Securing our Survival(SOS)
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
The Updated Model Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use andThreat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on their Elimination
With updated Commentary and Responses
Foreword by Judge C.G. Weeramantry

Securing our Survival(SOS)
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Including the Updated Model Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use andThreat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on their Elimination
With Commentary and Responses
Foreword by Judge C.G. Weeramantry

International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

The model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) presented in this book is a draft model treaty for thephased elimination of nuclear weapons. It is a revised edition of the model NWC submitted by Costa Ricato the United Nations Secretary-General as a discussion draft, UN Doc. A/C.1/52/7 (1997), and containedin Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (1999).
The book and the model NWC are non-governmental initiatives to further the goal of nuclear weaponsabolition. The commentary and revisions to the model reﬂect governmental and non-governmental
responses to the 1997 and 1999 versions.
Drafters and consultants to the model NWC are listed on the inside back cover. Sections 1,3, and 4 wereauthored by the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, the International Networkof Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, and International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War, except where otherwise noted. The authors and contributors do not necessarily share all of
the views presented here.
Principal authors: Merav Datan, Felicity Hill, Jürgen Scheffran, Alyn WareContributing authors: Martin Kalinowski, Victor Sidel
Editors: Tilman Ruff, John Loretz,
Design and production: Natalie Lowrey

Copyright © 2007
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

ISBN:

978-0-646-47379-6

Any section of this book may be copied and distributed provided all relevant sources are cited. Please
send copies of publications containing reprinted material to IPPNW ad the address below. Responses arewelcome and may also be sent to the address below.
IPPNW
Ref. NWC
727 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 USA
Telephone: + 1 617-868-5050
Fax: + 1 617-868-2560
Email: ippnwbos@ippnw.org

We gratefully acknowledge the Poola Foundation (Tom Kantor Fund), the New Zealand Disarmament
Education United Nations Implementation Fund and the Samuel Rubin Foundation for supporting the
publication of this book.

Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high;Where knowledge is free;
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls;
Where words come out from the depth of truth;
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection;
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit;
Where the mind is led forward into ever-widening thought and action
Into that heaven of freedom, let my country awake.
- Rabindranath Tagore

CONTENTS
Foreword: Judge C.G. WeeramantryiPreface to the second editionii

Section 1: Reversing Proliferation: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

1

What Is a Nuclear Weapons Convention?

2

Who Makes a Nuclear Weapons Convention?

9

When Will a Nuclear Weapons Convention Be Possible?

11

Why Pursue a Nuclear Weapons Convention?

13

How to Achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention?

22

Where Does the Nuclear Weapons Convention Fit?

29

Section 2: Model Nuclear Weapons Convention

41

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention Summary

44

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention Text

46

Purposes and Uses of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention

48

Section 3. Comments and Critical Questions

107

Enforcement

109

Security

112

Breakout

114

Deterrence

116

Terrorism

118

Health and Environment

120

De-Alerting

127

Cleanup, Disposition and Safe Disarmament

130

Nuclear Energy

133

Knowledge and Reversibility

139

Conversion

142

Research

147

Economic Aspects

150

Section 4. Veriﬁcation

157

Principles and Demands of Veriﬁcation

158

Political Mechanisms of Veriﬁcation: Building on Existing Regimes

163

Means and Procedures for NWC Veriﬁcation

167

Elements of NWC Veriﬁcation

170

Security Context and Challenges of NWC Veriﬁcation

174

Documents

179Foreword: Judge C.G. Weeramantry
The start of a new century invariably gives rise to universal attention to ways in which that century can bemade a century of peace. So it was at the dawn of the 20th Century when the great Peace Conference of 1899
sought ways and means of achieving a century of peace. Those hopes were shattered and that century became
the bloodiest century in human history.
Yet humanity survived to see the dawn of another century - the ﬁrst century in human history that has
dawned with humanity having the power to destroy itself. That century instead of commencing on a note ofpeace, has commenced on a note of war. We will not be granted another century to put our house in order. We
must do so in this century or all civilizations will perish. That is the urgency of the situation. But the urgency
is not perceived as widely as it should be. Certainly it has not seeped through into the corridors of power.
The principal agenda item in our program for human survival in this 21st Century must be the eliminationof nuclear weapons, especially because resort to the nuclear weapon is becoming easier year by year, monthby month and even day by day.
Why? There are at least ﬁfteen different reasons why the dangers of the use of nuclear weapons by someone, some where, some time is growing ever closer. Increasing knowledge of how to construct a bomb,
increasing availability of the materials with which to make a bomb, increasing numbers of people desperateenough to use the bomb, lack of inventories of ﬁssile materials, lack of the international resolve to ban thebomb and banish it from the arsenals of the world – all these are factors which bring the use of the bomb evercloser to us.
Our desired objective of eliminating the bomb can only be achieved through a Convention subscribed
to by all powers, nuclears and non-nuclears alike. The nuclears cannot expect the non-nuclears to pursue apolicy of abstention while they themselves desire to keep the bomb as a means of projecting their power andmight.
The bomb clearly stands categorically condemned by upwards of a dozen basic principles of internationallaw. The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons (1996) has unanimously held that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith andbring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control.”
There cannot be one law for the nuclear powers and another law for the non-nuclear powers. By the very
principles of law and justice which the powerful states seek to uphold, the nuclear weapon in any shape orform stands condemned. No policeman can enforce a law which the policeman himself openly violates.
At the close of the 19th Century all the members of the world community agreed that even weapons suchas the dum dum bullet which caused unnecessary suffering through its explosion when entering the victim’s
body were too cruel to be used in warfare among civilised nations. Civilised nations today still adhere to theseprinciples and will considerately refrain from using dum dum bullets, but will argue that the nuclear weapon
does not fall into this category.
A school child of ten would see the absurdity of such a position but the great powers seem to have
difﬁculty in perceiving this absurdity. A visitor from outer space might well wonder on what logical basis weconstruct the national policies on which the future of humanity depends.
Here shortly stated are the reasons why a case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention is unassailable. It is an
SOS for the whole human race. Nations large and small, rich and poor, strong and weak must all agree on theunassailable logic of the proposition that such a Convention is perhaps the most imperative need of our time.
I have much pleasure in providing a Foreword to a book that highlights the need for such a Convention.
All creatures great and small are instilled with the instinct for self preservation and when life threatening
dangers loom large and clear within their horizon they act instinctively to avoid it. Humans alone seem toreact differently despite this threat to their very survival which every child can perceive.
With the nuclear weapons in front of us we only face destruction and annihilation. With the nuclear weapon
behind us we can all look forward to reaching that sunlit plateau of peace and justice, which has been the
dream of humanity throughout the ages.
Can there be any choice?

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 IPreface to the second edition
Ten years ago, experts in law, science, disarmament and negotiation came together
to draft a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (Model NWC), a draft treaty forthe abolition of nuclear weapons. Their purpose was to determine whether nuclear
disarmament is possible by exploring the legal, technical and political requirements
for a nuclear-weapons-free world, taking into consideration the security concerns of all
States and of humanity as a whole.
The process was difﬁcult as drafters placed themselves in the positions ofgovernments, including those of nuclear weapon possessing states, with diverse
security needs, asymmetrical nuclear forces and policies, and varying reasons forresisting nuclear disarmament negotiations. After a year of consultations, however,the drafting process was successful in April 1997 and the resulting Model NWC was
submitted to the United Nations in the same year and circulated as UN Document
A/C.1/52/7.
This was followed in 1999 by the publication of Security and Survival: The Case fora Nuclear Weapons Convention, which explained the rationale for a Nuclear Weapons
Convention (NWC), explored the political processes for achieving an NWC (or aframework of agreements which would achieve the same results as an NWC), anddiscussed critical questions about issues such as veriﬁcation, enforcement, international
security, alternatives to nuclear deterrence, terrorism, health and environment, nuclear
energy, nuclear knowledge, reversibility, conversion, research and more.
Security and Survival also outlined some of the political and technical developmentsthat make the achievement of a nuclear-weapons-free world (NWFW) a realizable
goal. The Model NWC contained in Security and Survival and updated in this revised
publication offers a vision of what such a nuclear-weapons-free world might look likeand a plan for how to get there.
The Model NWC was well received by many governments, academics, scientists,
civil society leaders and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Initiatives bysome nuclear weapons possessing states, including studies on veriﬁcation and new
restrictions on speciﬁc fuel chain elements, reﬂected ideas raised in the Model NWC.
On the other hand, key nuclear weapons possessing states continue to resist the idea ofcommencing negotiations that would lead to the conclusion of an NWC.
Major political and social changes since 1997 have affected the broader context inwhich nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are addressed. These include therising spectre of nuclear terrorism, nuclear testing by India, Pakistan and North Korea;
concern about nuclear fuel chain capabilities of some non-nuclear weapon states; thedebate on missile defence; and the expansion of the nuclear doctrines of some of thenuclear-weapons-possessing states to include the threat or use of nuclear weapons in
response to suspected development of weapons of mass destruction and even against
threats from conventional weapons.
Former UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan has also noted the growing divide
between those countries advocating non-proliferation ﬁrst and those advocating
disarmament ﬁrst.
This makes revisiting the idea of an NWC timely as it combines both nonproliferation and disarmament measures. Can the NWC approach provide a way tobridge the divide and stimulate constructive steps towards nuclear abolition? Can an
NWC address the new security concerns relating to nuclear proliferation risks? Isachievement of an NWC a political possibility or a utopian ideal?
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix regretted
the “serious malaise” in disarmament diplomacy in recent years, and recommended
that nuclear weapons be outlawed, identifying the key as “ dispel[ing] the perceptionthat outlawing nuclear weapons is a utopian goal. A nuclear disarmament treaty

 II

is achievable and can be reached through careful, sensible and practical measures.
Benchmarks should be set; deﬁnitions agreed; timetables drawn up and agreed upon;
and transparency requirements agreed. Disarmament work should be set in motion.”1
With this updated discussion on The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention,
experts have returned, and been joined by others, to reconsider the NWC in thechanged global security dynamic. These experts address the variety of concerns andquestions about the call for nuclear abolition under an NWC. They argue that in aworld experiencing diverse security challenges and terrorism, nuclear abolition is bothan attractive and logical means of reducing and eliminating the dangers of accidents,
sabotage or deliberate use of a nuclear device.
They reafﬁrm the perspective of Nobel Peace Laureates in their 2006 Rome
Declaration: “The failure to work for nuclear weapons abolition shreds the fabricof cooperative security. A world with nuclear haves and have-nots is fragmented
and unstable, a fact underscored by the current threats of proliferation. In such anenvironment cooperation fails. Thus, nations are unable to address effectively thereal threats of poverty, environmental degradation and nuclear catastrophe. Nuclear
weapons are more of a problem than any problem they seek to solve.”2This book might not answer all relevant questions sufﬁciently. There may bedifferent perspectives on the degree of veriﬁcation required for nuclear abolition,
or a change in the actual timeframes for the achievement of speciﬁc disarmament
steps, or differing opinions on the security value of alternatives to nuclear deterrence,or continuing concerns about nuclear technologies used to generate electricity, or arequirement for improved methods of ﬁssile materials disposal.
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention indicates, however, that incomplete
answers to these questions should not prevent negotiations on an NWC from starting
and being brought to a conclusion in the near future. In fact, many of the answers will
evolve from the negotiations themselves.
Although the international security environment today might appear discouraging
for nuclear disarmament advocates, the Nuclear Weapons Convention — as a goal, as
an indication of change in global security policy, and as a catalyst to further change— does not depend exclusively on arms control and short-term incremental progress.
Efforts toward next steps in arms control and non-proliferation are conceivably
blocked precisely because they have avoided the fundamental underlying dilemma
posed by nuclear weapons: whether a global security regime based on threats of mass
destruction, either evenly or unevenly distributed, is consistent with global survival andsustainability.
Since the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention was published, the debate has grownricher, broader in scope, and more nuanced in content. But debate is not enough. The
International Court of Justice in 1996 afﬁrmed, “there exists an obligation to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects under strict and effective international control.”The drafters of the Model NWC and the authors of this publication hope that bydemonstrating the feasibility of nuclear disarmament, governments will be inspired
to take on the difﬁcult but necessary and increasingly urgent task of commencing,and bringing to a conclusion, nuclear disarmament negotiations. Not to do so willcondemn the world to an inevitable catastrophe – unimaginable in scale. To do so will
be enacting the will of the democratic majority, building a more cooperative and safe
world, and indeed Securing our Survival.

_____________________________________________________________
1
Weapon of Mass Destruction Commission, ﬁnal report, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biologicaland Chemical Arms (Stockholm: June 1, 2006), p. 109.
2
The Rome Declaration of Nobel Peace Laureates, 19 November 2006. http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/
Nobelrome_declaration.pdf

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 III

The Evolution of a Nuclear Weapons Convention:
Treaty, Custom, Norm
The abolition of nuclear weapons will be achieved through a combination of negotiated agreements,
national implementation measures, and the comprehensive rejection of nuclear weapons
by civil society, political institutions and legal authorities. Thus a Nuclear Weapons Convention
will be a combination of treaty, custom and norm.

What

TreatyNegotiated agreement

Custom
Accepted practice

Norm
Universal principle

Who

Governments

Civil Society

Humanity

When

Legislation

Transformation

Evolution

Why

Legal obligations

State Security

Survival

Human Rights

Human Security

Morality

Incremental steps

Arms control

Regulation/cooperation

Package of agreements

Non-acquisition

Disarmament

Comprehensive treaty

No use of threat of use

Abolition

HowSection

1

Reversing Proliferation:
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

A boy contemplates a display of missiles and otherweaponry at Beijing military museum, China
Photo: AP/Greg Baker

What Is a Nuclear Weapons Convention?
Convention • n.

1. a way in which something is usually done. Socially acceptablebehaviour.
2. an agreement between States.
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Edition

In the strict sense, a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) is an international treaty.
An NWC will be similar to other international treaties banning entire categories
of weapons such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons
Convention and the Mine Ban Treaty.
Treaties to prohibit weapons such as these are achieved through negotiations amongstates. Generally they prohibit all aspects of development and testing of the weapons,
and include measures to prevent the spread of technology and know-how in relation to
the weapons, as well as a framework for their elimination. The most effective treaties
include a system for verifying that no state party is cheating, including declarations,inspections and technical monitoring, as well as a mechanism for the settlement ofdisputes and enforcement in case ofserious violations.
No such treaty exists yet for
nuclear weapons, but demands forone have increased in recent years,
as have more general demands forcomplete nuclear disarmament.

World Court Project
advocates display boxes
before the World Court
which contains millionsof Declarations of Public
Conscience submitted tothe court as evidence of
global opposition tonclear weapons.
Photo: Ann Marie Janson/
World Court Project 2

In a wider sense, the Nuclear
Weapons Convention would be theimplementation of the universal
societal condemnation of nuclear
weapons and the codiﬁcation of thecustomary norm against all weaponsof mass destruction. It would thus
include additional measures atnational and international levels
further delegitimising nuclear
weapons and supporting theirprohibition. Its impact will therefore
be deeper and more far-reaching
than the treaty language itself. Sucha treaty would reﬂect a broader socialand political movement away from reliance on weapons of mass destruction andmilitary solutions to conﬂicts, and would incorporate the desires and responsibilities
of global civil society for a less militarized world. It would realise a profound and near
universal desire to ﬁnally free this and future generations, human civilisation and thebiosphere from the unprecedented and unparalleled threat of nuclear annihilation.
Generated by technical, legal and political experts, the model NWC in this bookprovides ideas and text suggestions for the usual components of a comprehensive
treaty, based largely on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the ﬁrst treaty completely
banning an entire category of weapons and providing for their veriﬁed elimination.
It is also based on the International Atomic Energy Agency and UN Security Council
procedures aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. Like other treaty texts, it
provides rule-framed expectations of conduct. It also provides schedules for progress,and crystallizes the elements of the problem and solution by deﬁning them precisely.

Section 1

Responses to the Model NWC - A Summary
Since the release of the Model NWC and the publication of Security and Survival:
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in 1997, there has been considerable
discussion in informal and formal settings relating to ideas from these documents. The
Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor, in its issues published in 2000, 2001 and 2002,
documented and included some of this ongoing discussion. It has focused primarily on
the “how” of nuclear disarmament as distinct from the more familiar political debate on“when” it should occur and “whether” it is possible. The main clusters of response to
the Model NWC are summarised below. In-depth discussion of many of these issues iscovered in the Critical Questions section.
Long-term goal and next steps: To what extent can a focus on the long-term goalof nuclear disarmament facilitate the identiﬁcation and promotion of next feasible steps
and help generate political impetus towards achieving such steps? Is it possibly too
ambitious and counter-productive to discuss the end goal? There is no single answer tothese questions. However, a preliminary conclusion appears to be that selective use of
the NWC as both a tool to assist short-term goals and as a concrete long-term politicalobjective can be genuinely helpful. In addition, States’ approach to the NWC can serve
as a litmus test of commitment to nuclear disarmament.
Low levels vs. zero: There are varying opinions on the relative difﬁculty ofverifying low levels of nuclear weapons as opposed to verifying maintenance of a
nuclear-weapons-free world, and thus on whether it is realistic to aim for zero nuclear
weapons. It might be possible for a NWS to hide a few nuclear warheads and thus
possibly remain a single nuclear-armed State in an otherwise nuclear-weapons-freeworld. In order to prevent such a monopoly, the most that might be possible is to get
down to low levels of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, maintaining a nuclearweapon-free world once the infrastructure had been veriﬁably dismantled and thenuclear option renounced would be more straightforward than verifying a precise low
number of nuclear weapons and trying to enact an absolute policy of no-use and nothreat-of-use while some States still possessed nuclear weapons ‘just in case’. If weconsider the two options, it appears that, we would be better off with a comprehensive
abolition regime which would include robust mechanisms for verifying, enforcing
and dealing with breakout and for ensuring security without nuclear weapons, than
we would be with a partial disarmament regime with less capability to detect secretstockpiles and programmes. There will be risks in implementing a NWC, however,these risks pale in comparison to the risks posed by maintaining the status quo orin only developing partial disarmament measures leaving the nuclear option still a
possibility.
Compliance: The model NWC envisions a security regime based on incentives
for compliance, good faith, institutionalising the norm of non-possession of nuclear
weapons, reducing or eliminating the technical possibility for maintaining ordeveloping nuclear weapons, and establishing mechanisms for addressing noncompliance. The Model NWC includes some procedures similar to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, but places more emphasis on individual responsibility, and gives
the Agency greater powers to impose preliminary sanctions (on technical assistance) in
the case of non-compliance before having to refer the situation to the Security Council.
Some commentators feel that the Security Council is so biased with respect to nuclear
disarmament that situations of non-compliance should not be referred there at all but
should instead be referred to the UN General Assembly. Others feel that the NWS

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 3

would have to be committed to nuclear disarmament for a NWC to be negotiated andso would by then also be committed to its successful enforcement. There has also beena suggestion of a reform to the Security Council to ensure that any one NWS could not
block compliance action regarding its own nuclear weapons programmes.
Veriﬁcation and the political process: There has been considerable discussion
on veriﬁcation for a nuclear weapons free world since the Model NWC was released.
Some, but not all of this has been stimulated by ideas and proposals in the Model
NWC. The UK Study on veriﬁcation of warhead destruction mirrors the warhead
identiﬁcation proposals in the Model NWC. The IAEA additional protocol is similar
to the nuclear facilities veriﬁcation in the Model NWC, although the Model NWC
goes further in prohibiting plutonium reprocessing and uranium enriching beyond
20%. There has also been considerable discussion on the emerging technologies forveriﬁcation, the role of societal veriﬁcation and political considerations on the degreeof certainty required in veriﬁcation.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) political process beneﬁted from theextensive research on veriﬁcation and development of veriﬁcation mechanisms thatpreceded conclusion of negotiations. The NWC, or a future regime for complete
nuclear disarmament, would beneﬁt from similar research and development if it helps
establish the feasibility of veriﬁable disarmament. The more complex and unresolved
political and technical questions, however, makes this somewhat more elusive for somethan the case of the CTBT. Which facilities should be subject to veriﬁcation? Facilities
that can produce nuclear materials, facilities that can handle or fabricate nuclear
components or can transform components back into ﬁssile materials, civil facilities
that can fabricate ﬁssile materials into fuel, and assembly/disassembly facilities wherecomponents are assembled or disassembled into warheads. On the other hand there
are emerging technologies and other developments that make veriﬁcation much easier.
These include increased access to satellite photography, better radioisotope monitoring,a wider range of portal control systems and sampling techniques, real-time or nearreal time data communications systems and a greater capacity for monitoring by nongovernmental entities.
Costs of disarmament: Discussion of the economic aspects of nuclear
disarmament is included in the Critical Questions section. What has not yet been done,
but has been recommended, is a full analysis and projection of the costs involved innuclear abolition and disarmament. It is estimated that such costs will be very high,particularly due to the difﬁculties in decommissioning and cleaning up nuclear fuelfacilities. The costs involved in veriﬁcation will be hard to assess as these could vary
greatly depending on the technologies chosen, degree of certainty required and extent
to which existing veriﬁcation mechanisms can be used. Thus the actual costs fordisarmament will revolve as much around political considerations as around baseline
costs for speciﬁc tasks.
The issue of how to convert nuclear weapons industries to nuclear disarmamentindustries is covered in the Critical Questions. One of the interesting areas of
discussion on this issue has been the degree to which the new wave of ethical investing
can be applied to nuclear weapons industries in order to help facilitate their conversion
prior to the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention or whether such economic
aspects should be left in the hands of the States parties to an eventual NWC.
Non-participants: There has been considerable discussion over entry-into-force
requirements and whether it would be possible for a NWC to be concluded if one ormore key States remained outside. The likelihood of states that would not participate in 4Section 1

the political negotiation process or the implementation of a future NWC raises criticalquestions about its feasibility. At the same time, this question is not unique to the
NWC. The NPT was concluded without two NWS (China and France joined later) and
four nuclear weapons capable states are outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime
today. Focusing on a nuclear disarmament regime might, in fact, serve to draw in thesestates or, at a minimum, help identify the source of resistance. Thus there has been thesuggestion that early commencement of negotiations on a NWC, even without key
States in the beginning, would help create the political environment that would movethe remaining States to join.
Carrots and sticks: The approach in the model NWC places an emphasis oncompliance over coercive enforcement. There are disincentives for non-complianceincluding targeted sanctions, but it would be useful to explore and develop incentives
in order to make compliance more attractive than non-compliance. More carrots, aswell as carrot cake, are needed. The NPT provides for assistance in nuclear energy forStates parties and some have proposed something similar for the NWC. However, theproliferation and environmental risks of nuclear energy led the drafters of the Model
NWC to instead propose assistance in alternative energy for States parties that choose
to phase out or not to develop nuclear energy. There are no speciﬁc incentives forother States parties to the NWC, other than assurances that they will not be attacked
by nuclear weapons and that the world will be a safer place with nuclear abolition.
Perhaps other incentives would be desirable.
Societal veriﬁcation and whistleblowers: The role of societal veriﬁcation andprotection for whistle blowers has been a recurrent theme. Some see this as the mostpromising approach to nuclear disarmament, including education aimed at increasing
scientiﬁc and societal responsibility. The capacity for non-governmental access toveriﬁcation data such as satellite imagery has markedly increased. It was an NGO for
example, which alerted the world to the fact that China was preparing for a nuclear test
in 1995, using commercially available satellite photography. The potential for whistle
blowing by those involved in the nuclear weapons industry is event greater. It has been
often noted, however, that in totalitarian regimes whistle blowers run high risk of being
punished unless there is a way to report violations anonymously. In the US, protections
have been moderately effective – returning whistleblowers to the job and awarding
damages. However in Israel and Russia, whistleblowers such as Mordechai Vanunu
and Alexandr Nikitin have been imprisoned with long sentences. An open questionis whether the provisions in the Model NWC are sufﬁcient to both encourage whistle
blowing if there are State violations of the treaty, and to protect such whistleblowers
from such a State.
A problem with relying too heavily on societal veriﬁcation is that it increases
the openness of the nuclear complex, which could contribute to proliferation of
information with respect to nuclear weapons if it is not properly protected.
Implementing agencies: The Model NWC proposes the establishment of an
Agency to implement and verify the treaty. However, there is a question as to whether a
new body should be established for a NWC or whether we should build on the existing
implementation and veriﬁcation bodies including the IAEA, CTBT and OPCW.
Resolution of this question will depend on political structures that emerge, expertiseand experience of existing agencies, bureaucratic culture, concerns about duplicating
efforts, and the ability to modify or separate the mission(s) of existing bodies.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 5

Nuclear Weapons Convention - the Treaty
A Nuclear Weapons Convention
Deﬁnes terms in precise detail to establish thresholds and limits
Creates rules so that everybody understands what is prohibited and what is allowed
Establishes a schedule for sequenced steps to remove the threat of nuclear weapons byseparating them from delivery vehicles and dismantling them
Outlines patterns of behaviour and cooperation that will enhance the communication andtransparency in implementing the treaty, and those that will arouse suspicion and possible
sanctions
Establishes veriﬁcation measures to make sure that no one is cheating.

While some governments believe that calls for a comprehensive NWC are premature,
the majority of states in the world want negotiations to commence. In December 2006
at the UN General Assembly, 125 governments - including nuclear-armed China,
India and Pakistan - called upon states to immediately fulﬁl their nuclear disarmament
obligations “by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusionof a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing,deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing fortheir elimination”.1
International desire and demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons have existed
since nuclear weapons themselves were ﬁrst invented. The very ﬁrst resolution of theUnited Nations called unanimously for “the elimination from national armaments ofatomic weapons…”4 – a call repeated in various forms nearly every year since then.
Not only do a majority of states want a Nuclear Weapons Convention; opinion polls
demonstrate that a majority of citizens – including those of nuclear weapon states– also overwhelmingly want a nuclear-weapon-free future.

Convention as a Customary Norm
“The solution arrived at in this [International Court of Justice] Advisory
Opinion frankly states the legal reality, while faithfully expressing andreﬂecting the hope, shared by all, peoples and States alike, that nuclear
disarmament will always remain the ultimate goal of all action in the ﬁeld of
nuclear weapons, that the goal is no longer utopian and that it is the duty of all
to seek to attain it more actively than ever... Indeed, it is not unreasonable tothink that, considering the at least formal unanimity in this ﬁeld, this twofold
obligation to negotiate in good faith and achieve the desired result has now, 50
years on, acquired a customary character.”
Declaration by Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, former President of theInternational Court of Justice, appended to the Advisory Opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, delivered on 8 July 1996.
[Original: French] 6

Section 1

There are few recent polls on nuclear weapons but those conducted towards the end of thenineties were strongly supportive of negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. It is possiblethat opinion may have moved during the last decade but unlikely to have changed dramatically.
69 % of Europeans polled in France, Italy, Germany, Belgium Turkey and the UK want Europe tobe nuclear free. (StratCom for Greenpeace International in March 2006)
87% of those polled in the US agreed, “the US should negotiate an agreement to eliminate
nuclear weapons.” (Lake, Sosin and Snell, 1997)
87% of those polled in Britain agreed, “Britain should help to negotiate a global treaty to prohibit
and eliminate nuclear weapons.” (Gallup, 1997)
61% of Russians polled agreed that “All nuclear weapons states should eliminate such weapons.”(Vox Populi commissioned by TASS, 1998)
62% of Indians polled agreed that “India should not produce nuclear bombs.” (The Hindu,1998)
78% of Japanese polled agreed that “all nuclear weapons states should eliminate such weapons.”(Asahi Shimbun, 1998)
92% of Australians polled agreed that “Australia should help negotiate a global treaty to ban anddestroy all nuclear weapons.” (Roy Morgan Research Co., 1998)
92% of Norwegians polled agreed that “Norway should work actively for a ban on nuclear
weapons.” (4 fakta A/S, 1998)
72% of Belgians polled said they were for “an initiative on behalf of Belgium with an aim of
initiating talks concerning a treaty for the abolition of nuclear weapons.” (Market Response, 1998)
93% of Canadians polled agreed that “Canada should take a leadership role in global negotiations
to eliminate nuclear weapons” (Angus Reid Group, 1998)

International law comes from both treaties and customary norms, a combination ofgenerally accepted practice and a sense of legal obligation. When a custom becomes
self-evident and requires formalization, treaties are negotiated to codify the practice
into law. The Mine Ban Treaty the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical
Weapons Convention are treaties that have prohibited landmines, biological weaponsand chemical weapons, respectively.
They evolved from already existing customary prohibitions against weaponsthat are indiscriminate, that use poison, that cause unnecessary suffering, that do
not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants, or that are used in a
disproportionate manner that violates neutral territory or causes long-term and severe
damage to the environment. Weapons of mass destruction, by their very nature, violate
most or all of these principles, many of which were codiﬁed in the Geneva and Hague
Conventions and the Statute for an International Criminal Court.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 7

“A nuclear disarmament
treaty is achievable andcan be reached throughcareful, sensible andpractical measures.
Benchmarks should
be set; deﬁnitions
agreed; timetables
drawn up and agreed
upon; and transparency
requirements agreed.
Disarmament work
should be set inmotion.”- Weapons of Terror,
Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Commission, 2006

The highest court in the world on general questions of international law is theInternational Court of Justice (ICJ), the judicial branch of the UN. In 1996, the ICJ
applied international law to nuclear weapons, and determined unanimously that thethreat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal, and that there exists an obligation
to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament.
The court was unanimous on whether governments were obliged to negotiate on
disarmament. The judges found that not only were states required by law to begin
negotiations, but also they must achieve complete nuclear disarmament through goodfaith negotiation. The court insisted that talking is not enough; the talk must leadto achievement of a successful outcome. The Court also de-linked the obligation toachieve nuclear disarmament from the objective of comprehensive demilitarization(general and complete disarmament) and insisted that the obligation to achieve nuclear
disarmament applies universally to all states, not just the states with nuclear weapons.
In arriving at this conclusion, the ICJ took into consideration the “dictates ofpublic conscience”, which are mentioned in the Hague and Geneva Conventions as
an important indication of the legal status of particular weapons systems for which
there is no speciﬁc treaty prohibition. The ICJ was presented with nearly four million“declarations of public conscience” in 40 different languages, along with evidence ofwidespread public condemnation of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, an NWC should be seen not as creating an entirely new prohibition
against nuclear weapons, but as implementing an existing prohibition against weaponsof mass destruction. Nuclear weapons are by far the most potent and destructive
weapons ever invented; qualitatively and quantitatively in a different league from anyother weapon. They alone have the potential to exterminate much of humanity andother species, end human civilisation, severely damage most ecosystems and disrupt
the climate, and cause global radioactive contamination over vast timeframes. Theirsingular potency accounts in part for the reluctance of the states that possess them togive them up. It also makes their abolition within a proximate timeframe all the moreurgent.
An argument has been made that other weapons of mass destruction, namely
biological and chemical weapons, continue to pose current and potential future threats,
despite treaties for their prohibition. The Biological Weapons Convention and theChemical Weapons Convention have not yet brought about the complete elimination ofthese weapons. But a primary reason offered as justiﬁcation for the pursuit of biologicaland chemical weapons by less developed states is that they are the “poor man’s nuclear
weapons”—that is, they are needed to counter the threat of nuclear weapons. Similarly,
the nuclear weapon states justify their retention of nuclear weapons, in part, as
deterrents to the use of biological and chemical weapons and as potentially necessary
to eliminate such threats pre-emptively. Thus, although the legal regimes addressing
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are distinct, the elimination of nuclear
weapons will assist in the elimination of all indiscriminate weapons.
There are valid technical and political reasons for maintaining distinct disarmamentand veriﬁcation mechanisms for the various weapons of mass destruction. But without
a general recognition that reliance on the capacity for mass destruction feeds on itself,
decision-makers will continue to rely on—and further develop—these capabilities.
The technical difﬁculties in verifying an NWC are not impediments to thenegotiation of such a treaty. The technology to produce chemical weapons is far
simpler, more diverse, more widely available, and more difﬁcult to differentiate fromlegitimate industrial, agricultural, pharmaceutical and other purposes than is thetechnology required to produce nuclear weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention
includes veriﬁcation and inspection provisions that are relatively intrusive but widely
accepted. On the other hand, the Biological Weapons Convention has been severely
constrained by the lack of effective veriﬁcation and enforcement provisions. The efforts

 8Section 1of many countries over many years to strengthen the BWC through an additional
protocol containing veriﬁcation provisions modelled on those of the CWC have been
frustrated by the unwillingness of the current US administration to accept any suchprovisions. In addition to the technical challenges, major deﬁciencies in the regimes
for minimising chemical and especially biological weapons threats, both current andfuture, relate to political will.
The Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions are key milestones for the
global community, establishing a clear prohibition of these weapons, spelling out
speciﬁc obligations to eliminate stockpiles, and providing means to respond to noncompliance. The mechanisms are not ﬂawless, but they impose severe practical andpolitical restraints on the development and use of such weapons, and markedly advancethe base from which further efforts to eliminate chemical and biological weapon threats
can proceed. A Nuclear Weapons Convention would complete the triad; both building
on and reinforcing these other efforts.

“Nuclear Weapons
must be banned andelimintated just as
chemical and biologicalweapons have beenprohibited ... through the
adoption ... as a ﬁrst stepof a universal and legallybinding multilateralagreement committing
all states to the complete
eliminations of nuclear
weapons”- Mulhammad Siddique Khan
Kanju, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Pakistan, July 1998

More than a Treaty
Not all who support the goal of nuclear abolition see a Nuclear Weapons Convention
as the best approach. Some have argued that focusing on a “single” treaty is unrealistic
and counterproductive, because it could detract from important intermediate measuresthat governments are more likely to undertake.
According to this logic, entire sections of our model treaty might be redundant if
nuclear weapon states unilaterally disarm, or fast-track the process by negotiating
among themselves. This may turn sections of the comprehensive treaty into separate
instruments, to become part of the “framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing
set of instruments”, a formulation that some governments prefer to use when describing
the nuclear disarmament process.
In the long run it would not matter whether elimination of nuclear weapons wereachieved through one treaty or through a framework of treaties, provided that theframework approach did not result in inordinate delay. For a Nuclear Weapons
Convention to be meaningful and effective, more than a signed agreement among
governments will be necessary. Political will and social motivation on several fronts are
required, and are an integral part of the treaty development process—lobbying efforts,
drafting, negotiations and implementation.
The policies, institutions and scientiﬁc and technical expertise that support today’s
nuclear establishment must be reoriented towards nuclear disarmament, and thisreversal of direction is the “singular” concept embodied in the Nuclear Weapons
Convention. Such a reversal will entail deeper and further reaching developments thana mere treaty, but the treaty process can be used to identify, guide and reinforce thesedevelopments towards the singular purpose of complete nuclear disarmament.

Who Makes a Nuclear Weapons Convention?
In the traditional conception of treaty making, governments are the principal actors
and the only ones required to consent to the ﬁnal agreement. Civil society, relevantbusiness actors, international organisations and parliaments, however, are recognized
as playing an increasingly important role in the negotiations, treaty acceptanceand implementation.3 The Mine Ban Treaty is often cited as a good example ofgovernments working with civil society, medical professionals and military experts
to affect the pace and content of this international law. To enhance ongoing andcomprehensive implementation, governmental agreement and action should be basedon the will, consent and involvement of citizens and its own democratic institutions.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 9The UN general Assembly
Photo: UN/DPI
by Eskinder Debebe 10This means that coordinated, voluntary governmental and non-governmental
participation is needed. In the case of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, this includes
broad expertise and participation of scientiﬁc, professional, academic, religious,
environmental and social justice organizations, as well as other social groups, at theinternational, national and local levels.
While not discounting these meaningful contributions to negotiations and to thecontext in which they occur, the genuine commitment of governments is essential
in treaty negotiation - particularly with regard to an NWC - because the questionof enforcement is uniquely difﬁcult. Government bodies, whether trans-national or
national, are responsible for existing and future implementation mechanisms. They also
manage the agencies with the relevant expertise or information to improve and reﬁnesuch mechanisms when necessary.
The question of who will participate in the creation and implementation of a nuclear
weapons convention must take into account more than six decades of determined
and increasingly widespread pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. Enormous
resources and effort have gone into creating the current stockpiles, and their ongoingdevelopment. Reversing this legacy is complicated, dangerous work, in large part
because the materials involved are uniquely hazardous and will outlast anyone
living today by many millennia. The US Department of Energy has observed that theenvironmental problems alone necessitate efforts at least on the scale of the Manhattan
Project.4 Barring a massive global catastrophe, such as nuclear war, countless future
generations have no choice but to continue to safeguard toxic and radioactive nuclear
materials.
While abolishing nuclear materials is not feasible, abolishing nuclear weapons
is—plausibly within the span of a generation. But however long it takes, uncertainty
about the political and social context of future nuclear disarmament work cannot beallowed to prevent progress on the legal and technological foundations. The abolitionof nuclear weapons is essential for human survival
and sustainability; the current situation of planned
indeﬁnite retention of their nuclear weapons by the
NWS feeds proliferation, is unstable, dangerous
and unsustainable. Allowing this status quo toremain, and likely deteriorate further, is simply nota realistic option. Future generations may well needto complete and continue many of the complex tasks
related to eliminating nuclear weapons, but there
is no more important test for current leaders thanensuring that substantial progress has been made in a
coherent and convincing framework towards nuclear
weapons abolition, and that available, practical steps
are not held hostage to uncertainties about the future.
The precise roles of the institutions—thegovernment agencies and the private, commercial,
and academic bodies—and individuals who will
undertake the work of undoing the cumulative
burden of the nuclear age will turn on the particular
combination of implementation and veriﬁcation mechanisms chosen. Decisions about
what is to be stored, in what forms and for how long will determine the appropriate
combination of reliance on environmental cues, surveillance, inspections and otherveriﬁcation mechanisms. Fortunately, the necessary capabilities already exist.
Implementation of these capabilities, however, simply requires continued development
and greater production of the relevant technologies in the context of a comprehensiveplan.
The knowledge, experience and technology accumulated to date are enough to lay
the cornerstone of a regime for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The

Section 1

work must begin now, with a view to the future roles of policymakers, scientists andengineers. The call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention is not an attempt to predict the
future; rather it is a reﬂection of the desire for a better future.
Implementing the NWC would not necessarily require creation of entirely new
mechanisms but, more likely, deﬁnition and coordination of functions on the part ofexisting and emerging agencies as well as effective application of current technology.
The experience of many international and inter-governmental bodies will be useful,whether their current functions remain or change. These include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

“Nuclear weapons
corrode and democratic
rule.”- Avner Cohen,
Israel and the Bomb

UN General Assembly to both broker agreements and maintain norms;
UN Security Council to report violations and agree to enforcement action suchas the arrangements established under Resolution 1540;
International Atomic Energy Agency to verify safeguarded global
disarmament;
Conference on Disarmament as the world’s primary multilateral disarmament
treaty negotiating forum;
Nuclear-weapon-free zone implementation agencies to ensure regions remain
nuclear-weapon-free;Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization to detect any nuclear testing;International Court of Justice as the world’s highest legal authority, toadjudicate on matters ﬂowing from its 1996 Advisory Opinion, and other legal
matters including disputes;
Regional organisations such as the EU to address particular regional issues;
US and Russian disarmament and non-proliferation bodies, including:oStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Intermediate Rangeo
Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty veriﬁcation mechanismsoCooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)oMaterial Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A)o
Nuclear Cities Initiative.

When Will a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Be Possible?
Because the precise nature of future political actors, structures and events is unknown,some claim that the call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention is premature. This view
confuses prediction of the future political context for disarmament with preparation fora better future. The call for an NWC and the drafting of a Model NWC are efforts toaddress the urgency of formulating and advancing coherent and consistent approaches
to the creation of a true nuclear disarmament regime.
There are many perspectives on when an NWC could or should be concluded.
Of the states that possess nuclear weapons, the US, France, Russia and Israel
have all argued that even thinking about an NWC is premature. They are unwillingto provide a time reference for beginning, let alone concluding, an NWC. Rather,
they are planning on retaining their nuclear weapons arsenals indeﬁnitely into the
future and are undertaking replacement and modernisation programs to ensure suchlong-term possession. The governments of India, China and Pakistan support thecommencement of negotiations on an NWC, but have taken no action to advancesuch negotiations. The UK has accepted the end goal of an NWC and has undertakensome preparatory work on veriﬁcation requirements5, but asserts that it is too early tocommence any negotiations and is also planning nuclear weapons renewal programs

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 11

to maintain its arsenal into the indeﬁnite future. The Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea has strenuously emphasised that discussions and negotiations in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) should be oriented towards achieving complete nuclear
disarmament.
As already noted, there are 125 governments that want negotiations for an NWC
to commence immediately.6 In August 1996, the Non-Aligned Movement submitted a
proposal to the Conference on Disarmament calling for the entry into force of an NWC
by the year 2010 and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.7
The mayors of over 1500 cities in 120 countries support this vision for 2020.8
The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons determined
that, while there is a need to further develop veriﬁcation and weapons dismantlement
systems, there are no real technological barriers to concluding an agreement oragreements to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. The determining factor is nottechnology but political will.9
When there is sufﬁcient political will, negotiations can be concluded fairly quickly.
The Partial Test Ban Treaty, for example, was concluded in ten days of determinednegotiating in July 1963, after years of deadlock.10 Agreements on timeframes
for negotiations can sometimes help facilitate the process. The parties to the NonProliferation Treaty in 1995 agreed to a timeframe for concluding negotiations on aComprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Such a timeframe helped to bring
the negotiations to a conclusion.11
The Mine Ban Treaty was also concluded very quickly – within a year of the startof negotiations. On the other hand the Chemical Weapons Convention took ten years
to negotiate as a high level of veriﬁcation and conﬁdence building was required in
the treaty. It is likely that, unless there are major improvements in relevant global andregional security systems, nuclear weapon states will require a high level of conﬁdence
that there will be universal compliance with an NWC for them to agree to eliminate
their nuclear weapons. Moreover, the nuclear systems of the different states areasymmetrical, requiring fairly complicated disarmament formulas. Thus, negotiations
are likely to be complex and may take some time.
The approach adopted in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention does notsuggest a time bound framework for conclusion of the negotiations or ﬁxed
dates for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Rather it calls for theimmediate commencement of negotiations that ought to be concluded in a quick but
comprehensive manner.
At some stage a timeframe for elimination of nuclear weapons will have to benegotiated. The Model NWC suggests that this be done in phases, from entry into
force. This is somewhat like incorporating a step-by-step process into a comprehensive
approach. The Model NWC attempts to balance the need for a speedy elimination of
nuclear arsenals with the concerns of safety, conﬁdence, and irreversibility.
These considerations, while delaying conclusion of an NWC, should not preventthe commencement of negotiations. In fact, it is through the negotiations that theseissues can be adequately addressed and resolved. What is desperately needed is thecommitment to begin.
According to some analysts, lack of certainty about the future has created obstacles
to the willingness to commence nuclear disarmament negotiations. William Walker in1997 observed that:[T]he main reason for the resistance of policy elites to disarmament, and fortheir ability to mount effective campaigns against nuclear abolition within the corridorsof power, is that satisfactory answers have not yet been given to three fundamental
questions:
1. Would nuclear disarmament increase or decrease national, regional andglobal security?
2. What exactly is entailed by nuclear disarmament—what is being disarmed,

 12Section 1

and when has whatever is being disarmed ﬁnally been disarmed?
3. How do we get from here to there safely and securely, and once in thecondition of disarmament how can we collectively ensure that we all staythere… ?
Unhappily, there are no clear, unambiguous answers to these questions …
Uncertainty is inherent to the current situation.12
Since 1997 considerable attention has been given to these questions by political,
academic and military analysts. With respect to the ﬁrst question, the weight ofevidence is overwhelming that regional and global security is seriously threatened by
the continued possession and proliferation of nuclear weapons and that such security
would be considerably enhanced by nuclear abolition (see “Why pursue an NWC”,
below).
There has also been considerable work on the second and third questions, includinginter alia, drafting of a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention that explores the legal,
technical and political elements required for the achievement and maintenance of a
nuclear-weapons-free world: papers published in the Nuclear Weapons Convention
Monitor;13 work undertaken by the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction;14
veriﬁcation studies on nuclear disarmament conducted by the United Kingdom15 and
VERTIC;16 informal inter-governmental Article VI Forum meetings on the elements
required to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world;17 and technical studies on nuclear
disarmament coordinated and published by INESAP.18
Any remaining uncertainty about the second and third questions should not prevent
but should stimulate work on an NWC. Uncertainty about the future did not prevent
large-scale development and deployment of nuclear weapons, which shaped theinternational security regime. Similarly, decisive action towards nuclear disarmament
will shape the viability of this goal. Uncertainty about the future has rarely prevented
human beings from seeking answers—in fact, it is generally an incentive. In the context
of nuclear weapons, pursuit of these answers is imperative for a positive outcome.
Signiﬁcant impediments to the commencement and conclusion of negotiations on an
NWC are the belief systems that nuclear weapons provide political power and military
security. As long as these beliefs continue to be held by the governments of NWS,
commencement of negotiations towards and conclusion of an NWC will remain a pipe
dream. Once these beliefs are abandoned, the achievement of an NWC could happen
very quickly. Thus, the next section looks at the rationale for abandoning nuclear
weapons and moving to a nuclear weapons free world through a Nuclear Weapons
Convention. Further discussion on nuclear deterrence and its replacement with security
based on nuclear abolition can be found in the Critical Questions section.

Why Pursue a Nuclear Weapons Convention?
The rationale for a Nuclear Weapons Convention is outlined in the Preamble of theModel Nuclear Weapons Convention. It begins:“We the people of the Earth, through the States signatory to this Convention:
Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity
and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all the creatures ofthis Earth,“The world is on theedge of warfare”- Senator Daniel Moynihan,
former US Ambassador to
India, 1998

We must “put the genieback in the bottle.
If we do not there issubstantial risk thatthe twenty-ﬁrst century
will witness a nuclear
tragedy.”19- Robert McNamara, Former
US Secretaryof Defense

Gravely concerned that the use of nuclear weapons might be brought about not
only intentionally by war or terrorism, but also through human or mechanicalerror or failure, and that the very existence and gravity of these threats ofnuclear weapons use generates a climate of suspicion and fear which isantagonistic to the promotion of universal respect for and observance of thehuman rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 13

Convinced of the serious threats posed to the environment by nuclear arsenals,
the economic and social costs and waste of intellectual talent occasionedby these arsenals and the efforts required to prevent their use, the dangers
inherent in the existence of the materials used to make nuclear weapons andthe attendant problems of proliferation, the medically and psychologicallycatastrophic effects of any use of a nuclear weapon, the potential effects ofmutations on the genetic pool and numerous other risks associated with nuclear
weapons,
and concludes,
Convinced that a convention prohibiting the development, testing, production,
stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing
for their elimination is required to abolish these weapons from the Earth,Some points made in the preamble deserve further explanation here.

Bridging the Divide between Non-proliferation
and Disarmament
Former UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan, in his ﬁnal major address before retiringin 2006, listed some of the major threats confronting humankind that require collective
and comprehensive action. These include economic and social threats (poverty,
environmental degradation and infectious diseases), conﬂicts between and withinStates, and terrorism.
Annan noted, however, that the greatest danger requiring action is that of nuclear
weapons: “Even a single bomb can destroy an entire city, as we know from the terrible
example of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and today, there are bombs many times as
powerful as those. These weapons pose a unique threat to humanity as a whole.”
Annan criticised countries for tackling this issue selectively and from two polarised
paths. One of these is promoted by the “non-proliferation ﬁrst” advocates (including
the Nuclear-Weapons-possessing States), who take no action on their own stockpiles
but attempt to prevent anyone else from acquiring nuclear weapons. The other path
is pursued by the “disarmament ﬁrst” advocates, who are hesitant to support stronger
non-proliferation measures while the NWS make no progress on disarmament.
Annan expressed concern that because of inaction, the world is not only
“sleepwalking towards disaster. In truth, it is worse than that – we are asleep at thecontrols of a fast-moving aircraft. Unless we wake up and take control, the outcome isall too predictable.”
The answer, according to Annan, is to work on both nonproliferation anddisarmament. ͆An aircraft, of course, can remain airborne only if both wings are inworking order. We cannot choose between non-proliferation and disarmament. We
must tackle both tasks with the urgency they demand.”The Nuclear Weapons Convention addresses nonproliferation and disarmament
simultaneously and thus bridges the divide between the disarmament-ﬁrst advocates
and the non-proliferation-ﬁrst advocates. The NWC adopts an abolition approach,which would prohibit proliferation as well as the maintenance of nuclear stockpiles anddoctrines and plans for their use.
The NWC would establish legal, technical and political mechanisms that would
prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism and achieve disarmament. These include
the comprehensive control of ﬁssile materials, enhanced veriﬁcation measuresapplicable to all nuclear-capable States and all nuclear-related facilities, and national
implementation measures to prohibit any individual from engaging in nuclear weapons
activities regardless of whether such individuals were government ofﬁcials or non-State
actors and whether such activities were related to activities of proliferation concern or
to NWS practice of maintaining nuclear arsenals and the policies behind them.

 14Section 1

The 21st Century faces an increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe from theproliferation of nuclear weapons to new States; the increasing potential for nuclear
weapons acquisition and use by terrorists; andthe further development of new, including “moreusable”, nuclear weapons and expanded nuclearuse plans of the NWS. The NPT, which enteredinto force in 1970, provided a non-proliferationand disarmament bargain that has, until recently,
been moderately successful in preventing further
proliferation and in encouraging NWS to takedisarmament steps. The NPT no longer provides
this security. An NWC could do this and more
– it could make the 21st Century the one in which
nuclear weapons became as anachronistic asslavery and colonies.

Slippery Slope to Armageddon:
the growing risk of a nuclear
catastrophe through nuclear
terrorism, proliferation and war
The post–Cold War “window of opportunity” for peace and disarmament has not
resulted in the predicted peace dividend. Throughout the 1990s, however, a complex
and interlocking web of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements was in place
and was seen as a positive foundation for progress on disarmament. Progress was
frustratingly slow and at times undermined or challenged by the practices and statedpolicies of the nuclear weapon states, but the overall trend was towards arms control
and solidiﬁcation of non-proliferation achievements, with a general consensus on theneed for progress towards disarmament.
The limited capacity of the NPT and associated safeguards to prevent proliferation
was graphically demonstrated in 1991 by the advanced nuclear weapons programthat Iraq had developed while a party in apparently good standing to the NPT. Israel’s
development of nuclear weapons had already highlighted the weakness of a nonproliferation regime that was not universal. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union
in 1991, public fears of a nuclear war subsided until nuclear tests by India and Pakistan
in 1998 and their conﬂict in 2002 that nearly resulted in all-out war. These provided
sobering wake-up calls that not all was well in the nuclear arena. Not only did theyraise the appalling spectre of a nuclear exchange between the two countries, theyalso demonstrated the erosion of the non-proliferation regime and the inevitability of
nuclear weapons acquisition by additional countries if a global disarmament regime
was not achieved in the near future.
The non-proliferation regime unravelled further in 2003 when North Korea quit the
NPT and announced its own nuclear weapons program as a response to the US and
UK invasion of Iraq. As North Korea explained, Iraq was invaded after they destroyed
their weapons of mass destruction. Thus, North Korea articulated a need for their own
WMD in order to deter the US from attacking their country.20
The risks of nuclear terrorism have also increased with the growing sophistication ofterrorist organisations, the increasing willingness of terrorist organisations to kill larger
numbers of people in their attacks, and the increasing availability of nuclear materials
and know-how. Both nuclear terrorist and state proliferation risks were highlighted by
the discovery of the black-market nuclear trade undertaken by the A.Q. Khan network,
an extensive international network which operated for years, with transit points anddealers in 30 countries, selling uranium enrichment centrifuge designs and components,
and Chinese nuclear weapons designs.21

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Survivors walking throughthe ruins of Nagasaki
on August 10, 1945, theday after the US used its
second atomic bomb.
Photo: Yosuke Yamahata,
Hiroshima Nagasaki
Publishing Company.

