Urban Rail Development in Tokyo
From 2000 to 201005

Discussion Paper 2014 • 05
Hironori KatoThe University of Tokyo,
JapanUrban Rail Development in Tokyo
From 2000 to 2010

Discussion Paper No. 2014-05

Report for the ITF – KOTI Seminar(March 27, 2014, Seoul)

Hironori KatoThe University of Tokyo, Japan

March 2014

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTSINTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 5
THE 2000 URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN IN TOKYO .......................... 6
URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS IMPACTS FOLLOWINGTHE MASTER PLAN IN TOKYO ........................................................................ 8
Urban Rail Development following the Latest Master Plan in Tokyo .................... 8
Policy–Target Achievements for the Latest Master Plan in Tokyo ........................ 9
RECENT ISSUES REGARDING URBAN RAIL SERVICE IN TOKYO .......................... 21
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 24
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................... 25
REFERENCES ............................................................................................... 26

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

INTRODUCTIONTokyo is well known as a rail-oriented city where the huge traffic demand generated fromthe megacity is well supported by a sophisticated urban rail system. The results of the2008 Person Trip Survey show that rail’s modal share was 30% as of 2008; the economy
of Tokyo is highly dependent on an efficient urban rail network. As shown in Kato (2014),
Tokyo’s urban rail market has unique characteristics: private rail companies provide
many of the rail services, the rail network was developed under the guidance of thecentral government, rail users suffered from chronic traffic congestion for many years,
and the rail market has recently been significantly influenced by a rapidly aging
demographic. In spite of its uniqueness, the experiences of urban rail development inTokyo could be useful for other OECD member countries.
The urban rail network in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area was developed over the past 100
years under the “master plan” system (Morichi, 2000), which contains both the long-term
rail network development projects and the service improvement programs proposed by
the central government. The latest master plan was created in 2000 and presented inReport No. 18 of the Council for Transport Policy. The current master plan covers theperiod from 2000 to 2015; therefore, the next plan should be prepared by 2015. The
government has started to review the recent performance of urban rail service and havebeen discussing the next strategies of urban rail network development in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area. This paper aims to introduce the latest master plan, to review the
recent development following the proposal of the latest master plan, and to discuss thecurrent issues regarding Tokyo’s rail network.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section will quickly explain the 2000 Urban
Rail Development Master Plan in Tokyo. Recent urban development is reviewed, and theachievement of policy targets set in the master plan is examined. Then, the policy issues
for the next master plan will be presented. Finally, some additional issues are
summarized. It should be noted that this paper relies heavily on the report in MLIT
(2012), which was prepared for the Research Committee on Current Problems and Future
Direction of Railway Development in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, organized by the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT), Japan.

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

THE 2000 URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN IN TOKYO

MLIT finalized the 2000 Urban Rail Development Master Plan in January 2000 (Morichi,
2000). This plan presents an ideal picture of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area’s urban rail
network in 2015, as well as the necessary rail developments. It identified five major
policy targets for solving the expected problems in Tokyo’s urban rail market: “Reductionof in-vehicle crowding,” ”Saving travel time,” “Contribution to urban redevelopment,”“Improvement of accessibility to airports and high-speed rail,” and “Development of
seamless transport network by introducing barrier-free facilities.”
The first target is a policy issue related to congestion in Tokyo that has not yet beensolved. The government stated that the congestion rate in 31 major rail sections shouldbe equal to or lower than 150% during peak morning hours. Note that the government
has regularly monitored in-vehicle traffic congestion in major rail lines in Tokyo.
The second target relates to the Tokyo Metropolitan Area’s decentralized land-use policy,
which has resulted in satellite sub-centers being developed for business. Strategies forsaving travel time for rail connections between sub-centers were pursued, as werestrategies for saving travel time when commuting from residential areas to business
districts.
The third target aims to increase rail capacity, particularly in the central business district(CBD) of Tokyo. Since the 1990s, a number of high-rise buildings were built for bothbusiness and residential use in the CBD. This is due to the redevelopment of seaside
areas near Tokyo Bay for business and residential use, and also because the younger
generation has gradually changed its living-space preferences from suburban residential
areas to the central area. These changes in land-use patterns are expected to generate alarge volume of traffic.
The fourth target follows the globalization of business and tourism markets. The
government has also implemented a globalization policy that includes the deregulation of
the air transportation market and the promotion of tourism in Japan. The improvement ofrail access both to and from airports, and of high-speed rail, is critical for better businessand tourism conditions.
Finally, the fifth target reflects Japan’s rapidly aging society. Social participation byseniors is widely understood to have a vitalizing effect on economic activities under the
depopulation trend, and easy access to social services could be one of the drivers forproviding them with better mobility in urban areas. Thus, the introduction of new devices
and upgrades to station facilities for handicapped passengers was highly recommended.
The 2000 Urban Rail Development Master Plan also presented a list of rail development
projects that were recommended for implementing construction or studying feasibility.
The map in Figure 1 depicts the recommended network. The proposed projects are
categorized into three types: A1 routes that are suitable for operation by the target year,

