“Financial Risk and Crisis Management after
the Global Financial Crisis” Series No.7 (4/2016)

The Federal Reserve’s Management of the
Financial Crisis through Quantitative
Easing and Currency Swap Agreements 1

Chikafumi Nakamura i

Associate Professor
Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University

This document is an English translation of the original Japanese, which appears
in the Apr. 2016 edition of The Japan Economic Research Institute Monthly Report,
published by The Japan Economic Research Institute.
11. Introduction
The subprime mortgage crisis, a disaster that resulted from thecollapse of the US housing bubble, was, by all rights, a US financial
crisis. However, this crisis spread almost instantaneously throughout
the global economy, resulting in a global financial crisis. Global financial
liquidity dried up due to counterparty risk and an insufficient supply of
US dollars. Consequently, demand for the US dollar grew rapidly, eventhough it had triggered the crisis, and the value of the dollar
subsequently increased, as illustrated in Figure 1. Such a crisis
unfolding in any other nation around the world would not necessarily
lead to such an outcome. This phenomenon once again demonstrates theextremely significant role of the US in the world economy, both as thenation that issues a dominant invoice currency and a nation that
accounts for a considerable part of the current account deficit in theworld. 2 Simultaneously, this event also clarified that international
financial markets are extremely complex and multilayered and that all
nations participating in the global financial markets must ensure theliquidity of the US dollar, the currency that underpins these markets.
Figure 1：USD Effective Exchange Rate
125.00120.00115.00110.00105.00100.00
95.00
90.00
85.00
Jan.2007
May2007
Sep.2007
Jan.2008
May2008
Sep.2008
Jan.2009
May2009
Sep.2009
Jan.2010
May2010
Sep.2010
Jan.2011
May2011
Sep.2011
Jan.2012
May2012
Sep.2012
Jan.2013
May2013
Sep.2013
Jan.2014
May2014
Sep.2014
Jan.2015
May2015
Sep.2015

80.00

Nominal effective exchange rate

Actual effective exchange rate

Source: Drafted from International Financial Statistics

For more information on the international currency system in which the US
dollar is the de facto key currency, see Dooley, Falkerts-Landau and Garber (2004a,
2004b), Caballero (2006), and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008).
2

To manage this situation, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) implemented
untraditional monetary policies domestically, such as quantitativeeasing (QE), and globally entered into currency swap agreements toprovide liquidity. This paper focuses on the role of the QE policy andcurrency swap agreements, which have been in effect since 2008, fromthe perspective of crisis management in global financial systems. To that
end, Section 2 describes the three rounds of QE implemented by the US
and provides details thereof. Section 3 presents data-based observations
on the external role of QE rounds with regard to supplying liquidity.
Section 4 describes the currency swap agreements, which functioned as amore direct method for supplying liquidity, and discusses the role ofthese Fed swap agreements in financial crisis management and theissues involved. The paper then presents its conclusions.

2. Quantitative Easing in the US
Because nominal interest rates cannot be negative, traditionalmonetary policy that adjusts interest rates through open market
operations fails to function when markets fall into a liquidity trap.
“Untraditional monetary policy” refers to monetary policy to achieve
further monetary easing in a liquidity trap. Therefore, as the federal
funds (FF) rate, the Fed’s policy interest rate, approached the near-zerolevel after a gradual ratcheting down, the Fed then adopted
untraditional monetary policies. These untraditional policies are
implemented as a combination of time line policies, 3 QE, and credit
easing. Although QE and credit easing should be differentiated fromeach other, 4 as per Fukuda (2013), most papers and articles discussthem both as QE, so this paper will do likewise.

