; civilian-based defense
against, 136-138; communicationand
warning strategy against, 98; defined,
6; denial of authority to usurpers, 25,66; legal prohibitions insufficient in controlling, 137; loci of power and, 34; nonviolent blitzkrieg strategy against, 97,
101; purposes of, 85; as rationallyplanned acts, 86; selective resistancestrategy against, 105; societal power
against, 34; total resistance strategy
against, 104. See also Algerian coup#&at of 1%1; civilian-based defense;
coup &&at; Kapp Putsch
Internal violence, 145
International economic sanctions, 34,69.
See also boycotts; embargoes
Invasions and occupations:cases of imp*
vised nonviolent struggle against, 14;civilian-based deterrenceagainst, 87;communication and waming strategy
against, 98; of Czechoslovakia (seeCzechoslovakia); denial of economic
objectives in, 107; denial of ideologicalobjectives in, 107; Nazi invasion of
Norway, 89; nonviolent blitzkrieg strategy against, 101; as rationally planned
acts, 86; of Ruhr (see Ruhrhpf,; purposes of, 86; s e h of t e m t e in, 85;
selective resistance strategy against,

INDEX

105; total resistance strategy against,
104
Iran,8,127; nonviolent revolution against
the Shah,8Ireland: resistance to English rule, 14
Irwin,Lord (later Lord Halifax) British
Viceroy of India, 74
Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, 8Italy, 9
Jews: activists' struggles in the U.S.S.R., 8;
emigration of Soviet Jews, 72; resistance against deportation from Bulgaria, 41; saving of, during Holocaust,
72;saving of, in France, 55; Warsaw
ghetto uprising, 56. See also Holocaust,
Nazis
Jouhaud, General, 12Kapp, Dr. Wolfgang, 10,ll
9,39,45,52,64,66,67, n,~ a p RIM,p
73,106,121,131; administrativenoncooperation in, 68; authority denied in,
11;Berlin security police withdraw s u p
port of, 68; described, 1M1;Freikorps
role in, 11,131; general strike against,
11;government& noncooperation to,
11;noncooperation to, 11;objechves in,
86; political noncooperation in, 49; refusal of Ministry of War to obey Kapp"government," 68; refusal to serve inKapp "government," 67; ReidrbanKs re&l offunds to Kapp "government,"
68; repression during 11; resistance ofbweauaacy in, 11; retention of legitimate government during, 91; strikes
against, 69; violence during, 11;workers' strikes in, 11Katkov, George, 64Martin Luther, Jr., 55
Korean nonviolent protest (1919-1922),8
Kriegel, Frantisek, 16
Kube, Wfielm, Generalkommissnr, 84
Labor unions, 43,52,63; Algerian coupand, 12; recognition of, 72; in
Ruhrkampf, 14
Latin America, 76
Latvia, 8,130,143
Leaflets, 11,41, %, 98,100
Legitimacy, 24; denial of, 114; denial of,

to attackers, 106; denial of, to usurpers,
66; maintaining own, 33,904'2; political noncooperation and, 45; rejection of,
45,449; relation of, to other sources ofpower, 45. See also authority
Lenin, V. I., 10
Lithuania, 8,130,143
Ljubiac, General Nikola, 135
Loci of power, 31,75,106,114,123,130,
135; 1956Hungarian Revolution and,52; 1%8 Czechoslovakian struggle and,52; American colonies and, 52; defenseof, 108; defied, 31; determination of
status of, 31; examples of, 31,33,52;
Kapp Putsch and, 52; Norwegian teachers' resistance and, 52; Polish struggle
in the 1980s and, 52; preparations
against internal usurpations and, 138;role of, in defense, 34; role of, in nonviolent action,/struggle,52; structural condition of society and, 31
Ludendorff, General Erich, 10
Lysistraticnonaction, 42
Magliore, General, 44
Marcos, Ferdinand, 38,67,nMartinez, General Maximiliano Her~ n d e z39,
, %, 63
Massachuseth extension of religious lib
erties in, 7%
McCarthy, Ronald, 47
Mechanisms of change in nonviolent action/struggle, 60-64. See also accomcdation; knversion; disintegration; nonviolent coercion
Methods of r~nviolentaction/struggle,
40-48. See also noncooperation; nonviolent action/struggle; nonviolent
intervention; nonviolent protest andpersuasion
Mexico, 8
Mi-resistance,
109
Military policies: genocide and, 84; paafist vi& of, 4; problems of, 4; seof temtory and, 84; views of, 3-4. See
also defense; defensive defense
Military power: as an expression of political power, 49
Military weaponry: not required in defen& 34; reactions to i&eased
destructiveness of, 4-~INDEX

