Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 27, Number 2, 2005, pp49-58

Study on Effective Operations Strategy of Emergency Fire Response Teams
After the Great Minami Kanto Earthquake Disaster1

Kenichi TANABE1 and Yoshio KUMAGAI2
Master's Program in Environmental Sciences, University of Tsukuba (Currently stationed at Honden Fire Station)
2
Institute of System and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba(Received for 27 May., 2005 and in revised from 6 Jan., 2006)

ABSTRACTThe Emergency Fire Response Team is a combining of fire brigades covering the entire country after a largescale disaster performing fire fighting activities in the stricken area. It is necessary to track the number ofrequired fire brigades corresponding to the scale of disaster for an effective operations strategy, as the number ofbrigades is limited. In this research, various experiments were conducted, revealing a quantitative understanding
and effective operations strategy on the use of Emergency Fire Support Teams.

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background on Research
Emergency Response Fire Teams are ready to respond to theimminent threat of large-scale earthquake disasters1). There are also
support operations beyond the boundaries of local prefectural governments based on the orders and requests of the Fire
Commissioner in the event it is difficult for fire fighting organizations acting as municipal fire fighters throughout Japan at normal
times to respond to large-scale earthquake disasters when these firefighting organizations are the only groups dealing with the affecteddisaster area. This system consists of 2,800 fire brigades registeredacross Japan, covering roughly 15% of all fire brigades nationwide(as of 2004).
However, it is difficult to demonstrate the effectiveness inlessening the maximum level of damage through the dispatch of alimited number of brigades because prefectures dispatching personnel, the number of brigades, and the operation area requiring
rapid decision-making by the overseer (nation) are not tracked
quantitatively in terms of operations that meet the scale and theconditions of the disaster, thus lacking clarity with respect to effective action policies for Emergency Fire Response Teams.
Moreover, while much research has been conducted on firefighting activities for multiple fires occurring simultaneously due
to an earthquake disaster, there is no research on the combining of
response teams from prefectures across Japan from the 2,800 registered brigades.
1.2

Purpose of Research
The purpose of this research is to respond to the scale andconditions of fires occurring simultaneously due to a disaster
caused by a large-scale earthquake, develop tools to track quantitatively those prefectures offering assistance, response teams,
response locations as ordered and requested by the Emergency Fire

Response Teams for Japan, the overseer of operations, and implement sensitivity analysis and policy experiments using these, topropose effective action plans for Emergency Fire Response
Teams in the case that a large-scale earthquake disaster occurs in
the Minami Kanto Region of Japan.
2. Overview of ResearchThis research targets the number of open fires that local firefighting organizations find it difficult to respond to, among thefires that occur due to a large-scale earthquake disaster. We
tracked the quantitative operations of Emergency Fire Response
Teams and uncovered effective action plans using the following
methods.
* Developing Unit Operation Tools for calculating assistancemethods (prefectures that are mobilizing, the number of dispatched brigades) using linear programming, in order to minimize the burned-out areas according to fire damage conditions(number of fires) for response teams throughout Japan* Implementing sensitivity analysis on traffic speed, the numberof open fires and disruptions of expressways* Implementing policy experiments on operation methods ofEmergency Fire Response Teams incorporating the support
operation restrictions of neighboring prefectures and the reinforcement of brigades to specific locations with the Minami
Kanto Region being the affected disaster area.
Tracking the efficacy of policies gained from the results ofpolicy experiments, and proposing action plans for Emergency Fire
Response Teams.
3. Development of Unit Operation Tools
3.1 Overview of Unit Operation Tools
Unit Operation Tools are used to calculate the shortest time

KEY WORDS: Emergency Fire Response Team, Unit Operation Tool, Earthquake Disaster