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

A2 routes that are suitable to begin development by the target year, and B routes thatmust be developed or studied in the future. The rail projects in the A1 routes are
considered the highest priority, which may mean that they are strongly supported by thegovernment. In the A1 projects, stakeholders have reached, or have almost reached, aconsensus; thus, these projects can be started immediately following the completion of
the official process. Rail projects in the A2 routes are considered medium priority, whichmeans that they are supported by the government, but there may be some reasons why
they cannot immediately be started, such as technical problems in construction orcontract problems between different companies. B projects are typically considered
important from the viewpoint of government targets, but they may not satisfy necessary
conditions, such as cost-benefit criteria or financial viability criteria. Thus, further
feasibility studies are required. The total length of all of the proposed projects is 658 km.
The length of the A1, A2, and B routes are 288.0 km, 166.8 km, and 203.3 km,
respectively.
Figure 1. Urban Railway Network Master Plan for the Tokyo Metropolitan Area
from 2000 to 2011

Source: Morichi et al. (2001)

In addition to the new construction projects, the 2000 Urban Rail Development
Master Plan also proposed the improvement of existing rail lines. It includes therenovation of freight rail lines into passenger rail lines, the improvement of rail
facilities for direct-through operations that connect one line with another, theincrease in capacity of existing rail lines, the installation of facilities for switch-backs
and additional tracks for overtaking, the upgrading of existing rail stations, thereformation of rolling stocks with additional trains, etc.

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS IMPACTS FOLLOWINGTHE MASTER PLAN IN TOKYOUrban Rail Development following the Latest Master Plan in Tokyo
Figure 2 presents the change over time for the length of the developed rail network in
the Tokyo Metropolitan Area from 2000 to 2011 by the type of project. It shows that rail
development has been implemented, gradually, almost every year. The developed length
increased from 2005 to 2006 because the Tsukuba Express Line connecting Akihabara
with Tsukuba began operating in 2005. It also shows the major improvement to existinglines, the introduction of the monorail, etc., which have all started since 2006. Figure 3
presents the major new urban rail lines that were completed or planned after 2008. Twoof them—Tohoku-Jukan Line and direct-through Sotetsu and JR line—are still planned tobe completed by 2015 and 2018, respectively. About 80% of the proposed A1 projects
were completed by 2012, while only 1% of the proposed A2 projects were completed by
2012. No construction has begun yet on any B project.
Figure 2. Length of the rail network developed in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area from 2000 to 2011

km
250
221.2

Monorail, LRT etc.

Improvement

200

200.1

Double tracking

202.1

177.6

New construction

147.6 147.6

150

86.5

100
75.1
59.9

79.2

61.9
129.3 129.3

142.3

151.2 151.2

161.9

50
56.5 56.5

66.9 71.0 71.002000 01 02 03

04 05 06 07

08 09 10 11

Source: MLIT (2012)8

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Figure 3. Newly developed rail lines after 2008

Source: MLIT (2012)

Policy–Target Achievements for the Latest Master Plan in Tokyo
Reduction of in-vehicle crowding
Figure 4 presents changes over time for in-vehicle congestion, with traffic volume andcapacity, in 31 major sections of Tokyo from 1975 to 2010. A section’s in-vehicle
congestion rate is defined as the section’s volume of traffic divided by the section’s traffic
capacity. Note that “section” refers to the link connecting one station with another station.
A section’s traffic volume represents the hourly traffic demand that passes through agiven section, while the link’s traffic capacity represents the hourly traffic capacity in that
section. Traffic capacity is computed using the service frequency running through thesection, the number of cars in a rolling stock, and the capacity of a car body as definedby the Japan Industrial Standard (JIS) (for more details, see Kato, 2014). Also note that
Figure 4 standardizes the traffic volume and capacity according to 1975 values.
Figure 4 indicates that the average in-vehicle congestion rate decreased from 221% in1975 to 171% in 2003, after which point it has remained almost stable. The decline in
the in-vehicle congestion rate was mainly caused by an increase in traffic capacity.
Although both traffic capacity and traffic volume increased between 1975 and 1993, thegrowth rate of traffic capacity is higher than that of traffic volume. This means that rail
operators invested in projects that enhanced rail capacity, such as the construction ofquadruple tracks, increases in service frequency, and the introduction of high-capacity
car bodies. Additionally, in 1993 traffic volume began to decrease. The recent decline intraffic volume reflects a decrease in the population of workers, as well as changes inland-use patterns in the metropolitan area. The rapidly aging population and shrinking
birth rate have led to a decrease in the number of workers in Tokyo.