 15

“Since nuclear weapons
can destroy all life on theplanet, they imperil allthat humanity has everstood for, and indeed
humanity itself ... The
work that this committee(united Nations
Disarmament Committee)
has done in calling fornegotiations leading
to a Nuclear Weapons
Convention must be
increased. Those nuclear
weapons states resisiting
such negotiations
must be challenged,
for, in clinging to theiroutmoded rationales fornuclear deterence, they
are denying the mostsrdent of aspirations ofhumanity as well as theopinion of the highest
legal authority in theworld ... the International
Court of Justice”- Archbishop Renato
Martino, Permanent
Observer of the Holy See tothe United Nations, October
15, 1997

The legal-political foundation of disarmament has been further shaken by a newpreventive-use-of-force doctrine in which certain Nuclear Weapon States claim aright to pre-emptively attack other countries that are suspected of developing nuclear
weapons or other WMD. In addition, there has been a growing abandonment by a few
States of hard-won arms control and non-proliferation achievements, the abrogation oftreaties and the blocking of negotiations and treaty bodies. The abrogation by the US of
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the ﬁrst renunciation of a major nuclear arms
control agreement, was an extremely negative precedent.
While international attention has been drawn to the non-existent weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq and the nuclear tests in South Asia and North Korea, what is notwidely realized is that the nuclear weapon states maintain 27,000 warheads witha combined explosive potential 330,000 times greater than the Hiroshima bomb.22
Several thousand of these weapons are on hair-trigger alert and are ready to be ﬁred atseveral minutes notice. It is also not widely known that France, the UK, the US and
now also Russia maintain policies that permit ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons—that is,they maintain the option to use nuclear weapons even when nuclear weapons are notused or threatened against them.
In January 2006, French President Jacques Chirac said that France was prepared
to launch a nuclear strike against any country that sponsors a terrorist attack against
French interests. He said his country’s nuclear arsenal had been reconﬁgured to include
the ability to make a tactical strike in retaliation for terrorism.23 This opens up the
possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in a range of conﬂicts, not just thosebetween nuclear states. In fact, the US is known to have made explicit threats to use
nuclear weapons four times since the end of the Cold War: against Iraq, Libya, Iran andNorth Korea.
The implications of any use of nuclear weapons need to be spelled out repeatedly– this is the fundamental physical, biological and social reality which must underpin all
discussion of nuclear weapons. The International Court of Justice warned in 1996 thatany use of even a tactical nuclear weapon would threaten escalation into a devastating
nuclear exchange. The Court also noted the uniquely destructive aspects of nuclear
weapons in both blast and radiation and stated that “[t]he destructive power of nuclear
weapons cannot be contained in either space or time”.24“Now is the time forserious consideration of
an integrated approach,encompassing bothbilateral and multilateralnegotiations, culminating
in an international
agreement on a total ban
on nuclear weapons.”- Ray Burke, United Nations,
September 1997 (Then the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Ireland)

Nor is the nuclear arms race over. Nuclear weapon states continue to research,
design, test, modernise and develop nuclear weapons. Programs to develop reliablereplacement warheads, earth-penetrating warheads and mini-nukes are at various
stages in the US. The total US budget for nuclear weapons work soared to roughly$US 6 billion in the 2005-2006 ﬁscal year from a low of about $US3200 million in
1994-1995. The Department of Energy plans to spend almost $90m in ﬁscal year 2008,
and $300m over the next few years to develop the ﬁrst of the Reliable Replacement
Warhead group of warheads. This new weapon would replace the W-76 Trident
warhead in service with the US Navy.
In early 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin boasted of a new hypersonicmissile for delivering nuclear and other weapons that is capable of changing ﬂight
path. Laboratory-based expansions of French nuclear weapon design, development andproduction capacities have been under way for a number of years. For example, morethan $US 3 billion is being spent on a new high-energy laser facility. This year, France
is expected to start testing a new missile (the M 51) for its submarine-launched nuclear
warheads, which will have an increased range, France is also working on improving
the capabilities of its air-launched nuclear delivery vehicle along with a more “robust”
warhead, the tête nucléaire aéroportée.
On 14 March 2007, the House of Commons voted in favour of the UK government’splans to renew its Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The UK government
has announced its intent to spend more than £1000 million over the next three years on

 16

Section 1

refurbishing key facilities at its nuclear weapon complex. This includes new facilities
for assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons and the handling of high explosives
and weapon-grade uranium, as well as a new high-energy laser facility. Plans to recruit
more than 1000 new staff over the next three years have also been announced, as has
the extension of the nuclear weapon cooperation agreement with the US for another 10
years.
In February 2002, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the hands of its
Doomsday Clock forward from nine minutes to midnight to seven minutes to midnight.
On 17 January 2007, the Bulletin’s Board of Directors and Board of Sponsors,
including 18 Nobel Laureates again moved the hands of the clock forward to ﬁveminutes to midnight. They stated:“Not since the ﬁrst atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
has the world faced such perilous choices. North Korea’s recent test of a
nuclear weapon, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a renewed US emphasis on the
military utility of nuclear weapons, the failure to adequately secure nuclear
materials, and the continued presence of some 26,000 nuclear weapons in
the United States and Russia are symptomatic of a larger failure to solve theproblems posed by the most destructive technology on Earth.”25
In 2005, Robert McNamara, former US Secretary of Defense wrote of the increased
risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons use because of the policies of the
NWS:
Among the costs of maintaining nuclear weapons is the risk—to me an
unacceptable risk—of use of the weapons either by accident or as a result of
misjudgement or miscalculation in times of crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis
demonstrated that the United States and the Soviet Union—and indeed therest of the world—came within a hair’s breadth of nuclear disaster in October
1962…
Human beings are fallible. In conventional war, mistakes cost lives, sometimes
thousands of lives. However, if mistakes were to affect decisions relating to theuse of nuclear forces, there would be no learning curve. They would result in
the destruction of nations. The indeﬁnite combination of human fallibility andnuclear weapons carries a very high risk of nuclear catastrophe…
If the United States continues its current nuclear stance, over time, substantial
proliferation of nuclear weapons will almost surely follow. Some, or all, ofsuch nations as Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Taiwan will very likely
initiate nuclear weapons programs, increasing both the risk of use of theweapons and the diversion of weapons and ﬁssile materials into the hands ofrogue states or terrorists.
McNamara, former US President Jimmy Carter,26 former Head of US Stratcom
General Lee Butler,27 and others, have concluded that the only strategy that canensure humanity does not risk a nuclear catastrophe is to move towards the complete
abolition of nuclear weapons. Prominent Cold Warriors former Secretaries of StateHenry Kissinger and George Schultz, and Defense Secretary William Perry, urged the
US to lead in creating “a world without nuclear weapons” in the Wall Street Journal in
January 2007. 28 Drawing from their expertise and direct experience in dealing with
nuclear weapons, their analysis was that the reliance on nuclear weapons is becoming“increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective”.

The Legal Obligation
Under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 17effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament.”29
On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that“[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith, and bring to a conclusion,negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control”.30
The signiﬁcance of the ICJ decision is that it afﬁrmed that:the existence of a good-faith obligation means there is an obligation to achieve thegoal, not merely to discuss the possibility or even to negotiate towards it;
the obligation is not merely to achieve steps toward nuclear disarmament, but toachieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects” (that is, to achieve the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons);
the elimination of nuclear weapons should occur under international control; nd
like any legal obligation, this obligation must be performed within an appropriate
timeframe and cannot be postponed indeﬁnitely.
The UN General Assembly, which had originally requested the opinion from the ICJ,
determined through yearly resolutions that this obligation should be fulﬁlled by theimmediate commencement of negotiations leading to an early conclusion of an NWC
prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat ofuse of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. The European Parliament
repeated this call on 13 March 1997.
The conclusions of the General Assembly and European Parliament are notsurprising. An NWC provides the most logical way to satisfy the ICJ requirementsthat nuclear disarmament be negotiated and completed under strict and effective
international control. An NWC is also the most logical way to achieve the eliminationof nuclear weapons in a non-discriminatory manner that will incorporate the security
concerns of states that currently possess nuclear weapons, because the negotiation
process will inevitably require consideration of such concerns. The NWC is also themost logical way of drastically reducing, if not to eliminating, the threat from nuclear
weapons. Partial steps that leave any number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals ofsome states will not provide a solution.
The Canberra Commission observed: “The proposition that nuclear weapons canbe retained in perpetuity and never be used—accidentally or by decision—deﬁes
credibility ... The opportunity now exists, perhaps without precedent or recurrence, tomake a new and clear choice to enable the world to conduct its affairs without nuclear
weapons, and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”31
This view is now supported by the majority of governments in the world and evenmore so by citizens, including citizens of the nuclear weapon states and their allies.
Public opinion polls in the UK, the US, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada andBelgium consistently show that more than 80 per cent of people support an NWC[see table above]. The Mellman Group poll in the US showed that the public was not
generally in favour of nuclear disarmament unless it was in the context of an NWC. 32
While the ICJ opinion cited the NPT as an important indication of disarmament
responsibility, it did not assert that the obligation is conﬁned to states parties to the
NPT. ICJ President Bedjaoui, in his separate declaration, stated that the obligation
has “assumed customary force” and that “it is the duty of all to seek to attain [nuclear
disarmament] more actively than ever”.33
The US and the UK argued at the ICJ that their nuclear disarmament obligation
was linked to progress in conventional disarmament and in developing alternative
security systems to the system of nuclear deterrence. The Court did not accept thisargument and, apart from the requirement for international control, made no mention of
conditions that were required to move toward nuclear disarmament.

 18Section 1

Thus the question to be asked is not why there should be an NWC, but why nuclear
weapon states have not yet agreed to start negotiating one.

The Strategic Factor
͆The failure to address the nuclear threat and to strengthen existing treaty
obligations to work for nuclear weapons abolition shreds the fabric ofcooperative security. A world with nuclear haves and have-nots is fragmented
and unstable, a fact underscored by the current threats of proliferation. In
such an environment cooperation fails. Thus, nations are unable to addresseffectively the real threats of poverty, environmental degradation and nuclear
catastrophe.”“I would have thought
it unecessary todemonstrate once
again the commitmentof the United States tonuclear disarmament,
a commitment weundertook when weadhered to the NPT ...”- United States Delegation
to United Nations, Oct 29,
1998 (Statement on Eight
Nation Resolution: Towards a
nuclear-weapon-free world:
the need for a new agenda)- The Rome Declaration of Nobel Laureates
7th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates
19 November 2006
An NWC is the most crucial step towards a world without weapons of mass
destruction. These were developed as the logical extension of conventional military
thought, according to which the goal of the military is to threaten or use superior force
on an enemy in order to protect strategic interests. Historically, governments in conﬂict
have sought to develop ever-larger military force capabilities in order to meet this aim,
and these capabilities have, over time and with advances in scientiﬁc knowledge andtechnologies, developed into weapons of mass destruction. Many major new formsof technology, once developed, have been adapted for use in weapons. Prohibitionof particular types of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, reverses thishistorical trend. The goal of peace and abolition of the social institution of war itself
are at the core of every major ethical and religious tradition, and integral to goals ofjustice, sustainability, custodianship and human rights.
The possibility for achieving an NWC will be enhanced by efforts that increase
the interdependent web of political, social, environmental, legal and economic
factors and instruments that increasingly interlink human security worldwide. Thesedevelopments contribute to and the conclusion of an NWC will in turn contributeto these developments. An emerging NWC will be supported by current social andpolitical change, and will lead to future change. The support globally for a NWC has
resulted in part from a paradigm shift in political, social and economic systems and in
consciousness. The world is moving away from self-contained nation-state systems tointer-state interdependence combined with globalization. The enterprises and concernsof humanity are becoming much more international through the development oftransnational and international corporations, a global market, international institutions,and communications systems. The environmental and social effects of policies andpractices, and the inﬂuences of civil society organizations and movements, and evena globalization of cultures and identities all contribute to the evolving sense of global
interconnectedness.
Indeed nuclear weapons are the paramount globalisation issue. The discovery of
the nuclear winter effect – the dramatic global climatic consequences of nuclear war
between the US and the former Soviet Union – made it clear that every inhabitantof the planet could be drastically affected. Landmark international collaborative
studies undertaken in the 1980s under the auspices of the International Council of
Scientiﬁc Unions predicted that following a major nuclear war, more people would
die of starvation in areas such as India and Africa – even without being targeted – thanwould die of the direct effects of nuclear blasts in the countries directly targeted.34
While counterforce scenarios involving the two nuclear superpowers involved several
thousand nuclear explosions and more than 1,000 Mt explosive yield, major climaticconsequences could be expected with even 100 nuclear explosions targeted on cities.35

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention“Viewing arms limitation
those responsible for
U.S. nuclear weapons
must not lose sight of
the fact that the intent
of these negotiations is
not to disarm the UnitedStates. The UnitedStates could do thatunilaterally if such was in
our interest. The intent of
U.S. arms negotiators is
to disarm them ...”
- Admiral W.J. Holland, Jr.,
Nuclear Weapons the Info
Age: Who Needs ‘Em?, US
Naval Institute Proceeding,January 1999, p.47

“Nuclear weapons
diminish the security ofall states. Indeed states
which possess them
become themselves
targets of nuclear
weapons.”- Canberra Commission,
August 1996

 19

Recent studies using state of the art interactive climate models demonstrate that
detonation of 50 “low yield” Hiroshima size nuclear weapons (15 kt explosive yield) ineach of two countries, would result in tens of millions of direct fatalities; for example,
a conservatively estimated 21.7 million immediate deaths following use of 100 such
weapons in India and Pakistan. Such a scenario utilises less than 0.1% of the current
global nuclear arsenal in terms of weapon numbers, and only 0.03% of the explosive
yield of the current global nuclear arsenal. It is estimated that not only Britain, France,
and China, but also Israel, India and Pakistan, possess sufﬁcient nuclear weapons
to make such a scenario quite plausible. Reducing the yields of nuclear weapons
from those typical of the US or Russian strategic arsenals to those more likely to be
associated with the newer nuclear weapons states or, potentially, terrorist groups, does
not reduce the potential destruction proportionately. Per kiloton of yield, low-yieldweapons can produce 100 times the fatalities and 100 times the amount of smoke fromﬁres as high yield nuclear weapons, if targeted at city centres.36
State-of-the-art analyses of the climatic consequences of a nuclear war involving
100 Hiroshima-size (15 kt) bombs exploded on cities in the subtropics demonstratelarge and long-lasting climate changes, with signiﬁcant cooling and drop in rainfall
lasting years, which would impact the global food supply.37 Smoke plumes generated
by burning cities, the plumes would rise high into the stratosphere, causing climaticchanges, that would be more long-lasting, if less dramatic, than previous nuclear wintersimulations involving a massive nuclear weapons exchange between the superpowers.
These ﬁndings underscore the profound dangers posed by all nuclear weapons to allof the world’s people, wherever they live.

“Progress towards a nuclear weapon free world should not be made contingent upon otherchanges in the international security environment. Successful nuclear weapon negotiations will
beneﬁt other security related negotiations and progress in regional and other political and security
related negotiations will enhance the prospect of building a nuclear weapon free world.”
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Defending borders with ever-larger military capacities is becoming meaningless in
an increasingly borderless world—where power structures are being transformed fromstate-based to more transnational systems.
Nuclear weapons do not ﬁt into this emerging future but instead hold up its
development by reinforcing old and dangerous power paradigms. An NWC, on theother hand, will necessarily involve many different elements of global society in its
implementation and will generate new mechanisms for global cooperation. It is both alogical result of global change and an enabler of it. The experience, mechanisms andlessons involved in achievement of an NWC could be expected to have substantial
positive beneﬁts for efforts addressing a wide range of other global challenges, and will
create a suite of new possibilities to enhance global cooperation and the rule of law. It
would liberate massive ﬁscal, human and technical resources for investment in humandevelopment and sustainability. The achievement of an NWC would also be welcomedwith enthusiastic celebration and enormous relief worldwide.

Global Support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Global rejection of nuclear deterrence and support for the comprehensive abolition of
nuclear weapons, encompassing both non-proliferation and disarmament, is growing
stronger. Examples of such support can be found on the opposite page. Governmental

 20

Section 1

and civil society support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, as the most practical andfeasible way to achieve abolition, is also growing, as indicated by the following:
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

In November 1995, Abolition 2000, an international network calling fornegotiations on an NWC, was established. More than 2000 organizations have now
joined this network.38
Since 1996, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions every year
speciﬁcally calling for negotiations leading to the conclusion of an NWC.39 A
number of other resolutions have also supported the call for such negotiations.40
The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which
included former key policy makers of the NWS,41 concluded that “Themaintenance of a nuclear weapon free world will require an enduring legal
framework, linked to the Charter of the United Nations, possibly in the form of aconvention on nuclear weapons.”42
On 13 March 1997, the European Parliament called on all members to support
negotiations leading to the conclusion of a convention for the abolition of nuclear
weapons.
The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia,
South Africa and Sweden released a joint statement in 1998 (New Agenda
Statement) which noted that “The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons
will require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legallybinding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of
instruments”43
Public opinion polls conducted in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Holland,
Japan, Norway, the UK, and the US have indicated overwhelming public support
for a nuclear weapons convention.
Separate resolutions have been introduced to the US House of Representatives byRepresentatives Lynn Woolsey, 44 Dennis Kucinich45 and Eleanor Holmes Norton46
calling for negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.
More than 1500 mayors have joined the Mayors for Peace Vision 2020, which calls
for the negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention to be concluded by 2010
with complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020.
In October 2005, the Middle Powers Initiative launched the Article VI Forumin order to bring like-minded States together to “identify the legal, political andtechnical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons,” and to undertake“informational and preparatory work for the development and implementationof the legal, political and technical elements, and the exploration of ways to startnegotiations on disarmament steps leading to a nuclear weapons convention or aframework of instruments for the abolition of nuclear weapons.”47 Approximately
40 middle power governments have participated in Article VI Forum meetings heldin New York, the Hague and Ottawa.
In June 2006 the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission called on all States to“accept the principle that nuclear weapons should be outlawed, as are biologicaland chemical weapons (ie. by a comprehensive abolition treaty), and explore
the political, legal, technical and procedural options for achieving this within areasonable time.” The Commission also concluded that “a nuclear disarmament
treaty is achievable and can be reached through careful, sensible and practicalmeasures.”48

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 21How to Achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention?
“A key challenge is to dispel the perception that outlawing nuclear weapons is
a utopian goal. A nuclear disarmament treaty is achievable and can be reachedthrough careful, sensible and practical measures. …
all states should commence planning for security without nuclear weapons.
They should start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint
practical and incremental measures that include deﬁnitions, benchmarks andtransparency requirements for disarmament.”49
There are three general views as to how nuclear disarmament can best be achieved.
The ﬁrst, a step-by-step approach, entails negotiations on a limited number of initialsteps towards nuclear disarmament. The US, which supports this approach, has
indicated that next steps should be bilateral reductions in stockpiles as agreed under
the Moscow Treaty50, and a treaty to cut off production of ﬁssile material.51 The NPT
Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000 agreed that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
was one of these disarmament steps, but the US has since reversed its support for the
CTBT.
A divergent perspective calls for comprehensive negotiations on the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons under a time-bound framework. The Non-Aligned
Movement, for example, has called on the Conference on Disarmament to “commence
negotiations … on a phased program of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework”.52
A third perspective calls for a middle path between the ﬁrst two, combining
elements of the step-by-step approach and the comprehensive approach into anincremental–comprehensive program. The declaration of eight foreign ministers
entitled Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda, calls fora series of bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral steps, which would lead towards theelimination of nuclear weapons through a legally binding instrument or framework of
instruments.53

Step-by-Step Approach
The US argues that “the step-by-step is the only realistic approach in this highly
complex ﬁeld”, and that it is “yielding signiﬁcant, concrete results in the area of
nuclear disarmament”.54 The validity of the second point is hotly contested. While
the step-by-step process has delivered a number of limited disarmament and arms
control treaties, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I & II), theINF and Moscow Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and negotiation of theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty,55 these have had little effect on the policies of thenuclear weapon states, on their ability to inﬂict unimaginable damage worldwide with
their remaining weapons, or on their ability to design and develop new weapons anddelivery vehicles.
Under START I and the Moscow Treaty the US and Russia are reducing theirdeployed nuclear weapons to no more than 2200 by 2012. The US, at least, has nointention of reducing these numbers further. The US claims, “This range establishes
the lowest possible number consistent with national security requirements and allianceobligations while maintaining a level that provides a credible deterrent.” By “credible
deterrent” the US explains that, ‘“US nuclear forces dissuade potential adversaries by
being so numerous, advanced, and reliable that the US retains an unassailable edge forthe foreseeable future.”
In fact, the US retains the option to reverse these reductions: “The remaining
US strategic nuclear weapons remain in storage and serve as an augmentation
capability should US strategic nuclear force requirements rise above the levels of the 22Section 1

Moscow Treaty.” In the words of the WMDC:“While continuing the positive downward trend
in deployments, this treaty does not involve any
destruction of warheads, as they will simply be put into storage, nor any counting rules or new veriﬁcation
measures. Under SORT, deployments change but theweapons remain.”
It is unlikely that Russia would unilaterally cut
its nuclear forces much below the numbers of US
forces. As most strategic weapons have yields of 100500 kilotons, this will leave an explosive equivalentof approximately 100,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs
in US and Russian arsenals in 2012 and into theindeﬁnite future.
The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), hailed as
an important disarmament step, in fact did not halt
nuclear testing, since the nuclear weapon states
merely shifted to underground tests. In fact, more
nuclear tests have been conducted since the PTBT
came into force (1679) than before its implementation(372).59 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has
been instrumental in curtailing nuclear test explosions
by the NWS, but has not prevented testing by othermeans (see below).
It is also hard to characterize the proposed Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) as a real disarmament measure, considering that thenuclear weapon states have huge stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) andplutonium and thus will not be limited by a cut-off in production of these materials—infact, they have already stopped production unilaterally. The proposed FMCT could
possibly help to limit nuclear weapons production and stockpiling by the nuclear
weapon states, were it to include a ban on the production of tritium, a warhead
component that must be replaced regularly due to fast decay. Tritium, however, hasbeen exempted from the FMCT negotiations.60
The achievement of insigniﬁcant steps can actually have a detrimental effect on—
and delay progress towards—elimination of nuclear weapons, by giving an appearanceof progress that can reduce impetus towards more signiﬁcant steps and that could
even derail ongoing negotiations. In the 1961 negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty,
for example, both the Partial Test Ban Treaty and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) had been proposed. There was considerable public and political pressure fora CTBT. The conclusion of the PTBT, despite its failure to restrain the number ofnuclear tests and the development of new nuclear weapons, was generally perceived
as a step towards nuclear disarmament. The PTBT thus took the wind out of the sailsof the CTBT campaign. This was a key factor in the long delay before a CTBT was
negotiated.
Negotiating the CTBT in the 1990s without incorporating India’s proposals thatthe treaty be linked to a ﬁrm commitment to complete nuclear disarmament may havebeen a factor in India’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998—deﬁnitely abackward step in global non-proliferation efforts.61 Another backwards step was taken
in October 2006 when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea tested a nuclear
weapon.
The long, drawn-out, step-by-step process that characterizes current arms control
efforts ensures that by the time a step has been achieved the nuclear weapon states havegenerally developed their technology to a stage where they no longer need whatever
it was they were negotiating away. For example, by the time nations had agreed to the
CTBT, most nuclear weapon states had developed the ability to conduct a range of non-

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Venting off radioactivity
from the Baneberry
underground nuclear test,
Nevada Test Site, USA,1970.
Photo: US Department ofEnergy.

 23

explosive nuclear weapons tests.62 This has led some nuclear disarmament advocatesto oppose the CTBT in its current form.63 Many would claim, in fact, that the nuclear
weapon states have never agreed to any disarmament step until they have developed
the technology to replace what they were giving up.64
It is arguable, therefore, that the step-by-step approach to the elimination of nuclear
weapons has been tried and, on the whole, has failed, despite signiﬁcant incremental
accomplishments. The nuclear weapon states are no closer to nuclear disarmament now
than when they accepted their obligation to disarm under the Non-Proliferation Treaty
more than three decades ago. As a matter of numbers alone, there has been only modest
reduction from the nuclear stockpiles that existed when the NPT entered into force in
1970. At that time there were 39,000 nuclear weapons. Now there are 27,000.65 An
equally important point is that the nuclear weapon states have made no moves awayfrom policies of threat or use. The UK, the US and France have been joined by Russia
in refusing to rule out the ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons and are continuing to keep
thousands of nuclear weapons on alert status. In addition, the threat of use, including
even the use in a pre-emptive ﬁrst strike, has been extended to cover threats fromchemical and biological weapons,66 terrorism, and conventional weapons. Moreover at
a time when vertical proliferation continues, horizontal proliferation is accelerating, thenuclear terrorist risk is growing, and the threshold for use of nuclear weapons has been
lowered, the pace of incremental progress in nuclear disarmament has ground virtuallyto a halt. The CTBT, concluded in 1996, languishes while key states including China,
Israel and particularly the US refuse to ratify it, and other NWS (India, North Korea
and Pakistan) have yet to sign it. The SORT Treaty is fundamentally ﬂawed - involving
time-limited, non-binding, non-veriﬁed and reversible withdrawals of weapons from
deployment. No substantive nuclear disarmament negotiations are currently underway.
Serious consideration should be given to the validity of the view that “the step-bystep process is the only realistic approach in this complex ﬁeld”. Nuclear disarmamentis complex. There are many political, legal and technical considerations in the process
of abandoning nuclear use policies, eliminating the stockpiles, and maintaining a
nuclear-weapon-free world. The political considerations may be most important. The
governments of nuclear weapon states continue to resist any but the most minimal
nuclear disarmament steps, because they believe that nuclear weapons still serve one
or more purposes. They continue to assert their belief that nuclear weapons prevent
war. The UK, for example, has argued that nuclear weapons are a necessary insurance
policy in order to prevent “subjection to conquest which may be of the most brutal andenslaving character”.67 The US has argued that “the policy of nuclear deterrence has
saved many millions of lives from the scourge of war during the past 50 years. In thisspecial sense nuclear weapons have been used defensively every day for over half acentury … to preserve the peace.”68
There is also evidence of an unspoken belief among the nuclear weapon states that
nuclear status confers political power. In 1995 the Mexican Ambassador to Geneva
noted:“What is at the heart of this debate is that it … forces a rethinking of the wholecold war power structure … Look at France … The French government thinks that
their legitimacy comes from having nuclear weapons. Take away their nukes andtheir Security Council veto, and what are they? A little more than Italy and less than
Germany.”69
Until the nuclear weapon states abandon these perspectives, which risk
unprecedented worldwide destruction and undermine the security of their own people
as much as that of others, they will not agree to a comprehensive approach to nuclear
disarmament. Thus, a limited step-by-step approach, minimal as it is, may indeed be
the only realistic way some governments see to move forward today. The danger ofmaintaining the status quo and the increasing instability of the non-proliferation regime
may soon alert them to the need for reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, but publicpressure is also needed.

 24Section 1

The corporate and scientiﬁc interest in maintaining a robust nuclear weaponsindustry also constrains nuclear disarmament to limited steps. Harold Muller notes that“[t]housands of jobs and careers depend on the production, or at least the maintenance,of these weapons.”70 Scientists, engineers, bureaucrats and corporations haveconsiderable power to inﬂuence government decisions on nuclear policy.
According to Lichterman and Cabasso, the weapons laboratories in the US
convinced the Clinton administration that the only way to achieve congressional
support for a CTBT was to guarantee a well-funded “nuclear weapons research andtesting program of Cold War proportions that will keep nuclear weapons in the arsenal,in the budget, and in the career paths of scientists well into the next century”.71“As a matter of numbers
alone, there has beenvery little net reduction
from the nuclear
stockpiles that existed
when the NPT enteredinto force in 1970. At thattime there were 39,000
nuclear weapons, Now
there are 36,000”- Canberra Commission,
August 1996

Comprehensive Approach
Advocates of the comprehensive approach argue that it is high time the nuclear
weapon states abandoned their nuclear deterrence policies and began work on atreaty for their complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Their arguments include thefollowing:
Nuclear deterrence is inherently unstable and is bound to fail at some point.
Deterrence relies on preventing an attack by convincing the enemy that a nuclear
response would result. An enemy is only convinced if they perceive a genuine
chance that nuclear weapons may be used against them. Thus, the line separating
threat from actual use in a conﬂict situation must remain solid for deterrence towork. Once this line is crossed, deterrence has clearly failed, and when it fails,
there is no plan B. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union approached thatline and then backed down. Had they crossed the line, the US would have faced adilemma: either use nuclear weapons or downgrade their deterrent value. If nuclear
deterrence remains an indeﬁnite policy, a conﬂict between nuclear weapon states—
whether through intent, human error, malice or ill will, technical malfunction,
inadvertent crisis escalation, sabotage, or terrorist provocation—will inevitably
cross the line at some time and thus result in a nuclear exchange.
Nuclear war could also occur by accident or miscalculation. A number ofaccidents that could have resulted in an inadvertent nuclear exchange have alreadyoccurred.72
Nuclear deterrence stimulates other states to develop or acquire either nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in response. For these reasons,nuclear deterrence should be abandoned immediately. There is no valid reason to
wait until nuclear disarmament steps have been achieved before dropping policies
of ﬁrst use—or indeed any use—of nuclear weapons.
Proponents of a comprehensive approach also argue that this is the only way todeal with the asymmetries in nuclear arsenals and capabilities, as has been clearly
demonstrated in the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBT was
originally proposed by India. Yet India rejected the CTBT when it was ﬁnallyconcluded, because by then other nuclear weapon states had developed the means for
non-explosive testing while India had not.73
With the US, Russia, France, the UK and some of their allies refusing at this stage
to embark upon a comprehensive approach, such a proposal seems unrealistic.74 As
indicated by the work of the Article VI Forum and others,75 however, it is possible forlikeminded States to make some progress on the development and implementationof the legal, technical and political elements for a nuclear-weapons-free world even
before all NWS have agreed to such a comprehensive approach. A change in politicalcircumstances, governments, or leaders may suddenly enable progress, and such

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 25changes may be facilitated by public and political pressure and preparatory work.
Advocates of a comprehensive approach, however, believe that it is possible tochange the perspectives of the hold-out NWS and their allies. Indeed, rejection of
nuclear deterrence and support for a rapid and comprehensive disarmament process
has already permeated the consciences of many academics, policy makers, scientists,
military leaders, and citizens throughout the world. For example:
On 6 February 1985, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki launched an appeal
calling for the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. The
appeal has since been signed by more than 80 million people, making it thelargest petition in the world. 76
On 5 December 1996, General Lee Butler and more than 50 other retired
generals and admirals from 17 countries including Russia, the UK, France,
India and Pakistan released a statement calling for the comprehensive
elimination of nuclear weapons. 77
On 17 June 1997, the US National Academy of Sciences released a reportcalling for a long-term strategy of complete elimination of nuclear weapons
and intermediate steps including restricting the role of nuclear weapons to only
deterring nuclear threats. 78
On 2 February 1998, 117 civilian leaders, including 47 past or present headsof state, (including from France, US, UK, Russia, Germany, Japan and South
Korea), released a statement calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. 79
On 9 June 1998, the foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New
Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden released a joint declaration callingfor a new agenda for nuclear disarmament culminating in the elimination of
nuclear weapons.
In October 1998, 75 US bishops released a statement condemning nuclear
deterrence and called for nuclear abolition.80 Fifteen years earlier this samegroup of bishops had condemned the use of nuclear weapons but had given
limited support to nuclear weapons possession and nuclear deterrence.81
On 3 October 2000, 70 prominent Americans, including former President
Jimmy Carter, Martin Sheen (actor), General Charles Horner (Commanderof the Coalition Air Forces in Desert Storm and Former Commander in Chiefof US SPAC ECOM), Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. (Former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Walter Cronkite, Ambassador Paul Nitze, Admiral
Stansﬁeld Turner (Former Director of Central Intelligence); Elie Wiesel (Nobel
Peace Laureate), Mia Farrow, Bill Joy (Co-Founder and Chief Scientist Sun
Microsystems), Sally Ride (Astronaut and President of Space.com), Hans
Bethe (Nobel Peace Laureate and physicist in the Manhattan Project), Joe
Firmage (CEO Project Voyager and Former CEO of US Web), and Steven
Kirsch (Founder Infoseek and Chairman and Founder Propel), released astatement in the New York Times calling upon “the United States government
to commit itself unequivocally to negotiate the worldwide reduction andelimination of nuclear weapons, in a series of well-deﬁned stages accompanied
by increasing veriﬁcation and control.”
On 25 June 2001, the US Conference of Mayors adopted a policy supporting
the elimination of nuclear weapons and presented this policy along with alonger Mayors Statement on nuclear disarmament to President Bush when headdressed the conference on the same day.83
The World Council of Churches, at its 9th Assembly in February 2006 in
Porto Alegre, Brazil, issued a Minute on the Elimination of Nuclear Arms,
which recognizes “the incontrovertible immorality of nuclear weapons.” The
ﬁve original nuclear weapons states “must pledge never to be the ﬁrst to use
nuclear weapons, never threaten any use, and remove their weapons fromhigh alert status and from the territory of non-nuclear states.” The Assembly“calls on each member church to urge its own government to pursue theunequivocal elimination of nuclear weapons under the terms of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.”84
In June 2006, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission issued its report
declaring that a nuclear disarmament treaty is achievable and can be reachedthrough careful, sensible and practical measures.85

 26

Section 1

By October 2006, more than 1,500 mayors in 120 countries had joined Mayors
for Peace, which is designed to build solidarity and facilitate coordination
among the cities that support the Program to Promote the Solidarity of Cities
towards the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons.
Advocates of a comprehensive approach have also noted theparallels between nuclear weapons and landmines, for which
a comprehensive approach was successful. Francis Sejersted,at that time the Chairman of the Nobel Committee, noted that:“Both hit victims at a vast remove from the actual warfare.
They strike mainly at civilian populations, and their effects
continue for generations after the end of the armed conﬂict.
They are weapons, which cast the shadow of war also acrosspeace. War’s threat to life and limb is everywhere and neverending.”86
For some years, negotiations on landmines were bogged
down in a step-by-step process involving negotiations oflimited protocols of the Inhumane Weapons Convention.87 The
shift by the majority of states to a comprehensive approach, led
by Canada in the early 1990s, resulted in the rapid conclusion of the Mine Ban Treaty.88
A key to the success of the landmines campaign was that the focus on a completeban, not just on control of landmines or a ban on certain types such as “dumb”
mines, captured public attention as a meaningful and visionary measure. During thenegotiation process, the comprehensive approach allowed the negotiators to jump overtricky issues such as which types of mines are “smart” and which types are “dumb”,
and to sidestep the fact that control mechanisms tend to discriminate in favour oftechnically advanced countries.
A similar comprehensive approach to nuclear weapons has the potential to capture
public attention and to jump over deadlocks in negotiations caused by asymmetries innuclear capabilities; disagreements over deﬁnitions, scope, and relative priorities; arange of complexities regarding reporting and veriﬁcation; and other issues—deadlocks
that cannot be overcome by partial measures.
Canadian Member of Parliament Bill Blaiklie had this to say after the achievementof the Mine Ban Treaty: “What we need now is a similar but even more comprehensive
and successful dynamic—to abolish nuclear weapons which pose a threat to the entire
human prospect.”89

The US nuclear bomb,
the B28R1, wasrecovered from waters off
the coast of Spain after a
B-52 bomber collided with
its refueler, scattering four
nuclear bombs over the
Spanish countryside.
Photo: Natural Resources
Defense Council, Nuclear
Weapons Databook,
Volume 1.

An Incremental–Comprehensive Approach
An alternative path forward between the above two extremes has been described
as an incremental–comprehensive approach.90 This approach incorporates step-bystep measures within a comprehensive framework. It is the approach suggested by theCanberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,91 by the New Agenda
Coalition92 and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.
The UN resolutions in relation to the International Court of Justice advisory opinion
on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons also suggest this approach.93
These resolutions call for the implementation of the disarmament obligation throughnegotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.
In introducing the follow up of the ICJ resolution, Malaysia noted:
While a model draft convention prepared by leading international nuclear
disarmament experts is already in circulation as a basis of discussion, my delegation
is not … suggesting the immediate negotiations on such a convention at this stage.
We believe the road towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons will be a long

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 27

General Lee Butler
and General Andrew
Goodpastor address
the National Press Clubin Washington, DC, toannounce the statementby more than 50 otherretired generals andadmirals calling for theelimination of nuclear
weapons.
Photo: Art Garrison

 28

and arduous one and would be best travelled through a series of well-deﬁned stages,
accompanied by proper veriﬁcation and control mechanisms. Such an approach is,therefore, not incompatible with the step-by-step incremental approaches alreadymooted by others.”94
An incremental–comprehensive approach has many advantages over a purely
step-by-step approach. It would ensure that negotiations would continue beyond
the achievement of small steps. Negotiators, policy makers and the public would allunderstand that the goal is not the small step but the complete measure. It could also
increase the momentum to complete the elimination process as governments andcitizens feel empowered by initial success anddevelop greater conﬁdence that the ﬁnal goal isachievable.
An incremental–comprehensive approach
would help to overcome the problems ofasymmetry in nuclear arsenals. Negotiating
parties would be willing to accept temporary
imbalances in forces or capabilities because
they would be conﬁdent that such temporary
imbalances would be rectiﬁed by subsequent
measures that would be part of the negotiating
program. Ultimately, the only real balance will
occur when no state possesses nuclear weapons.
If they recognize a clear program and can see
progress to reach that goal, states will more easily
agree to the steps along the way.
While the path to nuclear disarmament will
not mirror precisely the paths taken towards theabolition of biological weapons, chemical weapons, and landmines, adopting a similar
comprehensive goal for nuclear disarmament, as was done in those treaties, will assist
the process.
The nuclear weapon states are resisting the incremental–comprehensive approach
because they are not prepared to accept the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,
and they see this as the slippery slope to elimination.
The UK, for example, opposed the 1998 UN resolution Towards a nuclear-weaponfree world: the need for a new agenda95 because it “advocates measures which we on
the national basis … concluded … would be at the present time inconsistent with themaintenance of a credible minimum nuclear deterrence”.96
It would probably be more accurate to describe the incremental–comprehensive
approach as a path rather than a slippery slope. Once we are on the path, reaching
the destination is easier than if we had not begun the journey, but there would still bechecks and resting points along the way if conﬁdence and security were not sufﬁciently
developed to advance to the next step. For example, the Model NWC proposes a seriesof phases for reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons. Before commencing a phase of
reductions, states would have the opportunity to afﬁrm their conﬁdence that other states
have implemented their obligations under the previous phase.
Stansﬁeld Turner has noted that the most difﬁcult step may be proceeding froma few nuclear weapons to zero. He thus proposes a resting point prior to complete
elimination that would provide a “virtual zero”. This could be done by placing all
remaining nuclear weapons under a system of “strategic escrow”, which would “lockup” the weapons but make them available if necessary in an emergency and withpermission from an international controlling agency.97
The very fact that initial steps on the path had been taken would increase conﬁdence
to take the next step. For example, the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, with appropriate
veriﬁcation, is one of the suggested early steps in this approach. This measure would
increase conﬁdence on all sides that they would not be subject to a surprise attack, orSection 1

to accidental or inadvertent launch of nuclear weapons. It would enable a move awayfrom launch-on-warning posture, as states would have advance warning of any moves
to re-alert an opposing force’s weapons before they could be launched.
At the outset, states may prefer not to remove warheads from the delivery vehicles
until they have conﬁdence in the veriﬁcation systems developed through the de-alerting
process. Once such conﬁdence has been achieved, it would be much easier to adopt thenext disarmament measure.
In addition, an incremental–comprehensive approach would include thresholdstates98 and nuclear capable states99 as participants in the negotiating process, thus
reducing or eliminating the continuing risk of nuclear proliferation, which has been a
key rationale used by the nuclear weapon states to hold onto their nuclear weapons.100“The nuclear weapon is
obsolete. I want to get
rid of it”- General Charles Homer,
Former commander of US
Space Command.

Where Does the Nuclear Weapons Convention Fit?
The NWC ﬁts into either a comprehensive approach or an incremental–
comprehensive approach. It provides a conceptual package for the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons, taking into consideration each of the following:
the security concerns that would need to be the subject of negotiations;the technical difﬁculties in verifying the elimination of nuclear weapons andthe safe disposal of weapons materials; andthe legal mechanisms that would need to be established to implement theprocess with fairness and enforcement capacity.
In addition, it is framed in order to encourage and encompass incremental measuresthat could be adopted on the way to negotiating a complete convention.

Process for Negotiation
There are various perspectives on which negotiating forum can best achieve
nuclear disarmament. The Non-Aligned Movement has called for the Conference
on Disarmament “to establish, as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee to startnegotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons”.101
The 2000 NPT Review Conference identiﬁed the necessity of establishing in the
Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal
with nuclear disarmament.102
The US, on the other hand, holds that “bilateral efforts which have already produced
concrete results in the area of nuclear disarmament remain, for the time being, the only
realistic approach to arms control”.103 For this reason, the US opposes any negotiations,or even discussions on negotiations, in the Conference on Disarmament.
Negotiations leading to the conclusion of an NWC would most likely require
packages of negotiations in different forums. Ultimately, the conclusion of negotiations
on an NWC will need to be folded into one speciﬁc multilateral forum. Most likelythat will be either the Conference on Disarmament or a special negotiating conference.
Work in other forums will be necessary, however, if there is to be progress towards theﬁnal goal.

Bilateral Negotiations
The US and Russia continue to hold 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons – 26,000of the 27,000 global total (and more than 90% of the 12,000 deployed nuclear
weapons).104 Moreover, they maintain stockpiles of nuclear weapons at functionallyclose to Cold War levels – much larger arsenals than are needed to strike all signiﬁcantSecuring our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 29military targets, as well as every moderate to large city in the world. Many targets aretargeted with multiple warheads. Other nuclear weapon states have indicated that they
will not join plurilateral negotiations on reductions until the stockpiles of the US andRussia are brought down to levels comparable with their own. The most appropriate
way for US and Russian stockpiles to be further reduced is through bilateralnegotiations.
General Lee Butler has observed that numbers are not the key question—policy
is.105 In this case, policy issues include forward deployment, level of authorisation
required to launch nuclear weapons, alert status of nuclear weapons, ﬁrst use, potential
and thresholds for use, use against other weapons of mass destruction and non-WMD
threats, security assurances, commitment to abolition, transparency, and nuclear
weapons research and development. Plurilateral negotiations (amongst Nuclear Weapon
States106 or nuclear-weapons-possessing states107) and multilateral negotiations,particularly regarding policy aspects of nuclear disarmament, should therefore beheld concurrently with bilateral negotiations and should not be held hostage to any
difﬁculties in bilateral processes.
Number reductions, however, are not the only accomplishment in bilateral processes.
In negotiating and implementing bilateral treaties,108 the US and Russia have alsoestablished comprehensive missile and warhead destruction processes, veriﬁcation
regimes, and conﬁdence-building measures.
Some of these elements can be usefully included in plurilateral and multilateralprocedures yet to be negotiated. Transferring some of them into a multilateral context,
however, may be difﬁcult or inappropriate. Certain information that neither state would
want to be made available to other states is shared conﬁdentially. Certain technicalinformation could, for example, be useful to a threshold state wishing to advance its
nuclear program. Thus, there could be a need for additional bilateral agreements on
speciﬁc sensitive areas to be negotiated in conjunction with plurilateral and multilateralagreements.

Plurilateral Negotiations
Different suggestions have been made for how negotiations could occur amongsome or all of the nuclear weapon states recognized under the NPT (the US, Russia,
UK, France, and China) and those states that remain outside the treaty with nuclear
weapons (India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea). The Washington Council on
Non-Proliferation has suggested ﬁve-power or ﬁve-power-plus-one negotiations to
implement the NPT Article VI obligations for nuclear disarmament.109 The proposal
envisages negotiations among the ﬁve NPT nuclear weapons states (China, France,
Russia, the UK and the US) with the possibility of including a non-nuclear state. In
1998, then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan proposed negotiations among
China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the US; India proposed negotiations among the theneight nuclear weapon possessing states. In 2000, Russia offered to start negotiations
with the US to go down to 1,000 weapons on each side.110
Plurilateral negotiations on certain aspects of nuclear disarmament may be useful.
Experience with bilateral negotiations indicates that progress can be made relatively
quickly on reductions of stockpiles, on veriﬁcation and on conﬁdence building whennegotiations and implementing mechanisms are kept to a small number of parties.
Some security issues regarding nuclear disarmament, particularly in regional contexts,
could also be handled more efﬁciently in negotiations among a small number of parties.
Plurilateral negotiations, however, should take place concurrently with multilateralnegotiations. Nuclear-capable states need to be incorporated in the negotiating process
in order to ensure that veriﬁcation and compliance considerations that relate to them
are developed with their agreement and participation. Mechanisms and procedures
developed bilaterally and plurilaterally will need to be consistent with obligations andapproaches developed multilaterally.

 30

Section 1

Non-nuclear-capable states also have an interest in being involved in thenegotiations. Nuclear weapons threaten all states and all people. Therefore, all states
and all people have an interest in and, indeed a responsibility for participating indeveloping a regime for their elimination. As with the CTBT, some non-nuclearcapable states also have expertise and technical facilities useful for the development of
implementation procedures and systems. Some non-nuclear-capable states also haveexperience, skills, resources and creative ideas, communication channels and inﬂuencethat can make them valuable partners in negotiations, especially in overcoming
deadlocks.

Conference on Disarmament
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was established as the primary multilateralnegotiating forum for disarmament. Along with its predecessor (the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee), it was the negotiating forum for the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The CD, however, has some drawbacks:
all its decisions are taken by consensus, meaning that any member state could
prevent the beginning of negotiations or their successful conclusion;
membership is limited to the current 65 members, although some countries
that are not members have expressed an interest in participating fully in suchnegotiations.
The ﬁrst drawback would also apply to some degree to other negotiating forums,
since it is unlikely that any of the nuclear weapon states will begin negotiations without
the involvement of all of the nuclear weapon states. Once all ﬁve nuclear weapon statesagree to begin negotiations, the other members most likely will also agree. The second
drawback may be overcome to some degree if provision is made for non-members
to attend sessions as observers and to make their views known unofﬁcially; and/or if
membership can be expanded.

Non-Proliferation Treaty as a Negotiating Opportunity?
The parties to an existing treaty could negotiate a protocol, an amendment or evena new treaty in order to further the aims and objectives of the current treaty. The
Philippines, for example, suggested in 1996 that the parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty convene a conference for the purpose of negotiating an NWC as a means to
implement Article VI of the NPT.111 The Marshall Islands in 1997 proposed that the2000 NPT Review Conference establish an inter-sessional working group to assist in
negotiations on an NWC.112 If such a group were established, considerable preparatory
work for an NWC could commence even before the nuclear weapons states agree toenter into negotiations.
Malaysia and Costa Rica submitted working papers to the 2000 and 2005 NPT
Review Conferences calling on States Party to the NPT to “agree to commence
multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention
and invite those States that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons to join in such negotiations.”113
Another proposal is that the parties to the NPT call a special conference to amend
the NPT.114
The amendment, in the form of a negotiated protocol to the treaty, would prohibit
nuclear weapons and provide for their elimination. While obtaining agreement fromthe nuclear weapon states on such a protocol could be difﬁcult, the NPT requires aconference to be held to discuss the proposal if one-third of the parties to the treaty

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 31

request such a conference. A similar approach was taken in 1991 when one-thirdof the parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty requested a conference at which they
proposed amending the PTBT to make it a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While thenuclear weapon states did not agree to the amendment, the process did help achieve anegotiating mandate for a CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament.

International Conference
Another possible avenue to negotiations leading to an NWC would be theestablishment of an ongoing international conference especially for this purpose. The
Law of the Sea, for example, was negotiated through the establishment, by the UN
General Assembly, of the Law of the Sea Conferences. The establishment of a special
negotiating body allows for the creation of an appropriate negotiating forum. The Lawof the Sea Conferences used a combination of formal and informal structures, including
a number of working groups, which suited the large number of issues to be negotiated.
In 1998, the UN General Assembly called for “the convening of an international
conference on nuclear disarmament at an early date with the objective of arriving at
an agreement on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons within a speciﬁed framework of time through a nuclear
weapons convention”.115
Establishing an international conference to negotiate an NWC would have a distinct
advantage: this would leave the CD free to continue its work on other disarmamentissues, such as prevention of an arms race in outer space and transparency inarmaments. The CD would also be able to conclude agreements on certain steps
towards nuclear disarmament on which it is already working, such as the Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty.
Then-UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan called for an international conference atthe 2000 NPT Review conference and again in his report to the Millennium Summit.
In their initial resolution voted on 4 December 1998, the New Agenda Coalition
also called for an international conference. In its 59th recommendation, the WMD
Commission also called for the United Nations General Assembly to convene a World
Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction, to meet after thorough preparations. This World Summit should also
discuss and decide on reforms to improve the efﬁciency and effectiveness of the UN
disarmament machinery.

United Nations Subcommittees on nuclear disarmament
In 2005, a group of States including Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New
Zealand and Sweden ﬂoated a proposal for the UN General Assembly to establish
sub-committees to commence work on four disarmament items – negative security
assurances, a ﬁssile materials treaty, nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms
race in outer space.116
This proposal was similar to the idea of a UN negotiating conference, with thedifference that it envisaged that the subcommittees would merely commence work thatwould be concluded by the Conference on Disarmament. The rationale for the proposal
was that the commencement of such work should not be delayed by the consensus
procedures of the CD – procedures that have allowed one or two States to prevent any
substantial progress in the CD on nuclear disarmament items since negotiations on the
CTBT were concluded in 1996.
If such committees were established they would provide an opportunity tocommence deliberations and negotiations on an NWC even if not all NWS would beready to participate.

 32

Section 1

Ottawa-style process
In the early 1990s, efforts were underway to negotiate an additional protocol to theInhumane Weapons Convention,117 which would restrict or prohibit anti-personnel
landmines. When it became clear at the 1996 IWC Review Conference that aprohibition on anti-personnel landmines could not be achieved due to opposition by a
few key States, an alternative approach was announced by Canada’s Foreign Minister
Lloyd Axworthy which became known as the Ottawa process. Axworthy invited allinterested States to Ottawa to negotiate and adopt a treaty prohibiting anti-personnel
landmines. The negotiations concluded with adoption of the treaty in 1997 and it
entered into force following the 40th ratiﬁcation in 1998.
While the Mine Ban Treaty has not been ratiﬁed by all States, it has been
instrumental in strengthening the global norm against landmines and generating
sufﬁcient political will to move some States which previously employed landmines torelinquish them, and others to announce that they intend to do so in due course.118
The situation with nuclear weapons is not the same as with landmines. While both
weapons are indiscriminate, inhumane and arguably illegal, their nature, effects,
military and political utility differ enormously, as does the current situation withregard to constraint regimes. In the case of nuclear weapons, the world already has an
Ottawa-style treaty, i.e. one in which those countries prepared to abandon the weapons
have joined: it is the NPT. What is required with nuclear weapons is to go beyond an
Ottawa-style treaty and develop a process to involve all States including NWS andnon-Parties to the NPT.
Despite these differences, there is considerable merit in the concept of an
independent deliberating and negotiating conference on nuclear abolition in which all
States are invited to join, and which can begin work on nuclear abolition measureseven if not all the NWS currently participate or agree. Like the Ottawa process, such an
ongoing conference would generate considerable media coverage and political pressure
on NWS and non-NPT States to abandon nuclear deterrence and war-ﬁghting andembrace abolition.
The deliberations could provide a useful forum for developing plans and procedures
required for the abolition of nuclear weapons, including consideration of such key
issues as security assurances, compliance measures, veriﬁcation, disposition of ﬁssile
material, transparency versus commercial and State conﬁdentiality, development of
individual rights (whistleblower protection) and responsibilities (including scientiﬁc
responsibilities and criminal law).
Such deliberations could also lead to the adoption and implementation of measuresthat could assist abolition even prior to the beginning of abolition negotiations by
the NWS. This could include, for example, establishment of veriﬁcation systems
and adoption of national abolition measures including more robust criminal law andprohibition of transit of nuclear weapons and ﬁssile materials through areas within
national jurisdiction, including airspace and territorial waters.
There are a number of possible candidates to initiate or lead an Ottawa-styleprocess including a NWS, a non-Party to the NPT, a State that has relinquished nuclear
weapons, a group of States that have abandoned nuclear weapons (such as within
NWFZs) or a State or States that have particular political signiﬁcance in relation to
nuclear disarmament (such as Japan or the New Agenda Coalition).119
i)
Nuclear Weapon StateA process led by a NWS would be very inﬂuential on the other NWS. The mostobvious candidate from amongst the NWS would be the United Kingdom which has
acknowledged that a Nuclear Weapons Convention will be required at some stage inthe future, has reduced the operational readiness of its nuclear weapons, and has begun
work on veriﬁcation of its nuclear weapons as would be required once negotiations

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 33

begin. The UK, however, has indicated its unwillingness to take any further
disarmament steps until the numbers of weapons held by the US and Russia are down
to the hundreds rather than the thousands. UK government plans to renew its Trident
nuclear arsenal, supported by the House of Commons on 14 Mar 2007, may preclude
the UK taking a lead on nuclear disarmament unless this position is overturned. China
has indicated support for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, but has been
unwilling to take any practical steps that would advance this.
ii) State non-Party to the NPTThe NWS and some of their allies might be dismissive of a process led by a State
non-Party to the NPT, as they might see it as an attempt by that State to gain aninternational platform to criticize the NWS but take no responsibility for its own
nuclear policies. Thus, if a non-Party to the NPT led this process, it would need tocommit itself to some nuclear disarmament steps from the outset in order to build
credibility.
The most likely candidate would be India, which advanced the Rajiv Gandhi planfor nuclear abolition under a previous Congress-led government. The current Congressled government has indicated an interest in reviving and updating the Rajiv Gandhiplan and on seeking opportunities to make progress.120iii) State which has relinquished nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons
development program
Candidates here would include Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya,
South Africa and the Ukraine. Each State has nuclear disarmament credibility having
willing relinquished nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programmes. Argentina
and Brazil possibly have more experience than the others in veriﬁcation of nuclear
disarmament agreements as a result of the measures developed under the Agreement
for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Argentina and Brazil, 1991. If they
worked collectively these States would generate considerable interest and politicalimpetus.
iv) Nuclear Weapon Free Zone States Parties
The regional NWFZs have started inter-zone communication and collaboration inorder to strengthen the existing NWFZs, encourage establishment of additional zones
and contribute to the achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world. This includes aprocess led by Brazil and New Zealand to consolidate a Southern Hemisphere andAdjacent Areas NWFZ, and the ﬁrst meeting of States Parties to NWFZs hosted by
Mexico in 2005.
A nuclear abolition process led by the NWFZ State Parties, now numbering 113,
would have the political weight of the numbers of States sponsoring the process, themoral credibility of having forsworn nuclear weapons and an already establishedconnection with the NWS (as signatories to the NWFZ protocols).
v)
Japan
Mayors for Peace has proposed a “Hiroshima process” to make progress towards
nuclear abolition. They envisage States being invited to Hiroshima to begin
deliberations and negotiations for nuclear abolition. A problem with this proposal isthat without the support of the Japanese government, other States may be reluctant
to see this as a State-State negotiating process. On the other hand the initiative isworth considering given the surprisingly strong development of the Mayors for Peaceabolition campaign, which in three years has recruited more than 1500 mayors from
cities around the world including the capitals of NWS, and thus their potential togenerate political will.\vi) New Agenda Coalition
The New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia,
South Africa and Sweden) has been very effective in advancing a nuclear disarmament 34

Section 1

program in such a way as to engage all NPT members including NATO members andthe NWS. The success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference is due in large part to the
New Agenda Coalition and their skilful diplomatic approach. An independent abolition
process led by the NAC would thus hold diplomatic credibility. On the other hand, theNAC as currently functioning may not be able to muster sufﬁcient inﬂuence with the
NWS or States not Parties to the NPT to generate sufﬁcient political will to move the
NWS and non-NPT States to join the process. If the NAC elevated itself to Heads ofState level, such as was done by the Six Nation Initiative in the 1980s, backed up witha concerted diplomatic effort, it might be able to generate sufﬁcient political clout togenerate real traction.

