Japan Institute of International Affairs“Atoms for a Sustainable Future” Taskforce, Phase II
Policy Recommendations for Strengthening Global Non-Proliferation Architecture
to Facilitate Peaceful Use without Increasing the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation
April 2010
Essence1.

The ‘inalienable rights’ in Article IV of the NPT ought to be interpreted as including
rights to access, or to research and develop, fuel cycle technology.

2.

The ‘technology access denial’ approach would have difficulties in preventing
indigenous development and clandestine acquisition as well as in getting politicalconsent.

3.

The ‘criteria-based approach’ may not be perfect but, with the combination ofstrengthened responses to cases of non-compliance with the NPT as well as the IAEA
safeguards agreement, it would play a central role in global nuclear non-proliferation.

4.

The ‘incentive approach’ may be effective as a supplementary measure when it iscombined with other approaches.

5.

Support provided to emerging nuclear states for their efforts in 3S-related
infrastructure development and capacity building could also be an effective approachin terms of decoupling expanded use of nuclear energy from the risks of nuclear
proliferation, nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism.

6.

Technology would be best utilized in raising barriers to proliferation and strengthening
the verification of non-compliance.

7.

Recognizing the central role of the ‘criteria-based approach’, the best mix of various
approaches must be formulated.

8.

Regulatory, restrictive measures alone are not able to facilitate non-proliferation values.
Packaging them with incentive measures would further strengthen the effectivenessand efficiency of regulatory, restrictive measures.

Premises
As the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide, the risk of nuclear proliferation would
also rise under the existing modality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The spread of1

sensitive technology related to the nuclear fuel cycle would be the most critical issue that
we have to address in reducing the risk of proliferation. Without appropriate measures tocontrol the proliferation risk arising from the expansion of nuclear energy and technology
worldwide, the world would become a more dangerous place.
However, it is not easy to find a solution. Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) prescribes the ‘inalienable right’ of peaceful use of nuclear energy. This isnormally interpreted as allowing state parties to the NPT to conduct research anddevelopment of, or have access to, sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology per se as well as tobenefits from such technology, under the condition of full compliance with Articles I, II,
and III of the NPT. If it were possible to constrain the spread of sensitive technology
through an approach of denying access to such technologies by restricting the transfer oftechnology, this would allow us to contain the risk of proliferation. However, there areseveral concerns. First, indigenous development of fuel cycle technology cannot be
prevented as information on such technology would be relatively easily accessible. Second,clandestine acquisition of technology would occur, of dual use items in particular. Such
concerns remind us of the difficulty in containing proliferation risks at the entry point of
the proliferation cycle. Third, intensifying restrictions on technology transfer through sucha ‘technology access denial’ approach might cause a serious political polarization and create
more nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots,’ which could undermine the reliability and credibilityof the existing non-proliferation regime.
Therefore, it is important to establish a set of criteria for international transfer of nuclear
fuel cycle technology and possession of a nuclear fuel cycle program, in combination withstrengthened safeguard mechanisms for detection, verification, and enforcement against
non-compliance. The criteria-based approach would allow states that meet predetermined
criteria to possess a nuclear fuel cycle. While the criteria-based approach has a restrictive
nature, it does not categorically deny access to fuel cycle technology. It should beuniversally applicable, not only to non-nuclear weapons states but also to nuclear weapons
states, to supply-side states as well as demand-side ones. The Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) has already been moving toward a criteria-based approach for transfer ofenrichment and reprocessing facilities/equipment and technology. What is important isdecoupling, as much as possible, the promotion of peaceful use from the risks of nuclear
terrorism, diversion of nuclear materials and technology to military purposes andclandestine activities as well as nuclear accidents, without relaxing the conditions for2

