Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 38，Number 1，2017，pp49-64

Background to the Rapid Evacuation from the 2015 Eruption and
Education for Disaster Prevention by Residents on Kuchinoerabujima
VolcanoMiwa Kuri 1, Mayumi Sakamoto 2, Norio Maki 3
1

International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Tohoku University
2
Disaster Mitigation Research Center, Nagoya University
3
Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University（Received : Sep. 28, 2016 Accepted : May. 24, 2017）

Abstract
The 2014 Ontake eruption and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake resulted in some revision of
government measures for disaster prevention. The role of residents in disaster prevention is increasing.
The effectiveness fusing of tourism with disaster prevention education in the disaster prevention system
is confirmed in some volcanic areas.
This paper focuses on the background to the rapid evacuation during the 2015 Kuchinoerabujima
volcano eruption as a case study focusing on disaster prevention action and daily disaster awareness of
volcanic activity. The case of the 2015 Kuchinoerabujima eruption shows that it is important to enhance
relationships not only among experts, local government, residents, and the media but also among experts
and non-expert residents who have an interest in volcanic activity.
In Kuchinoerabujima, based on the proven program of nature study abroad, the effectiveness of fusing
tourism with disaster prevention education in the disaster prevention system is confirmed. Cooperation
between tourism and disaster prevention is important for the safety of visitors and the safety andlivelihoods of residents.
Keywords：Kuchinoerabujima volcano, disaster prevention education, tourism, migration policy.
１．Introduction
Kuchinoerabujima is an active volcano in Kyushu, Japan, with a length of about 13 km and an area of
about 38 km2 (Figure 1). The island can only be reached by boat. The residents are dependent mainly
on fishing, agriculture, and seasonal tourism.
Geshi and Kobayashi, 2007 reported the history of Kuchinoerabujima volcano. It consists of agroup of volcanoes with different activity levels and eruptive centers. The beginnings of this volcano
are unknown; Gokyo volcano in the northern part of the island seems to have risen grown to the sea
surface up to 500,000 years ago. Banyangamine volcano that constitutes the northwestern part of theisland is about 200,000 years old. The central part of the island consists of Noike, Hachikubo, Furudake
and Shindake volcanoes which have been active within about 15,000 years recently, and lava flow andexplosive eruption have been repeated from the summit crater. The earliest recorded eruption in history
was 1841ago; after that, eruptions have frequently recurred on Shindake. It was active from 1931 to
1934, and an eruption occurred on December 24, 1933. Pyroclasts from Shindake reached a distance of
2 km in the southeasterly direction, resulting in 34 victims. In the 1966 eruption, pyroclasts reached adistance of 3 km in the north-northeasterly direction. After that, some smaller eruptions occurred
repeatedly. In 1980, an eruption occurred in the crack of the east side of Shindake. After that, an
explosive eruption occurred on August 3, 2014.
On May 29, 2015, an eruption occurred at Mt. Shindake on Kuchinoerabujima, and an
emergency warning (Level 5: Evacuate from the residential area) was announced for the first time inJapan. All residents on the island then evacuated to outside the island rapidly after the 2015 eruption.
Another eruption with a total eruptive volume of 1 x 104 m3 dense-rock equivalent (DRE), as estimated49

M.KURI, M.SAKAMOTO, N.MAKI
from ash fall distribution, that occurred on August 3, 2014. Following this event, premonitory volcanic
activities, including an increased discharge of volcanic gas, ground deformation, and positive volcanic
earthquake activities, proceeded in a stepwise manner. The eruption column reached more than 9 km
above the crater in the May eruption, and the pyroclastic flow covered more than 2 km near the coastline.
The eruptive volume has been estimated at approximately 2 x 105 m3 DRE, including the June 19
eruption, based on ash fall distribution.
N

Iwayadomari

Heliport

H

Nishinoyu
Banyagamine
▲291

Gokyo
TashiroNemachi

HonmuraShinmura

Maeda
Mukaehama

Yumugi

Noike Takadomori▲470
Shindake
Distance from Shindake ▲ 657
3km
2km
1km Furudake▲638
Nanakama

Kagoshima Prefecture

Kagoshima
City +

Hachikubo
Kuchinoerabujima Tanegashima

0

1

2km

Yakushima

Figure 1 Map of Kuchinoerabujima volcano.
The Japan Central Government amended the Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes in
September, 2015. A specific evacuation plan was developed, with provisions such as a requirement that
customer facilities such as hotels and ropeways provide shelter and evacuation routes in municipalities
with volcanoes (Cabinet Office, 2015).
Volcanic eruptions are characterized by a large spatiotemporal gap between the geologicalphenomenon and its consequent risk to human life. Volcanic disasters thus require quick decisionmaking under uncertain circumstances. The perception of residents living near the volcano depends on
volcanic activity, and the dissemination of disaster information among local communities is left to theconsideration of the volcanic disaster prevention council in each region, in accordance with their own
code of conduct.
This paper focuses on the background to the rapid evacuation from the 2015 eruption ofKuchinoerabujima volcano, with the focus on disaster prevention through tourism. It presents casestudies of disaster prevention action from daily life.

2.