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Figure 4. Change over time for in-vehicle rail congestion during peak morning
hours in Tokyo: average of 31 sections between 1975 and 2010
(%)
230

221
214 212202

210

Congestion rate
Traffic capacity (1975=100)
Traffic volume (1975=100)

197

190

183

170

161

171 171 170 170 171 171
156
149
150

164 163 163 163 163 162 162163

136

130

124

110

121

131

167 166

Target: 150%
137 140133

127 127 126 126 126 125

123 1229070

197580 85 89

93 98 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Source: MLIT (2012)

The younger generation’s preference for residences in the city has increased the housing
demand in the center of Tokyo, which resulted in a decrease in the demand forcommuting lines from suburban areas to the CBD. On the other hand, the traffic capacity
has not grown much since 2003, which means that rail operators have stopped investing
in increased capacity. This probably reflects the prolonged economic recession in Japan
from the late 1990s to 2010. Although the average in-vehicle congestion rate slightly
declined from 2009 to 2010, it remains at 166%, which is higher than the government’s
target of 150%.
Figure 5. Rail sections where the in-vehicle congestion rates have significantly
changed between 1998 and 2010
Section where the in-vehicle congestion
rate decreased by over 30 %221%→189%

Section where the in-vehicle congestion
rate increased by over 10 %226%→169%

212%→179%
183%→150%
202%→171%120%→147%

200%→164%133%→101%

237%→201%(235%→195%

148%→163%228%→191%
115%→158%

234%→185%

Source: MLIT

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Figure 5 shows the recent changes in the observed in-vehicle congestion during peakmorning hours at the sections where the in-vehicle congestion rate has significantly
changed between 1998 and 2010. This shows that many sections benefitted from thereduction of in-vehicle congestion; however, three sections in the south-western part of T(2012) Tokyo faced an increase of in-vehicle congestion over the past 10 years. Major
reasons for the reduction in the in-vehicle congestion include an increase in service
frequency and the introduction of a wider car body.
Figure 6. Length of rail sections by in-vehicle congestion rate among the 42
major rail sections in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area

0

200

400

1995

600

Length (km)
800

860

2000

1000

1200

1400

286

152

223

1000

2005

272

1082

2015

279

1227
0-150%

150-180%

111

138

118 42

243
180-200%

1600

43 6

Over 200%

Source: MLIT (2012)

Figure 6 shows the change over time, from 1995 to 2015, for the length of rail sections
by in-vehicle congestion rate among 42 major rail sections in the Tokyo Metropolitan
Area. Note that the 2015 data are estimates based on the travel demand forecasted in
the latest master plan, under the assumption that the construction of all A1 and A2 lines
has been completed. This shows that the length of rail sections for which the in-vehicle
congestion rate is greater than 200% was drastically reduced, while rail sections with an
in-vehicle congestion rate of less than 150% have gradually increased over the past 10
years.
In summary, from 2000 to 2010, in-vehicle crowding was significantly reduced, mainly
through efforts of rail operators to increase traffic capacity and the recent decrease intraffic demand. However, in-vehicle crowding is still very high in major rail sections, andthe government target has not yet been satisfied. The prolonged economic recession andthe change in land-use patterns have decreased rail operators’ motivations for new
investments, which has made it difficult to expect the market-oriented reduction of invehicle congestion to happen immediately.
Saving travel time
The map presented in Figure 7 illustrates the rail-use access travel time from different
districts in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area to the CBD in 2010. It assumes that Otemachi
station is the representative point of the CBD. The areas along major suburban rail linesthat are located more than 30 km from the CBD can access the CBD within 90 minutes
by rail, whereas most of the areas within a 20 km radius of the CBD can access the CBD
within 60 minutes by rail. This means, first, that the rail lines connecting the CBD tosuburban districts contribute to the high accessibility of the CBD commute for residents
in the suburban areas. Second, it also shows that accessibility from the sub-centers to

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

the CBD is also high. Note that major business sub-centers are located on the major
suburban rail lines, about 30 to 40 km from the CBD. Third, it shows that the northeastern areas enjoy better access to the CBD via high-speed rail service thanks to thecompletion of the Tsukuba Express Line in 2005.
The map presented in Figure 8 illustrates changes in rail-use access travel time fromdifferent districts in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area to the CBD from 2000 to 2010. Thisshows that accessibility from the north-eastern areas has improved over the past 10
years. This improvement is mainly seen along the three newly introduced lines: the
Tsukuba Express Line, Saitama Rail Line, and Narita Sky Access Line.
Table 1 shows the changes in the populations covered by the areas where, between 2000
and 2010, rail-use access travel time to the CBD is within 60 minutes, by type of
population. The residents who reside in the area where rail-use access travel time to the
CBD is within 60 minutes account for 27.2% in 2000 and 28.2% in 2010. More
individuals can access the CBD within 60 minutes in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area; thismay also mean many commuters have saved time traveling to the CBD. The populationof workers who work in the area where rail-use access travel time to the CBD is within 60
minutes accounted for 46.1% in 2000 and 46.9% in 2010. More workers can access the
CBD within 60 minutes in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area; this may mean that workers canimprove their productivity by utilizing the time saved when traveling to the CBD.
Figure 7. Rail-use access travel time to Central Business District(Otemachi) in 2010

Estimated travel timeto CBDLess than 60 mins.
60-70 mins.
70-80 mins.
80-90 mins.
Over 90 mins.

