Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 27, Number 2, 2005, pp67-84

67

Clarifying Suffering of the Elderly in the 2004 Niigata Floodand the 2004 Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake
Keiko TAMURA1, Haruo HAYASHI2 and Reo KIMURA3
COE Researcher, Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University
2
Professor, Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University
3
Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Nagoya University
1(Received for 10 Jun., 2005 and in revised from 10 Jan., 2006)

ABSTRACTThis rapid pace of aging in Japan implies that the number of elderly persons requiring special care will also
increase rapidly at the time of disaster. A sure sign of this state was seen in two recent disasters that occurred inJapan, which received public attention as a social problem of the suffering of the elderly. In the 2004 Niigata
Flood, 12 of the 15 fatalities were over 65 years old. The Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake resulted in over1000 elderly refugees, who needed nursing care, staying in emergency shelters. This study aims to gather basic
data on the response to elderly people and to show the necessity of constructing the discipline of disaster management care, a systematic approach to the disaster process of elderly people under drastic social environmental
changes.
The major findings were as follows: 1. The care managers as the professionals licensed by the governmentsponsored Long-Term Care Insurance System worked effectively to manage the needs of moving temporarily tocare facilities, and 2. Thirteen percent of elderly people who moved to the care facilities as temporary shelters
remained in the care facilities 6 months after the impact. These results suggest that care managers should be themore effective agents in responding to elderly people in disasters; however, they need the opportunity to learn
about the disaster process of elderly people.

1. INTRODUCTION
Niigata Prefecture suffered two big disasters in 2004. The
Niigata Flood occurred on July 13 and caused 15 deaths, 13 ofwhich were senior citizens . Of these 13 people who died, 8 were
75 years old or older. The disaster reminded the public that disaster-prevention measures for the elderly are necessary. The MidNiigata Prefecture Earthquake occurred on October 23 and had 1)
long-lasting aftershocks, 2) evacuations by the village units, 3)
officials advising a wide area to evacuate, and 4) substantial damage to the life line, which resulted in a larger number of evacuees
and more senior citizens needing care. The aim of this study is togather basic data on the response to the elderly, to show the necessity for disciplined disaster management care, and to develop a systematic approach to the disaster process for senior citizens underdramatic changes in the social environment (Fig. 1).

aster still fresh in our memories is the high tide in Shiranui Bay
caused by Typhoon No. 18 on September 24, 1999. That disasterclaimed 12 lives, most of them elderly. It is generally taken for
granted that the older we get, the more susceptible we become to

2. THE 2004 NIIGATA FLOOD
2.1 BackgroundAn article from Niigata Nippo, a local newspaper, carried ahorrible scene of heavy rain localized in Niigata Prefecture on July13, 2004. The headline, A Disaster Strikes the Elderly, clearlyreflects how society took this flood. However, the concentration ofelderly victims is not peculiar to this flood in Niigata. Another dis-Fig. 1 Victims of the Niigata Flood and Mid-Niigata Earthquake,2004 (Source: Niigata Prefecture Government and Police)

KEY WORDS: the 2004 Niigata Flood, the 2004, Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake, evacuation, people with special needs, the elderly

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K. TAMURA, H. HAYASHI AND R. KIMURA

damage in disasters. This is why we need to consider the generaltendency towards a concentration of elderly victims in disasters.
This has become a critically important problem for us, a country
with a progressive tendency towards more elderly people and fewer
children. Our disaster prevention measures must consider how todeal with the particular susceptibility of the elderly to disasters.
2.2 Who is Elderly ?
According to the definition by the Ministry of Health, Laborand Welfare, people aged 65 and over are elderly. Moreover, people from 65 to 74 years are called first-term elderly, while people 75 years or older are latter-term elderly. As shown in Fig. 1,
among the 15 victims of the Niigata Flood, 12 were elderly as
defined by the Ministry. However, as far as human development isconcerned, only the concept of elderly people exists, althoughcapacity vary widely among individuals. There are always personal variations at every stage of development from infancy to adolescence. Nevertheless, compared with development until adolescence, it is notable that people classified as elderly show remarkably large variations. When this fact is taken into account, it
becomes clear that to uniformly treat all elderly people as fragile
presents no real solution.
There was another matter of concern in the news coverage of
the Niigata Flood. The flood report associated the concentration ofelderly victims with the fact that the municipality was late in issuing an evacuation warning to the affected areas. It argued that this
delay resulted in greater damage to elderly people. This argument
was made on the assumption that if an evacuation warning had
been issued earlier, the number of elderly victims could have been
reduced. The argument is that giving an early warning increases
the possibility of allowing more time for evacuation. However,this is just an assumption. It is necessary to conduct a fact-finding
survey in order to understand how residents acted in the face of thedisaster this time. Based on the results of the survey, the validityof the above-mentioned argument should be examined. It is also
necessary to consider the technical possibility of giving an early
evacuation warning and to verify the damage-reducing effect ofsuch a warning.
2.3 Purpose of Research in this Case
The purpose of this study is to investigate the reason for theconcentration of elderly victims in the Niigata Flood on July 13,
2004 and propose an appropriate measure for reducing the numberof victims of flood disasters in the future. There are tens of thousands of people classified as elderly living in the districts strickenby the flooding. It is essential to analyze the reasons that only 12elderly persons lost their lives and what factors made these persons
different from others. Possible factors include the physical properties of the hazard, the geographical characteristics of the districts
where the victims lived, and the personal attributes of the victims.
This study aims to clarify and combine these factors and determine
the causes of death in this disaster. In other words, this study aims
to profile the causes of death.
The survey of disaster conducted this time under the Ministryof Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology covers
three cases of flood damage that almost concurred in Niigata,
Fukushima, and Fukui. This paper focuses on analyzing the floodin Niigata, which involved the most victims. The 15 victims of the
Niigata Flood may be roughly classified as three victims of landslides and 12 victims of flooding. The target of this analysis is limited to the hazard of flooding, which claimed 12 lives, and excludes
the three victims of the landslides. As shown in Fig. 2, a field survey was conducted this time in Nakanoshima Town where three
persons lost their lives as a result of overflow from the broken leftlevee of the Kariyata River and Sanjo City where nine persons losttheir lives as a result of overflow from the broken left levee of the
Ikarashi River. The results of this survey are described in detail inthis report.