Relationship with Disaster Prevention

2.1. Volcanic Observation and Warning System of the JMA
The JMA (Japan Meteorological Agency), based on the Meteorological Service Act, made a presentationof monitoring and information of volcanic activity (Yamasato, 2003). Information for the protection ofpeople's lives and bodies from disaster caused by a volcanic phenomenon, which has been defined in50

Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 38，Number 1，2017，pp49-64

the Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes, must be reported to the relevant prefectural governor.
On November 21, 2007, the phenomena of earthquake and volcano were added to No. 115 of the law
regarding the duty of the JMA to make forecasts and issue warnings. Along with this, since December
1, 2007, the volcanic activity level has been abolished, and an eruption warning level introduced. The
eruption warning level is an index of five steps according to the situation of volcanic activity, as well as
the index of "Action of disaster management agencies, residents, and climbers for disaster mitigation."
This eruption warning level makes it possible to undertake disaster prevention, such as rapid intrusion
regulation and evacuation operation by a pre-agreed range, and it is expected to lead to disaster risk
reduction (Yamasato, 2013).
Due to the 2011 East Japan Great Earthquake disaster and the Kii Peninsula heavy rain disaster,
the JMA launched the Emergency Warning System including volcanic activity on August 30, 2013.
Emergency warnings are issued to alert people to the significant likelihood of catastrophes in association
with natural phenomena of extraordinary magnitude, and call to “take action immediately to protect
individuals in the best way you can” (JMA, 2014a).
Due to the 2014 Ontake eruption, the JMA had started issuing "Volcanic Information for
Mountaineers" on October 10, 2014, and the Coordinating Committee for Prediction of Volcanic
Eruptions created a study group to review the existing volcano monitoring and warning systems (JMA,
2014b). For the 2014 Ontake eruption, a lack of observatory system, insufficient knowledge about
precursory phenomena, and immature tools for information transmission to visitors was pointed out(JMA, 2015). Confusion about warning levels and volcanic activity levels resulted in a misinterpretationof risk. The work of the committee is reflected in "explanatory information about the situation of the
volcano" on May 18th. Furthermore, the JMA established an "Eruption Notice" on August 4, 2015 (JMA,2016). It was carried out prior to information dissemination strengthening for climbers who registered
the application software with the communication terminal.
2.2. Relationship with Local Disaster Prevention
Nakamura (2013) and Kuri (2016) reported a shift from structural measures to non-structural measuresof disaster prevention. A summary modified from Kuri (2016) about public information of the JMA andinformation media for residents is shown in Table 1. Until around 2000, these announcements wereheavily dependent on the observational sector of the system; later, emphasis was placed on theinformation transmission sector.

Main actor ofDisaster Response

Residents

Scientists

Government
Mass media

Main actor ofDisaster prevention
measures and Response

Promotion of social awarenessand disaster prevention
Rapid information transfer

Figure 2 Tetrahedron of disaster prevention (Okada, 1997)

51

M.KURI, M.SAKAMOTO, N.MAKI
Table 1 Volcano Disaster Prevention System, and Relationship around Residents in Japan Modified
from Kuri (2016).
Year

1973
1974

1994

1996

2000

Observation system and volcano disaster prevention system
Stage
Early stage

TargetObservation
around expert

Improvement
stage of theobservation
instrument
andobservation
systemTransition
stage

2007
2008

Improvement
stage of theinformationdeliverysystemInformationdelivery toresidents

2011
2012
2013

2014
2015

Event
Plan of Volcanic Eruption
Prediction
Volcanic Eruption Prediction
Coordinating Committee
Interference SAR
GPS observation in the South
Kanto and Tokai area
GPS observation point highdensity arrangement, GPS
continuous observation
system operation (GNSS)

Informationdelivery to
localgovernments

2003
2004

Informationdelivery toresidents andvisitors

Relationship aroundresidents

Usu: Face-visible
relationship
Miyakejima: Internet
communication between
residents andvolcanologists.
Volcanic activity level by the
JMA
Interference SAR "Highprecision ground deformation
survey"Eruption warning level by the
JMA
Basic practical plan of the
volcanic disaster prevention
countermeasure meeting forvolcano information
Volcanic Disaster Prevention
Council
Law concerning strengtheningof the fire brigade with thelocal disaster prevention force
as its core by the Fire andDisaster Management Agency
Emergency warning by the JMA
Information for volcano tourists
by the JMA
Enforcement of the Act on
Special Measures for Active
Volcanoes by the Cabinet
officeQuick announcement of
eruption by the JMA

Kirishima: Hot line between
Takaharu Town andvolcanologists.

Kuchinoerabujima: The firebrigades as corresponding
actors in planning andactionOkada et al. (1997) show the relationship between residents (disaster response of actors),
government (actors of disaster measures), mass media (information on intermediary support), andscientists (provision of expertise), called the "tetrahedron model of disaster mitigation" (Figure 2). It
had a high affinity with the system in 2004, in which local government decided the action for disaster52

Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 38，Number 1，2017，pp49-64

mitigation based on the findings of experts. However, in the 2000 Usu eruption the pre-built relationshipbetween experts and residents lead to smooth evacuation operation and, later, the construction of faceto-face relationships was recommended (Okada, 2008; Hayakawa, 2003). In addition, the developmentof Internet technology since around 2000 allowed immediate and direct exchange of information
between expert and residents. This was utilized in the 2000 Miyakejima eruption because there werealso the geographical conditions of an isolated island (Hayakawa, 2004).
Recently residents have come to act in local systems of disaster prevention through the Local
Volcano Disaster Prevention Council more than in a past. However, in the 2011 Shinmoedake eruptionin Kirishima, it was also the case that local administration was puzzled about making judgment, becauseof the judgment gap between a group mainly comprising the JMA and a group mainly composed ofscientists of the local university (Kuri, 2016).
The Central Disaster Prevention Council made an evacuation plan on December 27, 2011 andon September 6, 2012, on the basis of the Volcanic Disaster Countermeasures edition of the revised
Basic Disaster Management Plan as well as on the Local Volcano Disaster Prevention Councils managed
by each prefecture, including prefectures, municipalities, local meteorological observatories, local
administrations, erosion control departments, and volcano experts. It became a system to promote thesetting and improvement of disaster risk reduction. It means that the relationship was slightly modified
after establishment of the eruption warning level. That is, each Local Volcano Disaster Prevention
Council became to be based on the premise that to carry out a pre-determined. Residents played a role
not only in action during emergency, but also in pre-decision-making, for example, evacuation planning.
Furthermore, the "Act concerning strengthening of the fire brigade with the local disaster prevention
force as its core," based on lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake, was enforced on December
13, 2013 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2013).
In 2014 an eruption of Mt. Ontake occurred. Sakamoto (2015) pointed out that residents are
unfamiliar with evacuation policy, which makes it difficult for them to evacuate when eruptions occur.
For better disaster management, Okada (2015) emphasized the importance of keeping an equal level ofeach sector in order to shape the tetrahedron.
2.3. Tourism and Volcanic Information
Hiroi et al. (1992) and Koyama (2005) reported that local governments appeared to resist reporting
volcanic activity, as these announcements, combined with communications about evacuation planningby local government, tend to create fear and to give the impression that the region is unsuitable as a
tourist destination. Kuri et al. (2016) pointed out that this situation is changing, in part due to activitiesof the Japanese Geoparks Network (JGN) established in 2007. Coexistence of tourism and disasterprevention has become more important to save residents and visitors and to keep their livelihoods. There
are also movements such as strengthening cooperation with tourism through the volcano disasterprevention councils and tourism.

3. Interview Survey on Disaster Prevention and Awareness related to the 2015 Mt. Shindake
Eruption on Kuchinoerabujima
Interview surveys were carried out in July and October, 2015 and March, 2016. The main interviewees
were staff of the Miyanoura and Kuchinoerabujima branches of the YTG (Yakushima Town
Government) offices, members of the Kuchinoerabujima fire brigade, and district leaders. The focus of
this section is the background to rapid evacuation of the region.
This study analyzes volcanoes solely on the basis of scientific information related to evacuation
actions, and information gleaned from interviews but without personal details, conforming to the ethicalregulations of the author’s organization. Original expressions are retained to the extent possible.
As a reference for the interview, Table 2 shows the recent activity history of Kuchinoerabujima
volcano from the Japanese active volcano summary (JMA, 2013, 4th edition), to which information after
2014 has been added.

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M.KURI, M.SAKAMOTO, N.MAKI
Table 2 Recent Activities of Kuchinoerabujima Volcano.
Year

Event

Area

Activity and Damage

1841

Eruption on May 23
Explosive eruption
on August 1
Eruption?
Eruption?
Sound
Explosive eruption
on April 2
Volcanic explosion
on May 15

Shindake
Shindake

1932

Sound

-

193334

Some eruptions from
December 24, 1993
to January 11, 1994.

Shindake

1945

Eruption on
November 3

1966
(S41)

Eruption on
November 22

East crater
wall of
Shindake
Shindake

Details unknown.
Volcanic lapilli reached on Maeda
district. 1 victim.
Details unknown.
Details unknown.
Sulfur flow.
Volcanic sounds started fromMarch. Land slid. 2 victims.
Damage for horses, rice, andvegetables.
Ash fall, Sulfur flow, land uplift.
Columnar activity and soundstarted from July 23.
Complete burning of Nanakama
district. 8 victims. 26 injures. 15
houses completely burned.
Severe damage to livestock andfields.
Fracture eruption, bomb, ash fall.

1968691972

Eruption

Shindake
Shindake

1973

Eruption on
September 2
Eruption

1974

Eruption on July 3

Shindake

1976
(S51)

Eruption on April 2

Shindake

Explosive sound. Ash fall in thenorthwesterly direction at a 2km
distance.

Memory of evacuation drill atelementary school.

1978

-

-

-

The first Local Disaster
Management Plan by the YTG

1980

Small phreatic
explosion on
September 28

East slopeof Shindake.

1982

Fumarolic activity

Shindake

1996

Earthquake-

19992000

Earthquake

-

2003

Earthquake, Volcanic
tremor

-2004

Earthquake, Volcanic
tremor in February
Earthquake, Volcanic
tremor, Grounddeformation,
Fumarolic activity-

Many explosion crater for thelength of 800 m in the northsouth direction (same area as1933). Volume of discharge
magma was 0.0001 DREkm3(VEI=1).
4 fumarolic gas craters opened in
October.
Numerous volcanic earthquakes
from January to June.
Numerous volcanic earthquakes
from July 1999 to February
2000. Earthquakes in thenortheast sea area increased.
Numerous volcanic earthquakes
from January to February. After
February some volcanic tremors.
Numerous volcanic earthquakes.
Volcanic tremors continued.
Numerous volcanic tremors. From
February to April, a little more
fumarolic activity. Land
expansion around Shindake
Crater from January to May.

1906
1907
1914
1931
(S6)

2005

West part of
Shindake

Shindake-

3 injured. 1 cow. Aerodynamics
reached Kagoshima City andTanegashima Island. Small
pyroclastic flow.
Some eruptions from December
1968 to March 1969.

Memo from interview andothersAs there were no eruptions
experienced on the island,
1097 people conducted largescale evacuation outside theisland.

No large-scale evacuation
outside the island.

November 5 to 9.

54

Some residents climbed up thecrater, although withrecognition of activity
around 2001.

