Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 29, Number 1, 2007, pp21-28

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Post Tsunami Recovery Process in Sri Lanka
Harsha, A. R. RATNASOORIYA1, Saman. P. SAMARAWICKRAMA1 and Fumihiko IMAMURA2
1
Department of Civil Engineering, University of Moratuwa, Moratuwa, Sri Lanka
2Disaster Control Research Center, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan(Received for 12 Mar., 2007 and in revised from 1 Jul., 2007)

ABSTRACTThe Indian ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004 was the biggest natural disaster in the history of Sri Lanka.
Unlike many other countries affected by this tsunami, the damage in Sri Lanka was so widespread that about two
thirds of the coastline from the northern Jaffna peninsula, along the eastern coast down to the southern tip ofDondra Head, as well as the relatively sheltered southwestern and western coasts, were subjected to inundation.
More than 35,000 people died, 100,000 houses were damaged and 500,000 people were displaced, while thesevere damage caused to infrastructure and environment exceeded US $ 900 million. It has been estimated that 3
to 5 years will be needed to complete the rehabilitation and reconstruction task at a cost of nearly US $ 2.2 billion.
The recovery program has made some significant progress in certain areas and actions have also been initiated to
improve the disaster mitigation capability in the country. This paper reviews the issues, problems associated withand progress of the recovery process as well as the work carried out to mitigate potential future disasters in Sri
Lanka.

1. INTRODUCTION
On 26 December 2004, the coastal areas of Sri Lanka were
devastated by a tsunami, a natural disaster previously unknown toalmost all Sri Lankans. Except for monsoonal flooding, landslides
or occasional cyclones, Sri Lanka had previously been free frommajor natural disasters and the tsunami was by far the largest disaster experienced by the country.
Unlike in many other countries affected by this tsunami, thedamage in Sri Lanka was so widespread that about two thirds ofthe 1400 km long coastline was affected. The directly exposed
coastline from the northern Jaffna peninsula, along the eastern
coast down to the southern tip of Dondra Head, as well as the relatively sheltered southwestern and western coasts, were inundated
by the tsunami. The affected areas in terms of the smallest administrative divisions, i.e. GN divisions, are shown in Fig. 1 (DoCS,
2006). The tsunami height and inundation distance varied along
the coastline depending on the bathymetry, coastal geometry andtopographical features. The recorded tsunami heights (in m) along
the coastline are given in Fig. 2 (Samarawickrama et al, 2006).
The inundation distances in northern and eastern areas reached 2-3
km inland and, in southern and western areas, reached 500 m incertain locations.
2. IMPACT OF THE TSUNAMI
Sri Lanka, as a country, was totally unprepared for the disaster. No warning was given, no mitigation measures were in place,and the tsunami caused huge loss of life and extensive damage to
KEY WORDS: Indian ocean, tsunami, disaster, recovery, Sri Lanka