50

K. TANABE AND Y. KUMAGAI

from the main hubs of prefectures responding to the main hubs of
the affected prefecture using the Dijkstra method to enter affected
prefectures, highway travel speeds, national highways travel
speeds, mobilization restrictions, and the number of open fires.
The number of response teams needed is calculated from the number of open fires in the disaster area using the spreading rate
method (Tokyo Fire Department Techniques 2003 13)). Then, themobilization method (prefectures responding, number of response
teams, prefectures to mobilize) to minimize the total burned-out
area is calculated from both of these results using linear programming, and the burned-out area is calculated from these results.
3.2 Creating a Roadway Network Needed for Response
Emergency Fire Response Teams assemble primarily at highway interchanges and move to the disaster area. Thus network connection nodes based on actual roadways are created by establishingdeparture point main hubs one by one from the highway interchanges throughout Japan to each prefecture, and extracting 155
points, including main prefectural hubs as nodes in order to calculate the transit time to the disaster area. Figure 1 shows part of thisnetwork. The roadways used for the network are the national
expressways and national highways (designated zones on national
highways).
3.3 Setting Time Needed to RespondIn this paper, response teams follow the roadway network, andthe time to arrival at the disaster area was set as the lead time torequest a mobilization, the time to organize response teams, travel
time on highways & national highways, refueling time and thetotal time to deploy operations after arrivala) Lead Time until Request for Mobilization
After a large-scale disaster, the government dispatches
advance investigators to gather disaster information, then the time
until the prefectural governor or mayor requests and directs
Emergency Fire Response Teams is set as the lead time. In thispaper, the lead time was set at 60 minutes based on the operationsof the Disaster Headquarters of the Fire and Disaster Management
Agency for the Nigata Earthquake.
b) Time to Organize Response Teams
The time for response teams organized by each prefecture wasset. The time to organize the response teams was set based on thearea of the prefecture. The setting method was treated as a circle
for prefectures, fire brigades were deployed in uniform densities
internally and the average arrival time that these brigades assembled at the center of the circle was set as the time to organize theresponse teams. The travel speed at that time was set at 30 km/h.
c) Highway/Designated National Highway Travel TimeThe travel time for fire brigades using the route with the shortest time was calculated for set nodes (between main prefecturalhubs). The calculation method gives weight to the time to set links,and calculates the time using the Dijkstra method.
d) Refueling TimeThe refueling time is the time to refuel so that travel and support operations are performed as the response teams are heading to
the disaster area. The time is set at 30 minutes each time all prefectures responding refuel at least once then a refueling time (30 minutes) for 1 time is added to each 500 km increase in the distancetraveled for each prefecture.
e) Time to Deploy Operations after Arrival
The time to deploy operations after arrival is the time fromwhen the Emergency Fire Response Teams arrive at the musteringsite (main prefectural hubs) of the disaster area to when they moveto the area of the actual fires within the disaster area (urban areas).
For this, calculated values are used as substitutes for the affected
prefecture making the request in b) Time to Organize Response
Teams
3.4 Setting the Number of Brigades Needed for Affected
Prefecture
The number of brigades needed based on the scale of the disaster (the number of open fires) is computed for the affected prefecture. In terms of the steps for computing, a spreading area func-

LegendMain prefectural hub
Highway/National highway node
National highway link
Highway link

Fig. 1 Roadway Network (Partial Excerpt, Values Are Distance (km))

STUDY ON EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS STRATEGY OF EMERGENCY FIRE RESPONSE TEAMS AFTER THE GREAT MINAMI KANTO EARTHQUAKE DISASTER

tion expressed with function time t (minutes) for the burned-out
area of one open fire is set, then the number of fire brigades needed to contain the area from the spreading area function is similarly
expressed with the time t (minutes) function. Multiplying the number of open fires to this gives the number of brigades needed basedon the time t (minutes) for the affected prefecture.
a) Defining the Number of Open Fires
In many prefectures, assumed earthquake damaged is classified into 3 stages: a full fire outbreak expressing all fires, an erupting fire that cannot be extinguished by residents or voluntary disaster prevention organizations, and an open fire that cannot be extinguished by local or prefectural fire brigades. This paper uses thestage open fire. Open fires are set as occurring in DID regions ineach prefecture based on the assumption that they occur in densely
populated areas.
b) Setting Spreading Area Functions
Spreading rate functions are set in order to express the timecourse and the level of increasing damage.
First, weather data (humidity, wind speed) for the past 10
years for Otemachi in Chiyoda Ward, and average values for conditions in the urban area of Tokyo's 23 wards in the Tokyo Urban
Area Conditions Study (Rate based on building structures, numberof buildings by building structure, open space ratio, road ratio)
were assigned to the Tokyo Fire Department System 200113), andthe spreading rate was calculated at random times.
Then, the distance integrating the spreading rate obtained withtime t (minutes) was set at length, and double the distance integrating the spreading rate with time t when the wind speed is set at 0
was set at breadth, and the spreading area was obtained by an elliptic approximation. Furthermore, the relationship between the elliptic approximated spreading area and time was approximated using
a root curve, and this was set as the spreading area function.
As a result of this approximation, the spreading rate was set at
S(t), expressed as follows.
S (t) = 0.563 t1.9932

(m2)

[1]

c) Computing the Number of Required Brigades
First, for the number of brigades required per open fire at thestage where response teams have not arrived, the spreading condi-