Start of the Kuchinoerabujima
National Park ProjectJournal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 38，Number 1，2017，pp49-64

Table 2 Recent activity list of Kuchinoerabujima volcano (continued).
Year

Event

Area

Activity and Damage

2006

Earthquake,
Volcanic tremor,
Grounddeformation

-

2007

Earthquake,
Volcanic tremor-

Numerous volcanic
earthquakes and tremors.
Land expansion around
Shindake Crater from
September to December.
Numerous volcanic
earthquakes and tremors.
These activities oscillated.

2008

Earthquake,
Volcanic tremor,
Grounddeformation

Shindake2009

Earthquake,
Volcanic tremor

-

2010

Earthquake,
Volcanic tremor,
Grounddeformation

Shindake2011

Earthquake

-

2014

Eruption

Shindake

On August 3

2015

Eruption

Shindake

On March 29 and July 19.

Numerous big volcanic
earthquakes on September
4. Land expansion around
Shindake Crater andnumerous volcanic tremors
from September 2008 to
February 2009. White
columnar activity started in
October at the south wallof Shindake.
Numerous volcanic tremors
in April. Active volcanic
earthquake in September.

Numerous volcanic
earthquakes from January
to April. Numerous
volcanic tremors fromMarch to December. Land
expansion around Shindake
Crater started from
September.
Numerous volcanic
earthquakes in December.

Memo from interview andothers.

Establishment of the “warninglevel” by the JMA.
Warning level: Dec. 1, 2007 (2),Jan. 25, 2008 (1) .
Warning level: Sep. 4, 2008 (2),Oct. 27, 2008 (3) .

The first entry of the Nankai
Hyoutan-jima Mountain and
Sea Study Program.
Warning level: Mar. 18, 2009(2), Aug. 4, 2009 (1), Sep. 27,
2009 (2), Oct. 30, 2009 (1).

The revised Local Disaster
Management Plan by YTG.
Warning level: Dec. 15, 2011(2), Jan. 20, 2012 (1).
Warning level: Aug. 3, 2014 (3),Aug. 7, 2014 (3).
Kuchinoerabujima evacuation
drill on November 14, 2014.
Warning level: May. 20, 2015(5), Oct. 21, 2014 (5), Jun.
14, 2016 (3).
Full evacuation from the island.

3.1. Perception of Past Eruption Activities
The eruption in 1931 brought an exaggerated response: 1097 residents left the island. This was because
no one had ever experienced an eruption on the island at that time. Maeda and Honmura districts, which
are old settlements, suffered little damage. The main victims were sulfur-mining companies and theirfacilities from outside the island.

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M.KURI, M.SAKAMOTO, N.MAKI
The eruption in 1966 was greater than that in 1931, but fewer people evacuated. Residents
prepared for the next eruption because they had experienced small eruptions every several years since1966. Some people in their 40s remembered the evacuation drills at elementary and middle school in
the 1970s. The people recognized that eruptions could happen about every 20 to 30 years. Many
residents participated in the evacuation drills, which included escaping in the backs of dump trucks. An
island-wide evacuation system was established, replacing community-level systems. They could notprovide any details on the years after the 1980s because they had left the island for about a decade.
3.2. Issues That Became Apparent before the 2014 Eruption
Residents in Kuchinoerabujima had high disaster awareness preceding the August 3, 2014 eruption,although a downward trend was reported in the rate of resident participation in evacuation drills, which
had been carried out continuously in recent years. Simultaneously the Local Disaster Management Plan,
which was prepared in 2011, was being revised by YTG at the time of the 2014 eruption.
There were numerous earthquakes, as many as 100 to 200 per day, in 2001, but residents did nothave a sense of imminent danger. In fact, some residents had climbed to the crater in 2001, when theeruption was in a temporary quiescent period. At the same time, members of the fire brigade worked
managing guest houses, leading guided tours, the maintaining the infrastructure, including a recently
created volcano observatory, for their livelihood. These activities and communication experiences
provided new information on the volcano. An expert from the university explained to them about thepossibility of a large-magnitude eruption that could result in evacuation from the island. Members of
the fire brigade recognized the possibility of an eruption before it occurred in August 2014. And they
expected that it would be possible to predict eruptions in sufficient detail for step-by-step evacuation,from evacuation preparation to the actual order. They reviewed the evacuation plan based on the eruption
scenario they considered would arise. In the 2014 evacuation action policy, residents were instructed toboard evacuation vessels at the community level, even though defects in the evacuation system, such as
the unclear safety of the port and evacuation routes, had been recognized. The system was not improved
due to a lack of funds, despite the fact that an application to the administrative office had been made.
As the following subsection shows, these worries were realized in the 2014 eruption, and theseexperiences led to a renewal of the evacuation plan and the evacuation drill.
3.3. Issues That Became Apparent during the 2014 and the 2015 Evacuation
In this subsection, we will report (1) results of the July 2015 interviews about disaster prevention
awareness related to the August 2014 volcanic activity, disaster prevention awareness since the August
2014 volcanic activity, and the May 2015 evacuation decision; and (2) results of the October 2015
interviews and re-interviews about the 2015 evacuation report, including the issue of support for future
evacuations. Sakamoto et al. (2016) reported these evacuation operations of the 2014 and 2015 eruption,
which are summarized in this subsection and in Table 3. The volcanic activity information leading to
the evacuation of residents from Kuchinoerabujima following the May 29 eruption is reported in Kuri
(2016).
As mentioned above, the fire brigade recognized the possibility of an eruption before it occurredin August 2014. However, the 2014 eruption without any remarkable signs surprised them. At the
emergency onsite discretion, with the memory of evacuating to Banyagamine during the previous 1980
eruption, the emergency evacuation site was changed from Honmura district to Hayagamine, and theresidents were guided. Some residents did not want to evacuate, but members of the fire brigade tried
hard to persuade them, which is why it took almost two hours to complete the evacuation to
Banyagamine. This emergency evacuation was operated by the fire brigade without the YTG. Theseexperiences in August 2014 and awareness of the installation of and inspection by observation
instruments created a heightened perception of disaster risk reduction. They revised the evacuation plan.
The document was titled “Review Report on the Explosive Eruption at Shindake of 12:24, August 3,
2014” and handed to the YTG.
Disaster drills based on the Kagoshima Prefecture Tsunami Evacuation Plan were started in
September 2014. In Kuchinoerabujima an evacuation drill was held on November 14, 2014. At the drill,
an alert siren with the message that the volcano was suddenly erupting was transmitted.