Fig. 1

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H, A. R. RATNASOORIYA, S. P. SAMARAWICKRAMA AND F. IMAMURA

Fig. 2

Fig. 3coastal infrastructure and the environment.
The tsunami affected more than one million people out of a
total population of approximately 19 million. More than 35,000
died (DoCS, 2006) as indicated in Fig. 3, 20,000 were injured,
5,000 remain missing and 500,000 were displaced. It alsoorphaned more than 1500 children, while over 150,000 individuals
lost their livelihoods (MoFP, 2006).
Infrastructure facilities-houses, public buildings, schools, hospitals, hotels, fishery harbors, roads, railways, power, telecommunication, water supply and sanitation facilities in the coastal zone
were severely damaged by the tsunami and access to certain remoteareas was cut off for several days.
The seawater intrusion by the tsunami caused significant environmental damage. It also caused extensive soil erosion, damaged
or destroyed coastal vegetation and contaminated inland water bodies, while the pollution of dug wells by seawater as well as wastewater from damaged infrastructure posed serious public health concerns. The onrushing waves also caused damage to natural protective systems such as coral reefs, mangroves and sand dunes, while
the haphazard dumping of the shear volume of debris posed serious
environmental concerns.
The total damage due to the tsunami has been estimated to be
more than US $ 900 million, with a large percentage of damage
concentrated in the housing, tourist, fisheries and transport sectors(ADB, 2005). The overall economic loss has been estimated at
approximately 4.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and thetsunami impact was estimated to cause a reduction of GDP growthby 1% in 2005 (ADB, 2005).
The financial need for recovery has been estimated to beapproximately US $ 2.2 billion (GoSL, 2005). In the short term,
the major proportion of needs are in housing, transportation andlivelihood restoration sectors. The needs are in proportion to thedamages sustained and the recovery strategy, which may involve
replacing the damaged assets with those of equal value, as in housing and health sectors or with upgrades as in transportation, watersupply and sanitation and power services.
In summarized form the damage is given in Table 1 (GoSL,
2005). The damage and the recovery made so far in the sectors
most affected by the tsunami are also presented in this paper.
3. IMMEDIATE RELIEF AND RESPONSE
Immediately after the tsunami, hundreds of thousands ofaffected people sought refuge in nearly 600 places of temporary
shelter, mainly schools and places of religious worship-temples,
mosques and churches-and the task of providing them with theessential necessities was immense. Within hours, however, assistance started to pour in from local communities, followed by thegovernment, private sector, non governmental organizations(NGOs) and international communities.
Emergency repairs to damaged infrastructure were carried out
in parallel to the provision of essential services-accessibility, healthand sanitation, water supply, power and telecommunication facilities-within a few weeks. Local and foreign military personnel also
assisted in repair work as well as rescue operations, the identification and burial of dead bodies and clearing of debris. A scheme toprovide food aid for nearly one million people and a compensation
scheme for victims were initiated. Despite the sheer magnitude of

POST TSUNAMI RECOVERY PROCESS IN SRI LANKA

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Table 1. Human, Economic and Social impact of the tsunami

the disaster and the lack of readiness of the country, thanks to the
combined response, Sri Lanka recorded no additional deaths due todelayed medical attention or tsunami related illnesses.
The post tsunami recovery process was to be financed largely
by foreign financial aid. Aid commitments by the international
community reached nearly US $ 3 billion (Alailima, 2006) for therecovery effort and, in addition, the country received assistance inthe form of debt relief/moratorium and exceptional trade benefits.
There was also a significant contribution from local resources, inaddition to the contributions made by the private sector and NGOs.
Recognizing the sheer magnitude of the disaster, coupled withthe lack of previous experience, several response mechanisms wereenacted to expedite the relief effort immediately after the tsunami.
A Center for National Operations (CNO) was formed under thepresident to liaise with all involved with the emergency response
and coordinate the relief effort. Three task forces were also formed
under the president: Task force for rescue and relief, Task force torebuild the nation and Task force for logistics, law and order, whiledisaster management authorities were appointed at district levels tocoordinate local relief efforts. The structure of the coordination
mechanism changed subsequently with the disbanding and/or
merger of different agencies during the recovery and reconstruction

period. In November 2005, all government agencies involved withtsunami recovery and reconstruction were merged to form a single
agency, the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA).
Affected people were initially assisted through cash grants,
food aid, and later through cash for work and microfinanceschemes. Over 250,000 households received cash grants in installments, while nearly US $ 7 million was spent on the cash for work
program in the first year after the tsunami. More than 13,000 subsidizing loans amounting to US $ 38 million had also been disbursed (GoSL, 2005).
4. DAMAGE AND RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION
4.1 Housing
The tsunami damaged or destroyed more than 100,000 houses,
which amounts to 13% of the total housing stock in coastal administrative divisions. With total damage estimated at up to US $ 325
million, reconstruction needs are estimated to be up to US $ 460
million (ADB, 2005).
The people displaced initially took refuge in emergency shelter or with relatives or friends. As the capacity of the local con-