Although not discussed in detail in this paper, this term is similar to forward
guidance, in that, by making a pre-commitment to a deadline and policy
termination terms for the current monetary policy stance, it alters/guides
expectations on future inflation and short-term interest rates and thereby uses
the term structure of interest rates to influence current inflation and longer-term
interest rates. Inflation targeting is one example of a time line policy.
4 Credit easing policies reduce the risk premiums on risk assets (financial assets
other than short-term government debt). They should be essentially distinguishedfrom QE because they can be implemented without QE, such as in Operation Twist.
However, since credit easing is usually accompanied by QE, we treat them both as
QE.
3

Figure 2: Interest Rates and Money Supply in the US(Units: ％, Billions of USD)

(a)
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
Jan.2007
May2007
Sep.2007
Jan.2008
May2008
Sep.2008
Jan.2009
May2009
Sep.2009
Jan.2010
May2010
Sep.2010
Jan.2011
May2011
Sep.2011
Jan.2012
May2012
Sep.2012
Jan.2013
May2013
Sep.2013
Jan.2014
May2014
Sep.2014
Jan.2015
May2015
Sep.2015
Jan.2016

0.00

10-yearFF rate(b)
14000.01212000.0

10

10000.08

8000.06
6000.044000.02

0.0

0Jan.2007
May2007
Sep.2007
Jan.2008
May2008
Sep.2008
Jan.2009
May2009
Sep.2009
Jan.2010
May2010
Sep.2010
Jan.2011
May2011
Sep.2011
Jan.2012
May2012
Sep.2012
Jan.2013
May2013
Sep.2013
Jan.2014
May2014
Sep.2014
Jan.2015
May2015
Sep.2015

2000.0

Monetary base

M2

Credit multiplier

Source: Drafted from International Financial Statistics
Credit multiplier follows right-hand axis

In response to the global financial unrest that grew out of the August
2007 BNP Paribas incident, the Fed decided to supply liquidity to themarket that month by both lowering the discount rate from 6.25% to
5.75% and lending unlimited Fed financing up to the value of collateralposted. The Fed then lowered the federal funds rate the following monthfrom 5.25% to 4.75%. As illustrated in Figure 2(a), this was followed by asuccessive ratcheting down of the discount and FF rates through theoutbreak of the global financial crisis. While this initiative temporarily

resulted in visibly calming the financial markets, chaos re-emerged afterStandard & Poor’s (S&P) downgraded Ambac and MBIA in June 2008 5
and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008,
thereby intensifying the situation into a global financial crisis.
As the crisis developed, the Fed began to lower the discount and FF
rates again on October 8 of the same year, announced an interest rate
policy on December 16 that lowered the discount rate to 0.5%, andallowed the federal funds rate to float between 0% and 0.25% (see Figure2(a)). Confronting the restriction against negative interest rates, on
November 25, the Fed introduced the term asset-backed securities loan
facility (TALF) 6 and launched what came to be known as QE1 in which
they would purchase agency securities and mortgage-backed securities(MBS) issued by government-affiliated financial institutions. Table 1
presents the composition and scale of each QE round, and Figure 2(b)outlines the changes in money supply and monetary base provided by thepast three QE rounds.
Table 1：Breakdown of US Quantitative Easing Policies

QE1

QE2

QE3 *

Nov 2008–Jun 2010

Nov 2010–Jun 2011

Sep 2012–Dec 2013

US gov’t debt

$300Bn$600Bn$540BnMBS$1,250Bn

Other$175BnTotal$1,725Bn$640Bn$600Bn$1,180Bn

Source: Drafted from Federal Reserve Board data
* Figures for QE3 do not include the drawdown period in 2014 (Jan –Nov)

To observe the particulars of each QE round in more detail, let us
observe trends in major funding supply instruments, 7 as outlined in
Figure 3. QE1 lasted until June 2010, supplying $1.725 trillion
Monoline insurers (financial guarantee companies) specializing in guaranteeing
securities payments.
6 A program wherein the Fed provided loans against asset-backed securities
collateralized by student, auto, credit card, and government-guaranteed small
business loans.
7 T-bills (short-term US government debt securities) are discount bonds withmaturities ranging from a few days to 52 weeks. T-notes (medium-term US
government debt securities) are interest-bearing bonds with maturities of 2, 3, 5, 7,
or 10 years. T-bonds (long-term US government debt securities) are 30-year
interest-bearing bonds.
5comprising $300 billion in US government obligations, $1.25 trillion in
MBS, and $175 billion in other assets. From late 2008 through 2009, theprogram primarily aimed at helping the financial system recover fromits crisis-induced paralysis, supplying loans to bond dealers andfinancial institutions that were spiraling toward bankruptcy, andproviding liquidity to the credit markets. Figure 3 illustrates how thesimultaneous jump in lending balances and repurchase transactions 8 by
the Fed expanded the pool of funding for stabilizing short-term financial
markets under this policy.
Figure 3: Trends in the Fed’s Major Funding Provision Methods (Weekly average)（Unit: Millions of USD )T-Bills