Fig. 2 Areas Covered by this Survey and Overflow from the Broken Levees

CLARIFYING SUFFERING OF THE ELDERLY IN THE 2004 NIIGATA FLOOD AND THE 2004 MID-NIIGATA PREFECTURE EARTHQUAKE

69

Fig. 3 Cumulative Rainfall (July 13th 0 am-12 pm) in the Affected Area of the 2004
Niigata Flood (Data from the Japan Meteorological Agency)

2.4 Hazard Characteristics of the July-13th Heavy Rain
Prior to the examination of the factors behind the human damage based on the results of the field survey, it will be verified that
the July-13th flood was caused by a localized torrential downpour
incomparable in recent years in terms of precipitation and changes
in the water levels of the Kariyata and Ikarashi Rivers. Then, themunicipal measures taken and official announcements made forthis flood in Nakanoshima Town and Sanjo City will be summarized.
2.4.1 Precipitation
First of all, the severity of the hazard that caused this flood
disaster will be reviewed with reference to the precipitation of July
13 and the water levels of the Kariyata and Ikarashi Rivers.
According to A Quick Report on Heavy Rain and River Disasters
in Niigata and Fukushima in July 2004 compiled by the River
Department of the Hokuriku Regional Development Bureau andthe River Planning and Management Division of the Department of
Public Works, Niigata Prefecture, it is pointed out that in only one
day, the stagnant front locally brought even more torrential downpour into a small area than the normal monthly rainfall in July.
Looking at the spatial distribution of rainfall in Fig. 3 and 4, it isfound that there was a huge amount of rainfall in the upper reachesof the Kariyata and Ikarashi River water systems.
Rainfall of 431 mm/day was recorded at the Tochio Rainfall
Observatory (Japan Meteorological Agency), which covers the
Kariyata water system. This heavy rain was the first such experience for the majority of the local people. Looking at hourly rainfall, it is found that it began to rain on the night of July 12 and thatrainfall of over 100 mm/hour continued for three hours after 3 oclock in the morning on July 13. Although the rain eased at one
point, it strengthened again and averaged over 30 mm/hour from8:00 am until nearly 3:00 pm, during which time there was rainfallof about 300 mm. Between 9:00 and 10:00 am and between midday and 1:00 pm, the rain exceeded 50 mm/hour, the level at which
the Japan Meteorological Agency indicates that the risk of flooding
and landslide is high.
2.4.2 Levee Breaks
This heavy rain broke levees at 11 spots, and the time ofbreakage has been estimated for ten of these spots. As shown in
Table 1, at 9:00 am, two breaks occurred in the left bank of theNoshiro in Shimo-okanbara, Muramatsu Town and in the left bankFig. 4 The Distribution of Daily Rainfall on July 13 and Changes
in Hourly Rainfall in Tochio City
(Source: “A Quick Report on Heavy Rain and River
Disasters in Niigata and Fukushima in July 2004” compiled by the River Department of the Hokuriku Regional
Development Bureau and the River Planning andManagement Division of the Department of Public
Works, Niigata Prefecture)of the Saruhashi in Tomijima Town, Nagaoka City. At about 1:00
pm, the Ikarashi overflowed from the broken left bank in Suwa,
Sanjo City, and the Kariyata overflowed from the broken left bankin Nakanoshima, Nakanoshima Town, causing human damage. At
around that time, there were also breaks in both banks of the
Nakanoshima in Shitanuma-shinden, Nakanoshima Town, and inboth banks of the Chigoshimizu in Ikenoshima Town, Mitsuke
City. These facts appear to indicate excavated rivers overflowing
beyond their capacity. Moreover, at about 2:20 pm, the Kariyata
overflowed from the broken right bank in Myosho Town, Mitsuke
City, and from the broken left bank in Kawano Town.
2.4.3 Flood Damage in Sanjo City and SubsequentCountermeasures
This section will outline the process of breakage in the leftbank of the Ikarashi and its subsequent overflow in Suwa, Sanjo
City, where nine persons lost their lives. The city s countermeasures before and after the breakage according to The General
Situation of the Heavy Rain Disaster on July 13, 2004 compiled

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Table 1. Times of Levee Breakage due to Flooding on July 13

Fig. 5 Rainfall in Sanjo City in the July-13th Flood(Municipal Fire Defense Headquarters)by the Sanjo City Office will also be summarized.
The condition of rainfall in Sanjo City is shown in Fig. 5. The
observation equipment of the Automated Meteorological Data
Acquisition System in the Fire Defense Headquarters recorded
rainfall of 217.5 mm/day from 0:00 to 24:00 on July 13 and a maximum of 44.5 mm/hour between 6:00 and 7:00 am. Sanjo City hadsustained flood damage four times since 1961, namely in August
1961, August 1967, June 1978, and July 1999. The maximum
daily rainfalls at the times of these floods were 184.0 mm on
August 5, 1961, 106.0 mm on August 28, 1967, 169.0 mm on June
26, 1978, and 91.6 mm on July 21, 1999. However, the flood damage this time resulted from daily rainfall in excess of all theserecords.
Changes in the water level of the Ikarashi were observed at thespillway of the Shimada. The level changed every hour on July 13
as shown in Fig. 6. The highest level of the river at this spot isnormally 11.60 m, so, with a height of 13.35 m, the levee is highenough to prevent flooding. However, at 9:00 am, the levelexceeded the report level and continued to rise at a rapid pace.
At 1:00 pm, the levee finally broke in the Suwa District. Even
after that, the water level at this spot continued to rise and reacheda peak between 3:00 and 4:00 pm.

Fig. 6 Changes in Water Level of the Ikarashi (At the Shimada
Spillway) Source: Sanjo City Office

Sanjo City took action as follows. The Anti-Disaster
Headquarters was set up in the second reception room on the third
floor of the City Office at 9:00 am on July 13. As the disaster
expanded after that, the headquarters was moved to the conference
room on the second floor. At 11:18 am, the headquarters requested
the Governor of Niigata to send for the Self-Defense Forces.
Afterward, a break in the left bank of the Ikarashi was recorded at
1:15 pm.
Evacuation warnings were issued to the districts shown in Fig.
7 at the three times of 10:10, 11:00, and 11:40 am on the morningof July 13, before the time of the break. The first warning at 10:10
am targeted 2,300 households in Kagoba, Chushin, Nishi-osaki 1chome to 3-chome, and Magarifuchi 2-chome in addition to thebanks of the Ikarashi. The second warning at 11:00 am targeted
2,230 households in Sanchiku 1-chome, Higashi-shinbo,
Magarifuchi 1-chome to 3-chome, Tsukioka 1-chome to 4-chome,and Suwa 1-chome to 3-chome. The final warning at 11:40 am targeted 6,016 households in Shimada 1-chome to 3-chome, Onohata,
Kita-Yokkamachi, Yokkamachi, Minami-yokkamachi 1-chome to
4-chome, Nishi-yokkamachi 1-chome to 4-chome, Yuri, JonanTown, Sakuragi Town, Nishi-honjoji Town 1-chome and 2-chome,
Sugue Town 1-chome to 4-chome, Kita-shinbo 1-chome and 2-