51

tions were treated as a circle in order to simplify the spreading area
shown in Equation [1], and the length of the circumference (set as
the fire area perimeter) was set at a value to fully contain the fire.
Then, the circumference that Fire Brigade 1 can oversee (firedefense) was set at 30 m, the number of brigades required for one
open fire was set at N(t), resulting in the following when expressedusing S(t).
N (t ) =2 pS(t ) 2 p ¥ 0.563t 1.9932=
30
30(brigades) [2]Furthermore, the time required to arrive from prefecturesnationwide to the affected prefecture was shown as 3(3), thus if Xi
brigade can arrive at the fire in the affected prefecture after the
prefectures responding i in time ti, this means that the ratio of thecentral angle expressed in Xi/N (ti) for the corresponding fire will
be contained by the response teams assembling from these prefectures. It is necessary here for the conditions for X1, X2,..., Xnbrigades to arrive after prefectures 1, 2, ..., n are at times t1, t2,..., tn
n

Â

i =1

Xi
=1
N (ti )

[3]

while the number of response teams b(t) is as follows.
nb(t ) = Â Xi

(brigades) [4]i =1

If the number of open fires is set at F, then the number of all
required brigades B(t) is as follows (a non-overlapping spreading
area is assumed).
nB(t ) = F ¥ Â Xi

(brigades) [5]i =1

and fully contain the fire to be as shown below.
For the actual calculation, time t1, t2,..., tn required to arrive for
1,2,...,n prefectures responding is already known, thus it is backcalculated to satisfy the conditions of Equation [3], and the numberof required brigades X1, X2,..., Xn is calculated. In addition, whenused with the Unit Operation Tool, values rounded up with integers are used for the calculation. Figure 2 shows a simple image ofthe envelopment by the response teams and the spreading conditions.

Response teams X3
after time t3 (brigade)Response teams X2
after time t2 (brigade)

Burned-out part

Response teams X1
after time t1 (brigade)Fig. 2 Image of Envelopment by Response Teams and Spreading Conditions

52

K. TANABE AND Y. KUMAGAI

3.5 Calculating Total Burned-out Area
A method to calculate the burned-out area of this fire using asolution derived as the optimal solution for response by the Unit
Operation Tool is shown. Upon the breakout of a fire, X1, X2, X3,..., Xn brigades of response teams arrive after times t1, t2, t3, ..., tn,
and when the fire is fully contained, the burned-out area of the fireis as follows.
n

Burned - out area = Â S(ti ) ¥
i =1

Xi
(m2 )
N (ti )

[6]

Or, it can be expressed as follows if N(ti) is deleted
Burned - out area =30 n
Â Xi S(ti )( m 2 )2p i =1[7]

Thus the total burned-out area of the affected prefecture where
F fire has occurred can be expressed as follows.
Burned - out area =30 F nÂ Xi S(ti )( m 2 )2p i =1[8]

3.6 Calculating the Optimal Response Method Using Linear
Programming
The time required to head to the disaster areas by prefecture
obtained in (3) and (4), the number of required brigades for theaffected prefecture and information on the number of registered
Emergency Fire Response Teams for each prefecture is used to
calculate the optimal response method. The secondary operationsof the fire brigades at this time is that all fire brigades the affected
prefecture has can put out the open fires that occurred within theirprefecture 180 minutes after the fires started.
In this paper, the number of registered brigades in the prefecture, the transit time and the constraints are clearly presented. The
purpose is to minimize the burned-out area, which is expressedusing each linear equation, thus linear programming is used in thedevelopment of the Unit Operation Tool.
a) Setting Constraints
The following are settings for constraints.
・0≦the number of response teams of each prefecture≦ number of registered brigades
・Satisfying the required number of brigadesb) Objective Conditions
・Minimize total burned-out area
Thus the Unit Operation tool outputs the following 5 items:
the prefectures mobilizing a response, the prefecture to which they
are responding, the number of response teams by prefecture, theburned-out area by affected prefectures, and the total burned-out
area.

4.1 Overview of Sensitivity Analysis
For the implementation method of sensitivity analysis, only 1
item was changed for the items input to the developed Unit
Operation Tool (number of open fires, highway travel speed,
blocked highway), and other items were set and calculated.
Moreover, only Tokyo was considered as the disaster area.
4.2 Analysis Patterns
Conditions for sensitivity analysis are shown in order from a)to c) below.
a) Sensitivity Analysis on the Number of Open Fires (8 Patterns)b) Sensitivity Analysis on Travel Speed (4 Patterns)c) Sensitivity Analysis on Blocked Highway (2 Patterns)
The blocked highway here is where a highway cannot be usedwithin 30 km from the disaster area, and this zone is set as thestandard for national highway traffic, which flows at 20 km/h.
4.3 Analysis Resultsa) Number of Open Fires
Table 4 shows the results of sensitivity analysis on the number of open fires, and Figure 3 expresses this graphically.
Based on these results, with increases in the number of open
Table 1.