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H, A. R. RATNASOORIYA, S. P. SAMARAWICKRAMA AND F. IMAMURA

struction industry is about 50,000 housing units per year (GoSL,
2005), it quickly became clear that the construction of permanent
shelters for resettlement would take time and that transitional shelters would be required to bridge the gap between emergency andpermanent shelters. Such transitional shelters were expected toprovide protection from the environment as well as secure living
space and a base for restarting livelihoods. It was estimated thatcloser to 60,000 such shelters would be required (GoSL, 2005). It
was possible to reach this target in one year although the quality ofsome of the transitional shelters failed to attain the required standards.
For the construction of a permanent shelter, a buffer zone wasintroduced as a safety measure. A coastal buffer zone also existed
before the tsunami but was not strictly adhered to. After the tsunami, the government introduced a 100 m buffer zone in the west andsouth and a 200 m buffer zone in the east and north; restricting
reconstruction. This led to two types of housing reconstruction
programs- namely, donor built reconstruction to relocate the affected people from the buffer zone and a home owner driven housing
reconstruction program for damaged and destroyed houses outside
the buffer zone. Despite being introduced as a safety measure, thebuffer zone became a crucial issue, due to the reluctance of fishingcommunities, tourists and commercial sectors for relocation, thescarcity of land for resettlement and the inadequate scientific basis
for selecting the limits of the zone. It was subsequently relaxed in
October 2005.
The total number of houses to be built under the donor built
program is about 30,000 (MoFP, 2006) and under this program allaffected families are entitled to a house built by a donor agency
satisfying the standards specified by the government. The beneficiary will be the owner of the properties at the resettlement site aswell as in the buffer zone.
Under the home owner driven program, affected houses areclassified as either partially or fully damaged and the affectedhouse owners are to be provided with cash grants (US $ 1000 for apartially damaged house and US $ 2500 for a fully damaged house)
for the repair or reconstruction of their houses. These grants are to
be provided in installments at different stages of the repair/reconstruction process. Further financial facilities-in the form of concessionary loans are to be provided for households having successfully
utilized the disbursed grants. Nearly 35,000 houses were classified
as partially damaged and 23,000 houses as fully damaged under
this program, while the revision of the buffer zone resulted in an
additional 14,000 houses falling within this program (GoSL, 2005).
The home owner driven program is funded by a group ofmajor donors and has shown considerable progress in comparison
to the donor driven program. By the end of 2006 nearly 12,000
fully damaged houses and 35,000 partially damaged houses had
been completely rehabilitated under this program (MoFP, 2006).
Under the donor driven program, pledges for more than
65,000 had been made but, as of the end of 2005-one year after thetsunami-the number of houses completed was less than 5000
(GoSL, 2005) with only about 8000 more under construction.
According to the government agency for tsunami reconstruction,
only about 12,000 houses have been completed and nearly 13,000
were in different stages of construction by the end of 2006, nearly
two years after the tsunami (MoFP, 2006) and falling well below
expectations.

