A New Security Strategy for Addressing the
Challenges in the Turbulent International Order
11 Recommendations for the Defense of Japan

November 2018
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Introduction
Over the course of the approximately five years since the adoption of the current National Security
Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) at the end of 2013, thesecurity environment surrounding Japan has become ever more severe. Japan requires a security
strategy that will enable it to respond resolutely to the increasingly serious situation and maximize
national interests. This is not simply an issue relating to the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), but israther one that calls for a review of overall foreign and defense policies. It is for this reason that areview of the current National Defense Program Guidelines alone would be insufficient; what is alsoneeded is the revision of the NSS.
In FY2017 the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) launched a study group to review therequirements for Japan’s security strategy and defense policy in light of the increasingly serious
security environment. This booklet comprises a general proposal that reflects the discussions thathave taken place in the study group under the leadership of the chair, and also a set of individual
recommendations by the project members about items of particular concern when reassessing
Japan’s security situation. It should be noted that while the general proposal is the work of the JIIA,
the individual recommendations represent the opinions of their respective authors alone and not theopinions of the organizations to which they are affiliated. It is hoped that these recommendations
will provide insights and advice for the review of the NDPG and for considerations on Japan’s future
security strategy.
Kenichiro Sasae
President and Director General
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

1Study Group Members
Hideshi Tokuchi

Senior Fellow, GRIPS (Chair of the Study Group; Former Vice-Minister ofDefense for International Affairs)

Shigeo Akimoto

Chairman of the Board of Governors, Japan Coast Guard Foundation (Former
Vice Commandant for Operations, Japan Coast Guard)

Kouichi Isobe

Strategic Advisor, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. (former Lt. Gen., Japan
Ground Self-Defense Force)

Bonji Ohara

Senior Fellow, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation

Matake Kamiya

Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Adjunct Fellow, JIIA

Tetsuo Kotani

Associate Professor, Meikai Universit / Senior Fellow, JIIA

Ryo Sahashi

Professor, Kanagawa University

Kouji Shimohira

Representative, A&S Consulting, Inc. (former Lt. Gen., Japan Air Self-Defense
Force)Ken Jimbo

Professor, Keio University

Sugio Takahashi

Senior Fellow; Chief, Policy Simulation Division, National Institute for Defense
Studies

Eiichi Funada

Advisor, Kajima Corporation (former Vice Admiral, Maritime Self-Defense
Force)

Masashi Murano

Research Fellow, Okazaki Institute

Satoru Mori

Professor, Hosei University

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A. Situational Assessment
1. Whither the established international order?
The postwar international order formed under the leadership of the United States was predicated on
the assumption that all countries, large and small alike, would comply with international law, andsought to disseminate liberal values throughout the international community, from freedom,democracy and human rights, to respect for the rule of law, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and free
trade. This international order served to transform the tone of international relations from a“zero-sum” to a “plus-sum” game, forming a foundation for global peace and prosperity.
However, in recent years some countries that harbor dissatisfaction with the existing international
order, China and Russia included, have sought to create an environment advantageous toauthoritarian states through unilateral attempts to change or deny internationally established rules
and norms. These countries have either used or threatened force, or methods referred to as “grayzone” or “hybrid” coercion that have the same effect as the use or threat of force, to try and redraw
national borders. There have also been increased restrictions placed on personal freedoms and rights
in the domestic context in such countries. Some democratic nations in the developing world are also
being seen to indicate their support for these kinds of actions by China and Russia in the forum of
the United Nations or at other international organizations.
At the same time, advanced democracies have seen distrust in politics, divisions in society, andincome disparities cause political turmoil, which has become an internal factor that has contrived toundermine the legitimacy of the postwar international order. These developments have been further
exacerbated by China and Russia’s efforts to manipulate public opinion and intervene in electoral
processes in democratic nations, using such means as election and education systems, cultural
exchange and media outlets. Such inveigling attempts to influence national discourse in democraticnations have become known as “sharp power,” with China’s focus being to crack down on voices
critical of its own policies, while Russia’s priority to is to delegitimize democracy.
The “America First” Trump administration views China and Russia as “revisionist states” and haschosen to adopt strategic competition with these countries. However, the Trump administration isitself also lambasting the current international order as being against the United States’ national
interests and is engaged in blunt attempts to prioritize its own interests rather than support theexisting order.
Global peace and stability have for many years been maintained through a network of alliances
centered on the United States. As a super power the United States has at times made sacrifices of its
own to contribute to the defense of allied nations. However, when viewed from the perspective of“America First,” alliance relationships are deemed to be unfair, with the United States providing
benefits to allies in one-way transactions. The Trump administration has therefore called on some3