Analysis Patter on Open Fires

Parameters

Set/Variable

Disaster area

Range

Set

Tokyo

Number of open fires

Variable

30 to 65 incidents(by 5)

Expressway travel speedSet

60 km/hBlocked highway

Set

No

Table 2.

Analysis Patterns on Travel Speed

Parameters

Set/Variable

Disaster area

Set

Tokyo

Number of open fires

Set

55 incidents

Expressway travel speed

Variable40, 60, 80, 100 km/h

Set

No

Blocked highway
Table 3.

Range

Analysis Patterns on Blocked Highway

Parameters

Set/Variable

Range

Disaster area

Set

Tokyo

Number of open fires

Set

55 incidents

Expressway travel speedSet

60 km/hBlocked highway

Variable

Yes/NoTable 4. Sensitivity Analysis Results on the Number of Open Fires

4. Sensitivity Analysis

Number of Open
Fires (Incidents)

Burned-out
Area (m2)

Number of Response
Teams (Brigades)

Sensitivity analysis is performed to track the number of open
fires, the travel speed of response teams, the total burned-out area
due to changes whereby the highways are blocked or not near thedisaster area, and the effect on the number of response teams,
which are the non-policy variables whereby operations cannot be
performed technically when a large-scale earthquake disasteroccurs, by using the developed Unit Operation Tool.

30

520,130467

35

604,776543

40691,650621

45792,430705

50

929,158802

55

1,270,387

955

60

2,374,913

1,233

65

5,755,066

1,692

STUDY ON EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS STRATEGY OF EMERGENCY FIRE RESPONSE TEAMS AFTER THE GREAT MINAMI KANTO EARTHQUAKE DISASTER

Burned-out areas (ha)Number of response teams (brigades)

Table 6.

Sensitivity Analysis Results on Blocked Highway

BlockedHighwayArea

Burned-out(m2)

Number of
Response Teams(Brigades)

No

1,270,387

955

Yes

2,491,406

1,157

Number of response teams (brigades)

Fig. 3

Number of response teams

Relationship between the Number of Open Fires, theNumber of Response Teams and Burned-out Areas

Burned-out area (ha)Number of open fires (incidents)
Burned-out area

Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis Results on Highway Travel Speed
Travel Speed

Burned-out Area
(m2)

Number of Response
Teams (Brigades)

100 km/h

1,126,580

918

80 km/h

1,175,236

932

60 km/h

1,270,387

955

40 km/h

1,593,1191015

No Blocked highway
Burned-out area

Fig. 6

Burned-out area

Number of response teams

Travel speed
Burned-out area (ha)Relationship between Travel Speed, Burned-out Area andthe Number of Response Teams

Burned-out area (ha)Fig. 4

Number of response teams (brigades)

Yes

Number of response teams (brigades)

Relationship between Blocked Highways, Burned-out
Areas and the Number of Response Teams

fires comes moderate increases in the number of response teams
required, showing that the burned-out areas on 55 open fire incidents increased rapidly.
b) Travel Speed
Table 5 shows the sensitivity analysis results on the travel
speed on the highway for response teams, and Figure 4 expresses
this graphically.
Based on these results, with the drop in travel speed at a rangeof over 60 km/h, the number of response teams and the burned-out
area increase linearly, and when the speed drops to 40 km/h, therate of increase of the burned-out area increases slightly.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the number of
response teams and the burned-out area
From Figure 5, the values at 40 km/h are compared to others,
and both the number of response teams and the burned-out area
show large values, and 60 km/h to 100 km/h results in a fairly low
position.
c) Sensitivity Analysis Results on Blocked Highways
Table 6 shows the sensitivity analysis results on blocked
highways on which response teams are traveling, and Figure 6
expresses this graphically.
These results show that, in comparison to the effect on thenumber of required response teams, the presence of blocked highways greatly affected burned-out areas.
5. Policy Experiments on Minami Kanto Region

Number of response teams (brigades)

Fig. 553

Relationship between the Number of Response Teams
and Burned-out Area by Travel Speed

5.1 Overview of Policy Experiments
In policy experiments, a large-scale earthquake on theTokyo/Saitama border in the Minami Kanto Region was assumed
to have occurred, and the scale of damage was set at a maximum
value within the range of existing solutions using linear programming based on the results of sensitivity analysis on items input to54