As of the end of 2006, more than 42,000 of the transitional
shelters have been decommissioned, with nearly 15,000 shelters
remaining occupied (MoFP, 2006).
It has thus become evident that the housing reconstruction
efforts have not succeeded in reaching the targets set for various
reasons. A lack of consultation among all stakeholders, unawareness of those affected of their entitlements, confusion caused by therevision of the buffer zone and the resulting additional demand for
housing, escalation of the cost of building materials, limitation on
the capacity of the local construction industry, escalating conflictin the north and east and the lack of sustained commitment of someof the donor agencies have contributed to the shortcomings of the
housing reconstruction program.
4.2 Tourism
The tourist sector provides direct employment to about 50,000
while an additional 65,000 or so are employed in tourism related
activities. It contributes up to 4% of the GDP and has shown
growth since the ceasefire and peace process commenced in 2002,
with more than 500,000 tourist arrivals in 2004 (ADB, 2005).
The tsunami caused extensive damage to the tourist sector,
with total damage estimated at about US $ 250 million (ADB,
2005). Out of the 242 medium to large scale hotels registered, 105
are located in the tsunami affected areas, 8 of which were completely destroyed and about 50 partially damaged. In terms ofrooms, about 3500 out of a total of 14,000 rooms were not in operation after the tsunami. Further, 1200 rooms out of a total of about
4000 rooms in small scale hotels/guest houses were damaged by
the tsunami. The indirect effects such as loss of revenue, cash flow
etc. are difficult to quantify but are likely to have a negative impact
on the local economy.
Prior to the tsunami, tourist arrivals were predicted to reach
600,000 in 2005 but this was scaled down to about 400,000500,000 arrivals, causing a loss of US $ 130 million in 2005 (ADB,
2005). Tourism in Sri Lanka is not confined to coastal areas andabout 40% of the guest night stays are spent along the coastal areas
affected by the tsunami. As many tourists prefer to visit coastal
and inland areas, the tsunami was expected to adversely affecttourism in inland areas as well.
The lack of proper insurance cover for the majority of assets
damaged by the tsunami has also adversely affected the reconstruction efforts. In most cases, the larger hotels have sufficient financial resources for reconstruction but the lack of such resources orinsurance cover for smaller establishments had become a serious
issue in the recovery process. Confusion regarding the interpretation of the buffer zone has also hindered the recovery program.
Assistance in the form of concessions in obtaining financial
support and reconstruction materials was extended to this sector
but complete recovery was expected to take longer, even when thedamage was fully repaired, due to the overall devastation caused by
the tsunami and the diminished attraction of these destinations.
By the end of 2005, only 11 of the damaged hotels remained
closed (GoSL, 2005) and nearly 12,000 rooms were in operation.
Tourist arrivals had increased by about 8% in comparison to 2004.
As of the end of 2006, nearly 90% of the funds committed to this
sector had been disbursed and expended, making it the sector withthe highest percentage utilization of allocated funds (MoFP, 2006).
It is expected that all large hotels damaged by the tsunami will be