Mutiny, 29,45,49,70,71; in 1905 and Feb
ruary 1917Russian revolutions, 70; of
Philippine army,67
Native Americans, 46
Nazis, 9,41; fear of resignation of officers,
70; Gestapo, 55,70,89; Lebensraum and,84; occupation of Denmark, 44,50; occupation of Netherlands, 44,107; occupation of Norway, 52,67,89; repressionof strikes, 70; shift in Slavic policies(1940-1944),&1-85; view of generalstrike, 69. See also Holocaust; Jews
Netherlands, 133; anti-Nazi strikes, 44;denial of Nazi authority by Dutch
churches, 66,107; government-inexile,
91; 1944-1945 railway strike, 91
New Caledonia, 8Nicaragua, 127
Nicholas II, Tsar of Imperial Russia, 63,
64
Nicot, General, 12
Non-offensive defense. See defensive
defenseNon-provocative defense. See defensive
defenseNoncooperation, 25,26,40,54,100; in
1917February Russian Revolution, 64;
to Algerian coup, 13; in American colonies, 47,52; attackers' objectives and,
107; against attackers' regime, 90; in Bolivia, 10; in civilian-based defense, 6;communication and warning strategy
and, 97; conditions for large-scale, 29;
in Czechoslovakia (1%8-1%9), 16,17;
defensive, 45; defined, 42; derived fromstubbornness, 26; in Finland, 8; and foreign occupation, 66; forms of, 38; genocide and, 85; as government policy, 91,
106; in Haiti, 10; improvised for defense, 6; Indian campaigns of, 69; by institutions, 26,30; judicial, 107; to Kapp
Putsch, 11; methods of, 42; nonviolent
blitzkrieg strategy and, 97; and nonviolent coercion, 64; in Norwegian teachers' resistance, 67; offensive, 45; in Poland, 10; in Ruhrkmnpf, 14,15; severs
sourcff of power, 22,23,37,49; by Soviet bumuaacy, 10; strategy of total,
104405,110; violence and, 39. See also
bureauaacy; civil servants; civilian-based defenses; economic noncooperation; Kapp Putsch; political noncooperation; social noncooperatione:Nonviolent a c t i ~ n / s & ~ ~ laccomplishments of, 71-72; alters power relationships, 48; casualty rates lower than inmilitary conflicts, 79-80n,95; causes offailure in, 72; changes in human nature
and, 120; changes in international system and, 120-121; changes in social system and, 121-123; defined, 38,40;
against dictatorships, 21,76; differsfrom conciliation, 37; as distinctive
weapons system, 40; dynamics of, in
conflict, 48; effects on opponents, 75; effects on participants, 75; examples of, 8;
factors
factors assisting success in, n,
influencing outcome of, 53; factors operating in, 48; failure in, 72; against fixture dictatorships, 76-77; as governimportance of strategy
ment policy,
in, 51; improvised cases of, against
coups d'etat, 10-14; improvised casesof, for defense, 9-10,73-74,83,121; improvised for defense as compared tocivilian-based defense, 117; improvisedfor defense of oppressive regimes, 123;
initial confusion in improvised cases of,89; against invasions and occupations,
1448; loci of power and, 52; long term
results and standards of success of, 74;
maintaining autonomous legitimate
government in, 91; as means of combat,
37; mechanisms of change in, 60-64 (seealso accommodation, conversion, nonviolent coercion, disintegration)methodsof, 40-48 (see also noncooperation, nonviolent intervention, nonviolent protest
and persuasion); misperceptions of, 3738; motives for, 38; need for greater
knowledge of, 76; need for nonviolent
discipline in, 39; opponents' problems
facing, 53-54; outcome of, as a "draw"
or interim settlement, 74; political violence and, 48; power of, increasingly
recognized, 38; "reasons" why, impossible, 119; repmsion and, 54-56; requires
skillful application, 38; sophistication of
future improvised cases of, for defense,
117; sources of power and, 50; strategy
in, 51; strikes directly at issues at stake,

