Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 27, Number 2, 2005, pp95-100

95

Conflict over Natural Resource Exploitation in a Mountainous Community: The Trade Off
Between Economic Development and Disaster Risk Mitigation --A Case Study
Suman Ranjan Sensarma1 and Norio Okada2
Graduate School of Engineering, Kyoto University, Japan
2
Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Japan
1(Received for 10 June., 2005 and in revised from 10 Jan, 2006)

ABSTRACTThis research illustrates the conflict in the decision-making process in the case of the Ichinose community,
Chizu, Tottori prefecture, Japan. The dispute is modeled as a static structure for each of two phases, one from1985 to 2002, and the other from 2002 to date (2005). The GMCR model (Graph Model for Conflict Resolution)
is used to systematically describe the process of changes in the structure of this conflict. The conflict escalated in
the second phase of this dispute although there must have been many creeping metaphases before escalation of theconflict. The role of information and sudden social shock (as a natural disaster impact) can be interpreted as acause of the structural change of the conflict. An effective dispute resolution mechanism has been emphasized inlocal-level development processes.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Conflict over natural resources is a very common phenomenon
across the world, particularly in mountainous regions. The
exploitation of mineral resources has a direct impact on the local
environment. On the other side, the prospect of economic development of a local area by and large depends on the potential use ofmineral resources. However, mining- and quarry-related issues
also have a complex impact on economic, environmental and social
factors. Sometimes, the unscientific exploitation of natural
resources triggers the probability of disaster and in consequence,people s survivability comes under threat. In many development
projects, multiple players with different interests often evolve in
conflict. Commonly, conflict occurs if different parties wish toaffect their aspirations as much as possible, thus leading to a tradeoff state. Quite typically, disaster mitigation and economic development needs to be traded off. It is true, however, that crucial conflict can possibly challenge the concerned parties to increase theircoping capacity, which could entirely change the quality of theconflict. We may well interpret conflict as a perceived divergenceof interests, or a belief that the parties current aspirations cannot
be achieved simultaneously (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). Conflictcan be a potential obstacle to sustainable development. There is a
missing link between development policy and conflict resolution
mechanism, which needs to be explored scientifically.
Game theory has been widely used to model well formulated
conflicts and to predict possible equilibria. However, this theory
has difficulties due to its very strict assumption of reality. As in
game theory, the player s preference must be represented by realvalued utilities (called cardinal utilities ). In reality, however, it isvery difficult to measure the utility of players. On the other hand,
the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) provides a con-venient and flexible approach to modeling a strategic conflict.
Basically, this model is based on game theory that has been further
extended by Fraser and Hipel. In this model, instead of cardinalutility, the decision maker s ordinal preference can be ranked frommost preferred to least preferred. The model assumes that all preferences are transitive. It gives analytical insight into problems
within which possible strategic interaction among the decision
makers (DMs) can be systematically analyzed in order to ascertain
possible compromise resolutions, or equilibria. Additionally, modeling possible outcomes as nodes and feasible transitions fromeach node to another as links of a graph structure has the following advantages: (i) the graphical representation helps assumed
non-scientific players (stakeholders) easily understand the structure of the modeled conflict and (ii) unlike a classical set of gametheory, the game can easily be interactively operated by assumed
players by use of computer-based calculation software.
2.

MODELING

We propose to apply GMCR to formulating and analyzing thestatic structure of a real-world conflict. The major advantage ofthis model is the ease with which it models the interplay structure
among multiple players who have their own effective strategies(called moves ) from a particular outcome and who can only
order possible outcomes in terms of preference.
GMCR (Fang et al., 1993) is founded upon a mathematicalframework utilizing concepts from graph theory, set theory andlogical reasoning. It represents a conflict as moving from one state
to another state (the vertices of a graph) via transmissions (the arcsof the graph) controlled by the decision makers. Mathematically,
this multi-player conflict game can be formulated in the followingway:

KEY WORDS: conflict, graph model, dispute resolution mechanism, local level development