allies to increase defense spending and bear a greater burden of the costs for stationing U.S. forces,
with the implied threat that non-compliance with demands will result in the United Statesabandoning its defense obligations, or withdrawing U.S. forces. These actions could undermine thecredibility and deterrence of alliances.
In the international economic order, too, the Trump administration is calling for trade imbalances
to be corrected and turning its back on multilateral economic regimes, instead seeking to oblige
countries to enter into bilateral trade agreements and engaging in moves to protect U.S. industries.
Not only is the Trump administration engaging in a trade war with China, the country with which it
has the largest trade deficit, it is also increasing pressure on allies and friends such as Japan, theEuropean Union (EU), Canada and Mexico.
2. Geopolitics resurgent
In the Indo-Pacific region too, countries such as China and North Korea are engaging in unilateral
actions with the express purpose of making their aspirations to change the status quo a fait accompli.
Firstly, presenting a revisionist vision for the international order based on its “Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI),” China is seeking to expand its sphere of influence across Eurasia and into theIndian Ocean, offering assistance for port development in countries that border the Indian Ocean,
including Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Djibouti. As China provides massive amounts ofeconomic assistance that are essentially impossible for developing countries to repay, this results ininequality in diplomatic

relations between China and the debtor nation. For example, faced withdefault on its debt repayments, Sri Lanka was obliged to hand over the Port of Hambantota on a
99-year lease to China. There are growing criticisms of this kind of “debt trap” as being a form of“Chinese-style colonialism.”
China is also attempting to restrict freedom of the seas in the East China Sea and South China Sea
through moves to unilaterally alter maritime borders. China is also enhancing its anti-access and area
denial (A2/AD) capabilities from the East China and South China Seas, with its militarization of theSouth China Sea in particular also posing a threat to freedom of navigation.
Furthermore, in the face of China’s attempts to forcefully press its claims using a hybrid warfare
that utilizes not only military personnel, but also government vessels, fishing vessels and maritime
militia, those countries that find their sovereignty threatened by such actions are unable to respondeffectively, instead being forced to go on the defensive. With the transfer of the China Coast Guard
to the command of the Armed Police Force, as well as the introduction of drones, it can also be
anticipated that “gray zone situations,” while not constituting war, will become more acute.
China is also looking beyond the East China and South China Seas, with a view to expanding its
military presence in the Western Pacific, and even to the Pacific Islands region and Indian Ocean andin so doing alter the maritime power balance. There is a possibility that China’s military presence in4the Indian Ocean and South Pacific could threaten the safety of Japanese maritime transportation in
the future.
China is also increasing pressure on the Democratic Progressive Party administration in Taiwan,
and its efforts to diminish Taiwan’s diplomatic presence and frequent military operations in Taiwan’s
immediate vicinity are serving to stoke tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese naval and air forces
are also increasingly using the Bashi Channel as means of passage from the South China Sea toengage in exercises in the Western Pacific and East China Sea, making surveillance and monitoring
difficult for Japan as well.
North Korea has moved rapidly to develop its nuclear missile capability, which, combined with its
existing heavy artilleries and special operations capabilities, present a grave threat to the Northeast
Asian region. Although tensions on the Korean Peninsula have currently subsided due to North
Korea’s decision to engaged in dialogue with the United States, no clear path to denuclearization has
as yet materialized, nor can it be taken for granted that denuclearization will be the ultimate outcomeof dialogue. Through the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” North Korea is attempting tomaintain its position as a de facto nuclear weapons state and reduce the presence of U.S. forces on
the peninsula. If U.S. forces stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK) were to be reduced orwithdrawn without progress towards denuclearization of North Korea first being achieved, thiswould transform the military balance in Northeast Asia, with serious implications for Japan’s
security situation.
3. Intensifying military competition
The United States and China are already competing with each other over innovative militarytechnologies, incorporating artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned and automated technologies thathave the potential to be game changing. Both countries are investing in technology development andare also taking measures to prevent leakage of technological information. In its National Security
Strategy the United States is calling for the promotion and protection of the National Security
Innovation Base (NSIB), whereas China, under its “Made in China 2025” initiative, is aiming tobecome an “industrial superpower” through the home-grown development of advanced technologies.
The trade war between the United States and China may ostensibly be about trade, but it isnonetheless also part of broader competition over advanced technologies.
China is aiming to complete the modernization of its military forces by 2035 and the integrationof the People’s Liberation Army and the application of advanced technologies for military purposes
is likely to result in the U.S.-China/Japan-China military balance swinging significantly in favor of
China by mid-century. In particular, large-scale vessels, fixed bases and short-range strikecapabilities are likely to become increasingly vulnerable in the face of China’s A2/AD capabilities.
Cyber threats are present at all levels, not just at the state and military levels, but also extending to5