K. TANABE AND Y. KUMAGAI

the Unit Operation Tool, then, for internal data used for the calculations, mobilization restrictions of neighboring prefectures andpercentage of mobilization of a simultaneous shift (refer to (3) inthis Section) were changed and calculated to be used as policy
variables. Fixed values based on the sensitivity analysis results are
as follows.
・Number of open fires: 45 in Tokyo, 27 in Saitama
・Highway travel speed: 60 km/h
・Blocked highways: Yes
5.2 Policy Experiment 1: Mobilization Restriction of
Neighboring Prefectures
When a large-scale earthquake disaster occurs in a region,
there will be damage in prefectures neighboring the disaster area,
thus there may be hesitation in responding to another prefecture. In
this experiment, experiments on the reduction effect in burned-out
areas brought about by response mobilization from neighboring
prefectures to the disaster area are conducted in order to establish
these judged materials.
a) Experiment Patten (2 Patterns)
No restrictions is a policy for mobilizing all registeredbrigades in neighboring prefectures, while all restricted is a policy

whereby brigades in neighboring prefectures are not mobilized andthe mobilization response comes from prefectures beyond theneighboring prefectures.
b) Experiment Results
Table 8 shows Policy Experiment 1 and Figure 7 expresses
this graphically.
The burned-out area where all mobilization of neighboring
prefectures is restricted in this experiment mushroomed to near
2.5x that when mobilized from neighboring prefectures without
restrictions.
Figure 8 shows the situation of responding prefectures when
there are no restrictions, and Figure 9 shows the situation of
responding prefectures when all mobilization is restricted.
Figures 8 and 9 show that response requests when neighboring prefectures mobilize without hesitating are restricted to the partial range of the Kanto Koshinetsu and the Tohoku Region, yet
when there is no mobilization response from neighboring prefectures, support from Hokkaido to part of Kyushu and support fromall across Japan is needed.

Responding to Saitama

Table 7. Experiment Pattern for Policy Experiment 1
Parameters
Disaster area
Highway travel Speed
Number of open fires

Set/Variable
Set
Set
Set

Mobilization
restrictions ofneighboring prefectures
Blocked highway

Variable

Responding to Tokyo

Range
Saitama/Tokyo
60 km/h27 in Saitama, 45 inTokyo
No restrictions/
All restricted

Set

No mobilization response

Yes

Table 8. Experiment Results on Policy Experiment 1
Burned-out Area (m2)
Mobilization
Restrictions

Saitama

No restrictions 1,379,841
restricted
All3,288,089

Tokyo

Total

821,415

Number of
Response
Teams(Brigades)

2,201,256

1,321

2,258,584 5,546,673

1,672

Fig. 8Range of Response Request when There Are No
Mobilization Restrictions

Responding to Saitama

Burned-out area (ha)Number of response teams (brigades)

No restrictions
Total burned-out area (ha)Fig. 7

Responding to TokyoNo mobilization response

All restricted
Total number of response teams

Difference in Burned-out Area Due to Mobilization
Restrictions of Neighboring Prefectures

Fig. 9 Range of Response Request when There Are Mobilization
Restrictions

STUDY ON EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS STRATEGY OF EMERGENCY FIRE RESPONSE TEAMS AFTER THE GREAT MINAMI KANTO EARTHQUAKE DISASTER

Table 9.

Experiment Patterns in Policy Experiment 2

Parameters

Set/Variable

Range

Disaster area

Set

Saitama/Tokyo

Expressway
travel speedSet

60 km/hNumber of open
fires

Set

27 in Saitama, 45 in Tokyo

Simultaneous
shift rate

Variable

Number of registeredbrigades + remaining

Blocked highway

Set

Yes

20%, 30%, 50%

Table 10. Experiment Results of Policy Experiment 2
Simultaneous
Shift Mobilization
Ratio

Saitama

Tokyo

Total

20%

793,927

821,415

1,613,695

5.4 Comparing Policy Experiment 1 and Policy Experiment 2
Figure 1 shows the results when there are no mobilization
restrictions in Policy Experiment 1 as compared to Policy
Experiment 2, in order to verify the effect of the simultaneous
shift.
Figure 12 shows that a burned-out area less than 600,000 m2
is suppressed more than when there are no restrictions implemented in Policy Experiment 1 in all patterns where a simultaneous
shift is carried out, and that, when the mobilization ratio using thesimultaneous shift increases, the depression effect of the burnedout area increases even with the same number of open fires, andBurned-out Area (m2)758,708