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Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 38，Number 1，2017，pp49-64

Table 3 Outline of Disaster Prevention Operations in the 2014 and 2015 Eruption Modified
from Sakamoto et al. (2016).
Volcanic
event
August 3,
2014
12:50:
Eruption

Public action

Fire brigade action

13:00 YTG: Establishment of Yakushima
Town Disaster Countermeasures
Headquarters.
14:00 YTG: Received calls about the safetyof Kuchinoerabujima residents.

[Main interviewee: Chief of the firebrigade]Just after the eruption: Patrolled
settlements in the fire truck telling
residents to evacuate.
Just after pyroclastic flows: Visualconfirmation. Decided to change
evacuation site from Honmura to
Banyagamine.
[Main interviewee: Sub-chief of the firebrigade]Kept wearing their uniforms every time.
Checked the list of residents and theevacuation process.
13:00 Study meeting for residents by the
JMA
19:24 Contact with (calling to) the YTG
Just after the eruption: Visualconfirmation in the field in Maeda
district. Evacuated from Maeda to
Honmura district with families andneighbors by private car. Started
emergency evacuation operations from
Honmura district to Banyagamine.
Placement of members to leademergency evacuation to
Banyagamine. Back to Maeda district
to rescue residents by a fire brigadecar.
10:23 Almost all residents assembled at
Banyagamine. (Almost finishedemergency evacuation.)
10:30 Confirmed one missing man in
Mukaehama district
10:36 Drove to Mukaehama district by afire brigade car. (No land access due topyroclastic flow.)
10:41 Ordered fisherman’s boat toundertake rescue.
11:02 Found the missing man in
Mukaehama district.
11:03 Called the YTG about the missingman.
11:19 Rescued the missing man.
11:25(12:25?) Arrived at Banyagamine
after arrival of the mayor ofYakushima Town.
14:35 Assembled at Honmura Port.
15:45 Departed from Honmura Port by
the vessel Taiyo.

May 23, 2015
08:00:
Felt
earthquake(Magnitude:
2.3)

10:45 JMA: Explanatory Information on
Volcano Activity No.42
16:00 Prefecture: Disaster Information
Coordination Meeting for
Kuchinoerabujima Volcano Eruptions.

May 29, 2015
09:59:
Eruption

10:07 JMA: Volcanic warning level of 5.
10:07 Kagoshima Prefecture Government(KPG): Establishment of Kagoshima
Prefecture Disaster Countermeasures
Headquarters.
10:07 YTG: Establishment of Yakushima
Town Disaster Countermeasures
Headquarters.
10:15 YTG: Evacuation recommendation.
10:20 YTG: Evacuation order.
10:30 KPG: Disaster prevention helicopter
departed from Kagoshima City toYakushima to pick up the mayor of theYTG, and then to Kuchinoerabujima.
10:40 KPG: Request to the SDF for
disaster relief
12:15 Coast Guard: Helicopter landed at
Banyagamine.
12:30 KPG: Disaster prevention helicopter
arrived at Banyagamine with themayor of the YTG.
12:52 Coast guard: Patrol ship arrived at
Yumugi district.
14:38 YTG: The vessel Taiyo arrived at
Honmura Port on Kuchinoerabujima.
15:45 YTG: The vessel Taiyo departed
from Honmura Port.
15:50 Helicopter rescue in Yumugi district.
16:30 Central government: Establishmentof a government local liaison
coordination room.
17:30 YTG: The vessel Taiyo arrived at
Miyanoura Port on Yakushima.