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In this paper, two solution concepts are employed.
Nash Stability
State k is the Nash stable for player i iff i cannot improve his
payoff by changing his own strategies. In the other words,
Si+ ( k ) = {∆} ……………………………………………(3)Sequential Stability
State k is sequentially stable for player i iff for every
k1 Œ Si+ ( k ) , there exists k2 Œ S +j ( k1 ) with Pi ( k ) > Pi ( k2 ) .
GMCRII (Hipel et al., 1997; Hipel, Kilgour, Fang and Peng,
2001) provides a simple strategic representation of conflict, withminimal information requirements that can be analyzed for a rangeof stability patterns that represent different styles of decision making in a real-world conflict (Fig. 1).
3.

Fig. 1 Applying the Graph Model for conflict resolution
Source: Fang et al., 1993

Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players and K= {K1, K2, ...,
Ku} be the set of states of the conflict, and n-tuple {Di} (i =1, 2...,n) be the set of directed graphs where Di = (K,Vi). Set of arcs Vimeans player i s possible move between states. Let klkm be the arcfrom state kl to state km. If kl km ŒVi , it implies that player i canmove from state kl to state km unilaterally. Payoff function Pi specifies player i s preference order for states. If Pi (kl) > Pi (km), player iprefers state k l to state k m . The Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution (GMCR) is presented by 4-tuple {N, K, V, P}, where
N={1, 2, ..., n}, K={1, 2, ..., k}, V={V 1 , V 2 , ..., V n }and. P = {Pi \ i Œ N } .
One advantage of the graph model over more traditional gametheoretical approaches is that it can represent irreversible moves.
In such cases, a decision maker can unilaterally move from state k
to state q but not from q to k. DM i s graph can be represented
by i s reachability matrix, Ri, which displays the unilateral moves
available to DM i from each state. For i∈N, Ri is the u x u matrix
defined byÏ1 if DM i can move (in one step)ÔRi ( k , q ) = Ìfrom state k to state q
Ô0 otherwiseÓ………(1)

Where k π q , and by convention Ri (k, k) =0.
In GMCR, players can make a transition of conflicts. When aplayer does not have an incentive to move from a particular state,
the state is called stable for the player, and the state is called equilibrium.
G = (S, (Ai: i∈N)) ………………………………………(2)The main stability definitions currently used in graph model
analysis include Nash Stability (Nash), General Metarationality(GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), Sequential Stability(SEQ), Limited Move Stability (Lh), and Non-Myopic Stability(NM) (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

Ichinose, a mountainous community, is located in Chizu(Tottori prefecture) in Japan. It is a very small community having
32 households. Due to potential land resources, the local government planned to explore the rock resources from this area for theconstruction of roads and other civil work. Thus, the rock quarry
became a resource base for local development. Around 30 years
ago, one local quarry company (Hisamoto Company) entered thisarea in support of the local government, and this contract agreement intended to include safety measures from the company side.
Confrontation evolved when the local company refused to takewhat seemed to be possible action for disaster mitigation workordered by the local government. The history of the conflict is
described here in different time periods (Table 1).
4.

MODEL OF THE CONFLICT

4.1 Two phases of the conflict
We divide the whole process of the conflict into two phases
plus the instantaneous period of change in the structure that isinterpreted to have occurred between the end of the first phase andthe start of the second phase. To model the static structures of boththe first and second phases, GMCR is used as follows.
4.1.1 Phase I
This conflict is modeled by use of GMCR II. March 1985 saw
the start of phase I and is the point in time for which the modelingand analysis was conducted. Two players have been identified inthis conflict i.e., the local company and the local government. The
local government consists of the prefectural government and thetown office. At that time, players, their relative options, and thestatus quo are listed below (Table 2). Mathematically, there are atotal of 32 (25=32) possible states, but after removing all infeasible
states, there are 14 feasible states in total (Table 3). Some states
are infeasible because they are mutually exclusive. In Tables 2 and3, Y means Yes and indicates that the option is taken for a corresponding state, and N means No , where the option is nottaken. The local company s ranking state from most preferred toleast preferred was 5 1 13 9 3 11 7 6 2 14 10
4 12 8, and the local government s preference order was 10
8 9 7 14 12 13 11 2 1 6 45 3 The desirabilityof each state of each player is structured in the following way. A

BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DISASTER RISK MITIGATION --A CASE STUDY

Table 1.