14

INDEX49; strikes directly at opponents'
power, 49; stubbornness and, 120; success and failm in, 7l-74; success in, defined, 72; time required for success of,as compared to violent action, 39; underlying postulate of, 37; variations in
power in, 5G51; violence counterproductive in, 39; weapons of, 22,4048,
89; wielding power with, 48. See also Algerian coup d'6tat of 1%1; civilianbased defense; Czechoslovakia; Holocaust; Jews; Kapp Putsch;Ruhrkmnpf;
strategy
Nonviolent coercion, 60,62-64,70,93; defined, 62; examples of, 63-64; factors
producing, 65; process of, 63
Nonviolent discipline, 29,108; defined,of, 57; as requirement for56;
success, 56
Nonviolent intervention, 40,100; 1953 in
East Germany,46; defined, 45-46; examples of, 46; forms of, 46; in Norwegiankchers' resistance, 92; repressionand,46; in U.S.civil rights struggle, 46; used
offensively, 46
Nonviolent invasion: of Goa, 46
Nonviolent obstruction, 100
Nonviolent occupatiox of Alcatraz
Island, 46
Nonviolent protest and persuasion: Algerian street protest, 41; Anti-Nazi pastoral letters, 41; Brazilian street protests, 41; Buddhist students' protest inSouth Vietnam, 41; Bulgarian protests
against deportations of Jews, 41;
Czechoslovak National Assembly dedaration, 41; Czechoslovakian strretdemonstration,42; defined, 40; East
German street protests, 42; Hungarian
writers' memorandum, 41; methods of,
40; Polish anti-Nazi protests, 41; suffragists' banner, 41
Nordic countries, 140
North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), 139
Northwest Frontier Province of British
India, 66
Norway, 125,133,140; 1940 resignation of
Norwegian Supreme Court, 67; Corporative State in, 67,108; govenunentin-exile, 91; initial confusion in Nazi re-sistance, 89; Nasjonal Smnling, 89; Nazi
invasion of, 89; Norwegian Atlantic
Committee, 134; Norwegian Defense
Research Institution, 133; Norwegianteachers' mistance, 45,52,67,71,92,
108; Quisling regime, 45; resistance toQuisling re&ne19,92; saving of Jews
in, n
Nuclear weapons, 21,86,141,142,144,
147
Obedience, 25; fear of sanctions and, 28;
power dependent on, 23,49; repression
and, 57; withholding of, 66
Pacifism, 4Pakistan, 8,72
Palestine, 130
Panama, 8
Parallel government, 46,4743,64,66,91;
defined, 47; examples of, 47; formationin American colonies (1765-1775), 47;role in defense, 91; Russian Revolutionsof 1905 and 1917 and, 47
Passive resistance, 134
Peru, 136
Philippines, 8,56,7l; computer operator
walk-out against election fraud, 67; mutiny by army, 67
Pinochet, General Augusto, 54
Plaza del Mayo protests, Buenos Aires,
Argentina, 55
Poincad, Raymond, 16
Poland, 38,54,68,71,139; independent
educational system during Nazi occupation, 46; nt)ncooperation against Jaruzelski regime, 10; nonviolent struggle
in, 8; Solidarity, 38,53,7l; underground newspapers in, 107; Warsaw
ghetto uprising, 56
Political jiujitsu, 50,96,108; defined, 58;
examples of, 59-60; process of, 58-59
Political noncooperation, 89,92; in American colonies, 47; in Czechoslovakia
1%8,45; as defense, 45; defined, 44; denial of legitimacy and, 45; by Norwegian teachers' organizations, 45; in
Ruh~kampf~
45
Political power, 21; authority and, 24;
basic insight into, 22; changes in &tions of, 72; avilian-based defense and,

INDEX

7; controlling of, 29; defined, 22; degreeof availability of, 25; dependent on cooperation and obedience, 23,25; depends on cooperation of individuals
and institutions, 26;human resources
and, 24;and implementation of powertheory, 30-31;intangible factors and,24;material resources and, 25; nonviolent action/stmggle and, 48;potentialof, 22;sanctions and, 25;skills andknowledge and, 24;sources of, 23-25;
theory of, 22; withdrawal of sources of,
23,24,26. See also sources of power
Popular empowerment, 123
Quisling, Vidkun, 67

