RENEWABLES GLOBAL FUTURES REPORT
Online Supplement

ENDNOTES

Draft January 16, 2013

REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century
Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies

[Note: Full reference citations are found in the report’s bibliography.]
INTRODUCTION
1. For 2011, REN21 (2012) and BNEF/UNEP (2012) give net investment in renewable power
capacity as some $40 billion higher than the same measure for fossil fuels. BNEF/UNEP (2012)
and Schneider and Froggatt (2012) both estimate investment in new nuclear power plants at
approximately $5 billion in 2011. For more details, see Endnote 2 for Chapter 3.
2. Investment in 2011 from BNEF/UNEP (2012). See also Footnote (a) on page 33 of the report.
3. IEA projection from IEA WEO (2000). World Bank projection from World Bank (1996). Global
wind power capacity in 2010 and China wind power and solar PV capacity in 2011 from REN21(2012).
4. For more discussion on motivations for renewable energy, see GEA (2012) Chapters 2‐6. See
also Scheer (2005) and Girardet and Mendonca (2009). Many of the published scenarios listed in
Annex 1, particular high‐renewables scenarios like Greenpeace (2012), also discuss the variety
of motivations.
5. Good references for understanding energy systems and the context for renewable energy
include Tester et al (2006), Randolph and Masters (2008), IPCC (2011), and GEA (2012).
6. For basic discussion of cost comparisons, see Kammen and Pacca (2004), Owen (2004), IPCC
(2011) Chapter 10, and GEA (2012) Chapter 6.
7. Examples of “high‐renewables” scenarios modeling strong levels of policy support in the
future together with continued cost reductions include Greenpeace (2012), GEA (2012), RETD
ACES (2010).
8. Renewable energy policies are covered in many references, including IEA (2008), Sawin andMoomaw (2009), IEA (2011a), IPCC (2011) Chapter 11, and GEA (2012) Chapters 22‐25.
9. Scenarios portraying high‐renewables futures using only currently existing technologies
include NREL (2012): “The central conclusion of the analysis is that renewable electricity
generation from technologies that are commercially available today, in combination with a more
flexible electric system, is more than adequate to supply 80% of total U.S. electricity generationin 2050 while meeting electricity demand on an hourly basis in every region of the UnitedStates.”, p iii .[] Scenarios showing total energy system cost to be roughly equal for renewables‐
centric and fossil fuel‐centric cases include IEA ETP (2012): “The cost of creating low‐carbon
energy systems now will be outweighed by the potential fuel savings enjoyed by future
generations. A sustainable energy system will require USD 140 trillion in investments to 2050
but would generate undiscounted net savings of more than USD 60 trillion”, p. 29; UCS (2009):“Climate 2030 Blueprint shows that deep emissions cuts can be achieved while saving U.S.
consumers and businesses $465 billion in 2030”, p. 3; IEA RETD (2010): “when considering both
initial investments and ongoing energy cost savings, there is virtually no difference in totalenergy system costs between aggressive climate mitigation scenarios and so‐called “Reference”
scenarios that contain little or no mitigation measures”, p. ii.
10. A good discussion of the many facets of integration of renewable energy can be found in IPCC
(2011) Chapter 8.

211. Energy system transitions are discussed in Girardet and Mendonca (2009), Sims (2009), IEA(2009), Palz (2011), and GEA (2012) Chapters 16‐17.
12. Ibid.
13. ExxonMobil quotes from ExxonMobil (2012), p. 46 and 30. ENI quote from “Alternative andRenewable Sources,” http://www.eni.com/en_IT/innovation‐technology/technological‐
challenges/alternative‐renewable‐sources/alternative‐renewable‐sources.shtml (viewed
07/20/2012). Chevron quote from Chevron (2010) “The Next Generation of Energy Technology
Report: Energy for the 21st Century,” p. 29. CLP Hong Kong Power quote from CLP Hong Kong
Power (2011) “Sustainability Report,” p. 40.
14. The conclusions of the IRENA‐IEA RETD (2012) workshop on levelized cost are available at
http://iea‐retd.org/archives/events/irena‐and‐iea‐retd‐workshop‐on‐levelised‐costs‐of‐renewable‐energy. For more information on the IEA ETP (2012) transport cost assessment see
IEA ETP (2012), p. 453.
15. Number of countries with policies promoting renewables in 2005, and 2012, from REN21(2006) and REN21 (2012) respectively. ExxonMobil quote from ExxonMobil (2012), p. 1. IEA
quote from IEA WEO (2010), p. 277.
CHAPTER 1
1. REN21 (2012) gives 8.6% from traditional biomass and 8.2% from modern renewables. IEA(2012c) gives 9.6% from traditional biomass and 8.4% from modern renewables; both sets offigures are for share of final energy consumption (TFEC) in 2010. Other recent published figures
for primary energy share from renewables are as low as 13%, for example in IPCC (2011) using
the “physical” method. This is because there are several alternative approaches to calculating
global energy share from renewables, all of which are analytically valid, but which produce
different results. The two main types of indicators are primary energy share and final energy
share. Final energy share has emerged in recent years as an accepted indicator that many
consider better at capturing the true useful value of each energy source. For primary energy
share, there several alternative ways to calculate shares, and in particular the “physical” method
yields lower shares for hydro, solar PV, and wind power than the “substitution” method, relative
to biomass, fossil‐fuel, and nuclear power. For further explanation and comparison of thedifferent methodologies and metrics, three sources are recommended: REN21 (2008), Sidebar 1,
page 21, for a brief summary; Martinot et al (2007) for a detailed explanation; and IPCC (2011)
Annex 2 for a side‐by‐side comparison of methodologies. Examples of historical projections
include World Bank (1996), NREL (1999), EWEA and Greenpeace (1999), IEA (2000),
Greenpeace (2001), Pearce (2002), IEA (2003), and EWEA (2003). For more on historicalprojections, see Topic #1, “Past Views,” in the online supplement “Topical Discussion Report.”
2. REN21 (2012). The phrase “total energy from renewables” can refer in the context of thisreport to either primary energy share or final energy share, depending on what is reported fromthe source being cited. The REN21 (2012) figures for share of energy mostly refer to primaryenergy share, but some countries report and target final share only, and are cited by REN21 as
final energy share. In general, the exact difference between primary and final energy sharedepends on the mix of energy sources and their end‐uses, and is unique to each country. In somecountries, both figures can be almost the same, while in others they can be substantiallydifferent; see the explanations in sources cited in Endnote 1. In most of these countries, hydro is
the main renewable source. In others it is geothermal or biomass. Brazil, Iceland, and Sweden
had close to or above 50%. Renewable energy share data from REN21 (2012), Table R9, except
for Iceland and New Zealand, which come from IEA (2012) Renewables Information. All figures3

are most recent as of mid‐2012, but lag behind current year due to data collection and reporting;for some countries the reported share in Table R9 is for 2009 not 2010. Some shares are forprimary energy and some shares are for final energy. (See Endnote 1 for Chapter 1 regarding
primary vs. final energy.) For most countries, only one metric is available; however, when both
metrics are available, the final energy share metric is used for purposes of this report. Denmark
was 23% (final share) in 2009‐2010, but has grown since then. Other countries above 20%
include Barbados, Belize, Estonia, Guatemala, and Latvia. A number of countries shown in the
REN21 (2012) Table R9 Annex at 100% share are incorrectly reported, but still have shares
above 20%, including Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay. Data for renewable energy shares for the EU and U.S. also
from REN21 (2012) Table R9, and for Japan from METI (2010). Per REN21 (2012), Endnote 12,
Chapter 1, page 129, 102 GW of renewables and 106 GW of conventional power generation
capacity were added in 2011. That includes about 4 GW of new nuclear capacity per
International Atomic Energy Agency (2012), “Nuclear Technology Review.” REN21 (2012) calls
this comparison between renewable and conventional generation capacity for 2011 “almost
half,” but the numbers were considered close enough for general purposes of scale to label thecomparison "about half" in the present report.
3. IEA (2003) shows primary energy shares by 2050 of 15.7% for biomass and 18.9% for otherrenewables (page 129).
4. IEA ETP (2006) reference scenario was 11%. “ACT Map” showed a 24% share and “Tech Plus”
showed 30%. Greenpeace energy shares reported in this section are all for primary energy
share, although Greenpeace scenarios also project final energy shares as separate numbers,
generally higher than primary energy share.
5. [Pending]
6. All energy shares cited in this report are primary energy unless otherwise noted in endnotes.

Chevron quote from “Energy Policy (April 2012)”
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/energypolicy/ (viewed 7/20/2012). Total quotefrom “Our Energies: Oil Driving Growth” http://www.total.com/en/our‐energies/oil‐
940838.html (viewed 7/20/2012).
7. Box 2 is based on the following sources: BP (2012), ExxonMobil (2012), GEA (2012),
Greenpeace (2012), IEA ETP (2012), IEA RETD (2010), IEA WEO (2012), and IPCC (2011). For
IEA ETP (2012), the predecessor to the “2DS” scenario is the “Blue Map” scenario in the 2010
edition. For the IEA WEO (2012), the reference case is the “Current Policies” scenario. For IEA
ETP (2012), the “6DS” scenario is taken as the reference case. Percentage reductions in energy
demand for IEA ETP by 2050 is based on primary energy demand of 940 EJ by 2050 for “6DS”(reference case) and 697 EJ for “2DS”, which is a 26% reduction relative to “6DS” (697 EJ is 26%
less than 940 EJ). Similar calculations were done for IEA WEO (2012), and GEA (2012), andGreenpeace (2012). Although many scenarios include carbon capture and storage (CCS)
technologies, the “pace of deployment remains highly uncertain, with only a handful ofcommercial‐scale projects currently in operation,” according to IEA WEO (2012), p. 25. IEA
RETD (2010) “ACES” projects a virtual decarbonization of electricity by 2030 from renewables,
nuclear, and CCS on all fossil fuel power plants. Greenpeace (2012) primary energy share for2030 is 41%. Equivalent final energy shares are 45% in 2030 and 88% in 2050.
8. GEA (2012) provides a number of “pathways” in the “Efficiency” case that range from 30% to75%.