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71

Fig. 7 Timing of Evacuation Warnings Given by Sanjo City

Fig. 8 Timing of Evacuation Warnings Given by Nakanoshima Town

chome, and Minami-shinbo.
With regard to flood damage in Sanjo City as of August 11,
human damage included 9 persons dead, 1 seriously injured, and79 slightly injured, while housing damage included 1 house completely destroyed, 55 half-destroyed, 5,437 flooded above the floor(including 138 condominiums), and 1,336 flooded below the floor(including 15 condominiums).
2.4.4 Flood Damage in Nakanoshima Town and SubsequentCountermeasures
In Nakanoshima Town, a break in the left bank of the Kariyata

seriously affected the area down river from Imamachi Ohashi andtook three lives. No information is available regarding hourlychanges in rainfall in the town or the water level of the Kariyata.
For rainfall data, the author referred to data available in the aforementioned Tochio City that belongs to the Kariyata water system.
In the text that follows, the countermeasures taken by
Nakanoshima Town on July 13 will be generally reviewed according to A Quick Report on the July 13th Flood Damage compiledby the Nakanoshima Anti-Disaster Headquarters issued on July 24.
On the day of the flood, sandbags started to the piled in the

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area down river from Imamachi Ohashi Bridge to Nekoyono
Bridge at close to 11:00 am. The Anti-Disaster Headquarters was
set up between 12:20 and 12:40 pm, when evacuation warnings
were issued to Oaza-nakanoshima, Nekoyono, Mayumi, andNoguchi. The Kariyata started flooding behind Myoeiji Temple
down river from Imamachi-ohashi at 12:52 pm. At that time, evacuation warnings were issued to Kamidori, Nakajo, Shinjo, Saisho,and Mitsunuma. The timing of the warnings is shown in Fig. 8.
With regard to human and housing damage, there were three persons dead and an unknown number of people injured, and there
were 15 houses completely destroyed, 139 half-destroyed, 496
flooded above the floor, and 375 flooded below the floor.
Various measures were taken after the break in the levee. At
2:00 pm, the prefectural police started rescue activities by helicopter in Nakanoshima and Nekoyono. At 3:27 pm, the Air SelfDefense Force started rescuing children from Nakanoshima
Nursery. At 6:40 pm, the power supply to the Town Office was cut
off and public services were suspended. Then, the functions of theAnti-Disaster Headquarters were transferred to the Citizens Culture
Center. By 7:40 pm, all children had been rescued from the abovementioned nursery. At 10:35 pm, advance troops from the Defense
Army started rescue activities by boat.
2.5 Survey Method
In Sanjo City and Nakanoshima Town, Niigata Prefecture,
where people were affected by flooding, relevant available information was collected mainly by interviewing elderly people who
survived the disaster in these areas and the persons responsible atthe relevant agencies. The results of these interviews and information were compiled in the form of a database on GIS as shown in
Fig. 9. Then, the following three situations were reproduced inorder to determine the causes of death.
2.5.1 Information CollectedA) Physical Reconstruction of Flooding
The characteristics of flooding in the areas covered by thissurvey were clarified from physical and engineering standpoints
and displayed on GIS. Basically, a two-dimensional map was
drawn, but a three-dimensional mapping of a particularly badly
affected area was also made for the neighborhood association con-Fig. 9 Data Integration by GIS to Determine the Causes of Deathcerned.
(1) Where did flooding occur?
(2) How deep was the flooding?
(3) How did flooding progress? The rate of flow, the direction ofdeep flow, and the velocity of floodingB) Reconstructing Local Livelihoods
Regional characteristics in the following seven aspects of life
were examined with the focus on the neighborhood associations towhich the victims belonged. These aspects comprise housing, personal connections, community, preparations, mind and body, living
conditions, and the relationship between the administration and residents, which were identified as structural factors in reconstructing
livelihoods in the process of verifying rehabilitation from the Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1999 (Hayashi, 2003).
(4) Housing structure, age, spatial arrangement(5) Personal relationships with neighbors (including the need forvolunteers)(6) Town streets and local activities(7) Preparations for disaster(8) Mental and physical stress and health problems(9) Occupation (salaried worker, commercial or industrial proprietor, farmer)(10) Administrative anti-disaster measuresC) Reconstruction of Behavior during the Flood
The situations of residents in the flooded areas and the actionsof each family against the flooding were clarified in order toresolve questions as to whether there were any special factors
behind the occurrence of the deaths and what separated those whodied from those who lived.
(a) Issuance and transmission of evacuation warnings(b) Response of each family to the warnings
2.5.2 Preparations for Survey
As well as a preliminary study, the following preparations
were made for a more efficient field survey.
1) As much information as possible was collected regarding
where people were injured as well as personal data on the victims.
2) As much information as possible was collected regarding what
measures the relevant agencies took before and after the disaster.
3) The details of TV and radio broadcasting were gathered.
4) Relevant articles from local newspapers were gathered.
2.5.3 Field Survey
The field survey was conducted as follows.
1) Period: 4 days from August 21 to 24
2) Coverage: Sanjo City, Nakanoshima Town, Niigata University,
and Niigata Prefecture Office3) Method: Collect information from the people concerned using
the following method.
-Choose affected areas with the same hazard characteristics andregional features and interview elderly people (coordinate theirage and gender, if possible) who lived near the affected areas to
ask how they acted in the face of the disaster.
-Draw out the personalities and lifestyles of the victims fromtheir interviews.
4) Participants: A total of 18 persons (6 from the Disaster
Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University; 5 from theCivil Disaster Prevention Research Institute; 1 from Doshisha

CLARIFYING SUFFERING OF THE ELDERLY IN THE 2004 NIIGATA FLOOD AND THE 2004 MID-NIIGATA PREFECTURE EARTHQUAKE

University; 1 from Nagaoka National Collage of Technology; 1
from the Disaster Management Office, Nagoya University; 1
from NTT West Japan; 2 from the Earthquake Disaster
Mitigation Research Center (RDM), National ResearchInstitute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention (NIED);
and 1 from ESRI-J)
2.6 Results of the Field Survey
Fig. 10 shows the districts covered by this interview survey,
where the July-13th flood claimed several lives. Evidence andinformation were collected by interviewing the heads of the neighborhood associations in the six districts where residents lost theirlives, namely the Nakanoshima District of Nakanoshima Town,
Jonan Town, Minami-yokkaichi Town, Minami-shinbo, Shinbo,
and Magarifuchi of Sanjo City. The depth of flooding was also73

measured from photographs of the flooded districts and marks offlooding.
2.6.1 Three Patterns of Death in the July-13th Flood
To state the conclusion of this survey first, the situations of the
12 victims in Nakanoshima Town and Sanjo City may be largely
classified into three patterns, as shown in Table 2.
Pattern 1 applies to three cases of death in the Nakanoshima
District of Nakanoshima Town. After a break occurred in the
sharply curved left bank of the Kariyata, three latter-term elderly
people died in their respective houses located near the break, whichwere destroyed by overflow from the break. Patterns 2 and 3 arosefrom the broken bank of the Ikarashi in Sanjo City. These two patterns can basically be divided by the railroad of the Shin etsu Line.
Pattern 2 occurred on the east side of the Shin etsu Line near the
break. All five victims died outdoors, but their ages vary. On theFig. 10 Six Districts Covered by This Survey