Reitlinger, Gerald, 55
Repression, 23,27,109;aims to produce
submission, 96;application of, quires
cooperation, 27,2849; against civilian
defenders, 95,108;as counterproductive to repressor, 57;as evidence of
threat to opponent, 55; as exposing violent nature of opponents' system, 55;
fear of, produces obedience, 28; immobilizing agencies of, 57;insufficient to insure cooperation, 27-29; insufficient tomaintain regime, 27;limitationson,
against nonviolent action/struggle, 54;
as no reason to panic, 57;as response tononcooperation, 27;of strikes, 70. See
also political jiujitsu; sanctions
Roberts, Adam, 135
Riisch, Otto, 131
Royal Garhwal Rifles, British India, 67

Ruhrkampf, 9,14-16,42,43~107,109,121,
131,133;adzmats des b o b in, 15-16;assassinationsof suspected informers in,
15;Belgian and French popular support
during, 15;demolitions in, 15;described, 1446;exploitation of coal in,
92;Franco-Belgian objectives in, 86; government policy of nonviolent resistancein, 14;informers in, 15;methods of resistance in, 15;political noncooperationin, 45;protest shike in,43,repressionin, 1459;results of, 73;sabotage in, 15,94; spies in, 15;trade unions support ofnoncooperation during, 14
Rulers: defined, 22; dependent on soufies

of power, 25; limits on power of, 32;
power not intrinsic to, 22,23;sources ofpower of, 23;variations in power of, 32.
See also political power; sources ofpower
Rumania, 54
Russia: 1905 Great October Strike, 63;
1905massacre of protesters in St. P e t eburg, 59;1905 Revolution, 8/49;1917
Bolshevik coup d'ktat, 48;1917 February Revolution, 8,64,71; 1917Revolution, 48;Bureau of Zemstvo Congresses, 47;Duma of Imperial, 63;
Ochrana, 57;Provisional Governmentin, 48;repression in 1917 February Revolution, 59
Sabotage: in Ruhrkampf, 15;repression
and, 94
Salan, General, 12Sanctions, 23,24,25,27,33; applicationof, requires cooperation, 27;cooperation and threat of, 27;defined, 25; fearof, produces obedience, 28,s; insufficient to maintain regime, 27;
maintenance of political power and, 27;
mutinies and, 70;noncooperation andwillingness to suffer, 29; nonviolent, seenonviolent action/struggle; restricting
ability to apply, 70.See also political
puptsu, repression
Satyagraha, 48,60.See also Gandhi; India
Severing, Carl, 15
Sit-ins, 46
Smrkovsky, Josef, 16
Social boycotts, 42,89,135.See also social
noncooperation
Social defense. See civilian-based defense
Social distance, 60
Social noncooperation, 42,92;"cold shoulder" practiced by Danes, 42;forms of,42;in Ruhrkampf, 42
Social power: best guarantor of freedom,
33. See also civilian-based defense; nonviolent action/struggle
Sources of power, 23;&thority, 24;denialof authoritv, 65; denial of skills andhowledg;, 67-68;dependent on cooperation, 23;human resources, 24;intangible factors, 24;material resources, 24;removal of, 65-n;removal of humanINDEX

resources, 66-67; removal of human resources limits other sourcesof power,
66; removal of intangible factors, 68; removal of material &ources, 69-70; removal of sanctions, 70; sanctions, 25;
skills and knowledge, 24; withdrawalof, 26. See also authority; legitimacy;
nonviolent action/shuggle; politicalpower
South Africa, 8; boycotts of products of,
43,59,72; growth of African economic
power, 72; Sharpevillemassacre,59South Korea, 8South Vietnam: 1963 and 1%6 Buddhist
campaigns in, 8; repression of Buddhists in, 59
Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Spain, 123
Stalin, Josef, 141
Stay-at-home, 101
Strategy: aim of, 51; defined, 89; grandstrategy defined, 89; methods, tactics
and, 89. See also civilian-based defense;
nonviolent action/struggle
Strategy of communicatic% and warning,%-101; aimed at, 98,99; content of, 99;
defined, 97; means of, 98,100
Strategy of nonviolent blitzkrieg, 97,101102; aim of, 101; defined, 101; means of,101

Strategy of selective resistance, 103,105110; advantages of, 105; defined, 105;
determining points of resistance in, 106;against fo&i& invasions, 106; againstinternal usurpations, 106
Strategy of total noncooperation, 103,
104405; defined, 104; problems of, 104;
uses of, 104-105
Strikes, 11,17,M, 49,62,69,70,107;
1944five-day general strike in Denmark, 44; 1968 protest strikes in Prague, 43; 1989 general strike in Prague,
44; defined, 43; forms of, 43; general,
66,70,100,101; Nazi view of, 69; in
Ruhrkampf, 43,92; symbolic, 12,13,43
Structural condition of society, 31,33; consequences of, 32; determinants of, 31
Sudan, 71
Suffrage: gaining of universal manhood,72; women's, 72