Source: MLIT (2012)12

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Figure 8. Change in access time to CBD from 2000 to 2010

Changein estimated travel time
平成12年～平成22年
to所要時間の推移
CBD
Time
saved by less than 5 mins
５分未満短縮５分未満短縮Time
saved by 5-10 mins.
５～１０分短縮
５～１０分短縮Time
saved by over 10 mins.
１０分以上短縮
１０分以上短縮Nochange
変化なし
変化なし

Source: MLIT (2012)

Table 1. Changes in the population within a 60-minute rail commute to the CBD from2000 to 2010

Residents
Workers

2000
2010
Population (Thousand) %Population (Thousand) %9,372 27.2
9,739
7,977 46.1
8,131

28.2
46.9

Figures 9 and 10 show the changes in the average speed of rail service by JR rail line andby suburban rail line, respectively, from 2000 to 2010. They show that rail services insome lines, such as the JR Keiyo Line and Keisei Honsen Line, have increased theaverage speed. Note that both the JR Keiyo Line and Keisei Honsen Line connect theeastern part of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area with the CBD.
In summary, the recent development of urban rail has contributed to improving the
CBD’s accessibility for commuters traveling from the suburban areas, as well as forbusinesspersons traveling from their workplaces to the CBD. This improvement has beenachieved through the development of new rail lines and increases in the speed of rail
service made by rail operators.

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Figure 9: Changes in the average speed of rail service by JR rail line from 2000
to 2010
JR Tohoku Line (Local service)(Higashi-Omiya to Ueno)
JR Takasaki Line (Local service)(Miyahara to Ueno)(km/h) 70.0

JR Jyoban Line (Express service)(Abiko to Nippori)

60.0
50.0

JR Saikyo/Kawagoe Line
(Commuter Express service)(Sashiogi to Ikebukuro)

40.0

JR Sobu Line (Express service)(Inage to Tokyo)

30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0

JR Sobu Line (Local service)(Makuhari to Akihabara)

JR Chuo Line (Express service)(Hino to Shinjyuku)

JR Keiyo Line (Express service)(Kaihin-Makuhari to Akihabara)

JR Tokaido Line (Local service)(Totsuka to Shinagawa)

2000
2005

JR Yokosuka Line (Locals service)(Totsuka to Shinagawa)

JR Keihin-Tohoku/Negishi Line (Local service)(Isogo to Shinagawa)2010

Source: MLIT (2012)

Figure 10. Changes in the average speed of rail service by suburban rail line from2000 to 2010
Tobu Isesaki Line (Express service)(Kasukabe to Asakusa)(km/h) 60.0

Tobu Tojyo Line (Commuter Express service)(Kawagoe to Ikebukuro)

50.0
40.0

Keisei Honsen Line (Express service)(Yachiyodai to Nippori)

30.0
20.0

Seibu Ikebukuro Line
(Commuter Express service)(Sayamagaoka to Ikebukuro)

10.0
0.0

Seibu ShinjukuLine (Express service)(Iriso to Takadanobaba)

Tokyo Metro Tozai Line/Toyo Express Line
(Express service)(Yachiyo-Midorigaoka to Otemachi)

Keikyu Honsen Line (Express service)(Kamiooka to Shinagawa)
2000

Keio Honsen Line (Express service)(Kitano to Shinjyuku)

Odakyu Odawara Line (Express service)(Machida to Shinjyuku)

2005

2010

Source: MLIT (2012)

Contribution to urban redevelopment
Since the early 2000s, redevelopment in the central district of Tokyo has been boosted,particularly after the Act on Special Measures Concerning Urban Regeneration was
introduced in 2002, with which the Building Standards Law was revised by relaxing the
maximum floor area ratio (Deguchi et al., 2014). This led to the sharp increase of highrise buildings for residential, office, and mixed use in the central ward areas in Tokyo.
Figure 11 shows the change over time in floor areas in the 11 central wards in Tokyo by
type of use from 1999 to 2008, while Figure 12 shows the change over time in the floor
areas of super high-rise buildings in the 11 central wards in Tokyo by type of use from1999 to 2008. A “super high-rise building” is defined as a building that is taller than 60
meters. Approximately 22.49 km2 of floor area was added between 1999 and 2008 in the