49. Credibility as used in this report entails many factors such as the type of authoringorganizations and their experience, the number and breadth of experts involved, whether ascenario has become annually or biennially issued and based on an established long‐standing
process, if the process and methodologies are transparent, the degree of independent reviewer
participation, and analytical rigor. All scenarios cited in this report meet these criteria to varying
degrees and were deemed sufficient to be included in the “range of credible possibilities.” Forexample, the Greenpeace (2012) scenario involves leading academics, researchers, and industry
experts from around the world, has been published biennially since 2007, documents its
methodologies, and relies on an extensive review process. As Greenpeace/EREC/GWEC (2012)[Greenpeace (2012)] notes, “the IPCC’s Special Report Renewables (SRREN) chose the[Greenpeace scenario] as one of the four benchmark scenarios for climate mitigation energy
scenarios… Following the publication of the SRREN in May 2011…, the [Greenpeace scenario]
became a widely quoted energy scenario and is now part of many scientific debates andreferenced in numerous scientific peer‐reviewed literatures” (p. 338).
10. The original “Fact Sheet” for the UN “Sustainable Energy for All” initiative(http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org/images/content/untitled%20folder/Fact%20Sheets/
RenewableEnergy.pdf) gives a current global share from renewables of 15%, which would thenmean a doubling to 30% share by 2030. However, using a 17‐18% current global share (seeEndnote 1 for Chapter 1) implies a 35% share by 2030. The UN initiative in 2012 was in theprocess of updating its share baseline and methodologies, a process that was expected to resultin an implied 35% share by 2030. If a 13% current global share is used, based on primary energy
share from IEA WEO (2012) or IPCC (2011), then the target would only imply a 26% share by2030. Given that the share of traditional biomass in 2011 was 8.6%, and assuming that shareremains constant through 2030, and using a 35% target for the UN initiative, means a roughly
26% share of modern renewables by 2030, which is roughly triple the current share of 8.2%,
based on Endnote 1 for Chapter 1.
11. Selected national and regional scenarios are given in Annex 2, although many more such
scenarios exist than could be complied for the present report. One research problem faced wasthat many national scenarios are not in English and require translation.
12. Ibid.
13. Number of countries with policy targets from REN21 (2006) and REN21 (2012). The EUcollective target and individual country targets are all final energy targets; the EU adoption ofthis metric in 2007‐2008 made it a “mainstream” indicator for the first time, as previously
primary energy was the predominate metric; see REN21 (2008), Sidebar 1, p. 21. An EU 45%
target for 2030 is also under discussion (see section on EU in Chapter 5). The full progression oftargets for Germany is 18% (2020), 30% (2030), 45% (2040), and 60% (2050); these are final
energy shares. The actual 2010 share for Germany was 11%. Shares for Denmark are also final
energy shares; the actual 2010 share was 23%.
14. Target data from REN21 (2012) Table R9. Targets are Algeria 40% (2030), China 15%(2020), Indonesia 25% (2025), Jamaica 20% (2030), Jordan 10% (2020), Madagascar 54%(2020), Mali 15% (2020), Mauritius 35% (2025), Samoa 20% (2030), Senegal 15% (2025),
South Korea 11% (2030), Thailand 20% (2022), Turkey 30% (2023), Ukraine 19% (2030), andVietnam 8% (2025). Algeria’s targets are final energy share. Indonesia’s targets are 10.2% from
biofuels, 6.3% from geothermal, and 1.4% from wind/solar/hydro by 2025 (REN21, 2012, Table
R11). Shares for OECD countries without targets also from REN21 (2012), Table R9. Tonga andFiji are listed in REN21 (2012) Table R9 with 100% targets by 2013, but these targets are
considered as inaccurate or misinterpreted reporting, given that transport cannot be 100%
renewable in that time frame. A few countries with already‐large shares of renewables are listedwith targets above 80%, including Fiji, Gabon, Tonga, and Uruguay.
515. The Chinese target is for primary energy share. Chinese energy experts expected nuclear toremain in the range 2‐4% by 2020, so renewables should attain 11‐13% energy share if thetarget is met. China’s target includes nuclear power and thus represents a “zero‐carbon” target
rather than a renewable energy target. Some observers expect China’s nuclear share to reach 3‐
4% by 2020 (Martinot 2010), so the renewables share would be 11‐12% in that case if the 15%
target is exactly met. China also has a quota obligation for utilities, 3% of electricity and
8% of capacity by 2020, for non‐hydro renewables only. China’s share of energy fromrenewable energy in 2010‐2011 (both years are considered similar) was roughly 9%, and theshare of nuclear was roughly 1%, per Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Association (CREIA),
December 2012. The share of renewables in total power generation was 18% in 2011, but was
expected to increase to 22% in 2012 due to an increase in hydropower generation. The share ofelectricity from nuclear power was 1.9% in 2011 (about one‐tenth that of renewables), and was
expected to increase to 2.2% in 2012. The “50% increase in renewable energy over 2010 levels”
mentioned in the text actually means a “50% increase in renewable energy share over 2010
levels,” based on the presumption that the renewables share increases from 9% to 13.5% andthe nuclear share increases from 1% to 1.5% by 2020.
16. See REN21 (2012) Table R10 for countries with electricity share targets and for existing
electricity shares.
17. See REN21 (2012) Table R11 for countries with heating and cooling targets.
18. See REN21 (2012) Table R11 for countries with targets for transport shares, and Table R14
for national and state/provincial biofuels blending mandates.
19. Transport shares given in Table 1 and in other scenarios generally include road, air,maritime, and rail transport, although some scenario projections only cover road transport
specifically. [Other notes pending.]
20. Global and EU share of electricity production from renewables data from REN21 (2012). For
global electricity production, the share reported for hydropower is 15.3% and for other non‐hydro renewables is 5.0%. Countries with renewable electricity production share above 30%
from REN21 (2012), Table R10.
21. Most targets include both large and small hydropower, but some countries only have targets
for small hydropower. For example, India targets small hydro separately, and reports on total
renewables share excluding large hydro. All targets from REN21 (2012) except Malaysia, fromhttp://investpenang.gov.my/portal/pdf/FiT_Ms_Chen_SEDA.pdf. Thailand’s target is for 2022.
Australia’s target is based on its national 20% quota obligation for electric utilities.
22. Targets from REN21 (2012), except Australia, which is from REN21 (2011). South Korea has
a complete set of policy targets for electricity from all renewable technologies by 2030, including
solar PV (1 TWh [2]), wind (17 TWh), biomass and biogas (3 TWh), geothermal (3 TWh), ocean(6 TWh), and hydro (6 TWh), [AND SOLAR THERMAL (2 TWh)] totaling 40 TWh by 2030. (Forcomparison, South Korea’s total electricity generation in 2010 was 496 TWh, per BP XLS
workbook of historical statistical data through 2011,
http://www.bp.com/sectionbodycopy.do?categoryId=7500&contentId=7068481).
23. Scotland target from REN21 (2012), Upper Austrial and South Australia targets from REN21(2010). Abu Dhabi target fromhttp://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/01/abu‐dhabi‐sets‐7‐
percent‐renewables‐target‐54536. Technically, 29 states plus Washington DC, the U.S.
possessions of Puerto Rico, and Mariana Islands also have RPS policies. REN21 (2012)], Table
6

R13 footnote has list of additional targets and RPS policies not shown in Table R13. Additional
Canadian provinces have targets but no RPS policies; see the policy chapter of REN21 (2012).
Indian states with RPS policies were reported as 12 in REN21 (2010) and 15 in REN21 (2012).
24. [Pending]
25. In Table 2 and Figure 2, current electricity shares from REN21 (2012), Table R10, except
Japan from METI (2010) and China from Chinese Renewable Energy Industries Association,
December 2012. All targets for 2020, and German targets fro 2030 and 2050 also from Table
R10. Current electricity shares are typically for 2010 or 2011, although some sources are slightly
ambiguous as to which years apply. Future share of 75% for Europe from SEI (2009) is
estimated from two graphics: Figure 27, page 38 shows that approximately 78% of the CHP
feedstock will be biomass by 2030. From this assessment, and assuming that the share ofbiomass is the same in the heat and power generated, Figure 24, page 36 is then used to estimate
75% total share, including all renewables plus biomass used in CHP (assumed to be a 78% shareof feedstock). UCS (2009) excludes hydropower. Another US scenario “High‐resolution modelingof the western North American power system demonstrates low‐cost and low‐carbon futures”,
Nelson et al (2012), shows up to about 60% of electricity from renewables between 2026 and2029 (High gas price scenario).
26. [Links for heating and cooling legislation and targets]
27. EU member targets for heating and cooling from REN21 (2012) Table R11, except for
Lithuania from http://www.erec.org/fileadmin/erec_docs/Documents/Publications/EREC‐
roadmap‐V4_final.pdf
28. [Pending]
29. IEA quote from IEA WEO (2012), pp. 215‐216 and p.218. IEA also says: “Global bioenergyuse, excluding traditional biomass, for heat production grows from 294 Mtoe in 2010 to 480
Mtoe in 2035. Solar heat, mainly used in buildings, grows at 5.5% per year from 19 Mtoe to 73
Mtoe over 2010‐2035…Geothermal heat, also used mainly in buildings, grows at 7.8% per year
from 3 Mtoe in 2010 to 19 Mtoe in 2035” (p. 218‐219). In the Greenpeace (2012) “Revolution”
scenario for 2020, biomass will still be the dominant renewable energy source for heating,supplying almost three‐quarters of renewables heating. Then from 2020 to 2040 solar
collectors, geothermal heating and heat pumps will represent 94% of the renewables heating
growth and will ultimately become the dominant heating sources by 2050.
30. Biofuels blending mandates from REN21 (2012) Table R14. [add EU and Sweden targets]
31. Biofuels production was roughly 110 billion liters in 2011, per REN21 (2012), so growth by afactor of 3 to 6 reflects those multiples of this 110 billion liters by 2035. In Table 1, p. 18, global
scenarios take into account the transport sector as a whole including road transport, as well as
air, maritime, and rail transport in their analysis (see also Endnote 19). This also applies to EREC
(2010) and SEI (2009) both cited in Endnote 32. IEA RETD (2010) may not include all forms oftransport.
32. WWF projects that much of this transformation occurs after 2030, as the share of transportenergy from renewables grows from 5% in 2010, to 12% in 2020, and then to 33% in 2030,
before growing to 100% in 2050.
33. [Pending]7

CHAPTER 2
1. Some experts dislike the “integration” concept, instead preferring to think of coming“transformations” of our energy systems. (See also the report’s Conclusion.) One asks, “do wereally need renewables to fit into the existing system, or do we need all energy technologies to
evolve in different ways and with different roles and shares into a transformed energy system?”This report has presented “integration” as something of a middle ground between conservative
approaches that see renewables remaining marginal, and grand‐transformation visions. A
common sentiment among experts was that in the coming decade or two, the “integration”
concept would govern, but at some point, beyond a critical threshold, the view that [the systemtransforms to accommodate all energy technologies and their characteristics], will take hold. Of
course, some of the most optimistic experts said such transformation was imminent in the
coming several years!
2. For much more discussion and elaboration of the “integration” subjects covered in thischapter, see Chapter 8 of IPCC (2011), “Integration of Renewable Energy into Present and Future
Energy Systems.”
3. Some forms of ocean energy, for example tidal power, is also variable. The variability of CSP
plants depends on the degree of embedded thermal storage. Many current plants are being builtwith 4‐8 hours of daily storage, which allows operation into the evening hours, although longer
storage times of 24‐48 hours are possible with current technology. There is also a seasonal
component to CSP variability, as well as daily variations due to weather conditions. Examples oftechnical and regulatory tolerances include reserve margin, voltage and frequency control,
spinning reserve, and ancillary balancing services on varying time scales from minutes to hours.
The term “electric utility” is used generically here to denote a variety of companies in the power
sector. In most OECD countries and some developing countries, power grid functions have been
split among different entities through a process of “restructuring” or “liberalization” over past
decades. These include power generators, distribution utilities, and transmission system
operators. Transmission system operators are typically called “independent system operators”(ISOs) or “transmission systems operators” (TSOs). For simplicity, this report will use the term
“grid operators” for ISOs and TSOs, without differentiating the differing responsibilities ofdifferent classes of ISOs and TSOs.
4. Utilities must also contend with unpredictable and abrupt outages of large fossil‐fuel or
nuclear plants, with reserve margins provided by other available working plants to replace asudden unexpected loss of generation, and power systems have been designed for the past
century for such contingencies. Historically, a limit of 10‐20% share of renewables on a gridwithout storage has often been cited by utilities. Over the past ten years, however, many experts
have taken the view that upwards of 30‐40% share without storage is possible on many grids,
and only above 50‐60% does storage becomes desirable or necessary. [Cite literature examples]
5. [Pending]
6. See for example, IEA (2011) Harnessing Variable Renewables, and Cochran et al (NREL) 2012
for in‐depth discussions. This diversity of solutions is clear from the variety of country casestudies in Cochran et al (NREL) 2012.
7. In particular, sources and experts cite creating or strengthening specialized power markets,
including capacity markets, balancing/ancillary services markets (secondary and tertiary), andenergy time‐shifting. [] The term “balancing area” can signify different degrees of isolation; theIEA (2011) defines a balancing area as “the area of the power market over which balance ismaintained as a unit,” and notes that “balancing areas are defined to a large extent by thehistorical development of the grid, and by the distinct utilities and institutions that drove that8