POST TSUNAMI RECOVERY PROCESS IN SRI LANKA

in operation by the end of 2007.
4.3 Fisheries
The fisheries sector is one of those hardest hit by the tsunami.
It contributes 2.4% to the GDP (ADB, 2005) and provides employment to a large proportion of the rural coastal communities, withmore than 150,000 people directly or indirectly involved with this
sector. The average annual fish catch is slightly over 250,000 tons
and the output per fisherman is comparatively low. The averageliving conditions of fishermen are poor with income levels scarcely
above the poverty line and the tsunami thus had a severe impact on
the already improvised living conditions of fishing communities.
The tsunami killed about 27,000 fishermen (ADB, 2005) andabout 90,000 in fishing communities were displaced due to damaged or destroyed housing. It also damaged nearly 75% of the boat
fleet of about 28,000, consisting mainly of traditional non-motorized boats, single day motorized boats and a considerable numberof multi day motorized boats. Most of the fishing implements suchas outboard engines, ice storage, fishing gear and nets were also
severely damaged, while a number of fishery harbors and anchorages were damaged by the tsunami. This includes the damage tomarine structures, service facilities, equipment etc. and the fact thatmany harbors and anchorages required dredging and the removal ofdebris from the basins. In addition, many institutes in the fisheries
sector suffered infrastructure and asset damages due to the tsunami.
The damage in this sector, excluding that to housing and otherassets in fishing communities, has been estimated at approximately
US $ 120 million (ADB, 2005).
The fisheries sector has made a significant recovery since thetsunami, with the fish harvest reaching 70% of pre tsunami level atthe end of 2006. All damaged boats have been repaired and 95%of the destroyed non motorized boats have been replaced, withmost affected fishermen having resumed their occupation. Also 34
multi day motorized boats and 100 one day motorized boats havebeen handed over to the owners of destroyed boats, while 8 anchorages have been improved to date (MoFP, 2006).
4.4 Transportation(1) Roads
The road network in Sri Lanka consists of national roads
under the authority of the central government, provincial roads andlocal governmental roads assigned to provincial and local-municipal, urban and rural-administrations respectively. Local government roads are connected to provincial roads or within towns ormunicipalities, while provincial roads are connected to the nationalroad network. There has been no significant investment in the road
sector until recently and nearly 60% (ADB, 2005) of the entire
road network has been estimated to be in a deteriorated condition
due to the lack of maintenance and damage and neglect during the
20 years of civil war, particularly in the north and east.
The national roads suffered the most extensive damage by thetsunami. Long stretches of these roads are located in parallel, hugging the coastline and the tsunami damaged a total length of nearly
700 km, representing nearly 5% of the total national road network.
Provincial roads, usually aligned at right angles to the coastline andheading inland to higher elevations, presented a lesser barrier to theonrushing wave and resulted in shorter inundation distances, suffering comparatively less damage. As with provincial roads, the25damage was less severe in local government roads. It has been
estimated that a total length of 300 km of provincial roads and1100 km of local government roads, representing 2% of the combined total, was damaged by the tsunami. Moreover, several roadbridges, mainly on national roads, many culverts and road furnituresuffered severe damage. In addition, several road ferry services
and associated infrastructure suffered damage by the tsunami. In
the east, coastal roads were severely damaged by heavy rain andflooding immediately prior to and after the tsunami and it was difficult to segregate the damage caused by the tsunami. The total
damage in the road sector was estimated to be approximately US $80 million (ADB, 2005).
Immediate repair of the damaged roads was a priority toenable relief and urgent necessities to reach the affected communities. The southern highway and the northern coastal roads andbridges were repaired and reopened within a week after the tsunami. The east coast highway was reopened for traffic by mid
January 2005.
In terms of recovery, the short term need was to consolidate
the repairs carried out before the onset of the next monsoonal season. It was estimated that the associated road works could be completed within a contract period of about 6 months but certain bridge
replacement works would extend into the 2006 construction season. Following the short term work, the medium term needinvolved putting the national roads into a uniform standard, freefrom seasonal flood damage and erosion. It also includes thereconstruction of provincial and local government roads which aresignificantly deteriorated. The total short and medium term recovery needs are estimated to be US $ 21 million and US $ 157 million respectively (ADB, 2005).
The donors were quick in committing funds for road rehabilitation. 5 major bridges on the main southern coastal highway havebeen completed and major bridge rehabilitation work in the East isunderway. Almost all road rehabilitation projects are in progress,
even though the completion dates have been extended to 2007. Asof the end of 2006, more than US $ 42 million (MoFP, 2006) had
been spent on the recovery effort and it is presently estimated thatthe overall costs will remain within those initially estimated.
(2) Railways
Rail corridors in Sri Lanka extend from the capital Colombo
in the west to the north, northeast, east, south and the central highlands. The tsunami caused disruption to rail services in the northeastern, eastern and southern corridors, but the damage to thenortheastern and eastern corridors was minor in comparison withthe severe damage to the southern corridor. The southern corridor
carries about 78,000 passengers per day, mainly commuters, aswell as bulk freight from the southern port of Galle. Of a total
length of 160 km of this corridor, a length of 135 km was affectedwith approximately 20 km of track suffering severe damages. Thisdamage also prevented the damaged rolling stock from being
returned to workshops for repairs. The total damage to rail track,
railway infrastructure and rolling stock was estimated to be US $26 million.
The minor damages in the northeastern and eastern corridors
were quickly repaired and rail services resumed in mid January
2005. The short term needs in the southern corridor for the restoration of services to pre-tsunami levels were estimated to equate to26