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

11 wards, in which the floor areas of super high-rise buildings accounted forapproximately 70%. The rapid construction of these super high-rise buildings began in
2002, particularly in Minato and Chiyoda Wards.
This resulted in the rapid increase of traffic demands in the central district of Tokyo,
including rail demand. Figure 13 shows nine major areas in central Tokyo where largescale redevelopment projects were made near the rail stations. It also shows changes inrail demand from 2000 to 2007 at each rail station. This indicates that many rail stationsin the redeveloped areas have seen a significant increase in demand: for example, thenumber of passengers using Roppongi station increased by approximately 300%.
Although serious traffic congestion in rail service could occur due to the sharp increase inrail demand at those stations, no critical problem has yet been reported. This is because
potential congestion has been successfully mitigated by the introduction of new rail
networks in central Tokyo, including the Toei Oedo Line, Rinkai Line, and Tsukuba
Express Line, as well as by the extension of the existing Hanzo-mon Line.
Figure 11: Change over time of floor areas in the central 11 wards in Tokyo by
type of use
X100,000 m2

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Residential use

Office use

Others

Source: MLIT (2012)

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Figure 12. Change over time of the floor areas of super high-rise buildings in thecentral 11 Wards in Tokyo by type of use
X100,000 m2
550

500
450
400
350

300
250
200
150
100
50
0

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

Residential use

Office use

Mixed use

Others

Source: MLIT (2012)

Figure 13. Changes in rail demand at major stations at which large-scale
redevelopment was implemented in Tokyo

9. Oshiage

1 & 2. Roppongi(thousand pax. per day)(thousand pax. per day)

8. Kinshicho
3. Osaki(thousand pax. per day)(thousand pax. per day)

4. Tennozu-Isle 5. Shiodome 6. Kachidoki(thousand pax. per day)(thousand pax. per day)(thousand pax. per day)

7. Akihabara(thousand pax. per day)

Source: MLIT (2012)16

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

In summary, the recent development of urban rail has contributed to mitigating rail
traffic congestion in the central district of Tokyo, where large-scale redevelopment has
taken place.
Improving the accessibility of airports
There are two major airports in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area: Tokyo International Airport,
also known as Haneda Airport, and the Narita International Airport, also known as Narita
Airport. Haneda Airport is located about 15 km south of Tokyo Station, whereas Narita
Airport is located about 60 km east of Tokyo Station. Before 2010, almost all domestic
flights to and from Tokyo went through Haneda Airport, whereas the majority ofinternational flights to and from Tokyo went through Narita Airport. In 2010, a newinternational terminal was opened at Haneda Airport, following the completion of the
fourth runway; this led to a dramatic increase in international flights to and from Haneda
Airport. The air-travel demands of both domestic and international flights are expected toincrease in the future due to an expected growth in overseas tourists and businesstravelers, mainly from East Asian and Southeast Asian countries (Civil Aviation Working
Group, 2013). The national government has also promoted the tourism industry byimplementing the “The Tourism National Promotion Basic Plan” (Japan Tourism Agency,2013).
The map presented in Figure 14 illustrates changes in access time from different districtsin the Tokyo Metropolitan Area to Haneda Airport from 2000 to 2010. These changes
indicate that the three eastern areas have benefited travelers by reducing the timeneeded to access the Haneda Airport. The reduction in travel time was due to theintroduction of new rail lines, such as the north-eastern-bound Tsukuba Express Line, theeastern-bound Narita Sky Access Line, and the southeaster-bound Rinkai Line.
Figure 14. Changes in access time to Haneda Airport from 2000 to 2010

Saved access time to Haneda Airport
from 2000 to 2010
Less than 5 min.
5-10 min.
Over 10 min.
No change
Source: MLIT (2012)

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

The map in Figure 15 illustrates the changes in access time from different districts in theTokyo Metropolitan Area to Narita Airport from 2009 to 2010. Note that the new accessrail line, the Narita Sky Access Line, was introduced in 2010. This shows that many of thenorthern and western parts of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area saved access time to Narita
Airport, whereas the eastern part of the metropolitan area did not benefit from any
reduction in travel time. This is because the Narita Sky Access Line connects Narita
Airport with the Tokyo CBD, whereas only a few feeder lines connect to the Narita Sky
Access Line, particularly between Narita Airport and the terminal station.
Figure 16 shows the international comparison of accessibility to the main international
airport for major cities throughout the world. This includes the change in access time
before and after the start of operation in the Narita Sky Access Line. This comparison
indicates that the Narita Airport is located much further away than other airports; theTokyo CBD is located about 60 km from the Narita Airport, whereas the London and Paris
CBDs are located about 20 km from their main international airports. Although accesstime to Narita Airport was about 50 minutes before the start of operation, the Narita Sky
Access Line has reduced access time to about 35 minutes, which is close to the accesstime in London and Paris. This means that the Narita Sky Access Line provides highspeed rail access service.
Figure 15. Changes in access time to Narita Airport from 2009 to 2010

Source: MLIT (2012)

In summary, the introduction of a new, high-speed access rail-line to Narita Airport has
dramatically improved the accessibility of international airline services in Tokyo, while therecent development of an urban rail network has also contributed to the Haneda Airport’s
accessibility for international and domestic airline services.