Participation of Civil Society
As noted earlier, the elimination of nuclear
weapons will require participation not just bygovernments, but also by various sectors of civilsociety. Scientists, engineers, technicians andcorporations working in the nuclear ﬁeld are the mostobvious participants, given their technical expertiseand the responsibility they will have to ensure that nowork in other nuclear-related ﬁelds is diverted into
nuclear weapons work. Beyond that, individuals andorganizations involved in education, public policy,
law, health, human rights, environmental stewardship,social justice, ethics, religion and other ﬁelds must be
included to ensure that a nuclear-weapon-free regime
is widely accepted and promoted. The general norm
against nuclear weapons will need to be inculcatedat all levels of society in order to make any breakout by states or non-state actors
unthinkable and unsupported. Individuals will have a responsibility under an NWC torefuse to participate in activities that would support nuclear weapons, and to report any
such activities that come to their attention. Thus, wide awareness and understanding of
the NWC throughout global society will be important.
Negotiations for the Mine Ban Treaty and the International Criminal Court included
substantial input from non-government organizations (NGOs). Negotiations for an
NWC, likewise, should include wide involvement of the constituents of civil society,not only through governments, but also through interested and experienced NGOs.

Demonstrations like thisone at the former Soviet
test site in Kazakhstan
helped to close it down.
Photos: James Lerager

Political Will
Currently the leaders of the nuclear weapon states do not have the political will toabolish nuclear weapons and are inﬂuenced by strong political forces not to develop
such will. Barring a massive nuclear catastrophe, or the emergence of new andvisionary global leaders, only the combined efforts of citizens and supportive nonnuclear governments are likely to persuade them to move.
The concept of an NWC can be an important tool in these efforts, exploring many
concerns that are sure to arise as the nuclear weapon states consider moving away froma security policy that they know and with which they have lived for decades, albeit
very dangerously and with many undesired consequences.
The NWC approach also provides a way to ease or reverse the opposition of nuclear
weapons scientists, engineers, and corporations to nuclear disarmament. Considerable
scientiﬁc and engineering expertise and corporate involvement will be necessary forthe destruction of nuclear weapons and for the veriﬁcation of the nuclear-weapon-free

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 35

regime, and for the safeguarding of ﬁssile materials and the means to produce them, forthe essentially indeﬁnite future.
Progress on nuclear abolition requires political, legal and technical developments.
These are interrelated, and improvement in one area can stimulate improvement in theothers. Rather than waiting for progress on one of these fronts before working on theothers, therefore, we can improve the chances for overall progress by enabling efforts
towards complete nuclear disarmament in any and every relevant sector. To reiterate,
the crucial ingredient currently lacking is political will. But it is also clear that, in thewords of former US Vice-President Al Gore, political will is a renewable resource.
Political will and visionary leadership have never been more urgently needed on anissue of greater moment to our collective future on planet Earth.
_________________________________________________________________________

Endnotes to Section 1
1
General Assembly vote on 6 December 2006, 125 in favour to 27 against, with 29 abstentionsA/RES/61/83 Follow-up
to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/RES/61/83&Lang=E
2
UN General Assembly Resolution 1 (1) Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the
Discovery of Nuclear Energy, adopted 24 January 1946.
3
See Tom Farer, (1995), ‘New Players in the Old Game: The De Facto Expansion of Standing to Participate in Global
Security Negotiations’, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38 No. 6, p. 842., Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,
Activists beyond Borders (1998), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London., Ann. M, Florini, (2000), The Third
Force. Japan Center for International Exchange, Japan and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington
D.C.
4“Closing the Circle on the Splitting of the Atom”, U.S. Department of Energy, Ofﬁce of Environmental Management,
January 1995, p. 9.
5
See Nuclear veriﬁcation: Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2000
Conference of States Party to the NPT, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/NPTDocuments/mc1docs/ukwp.html
6
General Assembly vote on 6 December 2006, 125 in favour to 27 against, with 29 abstentionsA/RES/61/83 Follow-up
to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/RES/61/83&Lang=E
7
Final Document of the XII Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Durban, September 1998.
8
The Mayors for Peace is designed to build solidarity and facilitate coordination among the cities that support theProgram to Promote the Solidarity of Cities toward the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. Its primary goal is to work
internationally to raise consciousness regarding nuclear weapons abolition. It is also formally committed to pursuing
lasting world peace by working to address starvation, poverty, refugee welfare, human rights abuses, environmental
destruction, and other problems that threaten peaceful coexistence.
http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/index.html
9Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra, Australia, 1996. Available at Canberra
Commission homepage: www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html.
10
Daalder, Ivo H. The Limited Test Ban Treaty. In: Carnesale Albert, and Richard N. Haass, eds., Superpower Arms
Control: Setting the Record Straight. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1987.
11
NPT Principles and Objectives. See Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Decision2, paragraph 4: “The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective
implementation of Article VI, including the program of action as reﬂected below:…(a) The completion by the
Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively veriﬁable
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996….”
12
William Walker, Evolutionary versus Planned Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament”, Disarmament Diplomacy No. 15,
May 1997. Disarmament Diplomacy is published by the Acronym Institute, website: www.gn.apc.org/acronym/.
13
See Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor: updating the debate on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear
weapons, Issue 2, April 2001, http://www.ippnw.org/PDF%20ﬁles/NWMonitor2.pdf
Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor: updating the debate on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons,Issue 3, June 2002, http://www.ippnw.org/PDF%20ﬁles/NWCM3.pdf
14
See Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, Final Report of theCommission on Weapons on Mass Destruction, 1 June 2006, Sweden. See in particular Chapter 8. Compliance,
veriﬁcation, enforcement and the role of the United Nations.
15
Veriﬁcation of nuclear disarmament: ﬁnal report on studies into the veriﬁcation of nuclear warheads and theircomponents’, Working Paper submitted to the 2005 NPT Review Conference by the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, April 18, 2005, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.1
16
See for example:- Laying the Foundations for Getting to Zero: Verifying the Transition to Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons, Patricia
Lewis, VERTIC, September 1998
- Verifying the Transition from Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons to a Nuclear Weapon-Free World, Tom Milne andHenrietta Wilson, VERTIC, June 1999
- Virtual Nuclear Capabilities and Deterrence in a World Without Nuclear Weapons, George Paloczi-Horvath, VERTIC,
October 1998
- Sustaining a Veriﬁcation Regime in a Nuclear Weapon-Free World, Suzanna Van Moyland, VERTIC, June 1999.
17
See: - 28 States Participate: Inaugural “Article VI Forum” United Nations, New York, October 3, 2005
http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs/ArticleVI_Report.pdf

 36Section 1- Gaining Conﬁdence in Nuclear Disarmament Steps: Final Report from Second meeting of Article VI Forum,
http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs/Hague_A6F_Final.pdf- MPI Hosts Third Meeting of Article VI Forum in Ottawa, MPI Event Report, Ottawa, Canada, September 28-29, 2006.
http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/archives/000319.shtml#000319
18
See for example:- INESAP Bulletin Issue No. 25, April 2005, Transformation of the Nuclear Control Regime From the NPT to Nuclear
Abolition, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin25/index.htm- INESAP Bulletin Issue No. 14, November, 1997, Searching For The Bomb: Nuclear Disarmament Veriﬁcation
http://www.inesap.org/bulletin14/bulletin14.htm
19
In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, Robert McNamara, Time Books, 1995, p.346.
20
According to a 15 May 2003 press release from the Korean Committee for Solidarity with World Peoples, amouthpiece for the North Korean government:“The Iraqi war taught the lesson that “nuclear suspicion,” “suspected development of weapons of mass destruction”
and suspected “sponsorship of terrorism” touted by the U.S. were all aimed to ﬁnd a pretext for war and one would fallvictim to a war when one meekly responds to the IAEA’s inspection for disarmament. Neither strong international public
opinion or big country’s opposition to war nor the UN charter could prevent the U.S. from launching the Iraqi war. It isa serious lesson the world has drawn from the Iraqi war that a war can be averted and the sovereignty of the country
and the security of the nation can be protected only when a country has a physical deterrent force, a strong military
deterrent force capable of decisively repelling any attack to be made by any types of sophisticated weapons.”21
See Dr. Khan’s Nuclear WalMart, Christopher Clary, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 76, March/April 2004,
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd76/76cc.htm
225000 MT (BAS Jan/Feb 07 p34) divided by 15 Kt (0.015 MT) = 330,000
23Jacques Chirac, 19 January 2006, “The leaders of states who would use terrorist means against us, as well as those
who would envision using . . . weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a
ﬁrm and ﬁtting response on our part,” Chirac said during a visit to a nuclear submarine base in Brittany. “This response
could be a conventional one. It could also be of a different kind.”24
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
July 8), U.N. Doc. A51/218 (1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809 & 1343 (1996). The Advisory Opinion and separate
declarations and opinions of judges are available on the website of IALANA: www.ddh.nl/org/ialana/opiniontable.html.
25
Board of Directors. It is 5 minutes to midnight. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2007;63(1):66-71.
26
A Nuclear Crisis, Jimmy Carter, Washington Post, 23 FEBRUARY 2000
27
Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, GENERAL LEE BUTLER*, 4 DECEMBER 1996 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB,WASHINGTON, DC
28
George P. Shultz, Henry A. Kissinger, William J. Perry, Sam Nunn. A world free of nuclear weapons. Wall Street
Journal. 4 Jan 2007, pA15.
29
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, entered into force 1970.
30
ICJ Advisory Opinion, op. cit., note 7.
31
Canberra Commission, op. cit., note 3.
32
Melman Group poll, “Public Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons,” commissioned by the Stimson Center, interviews Sept.
10-15, 1997.
33
ICJ Advisory Opinion, Declaration of President Bedjaoui, op. cit., note 7.
34
Scientiﬁc Committee on Problems of the Environment, International Council of Scientiﬁc Unions. Environmental
consequences of nuclear war. SCOPE 28. Vols 1 & 2 Chichester, Wiley, 1989.
35
Turco RP, Toon OB, Ackerman TP, Pollack JB, Sagan C. Climate and smoke: an appraisal of nuclear winter. Science
1990; 247:166-76.
36
Toon OB, Turco RP, Robock A, Bardeen C, Oman L, Stenchikov GL. Consequences of regional scale nuclear
conﬂicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism. Atmos Chem Phys Discuss 2006;6:11745-816.
37
Robock A, Oman L, Stenchikov GL, Toon OB, Bardeen C, Turco RP. Climate consequences of regional nuclear
cnﬂicts. Atmos Chem Phys Discuss 2006;6:11817-843.
38
See www.abolition2000.org
39
UNGA Res. 51/45 M, December 10, 1996. UNGA Res. 52/38 O, December 9, 1997. UNGA Res. 53/77 W, December
4, 1998 (See Documents section for copies of the most recent resolution).
40
UNGA Resolution 52/38 L adopted on December 9, 1997; UNGA Resolution 52/39 C, adopted on December 9, 1997;
UNGA Resolution 53/77 X adopted on December 4, 1998; UNGA Resolution 53/78 D, adopted on December 4, 1998.
41
Members of the Commission included Michel Rocard (former Prime Minister of France), General Lee Butler (former
Head of US Strategic Command) and Robert MacNamara (former US Secretary of Defense).
42
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Final Report Part 2,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cc_report2.html
43‘A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,’ Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairsof Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, 9 June 1998
44
H.Res 479, 105th Congress, 2d Session, June 18, 1998, H.Res.82, 106th Congress, 1st Session, February 24,
1999.
45
Resolution to the 109th Congress calling for nuclear abolition,
http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/docs/US_Kucinich_abolition_bill.pdf
46
H. R. 2545 Nuclear Disarmament and Economic Conversion Act of 1999
47
“28 States Participate: Inaugural Article VI Forum” United Nations, New York, October 3, 2005
http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs/ArticleVI_Report.pdf
48
Weapons of Terror, Recommendation 30,p. 109
49
Weapons of Terror, p. 109
50
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation On Strategic Offensive Reductions, May
2002.
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18016.htm#1
51
Statement by John Holum, Acting Undersecretary of State and Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, UN First Committee, October 14, 1998
52
UNGA Res. 50/70 P, 12 December 1995.
53“Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda”, joint declaration of the foreign ministers ofBrazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, June 9, 1998.
54
United States Explanation of Vote on UN General Assembly Resolution L.45, November 10, 1998.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

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55
Other treaties, including the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok, (establishing nuclear-weaponfree zones in Latin America, South Paciﬁc, Africa and Southeast Asia, respectively), the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, act to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons rather thanto implement disarmament of existing stockpiles.
56
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006,
http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP3-12_05draft.pdf
57
US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Final Coordination, 15 March 2005, p xii.
58
Weapons of terror, p 93.
59
NRDC Nuclear Notebook, in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/December 1998, p66.
60
An FMCT will nevertheless still be a useful treaty to achieve as it could well develop procedures and accumulate
information which will be useful once the nuclear weapon states agree to a path of veriﬁed disarmament. Completemonitoring of civilian ﬁssile material production and of stockpiles of ﬁssile material will be necessary to develop
conﬁdence in compliance with a nuclear abolition regime (See Section 4, Veriﬁcation).
61
The Indian government was one of the ﬁrst to call for a CTBT and had been a strong supporter of it up until the ﬁnal
stages of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. India proposed language in the CTBT linking
it with a commitment for nuclear disarmament within a time bound framework. Rather than addressing this proposal
in the negotiations, a draft text of the CTBT, which had not been agreed by all delegations at the CD, was presented
to the United Nations General Assembly and forced through with a vote. India and Pakistan opposed the resolution. A
press statement released by the Indian government on 15 May 15 1998, following their nuclear tests noted that “It isbecause of the continuing threat posed to India by the deployment of nuclear weapons... that we have been forced tocarry out these tests.”
62
See “Stewardship Smokescreen”, Hisham Zerrifﬁ and Arjun Markhijani, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/
October 1996.
63
Victor Sidel, “Why Abolitionists Should Not Support the CTBT in Its Current Form” Victor Sidel, Medicine and Global
Survival, October 1998. Vol. 5, Issue 3. See also accompanying article, Daryl Kimball, “Why the CTBT Is Still an
Essential Step Toward Nuclear Abolition”.
64
French President Jacques Chirac highlighted this when he announced a resumption of French testing in 1995 inorder to “perfect computer simulation techniques that would end the need for further (physical) testing”. NY Times, 6
Sept. 1995.
65
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in Weapons of Terror, cite SIPRI and the Federation of American
Scientists data and calculate 27,000 nuclear warheads.
66
The US Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations of 1996, for example, holds that nuclear “operations must
be planned and executed to destroy or eliminate enemy WMD (weapons of mass destruction) delivery systems andsupporting infrastructure before they can strike friendly forces.”67
Sir Nicholas Lyell, UK Attorney General, Statement to the International Court of Justice, November 15, 1995.
68
John McNeill, Senior Deputy General Counsel for the Department of Defense. Statement to the International Court ofJustice, November 15, 1995.
69“Ban the Bomb?” The Nation, January 9/16, 1995.
70“An Incremental Strategy for Nuclear Disarmament: Rationale and Practical Considerations,” Harald Muller,
Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, April, 1998.
71“A Faustian Bargain: Why Stockpile Stewardship is Fundamentally Incompatible with the Process of Disarmament”,
Western States Legal Foundation, April 1998. See also “Stockpile Stewardship of Nuclear Weapons: The Deal to
Subsidize Nuclear Weaponeers”, Facing Reality, CA 1998.
72
See, e.g., “Selected Accidents Involving Nuclear Weapons 1950-1993”, Greenpeace, March 1996, at
http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/nukes/ctbt/read3.html.
73
Statement by Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador of India to the UN in Geneva, to the Conference on Disarmament,
February 15, 1996.
74
Of the states possessing nuclear weapons, only China, India Pakistan and North Korea support comprehensive
disarmament. All four have called for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.
75
See Snaring the Sun: Opportunities to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and advance nuclear disarmament
through an abolition framework, Alyn Ware, Dr Kate Dewes and H.E. Michael Powles, Disarmament and Security
Centre, February 2005. http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/papers/snaringsun.html
See also International Ju-Jitsu: Using United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to advance nuclear
disarmament, Alyn Ware, Disarmament and Security Centre, July 2004, http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/papers/Ju-Jitsu.html
76
Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki - for a Total Ban on and the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. http://www10.
plala.or.jp/antiatom/html/e/egensu/documents/hnappeal.htm
77
Statement by International Generals and Admirals, December 5, 1996 http://www.gsinstitute.org/archives/000014.
shtml
78
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National
Academy of Sciences, National Academies Press, 1997. http://books.nap.edu/catalog/5796.html#toc
79
Statement by Heads of State and Civilian Leaders Worldwide, February 2, 1998, Washington, D.C. National Press
Club, http://www.nuclearﬁles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/civil-society/cranston_statement-headsstate.htm
80
The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence, June 1998. http://www.ccnr.org/pax_christi.html
81“Fifteen years ago we concurred with Pope John Paul II in acknowledging that, given the context of that time,possession of these weapons as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by others could be morally
acceptable, but acceptable only as an interim measure and only if deterrence were combined with clear steps toward
progressive disarmament... In 1998 the global context is signiﬁcantly different from what it was a few years ago… We
raise up our voices with those around the world in calling for an end to the reliance on nuclear deterrence and insteadcall upon the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process leading to the complete
elimination of these morally offensive weapons.”
82
An Appeal to End the Nuclear Threat: Concerned Americans Speak Out. New York Times advertisement, 3 October
2000, http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/rsp_ad.pdf
83
U.S. Mayors Ask Bush to Commit to Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, 25 June 2001. http://www.gsinstitute.org/
archives/000061.shtml#000061
84
World Council of Churches 9th Assembly. Minute on the Elimination of Nuclear Arms. Porto Alegre, Brazil, 14-23 Feb 2006.

 38

Section 1

85

Weapons of Terror, p. 109
Francis Sejersted, December 10, 1997. Speech at the presentation of the Nobel Peace Award to the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines.
87
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
88
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction.
89
Blaiklie, B. Speech to the Canadian Parliament November 3, 199790
“Nuclear Weapons Convention on Track: UN Resolution, Incremental Comprehensive Approaches and the Drafting
Process.” INESAP Information Bulletin, December 11, 1996.
91
Canberra Commission, op. cit., note 3.
92“Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda”, op. cit., note 22.
93
UNGA Res. 51/45 M, December 10, 1996. UNGA Res. 52/38 O, December 9, 1997. UNGA Res. 53/77 W, December
4, 1998 (See Documents section for copies of the most recent resolutions.)
94
Ambassador Hasmy Agam, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations. United Nations First
Committee, October 12, 1999.
95
UNGA Resolution 53/77 Y, December 4, 1998.
96
R. Tauwhare, United Kingdom. Debate of the UN First Committee, October 27, 1998.
97
Stansﬁeld Turner, Caging the Nuclear Genie, Westview Press, 1997.
98
India and Pakistan are resistant to joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
and to negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. However both states indicated that they would have supported the
CTBT and would support FMCT if they were linked to a program for complete nuclear disarmament.
99
All nuclear weapon capable states, ie those with nuclear reactors, are members of the Conference on Disarmament,
which would most likely be the negotiating body for the major multilateral elements of a program for nuclear
disarmament.
100
The US Defense Department’s 1994 Annual Report, for example, noted that “...US nuclear weapons and nuclear
posture can play a role in deterring the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations.”
101
Final Document of the XII Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Durban, Sep 1998.
102
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document,
Vol 1, NPT/CONF.2000/28, access at disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/ﬁnaldoc.html
103
US Explanation of Vote before the vote on United Nations General Assembly resolution A/C.1/52/L.37, Nov 10,
1997.
104
Weapons of Terror, p36.
105
General Lee Butler, public meeting, 3 March 1999, Ottawa, Canada.
106
Those States which had tested nuclear weapons as at Jan 1 1970. This includes China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States
107
This currently includes NWS as well as India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.
108
Including the ABM, START, INF and Moscow treaties, the Hot Line and Nuclear Accidents Agreements, and theAgreement on Notiﬁcations of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine Launched Missiles.
109“An Article VI Negotiating Forum of Five Plus One”, Nuclear Disarmament: How Much Have the Five Nuclear
Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty?, Washington Council on Non-Proliferation, June 1994.
110
In November 2000, President Putin of Russia made a statement proposing that the next round of negotiations
between Russia and the US in the Strategic Arms Reduction or START series of treaties, entail much deeper
reductions, down to a level of 1,000 to 1,500 warheads for each side. See Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Eyeing U.S. Missile
Defense, Russia Wants Less Offense’ New York Times 15 November 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/15/world/
15RUSS.html?ex=1169096400&en=424982ff94fff67a&ei=5070
111
Statement by Philippines President Fidel Ramos. Manila. July 9, 1996.
112
General considerations to be taken into account by Parties in the Review Process. Submitted by the MarshallIslands. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/11, 11 April 1997.
113
Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons: Legal, technical and political elements required for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear weaponfree world: Working Paper submitted by Malaysia, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Nicaragua,
and Yemen. 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New
York, 2-27 May 2005, http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/npt/2005NPTmalaysia-wp.htm
114“Diplomatic Judo: Using the NPT to make the nuclear weapons states negotiate the abolition of nuclear weapons”,
Zia Mian and M.V.Ramana, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, October 1998.
114
UNGA 53/77 X, adopted December 4, 1998.
116“Initiating work on priority disarmament and non-proliferation issues” Draft elements of an UNGA60 First Committee
Resolution, Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/
1com/1com05/docs/draftelementsinitiating.pdf
117
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (1981).
118
See “A Ban against landmines? Never!” Jody Williams, in Peace is Possible, Fredrik Heffermehl (ed) International
Peace Bureau, Geneva, 2000.
119
For more on the potential of an Ottawa Style process for negotiating an NWC and additional support measures, seeSnaring the Sun: Opportunities to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and advance nuclear disarmament through an
abolition framework, Alyn Ware, Dr Kate Dewes and H.E. Michael Powles, Disarmament and Security Centre, February
2005. http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/papers/snaringsun.html
120
See Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World (Draft Convention), Mani Shankar Aiyar MP,
presentation at an international parliamentary forum: From Nuclear Dangers to Cooperative Security: Parliamentarians
and the Legal Imperative for Nuclear Disarmament. Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Colombia,
Vancouver, Nov 7-9, 2003, http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/reports.html, andA gaffe, or a historic chance? Praful Bidwai, Frontline, Volume 22 - Issue 01, Jan. 01 - 14, 2005, http://www.ﬂonnet.
com/ﬂ2201/stories/20050114007112400.htm
86

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 40

Section 2

Section2
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention

Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Testing, Production, Stockpiling,
Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear
Weapons and on Their Elimination.

withComments and Critical Questions

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

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Summary of the Model
Nuclear Weapons Convention
General Obligations
The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibits development, testing,production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. States
possessing nuclear weapons will be required to destroy their arsenals according toa series of phases. The Convention also prohibits the production of weapons-usableﬁssile material and requires delivery vehicles to be destroyed or converted to makethem non-nuclear capable.

Declarations
States parties to the Convention will be required to declare all nuclear weapons,
nuclear material, nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles they possessor control, and the locations of these.

Phases for Elimination
The Convention outlines a series of ﬁve phases for the elimination of nuclear
weapons beginning with taking nuclear weapons off alert, removing weapons from
deployment, removing nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles, disabling thewarheads, removing and disﬁguring the “pits” and placing the ﬁssile material underinternational control. In the initial phases the U.S. and Russia are required to make thedeepest cuts in their nuclear arsenals.

Veriﬁcation
Veriﬁcation will include declarations and reports from States, routine inspections,challenge inspections, on-site sensors, satellite photography, radionuclide sampling
and other remote sensors, information sharing with other organizations, and citizen
reporting. Persons reporting suspected violations of the convention will be provided
protection through the Convention including the right of asylum.
An International Monitoring System will be established under the Convention togather information, and will make most of this information available through a registry.
Information which may jeopardize commercial secrets or national security will be kept
conﬁdential.

National Implementation Measures
States parties are required to adopt necessary legislative measures to implement their
obligations under the Convention to provide for prosecution of persons committing
crimes and protection for persons reporting violations of the Convention.
States are also required to establish a national authority to be responsible fornational tasks in implementation.

Rights and Obligations of Persons
The Convention applies rights and obligations to individuals and legal entities aswell as States. Individuals have an obligation to report violations of the Convention
and the right to protection if they do so. Procedures for the apprehension and fair trialof individuals accused of committing crimes under the treaty are provided.

 42Section 2

AgencyAn agency would be established to implement the Convention. It will be responsible
for veriﬁcation, ensuring compliance, and decision making, and will comprise a
Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat.

Nuclear Material
The Convention prohibits the production of any ﬁssionable or fusionable material
which can be used directly to make a nuclear weapon, including plutonium (otherthan that in spent fuel) and highly enriched uranium. Low enriched uranium would bepermitted for nuclear energy purposes.

Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement
Provisions are included for consultation, cooperation and fact-ﬁnding to clarify andresolve questions of interpretation with respect to compliance and other matters. A
legal dispute may be referred to the International Court of Justice by mutual consent ofStates Parties. The Agency also is empowered to request an advisory opinion from the
ICJ on a legal dispute.
The Convention provides for a series of graduated responses for non-compliance
beginning with consultation and clariﬁcation, negotiation, and, if required, sanctions or
recourse to the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council for action.

Relation with Other International Agreements
The Model NWC would build on existing nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament
regimes and veriﬁcation and compliance arrangements, including the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty Organisation International Monitoring System and bilateral agreements between
Russia and the United States. In some cases the NWC may add to the functions andactivities of such regimes and arrangements. In other cases, the NWC would establish
additional complementary arrangements.

Financing
Nuclear weapon states are obliged to cover the costs of the elimination of their
nuclear arsenals.
However, an international fund will be established to assist states that may haveﬁnancial difﬁculties in meeting their obligations.

Optional Protocol Concerning Energy Assistance
The Convention does not prohibit the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
However it includes an optional protocol which would establish a program of energy
assistance to promote sustainable energy resources for States parties choosing not todevelop nuclear energy or to phase out existing nuclear energy programs.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 43

CONTENTS: MODEL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

 44

Preamble
General Obligations
A. State Obligations
B. Obligations of Persons
Deﬁnitions
A. States and Persons
B. Nuclear Weapons
C. Nuclear Energy, Explosion, and Explosive Device
D. Nuclear Material
E. Nuclear Facilities
F. Nuclear Activities
G. Veriﬁcation
I. Delivery Vehicles
Declarations
A. Nuclear Weapons
B. Nuclear Material
C. Nuclear Facilities
D. Delivery Vehicles
Phases for Implementation
A. General Requirements
B. Extension of Deadlines
C. Reciprocity in Extensions
D. Phases
E. Special Provision
Verication
A. Elements of Verication Regime
B. Activities, Facilities, and Materials Subject to Veriﬁcation
C. Rights and Obligations of States Parties with Respect to Veriﬁcation
D. Conﬁdence-Building Measures
E. Relation to Other Veriﬁcation Arrangements
F. Implementation
National Implementaion Measures
A. Legislative Implementation
B. Relations Between the State Party and the Agency
C. Conﬁdentiality
D. Relation to implementation measures assumed or required under other arrangements
Rights and Obligations of Persons
A. Crimes Under this Convention
B. Responsibility to Report Crimes
C. Protection for Persons Providing Information
AgencyA. General Provisions
B. Conference of State Parties
C. Executive Council
D. Technical Secretariat

46
48
48
49
50
50
50
50
51
52
53
55
56
58
58
58
58
59
60
60
60
60
60
62
63
63
63
63
64
64
65
66
66
67
67
67
68
68
68
68
70
70
70
72
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Section 2

E. Privileges and Immunities
F. Registry and Other Databases
G. International Monitoring System
IX.
Nuclear Weapons
A. General Requirements
B. Procedures for Destroying Nuclear Weapons
C. Prevention of Production of Nuclear Weapons
X.
Nuclear Material
A. Reconstruction and Documentation
B. Control of Special Nuclear Material
C. Licensing Requirements
D. Relation to other International Agreements
XI.
Nuclear Facilities
A. Nuclear Weapons Facilities
B. Command, Control, and Communications Facilities and Deployment Sites
C. Nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear materials storagesites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside of facilities.
D. Activities at nuclear facilities
XII.
Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles
XIII. Activities Not Prohibited Under This Convention
XIV. Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement
A. Consultation, Cooperation and Fact-ﬁnding
B. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanction
C. Settlement of Disputes
XV.
Entry Into Force
A. Conditions of Entry Into Force
B. State Waiver of Entry Into Force Requirements
XVI. Financing
XVII. Amendments
XVIII. Scope and Application of Convention
A. Relation to Other International Agreements
B. Status of the Annexes
C. Duration and Withdrawal
D. Reservations
XIX. Conclusion of Convention
A. Signature
B. Ratiﬁcation
C. Accession
D. Depository
E. Authentic Texts

76
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77
79
79
79
79
80
80
80
80
81
82
82
82

Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
Optional Protocol Concerning Energy AssistanceAnnex I: Nuclear Activities
A. Guidelines for Schedules of Nuclear Activities
B. Schedule of Nuclear Activities
Annex II: Nuclear Weapon Components
Annex III: List of countries and geographical regions for the purpose of Article VII.C.23
Annex IV: List of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors
Annex V: List of Countries with nuclear power reactors and/or nuclear research reactors

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99
100
100
101
103
104
105
105

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83
84
85
86
86
90
90
92
92
92
93
94
96
96
96
96
96
97
97
97
97
97
97

 45

Preamble
We the people of the Earth, through the States Parties to this Convention:
Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use
would have catastrophic consequences for all the creatures of this Earth;
Noting that the destructive effects of nuclear weapons upon life on earth are uncontrollable in timeor space;
Aware that amongst weapons of mass destruction, the abolition of which is recognized as being
in the collective security interest of all people and States, nuclear weapons are unprecedented andunequalled in destructive potential;
Afﬁrming that the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the humanfamily include the right to life, liberty, peace and the security of person;
Convinced that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal ofeliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose
to life on Earth;
Recognizing that numerous regions, including Antarctica, Outer Space, Latin America and the
Caribbean, the Sea Bed, the South Paciﬁc, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia have already been
established as nuclear weapon free zones, where possession, production, development, deployment,
use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are forever prohibited, and desiring to extend this beneﬁt to
the entire planet for the good of all life;
Determined to eliminate the risks of environmental pollution by radioactive waste and otherradioactive matter associated with nuclear weapons and to ensure that the bounty and beauty of the
Earth shall remain the common heritage of all of us and our descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyedby all in peace;
Recognizing the universal need for environmentally safe, sustainable energy;
Gravely concerned that the use of nuclear weapons might be brought about not only intentionallyby war or terrorism, but also through human or mechanical error or failure, and that the very existence
and gravity of these threats of nuclear weapons use generates a climate of suspicion and fear which
is antagonistic to the promotion of universal respect for and observance of the human rights andfundamental freedoms set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights;
Convinced of the serious threats posed to the environment by nuclear arsenals, the economic andsocial costs and waste of intellectual talent occasioned by these arsenals and the efforts required toprevent their use, the dangers inherent in the existence of the materials used to make nuclear weapons
and the attendant problems of proliferation, the medically and psychologically catastrophic effects of
any use of a nuclear weapon, the potential effects of mutations on the genetic pool and numerous otherrisks associated with nuclear weapons;
Welcoming the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling ofBacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on theProhibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, as indications of a progression toward the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction;
Recognizing that all life is sacred and that there is a moral imperative to eliminate all weapons ofmass destruction;

 46

Section 2

Welcoming the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer ofAnti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as an indication of progress towards the prohibitionand elimination of weapons which are indiscriminate and cause unnecessary suffering;[Welcoming the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as anindication of progress in addressing the threat of acquisition, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by
non-State actors;]
Welcoming also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in particular the recognitionof individual responsibility for crimes involved in employing weapons which cause unnecessary
suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate;
Believing that the threat and use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with civilized norms, standardsof morality and humanitarian law which prohibit the use of inhumane weapons and those withindiscriminate effects;
Recalling Resolution 1(I), adopted unanimously on January 24, 1946 at the First Session of theGeneral Assembly of the United Nations, and the many subsequent resolutions of the United Nations
which call for the elimination of atomic weapons;
Recalling also the Final Document of the United Nations First Special Session of the General
Assembly on Disarmament 1978, which calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons;
Mindful of the solemn obligations of States made in Article VI of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons to end the nuclear arms race at an early date and achieve nuclear
disarmament, and to further commitments on speciﬁc steps to achieve nuclear disarmament in the“Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” agreed in 1995, and the“Practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” agreed in 2000;
Convinced that the elimination of nuclear weapons is an important step towards the goal of generaland complete disarmament and that the implementation of disarmament obligations would strengtheninternational law and peaceful relations between countries;
Welcoming the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 8, 1996, whichconcluded “that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules ofinternational law applicable in armed conﬂict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarianlaw”, and concluded unanimously that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring toa conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control”;
Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolutions 51/45 M, of 10 December 1996, 52/38
O of 9 December 1997, 53/77 W of 4 December 1998, 54/54 Q of 1 December 1999, 55/33 X of 20
November 2000, 56/24 S of 29 November 2001, 57/85 of 22 November 2002, 58/46 of 8 December
2003, 59/83 of 3 December 2004, 60/76 of 8 December 2005, and 61/83 of 6 December 2006 which
underline the nuclear disarmament obligation afﬁrmed by the International Court of Justice andcall “upon all States to fulﬁll that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations… leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing
for their elimination”;
Convinced that a convention prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer,use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination is required to abolish theseweapons from the Earth;Have agreed as follows:

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 47

I. General Obligations
A. State Obligations
1.

The prohibition on
funding nuclear
weapons research(subparagraph 1.g)
replaces the prohibition
on research in the 1997
MNWC, as this would
be pragmatically andethically problematic.
The bracketed language
would maintain thisprohibition, which some
respondents consider
essential.

2.

Preventive controls entail
obligations additional tosafeguards and would
imply new obligations on
the part of non-nuclear
weapon states. (SeeVeriﬁcation Section 4.)

There is no satisfactory
answer yet to thequestion of veriﬁcationof command and control
facilities.

 48

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:a.

To use or threaten to use nuclear weapons;b.

To engage in any military or other preparations to use nuclear
weapons;c.

To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile,
maintain, retain, or transfer nuclear weapons except as speciﬁed underparagraph 4 of this Article;d.

To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer
or use proscribed nuclear material except as speciﬁed under paragraph
4 of this Article;e.

To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile,
maintain, retain, or transfer nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;f.

To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, maintain,
retain, or transfer nuclear weapon components or equipment as
speciﬁed in this Convention;g.

To fund [or conduct] nuclear weapons research, with the exception of
nuclear disarmament research;h.

To assist, encourage, induce or permit, in any way, directly or
indirectly, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under thisConvention.

Each State Party undertakes:a.

To destroy all nuclear weapons it owns or possesses, or that arelocated in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordancewith the provisions of this Convention;b.

To destroy all nuclear weapons it abands on the territory of anotherState, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention;c.

To submit all nuclear facilities to preventive controls;d.

To destroy all nuclear weapons facilities it owns or possesses, or thatare located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, or to convert
such facilities to weapons destruction facilities or other facilities notprohibited by this Convention;e.

[To disable or destroy all facilities, systems or sub-systems designed
or used in the command or control of nuclear weapons, or convert
such facilities, systems or sub-systems to purposes not prohibited
under this Convention;]f.

To destroy or convert for purposes not prohibited under thisConvention all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and nuclear weapon
components;g.

To place all special nuclear material under preventive controls as
speciﬁed in this Convention.

Section 2h.

To participate in good faith in activities aimed at the promotion oftransparency with respect to nuclear weapons and related technologies
and the promotion of education for the purposes of detecting andpreventing activities prohibited under this Convention;i.

To report violations of this Convention to the Agency [and tocooperate to the fullest with the Agency’s investigative, monitoring
and veriﬁcation functions;] [and to provide to the Agency
all information requested by the Agency for the purposes of
implementing this Convention, except such information as may be
with-held for legitimate international or national security or trade
secret concerns;]j.

To enact all domestic legislation necessary for the implementation ofthis Convention.

3.

These obligations shall apply equally to nuclear explosive devices intended forpeaceful purposes.

4.

These obligations shall not be interpreted to prohibit activities consistent
with the application and implementation of the provisions of this Convention[including but not limited to transfer of nuclear weapons, special nuclear
material, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles for the purpose of theirdestruction or disposal, and nuclear disarmament research and veriﬁcation
thereof].
B. Obligations of Persons

5.

6.

The following acts are crimes for which persons shall be held responsible
regardless of their position, residence, citizenship or country of incorporation:a.

To engage or attempt to engage in any acts listed in subparagraphs 1.a
through 1.g, inclusive, of this Article;b.

To aid, abet, or otherwise assist, in any way, anyone to engage in any
activity prohibited under this Convention.

Subparagraph 2.hpromotes transperancy
and education. Thisis a response to theargument that nuclear
weapons technology
and knowledge cannot
be disinvented. (Seealso Critical Question
on Knowledge andReversibility.)

Paragraph 4 is necessary
in order to ensure
implementation thatis consistent with the
purposes of the NWC.
Some responses
indicated that thebracketed language
should be deleted
because it leaves room
for loopholes. The
question of intent andthe difﬁculty of deﬁning
technical criteria for all
provisions that turn on
intent surface here andelsewhere.

The fact that the present Convention provides criminal responsibility for
individuals does not affect the responsibility of States under international law.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 49

The deﬁnition of Nuclear
Weapons State isconsistent with thedeﬁnition in the NonProliferation Treaty.
The 1997 Model NWC
deﬁnition of ‘Nuclear
Threshold State’ hasbeen replaced with
“Nuclear Capable State”
and includes all Statesoutside of the NPT thathave a current capability
to produce nuclear
weapons. States which
could develop a nuclear
capability in the future
are not deﬁned but
rather listed in the annex
on States with nuclear
reactors.

II. Deﬁnitions
A. States and Persons
1.

“Nuclear Weapons State” means a state which has manufactured andexploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
1 January 1967

2.

“Nuclear Capable State” means [a State which has developed or has
the capacity to develop nuclear weapons and which is not party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty]

3.

“Person” means a natural or legal person.

B. Nuclear Weapons
4.

“Natural person” means
an individual. “Legal
person” includes, forexample, corporations.

Deﬁnition 4.a. isborrowed from theTreaty of Tlatelolco.
Deﬁnitions 4.b,c andd update and expand
this deﬁnition to covermodern weapons thatuse nuclear technology.
Nuclear weapons are
generally understood to
be warheads (which haveguidance systems andare delivered by missiles)
or gravity bombs(delivered by aircraft).

“Nuclear Weapon” means:a.

Any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an
uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics
that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes;b.

Any nuclear explosive device;c.

Any radiological weapon; ord.

Any weapon which is designed to include a nuclear explosive
device as a trigger or other component.

5.

“Nuclear Weapon Component” means any constituent part of a
nuclear weapon. [excluding the special nuclear material whenseparated from other components]

6.

“Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicle” means any vehicle designed
for or capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weaponsdelivery vehicle that has been constructed, developed, ﬂight-tested or
deployed for weapon delivery shall be considered a nuclear weaponsdelivery vehicle.

7.

“Plutonium Pit” means the core element of a nuclear weapon’s
primary or ﬁssion component.

8.

“Radiological Weapon” means any weapon that disperses radioactive
material or uses radioactive material as a primary material in its
construction.

9.

“Warhead” means the explosive part of a nuclear weapons system.
Warheads consist of nuclear materials, conventional high explosives,
related ﬁring mechanisms and containment structure.

Notes:[..] Square brackets
indicate alternative
language or optional text
Within Article II{Deﬁnition}, each category
begins with the deﬁnitionof the categorical term.
Other deﬁnitions follow inalphabetical order.
The text makes reference to a
“Veriﬁcation Annex” which
would form an integral part ofa negotiated NWC, but is notincluded in this Model NWC

 50

C. Nuclear Energy, Explosives, and Explosive Devices

10.

“Nuclear Energy” means energy released from the nucleus of an atom
either spontaneously or through interaction with other particles and/or
electromagnetic radiation.

11.

“Nuclear Explosion” means the release of signiﬁcant amounts ofnuclear energy on a time-scale faster than or comparable to chemical
explosives [including micro-ﬁssion, micro-fusion or miniaturized
devices of any yield].

Section 2

12.

“Nuclear Explosive Device” means any device capable of undergoinga nuclear explosion, irrespective of its purpose. The term includes
such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms,
as well as devices or assemblies which belong to a nuclear explosive
device or are a modiﬁcation of such suitable for development andtesting of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, butdoes not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon
or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it.

13.

“Signiﬁcant Amount of Nuclear Energy” means more than the energy
released by radioactive decay and spontaneous ﬁssion and may bemuch smaller than the maximum energy yield of the largest chemical
explosions.

D. Nuclear Material
14.

“Nuclear Material” means any source or ﬁssionable or fusionable
material as deﬁned in this Convention.

15.

“Exemption Quantities” mean quantities of nuclear material notprohibited under the provisions of this Convention [and preventive
controls].

16.

“Fissionable Material” means any isotope which may undergo either
spontaneous ﬁssion or ﬁssion induced by neutrons of any energy, as
well as any compound or mixture including such isotopes.

17.

“Fusionable Material” means any isotope capable of undergoing
fusion with the same kind of nuclide or with any other nuclide by
applying sufﬁcient conditions (pressure, temperature and inclusiontime) with technical means.

18.

“Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)” means uranium in which thenaturally occurring U-235 isotope (0.7% in natural uranium) is
increased to 20% U-235 or above.

19.

“Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)” means uranium enriched in theisotopic content of U-235 but to less than 20% of the total mass.

20.

“Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX fuel)” means nuclear reactor fuelcomposed of plutonium and uranium oxides.

21.

[“Other Special Nuclear Material” means special nuclear material
other than plutonium and uranium enriched to 20% or more U-235 or
U-233.]

22.

“Proscribed ﬁssionable material” means any ﬁssionable material
that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons withouttransmutation, chemical reprocessing or further enrichment, andincludes any isotopic mixture of separated and un-irradiatedplutonium, uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 to 20% or more,uranium-233.

23.

“Proscribed fusionable material” means any fusionable material
that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons withouttransmutation, redoxation or further enrichment.

24.

“Proscribed nuclear material” means any proscribed ﬁssionable or any
proscribed fusionable material.

25.

“Signiﬁcant quantity” means the approximate quantity of nuclear
material in respect of which, taking into account any conversion

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

See Critical Question on
Nuclear Energy.

The number of nuclides
that fall under thedeﬁnition of fushionable
material may changewith scientiﬁc-technicalprogress.

The terms , ‘proscribed’material, are offered tocover all materials thatare to be banned under
the MNWC. Proscribedﬁssionable material does
not include plutonium inspent fuel or plutoniumthat is irretrievably
stored.

 51

process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive
device cannot be excluded.
26.

“Source Material” means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes
occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope U-235, thorium,
lithium beyond naturally occurring concentration, deuterium, helium3, or any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemicalcompound or concentrate.

27.

“Special Fissionable Material” means ﬁssionable material that can beused for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

28.

“Special Fusionable Material” means any fusionable material thatcan be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and includes
deuterium, tritium, helium-3, and lithium-6.

29.

“Special Nuclear Material” means any special ﬁssionable or any
special fusionable material.

E. Nuclear Facilities

The deﬁnition of C3
facilities may not benecessary if such
facilities were no longer
used for the commandand control of nuclear
weapons by the timeof entry into force of
the NWC. In any case,
veriﬁcation of nuclear
activities at thesefacilities would be
difﬁcult, so trust among
States would have to
be strong.

It is necessary to draw
a distinction between
deployment sites andstorage facilities not
located in deploymentsites, since a deployment
site will have facilities forstorage. This distinction
could be made byrequiring a certain
distance between a
deployment site and any
storage facility.

 52

30.

“Nuclear Facility” means any facility for the research, testing,production, extraction, enrichment, processing, reprocessing, or
storage of nuclear material; any facility for the production of nuclear
energy; any facility for the research, development, testing, production,
storage, assembly, disassembly, maintenance, modiﬁcation,
deployment, or delivery of nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapon
components; or any facility deemed a nuclear facility by the Technical
Secretariat. The term “Nuclear Facility” includes [but is not limitedto] the following:

31.

“Command, Control or Communication Facility”, means [any facility
designed or used for the purpose of launching, targeting, directing or
detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding or
assisting in any of these purposes.]

32.

“Deployment Site” means the location where a nuclear weapon is or
has been deployed, or a location which is equipped for the deploymentof nuclear weapons.

33.

“Nuclear Enrichment Facility” means a facility capable of increasing
the ratio of the isotope uranium-235 in natural uranium.

34.

“Nuclear Material Storage Facility” means a facility for the interim or
long-term storage of nuclear material.

35.

“Nuclear Reactor” means any device in which a controlled, selfsustaining ﬁssion chain-reaction can be maintained or in which acontrolled ﬁssion chain is maintained partly by an external source ofneutrons.

36.

“Nuclear Reprocessing Facility” means a facility to separate irradiatednuclear material and ﬁssion products in whole or in part, and includes
the facility’s head-end treatment section and its associated storage andanalytical sections.

37.

“Nuclear Weapons Destruction Facility” means any facility fordisassembly or destruction of nuclear weapons or for rendering them
permanently inoperable.

38.

“Nuclear Weapons Facility” means any facility for the design,
research, development, testing, production, storage, assembly,

Section 2maintenance, modiﬁcation, deployment, delivery, command, or
control of nuclear weapons or Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 nuclear
weapon components.
39.

“Nuclear Weapons Production Facility” means any nuclear facility
which produces materials which have been or may be used formilitary purposes, including such a reactor, a plant for processing
nuclear material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating theisotopes of nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating
nuclear material, a plant for the construction or assembly of nuclear
weapon components, or a facility or plant of such other type as may
be deemed a Nuclear Weapons Production Facility by the Technical
Secretariat.

40.

“Nuclear Weapons Research Facility” means any facility in which
nuclear weapons research, development, testing or computer
simulation is conducted.

41.

“Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility” means a facility for the storageof nuclear weapons but does not include such a facility located on a
deployment site.

42.

“Nuclear Weapons Testing Facility” means a facility or prepared site
for conducting nuclear weapons testing.

F. Nuclear Activities

As long as they exist,
nuclear weapons
destruction facilities
would be underveriﬁcation to ensurethat they are not used forprohibited activities.

The deﬁnition nuclear
weapons facility does
not include nuclear
weapons destruction
facilities.Thus, all nuclear
weapons facilities
can be closed or
decommissioned evenwhile weapons are being
destroyed. If disassemblyand destruction of
nuclear weapons wereboth to take placeat nuclear weapons
facilities, this deﬁnition
wold require reﬁning.

43. “Nuclear Activity” means:a. Any construction or use of a nuclear reactor or component parts
thereof;b. Any production, use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon;c. Any research, development or testing of nuclear energy or nuclear
weapons;
d. Any production, separation, treatment or handling of nuclear
material;e. Any dismantling, disabling or destruction of nuclear weapons;
f. Any decommissioning of nuclear reactors and power plants;

A nuclear weapons
production facility
might but would notnecessarily be a complex
that includes research,storage, destruction,
reprocessing, or testing
facilities. It would also
include facilities for the
production of nuclear
weapon componentsthat are non-nuclear.

g. Any application of radiation and isotopes in food, agriculture,
medicine, engineering, geology or other industrial processes; orh. Any other activity listed below or deemed a nuclear activity by the
Agency.
44.

“Convert” means modify to a use not prohibited under thisConvention.

45.

“De-alert” means reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons byeliminating launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack alert readinesspostures, e.g., by removing key trigger mechanisms, decoupling
warheads from nuclear weapons delivery vehicles or other means.

46.

“Deployment of a nuclear weapon” means prepare or maintain anuclear weapon for possible use by any of the following:a. placing it on, in or near a delivery system;b. moving it to or maintaining it at a location suitable for delivery to atarget.

47.

“Destroy” means, with regard to a nuclear weapon, to remove the

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Nuclear weapons
storage facilities do
not include such
facilities if located on a
deployment site becauseof the requirement thatwarheads and bombs be
stored seperately fromtheir delivery vehicles.

 53

warhead from its delivery vehicle, dismantle and irreversibly disable
the warhead and its components, and dismantle and disable or convert
the delivery vehicle to non-nuclear use, in accordance with theprovisions of this Convention.
48. “Disable” means:
Disposition refers toirretrievable disposalof nuclear weapons
usable material. Thereis no known satisfactory
technology fordisposition yet.

a. with regard to a nuclear weapon, to render the weapon unable to be
detonated by such means as disengaging or removing the arming fuseand ﬁring mechanisms;
b. with regard to a plutonium pit, to render it unable to be used in a
nuclear weapon, e.g., by disﬁguring, quenching, squeezing, dilution,
mixing with highly radioactive waste, immobilization and disposition,transmutation or other means;c. with regard to command and control systems for nuclear weapons,
to render such systems incapable of initiating or directing the launchof nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;
d. with regard to a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle, to render suchvehicle unable to launch a nuclear weapon including such means asremoving essential components and removing the delivery vehicle
from the launch facilities.
49. “Disassemble” or “Dismantle” means:a. with regard to nuclear weapons, to take apart the warhead andremove the subassemblies, components, and individual parts;
b. with regard to a nuclear weapons delivery vehicle, to separate theessential component parts, such as warheads, propulsion and guidance
units.

The deﬁnition of nuclear
disarmament research
was deemed necessary
to distinguish between
prohibited and necessary
research with respect to
the NWC. This concept
requires more analysis
and discussion.

 54

50.

“Immobilization” means the process of putting nuclear material into
non-weapons usable form without irradiation, e.g., by mixing withhighly radioactive isotopes and encasing into a matrix of anothermaterial in order to render separation of the nuclear material from thematrix technically difﬁcult. Immobilization includes vitriﬁcation andencasing nuclear material in ceramic.

51.

“Nuclear Disarmament Research” means research intended to further
the purposes of this Convention.

52.

“Nuclear Weapons Research” means experimental or theoreticalwork undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge going beyond
publicly available information of phenomena and observable facts
directed toward understanding, development, improvement, testing,production, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons.

53.

“Nuclear Weapons Testing” means nuclear explosions, computer
simulations, hydrodynamic tests, hydronuclear tests designed tosimulate behavior of nuclear materials, nuclear warheads, nuclear
weapons or their components, under nuclear explosive conditions, andsub-critical testing using nuclear materials.

54.

“Reprocessing” means the separation of irradiated nuclear material
and ﬁssion products in whole or in part.

55.

“Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons” means any act, whether physicalor verbal, including the maintenance of a previously stated policy thatcreates or is intended to create a perception that a nuclear weapon
may or will be used.

Section 2

56.

“Uranium Enrichment” means the process of increasing thepercentage of U-235 isotopes so that the uranium can be used asreactor fuel or in nuclear weapons.

57.

“Use of Nuclear Weapons” means the detonation of a nuclear weapon.

G. Veriﬁcation
58.

“Veriﬁcation” means a comprehensive system for ensuring thecompliance with and implementation of this Convention. Veriﬁcation
measures include obtaining, providing, and assuring the accuracy of
information on nuclear weapons, nuclear material, nuclear facilities,
and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including information inarchives, data bases, and transportation systems, through declarations,monitoring, agreements on sharing information, consultation andclariﬁcation, on-site inspections, conﬁdence-building measures,
reporting and protection, preventive controls, and any other measuresdeemed necessary by the Agency.

59.

