核軍縮賢人会議の提言に関する覚書
山田寿則
2018 年 3 月 29 日、「核軍縮の実質的な進展のための賢人会議」が河野外相に「効果的な核軍縮への橋渡し-２０２０年ＮＰＴ運用検討会議のための提言」を提出しました。
以下では、この提言の和文概要と英文全文を対比しつつ読めるようにパラグラフごとに和文の後に英文を配置しました。
概要（和文）は、全文（英文）をよく反映していますが、概要（和文）を読むだけでは
全文（英文）を正確に理解できないと思われる個所は赤字で、概要（和文）に反映されていないと思われる全文（英文）の箇所は青字で示しました。なお、筆者による別訳の提示は和文中に〔〕で示しました。

出典情報
河野外務大臣に対する「核軍縮の実質的な進展のための賢人会議」提言の提出
平成 30 年 3 月 29 日
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_005859.html
提言概要（和文）http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000348911.pdf
提言全文（英文）http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000348864.pdf

効果的な核軍縮への橋渡し-２０２０年ＮＰＴ運用検討会議のための提言
Building Bridges to Effective Nuclear Disarmament Recommendations for the 2020
Review Process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
核軍縮の実質的な進展のための賢人会議
Group of Eminent Persons on the Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament
Ⅰ章

分断された世界のための共通目標の模索（現状認識）

I. In Search of a Common Goal for a Divided World
1. 核軍縮における２つ潮流の対立がより先鋭になった結果，異なる立場の国々が重要な事項について有意義なやり取りができなくなっている；①戦略環境の悪化により，一部の国
は核抑止が安全保障と安定に資するものであり，大きな戦争を防ぐとの信念の下，核抑止

1への依存を改めて確認している。②一方，他の国や被爆者を含む市民社会は，核兵器禁止条約の採択に見られる様に，核兵器使用の悲惨な人道的結末のリスクへの深い懸念から，
核兵器の即時の廃絶を追求している。
1. The vision for a world without nuclear weapons has become blurred and needs to be
refocused. Two opposing trends in disarmament have come into sharper relief.
Deepening concerns over the deteriorating strategic environment impel some states toreaffirm reliance on nuclear deterrence in the belief that nuclear deterrence benefits
national and international security and stability and prevents a major war. At the sametime, other states and civil society groups, including hibakusha, seek the totalelimination of nuclear weapons without further delay, based on deep concerns about therisks of catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear use, as reflected in the
adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This divide has
deepened and become so stark that states with divergent views have been unable toengage meaningfully with each other on key issues.
2. 核軍縮をめぐる停滞は維持できるものではなく，核の秩序が崩壊することはどの国にとっても利益とはならない。ＮＰＴ（核兵器不拡散条約）第６条に基づいて国際的な安全保障環境を改善しながら「核兵器のない世界」を追求することが共通の利益。国際社会は立場の違いを狭め，無くすために，共通の基盤を見出すべく，議論における礼節を取り戻し，
多様な意見を尊重する必要がある。
2. The Group of Eminent Persons strongly believes that the stalemate over nuclear
disarmament is not tenable. Whatever the disagreements expressed by states regarding
the NPT process and the TPNW, it is not in any state’s interest to allow the foundationof the global nuclear order to crumble. Rather, it is a common interest of all states toimprove the international security environment and pursue a world without nuclear
weapons in line with Article VI of the NPT. The international community must moveurgently to narrow and ultimately resolve its differences. Civility in discourse andrespect for divergent views must be restored to facilitate a joint search for a common
ground for dialogue, where all parties even though they might have different
perspectives can work together to reduce nuclear dangers.
3. 各国は直ちに Ⅱ 章に記されている橋渡しの措置に取り組まなければならない。これらは，
ＮＰＴの今次運用検討プロセスにおいて，同プロセスの実施の促進と，異なるアプローチを収斂させるための基盤を創出する観点から，核軍縮・不拡散を活性化するために必要。
3. Against this backdrop, the Group recommends that states should, with a sense ofurgency, undertake the bridge-building measures prescribed in Part II. This is2necessary to re-energize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation during this cycle of
the NPT review process, enhance the process itself and lay the ground for converging
different approaches.
●核軍縮・不拡散体制を維持するための前提
Premises for upholding the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime
4. ７３年の不使用の実行に裏打ちされた「核不使用の規範」は，あらゆる手段で維持されなければならない。
4. The norm of non-use of nuclear weapons, which is backed by the 73-year practice of
non-use, must be maintained by all means.
5. ＮＰＴは「核兵器のない世界」という共通の目標の前進に向け引き続き中心的な存在。
5. The NPT remains central to advancing our common goal of a world without nuclear
weapons.
6. ＮＰＴを維持するため，全ての加盟国は究極的な核廃絶に向けた共同のコミットメントと過去の運用検討プロセスにおける合意を実現させなければならない。また，中東非大量破壊兵器地帯に関する会議が，中東の全ての国の出席を得て早期に開催されるべく，全ての関係するＮＰＴ加盟国及び国連が取り組まなければならない。
6. To preserve the NPT, all states parties should fulfill their joint commitment to theultimate total elimination of nuclear weapons, and to the implementation of theDecisions on Principles and Objectives and Strengthening the Review Process of 1995
and the Final Documents of 2000 and 2010. Based on the resolution adopted in 1995
andActionPlanagreed