819,768

1,580,123

50%

709,343

819,768

1,530,758

20%

30%

Burned-out area in Saitama

Fig. 1150%
Burned-out area in Tokyo

Simultaneous Shift Mobilization Ratio and Burned-out
Area per Incident

Burned-out area (ha)Number of response teams (brigades)

Burned-out area (ha)

30%

20%

30%

Burned-out area in Saitama

Fig. 10

tered brigades.
Table 10 shows the results of Policy Experiment 2, andFigure 10 expresses this graphically.
The experimental results show that when the mobilization
ratio using the simultaneous shift increased from 20% to 30%, theburned-out area decreases approximately 330,000 m2, and from
30% to 50%, it decreases approximately 50,000 m2. In addition,from Figure 10, we learned that the reduction rate of the burnedout area in Saitama is larger than the reduction rate of the burnedout area in Tokyo. Figure 11 shows these results expressed in theburned-out area per open fire.
This figure shows that the burned-out area per open fire inTokyo is suppressed less than in Saitama, regardless of the simultaneous shift mobilization ratio.

Burned-out area (ha)5.3 Policy Experiment 2: Implementing Response
Mobilization Using Simultaneous Shift System
Policy Experiment 1 shows the importance of mobilizingneighboring prefectures. Policy Experiment 2 uses a method (hereinafter referred to as a simultaneous shift) whereby neighboring
prefectures mobilize a response to the disaster area beyond thenumber of registered brigades, and fire brigades from across Japanmove in tandem to the neighboring prefectures in order to supplement the voids that occur in their fire fighting capabilities; i.e. alarge number of brigades are sent into the disaster area in a shortperiod of time. Moreover, only neighboring prefectures mobilize a
response to the disaster area in this policy experiment, and otherprefectures mobilize to supplement the fire fighting capability of
the neighboring prefectures.
a) Experiment Pattern (3 Patterns)
Table 9 shows the policy experiment patterns of the simultaneous shift system. The ratio of simultaneous shift in Table 9 is
the rate as per the number of brigades the corresponding prefectures possess for mobilization, in addition to the number of regis-