On May 23, 2015, the number of volcanic earthquakes had increased in Kuchinoerabujima, anda felt earthquake occurred at 08:00. The JMA issued a warning that there may be a possibility of large
rock falls caused by eruption into the area within a 2-km radius from Shindake Crater. Residents
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M.KURI, M.SAKAMOTO, N.MAKI
requested the JMA to hold a study meeting to explain the updated situation of the volcano activity. The
JMA told residents about the possibility of an eruption, the definition of volcanic earthquake and tremor,an example case of signs of eruption, difficulty of prediction, evacuation before official warnings, andso on. The fire brigade prepared for a possible sudden eruption, wearing their uniforms every time andchecking the evacuation process of residents, including people who need special assistance for
evacuation.
On 09:59 May 29, 2015, the explosive eruption occurred. However, they were surprised at thesudden eruption and the rapid escalation of the warning level, directly from 3 to 5, on May 29, 2015.
Almost all of the residents evacuated to Banyagamine within 30 minutes. Members of the fire brigade
felt that the drill on the island was sufficiently effective. The YTG based its own evacuation drills on adivision of roles. They recognized that it was reasonable for residents to take part in soft measures suchas evacuation drills, whereas the town implemented the hard measures, including familiarizing thecountry and the province with the subsidy program.
3.4. Issues That Became Apparent upon Residents’ Return to the Island
In this section we will report the results of (1) the October 2015 interviews about the May 2015
evacuation (including the issue of future evacuation operations) and resident opinions about returning
to the island; and (2) the March 2016 interviews about the residents’ decision to return, the circumstances
after their return, and their thoughts about the volcano after their return. In addition, the situation ofbiosphere reserves, so-called eco-parks in Japan, is reported. Events before the residents’ return were as
follows:
September 25, 2015: Installation of Kuchinoerabujima Reconstruction Headquarters.
October 16, 2015: Meeting of evacuees from Kuchinoerabujima by the YTG
October 21, 2015: Eruption warning maintained at Level 5 by the JMA
October 22, 2015: Announcement by the YTG that a local measures team would be established thefollowing month
October 27, 2015: Temporary return of 58 residents; conducting by the YTG of a questionnaire surveyof returning residents
November 16, 2015: Deployment of the Kuchinoerabujima Reconstruction Local Emergency
Response Team
November 20, 2015: Partial restoration of power on Kuchinoerabujima
December 24, 2015: Restoration of GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) continuous
observation (Kuchinoerabujima electronic reference point)
December 25, 2015: Issuance by Yakushima Town mayor of a statement releasing evacuation
instructions and announcing a free municipal ferry service for returning residents
January 8, 2016: Resumption of schools
January 16, 2016: End of municipal ferry service for returning residents
Before eruption: 86 households, 137 people
After eruption: 23 households, 34 people (as of January 16, 2016)
The YTG held an explanatory meeting for evacuees from Kuchinoerabujima on October 16,
2015. More than 60 people, including residents, administrative officials, and journalists, attended. On
October 21, the mayor explained the policy for preparing to return to the island in the same year,
referring to the opinions of the Coordinating Committee for Eruption Prediction. The chief of theGeneral Affairs Department discussed considerations related to the establishment of a committee aimed
to prepare residents to return to the island and establish basic services such as water, electricity, andcommunications, and other public support. This discussion of procedures being put in place confirmed
to residents the intention to return them to the island. These procedures were based on fiscal year plansover several years, and a 10-year reconstruction goal was proposed. The chief of the General Affairs
Department said that establishment of an organization to arrange residents’ return was underconsideration. A reconstruction organization separate from that in the management headquarters was
proposed for the volcanic disaster. Processes for confirming plans related to basic services and official
support measures were explained. The question-and-answer session showed that residents wereinterested in official government financial support. The local government based its decision about the58