key infrastructure, as well as the corporate and individual levels. China, Russia and North Korea areamong countries seeking to use cyberattacks to acquire information about the decision-making
processes for national security in other countries, as well as military operational plans and advanced
technologies. They are also engaging in covert operations for military and political purposes. North
Korea is also using ransomware and other means to subvert economic sanctions and acquire funds
by illicit means.
There are also growing threats to the free use of outer space. China and Russia are engaged indevelopment and testing of anti-satellite weapons and also offensive capabilities from orbit. There isalso a possibility that courtiers that do not possess such capabilities could use electronic jammingand cyberattacks to threaten space systems.

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B. Basic Policy
Based on the assessment of the situation as detailed above in Section A, it is the case that Japan’s
security and defense policies from now will need to systemically incorporate specific measures that
address the key points set out hereunder.
1. Response to China’s attempts to disrupt the international order and U.S. “America First”
policyIn an environment in which China is attempting to disrupt the international order and the UnitedStates is prioritizing its own interests, Japan should play an active and leading role, including inmilitary aspects, in order to maintain the existing international order and prevent U.S.
disengagement.
2. Whole of nation self-defense posture and deterrence capability of the Japan-U.S. alliance
As the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) cannot be expected to defend the nation alone, Japan
should build an effective defense posture that brings together the combined might of the nation. At
the same time, while the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship remains the most important pillar ofJapan’s security, in light of the new adjustments that are being made, the alliance should not remain
inert, but should be further enhanced, with Japan taking a larger role.
3. Deterring and engaging China
With the United States embroiled in strategic competition with China and also given the necessity
for Japan to make a realistic response of its own to China’s moves to expand its national power andchange the status quo, Japan should strengthen required deterrent and adopt a cost-imposing strategy
that would make it difficult for China to change the status quo or expand its A2/AD capabilities. At
the same time, Japan should work to deepen trust with China and enhance crisis management
structures to ensure that differences over individual issues, including territorial and history-related
problems, do not adversely affect Japan-China relations overall.
4. Improving the security environment in Japan’s vicinity and contribution to the security in
the Indo-Pacific region
Ensure sufficient resources are allocated for Japan’s defense and enhance cooperation with othercountries to improve the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and secure the safety of sea
lanes.
5. Deterring and engaging North Korea