“Abuse of the Right of Veriﬁcation” means obtaining information,
or attempting to obtain information, through veriﬁcation activities,
for purposes not relating to the veriﬁcation or implementation of andcompliance with this Convention.

60.

“Conﬁdence-Building Measures” means voluntary measures byStates Parties to supply information, additional to that required, to
the Technical Secretariat or to other States Parties in order to develop
greater conﬁdence in compliance with the Convention. These could
include bilateral or multilateral agreements on monitoring andinformation sharing between States Parties.

61.

“Dual-access” means access to nuclear weapons, nuclear material,or nuclear facilities that requires authorization of a State Party andanother State Party or the Agency.

62.

“Reconstruction” means undertaking good faith scientiﬁcally soundefforts to produce or reproduce data that is not readily available
regarding past production of nuclear material. Reconstruction
measures include gathering and reviewing past data records, analyzing
production capacity and estimating the range of quantity of nuclear
material produced, and interviewing individuals with knowledge ofthe operation of a nuclear facility under review.

63.

“Preventive Controls” mean provisions adopted by the Agency toensure that nuclear material and nuclear facilities are not used for any
military or other purpose prohibited under this Convention.
a. The goals of preventive controls include:
i. Timely detection of diversion of nuclear material to allow
a response before the material can be fabricated into a
nuclear weapon;
ii. Deterring clandestine activities through the possibility ofdetection;

Dual-access agreements
establish a “two-key”
model of access, which
may be worked out
bilaterally or multilaterally
among States, or
between States and the
Agency. No State Party
would have exclusive
national access tonuclear weapons, nuclear
material or nuclear
facilities it formally owned
or possessed after Phase
I. Eventually dual-accessagreements would be
between States and the
Agency. Dual-accessis distinct from national
control with international
monitoring, which would
apply to early de-alerting
measures.

Preventive controls
may include theestablishment ofprocedures for transport,
treatment, storage anddisposition of suchmaterials, including
the establishment ofenvironmental guidelines
on such activities.

iii. Prevention of diversion through physical safety
procedures and transfer of national access to dual-access.
b. Preventive controls encompass safeguards of the IAEA (including
all provisions of the 93+2 Programme), EURATOM, ABACC or otherbodies; agreements among States; and agreements between States andthe Agency.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 55

c. Preventive controls apply to all nuclear weapons, nuclear material
and nuclear facilities. The degree of restrictiveness, accountability
and accessibility vary according to the risks posed by these weapons,materials or facilities to the purposes of this Convention. Preventive
controls may include:

See discussion ofPreventive Controls in
Section 4 of this book.

i. Accountancy and surveillance of nuclear material in any
form;
ii. Containment of special nuclear material in any form;
iii. Guidelines for the transport, treatment, handling, storage
and disposition of nuclear material;
iv. Environmental guidelines;
v. Dual-access agreements for all nuclear weapons facilities
and nuclear storage facilities for proscribed nuclear material.
Technical means
encompass national
technical means (statesystems of surveillance)
and international
technical means of the
Agency.

64. “Technical Means” means the independent gathering or analysis of
information which may have relevance to veriﬁcation of the Convention,
without physically accessing the territory being inspected.
65. “National Technical Means” (NTM) comprise nationally-owned andoperated technologies and techniques used to monitor the activities ofother states, including their compliance with treaty obligations. [NTM
include satellites, aircraft, remote monitoring, signals intelligence(SIGINT) and open source information.]
66. “Open Skies” means a regime for the conduct of observation ﬂights byStates Parties over the territories of other States Parties.

I. Delivery Vehicles
67.

“Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicle” means any vehicle designed
for or capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapondelivery vehicle which has been constructed, developed, ﬂight-tested
or deployed for weapon delivery shall be considered a nuclear weapondelivery vehicle.

68.

“Ballistic Missile” means a missile thata. consists of single or multiple stage(s) whose sole means ofpropulsion is an internal rocket engine that is functional over all or a
portion of the ﬂight path;b. follows a ballistic trajectory over the remaining unpowered portionof a ﬂight path;andc. is devoid of active aerodynamic surfaces.

69.
“Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM)” means a ballistic missilethat is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose ofbeing launched from this aircraft.
70.

 56

“Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile (GLBM)” means a groundlaunched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

Section 2

71.

“Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)” means a land-based
ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

72.

“Submarine [Sea] Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)” means aballistic missile designed to be launched from a submarine or othernaval vessel.

73.

“Cruise Missile” means an unmanned, self-propelled weapon delivery
vehicle that sustains ﬂight through the use of aerodynamic lift overmost of its ﬂight path. Cruise Missiles include:a. Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM);
b. Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM);
c. Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM).

74.

“Intermediate-Range Missile” means a ballistic or cruise missile
having a range capability “in excess” of 1,000 kilometers but not iexcess of 5,500 kilometers;

75.

“Shorter-Range Missile” means a ballistic or cruise missile having
a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not inexcess of 1,000 kilometers;

76.

“Bomber” means an airplane which was initially constructed or later
converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles.

77.

“Heavy Bomber” means a bomber which satisﬁes either of thefollowing criteria:
a. its range is greater than 8,000 kilometers; orb. it is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

78.

“Nuclear-Capable” in relation to delivery vehicles means able todeliver and activate a nuclear weapon.

79.

“Nuclear-Capable Missile” means a missile able to deliver any
payload over 300 kilometers.

80.

“Nuclear-Capable Submarines” includes ballistic missile submarines,
cruise missile submarines and attack submarines capable of deliveryof nuclear weapons.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 57

III. Declarations
A. Nuclear Weapons
Each State Party shall submit to the Registry, not later than [30] days after thisConvention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall, in
accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Veriﬁcation Annex:

See Critical Question
on Nuclear Energy in
Section 3 of this book.

1.

Declare whether it owns or possesses or has owned or possessed any nuclear
weapons, or whether there are any nuclear weapons located in any place under
its jurisdiction or control;

2.

Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of
nuclear weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its
jurisdiction or control.

3.

Report any nuclear weapons on its territory that are owned or possessed byanother State or under the jurisdiction or control of another State, whether or
not that State is a Party to this Convention.

4.

Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, nuclear
weapons and specify the transfer or receipt of such weapons.

5.

Provide its general plan for destruction of nuclear weapons that it owns or
possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

B. Nuclear Material
Each State Party shall submit to the Registry the following declarations, in which
it shall, in accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Veriﬁcation
Annex:
6.

Not later than [60] days after this Convention enters into force for it, declarean inventory of all special nuclear material it owns or possesses or that is
located within its jurisdiction or control, whether intended for civilian or
military use.

7.

Not later than [90] days after this Convention enters into force for it, declarean inventory of all other nuclear material it owns or possesses or that is locatedwithin its jurisdiction or control, whether intended for civilian or military use.

8.

Not later than [120] days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit
a report on the availability of data with respect to nuclear material produced in
the past, including estimates regarding missing data and extent of uncertainty,
and its plans for the reconstruction of such data.

C. Nuclear Facilities
Each State Party shall submit to the Registry, not later than [180] days after thisConvention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall, in
accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Veriﬁcation Annex:
9.

 58

With respect to nuclear weapons facilities:a.

Declare whether it has or has had any nuclear weapons facility under
its ownership or possession, or that is or has been located in any place
under its jurisdiction or control at any time.

b.

Declare any nuclear weapons facility it has or has had under its
ownership or possession or that is or has been located in any place

Section 2

under its jurisdiction or control at any time.
c.

Declare any nuclear weapons facility on its territory that another Statehas or has had under its ownership or possession and that is or has
been located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of anotherState at any time.

d.

Declare the precise location and production and storage capacities ofany facility reported under subparagraphs a, b, or c above.

e.

Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly,
any equipment for the production of nuclear weapons, and provide a
detailed account thereof.

f.

Specify actions to be taken for the closure of any facility reported
under subparagraphs a, b, or c above.

g.
10.

Provide its general plan for conversion of any facility reported undersubparagraphs a, b, or c into a nuclear weapons destruction facility.

With respect to other nuclear facilities, declare the precise location, nature andscope of activities of any nuclear facility under its ownership or possession, or
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control. Such declaration shall
include, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites as well as anyother facility, site, or installation in which nuclear activities of any kind havebeen or are carried out, or which are suitable for carrying out such activities.

Declarations would be
required for scientiﬁc
research laboritories
engaged in nuclear
physics research andfacilities with dual use
potential.

D. Delivery Vehicles
Each State Party shall submit to the Registry, not later than [210] days after thisConvention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall, in
accordance with the standards and guidelines set forth in the Veriﬁcation Annex:
11.

Declare the number and location of all nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise
missiles, including all those in production, storage or under repair.

12.

Declare the number and location of all nuclear-capable submarines, naval
crafts, and aircraft, including all those in production, storage or under repair.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 59

IV. Phases for Implementation
A. General Requirements
1.

Each phase indicates the deadline for completion of speciﬁc implementation
activity. Any phase can begin at any time, and does not require the completionof previous phases before initiation.

2.

Implementation activities shall be conducted in accordance with theVeriﬁcation Annex.

B. Extension of Deadlines
3.

If a State Party is unable to complete any of its obligations under Phase One
within the deadline, it may submit a request to the Executive Council for an
extension. Such a request must be made at least [four] months prior to thedeadline, and no extension may exceed [six] months.

4.

If a State Party is unable to complete any of its obligations under Phase Two
within the deadline, it may submit a request to the Executive Council foran extension. Such a request must be made at least [six] months prior to thedeadline, and no extension may exceed [one] year[s].

5.

If a State Party is unable to complete any of its obligations under Phases
Three, Four, or Five within the deadlines, it may submit a request to the
Executive Council for an extension of the deadline. Such a request must
be made at least [one] year[s] prior to the deadline for that phase, and no
extension may exceed [one] year[s].

C. Reciprocity in Extensions
6.
See Section 1, “Howto Achieve a Nuclear
Weapons Convention”
for a discussion of thephased approach.

D. Phases
7.

“De-alerting
includesturning off
power to missiles,
decoupling warheads
from missiles,
immobilizing missile silo
lids, and discontinuing
launch-on-warning
systems. Disabling
includes removing
trigger mechanisms,
replacing missilecones with nonaerodynamic covers,
removing SLBMs fromsubmarines, removing
warheads from delivery
vehicles, and disablinglaunch mechanisms.”

 60

If any State Party makes a request for an extension of any deadline, any otherState Party may request a similar extension within [one month] of the original
State’s request.

Phase One. Not later than [one year] after entry into force of this Convention:a.

All States Parties shall have complied with the requirements of Article
III {Declarations}.

b.

Targeting coordinates and navigational information for all nuclear
weapons delivery vehicles shall be removed.

c.

All nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall bede-alerted and disabled.

d.

Activities listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Nuclear Activities
shall have ceased.

e.

Production of nuclear weapon components and equipment listed in
Schedules 1 and 2 of the Annex on Nuclear Weapons Components andEquipment shall have ceased.

f.

All nuclear weapons testing facilities, nuclear weapons researchfacilities and nuclear weapons production facilities shall be designatedfor decommissioning and closure or for conversion.

Section 2

g.

Production of proscribed nuclear material shall have ceased, with the
exception of exemption quantities.

h.

[Funding for] nuclear weapons research of any sort not consistent withthe purposes and obligations of this Convention shall have ceased.

i.
8.

Phase Two. Not later than [two] years after entry into force of thisConvention:
a.

9.

10.

All nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be
removed from deployment sites.

b.

All warheads shall be removed from their delivery vehicles and either
placed into nuclear weapons storage facilities or dismantled.

c.

Agreements shall be negotiated to subject all nuclear weapons,
nuclear material and nuclear facilities to preventive controls.

Phase Three. Not later than [ﬁve] years after entry into force of thisConvention:a.

All nuclear weapons shall be dismantled.

b.

All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed, except:i.

no more than [1000] warheads in each of the stockpiles of
Russia and the United States; andii.

no more than [100] warheads in each of the stockpiles ofChina, France, and the United Kingdom.

c.

All nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be destroyed or converted
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

d.

All nuclear weapons facilities shall be designated fordecommissioning and closure or for conversion.

Phase Two would require
deep cuts in the nuclear
arsenals of the United
Staes and Russia if these
had not taken place by
the time of entry into
force of the NWC.

The phases are notequivalent to a timebound framework. They
do not indicate actual
dates for completionof each obligation, but
periods of time following
Entry-into-force (EIF)of the convention. It
may be important to
add speciﬁc dates if
there are some hold-out
States preventing EIF
but there is otherwise
general support for
implementation. The
principal purpose for thephases is to indicate theorder and coordinationof key steps towards
nuclear disarmament.
The emphasis should not
be primarily on speedof disarmament but
on safety, security andirreversibility.

Phase Four. Not later than [10] years after entry into force of this Convention:a.

11.

Plans for the implementation of all obligations under this Convention
shall have been submitted to the Agency.

See Critical Question,
Chapter 3, on Research

All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed, except:i.

no more than [50] warheads in each of the stockpiles of
Russia and the United States, andii.

no more than [10] warheads in each of the stockpiles ofChina, France, and the United Kingdom.

b.

All reactors using highly enriched uranium shall be closed orconverted to low enriched uranium use.

c.

[All reactors using plutonium as fuel shall be closed or converted toreactors that do not use any special nuclear material.]d.

All special nuclear material in any form shall be under strict, effective
and exclusive preventive controls.

Phase Five. Not later than [15] years after entry into force of this Convention:a.

All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed.

b.

[The powers and functions of the Agency shall be reviewed andadjusted to preserve its role in carrying out the objectives of thisConvention.]

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

See Critical Question,
Chapter 3, on
Nuclear Energy

Determining a timeline
for the ﬁnal phase ofmoving to zero nuclear
weapons could be themost problematic. A highlevel of conﬁdence will
be required to movefrom low numbers tozero unless politicalconditions have changed
markedly to ensure thatany threat of break out
could be met by nonnuclear means. Some
commentators havesuggested that the
timeline for the ﬁnal
phase be left open foragreement after otherphases have been
completed. The Model
NWC however suggests
a timeline be agreed,
but that an extension
could be requested if
necessary.

 61

E. Special Provision
Provision designed todeal with undeclared or
unrecognized nuclear
weapon state.

 62

12.

The Executive Council may make special provision for temporary retentionof small and diminishing quantities of nuclear weapons or proscribed nuclear
materials by Nuclear Capable States

13.

States meeting the criteria of this Special Provision shall follow therequirements, guidelines and phases outlined in this Article. They shall not
be expected to implement the provisions of this Convention in advance ofother States Parties, nor shall they be exempted from the requirements of eachphase.

Section 2

V. Veriﬁcation
A. Elements of the Veriﬁcation Regime
In order to verify compliance with this Convention, a veriﬁcation regime shall beestablished consisting of the following elements:
1.

Agreements on sharing data and veriﬁcation activities among States, UN
organs and with existing agencies,

2.

A Registry,3.

An International Monitoring System,

4.

Reporting of information gathered by National Technical Means,

5.

Open Skies,

6.

Preventive controls,

7.

Consultation and clariﬁcation,

8.

On-site inspections, including challenge inspections,

9.

Conﬁdence-building measures, including additional voluntarymeasures,

10.

Citizen and non-governmental reporting and protection,

11.

Any other measures deemed necessary by the Agency.

See the discussion of
veriﬁcation in Section
4 of this book. A
Veriﬁcation Annex woldhave to be negotiatedamong States as anintegral part of the NWC.
Article V provides thegeneral guidelines of theveriﬁcation regime.

B. Activities, Facilities, and Materials Subject to Veriﬁcation
12.

All obligations of States Parties and persons as deﬁned, inter alia, in Article I{General Obligations}, Article III {Declarations} and Article IV, Section D{Phases} shall be subject to veriﬁcation in accordance with the relevant
provisions of this Convention and its Veriﬁcation Annex.

C. Rights and Obligations With Respect to Veriﬁcation
13.

Veriﬁcation activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited
to the subject matter of this Convention, and shall be carried out on the basisof full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive
manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishmentof their objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right ofveriﬁcation.

14.

Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Convention to cooperate
through its National Authority established pursuant to Article VI {National
Implementation Measures} of this Convention, with the Agency, with otherStates Parties and with other agencies as stipulated in this Convention andin separate agreements to facilitate the veriﬁcation of compliance with thisConvention by, inter alia:a.

Establishing the necessary facilities, or providing necessary
modiﬁcations to existing facilities, to participate in these veriﬁcation
measures, and establishing the necessary communication;b.

Providing all relevant data obtained by technical means and bynational systems that are part of the International Monitoring System
as agreed among States;

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 63

Conﬁdence-building
measures are voluntarymeasures by States
to supply information,
additional to that alreadyrequired, to the Agency
or to other Statesin order to develop
greater conﬁdences incompliance with the
NWC.

c.

Participating, as necessary, in a consultation and clariﬁcation
process;d.

Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections;e.

Participating in conﬁdence-building measures; andf.

To the extent possible, internationalizing elements of its National
Technical Means and incorporating them into the International
Monitoring System.

15.

Each State Party shall have the right to take measures not contrary to theprovisions of this Convention to prevent disclosure of conﬁdential informationand data not related to this Convention.

16.

Subject to paragraph 15, information obtained by the Agency through theveriﬁcation regime established by this Convention shall be made available
to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of thisConvention.

17.

The provisions of this Convention shall not be interpreted as restricting theinternational exchange of data for scientiﬁc purposes not prohibited by thisConvention.

18.

Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with otherStates Parties in the improvement of the veriﬁcation regime and in theexamination of additional monitoring technologies. Such measures shall, whenagreed, be incorporated in amendments to this Convention or changes to theAnnexes or, where appropriate, be reﬂected in the operational manuals of theTechnical Secretariat.

D. Conﬁdence-Building Measures
19.

Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with otherStates Parties in implementing various measures additional to those explicitly
required under this Convention in order to:a.

Develop greater conﬁdence regarding compliance with the obligations
under this Convention, andb.

Assist in the compilation of detailed information by the International
Monitoring System.

E. Relation to Other Veriﬁcation Arrangements

 64

20.

The Technical Secretariat may enter into cooperative veriﬁcation arrangementsin accordance with the provisions of Article XIV {Cooperation, Complianceand Dispute Settlement} para. 3 and the provisions of Article XVIII, Section A{Relation to Other International Agreements} para. 2.

21.

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the veriﬁcation arrangements assumed by either State under
the Treaties Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles {INF}.

22.

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the veriﬁcation arrangements assumed by Argentina and Brazil
under the Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Section 2

23.

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the veriﬁcation arrangements, assumed by any State under theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or under safeguards agreements andadditional protocol agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency[or under the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty].

F. Implementation
24.

Prior to entry into force of this Convention, nothing shall preclude any
signatory State from implementing, individually or in agreement with otherStates, the veriﬁcation measures of this Convention which are applicable tothem. Such measures may include public declarations as detailed in Article III{Declarations}, negotiations with other States for the purposes of verifying
bilateral or multilateral reductions of nuclear weapons, and the veriﬁcation ofplans for the destruction of nuclear weapons, disposition of special nuclear
material, and destruction or conversion of nuclear weapons facilities or nuclear
weapons delivery vehicles.

25.

Veriﬁcation measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 23 may include theformation of a provisional authority for the purpose of overseeing veriﬁcation
activities, including assistance in the development of national implementationplans pursuant to Article VI {National Implementation Measures} of thisConvention.

The requirements and tasks of veriﬁcation would be deﬁned by the obligations of the
NWC. The veriﬁcation tasks can be divided into the following three main stages:
1. Baseline information exchange and data gathering. Identify the current status of
the nuclear-weapons complex with reasonable accuracy without proliferating sensitive
information.
2. Disarmament: Monitor the agreed path of reducing nuclear arms and eliminating
the nuclear-weapons complex within tolerable limits of uncertainty and sufﬁcient
conﬁdence.
3. Preventing rearmament: During the transformation to and within a nuclearweapon-free world, observe any objects and detect any activities that might indicate anuclear-weapons capability.
Veriﬁcation in all three stages would need to focus on monitoring a complex rangeof treaty-limited items and activities and their combination. What actually needs to be
veriﬁed is the combination of required/prohibited objects and activities, according to
the General Obligations of the MNWC. These include, for instance, dismantlement of
nuclear weapons; disposition of nuclear material; conversion or destruction of certain
nuclear facilities; monitoring the location and status of nuclear weapons, nuclear
material, nuclear facilities, delivery systems, and command and control systems toinsure that they are not used for research, development, testing, production, transport,
deployment or use of nuclear weapons. Other activities would include storage, transfer
and handling of nuclear weapons and ﬁssile material.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 65

The National
implementation
Measures include
the establishment of
national authorities tooversee implementationof the NWC. Domestic
legal systems will haveto be adapted to the
obligations assumed by
State Parties.

VI. National Implementation Measures
A. Legislative Implementation
1.

Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt
the necessary legislative measures to implement its obligations under thisConvention. In particular, it shall:a.

Extend its penal legislation to provide, in accordance with Article VII,
Section A, for the trial, extradition and punishment of persons who
commit crimes as deﬁned in Article I, Section B.

b.

Provide all necessary protection for persons who report violations of
this Convention, in accordance with Article VII, Section C.

2.

Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties in affording legal
assistance toward fulﬁlling the obligations under paragraph 1.

3.

Each State Party, in the implementation of its obligations under thisConvention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people
and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate withother States Parties in this regard.

B. Relations Between the State Party and the Agency
4.

 66

In order to fulﬁll its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shalldesignate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal
point for effective liaison with the Agency and other States Parties. EachState Party shall notify the Agency of its National Authority at the time that
this Convention enters into force for it. The responsibilities of the National
Authority include:a.

The preparations and submission of declarations in theregistry;b.

The enactment of new legislation or the revision of existing legislation
to facilitate the enforcement of the Convention;c.

Preparations for receiving inspections, including, inter alia, approvalof the list of inspectors, issuing of multiple entry visas for inspectors,
providing aircraft clearances, and designating points of entry and exit.

5.

Each State Party shall inform the Agency of the legislative and administrative
measures taken to implement this Convention.

6.

Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency in the exercise of allits functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat.
This includes cooperation in carrying out any investigation which the Agency
may initiate, and to provide or support assistance with investigations of noncomplying State Parties and with Parties exposed to danger as a result of
violation of this Convention.

7.

Each State Party shall disseminate information regarding the requirementsof this Convention and shall ensure the inclusion of such information in the
training of relevant personnel regarding obligations under this Convention.

8.

Each State Party shall transmit relevant information gathered by its National
Technical Means to the International Monitoring System.

Section 2

C. Conﬁdentiality
9.

Each State Party shall treat as conﬁdential and afford special handlingto information and data that it receives in conﬁdence from the Agency.
Information subject to conﬁdentiality shall include data used for purposes notprohibited under this Convention and state and military technology for dual
use vehicles, components and computers.

D. Relation to implementation measures assumed or required underother arrangements
10.

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the National Implementation Measures assumed or required by
States under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, International Atomic Energy
Agency Safeguards agreements, International Convention for the Suppressionof Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, [Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty] and United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 67

VII. Rights and Obligations of Persons
A. Criminal Procedure
1.

2.

Certain prohibited
acts unde the NWC
would be crimes forwhich there should be
individual responsibility.
This section outlines
procedures for the trialof persons accused ofcrimes, including therights of the accuse.
In addition, protectionof individuals reporting
crimes (societal
veriﬁcation) is considereda vital component of themodel NWC (Section C).

See discussion ofSocietal Veriﬁcation in
Section 4 of this book

 68

3.

Any person accused of committing a crime under this Convention within thejurisdiction of a State Party of which such person is a citizen or resident shallbea.

tried according to the legal process of such State if foundwithin such State, orb.

surrendered to the International Criminal Court if the crime alleged iswithin the jurisdiction of such Court and the State concerned is unable
or unwilling to undertake adequate criminal procedures.

If found within another State Party, such person shall bea.

tried within such State, orb.

extradited to the State within the jurisdiction of which the crime isalleged to have been committed, orc.

surrendered to the International Criminal Court if the crime alleged
is within the jurisdiction of such Court and the States concerned are
unable or unwilling to undertake adequate criminal procedures.

Any person accused of a crime under this Convention shall be assumed to
be innocent until proven guilty and have the right to a fair trial and humane
treatment, as prescribed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and other conventions and agreements which have acquired the statusof customary international law.

B. Responsibility to Report Violations
4.

Persons shall report any violations of this Convention to the Agency. This
responsibility takes precedence over any obligation not to disclose information
which may exist under national security laws or employment contracts.

5.

[Information received by the Agency under the preceding paragraph shallbe held in conﬁdence until formal charges are lodged, except to the extent
necessary for investigative purposes.]

C. Protection for Persons Providing Information
Intra-state protection
6.

Any person reporting a suspected violation of this Convention, either by aperson or a State, shall be guaranteed full civil and political rights including
the right to liberty and security of person.

7.

States Parties shall take all necessary steps to ensure that no person reportinga suspected violation of this Convention shall have any rights diminished or
privileges withdrawn as a result.

8.

Any individual who [in good faith] provides the Agency or a National
Authority with information regarding a known or suspected violation of thisConvention cannot be arrested, prosecuted or tried on account thereof.

Section 2

9.

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any employee or applicant for employment because such person has
opposed any practice as a suspected violation of this Convention, reported
such violation to the Agency or a National Authority, or testiﬁed, assisted,or participated in any manner in an investigation or proceeding under thisConvention.

10.

Any person against whom a national decision is rendered on account of
information furnished by such person to the Agency about a suspectedviolation of this Convention may appeal such decision to the Agency within[..] months of being notiﬁed of such decision. The decision of the Agency inthe matter shall be ﬁnal.

Inter-State Protection
11.

Any person reporting a violation of this Convention to the Agency shall beafforded protection by the Agency and by all States Parties, including, in thecase of natural persons, the right of asylum in all other States Parties if theirsafety or security is endangered in the State Party in which they permanently
or temporarily reside.

Additional Provisions
12.

[The Executive Council may decide to award monetary compensation topersons providing important information to the Agency concerning violationsof this Convention.]13.

Any person who voluntarily admits to the Agency having committed aviolation of this Convention, prior to the receipt by the Agency of information
concerning such violation from another source, may be exempt frompunishment. In deciding whether to grant such exemption, the Agency
shall consider the gravity of the violation involved as well as whether its
consequences have not yet occurred or can be reversed as a result of theadmission made.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 69

VIII. Agency
A. General Provisions
The model NWC
proposes animplementing agency
similar in structure to
the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical
Weapons, although theprovisions within theTechnical Secretariat
dealing with the Registry
and the International
Monitoring System do
not have counterparts in
the Chemical Weapons
Convention.

The NWC Agency, unlike
the IAEA, would not havethe task of promoting
nuclear energy. Its
primary objectives
include containmentand surveillance of allmaterials, equipment,
or facilities that
could contribute to
the development,
production, or
maintenance of nuclear
weapons.

1.

The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the Agency for theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter “the Agency”) to achieve theobject and purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation of its
provisions, including those for international veriﬁcation of compliance with it,
and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.

2.

All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Agency. A State
Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Agency.

3.

The seat of the Headquarters of the Agency shall be _____.

4.

The organs of the Agency are the Conference of the States Parties, theExecutive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat
shall oversee the Registry and the International Monitoring System.

5.

The Agency shall conduct its veriﬁcation activities provided for under
this Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with thetimely and efﬁcient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request
only the information and data necessary to fulﬁll its responsibilities under
this Convention. It shall take every precaution to protect the conﬁdentialityof information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its
knowledge in the implementation of this Convention.

6.

In undertaking its veriﬁcation activities the Agency shall consider measures tomake use of advances in science and technology.

7.

The costs of the Agency’s activities shall be paid by States Parties inaccordance with Article XVI {Financing}. The budget of the Agency shallcomprise two separate chapters, one relating to administrative and other costs,
and one relating to veriﬁcation costs.

8.

A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payments of its ﬁnancial
contribution to the Agency shall have no vote in the Agency if the amountof its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it
for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may,nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisﬁed that the failure to
pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.

B. The Conference of the States Parties
Composition, procedures and decision-making
9.

The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter “the Conference”) shallbe composed of all members of this Agency. Each member shall have one
representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates andadvisors.

10.

The ﬁrst session of the conference shall be convened by the depositary notlater than 30 days after the entry into force of this Convention.

11.

The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held annuallyunless it decides otherwise.

12.

Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened:
a.

 70

When decided by the Conference;Section 2b.

When requested by the Executive Council;c.

When requested by any member and supported by one thirdof the members;d.

In accordance with paragraph 22 to undertake reviews of the operationof this Convention.

Except in the case of subparagraph (d) the special session shall be convened
not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the Director-General of
the Technical Secretariat, unless speciﬁed otherwise in the request.
13.

The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an Amendment
Conference in accordance with Article XVII {Amendments}.

14.

Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Agency unless theConference decides otherwise.

15.

The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of eachregular session, it shall elect its Chairperson and such other ofﬁcers as may berequired. They shall hold ofﬁce until a new Chairperson and other ofﬁcers areelected at the next regular session.

16.

A majority of the members of the Agency shall constitute a quorum
for the Conference.

17.

Each member of the Agency shall have one vote in the Conference.

18.

The Conference shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple
majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on matters of
substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is
not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the Chairperson shalldefer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall makeevery effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to theConference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible atthe end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds
majority of members present and voting unless speciﬁed otherwise in thisConvention. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one ofsubstance or not, the question shall be treated as a matter of substance unlessotherwise decided by the Conference by the majority required for decisions on
matters of substance.

Powers and functions
19.

The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Agency. It shall consider
any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Convention, including
those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and theTechnical Secretariat. It may make recommendations and take decisions on
any questions, matters or issues related to this Convention, raised by a State
Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.

20.

The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this Convention, andact in order to promote its object and purpose. The Conference shall review
compliance with this Convention. It shall also oversee the activities of the
Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issues guidelines
in accordance with this Convention to either of them in the exercise of theirfunctions.

21.

The Conference shall:a.

The Agency’s primaryobjectives include
containment andsurveillance of allmaterials, equipment,
or facilities that
could contribute to
the development,
production, or
maintenance of nuclear
weapons. Sources of
information include
declarations andreports by States,
systematic andchalllenge inspections,information from otheragencies (includingNGOs), publicly available
resources means,
and the international
monitoring system.

Consider and adopt at its regular sessions the report, program andbudget of the Agency, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as
consider other reports;

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 71

22.

Considerations formembership in the
Executive Council
are nuclear status,
geographic diversity,
special interest or
expertise in the aimsof the Convention
and speciﬁc concerns
regarding nuclear
weapons. This could
include, for example,
Sates in which nuclear
weapons have beenused or tested.

 72

b.

Decide on the scale of ﬁnancial contributions to be paid by States
Parties in accordance with paragraph 7;c.

Elect the members of the Executive Council;d.

Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafterreferred to as “the Director-General”);e.

Approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council
submitted by the latter;f.

Establish such subsidiary organs as it ﬁnds necessary for the exercise
of its functions in accordance with this Convention;g.

Review scientiﬁc and technological developments that could affect theoperation of this Convention and, in this context, direct the DirectorGeneral to establish a Scientiﬁc Advisory Board to enable him or her,in the performance of his or her functions, to render specialized advice
in areas of science and technology relevant to this Convention, to theConference, the Executive Council or States Parties. The Scientiﬁc
Advisory Aboard shall be composed of independent experts appointed
in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference;h.

Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with thisConvention and to redress and remedy any situation which
contravenes the provisions of this Convention, in accordance with
Article XIV {Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement}.

The Conference shall, not later than one year after the expiration of the ﬁfth
and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention, and at suchother times within that time period as may be decided upon, convene in
special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention.
Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientiﬁc and technologicaldevelopments. At intervals of ﬁve years thereafter, unless otherwise decided
upon, further sessions of the Conference shall be convened with the same
objective.

C. The Executive Council
Composition, procedure and decision-making
23.

The Executive Council shall consist of 44 members. Each State Party shallhave the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve on the
Executive Council. The members of the Executive Council shall be electedby the Conference for a term of four years. Each geographical region, as
determined by Annex III, shall designate States Parties from that region forelection. In order to ensure the effective functioning of this Convention, due
regard being paid to equitable geographic distribution, to representation by
nuclear weapons states and nuclear-capable states, and to the interests of allstates to be free from the threat of nuclear devastation, the Executive Council
shall be composed as follows:a.

All Nuclear Weapons States Parties; andb.

Six States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia;c.

Seven States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean;d.

Six States Parties from Eastern Europe;e.

Seven States Parties from Africa;

Section 2f.

Six States Parties from among North America and Western Europe;g.

Six States Parties from South East Asia, the Paciﬁc and the Far East;h.

Up to two additional States Parties that have special interest or
expertise in implementing the aims of this Convention to be elected if
required.

24.

For the ﬁrst election of the Executive Council 22 members shall be elected fora term of two years, and 22 members for a term of four years.

25.

The Conference may, on its motion or upon the request of a majority of themembers of the Executive Council, review the composition of the Executive
Council taking into account developments related to the principles speciﬁed inparagraph 23.

26.

The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit themto the Conference for approval.

27.

The Executive Council shall elect its Chairperson from among its
members.

28.

The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regularsessions it shall meet as often as may be required for the fulﬁllment of its
powers and functions.

29.

Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. Unless otherwise
speciﬁed in this Convention, the Executive Council shall take decisions on
matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members. Whenan issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, thatquestion shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by
the Executive Council by the majority required for decisions on matters of
substance.

Powers and Functions
30.

The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Agency. It shallbe responsible to the Conference. The Executive council shall carry out
the powers and functions entrusted to it under this Convention, as well as
those functions delegated to it by the Conference. In so doing, it shall act
in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of theConference and assure their proper and continuous implementation.

31.

The Executive Council shall promote the effective implementation of, andcompliance with, this Convention. It shall supervise the activities of theTechnical Secretariat, cooperate with the National Authority of each State
Party and facilitate consultations and cooperation among States Parties at theirrequest.

32.

The Executive Council shall:

33.

a.

Consider and submit to the Conference the draft program andbudget of the Agency;b.

Consider and submit to the Conference the draft report of the
Agency on the implementation of this Convention, the report on theperformance of its own activities and such special reports as it deems
necessary or which the Conference may request;c.

Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference including the
preparation of the draft agenda.

The Executive Council may request the convening of a special session of theConference.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 73

34.

The Technical Secretariat
is responsible forveriﬁcation, including
the preparation andmaintenance of technicalmanuals. The contentsof these manuals arebeyond the scope of thisdraft.

 74

The Executive Council shall:a.

Conclude agreements or arrangements with States and internationalorganizations on behalf of the Agency, subject to prior approval by the
Conference;b.

Approve agreements or arrangements relating to the implementationof veriﬁcation activities, negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with
States Parties.

35.

The Executive Council shall consider any issue or matter within its
competence affecting this Convention and its implementation, including
concerns regarding compliance, and cases of non-compliance, and, as
appropriate, inform States Parties and request compliance within a speciﬁed
time.

36.

If the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take,inter alia, one or more of the following measures in accordance with Article
XIV {Cooperation, Compliance and Dispute Settlement}:a.

Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter;b.

Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;c.

Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures toredress the situation and to ensure compliance.

d.

The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity andurgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant
information and conclusions, directly to the attention of theUnited Nations General Assembly and the United Nations
Security Council. It shall at the same time inform all States
Parties of this step.

D. The Technical Secretariat
37.

The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive
Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shallcarry out the veriﬁcation measures provided for in this Convention. It shallcarry out the other functions entrusted to it under this Convention as well as
those functions delegated to it by the Conference and the Executive Council.

38.

With respect to the veriﬁcation of and compliance with this Convention, theTechnical Secretariat shall:a.

Maintain the Registry and other information databases in accordancewith Section F below;b.

Maintain and coordinate the operation of the International
Monitoring System;c.

Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation andoperation of monitoring systems;d.

Assist the Executive Council in facilitating consultation andclariﬁcation among States Parties;e.

Receive requests for on-site inspections and process them, facilitate
the Executive Council consideration of such requests, carry out the
preparation for, and provide technical support during, the conduct ofon-site inspections, and report to the Executive Council;f.

Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation

Section 2of veriﬁcation activities with States Parties, subject to approval by the
Executive Council;g.

Provide technical assistance and technical evaluation to States Parties
in the implementation of the provisions of this Convention;h.

Assist the States Parties through their National Authorities on otherissues of veriﬁcation under this Convention.

39.

The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approvalby the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation ofvarious components of the veriﬁcation regime, in accordance with theVeriﬁcation Annex. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of thisConvention or the Annexes, and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat
subject to approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shallpromptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.

40.

With respect to administrative matters the Technical Secretariat
shall:a.

Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft program andbudget of the Agency;b.

Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft report of the
Agency on the implementation of this Convention and such otherreports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request;c.

Provide administrative and technical support to the Conference, theExecutive Council and subsidiary organs;d.

Address and receive communications on behalf of the Agency to andfrom States Parties on matters pertaining to the implementation of thisConvention;e.

Upon approval by the Executive Council and the Conference, submit
the report of the Agency to the United Nations Secretary General.

41.

All requests and notiﬁcations by States Parties to the Agency shall betransmitted through their National Authorities to the Director-General.
Requests and notiﬁcations shall be in one of the ofﬁcial languages of theUnited Nations. In response the Director-General shall use the language of thetransmitted request or notiﬁcation.

42.

The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council of any problem
that has arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions, including doubts,
ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with this Convention that havecome to its notice in the performance of its veriﬁcation activities or throughconﬁdential or non-governmental sources and that it has been unable to resolveor clarify through its consultations with the State Party concerned.

43.

The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its
head and chief administrative ofﬁcer, inspectors and such scientiﬁc, technicaland other personnel as may be required.

44.

The Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical Secretariat and shall act under
the supervision of the Director-General.

45.

The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon therecommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable
for one further term, but not thereafter. The appointment of the DirectorGeneral shall be considered a matter of substance governed by paragraph 18.

46.

The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive
Council for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioningof the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Additinal provisions
might provide forindependent researchdone by institutions otherthan the current nuclear
weapons researchlaboratories. A fund tosupport such researchmight be established.

 75

of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be thenecessity of securing the highest standards of efﬁciency, competence andintegrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General,
as inspectors or as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Dueregard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide ageographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principlethat the staff shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper discharge ofthe responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.
47.

The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization and functioningof the Scientiﬁc Advisory Board referred to in paragraph 21.g The DirectorGeneral shall, in consultation with States Parties and non-governmental
sources, appoint members of the Scientiﬁc Advisory Board, who shall servein their individual capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed
on the basis of their expertise in the particular scientiﬁc ﬁelds relevant to
the implementation of this Convention. The Director-General may also, as
appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary
working groups of scientiﬁc experts to provide recommendations on speciﬁc
issues. In regard to the above, States Parties and non-governmental sources
may submit lists of experts to the Director-General. The Scientiﬁc Advisory
Board may be called upon to review nuclear or other research and determine
whether it is of a nature prohibited under this Convention or of a nature that
may contribute to veriﬁcation of nuclear disarmament.

48.

In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors andthe other members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any
Government or from any other source external to the Agency. They shallrefrain from any action that might reﬂect on their positions as internationalofﬁcers responsible only to the Conference and the Executive Council.

49.

Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character ofthe responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors and the othermembers of the staff and not seek to inﬂuence them in the discharge of their
responsibilities.

E. Privileges and Immunities

 76

50.

The Agency shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under thejurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges
and immunities as are appropriate for the exercise of its functions.

51.

Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers,
representatives appointed to the Executive Council together with theiralternates and advisers, the Director-General and the staff of the Agency shallenjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent
exercise of their functions in connection with the Agency.

52.

The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article shallbe deﬁned in agreements between the Agency and the States Parties as well as
in an agreement between the Agency and the State in which the headquartersof the Agency is seated.

53.

Notwithstanding paragraphs 50 and 51, the privileges and immunities enjoyedby the Director-General and the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the
conduct of veriﬁcation activities shall be those set forth in the Veriﬁcation
Annex.

Section 2

F. Registry and Other Databases
54.

55.

The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a Registry of the following:a.

All nuclear weapons;b.

All nuclear material;c.

All nuclear facilities;d.

All nuclear weapons delivery vehicles;e.

Any other facilities or materials as determined by theTechnical Secretariat.

The Technical Secretariat shall obtain information from thefollowing sources:a.

Declarations by States in accordance with the provisions ofArticle III {Declarations};b.

Reports by States on progress in implementing their
obligations under this Convention;c.

The International Monitoring System;d.

National Technical Means;e.

Systematic inspections;f.

Challenge inspections;g.

Other organizations with which the Agency has concluded agreements
on sharing information in accordance with Article XVIII, Section A{Relation to Other International Agreements};h.

Other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations thatcollect and submit such information;i.

Publicly available sources;j.

Any other sources which the Technical Secretariat deems
appropriate.

56.

The Technical Secretariat shall make available to the Registry information
obtained from the above sources with the exception of information which may
remain conﬁdential because of legitimate national and international security
concerns or trade secret concerns.

57.

Information in the Registry shall be available to all States parties and to the
public according to criteria established by separate agreements [among States].

The Registry would
maintain a list of all
nuclear warheads,
delivery vehicles,
facilities and material
subject to veriﬁcation.

G. International Monitoring System
58.

The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities and systems formonitoring by satellite, on-site sensors, remote sensors, radionuclide sampling,respective means of communication, aircraft and other systems developed as
deemed necessary by the Agency.

59.

The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of theTechnical Secretariat.

60.

All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall beowned and operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility forthem except for those systems or facilities which may be owned or operated
by another agency or by the United Nations, or constructed or acquired by the
Agency in accordance with paragraph 64.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 77

The model NWC
proposes theestablishment of theInternational Monitoring
System (IMS) similar
to but more extensive
than the International
Monitoring Systemestablished by
the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty.
The main purpose of
the IMS is to enable
the Agency to gather
information necessary
for the veriﬁcation of theConvention. The system
would include monitoring
and analysis equipment
owned or controlled by
the Agency. In addition,
information generated
by equipment owned orcontrolled by member
States would be sharedthrough agreements with
the Agency.
Special arrangements
may have to be madefor facilities locatedon disputed territory
or on the territory ofindigenous nations.

 78

61.

The Technical Secretariat shall acquire equipment necessary for collating andanalyzing data provided by the International Monitoring System.

62.

Any State Party may, if it so decides and upon agreement with the Technical
Secretariat, give a monitoring facility to the Agency.

63.

The Technical Secretariat may, upon agreement of the Conference and inaccordance with its funding guidelines, construct or otherwise acquire amonitoring system or facility if it determines that such a facility or system isnecessary for veriﬁcation of obligations of States under this Convention, and
if no State is able or willing to provide such a system or facility or informationfrom such a system or facility to the International Monitoring System.

64.

Each State shall have the right to participate in the international exchange ofdata and to have access to all data made available to the Registry.

65.

The Agency shall conclude agreements with other agencies or organizations
using international monitoring systems relating to the sharing of information
obtained through such systems relevant to the veriﬁcation of this Conventionin accordance with Article XVIII, Section A {Relation to Other International
Agreements}.

66.

Data obtained by the International Monitoring System not directly relevant
to veriﬁcation of this Convention shall be treated as conﬁdential, except
where such information is relevant to the veriﬁcation of another international
agreement [and there is an agreement on sharing such information between
the Agency and the organization responsible for implementation of thatagreement].

67.

Data obtained from the International Monitoring System shall ﬁrst be
analyzed, processed and veriﬁed by the Technical Secretariat before being
compiled as part of the Registry, in accordance with the provisions ofparagraph 57.

Section 2

IX. Nuclear Weapons
A. General Requirements
1.

All nuclear weapons [with corresponding delivery vehicles] shall be taken off
alert status, disabled, removed from deployment, declared, and destroyed inaccordance with the guidelines and standards of Article III {Declarations},
Article IV {Phases for Implementation}, the Veriﬁcation Annex, and theprovisions set forth below:

B. Procedures for Destroying Nuclear Weapons
2.

Each State Party shall take the following measures with respect to all nuclear
weapons that it owns or possesses or that are under its jurisdiction or control:a.
All warheads shall be bar-coded, registered, and tagged for
identiﬁcation using secure visual tags.
b.

All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed or moved to nuclear weapons
storage facilities subject to international preventive controls. No
exclusive national access to the repositories is allowed. Weapons may
be removed from the nuclear weapons storage facilities only for the
purposes of destruction.

c.

All core elements from newly dismantled warheads shall be quenchedor otherwise deformed and placed in storage under international
preventive controls until ﬁnal disposal of the proscribed nuclear
material, in accordance with the guidelines and standards of Article X{Nuclear Material}.

The procedures outlined
to remove nuclear
weapons from alertand deployment andto register, tag, declareand destroy such
weapons need notnecessarily follow in eactchronological order inexact circumstance. It
may be possible in somecases, for example, todisable a warhead before
removing it from its
delivery vehicle. In othercases the procedure
may be reversed. The
manuals to be compiledby the Technical
Secretariat will provide
the precise details foreach weapon system.

C. Prevention of Production of Nuclear Weapons
3.

All nuclear [weapons] facilities and deployment sites shall be subject toveriﬁcation, including challenge inspections at any time and non-destructive
detection of hidden warheads, to ensure compliance with obligations under
this Convention not to develop, produce, or deploy nuclear weapons.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 79

Although all nuclear
material presents someproliferation-relatedrisks, the emphasisin this article is on
nuclear-weapons-usablematerial (special nuclear
material). Efforts atreconstructing recordsof past production andtransfers and accounting
for current inventories of
special nuclear material
should begin as soon as
possible. No distinction
is made in this article
between military andcivilian material, as
it is the material, notthe source, which isof concern regarding
possible diversion to
nuclear weapons.
In practice, however,there will be somedifferences inreconstructing anddocumenting the material
from different sources.
In general, civilian
facilities have kept better
records than militaryfacilities since the former
were subject to a greater
degree of national andinternational monitoring
and control, and safetyin civilian facilities wasoften a higher priority
than in military facilities.

Paragraph 6 would
prohibit the use of
MOX fuel and HEU
in reactors as well as
certain concepts oftransmutation

X. Nuclear Material
A. Reconstruction and Documentation
1.

All military and civilian nuclear material shall be documented and declaredaccording to the guidelines and standards set forth in Article III {Declarations}and the Veriﬁcation Annex.

2.

Special Nuclear Materiala.

Records of production and use of special nuclear material producedin the past shall be reconstructed to the extent possible throughanalysis of past records, measures of transparency including national
legislation aimed at disclosure of information, interviews, and anyother appropriate means.

b.

All special nuclear material storage sites and related nuclear facilities
usable for production of special nuclear material shall be subject topreventive controls, including inventory veriﬁcation as set forth in the
Veriﬁcation Annex.

B. Control of Special Nuclear Material
3.

Subject to Section C below, production and use of proscribed nuclear
material is prohibited. Existing inventories of special nuclear material shallbe subject to preventive controls and storage and disposal in accordancewith the guidelines and standards set forth below and in separate veriﬁcationagreements.

4.

All treatment of nuclear material that improves its quality to the level ofproscribed nuclear material or improves the accessibility of proscribed nuclear
material is prohibited, including, inter alia, separation of plutonium fromspent fuel, enrichment of uranium in U-235 beyond unavoidable civilian
requirements or beyond 20%, or extraction of tritium from heavy water, withthe exception of exemption quantities.

5.

All existing stocks of special nuclear material shall be placed under preventive
controls until a safe method of ﬁnal disposal is found and approved by the
Agency. All handling of proscribed nuclear material except for such handlingas necessary for the purposes of this Convention shall be prohibited.

6.

[Burning of special ﬁssionable material is prohibited unless the net amount ofﬁssionable material resulting from such burning is reduced.]

7.

Facilities for the production, research and testing of special nuclear material
may be converted to uses consistent with the purposes and obligations of
this Convention. Conversion of such facilities may include research anddevelopment for methods of demilitarization and disposal of proscribednuclear material, including immobilization and ﬁnal disposition of plutonium.

C. Licensing Requirements
8.

 80

The Agency shall establish a licensing process for civilian use of proscribednuclear material which is not prohibited.

Section 2

D. Relation to other International Agreements
9. Nothing in this Section shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting fromthe veriﬁcation arrangements assumed by any State under safeguards agreements andadditional protocol agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency [or under
the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty]

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 81

Nuclear weapons
production and researchfacilities may contains
or consist of plants andequipment useful forthe implementation of
the Convention. For thisreason, it may be moresuitable to convert rather
than close down someof these facilities. Underconversion, however,veriﬁcation that nuclear
weapons research andproduction have stopped
could be difﬁcult.

See Critical Questions,
Chapter 3, on Researchand Conversion.

XI. Nuclear Facilities
A. Nuclear Weapons Facilities
1.

All nuclear weapons production facilities shall cease operations prohibited
under this Convention and shall be closed or converted to purposes notprohibited under this Convention.

2.

All nuclear weapons testing facilities shall cease operations and shall bepermanently closed [or converted to purposes not prohibited under thisConvention].

3.

All nuclear weapons research facilities shall be closed or converted to researchin accordance with paragraph 4.

4.

Funding of research for the purposes of designing, modernizing, constructing,modifying or maintaining reliability of nuclear weapons is prohibited.
Funding of research for the purpose of developing knowledge in the physics
of nuclear explosions is prohibited. Funding of research in safety mechanisms
for existing nuclear weapons is permitted only until all nuclear weapons are
dismantled. Funding of research for the purposes of safe dismantling anddestroying of nuclear weapons and for safe disposal of special nuclear material
is permitted.

5.

[All nuclear reprocessing facilities shall cease operations and shall bepermanently closed.]6.

All nuclear facilities shall be subject to preventive controls.

7.

All plans for the destruction or conversion of nuclear weapons [production,
research and testing facilities and principal nuclear] facilities, submitted
in accordance with Article IV {Phases for Implementation}, shall include
provisions or recommendations for the placement of former employees ofsuch facilities in positions of employment consistent with their experience andexpertise and with the object and purpose of this Convention. Such positions
and recommendations may include employment within a converted facility,
employment for the destruction of a nuclear facility, employment for thedestruction of nuclear weapons or disposition of special nuclear material, or
employment within the Agency for the purposes of veriﬁcation.

B. Command, Control, and Communications Facilities and Deployment Sites
8.

9.

 82

Each State Party shall make the following changes to nuclear targeting
commands and command systems in accordance with Article IV {Phases for
Implementation}:a.

Rescind alert status on all nuclear weapons;b.

Remove targeting coordinates from all command and control systems;
andc.

Remove navigational information for all nuclear armed missiles fromthe navigational systems.

Each State Party shall, in accordance with Article IV {Phases for
Implementation} and the Veriﬁcation Annex, destroy any facility, system or
sub-system designed or used solely for the purpose of launching, targeting,directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding
or assisting in any of these purposes.

Section 2

10.

Each State Party shall, in accordance with Article IV {Phases for
Implementation} and the Veriﬁcation Annex, and in order to prevent use forpurposes prohibited under this Convention, destroy or convert any facility,
system or sub-system which is used for the purpose of launching, targeting,directing or detonating a nuclear weapon or its delivery vehicle, or for aiding
or assisting in any of these purposes, and which is also used for purposes notprohibited under this Convention.

11.

Any facility, system or sub-system designed and used for detection ofactivities prohibited under this Convention is permitted.

12.

All plans for the destruction or conversion of command, control, andcommunications facilities and deployment sites submitted in accordance with
Article IV {Phases for Implementation} and the Veriﬁcation Annex, shall
include provisions or recommendations for the placement of former employeesof such facilities in positions of employment consistent with their experienceand expertise and with the object and purpose of this Convention. Such
positions and recommendations may include employment within a converted
facility, employment for the destruction of a nuclear facility, employment forthe purpose of gathering information, including National Technical Means,
and employment within the Agency for the purposes of inspection or othermethods of veriﬁcation.

C. Nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear materials
storage sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside of facilities.
13.

All States shall declare the precise location, nature and scope of nuclear
reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear laboratories, nuclear
materials storage sites and other nuclear-fuel cycle locations outside offacilities.

14.

All plutonium reprocessing facilities shall cease operations and bepermanently closed.

15.

All States shall conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency [orInternational Atomic Energy Agency] to verify that nuclear facilities
are operated consistent with obligations under this convention including
obligations under Section X (Nuclear Material).

Section C reﬂects asimilar provision in the
IAEA additional protocols
and is designed toinclude all nuclear
fuel-cycle locations thatmight be outside nuclear
facilities. Some of thismay be already coveredby other sections of theModel NWC and thus notnecessary.

D. Activities at nuclear facilities
16.

Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 1 of theAnnex on Nuclear Activities shall be prohibited.

17.

Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 2 of theAnnex on Nuclear Activities are permitted unless otherwise determined by the
Conference of States Parties in accordance with Articles XIV (Cooperation,
Compliance and Dispute Settlement).

18.

Activities undertaken at nuclear facilities that are listed in Schedule 3 of theAnnex on Nuclear Activities are permitted.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 83

The model NWC
proposes the destructionof delivery vehicles
designed solely for the
purpose of delivering
nuclear weapons. It
does not prohibit dualuse delivery vehicles.
However requiring dualuse delivery vehicles
to be converted to
non-nuclear capability
would only provide
limited conﬁdence, as
reconversion back tonuclear capability would
not be difﬁcult. For thisreason, it is proposed
there be an additional
optional protocol on
prohibiting certain dualuse delivery vehicles
which are destabilizing
irrespective of whether

XII. Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles
1.