H, A. R. RATNASOORIYA, S. P. SAMARAWICKRAMA AND F. IMAMURA

US $ 71 million over a period of 4 months. Due to the traditionalreliance of most commuters on rail transport and the lack of alternative modes of transport, the restoration of rail services in thesouthern corridor within 60 days was give highest priority and it
was possible to achieve this target in 57 days (Fernando, 2006),
which is considered as an important achievement in the tsunami
recovery effort.
4.5 Agriculture and Livestock
Many families in almost all districts affected by the tsunami
depend on crop agriculture and livestock as primary or secondary
sources of income. These activities are usually conducted at subsistence level rather than on a commercial scale. The main agricultural areas are located inland and there are very few large livestock
farms located in the areas affected by the tsunami. As a result, theoverall damage in this sector is comparatively less, although manyfamilies have suffered a loss of income levels.
The damage in this sector is mainly due to the destruction ofrice and other crops and home gardens along the coastal belt. Morethan 2000 ha of rice fields, 1000 ha of other crops and about 2500
home gardens were destroyed by the tsunami. The inundation ofagricultural land by seawater has caused high levels of salinity
making them unproductive for 3-4 years until the salinity is
reduced by seasonal monsoonal rains. It has been reported thatnearly 10,000 livestock animals were also killed (ADB, 2005).
In terms of agricultural infrastructure, although no large irrigation schemes are located in coastal areas, a large number of salt
water exclusion structures are located along the coastal belt. These
structures are used to prevent seawater entering cultivated areas
through drainage canals-mainly in the dry season. The tsunami has
damaged many of these structures and eroded and clogged thedrainage canals with debris. In addition, infrastructure facilities
belonging to various institutions in this sector were also badly
damaged. The total damage to the agricultural and livestock sector
is estimated to be about US $ 3 million (ADB, 2005).
The immediate needs were to include the affected people incash grant assistance programs and to provide financial facilities torestart their livelihoods. In the long term, recovery efforts were to
be focused on the repair and reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure and the provision of technical assistance to accelerate therecovery of agricultural production. The estimated cost of recovery in this sector is approximately US $ 4.3 million (ADB, 2005).
As of the end of 2006, it has been reported (Fernando, 2006)
that 75% of the total land used for rice cultivation and 84% of thatused for other crops are back in production. Soil salinity, labor
shortages and a lack of financial resources-particularly in the eastern districts-have contributed to the shortfall to the complete recovery.
4.6 Power Sector
No major infrastructure in the power sector were located incoastal areas and the damage in this sector was limited and marginal; mainly confined to medium and low voltage distribution lines.
About 50 km of medium voltage distribution lines ( 11KV and 33
KV) and 400 km of low voltage lives were destroyed, disrupting
electricity supply to approximately 70,000 households representing
2% of the total. The total damage in this sector was estimated atabout US $ 9.4 million (ADB, 2005).

The immediate recovery needs involved commencing temporary repair works, prioritizing the restoration of supply to watersupply facilities, hospitals and shelters in order to meet humanitarian needs. It was possible to restore the electricity supply in theaffected areas within 2 months. The short term priority involved
restoring the supply to the affected households and to expand the
distribution network to supply power to the housing that will be
provided for the affected population, for which the financial needhas been estimated as approximately $ 27 million (ADB, 2005).
The provision of electricity to resettlement sites depended on the
progress of construction and as of the end of 2006, nearly 18,000
new houses have been provided with electricity (MoFP, 2006).
4.7 Water Supply and Sanitation
Due to water resource scarcity and the damages caused to thewater delivery systems by the civil war, many of the tsunami
affected areas had experienced water shortages even before thetsunami. In the affected areas, the dependence on wells is high andmore than 60,000 wells were damaged by the tsunami inundation.
The damage to water supply schemes was restricted mainly to the
distribution network close to the shoreline, with 9 such networks
reported to have been damaged. Damage to sanitation facilities
mainly included household latrines, which in many households arelocated separately, and some infrastructure associated with sewerage works, with total damage in this sector estimated at approximately US $ 40 million (ADB, 2005).
Some of the affected wells were recoverable while the others
had to be abandoned due to heavy contamination by seawater.
More than 12,000 wells needed to be cleaned and potable water
was supplied by dowsers in areas where the water supply schemes
were not in operation. Quick repairs to damaged distribution networks were also performed, restoring them to operable levels but
sometimes with restricted supplies.
It has also been observed that well supply will not be a significant water resource in certain coastal areas and expansion of watersupply facilities will be needed to meet the growth in demand. Dueto the relocation of communities, some existing networks need to
be expanded and parts of them have become redundant.
4.8 Health Sector
The damage to the health sector by the tsunami was significant
with losses to both infrastructure and personnel. More than 90
health institutions, including hospitals, drug stores and health centers were damaged or destroyed by the tsunami. Losses also
included medicine and medical equipment. These losses and thatof health personnel caused a total breakdown of health services in
the affected areas. The estimated cost of damage in the health sector was approximately US $ 57 million (ADB, 2005).
The immediate health need was to provide basic health care to
the affected people. Providing clean water to emergency sheltersand health institutions and taking measures to prevent the spread ofcommunicable diseases among those affected were also among theurgent needs. The disaster caused considerable trauma among theaffected people and it became urgently necessary to implement a
program addressing their psychological needs. The provision of
temporary health facilities and strengthening of unaffected healthfacilities to expand the service to provide health care to the displaced population were among the short term needs. The estimated