Table 2.

Chronology of the Conflict

Players and their Options, March 1985 in phase I

Table 3.

Feasible states of the conflict in phase I

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positive number means that a player prefers that this option betaken, and a negative number means that a player does not preferthat this option be taken. Players have the following options.
Local company s desirability
・The local company wants to quarry rock deposits. (1)・The local company does not want to operate and maintain the
EWS. (-2)
・The local government allows them to dump rock at the site. (3)・The local government can operate and maintain the EWS. (4)・The local company does not want to monitor work by the local
government. (-5)
Local government s desirability
・The local company can quarry rock deposits and dump rock at
another site. (1)・The local company can operate and maintain the EWS. (2)・The local government allows the local company to dump rock at
the site. (3)・The local government does not want to operate and maintain the
EWS. (-4)
・The local government wants to monitor the local company s
work. (5)Here, we obtained only one equilibrium, i.e., state 9 (bothNash equilibrium and Sequential equilibrium), which was also thestatus quo state at that time. The graph model helps to describe theactual outcome as equilibrium in this game. It seems that although
the local government suspended the local company s quarry work
for a while, they again gave approval to continue the rock quarrywork. However, the company was not ready to take the proper
measures for the disaster mitigation work ordered by the local government. Under this condition, the agreement was not stable andneither did the local government use their power to enforce theagreement. Thus, the delay of a concrete agreement upset the status quo state (modeled as a stable state). Neither the local company nor the local government made potential improvements from thestatus quo state (Fig. 2). This graphic representation provides
more flexibility than the other forms, i.e., the normal and option
forms of modeling non-cooperative conflicts. The option (Howard,1971) and the normal forms (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,1953) are symmetric in the sense that if player i can reach outcome
x, then player i can also reach outcome x from outcome y.

Table 4.

Therefore, irreversible moves cannot be properly represented using
option and normal form (Kilgour et al., 1987).
On 25th January 2002, a large-scale landslide occurred, andthis natural disaster accidentally triggered a social shock thatforced the game to move on to another phase of the conflict. This
is interpreted as, in this instantaneous period, some structuralchange occurred.
4.1.2 Phase II
The second phase of the conflict started on 25th January, 2002.
At that time, the local community became a player in this game andthe different issues and sub-issues thus changed the structure of thegame. The players and their options, and the status quo state arelisted below (Table 4). In this conflict, there are a total of 512
states (29=512) However, many of the states are not feasible for
actual conflict for different reasons. For example, the local community has two options: to stay in the same village with disaster
preparedness, or to shift the village with public facilities. Both aremutually exclusive, so they are infeasible options. However, incase of the local government, out of four options, there are two
options, i.e., rock and debris clearance from the site, and operationand maintenance of the EWS, both of which are mutually exclusive
for the local company. This may be possible with the coordination

Fig. 2 Integrated state transition graph (Phase I)

Players and their options, January, 2002 in phase IIBETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DISASTER RISK MITIGATION --A CASE STUDY