development and persisted subsequently. Protocols will exist governing the flow of electricity
across these boundaries, and long‐term collaborations may exist; but these may not necessarily
allow for interchanges of electricity inside the balancing timeframe” (p. 59). The IEA also notesthat “larger (effective) balancing areas have greater flexible resources to deploy, and benefit
substantially from smoothing of both load and variable renewable generation throughgeographical and technological diversity.” (p. 59) In Spain this is well advanced and somemodels have already been in use for 10 years. Still, improvement of such models is an ongoingprocess and will result in better balancing, said one expert.
8. Experts disagreed over which of these six technical‐operational measures would become mostimportant or cost‐effective in the future, and how the options should be prioritized. Experts evendisagreed with the order of presenting these options in Chapter 2. [More pending]
9. For more information on curtailment, see Fink et al (2009) and Ela (2009). For more
information on the CECRE, see http://www.ree.es/ingles/operacion/cecre.asp. Spain power
generation shares from wind in 2012 from statistics provided by Red Electrica de Espana (REE).
10. For more information on demand response, see Osborne and Warrier (2007). [Add more
sources.] Two definitions of demand response are: (1) “Demand Response programs offer
incentives to electricity users to reduce their power use in response to a utility's need for power
due to a high, system‐wide demand for electricity or emergencies that could affect thetransmission grid.” (Source: http://pearcalifornia.com/what‐is‐demand‐response‐program) (2)“Demand Response increases systems efficiency, bringing several important environmental andfinancial benefits within today’s electricity markets. It substantially reduces the need forinvestment in peaking generation by shifting consumption away from peak hours. It acts as acost effective GHG free balancing resource for wind and solar generation. Adding stability to thesystem, it lowers the need for coal and gas fired spinning reserves – power plants that run
offline, burning fuel continuously, in order to be ready to supply power and short notices. It
reduces wholesale energy costs by lowering the point at which the demand curve intersects the
supply curve. And it can decrease the need for local network investments, as it can shiftconsumption away from peak hours in regions with tight network capacity. Demand responsedelivers these benefits through providing consumers; residential, commercial or industrial, with
control signals and/or financial incentives to lower or adjust their consumption at strategic
times.” (Source: Smart Energy Demand Coalition, “The Demand Response Snap Shot” (2011), p.
4‐5.) Many demand response measures can be implemented through so‐called “smart grids,” seeEndnote 31.
11. ERCOT could supply more than 50% of reserves via demand response, but there is aregulatory limit of 50% imposed; see
http://www.goodcompanyassociates.com/files/manager/demand_response_in_ercot__paul_wat
tles.pdf and http://www.ee.ucr.edu/~hamed/ERCOT_DR.pdf. One example of a scenario thatincorporates demand response is the Lovins/RMI (2012) “Transform” scenario, which models
mostly demand‐response for managing variability, including distributed storage (notably ice‐storage and air conditioning and smart charging and discharging of electric vehicles), coupledwith diversifying renewables by type and location, and advance weather forecasts. That scenario
found that an 80% renewables electricity scenario for the entire U.S., including half distributedand half centralized renewables, could manage variability with these options alone, without
requiring the next costlier option, bulk energy storage.
12. Simple cycle is also called single cycle. The Spain case points to the future interplay among
renewables, gas turbines, and existing fossil capacity, and how, given legacy infrastructure andlong lifetimes, this interplay will persist for many years.

913. For more information about the Danish case see
https://selvbetjening.preprod.energinet.dk/NR/rdonlyres/CC966C3A‐FE78‐41D8‐9DC7‐
6B455210B502/0/TechnicalReportSummary.pdf”
14. For further information on overhead vs. underground lines, see Fenrick and Getachew(2011). For further information on high‐voltage DC transmission, see Teichier and Levitine(2010) and Larruskin et al (2011). For further information on Desertec, see Erdle (2010), Trieband O’Sullivan (2011), and Desertec Foundation (2009). For further information on the “AsianSuper Grid” concept, see: http://www.renewableenergymagazine.com/article/wind‐power‐
from‐the‐gobi‐desert‐offers‐20121024 and http://oilprice.com/Latest‐Energy‐News/World‐
News/Asian‐Supergrid‐to‐Connect‐Japan‐China‐Russia‐Korea‐and‐Mongolia.html
15. For further information on storage technologies, see Baxter (2006), Denholm et al (2010),
Eyer and Corey (2010), Hadjipaschalis et al (2009), Ibrahim et al (2008), and Zito (2010). For
the role of solar thermal power (CSP) storage, see IEA (2010) and Sioshansi and Denholm(2010). The most common battery technology used today for grid‐tied storage is high‐temperature sodium batteries, followed closely now by lithium‐ion batteries, which have gainedin application in recent years, according to storage experts. Other battery technologies that arestarting to be used for grid‐tied storage are redox‐flow and advanced lead‐acid batteries.
Conventional lead‐acid batteries have been a traditional form of end‐user storage medium forbackup and uninterruptable power supplies by high‐reliability commercial consumers, and havealso been common for many years in some developing countries with frequent grid outages,
such as India.
16. Compressed air energy storage (CAES) is another option. However, there are currently only ahandful of demonstration compressed air plants around the world, and none operating on acommercial basis. Other storage options include electrochemical capacitors and thermal storage
using ice.
17. “Conventional plants” includes both fossil‐fuel and nuclear plants. For discussion of ramping
and cycling of fossil‐fuel plants, see IEA WEO (2012), p. 190 and p. 237, and IPCC (2011), p. 636.
See also Cochran et al (NREL) 2012. In the Canadian province of Ontario, and also in Denmark,utilities have “very high ramp capabilities in their coal fleet – its normal for them,” said one
utility expert. So this is not a theoretical concept but already a practiced one, which tends tooccur utility by utility, for “fleets” of plants as the expert noted.
18. Daily or weekly cycling of nuclear plants is true at least in France and Germany. OECD 2011
study quotes from OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (2011), “Technical and Economic Aspects of
Load Following with Nuclear Power Plants” (Paris: OECD), page 49.
19. [Pending]
20. One utility expert highlighted the concept of “flexibility supply curves” as the best means towork out which measures could offer what levels of flexibility at what costs. He said that such
curves could guide the step‐wise adoption of flexibility measures according to least‐costprinciples. [Pending citation of further studies]
21. GEA (2012), p. 17. NREL (2012), Vol. 1, p. xviii, says: “Electricity supply and demand can bebalanced in every hour of the year in each region with nearly 80% electricity from renewable
resources, including nearly 50% from variable renewable generation, according to simulationsof 2050 power system operations.”

1022. In the NREL study, less storage was needed in the cases with more CSP, which was modeledwith embedded thermal storage, whereas greater levels of wind and/or solar PV resulted inhigher storage needs. (See NREL (2012), Vol. 2, p 12‐28.)
23. IEA quote from IEA (2011), p. 15.
24. Quote translated from Electricité de France (2011), « Activités et Développement Durable
Report » , p. 28. The use of the word 'intermittent' for renewables was common in the 1980s and1990s, but in the past decade, experts and publications have begun to consistently use 'variable'
instead, as more reflective of the true nature of power grids. One expert also pointed out thatconventional generation sources also present challenges for power system reliability, especiallynuclear power, which poses challenges due to the possibility of abrupt and unexpected shut‐
downs that require additional system reserves be available as quick‐response contingency. E.ON
quote from E.ON (2011), “Sustainability Report,” p. 71. CLP Hong Kong Power quote from[missing source]. American Electric Power quote fromhttp://www.aep.com/about/IssuesAndPositions/Transmission/Renewables.aspx (viewed
7/24/2012).
25. ExxonMobil quote from ExxonMobil (2012), p. 15.
26. For more information on base load and its definition, see Lovins and Harding (2009), Renews(2010), and New York AREA (2008). [EPRI reference.] For an example of a natural gas company
vision, see Tokyo Gas, “Vision for Energy and the Future,” http://www.tokyo‐
gas.co.jp/IR/english/library/pdf/vision/vision2020_01.pdf
27. Vattenfall quote from Vattenfall (2011), “Annual Report,” p. 23. E.ON quote from E.ON
(2011), “Sustainability Report” (2011), p. 71
28 [Pending]
29. Net metering involves one meter that runs forwards and backwards. Net billing involves twometers, one for incoming power and one for outgoing power. Different jurisdictions use
different options. See REN21 (2012) for more policy details on net metering.] Net metering laws
exist at the national level in at least 14 countries, and at the state/provincial level in 8 Canadianprovinces and 43 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
30. For further information on hybrid fossil fuel/renewable power plants, see Phadke et al(2008). [More references pending.] Biomass and coal co‐gasification systems also offer the
option of carbon sequestration. Statistics on number of co‐fired plants operating from REN21(2011). According to one Spanish expert, virtually all CSP plants in Spain also burn natural gas,permissible by regulation for up to 15% of their output, for purposes such as meeting dispatch
commitments, better start‐up conditions, and pre‐heating heat‐transfer oil.
31. For further information on smart grids, see IEA (2011), NREL (2010), and European
Commission (2006). By itself, the term “smart grids” concerns much more than renewableenergy. The U.S. Electric Power Research Institute (2009) defines a smart grid as “amodernization of the electricity delivery system so it monitors, protects and automatically
optimizes the operation of its interconnected elements – from the central and distributed
generator through the high‐voltage network and distribution system, to industrial users andbuilding automation systems, to energy storage installations and to end‐use consumers…andtheir devices.” [page ref] Bazilian et al (2010) reviewed literature on smart grids and found thatmuch of it focuses on two‐way information flows between suppliers and users to increased
network efficiency. Some, but not all treatments of smart grids also focus on integrating large‐11

