US‐China Relations Report, Vol. 4
US‐China Relations and Climate Change: Tackling the Global Agenda

Hiroshi Ota(Professor, Waseda University)*This report is part of the research findings of “US‐China Relations and International
Relations Centered on the United States and China” (US‐China Relations Research Group),
which is a sub‐project of the fiscal 2015 Japan Institute of International Affairs project“Major Developments in the US and China and US‐China Relations amidst Turmoil in theInternational Order.”Can the United States and China work together to demonstrate global leadership in
mitigating and adapting to climate change, one of the major global issues of the twenty‐firstcentury? China was the greatest contributor of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuelcombustion in 2011, accounting for 25.5% of the global total, followed by the United States at
16.9%. While the G20 countries—consisting of major and emerging economies—together
emitted over 80% of the total over that period, China and the United States alone wereresponsible for more than 40% of worldwide emissions, giving the global community nochoice but to rely on the leadership of the two countries.
Looking at bilateral relations with regard to the issue, the United States and China were
frequently at odds over international negotiations on climate change from the 1990s throughthe first decade of the 2000s, particularly between the administrations of US President
George W. Bush and President of the People’s Republic of China Hu Jintao. In the 2010s,
however, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping have both been seeking to build
a cooperative relationship regarding climate change.
To mitigate climate change, it goes without saying that the United States and China mustsignificantly reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Achieving this will requirea variety of measures, including domestic energy policies. They will need, for instance, tomake use of large‐scale renewable energy. China had the world’s greatest wind power
capacity in 2010, with the United States coming in second place. As for solar power,
Germany topped the world in cumulative capacity as of the end of 2010, and China, Japan,
and the United States trailed behind in that order.
As these data show, the United States and China are world leaders in wind power use; theirsolar power capacity is likewise comparable to that of other major countries. Thus, while theUnited States and China are often popularly construed as countries exercising veto power1

on the issue of climate change mitigation, it is important that we examine the international
behavior of both countries in a manner that is more in line with reality. To that end, we needto consider how each country’s domestic energy policy and domestic politics and foreign
diplomacy involving climate policy relate to one another.
When analyzing US foreign policy on climate change, as with the issues of security and theglobal economy, it will be effective to draw on the theoretical framework of the two‐level
game of international and domestic politics in negotiations toward an internationalagreement.1 The US head of international negotiations engages in talks with other countries
while constantly receiving both pressure and support from Congress, domestic interest
groups, and other parties and taking into account political developments and responses athome. A prime example of a two‐level game is the so‐called Kyoto Conference that took
place

duringtheClinton‐Goreadministration,

under

thevicepresidencyofenvironmentalist Al Gore. In July 1997, ahead of the Third Conference of the Parties to theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP3) that would be held in
Kyoto in December, the US Senate unanimously passed (with a vote of 95‐0) the Byrd‐Hagel
Resolution opposing the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, narrowing the US delegation’s roomfor negotiation.
In March 2001, after George W. Bush became president, the United States declared that it
would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, a framework for international cooperation on climatechange. The primary reasons were that it was an unfair international treaty exempting large
developing countries (implying China) from international obligations to reduce GHG
emissions and that fulfilling US reduction obligations under the protocol would haveunavoidable negative consequences for the domestic economy.
Following the start of the Barack Obama administration, the House of Representatives
passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES Act) in June 2009. Also known
as the Waxman‐Markey Act, this represented a comprehensive energy policy encompassing
the promotion of clean energy development, the improvement of energy efficiency, thereduction of GHG emissions (including use of a cap‐and‐trade system of emissions trading),
and a transition to a clean energy economy. Similar bills were proposed in the Senate as well,culminating in the October 2009 submission of the Kerry‐Boxer bill. However, the bill neversaw a vote in the full Senate, where deliberations on health insurance reform—President
Obama’s other key policy agenda item—took up all the time, and was discarded due tounfinished deliberations. Still, the Obama administration has not only been keen on tacklingclimate change but has shown enthusiasm for domestic initiatives that are within its power
as the executive branch of government and for international cooperation in frameworks led
by the United Nations.

1Putnam, Robert D. 1988, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,” International
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427–460.