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Even through U.S.-North Korea relations may change and tensions on the Korean Peninsula aredefused, unless there is a demonstrable reduction in the North’s military capabilities it will continue
to be necessary for Japan to enhance response capabilities. At the same time an engagement strategy
should be formulated with a view to resolving the nuclear, missile and abduction issues.
6. Reforms of the present situation and investment in the future
The foundations that support Japan’s defense force are already extremely vulnerable and can under
no means be further neglected. In addition, although the target level for Japan’s defense expenditure
should not be formulated on the basis of simple comparisons with other countries in a way that does
not relate directly to Japan’s defense needs, in view of the fact that, for example, China’s publicized
defense expenditure alone has risen 15-fold in the past 30 years, and approximately 2.7-fold in thelast 10 years alone and is already more than three times greater than Japan’s expenditure, it ispatently clear that the marginal increases in defense spending that have been implemented to date arein no way sufficient if Japan is to maintain independence in the truest sense and ensure its own
stability and prosperity. Based on the current situation, Japan should engage determinedly inmeasures to strengthen all foundations of defense—personnel, material, technological, intellectual,and financial—and should engage in technological innovation and defense spending based on aperspective of investing in the future, in anticipation of the security environment around 2035.

8C. Japan’s Own Efforts
1. Clearly articulating Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Peace
In order to continue to advance security policy based on Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Peace,
maintaining the existing international order, with its focus on peaceful resolution of disputes and free
trade, should be made a strategic goal and the necessary legislation should be formulated (seeRecommendation 1). Furthermore, in order to maintain the international order and ensure amilitary balance in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan should engage in realistic diplomacy. Japan should
also work with the international community in calling for improvements in cases where individual
rights are suppressed by authoritarian states. In addition, the content of international peacecooperation activities should be enhanced and deepened, moving from capacity building assistancelike the provision of equipment and training to developing countries, to assistance focused onbuilding security foundations, which affords recipient countries the opportunity to effectively utilize
the capacities and skills they have acquired.
2. Developing defensive capacity
While maintaining the direction towards a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, in order to out theadcersary on the defensive, a multi-domain battle concept must also be incorporated that would
enable operations to be simultaneously executed in all domains, with units able to maintain a degreeof autonomy even in situations where an A2/AD environment has rendered command
communication systems unusable (see Recommendation 2). A permanent joint operationcommand should be established in order to further strengthen the integration of the SDF. In addition
to constructing integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) to enhance simultaneous response
capabilities against airborne threats, counterattack capabilities should be introduced to respond to
missile threats (see Recommendation 3). In addition to significantly strengthening Japan’s
cyber-defense structures, a cyberattack capability should also be introduced that would act as adeterrent. In outer space, it will be necessary to heighten monitoring capabilities for threats tosatellites and strengthen early warning and communications capabilities. Electronic warfare
capabilities also need to be strengthened and the effective utilization of electromagnetic waves
promoted. Sufficient budgetary allocation needs to be made available for these programs and otherexpenses, including logistical expenses, in order to construct a defensive capability that can respondassuredly in a severe international environment.
3. Cost-imposing strategy and engagement with China
In order to improve response capabilities to China’s A2/AD capabilities and heighten the cost to
China of its attempts to change the status quo, Japan should strengthen its own A2/AD capabilities,9