nuclear trade.
The point, for the purpose of non-proliferation, is how to effectively contain latentintentions with strategic motives by preventing covert/overt acquisition of technology
using objective and universal rules and criteria. At the same time, in order to avoid being
exploited in authorizing the acquisition of technology for ill-purposed activities, strict andsevere measures must be taken against violations of and non-compliance with internationalrules and obligations. Without these measures, the effectiveness of such a criteria-based
approach would not be guaranteed. The criteria-based approach is also important inmaintaining the credibility and legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime byproviding assurance of rule-based governance, not of governance by politicallydiscriminatory decisions.
Incentives such as assurance of fuel supply through multilateral fuel cycle arrangements areimportant measures to encouraging new nuclear energy states to give up pursuing theirown national fuel cycles from an economic viewpoint. Participation in multilateralarrangements may also result in demonstrating the faithful commitment of participatingstates to global non-proliferation norms. Non-participation, despite economic rationality,
may also be a good reason to suspect hidden intentions behind such a decision. However,multilateral arrangements alone may not be sufficient as non-proliferation measures sinceparticipation in a multilateral arrangement cannot become a legally-binding obligation. If it
is not possible to have legally-binding multilateralization of all fuel cycle activities, theincentive approach, such as multilateral arrangements, may work complementarily withother approaches.
It should also be noted that the incentive approach mentioned above deals only witheconomic incentives, which are not sufficient. Equally important is dismantling potential
proliferators’ political and strategic motives. Although this question is beyond the scope of
this policy recommendation, this recommendation takes into consideration the need toaddress a fundamental challenge for nuclear non-proliferation: the improvement of theregional security environment so that potential proliferators would not be tempted topursue nuclear ambitions to cope with their regional security concerns.
Lastly, in order to decouple expanded use of nuclear energy from the risks of nuclear
proliferation, nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism, we have to ensure the 3Ss, namely
3nuclear non-proliferation/safeguards, nuclear safety and nuclear security, in emerging
nuclear states. Advanced nuclear states such as Japan have a role and responsibility tosupport their efforts on 3S-related infrastructure development and capacity building. In thisrespect, the proposals to establish support centers for nuclear security made by several
states, including Japan, during the nuclear security summit should be promoted in terms ofsharing the expertise of advanced nuclear states with emerging nuclear states.
The technological approach should also have value. Although the technological approach
alone is not able to prevent nuclear proliferation, we can reduce the risk of proliferation
through utilization of the technological approach in combination with other approaches.
For example, combining the adoption of proliferation-resistant technologies and extrinsic
measures for proliferation resistance such as safeguards will increase overall proliferation
resistance. Efforts to obtain international consensus on the guidelines for proliferation
resistance as well as R&D efforts for proliferation-resistant nuclear technology should bepromoted. Also, innovation and improvement in safeguards technologies, such astechnology for measurement and detection, help promote the non-proliferation capabilitiesof the international community.
In considering the pros and cons of various approaches, it is important to stress thatfinding and developing the ‘best mix’ of multiple approaches with a combination of‘restrictions’ and ‘incentives’ is an urgent task for the world.
What to Do?
1. Increasing the IAEA’s capabilities ofdetection and verification of

non-compliance Better utilization and improvement of the IAEA’s existing tool kit
 Utilizing a ‘Special Inspection’ mechanism in cases of non-cooperation or
insufficient cooperation by the states concerned. This should be accompanied
by entitling the IAEA to conduct clearer and wider mandates of verification.
 Facilitating universalization of the Additional Protocol, which would provide
a greater mandate to the IAEA’s safeguards activities


Being aware of the responsibility and necessity for their own interests,
nuclear supplier states, in cooperation with the IAEA, should provide
assistance to those states that have not ratified the Additional Protocol inorder to build and improve their legal and technical infrastructure for4

ratification.


Nuclear armed states should also accept safeguards under the Additional
Protocol for their civilian nuclear facilities in order to reduce theinequality of non-proliferation obligations between nuclear armed statesand others.



Adding another mandate to the G8 Global Partnership to channel
support and assistance for adherence to the Additional Protocol

 Re-allocating resources more effectively and providing new tools and resources Equipping intelligence capabilities, including its own capacity for imaginary
data analysis
 Allocating more human, financial and technological resources to safeguards
activities Considering the re-allocation of resources to verification in order to copewith verification challenges


Records of compliance and cooperation with IAEA verification activities,
in particular the application of integrated safeguards, could be
introduced as a condition for reducing inspection burdens. It would also
help incentivize member states to comply with the Additional Protocol
to the IAEA safeguards agreement.