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Figure 16. International comparisons of accessibility to the main international
airport for major cities throughout the world
Mins 60

Tokyo
Chicago40

LondonFrankfurt
Amsterdam

20

0

Osaka

Paris
Rome

Hong Kong

After thestart ofnew accessrail line in
2010

0
20
40

60
80(km)
Source: MLIT (2012)

The development of a seamless transport network by introducing barrier-freefacilities
Figure 17 shows the change over time for the share of stations that have over 5,000
passengers/day and have introduced a non-step route in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. A“non-step route” refers to a path from the entrance of the station to the train platform
along which an individual can move without using steps. Elevators, slopes, and escalators
all support non-step routes. This shows the share of non-step-route stations has
gradually increased. This reflects the government policy that introduced the Barrier-Free
Act in 2000, which makes the installation of elevators and escalators in large-scale rail
stations mandatory. According to the government’s review, as of 2010, 77% of rail
stations that have more than 5,000 daily passengers had installed barrier-free facilities(MLIT, 2011). As further growth in the number of elderly rail users is expected in the
coming decade, in 2011 the national government revised the Act to add a new policy
target: that 100% of rail stations that have more than 3,000 daily passengers install thebarrier-free facilities.
Additionally, by 2010, automatic platform screen doors had been installed in over 250
stations in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (MLIT, 2012). These doors allow passengers tosafely wait for trains in secured spaces. The smart card system was also introduced tothe entire urban transportation network, including both rail and bus services, in theTokyo Metropolitan Area. Although two different smart cards were introduced by JR Eastand other urban rail operators—SUICA (JR East, 2006) and PASMO (PASMO, 2013)—theyare mutually compatible and allow passengers to easily change from the rail service of JR
East to other rail services and vice versa. To ensure better physical connections to andfrom rail services, station facilities were also improved; for example, station gates wereredesigned for better access between rail stations and bus services in Tsunashima
Station on the Tokyu Toyoko Line.

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Figure 17. Share of stations in the Tokyo Metropolitan area that have over 5,000
passengers/day and have introduced a non-step route2000 01

02

03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Source: MLIT (2012)20

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

RECENT ISSUES REGARDING URBAN RAIL SERVICE IN TOKYO

Figure 18. Rail sections where in-vehicle congestion rates were over 180% as of2010
JR Musashino Line
Higashi-Urawa→Minami-Urawa
7:26-8:26
189%

Omiya

JR Takasaki Line
Miyahara→Omiya
7:23-8:23
191%

Decrease of congestion rate by 10% or more from 1998

Minami-Urawa

Decrease of congestion rate by less than 10% from 1998
Akahane

JR Saikyo Line
Itabashi→Ikebukuro
7:50-8:50
200%
Haijima

JR Chuo Line
Nakano→SHinjuku
7:55-8:55
194%

Kitasenjyu

Ikebukuro

JR Keihin-Tohoku LineUeno→Okachimachi
8:00-9:00
195%

TachikawaShinjuku

NIppori
Ueno

JR Sobu Line
KInshicho→Ryogoku
7:34-8:34
203%

Odakyu Odawara Line
Setagaya-Daita→Shimokitazawa

JR Yamanote LineUeno→Okachimachi
8:00-9:00
201%

7:47-8:49
188%
Shibuya

JR Nambu Line

JR Yokohama Line
Kodukue→Shin-Yokohama
7:26-8:26
183%

Musashi-Nakahara→
Musashi-Kosugi

Tokyu Denentoshi Line
Ikejiri-Ohashi→Shibuya
7:50-8:50
182%

JR Yokosuka Line
Shinkawasaki→Shinagawa
7:40-8:40
193%

Tokyo Metro Tozai LineKiba→Monzen-Nakacho
7:50-8:50
196%

NishiFunabashi

JR Keiyo Line
Kasai Rinkai Koen→Shinkiba
Shinagawa

7:30-8:30
191%
Kawasaki
Yokohama

Ofuna

Tokyo

JR Tokaido Line
Kawasaki→Shinagawa
7:39-8:39
188%

JR Keihin-Tohoku Line
Oimach→Shinagawa
7:30-8:30
185%

7:27-8:27
185%
Chiba

Source: MLIT (2012)

As shown in the earlier section, the recent development of the urban rail network and theimprovement of urban rail service have contributed to the improvement of the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area’s rail service in both its quality and quantity. However, there are still
many issues for improving the quality of urban rail service that need to be discussed.
First, the government’s target regarding the in-vehicle congestion has not yet beenreached. Figure 18 shows the rail sections where the in-vehicle congestion rates were stillover 180% during peak morning hours as of 2010, with the recent changes in the invehicle congestion rate from 1998 to 2010. Despite recent efforts to reduce in-vehicle
congestion, there are still many sections facing serious congestion. This congestion
mostly results from traffic flows from the suburban area to the central area. The sections
connecting with terminal stations on the inner ring rail line (Yamanote Line), in particular,
suffer from serious in-vehicle congestion.
One of the barriers for tackling the problem of in-vehicle congestion is the rail companies’
low incentive to increase rail service capacity. First, many experts and commentators
have highlighted the expected decline of the urban population in the Tokyo Metropolitan
Area in the next 20 years (for example, National Institute of Population and Social