including air defense and anti-ship/anti-submarine capabilities. Furthermore, enhancing thecapabilities of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) would serve to support the existing law and rules-basedorder at sea through policing powers (see Recommendation 4). A structure should be constructedthat would enable the government as a whole to respond appropriately to gray zone situations andhybrid coercion in armed attack situations (see Recommendation 5). Furthermore, efforts need to bemade to alert international public opinion to the lengths that China is prepared to go to unilaterally
change the status quo by force. On the other hand, it is critical that efforts be made to develop crisis
management structures and build trust between Japan and China and to this end it is necessary toensure that the Japan-China Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism is put into steady
operation.
4. Promotion of Indo-Pacific strategy
Efforts should be made to enhance public diplomacy with the countries of Southeast Asia, countries
bordering the Indian Ocean and Pacific Island countries regarding Japan’s “Free and Open
Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Japan should enhance its presence in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean
in order to maintain the rule of law at sea and freedom of navigation. Japan should promote
high-quality infrastructure that seeks to expand connectivity and invigorate flows of people andgoods, and demonstrate alternatives to the BRI “debt trap,” working with China in economic
cooperation consultations to encourage it to adopt international standards in its economic assistanceactivities. Furthermore, priorities for foreign aid strategy need to be clearly defined and efforts
should be made to improve the overall capabilities in ASEAN countries (see Recommendation 6).
5. Response to situation on the Korean Peninsula
In order to enhance response capabilities against North Korean military capabilities, further
measures should be taken to enhance missile defense, civil defense, rescue of Japanese nationals
overseas, cyber defense, and counterattack capabilities in response to missile threats. The policy of
maximum pressure should be maintained until progress is made towards denuclearization andindependent sanctions and countermeasures against ship-to-ship transfers need to be strengthened. Inorder to build Japan-North Korea relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration,
Japan-North Korea dialogue should be advanced in parallel with developments in U.S.-North Korea
negotiations.

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D. Japan-U.S. Alliance and Partnership
1. Maintenance of the international order
In order to promote the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the international
community, Japan should enhance cooperation with bodies such as the United Nations, Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), and oppose attempts byauthoritarian states to change the status quo and block any attempts at appeasement of such policies.
Japan should also work through multilateral bodies such as the G7, G20 and Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) to oppose protectionism, and work to resolve various issues that are brought
about by globalization. Support for democratization needs to be provided to democratic nations thatare vulnerable to the sharp power of China and Russia, and a contribution made to enhancing
systems that could prevent manipulation of public opinion and intervention in elections.
2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and overcoming asymmetry
Cooperation between the JSDF and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command should be enhanced in thecommand/control and operations, and Japan and the United States should constantly update flexible
deterrent options and joint plans so that they can appropriately respond the escalation from peace
time to gray-zone and armed conflict. As the realignment of U.S. Forces proceeds, efforts should bemade to promote joint use of bases and facilities, and also expand access to commercial facilities inJapan by U.S. Forces. Operational cooperation should be maximized, based on the Guidelines forJapan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and efforts made to overcome asymmetry in the alliancerelationship. In terms of extended deterrence, in addition to maintaining and strengthening
credibility in deterrence by retaliation, a concept of damage limitation should also be incorporated(see Recommendation 7). In addition, in order to enhance measures to ensure bases for U.S.
support in an A2/AD environment, Japan-U.S. cooperation should be strengthened in the areas ofsurveillance and monitoring, IAMD and anti-submarine operations.
3. Adopting a balancing strategy in response to China
To ensure that the military balance with China does not deteriorate, Japan should cooperate with theUnited States and the countries of Europe, etc., to prevent efforts by China to force foreigncompanies doing business in China to transfer technologies, or to prevent the illegal acquisition oftechnologies by cyber theft or other means. To counter the militarization of the South China Sea,
Japan needs to enhance partnership with the United States and other allies to establish a stronger
presence in the region that would maintain freedom of navigation. Maritime law enforcement
cooperation should be expanded at bilateral and multilateral levels in order to strengthen the rule oflaw at sea. In the East China Sea too, Japan should enhance its presence jointly with the United