Svoboda, Ludvik, 16,17
Sweden, 11,125,131,140; civilian-based
defense component in "total defense"
policy, 132; Commission on Nonmilitary Resistance in, 132; gaining of universal marhood suffrage in, 72; nonmilitary resistance in case of occupation of,132

Switzerland, 4,125,131; Cimlian Defense
Book in, 134; civilian-based defense
component in "general defense" policy, 134; "passive resistance" in, 134; refusal of collaboration in, 134
Tactics, 37,40,51,72; altering, in face ofrepression, 58; defined, 89. See also
methods; strategy
Terboven, Josef, Reichskommissar, 67
Terrorism, 146
Thailand, 71.136
Thennopylae, Battle of, 18,56
Thoreau, Henry David, 26
Tibet, 130
Totalitarian systems, 32
Transarmament, 117-150; advantages of,for countries with limited military capacitia, K39; aim of, 128; defense establishment considerationof, 125; detined,
126; full phased changeover model of,
138-139; full rapid adoption model of,
129-131; governmental considerationof, 149; by governmental decisions, 126,
130; incremental approach to, 124,127128; mod& of, 12%141; multilateralmodel of, 139-141; by non-governrnental procescses, 126,130; process of, 126;
rapid adoption undesirable, 127; rapid
adoption unlikely, 126; special purposes mociel, 131-138; transpartisan
considerationof, 124; by unilateralmeasures, 139; variations in, 126. Seea h civilian-based defense
Treaty of Versailles, 130
Tyranny, 8,22,30,32,33;
Aristotle on, 75
Ubico, General Jorge, 39,54,64
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 5,8,
16,54,84,85,127,139,141; Armenia, 8,
9,130,143; civil rights struggles in, 8;
civilian-based defense and, 142;
Estonia,8,9,130,143; Georgia, 8,9,

INDEX

143;glasnost, 143;improvised civil
servants resistance in (1917-1921), 10;internal usurpations and, 143; Jewish
activist struggles in, 8;K.G.B., 16;
Latvia,8,130,143;Lithuania,8,130,143;military invasion of, 143;nationalities problem in, 143;1953 strike
movement at Vorkuta, 8;1989 strikes
and ethnic movements in, 8; perestroika, 143
United States, 16,73,137,141;abolitionof legalized racial segregation in,
72; Atlanta, Georgia, 59;Birmingham,
Alabama, 59;Central Intelligence
Agency, 137;civil rights struggles
in, 8,46;civilian-based defense and,
142;Irangate, 137;Mississippi, 59;
Montgomery, Alabama, 55,59;repression of civil rights struggle in,
59;Rhode Island, 52;security threats
to,and civilian-based defense,
142;slavery in, 72;women's suffragein,72

Vietnam, 5,39,127
Violence, 29; counterproductive in nonviolent action/struggle, 39;defined,
38;distracts attention from issues,
51;strikes indirectly at opponents'
power, 48
Von Liittwitz, Lieutenant-General Walter,
l0,ll
Warsaw Treaty Organization, 16,17,100;
invasion of Czechoslovakia, 100Western Europe, 4,140,142
Wilson, President Woodrow, 41
Win, Ne, 54
Work-on without collaboration, 46,107
Yugoslavia, 5,39,54,125,131;civilianbased defense and, 135;Total National
Defense policy of, 135;types of msistance in, 135
Yulzari, Matei, 41
Zeller, General, 12

About the Author

GENE
SHARP,
D.Phil. (Oxon.), is Resident of the Albert Einstein Institution, a nonprofit organization devoted to research, policy studies, andeducation about nonviolent struggle. He was previously Program
Director, Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense,
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and is Professor
Emeritus of Political Science at SoutheasternMassachusetts University.
He holds the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy in political theory from
Oxford University, Master of Arts in Sociology from Ohio State University, and Bachelor of Arts in Social Sciences from Ohio State University. He lived for ten years in England and Norway before being invited to Harvard in 1965. He is an international lecturer and his writings have been translated into seventeen languages.