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Security Research, 2013); this reduces the rail companies’ motivation to make further
investments. Although passengers in some rail sections still suffer from a high in-vehicle
congestion rate, passengers in other rail sections have already enjoyed a quite low invehicle congestion rate. As the in-vehicle congestion rate decreases, the profitability ofrail operators should also decline, which may cause them to hesitate when increasing
service frequency. Although it may be difficult to give investment incentives to rail
operators, less costly measures that make the best use of existing facilities should be
explored as a solution to the problem. Soft approaches, such as traffic demand
management, should also be taken into consideration as methods for changing thedeparture time of passengers.
Second, Tokyo’s urban rail service has recently suffered from frequent delays,
particularly during peak morning hours. These delays on urban railway lines result inservice delays across the metropolitan area, because many of the suburban rail services
directly connect to the metro services in the Tokyo CBD. The so-called “direct-throughoperation” enables passengers to change rail services between a suburban rail line and a
metro line without physical transfers at connecting stations. It was first proposed in theReport No. 1 of the Council for Urban Transport in 1956, and it has so far been gradually
introduced into many of the rail lines in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. As of 2013, thetotal length of rail network under the direct-though operation had reached about 880 km,
which accounts for over 35% of the total urban rail network in the Tokyo Metropolitan
Area (MLIT, 2012).
Figure 19. Average service delay time during the observed days in 2010: the left
two lines are directly connected, whereas the right two lines are independent(mins)
16
14

Before 10:00

12After 10:00

10
8
6
4

2
0
Tokyu Denen-Toshi Tokyo Metro
Tokyo Metro Ginza Tokyo Metro Ginza
Line
Hanzomon Line
Line
Line

Source: MLIT (2012)

Figure 19 shows the comparison among average service delay time during the observeddays in 2010 for four rail lines in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. The Tokyu Denen-Toshi
Line, one of the suburban rail lines in the western part of Tokyo, directly connects to theTokyo Metro Hanzomon Line, one of the metro lines. The other two lines are both metro
lines that run in Tokyo’s central district. This shows that the rail lines with direct-though
operation suffer from longer service delays than those without it. It also shows that theservice delay after 10:00 a.m. is longer than the delay before 10:00 a.m. Note that themorning peak hour is from 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. for the suburban rail lines, whereas it isfrom 8:00 to 9:00 a.m. for the metro lines. This means that the rail lines with directthough operation suffer, even after the morning peak hours. This is because the rail
service is provided over a long distance, including both the suburban line and the metro
line, and the service delay occurred over too great an area to be quickly adjusted.
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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Note that, for rail-service delays of up to 30 and 60 minutes, the economic losses were
estimated to be approximately JPY 60 million and more than JPY 200 million, respectively(MLIT, 2009).
One of the major factors causing service delays in the urban rail network is the lack of
capacity in the rail stations in the Tokyo CBD. As shown earlier, recent urban
redevelopment has increased rail demand at the CBD stations; additional redevelopment
is expected to put further pressure on the capacity of the rail stations (Mori Building,2013). For example, a large-scale redevelopment project is being planned near
Toranomon station in the CBD, which is expected to significantly increase rail demand. It
could cause serious traffic congestion at the station platform spaces, station stairs,
station gates, and station entrances. There is some concern that this congestion could
result in further service delays, particularly in rail lines under the direct-throughoperation.
One of the difficulties facing metro rail operators is the investment cost for increasing
station capacity. The metro station is, by nature, located underground in urbanizedareas; this makes the construction technically difficult and increases construction costs.
Thus, it may be claimed that the negative externalities of urban redevelopment should bejointly covered by rail operators and developers (Urban Renaissance Agency, 2013).
There are some examples of the joint financing of rail-station development, including thatof the developers near the station and rail operators, such as the renovation of the Tokyo
Station (Suzuki and Murakami, 2014). A new partnership-agreement program among
stakeholders, or an innovative financial scheme based on a private-public partnership,
may be required.
Third, disaster mitigation measures for rail services and smart reaction/recovery
processes after a natural disaster are also strongly required. The Great Tohoku
Earthquake struck the northern part of the main island on March 11, 2011, and it also
had a serious impact on urban rail service in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area; many rail
operations were suspended for many hours, even though the rail facilities were notphysically damaged. This caused serious mobility problems, particularly for workers who
still needed to return home. Some rail services were stopped overnight while the road
network was completely halted due to the serious traffic congestion, forcing a number ofworkers in the CBD to walk for many hours in order to return home, arriving late in theevening or even during the late night (Hiroi et al., 2011). Even in the days after theearthquake, some rail operators closed the station facilities or reduced the service
frequency due to their fear of a second or even third attack of an after quake, causinginconvenience and traffic congestion for rail users for days. Additionally, the shutdown ofnuclear power plants in Fukushima required energy-saving measures, even in urban rail
operations; this created poor urban rail service for many days (Hyodo, 2011). A series ofsuch events strongly impressed the importance of urban rail service in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area on many people. The government and rail operators started to
examine disaster mitigation and adaptation plans, including reinforcing existing facilities,
sharing information among stakeholders during an emergency, jointly planning terminal
stations in order to avoid accidents, the availability of alternative bus service, etc. (forexample, Cabinet Office, 2012; Muroi, 2012). The government also recommended thatprivate firms prepare business-continuity plans, which include the reactions required
during the risk event, the responses, the adaptation needed shortly after the risk event,and the recovery from the disaster. An integrated approach against a disaster in thecontext of urban rail service should be further examined.