T-Notes and bonds, nominal

T-Notes and bonds, inflation-indexedFederal agency debt securities

Mortgage-backed securities

Repurchase agreements

Loans

Maiden Lane LLC

Central bank liquidity swaps
4500000
4000000
3500000
3000000
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
5000000

Source: Drafted from Federal Reserve Board data

For example, the March 2008 introduction of the Primary Dealer
Credit Facility, a Federal Reserve lending program for primary dealers
A securities loan transaction, whereby the securities serve as the funding
medium, is referred to as a repo transaction.
8

that also applied to investment banks, strengthened the Fed’s role as thelender of last resort; the use of this facility dramatically increased
during QE1. Furthermore, the aforementioned TALF began lending
operations in March 2009 following a total shutdown of the credit
markets (including the securitization markets). The Fed’s purpose inestablishing TALF was and continues to be to reduce risk in the credit
markets and restore liquidity by ultimately underwriting certain loans.
In contrast, the expansion of the supplied volume of funds starting in2010 was due to the purchase of MBS and medium- to long-term
government obligations, which were intended to facilitate economic
recovery by lowering long-term interest rates. Thus, the Fed served as
the lender of last resort during QE1 in response to the financial crisis as
well as prevented the crisis from spreading by providing liquidity
directly to the credit markets, thereby succeeding in stabilizing thefinancial system.
On November 3, 2010, the Federal Open Market Committee voted to
implement QE2 as a means of promoting economic recovery, preventing
deflation, and averting declining long-term interest rates. The program
comprised the Fed’s purchasing of $600 billion of long-term government
bonds by June 2011 as well as continuing to reinvest the proceeds ofmaturing securities holdings, such as agency debt and MBS, into
government obligations. Figure 3 illustrates that long-term government
debt holdings grew sharply during this period. Although QE2 concluded
as scheduled in June 2011, interest rates and risk premiums were being
pulled up by liquidation sales of US government debt in response to thedeepening Euro crisis and S&P’s downgrading of the US sovereign debt
rating. In response to these events and to strengthen the effects of theeasing, the Fed announced Operation Twist on September 21, 2011, in
which it would sell short-term government bonds to the market andpurchase an equivalent amount of longer-term government debt. Thiswas intended to reduce liquidity premiums in the term structure ofinterest rates. This initiative reduced the long-term interest rate from
3.5% to 2% (Figure 2(a)).
As a result of QE1 and QE2, the Fed was able to achieve some visible
recovery in consumption and production, but the labor market was not so
fortunate. Unemployment failed to improve as expected, still trending
between 8% and 9%. Therefore, the Fed launched QE3 in September
2012 by implementing further MBS purchases, expanding its bondpurchases to include US Treasury securities in January 2013, andpurchasing $45 billion bonds on a monthly basis for an unspecified
period of time. This spurred investments in risk assets due to portfolio
rebalancing. These purchases continued until December 2013, after
which they were gradually reduced so that easing was phased out by theend of October 2014. As illustrated in Figure 2(b), the outcome of these
QE policy rounds was that the monetary base increased toapproximately four times its pre-crisis level, with M2 growing toapproximately double its pre-crisis level.

3. Quantitative Easing Programs and Their Spillover Effects
The effects of these QE policies were not limited to the US; theseactions were considered to have strong spillover effects on international
capital flows. This section focuses on capital outflows from the US,
particularly after the global financial crisis, and examines the changes
with each QE round.
Figure 4: Capital Flows in the US, by Sector(Unit: Billions of USD)