55

No restrictions 20% shift
30% shift
Mobilization method

50%
Burned-out area in Tokyo

Relationship between Simultaneous Shift Mobilization
Ratio

Burned-out area in Saitama

Fig. 12Burned-out area in Tokyo

50% shift
Total number of response teams

Comparison of Policy Experiment 1 and Policy
Experiment 2

56

K. TANABE AND Y. KUMAGAI

the number of required brigades is controlled.
6. Results of This Study and Future Issues
6.1 Results of This Studya) Development of Unit Operation Tool
We extracted the main prefectural hubs, highway nodes/links,
national highway nodes/links from across Japan, expressed the
roadway network in relation to time and distance to calculate theshortest (time) route from each prefecture to a disaster area, thenwe assigned the number of response teams and neighboring prefecture data derived from spreading area functions and performed linear programming calculations to develop a Unit Operation Tool for
calculating solutions that minimize the burned-out area.
This tool outputs the prefectures responding, the number of
response teams, the response mobilization destination and theburned-out areas from inputs of affected prefecture, travel speedsof response teams, mobilization restrictions of neighboring prefectures and the number of open fires, which can be utilized for disaster areas nationwide.
b) Sensitivity Analysis on Non-Policy Variables
This study assumed that a disaster occurred in Tokyo , theresponse was mobilized from across Japan, and sensitivity analysis
was performed on the effect each parameter for the number ofopen fires, travel speeds, blocked highways, and non-policy variables has on the burned-out area and the number of response
teams.
(A) Sensitivity Analysis on the Number of Open Fires
The number of open fires was increased 5 at a time from 30 to
65 incidents in the sensitivity analysis on the number of open fires,and we tracked the situation where there was an increase in theburned-out area. The result was that, when the number of open
fires surpassed 55 incidents, the burned-out area appeared toincrease rapidly. The cause of this is that, based on the geographical conditions of Tokyo, it was easy to assemble up to the numberof required brigades (farthest prefecture was Shizuoka) to respondto these fires, and when the number of open fires exceeded this,brigades had to be assembled from places farther away to obtain
the required number of brigades, as the required brigades assembled only from northern and western Japan. Furthermore, when theneighboring prefectures were compared to the remote prefectures,the area burned out even in the same supervised fire area perimeterincreased because of the difference in arrival times. The combination of these 2 factors was accompanied by an increase in the number of open fires, and may have led to the appearance of locations
where burned-out areas increased rapidly.
(B) Sensitivity Analysis on Travel Speed
We changed the highway travel speeds in this analysis to 100
km/h, 80 km/h, 60 km/h and 40 km/h then performed our analysis.
From the analysis results, we were able to track the increase in theburned-out areas and the number of required brigades according to
the drop in speed, yet, when compared to the sensitivity analysis of
the number of open fires, we found nothing that rapidly increased
the burned-out areas as the increases can be linear. Although, whencomparing burned-out areas, an approximately 1.4x difference
between 100 km/h and 40 km/h exists, the increase is only approximately 1.1x between 100 km/h and 60 km/h. It may be that there
is little effect on increases in the burned-out areas if a travel speedof 60 km/h can be maintained.
(C) Sensitivity Analysis on the Presence of Blocked Highways
We performed sensitivity analysis in this paper assuming
blocked highways located within a radius of 30 km from the disaster area. The analysis results showed that when we compare theeffect that blocked highways have on the number of response
teams and the burned-out areas, while the increase in the numberof response teams was from 955 brigades to 1,157 brigades, standing at around 20%, due to the blockage, the burned-out areas
increased approximately 2x from 137 ha to 249 ha. The cause forthe great increase in the burned-out area is mainly that the 30 km
distance to the disaster area was traveled at 20 km/h, and due to theextra time it takes at over 60 minutes regardless of the prefecture,and may greatly affect the increase in the burned-out area as aresult. Compared to the burned-out area, the fact that the level ofincrease in the number of response teams required can be extrapolated to be that Tokyo has a secondary operational effect due to the
2 fire engines it has. When the number of response teams fromplaces other than Tokyo is calculated, 668 brigades are deducted
respectively from the number of response teams of the analysis
results, an increase of 1.70x at 287 brigades and 489 brigades.
Thus, the results in this case may be particular to Tokyo, and anincrease in the number of response teams at the same level as theincreases in the burned-out area are expected in other prefectures.
c) Policy Experiments for Minami Kanto Region
In our policy experiments, Tokyo and Saitama are damaged,
response mobilization for Tokyo and Saitama from across Japanare assumed, and policy experiments were conducted on the effectthe mobilization restrictions of neighboring prefectures that havepolicy variables and mobilization ratios using the simultaneous
shift have on burned-out areas and the number of response teams.
The conclusions for each are as follows.
(A) Presence of Mobilization Restrictions in Neighboring
Prefectures
The policy experiments on response mobilization of neighboring prefectures indicate that when there are no mobilization restrictions, and when there are restrictions, the burned-out areas are 220
ha and 555 ha respectively, creating a tremendous gap of approximately 2.5x.
These policy experiments revealed the tremendous effect thatbrigades from neighboring prefectures have on suppressing theburned-out areas, the need to mobilize more response teams fromneighboring prefectures to reduce the burned-out areas and thetotal number of response teams.
(B) Implementing a Simultaneous Shift
Fire brigades from across Japan moved concurrently to neighboring prefectures in the direction of the disaster area. The policy
experiments on rapid response mobilization of large numbers ofbrigades from neighboring prefectures in a short period revealed
that there would be a great impact compared to when there were no
mobilization restrictions in neighboring prefectures, even when asimultaneous shift ratio of 20% was set. In addition, when theburned-out area with respect to the mobilization ratio using thesimultaneous shift is compared, while a tremendous change was
not really apparent in the burned-out area as compared to theincrease in the ratio, this shows that 20% is a sufficient response inthis case.
Furthermore, by comparing the burned-out areas of Tokyo andSTUDY ON EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS STRATEGY OF EMERGENCY FIRE RESPONSE TEAMS AFTER THE GREAT MINAMI KANTO EARTHQUAKE DISASTER