scale intermittent generation, as well as control of distributed generation, such as the European
Technology Platform (2010).
32. For further information on renewables integrated with buildings, see IEA (2007), IEA (2009),
Girardet and Mendonca (2009), GEA (2012), Chapter 10, and Yudelson (2008). In particular, IEA(2007) on renewables heating and cooling contains much explanatory information difficult tofind elsewhere.
33. GEA (2012) models a 46% reduction in heating and cooling energy demand compared with a2005 baseline.
34. Solar thermal data for 2010 from REN21 (2012). New solar collectors capacity is for glazed
systems only and additions include net annual capacity additions only; it is expected that grossannual additions were higher due to retirements. Estimate of 25 million homes based on
author’s assumption of average 3 m2 per home, or 2.1 kWth. Average sizes in China, where mostof the global market is, are less, closer to 2 m2 per home, while average sizes in Europe arehigher than 3 m2. China solar collectors capacity reached 135.5 GWth in 2011 [Source].
35. Saudi Arabia example from REN21 (2012). [References for large systems]
36. [Pending]
37. [Pending]
38. Costs will depend on building density, and can be lower for planed subdivisions. Greenpeacequote from Greenpeace (2012), p. 81.
39. See http://www.energy.eu/directives/2010‐31‐EU.pdf for more information on the EU“Energy Performance of Buildings” (2010) directive.
40. [Pending]
41. [Pending]
42. REN21 (2012): “Although the economic downturn has slowed construction, which in turnhas dampened BIPV growth, an estimated 1.2 GW was added during 2010” (p. 49). A total of 16.8
GW of solar PV were added in 2010, so the BIPV share is 7%.
43. [Pending]
44. For further information on renewable energy integrated with industry, see Taibi et al (2012),
UNIDO (2010), UNIDO and TERI (2012), and GEA (2012), Chapter 8.
45. The IEA ETP (2012) defines temperature ranges in industry as follows: low temperature
heat (<100 degC), medium temperature heat (100‐400 degC), and high temperature heat (>400
degC), see p. 195. In Weiss and Biemayr [year], “Potential of Solar Thermal in Europe,”(European Solar Thermal Industry Federation), low temperature for industrial process heat is
considered < 250 degC.
46. [Pending]
47. UNIDO (2010) shows 67 EJ total renewable energy use in industry, including 37 EJ biomass
and 10 EJ of solar thermal and heat pump in manufacturing industry by 2050. (For comparison,
12

global industrial energy demand in 2010 was about 100 EJ per IEA, Key World Energy Statistics
2012, including electricity.)
48. For GEA (2012), 45% share from personal communication, K. Riahi, December 2012, which
also includes the renewable share of electricity that is used in the industry sector. IEA quotefrom IEA WEO (2010), p. 346.
49. Dow Chemical quote from Dow Energy (2012), “Plan for America 2012,” p. 23, available at
http://www.dow.com/energy/pdf/DEPA_Booklet‐611121.pdf (viewed 08/02/2012). [][Huntsman quote from Huntsman (2008) Environmental, Health and Safety Report, p. ii
available at:
http://www.huntsman.com/portal/page/portal/corporate/Media%20Library/a_MC4EE584E6
EFA7273E040EBCD2C6B19E9/Sustainability_MC4EE584E6F477273E040EBCD2C6B19E9/Rep
orts_MC4EE584E71627273E040EBCD2C6B19E9/files/final_‐__2008_annual_report.pdf (viewed
12/13/2012)]
50. Share of biofuels in global road transport from REN21 (2012). For further information on
vehicle technologies and integration of renewable energy in transport, see Sperling and Gordon(2008), IEA RETD (2010), IPCC (2011), Chapter 8, and GEA (2012), Chapter 9. [Explain “highblend” percentages and flex‐fuel vehicles, or refer to glossary.]
51. For further information on syngas from renewables, see Mota et al (2011) and Van der Drift(2006). Many experts point out that when electric vehicles consume grid‐based power (asopposed to local dedicated charging based only on renewables), only a portion of the electric
power used for charging comes from renewables – and on grids with large shares of coal power,
then much of the charging comes from coal rather than renewables.
52. Electric and plug‐in hybrid vehicles today predominantly utilize lithium‐ion and nickel‐metal
hydride batteries. Other battery technologies are being developed. In addition, a variety of otherstorage technologies are possible in electric vehicles, such as super‐capacitors (which areparticularly feasible for urban buses with frequent recharging stops along fixed routes) andflywheels (which can absorb braking energy for subsequent use). Methanol is also a possible fuelfor fuel cell vehicles. Methanol can be produced from coal or biomass through a gasification
process.
53. [Pending]
54. [Pending]
55. [Pending]
56. Royal Dutch Shell quote from Shell, “Sustainability Report” (2011), p. 24. BP quote from BP,
Energy Outlook 2030 (2011), p. 31. ExxonMobil quote from ExxonMobil (2012), p. 20.
57. IEA quote from IEA WEO (2010), p. 357. Estimate of hundreds of millions of] vehicles basedon author’s assumption of at least kWh storage capacity per vehicle.
58. From GEA (2012): “the analysis below distinguishes between two sets of assumptions about
the transportation sector transition, labeled Advanced Transportation and Conventional
Transportation. The Advanced Transportation setup is characterized by a transition toelectricity or hydrogen, or both, as main transportation fuels in the medium to long term. By
2050 these two fuels would have to deliver between roughly 20% and more than 60% of thetransportation sector’s final energy, depending strongly on overall transportation demand”, p.
1232. These setups apply to all the GEA pathways (Efficiency, Supply and Mix)” (p. 1216).
13

59. Other automakers with PHEV or EV development and/or commercial plans include
Dongfeng, Ford, Volvo, Porsche, BMW, Daimler, and Volkswagen. See Mitsubishi “Environmental
Vision 2020” at] http://www.mitsubishi‐motors.com/en/spirit/environment/vision/index.html(viewed 11/20/2012)
60. Mitsubishi “Social and Environmental Report” (2011), p. 9] http://www.mitsubishi‐
motors.com/en/corporate/social/pdf/2011e_all.pdf. BMW, “Product Responsibility Report”(2011), p. 23.
http://bmwgroup.com/bmwgroup_prod/e/0_0_www_bmwgroup_com/verantwortung/svr_201
0/_pdf_en/produktverantwortung/02_Chapter_product_responsibility.pdf. Audi,
http://www.audi.com/com/brand/en/vorsprung_durch_technik/etron/the_glossary.html See“Tata Mini CAT Air‐powered Car” at http://www.themotorreport.com.au/53641/tata‐mini‐cat‐
air‐powered‐car‐on‐sale‐from‐mid‐2012. (viewed 11/15/2012)
61. Mitsubishi, op cit., Endnote 60.
62. [Pending]
63. See Toyota, “TMC Develops Mutual Power Supply System for Electric Vehicles and Homes” at
http://www2.toyota.co.jp/en/news/12/06/0604.html.
64. Reference to IEA (2009c) is in IPCC (2011), p. 671.
CHAPTER 3
1. [Pending]
2. Investment figures from BNEF/UNEP (2012). Investment figures are for capacity additions
and new manufacturing plants only, not for public share transfers or the value of mergers andacquisitions, figures that tend to get mixed in with new capacity investments by some sources orreporting channels. Note that BNEF/UNEP (2012) and REN21 (2012) both report investment in“solar power” as $147 billion, but this includes CSP investment of $20 billion. The statement in
REN21 (2012), page 61, that “solar PV attracted nearly twice as much investment as wind” isfactually incorrect and should read “solar power (including CSP)” not “solar PV.” BNEF/UNEP(2012) gives net investment in renewable power capacity at $262.5 billion (excluding solar
water heating net investment, estimated over $10 billion, but including large hydro estimatedapproximately at $25.5 billion) and $223 billion in fossil fuel capacity in 2011. Investment in
new nuclear power plant in 2011 was an estimated $5 billion (estimated from graphic). Note:“All the investment costs have been included in the year in which construction was started,
rather than spreading out the investment over the construction period. Furthermore, thenuclear investment figures do not include revised budgets if cost overruns occur.” Sources:
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2012) and WNISR original research (2012) in World Nuclear
Industry Status Report 2012, p. 41‐42].
3. [Pending]
4. Figures are 2011 dollars. Technololgy shares of investment from IEA WEO (2012) are for the
New Policies Scenario, and provided per personal communication, Marco Baroni, IEA, December
2012.
5. BNEF GREMO (2011).
14

6. Greenpeace quote from Greenpeace (2012), p. 79.
7. [Pending]
8. [Pending]
9. [Pending]
10. E.ON and RWE both announced they are targeting 20% by 2020. See E.ON, “Sustainability
Report” (2011), p. 71” and RWE, “Factbook Renewable Energy” (2012), page 5. EDF is aiming for
25% by 2020. See EDF, “Activités et Développement Durable Report” (2011), page 17. Dong
Energy of Denmark plans to increase wind power capacity from 1 GW in 2011 to 3 GW by 2020
[Source.] Iberdrola 51% of renewables installed capacity from First Quarter 2012 Results
Report, page 4; and NEER 55% of renewables installed capacity fromhttp://www.nexteraenergyresources.com/pdf_redesign/One_page_factsheet.pdf (7/23/2012).
For Dong Energy climate‐related target, see
http://www.dongenergy.com/EN/Media/Newsroom/News/Pages/Denmark_and_the_USA_to_le
ad_climate_battle_denews.aspx
11. Investments by Total from http://www.enerzine.com/14/8330+total‐‐‐2‐milliards‐dans‐le‐renouvelable‐d‐ici‐2020+.html (07/20/2012), and Total, “Total at a Glance, 2011‐2012 Report,”
p. 4. BP Investments fromhttp://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=7041&contentId=7046652”
12. BP was investing in solar in the past but is now selling off their solar assets.
13. For more information about Google investments in renewable energy projects, see
http://www.google.com/green/energy/investments (viewed 11/29/2012)
14. [Pending]
15. From Master Limited Partnership Primer, Understanding an Emerging Asset Class : “Master
Limited Partnerships, or MLPs, are engaged in the transportation, storage, processing, refining,marketing, exploration, production, and mining of minerals or natural resources. By confining
their operations to these specific activities, their interests, or units, are able to trade on public
securities exchanges exactly like the shares of a corporation, without entity level taxation” (p. 3).
16. See Great Debate 8, “Will Green Power Purchasing Scale Up Like Organic Food Has” on page
37 of report.
17. [Pending]
18. [Pending]
19. Number of countries with some type of policy and/or target to promote renewable energy
from REN21 (2012). Dollar figures in text are rounded to nearest $10 billion from IEA figures asexact figures are not necessary for showing the scale of trends. For 2011, the exact figure is $88
billion.
20. Data from IEA WEO (2012), Figure 7.12, “Global Subsidies to Renewables‐Based Electricity
Generation and Biofuels by Region in the New Policies Scenario” (p. 235), and associated text on
page 236. Exact figure for the United States is $58 billion around 2030, for China $35 billion
during the late 2020s and for India $26 billion by 2035. 2009 figures are estimated from Figure
7.12.
15