600.0

400.0

200.0

0.0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4-200.0

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

-400.0-600.0Public sector

Private sector

External investment

Source: Drafted from US Bureau of Economic Analysis data

Let us first observe the trends in capital flows by sector in the US,
illustrated in Figure 4. This indicates that the private sector is theprimary source of external investment originating in the US. Notably,private sector capital flows became net inflows as the global financial
crisis and Eurozone crisis worsened and then became US private sector
capital outflows during QE.
Let us now look at the private sector’s investment targets. Figure 5
gives a breakdown of the cross-border investments made by the US
private sector. Although direct investment is a net outflow, the directionof other types of investment varies over time.
Figure 5: US Private Sector External Investment(Unit: Billions of USD)

600.0

6

400.0

5

200.0

4

0.0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4-200.0

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

3

2013
2

-400.0-600.01-800.00
Other investment (financial institutions)
Securities investment
Private sector investment

Other investment (non-financial institutions)
Direct investment
10-year interest rate

Source: Drafted from US Bureau of Economic Analysis data
10-year interest rate follows right-hand axis

Starting with movements of financial institutions that received large
volumes of liquidity from the Fed, we can see a dramatic pull back inproviding external credit at the beginning of the global financial crisis ;while the situation returned to a net outflow during QE1, the out breakof the Eurozone crisis around late 2011 and the period thereafter largely
coincided with a return to net capital inflows. The US Treasury
Department’s Treasury International Capital data also indicates that
US financial institutions were not actively investing in securities during
QE. The fact indicates that the portfolio rebalancing effect, whereby
financial institutions rebalance their portfolios by investing in risker
assets, did not function effectively, particularly during QE2.
Furthermore, we can see this indirectly from the rapid decline in thecredit multiplier in Figure 2(b). Therefore, it is not conceivable that thespillover effects were significant in the sense that Fed-provided currency
flowed out of the US to other nations.
In the securities investment area, however, we can see that net
outflows prevailed throughout the entirety of the QE periods. One
reason for this is that risk assets became relatively more profitable after
QE caused a decline in long-term interest rates. The same situation
occurred in the US domestic stock markets; The QE program influenced
investor behavior in a way that led to the spillover effect of bolstering
the liquidity of securities markets, particularly those in emerging
nations, after the crisis.
Figure 6: Capital Flows into the US, by Sector(Unit: Billions of USD)

900.0
700.0
500.0
300.0
100.0
-100.0Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

-300.0Public sector

Private sector

Foreign investment in the US

Source: Drafted from US Bureau of Economic Analysis data

However, there is no empirical consensus regarding the overall effectof various QE measures on exchange rates. This is because the QE
policies affected both capital outflows from and inflows to the US. As
indicated in Figure 6, the flow reversal that occurred when the crisis hit
reverted to a net inflow after the implementation of QE. The data
indicate that the public sector outside the US consistently purchase US
government debt. Meanwhile, the private sector withdrew capital at the
beginning of the global financial crisis and the worsening of theEurozone crisis. After the subsequent implementation of the QE rounds,
capital inflows into the US resumed although not on the same scale asbefore.
Since capital outflows from and inflows to the US occur ex post facto,
the direction in which the QE program pushed exchange rates is unclear.
Discussion on this topic continues to this day. For example, in an event
study utilizing intraday data from 2008 to 2013, Glick and Leduc (2013)
argue that QE announcements significantly negatively impacted USD
exchange rates vis-a-vis other nations’ currencies. On the other hand,
Chen et al. (2015) use monthly data from 1995 to 2012 to demonstratethat this untraditional monetary policy shock on the part of the US
positively influenced the USD/JPY rate while negatively influencing
some exchange rates with other advanced nations and emerging Asian
nations.

4. Currency Swap Agreements and the Global Financial Crisis
One set of policies that has not yet been discussed in this paper is theFed’s expansion of currency swap agreements with major central banks
worldwide, conducted in tandem with the QE program. These
agreements provided liquidity to the markets around the time of the
global financial crisis. In contrast to the spillover effects that indirectly
provided liquidity to the global financial markets, these agreements
served to provide direct US dollar liquidity to financial systems
worldwide.
The context behind this is the US dollar’s special position as a key
international currency. Financial institutions in the US and worldwide
need US dollars for payment clearance. Before the global financial crisis,
the US dollar enjoyed extremely high liquidity in international financialtransactions, and credit spreads remained at low levels. However, as thecrisis unfolded, a sudden credit crunch and the ensuing illiquidity of the
US dollar worldwide rapidly widened credit spreads (see Figure 7), thepoint at which international short-term money markets were on theverge of shutting down.
These Fed-led currency swap agreements began with exchange swap
arrangements 9 established with the December 12, 2007, execution ofdollar liquidity swap lines with the European Central Bank (ECB) andFor more detail on the background to establishing these agreements and thediscussions involved, see Allen and Moessner (2010). Note that the actual entity
supplying dollars in these swap agreements is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
9