of both players. So, in this case, it is regarded as a feasible state
for both players. After removing the infeasible options, a total of
18 states were identified for this conflict (Table 5). The player sranking of states from most preferred to least preferred is as below:
The local community: 13 f 11 f 12 f 17 f 10 f 5 f 3 f 4 f
f
15 2 f 9 f 7 f 8 f 16 f 6 f 14 f 18 f 1
The local company: 1 f 10 f 2 f 6 f 12 f 4 f 8 f 11 f 3 f 7 f
f
13 5 f 9 f 17 f 15 f 16 f 14 f 18
The local government: 18 f 1 f 13 f 5 f 9 f 11 f 3 f 7 f
f
12 4 f 8 f 17 f 15 f 16 f 14 f 10 f 2 f 6
The player s preferences over the states defined by the combination of options can be ranked by using option prioritizing (Table6). In this case, option prioritizing is defined by the importanceand desirability of two properties of a state from the viewpoint of
the player. The desirability state of each player is assumed as follows.
Local community s desirability
・The local community intends to stay in the same village withdisaster preparedness. (1)・The local community does not want to shift from their place. (-2)
・The local company should clear the rocks and debris from thesite. (3)・The local company should operate and maintain the EWS. (4)・The local company should not appeal to the national government. (-5)
・The local government should not assist the local community toshift the village. (-6)
・The local government should clear the rocks and debris from thesite. (7)Table 5.

・The local government can operate and maintain the EWS. (8)・ The local government wants to wait for the national
government s judgment. (9 IF -3, -4)
Local company s desirability
・The local community does not intend to stay in the same village
with disaster preparedness. (-1)
・The local community wants to shift from their place. (2)・The local company does not want to clear the rocks and debris
from the site. (-3)
・The local company does not want to operate and maintain the
EWS. (-4)
・If the local government will appeal to the national government s
judgment, then they will file a case. (5)・The local government can help the local community to shift thevillage. (6)・The local government can clear the rocks and debris from thesite (7)・The local government can operate and maintain the EWS (8)・The local government should not appeal to the national government (-9)
Local government s desirability
・The local community does not intend to stay in the same village
with disaster preparedness. (-1)
・The local community can shift their village. (2)・The local company can clear the rocks and debris from the site.
(3 IFF 1)
・The local company can operate and maintain the EWS. (4 IFF 1)
・The local company should not file a case. (-5)
・The local government can assist the local community to shift

Feasible states of the conflict in phase II

Table 6.

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Option prioritizing

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R. SUMAN AND N. OKADA

Fig. 3 Integrated state transition graph (Phase II)

their village. (6)・The local government can clear the rocks and debris from thesite. (7)・The local government can operate and monitor the EWS. (8)・If the local company does not cooperate, then they can wait for
the national government s judgment. (9)5.

STABILITY ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS

To understand the behavior of each player in this conflict, situation stability analysis has been conducted. In this analysis, thestatus quo state does not appear as an equilibrium state. States 1,
11, 12, 13, 17 and 18 are possible equilibria in this conflict. Since
the local community was not ready to move from their location,equilibrium 1 was found not to be a possible solution in this game.
The game did not proceed in a cooperative way perhaps due to
mistrust and miscommunication among the players. From Fig. 3,
we can trace the irreversible moves and common moves. Fromequilibria 17 and 18, none of the players had the potential to movefor a better solution. It is assumed that neither the local company
nor the local government had the appropriate information from theother side. Otherwise, a new proposal either from the local company or the local government side could have brought the conflict tostate 11, 12 or 13, or this could also have changed the structure of
the game.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The integration of disaster risk management and conflict resolution has not been well explored so far, but this aspect must be
addressed in integrated disaster risk mitigation policy. As referred
to in the above, we could qualitatively analyze how the structure of
the conflict changed over time. Our interpretation is that the inter-vening social shock caused by the repeated landslides triggered thecontextual shift in the development of the conflict. We may alsoinfer that some political climate change such as a new governor
being elected and coming to office could also have contributed tothis quantum jump in the structure of the conflict. The conflict
escalated in the second phase of this game, and there remained nofurther scope to deescalate the conflict. In this case, a third party
can change and improve the situation. A lesson could be derived
from this study that before taking on any quarry-related project,
local government must engage the local community to ensure theirinterests are served through participatory planning. At each stage,
verification of ongoing work should be assessed, and informationmust be shared among different stakeholders. This study alsoemphasizes that incorporating a dispute resolution mechanism, if
well managed, will further ensure the success of local-level development processes.
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