Table 2. Patterns Leading to Death in the July-13th Flood

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other hand, Pattern 3 occurred on the west side of the line. All four
victims were latter-term elderly people who died in their homes.
These results suggest that elderliness is a major factor that
increased the fragility of three of the victims in the July-13th flood,
but it does not explain all. In the text that follows, these three patterns will be examined in detail.
2.6.2 Pattern 1: Effect of Severe Hazard (Nakanoshima,
Nakanoshima Town)
Fig. 11 summarizes the respective situations of victims killedby the overflow of the Kariyata in the Nakanoshima District ofNakanoshima Town. To display a clearer state of the hazard,
flooding depth contours were drawn from on-the-spot measurements of depth using laser profiling technology on the three-dimensional map depicting the flooded areas just after the break. Three
victims are indicated on the map with regard to the location of theirhouse, age, gender, health condition, estimated time of death, timeof discovery, and the assumed situation of death.
Fig. 11 shows that all of the victims houses were locatedwithin a radius of 100 meters from the broken bank and weredestroyed on the first floor. It was also found that the depth offlooding exceeded three meters. Moreover, it is apparent from thetwo photographs in Fig. 12 that the rain continued to fall even after
the levee broke and the flood reached the second-floor level. The
intensely rising waves produced a strong current. After the water
eased, sediment and various other floating objects piled up in theareas that had been submerged by over three meters of water. Allof the houses in these areas were so severely damaged that they
had to be demolished after the flood.
Three of the victims had the following aspects in common.
First of all, they were found dead in their houses. Second, theirhouses were destroyed. Third, they were latter-term elderly. And
fourth, they were healthy. Although many houses were destroyed

Fig. 11 Occurrences of Victims in Nakanoshima, Nakanoshima Town

Fig. 12The State of Flooding just after the Break and Several Days Later near the Broken Bank in
Nakanoshima Town (Photos by Mr. Kaichi Murohashi)

CLARIFYING SUFFERING OF THE ELDERLY IN THE 2004 NIIGATA FLOOD AND THE 2004 MID-NIIGATA PREFECTURE EARTHQUAKE

by the flood, only these three elderly people died. From this fact, itis certain that their elderliness hindered their evacuation from theirhomes. However, the severity of a three-meter flood strong
enough to destroy houses also played a huge part in deciding thefate of these victims.
If these aspects are summarized, it may be concluded that incases of severe flooding over three meters deep with a strong current, wooden houses near a broken bank are exposed to a high riskof collapse. The construction of private properties under suchenvironmental conditions will increase regional fragility and influence the concentration of damage to the fragile latter-term elderly.
2.6.3 Pattern 2: Near the Broken Left Bank of the Ikarashi in
Sanjo City
Fig. 13 shows the characteristics of the five cases on the eastside of the Shin etsu Line near the broken left bank of the Ikarashi,
which belong to Pattern 2. The most striking features of this pat-75

tern are that the victims were found dead outdoors and all threewere non-elderly. Even the house closest to the break was about
400 meters distant from it (marked with a small square in Fig. 13).
This house was the most severely damaged in this affected area.
The severity of the damage is shown in Fig. 14. It was a two-story
wooden house. As the house was flooded above the floor and had
clay sediment nearly one meter high inside, it looks uninhabitable
and abandoned. However, the exterior of the house remains
undamaged and it would still be basically habitable if it werecleaned. From the marks left on the neighboring houses, the depthof flooding was estimated to be about 1.5 meters in this area.
Two of the five victims died on their way to the shelter.
Another two were living in other cities but visiting Sanjo City on
business and died on the street. In the final case, the victim went toinspect his factory, which faced the railway of the Shin etsu Line,and died just after arriving. According to witnesses, there was aFig. 13 Occurrence of Victims near the Broken Left Bank of the Ikarashi

Fig. 14 Damage to the House Closest to the Broken Left Bank of the Ikarashi (Photos by Haruo Hayashi)

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considerably strong water current on the east side of the Shin etsu
Line. For example, it is reported that a rescue boat of the SelfDefense Forces was overturned by the strong water current in the
Tsukioka District, designated as a shelter for residents near the
break in Magarifuchi and Suwa.
In the five cases belonging to Pattern 2, all victims died outdoors. Judging from the fact that they included persons of 37 years
and 42 years of age, elderliness was not necessarily a factor in thedeaths. These cases strongly suggest that, even with a good reason,
it is very dangerous to venture outdoors in a 1.5-m-deep flood witha strong current. As shown by the photographs in Fig. 14, even thehouse closest to the break suffered only partial structural damage.
This suggests that death could have been avoided if the victims had
escaped upstairs or if the visitors from other cities had escaped tonearby houses. This also raises questions as to whether or not it issafe to go to a designated shelter on foot against a strong current,
especially when the current does not threaten to destroy houses.
2.6.4 Pattern 3: Western Vicinity of the Shin etsu Line on the LeftBank of the Ikarashi in Sanjo City
The severity of the four cases belonging to Pattern 3 is shownin Fig. 15. This area is known as the Rannan District and is in thewestern vicinity of the Shin etsu Line on the left bank of the
Ikarashi. The flooding of this area was about 1.0 m to 1.2 m deepand started after 3:00 pm. This means that there was a time lag of
two hours from the levee break until the start of flooding. Since
this is a lowland area near the meeting point of the Ikarashi and the
Shinano, water is always drained away with a pump. The local
people experience floods of about 20 cm deep several times every

Fig. 15

The Situations of the Victims in the Western Vicinity of the Shin’etsu Line on the LeftBank of the Ikarashi in Sanjo City

Fig. 16

Examples of the Victims’ Houses in the Western Vicinity of the Shin’etsu Line on the LeftBank of the Ikarashi in Sanjo City (Photos by Haruo Hayashi)