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

CONCLUSIONSThis paper reported on urban rail development in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area following
the latest master plan proposed in 2000 and discussed recent policy issues that may beraised as key issues in the next master plan.
Tokyo is Japan’s capital city and the most populated in the nation. It has been the centerof Japan for years, and its central roles in political, business, financial, industrial,
educational, and even academic functions are expected to play a leadership role inJapanese society, even during the coming age of population decline. A major
infrastructure that supports urban activities in this megacity is the urban rail system.
Recently, the importance of enhancing Tokyo’s international competitiveness has
frequently been pointed out. For example, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government has
proposed introducing Tokyo’s Special Zone for Asian Headquarters, where over 500
foreign companies would be invited to five central zones in Tokyo (Tokyo Metropolitan
Government, 2012). Introducing an urban rail service that accesses these zones may behighly expected, as well as a service connecting the zones to the international airports.
Next, a new direct rail line connecting Narita Airport with Haneda Airport has also been
proposed (Sankei Shinbun, 2013). This is also expected to enhance Tokyo’s international
status. Note that this may also reflect a strong demand from people in local regions, who
are required to change from domestic airline service at Haneda Airport to international
airline service at Narita Airport. It should be noted that this proposal may be highly
influenced by the demarcation of the two airports in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, which
is one of the major issues in Japan’s air transportation policy.
On the other hand, peri-urban areas, or the edges of metropolitan areas, have been
facing a decrease in population due to rapid aging; this includes the northern part of
Saitama Prefecture and the southern parts of Chiba, Ibaraki, and Tochigi Prefectures. The
rail operators in those areas suffer from a decline in demand, and even serious deficits.
The motorization spiral, in which poor rail service leads to an automobile-oriented
lifestyle and urban structure, has already begun in such areas. Although local people
prefer maintaining the rail service, which could represent the regional identity or symbolin the long term, they also find it difficult to increase the ridership of old rail services.
Regenerating the declining economies in those areas is probably required to overcome
this challenge, but a successful approach is still under investigation.
Declining rail demand along the edge of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area may be a part ofthe processes of a shrinking city, in which rapid aging and low birth rates lead to thedecline of both the urban area and its population (Ohno et al., 2008). Similar changes insocio-demographic patterns are also expected to emerge in many other matured cities inOECD member countries in the near future (Bloom et al., 2011). Thus, Tokyo’s recent
challenges may be suggestive to them—aggressive transportation investment in thecentral district for enhancing international competitiveness along with deliberative
discussions at the edge of the metropolitan area for smartly shrinking the city.

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

Additionally, the Chuo Shinkansen, a new Japanese line that uses the superconducting
maglev system, is planned to connect Tokyo with Chukyo, and ultimately with Kinki (JRCentral, 2013). The line is expected to connect Tokyo and Nagoya in the first stage in 40
minutes, and eventually Tokyo and Osaka in 67 minutes, running at a maximum speed of
505 km/h. Its development plan was formally determined in 2011. Operation between
Tokyo and Nagoya is expected to start in 2027, while operation between Tokyo andOsaka will start in 2045. The introduction of new high-speed maglev should influence theurban rail market in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area.
Furthermore, the 2020 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo have boosted
massive investment of new facilities and infrastructure in Tokyo, including rail network.
This is also expected to make a great opportunity where the sophisticated rail system inTokyo appeals to international visitors; and it may lead to the increase of tourists andbusinesspersons to Japan.
Many new issues are emerging related to the urban rail market in the Tokyo Metropolitan
Area, as shown above. The next master plan should probably cover a broader scope
while simultaneously incorporating those issues. I hope the urban rail network in theTokyo Metropolitan Area will manage to handle those problems in innovative ways.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The data shown in this paper refer to documents used in the Committee on Current
Problems and Future Direction of Railway Development in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. I
am grateful to Mr. Shinichiro Kato (Institute of Transport Policy Studies) and Mr.
Yoshihisa Yamashita (Creative Research and Planning Co.) for their support with the data.

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URBAN RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN TOKYO FROM 2000 TO 2010

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