21. [Pending]
22. See also L. Würtenberger L, Bleyl JW, Menkveld M, Vethman P, van Tilburg X, 2012, “Businessmodels for renewable energy in the built environment,” ECN Energy Research Center of theNetherlands, Report ECN‐E‐‐12‐014, commissioned by IEA‐RETD. http://iea‐
retd.org/archives/publications/re‐bizz. [More examples.]23. In 2010, Nissan partnered with Daikyo, one of Japan’s largest condominium marketers, toestablish EV charging points in new housing. See Nissan, “Sustainability Report” (2011), at
http://www.nissan‐global.com/EN/DOCUMENT/PDF/SR/2011/SR11E_All.pdf] [Moreexamples.]
24. Approved in 2007, the city of Berkeley (California) launched the Financing Initiative for
Renewable and Solar Technology (FIRST) in 2009, which “allows residential and commercial
property owners to install improvements in their buildings. The city covers the up‐front expense
through a bond or other /financing mechanism, and the individuals pay that back through aspecial fee on their property tax bills, spread over 20 years.” See Daniel M. Kammen, 2009,“Financing Energy Efficiency,” Scientific American, 2009, pp. 21. In November 2008, Boulder(Colorado) passed Measure 1A, which “allows the county to issue up to $40 million in special
assessment bonds to finance clean energy improvements.” See Merrian C. Fuller, Stephen
Compagni Portis, and Daniel M. Kammen, 2009, “Toward a Low‐Carbon Economy: Municipal
Financing for Energy Efficiency and Solar Power,” Environment Magazine, January/February
2009, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 22‐32. [More examples.]25. [More examples.]
26. Many examples exist of community energy programs around the world. Ontario, Canada has
been a leader in fostering such programs, see
http://www.communityenergyprogram.ca/Home.aspx [More examples.]
27. See the Policies section of the REN21 Renewables Global Status Report for further
description of trends in green power purchasing. For more information about WindMade, see
http://www.windmade.org.
28. [Pending.]
29. For more information on the business models mentioned in Box 5, see: For Pacific Venture
Capital subsidiary of Pacific Gas and Electric in California
http://www.pgecorp.com/news/press_releases/Release_Archive2010/100120press_release.sht
ml
For Maui Electric:
http://www.mauielectric.com/portal/site/meco/menuitem.ed4aed221358a44973b5c410c510
b1ca/?vgnextoid=f94c5e658e0fc010VgnVCM1000008119fea9RCRD&vgnextfmt=default&cpsext
currchannel=1
For New Jersey Natural Gas: http://www.njrcleanenergyventures.com/residential‐
solar/sunlight‐advantage‐program/index.asp. For Sacramento Municipal Utility District in
California: https://www.smud.org/en/about‐smud/environment/renewable‐energy/community‐solar.htm. For Salt River Project:
http://www.srpnet.com/environment/communitysolar/home.aspx
For Tucson Electric Power in Arizona: https://www.tep.com/renewable/home/bright/]

16

CHAPTER 4
1. For further information on local/city policies, planning, and infrastructure, see: International
Energy Agency (IEA), 2009, “Cities, Towns & Renewable Energy: Yes In My Front Yard,” Paris,
194 pp. Available at:
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/cities2009.pdf. [] REN21 (2011)“Global Status Report on Local Renewable Energy Policies,” 59 pp. Available at:
http://www.ren21.net/Portals/97/documents/Publications/REN21_Local_Renewables_Policies_2011.pdf. [] KPMG (2011) “Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) Cities 2011: Global Report on C40
Cities,” London, 40 pp. Available at: https://www.cdproject.net/Documents/CDP‐Cities‐2011‐
Report.pdf. [] ARUP (2011) “Climate Action in Megacities: C40 Cities Baseline andOpportunities,” 114 pp. [] HafenCity University Hamburg and World Future Council Foundation(2010), “100% Renewable Energy ‐ and Beyond ‐ for Cities,” Hamburg, Germany, 29 pp.
Available at
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/100__renewable_energy_for_c
itys‐for_web.pdf. [] European Union Covenant of Mayors
http://www.conventiondesmaires.eu/index_en.html.
2. For example the city of Hamburg (Germany) a highly industrialized, densely populated
economic hub and home to Europe’s third largest port, aims to build up capacity of sources ofrenewable energy (electricity and heat) in the city with 100% renewable energy in 2050 as along term goal. To reach this goal Hamburg has build a strong renewable energy cluster,
including over 160 member companies, which facilitate the growth of renewable energy
manufacturers and service companies. The city notably brings a special attention to thedevelopment of green urban mobility, heating system, and buildings. See
http://fr.slideshare.net/cphcleantech/jan‐luca‐plewa‐hamburg‐germanysmartcity. The city of
Copenhagen, Denmark plans to invest in biomass, solar energy and wind farms, electric cars,
bike paths and improve energy efficiency in buildings, transport, heating and industry in order
to become the world's first carbon‐neutral capital by 2025. The city plan mirrors the national
climate plan which aims to be carbon neutral by 2035 and to achieve 100% renewable energy by
2050. Over 2/3rds of the planned emission reductions in the city of Copenhagen will be comefrom an increase in the production of renewable energy, including replacing coal with biomass
and waste at district heat and power stations, installing 100 wind turbines (on and offshore)around the city and solar panels on all council buildings, expanding the geothermal facility on
Amager, and having all city vehicles run on electricity, hydrogen or biofuels. The city aims tohave one percent of local electricity roof sourced from roof‐mounted PV. The plan is also seen as
part of a green growth strategy. According to the city, the plan will require municipal investmentof around 2.7 billion Danish crowns up to 2025 and new private investment of 20 ‐ 25 billion
crowns, resulting in employment of about 35,000 man‐years until 2025. See
http://cphpost.dk/news/national/copenhagen‐announces‐ambitious‐climate‐plan.
3. Over the coming decades, cities will employ intelligent distributed renewable energy
strategies that maximize every unit of energy available to meet as much of the demand forelectricity, heating, cooling and transport as possible. Cities will both utilize local renewableenergy sources, as well as imports from more distant regions. Many cities will first try to satisfy
demand from locally available sources and then go to more remote sources as a secondary
strategy, while others may have no choice but to accept remote sources in parallel with local
development.
4. As of December 2012 the EU Covenant of Mayors reported 4,606 signatories. According to
CDP Cities (2011) “Global Report on C40 Cities,” 42 cities out of the 58 reported have adopted
action plans for climate change.

175. Emissions‐reduction targets from REN21 (2012), Table R15, sub‐heading titled “CO2emissions reductions targets, all consumers.” Tokyo relative base year is 2000, Oslo 1991,
Chicago and Hamburg 1990. In 1990, per‐capita CO2 emissions were 5.5 tonnes in Stockholm.
Rajkot targets 10% reduction in conventional energy by 2013, and Bhubaneswar 15% by 2012,
from REN21 (2012), Table R15. “Carbon‐neutral cities”: Dallas (Texas) (by 2030), and “fossil‐
free cities”: Växjö (Sweden) (by 2030), Göteborg (Sweden) (by 2050), from REN21 (2012), Table
R15.
6. For renewable targets for shares of total electricity consumption within local jurisdictions andre target share of electricity consumption by local governments, see REN21 (2012) Table R15.
7. Calgary target from REN21 (2011). Seoul total renewables target from REN21 (2012). Biofuels
use targets in public transport or vehicle fleets from REN21 (2012) Table R15. Total amount of
installed renewables capacity targets and targets for number of installed units from REN21(2012) Table R15.
8. For the research for this chapter, cities and towns were first identified and selected on thebasis of having a renewable energy or a carbon reduction target and/or renewable energy
specific policy framework. This was largely facilitated by resources including REN21 (2011)
Global Status Report on Local Renewable Energy Policies and the local policies sections of annual
editions of the Renewables Global Status Report, as well as resources such as ICLEI, C40, EU
Covenant of Mayors, etc. This was also facilitated in developing‐countries workshops conductedin Morocco, South Africa and India. At these workshops, experts provided further information on
the role of cities in the respective regions and identified resources, publications, institutes,
actors to get more information. In each selected city/town a range of 3‐5 actors were identified
who held different but complimentary roles (e.g. city officials, urban planners, and utility or
program managers, grid operators, etc) to understand how RE were being integrated in different
ways to reach the overall goals outlined in the city plan. For example in Amsterdam, aninterview was conducted with a grid operator (regional grid operator working closely with cities
like Amsterdam and the local utility), an urban planner, a former local utility manager andcurrently the manager of the cities ICT program, and a city official working on integrating thethree different city divisions under sustainable development. In Hamburg, interviews wereconducted with the manger of the cities RE industry cluster, the head of the internationalbuilding association and an NGO representing those fighting to remunicipalise the utility. In
London, interviews were conducted with the advisor to the mayor and head of environmental
affairs in the city department as well as an independent policy expert/advisor to the city plan(etc). Each interview lasted from 1‐2 hours. During the interviews or in follow up to theinterviews, reference was made to city documents that would otherwise have been in accessible
as they were in development or in another language. The physical interviews helped toovercome this problem as they would sit and go through the document with me and translate itin the process (for example in Amsterdam or Hamburg) . Further, documents, magazine
clippings and/or debates from meetings would be sent to me in personal communication and/or
in follow up to the discussion.
9. [Pending]
10. For more information on the EU “Energy Performance of Buildings” (2010) Directive, See:
http://www.energy.eu/directives/2010‐31‐EU.pdf”.
11. An International Energy Agency (IEA) research group, the Research for Energy Optimized
Building (EnOB), has documented and analyzed around 300 net zero‐energy and energy‐plusbuildings worldwide. For more information on the “Towards Net Zero Energy Solar Buildings”
project see http://www.enob.info/en/net‐zero‐energy‐buildings/international‐projects/.” []The International Living Building Challenge (ILBC) is a certification scheme that rates buildings,
18