All deployment, development, testing, production, or acquisition of delivery
vehicles and launchers designed solely for the purpose of delivering nuclear
weapons {Schedule 1} is prohibited.

2.

All delivery vehicles and launchers designed solely for the purpose ofdelivering nuclear weapons shall be destroyed according to Article IV {Phases
for Implementation} [and the Veriﬁcation Annex].

3.

All delivery vehicles capable of use for the delivery of nuclear weapons or
non-nuclear weapons {Schedule 2} shall be destroyed according to Article IV{Phases for Implementation} or converted for purposes not prohibited under
this Convention.

Schedule 1 - Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles to Be Destroyed
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
Heavy Bombers
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Ground Launched Cruise Missile
Schedule 2 - Delivery Vehicles to be Destroyed or Converted
Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles
Ground Launched Ballistic Missiles
Air Launched Cruise Missile
Sea Launched Cruise Missile
Nuclear-capable ﬁghter bombers
Cruise Missile Submarines
Attack Submarines
Warships[Schedule 3 - Transport Vehicles Not Designed for Nuclear Weapons to be Subject toPreventive Controls – to be completed] 84Section 2

XIII. Activities Not Prohibited
Under This Convention

See Optional Protocol
Concerning Energy
Assistance.

1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention [and otheragreements and regulations relating to nuclear material] to the research, development
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that research,development and use of nuclear energy within its territory or under its control isundertaken only for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. To this end, and inorder to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Convention,
each State Party shall subject nuclear facilities and nuclear material listed in the Annex
on Nuclear Activities, Components and Equipment of this Convention, or any otheractivities so declared by the Agency, to control and veriﬁcation measures as provided
in Sections V (Veriﬁcation), VI (National Implementation Measures), VIII (Agency), X(Nuclear Material), XI (Nuclear Facilities) [and the Veriﬁcation Annex.]
3. Each State Party has the right to the research, development, production, acquisitionand deployment of weapons-delivery systems for security purposes. This right issubject to the provisions of this Convention, other agreements and regulations relating
to weapons and weapons systems, the United Nations Charter and other internationallaw relating to the threat or use of force.
4. In the exercise of military activities not prohibited under this Convention,] eachState Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that [weapons and] weaponsdelivery systems are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained,
transferred, tested or deployed in a manner consistent with this Convention. To thisend, and in order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under
this Convention, each State Party shall subject weapons delivery systems includingcommand, control, communication and production facilities to control and veriﬁcation
measures as provided in Section XII (Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles) [and the
Veriﬁcation Annex].

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 85

XIV. Cooperation, Complianceand Dispute Settlement
A. Consultation, Cooperation, and Fact-ﬁnding

Cooperation,compliance and disputesettlement: The NWC
includes provisions
for consultation andfact-ﬁnding to clarify
and resolve questionsof interpretation withrespect to complianceand other matters.
These procedures
would be time-crucial
to essential evidence
is not lost. Complianceand enforcement
provisions are linked
to transparency andconﬁdence building
measures among State
Parties.

1.

States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly among themselves, or
through the Agency or other appropriate international procedures, including
procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordancewith its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object andpurpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Convention.

2.

Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Agency and with otherStates Parties in the improvement of the veriﬁcation, destruction andconversion regimes, with a view to developing speciﬁc measures to enhancethe efﬁcient, safe and cost-effective veriﬁcation, destruction and conversion
procedures and methods of this Convention.

3.

Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request a challenge
inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, ﬁrst make every effort
to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations
among themselves, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance withthis Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which
may be considered ambiguous. A State Party which receives a request fromanother State Party for clariﬁcation of any matter which the requesting State
Party believes causes such a doubt or concern shall provide the requesting
State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not later than [48] hours after
the receipt of a request to clarify a possible threat of use of nuclear weaponsor [10] days after the receipt of a request to clarify any other matter, withinformation sufﬁcient to answer the doubt or concern raised along with an
explanation of how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing
in this Convention shall affect the right of any two or more States Parties toarrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among
themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubt aboutcompliance or gives rise to a concern about a related matter which may beconsidered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights andobligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention.

Procedure for requesting clariﬁcation

 86

4.

A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist
in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which
gives rise to a concern about the possible non-compliance of another State
Party with this Convention. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate
information in its possession relevant to such a concern.

5.

A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council toobtain clariﬁcation from another State Party on any situation which may beconsidered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about its possible noncompliance with this Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply:a.

The Executive Council shall forward the request for clariﬁcation to
the State Party concerned through the Director-General not later than[24] hours after its receipt;b.

The requested State Party shall provide the clariﬁcation to the
Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case not later than[48] hours after the receipt of a request to clarify possible threat or use

Section 2of nuclear weapons or [10] days after the receipt of a request to clarify
any other matter;c.

The Executive Council shall take note of the clariﬁcation and forward
it to the requesting State Party not later than [24] hours after its
receipt;d.

If the requesting State Party deems the clariﬁcation to be inadequate,
it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain fromthe requested State Party further clariﬁcatione.

For the purpose of obtaining further clariﬁcation requested undersubparagraph d, the Executive Council may call on the DirectorGeneral to establish a group of experts from the Technical Secretariat,
or if appropriate staff are not available in the Technical Secretariat,
from elsewhere, to examine all available information and data
relevant to the situation causing the concern. The group of experts
shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its ﬁndings;f.

If the requesting State Party considers the clariﬁcation obtained undersubparagraphs d and e to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right torequest a special session of the Executive Council in which States
Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shallbe entitled to take part. In such a special session, the Executive
Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it
deems appropriate to resolve the situation.

6.

A State Party shall also have the right to request the Executive Council toclarify any situation which has been considered ambiguous or has given rise
to a concern about its possible non-compliance with this Convention. The
Executive Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate.

7.

The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties about any request forclariﬁcation provided in this Article.

8.

If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a possible non-compliance has
not been resolved within [60] days after the submission of the request forclariﬁcation to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent
consideration, notwithstanding its right to request a challenge inspection, it
may request a special session of the Conference in accordance with Article
VIII {Agency}. At such a special session, the Conference shall consider thematter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve thesituation.

Procedures for challenge inspections
9.

Each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any
facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction
or control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of clarifying andresolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance with theprovisions of this Convention, and to have this inspection conducted anywhere
without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and inaccordance with the Veriﬁcation Annex.

10.

Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request within
the scope of this Convention and to provide in the inspection request all
appropriate information on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding
possible non-compliance with this Convention as speciﬁed in the Veriﬁcation
Annex. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded inspection requests,
care being taken to avoid abuse. The challenge inspection shall be carriedout for the sole purpose of determining facts relating to the possible noncompliance.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

On-site inspections
and techniques would
include both systematic,
baseline inspections andchallenge inspections(anytime-anyplace) of
declared and undeclaredfacilities, utlizing a rangeof techniques, including
visual inspection,
record checks andnon-destructive
measurements (e.g.,with portable x-ray andgamma-ray detectors)
and could be assisted by
identiﬁcation techniques,
such as tagging,tamper-indicating seals
in nuclear power plants
and “ﬁngerprinting”
of delivery systems.
Perimeter portalmonitoring systems
would track the ﬂow
of items and materials
relevant for nuclear
weapons.

 87

11.

For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of thisConvention, each State Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct
the on-site challenge inspection pursuant to paragraph 9.

12.

Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, andin accordance with the procedures provided for in the Veriﬁcation Annex, theinspected State Party shall have:a.

The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort todemonstrate its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, toenable the inspection team to fulﬁll its mandate;b.

The obligation to provide access within the requested site for thesole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding
possible non-compliance; andc.

The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and toprevent disclosure of conﬁdential information and data, not related tothis Convention.

13. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:

 88

a.

The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of theinspected State Party, send a representative who may be a national
either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe
the conduct of the challenge inspection.

b.

The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the observer inaccordance with the Veriﬁcation Annex.

c.

The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed
observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact
shall be recorded in the ﬁnal report.

14.

The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an on-sitechallenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to the
Director-General for immediate processing.

15.

The Director-General shall immediately ascertain that the inspection request
meets the requirements speciﬁed the Veriﬁcation Annex, and, if necessary,
assist the requesting State Party in ﬁling the inspection request accordingly.
When the inspection request fulﬁlls the requirements, preparations for thechallenge inspection shall begin.

16.

The Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspectedState Party not less than 12 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection
team at the point of entry.

17.

After having received the inspection request, the Executive Council shall takecognizance of the Director-General’s actions on the request and shall keep thecase under its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, itsdeliberations shall not delay the inspection process.

18.

The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours after having received
the inspection request, decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members
against carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection
request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this Convention
as described in paragraph 9. Neither the requesting nor the inspectedState Party shall participate in such a decision. If the Executive Council
decides against the challenge inspection, preparations shall be stopped, nofurther action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States Parties
concerned shall be informed accordingly.

Section 2

19.

The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of
the challenge inspection. The inspection mandate shall be the inspection
request referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10 put into operational terms, and shallconform with the inspection request.

20.

The challenge inspection shall be conducted in accordance with the provisionsof the Veriﬁcation Annex. The inspection team shall be guided by theprinciple of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner
possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its
mission.

21.

The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout thechallenge inspection and facilitate its task. If the inspected State Party
proposes, pursuant to the Veriﬁcation Annex, arrangements to demonstratecompliance with this Convention, alternative to full and comprehensive access,it shall make every reasonable effort, through consultations with the inspection
team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts with theaim of demonstrating its compliance.

22.

The ﬁnal report shall contain the factual ﬁndings as well as an assessment by
the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted
for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. The DirectorGeneral shall promptly transmit the ﬁnal report of the inspection team to therequesting State Party, to the inspected State Party, to the Executive Council
and to all other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit
promptly to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and of theinspected States Parties, as well as the views of other States Parties which may
be conveyed to the Director-General for that purpose, and then provide them toall States Parties.

23.

The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions,review the ﬁnal report of the inspection team as soon as it is presented, andaddress any concerns as to:a.

Whether any non-compliance has occurred;b.

Whether the request had been within the scope of this Convention;
andc.

Whether the right to request a challenge inspection had been abused.

24.

If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers
and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph
23, it shall take the appropriate measures to redress the situation and toensure compliance with this Convention, including speciﬁc recommendations
to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the Executive Council shall
examine whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the ﬁnancial
implications of the challenge inspection.

25.

The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party shall have the rightto participate in the review process. The Executive Council shall inform theStates Parties and the next session of the Conference of the outcome of theprocess.

26.

If the Executive Council has made speciﬁc recommendations to theConference, the Conference shall consider action in accordance with Section
B.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 89

B. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including
Sanctions27.

The Conference, taking into account the recommendations of the Executive
Council, shall take necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 28, 29 and
30 to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any
situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention.

28.

In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the
Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard toits compliance and fails to fulﬁll the request within the speciﬁed time, theConference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party
from the exercise of its rights and privileges under this Convention until the
Conference decides otherwise.

29.

In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Convention may
result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Convention, theConference may recommend to States Parties collective measures which arein conformity with international law. Such measures may include restrictions
or suspensions of all assistance in nuclear activities outlined in Schedule 2of the Annex on Nuclear Activities, Components and Equipment. If the State
concerned continues in its failure to comply with the request, further sanctions
may be imposed.

30.

The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council,
may bring the issue, including relevant information, conclusions andrecommendations, to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly
and the United Nations Security Council.

31.

The threat or use of nuclear weapons shall be deemed to be a threat to thepeace subject to the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

C. Settlement of Disputes
See Critical Questionsin Chapter 3 on
Enforcement andSecurity.

 90

32.

Disputes that may arise concerning the application, implementation orinterpretation of this Convention shall be settled in accordance with therelevant provisions of this Convention, including Section B and in conformity
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

33.

When a disputes arises between two or more States Parties, or between one ormore States Parties and the Agency, relating to the application, implementation
or interpretation of this Convention, the parties concerned shall consult
together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute bynegotiation, mediation, arbitration or by other peaceful means of the parties’
choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Convention and, by
mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity
with the Statute of the Court.

34.

If other peaceful means of settlement are not found, a State Party in disputewith one or more States Parties may refer the dispute to the International
Court of Justice, in conformity with the Statute of the Court [and the Optional
Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes]. The States
Parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being
taken.

35.

The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute bywhatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good ofﬁces,
calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to start the settlement process of
their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

Section 2

36.

The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States
Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference
shall, as it ﬁnds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to thesettlement of these disputes in conformity with Article VIII {Agency}.

37.

The Conference and the Executive Council may recommend to the General
Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justiceto give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scopeof the activities of the Agency. An agreement between the Agency and theUnited Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article
VIII {Agency}.

38.

This Section is without prejudice to Sections A and B.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 91

XV. Entry Into Force
A. Conditions of Entry Into Force1.

Two-tier entry into force
allows early entry into
force for individual2.

This Convention shall enter into force [180] days after the date on which thefollowing conditions are met:a.

[All] Nuclear Weapons States have deposited their instruments of
ratiﬁcation; andb.

All Nuclear Capable States have deposited their instruments of
ratiﬁcation; andc.

At least [65] States in total have deposited instruments of ratiﬁcation[including all States listed in Annex IV: List of Countries with
Nuclear Power Reactors] [or] [including at least [40] States fromAnnex V: List of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors or Nuclear
Research Reactors].

For States whose instruments of ratiﬁcation or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force
on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratiﬁcationor accession.

B. State Waiver of Entry into Force Requirements
For States who waive the entry into force requirements, this Convention shall enter into
force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratiﬁcation oraccession.

Entry into force is one of the most politically difﬁcult provisions, as was evidenced in
the CTBT negotiations. It is unlikely that any of the Nuclear Weapon States will assent
to the Convention unless all Nuclear Weapon States and nuclear capable States assent.
On the other hand, if by the time of signing, most Nuclear Weapon States have decided
that possession of nuclear weapons has no more strategic value, as they did in thecase of chemical weapons, they may agree to a less restrictive entry-into-force requirement in order to advance the timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Drafters have opted for a somewhat restrictive entry-into-force requirement, including
all Nuclear Weapon States, all nuclear capable States and a minimum number of otherStates, focusing primarily on those with nuclear reactors. This recognizes that all otherStates that could possibly develop a nuclear capability are already obligated not todevelop or acquire nuclear weapons under the NPT, and are already bound by IAEA
safeguards, making their early accession to this Convention less urgent.

 92

Section 2

XVI. Financing
1.

The costs of the Agency’s activities shall be paid by States Parties inaccordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take
into account differences in membership between the United Nations and thisAgency. The budget of the Agency shall comprise two separate chapters, one
relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to veriﬁcation andcompliance costs.

2.

Each Nuclear Weapons State shall meet the costs of destruction of weapons,
proscribed nuclear material and nuclear facilities under its authority. Each
Nuclear Weapons State shall meet the costs of veriﬁcation of nuclear facilities
under its authority, except for instances of challenge inspections which are
funded according to the provisions of the Veriﬁcation Annex.

3.

The Agency shall establish a voluntary fund to assist States Parties to comply
with paragraph 2 where such compliance imposes undue ﬁnancial burdens on
them.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 93

XVII. Amendments

 94

1.

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any State Party
may also propose changes, as speciﬁed in paragraph 4, to the Annexes of thisConvention. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures inparagraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for changes, as speciﬁed in paragraph 4, shallbe subject to the procedures in paragraph 5.

2.

The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Director-Generalfor circulation to all States Parties and to the Depositary. The proposed
amendment shall be considered only by an Amendment Conference. Suchan Amendment Conference shall be convened if one third or more of theStates Parties notify the Director-General [not later than [60 days] after its
circulation] that they support further consideration of the proposal. The
Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular sessionof the Conference unless the requesting States Parties ask for an earlier
meeting. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days
after the circulation of the proposed amendment.

3.

Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 20 days after depositof the instruments of ratiﬁcation or acceptance by all the States Parties referredto under subparagraph b below:a.

When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of amajority of all States Parties [with no State Party casting a negativevote]; andb.

Ratiﬁed or accepted by all those States Parties casting a positive voteat the Amendment Conference.

4.

In order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness of this Convention,
provisions in the Annexes shall be subject to changes in accordancewith paragraph 5, if proposed changes are related only to matters of an
administrative or technical nature.

5.

Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be made in accordance withthe following procedures:a.

The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with
the necessary information to the Director-General. Additional
information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by
any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shallpromptly communicate any such proposals and information to all
States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary;b.

Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shallevaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences forthe provisions of this Convention and its implementation and shallcommunicate any such information to all States Parties and the
Executive Council;c.

The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all
information available to it, including whether the proposal fulﬁlls
the requirements of paragraph 4. Not later than 90 days after its
receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, withappropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States
Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days.

d.

If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the
proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party

Section 2

objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If
the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it
shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection
within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;e.

If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with theacceptance required under subparagraph d, a decision on the proposal,
including whether it fulﬁlls the requirements of paragraph 4, shall betaken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session;f.

The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositaryof any decision under this paragraph;g.

Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all
States Parties 180 days after the date of notiﬁcation by the DirectorGeneral of their approval unless another time period is recommended
by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 95

XVIII. Scope and Application of Convention
A. Relation to other International Agreements

The model NWC
provides for nowithdrawal, reﬂecting theview that the prohibitionof nuclear weapons,
and the obligation toeliminate them, haveentered the realm ofcustomary internationallaw from which there
should be no exception.

1.

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or
detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the United Nations
Charter; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water; the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the Caribbean; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; the Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the South
Paciﬁc Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; the African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; theSoutheast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty; the Central Asia Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Treaty; any other treaties establishing nuclear weapon freezones; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the Treaty Between the
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range andShort-Range Missiles; the Treaty Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; the Treaty Between the
U.S.A. and Russia on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms; the Treaty between Russia and the United States on Strategic Offensive
Reductions, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism, or under agreements with the International Atomic Energy
Agency.

2.

Pursuant to Article VIII {Agency}, the Agency may enter into agreementswith the implementing organizations of other international agreements for the
purpose of sharing information necessary or applicable to the veriﬁcation tasksof each organization involved, or for any other purposes that would further theobjectives of the international agreements concerned.

B. Status of the Annexes
3.

The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention. Any reference to thisConvention includes the Annexes.

C. Duration and Withdrawal
4.

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

5

Withdrawal from this Convention shall not be permitted [upon ratiﬁcation by
all Nuclear Weapons States].

D. Reservations
6.

 96

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexesof this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object
and purpose.

Section 2

XIX. Conclusion of Convention
A. Signature
1.

This Convention shall be open for signature for all States before its entry into
force.

B. Ratiﬁcation
2.

This Convention shall be subject to ratiﬁcation by States Signatories according
to their respective constitutional processes.

C. Accession
3.

Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force may
accede to it at any time thereafter.

D. Depository
4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositoryof this Convention and shall, inter alia:a.

Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of eachsignature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratiﬁcation oraccession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, andof the receipt of other notices;b.

Transmit duly certiﬁed copies of this Convention to the Governmentsof all signatory and acceding States; andc.

Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of theUnited Nations.

E. Authentic Texts
5.

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian andSpanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 97

Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes
The States Parties to this Protocol, expressing their wish to resort to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, unless some other form of settlement
is provided for in the Convention or has been agreed upon by the Parties within areasonable period, have agreed as follows:
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of this Convention shall lie
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and may
accordingly be brought before the Court by an application by any party to the dispute
being a Party to this Protocol.

 98Section 2

Optional Protocol Concerning Energy Assistance
The States Parties to this Protocol:

See Critical Questionsin Chapter 3 on
Nuclear Energy.

Desiring to prevent any threat to the aims and objectives of this Convention fromarising due to the proliferation of nuclear technology which could aid or assist in thedevelopment of nuclear weapons,
Desiring further to prevent any threat to health and the environment arising from theexcessive creation of radionuclides in nuclear reactors,
Afﬁrming the right to the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy
sources,Have agreed as follows:1.

Not to manufacture, assemble, transfer or otherwise acquire nuclear powerreactors.

2.

Not to use any existing power reactor, nor the products from the use of any
nuclear power reactor.

3.

To close any existing nuclear power reactors within [ﬁve] years of signing thisprotocol.

4.

To assist other Parties to this protocol in the development and use of nonnuclear, sustainable energy sources.

5.

To create a voluntary fund for the purposes of implementing paragraph 4.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 99

Annex I: Nuclear Activities
A. Guidelines for Schedules of Nuclear Activities
Guidelines for Schedule 1
1.

2.

The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether anuclear activity shall be included in Schedule 1:a)

It is an activity speciﬁcally prohibited under Article I of thisConventionb)

It is an activity the purpose of which is to aid or assist in any activity
speciﬁcally prohibited under Article I of this Convention.

c)

It is an activity which poses a grave risk to the object and purpose ofthis Convention by virtue of its high potential for aiding and assisting
activities speciﬁcally prohibited by this Convention.

d)

It has little or no use for purposes not prohibited under thisConvention, or alternatively its use for purposes not prohibited under
this Convention can be safely substituted by another activity.

Schedule 1 activities are prohibited.

Guidelines for Schedule 2
3.

4.

The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether anuclear activity shall be included in Schedule 2:a)

It is an activity not speciﬁcally prohibited under Article I of thisConventionb)

It is an activity the purpose of which is not to aid or assist in any
activity speciﬁcally prohibited under Article I of this Convention.

c)

It is an activity which poses some risk to the object and purpose ofthis Convention by virtue of its potential to aid and assist activities
speciﬁcally prohibited by this Convention.

Schedule 2 activities are permitted unless otherwise determined by the
Conference in accordance with Articles [Agency, Technical Secretariat] and[compliance].

Guidelines for Schedule 3

 100

5.

The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether anuclear activity shall be included in Schedule 3:a)
It is an activity not speciﬁcally prohibited under Article I of thisConventionb)
It is an activity the purpose of which is not to aid or assist in any
activity speciﬁcally prohibited under Article I of this Convention.
c)
It is an activity which poses no risk to the object and purpose of thisConvention

6.

Schedule 3 activities are permitted.

Section 2

B. Schedule of Nuclear Activities
Schedule 1(1)

Production of nuclear weapons(2)

Use of nuclear weapons(3)

Threat of use of nuclear weapons(4)

Production and any use of special nuclear material(5)

Production of metals or alloys containing plutonium or uranium(6)

Weaponization: This covers the research, development, manufacturing andtesting required to make nuclear explosive devices from special ﬁssionable or
fusionable material(7)

Nuclear fuel fabrication using plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched to
20% or more in uranium-235(8)Import, construction or use of research and power reactors of any kindutilizing uranium enriched to 20% or more in uranium-235, uranium-233,
plutonium or MOX as a fuel or any reactor designed speciﬁcally for plutonium
production. This includes critical and sub-critical assemblies(9)

Reprocessing of irradiated fuel or irradiation targets containing nuclearweapons capable material. This includes the use of hot cells and associatedequipment(10)

Enrichment of uranium in isotope U-235 beyond 20% and any preparatory
steps in this process, including the preparation and storage of UCI4 and UF6
enriched to more than 3% in U-235. {The preparation of UC14 and UF6 fromnatural uranium will not be forbidden by the NWC. After enrichment it should
not be stored in this form which would be appropriate feeding material forfurther enrichment beyond 20%.}(11)

Production, separation, and enrichment of the isotope of plutonium-239 ,hydrogen, tritium and lithium-6.

(12)

Production of antiprotons, antimatter, nuclear isomers and super-heavy
elements in signiﬁcant quantities

Schedule 2(1)

Import, construction, use of research and power reactors of any type using
natural uranium or uranium enriched to less than 20% in uranium-235 as afuel. This includes critical and sub-critical assemblies, but excludes reactors
speciﬁcally designed for plutonium production.

(2)

Prospecting, mining or processing of ores containing uranium and/or thorium(3)

Preparation of chemical compounds containing uranium enriched to less than
20% in uranium-235 and thorium; excluding the preparation of UCI4 and UF6
enriched to more than 3% in U-235.

(4)

Nuclear fuel fabrication using natural uranium or uranium enriched to less than
20% in uranium-235.

(5)

Production of particle and laser beams of all kind.

(6)

Nuclear fusion experimental devices based on inertial conﬁnement, including
diagnostics

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 101

Schedule 3(1) Application of radiation and isotopes in food and agriculture:- Soil fertility, irrigation and crop production- [Plant breeding and genetics]- Animal production and health- Insect and pest control- [Food preservation]- Other uses upon approval(2) Applications of radiation and isotopes in medicine- Diagnostic and therapeutic medicine including dosimetry- Radiotherapy by teletherapy and brachytherapy- Nutrition and health-related environmental studies- Other uses upon approval(3) Application of radiation and isotopes in industrial processes- Radiography and other non-destructive testing methods- Industrial process control and quality control- Radiotracer applications in oil, chemical and metallurgical processes- Development of water and mineral resources- Industrial radiation processing- Other uses upon approval(4) Applications in research with and production and disposal of radioactive isotopes
and elementary particles- Conditioning and disposal of radioactive wastes- Nuclear fusion experimental devices based on magnetic conﬁnement,
including diagnostics- Production of isotopes both radioactive and stable. The production of theisotope Pu-239, titanium and lithium-6 is prohibited.
- Import, construction and use of neutron sources, electron accelerators,
particle accelerators, heavy icon accelerators- Research on radiation physics and chemistry and on the physical andchemical properties of isotopes except in areas relevant to activities notprohibited by or subject to authorization under this Convention

 102Section 2

Annex II: Nuclear Weapon Components
Guidelines for Schedule 1
1.
2.

A component shall be included in Schedule 1 if it is produced solely for the
purpose of incorporation into a nuclear explosive device.
Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 1 components is prohibited.
Guidelines for Schedule 2

3.

The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether acomponent shall be included in Schedule 2:a)
The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive
deviceb)
The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under thisconvention, but is not produced in large commercial quantities forsuch purposesc)
There exist alternative components for the purposes cited in paragraph
(b).

4.

Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 2 components is prohibited.
Guidelines for Schedule 3

5.
a)

6.

The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether acomponent shall be included in Schedule 3:
The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive
deviceb)
The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under
this convention, but is not produced in large commercial quantities forsuch purposesc)
There do not exist alternative components for the purposes
cited in paragraph (b).
Manufacture, transfer or stockpiling of Schedule 3 components is permitted
only in accordance with the provisions established by the Agency.
Guidelines for Schedule 4

7.

The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether acomponent shall be included in Schedule 4:a)
The component is produced for incorporation into a nuclear explosive
deviceb)
The component is also used for purposes not prohibited under thisconvention, and is produced in large commercial quantities for such
purposes[ c)
There do not exist alternative components for the purposes cited inparagraph (b).]8.
Manufacture of Schedule 4 components is permitted only in accordance withthe provisions established by the Agency.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 103Annex III: List of countries and geographical regions for the
purpose of Article VII.C.23
AfricaAlgeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti,
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republicof Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Eastern Europe
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Middle East and South Asia
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Nepal, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
North America and Western Europe
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States ofAmerica.
South East Asia, the Paciﬁc and the Far East
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia,
Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor Leste, Tonga,
Tuvalu,Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

 104

Section 2

Annex IV: List of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors
ARGENTINA
ARMENIABELGIUM
BRAZIL
BULGARIA
CANADACHINA
FINLANDFRANCEGERMANYHUNGARY

INDIA
IRAN
JAPAN
REPUBLIC OF
KOREA
LITHUANIAMEXICONETHERLANDSPAKISTAN
ROMANIARUSSIA

S.AFRICASLOVAKIASLOVENIASPAIN
SWEDENSWITZERLAND
UNITED KINGDOMUKRAINEUSA

Annex V: List of Countries with nuclear power reactors and/or nuclear research reactors
ARGENTINA
ARMENIA
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIABANGLADESH
BELARUSBELGIUM
BRAZIL
BULGARIA
CANADACHILECHINACOLOMBIACZECH REPUBLICDPRKDEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF
CONGODENMARKEGYPTEUROPEAN UNION*
FINLANDFRANCEGEORGIAGERMANYGHANA
GREECEHUNGARY
INDIA
INDONESIAIRAN
IRAQ
ISRAELITALY
JAMAICAJAPANKAZAKHSTANLATVIA
LIBYA
LITHUANIAMALAYSIAMEXICO
MOROCCONETHERLANDSNIGERIANORWAYPAKISTANPERU

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

PHILIPPINESPOLANDPORTUGALREPUBLIC OF
KOREA
ROMANIARUSSIASERBIA AND
MONTENEGROSLOVAKIASLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SWEDENSWITZERLAND
SYRIATAIWANTHAILANDTUNISIA
TURKEYUNITED KINGDOMUKRAINEUSA

 105

 106

Section

3
Comments and Critical Questions

A D-5 Trident II missile spins out of control after
being launched from the nuclear-powered strategic
missile submarine USS Tennessee.
Photo: US NavyCONTENTS: Section 3. Comment and Critical Questions

 108

Enforcement
Security
Breakout
Deterrence
Terrorism
Health and Environment
De-Alerting
Cleanup, Disposition and Safe Disarmament
Nuclear Energy
Knowledge and Reversibility
Conversion
Research
Economic Aspects

109
112
114
116
118
120
127
130
133
139
142
147
150

Update to comments on Breakout, Knowledge, Conversion and Research by
Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation,
for the 2007 edition

152

Section 3

Enforcement
Critical Question:
Can a Nuclear Weapons Convention be enforced?
How to enforce nuclear abolition is one of the most frequently asked questions
regarding the Nuclear Weapons Convention. The model NWC emphasizes complianceover enforcement. It is more effective to persuade states to comply with the Convention
than it is to have to respond after a violation with enforcement measures.
However, should compliance fail, enforcement may be necessary depending on
the degree of non-compliance and the threat posed. The model NWC includes someprovisions for enforcement including the restriction of States’ rights, suspension ofassistance in nuclear activities, and other sanctions. But, ultimate authority remains as with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, andthe Biological Weapons Convention - with the United Nations Security Council. The
model NWC includes a provision making the threat or use of nuclear weapons a threat
to the peace, requiring action by the Security Council. Security Council action on nonproliferation, such as Resolution 1540, demonstrate that the Security Council could go
further and mandate national implementation and enforcement measures making themcompulsory for all States regardless of whether or not they have ratiﬁed the NWC. This
would enhance enforcement powers of the Security Council.
Another provision makes threat or use of nuclear weapons a crime for which
individuals shall be held accountable before national courts and/or the International
Criminal Court.
Both the composition and the mandate of the Security Council are regularly raisedin consideration of this question. This leads to concern about the current and possible
future international security regimes and the concept of security itself. (See Critical
Question on Security.)
It has been suggested that in addition to Security Council authority to respond to abreach, including by use of force, there should be recognition of a right of individualstates to respond with force to a breach if the Security Council does not act - forexample, due to a veto. However, to the extent that such a right goes beyond thepresent right of inherent self-defense against an armed attack under the UN Charter,
it could prove destabilizing to international security arrangements generally and also
serve as a disincentive for present nuclear weapon states agreeing to an NWC.
Some also suggest that the Security Council should be granted a small number ofnuclear weapons to be able to threaten or use in response to nuclear breakout. Mostof the MNWC drafters oppose this idea on the grounds that 1) there are adequate
non-nuclear means for responding to breakout, 2) the retention by any entity of
nuclear weapons would justify the deterrent posture, and could lead to retention
by certain states of their own nuclear weapons as a counter-balance to those of the
Security Council, and 3) it is difﬁcult to see how any threat or use of nuclear weapons,
whether by a state or the Security Council, could conform with international rules ofhumanitarian law.
Experience with the NPT indicates that for most states in the world, enforcement
will not be an issue. Almost all non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT — thevast majority of states in the world — have complied with their obligation under thattreaty not to acquire nuclear weapons. Cases of actual or possible violation illustratethat while an effective international response can be difﬁcult and problematic, it
nonetheless is possible. In the case of Iraq’s WMD programs, the measures imposed by
the UN Security Council in 1991 were successful in achieving their dismantling anddestruction including of their ﬂedgling nuclear weapons programs.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Responses to thequestion of enforcement
overwhelmingly favorreliance on incentives forcompliance rather than
threat force, or sanctions.

 109

The North Korean situation is somewhat different in that they exercised theirright to withdraw from the NPT prior to openly embarking on a nuclear weapons
program. Subsequent developments indicate that a negotiated approach involving
security assurances and economic incentives can facilitate compliance with nuclear
disarmament objectives.
Moreover, in a nuclear-weapon free world, the international response to a breach of
the NWC by small or mid-sized powers would almost certainly be more effective thanunder the NPT. Among other reasons, current nuclear weapon states would no longer
have their own nuclear threat, and would have very strong incentives to ensure that noother state acquires that capability.
Violation of the NWC by a major military power, including those states that are
now both nuclear-armed and permanent members of the Security Council with a veto,obviously would pose serious problems for a nuclear weapon free regime. Certain
reforms, such as restricting the power of the veto or providing that the General
Assembly could act in the absence of Security Council action, may be useful inaddressing that possibility. But, in the near-term, the stability of a nuclear weapon
free regime may depend on the assessment by major powers that it is in their security
interests, and on the normative force of the prohibition of acquiring nuclear weaponsthat would grow as the regime was institutionalized and endured. These are signiﬁcantfactors. Moreover, the development of a nuclear weapon free regime will itself change
the security situation.In the longer term, owing in part to the NWC, global collective
security arrangements may develop that are capable of effectively responding to any
state breaching the NWC.

Illustration: Laurence Clark.
Courtesy of the Alexander Turnbull Library,
Wellington, New Zealand.

 110Section 3

Comment: Treaties are not enoughPresent-day political culture derives from a long history of “might is right.” Thismeans that militarily and economically strong countries can make or break agreements
at their will, and enforce them on the weak with equal arbitrariness. For instance,
nuclear weapons states have signed the NPT, which requires an early end to the nuclear
arms race. Yet after three decades, all ﬁve continue to modernize their arsenals. Other
than China, none have even accepted the World Court’s unanimous advisory opinion
that Article VI requires the achievement of nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.
Nuclear apartheid can continue even after it has been declared to be illegal.
The CTBT provides a similar lesson. Though Article I bans all nuclear explosions,
including peaceful nuclear explosions, nuclear weapons states (and some others)interpret it as allowing nuclear fusion explosions in laboratories. This interpretation of
the CTBT will allow the modernization of present arsenals, as well as the developmentof entirely new types of nuclear weapons, notably pure fusion weapons.
Some of the most difﬁcult nuclear disarmament issues relate to the minimization of
the risk of (i) a break out of the treaty and (ii) retaliation with nuclear weapons in casebreakout results in the use of nuclear weapons. To address these concerns, any nuclear
weapons convention must contain features that go well beyond the complete veriﬁed
dismantlement of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure, since both of these canbe re-constituted. Unlike many existing treaties, such as the NPT and CTBT that
permit withdrawal (usually at short notice and no speciﬁed penalty), the NWC mustcompletely prohibit withdrawal under any circumstances. Activities violating the treaty
should be punishable under the Nuremberg code. This would allow the individuals
making the decisions to be held accountable under international law. Further, the roleof the World Court clearly needs to be strengthened so that it can effectively deal withviolations by any state, including present-day nuclear weapon states.
Such features, which are essential to enduring nuclear disarmament, cannot be
success-fully incorporated into a NWC unless there are profound changes in the present
political, military, moral, and economic framework of which nuclear weapons are justone part. For instance, current military and political deterrence doctrine legitimizes thekilling by states of children in an adversary country in retaliation for a nuclear attack
even though such an idea is generally regarded as immoral and illegal at individual or
non-state party levels. Unless such retaliation by a state is rejected by the majority ofthe people of nuclear weapons states as immoral, there is little chance that a nuclear
weapons convention with the necessary features can be negotiated. The resistance of
the United States to the International Criminal Court is a case in point.
Finally, huge nuclear weapons budgets have created powerful vested interests thata treaty alone cannot overcome. Even the decision to bomb Hiroshima was madewith an eye to justifying World War II nuclear weapon budgets and hence to postwar allocations of funds. As another example, the CTBT gave birth to “stockpile
stewardship” programs that have increased the ﬂow of money into nuclear weapons
maintenance modiﬁcation, design, and laboratory testing. A full conversion of
nuclear establishments from their Cold War functions to management of weaponsusable materials and nuclear wastes as well as to clean-up of vast areas that have been
contaminated is an essential part of the disarmament process. Such a restructuring offunctions will reduce the economic incentives for continued maintenance of nuclear
weapons capacities and help reduce the risk of a breakout from a nuclear weapons
convention.
-Arjun Makhijani, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 111

Security
Critical Question:Will a Nuclear Weapons Convention mean a different
international security system?
Some governments consider the threat of nuclear weapons to be a vital componentof their security. This posture will have to change before they agree to eliminate theseweapons, and this change will help create a different security system, with greater
reliance on non-violent conﬂict resolution, demilitarization and international law.
Existing international security mechanisms may be strengthened and new ones
created in the process, but these are not necessary prerequisites to developing a planfor the elimination of nuclear weapons. Such security systems already exist, albeit
in undeveloped or underused form. The NWC cannot prescribe the elements of analternative security system. Rather, as it evolves, the NWC should incorporate andreinforce developments towards demilitarization and less reliance on force as a methodof responding to conﬂicts and achieving security.
“We have guided
missiles andmisguided men.”-Martin Luther King Jr.

Security is related to the question of enforcement because the latter will be the
Achilles’ heel of any regime that relies primarily on threat or use of force for security
and defense. Collective security doctrines further complicate the power balance andhave the potential to aggravate perceptions of threat.
For most of the world, security increasingly refers not to the military capacity to
defend territory, but to the capacity to provide for human needs in a sustainable way.
Such ‘human’ security is threatened by the detrimental environmental and economic
impact of nuclear weapons and by the political threats which are perpetuated by nuclear
policies and which prevent the global cooperation required to meet human security
needs.
Despite this reality, the security policies of some States continue to rely on militarymight in the form of policies of mass destruction, ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons,
and overwhelming offensive capacity. If this approach continues, it will lead todevelopment of new weapons and increasingly sophisticated methods of warfare.
These could include pure fusion weapons, weapons that defy the conventionalnuclear distinction, unforeseen means of mass destruction, militarization of space,and information technology warfare. Possible ways to reduce reliance on policies
of security through military might include avoiding military “solutions” to humanproblems, and democratizing the security debate.
Whatever international security regime emerges, the NWC should emphasize
compliance over enforcement. Compliance must be more attractive than noncompliance. The question then becomes how to design incentives. The NPT offeredassistance in nuclear energy to non-nuclear weapons states. The NWC should offer
assistance in alternative energy possibilities, in recognition of the proliferation risks
and veriﬁcation difﬁculties associated with nuclear energy. Other forms of development
or humanitarian assistance related to nuclear disarmament and its risks could also
provide incentive.
A recurrent question is how to reduce the existing incentives to develop nuclear
weapons and increase the repercussions enough to dissuade pursuit of the nuclear
option. If a nuclear free regime were accepted, non-compliance would be universallycondemned and likely result in ostracism and other negative consequences to theviolating State in such areas as trade, aid, cooperative endeavors and politicalinﬂuence. This is the reverse of the current situation where the possession or possible
development of nuclear weapons generates international power and attention.

 112

Section 3

It is important to recognize, however, that for a great majority of states, nuclear
weapons are already perceived as not necessary for their peace and security, even in
the current international order. The national security of one state, and the collective
security of a group of states cannot, by deﬁnition, be separated from larger regional
and international security issues. One group’s self defense policies are often seen as
aggression by others, and in today’s political environment, this means arms races andescalating militarism.
“Security” as the rationale for developing arsenals of nuclear weapons is notcompatible with security in the sense of common survival. Pursuit of security throughmilitarism — “hard” or State security — undermines “soft” or “human” security
concerns such as health, development and sustainability. “Hard” security pursuit
diverts resources away from social needs. “Hard” security has also been claimed as
the domain of governments and military experts, and decisions are often made secretlyor otherwise undemocratically, even though these decisions affect everyone. A wiser
and fairer approach, therefore, is to link security with survival at every level — global,
regional, national and local.

Comment: Security
A Nuclear Weapons Convention will be negotiated among parties that understandthey are better off without nuclear weapons than with them. In reality, an international
security regime which relies on the threat or use of greater force by a few states isself-defeating, promotes lawless proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons
and tactics of mass destruction, and causes grave harms and threats to the health andexistence of all human beings, including all states and our common ecosystems. An
agreement reached in the ratiﬁcation of a NWC establishes systematic and transparent
processes that fulﬁll real determination to eliminate nuclear weapons. Such an
unequivocal determination to eliminate nuclear weapons faces the fact that nuclear
deterrence has proved a dead-end and delusional basis for security for any state andfor the community of states. The vast majority of states who recognize the current
universal legal obligation to negotiate in good-faith a treaty for nuclear disarmament in
all its aspects can and should now begin formal negotiations of the NWC.
-Anabel Dwyer Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

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 113

Breakout
Critical Question:
How can the NWC prevent breakout?
There is no magic formula to prevent a State breaking out from a Nuclear Weapons
Convention and pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. The key to breakout isirreversibility of the disarmament process. A concerted effort to eliminate not only
nuclear weapons but the infrastructure behind them will require sequenced measures-perhaps incrementally reversible but cumulatively irreversible--aimed at building
conﬁdence and leading to a world in which developing nuclear weapons will mean
starting from scratch. Such a program will become increasingly difﬁcult to conceal aselements of the nuclear weapons industry are destroyed, converted or allowed to erode.
The potential for a state
to break out of the NWC
and pursue a nuclear
weapons program will
exist as long as thereis the nuclear material
including that produced
by use of nuclear
energy. The likelihood
will decrease, however,as progress is made on
nuclear disarmamentand reliance on nuclear
weapons is stigmatized.

The potential for a state to break out of the NWC and pursue a nuclear weapons
program will exist as long as there is the nuclear material, including that produced
by use of nuclear energy. The likelihood will decrease, however, as progress is madeon nuclear disarmament and reliance on nuclear weapons is stigmatized. Concern
over breakout, though valid, should not prevent progress on nuclear disarmament.
The real risk of breakout inherent in a nuclear disarmament regime must be measured
not against a perfect nuclear weapons free world--where breakout is impossible--but
against the world we live in today, where pursuit of nuclear weapons programs is apotential temptation to some states and even non-state actors. The question becomes
whether we are safer from intentional, accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons in today’s “non-proliferation” regime or in a future regime directed toward
complete nuclear disarmament.
The Model NWC includes a number of technical, legal, political and institutional
measures that would make any possible development of nuclear weapons following
breakout that much more difﬁcult and detrimental to State interests (see Criticalquestion on Enforcement). These include preventive controls on nuclear materials andfacilities, application of individual responsibility, and sanctions. Thus, while breakout
is a concern, it would not pose the same risk of nuclear weapons production and threatas currently exists if a State breaks out from the NPT.

Comment: Breakout
If the key to breakout is the irreversibility of the disarmament process, it is essentialthat the NWC be unequivocal in this regard. This will require a major departure fromthe approach taken in the NPT and the CTBT, which relies upon statements of intent
not backed by measurable objectives. This has allowed the nuclear weapon states, thus
far, to circumvent meaningful compliance with the historical intent of these treaties.
While the Preamble to the CTBT claims that “the cessation of all nuclear weapon
test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development
and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development ofadvanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear
disarmament...,” the Treaty fails to deﬁne a nuclear test. In fact, the nuclear weapon
states, separately and in cooperation with each other, are using the CTBT as ajustiﬁcation for undertaking major new programs to replace underground nuclear
test explosions through advanced technological means. The October 1998 WhiteHouse ”National Security Strategy For a New Century” asserts that the U.S. must
continue to maintain, for “deterrence” purposes, a “robust triad of strategic forces,” 114Section 3

and states further: “We must also ensure thecontinued viability of the infrastructure that supports
U.S. nuclear forces and weapons. The Stockpile
Stewardship Program will guarantee the safety
and reliability of our nuclear weapons under theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”[1]Such programs also represent the antithesis of the
NPT Article VI obligation to “pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race and an early date
and to nuclear disarmament,” which was reafﬁrmedby the nuclear weapon states in the Principles
and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation andDisarmament adopted with the NPT extension
decision in May 1995. This obligation was
reinforced by the International Court of Justice inJuly 1996, which unanimously held that “there exists an obligation to pursue in goodfaith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects under strict and effective international control.” In fact, expanded laboratorybased experimental programs in the nuclear weapon states fundamentally are intended
to ensure that nuclear disarmament does not occur as a consequence of the CTBT.
Moreover, new nuclear weapons designs, modiﬁcations and improvements directly
contravene the “cessation of the nuclear arms race” Article VI requirement and theApril 1995 Declaration by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United Statesin connection with the NPT that “the nuclear arms race has ceased.” [2] In addition, theclose interconnections between research, design and testing of thermonuclear weaponsand other forms of advanced weapons research have the potential to ignite entirely
new arms races. The potential development of pure fusion weapons, using inertial
conﬁnement fusion and other Stockpile Stewardship technologies, exempliﬁes thisinherent danger.

U1A complex, anunderground laboratoryof tunnels built 960 feetbeneath the ground,designed to conductsubcritical high explosive
experiments to test
nuclear weapons material.
Photo: US Department ofEnergy.

If the NWC is to minimize the potential for breakout, the closure and monitoringof the nuclear weapons infrastructure in all nuclear weapons states must begin earlyin the process of disarmament. Nuclear weapons research, testing, and component
production should be halted while reductions are in progress, not after, with nuclear
weapons production and research facilities subject to intrusive veriﬁcation regimes atthe earliest possible time. Fissile materials accounting, already a challenging task,
is rendered more so by the continued fabrication and testing of weapons components
in classiﬁed facilities. Early cessation of both research and production activities also
makes evasion of emerging veriﬁcation regimes and covert production of components
or manufacturing equipment particularly suited to a hidden long-term nuclear weapons
capability more difﬁcult. The continued pursuit of increased nuclear weapons
knowledge by one state – including everything from systematization of ﬁssile materials
understanding to more rapid, ﬂexible, and easily scaled production techniques — will
be matched to a greater or lesser degree by others. The longer such activity continues
prior to achievement of an abolition regime, the greater and more widespread thetechnical capability for breakout is likely to be.
-Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation
References
1. “A National Security Strategy For A New Century,” The White House, October 1998,
p. 12. Available on the World Wide Web at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/
html/documents/nssr.pdf
2. CD/1308, 7 April 1995

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“[Deterrence] evolved
from an increasingly
convoluted morassof unwarranted
assumptions, unprovable
assertions and logicalcontradictions. By theend of the ﬁrst decadeof the Cold War, it had
effectively served tosuspend rational thinking
about the ultimate aimof national security: toensure the survival of thenation.”- General Lee Butler
February 2, 1998

Deterrence
Critical Question:
What is the future of nuclear deterrence?
Nuclear deterrence has served as a central component of the security posture of
nuclear weapon states and their allies since WWII. Essentially a psychological process,deterrence relates to inﬂuencing the rational calculation of threat probability by anaggressor, who would be assured unacceptable damage and is therefore deterred frominitiating attack. Nuclear deterrence is a contested concept. The principles of nuclear
deterrence are not objective truths, but rather theoretical concepts. However, many
believe that it has protected these states from attack and has prevented a third world
war from occurring. Such beliefs are difﬁcult to prove or disprove. All of the Nuclear
States have been involved in wars, and indeed have lost wars despite their nuclear
arsenals. It may also have been other factors that prevented attack on the nuclear
weapon states. Countless other nations that do not have nuclear weapons or allianceswith nuclear weapon states have not been attacked either.
Doubts about the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence doctrines were multiplying
before 11 September 2001 because the geopolitical circumstances that had shaped theCold War balance between secrecy and democracy no longer existed. The events of 11
September 2001 spawned a new use of force doctrine outlined in the 2002 US Nuclear
Posture Review and National Security Strategy, calling for military action to preventrogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, adoctrine that reﬂects a loss of conﬁdence in the utility of nuclear deterrence.
With respect to non-State actors, especially terrorist organizations, deterrence isclearly inadequate. Nuclear weapons could only be used against states sponsoring
terrorism with the danger that they might provoke the very danger they were designed
to avoid. France has recently announced that it would deploy nuclear weapons against
states supporting terrorism.
General Lee Butler, retired Commander-in-Chief of United States Strategic
Command has said that, “Deterrence is a dialogue of the blind with the deaf.
Deterrence invokes death on a scale rivaling the power of the creator… It [nuclear
deterrence] was our shield and by extension our sword. The nuclear priesthood extolled
its virtues and bowed to its demands. Allies yielded grudgingly to its dictates evenwhile decrying its risks and costs. We brandished it at our enemies and presumed theyembraced its suicidal corollary of mutually assured destruction. We ignored, discounted
or dismissed its ﬂaws and cling still to the belief that deterrence is valid in a world
whose security architecture has been wholly transformed.” [1]Nuclear deterrence advocates claim that nuclear weapons should be retained as an“insurance policy,” in case diplomacy or other forms of war prevention fail. However,this approach has fatal ﬂaws because nuclear deterrence itself can and has failed:- By design: Deterrence relies on a “credible” threat of use in order to deter anattacker. In a conﬂict situation, antagonists may decide that the point has been reachedthat they have to launch a nuclear attack or lose the deterrent value of their weapons.
A crisis may also be created by the very weapons themselves, as in the Cuban Missile
Crisis. “Counter-proliferation” policies identifying a role of nuclear weapons incountering a chemical or biological attack have widened the range of settings in which“credibility” could drive nuclear use. {See below}- By accident: Nuclear forces remain on alert in a launch-on-warning posture inorder to maintain “survivability” of weapons should an attack occur (i.e., “use ‘em orlose ‘em”). In times of tension, a mistake in early warning information could lead to an 116Section 3

inadvertent nuclear “response”.
It also needs to be asked: Is nuclear deterrence really deterrence? The possession of
nuclear weapons can make the possessing country a nuclear target rather than immune
to nuclear attack. The nuclear deterrent may in fact be a nuclear magnet.
Current nuclear deterrence doctrine has additional problems:
The adherence to it by some States leads to nuclear proliferation, as other States
imitate this policy. The argument that a nuclear deterrent is required to defend against
unknown future threats suggests that all states would be wise to possess nuclear
weapons.
- It creates constant pressure to improve nuclear arsenals.
- It places the whole world at risk, not only the nuclear weapons states, and isthus a violation of the sovereign rights and humanitarian rights of the world’s
nations and peoples.
- It creates and perpetuates an unstable, hostile attitude between nuclear
possessor States, and inhibits cooperation in promoting true security.
Finally one must ask what deterrence does to us as a society. Gandhi noted after thebombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “We have yet to see what it does to the soul ofthe destroying nation.” Does threatening to incinerate millions of people and destroy
the environment desensitize us and make us more ready to inﬂict harm in other areas?
Does it create a form of hopelessness about the human condition and an acceptance ofthe belief that ultimately we must threaten to destroy in order to achieve our desires?
Has this posture been a contributor to the horriﬁc increase in social violence anddespair in this century? If so, rejection of deterrence will indeed assist humanity in its
quest for the development of a more humane international society.
The United States has given conﬂicting signals about both preemptive andretaliatory use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons, including chemical or
biological weapons. According to the Air Force “Nuclear Operations,”“If US objectives are more limited, a counterforce strategy of employment
might be more appropriate. This refers to the use of weapons against theenemy’s immediate war-ﬁghting capability. While there will certainly be longterm effects from the use of a nuclear device against any target, counterforce
strategy focuses on the more immediate operational effect. Nuclear weapons
might be used to destroy enemy WMD before they can be used, or they may
be used against enemy conventional forces if other means to stop them have
proven ineffective. This can reduce the threat to the United States and its
forces and could, through the destruction of enemy forces, bring an end to the
conﬂict.”[2]References
1. General Lee Butler, “The Risks of Nuclear Deterrence: From Superpowers to Rogue
Leaders”, speech to the National Press Club, Washington DC, 2 February 1998
2. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.5 (15 July 1998, P.8-9)
For more discussion, see R. Jeffrey Smith, “Clinton Directive Changes Strategy On Nuclear
Arms,” Washington Post, December 7, 1997, and Stephen I. Schwartz, “Miscalculated
Ambiguity: US Policy on the Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Disarmament
Diplomacy No. 23, available at www.acronym.org. See also Robert Bell, “Strategic
Agreements and the CTB Treaty: Striking the Right Balance”, 28 Arms Control Today No.
1 (January/February 1998)

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

The warheadon the Trident IImissile is slated forre-design.
Photo: US Navy

 117

Terrorism
Critical Question:
How could a nuclear weapons convention deal with the growing
threat of terrorists acquiring and possibly using nuclear weapons?
Nuclear weapons are weapons of terror, and any use or threat of nuclear weapons
constitutes terrorism, whether by governments or non-state groups, regardless of how it isrationalized. However, this section will deal with the issue of nuclear weapons acquisition
and threat of use by non-State terrorists.
Terrorism involving nuclear weapons or radioactive materials could take a wide variety
of forms. Terrorists could steal, buy or otherwise acquire a ready-made nuclear weapon
or take over a nuclear-armed submarine, plane or base. They could also acquire ﬁssile
material and fabricate a crude nuclear bomb. This is a real danger: the global stockpile ofhighly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium currently amounts to 2300 tons, enoughfor more than 200,000 nuclear weapons. [1] These materials exist in hundreds of buildings
in more than 40 countries, under security arrangements ranging ‘from excellent toappalling.” The IAEA Illicit Trafﬁcking Database has documented more than 650 instancesof intercepted smuggling of radioactive materials over the past decade; 18 cases of stolen
plutonium or HEU have been conﬁrmed. IAEA Director General ElBaradei estimated in
March 2006 that regarding protection of nuclear material, “…perhaps 50 per cent of thework has been completed.” [2]A Nuclear Weapons Convention would build on existing measures to deal with nuclear
terrorism at national and international levels.
States Parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (“Nuclear Terrorism Convention”), for example, are obliged to develop
appropriate legal frameworks criminalizing nuclear terrorism-related offenses, investigate
alleged offenses, and, as appropriate, arrest, prosecute, or extradite offenders. It also
calls for international cooperation with nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions,through information-sharing, extradition and the transfer of detainees to assist with foreign
investigations and prosecutions.
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention however is limited to States Parties. In order toensure action is taken globally, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 [3]requiring all States to take measures to prevent nuclear terrorism, focusing particularly
on prohibiting non-State actors from acquiring or using nuclear weapons and on further
measures to control nuclear materials and prevent proliferation. The resolution requires
States to adopt and implement measures to a) prevent non-State actors from acquiring
or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and b) control nuclear, chemical andbiological weapons and related materials in order to prevent proliferation. The resolution
arose in response to security concerns from a number of States, including the United States,
arising from the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons ofmass destruction to States and non-State actors. Participation in the universal reporting
process has been rather positive, despite its novelty and complexity. If the negotiation andadoption of UNSC 1540 had many possible points of origin, the underlying motivation also
varied by state, triggered by events in 2003-4, such as information on efforts by Al Qaeda toacquire WMD, described as a “religious duty” in comments attributed to bin Laden. [4]UNSC 1540, however, circumvents the question of state responsibility for proliferationof WMD by focusing on access by non-state actors to NBC weapons and deﬁning nonstate actor for the purpose of the resolution as: “individual or entity, not acting under the
lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of thisresolution.” It is thus unclear whether the provision could have been used in relation to the
nuclear black market of AQ Khan, which appears to have been integrally bound up with the
Pakistani state, where lines of state authority were deliberately blurred to provide plausible
deniability.
In its report to the 1540 Committee, New Zealand emphasized that “all weapons of mass
destruction should be eliminated” and that measures should be taken to prevent “any entity

 118Section 3- whether State or non-State actor - from attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture,possess, transport, transfer or use WMD and their means of delivery.” New Zealand
noted that, “This is reﬂected in the prohibitions under New Zealand law which make it anoffence to aid or abet any person in developing WMD. This prohibition also applies extraterritorially to agents or servants of the Crown outside the New Zealand nuclear free zone.”
Implementation requirements of a NWC would include criminal measures for both nonState and State actors engaged in nuclear weapons related activities, similar to those alreadyadopted by New Zealand. However, NWC requirements would go further by extending
extra-territorial application to all citizens and incorporating universal jurisdiction, i.e. it
would be illegal for anyone anywhere in the world to engage in nuclear weapons activities
and any State could prosecute them.
Some terrorist groups now have access to professional scientiﬁc and technical skills,
large sums of money, international networks, modern communications, and a burgeoning
supply of recruits. Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda are the two most capable and wellﬁnanced terrorists groups that have thus far known to have pursued nuclear weapons. An
IPPNW report “Crude Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and the Terrorist Threat,” concluded
that, “unless radical steps are taken urgently, it will not be a question of whether terrorists
can acquire or build a nuclear device, but when.”
Non-State organizations would not be parties to a Nuclear Weapons Convention andwould thus not be party to the veriﬁcation regime agreed to by states parties. In addition,
non-State organizations may have less restraint on threatening to use or on using nuclear
weapons should they acquire them. This leads some commentators to question whether anuclear weapons convention could prevent nuclear terrorism. If not, should a small numberof nuclear weapons be retained to respond to nuclear terrorism?
To respond to the second question — A terrorist organization is unlikely to be deterred
by a State with nuclear weapons, because: a) It would be difﬁcult for the State to ﬁnd atarget to retaliate against or threaten such retaliation against. Unlike a State, a terrorist
organization does not usually have a territory or large military facilities against which totarget a weapon of mass destruction. b) Terrorists are most often prompted by a psychologyof “heroic” response to perceived aggression including the acceptance of personal death in
the battle. A threat of nuclear weapons against them would likely increase their perceptionof the “evil” of the state they are ﬁghting against, and give them justiﬁcation for respondingin kind. Rather than deterring them from using nuclear weapons it would likely stimulatethem to.
A nuclear weapons convention, on the other hand, would make it much more difﬁcult
for a terrorist organization to acquire or build a nuclear weapon. Once all nuclear weapons
are eliminated, terrorists would not be able to steal a bomb. And once all nuclear materials
and facilities are placed under safeguards it would be difﬁcult for terrorists to acquire bomb
making materials and technical assistance. The veriﬁcation systems established under anuclear weapons convention would make it easier to discover a potential terrorist threat
from diversion of ﬁssile material or technical expertise in time to prevent the building of abomb.
In addition, a nuclear weapons convention would reduce or remove the political powerof nuclear weapons for a terrorist organization. Terrorists commit terrorist acts either
to retaliate against perceived aggression, or to generate support for their cause throughmaximizing publicity. Once nuclear weapons have been prohibited, there could be noperceived aggression requiring a nuclear response, and any threat or use of such a weapon
would be condemned universally and eliminate support for a terrorist’s cause.
References
1. Bunn M, Wier A. Terrorist nuclear weapon construction: how difﬁcult? Annals of theAmerican Academy of Political and Social Science. 2006;607 (Sep): 133-49
2. ElBaradei M. Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
2006 Karlsruhe Lecture, Larlsruhe, Germany, 25 March 2006. Available at www.iaea.org
3. S/RES/1540 (2004), http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/Res1540(E).pdf
4. Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden”
CNS Reports (20 November 2001) online at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 119Health and Environment
Health and Environmental Consequences of the Production,
Testing and Use of Nuclear Weapons
The world has yet to come to terms with the medical
consequences of the nuclear weapons era more than 60 years
after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atthe end of World War II. Nuclear weapons, when exploded
over population centers, cause not only immediate death andsuffering on a massive scale, but every part of the production
process—from mining uranium ore to developing andtesting the weapons, and storing the inevitable radioactive
waste materials—has brought with it health consequences,
especially high rates of cancer, that have never been fully
acknowledged by governments and industry. This is even
before the weapons are used. Survivors of the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki bombings suffer increased rates of illness tothis day, and the full effects on future generations, including
possible genetic effects, are not yet known. The health andenvironmental consequences of long-lived high-level nuclear
waste adds further to the price paid by current and future
generations for the policies of a handful of nations.