11States and other maritime nations, by engaging in training and exercises.
4. Promotion of a multilateral Indo-Pacific strategy
Stable Japan-China relations are essential for the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region andfrom a broad mid- to long-term perspective Japan and China should build a “mutually beneficial
relationship based on common strategic interests” in all areas, including security. On the other hand,in order to maintain a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and ensure safety of maritime
transportation and freedom of navigation, Japan should support the Japan-Australia-India-U.S.
cooperation framework (known as the “Quad”) and further promote the creation of alliance networks
around the United States. In addition to cooperation with Australia, moves should be made toenhance partnership with the United Kingdom, which is a core member of the Five Power Defense
Arrangements (FPDA) and the UK-USA Agreement (Five Eyes), and also with France, which
possesses territories in the Indo-Pacific region (see Recommendation 8). Furthermore, Japan
should, with the United States and its allies and friends, call on China to correct external assistancepolicies that diverge from international standards, in order to avoid the BRI “debt trap.” Working
with the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, France and other countries that are providing
capacity building assistance to developing countries that fall within the Indo-Pacific strategy, roles
should be divided in such a way as to create an effective assistance structure. Furthermore, in viewof the rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the strategic importance of a democratic Taiwan
should be reappraised and exchange strengthened.
5. Sustaining pressure on North Korea and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation
Until such a time that North Korea moves to engage in denuclearization, international cooperation
should be strengthened in order to maintain maximum pressure. In particular, efforts should be
strengthened to eliminate sanctions loopholes, such as ship-to-ship transfers. Furthermore, in
addition to strengthening defense cooperation between Japan and the ROK, trilateral cooperation
among Japan, the United States and the ROK should be deepened in missile defense, anti-submarine
warfare, counter-proliferation efforts, and non-combatant evacuation operation. In the event thatmoves are made towards denuclearization, trilateral cooperation will need to be enhanced to build apeace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and a common recognition will need to be confirmed
concerning the role and importance of U.S. Forces stationed in the ROK in such an event.

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E. Strengthening the National Security Base
1. Strengthening the defense industry baseIn order to enhance the defense industry base that supports Japan’s defensive capacity, in addition toconcentrating resources in priority technological areas and bases that need to be supported andheightening national manufacturing capacity for defense-related equipment, the realignment of the
defense industry will require the establishment of robust companies or corporate entities, andnecessitate the development of an industry base that is capable of developing and manufacturing
better high-performance equipment and nurturing international competitiveness. Furthermore, thetransfer of equipment should be promoted using the framework of the Three Principles of Transfer ofDefense Equipment and Technology, and efforts should be made to expand markets and lower
equipment costs (see Recommendation 9).
2. Development and utilization of advanced technologies
Based on trends in the defense technology environment, in addition to developing structures to
identify, protect and nurture advanced technologies developed in Japan, a roadmap should beformulated that sets out how such technologies are to be adopted by the Ministry of Defense or the
JSDF (see Recommendation 10). Furthermore, in view of Japan’s population trends, cutting-edge
technologies should be utilized in order to respond to personnel shortages arising from the declining
birthrate. In addition, from the perspective of realizing more efficient defense expenditure,investment in platforms that are vulnerable in modern warfare needs to be reviewed, and unmannedsystems that operate autonomously using artificial intelligence utilized instead.
3. Opposing sharp power
In order to alert people to the threat to democracy in Japan posed by the wielding of sharp power by
China and Russia, and to avoid the manipulation of public opinion and intervention in elections, asystem should be developed whereby concerted and whole of governmentl efforts are made tocollect information and prevent the exercising of influence through the provision of funds to political,
governmental and academic bodies and prevent the dissemination of false information through themedia (see Recommendation 11).
4. Establishment, enhancement and strengthening of a security community in Japan as aknowledge baseIn order to ensure that the ever-increasing complexity of the security environment can be accurately
analyzed and effective response policies formulated, bases for security-related research should beenhanced within research organizations and higher education institutions, and human resources13

developed who can contribute to governmental decision making, promote public understanding andare effective in putting a message across. As a part of efforts to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliancerelationship, American studies at think tanks and other bodies should also be enhanced, in order toensure a full understanding of the diversity and complexity of U.S. society that has emerged under
the administration of President Donald Trump.