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return on the opinion of the JMA that the volcanic activity was decreasing, while residents were morealigned with the assumption that volcanic activity would continue.
Financial support for households was considered. The volcanic explosion was just one source ofdamage. Houses were also damaged by typhoons, wind, and rain. Schools were damaged by mud flow.
Reaching a consensus about how to respond to grant applications has been a relatively smooth process,as there was little discretion in determining the priority of applications. Decisions about restoration workand the difficulty of maintaining safety measures all depended on changes in the volcanic activity. The
residents’ return went smoothly under the assumption that it would proceed as planned. The restorationof basic services, such as electricity, water, gas, and communications, has been relatively smooth. With
this support, residents regained a strong sense of autonomy and an awareness of the risk of further
eruptions.
Temporary housing plans affected the residents’ decision to return. After two months, the media
broadcasted long-term evacuation plans for the island. Residents hoped that these plans would include
support both for people who wanted to return and for those who wanted to continue the evacuation. In
their view, the temporary housing plan provided support for only those residents who wished to remain
in evacuation; this was seen as an impediment to plans to return. Ultimately, the local government
decided to keep its temporary housing preparations for the next eruption.
3.5. Tryout for Volcanic Disaster Prevention after Return to the Island
The interview survey was conducted in March and November 2016. In March, the 10-year plan,
including details and background, that the residents proposed to the town in October 2015 was the focus.
In November, "living after returning to the island," "awareness for volcano, " and "tryouts for disasterprevention" were heard.
The reconstruction goals of the 10-year plan were based on the plan to make Kuchinoerabujima
a biosphere reserves. Initially, in 2005, the residents submitted a proposal to the local government tocreate a biosphere reserves over the entire island of Kuchinoerabujima; this proposal was supported bygovernment promotion of the project. In addition, the Nankai Hyoutan-jima Mountain and Sea Study
Program was created in 2009, incorporating childcare and environmental education for migration.
Tourism is a priority around the volcanic area. The eruption on August 3, 2014 increased awareness ofthe necessity to plan for tourist safety. The cancellation of the ferry due to weather disrupted the climbingplans of a number of visitors, preventing their deaths in the eruption.
The timeline for establishing a biosphere reserves is as follows:
July 14, 2014: Creation of the Yakushima Kuchinoerabujima UNESCO Biosphere Reserve Promotion
CouncilAugust 24, 2015: Recommendation to pursue registration of the Yakushima Kuchinoerabujima
Biosphere Reserve with the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, 33rd MAB subcommittee,
hosted by MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan)
February 26, 2016: Application form submission for a United Nations Educational, Scientific andCultural Organization (UNESCO) World Biosphere Reserve
March 20, 2016: Acceptance of the Yakushima–Kuchinoerabujima Biosphere Reserve application at“Biosphere Reserves, Man, and the Biosphere,” sponsored by MEXT and held at the MAB
International Coordinating Council meeting in Peru
June 14, 2016: Full-scale reconstruction; dropping of the eruption warning level from 5 (Evacuate)
to 3 (Restricted access)
A Kuchinoerabujima branch officer said, on November 2016, that about 100 to 110 residents
were returning. Dormitories of Hiroshima University and Keio University were moved from Maeda to
Honmura district after the return.
A woman in the Maeda district said that she returned soon after the lifting of the access restrictionof the Maeda district. Eruption situations are not always the same. On August 4, 2014, it seemed as
though a rocket had fallen into her backyard; on the other hand, on May 29, 2015, she found herself inthe volcanic cloud without any volcanic sounds. On May 29, 2015, her family thought that she might
have perished, and they were greatly relieved by her call telling them, "I am in Banyagamine." The firstpriority in an evacuation drill is to "protect myself by myself." First, one must reach Banyagamine. Next,
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food and cooking are considered. These aspects would be discussed among evacuators after the
emergency evacuation. After some calm in the 2014 eruption, the respondents answered that the
women's association "Sha-sha-bu" (blueberry) delivered rice balls. She did nothing in particular for the
return to the island after the evacuation of the whole island in the eruption of 2015, under the perceptionthat governmental judgment about returning was based on the judgment of the Eruption Prediction
Liaison Committee.
A fire brigade member in the Maeda district relating the work of regional promotions said that,
although he had been participating in evacuation drills, he had not experienced cooking in a shelter. So,
in the next drill, he planned to provide miso soup at a shelter on Banyagamine. The fire brigade had not
determined evacuation dispatch, because it could not determine where a person was, which also
depended on the time zone, even on that day. On the other hand, grasping the number of cars on theisland and who on that day knows each other, so they can deal flexibly in case of emergency. It isunhelpful to make plans in vain. Through the experience of August 2014, they reviewed the training thatwas useless in the past. It was more important to make a list of car owners than to decide on dispatch.
Currently there are about 80 car owners on the island and 60 came to Banyagamine in May 2015. It is
generally also possible to grasp who is in the evacuation site from the number of cars. Especially on
remote islands, this is an essential procedure for the Land Transport Bureau. In the evacuation to
Banyagamine, it was revealed that people trying to return home to retrieve forgotten items were thecause of accident, and the reverse car flow was a source of confusion. As another task, there were evenmany fire brigade members who did not know what to do after arriving at Banyagamine. Currently, theresponsibilities are organized, such as the director in charge of Banyagamine as a director and guide in
the district. In the evacuation of May 2015, we saw the issue about of evacuation management inYakushima Island as a remote island. Smooth operation is enabled if priority is given to fatigued people;
if evacuation is prolonged, a decision is made to divide by age structure of households.
Unlike the liaison network of the administration-/-district, in an emergency, priority is given to
the system of fire brigades. Of course, when necessary in evacuation centers, etc., the communication
network of administration-/-district is utilized. The fire bridge thought that, while they are in a teamunder emergency, after the emergency, they should be in the district units. As a new initiative, the firebrigade conducted a study on the framework of salvage rescue. Although there are few examples of thissystem, there are, as a matter of fact, many sea accidents and help in cleaning up of spreading oil is alsoneeded.
On June 1, 2016, an agreement to fund the rebuilding and living support from Kuchinoerabujima
volcano eruption between the YTG and Yumugi and Honmura districts in Kuchinoerabujima was signed.
The YTG currently manages the fund; however, in future, it is important that the islanders themselves
decide how to use the reconstruction fund. In a situation of declining population, it is the principle ideathat human resource development is important in remote islands, carefully considering promotion ofresettlement, human resource development, and child rearing support. They hope to use the fund fromthe next fiscal year.
In June 2016, a reconstruction committee was established by the offer of direct donation without
local government from supporters. The residents were progressing towards independence andconsidered this fund to be necessary for their independence. Nineteen people, including women, aremembers. It is a budget for local people to plan and to implement with a vision in the future. Residents
give their own suggestions. It seems to be administrative work, but the residents have to be able to doit, and this reconstruction committee also considers it as a place of training. They need experience ofmanagement. For example, if a Satoyama Tour were held once, about 80,000 yen would be the incomeof the district. The accumulation of achievement would suppress opposing opinion. It is necessary to
inform them over time and someone have to show it. Whether to do or not is a simple personal choice,but after deciding, it becomes structure selection how to do, which requires training. In any case, theywould like to integrate the handling of the above funds here.
The Mountain and Sea Study Abroad Program, with the participation of more than 100 people
in 20 years and some of them staying longer than the regular period, was restarted after the return.
Family study abroad is recommended, and jobs for parents, such as public facility management andschool clerking, are proposed; however, in many cases, children were selected to study abroad, becauseof the circumstances of brothers and sisters and the strong hope of the child him/himself. These activities
assist children who will nurture society. This society designed an original T-shirt of Kuchinoerabu,
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Kuchinoerabu Big Bat and Yaku Deer. One family undertook coverage of the observation ofKuchinoerabu Big Bat through a mass media channel.
A leader of the Guardians Association said that they had decided to make a disaster manual asan activity of the Guardians Association soon after returning to the island in January 2016. In October
2016, they published a manual for natural disaster on Kuchinoerabujima, including an original hazard
map and messages from children, supported by the Yakushima Environmental and Cultural Foundation(public good). She hoped that the children in the Kuchinoerabujima would keep memories of theeruption, and held a workshop of walking around hazard risk places with children in March and June
2015. She also hoped to let the children, residents, and visitors know about hazard risk places in plain
language. For visitors, she planned a joint event of remote islands held in late November in Tokyo, tointroduce the activity of making a natural disaster manual as well.