Some of the injured
and dying the day
after the bomb was
dropped on Nagasaki.
Photo: Yosuke Yamabata

There are signiﬁcant difﬁculties involved in assessing
the health effects of nuclear weapons production, testing,and use. The widespread dispersal of ionising radiation in
the environment during many of the steps involved even in
manufacturing and testing a nuclear weapon make it difﬁcult
to quantify with certainty the doses received by affected populations. In addition,
cancers induced by radiation exposure often take decades to develop, and cannot be
distinguished in any way from cancers due to other causes.
We do know, however, that there is no safe dose of radiation exposure. Even avery small dose carries a risk of harm. This was conﬁrmed by the 2005 report of theCommittee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) of the US National
Academy of Sciences, which stated, “The smallest dose has the potential to cause asmall increase in risk to humans.” There is no threshold below which radiation issafe. [1]In 1984 the United Nations Human Rights Committee noted that “It is evident thatthe designing, testing, manufacture, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons
are among the greatest threats to the right to life which confront mankind today,” andconcluded that “The production, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear
weapons should be prohibited and recognized as crimes against humanity.”[2]Use of nuclear weapons
On August 6, 1945, a nuclear weapon with an explosive force equivalent to that ofabout 15 kilotons (thousand tons) of TNT was detonated above the city of Hiroshima.
Three days later, another nuclear weapon was detonated over the city of Nagasaki.
Each of these bombs caused the deaths over the next few days of almost 100,000
people and the deaths over succeeding months of tens of thousands of others. [3]John Hersey describes the consequences of the Hiroshima bomb and the role played
by a physician of Hiroshima: 120

Section 3

The lot of the majority of physicians of Hiroshima — with their ofﬁces andhospital destroyed, their equipment scattered, their own bodies incapacitated in varying
degrees — explained why so many citizens who were hurt went untended and why
so many who might have lived, died. Of the one hundred and ﬁfty doctors in thecity, sixty-ﬁve were already dead and most of the rest were wounded. In the biggest
hospital, that of the Red Cross, only six doctors were able to function, and only ten
nurses. The sole uninjured doctor on the Red Cross Hospital staff was Dr. Sasaki....
Dr. Sasaki worked without method, taking those who were nearest him ﬁrst,
and he noticed soon that the corridor seemed to be getting more and more crowded.
Mixed with the abrasions and lacerations which most people in the hospital had
suffered, he began to ﬁnd dreadful burns. He realized then that casualties were pouring
in from outdoors. There were so many that he began to pass up the lightly wounded;
he decided that all he could hope to do was to stop people from bleeding to death.
Before long, patients lay and crouched on the ﬂoors of the wards and the laboratories
and all the other rooms, and in the corridors, and on the stairs, and in the front hall, andunder the portecochere, and on the stone front steps, and in the driveway and courtyard,
and for blocks each way in the streets outside. Wounded people supported maimed
people; disﬁgured families leaned together, many people were vomiting...
The people in the suffocating crowd inside the hospital wept and cried for Dr.
Sasaki, and the less seriously wounded came and pulled at his sleeve and begged him
to go to the aid of the worse wounded. Tugged here and there in his stockinged feet,bewildered by the numbers, staggered by so much raw ﬂesh, Dr. Sasaki lost all sense of
profession and stopped working as a skilful surgeon and a sympathetic man; he became
an automaton, mechanically wiping, daubing, winding, wiping, daubing, winding.... [4]In addition to the effects of blast injuries and burns, many of Dr. Sasaki’s patientssoon developed the features of acute radiation sickness: severe gastrointestinal
problems, uncontrolled bleeding, hair loss, and extreme susceptibility to infection. [5]
Dr Sasaki was among the very ﬁrst medical witnesses to the utter devastationinﬂicted by mankind’s newest and most terrible
weapon. Within several years, however, eventhe atomic bomb was surpassed in its capacity
to destroy. During the 1950s, new types ofnuclear weapons were developed and tested ﬁrst
by the United States and then the Soviet Union.
Based on nuclear fusion in addition to the initialﬁssion reaction, these new “thermonuclear” or“hydrogen” bombs had a destructive force equal
to 1,000 times the force of the bombs detonatedover Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
In 1961, a group of Boston physicians
analyzed the potential medical consequencesof the use of these new weapons. An entire
issue of the prestigious New England Journalof Medicine was dedicated to articles on “The
Medical Consequences of Thermonuclear War.”Analyzing an attack on the US postulated in
1959 by the Joint Congressional Committee on
Atomic Energy, a new group called Physiciansfor Social Responsibility (PSR) documented indetail the health effects of nuclear explosions. If
such an explosion were to occur over Boston,
the authors wrote, severe traumatic injuries
and massive burns, combined with life-threatening radiation exposure, would kill
1,300,000 people on the ﬁrst day alone, with another 1,250,000 injured. There would
be widespread destruction of health care facilities, and approximately 1,000,000 of

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

This child from Nagasaki
suffered third degree burns
that exposed the bone.
Photo: Yasuo Tomishige

 121

More signiﬁcant is thefact that most deployednclear weapons are not
the low yield tactical
weapons, but high yieldstrategic weapons, mostof which are 10-100
times more powerfulthan the bombs used on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

those injured would die. The authors concluded that effective responses by healthprofessionals after a thermonuclear weapon explosion would be impossible or futile,and that civil defense efforts offered little beneﬁt. They, and the then-editor of the New
England Journal of Medicine, argued that the prevention of use of nuclear weapons wasan urgent task for health professionals [6,7,8]
The World Health Organization in 1986 summarized the nature and effects ofnuclear weapons in the following terms: “Quantitatively nuclear weapons are vastly
more powerful than conventional weapons. The explosive power of all the nuclear
arsenals is now about 5,000 times greater than that of all the explosives used in theSecond World War.” [9]Nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from conventional weapons. In addition
to the deaths and injuries caused by the effects of blast and heat, nuclear weapons
produce radioactive isotopes (fallout) that may be transported by winds great distancesfrom the site of the explosion. Moreover, fallout may be an obstacle to rescue
operations and effective care of injured survivors. [10]In 1993, the World Health Assembly reafﬁrmed that “no health service in the world
can alleviate in any signiﬁcant way a situation resulting from the use of even one single
nuclear weapon.”[11]In its 1996 advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) noted, “The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be
contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization andthe entire ecosystem of the planet.”[12]The US and the UK argued before the ICJ that the use of precisely targeted, loweryield nuclear weapons would not have the same effects as those describedin the WHO studies. The Court did not accept this argument. Even thelowest yield of nuclear weapons in the current arsenals, about 1 kiloton,would still produce large quantities of radiation. More signiﬁcant is the factthat most deployed nuclear weapons are not low-yield tactical weapons,
but high-yield strategic weapons, most of which are 10 to 100 times more
powerful than the bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
An understanding of the massive levels of death and irremediablesuffering that would result from an explosion of even a single nuclear
warhead near a populated area compels a simple conclusion: no such
explosion must ever happen again.

Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Tests

Despite a de facto
moratorium on testing.
France began preparations
to resume testing at
Moruroa in 1995. This childin Rarotonga joined morethan 1,500 people (onequarter of the population) in
protest. France was forced
to stop testing by the global
outcry, which included aboycott of French products
Photo: Greenpeace/
Morgan 122

Of all the activities in the nuclear weapons cycle, nuclear testing has
been the most destructive of human health and the environment. The US,
the former Soviet Union, China, France, India, Pakistan, and the UK havecollectively conducted more than 2,000 nuclear explosions for testing
purposes, approximately 500 above ground or under water and the rest
underground.
Lijon Eknilang, of the Marshall Islands, recounted her experiences of nuclear
testing as follows. “I was eight years old at the time of the Bravo test on Bikini in
1954. I woke up with a bright light in my eyes. There was a huge brilliant light that
consumed the sky. Soon after we heard a big loud noise and the earth started to sway
and sink...A little later...it began to ‘snow’ in Rongelap. We had heard about snow fromthe missionaries, but this was the ﬁrst time we saw white particles fall from the sky.
We kids were playing in the powder, but later everyone was sick and we couldn’t doanything.... My own health has suffered as a result of radiation poisoning. I cannot havechildren. I have had seven miscarriages. One was severely deformed — it had only
one eye. Many of my friends keep quiet about the strange births they had. They gaveSection 3

birth, not to children as we like to think of them, but tothings we could only describe as “octopuses”, “apples”,“turtles” and other things in our experience. The mostcommon have been “jellyﬁsh” babies. These babies areborn with no bones in their bodies and with transparent
skin. We can see their brains and hearts beating. There
are no legs, no arms, no head, no nothing.”[13]The story of Lijon Eknilang is just one of the many inthe test sites and adjacent areas in the Marshall Islands,
Te Ao Maohi (French occupied Polynesia), Maralinga,
Nevada, Kazakhstan, Lop Nor, Novaya Zemlya, Kiribati,
Pokhran and elsewhere. “Radioactive Heaven andEarth”, a study that was published by International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and theInstitute for Energy and Environmental Research in
1991, estimated that global fallout from nuclear testing will lead to more than two
million cancer fatalities alone, in addition to other health and environmental effects.[14]Government reporting on health effects of nuclear weapons testing has often been
inaccurate, incomplete, or non-existent. The US government, for example, neglected to
conduct systematic studies of the effects of radioactive iodine-131 from atmospherictests between 1945 and 1962, until it was mandated to do so by the US Congress in
1982. The studies were not released for another 15 years, and even then the problem
was downplayed.
The US National Cancer Institute (NCI), which reported the ﬁndings, estimated that
fallout of radioactive iodine (I-131) from nuclear weapons tests had caused 10,000
to 75,000 cases of thyroid cancer. [15] These high ﬁgures are cause for considerable
concern. But critics noted that the real ﬁgures are probably much higher. NCI provided
no basis for its thyroid cancer risk estimates and appeared to have ignored evidence
from Chernobyl, where thyroid cancer rates have been approximately 10 times higher
than expected from conventional calculations based on extrapolation from exposures
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. North Dakota health department analysts estimated that
I-131 in fallout may have increased the rate of thyroid cancer in that state alone by 5 to
10 percent. [16,17]

Radiation Day at
Chelyabinsk Ecology
School, 1992. May 19
is Radiation Day at the
Chelyabinsk Ecology
School in Russia, sited ona dead river at the edgeof the city’s metallurgicaldistrict. Each year
on this day students
practice safety routinesdesigned to protect themfrom a sudden releaseof radiation from the
Chelyabinsk-65 complex
160 kilometers to thenorth.
Photo: Robert Del Tredici

The American Public Health Association noted that
if disclosures of the releases had been made public
at the times they occurred, implementation of federal
protective action guidelines — including removal ofsoil, destruction of milk and dairy cows, destructionof contaminated human and animal food, and public
education about protective measures — would have beenrequired. No public warnings were issued (although theEastman Kodak corporation was warned in advance ofsome of the tests, to protect its ﬁlm stocks). [18]While the effects of radioactive iodine exposure
can generally be treated with considerable success, theNCI study did not focus on other radioactive elements
produced by nuclear testing, including strontium,
caesium, plutonium, and carbon, the health effects ofwhich are much more difﬁcult to treat.
Governments of the other nuclear weapon states
have been similarly reluctant to reveal the full extent of the health and environmental
problems from nuclear testing. Thus, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) haveattempted to ﬁll the gap.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Troops at Operation
Buster, Nevada Test site,
US, November 1951.
Photo: Defense Nuclear
Agency 123During the late 1950s and early 1960s NGOs in the
United States collected the deciduous teeth of children,and demonstrated the replacement of calcium in theteeth with radioactive strontium-90. The publicity
given to these ﬁndings by PSR and other groups was animportant factor in the negotiation in 1963 of the Partial
Test Ban Treaty, which banned nuclear tests in theatmosphere, in space, and under the oceans. [19]Among the most highly
exposed groups ofdownwinders arethose who live near
Semipalatinsk nuclear
weapons test site in
Kazakhstan.
Photo: Yuri Kuidin.

The Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences determinedin 1989 that residents of Semipalatinsk, near themain USSR nuclear test site in Kazakhstan, had
experienced excess cancers, genetic diseases, and childdeaths because of radiation exposure from pre-1963
atmospheric tests. This helped stimulate the formationof the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” movement, which led tothe closure of the test site in 1991. [20]The conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 signalled a potential
end to the era of nuclear testing. However this Treaty has not yet come into effect and a
resumption of testing remains a possibility. In any event, the legacy of nuclear testing
will remain for centuries as the radiation from the tests, whether dispersed throughout
the atmosphere or concentrated in the underground test sites, will continue to threaten
human health.

Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Production
Radioactive pollution contaminates every site where nuclear
weapons have been developed. The two nations that produced the vast
majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, the US and the former Soviet
Union, are the most heavily affected.
There are more than 4,500 contaminated Department of Energysites in the United States. Production facilities for nuclear weapons,such as those at Feed Materials Production Center (OH), Hanford
Reservation (WA), Los Alamos (NM), Rocky Flats (CO), Oak Ridge(TN), and Savannah River (SC) are heavily polluted. Epidemiologic
surveys have demonstrated elevated levels of cancer in surrounding
communities. The Department of Energy knowingly polluted its
nuclear weapons production facilities and the areas surrounding themwithout warning either its workers or those living in the endangered
areas around the plants. Furthermore, the impact of this pollution has
been disproportionately concentrated in areas in which poor people
and people of colour live.
Worker at the
Rocky Flats Plant
examining a plutonium
button inside a glove
box designed to protect
workers from radiation.
Photo: Department ofEnergyDispersion of these pollutants is an ongoing process. For example, waste storage
tanks at Hanford containing millions of gallons of highly toxic processing chemicals
and radionuclides are reaching groundwater and ﬂowing towards the Columbia River
seven miles away. Spent nuclear fuel at this same facility is at risk of spontaneous
combustion due to uranium hydrides. Such a ﬁre would spread deadly radionuclides
across the agricultural belt of the northwestern United States. [21]Production sites in the former Soviet Union are even more heavily contaminated.
These include Chelyabinsk 65 (“Ozyorsk”) in the Urals, with radioactive wastes
dumped into the Techa River and Lake Karachay; Dimistrovgrad; Tomsk; andKrasnoyarsk. Russian authorities have now admitted injecting approximately abillion curies of radioactive substances underground at both Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk.
While the US has dispersed an estimated three million curies of radioactivity into the 124Section 3

environment from nuclear weapons production, the comparable ﬁgure in the former
Soviet Union is 1.7 billion curies. [22]Conclusion
Nuclear weapons have been developed, produced, tested, and deployed by a handfulof nations, largely in secret, with disregard for human health and environmental
well being. The effects, even without further explosions of nuclear weapons, include
deaths estimated to number in the millions, and permanent radioactive pollution of
our land, sea, and air. As nuclear arms production and the mining, fuel processing,and manufacturing infrastructure to support it gathers momentum in India, Pakistan,and possibly other countries that take their cue from the US and the other nuclear
weapon states, the damage to health and the environment will be compounded rather
than mitigated. If these weapons are eventually used again, as they will be if they
are not abolished, we will not only have failed to learn the lessons of Hiroshima andNagasaki, we will have consigned the rest of the world to their fate. A nuclear weapons
convention, as described in this book, is therefore not only a political prescription but
also a medical prescription for averting that catastrophe.
References
1. National Academies of Science, BEIR VII: Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levelsof Ionizing Radiation, 2005.
2. Human Rights Committee General Comment 14(23) on Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, November 2, 1984.
3. Kenjiro Yokoro and Manao Kamada. “The Public Health Effects of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons.” In: War and Public Health, Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel, editors.
Washington, DC: American Public Health Association, 2000. pp 65-83.
4. John Hersey. Hiroshima. New York: Vintage Books, 1989
5. Robert J. Lifton. Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. New York: Random House,
1968.
6. David G. Nathan, H. Jack Geiger, Victor W. Sidel, and Bernard Lown. The Medical
Consequences of Thermonuclear War: Introduction, New England Journal of Medicine,266: 1126-1127, 1962
7. Victor W. Sidel, H. Jack Geiger, and Bernard Lown. The Medical Consequences ofThermonuclear War: The Physician’s Role in the Postattack Period. New England Journalof Medicine, 266:1137-1145, 1962.
8. Joseph Garland. Editorial: “Earthquake, Wind, and Fire.” New England Journal of
Medicine, 266:1174, 1962
9. World Health Organization Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services.
Second Edition.
Geneva: World Health Organization, 1987.
10. Alexander Leaf. New perspectives on the medical consequences of nuclear war. New
England Journal of Medicine 315:905-912, 1986.
11. World Health Assembly Resolution 46.60, adopted 14 May 1993
12. International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996.
13. Lijon Eknilang, “Learning from Rongelap’s Pain”, Paciﬁc Women Speak Out, editedby Zohl de Ishtar, The Raven Press, Christchurch, 1998
14. IPPNW and IEER: International Commission to Investigate the Health andEnvironmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Production, reported in “Radioactive Heaven
and Earth: The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on andabove the earth.” The Apex Press, New York, 1991.
15. “Estimated Exposure and Thyroid Doses Received by the American People from
Iodine-131 in Fallout Following Nevada Atmospheric Nuclear Bomb Tests.” National
Cancer Institute Publication Number 97-4264, October 1997

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 125

16. H. Jack Geiger. NCI Study Raises New Concerns About Fallout-Related Thyroid
Cancer. Medicine and Global Survival 5(1):8-10, 1998.
17. David Rush. An Attempt to Cover Claims? Or Continuing Obfuscation? Medicine andGlobal Survival 5(1):3-6, 1998.
18. P. Ortmeyer, A. Makhijani. “Worse Than We Knew.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
November/December 1997.
19. H. L. Rosenthal, J.E. Glister, J.T. Bird. Strontium -90 Content of Deciduous Human
Incisors. Science 140:176-177, 1963
20. A. Yemelyanenkov, V. Popov. The Atom Declassiﬁed: Points of View. Berlin: H & P
Druck (Offsetdruckere: Körtestrasse 10, Berlin 61), 1992.)
21. Complex Cleanup: the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production(Doc.#OTA-0-484). U.S. Congress Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment, Washington: US
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1991.
22. Anthony Robbins, Arjun Makhijani, KatherineYih. Radioactive Heaven and Earth: theHealth and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing In, on and above the earth.
New York: Apex Press, 1991.
Additional references by topic:
Hiroshima –John Hersey. Hiroshima. New York: Vintage Books, 1989
Use of Thermonuclear Weapons – David G. Nathan, H. Jack Geiger, Victor W. Sidel,
Bernard Lown. The Medical Consequences of Thermonuclear War: Introduction, New
England Journal of Medicine, 266: 1126-1127, 1962
Victor W. Sidel, H. Jack Geiger, Bernard Lown. The Medical Consequences ofThermonuclear War: The Physician’s Role in the Post— attack Period. New England
Journal of Medicine, 266:1137-1145, 1962.
Nuclear Tests –H. L. Rosenthal, J.E. Glister, J.T. Bird. Strontium -90 Content of Deciduous Human
Incisors. Science 140:176-177, 1963
Anthony Robbins, Arjun Makhijani, KatherineYih. Radioactive Heaven and Earth: theHealth and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing In, on and above the earth.
New York: Apex Press, 1991.
A. Yemelyanenkov, V. Popov. The Atom Declassiﬁed: Points of View. Berlin: H & P Druck(Offsetdruckere: Körtestrasse 10, Berlin 61), 1992.

Nuclear Weapons Production –Complex Cleanup: the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production (Doc.#OTA0-484). U.S. Congress Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment, Washington: US Government
Printing Ofﬁce, 1991.
Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, Katherine Yih, eds. Nuclear Wastelands, Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press, 1995.
Howard Hu, Arjun Makhijani, Katherine Yih. Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age.
Cambridge, Mass: International Physicians Press, 1992.
Accidental Launch –Lachlan Forrow, Bruce G. Blair, Ira Helfand, George Lewis, Theodore Postol, Victor W.
Sidel, Barry S. Levy, Herbert Abrams, Christine Cassel. Accidental Nuclear War: A PostCold War Assessment. New England Journal of Medicine 338:1326-31, 1998.

 126

Section 3

De-Alerting
The Legal and Moral Casefor De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons andRemoving Launch-on-Warning
The Model NWC calls for a phased programmeof disarmament commencing with measures such as
de-alerting of all existing nuclear weapons. It would
however be helpful in reducing nuclear dangers andin building conﬁdence between negotiating parties
if some initial measures such as de-alerting were
undertaken by parties prior to conclusion of the
NWC. In fact, there is a legal and moral case forthe immediate de-alerting of nuclear weapons andremoving the launch-on-warning policy.
The US and Russia continue to deploy approximately 3000 nuclear weapons on
a high level of readiness for use [1] and on launch-on-warning (LOW) operational
procedures.[2] Such policy and practice constitute a real and immediate threat touse nuclear weapons. The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Blix
Commission) notes that “since the ﬂight time of US and Russian land-based missiles
is between 25 and 30 minutes – signiﬁcantly less for sea-based missiles – such nuclear
postures risk causing nuclear exchanges by accident, technical malfunction or strategic
miscalculation. [3]

US Strategic Air
Command Headquarters
at Offut Air Force Base,
Nebraska, USA.
Photo: US Air Force.

Despite calls for reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, the US andRussia maintain that high alert status [4] and LOW are necessary.
The US argues that a high level of readiness to use nuclear force acts as a deterrent
to potential aggressor States. However, they also argue that during times when an
adversary is preparing for war, visibly increasing the readiness to use nuclear force
acts as a warning to the adversary and assists deterrence. [5] If this is true, then during
peacetime a lower level of readiness to use should be maintained in order that there
are additional steps of readiness to progress to without having to move to actualuse. Maintaining a high level of use leaves no such room for manoeuvre. Robert
McNamara, former US Secretary of Defense, has noted that the high alert status has
left the NWS vulnerable to nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. “During the
Cuban Missile Crisis we had thirteen days to muddle our way and avert nuclear war.
Today we would only have thirteen minutes.” [6]The policy makes the potential use of nuclear weapons by miscalculation that much
more likely. While no-one may want nuclear war, military decision makers may launchan attack ﬁrst if they know the other side has weapons on alert and is considering an
attack themselves. This is particularly true if they believe that their nuclear forces could
disable the nuclear forces of the adversary before the adversary had the opportunity tolaunchThe ICJ afﬁrmed that the threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with therequirements of international law applicable in armed conﬂict and with Articles 2 (4)and 51 of the UN Charter. These laws prohibit the threat or use of weapons unlessan armed attack has occurred against a State and until the Security Council has taken
measures to deal with this attack.
The deployment of nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles ready to be used withinminutes or hours, at a time when there has been no attack or imminent threat of attack,thus constitutes an illegal threat of use of such weapons. C.G. Weeramantry, former

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 127

Vice-President of the ICJ, has noted (with regard to naval nuclear weapons) that:
Assuming that nuclear weapons are deployed on naval vessels on alert status,
they constitute a threat of use. The ICJ’s opinion was that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be generally contrary to international law, and in particular thehumanitarian laws of warfare. The only situation in which the ICJ was inconclusive on
absolute illegality was the extreme circumstance of self-defence when the very survivalof a State is at stake. Considering the conclusion of general illegality, the burden of
proof that a speciﬁc situation of threat or use is not proscribed by this rests on thethreatening or using state. There is no proof offered by the deploying states that there iscurrently a threat to the very survival of a state which would require a threat or use of
nuclear weapons.[7]The US and Russia claim that LOW is necessary in order to protect against thepossibility of a ﬁrst strike by the other side which might destroy the bulk of their
nuclear forces thus leaving them defenceless and unable to retaliate. During wartime
launch-on-warning could possibly be justiﬁed in response to a threat of imminent
nuclear attack as long as the response is designed not as retaliation but in orderto prevent further attack, and is consistent with other principles of international
humanitarian law previously discussed.
During peacetime however, launch-on-warning makes nuclear weapons use by
accident or intent much more likely. The policy leaves little time to check accuracy of
information regarding possible nuclear attacks before a retaliatory launch is authorised.
A nuclear war could be started accidentally by faulty information of an incoming
attack triggering a launch-on-warning response. In January 1995, for example, Russian
early warning systems detected a missile heading towards Moscow. Russian leaders
were alerted that it may be a nuclear tipped submarine launched nuclear missile.
The “nuclear suitcase” which is used to give commands for a retaliatory strike, was“opened” in preparation for activation. It took eight minutes to conclude that themissile was not a nuclear missile – less than four minutes before the deadline forordering a nuclear response. [8]LOW also establishes a response procedure that might not be appropriate. If there
is an actual nuclear attack, it could be one of a range of scenarios including a mistaken
launch, a stolen nuclear weapon ﬁred by a non-State group, a limited demonstration
attack, or a massive attack. Launch-on-warning provides very little time to determine
the exact nature of the attack, whether a nuclear response is the most appropriate, or
what scale of response would be appropriate. Military strategy often assumes a worstcase scenario in order to provide maximum protection for ones-self. The assumption ofa worst-case scenario in a nuclear strike could lead to a full-scale response which could
be out of all proportion to the actual attack.
Finally, launch-on-warning and maintaining nuclear forces on high alert statusconstitute a highly confrontational posture which jeopardises efforts to reduce politicaltensions between countries, to solve longstanding conﬂicts and to move towards
disarmament and cooperative threat reduction.
Philips and Starr have proposed that the US and Russia could rescind LOW andadopt instead a policy of RELOAD (Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation). They
argue that “ Such a policy ‘is compatible with the current posture of nuclear deterrence,and that the military on both sides would be glad to accept it in order to reduce the risk
inherent in LoW.” [9]The Blix Commission says that the most urgent task is to eliminate the launchon-warning posture, and suggests some bilateral veriﬁcation measures including theparticipation of inspectors from both countries in military exercises of their strategic
forces or even a permanent presence of liaison ofﬁcers at their strategic command
posts.

 128

Section 3

The Blix Commission also recommends that Russia and the United States should
agree on reciprocal steps to take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert andshould create a joint commission to facilitate this goal. They should implement a
controlled parallel decrease in operational readiness of a large part of their strategic
forces, through: reducing the number of strategic submarines at sea and lowering theirtechnical readiness to launch while in port; storing nuclear bombs and air-launchedcruise missiles separately from relevant air ﬁelds; storing separately nose cones and/or
warheads of most intercontinental ballistic missiles or taking other technical measures
to reduce their readiness. [10]De-alerting as part of a transition to abolition would begin to move the Nuclear
Weapon States out of the state of immorality inherent in the possession of nuclear
weapons and provide a more positive political environment for negotiating a NWC. It
would contribute to ending what Lee Butler, former commander of US strategic nuclear
forces, called the “spectacle of democratic societies clinging to the proposition thatthreats to the lives of tens of millions of people can be reconciled with the underlying
tenets of our political philosophy”.
References
1. Such weapons are primed and ready for launching within moments of a launchcommand.
2. Launch-on-warning procedures enable the launch of a retaliatory nuclear strike if anuclear-armed missile is headed toward a State but before the missile strikes.
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission ﬁnal report, Weapons of Terror: Freeing theWorld of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms, Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006, page
92. For electronic copies of the report, please visit www.wmdcommission.org
4. “De-alerting undermines a basic principle of deterrence; namely the ability to retaliate
promptly so as to prevent any aggressor from assuming it can achieve a fait accompli.”
US Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century, National Defense Council and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory Experts Group, 1998
5. The US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations notes that:
Increased readiness levels help deter aggression. Consequently, an increased risk of attack,prompted by adversary war readiness measures, may require US forces to maintain visibly
increased states of alert. Delivery system postures can send a clear warning. Nuclearcapable bombers and submarines deploying to dispersal locations can send a forcefulmessage that demonstrates the national will to use nuclear weapons, and increase theirsurvivability.
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, pages I-12 – I-13
6. Presentation to the US Congress following a screening of “Thirteen Days.” 1 March
2001. See GSI Hosts Thirteen Days in Washington, D.C.
http://www.gsinstitute.org/archives/000074.shtml#000074
7. Illegality of deployment of nuclear weapons within Nuclear Weapon Free Zones:
Principles placed before the New Zealand Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade by Judge C.G. Weeramantry, August 2003.
8. Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert, Scientiﬁc American, 1998.
9. Alan Philips and Steve Starr, Change Launch on Warning Policy, 5 April 2006, Arms
Control Russia,
http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/change-low.pdf
10. WMD Commission, Recommendation 17, page 94

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 129

CleanUp, Disposition and Safe Disarmament
The implementation of a nuclear weapons convention
would require dismantling thousands of nuclear missiles
and disposing massive quantities of nuclear materials. In
addition, many facilities involved in the production of
nuclear weapons are severely contaminated. Experience
to date indicates that more attention, research, andfunding are necessary for safe nuclear disarmament,
disposition, and cleanup.

Barrels of transuranic
waste in temprary storage
at the E. Area Burial
Grounds, SavannahRiver Site, South
Carolina, US. This waste
is contaminated withplutonium. More than
300,000 such barrels
from nuclear weapons
production are buried orstored around the country.
Photo: Department ofEnergyNot only does the production, testing, storage anduse of nuclear weapons lead to environmental andhealth damage, (See Critical Question on Healthand Environment), but the process of dismantling theweapons also carries major risks. These risks include:
accidents to or hijacking of the nuclear weapons
during their transport to the site of dismantling; thehazards to the workers during the process of dismantling the weapons; and healthand environmental damage associated with the removed components, including theirtransport, storage, and destruction.
In 1989, a committee of the U.S. Senate expressed concern that the Department of
Defense had devoted too little money and effort to ﬁnding ways to comply with nuclear
arms reductions in “an environmentally benign manner.” For example, pursuant to
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, hundreds of Pershing missiles
were burned in the open air or exploded on a test stand at the Pueblo Army Depot inColorado. These procedures can release clouds of toxic hydrochloric acid when the
missiles’ solid fuel combines with moisture. (See Defending the Environment, 1989).
Virtually all the experience with the disassembly and destruction of nuclear weapons
in the United States has been gained over the past decade at the Pantex nuclear
weapons facility, located about 17 miles northeast of Amarillo, Texas. It is operated
for the U.S. Department of Energy by a contractor, the Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason
Co., and is the U.S. primary assembly and disassembly plant for nuclear weapons.
Prior to 1989 the Department of Energy had considered Pantex to be a relatively
clean and safe facility. Since 1989 Pantex has been repeatedly criticized for its safety
and health problems. These problems have included: radiation accidents in 1989 and1990 resulting in workers being exposed to tritium and depleted uranium; inadequate
stafﬁng, training and procedures designed to protect workers and the environment fromradiation; and violations in the general worker safety program.

Comment: Disposition
Unlike enriched uranium, plutonium poses special problems when one decides to“get rid of it.” Enriched uranium can simply be diluted to low enriched uranium andfabricated into fuel for nuclear power plants. Plutonium cannot be “diluted” – both“reactor grade” plutonium, the material produced in an average nuclear power plants
and “weapons grade,” material produced in special reactors for the use in sophisticatednuclear weapons can be used in nuclear weapons. With isotopes that have half-lives of
86 – 380,000 years, it will take 860 to 3.8 million years for the material to completely
decay.
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there are no acceptable methods
to eliminate plutonium. Shooting it into the sun or at the least into outer space 130

Section 3

would be expensive and risky – a Challenger-type disaster with a plutonium payload
could potentially harm many people. Diluting plutonium in the oceans is politicallyunfeasible and may be scientiﬁcally unfeasible, too. Destroying it in undergroundnuclear explosions would be hazardous and environmentally unsound, not to mention aviolation of the CTBT. The only other option is to transmute or transform it into otherisotopes in a nuclear reactor or accelerator. The only problem is that the technology forsuch a process is only theoretical at the moment, and would take at least 25-50 years
to fully develop. Furthermore, transmutation would require the construction of new
nuclear reactors, which may be problematic in some countries (like the United States).
Fortunately, there are ways to minimize access to plutonium by burying underground ina geologic repository, by putting it into a deep borehole, 2-6 km in depth, or by burying
it in deep sea muds. One can further reduce access by immobilizing plutonium in a
glass form or in a ceramic matrix prior to burial. Or, one can “burn” the plutonium as
mixed oxide fuel (MOX fuel) in nuclear reactors and transport the spent MOX fuel to ageologic repository. Finally, instead of minimizing access, plutonium could be stored
above-ground indeﬁnitely with tight security, but this option presupposes continued
political stability and a continued commitment to the NWC.
Only the United States and Russia have considered the question of plutonium
disposition so far. Both countries have agreed to declare 50 metric tons of plutonium
each as excess to military needs. The United States has adopted a “dual-track” methodfor dispositioning plutonium: immobilizing it in a ceramic matrix and burning it as
MOX fuel in commercial reactors. Both the immobilized plutonium and the spent
MOX fuel would then be put into a mined geologic repository. Russia is very attachedto plutonium as a fuel form and would like to burn all of it as either MOX fuel ordirectly in breeder reactors. At the moment, it has only one breeder reactor (one isunder construction). Russia has made no formal declarations of its intentions, incontrast to the United States.
Because there are no straightforward solutions to plutonium disposition, it would
be difﬁcult for the NWC to require the use of speciﬁc technologies for plutonium
disposition, especially as the technology to disposition plutonium may improve in the
future. Consequently, the NWC may be best off only requiring general conditions,such as physical protection standards. At the moment, no global standards exist for thephysical protection of ﬁssile materials like plutonium. For example, some countries(like the United States) require guards protecting plutonium to be armed, whereas
other countries (like Japan) do not arm the guards protecting plutonium stockpiles.
Consequently, it could be useful for the NWC to have a clause on physical protection
for all ﬁssile materials.

Contaminated rubble
and soil from thedemolition of a uranium
processing facility anddebris from a munitions
factory and chemicalplant have been
dumped in Weldon
Spring Rafﬁnate Pit 4
in Missouri. Photo: US
department of Energy.

-Allison Macfarlane, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University

Related to the question of disarmament and cleanup is the problem of disposition of
weapons usable material, particularly plutonium. No satisfactory solution has beenfound to date. Among the proposed options are the following:
1 Monitored and secured storage of plutonium for an indeﬁnite period while a solution
is sought,
2 Fabrication of plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to be used in commerical
power reactors (see discussion below),
3 Fissioning of plutonium in an accelerator or a nuclear reactor,
4 Deep geologic disposal or sub-seabed disposal of plutonium
5 Launch of plutonium into the sun
6 Destruction of nuclear warheads in an underground nuclear explosion.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 131Comment: Disposition
Disposition is a misnomer. We cannot “dispose” of plutonium, which remains lethally toxic
for 250,000 years. The latest plan to handle nuclear materials generated by nuclear power isthe Bush Administration’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to replace the MOX
project. [1] GNEP is a disastrous scheme to promote nuclear power around the world while“controlling” the outbreak of additional nuclear weapons states by maintaining custody of thebomb materials produced by nuclear reactors and recycling it in fast breeder reactors. The
US has been approaching established nuclear weapons states and their friends with advanced
civilian nuclear technology such as France, Japan, Russia, UK, China and India with a plan
to provide toxic nuclear “fuel services” to developing countries which includes transporting
fresh nuclear fuel to the four corners of the earth and then importing foreign “spent” fuelback to the US and shipping it by rail and truck, to selected US sites across the continent,
to be reprocessed to make nuclear reactor fuel and shipped out again. GNEP would breaka 30 year taboo, established by President Carter, on reprocessing civilian nuclear waste,
which separates the used irradiated fuel produced by nuclear power plants into bomb-readyplutonium and uranium.
We would be putting our security at enormous risk, raising the chances exponentially fortheft and nuclear weapons proliferation by increasing substantially the amount of bomb readynuclear materials and putting it in transit all over the world. There is no guarantee that we
could provide nuclear materials to a developing country for “peaceful” purposes, and that thereceiving country wouldn’t decide some day, like North Korea did, to break its agreements
and weaponize its plutonium.
GNEP creates additional toxic waste which would lie around for eons with no guarantee that
it will not seep into our groundwater, aquifers and rivers, causing increases in cancers, birthdefects, and mutations, as has been demonstrated at every other nuclear site on the planet.
Reprocessing is the most polluting part of the nuclear fuel cycle. Like the MOX scheme,
the nuclear industry is arguing that GNEP would make the material safe from terrorists. The
best, cheapest, and quickest way to secure the material from theft is to put it behind gateswith guns and guards while a new generation of scientists, untainted by the inadequate
thinking of the current weapons designers, is provided adequate resources to re-visit thedisposition problem anew.
The late Ted Taylor, a former nuclear weapons designer at Los Alamos, who quit his job
after a crisis of conscience to work for nuclear abolition, maintained that we could disable
all the nuclear weapons in our massive arsenal in a matter of weeks without resorting to thecostly, complex, and environmentally harmful processes with hi-tech facilities recommended
by the weapons scientists to dismantle the bombs over an agonizingly long period of time.
When questioned as to how that could be done he said, “Put them in molasses! That would
gunk up the works and prevent them from going off.” Frank von Hippel, President Clinton’sformer science advisor, and Co-Chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials afﬁrmed
that, indeed, we could just gum up the works of a nuclear bomb with some kind of sticky
substance and render it inoperable in no time.
With adequate resources and new thinking, we may discover new properties of nuclear
materials, which will enable us to render them inert over a shorter period of time than thecurrent 250,000-year toxic lifespan of plutonium. In the meantime, nuclear waste should
be stored as near to the site where it is generated as can be safely managed, in above
ground monitored storage, until a new generation of scientists, untainted by weapons-workand ecological unconsciousness, has addressed the disposition conundrum, with adequate
resources, fresh thinking, and a commitment to solutions that will not further pollute theearth. Just as the Hebrew children wandered in the desert for forty years so that no one born
into slavery would enter the Promised Land, no one who ever worked at the weapons labs
should be part of the solution for nuclear materials disposition.
-Alice Slater Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, New York
References
1. House Report 109-474-Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2007,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/cpquery/?&sid=cp109QlRbV&refer=&r_n=hr474.109&db_
id=109&item=&sel=TOC_272254&

 132

Section 3

Nuclear Energy
Critical Question:
How should the NWC handle the nuclear fuel cycle?
Nuclear Energy
Unlike the NPT, the Model NWC discourages the use of nuclear energy, recognizingthat the continued reliance on nuclear power and its potential expansion pose achallenge to veriﬁcation of a nuclear-weapons-free world. Recent high-proﬁle cases,
including the crises over the nuclear programs in Iran and the North Korea, havebrought the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear fuel-cycle technology to
the forefront of the international agenda.
Article IV of the NPT refers to an “inalienable right” of non-nuclear-weapon states
to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. A possible problem for the conﬁdent
achievement and sustainability of a world free of nuclear weapons, this current norm
allows for states to build up the capacity and infrastructure––through ostensibly
civilian energy and research programs––to produce nuclear weapons within a brieftime period. However, any right must be exercised in conformity with internationallaw, as is illustrated by the NPT itself, which makes the exercise of the Article IV rightcontingent on the obligation not to manufacture nuclear weapons. More broadly, theArticle IV right is subject to limits based upon the environmental and security rights
of other States and the global community. Further, while states surely are entitledto develop energy sources as part of the sovereign right of development, that rightis subject to restrictions – including on particular energy sources – in the common
interest. Accordingly, the qualiﬁcation of the NPT right to peaceful nuclear energy
as “inalienable” should be understood in the context of the NPT bargain, and not
as a claim that it is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty. It therefore may be limited
or extinguished over time by subsequent developments and agreements, as has theNPT Article V promise of access to the “beneﬁts” of peaceful nuclear explosions – aprovision which catered for the possibility of digging canals and mining operations
with nuclear explosive devices, but which has subsequently become understood as too
environmentally damaging and has been prohibited in the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
The question of the relationship of nuclear power to the achievement of a nuclearweapons free world remains crucial. Appreciation of the extreme environmental risksof nuclear energy, as demonstrated by the Chernobyl disaster, have been partially offset
by a push to reduce reliance on fossil fuels creating a new demand for nuclear energy,
with a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study predicting a three-fold
expansion in nuclear energy by 2050. Should these predictions be accurate, the needfor nuclear fuel-cycle services will expand as well. With some adjustment, the verysame facilities and equipment used to produce low-enriched uranium fuel for powerreactors can produce high-enriched uranium suitable for use in a nuclear weapon. The
separation and reprocessing of plutonium from spent reactor fuel as mixed-oxide fuelis a potentially greater proliferation challenge, as all separated plutonium is directly
usable in nuclear weapons. All existing commercial nuclear power reactors produce
plutonium as a by-product. The spread of these technologies increases the risk that such
facilities might be misused and nuclear material diverted to use in weapons or into thehands of terrorists, or that the knowledge gained from operating such facilities might
be employed in a clandestine nuclear bomb program. The spread of nuclear technology
also increases the risk of terrorist attack on reactors and their spent fuel stores.
Veriﬁcation of nuclear non-proliferation objectives historically has been limited inorder to maintain the balance between rights and obligations of NPT states parties.
NPT Safeguards, administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 133are restricted to verifying that no nuclear material in each non-weapon state has been
diverted to weapons. The IAEA only has the authority to comprehensively verify
the presence or absence of undeclared nuclear activities or materials in a state if
it has accepted the voluntary Additional Protocol. Enforcement is hindered by thetreaty’s institutional deﬁcits: the lack of a standing secretariat for the NPT and theinfrequent meetings of states parties. The UN Security Council has increasingly
ﬁlled the enforcement gap left by the lack of compliance mechanisms, but under a
traditional view its authority is limited to cases that it has found to constitute a threat
to international peace, rather than functioning as a reliable enforcer of global treaty
regimes.
These concerns over the limits of the NPT safeguards regime led a 2003 MIT team,
examining issues related to the expansion of nuclear power, to question the wisdomof any scenario envisioning the growth of nuclear energy. Undoubtedly, the only
truly proliferation-proof solution would be the global phase-out of nuclear power.
The Model NWC does not mandate such a global phase-out, but does provide someencouragement for it through an additional protocol on nuclear energy phase-out. This
could be assisted by the establishment of an International Sustainable Energy Agency,
which would provide assistance to States in developing environmentally sound energy
technologies and phasing out nuclear energy.
A variety of proposals exist to mitigate the risks posed by the proliferation ofsensitive nuclear technology and they should be explored and possibly implemented
in parallel with negotiation of a NWC or prior to its conclusion. The Model NWC
itself provides additional restrictions and controls on nuclear technology including aprohibition on plutonium reprocessing and on enrichment of uranium beyond 20%
U-235 - an enrichment level sufﬁcient for most nuclear reactors but insufﬁcient for
nuclear weapons. This would require the phase-out of breeder reactors and reactors
using highly enriched uranium.
Beyond this, the continued existence of nationally based nuclear fuel-cycle facilities
might pose an insuperable obstacle to the veriﬁability of a nuclear-weapons-free world.
Thus, the IAEA has been studying the possibility of international control of fuelcycle in order to prevent any State from possessing the national capability to produce
material for nuclear weapons.
While there is a deﬁnite link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons,
progress towards nuclear disarmament should not be prevented due to continuing
reliance by some States on nuclear energy. Thus the Model NWC attempts a balanced
approach, permitting nuclear energy while at the same time strengthening controls
over nuclear technology, and encouraging the phase-out of nuclear energy. Opinions
vary on whether the Model NWC is too permissive or too restrictive in this respect,
but such variance should not prevent progress on either negotiations for the NWC or
strengthening nuclear energy controls.

 134Section 3

Comment: Nuclear Energy
I agree that there should be much more thorough and open debate on nuclear energy.
I would add that it should be international, with inputs from people who are citizens
of a wide variety of countries with regard to their past and current nuclear activities.
These should include announced or unannounced possession of nuclear weapons(including Israel); the nearly 50 countries that have nuclear power plants and/or
research/test reactors with thermal power outputs greater than about 1 megawatt; andany other countries that are openly seriously considering use of nuclear energy forpeaceful or military purposes. I would also include the dozen or so countries within
which work is proceeding on R&D on inertial or magnetic conﬁnement fusion powersystems.
It has been my conviction for decades that solar energy is, by far, the bestalternative, anywhere in the world, for meeting all human energy needs. I
therefore keep pressing for completely open, urgent international development anddemonstration of solar powered total energy systems to displace the present andwidely projected dependence on fossil and nuclear fuels worldwide. I expect theenvironmental and economic beneﬁts of such a global effort to become evident toeveryone within less than a decade.
– Theodore B. Taylor, former nuclear weapons designer, Los Alamos National
Laboratory.