 Introducing new technical means for verification and monitoring
2. Improving enforcement through strengthening the linkage between the IAEA
and the United Nations Security Council to increase the deterrent effects of the
IAEA Safeguards system
 Granting a more authoritative mandate to IAEA inspections through UN Security
Council resolutions with reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter in cases of
inadequate cooperation from states subject to inspection Adopting another resolution supporting and strengthening UNSCR 1887 torecognize and define cases of non-compliance as threats to international peaceand security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter Requiring UN Security Council deliberation for the approval of a request forwithdrawal from the NPT. During deliberation, full compliance with the IAEA
Safeguards agreement should be required as a condition for withdrawal.
 Strengthening sanctions against non-compliance53. Utilizing a criteria-based approach and strengthening responses (sanctions) to
non-compliance Introducing an ‘Additional Protocol Plus’ and supporting NSG efforts to set up
new guidelines for nuclear trades Items in the ‘AP Plus’ should include:Inspection and verification of weaponization-related activitiesTransparency of activities and programs related to nuclear energyIncreased accountability of nuclear programs

Records of compliance/non-compliance and cooperation with the IAEA

4. Encouraging appropriate use of incentives through multilateral fuel cycle
arrangements
 Assurance of fuel supply through bilateral or multilateral arrangements backed by
the IAEA will serve the purpose of giving states incentives to rely on theinternational nuclear fuel market, rather than pursue indigenous nuclear fuelcycles.
 It would also be necessary to initiate an international discussion to address theaccumulation of spent fuel, in particular in small and medium-sized nuclear
energy countries.
 Such incentives, combined with a criteria-based approach, would encourage states
to ensure compliance.
5. Setting the ‘3Ss’ and liability as criteria for cooperation: synergetic impact of
the 3Ss concept and the overarching concept of the international nuclear order Elements of the ‘3Ss’ should be discussed at an appropriate international forum
so that this concept can be effectively introduced as an international norm andrule.
 Coupling nuclear energy cooperation with 3S-related capacity building and liability
 The ‘3Ss’ as a means of maintaining the quality of nuclear energy programs
 Substantial ‘3S’ and liability regulations and institutions would reduce the riskof nuclear proliferation and terrorism that could undermine global security, as
well as nuclear accidents that could endanger the lives of local populations aswell as the future of nuclear energy.
 Advanced nuclear states must coordinate and cooperate in their support
provided to emerging nuclear states for their efforts on 3S-related
6infrastructure development and capacity building, in parallel with promoting
energy cooperation.
6. Establishing codes of conduct for the nuclear business The ‘3Ss’ and liability could be restrictive measures to prevent nuclear energy frombeing best utilized in host countries receiving cooperation. However, the ‘3Ss’ andliability could also be understood as the criteria for cooperation in the nuclear
business.
 Necessity of contribution to human resource and regulatory infrastructuredevelopment in recipient states No packaging of nuclear deals with military cooperation as a confidence building
measure, in order to avoid undermining the strategic environment of the region
7. Utilizing technology for reducing threats of nuclear proliferation
 Pursuing proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technology
 Increasing the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle through thebest combination of intrinsic technological solutions and extrinsic measuresin order to increase the proliferation-resistant character of the nuclear fuelcycle.
 Facilitating research and development of proliferation-resistant reactor and fuelcycle technologies
 Promoting international research and development initiatives for fast reactor cycle
technology, taking into account proliferation resistance, so that fast reactor cycle
technology with proliferation resistance will be deployed globally in the future.
 In this respect we need to make efforts to build an international consensus on
the guidelines for proliferation resistance for fast reactor cycle technologythat include both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures.
 Promoting the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative7

Members of the Taskforce
Tetsuya Endo*, Ambassador, Former Vice Chairman, Japan Atomic Energy
Commission / Senior Adjunct Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA)
Yumi Akimoto, Chief Executive Emeritus, Mitsubishi Materials Corporation
Masahiko Asada, Professor, Kyoto University
Tatsuya Abe, Associate Professor of International Law at the School ofInternational Politics, Economics and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin
University
Takahiko Ito, Advisor, Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Masashi Nishihara, President, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Shinichi Ogawa, Visiting Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University
Toshio Okazaki, President, Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Yoji Uchiyama, Professor, Department of Risk Engineering, University ofTsukuba
Nobumasa Akiyama, Associate Professor, School of International and Public
Policy, Hitotsubashi University / Adjunct Fellow, The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs (JIIA)* Task Force Leader