CLARIFYING SUFFERING OF THE ELDERLY IN THE 2004 NIIGATA FLOOD AND THE 2004 MID-NIIGATA PREFECTURE EARTHQUAKE

year. On the morning of July 13, too, there was an intense downpour and internal flooding in some districts. However, the residents took it for just another of the regular floods.
A witness of the flood, the acting head of the Rannan
Neighborhood Association said, At about 3 o clock, something
like a black snake appeared in a small pool of water on the
ground. This shows that the external flood water on the east sideof the Shin etsu Line began to flow into the inland flood water
about two hours after the break. When he saw something like a
black snake appearing from sewage in a clear pool, he recalled
what his mother had told him long ago: If you see a black snakein the sewage, be careful! There was once a break on the samebank of the Ikarashi in 1926. His mother, who experienced it atthat time, said, At the time of Suwagire, a snake appeared in clear
water. As soon as he recalled what his mother had said, he started a rapid escape. According to this witness, the water level rose
rapidly but the flow rate was not so quick.
In the two-story apartment house shown in Fig. 16, a woman
who lived in the left-hand apartment on the first floor died. The
whole of this area was flooded up to 1.2 m above the floor.
However, damage to the houses cannot be seen from the exterior.
The four victims belonging to this pattern had the following
features in common. The first feature is that all four victims were
found dead in their own homes. The second is that all of themwere latter-term elderly. The third is that they were unable to walknormally for some reason. More specifically, some walked with astick, while others were bedridden and needed care. The fourth isthat no helpers were available beside them at the time of flooding.
Three of the victims lived alone. In the case of a 77-year-old
bedridden man, his wife was with him at the time but she was also
elderly. I tried to pull my husband up over and over again, but
could not move him from the bed, she said. In other words, victims were all latter-term elderly unable to walk by themselves who
had nobody beside them to help them upstairs or to a safe place.
The implication of these findings is that if any one of the latter
three conditions had been different, everyone would have been able
to survive.
2.6.5 The Meaning of Elderly Seen in the Three Patterns of
Death in the July-13th Flood
Comparing the three patterns of death found in this survey
makes the meaning of the headline A Disaster Strikes the
Elderly clear. The occurrence of human damage may be regarded
as a function of hazard severity and personal fragility. In both the
Nakanoshima District of Nakanoshima Town (Pattern 1), which isconsidered to have faced the severest hazard, and the westernvicinity of the Shin etsu Line in Sanjo City (Pattern 3), which isconsidered to have faced the lightest hazard, the victims were all
found dead indoors and were all latter-term elderly. This clearlyshows that latter-term elderliness is a major factor that may determine personal fragility, and, as the newspaper article pointed out,
there was certainly a concentration of elderly victims.
Although all of the victims in Patterns 1 and 3 were latter-term
elderly, there were variations in the personal capacity of the victims of each pattern. In the three cases in Nakanoshima (Pattern1), the victims were healthy but died in a disaster strong enough todestroy houses. In the four cases in Sanjo (Pattern 3), on the other
hand, the flood was at most 1.5 m deep and not very rapid andthere was an interval of one and a half hours between the break and77

the start of flooding. In this respect, the hazard was not highly life
threatening. However, elderly people who usually had difficulty inmoving or walking were found dead in their own homes without
any helpers available beside them. This comparison suggests thathazard characteristics and personal and social attributes becomecauses of death: i.e. the occurrence of a severely hazardous flood
over 3 meters deep strong enough to destroy houses, physical handicaps in everyday life, and the absence of helpers available on the
spot.
Moreover, the analysis of the five cases on the east side of the
Shin etsu Line in Sanjo (Pattern 2) this time shows such exceptional conditions that latter-term elderliness does not prove a clear
determinant. Of these cases, only the 78-year-old woman was latter-term elderly. Even if the range of elderliness is expanded toinclude the first-term elderly, only the 72-year-old man will be
added. The remaining three were 37, 42, and 63 years old, andnone of them was elderly as defined by the Ministry of Health,
Labor and Welfare. This suggests that age was not the only causal
factor in their deaths. The most notable feature common to these
five cases is that all of the victims were found dead outdoors. Thissuggests that even in a flood about 1.5 m deep not severe enough todestroy houses, it is extremely dangerous to move in a rapid current. Two women among the victims died on their way to the designated shelter. This raises significant problems regarding how tosecure safety at the time of a flood.
Care managers and nursing care workers have become social
resources to assist the elderly since many senior citizens who livein their own homes receive nursing care insurance. These professionals essentially worked well during the disaster. However, one
reason for the elderly deaths is that there was not a systematic
emergency preparedness plan for community care managers. It
was also concluded that there was a clear gap in the understandingof the senior citizens needs between the nursing care workers andthe leaders and sub-leaders of community associations or district
welfare officers.
2.7 Lessons of this Survey for Damage Mitigation
What proposals can be made to reduce flood damage in the
future based on the above results? There appears to be no universal measure to reduce the number of elderly victims. Rather, theresults of this survey suggest that the following methods for reducing damage should be specifically determined for each of the threepatterns.
・Where a severe flood threatens to destroy wooden houses:
・Ensure early escape to a safe shelter in anticipation of flooding
above the second floor.
・Identify dangerous zones by mapping hazards.
・Advise residents to avoid constructing houses without considering flood preparedness in hazardous zones.
・Where a flood (above the floor) is not severe enough to destroy
wooden houses:
・Avoid going out during the flood.
・Escape to somewhere safer inside the house.
・Where someone is latter-term elderly and unable to walk and yet
has no helper beside him/her in an emergency:
・Utilize the care insurance system and local welfare resources.
・Ensure a system for transmitting information helpful for earlyrecognition of unusually heavy rain or strong wind. And set

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K. TAMURA, H. HAYASHI AND R. KIMURA

numerical standards for the system.
2.7.1 When a severe flood threatens to destroy wooden houses
As a precaution against a severe flood such as the one that
occurred in the Nakanoshima District of Nakanoshima Town, it
may first be concluded that land use avoiding the construction ofwooden houses in areas at high risk of flooding should be fundamentally promoted. If possible, it is advisable to control the construction of private properties in such highly hazardous areas. If
residents still insist on building their houses in such areas, anti-hazard house construction methods should be devised: e.g. the use ofhighly earthquake-resistant architecture such as reinforced concretebuildings, traditional levee raising, and the first floor constructedon piers to allow water through.
In post-war Japan, the population increase and the concentration of people in urban areas have accelerated the construction ofmany houses in floodplains in the vicinities of cities, which wereformerly used for agriculture. As a result, the potential susceptibility of floodplains to disaster has risen. On the other hand, flood
disaster measures have been taken with a focus on the promotion ofriver and embankment improvements for higher flow capacity andwater control of the whole basin through constructing dams in theupper reaches of rivers. These measures have gradually reduced
the frequency of floods. In turn, this reduction has increasingly
facilitated the concentration of population in the floodplains.
The flood in Sanjo in 2000 really showed the limits of making
river improvements for flood prevention. This disaster was a oncein-several-centuries event that resulted in external and internal
flooding in the Shinkawa Basin on the right bank of the Shonai.
The Shinkawa is a canal that was dug on the rural right bank of the
Shonai in the Edo Period to protect the developing city center ofNagoya on the left bank from flooding. The recent development ofland for housing has had an effect on the frequency of flood disasters in the Shinkawa Basin, which have occurred on such a large
scale that insurance paid for written-off cars alone exceeds 100 billion yen. This example shows that there are limits to the hazards
that can be prevented by river improvements. Floods now cause
tremendous damage due to the increased fragility of the basin. The
flood deterrence level of a river is represented by the recurrence
cycle of flooding. Whereas a cycle of 200 years is assumed forfirst-class rivers, a cycle of 5 to 10 years is assumed for small andmedium-sized rivers and drainage systems. The fragility of floodplains in the face of hazards beyond such scales has been sharply
increased by the recent concentrations of population.
In this situation, efforts toward damage mitigation should startwith making local people aware that they are living in a dangerous
place. For this purpose, a hazard map needs to be prepared toensure that local people take hazards into account when using land.
2.7.2 When a flood (above the floor) is not severe enough todestroy wooden houses
This applies to the two patterns of death in Sanjo City where
wooden houses were not destroyed. For the five victims who diedoutdoors near the break on the east side of the Shin etsu Line in thecity, it seems that their deaths could have been prevented by clarifying the concept of evacuation. Where the flooding of wooden
houses is not severe enough to destroy them or where flooding ofjust the first floor is predicted, staying at home should be considered as an important means of escape: i.e. going upstairs or using
the second floor of a neighbor s house as a shelter.