in

2010,

the

concerned

regional

actorsandco-sponsors/conveners – the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the UnitedStates – in close communication with interested states parties to the NPT and theUnited Nations, should work to convene as soon as possible a conference on the Middle
East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction to beattended by all states of the region of the Middle East.
7. ＣＴＢＴ（包括的核実験禁止条約）は「核実験の不実行の規範」の強化及び軍縮・不拡
散にとり不可欠な役割。付属書 Ⅱ の国の遅滞のない署名/批准及び実験の不実施と，検証メカニズムの有効性等の維持に向け更なる取組を求める。
7. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) plays a critical role inreinforcing the norm of non-testing, preventing nuclear proliferation, and contributing3

to nuclear disarmament. The Group urges the remaining Annex II States to sign and/or
ratify the treaty without further delay and calls upon all states to refrain from nuclear
testing. All states should make extra efforts to maintain the effectiveness of the treaty’s
verification mechanisms and the Provisional Technical Secretariat and ensure adequate
funding.
8. 米露の軍備管理の枠組みは国際の核軍備及び脅威の削減の基礎。両者は核戦力の更なる削減に向けて枠組みの再構築に努力すべき。最も喫緊の課題は，新ＳＴＡＲＴ条約（新戦略兵器削減条約）の５年延長。
8. The Russia-US nuclear arms control framework constitutes a fundamental basis forthe global nuclear arms and threat reduction effort. The Group urges the RussianFederation and the United States to spare no effort to re-engage and to rehabilitate theframework to secure further reductions in nuclear forces. The most urgent task is theextension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years.
9. ＪＣＰＯＡ（イランに関する包括的共同作業計画）を全ての関係国が完全に遵守することは核不拡散レジームの一体性にとり不可欠。
9. Full compliance by all parties with all elements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) is essential to the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. All
stakeholders should continue to support full implementation of the JCPOA, which isunderpinned by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231.
10. 北朝鮮の核・弾道ミサイル開発の危機による悲惨な結末は防止されなければならない。
全ての当事者は，本件の平和的解決及び完全に検証可能で不可逆的な朝鮮半島の非核化に向けあらゆる努力をしなければならない。
10. Catastrophic consequences from the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis must
be prevented. All stakeholders are urged to make every effort to resolve the problems
through peaceful means, and to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Ⅱ章

橋渡しの取組II. Bridge Building Actions
11. 橋渡しの取組は，核廃絶を実現するための明確で共通のビジョンを見出すものでなければならない。橋渡し役は，アプローチの対立を生んでいる本質的な事柄についての議題を検討すべき。特に，ＮＰＴの目的に対する核兵器国及び非核兵器国による共通のコミット