4. Discussion
4.1. Relationship between Experts and Residents
The JMA gave a presentation on monitoring and information of volcanic activity based on the
Meteorological Service Act. In fact, the residents recognized that the JMA had the role of providing
information, as the residents requested that the JMA comment on information on the situation of the
volcano just after the felt earthquake on May 23, 2015. However, there were no remarks concerning
residents' awareness of the category of information from the JMA.
Although information about volcanic and earthquake activity has been available since around2001, residents continued to climb to the volcanic crater. This suggests that sufficient transmission of
information about volcanic activity does not necessarily lead to proper disaster prevention action. After
that, the relationship between residents and experts also became closer than before. Some of the firebrigade had acquired academic information from the university through the maintenance job at theobservatory. And they use this information for planning evacuation from the volcano. The results suggestthat it is important not only to build relationships with highly interested local residents as non-experts,
residents who can communicate information, including uncertainties, but also to communicate
information among experts, government bodies, and designated members of the news media.
On the other hand, knowledge of magma monitoring created the perception that experts could
predict eruption. Therefore, residents were disappointed that the 2014 and 2015 eruptions were notpredicted, and the trust in experts was shaken. During our interview survey some interviewees expresseda hope for more information as follows. "Highly accurate observations might make prediction of the
movement of magma possible. Such observation systems gather signals of magma uplift. The first suchcases occurred at Iwate in 1998 and in Sakurajima in August 2015. However, an uplift signal is notnecessarily an eruption signal. Even if these systems can report the volume of the magma supply fromdeep underground, it is difficult to estimate the timing and the magnitude of an eruption from magma
uplift." Describing the limits of findings by experts might build a better relationship between residents
and experts.
4.2. Relationship between Government and Residents
Government takes the role of decision-making to protect people's lives and bodies from disaster caused
by volcanic phenomena defined in the Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes. After theestablishment of the Local Volcano Disaster Prevention Council, residents came to play a role in thelocal system of disaster prevention.
Residents in Kuchinoerabujima have a strong spirit of independence. Particularly in an
emergency, they must do what they can for themselves in a remote island environment. Not only
members of the fire brigade, but also residents have the concept of "self aid (during an emergency
evacuation)," "mutual aid (after an emergency evacuation)," and "public aid (as a safety net)." Anotherresident expected the that government to be familiar with choosing appropriate support measures anddocument preparation at the reconstruction stage. In the process of thinking about concrete plans for
migration and human resource development, the residents themselves came to have the idea of managing
funds and the awareness of employing these funds as grants. As a result, the roles of the residents became
diversified. The residents are in positive contact with the YTG.
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4.3. Relationship between the Media and Residents
Although Hiroi et al. (1992) and Koyama (2005) reported the hesitation of residents to open disaster
information, the YTG and Kuchinoerabujima residents have less anxiety about outside harmful rumors.
They worry about information leakage of undetermined administrative issues by the media leading tomisunderstanding and discrepancy; however, they have less concern about harmful rumors affecting
outside tourists by volcanic disaster information. And the residents on Kuchinoerabujima hope that themedia will deliver nature stories in Kuchinoerabujima rather than sentimental stories aboutreconstruction. The reasons that they are not concerned about damage caused by rumors, with a view totourism, will be discussed in the next chapter. Comparison with other volcanic tourism areas about
handling of information openness is a future issue.
4.4. Cooperation between Disaster Prevention Education and Tourism
The purpose of visitors from neighborhoods around Yakushima is mainly fishing, and the purpose ofvisitors from remote areas is mainly environmental educational excursion in Kuchinoerabujima. The
residents selected the biosphere reserves method based on their experience. Kuchinoerabu Big Bat andYaku Deer are symbols of their activities. In addition, they have a migration policy. Visitors are viewed
as latent future migrant candidates. There is a possibility that there may be the understanding that
protecting the safety of tourists is beneficial for residents.
Active members of the fire brigade acquired knowledge through activities such as evacuation
drills at elementary school and, through their later job with volcanic experts, they improved theirknowledge of concrete measures against volcanic eruption dramatically through the experience of the2014 eruption. Inevitably, they tried to feed back the improved knowledge to the tourism and themigration policy. Their selected works tied with themselves job for livelihood.
In Kuchinoerabujima, independent and subjective activities by residents with some grants madepossible a more equal tetrahedral relationship of disaster prevention, which was originated by Okada(1997) as shown in Figure 2. However, this might be the case on an isolated island. Although it isdifficult to generalize the handling of volcano tourism and volcanic information in this respect, a modelin which residents themselves make decisions independently of safety management and local
revitalization can also be applied to other volcanic tourist spots. Comparison with residents' awarenessof volcanoes in other areas is a future issue.

5. Conclusion
The immediate evacuation of Kuchinoerabujima causing the 2015 eruption was the result of therelationships built not only among experts, local government, residents, and the media but also amongexperts and highly interested non-expert residents. It is also suggested that a cooperative system thatfeatures disasters and benefits would help the Volcanic Disaster Prevention Council.
After returning, around the proven activity of the Mountain and Sea Study Abroad Program that
had been active before the evacuation, they worked on the growth of human resources, disasterprevention education, regional safety, and regional activities including tourism. All of these activities
concerned disaster prevention. Additionally, they worked on securing the safety of tourists who may
potentially have to migrate. Also, this attitude led to the construction of a resident system.

Acknowledgments
This research, "A comprehensive survey on 2015 Kuchinoerabujima eruption," was supported by agrant-in-aid for science by MEXT/JSPS. We appreciate the anonymous reviewers and editors for theirconstructive comments.

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