After this disaster, the staff in charge of disaster prevention in
the Cabinet Office set up a conference on the transmission of
information and provision of support to elderly people in case ofheavy rain. This conference considered the concept of evacuation
with respect to those who need care and help in a disaster.
Evacuation when used as an administrative term is defined as
spatial movement from one point to another. However, the pattern of death near the break on the east side of the Shin etsu Line in
Sanjo City suggests how dangerous walking in the water above thehips is once the town begins to be submerged in over one meter offlood water. From the aspect of life saving, it should be regarded
as an active escape for those who are able to walk by themselves tostay in a safe indoor place available near them instead of going to a
designated shelter far away. This requires the local people to makeit a habit to not only escape with their own families but also mutually help neighbors or even strangers just passing by. In the UnitedStates and Europe, where more weight has been given to anti-terrorism measures in recent years, staying at home is regarded as afundamental means of escape from the leak of toxic substances orthe detonation of explosives. For escape from terrorist attacks,
staying at home is considered as the main means of protection.
2.7.3 When someone is latter-term elderly and unable to walk andyet has no helper beside him/her in an emergency
Even in a flood that did not destroy wooden houses (flooding
above the floor), four elderly victims were found dead in their own
homes in the western vicinity of the Shin etsu Line in Sanjo City.
This fact will fuel the argument that staying at home is not a safemeans of escape. However, they were latter-term elderly andunable to walk by themselves and yet had no helpers available withthem at the time of flooding, and these personal conditions exerted
a great effect on their suffering. The fragility of the victims had asubstantial effect on their suffering because they were not flexible
enough to act in response to a rapid change in their circumstances.
On the other hand, it was found through the field survey thatthe local communities in the affected areas have remained strong.
The local people, who have sensitive and humane feelings, arehighly capable of self-help and mutual help. Paradoxically, it may
be because of this sense of mutual support that the Sanjo victims
who needed care were able to live at ease in their communities.
Ironically, it is highly possible that if they had lived in a large city,
they may have been nursed in homes for the elderly, where the riskof death is probably rather low. When considering the problem ofsafety for those who need to be cared for at home, it is important toregard it not as a personal problem of those in need of help but as asocial issue of how to coordinate welfare resources in the community with individual needs in as swift and proper a manner as possible in a disaster. Specifically, it is a significant issue for the future
to examine how to integrate the problem of disaster into the framework of the care system that started in 2000.
2.8 Model of Support for Evacuation of People Needing Careand Transmission of Information in the Case of Storm andFlood Damage
The results of the field survey are summarized in Fig. 17. To
conclude this survey, five points to be examined will be describedin relation to damage mitigation in the future.
2.8.1 Staying at Home as a Means of Escape
In order to escape storm and flood damage, inhabitants of an

CLARIFYING SUFFERING OF THE ELDERLY IN THE 2004 NIIGATA FLOOD AND THE 2004 MID-NIIGATA PREFECTURE EARTHQUAKE

area evacuate to a shelter designated by the administration, usuallyin a school or community center. This means of escape could beconsidered simplistic. Instead, we need to consider taking actions
more appropriate to the circumstances presented. If moving toanother place is very dangerous and a house has a low risk of collapse, we should consider it as a proper means of escape to go
upstairs or to a place high enough for safety in the neighborhoodand stay there until the storm or flood subsides.
The role of the hazard map is very significant in providing abasis for determining whether people should move to a safe placein their homes or go to a designated shelter. In an area where theflood threatens the collapse of houses, it is advisable to escape to avery safe place such as a designated shelter well before the flooding starts. In contrast, in an area where the flooding of wooden
houses is not expected to be deep enough to destroy them, should
staying at home not be considered a means of escape? In either
case, it is clearly dangerous to go out in a flood.
2.8.2 Positioning Helpers for Disaster Prevention
The conventional approach to escape has treated people uniformly under the general concepts of sufferer and evacuee
without taking specific personal needs into consideration. With
this approach, we have unconsciously assumed healthy adult men.
The flood this time raises new questions about how to cope withpeople needing care. In other words, it is pointed out for the futurethat we are required to consider not only how to get ourselves out
safely on the one hand, but also how to support the people needing
care around us on the other.
When considering the evacuation of people needing care, weshould not leave it to them to escape by themselves but should consider how to make caretakers and helpers available to them.
Securing such supporters is impractical in the conventional anti-

79

disaster community. Rather, a very realistic way to secure support
is linkage with the care insurance system whereby the supportivefunction of the welfare community will be reinforced to cope witha disaster.
2.8.3 Self-determination on Proper Escape as a Target of Disaster
Prevention
A fundamental rule of escape is self-help. For us to escapesafely using our own judgment, we need to correctly understandwhen we should evacuate our homes and when we should not. For
this purpose, a system for providing information needs to be established. Local people are not certain to take safe action just becausea municipality issues an evacuation warning. Information influencing the decision to evacuate is not limited to warnings issued by theadministration but also includes various types of information suchas TV, radio and other mass media, the Internet, word-of-mouthcommunication, and information directly obtained by the five senses. We usually reach a decision after considering all of these typesof information in combination. Accordingly, the municipality
should not consider it sufficient just to provide information to urge
local people to evacuate their homes. Instead, they should regard
such information as a reference to aid local people in understanding the situation.
2.8.4 Setting Numerical Standards for Forecasts and Warnings
Since the municipality is responsible for securing the safety of
the lives and properties of individual residents, it is required toissue a warning or an order of evacuation depending on the circumstances. Even the staff in charge of disaster prevention is basicallygeneral members of the municipality who take charge in rotation.
In reality, the staff members in charge are not always highly specialized or sufficiently experienced in this area. Therefore, standards for issuing forecasts and warnings need to be set in numericalFig. 17 A General Model of Evacuation from Storm and Flood Damage