8Tetsuya Endo is currently Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. He
was Vice Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan. He served in various
overseas diplomatic postings, including Vienna and New Zealand, as Ambassador. His
domestic postings include Director-General for Science and Technology at the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Head of the Japan-North Korea Normalization Talks.
Tatsuya Abe is an Associate Professor of International Law at the School of International
Politics, Economics and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin University. He was a memberof the Permanent Representation of Japan to the Organisation for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons in The Hague, the Netherlands from 2002 to 2005. He has specialized
in arms control and disarmament law and has been involved as a legal expert in several
technical assistance missions to developing countries. He earned his doctoral degree from
Kyoto University.
Yumi Akimoto is currently President of the Japan Atomic Relations Organization. From1958 to 1960, he conducted nuclear chemistry research at Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory. Since then, he has been engaged in various domestic and international nuclear
programs covering fuel cycle, environmental and non-proliferation issues. Dr. Akimoto
served as President and CEO and then Chairman of Mitsubishi Materials Cooperationfrom 1994 to 2003. He also served as President and CEO of Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co.
Masahiko Asada is Professor of International Law at the Graduate School of Law, Kyoto
University, and a member of the International Affairs Panel of Japan’s Atomic Energy
Commission. A former Senior Associate (1988-1989) at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, heserved as Legal Adviser to the Japanese Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva from 1991 to 1993. He was also a member of the UN Panel on Verification in2006. Professor Asada is the author of numerous articles on international law, arms
control and disarmament, the use of force, and international humanitarian law.
Takahiko Ito is currently Advisor to Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., as well as
Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan (until January 2010). He has
worked for Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., since 1964 and spent his business career in the
nuclear power field, serving as Executive Vice President & Director, Division Manager of
the Power Generation Division, and Director and General Manager of the Hamaoka
Nuclear Power Station (Chubu Electric Power's NPS).
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Yohji Uchiyama is a professor and a chairperson of the Department of Risk Engineering,
Faculty of Systems and Information Engineering, at the University of Tsukuba. His
specialty is technological assessment of energy systems, covering life-cycle analysis ofenergy supply technologies and energy utilization technologies, and engineering economics.
He served as a senior research engineer managing both the technological assessment
section and the energy systems section at the Central Research Institute of the ElectricPower Industry. He is an executive director of the Japan Energy and Resources Association
and a vice president of the Japanese Electric Heat Association.
Toshio Okazaki entered the Science and Technology Agency (STA) in 1966. Afterwards, heserved in several important science and technology positions such as First Secretary of theJapanese Embassy in France (1977), Director General of the Atomic Energy Bureau (1994)
and Vice-Minister for Science and Technology (1998). He is currently President of theJapan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA).
Shinichi Ogawa has been teaching at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University since April 2009as Visiting Professor. He was the Director of the Research Department, National Institutefor Defense Studies (NIDS), Ministry of Defense. He started his career as a research
assistant at the Institute in 1978. He holds a PhD in political science from Yale University
with a concentration in international relations, nuclear arms control and strategic studies.
Dr. Ogawa's most recent article is "The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and Its
Implication for Japan" carried by the Asia Pacific Bulletin (16 April 2010), published by theEast-West Center in Washington, DC.
Masashi Nishihara is President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, andalso Chairman of the Japanese Association for International Security. From 2000 to 2006
he served as President of the National Defense Academy, Yokosuka. Earlier, from 1986 to
1992, Dr. Nishihara was on the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London. From 2004 to 2006 he was a member of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission.
Nobumasa Akiyama is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Law and the
Graduate School of International Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University, and an AdjunctResearch Fellow at the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,
Japan Institute of International Affairs. His other professional appointments include
10membership in various governmental and academic study groups at the Ministry of
Defense, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, and the Japan Atomic Industry Forum,
and advisor to the Japanese delegation to the NPT Review Conference. Professor Akiyama
has published extensively and presented papers at various conferences on non-proliferation,
Japan’s national security and nuclear energy. Recently, he has been working on institutional
problems at the nexus of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation.

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