communities and infrastructures. There are more than 80 Living Building projects being
developed or in operation in cities around the world, in Australia, Ireland, Mexico, CA, and the
US. Certified “Living Buildings” must obtain 100% of the building’s energy demand using on‐site
renewable energy (net‐zero‐energy) and capture and treat the building’s own water needs for atleast 12 continuous months at full occupancy, in addition to standards for sustainable materials
and indoor environmental quality”. http://living‐future.org/lbc
12. Examples from REN21 (2012). In Hamburg, hotels will have a primary energy requirementof less than 95 kWh/m2/year using passive solar building design. For more information on the
Hamburg Renewable Heating Act, see
http://klima.hamburg.de/contentblob/3352628/data/klimaschutzkonzept‐update‐2011‐2012‐englisch.pdf.
13. A fast expansion of the use of district heat is one of the important assumptions taken into
account by Greenpeace (2012) in its “Revolution” scenario.
14. [Pending]
15. [Pending]
16. Information from REN21 (2012), except Copenhagen fromhttp://www.copenhagenenergysummit.org/applications/Copenhagen,%20Denmark‐District%20Energy%20Climate%20Award.pdf, and Hamburg fromhttp://www.solarthermalworld.org/content/germany‐district‐heating‐companies‐encourage‐
customers‐feed‐solar‐heat. [Hong Kong source.]
17. For more information on the Boulder smart‐grid project see http://www.dac.dk/en/dac‐cities/sustainable‐cities‐2/all‐cases/energy/boulder‐smart‐grid‐city/?bbredirect=true
18. [Pending]
19. Information for San Francisco, Austin and Boulder from REN21 (2012). Information for
Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Munich, Sacramento from Hafen City University, Hamburg, and World
Future Council Foundation (2010) “100% Renewable Energy ‐ and Beyond ‐ for Cities,”
Hamburg, Germany, 29 pp. For more information on German municpal utilies see
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/10/city‐utilities‐push‐germanys‐switch‐to‐renewables?page=all.
20. For more information on Yokohama strategy see
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/336387‐
1296405826983/7699103‐1296623042596/4_2Okazaki%28Yokohama%292.pdf. For
Hamburg see http://e‐mobility‐
nsr.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/events/02_Lindlahr_Hamburg_HAW.pdf. FOR São Paulo REN21(2012).
21. For more information on the C‐Train wind‐power commuter system in Calgary http://esci‐
ksp.org/?project=c‐train‐wind‐powered‐commuter‐system‐in‐calgary. For Genoa, see
http://www2.comune.genova.it/servlets/resources?contentId=535057&resourceName=ALLEG
ATO‐02
22. Forms of supply to charging stations: local PV or green power purchasing.
23. All examples from REN21 (2012), except Hamburg http://www.now‐
gmbh.de/uploads/media/NOW‐FactSheets‐ModelRegionsElectromobility_01.pdf.
1924. Information for Mexico City zero emission taxi program from REN21 (2012) andhttp://www.demotix.com/news/849468/inauguration‐first‐charging‐station‐and‐ecological‐
taxis‐mexico#media‐849442.”]25. [Pending]
26. For New Delhi and Portland, see REN21 (2012). For Kyoto see
http://kitakyushu.iges.or.jp/docs/network_meetings/kin4/ppt/13.Minami.pdf. For
Frederikshavn, see http://www.folkecenter.net/gb/documentation/energycity/]
27. As one recent example, Copenhagen and MIT are developing a new electric bike (the“Copenhagen Wheel”), which will integrate ICT – in this case providing real‐time information on
traffic congestion.
28. [Pending]
29 For Frederikshan, see www.energycity.dk. For Moura and Rizhao, see Girardet andMendonca (2009), p. 163‐166. For Malmö and Gothenburg, see http://www.iclei‐
europe.org/members/member‐in‐the‐spotlight/archive/gothenburg‐and‐malmo/. For San
Francisco, see http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/12/14/14greenwire‐san‐francisco‐eyes‐
goal‐of‐100‐green‐power‐by‐39895.html. For Sydney see
http://www.sydney2030.com.au/development‐in‐2030/city‐wide‐projects/powering‐sydney‐allan‐jones.”]
30. See REN21 (2012), Toronto and Region Conservation, 2010, “Getting to Carbon Neutral: a
Guide for Canadian Municipalities,” Toronto, 176 pp.”,
http://www.nieuwamsterdamsklimaat.nl/, and www.chicagoclimateaction.org.]
31. Information from http://www.swm.de/dms/swm/dokumente/english/projects‐renewable‐energies‐expansion‐campaign.pdf
32. In the city of Malmö, a former industrial area, the Western Harbor district, has become
energy self‐sufficient thanks to renewables through the development of the city’s district heating
grid and power supply network. The Aktern heat pump plant is the heart of the energy system. It
produces energy for heating and cooling. A local 2 MW wind power plant provides the electricity
needed to power the heat pumps and also supplies 1,000 apartments with electricity. For more
information, see http://www.symbiocity.org/en/Cases/Western‐Harbour/. Västra Hamnen,
another district in Malmö, is now entirely self‐sufficient with renewable energy from water,
wind, sun and compostable waste. A wind power plant nearby serves powers the district’senergy system. Solar cells are used for electricity. Aquifers store warm sea water from thesummer in the bedrock and use it in the winter as district heating for residential housing. In thewinter cool sea water is stored to be used as district cooling in the summer. Solar collectors
connected to the district heating network are also used for heat and hot water (700,000 kWh).
Biogas is derived from the domestic waste and fed into Malmö’s natural gas network. [Source.]
33. One of the earliest Masdar projects was a 10 MW solar PV plant. For Masdar, see
http://www.masdarcity.ae/en/110/frequently‐asked‐questions/ For PlanIT, see
http://www.pikeresearch.com/blog/articles/planit‐valley‐a‐blueprint‐for‐the‐smart‐city. For
Songdo, see http://www.songdo.com/songdo‐international‐business‐district/why‐songdo/sustainable‐city/energy‐use.aspx. For Tianjin Eco City, see
http://sustainablecitiescollective.com/big‐city/25556/china‐s‐second‐eco‐city‐set‐soar”

20CHAPTER 5
1. For complete list of scenarios see Annex 2. For specific scenarios projections see the Scenario
Profiles Report.
2. [Pending]
3. It is impossible to cover all countries and regions adequately in a few pages. Countries given
here reflect the majority of interviews conducted for the report, plus a balance of developing
countries, and results from workshops in three developing countries (see Annex 1). For moredetails on these countries and others, see Topics [pending] in the online Topical Discussion
Report. It is hoped that additional country profiles can be added to that online report and any
future editions of the present report.
4. European Union target share from renewable energy sources by 2020 available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/climate_actions/doc/2008_res_directive_en.pdf, and http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=Oj:L:2009:140:0016:0062:en:PDF. In 2011, theEREC called the European Commission, Member States and the European
Parliament to “deliver on the European Union’s long-term climate commitment by proposing
and endorsing a legally binding EU target of at least 45% renewable energy by 2030,” in EREC
(2011) “45% by 2030 Towards a Truly Sustainable Energy System in the EU,” p. 5.
5. Wind power targets from REN21 (2012), Table R11. France 19 GW onshore 6 GW offshore in
text is based on calculation from 25 GW total including 6 GW offshore, which is the official target.
In EWEA (2011) offshore wind plays a significant role in the growth of the wind power industry.
Indeed, the report estimates 150 GW of offshore wind installed capacity by 2030, a 50-foldincrease compared to 2010.
6. 2011 data from REN21 (2012). For Germany solar PV target see
http://www.sma.de/fileadmin/content/global/Investor_Relations/Documents/201012_16_DT_2_01_10_009_Komplett-02-Kurz_E.pdf. In EREC (2010), solar PV will have become by
far the most important renewable energy source by 2050; almost 50% of the total renewables
installed capacities, and more than twice the ones of the second most important renewableenergy (wind).
7. [Pending]
8. See “Europe” topic in Topical Discussion Report for further discussion.
9. [Pending]
10. An RPS, or quote policy mandates utilities to obtain a certain share of power fromrenewables by future years, typically 2015, 2020, or 2025, and typically ranging from 10% to30%. As of early 2012, 29 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. possessions of
Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands had RPS policies. See REN21 (2012) for details.
11. [Pending]
12. 2011 data for the U.S. solar PV market from REN21 (2012).
13. RPS policies have been widely credited with accelerating wind power markets in the U.S.; seefor example [LBL report], and are considered, notably by the U.S. DOE EIA, as a key asset for
their future growth. 2011 data for the U.S. wind power market from REN21 (2012).
21

14. Softbank expects to build the largest solar plants of the country with an installed capacity
between 200 MW and 340 MW able to provide electricity for roughly 100,000 homes in
Hokkaido Prefecture. The Chief Executive Officer of the company Masayoshi Son, who is playing
an important role in Japan’s green shift, has also decided to invest in the Gunma, Kyoto andTokushima Prefectures, see http://japandailypress.com/softbank-announces-hokkaido-ashome-for-new-solar-plant-05390 (viewed 06/21/2012). Toshiba will spend ¥30 billion in asolar farm project of 100 MW installed capacity in Fukushima Prefecture, which is supposed to
begin constructed in the current business year and operate by fiscal year 2014, see
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nb20120622a4.html#.T-QmXRc5LQA (viewed 06/22/2012).
Kyocera, along with Mizuho Corporate Bank and IHI Corporation, expects to build a 70MW solar
plant able to provide electricity for roughly 22,000 homes in Kagoshima Prefecture, on thesouthwestern island of Kyushu, see http://japandailypress.com/kyocera-claims-to-buildlargest-solar-plant-in-japan-11693 (viewed 06/21/2012). The Obayashi group plans to launch
giant solar power plants in four locations with a combined capacity of 20MW, including a 15MW
facility planned in the town of Ashikita in Kumamoto Prefecture, see
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nb20120714a4.html (viewed 07/15/2012). The Federationof Electric Power Companies of Japan has also announced that its members are building 20
mega-solar facilities for a total installed capacity of 103MW, which will provide electricity by
March 2015, see http://news.yahoo.com/crisis-hit-japan-mulls-shift-renewable-energy074520569--finance.html (viewed 06/21/2012). As of the end of September 2012, 1,480 MW ofsolar projects had already been approved by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(METI), see http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/10/solar-makesup-83-of-clean-energy-projects-approved-by-japan (viewed 10/22/2012).
15. See Topic #7.
16. 2011 data for solar PV from REN21 (2012).
17. 2011 data for wind power capacity from the Japanese Wind Energy Association at
http://www.ewea.org/blog/2012/04/global-wind-power-market-is-expected-to-more-thandouble-in-next-five-years/ (viewed 12/08/2012).
18. British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island have RPS policies. Québec(4 GW by 2015), Manitoba (1 GW by 2014), and Prince Edward Island (0.5 GW by 2013) wind
power capacity targets at http://www.rural.gc.ca/RURAL/displayafficher.do?id=1291667110819&lang=eng (viewed 12/08/2012). Ontario target (7.1 GW by2018) at http://www.awawindprojects.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/economic_impacts_wind_energy_ontario2011-2018.pdf (viewed
12/08/2012). For other renewable energy policies and information mentioned here see REN21(2012), and endnote 23 of Chapter 1.
19. REN21/GSR 2008-2011. refs to TR [Pending].
20. For hydropower and pumped hydro installed capacity see REN21 (2012). LNBL (2011)shows 400 GW in its “Accelerated Improvement Scenario,” Zhang et Al. (2010) 380 GW, andChina ERI (2009) (430) GW. State Grid pumped hydro plans at
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/09/extending-performanceenergy-storage-takes-on-the-variability-conundrum (viewed 12/08/12).
21. 2011 data for wind power installed capacity from REN21 (2012). China’s target for wind
power capacity by 2020 from REN21 (2012). 2011 data for new wind power installed capacityfrom REN21 (2012). The capacity 18 GW denotes constructed capacity, whereas only 15 GW
became operational. As this disparity in China and elsewhere was becoming large, REN21
started to document both figures.
2222. For wind power installed capacity in China, IEA WEO (2012) “New Policies” shows 326 GW
by 2035, BNEF (2011) 350 GW by 2030, and IEA WEO (2012) “450” 468 GW by 2035. By 2050,
China ERI (2009) shows 400 GW, and LBNL (2011) “Accelerated Improvement Scenario” 500
GW. At the higher end, Greenpeace (2012) “Revolution” shows over 1,100 GW, of which 133 GW
offshore in 2050.
23. 2011 data for solar PV capacities from REN21 (2012). NDRC Medium and Long Term
Development Plan, September 2007; see Martinot and Li (2007) for details. These targets were
not necessarily official, but called “provisional” by some. China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (July 2012
update) sets target for solar PV installed capacity to 50 GW by 2020, in IEA WEO (2012), p.213.
24. About new solar PV promotion policies and decreasing costs leading to a domestic growth ofsolar PV in China see Martinot (2011); [More pending]. For solar PV installed capacity in China,
BNEF (2012) shows 194 GW by 2030, Greenpeace (2012) “Revolution” 221 GW by 2030, and
IEA WEO (2012) “450” 256 GW by 2035. By 2050, China Eri (2009) shows 300 GW, andGreenpeace (2012) “Revolution” 803 GW.
25. 2011 data for biomass power capacity in China from REN21 (2012). Target for biomass
includes waste-to-energy, see BNEF (2012). Scale 500–1,000 kW for use with smaller gas
engines and gas turbines.
26. 2011 data for biofuels from REN21 (2012). China’s biofuels targets at
http://biofuelsandthepoor.com/case-study-china/ (viewed 11/27/2012).
27. 2010 data and 2020 target for solar heating from REN21 (2011).
28. refs to TR. For feed-in and RPS policies in India at national, and state levels see REN21(2012), Tables R12, and R13.
29. REN21 (2012). [More pending]
30. 2010 data from REN21 (2011). 2011 data for wind power capacity is 16 GW, from REN21(2012). India still ranked 5th in 2011. Reference goal; the government plan calls for up to a 15%
electricity share from renewables by 2022 is to be achieved. For wind power installed capacity
in India, GWEC (2012) “Advanced Scenario” shows 89 GW by 2020, and 192 GW by 2030.
Greenpeace (2012) “Revolution” 96 GW and 185 GW, respectively.
31. 2012 data for solar PV capacity in India from http://mnre.gov.in/mission-and-vision2/achievements/. National solar capacity target for 2022 from REN21 (2012), Table R11.
Chhattisgarh target at http://www.pv-power-plants.com/industry/national-markets/ (viewed
12/08/2012).
32. Target for solar thermal collectors capacity in REN21 (2012), Table R11.
33. According to the IEA WEO (2012), hydropower installed capacity represented 71% of India’s
renewables installed capacity in 2010. While the growth of hydropower in India is undisputed
the scale of its deployment is relatively uncertain. Greenpeace (2012) “Revolution” estimates 64
GW of hydropower capacity by 2030 (compared to 39 GW in 2009), less than half of what the
IEA WEO (2012) “450” projects; 148 GW.
34. Target for rural lightning systems in REN21 (2012), TABLE R11.