4メントは，橋渡しにとり有益な出発点。賢人会議は，政府と市民社会が協力し効果的な役
割を果たせるとの認識の下，以下の 取組を提言する。
11. A range of activities to build bridges across the nuclear disarmament divide should
be designed to yield a clear common vision for achieving a world without nuclear
weapons. “Bridge builders” should consider developing an agenda that requires diverse
states to openly address the fundamental issues and questions that create the divide, sothat possible pathways to common ground can be identified and concrete effective steps
toward nuclear disarmament can be taken. In particular, despite their diverging
approaches

toachieving

nucleardisarmament,

thecommoncommitmentofnuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states to the objective of the NPT offers
a useful point of departure for bridge-building. The Group recommends the following
actions with the recognition that governments along with civil society organizations canjointly play effective roles.
●ＮＰＴ運用検討プロセスの実施の強化
Enhancing the implementation of the NPT review process
12. 全締約国は，ステートメントや現実的・実践的な提案を通じて，条約への当事者意識を示さなければならない。これらは，報告，橋渡しの提案や，次の運用検討サイクルで実施される無条件の自発的な取り組み等が考えられる。
12. All NPT states parties should demonstrate ownership of their treaty – in statements
but also by making concrete and practical suggestions. These could be unconditional
voluntary actions, reports on treaty implementation and bridge-building proposals that
demonstrate states’ commitments during the review cycle.
13. ＮＰＴプロセスにおける国別報告は更に有効に活用できる。例えば，第３回準備委員会にて核兵器国による報告の後，その他の加盟国や市民社会と双方向の議論をすることは有益。また，核兵器国が核軍縮に向けて想定する現実的・実践的な措置についての情報も有益。
13. National reports can be better utilized in the NPT strengthened review process. In
particular, it would be useful to convene a session at the third PrepCom, at which
nuclear-weapon states explain their national reports, followed by an interactive
discussion with other states parties and civil society participants. Information on steps
towards nuclear disarmament envisaged by the nuclear-weapon states in the
step-by-step approach would be helpful.

514. 橋渡し役は核兵器国及び非核兵器国を巻き込み，①脅威の削減，リスクの削減，②核軍
縮に伴う安全保障上の懸念への対処，③全ての国の間での信頼を促進するため，透明性を高める取り組みとその理解を促すための対話を発展させる取り組みを行うべき。この対話
は核弾頭の削減，ドクトリン及び政策面の透明性といった具体的措置にも対応するものになり得る。
14. “Bridge builders” could take initiatives in fostering a dialogue, involving both
nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-weapon states, to improve understanding of anddevelop enhanced transparency measures intended to: (1) contribute effectively tothreat reduction and risk reduction; (2) address security concerns incurred during theprocess of nuclear disarmament; and (3) improve confidence and trust among all typesof states – nuclear-armed states, states under extended nuclear deterrence and TPNW
proponent states. The dialogue could address relevant issues, such as concretemeasures for reduction, transparency about doctrine, and the policy dimensions of
nuclear arsenals, through interactive discussions rather than repetitive statements. In
addition, the dialogue should review the content, format, and cost of national reports.
●橋渡しの基盤としての信頼醸成措置
Confidence-building measures as a foundation for bridge building
15. 核兵器国は，拡大抑止の下にある国々と協力の上で，国家安全保障政策における核兵器の役割を低減する方法を見出さなければならない。
15. Nuclear-armed states, in cooperation with states under extended nuclear deterrence
arrangements, should find ways to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national
security policies.
16. 核兵器国は，安保理決議第９８４号に記されている，ＮＰＴ上の非核兵器国と非核兵器地帯条約の加盟国への消極的安全保証に関するコミットメントを強化しなければならない。
それができない国は理由を説明すべき。
16. Nuclear-weapon states should strengthen negative security assurance commitments
enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 984 to NPT non-nuclear-weapon statesand states parties to treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones. Those who are not able to
do it should explain why. Nuclear-weapon states also should consider how to best utilize
declaratory policies for confidence-building, including suggesting ways that would allow
more empirical assessments that stated declaratory policies are actually operative.