POST TSUNAMI RECOVERY PROCESS IN SRI LANKA

cost of rehabilitation of this sector was estimated to be US $ 79
million (ADB, 2005).
The efficiency of the health sector has managed to halt the
spread of disease among the population affected by the tsunami. It
has also been successful in mobilizing sufficient resources for therecovery effort, with much higher commitments than the extent of
the damage having occurred. Satisfactory progress has been madein small scale construction, with the renovation of buildings andprimary health care facilities almost completed. However there
have been major delays for larger construction projects with 50%of the construction work yet to begin. As of the end of 2006,
approximately 23% of the financial commitments had been utilized
in the recovery and reconstruction effort (MoFP, 2006).
5. EDUCATION AND AWARENESS FORDISASTER MITIGATION
The tsunami damaged 183 schools, 18 vocational and industrial training institutes and 4 universities, affecting the studies ofnearly 100,000 students. The majority of the damage was to primary and secondary schools with buildings in 57 schools completely destroyed. Concerns have also been raised with 91 schools,
which were damaged or destroyed and which are located too close
to the sea, with the cost of damage to the education sector estimated at approximately US $ 21 million (ADB, 2005).
The urgent need in this sector after the tsunami was to repair
the facilities to enable the students to recommence their studies.
The damage to the universities was minor in comparison and academic activities resumed soon after the tsunami. Apart from thedamaged schools, it was also impossible to recommence academic
activities at 444 undamaged schools which had been used as temporary shelters for displaced people, affecting the studies of a further 100,000 students. It was necessary to clear these camps andwhen the reconstruction was likely to be delayed due to the extent
of the damage or the need for relocation, to provide temporary
shelter to conduct classes. The cost of short term construction andrestoration process, with quality upgrading in the education sector,
was estimated at US $ 42 million (ADB, 2005).
One year after the tsunami, nearly 95% of the school children
in the affected areas had returned to school although only a low
percentage of education facilities had been fully repaired. As ofthe end of 2006, approximately 57% of the damaged schools werein various stages of construction but only 10% of the construction
had been completed. Among the schools used as temporary shelters, 34% were undergoing rehabilitation with about 9% completed(MoFP, 2006).
6. LIVELIHOODSOver 150,000 people lost their livelihoods due to the damages
caused by the tsunami: 50% in the fisheries sector, 45% in the service sector and 5% in the agricultural sector respectively.
Approximately 80% of those affected lost their main source ofincome and 90% lost their productive assets (ADB, 2005).
The short term priorities in this sector included creating andrestoring the income generating capacity of the self employed andsmall scale businesses, creating employment in all the affectedareas and providing training and business development services. In