“It has been myconviction for decadesthat solar energy
is, by far, the bestalternative, anywherein the world, formeeting all humanenergy needs.”- Theodore B. Taylor
Photo: Petr Nad

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 135Comment: Nuclear Energy
The fundamental problem with banning nuclear weapons but allowing nuclear poweris that they have the same energy source: the ﬁssion of uranium and plutonium isotopes.
To use uranium in a nuclear weapon, it must ﬁrst be enriched in the isotope U-235. At thesame time, most of the nuclear power plants in the world also require enriched uranium,
though not enriched to the degree used in nuclear weapons. To create plutonium for use
in nuclear weapons, uranium-based fuel must be “burned” in a nuclear power reactor. In
1974, India showed the world that diversion of nuclear material for a “peaceful” nuclear
explosion was indeed possible.
On the other hand, nuclear power may be needed in the 21st century to replace energy
from fossil fuel power plants that emit greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is seen by
a number of Asian countries, themselves either fossil-fuel-poor or loathe to expand
dirty coal-burning plants, as a reliable energy source to fulﬁll the increasing electricity
demands of their rapidly growing populations. Finally, who are western countries, having
enjoyed the “luxury” of energy beneﬁts from nuclear power, to inform developing Asian
countries that they cannot have nuclear power?
Currently, the IAEA veriﬁes that non-nuclear weapon states signatories to the NPT
do not divert nuclear materials from energy to weapons purposes. With the exception of
Iraq, the IAEA has done its job successfully. There will be no way to ensure completelythat an individual country, especially a former nuclear weapons nation, will not break outof the NWC. Unless the NWC nulliﬁes the NPT, there will be no reason to have a parallelorganization to the IAEA. Nations, however, may wish to “update” or “recreate” theIAEA, and perhaps doing so under the auspices of an NWC is the path to follow.
There are two processes in nuclear materials handling for nuclear energy and nuclear
weapons that are, in my mind, the most vulnerable to diversion activities: reprocessingof spent fuel and enrichment of uranium. The latter, as noted, is necessary for fuelfabrication in most light water type reactors, the most common reactor design. OnlyCANDU (Canadian deuterium-uranium) reactors use natural uranium, but they havetheir own proliferation problems. Fuel requires only 3-4% enrichment, whereas
nuclear weapons require at least 20% enrichment. Therefore, careful monitoring of
the enrichment process is necessary. As it stands now, only a few facilities worldwide
can enrich uranium, though, each country that uses nuclear power would rather not be
dependent on another for the main component of its fuel. Nonetheless, there may besome way to control the uranium enrichment market, but I’m not certain the NWC should
do so.
Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is perhaps more worrying than enrichment interms of proliferation. It easily can create a plutonium economy, and plutonium, nomatter whether it is “weapons grade” or “reactor grade” can be used in nuclear weapons.
Currently, only Russia, France, Britain, Japan, and Germany reprocess their spent fuel.
India has plans to, and has reprocessed some material already for use in nuclear weapons.
Germany recently announced that it plans to phase out reprocessing. Such a move may
be the death knell for reprocessing plants in Britain and France, which rely heavily on
Germany’s business. Japan is ﬁnally coming to the realization that reprocessing is a very
expensive method for producing electricity. At today’s prices, uranium is so cheap thatit does not make economic sense to use anything but uranium-based fuel. The dreamof breeder reactors, which France, Japan and Russia clung to, is fading in France andJapan, but Russia continues to cling to the idea. The only country currently enthusiastic
about plutonium as a good nuclear fuel is Russia, which has no money to reprocess spent
fuel, build new reactors, or even run the ones they have very efﬁciently. So, commercial
reprocessing may die a slow death. The NWC may want to restrict reprocessing
activities, but again, doing so may cause it to lose signatories (Russia, in particular). It
may be better for concerned countries to encourage those that reprocess to stop, and for
the NWC to avoid this question and the question of nuclear energy.
- Allison Macfarlane (See Comment on Disposition for afﬁliation)

 136

Section 3

Plutonium generated in power reactors can be used to make nuclear weapons. This
photograph is of a nuclear missile in its silo. Photo: John Wollwerth

Comment: Nuclear Energy
The problem of nuclear energy is complicated by the fact that almost all plutonium
can be used to make nuclear weapon. For a time, many in the nuclear industry believedthat the plutonium generated in power reactors could not be used for weapons.
However, it is now understood that virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes
can be used to make a nuclear weapon, using a design as simple as that of the Nagasakibomb.
At present, there are roughly 500 tonnes of separated plutonium in the world,
enough for over 100,000 nuclear weapons. About 250 tonnes of this plutonium has
been separated from civilian spent nuclear power-reactor fuel, mostly in France, Russia
and the UK. The stock of civilian separated plutonium is growing and will soon besigniﬁcantly larger than the amount of weapon plutonium. It is all weapon-usable.
As of December 2005, there is over 800 tonnes of plutonium contained in spent fuel-- 700 tonnes in non-weapons states, and over 100 tonnes in the nuclear weapons states.
This will grow each year as fresh spent fuel is generated from the production of nuclear
electricity. There is an urgent need to address the problem of this growing stock of
separated and unseparated civil plutonium.
-Zia Mian (Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University)

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 137Comment: Nuclear Energy
Despite massive public relations expenditures by the nuclear industry to convince
the world that nuclear power is needed to mitigate the effects of global warming,that contention is unsupportable. Nuclear power is the slowest and costliest way to
reduce CO2 emissions. Financing nuclear power would divert scarce resources frominvestments in renewable energy and energy efﬁciency. The enormous costs fornuclear power per unit of carbon emissions reduced compared to oil and coal, would
worsen climate change by buying less carbon-free energy per dollar, compared to sun
and wind. Nor is nuclear power carbon free. It is not only dependent upon fossil fuels
for the production of uranium fuel, decommissioning and the disposition of wastes
generated; it is also dependent upon a grid that is powered by other sources of energy,
typically coal. And nuclear power is not reliable in extreme weather conditions. Everyreactor needs back up power to prevent a meltdown. Recent incidents of intense heat,drought, blizzards, and hurricanes contributed to electric grid failures. In the summerof 2004, France had to shut down a number of reactors during the extreme heat wave.
It’s time to replace Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with an International
Sustainable Energy Agency. The nuclear crisis has resulted from the spread of“peaceful” nuclear technology together with the nuclear weapons states failure todisarm their arsenals. IAEA Director, Mohammed Elaborate stated, “We just cannot
continue business as usual so that every country can build its own factories forseparating plutonium or enriching uranium. Then we are really talking about 30, 40
countries sitting on the fence with a nuclear weapons capability that could be converted
into a nuclear weapon in a matter of months.”
However, the proposals to try to control civilian nuclear fuel production, suggested
by El Baradei and the Blix Commission are doomed to fail. It is unjust for certain
favored nations to make their own nuclear fuel, without world condemnation, suchas Brazil and Japan, while others, such as Iran and North Korea, are threatened for
doing so. We must supercede the “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear technology
by establishing an International Sustainable Energy Agency (ISEA), funded by themore than $250 billion in annual subsidies to nuclear and fossil fuel. Civil Society
has produced a model statute for the Agency. www.abolition2000.org. Just as the
CTB rendered the NPT’s Article V guaranteed right to “peaceful nuclear explosions”
inoperative, the establishment of ISEA would make the inalienable right to peaceful
nuclear technology inoperative as well. Setting up ISEA, with a moratorium on newreactors and fuel production, phasing out nuclear power with safe, sustainable energy,
should be an integral part of the negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
- Alice Slater Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, New York Convenor, Abolition 2000
Working Group for Sustainable Energy 138Section 3

Knowledge and Reversibility
Critical Question:
Can the Nuclear Weapons Convention put thenuclear “genie” back in the bottle?
A recurring argument in the debate over elimination of nuclear weapons is that the“nuclear genie is out of the bottle”, inferring that nuclear physics cannot be unlearned.
Because of this, it has been argued, there is no point in pursuing the elimination of
nuclear weapons. True, nuclear weapons knowledge cannot be unlearned. In fact,
it would be foolish to base any non-proliferation regime on the assumption thatknowledge is lacking. But current proliferation risks are not merely a result of the
discovery of the splitting of the atom. They are also the end product of long-standing
policies to exploit this discovery for military purposes. Making nuclear disarmamentirreversible will therefore involve a gradual dismantling of the entire nuclear weapons
infrastructure, beginning with greater, not lesser, awareness of the potential risks posedby scientiﬁc discoveries.
The MNWC actually stresses the importance of keeping up the public availabilityof nuclear weapons and disarmament related knowledge in order to facilitate societal
veriﬁcation and conversion. However, it is virtually impossible to reconstruct acomplicated technical device from its blueprints without referring to the implicit
knowledge of the very experts who designed and constructed it. Therefore, nuclear
weapons can be “disinvented” to some degree simply by retirement of the experienced
weapon designers and by destruction of data storage media that contain most of
the technical information relevant for nuclear weapons. A suggested approach is toeliminate all nuclear weapons related classiﬁed information, i.e., to destroy all design
information and to declassify whatever is not destroyed.

“Absent action, theknowledge and skills
base unique to nuclear
weapons will be
atrophy.”- The Stockpile Stewardshipand Management Program,
US DOE, Ofﬁce of Defense
Program, May 1995.

On a more negative note, laboratory testing and computer simulation would further
knowledge of nuclear weapons. The improved simulation technology is highly
incompatible with the goal of a nuclear weapons free world. At the end of an era ofcomparatively primitive trial and error, a scientiﬁc revolution is now being initiated.
With it, the theoretical understanding of nuclear weapons is supposed to be deepened.
In addition new scientists and testers are being primed for systematic conservation of
the knowledge relevant for nuclear weapons. If these developments continue, it will
become more difﬁcult in the future to “disinvent” sophisticated designs of nuclear
weapons.

Comment: Knowledge
This is an extremely complex subject. Present and past knowledge of a wide variety
of technical concepts has evolved from basic principles of design and analysis thatare no longer secret. This knowledge has spread dramatically during the past decadeor so. Much that is considered secret by governments of announced or unannounced
Nuclear Weapon States is not in others. I therefore tend not to be hopeful that control
of information is likely to be very effective in curbing the proliferation of nuclear
weapon concepts in countries with either rudimentary or advanced understanding of
the relevant design principles. The proliferation of actual nuclear weapon arsenals now
and in the short-term future are, I believe, therefore best controlled by veriﬁed physicalcontrol of the key materials needed for making nuclear weapons. These key materials
are now plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and tritium.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 139This type of international control of nuclear weapons may no longer be applicable if
present efforts to develop pure fusion explosive weapons succeed. This possibility, thelikelihood of which is strongly debated by experts, cannot be openly assessed becausesome of the key considerations remain secret.
- Ted Taylor (See Comment on Nuclear Energy for afﬁliation)

Comment: Knowledge
Many who advocate retention of substantial nuclear weapons facilities and arsenals
for the foreseeable future rest their case in large part on two claims. Abolition of
nuclear weapons is seen as impossible because the knowledge needed to make nuclear
weapons cannot be “disinvented”. At the same time, many of the same people argue
that we must keep and constantly modernize a huge complex of nuclear weapons
research and testing facilities, because the knowledge needed to maintain an adequate
deterrent is so fragile that it requires enormous effort to retain it.
The argument that retention of a nuclear arsenal is essential once the knowledge
needed to make nuclear weapons is widespread has many ﬂaws. Perhaps mostimportant is that it implicitly compares a world without declared nuclear arsenals to aperfect, risk free world, in which there is no possibility of either breakout by a nuclear
weapons state or proliferant or covert retention of small arsenals. The proper groundfor comparison is the world we now inhabit, one bristling with nuclear weapons, somein decaying military structures, with a nonproliferation regime in tatters and new
nuclear and ballistic missile races underway in South Asia. It is only in this context
that the discussion of “reversibility” can be more than another abstract technicaldebate. The argument that large, active nuclear weapons establishments are necessary
to sustain an acceptable deterrent rests on assumptions about the role of nuclear
weapons which still receive far too little attention in arms control debates. Deterrence
for several nuclear weapons states means far more than deterring an adversary’s
nuclear weapons use. Rather, nuclear weapons are seen by the dominant factions in
those states as an integral part of military policies which deem necessary and rightful
the capacity to apply overwhelming force in response to a wide range of perceived
threats, including threats to military forces deployed far beyond national boundaries.
Only in this context does the constant reﬁnement of large and diverse nuclear arsenals
become understandable.
The assertion that constant increases in nuclear weapons knowledge are essential
because nuclear weapons knowledge cannot be eliminated increasingly becomes aself-fulﬁlling prophecy. As the nuclear weapons states develop more sophisticatedmeans to simulate nuclear weapons phenomena, and as techniques of nuclear weapons
production also are developed to improve their ﬂexibility and capacity to move quickly
from design to production, the proliferation of nuclear weapons knowledge is boundto increase, and the technical barriers to reconstitution of a nuclear arsenal will tend
to diminish. The technical capabilities which are touted as necessary to counter
proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction have the potential to make nuclear
weapons proliferation more likely, and abolition of nuclear weapons more difﬁcult toachieve.
Jonathan Katz, a member of a 1994 JASON panel which evaluated the U.S. nuclear
weapons “stewardship” program, advocated an alternative “curatorship” approachin which new experimental facilities like the NIF “are not built, experiments are notconducted, and design and development skills are allowed to atrophy. Only those 140Section 3

skills required to remanufacture weapons according to their original
speciﬁcations are preserved.” Stewardship would add little toconﬁdence in the nuclear weapons stockpile, Katz argued, while posing
proliferation risks due to the knowledge which could diffuse from
nuclear weapons “stewardship” programs, particularly those involving
inertial conﬁnement fusion:“....NIF would bring together weapons scientists with scientists
who are doing unclassiﬁed work on inertial fusion. They would rub
elbows, share facilities, collaborate on unclassiﬁed experiments, andcommunicate their interests and concerns to each other. Information
and understanding would diffuse from the classiﬁed to the unclassiﬁed
world, even without any technical violations of security....
Weapons work is so advanced in the United States that the
NIF would not advance it; but NIF could be of tremendous use tonations where nuclear weapons work is less advanced. The lowering of the barriers toproliferation of both ﬁssion and fusion weapons that NIF would bring is surely not in
the national interest....
As nuclear weapons grow older, it is inevitable that conﬁdence in theirperformance will erode. But stewardship cannot remedy that. The source of
conﬁdence in the nuclear stockpile is the original testing program, combined with thefaithful remanufacture of weapons components to original speciﬁcations. Curatorshipis sufﬁcient to make this degree of conﬁdence possible, and stewardship can do no
better....

National Ignition Facility(NIF) under construction
at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in
California would pursue
research on fusion
reactions for a whole newgeneration of weapons.
Photo: Brian Quintard,
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory

Curatorship makes more sense than stewardship. It is cheaper, more
proliferation resistant, and it is plainly more suitable for a world in which a nuclear
arms race no longer exists.”
We are entering a time in which full-scale nuclear arms races are beginningonce more. Today, they are principally races among new nuclear weapons states,
manifesting the deterioration of the nonproliferation regime, attributable in large
measure to the failure of the nuclear weapons states to make signiﬁcant progress
towards nuclear disarmament in a decade of unprecedented opportunity. The
complexity of the multilateral nuclear confrontation is growing as sophisticated nuclear
weapons capabilities continue to spread, each new turn making the technical andpolitical tasks of achieving abolition of nuclear weapons more difﬁcult.
In the end, the road to abolition requires political, not technical, inventiveness.
Every round of technological innovation in the nuclear weapons sphere has
proliferated, only making the world more dangerous and the path to abolition
more complicated. The problem of “reversibility” in an abolition regime is an
abstract theological debate in a world where the powerful are turning their backs on
disarmament and returning to the rule of force in international affairs. Elimination of
nuclear weapons will require profound political change within the nuclear weapons
states, leaps of faith and building of conﬁdence on all sides, and an international
security regime that is truly multilateral. The “reversibility” of nuclear abolition, andthe degree of risk it represents, cannot be discussed meaningfully until we are at least
stumbling towards abolition rather than marching towards war.
- Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman Western States Legal Foundation. See
comments on Research and Breakout.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

The proper groundfor comparison is theworld we now inhabit,
one bristling with
nuclear weapons, somein decaying military
structures, with a nonproliferation regime intatters and new nuclear
and ballistic missile races
underway in South Asia.

 141

Conversion
Critical Question:
How should the Nuclear Weapons Convention handle
conversion?
“I have to cast my lot
with those who age
after age, with no
extraordinary power,reconstitute the world.
- Adrienne Rich, Poet

Current nuclear weapons programs have generated a constituency of corporations andworkers that beneﬁt economically from the nuclear weapons budget and is thus resistantto nuclear disarmament. Conversion refers to the least disruptive transformation of nuclear
weapons facilities and supporting industries to non-weapons purposes. Conversion models
envisage the potential for productive roles for nuclear weapons corporations and workers.
The education, skills, and training necessary for large-scale nuclear disarmament, fromresearch and development to implementation, are one answer to the “jobs” argument, often
used to defend the nuclear weapons industry.
There is, however, disagreement as to the most appropriate type of work for weapons
designers, whether as part of the disarmament process or in a completely separate ﬁeld
(e.g., medicine). On the one hand, the knowledge, skills and technology necessary
for veriﬁable nuclear disarmament are today in the hands of the nuclear weapons
establishment. Thus conversion of this infrastructure seems the most efﬁcient way topreserve jobs and redirect expertise. On the other hand, opponents argue, the mentality of
the nuclear weapons infrastructure would prevent it from being truly able to participate in a
nuclear disarmament regime.
The viability of conversion would seem to turn on the ability of a disarmament culture
to permeate the nuclear weapons infrastructure and the scientiﬁc educational and training
institutions that feed into it. Research and development priorities, with the emphasis on
military ambition, have limited the options available to scientists, and participation in
weapons research, in turn, has shaped the political outlook of the scientiﬁc establishment.
It is not possible to predict with certainty whether scientiﬁc research and education
institutions can be transformed from a weaponization mentality to a disarmament mentality.
The feasibility of such a transformation will depend greatly on the larger cultural context
in which scientists are educated, trained and politicized. If nuclear weapons are stigmatizedrather than gloriﬁed in political discourse and popular movies, they will also be lessappealing as objects of scientiﬁc pursuit than they are today.
The success of conversion will likely rely on a mix of coercion and incentives at bothnational and internatio nal levels, many of which could be implemented prior to the NWC
entering into force, and which could in fact assist in removing institutional blocks in NWS
to their ratiﬁcation of the NWC. One such example would be divestment in corporations
involved in nuclear weapons contracts – a measure already undertaken by the NorwegianPension Fund. Incentives could include retraining for workers and government contracts forcorporations converting to nuclear disarmament, clean-up or veriﬁcation tasks.
Even without transformation to a nuclear disarmament regime, research is desperately
needed for cleanup of the radioactive and other hazardous waste produced by 50 years of a
nuclear arms race. For nuclear disarmament to progress, research is also needed in the areaof plutonium disposition and veriﬁcation technology. Assuming that a good faith reorderingof research and development priorities is possible, conversion of the nuclear weapons
complex would seem to be the most efﬁcient way to develop a nuclear disarmament regime.
Conversion, if it is possible, would likely take more than one generation and it would
depend on changes in policy and popular culture. It also depends on whether nuclear
disarmament research can be made as economically enticing and intellectually exciting as
nuclear weapons research has been for many. (See Critical Question on Research.) 142Section 3

Comment: Conversion
What would happen to nuclear weapons laboratories in a world where nuclear
weapons had been abolished by international treaty? Presumably the weapons
laboratories, together with universities and NGOs, would play an important rolein studying how to disarm in a stable and veriﬁable way, how to dismantle nuclear
weapons cleanly and efﬁciently, and how to dispose of the material in the weaponssafely. But, if we believe that a world without nuclear weapons is possible to achieve,
what should the weapons laboratories do once such a world has been achieved?
It is fashionable on the left to say that, if they are no longer needed, weapons
laboratories should be “converted” to other purposes. I have to confess that thispuzzles me. We did not “convert” the typewriter industry when computers were
invented; we let it shrivel and(nearly) die. In our society, which tends to trust the invisible hand of the inﬁnitely
wise free market to allocate economic resources, it’s generally assumed that, once anindustry’s product is no longer needed, it’s best to lay off the people making products
we no longer use and let them ﬁnd new jobs in industries whose products we want.
Why should a nuclear weapons laboratory be any different? And why should thealternative, central planning by the government, work any better in the U.S. than it didin the Soviet Union?
The problem with “converting” the weapons laboratories is that it’s like asking
an elephant to be a giraffe. If you wanted a new clean car engine or environmental
remediation technologies, you wouldn’t ask Microsoft to do it because they have noexperience in the ﬁeld; so why would you ask a nuclear weapons laboratory?
Having said this, I would not close the weapons laboratories outright. They are large,
complex organizations with many subcultures, of which the weapons subculture is
only one — albeit the largest and most important one. Still, the Livermore Laboratory,
for example, has a biomedical division, it has an atmospheric sciences division, it has
people working on new computer chip technologies, new automobile engines and soon. Such programs could become the nucleus for a smaller, different kind of laboratory
if the laboratory was no longer dominated by managers who worked their way up
through the weapons programs.
But what of the weapons scientists? Many of these have given the best years of theirlives to their country and, if their curriculum vitae are classiﬁed and their skills narrowand esoteric, it will not be easy for them to ﬁnd new jobs, especially if they are middle
aged. Besides, if they are ﬁred en masse, the politicians representing their districts willﬁght to save their jobs. Thus I would suggest a kind of GI Bill for weapons scientists.
I would lay them off with very generous severance payments that they could use tostart their own businesses, go back to college, play the stock market etc. This would
compensate the weapons scientists for their sacriﬁce, keep federal money ﬂowing into
the local economy for a while, and it would, in the long run, be cheaper than keeping
the weapons labs at their present size
-Hugh Gusterson, Professor of Cultural Studies and Sociology at George Mason
University.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 143Comment: Conversion
The U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories constitute a politically powerful, selfperpetuating, multi-billion dollar industry. Almost mystically rooted in their origins as
developers of the ﬁrst atomic and hydrogen bombs, their power is ampliﬁed by the lackof recognized independent nuclear weapons expertise and their monopoly on access todecision makers. The link between control over nuclear weapons-relevant informationand inﬂuence over nuclear weapons policy has been formally institutionalized by the“certiﬁcation” process, an element of the “Stockpile Stewardship” program, in which
the weapons laboratories annually “certify” the “safety” and “reliability” of the nuclear
arsenal. As one of the Clinton Administration’s prerequisites for acquiescence to the
CTBT, the certiﬁcation process provides an opportunity for the weapons laboratories
to call for resumption of underground testing if they are not given what they consider
adequate alternative resources to “certify” the stockpile — a temptation which may
grow in appeal if nuclear weapons begin to lose their central place in U.S. national
security dogma. The concentration of arms control and nonproliferation policy andtechnology work at the weapons laboratories has further consolidated their inﬂuence
over nuclear weapons policy.
Monitoring and veriﬁcation technologies also employ a facilities and skills base,which is centered largely at the weapons laboratories. The difﬁculties of sorting out
what is truly needed for monitoring and veriﬁcation of the nuclear disarmament processalone from attempts to continue weapons development are substantial. Combined withan extensive counter-proliferation program in which nuclear weapons play a central
role and an ambitious nuclear weapons “stewardship” program, which will entail new
generations of multi-use high energy density, hydrodynamic testing, and computing
capabilities, they may be insurmountable.
Conversion will require radical and profound changes at the highest levels innational security and foreign policies, coupled with the lifting of secrecy and a greatly
increased level of public participation in decision-making at the local/community
level. These developments will necessarily be accompanied by a major realignment of
powerful economic interests.
- Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation(See Comments on Breakout and Knowledge.) 144Section 3

Comment: Conversion
We have observed the response of the US nuclear weapons labs to the end of theCold War and the moratorium on nuclear testing. First they came up with AGEX,(Above Ground Experiments) and then they sold the Congress on the “stockpile
stewardship” program which enabled weapons workers to design new nuclear weapons
in computer simulated cyberspace with the addition of so called “sub-critical” nuclear
tests. These tests, while shattering plutonium in underground tunnels 1,000 feetbelow the desert ﬂoor at the Nevada test site, do not cause a chain reaction, and so theweapons labs argue that they do not “count” as nuclear tests and are permitted under a“Comprehensive” Test Ban Treaty, which they have opposed in the halls of Congress,
arguing that someday they may want to do full scale tests again. Stockpile Stewardshiphas now spawned the Reliable Replacement Warhead, at a cost of nearly $9 billion ayear, where our best and brightest at the weapons labs are now arguing that we should
replace the entire nuclear arsenal with a new set of hydrogen bombs, that will lastforever, even though experts have concluded that “most plutonium pits have a credible
lifetime of at least 100 years.” [1] The oldest pits, or plutonium bomb cores, currently
in the US arsenal are still less than 50 years old.
The culture of the weapons labs makes them a very poor bet for conversion. It
would be foolish and naive, given our experience to date, to assume any "good faith
reordering of research and development priorities" by the labs. Thus, conversion would
not be the most efﬁcient way to achieve a nuclear disarmament regime and should not
be addressed in a Nuclear Weapons Convention. It would be far more efﬁcient to send
all the weapons designers and their teams to medical school, or muster them out withfull pay until retirement, using the $9 billion per year now budgeted for new weapons
work at the labs. We would still have enough funds left over to cover the desert withsolar panels and wouldn't be plagued by new loopholes and twisted interpretations of
our commitment to disarmament by the current weapons establishment
References
1. JASON group, (20 November 2006),
http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/JASON_ReportPuAging.pdf-Alice Slater (See Comment on Disposition) Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, New York

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 145Comment: Conversion
Conversion does not minimize disruption of the entities being converted, it refers
instead to transforming military industries into civilian industries in a manner inwhich the beneﬁts outweigh the costs. And disarmament tasks are not conversion; they
simply substitute a disarmament program for a weapons program. This is exactly what
the stockpile stewardship claims to be, and over 50% of the budget of that programis currently being spent on research and development of new weapons. Conversion
should concentrate on people, not facilities. Unfortunately, attempts to challenge
scientists and engineers at the labs are mainly associated with new weapons design andtesting.
The only measures of viability for conversion are market-based. One cannot assume
a good faith reordering of research and development priorities if the weapon labs
control the research funds. Only the market, not another government project, canguarantee a reordering of research funds.
Research isn’t desperately needed for cleanup of nuclear waste. DOE has research
units scattered around the complex. What is needed is a commitment to pursue cleanup.
“Innovative” research from the labs has centered on breeder reactors, MOX burningand other methods of disposition that create more, not less, waste. Similarly, research inplutonium disposition and veriﬁcation technologies is ongoing around the US. Again,
viable methods have been by-passed so we can engage in MOX burning.
-William Weida, Economics Department, Colorado College 146Section 3

Research
Critical Question:
How should the NWC handle research related to nuclear
weapons?
The question of research has triggered some of the mostreactive responses to the model NWC. Any suggestionof state or international control over scientiﬁc work isinherently disturbing, not only to scientists. There is intense
disagreement about whether certain types of nuclear
physics research should be limited or prohibited, and what
prohibitions would even be possible.
An approach to research that relies primarily on
prohibition of certain activities or knowledge will meet
resistance and its effectiveness will depend greatly
on enforcement rather than compliance. Today’s vast
accumulated knowledge about the weapons applicationsof nuclear physics is not a direct and inevitableconsequence of the splitting of the atom. It is the result of deliberate research anddevelopment priorities based on considered policy, which has led to an availabilityof weapons related work and lack of meaningful alternatives. The social and politicalmanifestations of dependence on military power and nuclear capability for security also
play a role. Scientists do not make choices in a cultural vacuum.

Los Alamos National
Laboratory, one of
the three major labs
responsible for creating
and manufacturing the
US nuclear stockpile.
Photo: Department ofEnergy.

Deﬁning what constitutes nuclear weapons research is a difﬁcult threshold question.
Whether an area of research is in conﬂict with the purposes of the NWC depends
largely on intent and will remain unclear and controversial as long as any nuclear
weapons are being maintained. In today’s world, such controversy is inevitable because
a policy of maintaining a nuclear arsenal allows for a “grey” area regarding the intent
of research related to nuclear weapons. An example of this is the debate in the UnitedStates over what constitutes design of new weapons, as opposed to modiﬁcation ofexisting weapons types or additional safety features. These types of debates will
dissipate under a regime committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Grey areas
will decrease even further once weapons are actually eliminated and no research isnecessary for their interim maintenance and storage.
Research essential to nuclear weapons, if it is to be restricted, may need to behandled differently from research that may support or enhance a nuclear capability
but primarily has other purposes. Again, intent plays a critical role here, as almost
any area of scientiﬁc research can lend itself to military applications. The answer tothis dilemma is to cultivate a culture of scientiﬁc responsibility rather than approach
science and scientists with suspicion. Scientists should learn about proliferation
risks and develop the tools to recognize potential diversion of scientiﬁc discovery
to aggressive purposes. (See Critical Question on Nuclear Weapons Knowledge andReversibility.)
Prohibiting nuclear weapons research does not necessarily create pragmatic or
ethical problems. Where there is no policy of nuclear weapons dependence, as inAfrica, a prohibition on research or the seeking, receiving, assisting or encouraging ofresearch is generally acceptable. This is evidenced in the Treaty on an African Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba), which prohibits States from conducting
research, seeking or receiving assistance in research, or assisting or encouraging
research on “any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere” (Art. 3). However,where there is a long history of nuclear weapons research, a direct prohibition may

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 147

be controversial or impossible until nuclear weapons are completely destroyed. For
this reason the model NWC suggests a prohibition on funding as an alternative to a
direct prohibition on research. It is also simpler to determine and deﬁne the purpose offunding than it is to determine the potential uses of speciﬁc research.
The United States Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has as one ofits goals attracting young scientists to keep the knowledge necessary for a nuclear
capability alive. (See Critical Question on Conversion.) Scholarships, fellowship,
education and training programs, and intellectually stimulating research opportunities
feed today’s nuclear capability in the United States and elsewhere. In fact, the current
disrepair in the former Soviet Union’s nuclear complex is directly related to thecollapse of the economic and educational systems that supported the vast nuclear
weapons structure. (See Critical Question on Economic Aspects.)
Research is desperately needed for safe, secure, irreversible and veriﬁable nuclear
disarmament. Most of the knowledge, skills and mechanisms essential to safely
reversing nuclear armament are today in the hands of the scientiﬁc and technical staffof the nuclear weapons complex and supporting agencies, such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Thus the most efﬁcient and least disruptive way to further
nuclear disarmament research would be to transform the weapons related institutions
and redirect the skills of their staff. Many supporters of nuclear abolition, however,question whether the institutions that have produced today’s nuclear arsenals arecapable of change. There is concern that any NWC provisions that allow or encourage
nuclear disarmament research would function as loopholes allowing maintenance of a
nuclear weapons capability. (See Critical Question on Conversion.)

Comment: Research
I don’t believe that you can ban research in the purest sense of the term. How can
you tell scientists to stop thinking about an issue — especially when the issue (nuclear
weapons physics) is so closely tied in to other areas of academic physics? And how
would you verify such a ban? The only thing you can veriﬁably ban are certain
large experiments — such as nuclear tests or laser fusion shots. These take immense
amounts of money, complex social organization and political will to orchestrate andcan be banned by treaty if there is a will to do so. Computer simulations of nuclear
tests are in a different category, and I don’t see any realistic way to ban them.
If there were a NWC, I would expect the decline of nuclear weapons research to
be a very gradual affair — with some continuation of basic research initially as thepolitical price for such a convention. Presumably if there were such a convention, it
would at ﬁrst be accompanied by the survival of a fairly substantial group of stewards
maintained as a hedge against a new arms race. The stewards would rightly say thatthey wouldn’t be very good at being stewards unless they were allowed to do some
sort of basic research into their ﬁeld — short of making new weapons. But over timethe existence of such a group would be seen as an extravagance and bright people
would not be very interested in joining such a dead-end profession provided there wasno resumption of the nuclear arms race internationally. It would help if there were nofurther production of ﬁssile material, of course. Furthermore, as the group of scientists
who had participated in nuclear tests died off, it would become harder to transmit
nuanced nuclear weapons knowledge to a new generation of scientists. The knowledge
and research that survived would seem, like alchemy, of increasingly questionablevalue.
- Hugh Gusterson, Professor of Cultural Studies and Sociology at George Mason
University.

 148Section 3

Comment: Research“Stockpile Stewardship” is a nuclear weapons research and testing program ofCold War proportions that will keep nuclear weapons in the arsenal, in the budget,and in the career paths of scientists well into the next century. Under the pretense ofmaintaining the “safety” and “reliability” of the nuclear weapons stockpile, Stockpile
Stewardship is intended to preserve the capacity to maintain, test, modify, design
and produce nuclear weapons, with or without underground testing. Some of the key
Stockpile Stewardship technologies have been developed as “dual-use” scientiﬁcfacilities that can be used for both high-energy physics research and bomb science.
Prime examples are the multi-billion dollar, stadium-sized National Ignition Facility,
a laser fusion installation presently under construction at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California, and the virtually identical “Projet Megajoule,” underconstruction in France, which have the potential, in combination with other ongoingexperimental research, to lead to the development of pure fusion weapons. Most
Stockpile Stewardship facilities have little to do with maintaining either the safety or
reliability (itself a highly debatable proposition) of existing weapons as they await
disablement and dismantlement on the path to elimination. Rather, they are intended toserve as training grounds for the next generation of nuclear weapons designers as wellas the tools of the trade.
It is often stated that we can’t or shouldn’t prohibit certain types of research.
However, we don’t have to pay people to design weapons of mass destruction. What’s
needed is an engineering-based “stewardship” approach to ensure the safe and securecontainment of nuclear weapons, their components and materials, under international
supervision, as nuclear weapons are phased out and eliminated. We support a
prohibition on funding for nuclear weapons research, as suggested in the model NWC.
- Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman, Western States Legal

Comment: Research
The weapons labs should be shut down after a treaty is signed. There should be
an international prohibition on government funding of research for nuclear weapons
design, development, testing and production. Such a provision would be a totally
appropriate international control on government-funded research for the future of theplanet. Research should be permitted on veriﬁcation and materials disposition, andthe language of the treaty should be speciﬁcally limited solely to those two areas ofresearch. While the veriﬁcation research may require the use of older experienced
weapons lab personnel, their contribution to solutions on the disposition of materials
such as plutonium has been worse than nothing at all. Their latest new ideas for GNEP
and the Reliable Replacement Warhead, are a recipe for proliferation, giving othercountries an incentive to get nuclear weapons of their own and to develop homegrown“peaceful” nuclear technology while creating extraordinary planetary hazards as
hundreds of thousands of tons of lethal material are shipped around the world — byplane, ship, train, and truck — to be burnt up in civilian reactors which will cause evenmore deadly environmental contamination.
-Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, New York
(See Comments on Disposition and Conversion)

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 149

Economic Aspects
Critical question.
Will nuclear weapon states, particularly Russia, be able toafford to eliminate their nuclear weapons?
The full cost for the total dismantlement and destruction of nuclear weaponsand disposal of ﬁssile material is impossible to determine at this point in time, anddepends on a number of policy decisions regarding, among other things, the speed ofdestruction, the types and complexity of veriﬁcation systems adopted and the methodof ﬁssile material disposal.
Experience from the START I and INF Treaties indicates that costs will be extremely
high. Projected U.S. costs for dismantlement and veriﬁcation under these treaties isapproximately $31 billion. [1] However, this does not include cleanup costs, which
could reach a staggering $365 billion. Russian costs are likely to be comparable, if they
are to enact cleanup operations commensurate with the requirements.
Russia is already experiencing difﬁculties in meeting the costs of current programsof dismantlement and disposition, threatening the continuation of such programs. In
response the US has provided $1.5 billion to help in dismantlement, and has agreed
to spend $8 billion - $12 billion to purchase Highly Enriched Uranium from thedismantled bombs. However this may bring some economic return to the U.S. as it will
be used in nuclear power facilities.
While the nuclear weapons States are responsible for the costs of eliminating theweapons they have created, the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention provides for theestablishment of a voluntary fund to assist States who might otherwise be unable to
fulﬁll their disarmament obligations.
As large as the disarmament costs may be, the alternative of maintaining nuclear
weapons would be even more costly, as it merely delays the disarmament costs into the
future, and adds extra costs to maintain the weapons. The US is currently spending $30
billion annually on nuclear weapons programs, and has spent over $5.5 trillion since1940. [2] These programs continue to add to the future costs of weapon destruction
and clean-up. In purely dollar terms, it will thus be more economic to move fromthe current nuclear weapons maintenance and modernization program to a nuclear
disarmament program.
Proponents of nuclear weapons research and development (R&D) often cite
economic beneﬁts of such research, arguing that such R&D generate technological“spin-offs” which have led to economic advancement. [3] For example, NAVSTAR
satellites, originally developed to provide pinpoint accuracy for ballistic missiles, arenow ﬁnding widespread commercial use in automobile electronic atlases and handheld directional ﬁnders. However, the extent of civilian beneﬁts from nuclear weapons
spending is necessarily restricted due to the secrecy of much research and the speciﬁcorientation to military purpose. [4] If a comparable amount of public money were spentin civilian research and development, the returns would most likely be much greater.
References
1. “Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940”,
Stephen Schwartz (ed), Brookings Institution, 1998.
2. Costs for the programs of the other nuclear weapon states are not available.
3. See, for example, “The Star Wars Spin-Off”, New York Times Maazine, August 24, 1986.
4. See, for example, “Labs Struggle to Promote Spin-Offs”, Science, vol 240, May 13,
1988, pp 874-76

 150

Section 3

Comment: Economic Aspects
Russian cleanup costs will certainly be larger than ours because of the lax
environmental standards followed in Russia. Our cleanup costs may be as much as $1
trillion - comes from a DOE estimate that omitted many costs. The cheapest short-run
alternative for the Russians is not to clean up at all — and the cheapest course of action
is may be to retain most of their nuclear weapons. The Russians probably spent anamount similar to the US to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. A French researcher
recently claimed that the French spent $1.5 trillion on their entire effort to develop anddeploy nuclear arms.
Spinoffs are always more expensive to develop than if the product/item had beendeveloped directly. As a result, they always represent an economic loss compared tomore efﬁcient methods of development.
The real economic issue that is not addressed here is the ‘future cost’ of all theweapon work we are now doing. The essay on economics tends to view nukes andtheir waste as past events that need to be corrected. While this is true, the productionof both weapons and waste continues unabated. And the costs continue to mount.
- William Weida (See Comment on Conversion)

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 151

Update to comments on Breakout, Knowledge, Conversion
and Research by Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman,
Western States Legal Foundation, for the 2007 edition
When we wrote our comments on Breakout, Knowledge, Conversion and Researchin 1998, the window of opportunity for meaningful progress towards nuclear
disarmament that had appeared with the end of the Cold War was still open. In thesecomments, which are reprinted here without changes, we warned that programs thenunderway by the nuclear weapon states to maintain and upgrade their nuclear weapons
research and production infrastructures would create insurmountable obstacles tonuclear nonproliferation and disarmament and invariably lead to new arms races.
Today, in the world’s leading nuclear weapon state, we are seeing that the deal obtainedby the U.S. nuclear weapons establishment-- modernization of its nuclear weapons
complex in exchange for the cessation of full scale underground tests-- is bearing
fruit in the form of plans for a new generation of hydrogen bombs. Moreover, these
new weapons of mass destruction play a central role in that nation’s ofﬁcial national
security policy.
In August 1995, citing the promise made in connection with indeﬁnite extensionof the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty earlier that year, U.S. President Bill Clinton
announced his support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996, in order to“reduce the danger posed by nuclear weapons proliferation.” He also announced
the U.S. intent, “as part of our national security strategy,” to “retain strategic nuclear
forces. . . In this regard,” he stated, “I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliablenuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States.” Clinton
strongly endorsed the nuclear weapons labs’ “Science Based Stockpile Stewardship”
program as a means of maintaining the U.S. “nuclear deterrent” without nuclear testing,and he appealed to Congress for bipartisan support for the program “over the next
decade and beyond.” [1] Congress provided that support and just over ten years later, in
April 2006, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the Departmentof Energy (DOE) rolled out its plans for Complex 2030, the new name for its evolving
nuclear weapons research and production infrastructure.
The DOE proudly traces its lineage to the Manhattan Project and the race to develop
an atomic bomb during World War II. [2] The DOE’s Livermore Lab in California wasfounded in 1952 to compete with its Los Alamos Lab in New Mexico - the original
home of the Manhattan Project - to develop a hydrogen bomb, orders of magnitude
more powerful than the U.S. atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945. Today, the Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories – the direct
descendants of the Manhattan Project – are engaged in a new arms race with eachother to design the next generation of hydrogen bombs, euphemistically called“Reliable Replacement Warheads” (RRWs).
After a lengthy design competition, the Livermore Lab has recently been given thegreen light to proceed with development of a replacement for the 100-kiloton W76
warhead [3] (some 1,600 of which are currently deployed on Trident II D-5 submarinelaunched ballistic missiles). The Nuclear Weapons Council, a joint Departmentof Defense (DoD)-DOE agency, has directed the NNSA to begin another designcompetition for a second RRW. The ﬁrst RRW is due for production in 2012; theproduction goal for the second warhead is 2014. [4] A DoD document outlining thefuture of the nuclear stockpile, forecasts that the U.S. will “develop warheads for nextgeneration delivery systems” between 2010 and 2020. The “long term vision” statedin the “Stockpile Transformation” chart includes “possible new DoD platforms anddelivery systems” along with “2-4 types of RRWs”. [5]In April 2006 testimony to Congress, the Deputy Director for Defense Programs at
the NNSA bragged: “Progress on RRW has been remarkable. Last year, the DoD and 152

Section 3

DOE jointly initiated an RRW competition in which two independent design teams
from our nuclear weapons laboratories—LLNL and LANL both in partnership with
Sandia and the production complex—are exploring RRW options. A competition ofthis sort has not taken place in over 20 years, and the process is providing a unique
opportunity to train the next generation of nuclear weapons designers and engineers.
Both teams are conﬁdent that their designs will meet established requirements and be
certiﬁable and producible without nuclear testing.” [6]This testimony was proffered in support of the NNSA’s “Complex 2030” plan for
the future of the nuclear weapons complex. Under this proposal, “NNSA’s future
path is to establish a smaller, more efﬁcient Nuclear Weapons Complex that is able torespond to changing national and global security challenges.” [7] The RRW Program is
identiﬁed as a principal element of Complex 2030, “to ensure the long-term reliability
and safety of the nuclear weapons stockpile and enable a more responsive supporting
infrastructure while reducing the possibility that the United States would ever needto return to underground testing.” [8] While the NNSA claims that “RRW is not a newweapon providing new or different military capabilities and/or missions,” [9] thenNNSA chief Linton Brooks was very clear that this possibility remains on the table.
“In 2030, our Responsive Infrastructure can also produce weapons withdifferent or modiﬁed military requirements as required. The weapons designcommunity that was revitalized by the RRW program can adapt an existing
weapon within 18 months and design, develop and begin production of the
new design within 3-4 years of a decision to enter engineering development...
goals that were established in 2004. Thus, if Congress and the President
direct, we can respond quickly to changing military requirements.” [10]Brooks spelled out the purpose of the “responsive infrastructure:” “The current
nuclear weapons complex was built in the 1950s and 60s for the Cold War. Unless
this infrastructure is improved, we will not be suited for 21st century challenges.
As outlined in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, we are moving towards a nuclear
deterrent that is smaller, more capable and better able to respond to changing needs.
Our Complex 2030 plan... puts NNSA on a path to achieve this necessary national
security goal.... In short, I see a future world where a smaller, safer, more secure andmore reliable stockpile is backed up by a robust industrial and design capability tobetter respond to changing technical, geopolitical or military needs.”[11]This work is already in progress under the existing Stockpile Stewardship program.
“Life Extension Programs,” to render the U.S. nuclear arsenal reliable for decades tocome have been completed for the W80 Cruise Missile and are underway for the B61
bomb and the W76 SLBM (Sea Launched Ballistic Missile). [12] While considering
options for a new large-scale factory for warhead components, the U.S. is establishingsigniﬁcant “interim” capacity to make bomb parts at its existing facilities. [13]According to the NNSA, “Once it is demonstrated that replacement warheads canbe produced on a timescale in which geopolitical threats could emerge, or the nuclear
weapons complex can respond in a timely way to technical problems in the stockpile,further reductions can be made in reducing on-deployed warheads.” [14] This approachrenders the disarmament objective implicit in further reductions meaningless.
An ofﬁcial government study on plutonium aging, released in November 2006,
created a ﬂurry of national media attention. The study, conducted by nuclear scientists
at the Livermore and Los Alamos Labs and reviewed by an outside panel of nuclear
weapons experts known as the JASONs, concluded that plutonium pits degrade ata much slower rate than was previously believed. The study found that plutonium
in the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains viable for as long as 100 years, more than twice
as long as had been thought. Some critics of Complex 2030 seized on the report,
claiming it “proved” that new pits and warheads are “completely unnecessary” because
the existing warheads will last for a century. [15] But the Democratic Congressional

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 153

Representative whose district includes the Livermore Lab welcomed the study,
claiming that plutonium aging is a “side matter” that will not inﬂuence the RRWdecision, which she characterized as “an opportunity to rejuvenate the complex” andattract the “smartest scientists in the world” to the weapons labs. [16] Indeed, the
NNSA issued a press release two days later, reafﬁrming its commitment to the RRWprogram as the best strategy for “sustaining the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile forthe long-term without underground nuclear testing. [17]In a famous line from the movie, “Field of Dreams,” the protagonist declares, “Ifyou build it, they will come.” He was talking about a baseball ﬁeld and the sports
fans it would attract. In the same way, as we’re clearly seeing, if you build a new
nuclear weapons infrastructure, it will produce new nuclear weapons. As events havecontinued to unfold in the post Cold War era, we believe it has been conclusively
demonstrated that, as we said nearly ten years ago, the closure and monitoring of
the nuclear weapons infrastructure in all nuclear weapons states must begin earlyin the process of disarmament. Nuclear weapons research, testing, and component
production should be halted while reductions are in progress, not after, with nuclear
weapons production and research facilities subject to intrusive veriﬁcation regimes atthe earliest possible time.
Some argue that Complex 2030 is merely a “make work” program for scientists andengineers, or that the nuclear weapons we already have are not “useable.” But consider
the following passage from an August 2006 DoD planning document:“Within Global Strike, US nuclear forces contribute uniquely andfundamentally to deterrence—through their ability to threaten to impose costs
and deny beneﬁts to an adversary in an exceedingly rapid and devastatingmanner. Nuclear weapons provide the President with the ultimate means toterminate conﬂict promptly on terms favorable to the US.... Nuclear weapons
threaten destruction of an adversary’s most highly valued assets, including
adversary WMD capabilities, critical industries, key resources, and means ofpolitical organization and control (including the adversary leadership itself).
This includes destruction of targets otherwise invulnerable to conventional
attack, e.g., hard and deeply buried facilities, “location uncertainty” targets,
etc. Nuclear weapons reduce adversary decision-makers’ conﬁdence in theirability to control wartime escalation.” [18]We believe that maintenance of a nuclear arsenal for another hundred years, whether
in the form of existing or “new” weapons, by the only country that has so far usednuclear weapons, is “unreasonable,” unacceptable, and unlawful. It is long past time
for us to break out of the conﬁnes of clever technical arguments against the “need”
for replacement warheads, and instead to demand the only reasonable alternative,
nuclear abolition. The United States, in compliance with its obligation under the NPT,
should commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons no later than 2030, by initiating
negotiations leading to conclusion of a veriﬁable treaty, under strict and effective
international control.

References
1. Statement by the President, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, The White House, Ofﬁce of
the Press Secretary, August 11, 1995.
2
U.S. Department of Energy, Strategic Plan, October 2, 2006, p. 6;
http://www.doe.gov/media/2006_DOE_Strategic_Plan.pdf
3. Design Selected for Reliable Replacement Warhead, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Ofﬁcial Press Release, March 2, 2007, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/
newsreleases/2007/PR_2007-03-02_NA-07-06.htm
4. NNSA Pursuing Second RRW Design ‘Concept,’ by George Lobsenz, Defense Daily,
February 12, 2007

 154Section 3

5. Pentagon Envisions New Warheads for New Delivery Systems, Andrew Lichterman, July27, 2006,
http://disarmamentactivist.org/2006/07/27/pentagon-envisions-new-warheads-for-newdelivery-systems/
6. Statement of Thomas P. D’Agostino, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs,
National Nuclear Security Administration Before the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 5, 2006, p. 9, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/
congressional/2006/2006-04-05_HASC_Transformation_Hearing_Statement_(DAgostino).
pdf
7. National Nuclear Security Administration, Future of the Nuclear Weapons Complex,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/future_of_the_nuclear_weapons_complex.htm
8. Id
9. NNSA Factsheet, NNSA’s Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program; Modernizing
the Nuclear Weapons Complex Today To Make It More Responsive to the Challenges ofTomorrow, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2006/NA-06_FS03.pdf
10. Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Speech to the East Tennessee Economic Council March 3, 2006, p. 4, http://www.nnsa.doe.
gov/docs/speeches/2006/speech_Brooks_East-Tenn-Economic-Council11. NNSA press release, NNSA Establishes New Ofﬁce to Lead Future of Nuclear Weapons
Complex, June 28,2006,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2006/PR_2006-06-28_NA-06-20.htm
12. The Stockpile Life Extension Program extends the lifetime of existing nuclear weapons
by identifying and correcting potential technical issues and refurbishing and replacing
certain components within each weapon. The Life Extension program can also give
existing weapons new or enhanced military capabilities. For example, under this program
the W76 warhead missile is being given a capacity to destroy “hard targets” with a “groundburst” by modifying a sub-system in its reentry vehicle. The W76 is also the ﬁrst warhead
being redesigned under the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, with the intention of
manufacturing entirely new warheads.
13. See U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Noticeof Intent To Prepare a Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement—Complex 2030, Federal Register Vol. 71,
No. 202 October 19, 2006, 61731
14. Ian Hoffman, Report: Nukes not so rusty, New information on plutonium’s lifespanundermines Bush’s plan, Oakland Tribune, November 29, 2006, http://www.insidebayarea.
com/search/ci_4738283
15. See, for example, H. Josef Hebert, Associated Press Writer, Study: Warhead plutonium
long-lasting, November 29, 2006, http://p107.news.scd.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061130/ap_on_
sc/plutonium_weapons
16. Ian Hoffman, Report: Nukes not so rusty, New information on plutonium’s lifespanundermines Bush’s plan, Oakland Tribune, November 29, 2006, http://www.insidebayarea.
com/search/ci_4738283
17. NNSA News, Nuclear Weapons Ofﬁcials Agree to Pursue RRW Strategy, December 1,
2006, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2006/PR_2006-12-01_NA-06-47.pdf
18. Final Draft, Deterrent Operations Joint Operating Concept, Department of Defense,
United States of America, Version 2.0, August 2006, pp. 39-40,
http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/do_joc_v20.doc

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Section

4
Veriﬁcation

Part of a Pershing II missile being destroyed.
Under the 1987 INF Treaty, more than 200 of thesemissiles were retired and destroyed.
Photo: US Army.

1. Principles and Demands of Veriﬁcation
A Nuclear Weapons Convention will only be effective if it
can be adequately veriﬁed, both in political and technical terms.1
Veriﬁcation is the process of establishing whether States partiesare complying with their obligations under an arms control ordisarmament agreement. Veriﬁcation has several functions:

Nuclear burst detection
satellite sensor system.
Photo: Cooperative
Monitoring Centre“First, it allows the parties to assess an agreement’s stateof implementation. By establishing how each party is fulﬁlling
its obligations, veriﬁcation gives a good indication about thefunctioning of the agreement. Second, it discourages noncompliance with agreement provisions. Because parties knowthat breeches of obligations carry the risk of detection, theyshould be less inclined to attempt to renege secretly on theircommitments. Third, veriﬁcation can give timely warning of
violation(s) of agreement conditions. In case of non-compliance,
veriﬁcation can reveal transgressions before these have achance to turn alarming. Finally, by checking that obligations
are indeed being honoured, veriﬁcation helps generate conﬁdence that the agreement
and its veriﬁcation mechanism are functioning as intended, thereby fostering trust andconﬁdence between the parties.”2
These four veriﬁcation tasks - assessing implementation, discouraging noncompliance, timely warning, building conﬁdence - are of particular relevance withregard to a potential Nuclear Weapons Convention. States parties need to implement
the agreed process towards elimination and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons andallow other States to assess the effectiveness of this process. Since a few nuclear
weapons can make a signiﬁcant difference, violations of the obligations must be
detected as early as possible and with high likelihood to discourage any State party
from non-compliance due to unacceptable risks from responses of the international
community. While punishment may only be applied in exceptional cases, veriﬁcationof an NWC requires and contributes to an unprecedented degree of conﬁdence andcooperation, which in itself is a value that discourages beneﬁts from acquisition of
nuclear weapons.
The Model NWC strives to prevent the construction of nuclear weapons and puts
the technical barrier for diverting nuclear-weapon-usable material as high as possible,
aiming at the detection and prevention of the illegal acquisition of nuclear weapons
through production or removal of nuclear material from existing stocks. Veriﬁcation of
an NWC would monitor a wide range of nuclear-weapons objects (nuclear warheads
and components, nuclear materials, equipment, facilities, delivery systems, command and control) and nuclear-weapons activities (research, development, testing,production, acquisition, deployment, stockpiling, maintenance, transfer, use, threat ofuse, destruction, disposal, and conversion) and their combination. These include, inparticular, dismantlement of nuclear weapons; disposal of nuclear material; conversion
or destruction of certain nuclear facilities; monitoring the location and status of nuclear
weapons, nuclear material, nuclear facilities, delivery systems, and command andcontrol systems to ensure that they are not used for research, development, testing,production, transport, deployment or use of nuclear weapons. Other prohibited
activities would include storage, transfer and handling of nuclear weapons and ﬁssile
material. Some of these activities are easy to monitor (such as nuclear explosions),
others require considerable detection efforts (such as ﬁnding hidden warheads).
Veriﬁcation policies of the NWC should be designed to assure early detection
and interpretation of information necessary for preventing prohibited activities or
permitting timely responses to nuclear weapons development, involving a range ofissues3 158

Section 4

Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament Veriﬁcation
The 1996 Canberra Commission noted, “(b)efore states agree to eliminate nuclear
weapons they will require a high level of conﬁdence that veriﬁcation arrangements
would detect promptly any attempt to cheat the disarmament process.” (Executive
Summary) According to the 1998 CISAC report of the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences complete nuclear disarmament will, “require continued evolution of theinternational system toward collective action, transparency, and the rule of law; acomprehensive system of veriﬁcation, which itself will require an unprecedented degreeof cooperation and transparency; and safeguards to protect against the possibility ofcheating or rapid breakout.” On the other hand, “even the most effective veriﬁcation
system that can be envisioned would not produce complete conﬁdence that a small
number of nuclear weapons had not been hidden or fabricated in secret. Morefundamentally, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons cannot be erased fromthe human mind. Even if every nuclear warhead were destroyed, the current nuclear
weapons states, and a growing number of other technologically advanced states,
would be able to build nuclear weapons within a few months or few years of a national
decision to do so.”4
The stakes are high: “The veriﬁcation and compliance regime for a nuclear-weaponfree world will need to be more effective than any disarmament arrangement hitherto
envisaged. One hundred per cent veriﬁcation of compliance with any internationalarms agreement is highly improbable. In the case of nuclear disarmament, however, thesecurity stakes will be so high that states will not agree to disarm and disavow futureacquisition of nuclear weapons unless veriﬁcation reduces to a minimum the risk of
non-compliance.” 5
However, these fundamental restrictions do not generally exclude veriﬁability ofcomprehensive disarmament, as Steve Fetter points out: “Although no veriﬁcation
regime could provide absolute assurance that former nuclear-weapon states had not
hidden a small number of nuclear weapons or enough nuclear material to build asmall stockpile, veriﬁcation could be good enough to reduce remaining uncertainties
to a level that might be tolerable in a more transparent and trusting international
environment. And although the possibility of rapid break-out will be ever present inmodern industrial society, veriﬁcation could provide the steady reassurance that would
be necessary to dissipate residual fears of cheating.”6This indicates the link between the veriﬁability of the NWC and its security
environment. Accordingly, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission notes in
its 2006 report:7 “One state’s non-compliance with its obligations under a treaty onarms control or disarmament may fundamentally and negatively affect the security ofothers. A bilateral treaty may simply be abrogated. In a global context, this may leadto collective reactions. Conversely, continued compliance with such treaty obligations
impacts positively on security. In both cases, credible veriﬁcation to establish
compliance or non-compliance is of major importance.”
A viable regime should assure states at the very outset that participation provides abetter guarantee of security than maintaining the nuclear option. A guiding principle
should be the search for a regime sufﬁciently restrictive to ensure the highest levelof conﬁdence in compliance, but also sufﬁciently permissive to allow states to join
without jeopardizing their legitimate security interests and commercial activities

Requirements and Guiding Principles
To discuss the possible options and means for the veriﬁcation of an NWC, it isuseful to refer to some established general principles of adequate veriﬁcation:
1.
International law and its veriﬁcation should enhance international security andSecuring our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

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2.