Swiss National Bank (SNB). In this case, the Fed would exchange up to acertain amount of US dollars for those nations’ currencies over a certain
period. These were established in response to the continued rapid
widening of credit spreads since August of that year. However, since the
Fed was not contractually obligated to pay interest under this swap
mechanism, it was, in effect, a system wherein other countries’ central
banks could borrow US dollars using non-US currencies as collateral. In
other words, the Fed provided US dollar liquidity to other countries’
central banks while financial institutions in those countries could inturn obtain dollar liquidity from their respective central banks, thereby
creating a mechanism for eliminating illiquidity in financial systems
outside the US. This mechanism thus made it possible for European
financial institutions to procure US dollars from the ECB and SNB.
Figure 7: US Dollar Credit Spread (three-month LIBOR T-bills)(Unit: %)

6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00

TB

Sep.02,2014

May.02,2014

Jan.02,2014

Sep.02,2013

May.02,2013

Jan.02,2013

Sep.02,2012

May.02,2012

Jan.02,2012

Sep.02,2011

May.02,2011

Jan.02,2011

Sep.02,2010

Jan.02,2010

SpreadMay.02,2010

Sep.02,2009

May.02,2009

Jan.02,2009

Sep.02,2008

May.02,2008

Jan.02,2008

Sep.02,2007

May.02,2007

Jan.02,2007

0.00

LIBOR

Source: Drafted from Nikkei NEEDS Financial QUEST data

However, since the initial contracts set upper limits of $20 billion and$4 billion for the ECB and SNB, respectively, they were unable tomanage the deterioration of the crisis after the September 2008
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Counterparty risk led to severe
cutbacks in financial institutions’ credit limits, credit spreads
skyrocketed (Figure 7), and assets were dumped to obtain liquidity.
According to Fleming and Klagge (2010), at this point, the ECB’s
overnight dollar auction rate was 800bps higher than the Fed’sovernight rate. Liquidity therefore dried up in the interbank markets,and the world’s financial institutions fell into severe cash flow problems
with respect to dollar funding.
At that point, the Fed launched successive rounds of expanding thescale and scope of its currency swap agreements. On September 18, 2008,
it expanded the scale of its swap agreements with both the ECB and
SNB, set up new swap lines with the Bank of Japan (BOJ), Bank ofEngland (BOE), and Bank of Canada (BOC), and clarified its position on
supplying dollar funds to short-term money markets in other countries
and regions. The following week (on September 24), the Fed announced
more swap agreements with the central banks of Australia, Denmark,Norway, and Sweden and doubled its swap limits with each country on
September 29, thus significantly expanding the maximum supply of
dollar funding to $620 billion. Finally, on October 13, it fixed interest
rates with the ECB, SNB, BOE, and BOJ and abolished the swap limi ts
so that financial institutions would be able to borrow as many dollars as
they needed as long as they could post enough collateral in their own
currencies. On October 29, to hold down increases in emerging markets’
sovereign debt yields and enhance US dollar liquidity, the Fed also
entered into bilateral swap agreements with 14 central banks, including
the Central Bank of Brazil, the Bank of Korea, Banco de Mexico, theReserve Bank of New Zealand, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore.
Figure 8 illustrates the scale of dollar funding provided by thesecurrency swap agreements. A significant portion of this is taken up by
the ECB; given that the swaps peaked at a level of over $580 billion
shortly after the occurrence of the global financial crisis, we can see how
dollar illiquidity spread throughout the international financial markets
at the time. Furthermore, the May 9, 2010, decision to resume dollar
swaps when the Eurozone crisis deepened and the augmented use ofcurrency swaps in late 2011 and 2012 provide evidence that the
Fed-provided dollar swaps functioned for managing the global financial
crisis as well as other global crises.
After numerous extensions to these agreements, the BOC, BOE, BOJ,
ECB, Fed, and SNB announced the normalization of liquidity swap
arrangements on October 31, 2013. The supply of US dollar liquidity
made it possible for the respective countries’ central banks to enter into
whatever volume of swaps they deemed necessary at the given market
conditions. These moves on the part of the Fed indicate the Fed’sfunction as the “lender of last resort” for the world’s central banks byproviding liquidity for the global currency that is the US dollar. These
currency swap agreements have functioned effectively as a crisis
management tool for the global financial system.
Figure 8: Usage of US Dollar Currency Swaps (Weekly average ) (Unit: Millions of USD)
6000005000004000003000002000001000000