6

●異なるアプローチを収斂するための基盤作り
Preparing the ground for convergence of different approaches(1) 核 軍 縮 の た め の 要 素 の 特 定A) Identifying elements of nuclear disarmament
17.現在，安全保障を促進し，検証と強制が可能な核軍縮について広く共有された理解はない。国際社会は，核軍縮を可能とするためにこの点を明確にするための課題に取り組むべき。
17. There currently exists no widely shared understanding of what security-enhancing,
verifiable and enforceable nuclear disarmament should entail. The international
community will not be able to decide on and implement nuclear disarmament without
more clarity on what it will require. States that rely on nuclear deterrence – directly or
through alliances – and states that support immediate prohibition should take up thischallenge in the NPT process as well as through other forums.
(2) 核 軍 縮 の 監 視 ， 検 証 及 び 遵 守 の メ カ ニ ズ ム の 構 築 に 向 け た 取 組 の 強 化B) Intensifying efforts to develop monitoring, verification and compliance mechanisms
18. 検証メカニズムは核廃絶に向け必要なステップであり，プロセス自体が全ての国の間の信頼醸成に資する。
18. Development of effective monitoring, verification and compliance mechanisms isnecessary for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The process of developing suchmeans should in itself help build confidence among nuclear-armed states and between
nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-weapon states.
19. 核兵器の解体とその結果生じる軍事利用可能な核物質を監視・検証するための，信頼性と費用対効果が高く技術的に実現可能な方法の検討について，国際的に様々な取り組みが行われている。それらの取り組みが相互に協力し，成果がＮＰＴ運用検討プロセスに報告されるべき。
19. Several initiatives are currently being undertaken by individual states and groupsof states, including nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, toinvestigate technologies, techniques and methodologies to ensure effective monitoring
and verification of nuclear disarmament. Reliable, cost-effective technologies thatprovide a high level of confidence without disclosure of sensitive information to
non-nuclear-weapon states should be the goal. Current efforts should be continued and7

afforded the necessary resources. Ideally, there should be collaboration among current
initiatives to help accelerate progress, with regular reports to the NPT review process.
All states should begin to consider how they might contribute to monitoring andverification.
20. 全ての関係国により，ＮＰＴ第１条及び第２条に反するような機微な情報の開示なしに検証活動を行うことが出来る可能性を確認するための技術的な研究が国連の下で実施されるべき。
20. A technical study under the auspices of the UN should be undertaken that would
ascertain the possibility of conducting verification activities without disclosure ofsensitive information (such disclosure would run counter to the provisions of Articles I
and II of the NPT), and lay the ground for further efforts to develop nuclear
disarmament verification mechanisms involving all interested NPT states parties.
21. 更に大きな課題は，各国に法的拘束力のある義務の遵守を保障する方策を作り又それに合意させること。各国が核軍縮が効果的で恒久的なものであるとの自信を持つため，メカニズムは迅速な強制を保障する必要がある。
21. An even greater challenge than ensuring effective monitoring and verification is todesign and agree on measures to ensure compliance by states with their legally binding
obligations, including the use of enforcement measures, when non-compliance occurs.
Among the worst-case scenarios that must be confronted is the “breakout” of a statefrom a nuclear-weapon-free world by acquiring a nuclear weapon or weapons. To give
all states the confidence that nuclear disarmament will be effective and durable, agreed
mechanisms must be created to ensure timely enforcement. Research into thisrelatively neglected but vital subject should be accelerated both by governments andcivil society, and results shared in the NPT review process.
22. 兵器用核物質（高濃縮ウラン及び兵器用プルトニウム）の管理は，軍縮にとり不可欠。
各国は核兵器用核分裂性物質の生産を終了することが望まれ，生産を継続する国については終了できない理由を明らかにすることが望まれる。
22. The control of weapons-usable fissile material – highly enriched uranium (HEU) andweapons usable plutonium – is both a near term imperative and a prerequisite fordisarmament. States are encouraged to end production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons; those that continue to produce such material are encouraged to clarify what
prevents them from stopping.