27

the longer term, it will be necessary to focus on the alleviation ofpoverty, the provision of financial assistance to obtain the benefit
of new business opportunities and adopt new higher productivity
technologies. The initially estimated cost of restoration of livelihoods was approximately US $ 140 million (ADB, 2005).
The livelihoods recovery program consisted of providing cash
grants, asset distribution through the provision of productive tools,
providing cash for work and providing access to micro financing
systems.
Over 250,000 households started receiving cash grants of up
to US $ 2000 in 4 installments, to supplement the food rationing
program of US $ 3.5 per week. Under the cash for work programs,
more than US $ 7 million has been spent, with the initial focus on
the clearing of debris and implementation of other emergency
repairs, followed by road and irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation(GoSL, 2005).
The concessionary loan schemes for restarting micro, small
and medium enterprises were implemented by the central bank andmany other organizations and in the first year, nearly US $ 36 million was disbursed to nearly 8000 borrowers under the central bankscheme (GoSL, 2005).
According to available data, up to 85% of the affected families
had regained their main source of income one year after the tsunami. A survey reveals that, as of the end of 2006, 95% of womenand 84% of men who lost their income are earning an income
which is also significantly higher than their previous income levels.
(MoFD, 2006).
7. DISASTER RISK MITIGATION
Although Sri Lanka had been free from any major disaster
before the tsunami in 2004, floods and landslides in 2003 and various other small to medium scale disasters in recent years havehighlighted the fact that Sri Lanka is a disaster prone country.
These disasters have caused loss of life, property and environmental damages adversely affecting the development activities of thecountry. It has therefore become important to consider the risk ofdisasters in all development programs and the government haslaunched a number of initiatives to strengthen the disaster mitigation capacity of the country.
In the aftermath of the tsunami, a parliamentary select committee was appointed to investigate the preparedness of the country
to face emergencies and to make recommendations to minimize thedamage caused by various disasters. Based on the recommendations made by the committee, the Disaster Management Act wasenacted by the parliament in May 2005. Under this act, theNational Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) was established as the main body responsible for disaster risk management
in Sri Lanka. The ministry of Disaster Management and Human
Rights as the leading ministry and the Disaster Management Centeras the executing agency for disaster risk management were alsoestablished by the directives of the NCDM.
An interim committee for early warning was formed soon after
the tsunami to establish an early warning system for Sri Lanka,
while several other committees were also established at a national
level to prepare responses and mitigate future disaster risks. In
addition, committees at district, divisional and village level werealso established for early response and preparedness for disasters

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H, A. R. RATNASOORIYA, S. P. SAMARAWICKRAMA AND F. IMAMURA

and the capacity building is continuing at present.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKSThe post tsunami recovery process in Sri Lanka is briefly presented in this paper. It discusses the progress of the recovery
process in terms of the thematic areas around which the recovery
and reconstruction activities are organized: getting people backinto homes, restoring livelihoods, services-education, health etc,
and national infrastructure development. It has become evident
that despite being by no means complete, the recovery process has
made some significant progress in certain sectors affected by thetsunami. At this juncture, two yeas after the tsunami, it may be
useful to carry out a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the recovery process so far, in order to reach the objectiveof complete recovery at the earliest possible time.
Such an assessment needs to look into the effectiveness of themeasures taken to overcome the identified weaknesses of therecovery process. Concerns had been raised regarding the transparency, equity, communication and coordination between stakeholders involved, effective monitoring and measuring the progress
and the capacity of the implementing organizations of the recovery
process. There is also a need to address the issues that currently
dominate. Among these issues are the escalation of violence in thenorth and east, which has slowed the reconstruction activities andincreased the number of displaced people, the inferior quality of
the assets provided, due to the initial focus on only the quantity oftsunami disbursements, and the maintenance of the institutionaland financial sustainability of the stakeholders, due to the lack ofsufficient resources.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Prof.Samantha Hettiarati, Matotuwa University, Sri
Lanka for his valuable comments and support for research, andPrefecture of Miyagia, Japan for providing the opportunity for theauthor to stay in Tohoku University for Tsunami Traning Programin 2006.
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