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Recommendation 1
Japan needs to demonstrate the necessary changes in order to promote security policies based on
Proactive Contribution to Peace. Maintaining the liberal international order should be considered to
be a key strategic goal for Japan going forward, and by further strengthening legal foundation for
security policy, Japan must adopt measures that will enable it to fulfil an active international role insecurity-related areas that it has been unable to fulfil to date.
(Matake Kamiya)
Recommendation 2
While further developing the existing Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which focuses on preventing
further escalation of situations and minimizing damage after a situation has arisen, Japan should
introduce a multi-domain battle concept and establish a permanent joint operation command in orderto enhance response to situations that have already escalated.
(Bonji Ohara)
Recommendation 3
In view of the diversity of missiles and launch platforms held by countries the region, Japan should
build an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), including counterattack capabilities against
missile threats, in order to enable a response not only to ballistic missiles, but pluralistic
simultaneous or successive attacks in which missiles with different flight characteristics are used,such as cruise missiles or hypersonic glide vehicles.
(Masashi Murano)
Recommendation 4
In addition to securing maritime safety and strengthening efforts to maintain the maritime order the
Policy on Strengthening of the Maritime Security System as decided by the relevant ministerial
council should be speedily and assuredly implemented in order to prevent unforeseen situations
occurring or escalating. In addition, in order to strengthen the maritime order based on the rule oflaw, further efforts should be promoted to implement partnership/cooperation/support on abilateral/multilateral basis between coast guard agencies.
(Shigeo Akimoto)
Recommendation 5
In anticipation of hybrid coercion by Chinese naval vessels, government vessels and maritime militia
in the East China Sea and the waters around the Nansei Islands, in addition to implementing
preparations based on various scenarios that will facilitate swift government decision making,15

inter-ministry/agency cooperation should be enhanced between the Japan Self-Defense Force, Japan
Coast Guard and police force in order to ensure an appropriate response to various situations,
including armed attack situations.
(Tetsuo Kotani)
Recommendation 6
The Government of Japan should work to improve the overall maritime security capabilities ofcoastal nations of ASEAN (particularly the Philippines and Vietnam). Above all, efforts should bemade to: 1) enhance joint military exercises and training, 2) engage in funding and technicalcooperation for defense-related infrastructure, and 3) engage in active exports of defense-related
equipment.
(Ken Jimbo)
Recommendation 7
The following passage from the current National Defense Program Guidelines should be maintained:“With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with
nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of theextended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will takeappropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) andprotection of the people.” In addition, efforts should be made to maintain and strengthen credibilityof deterrence by retaliation through U.S. deterrence capabilities, and the concept of damage
limitation should also be enhanced.
(Sugio Takahashi)
Recommendation 8
In order to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law in the maritime region
stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, Japan should promote the development ofmulti-layered frameworks of the Japan-U.S. alliance cooperation and multilateral cooperation that
aim to secure safety for maritime transportation and freedom of navigation.
(Eiichi Funada)
Recommendation 9
In addition to concentrating resources in technological areas and bases that need to be supported andpromoting national manufacturing capacity for defense equipment, Japan should establish robust
companies or enterprises through the realignment of the defense industry, and develop an industry
base that is capable of developing and manufacturing better high-performance equipment and16nurturing international competitiveness. Furthermore, the transfer of equipment should be promotedusing the framework of the Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, andefforts should be made to expand markets and lower equipment costs.
(Kouji Shimohira)Recommendation 10
Based on trends in the defense technology environment, Japan should develop systems to identify,
protect and nurture advanced technologies developed domestically, and a roadmap should beformulated that sets out how such technologies are to be adopted by the Ministry of Defense or theJapan Self-Defense Force.
(Satoru Mori)
Recommendation 11
Adequately understanding the rising sense of international caution against direct and indirectinterference by Russia and China in the elections and policy processes of democratic countries,
Japan should construct measures that will protect its own free and democratic structures and those ofother countries and also the economic and social activities that are built on such democratic
structures.
(Ryo Sahashi)

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