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K. TAMURA, H. HAYASHI AND R. KIMURA

terms so that everyone can make correct judgments with certainty.
2.8.5 Establishing a System for Observing Low and Medium
River Water Levels and Flows for Each River Basin
A prerequisite for setting numerical standards for forecasts
and warnings is the availability of data on rainfall and water level
observations. Water level observations for rivers under direct
national control and those under indirect prefecture control vary.
In the latter case, there are many small and medium-sized rivers forwhich water levels are not observed. Moreover, as these rivers are
subject to improvement works to prevent only small-scale five- toten-year-interval floods, they have a high risk of overflow compared with rivers under direct national control. Moreover, while
the rivers under direct national control are improved to cope withrare one- to two-hundred-year-interval floods, the water levels ofsmall and medium-sized rivers at high risk of overflow are not wellobserved. Many small and medium-sized rivers lack sufficient
data on water level, volume of flow, and river cross-section for
estimating discharge capacity or for considering flood control andrisk management.
In the July-13th flood, breaks occurred not in the banks of the
Shinano, the main stream, but in those of the Ikarashi and the
Kariyata, flowing into the Shinano. Before these breaks, inland
flooding occurred in Rannan, Sanjo City. The suffering thatensued reflects the fact that observation networks had not yet been
established for the immediately threatening external flooding of
small and medium-sized rivers or inland flooding despite being
fully established for the rivers under direct national control thathave a greater impact on a larger area. It is a problem for the
future to coordinate the observation system of small and mediumsized rivers with the evacuation of the local people.
3. THE 2004 MID-NIIGATA EARTHQUAKE
3.1 Background
The Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake occurred on October
23 and had 1) long-lasting aftershocks, 2) evacuations by the village units, 3) officials advising a wide area to evacuate, and 4) sub-stantial damage to the life line, which resulted in a larger numberof evacuees and more senior citizens needing care. The aim of thisstudy is to gather basic data on the response to the elderly, to show
the necessity for disciplined disaster management care, and todevelop a systematic approach to the disaster process for senior citizens under dramatic changes in the social environment.
3.2 Survey 1: Social Random Sampled Survey in the AffectedAreas
3.2.1 Subject disaster and area
The survey was conducted in Ojiya City and Kawaguchi Town
where casualties and damage to houses were serious throughout thearea. Both male and female adults living in this area participated inthis survey. The adopted method was stratified two-stage sampling. Initially, 50 spots in this area were randomly selected: 43
spots in Ojiya City and 7 spots in Kawaguchi Town, which is proportional to the population ratio. Then, a sampling was conductedwith the probability proportional to size. Using the basic registersof the residents, we sampled 20 individuals, who did not reside in
the same household, from each spot. We requested the individual
to complete the survey so that an equal number of male and female
subjects were sampled. Consequently, 1,000 subjects were sampled, i.e., 2.19% of the population in the area (45,668 persons as ofMarch, 2005).
We mailed the questionnaires to the subjects and asked themto return the completed survey via mail. We mailed the questionnaires on March 18, 2005 and collected them until April 5, 2005.
Toward the end of March, reminders were mailed to those who had
yet to return their questionnaires.
3.2.2 Basic Attributes
We collected 543 responses (response rate: 54.3%).
Responses that 1) were partially or not completed, 2) were error
laden, 3) did not specify sex or age, and 4) were from individuals
that did not reside in Ojiya City or Kawaguchi Town during theearthquake were excluded. Hence, 518 completed surveys werecollected (effective response rate: 51.8%).
To ensure random sampling, we verified that the respondents
reflected the features of the general population in terms of basic

Fig. 18 After the Impact, Which Place were You Evacuated to?

CLARIFYING SUFFERING OF THE ELDERLY IN THE 2004 NIIGATA FLOOD AND THE 2004 MID-NIIGATA PREFECTURE EARTHQUAKE

attributes, i.e., sex and age (generation). The number of households and estimated population per municipality (as of March 1,
2005) and the estimated population per age (5-year increments)(aggregate) (as of January 1, 2005), published by the Emergency
Management and Disaster Division, Niigata Prefecture
Government, were used to determine the basic attributes of thegeneral population.
The result of the goodness-of-fit test did not show significant
differences in sex and age (generation) between the respondents
and the general population (sex:χ2 (1)=0.85, n.s., generation:χ2(2)=5.82, n.s.). Since there were no significant differences in thebasic attributes, it was concluded that the respondents do represent
the tendencies of the area.
3.2.3 The Results of Survey 1
Fig. 18 shows that 89.4% of the people who lived in theaffected area were evacuated outside the buildings because many
aftershocks occurred (over 500 aftershocks occurred from Oct 2331), while 10.6% of the people chose to stay at home. A total of
20.1% of them were evacuated to open spaces, 19.2% went onto
roads, 17.9% went into their own garage, and 13.8% stayed in theircars. The survey asked the respondents why they chose to stay athome, and 35.7% of them answered that because they had elderly
people in their family, they did not move somewhere else (Fig. 19).
The subject area of Survey (2), which assessed the MidNiigata Prefecture Earthquake on October 23, was Ojiya City,
Niigata Prefecture.
3.3 Survey 2: Social survey of Care Managers and Senior
Citizens
3.3.1 Subjects of this survey
Survey (2) included 23 care managers who provided homebased nursing care support in Ojiya City and 399 senior citizens

81

who were sent to welfare facilities for the elderly or hospitals during the emergency evacuation. Since it was difficult for somesenior citizens to answer the questionnaire, we asked the care managers who cared for the senior citizens evacuated to welfare facilities or hospitals to answer the questions on the senior citizens
behalf.
3.3.2 esults of Survey 2(A) General situation
The questionnaires were distributed on January 15, 2005
through the Geriatric Welfare Division, Ojiya City Office, and collected on January 31, 2005. A 100% response rate was achieved
with the assistance of the Geriatric Welfare Division since all 23
care managers that provide home-based nursing care in Ojiya City
responded to Questionnaire-A in Survey (2). Questionnaire-B was
distributed to 399 senior citizens, although 382 were returned; only
257 were assessed to be useful for the survey. Consequently, theeffective response rate was 64.4%.
(B) Situation of the senior citizens received at welfare facilities andhospitals in Ojiya City after the Mid-Niigata Prefecture
Earthquake
The graph in Fig. 20, which is based on the data from theGeriatric Welfare Division, Ojiya City, chronologically shows theextent to which care managers coped with the emergency evacuation needs. The division accumulated the data by calling the welfare facilities and hospitals to confirm the senior citizens received
during the emergency evacuation based on reports from the caremanagers. The division continued calling the facilities and hospitals until December 12, 2004, and the total number of people
received reached 399. On the day of the earthquake, the need for
emergency evacuations arose mainly for the elderly, who arehighly dependent on medical care. The needs then shifted tosenior citizens, who have difficulties staying at the shelters for a