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In its second term, the Obama administration has continued to take interest in the issue ofclimate change and maintained a willingness to play an active role in international
negotiations. It has expressed its intention to engage in the issue through its June 2013
announcement of the Climate Action Plan, as well as in the president’s State of the Union
address of January 28, 2014. In the US‐China Joint Announcement on Climate Change
released on November 12 of that year, moreover, the two countries promised that (1) they
will be mindful of the international community’s longer‐term goal of limiting the rise in theaverage global temperature to within 2˚C of pre‐Industrial Revolution levels, (2) the UnitedStates will strive to reduce GHG emissions to 26%–28% below their 2005 level by 2025 andmake best efforts to achieve 28% reductions, and (3) China will aim to peak out its CO2emissions by around 2030 and make best efforts to peak early, as well as increase the shareof non‐fossil fuels in its primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030.2
As of yet, no comprehensive energy and climate policies exist at the US federal level.
Nonetheless, under the current conditions, it seems likely that the United States will be able
to achieve the emissions reduction target noted in the joint announcement throughadministrative means, state‐level efforts, and the impacts of economic stagnation and theshale gas revolution. Moreover, the public’s growing sense of crisis fed by the frequency ofextreme weather events in the country, as well as the climate security discourse taking place
within the military, appear to be helping to increase national interest in the issue of climatechange. It is safe to assume, then, that we can expect US leadership in tackling the global
agenda of climate change. However, if Republican candidates skeptical of climate change
were to win the next presidential election or gubernatorial elections, administrative
measures and state‐level initiatives could be suppressed, setting back US climate
policy—although just how far‐reaching the repercussions might be is difficult to predict.
Shifting our attention to the world’s biggest emitter of CO2, what is the situation in China?
The crux of energy and environmental problems in China is coal. The energy diversification
policy of the government notwithstanding, the share of coal in the country’s total primaryenergy consumption in 2011 was 69%, far surpassing the 18% share of petroleum. Much like
Japan in decades past, China’s current rapid economic growth is powered by heavy,energy‐intensive industries: iron and steel, petrochemicals, machinery, cement, andelectricity. Low energy efficiency is also a problem.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed atthe UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June
1992, and entered into force two years later. This paved the way for negotiations toward aprotocol, which began in 1995 at the first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP1)
in Berlin, Germany. Based on the UNFCCC’s principle of “common but differentiated
2White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change,” Beijing,China, 12 November 2014.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change3responsibilities and respective capabilities,” the Berlin Mandate adopted at COP1 affirmedthat the eventual protocol would not impose GHG reduction obligations on developing
countries. China exhibited opportunistic behavior in the decade‐long talks leading up to theKyoto Protocol’s entry into force, holding fast to the principle of “common but differentiatedresponsibilities” while engaging in conditional negotiations with advanced industrial
countries.
The international community has come to watch China, now the largest contributor ofcarbon dioxide worldwide, more closely than ever. China’s stubborn resistance to legallybinding reduction obligations coincided with the surge in its CO2 emissions during
President Hu Jintao’s time in office, inviting scorn not only from the industrialized world
but also from developing countries that are vulnerable to climate change and fromenvironment‐related nongovernmental organizations. During this period, moreover, notonly China’s national total CO2 emissions had become the world largest, its per‐capita CO2
emissions became far exceeding the global average.
Whileinternational

criticismof

Chinaisgrowing

underthesecircumstances,counterarguments have also been made in its defense. The gist of the argument is thatindustrialandothergoods

exportedfrom

China—particularly

toindustrializedcountries—are manufactured based on outsourcing contracts with companies of the latter,so that these countries are in effect emitting large amounts of GHGs in China by importing
cheap products made there.
China’s climate policy, led by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),
is that it will support international cooperation frameworks insofar as they serve nationalinterests. The essence of NDRC policy, meanwhile, is to balance energy security witheconomic growth and to take some degree of action on climate change issues to the extent
that is compatible with this objective. Thus, for instance, China promotes the developmentof renewable energy as domestic policy not primarily to mitigate climate change; rather, itstrue motive lies in its energy security strategy of cutting back on fossil fuel imports, as wellas its strategy of developing new industries for continued economic growth. Huge domestic
markets for solar thermal and wind energy have taken shape in China. While the domestic
market for solar power is still in a stage of development, solar panels exported from China
are taking the world by storm and causing trade frictions with the United States andcountries in the European Union. To avoid further trade friction with the United States inthis area, China will need to expand demand at home.
Together with US President Obama, Chinese President Xi Jinping released the US‐China
Joint Announcement on Climate Change on November 12, 2014, in Beijing. The twopresidents stated that their countries “have a critical role to play in combating global climatechange, one of the greatest threats facing humanity.” To that end, they “reaffirmed theimportance of strengthening bilateral cooperation on climate change” and stated that they4

“will work together, and with other countries, to adopt a protocol, another legal instrument
or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties at theUnited Nations Climate Conference in Paris in 2015.”3 Furthermore, they promised thatthey would achieve the aforementioned “ambitious” GHG emissions reduction targets
based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities,“ in light of different national circumstances.”

3The United States and China have agreed that, through the existing US-China Climate Change Working Group(CCWG) and other channels, they will engage in dialogue and carry out initiatives on, inter alia, vehicles, smart
grids, carbon capture and storage, energy efficiency, the global phasedown of hydrofluorocarbons(HFCs)—which are very potent greenhouse gases—and nuclear energy. They have also created the US-China
Clean Energy Research Center to facilitate collaborative work in carbon capture and storage technologies,
energy efficiency in buildings, and clean vehicles. (The White House, 2014, op. cit.)

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