Saitama, we demonstrated that the effect of containing the burnedout area using the simultaneous shift affects the number of firebrigades the affected prefectures has.
d) Conclusions
We limited the damage to multiple fires that occur when alarge-scale earthquake occurs, and we performed sensitivity analysis and policy experiments in order to propose effective operation
measures for Emergency Fire Response Teams.
The sensitivity analysis showed that there are upper limits tothe number of open fires that can be responded to, and that blocked
highways and traffic congestion are tremendous stumbling blocks
to the mobilization of a response by Emergency Fire Response
Teams to multiple fires. Under these conditions, the policy experiments indicated the need to have prefectures neighboring the disaster area mobilize a response, and for brigades to mobilize a
response, and not be fully restricted even when there are mobilization restrictions, in order to minimize the burned-out area of thedisaster area. In addition, it became clear that mobilization using asimultaneous shift has a strong effect if the depression effect israised further.
6.2 Future Issues
The following issues require future study.
a) Improving the Calculation Accuracy of Unit Operation Tools(A) Setting Departure Points/Destinations
Although 1 main hub was established with prefectures in thisstudy, and a mustering area for response teams was established,when there is uneven distribution of locations for registeredbrigades within the prefectures, designating multiple mustering
areas helps shorten the time to assemble. It is important to make
improvements in establishing multiple main prefectural hubs.
(B) Examining the Travel Speeds of Response Teams
In this paper, the travel speeds of the Emergency Fire
Response Teams were set to 60 km/h and 40 km/h respectively for
highways and national highways when there were no blocked highways, and to 60 km/h and 20 km/h respectively when there were
blocked highways. However, there is no basis for these settings,
and, based on hearings we conducted on traveling in the left-mostlane when on the highway, lining vehicles up in a column and traveling on the highway, and refueling in tandem along the way on
the interchange, these are values set based on ballpark estimates. It
is necessary to perform detailed investigations on the travel speed
based on past examples, etc. and reset these travel speeds in orderto create a tool with a higher accuracy than the current Unit
Operation Tool.
(C) Roadways Used
Concerning roadways used by Emergency Fire Response
Teams, we established only national expressways, highways andnational highways (designated zones on national highways). For
this, although we narrowed down the target roadways in order tosimplify the calculations, the roadways used to mobilize
Emergency Fire Response Teams are primarily prefectural andmunicipal roads in order to arrive at the disaster site, not limiting
the response to highways or national highways. When establishingroads to be used, it is necessary to examine all roadways using factors such as road widths and cities linked together by these roadways, in order to create a Unit Operation Tool with better accuracy
that the one currently available.
(D) Weather Data

57

For wide-ranging objective functions to be adequately limited
for earthquake disasters, average values over the past 10 years
were set for wind speed. However, it may be necessary to use theseas non-policy variables in order to create a tool with better accuracy.
b) Using Linear Programming
Linear programming was used in this paper for calculating the
response method to minimize the burned-out area in the development of a Unit Operation Tool. The reasons for this were to clearlypresent constraints based on the number of registered brigades
from prefectures and the transit times, the objective of clearly minimizing burned-out areas, to be able to simplify calculations inshort periods of time in comparison to replicated experiments, byusing a simulation model.
It may be necessary to calculate the response method using
both linear programming and simulations in order to gain solutions
for such things as the number of fires fully contained, the numberof fires not extinguished, and the burned-out areas from fires thathave burned out, and in order to raise the reliability of this study,
when experiments are conducted using a simulation model.
c) Policy Experiments on Simultaneous Shift Systems
Calculations for mobilizing a response to a disaster area
beyond the registered number of brigades were performed where
there was definitely a supplement of fire brigades mobilizing to
respond from remote locations to neighboring prefectures of theaffected prefecture in Policy Experiment 2. However, there are no
proposals for an implementation method (prefectures responding,mobilization destination, number of brigades) for a simultaneous
shift. Thus, to make specific proposals for mobilizing a responseusing a simultaneous shift, it is necessary to develop a means ofcalculating an implementation method for an effective simultaneous shift from a remote location to a neighboring prefecture basedon the distance between each prefecture and coordinates. In addition, although we verified that carrying out mobilization using asimultaneous shift raises the depression effect of the burned-out
area, in reality, it is also important to consider the tremendous risks
borne by prefectures mobilizing response teams. This may be
because aftershocks are occurring immediately after response
mobilization. Implementing a simultaneous shift from the initialearthquake for earthquakes that are likely to occur in conjunction
primarily with Higashi Nankai and Nankai earthquakes createsconditions whereby there is a lack of fire fighting capabilities vis_-vis the required number in prefectures where response teams aremobilizing, and, secondly, where damage from disasters at normal
times that occur in prefectures that have haphazardly implemented
response mobilization increased as a result of mobilizing response
teams, even when there is no correlation to other earthquakes suchas those in the policy experiments of this study.
The following items must be considered in order to perform
operations.
* Each prefecture must set plans in advance that determine thedestination and the number of response teams, in order to startmoving in tandem to the prefectures neighboring the affected
prefecture.
* It is difficult to determine the use of a simultaneous shift as it
is difficult to track information on region-wide damage immediately after a disaster has struck.
* It is difficult to direct response teams from other prefectures

58

K. TANABE AND Y. KUMAGAI

that have different operation systems.
* It is necessary to rotate personnel who have performed firefighting operations at the site of response mobilization for along period of time.
* It is necessary to alter the deployment of brigades at the stage
where information on actual damage comes in.
This paper is based on a dissertation (thesis) compiled by theprincipal authors, and is unrelated to the specifics of their work intheir current posts.
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