Fig. 19 Reasons of the People for Choosing to Stay at home after the Impact

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K. TAMURA, H. HAYASHI AND R. KIMURA

long period. These needs peaked on October 27, 4 days after theearthquake.
(C) Actual situation of the elderly received at welfare facilities or
hospitals during the emergency evacuation
The average age of the 257 senior citizens received during
the emergency evacuation was 84. A total of 89.9% were 75 orolder, 6.2% were 65 to 74, and 3.9% were under 65. The reasonsfor their emergency hospitalization or reception at welfare facilities
were: 1) their houses were damaged and it became impossible toFig. 20

receive home-based nursing care (58.2%), 2) it became impossible
for the family member(s) to care for them at home (19.5%), 3) theirfacilities suffered physical damage (8.6%), 4) their needs changed(2.3%), 5) their conditions changed (1.8%), 6) they evacuated outside the city (1.8%), and 7) other (7.8%). The resources that supported the home-based care decreased by 77.7%.
Before the earthquake, 65.9% of the senior citizens received
dwelled at home and 27.1% resided in welfare facilities ( others
comprised 7%). On the day of the earthquake, 37.1% stayed in a

Elderly People Evacuated to Hospitals/Welfare Facilities in Ojiya City after the MidNiigata Prefecture Earthquake

Fig. 21 Changes in Dwelling Places of Victims Received during the Emergency Evacuation

CLARIFYING SUFFERING OF THE ELDERLY IN THE 2004 NIIGATA FLOOD AND THE 2004 MID-NIIGATA PREFECTURE EARTHQUAKE

Fig. 2283

Comparison of the Number of People Staying at Shelters and the Number of Senior Citizens
Evacuated to Hospitals/Welfare Facilities during the Emergency Evacuation

tent or a car, 16.3% evacuated to shelters, 17.6% stayed in welfare
facilities, 6.9% stayed in hospitals, and 10.6% remained at home.
Two to four days after the earthquake, 20% were still living intents, cars, or shelters. One week after the earthquake, the numberof senior citizens received at welfare facilities and hospitals
increased and peaked one month after the earthquake. By thattime, 61.7% had moved to welfare facilities and 23.0% to hospitals( others comprised 15.3%). Two months after the earthquake,the number of senior citizens at welfare facilities and hospitals
decreased, implying that they started to return home. However,three months after the earthquake, only 42.0% of the senior citizens
received had returned home (Fig. 21).
(D) Senior citizens returning home from hospitals/welfare facilities
Fig. 22 chronologically compares the number of senior citizens received at hospitals/welfare facilities during the emergency
evacuation and the number of evacuees staying at shelters.
The number of evacuees peaked five days after the earthquake. A
total of 29,000 of the 44,000 residents in Ojiya City evacuated thearea. The number of evacuees started to decline two weeks after
the earthquake and all of them had returned home by December 20,
2004. On the other hand, the number of elderly people received at
welfare facilities and hospitals during the emergency evacuation
increased in accordance with the increase of evacuees at the shelters and peaked 12 days after the earthquake. Although the numberof evacuees sharply declined two weeks after the earthquake, thenumber of the senior citizens at the welfare facilities and hospitals
did not decline as rapidly. The number of senior citizens staying at
welfare facilities and hospitals gradually declined to 177 as ofDecember 12. These findings suggest that the senior citizens whoneeded care were unable to reconstruct their lives compared to theother evacuees. Via a verbal confirmation on February 17, 2005,
67 senior citizens were still at hospitals and welfare facilities. Asof May 27, 2005, this number decreased to 50. Thus, our current

task is to help these 50 senior citizens return to their own homes.
4. CONCLUSION AND OBSERVATIONS
An essential issue in disaster planning is how to help people
that have difficulties evacuating an area by themselves. Typically,
the welfare services that support the lives of these people are only
provided at fixed times and cannot handle abrupt catastrophic disasters. Nevertheless, care managers play a pivotal role in the current welfare service and are knowledgeable about senior citizens
and their need for assistance when a disaster occurs. Care managers also have a strong sense of responsibility for the safety ofpeople in need. Thus, these care managers must be involved indeveloping individual evacuation plans for future senior citizens
who need support. Since care managers determine the evacuation
plan for senior citizens who require care, individuals and organizations, which will become life-saving resources in an emergency,
must be secured. Once these resources are ascertained, the administration, the welfare-related employees, and the community needto simulate evacuations and provide training in order to improvethe disaster prevention abilities of the community.
On July 13,2004 in Niigata Prefecture, 15 people were killed
due to the disaster caused by severe rains. Twelve of them wereclassified as elderly people who were over 65 years old. We
investigated using a profiling technique the causes of the deaths of
the 12 persons who died in the flood disasters based on the integration of various kinds of related information through GIS. Three
distinct patterns were identified: 1) Death was caused by severe
flooding that exceeded 3 meters high and collapsed the wooden
houses where the victims were located; 2) It was caused bystrolling in the flooding area; 3) It was caused by individual vulnerabilities such as being over 75 years old, having a need for assistance due to difficulty in walking capability, and the unavailability

84

K. TAMURA, H. HAYASHI AND R. KIMURAof assistance at the time of flooding. The survey clarifies thatmany elderly survivors of the flood were assisted well by caremanagers, professionals of the government-sponsored Long-term
Care Insurance System.
After the emergency period of the Mid-Niigata Prefecture
Earthquake was over, the care managers mainly provided support
to the elderly requiring care by facilitating their reception at welfare facilities and hospitals. However, there are fundamental
issues. 1) The facilities were selected from the limited options
within the care managers network. It was difficult to select facilities that might help these senior citizens reconstruct their lives. 2)
These senior citizens tended to have prolonged stays at these facilities. In Ojiya City, which was hit by the Mid-Niigata Prefecture
Earthquake, more than 50 senior citizens (as of May 27, 2005 when
this paper is written) have yet to return to their previous lives within the community.
The resources available to care receivers living at homedecreased due to the disaster, which prevented these senior citizens
from leaving the hospitals and welfare facilities and from returning
home. Hence, a new special area called disaster caremanagement must be established. This area allows care managers to play a leading role in systematizing knowledge, techniques, and networking for total care management during a disasterand remaining within the framework of the nursing care insurance
system.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was partially supported by the Ministry of
Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Special
Purposes, research on the Niigata, Fukushima and Fukui Flood
Disaster in July 2004, and by COE research, Center of Excellence
for Natural Disaster Science and Disaster Reduction (Disaster
Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Japan).
The Authors thank the people who gave us the opportunity ofinterviewing them about their experiences through the 2004
Niigata Flood and the 2004 Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake.
We also thank the officials of Ojiya city, who gave us the chance towork together solve a variety of challenges we faced in the 2004
Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake

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