Source: Drafted from US Bureau of Economic Analysis data

However, why would the Fed, tasked with maximizing the well-beingof the US, go to such lengths to seek international financial systemstability? The answer corresponds with the purpose of QE. When the US
dollar has insufficient liquidity, unless central banks can obtain a supplyof dollars via swaps, they may need to draw down theirdollar-denominated foreign reserves, which would increase the interest
rates on US sovereign debt. Illiquidity of the dollar in global financial
markets, where it is a key currency, can also suppress the US economy
and create concerns over deflation.
This seemingly wonderful function of the Fed as the global lender oflast resort also presents a problem. For example, if a country’s economic
cycle was asymmetrical to that of the US, then such a currency swap
agreement could work against the Fed’s monetary policy. This raises theconcern that swaps executed through agreements among central banks
may not function. There is yet another issue. Prasad (2014) emphasizes
the Fed’s execution of currency swap agreements with a few selectnations at the time of the global financial crisis. Furthermore, he voices
concerns about the political nature of the decisions made to use the Fed’sswap limits. It is conceivable that the act of placing the onus of providing

liquidity to the global financial system on a single nation’s central bankis, in itself, a problem inviting uncertainty.

５．Conclusion
This paper employed data from 2008 through 2013 (the term of the QE
program in the US) to explain and observe the impact of the Fed’s QE
program and currency swap agreements on liquidity in the global
financial markets. In doing so, we showed that the currency injected into
the US domestic markets by the QE policy did not sufficiently stimulate
the portfolio rebalancing effect. Furthermore, the QE program’s indirect
effect on the global financial system was limited. This paper has also
showed that, on the other hand, the Fed’s currency swap agreements
were a mechanism for providing liquidity directly, which led to the Fed’sfunctioning as a literal “lender of last resort” in the global financial
markets, where the dollar reigns supreme. This system thus worked
effectively as a crisis management tool for the global financial system.
However, we noted that this type of crisis management system is not apanacea as it invites uncertainty itself. The Fed is, at the end of the day,the US central bank, and it cannot be the social planner for the world
economy. This is also the case for bilateral currency swap agreements
espoused by China. In preparing for the next crisis, the world must
consider a new, more neutral method for securing liquidity.

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iProfile: Chikafumi Nakamura

He was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture, 1983.
He graduated from Hitotsubashi University, Faculty of Commerce and Management.
He completed his doctoral studies at Hitotsubashi University Graduate School ofCommerce and Management (Ph.D. in commerce). He has served as an AssistantProfessor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Kyorin University and as an AssistantProfessor in the Faculty of Economics at Kyushu University. He has held his
current position since April 2015.
Specialties: International macroeconomics, monetary policy
Recent Major Works:“Asian Currencies in the Global Imbalance and Global Financial Crisis ”（ with
Eiji Ogawa）,in Inderjit Kaur and Nirvikar Singh ed., The Oxford Handbook of the
Economics of the Pacific Rim, London: Oxford University Press, January 2014.
“The Relationship Between Global Imbalances and Macroeconomics,” ed. Eiji
Ogawa, Global Imbalances and International Monetary System , Toyo Keizai, pp.
1-39, March. 2013.
“Currency Mismatch, Balance Sheet Effect and Monetary Policy.” Journal ofInternational Economic Studies, vol.25, pp.103-128, March 2011.