23

35. For more developing countries perspectives, see topics [pending] in the Topical Discussion
Report. [More Pending]
36. Brazil Government Law No. 9648, of May 27, 1998 defines small hydro as 30 MW or less, in
IPCC (2011), p. 450. Data for wind power capacity by 2021 from the Ten-Year Plan for Energy
Expansion (PDE) 2021 of the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy available at
http://www.epe.gov.br/PDEE/20120924_1.pdf. Brazil 2011 wind market from GWEC (2012),
582 MW added. [More Pending]. REN21 (2012), Table R4 indicates 21 billion liters of ethanol
produced in Brazil in 2011. The Empresa de Pesquisa Energética expects this production toreach 63 billion liters by 2020, see http://www.epe.gov.br/imprensa/Clipping/20120913_d.pdf(viewed 29/11/2012). The South African Energy Plan the main text is referring to is theIntegrated Resource Plan for 2030 [More pending]. Reference topical discussion report[Pending].
37. Targets data from REN21 (2012), Table R11, except for Brazil, which data (for 2011 and2021) come from the Ten-Year Plan for Energy Expansion (PDE) 2021 of the Brazilian Ministryof Mines and Energy available at http://www.epe.gov.br/PDEE/20120924_1.pdf (Brazil’s windtarget in REN21 (2012) is 11.5 GW by 2020), and South Africa, which wind power capacity
target comes from the South African’s Department of Energy 2011 Integrated Resource Plan forElectricity for 2010-2030 available at http://www.energy.gov.za/files/irp_frame.html.
38. Philippines and Tunisia examples from REN21 (2012), Table R11. Developing countries’
targets for share of renewable energy in electricity from REN21 (2012), Table R10. Online
interactive map for complete targets database: www.map.ren21.net.
39. For rural (off-grid) renewable energy targets see REN21 (2012), Table R11.
40. [Pending]
41. [Pending]
42. The replacement or supplementation of diesel generators with renewables is a potentiallyhuge market, as there are millions of diesel generators in rural areas around the world [morepending]. IRENA (2012) indicates that over 50% of the power generation capacities in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Mauritania, and 17% in West Africa, arebased on diesel fuel because of the current important need of diesel generators to overcome
daily power outages.
43. [Pending]
44. The unbundling and liberalization of power markets is often perceived as theoreticallymaking possible the introduction of massive quantities of renewable energy in the grids throughnotably increasing competition among power producers. Unbundling generation andtransmission of electric power makes it easier for smaller utilities to send and sell the electricity
they generate to consumers, as such reform puts an end to monopolies’ control overtransmission of power. In addition, on the one hand deregulating the power system means that
smaller energy companies can enter the market and vie for consumers and on the other handthat consumers are able to choose their own electric companies. As a result, consumers withenvironmental consciousness are able to pay for electricity generated from utilities supplying
power from renewable energy sources. Denmark is an illustrative successful example of thistype of reform. [More pending]
45. The Greenpeace scenario mentioned here is the “Advanced Revolution” one.
24

46. In this regard IRENA (2012) notes that “There is a range of concrete developments in place
to create new interconnections and significant interest has been shown in improving current
grid interconnection in Africa in order to provide security of supply and facilitate thedevelopment of large electricity generation projects. The southern African Power Pool (SAPP) isan effort by the national electricity companies of 12 countries in Southern Africa to improvecooperation through grid connection. Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) West Africa Power Pool (ECOWAPP) includes all the ECOWAS countries. The Central
African Power Pool includes 11 utilities… The Arab Maghreb Union has a set ofinterconnections… that connect the countries of North Africa,” p. 33.
47. [Pending]
48. [Pending]
49. REN 21 (2012) notes that “The expansion of hydropower production must take into accountthe potential for significant evaporative water losses from the regional watershed as well as theenvironmental impacts associated with altering natural water flows and siltation patterns,” p.
52. In the World Bank scenario it is estimated that hydropower capacity represented 53% of the
295 GW total power capacity in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 (data from theOrganización Latinoamericana de Energía (OLADE), 2009). The World Bank estimates that 239
GW of new power capacity will be required to meet the electric demand of the region by 2030, of
which 36% will be hydro. Hydropower installed capacity in Africa in 2009 was 25 GW per
Greenpeace (2012).
50. Golemberg ref [pending]. IPCC (2011), while referring to Egré and Milewski (2002) “Thediversity of hydropower projects” notes that the “classification according to size has led toconcepts such as “small hydro” and “large hydro", based on installed capacity measured in MW
as the defining criterion. Small-scale hydropower plants (SHP) are more likely to be run-of-riverfacilities than are larger hydropower plants, but reservoir (storage) hydropower stations of all
sizes will utilize the same basic components and technologies. Compared to large-scalehydropower, however, it typically takes less time and effort to construct and integrate smallhydropower schemes into local environments. For this reason, the deployment of SHPs is
increasing in many parts of the world, especially in remote areas... Nevertheless, there is noworldwide consensus on definitions regarding size categories. Various countries or groups ofcountries define “small hydro” differently,” p. 450. In the same report, Table 5.3, p. 450, shows
various ranges for small hydropower capacity; from 1.5 MW or less in Sweden to 100 MW in the
U.S.
51. See Endnote 1, Chapter 1 for definition of traditional biomass.
52. See REN21 (2012). Some experts particularly noted the expanded use of cogeneration inagricultural industries.
53. 2011 data for wind power capacities and annual additions in developing countries from the2012 GWEC “Global Wind Report: Annual market update 2011.” Share of wind power capacity
existing in developing countries in 2005 and 2011 from GWEC (2006) and GWEC (2012).
54. For Africa, GWEC (2012) “Advanced Scenario” is 83 GW and IRENA (2012) 95 GW.
55. One expert also noted, however, that, “the notion that we must use "the best wind areas" or"the best solar areas" is a big and pervasive fallacy” prevalent in many countries.
56. For global repartition of solar PV operating capacity see REN21 (2012), Figure 12. For Africa,
IRENA (2012) gives approximately 90 GW of solar installed capacity in 2030 and 320 GW in
25

2050. Greenpeace (2012) gives 91 GW (49 GW of solar PV and 42 GW of CSP) and 316 GW (155
GW of solar PV and 161 of CSP) respectively. For 2030 only, Greenpeace (2012) gives Middle
East 162 GW of Solar PV and 102 GW of CSP. Latin America 74 GW of solar PV and 21 GW of CSP.
Non-OECD Asia 199 GW of solar PV and 64 GW of CSP.
57. For more on energy access, see the “Off-Grid (Rural) Energy” section of the REN21 (2012).
[More pending]
58. [Pending]
CHAPTER 6
1. [Pending]
2. Data from REN21 (2012). In this edition the hydropower capacity does not include pure
pumped storage anymore; see notes for Table R2. This is the reason why the hydropower
capacity in the 2012 edition is lower than in the 2011 one (i.e. 1,010 GW, of which 136 were
estimated to be pumped storage, 2010 data from REN21 (2011)). The distinction is done
because pumped storage is not an energy source, but rather a means of storage. Global power
generating capacity was estimated to 5,360 GW in 2011, data from REN21 (2012).
3. REN21 (2012) notes that about 86% of the global demand for biomass for energy purposes “isused to produce heating (and cooling), for cooking, and for industrial applications… Of theremaining 14%, nearly three-fourths is used for electricity generation and combined heat andpower,” p. 31. Data from REN21 (2012), solar heating capacity includes solar cooling.
4. Data for biofuels from REN21 (2012).
5. [Pending].
6. Scenario projections can take several approaches, including learning-curve analysis andengineering and manufacturing advancement models. In contrasting the two, NREL (2012) notesthat for its model: “Although the methods used in RE Futures to project the future cost of eachrenewable electricity technology differ to some degree by technology, the resulting forecasts arelargely based on anticipated scientific and engineering advancements rather than on learningcurve-based estimates that are endogenously driven by an assumed learning rate applied tocumulative production or installation,” vol.1, page A-5. For discussion on the sustainability andrecycling questions noted in footnote (b), p. 53 see;
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/news/documents/criticalmaterialsstrategy.pdf,
http://resnick.caltech.edu/learn/docs/ri_criticalmaterials_report.pdf, and http://svtc.org/wpcontent/uploads/Silicon_Valley_Toxics_Coalition_-_Toward_a_Just_and_Sust.pdf.
7. [Pending]
8. 2011 data from REN21 (2012).
9. RWE quote from https://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/183636/rwe/innovation/projectstechnologies/renewables/wind-power/ (viewed 07/23/2012). Gas Natural Fenosa quote fromhttp://www.gasnaturalfenosa.com/en/home/activities/our+energy/power+generation+techno
logies/1285338592375/wind+energy.html (viewed 07/23/2012).
10. IRENA in its 2012 “Wind Power Cost Analysis” report, available at:
http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/RE_Technologies_Cost_Analysis26