823. 全ての国は以下に取り組むべき；①存在する軍事用核物質のストックについて最高基準の防護及び危機管理の保障，②以前兵器に使用されていた余剰核物質の不可逆的で検証可能な廃棄のための，広く受け入れられた技術の開発に向けた協力。
23. In this regard, all states should: a) Ensure the highest standards of physicalprotection and security for existing stocks of such material; and b) Work cooperatively
to develop widely accepted techniques for the irreversible and verifiable disposition ofexcess ex-weapons fissile material.
24. 「核兵器のない世界」には，核物質についての生産を管理し，既に存在する物質の検証
説明〔検証可能な計量〕，核兵器製造のための使用についての〔を禁じる〕適切な保障措置，
不可逆で検証可能な廃棄についての，合意された法的拘束力のあるグローバルな体制が必要。
24. A world free of nuclear weapons will require an agreed, legally-binding global
regime that regulates production, provides verifiable accounting of existing material,
provides adequate safeguards against its use in nuclear weapon, and disposes of it in an
irreversible and verifiable manner. This regime should include effective provisions toensure that HEU used in nuclear-powered warships or civilian uses cannot be diverted
to weapons use. All states possessing HEU or weapon-usable plutonium should work
toward developing the characteristics of such a regime.
(3)安 全 保 障 と 軍 縮 の 関 係 に 関 す る 「 困 難 な 問 題 」 に 取 り 組 む 議 題 の 設 定C) Setting a nuclear disarmament agenda that addresses hard questions about therelationship between security and disarmament
25. 核抑止の効用について国家の中及び間に根本的相違がある。核廃絶のためには，相違を受け入れた上で調整すべき。核抑止は安定を促進する場合もあるとはいえ，長期的な国際安全保障にとり危険なものであり，全ての国はより良い長期的な解決策を模索せねばならない。
25. There are fundamental differences within and between states regarding the utilityof nuclear deterrence. The existence of these differences needs to be accepted andaddressed constructively if they are then to be reconciled in a way that will make theelimination of nuclear arsenals possible. Proponents and opponents of nuclear
deterrence must persist in bridging their differences. Although nuclear deterrence may
arguably enhance stability in certain environments, it is a dangerous long-term basis
for global security and therefore all states should seek a better long-term solution.

926. 当面全ての国は以下に取り組むべき；①核戦争に勝者は無く，戦われてはならないことの再確認，②議論に礼節を取り戻すこと。そのような礼節なしに協力はできない。
26. Meanwhile, all states should:a) Reaffirm the understanding that nuclear war cannot be won and should never befought; andb) Restore civility in discourse, without which there is no cooperation.
27. 加えて，核保有国は，以下に取り組むべき；①核戦争を遂行するドクトリンを控える，②核兵器使用の脅威を基礎とした威圧的行動を控える。
27. In addition, nuclear-armed states should:a) Eschew any nuclear war-fighting doctrine; andb) Refrain from coercive action based on the threat of use of nuclear weapons;
28. 橋渡しをする国は，以下を可能とする誠実な対話の場を立ち上げるべき；①効果的な措置やベンチマークを伴う核軍縮のプロセスや枠組み創出の追求，②全ての国のための共通の基盤を作るため，以下に対応する「困難な問題」を含む議題の設定；(1)自衛権に関する問題（国家存立に関わる究極的な状況において，国際人道法を勘案し，核兵器の人道的結末や文民・非戦闘員及び環境を考慮した上で，限定的な核による威嚇や核使用の可能性について），(2)国際の平和と安全を保持しながら「核兵器のない世界」を実現していくにあたって，人間の安全保障を担保することについて，③核軍縮が直面している究極のジレンマの解決の追求（全ての国の安全を保障しながらレジームの下での義務の遵守と適時の軍縮の強制を両立させる方法）。
28. “Bridge builders” should launch honest dialogue that:a) Seeks to design a disarmament process or framework with effective measures andbenchmarks;b) Aims to establish common ground for all states by setting an agenda comprised ofhard questions that: (1) address the right of self-defense, which under extreme
circumstances of national survival could envisage the possibility of limited threat of use
or use of nuclear weapons, mindful of international humanitarian law, taking into
account the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and protection of civilians,
non-combatants and the environment; and (2) ensure that human security is considered
in designing a world free of nuclear weapons, while preserving international peace andsecurity; and10c) Seeks solutions to the ultimate dilemma facing nuclear disarmament: how toguarantee the security of all states by ensuring compliance with the obligations undersuch a regime, including timely enforcement when other measures fail to achievecompliance.

11