3.

4.

5.

stability and avoid the risks of an unrestrained situation that could lead to arms
races or war;
Veriﬁcation is a comprehensive iterative process, with political, legal,
diplomatic, economic, technical and military dimensions, for judging
compliance with international law, containing the risk of cheating andincreasing time for adequate response;
The veriﬁcation process balances between those provisions that are to be
veriﬁed (which degree of veriﬁcation is tolerable) and those activities that canbe veriﬁed (which degree of veriﬁcation is feasible);
The demands, requirements and costs of veriﬁcation are to be adapted to therelevance of speciﬁc treaty provisions and the associated risk of cheating,comparing the beneﬁts and costs of additional veriﬁcation measures;
Because existing veriﬁcation means are not perfect, the residual risk needs
to be reduced to tolerable levels by adequate responses, offsetting eventual
military threats by and advantages for non-compliance.

Thus, the veriﬁability of a treaty is not an absolute issue, but a matter of degree
depending on political assumptions and requirements as well as the available resources
and capabilities for veriﬁcation, which are not only technical. Most crucial is thequestion of “tolerable” degrees of veriﬁability and their associated residual risks.
For the early Reagan Administration, for instance, nothing short of 100 percent
certainty that the Soviets were not cheating was tolerable. Since this was an impossible
standard to achieve with limited veriﬁcation efforts, the requirement prevented progresson disarmament. With Gorbachev, however, conﬁdence and trust increased between
the superpowers, and ﬁnally even Reagan accepted much lower veriﬁcation standards
in order to conclude the INF and START treaties. More veriﬁcation was seen as too
costly, and the residual risks were accepted because the potential security implications
were perceived as manageable. It is remarkable to compare this with the [...] turn underthe Bush Administration, which refused any veriﬁcation provisions under the Moscow
Treaty with Russia, failing to assert its demand for veriﬁcation. Therefore, the nuclear
disarmament process of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty SORT remains
undeﬁned and does not build an infrastructure to implement and measure its success.
Between friendly nations, usually lower standards of veriﬁcation are tolerable
because the incentive for and probability of cheating are perceived as negligible.
As long as there is a gap between veriﬁcation demands and capabilities, either thecapabilities must be improved, depending on the available means and resources, orthe political requirements must be reduced to achieve the desired security gains by
the treaty within the given resource limits. Thus, the veriﬁcation process assesses thedifference between the desired situation and the actual situation, and tracks the agreed
path connecting both.
If the actual path diverts from the agreed path more than is tolerable, then theveriﬁcation system should provide a timely alarm. Thus the following questions are to
be considered for the veriﬁcation process:•
Which agreed states, items and activities should be achieved, limited
or prohibited during given periods with conﬁdence and certainty (what are therequirements/tasks of veriﬁcation)?
•
Which veriﬁcation means could be applied to monitor actual states andactivities (what are the means of veriﬁcation)?
•
Can an intolerable deviation from agreed states, items and activities be
detected in time with reasonable veriﬁcation efforts (what are the beneﬁts,
costs and risks of veriﬁcation)?
The requirements and tasks of veriﬁcation are deﬁned by the provisions of the NWC,
speciﬁed by the deﬁnitions, and the agreed timeframe of their realization. The tasks ofverifying these obligations can be divided into the following three main stages:

 160Section 4

1. Baseline information exchange and data gathering: Identify thecurrent status of the nuclear-weapons complex with reasonable accuracy
without proliferating sensitive information.
2. Disarmament: Monitor the agreed path of reducing nuclear arms andeliminating the nuclear-weapons complex within tolerable limits of uncertainty
and sufﬁcient conﬁdence.
3. Prevent rearmament: During the transformation to a nuclear-weapon-freeworld, and after it has been achieved, observe any objects and detect any
activities that might indicate a nuclear-weapons capability.
The NWC needs to foresee a number of provisions that help to create the necessary
conﬁdence that the elimination of nuclear weapons is complete and will not bereversed. Veriﬁcation of the following obligations is crucial:8
1. No nuclear weapons or relevant nuclear materials may be held back andhidden in the current nuclear weapons states. The existing arsenals of nuclear
weapons need to be disarmed completely. No single nuclear warhead and no signiﬁcantquantity of nuclear-weapons-usable material may be retained. The process also needs
to avoid a hidden inertia of the whole nuclear weapons production system.
Verifying the dismantlement and destruction of remaining declared weapons,
production and maintenance facilities is the easiest task of the veriﬁcation system.9
The locations are known and the state of the facilities can be checked by on-site
inspections. From the outset, member states would give a detailed inventory of theirremaining weapons and weapons-grade ﬁssionable materials. Afﬁxed with a uniquetamper-proof tag and seal, these would be stored in sealed containers and stored atsecure locations, well away from potential delivery systems. Warhead pits would be
removed to internationally monitored storage facilities to await ﬁnal disposition.10
2. Nuclear weapons need to be “disinvented” to the degree achievable.
The whole infrastructure of the now existing nuclear weapons complex has to be
dismantled. No research for or testing of nuclear weapons should be conducted. The
knowledge of nuclear weapons experts should not be intentionally maintained, inparticular the important specialized personal knowledge directly related to the design ofweapons. Through these means, the threshold against reinvention of nuclear weapons
can be signiﬁcantly increased. Dual-use science and technology which is perceived as
too important for civilian purposes to be banned needs to be controlled.
3. A break-out of the ban to develop or manufacture nuclear weapons needs tobe prevented and detected. In any country that conducts nuclear power or nuclear
research programs, the diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear weapon purposes
needs to be prohibited and any related activity needs to be detected in time. Nuclearweapon-useable materials should neither be produced for weapon purposes nor
removed from existing stocks. Step-by-step, existing stocks have to be reduced down
to zero. While old facilities are subject to monitoring and inspection, new production
may occur at remote locations and at new, specially designed underground facilities
that may be rather small and easy to hide. The risks of these activities can be reduced
and the costs increased by a combination of remote monitoring from air and space,environmental sampling, and on-site inspections without a complete guarantee to detectsuch violations.
4. No intention to acquire nuclear weapons should remain or have a reason
to reemerge. The international security system needs to provide clear evidence
that nuclear weapons are inherently negative, and create incentives that make thepossession of nuclear weapons undesirable.
It is essential that compliance with these obligations can be sufﬁciently veriﬁed
and universally and indeﬁnitely enforced. Veriﬁcation can signiﬁcantly reduce thelikelihood of breakout through a combination of deterrence and enhanced warning, butcannot completely assure that a small clandestine nuclear arsenal or hidden cache ofplutonium will be discovered.

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention 161

Iterative Veriﬁcation Process
Veriﬁcation is not a static one-time activity of monitoring thatapplies the above-mentioned means, but a dynamic, iterative processwith four distinct phases of declaration, monitoring, inspection andenforcement being repeated successively and in parallel:
1. Declaration and registration provide the necessary
information of the initial situation as a starting point for veriﬁcation
to allow comparison with future changes, either agreed or
prohibited. All treaty-limited items are tagged, identiﬁed andregistered, using advanced identiﬁcation techniques (ﬁngerprinting)without revealing sensitive design information.
2. Monitoring aims at detecting prohibited objects or activities.
Continuous monitoring requires information gathering over periodsof time. Remote sensors on satellites and aircraft provide monitoringof large areas to detect larger objects, in particular transport vehicles
and buildings. The problem is to identify treaty-limited items
among the vast number of existing civilian and military objects.
However, regular cartographic mapping provides a basis […]to detect irregularities/inconsistencies between ofﬁcial mapping
information and actual remote sensing data.
Pedestrian portal monitors
at the Siberian Groupof Chemical Enterprises
Enrichment Plant.
Photo: Department ofEnergy3. Inspection: As soon as a suspicion of a treaty violation israised, the inspection mechanism is applied to check whether it is justiﬁed or not.
During visits to facilities, the inspectors could request all the necessary detailed
information from the inspected party, including the opening of rooms, access tocomputer codes and interviews with personnel and neighbors. In addition, a wide
range of non-destructive on-site monitoring devices at entrance/exit ports or along theperimeter of critical facilities (portal/perimeter controls) could be applied to understandthe structure and function of equipment. Cooperation and consultation within theinternational agency could help in gaining and proving the information.
4. Negotiation, prevention and enforcement: If sufﬁcient information has beengathered to indicate a treaty violation, negotiation and enforcement mechanisms could
apply. The ﬁrst step would be to demand that the suspected violator ends the prohibited
activities or enters the destruction and conversion of prohibited objects. If the object or
activity of concern is to be excluded from nuclear weapons use, additional preventive
control measures are applied. If the suspected violator refuses any of these measures,a negotiation process is started, during which the motivations of the violator and thepossible coordinated actions of the international community are explained. It would
be important to leave the violator the option of a face-saving exit as early as possible.
Ideally, enforcement measures should be preventive and minimally intrusive.
In the past, the iteration process has been incomplete. Neither remote monitoring andchallenge inspections nor prevention and enforcement were adequate or possible under
the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the global
spread of nuclear energy has made diversion for military purposes too easy. This
explains the limited effectiveness of safeguards (see more in the following sections).
Monitoring without inspection or enforcement can raise suspicions but not prove or
prevent them. Therefore, more emphasis should be given to integrated mechanisms
realizing all four tasks.

 162

Section 4

2. Political Mechanisms of Veriﬁcation:
Building on Existing Regimes
Political veriﬁcation of an NWC will have organizational and societal requirements.
Organizational means of veriﬁcation include state, regional and international
bodies as well as national legislation and bi- or multi-lateral arrangements. Societal
veriﬁcation means large-scale governmental and non-governmental participation in theimplementation of an NWC. Such participation would be sought through afﬁrmative
obligations to report non-compliance and provide guarantees of protection for suppliersof information.
Each of the following examples has relevance to the functions and the forms ofauthority necessary for nuclear disarmament:11
1. CWC: The Chemical Weapons Convention establishes a comprehensive
framework for elimination of an entire class of weapons to be implemented through theOrganisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It proposes, among
other measures, a system for on-site inspections unprecedented in its intrusiveness.
How successful this system is considered to be in promoting compliance andconﬁdence will be instructive in considering the degree and type of intrusiveness tobuild into an NWC.
2. CTBT: The veriﬁcation provisions of the CTBT suggest a system forgathering and processing information. The International Monitoring System under
the supervision of the Technical Secretariat includes facilities for seismological,
radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound monitoring. The Technical Secretariat
is to store and process information through its International Data Centre on behalfof States Parties. Application of this model to an NWC would require, for example,
review of the provisions for data receipt and initiation of requests for data to adjust
for the security and transparency considerations particular to the nuclear weapons
infrastructure.
3. INF/START: The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) and Intermediaterange Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties provide positive examples of bilateral veriﬁcation
procedures for nuclear disarmament. They shed light on the role of conﬁdencebuilding and the ability to adjust for conﬁdentiality concerns. The veriﬁcation
provisions of these treaties apply to delivery vehicles rather than warheads. New
guidelines for veriﬁcation of warhead dismantlement, removal of warheads from
deployment and de-alerting would be necessary as next steps. A salient question inthis context is the expansion of bilateral to multilateral procedures. This process must
balance considerations of security, transparency, and conﬁdentiality.12 Several studies
have explored the veriﬁcation of deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and the special
requirements of elimination of nuclear weapons. One proposal for a “veriﬁcation
scheme for deep cuts” would begin bilaterally, incorporating the other nuclear weapon
states (NWS) through transparency and conﬁdence-building measures, leading
to proportional or gradual reductions down to very low levels, in order to lay thefoundation for eliminating nuclear weapons.13
4. IAEA: In order to detect illegal activities, the NPT foresees nuclear safeguards
on special nuclear materials to verify compliance. The IAEA safeguards regime is theprimary model for accountancy, containment and surveillance of nuclear material.
The ofﬁcially declared intention of these safeguards is not to prevent diversion ofsuch materials. The IAEA insists on not having a police function but only the roleof inspection. The purpose of nuclear safeguards is the timely detection of diversion
after it has happened. The detection should be made early enough to allow for political
reactions aimed at stopping the proliferating country before a bomb is manufactured
from the diverted material. However, the dual function of the IAEA—timely detection

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 163

of diversion and promotion of “peaceful” uses—makes its direct application to adisarmament regime problematic. Because of unavoidable measurement uncertainties,
loss of material within facilities and lax practice, the IAEA safeguards materialaccounting system cannot with conﬁdence detect the diversion of weapons size
quantities of nuclear material sufﬁcient for the manufacture of dozens of weapons(the limits became obvious in the case of Iraq). The task of differentiating between
military and civilian applications of nuclear material--widely though not unanimously
recognized as a primary source of IAEA shortcomings--will become more difﬁcult if
reliance on nuclear energy increases. Some of the changes proposed in the IAEA 93+2
Programme and Additional Protocol reﬂect strategies and policies aimed at improving
the conditions for safeguarding.14

Effectiveness of Nuclear Safeguards
Safeguards in Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) are virtually non-existent, and the
IAEA does not have the mandate it needs to effectively prevent proliferation. Current
timely detection goals are faulty, and do not take into consideration the enhanced
nature of the technical means to turn ﬁssile materials speedily into weapons. The factthat the nuclear weapon states are only subject to selective voluntary scrutiny has
made it easier for them to share nuclear materials and designs; several have been guiltyof this practice. IAEA safeguards are currently not extended to apply fully to mineduranium ores, reﬁned uranium oxides, uranium hexaﬂuoride and uranium conversion
facilities, prior to the stages of enrichment or fuel fabrication.14a
One severe criticism of the current nuclear safeguards system is that it cannot evenachieve the limited goal of detection. At any large bulk handling facility, large amountsof material unaccounted for (MUF) will inevitably occur. This problem is exempliﬁed
drastically with the publication of the US plutonium inventory for the ﬁrst 50 years of
its nuclear program.15 While there is a current stockpile of about 100 tons of plutonium,
the amount of not less than 2.8 tons of plutonium is unaccounted for. This is enoughmaterial for hundreds or even a thousand nuclear weapons. This raises a big concern;Will we ever have the chance to gain enough conﬁdence that no nuclear-weaponsusable material is diverted by any country that possesses large amounts of suchmaterials?
Another severe criticism of nuclear safeguards is that clandestine nuclear weapons
programs are very difﬁcult to detect. The experiences with clandestine nuclear weapons
programs in Iraq and other countries call for very strong and efﬁcient veriﬁcation
as long as nuclear installations with signiﬁcant amounts of nuclear-weaponsusable materials exist. The 93+2 Programme of the IAEA resulted in a number of
improvements that strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efﬁciency of thenuclear safeguards system. However, the MUF-problem is not even tackled by thesemeasures and there will still remain deﬁciencies with other detection problems.
The question of capabilities and limits of technical veriﬁcation depends on the
degree of political demands. The main purposes of nuclear safeguards on special
nuclear materials are timely detection of and deterrence against diversions ofsigniﬁcant quantities of these materials, i.e. they are not designed to prevent diversion
of such materials, but to deter from diversion by the risk of detection. Diversion
remains a technical possibility. With respect to a nuclear-weapon-free world such apolitical goal may change. The demand may be posed that compliance with treaty
obligations is not only veriﬁed with a high probability of detection but also rendered
impossible especially through a strict reduction of the availability and accessibility of
nuclear-weapon-usable materials.
The experience of the IAEA in verifying South Africa’s nuclear inventory andthe termination of its weapons program is signiﬁcant for developing and evaluating
the framework for veriﬁcation of complete nuclear disarmament within the NWC.

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By comparing calculations with physical inventory measurements, apparent
discrepancies indicated that an amount of enriched uranium-235 was unaccountedfor. Though extensive examinations were able to signiﬁcantly reduce the magnitudeof these apparent discrepancies, the IAEA had to conclude that the assessment of thecompleteness of South Africa’s inventory of nuclear materials was not free from uncertainty. Nevertheless, the international community was satisﬁed with the result of theinvestigations, which led to the conclusion that there were no indications that the initial
inventory was incomplete or that the nuclear weapon program was not completely
terminated. This positive conclusion is only possible because of the openness for transparency and the cooperation of the South African authorities with respect to access to
information and past and future locations that allowed for further IAEA investigation.
The experiences with clandestine nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and othercountries call for very strong and efﬁcient veriﬁcation as long as nuclear installations
using, producing or storing signiﬁcant amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable materials
exist. Activities to strengthen the current regime include the following:16
1. Despite the improvements of the 93+2 programme, which strengthen theeffectiveness and improve the efﬁciency of the nuclear safeguards system, there arestill deﬁciencies. In 1997, the IAEA introduced the Model Additional Safeguards
Protocol17 with expanded safeguards authorities and activities. Not much has beenachieved so far in providing the IAEA with technical means to detect clandestine
activities from a distance. Satellite imagery is used mainly for investigations on
known facilities18 and is not capable of providing a proof for clandestine plutonium
production; environmental sampling is restricted to the locations that are routinely
visited by inspectors anyway. Adopting and fully implementing the Additional
Protocol increases the veriﬁcation powers of the IAEA and expands transparency andveriﬁability for the whole civilian nuclear fuel cycle. It allows the IAEA to redirect
saved veriﬁcation resources towards states of greater concern.
2. UN Security Council resolution 1540 of April 2004 has made it mandatory for allstates, including the three non-NPT parties, India, Israel and Pakistan, to adopt national
implementation measures for all types of weapons of mass destruction to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring or proliferating such weapons, either on its territory or
elsewhere.
3. The Trilateral Agreement, negotiated 1996 to 2002 between Russia, the US andthe IAEA, seeks to involve the Agency in verifying disposal of excess ﬁssionable
material and could give it a role in a multilateral global nuclear disarmament process.
The agreement’s implementation has been hampered by the fact that no material has
been offered by the US and Russia for the purpose; there is disagreement over theperiod and costs of IAEA monitoring.
4. The IAEA Board of Governors has established a Special Committee on
Safeguards and Veriﬁcation to examine further improvements, but it has moved slowly.
For instance, the examination of environmental and other samples from Iran has notbeen as speedy as it might have been. More funding is required to conduct research inadvanced nuclear veriﬁcation techniques.
A breakthrough was expected since the mid-1990s on a ﬁssile cut-off agreement,
which has been prevented by the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva.19 Further progress is urgently needed as nuclear weapons development does
not stand still. Laboratory testing, laser enrichment and computer simulation reduce thepossibilities of driving back the knowledge about nuclear weapons development. With
improved simulation technology, highly undesirable developments are possible that
obstruct the goal of a nuclear weapons free world. At the end of an era of comparablyprimitive trial and error, a scientiﬁc revolution is now being initiated, which is
supposed to deepen the theoretical understanding of nuclear weapons. Rather thandeliberate and systematic conservation of knowledge about nuclear weapons, transition

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to a nuclear-weapon-free-world would require retiring nuclear weapons scientists andtesters to not transfer their expertise to future generations. Otherwise, it will be more
difﬁcult to “disinvent” sophisticated designs of nuclear weapons.
In a nuclear-weapon-free world not all use of nuclear materials may be banned. To
prevent the diversion of nuclear materials for weapons development through the whole
nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining and milling to disposition, nuclear safeguards
would be needed. These would cover all nuclear materials in reactors, stockpiles orextracted from dismantled weapons, including those of the nuclear weapon states, toensure that all sources of new ﬁssionable material are accounted for. Consequently,
the safeguards system would cover a considerably higher amount of material and alarger number of facilities than today. Completely banning weapons-usable materials
would signiﬁcantly facilitate the veriﬁcation task. Allowing the use of HEU in naval
propulsion would require special safeguards arrangements. Other ways in whichsafeguards would have to be further strengthened include increasing the intrusivenessof inspections, lowering the quantities and increasing the types of nuclear materials
requiring declaration and inspection, and boosting the intelligence and data-handling
capacities of the international veriﬁcation organisation.20
A critical issue is the “signiﬁcant quantity” of weapons-usable material required fornuclear weapons production. To provide greater assurance, the current standard (8 kg of
plutonium, 25kg of HEU) would have to be lowered and other nuclear materials identiﬁed as weapons-usable to be included. 3-4 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium iscommonly used for a nuclear warhead and, depending on the sophistication of weapons
design, even signiﬁcantly smaller quantities may sufﬁce. Another issue is to lower
the current standard for ‘timely detection’ from months to weeks which would better
address the risk of rapid diversion from former nuclear weapon states.21

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Section 4

3. Means and Procedures for NWC Veriﬁcation
Initially states rely predominantly on their national technical means (NTM) of
veriﬁcation and monitoring capabilities, including satellite monitoring, information
gathering and espionage. In the process of moving towards a nuclear-weapon-freeworld a strong multilateral system of data collection and analysis capabilities needs
to be established that complements or replaces national capabilities. All measures
combined will reduce the risks and increase the costs of illicit activities to an actual or
potential violator even though they may not completely guarantee the detection of such
violations.
While the Model NWC bases many of its veriﬁcation procedures on those employedin other treaties, new approaches are required. Remote and wide-area monitoring is
a vital element of the veriﬁcation regime as soon as the relevant production facilities
are shut down and dismantled, especially if only a few sites remain to be inspected
and efforts are more concentrated on detecting clandestine facilities and activities.
Technical veriﬁcation means and processes have been continuously improving. Remotesensing from aircraft and satellites provides high-resolution images over large areasin short time. On-site inspections have to search for hidden warheads and relatedmaterials and to verify the shut-down of declared facilities. Challenge inspections arenecessary to search for clandestine activities. To survey sensitive installations andactivities, inspection authorities can make use of new cost-effective techniques without
frequent intrusive visits. The inspections in Iraq stimulated the introduction of new
methods such as environmental monitoring to detect releases around nuclear-related
facilities and ground-penetrating radar.22 For example, atmospheric concentrationsof krypton-85 can be used to get indications for clandestine plutonium separationfrom some distance.23 Authentication and ﬁngerprinting techniques are based on themeasurement of radiation emissions and other characteristic signatures.24
To assure that the main obligations are adequately monitored and violations detected
within tolerable limits of deviation, a variety of veriﬁcation means and procedures canbe applied, as listed in the following box. Some technical possibilities are principally
available; others require additional research and development.
To address the technical challenges in verifying nuclear dismantlement, research,development and cooperation needs to be intensiﬁed on innovative techniques tomonitor declared and detect undeclared weapons, facilities and materials. Most of theresearch in this area has been done in the US and the UK who have shared informationon the results.25 In particular, the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston has
concluded a ﬁve-year program to study the dismantling of their Chevaline warheads toidentify potential methodologies for a future nuclear disarmament veriﬁcation regime.
In 2005 the US National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security
and Arms Control (CISAC) published a comprehensive assessment of methods formonitoring nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive materials in a disarming world.
The Committee concluded:26 “Current and foreseeable technological capabilities
exist to support veriﬁcation at declared sites, based on transparency and monitoring,for declared stocks of all categories of nuclear weapons—strategic and nonstrategic,
deployed and nondeployed—as well as for the nuclear-explosive components andmaterials that are their essential ingredients.”
An effective NWC requires speciﬁc veriﬁcation mechanisms that can discoverclandestine nuclear-weapons-related activities with sufﬁcient certainty, thereby
increasing transparency and conﬁdence in the whole nuclear disarmament process. In
order to verify compliance with the NWC, a veriﬁcation regime would be establishedwith all the veriﬁcation means and procedures explicitly needed to assure theveriﬁcation of the NWC. The Model NWC seeks to lay out a veriﬁcation regime toassure states that participating in this regime provides a better guarantee of security
than maintaining the nuclear option.

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Veriﬁcation Means and Procedures
1. Monitoring technologies- Remote sensors in the visible, infra-red or radar spectra, based on satellites, aircraft oron ground-based systems- Signal and electronic reconnaissance- Seimological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring- On-site sensors for non-destructive measurement, e.g. for portal perimeter monitoring:measurement of weight, length, acoustics, light (UV, infrared, visible), electrical andmagnetic fields; passive radiation measurement, active radiation (x-ray, gamma ray, beta
particles, protons, neutrons)
2. Cooperative procedures for information exchange, inspections and safety controls- Nuclear archaeology and forensics- Initial declarations and data exchange- Identification and item counting of objects (tagging, fingerprinting, registration)- Confidence-building measures- Joint overflights (Open Skies)- Accountancy, control and surveillance- Safety Controls at nuclear facilities- Baseline and routine inspections- Challenge inspections of suspected facilities (anytime-anywhere)- Personal observation of destruction and suspected activities
3. Institutional verification- International Agency for Verification- Cooperative fact finding on compliance- Consultation- Dispute settlement
4. Societal verification- Open sources, scientific knowledge- Espionage- Citizen reporting and protection, whistle-blowing

The box opposite gives four categories of different readiness of veriﬁcation technologies and provides a few examples for each of these categories. From this, it becomes apparent that most veriﬁcation technologies required or proposed by the Model
NWC are already implemented in existing treaties within the nuclear disarmament andnon-proliferation regime. Some others are established in other international regimes
and can be adopted for an NWC. In addition, there are further technological means
which are already developed or demonstrated, but which are not yet implemented
in any international control regime. Only very few veriﬁcation technologies which
may be helpful or necessary to verify an NWC are not yet developed or proven towork sufﬁciently. However, it has to be noted that most technologies have inherent
deﬁciencies and need to be evaluated on a critical basis. That a variety of technicalmeans for the veriﬁcation of an NWC already exist does not imply that these means arecovering satisfactorily all veriﬁcation demands.

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Section 4

Availability of Veriﬁcation Technologies27
1. Technologies which are already implemented in existing treaties within the
nuclear disarmament and veriﬁcation regime• Nuclear material accountancy, limited by Materials Unaccounted For (NPT)• Containment and surveillance of nuclear materials (NPT)• Identiﬁcation and item counting of objects by tagging, ﬁngerprinting, registration(NPT and others)• Personal observation of suspected activities and destruction (NPT, INF, START)• Remote sensors in the visible spectrum based on satellites (INF, START)• On-site sensors for non-destructive characterisation of containers and transport
vessels, e.g. for portal perimeter monitoring; measurement of weight, length (INF,
START)• Seismological, radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound monitoring (CTBT)• Challenge inspections of suspected facilities without any restrictions, i.e. anytime
and anywhere, limited by political acceptability and costs (UNSCOM)
2. Technical approaches which are established in other international regimes
and can be adopted for the NWC• Preventive controls at nuclear facilities (Convention on Physical Protection )• Joint overﬂights with remote sensors in the visible spectrum (Open Skies)• Managed access (CWC)

3. Technical means which are already developed or demonstrated, but not yet
implemented in any international control regime• Accounting, surveillance and containment of nuclear warheads, limited by access• Veriﬁcation of dismantling of nuclear warheads, limited by the interest to protect
sensitive design information• Remote sensors in the infra-red or radar spectra based on satellites, aircraft or on
the ground• Passive radiation measurement, active irradiation using x-ray, gamma ray, beta
particles, protons or neutrons, limited by free mean path depending on shielding of
nuclear radiation (e.g. Black Sea experiment for the detection of hidden warheads)

4. Technological options which need further research, development ordemonstration of their capabilities and limits, before they can be adopted for
the NWC• Wide area radionuclide monitoring to detect uranium enrichment or plutonium
separation (e.g. krypton-85)• Nuclear archaeology to reconstruct the working history of production reactors

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4. Elements of NWC Veriﬁcation
Some of the potential veriﬁcation elements of the NWC are discussed in thefollowing.

Registry and International Monitoring System
The Registry would maintain a list of all nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles,
facilities, and materials subject to veriﬁcation. The International Monitoring Systemenables the Agency to gather information necessary for the veriﬁcation of the NWC
and would comprise facilities and systems for monitoring by satellite, ﬁxed on-site
sensors, remote sensors, radionuclide sampling, means of communication and othersystems. Information generated by equipment owned or controlled by member States
would be shared through agreements with the Agency. Required are agreements
on sharing data and veriﬁcation activities with existing agencies, including those
responsible for implementation of other treaties regarding nuclear disarmament.
Methods of nuclear archaeology are important to reconstruct the past production
history by investigating traces which are characteristic for the relevant past activities at
production facilities and by doing model calculations.28

On-site inspections and techniques
A challenge inspection system will be important to conduct on-site inspections,which may require an even more intrusive system than that of the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This would include both systematic, baseline inspections and challenge
inspections (anytime-anyplace) of declared and undeclared facilities, utilizing a
range of techniques, including visual inspection, record checks and non-destructive
measurement (e.g., with portable x-ray and gamma-ray detectors). This could be
assisted by identiﬁcation techniques, such as tagging, tamper-indicating seals in nuclear
power plants and “ﬁngerprinting” of delivery systems. Perimeter portal monitoring
systems would track the ﬂow of items and materials relevant for nuclear weapons.

Preventive controls and nuclear energy28
Due to unavoidable measurement uncertainties, loss of material within facilities
and lax practice. As mentioned before, [ ... ] IAEA safeguards material-accounting
system cannot with conﬁdence detect the diversion of weapons size quantities ofnuclear material sufﬁcient for the manufacture of dozens of weapons, either by illegally
producing nuclear materials, or by illegally removing nuclear material from existing
stocks. The Model NWC strives to prevent the construction of nuclear weapons
and puts the technical barrier for diverting nuclear-weapon-usable material as highas possible. Effective prevention would not be possible as long as weapons-usable
nuclear material is available and can be diverted for use in nuclear weapons at any
time. The above-mentioned problem of MUF leads to the conclusion that not only
prevention but also the veriﬁcation of the NWC would be very much facilitated bya signiﬁcant reduction of the accessibility of nuclear-weapons-usable materials andproduction technology.
Therefore, the Model NWC demands the reduction of inventories as well as the
reproducibility of nuclear-weapon-usable materials to the lowest possible level30
and proposes preventive controls on nuclear-weapons-usable material to guard
against breakout of the ban to manufacture nuclear weapons. Preventive controls are 170Section 4

broader than IAEA safeguards, which are primarily intended to deter diversion of
nuclear materials through detection of such diversion once it has taken place. The
measures proposed in the Model NWC would concentrate on prevention of diversion
through physical protection and restricted physical access to special nuclear material(containment and surveillance), increasing the risk and the cost for cheating andminimizing the risk for the international community. Preventive controls may include
the establishment of procedures for transport, treatment, storage and disposition of suchmaterials. By banning the technologies for production of direct use nuclear materials
such as the reprocessing of spent fuel for separation of plutonium and by imposing
other appropriate provisions the available quantities of nuclear-weapons-usable
materials are minimised. The inventories of these materials should be eliminated underinternational control as far as possible or converted into a physical form that minimizes
access.
Recognizing the importance of declaring and monitoring all such material, theveriﬁcation provisions allow for accountancy to begin even before entry into forceof the Convention. In addition to the requirement that all special nuclear material beplaced under strict, effective and exclusive international control, the NWC proposes
to deal with long-term disposition of the ﬁssile material through an optional protocolthat would recognize disposition as an urgent problem and devote signiﬁcant resources
to the search for a permanent solution. Preventive controls will be international,
eliminating national access to be eliminated to the extent possible. Nuclear weaponsusable materials in the civilian sector need to be included into preventive controls. An
important step towards more effectiveness is the 93+2 safeguards agreement signed by
IAEA members in May 1997. It includes expanded declarations, extended possibilities
of inspection and techniques for environmental monitoring.31
In theory the highest barrier against breakout would be realised in a world without
nuclear energy, which would exclude the infrastructure to produce nuclear weaponsmaterials and would effectively foreclose any path towards the bomb. The NWC
does not prohibit peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but it offers an optional protocol onenergy assistance for States that choose not to develop or use nuclear energy. However,it should be pointed out that the abolition of nuclear weapons could be accomplished,though less easily, even without abolishing nuclear energy. The second best approachis to restrict the use of those nuclear technologies that have the highest relevance fornuclear proliferation and in addition to make the remaining special nuclear materials
as inaccessible as possible for any country. Nonetheless, while the NWC veriﬁcation
measures will improve the existing safeguards system, they will face the samechallenges in a world where reactors make bomb fuel.

Organizational veriﬁcation and the implementing Agency
To implement the NWC and oversee the nuclear disarmament process, the Model
NWC proposes an International Agency similar but not identical in structure to the
OPCW. Its primary objectives include containment and surveillance of all materials,
equipment, or facilities that could contribute to the development, production, or
maintenance of nuclear weapons. The Agency would encompass and expand on someof the tasks currently within the mandate of the IAEA, which would be altered to focus
entirely on verifying global disarmament, ceasing to facilitate the nuclear industry. The
Agency in the Model NWC would have the following structure:•
The principal organ of the Agency would be a Conference of all
States Parties, which would meet annually, and for special sessions asnecessary;•
An Executive Council would be a standing body, to be elected by
the Conference for a certain period. The EC would oversee implementationand operation of the Convention and would be responsible for day-to-day

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 171

decision-making on the operation of the treaty. It would also have the power todemand clariﬁcation from any state party and recommend action in the case ofnon-compliance. Membership would rotate, with attention to equitable regional
distribution and representation by nuclear weapon and nuclear-capable states;•
A Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General, would carryout the tasks of implementation and veriﬁcation through various mechanisms,
including a Registry and an International Monitoring System. Sources forsuch information include declarations and reports by States, systematic andchallenge inspections, information from other agencies (including NGOs),
publicly available sources, national technical means, and the international
monitoring system.
An important component of the institutional process would be the reform of the UN
Security Council, which needs to represent nuclear and non-nuclear great powers todelegitimise nuclear weapons and devise an effective and fair compliance system.

Transparency, education and conﬁdence- building
The Model NWC makes transparency and education obligatory, in response to theargument that nuclear weapons technology and knowledge cannot be uninvented.
The idea is to promote scientiﬁc responsibility and greater awareness of the link
between nuclear science and weapons development. Scientists can and should betrained to identify and warn others of potentially prohibited activities. Conﬁdencebuilding measures (CBMs) and supplying additional information on a voluntarybasis increases conﬁdence in compliance with the Convention. CBMs could include
bilateral agreements on reciprocal monitoring and information sharing between States.
Consultation, cooperation and fact-ﬁnding should help to clarify and resolve questionsof interpretation with respect to compliance and other matters. These procedures
would be time-critical to ensure that essential evidence is not lost. Compliance andenforcement provisions are linked to transparency and conﬁdence-building measuresamong States Parties. Dispute settlement provisions include negotiation, mediation
and referral to regional agencies or to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The
Executive Council or Conference would also have the authority to refer unresolved
disputes to the ICJ for an advisory opinion and to the General Assembly or Security
Council.
All NWS need to contribute to improving the mutual nuclear transparency process.32
This is a difﬁcult task, partly because of concerns about conﬁdentiality, partly because
of inherent uncertainties and poor bookkeeping from the beginning of the nuclear
era. Openness about past production of ﬁssionable materials will be particularly
challenging, since it will be virtually impossible for any nuclear weapon state to givea complete and accurate account.33 The documentation of past production (nuclear
archaeology) must begin now, while discrepancies are not strategically signiﬁcantand potentially destabilising. The sooner transparency can be achieved in relation tonumbers, types and deployments of nuclear weapons, delivery systems and holdingsof special nuclear materials, the earlier and deeper can conﬁdence be established.
Activities could include exchange visits and cooperative monitoring ventures between
the nuclear weapon possessors.

Societal veriﬁcation
Beside technical instruments, human information sources are increasingly relevant
for arms control veriﬁcation. In addition to the governmental tasks in veriﬁcation, newpossibilities of societal veriﬁcation are created under the Model NWC which provide
citizens of all states with the right and the obligation to indicate suspected nuclear
weapons activities.34 Cheap and ready access to information and communication

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Section 4technologies increases the possibilities
for NGOs to participate in veriﬁcation
activities. Civil society, including nongovernmental organisations (NGOs),
professional bodies and individuals (suchas academics, scientists and engineers),
are involved in monitoring the activitiesof governments and if necessary can‘blow the whistle’.35 Instructive cases
are Mordechai Vanunu on the Israeli
nuclear arsenal, Kamal Hussein on Iraq’s
biological weapons program and various
Russian defectors and whistle-blowers.
Societal veriﬁcation would substantiallyextend the basis of information andadd to the complexity of violating the treaty. It would also be a contribution to theprotection and creation of democratic rights in all parts of the world. Organised societal
veriﬁcation is more feasible in open societies, but even in closed societies it would be
difﬁcult to prevent defectors from leaking critical information. Questions about therole and function of societal veriﬁcation are particularly relevant to the future directionof nuclear research and development. The model NWC incorporates the conceptof societal veriﬁcation through individual rights and obligations, including citizen
reporting and protection for whistle-blowers. According to Joseph Rotblat,

A device that indicatestampering with a nclear
material container.
Photo: Department ofEnergy“The main form of societal veriﬁcation is by inducing the citizens of the countries
signing the treaty to report to an appropriate international authority any information
about attempted violation going on in their countries. For this system of veriﬁcation tobe effective it is vital that all such reporting becomes the right and the civic duty of thecitizen.”36
Societal veriﬁcation requires transparency and education. Scientists and nuclear
industry workers should be alerted to the potential links between nuclear scienceand nuclear proliferation. This responsibility could be developed through training to
identify activities that are, or border on, prohibited activities. Supplying additional
information on a voluntary basis increases conﬁdence in compliance. By deﬁnition, thisapproach is not the “Big Brother” model of suspicion and surveillance where citizens
watch each other and the state watches all citizens, as some have suggested. Rather,societal veriﬁcation aims for openness and trust in scientiﬁc and industrial endeavors.
Indeed, secrecy and mistrust undermine the openness and free ﬂow of ideas necessary
for good science and its productive application.
In addition to the governmental tasks of veriﬁcation, societal veriﬁcation would
substantially extend the basis of information and would be a contribution to theprotection and creation of democratic rights in all parts of the world. NGOs could
play an important role in this process. No state that secretly strives for nuclear
weapons can be sure that persons involved in clandestine activities would not transmit
their knowledge for a reward to the international community which then could takeappropriate reactions.

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5. Security Context and Challenges of
NWC Veriﬁcation
A precursor of a veriﬁcation system for nuclear disarmament will be the US andRussian experience of verifying deep cuts, building on their [ ... ] extensive bilateralexperience in verifying the INF and the START [ ... ] treaties. Valuable lessons havealready been learned from existing regimes. On-site inspections can be managed in a
way that does not reveal security or commercial proprietary information and some of
the concerns disappear with progressing implementation and experience.37 Veriﬁcationand transparency measures can learn from the cooperative threat reduction programs
between Russia and the US to safely dismantle the former Soviet nuclear complex andcontrol the ﬁssionable material from dismantled nuclear weapons.38 Former nuclear
scientists and facilities are employed in the disarmament process to prevent them fromspreading their knowledge. This would also minimize the risk that personnel involvedin verifying nuclear disarmament would acquire additional knowledge of nuclear
weapons and thus contribute, inadvertently or deliberately, to proliferation.
The 2005 National Academies of Science (NAS) report has identiﬁed several issues
that are critical for the monitoring of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive materials(NEM):39• There are some tensions between sharing information about nuclear weapon and
NEM stockpiles and maintaining the security of these stockpiles, but cooperative use oftechnologies can substantially alleviate these tensions;• The characteristics of NEM and nuclear weapons place some fundamental limits
on the capabilities of any system of monitoring and transparency to provide assuranceof compliance. Accordingly, a degree of uncertainty is inescapable;• The biggest challenge to cooperation-based veriﬁcation would arise if countries
give the appearance of cooperation while covertly retaining undeclared stockpiles ofnuclear weapons or NEM and/or undertaking clandestine production programs;• Important transparency measures do not necessarily require formal treaties but
could be undertaken on the basis of informal understandings or unilateral initiatives,
e.g. as part of broader conﬁdence-building efforts;• There are both liabilities and beneﬁts of incorporating, in the long run, nuclear
transparency and monitoring into formal agreements to address complexity and sustain
measures over time;• The synergistic effect of the discussed approaches in a cooperative environment,
coupled with robust NTM capabilities, would substantially reduce current uncertainties
over time.
The report also makes clear that in view of the sheer size and age of the Russian
stockpile (where current uncertainties are equivalent of several thousand weapons),“Russia probably could conceal undeclared stocks of several hundred weapons”. For
other countries with much smaller programs, absolute uncertainties would be muchless, leading to the possibility that “these countries could conceal undeclared stocks
equivalent to one or two dozen weapons in the case of China, and at most one or
two weapons in the cases of Israel, India, and Pakistan.” However, “conﬁdence thatdeclarations were accurate and complete, and that covert stockpiles or production
facilities did not exist, would be increased by the successful operation of a monitoring
program over a period of years in an environment of increased transparency andcooperation.”
The security impact of breakout scenarios would depend on the particular
circumstances, including the state of readiness and deliverability of weapons; theexistence of defenses; the relative military strength of the violator; and the international 174

Section 4community’s willingness to respond (Findlay 2003). Illicit nuclear weapons produced,“would be untested, could not be deployed until the last minute, could probably not
be delivered by conventional means, and overt training for use would have been
impossible.” Of course, such a scenario is not only possible in a nuclear-weapon-freeworld, but also more likely in today’s nuclear-armed world, and it may be or may not
be deterred by the existence of other nuclear weapons. An actor (whether governmental
or non-governmental) threatening to use such a weapon would provoke others torebuild a nuclear device or arsenal, thus loosing the temporary advantage.
This highlights the fact that veriﬁability of a NWC depends on political assumptions
and requirements as well as on the available resources and capabilities for veriﬁcation,
which are not only technical. A bargaining process is necessary between politicaldemands and technical capabilities. If political demands increase, the technical solution
may become more expensive. If technical or economic limits for introducing advanced
or improved veriﬁcation means are reached, political demands are either cut back orneed to be satisﬁed by non-technical measures. For example more intrusive measuresof physical protection and control can be introduced which go beyond veriﬁcation ofcompliance with treaty obligations.
Although there may never be a foolproof multilateral veriﬁcation system fortotal nuclear disarmament, the limits of technical veriﬁcation must not lead to the
pessimistic view, that a nuclear-weapon-free world and an irreversible path towards
that goal is not adequately veriﬁable. Instead, the political consequence of this merely
technically induced evaluation is to ﬁnd strategies to increase the barrier against a ﬁrst
or renewed access to nuclear weapons. Given their limits, veriﬁcation of an NWC
would not only rely on technical measures. A number of means and procedures can beapplied to detect clandestine objects and activities and clarify critical questions. How
well these elements can be integrated into a coherent and effective veriﬁcation system
for a Nuclear Weapons Convention requires further examination.
As Trevor Findlay (2006) points out, “complete nuclear disarmament implies notjust a signiﬁcant evolution in veriﬁcation, but an evolution of the international system.
States will have to change their attitudes towards the limits of sovereignty, the rule ofinternational law and governance of the international system, particularly in regard to
enforcement, if nuclear disarmament is ever to be negotiated. Indeed, the attainment of
a nuclear weapon free world is so dependent on such changes that we will only be able
to judge fully and accurately its veriﬁability as we become seriously engaged in moving
towards that goal.”_________________________________________________________________________
Endnotes to Section 4
1
This section builds on the following original sources which were expanded and updated: Merav Datan, Jürgen
Scheffran, Principles and Means for Veriﬁcation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, INESAP Information Bulletin
No. 14, November 1997; Martin B. Kalinowski, Beyond Technical Veriﬁcation: Integrated Prevention and Detectionof Diversion of Special Nuclear material in the Nuclear Weapons Convention, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 14,
November 1997; Merav Datan, Veriﬁcation Requirements for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, Paper presented at the
9th International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Cornell University, July 1997; Jürgen Scheffran,Content and Veriﬁcation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, in: Joseph Rotblat (Ed.), Remember Your Humanity,
Singapore: World Scientiﬁc, 1999, 318-334; Martin B. Kalinowski, Wolfgang Liebert, Jürgen Scheffran, Beyond
technical veriﬁcation. Transparency, veriﬁcation, and preventive control for the Nuclear Weapons Convention, in: Martin
B. Kalinowski (ed.), Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000, 61-68.
2
Steve Tulliu, Thimas Schmalberger, Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conﬁdence-Building, Geneva:
UNIDIR, 2004, www.unidir.ch/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-157-2-en.pdf.
3
A number of publications discuss the requirements and possibilities of nuclear weapons elimination: Chris B. Paine,
Tom B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Techniques and Procedures for Verifying Nuclear Weapons Elimination, in:Canberra Commission Background Papers, August 1996, pp. 167-178; Steve Fetter, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament,
Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 29, October 1996 (excerpts are reprinted in
INESAP Bulletin No.13, July 1997, pp.41-43); George H. Quester, International Safeguards for Eliminating Weaponsof Mass Destruction, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No.31, December 1996; Richard
Guthrie, The Transition to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: A New Model for the Veriﬁcation Framework, Veriﬁcation

Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

 175

Matters, Brieﬁng Paper 97/1, April 1997; Patricia M. Lewis, Laying the Foundations - Verifying the transition to lowlevels of nuclear weapons, VERTIC Preliminary Report, April 1997; David Fischer, Safeguards for a World Freeof Nuclear Weapons, INESAP Information Bulletin, No.14; Annette Schaper, Verifying nuclear arms control anddisarmament, in: Trevor Findlay, (ed.), Veriﬁcation Yearbook 2000, VERTIC, London, 2000; Edward M. Ifft, Verifying
Nuclear Arms control and disarmament, in: Trevor Findlay, Oliver Meier (eds.), Veriﬁcation Yearbook 2001, VERTIC,
London, 2001.
4
Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), National Academy of Sciences (NAS), The Future of
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, July 1997.
5
Trevor Findlay, Veriﬁcation of a nuclear weapon-free world, VERTIC Briefs, May 2003.
6
Fetter 1996.
7
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, Weapon of Mass Destruction
Commission, Stockholm, 2006.
8
Kalinowski, Liebert, Scheffran 2000.
9
Findlay 2003.
10
Tom Milne, Henrietta Wilson, Verifying the transition from low levels of nuclear weapons to a nuclear weapon-freeworld, VERTIC Research Report, no. 2, June 1999, p. 17 ff .
11
Merav Datan, Veriﬁcation Requirements for Nuclear Weapons Convention, Paper presented at 8th International
Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Cornell University, July 1997.
12
For a full discussion of proposed immediate nuclear disarmament measures and accompanying veriﬁcation
measures, see generally: Nuclear De-alerting: Taking a Step Back, UNIDIR Newsletter No. 38; Bruce Blair, Global
Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Brookings Institution, 1995; Chris Paine, Tom Cochran and Robert Norris, Practical
Interim Steps Toward Nuclear Weapons Elimination and a Fissile Material Control Regime for Nuclear Weapon States,
Canberra Commission Background Papers; Matthew Bunn, ’Pit-Stufﬁng’: How to Disable Thousands of Warheads
and Easily Verify Their Dismatlement, Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report, Vol. 51, No. 2, March/
April 1998; Owen Greene, Multilateralising the Nuclear Disarmament Process, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 14,
November 1997.
13
Patricia M. Lewis, Laying the Foundations for Getting to Zero: Verifying the Transition to Low Levels of Nuclear
Weapons, Vertic Research Report No. 1, September 1998.
14
Suzanna van Moyland, Programme ‘93+2’: Evolution in IAEA Safeguards, in: Richard Guthrie (ed.), Veriﬁcation 1997:
The Vertic Yearbook.
14a
Illusion of Protection, Medical Association for Prevention of War, Australia, Report 5 November 2006,
www.mapw.org.au/Illusion of Protection index.html.
15Department of Energy, Plutonium - The ﬁrst 50 years, Washington, February 1996.
16
Trevor Findley, Veriﬁcation and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 27, December
2006, pp. 67-70; IAEA, Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols, 2004; Thomas E. Shea,
Potential Roles for the IAEA in a Warhead Dismantlement and Fissile Materials Transparency Regime, in N. Zarimpas,
ed., Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials, New York: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2003, pp. 229-249; George Perkovich, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose
Gottemoeller, Jon Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, 2005.
17
IAEA INFCIRC/540.
18
See Gotthard Stein, Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Usable Materials Production with Satellite Imagery,
INESAP Information Bulletin, No.27, December 2006, pp. 23-26.
19
Victor Bragin, John Carlson, and John Hill, Verifying a Fissile-Material Production Cut-Off Treaty, The
Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, pp. 97-107.
20
Fetter 1996.
21
Findlay 2003.
22
J. Whichello, D. Parise, N. Khlebnikov, IAEA Project on Novel Techniques, INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 27,
December 2006, pp. 27-30.
23
See Martin B. Kalinowski, Heiner Daerr, Markus Kohler, Measurements of Krypton-85 to Detect Clandestine Plutonium Production; Martin B. Kalinowski, Johann Feichter, Ole Ross, Atmospheric Krypton-85 transport modeling forveriﬁcation purposes; Daek Youn, Donald J.Wuebbles, Martin B. Kalinowski, Global Modeling of Atmospheric Krypton85 Concentrations; all published in: INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 27, December 2006.
24
Oleg Bukharin, Kenneth Luongo, US-Russian warhead dismantlement transparency: the status, problems, andproposals, Princeton University/Center for Energy and Environmental Studies (PU/CEES) report no. 314, April 1999;
Theodore B. Taylor, Lev P. Feoktistov, Veriﬁed elimination of nuclear warheads and disposition of contained nuclear
materials, in Francesco Calogero, Marvin L. Goldberger, Sergei P. Kapitsa (eds), Veriﬁcation: Monitoring Disarmament,
Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991.
25
Tom Milne, Global spending on nuclear disarmament veriﬁcation work, Veriﬁcation Matters, no. 3,VERTIC, London,
April 2002.
26
Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences, Monitoring Nuclear
Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities, Washington DC, 2005, p.12.
27
Source: Kalinowski, Liebert, Scheffran 2000.
28
Fetter 1996.
29
After a discussion in the Drafting Committee in November 1997 the term “preventive controls” has replaced the term
“Safety Controls” used in the original Model NWC.
30
Similar proposals have been put forward earlier. See especially Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, Beyond
Safeguards: A program for more comprehensive control of weapon-usable ﬁssile material, report by the Union ofConcerned Scientists, Cambridge, May 1994. This report deﬁnes type 1 controls which limit the production and use ofﬁssile material for weapons or outside of safeguards, and type 2 controls which limit the production and use of weaponusable ﬁssile material for all purposes, including civil purposes that are safeguarded, and the operation of facilities thatcan produce weapon-usable ﬁssile material.
31
Susanna von Moyland, The IAEA’s Programme `93+2’, VERTIC Report No.10, January 1997.
32
Eric R. Gerdes, Roger G. Johnston, and James E. Doyle, A Proposed Approach for Monitoring Nuclear Warhead
Dismantlement, Science and Global Security 9 (2001); James Goodby, Transparency and Irreversibility in Nuclear

 176

Section 4

Warhead Dismantlement, in Harold A. Feiveson (ed.), The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and DeAlerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999); Annette Schaper, Transparency andSecrecy in Nuclear Weapons, Study of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Nr. 34, Stockholm 2005.
33
Findlay 2003, p. 10.
34
Joseph Rotblat, Societal Veriﬁcation, in: Joseph Rotblat, Jack Steinberger, Bhalchandra Udgaonkar, eds., A NuclearWeapon-Free World: Desirable? Feasible?Westview Press, 1998.
35
Dieter Deiseroth, Societal veriﬁcation: wave of the future?, Veriﬁcation Yearbook 2000, VERTIC, London, 2000.
36
Joseph Rotblat, Societal Veriﬁcation, in: Rotblat/Steinberger/Udgaonkar 1993.
37
Model Protocol Additional, IAEA, INFCIRC/540, Vienna, September 199738
See Rose Gottemoeller, Beyond arms control: how to deal with nuclear weapons, Policy Brief, no. 23, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, February 2003; Nancy Gallagher, Veriﬁcation and advanced
co-operative security, Veriﬁcation Yearbook 2002, VERTIC, London, 2002; Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John
P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, Washington, DC: Nuclear
Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, March 2003; http://www.nti.org/cnwm
39
NAS/CISAC Committee 2005.

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