WIND_POWER.pdf, shows onshore wind power costs of US 6-14 cents/kWh (2010$) in 2010: 611 cents/kWh in China and India, 8-14 cents/kWh in Europe, and 7-11 cents/kWh in North
America. GEA (2012) shows onshore wind power costs of US 4-15 cents/kWh (2005$) in 2009,potentially declining to US 3-15 cents/kWh in the future. One expert pointed out that U.S. wind
contract prices in 2012 for standard commercial utility-class wind turbines, for good sites, wereUS 4-5 cents/kWh, based on empirical data from Wiser and Bolinger (2012), LBNL-5559e. [MorePending]
11. IEA ETP (2012) cost projections are just for the U.S. and in 2010$.
12. [Pending]
13. [Pending]
14. [Pending]
15. WWEA quote from WWEA (2012), p. 11. For small wind turbines WWEA (2012) projects anincrease from 443.3 MW in 2010 to 3.817 GW in 2020.
16. [Pending]
17. IEA quote from IEA WEO (2010), p. 330.
18. IRENA in its 2012 “Wind Power Cost Analysis” report, available at:
http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/RE_Technologies_Cost_AnalysisWIND_POWER.pdf, shows offshore wind power costs of US 14-19 cents/kWh (2010$) in Europe
in 2010. GEA (2012) shows offshore wind power costs of US 7-25 cents/kWh (2005$) in 2009,potentially declining to US 5-15 cents/kWh in the future. “Technology Roadmap” for wind powerfrom IEA ETP (2012), p. 498-499.
19. E.ON quote from http://www.eon.com/en/business-areas/powergeneration/wind/offshore.html (viewed 07/23/2012). RWE quote from RWE (2011) “Tapping
tomorrow’s energy sources today” report, p. 10. Iberdrola quote from Iberdrola (2011) “Annual
Report,” p. 32. Vattenfall quote from http://www.vattenfall.com/en/wind-power.htm (viewed
07/23/2012). RWE quote from http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/86676/rweinnogy/sites/wind-offshore/ (viewed 07/23/2012).
20. EWEA (2011) in its “High” scenario” estimates up to 3 GW of offshore wind power installedcapacity in Sweden by 2020, from 164 MW in 2010. In this case offshore wind power capacity
will represent about one-third of the country’s total new wind power capacity added during thedecade.
21. EWEA (2011) develops a scenario with average offshore turbine size of 5 MW in 2020.
22. Greenpeace (2012) projects over 4,500 GW of solar PV installed capacity by 2050.
23. 2011 data for the global solar PV market growth and Europe’s share of the consideredmarket from REN21 (2012).
24. In some countries, grid parity is also confounded by public subsidies to retail consumer
electricity prices. Further, in many countries, industry receives cross-subsidies from otherclasses of consumers, so grid parity for industry is distorted. In India, the opposite is true; crosssubsidies flow from industry to consumers. See [glossary] for these terms. There are manyutility rate structures in use today that confound the meaning of “grid parity” and make solar PV
27

cheaper than many existing rates under these structures today. Peak pricing generally refers totime-of-day-based rates, and peak rates can be double or triple off-peak rates. Rates can also
vary by season. And some customers can face higher “demand charges,” meaning that power
costs increase significantly above a certain threshold of use. As one example of prices linked togrid conditions, Pacific Gas and Electric in California has a new “SmartMeter” option that charges
high per-kWh rates on days of high power demand (i.e. hot days linked to air conditioning use),
offset by lower off-peak rates; the cost of solar PV electricity is significantly lower than peakretail rates on these high-demand days (some rates have been exceeding $1.00/kWh). [Cost- or
price-based policy support is generally a capital investment subsidy or tax credit, or a feed-in
tariff (preferential power purchase pricing). However, other forms of policy support may
continue to be needed even at grid parity, such as net metering rules, interconnection standards,
and guaranteed-purchase mandates.]
25. [Pending]
26. One example of an expert claim that grid parity including subsidy/tax support already exists,
one U.S. expert said, “one obvious piece of evidence about grid parity is that Sun Run, Sungevity,
Sun Edison, and Solar City operate collectively in about 20 US states where they can often
finance rooftop PV systems with no down payment and guarantee to beat your utility bill[including available tax/subsidy support]. Case closed.” [Claims of grid parity often do not
distinguish whether they are based on subsidized or unsubsidized costs. Generally, thepresumption is that claims are based on subsidized costs under current policy regimes, such as
California and Hawaii, but based on unsubsidized costs in areas with feed-in tariffs but no otherpolicy support.]
27. “Technology Roadmap” for solar PV from IEA ETP (2012), p. 494-495.
28. One solar PV expert stated that prices had fallen below $1/watt in 2012 for high-volume
orders.
29. Solar PV costs for rooftop and utility-scale installations from REN21 (2012). IRENA in its
2012 “Solar Photovoltaics Cost Analysis” report, available at:
http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/RE_Technologies_Cost_AnalysisSOLAR_PV.pdf, shows solar PV costs of US 25-65 cents/kWh (2010$) for residential system
without battery storage, and costs of US 36-71 cents/kWh for residential system with battery
storage. The report also shows solar PV costs of US 26-59 cents/kWh (2010$) for utility-scale
system. GEA (2012) shows solar PV costs of US 15-70 cents/kWh (2005$) in 2009, potentiallydeclining to US 3-13 cents/kWh in the future. Some experts cited radically lower numbers for
Europe, in the range US 9-13 cents/kWh rather than the US 22-44 cents/kWh given by REN21.
One expert said in 2012, “Germany may well have achieved already the US 9-10 cents/kWhunsubsidized cost that the IEA foresees for 2035.” Another pointed out that extremely low
interest rates were lowering solar PV generation costs, perhaps artificially and temporarily.
30. IEA ETP (2012) cost projections are just for the U.S. and in 2010$.
31. [Pending]
32. Another expert said $2.50/watt for balance of system was too high, and must include morethan just BOS.
33. [Pending]
34. [Pending]28

35. Greenpeace (2012) point of view is that “Technologies like PV thin film (using alternative
semiconductor materials) or dye sensitive solar cells are developing quickly and present a huge
potential for cost reduction,” p. 63. NREL (2012) notes that “Several promising next-generation
PV device concepts are being developed, but they have not yet reached sufficient maturity to be
introduced to the market. Examples include dye-sensitized PV cells and several PV
nanostructures like quantum dots. These, and other, next-generation PV technologies have thepotential to lower module costs by using less expensive materials and simpler manufacturing
processes, but there have been challenges in reaching high-efficiency and long-term durability
for the materials explored to date,” Vol. 2, p. 10-6.
36. [Pending]
37. IRENA in its 2012 “Concentrating Solar Power Cost Analysis” report, available at:
http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/RE_Technologies_Cost_AnalysisCSP.pdf, shows parabolic trough costs of US 14-36 cents/kWh (2010$) in 2011, and solar tower
costs of US 17-29 cents/kWh. GEA (2012) shows CSP without heat storage costs of US 10-30
cents/kWh (2005$) in 2009, potentially declining to US 5-15 cents/kWh in the future. IEA ETP(2012) cost projections are just for the U.S. and in 2010$.
38. IEA quote from IEA WEO (2010), p. 309.
39. [Pending]
40. Quote from IEA ETP (2010), p. 503. No similar statement was made in IEA ETP (2012), so
reference is retained to the 2010 edition. IPCC (2011) notes “Although CSP is now a proventechnology at the utility scale, technology advances are still taking place. As plants are built, both
mass production and economies of scale are leading to cost reductions. There is scope forcontinuing improvement in solar-to electricity efficiency, partly through higher collector
temperatures. To increase temperature and efficiency, alternatives to the use of oil as the heattransfer fluid—such as water (boiling in the receiver) or molten salts—are being developed,
permitting higher operating temperatures,” p. 67.
41. IEA ETP (2012) notes that improvements in heat-transport media and storage systems are
critical in order to reduce the technology costs of CSP, p. 80.
42. [Pending]
43. IEA quote from IEA WEO (2010), p. 282.
44. [Pending]
45. [Pending]
46. Greenpeace (2012) notes that “Biomass can provide a large temperature range of heat andcan be transported over long distances, which is an advantage compared to solar thermal orgeothermal heat. However, sustainable biomass imposes limits on volume and transportdistance,” p. 257.
47. See IPCC (2011) for more information on advanced or second generation bio-refineries thatwould be based on more sustainably derived biomass feedstocks, and which would aim to
optimize the use of biomass and resources in general (including water and nutrients), while
mitigating GHG emissions.
48. IRENA in its 2012 “Biomass for Power Generation Cost Analysis” report, available at:29http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/RE_Technologies_Cost_AnalysisBIOMASS.pdf, shows biomass technologies costs in the range of US 4-29 cents/kWh. Greenpeacequote from Greenpeace (2012), p.64 and p.67.
49. GEA (2012) shows hydropower costs of US 1.5-12 cents/kWh (2005$) in 2009, with a veryslight decrease in the future; US 1.5-10 cents/kWh. IRENA in its 2012 “Hydropower Cost
Analysis” report, available at:
http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/RE_Technologies_Cost_AnalysisHYDROPOWER.pdf, shows large hydro costs of US 2-19 cents/kWh (2010$), and small hydrocosts of US 2-27 cents/kWh.
50. NREL quote from NREL (2012), Vol. 2, p. 12-22. IEA ETP (2012), p. 226.
51. IEA ETP (2012) also shows 130 GW of pumped hydro capacity globally. [More pending]. IEA
quote from IEA ETP (2012), p. 224, IEA cites Pieper and Rubel (2011) “Revisiting energy storage
there is a business case.” IEA ETP (2012) Figure 7.2, “Levellised costs of electricity storage,” p.
245; US 10-15 cents/kWh estimated from graph. Only CAES was equivalent to or cheaper thanpumped hydro. GEA (2012) figure 11.70 “Electricity storage costs for different storage options,”
p. 864.
52. Data from REN21 (2012). GEA (2012) shows geothermal costs of US 3-9 cents/kWh (2005$)
in 2009, with no decline in the future. Greenpeace quote from Greenpeace (2012), p.65.
53. REN21 (2012). GEA (2012) does not offer cost projection for salinity gradient energy.
54. Greenpeace quote from Greenpeace (2012), p.65.
55. Debates on sustainability, refer to REN21 (2010), Sidebar 7, p. 43. One developing country
expert said: “I am afraid [the world] is placing excessive emphasis on bio fuels. This would
virtually mean diversion of land in developing and poor countries from food crops to fuel crops a strategy that may not be acceptable to all the countries.” [V Subramanian]
56. Chevron quote from Chevron (2010) “The Next Generation of Energy Technology: Energy forthe 21st Century” report, p. 41. IEA quote from IEA WEO (2012), p. 222. IEA (2011) “Technology
Roadmap: Biofuels for Transport,” p. 35.
57. [Pending]
58. See IEA WEO (2012), p. 47.
59. [Pending]30